EFECTS OF 2011 POST- ELECTION VIOLENCE ON LIVELIHOODS OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS IN SAMARU KATAF AGRICULTURAL ZONE OF KADUNA STATE, NIGERIA

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIRMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc) IN AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND RURAL SOCIOLOGY

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AND RURAL SOCIOLOGY,
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AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA

AUGUST, 2014

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Thesis entitled "Effects of 2011 Post- Election Violence on Livelihoods of Farm Households in Samaru Kataf Agricultural Zone of Kaduna State, Nigeria" has been carried out by me in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, and it is a record of my research work. No part of this work has been presented in any previous application for another degree or diploma at any institution. All borrowed ideas have been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided.

_____ _____

Augustine Sunday ONWUAROH (Student) Date

CERTIFICATION

This Thesis, entitled "EFECTS OF 2011 POST- ELECTION VIOLENCE ON LIVELIHOODS OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS IN SAMARU KATAF AGRICULTURAL ZONE OF KADUNA STATE, NIGERIA" by Augustine Sunday ONWUAROH, meets the regulations governing the award of degree of Master of Science (M.Sc) in Agricultural Extension and Rural Sociology of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Dr. Akinwunmi Ayo Adesina and Victims of the April 2011 Post-Election Violence.

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ABSTRACT

This study was designed to assess the effects of 2011 post- election violence on livelihoods of farm households in Samaru Kataf Agricultural Zone of Kaduna State, Nigeria. The specific objectives were to describe the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, identify the livelihood sources of the respondents, establish the perception of the farmers on the causes of the post election violence and determine the effect of the post-election violence on the agricultural activities and income of the farmers. Multi-stage sampling procedure, involving purposive and simple random sampling techniques, was employed in selecting 300 farmers used for the study. Primary data were collected with the aid of a well structured questionnaire and analyzed, using descriptive and inferential statistical tools. The likert scale was used to measure the perception of the people on the causes of the violence while the Z-test statistic was used to determine the effect of the violence on livelihood. Findings indicate that 67% of the respondents were male, while majority (82%) were married with about half (53%) of them having a household size range of 6-10 persons. Majority (90%) of the respondents had one form of formal education or the other, and 50% of them had farming as their major source of livelihood. About 40% of the respondents were of the opinion that corruption was the major cause of the post election violence, while 30% of the respondents claimed insecurity was responsible for the violence. About 60%, 67% and 60% of the respondents had their input supplies, hiring of labour and selling of farm produce negatively affected, respectively. The negative effects on input purchase, hiring of labour and selling of farm produce were caused by the destruction of agro-allied shops, fear of insecurity by the labourers and fear of being killed at market areas, respectively. The annual mean income of the respondents (₦290733.30) was seen to be lower than their theoretical mean income (₦361360.70). This implies that the respondents' incomes fell below what was expected of them. The value obtained was significant at one percent (1%), which implies that the post election violence had a significant effect on the income of the farmers. Government should do all it can to fight corruption especially those related to electoral irregularities and provide adequate security for the people of Kaduna State and Nigeria at large. Also, government should locate these communities and see how they can be assisted financially to enable them recover quickly from their losses so that they can give their best again to agriculture which is their major occupation.

Keywords: post-election, violence, corruption, insecurity, livelihoods

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1: Background to the Study

The Nigerian success story of amalgamation of diverse groups in 1914 has radically shifted from a platform for peaceful coexistence to an arena of violence and gradual disintegration. The popular explanations for this unexpected situation include colonialism, corruption and political instability (Akeem, 2010). About 50 episodes of violent conflict, which culminated in the death of over 10, 000 persons and internal displacement of over 300, 000 people, were recorded in Nigeria between 1999 and 2003 (International Crisis Group, 2009). As a Human Right Watch (HRW) report reveals, it is quite easy to establish a direct link between violence and the official results of elections (HRW, 2004).

This is largely because the expression of anger by some voters (usually opposition supporters) at what they perceived as the theft of the people's votes often defines sporadic protests, arsons, shooting and even killing that sometimes greeted the announcement of election results (Ben, 2001; Kanyongolo and Lunn, 1998; Autheman, 2004; Egwu, 2007; KNCHR, 2008; Powell, 1982; Krain, 1998). In the present democratic dispensation of the Nigerian Fourth Republic, events have shown that the electoral body is not independent of the party in power. This has been defined in relation to the manner in which the electoral body had conducted elections in a way that advantaged the party in power through poor planning, the device of excluding electorates from voting in places considered to be the strongholds of opposition, through the inadequate supply of voting materials, or late arrival of electoral officers to polling stations (Abdullahi, 2008).

The spate of insecurity and threats to lives and properties in Nigeria have reached alarming proportions despite the increasing visibility of the Nigerian state mobile police and military in the management of internal conflicts (Erinosho, 2007; Falola, 1998). The Northern part of the country has for years witnessed several violent clashes that have claimed lives and property worth billions of Naira and, no doubt, have culminated to the present unfortunate situation in the region in the area of education, infrastructure, health, economic and other social necessities needed in the present day (Tukur, 2011).

The April 2011 general elections in Nigeria were hailed as among the fairest in the country's history, but also among the bloodiest. More than 800 people died in three days of rioting in 12 states in northern Nigeria. Aid workers estimated that 65,000 people were displaced during the elections (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The outbreak of violence and the resultant displacement is at least in part attributed to inflammatory statements made by political leaders and public discourse in the media before, during, and after the elections (Patricia(female), 2011). While the discourse surrounding the zoning formula threatened to tear apart the People's Democratic Party (PDP) some major players were threatening chaos if a southerner re-emerged as the presidential candidate of the party (Adegbuyi, 2010).

Both Atiku Abubakar and Ibrahim Babaginda made it clear that the 'zoning' formula of the PDP, which to them represented a peaceful change, should be respected or violence would be inevitable during the elections (Adegbuyi, 2010).These utterances were echoed by General Buhari, who told his supporters to lynch election riggers just a month before the polls. His running mate, Pastor Tunde Bakare, a southern Christian predicted a "wild wild north" if the elections were rigged (Abati, 2011).

Rural livelihoods are composed of the activities that generate the means of household survival and longer-term well-being. Livelihood strategies may be divided into natural resource based activities (e.g. cultivation and livestock-keeping) and non-natural resource based activities (e.g. trade.) (Ellis, 2000).However, livelihood outcomes and goals vary and they are subject to changes: for example, in peaceful and politically stable situations, livelihood goals might include increased well-being or more income; whereas in times of crisis, people's goals might become focused on such short-term objectives as personal safety, food security, reduced vulnerability and survival (UNDP, 1998). Crises pose serious threats not only on the lives of individuals, but also to their livelihood sources.

1.2 Problem Statement

According to Fischer (2002) an electoral process is an alternative to violence as it is a means of achieving governance. It is when an electoral process is perceived as unfair, unresponsive or corrupt that its political legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are motivated to go outside the established norms to achieve their objectives. Apart from the seminal work of Anifowose (1982) in violence and politics in Nigeria which partly devoted meticulous attention on post election violence in the Western Nigeria during the First Republic, the incident of post election violence has since received slight treatment. Evidently, most documented cases of electoral violence largely captured only the Pre and Election Day violence with little in the area of post election violence in the available literature. This observation is particularly absent when it relates to its effects on rural dwellers, particularly farmers. Whilst the growing recurrences of post election violence remain a common feature of most elections in many new democracies, little scholarly

efforts have been done in respect of this phenomenon beyond the media reportage(Ladan, 2009). As such, there is presently no in-depth and scholarly study on the effect of post election violence on livelihood of farmers.

Given the destabilizing role that the post election violence has played in the lives of victims involved, it is important to examine the extent to which the livelihood of the victims are being affected. Thus, this study investigated the effects of 2011 post- election violence on livelihoods of farm households in Samaru Kataf Agricultural Zone of Kaduna State, Nigeria, using the 17th April, 2011 presidential election as a case study. It is against this background that the research addressed the following questions:

i. what are the socio-economic characteristics of the farmers in the study area?
ii. what are the sources of livelihood of the farmers?
iii. what are the perceptions of the farmers on causes of the post election violence ? and
iv. what are effects of the post election violence on the agricultural activities, assets and income of the farmers?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of the study is to examine the effects of 2011 post- election violence on livelihoods of farm households in Samaru Kataf Agricultural Zone of Kaduna State. The specific objectives are to:

i. describe the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents ;
ii. identify the sources of livelihood of the respondents ;

iii. establish the perception of the respondents on causes of the post election violence, and

iv. determine the effects of the post election violence on the agricultural activities, assets and income of the respondents.

1.4 Justification of the Study

Elections cannot be free, fair and peaceful if they are not conducted in an atmosphere of peace and security. The unprecedented postponement of some elections as a result of spate of insecurity in some parts of the country during the 2011 General Election and the menace of recurring electoral violence justifies the need to examine the phenomenon of post election violence. Farmers no doubt, are the most valuable asset of any nation and anything that affects them directly or indirectly affects the nation as such would constitute a national threat to food security. In view of the fact that electoral violence has led to grave consequences like deaths, starvation, poverty, social unrest and unquantifiable losses among the citizens of different nations. There is therefore, a pressing need to study and understand the causes of electoral violence and to find appropriate strategies for negotiating and amicably resolving them.

