AN EXAMINATION OF YOUTH ROLE IN THE POLITICAL CHANGE IN EGYPT (2010-2011)

BY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this Dissertation entitled **An Examination of Youth Role in the Political Change in Egypt (2010-2011)** has been carried out by me in the Department of Political Science and International Studies. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this Dissertation was previously presented for another degree or diploma at this or any other institution.

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CERTIFICATION

This Dissertation entitled AN EXAMINATION OF YOUTH ROLE IN THE POLITICAL CHANGE IN EGYPT (2010-2011) by Oluwafisayo OJUMU-AGUNBIADE meets the regulations governing the award of Master degree in Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDEJ – Council of European Steering Committee for Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Youth Field

EIPR – Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights

FID – Foreign Direct Investment

GCC – Gulf Co-operation Council

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GFC – Global Financial Crisis

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

MENA – Middle East and North Africa

MOI – Ministry of Interior

NDP – National Democratic Party

PPP – Purchasing Power Parity

RCC – Revolutionary Command Council

SCAF – Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

SSIS – State Security Investigative Service

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of the role the youths played in the movement for political change in Egypt. In Egypt the youths experienced high unemployment and exorbitant food prices fed mass-level discontent; yet the regimes benefited from positive economic growth in 2010, had plenty of money to pay their police personnel and soldiers, and felt no shortage of patronage to hand out to top civilian and security officials. All these worked together to stir up things that upset the youths in Egypt. The study is significant in that it contributes to our understanding of the role of the youth in pushing for regime change within the context of certain domestic and international factors, and also provides explanations of the linkage between the youth-led revolution and the present state of things in the politics of Egypt. In other words, it explains the domestic and external factors that predisposed the Egyptian State to the youth uprising and examines the outcome of the youth uprising in Egypt. Data was gathered from secondary sources and supported by interviews conducted with some staff of the Egyptian High Commission in Abuja, Nigeria. The thematic analysis was undertaken within the framework of the theory of Marx's historical materialism to establish the chain of events leading to (i.e. predisposing factors) the role of the youths and from (i.e. outcomes) the role of the youths in the Egyptian uprising, within a historical and economic context, thereby giving explanations for the 2011 protest, especially why it happened at that time and the extent of its impact on the politics of Egypt. The findings of the study show that the youth uprising was justifiable and partly explicable by the scourge of domestic factors for many decades, and for which the Egyptian Government was indicted, including unemployment, emergency (brutal) law and poverty. This uprising was reinforced by some external factors such as the influence of social media on and foreign contacts made by the savvy youths, the United States' military aid, the world economic crisis and ripple effect of the Tunisian Revolution. Secondly, the youths had acquired some collective characteristics that were advantageous to their cause, at least to the extent they succeeded in the revolution, such as readiness and capability to mobilise the society, efficient use of social media tools, training acquired in view of the revolution, and a clear definition of their cause and the demands that must be met in that regard. This led to the collapse of the regime, which created a political vacuum for political contest among competing interests in Egypt's political landscape. Lastly, events took an unfavourable turn for the youths after the collapse of the regime, because the Egyptian military – which was virtually unaffected by the changing circumstances largely due to its relative independence as an institution within the Egyptian state – not only took over power and control of the transition process, but also the youths (completely excluded from the transition process) have now become an integral part of the political polarisation in the country, such that the youthful leaders were found to represent a losing majority in the face of an organised and more powerful minority elites. The study concludes that, given the domestic and international context that prevailed then in Egypt, the youths' role in the movement for political change in Egypt succeeded only to the extent that the youthful leaders could envision and prepare for, thereby unconsciously leaving events afterwards in the hands of whichever interests or groups that would have the capacity to take charge of the political machinery of the country. That is why the ultimate goal of the revolution was truncated from the point that the youths ceased to be responsible for the unfolding events for advancing their revolutionary objectives.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Over the past couple of years, the Arab world has experienced an increase in protests, demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of social and economic protests most often led by the youths in the communities concerned. The Arab Knowledge Report of 2014 notes in retrospect that the Arab region is considered among the regions of the world with the highest population growth rates, estimated at approximately 2.4% annually between 1980 and 2010. Scholars have pointed to past warnings about the youth bulge that have been for some years, emphasising that the disproportionately large population of the young men in the Arab world is a ticking time bomb (Schomacher, 2013; Urdal, 2012; Kronfol, 2011). This logic focused on young men with little access to jobs and whose grievances are not addressed by good governance. We are seeing an outpouring of young activists, both men and women, who in Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab states are using both strategic non-violent and violent means as strategies for political change.

To achieve political change the youths laid down their differences in religion, economic strata, political parties, ethnicity, and goals to come together to achieve a common goal. The series of protests and demonstrations across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has become known as the Arab spring. It was sparked by the first protest that occurred in Tunisia on 18 December, 2010 in SidiBouzid following Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation in protest against police corruption and ill treatment. With the success of the protest in Tunisia sparked by the "Tunisian burning man," a wave of unrest struck Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen, and then later spread

to other countries. The largest, most organized demonstrations have often occurred on a "day of rage" usually after Friday afternoon prayers. To date four rulers have been forced out of power in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

In Egypt the youths experienced high unemployment and exorbitant food prices fed mass-level discontent; yet the regimes benefited from positive economic growth in 2010, had plenty of money to pay their police personnel and soldiers, and felt no shortage of patronage to hand out to top civilian and security officials. All these work together to stir up things that upset the youths in Egypt, leading to the collapse of the Mubarak government. Suffice it to note that the Egyptian military has since emerged as one of the most powerful and influential actors in Egypt (Salem, 2013), in addition to other political parties and interests such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The interests represented in the Egyptian political landscape since the ouster of the Mubarak regime seemed to have lacked the flavour of the objectives of the youth-led protests.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

This study examines the impact of the specific roles played by the youths in the movement for political change in Egypt and the response of the government, which led to the subsequent turn of events, processes and emergence of governance after the ouster of the Mubarak regime. Youths in any society, including Egypt, cannot be neglected politically, socially and economically; they play crucial roles in the development of their society if their aspirations and potentials are effectively harnessed and mobilized toward purposeful and meaningful engagement in society.

Unfortunately, it has been generally assumed that the aspirations of the youths in Egypt were neither harnessed nor mobilized over time; rather, they lived within a socio-economic and political milieu that frustrated their potentials, leading to mounting dissatisfaction and tension which met with the government's unwillingness to address the most important issues that matter to them. The result was the movement for political change that led to the collapse of the Mubarak regime and the subsequent transitional processes and upheavals that followed suit.Therefore, this study attempts an examination of the specific roles and impact of the youths in the movement for political change in Egypt, the response of the government and the outcomes that followed.

1.3 Research Questions

The following questions are therefore asked:

1. What were the specific roles played by the youth in the political change in Egypt?
2. How did these roles led to political change in Egypt?
3. What was the response of the Egyptian state to these roles?
4. What were the consequences of these roles and responses to political change in Egypt?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

This research work has the following objectives

1. To examine the specific roles played by the youth in the political change in Egypt.
2. To assess how these youth roles led to political change in Egypt.
3. To examine the response of the Egyptian state to these youth roles.
4. To determine the consequences of these youth roles and government response in Egypt.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study is contributes to the understanding of the role of the youths in pushing for regime change within the context of certain domestic and international factors, including the responses of the Egyptian government, thereby providing explanations of the linkage between the youth-led protests and the subsequent turn of events in the politics of Egypt.

1.6 Assumptions

The youth roles in the movement for political change in Egypt were both instigated and facilitated by a combination of external and domestic factors.

The Egyptian youth uprising that led to the collapse of Hosni Mubarak's government created a real political vacuum for contest among different interests, other than the youths themselves.

1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study focuses on the influence of domestic and external factors on the youths' role in the movement for political change in Egypt between 2010 and 2012. The year 2010 was the period in which the youth started the uprising which peaked in 2011 when it became violent. The limitation of the study was mainly the inability of the researcher to travel to Egypt to conduct field survey, due to travel restrictions informed by the country's turbulent political atmosphere. However, relevant information was

acquired from secondary sources, supported by some interviews conducted with some Egyptians in the Egyptian High Commission in Abuja, Nigeria.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This study examines the role of the youths in the movement for political change in Egypt and the outcome of that role on the political landscape of the Egyptian state. Youths in any society cannot be neglected; they play a crucial role in the development of any society if their potentials are effectively and efficiently harnessed and mobilized towards purposeful and meaningful life in society by the state, or else the same potentials could also be directed against the state. This chapter contains a review of existing literature on the concepts and themes (variables) that are relevant to the study, namely political change, youth politics, youth politics groups around the world, youth demography in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region generally and in Egypt specifically, and some prominent historical revolutions around the world.

2.2 Revolution and Political Change

The relevance of discussing political change here is against the background that the Arab world is the only major world area where authoritarianism persisted unchallenged for decades. While in various countries of the Arab world mass protests in 2011 forced rulers to resign, other authoritarian regimes have – despite political and

economic pressure – so far been able to remain in power, or have even been only insignificantly affected (Beck and Hüser, 2012). Most literature describe what took place in Egypt as a revolution; this is subject to argument – this is not part of the objectives of this study. However, if one compares the indices of a complete revolution described by scholars (some of whose definitions are discussed below) with the details of what took place in Egypt, there may not be found a very strict resemblance, and therefore this study prefers to use the term 'political change' as the description of what happened.

Political change may simply refer to any form of change (transformation, transition, increase, decrease, or modification) that bears on the centre of power (decision making machinery) in the state. Several factors could predispose any society to different types of political change; some societies have undergone revolutionary changes, others have undergone modification, and still others experience mere regime change. The common thing underlying all forms of political change is the changing custodians, patterns and/or relations of power in society. In other words, something – a person, practice or relationship – related to the centre of power within the state system (Maiese, 2003). Suleiman (1986) reflects on the basis of revolution, which is the ceaseless conflict between good and evil, right and wrong, justice and injustice, which make revolution a continuous necessity. Regarding the concept of change, he also notes that it is imperative to answer the question of what went so bad in society that it requires changing. Therefore, the presence of problems in a society predisposes it to change.

Political change could take different forms. When one group takes over power from another within the legal and mutually accepted constitutional framework of the land, it does not connote revolution; it is a transition or change of government. But when the

government and the constitution are restructured, then it can be called a revolution. Revolution can therefore be said to be a sudden or very fast change in social system which may affect all aspects of social life, viz. power structure, economy, and ways of living, norms and beliefs and so on, which may be the outcome of mass uprising, mass mobilization, and/or new discovery. Factors behind revolution may have taken time to reach the point of accumulation, but their impact is felt abruptly at a given time (Egan, 2015).

However, besides constitutional modification, society is transformed root and branch, the character of the revolution becomes still more thorough going and most turbulent disorders usually ensue,though changes in government, constitution and social order are simultaneously attempted suddenly and usually violently. The American Revolution of 1775-1779 involved a change of government and constitution, but conserved most of their social and economic structures. The English Revolution of 1640-1668 altered both Government and constitution, settled the issue of Protestantism and Catholicism, church-state relations, and confirmed the prominence of a new urban commercial class. The French Revolution of 1789 went much further than the English revolution in fermenting economic, philosophic and cultural changes that evoked throughout the society as a whole (Hardison, 2011; Neitzel, n.a.).

According to Clapham (1985), revolution is a rapid, violent and irreversible change in the political organization of a society. It involves the destruction of the existing political order together with the myth, this change may well result from and will certainly lead to, other dramatic changes and development in the socio-economic framework. Furthermore, it is the fluidity, ineffectiveness and weak institutional structure of a great number of

third world societies and regimes which appear to increase its likelihood on one hand, and enhance attraction as a solution to the full range of overlapping third world societal problems on the other hand. Revolutionary uprisings aim at reforming the state by providing or establishing effective institutional order but do not promise a withering away of the centralized and bureaucratic states. Henceforth, it offers to render the state more effective through a proper application and the use of legitimized authority by a combination of nationalism and Universalist ideas of equality, freedom, and social justice. When successful it makes the state more effective in its internal dynamism (Clapham, 1985).

However, weather the revolutionaries can succeed in establishing themselves as an alternative local leadership depends to a large extent in masses' perception of the possible dangers and benefits of the extremely high risk strategy of rebellion. Most peasants' revolts have a history of suppression, with high loss of lives and the imposition of a staff and a more repressive system (as it has been found in the Arab world where the government impose martial laws, state of emergency, or the use of the military and other forms of state coercion to suppress protests and protesters). The unusual idea of revolution, leading not only to the rectification of abuses, but to the entire restructuring of society, is one which masses may well be justified in treating with the proverbial suspicion and assurance born of a long conceived experience of finding themselves on the receiving end.

Bowyer (1976a) also defines revolution as that which seeks to transform or transpose basic values; old ways are ridiculed, entrenched power expropriated and old classes destroyed. New men are advised or created, former habits and attitudes, even those held

by men distant from the centre, decay or warp in the service of new ideas. It implies substantial change, a most serious transformation of an existing society beyond the arrival of new elite concerned solely with the accumulation of assets and uninterested or unable to affect the tenor of life. Revolution seeks to establish a new version, compelling in logic and effective in practice, that converts many to change values, establishing a new legitimacy not entirely unrelated to the heritage of the past but alien to the displaced. Though, in political change (revolution) such a transformation is almost inevitably associated with violence during seizure of power or in the protection of threat (Bowyer, 1976a).

According to Lakey (1973), revolution is a drastic and relatively rapid change of power relations and values among people. The breakthrough of new life is powerful, but not in the way of the violent defenders of exploitation. It is the result of internal factors such as frustration, corruption, poverty, dictatorship, etc. Overtime large scale organization, strategy, tactics and ideology, carried out by threat, sabotage, strikes and propagandas often based on ideology of liberation, truth, social justice, equality, equity and freedom. Many however, get inspiration from successful revolutions elsewhere with some taking a long time before it can be achieved while others takes a relatively short period for change to be effective.

Consequently, political change via revolution is pervasive, often violent change of a social or political order by a sizeable segment of a country's population. It is a most extreme politics option of a disseminating group, a course taken collectively when more moderate and legal attempts to achieve recognition or reform have failed, even tormented by a political minority. It usually reflects a general climate of discontent whether

occurring simultaneously or sporadically, which is rare, although carefully planned; its success is dependent on crucial timing, fostering of popular support and the emergence of a new government organization. Most, if not all modern societies own much to the past uprisings and present ones on repressive government, stagnant or restrictive economic condition, and rapid class division. This (revolution) often replaces one evil with another. In the same vein, government might fail, but power vacuum might quickly be filled by a rearrangement of the articulate force or oligarchy. While, at times convulsion by the masses creates a power vacuum but cannot by it fill the vacuum (Lakey, 1973).

Also Huntington (1968) defines revolution as "rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political structure or institution, social structure, leadership and governmental activities and policies." In agreement with this, Bowyer (1976b) posits that "the crucial factor in attitude, not posture, in values, not offices."

