SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN PEASANT AGRICULTURE:

A Case Study of Simple Commodity Production in Kaura Namoda Area of Sokoto State

by

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A thesis submitted to the Postgraduate School, Ahmadu Bello University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that it is a record of my own research work. It has not been accepted in any previous application for a higher degree. All quotations are distinguished by quotation marks and the sources of information are specifically acknowledged by means of references.

YAHAYA ABUBAKAR ABDULLAHI

Date: 30th March 1983

Preface and Acknowledgements

This study is an enquiry into the nature of production relations in peasant agriculture. It is an attempt to show how agriculture is subordinated to the needs of capital accumulation by foreign/domestic, merchant and industrial capital; and how that subordination leads to its underdevelopment and the improverishment of the peasant producers. We contend that, long-term and sustained agricultural development, leading to the improvement of the living conditions of Nigeria's peasant farmers, is only possible when the relations between men in the sphere of production and exchange are re-structured, to the short-term and long-term advantage of those directly engaged in production.

In our attempt to capture the essence of the agricultural system as a whole, and the manner in which it is subordinated to domestic and foreign capital accumulation, we inevitably left a lot of important issues untouched. No attempt was made in the study to expose the important issue concerning the nature of the ideological superstructures which have emerged to legitimate the system of peripheral capitalism.

In addition to this, not much clear reference has been given to the issue of class formation in either rural or urban areas. These, though inextricable parts of the articulation process, we feel are better treated in a separate work.

Furthermore, we restricted our analysis only to agricultural production proper. We did not take into account the farmers' off-farm occupations. We also did not touch the role of women in agriculture and in other home-based activities. All these we feel should be subjects of investigations in their own rights because we believe that understanding the socio-economic structure under which agricultural production takes place is paramount in any attempt to change it for the good of the rural communities.

With regards to what little we have been able to accomplish in this study, some limitations may also arise. These may be due to the manner of presentation and the conclusiveness (or otherwise) or our results.

However, despite all these limiations, and omissions, we may take some consolation in the words of Paul Baran, who once remarked that,

> "It is better to deal imperfectly with what is important, than to attain virtuoso skill in the treatment of what does not matter."
>
> - The Political Economy of Growth, p. 22

In the course of this enquiry, I benefitted from the support of several institutions and individuals. First, I must acknowledge my gratitude to the Institute for Agricultural Research, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, who provided this study with all the logistical support. I am also grateful to the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, under the headship of both Professor D.W. Norman and Professor G.O.I. Abalu for the free atmosphere and facilities, it put to my disposal in the whole course of this study. I also thank Mr B.J. Buntjer, Dr Jacob Voh and Dr S.K. Manzo, who helped a lot in the early and later stages of the investigation and data analysis.

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Any contribution which this study might make is the result of the combined assistance and support received from institutions and individuals, many of whom could not possibly be mentioned here. Any faults, commissions and omissions, and the manner in which the ideas herein are expressed, however, are mine alone.

1982 Yahaya A. Abdullahi

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INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is today engaged in efforts to find a viable path for long-term social and economic development. The primary objective of national policy is said to be directed towards raising the people's material living conditions. In such a process of development, agriculture has a crucial and strategic role.

In efforts to achieve a long-term and sustained development in the area of agriculture, two current strategies seem to be on the ascendency in the actions of the government. The first is concerned with the establishment of what are called 'Integrated' Agricultural Development Projects. The second is the creation of River Basin Development Authorities. The former strategy aims to provide modern inputs, credits, extension services, low cost agricultural roads, and earth dams for water supply. The intention of the government is to create such organizations all over the country under several such projects catering for different areas of the nation. The Gusau Agricultural Development Project; the Funtua Agricultural Development Project; Gombe Agricultural Development Project, etc., are all manifestations of such a strategy.

The latter strategy concerned with the development of river basins aims to create regions of agricultural abundance to serve as centres for year-round food production; and as bases for the establishment of agro-based industries. Sokoto Rima Basin Development Authority, Upper Benue Development Authority, Lake Chad Basin Development Authority, etc., are just few examples of this strategy. In addition to these the Government has taken far-reaching fiscal measures which range from input subsidies and credit to long tax holidays for small and large scale producers, and investors respectively. This in essence means the subsidization of the process of resource and capital accumulation by large scale private farmers and agribusiness corporations. All these are now pursued under the slogan - Green Revolution; and aimed at increasing the production of food and agricultural raw materials.

It appears, however, that the basic philosophy behind these 'Green Revolution' strategies avoids the central problems confronting the agrarian system as a whole. For it sees the backwardness of agriculture only in terms of logistics, i.e., physical infrastructure and modern inputs. Hence the tendency to seek for solutions in purely technical terms.

But just as we cannot judge an individual by what he thinks of himself, so we cannot tackle agricultural backwardness in terms of the apparent manifestations of this backwardness. We have to explore and attempt to comprehend the hidden social structural relationships behind this backwardness. In other words instead of seeing our problems as arising from relations between things, an alienated perception; we have to see them as arising from relationships between men with regards to the forces of production and the fruits of labour, i.e., social relations. This realization is fundamental, for without a knowledge of the socio-economic basis of the agricultural system, we may not be able to know which forces in society are for genuine, long-term and sustained development, and which are structurally and advantageously positioned to oppose it.

More so, every branch of production is a social activity. It is a social subject in which relations between men are often phantasmically perceived as relations between things. The purpose of this research is to correct this alienating perception by looking at our agricultural problems today, as arising from the nature and structure of social relations of production generated within a historically determined social formation in which two modes of production articulate.

The study of relations of production in the field of agriculture, is one of the best ways of comprehending agricultural problems, as social problems. By relations of production we mean man's relationship to man in the appropriation and control of the means of production (i.e., land, tools, raw materials, manpower, etc.) and the products of labour. In other words, the relations of people with regards to land, labour, instruments and products of labour are often in conflict with the nature, form and organization of the mode of exploiting these means of production to their optimum, most efficient and just manner. This therefore limits the maximization of the material and spiritual development of the society as a whole.

The nature of production relations in Nigerian agriculture, is reflected in the forms assumed by the structure of land holding; the level of development and distribution of the instruments of labour; and the manner in which the fruits of labour are appropriated. In general, the agrarian scene is composed of innumerable isolated small scale producers, working on small and fragmented holdings, utilizing a backward form of technology in the production of agricultural goods. The fruits gained from this demanding and exerting process of production

are generally appropriated in exchange with middlemen-organizations of merchants, and institutions set up by the state. Whatever income is gained by the farmers in this exchange relationship is by and large utilized in the purchase of manufactured commodities, through a proliferation of all kinds of merchants and traders.

It is a case where agriculture producing simple commodities, (agricultural raw materials and food products), is articulated, in more or less a dependent manner, with domestic and foreign merchant and industrial capital. In this regard, we see the whole system as a formation of peripheral capitalism within which merchant and industrial capital (fully supported by the state) dominate agriculture producing simple commodities. It is in effect, a formation in which a simple commodity mode of production is articulated in a dependent relationship to a capitalist mode. We argue that historically the formation initially emerged with the arrival of European traders, and was subsequently established on a secure footing during the era of British colonialism. It was in this period that colonial socio-economic changes utilized the forms of a previous pre-capitalist mode of production, in serving the purposes and needs for capital accumulation by the dominant capitalist mode.

Hypotheses

This study intends to work on the basis of a central hypothesis and other ones related to it.

CENTRAL HYPOTHESIS

That the structure of social relations of Production in Peasant Agriculture, is a fetter to the long-term and sustained development of the agrarian system as a whole.

RELATED HYPOTHESES

1. that the relationship between men with regards to land, leads to sub-division and fragmentation of holdings, and this is not feasible for substantial capital investment and far-reaching technological changes, through which sustained growth is achieved.

2. that the relationship between men with regards to the instruments of labour leads to the scattering of these instruments, and results in the failure to develop and adopt more complex instruments in the field of production.

3. that the relationship between men with regards to agricultural labour leads to labour bottle-necks, in that labour is isolated and highly dependent on human energy and muscles. This is because it is organized to reflect the structure of factor ownership which is not conducive to long-term development.

4. that the structure of exchange relations in the sale of agricultural goods and the purchase of manufactured products represents a form of exploitation and income drain. This cripples the small peasant's capital formation efforts.

5. this shows that capital is formed outside agriculture (by foreign capitalist corporations, domestic merchants, traders and the state) and not within it. This consequently robs agriculture of the much needed resources for its internal development.

METHODS OF ENQUIRY

This study utilizes three methodological packages. These are; questionnaire survey; Archival records; and documents from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Sokoto State History Bureau.

SURVEY

A survey was conducted in three villages in Kaura Namoda Local Government Area, Sokoto State. We used a schedule, the English and Hausa versions of which are presented in Appendix A and B respectively. The schedule was applied to 273 farmers (115 in Birnin Magaji and 79 each in Kasuwan Daji and Yankaba).

The sampling procedure adopted was that each village was divided into its respective quarters and all the houses were allocated numbers, from which the sample was drawn. Only adult males (preferably household heads) in each household were interviewed conforming to the traditions of the local setting, whereby adult males are both the economic and social heads of households. Moreso because the participation of women in agricultural production in these areas is very minimal. It is from these interviews that we obtained most of the empirical data used in this study.

ARCHIVAL RECORDS

These were obtained from the National Archives, Kaduna. Most of these materials deal with reports and assessments made in the area, with particular reference to agriculture, in the colonial and early post-colonial era.

DOCUMENTS FROM THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, AND SOKOTO HISTORY BUREAU

These documents have to do with the production and marketing figures collected by the Produce Inspection Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Sokoto. Files kept by both the Government, Native Authority, Area Council and Local Governments on Kaura Namoda, Zurmi and Moriki were consulted in the Sokoto History Bureau.

THE AREA OF RESEARCH

The study was conducted in the Kaura Namoda Local Government Area in Sokoto State (which was last year split up into three local governments). The villages selected are all in Kaura Namoda district. This area is well known for its agricultural wealth which was in fact the main reason why it is one of the terminals of the Nigerian railway system. Kaura Namoda is to the north of Gusau. On the north it is bounded by Isa Local Government Area, west by Talata Mafara Local Government Area, east by Katsina area of Kaduna State and south by Gusau Local Government Area (see Map in Appendix I).

The three villages where our investigations took place are Birnin Magaji, Kasuwan Daji and Yankaba. For the exact location of these villages, see Map in Appendix J).

OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

This study is divided into six chapters excluding the introduction. Like every other work we started with the review of literature on the theories of agricultural and rural development. We dealt with several conventional theoretical approaches concerning the place of agriculture in the social and economic development of the underdeveloped countries. After outlining the presentation of each theoretical approach, we present our own criticisms of its premises and conclusions.

Noting that these theoretical formulations suffer from inappropriate conceptualization of the problem, we presented a conceptual framework which we feel is more appropriate when analyzing the problems of contemporary peasant agriculture. This conceptual formulation is presented in the first half of chapter two. The second half of this chapter is devoted to an analytical exposition of the pre-colonial social formulation and the modes of production within it and how these were subsequently transformed and put in the service of foreign merchant and industrial capital at the advent of and during the colonial era. This in effect gives the study a historical dimension, and shows the rigour and relevance of the conceptual framework we have adopted.

Chapter three is concerned with labour and property relations. This is essentially an enquiry into the nature and structure of land holding, the nature and level of development of the instruments of labour; the organization of agricultural labour; and how all these affect efficiency and the level of productive output.

Chapter four is concerned with the structure of exchange relations. It deals with the organization of marketing of agricultural and manufactured products. It concludes with a discussion on whether marketing creates or adds value to agricultural commodities.

Chapter five is essentially an enquiry into the nature and extent of the agrarian crisis now facing the nation, and the implications of current policies and strategies for agricultural and rural development in the country.

Chapter six is the summary and conclusions. Here we summarized our presentation and make recommendations on how to go about developing the agrarian system for the good of the rural communities in particular and the country in general.

CHAPTER ONE

THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

The theory of economic development of the under-developed countries has experienced a sharp transition from what is commonly referred to as 'industrial fundamentalism' to its present state. Agriculture is now recognized as the backbone of future economic and social development of these countries. This disillusionment with 'industrial fundamentalism' was largely due to successive records of failures of various industrializing strategies applied to most of these countries during the United Nations Development decade (1950-1960).

These failures alerted scholars, national and international institutions to the fact that the agricultural sector in these countries is the most crucial. This is so, in the sense that it employs on the average between 60 percent to 80 percent of the total populations of these countries. It also, in most cases despite its technological backwardness, contributes on the average between 50 percent and 90 percent of these countries' total national income. Hence it is in effect the main foreign exchange earner of these countries.

In Nigeria, agriculture employs between 70 and 80 percent of the country's approximately 80 million people.[1] In fact, between 1967 and 1969, it was estimated that the average share of agricultural products in the total export earnings of the country was 58.8 percent of a total earning of $713,400,000 (at 1967-69 value).[2] And prior to the first exports of petroleum, agriculture provided between 70-80 percent of total value of Nigerian exports.[3]

It was hence by and large conceded that, "growth in agricultural output is in most societies essential to the development process, and the contribution of agricultural growth to the development process is positively related to the rate of productivity growth in the agricultural sector."[4]

But agricultural development efforts are relevant not only because agriculture is the main national employer and the main source of national income, but also because it has the potentialities of elevating the current abysmal living conditions of the teeming rural producers. In essence, the whole concept of rural development is related to efforts to bring about development in the rural areas to the advantage of the majority, low-income populations.

Development, in the sense of, "improving living standards of the mass of the low-income populations residing in rural areas and making the process of their development self-sustaining."[5]

To this end, agricultural development projects have been established in Nigeria with loans from the World Bank and other foreign agencies. The government has also instituted programmes such as Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP) and later the Green Revolution Programme, providing subsidized agricultural inputs, credits and fiscal incentives to the agricultural sector. Agricultural Research Institutes, the mass media, students etc., were mobilized all in the name of triggering an agricultural revolution in the country. All these efforts underscore the correct perception that agricultural development is crucial to total national economic and social development.

Any attempt at an enquiry into the history of economic and agricultural development especially in the underdeveloped countries is necessarily a formidable task. This is not only because of the differences in the agricultural system, but also because of the sheer diversity of the views expressed. As such our aim here is to review these theories not necessarily on the basis of

which country or group of countries the theorizing is based upon, or even in the historical sequence they appear. Our interest lies in the relevance of the differing views and ideas they express about agricultural and social development, to Nigerian circumstances or those experiences similar to it.

As a result of this, we are dividing our theoretical enquiry into three related components. The first is concerned with the general theories of economic development and technical change in the underdeveloped countries. These are the 'Growth Stage' and 'Dual Economy' types. The second component deals with the history and analysis of the nature of West African export growth. The third is concerned with the currently popular theories often referred to as 'the high pay-off input models' which seek to develop agriculture on the basis of the small farmer through increasing the rate of modern input utilization. All these components are related in the sense that the first tries to provide general theories, the second modifies the general theories in the light of West African experiences, while the third while clarifying some draw-backs of the first and the second in the light of new information and materials, seeks to recommend development strategies for practical application.

GENERAL THEORIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNICAL CHANGE

Economic theories, dealing particularly with the type of economic growth which gives agriculture a special place are mainly of two types. These are the 'growth stage' theories and the 'dual economy' theories. We are here dealing with them very briefly so as to provide us with a general overview of what they are all about so as to enable us recognize their connection with later more specific theories.

Growth Stage Theories

These are mainly evolutionary formulations interested in the process of transition from an agricultural to an industrial society. They are "efforts to systematize the process of economic growth within the framework of sequential stages with general application across national and cultural boundaries."[6] As such, consequently, they are often formulated on a high level of generalization. One of the most prominent works in this direction is Rostow's much quoted and criticized, leading sector theory.[7]

Rostow identified five stages of economic growth from a primitive to a modern economy. These are - the traditional society, the pre-conditions for taking off, the take off,

the drive to maturity and the age of high mass consumption. He was primarily interested with the processes via which a society travels from one stage to another. Using this scheme he plotted the stage in which various countries in the world are, and the conditions which would have to be satisfied before they move to the next stage.

The level of technology and investment rate in the process of production play a leading role in this scheme. As such he recommended massive technological transfers from the more developed countries to the less developed countries through the agency of multinational cooperations' foreign investments and through foreign aid. Rostow, further postulated that at each of these stages certain sectors of the economy will be the leading ones. So in a country which is in the stage of pre-conditions for taking off, agriculture will be the leading sector while in a country which is driving towards maturity, industry will be the leading sector.

This theory hence assumes that, for all societies, irrespective of their historical and cultural experiences, the path to development is one. That for societies to develop, they have to follow the footpaths of their more

developed predecessors. This implies that for the underdeveloped societies to develop, they have to follow the same terrain traversed by the developed nations of the capitalist world. This assumption is tantamount to saying that development on capitalist lines is inevitable for all underdeveloped countries.

This view has been refuted historically by the failure of several countries such as Brazil and Argentina to develop even though they have been independent sovereign nations for over one and a half centuries, and have since followed the capitalist path. On the other hand we find countries which took a different path of development doing better, in a smaller time span. As such we can see that growth stage theories are theories which mainly preach the inevitability and necessity for capitalist development of the underdeveloped countries. More so, the linear development programme adopted in the model makes it too simplistic and a-historical inspite of its historical pretentions. It doesn't fundamentally tackle the nature of the relationship between the underdeveloped countries and the capitalist world. For the relationship between them is not one of symbiosis, with each gaining from the other, but one of outright exploitation of the underdeveloped world by the capitalist world. This is why it sees colonialism

and neo-colonialism as having a beneficial effect in the sense of awakening traditional societies to the needs and paths of modern development.

Dual Economy Models

These models can be seen as a reaction against the leading sector formulations of the growth stage theories. They are based essentially on the simple (even though superficial) observation that in the present day underdeveloped countries, two sectors exist both at the social and economic levels which are qualitatively different from one another. These sectors are identified as the modern advanced capitalist sector and the backward traditional sector. This approach is basically an attempt to reduce the whole problem of development of the underdeveloped countries to that of transforming the lagging and backward traditional sector to achieve advanced and modern characteristics.

There are dynamic and static versions of these models. One of the static versions is that developed by Boeke, a Dutch economist in his study of Dutch colonial policy in Indonesia. It emphasizes the sociological nature of foreign dualism in the sense of the difference between western and nonwestern concepts of rationality and economic organization.

Boeke hypothesized that there is a fundamental distinction between the objectives of economic activity in the western and nonwestern society. That "... while economic activity in the West and Western enclaves in the east (Indonesia) is based on the stimulus of economic need, the Indonesian is guided primarily by social needs."[8] Using this dichotomy of the objectives of economic activity he argues that it is futile to introduce western technology in traditional systems, for this will only accelerate the rate of population growth in this system. So any attempt to develop traditional agriculture technologically in the form of provision of advanced farm equipment, fertilizers, pesticides etc., will not result in any appreciable contribution to total national development efforts, since the motives of the traditional producers are social rather than economic or commercial.

This postulation is rather crude for it does not take account of the fact that the structure of motivations and needs are not anthropological categories, but are rather objective predispositions arising from the nature of a foreign imposed and maintained socio-economic system, which after creating new needs in the people at the same time blocks their avenues to need satisfaction by taking away from them the fruits of their productive efforts.

Another version of static dualism is what is often referred to as enclave dualism, mainly seen in the works of Higgins and some of the works of Myint. This type of dualism refers to the situation where the export sector itself is not in the hands, or within the traditional sector, but in plantation and mining enclaves. The role of the traditional sector here is just the provision of food and labour to the technically advanced foreign enterprises of mines and plantations. These enclaves are stimulated more by foreign than domestic demand. The growth of this sector has little if any impact on the domestic economy. Instead, it is the 'modern' sector which receives an inflow of labour and food from the traditional sector while the former's capital outflow is to the international foreign financial centres.[9]

The dynamic versions of the dual economy theories, are by far the most relevant to our present enquiry. This type of dualistic theorizing had its origin from Arthur Lewis' writings.[10] Lewis argues that the main characteristics of certain class of underdeveloped economies is the existence of what he referred to as 'disguised unemployment.' Lewis' model postulates the existence of an advanced or capitalist sector and a backward traditional

sector, quite similar to all other dualistic models. But in Lewis' constructs, the mutual relationship in the activities between the two sectors, is limited to a certain extent. This in the sense that the modern sector being more developed, needs to be the prime mover of the development of the traditional sector through its absorption of surplus labour which is said to exist in the latter sector. As such the population of the backward traditional sector is regarded merely as a labour reservoir for the modern capitalist sector. In his view, the backward economy can develop into a modern capitalist economy if disguised unemployment, or labour surplus from the agricultural sector disappears.[11]

Fei and Ranis, were the first to apply Lewis' approach. They also postulate from observation, "... a relatively large and overwhelmingly stagnant subsistent agricultural sector in which institutional forces determine the wage rate and a relatively small but growing commercialized industrial sector in which competitive conditions obtain in the input markets." Labour is in surplus in the traditional sector in the sense that, "given existing production condition in the two sectors, labour is a nonscarce factor while capital is extremely scarce."[12] Hence labour is in surplus only to the point where capital is scarce.

Fei and Ranis, thus attempted to study the detailed interrelationships between the two sectors, these include:

(a) common sharing of the supply of labour;

(b) consumption of the goods produced in each sector by workers of the other sector;

(c) investment by property owners in one sector in the assets of another sector etc.[13]

It is pertinent here to reiterate that Fei and Ranis like Lewis assume the existence of surplus labour in the traditional sector. Traditional agriculture supplies what they refer to as the "wage fund" in the form of surplus labour and agricultural products to support industrial expansion. In this model, industry develops at the expense of agriculture, i.e., the modern sector develops at the expense of the traditional sector. This is so despite the fact that they postulate that agricultural production will not fall due to the withdrawal of this mass labour, because the few who remain will exact more energy to maintain production levels at least constant. But the assumption of labour surplus on which this theoretical formulation is based is questionable. For in peasant agriculture, the nature of landholding and the backwardness of the technology of production leads to periods of bottlenecks instead of labour surplus. (For more details on this see chapter three).

But another similar model proposed by Jorgenson starts with the assumption that disguised unemployment or surplus labour does not exist, but otherwise his constructs and those of Fei and Ranis are similar. The principal difference between the two models "... is in the conditions governing the supply of labour to the advanced sector." While in the Fei and Ranis model, labour supply may be removed at no sacrifice to output; in the Jorgenson model labour may be removed from the backward sector only at the cost of reducing the output of that sector.[14] As such Jorgenson's model is pro-agriculture while Fei-Ranis model is pro-industry. Nevertheless their differences peter out once the alleged surplus labour disappears.

Both of these presentations, however, are mere exercises in model building and are not of much relevance to the issues of policy in the process of agricultural development. They all started with classical and neo-classical concepts and theories of growth and development and then applying them to underdeveloped economies. They both assume that the history of western economic development where industry gained from the proletarized labour of agriculture can be applied to the problems of the present day underdeveloped countries.

In effect, they do not take account of the fact that even in the western historical experience, the process of obtaining labour was as a result of the destruction of the feudal mode of production and the proletarization of the mass of peasant small holders through various policies such as the enclosure policy. In other words, this was because the structure of social relations of production governing the feudal mode were burst asunder to bring forth new conditions based on capitalist production relations. Whereas in the underdeveloped countries the structure of feudal or semi-feudal relations of production were by and large conserved but transformed to serve the needs of foreign capitalist accumulation.

As such mere model building with neither historical nor structural analysis, is of no relevance to the present problem of underdevelopment. The implicit assumption in all these models was that they were dealing with a pure capitalist mode of production, only that it needs some adjustment to enter into full blown process of economic growth. This assumption is untenable in the light of existing facts. These are that underdeveloped economies are not pure capitalist economies; their colonial and

pre-colonial history is in itself a very significant variable which none of these models ever touched. As such they turn out to be superficial and policy wise empty.

Another issue which neither of these models even reflected upon was the nature of the relationship between the advanced capitalist economies of the west and these underdeveloped countries. They tend to treat the modern sector as if it has been there all the time, an integral part of a national economy. They fail to see it for what it fundamentally is; a peripheral extension of the world capitalist system. Its role is that of middle-man whose purpose is to facilitate the exploitation and transformation of the traditional sector into one whose only purpose is the production of agricultural raw materials for the capitalist centre and food products for itself and the domestic economy. Even this it is currently incapable of fulfilling.

Apart from these general theories working on a high level of generalization, there are those which try to see the problem of transition from 'traditional' to 'modern' at the micro level. These micro theories are concerned with how and in what ways it is possible to transform the 'subsistence' farm into a commercial farm; the peasant into an agricultural entrepreneur and his traditional society into a modern society. This kind of theorizing is evident in for example, the works of Wharton and Mosher.

Mosher for example suggested that subsistent farming is carried on more and more to provide food for the family, or for the village community or tribe, than it is for sale to an outside market. He warned that "... if this situation continues very little agricultural development can occur and the levels of living of the people on these farms cannot rise. For agricultural development to take place; it is essential among several other necessities, that farms become less and less subsistence and more and more commercial and producing increasingly for the market."[15]

He maintained that to promote the transition from subsistence to commercialization; from traditional to modern, we have to study the motives of the peasants and show how we can bring new influences upon them to help them move towards this goal of development. He suggested to this end, mass education, credit facilities, creation of farmer associations and cooperatives.[16]

Wharton on the other hand tries to find out the extent of interaction and interdependence of the subsistent farmers with the wider society. This is only for the purpose of using it as an index of measuring their exposure to and acceptance of modern influences which are associated with

economic development. His measures of this interaction are based on several criteria. Economic criteria being sale of farm products ratio, production versus consumption ratio, as determining the peasants' subsistence orientation. Others are hired labour versus family labour, purchased inputs versus family produced inputs, the level of technology, incomes, living standards, and freedom of decision making are all taken as indicators of the presence or absence of peasants' subsistence orientation. On the socio-cultural level, he used the pattern variables and the degree of outside contacts as indicators of the peasants' receptivity to change and the rate of adoption of new ideas.[17]

These formulations are in effect attempts to translate the general theories into indicators which can be used in researches in order to promote policies with the view to modernizing the so called traditional sector. The whole issue of subsistence and commercial orientation in peasant agriculture, I feel is not actually the relevant issue. Peasants in the present underdeveloped countries, have been increasingly producing for the world and domestic markets to the extent that the distinction between cash and food crops is in some areas being glossed over. The questions of attitudes are not (as I said above) anthropological categories,

but mere reflection of the nature of the socio-economic situation in which peasants find themselves. Peasants can be fatalistic for it "... represents a just estimation of the enormous and discouraging weight of the chancy factors that condition the success of their efforts."[18] Such factors as exploitation by the state and middlemen of all shades of activities, climatic factors such as drought; fertility of the soil; poverty; abysmal health conditions; fluctuating market conditions; pests; etc., are all factors which shape peoples perceptions.

As such it can be argued that traditionalism and fatalism are not related with anthropological predispositions, but by a just appraisal of the nature of social and economic conditions of existence arising from underdevelopement itself. In otherwords, they do not in themselves lead to underdevelopment but on the contrary underdevelopment creates and reinforces them.

It is interesting at this stage to find out the connection between the theories of dualism and those concerned with the development and growth of export activities in especially the West African region.

THEORIES OF EXPORT GROWTH

These theories are mainly concerned with the transformation of indigenous economic systems on the eve of colonialism and their integration into the capitalist market economy. The introduction of European political and economic influence provides a useful point of departure for an examination of African movement into the world economy. Barber, contends that, "... the massive movement into the world economy is the most important single economic fact of sub-saharan economic life over the past century."[19]

In effect, it was political control by European powers that provided the imperative for the stimulation of export production.* For in so far "... as metropolitan governments required their colonies to be self-financing production for export was essential if foreign exchange to service external debts was to be generated."[20] This justification for export production is also often accompanied with the view that the European powers saw the initiation of monetized production as part of their civilization mission in Africa. In otherwords, the indigenous peoples could only be

*It is however important to note that export production started even before the establishment of political control. Thus this is only meant to say that under firm political control the impetus towards export production was accelerated and the terms of trade got worse. See for example the work of A.G. Hopkins, "The Economic History of West Africa." Longmans, London, 1973.

advanced from their backward state by educating them to new standards of taste and to high level of productive performance. In this regard, Lugard also talked of developing cash crop production for the purpose of helping "... the native population and other nations in the world."[21]

Others were even of the racist belief that the maintainance of the pax Africana "... depended on the provision of opportunities to earn money incomes, otherwise idleness among African men might well breed mischief and thereby expensive threats to the new order." As such the process of economic change brought about modern forms of export activity and two contrasting sectors emerged; one monetized exchange economy and the other, traditional economic systems of the indigenes. This new modern exchange economy is oriented towards imports and exports. It was therefore said to have imposed new demands on the Africans, and created new economic opportunities for them.

The traditional economies are said to be characterized by a substantial under utilization of potentially available labour. This excess labour capacity "... meant that additional forms of economic activity could be undertaken without sacrifice in the conventional level of physical output in

the traditional economy."[22] Johnston also maintained that it is possible to "... superimpose production of an export crop or crops on to the traditional agriculture without affecting food crop production adversely."[23]

Labour was alledged to be in surplus because colonisation brought domestic peace to the indigenous social system through the abolishing of tribal warfare. As a result of this leisure time increased. This leisure time was not productively employed because of the lack of remunerative ways for man to utilize his excess labour capacity. Then came the European trader who provided men with opportunities to utilize their leisure time for productive purposes. This he did by providing them with market outlet for potential surplus products which they might be able to create through the employment of this leisure time.

Helleiner, for example, painted a static picture of indigenous economies, in the sense that there were "... few incentives in the social structure for individual or even collective self betterment." He further assumed that not only labour but also land was in surplus in these stagnant economies. To this essentially static picture, he contends,

"... was added in the 19th century, an external stimulus. The appearance of European trading firms, missionaries, sowing new ideas and bringing education and later an externally imposed government, began to produce important structural changes in the economy ... Most significant of all was the offering by traders of rewards for the sale of particular crops which were in demand abroad..."[24]

This new external impact stimulated the economy, and it came to have a new form of dynamism which can now be extended further to achieve economic growth. Helleiner further asserted that, "beyond offering the farmers a vent for their potential surplus production, the foreigner did next to nothing to alter the technological backwardness of the economy. Since production functions were largely left untouched, he cannot be accused of introducing export bias into the economy. All he did was to dangle sufficiently attractive prizes before the producers noses to persuade them to convert potential into actual surpluses by increasing their inputs."[25]

In this Helleiner is basically using the vent for surplus thesis also advanced by Myint. This thesis is based primarily on three assumptions: that massive increases in export production was achieved;

(a) without comparable increase in population. This suggests that there had been under-utilization of labour previously.

(b) without significant reduction in the amounts of land, and time involved in the production of traditional goods and services. This suggests that land was also under-utilized previously.

(c) without the adoption of major improvement in agricultural techniques.

All these suggest that increases in output were mainly as a result of increased inputs of land and labour. This theory hence implies that since land and labour are in surplus in especially the West African area, agricultural production can be increased without altering traditional techniques of production and mode of production organization. In otherwords, the peasant can resort to market production without necessarily jeopardizing his subsistence needs.

In a nutshell, it was generally believed that monetary incentives were crucial in forcing the producer to produce for the market. But the question is, will monetary incentives by themselves be able to generalize cash production among the peasantry? Under what socio-economic relations did monetary incentives become an important phenomenon? It has to be realized that colonialism doesn't only mean foreign political control. It is both a political and an economic system. It initially forced the peasants to pay taxes in cash.

The money is in European currency. The holders of this currency hence are European traders. For the peasant to obtain cash, he has either to sell his food (which was not then in demand by the Europeans), to sell his labour by working for them, or in the final analysis to produce crops in which they are interested.

As such participation in the money economy, initially was never voluntary. The consequences for refusing to participate were grave. It means imprisonment for failure to pay taxes. The massive importation of foreign manufactured goods was also very crucial. For mass importation crippled the industrial activities of the peoples. This produced a change of taste from indigenous to foreign goods. Barber for example, noted that local tin producers couldn't compete with foreign companies; "... in 1884, it was found that the tin used by the Hausa for tinning their brass wares was mined by Nigerians... and smelted in primitive clay furnaces, but by 1923 this indigenous industry has completely disappeared."[26]

So was the fate of textile production, iron smelting, salt mining and other similar industries that used to provide the people with their material necessities. The only industries left were those of the blacksmiths and metal

smiths, who are responsible for producing hoes and other implements that make up the technology of agricultural production; and even in these few cases, their sources of raw materialswere divested from African indigenous smelters to European importers of pig-iron and the scraps of vehicles imported from abroad.

Hence money was in need not only for the payment of taxes and other dues but also for the purchase of foreign goods. This was necessary because of the systematic destruction of peoples' self-sufficiency.

The shift to production for the market was not accomplished merely because of the presence of money; on the contrary it is the needs of the colonial socio-economic system which instilled into the peasant the necessity of this money and hence the conversion of his productive activity for its procurement. Those who contend that it is the appearance of money which brought about monetary relations are simply putting the cart before the horse. It is the nature of the socio-economic system which makes money important in peasant life. As Karl Marx noted in Capital, "the purchase and sale of slaves is formally a purchase and sale of commodities. But money cannot perform this function without the existence of slavery."[27]

There are writers, like Polly Hill,[28] who try to give some respectability to the views expressed by the above theories by giving some credit to the peasant producers for their 'rationality', 'initiative' and 'enterprise' in the allocation of their 'surplus' land and labour resources for cash production. Hill tries to show that indigenous institutions often serve as highly effective mechanism for economic enterprise. This leads to changes towards capitalistic forms of organization and investment behaviour. This it is contended leads to the emergence of rural capitalism in the West African area; in the sense that land is being purchased, labour being hired, ability to manage sizable farms and some saving and investment activities leading to capital formation are also prevalent.

But Hill, mainly deals with small communities, such as villages, groups of producers or traders. After studying their economic activities and organization, Hill concludes that they exhibit capitalist ingenuity and entrepreneurship. This preoccupation with small groups does not allow fundamental enquiry. For it doesn't look at the problem from a holistic approach of the phenomena under study in the sense of how it is related to the larger society and economy of which they are just small parts.

The fact that people save, invest, employ labour, participate in long distance trade or buy a piece of land for the purpose of cash production doesn't mean capitalism. For according to Marx, "... the expropriation of the mass of the people from the soil forms the basis of the capitalist mode of production."[29] As such cash crop production, marketing and trading, even if they bring about acquisition and concentration of money into few hands do not bring about capitalism, since there has been no process of social disintegration resulting in the expropriation of the mass of the peasantry from the soil.

Just as the small farmer with a small farm of his own employs his leisure time to augment his income by working on the farm of a more prosperous farmer is not (in the full sense of the word) a free 'wage labourer'; so does the rich or middle peasant who employs labour but still works on his farm cannot be said to be a full fledged capitalist, (in the full sense of the word). In the same measure, capitalist features in the underdeveloped societies don't give rise to a full fledged capitalist society because:

(a) no process of proletarization of the working masses, i.e., no class of wage labourers on a social scale.

(b) non-existence of large scale capitalistic operations in the rural areas.

The capitalist features in the productive activities of the people are simply evidences which manifest the character of their integration into the world central, and national peripheral capitalist economy. Therefore it should be realized that the integration into the world capitalist system (which is the case with almost all the African peasant societies today) leads to improverishment without proletarization and not to rural capitalism.[30]

From this premise we now move on to the third and final component of our theoretical critique. This is what is referred to as the high-pay-off input model. We shall look at its genesis and relevance to the present day problems confronting peasant small-scale agriculture.

THE HIGH-PAY-OFF INPUT MODEL

This model is a reaction to the inadequacy of all the earlier theoretical constructs in explaining the problem and providing recipes for agricultural development. It basically accepts that peasant cultivators are rational, efficient resource allocators. They remain poor only because of the lack of technical endowments of their countries.

Schultz, for example maintains that the key to transforming traditional agriculture lies in investment to make modern high pay-off inputs available to farmers in poor countries.[31] Hayami and Ruttan, noted that, historically, "... the problem of agricultural development is not that of transforming a static agricultural sector, into a modern dynamic sector, but of accelerating the rate of growth of agricultural output and productivity consistent with the growth of other sectors of a modernizing economy."[32]

Olayide defined agricultural productivity as, "... the ratio of the index of the value of agricultural output to the value of inputs employed in farm production." And that, "agricultural productivity is a function of efficient and optimal use of inputs in farm production." So, "the most dynamic parameter of agricultural productivity is the constantly changing input mix." These inputs are land, labour, capital and management.[33]

Hence there is a general tendency of viewing agricultural productivity growth as principally a function of physical and technical changes.

Physical, implies maximum utilization of available manpower and land resources. Technical, implies the utilization of modern agricultural implements and equipment, high yielding seed varieties, chemical fertilizers, and new 'scientifically' tested methods and procedures of doing things.

It is true that a long-term sustained increase in agricultural output is necessary in any process of agricultural development. This implies, also, extensive utilization of advanced technology in agricultural production. But under what socio-structural and organizational conditions? Can the mere utilization of advanced technology, without socio-structural and organizational transformation lead to agricultural development?

Agricultural production can doubtless be expanded through extension of acreage which implies bringing more land under cultivation. Similarly, increase in yields per hectare can also be brought about through extensive use of new seed varieties, fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, etc. Productivity per unit of labour can also be increased through technological improvements in the form of sophisticated mechanized labour-saving devices. Basically all of the above strategies are necessary for agricultural productivity growth

to be a sustained one. But under what social and organizational frameworks are these changes feasible to take off? This has been one of the least problems taken into account both by the policy-makers and project designers.

In Nigeria, for example, two policy patterns have been articulated. The first was the one concerned with the possibility of bringing about large-scale changes over small areas, such as plantations, state farms in irrigation schemes, and settlement schemes. The second possibility, was that of bringing about small changes over large areas, and this implies, an extensive distribution of farm inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, adoption of improved seed varieties etc. The former strategy has tended to lose the favour of the policy planners because the improvements it may bring about often don't reach the teeming peasant population spread all over the countryside. They also take their cue from several cases of grotesque failures of this strategy, the most celebrated of which was that of the Niger Agricultural Development Project which included both re-settlement and capital intensive agriculture. The history and analysis of the failures of this project was ably written by Baldwin.[34]

The latter strategy, however, was taken up and really found favour not only with the policy planners but with scholars and international organizations. This was so because its technological package is simple and was assumed to be more relevant to the circumstances of the small peasant farmer. To the policy makers it is even more so since it is politically more appeasing to the numerically dominant population of small agricultural producers. It further gained more currency, because, the social organization of agricultural production in most parts of Nigeria is characterized by the preponderance of small scale farmers, tilling very small pieces of land which are realistically not economically feasible for large scale mechanization.

As such many scholars and international organizations all came to advocate the extension to the small scale farmers, mainly the chemical and biological package which increases yields per hectare, that is, what the World Bank refers to, as, the "New Technology." This technology, "increases output per unit area (and) is essentially land-substituting in character, since it enables a given output to be produced from fewer hectares of land."[35] The World Bank further noted that the best that can be done, perhaps, is to make the maximum practical use of the small farmer as a production unit.

The small farmer (defined here as one who uses principally family labour) will tend to displace labour by other factors of production later than would other agricultural producers since the prices he places on his own and his family's labour will represent its opportunity cost as he sees it.[36]

Scholars advocating this strategy generally argue that since mainly in the underdeveloped countries, it was estimated that there are 100 million farms of less than 5 hectares size, 50 percent of which are in fact, less than 1 hectare; "how is this then that governmental policies have not apparently, either in design or in the resulting execution, helped the small farmer but instead have often encouraged large scale mechanization schemes?"[37] Many insisted on the positive benefit to society as a whole by helping the small farmer.

This means basing the rise in productivity effort on the requirements of the, "independent small farmer rather than to the large scale entrepreneur, e.g., small-scale crops rather than plantation crops, ways of encouraging voluntary participation rather than enforcing it, communication of new crops and techniques to the illiterate farmer rather than a factory-like teaching process, a multi-crop rather than single crop orientation."[38] Furthermore, it is contended that if the past is anything to go by, "there is some justification for placing

faith in the (small) farmers, (for) "... until recent discovery of petroleum, almost all the foreign exchange earned in Nigeria was derived from cash crops produced by small farmers who at the same time produced most of the food required by the increasing population."[39]

It was further noted that much of the increase in the production of cash crops in the past was due mainly to price incentives, improved transportation facilities and the utilization of surplus land and labour. But as population increases, new inputs such as fertilizers, improved seeds, pesticides, herbicides etc, "... will become critical in bringing about further increases in production."[40]

As such the new technology package is principally concerned with maximizing the utilization of chemical inputs (fertilizers etc) biological inputs (seeds), and the extension input (by way of advising farmers on how to apply the package, and persuading them to adopt new innovations and methods of cultivation). Only occasionally is mechanical application appreciated. Even where it is, they often prefer what is called 'medium level' mechanization. This is because the individual peasant lacks capital and mechanization is costly both in terms of the initial capital needed for the purchase

of machines and the cost of repairs. Moreso, that sophisticated mechanical application is not economically feasible on small farms. As such expansion of productivity per unit of labour through mechanical labour-saving devices is not relevant to the current state of peasant agriculture.

The primary strategy of the notion of development at the small farm level is/therefore mostly concerned with the provision of chemical and biological inputs, accomplished through the medium of efficient extension strategy. This implies limiting the area of improvements to the small individually-owned plots of land, thus limiting the urgency of expansion of areas under cultivation which cannot be utilized as a result of the technological, i.e., mechanical limitations of the strategy.

Nevertheless, several attempts by international organizations came out with various designs, strategies and projects to assist the small farmer, their aim all being to achieve productivity growth per unit of land through direct contact with the small individual farmer.[41]

However, Norman, in his village studies noted that labour, especially during the peak period of farming is a more limited factor than land in especially the northern parts

of Nigeria.[42] And in other parts of Africa, "evidence suggests that compared to Asia, labour availability ... is frequently a greater constraint to increasing agricultural productivity than is the availability of land. As such technological innovations which require intense labour input often may not result in the full realization of potential production increases."[43]

Since seasonal production, which characterizes most of savannah regions implies a labour-peak period, approximately between April and July, and since application of the (mainly chemical and biological) package of the 'new technology' is highly labour demanding, and its labour demand generally occurs during this peak, this technology seems to contradict the concrete reality.

As the central aim of the 'new technology' is to raise productivity per acre, it has been shown that this is inevitably a slow process in which two to three percent increases per acre per year are considered a respectable performance by agronomists. But even here the achievement of such rates is predicated upon the availability of the chemical supplies and on the skill, diligence and patience of the cultivators.[44]

Norman further noted that, "increases in inputs (chemical and biological) and increases in potential profitability (through marketing reforms and incentives) could mean substantially higher returns to the farmer under conditions not radically different from those which apply currently." But "... if efforts are not made to alter the traditional agricultural methods through the introduction of more long term technological changes the agricultural sector may become a drag on future national development."[45]

In essence, the fundamental limitations of the small farmer development strategy and its 'new technology' package are summarized in five related points below:

Firstly, it tries to find a solution for subsistence agriculture that is not also a solution of general under-development. In this regard its efforts might be futile.

Secondly, it is argued that the alternative to small farmer development implies a form of land concentration, utilizing advanced chemical, biological, and mechanical (labour-saving) devices. These mechanical devices result in the freeing of surplus labour, therefore, since our 'industrial' sector is small and capital intensive, such a

strategy may be politically and socially disastrous in the sense of creating more unemployment. As such development on the basis of small farms may seem to be on the surface more relevant to the current reality. But then the need for development implies dissatisfaction with what is current, and the need to supercede it.

Furthermore, not all forms of land concentration immediately proletarianize peasants. In otherwords, you can transform agriculture on a collective, large-scale basis without initially releasing a mass of pauperized labour. Baran argued in favour of the need for "collective, large scale organization of agriculture which, by doing away with the unviable dwarfholdings of the peasantry, creates the indispensible conditions for the sustained growth of agricultural production, (and) transforms the peasant into an industrial worker, working in agriculture," and it "insulates him from the ruinous impact of the capitalist market, immunizes him against the sticks and carrots of the competitive struggle."[46]

The third limitation is that, the model does not recognize, or hypocritically denies the fact that long-term and sustained agricultural development pre-supposes fundamental changes in the structure and organization of society through the alteration

of production relations. This is evidenced by the history of agricultural development in the now developed countries, where land concentration and destruction of, for example feudal relations of production, went hand in hand, leading to sustained agricultural productivity growth. Enclosures in Britain; collectivization in Russia and some parts of Eastern Europe, communes in China. In the United States of America, which has no history of feudal relations, concentration of land was achieved through the development of labour saving devices, land purchases and a conscious and deliberate interference on behalf of large scale farmers by the state.

In the case of Britain, Arthur Young, one of the Stalwarts of English agricultural revolution noted in 1771 (and this deserves to be quoted at length) that, it is "... at once apparent that no small farmer could affect such great things as have been done in Norfolk. Enclosing, marline, and keeping a stock of sheep large enough for folding, belong absolutely and exclusively to great farmers ... great farmers have been the souls of Norfolk culture: Split them into tenures of an hundred a year, you will find nothing but beggars and weeds in the whole country. The rich man keeps his land rich and clean."[47] Furthermore, Galeski stated that, "the break

through to modern capitalist agriculture in the 18th century also involved a revolution (not only) in productive techniques (but also) in the relations of production."[48]

In Russia, one of the best analysis of the process of collectivization with all the agonies it wreaked on the peasant population has been made by Lewin.[49] In China, Peter Schran's analysis is also a case in point, as in this case the Chinese wanted to minimise the agonies which characterized the Soviet experience.[50]

The case of the United States is very important being a country inhabited mainly by settlers, escaping from the socio-economic turmoils of Europe, it emerged basically (with no feudal relations), a country of small producers and traders. Mills, noted in what he called the 'Rural Debacle', that "... in 1820 almost three-quarters of the nation's labour force was engaged in agricultural production ... by 1880, they comprised one-half and by 1949, farmers of all sorts made up only one-eighth of the occupied populace."[51] The rise of big commercial farmers is further noted in that by 1945 2 percent of all farms contained about 40 percent of all farm land.*

*cf. It was further noted by Braverman that the proportion of working population in agriculture which in 1880 comprised approximately 50% of the population was by 1970 only less than 4% of total employment. See Braverman, H. Labour and Monopoly Capital, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974, p. 254.

Griswold, (quoted in Mills) noted that, "a self-sufficient farm in our time is more likely to be a haunt of illiteracy and malnutrition than a well-spring of democracy."[53] It is indeed ironical, that some people forget the history of their own nations' development when deliberating on the developmental future of others.

After this long digression, we come to the fourth limitation. This (as shall be made clear later on in the study) is that the small farmer development strategy, sees nothing wrong with the nature and consequences of primary production (whose sole purpose is export) and its integration in the world capitalist system. In fact some of its components, especially the international agencies and their scholars often see this integration as a beneficial contribution to development.

Our fifth and final point is that this strategy asks the wrong questions on the general problem of social and economic development. For it tends to see all the problems of agriculture only within the context of agriculture and what it presumes to be the characteristics of rural society. It is on this account parochial.

Quoting a German writer, Paul Baran remarked that the question of "whether there will be meat in the kitchen is never decided in the kitchen."[54] Nor can the problems of agricultural and rural development in Nigeria ever be fundamentally understood and solutions found, only within the context of agriculture and the rural society. For, doing this is tantamount to believing that agriculture and the agricultural producers live in de facto isolation from the rest of the society.

The inadequacy of the conventional theories in their effort to comprehend the nature of production in peasant agriculture, articulated and peripheral to world capitalism, is evident. One of the most important reasons for this inadequacy is rooted in the inappropriate conceptual tools used in the investigations and analysis, which results in the failure to take into account the differences between capitalist commodity production and peasant commodity production. Thus our next chapter is based on the discussion and elaboration of these differences to provide us with a conceptual framework more relevant to our analysis. Chapter two is therefore concerned with outlining the conceptual framework we are adopting for this study. We then subsequently utilize this framework with the view to first analyse the historical

integration of the agricultural sector within the so called 'modern' capitalist sector, and secondly to show the character of this integration, and its consequences, for agricultural and rural development. This furthermore provides this study with a historical dimension.