This study provides information that can be used by policy makers in future political elections to formulate workable policies that would be of assistance towards ameliorating or preventing the mindless destruction of crops, animals, properties as well as the senseless killings of humans that occurred in the study area. Also, this study is also important as it estimates the losses encountered by the farmers in the study area which the local, state and federal governments could use as a guide in compensating the farmers. The findings from

this study would contribute to existing literatures on post election violence which could provide a basis for better planning in conducting elections not just within the nation but other nations of the world at large.

1.5 Hypothesis of the Study

Post election violence has significant effect on the farmers' livelihoods in the study area.

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1: Electoral Conflict and Violence

Conflict is a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other (Boulding, 1963). Pruit and Rubin (1986) in their opinion have also asserted that "conflict means perceived divergence of interests or a belief that the parties current aspiration cannot be achieved simultaneously". To understand the compound concept of electoral violence, it is necessary that we begin by conceptualizing "violence". For Roberts and Obioha (2005) and Tamuno (1991) violence is the unlawful use or threat of force. It could be perceived as the exercise of physical force to inflict injury or cause damage to a person's property. Implicit in these definitions of violence are two basic issues the use of force and the abuse of another person's fundamental rights (Albert, 1994).

Past thinking on how to deal with electoral violence has been defective largely because of the narrow ways in which the phenomenon is conceptualized or defined (Albert, 2007). Electoral violence is the employment of force by political parties or their supporters to intimidate their opponents. These forms of violence pose a threat to a democratic dispensation, and are often exampled in the seizure of political power by the use of force (Balogun, 2003). Nweke (2005) defines electoral violence as any form of physical force applied to the end of disorganising the electoral process, ranging from the destruction of electoral materials to the intimidating of the electorate to vote against their wish. Electoral violence, according to Olagbegi (2004) is a multi-faceted process not open to a singular

explanation but unfortunately tending to reproduce itself in a series of socially disruptive behaviours. According to Ilufoye, Ogundiya and Baba (2005) electoral violence is a limited aspect of political violence that is associated with the process of elections. They reason that forms of political violence occur before, during or after elections.

According to Jegede (2003) there are different manifestations of electoral violence e.g. murder, arson, abduction, assault, and violent seizure and destruction of electoral materials. These acts are perpetuated by individuals and groups with the intention of influencing the outcome of elections or deterring elected officials from consolidating their positions after elections. Some writers have associated electoral violence with the process of democratic transition (Afolabi, 2003). Others see electoral violence, as originating as a quintessential elite affair arising from the inordinate struggle for places in the structure of power, which often degenerates into open violence between ethno-communal groups as individuals are deceived into believing that their interests are about to be imperiled (Ilufoye *et al.*, 2004). According to Fischer (2002) an electoral process is an alternative to violence as it is a means of achieving governance. It is when an electoral process is perceived as unfair, unresponsive or corrupt, that its political legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are motivated to go outside the established norms to achieve their objectives.

In the existing literature, electoral violence is used interchangeably with the political violence yet the latter is acknowledged to be much broader than the former; thus, political violence can be distinguished from electoral violence (Byarugaba, 1997; Ben, 2001; Diamond *et al*., 1997). To be sure, political and electoral violence are pernicious vices that continue to afflict most emerging democracies and it is a truism that these two are mother

and baby: with political violence being the umbrella under which electoral violence shields itself. The motivation behind these two categories of violence is eminently political; it is the unfair acquisition of political advantage by one individual or group or individuals over another (FESCCR, 2001). Mwagiru (2001) states that political violence is violence over political competition. And at its heart is the concern with issue of the legitimacy of government. It removes or fractures political competition and is essentially aimed at removing or cowering political dissent. Similarly, Ladan (2007) describes electoral violence as any act of violence perpetrated in the course of political activities that may include any of the following acts: thuggery, use of force to disrupt political meetings or voting at polling stations, or the use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral process, or to cause bodily harm or injury to any person connected with electoral process. Having defined the term *violence* itself as any act, which causes or may cause any person physical, psychological, emotional, sexual, verbal or economic harm (Ladan, 2007). He, therefore, considers violence as part of the political culture of Nigeria so much that all elections are almost violence ridden.

Fischer (2002) defines electoral violence as any random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process. Albert (2007) sees electoral violence as all forms of organized act or threat – physical, psychological and structural – aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing political stakeholders before, during and after an election with a view to determine, delay or otherwise influence an electoral process.

2.2 Dimensions of Electoral Violence

According to Ladan (2009) electoral violence has both physical and psychological dimensions. The physical aspects include attacks and assaults by one group of partisans on another, resulting in injuries, and often death. Armed gangs of youths are often recruited by candidates, ostensibly for protection against assault by opponents, but, in reality, often used for premeditated attacks on opponents. Every political party in Nigeria has what is known as the youth wing, which is merely the euphemism for the terrorist gang of the party (Sanni, 2007). Physical electoral violence also includes the use of hired assassins to eliminate political opponents perceived to be a threat to one‘s chances of electoral victory (Sanni, 2007). The psychological dimension of electoral violence includes the aggressive, abrasive and anarchic conduct of candidates and their supporters during the electioneering period. One example is the dissemination of rumors about opposing candidates, and deliberately spreading false propaganda (Ladan, 2009).

The indiscriminate pasting of offensive campaign posters and the convoys of reckless drivers conveying candidates and their supporters to campaign rallies also constitute psychological violence on the people at large, in the sense that they assault society‘s sense of decorum, respectability, civility and integrity. They also cause anxiety and apprehension among the public any time campaign rallies and elections are scheduled (Nwoke, 2010). Galtung (1991) argues that violence could also be psychological, cultural and structural. He particularly characterizes physical assault to include the kind of bodily attacks politicians or their agents inflict upon one another and electoral official at party conventions, during political campaigns during elections and when election results are released.

Galtung (1991) characterizes the first form as psychological violence. This kind of violence manifests in terms of citizens living in a state of perpetual fear of what could happen to them as a result of their participation in electoral activities. This type of violence explains the phenomenon of political apathy in a society. The people are afraid of contesting for public offices. In some cases, they are afraid of coming out to vote. In other words, this type of violence frustrates the exercise of conventional and unconventional political participation rights (Albert, 2007).

The problem of electoral (Psychological) violence becomes phenomenal in a society where the police finds it difficult to assure the state of electoral security which is defined by Fischer (2002) as the process of protecting electoral stakeholders such as voters, candidates, poll workers, media and observer; electoral information such as vote results, registration data, and campaign material; electoral facilities such as polling stations and counting centers; and electoral events such as campaign rallies against death, damage, or destruction. The third type of violence discussed by Galtung (1991) is structural violence. This is usually indirect and embedded in structures of the society but could be worse than physical violence in the sense of leading to death or causing people to live miserable lives because they are politically repressed, economically exploited or deprived of the freedom to be close to those they do not like. This type of violence according to Galtung (1991) manifests in forms of exclusionary or discretionary policies against certain groups.

2.3: Stages of Electoral Violence

According to Chika and Joshua (2011) Electoral violence can occur at different stages in the election process starting pre election period (registration) to post election period (after

results). The crucial thing is for the monitors to understand deeply the context and concept of electoral violence for easy and comprehensive reporting of incidents in a way that will capture incidents across the stages without neglecting any stage. Chika and Joshua (2011) classify the stages of Electoral Violence to include:

2.3.1: Pre-election period

Pre- Election Day violence can occur during registration period and can lead to massive disenfranchisement of voters due to psychological fear. This can in turn threaten the very target of achieving free and fair election in any political system. Irregularities in voters register, blurred identity, and poor technical quality might lead to void registration and subsequently denials of voting right. This not only disenfranchises the voters but is also a trigger to bigger scale violence on the Election Day. Disenfranchised voters who felt disgruntled about the process might result to descriptive category as captured by Fischer as a pay back to the state.

2.3.2: Campaign period

Campaign period is also a prominent stage with high tendency for electoral violence. The manifestation is mostly during campaigns, political meeting and rallies. It can be intra and/or inter party conflict. In the Nigerian context, the deployment of thugs and cults groups to attack opponents and/or supporters of opponents is usually the case. This is done with the intention to intimidate opponents and send psychological fear to potential voters.

2.3.3: Post election/result conflict

Electoral violence can also occur hours and days after elections. This can emanate from dispute over election results and the inability of judiciary system to handle election dispute fairly. Post result violence might occur where the judiciary is perceived to be partial. This

might lead to low level of confidence on the judicial system by the candidates and as such would prefer taking laws into the hands than wasting time in a corruptible judicial system. The frustration and fear of partial judgment then leaves them with the hard option of electoral violence. This can also lead to higher scale violence beyond elections. Fischer noted that the manner in which election result are announced might also lead to electoral violence and in some cases lead to targeting of setting group or ethnic origin in a multiethnic society (Fischer, 2002). In one sense, many political analysts argues that electoral violence particularly in Nigeria is a quintessential elite affair arising from the inordinate struggle for places in the structure of power that have often degenerate into open violence among ethno-communal groups or individuals who are deceived into believing that their interest is about to be imperiled (Ogundiya and Baba 2007). The high incidences of political and electoral violence have also been explained by cultural factors. Here, there is a political culture of thuggery that generally predisposes actors to engage in violence and intimidation during political contests (Smah, 2008; Ottie and Albert, 1999).

2.4: Management of Electoral Violence

Recent policies on electoral violence mainly concentrate on guidelines on how to manage or prevent it. For example, the 'Do no Harm' concept (Anderson, 1999) as developed as a tool to minimize the negative and maximize the positive impact of development aid on conflicts has been expanded to electoral assistance (UNDP, 2009; OECD, 2010). Furthermore, Höglund and Jarstad (2010) distinguish different management strategies that can be taken up by different actors:

(i) The presence of monitors can be instrumental in preventing electoral violence through naming and shaming mechanisms and by creating awareness of tensions building up.