The significant thing associated with a complete revolution is the fact that it brings about change in political leadership, social dimension, economic sphere, institutional pattern, along with fresh ideas. The sense of new beginning brings about a new government to foster or lead a new body polity. Macpherson (2007) also agrees with this view in his definition of revolution. He says it is the "transfer of state power by means involving the use or threat of organized force, the subsequent consolidation of that transferred power, with a view to bring out a fundamental change in social, economic, and political institution." Implicitly, humans have the right to implement change whenever they deem fit; also there is a limit to human endurance. Whenever humans have endured and it reached its peak, citizens suffering from oppression, economic hardship, lack of freedom,

and political participation can turn against their leaders when all peaceful available measures have been exhausted.

2.3 Youth Politics

Youth politics refers to political movements organized and carried out by young people, or it may refer to youth-targeted organizations devised by political parties. In addition, youth political movements may specifically deal with political issues of concern to youth. Examples of youth politics groups have included American Youth Congress, the British Youth Council, and the Egypt Youth Party. The age at which individuals are considered youths varies by region. In some areas, the term youth may only be used in regards to a preadolescent child. Other regions might consider any individual under a certain age limit as a youth, such as teenagers or individuals under the age of 30. As such, the specific aims and composition of youth politics movements will likely reflect these differences. Basically, the youth are associated with 'activity' in the sense that they constitute the most active and productive section of the population. Issues that are contentious normally attract, involve or affect the youths, especially policy issues like employment, leadership, education, etc. And because they are the most active part of the population, mishandling of such issues usually attract the weight of their pressure in several dimensions, one of which is violence.

Several issues have been viewed as youth politics-oriented, due to the age range of the population they most impact. Any law that makes a distinction between a youth and an adult may be considered part of youth politics. For example, many regions

establish strict age limits on activities ranging from military service to operating a motor vehicle. In addition, political movements aimed at perceived injustices against young people – such as child labour regulations or child abuse prosecution standards – are often a focal point of youth politics. Leaders of these movements may use certain tactics as a means to further political change, like labour strikes.

Perhaps the most radical political change youth political movements can facilitate is revolution, being the most active section of the population. In many regions where economic or cultural conditions are controversial, political strife grows. Large-scale protests and para-militia groups in these regions are often comprised primarily of young people. When political turmoil escalates, a whole government and political system can crumble under the pressure, and a region's youth are often leading this charge. The younger branch of a large political party can fall under the umbrella of youth politics as well. Political parties of various regions often devise organizations targeted specifically at young people, with aims ranging from simple information dispersion to active party recruitment. Motivated young people of a certain political party affiliation may also organize youth groups themselves. These organizations may work directly with the political party as a representative for their peers. Youth politics groups also create outreach activities such as voter registration that are designed to get young people more actively involved in the political process

Some revolutionaries said “we must destroy in order to build”; living revolutions include forceful, powerful processes which allow the new life to breathe and grow (Lakey 1973). Parsons (1952) conceptualizes the participation basically or simply an internal factor that ensure a successful revolution or political change of a dictatorial or autocrats. If age is a

strong predictor of political behaviour for political scientists who do not agree whether this is an age cohort or a generation effect, participation is a central concept in youth studies and has risen to the top of research and policy agendas. Policies and practices in the youth field the idea has also evolved considerably, although following a different path. The classical approach to the idea arises from the socialization theories of young people as their integration into the structure of society through internalizing dominant social norms (Eisendadt, 1956). The social position of youth is accomplished through their involvement in existing institutions and arrangements. Thus participation turns out to be more about controlling young people and regulating their activities in concordance with the requirements of the state system than about their autonomy or self-fulfilment. This understanding has been criticized as biased toward preserving the status quo, perceiving the young only as impassive acceptant of adult values and practices (Hartman and Trnka 1986).

A later perspective has as its departure point the concept of citizenship as formulated by Marshall (1952). According to this concept, youth participation is seen as young people's access to the wide range of civil, political and social rights in a given community. Citizenship rights, gradually acquired during youth, and the transition to civil, political and social citizenship together produce the right to full participation in society. It is also about "belonging" to one's nation and having the responsibility to contribute to its well-being. Following the explanation of Marshall (1952) on the relationship between citizenship and social class, as well as other dimensions of stratification (such as gender, race, ethnicity, etc.), the debate on citizenship links the concept of participation with the issues of social exclusion and inclusion. The notion of

social participation of individuals and groups offers a framework for examining the opposite process of social exclusion.

The citizenship theory has important consequences for the understanding of political participation. The new understanding of citizenship envisages it not as a passive conferring of social rights and responsibilities but as their active appropriation by the groups previously excluded from them. Citizenship is a wider concept than a legal or civil status and is linked to people's willingness and ability to actively participate in society (Dwyer, 2000). Also, citizenship is no longer limited to the structures of the nation state but is performed when citizens take responsibility in their relations to a wide range of private and public institutions. Applying the broader approach to citizenship, Eden and Roker (2002) developed a concept of constructive social participation. It encompasses various social actions: formal voluntary work, informal community networks, neighbourliness, informal political action, awareness raising, altruistic acts, and caring work at home and in the community, through which young people "participate in their communities and influence world around them" (Eden and Roker 2002).

In the 1990s, the Council of Europe's European Steering Committee for Intergovernmental Co-operation in the Youth Field (CDEJ) developed a new proactive understanding of youth participation, postulating that "participation is not an aim in itself, but an approach to becoming an active citizen, a means of taking an active role both in the development of one's own environment and in European co-operation" (CDEJ, 1997:7). Such an approach was accepted in the design of the study of youth experiments in European Union member states (Boukobza, 1998). This approach provides a functional means of engaging relevant sections of society and minimises against social dysfunctions

that are associated with denying citizens avenues for meaningful participation in governmental processes that affect them most. In other words, when the government does not help the youths, through the provision of means of engaging them and harnessing their capabilities in governmental processes, there will be the risk of generating frustrations that could result in dysfunctional practices. Citizen involvement in governance is therefore a means of maintaining societal order.

The operational definition used in this study agrees with Golubovic's (1982) ample interpretation that "power based on the possibility of exerting influence on the economic and social aspects of life in the broad community." Unlike the classic notions of youth participation as a passive process of development and integration into societal structures, youth researchers in communist Eastern Europe in the 1980s linked it to the concept of "juventisation." Mahler (1983) and Mitev (1982) offer an understanding of youth as an active and committed group and described participation as a two-way process: interaction rather than integration, a development of both young people and society. From this perspective young people were seen as the group who produced new values and who, through their active participation in social life, changed and "rejuvenated" society. The effect of youth participation was a societal innovation. In the political context of the societies with one-party regimes, however, this concept was soon blended into the dominant constructs of the official ideology, leaving aside and subduing its critical dimension towards the status quo.

In order to break with the ideological myth about the "great mission of youth" in building the classless communist society, youth research under post-communism turned from the concept of "juventisation" to "youth citizenship." Following Marshall (1952),

there is a shift in the conceptualization of participation back to the more passive notion of integration into existing social structures.

Huntington (1968) argues in his book, titled *Political Order in Changing Societies*,that order was an important goal of developing societies. And it does not matter if that order was democratic, authoritarian, socialist, or free-market. How important is order? And how much authoritarianism are people willing to put up with in order to have stability in their everyday lives? Huntington's main thesis is that violence and instability result in large part from rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics. Since political institutions have not developed at a rapid enough pace they are unable to deal with the surge in political participation. This is especially true in countries like Egypt where opportunities for political association have been extremely limited. While, by its constitution, Egypt has a multi-party system, in practice the National Democratic Party (the long-time ruling party) was dominant. Opposition parties were allowed, but had no real chance of gaining power. In addition, Law 40 of 1977 regulates the formation of political parties in Egypt; it prohibits the formation of religious-based political parties, and so groups such as the Kefaya movement have lost traction and the Muslim Brotherhood has been barred from politics.

In sum, political organization and institutions have not kept up with social mobilization and the demand for political participation. In keeping with the argument of Huntington (1968), the result is political instability and disorder. As always, though, there is another argument, which points that the problem is not really one of order and stability; it is not about getting to work, or buying food, or making sure that the kids get to school. Instead the problem surrounding political participation – and democratization –

in the Arab world is all about what political scientists call “external actors.” Wolfe (2011) affirms that even though there is a good deal of popular support for democracy in the Arab world, there are also significant pockets of support for authoritarian regimes. This is because citizens perceive that it is absolutely essential that their governments please the United States. In fact, recent studies (Lowenthal and Bitar, 2015; Göbel and Lambach, 2009) suggest that citizens continue to profess support for existing authoritarian regimes even though they hold strong democratic values. The reason is that Arab countries are highly dependent on the US for military security and for economic aid. So while resentment is high against the US, citizens understand that they need the US to sustain their nation’s stability.Stephanie Schwartz, author of *Youth and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change* (2010), discusses the critical role youths played in the Arab Spring; she believes that the youths, despite being the leaders of the Egyptian revolution, generally hold less power in any political system than adults or elders. Moreover, the way in which this movement emerged was through widespread, decentralized grassroots participation. Schwartz (2010) assumed that “the youth movement” represents one homogeneous group, but young people are not all the same, and the youth movements represent many different interests and goals for the new Egyptian and Tunisian states. This puts the youth movements at a major disadvantage as they compete against well-established institutions and opposition parties for control over their countries’ future. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition movements in Egypt all had an interest in rallying behind the youth movement in overthrowing Mubarak. Now that power is up for grabs, the more established parties have the leadership and experienced political machinery to co-opt the process of state-building for their own goals.

A broad youth movement exists today; the world is generally not aware of it, and even young people do not know they belong to it. Today's youth are the people who could change the world, as well as the people that are changing it. Social change led by young people is not all about young people. Instead, children and youth are working for their communities, their families, their cities, and their world. Action that is focused on youth issues often addresses young people as a whole, not isolating other youth because of race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation. The median age in Egypt is 23.9 years, in Jordan 22.8, in Morocco and Algeria 26.2 years, in Tunisia 29.1 years, in Syria 22.5 years and in Yemen it is as low as 17.8. These are astonishing statistics. By way of comparison, the median age in most of Europe, for instance, is well over 40 years and over 36 years in the United States (Roudi, 2011).

The Middle East and North Africa are currently experiencing a prominent youth bulge. Structural changes in service provision, especially health care, beginning in the 1960s created the conditions for a population explosion, which has resulted in a population consisting primarily of younger people. It is estimated that around 65% of the regional population is under the age of 30 (Roudi, 2011). The rise of Arab youth movements transcending the narrow demands of the typical student movements is a relatively recent phenomenon but is gaining in importance. So far, youth movements have been active as organized networks in Egypt and Jordan, and played an important though short-lived role in bringing about change in the election law in Kuwait. Most importantly, the uprising in Tunisia showed how quickly youth could mobilize even in the absence of organizational structures.

The April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt best exemplifies both the great strengths and the fundamental weaknesses of youth mobilization; the activists succeeded in mobilizing large numbers of people for the 2008 general strike but were never able to repeat the success. The movement sought to regroup before the 2010 elections but it had no obvious impact on the other protests or on the election. It claims to have 100,000 online members and has been lauded for creating a large and unified movement unprecedented in scope, but when it called for protest it usually only brings out a small number of participants, indicating a rather low level of commitment among members (Frontline, 2011).

In Jordan there are two active youth organizations, the National Campaign for Student Rights and the Jordanian Democratic Youth Union, supported by a broad coalition of political parties and professional associations; both organizations try to transcend the typical demands of students by combining socioeconomic demands with national political demands. But it is unclear how effective they are in reaching out to young people outside the cities and to activists from different social classes. So far, it appears that youth movements in the countries discussed are not solid, lasting organizations with a reliable and committed membership that can organize and plan over the long haul. Rather, they appear to be somewhat ephemeral networks, which can make up for their lack of staying power with the speed they can mobilize and the intensity of the activism when an outburst takes place.

Young people participate in Change almost twice as often as adults' do. About 15.5 million youth ages 12 to 24 volunteered more than 1.3 billion hours of their time in 2004 alone on their own accord; only 5% do so because of school or other requirements. Youth mainly participate not only because they want to make a difference, but they also do so

because they have learned about specific action they want to take; they have talked about issues with their parents, or for other reasons. While only 29% of adults volunteer for causes, a whopping 55% of youth do. A massive 70% of youth have participated in some sort of event or activity to help better their community, 78% of youths who participate in service-learning say that it helps them learn to be better citizens (Roudi, 2011).

Researchers quote that over the next two decades, the youth populations in Iraq, Yemen, and the Palestinian Territories – where current levels of fertility are the highest in the region – will experience the fastest growth. In these countries, well over 40% of their populations are currently under 15 years of age. On average, an Iraqi woman gives birth to 4.8 children in her lifetime, while Palestinian and Yemeni women give birth to more than five children. As a result, 15-to-24-year-olds will still constitute around 20% of the population in these countries in 2025. The number of youth in Iraq is projected to increase by nearly 3 million – from 5.8 million in 2005 to 8.6 million in 2025. And the number of Palestinian youth will increase from 0.7 million to 1.3 million – more than an 80% increase. The number of youth in Yemen will also increase by more than 3 million during this same period, a 69% increase. The number of youth in the MENA region is projected to peak at 100 million by 2035 (Roudi, 2011).

Educated young people with jobs can be a boon for development. For example, the rapidly growing economies of East Asia, or in Europe, that of Ireland, all underwent small youth bulges that contributed to their countries' strong economic outputs. It is possible for youth bulges to help shape politics for the better, citing, for example, the role that South Africa's large youth population played in the anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s. The Middle East has invested more in education, including religious education,

than most other regions such that education is available to most young people. However, that education has not led to higher levels of employment, and youth unemployment is currently at 25%, the highest of any single region. Of this 25%, over half are first time entrants into the job market. With the right investments and continued progress through the demographic transition, in time large youth populations can become large, economically-productive populations that can drive economic gains – a phenomenon known as the demographic dividend (Roudi, 2011).

The President of the United States, Barack Obama, on his first News Conference on the political unrest spreading across Middle East and North Africa (2011) says that "The world is changing...with a young, vibrant generation within the Middle East that is looking for greater opportunities. Government leaders in the tumultuous Middle East must recognize they can't bully their citizens who hunger for freedom." If you combine a burgeoning youth bulge with autocratic regimes, in addition no jobs and little education, what you have is a classical recipe for social unrest. In other words, increasingly younger and aspirational societies with increasingly fewer opportunities for growth will end in social mobility and self-expression.

2.4 Youths in the Middle East and North Africa

Nearly one in five people living in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is between the ages of 15 and 24 – the age group defined as "youth." The current number of youth in the region is unprecedented: nearly 95 million in 2005. The extent to which this large group of young people will become healthy and productive members of their societies depends on how well governments and civil societies invest in social, economic, and political institutions that meet the current needs of young people (Roudi, 2011).

Roudi (2011) illustrates that young people in the neighbourhood of Colobane in Dakar are significant political actors whose practices and discourses are co-producing processes of change in a context of economic hardship and dissatisfaction with reigning elites, showing that youths are the most outspoken on the need for transparent, democratic and accountable politics: they openly criticize politicians, increasingly reject the practices of earlier generations and are more prone to questioning established authorities. In some of the mosques in Colobane, intergenerational differences and how young people struggle for influence and social change is particularly evident. Here, the discourse and aspiration towards democratic, accountable and transparent management politics and the questioning of habitual authority is manifest. These mosques have been arenas of intricate and silent power battles, as young men have been integrated in their management committees after challenging the previously automatic recognition of imams and notables in instances of mismanagement. When resourceful young men take on responsibilities and promote changes in religious, managerial and distributional issues, local mosques are experiencing intergenerational tensions and negotiations.

