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THIS THESIS SUBMITTED BY

ISAH MOHAMMED ABBASS

was accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of this University.

at

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# APPROVAL

This Thesis - "The Political Economy of Rural Development in Nigeria: A study of Rural Zaria, 1960-1995" - has been carefully read and approved as having satisfied the conditions for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Economy, in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria.

THESIS SUPERVISOR
(PROF. RAUF AYO DUNMOYE) ---------- 27/9/97

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT ----------
(DR. PAUL P. IZAH)

EXTERNAL EXAMINER ----------

# THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF RURAL ZARIA, 1960-1995.

BY

ISAH MOHAMMED ABBASS

A thesis submitted to the Postgraduate School, Ah mad u Bello University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of philosophy (Ph.D) in political economy.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES;
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, NIGERIA.

JANUARY 1997

# DEDICATION

**THIS WORK IS DEDICATED TO:**

**LATE MALLAM ABUL-HASSAN ALIYU (AUDI)**
**HAJIYA RABIATUL-BADAWIYYA (TAKKO)**
**... For the sacrifices and investments you made towards my education**

**BINTA**
**... for the concern and patience**

**AMINA, ABIDA, ADILA, ANISA**
**RUKAYYA, FATIMA (MAMI)**
**...for your admired and inspired curiosity to know what I was painstakingly doing**

**AHMED TIJJANI**
**... for the support and that opportunity**

# DECLARATION

I, Isah Mohammed Abbass with Regn. NO. Ph.D/FASS/1919/1991-92 hereby declare that this thesis has been prepared by me and it is the product of my own research work. It has not been accepted in any previous application for a degree. All quotations are indicated by quotation marks or by indentation and acknowledged by means of references.

---------- ----------

ISAH MOHAMMED ABBASS D A T E

# CERTIFICATION

This thesis entitled" The political economy of Rural Development in Nigeria: A study of Rural Zaria, 1960-1995" meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Political Economy) of Ahmadu Bello University and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation

| | |
|---|---|
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| MEMBER<br>SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE | DATE |
| HEAD OF DEPARTMENT | DATE |
| DEAN<br>POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL | DATE |

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ISAH MOHAMMED ABBASS JANUARY, 1997

# ABSTRACT

**The Political Economy of Rural Development in Nigeria: A Study of Rural Zaria 1960-1995**

Most strategies of rural development tend to ignore or place less emphasis on the role of local people, institutions and resources. Moreover, rural policies more often sanction the sanctity of the political economy to provide the congenial grounds for capital to freely operate. This thesis is about the actual and potential assaults and consequences of the application of rural development programs on the rural economy, social setting and environment.

The study is divided into four parts. Part one argues that the State, despite all approaches made and resources expended, is incapable to bring about improvement and meaningful change in the impaired agrarian and rural socio-economic structure.

The second part shows that the impo tence of the State is derived from the determined and specific historical conjunctures. It stresses that the duality and sharp stratifications of the society into rural and urban sprouted since the beginning of the process of State formation and establishment of coercive apparatuses. It further shows that colonialism re-intensified the consolidation of **birni** over **kauye** and the integration of the rural economy within the global system of production.

Part three argues that under the given rural development policy and within the matrix of its objectives, rural conditions have practically exhibited a portrait of impoverished living albeit with total surrender to foreign influxes. It further shows that the World Bank accessary/conspiratory role, within the State-capital league, renders the adopted policy defective and elusive.

Part four thus makes an empirical analysis of the deplorable State of rural infrastructures and institutions, particularly local government, and argues that people must be considered first in the design of rural development programs. Hence, people must be involved to directly participate, particularly through CDAs, as the only panacea to a genuine and sustainable rural transformation.

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## A GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| ABU | Ahmadu Bello University |
| ADP | Agricultural Development Project |
| APMEU | Agricultural Project Monitoring and Evaluating Unit |
| ARD | Agency for Rural Development |
| ARMTI | Agricultural and Rural Management Training Institute |
| ASSU | Academic Staff Union of Universities |
| ATAP | Agricultural Assistance Project |
| BAT Ltd | British American Tobacco Limited |
| BCGA | British Cotton Growing Association |
| CFAO | Compagnie Francaise de 1' Afrique |
| BLF | Better Life Program (for Rural Dwellers) |
| CBN | Central Bank of Nigeria |
| CUP | Cambridge University Press |
| CDA | Community Development Association |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| DFRRI | Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure |
| DPO | Divisional Police Officer |
| ECN | Electricity Corporation of Nigeria |
| EDF | European Development Fund |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| FACU | Federal Agricultural Coordinating Unit |
| FADP | Funtua Agricultural Development Project |
| FAO | Food and Agricultural Organization |
| FMWR | Federal Ministry of Water Resources |
| FORMCU | Forestry Management and Coordinating Unit |
| FSP | Family Support Program |
| GNP | Growth Domestic Product |
| GR | Green Revolution |
| GRA | Government Reservation Area |
| IBRD | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
| IAR | Institute of Agricultural Research |
| ICR | Implementation Completion Report |
| IDA | International Development Association |
| IFC | International Finance Corporation |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IRD | Integrated Rural Development |
| ITTC | International Trading, Technical and Commercial Consultants Ltd |
| JPC | Joint Planning Committee |
| KADP | Kaduna State Agricultural Development Project |
| KSIRDP | Kaduna State Integrated Rural Development Project |
| KSWB | Kaduna State Water Board |

| | |
|---|---|
| LBA | Licensed Buying Agents |
| LEA | Local Education Authority |
| LGA | Local Government Area |
| LGC | Local Government Council |
| LGHQ | Local Government Headquarters |
| MAIDA | Maigana Development Association |
| MAMSER | Mass Mobilization for Social and Economic Recovery |
| MTRM | Monthly Technical Meeting |
| MNC | Multinational Corporation |
| NA | Native Authority |
| NACB | Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank |
| NAFPP | National Accelerated Food Production Program |
| NALDA | National Agricultural Land Development Authority |
| NBA | Nigerian Bar Association |
| NBRRI | Nigerian Building and Road Research Institute |
| NDE | National Directorate of Employment |
| NEPA | National Electric Power Authority |
| NFDP | National Fadama Development Program |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NPN | National Party of Nigeria |
| NTC | Nigerian Tobacco Company |
| NMA | Nigerian Medical Association |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| OFN | Operation Feed the Nation |
| OFAR | On Farm Adaptive Research |
| OSAR | On Station Adaptive Research |
| OUP | Oxford University Press |
| PRP | People's Redemption Party |
| PZ | Petterson Zochanics |
| PTF | Petroleum Trust Fund |
| REB | Rural Electrification Board |
| RUWATSAN | Rural Water and Sanitation (Program) |
| SAP | Structural Adjustment Program |
| SAR | staff Appraisal Report |
| SCOA | Societe' Commercial de l' Quest Africain |
| SDP | Social Democratic Party |
| SPAT | Small Plot Adoption Techniques |
| TCPC | Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization |
| TEW | Technical Extension Workers |
| T & V | Training and visit |
| UAC | United African Company |
| UDT | Under-development Primary Education |
| UNECA | United Nations Economic Commission for Africa |
| UNECLA | United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America |
| UPE | Universal primary Education |

| | |
|---|---|
| US | United States |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| UTC | Union Trading Company (SWISS) |
| WAFF | West African Frontier Forces |
| WHO | World Health Organization |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Emergency Fund |

# PART ONE
# CHAPTER ONE

## 1.00 PROBLEM, RELEVANCE AND GENERAL BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

> *One of the major characteristics of developing countries is the failure of the planning efforts, past and present, to fulfil objectives and bring about desired development.*[1]

### 1.01 INTRODUCTION

The challenge of development has, over time, been central in the agenda of African States that have emerged from the ravages of colonialism. The thinking of the theoretical and methodological approaches to development, in the multi-faceted dimension, has shifted repeatedly since the last three decades but still remains within its problematic on what it entails or how it might come about. The emergence of modern States in Africa has fundamentally altered or distorted the African community-oriented development processes. Thus, the strategies of developing the human and material resources to provide infrastructures relative to the levels of the productive forces, had consequently been reversed.

The genesis and basis of socio economic and political instability in the Nigerian economy, generated by social injustice and inequality, may thus be located within the political economy of development. The need to reverse these trends therefore calls for a change or shift in focus of the paths of development. The challenge, in its broadest sense, must primarily be designed to transform the entire living conditions,(in health, education, nutrition, equality, freedom, eradication of absolute poverty etc) of the countryside fundamentally rather than mere agricultural programs sponsored for a variety of purposes.

For over three decades of political independence, Nigeria's attempts at development, particularly rural development, have intrinsically struck the tidal waves of the State and its public policy. Serious obstacles to development have therefore originated and developed not necessarily from the development planners and policy implementors but fundamentally from the structure of the economy and the nature of the State. Hence, the development theories that have pervaded the Political thought of the time have generally centered on economic growth with emphasis placed on different sectors of the economy.

Rural development, within this development perspective, cannot escape being tailored along the same direction of the general State behavior in its policy formulation and policy implementation. The components of overall rural development must encompass all the composite ingredients of inward oriented strategies by, first of all, investing in the people. Since rural areas are centers of production 'but plagued with poverty, degradation and neglect, the only way to ensure rapid social, economic and political transformation and meet the basic needs is to motivate, mobilize and increase the degrees of people's capacities and enthusiasm to popularly participate in issues that involve them and their environment; rather than make them mere passive subjects.