(ii) Mediation can be carried out in high-tension situations to solve an ongoing election-related dispute.

(iii) The legal framework and institutional design provides the basis for combating impunity and for creating conditions discouraging violence.

(iv) Law enforcement highlights the deterring function of security forces.

(v) Voter-focused strategies emphasize the importance of long-term prevention though the cultivation of democratic norms and tolerance in society at large.

The second management (but also prevention) strategy, Mediation, can play an important role not only during, but also before and after elections, if violence is imminent and systems for legal recourse or conflict resolution mechanisms are inexistent or insufficiently developed (Tip, 2008). As one of the main advantages of this alternative conflict resolution mechanism, mediation can bring about a resolution of the election-related conflicts among parties in privacy (Tip, 2008). Others have considered the different levels mediation efforts can address in election-related violence (Ibrahim, 2008). Gienath (2008) establishes different guidelines how electoral violence could be prevented: He strongly focuses on Election Management Bodies, their independence, transparency and access to resources. Apart from these, he states that formalized dialogue between the political parties and the electoral body, voter education, the unity of the electoral commission and the participation of political parties at all the important stages of the electoral process as relevant for conflict prevention.

2.5 Perceptions of Nigerians on Causes of Electoral Violence

According to the Electoral Reform Committee's (ERC) (2008) reports, five key causes can be identified as responsible for electoral violence in Nigeria. Among these are historical context of States creation in Nigeria; the structural imbalance of the Nigerian federation; the nature and character of the Nigerian state and its ruling elites; inter-ethnic competition, and the role of the military and militarization of the polity. Smah (2008) has argued that the main roots of violence associated with the political process are the basic political culture and its zero-sum philosophy. In addition to the zero-sum philosophy, he advanced that there is an investment mentality that governs party and election funding in Nigeria. These twin-faceted and related issues remain the cardinal fulcrum upon which the culture of violence, illustrated in assassinations, attempted assassinations or arson, is built and sustained. Smah (2008) expatiates that given the enormity of financial and human resources expended in elections as well as the extent to which injustice has resulted in a party or candidate losing an election, violence may be the logical, rational line of action taken.

In other words, electoral violence may be the result of losing an election in spite of huge financial expenses or due to irregularities in the counting and release of results that steal a win from those who worked for it. The preponderance of political violence in the country electoral environment has also been attributed to the availability of small arms and youth unemployment. The Punch Newspaper reports that Nigeria had one gun per 100 people in a recent small arms survey monitoring the number of guns in civilian hands (The Punch, Thursday, August 30, 2007). Indeed, one empirical survey (Ladan and Kiru, 2005) focusing on electoral violence in Nigeria has identified greed, electoral abuse, corruption, rigging, fraud, thuggery and police abuse of power as specific key factors responsible for electoral

violence in the country. Ladan and Kiru (2005) revealed in their study that corruption was one of the major causes of violence in Kaduna State. As a global comparative survey of electoral events from 2001 suggests conflict among political rivals appears to have been the most common form of electoral violence (Fischer, 2002). Undoubtedly, the apparent objective of electoral violence centers on influencing the voting behaviour of the electorate and or changing the electoral results in favour of an individual, groups and or political party.

2.6 Agricultural Activities in Rural Households

Agricultural activities include activities related to cultivation of plants and rearing and breeding of animals, which covers all field crops, vegetable gardening and horticulture, nurseries, cultivation and seed production of agricultural and horticultural crops as well as activities related to rearing and breeding of animals (cattle, sheep, goats, horses, pigs, poultry, bees, rabbits, game kept for slaughter) and production of raw (not processed) animal products (e.g. milk, hen eggs and eggs for hatching, wool and honey), as well as activities consisting in maintaining the land no longer used for production purposes in good agricultural and environmental conditions (according to the norms) (Central Statistical Office, 2012).

The rural poor have developed the capacity to cope with increasing vulnerability associated with agricultural production - diversification, intensification and migration or moving out of farming (Ellis, 1998). Diversification as a strategy involves the attempt by individuals and households to find new ways to raise income and reduce environmental risk, which differs sharply by the degree of freedom of choice (to diversify or not) and the reversibility of the outcome (Hussein and Nelson, 1998). It is evident that rural households in Nigeria

engage in multiple Agricultural and livelihood activities such as trading (marketing or adding value to commodities), small scale business enterprises (carpentry, radio and bicycle repairs) and processing of agricultural goods and arts and craft (weaving, mats and basket making) in order to supplement earnings from agriculture (Edna *et al*., 2007; Ekong, 2003). These activities (livelihood diversification) are influenced by certain factors which operate at both internal and external environments of rural households (Kinsella *et al*., 2000; Bateman and Ray, 1994; Butler and Mazur, 2004).

2.7 Empirical Findings on Effects of Electoral Violence on Humans and their Society

According to Thompson (2010) electoral violence has the following effects:

(i) Political instability. Political instability often arises due to inability of opposition and relevant actors in governance to resolve perceived or real grievances. Electoral violence is both causative and symptomatic of political instability in Nigeria. It is symptomatic as it reflects an inchoate political system. It is also causative because it feeds the political crises that manifest regularly. Electoral violence, if not properly addressed, could ultimately lead to *escalated violence*. Political violence is incapable of building a strong, efficient and virile democratic nation (social development). It is anti-people because issues of human rights, gender equality, cultural rights and identities are often ignored or trampled upon. These adversely affect the human security, Agricultural and social development of the country.

(ii) Insecurity. Electoral violence breeds insecurity as it is often characterized by loss of lives and properties as was the case during the November 2008 political violence in Jos, Nigeria. Over 500 people were killed, thousands displaced and properties worth billions of

naira were burnt, looted or destroyed. In addition to the insecurity, there are attendant costs like increased security votes and the resources spent on repairs of damaged infrastructure. These resources could have been better spent on human and social development and such trends adversely affect the social and economic wellbeing of the country. It is axiomatic that Agricultural development cannot occur in the absence of peace and security. The economy suffers in an atmosphere of insecurity and political instability. This is because investors are scared due to lack of security for their investment. Direct foreign investment in Agriculture and other sectors of the economy is thus often lost in such circumstances which have contributed to the state of underdevelopment in Nigeria. According to Clare (1998) "Businesses have a strong interest in peace and security in the countries in which they are operating or might wish to operate."

(iii) Cycle of violence. Another effect of electoral violence is that it has helped propagate the ongoing cycle of violence in the country. Acts of violence impact negatively on the children living in such societies. In line with the social learning theory, such children would likely end up being violent (Bandura and Walters 1963). The ongoing violence by youths in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria (which has witnessed considerable political violence) supports this. Moreover, acts of electoral violence are likely to result in hostile goals like "*the desire for revenge*" in political opponents which could lead to conflict escalation (Pruitt and Kim, 2004). This perhaps explains why almost all political parties in Nigeria are involved in electoral violence. This Cycle of violence has not allowed agriculture to develop adequately as many farmers do abandon their farms and others sources of livelihood whenever violence erupts. The Barma village in Borno State, shows a typical example of farmers abandoning their farms as a result of violence.

2.8 Socio-economic Characteristics of Farmers

2.8.1 Age, sex composition and marital status

The ratio of males to females varies with the season. During the rainy season when most of the farming activities take place, the men make up 53.2% of the population, while women account for only 46.8%. On the other hand, the proportion of males is lower than females (49.1% and 50.9% respectively) in the dry season. This seasonal sex imbalance is a reflection of labour market adjustment. During the dry season, the young men move out of the village in search of jobs that are unrelated to farming (Nyong *et al*., 2001). Accordingly, the proportion of the working age population is lower, particularly among men in the dry season (50.2%) than in the rainy season (57.4%). This results in higher age dependency ratios in the dry than in the rainy season (Nyong *et al*., 2001).

Baiyegunhi and Fraser (2009) observes that majority (86%) of the farmers are within the middle age group of 26-54 years. This is within the economically productive ages in population. Mustapha *et al*. (2012), shows that majority (62.20%) of the farmers were male, while female constitutes only 37.80% of the respondents. This implies that gender is a significant factor in agriculture because of its vital role in determining farming activities in the study area. Ugwoke *et al*. (2005) discovered in their findings that about 53.0 percent of the respondents were either married or widowed. They noted that young people in the rural areas get married earlier than their peers in urban zones. This tendency to marry early helps in building a virile farming population. This tends to agree with the assertion of Perez-Morales (1990) who noted that young people in rural areas get married earlier than

their peers in urban cities and also become involved in adult responsibilities before urban youth.

2.8.2 Household size

The report of the Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS, 1990) shows that the average household size in rural Nigeria is 6. Less than 5% of the households in the north are headed by women, compared to more than 20% in the south (NDHS, 1990). A major reason for this is the way by which local communities in the north identify a household head (Nyong *et al*., 2001). Katarko, for instance, adopts three methods based on its social organization and customs.

The first choice is the person identified by other household· members as the one who controls the maintenance of the household and exercises the authority to run the household. Without such an individual, the second option is the person who is the chief earner or supporter of the household's economy. The custom and culture of Katarko village preclude women from owning large farms, by that making it rare for them to be the chief earners in the households. A third choice is the person who is the oldest male resident in the household (Nyong *et al*., 2001). Mustapha *et al*. (2012) shows that most (42.20%) of the respondents had household size of 5-9 members. This implies that, there would be enough work forces to supply the most needed labour requirement in soya bean production.