The youth bulge in the Middle East and North Africa has been favourably compared to that of the Asian Tigers, which harnessed this human capital and saw huge economic growth in recent decades. The youth bulge has been referred to by the Middle East Youth Initiative as a demographic gift, which, if engaged, could fuel regional economic growth and development (Dhllon, 2008).

2.5 Theoretical Framework: Marxist Theory of Historical Materialism

Historical materialism is a scientific explanation of mankind's development from primitive society to socialism developed by Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, and later

further applied by Lenin and Mao. The materialist conception of history (historical materialism, for short) was discovered a little before the middle of the nineteenth century by the great German thinker and practical revolutionary Karl Marx. It was the first – and remains the only - scientific view of history. The value of historical materialism to working people and others who feel and see the rottenness of capitalism is it not only enables them to understand the world of today, but also guides them in the historic task of changing it, of making a new world, one free from the exploitation of man by man or nation by nation. Historical materialism is based on the idea that 'Mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion etc.

Marx was motivated by the great social movements of the period to make a profound study of the different forms of human society which had existed up to that time. He showed for the first time the overriding importance of economic development as the underlying cause of all important historical events and movements, singling out the class struggle as the motive force of history:

The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders is dependent on what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in man's better insight into eternal

truth and justice, but in changes in the mode of production and exchange. They are to be sought not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular epoch.

The great revolutions of history (British, 1640-1688; French, 1789; Russian, 1905, 1917; Chinese, 1949) have always remained a mystery to bourgeois historians. Only historical materialism can explain them, and why they broke out when they did. Each of these great revolutions marked the partial or complete overthrow of an outworn and decaying mode of production by a vigorous new one representing new social forces which played the decisive role in changing the social order. According to historical materialism, each main epoch in the development of human society constitutes a specific mode of production, or socio-economic formation, of which five are now known; they are: Primitive Communism, Slavery, Feudalism, Capitalism and Socialism (that is, the lower stage of Communism).

Societies are composed of people and have to be changed by the actions of people. But people are by no means free agents in determining what sort of society they are born into. Marx was the first to draw attention to the decisive role played by the material basis on which societies grow up. In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the

contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production. Therefore, from being forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters, and then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.

Laws or tenets of Historical Materialism can now be sum med up as follows:

1. The law of contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production: the operation of this law brings about the transformation of one socio-economic formation into another through the sharpening of this contradiction. It is the basic law of social development. In class-divided society it is expressed by the struggle between opposed classes.
2. The law of basis and superstructure: every social system consists of an economic basis and a superstructure which is erected upon it. A fundamental change in a social system takes place when a social revolution changes the basis and then proceeds to change the superstructure.
3. The law of class struggle: in a class-divided society the underlying economic contradictions are expressed in society as a class struggle, which is the motive force of social development. The sharpening of this struggle brings about a social revolution.

The relevance of this theory to the study of the Egyptian youth uprising of 2011 is predicated upon the fact that the revolt was a part of a whole historical process in Egypt that began several decades before its occurrence, even from colonial times. Secondly, the

Egyptian youth uprising has clearly categorised the protesters as having similar characteristics that developed due to the historicity of Egyptian government and governance practices, and under which the youths were born and grew over time – and it is obvious they fell in the category of the 'have nots', while the government (more precisely, those wielding state power) constituted the 'haves.' This is characteristic of African capitalism where there are no highly developed capitalists and proletariats as found in more advanced capitalist societies of Europe and North America. In Africa, it is difficult to separate the capitalist exploiters from the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (political power holders) – they are either the same or united into one category against the rest of society. Lastly here, all the laws of historical materialism in general, and particularly the second and third laws outlined above, could be seen to have taken effect in Egypt, thus the breaking point of the protests of the youths who by their role in the movement for political change in Egypt spearheaded the mobilisation of the entire mass of the oppressed in Egypt against the detested Egyptian government of Hosni Mubarak, which represented the team of exploiters in the country. The motivation for the uprising and movement for political change is underscored by the social and material conditions of the youths as laid upon them by the Egyptian society under the government of Hosni Mubarak for several decades.

As can be seen, the materialist conception of history is a scientific viewpoint which shows history as a law-governed process of development. It is the only scientific view of history. It demonstrates that the main ideas in society like Egypt, whether in politics, culture or social life, are determined by the mode of production prevailing in it, and not vice-versa. Thus it places the Egyptian revolution on a proper historical

foundation by providing valid explanations of the changing circumstances brought about by the protracted struggles between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' – represented by the wielders of power and the mass of the people respectively – which culminated in the youth uprising that led to the collapse of the government of Hosni Mubarak after many decades of governance, and also shows that the mass of the people, especially the youths, are the real makers of history with the potential of invoking change through their struggles against the exploiters and oppressors in their society.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design and Sources of Data

This study is a qualitative research that employed both primary and secondary sources of information. Primary data was generated directly from stakeholders and scholars, while secondary data was generated through careful library search and examination of articles by scholars, media broadcasts and commentaries, and reports of Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and other international organisations, regarding the January 2011 Egyptian revolution.

3.2 Population and Population Sample

The population of this study comprised stakeholders in and scholars on the Egyptian revolution. The four (4) members of staff of the Egyptian High Commission in Abuja, and two (2) scholars from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria were carefully selected based on their relative capability to provide quality and relevant information related to the

variables under consideration in this study such as Egyptian youths, domestic factors or conditions in Egypt before the revolution, external factors and their influence, and the outcome of the uprising in Egypt.

3.3 Method of Data Collection

Primary data was collected using interviews with members of staff of the Egyptian High Commission in Abuja, and two academics from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Secondary data was collected from writings, articles, reports, recorded interviews, and commentaries of scholars, revolutionaries, commentators and other stakeholders in the Egyptian revolution who are both within and outside Egypt as found in journals, the news media, internet blogs and websites and reports, among others. Secondary materials here were carefully selected based on the quality and relevance of each of them in providing suitable information needed for understanding and analysing the Egyptian political change within the context of several factors, roles, responses and outcomes.

3.3 Method of Data Analysis and Presentation

This study adopted a qualitative method for analysing the generated data. The analysis was centred on the central themes (or variables) of the study such as Egyptian youths' roles, domestic factors or conditions in Egypt before the revolution, external factors and their influence, the state response to the youth roles and the outcome of the uprising in Egypt. Facts from secondary sources of data, supported with the data gathered from the people interviewed, are used to for the analysis. The data is presented in discussion format subdivided into themes that address several variables under the objectives of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

EGYPT'S POLITICAL SYSTEM AND POLITICS OF CHANGE

4.1 Introduction

As part of the pre-occupation of the research, this chapter shall look at the political background of Egypt, the Arab republic of Egypt under Hosni Mubarak and the nature of the Egyptian revolution and Egypt after the revolution. Egypt is located in North Africa, the capital of Egypt is Cairo its territory is 386,660 sq miles with a population of 6.7 million. The year of current constitution is 1971. The official language is Arabic, other spoken language include English or French which is widely spoken among the educated class. Religion includes Muslim (mostly Sunni) 92%, Coptic Christians and other religion 8% (unofficial estimate). Egypt is an ancient country famous for its Pharaonic monument and fertile Nile valley. It is strategically located at the intersection of Asia, Africa, and Europe underpins its weight in the Middle East region and her relevance to external powers. That continuity and centrality remain

prominent aspects of Egyptians' sense of identity. Egypt is located in the north east corner of Africa, with the Sinai Peninsula jutting into Asia, the Mediterranean Sea forms its border to the north and the red sea forms its boarder to the east. The western desert merged with Libya bordered it to the west, and it is bordered by Sudan in the south. This pivotal strategic location places it at the cross roads between Europe, Asia and Africa. The Suez Canal (opened in 1869) serves as an important artery for international trade.

This strategic price has been coveted by foreign powers from Hypos (1730 B.C) through Alexander the Great (330 B.C) to the armies from Arabia (A.D641), the Ottoman Empire (1517), and the European powers of both France and Britain, 1798 and 1882 respectively. Egyptian people and government have experienced difficulties fending her from external invasion. The Muhammad Ali led Othman government of the early 19th century was the only modern ruler capable of projecting Egypt's power beyond its borders, east in to the Palestine and the Hejaz (Arabia) and into the south of Sudan. These conquest were not tolerated by his Othman overlord (European states), which used military and economic pressure to force Mohammed Ali's troops out of Palestine (BBC News, 2017).

Egypt's vulnerability was further outlined in the mid-twentieth century to wars with Israel (1948-1949, 1956, 1967, and 1973), in which the armed forces protection was not enough to protect the country's eastern flank in the Sinai Peninsula (the vital Suez Canal). Thus, the canal was closed from 1967 to 1975; with Israel troops stationed on its eastern banks. This closure affected Egypt negatively, strategically and economic wise. After years of British occupation, Egypt was granted internal independence in 1922, while British government still retained significant power over its foreign policy, external

security, and economic life. Under the 1923 constitution, the monarch ruled in conjunction with the council of ministers and a bicameral legislature, with the constitution retaining high property qualification for member of the parliament but established a universal male suffrage (BBC News, 2017).

Thus, the leader of the 1919 revolution formed Wafd party, which later became the country's most popular party, named for the delegation that the Egyptians forced Britain to let them send to Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The party attracted a broad base of support from the middle and lower middle classes with leadership from the upper middle class professionals. These groups of people or individuals shared an antagonistic view to foreign domination and the arbitrary rule to the king. The Wafd was allowed to participate in the first election which it had 85% of the seats in the lower house (1924 elections). This victory, that is having the major seats, compelled the king to let the party form the government. King Faud (1922-1936) and King Farouq (1936-1952) retained the right to select the prime minister, dismiss the council of ministers at will, delay or prolong parliament, and appoint two fifths 2/5 of the senators. These powers were used to reduce the Wafd party's influence and prevent free functioning of the legislature. From 1930 to 1935, a monarchist minister suspended the constitution and implemented a decree rule, much to the anger of the public, with support and encouragement from the British Army which served as the final arbiter of Egyptian politics; it was a success.

In 1936, the British government welcomed the election of the Wafdist government and went ahead to sign a treaty of alliance that accorded Egypt full political and economic autonomy. Due to the growing hegemony and threat from Italy, the British retained their military bases in Egypt. When World War 2 escalated in 1939, Britain

swiftly reinforced its military presence, a move Egyptians considered an apparent imposition or reinstatement of colonial hegemony.

In 1943 the British forced King Farouq to appoint a Wafdist government, fearing the King's pro-axis sympathies. The British Wafd entente tarnished and reduced the Wafd's nationalist credibility, which was increasingly been dominated by large landowners and businessmen who blocked and sagged widely demanded agricultural, social welfare, health and educational system reform. Gradually, Egyptians became alienated from the political system, breeding cynicism about the Wafd's nationalist credibility's, upset by the Kings' manipulation of elections, and insulted by the British military presence. Furthermore, the dominance by wealthy Egyptians over the parliament resulted in economic and social policies that reinforced vested interests and ignored the pressing demand of the poor. Opposition groups which sprang up criticized the entire political system, and the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 sought a government based on Islamic legal and social principle which would provide the poor with socio-economic benefits. The Brotherhood grew in popularity with the establishment of schools, clinics, and social programs. The Young Egypt, founded in 1931, later joined the Brotherhood in the fight for political and economic independence. The Young Egypt insisted that only a strong, authoritarian government fashioned on European fascism, could guarantee Egyptian independence. Intellectuals on the left critiqued the Egyptian society and sought to organize industrial workers to protect their selfish class interest.

These political grievances also affected the middle class army officers, which resulted in the formation of a secret society called the free officers through which clamor

for British occupation to end, formation of a strong popular army, elimination of feudalism and the capitalist domination of political life, and establishment of a democracy and social change led by Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser. The free officers were drawn from middle class youths who were allowed to enter the military for the very first time in 1936-1937. Military officers were further alienated by the government's lack of preparation for the 1948-1949 war with Israel, Egypt was defeated by the new created Jewish state. The king and the government were accused of supplying defective weapons to soldiers, failed to train soldiers properly, and displayed incompetent leadership in battle. During this period, political tension flared into violence, resulting to the death of the Muslim Brotherhood vanguard and the prime minister. This group continually showed their displeasure when a guerrilla movement challenged the presence of British military in the Suez Canal zone in 1951, and in January 1952 it was a bloody confrontation in which the British soldiers killed 43 Egyptian policemen and mobs burned central Cairo.

In the middle of a sagged legitimacy for the political system and widespread interest, the free officers doctored a coup d'état on July 23, 1952. They allowed King Farouq to leave Egypt peacefully, which marked the end of a monarchical reign, and a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was constituted to run the government. They resolved to uphold Egyptian independence and fight against corruption, counter political divisions, and undertake fundamental socio-economic reforms. The free officers' government (Revolutionary Command Council) headed by Gamal Abdul Nasser launched significant reforms ranging from agriculture, land reform, health and a new government, and also broke the power of the wealthy landowners by confiscating land

from nearly 5,000 persons. It also emphasized on industrialization as the most important route out of underdevelopment and went ahead to nationalized foreign businesses (banks and industries). The free officers transformed the political system, dismantled the monarchy, parliament, and political parties. They allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to function as a religious society until 1954 when it was banned. The members were accused of planning an assassination on Gamal Abdul Nasser's life. To rally for public support for the regime, Liberation Rally was created as an umbrella organization in 1953; also, 1956 witnessed the creation of National Union and The Arab Societies Union in 1956 and 1962 respectively.

The constitution of 1956 established a political system with a strong president, weak parliament and one party system; party leaders approved all the contestants for the parliamentary election but no election was conducted in its union with Syria from 1958-1961. Thus, in 1964 another constitution was signed into law which also embraced one party system that required half the members of parliament to be workers or peasants – a step that was widely accepted. Even with only one party, parliamentary election was vigorously contested.

The regime offered access to jobs, socio-economic equality, and national independence. But in the 1960's the government began to fray; with the service of foreign policy failure, notably the collapse of its union with Syria (1958-1961), the draining military involvement in the north of Yemen (1962-1967), and the suffered defeat in the 1967 war with the state of Israel and the Arab-Israeli war which lead to the takeover of the Sinai Peninsula, destruction of its armed forces. In view of these the Egyptian government lost credibility as the leader of a resurgent Arab world.

Nasser's diminished legitimacy was evident after it had lost all its revenue from oil in the Sinai Peninsula and from tolls or ship passing through Suez canal, demonstration from students against light sentences handed down to the air force officers for wartime negligence with the underlying criticism of lack of accountability on government part and the sack of 200 judges after their demand for the rule of law. In the face of severe economic crises and the diminished legitimacy of the state, coupled with a weak state system, in September 1970 President Nasser died of heart attack and the vice president Anwar Sadat succeeded him as the new president. Sadat promulgated a new constitution in 1971 and he swiftly distinguished his regime from that of his predecessor with economic reform (1974); it ended the one party system in 1976; endorsed formation of political parties to contest parliamentary elections; he also established social and medical programs which encouraged a partial democratization alongside more open political debate.