Many rural development programs and strategies have collapsed because they lack the grassroots support and relevance. This precisely accounts for the vulnerability of rural areas in addition to the rural-urban disparity. Hence, all efforts may not succeed if deliberate intensification of the human factor is not mounted in the entire rural development policy. This methodological instrument for planning rural development must be cultivated, by involving and putting the needs of people first, to bear the fruits of development.

The history of rural development policies in Nigeria has indicated the pervasiveness of rural poverty within the context of the World Bank's perspective which states that a greater percentage of the populations in the technologically backward countries live below the poverty line[2] . Since a greater proportion of the population cannot afford the basic necessities of life, various models to achieve rural development have been evolved by the Nigerian State.

These models include the urban development strategy where the "trickle down" effect from the urban "growth centers" will spark off development in rural areas. This is in line with Lele's thesis whereby the growth of urban commercial and industrial investment benefit is expected to trigger off economic development in the rural areas[3]. The unpalatable results of this model provoked the Nigerian State to adopt the sectoral, particularly agricultural, development model with the firm but erroneous belief that agriculture would surmount the rural problems through capital generation for industrial investments. This policy, notwithstanding the land reform, has hit the rocks due largely to the fact that the land reform was essentially pursued as an end in itself rather than an integral part of the agrarian reform in rural development.

Industrial development model also took its own turn in rural development strategy under the concept of rural industrialization. Further brands and models of rural development were poured in by different regimes within the political economy of the State. All these strategies, have not fundamentally transformed rural areas and benefitted rural communities. Instead, majority of rural communities have been tenaciously hurt by every adopted rural development strategy and thus become its victims or infinite life prisoners par excellence.

## 1.02 THE STATE AND PUBLIC POLICY

Public policies directly indicate State's general and nebulous character and orientation. In other words, any policy by the State must correspond to the principles of respectively performing and

attaining its primary role and goal. Thus, public policy refers to the expressed, planned and directed State program to attain the goals, values and practices of government.[4] It should be noted however that the role of government, within the character of the modern State has, since the end of the nineteenth century, seemingly been transformed with acquisition of more responsibilities or powers to formulate and implement public policies. Griffin states that:

> *...the role of public policy in the process of growth and development must be kept in perspective. Although in principle acts of government policy can be very powerful, in practice, they may not always be so-not because government policies are intrinsically weak, but because the capacity and willingness of governments to alter previous decisions is limited.*[5]

Government is the major agent of the State in the formulation and execution of public policies. The State therefore places enormous power or authority on the government to decide on what to do or even what not to do. Since public policy is essentially concerned with the action of government, the forces which shape them must be examined and their impacts on the society clearly understood. What are the forces that have mitigated the establishment of public policies and their impacts on the society ? This study attempts to unveil these aspects since:

> *Public policies may deal with a wide variety of substantive areas - defence, foreign affairs education, welfare, police, highways, housing, social security, health, economic opportunity, urban development, inflation, recession...*[6]

Since public policy is an applied social science discipline, it therefore

> *uses reason and evidence to clarify, appraise and advocate solutions for public problems*[7]

William N. Dunn further maintains that the most important issue in

policy making is understanding what is right, policy options, policy action and policy consequences. In his public policy analysis, he explicitly stresses that:

> *Today's policy problems are so highly interdependent that any effort to understand and resolve them demands that we step outside the boundaries of discipline and professions whose structure and content no longer mirror the contours of society.*[8]

Hence, any attempt by the State to device any line of action to address policy problems must have to be in the line with what the State considers to be right. Therefore, recommendations, policy alternative and action designed to solve rural development problems would depend, partly or in whole, on the State ability or capacity to identify what it considers as the causes. This however comes down to examining whether or not the recommendations on policy options and implementation of the problems of rural development have been rightfully identified and the right values pursued.

The State public policy on rural development clearly reflects on and is directly a product of its very biased policy on urbanization and the intrinsic consequences in both areas. Policies on urban and rural areas are thus the reverse sides of a coin. The issue is who are the victims and beneficiaries ? Hence, as the dominant classes struggle to always be the beneficiaries of public policies, it is imperative to underscore both the top-enders and bottom-enders of policies side-by-side with the symbolic goal which a given policy is set to achieve.

The development of under-development in all the affected regions of the world was dialectical sequel to the imperial policies of the Western Industrialized World. At political independence in the 1960s, most African States, provoked by the situation at hand, embarked on strategic development planning. Hence, socio-economic and political policies were ostensibly designed to improve the condition of living of the people and enhance overall development.

It has been observed that since 1960s, notwithstanding all policies made, the socio-economic and political conditions of the people and the entire processes of development have not been remarkable. In Nigeria, for instance, substantial though lopsided, progress has been relatively attained but without real development. The progress so far attained has its own negative outcome or contradictions because there exists:

> *a high level of unemployment, especially in the urban cities, rural inertia, food shortages, a high rate of inflation, even larger economic inequalities among persons and most prominently between the urban and rural sectors of the economy, glaring situation of abject poverty everywhere and a general deterioration of the physical and social environment.*[9]

Consequently, public policy makers in most African countries, particularly in Nigeria, have appreciated, in recent times, the tremendous benefits to be derived from shifting to the policy of 'development from below' by focusing first on rural areas as opposed to 'development from above' where urban cities are considered strategic in development. Thus, the policy option of rural development, where the State provides essential infrastructure to energize production and bring about meaningful and sustainable development have all dominated the political rhetoric of the political leaders. This scenario has made important contributions in evaluating the dire-need to adopt policies, in one way or the other, of redistributing resources amongst different classes.

## 1.03 THE PROBLEMATIC

The role of infrastructure in rural development can not be over stressed. In Nigeria, direct State intervention in rural economy pre dated the colonial era. During the post-colonial period, further State intervention in rural areas, to provide infrastructure, have not been successful. Since rural areas have been the main focus of the State, it should be realized that the populist attention paid to these areas has primarily been to extract surplus rather than provide services to the communities. Even where attempts have been ostensibly made to provide services, it is

noted with great concern that a lot of material and financial resources are said to have been sunk, but there is nothing tangibly and palpably to indicate the commitment.

Rural communities occupy central places and thus play unique roles in sustaining the national economy. Nigeria is fortunately endowed with abundant resources which can satisfy the basic needs of the populace if properly harnessed, handled and equitably distributed. Successive regimes, since 1960, have made several policy statements and inaugurated programs and strategies aimed at transforming the rural areas. In the provision of rural infrastructure, the Babangida regime (1985-1993), for instance, introduced an unprecedented pile of populist strategies for rural development, more than all the preceding regimes put together. It is therefore illuminating to particularly note that since 1985-notwithstanding, the State has, with increasing speed, only achieved to redistribute poverty among a great number of people.

Thus, as several scientific disciplines have presided over the processes of planned rural development, the incessant failures that have plagued the programs in Nigeria must be located within the realm of the State, via the method as well as the instruments applied. In other words, the problem must be directly associated with the missing of a vital hyphen of first of all, involving the community to participate directly in the affairs that concern them. Furthermore, it should be realized that the basic element in rural development intrinsically centers around human beings and not infrastructures alone.

Many studies and policies on rural development have therefore either paid perfunctory attention to infrastructure or deliberately ignored the potentials of the people. In many instances however, rural people in the transformation of rural areas are labelled 'conservatives', 'local' and 'resistant to change'. This study argues to the contrary. The failures of rural development

programs in Nigeria cannot be succinctly explained outside the socio-economic and political realities of the Nigerian State.

This brings in the question of relevance or irrelevance of the State in rural development. The primary role of the State has therefore rendered it virtually irrelevant and practicably incapable. Rather than act as a shield to the oppressed, the State, in its ultimate role, acts not only as a shield to the oppressors but simultaneously attacks those not controlling State power, or not owning and controlling the means of production.

Hence, the struggle to accumulate, by those controlling State power, prevents the State to provide meaningful and sustainable infrastructural services to rural communities let alone involve and invest in them. With the growing power of State organs, the people will therefore continue to be neglected by the bureaucratic and parasitic bourgeoisie whose interests are diametrically opposed to those in the rural areas.

The study examines the impact of the Nigerian State intervention in rural development. Based on the existing socio-economic structures, the impact thus indicates the State inability and incapacity to transform rural communities. More importantly however, the study will focus on the shifting attitudinal conception of rural development from mere provision of physical infrastructures to concentrating on the social variables, structures or setting of rural communities.

It is due to the non-recognition of people's potentials, feelings and opinions that has provoked the inquiry to critically examine these issues with the objective of identifying and addressing the multi-faceted variables in rural development. Thus, is the provision of infrastructures the

ultimate end in rural development? What is the impact of outside interaction in rural development ?

In the 1960s, rural development projects were therefore the initial strategies embarked by many countries that emerged out of colonialism. This approach to rural development was essentially designed to effectively address the problems surrounding overall long-term growth. Particularly important was to look into critical areas which required improvements in the basic needs of rural communities through investments in infrastructure, like irrigation, water supply, rural electricity, roads, education, health etc.