FOOTNOTES

1. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization: Agricultural Development in Nigeria, 1965-80, Rome, 1966, p. 3.

2. United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, UN, Reprinted in the "World Bank Agricultural Sector Report" Annex 8, p. 73, 1972.

3. Norman, D.W. "Initiating Change in Traditional Agriculture." A Paper presented at the Nigerian Agricultural Society Conference, Ibadan, 1970. Proceedings of Agricultural Society of Nigeria, Vol. 7, p. 6.

4. Hayami, Y. A., and Ruttan, V.W., Agricultural Development: An International Perspectives. The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971, p. 3.

5. Lele, Uma The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1975, p. 19.

6. Hayami and Ruttan, op. cit., p. 10.

7. cf. Rostow, W.W., The Stages of Economic Growth Cambridge University Press, London, 1960 and also Rostow (ed) The Economics of Take-off into sustained Growth, MacMillan, London, 1963.

8. Hayami and Ruttan, op. cit., p. 18.

9. Hayami and Ruttan, op. cit., p. 19.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL DIMENSION OF THE ARTICULATION PROCESS

The aim of this chapter is to discuss and develop the conceptual tools we consider to be eminent in any attempt to comprehend the nature of the contemporary Nigerian social and economic formation, and the modes of production within it.

The conceptual tools developed and refined from such a discussion are then used to analyse briefly the nature of the pre-colonial formation and the modes of production in our area of study. We shall then discuss how the modes of production within this historic formation were gradually transformed with the emergence of colonial capitalism. This is with a view to demonstrating the existence and succession of two social and economic formations. In the first, a pre-capitalist tribute paying mode of production dominated. We shall then see how this pre-colonial formation was eventually transformed into the second, a peripheral capitalist formation, in which the emergent capitalist mode assumed dominance.

But before embarking on this complex task, we first of all have to present and discuss these conceptual tools.[1]

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The key concepts in this study are 'Social and Economic Formations', and 'Modes of Production'. For we believe that it is within historic formations that we find modes of production which determine the nature and form of the social organization of production, the character which the products of labour assume, and the nature of relations of production, in a specific historical epoch. Amin noted that, a distinction between these two concepts is necessary "... if a great confusion in social theory is to be avoided."[2]

The concept of modes of production is an abstract one. It is a discrete concept implying no historical sequence from one mode to another, in the history of human civilization. Its operational power is nevertheless apparent when applied to a historic social and economic formation. The concept of a mode of production is meant to indicate the nature and form of generation of surplus, and how that surplus is appropriated and distributed within a given social and economic formation. This is evident, in that the form and composition of surplus and how it is distributed assume, different forms in different societies.

Most societies known to history are formations which on the one hand combine modes of production and on the other organize relations between themselves and other formations through long distance trade relations etc. "Social formations are thus organized structures that are marked by a dominant mode of production and the articulation around this of a complex group of modes of production that are subordinate to it."[3]

As such analysis of a concrete social formation must "... be organized around analysis of the way in which surplus is generated in this formation, the transfers of surplus that may be effected from or to other formations, and the internal distribution of this surplus among the various recipients, (classes and social groups)."[4] This procedure then implies analysing the interaction, or the articulation of the modes of production in a particular social formation.

For the purpose of our present exposition, we identify five modes of production, then briefly spell out their different characteristics.[5]

1. The Communal Mode of Production

This mode of production is considered to be anterior to all the others. Its chief characteristics are:

(i) Organization of labour partly on the basis of nuclear family and partly on a collective basis, that is, on the basis of extended family, clans, lineage or villages. The principal means of production (land) is collectively owned by the clan or tribe. The use of the means of production is fully guaranteed to all members in accordance with specific rules that land allocated has to be worked or forfeited.

(ii) Commodity exchange is absent.[6]

(iii) The distribution of the fruits of labour (products) within the community is in accordance with rules closely bound up with Kinship Organization.

(iv) The society is not sharply stratified into the rulers and the ruled both in terms of access to the means of production and the distribution of products.

2. The Slave-Owning Mode of Production

The central characteristic of this mode is that, the worker is turned into a slave. He becomes the essential means of production who can be even brought into exchange relations.

3. The Tribute Paying Mode of Production

This mode of production is marked by classification of society into two main classes; the peasantry or serfs and the ruling classes or feudal lords. The ruling classes control the political structure and exact tribute-in-kind from the peasant communities.

There are two varieties of this mode. The feudal variety implies the existence of lords and tenant serfs. The lords have inalienable rights to property in land. The serfs, though they have a right to tilling the land do not have a right to it as an inalienable property. They have only tenancy rights. As a result of this, exaction of surplus (dues) by the landlords is as a matter of right. The rents or dues exacted, are also not in commodity form, within the 'domain'. This variety of the tributory

mode is threatened with disintegration once the lord 'frees' his serfs from the land as was the case with feudal Europe.

The second variety of the tribute paying mode is where the peasants have not lost their inalienable rights to the land to the ruling class. They mainly pay tribute-in-kind to the central authority but control their rights to the land. This "... fundamental right of access to use the land that is possessed of every peasant who belongs to the community ... renders this disintegration impossible."[7] There may be some limited commodity exchange in form of industrial products, primary or semi finished, within the domestic economy or for long distance trade.

4. The Simple Commodity Mode of Production

On this mode of production, Marx has this to say; and it is so important that it deserves being quoted at length:

> "The private property of the labourer in his means of production is the foundation of petty industry, whether agricultural, manufacturing or both; petty industry again, is an essential condition for the development

> of social production and of the free individuality of the labourer himself. Of course this petty mode of production exists also under slavery, serfdom, and other states of dependence. But it flourishes, it lets loose its whole energy, it attains its adequate classical form, only where the labourer is the private owner of his means of labour set in action by himself; the peasant on the land which he cultivates, the artisan of the tool which he handles as a virtuoso. This mode of production, presupposes parcelling of the soil, and scattering of the other means of production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production so also it excludes cooperation, division of labour within each separate process of production, the control over and the free development of the social productive powers. It is compatible only with a system of production and society, moving within a narrow, more or less primitive bounds. To perpetuate it would be ... 'to decree universal mediocrity'."[8]

Marx's notion of simple commodity production in its ideal form as such can be summarized in four related points:

(1) That it connotes private ownership of the means of production by the producers themselves who also set these means in action by their own efforts, and on their own volition.

(2) That it presupposes parcelling of the soil and scattering of other means of production. In other words, the means of production, are distributed into the hands of innumerable private producers.

(3) That since it excludes concentration of productive forces, it excludes cooperation, division of labour within each separate process of production. And as such

(4) It excludes control over, and free development of social productive forces.

In fact there is a "wide agreement among contemporary scholars that the notion of simple commodity production involves the production of products destined for exchange rather than for own use, under a division of labour among producers who are independent in at least two senses; first, that there exists individual private ownership of the means of production. Secondly, that there is individual private appropriation of the products of labour and individual private disposal of these through exchange."[9]

Several scholars referred to the simple commodity mode as a mode of production which though never dominant in any formation appears subsidiary to the dominant mode.[10] This approximates to Marx's contention that it exists also under "slavery serfdom and other states of dependence."[11]

5. The Capitalist Mode of Production

This mode of production requires these basic conditions, to become generalized throughout society. Viz:

(i) "Workers are separated from the means of production, and can gain access to them only by selling their labour power to others."

(ii) "Workers are freed of legal constraints, such as serfdom or slavery, that prevent their disposing of their own labour power."

(iii) "The purpose of the employment of the worker becomes the expansion of a unit of capital belonging to the employer, who is thus functioning as a capitalist."[12]

As such we can see that the essential conditions for the emergence and generalization of the capitalist mode of production requires the sale, and purchase of labour power for the purpose of commodity production. In other words, "when production by means of wage-labour becomes universal, commodity production is bound to be the general form of production."[13]

But then, if we agree that both the simple commodity mode and the capitalist mode are concerned with the production and exchange of commodities; what is the difference between the two modes? To answer this question, we have to first of all define what a commodity is, and to identify the different modes of circulation of commodities in the two modes of production. In doing this we may find out whether there is any qualitative distinction between the two modes.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN CAPITALIST COMMODITY AND SIMPLE COMMODITY PRODUCTION AND CIRCULATION

Marx started his definition of a commodity by first defining what it is not. That "... a thing can be a use-value without having value." This is because its value is not due to human labour power embodied in it, such as, air, virgin soil, and all products of nature not tempered with by human activity. On the other side of the coin, "a thing can be useful, and the product of human labour without being a commodity." That is whoever directly satisfied his wants with the products of his own labour, creates only use-values and not exchange-values. "To become a commodity," according to Marx, "a product must be transferred to another, whom it will serve as a use-value by means of exchange."[14]

As such we can see that a commodity is a product of human labour power produced for the purpose of exchange. That is, its use-value can only be realized by the buyer and not the producer himself.

But by this definition we can see that both the simple commodity producer and the capitalist are all producing exchange-values and not direct use-values. As such then, wherein lies their difference?

The essential difference between them is hidden in the circulation process. The capitalist starts with money with which he buys labour, machinery, raw materials, etc.

With these he produces products which he again exchanges for money and the process starts all over again. This process of circulation is depicted by a notation of M-C-M (i.e., money to commodities to money). The simple commodity producer on the other hand, starts with commodities which he sells in order to buy other commodities. This process is depicted by a notation of C-M-C (i.e., commodity to money to commodity).

We can hence see that the capitalist exchanges money for money through the medium of commodities while the simple commodity producer exchanges commodities for commodities through the medium money.

Marx noted that "simple circulation of commodities begins with a sale and ends with a purchase, while circulation of money as capital begins with a purchase and ends with a sale." Hence, "the circuit, C-M-C starts with one commodity and finishes with another, which falls out of circulation into consumption. Consumption, the satisfaction of wants, in one word use-value, is its end and aim."[15]

For example, a sack of millet produced by a peasant and kept for his own consumption is not a commodity. But when he takes it to the market for sale, it becomes a commodity. For what he is after is not its use-value but its exchange-value. Its value to the peasant is only realized by its capacity for exchange. But he is interested in its exchange-value only to the extent that, that value can procure for him use-values such as clothing or salt which pass into consumption. He is as such involved in a simple commodity transaction.

A merchant on the other hand who buys corn with his money for later sale is involved in a capitalist transaction since he is after the expansion of his money capital.

In the final analysis, "the simple circulation of commodities selling in order to buy - is a means of carrying

out a purpose unconnected with circulation, namely, the appropriation of use values, the satisfaction of wants. The circulation of money as capital is, on the contrary, an end in itself, for the expansion of value takes place only within this constantly renewed movement. The circulation of capital has therefore no limits."[16]

But then what is the nature of the relationship between the producer and the buyer in a simple commodity production; and between the worker and the capitalist in advanced commodity production? Is it a relationship between things (commodities) or a relationship between people (a social relation)?

From our understanding of the above analysis, we come to believe that their relationship is not only one of exchange, but also a social relation. This is so, for the social element is hidden by the commodity and money nature of the transaction. Here we must again refer to Marx, for according to him;

> "It is plain that commodities cannot go to the market and make exchanges of their own account." As such we must "have recourse to their guardians who are also their owners. Commodities are things and therefore without power of resistance against man ... In order that these objects may enter into relation with each other, their guardians must place themselves in relation to one another."[17]

As such this relation is not a relation of things but of people; each with his own possession; a social relation. Similarly, exchange relations between the worker and capitalist and simple commodity producer and buyer is a social relation (ownership or non ownership of the means of production notwithstanding).

But before the close of this chapter we shall briefly analyse the recent pre-colonial, and early colonial history of our area of reference, using the conceptual tools and ideas generated from the above discussion.

THE HISTORICAL DIMENSION OF THE ARTICULATION PROCESS

In any process of analysing the historical succession of social and economic formations, a brief insight into the nature of political and social organization of the societies in question, is inevitable. As such our objectives in this analysis are three-fold:

(i) To identify the social, political, and ideological superstructure which in their origins and functions, serve the purposes of the dominant mode of production in its articulation with other modes in the social formation.

(ii) To identify the number of modes of production within the formation and show which constitutes the economic basis of that formation.

(iii) To determine the form and content of the articulation, that is, the combination of different modes of production, when one mode dominates others and obliges them to adapt to the needs and logic of its own functioning, and integrates them into a mechanism for its reproduction.[18]

THE PRE-COLONIAL FORMATION

The Kaura Namoda area, was until the early 1760s one of the major territorial components of a larger kingdom known as Zamfara. Zamfara kingdom was one of the early Hausa States which were in existence in the area of the Western Sudan before the Sokoto Jihad. The capital of this kingdom was situated at Birnin Zamfara (City of Zamfara).

The kingdom was more or less centralized, and the society was divided into the rulers and the ruled. On the one hand is the Sarkin Zamfara, the overall chief, surrounded by his officials, the masu sarauta, at the centre; and on the other hand, the various subordinate territorial chiefs and

their officials, at the periphery. These classes in general lord it over the peasant community, the artisans, the merchants and other talakawa (commoners). These latter groups pay tribute-in-kind to the ruling class.

The political ruling class derived its authority politically from forceful military integration of the various communities in the area; and ideologically and morally from being custodians of the spirits of the mother earth (Inna). Beliefs associated with these spirits, were by and large the religion of the peasant communities and the ideological base of the socio-political order.

However, there were also communities of merchants, traders and urban dwellers who largely subscribed to Islam. It was even said that some sarakunan Zamfara were converted to Islam, though they still performed certain state functions connected with earth worship, which was the earlier ideological base of their authority. Within the population, there were also artisans and craftsmen whose worships corresponded to the various spirits associated with their occupations.

The political system, as such, was organized under the overall authority of the sarki. Around him were an array of trusted administrative officials some of whom were of royal

descent and some of slave origins. They are collectively referred to as the masu sarauta. They help to keep the sarki in touch with his district chiefs and thereby the rural population. They were usually assigned portfolios, such as war, internal security, external affairs, household or palace affairs, etc. At the local levels, there are chiefs, some of whom have claims to royalty in their respective areas (or even at the centre). These chiefs have also got their own officials at the district and village levels, who keep them in touch with the affairs of their subjects.

The economy of the area is centred around agriculture. The area is endowed with good soil, suitable for the production of a variety of crops. Associated with agriculture, in one way or another are various types of manufactures; and crafts, engaged, by and large, in the production and processing of various goods for internal and external trade. There are merchants and traders, trading in various goods both internally and externally, i.e., long distance trade.

The land is nominally held in the hands of the sarki. But the basic unit of agricultural production, and landholding, is the gida (household). This is a patrilenial group of close kins headed by the maigida (household head), who is normally

the eldest in such a unit. The population of the gida forms the labour unit of agricultural production. Peasant household agriculture is organized around the gandu (plural gandaye). This type of gandu is known as the gandun gida (household farm). Agricultural production on such farms is organized under the authority of the maigida, and work on these farms is collective, involving all the members of the household. The fruits from the activities on the gandu are held collectively within the gida. It is on these type of farms that the major food crops such as Dawa (sorghum) and Gero (millet) are grown. This in fact forms the principal basis of social production organization among the peasantry.

However, adult members of each household often have their own private farms, though smaller, called kurga or gayauna on which a variety of crops such as baba (indigo), cotton, groundnuts, etc., are grown. Labour on gandu is paramount, and over and above that of private individual farms. In fact, no member of the household is allowed to work on his farm, at the time when collective labour is required for the gandu. It is from the fruits of the work of the gandu that households pay tribute-in-kind to the political superstructure, on behalf of everyone of its members. From this presentation we can see the role of kinship in the social relations of production. In other words

kinship provides the basis for production organization, in the very structure of property and labour relations and also in the alienation or distribution of the products of labour."

Apart from the organization of labour on the basis of households, there is another system called gayya (work-party system), among the peasantry. This is usually effected during the peak periods of farming activity, when, ploughing, weeding and replanting, demand a lot of labour which many a household cannot afford. This is arranged between several elders and household heads in a given area, under the sarkin noma (chief of the farmers) of that area.[19] This kind of gayya hence, helps those households with a smaller work force, but large farms, to be able to finish-off their farming activities on schedule.

Besides the production units and the labour organization of the peasantry there are also large gandaye of the sarakuna, the masu sarauta and the tajirai (wealthy men). The gandayen sarauta are in fact reported to be the largest farms.[20] On these farms slaves and servants are permanently settled. They are in-charge of every aspect of work on the farms. These slaves are referred to as the bayin gandu (farm slaves). Apart from the slave labour used on these farms, the talakawa also

organize a form of gayya for the sarki, called gayya kalankuwa. During this time all able bodied males in the village and other surrounding villages gather amidst a lot of feasting, pomp and pageantry for the purpose of this gayya.

Nevertheless, a lot of the gandayen sarauta and also farms of the wealthy people are cultivated with the labour of servants and mostly that of slaves. 'From this we can see that employment of slave labour in production is very significant.'

'Most of the slaves belonging to the sarakuna and the masu sarauta are obtained in military campaigns, or as gifts from princes of other lands, and from merchants. The wealthy men often buy their own slaves for agricultural and other purposes. From this we can see that, apart from getting tribute from the mass of peasant producers, the political superstructure, also commands their labour, as a compliment to the slave labour they employ. In fact it was contended that, "slave labour to a certain extent facilitated large scale production on the farms of the aristocracy and the merchants."[21]'

Tribute in labour and in-kind obtained from the peasantry is not the only source of income for the aristocracy. They also exact tribute from craftsmen, artisans, and from

internal and long-distance commerce. The various industrial activities from which tributes are exacted, are; blacksmithing, mining and smelting of iron ore, weaving, dyeing, metal smithing, etc. The 'guilds' in these various trades are organized under a head who is recognized by the political authorities as a communication channel between the practitioners and the authorities. Often he also serves as the main channel through which tribute is paid. These various crafts represent a form of commodity (simple) production, in that articles produced thereby are exchanged within the formation or enter into long-distance trade with other formations.

Before the emergence, and widespread use of the cowries as standard currency, transactions were carried by barter. It consisted of exchanging food crops for yarn, ball of cloth, or even livestock and vice versa. The exchange of salt for cloth; iron goods for cloth, slaves for horses, etc., was said to have persisted even after the introduction of the cowrie. The imports of Zamfara were said to have consisted of natron, mineral salts, horses, ostritch feathers, swords, copper, silk, mirrors, etc.[22] It was noted that "some of the commodities brought into Zamfara, such as horses, slaves and luxury goods, would have found very limited market with the common men."[23] So it is safe to assume that they were sought after

mainly by the sarakuna and the attajirai who had various uses for these imported items. Nevertheless, other items such as mineral salts, antimony, kolanuts, etc., are staple commodities purchased by a wider cross-section of the population.

From this we can see that the tributes the political superstructure is able to collect from the peasant households, craftsmen and artisans, and from commercial activities, can be enormous. The use of slave labour complimented with peasant labour contributions, on gigantic farms is a very significant source of wealth for this political class. "The masu sarauta through different methods, such as taxation, gaisuwa (gift) and gandayen sarauta, were able to amass wealth and use it in maintaining the administration of the kingdom."[24*]

This was the situation in the Zamfara Kingdom until the early 1760s when it collapsed. It then broke up into several chiefdoms one of which is Kiyawa situated in Kaura Namoda area. But roughly four to five decades later the Sokoto Jihad broke out. This led to the integration of all the political communities in the area into a supra-national organization.-

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*For a full social and political history of the area see the above cited work. For a work on similar social and political formation in the area of Katsina, See, Y.B. Usman, The Transformation of Katsina (C. 1797-1903), Ph.D. Thesis, History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1974.

the Sokoto Caliphate. The various statelets in the former Zamfara Kingdom came under the direct administration of the Caliph at Sokoto, through his district representatives.

The impact of the Jihad on the internal structure of this area was the elimination of the ruling classes and the substitution of the former ideological superstructure waxed around earth worship, with the religion of Islam. The Caliph came to command moral and ideological allegiance of the people as the commander of the faithful and upholder of the Islamic faith.

As such all the respects and services in form of tributes, given to the former Habe ruling classes are now vested in the Caliph and his representatives. Thus the ideological base for the existence of the state changed without an appreciable change in the form of production organization and relations of production. Tribute payment by the peasantry, artisans, and merchants and traders continued. Slave production continued.

From the above analysis we can see that the Jihad brought about superstructural changes within the area at the political and ideological levels. It used a different ideological base for the legitimation of political control, over the same internal socio-economic structure.

Within this structure we can thus identify four modes of production, or forms of generation of surplus. These are:

(i) Tribute-paying mode of production.

(ii) Simple commodity mode of production; i.e., in the sphere of goods produced by artisans and craftsmen, and also all other goods meant for exchange internally or externally.

(iii) Commerce, both internal and long-distant, where the above goods are exchanged for imports from elsewhere.

(iv) Slave mode of production, utilized by small but priviledged section of the community.

Among these modes we postulate that the 'tribute paying' mode of production is the most dominant for the following reasons:

(a) It is the payment of tribute within the formation that determines its political character, i.e., division between the rulers and the ruled.

(b) That tribute-payment constitutes the economic basis of the formation, in that both the producers of simple commodities and those in commerce articulate with the political superstructure through the payment of taxes and tributes.

(c) That it is the basis on which the mass of the agricultural community are linked with the central authority.

(d) That, above all, it is the basis for the existence of the state, in other words, the basis for the appropriation of surplus from agriculture, industry, and commerce within the formation.

(e) The use of slaves in production generates private wealth among the powerful groups, that enables them to maintain their power within the formation and in relation to other formations. Thus in this way it is a compliment to the tributes paid into the coffers of the State through all the other spheres of reproduction, e.g., agriculture, industry and commerce. It is also from the tributes the political authorities

> obtain, that they are able to wage wars and capture slaves; or buy more, to amass more individual wealth for themselves, which further enables them to keep control of the political system; and keep appropriating surplus through tributes.

COLONIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE SUCCESSION OF FORMATIONS

Almost immediately after colonial conquest, various trends were set in motion, which progressively, and eventually effected a change in the structure and orientation of the pre-colonial formation, and the modes of production within it. These socio-economic changes, brought about in the colonial era, transformed the pre-colonial formation, in which the tribute-paying mode of production dominated, into a peripheral capitalist formation, in which merchant and industrial capital dominated.

Military conquest facilitated the taking over of control of the political superstructure from the former ruling classes by the colonial authorities. Conquest means loss of power, and this implies the elimination or restriction of the ways and means that power is butressed and reproduced.[25]

Although the British used the pre-colonial administrative structures under what they referred to as 'indirect rule', they adopted them purely for politico-administrative expediency. For the essence of the new political arrangement, as a matter of policy was, according to Lugard, with a view that "... these chiefs should govern their people, not as independent but as dependent rulers. ... while they themselves are controlled by the Government in matters of policy and importance, their people are controlled in accordance with that policy, by themselves."[26] As such the chiefs just became British officials who owe their allegiance to the colonial authorities.

Gradually, the former political superstructure was systematically deprived of all the means of its own maintainance and independence. Almost all the financial sources of the power of the ruling class, was subsequently abolished. Tributes and taxes are now collected on behalf of the colonial authorities. With the evolution of the Native Authority system of administration, capitalist means of revenue exaction and capitalist forms of financial management were gradually introduced. The Emirs and chiefs were classified and put on fixed salaries.

Furthermore, the abolishing by the British of the utilization of slave labour by the chiefs, for agricultural purposes, was one of the important ways in which their powers were broken. This is because, a substantial means of creating private wealth for these ruling classes was eliminated. From then on, gayya on chiefs' farms, gradually lost its significance and importance. This elimination of the power-base of the former ruling classes, was progressively accomplished with every successive local government reform, up till today.

On the economic front, measures were taken, which critically restricted and jeopardized, manufacture and commerce. For example, special laws restricting cotton trade, such as fuloti (buying station), and 'yan baranda' (middlemen) were introduced. This led to the restriction of the sale of cotton to local weavers, and special taxation was used to destroy the weavers. Taxation of iron mining and processing made this industry unprofitable, and it subsequently collapsed.

Excessive taxation of manufacture eventually brought industry to its knees. This is also associated with the strategy of creating a market for foreign manufactured goods. Thus industry and manufacture were taken out of the formation and/or controlled within it by outsiders, whose profits are

largely repatriated abroad. Thus by 1919, the industry of the whole Sokoto area was summarized as composing of only, "... the tanning and dyeing of goat and sheep-skins (being) the most important industry since much of the output is exported. The other industries such as weaving, dyeing, smithing, etc., are adequate to the needs of the population, but do not call for remarks."[27]

Loss of political power actually meant loss of control over the economy. There was no power to protect the indigenous industries, so they were eventually destroyed by "free trade". The people lost their self-sufficiency, as goods ranging from salt, soap, cloth, household ware, etc., all came largely to be imported.

Simultaneously, another trend was set in motion which gradually transformed the majority of the agricultural producers, into primary commodity production for export. This was accomplished essentially through the imposition of taxation, not in-kind or in cowries, but in foreign minted coins, i.e., silver coins. This new currency is associated with the new regime and its economic institutions. The need for silver coins, for the payment of taxation, fees, fines etc.,

and for the purchase of the necessary manufactured goods, contributed immensely, in forcing the peasantry into agricultural commodity production en masse. The objective necessity of paying taxes, fees and fines, and of purchasing manufactured commodities forced the people to either produce crops for sale or go into wage labour. For apart from governmental employment, these were the only ways in which silver coins could be acquired by the peasantry. There was also government propaganda through the chiefs and all available media, that production of agricultural goods, as commodities, is beneficial both to self and the community.

On the whole, the intention was to allow the subjugated people to produce their own means of subsistence, in accordance with traditional practice; and to oblige them to produce for the market and the state, in forms of production which they would understand and which would appear to be justified in the subjugated people's minds. But qualitatively, the fundamental character of agricultural production changed. A mass of tribute-payers now pay not only taxes, but more consequentially, are forced to produce agricultural commodities for the capitalist market and the state. They are furthermore transformed into a market for the purchase of goods produced

under a capitalist mode of production. All these transactions are carried, through merchant-middlemen, under the protection of the colonial state.

Initially these merchant-middlemen are foreign companies. Most of them are familiar names, even in present day Nigerian economic affairs. They are, the United Africa Company (UAC) which was followed by other firms such as, the British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA), L. Ambrosini, John Holt, G.B. Olivant, Gottschalk, Campagnie Francaise de Afrique Occidentale (CFAO), Patterson and Zochonis (PZ), A.J. Tangalakis, Societe Commerciale de L'Ouest African (SCOA), London and Kano Trading Company (LKTC), etc.

These companies are mainly commercial. They operate through agents, (initially Lebanese and Syrians) right deep into the rural areas. They buy raw materials (mainly agricultural and hides and skins) and sell foreign manufactured products. One writer in his biography of these firms, observed that in terms of the range of goods they are involved with, these companies sell "... practically everything ministering to the comforts and necessities of life."[28] These companies later on spread their operations almost in every field. They are the precursors (with some later new arrivals) of what is

referred to as the market or capitalist sector of the economy. For they are themselves off-shots or were later acquired by giant capitalist multinational corporations.

Initially, the companies buy produce, and sell their wares directly from, and to the peasant producers. Later, their activities became chaotic and the intervention of the colonial government re-organized them through the policy of trading stations in the 1930s. They then mainly turned into wholesalers. Syrians and Lebanese turned into retail trade. The indigenous people then got a role as petty traders and hawkers.

The trade in manufactured goods was organized in hierarchical structures. First you have the companies, then below them, their agents, then Lebanese and Syrian retailers, then the indigenous traders, petty traders and hawkers. This hierarchical organization is consequential, for prices of goods get higher when you reach the bottom structures as each is trying to make profit. And they cumulatively exploit the peasant population. The centralization of commerce in commercial centres, i.e., urban areas also has consequences, in that prices tend to be higher in the rural areas where the mass of the population live.

Before the Second World War, practically the whole of the import and export trade was in the hands of the companies. Commodity marketing boards were hence established in 1949 to handle the export trade. They buy produce from the companies who then were designated Licenced Buying Agents (LBAs). The Nigerian produce marketing company was entrusted with the sale of these produce abroad. The purpose of the Marketing Board policy was said to be, to employ accumulated funds to stabilize producer prices in case of world price depression; to use the funds as a vehicle for economic development, research and improvement of the economic conditions of the producers; and finally, it was seen as a means of restraining the activities of larger firms.[29]

With this the government placed itself at the pinnacle of the structures of surplus appropriation from the agricultural producers. Gazetted buying stations were established. At these stations, the LBAs appoint agents who buy produce on their behalf according to gazetted prices set by the government.

With few modifications this system was operating up to independence. Before independence, the companies and Lebanese with very few indigenes were the LBAs. After independence

a lot of indigenes were included by the government. In 1961/62 season the number of LBAs was raised from 23 to 91,[30] most of the new ones being indigenes. These indigenes were helped by government guarantees of loans and overdrafts from commercial banks for the purpose of produce buying. Thus a new 'class' - merchant capitalist class in the society was born and the government was the mid-wife.

But suffice it to say that these new 'classes' of indigenous businessmen have since been dominating this middleman role in produce trade, the companies have since taken up more lucrative areas of the economy as a result of the expansion of the capitalist market sector in the country.

On the whole, this is briefly, how historically the generalization of simple commodity production in the country side developed. For the "... appearance of foreign companies in mining and commerce, plus the economic activities of the colonial government itself" (fostered) "the beginning of wage labour ... and more importantly commodity production spread throughout the countryside, giving rise to wholly new social relations and institutions."[31]

In conclusion, we should note that, colonialism generalized the production of simple commodities in the country side. This is articulated to a capitalist commercial and industrial sphere based mainly in the cities and towns. It was concerned simply with the purchase of primary products and sale of manufactured goods. Though domestically this commercial and industrial sphere is dominant, it is itself an extension, i.e., a periphery of the world capitalist system. Most of the firms are wholly or partly foreign-owned their wares foreign or domestic-manufactured and their purchases foreign-destined.

Finally, our brief analysis has shown how colonial transformations resulted in fundamental changes in the structure of the society and the economy. These changes, as we noted earlier gave rise to new social relations of production. With this in mind we may proceed to analyse the contemporary nature of these production relations. In this regard, chapter three is devoted to the exposition of labour and property relations in peasant agriculture. This is with a view to analysing the social organization of labour and the factors of production, as conditions facilitating the domination of agriculture by merchant and industrial capital.

FOOTNOTES

1. This is not to say that concepts precede history. Far from that. We believe that concepts are derived and developed in the process of a critical and rigorous analysis of concrete historical experience. We are here adopting the strategy of explaining the concepts before outlining their historical essence, only because we feel that they need a clear presentation, so as to make our use of them concise and unambiguous.

2. Amin, S. "Modes of Production and Social Formation" Original paper presented to a Seminar on Planning Techniques in Kinshasa, February-March 1972, Reprinted in UFAHAMU - N.D.

3. Amin, S. Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. The Harvester Press Ltd., Sussex, 1976, p. 16.

4. Amin, S., Ibid., p. 18.

5. This classification is mainly derived from the above cited work of Samir Amin, Ibid.

6. We shall come later on (when considering the simple commodity and the capitalist mode) with a specific definition of our usage of the concept, 'commodity.'

7. Amin, S., Ibid., pp. 4-15.

8. Marx, K., CAPITAL Vol. I., Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1954, pp. 713-4.

9. Cook, S., "Value, Price and Simple Commodity Production: The Case of the Zapotec Stone Workers" in The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1976, p. 395.

10. cf. Amin, S., op. cit., also, see Oscar Lange, "Political Economy Vol. I., General Problems. New York, MacMillan, 1963, pp. 19-20.

11. See the above quoted passage.

12. Braverman, H., Labour and Monopoly Capital. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974, p. 52.

13. Marx, K., Capital Vol. II, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1967, p. 35.

14. Marx, K., Capital Vol. I, op cit., p. 48.

15. Marx, K., Capital Vol. I., op. cit. pp. 147-8.

16. Marx, K., Capital Vol. I., op. cit., p. 150.

17. Marx, K., Capital Vol. I., op. cit., p. 88.

18. A similar approach to analysing social formations, is advanced by Maurice Godelier, in his, Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology, Cambridge University Press, (1973) 1977, pp. 63-69.

19. The office of the Sarkin Noma is both ancient and significant. He is the supervisor of all the activities connected with farming in a given vicinity (including rites etc.). He also has the priviledged position of presenting the views of the Talakawa to the Sarki against cases of oppression by the 'yan sarki (princes), yaran sarki (servants) and fadawa (palace officials). See, Na-Dama, G. The Rise and Fall of a Hausa State: A Social and Political History of Zamfara, Ph.D. Thesis, History Department, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1977, p. 95.

20. Na-Dama, G., Ibid., p. 103.

21. Na-Dama, G., Ibid., pp. 147-8.

22. Na-Dama, G., Ibid., pp. 138-9.

23. Na-Dama, G., Ibid., pp. 138-9.

24. Na-Dama, A.G., Ibid., p. 154.

25. Lugard in a speech read on his behalf after the capitulation of Caliphate forces, in Sokoto in 1903 asserted that, "The Fulani in the old times under Dan Fodio conquered this country. They took the rights to rule over it, levy taxes, to depose kings and create kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule, which has come into the hands of the British. All these things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do, now pass to the British." See, Kirk-Green (ed.) The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria, 1900-1947, Oxford University Press, London, 1965, p. 43.

26. Lugard, F.D., Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates 1912-1919, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1920, p. 14.

27. Arnett, The Gazetteer of Sokoto Province, 1904-1919, Waterlow and Sons, Ltd., London, 1920, p. 60.

28. MacMillan, A., The Red Book of West Africa, Frank Cass, London, (1920) 1968, p. 66.

29. Kriesel, H.C., Marketing of Groundnuts in Nigeria, Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research, Ibadan, 1968, pp. 11-12.

30. Northern Region of Nigeria, Eighth Annual Report of Northern Nigerian Marketing Board, 1961/62, p. 10.

31. Kay, G.B., The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana, Cambridge University Press, 1972, p. 6.

32.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION

Every process of production is at the same time a labour process; that is, "... human action with a view to the production of use-values, appropriation of natural substances to human requirements."[1] Labour is a conscious activity of man, in which he expends his energy and human endowments upon the natural environment for the production of value. A process of production is therefore a labour process because labour is its starting point.

The essence of the labour process is united in the interrelationships between its three constituent elements. These are:

(i) the personal activity of man, i.e., work itself;
(ii) the subject of that work;
(iii) the instruments used by the worker on the subject of work, i.e., instruments of labour.

These three elements are united in the labour process because each one of them is indispensable in the process of production. The exercise of labour power is only possible within

the natural environment, and for effective extraction of the natural endowments, man must interpose certain forms of implements between himself and subject of work. The interrelationships between these three elements in a particular socio-economic setting, is crucial to the understanding of the mode of social organization of production.

In peasant agriculture, it is said that land and labour are the two most important factors of production.[2] We contend, however, that the technology of production is equally as important as either land or labour. The nature of and the interrelationships between these constituent elements of the labour process in agricultural production, indicates the level of development and character of agricultural production.

To analyse the structure and organization of production in peasant agriculture, therefore, we have to investigate the form of the interrelationships of these three constituent elements. It is pertinent to start with the structure of landholding, for it is important in any attempt at exposing the relationship between men with regards to the use of the earth's surface.

THE STRUCTURE OF LANDHOLDING

Land as the universal subject of human labour in agriculture, has of necessity, in the course of human history, experienced different varieties of arrangements under which it is cultivated. These arrangements may be legal, quasi legal or customary. They are to regulate the access of each man within society to a particular portion of the earth's surface. These arrangements are called land tenure arrangements.

Land tenure is defined as the "... interrelationships between men in the use of land resources."[3] It is further defined as "... the rights that people have in land, that is, their legal privileges to use, cultivate, dispose of, and even exploit specified portions of the earth's surface. Tenure is therefore a social relationship between human beings and the land; it is reflected in a broad array of social regulation regarding the use of the soil."[4]

One of the best approaches to studying a particular tenure arrangement is through the study of the historical and socio-economic backgrounds of a particular society in which it exists, rather than isolating it through a general system of tenurial evolution. Some scholars on the subject presume to have found a general evolutionary formula within

which all tenure arrangements can be classified. Such scholars assert that land tenure evolved from collective or communal and extensive cultivation, to individual or private and intensive cultivation.

According to Lugard, in the early times "... the land and its produce is shared by the community as a whole; later the produce is the property of the family or individuals by whose toil it was won, and the control of land becomes vested in the head of the family. When the tribal stage is reached, control passes to the chief, who allots unoccupied lands at will, but is not justified in dispossessing any family or person who is using the land. Later still, especially when the pressure of population has given to the land an exchange value, the conception of property rights in it emerges, and sale, mortgage and lease of the land, apart from its user is recognized."[5] But whether this evolutionist formulation is true for all societies is purely an academic matter.

The legal basis of the present land tenure arrangement in the former Northern region (our study villages inclusive) was laid down in the colonial era. After conquering the Sokoto Caliphate and subduing opposition from political

communities not under the Caliphate, the British arrogated to themselves (as the governing power) the sole rights to the ownership and control of all lands in the former region.

The Lands and Native Rights Proclamation of 1910 declared that; "All native lands and all rights over the same are hereby declared to be under the control and subject to the disposition of the Governor and shall be held and administered for use and common benefit of the natives of Northern Nigeria; and no title to the occupation of and use of any such lands shall be valid without the consent of the Governor." However, the Governor is required to have "... regard to the native laws and customs existing in the district in which such land is situated." Furthermore, according to this law, no individual has the rights to "... alienate his right of occupancy, by sale, mortgage, or transfer of possession without the consent of the Governor."[6] Any such sale or transfer without the sanction of the Governor is regarded as null and void.

In effect, the government after assuming sole ownership of the land, "... delegated (its) authority to the traditional rulers to administer land according to the traditions of the people."[7] The government therefore has legislative control

over land matters; the traditional rulers have 'customary' administrative control; while the peasant cultivators have unreserved usufructuary rights.

Despite these laws, however, "the Nigerian farmer ... enjoys a perpetual right of user."[8] Lugard himself remarked that the "... law remained a dead letter so far as the native occupiers are concerned. They were unaware that it (the government) had declared their titles to be invalid, unless granted under a certificate by the governor."[9] In actual fact no certificates of occupancy were issued to the peasant cultivators. Certificates of occupancy become important only in the urban areas where commercial enterpreneurs are supposed to obtain these certificates if they need to construct permanent trading structures. Initially, governmental land ownership has no direct impact on agricultural production, "... beyond the fact that land cannot be used (by a peasant) as a collateral for raising bank loans."[10]

Furthermore, even under these legalistic trappings, land can be individually owned, inherited and alienated, even if theoretically the 'consent of the Governor' is required. This form of 'consent' is more or less vested in the recognition by the chief or village head that such a

transaction has taken place. Even though the peasant is not legally the absolute owner of the land he cultivates, his title to it approximates well with private ownership. He can sell his rights to it; his children can inherit it; he can pledge and lease it out; and even in cases where the Government itself acquires land, he is entitled to compensation and/or provision of an alternative site.

It is, therefore, indeed surprising that some scholars still contend that land tenure is communal, tribal or traditional, (these words used ostensibly to mean the same thing).[11] Adegboye defines this conception of communal tenure as the "... situation in which a community exercises control, occupation, and use of a landed property. The rights of transfer and reversion is exercised only by the community as a whole."[12]

Goddard identified the features, central to this conception of 'communal' as when "... land ownership is vested in the community as a whole" and when "the rights of occupancy depend upon residence within the community. Each member of the community has the right to make use of whatever land he requires, but he has no right to alienate the land he holds."[13] It was further argued that, these 'communal'

circumstances often lead to inefficient land use patterns, because of the absence of security to land titles; restriction of the mobility of farmers; subdivision of holdings into excessively small units; and fragmentation of holdings.[14]

Insecurity of land tenure implies that since land belongs to the community, there may not be sufficient incentives for a holder to undertake long-term land improvements and investments. Mobility of farmers is restricted because, since one has title rights only within his own community, he is not disposed to leave, (since this will mean relinquishing his rights of occupancy in his own community), even if land is scarce there. Also under this 'communal' conception, holdings eventually become undersized due to population increases within the community; and where population densities are high, people come to hold very small fields in terms of size which often may not be enough to sustain themselves and their families. Land is also said to be fragmented due to partition in the event of inheritance and or land shortage. This, it is contended, reduces the efficiency of labour in terms of the working hours lost in travelling from the compound to the fields and from one plot to another.

However, this conception defines 'communal' ownership only in a restricted and legalistic sense, that is, only the sanctions of the 'community' vis-a-vis individual holdings. It isolates the structure of landholding from common labour and sharing of fruits and common ownership of the instruments of labour. This results in fragmenting the unity of the labour process. A structure of landholding cannot be said to be communal unless and until all these three elements are also communal. In other words, the fact that land is legally in the hands of the community (or the Government on behalf of the community) doesn't also imply that labour and the instruments of labour are held in common. Community or Governmental legal control of the land indicates their fears of permanent and total individual alienation of land, as such, but not its products. The fact is that land is worked individually. For communal ownership proper denotes the unity of the labour process as a whole, which is absent in this conception.

Referring to the existing land tenure structure as 'communal' is both inappropriate and misleading. It is a situation where the trappings of current legalities have obscured a full comprehension of the essential nature of the labour process as the interrelationships between land, labour and its instruments. As such all the shortcomings of what

is referred to as 'communal' are in fact not due to it, but more or less to the nature of private individual control, (and on this, more later).[15]

But before we throw out this conception, let us finally put to rest the often pointed evidence of the gandu institution, as an example of 'communal' ownership and use of the land.

The gandu is a social production unit, organized essentially under the criteria of kinship. It is defined as "... two or more married men and their dependents farming together under a common leadership. ... the men and their dependents work together on a common gandu farm."[16] In its ideal mode of operation, "... the gandu head (as the head of the household) provides seeds and tools used by the unit, pays for the expenses of tax, marriage and child birth of its members and provides dwelling places. He also distributes food supplies from the gandu's granaries used in the common meals and provides the male members with personal plots of land (gayauna or kurga) on which they are allowed to work at specific times and to keep the produce for themselves."[17]

Essentially, therefore, the gandu is a social production unit in which all the factors of production are owned and

used in common. It also provides an individual with institutional security within the community and vis-a-vis the political authority.

However, the criteria of kinship under which it is organized has brought about a complex situation in the analysis of the current structure of production organization in the areas it exists. In kinship terms, we have to differentiate between gandu and family (iyali), and in production terms, the gandu farm and the family farm.

The gandu is essentially a type of African extended family system which is a composite unit containing "... a man, his wife/wives and children, the wives of his sons and their children, his brothers, their wives and children and other close relatives."[18] When the labour process as a whole is common within such a unit, it may be referred to as gandu either in common or non-common residence. But when it is not, it rests wholly on the superstructural kinship level and cannot be referred to as gandu even if they dwell within a common compound. The concept of ya fita gandu (he has opted out of the gandu), doesn't mean a break of family ties, but of production ties.

The gandu is essentially a production unit while the extended family is a social unit. The gandu is a composite unit containing several simple units, iyali (plural iyalai).[19] The simple unit iyali is mainly composed of a man, his wife/wives and children. When this simple unit expands as a result of population increases, the children become adults and married with their own children, a new situation emerges. In areas where there is land shortages these adult children have to stay and work with the father under his authority. Only after his death do they, under the provisions of the Islamic inheritance laws, divide up the farms and the estate, and each starts afresh as a single unit. But in cases of areas where land is abundant, the father, in his life time, allocates or buys a piece of land for each of the adult children to start afresh as single units; hence the expression, an fitar dashi gandu (he has been separated from the gandu).

Evidence from researchers in the nature of the composition of the gandu show that the situation where brothers and their families work together on a common farm or farms is very rare.[20] For these tend to break up with the death of the father. Furthermore, it is in fact bizzare for one to conceive of the gandu as a dwelling or eating unit. Goddard has observed that "... persons occupying one compound were

found to comprise separate family farming units, whilst families living in separate compounds may still combine together as one economic unit both for farm production and for the consumption of food."[21] Also, "... it is common for both father and sons and brothers to continue to eat together ... even after they have separated their farming units. This of course is a complete negation of the concept of gandu."[22]

Furthermore, evidence from our study villages and elsewhere indicates that whether we conceive of the gandu as a simple unit of production or as a composite unit, the institution is fast breaking down. In our study villages, out of a sample of 273 farmers, we found that only 31 (11.4 percent) indicated they belong only to the gandu. In Birnin Magaji (N = 115) only 2 1.7 percent) belong only to the gandu. In Yankaba village (N = 79) only 5 (6.3 percent). Only in Kasuwan Daji (N = 79) is gandu more popular than in the other villages, with 24 (30.4 percent) belonging to it. Conversely, personal farms on the whole, seem to be more popular than gandu, with 147 (53.8 percent) farming specifically on their own.[23] Table 1.1 below gives the picture in greater details.

Table 1.1: Nature of Landholdings

Nature of Farm Ownership	B. Magaji (N=115)		K. Daji (N=79)		Yankaba (N=79)		Total (N=273)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
In Gandu only	2	1.7	24	30.4	5	6.3	31	11.4
Personal Farm only	62	53.9	47	59.5	38	48.1	147	53.8
Gandu and Personal	49	42.6	8	10.1	36	45.6	93	34.1
No Farm, No Gandu	1	0.9	-	-	-	-	1	0.4
Unknown	1	0.9	-	-	-	-	1	0.4
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

From this Table we can further see that those partly in gandu and partly operating on personal farms are 93 (34.1 percent). This indicates that further processes may convert them wholly into separate and individual producers. For commercialization of production also brings about progressive individualization of landholding.

As such it is within the context of more or less individualistic as opposed to communal control of the land that the structure of landholding in peasant agriculture exhibits limitations to proper land use and resultant low productivity. Insecurity of tenure, subdivision and fragmentation are in fact, factors associated with individual private landholding and not 'communal' landholding.

Earlier on we have observed that in fact an individual holder of a piece of land has in effect unrestricted tenure rights. An insecurity which arises in these circumstances is wholly due to the individualized nature of the holdings. Insecurity to land titles arises only because these titles are vested in individuals, for a community will have more security of tenure than an individual family. Community pressure is quantitatively and qualitatively stronger and more influential than an individual's or isolated individuals'

discordant voices. It is easier to coerce a single individual or family with regards to the land, than a whole community.

Once land is under individual control, its break-up on inheritance, is inevitable. The proliferation of transfers of usufructuary rights, through sale, pledge, gift, etc.; further confounded by population increases, make land fragmentation an inescapable feature of land use. By fragmentation, we mean the break-up of land through differential ownership into individual plots spread throughout the land surface of a given area. This situation is depicted in the case of say an individual, holding title to two or more pieces of land separated from one another within a given farming area.

This precludes land concentration and fosters the division of the earth's surface among innumerable holders and cultivators. The concentration of land is almost impossible under this situation, for it pre-supposes the revocation of the different individuals' titles to land, within a given farming vicinity.

In our study villages, the incidence of fragmentation is very high indeed. Among all the 273 farmers in our sample

only 17 (6.2 percent) own only one single farm; 83 (30.4 percent) own two farms; and 71 (26.0 percent) own three farms. Therefore those owning only one to three farms make up 62.6 percent of the sample. 89.7 percent own one to five farms while the rest 10.3 percent own six to ten plots of land in different places. Table 1.2 gives us a clear picture of the situation.