2.8.3 Level of education

Although universal literacy is recognized as a fundamental right and as an explicit development objective, this goal remains elusive in many developing countries, including Nigeria. In 1976, Nigeria adopted a national policy on Universal Free Primary Education, which ·gave every child the right to free primary education. To serve the needs of migrant pastoral nomads and their children, the government established the National Commission on Nomadic Education in 1989. To complement this effort, the government launched a national mass literacy campaign in 1990 with the purpose of raising "literacy. Mustapha *et al*. (2012) shows that most (41.10%) of the respondents had formal education. This implies that the respondents could apprehend the improved technologies being disseminated to them. The findings was not in agreement with that of Apata *et al*. (2010) and Tiwari (2010) who asserts that most of the Nigerian farmers have no formal education.

2.9 The Concept of Livelihood

The concept of livelihoods has gained wide acceptance as a valuable means of understanding the factors that influence people's lives and well-being, particularly those of the poor in the developing world (Bernstein et al., 1992; Davies, 1996; Rennie and Singh, 1996; Carney, 1998). It has been embraced by a number of development agencies, with UNDP the first to do so fully and the Department for International Development (DFID) adopting it as central to its strategy for meeting the goals set out in its 1997 ‘White Paper Eliminating World Poverty’ (John *et al.*,2002). Livelihood has a number of meanings, and there are a number of definitions for the term. Clarity and rigour are therefore needed if the approach is to achieve its full potential as a basis for development initiatives that are in tune

with the realities on the ground (John *et. al.,*2002). Livelihood can be attached to all sorts of other words to construct whole fields of development enquiry and practice. These relate to locales (rural or urban livelihoods), occupations (farming, pastoral or fishing livelihoods), social difference (gendered, age-defined livelihoods), directions (livelihood pathways, trajectories), dynamic patterns (sustainable or resilient livelihoods) and many more (Scoones, 2009).

Over the last decade or so, livelihood has emerged as a boundary term; something that brings disparate perspectives together, allows conversations over disciplinary and professional divides and provides an institutional bridging function(linking people, professions and practices in new ways) (Gieryn, 1999).The livelihood concept according to Chambers and Conway (1992) is based on the premise that a rural household has access to (or has an endowment of) a minimum amount of resource base (capitals or assets), which can be utilized to fashion out a set of livelihood strategies (crop farming, livestock rearing, off farm employment, etc.) to improve its welfare. A holistic attempt to identify the various livelihood strategies rural poor people adopt across ethnic groups shows that, households and individuals are in pursuit of different strategies based on normative standards (e.g. nutritional status) disaggregated across groups, households and individuals under social, economic, political, historical and demographic trends that influence these livelihood options (Chambers and Conway, 1992).

2.9.1: Nature and sources of livelihood

Rural livelihoods are composed of the activities that generate the means of household survival and longer-term well-being. Livelihood strategies may be divided into natural resource based activities (e.g. collection and gathering, cultivation, livestock-keeping, weaving) and non-natural resource based activities (e.g. trade, services, remittances.) (Ellis, 2000). Means of livelihood are referred to as production strategies which include income-earning activities, remittance, gifts and loans. But livelihood strategies are dynamic and widespread from which rural poor people are able to respond based on changing pressures and local opportunities that could be adapted accordingly (Ellis, 2000). However, livelihood outcomes and goals vary and they are subject to changes: for example, in peaceful and politically stable situations, livelihood goals might include increased well-being or more income; whereas in times of crisis, people's goals might become focused on such short-term objectives as personal safety, food security, reduced vulnerability and survival (UNDP, 1998).

As defined by Ellis (2000) livelihood is made up of the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims, and access) and activities necessary for a means of living. Abilities do not only include sheer physical labour, but also knowledge, trainings, skills, and years of experience. Assets are the basic material or social, tangible or intangible services, resources, skills or attributes. They are the physical, natural, social, financial, and human resources that people use for constructing their livelihoods. Livelihood activities are understood in the sense of individual and group perspectives that transform materials, using the abilities and resources to produce goods and/or services that can be exchanged, especially for a price. Activities in livelihood analysis include income-generating

(agricultural and non-agricultural), and non-income generating (for example, religious, environmental, fun/relaxation, etc.) (Ellis, 2000).

Kollmair and Gamper (2002) states that natural assets are forest land (non-timber forest products and wildlife), agricultural land (inherited or acquired), water (stream, well, borehole, or pipe-borne water), soil (fertility), and genetic resources (for example, disease resistant livestock and crops). Human asset represents the household size (demographics), skills (credit management, entrepreneurship, leadership, numerical and language), knowledge (indigenous, non-formal, extension or formal), ability to labour (amount and quality), and health status that one has access to in other people that together enable one to pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve livelihood objectives (Kollmair and Gamper, 2002). World Bank (2002) has ascertained that one in five people on the planet live in abject poverty. Moreover, DFID (2000) explained poverty to be not just a question of low income, but to also include other dimensions such as bad health, illiteracy, lack of social services, etc., as well as a state of vulnerability and feelings of powerlessness in general. Inadequate access and control over capital assets, education, and policies still pose constraints to livelihood activities (both farm and non-farm), which in-turn reduce socio-economic characteristics and states in rural areas and undermine sustainable rural development (Ellis, 2000).

2.9.2 Determinants of livelihood

According to Chambers and Conway (1992) there are numerous initial determinants of livelihood strategy. Many livelihoods are largely predetermined by accident of birth. Livelihood of this sort may be ascriptive: in India, children may be born into a caste with

an assigned role as potters, shepherds, or washerpeople. Gender as socially defined is also a pervasive ascriptive determinants of livelihood activities. Or not necessarily ascriptively, a person may be born, socialized and apprenticed into inherited livelihood- as a cultivator with land and tools, a pastoralist with animals, a forest dweller with trees, a fisherperson with boat and tackle, or a shopkeeper with shop and stock; and each of these may in turn create a new household or households in the same occupation (Chambers and Conway, 1992). Many livelihoods are also less singular or predetermined. Some people improvise livelihoods with degree of desperation, what they do being largely determined by the social, economic and ecological environment in which they find themselves. A person or household may also choose a livelihood, especially through education and migration. Those who are better off usually have a wider choice than those who are worse off, and a wider choice is usually generated by economic growth. In a future of accelerating change, adaptable capabilities to exploit new opportunities may be both more needed and more prevalent (Chambers and Conway, 1992).

2.9.3: Sustainable livelihood

A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base (Chambers and Conway, 1992). The sustainable livelihoods idea was first introduced by the Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development, and the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development expanded the concept, advocating for the achievement of sustainable livelihoods as a broad goal for poverty eradication (Lasse, 2001). In any definition of livelihood sustainability, Chambers and Conway

(1992), argues that such definitions must include the ability to avoid, or more usually to withstand and recover from stresses and shocks.

According to Chamber and Conway (1992) sustainable Livelihood is indicated by the following parameters:

i) Creation of working days: This relates to the ability of a particular combination of livelihood strategies to create gainful employment for a certain portion of the year. This may be on or off-farm, part of a wage labour system or subsistence production. Sen (1975) notes three aspects of employment – income (a wage for the employed), production (employment providing a consumable output) and recognition (where employment provides recognition for being engaged in something worthwhile). In terms of the income/production aspects, various target levels have been suggested, but 200 days a year appears to be widely used as a minimum level to create a livelihood (Lipton 1991; 1993). Overall, the number of livelihoods created will be dependent on the proportion of the population available for work.

ii) Poverty reduction: The poverty level is a key criterion in the assessment of livelihoods. Various measures can be used to develop an absolute 'poverty line' measure based on income or consumption levels (Ravallion, 1992; Baulch, 1996). Alternatively, relative poverty and inequality can be assessed using Gini coefficient measures. There are a range of pros and cons for each measure, as well as some major measurement challenges (Greeley, 1994). However, such quantitative assessments of poverty can be used in combination with more qualitative indicators of livelihoods (Jodha, 1988; Schaffer. 1996).

iii) Well-being and capabilities: The notions of 'well-being' (Chambers, 1995; 1997) and 'capability' (Sen, 1984; 1987) provide a wider definitional scope for the livelihoods

concept. Sen sees capabilities as 'what people can do or be with their entitlements', a concept which encompasses far more than the material concerns of food intake or income. Such ideas represent more than the human capital which allows people to do things, but also the intrinsically valued elements of 'capability' or 'well-being'. Chambers (1997) argues that such a well-being approach to poverty and livelihood analysis may allow people themselves to define the criteria which are important. This may result in a range of sustainable livelihood outcome criteria, including diverse factors such as self-esteem, security, happiness, stress, vulnerability, power, exclusion, as well as more conventionally measured material concerns (Chambers, 1989).

iv) Livelihood adaptation, vulnerability and resilience: The ability of a livelihood to be able to cope with and recover from stresses and shocks is central to the definition of sustainable livelihoods. Such resilience in the face of stresses and shocks is key to both livelihood adaptation and coping (Davies, 1996). Those who are unable to cope (temporary adjustments in the face of change) or adapt (longer term shifts in livelihood strategies) are inevitably vulnerable and unlikely to achieve sustainable livelihoods. Assessing resilience and the ability to positively adapt or successfully cope requires an analysis of a range of factors, including an evaluation of historical experiences of responses to various shocks and stresses. Different types of shock or stress, in turn, may result in different responses, including avoidance, repartitioning, resistance or tolerance mechanisms (Payne and Lipton, 1994).

v) Natural resource base sustainability: Most rural livelihoods are reliant on the natural resource base at least to some extent. Natural resource base sustainability refers to the ability of a system to maintain productivity when subject to disturbing forces, whether a 'stress' (a small, regular, predictable disturbance with a cumulative effect) or a 'shock' (a

large infrequent, unpredictable disturbance with immediate impact). This implies avoiding depleting stocks of natural resources to a level which results in an effectively permanent decline in the rate at which the natural resource base yields useful products or services for livelihoods (Conway, 1985). Measuring natural resource sustainability is notoriously difficult, as it is critical to link indicators of resource depletion or accumulation (e.g. soil fertility levels, vegetation cover etc.) to both the temporal dynamics of system resilience (i.e. the ability to recover from disturbance) and livelihood needs (i.e. an assessment of whether natural resource change results in 'effectively permanent declines in useful products or services') (Holling, 1993).