It should be recalled however that this project approach to rural development has been the most preferable and ubiquitous device employed by both the State and international agencies because of its inherent character and tendency to financially induce growth and change. Thus, the call by the World Bank which stresses that governments must invest in infrastructure to provide services to the rural poor justifies the project approach.[10]

As investments in infrastructures are within the purview of the classical and growth-oriented strategies for economic development, they however have enhanced our appreciations of the development needs of rural communities and thus added insights to our knowledge of the limitations of such infrastructures in enhancing sustained development. Thus, as major investments in infrastructures in rural areas were heavily loaded within this development paradigm, they were essentially designed to support the export of goods particularly during the early years of development planning.

The place and role of rural development are very crucial in Nigeria's device towards self-

sufficiency in all the facets and phases of development. This cannot be over emphasized. It should be recognized and realized that most strategies on rural development concentrate more on the provision of infrastructure (and in some cases their maintenance) by the State with scant attention paid to involve the people practically (in the initiation, implementing and evaluation) because of the belief that the induced growth and change through financial or material investments would surmount the problems identified. More importantly, no attention has been paid to who are the beneficiaries and who are victims of such strategies. This study is poised to unravel these issues.

While it is crucial to note that financial resources are equally indispensable to rural development, it must be realized that sectoral rural programs in, for instance, agriculture, health, education etc have, over time, languished not due to insufficient external finances but primarily because of the State's inability to define an efficient practicable social strategy for development. This goes to confirm that:

> *Money is not everything, and in some cases is the least important contribution to change processes. The financial levels of development can never soundly substitute for non-financial ones. Frequently the over-looked variables are the socio-cultural and institutional ones. If these are mishandled, the project will fail, no matter the national or international agency that promotes it.*[11]

Analysis of the issues central to the interventionist stance of the State in rural development is paramount so as to capture the perspectives on how this approach challenges a people-oriented development strategy. Hence, the State interventionist approach brings in other important variables militating against a sustainable development, particularly foreign aids. Foreign aids thus bring increasing external influences and invariably put rural development in complete jeopardy. The contention is that the sudden large incursion of external resources into the country-side has reversed the process of development.

The point is that people, not infrastructures, should be the starting point, the center and end goal of any rural development program and strategies. This therefore suggests that the social setting of communities should be the explicit cornerstone of any rural development policies. Rural development projects should invariably be designed and constructed with due cognisance of the existing mode of productions, cultural pattern, needs and potentials of the target groups. The relevant research questions the study addresses are:-

( i ) What problem is rural development strategy essentially designed to solve and to what extent have the means justified the end ?

(ii ) What role do infrastructures play in rural development and to what extent does the provision of rural infrastructures promote powerful financial inducements in, as well as affect the socio- economic and cultural patterns of rural communities?

(iii) To what extent does the State-capital alliance influence the perception of the leadership in the decision and implementation of the adopted rural development program ?

(iv ) To what extent does the nature of the Nigerian State and structure of the economy affect the adoption of the rural development policy ?

( v ) Why have successive rural development policies and programs in Nigeria failed to transform rural communities and what are the required adjustments needed to make rural development benefit rural communities ?

The problematic is thus dichotomized into two major categories. On the one hand, it examines the role of the state and the influences it exerts over policy making process as well as the entire patterns of coercion, ownership and control of the means of production. It stresses, that the State, with all its powerful apparatuses, lacks the ability and capacity to transform rural conditions of poverty. Thus, the question on whether the State, based on its primary role, is

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incompetent to perform this is therefore indisputable.

On the other hand, the research problem also centers on the irreversible and inevitability of the involvement and power of the people in rural development. It frowns at the desperate attempts by the State to thwart the participation of rural population by all forms of interventionist approach introduced to induce growth and thus distorting the patterns of social and material production, distribution, exchange and consumption of goods and services through populist provision of infrastructure.

## 1.04 THE STATE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

Since the attainment of its Political independence, over three decades ago, Nigeria has been grappling with a series of policies and strategies aimed or directed at addressing the dilemma of overall development. All these attempts have largely focused on the rural sectors whose vital roles and significance, in the entire process of development were hitherto neglected or ignored.

Social Scientists, Physical Planners and other Scholars interested in the dynamics and dimensions of development have advanced theories on the subject matter in its multi-dimensional contexts. Invariably, rural development, within this perspective, can no longer be an ignored area of study. Students of political economy have succinctly argued that economic issues, behavior and interest of the State are better analyzed and understood within their political context.[12] Since development is largely an economic phenomenon, any policy by the State must correspond and therefore be analyzed from its socio-political rationale and socio-economic implications. Since 1945 however, the phenomenon of development has become a crucial agenda in not only the under-developed but also the industrialized world.

Debates on theory and practice of development have a long history. Fundamental problems which usually surround the concept centers on what it means or entails.[13] It is theoretically posited that it might come about 'from above' or ' from below'[14]. These 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches to development have strait jacketed the phenomenon into a dualistic paradigm.

Thus is it the 'top-down' or the bottom-up approach to development problematic for the **desired development** to 'trickle-down or 'spread-out' or what actually is the problem ? In other words, why have the two strategies of development turned out to be frustrated options ? Are these policies systematically and purposely designed as inversions or reversals to each other with the same structural barriers or obstacles ?

The problem is that rural development programs and strategies are conventionally taken as given rather than understood as direct manifestations of the political economy of the State. It is therefore contended that mere flowery pronouncements and colorful inaugurations of rural development programs will not, in any way, eradicate the problems addressed.

Since the early 1960s rural development policies in Nigeria have been established and strategies adopted with a general view to improving rural life. The recorded results emanating from such policies and strategies were rather negative with adverse impacts on the socio-economic and even political conditions of rural communities.

Today, rural communities have been plunged into more serious and fundamental problems than before as they are plagued with infrastructural inadequacies and marked by all indices of underdevelopment, impoverishment, social backwardness, widespread poverty and hunger,

unemployment, illiteracy etc. Why are rural development policies and strategies so elusive ?

If sustainable development must take place it must invariably begin from the rural areas. But with the State primary focus in agricultural sector, coupled with the devastating incursion of international capital into the national economy in form of foreign aid, the condition of the rural dwellers has exacerbated to an alarming proportion. In addition, the intrinsic role of the State has only aided in strangulating the hitherto agricultural economy and thus transformed it to the one based on imports food and import substituting industrialization.

Access to rural infrastructural facilities, notwithstanding the limitations in particular social formations, provides a strong base for socio-economic growth and eradication of poverty and degradation. This requires reliable data on the nature and peculiarities of the environment, types and priorities of communities' basic needs the behavior of the State and the political actors. However, data on the degree or extent of rural poverty, socio-economic structures or setting, class formation and power relationships in the community are equally essential.

Thus, incomplete information constitutes a serious setback in appraising the magnitude of resources required to improve rural conditions. Information is equally incomplete or completely lacking as regards the complementary roles of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in rural transformation. The paucity of data in the study of rural development infrastructural facilities therefore adds to the gross under-estimation or over-exaggeration of the real condition in the country-side.

Hence, a grossly misleading conception/information on what rural communities need, opposed to the actual situation on the ground, is largely the result of the political economy of the State.

Rural life, overtime, has continued to worsen. The structural changes from the agricultural to petroleum economy particularly from 1970s, when the former was neglected and relegated to the background, led to massive rural-urban migrations at an unprecedented scale. Thus results of these changes particularly in the 1990s, indicate that a far greater number of people, more significantly in the urban areas, cannot adequately feed themselves, and are therefore faced with increased insecurity, widespread diseases and criminal activities.

The concept of rural development, as an alternative strategy for overall development, has become a world-wide currency and fashion in both the advanced and backward countries[15] particularly during the last three decades. There is hardly any State policy or program that does not touch or have direct bearing on the rural sector.

The issues generally addressed on the rural development phenomenon are centrally focused on organizing human and natural resources designed to provide a solution to the perennial problems of poverty and deprivation of the rural folks with a view to raising their living conditions[16]. Political arguments are based on the assumption that since the rural population constitutes a larger proportion of the population and produce essential food items, they should enjoy the end-result of their labor.

Since the last three decades, there has been, particularly in the dependent states, a continuous and desperate search for the solution of the challenges of development . The solutions so far advanced have remained practically elusive, unserviceable and unrealistic[17]. This situation has therefore posed serious challenges to the development strategies in Nigeria and other under-developed countries who have been caught up in socio-economic and political trap. Invariably, the conditions of rural communities, in recent years, have consistently deteriorated as more and

more rural development programs and strategies have unfolded.

> *In deed, in many respects, the outlook now appears worse than it did twelve months ago... For the poorest countries - those with per capita incomes of less than $200 - the situation is particularly grave... In 1974, per capita incomes of one billion people living in these nations decline on average 0.5 per cent. For the hundreds of millions of them already severely deprived, it meant hunger and illness, and an erosion of hope*[18]

The central theme of this study is to evaluate the extent to which rural development programs in Nigeria have been addressed and tackled. The research will also attempt to examine how the role of the State and penetration of capital into the rural areas constitute a challenge to rural development. This will seek to throw some light on how the adopted rural development programs in Nigeria have contributed immensely not only in laying the necessary foundations of peasant exploitation and extraction of surplus but also compounding the levels of structural dependency and under-development.