Table 1.2: Number of farms owned

Number of Farms	B. Magaji		K. Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
One farm	10	8.7	5	6.3	2	2.5	17	6.2
Two farms	41	35.7	28	35.4	14	17.7	83	30.4
Three	25	21.7	18	22.8	28	35.4	71	26.0
Four	15	13.0	11	13.9	16	20.3	42	15.4
Five	12	10.4	11	13.9	9	11.4	32	11.7
Six	3	2.6	2	2.5	3	3.8	8	2.9
Seven	1	0.9	1	1.3	5	6.3	7	2.6
Eight	3	2.6	-	-	1	1.3	4	1.5
Nine	-	-	2	2.5	-	-	2	0.7
Ten and Over	3	2.6	1	1.3	1	1.3	5	1.8
Unknown	2	1.7	-	-	-	-	2	0.7
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

This Table apart from indicating the incidence of fragmentation of holdings also shows that farm distribution in the area is skewed. In Birnin Magaji, we find that the average number of farms is 3.2 farms per individual. 66.1 percent of the farmers in this village sample (i.e., those owning one to three farms), own only 45.6 percent of all the farms in the sample. In Kasuwan Daji, the average number of farms per individual is 3.3, while 64.5 percent of the sample own only 39.1 percent of all the farms in the sample. In Yankaba, the average farm ownership per individual is 3.7 farms; while 55.6 percent of the farmers in the sample own only 38.8 percent of the farms. The average number of farms owned in all the villages, therefore, comes to about 3.3 farms per individual, with 62.6 percent of the farmers owning only 46.5 percent of all the farms.[24]

The process of fragmentation of holdings through inheritance, population increases and other forms of alienation of land rights, further results in and is inturn reinforced by the progressive dimunition of the sizes of the separate landholdings. The fragmented land in this situation exists in the form of very small pieces of land held here and there by an individual cultivator.

In our study area, the total size of all the farms owned by an individual is given in the Table below.

Table 1.3: Total acreage* per individual

Average per individual	B. Magaji		K. Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1 - 5 acres	28	24.3	27	34.2	13	16.5	68	24.9
6 - 10	34	29.6	26	32.9	40	50.6	100	36.6
11 - 15	26	22.6	13	16.5	12	15.2	51	18.7
16 - 20	9	7.8	2	2.5	5	6.3	16	5.9
21 - 25	7	6.1	2	2.5	4	5.1	13	4.8
26 - 30	4	3.5	3	3.8	1	1.3	8	2.9
31 - 35	2	1.7	-	0.0	2	2.5	4	1.5
36 - 40 acres	-	0.0	1	1.3	1	1.3	2	0.7
41 and over	3	2.6	5	6.3	1	1.3	9	3.3
Unknown	2	1.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	2	0.7
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*NB 2.4711 acres = one hectare (ha)

In Birnin Magaji, the average acreage per person is 11.5 acres with a mode of 4 acreas and median of 9 acres. Kasuwan Daji has an average of 13.4 acres with a mode of 5 acres and a median of 7 acres, and Yankaba has an average of 13.1 acres

with a mode of 6 acres and a median of 9 acres. This also indicates that the acreage of all the farms belonging to an individual is small even if it is concentrated together rather than the current situation in which these figures are in fact total of all the acreages of different isolated farms.

This situation of the smallness of plots is more glaring when we total the sizes of all farms and divide them by the number of farms owned. We shall then be able to see the average size of each individual farm. In other words, an individual may have four farms of two acres each; his total acreage comes to 8 but the average size of each farm remains at just two acres. Table 1.4 provides us with some information in this regard.

From the Table we can see that 192 respondents, about 70.3 percent of our sample have farms whose average individual size is between one and three acres only. Seven respondents (2.6 percent) have average individual farm size of seven to nine acres. This is also an indication of the inequitable nature of land distribution in terms of the sizes of the individual landholdings.

Table 1.4: Average size of fragmented holdings

Average Acreage*	B. Magaji		K. Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
One acre	10	8.7	7	8.9	15	19.0	32	11.7
Two acres	37	32.2	35	44.3	37	46.8	109	39.9
Three	29	25.2	15	19.0	7	8.9	51	18.7
Four	13	11.3	10	12.7	8	10.1	31	11.4
Five	7	6.1	3	3.8	4	5.1	14	5.1
Six	10	8.7	3	3.8	2	2.5	15	5.5
Seven	2	1.7	-	-	2	2.5	4	1.5
Eight	1	0.9	1	1.3	-	-	2	0.7
Nine	1	0.0	-	-	-	-	1	0.4
Ten and Over	2	1.7	5	6.3	4	5.1	11	4.0
Unknown	3	2.6	-	-	-	-	3	1.1
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*2.4711 acres = One hectare (ha)

As such fragmentation and sub-division of holdings lead to inefficient land use. This is largely as a result of the ascendency of individual as opposed to communal nature of landholding; and individual as opposed to communal appropriation of the fruits of labour. The progressive sub-division of holdings is due to a situation where individualist landholding

is confounded by the fact that a large number of the people, the majority of the population are engaged in agriculture. Population increases, and the division of estates in this situation, are bound to affect the structure of landholding.

The control of land under commercialized production results in even the land itself becoming a commodity, subject to being purchased and sold. The buying and selling of land in this situation doesn't up-set the process of fragmentation and sub-division, leading to consolidation of holdings, but on the contrary reinforces it. The fact is that, land consolidation is difficult because not all the neighbours of a given farmer will be willing to sell at the time one requires to buy more land. As such an individual with money more or less resorts to buying land here and there thus aiding in its further fragmentation. Also, because land, is the chief asset of the farmer, he will not concede to its sale unless he decides to migrate elsewhere or is financially or physically unable to cultivate it. Furthermore, even where one succeeds in consolidation of holdings, through purchase, the division of estates among his heirs after his death may also lead to its sub-division and fragmentation once again.

The mode of land acquisition also indicates the rising importance of purchase as opposed to other means of acquisition. Our study indicates that the two principal means of land acquisition are purchase and inheritance, making up, between them 86.5 percent of all the incidences of land acquisition.

Out of the 273 farmers, 93 (34.1 percent) claimed to have acquired their farms through inheritance only; while 112, (41.0 percent) claimed to have bought all their farms. Those who bought some and inherited some make up 31 (11.4 percent) of the farmers.

Table 1.5 below gives the picture in greater detail.

Table 1.5: How farms were acquired

Mode of farm acquisition	B. Magaji		K. Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Inherited only	51	44.3	10	12.7	32	40.5	93	34.1
Sarawa* only	5	4.3	3	3.8	-	-	8	2.9
Inherited & Sarawa*	-	-	3	3.8	2	2.5	5	1.8
Sarawa* & bought	1	0.9	9	11.4	-	-	10	3.7
Bought all farms	42	36.5	40	50.6	30	38.0	112	41.0
Inherited & bought	2	1.7	14	17.7	15	19.0	31	11.4
Gift	9	7.8	-	-	-	-	9	3.3
Hire	2	1.7	-	-	-	-	2	0.7
Unknown	3	2.6	-	-	-	-	3	1.1
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*Sarawa - means that the individual cleared an area which was hitherto bushland into a farmland.

This trend towards the purchase and sale of land is further supported by the findings of Goddard, in his study of some villages in central Sokoto. He noted that "... land has become a transferrable economic commodity. The allocation and transfer of land is not vested in the community. Sale has become an established means of transferring land and customary obligations to make token presents of produce for temporary transfers of land have largely been commuted into cash payments of rent."[25]

The purchase of land in peasant small scale agriculture, not only increase the sub-division and fragmentation of holdings, but also increases the production costs of the producer and the cost-price of the product itself. Marx asserted that, "one of the specific evils of small scale agriculture where it is combined with free land ownership arises from the purchase of land. ... owing to the changeable nature which the land here assumes as a mere commodity, the changes of ownership increase, so that the land, from the peasants' point of view, enters a-new as an investment of capital with each successive generation and division of estates ... The price of land here forms a weighty element of the individual unproductive costs of production or cost-price of the product for the individual producer." Furthermore, "the investment of money -- capital for the purchase of land, then, is not an investment of

agricultural capital," for it decreases proportionately, the capital which the small peasants can employ in their own sphere of production. It also proportionately reduces the size of their means of production and as such narrows the economic basis of re-production, for "... it subjects the small peasant to the money-lender since credit proper occurs but rarely in this sphere. It is a hindrance to agriculture."[26]

Individual control and ownership of land brings about not only the scattering and sub-division of the land among a mass of producers, but also implies that the instruments of labour are both simple and scattered.

Our discussion now, turns to the nature and distribution of these instruments, for, "the productiveness of labour depends not only on the proficiency of the workman but on the perfection of his tools."[27]

THE INSTRUMENTS OF LABOUR

The first thing that a labourer possesses himself is in fact, not the subject of labour but its instruments. An instrument of labour, is "... a thing or a complex of things which the labourer interposes between himself and the subject of his labour, and which serves as the conductor of his activity."[28] These instruments are themselves products of previous labour.

The instruments are mechanical, physical or chemical products of some substances which are used in order to make other substances subservient to the aims and ends of labour. In agriculture they can be regarded as composing of basically two elements:

(i) tools or implements used in production;

(ii) the chemical and biological substances used in enhancing the productivity of the soil such as fertilizers, manure, pesticides, new seed varieties, etc.

The nature and level of sophistication which these instruments assume in a given production system, is an indicator of the degree of development to which human labour has attained, and also of the social conditions under which production takes place.

In developed countries, scientific and technical knowledge has attained a high degree of development, thus enabling man to attain a high degree of control ever the physical factors affecting production. The application of science to soil management and general agricultural problems, the use of machines in cultivation and development of high yielding varieties have to a large extent helped these countries in their struggle

against the natural environment.[29] More so, the development of industrial production, of heavy and light consumer goods, has to a large extent reduced the percentage of direct agricultural employment; and at the same time provided agriculture with the heavy and complex equipment used in enhancing production. Agricultural production, thus became a capitalistic monopoly undertaking, capital intensive, labour saving, and highly mechanized.

In the underdeveloped countries and Nigeria in particular, the opposite situation is the case; man is still at the mercy of his environment, his implements and techniques, outmoded and backward. He produces without the aid of modern science and machines and his "... yields are only a bare minimum of its potentials."[30]

Generally, tools or implements used in agricultural production can assume basically three forms; viz:

(i) Those used through the agency of the human muscles, and thus demand excessive utilization of human energy.

(ii) Those applied through the agency of animal muscle and energy under human direction.

(iii) Those used through the agency of mechanical power under human operation.

In our study villages, and of course in most of Hausaland, the implements used in agricultural production are by and large, hand tools with very little use of animal power or machinery (despite efforts to introduce and popularize their use in the colonial era). The major tools used are, Hauya (hoe), Garma (a special variety of hoe with a larger and wider blade), Sungumi (a hoe with a long handle usually used for sowing), Lauje (sickle) and Gatari (axe). These tools are those which have been in use in agricultural production, from time immemorial. They are produced locally by blacksmiths, who previously produced the blades using local sources of iron (tama) locally mined and smelted. However, importation of pig-iron, the utilization of old rail-sleepers and scraps from vehicles and other machinery imported from outside sources, led to the abandonment of local iron working industries and thus the sources of raw materials for the production of these implements was diverted. The wood workers produced the wooden handles attached to each of these implements, using local sources of wood by felling trees with the authority of the local government.

Tables in Appendices G(i), G(ii) and G(iii), give us the incidences and mode of acquisition of these implements in Birnin Magaji, Kasuwan Daji and Yankaba, respectively. Table in appendix G(iv) gives us, the total for all the villages concerned.

In all these, we can easily see that purchase, is the principal means of implement acquisition. On the whole, 97.1 percent of all the farmers claimed to have bought their hoes; 78.8 percent bought their garma; 93.0 percent bought their sungumi; 96.3 percent bought their lauje and 92.3 percent bought their gatari (axe). Other modes of acquisition such as inheritance, gift and hire are all of negligible importance compared with purchase.

These tables further show us the negligible importance of the use of either bullock drawn ploughs or tractors. In fact in the whole of our sample only one person in Kasuwan Daji, (who incidentally, is the village head) has a tractor. Twenty-five farmers making 9.2 percent of our sample have bullock-drawn ploughs, of which 7 claimed to have hired them.

In terms of the quantity of each implement owned by an individual farmer, Tables in Appendices H(i), H(ii) and H(iii) for Birnin Magaji, Kasuwan Daji and Yankaba respectively, and Table in appendix H(iv), for all the villages, show that a majority of the farmers own no more than 3 units of each tool with the percentage rising for Garma (74.4%, Sungumi (86.1%). 87.9 percent of the farmers have no bullock drawn plough and 99.6 percent have no tractor at all.

This situation shows that the main implements themselves are scattered among the producers. The fact that one only uses a single tool at a time also shows that he doesn't need more than he can use, unless he employs labour which he provides with implements. This scattering of the implements of labour is related to the structure of landholding and the mode of labour organization. We shall see more of this later.

The simpleness of these implements in general, is further indicated by our estimation of the cost of all the implements owned by an individual producer. Table 1.6. below shows that 68.1 percent of all farmers, have implements whose total cost doesn't exceed ₦20.00. (63.5% in Birnin Magaji; 64.6% in Kasuwan Daji and 78.4% in Yankaba). If we extend this costing to ₦40.00; we find that 82.0 percent of our sample have implements whose total cost doesn't exceed this amount. This indicates not only the poverty of the producers generally, but the poverty of the technology and hence the collosal limitations which this imposes on their productive efforts.

Efforts made since the colonail era to introduce what is officially referred to as 'mixed' farming,* and tractor hiring

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*This farming is 'mixed' only in the sense that bullock farming is introduced. It doesn't mean agriculture where animal and crop production are carried on together simultaneously.

Table 1.6: Estimated cost of all implements (₦)

Cost (₦)	B. Magaji (N=115)		K. Daji (N=79)		Yankaba (N=79)		Total (N=273)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1 - 20	73	63.5	51	64.6	62	78.4	186	68.1
21 - 40	16	13.9	13	16.4	9	11.3	38	13.9
41 - 60	4	3.5	5	6.3	1	1.3	10	3.7
61 - 80	4	3.5	2	2.5	1	1.3	7	2.6
81 - 100	2	1.7	1	1.3	-	0.0	3	1.1
101 - 120	4	3.5	2	2.5	1	1.3	7	2.6
121 - 140	3	2.6	1	1.3	1	1.3	5	1.8
141 - 160	2	1.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	2	.7
161 - 180	2	1.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	2	.7
181 - 200	1	.9	1	1.3	-	0.0	2	.7
201 - 220	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	1.3	1	.4
221 - 240	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	1.3	1	.4
241 - 260	1	.9	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	.4
261 - 280	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
281 - 300	1	.9	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	.4
301 & over	-	0.0	1	1.3	1	1.3	2	.7
Unknown	2	1.7	2	2.5	1	1.3	5	1.8
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

services, have to a large extent failed to bring about any mass improvement to the technology of production. For they merely seek to replace immediately, hand tools with animal and/or mechanical power. They failed not because of the inability of the peasantry to adopt, but because they seek to transform overnight the technology of production without changing the basic structures of production and of landholding.

These colonial attempts led to under-utilization of equipment, misuse and also high depreciation costs. The cost of maintaining the under-utilized oxen and equipment also added weighty element on the peasants' production costs without adequate returns. The small sizes of the plots of land and the fact that the equipment can be used only at the ploughing stage of the production process led not only to their under-utilization, but also brought about an increase in the costs of production.

No wonder then, even at that material time of zealous introduction of this technology very few people, mostly district heads and other officials attempted to adopt the technology.[31]

In our study area, we asked the farmers whether they are aware of governmental efforts to develop agriculture through the provision of hiring facilities for tractors and bullock-drawn ploughs. On the whole 146 (53.5 percent) indicated that they were aware, while 125 (45.8 percent) said they were unaware, with two unknown. See Table 1.7 below for the break-down in terms of the different villages.

Table 1.7: Awareness of government efforts in agricultural development

Awareness	Birnin Magaji (N = 115)		Kasuwan Daji (N = 79)		Yankaba (N = 79)		Total (N = 273)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Aware	73	63.5	41	51.9	32	40.5	146	53.5
Unaware	41	35.6	38	48.1	46	58.2	125	45.8
Unknown	1	.9	-	-	1	1.3	2	.7
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

The incidence of unawareness of these efforts is really alarming especially in Yankaba village, where 58.2 percent of the sample claimed to be unaware. But most of those who are unaware do know that such facilities exist but think that since they haven't been approached, the facilities are only for the

chiefs and other officials and for the well-to-do farmers other than themselves. In this their assumptions are often correct, for only these well-to-do people qualify for the benefits the government provides.

Furthermore, we asked whether they have ever tried to hire a tractor or plough from the governmental facilities and 164 of them, i.e., 60.1 percent indicated that they have never tried to obtain these hiring facilities. See Table 1.8 below for greater details.

Table 1.8: Ever tried to hire a tractor or plough from governmental institutions?

Response	Birnin Magaji (N = 115)		Kasuwan Daji (N = 79)		Yankaba (N = 79)		Total (N = 273)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	41	35.7	41	51.9	17	21.5	99	36.3
No	71	61.7	38	48.1	55	69.6	164	60.1
Unknown	3	2.6	-	-	7	8.9	10	3.6
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

This Table further shows that the majority of the peasants do not even so much as care about these hiring facilities. This may be because most of them consider such an investment rather

risky or even that they do not have the money to pay for the hire. But the fact is that they know that fundamentally, such kinds of tools are not feasible on their kind of farms.

Among those who claimed to have tried to obtain such implements on hire (i.e., 99 of them), 56, that is, 56.5 percent of them were able to get the hire; 37, that is, 37.4 percent of them were not able to obtain the hire, while 6 (all in Kasuwan Daji) that is, 6.1 percent of them were successful but had no money to pay for the facilities. Table 1.9 below shows this in greater detail.

Table 1.9: **Ever** successful in hiring attempts?

Response	Birnin Magaji (N = 115)		Kasuwan Daji (N = 79)		Yankaba (N = 79)		Total (N = 273)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Never tried	71	61.7	38	48.1	55	69.6	164	60.1
Successful	24	20.9	20	25.3	12	15.2	56	20.5
Not successful	17	14.8	15	19.0	5	6.3	37	13.6
Yes, but no cash	-	-	6	7.6	-	-	6	2.2
Unknown	3	2.6	-	-	7	8.9	10	3.6
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

As we have shown above, this evidence, does not suggest that the peasants are unprogressive and do not want to take up good opportunities. What this shows, however, is that they are consciously unwilling to take up innovations which they rightly feel are not in their interests. For they result in further getting them indebted; and this time to the government. They know that structurally using these tools may result in only increasing their unproductive costs of production and are thus structurally irrelevant.

As such, fundamentally, the main implements used in production by the mass of the peasantry remain the outmoded and backward tools now prevalent.

Furthermore, the use of these tools is both labour demanding and time consuming. Any stage of production involves excessive wastage of time; and further gives a time limit within which various phases of activities have to be completed, or not at all. Labour input, is therefore heavy not only because work is concentrated at a certain time of the year but also because the tools demand excessive utilization of human energy and muscles.

The nature of the tools is thus influenced by, and reinforces land parcelling and sub-division. For there is no way that a man (who has very limited working hands) can effectively cultivate

larger tracts of land using these tools. The tools further bring about wastage in production. For labour and time constraints force people to work haphazardly, than not at all. And conversely, labour and time saving machinery, cannot be employed feasibly under the given conditions of land sub-division and fragmentation. This is therefore a vicious circle within which the peasant producer has to operate, and cannot get out of, without fundamental structural transformation of the social organization of production.

Several scholars and institutes, however, both national and international, are still of the opinion that though large scale and heavy technology may not be feasible and relevant to what they refer to as small scale agriculture, it is still possible to increase yields, and thus productivity through employing a technical package, called the 'new technology'. This is in the form of increasing the application of fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and using improved high yielding seed varieties.

Fertilizers were first introduced in the former Northern Nigeria in the 1949/50 season. This was initially financed by the Northern Region Production Development Board. In this case 30,000 half cwt. bags (1 cwt. = 50.802 kg) of superphosphates

were distributed free of charge. But on 1/4/1953, this operation was taken over by the Department of Agriculture, and it was decided that fertilizers should no more be issued free, and should be sold on their own merit.[32]

The extension effort in popularizing fertilizer usage at that time, was mainly through planting on a number of demonstration plots in central locations and by intensive propaganda through posters, leaflets, etc. Its aim was to show to the farmers that by using fertilizers, they can increase their yields. Increase in yields means, the crops are going to be more in quantity and of better quality. Thus they can be able to realize more money from the increased sales which this results into.[33]

The response of the farmers to the introduction and propaganda for fertilizer usage was reported to have been mixed. It varied from one of "apathy to one of definite hostility."[34] The reasons given for this type of response were:

(i) "inborn antipathy natural to a peasant farmer to any new method,

(ii) "hostility built up in certain areas in the past by over-zealous propaganda,

(iii) "the actual labour involved in applying and the occasional burning of seedlings due to faulty application."[35]

Furthermore, the extension effort was highly insufficient. Several reports indicated that there was chronic shortage of staff to instruct farmers on proper use. Most of the field staff, in fact were more interested in the salaries they earn than in the work. While many prefer to be deployed to cotton or groundnuts marketing centres, where they make easier money through several malpractices and cheatings of the farmers.

Though the initial response of the farmers was not so much encouraging, (especially) with regards to fertilizers, the application of the bio-chemical[36] package (which is all that the 'new technology' is all about) is currently one of the most favoured strategy for the solution of our agricultural problems.

The use of fertilizers and pesticides in agriculture has over the years grown to the extent that almost all the farmers at least know of the existence of these modern inputs. Moreover, a lot of them have at one time or other used one or both of these inputs. Furthermore, with the current Green Revolution

programme, coupled with Government's fertilizer subsidies, more and more farmers are now coming to actually realize the value of these inputs.

In our study villages, in fact, a lot of the farmers acknowledged that fertilizers are more effective than the local manure. Fertilizers in fact have made a lot of headway. In all our three villages 85.4 percent of our sample, (N = 273), indicated that they have at one time or other used fertilizers. /Birnin Magaji (N = 115) = 88.7%; Kasuwan Daji (N = 79) = 88.6%; and Yankaba (N = 79) = 77.2%/.[37]

However, the use of pesticides is not as widespread as that of fertilizers. This may be due to the fact that it is a latecomer to the agricultural scene of this area. Despite this, (and the fact that this area is quite far from the Samaru Institute for Agricultural Research[38]), the use of pesticides is quite impressive. In all the three villages, 40.7 percent of our sample, (N = 273), indicated that they have at one time or other used pesticides on their farms. The details are as follows: /Birnin Magaji (N = 115) - Ever = 40%, Never = 47%, Unknown = 13%; Kasuwan Daji (N = 79) - Ever = 51.9%, Never = 48.1%; Yankaba (N = 79) - Ever = 10.4%, Never = 58.2%, Unknown = 11.4%/.

The figure for Kasuwan Daji is more impressive because it lies on the main road half-way between Gusau and Kaura Namoda and thus easily accessible than the other two villages to various forms of extension efforts.

Table 2.0 below shows the number of bags of fertilizer used in the year 1976/77 as reported by the farmers.

Table 2.0: Estimated number of bags of fertilizer used this year (1976/77)

Number of bags	Birnin Magaji (N = 115)		Kasuwan Daji (N = 79)		Yankaba (N = 79)		Total (N = 273)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Never and none this year	37	32.2	28	35.4	24	30.4	89	32.6
1 - 3 bags	52	45.2	23	29.1	24	30.4	99	36.3
4 - 6 bags	10	8.7	14	17.7	17	21.5	41	15.0
7 - 9 bags	2	1.7	2	2.5	4	5.1	8	2.9
10 - 12 bags	6	5.2	3	3.8	1	1.3	10	3.7
13 - 15 bags	2	1.7	-	-	1	1.3	3	1.1
16 - 18 bags	-	-	5	6.3	-	-	5	1.8
19 and over	6	5.2	4	5.1	8	10.1	18	6.6
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0

It is evident from this Table that some of the people who previously used fertilizers didn't use it in the 1976/77 cropping season, this may be mainly due to the lack of ready cash to buy fertilizers (as I learnt from some of them). Furthermore, these people and a lot of the people who indicated to have used only 1-6 bags, didn't use much or none of the fertilizer because of its inavailability and also because some 'enterprising' people are selling it above the normal government subsidized prices. It is thus evident that most of the farmers buy little quantities of the fertilizers for the two reasons stated above, and because of the small sizes of their holdings.

It is in the light of the above, that we can see the estimated cost of fertilizers used in the 1976/77 cropping season, (by the majority of the farmers) is relatively small, or none at all (for those who didn't use it that year). Table 2.1 illustrates this picture in greater detail.

From the Table we can see that, though the farmer realized the value of fertilizers and other modern inputs, it is often not very easy for him to obtain as much as he thinks he needs at the subsidized prices. This may be because there are people in the rural areas, usually the wealthier ones (Kulaks) who do 'business' in subsidized fertilizers, so that, the end-result may be the escalation of prices far above the subsidized rates, and hence beyond an average peasant's reach.

Table 2.1: Estimated total cost of fertilizer used this year (1976/77)

(₦)	Birnin Magaji (N = 115)		Kasuwan Daji (N = 79)		Yankaba (N = 79)		Total (N = 273)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Never and none this year	37	32.2	28	35.4	24	30.4	89	32.6
1 - 10 naira	66	57.4	29	36.7	47	59.5	142	52.0
11 - 20	7	6.1	8	10.1	4	5.1	19	6.9
21 - 30	2	1.7	5	6.3	2	2.5	9	3.6
31 - 40	-	0.0	1	1.3	-	0.0	1	0.4
41 - 50	-	0.0	1	1.3	1	1.3	2	0.7
51 - 60	2	1.7	1	1.3	1	1.3	4	1.5
61 - 70	1	0.9	2	2.5	-	0.0	3	1.1
71 - 80	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
81 - 90	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
91 - 100	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
101 and over	-	0.0	4	5.1	-	0.0	5	1.5
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

Furthermore, cash constraints may prohibit him from obtaining the optimum number of bags he needs, even at the subsidized rates. For as a rational 'economic' man, he also makes the estimation of costs and returns in his own way.

In extension terms, it seems that most of agricultural knowledge on the use of the new inputs, mainly fertilizers and pesticides, is transmitted through friends and relatives and agricultural workers. Asked how proper application of both fertilizers and pesticides was initially learnt, the majority of the farmers, 69.2 percent indicated that they learnt it from both agricultural workers and friends and relatives, with the latter having a slight edge (37.7% versus 31.5 percent). Table 2.2 illustrates this in clearer details.

As a matter of fact, for the farmers, there is no doubting that fact that the usage of fertilizers and pesticides brings about favourable results in terms of yields. 79.4 percent of the farmers in our sample indicated that yields actually increased due to their usage of these inputs. The actual breakdown for the three villages is shown in Table 2.3.

Table 2.2: How proper application of fertilizers and pesticides was first learnt

Learning Agent	Birnin Magaji (N = 115)		Kasuwan Daji (N = 79)		Yankaba (N = 79)		Total (N = 273)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Not using either	22	19.1	10	12.7	22	27.8	54	19.8
Friends and relatives	47	40.8	22	27.8	34	43.0	103	37.7
Agricultural workers	34	29.6	40	50.6	12	15.2	86	31.5
Radio*	4	3.5	-	0.0	4	5.1	8	2.9
Village Head	8	7.0	5	6.3	5	6.3	18	6.6
Can't remember	-	0.0	2	2.5	2	2.5	4	1.5
Other	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*The limited role of the radio in this situation is very revealing, in that the radio can only disseminate information on the existence of something, but without actually one listening all the time and quite well too, he may not be able to grasp the full process. The fact that, you can't immediately ask back and get an immediate answer are just some of the limitations associated with the utilization of the radio as a means of disseminating agricultural information, methods and procedures. Another thing is that not many people own radios at all.

Table 2.3: Whether yields increase as a result of fertilizer and/or pesticides usage

Village	Response	Number	Percentages
Birnin Magaji: (N = 115)	Yes	92	80.0%
	No	0	0.0%
	Cannot tell	23	20.0%
Kasuwan Daji: (N = 79)	Yes	68	86.1%
	No	0	0.0%
	Cannot tell	11	13.9%
Yankaba: (N = 79)	Yes	57	72.2%
	No	1	1.3%
	Cannot tell	21	26.6%
Total: (N = 273)	Yes	217	79.4%
	No	1	0.4%
	Cannot tell	55	20.2%

From this table we can clearly see that only one farmer disagreed with the notion that yields actually increased as a result of the usage of these inputs.

As for new high yielding seed varieties, it is our opinion that these generally have not made an in-road into the survey villages. This is because most of the farmers claimed to have selected their seeds from the previous years' harvest. Normally, even before harvest they select the best out of their crops

which they keep as seeds for the next year's planting. Seeds obtained from the government or the Gusau Agricultural Development Project haven't had much impact in this area.

But despite the fact that fertilizers and other inputs have been popularized over the years and the farmers are increasingly realizing the value in terms of yields, why hasn't this in itself generated a kind of agricultural resurgence? Some people may attribute this to climatical factors, such as the recent (1970-74) drought. However, from our own estimations it appears that, the problem has to do with the constraints brought about by the nature of the social organization of production itself, i.e., the structure of landholding, the nature of the instruments of production and how they are related, above all, with the organization of agricultural labour.

We have argued above that the application of the bio-chemical package actually brings about yield increases per unit of land. But we contend that a policy which sees this as the MAIN cure of agricultural ills is actually short sighted and misleading. This is because since it doesn't want structural changes, it sees agricultural changes as mainly technical in nature. But agricultural productivity is not a function of technology *per se*. Agricultural development is essentially a social process.

A process whose end and aim are essentially social. Technology becomes important as an agent of change only in so far as the social processes and the nature of production structures permits it to operate unhindered. As such we are of the opinion that the strategy for agricultural development whose main basis is the extension to farmers of the bio-chemical package alone, intends actually to conveniently forget about the fundamental structural questions.[39]

Moreover, we can also see that within the current structural conditions under which agricultural production takes place, even the bio-chemical package is beset by a host of problems, in that it:

(a) Brings about an increase upon the already serious labour constraints.

(b) Brings about disastrous results due to faulty application, which is more or less inevitable due to the insufficient extension efforts and/or absence of commitment by the extension agents.

(c) Brings an increase in the costs of production which some farmers may not be willing or do not have the means to incur.

In summary, we have so far in this Chapter, been discussing the nature and structure of landholding and the means of labour. We have argued that landholding corresponds more or less to private ownership (stripped of all the legalistic trappings). Land furthermore exists in small, fragmented and scattered tracts distributed among thousands of individual simple families. Similarly, the implements of production are backward and scattered. That the 'new technology' however useful, may not be eminently successful in triggering fundamental agricultural resurgence due to the nature of landholding and the instruments of labour. Furthermore, we contend that whenever land exists in such a manner, the implements are of necessity scattered and backward; and conversely whenever the implements are simple and scattered, land becomes sub-divided and fragmented.

But what becomes of labour, the creator of all value, under this structural matrix? This brings us to the third and very important component of the labour process, that is, the organization of agricultural labour.

THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR

The nature and mode of labour organization is one of the most important criteria which defines the character and level of development of any production system. Labour organization

in peasant agriculture is intimately related to the nature of the disposition of the other factors of production, i.e., land and the implements used in production.

Labour in this context is essentially organized on the basis of simple families as landholding units. The implements of production are also held within these units. These units (as we have noted earlier in this chapter) contain as a rule limited number of working hands. The general exclusion of women from the production sphere confounds this numerical limitation of agricultural labour.

Knowledge and skill in agricultural production are acquired by an individual male child, essentially in the socialization process. Tasks associated with production are learnt gradually, to the point that they can be accomplished from planting to harvesting by a single individual. As such the concept of division of labour as fundamental separation of work into its constituent elements, learnt and performed as fields of specialization for different individuals is absent in this context. It is more or less social i.e., according to sex, age, status, etc., rather than detailed, i.e., in terms of specialization as in the modern factory.

The dispersion of the means of production among numerous producers, coupled with the backwardness of the technology of production, means that production specialities cannot be developed. Apart from the normal process of production socialization, no definite skills have to be developed for the performance of productive tasks, except those concerned with weather observation techniques, hoeing, ridging, etc.

Within the sphere of work, every average producer does equally the same thing, and is capable of performing what another producer performs. Thus labour itself, by its demands on physical energy (aided only by a rudimentary technology) becomes a hard and demanding process. This of necessity limits the capability of each producer to limited acreage. The fact that most of the production activities are concentrated within a short period of the year, also means that the extent of land that one can effectively cultivate within such a period is of necessity, small.

In agriculture, as we have all along been saying, the question of time is always very crucial. The time one prepares the land, plants the seeds, weeding time, harvesting time, etc., all have specific time limits within which they have to be performed. For one to obtain satisfactory results, these tasks

have to be accomplished on schedule. In other words, the quantity and quality of given agricultural product is to an extent determined by starting and ending work within a certain time schedule.

Essentially, the time factor problem can be solved in two ways. The first, is through the employment of labour and time saving technical devices, such as tractors, combines, sprayers, etc. This is capital intensive and requires a large cash outlay which the mass of the peasants do not possess. Furthermore, it implies throwing masses of men off the land, which the capital intensive, import substituting, and largely consumer oriented industrial sector in the urban areas cannot accommodate. The second, is through throwing a mass of labour working together at the same time, that is, labour intensity. This implies concentration of the factors of production.

In peasant agriculture, the implements of labour are both time and labour demanding. This predicament might then appear to justify the exigencies of cooperation in production. Men are said to cooperate or to be working in cooperation, when numerous labourers work together side by side, whether in one and the same process or in different but connected processes.[40]

It has been established that the output of a given number of men working in cooperation within given hours; is greater than would be the isolated work of the same number of men for the same length of time, or that of an individual working for successive days to achieve the same time target. Furthermore, cooperation reduces the labour time necessary for the production of a given product.[41] Apart from this, cooperation is said to provide added capabilities to those involved. For in cooperation, men shed the limitations imposed by their individuality and develop the capabilities of their species.[42]

But is cooperation possible under the current system of factor ownership, and mode of product appropriation engendered by simple commodity production? This is a crucial point, for cooperation needs concentration of the means of production, while simple commodity production disperses them.

The parcelling out of the soil and the scattering of the instruments of labour among innumerable producers, leads to the isolation of production units from one another in the production process. This therefore destroys cooperation in production, which under existing level of sophistication of the technology of production, leads to limited and scattered efforts, with the consequences that individual limitations bring about a general picture of low productivity.

This general situation which the structure of factor ownership generates, is well presented by Marx, when he observed that,

> "Small landed property presupposes that the overwhelming majority of the population is rural, and that not social but isolated labour predominates; and that therefore, under such conditions, wealth and the development of reproduction, both in its material and spiritual prerequisites are out of the question, and thereby also the prerequisites for rational cultivation."[43]

Indeed commercialized production, when engaged in by an overwhelming majority of people leads to the dispersion of the factors of production rather than their concentration. Furthermore, individualistic appropriation of the fruits of labour, brings about individualistic and isolated modes of their pursuit. This progressively destroys all basis for productive cooperation among the labouring masses.

The destruction of the basis for productive cooperation and the resultant isolation of producers leads to the exclusion of all social forms of labour in agricultural production. Apart from bringing about the progressive demise of the role of composite gandu institution in the production process (discussed earlier in this chapter) simple commodity production destroys all basis of combined or cooperative labour, as is the case with the demise of the practice of gayya.

We have seen (in Chapter Two) for example how the practice of gayya, in which farming families within a vicinity cooperate in productive work, and thus help each other in overcoming labour constraints at the crucial labour demanding peak of the season. Thus it helps those families with limited labour capacities in terms of personnel to finish off their work on schedule.

However, the development of simple commodity production saw to it that for all practical purposes, this form of cooperation is more or less extinct. In our study villages, 96.7 percent of all the farmers in our sample indicated that gayya is no more. For details see Table 2.4 below:

Table 2.4: Employment of gayya labour in agricultural production

Response	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Yes	5	4.5	-	0.0	1	1.3	6	2.2
No	109	94.8	77	97.5	78	98.7	264	96.7
Unknown	1	0.9	2	2.5	-	0.0	3	1.1
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

Indeed, "the parcelling out of the means of production among innumerable owners, working on their own account annihilates, along with the centralization of capital, all the foundations of combined labour."[44]

The exclusion of combined forms of labour, results in a situation where all labour outside the simple producing unit becomes labour purchased. In efforts to avert the time constraints, and finish off productive tasks on schedule, a lot of the producers are forced to hire some form of labour on their farms. This becomes a drain on their meagre cash resources. Some even resort to selling part of their food to obtain money for this purpose. Nevertheless, a lot of them are not able to hire any form of labour even under these circumstances. As such they have to limit their productive efforts on very limited hectarage, which they feel they can effectively cultivate. Thus the question of size of holding actually put in use by an individual farmer actually depends on how much money capital he can muster to pay for agricultural labour.

The purchase and sale of labour power for agricultural purposes, is fairly widespread. This we can see from Table 2.5 below.

Table 2.5: Incidence of labour hiring

Response	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Hiring	64	55.7	34	43.0	37	46.8	133	49.5
Not Hiring	50	43.5	43	54.4	42	43.2	135	49.5
Unknown	1	0.9	2	2.5	-	-	3	1.1
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

From the above table, we can see that the proportion of those who hire labour and those who do not is fairly equal. This is not due to a situation whereby the population is equally divided in terms of prosperity. Rather it is a situation whereby even the poor ones who do not have the adequate labour capacity, are forced to seek alternative forms of acquiring labour if they are to produce at all. In other words, though the purchase of labour power is a criterion for identifying rural social stratification, it is not in itself the sole criterion. In fact what is now important is the scale and frequency of labour hiring.

Table 2.6 below, gives us an estimation by the farmers themselves of the average number of men they hire per day.

Table 2.6: Estimated number of men hired per work day

Number of hired men per day	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
N.A.*	50	43.5	45	57.0	42	53.2	137	50.2
1 - 3 men	10	8.7	6	7.6	10	12.7	26	9.5
4 - 6 men	23	20.0	12	15.2	10	12.7	45	16.5
7 - 9 men	8	6.9	7	8.9	5	6.3	20	7.3
10 and over	24	20.9	9	11.5	12	15.2	45	16.5
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*Not applicable.

Furthermore, Table 2.7 gives us the frequency of the employment of labour for agricultural purposes.

Table 2.7: Frequency of labour employment

Frequency of labour employment	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
N.A.*	50	43.5	45	57.0	42	53.2	137	50.2
Always	23	20.0	19	24.1	10	12.7	52	19.0
Sometimes	35	30.4	13	16.5	18	22.8	66	24.2
On few occasions	7	6.1	2	2.5	9	11.4	18	6.6
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*Not applicable.

As we have always implicitly observed, the main mode of labour payment is with cash. The amount one estimates as having paid for labour in a season is indicative of the size of holdings he has effectively cultivated and thus his level of prosperity. Table 2.8 gives us an estimation of the total labour costs incurred by those who employ labour, i.e., 49.8 percent of our total sample.

Table 2.8: Total estimated labour cost this season (1976/77)

Total labour cost this season (₦)	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
N.A.*	50	43.5	45	57.0	42	53.2	137	50.2
0 - 30	9	7.8	6	7.6	3	3.8	18	6.6
31 - 60	19	16.5	9	11.4	11	13.9	39	14.3
61 - 90	9	7.8	5	6.3	6	7.6	20	7.3
91 - 120	9	7.8	2	2.5	7	8.9	18	6.6
121 - 150	5	4.3	2	2.5	2	2.5	9	3.3
151 - 180	3	2.6	1	1.3	1	1.3	5	1.8
181 - 210	3	2.6	1	1.3	3	3.8	7	2.6
211 - 240	2	1.7	2	2.5	-	-	4	1.5
241 - 270	1	0.9	1	1.3	2	2.5	4	1.5
271 - 300	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
301 - 330	2	1.7	2	2.5	-	-	4	1.5
331 - 360	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
361 - 390	1	0.9	-	-	-	-	1	0.4
391 - 420	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
421 and over	1	0.9	3	3.8	2	2.5	6	2.2
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*Not applicable.

From the table we can see that even among those who employ labour, the majority spend no more than ₦120.00 for such purposes. Conversely we have about six people who claimed to have spent over ₦421.00 in just paying for agricultural labour. These can be conceived to belong to the rural-rich who are able to cultivate large hectarages, and thus may be said to be very prosperous, relative to the general picture of poverty in the country-side.

The generally accepted mode of labour payment in this context is found to be jinga. This is a form of contractual agreement entered into between the farm owner and the farm labourers on how much he (the farm owner) will pay for work on a given piece of land within a given time. Remuneration is effected when the job has been satisfactorily completed. The amount paid also depends on the nature of that work, i.e., whether weeding, harvesting, or land preparation. Normally the agricultural labourers organize themselves in working batches and enter into this contract as a group. But when the farm owner employs the labourers piece-meal, then the mode of payment takes the form of daily wages. However, from Table 2.9 below, we can see that jinga is the most favoured, which may indicate that the labourers are normally employed as a group rather than obtained piece-meal.

Table 2.9: Nature of payment for hired labour

Nature of payment of hired labour	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
N.A.*	50	43.5	45	57.0	42	53.2	137	50.2
Jinga	54	47.0	26	32.9	28	35.4	108	39.6
Daily payment	6	5.2	4	5.1	9	11.4	19	6.9
Whatever arranged	5	4.3	4	5.1	-	-	9	3.3
Unknown	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*Not applicable.

The farm labourers do not only originate from the village where the land is situated. A lot of them are youths who organize themselves from surrounding villages and travel from place to place during the labour period looking for work. The farmers who employ labourers when asked whether they prefer to employ those residing in the village or those who come from outside, indicated that both the two groups of labourers are equally employed. This is shown in Table 3.0. In fact only in Birnin Magaji do employers prefer insiders to outsiders. The reasons for their preference were not investigated.

Table 3.0: Persons preferred for employment

Preference for employment	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
N.A.*	50	48.5	45	57.0	42	53.2	137	50.2
Those living in the village	36	31.3	14	17.7	17	21.5	67	24.5
Those coming from another place	27	23.3	20	25.3	20	25.3	67	24.5
Any of the above	2	1.7	-	-	-	-	2	0.7
Unknown	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*Not applicable.

Generally, cash payment is not the only obligation of the employer to those employed. In fact an overwhelming majority of the employers indicated that there are other obligations apart from cash payment in this case, especially, the provision of food on the farm while work is taking place. Among the employers only three declined any form of obligation to the labourers apart from payment in cash. See Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Nature of obligation to the labourer apart from cash payment

Nature of obligation	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
N.A.*	50	43.5	45	57.0	42	53.2	137	50.2
No obligation	3	2.6	-	-	-	-	3	1.1
Food only	44	38.3	32	40.5	35	44.3	111	40.7
Implements only	-	-	2	2.5	-	-	2	0.7
Accommodation only	2	1.7	-	-	2	2.5	4	1.5
Food, implements and accommodation	13	11.3	-	-	-	-	13	4.8
Unknown	3	2.6	-	-	-	-	3	1.1
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*Not applicable.

The question of persons who are likely to become farm labourers, i.e., those most likely to sell their labour, is a very crucial one. For it can indicate the social and economic reasons why people sell their labour power. To this end, a question was asked on who is likely to become a farm labourer, the response can be seen in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.2: Persons likely to be farm labourers*

Persons likely to be farm labourers	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No response	42	36.5	45	57.0	41	51.9	128	46.9
One with no farm	5	4.3	3	3.8	2	2.5	10	3.7
One from another village	14	12.2	6	7.6	9	11.4	29	10.6
One without enough food	32	27.8	12	16.5	14	17.7	59	21.6
Lazy man/ malalaci	1	0.9	-	-	-	-	1	0.4
One who wants to get money	21	18.3	12	15.2	13	16.5	46	16.8
Unknown	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*There is a kind of mistake in this question. It was in fact intended to be a general question to which all (irrespective of whether one hires labour or not) were supposed to answer. But the result was that the question was inadvertently addressed mainly to labour employers. This mistake is regretted.

Despite the mistake encountered in administering this question, it appears that the majority of the respondents who answered the question are generally of the opinion that those who do not have enough food, and those who want to obtain money,

form the bulk of the persons who sell their labour power for money. Furthermore, it is clear that the question of laziness as a factor inducing a person to sell his labour power, is out of the issue.

Table 3.3, is response to the question on whether one has ever been a farm labourer before. To this end, a majority of those who answer the question indicated that they have once been farm labourers.

Table 3.3: Have you ever been a farm labourer?

Have you ever been a farm labourer?	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No response	10	8.7	21	26.6	31	39.2	62	22.7
Yes	51	44.3	36	45.6	28	35.4	115	42.1
No	41	35.7	22	27.8	20	25.3	83	30.4
Unknown	13	11.3	-	-	-	-	13	4.8
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

In terms of social values, no stigma is attached to people who sell their labour. It is not generally considered that being a farm labourer is a shameful thing. Table 3.4 indicates this clearly.

Table 3.4: Is it a shame to be a farm labourer?

Response	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No response	10	8.9	20	25.3	31	39.2	61	22.3
Yes	30	26.1	12	15.3	14	17.7	56	20.5
No	62	53.9	47	59.5	34	45.0	143	52.4
Unknown	13	11.3	-	-	-	-	13	4.8
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

On the whole, we can see that the issue of purchase and sale of labour is a reality in peasant agriculture. Purchase of labour is a means of expanding production and sale of labour power is a means of obtaining cash by the poorer sectors of the rural population.

Moreover, the fact that labour can only be obtained either within the factor ownership unit, or bought with cash means that a lot of producers who are faced with both labour and cash constraints, are not able to fully cultivate the lands they hold title to. The demise of traditional cooperative labour, such as gayya further exacerbates this situation.

Therefore, a producing unit invariably has to adopt the adage of 'cut your coat according to your size'. For one's 'size' in terms of labour capacity and ability to pay for hired

labour is a determinant of the extent of his productive capabilities. Thus the assumption among certain scholars that there is surplus land, is only partly true. Land is in surplus not because of a low population-land ratio, but fundamentally because under the current structural predicament (of backward labour demanding implements of production, individualistic and scattered mode of factor ownership and the isolated mode of labour organization) a lot of land has to stay idle precisely due to the inability of the holders to cultivate it. This leads to wastage of productive land, due to under-utilization. Therefore, labour is a constraint in peasant agriculture precisely because it is isolated labour, i.e., not collective or combined labour.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCUMULATION AND INVESTMENT

Capital accumulation and investment are central in any effort to achieve a long term and sustained growth of production in an economic system. This is no less the case in agriculture. The implication of the structure of the social organization of production in peasant agriculture, on accumulation and investment, is to say the least, negative.

The scattering and low level of development of the means of labour (i.e., land and implements of production,) and the exclusion of

the most common forms of combined labour, limit the ability of each producer to cultivation of small hectarag s. This situation deprives him of the opportunity to accumulate for investment. For isolation means that productive capital is scattered in the hands of many independent producers. Absence of centralization of social capital precludes fundamental accumulation and investment. Without this, application of science and technology in production are out of the question, for they demand substantial capital investment which is beyond the capability of the small, independent producer. This in general excludes control over social productive forces and their free development.

Upon this negative structure is superimposed a form of marketing arrangement which rather than benefit the producers, leads further to their exploitation and improverishment, by merchant-middlemen and the state. Since under the simple commodity mode, production is said to be generally for exchange rather than for own-use, the nature of the organization of these exchange relations and how they are related to the problem of capital accumulation by the producers is the subject of our next chapter. For the determination of how simple commodity production articulates with merchant capital, supported by state power, may indicate the level of development of production and the prosperity of the petty producers. Thus our next chapter is concerned with

product relations, i.e., the relationship between people, with regards to the products of labour. This is to show us the structural and institutional arrangements under which surplus is appropriated by merchant and industrial capital, and by the state.

FOOTNOTES

1. Marx, K., Capital Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1967, p. 179.

2. cf. Norman, D.W., "An Economic Study of Three Villages in Zaria Province." Samaru Miscellaneous Paper, No. 19, Institute for Agricultural Research, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1967, p. 1; see also Johnston and Kilby, Agriculture and Structural Transformations, Oxford University Press, London, 1975, p. 8.

   What strikes us here is the seeming isolation of land and labour from the technology of production. Technology was conveniently relegated to the background. We on the other hand believe that the labour process is a united activity where all the three factors interact. The technology of production even if backward, is important because it characterizes the effectiveness and efficiency of labour. The structure of landholding is also related to the technology employed on landholdings. More so, the technology of production is an indicator of the state of the arts and hence a part of the production process. Changes in technology also affect the structure of landholding and the dexterity and performance of labour power; and vice versa.