2.10 Theoretical Framework

This study was guided by the theory of social identity and the conflict theory.

2.10.1: Social identity theory

Political scientists apply the Social Identity Theory (SIT) to explain political behaviors such as ethnic conflicts, racism, and political extremism. The SIT was originally used in social psychology. The SIT was developed by Tajfel and Turner in 1979 in order to understand the psychological basis of intergroup discrimination. The theory not only explains how groups come into conflict, but also explains a wide range of political events such as racism, ethnic conflict, nationalism, and political extremism (Cottam *et al*., 2004). When dominant groups feel that their dominant position is threatened by subordinate groups, the competition can lead to a conflict (Cottam *et al*., 2004). Social Identity Theory not only aids our understanding of the causes and outcomes of conflicts, it also provides us the knowledge of how to resolve those conflicts. The theory provides three conflict

resolution approaches which are: *Contact Hypothesis, Decategorization, and Recategorization or Superordinate*. These three approaches all have their origins in the social identity theory

(a) Contact hypothesis

Gordon (1954) introduces the contact hypothesis to eliminate prejudice among groups. The goal of the hypothesis is that bringing members of different groups into contact with one another in various ways is the best way of reducing any tension or hostility that might exist between them (Brown, 2000). However, the hypothesis works only under certain conditions. One of the conditions is that the contact groups must have equal status. Therefore, the minority group should have an equal status with majority group in order for the contact hypothesis to be applicable (Brown, 2000).

(**b) Decategorization**

The idea of decategorization is introduced by Brewer and Miller (1984) as a way of reducing the intergroup discrimination and stereotyping. According to the decategorization approach, boundaries between the two groups become less rigid during contacts, and ultimately they will be dissolved altogether. In order to decrease boundaries between groups, all interactions should take place on an interpersonal level, rather than on the group level because in this 'personalized' form of contact, individuals are interested in one another's information and less attentive to the group-based information. The relationship between groups will improve when contacts are people - people, not race - race (Brown, 2000).

An example is former President Clinton‘s “Come Together Fellowship”. This program are helped for improving American racial relations by supporting black and white individuals who belong to existing clubs and groups to get to know each other better. Moreover, the approach could also lead to assimilation. According to Brown (2000) this approach has a generalization problem. It can prevent only individuals that have been in contact with individuals from other groups from becoming prejudice. It cannot prevent prejudice against individuals who have not met or contacted individuals in other groups.

(c) Recategorization or Superordinate Approach

Instead of decategorization, Gaertner *et al*. (1999) proposes a different method to reduce prejudice between groups. It is recategorization or superordinate identity. Recategorization is not trying to eliminate the categories; instead, they redraw the boundaries of categories. In other words, it recategorizes the previous in-groups and out-groups into a new superordinate category so that the former out-groupers can be perceived as fellow in-groupers. According to this approach, rather than attempting to eschew group references altogether, it allows keeping minimal group salient or identity while optimizing the various contacts. Gaertner (1999) demonstrated that through two experiments. The experimental results show that recognizing subgroups within the superordinate identity is the best method of lessening the intergroup bias. According to the author, establishing a common superordinate identity, while simultaneously maintaining the salience of subgroup identities, would be particularly effective because it permits the benefits of a common ingroup identity with arousing countervailing motivations to achieve positive distinctiveness (Gaertner, 1999).

The Social Identity Theory (SIT) focuses on causes, outcome and resolution of conflicts. The conflict resolution approach of SIT was employed in this research work in proffering possible solutions that can be used to prevent and manage election violence.

2.10.2: The conflict theory

This study adopted the conflict theoretical framework which is also suited for the topic under investigation. According to Marx (1964) human societies are a whole or system of inter-related parts-institutions, belief, and that, conflict is perceived to be inherent in all human relations and basics to these conflicts are the economic factor which is the substructure on which the super structure lies or stands, and this invariably divides society into antagonistic groups. Weber (1947) also adds that a conflict situation is created when a person or group of persons attempt or succeeds in carrying out its will by overcoming the resistance of other groups or persons and their interest in a situation of scarcity of resources. Thus, conflict denotes a relationship of struggle, muscle flexing, retaliation relations and clashes. Coser (1956) regards conflict as a "struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals".

The April 17th 2011 post election violence brings a conflict scenario between two political parties, namely: Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). This is a kind of "cold war" that has existed between these two parties from time past until this present dimension. These two political parties had a common-clashing interest of winning the presidential election. This invariably agrees with Coser (1956) who regards conflict as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources. Consequently, the two parties started seeing each other as a "clog in ones wheel" of success

to winning the presidential election. This situation did not only multiply the degree of animosity between these two political parties, but also led to bitter violence and devastating confrontation. The relevance of the theory in this study is seen in the existence of individuals from two major political parties (PDP and CPC) struggling for power. The conflict theory was employed in this research work to explain how the struggle for power and the conflicting values among individuals have invariably led to the post election violence which devastated the rural farmers and their livelihoods.

CHAPTER THREE


METHODOLOGY

3.1: Description of the Study Area

The study was conducted in three Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Kaduna State, namely:Jaba LGA, which has its headquarters in Kwoi, with an area of 368 km² and a projected population of 182567 from the 2006 population census figure of 155,377; Zangon Kataf LGA, which has its headquarters in Zonkwa, with an area of 2,668 km² and a projected population of 371734 from the 2006 population census figure of 316,370; and Jema'a LGA, which has its headquarters in Kafanchan, with an area of 1,661 km² and a projected population of 327513 from the 2006 population census figure of 278,735(KADP, 2007). Kaduna State was created in 1967, and it occupies about 46,061 square kilometers, which represent about five percent of the land area of the 923,768 square kilometers of Nigeria. The state is made up of twenty-three Local Government Areas. The current projected population of the State at 3.2 percent national population growth rate is 7,037,153 people. The State lies between latitude 11^{o} 32' and 09^{o} 02' North of the equator and 80^{o} 50' and 06^{o} 15 East prime meridian. It shares borders with Abuja, Katsina, Kano, Zamfara, Nasarawa, Plateau, Niger and Bauchi. The vegetation of the State is divided into Northern Guinea Savanna and Southern Guinea Savanna (KADP, 2007).

The soils are sandy loamy in nature. The mean annual temperature varies between 24^{o}C and 27^{o}C. The wet season usually lasts for about three months (May – October) with great variation as one move northwards. The rainfall is very much heavier in the southern part of

the State, with an average of 1,524mm than in the extreme northern part, with an average of 1,016mm. Many people in the State are engaged in agricultural production activities, and farmers usually carry out these activities with family labour, and it is dependent on the household size (KADP, 2007). Crops mostly grown in the state include maize, sorghum, millet, rice, acha, groundnut, cowpea, yam, cocoyam, potatoes, cassava and sugarcane among others (KADP, 2007). They embark on small, medium and large – scale livestock production such as rearing of chickens, ducks, goats, sheep and pigs as well as marketing of their products (NBS, 2005). Kaduna State is mostly populated by Hausa, Gbagyi, Ham, Atyap and Bajjuu ethnic communities. There are 57 languages spoken as first languages in Kaduna State. Hausa is a major language spoken by a majority of the people due to the influence of Hausa people. Kaduna State provides the meeting point of the earliest histories of Northern Nigeria. It is the home of Nok which gave its name to the oldest culture of Nigeria – the Nok culture (www.kadunastate.gov.ng).



Source: Adapted and Modified from the Administrative Map of Kaduna State

3.2 Sampling Procedure and Sample Size

Multi-stage sampling technique was employed in selecting the farmers for this study. In the first stage, out of the 23 Local Government Areas of Kaduna State, Jaba, Zango Kataf, and Jema'a Local Government Areas were purposively selected for this study based on the fact that they are the prominent areas farmers have been affected by the April 17, 2011 post election crises. In the second stage, three towns were purposively selected (one from each Local Government Area) on the basis of the high intensity of damage inflicted on the farmers by the post election violence. In the third stage, simple random sampling technique was employed in selecting farmers from villages around each of these towns for enumeration so as to avoid being biased. Seven percent (7%) of the sample frame (4286) was used as the sample size. In all, 300 farmers were randomly selected for enumeration. The sample frame and size that was used in this study are shown on Table 1.