Since the protection of the interest of capital and its insatiable reproduction by the State is paramount, it is our contention that the State-capital alliance will continue to militate against the peasantry and the genuine transformation of rural areas. In essence, the rural development strategy will only continue to remain a tragedy, - mere political rhetoric and propaganda.

Approaches to rural development have, over time and space, varied and consequently produced different results. Our point of departure is that before any genuine approach to rural development is made vital socio-economic, political, moral or cultural issues have to be settled and resolved before it is even contemplated let alone implemented. Considerations should however be given to the nature and circumstances of the social, political and economic systems, (within specific conjunctures) as well as the dominant class character and class struggles

operating in the state.

It is therefore contended that despite the huge financial expenses and arduous struggles for social and economic development in Nigeria during the last three decades, the rural development strategy pursued or adopted have been inappropriate, irrelevant to the environment and needs of the people, misdirected and misplaced[19]. Thus, the solutions to the problems of unemployment, land pressures, equitable income distribution and the improvement of the living conditions of the poorest strata of the people have been lamentably unmet; leading to further and aggravated problem of poverty, pauperization, inequality as well as the creation of a new breed of 'peasantariat'.

In general, rural areas in Nigeria have been neglected and thus marginalized in preference to urbanization programs. This rather unwarranted urban emphasis is embedded in the neo-classical economic theory of development[20]. It should be noted therefore that the growth of GNP, based on the neo-classical theory, is no longer regarded as the main determinant or index of development. This theory has therefore rendered the policy objectives on rural development to conflict with the priorities and aspirations of the rural folks in many forms and dimensions[21]. It is rarely pointed out that the salient factors militating against the development of rural areas in Nigeria also lie squarely in the rural-urban dichotomy since the provisions of rural infrastructural facilities constitute part of the substantial indices of rural welfare.

Since urban bias in Nigeria is currently predominant in the development strategies, it has invariably incorporated or upgraded rural areas with some characteristics of urban status[22]. The design to incorporate rural areas with semi urban features is rooted in the perception which suggests that the establishment of institutions, structures, agencies etc. per se, would

automatically provide the basic needs of rural dwellers and then solve rural poverty[23]. Therefore, efforts to raise rural welfare must move from mere extension of urban physical appearance to rural areas as models of development since urban areas are not devoid of features of rural life - abject poverty and deprivation, etc.

The transformation of rural communities has been central in the formulated and implemented policies and programs of rural development in Nigeria[24]. These policies, for example, the World Bank's 'poverty-oriented aid philosophy' under McNamara are limited to propagandize the program ostensibly to uplift the living conditions of rural communities through 'aids' or penetration of capital[25]. Part of the greatest issues of rural question in Nigeria is how to evolve and explore workable solutions to deal with mountainous socio-economic difficulties in our country-side. Unfortunately, the existing generations of rural development "solutions" have really turned out to be more problematic perhaps than the previous generations of rural development strategies particularly of the 1950s and 60s.

As Nigeria is predominantly rural[26], emphasis in this study hinges on the perennial rural situation of poverty, class formation and power relations in rural communities rather than mere analysis on how the elites communicate with themselves and protect their selfish interests. It would therefore be more meaningful, within this context to analyze rural-mass-cum-urban elite dual structure which perpetuate the status-quo. Feldman expresses that:

> *The analysis of political change in Africa has tended to concentrate on describing the development of political elite, and process of communication of aspirations in the form of political decisions through political and administrative structure. The mass of individual decision-makers within the society over which the elite strive for control tend to be examined only in so far as they react in a particular way to the various stimuli which originate from above in the power structure. Although such an approach may have produced certain useful insight into the process of communication between the government and governed, it has*

> *disregarded sources of change, generated independently of the government's decisions, within the rest of society, the emphasis on looking at political change 'from above' may, in fact, have created an exaggerated estimation of the power of leaders to mould the structure of African societies to the images they have determined*[27].

The plight of rural dwellers has become more precarious with intensification of spatial inequalities, narrowing accessibility to basic necessities and consequently heightening rural-urban gap[28]. The concentration of facilities in urban centers and abysmal rural migration have sprang-up the creation of satellite settlements at the fringes of urban areas.

Even though the socio-economic condition of people in the urban satellite enclosures, concentrated by the low wage-earners, is not in any standard better than that of the rural peasant farmers, it is equally important to state that even the condition of a large proportion of urban dwellers has remarkably fallen below the poverty line. Thus, the disappearance of the so-called 'middle-class' or the petty-bourgeoisie has dissected the society vertically and diametrically into two distinguishable camps - the rich and the impoverished.

It should therefore be noted that the conditions of over 79,200[29] rural communities in Nigeria have remained impoverished as very limited progress has been recorded as regards provision of social, physical and institutional infrastructural facilities despite the State programs and policies on rural development.For example, various government policies which touched on agriculture, health, communication, trade, banking, insurance, energy, technology, commerce, transportation etc hardly had any articulate regard and expression with rural communities.

Most inhabitants of rural areas have remained poor with inadequate standard of living. Therefore, the poverty and indeed degrees of inequality in and within rural communities have called for a reassessment of development priorities and hence challenged adopted development

policies. The challenge calls for eradication of absolute poverty, reduction of inequality and creation of sustainable employment opportunities. Meier, for example, succinctly expresses that the failure of the World Bank

> *...to achieve a minimum level of income above the poverty line' has kept some 40% of the people in the less developed countries in the condition of 'absolute poverty' - a condition of life so degraded by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition and squalor as to deny its victims basic human necessities. The persistent of absolute poverty, despite respectable achievements in rate of growth in GNP, is now of more concern than of relative poverty, or a 'widening gap' between rich and poor countries*[30].

The Basic needs approach emerged with the primary assumption of alleviating the persistent growth and problems of absolute and mass poverty in the under developed world acknowledged to have defied all previous strategies. Its strategy of promoting growth to advance minimum living standards through the provision of the basic human needs has its inherent policy implications. In the first place, the roots of poverty goes beyond regional boundaries since it is a global phenomenon and its eradication must be world wide. However, the complex issues of the political economy ferment class formation and class struggles in various social formations. While inequality in the world economic system is not a justification for persistent poverty in the under-developed countries, the national and international struggles to eradicate and/or perpetrate it have over-riding implications.

The World Bank is the foremost international agency involved in the basic needs strategy emphasizing on increases in National Income[31]. The vibrancy of this fire-brigade approach to rural development adopted by the World Bank in early 1970s soon died down [32] and has since been an acknowledged failure[33] because increases in National Income do not necessarily reach and benefit the poor as shown in the Nigerian cases[34]

[redacted] failure of basic needs approach to rural development provoked the inaugurations of 'new' [redacted]ases and brands of development strategies [35]. For instance, the World Bank shifted its [redacted]mphasis on economic growth to a more elaborate and celebrated campaign to eradicate absolute poverty and promote 'redistribution with growth', whereas the United Nations' environmental focus on ecology shifted from the 'outer limits' to 'inner limits' of minimum human needs,[36] while the ILO enlarged its hitherto emphasis upon employment to encompass a total commitment to the fulfillment of the basic needs of both the employed and unemployed poor[37].

Other agencies have however dedicated their campaigns towards the advancement of basic human needs of minimum living standards. The final results recorded were rather disappointing. Despite huge foreign aid and capital accumulation, development efforts have turned out to be elusive or illusionary as the number of people living below the 'poverty line' has continued to increase. Are these campaigns not primarily advocated to rationalize or legitimize their existence or are they making any meaningful impact on rural communities ?

Even the author of the World Bank's influential study on 'Redistribution with Growth', Hollis Chenery states that:

> *It is now clear that more than a decade of rapid growth in under-developed countries has been of little or no benefit to perhaps a third of their population. Although average per capita income of the third world has increased by 50% since 1960. This growth has been very unequally distributed among countries, regions within countries, and socio-economic groups. Paradoxically, while growth policies have succeeded beyond the expectations of the first development decade, the very idea of aggregate growth as a social objective has increasingly been called into question*[38].

In a resource-rich but dependent capitalist oriented market economy, like Nigeria, debates on rural and community development are current and vibrant. These debates do not essentially and fundamentally concentrate on the role of the state, levels of the incursions of international capital

the consequences on the economy in general and the peasantry in particular[39]. Rather, they concentrate largely on the populist view which suggests that the role of the modern state in rural development efforts is to provide and run services essentially designed to subsidize on the humanitarian gesture and then remove the repercussions of 'market forces' on rural dwellers.

It is against this thesis that this study takes its point of departure and belligerently argues that the well being of the entire populace is not a selective prerogative of governments or regimes to device. Therefore, the programs and strategies of rural development adopted at the expediencies of time are inherently embedded in the primary role and functions of the state. Thus, the incursion of capital into the sectors of national economy has assumed some significant dimensions in directing the psyche of the political leadership in its romance with capital and accepting virtually everything proposed. The relevant question is that why have rural development programs, sponsored by international capital/agencies in Nigeria, failed to fundamentally satisfy the hopes and aspirations created for rural dwellers ?