3. Oluwasanmi, H.A., Agriculture and Nigerian Economic Development, Oxford University Press, Ibadan, 1966, p. 23.

4. Smith, T.L., and Zopf, P.E. Jr., Principles of Inductive Rural Sociology, F.A. Davis & Co., Philadelphis, 1970, p. 159.

5. Quoted in Oluwasanmi, H.A., op. cit., p. 24.

6. Lands and Native Rights Proclamation 1910. Laws of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria (London, 1910) p. 668 -- also quoted in Oluwasanmi, H.A., op. cit., p. 34.

7. Baba, J.M., "Induced Agricultural Change in a densely Populated District: A Study of the existing Agricultural System in Kaura District and the Projected Impact of the Kano River Irrigation Project." Ph.D. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1978, pp. 72-73.

8. Oluwasanmi, H.A., op. cit., p. 26.

9. Quoted in Oluwasanmi, H.A., op. cit., p. 34.

10. Baba, J.M., op. cit., p. 73 and cf Goddard, A.D., "Land Tenure and Agricultural Development in Hausaland." Samaru Agricultural Newsletter, Vol. 12, No. 2., 1970, p. 30.

11. cf. Adegboye, R.O., Improving Land Use in Nigeria through Removing Defects in Land inheritance. Ph.D. Thesis Iowa State University, 1964.

Federal Government of Nigeria, National Development Plan, 1962-68, Chapter 3.

12. Adegboye, R.O., Ibid., Quoted in A.D. Goddard, op. cit., p. 30.

13. Goddard, A.D., op. cit., p. 30.

14. Goddard, A.D., op. cit., p. 30.

15. In fact whether landholding is strictly communal or a mixture of communal and individual ownership is out of the issue. The fundamental fact is that, landownership and distribution is currently in a type of transition from a pre-capitalist ownership structure, to another form specially characteristic of the rise and ascendency of the simple commodity mode of production and the structure of factor ownership which it implies.

16. Goddard, A.D., "Are Hausa-Fulani Family Structures Breaking Up?" Samaru Agricultural Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 3, Zaria, 1969, p. 36. cf Buntjer defined it as "... an arrangement in which two or more married males work together on a common farm in a single authority units." See Buntjer, B.J., "Rural Society in the Zaria Area: The Changing Structure of the Gandu", Samaru Research Bulletin, 180, 1973, p. 2.

17. Goddard, A.D., op. cit., Samaru Agricultural Newsletter Vol. II, p. 36.

18. Oluwasanmi, op. cit., p. 25.

19. In fact, the progressive disintegration of the African extended family, from composite to simple units, with regards to production is one of the results of the development of commercialized production, that is, the production of simple commodities.

20. Buntjer, B.J., op. cit., p. 7, shows that of a total number of 143 composite gandu units, more than 73% contain the father-son type of relationship and only 26.6% contain other non-father relationships. cf. Baba, J.M., op. cit., p. 82, and Goddard, A.D., op. cit.

21. Goddard, A.D., op. cit., p. 36.

22. Goddard, A.D., op. cit., p. 43.

23. The work of Norman, op. cit., Paper 37, p. 6, and Buntjer, op. cit., also shows the upopularity of the gandu organization. Baba, op. cit., p. 82, also found out that of his sample of 115 only 22 percent, i.e., 25, were found to be in any form of gandu.

24. The findings of Norman, also shows further evidence of inequitable land distribution. See Norman, D.W.; Miscellaneous Paper No. 19, op. cit., (1967), p. 12.

25. Goddard, A.D., Land Tenure and Agricultural Development, op. cit., p. 35.

26. Marx, K., Capital Vol. III, op. cit., pp. 807-808. He further noted that "... in small scale agriculture, the price of land, a form and result of private land ownership, appears as a barrier to production itself." p. 812.

27. Marx, K., Capital Vol. I., op. cit., p. 312.

28. Marx, K., Capital Vol. I., op. cit., pp. 174-175.

29. Oluwasanmi, H.A., op. cit., pp. 22-23.

30. Oluwasanmi, H.A., op. cit., p. 23.

31. Sokoto Area Report, 1935, reported that "Most of the mixed farmers are district heads and Native Authority officials who have little real interest in farming and have taken it up merely because they thought it good policy to do so. There is a tendency among such people to think that mixed farming is for their class only and not for the peasants." It was further noted that in the whole province, by 31/12/1935, there were only 91 mixed farmers, out of which the whole of Kaura Namoda district had 12. These comprise, 3 emirs, 46 Native Authority executive officials, 20 village heads, 16 peasant farmers and 6 middlemen. (See Sokprof, File No. 3/2, 56 "Agriculture in Sokoto Province" National Archives, Kaduna. The 1939 report on mixed farming (Sokprof, File No. 947, Vol. II, "Agricultural Extension Works--Sokoto Division and Advances to Farmers" National Archives, Kaduna) further reported that mixed farming accounts are always in terms of losses, several farmers, especially the peasants dropped out, sold their cattle with outstanding debts on them. There was in fact the rather very illuminating case of two peasant farmers in Zurmi District, who told the Agricultural Officer (J.H. Palmer) visiting them, "to sell them up because they have no money to cover hiring charges and their cattle are half trained due to lack of work and they thoroughly regret having started" (Report dated 22/6/39).

By 1953/54 it was reported that there were 11,625 'mixed' farmers in the whole of the former Northern region, but close examination by produce officers showed that many in this record were no longer operating (See Northern Region of Nigeria, Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture 1953/54, Government Printer, Kaduna), and by 1964/65 it rose to only 36,000 (See Northern Region of Nigeria Triennial Report of the Northern Nigeria Ministry of Agriculture, 1962-65, Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, p. 13). The same report noted that in 1964/65 only 4,805 acres were cultivated mechanically.

In fact, the history of mixed farming and tractor hiring services is very important and deserves a careful and separate investigation; for it gives us some lessons to learn about the implications and consequences of the now fashionable recipe of "technological transfer" advocated by scholars and national and international institutions. This history shows that introducing technological packages but avoiding structural and organizational transformation is bound to fail in any development effort.

32. Northern Nigeria, Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture of the Northern Peqion of Nigeria, 1953/54, Government Printer, Kaduna, p. 5.

33. Fertilizer Distribution in Northern Nigeria (in 56 lb bags)

Year	Free Issues	Sales
1949/50	30,000	-
1950/51	67,000	25,000
1951/52	32,000	22,000
1952/53	100	44,000
1953/54	64	24,472
1954/55	113	28,189
1961/62		2,500*
1962/63		5,680*
1963/64		7,000*
1964/65		11,500*

N.B. 56 lb = 25.401 kg.

*Includes superphosphates and sulphate ammonia. Data from 1955/56 Report of the Northern Nigeria Department of Agriculture and from the Triennial Report of the Northern Ministry of Agriculture, 1962-65, Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria.

It is apparent from the above data that fertilizer supply has actually declined over the years reported since it was introduced.

34. Northern Nigeria, Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture, 1953/54, op. cit., p. 5.

35. Northern Nigeria, Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture, 1953/54, op. cit., p. 5. The fact that faulty application leads to the burning of seedlings is also the view of the District Head of Kaura Namoda, Sarkin Kiyawa in several discussions we have had with him on this subject on several dates in April 1977.

36. By bio-chemical, we mean that the inputs are chemical or biological properties of certain substances. These include, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, high yielding seeds, etc. Further improvements on these to make them more relevant to our climatical and soil conditions; and also espousing new and relevant methods of cultivation through experiments using these, is currently one of the main pre-occupations of the Institute for Agricultural Research, Samaru, Zaria.

37. It would in fact be quite interesting to find out the reasons and social characteristics of those who have never used fertilizers. But this is out of the scope of this study.

38. This is not to say that the technology and knowledge generated from the Institute for Agricultural Research doesn't reach this area, but that because of the distance, it takes a longer time to do so.

39. As Marcuse noted, "... it is not technique, but the social organization of the productive forces that determines the difference between social systems." Interview with Marcuse in Blackburn and Cockburn (eds.). Student Power, Penguin, (1969) p. 369.

40. Marx, K., Capital Vol. I., op. cit., p. 308.

41. See Marx, K., Capital Vol. I., op. cit., pp. 308-11, especially where he observed that:

> "The shortness of the time allowed for the work is compensated by the large mass of labour thrown upon the field of production at the decisive moment. The completion of the task within the proper time depends on the simultaneous application of numerous combined working days; the amount of useful effects depends on the number of labourers; this number however, is always smaller than the number of isolated labourers required to do the same amount of work in the same period" (p. 310). Also that "The combined working day produces, relatively to an equal sum of isolated working days a greater quantity of use-values, and consequently diminishes the labour time necessary for the production of a given useful effect" (p. 311) ..., this in fact enhances the capabilities of social production.

42. Marx observed that, "when the labourer cooperates systematically with others, he strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his species." (Capital Vol. I., p. 312).

43. Marx, K., Capital Vol. III, op. cit., p. 818.

44. Marx, K., Capital Vol. I., op. cit., p. 721.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE STRUCTURE OF EXCHANGE RELATIONS

All products of the labour process can assume essentially, two forms; either as objects for exchange, i.e., commodities, or as objects for direct and immediate consumption, i.e., use-values. The extent to which products assume either of these states depends on the mode of their production, and the nature of the social formation within which they are produced.

As such, a product can be a use-value, if it is directly consumed, or used by the producer himself, or a commodity if the producer brings it to the market for exchange. In other words, the existence of a product as a commodity is solely determined by its being brought into exchange.[1]

In areas where colonial policy was bent on promoting the production of commodities within the existing structure of peasant agriculture, (as was the case with Kaura Namoda area and much of Nigeria) the aim was not the destruction of subsistence or peasant self-provision for own food, housing and other necessities, but to incorporate these within a general system of commodity production and circulation. As such whether the motive of production is wholly commodity production or partly so, is not the crucial issue.

As a matter of fact, food production for consumption and self-provision of other human requirements were necessary, in that they provide support for the reproduction of the labour of the producer, in his efforts to produce for the market. In other words, self-provision of food and some few other requirements, serves as a cushion on which commodity production rests.

The expansion and proliferation of foreign and domestic commercial operations since the advent of European traders, and later direct colonization, has resulted in the progressive widening of the sphere and scope of commodity production. This represents a change in the pre-colonial character and purpose of production, for it progressively turns all products into commodities, and production into commodity production.[2]

It is furthermore evident that whenever products are produced as commodities, exchange becomes a necessary element of the process of reproduction. Thus production and exchange (in any social formation dominated by commodity production), are tied together.

An exchange relation is that contractual and juridical relation between owners of commodities, which reflects the

economic relationship between them. An economic relationship is also a social relationship. And the fact that production itself is tied-up with exchange in the total process of reproduction, means that exchange relations are the same time a part of production relations.

The essence of production relations concerns three basic relations whose interrelationship sums up the character of production relations. There relations:

(a) between men with regards to the means of production, i.e., property relations;

(b) between men and labour power, i.e., labour relations;

(c) between men and products of labour, i.e., the issue of surplus creation and appropriation.[3]

Furthermore, for the purpose of clearer presentation, we can present this in a schematic form on the basis of an idealized abstraction of these relations of production as they manifest themselves in differing modes of production.

FIGURE I

RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN DIFFERING MODES OF PRODUCTION[4]

MODES OF PRODUCTION	PRODUCTION RELATIONS		
	PROPERTY RELATIONS	LABOUR RELATIONS	PRODUCT RELATIONS
CAPITALIST MODE	Private ownership of means of production, their concentration and unequal distribution of wealth.	Labour as a commodity bought by capitalist.	Product of labour alienated by capitalist through appropriation of surplus-value.
FEUDAL MODE	Land ownership private and concentrated in the hands of the lord.	Labour of serfs (not lords) attached to land but pay for use of land in labour and/or product form.	Surplus extracted by the lord from the serfs in form of rent and other dues.
AFRICAN PRE-CAPITALIST	Land communally controlled but allocated virtually free to households.	Family labour with often complete rights to produce.	Surplus if any is disposed of through exchange and/or tribute payment.
PRE-CAPITALIST ARTICULATING CAPITALIST	Trends towards individualized landholding and in certain areas, its concentration.	A modification of labour use where both family and cash labour exist side by side.	Alienation of surplus through capitalist marketing channels and income drain through the same. Surplus in form of trading and commercial profit.

Exchange relations are an inextricable part of social relations of production. For in exchanges, "... the persons exist for one another merely as respresentatives of, and therefore, as owners of commodities, ... the characters who appear on the economic stage are but personifications of the economic relations that exist between them."[5]

The fact that one is forced by necessity to bring a product to the market for exchange, that is, enters into an exchange relation with another possessor of another product (or money) means that for him, and for the other exchanger, the product has to be alienated to serve their different purposes. What makes products exchangeable, is the necessity imposed on their owners to alienate them. Exchange is therefore always a social transaction.

In the peripheral capitalist formation of the type we are discussing here, peasant agriculture producing simple commodities is articulated to industrial capital, through merchant operations. The nature of exchange relations generated by this articulation process, is by and large, concerned with the sale of agricultural products and the purchase of manufactured commodities. We have seen (in Chapter Two) how the necessities (of obtaining foreign

money to pay taxes, fines, fees, and buy foreign goods, etc.) imposed by the colonial system, forced the farmers to transform all or part of the products of agricultural labour into commodities by exchanging them for money.

This is coupled by decades of historical a[illegible]ons (and sometimes even the use of force) on the part of the colonialists, to force the peasant to turn all or part of his productive endeavour towards the mass production of agricultural products for the market.

The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to enable us grasp the manner in which the products of agricultural labour, as simple commodities, are appropriated through various channels and institutions of exchange, and how the income of the producers is drained, by and large, through the same.

To provide us with a clear system of presentation, and for the purposes of establishing an elaborate focus on the different channels and institutions of exchange, we shall divide this chapter into three fundamentally related sections. The first deals with trade in Marketing Board crops. The second is concerned with trade in 'food' crops, and the third with buying and selling of manufactured products. We shall conclude with a brief discussion on whether the process of exchange is by itself a value creating process.

SECTION ONE

THE ORGANIZATION OF TRADE IN MARKETING BOARD CROPS

The two principal Marketing Board crops in the Kaura Namoda area, are cotton and groundnuts. They are currently very important crops in all our study villages. It is important to note that, both these two crops were grown in the area prior to British colonization. Cotton is a local crop in the area. It is grown widely and has been used for local spinning and weaving for hundreds of years. Barth in his travels in the area in the 1850s attested to the importance of cotton production for local textile manufacture. The extent of cotton production then, was in tune with the textile manufacturing capacity of the local economy. It also used to be an important item of trade throughout the Western Sudan and beyond.

Groundnuts on the other hand is said to have been introduced by the Portuguese during the era of slave trade. It was also a common crop in the 1850s when Barth visited the area. He noted that it grows in considerable quantities, and forms a significant portion of the diet of the indigenous population. It is eaten roasted and crushed locally for oil which is used in cooking and as fuel in lamps. The cake is also used in cooking or eaten directly. But at the beginning

of the twentieth century, through to colonial conquest, foreign commercial penetration and political control succeeded in transforming both cotton and groundnuts into export crops and raw materials for mainly European manufacturing industries. The historical processes through which this was accomplished have been documented especially in the works of Hogendorn and Cowley.[6] Nevertheless, it may be appropriate to recount briefly the history of commercial export production of these crops in the whole of the former Northern Nigeria.

COTTON

The introduction of export-cotton production in Nigeria was the work of the British textile mills through their agency, the British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA), with the active support of the British home and colonial governments. For at the turn of the twentieth century, Lancashire's cotton mills were Britain's largest and most important manufacturing industry. They directly employed 3 million people, with an output of £100 million and capital stock of £400 million. Cotton goods constituted more than half of British manufactured exports.[7]

As such it was not at all surprising that the shortfall in imports from the United States (which was then, their main supplier of raw cotton) due to the Boll-weevil plague and the United States' own use of its cotton for domestic textile manufacture, sent jitters in Britain's cotton industry, the ripples of which reached the British government. This crisis led many capitalists and politicians to question why the government shouldn't force its dominions to produce cotton as a raw material for its own industries.

The outcome of this furore was the formation of the BCGA in 1902. It was granted a charter in 1904. And almost at once, attention was focussed on Nigeria. "The agents of the association report there are unlimited lands suitable for cotton production, and that labour is available. The soil in some districts is reported to be the finest cotton soil in the world. It is estimated that in this territory alone, almost sufficient cotton can be grown to supply the wants of Lancashire."[8] Furthermore, it was said that, "All attendant conditions conclusively prove that in Northern Nigeria, Lancashire can and must 'find salvation' and emancipate herself from the comparative monopoly of the United States."[9]

Local colonial reports further confirmed these predictions. Thus, the RCGA organized a strong lobby which comprised eminent personalities in British industrial, commercial and political circles. One of the important political lobbyists was Winston Churchill, then a prominent member of parliament and later Under Secretary for the colonies, and Prime Minister. These lobbyists succeeded in getting the British government to embark on building a railway from the coast to Kano, to stimulate commercial cotton production and facilitate easy bulk transportation.

Thus, through this and other more subtle means, such as the need for cash by the peasantry to pay taxes and progressive demise of local [illegible] and propaganda by the colonial and local (native) authorities, people were forced not only to sell existing cotton to the foreign firms and their agents, but also to expand their hectarage under cotton production. So between 1900-1911 total exports ranged from some few hundred bales to 2000. By 1916, exports rose to over 10,000 bales, reaching 37,000 bales in 1926. Purchases of seed-cotton reached 124,000 tons in 1958 and by 1967, total lint output for Northern Nigeria reached 315,281 bales; (Sokoto Province contributed 46,408 out of this total).[10]

GROUNDNUTS

Groundnut production for export rather than for home consumption started in 1912. Hitherto, it was commercially ignored in Europe. It first came into demand during the industrial revoultion as a compliment to the existing use of soap, and later the needs for fats and oil, particularly in France. But what was said to have stimulated its demand in Northern Nigeria between 1906 and 1912 was the result of a new product - margarines.[11]

But up to this time, the interests of British cotton millers far out-weighed that of oil-seed crushers or margarine producers, thus the government didn't pay much attention to groundnuts.

Probably the first attempt to attract government's attention on whether groundnuts are to be bought as an export crop was made in 1912 by E.J. Arnett, then Resident, Kano Province. He wrote to the colonial authorities that, "... the representative of the Lagos Stores is enquiring into the prospects of groundnut trade which he considers very good and he suggests that it

would be worthwhile for government to encourage the produce of this article."[12] This suggestion was rejected for the reason cited above.

But the UAC (United African Company) sent one of its local agents, one Adamu Jakada in the countryside to investigate quality, quantity and prospects for exportation. He did. The report was favourable and they sent a report on this to London. Consequently, the first purchase of groundnuts for export was probably by the Lagos Stores and the UAC. These companies employed local agents and merchants initially to popularize to the farmers that the companies wish to buy groundnuts, arguing that more cash could be obtained by producing groundnuts for sale than by producing cotton,[13] thus undermining current government policy which generally favoured cotton.

The companies used their agents to bribe village and district heads and even the farmers, to persuade them to expand the groundnut production for sale to the companies vis-a-vis cotton. Agent buyers were sent into the country on donkeys laden with foreign manufactured goods which they sell, to buy groundnuts with the proceeds. Thus production expanded. From 1900-1911, it ranged from a few hundred tons

to 2000 tons and by 1963, it reached 200,000 tons. By 1965 - it was 675,884 tons, out of which the former Sokoto Province was third (after Kano and Borno Provinces) with an output of 70,797 tons.[14]

However, it is important to note that with the expansion of groundnut production, which later even became the premier crop, government policy, both colonial and post colonial adopted an even-handed approach, and encouraged the production of both, with almost no bias towards either. This may be because the government now derives a lot of revenue from the production of both since the introduction of the Marketing Board system.

MARKETING STRUCTURES AND ORGANIZATION

Prior to the Second World War, both cotton and groundnuts for export were purchased almost exclusively by foreign firms whose headquarters are in foreign metropolitan centres. These firms employed local purchasing representatives and supplied them with funds for paying farmers. The firms have the responsibility for grading, storing, transportation and selling in overseas markets. The major firms such as the UAC (United African Company), BCGA (British Cotton Growing

Association), John Holt, etc., usually employed Levantine traders, who on the other hand employ Nigerians as sub-agents.

Prices fluctuated tremendously within seasons and between seasons, and between one place of purchase and another. During this time, there was nothing like gazetted buying stations. There were also no direct taxes either at the producer level or export duties at the port of shipment.

However, at the out-break of the war, the British colonial authorities introduced measures to control the marketing activity at the top. This consequently led to the transformation of the former export merchant firms into domestic purchasing agents licenced and remunerated at a flat fee per ton purchased with little risks to them. They also controlled entry to this activity, thereby excluding other foreign firms and the indigenous people. Purchasing quotas were allocated to these firms on the basis of their pre-war purchasing capacity.

Various reasons were attributed to explain this control from the top. They ranged from reasons of defence of the sources of raw materials dictated by war-time exigencies, to those of a desire to 'protect' the producers against fluctuating

world market prices; and furthermore with a view to arresting surpluses for the purpose of research and development which were thought to be in the interests of the producers.

However, despite these reforms, as noted by Kriesel, the "fundamental ills of the system at the procurement and operational levels were left essentially untouched. If anything, it appears that under the flat - fee system these ills have become more pronounced than ever."[15] Nevertheless these marketing reforms are the precursors of the present Marketing Board system.

Evolution of the Marketing Board System

The Marketing Board System has gone through a long history of evolution since it was established by law in 1949. This corresponds to the changing political climate in the country and also attests to its role as a vehicle for surplus absorption by the State through the imposition of various forms of taxes and duties on export produce.

The system made its debut as national commodity boards with both graoundnut and cotton having different boards. By law the government gave the Board exclusive rights to purchase all produce for export, through the Licenced Buying Agents

in gazetted markets and at gazetted producer prices. In 1954, as a result of constitutional changes which favoured increased regional autonomy, the Commodity Boards were replaced by a single Marketing Board which catered for all export produce in the former Northern Nigeria, i.e., NNMB (Northern Nigerian Marketing Board).

With the creation of States in 1968, only the name of the Board changed to Northern States Marketing Board (NSMB). It was then administered as a joint asset by all the Northern States through the Interim Common Services Agency (ICSA).* The July 1975 coup which ousted the Gowon Regime furthermore announced the creation of more States. Thus raising the number of States in the North from six to ten.

Due to the nature of the political climate which views the ICSA as a disguise under which 'northern hegemony' is allegedly maintained, it was dissolved and the joint assets were separated. Thus the Northern States Marketing Board entered another era of change. Realizing that it would be too divisive for each State to have its own Board, the Federal Government decided to go back again to the national commodity boards.

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*The former Benue-Plateau State later opted out and created its own Board.

However, despite all these politico-administrative changes, the initial objectives of the Boards since their creation by law have experienced no significant changes. The essential functions of the Boards are to:

(a) act as the sole purchaser of agricultural produce from the farmers through the Licenced Buying Agents;

(b) set the basic purchase price with the approval of the Central Bank, the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Executive Councils of the States. (Later on in the 1975/76 season, this function was vested in the Head of State with the advice of the Board);

(c) appoint agents to perform prescribed functions;

(d) provide facilities for marketing and handling, such as pyramids, and tarpaulins, sacks, twines, etc. However, the responsibility for erecting marketing structures, is the function of the State governments;

(e) coordinate the activities of the Licenced Buying Agents and other functionaries with a view of achieving smooth functioning of the whole system.[16]

Moreover, the Board is charged with the transportation of the produce to the port of shipment, and through the Nigerian Produce Marketing Company for sales both locally and overseas. This company is incorporated with all the Boards in Nigeria as shareholders. The Nigerian Produce Marketing Company on the other hand, collects the proceeds from both local and overseas sales and remits the proceeds to the Boards less its costs of operation, and export and excise duties. However, the funds remitted to the Boards find their way into the coffers of the States.

On the whole, the Marketing Boards have for sometime now been under sharp criticisms from scholars and institutions alike. That the function of the Boards is exploitative, i.e., an avenue for raising State revenue from agriculture, needs not be overemphasized. The Boards since their inception have pledged to use their accumulated funds 70 percent for producer price stabilization, 22½ percent for development and 7½ percent for research. However, it was noted that, "... in the 18 years of the operation of the Boards through 1966/67, (they) experienced five years of losses and thirteen years of net gains. Thus the Boards supplemented farmers' incomes in five years and reduced them in thirteen years."[17]

Furthermore, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, in its review of agricultural development in Nigeria, observed with regards to the marketing component that, "... the major draw-back to the present primary marketing and producer price policies of the boards is that although minimum prices are fixed for different types of produce and different grades, there are no institutional arrangements for ensuring that these prices are actually paid to farmers."[18] In fact, the produce inspection divisions of the Ministries of Agriculture are not there to see that the actual prices are paid to the farmers, but rather to inspect and grade the produce which has already ceased to be the property of the producers.

Apart from the revenue which the States make from the profits of the Board since 1953 and until 1975/76 season, the producers were also charged produce sales taxes as a percentage of total volume of the products sold, and thus a reduction from the 'guaranteed minimum prices' set by the Boards. Furthermore, due to problems faced by the farmers as isolated sellers and communication difficulties, the farmers often had no information regarding the prices set by the Boards, and thus were left at the mercy of unscrupulous Licenced Buying Agents and their sub-agents.

The revenue which the governments make from produce purchases is said to be for the purpose of development, which ultimately benefits the producers. In fact, it was observed that only about 30 percent out of the intended 70 percent of Marketing Board funds were used for any form of price stabilization and most of the funds were used for "... development objectives, many of which had very limited benefits to the economy in terms of solid economic development."[19]

The Licenced Buying Agents

The central feature of the whole marketing system is the network of licenced buying agents. These are individuals, firms or 'cooperatives' licenced by the Boards to purchase produce from the farmers, assemble, package, handle and transport under the directives of the Boards to designated points desired by the Boards. These agents are the representatives of the Boards at the producer level. They in turn employ their own sub-agents, who they pay on commission per tonne purchased. These agents in turn also employ others to help them in these tasks.

The main qualifications for appointment as LBA are:

(a) Some experience in grading and purchasing from farmers.

(b) Financial strength to handle certain minimum quantities of the product which by 1966/67 was put at 150 tons annually for those who operate entirely on their own and 300 tons annually, for those depending on the Board to guarantee overdrafts from banks.

(c) Political considerations especially after independence played a very important role in appointments of LBAs.[20]

The importance of the Licenced Buying Agents in the Marketing network cannot be underestimated. For by the letter of the law, the Boards are made to recruit them as of necessity. In other words, they have a legal standing and cannot be legally by-passed by the Boards.

More so, the LBAs benefit from a system of advance payments since the 1951/52 season, where about half of their investment is guaranteed and paid once the produce has been delivered to a railway line or in the case of cotton to the ginneries. This minimizes a lot of their risks. From the time of self-government, up to 1970/71 season, the LBAs benefit from the Board, which guarantees overdrafts for them from commercial banks.

This is to enable especially the financially weaker LBAs, to find working capital. This system of guarantees was minimized in 1970/71 season because of a high rate of default by some of the LBAs, many of whose appointment was in fact a political pay-off. Nevertheless, up to now the LBAs obtain loans and overdrafts from the banks each buying season at between 6-7% rate of interest, much of which is compensated for by the Board in the LBAs' Block Buying Allowance.

The main functions of the LBAs are officially to:

(a) purchase at gazetted buying stations at not less than the minimum price established by the Boards;

(b) arrange for inspection in accordance with any written law and fill the bags to a standard weight prescribed from time to time by the Board;

(c) finance purchases of produce until time of shipment or delivery to sheds, local crushers or ginneries and also to provide for storage until delivery to sheds or ginneries;

(d) make such returns of purchases and stocks as the board may require from time to time;

(e) arrange for conveyance by approved routes as and when required by the Board;

(f) comply with regulations and instructions regarding weighing, inspection, etc.;

(g) arrange for delivery to railway transit sheds at any port or to local stores, dumps, etc., as required by the boards;

(h) insure against all risks other than such expected risks as specified in the instruction up to the time of shipping or delivery to railway sheds or delivery to local crushers (groundnuts) or ginnery (cotton).[21]

In fact, the LBAs are now no longer responsible for transportation to the ports. The Boards contract this out with certain firms at a fee per ton. Furthermore, the LBAs are in-charge of grading which implies that since most of the farmers are not conversant with the grading system, they are again at the mercy of the LBAs and their sub-agents.

The LBAs are remunerated with a Block Buying Allowance which is determined to cover the following:

(a) Variable overhead costs including normal labour requirements.

(b) Fixed or static overhead costs.

(c) Risks involved which the LBA could ensure against.

(d) Finance charges.

(e) Cost of storage.

(f) Middlemen's allowance or commission.

(g) Return on capital.

(h) Remuneration in form of profit to the LBA. There are also compensation for transport cost and any miscellaneous expense incurred in the conduct of business.[22]

From these we can see that in essence, the LBAs do not shoulder any risks in their business operations. That is why appointment as an LBA is one of the most important avenues to sudden and quick wealth. In fact, almost all the local business heavyweights in the country were once or are still Licenced Buying Agents. In the colonial era, it was the foreign commercial firms which dominated this activity. In the case of groundnuts in 1953, there were twenty-two LBAs, out of which only two were indigenes. In 1958, there were 27, out of which 18 were foreign firms. But in 1963, there were 91 out of which only 19 were foreign firms, and by 1968 there were 268 LBAs, out of


which only 2 were foreigners. This sharp reduction of foreign firms involvement in direct groundnuts trade is also similar to the case for cotton.[23] This is consonant with the Governments' policies since self-government, of promoting 'Nigerian enterprises'. Later on the Indigenization Decree changed this situation permanently in favour of the local businessmen.

The middlemen role of the Licenced Buying Agents in Produce trade is just an innovation by the government to enrich certain individuals, often chiefs, district and village heads, political supporters and some businessmen, at the expense of the producers. Furthermore, the unprecedented rise in the number of the indigenous LBAs at independence, can be compared with their almost total absence during the colonial era. This may be because they were then the prominent supporters, or even part of the new Government. For it is true that, "... State power (under a capitalist setting) has everywhere been used by governments to enrich the capitalist class and by individuals to enrich themselves."[24]

By all accounts, this system of marketing as it has been generally described above is complex and exploitative. Therefore, to enable us to grasp this complex arrangement at a glance, it may be worthwhile to present this in a chart. In this case we shall see the link of the farmers through an individual LBA, to the Marketing Boards, and the State.

FIGURE II

A PICTORIAL PRESENTATION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF TRADE IN MARKETING BOARD CROPS



KEY:

——————→ MONEY FLOW (ARROW POINTS TO DIRECTION)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - → PRODUCT FLOW

. . . . . → LOAN OR OVERDRAFT GUARANTEES

This long description is in fact a necessary digression to enable us have a concrete understanding of how the total system operates. We shall then see in our case study, how the system operates at the grass-roots level. In this case, then, we shall look at the operations of the IBAs and their agents, as representatives of the Boards, and in their relationship with the producers and their products.

THE OPERATION OF THE MARKETING BOARD SYSTEM AT THE GRASS-ROOTS LEVEL

The importance of cotton and groundnuts production in the Kaura Namoda area can be assessed from the percentage of agricultural population engaged in it, and from the elaborate arrangement made for the buying season by the various participants engaged in this transaction. Our survey revealed that in Birnin Magaji, 90 percent of our sample indicate that they produce groundnuts and 88 percent produce cotton. In Kasuwan Daji, 79 percent produce groundnuts and 96 percent produce cotton. In Yankaba, 100 percent produce groundnuts and 81 percent produce cotton. Therefore, on the whole, we find that out of the 273 farmers sampled 96.2% produce groundnuts and 90.9 percent produce cotton.

The output according to the farmers for both cotton and groundnuts ranges from a few sacks for the majority of the farmers to over one hundred for a few. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show us this, in terms of the farmers' response with regards to their own output of groundnuts and cotton.

Table 3.5: Estimated output of groundnuts (in undecorticated sacks)*

Undecorticated sacks	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Not producing	10	8.7	3	3.8	-	0.0	13	4.3
1 - 10	63	54.8	47	59.5	37	46.8	147	53.8
11 - 20	13	11.3	10	12.6	17	21.5	40	14.6
21 - 30	14	12.2	6	7.6	11	13.9	31	11.3
31 - 40	5	4.3	5	6.3	3	3.8	13	4.8
41 - 50	1	0.9	1	1.3	2	2.5	4	1.5
51 - 60	1	0.9	2	2.5	4	5.1	7	2.6
61 - 70	1	0.9	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	0.4
71 - 80	-	0.0	1	1.3	-	0.0	1	0.4
81 - 90	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
91 - 100	5	4.3	4	5.1	5	6.3	14	5.1
101 and over	2	1.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	2	0.7
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*NB: Groundnuts is taken to the market decorticated. It is normally the LBAs or their agents that own decorticating machines. The farmers pay for the services or hire the machines.

One sack of groundnuts undecorticated is approximately equal to between 85-95 lbs (41.5 kg - 46.4 kg) with some farmers recording up to 120 lbs (53.4 kg) - 3 bags undecorticated, is approximately equal to one shelled bag - weights derived from fieldwork in the Gusau area by - C.K. Laurent, Problems Facing Fertilizer Distribution Program in the Six Northern States, CSNRD/NISER, Paper 27, 1969, pp. 74-76.

Table 3.6: Estimated output of seed cotton (in sacks)*

Estimated output (in sacks)	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Not producing	12	10.4	4	5.1	9	1.4	25	9.1
1 - 10	71	61.7	49	62.0	45	57.0	165	60.4
11 - 20	22	19.1	16	20.3	13	16.3	51	18.7
21 - 30	7	6.1	3	3.8	6	7.6	16	5.9
31 - 40	2	1.7	2	2.5	3	3.8	7	2.6
41 - 50	-	0.0	2	2.5	2	2.5	4	1.5
51 - 60	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	1.3	1	0.4
61 - 70	-	0.0	1	1.3	-	0.0	1	0.4
71 - 80	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
81 - 90	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
91 - 100	1	0.9	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	0.4
101 and over	-	0.0	2	2.5	-	0.0	2	0.7
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*NB: One sack of seed cotton is approximately equal to 50 kg.

From the above two tables therefore, we can see the importance of groundnuts and cotton in the context of peasant agriculture in the area. Eventhough the output for the majority (because of the limitations imposed by peasant agriculture) is small, we nevertheless have to realize that it is within the context of production of several other crops, which the farmer

grows mainly for his food. These other crops are sorghum, millet, cowpeas, some sweet potatoes, and several other minor crops. For this and other reasons, (which we shall not delve into here) production is more or less in form of a mixed, rather than sole crop.

THE MARKETS

In the whole of Kaura Namoda Local Government Area, there are 12 gazetted markets for cotton and 10 for groundnuts. Both Birnin Magaji and Kasuwan Daji are important cotton and groundnuts' markets, Kasuwan Daji with the maximum of 9 permanent grading sheds (stalls) and Birnin Magaji with 6 permanent grading sheds. Yankaba on the other hand has no market for either cotton or groundnuts because of its proximity to Kaura Namoda town, (only 3 miles).

In each buying season, the activity starts with the construction of markets which is the responsibility of the State government. The markets are built (since they are only operated seasonally) with the lowest costing building materials, which in this case is thatch. For those stations with permanent grading sheds as opposed to temporary grading sheds, some iron poles are erected permanently which are surrounded with thatch every new buying season. The cost of erecting a market depends on the

type of market, i.e., whether permanent or temporary, and the number of grading-sheds in it. In the 1976/77 and 1977/78 seasons, the costs for these markets in the Kaura Namoda area is given as follows:

Table 3.7: Costs of erecting produce markets*

Market	Structure**	Cost (₦)	
		1976/77	1977/78
Birnin Magaji	6 Permanent Grading sheds	280	430
Dogon Kade	9 " " "	440	500
Gulbin Bore	4 " " "	160	300
Kaura Namoda	7 " " "	340	440
Kagara Dauran	6 " " "	320	360
Kasuwan Daji	9 " " "	400	500
Moriki	2 Temporary Grading sheds	180	200
Modomawa	4 Permanent Grading sheds	240	260
Nasarawa Kaura	5 Permanent Grading sheds	280	300
Gidan Kayya	1 Temporary Grading shed	120	140
Zurmi (New)	2 Temporary Grading sheds	-	200
Nasarawa Godal (New)	2 " " "	-	200
Total		2,760	3,830

*Source: Produce Inspection Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Sokoto.

**The number of grading sheds determines the number of LBAs sub-agents who can operate in the market.

The determination of the creation of any new market is decided by the produce advisory committee of the Local Government Area where the market is to be situated. This committee is normally made up of rich and/or influential local people, such as the district and/or village heads, some LBAs in the area, with the Produce Inspector in-charge of that area as secretary. They decide that sufficient groundnuts or cotton has been produced in a certain area, in a season to warrant creation of a market, often arguing on the basis of the distances the farmers in the area have to travel to market their produce. The committee meets each season and their recommendations are then passed to the Produce Inspection Division of the Ministry of Agriculture, which has the final say.

Nevertheless, the fact that the whole area of Kaura Namoda Local Government Area has only 12 markets for cotton and 10 for groundnuts*, means that most of the producers who are far from the nearest market do not have adequate market information especially concerning prices and duration of the

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*In fact, the number of markets always fluctuates. This is because markets are established season by season. And if for any reason in a particular season, sufficient groundnuts or cotton, are not produced in the area a market is serving, then for that season, the market will not open there. So in fact, the number of markets is more or less determined by the extent of production in the area as a whole within a particular season.

marketing season. Furthermore, due to the distance which some farmers have to travel to market their crops under very difficult transportation problems, the costs and the efforts are prohibitive. A farmer has either to use a fleet of donkeys (if he has any) or hire donkey transportation if he has none. Those farmers who cannot do these, are forced to sell their produce to a class of middlemen locally referred to as Yanberanda, at a price lower than the one they could obtain from the LBAs at the gazetted market.

In most cotton markets, there are three sets of staff. Those employed by the government (the examiner and his staff); those employed by the LBA, as the representative of the Marketing Board, and those employed by the local or traditional administration of the area.

The Examiner and His Staff

In each market, the officer in-charge is a produce examiner (often with an assistant in bigger markets). He is in-charge of grading after the agents' purchase, and sees to the orderliness of the whole operation. He employs temporary staff often engaged only for the duration of the buying season (normally two months). These are the messenger and the cleaner who sees to the cleanliness of the market after every day's

operation, and may also perform any task assigned to him by the examiner.

The LBAs and their staff

Each LBA in a market has an agent who he employs on a commission basis. This agent has to have a licence to operate, from the Produce Inspection Division, which the LBA engaging him often secures. This agent in turn, at his own cost, employs labourers, who bag, sew, weigh to standard weight, and arrange all purchases for lorry evacuation, in temporary dumps. He also employs a night-watchman to guard his purchases.

The Staff of Local and/or Traditional Administration

This category of staff are provided by the local or traditional authorities where the market is situated. Mainly, they are the boys of the district or village heads (Yaran Sarki/dogari), and in larger markets, policemen. Their duty is to control entry into the market by the cotton sellers. If any fracas ensued, they have the power of arrest. Those arrested are taken to the district or village head for discipline and the solution of disagreements. Hence they are generally in-charge of the security of the market. The market is an enclosure which is divided into several sheds manned by the agents of each LBA operating in that market. The market has two gates,

one leading to the grading shed where the examiner has his office and often guarded by the security people. This is the entrance gate for the farmers who are bringing produce for sale. The other gate is the exit, where the farmers go out after selling or refusing to sell. After the grading shed, is a wide interior where the actual purchase takes place. To grasp this market structure, it may be worthwhile to present it in a diagram-form, to show what a typical cotton market looks like. (See Figure III below).

From the diagram, we can see that several LBAs can operate through agents in any one cotton market. The official provision is an agent per market per LBA, though certain LBAs use more than one, thereby going against the rules of the game. This is illustrated well, in the case of Birnin Magaji when I visited the market on 8th March 1977. The following purchase figures were given even before the market closed, indicating that the final purchase figures are above these.

FIGURE III

THE STRUCTURE OF A COTTON MARKET




Table 3.8: Purchases by LBAs in Birnin Magaji market as at 8th March 1977 (Cotton)

Licenced Buying Agent	Grade	No. of bags purchased
Alhaji Bello Haidara	Grade I	4,153
	Grade II	129
Birnin Magaji Trading Co.	Grade I	5,003
	Grade II	120
*Alhaji Umaru Dangaladima I	Grade I	20,923
	Grade II	415
*Alhaji Umaru Dangaladima II	Grade I	7,584
	Grade II	160
Kaura Co-ops	Grade I	2,025
	Grade II	31

*It is quite possible that this LBA has assumed the place of another LBA who hadn't enough capital to operate in this market during the 1976/77 buying season. Furthermore, it may not be out of place, to know that Birnin Magaji Trading Company is jointly owned by the village head of Birnin Magaji with another village head, the Dan Maliki of Gabaki; while, Alhaji Umaru Dangaladima is the junior brother of the village head. Kaura coops, on the other hand, is owned by the District Head, the Sarkin Kiyawa.

The Licenced Buying Agents and their staff

It is the network of the agents representing the LBAs in the various produce markets which is the nucleus of the grass-roots marketing organization. In the whole of Sokoto State, there are fifty-five cotton Licenced Buying Agents who operated during the 1977/78 buying season. Out of these twenty-four operated in the Kaura Namoda Local Government Area. This attests to the importance of this area as a major centre of

commercial production in the State. All the LBAs are prominent businessmen and some of them have connections with the local and traditional administrations.

It is necessary for the purpose of our exposition, to throw some light on the nature and character of this network, and thus the marketing scene as a whole. The Licenced Buying Agents are allocated a trading shed, with a limitation of one shed per LBA, per market (though as we have observed above, some LBAs operate more than one shed). The allocation of sheds to the LBAs depends on the size of the market, calculated on the basis of the number of grading sheds it has. The number of markets in which a particular LBA operates depends on his financial capacity, as well as his political standing in the area.

In order to create a semblance of competition among the agents of the LBAs, at each market several LBAs are required to operate simultaneously. But as we shall see later, this in fact doesn't give the farmers any form of leverage, in that the agents simply collude and introduce some form of oligopsony, i.e., a situation where a group of buyers dominate the market for a particular commodity or a set of commodities.

The network of agents representing particular LBAs in the cotton market in Kaura Namoda Local Government Area is presented in the following table:

Table 3.9: Licenced Buying Agent network in cotton markets, Kaura Namoda Local Government, 1977/78

Market	No. of sheds	LBA Representation (in LBA code name)*
B. Magaji	6	Dangaladima, B. Haidara, Magayaki, BMCT Kaura Co-ops, Iyya.
D. Kade	9	D/Daudu, Dangaladima, B. Haidara, D/Agwai Almajir, Yachunku.
G. Kayya	2	Almajir, Yachunku.
G. Bore	4	KNTC, Sambare, Nasara, Dangaladima.
K. Daji	9	Nasara, Dangaladima, KNTC, B. Haidara, Sambare, A. Lalo, BMTC, N. Ango, A. Mainasara.
K. Dauran	9	GTCC, KNTC, Dangaladima, BMTC, Kaura Co-ops.
K. Namoda	9	KGTC, KNTC, B. Haidara, Kaura Co-ops, D/Agwai, Danyadodo, Nasara, Magayaki, Iyya.
Modomawa	5	Dangaladima, Sambare, B. Haidara, Kaura Co-ops., Z. Nasarawa.
Moriki	3	Danyadodo, Harika, B. Haidara.
Nasarawa	5**	Dangaladima, Kaura Co-ops, Z. Nasarawa.
Zurmi	2**	- - - -
Nasarawa (G)	2**	Z. Nasarawa.
Total	65	60 Agents

**Unfilled vacancies. *Full business names as follows:

Code Name	Full business name
DANGALADIMA	Alhaji Umaru Dangaladima
A. HAIDARA	Alhaji Bello Haidara
MAGAYAKI	Alhaji Magayaki & Sons
BMTC	Birnin Magaji Trading Company
KAURA CO-OPS	Kaura Namoda CCMU Ltd.
IYYA	Alhaji Iyya & Sons
D/DAUDU	Alhaji Mamman Dan Daudu
KNTC	Kaura Namoda Trading Company
D/AGWAI	Alhaji Saidu Dan Agwai
ALMAJIR	Alhaji Mamman Almajir
G.U.C.	Gusau United Company
AMANI	Alhaji Ibrahim Amani
ALFIJIR	Alfijir Trading Company
YACHUNKU	Alhaji Ibrahim Yachunku & Sons
SAMBARE	Sambare Trading Company
NASARA	Kaura Nasara Trading Company
A. LALO	Alhaji Idris Lalo
N. ANGO	Alhaji Namodi Ango
A. MAINASARA	Alhaji Muhammadu Mainasara
KGTC	Kaura General Trading Company
DANYADODO	Alhaji Mamman Danyadodo
Z. NASARAWA	Alhaji Zubairu Namailayi K/Namoda
HARIKA	Harika Enterprises

Source: Produce Inspection Divison, Ministry of Agriculture, Sokoto.

From the table, we can see that in the Kaura Namoda Local Government Area, there are 24 LBAs operating in twelve markets, employing sixty agents in that process. A glance through the table shows that some LBAs operate in more than 6 out of the twelve markets and thus have wider agent distribution in this area. Moreso, it is worth realizing that almost all of these LBAs operate in markets situated in other Local Government Areas of the State, especially Gusau, Isa and Talata Mafara Local Governments.

The amount of produce an LBA purchases in each market, depends on the amount of produce brought to the market, the amount of money supplied by the LBA to his agent, and the LBA's local standing among the sellers. The latter is very significant for example when we see the case of a single LBA operating in his home village market. Table 3.8 shows that Alhaji Umaru Dangaladima by far outstripped all the rest of the LBAs in terms of purchases, not only because he operated two buying agencies but also because he is a native of Birnin Magaji, a brother to the village head (hence the title Dan Galadima), and also rumoured to be one of the richest individuals in the whole of Kaura Namoda area (thereby the wideness of the scope of his operations).

It may also be relevant to point out here that these LBAs are in most cases also transporters in their own rights (especially bulk transportation). They are also engaged in real estate and other commercial enterprises. Not much of their capital is re-invested from where it originally came, that is, agriculture.

On the whole, this organization of produce trade represents a form of monopolistic oligopsony where 24 buyers operating through sixty agents are able to control the purchase of Marketing Board crops in a whole Local Government Area.

This marketing arrangement is monopolistic in that the LBAs are the sole licenced representatives of the Marketing Boards, with the powers of the Government supporting their operations. The restrictions imposed by the Government on the number of accredited LBAs in a market, also makes their operations oligopsonistic. This is because they make prior arrangements to present the farmers with the same price, and between them control the purchase of the commodity produced by the farmers in a given area.

On the surface, it appears that the LBAs do not force the farmers to sell their produce to them. However, there are other subtle means of assuring that the farmer sells. These include the fact that, normally in a buying season, road-blocks are set up along the motorable roads. These are manned by the staff of the Produce Inspection Division, dressed in paramilitary uniforms, and often the police force. Every passing lorry is inspected for produce, and its destination ascertained. If it is found to be suspect, the lorry and its occupants are detained for 'further questioning'. This surveillance is officially explained and justified by the authorities, as a means of trying to prevent the smuggling of produce to neighbouring countries. (In this case Niger Republic, where according to some farmers, the prices are higher). Indeed,

some farmers make attempts to avoid the LBA markets, because the prices offered to them by the LBAs are lower than the gazetted prices set up by the government; and more often than not, even the governments' prices are lower than could be obtained by the farmer in a market not controlled by the LBAs.

The isolation of the farmers at the level of marketing (as with production) makes them an easy prey of the LBAs and their agents. The marketing period is of short duration, normally three to four months. An individual farmer, in very serious need for money has to sell to obtain the money, while if he is in a marketing cooperative, his needs for immediate disposal of his products may be temporarily cushioned to allow the members of the cooperative collectively negotiate for a better price. Indeed the lack of unity among the producers, even at the level of marketing of their products, makes collective action to improve their lot, totally impossible. As individual sellers, with no collective voice to influence Marketing Boards' and Governments' decisions; with no collective bargaining power; they are individually swindled, and like potatoes in a sack exploited as a group, by the LBAs and their agents, under the protection of the Government.