Table 1: Population and Sample Size of Farmers

LGA's	Towns	*Sample frame	Sample size (7%)
Jaba	Kwoi	2497	174.79
Jema'a	Kafanchan	1153	80.71
Zango kataf	Zonkwa	636	44.50
Total	**3**	**4286**	**300**

*Source: Kaduna State Agricultural Development Project (KADP) (2007)

3.3 Data Collection

The study made use of primary data and secondary sources of information. The primary data were collected based on 2011 farming season using structured questionnaire. Variables on which data were collected include:

i) Socio-economic variables such as age, sex, marital status, educational level, household size, farming experience, farm size, main occupation and contacts with extension workers;
ii) Sources of livelihood of the farmers;
iii) Assets possessed by the farmers, and
iv) Material possessions lost by the farmers as a result of the post election violence.

Secondary sources of information include text books, journals, conference/workshop, proceedings, magazines, Kaduna State Agricultural Development Project reports, internet and other articles relevant to the study.

3.4: Analytical Techniques

Descriptive and Z-test statistics were used to achieve the objectives of the study, as specified below:

i. **Descriptive statistics**

These comprise of percentages, means and frequency, which were used to achieve objectives i, ii and part of objective iv. The Likert-scale which is a form of descriptive statistics was used to achieve objective iii

ii. **Z-test**

The Z-test statistic was used to determine whether an observed difference exists between the mean of two groups (Expected mean income of Kaduna State farmers and the calculated mean income of the rural farmers), since the sample size was larger than 30. This was used to determine the effects of post election violence on the livelihoods of the farmers in the study area. The Z-test model compared the differences in the mean income of the rural farmers with the expected mean income of Kaduna State farmers.

The Z-test is represented as follows:

$$Z = \frac{|\bar{X} - u|}{S_{\bar{X}}}$$

Where:

Z = Calculated Z value

$\bar{X}$ = Sample mean income of the respondents.

u = Theoretical mean income of rural farmers in Kaduna State.

$S_{\bar{X}}$ = Standard error of the mean income of the respondents.

3.5: Operational Definitions and Measurement of Variables

Age: This refers to the number of years an individual attained from birth till date and it is believed to be capable of influencing the perception, view, interest and conduct of a person. This was measured in years.

Literacy level: This is the ability of an individual to read and write, which is acquired in a formal or informal organized means or through schooling. This was measured on the scale scored from 0-4. Thus, farmers were scored 0 with no formal education, while those with Arabic and Adult education were scored 1, those with primary education were scored 2 and

those with secondary education were scored 3. Finally, those with tertiary education were scored 4.

Household Size: This refers to the number of individuals in the household, which include wives, children and dependants who reside within the same family and eat from the same pot. This was measured in numbers.

Sex: This means the male or female category of respondents. This was given a dummy variable of 0 or 1, such that males were scored 1 and females were scored 0.

Farming experience: This is the number of years a farmer is been engaged in farming. Farming experience was measured in years.

Farm size: This is the total land area under cultivation by the farmer. This was measured in hectares (ha).

Livelihood

Livelihoods are composed of the activities that generate the means of household survival and longer-term well-being of individuals. Livelihood, in this research work was measured using three basic determinants of livelihood which are: (i) assets (ii) income and (iii) the agricultural activities engaged by the respondents.

The effect of post election violence on income

The effect of electoral violence on livelihood was measured based on the differences in the theoretical mean income of farmers with their present mean income after the post election violence.

Income: this is defined as the amount of money the respondent earned from agricultural and non-agricultural- based activities to sustain livelihood. This was measured in terms of the amount of money (₦) the farmers earned in the season, which followed the post election violence.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1: Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents

4.1.1: Sex

Table 2 shows that majority (67%) of the respondents were males, while 33% were females. The domination of male in the study area could be attributed to the fact that males have access to land and other farming resources. It could also be due to the culture of the respondents in the study area, suggesting that male carried more responsibilities than their female counter-part, who were kept in-doors for child rearing and caring of homes. More males in the study area would mean more forces available to serve as a form of defence in times of violence.

4.1.2: Age

Results of the analysis on age of the respondents show that about 39% of the respondents were between the age range of 41-50 years, 21% of the respondents were within the age range of 31-40 years, 21% of the respondents were within the age range of 21-30 years. Their mean age of 42years shows that most of the respondents are relatively middle aged, which could be regarded as active and productive age group and so, have energy to withstand threats being imposed on them by intruders. This agrees with the findings of Baiyegunhi and Fraser (2009) which indicates that majority of the farmers are within the middle age group of 26-54 years.

4.1.3: Marital status

It is evident from Table 2 that 82% of the respondents were married, while 5%, 7% and 4% of them were single, widows and widowers, respectively. The high percentage of the married respondents could be due to struggle to meet most needs of the family. This agrees

with the assertion of Perez-Morale (1996) who noted that young people in rural areas get married earlier than their urban counterparts. This tendency of high marriage in the areas would help in building a virile generation of youths who would stand for the community in times of violence and crises.

4.1.4: Household size

Findings in Table 2 reveal that about half (53%) of the respondents have an average household size of between 6-10 persons. This agrees with the finding of Mustapha *et al*. (2012) which indicates that most of the respondents had household size of 5-9 members. Household size is an important factor in traditional agriculture because it influences the supply of labour for immediate employment and determines consumption pattern (Akinyemi, 1998). This implies that there would be enough work forces to defend the community in times of crises and also, supply the most needed labour requirement in farming.

4.1.5: Educational level

Table 2 reveals that 28% of the participants completed primary school, 22% had secondary education and 17% attended post secondary education. This agrees with the finding of Mustapha *et al*. (2012) which indicates that most of the respondents had formal education. Education helps to enlighten people on their privileges and rights in the society. This implies that most of the respondents would be aware of their rights and therefore, fight against any form of infringement on their benefits.

4.1.6: Total farm land area cultivated

Table 2 shows that 39% of the respondents had farm size of about 3.1-4.0ha, while 33% of the respondents had farm size of 2.1-3.0ha. About 18% of the participants had farm size of about 4.1-5.0ha. According to the International standards judgment for farm sizes, farms

less than 5ha are classified as small-scale farms (Ozowa, 2005). This implies that most of the respondents in the study area were small-scale farmers and may find mechanization difficult.

Table 2: Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents

Items	Frequency	Mean	Percentage
Sex			
Male	200		66.7
Female	100		33.3
Age(years)			
21-30	63		21.0
31-40	63	42	21.0
41-50	116		38.7
51-60	58		19.3
Marital Status			
Single	16		53
Married	246		82.0
Widow	21		7.0
Widower	11		3.7
Divorce	6		2.0
Household size			
1-5	121	8	40.3
6-10	160		53.3
11-15	19		6.3
Educational status			
No formal education	29		9.7
Adult	70		23.3
Primary	84		28.0
Secondary	67		22.3
Post-Secondary	50		16.7
Farm size(ha)			
1-2	15		5.0
2.1-3	99	3.4	33.0
3.1-4	117		39.0
4.1-5	54		18.0
5.1-6	15		5.0

4.1.7: Formal credit received in 2011

Table 3 reveals that only about 35% of the respondents received formal credit facilities in 2011. The credit facility received was to increase the respondents' capital base and

subsequently have a positive impact on their agricultural productivity. This implies that less people have access to credit and may cause them not to participate actively in farming, adopt recommended practices and engage in other income earning activities. This agrees with the findings of Nasiru (2010) who noted that access to micro-credit could have prospect in improving the productivity of farmers and contributing to uplifting the livelihoods of disadvantaged rural farming communities. Also, most credit institutions would not risk borrowing farmers money in areas where violence is prone.

Table 3: Formal Credit Received by the Respondents in 2011

Formal Credit	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	104	34.7
No	196	65.3
Total	**300**	**100.0**

4.1.8: Membership of cooperative societies

The result in Table 4 reveals that only 27% of the respondents were members of co-operative societies. The implication of this finding is that accessibility of the respondents to credit, farming inputs and information will be greatly limited. Ekong (2003) and Ajayi (2002) stated that membership of cooperative societies have advantages of accessibility to micro-credit, input subsidy and also as avenue for cross breeding ideas and information.

Table 4: Distribution of Respondents Based on Membership of Cooperative Societies

Membership	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	80	26.7
No	220	73.3
Total	**300**	**100.0**

4.2: Sources of Livelihood of Respondents

Objective (ii) of this study is to identify the sources of livelihood of the respondents.

4.2.1: Major sources of livelihood of respondents

Table 5 reveals that half (50%) of the respondents were farmers. About 23% of them were traders and 27% were civil servants. Respondents with trading and civil service as their major occupation had farming as their secondary occupation. The implication of this finding on the income and level of living of respondents is that it could promote or enhance livelihood diversification, which could also make more money available for investment in farming thereby bringing about reduction in poverty. This agrees with the finding of Ellis (2000) who identifies livelihood strategies to be divided into natural resource-based activities (e.g. cultivation and livestock-keeping) and non-natural resource-based activities (e.g. trade)

Table 5: Distribution of Respondents Based on their Major Occupation

Major occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Farming	150	50.0
Trading	70	23.3
Civil Servants	80	26.7
Total	**300**	**100.0**

4.2.2: Determinants of occupation of the respondents

Table 6 reveals that about 50% of the respondents had their occupation being determined by inheritance, while 27% and 23% of them had their occupation being determined by education and migration, respectively. This agrees with the finding of Chambers and Conway (1992) who reveals that many livelihoods are largely predetermined by accident of birth (inheritance). This finding implies that most of the respondents are not new into their occupation and so are expected to have great output because of their wealth of experience.