After a long belligerence with the state of Israel, Egypt regained control of the Suez Canal oil wells and ports of Sinai as a result of two disengagement accords with the Jewish State. In 1974 and 1975, Camp David accord of September 1978 led to a peace accord with Israel in March 1979. Due to this, most Arab states broke diplomatic ties with Sadat's Egypt and were eventually suspended from the Arab league for a decade. Hence peace with Israel, economic policies that encouraged foreign trade, rolled back of state control of the economy, and widened the gap between the rich and the poor; weaknesses in government's commitment to social and economic benefits, and hike in price of essential goods and commodities ensued. In view of the aforementioned, Islamic groups became more militant in their demand for social, moral and political reform, and

tension rose between them and the Coptic community. Sadat was finally assassinated by a military officer who was a member of a militant Islamist group.

4.2 The Nature of Egyptian Political System

Nasser presided over the first independent Egyptian government, from 1956 until his death in 1970. One of the major hallmarks of his rule was Arab socialism. His focus on social justice led to the implementation of massive social service programs and subsidies: “The state provided food, electricity, education and other services for free or heavily subsidized” (Rutherford, 2008). He nationalized many industries, as well as the Suez Canal, and led a massive industrialization program. In order to implement all of these changes, a strong state was needed (Shorbagy, 2009)

The modern Egyptian state is the product of a historically rooted political culture and of the state-building efforts of its founding leaders, Gamal Abdul Nasser and Anwar Sadat. Egypt has been governed by powerful centralized rule since ancient times, when the management of irrigated agriculture gave rise to the pharaohs who were absolute god-kings. This experience produced a propensity toward authoritarian government that persisted into modern times. Although the contemporary Egyptian state remained in essence authoritarian, such rule was not accepted unconditionally. Its legitimacy depended on adherence to certain public expectations. Egypt's centuries of subordination to foreign rule, its long struggle for independence, and its continuing dependency on other countries generated a powerful nationalism that made national legitimacy crucial to the acceptance of the authoritarian state. Moreover, after the Arab invasion in the seventh century A.D., many expected the state to rule on behalf of the true faith and community and according to Islamic norms of justice; as a result, the state sought to legitimize itself

in Islamic terms. Finally, in more recent years, the spread of political consciousness had put rulers under growing pressure to accommodate demands for participation.

The 1952 Revolution against the traditional monarchy, led by Gamal Abdul Nasser's group of nationalist-reformist Free Officers, gave birth to the contemporary republic. Nasser forged the new state, suppressing the rudiments of pluralism and creating a president-dominated, military-led authoritarian-bureaucratic regime with a single party and a subordinated parliament, press, and judiciary. Nasser's charismatic leadership and the populist achievements of the 1952 Revolution – particularly land reform, social welfare, and a nationalist foreign policy – legitimized the new regime. Nasser gave the state a broader base of support than it had hitherto enjoyed, a base that embraced a populist coalition of the army, the bureaucracy, the middle class, and the masses.

Nasser’s successor, Anwar as Sadat, adapted the state to a “post-populist” era. The major vulnerabilities of the Nasser regime were its lack of strong support among the Egyptian landed and business classes and, after the 1967 defeat by Israel, its alienation from the United States, the superpower whose support was needed to resolve the conflict with Israel. Although Sadat assumed power as Nasser's vice president and was a veteran of the revolution, he soon reoriented the policies of the state to reconcile it with the need for support from the Egyptian middle class and for a good relationship with the United States. While retaining the essential structures of the Nasserist state, he carried out a limited political liberalization and an economic and diplomatic infitah (opening or open door) to the West. This shifted the state's base of support from reliance on Nasser's populist coalition to a reliance on the landed and business classes internally and an American alliance externally. The political system remained essentially authoritarian but

with a greater tolerance of political pluralism than under Nasser; thus, parliament, opposition parties, interest groups, and the press all enjoyed greater, though still limited, freedom. Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's vice-president, inherited power on the basis of constitutional legitimacy at Sadat's death. He consolidated Sadat's limited political liberalization and maintained the major lines of Sadat's policies while trying to overcome some of their excesses and costs.

As revolutionary legitimacy was eclipsed by the passage of time, the legal powers enshrined in the Constitution of 1971 became a more important source of legitimacy. The Constitution, a descendant of the 1956 constitution drafted under Nasser, largely reinforced authoritarian traditions. It established a mixed presidential-parliamentary-cabinet system, but the president is constitutionally the centre of power. The president is supreme commander, declares war, concludes treaties, proposes and vetoes legislation, and may rule through decree under emergency powers that have been regularly delegated by parliament. He appoints the prime minister and the cabinet, which may issue "decisions" having the force of law. Under the Constitution, the People's Assembly has the power to legislate and to nominate the president, and other branches of government are responsible to the assembly. But it has never effectively exercised these constitutional checks on the executive.

The present research aims at adding more to the existing literature on the role of youths in bringing about political change. It also stresses the importance or the role of youths in bringing about political change in Egypt.

4.3 Egypt under Hosni Mubarak

Egypt has long been a society with a powerful state and a bureaucracy that might have been backward and corrupt, but nonetheless maintained peace, with a remarkable record of political stability. The Mubarak regime was not any different. The assassination of the then president Anwar El-Sadat on October 14, 1981, brought his vice as the new Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak became the head of the Egyptian semi presidential Republican Government (Almond, 1974) following the overwhelming endorsement of his candidature by the people's assembly in a national referendum with an official poll turnout of 98.5% (*Africa Today*, 1989), and he continued serving until 2011. Mubarak's years of reign set him a record as the longest served president in Egypt's history under the umbrella of his National Democratic Party (NDP). The government maintained a one party rule under continuous state of emergency. Its reign also earned support from the capitalist West, and also continued grants, aids and technical assistance from the United States for maintaining policies of suppression towards Islamic militants and the peace accord with the Jewish State of Israel.

Upon swearing in, he pledged tough measure against religious fundamentalist activities; also in his speech to the people's assembly, he affirmed that Egypt would continue negotiation with the State of Israel and previous bilateral economic and political accounts shall be respected. The next day hundreds of militant Muslim activities suspected of being behind the violent disturbances in a number of Egyptian cities were rounded up by the authority. The property and assets of exiled opposition leader General Saad Mohammad Al-Shazli, who masterminded the crossing of the Suez Canal that took Israel by surprise on October 6, 1973, and had since 1978 denounced Sadat as a tyrant, were ordered to be impounded by the Cairo Court of Ethics on November 15 (*Africa*

Today, 1989). Within a week of assuming office, a state of emergency was declared throughout the country. It increased the imbalance in the constitutional system with regulation to security and public life. Also, the emergency regulation gave the President power to restrain the movement of citizens, forbid meetings, and imprison suspects, search persons or places for contraband materials and ban publications. As minister of interior praised it, "Where ordinary laws can be applied only after a crime is committed, emergency allows them to anticipate a crime and prevent it from happening." The state of emergency was used to cordon off villages, force their ways into mosques, search for suspect and detain persons who has been acquitted by the court. At its peak in 1997, a minimum of 23,000 people were held under administrative detention; some 8,000 were released as the battle against Islamist militant waned down. Although the state of emergency powers was meant to be used on those who have used violence and drug dealers, the distinction between violent and non-violent was often ignored. Dissent lawyers have been tortured during interrogations by officers of the ministry of interior (State Security Investigation Office) whose detention facilities are separate from the prison service system run by the ministry of justice, thus fostered securing perspective alongside political, economic, and social problems. Central security forces breakup student protest and state security forces counter worker job actions. Critics were seen and perceived as traitors, as saboteur rather than citizens who have the right to have different interest and perspectives. As a result, a security court sentenced a renowned sociologist Said Eddin Ibrahim to 7 years imprisonment in 2002 for receiving foreign funds without permission, a sentence imposed due to his pioneered research on Coptic –Muslim relation, and his effort to promote public awareness on the need to participate in the

election process, and the hint that Mubarak might establish a 'presidential monarchy' by designing his son Gamal as his heir or successor.

President Mubarak has been re-elected with majority votes in referendum successively for five times in 1983, 1987, 1993, 1999, and in 2005 which he won overwhelmingly through manipulation. Even without the draconian restriction of creating political parties, the NDP's close tie with the government restrained ability of opposition parties to win seats in legislative bodies. The president with the NDP leaders managed the elections in such a way that their party and its candidates dominated the legislature irrespective of the electoral system. Although, Egypt's political party system appeared to be a robust multiparty system, beyond image of competitiveness, the picture emerged of a largely "contrived multi-partism." The multiparty system was institutional with a top-down hierarchy. The president initially established several opposition parties and then the government vetoed the registration of new parties; oppositions could not make significant inroad into the dominant position of the governing party; and significant political movements were not allowed to form political parties by which they could contest the ruling party's control. The new Wafd Party, Labour Party, Green Party, the Arab Democratic Nasserist party, Arab Socialist Party, and Young Egypt, among others, were frustrated with a party system that could not play an effective role in interest aggregation or articulation; rather it gives appearance of choice while ensuring that the ruling party wins the election.

Despite the state of emergency, one party rule, government monopoly of television and radio in order to prevent opposition at all cost, Mubarak's regime advanced diplomatic relations, carried on negotiation with the Jewish state of Israel, thus Sinai pre-

occupied by Israelis was returned to Egypt. Also, relationship with Sudan was improved; the two neighbouring countries signed a charter of integration which converted into a number of trade and cultural agreements, it also resulted into the first ever Nile valley parliament field in Khartoum on October 18, 1985. President Mubarak also ensured the full readmission of Egypt into the Arab League, after ten years, in May 1989 and in June Egypt was considered as a member of the Arab Parliamentary Union. The border between Egypt and Libya was reopened. However, Mubarak's substantial extractive, distributive and regulatory powers accorded him the right to collect income tax from salaried workers, civil servants, professionals and businesses, to imposed custom duties on imports and gain revenue through a "sales tax" that was introduced in 1994. Government revenue accrued from the profits of publicly owned and managed enterprises. Thus many of these enterprises are non-profitable – required subsidies to keep moving. Egypt also got economic aid from the West, notably the United States in recognition of Egypt's support for her policies in the Middle East; debt service however drained its resources.

The economy suffered from unstable government policies. Mubarak also tried to balance the interest of domestic producers (high agriculture prices), consumers (Cheap food and goods), domestic factories (low agriculture prices and low tariffs on manufacture components), and import (low Import duties). Since he could satisfy these conflicting interests simultaneously, Mubarak shifted according to the balance of pressure. A high level of corruption in the regime and the relocated economy, the increased gap between the rich and the poor with the people in government extremely benefiting from state wealth at the expense of economic growth and increase in the well-being of citizens was a source of grief. Examples include Mubarak administration's

former Housing Minister Ahmed Al-Maghraby, who was estimated to be more than 11 billion Egyptian pounds rich; his counterpart in the Ministry of Tourism ZaharGarraia was estimated at 13 billion Egyptian pounds, Trade and Industry Minister Rashid Muhammed Rashid estimated at 12 billion Egyptian pounds, and Interior Minister Habib Al-Atidy as estimated at 8 billion Egyptian pounds. Only businessmen with affiliation to the regime accumulated wealth tremendously.

Throughout the reign of Mubarak, there was crackdown on civil society, political parties were shut down, newspapers were closely watched, politicians were jailed, intellectuals were silenced, judgments were perverted, unemployment increased, government employees received insufficient wages and salaries, a decreased minority accumulated vast wealth, wide gap ensued between the haves and the have not, universities were monitored and brutal thugs allowed Mubarak's regime to clamp down even harder on Egyptian society in the name of security.

4.4 The Nature of the Protest

The protest started on January 25, 2011; it marked the beginning of the end of Hosni Mubarak's 30 years reign (*Time*, 2011). It took the form of a rebellion against a tyrannical government – a demand for a political change (democracy and accountability). Hence, the revolution had no specific ideology, it was all encompassing: Muslims, Christians, liberals, socialist, and other groups in Egypt were represented. It cannot be associated to a single vanguard, but rather those youths between the age ranges of 18 and 36 years were connected on social networks (Twitter, My Space, hi5, Facebook, among

others) to propagate and expose Mubarak ill deeds and also urged to participate in the protest; this brought them out of their sheds to match forward to Tahrir Square to increase the chant "Keep faith countrymen – freedom is being born!" The protest was named a "Yom El Raheel", meaning a farewell party for estranged president Hosni Mubarak (Amr, 2011).

The peaceful demonstrations that pushed for change, which were first allowed to gather and chant with minimal police harassment were soon met with unprovoked violence by massive drogues of heavily armed security forces, water hoses, more than 60 cannons of tear gas, rubber bullets, and even live ammunition were unleashed to disperse the crowd who had vowed an overnight sit-in at Cairo's main downtown square – Tahrir Square. In an attempt to reduce the strength of the revolution the government disabled the country's three main mobile networks in the downtown area where the protests were taking place in order to stifle communication between protesters; also Face book and other social networks were disabled.

The theme of the government's propaganda assault revolved around foreign agents as organizers and deceiver of the naïve anti-regime protesters. As reported by Al-Akhbar English (2011) that "300 foreign saboteurs were caught red handed in Suez, Israeli spies sponsored by Americans and Hamas activities financed by Iranian on a joint mission to turn Egypt into a striptease club rutted by a Shiite theocracy." The state-controlled media for most tried to turn a blind eye to the protests in order to minimize their influence on audiences; Egyptian radio, TV, and satellite dished out the usual diet of football, music, soap operas, and game shows steering well away from any reports or analysis the uprising. Government owned newspaper headlines of this period blamed it

on favourite "arch enemies" the Muslim Brotherhood, and then dismissed calls for reforms as coming from a "a bunch of clueless kids" (http://www.mindfulofdreams.com/fromthestreet).

It has been argued that the Muslim Brotherhood played limited role in the revolution; this is simply because the group adopted a cautious and more meticulous approach to the protest, which in a large part is an extension of the group's strategy of the past decade, namely a preference for incremental rather than revolutionary change, caution and pragmatism, and close cooperation with other Egyptian political actors (Brooke and Hamid, 2011). This has been advanced as part explanation as to why the group preferred to rally behind the youth movement. Moreover, that is the popular perception of the Brotherhood's role in the Egyptian revolution, although the government did not exonerate the group's complicity in the uprising. One opinion is that of Halevi (2012) who notes the following:

> An official Egyptian intelligence document reveals what the regime knew during the first days of the revolution, and it turns out that the Muslim Brotherhood played a central role in planning, inciting, and steering it. The document was posted on a new website that offers documents taken from the offices of Egyptian intelligence that were attacked and looted by mobs during the revolution.