The relationship between the LBAs and their agents often takes the form of patron-client relationship. It is the LBA

who recruits his agents. These agents, more often than not, do not possess any capital independent of the LBA. They are employed on commission basis per tonne of produce they purchase. The number of markets in which an LBA operates determines the number of agents he employs. The commission paid to the agents by the LBAs is compensated in the LBAs Block Buying Allowance. Their relationship as such is more often on a personal level. It is the duty of the LBA to licence all his agents.

At the beginning of every buying season, the LBA advances a sum of money to his agents for the purchase of a specified quantity of produce. The agent takes the money to the market allocated to him for that season. He then purchases produce worth that amount. After the produce examiner in the market agrees that actually the produce purchased is worth the amount, the agent goes back to the LBA for further advances. The LBA then provides transport for the evacuation of the produce already purchased.

However, it happens sometimes, that the LBA runs short of money (often blamed on the banks for not making overdrafts in time for the buying season), the agent then resorts to credit purchases from the farmers. Some agents even fail to pay the farmers after the LBA has already paid the money and

evacuated his produce. This resolves itself in lengthy litigations between the farmers and the agents. In such cases it is the farmers who suffer, in that they do not have the resources to support lengthy court cases.

Certain agents even dupe their masters by claiming to have purchased produce to a quantity that they never did. This also resolves itself in lengthy court cases. The employment of an agent by the LBA, as we have noted above is not a business expense on the part of the LBA. In employing an agent, the normal understanding is that, he uses such avenues to create, (often through fraudulent means) some kind of private wealth for himself. Tales abound of wealthy-men and even many of the LBAs, who initially started-off as agents. But it appears to be the knowledge of many farmers in the villages surveyed, that the commission paid to an agent by the LBA, cannot by itself create substantial wealth for him. As such, to obtain private capital, the agents normally indulge in some fraudulent practices, such as underweighing through bribing weighing clerks, tampering with scales, the use of old scales which record lower weights, etc.

Apart from these irregularities and others too many to mention, the marketing system lends itself to many abuses, especially in the relationship between the agents and the farmers.

The Agents and the Farmers

It is already clear from the above discussion that it is the agents who have direct purchase-payment relationship with the farmers. Apart from credit purchases by the agents from the farmers, some agents at the same time operate as money-lenders. This happens especially when the agent is a resident of the local area. The farmers may come to him for loans, often in the lean seasons of the year, such as late dry season and early wet season. They may need this loan to re-start production or for other unexpected social obligations. The farmers take the loan on promise to pay with produce or with money at harvest time.

To protect themselves from charges of usury, the lenders always prefer not to advance the loan in cash. They may give the person taking the loan a piece of cloth, a sack of salt or some other commodity which he has to sell to obtain the money he needs. He sells these at a very low price since his need for cash is immediate. At harvest time, the lender receives

payment in cash; or the produce of the debtor is estimated and the lender takes as much as he is owed. It is important to note that the debtor takes these goods at about twice their market value. This kind of debt agreement is not only limited to the agents of LBAs, but is found among other money lenders in the rural areas.

If the farmer fails to pay, he stands the risk of having his whole produce after sowing, sometimes even including his food crops, being pledged to the money lender. This is decided in the local area courts where an estimate of the produce on all the debtor's farms is made. This is put against the amount of money he owed. If there is any balance for him, he receives it in cash.

From then on, the produce of all his farms, or certain number of his farms, are the property of the lender. Sometimes farmlands themselves become alienated in this process.

But there are times when the Government becomes aware of these irregularities. This happens especially when there is an appeal against the judgement of the lower court. It condemns them, but prefers to see them as isolated happenings, which are better treated in the court. It consoles itself in the belief that the marketing system is perfect, and it is only the operations of unscrupulous individuals that introduce complications into it.

However, we contend that the central problem is that the farmers are not aware or they are prevented by forces beyond their individual control, from perceiving the community of interests that binds them together. It is easier to cheat and exploit a divided community than a united one.

The overall effect of the marketing arrangement results in the disturbance of the production cycle. The unfair terms of trade within which the individual farmer operates progressively prevents him from not only expanding his production, but also from producing on the scale he used to before. Moreso, since farmers are individually aware that they are cheated in the marketing process, and that the weight of the government is behind the system, they individually choose to take themselves out of the system by refusing to grow or depend on the Marketing Board crops on a large scale. Moreover, a lot of the farmers learnt their lesson during the 1973/74 drought. Those farmers who devoted their activities to the production of the Marketing Boards' crops suffered. The crops generally failed, and the small amount they could gather from their farms wasn't enough to see them through the year. They woke-up to find themselves with no food and deeply in debt. So next time, those of them who could get a chance to start again, concentrated on food production.

These are among several other reasons why the production of Marketing Boards' crops has dramatically dropped almost everywhere. To get an idea of the progressive short-fall in production, it may be useful to consult purchasing figures over the years for each gazetted market in Kaura Namoda area, as reported by the Produce Inspection Division of the Sokoto State Ministry of Agriculture.

LBA Purchases of Cotton and Groundnuts

Purchases of cotton and groundnuts in the area of Kaura Namoda have been fluctuating over the years. But the general trend indicates the fact that production has actually dropped dramatically for both cotton and groundnuts. **Table** 4.0 shows the purchase figures for cotton from 1970/71 season to 1977/78 season.

Before presenting the figures for groundnuts it is worth noting that the markets for groundnuts are different from those for cotton. Though the basic decision making process in creating the markets are the same, the two commodities have different advisory committees which advice on market creation. Nevertheless, there is much overlapping of markets in the area.

The purchase figures for groundnuts according to markets are as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.0: Cotton purchases in Kaura Namoda cotton markets (1970/71 - 1977/78)

COTTON MARKET	TONNAGES							
	1970/71	1971/72	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78
B. Magaji	743	334	1,034	453	1,165	1,124	1,184	797
D. Kade	775	542	1,063	356	1,066	896	1,081	579
G. Baure	297	89	89	-	251	569	339	465
G. Kayya	-	-	-	-	-	-	133	116
K. Namoda	759	421	1,345	308	1,034	1,783	1,783	1,338
K. Daji	637	393	810	220	1,322	1,007	1,679	643
K. Dauran	579	305	363	73	791	758	128	106
Moriki	119	4	75	-	124	392	394	95
Modomawa	411	171	388	101	473	342	450	464
Nasarawa (KN)	706	572	1,117	329	793	682	656	469
Nasarawa (G)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	221
Zurmi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	87
Total	5,026	2,831	6,285	1,840	7,019	7,553	7,827	5,380

Source: Produce Inspection Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Sokoto

Table 4.1: Groundnuts purchases in Kaura Namoda groundnuts markets (1970/71 - 1977/78)

GROUNDNUTS MARKETS	TONNAGES							
	1970/71	1971/72	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78*
B. Magaji	2,750	3,426	3,719	1,520	1,623	-	596	-
G. Baure	331	180	20	-	64	-	-	-
K. Namoda	10,212	8,455	1,185	1,335	4,739	-	1,948	-
K. Dauran	-	478	1,328	-	324	573	-	-
K. Lamba	-	-	-	598	995	-	-	-
Moriki	964	1,102	1,818	114	440	-	-	-
Modomawa	-	-	-	277	545	-	37	-
Nasarawa (KN)	-	-	-	377	355	-	-	-
K. Daji	-	-	-	255	637	-	-	-
Zurmi	1,090	1,414	1,358	325	355	-	-	-
Total	15,347	15,055	10,098	4,801	10,077	573	2,635	41

Source: Produce Inspection Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Sokoto.

*1977/78 purchases not reported according to stations because they are too small, for only 41 tons were purchased in the whole State this season. The dash between figures indicates that for that year no produce was purchased in the station.

From the above table we can see that groundnut production is really haphazard. It depends highly on the will and the ability of the farmer to produce. In fact, a close source from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Produce Inspection Division, indicates that the government is really getting disillusioned with the future of groundnuts production. For example, it is revealed that the Kaura Namoda producing area which in the 1974/75 buying season was responsible for about 11,000 tons dropped remarkably to only 2,635 tons in the 1976/77 season. Gusau area's production dropped from 13,449 tons in the 1974/75 season to only 3,377 tons in 1976/77 season. Furthermore it is really alarming that in the last season, 1977/78, the whole State produced only 41 tons of groundnuts compared with 28,393 tons in the 1974/75 season. This is a real catastrophe for the Marketing Boards, the State and the LGAs. This, furthermore shows the reason why the organization of cotton marketing is given more prominance over that of groundnuts.

The reasons for the shortfall and haphazardness of the production and purchasing of both groundnuts and cotton are many. But suffice it to say that the principal reason is to be found in the marketing system itself. It is a case where the peasants realize that the employment of their means of

production for the purpose of producing crops from whose returns they do not benefit is self-defeating. Thus a lot of them abandoned their cotton or groundnut fields, and some refuse to grow these crops altogether.

The conversion of substantial number of farmlands for the production of groundnuts and cotton has over the years subjected a lot of the peasantry to hardships concerning their food, especially in the dry and early wet seasons, when food stocks are very low. Their returns from the sale of groundnuts and cotton on the other hand, have been spent. This puts most of them in the clutches of the money-lenders. This realization forced a lot of the peasantry to turn their attention more and more towards producing their own food since the returns from groundnuts and cotton do not compensate for this. Our survey in fact indicated that the peasants now overwhelmingly depend on their food crops. Table 4.2 illustrates this.

This table indicates a classic realization by the farmers of the hazards of commercial production by isolated peasants' small scale production, in the hands of capitalist merchant operations.

Table 4.2: Crops farmers are now most dependent upon

Crops	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Food crops only	89	77.4	65	82.5	67	84.8	221	80.9
Board's product only	5	4.3	4	5.1	2	2.5	11	4.0
Both	18	15.7	9	11.4	9	11.4	36	13.2
Unknown	3	2.6	1	1.3	1	1.3	5	1.8
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

But to complete this section, it is important for us to have a general idea of the destination of the products once they leave the hands of the producers.

The Ginneries and the Oil Mill

There are two cotton ginneries in Sokoto State. One is situated in Gusau and one in Mainchi 52.8 kilometers away from Gusau on the Gusau-Sokoto road. For reasons of proximity, the cotton from Kaura Namoda area is ginned at the Gusau Ginnery. Both of these ginneries (like most others in the northern States) are owned by the Cotton and Agricultural Products Company (CAPC) formerly BCGA. It is a subsidiary of the Bowater Group of Companies. These ginneries operate on commission basis with the Nigerian Cotton Board, which is the sole supplier of cotton and the sole purchaser of the lint.

Once the LBAs buy the seed cotton from the farmers they take it to the pyramid sites of the ginneries where the marketing board takes over control. Each of the ginneries have a capacity of about 2,000 bales a week. Therefore, in an average 24-weeks ginning season, each of them can produce 48,000 bales of cotton lint from 24,000 tonnes of seed cotton.[25] As such both the two ginneries have a joint capacity of ginning approximately 48,000 tonnes of seed cotton with an output of 96,000 bales of lint. But in the 1977/78 season, the total cotton purchased in the State was 33,674 tons.[26] This figure is 14,326 tonnes short of the capacity of the two ginneries.

After the ginning operations, the Marketing Board sells the lint to the textile firms.

Groundnuts on the other hand is decorticated by the farmers before sale. After the sales some of it is transported at the rail terminal at Kaura Namoda and some is stored in Dumps at Gusau. There is an oil mill in Gusau which was established in 1973 by Messrs. Raccah of Kano with the participation of the State Government and some individuals. Its products are groundnuts and cotton seed oil and by-products of meal and cake for animal feeds. The final capital costs of the mills is in the region of ₦5 million. It employed

300 people by 1975, including ten expatriates. The plant has a capacity of processing 100,000 tons of groundnuts annually. It was planned to process groundnuts 75 percent capacity and cotton-seed 25 percent capacity.[27]

Though groundnut processing is more profitable to the mill, due to the serious shortfall of groundnuts production in the area, cotton-seed processing used up much of the capacity of the mill, thereby depleting the seeds of cotton meant for the next season's sowing.

The mill operates at a very serious under capacity since the production of groundnuts for the whole State in 1973/74 was only 8,680 tonnes, 1974/75 - 28,393 tonnes, 1975/76, only 130 tonnes, 1976/77, 6,419 tonnes and 1977/78 only 41 tonnes. This really is a very serious situation which nearly forced the mill to close. Now in fact, the mill doesn't operate for most of the year.

This situation is aggravated by the fact that the mill purchases its groundnuts from the Groundnuts Board which often gives priority to the Nigerian Produce Marketing Company whose main aim is to maintain export levels. This then is the overall situation and the future, to say the least, is bleak.

This brings us to the next section of this chapter which is concerned with the organization of marketing of staple food crops.

SECTION TWO

THE ORGANIZATION OF TRADE IN STAPLE FOOD CROPS

Prior to the colonial transformation, and expansion of cotton and groundnuts production for export, food crop production was the objective of the agricultural system. Even after this transformation and expansion, food crop production remained an inseparable part of agricultural production. This is so, for as we noted earlier in this chapter, colonial strategy was not bent on destroying food production and imposing export production. It was a double-edged sword whereby commercial export production was superimposed on the general food production character of pre-colonial agriculture. This realization is fundamental, in that food production served as a cushion on which export production rested. It provided the farmer with a means of reproducing his labour power after he has been expropriated at the level of export production.

Therefore, it is important to note that the colonial authorities were never interested in food crop production for its own sake. Food crops were not needed for export, because

they were not needed by metropolitan firms. The intention was to make food production an appendage of export production. In other wards to make the farmer produce for metropolitan needs and at the sametime be able to cater for his own food requirements.

Thus historically, the organization of food crop marketing, has never come under the government sponsored marketing system for export crops until the 1977/78 season when the National Grains Board was created. Food crop marketing has always come under what is called the 'traditional' marketing system. But this is not to say that attempts were not made by foreign firms to introduce various food crops into their inventory of goods for internal trade.

Probably, the first attempt in this direction, was made by the United African Company in late 1930, when they ventured into trading millet, onions, garri, etc., with the objective of relieving scarcity in certain areas by transfer from areas of surplus, thereby securing a "... reasonable margin of profit for our trouble." The revelation of this activity alarmed the colonial government. This led to an exchange of furious words between the UAC Headquarters in Britain and Nigeria's colonial authorities. In the end the government

prevailed. In fact the government was really jittery for the reasons cited above, of the relationship between food and export production in terms of colonial policy.[28]

Perhaps one of the most important stimuli to the expansion of food crop marketing under 'traditional' organization was the expansion of cities as commercial and administrative centres. This provided a significant population in the urban areas who were not agricultural producers and therefore needed to purchase food for their own consumption. Furthermore, the fact that in areas where export production was not well developed (such as in Western Sokoto State), the only means which people have for obtaining cash was through food crop sales.

Thus we can see that initially the central objective of food crop production and marketing was to provide food for the increasing urban-based population, provide food and cash in areas where export production didn't develop, and where it did, to serve as a cushion on which commercial production rested.

After this outline on the role of food crops in the articulation process, it is important to have a general idea of the crops we consider as food crops and their importance in the food culture of the population.

The Food Crops

The main food crops in Kaura Namoda area are guineacorn (sorghum vulgare) and millet (pennisetum typhoideum). They are supported by an array of other crops such as rice, maize, cowpeas, sweet potatoes, cassava, etc. In our survey villages 97.4 percent produce sorghum, and 97.8 percent produce millet. 88.7 produce cowpeas. Conversely, rice and maize are not as important with only 19.1 percent producing rice mainly in river valleys, and 16.5 producing maize. As such in this description we shall limit ourselves only to sorghum and millet which provide about 90 percent of the total food consumed in the area. For the whole of the Northern States, it is said that these two crops together make up a minimum of 70 percent of total calorie intake of the population.[29]

Although the production of Marketing Board crops is very important, the incidence of food crop sales is both widespread and significant. One finds two categories of people who are forced by one necessity or other, to sell the crops they have grown for their own food. Those who in a particular year haven't produced either cotton or groundnuts, and those who did but have since spent the proceeds. This often makes the sale of food crops virtually necessary for a substantial number of the farmers. In so far as our survey villages are concerned, the following table speaks for itself.

Table 4.3: On whether crops grown mainly for food are sold

Response	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	42	36.5	24	30.4	50	63.3	116	42.5
No	71	61.7	51	64.6	29	36.7	151	55.3
Unknown	2	1.7	4	5.1	-	0.0	6	2.2
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

On the whole, 42.5 percent sell their food crops. It may be useful to know how the timing of sales of crops is related to the general time of the need for cash. The table below, provides us with this at a glance.

Table 4.4: Time of the year food crops are sold

Time of the year	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Harvest time	2	4.7	4	16.7	1	2.0	7	6.0
Early dry season	10	24.0	8	33.3	12	24.0	30	25.9
Late dry season	9	21.4	4	16.7	12	24.0	25	21.6
Early wet season	8	19.0	4	16.7	8	16.0	20	17.2
Late wet season	4	9.5	1	4.1	4	8.0	9	7.7
Whenever the need arises	9	21.4	3	12.5	13	26.0	25	21.6
Total	42	100.0	24	100.0	50	100.0	116	100.0

It is interesting to note that very few farmers sell their food crops at harvest time and late wet season, which often go together. This may be because at that time, the prices of these crops are generally low as a result of abundance, and also because a lot of them have other crops, such as cotton or groundnuts to sell. But a significant number of farmers indicate that they sell at any time provided that a need arises which forces them to have no alternative but to sell these crops.

However, according to the above table, the most significant time during which most of the food crop sales occur, is within the dry season and early wet season. Over 60 percent of those who sell their food crops, do so within this time. This may be because by this time most of the groundnuts and cotton would have been sold, and the proceeds from their sale would have been spent. So the farmer either sells his livestock or poultry (if he has any), or sells his food crops. For apart from selling his labour power as an agricultural, or other kind of labourer, this is the only avenue open to him for obtaining cash. Moreso, this time coincides with the period when rural poverty is at its highest.

Food crops are sold either threshed, i.e., in the form of grain, or unthreshed, in the form of dami (bundle). But the

most common form of sale is in grain. The farmer finds a container or bag and puts grain commensurate to his cash needs and takes it to the nearest market, or to the nearest person who is in a position to buy, normally a local grain trader.

The Markets

The organization for marketing food crops is different from that for Marketing Boards' crops, eventhough, the participants overlap. While the latter is concentrated in gazetted Buying Stations, the former is spread over the whole length and breadth of the area. The marketing system hence involves a large number of participants and markets. The participants are graduated in terms of their role in the marketing process, while the markets are arranged in terms of their location, the regularity of their meetings, their accessibility and the extent of their attendance.

The marketing organization is very complex. It requires that the small quantities sold by the farmers, in whatever manner, and any where, be assembled from the various local markets to more central ones, for bulk transportation to the cities. We can see therefore that the quantities of grain differs with the size and location of a market.

Wherever you find a cluster of settlements, they normally have their own market which meets twice weekly, weekly or

fortnightly as the case may be. These markets attract traders who come to sell and buy. Therefore the marketing of food crops takes place in several markets, of various sizes, in different locations, meeting on specific days of the week.

To make our task easier, we shall classify markets according to four main criteria. These are, location, accessibility, regularity and attendance. By location, we mean the position of the market within a particular area. By accessibility, we mean whether it is located in a place which is easy to reach by modern means of transportation, particularly lorries and cars. By regularity we mean the number of days they meet in a week or in a fortnight. By attendance, we mean the average population in a market on a particular market day. With this in mind we may classify markets in the Kaura Namoda Area into three categories[30] viz:

The Isolated Rural Market

This is a market serving a small cluster of rural settlements. It meets once fortnightly. It is normally a small market. The only means of transportation are donkeys and bicycles. There is no access road. The attendance is normally small. It attracts people from a spatially limited area, ranging from

few surrounding hamlets to a radius of a few kilometres. Its inaccessibility thus affects the extent of its attendance, and the quantity and variety of goods brought to market.

The Accessible Rural Market

This market serves a wider community than the isolated market. It meets once a week. It is a larger market and attracts buyers and sellers from longer distances due to the availability of lorry transportation. It is normally located in a relatively large village, often the seat of a village head. As such it serves a wider community. Birnin Magaji and Kasuwan Daji are such markets. Birnin Magaji market meets every Wednesday and Kasuwan Daji every Saturday. However, Kasuwan Daji being on the main Guwau-Jibiya road has a larger attendance due to the fact that it is on a tarred road while Birnin Magaji is on a dirt road about ten miles off the main road. Both these markets serve the whole village areas. The village heads reside there. They attract people from far and wide.

The Regional Market

This is a very large market. It is normally situated at the district level to serve a whole district. It normally meets twice weekly. It is accessible to lorry and car transport and thus attracts people from far away places. Kaura Namoda market is an example of this type. It meets on Fridays

and Mondays. It is on the main Gusau-Jibiya road, and is served by a railway terminal. It is also situated at the headquarters of the Local Government Area. Thus it is a very important market in that it serves a whole production region. The tarred road and the railway terminal provide easy transportation, making bulk purchases possible. It is from this type of market that grain and other goods purchased in bulk find their ways to non-regional markets, i.e., markets situated outside the orbit of the Kaura Namoda production region. These markets may be situated in any of the Nigerian cities.

The usefulness of this market classification is that it allows us to see the nature of commodity flows between rural and urban areas. In other words, these markets are institutions which serve as channels of information and exchange. They provide the main links in the chain of rural-urban exchange relationships. It is by and large through the hierarchical graduation of these markets, that commodities from the urban areas reach the rural areas, and vice-versa.

However, the process of exchange between rural and urban areas, is facilitated, within and between markets, through the activities of various types of intermediaries. These

intermediaries are individual traders and businessmen through whose hands commodities are exchanged. They are to be found in every market and on every market day. They may also be graduated in terms of the type of markets within which they conduct their business operations, and the scope of those operations. Needless to say, these intermediaries are many, and are proliferated everywhere. Their various activities, as a group, result in the siphoning off of a significant portion of the economic surplus. But individually the profits they make from trade depends to a large extent on the volume and scope of their operations.

In the type of market we call the isolated rural market, we find normally three kinds of intermediaries engaged in grain trade or transportation business. These are, the local assembler, the local commission agent or retailer and the local transporter.

The Local Assembler

The local assembler is a trader who lives in the rural area and engages in the buying and selling of grain. He may own a donkey which he uses in conveying the grain he purchases from the farmers to the market. Trading is only a part-time activity for him. And apart from grain trade, he may also

engage in trading in other goods such as kolanuts, sugar, salt, soap, etc. The scope of his operations is limited to buying in the villages and small rural markets. As a rule, his purchases are in small quantities. He provides a link between isolated areas, and also brings grain out of every nook and corner of the isolated villages.

The Local Commission Agent

The local commision agent is normally a resident of the local area who rents a market stall and comes to the market on market days to measure and sell grain. He does not take title to the grain but merely brings buyers and sellers together. He measures the grain, collects the money and turns it over to the person who has brought the grain for sale. He receives commission in-kind or in cash. He sells both to the consumers and to the local assemblers. His business is facilitated by the use of containers (normally baskets) and measures. This intermediary is locally referred to as the ma'uni (plural ma'auna). He is referred to as such because he uses certain standard containers as measures. These are normally tiya and mudu.[31]

The Local Transporter

In the isolated market, there is also the local transporter. He lives in the local area and uses donkeys to transport grain to the market for farmers and for the local assemblers. He may own two or more donkeys. Transportation is only a part-time occupation. His scope of operation is limited to markets within a very small geographical area. He may also be a local assembler in his own rights.

In the rural accessible markets, we have three intermediaries. These differ from those in the isolated rural markets by the scope of their operations, the capital they control, and the larger market within which they operate. These intermediaries are; the rural assemblers, the commission agents, and the lorry transporters.

The Rural Assembler

The rural assembler is an individual residing in either rural or urban areas and who moves around rural areas purchasing grain from village commission agents, the local assemblers and occasionally from the farmers directly. His activities are limited to accessible markets because he purchases in bulk and as such needs lorry transportation. He may convey the grain to the cities or to the regional market where he sells it in bulk, or in smaller quantities, as the case may be. He is

distinguished from the local assembler by the wider geographical area he covers, as well as the size of his operations. He purchases only in sack quantities.

In Birnin Magaji, one of our accessible markets, we talked to ten buyers of grain. Among them four belong to this particular category. They indicated that they buy grain in bulk for later sale. Their destination after grain purchases was to Kaura Namoda and other larger cities, such as Kano, Zaria, Gusau and even Sokoto. They all hire lorries to convey their grain to such destinations.

The Rural Commission Agents

The commission agents in the accessible markets perform the same roles as those in isolated markets. The main difference is that being situated in a larger market, they operate on a larger scale. In Birnin Magaji, we talked to ten people in this category. Three females and seven men. All but two come from Birnin Magaji village. The two who are not residing in the village are from Kagara Dauran, a village about ten miles from Birnin Magaji. Two of these people said they cater only for small buyers, that is, those from Birnin Magaji and environs, who come to buy grain, normally for direct consumption. One caters for bulk buyers only, and the rest sell to both small and bulk buyers. Their length of experience in this activity ranges

from four to twenty years. Commission is received from both buyers and sellers, and can be either in-kind or in cash. In return, they pay about 40 kobo as market fees. They don't limit their activities to Birnin Magaji only. The markets they attend range from two to four. The money they make from this activity per market day, ranges from ₦5-₦100 (₦100 was mentioned only by one individual who incidentally is the one who deals exclusively with bulk buyers). Their average take per market day is about ₦36.20k.

The Lorry Transporter

He is an individual who conveys the purchases of the rural assemblers by lorry from accessible to regional or urban markets. He is engaged in different types of haulage business, of which grain haulage is only a part. In fact, he conveys people and other traders with their wares to and from the market. If he conveys grain, he receives a fee per sack calculated according to the distance of the destination of the grain from the market. Some of them are drivers or managers of the lorries, and are as such only the employees of the owner of the vehicle. Some of them hire the lorry from the owners for their purposes. Those who hire the lorries are often rural assemblers, who purchase grain in bulk and at the same time carry other traders and people to various destinations.

In the regional market, i.e., Kaura Namoda, we find the same types of intermediaries. But in this market they are more prosperous. Their scale of operations is higher. Here you find the wholesalers who rent stalls in the market and handle only bulks, usually in sacks. They buy grain from the rural assemblers and often directly from retailers in the market. They may also act as commission agents for the rural assemblers who buy grain from accessible rural markets. These people are engaged in large scale operations and often sell to urban assemblers if they are not urban assemblers in their own right. Urban assemblers are the people who buy and convey grain from the regional markets to the cities. Their operations are very wide and they need a lot of capital. They normally take grain to far away places, such as Enugu, Lagos, Kaduna, etc. These people are very rich and many of them own lorries. Thus we can see that the regional market is a collection centre for produce from the rural areas. We can also see that, the marketing chain as a whole is concerned with the transfer of grain from the producer to the urban markets. We may hence observe that grain is bought in small quantities by various intermediaries, then it is bulked at the regional markets. The bulks from the regional markets are then taken to the urban markets, where they are broken and sold to the final consumers, again in small quantities.[32]

From the brief description above, we can see that apart from the complexity of the marketing system, the sheer number of the intermediaries within it means that lucrative profits are made in the process. This also affects price, hence consumption circulation.

In a survey sponsored by the former North Western State Government, the consultants found that a large number of traders owning or renting lorries, engaged in the buying and selling of food crops. They further found that there may be three or four changes of ownership before the products reach the hands of the consumers. The scale of operations of these traders varies as much as the commodities they handle. And "... frequently, they offer credit facilities, and small farmers in the periods of chronic cash shortages, are forced to mortgage their crops prior to harvest."[33] This we can see is quite similar to the case of LBAs' loans to farmers.

Nevertheless, in the process of food crop marketing, the profits made by these marketing intermediaries are really high. When one considers the sheer number of the people engaged in this activity, we may see that these profits are really staggering. In the case of the Marketing Board crops, the

beneficiaries are relatively few, though their profits are really very high. In food crop trade on the other hand, the number of the intermediaries makes the profits relatively smaller but aggregatively very high indeed. For example, the report we have just cited further found that, "... the price of most food crops at the beginning of the wet season, when food-stocks are low, is approximately double the price just after harvest when food-stocks are high. However, the analysis revealed that high prices do not in general, get back to the producer who receives a low post-harvest price. Therefore the returns to labour received by producers are low and in most cases fail to reach even the pre-Udoji minimum wage levels. These low prices received by farmers are among the factors that do not motivate them to sufficiently increase production."[34]

The fact that the farmers do not get the actual price of their products, means that the difference is appropriated by these marketing intermediaries. The problem of the number of these intermediaries also shows that, on the average what they make is relatively small. Most of them cannot invest any substantial amount in the economy. Thus a large proportion of capital is divided up among innumerable merchants and traders and cannot be harnessed for agricultural and social development.

To make their profits, these intermediaries resort to hoarding agricultural commodities until the price is right, i.e., until their uncoordinated hunkering for profits, forces prices of food products to rise. But some people may justify these profits by asserting that these intermediaries are performing 'marketing services', especially in the area of storage, for which they must be rewarded for their 'trouble'. But as far as storage is concerned, most of these intermediaries do not have fool-proof storage facilities. This results in wastage of food products in unkept stores and market stalls, which often leads to providing rotten and unhygienic food for the population. Moreover, we do not know the line where storage as a marketing service stops, and hoarding starts. All we know is that this marketing system is efficient in making profits for a large array of middlemen, and inefficient in bringing consumable goods at a fair price, to both the consumers and the producers.

One serious result of the operation of the marketing system of food crops, is that, it leads to the depletion of the food-stocks of the farmers. After a lot of the food crops are bought from the producers, they are kept by individual wholesalers, traders, etc., and are not sold until the time when the stocks are low and the prices are high. During these times even the producers themselves have finished what stocks they have left, and thus are brought back to the market again, but this time as buyers.

In fact, we asked the farmers in our survey villages, whether they buy grain for food at any one time of the year. Their response is as follows:

Table 4.5: Purchase of grain for consumption

Birnin Magaji (N = 115)	Yes	71	-	61.7%
	No	41	-	35.7%
	Unknown	3	-	2.6%
	Total	115	-	100.0%
Kasuwan Daji (N = 79)	Yes	50	-	63.3%
	No	28	-	35.4%
	Unknown	1	-	1.3%
	Total	79	-	100.0%
Yankaba (N = 79)	Yes	36	-	45.6%
	No	42	-	53.2%
	Unknown	1	-	1.3%
	Total	79	-	100.0%
All Villages (N = 273)	Yes	157	-	57.5%
	No	111	-	40.7%
	Unknown	5	-	1.8%
	Total	273	-	100.0%

The fact that a significant proportion of the farmers at one time of the year are forced to buy food to feed themselves and their families means that the returns from their productive activities do not actually reach them in full. It may also mean that under the production factor and labour organization

conditions within which they operate, their level of production is quite low. The level of production of an individual peasant household is low, since the members of the household cannot be able to feed themselves year round from their own activity. This further shows that the notion of making food production by the peasants, a cushion on which they can rest in case they are appropriated in the process of marketing their 'cash' crops, is highly misplaced.

In other words, the nature and level of development of the means of production, and labour organization within which peasant agriculture operates, does not allow them to produce crops for sale and at the same time be able to feed themselves. This is a case where labour and property relations are in conflict, and as such a hindrance to the development of production in general, i.e., they conflict with objective needs for the survival of the community.

As a result of this a substantial number of the farmers live perpetually in-debt. Since they cannot exist under the nature of the production relations within which they are forced by circumstances to operate, they have to constantly be in-debt just to survive. The farmers in our survey villages were asked whether they take any loan at any time of the year, and the response is as follows:

Table 4.6: Whether farmers are indebted

Response	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	76	66.1	42	53.2	58	73.4	176	64.5
No	38	33.0	37	46.8	20	25.3	95	34.8
Unknown	1	0.9	-	0.0	1	1.3	2	0.7
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

The above table shows that, on the whole 64.5 percent of the farmers in our villages do take loans. On the whole they indicated that they receive their loans in money form, though others take it in grain. This can be seen more clearly in the table below:

Table 4.7: What is received as loan

Nature of loan	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
N.A.*	39	33.9	37	46.8	21	26.6	97	35.5
Money	66	57.4	34	43.0	53	67.1	153	56.0
Grain	8	7.0	6	7.6	3	3.8	17	6.2
Seeds	-	0.0	-	0.0	2	2.5	2	0.7
Fertilizers	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
Implements	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
Clothes	2	1.7	2	2.5	-	0.0	4	1.5
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*Not applicable and unknown

The issue of taking loans in money-form has to be clarified. The money lenders often do not want to be paid in cash. They normally like to be paid in produce worth their money at harvest time. The implication is this; since crops are cheap at harvest time, and the loan is advanced normally in the dry and early wet season, the crops which these money-lenders get is worth more than the money they have advanced.

The magnitude of indebtedness among the farmers ranges from a few naira to hundreds of naira. According to them, the amounts they were owing in 1976/77 (when the survey was conducted), is presented in the table below:

Table 4.8: The magnitude of indebtedness, 1976/77

(₦)	Birnin Magaji		Kasuwan Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
N.A.*	39	33.9	37	46.8	21	26.6	97	35.5
Not in-debt this year	10	8.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	10	3.7
1 - 50	44	38.3	21	26.6	16	20.3	81	29.7
51 - 100	11	9.6	10	12.7	19	24.1	40	14.6
101 - 150	5	4.3	3	3.8	1	1.3	9	3.3
151 - 200	3	2.6	4	5.1	7	8.9	14	5.1
201 - 250	-	-	1	1.3	-	-	1	0.4
251 - 300	-	-	1	1.3	2	2.5	3	1.1
301 - 350	-	-	1	1.3	-	-	1	0.4
351 - 400	-	-	-	-	5	6.3	5	1.8
401 - 450	-	-	-	-	1	1.3	1	0.4
451 - 500	-	-	-	-	1	1.3	1	0.4
501 and over	3	2.6	1	1.3	6	7.6	10	3.7
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

*Not applicable and unknown

Most of the farmers who take loans do so in the early wet season when their food-stocks are low, and when they need money to re-start production. About 110 farmers out of the 176 who take loans indicated this as the time when they take loans. Eighteen take the loans whenever the need arises, and 20 in the late dry season which is almost the same as the early wet season. As such if we add those who take their loans in early wet season and those who do in late dry season, we shall have about 130. This represents about 73.8 percent of all those who take loans. As we have said above, most of the farmers pay back their loans at harvest time. In fact 131 of the debtors repay at harvest time, and 25 pay whenever they are able to do so. The rest are spread over the other seasons.

The taking of loan in the late dry season and early wet season, and paying back at harvest time indicates not only the needs of the farmers, but also the level of exploitation. In fact it is not unknown for one to advance money or goods worth half a sack of grain for a full sack at harvest time. The rate of interest according to the farmers in our survey was calculated and found to range between 25% and 100%. But the modal figure is around 50%.

Contracting debts among the farmers is almost perpetual. This is because, as we have noted above, they are incapable of even providing for their own means of subsistence year round. These means of subsistence and raw materials constitute the essential requirements for re-starting production. If they become expensive, (as they normally are at the time they are needed), it may be impossible to replenish them from the returns of the products. And in this case, these returns have already been spent.

Once a system of production cannot by its own motion, provide for its raw materials, its capital, and even the subsistence of the producer, then it is bankrupt and can never expand. In other words, when the process of re-production suffers, and production progressively fails to reach its previous levels, the system of production is doomed to collapse. This is the rule wnether one is dealing with a single enterprise, or with peasant agriculture.

The nature of production relations in peasant agriculture shows that, eventhough the producers are independent as individual producers, owning their means of production, which they set in motion on their own volition, and produce commodities which they individually alienate, they nevertheless become dependent both individually and collectively on the marketing structures through their own products. In other words, the

apparent 'independence' of the simple commodity producers, is supplanted by their real dependence on the market forces, which have crippling effects on their productive efforts. Marx noted this dilemma of the producers of simple commodities in his characteristic lucidity;

> "The owners of commodities find out that the same division of labour that turns them into independent private producers also frees the social process of production and the relations of individual producers to each other within that process, from all dependence on the will of those producers, and that the seeming mutual independence is supplemented by a system of general and mutual dependence through or by means of the products."[35]

The marketing of food and Marketing Board crops in fact represent the avenues within which 'surplus' agricultural wealth is appropriated by merchant capital under the protection of the State. In fact, the State itself protects this arrangement because it is in its interest. It realizes revenue through direct appropriation of agricultural surplus via its agencies - the Marketing Boards. It also taxes traders, collecting market dues, etc. Peripheral capitalist State power is always based on opening itself up, and participating in the exploitation of its people.

Another avenue within which the triumverate of merchant capital, industrial capital and the State, operate hand in hand to appropriate the incomes of the producers is also at the level of marketing. This time, the marketing of manufactured commodities. By manufactured commodities, we here mean, products produced under the aegies of industrial capital, in other words, they are produced under pure monopoly relations of production. They may be imported goods, or goods produced domestically by foreign and/or domestic import substitution manufacturing firms.

The purchase of manufactured products by the peasantry is one of the important ways in which the income the peasants make in the process of selling their crops is spent. It is also one of the central ways in which the peasantry are linked with both domestic and international capitalism. A peasant sells his groundnuts and buys a piece of soap, he sells his cotton to buy cloth for himself and his family. He may also sell his grain or livestock to buy enamel wares or an iron bed, for his daughter on her wedding. More so, some of the products he produces, such as cotton and groundnuts are at the sametime raw materials needed by these manufacturing industries. The destruction of the people's self sufficiency, occasioned by the progressive elimination of pre-colonial industries, means that the peasants increasingly become dependent on manufactured commodities for their multifarious needs.

But the organization of marketing of these products shows not only the drain of the income of the peasantry but also their exploitation by a proliferation of middlemen, traders, etc., who make profits in this activity. The State also comes into the picture, through exacting import and excise duties on the products, resulting in escalating their costs. And these are passed on to the consumers, the majority of whom are the peasantry.

Thus, we shall see in the next section, that peripheral capitalism, is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it appropriates agricultural surplus from the producers through the marketing channels, and on the other, it exploits and drains their income through the sale of manufactured products to them.

SECTION THREE

THE ORGANIZATION OF TRADE IN MANUFACTURED COMMODITIES: EXPLOITATION AND INCOME DRAIN

In the early colonial period, trade in manufactured commodities had always been tied-up with the purchase of agricultural products, especially cotton and groundnuts. The foreign firms who sell the former are also simultaneously engaged in purchasing the latter. In fact, there were times

when export crops were not paid for in cash, but in manufactured commodities. But when the government assumed control over the marketing of export crops, the sale of manufactured products was by and large separated from the former.

Nevertheless, it is important to know that the needs for markets overseas is one of the important motivations of foreign capitalist expansion, and later, direct colonization. This was accompanied by almost complete destruction or pauperization of pre-colonial industry. This created an 'internal' market for foreign capital. Progressively, pre-colonial supply of consumer goods, was substituted by foreign importation of manufactured products.

Hence, peripheral capitalist development is based on widening and deepening the 'internal' market of the periphery for the purpose of wider and deeper capitalist penetration. Hence the term 'open' market. An 'open' market is that market which creates no restrictions for international capitalism. The more open it is, the wider and deeper the capitalist penetration, the more dependent population becomes on international capitalism, and the more the self-sufficiency of the society is eroded. In other words, an 'open' society, is that society which throws itself wide open for international capitalist manipulation and exploitation.

If trade in Marketing Boards' and food products shows the appropriation of agricultural surplus from the peasants by the State and an array of middlemen; trade in manufactured commodities indicates the channels through which a sizable portion of the income made by the producers is drained by foreign and/or domestic industrial capital, through the agency of foreign and/or domestic merchant capital. The proliferation of traders and hawkers engaged in this process, also shows how the economic surplus expropriated from the peasantry is divided up among innumerable recipients, thereby acting as a hindrance to substantial capital accumulation by a majority of the intermediaries.

To have a glimpse of this complex system, it is important for us to look closely at the structure of market hierarchy which link the manufacturing firm with the peasant farmer.

The Hierarchy of Markets

Trade in manufactured products is organized through a chain of markets from the cities to the rural areas. In other words, while agricultural products move from rural to the urban areas, manufactured products move in the reverse direction. Once a product leaves the factory or ports, it enters the circulation process through several markets, located in several cities, towns, and villages around the country.

Like the markets through which food trade is facilitated, these markets are also organized in a hierarchical fashion. From the central city markets, through regional markets, to inaccessible rural markets. Therefore, it may be useful to provide us with a brief outline of the nature and function of each of the market categories in this hierarchy.

The Central City Market

This market is normally located in a city where a factory producing a commodity or a set of commodities, is situated. In the case of imported goods, it may be a port city, such as Lagos or Port Harcourt, etc. It is here that the commodity is sold by manufacturing firms or importers, to dealers and wholesalers who in turn transport the products to regional markets. Since the factories or importers do not sell direct to the consumers, they appoint sole agents and distributors, through whom the products are sold. These intermediaries are located or operate in various markets. As such this market is fundamentally concerned with bulk distribution. Those products needed by consumers residing in the central market are similarly distributed within the area through wholesalers, retailers, petty traders and hawkers. It has all the necessary facilities for bulk transportation.

The Regional Market

The market is located in a city which is situated, by and large, at the centre of a targetted consumption region. It is a market controlled by wholesalers. Here, the bulks transported from the central city markets are further broken into smaller bulks. The wholesalers (who may own retail stores in the city) sell to another lesser category of bulk-buyers, and in the process make a 'respectable' margin of profit after subtracting their 'business expenses'. The products are thus sold to wholesaler-retailers some of whom sell within the environs of this city, and others who transport their bulks to sub-regional markets. This category of markets also has the necessary facilities for bulk transportation.

The Sub-Regional Market

The Sub-Regional Market is the one where wholesaler-retailers operate. They sell in smaller bulks to retailers who buy in medium quantities for later sale to accessible and inaccessible markets. These wholesaler-retailers also at the same time have stores located in these markets and sell direct to the final consumers located in the town and its environs. This market is controlled by small wholesalers and retailers, who also make profit upon the goods they sell. Kaura Namoda market may serve as an example of this type.

The Rural Accessible Market

This is a market similar to the one discussed in the previous section. It is located in the rural areas. It is a market controlled by traders who may be residents in the rural areas, or come to the market on each market day to sell their goods to the final rural consumers. The traders often employ hawkers for the duration of the market day to increase their sales.

The Rural Inaccessible Market

This is a kind of market discussed in the previous section. Because it is not served by motorable road, the traders use donkeys, motorcycles or bicycles to transport their wares to this market. It is a market of small traders who may be in the village where the market is situated, or come from neighbouring town and villages to sell their goods.

From this classification of markets, it is important to note that various cities and towns, may act in various capacities for several types of manufactured products. This depends on their location, the factories and facilities (such as ports) situated in them, etc. For example, with regards to textiles, Kaduna and Kano (in the North) may serve as central city markets,

while Gusau and Sokoto may serve as Regional Markets. But with regards to goods not produced in either Kano and Kaduna, but produced, say in Lagos, Kaduna and Kano become Regional Markets for such goods; and Gusau, Sokoto or even Kaura Namoda, may become Sub-Regional markets. However, with the improvement of transportation, almost all the State capitals may at any time become Regional markets for imported goods and those goods not produced in these cities.

The market hierarchy, and the proliferation of intermediaries located in each market category, implies that prices of goods escalate from more centrally located markets, to those in the periphery. At each market the price of the product changes. By the time a product moves from the central markets to the rural markets, through the hands of various profit making intermediaries, its price to the consumers becomes prohibitive. Appendix E shows us this market hierarchy and the linkages between the market categories.

But the escalation of the price of the products is not only as a result of the markets' arrangement. It is essentially, also, a result of the proliferation of the operations of merchants' and traders' capital. The marketing system is facilitated through a chain of marketing institutions and individuals.

It manifests itself through a chain of importers, dealers, wholesalers, commission agents, retailers, traders, petty traders, and hawkers. At each stage of the marketing chain, profits are made upon the exchange-value of the commodity before it becomes a use-value in the hands of the final consumer. As such the surplus-value of a given product is divided up between industrial, merchant and traders' capital. The longer the chain of marketing intermediaries, the higher the price of the product at the end of the line.

The institutions and individuals who participate in the sharing-up of surplus-value, from the circulation process in the sale of manufactured commodities, can also conveniently be arranged in a hierarchical fashion.

The Multinational Firm

This is a large firm which is normally owned in the central capitalist world. It has the whole globe as its centre of operation. It may own industries, companies engaged in different business, in several countries. It may also own a firm producing inside the country, (in some cases owned jointly with the Government and indigenous businessmen, appointing local Directors and Managers). It may, therefore, own a firm which imports goods into the country. This local arm of the

multinational produces goods which are charged excise duties by the State. If it is an importer, the State charges import duties on the products. This industry or company may, either through its own marketing department, or through the employment of foreign and/or domestic agents bring its products to the public for sale.

The Factory

The factory is a wholly or partly foreign owned manufacturing facility located within the country. It uses raw materials domestically produced and/or imported. With these it produces products or a set of products meant for internal consumption. It is often than not an import substituting industry located in the cities of the metropolis. It is, more or less, capital intensive, with all its complex machinery imported from abroad. It employs a handful of local labourers. As a result of its capital intensity, it may not be able to employ a large local work force. It pays taxes to the State, but often initially enjoys tax rebates for a certain period. From the sale of its products, it makes profit, the bulk of which is repatriated. The products it produces are distributed through various dealers, located around the country.

Foreign and/or Domestic Importers and Dealers

After importation or domestic production, it is the duty of this institution to sell the products. This institution may be a marketing arm of the manufacturers or a different foreign or domestic firm which either holds title to the products or are employed on commission basis by the manufacturers. They normally operate in the central city markets. Sometimes they are appointed to a sole-agent status by the manufacturers. Their main duty is to advertise the products and sell in bulks. Often they also employ lesser dealers situated in various regional or even sub-regional markets. They sell to, or appoint on commission, various agents who also function as minor wholesalers and sometimes engage in retail.

Wholesalers and Commission Wholesalers

These are often business organizations related to the importers and dealers. They either take title to the products they buy, or sell on commission. They often also do retail business on the side. Their strength is determined by their capital, their stocking capacity, and the fastness of their sales. They are situated often in both central, regional and in some cases sub-regional markets.

Retailers (Traders)

These buy from the wholesalers in small bulks. They most often hold title to the products they buy. They both retail and sell in smaller quantities to the traders, petty traders, and often employ hawkers. They are situated almost in all markets except may be the rural accessible market and the inaccessible markets. Most of these deal in various types of goods purchased from several wholesalers. Sometimes they may strike-up a very good business relationship with the wholesalers that enables them to get an advance of goods. They may also move from market to market.

The Petty Traders

Found in all markets, and there are a large number of them. They hold title (most often) to the products they sell. They sell almost any product they can lay their hands on, if it promises some margin of profit. They may also move from market to market. They are not engaged in wholesale but only in retail activities. The scale of their operations needs a small capital, hence their large number in the marketing system.

Hawkers

These are often employed by the retailers to do business for them on a day's basis, often on the market day. But there are some who buy the products for later sale. They are highly itenerant, and of no fixed business location. The scale of their operation is very small. They move on foot, bicycles or motorcycles. The goods they sell are varied but always in small quantities.

This in general, is the character of the marketing intermediaries in the marketing system. For pictorial presentation of the possible links, see Appendix F.

From this we shall see that the marketing system is not only complex but also exploitative. Prices escalate by the time they reach the consumer, especially if that consumer lives in the rural areas. Every cost of business in this hierarchy is passed on to the consumer. Costs are increased by import or excise duties, transportation, advertising, storage, and other miscellaneous activities. More so each of these strata has the aim of making profits.

The implications of this marketing arrangement are many. But above all, it means that the consumers located at the end of the line, with no price information whatsoever, can be duped at any time, since everything depends on bargaining.