Despite the large scale and expensive programs on the rural development strategies by the Nigerian state in alliance with international capital, intentions contained therein are inconsistent with the way policies are implemented. Furthermore, provision of the basic social infrastructural services have not also been spectacular in spite of the injection of foreign capital into rural communities. The problems of low level productivity (which led and is still leading to a dangerous reliance on food import,) rural poverty, disease, pauperization, dependency etc. are still prominent. The question is whether agricultural programs are the appropriate strategies for accelerating overall rural development. Can the continuous injection of capital into rural areas raise productivity ? Is increased agricultural productivity synonymous with improved rural development or welfare ?

other important dimension of rural development strategy in Nigeria which most studies have ad perfunctory attention to is the phenomenon of local government . Various government pronouncements, over time, have indicated the direct linkages of the system of local government with rural development. It is therefore illuminating to realize that the responsibility of a local government "to participate in economic planning and development of the Local Government Area under an enacted law of joint economic planning board.."[40] is perhaps designed to enable people participate effectively in the administration of their respective areas as it is explicitly entrenched in the constitution.

Since the emergence of the military into Nigeria's political arena, the junta has proclaimed to reform the system of local government with the aim of inter alia, (i) bringing government closer to the people, (ii) encouraging the participation of people in the management of their affairs; (iii) injecting democratic practices into the local government system; (iv) ensuring even and uniform development throughout the state[41]. The rationale for reforms on local government, over time, has however shown that increases in the number of local government areas would enhance, among other things, the provision of infrastructural facilities and services to a great number of the populace[42].

It should be noted however that the 1976 reform for example, stated that:

> *every stratum of Nigerian society would benefit from the continued prosperity of this country, through the availability of amenities, indeed necessities, such as electricity, adequate water supply, improved transportation, health facilities and so on"*[43].

The strategy to achieve the objectives of the reform included a process of extensive consultation with the people and decentralization of authority to harness local resources for rapid development. The strategy was aimed at stimulating grassroots development and ensuring the

attainments of the principles of participatory and rapid rural development, democracy and political responsibility.[44]

The study proposes that the failure of the local governments to provide basic necessities to majority of the people has been ancillary to the intricacies of power, economic and class relations of the State structure that creates and dominates local governments[45]. It should be realized that the successes and failures of rural development programs in Nigeria can not be meaningfully explained in isolation from the socio-economic and political circumstances of the Nigeria state system.

The study will specifically attempt to examine the impact of socio-economic policies and factors which have often struck rural social settings with tidal force. On the nature and direction of rural development strategy, the problematic of our research will also be addressed on the role of Infrastructural facilities established or provided to the rural communities in raising living conditions and the extent to which these facilities are sustainable.

A central problem of rural development policy in Nigeria is essentially rooted on the assumptions that increased productivity is dependent on the application of the newly introduced or imported technology, crops, chemicals, mechanized techniques etc. This study argues to the contrary. These assumptions generally ignore the environmental/cultural conditions of the people, the system of private holdings, levels of productive forces as well as what might stimulate and increase the ability of peasant farmers as regards health needs, improved roads, education/training, cooperative of land, labor and marketing, etc.

## 1.05 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH:

The study will attempt to survey how the role of the state and nature of the economy dictate the politics of rural development in Nigeria. It will also attempt to examine the degree of the penetration of international capital into rural communities. Essentially, the objectives of the research are to:

(a) *Conduct a historical analysis and trace how the Nigerian economy* became integrated into the world-wide circuit of production and how the State has continued to satisfy certain requirements of capital penetration and its accumulation.

(b) Examine Nigeria's National Development Plans with a view to assessing the extent to which they have achieved the objectives of increased rural productivity and rural transformation.

(c) Assess Nigeria's policies and programs on rural development and evaluate the problems surrounding them with the objective of linking these problems to the very policies and programs pursued and the role of capital and technology in relation to the peasant system of production.

(d) Evaluate what actual problems rural development programs were specifically designed to solve and assess how far they have solved them.

(e) Analyze the crucial problems rural communities in Maigana face; and in the light of the State policies and strategies of rural development, highlight the potential obstacles and dangers inhibiting and threatening rural development.

## 1.06 THE RATIONALE AND AREA/SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The basic assumptions of our contributions in this research are to:

(a) Produce relevant data and provide useful information vital to decision and policy makers as well as implementors from all the levels government.

(b) Develop a base-line of data about the previous and current perceptions of rural development, the role of the state and the degree to which capital has transformed the peasantry and rural economies.

(c) Take a particular case study of a rural area in Zaria and assess how rural development policies and strategies have affected the entire conditions of rural life.

Our study will focus on a specific village of Maigana but inferences would be drawn from other surrounding communities affected by the rural development programs. The objective is to show the relevance of the study and the extent to which it might be replicated to similar village setting. The focus will however provide specificity and coherence to our study on rural development activities affecting the community/communities in question.

Since rural development refers to the various attempts by governments, local communities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to make quantitative changes and enhance more meaningful living standards to the rural folks, it is imperative to note that the establishment, constructions and provision of the basic social, physical and institutional infrastructural facilities fall within the canopy of rural development. However, the need to delimit the study in terms of space and time is therefore very paramount. Our study will hence examine the impact of the rural development strategies on the socio-economic settings of rural communities and the forces/factors militating against the provision of the basic needs to rural dwellers.

In time perspective, our assessment is limited to the period of thirty five years (1960-1995). This period falls within three distinct stages. The first decade covers 1960 to 1970. This was the period which marked the assumption of the indigenous political leadership after the

emergence of the Nigerian modern State, up to the period of the emergence of the military and the civil crisis. This will examine the capacity and ability of the Nigerian State in the initiation and execution of policies and programs for rural development.

Secondly, the period between 1971 and 1980 was largely the time when the rural development strategies received a great attention by not only the State but also international agencies/organs. The attention given by the State was however not unconnected with the amount of revenue coming into its coffers. This period equally featured serious devastation of drought and famine which forced the State to take a seeming responsibility in alleviating the problem. The final phase 1981-1995 was largely a period of great depression and economic squeeze. This period however marks a watershed in rural development pronouncements and inaugurations more than all the rural development strategies, policies and program formulated in the previous years, put together.

Maigana is an old settlement located at the north-east corner of Zaria Local Government Area, off Zaria-Jos highway. This village is however the Zonal Headquarters of the Kaduna State Agricultural Development Program and has recently been up graded or elevated to a status of a Headquarters of Soba Local Government Area.

Agriculture is the major if not the only occupation of the people. Both cash and food crops are grown in the area. Dry season farming is being facilitated through irrigation canals. However, mixed farming activities have been expanded as a result of the establishment of the Maigana farm center. It should be emphasized that the farm center was essentially established for the training or nurturing of 'progressive farmers' in and around the area. The Maigana farm center is jointly run by Kaduna State Ministry of Agriculture and the Nigerian Tobacco Company

(NTC) Zaria basically to boost the production of tobacco. However most of the activities of agricultural division were taken over in April 1980 after the establishment of the Integrated Rural Development Project in the State.

It should be noted however that the NTC import substitution automated factory in Zaria is a complete personification of the British-American Tobacco Industries Limited (B.A.T) - the largest MNC that produces half of the World's cigarettes.[46] With the emergence of the modern Nigerian State, surplus appropriation, unleashed into Maigana, has been well entrenched by B.A.T since the establishment of its trading posts etc. This was sequel to its deep penetration into the rural economy through inducing the peasant to cultivate tobacco. With the State and capital coming into league, overtime, Maigana area, among others, has been penetrated by capital since the early imperialist epoch. To exploit the peasants more, the NTC lured them with seeds and fertilizers to produce cheap tobacco leaves.

## 1.07 THE HYPOTHESIS/PROPOSITIONS:

The ideas used to guide our planned research propositions posit that:

( i ) The ability of the Nigerian State to design rural development policies and strategies and provide infrastructures for rural communities has been necessitated by the need to attract the influx of external resources and to maintain class domination.

(ii) If appropriate and sustainable infrastructures are provided to the rural communities, rural development would have been effectively and meaningfully realized thereby enhancing the Socio-economic condition of the majority of rural inhabitants;

(iii) Far from being an instrument of rural development, the involvement of the Nigerian State, in alliance with International Finance Institutions, supported by the economic base, will entrench structural dependency and underdevelopment.

(iv ) should a people - oriented policy, with popular and direct participation of rural inhabitants, be considered and taken Primary in the rural development strategies, and the State actually involves the participation of the people in the policy making and implementation, the imported packages of rural development programs would have no place whatsoever in our development pursuits.

## 1.08 THE PURPOSE AND RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH TO DISCUSSION IN LITERATURE AND TO THE POLICY MAKING

A large percentage of the people in the under-developed world live in abject or stark poverty. Paradoxically, a lot of resources exist in the rural areas. These resources can be utilized for the improvement of the localities. But since these resources which are located at various rural communities are not utilized for the benefit of the rural folks, it is logically relevant to examine how rural communities got entangled with State policies within the trappings of international capital. The researcher is therefore intrigued to study this area of concern and examine why rural development efforts that were undertaken have not been successful.

Issues surrounding rural development are numerous. A lot of difficulties in rural development arise in identifying and separating the symptoms from their actual causes. Since rural development strategies are primarily targeted to the rural poor,[47] how can we identify and separate the 'rural poor' from others ? In other words, what are the socio-economic, political, cultural and psychological features used to distinguish them? What is the rationale to emphasize

and separate the 'rural poor' on the basis of geographical locations ? What is the position of the urban poor in this context ? Why is it that serious constraints exist in these horizontal policies in attempts to provide necessities of life to rural communities ?