The above mentioned intelligence document (posted on a new website that offered documents taken from the offices of Egyptian intelligence that were attacked and looted by mobs during the revolution.The document originated in the Interrogations Department of Egyptian State Security and is dated January 28, 2011 – three days after the beginning of the revolution.See translated excerpts of relevant portion in Appendix II) sheds light on the Muslim Brotherhood's strategy, the translation of the strategy into practice by the Brotherhood's senior officials including Mohamed Morsi, and the security

officials' reaction to curtail the Muslim Brotherhood activity. It is certain that the Brotherhood did not play overt, so much that that a journalist, Gideon Levy (cited in Halevi, 2012), wrote that "…prophecies of doom, according to which any democratic change would mean the rise of Islam, are also far from being realized. Look at the images from Tahrir Square: There are relatively few obviously religious individuals." But the absence of overt activity does not necessarily exclude covert activities, as indicated by the intelligence document. So the 'limited' role ascribed to the Muslim Brotherhood actually refers to little participation in obvious revolutionary activities, but definitely not applicable to real, underground activities that changed the tide of things on Egypt's political landscape.

At its climax, Cairo's downtown protest reached 60,000 protesters, though it started with a few thousands in Cairo but grew to other cities like Alexandria, and other cities in Egypt started gathering, many coming to the side streets and across bridges over the Nile, the peaceful and civil nature of the protest that chanted the Egyptian anthem and slogans demanding democratic reforms. Things began to getting hideous when policemen in plain uniform and hire thugs were dispersed into the crowds to instigate chaos, beat up protesters with sticks and chains while the security forces fired tear gas cannons, rubber bullets, and open water hoses over the people, a few younger protesters responded by throwing stones and rocks, burning police cars in at least two instances or more, and scuffling with soldiers.

As the rebellion continued and was fast becoming unstoppable in many major cities Mubarak addressed Egyptians amid speculation of a military coup, he simply stated he would delegate powers to vice president Suleiman, while continuing as the head of

state. The reaction to this statement was marked by anger, frustration, and disappointment and it increased or escalated the number and intensity of demonstration across the cities. As the protest increased, Suleiman announced Mubarak's resignation, and entrusted the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces with the leadership of the country. On 11 February 2011, Mubarak resigned and fled Cairo. Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that Mubarak had stepped down and that the Egyptian military would assume control of the nation's affairs in the short term. Jubilant celebrations broke out in Tahrir Square at the news. Mubarak may have left Cairo for Sharm el-Sheikh the previous night, before or shortly after the airing of a taped speech in which Mubarak vowed he would not step down or leave.

Though, the protest started peacefully, but an attempt by Mubarak to quell the upraising as it grew without the support of the military, which just stood by to watch how it goes. Several clashes between the pro and anti-Mubarak government recorded these causalities. Cairo 232, Alexandria 52, Suez 18, BeniSuef 17, El-Arish 1, Luxor 1, Arrfih 1, with 300 people injured as recorded by the Human Rights Watch. Thus, it should not be forgotten that the uprising in Egypt took a spontaneous form and was embraced by vast majority.

The protest also proceeded with the looting and/or burning of several government buildings; many State Security Intelligence (SSI) buildings were raided across Egypt and prisons were burnt down. In the midst of all these Egyptian protesters took up more responsibilities, for a week or more the people managed quite nicely without police (who had vanished) and crime statistics was very low – thanks to the citizens' security committees set up to confront criminal elements, no burglar in his right mind would

brave the gauntlet of checkpoints set up on virtually every block. Even though it involved some elements of violent attacks, the protesters achieved their aims and Mubarak was ousted and the people demanded he should be tried on Egyptian soil.

CHAPTER FIVE

YOUTH ROLE IN THE EGYPTIAN POLITICAL CHANGE

5.1 Introduction

This study is an examination of the youths' role in the movement for political change in Egypt and the factors (domestic and external) that influenced that role. It has

been noted already that the youths in any society cannot be neglected because they could play a crucial role in the development of any society, particularly if their potentials are effectively and efficiently harnessed and mobilized towards purposeful and meaningful life in society. In this chapter data generated from carefully selected secondary sources, and in addition to data derived from interviews with some academic scholars and some members of the Egyptian High Commission to Nigeria in Abuja are presented and analysed with implications drawn on the variables of the study, on the basis of which the findings are discussed and the conclusion established.

5.2 The Specific Roles of the Youth

It is certain that the youths succeeded in several domains prior to the January Revolution. In fact Hatem (2014) opines that:

> Without seeking to d`1etract from the roles these young icons played in the initial phase of the Arab uprising, there is still a need to move the discussion to the study of formal and/or new informal organizations that some youth groups developed in addressing their existing polarized and fragmented publics. For this, a detailed discussion...may provide some...political debate on the roles that young men and women should (or should not) play in this transitional period.

This opinion points to the actual and potential role of the youth in the entire Arab uprising, although it acknowledges some lapses or differences (debatable) in the patterns of bringing it (the role) to bear on the political landscape in order to advance the cause of the protests. This agrees with the suggestion of UNESCO (2011) that taking the youth seriously is not an alternative but an urgent priority for many countries in the region, which has witnessed the readiness and capability of the young people to mobilise the society and become an integral part of the social transformations in 2011. It is therefore certain that the youth played some identifiable role in the movement for political change

in Egypt. Dr Isa Kabir (Interview, 28/02/2017) and Dr. David Moveh (Interview, 24/02/2017) both agreed that the section of the Egyptian society that led the movement for political change were the youths, who mobilised across all ethnic, social and religious section of the society; they mobilized, undertook advocacy and campaigned against the regime in a sustained manner the led to the eventual collapse of the regime. There are other interests identifiable that played notable roles especially indirectly in the entire process, but the youth played a major role in the open protest. This has some political implications, including the fact that with some effort at achieving unity of purpose concerning any political matter, the youths can constitute a formidable political force in any society, and thus the need to take youth issues seriously.

They were motivated by the knowledge they gained from the internet and social networking sites about issues like how to fight tyranny and human rights violations, and about non-violent resistance movements abroad. They used this knowledge to their advantage and began to publish and broadcast information on human rights violations electronically through every means possible. They also used such information to engage their communities and mobilise the masses. Thus the youth were able to liberate themselves from traditional partisan affiliations, and also from historical and ideological conflicts; they were able to discern the level of institutional liquidity and regulatory decentralisation. Most importantly, their demands were based on a common denominator of rejecting tyranny, oppression and torture, and calling for freedom and emancipation, as they refused any partial solutions less than the departure of the regime. The youth succeeded in being the driving force that mobilised the masses on the streets, a feat which

the elite and traditional powers had tried but were unable achieve for several decades (Madi, 2013; Frontline, 2011).

As the Tahrir Square protests gained momentum through late January and early February 2011, the April 6 Youth Movement issued the following specific demands on 6 February, 2011: Mubarak must immediately resign; the national assembly and senate must be dissolved; a "national salvation group" must be established that includes all public and political personalities, intellectuals, constitutional and legal experts, and representatives of youth groups who called for the demonstrations on 25 and 28 January (this group would form a transitional coalition government for a transitional period and also form a transitional presidential council until the next presidential elections); a new constitution must be written to guarantee the principles of freedom and social justice; those responsible for killing of hundreds of "martyrs" in Tahrir Square must be prosecuted; and detainees must be released immediately (Frontline, 2011).

Behind this enormous protest is what Hauslohner (2011) calls the "Nerve Center of the Revolution." She captures a scene as follows:

> On the 4th floor of an old shadowy apartment building in the heart of downtown Cairo, the tech savvy leaders of the 6th of April Youth Movement, are busy planning the Revolution...They're lawyers, accountants and web designers. They wear jeans and flip flops, colourful headscarves, and the black and white checkeredkeffiyahs associated with the Palestinian intifadeh. Today they are among the country's core activists who shoulder the responsibility for the largest Egyptian uprising in more than 50 years.

The youths, both in the square and at the 'Nerve Center", were able to mobilise themselves and entire society to move for a political change in Egypt. They were clear in their demands, and they insisted with persistence and endurance for their demands to be met fully, using available information and strategies they acquired to push their cause

against the regime, until they succeeded. There has not been any more organised group that has achieved such feat in this manner at any point in the history of Egypt. To this Dr.Moveh (Interview, 24/02/2017) attests that it was a revolution because it was unprecedented in the enormous number of people that were mobilized against the government against all odds. However, Dr. Isa Kabir (Interview, 28/02/2017) disagreed that it was a revolution; he opines that it was a spontaneous response to global events. Looking at these varying opinions about that interpretation of what happened in Egypt, there is need to emphasize that most given the history of Egypt since independence, the 2011 protests have made a mark that has never been recorded in the country, and the presence of global factors as motivations for the protest are not an argument against its definite impact within Egypt, but even supporting variables for explaining the success thereof to an extent and magnitude that can be termed a revolution.

5.3 Conditions that Instigated and Facilitated the Youth

This section contains a critical examination of the domestic conditions and external factors that instigated the youths to rise up and demand for political change against the regime of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. The manner in which these conditions and factors worked to make the Egyptian state vulnerable to the youth uprising is systematically discussed, thereby giving more light to the motivation for the youth's role in the movement for political change.

5.3.1 Domestic conditions

Unemployment generally refers to a situation where a capable person is not fully gainfully employed so that his full capacity is explored, resulting in his/her inability to

generate a certain level of income that will guarantee a decent standard of living. A major reason for frustration of Egyptian people with Hosni Mubarak was his failure to improve economic conditions; Egypt's unemployment rate shortly before the revolution was 10.1% (Grammy, 2011). Generally, a basic problem in Egypt is unemployment driven by a demographic youth bulge: with a few people entering the job force at about 4% a year, unemployment in Egypt is almost 10 times as high for college graduates as it is for people who have gone through elementary school, particularly educated urban youth – the same people who were out in the streets during the revolution. Over the last two decades, unemployment, particularly among young educated Egyptians, worsened dramatically. Although some have argued that in the last ten years, total unemployment Improved, youth unemployment among university graduates increased (from 9.7% in 1998 to14.4% in 2006) (Assaad, 2007), but there has been no proof as regards this statement.

The above statistics agree with the opinions of AbdelhamidMuhammed (Interview 17/4/2013), a staff at the Egyptian embassy, who said "there are a lot of graduates in and around Egypt who cannot get jobs even after graduating with honours; those who are lucky to get are underpaid."He further states that the government of the day had no interest in providing social welfare where by the youths could receive a little amount of money to fend for themselves therefore they felt neglected by the government. Moreover, persisting in the trend of the 1990s, most jobs created in the 1998-2006 period were in the informal economy, in which workers are poorly paid, lack social security coverage and work contracts, and, therefore, are more exposed to therisk of poverty. The global crisis further exacerbated labour market challenges in Egypt employment growth

slowed down, lay-offs increased and even total unemployment started torise, albeit slightly (from 8.9% in 2007 to 9.4% in 2009). Youths, again, were particularly affected by the global crisis.

The economic policies undertaken by the Egyptian government had a very limited impact on job creation and, in many cases, worsened the employment situation. In fact, in spite of economic reforms, Egypt's economic performance remained largely dependent on external factors and therefore unsustainable. The country's economic boom during 2003-2008 was largely due to the boom in the global oil market, which benefited Arab oil exporting countries, resulting in higher direct foreign investment (FDI) and remittances from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. By contrast, with the global financial crisis and the consequent decline in the fortunes of GCC countries, Egypt's economic growth slowed down through declines in the major drivers of its economic success, namely exports, FDI, remittances and tourism revenues (Paciello, 2010; Radwan 2009; Abu Hatab, 2009).

Furthermore, in spite of the attempts at improving Egypt's competitiveness, its export structure remained heavily dominated by natural resources and low-tech manufacturing exports, which provided very low quality jobs and limited opportunities for well-qualified young workers. In addition, FDI flowed to capital-intensive sectors that did not generate sufficient employment opportunities, and its large increase in recent years reflected privatization, rather than new investment opportunities, that would have contributed to job creation(Alissa, 2007; El-Megharbel, 2007). Economic reforms did not bring about an increase in private investment as initially expected. Thus, the prospects of

public sector employment declined significantly in recent years, employment opportunities in the formal private sector remained limited.

Maria Cristina Paciello also wrote in her book Egypt: Changes and Challenges of Political Transition (2011), that over the last two decades, the state social welfare system in Egypt has gone through a seriouscrisis, which accelerated in the last years. While the government continued to be the mainprovider of education and health services, such services were no longer free and their qualityworsened dramatically because public expenditure on social services declined. The retrenchment of the state's welfare provision accelerated in recent years. Public expenditure on education and health services was cut. For example, public spending on education declined, from 19.5% in 2002 to 11.5% in 2006, as a percentage of total expenditure, and from 5.2% to 4.0%, as a percentage of GDP (UNDP, 2008). Similarly, although total health expenditure as a percentage of public spending increased from 1.2% in 2001/2002 to 3.6% in 2008/2009, its share remained low relative to other countries of comparable income levels. Most of this spending went towards paying salaries, which, however, were insufficient to guarantee a dignified life for health sector workers (EIPR, 2009). Egyptian families increasingly incurred a wide range of private costs when they accessed public social services. Private out-of-pocket health spending, for example, increased faster than public spending, from 63% of total health expenditure in 2002, to 70% in 2008 (EIPR, 2009).

Lastly, the dramatic deterioration in the quality of public education contributed to creating a generation of young Egyptians who are ill prepared for the job market. Egypt is rated number 120 among 128 countries on gender gap measurement. Full and productive employment and decent work for all remains a challenge, particularly for women and

young people. The labour market remains highly gender discriminated. Women participation in the labour market is among the lowest in the world, where young women (aged 18-29) represent 18.5% of the Egyptian workforce compared to more than 50% of men. Egypt's unemployment reaches almost 23% among women and young males aged 15-24, and exceeds 60% among young females in the same age group, compared to the overall unemployment rate of approximately 9.4% in 2009. Almost 75% of jobs created between 1998 and 2006 were in the informal sector. The informal sector currently represents the main source of employment for new labour market entrants. Women's engagement in the informal sector differs from men's.

Whereas most men in the informal sector are either wage workers or employers, Women are primarily non-wage workers contributing in various ways to household production and family businesses. Most Women in the informal sector work in agriculture or horticulture agro-business, with agriculture continuing to account for one third of all female employment. This sector, by nature, is an insecure sector, since it does not offer a work contract or social or medical insurance. In addition, while women make important contributions to the rural economy, their productivity is limited due to lack of access to land, credit, networks, marketing and information, as well as their heavy workload due to household responsibilities. 1.1 million Women work in the informal sector, 93% of these in rural areas. In 2006, according to United Nations report entitled Arab Youth Strategizing for the Millennium Development Goals, in Egypt, 41% of adult females were illiterate, and mostly in the rural areas of Upper Egypt. Moreover, 54% of rural Upper Egyptian girls aged 13 to 15 are not enrolled in school, compared with 11% of boys (UNDP, 2006).

To summarize, education is irrelevant to market demands; also the wealth and gender gaps were of a high relevance to the outbreak of the revolution of the 25th of January. The lack of investment in vocational education and training has derived people to seek higher educational certificates, such as university education, leading to more supply in the job market, noting that official development reports that highlight the fact that education does not match market needs. The wealth gap and the disappearance of the middle class in society along with the existing gender gap and the absence of social justice were some of the existing contextual conditions that provided the necessary atmosphere for the thriving of the motivation to revolt against the government of the day, by the youths, on January 25th, 2011.