This means that the peasantry, who form the bulk of the rural dwellers, pay more for basic products, price controls or no price controls. This attests to the fact that the income they succeed in making is always drained away from them in their purchase of manufactured products.

Implications for Internal Accumulation and Investment

We have so far seen in this chapter how the structure of exchange relationships within which peasant agriculture operates, leads to unfavourable terms of trade for the peasant agricultural producers. In the marketing of their crops they are exploited by the State and an array of middlemen; in their purchase of manufactured produce, they are again exploited by firms and middlemen protected by the State. They suffer from "... the highly unfavourable terms of trade under which (they are) usually forced to operate. Exploited by middlemen of all kinds (they) receive low prices for what little (they have to sell, and pay high prices for the few industrial commodities that (they) are in a position to buy."[36]

As such, in so far as the peasantry are concerned, they have no avenue of accumulating capital to expand and improve agricultural production. The productive factor limitations

in the production sphere is also reflected in the unfavourable terms of trade within which they have to operate, in the marketing sphere. This cumulative negative effect, brought about by the nature of production relations, leads to their improverishment, pauperization, and as such, their low productive capabilities.

The economic surplus generated in the social metabolism, and the income of the peasant producers, is appropriated externally by the multinationals, through foreign manufacturing and commercial companies. What remains internally is consumed by merchant-middlemen, traders, etc., and to some extent by the State.

Cumulatively, the profits and commission gained by the intermediaries in the marketing process is very high indeed. But individually, (because of the sheer number of these operatives) these profits are relatively small. This scatters the internally retained portion of the economic surplus into the hands of innumerable merchants, commission agents, traders, etc. This scattering of the internally retained economic surplus, acts as a brake to substantial private capital accumulation by a single, or a small group of local capitalists. This, therefore prevents these intermediary capitalists from making a break-through

as industrial capitalists in their own rights. They are forced to exist as mere merchants, because they neither control agricultural nor industrial production. Their capital, because it is invariably small, is forced to exist solely in the form of money, shares in foreign controlled firms, real estate, transport business, or conspicuous consumables. This shows that independent and fundamental, indigenous private capitalist accumulation, is impossible under this system. Thus the impossibility of the capitalist road to fundamental national development. As such the so-called Nigerian capitalists are doomed to a permanent existence as agents and hangers-on of foreign capital; and that is only if they are capable of manipulating, and controlling the socio-political structures, long enough to allow their 'permanent' existence.

However, this apart, we are theoretically told that marketing in itself creates value, and therefore the merchants and the commission men, perform 'marketing services', for which they must be rewarded for their 'trouble'. So exploitation in the circulation process is justified, that is, the price which the consumer pays for a commodity, over and above its actual cost of production is justified. But is it theoretically true, that marketing functions add 'value' to a commodity?

Marketing and the question of value

We have seen so far in this chapter, that merchant capital has everywhere, the surplus extraction role in product relations. It is always in a middleman role. The merchants or LBAs in Marketing Boards' crops trade, the merchants and other middlemen in food crop trade, the wholesalers, dealers, traders, petty traders in the marketing of manufactured products. Do we then agree that the functions performed by these structures add value to the commodities to justify their exploitative position?

Marketing is defined as "the performance of all business activities involved in the flow of goods and services from the point of initial production until they are in the hands of the consumer."[37] In its attempt to show that value is added on the product as a result of the performance of marketing services, i.e., to justify exploitation, classical marketing theory argues that merchants' or middlemen's capital is productive capital because it demands an advance (investment) of money and labour which must be rewarded. Furthermore, that it saves the time of both the producer and the consumer. It, therefore, adds value to the products since the same products in the hands of the consumer are worth more than in the hands of the producer.

Brunk and Darrah argued that "... a service usually involves cost to the agency which performs it, ... as products move through the distribution channels, the services performed add value to them."[38] But does this mean an addition to the value of the product or escalation of its cost. For cost and value are different and non-interchangeable concepts.

In terms of value addition, this view is fundamentally wrong. The fact that goods are worth more in the hands of the consumer, than in those of the producer, doesn't mean that this increase in the price of goods, is the product of marketing functions. The value of a product is internal or intrinsic to it. In other words, it is determined by the past labour contained in it. The product is worth more in the hands of the consumer because what he is after is its use-value. This value in fact is first realized by him as direct consumer. For use-value does not reach realization until the commodity enters the sphere of consumption.

The product, on the other hand, is worth less to the producer because what he is after is its exchange-value. By paying for this exchange-value, the merchant appropriates the use-value of the product. He later trades off its use-value to the consumer for the realization of the full exchange-value

of the product. Thus the use-value of the product is not the least augmented in this process. Only that its exchange-value increases in magnitude from the one offered to the producer and the other paid by the consumer to the merchant who pockets the difference.

Merchant's capital acts in the sphere of circulation, and its role is exlusively the promotion of the exchange of commodities. It always exists in the form of money and serves as capital. The metamorphosis of this form of capital exists in the notation of M-C-Mx, where M is the original money advanced, C is the commodity purchased, and Mx is the money realized in the final sale to the consumer plus profit (x).

The sphere of circulation, where merchant capital operates, is a part of the total process of reproduction. However, no value is created here. The circulation process only acts in the conversion of value from one form to another, i.e., from commodity-form to money-form. The labour and costs of circulation are only instrumental in the change of the form of value. The function of marketing, therefore, is unproductive in itself, but nevertheless is a necessary element of the process of reproduction.

Marx, noted that, "Since the movement of merchants' capital is M-C-Mx the merchants profit is made first in acts which occur only within the circulation process, hence in the two acts of buying and selling; and secondly it is realized in the last act, the sale. It is therefore profit upon alienation (of the products) prima facie, a pure and independent commercial profit seems impossible as long as products are sold at their value. To buy cheap in order to sell dear is the rule of trade."[39]

Thus if more is realized from a commodity as a result of the sale, it is because the value of the commodity is internalized in the product. For 'commercial capital' -- creates neither value nor surplus-value, but acts as middleman in their realization and thereby simultaneously in the actual exchange of commodities, i.e., in their transfer from hand to hand, in the social metabolism."[40]

All costs incurred by the merchants in the process of selling commodities "... are not incurred in producing the use-value of commodities, but in realizing their value. They are pure costs of circulation. They do not enter into the immediate process of production, but since they are part of the process of circulation, they are also part of the total process of reproduction."[41]

In both produce trade and manufactured goods' trade, merchant capital dominates the circulation process, but has no hand whatever in the original production. It developed independently as a result of the presence of products as commodities. And, "independent development of merchants capital," Marx asserts, "stands everywhere in inverse proportion to the general economic development of the society."[42] Merchants capital therefore is initially "... the intervening movement between extremes which it does not control and between premises which it does not create."[43]

Wherever merchants capital stands in a position of dominance (as it does in our case study) it stands, according to Marx, for a system of robbery, "... so that its development among nations of old and modern times is always directly connected with plundering, piracy, kidnapping slaves, and colonial conquest."[44] Its current hold over the circulation process in this country today, is no less an obnoxious act of naked plunder.

From the foregoing analyses, we have seen that simple commodity production in peasant agriculture has led to a progressive disarray, i.e., structural disarticulation in the arrangements of the factors of production. This is coupled with

exchange relations organized in such a way that the multiple transactions that take place are in the final analyses at the expense of the direct producers. Thus capital accumulation which is necessary for agricultural development does not occur within the agricultural sector, but at its expense. Thus the development and growth of that sector stagnates, since it does not benefit from new investments. Whenever production stagnates, productivity declines, and the system as a whole enters a period of crisis. The nature and extent of this crisis is what we are concerned with in the next chapter.

FOOTNOTES

1. Thus the conventional distinction between 'cash' and 'food' crops is unscientific and at best tenuous. It is essentially a colonial distinction which is dictated by the needs of metropolitan industries. For example, prior to the imposition of the colonial economy, groundnuts was a 'food' crop but later it became a 'cash' crop because it became an item for export. In essence therefore, there are only commodities as exchange-values and products as use-values, whether they are staple food products or cotton and groundnuts. Throughout this chapter, we refer to cotton and groundnuts as 'Marketing Board Crops' instead of 'cash crops' to avoid this confusion.

2. "The extent to which products enter trade and go through the merchants' hands depends on the mode of production, and reaches its maximum in the ultimate development of capitalist production, where the product is produced solely as a commodity, and not as direct means of subsistence. On the other hand on the basis of every mode of production of surplus products destined for exchange, commerce imparts to production a character directed more and more towards exchange-value." Marx, K., Capital Vol. III, pp. 325-6.

3. cf. Cliffe, L., "Rural Class Formation in East Africa" The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1977, pp. 195-224.

4. This chart being an idealistic abstraction is mainly with a view to clarifying the issue. Therefore extensive discussion of it, is not likely to produce concrete results. But it may suffice to say that as far as the articulation process is concerned, all postulations are trends which are everywhere observable in areas where this articulation takes place. For example, we can see that in so far as property and labour relations are concerned, our discussion in chapter three follows closely the abstractions listed in the chart.

5. Marx, K., Capital Vol. I, op. cit., p. 89.

6. cf. Hogendorn, J.S., The Origins of the Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria, Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics, 1966.

   Cowley, E.J., "Development of the Cotton Growing Industry in Nigeria with Special Reference to the Role of the BCGA." Empire Cotton Growing Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, 1966, pp. 165-195.

7. Hogendorn, J.S., op. cit., p. 46.

8. Hogendorn, J.S., op. cit., p. 48.

9. Hogendorn, J.S., op. cit., p. 49.

10. Kriesel, H.C., Cotton Marketing in Nigeria CSNRD (NISER - 24, 1968) pp. 6-7.

11. Hogendorn, J.S., op. cit., p. 21.

12. Hogendorn, J.S., op. cit., p. 151.

13. Hogendorn, J.S., op. cit., p. 155.

14. Kriesel, H.C., Marketing of Groundnuts in Nigeria CSNRD/NISER, July 1968, pp. 3-5.

15. Kriesel, H.C., Marketing of Groundnuts in Nigeria Ibid., p. 12.

16. Kriesel, H.C., Marketing of Groundnuts in Nigeria op. cit., p. 13.

17. Kriesel, H.C. Marketing of Groundnuts in Nigeria op. cit., p. 28.

18. FAO Agricultural Development in Nigeria 1965-80 Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1966, p. 350.

For further criticisms of Board operations, see: Olatunbosun, D. Nigeria's Neglected Rural Majority, Oxford University Press, Ibadan, 1975.

19. Kriesel, H.C., Marketing of Groundnuts in Nigeria op. cit., p. ii.

20. Kriesel, H.C., Marketing of Groundnuts in Nigeria op. cit., p. 25.

21. cf. Kriesel, H.C., Marketing of Groundnuts in Nigeria op. cit., p. 30.

22. Kriesel, H.C., Marketing of Groundnuts in Nigeria op. cit., p. 33.

23. See, Kriesel, H.C., Marketing of Groundnuts in Nigeria op. cit., p. Table 6, p. 26.

24. Braverman, H., Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. cit., p. 284 (words in brackets are mine).

25. Emirate Technical Services, Crop Production in North Western State, Nigeria. A Report submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture, 1975, p. 114.

26. Source of figure: Produce Inspection Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Sokoto.

27. Emirate Technical Services, Crop Production in North Western State, Nigeria, op. cit., pp. 112-113.

28. For the full details of this controversy and the hot correspondences between London and Lagos, see, SOK Prof. File No. C. 107/1930, Commercial Firm, UAC, National Archives, Kaduna.

29. Hays, H.M., The Marketing and Storage of Food Grains in Northern Nigeria, Institute for Agricultural Research, Samaru Miscellaneous Paper No. 50, 1975, p. 1.

30. This and subsequent classifications closely follow the works of H.M. Hays, See:

    Hays, H.M., The Marketing and Storage of Food Grains in Northern Nigeria, Samaru Miscellaneous Paper 50, IAR/ABU, Zaria, 1975.

    Hays, H.M., The Organization of the Staple Grain Marketing in Northern Nigeria: A Study of the Efficiency of the Rural-Urban Link, Ph.D. Dissertation, Kansas State University, 1973.

31. A mudu is a local measure which normally contain 1-3 kilograms of grain, while a tiya is also another measure which contains approximately 2.7 kilograms of grain.

32. To enable us have a concrete pictorial view of this complex marketing organization, two charts produced in H.M. Hays' above cited works are very useful. Hence we reproduce them in Appendix C, and Appendix D.

33. Emirate Technical Services. Crop Production in the North Western State, Ministry of Agriculture, North Western State, 1975, p. 142.

34. Emirate Technical Services; Ibid., p. 72.

35. Marx, K., Capital Vol. I., op. cit., pp. 109-110.

36. Baran, P.A., The Political Economy of Growth, op. cit., p. 165.

37. Kohls, R.L., Marketing Agricultural Products, MacMillan, New York, (1955) 1961, p.6.

38. Brunk, M.E. and Darrah, L.B., Marketing of Agricultural Products, Ronald Press, New York, 1955, p. 6.

39. Marx, K., Capital Vol. III, op. cit., p. 329.

40. Marx, K., Capital Vol. III, op. cit., p. 282.

41. Marx, K., Capital Vol. III, op. cit., p. 289.

42. Marx, K., Capital Vol. III, op. cit., p. 327-8.

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CHAPTER FIVE

SIMPLE COMMODITY PRODUCTION AND AGRARIAN CRISIS: A SYNTHESIS

Introduction

It is now widely accepted that Nigeria's agriculture is currently facing a major crisis. The debate on the nature and full extent of the crisis, however, does not comprehend and even obsecures the real causes of the crisis. At certain levels, moreover, the debate is couched in very sterile terms. Thus the solutions suggested at the end are contradictory as well as unimaginative.

Most conventional approaches which study the problems of our contemporary agriculture start by relating the external, visible features which are themselves products of the crisis. This is because most analyses are mainly concerned with reporting one or a combination of the following symptomatic features:

(a) That in the past government policies and strategies regarding pricing, taxation and investment plans and priorities have largely been outside agriculture or at its expense.[1]

(b) The contribution of agriculture to the country's Gross Domestic Product has declined significantly from "... 61% in 1964 to 48% in 1970 and to 18% in 1982."[2]

(c) Nigeria which prior to and just after independence was a net exporter of food and agricultural raw materials has become a net importer to the extent that in 1981, the country imported food worth more than one billion (US dollars) from the United States alone.[3]

(d) "Progress in agriculture was cut short by oil boom in the mid 1960's and further distrupted by the three-year civil war. As a result farming has yet to recover. Agricultural growth has been close to zero over the twenty years from 1960 to 1980 despite economy wide growth of 4.8% a year." Furthermore, the oil boom was said to have confounded Nigeria's agricultural development in that it has led to substantial revaluation of the Naira, and led to high local inflation which made food exports unprofitable and food imports successfully competitive with local production. Oil was also said to have created an urban boom whereby agriculture was

> deprived of young and able bodied manpower. And efforts to sustain agriculture were hampered by the dearth of trained and experienced manpower.[4]

Thus in a nutshell, according to these views, "to talk of Nigeria's agricultural development ... involves something of a misnomer. Production has declined, resulting in greater disparities between rural and urban sectors and lack of balanced development in the country. A more accurate description of the past twenty years' experience might be agricultural undevelopment."[5]

When it comes to suggesting recipes capable of providing solutions to the problems identified, this school of thought is divided and evasive. The advises offered range from making administrative, institutional and policy reforms, investing in and redirecting agricultural research to the social, technical and environmental circumstances of the 'small farmers' (i.e., the so-called farming systems approach), and investment in "human capital formation including graduate training of several thousand agricultural scientists and managers."[6]

But these solutions to agricultural development are not only self-serving but evasive. This is because they are not informed by any fundamental analysis of the agrarian system

beyond its surface trappings. Policies and strategies are not independent entities. They are always advocated and executed within a social, economic and political context. It is this context that provides meaning and substance. To understand the essence of policies and strategies and even the possibilities of their success, we have to have a fundamental grasp of the realities they are designed to solve. In otherwords to understand the nature and extent of the crisis, it is just not enough to pinpoint the external features in terms of government policies or statistics which only indicate the magnitude of the crisis. More fundamentally, however, it is essential to grasp the structure of social and economic relations in the context of which agricultural production takes place.

These approaches hence tend to mystify the problems; they chase the shadows rather than face the substance. Thus the crisis itself is explained by referring to its effects rather than its causes. This mix-up of cause and effect leads to the standing of the whole problem of agricultural and rural transformation, as it were, on its head.

To comprehend the nature and full dimensions of this crisis, we must understand the structure of the system of social production. This is in terms of the forces and relations which

have shaped it, and how they developed overtime. Only through a systematic enquiry can substantive rather than frivolous solutions be found. For "... to know where we are going" we must not only "know where we are" but also "how we got there".[7]

The purpose of this chapter therefore, is to determine the nature and extent of the agrarian crisis, in terms of its socio-economic and political dimensions with a view to comprehending the general direction and significance of current efforts towards introducing structural changes in the agricultural sector, and transformation of agrarian relations. It is important however, to note that the social, economic and political factors that determine the cause of the crisis are themselves products of historical processes whose antecedents date from the incorporation of Nigeria and Africa into the world capitalist system.

The main initial logic of this incorporation, as far as the Nigerian situation is concerned, led to the establishment and generalization of simple commodity production to ensure the continued provision by the peasantry of commodities - labour and agricultural products - for capitalist development below the price of their reproduction through the market. For one central law of capitalist development is the need to reduce costs of reproduction in order to raise profit. Therefore, as the costs of peasant production soared capitalist profits evaporated.

In other words, the agrarian crisis is essentially rooted in the failure of the socio-economic and political arrangements under which peasant agriculture is subordinated to the needs of capital accumulation by the world capitalist system.

Even bourgeois scholars do in fact realize this, but cynically cut-off the discussion of the real issues just when they have arisen. Carl Eicher, for example, noted that:

> "In fact, the crisis stems from a seamless web of political, technical and structural constraints which are a product of colonial surplus extraction strategies" further exacerbated by "misguided development plans and priorities of African States since independence, and faulty advice from many expatriate planning advisers."[8]

This clearly shows that those surplus extraction strategies, i.e., accumulation strategies, are no longer feasible. It shows that the system of capital accumulation from peasant agriculture organized under a system of simple commodity production strongly supported by a colonial or neo-colonial state apparatus is no longer tenable given the existing realities. It is these realities which to Eicher are "a seamless Web", i.e., impenetrable, that are our subject of enquiry in this chapter. But before then, we shall briefly define what we mean by a crisis of accumulation.

Crisis of Accumulation

Every process of production must be continuous. "A society can no more cease to produce than it can cease to consume ... every social process of production is at the sametime a process of reproduction." Therefore, "... no society can go on producing ... unless it constantly re-converts part of its * products into means of production..."[9]

If however, the total revenue obtained in the process of production is consumed by the producer, i.e., if the producer consumes all the products after deducting the means to enable him re-start the production process all over again, then what obtains is called simple reproduction since no accumulation takes place. This is the ideal in a hypothetically pure subsistence production. In other words, the process of production becomes a mere repetition on the same previous scale.

Accumulation of capital however, means the conversion of a portion of revenue or surplus-product into capital. This is reproduction on an extended scale. To accumulate, according to Marx,

> "... it is necessary to convert a portion of the surplus-product into capital. But we cannot, except by a miracle, convert into capital anything but such articles as can be employed in the labour process (i.e., means of production) and such further articles as are suitable

> for the sustenance of the labourer, (i.e., means of subsistence). Consequently, a part of the annual surplus-labour must have been applied to the production of additional means of production and subsistence over and above the quantity of these things required to replace the capital advanced."[10]

The process of accumulation therefore implies that the process of production starts each time on an expanded scale. Therefore, the growth and development of any system of production implies progressive accumulation. Simple reproduction on the other hand stagnates growth and development by only repeating the production process at the same old level. Contemporary Nigerian agriculture producing simple commodities should however, not be confused with simple reproduction. For while simple reproduction merely means continuous repetition, and therefore implies independence of the producers, simple commodity production as manifested in Nigeria's agriculture entails their dependence. In other words, the mode of production is not independent. It exists only because it serves the needs of capital accumulation by foreign and domestic capital at a certain stage of capitalist development. Its central advantage at the time was that it serves the purposes of super-exploitation in terms of leaving it to the producer to provide for his own subsistence. In other words, it allows for accumulation without responsibility.

Crisis of accumulation in the context of simple commodity production means that the nature of the production process itself makes it impossible for capital accumulation to take place on a continuous basis on a substantial scale after a certain stage has been reached. This means that there is a threshold beyond which accumulation becomes impossible on a progressive scale. Moreover, since capital accumulation means the progressive increase of the mass of surplus-products that are converted into capital, falling production ultimately means recession for capital and misery, malnutrition and hunger for the majority of the direct producers. Hence the need for new directions of structural transformation which, in the logic of capital, might provide a sounder basis for the re-establishment of relations of exploitation by facilitating progressive accumulation.

Capital Accumulation Crisis of Peasant Agriculture

Whenever a system of production is said to be in crisis, it means that the interrelationship between forces and relations of production have reached ... "a decisive turning point filled with danger and anxiety, possibly meaning life or death for a ... social system or historical process."[11] In other words, it means that a stage has been reached when the forces and relations of production are turning into their fetters.

To understand fundamentally the nature and extent of the capital accumulation crisis of peasant agriculture, it is necessary for us to look into two interrelated issues.

(a) The internal contradictions emerging from the interrelationship of the forces and relations of production including political relations and the possibilities of progressive accumulation under those conditions.

(b) The dependent nature of the simple commodity production to the logic and circumstances of the world capitalist system and implications for capital accumulation.

Internal Contradictions and Possibilities of Accumulation

Peasant agriculture has come along way from the days when simple commodity production was celebrated.[12] It turned into despair from the late 1950s when the problems manifested themselves. Those who celebrated the establishment and generalization of the system of simple commodity production judged it only in terms of its short honeymoon. They did not critically appraise its potential in terms of the nature of the forces and relations of production that guided its 'growth' and 'development'.

We have seen in chapter two and three that the system of simple commodity production in Nigerian agriculture is essentially a product of colonial agrarian policies. Its central character is the production of agricultural raw materials and food products for exchange. It is as such a commercially oriented production system. Its distinguishing features, however, are that it engages the vast majority of the population, and not social, but isolated labour predominates. Whenever the majority of the population are engaged in individual production of agricultural commodities, land becomes sub-divided and fragmented. The instruments of labour which are of necessity simple and backward, are scattered among millions of isolated families.

The structure of land-holding, the nature and level of development of the instruments of labour and the manner in which labour is organized under this system, act as a brake on the expansion of production, and limits the capacity of each peasant family to small holdings which are not feasible to far-reaching technical changes. Simple commodity production destroys the basis of cooperative labour since the producers are isolated from each other at the level of production. Moreover, this isolation means that the people can at the same time not be able to unite at the level of exchange.

In the first instance, the development and generalization of simple commodity production in agriculture led to a progressive atomization of hitherto composite units of production. Households became increasingly nucleated leading to increasing breakdown of flail ties. This is in the sense that these ties progressively lose whatever substantive common and emotional appeal they might have since they are not rooted in production. This development has the potentialities of commoditizing even the basic social relationships among the peasantry. This can be seen in the manner in which social and cultural obligation have become progressively commuted to cash payments.

The atomization of production units in the form of nucleation of households led to a progressive reduction in economies of scale. This can be seen both in terms of the sub-division and fragmentation of land (discussed in chapter three) and also in the units of labour.

Table 4.9 below shows the number of able bodied males in the household which constitute the main unit of landholding and labour organization.

Table 4.9: Number of Able-bodied Male in Households

	B/Magaji		K. Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	45	39.1	38	48.1	28	35.4	111	40.7
One	18	15.7	14	17.7	18	22.8	50	18.3
Two	21	18.3	12	15.2	15	19.0	48	17.6
Three	8	7.0	5	6.3	10	12.7	23	8
Four	8	7.0	7	8.9	4	5.1	19	7.0
Five	6	5.2	1	1.3	3	3.8	10	3.7
Six	1	.9	-	-	-	-	1	0.4
Seven	3	2.6	-	-	-	-	3	1.1
Eight	2	1.7	-	-	1	1.3	3	1.1
Nine	-	-	1	1.3	-	-	1	0.4
Unknown	1	.9	-	-	-	-	1	0.4
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

From the above table we can see up to 40.7 percent of the households sampled indicate that the household head himself is the main labour unit. This clearly indicates the extent of this atomization and deterioration of economics of scale as the system of production unfolds its true characteristics.

Secondly, the deterioration of economics of scale, as we also noted in chapter three, leads to problems regarding the development or adoption of technology of production in form of new instruments of labour or utilization of production inputs.

Current research on technology adoption by small scale farmers shows that farmers adopt only those inputs and practice that are compatible with their resource endowments, i.e., economies of scale and labour availability.[13] But since modern agricultural technology comes in the form of packages, selective application of inputs and improvements do not enable the producer to realize the full potential of the technological innovation. In other words, economies of scale have become a hindrance to the utilization of available technology in peasant agriculture.

Thirdly, the system of simple commodity production in peasant agriculture, by its very nature not only limits the capacity of individual producers to adopt farming improvements, but it also limits their capabilities in perceiving the real benefits that can be obtained. This is attested to by the mass illiteracy of the producers in the formal education that provide the central means of communication and social and economic organization in the country. Table 5.0 speaks for itself.

This pervasive illiteracy tends to keep the peasantry out of the mainstream of ideas and incapacitates them in terms of organizing themselves to protect their own individual and collective interests. But this is as it should be since a literate peasantry cannot be exploited and oppressed continuously

and with impunity. Illiteracy not only results in the aforementioned handicaps, but also implies that the level of capability, knowledge and dexterity of labour is undermined and in fact with generations deteriorates. This always has negative consequences for production and development.

Table 5.0: Level of Formal (Western) Education

Level of Western Education	B/Magaji		K. Daji		Yankaba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
N.A.	105	91.3	69	87.3	71	89.9	245	89.7
Adult Education	5	4.3	9	11.4	8	10.1	22	8.1
Junior Primary	2	1.7	1	1.3	-	-	3	1.1
Senior Primary	3	2.6	-	-	-	-	3	1.1
Total	115	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	273	100.0

Therefore, we can see that because of the nature of the system under which labour and property relations are organized, and because of the low level of development of the productive forces (land and the instruments of labour) there arose a breakdown in the process of accumulation. The introduction and generalization of simple commodity production, therefore, not only led to the reorganization and orientation of the economic structures and institutions, but it also led to political, administrative and judicial transformations.

Transformation of Political and Administrative Structures

According to Marx, "... every form of production creates its own legal relations, forms of government, etc."[14] Similarly, the progressive generalization of simple commodity production in agriculture went hand in hand with the establishment of administrative and judicial structures which in essence administered the transformation of the pre-colonial peasantry into petty commodity producers.

We have seen in chapter two, how political power was wrested, by military conquest, away from the precolonial ruling classes and the consequences of the new political arrangements established by the British in terms of the society's self sufficiency. We have also seen how taxation played a very central and prominent role in converting the peasantry en masse into simple commodity producers. In this section we shall briefly outline the consequences of this administrative set up with regards to the nature of the accumulation process.

Probably the single most important administrative innovation that led to the extension of colonial control to the rural areas of Northern Nigeria was the strategy of the creation of homologous districts, i.e., the creation of hierarchical and territorially defined administrative units.

This strategy as noted by many scholars was a total departure from the system of rural administration that operated in the pre-colonial era.[15]

It is furthermore stated that;

> "It was the lack of coincidence between the structure of local government in the emirates, on the one hand, and British aims of having a few rather than very many people to hold responsible for law and order in the rural areas and through whom to collect their taxes, and all that at minimum financial cost, on the other, that necessitated the reorganization of that pre-colonial structure of local government."[16]

The creation of territorially defined and hierarchical administrative structures, from the hamlet, village, district to emirate levels in fact led to the direct subjugation of the peasantry through authority structures operating within well defined territories. This was in direct contrast to the pre-colonial systems of fief hold administration on which Lord Lugard bitterly commented that:

> "the lands ... arbitrarily assigned to the rapacious rule of the Emirs nominees are frequently not homologous. A district which happened to be available owing to the death or removal of its feudal chief would be granted to a favourite, irrespective of whether it lay near his territory or not ... it came about that a territorial chief might hold jurisdiction over and claim taxes from a number of detached areas situated like islands in the heart of another jurisdiction."[17]

However, that was not all, for in the pre-colonial era most of the fief-holders do not reside in the areas of their fief. They reside at the capital. It was in the era of the British administration that physical settlement of the District Head in his area of jurisdiction became a necessity.[18]

Under this system of rural administration established by the British, the District and Village heads came to possess powers over the peasantry that they never had before. These powers ranged from control over access to land, to the issue of maintenance of law and order.

In fact, in the pre-colonial era "there was no sense in which the Hakimi or Uban Kasa (district head) owned (or even thought he owned) the land in his territory ... the nature of land administration before the British did not enable the fief holder to demand and obtain labour services from the peasantry in return for the right to cultivate certain portions of the land." In fact, ... "portions of land at that time were never formally allocated to individual farmers by any authority"[19] as later came to be the case during and after British rule. Peasant farmers were always free to clear (sara) and cultivate

unoccupied lands and the right so established by this clearance more or less guaranteed absolute ownership. This control given to the District and Village heads over the allocation and administration of the central means of production-land, constitutes one of the central legacies of land tenure abuse of our times. It in fact tied the peasantry to the apron strings of the District and Village heads who are but executive arms of colonial authority in the rural areas.

Moreover, the District and Village heads had a lot of powers conferred by the colonial authorities. The duties of the District heads for example were defined as;

> "the assessment and collection of kudin kasa (land tax) and jangali (cattle tax), carrying out periodic censuses and keeping record of emigration from and immigration into their district, and helping in arresting thieves and 'bad characters', and generally maintaining law and order."[20]

This shows the wide ranging powers that the District heads enjoyed over the peasantry. In other words, they could practically do whatever they liked. But nevertheless a conflict often arose between the District heads and their superiors - the Emirs and even more importantly the British District Officers. The British required loyalty

and efficiency, but the lack of probity of many District heads and their unpopularity with the peasantry they oppress often put them into conflict. For example, between 1902 and 1960 Kaura Namoda had nine District heads. Out of these five were dismissed for corruption and embezzlement, while another was dismissed for harbouring thieves."[21] Similarly, Zurmi district had seven district heads from 1901-1971 and four were dismissed for similar offences.[22]

The grounds for dismissing District and Village heads are also very revealing. Some of these are:-

(a) abetting acts of rebellion by the peasantry;

(b) failure to participate in the suppression of rebellions if they occur;

(c) refusal to participate in the assessment and collection of taxes;

(d) embezzlement of proceeds from these taxes;

(e) general inefficiency.[23]

These further got to show that the village heads had unlimited powers over the peasantry.

The interest of the British administration in the detailed aspects of District and Village administration derived almost entirely from their concern with taxation.

In 1909 for example Temple, a seasoned colonial administrator noted that;

> "village ... administration and taxation are so interdependent and interrelated that it is impracticable to consider one without at the sametime considering the other".[24]

It is however, important to note that taxation here does not only refer to direct poll or cattle taxes but also taxes levied on all significant productive endeavours of the people. It was only when simple commodity production became pervasive and generalized, for example, that taxes such as Kurdin Karofi (dyers tax) Kurdin Gida (compound tax) Kurdin Shuka (planting tax, exacted for all plots planted with non-grain crops) Kurdin Rafi (tax on irrigated plots) etc., were gradually abolished. This was mainly because such taxes were no longer necessary as most of these activities gave way to the production of export crops.

In the pre-colonial era, there was no strict distinction between the executive and judicial arms of government, either at the emirate or the levels below it. The judicial system was totally integrated into the administrative system. But the British decided to introduce separation of powers by way of "... rigid formality that among other things included the keeping of regular records of cases for British inspection..."[25]

To this end Native Courts were created at each District and in some cases also at village level. The gadis (judges) were appointed and put on fixed salaries. Later on the courts themselves were hierarchically graded with the courts at the Emirate levels even having powers of imposing death sentences. Fines and fees were collected from both the culprits and the plaintiffs respectively. Prisons were set-up and Native Authority police were established.

All these indicate the nature of administrative arrangements and the coercive facilities that were arrayed against the peasantry. The result of all this was oppression, extortion, corruption and political repression. A simple glance at the records clearly indicates this.

The District heads, village heads and their hangers on in Kaura Namoda, Zurmi and Moriki Districts were continuously reported to be engaging in corrupt and extortionate acts against both the farmers and the pastoralists by the visiting colonial administrators.[26] People were being driven away from their farms and villages for daring to complain. These complaints and reports in fact are abiquitious in all records.

It may suffice, however, to cite one case which is quite representative of the extortionate ways of the District and village heads.

In October 1949, the District head of Moriki, the Sarkin Burmi was accused of oppression, corruption and extortion by one student of Sokoto Medical School by the name of Mallam Moyi and the charges were as follows:

(1) Withholding (and apparently converting to his own use) salaries of village and ward heads.

(2) Pocketing jangali tax.

(3) Forcing butchers in Dole village area to buy a bull for twice or thrice its actual cost.

(4) Misappropriating some of the money that should have been paid for labour on dry season roads.

(5) Exacting tribute from market women and fishermen.

(6) Demanding fees from those who come to report the death of a relative.

(7) Forcing the talakawa to work on his farm without proper reward.

The first three charges were confirmed by the touring District Officer, Mr H.A.S. Johnston. The rest were determined by him to have some credibility, but were

referred to the Sultan of Sokoto for proper investigation, and later was said to have been only fined by the Sultan for his 'extortionate ways'.[27]

The judiciary did not fare any better. In 1957, the Kaura Namoda area court was referred to by the visiting District Officer as 'vicious'. The judge was found to be incompetent, vindictive and corrupt. He was described as "... dilatary, slack and more than suspect." Court messengers were found to be making illegal exactions and the judge was accused of attempting to cover up bribes by adjusting fines in the book. He was subsequently removed. But he was known to have been doing this ever since before he was removed from Gusau native court for similar reasons in 1948.[28] This case is not an exception but the rule.

As the country approached independence, the vicious powers of the rural political, law and order, and judicial administration were unfurled against the political opponents of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) to which all the village heads, the District heads, the judges, their retainers and hangers-on belong. The main brunt was born by the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) whose candidate, Haruna Tela, swept the election for the Northern House of Assembly seat in 1956.

He clearly beat the NPC candidate who was the Kaura Namoda District head and his brother who contested as an independent candidate.[29]

It was generally under this corrupt, exploitative and repressive social and political order that simple commodity production prospered. It was under these conditions that in 1950 the late Prime Minister of Nigeria, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, then a member of the Northern House of Assembly issued a warning in a long speech on the floor of the house which is relevant today. The following extracts are instructive:

> "At present, Sir, nobody knows where he stands, and district officers have often assumed the role of dictators, and giving the executive instructions instead of the advice to which Native Authorities are entitled ... the illiterate mass of the people recognise no change in their status since the coming of the British. They are still ruled by might and administration is still none of their concern ... Neither the Native Authorities nor the British seem to care with the work of village and district heads as long as they collect their taxes in time ... I make bold to say that there is hardly a single district head in the North who sits in his district with the full knowledge of his work and who can send comprehensive reports about the district to his central authority ... It is as all of you are aware the twin curses of bribery and corruption which pervade every rank and department. It is notorious, Sir, that Native Administration servants have monetary obligations

> to their immediate superiors and to their sole Native Authorities ... Much of the attraction of a post lies in the opportunities it offers for extortion of one form or another ... It is a most disturbing fact that few officials can afford to be honest."[30]

This is mainly an indication that the political and administrative system, just like the system of commodity production were by 1950 in serious disarray. Therefore, the events leading to the 1966 military coup were neither accidental, nor unexpected. In fact, that was why there was no mass peasant uprising against the coup. Most peasants were either unconcerned or welcomed the coup with relief.

This also attests to the correctness of the theoretical position that when social and political conditions corresponding to a certain stage of production are in a state of disappearance (or formation) disturbances in production naturally arise. In other words, the crisis of a system of production, i.e., its failure to accumulate is always reflected in the breakdown of the political and administrative superstructure and vice versa.

In fact, it is in this light that the subsequent political and administrative changes that were brought by the military should be seen. These changes such as the abolishing of native authority police, take over of native courts and prisons

from the native authorities, the creation of states were really phenomenal, clearly popular, and progressive. But they were not enough to reverse the crisis of the system of production. This is because the system of production is itself dependent on the need for capital accumulation by the world capitalist system, so do the political relations which are but its expression.

Simple Commodity Production, Dependency and Capital Accumulation

Just as simple commodity producers find their independence and prosperity lost in a web of political repression and economic exploitation, so does the mode of production lose its capacity to accumulate when it acts just as a vehicle of capital accumulation by the all pervasive capitalist mode of production.

In other words, it is not that under the system of simple commodity production, there is no accumulation. On the contrary, there is, but it is dependent accumulation, i.e., where accumulation takes place at the centre rather than the periphery of the world capitalist system; and simple commodity production is that periphery. Since the simple commodity mode of production is a dependent one, accumulation in this situation goes on but according to the logic and dictates of the capitalist mode of production. The logic of capitalist accumulation is continuous growth of capital and therefore continuous accumulation.

This is confirmed by no less an authority on the laws of capitalist development than Karl Marx when he stated that:

> "... the development of capitalist production makes it constantly necessary to keep increasing the amount of capital laid out in a given industrial undertaking, and competition makes the imminent laws of capitalist production to be felt by each individual capitalist, as external coercive laws. It comples him to keep constantly extending his capital, in order to preserve it, but extend it, he cannot except by means of progressive accumulation."[31]

Thus to understand the nature and significance of the accumulation process we have to understand it in the context of the nature of the dependency relationship at different stages of capitalist development. It is in this direction, we believe, that we can both understand the structural roots of the accumulation crisis, and the significance and direction of current Government policies regarding agricultural development and agrarian change.

In other words, the contemporary crisis in Nigeria's agrarian relations is part of the crisis of world capitalist accumulation. The antecedents of this crisis are indigenous but they must be analysed in the "... context of the specifics of an evolving world system of economic and political relations,

starting in the sixteenth century leading first to the gradual involvement of Africa in world wide exchange relations, and later by the middle of the nineteenth century into more direct incorporation, and finally in the early twentieth century, to the subordination of the continent to the economic and political needs and objectives of the major Western powers."[32]

Therefore, for our own purposes and convenience and without rigidity, we shall delineate the following phases of this dependent relationship; viz, the period prior to the end of world war II, the period of post-war reconstruction, the age of mass production and consumption, and the era of agribusiness.

Pre-World War II Period (C. 1900-1945)

Prior to 1900 economic and political relations between most parts of Nigeria and Western Capital was based on the so-called legitimate commercial relationships which by and large did not lead to the alienation of sovereignty. But "... the economic expansion of Europe in the nineteenth century had a profound and destabilizing effect on West Africa because it changed the structure of export production and involved the region in the trade cycle of the new industrial economy."[33]

In fact, ever since their experience with slave trade, European capitalists and merchants became aware that West Africans on the whole, were "... more accustomed to growing exchange cultures for exports ... and could be more easily persuaded to extend their cultivation in that direction..."[34] if they could be brought under political control of the Government of the trading companies. This conclusion later became necessary when it was realized that under the limitations of 'legitimate' commerce, the European firms "... feared that West Africa, with its pre-industrial transport system and its numerous tolls was in danger of becoming, by international standards, a high-cost producer,"[35] thereby limiting the scope and magnitude of capital accumulation by foreign firms.

Therefore, with regards to West Africa, the economic logic of colonialism led to the enunciation of a policy "... of exploitation by means of independent, small scale native producers aided to the best of its means by the (colonial) administration."[36]

Thus the period between 1900-1945 can be divided into two phases. The first was the period of colonial conquest and the establishment of infrastructural facilities and politico-administrative arrangements to facilitate the growth

of export production. This phase runs roughly between 1900-1929, i.e., before the world wide depression. The second phase runs roughly between 1930-1945.

In the first phase administrative transformations were made in the manner described above. Motorable roads and railway lines were also established. In the Kaura Namoda area, "the colonial administration directed roads to the areas producing crops for overseas markets. The extension of a motorable road from Zaria to Sokoto in 1917 passing through Gusau and the linking up of the area to the south by rail-line made Gusau a rail-head town and Kaura Namoda the north-western terminus. This development paved the way for a new type of economic activity based on import and export overseas trade. In the wake of the road and railway construction came the big colonial commercial companies, choosing the rail-head towns as their bases."[37]

Thus the first phase of this period marked the establishment of the administrative and infrastructural frameworks that facilitated the accumulation of capital from agriculture by foreign firms; and also the gradual extension and expansion of simple commodity production. At this time foreign companies, such as the United African Company (UAC), the Compagnie Francaise de L'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO), Societe Commercial de l'ouest Africain (SCOA), etc., were in direct control of commerce;

through the purchase of export commodities and sale of manufactured products. It was said that these three companies by 1930 were controlling two-thirds to three-quarters of West Africa's overseas trade "... and their commercial network may be compared in size and importance with the administrative system operated by the colonial powers. Indeed, sometimes the 'District Officer' of UAC had more local influence (and was certainly better paid) than the 'branch manager' of His Majesty's Government."[38] This phase therefore, marked the period of the 'free trade' era of dependent accumulation.[39]

The main significance of the second phase, i.e., between 1930-1945 rested mainly on two important events - the depression and the second World War. This was generally a period of strain. It was marked by the decline of the terms of trade for export crops and later, the beginning of the direct involvement of the state in the process of capital accumulation with the establishment of marketing boards. Hopkins noted that, "after 1930 a given 'basket' of export crops purchased a progressively smaller basket 'of imports, "and Africans responded to this by increasing" ... the volume, and hence raise the value of cash crop production merely to maintain existing levels of import consumption." But "even with a larger export volume, producers were still unable to halt the slide in their total import-purchasing power, and the result was that their real incomes fell."[40]

Thus in the thirties, despite these adverse conditions, the volume of exports expanded. This is because the producers having lost their local self-sufficiency, their local industries destroyed by capital, and deliberate over-taxation of the colonial state (see chapter two) were forced to increase production to maintain their existing living conditions (i.e., levels of consumption) even when faced with falling profits and increased costs of production. This enhanced the magnitude of the capital accumulated by the foreign firms, who being capitalist firms, when faced with a similar situation would react in an opposite way, i.e., curtailing production. This type of response for simple commodity producers producing for capitalist accumulation is impossible, and would even be suicidal.

Thus the whole period (1900-1945) represents the era of the establishment of the structures and relations of exploitation and capital accumulation not in agriculture, but at its expense.

The Period of Post-War Re-construction (1946-1960)

We have seen in chapter four how with the out-break of the Second World War, the British colonial Government got directly involved with capital accumulation hitherto controlled exclusively by foreign companies. This involvement was achieved

with the creation of commodity boards and the foreign firms designated as buying agents. This was done to protect British sources of raw materials in war time, but was legitimized in the name of protecting the producers from market fluctuation. This myth has already been dispelled earlier in chapter four.

But suffice it to say that the period of 1946-1960 was one of capitalist reconstruction of war ravaged industries. The terms of trade for agriculture recovered and was "... highly favourable to the producers until the close of the 1950's... Between 1945 and 1955 the volume of exports guadrupled, and there was six-fold increase in ... importing capacity."[41]

The main distinguishing feature of this era as we have noted above, was the direct and conspicuous role that the state played in capital accumulation at the expense of agriculture, through the commodity/marketing boards.

This era can also be divided into two phases. The first phase is that of the period of country-wide commodity boards, i.e., from 1946-1953. The second was the creation of Regional Marketing Boards, 1954-1960.

In the first phase, the commodity boards succeeded in accumulating massive capital the bulk of which was held in the form of reserves in United Kingdom and Commonwealth securities. The small portion of the economic surplus that returned to the country is in form of the meagre research and development funds and also allocations made to the Regional Development Boards (of which we shall see more later).

Table 5.1 for example shows that between 1947 and 1954, the Nigerian commodity boards accumulated capital to the tune of £119,914,700 the bulk of which was in foreign (British) securities. This is tantamount to financing British and not Nigerian capitalist development.

That this was done at the expense of Nigeria's agriculture and the peasant producers can be attested to by the fact that marketing board surpluses removed on the average between 20 to 30% of the potential producer income during this period of phenomenal export growth. In fact, "in peak years, individual marketing boards alone withheld over 40, 50 and even 60 percent of potential income of the producers of particular crops."[42]

Table 5.1: Total accumulation by Nigerian Commodity Marketing Boards, 1947-54 (£ thousands)

	Cocoa	Palm oil	Palm Kernels	Ground-nuts	Cotton	Total
Initial reserves	8,896.6*	11,457.0		4,487.8	250.0	25,091.0
Net trading surplus	33,797.4	2,269.7	18,790.8	22,483.6	6,968.6	84,310.1
Excess of other income over expenditures	3,349.3	2,497.3		3,563.9	1,102.7	10,513.2
Total	46,043.3	35,014.8		30,535.3	8,321.3	119,914.7

Source: Heilleiner, G.K., "The Fiscal Role of Marketing Boards in Nigerian Economic Development 1947-61" in Eicher and Liedholm (eds) op. cit. p. 12.

The second phase of this era (1954-1960) was marked by the constitutional changes which created strong Regions and conferred on them "... greatly increased fiscal spending powers."[43] The National Commodity Boards were converted into Regional Boards. After regionalization, the Boards "... begun to supply funds in the form of grants and loans to regional governments directly to purchase equity in and offer loans to private companies, and to purchase Nigerian Government Securities." Regional Development Corporations succeeded the Development Boards and though allocations to them have then been curtailed, they had enough from previous allocations to expand and "accelerate their own development."[44]

At the time of the regionalization there was a division of assets, and the newly created Regional Boards inherited assets as can be seen in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: Total Transfer of Assets from Nigerian Commodity Marketing Boards to Nigerian Regional Marketing Boards (£'000)

Marketing Board	Eastern Region	Northern Region	Western Region	Total
COCOA	176.1	135.5	32,625.1	32,936.7
OIL PALM PRODUCE	11,248.6	484.5	10,199.0	21,931.9
GROUNDNUT	39.6	24,722.6	-	24,762.2
COTTON	-	7,309.2	73.0	7,382.2
Total	11,464.1	32,651.8	42,897.2	87,013.0

Source: G.K. Heilleiner in C.K. Eicher and C. Liedholm (eds) op. cit. p. 124.

But the year 1954, which marks the regionalization of commodity boards also "... marks the end of a period of export prosperity and the beginning of a period of declining barter terms of trade."[45]

This can be seen clearly when we compare Table 5.1 with Table 5.3 below.

Table 5.3: Total Accumulation by Nigerian Regional Marketing Boards 1954-1961 (£'000)

	Eastern Region	Northern Region	Western Region	Total
Transfer from Commodity Boards	11,464.1	32,651.8	42,897.2	87,013.1
Net Trading Surplus	10,736.2	-3,202.7	14,303.9	21,837.1
Excess of income over expenditure	1,718.9	2,451.2	5,349.1	9,519.2
Total	23,919.2	31,900.3	62,550.2	118,369.4

Source: G.K. Heilleiner, in C.K. Eicher and C. Liedholm (eds), op. cit., p. 125.

This second phase is also important because indigenous Nigerian Nationalists are directly involved in running the Governments of the various regions. Thus they now come to control this economic surplus from agriculture. But instead of

investing this surplus into agriculture, it was used to finance the running of Government and political parties and for the execution of some infrastructural and industrial projects most of which are based in the urban areas.

In this second phase capital accumulation faced two types of crises. The first crisis is that of falling terms of trade for agricultural sector (at the expense of which the accumulation was taking place). The second was that the sector, as a result of the massive exploitation that it had suffered for decades started showing very serious strains. Part of the reason for this strain is the contradiction between the need for foreign capital accumulation from the sector, and the need for the state and the nationalist dependent bourgeisie to keep larger and larger portions of the economic surplus, for administration, infrastructural development, political patronage and conspicuous consumption.