The relevance of this research is mooted in the concept of 'rural development'. This concept, expounded in various literature, has gained a national currency in Third World policies as the policy making organs have attempted to transform it beyond mere theoretical connotations. The concept has therefore been transformed into the public psyche by the State with the objective of achieving an increased rural productivity and incomes, diversification of the rural economy and the overall improvement of the quality of life of rural communities.

Hence, the dialectics of rural development in these countries, particularly in Nigeria, have indicated that these policies and programs are imbued with serious entanglements. The policies, based on the World Bank prescribed strategy, are further connected with a view that they are yet to address the actual rural predicaments as well as the relative compatibility or incompatibility with foreign capital. The research is further connected with the question of why these policies have continued to pose serious constraints to the entire processes of development. Furthermore, what are the role and material requirements to be fulfilled by linking foreign capital and technology with the Nigerian state and other related questions.

This research will also attempt to show how the policies of rural development in Nigeria have come into force within the state and the corresponding levels of economic and political circumstances. It will further try to assess the role of international capital and technology on the peasant productive forces and then seek to evaluate how these issues have structurally inhibited further progress as well as why peasants have found it extremely difficult, if not

impossible, to adapt the changing new styles to suit their peculiar environment. Our study will however examine how the downward trend in productivity, in absolute terms, is immensely affected by the skewed and incoherent policies by assessing how these have been reinforced to squeeze the peasantry.

Rural development policies were designed with a view to mobilizing the rural populace and making them to massively participate in the local government. Since these policies are intended to reduce rural poverty, provide certain infrastructural amenities etc, the achievements of these tasks are highly herculean. The bone of this contention is based on and associated with the questions which center on equitable distribution of available resources, public ownership and control of the means production and the organization of farming founded on collective basis to mobilize and coordinate labor and other resources as well as the concept of rural development.

The programs for rural development in Nigeria have continued to provoke many uprisings from the peasants[48]. Sequel to these peasant uprisings, the State has devised and evolved the slogan of 'peoples participation in rural development'. The emergence of this notion is not unconnected with the state's desperate attempts to reconcile labor and the requirements of capital. It is assumed that for rural development to have any meaningful achievement and solve the long, viable end, 'local people' have to be involved in the entire processes of development, from initiation to direct participation. But how can the 'local people', be emancipated to participate en masse in the processes of development by mere symbolic roles ?

Within the discussion in the literature and the policy making machinery, the research seeks to evaluate the deteriorating peasant commodity production and why the new adopted system of production could not ensure the sustenance of productivity. It should be noted that since

capitalism has not been able to smash or wipe out the peasantry, it however devised a means to reorganize it by subsuming subsistence into capital through a variety of programs. It is necessary to note that the alteration of peasant economy was to effect the colonial cohesion and break the reproduction cycle by the penetration of commodity relations and monetization[49]. Peasants, during the colonial era, were regimented towards the production of cash crops at the expense of consumer food items which had exacerbated the peasant commodity production.

The ascendancy of oil over other sectors of the Nigerian economy has thus risen rather than lowered the degree of exploitation and impoverishment of the rural communities. This ascension of oil power has accompanied further penetration of transnational corporations and aggravated further assaults of poverty in Nigeria. Since oil has dominated the major source of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings, peasant production has continued to be marginalized (to the point of being crippled) to fall short of not even fulfilling the State obligations to provide surplus. Thus, the threats posed by the massive food importation, due to the petro-dollar revenues, particularly in the 1970s, subjected the peasantry vulnerable to fall short in feeding his own family.

The research will, within the discussion of literature and policy making organ, analyze systematically how the agricultural and rural crisis in Nigeria has been provoked by the various state interventions as well as the gloomy performance of the economy. This interventionist stance is concomitant with huge financial investments poured on the projects designed to improve rural life. These large scale and capital intensive programs range from institutional establishments like the River Basin and Rural Development Authorities (RBRDAS) Integrated Agricultural Development Authorities (IADAS), National Accelerated Food Production Programs (NAFPP), the Green Revolution, Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) to the provision of inputs and technology, credits through banks etc. All these projects were nurtured and institutionalized

in conjunction with international capital represented by and under the prescriptive guidelines of the World Bank and agribusiness agencies through loans obtained from them.

Since rural development programs in Nigeria have concentrated on subduing the peasants by the penetration of capital, the State upholds that agricultural and rural development policies can no longer be effective and dynamic based on or side-by-side with peasant system of production[50]. This peasant system of production is therefore considered as antiquated and backward. It should be remembered that this was the system that sustained the entire colonial economy with abundant surpluses extracted. It is further necessary to note that the peasant entered the colonial era with his hoe and came out with it without any significant modification in his productive forces, and yet it sustained the colonial economy.

The popular assumption is that rural development strategies can only be achieved if the state and capital jointly finance the mechanization of agriculture with a view to diversifying it and promoting rural industrialization[51]. What is significantly required is to bureaucratically link the State with foreign capital and technology. With all the accompanying problems, certain measures were extrapolated but the problems only continue to wear new faces, as more transient solutions were made. Hence, the same problems of inflation, increase in poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, infant mortality rate etc. still persist unabated despite the astronomic increase in foreign earnings. Nigeria's position among the highly indebted and poorest nations[52] is therefore paradoxical and diabolical.

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## 1.09 THE METHODOLOGY:

The research will employ analytical description and interpretation of historical and empirical records and facts. The research methodology will involve collections and assembling of relevant

data or documentary information from primary and secondary sources. The intention is not only to gather relevant information but also to test their relative relationship between the nature or structure of the economy and the state role on the one hand and the direction of rural development policies and strategies in Nigeria on the other particularly since the attainment of political independence in 1960.

The initial collection and assembling of data will involve a critical review of literature by relating the relevance of the issues raised to the subject matter. This will therefore involve an overview of the state policy implementation as well as the implementation of the rural development program in particular. This process will attempt to synthesize various issues raised so as to place them in their proper theoretical perspectives.

Since the methodology of gathering data will use both quantitative context and aggregate data analysis, the past rural development strategies in Nigeria, from the colonial era, would be assessed. This attempt will bring into focus the nature of socio-economic and political structures created during colonialism and those during the post-colonial era by examining the policy pronouncements of governments and their directions.

Our secondary sources will largely, if not entirely, depend on published books, journals, periodicals, reports, newspapers, seminar/conference papers, state documentary records and other unpublished or classified materials related and relevant to the subject matter. In particular, archival materials, (mimeographs, official gazettes, dispatches from colonial officials, annual reports, ordinances etc). Arewa House for Research and Documentation as well as other related places and Ministry records/data or urban/rural socio-economic situation will be consulted where available. Other information will be collected from various International Finance Agencies with

The questionnaire will also identify what type of infrastructural facilities existing in the locality were provided by the people themselves or any other non-governmental organizations as well as their tangible and intangible cost of such facilities and nature of their maintenance. Finally the questionnaire will, among other things, solicit and elicit the opinions of the rural-folk on how to formulate and sustain rural development strategies to benefit the targeted group.

Whereas non-behavioral questionnaire or interviews will be conducted for the collection of data from government organizations established for the implementation of rural development as well as various finance agencies involved. This will seek information from individuals directly involved in the initiation and execution of rural development policies, strategies and programs. Information, which are technical and professional in nature would attempt to evaluate and assess rural development programs in their multi-dimensional aspects .

This therefore seeks to examine the viability and the visibility of the strategies in attaining the objectives designed to achieve. The questionnaire is also an attempt to identify the forces and factors militating against the attainment of the policy and then elicit for a practicable solution to the problem especially the management and fiscal issues. Finally it is intended to, inter alia, juxtapose the policy statements and official pronouncements of rural development programs with what is empirically and realistically existing in the rural communities.

Interviews will also be conducted to get the opinions of various individuals and organizations involved in rural development programs with a view to authenticating the information already supplied in the questionnaires, as the case may be. Furthermore, empirical observations and assessment of people's living conditions will be made especially during the unstandardized interview to the randomly selected individuals.

Since the study is essentially heuristic like all case studies, data collection, based on primary and secondary sources, is illustrated by reliance on historical insights gleaned from personal observations, structured and open-ended interviews as well as classified materials. Hence, the process of data presentation adopted in this work includes sampling procedure of the study area. Therefore, a sampling frame of 150 households was initially compiled as constituting that essential part of methodology germane to the research design, problem and objectives as indicated, for the purposes of data presentation and analysis.

Thus, as the project is essentially to assess the implementation of rural development policies on rural population, a sample of 82 households was finally drawn and used as the basic unit of analysis. This was based on a systematic procedure of drawing a relatively random sampling by carefully adding or selecting groups, individuals, houses etc that appear distinct in the localities with a view to ensuring that no significant social category in the population was left out of the sample.

Meanwhile, all these categories were scrutinized to ensure completeness, unbiasness, comprehensibility, consistency and reliability. Thus, the target groups in the focus area cut across age, sex, occupation, culture, class etc thereby exhibiting a complete representative of the entire population. Based on data collected, our choice of research methodology, particularly to the types of data presentation and analysis, are therefore designed to be congruent, strategically intrinsic or related and appropriate to the problematic of the study.