Closely tied to unemployment is the phenomenon of poverty. The population of Egypt grew from 30,083,419 in 1966 to roughly 79,000,000 by 2008. The vast majority of Egyptians live in the limited spaces near the banks of the Nile River, in an area of about 40,000 square kilometres (15,000 sq mi), where the only arable land is found. In late 2010 around 40% of Egypt's population of just fewer than 80 million lived on the fiscal income equivalent of roughly US$2 per day, with a large part of the population relying on subsidized goods. Whereas the top 20% of the population receives about 41% of the national income, the remaining 80% receives the remaining 59% (Grammy, 2011; Koratayev and Zinkina, 2011). This is especially instructive when set against the inflation rate of 10.6% (Grammy, 2011) which means lower purchasing power for the poor majority. In other words, there was a demographic change taking place in Egypt that was not met by effective, people-oriented government policies to address issues (e.g. poverty, unemployment, lack of dignity, etc.) affecting them (Beck and Hüser, 2012).

The main demands of the 2011 uprising were bread, freedom and human dignity. "The people who started the revolution weren't poor. They started the revolution for those less fortunate than them," said Ahmed Nabil (Interview, 17/4/2013). Indeed there was a general awareness, especially among the youth, that poverty was one of Egypt's major problems. While many expressed the view that not only the poor suffered under Mubarak, there was also an acknowledgement that social class brought protection with it. Salem (2011) says that it is clear that social class and generation were two prominent social relations that led to and impacted on the revolution, and these were interwoven within a web that is ran through by dignity. Dignity as a concept should be understood as interconnected with all levels of Egyptian society: there is the dignity of the person in terms of their economic status, their political freedom, the worth of their passport, and the opportunities for their children. All these are issues that bear on the poverty level of the citizens of Egypt.

The wide gap between the rich and the poor is also another dimension of poverty as a factor in the revolution (Salem, 2011). Studies by Paciello (2011), and Abdou and Zeinab (2013) showed that the Egyptian uprising occurred based on the increased disconnect among citizens; they were oppressed as a minority from a group of businessmen. Many of those involved in the revolution fall within the class of the 'have nots' when compared with the class of the rich. And where the government works in favour of the rich against the poor, as the case has been affirmed in Egypt, then the poor (if they are the majority and if they are mobilised and motivated) are capable of forming a formidable force against the government. Poverty, in its entire ramifications, is therefore one of the factors that motivated the youth to participate in the Egyptian revolt.

Another factor worth considering is repressive nature of the Egyptian political system. Ahmed Nabil (Interview, 17/4/2/2013) agreed that the emergency law in Egypt also contributed to the upraising believed it was a youth revolution in its totality because most of them were born after Mubarak became president of Egypt, and thus his system is the only one they have known. They have grown up in a society that has become increasingly stratified and repressive, and in which public space has become increasingly constricted. They could not participate in governance for the fear of their lives but he also believes in any type of government that can meet the people at their needs and the citizens are also free to contribute to the government without fear. More factors are attributed to socio-economic and political factors. Explanations include the persistent rule by terror for thirty years through the emergency law (Law No. 162 of 1958) was enacted after the 1967 Six-Day War. It was suspended for 18 months in the early 1980sand has otherwise continuously been in effect since President Sadat's 1981 assassination. Under the law, police powers are extended, constitutional rights suspended, censorship is legalized, and the government may imprison individuals indefinitely and without reason. The law sharply limits any non-governmental political activity, including street demonstrations, non-approved political organizations, and unregistered financial donations.

The Mubarak government has cited the threat of terrorism in order to extend the emergency law, claiming that opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood could come into power in Egypt if the current government did not forgo parliamentary electionsand suppress the group through actions allowed under emergency law. This has led to the imprisonment of activists without trials, illegal undocumented hidden detention

facilities, and rejecting university, mosque, and newspaper staff members based on their political inclination. A parliamentary election in December 2010 was preceded by a media crackdown, arrests, candidate bans (particularly of the Muslim Brotherhood), and allegations of fraud involving the near-unanimous victory by the ruling party in parliament. Human rights organizations estimate that in 2010 between 5,000 and 10,000 people were in long-term detention without charge or trial. According to a report from the United States Embassy in Egypt, police brutality has been common and widespread in Egypt. In the five years prior to the revolution, the Mubarak regime denied the existence of torture or abuse carried out by the police. However, many claims by domestic and international groups provided evidence through cell phone videos or first-hand accounts of hundreds of cases of police abuse.

According to the 2009 Human Rights Report by the US State Department, "Domestic and international human rights groups reported that the Ministry of Interior (MOI) State Security Investigative Service (SSIS), police, and other government entities continued to employ torture to extract information or force confessions. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights documented 30 cases of torture during the year 2009. In numerous trials defendants alleged that police tortured them during questioning. During the year activists and observers circulated some amateur cell phone videos documenting the alleged abuse of citizens by security officials. For example, on 8 February, a blogger posted a video of two police officers, identified by their first names and last initials, sodomizing a bound naked man named Ahmed Abdel Fattah Ali with a bottle. On 12 August, the same blogger posted two videos of alleged police torture of a man in a Port

Said police station by the head of investigations, Mohammed Abu Ghazala. There was no indication that the government investigated either case.

The deployment of plainclothes forces paid by Mubarak's ruling party, Baltageya (Arabic: بلطجية), has been a hallmark of the Mubarak government. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights has documented 567 cases of torture, including 167 deaths, by police that occurred between 1993 and 2007. Excessive force was often used by law enforcement agencies. The police forces constantly quashed democratic uprisings with brutal force and corrupt tactics. On 6 June 2010 Khaled Mohamed Saeed died under disputed circumstances in the SidiGaber area of Alexandria. Multiple witnesses testified that Saeed was beaten to death by the police. Habib el-Adly (ex-interior minister) had issued a statement that Said was on drugs and had died of overdoes but many people had doubts because the statement did not correspond to the way his face was smashed. A Facebook page called "We are all Khaled Said" helped bring nationwide attention to the case. Mohamed El Baradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), led a rally in 2010 in Alexandria against alleged abuses by the police and visited Saeed's family to offer condolences. Nevertheless, Said was a trigger, not a cause, and other elements had to have reached breaking point for the Said case to have had such a profound impact.

The prohibition on political rights and civil freedoms and lack of free and fair elections, police brutality against activists, the spread of virtual-opposition through social networking websites and the Arabic satellite, the lack of health services. In short, the revolution is explained by the increasing density and pervasiveness of social, economic and political grievances that culminated into an uncontrollable anger towards a

diminishing legitimacy of Mubarak's thirty-years-rule of the country. This was largely reflected in the main demands of the protestors that called for "democracy, freedom and social justice." Abdou and Zeinab (2013), Bitar (2013), Masoud (2011) and Salem (2011) all agree in their conclusions that there are certain reasons behind the Egyptian revolution, including outright police brutality on the citizens and its troubling presence in the neighbourhoods. Socioeconomic and political pressures in the form of political oppression, unemployment, high cost of living, and the need for more just laws, among others, are some of the intertwined factors that forced rebellion out of the youths, with the accomplice of some external factors (Moveh, Interview 24/02/2017; Isa, Interview 2017).

5.3.2 External factors

Every nation exists within an international system, and therefore it is subject to – and also responds to – different types of external influences. The responses of a country to external influences normally take place at different levels: individual, group, and state levels. Also, the response could be inwardly project to one or more elements or components within the state system, or outwardly toward the external environment (international event, actors, etc.). Both Egyptian state and citizens have responded in several ways to external influences generally. During the time of the revolution, the role of the external influences cannot be denied, and it operated in a complex way to both influence the youth and/or provide a suitable atmosphere for their ambitions in the revolution.

Webster (2011) says: "You're going to see a revolution world-wide. What's going to unite them in this cause is another major trend: Journalism. The Internet has become the great connector. They all know what's going on. They're all Facebook. They're all

together. They have a system where they're interacting and relating. It's a different kind of social network than the other one, but the same."Abdulmuji (Interview, 17/4/2013) believes that the youths were indoctrinated by the United States in a bid to advance her interest in Egypt, through the instrumentality of social media tools like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, among others. Chelib and Sohail (2011) maintain that the revolution in Egypt was a result of accumulated misery and hardship that Egyptians have been facing for decades. However, the social media were instrumental in facilitating and accelerating the organisation of the revolutionary movement. Moreover, it is also a means through which foreign opinions infiltrate into the system especially as it touches on the revolution from the dimension of those people who have access to the social media. Chelib and Sohail (2011) argue that although the actual numbers of social media users in Egypt was small, the majority who were connected to social media was politically active and influential enough to gather the support of a large number of people. Social media was used properly to help in converting a popular trend or movement into a social epidemic, thus accelerating its growth at a much faster pace. However Lust and Wichmann (2012) opine that Arabs and outsiders alike have heralded technologically savvy youth for engineering the uprisings. They argue that young Arabs used Facebook and Twitter to mobilize people as never before. Certainly, youth-led social media played a role in the uprisings, but viewing the uprisings too narrowly in these terms overlooks the breadth and depth of the popular mobilisation:

> …just over one-quarter of Egyptians that participated in the demonstrations during the revolution read blogs, as compared with 8 percent in the general population. Social media did play a role. But Facebook and other internet tools did not necessarily drive change. Indeed, most of the countries that witnessed the greatest mobilization in 2011 are among those with poor internet coverage: Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen are six

> of the lowest ranking Arab states in terms of internet usage, according to the International Viewing the uprisings as the outcome of suddenly mobilized, internet-savvy youth overemphasizes the role of the internet and overlooks the role of older Arabs whose participation was critical…this view "ignores a decade of contentious politics and mobilization in Egypt, which paved the way for the January 25th uprising (Lust and Wichmann, 2012).

They conclude that the 2011 uprisings were of unprecedented size and impact, but the discontent was not entirely new nor solely the product of technologically savvy youth. Moreover, the uprisings were mobilized around governance failures that were felt far beyond economic conditions, including issues of national identity and dignity. These issues will play a critical role in the transitions ahead – and most importantly, uprisings are far from over. Domestic, regional and international factors will continue to shape and reshape contests within Arab states – destabilizing some regimes, strengthening others and contributing to a fluid regional reformation. The argument of Lust and Wichmann (2012) recognise the limited role of social media as a tool for popular mobilisation without ignoring the role of older Arabs and other participants whose involvements in the revolution were critical. But social media as a factor had engendered another related factor – foreign contact (Beck and Hüser, 2012).

Some of the revolutionary youth leaders of Egypt had a number of foreign contacts that as means of arming them for the subsequent revolution, which cannot be ignored as another aspect of external influence, beside social media. The actual number and manners of these foreign contacts cannot be accurately estimated or determined, given the circumstances (before and during) of the revolution. However, Frontline (2011) notes the following in this regard:

> …April 6 members also studied the nonviolent tactics of Serbian and Ukrainian youth movements. In the summer of 2009, blogger and April 6 activist Mohammed Adeltraveled to Serbiato take a course on strategies for

> nonviolent revolutions. It was taught by people who had organized the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević in the 1990s. In December 2008, one April 6 member visited the United States to take part in a State Department-organized "Alliance of Youth Movements Summit" in New York City. According to a recently releasedWikileaks cable, the activist said he discussed with other activists there techniques to evade government surveillance and harassment. He also reported to his State Department contact that the April 6 group "would like to call for another strike on April 6, 2009, but realizes this would be 'impossible' due to SSIS [state security] interference," and said that the government had driven the group's leadership, including Maher, underground.

The facts above, which agree with the opinions of some staff members of the Egyptian High Commission in Abuja, are an evidence of the fact that the Egyptian youth revolt was an event and process that has global bearing, drawing motivation from outside the borders of the Egyptian state. In this age of global connectedness, events in one part of the world can hardly be disconnected with some other factors in other parts of the world. The implication of this, by way of a recommendation, is that nations should not take for granted any groups within their borders, whether youths or terrorists or women or civil right activists, that have the capacity to maintain any kind and/or means of global connection with similar groups or interests elsewhere outside their borders, that could influence their collective behaviours toward any issue or entity within their borders, including the established systems of government and administrations. This was the pitfall of the Mubarak regime, as powerful and long enduring as it might have been before the youth uprising.

Another aspect of external influence has to do with the response of the Egyptian military. Barany (2011) notes that although Egypt's generals opted to back the uprising, their road to that decision was full of a complex of factors, notable among which was the fact that the armed forces reap huge amount of funds every year in military aid from the United States. When in response to the massive anti-Mubarak protests in late January

2011 the Egyptian military was deployed in different parts of the country, the high military command declared that the demands of the protesters were legitimate, and pledged not to use force against the Egyptian people (Lutterbeck, 2011)

The military has been part of the ruling class since the inception of the Egyptian state. Since the peace treaty of 1979 with Israel, the Egyptian military has been the recipient of the second largest American military aid, totalling over $2 billion per year (Salem, 2013). Furthermore, the military continued to have widespread popular support in the public opinion, and continued its influence in the economic sphere. Importantly, top military figures were part of the corrupt system that existed under Mubarak, although it can be argued that they were drawn in as part of a broader attempt to co-opt them. While their position within the ruling class has changed vis-à-vis other elites, their presence within the class is difficult to dispute (Salem, 2013).

These facts, coupled with other factors connected with the Mubarak regime in particular and the Egyptian society in general, influenced the decision of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), some weeks into the revolution, to decline to save Mubarak's regime, to assume control of the country on February 10, and the next day to persuaded Mubarak to resign and head for internal exile. In this case here, the influence of the United States over the decision of the Egyptian military is not necessarily implied or validated, but the relative strength and autonomy of the military as a product of the United States military aid has given the military some level of power in Egyptian politics. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian military remained a key part of the support base for Mubarak before the revolution. Ahmed (2011) and Siddique (1985) both believe that the Egyptian military has enjoyed a relative autonomy as a result of the decades of support

from the United States. This is a crucial external factor that explains the position and impact of the military throughout the period of the protests, and thereafter. It is certain that the several displacements that took place as a result of the protest did not affect the military's position in the political landscape of Egypt. Salem (2013) rightly concludes that the army's interventions in 2011 and subsequently can be viewed as an attempt to restore its centrality within the ruling class (especially after 2011), and to protect its privileges from the protests themselves.

In all countries of the world, certain happenings that take place in a country effects the other for example the happenings in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria affects the price of crude oil around the world. Globalization has made the world a small village the happenings in one part of the world affects all other parts (Bitar, 2013); examples include the global warming and the global financial crisis. The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 was accompanied not only by economic growth rates slowdown, but also by a visible decrease in the proportion of Egyptians living on less than $2 a day, from 23% to 19.5%. This was a painful strike to such a poor country in the world that spends a major part of its household income on buying food. Egypt strongly depends on food imports, so poor Egyptians felt the price growth very perceptibly. The $2 a day income poverty line is calculated by the UN accounting for purchasing power parity (PPP); as a result, several millions of Egyptians found themselves below this poverty line. Reda and Hatab (2007) summarise the position of Egypt with the framework of the GFC in the following way:

> Although the epicenter of the crisis was the US sub-prime mortgage market, the shockwaves of the crisis are still being felt in Egypt's economy as well, since we are far more exposed to international markets after our macro-economic reforms of 1991. As the financial sector is fully integrated with the

> real economy, the burgeoning crisis in the financial sector poses a threat to the real economy. Macro-economic fundamentals like growth, investment, exports, tourism, employment and other segments are bound to be affected.