As a result of these developments, by 1962 the marketing board holdings in British securities were all but eliminated. In fact in 1961 one of the boards was reported as lacking in working capital and had to go through the banking system to borrow rather than its own reserves which were no more.

Thus the whole deception about withholding potential producer income for price stabilization in bad years exploded. The boards became demystified and are seen for what they really are: no more than vehicles of capital accumulation at the expense of agriculture and the peasantry by foreign capital and the neo-colonial state.

The veracity of this conclusion can be attested to when we look into the use that was made of the Northern Region Marketing Boards resources under the Government of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC).

After the 1966 military coup, committees were appointed to look into the affairs of the Northern Nigerian Marketing Board and the Northern Nigerian Development Corporation. Even though, the committees did not have judicial powers, (i.e., could neither force witnesses to give evidence under oath nor compel attendance) and was given mandate to cover only the period between 1963-1965 the findings of the committees were revealing.

The Northern Nigerian Marketing Board for example was found through Government directives to have "... invested heavily and frequently injudiciously, in projects many of which are related to neither agriculture nor to producer industries

and hence ultra vires section 17 of the law. Some were of purely 'prestige' nature, e.g., Hamdala Hotel. Others were alleged to be uneconomic..."[46]

The committee uncovered massive fraud involving both the officials of the Board and its Licenced Buying Agents. They concluded that there were ... indiscriminate, irresponsible and possibly corrupt grants of guarantees ... to companies with little capital, to persons with neither experience, assets, business acumen nor integrity; or even to persons of known unreliability. The executive's incompetence and possible dishonesty has led to irrecoverable losses on a fantastic scale. In some cases post-dated cheques were arbitrarily accepted, in others, debts were concealed by various means to carry forward in the account. Although accounts are not complete, the committee with the cooperation of the banks has estimated the shortfall for the last buying season alone to be of the order of £2,000,000".[47]

In fact, the gross financial mismanagement uncovered by the Boards is indicative of the nature of the 'primitive accumulation' of the dependent bourgeoisie which then was in a state of formation. In fact, the Minister for Economic Planning himself admitted to the committee that he owns "... more goods, cash, investments and property than he could ever have received from his ministerial endowments."[48]

The Northern Nigerian Development Corporation has been a major recipient of Marketing Board surpluses. But as an investment holding company, it did not make investment in agriculture. Rather it went into buying equity shares in manufacturing and construction industry, real estate, hotels, etc.

The committee which investigated the affairs of the NNDC found it guilty of gross mismanagement, corruption, fraud, the issuing of unsecured loans, and of making investments whose returns are doubtful.

The activities of the Northern Nigerian Development Corporation include projects and development schemes either totally financed by the corporation or commercial and industrial ventures in which it has financial interests. The corporation also provides loans to Native Authorities, Cooperative Societies, Private Companies, partnerships and individuals.

The investigations committee in this regard found out that of the twelve projects wholly financed by the corporation, only one (Jema'a Fibre Project) was found by the committee to be developing according to plan. Of the 27 commercial ventures in which the corporation had shares only six could be regarded as successful. In fact, "in one case (Nigerian Sweets and

Confectionaries Ltd (NICCO)) where the corporation's investment proved most profitable, it sold out its interests to the other shareholders of the venture (foreign interests) at a fantastically low price contrary to the advice of its auditors and officials."[49]

All the projects totally financed by the corporation which could be said to have any bearing on agriculture were failures. For example Ahmed and Ahmed Farms, located at Bakura was established with a loan of £106,000 at 1% interest with repayment not expected to start until after six years. The unsecured loan was given to the late Premier in partnership with Alhaji Ahmadu Danbaba, the Marafan Sokoto. The Committee found that "the farm is one of the largest mixed farming projects in the Region but the £106,000 loaned had been almost entirely exhausted and it is doubtful whether this large sum has been wholly expended on farming operations." When the Committee visited the farm it found that, "some assets purchased at Bakura would be of little value to the project. For example, gilded chairs, settees and similar items should not be taken into account to arrive at an acceptable and realistic valuation of farm assets."[50]

Other agriculture oriented projects such as Kaduna Poultry Farm in which the NNDC invested £63,775 and lost £29,019 finally ended up as a "... repository for cattle belonging to Ministers of Government who were charged nothing for the service."[51] There was also Kaduna Dairy Scheme, K. Maroun Pork Product Ltd, Palm Oil Mills at Ayangba Acharu and Alade which were all losing ventures.

NNDC also bought many real estate properties, transport ventures and shares in manufacturing, service and commercial ventures at very inflated prices. It also made substantial unsecured loans to private individuals. The Committee found that the total loans offered to individuals as at 31/3/66 was £1,807,079 of which £1,371,850 was outstanding. Of this sum, £838,014 was overdue. The "loans were not being repaid regularly. In fact, the position was becoming worse each year and as a result, the provision for bad debts was progressively increased from £125,000 in March 1962 to £400,000 in March 1965 ... loans were granted which were used for purposes other than those mentioned in the application, and without doubt a number of loans were issued for political advantage", and without project feasibility appraisal or correct estimates.[52]

On all these the committee found that the corporation "... had wasted public funds by inefficient handling of business affairs, and it neglected to take firm action to recover overdue loan repayments."[53]

It is generally through these unwholesome business practices that by the end of 1963, the NNDC had come to the end of its existing resources and turned to Government for assistance. The expectation that given the funds already invested in form of Northern Nigerian Marketing Board surpluses in various ventures, the NNDC would be able to carry on and "accelerate its own development", became an illusion. This situation got so bad that the NNDC had to obtain investment funds from the Commonwealth Development Corporation by transferring its most profitable investments to Northern Nigerian Investment Limited in which the Commonwealth Development Corporation had equal shares. The Committee on the other hand was of the opinion that the "... interests of the Government, the NNDC, the NNIL would have been better served if the CDC's investment had been matched in cash."[54]

This in general is what happened to the economic surplus retained internally by the neo-colonial state. It is quite clear, from the nature of the enterprises invested into and the use which individual recipients have made of their loans

that the share of the economic surplus that accrues to the state was used to increase the dependency relationship with foreign capital. This dependency was enhanced by way of imports of luxury items for the consumption of the dependent bourgeoisie and upper sections of the middle class, and the purchase of plants and components for industrial, construction and commercial enterprises and public services. The industrialization strategy in fact was dependent on industrialization.

Thus fundamental capital accumulation still continues to take place abroad, at the centres of the world capitalist system. The main change is that it requires local agents to facilitate and protect the process.

The global terms of trade that had been against agriculture since the mid 1950's continued into the 1960's. We have seen above how, as a result of this and other reasons simple commodity production as a basis of capitalist accumulation entered into a very serious crisis to the extent that accumulation on its basis became no longer profitable. In countries such as Ghana this collapse led to traumatic experiences that continue up till today. In Nigeria however, oil provided a cushion to the extent that after the traumatic experiences of 1966-1970 the collapse in fact turned into a boom.

Oil has now become what capitalists refer to as a 'growth sector' i.e., a resource the exploitation of which will bring about increased capital accumulation. Oil, however, did not become a growth area just because the system of simple commodity production had collapsed, but also because, capitalist production process and the nature of accumulation has shifted to a new stage - an era of mass production of military, consumer and luxury goods. Oil became the central need of the newly revolutionized production processes mainly because it was the cheapest, most convenient and most efficient source of energy for the second industrial revolution.[55]

The Age of Mass Production and Mass Consumption (1960-1975)

The revolutionization of methods of production through the adoption of mass production techniques led to mass production of military, consumer and luxury goods aimed at the world market. This did not only take place in industry, but also in the Agricultural sectors of the leading capitalist nations. Most of the leading capitalist nations not only became self-sufficient in food and a range of agricultural raw materials but major exporters as well.

The United States of America alone for example, accounts for more than sixty percent of the grain entering the world market.[56] The European Economic Community Nations, on the other hand, through their common agricultural policy, have "... increasingly reduced their dependence on agricultural imports from the Third World, since 1960 and are entirely or almost self-sufficient in the production of sugar beet, potatoes, wine, milk, butter, cheese, beef, pork, poultry and eggs all grains and fresh vegetables."[57]

Thus the agricultural sector in the dependent capitalist nations was faced not only with internal crisis between the forces and relations of production but also faced a period of declining demand for its products.

Under simple commodity production, it became more costly to produce a unit of food or raw materials in the underdeveloped countries, than in the leading centres of world capitalism where mass production facilitated not only large scale production, but also reduced the cost of production as well.

As a result of this, however, capitalist production was faced with a dilemma characteristic of mass production without effective demand.

The home markets of the leading capitalist nations have been saturated with industrial and agricultural products including inputs massively turned out by the mass production technology. The growth area has to be in untapped overseas markets most of which are in the third world. But because of the agrarian crisis these markets could not be tapped to any meaningful capacity to facilitate continuous accumulation because they do not have effective demand. The agricultural sector which employs the majority of the people and provides them with cash income is in serious desarray. Capital accumulation therefore was faced with a dilemma of mass production without mass market.

It was therefore realized that this potential market could only be tapped by developing the agricultural sector of the underdeveloped capitalist nations in a capitalist direction. To this end, A.W. Clausen, President of the World Bank asserted, that "Agriculture is a key sector, both because of its importance in improving the lot of the poor, and in providing a basis for growth in other segments of the economy ... experience over many years with scores of agricultural projects demonstrates that countries with policies of fair and adequate incentives and assistance to farmers, through the public and private sectors, are those that do best with both food and cash crops."[58]

In other words, Third World Governments should develop their agriculture by subsidizing the process of capital accumulation in the agricultural sector, the market of which is being increasingly cornered by the multinational agribusiness corporations. This is because the second Green Revolution now taking place in the underdeveloped nations is an "... immense undertaking ... involving governments, international agencies, planners, and, to a growing extent private industry."[59] This revolution is to be carried out under the direct or indirect control of agribusiness corporations. For "... if a country wants to build a car assembly plant it goes to Fiat or General Motors, not to a United Nations Agency. The same should hold true for agriculture."[60]

The second Green Revolution, according to this view, requires huge amounts of money, and more importantly a large-scale transfer of technology and managerial skills, which in the capitalist world, are controlled by agribusiness corporations.

Therefore, the failure of capital accumulation under a dependent simple commodity mode of production, coupled with the failure of capital to open-up third world markets for luxury and consumer goods on an extensive scale (since the majority of the population in these countries are too poor to afford such goods) has led to a new strategy of agricultural development dominated by agribusiness.

The Era of Agribusiness

The strategy of agricultural development under the aegis of agribusiness, in the first instance, emerged as a means of solving world food crisis after the failure of neo-Malthusian population control strategies. It is also a means of enhancing the magnitude of world capital accumulation by re-structuring the basis of the dependent relationship between the centre and periphery of the World capitalist system.

In the first place, it is argued that the race between food production and population growth can only be won "... if backward agricultural systems in the third world are thoroughly modernized in the mold of the capitalist world's most efficient and productive food system: namely agribusiness."[61]

Secondly, it was also argued that in view of the decline of agricultural production in the third world and the food cirisis which led to famine in many areas of the underdeveloped world in the early seventies, there is a need to revolutionize the system of agricultural production in the third world. But this process cannot be accomplished with foreign bilateral or multilateral aid alone. For, developing countries could not be able to mobilize either internally or externally the

1700 billion dollars (US dollars) that the Food and Agricultural Organization estimates will be required to accelerate agricultural production over a twenty year period. Therefore, it was suggested that the developing countries should "... offer much more scope for investment from the private sector, with incentives for the inflow of foreign capital, which has shown itself as the most efficient user of land, labour and capital."[62]

Moreover, this strategy of agribusiness investment into third world agriculture was said to be necessary and in the interest of the industrialized countries themselves. For "commercial self-interest alone could well justify substantial investment by the industrial sector of the developed nations. For Western agribusiness companies facing depressed markets at home, developing nations represent the best potential area for growth. Laying the basis for economic takeoff in the third world, development of the South's agriculture would help open a market of three billion people to the exports of the North. Exploiting this huge, untapped potential may be a partial solution to the developed economies' problems of recession and unemployment."[63]

Agribusiness strategy, therefore, is said to be beneficial to both parties in the development process. The strategy itself entails the linking of agriculture to industry whereby

increases in productivity are achieved through the application of technology and agricultural production comes increasingly to resemble industrial production. It is a strategy of penetrating third world agriculture through the vertical integration of the entire production process, (production, processing and marketing) the real basis of which is the ownership of the technological process and of the knowhow of efficient management.[64]

The era of agribusiness entails not only the modernization of agriculture, but also the transfer of the capitalist model of economic development and social relations which in the final analysis means the elimination of 'inefficient' small scale peasant producer by progressively separating him from his means of production - land.

Agribusiness firms are mainly of three types: "firms manufacturing inputs for world-wide agricultural production; firms engaged in agricultural production and/or marketing; and firms engaged in ancilliary activities and services such as advertising, technical assistance, feasibility studies, legal advice and technology transfers."[65] The strategy of their penetration and integration of third world agriculture, takes one or a combination of the following forms:

(1) Direct integration of agricultural production through investments in land to assure direct production of agricultural commodities as in plantations.

(2) Direct integration of agricultural production through the purchase and opening of virgin lands.

(3) Quasi integration through purchase by intermediaries or rental of agricultural land.

(4) Contracts with local producers who receive credit for the purchase of machinery, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and other inputs from the agribusiness and agree to deliver all or part of their harvests to the latter for processing and/or commercialization.

(5) Triangulation, i.e., the linking of industry, management, and technical resources with developing country partners and third party finance. This is especially in the form of linking up developing countries that undertake large-scale infrastructural development through irrigation projects and the like, local agricultural producers and foreign agribusiness, which arrange for financing through the world bank or syndicated loans. Agribusiness, in this regard, undertakes processing and distribution of produce it receives under contract from the partners.[66]

Agribusiness strategy is even more necessary for capitalist accumulation since for input manufacturers it means more market for farm equipment and inputs, as the European and North American firms are almost entirely mechanized and the market highly saturated. For production-oriented firms it means increased production through the employment of cheap labour and efficient utilization of inputs for higher returns. For example inputs such as fertilizers have a threshold, or what is referred to

as fertilizer response curve. This means that yields increase dramatically for the first few kilos of fertilizer applied, but at the higher end of the scale the returns start diminishing. "Thus the first 20 kilos of nitrogen applied yields some 250 extra kilos of grain, but at the end of the scale, one kilo of nitrogen yields just one incremental kilo of grain. With fertilizer use having reached these upper limits in many developed countries, experts are beginning to question whether it may not become increasingly economical to grow crops in those developing countries where fertilizer use still holds out the prospect of major increases in yields."[67]

The expansion of the activities of the input producing and production oriented firms, moreover, has the potentiality of increasing the business of their partners engaged in ancilliary services, i.e., the advertisers, consultants, the lawyers, etc. Agribusiness is therefore, the strategy of universalizing the capitalist mode of production by penetrating and integrating third world agriculture, which is the last bastion of pre or non-capitalist relations of production. This we argue is necessary in view of the nature and dimension of the accumulation crisis facing both the centre and periphery of the world capitalist system.

It is only by understanding the nature of these changes in the strategy of capital accumulation, that we can comprehend and appreciate the current policies and transformations currently going on in Nigeria's agriculture.

Impact on Domestic Policies and Strategies

A development strategy is the conscious direction of state policies and actions towards certain specific objectives, the attainment of which are thought by those in power to bring about desirable changes in the structure of society and economy. It seeks through conscious actions to effect fundamental changes in the structure of social relations. These relations are generated by the way men relate to each other in the process of production and exchange. The success of any development strategy therefore, is contingent upon the extent to which it has achieved its objectives.

However, the direction of state policies and actions cannot be neutral, since the state itself is not. For every society is composed of men who enter into definite relations with one another in the process of production and exchange. Groups of men become united in the process of re-producing their social and material existence, and come to share objective interests independent of their will. These groups

or socio-economic classes unite for political action not because they belong to the same family, tribe, region or religion, but because they want to maintain, enhance or alter their destiny, which is in turn shaped by the position they occupy in the process of production.

In other words, social classes unite for political struggle not because of power as such, but because the control of power gives them access to the control of the state. They use this as a tool to articulate, entrench and enhance their social and economic interests, and prevail over other contending social classes in society.

However, the nature and intensity of the political struggle, and the ideology employed by each contending class for the attainment of its objectives, is determined by the mode of production and the level of development of the forces of production. For the mode of production and the level of development of productive forces circumscribe the level at which certain other classes are able to unite for political action. In other words they can set limits to class consciousness and class action. This we have seen regarding the isolation of the peasantry from each other in the process of producing simple commodities.

Therefore, the choice of a particular agricultural development strategy is to a large extent determined by the nature and outcome of the struggle between socio-economic groups for the control of the sources of power and appropriation of wealth created in the production process. The direction of agricultural policy at any given time in Nigeria today is hence a product of the objective interests of the social class which controls the political process, and this social class, as we have seen above, is essentially a nationalist bourgeoisie dependent for its existence on foreign capitalist accumulation processes.

Therefore, a strategy of development is not neutral. It is a product of the distribution of power; distribution of power is determined by the manner in which the means of producing wealth are controlled.

This contention is based on the principle that the state is not a neutral entity which articulates and balances different interests of all the contending socio-economic groups. To the contrary, the state is but an instrument of power and coercion wielded by the social class which exercises control over the means of production and thus organizes the distribution of power and wealth.

The state is thus a stage on which policies are articulated in the objective interests of those in power, irrespective of whether such policies injure, oppress and/or marginalize other socio-economic groups not so favourably placed with regards to the control of the means of production and appropriation of the products of labour.

The current strategy of agricultural development in Nigeria goes under the slogan of the Green Revolution. This is a typical agribusiness oriented development strategy. This strategy is two-fold: - "First it encourages private enterprenuers to establish large-scale farms, keeping the Government's role in such ventures lower than previously. Existing fiscal incentives for foreign investors have been bolstered by a relaxation of the indigenization Act requirements for agricultural enterprises, lowering the required Nigerian stakes from 60 percent to 40 percent. Parastatals will continue to operate large-scale projects but their economic results will be more carefully monitored.

"Secondly, ... the Green Revolution seeks to improve the productivity of the previously ignored small holders. The main vehicle for peasant assistance in the program of integrated Agricultural Development Project (ADPs). Originally introduced in Nigeria by the World Bank and under the Green Revolution

implemented through a tripartite (triangulation) arrangement involving the Bank and the Federal and State Governments, the ADPs provide peasants with farm inputs (fertilizers, chemicals, seeds, simple machinery) training, credit facilities, roads, irrigation schemes, etc. The Green Revolution plan is to extend these existing projects to the whole of Nigeria". Already nine ADPs have so far cost ₦1.1 billion, of which ₦520 million was contributed as a loan by the World Bank.[68]

Agribusiness investment, moreover, is a priority area in the administration of incentives. The Government welcomes agribased food production and processing industries such as "cattle ranching and meat processing; dairy industries; fruit growing and fruit-juice production; rice plantation and milling; sugar complexes; forest plantations and wood-work complexes; plantation and processing of cocoa, groundnuts, coffee and cotton."[69]

From this we can see that the policy is directed towards linking Nigeria's agriculture with agribusiness in basically two ways. The first is in the direction of triangulation between the Nigerian agricultural sector with agribusiness through the world bank or consortiums of world finance capital advancing syndicated loans. The second is in form of direct investments in agricultural production and processing by agribusiness corporations, heavily subsidized by the state.

The whole strategy is mainly organized by United States-Nigeria Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee under the Joint Chairmanship of Mr Orville Freeman, a former US Agriculture Secretary and President of Business International, and Alhaji Ahmed Joda. This committee links agribusiness corporations with both the Government, its parastatals such as the River Basin Development Authorities and Nigerian 'businessmen'.

In fact, between October 1979 and July 1982, the Federal Government alone was said to have spent over ₦2 billion in its Green Revolution Program.[70] The Federal Government alone was said to be in foreign debt of up to ₦5 billion while external borrowing by states by August 1982 has reached up to about 3 billion Naira and the borrowing binge continues.[71]

Fertilizer consumption has risen from 80,000 tons in 1975 to over one million tons in 1980. In 1981 alone loans totalling ₦78.97 million have been advanced for over 211 agricultural enterprises. This was in addition to the ₦55.0 million loaned to large-scale farmers through the River Basin Development Authorities. The Government in 1981 also guaranteed loans totalling ₦33 million from commercial banks for 1,224 medium level projects.[72] This shows the extent to which

the government is subsidizing capital accumulation by agribusiness firms, in form of subsidies for production oriented schemes involved with massive purchases of agricultural inputs and machinery from the input manufacturing corporations.

The promotion of the integration of Nigeria's agriculture into agribusiness, which is the essence of Government's policy is bound to have far reaching consequences for the structure of society and economy. The River Basin Development Projects for example have led to massive displacement of the peasantry,[73] and the Integrated Rural Development Projects are in the process of squeezing out the small holder and strengthening both the power and resource base of the 'progressive farmers'.[74] In fact, it is true to say that the "... World Bank's objective ... is to be another 'honest broker' in the natural alliance of agribusiness and the rural rich."[75]

Agribusiness strategy therefore aims at vertically integrating agriculture into capitalist production relations and liquidating the peasantry by proletarizing them in the process. This strategy in Nigeria has led to massive displacement, leading to the marginalization of the peasantry through alienating them from the land. Land alienation is currently taking place on a large-scale. This alienation takes the form of Government and Local Government acquisitions for various 'public' and private projects, and large-scale privatization, i.e., enclosure of common lands.[76]

This is important in that this strategy of development and it impact in the rural areas led to the extension of state authority, and bureaucracy into the rural areas thereby exacerbating the conflict between the nationalist bourgeoisie and the peasantry. Moreover, massive land alienation and usurpation of common lands limit the frontiers of expansion (i.e., natural increase) of the peasantry. Hence they are forced to turn inwards or migrate to seek elusive urban employment opportunities. These employment prospects are elusive because agriculture's integration into agribusiness does not also entail internal integration within the domestic economy. This development strategy in the final analysis leads to:

(a) increasing poverty and misery of the displaced peasantry;

(b) lumpen proletarization of a large section of the peasantry in urban slums;

(c) increasing land conflicts among the peasants who still cling to their ever reducing land portions;

(d) increases in rural landlessness;

(e) increases in large-scale land alienation and consolidation by the rich and powerful;

(f) social and political instability in the nation.

In short, "the two sides of the agribusiness coincides increased profits for the controlling multinationals and their banks, and widespread poverty and starvation for the masses - characterize those third world regions submitted to 'development' under agribusiness."[77]

The whole process of agricultural development under agribusiness control is therefore, the subsidization of capital accumulation by multinational corporations.

FOOTNOTES

1. cf. Liman, M. "Prospects and Problems of Agricultural Development in the Eighties" ABU, Public Lecture, July 29th 1982, pp. 2-4.

   Abdullahi, A. "The Problem and Prospects of Green Revolution for Agricultural and Rural Development in Nigeria: Technical and Environmental Perspectives" in G.O. Abalu et. al. (eds) Green Revolution in Nigeria? NNPC Zaria, Forthcoming.

2. Liman, M. op. cit. p. 4.
   cf. Norman, D.W. et. al., Farming Systems in the Nigerian Savanna: Research and Strategies for Development, Westview Press, Boulder, 1982, p. 1.

3. Eicher, C.K., "Facing up to Africa's Food Crisis." Foreign Affairs Vol. 61, No. 1, 1982.

4. World Bank, World Development Report 1982, IBRD.
   cf. Norman, D.W. et. al., op. cit. "Reliance on Oil Revenues with the Government's directed emphasis on Infrastructure, Education and Industrialization has promoted significant growth in all sectors but agriculture." p. 1.

5. Norman, D.W., et. al., op. cit. p. 3.

6. Eicher, C.K. op. cit., p. 170. For the Farming Systems Approach see Norman, et. al., op. cit.

7. Osoba, S.O. "Income Distribution in Nigeria: Which way? Address delivered at a Symposium of the Nigerian Economic Society, Kaduna, October, 1981.

8. Eicher, C.K., op. cit., p. 15.

9. Marx, K. Capital Vol. I, p. 531.

10. Marx, K. Capital Vol. I, op. cit., p. 544.

11. Frank, A.G. Crisis: In the Third World, Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1981. p. ix.

12. From the mid 1930's to early 1950's it led to tremendous increases in the production of raw materials and food products. This led several scholars to defend it as a viable system of production. These theorists essentially contend that colonization and the resultant integration of the peasantry into the world capitalist system gave the former a vent through which they can utilize excess productive resources to produce goods which they can dispose through exchange. This, it was erroneously argued, led and can still lead to phenomenal productivity increases in agriculture. The vent-for-surplus theory is, however, both unrealistic and ahistorical because it totally ignores the socio-historical basis on which such productivity increases were possible. It assumed that the factors of production were in surplus, while neglecting the fact that the organization of relationships between men in the process of controlling such forces led to their under-development and restricted their expansion and the achievement of productivity increases after a certain stage had been reached. The vent-for-surplus theory essentially led to the glorification of colonial policies which led to the pauperization of the peasantry. For a statement of the arguments for the vent-for-surplus theory, see:

Hla Myint, Economic Theory and the Under-developed Countries, 1971.

Heilleiner, G., Traditional Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria.

Hogendorn, J.S., "The Vent-for-Surplus Model and African Cash Crop Agriculture" SAVANNA, Vol 5, 1976, pp. 15-28.

For one of the best critisms of the vent-for-surplus theory, see:

Freund, W.M. and R.W. Shenton, "Vent-for-Surplus Theory and the Economic History of West Africa", SAVANNA, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1977. pp. 191-196.

13. See Voh, J.P., "Farm Technology Adoption Among Farmers in Gusau Agricultural Development Project Villages." Invited Paper at the CSER Seminar on Development Issues 21-22nd January, 1981.

    Also see Banta, T.A. An On-farm Evaluation of the Improved Sorghum Production Technology in the GCP Areas. Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis, Dept. of Agric. Econ. & Rur. Soc., ABU, Zaria, 1982.

14. K. Marx Quoted in David MacLellan, Marx's Grundrisse, Granada Publishing, London, 1971. p. 31.

15. See Tukur, M.M. The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States: 1892-1914. Ph.D. Thesis, Dept. of History, ABU, Zaria, 1979.

    Also, Hill, Poly, Population Prosperity and Poverty: Rural Kano 1900-1970, Cambridge University Press, London, 1977.

16. Tukur, M.M. op. cit., p. 335.

17. Hill, P. op. cit., pp. 9-10.

18. Kaura Namoda Area was however, one of the exceptions to this rule. The fief-holding dynasty, from which the district heads of Kaura, Zarni and Moriki descended was made up of local Fulani group which participated and led the Jihad in the area. For a good account of this, see A.G. Na-Dama "Urbanization in the Sokoto Caliphate: A Case Study of Gusau and Kaura Namoda" in Y.B. Usman (ed) Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate, Third Press International, Lagos, 1979.

19. Hill, Poly, op. cit., p. 8.

20. M.M. Tukur, op. cit., p. 368.

21. Kaura Namoda District Note Book, No. 33, Sokoto History Bureau.

22. Zurmi District Note Book No. 51, Sokoto History Bureau.

23. Tukur, M.M. op. cit., pp. 374-388.

24. Quoted in P. Hill, op. cit., p. 39.

25. Tukur, M.M. pp. 444-448.

26. See District Note Books 33, 41 and 51 for Kaura Namoda, Moriki and Zurmi Districts respectively.

27. Moriki District Note Book, No. 41, Sokoto History Bureau.

28. Kaura Namoda District Note Book No. 33, Sokoto History Bureau.

29. The nature of the Political repression that followed can be seen in Files No. KNLG/7B/1m KNLG/7A/19/104, KNLG/7D/27/83, KNLG/7B/2/7, KNLG/7D/13/36, KNLG/7D/27/84, KNLG/7D/12/34, Sokoto History Bureau.

30. Tafawa-Balewa, A., Speech on the Floor of the Northern Nigerian House of Assembly, August, 1950, Reprinted in the Sunday Triumph, 12th September, 1982.

31. Marx, K. Capital Vol. I, op. cit., p. 555.

32. Gutkind, P.C.W. and Wallerstein "Introduction" in Gutkind and Wallerstein (eds). The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1976.

33. Hopkins, A.G. Economic History of West Africa, Longmans, London, 1973. p. 164.

34. McPhee, The Economic Revolution in British West Africa, Frank Cass & Co., London, 1926 (1971)

35. Hopkins, A.G., op. cit., p. 165.

36. McPhee, A., op. cit., p. 16.

37. Na-Dama, A.G., Urbanization in the Sokoto Caliphate, op. cit., p. 158.

38. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 199.

39. For a good account of this era see Alan McPhee, op. cit., and A.G. Hopkins, op. cit.

40. Hopkins, A.G., op. cit., p. 254.

41. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 267. This further shows that the proceeds from export growth further increased the dependency relationship. Capital is accumulated by foreign industrial and merchant firms and not by agriculture.

42. Heilleiner, G.K. "The Fiscal Role of Marketing Boards in Nigerian Economic Development" in Eicher and Liedholm (eds) op. cit., p. 122.

43. Berry, S. & Liedholm, C., "Performance of the Nigerian Economy, 1950-1962" in Eicher and Liedholm (eds) op. cit., p. 62.

44. Heilleiner, G.K. in Eicher and Liedholm (eds), op. cit., p. 133.

45. Heilleiner, G.K., in Eicher and Liedholm (eds), op. cit., p. 124.

46. Northern Nigeria, A White Paper on the Northern Nigeria Military Government's Policy for the Comprehensive Review of the Past Operations and Methods of the Northern Nigerian Marketing Board, Government Printer, Kaduna, 1967, p. 4.

47. Northern Nigeria: A White Paper. Ibid., p. 11.

48. Northern Nigeria, Ibid., p. 6. Furthermore, among the agricultural activities the Board was said to be engaged in, was the subsidization of the supply of fertilizers. The Board committed £219,000 in 1964/65, and £340,800 in 1965/66 for this purpose. But this claim was found to be bogus in that "by a slight adjustment in price paid to farmers, of less than one-tenth of a penny per pound (lb) the cost of subsidy is recovered." p. 4.

49. Northern Nigeria: A White Paper on the Military Government's Policy for the Reorganization of the Northern Nigerian Development Corporation Government Printer, Kaduna, 1967. p. 2.

50. Northern Nigeria, Ibid., p. 2.

51. Northern Nigeria, Ibid., p. 4.

52. Northern Nigeria, Ibid., p. 34.

53. Northern Nigeria, Ibid. p. 34.

54. Northern Nigeria, Ibid., p. 40.

55. With oil as the new growth sector, the Eastern Region of this country became the coveted prize. The Northern, Western and later even a section of the Eastern Nigeria dependent bourgeoisie not only single mindedly supported the Nigerian Army to fight the rebels but also quarrelled with their masters the multinationals and their Governments who were aiding the rebellion in their own interests. This was unthinkable in 1954. The creation of States of 1967 which was welcomed everywhere provided for a fragmented Federal structure which inevitably implied a very strong central Government.

56. Burbach, R. and Flynn, P. Agribusiness in the Americas. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1980, p. 16.

57. Frank, A.G. Crisis in the Third World, op. cit., p. 65.

58. Quoted in Matthew, C. "Agribusiness in the Developing World: Meeting Food Needs in the Year 2000." Agribusiness Supplement News Week, August, 16th, 1982.

59. Matthews, C. Ibid., p. 1.

60. Matthews, C. Ibid., p. 2.

61. Burback, R. and Flynn, P. op. cit., p. 12.

62. Matthews, C. op. cit., p. 2.

63. Matthews, C. op. cit., pp. 2-3.

64. Erich Jacoby: Quoted in Frank, A.G. Crisis in the Third World, op. cit., p. 91.

65. Ernest Feder, Quoted in A.G. Frank, Crisis in the Third World, op. cit., p. 79.

66. Frank, A.G. Crisis in the Third World. op. cit., pp. 79-81.

67. Matthews, C. op. cit., p. 5.

68. Federal Department of Information "Advertisement in New African No. 182, November, 1982, p. 71.

69. Federal Department of Information, Ibid., p. 66.

70. Nigerian Standard, 7th July, 1982.

71. New Nigerian, 5th August, 1982.

72. Federal Department of Information, op. cit., p. 72.

73. cf. Voh, J.P. Resettlement Adjustment Patterns to Rural Development Programs: The Case of Tiga Dam in Kano State of Nigeria. Ph.D. Thesis, Iowa State University, Ames, 1980.

Raza, M.R. & Y.A. Abdullahi, Irrigation Schemes and the Agrarian Structure: A Re-specification of the Impact of the Structure of Landholding and Land Use Patterns of Agricultural Development. Proceedings of the Sixth National Irrigation Seminar AERLS, ABU, Zaria, 1979.

Wallace, T., Rural Development Through Irrigation: Studies in a Town on the Kano River Project. CSER/ABU, Zaria, 1978.

74. D'Silva, B.C. and M.R. Raza, "Integrated Rural Development in Nigeria: the Funtua Project." Food Policy, November, 1980.

75. Frank, A.G. Crisis in the 3rd World, op. cit., p. 85.

76. See Kaduna State of Nigeria, Report of the Land Investigation Commission, Vols. 1-16, Government Printer, Kaduna.

77. Frank, A.G. Crisis in Third World, op. cit., p. 87.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The development and expansion of capitalism on a world scale is one of the most central features of human history in the 20th century. This led to the establishment of various forms of dependency relationships between the central capitalist nations and the rest of the world. These relationships have always been based on political domination and/or economic exploitation, facilitated mainly through unequal trading relationships, i.e., unequal exchange.

These relationships led eventually to the division of the capitalist world into central and peripheral areas. The extraction and transfer of economic surplus from the periphery to the centre progressively led to development, i.e., industrial and technical growth in the latter and underdevelopment, i.e., stagnation and poverty in the former.

This development has been a subject of interesting and intense scholarship and debate. Lenin's "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism"[1] is one of the most important precursors of this debate and scholarship. Analysis of the development of the internal structures of the central formations

of capitalism has been the subject of many treaties, one of the most recent being Baran and Sweezy's analysis of American capitalist social and economic order.[2]

Analysis of the relationships between the central and peripheral capitalist formations can be seen from many works, among which are those of Baran,[3] Frank,[4] Nkrumah,[5] and Amin,[6] just to mention a few. As regards to the nature of the structural and exploitative relationships established within the peripheral formations themselves, the works of Amin, Colin Leys, Lionel Cliffe, etc., (Africa) Scott Cook, C.D. Scott, etc., (Latin America) and several other works on Asia are very important and instructive.[7]

Suffice it to say that these central peripheral relationships, i.e., the articulation process, led to the emergence of new basis, and forms of relations of production within the periphery, which are distinct from pure capitalist relations of production. Relations of production in general indicate the relationship between men established in the whole process of reproduction. These are seen in the nature of labour, property and product relationships and how they manifest themselves within a social formation. This serves as an indicator to the general problem of surplus creation and

appropriation, and also the position of various social groups and individuals in this complex structure, in terms of their different roles in the social process of reproduction.

The present work is a general attempt in this direction with specific reference to agriculture. What we have attempted to do here is to present a general framework for the understanding of the nature of the relations of production as they manifest themselves in peasant agriculture, subordinated to the needs for capital accumulation by the world/domestic capitalist system.

To this end, chapter one dealt with a review of general bourgeoisie theories of economic, agricultural and rural development. In this we showed the inadequacies of these theories in their attempts to explain the problems of agricultural and rural development in the periphery. We noted that the conceptual framework adopted in these studies, which regard peasant agriculture as essentially a problem of dualism, between peasant 'traditional' and capitalist 'modern' sectors. These analytical shortcomings, we feel, are the result of utilizing concepts which are only applicable when analyzing a pure capitalist mode of production.

Thus we went on in chapter two to introduce a conceptual framework based on a different level of abstraction, in terms of the distinction between products as exchange-values

(commodities) and as use-values (subsistence). We went further to show the differences between capitalist commodity production and simple commodity production. Furthermore, we briefly showed the historical development of commodity production in our area of study; and its articulation with foreign firms in their middlemen role, as the main link in the chain of incorporation-marginalization syndrome characteristic of the relationships between the peasantry and world capitalism.

Utilizing our case study of labour and property relations in three villages of our study area in chapter three, we showed that institutions for the control of labour and property relations which best facilitate the maximization of surplus expropriation from peasant agriculture, are not those associated with industrial capitalism. In other words the nature of labour and property relations existing in peasant agriculture, are those which best facilitate the maximization of exploitation of the peasants.

This is seen in the progressive break-up of composite families as production groups and their replacement by individual or nuclear family ownership of the means of production and as the basis of production organization. This led to progressive sub-division of farms into small plots and the fragmented nature of landholding. This furthermore, attests to the isolation of producers from each other at the level of production and

consequently the destruction of every form of free communal/ co-operative labour. Labour becomes drudgery and time consuming; because it is individualistic and isolated and it also becomes a commercial activity subject to being purchased and sold. Generally, this is indicative of the non-development of productive forces outside agriculture, and the backward technical and other factor conditions operating within it.

Chapter four indicates the nature of product relations, i.e., the question of structures for surplus extraction from agriculture, arising from the sale of agricultural produce and purchase of manufactured products. Here we can see that the conventional role of commerce in a developed capitalist economy is not the same as in the peripheral formations. For the commercial sector in the latter is the nucleus of the relations of exploitation. It is the channel through which surplus created by the peasant producers is extracted, and is the main centre of capital accumulation within the domestic economy. This form of internal accumulation through merchants' capital is by its very nature unproductive. In other words, the central and peripheral capitalist modes have incorporated agriculture in such a way that capitalist development takes place at the expense of agriculture and those directly engaged in agricultural production.

The lack of organization of the small producers, and consequently their weak power position, and also the fact that they are paid low prices for what they are able to produce and pay high prices for what they are in a position to buy, led to a situation in which the producer is put under the control of merchant/industrial capital and the State. He is constantly forced to maximize his own exploitation, in the form of increasing his productivity not in order to maximize his profits, but to cover his expenses and meet his mounting debts.

The extraction of economic surplus from peasant agriculture under the aegies of commerce, (i.e., at the level of circulation) was accomplished without the capitalists or merchants assuming the ownership of the means of production; without any substantial capital outlay except organizational, transportation costs etc., (which in fact are passed on to the consumers-peasants and workers). This leads to appropriation without responsibility, and exploitation without redress.

Any system of production can only last so long as it helps, or at least does not hinder the unfolding and full exploitation of the productive forces of society. A system of production becomes a hindrance or a fetter to production whenever it only exists by preventing the expansion of production, and by wasting that it has already produced. Such is the predicament of peasant agriculture producing simple commodities.

Therefore, we can see clearly that the failure of agricultu to develop, and the conditions accounting for its stagnation, the poverty, and the abysmal misery of the producers, are not as a result of its being 'traditional', but as a result of its backward internal characteristics and organization, and by the way it is subordinated in exploitative relationships with foreign/domestic commercial and industrial capital. In fact it is this subordination and exploitative relations which account for the backwardness of its internal organization and characteristics. But its backwardness, on the other hand, also facilitates the smooth operation of the exploitative system. For underdevelopment is peripheral capitalism, and vice versa.

Chapter five argues that, given the nature of productive factor and exchange arrangements, and the fact that capital accumulation takes place at the expense of agriculture, there arose a major crisis in the agrarian system. The result of this crisis can be seen from the progressive decline of agricultural production to the point where the nation increasingly becomes dependent on external sources for its food and agricultural raw materials. But the real causes of the crisis is the breakdown of the process of capital accumulation brought about by a combination of the disarray of production forces and the dependent nature of the accumulation process itself. We conclude that current

development policies and strategies are designed to facilitate the vertical integration of the agricultural sector with agribusiness, controlled by foreign multinational corporations. The result of this is State subsidization of the process of capital accumulation by agribusiness corporations and the progressive pauperization and marginalization of the peasantry.

However, it may be said that it is unproductive, if not down right irresponsible for us to present such a general criticism of this dimension without suggesting some humble, even if politically unacceptable, recommendations on how to tackle the problem of achieving a long-term and sustained agricultural development and the consequent elevation of the living standards of our people.

Recommendations

Development is social change, the transcendence of the existing. Progressive social change means structural and institutional transformations leading to the elimination of the structures of domination and institutions of exploitation. Thus it means fundamental reorganization of social relations and re-establishing them on new, more democratic, and for the people, more materially beneficial basis. Agricultural development implies fundamental social changes and reorganization

of production relations. This is a multidimensional process affecting all aspects of social existence. Thus it is both political and economic. We cannot expect a long-term and sustained agricultural development without simultaneously effecting changes in other areas of the social structure. For social life is not compartmentalized into independent sectors. The sum of social life is the interdependence of all its aspects, social, economic, political, etc.

Therefore, agricultural development has to do with the dismantling and reorganization of the basis of the relationship between men with regards to labour, property, and products of labour. Changing product relationship means putting the producers in charge of their products, i.e., abolishing exploitation by marketing structures at the level of circulations. Changing labour and property relations, means reorganization of the forces of production, i.e., the structure of the land holding and the mode of labour organization. This leads to freeing these forces from the shackles imposed on them as a result of their internal characteristics. This opens them up for more fundamental technical changes.

This transformation can be achieved at two levels both of which seek to alter simultaneously the current nature of production relations. The first level and the most immediate

is that concerned with changing product relationships. This means dismantling the Marketing Board and Licenced Buying Agents structures, from agricultural marketing, at all levels. These can be replaced by democratically constituted producers' marketing cooperatives. The cooperatives can be organized at the Local Government Area level as the highest form of organization with similar ones at the district and village or settlements level. At each level, they should be organizations of the producers, by the producers and for the benefit of the producers. All functionaries are elected by the producers in open elections at each level.

They should be in-charge of dealing directly with foreign or domestic processors and manufacturers. The state should have no hands in slecting or nominating their leaders. The influence of traditional chiefs, merchants, and Kulaks, etc., should be limited in the cooperatives.

Each cooperative is responsible for the disbursement of proceeds of sales to its member farmers, according to the value of their input and output. Any surplus minus genuine organization expenses, is to be used on projects, social services, etc., unanimously agreed upon by the member-farmers. The cooperatives are solely in-charge of employing their own workers and other administrative and technical staff. They should also constantly

hold meetings at every level and arrive at democratic decisions through open debates.

Thus they should eventually evolve into centres of popular control of political power in their respective areas. They can simultaneously provide the channels through which the sale of manufactured products takes place. They in this regard, establish their own cooperative shops in every village and in every settlement where basic goods needed by the people can be sold at a cheap and fixed prices. There will be no need for special agents, for price controls, because the prices will be socially controlled.

From marketing cooperatives and centres of popular control of political power, the cooperatives simultaneously move into the area of production. For long term and sustained agricultural development means challenging the constraints brought about by labour and property relations. Here the cooperatives enter their second phase. Since no fundamental agricultural development can take place on the basis of the small farm structure, the backward technology, and producer isolation; these problems have to be positively challenged.

In this regard, we propose the setting-up of large and self-sustaining collective farms in each village, uniting all producers as equal partners. They decide what they want to produce, labour together and all proceeds from that labour be returned to the workers. They can be responsible for farm investment, social services, such as education, basic health care for the communities with the assistance of the state. They can also establish rurally based processing and other industries from their surpluses. These industries may be able to absorb the surplus labour which may eventually emerge at the rural level as a result of farm mechanization. The establishment of rural industries by the rurally based cooperatives can effectively check the problem of rural-urban migration.

These cooperatives are thus on the whole, producing and marketing concerns, local political authorities based on peoples democratic power, providers of social services, and institutions of genuine rural development. Thus they need to be highly democratic with power diffused at every level of their operations.

The role of the state in this set-up is the provision of banking facilities, heavy industry, assistance to the various cooperatives and the general coordination of the activities of all the cooperatives.

Of course, in the process of this transformation, various problems are going to be encountered. But development is a problem solving process. Thus it needs political education and political will. Social changes leading to fundamental agricultural development mean political and economic reorganization of the whole society. Therefore, certain privileged classes and powerful groups, i.e., the present exploiters and their foreign allies and masters are bound to oppose this process, with force if need be. For no privileged class in history has ever presided over its own liquidation or stood without a fight.

Thus there are social groups who would not sit down idly to see the creation of self-supporting agricultural cooperatives uniting the peasantry on common lands. They regard this process an anathema to their class interests. They are bound to resist, but this resistance can be broken by peoples' power.

That is why this class of exploiters and their agents at present, conceive of a situation whereby agriculture can develop and the lives of the masses of this country improve without affecting the current organization of production relations and fundamentally our national peripheral capitalist orientation and the internal class structure which these presuppose.

They hence see the whole problem of underdevelopment in technical terms. But development is not a function of technology per se. Technology becomes important as an agent of change, only in so far as the social process and the nature of socio-economic and structural relationships permits it to operate unhindered. It is foolhardly for someone owning just two or three hectares of land to buy a tractor.

Therefore, a fundamental reorganization of the socio-economic structures within which agricultural production takes place, also means challenging the political and economic power position which the comprador bourgeoisie class in Nigeria and their bureaucratic underlyings, monopolize. We therefore, contend that fundamental development both agricultural, social and economic, presupposes the elimination of the current internal structures of political domination and economic exploitation and the freeing of our society and national economy from the shackles of world capitalist imperialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. cf. Lenin, V.I., Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. International Publishers, New York, 1939.

2. cf. Baran, P.A. and Sweezy, P.M. Monopoly Capital. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1966.

3. cf. Baran, P.A. The Political Economy of Growth. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1957.

4. cf. Frank, A.G., Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Monthly Review Press, New York, (1967) 1969.

5. Neo-colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism. Panaf Books, London (1965) 1971.

6. Amin, S., Accumulation on a World Scale, 2 Vols., Monthly Review Press, New York, 1975.

7. cf. Amin, S., Unequal Development: An Essay on the Peripheral Formation of Capitalism. The Harvester Press, Sussex, 1976.

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Kaura Namoda 7B

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Kaura Namoda 7C

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Kaura Namoda 7D

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File No. ZM/2 - Census.

File No. ZM/3 - Census.

APPENDIX A:

QUESTIONNAIRE SCHEDULE

(ENGLISH VERSION)

Questionnaire Number _____

Area Number _____

Name of Village _____

Name of Enumerator _____

Date and Place of Interview _____

==========

SECTION A: PERSONAL PARTICULARS OF RESPONDENTS

We would now wish to start by asking you some questions about yourself and your family.

---

1. Name _____
2. Age (Years) _____
3. Position in household[1] _____
4. Type of education: (Islamic/Western or none) _____
5. Level of education (if Western)[2] _____
6. Marital status[3] _____
7. No. of wives _____
8. No. of children _____
9. No. of other members of household _____
10. Total number in household _____
11. Total number of male work-force[4] _____

---

1. Maigida/Member
2. Adult education/junior primary/secondary/post secondary.
3. Single/married/widowed.
4. Excluding women and children (ONLY ABLE BODIED MALES IN THE HOUSEHOLD WHO ACTUALLY WORK ON THE FAMILY FARM OR OTHER FAMILY ENTERPRISE).

12. (a) Are there any members of your household who have migrated?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(b) (IF YES, FILL TABLE BELOW)

Name	Reason for Migration	New place of residence	*Frequency of contact with home

*Never/once in a year/twice in a year/constant.

(c) Do the migrants contribute anything to the welfare of the household?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(d) (IF "YES", ASK:) What do they contribute?

Send money all the time 0

Send some money sometimes 1

Send some money regularly 2

Come home every rainy season to participate in production 3

Other (specify) _____

13. (a) Do you approve of members of your household migrating?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(b) (IF "YES", ASK:) Why do you approve?

_____

_____

(c) (IF "NO", ASK:) Why don't you approve?

_____

_____

14. (a) From among the following social groups what group do you consider yourself to belong to?

Commoner's (Talakawa	0
Islamic Mallams' class	1
Rich or well to do people (Tajirai)	2
Businessmen and Traders	3
Noblemen (Yan sarauta and masu sarauta)	4
Chiefs	5

(b) (IF BELONGING TO ANY OF THE ABOVE GROUPINGS ASK:)

Does belonging to such a group contribute to your agricultural or any other productive endeavour?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(c) (IF "YES", ASK:) In what way?