Table 6: Distribution of Respondents Based on Determinants of their Occupation

Determinants of occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Education	80	26.7
Inheritance	150	50.0
Migration	70	23.3
Total	**300**	**100.0**

4.3: Perception of the Respondents on Causes of the Post Election Violence

Objective (iii) of this study is to establish the perception of the respondents on the causes of post election violence.

4.3.1: Dimensions of post election violence as perceived by respondents

From Table 7, about 67% of the respondents vehemently said the electoral violence followed a religious dimension while about 23% believed it was political. The respondents who claimed it was a religious violence said the killings and destruction of properties occurred between the Muslims and Christians in the community. This finding implies that the post election violence was a religious war. In assessing the present level of security in the area, Table 7 further shows that 50% of the respondents are of the opinion that security was good, 24% and 16% of the respondents claimed the security was very good and average, respectively. Only 10% of the respondents claimed that the present security in the area is bad. This finding implies that the government has helped to enhance the security of the respondents in the study area.

Table 7: Distribution of Respondents Based on the Dimension Followed by the Post-Election Violence and the Area's Present Level of security

Items	Frequency	Percentage
Dimension of violence		
Religious	200	66.7
Political	70	23.3
Ethnical	25	8.3
Domestic	5	1.7
Present level of security		
Very good	72	24.0
Good	149	49.7
Average	49	16.3
Bad	30	10.0

4.3.2: Major causes of the post-election violence

From Table 8, about 40% of the respondents claimed corruption was strongly the major cause of the post election violence as electoral irregularities were said to be rampant at various polling centers, while about 30% of the respondents claimed insecurity was strongly responsible for the violence. Unemployment was seen as a major cause of the election violence by 20% of the respondents. This finding agrees with Ladan and Kiru (2005) which identifies corruption as a major cause of electoral violence in Kaduna State. This finding implies that if corruption is not handled squarely in Kaduna State and Nigeria as a whole, election violence would always be inevitable.

Table 8: Distribution of Respondents based on their Perception on the Causes of the Post-Election Violence

Causes of election violence	Agreed		Undecided		Disagree	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Corruption	120	40.0	80	26.7	100	33.3
Insecurity	90	30.0	50	16.7	160	53.3
Unemployment	60	20.0	40	13.3	200	66.7
Poverty	30	10.0	50	16.7	220	73.3

4.3.3: Acts of election violence in Kaduna State

In Table 9, about 50% of the respondents are of the opinion that election violence in Kaduna State is mainly characterized by property destruction; about 34% of them sees killings as a major occurrence in most election violence in Kaduna State. This agrees with the findings of Thompson (2010) which indicate that election violence was characterized by loss of lives and properties as was the case during the November 2008 political violence in Jos, Nigeria.

Table 9: Distribution of Respondents based on the Acts of Election Violence in Kaduna State

Items	Frequency	Percentage
Acts of election violence		
Property destruction	150	50.0
Killings	101	33.7
Unleashing wildfire	23	7.6
Closure of markets	26	8.7
Total	**300**	**100.0**

4.4: The Effects of the Post-Election Violence on Agricultural Activities, Assets and income of the Respondents

Objective (iv) of this study is to determine the effects of the post-election violence on the agricultural activities and income of the respondents in the study area.

4.4.1: Perceived Effects of Post-Election Violence on Agricultural Activities

From Table 10, about 60% of the respondents had their input supplies affected because of the agro-allied shops destroyed during the post election violence; hiring of labour was greatly affected as about 67% of the respondents attributed it to fear of insecurity by the labourers. Also, about 60% of the respondents had difficulties in selling their farm produce because of fear of being killed in market areas. This implies that the output and consequently income of these respondents will be drastically affected, thereby affecting the development of agriculture in the area and Kaduna State at large. This agrees with the finding of Thompson (2010) which indicates that Agricultural development cannot occur in the absence of peace and security

Table 10: Distribution of Respondents Based on the Perceived Effects of the Post - Election Violence on their Agricultural Activities

Items	Frequency	Percentage
Difficulties in input purchase		
Destruction of agro-allied shops	180	60.0
Fear of insecurity by external traders	60	19.9
High prices of inputs due to scarcity	39	13.1
Difficulties in hiring of labour		
Fear of insecurity by labourers	200	66.6
Death of family members	59	19.7
High cost of labour due to scarcity	30	10.0
Difficulties in selling farm produce		
Fear of being killed at market areas	180	60.0
Relocation of customers to other areas	50	16.7
Declaration of curfew by Government	40	13.3

4.4.2: The perceived effects of the post-election violence on the major assets of the respondents

Results from Table 11 reveal that 3%, 15%, 29%, 29%, 10%, and 7% of the respondents lost their cars, houses, shops, farming implements, bicycles and farm produce (crops and livestock), respectively, to the election violence. Also, 7% of the respondents claimed their loved ones were lost to death arising from the post election violence. This implies that valuable assets were lost by the respondents and this agrees with the finding of Thompson (2010) which indicates that election violence was characterized by loss of lives and properties.

Table 11: Distribution of Respondents Based on the Assets Lost as a Result of the Post-Election Violence

Items	Frequency	Percentage
Types of assets lost		
Car	9	3.0
House	45	15.0
Shop	87	29.0
Farming implements	87	29.0
Bicycle	30	10.0
Farm produce	21	7.0
Lives	21	7.0
Total	**300**	**100**

4.4.3: Effects of the post-election violence on the income of the respondents

Objective iv of this study is to determine the effect of the post-election violence on the income of the respondents. This was determined using the Z – test statistic model. Table 12 shows the calculated annual mean income (average of the sum total of the respondents' monthly income) of the respondents for years 2011 and 2012 to be ₦290, 733.30 and ₦398, 266.70, respectively. The annual mean income of the respondents for years 2011 and 2012 are seen to be lower than their theoretical mean income (gotten from Federal Bureau of Statistics in Kaduna State) which are ₦361, 360.70 and ₦415, 564.8, respectively.

This implies that the respondents' income fell below what was expected of them. This agrees with the finding of Thompson (2010) which indicates that the economy of the people suffers in an atmosphere of insecurity and political instability.The Z-values for the years 2011 and 2012 are 6.03 and 18.04, respectively, as shown in Table 12. These values are both significant at one percent (1%) which implies that the post election violence had a significant effect on the income of the respondents. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected.

Table 12: Result of the Z-test Statistic

Years	Theoretical annual mean income (₦)	Calculated annual mean income of Respondents (₦)	Z-values
2011	361360.70	290733.30	6.03***
2012	415564.8	398266.70	18.04***

***=Significant at 1%

$S_{\bar{X}}$= 11712.60

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1: Summary

This research was designed to determine the effects of 2011 post-election violence on livelihoods of farm households in Samaru Kataf Agricultural Zone of Kaduna State, Nigeria. Multi-stage sampling technique was employed in this study. Jaba, Zango Kataf, and Jema'a Local Government Areas were purposively selected for this study. Simple random sampling was employed in selecting respondents from each of the villages. In all, 300 farmers were randomly selected for enumeration. Descriptive and Z-test statistics were used to analyze the data.

The first objective of the study was to describe the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents which revealed that majority of the respondents were male (67%) and about 82% of the respondents were married. About half (53%) of the household size of the respondents ranges from 6-10 people per household. Majority of the respondents (90%) had one form of formal education or the other while about 39% of the respondents had farm sizes of about 3.1-4.0ha. About 33% of the respondents had farm size of 2.1-3.0ha and only about 35% of the respondents received formal credit facilities in 2011. Joining cooperative societies was not too encouraging as only 26% of the respondents were members of cooperative societies.

The second objective of the study was to identify the sources of livelihoods of the respondents. The result of Table 5 reveals that about half (50%) of the respondents were farmers. About 23% of them were traders and 27% were civil servants. As shown in Table

6, 50% of the respondents had their occupation being determined by inheritance, while 27% and 23% had their occupation being determined by education and migration, respectively. The third objective of the study was to establish the perception of the farmers on the causes of post election violence. From Table 7, about 67% of the respondents vehemently said the election followed a religious dimension while about 23% believed it was political. Table 8 shows that 40% of the respondents were of the opinion that corruption was the major cause of the post election violence, 30% of the respondents claimed insecurity was responsible for the violence while 20% of the respondents still believed unemployment was the major cause of the post-election violence.

The fourth objective of the study was to determine the effects of the post-election violence on the agricultural activities and income of the respondents in the study area. From Table 10, 60% of the respondents had their input supplies affected due to the destruction of agro-allied shops; fear of insecurity by the labourers was responsible for the difficulties faced in hiring of labour by about 67% of the respondents, also, 60% of the respondents reported selling of their farm produce was affected because of fear of being killed at market areas. Results from Table 11 reveal that about 3%, 15%, 29%, 29%, 10%, and 7% of the respondents lost their cars, houses, shops, farming implements, bicycles and farm produce, respectively, to the election violence.

Furthermore, objective iv of the study was to determine the effect of the post election violence on the income of the respondents. Table 12 shows the calculated annual mean income of the respondents for years 2011 and 2012 to be ₦ 290,733.30 and ₦ 398,266.70, respectively. The Z-values for the years 2011 and 2012 are 6.03 and 18.04, respectively, as

shown in Table 13. These values are both significant at one percent (1%) which implies that the post election violence has a significant effect on the income of the farmers. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected.