In spring 2008 the protests against food price growth surged in Egypt. The central event was the strike of spinning and weaving factory workers in the industrial city of al Mahalla al Kubra which started on the 6th of April, 2008. The worker's dissent was aimed first and foremost at the decrease of living standards caused by food price growth. Egyptian bloggers supporting the strikers launched a Facebook group called "April 6 Youth Movement". It is known that this movement played a crucial role in the Egyptian Revolution 2011. Still more important was social self-organization through Facebook which was first successfully tried in spring 2008 by this youth movement and proved its efficiency in 2011 events.

Summatively, the GFC proved to be a source of pressure on the Egyptian economy, in addition to the domestic economic inefficiencies. It indirectly provided a pilot opportunity for the use of social media as a tool for social mobilization and self-organisation among youths, which became an effective tool in the 2011 revolt.

The start of the uprising on Tuesday, 25 January 2011, was by all means inspired by the success of The Tunisian Revolution or "The Jasmine Revolution" to overthrow the Old regime. Many credit the successful ouster of Ben Ali in Tunisia for providing Egypt the necessary counter example that sparked the ambition to rid it of its culture of political fatalism. The citizens of Egypt harnessed their collective discontent and changed the social and political future of their country in the days spanning January 25 to February 11, 2011. Hundreds of thousands of citizens took to the streets in a peaceful stance of

solidarity that resulted in one key outcome - an end to Hosni Mubarak's nearly 30-year rule (Isa, Interview 28/02/2017).

If Tunisia's revolt provided the trigger for Egypt's uprising, the gap between what Egyptians expected and what they experienced provided the fuel. The "spark" for the Tunisian Revolution, that was largely inspirational in Egypt and the region generally, is very demonstrative of the dual action of economic deprivation and political repression in the region. Mohamed Bouazizi, an unemployed fruit and vegetable seller in Tunisia, had his produce confiscated by authorities and responded with the shocking protest of setting himself on fire in front of the local government office. Bouazizi, an "everyman" example of the problems plaguing the region, was driven on one hand by his economic deprivation, and on the other by the abuse he suffered at the hands of the authorities who took away his only source of income. Similar incidents all over the region, including Egypt, were driven by similar economic 'woes'. Most importantly, such incidents roused people and resulted in widespread protesting. However, in spite of the importance of international influence, it has also been suggested that internal influence conditions also played a fundamental role in the development of the process of political change in Egypt.

5.4 The Response of the Egyptian State to the Youth Roles

The historicity of Egypt's government response to opposition has shown a consistent pattern of repression through violence and emergency laws which to a large extent had succeeded in preserving the status quo until the 2011 protest. The attitude of the government was to repel and kill the movement through the use of the armed forces; however, this has rather caused an escalation of the peacefully started protest and turned it into a violent faceoff with the masses that led to the complete loss of legitimacy by the

government and the insistence for its exit from power (Isa, Interview 28/02/2017). Also, knowing fully well the internet strategy adopted by the leaders of the movement, the government attempted to cut off all internet access in order to frustrate the communication; but this also did not succeed (Moveh, Interview 24/02/2017; Bangash, 2011).

The government's usual method of dealing with opposition has actually sped its collapse, not only because of a bettercampaign strategy or strategies adopted this time, but also because of the size and composition of people mobilized against the government. The government did not adopt a more profitable approach to resolving the issue: Dr. Isa (Interview, 28/02/2017) recommends that the government should have considered dialogue and negotiation before attempting to use force. Dr.Moveh (Interview, 24/02/2017) adds that the government should not have perceived the youth as opposition; rather, the government should have carried them along in the political process. The implication of these responses is that where legitimate and more acceptable media for meaningful transactions between the government and the masses are not available, the option of violence and counter-violence are highly likely to be adopted by the opposing parties (i.e. the government and the youths). In the case of Egypt, the preparations of the youths have surmounted the government's capacity to quench their move through the use of force. Therefore, not only should measures be taken that will remove the possible stirring of youth agitations, such as social and economic development, political inclusiveness, political decisions that will stimulate an economic atmosphere for better job availability and sense of belonging to the Egyptian polity (Isa, Interview 28/02/2017; Moveh, Interview 24/02/2017).

5.5 The Outcome of the Youth Role and State Response in Egypt

This theme discusses the outcome of the youth's role in the movement for political change, and the responses of the government, on the political landscape of Egypt. The extent of the impact of the youth protest, the collapse of the Mubarak regime and the turn of events after the collapse of the regime are carefully examined.

5.5.1 Egypt after the uprising

To put it simply, the government of Hosni Mubarak collapsed and, to that extent, the youth achieved one of the crucial goals of the movement for political change in Egypt (Isa, Interview 28/02/2017; Moveh, Interview 24/02/2017). Beyond the collapse of the regime, there are mixed feelings about the success of the protest due to the events that followed after. In fact, it is because of the lack of any further noticeable impact resulting directly from the youth protests that generated several opinions that question whether or not what happened in Egypt was a revolution or merely a forced political change. It has been acknowledged removing the government was a significant achievement that was unprecedented before in Egypt; however, the question of establishing a new political order that is suitable to the major advocates of the movement is something that has been a debate subject, because some are of the opinion that not only was the achieved success short-lived, but the entire demands made by the protest were not attained, because something went wrong along the way.

On 13 February 2011, the high level military command of Egypt announced that both the constitution and the parliament of Egypt had been dissolved. The parliamentary election was to be held in September 2011. A constitutional referendum was held on 19 March 2011. On 28 November 2011, Egypt held its first parliamentary election since the previous regime had been in power. Turnout was high and there were no reports of irregularities or violence, although members of some parties broke the ban on campaigning at polling places by handing out pamphlets and banners. On 8 July 2012, Egypt's new president Mohamed Morsi announced he was overriding the military edict that dissolved the country's elected parliament and he called lawmakers back into session.

On 10 July 2012, the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt negated the decision by President Mohamed Morsi to call the nation's parliament back into session. On 2 August 2012, Egypt's Prime Minister HishamQandil announced his 35 member cabinet comprising 28 newcomers including four from the influential Muslim Brotherhood, six others and the former military ruler Mohamed Hussein Tantawi as the Defence Minister from the previous Government.

On 22 November 2012, Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi issued a declaration immunizing his decrees from challenge and seeking to protect the work of the constituent assembly drafting the new constitution. The declaration also requires a retrial of those accused in the Mubarak-era killings of protesters, who had been acquitted, and extends the mandate of the constituent assembly by two months. Additionally, the declaration authorizes Morsi to take any measures necessary to protect the revolution. Liberal and secular groups previously walked out of the constitutional constituent assembly because

they believed that it would impose strict Islamic practices, while Muslim Brotherhood backers threw their support behind Morsi.

The move was criticized by Mohammed El Baradei, the leader of Egypt's Constitution Party, who stated “Morsi today usurped all state powers and appointed himself Egypt's new pharaoh” on his Twitter feed. The move led to massive protests and violent actions throughout Egypt. On 5 December 2012, Tens of thousands of supporters and opponents of Egypt's president clashed, hurling rocks and Molotov cocktails and brawling in Cairo's streets, in what was described as the largest violent battle between Islamists and their foes since the country's revolution. Six senior advisors and three other officials resigned from the government and the country's leading Islamic institution called on Morsi to stem his powers. Protesters also clamoured from coastal cities to desert towns.

Mohamed Morsi offered a “national dialogue” with opposition leaders but refused to cancel a 15 December vote on a draft constitution written by an Islamist-dominated assembly that ignited two weeks of political unrest. According to Childress (2013), the Muslim Brotherhood felt its rivals failed to respect the rules of the new democracy that put the Islamists in the driving seat via free elections. Six months into office, Morsi was also being held responsible for an economic crisis caused by two years of turmoil. The Egyptian pound has sunk to record lows against the dollar. The parties that called for Friday’s protests listed demands, including a complete overhaul of the constitution. On the other hand, Childress (2013) also notes that critics said that the constitution, which was approved in a referendum, offers inadequate protection for human rights and grants the president too many privileges and fails to curb the power of a military establishment

supreme in the Mubarak era. Morsi's supporters were of the view that enacting the constitution quickly was crucial to restoring the stability needed for economic recovery.

Amara (2012) notes that the direct effects of the youth war are evident in the Arab spring, an uprising that was sparked by two young men: Mohammad Bouazizi of Tunisia who inspired the Tunisian revolution after he set himself on fire to protest against unemployment and the state's role, and Khalid Saed of Egypt who was killed by security forces while in custody in Alexandria, Egypt. The two were youth who refused to acquiesce to the state and demanded that their rights be respected. In doing so, they tapped into a common sentiment among millions of Arab youth of material deprivation, sense of helplessness, lack of potential and political alienation. Their deaths motivated an apathetic youthful generation to rebel and turned a system upside down where the youth led the political discourse and the older generation followed. This youth upheaval is the result of an action-oriented quick results generation impatient of waiting for change and taking matters into hand. What started in Tunis and Egypt has now engulfed most Arab nations and threatens the rest of the regional nations (Amara, 2012).

It should be noted that opponents of the revolution exploited many issues, complications and positions such as identity, the application of Shari'ah law, and partisan demands with great skill. Thus, the youth's lack of interest stemmed from not wanting to participate in the decision-making process, which was dominated by old parties and the long-standing elite (Madi, 2013). Moreover, the young people have suffered from the lack of a true political project and failure to establish a democracy, and have become an integral part of the political polarisation in Egypt. By endorsing the army to take over the political landscape once again, they have contributed to aggravating an already sensitive situation.

5.5.2 Egypt's political landscape after the youth-led protests

The protest exposed young people to revolutionary ideologies, and instils attitudes of condescension and even contempt for the more cautious politics of their elders. And it connects people with these ideas and attitudes and frustrations with other people who share them. Education raises expectations, but fails to deliver the expected higher standard of living. Therefore, if a country has a large youth mass, a high college graduation rate and at the same time has high unemployment, then higher education seems to function as an accelerant of unrest. This is a recipe for potential violence and bloodshed. All of this is rendered even more heartbreaking when one realizes that the pattern is that young people are typically the vanguard of the revolution, not its eventual rulers. In other words, self-sacrificing idealists (young enthusiastic and educated people) start revolutions, but self-seeking realists consolidate them (Bowyer, 2013).

After the successful ouster of the Mubarak regime, the youth activists who sparked the revolution were among those who first expressed frustration with their country's post-revolutionary transition. Egypt's youth unquestionably played a leading role in organizing their countrymen and outmanoeuvring the leaders who had long failed to provide the youth with opportunities to participate politically and economically. Yet, they have complained that they have been sidelined from the post-revolutionary transition (Grubman, 2012). Egypt's 2011 uprising was often referred to as a youth revolution, and rightly so, but two years after long-time President Hosni Mubarak was forced out of

office, many in the younger generation say they feel more politically isolated than ever. The country is beset by severe political and social divisions as the struggle between the ruling Muslim Brotherhood and its opponents persisted. Therefore, young activists across the political spectrum say they have been sidelined, prevented from participating in the leadership and management of post-Mubarak Egypt by a patriarchal culture that favours the older and supposedly more experienced (Hassieb, 2013). MostafaSherif, 29 years, an unemployed mechanical engineer is quoted by Hassieb (2013) as saying this:

> We received nothing of what we fought for and what some of us died for. We did not get our freedoms, the rights for which people died, the economy is doing much worse than ever, and it seems like we're in need of a new revolution.

As a result of opinions as the one quoted above, Madi (2013) suggests that there is the need to find out how and why the youth-led revolution evolved from a struggle of the youth and the masses to an elitist concern. In other words, it may be best to try to find out where the youth succeeded prior to the January 25 Revolution and why, and where they failed. It must be noted that the young people were motivated by the knowledge they gained from the internet and social networking sites about two main issues: first is how to combat tyranny and human rights violations at home, and second is about non-violent resistance movements abroad. They also used the information to engage their communities and mobilise the masses; thus they were able to liberate themselves from traditional partisan and historical and ideological conflict (Madi, 2013). Above all, based on a common denominator of rejecting tyranny, oppression and torture, and calling for freedom, they also were able to refuse any and all partial solutions until their main demand of complete departure of the regime was met. Madi (2013) notes that in spite of these significant successes, the youth failed in several respects:

> They did not care to make an intellectual presence and they failed to crystallise a clearly defined political project. They also had no leadership that could express their needs and represent them. Perhaps this was due to their surprise that they were able to topple the regime so quickly. Whatever it was, they did not have sufficient time to prepare themselves for a suitable political alternative and to familiarise with themselves with nation-building skills.

Therefore, after February 11 events in Egypt took a disfavourable turn, leading to the hijacking of the youth revolution by the elite and older generation. The military and the elite took over after the regime was toppled, and during the transition period there was no any concrete participation from the youth who led the revolution. The expectations of the youth in the revolution – namely (i) building a new political system, (ii) enabling the youth and the politically disadvantaged sections of Egyptian society to participate in the decision making process by way of effective social and political institutions, (iii) the accountability and trial of the individuals responsible for killing youth during the revolt, and (iv) achieving social justice and embarking on socio-political programme that would alleviate hardship for the vast majority of Egyptians – were not at all achieved by the political elite that took over during the transition period (Madi, 2013). Furthermore, the political elite became more and more polarized. The situation became worse when the youth, along with other parties and factions, did not realize the real nature of revolutionary change, notably, that toppling a regime does not necessarily mean the fall of the system and the institutionalized forces behind it. Thus the youth not only lost their direction after the revolution; they also lacked focus necessary to attain any of their goals. This, Madi opines, led to the death of the process of change and prevented the development of any alternative political system.

Abdalla (2013)however feels that the youth movement that led Egypt's 25 January 2011 revolution is far from being demobilized today; it is currently undergoing

an institutionalization process as several new political parties (e.g. El-Adl, el-Tayar El-Masry, Masr El-Horeya, El-Waa'y) representing the youth are being founded, and this political empowerment and inclusion of the youth in the democratic process are important for the success of the current transition process. Abdalla(2013) however did not fail to recognize the main challenges and obstacles faced in this development, namely the continuous political instability that has made it difficult for all the new parties to build structures, the lack of sustainable funding that has harmed the performance of the parties, the generational rifts and obstacles for participation, and the internal struggles, among others. He therefore concludes that the dynamism of highly mobilized youth offers an opportunity for the creation of new leadership and alternatives to Egypt's old parties and movements. However, in order to consolidate themselves, the new youth dominated political parties needed to develop their internal structures and their cadres alike. This implies that there is still a lot of work to be done if the youth will be able to still push their cause within the transitional Egyptian state system with its emerging political institutions in order to achieve their goals.