The process of analysis is relatively simple: the number of households sampled was small, while the number of characteristics was not large and complex. Therefore, the method of data analysis adopted in this study includes coding of interview responses (interview schedules), questionnaire replies, observations and thereby placing each item in its

appropriate category and in a tabular form, among others. Tabulated data, through the use of statistical computations, were entered appropriately through the computerized LOTUS 1,2,3; with tables drawn and analyzed based on the different characteristics and issues raised, particularly in the questionnaire.

Statistical computations were essentially used in this study to demonstrate the allocation of percentages, and to empirically show correlations or averages computed, as the case may be, as obtained in the questionnaire/interview enquiries and replies. These exercises were however done to justify our conclusions as a true representative of the entire population based on the specific findings and generalizations. In addition, to content-analyze the verbal and other data collected, various items or variables on rural development policies were selected to clearly illustrate results empirically and graphically by units analysis and quantification through assigning of numbers, ranking and rating.

While the coding exercise was essentially undertaken to translate question replies and respondents' information to the relevant classification or variables for the purpose of analysis, the data collected or assembled and studied were finally interpreted with the results of these interpretative process clearly indicated and presented.

## 1.10 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY AND THE SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTERS

The study, made up of ten chapters, is divided into four parts. Part one is the introduction. It examines the general theoretical tools and background for the study. It consists of chapters one and two. Part two is the historical discourse of the study and consists of chapters three and four. Part three is made up of chapters five, six, and seven while part four consists of chapters eights, nine and ten.

While both parts three and four respectively are hinged on the theoretical and historical outline set out in parts one and two; they exhibit the empirical situation. They also analyze rural development policies and strategies in Nigeria by focusing specifically on Maigana rural communities.They however highlight on the State and politics of rural development aimed at a critical understanding of the political economy of rural development particularly with regard to the state-capital alliance and its impact on the peasantry.

However, attempts are made to analyze institutional supports for rural development in Maigana and explore problems and prospects of achieving rural development. This further highlights on how the relevance of management of sustained rural development programs of strategies provided in the rural area are handled by the rural dwellers especially on the crucial dimensions of participatory rural development, sustainability of institutions and techniques, particularly on how the villagers identify their peculiar problems and appropriate solutions likely to enable them plan and manage their environment and needs.

Hence, part three opens with a general outlook on the perspectives of rural development in Nigeria zeroing down to Maigana. This perspective outlook is therefore very relevant since the country as a whole represents the macro entity within which Maigana is located. Whereas part

four presents an analysis of rural infrastructures in Maigana and the institutions supposedly expected to provide and maintain such infrastructures and services. A chain of conclusion was drawn based on the issues raised and the actual situation on the ground.

Chapter one introduces and examines the subject matter. It attempts to place the study within the general theoretical context and highlights on the perspectives of the state and rural development in Nigeria. The problematic of the political economy of rural development in Nigeria in the study is shown to be associated with the non-recognition albeit with non-involvement of and non- investment in the local population.

The role of local people and institutions in rural development activities has been far less stressed and clammed up sequel to the modernization and oriental theories of development which consider local people/institutions as inimical to development. It argues that the rural development strategies have collapsed and will continue to do so as long as there is no grassroots support, participation and relevance.

In other words, success depends on deliberate intensification and direct recognition of human factor and thus putting the needs of people first before any thing else. The poverty situation in the country-side and the orthodoxy of the rural-urban gap are the debilitating issues within the purview of the political economy of development.

The intrinsic role of the State and capital via the World Bank etc in the extraction of surplus, rather than providing relevant services or infrastructures, has only succeeded in redistributing poverty not only amongst the rural but also the urban communities. The chapter raises fundamental questions on the ultimate objectives of rural development and how these objectives

have been transformed to suit the whims of the State and its actors. However, the relevance, objective, and methodology of the study are highlighted stressing the incapability of the State to transform rural communities due primarily to the instability inherent in the socio-economic system.

Chapter two dwells on the review of relevant literature and examination of the theoretical framework with which the study rests. In the first place, it brings out the methodological and theoretical problems inherent in the definition and realization of development. The problematic of the doctrines of development is buttressed and began by taking a survey of the classical theorists up to the Keneysian era. Other theoretical postulates that emerged since then were also examined. Thus relevant literature relating to the nature, dynamics and perspectives of theories of development are reviewed.

Our survey on relevant literature concludes that all development theories have strikingly failed to have much empirical relevance to our domestic affairs. Rather, their application has further made the intensification of inequality and absolute poverty more pronounced and precludes all attempts to provide basic needs to rural communities.

On the theoretical framework, the chapter analyses the political economy approach and situates the study on the Marxist materialist approach. It is within this context that the study theoretically rests, makes its systematic analysis and draws its conclusion from the method and subject matter of political economy. It brings out the impacts of the State and capital on the peasantry and provision of services/infrastructures within the contours of rural development policies and strategies.

However, the role of the modes of production, within specific historical conjunctures, has been shown in relation to the nature of relations and forces of production in the development of human society. This is done in order to establish links, where available, with the study area. In addition, the mode of production within the current perspective on rural development strategies is not as given, as it emerged out of historical circumstances. The chapter finally examines the role of the State-cum-petty-bourgeois alliance within the context of theoretical constructs and the political economy of development.

Chapter three begins the historical analysis of the State in the traditional Hausa society before 1900. It shows the evolution and distinctive features of the dual structure of the society exhibited by Karkara (rural) and Maraya (urban) continuum of disparities. Of particular importance is the process of State formation which produced the phenomenal birni settlements and all the paraphernalia of the sarauta and fief-holding officials spread throughout kauyuka to control and extract resources rather than develop or provide services to them.

The chapter looks into the pre and post birni socio-economic and political structures in the entire process of the replacement of kinship relation by one based on control of territory. Thus, the development of birni/maraya through extraction of surplus from kauye/karkara was advanced as an essential factor producing the phenomenal rural-urban gap and thereby culminating in draining of the rural population.

Invariably, the rural economy and population gradually came under the orbit of the State control and supervision. Consequently the colonial regime, as a new socio-political force, further consolidated this control by reenforcing the powers at the birane. It concludes that all these structures created facilitated the colonial government to have easier access to rural areas and control the machinery of the State through the traditional structure already put in place.

Chapter four traces the historical perspectives of the colonial State and rural Zaria from 1900 to 1960. An examination of the structure and political economy of colonialism is discussed within the contours of rural-urban relations exhibited by the colonial government. Hence the dual functions of the rural and urban structures the colonial State maintained or enhanced for the extraction of surplus are highlighted along side with the violent penetration of capitalism into the rural economies.

It is argued that with the integration of the entire economy within the circuit and orbit of the world capitalism and imperialism, exploitation, domination and dependence become unabated. Hence, there was a complete absence of infrastructural facilities primarily designed for the sustenance of rural areas. The further development or growth of urban Zaria was corollary to the under-development of its rural areas, particularly enhanced during the colonial era.

Thus, the growth or development the Sabon Gari and the plans to transform Zaria, according to Governor Bell's design, as the capital of Northern Nigeria add more impetus to impinge upon further assaults on the rural impoverishment. Thus, the establishment of Maigana farm center is an example where such surplus extraction was unleashed on the rural communities.

Chapter five looks into the perspective approach to rural development in Nigeria within the entire rural development paradigm. It shows that part of the tragedy of rural development policy in Nigeria is that rural areas are taken as given or the State refuses to appreciate and recognize rural situation but prefers to surrender them to external incursions and distortions. Consequently, serious drawbacks in the induced rural programs have come to reduce rural areas as an eyesore of the Nigerian social and economic setting.

Chapter six examines Maigana in its historical and socio-economic setting and empirically shows its potentials for rural development. The colonial perspective on Maigana was specifically singled out to buttress the attention the rural community attracted or was paid to since the colonial era. The chapter also focuses on the other important variables like the ecological and topographical description of locality, sample description and survey frame.

Chapter seven examines the role of the World Bank and its sponsored programs of rural development in Maigana. Thus, the chapter evaluates the State-capital alliance, within the rural development policy making and its implementation, on the peasantry under the Bank's guided operations. Since one of the major features of the World Bank Projects is the ADPs, the chapter analyses the KADP in Maigana and evaluates the activities of the project and its impact on the targeted and un-targeted groups; particularly in the objectives of agricultural productivity etc.

However, the chapter shows that despite millions of dollars lent out by the Bank, Maigana and its environs are yet to witness any positive changes in the social and economic angles as well as sustainable infrastructural facilities. Furthermore, a detailed and empirical survey on the socio-economic setting of rural Maigana was demonstrated to exhibit the stark realities, while the role of non-agricultural activities has been shown to be very crucial in the development of the rural areas but have not been fully organized and put in proper shape.

Chapter eight concentrates on the dynamics and a critical analysis of rural infrastructural facilities in Maigana and the State policy or programs vis-a-vis the concrete realities on the ground. The chapter opens with a critique of the Nigeria's development plans and the paucity of rural infrastructures therein. Thus, the role of relevant infrastructures in rural development, maintained and sustained, provides a strong base for the human factor in rural development to be mobilized, motivated and energized.