5.2 Conclusion

This study revealed that corruption (rigging of election and the use of thugs to harass people) and insecurity (inadequate security personnel, facilities and equipments) were the main causes of the violence in the study area. This study also revealed that the post-election violence significantly affected the livelihood of the people as their income, agricultural activities and assets were negatively affected.

5.3: Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study the following recommendations were made:

(i) Corruption and insecurity were found to be the major causes of the post election violence that led to the destruction of lives and properties and obstruction of agricultural activities in the study area. To this effect, it is recommended that Government should employ the use of harsh laws like life imprisonment, death sentence and other heavy punishments in fighting corruption, especially those related to electoral irregularities and provide adequate security for the people of Kaduna State and Nigeria at large

(ii) It was revealed that the incomes of the respondents were affected as a result of the election violence. It is therefore recommended that Government should go to the affected communities and see how they can be assisted financially to enable

them recover quickly from their losses so that they can give their best again to agriculture which is their major occupation.

(iii) It was found that the violence took a religious dimension as the killings were between the Muslims and the Christians. It is therefore recommended that religious leaders should re-activate and make functional the inter-religious dialogue so that the people will speak out their differences and live at peace with one another. These dialogues could be on individual or group bases. Also, the two religious groups could come together to form a group headed by either a Muslim or a Christian. This would further help to cement the relationship between the groups.

(iv) This study also revealed that the present level of security in the area was above average. It is therefore recommended that government and non-government agencies should sensitize and increase people's awareness on this so that investors can invest in various businesses that would help better the lives of the farmers.

(v) Unemployment was found as a major cause of post election violence. It is therefore recommended that government should help create jobs for the people to keep idle minds busy so that they do not get used for violence. These jobs should vary from teaching jobs, bank jobs and other white collar jobs for the ones with post-secondary education to skill acquisition training of those with lower or no formal education. They should be given capital to start on their own.

5.4: Contribution to Knowledge

i) Corruption and insecurity were the major causes of post election violence as electoral irregularities were rampant at different polling units. About 40% of the respondents were of the opinion that corruption was the major cause of the violence while 30% believed that insecurity was the main cause of the violence.

ii) The violence had effects on the farmers, particularly in terms of high cost of labour hiring, difficulties in selling of farm produce and input purchase. About 60% of the respondents had their input supplies affected due to the destruction of agro-allied shops; about 67% of the respondents had difficulties in hiring of labour because of the fear of insecurity by the labourers while 60% of the respondents had selling of their farm produce affected because of the fear of being killed at market areas. This negatively affected their outputs which contributed to their low annual income.

ii) The violence took a religious dimension as killings occurred between the Muslim groups and the Christians rather than between the aggrieved political parties who felt the elections were rigged. About 67% of the respondents were of the opinion that it was a religious war rather than being political.

5.5: Suggestion for Further Research

The suggested areas for further research are:

i. Similar research should be replicated in other northern States using different methodological approaches and statistical tools to further provide justification of the effects of post election violence on the livelihoods of farmers.

ii. The finding of this study revealed that the violence has some religious undertone and colouration, research works should be done on the effects of the insurgence of Boko Haram on Agriculture in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States.

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APPENDIX I: Farmers' Research Questionnaire

EFFECTS OF 2011 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE ON LIVELIHOODS OF RURAL FARMERS IN SOUTHERN SENATORIAL ZONE, KADUNA STATE

Dear Respondent**,**

This questionnaire is for an M.Sc. Thesis in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, Faculty of Agriculture, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Please, respond or tick where necessary. All information will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will strictly be used for the purpose of this research only. Thanks for your cooperation, Sir/Madam.

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION OF THE RESPONDENT

Questionnaire No……..….. Name of Respondent……

Village…… L.G.A……

Date……../……../2013.

SECTION B: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENT

1. Sex: Male ( ) Female ( )
2. Age of respondent (years): ……
3. Marital status: (a) Single ( ) (b) Married ( ) (c) Widow ( ) (d) Widower ( ) (e) Divorce ( )
4. Household size: ……
5. Level of education……..……..
   (a) No formal education: ( )

(b) Adult-education: ……. Years

(c) Primary education: ……..…….Years

(d) Secondary education: …….……..Years

(e) Post-secondary education : ……years

6. Are you a member of any cooperative group? Yes ( ), No ( )

7. If yes, give names of such groups: ……..

8. What are the benefit(s) you derived from being a member

a. Input ( )

b. Credit ( )

c. Irrigation Machine ( )

d. Training ( )

SECTION C: LIVELIHOOD SOURCES OF FARMERS IN THE STUDY AREA

9. What is your major occupation?

(a) Farming

(b) Trading

(c) Civil servant

(d) Others (Specify): …….

……...

……..

…….

10. Which of these factors is a major determinant of your occupation?

(a) Education

(b) Inheritance

(c) Migration

(d) Apprentiship

(e) Others(Specify):……

…….

……

11. Do you like your occupation? (a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

12.If no, please give your reason(s): ……

…….....

……

……

13. Have you any other source(s) of income? (a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

14. If yes, name it (them):

S/N	for year 2010	for year 2011	for year 2012
i			
ii			
iii			
iv			

SECTION D: PERCEPTION OF THE FARMERS ON CAUSES OF THE POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE

15. Which of these dimensions do you think the post election violence followed?

(a) Religious ( )

Give reasons why you think it was religious ……

……..

……

……

(b) Political ( )

Give reasons why you think it was political

……

……

……

……

(c) Ethnical ( )

Give reasons why you think it was Ethnical: ……

……

……

……

……

(d) Domestic ( )

Give reason why you think it was domestic: ……

…….

…….

……

……

(e) Others please specify.....

……

Give reason(s) for your choice: ……

…….

……..

……

…….

16. How would you assess the present level of security in this Village?

(a) Very good ( )

(b) Good ( )

(c) Average ( )

(d) Bad ( )

(e) Very bad ( )

17. How safe do you feel this village is for strangers?

(a) Very unsafe ( )

(b) Unsafe ( )

(c) Safe ( )

(d) Very safe ( )

(e) Not sure ( )

18. What measures would you say the incidence of the 2011 post-election violence in Kaduna State has made some people to take up?

(a) Acquired guns ( )

(b) Distrust among people ( )

(c) Being self-centered ( )

(d) Evacuation from area( )

(e)Others please specify……

……

……

……

……

19. What was the major cause of the post election violence in your area?

(a) corruption ( )

(b) insecurity ( )

(c) unemployment ( )

(d) poverty ( )

(e) Others specify ……..

20. give reason(s) for your answer above: …….

……

….……

……..……

…….

SECTION E: THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RESPONDENTS PERCEIVED THE POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE

21. Please, indicate how serious you think the level of the 2011 post-election violence was in Kaduna State.

    (a) Very serious ( )

    (b) Serious ( )

    (c) Somewhat serious ( )

    (d) Not serious ( )

    (e) Not sure ( )

22. Among which Category of individual ages do you think were associated most with the 2011 post-election violence in Kaduna State?

    (a) 1 - 20yrs ( )

    (b) 21 -40yrs ( )

    (c) 41-60yrs ( )

    (d) 61-80yrs ( )

    (e) Above ( )

23. How would you assess the level of the 2011 post-election violence compared to other election violence in Kaduna State?

(a) Far more severe ( )

(b) More severe ( )

(c) About the same( )

(d) Less severe ( )

(e) Far less severe ( )

24. What do you think is most common to all incidences of post-election violence in Kaduna State area?

(a) Property destruction ( )

(b) Killings ( )

(c) Unleashing of wild fire ( )

(d) Closure of markets ( )

(e)Others please specify……

…….

…….

……

……

25. Did you lose anything during the 2011 post-election violence? (a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

26. If yes, name it (them): (i)……..……

(ii)…….

(iii)……..

27. Did you know that the 2011election would result to this kind of violence?

(a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

28. If yes, give your reason(s): ……

……..

…… ……

……

……

……

SECTION F: EFFECTS OF ELECTION VIOLENCE ON THE AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES AND INCOMES OF THE RESPONDENTS

29. Did the election violence hinder the purchase of some farm inputs in your area?

(a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

30. If yes, give your reason(s): ----------

---

31. Did the election violence affect the hiring of labour for farming in your area?

(a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

32. If yes, give your reason(s): ----------

---

33. Was selling and buying of farm produce affected by the election violence in your area?

(a) yes ( ) (b) No ( )

34. If yes, give your reason(s): ----------

---

35. Did the election violence affect your major source of livelihood?

(a) Yes ( ) (b) No ( )

36. if yes, give your reasons:……

……

……

37. Estimated annual income in 2010: ……Naira.

38. Estimated annual income in 2011: ……Naira

39. Estimated annual income in 2012: ……Naira

40. Extension contact in 2010 :……(Times)

41. Extension contact in 2011 :……(Times)

42. Extension contact in 2012 :……(Times)

43. Total farm land owned: ……..…...ha.

44. Total farm size cultivated in 2010: ……..ha

45. Total farm size cultivated in 2011: ……..ha

46. Total farm size cultivated in 2012: ……..ha

47. Amount of formal credit received in 2010: ……Naira.

48. Amount of formal credit received in 2011: ……Naira.

49. Amount of formal credit received in 2012: ……Naira.

50. Amount of informal credit received in 2010: ……Naira.

51. Amount of informal credit received in 2011: ……Naira.

52. Amount of informal credit received in 2012: ……Naira.

SECTION G: SOLUTIONS TO ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KADUNA STATE

53. Give the measures you think will be effective in reducing election violence in Kaduna state?

……

……

……

……

……

……..