Contrary to the opinion of Abdalla (2013), Madi (2013) feels that the youth did not succeed in establishing new viable parties that would continue with the goals of the revolution, and the majority of their nascent initiatives were unsuccessful due to many divisions and problems as was the case with the April 6th Movement, the Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood. The situation worsened due to the issues that political forces focused on. These forces and traditional parties did not allow the youth to engage in the public domain or contribute to new policies or core issues; they did not enable or mobilise the youth, nor did they listen to their demands. Thus, the military imposed its

presence on the people and became the main force behind any new laws. In other words, although new parties were formed, they did not serve as platforms for the advancement of the goals of the youth-led revolution after the departure of the Mubarak regime.

The talk of entrenching a participatory democracy that places particular emphasis on the youth's participation by creating a new faction (party or parties) for their initiatives within a larger institutionalised political framework was made more appealing by the media's contribution. In other words, the same media contributed to the politicisation of youth movements that did not originally have any political orientation (Madi, 2013). The implication of this was that with all the potential and achieved success of this movement for political, it would only facilitate the relegation of the youth to the level of being part of one or more of the contending factions in the political landscape of Egypt, alongside the existing political forces, which are much stronger (in experience, resources, etc.) than the newly formed youth-oriented parties. Szmolka (2014) submits that the Arab revolutions and protests triggered processes of political change that, in most cases, have ultimately had little impact on the nature of the respective political regimes.

Thus the youth did not only suffer from the absence of a democratic political project as an alternative to the Mubarak government, but they also became an integral part of the political polarisation in the country. They have contributed greatly to aggravating the political situation and helped the military to take hold of the political scene once again. In fact, Grubman (2011) notes that some Egyptians who were tired of the destabilising effect of the revolution and continued protests on their daily lives, despite their effectiveness, have reinforced the misperception that the youth are irresponsible, intolerant, inexperienced, and radical, thereby furthering their marginalization. In

summary, the youth have contributed, consciously or unconsciously, to deepening the political divisions in the Egyptian society. At the end these youthful leaders were found to represent a losing majority in the face of an organized and more powerful minority. Bayoumi (2013) captures the conclusions of Mohammed El Baradei, one of the prominent opposition leaders, and of Shady Al Ghazaly, that young activists have established different parties and are having trouble adjusting to electoral politics:

> A large part of why we lost control over the revolution and our ability to fulfil its goals is the divisions that took place among the youth. Today, youth feel they have been robbed of their revolution...But, this is because they were divided. Every one of them [considered himself] a new Che Guevara. Everyone wanted to speak on TV. Two years after the revolution, youth leaders feel neglected, divided, and powerless. Only three youth leaders were elected to the People's Assembly, the lower house of Egyptian parliament, which has since been dissolved. The Revolution Youth Coalition (RYC), the main body coordinating between youth leaders in Egypt after the January 25 revolution, was dissolved last July; no other body has replaced it. All the political elite, including the Salvation Front (SF) [Egypt's main opposition coalition] does not represent the youth....

The youths that had exercised a great deal of mobilising power for a protest sufficient enough to remove Mubarak from power have eventually become weakened by division, thereby relegating them to a position or positions where, compared to the more experienced and powerful elite, they could do nothing more as far as the subsequent, unfolding events in Egypt are concerned. They started as a united force, but ended in division.

5.6 Conclusion

It is highly likely that the youth revolt will spread beyond the Arab world. Youth bulges are evident in nations that are currently identified as having high levels of violence. Young people in these nations constitute a significant percentage of the

population ranging from a low of 29% of the population in Georgia and a high of 48% in the Maldives, with most nations' youth population hovering around 30% and growing. The conditions that nurtured the Arab spring are festering and evident in violence prone nations as well as developed nations such as Spain, Greece and Italy and even the UK and the United States. With a youth population of 20%, the United States is low on the scale of developing countries, but high for developed countries.

The generational war can be attributed to a number of factors:

- The economic systems ration away resources from the youth to the established.

- Young people face severe economic and social exclusion due to rising cost of education, high unemployment, and lack of quality employment. Their access to affordable education, health care and social benefits at retirement is slim.

- Youth are being asked to foot the bill for their parent's extravagance – to pay for wars they did not start, for collapsing economic systems they did not create, for national debt they did not incur and for supporting an advantaged older generation in retirement. At the same time, they are being denied the economic benefits, privileges and hope of their parent's generation.

- Finally, youth will inherit political systems that are impotent and paralyzed, totally unable to resolve any crises.

The inclusion of youth appropriately is the most critical development challenge facing the world today. This presents nations with an opportunity to build a lasting foundation for prosperity by harnessing the full potential of its young population. A

compelling and credible agenda for change between international actors, national governments, and civil society, that includes youth, can be created to facilitate change. The youth revolt should be viewed in a positive light and its effects directed productively. In other words, for reforms to have results there must be a clear understanding of needed changes that will touch on the youths.

It must be noted that the youth revolts sweeping the Arab world will set the tone and serve as an example (for emulation or for deterrence) for other youth movements and governments, potentially with far reaching consequences. In the Arab world, established institutions such as national regimes and NGOS and civil society are being forced to re-evaluate their positions and actions on issues as diverse as economic reform, the role of young people in politics, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is unlikely that the generational war will stop at the borders of the Arab world. It is likely to be a movement that inspires similar movements across the globe. To mitigate the possibility of youth revolts spreading, attention must be paid to the differential needs, circumstances, and experiences of the youth to create an environment conducive to economic development and a more hopeful future for this youth generation and future youth generations in the world.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary

The unprecedented turn of events, as championed by the youths in the Arab world (Middle East and North Africa, MENA) generally, in Egypt particularly, inspired this study to examine the role of the youth in the movement for political change in Egypt and the outcome of that role on the political landscape of the Egyptian state. Existing literature and historicity of many nations have pointed to the fact that youths in any society cannot be neglected; they play a crucial role in the development of any society if their potentials are effectively and efficiently harnessed and mobilized towards purposeful and meaningful life in society, otherwise the opposite would happen if they are neglected. The objectives of the research are to identify the domestic conditions and international factors that predisposed the Egyptian state to the youth uprising, to explain the role that the youths played in the movement for political change in Egypt, and to determine the actual outcome of the youth uprising in Egypt.

In Egypt the youths had experienced high unemployment and exorbitant food prices fed mass-level discontent; yet the erstwhile regime benefited from positive economic growth that peaked in 2010, had plenty of money to pay their police personnel

and soldiers, and felt no shortage of patronage to hand out to top civilian and security officials. All these work together to stir up things that upset the youths in Egypt, leading to the 'unimaginable' mobilisation of millions of Egyptian in the movement for political change. The result of that movement was remarkable with the prominent feature of the departure of the Mubarak regime.

The sources of data for this study were based on the quality and relevance of each in providing suitable information for the discussion of issues related to the variables under consideration in this study such as Egyptian youths, domestic factors or conditions in Egypt before the revolution, external factors and their influence, and the outcome of the uprising in Egypt. The thematic method of discussing the generated data, based on content analysis, was adopted due to the qualitative nature of the data. The analysis was on the central themes (or variables) of the study such as Egyptian youths, domestic factors or conditions in Egypt before the revolution, external factors and their influence, and the outcome of the uprising in Egypt, and the facts from secondary sources of data, supported with the data gathered from the people interviewed, are used for the analysis.

Existing literature was extensively reviewed touching issues such as political change, youth politics, youth politics groups around the world, youth demography in the MENA region generally and in Egypt specifically, and some prominent historical revolutions around the world. The frustration aggression theory was employed to explain the dynamics behind the emergence of youths and political change in Egypt. By far the most popular explanation of political violence among social scientist is a psychological explanation by those who stress the model, emphasizing the psychological theories of motivation and behaviour.

The major findings centre on domestic factors, external factors and the role of the youths (and outcome thereof) in the movement for political change in Egypt. Domestic factors that hit the youths hardest, such as unemployment, poverty, emergency (brutal) laws and outright negligence, were responsible for increasing frustration, annoyance, discontent and violence amongst the youths; these were successfully mobilised, harnessed and directed by the savvy leaders of the youth movement for political change against the Egyptian State. Whereas the Egyptian state tried to use force and brutality to suppress the frustration of the people, the informed youths were able to harness it for a purpose that led to the collapse of the regime. The combining effects of all these internal was that the Egyptian state became predisposed (vulnerable) to a revolution by the category of people most neglected by it.

The role of external factors, mostly indirect, cannot be ignored as one of the explanations of the nature of the youth roles in the uprising in Egypt. These factor include the infiltration of relevant information through social media, foreign contacts and training undertaken by some of the youths in view of the revolution, the impact of the global economic crisis of 2007-2009 which affected many economies (the manifestation of its negative impact within Third World economies is usually noticeable on the economic situation of the poor masses in the form of unemployment, etc.) hit hard on the youths, many of whom are unemployed or underemployed.

The role of the Egyptian military as a beneficiary of US military aid was also significant; the result was that at the turn of events the Egyptian military still retained a considerable level of autonomy and capacity to take control of things, more than any other state institution in Egypt. In fact, the Egyptian military seemed not to be affected by

the revolution, so much so that it became the guardian institution that was to decide the political trends in Egypt since the collapse of the Mubarak regime. Another external factor that cannot be overemphasised was the ripple effect of the Tunisian revolution not only in Egypt, but in the entire MENA region. The combining effect of these indirect, external factors was their collective role as reinforcement and facilitation for the youths' mobilisation against the Egyptian state, which was successful to the point that the detested regime collapsed. It is therefore valid that without the complicity of external factors, domestic factors alone could not have instigated and facilitated the magnitude of youth uprising against the Egyptian state successfully.

As to the role of the youths, it is shown that the youth had acquired some collective characteristics that were advantageous to their cause, at least to the extent of their success in the revolution. These characteristics include readiness and capability to mobilise the society, using mainly social media tools. In other words, they were connected in communication and exchange of information, and in the acquisition of revolutionary skills. Also, the youths took advantage of foreign contacts through which they were armed with training, information and other things needed to advance their cause against the Egyptian state. The youth succeeded in being the driving force that mobilised the masses on the streets, a feat which existing (albeit opposition) elites, power interests and groups had tried but were unable to achieve for several decades. One thing that must be noted was the fact that the revolutionary youths spelt out their demands clearly, around which both their mobilisation on the streets and particular insistence on the departure of the erstwhile regime centred – the youths were focused and definite on their demands.

After the collapse of the regime many things happened. On 13 February 2011, the high level military command of Egypt announced that both the constitution and the parliament of Egypt had been dissolved. The parliamentary election was to be held in September 2011. A constitutional referendum was held on 19 March 2011. On 28 November 2011, Egypt held its first parliamentary election since the previous regime had been in power. Therefore after February 11, events took an unfavourable turn, leading to the hijacking of the youth revolution by the elite and older generation. The military and the elite took over after the regime was toppled, and during the transition period there was no any concrete participation from the youth who led the revolution.

Therefore, as it touches on the youths, the turn of things was not favourably disposed toward them. First, the youths felt side-lined and frustrated (again) with the country's post-revolutionary transition. The major reason for this was that the youths did not emerge as the determining force of change after the collapse of the Mubarak regime; the military took over the rein of power in the state. During the process of transition, the country was beset by severe political and social divisions as the struggle between the ruling Muslim Brotherhood and its opponents persisted. New political parties were formed, but neither they nor the existing parties served as platforms for the advancement of the goals of the youth-led protests after the departure of the Mubarak regime. The youths were therefore relegated to the level of being merely one of the contending parties in the political landscape of Egypt, alongside some existing political forces which were stronger in experience, in resources and organisation than the newly formed youth-oriented parties or even the revolutionary youth forum. Thus the youth did not only suffer from the absence of a democratic political project, as they did not prepare for this, but

have now become an integral part of the political polarisation in the country. At the end, these youthful leaders were found to represent a losing majority, the revolutionary mass, in the face of organised and more powerful minority elites, especially the military hierarchy.

6.2 Conclusion

It is therefore concluded that the youths' role in the movement for political change in Egypt succeeded only to the extent that the youth-mobilised masses and the youthful leaders could envision, prepare for and push, thereby unconsciously leaving events afterwards in the hands of whichever interests or groups that would have the capacity to take charge of the political machinery of the country. That is why the advancement of the ultimate goal and objectives of the revolution became truncated from the point that the youths ceased to be responsible for the successive, unfolding events in the political landscape of Egypt. In summation, therefore, the youth protests only triggered a process of political change that ultimately have had little impact, in terms of the goals of the revolution, on the nature of the Egyptian political system.

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APPENDIX I

LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

/N	NAME	POSITION	DATE OF INTERVIEW	PLACE OF INTERVIEW
	Ahmed Nabil	Administration Officer, Egyptian High Commission	17/04 /2013	Abuja
	Abdelhemid Muhammad	Security Officer, Egyptian High Commission	17/04 /2013	Abuja
	Salam Mohammed	Secretary to the High Commissioner, Egyptian High Commission	17/04 /2013	Abuja
	Abdulmuji	Staff, Egyptian High Commission	17/04 /2013	Abuja
	David Moveh (Ph.D.)	Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria	24/02 /2017	Zaria

	Isa Kabir (Ph.D.)	Senior Lecturer, Department of Local Government and Development Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria	28/02 /2017	Zaria

APPENDIX II

EXCERPT FROM EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT

"From information received it appears that a group of activists belonging to the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood have recently held a number of meetings under the aegis of the organization. After a check carried out by branches of the international Muslim Brotherhood, the leaders discussed a decision concerning the need to exploit the prevailing mood in the domestic arena [in Egypt] and the impact of the events in Tunis on different groups in [Egyptian] society by means of inciting the masses with their different sectors against the regime [of Mubarak], in an effort to sow anarchy in the country by organizing demonstrations and processions that would demand political, economic, and social reforms. The aim was to pressure the regime and achieve certain goals of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly recognition of the legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood movement whose activity is prohibited [by law], and the granting of permission for it to establish a political party.

"The leadership of the [Muslim Brotherhood] movement began to implement this program with the onset of mass demonstrations in Tunis [December 18, 2010] by

appointing the leader Mohamed Morsi al-Ayat [today the president of Egypt] as head of a committee to be called the "Liaison Committee with the Outside World." Morsi instructed the committee members who fled the country to open channels of communication with foreign media, institutions, and forces, and persuade their representatives that the events in Tunis can also occur in Egypt, and that the Muslim Brotherhood will be able to control them [the events of the revolution] if it [the revolution] has the necessary support.

"These leaders [of the Muslim Brotherhood] began this activity of theirs when they exploited the call, raised by Facebook youth on the Internet, to organize peaceful demonstrations so that they could express their demands peacefully. They began to encourage the young activists of the Muslim Brotherhood to take part in these demonstrations and perform acts of mayhem and destruction. They also called to organize simultaneous demonstrations in different areas of the republic, thereby creating a state of anarchy and disorder in the security domain in the country."

Source: Halevi (2012)

NB: The document notes that on the basis of this information, 34 senior Muslim Brotherhood members were arrested; their homes searched, and documents, portable computers, and digital media confiscated. The detainees included seven top-level figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Morsi, ten senior members of the second-level leadership, and seventeen directors of branches and task-specific committees.