_____

_____

(d) (IF "NO", ASK:) Why not?

_____

_____

SECTION B: PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY

Sub-section i - farm tenure and ownership

15. (a) Do you regard farming as your central or main occupation?

Farming only	0
Farming and another occupation	1
Engaged in another occupation but not farming	2

(b) (IF NOT FARMING, ASK:) What then do you regard as your main occupation?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

(c) What other occupations do you pursue other than farming? (IF FARMING AND ALSO HAS ANOTHER OCCUPATION)

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

16. (a) (IF FARMING IS THE MAIN OCCUPATION, ASK:) On what type of land do you farm?

Family farm (GANDU) only	0
On personal (PRIVATE) farm only	1
On both private and family farm	2
No land on which to farm	3
Other (specify) _____	

(b) (IF RESPONDENT HAS NO PRIVATE FARMLAND, ASK:) Do you rent, or share crop on any farmland?

No	0 1
Borrowing farmland	1 1
Share cropping	2
Renting farmland	3

(c) (IF RESPONDENT HAS NO PRIVATE FARMLAND, ASK:) Why don't you have any farmland?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

17. (IF RESPONDENT HAS PRIVATE FARMLAND, FILL IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE)

No. of fields	Gandu/Private	Size (acres)	How obtained*
1st field			
2nd "			
3rd "			
4th "			
5th "			
6th "			
7th "			
8th "			
9th "			
10th "			

Codes

*(a) Inherited (b) Bought (c) Borrowed (d) Rented
(e) Share cropping (f) Gift

Sub-section ii - Farm Labour and Organization (Aikin gona da shirye-shirye).

18. Ta wace hanya ka ke samun aikara gonakin ka? (Explain the question by mentioning the different types of labour employed listed below and tick as many as he uses).

Ina yin aikin da kaina ☐

Iyalaina da 'yan uwana suke aikin ☐

Ina kiran gayya ☐

Ina daukar 'yan kwadago ☐

19. (Idan mai bada amsa ya nuna cewa yana yin aikin sa da kansa ne kawai, tambayeshi): Me ya sa kake yin aikin kai kadai? (rubuta duk dalilan da ya fada).

_____

_____

20. (a) (Idan mai bada amsa yana amfani da iyalinsa ko 'yan uwansa wajen yin aikin gona, tambayeshi):

A gidanka, mutanen nawa majiya karfi wadanda ke aikin gona ka ke dasu?

(Rubuta yawansu) _____

(b) Gonaki nawa ne kuke nomawa?

(Rubuta yawan gonakin) _____

(c) Kwanaki nawane, a takaice yakan dauke ku ku nome gonakin?

(Rubuta yawan kwanakin) _____

21. (a) (Idan mai bada amsa yana kiran gayya wajen aiki, tambayeshi): Sau nawane kake kiran gayya a cikin shekara daya?

Duk lokacin da akwai aikin yi	0
Sau daya a shekara	1
Sau biyu a shekara	2
Sau uku ko fiye da haka	3

(b) Ko kai ma ka kanje gayyar wadansu idan suka kira ka?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(c) Idan "I", tambayeshi): Kakan je ne da kanka ko kuma ka kan aika wadansu ne su wakilce ka?

Ni kan tafi da kaina	0
Ni kan aika wadansu su wakilce ni	1
Ni kan aika kudi ko abinci idan bana iya zuwa	2

(d) (Idan "A'a", tambayeshi): Me ya sa baka zuwa gayyar wadanda suka zo taka? (Rubuta duk dalilin da ya bayar).

_____

_____

22. Idan kayi niyyar kiran gayya wadanne kake kira?

Dukan mutanen unguwa ☐

'Yan uwa da abokan arziki kawai ☐

23. Ko ka yarda cewa gayya itace hanya mafi kyau da dacewa wadda talaka wanda baya iya daukar 'yan kwadago ko hayar galmar noma ta turawa zai iya yin aikin gonarsa da sauri?

Na yarda kwarai da gaske	0
Na yarda	1
Ban yarda ba	2
Ko alama ban yarda ba	3

24. (a) (Idan mai bada amsa yana hayar 'yan kwadago, tambayeshi): Daga ina kake dauko 'yan kwadago da suke yi ma aiki?

Ina zuwa cikin gari nemansu	0
Su kan zo gida na neman aiki	1
Abokaina sukan kawo min su	2
Ina aika wadansu su samosu	3
A wani gari nake zuwa in dauke su	4

(b) Kamar 'yan kwadago nawa ne kake dauka lokaci daya?

(Rubuta yawan 'yan kwadagon) _____

25. Ko su 'yan kwadagon suna zuwane cikin kungiya-kungiya ko kuma kana samo sune da dai-dai?

Suna zuwa kungiya-kungiya	0
Ina dauka da dai-dai	1
Ina dauka duk yadda na same su	2

26. (a) Ko kana jinga ne da su akan ko nawa zaka biya akan gona daya, ko kuma kana biyan su ne akan ko wace rana da suka yi maka aiki?

Ina jinga da su	0
Ina biyan su ko wace rana	1
Ya danganta akan yadda muka shirya	2

(b) CIKA TEBUR NA KASA:

Gonaki	Girman gonar (acres)	Yawan yan kwadago da ake so	Yawan kwanakin aiki	Kudin da kake biya
Gona ta daya				
Gona ta biyu				
Gona ta uku				
Gona ta hudu				
Gona ta biyar				
Gona ta shida				
Gona ta bakwai				
Gona ta takwas				
Gona ta tara				
Gona ta goma				

27. (a) Ko akwai wadansu abubuwan da kake ba 'yan kwadago bayan ka biya su kudin aikin da suka yi maka?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Wadanne irin abubuwa ne kake basu?

Ina basu abinci	0
Ina basu kayan aiki	1
Ina basu wurin kwana	2
Ina basu abinci, wurin kwana da kuma kayan aiki	3

28. Yaushe ne kake daukar 'yan kwadago?

Koda wane lokaci	0
Wani lokaci	1
Akai akai	2
Can ba'a rasa ba	3
Ban taba daukar 'yan kwadago	4

29. Idan kayi niyyar daukar 'yan kwadago wa kafi son ka dauka?

Wadanda suke zaune a unguwannan	0
Wadanda suka fito da wani gari neman aiki	1

30. Daga cikin wadannan, wadanne ne kake jin cewa zasu zama 'yan kwadago?

Wanda baya da gona	0
Wanda ya fito daga wata unguwa	1
Wanda baya da issashen abinci/ arziki	2
Malalaci	3
Wanda yake neman wata hanyar samun kudi	4

31. Ko kana ganin cewa abin kunya ne mutum ya zama dan kwadago?

I ☐

A'a ☐

32. (a) Ko ka taba aikin kwadago kai da kanka?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Ko har yanzu kana yiwa wadansu kwadago do su biya ka kudi?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(c) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Menene dalilin da yasa kake yin wannan kwadagon? (Rubuta dalilin da mai bada amsa ya fada).

_____

_____

Sub-section iii - Farming Technology

33. (A cika tebur na kasa akan kayan aikin noma)

Kayan aiki	**Yadda aka samu	Idan haya, daga wa/ina	Yawa Yawa	Kudin da aka saya idan saya aka yi
1. Hauya (fartanya)				
2. Garma				
3. Sungumi				
4. Lauje				
5. Gatari				
6. Garman shanu				
7. Motar noma				
8.				
9.				
10.				

**(a) saye (b) Aro (c) Haya (d) gado
(e) self-made (yayi da kansa).

34. Gwamnati a halin yanzu tana yin kokarin ta kawo kayan aikin noma irin na zamani, kamarsu garman shanu da motar noma don mutane wadanda ba za su iya sayen wadannan kayan ba, suyi haya.

(a) Ko ka san da wannan? I ☐ A'a ☐

(b) Ko kana ganin cewa wannan aikin da gwamnati ke yi yana da amfani?

Yana da amfani kwarai	0
Yana da amfani amma bamu san da shi ba	1
Baya da amfani	2
Ban sani ba	3

(c) (Idan yace yana da amfani, tambayeshi): Ko ka taba kokarin ka samu hayar garman shanu ko kuma motar noma?

I ☐ A'a ☐

(i) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Ko ka samu nasarar samun hayar?

Na samu nasara	0
Ban samu nasara	1
Na samu nasara amma bani da kudin biyan hayar	2

(ii) (Idan yace bai taba kokarin samun hayar wannan kayan ba, tambayeshi): Me yasa ba ka yi kokarin samun hayar kayan ba? (Rubuta dalilin da ya bayar).

_____

_____

35. (a) Ko kana amfani da takin zamani a gonarka?

I ☐ A'a ☐

(b) Ko kana amafani da maganin kwari a gonarka?

I ☐ A'a ☐

(c) (IDAN MAI BADA AMSA YA NUNA CEWA YANA AMFANI DA TAKIN ZAMANI KO MAGANIN KWARI, CIKA TEBUR NA KASA, IDAN BAYA YIN AMFANI DASU, WUCE ZUWA TAMBAYA TA 42).

ITEM	Yawan jikunan da akayi amfani da su a bara	Yawansu a bana	Kudin da aka sayi jika	Inda aka saya
Takin Zamani				
Maganin Kwari				

36. Ta yaya ka fara gane yin amfani da takin zamani, da/ko maganin kwari?

Daga wani dan'uwa ko aboki	0
Daga mallamin gona	1
Daga mallamin N.T.C.	2
Daga Radio ko jarida	3
Daga mai Unguwan mu	4
Bana iya tuna wa	5

37. A yanzu shekararka nawa kana amfani da takin zamani da/ko maganin kwari?

Shekarun amfani da takin zamani _____

Shekarun amfani da maganin kwari _____

38. (a) Akwai wanda ya taba nuna maka yadda yafi kyau kuma yafi dacewa ayi amfani da takin zamani ko maganin kwari?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) Idan akwai wanda ya taba nuna maka, wane ne?

i _____

ii _____

iii _____

39. Ko kana jin cewa albarkar gonarka ta karu tun lokacin da ka fara amfani da takin zamani ko maganin kwari?

Albarkar gona ta karu	0
Albarkara gona bata karu ba	1
A yanzu dai ban iya sani ba	2
Ban sani ba	3

40. (a) Ko ka yarda cewa takin zamani yana bada kayan gona masu kyau da albarkar gona mai yawa fiyeda takin mu na gargajiya?

Na yarda	0
Ban tabbata ba	1
Ban yarda ba	2

(b) (Idan ya yarda), Menene dalilin da yasa ka yarda? (Rubuta dalilin da ya bayar).

_____

_____

(c) (Idan bai yardaba ko kuma bai tabbata ba, tambayeshi): Me ya sa baka yarda ko baka tabbata ba? (Rubuta dalilin da ya bayar).

_____

_____

41. (a) Ko kana samun taimako da kuma shawarar wadanda suka kware wajen aikin noma?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (Idan haka ne, tambayeshi): Da ga wajen wa kake samun wannan taimakon? (Rubuta duk wadanda ya ce suna bashi shawara da taimako).

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

(c) (Idan yace yana samu ko baya samun wani taimako ko shawara, tambayeshi): Mene ne ra'ayinka akan ma'aikatar gona da kuma mallaman gona na kusa da unguwarku?

_____

_____

Sub-section iv - Crops, their production and disposition

42. CIKA WANNAN TEBUR DA YAKE A KASA

Kayan amfanin gona	Don abinci ko don sayarwa ko duka	Inda aka samo iri*	Gona, Tudu ko fadama (crop)	Mixed or Sole	Yawan albarkar gonar da aka samu bana**	Yawan albarkar gonar da aka samu a bara
Dawa						
Shinkafa						
Gero						
Masara						
Wake						
Gyada						
Auduga						
Taba						
Others: 1. _____						
2. _____						
3. _____						

*Inda aka samo iri -- (a) saye, (b) an aje iri daga aikin bara, (c) an saya daga gwamnati, (d) An samo kyauta, (e) An ramta.

**Yawan kayan gona/dami ko taiki ko buhu.

43. (a) Daga cikin kayan amfanin gona da kake girbawa, wadanne uku kake gani kafi dogara akan su?

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

(b) Wane dalili ne ya sa ka ke ganin kafi dogara a kansu? (Rubuta dalilan da mai bada amsa ya fada).

_____

_____

44. (a) (CIKA TEBUR WANDA YAKE A KASA)

Kayan amfanin Gona	Yawan abinda da sayar	Inda aka sayar	Wanda ya sayar
Dawa			
Shinkafa			
Gero			
Masara			
Wake			
Gyada			
Auduga			
Taba			
_____			
_____			
_____			

(b) Daga cikin kayan amfanin gona da aka tsara a sama, wadanne biyu kake gani kafi dogara akansu wajen samun kudi?

1. _____

2. _____

(c) A takaice kamar nawa kake samu wajen sayarda wadanan kayan amafanin gonar a shekara daya? (Rubuta yawan kudin da ya fada).

₦ _____

45. (a) Wadanne irin kayan amfanin gona ne kafi dogara akai, kayan abinci ko na sayarwa?

Kayan abinci	0
Kayan sayarwa	1
Kowanen su	2
Ba ko daya daga cikin su	3

(b) A wane lokaci ne a cikin shekara kake sayarda kayan amfanin gonarka na sayarwa kamar su gyada, auduga ko taba?

Lokacin girbi	0
Farkon rani	1
Karshen rani	2
Farkon damina	3
Karshen damina	4
Lokacin da duk bukata ta same ni	5

(c) Ko kana sayarda kayan amfanin gona da ka shuka don abinci?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(d) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Wane lokaci ne a cikin shekara kake sayarda wadannan?

Lokacin girbi	0
Farkon rani	1
Karshen rani	2
Farkon damina	3
Karshen damina	4
Lokacin da duk bukata ta same ni	5

46. (a) Ko kana sayan tsabar abinci wani lokaci a cikin shekara?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Ko kana iya gaya mana yawan tsabar abinci da kake saya a cikin shekara? (Rubuta yawan tsabar cikin: buhu/dami).

_____

(c) Wane lokaci ne a shekara kake sayen tsabar abinci?

Lokacin girbi	0
Farkon rani	1
Karshen rani	2
Farkon Damina	3
Karshen damina	4
Lokacin da duk bukata ta same ni	5

(d) Me kake yi da tsabar abinci da ka saya?

Ina amfani da ita don ci	0
Ina ajiyewa ne don sayarwa	1
Ina ajiyewa don ci nan gaba	2

(e) Ta wadanne haya ne kake kashe kudin da ka samu wajen sayarda kayan amfanin gonarka. (Rubuta duk hanyoyin da ya nuna yake kashe kudinsa).

_____

_____

SECTION C: TSIMI, KARBAR RANCE KO BASHI

47. (a) Ko kana ajiya wani sashen kayan amfanin gonarka ko kudin da ka samu wajen sayarda su?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Ta wace hanya kake ajiya?

Ta hanyar ajiyan kudi	0
Ina arawa mutane kudi	1
Ina sayen tsabar abinci don in sayar a qaba	2
Ina sayen dabobi don kiwo	3
Ajiya a rumbu	4

(c) (Idan "A'a", tambayeshi): Me ya sa baka yin ajiya? (Rubuta duk dalilan da ya fada).

_____

_____

48. Me kake yi da abinda ka ajiye? (Rubuta duk abinda mai bada amsa ya fada).

_____

_____

49. Ko kana da dabbobi ko tsuntsayen gida da ka ajiye don kiwo?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (Idan "I", Cika tebur a kasa).

Dabbobi ko tsuntsayen gida	Yawan su	*Amfanin da ake dasu	Kudinsu (idan kamar kayi niyyar sayar wa)
Dawaki			
Shanu			
Jakkai			
Tumaki			
Awaki			
Kaji			
Talo-talo			
Aqwaqwa			

*Don nishadi/daukar kaya/don sayarwa/don abinci/ don kiwo kawai/don aikin gona.

50. (a) Ko ka kan karbi bashi/rance daga wani wuri?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Daga ina kake samun bashi ko rancen?

Dan Banki	0
Daga gwamnati	1
Daga abokaina ko 'yan uwana	2
Daga masu bada bashi	3
Daga 'yan kasuwan unguwanmu	4
Daga kungiyar manoma	5

(c) Menene kake karba bashi?

Kudi	0
Tsabar abinci	1
Tsabar iri	2
Takin zamani/maganin kwari	3
Kayan aikin gona	4
Turamen lailai don tufafi	5

(d) Kamar nawa ne kake jin ake binka bashi wannan shekara? (Rubuta ko nawane)

N _____

51. Da me ne kake biyan bashin da ka dauka?

Da kudi	0
Da tsabar abinci	1
Da kayan amfanin gona na sayarwa	2
Da aikin kwadago	3

52. (a) A wane lokaci ne a cikin shekara kake ganin ka fi daukar bashi/rance?

Farkon rani	0
Karshen rani	1
Farkon damina	2
Karshen damina	3
Lokacin da duk bukata ta same ni	4

(b) Wane lokaci ne kake biyan bashi/rance da ke dauka?

Lokacin girbi	0
Karshen damina	1
Farkon damina	2
A cikin rani	3
Lokacin da duk na sami hali	4

(c) Me ne ne kake yi da bashin/rance da ka dauka? (Rubuta duk abinda mai bada amsa ya fada).

_____

_____

(d) Ko da akwai ruwa cikin bashin da kake karba?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(e) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Ko zaka iya gaya mana yadda ruwan yake? (Rubuta duk abinda ya fada).

_____

_____

SECTION D: - Halin Zaman Rayuwa da Hanyoyin Batarda Kudi

HOUSING:

53. (a) Kana zaune ne yanzu a gidanka da ka gida kai da kanka ko kuwa kana zaune ne a gidan gado tare da 'yan uwanka?

Cikin gidan da na gina da kai na	0
Cikin gidan gado	1
Ba gidan gado kuma bani da gidan kai na	2

(b) (Idan yana zaune ne a gidan kansa, tambayeshi): Ta yaya ne ka samu filin da ka gina shi?

Na saya ne	0
Na gade shi ne	1
Na samu ne kyauta	2

(c) Da waddane irin kayan gina ne ka gina gidan da kake zaune a cikinsa yanzu? (Rubuta dukkan kayan ginai da ya fada).

_____

_____

54. (a) Ko kana da wani gida bayan wanda kake ciki yanzu?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Gida nawa ne kake da su irin haka? (Tubuta yawan gida):

_____ _____

(c) Ko kana bayar da hayar wadannan gidaje ga wadansu?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(d) Ko kai kanka kana zaune ne a gidan haya?

I ☐

A'a ☐

55. (CONSUMER/LUXURY/DURABLES OWNED)

Cika wannan tebur akan duk irin kayan da mai bada amsa yake da su.

Kayan Alatu	Yawan su a gida	Kudinsu
Radio		
Agogon Tebur		
Agogon hannu		
Kekuna		
Babura		
Motar shiga		
Motocin haya ko na aiki		

56. Kamar nawa ne zaka iya kayyadewa kake batar wa wajen suturarka da ta iyalanka a cikin shekara? (Rubuta ko nawa ya fada a kasa).

_____

57. (a) Ko kana sayen abinci da kake ci koda yaushe?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Kamar nawa ne kake kashewa wajen abinci a rana daya? (Rubuta abinda yake kashewa a kasa).

₦ _____

(c) Kamar nawa kake kashewa wajen kayan miyar gidanka a rana daya? (Rubuta abinda yake kashewa a kasa).

₦ _____

SECTION E: - GENERAL QUESTIONS

58. (a) Ko kana jin dadin rayuwarka a cikin aikin noma?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Me ya sa kake jin dadinta? (Rubuta duk abinda ya fada a kasa).

_____

_____

(c) (Idan "A'a", tambayeshi): Me ya sa ba ka jin dabinta? (Rubuta duk abinda ya fada a kasa).

_____

_____

59. (a) Idan da kana da zabin wani aiki, ko zaka fi son ka bar aikin noma ka kama wani aiki?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (Idan "I", tambayeshi): Wadanne irin ayyukka ne daga cikin wadannan na kasa kake ganin kafi so fiyeda noma?

Ayyukka sune:

Aikin Gwamnati ☐
Kasuwanci ☐
Aikin masanaiantu ☐
Aikin siyasa ☐
Sarauta ☐

(A Saka "X" a cikin akwati a sama akan duk ayyukkan da mai bada amsa ya ke ganin yafi so fiyeda noma).

60. (a) Ko kana son 'ya'yanka su zama manoma?

I ☐
A'a ☐

(b) (Idan "A'a", tambayeshi): Me ne ne dalilin da yasa baka son su zama manoma? (Rubuta dalilan da ya bayar).

_____

_____

NB: MAI TAMBAYA: BADA AMSOSHIN WADANNAN TAMBAYOYIN A KASA

1. Mai bada amsa shi kadai ne a lokacin tambayar?

I ☐ A'a ☐

2. Ko mai bada amsa ya nuna aminchewa da tambayoyin?

I ☐ A'a ☐


3. Wadanne tambayoyi ne suke da wuyar amsawa? (Rubuta lambar tambayoyin)

_____

SAI KA GAIDA MAI BADA AMSA, MUN GODE DA WANNAN TAIMAKON DA YA BAMU.

APPENDIX C:

Marketing system showing possible distribution channels of millet and sorghum



KEY:


———— Denotes major rural-urban link

- - - - - - - - Denotes other possible links

Source: Hays, H. M., Jr., The Marketing and Storage of Food Grains in Northern Nigeria, p.

APPENDIX D:


Traditional channels of millet and sorghum marketing



Source: Hays, H. M., Jr., The Marketing and Storage of Food Grains in Northern Nigeria, p. 11.

APPENDIX E:

THE STRUCTURE OF MARKETS AND RELATIONSHIPS




KEY:

——→ DIRECT RELATIONSHIPS

- - - - - - - - → POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS

APPENDIX F:

MARKETING INSTITUTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS



APPENDIX G (i)

HOW IMPLEMENTS ARE OBTAINED (BIRNIN MAGAJI - N = 115)

MODE OF ACQUISITION	HAUYA		GARMA		SUNGUMI		LAUJE		GATARI		G. SHANU		TRACTOR	
	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%
None	1	0.9	28	24.3	6	5.2	3	2.6	11	9.6	96	83.5	115	100
Inherited	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	0.9	-	-
Bought	111	96.5	84	73.0	106	92.2	110	95.7	101	87.8	12	10.4	-	-
Hired	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	6	5.2	-	-
Gift	1	0.9	1	0.9	1	0.9	-	0.0	1	0.9	-	0.0	-	-
Self-made	2	1.7	2	1.7	2	1.7	2	1.7	2	1.7	-	0.0	-	-
Unknown	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
TOTAL:	115	100.0	115	100.0	115	100.0	115	100.0	115	100.0	115	100.0	115	100

APPENDIX G (ii)

HOW IMPLEMENTS ARE OBTAINED (KASUWAN DAJI - N = 79)

MODE OF ACQUISITION	HAUYA		GARMA		SUNGUMI		LAUJE		GATARI		G. SHANU		TRACTOR	
	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%
None	1	1.3	15	19.0	1	1.3	2	2.5	2	2.5	72	91.1	78	98.7
Inherited	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	1.3	-	0.0	-	0.0
Bought	77	97.5	62	78.5	73	92.4	76	96.2	75	94.9	6	7.6	1	1.3
Hired	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	1.3	-	0.0
Gift	-	0.0	1	1.3	2	2.5	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
Self-made	1	1.3	1	1.3	3	3.8	1	1.3	1	1.3	-	0.0	-	0.0
Unknown	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
TOTAL	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0

APPENDIX G (iii)

HOW IMPLEMENTS ARE OBTAINED (YANKABA - N = 79)

MODE OF ACQUISITION	HAUYA		GARMA		SUNGUMI		LAUJE		GATARI		G. SHANU		TRACTOR	
	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%
None	0	0.0	9	11.4	1	1.3	-	0.0	2	2.5	72	91.1	79	100
Inherited	1	1.3	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	0	0.0	-	-
Bought	77	97.5	69	87.3	75	94.2	77	97.5	76	96.2	7	8.9	-	-
Hired	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
Gift	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
Self-made	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
Unknown	1	1.3	1	1.3	3	3.8	2	2.5	1	1.3	-	0.0	-	-
TOTAL	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100

APPENDIX G (iv)

HOW IMPLEMENTS ARE OBTAINED (ALL VILLAGES - N = 273)

MODE OF ACQUISITION	HAUYA		GARMA		SUNGUMI		LAUJE		GATARI		G. SHANU		TRACTOR	
	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%
None	2	0.7	52	19.0	8	2.9	5	1.8	15	5.5	240	87.9	272	99.6
Inherited	1	0.4	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	0.4	1	0.4	-	0.0
Bought	265	97.1	215	78.8	254	93.0	263	96.3	252	92.3	25	9.2	1	0.4
Hired	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	7	2.6	-	0.0
Gift	1	0.4	2	0.7	3	1.1	-	0.0	1	0.4	-	0.0	-	0.0
Self-made	3	1.1	2	0.7	5	1.8	3	1.1	3	1.1	-	0.0	-	0.0
Unknown	1	0.4	2	0.7	3	1.1	2	0.7	1	0.4	-	0.0	-	0.0
TOTAL	273	100.0	273	100.0	273	100.0	273	100.0	273	100.0	273	100.0	273	100.0

APPENDIX H (i)

QUANTITY OF IMPLEMENTS OWNED (BIRNIN MAGAJI - N = 115)

QUANTITY OF IMPLEMENTS	HAUYA		GARMA		SUNGUMI		LAUJE		GATARI		G. SHANU		TRACTOR	
	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%
None	1	0.9	26	22.6	5	4.3	3	2.6	13	11.3	96	83.5	115	100
1 - 3	56	48.7	77	67.0	93	80.9	76	66.1	94	81.7	19	16.5	-	-
4 - 6	34	29.6	8	7.0	11	9.6	26	22.6	8	7.0	-	0.0	-	-
7 - 9	5	4.3	3	2.6	2	1.7	4	3.5	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
10 - 12	13	11.3	-	0.0	4	3.5	2	1.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
13 - 15	4	3.5	1	0.9	-	0.0	1	0.9	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
16 - 18	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	3	2.6	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
19 - 21	1	0.9	1	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
22 and over	1	0.9	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
Unknown	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
TOTAL	115	100.0	115	100.0	115	100.0	115	100.0	115	100.0	115	100.0	115	100

APPENDIX H (ii)

QUANTITY OF IMPLEMENTS OWNED (KASUWAN DAJI -- N = 79)

QUANTITY OF IMPLEMENTS	HAUYA		GARMA		SUNGUMI		LAUJE		GATARI		G. SHANU		TRACTOR	
	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%
None	1	1.3	15	19.0	1	1.3	2	2.5	2	2.5	72	91.1	78	98.7
1 - 3	45	57.0	59	74.7	68	86.1	57	72.2	69	87.3	7	8.9	1	1.3
4 - 6	22	27.8	3	3.8	9	11.4	16	20.3	7	8.9	-	0.0	-	0.0
7 - 9	2	2.5	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	1	1.3	-	0.0	-	0.0
10 - 12	4	5.1	1	1.3	-	0.0	3	3.8	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
13 - 15	1	1.3	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
16 - 18	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
19 - 21	1	1.3	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
22 and over	3	3.8	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
Unknown	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
TOTAL	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0

APPENDIX H (iii)

QUANTITY OF IMPLEMENTS OWNED ('YANKABA - N = 79

QUANTITY OF IMPLEMENTS	HAUYA		GARMA		SUNGUMI		LAUJE		GATARI		G. SHANU		TRACTOR	
	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%
None	-	0.0	9	11.4	1	1.3	-	0.0	2	2.5	72	91.1	79	100
1 - 3	39	49.4	67	84.8	71	89.9	60	75.9	72	91.1	4	5.1	-	-
4 - 6	29	36.7	3	3.8	6	7.6	16	20.3	5	6.3	3	2.5	-	-
7 - 9	5	6.3	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	1.3	-	0.0	1	1.3	-	-
10 - 12	2	2.5	-	0.0	1	1.3	1	1.3	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
13 - 15	2	2.5	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
16 - 18	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	1.3	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
19 - 21	1	1.3	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
22 - Over	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
Unknown	1	1.3	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-
TOTAL	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100.0	79	100

APPENDIX H (iv)

QUANTITY OF IMPLEMENTS OWNED (ALL VILLAGES - N = 273)

QUANTITY OF IMPLEMENTS	HAUYA		GARMA		SUNGUMI		LAUJE		GATARI		G. SHANU		TRACTOR	
	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%	NO	%
None	2	0.7	50	18.3	7	2.6	5	1.8	17	6.2	240	87.9	272	99.6
1 - 3	140	51.2	203	74.4	232	85.0	193	70.7	235	86.1	30	11.0	1	0.4
4 - 6	85	31.1	14	5.1	26	9.5	58	21.2	20	7.3	2	0.7	-	0.0
7 - 9	12	4.4	4	1.5	3	1.1	6	2.2	1	0.4	1	0.4	-	0.0
10 - 12	19	6.9	1	0.4	5	1.8	6	2.2	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
13 - 15	7	2.6	1	0.4	-	0.0	1	0.4	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
16 - 18	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	4	1.5	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
19 - 21	3	1.1	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
22 and over	4	1.5	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
Unknown	1	0.4	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
TOTAL	273	100.0	273	100.0	273	100.0	273	100.0	273	100.0	273	100.0	273	100.0

Sub-section ii - Farm labour and organization

18. What type of labour do you employ on your farm?

Personal labour only ☐

Gayya labour ☐

Family labour only ☐

Hired labour only ☐

19. (IF RESPONDENT USES PERSONAL LABOUR ONLY, ASK:) Why do you have to work alone?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

20. (a) (IF RESPONDENT USES FAMILY LABOUR, ASK:) How many working hands do you have in your family?

State No. _____

(b) How many farms do you work with that available manpower?

State No. _____

(c) How many days does it take you to finish preparing one farm for sowing?

State No. of days _____

21. (a) (IF THE RESPONDENT USES 'GAYYA' LABOUR, ASK:) How many times do you call-up 8gayya8 in one year?

Whenever there is work to be done	0
Only once a year	1
Only twice a year	2
Three or more times a year	3

(b) Do you reciprocate the labour of every gayya member when called?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(c) (IF "YES", ASK:) Do you go yourself, or send others to represent you?

I go myself	0
Send others to represent me	1
Send money or food if I can't go	2

(d) (IF "NO", ASK:) Why don't you reciprocate?

_____

_____

22. If you intend calling-up 'gayya', who do you call upon?

All the people in the village ☐

Friends and relatives only ☐

23. Do you agree that 'gayya' is the best and most efficient means by which poor people who cannot afford to hire paid labour or machinery can get work done quickly on their farms?

Strongly agree	0
Agree	1
Do not agree	2
Strongly disagree	3

24. (a) (IF THE RESPONDENT USES HIRED LABOUR, ASK:) From where do you recruit the labourers?

I go in the village to look for them 0

They come to my house 1

A friend brings them to me 2

I send others to search for them in town 3

I go to another village to get them 4

(b) How many men do you employ at a time?

State number _____

25. Are the labourers themselves organized in groups, or do you hire them piece meal?

Organized in working batches 0

Hire them man by man 1

I hire them any how I get them 2

26. (a) Do you enter into a contract with them on the basis of price per farm, or do you just pay them on daily rates?

Enter into contract per farm 0

Pay them individual daily rates 1

Depends on how we agree 2

(b) PLEASE FILL IN THE TABLE BELOW:

No. of farms	Size	No. of men needed	No. of days at work	Cost
1st farm				
2nd "				
3rd "				
4th "				
5th "				
6th "				
7th "				
8th "				
9th "				
10th "				

27. (a) Do you have any other obligation, (WHICH IS PART OF THE CONTRACT) to the farm labourer apart from the payment for his services in cash?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(b) (IF "YES", ASK:) What are these obligations?

Supply of food	0
Supply of farm implements	1
Supply of lodging	2
Supply all the above	3

28. How often do you employ paid labour?

All the time	0
Sometimes	1
Very often	2
On very few occasions	3
Never	4

29. If you decide to employ farm labourers, who do you prefer to employ?

A native of the town/village	0
A migrant who is searching for work	1

30. Who do you think is likely to become a farm labourer? (TICK AS MANY AS MENTIONED).

One who has no farm	0
Only a non-native of the village	1
One who hasn't enough food	2
Lazy man	3
One who needs extra income	4

31. Do you think that it is degrading to become a farm labourer?

Yes ☐

No ☐

32. (a) Have you ever been a farm labourer yourself?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(b) (IF "YES", ASK:) Do you still work for other people for money?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(c) (IF "YES", ASK:) Why do you work for money?

_____

_____

Sub-section iii - Farming Technology

33. (PLEASE FILL IN THE TABLE BELOW ON THE IMPLEMENTS USED IN PRODUCTION)

Tool/Implement of Machinery	How obtained	If hired, from whom?	Quantity	Price per piece if bought
1. Hoe				
2. Garma				
3. Sungumi				
4. Sickle				
5. Axe				
6. Plough (Ox-drawn)				
7. Tractor				
8.				
9.				
10.				

34. Efforts are being made by the government to introduce modern implements, such as the ox-drawn plough and tractor hiring facilities for those who cannot afford to buy them:

(a) Do you know of this? Yes ☐ No ☐

(b) Do you think these efforts are useful?

Very useful	0
Useful but I don't know about it	1
Not useful	2
I can't say	3

(c) (IF USEFUL, ASK:) Have you ever tried to obtain or hire a tractor/ox-drawn plough?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(i) (IF YES,) What was the result of your trial?

Successful	0
Not successful	1
Can't afford it	2

(ii) (IF, NO, ASK:) Why didn't you try?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

35. (a) Do you use any fertilizer on your farms?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(b) Do you use any pesticides on your farms?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(c) (IF RESPONDENT INDICATES FERTILIZER AND/OR PESTICIDES USAGE, FILL IN THE TABLE BELOW, IF NOT, MOVE TO QUESTION 42).

Item	No. of bags used 1975/76 season	No. of bags used 1975/76 season	Price per bag (₦)	Where bought
Fertilizers				
Pesticides				

36. How did you first come across the usage of fertilizers and/or pesticides?

Through a friend or relative	0
The extension worker	1
The N.T.C. extension worker	2
Mass media (radio and newspaper)	3
Through our village head	4
Can't remember	5

37. For how many years now, have you been using fertilizers and pesticides?

Fertilizers: length of usage (years) _____

Pesticides: length of usage (years) _____

38. (a) Has anybody or organization ever helped in showing you how best to apply fertilizers and pesticides on your farms?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(b) (IF YES, ASK:) Who, or what organization is that?

(i) _____

(ii) _____

(iii) _____

39. Do you feel that you have been reaping a remarkable increase in yields since the time you have started using fertilizers and pesticides?

Yes	0
No	1
Yet to see	2
I don't know	3

40. (a) Do you agree that fertilizers give better crops and better yields than the local manure?

Yes, I agree	0
I am not sure	1
I do not agree	2

(b) (IF YES, ASK:) Why do you agree with that?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

(c) (IF NO, ASK:) Why don't you agree?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

41. (a) On the whole, do you receive any specialist help in your farming activities?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(b) (IF YES, ASK:) From whom do you receive such help?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

(c) What is your opinion about the work the agricultural offices and the government extension workers nearest to you?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

Sub-section iv - Crops, their production and disposition

42. PLEASE FILL IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE

Crop	Food, cash or both	Source of seeds*	Type of land (upland/fadama)	Mixed or sole crop	Output this season	Output last season
G/corn						
Rice						
Millet						
Maize						
Cowpeas						
G/nut						
Cotton						
Tobbacco						
Others: 1 _____						
2 _____						
3 _____						

@ *i.e. Bought (a) Kept from last year's harvest (b)
From government (c) Obtained as gift (d)
Borrowed (e)

**Quantity of yields in local weights - i.e. Buhu/dami or taiki.

43. (a) From among the crops you produce, which three do you generally depend on? (List in order of importance)

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

(b) Why do you depend on these?

(LIST DOWN THE REASONS VERBATIM)

_____

_____

44. (a) (FILL IN THE TABLE BELOW)

Crop	Quantity sold	Place of sale	To whom sold
G/corn			
Rice			
Millet			
Maize			
Cowpea			
G/nuts			
Cotton			
Tobacco			
Others 1 _____			
2_____			
3 _____			

(b) From among the crops listed above, which two are your most important means of cash?

1. _____

2. _____

(c) Roughly how much money do you realise from the sale of these two crops in a year?

(STATE AMOUNT) ₦ _____

45. (a) What kinds of agricultural produce do you depend upon: food crops or cash crops?

Food crops	0
Cash crops	1
Both food and cash crops	2
None of them	3

(b) At what time of the year do you usually sell your non-food crops?

At harvest time	0
Early dry season	1
Late dry season	2
Early wet season	3
Late wet season	4
Whenever the need arises	5

(c) Do you sell your food crops as well?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(d) (IF YES, ASK:) At what time of the year do you usually sell these?

At harvest time	0
Early dry season	1
Late dry season	2
Early wet season	3
Late wet season	4
Whenever the need arises	5

46. (a) Do you usually buy grain at sometimes of the year?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(b) (IF YES, ASK:) Can you tell me the quantity of grain you buy in a year?

_____

(c) At what time of the year do you buy grain?

At harvest time	0
Early dry season	1
Late dry season	2
Early wet season	3
Late wet season	4
Whenever the need arises	5

(d) What do you usually do with the grain you buy?

Use for consumption	0
Kept for sale at other times of the year	1
Kept as a buffer stock	2

(e) In what way do you usually spend the money you realise from the sale of your agricultural produce?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

Section C - Savings and credit

47. (a) Do you save any part of your produce or cash earnings?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(b) (IF YES, ASK:) In what form do you save?

In form of cash	0
By lending money to other people	1
By buying grain for later sale	2
By buying livestock with the money	3

(c) (IF NO, ASK:) Why don't you save?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

48. What do you usually do with your savings?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

49. (a) Do you keep/own any livestock or poultry?

Yes ___ No ___

(b) (IF YES, FILL IN TABLE BELOW)

Animal/Birds	Quantity owned	Their uses in household	Price per piece (if willing to sell now)
Horses			
Cows			
Donkeys			
Sheep			
Goats			
Hens			
Turkeys			
Ducks			
Others 1 _____			
2 _____			
3 _____			

50. (a) Do you get any credit?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(b) (IF YES, ASK:) From what source do you obtain it?

Commercial banks	0
The Government	1
A friend or relative	2
A local money lender	3
A local trader	4
A cooperative society	5

(c) In what form do you usually receive the credit?

In form of cash	0
In form of grain	1
In form of seeds	2
In form of fertilizers and insecticides	3
In form of implements	4
In form of clothing	5

(d) How much do you think you owe this year to all your debtors?

(STATE AMOUNT) ₦ _____

51. In what form do you pay back your debts?

In cash	0
In grain	1
By supplying cash crops	2
By supplying labour	3

52. (a) At what time of the year do you usually receive debts?

Early dry season	0
Late dry season	1
Early wet season	2
Late wet season	3
Whenever the need arises	4

(b) At what time of the year do you pay back the debts that you receive?

Harvest time	0
Late wet season	1
Early wet season	2
In the dry season	3
Whenever I have money	4

(c) What do you do with the debts you take?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

(d) Is there any interest involved in the loan?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(e) (IF YES, ASK:) Can you enlighten us about the nature of the interest terms?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

Section D - Life style and expenditure patterns

Housing

53. (a) Do you live in your own house which you built yourself, or do you live in a family compound with brothers and other close relations?

Living in my own personal house	0
Living in a family compound	1
No family house, no personal house	2

(b) (IF LIVING IN A PERSONAL HOUSE ASK:) How did you obtain the land on which you built it?

Bought the land	0
Inherited the land	1
Got the land as a gift	2

(c) With what building materials is the house you are now living in built? (NOTE DOWN AS MANY BUILDING MATERIALS AS MENTIONED BY THE RESPONDENT)

_____

_____

54. (a) Do you own any other house apart from the one you are now living in?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(b) (IF YES, ASK:) How many houses like that do you own? (NOTE DOWN THE NUMBER OF HOUSES)

No. of houses _____

(c) Do you rent the house(s) out to other people?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(d) Do you live yourself in a rented house?

Yes ☐ No ☐

55. CONSUMMER/LUXURY DURABLE OWNED (FILL IN THE TABLE BELOW FOR AS MANY AS OWNED IN RESPONDENT'S HOUSEHOLD)

Commodities	Quantity in household	Total cost
Radio		
Clock		
Watches		
Bicycles		
Motorcycles		
Cars		
Lorry or Tipper		
Others:- _____		
_____		
_____		

56. What can you estimate as the amount you spend on clothing yourself and your family in a year?
(NOTE DOWN ESTIMATED COST IN NAIRA PER YEAR)

(COST OF CLOTHING PER YEAR ₦ _____)

57. (a) Do you buy the basic foodstuff you consume in your household?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(b) (IF YES, ASK:) How much do you spend on foodstuff in one day?

(NOTE DOWN EITHER PRICE IN NAIRA OR QUANTITY OF FOOD-STUFF CONSUMED PER DAY)

_____

(c) How much do you spend on the soup ingredients for your household?

(NOTE DOWN COST) _____

Section E - General Questions

58. (a) Do you enjoy your life as a farmer?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(b) (IF YES, ASK:) Why do you enjoy it?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

(c) (IF NO, ASK:) Why don't you enjoy it?

(REPORT VERBATIM) _____

_____

59. (a) If you have a choice of occupations, would you prefer leaving farming for another form of occupation?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(b) (IF YES, ASK:) What type of occupations would you prefer from among the following?

Civil servant ☐

Merchant ☐

Factory ☐

Contractor ☐

Political office ☐

Chieftaincy ☐

NB. (INDICATE AN "X" ON AS MANY OCCUPATIONS PREFERRED BY THE RESPONDENT).

60. (a) Would you like your children to become farmers?

Yes ☐ No ☐

(b) (IF NO, ASK:) Why don't you like them to become farmers?

_____

_____

N.B. - ENUMERATOR, PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

1. Was the respondent alone when he was interviewed?

Yes ☐ No ☐

2. Was the respondent cooperative?

Yes ☐ No ☐

3. Which questions were difficult to answer? (LIST DOWN NUMBERS OF THE QUESTIONS)

_____

Please thank the respondent for the very valuable information be volunteered to us.

APPENDIX B:

QUESTIONNAIRE SCHEDULE

(HAUSA VERSION)

Lambar Questionnaire: _____

Lambar Area (Unguwa): _____

Sunan Unguwa: _____

Sunan mai tambaya: _____

Kwanan wata: _____

Wurin Interview: _____

SECTION A:

Yanzu mu na son mu fara da yi maka wadansu tambayoyi akan ka da kuma iyalinka.

==========

1. Sunan (mai bada amsa) _____
2. Shekarun haifuwa _____
3. Matsayi acikin gida[1] _____
4. Ilmi (Arabic/boko/ko kuma ba ko daya) _____
5. Zurfin ilmi (idan na boko ne)[2] _____
6. Akwai aure ko babu?[3] _____
7. Yawan mata (idan da aure) _____

---

1. Maigida/dangida (wanda yake babba ne a cikin gida amma ba maigida ba).
2. Yaki da Jahilci/Aji hudu na Primary/cikakken Ilmin Primary/Ilmin Sakandare/Ilmin gaba da Sakandare.
3. Gwabro/mai mata/wanda ya rasa ko ya saki matansa.

8. Yawan 'ya'ya _____

9. Yawan sauran mutanen gida _____

10. Jimlar mutanen gida duka _____

11. Jimlar maza majiya karfi a gidan[4] _____

12. (a) Ko da akwai wadansu mutanen gidanku wadanda suka tafi wani wuri do cin rani ko zama?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (IDAN AKWAI, CIKA TEBUR NA KASA).

Suna	Dalilin tafiya cin rani/ko canjin wurin zama	Inda suka tafi, ko suke zaune yanzu	Yawan saduwa da mutanen gida*

*Basu taba zuwa gida ba/sau daya a ko wace shekara/sau biyu a kowace shekara/koda yaushe sukan zo.

(c) Ko su wadannan mutanen gida da suka bar gida, su kan taimaki mutanen gida da suke zaune anan yanzu?

I ☐

A'a ☐

---

4. Banda mata da yara (maza kawai majiya karfin wadanda suka isa aik a gona ko kuma wata sana'ar mutanen gida).

(d) (IDAN 'I', TAMBAYE SHI) Me nene su kan taimake ku da shi?

Su kan aiko kudi koda yaushe	0
Su kan aiko kudi wani iokaci	1
Su kan aiko kudi akai-akai	2
Su kan zo gida lokacin damina a yi aiki da shi	3
Wani irin taimako (rubuta irin taimakon da mai bada amsa ya fada)	
_____	4

13. (a) Ko ka amince da ganin 'yan uwanka sun bar gida zuwa cin rani ko sun koma wani wuri da zama?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(b) (IDAN 'I', yi wannan tambayar): Me yasa ka amince da haka? (rubuta abinda duk mai bada amsa ya fada)

_____

_____

(c) (IDAN A'a) yi wannan tambayar: Me yasa baka amince da haka ba? (rubuta abinda mai bada amsa ya fada).

_____

_____

14. (a) Da ga cikin wadannan rukunoni jama'a, wane rukuni ne kake ganin ka cancanta a saka ka aciki?

Talakawa	0
Mallamai	1
Tajirai	2
'Yan-kasuwa	3
'Yan sarauta/masu sarauta	4
Sarakuna	5

(b) (Idan ya fadi inda ya cancanta asakashi, tambaye shi):
Ko kana ganin cewa zaman ka acikin wannan rukuni yakan taimake ka wajen aikin gona ko wajen wata sana'ar da ka sa kanka?

I ☐

A'a ☐

(c) (Idan yace "I", tambaye shi): Ta wace hanya ne kake tsammanin zaka samu wannan taimako?

(rubuta duk abinda mai bada amsa ya fada).

_____

_____

(d) (Idan yace "A'a", tambaye shi): Me nene dalilin da yasa wannan bazai taimakeka ba?

(rubuta duk abinda da mai bada amsa ya fada).

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SECTION B: PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY

Sub-section i - farm tenure and ownership

15. (a) Ko kana ganin cewa noma shine kawai sana'ar da ka dogara a kanta?

Noma ne kawai	0
Noma da kuma wata sana'a	1
Wata sana'a kawai ba noma	2

(b) (Idan bashi noma, tambayeshi): To memene sana'ar ka idan baka dogara akan noma ba? (Rubuta duk sana'ar da mai bada amsa ya fada).

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(c) (Idan yana sana'a kuma yana noma, tambayeshi) Wadanne irin sana-oi ne kake yi bayan noma? (Rubuta sunayen duk sana'o in da ya fada).

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16. (a) (Idan mai bada amsa ya na noma, tambayeshi): Akan wadanne gonaki ne ka ke noma?

A cikin gandu ko gonakin gado tare da 'yan uwa	0
A kan gonakin na na kaina	1
Ina yi acikin gandu da kuma gonaki na	2
Ba gona, kuma ba gandu	3

(b) (Idan mai bada amsa ba yada gona, tambayeshi): Ko kana da gona da kake aro ko kuma kashe-muraba?

A'a	0
Ina aron gona	1
Ina kashe-muraba	2
Ina haya	3

(c) Menene dalilin da yasa baka da gona? (rubuta dalilin daya bayar kamar yadda ya fada).

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17. (IDAN MAI BADA AMSA YANA DA GONA, CIKA WANNAN TEBUR).

Gonaki	Gandu ko gonarsa ta kansa?	Girman gona (eka)	Yadda aka samu gona*
Gona ta daya			
Gona ta biyu			
Gona ta uku			
Gona ta hudu			
Gona ta biyar			
Gona ta shida			
Gona ta bakwai			
Gona ta takwas			
Gona ta tara			
Gona ta goma			


*Codes

(a) Gonar gado (b) Wadda aka saya

(c) Wadda aka ara (d) Wadda ake haya

(e) Kashe-muraba (f) Wadda aka samu kyauta.

APPENDIX I: KAURA-NAMODA & OTHER LOCAL GOVT AREAS.



APPENDIX J: MAP SHOWING THE LOCATION OF SURVEY VILLAGES