The chapter assesses the most important infrastructures and examines their impotence in Maigana. These infrastructures include roads, water supply, educational facilities, health delivery system, rural electrification etc. It concludes however that the provision, maintenance and sustenance of such infrastructural facilities the ingredients for basic rural living condition, are completely deficient or non-existent and misplaced in the localities.

Chapter nine takes an overview of the institution of local government in rural development by focusing on the Soba local government area where Maigana is the headquarters of the local government. It shows that in the system of local government, despite all constitutional provision and articulations, there still exists fundamental constitutional lacuna which has seriously transformed the system as a toothless bull-dog and completely senile and powerless.

The senility and powerlessness of the system of local government coupled with the domineering power and interest of the State make it vulnerable to controls, abuses and thereby becoming incapable of discharging even its assigned symbolic responsibilities to the people. The chapter also examines the role of women in Maigana and shows that through very crucial in production but are completely a neglected theme and focus in rural development strategies.

The chapter concludes that the realities on the ground has consequently forced the local communities to engage in self-help efforts in NGOs, CDAs etc to bail themselves out. Thus powerful NGOs or CDAs seem to be the best channels through which the objectives of rural development can be over-whelmingly accepted and realized as the no-response analysis shows.

Chapter ten summarizes the major theoretical postulation raised with regard to doctrines of development and the various paths or approaches to rural development vis-a-vis the world global

system. Thus, it is concluded that the modernization and oriental theories of development have not proved potent and relevant to our domestic situation. However, the materialist view of the State has been demonstrated to be the potentates of and an appropriate theoretical tool for our understanding of the problem and solution to the challenges of development.

The chapter reaffirms that the political economy of rural development is the architect of the intensity of rural suffering. Thus, the politics and failures of rural development are shrouded within that realm; historically, materially and dialectically. Empirical evidence has therefore shown that all policies and strategies aimed at increasing productivity and incomes of the peasant farmers turned out to be a pyrrhic victory despite the billions of dollar expenditure. The so-called 'target groups' become victims with the bureaucratic propensity to accumulate.

Finally, the concluding chapter evaluates the implementation of rural development in Maigana and the state of infrastructural facilities with a view to reconstructing better rural development policies, programs and strategies for policy makers and implementors as well as for further research.

FOOT NOTES

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46. Patrick Heinecke - Freedom in the Grave: Nigerian and the Political Economy of Africa, Gaskiya Corporation Ltd., Zaria, 1986, PP17-20.
47. Vincent Austin, Rural Industrial Development: A Practical handbook for Planners, project Managers and Field Staff I Casse11, London, 1981, p.1.
48. For instance, the Bakalori Peasant revolt was a case in point.
49. Henry Bernstein, op.cit
50. Tina Wallace - "The challenge of food: Nigeria's Approach to Agriculture, 1975-80, The Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 15, 1981, p.240.
51. Vincent Austin, 1981, op.cit P.7.
52. See World Bank News, December, 1988.

# CHAPTER TWO

## 2.00 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

> *... all phases of development are temporary or transient and are destined sooner or later to give way to something else.*[1]
>
> *It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.*[2]

### 2.01 INTRODUCTION

In the early 1950s, development was perceived to be synonymous with economic growth. This view explains that economic development could be promoted, **inter alia**, by setting up of import-substituting industries. This view was thus based on the belief that foreign aid and technical assistance to the under-developed countries could be used to launch a 'take-off' stage of development similar to the Marshall Plan in Western Europe.

In the under-developed world, foreign aids, loans and technical assistance, since the late 1950s, have been highly unserviceable and unrealistic panacea to the challenges of development. Approaches and proposals further put forward by development economists and social scientists have shown greater shifts and reawakening in the philosophical thoughts; particularly on the sectoral focus of development. Thus a search for a more meaningful and sustainable alternative had to be propounded.

The problems of poverty that have plagued all the under-developed countries and the plight of the majority of the people residents in the rural areas have captured the macro attention of many a scholar. There has been, particularly during the early and mid 1960s, a growing and widespread recognition of the inherent inadequacies and irrelevance of the development models being formulated and proposed for the under-developed world. Thus, the more the models unfold the more impoverished the people of the under-developed world become and in the process the more elusive and problematic the realization of development.

Rural development must begin in from and end with the overall socio-economic and political desire or needs of the people. These needs must therefore be embraced in both the theory and practice of the state activity or role. If the objective of the state is to, in theory and practice, build a society devoid of exploitation, deprivation, poverty and inequality and then achieve an overall well being of the community, then the vertical dissection of societies into rural and urban, oppressed and oppressors etc would have been at its lowest ebb.

## 2.02 METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Methodologies for formulation and reformulation of development theories have been problematic. Attempts, over time, to solve the problem arising from the conceptual construction or definitional priorities and other requirements of development seem to, notwithstanding, generate more debates, controversies than produce empirical evidence in the achievements of socio-economic well being of the people. The central theme in the study of the subject matter therefore reflects changes to the old theoretical postulation started by early classical economists.

The central problem in the theories of development is that which associates the orthodoxy of the concept to western in origin and limited to the narrow economic angles. To classical economists, economic growth was crucial to development. But in spite of unanimity among classical theorists on the concept of development based on economic growth, they however differed on the weight and priorities they placed in different segments of the economy.

It is therefore imperative to evaluate, in general, the nature and framework of Western bourgeois theories of development with a view to placing them within the myriad of conceptual perspectives. Thus, to comprehend the nature, direction and scope or dimension of the theories, the historical and socio-economic and political environment within which the theory was built

or formulated and the inherent class interest they were to serve are therefore essential. This will then bring or solve the question of relevance of the theories over time and space. Invariably, the evaluation of the Western or bourgeois theories of development, which had for long been the dominant theme in various attempts to explore and explain socio-economic and political issues, needs to be holistic. The rationale is to show their consistency, validity, reliability or practical universal applicability.

Universal applicability of the concept and model of development theories formulated over time has continued to raise, **inter alia,** definitional problems. Thus the teleological considerations or assumptions which placed West as a blue print for development which the under-developed countries have strived to emulate are already discarded. The discarding of these assumptions has sprouted out the notion of different paths to development which further compounded the problems associated with the concept.

Hence, the causal relationship between economic growth and various categories of development has continued to loosen up and therefore industrialization came to be regarded as a separate issue from development. Even within economic perspectives, problems of priorities between agriculture and industry, between balanced and unbalanced growth, between measures of collective and individual 'betterment' further eroded confidence about meanings".[3]

However, the definitional problems arising from development further come to be "intruded with relativistic categorization of "modernity"[4]. Hence, old relativistic meanings of development have been discarded as a result of the universal applicability of the concept based particularly on aspirations gleamed from the global system and dynamic changes in the doctrine of development.[5] It is further stressed that

The 'one-sector model' formulated by Adam Smith shows that economic growth could only be sustained in agricultural sector.[7] The focus was on the causes, costs and sustainability of increasing production based on division of labor and large market incentives. By 1817, David Ricardo improved on the 'one sector model' of development but still remained within its problematic. He placed greater priority on agriculture but however emphasized that it could no longer play a dominant role as it must depend on capital and manufacturing sector.[8]

Thus, a 'two-sector model" - agriculture and commerce - would determine the development process and economic expansion of the entire system of production. The Ricardian theory of development stressed on the need for a fair distribution of the benefits of production amongst various categories, groups or classes in the society and then analyzed how the nature of the distribution affected economic growth. The theory further analyzed the relationship between labor and capital, owners and controllers of the means of production.

The Malthusian theory concentrates more on population and how it affects growth and production.[9] Emphasis is placed on how economic growth could be drastically stultified with increasing or uncontrolled population not directly engaged in production. Basically, classical theorists perceived development and growth as synonymous and that the concept could not be coherent unless it was analyzed within the framework of economic growth.

The neo-classical era critically refined the classical economic theory. Particular attention under this development paradigm is placed on Karl Marx even though there is no unanimity of him being placed under this phase because of, among other things, time and his revolutionary tendencies in the interpretation of history and economic analysis. It has been contended that Marx was a class of his own. But the works of Marx can not be discussed without references

to the classical economic theories. As the classical school looks at the economy at the micro-level, Marx looks at it from a holistic perspective.

Marx based his study on the materialist interpretation of history. In this approach, analysis of the growth or development of a society must start from the level of production which consists of two important components - forces of production (the sum total of the material condition of production) and relations of production (relations human beings enter with each other in the process of development). Both the forces and relations of production constitute the societal mode of production.

Hence, the mode of production forms the core of society's structure, which constitutes a fundamental point of departure of Marx. He stresses that without a proper understanding of the mode of production, we cannot comprehend the trend and historical development of society. He shows that forces of production are continuously being improved upon and that a time would come when the relations of production would not agree with the forces of production. He maintains that the origin of all the historical changes may be found or are inherent in the conflicts between forces and relations of production. In other words, when the latter does not correspond with the former, progress is slowed down; and until the contradiction is resolved, which does not come automatically and smoothly, before change is realized. Thus, when a new mode of production emerges, new ideas, new relations of production etc. come into place. Furthermore, new economic structures and indeed the entire super-structure of the society come into effect. Hence, the kind of mode of production and economic base determine the super structure.

Marx shows that the five modes of production have occurred in different societies, over time and space, in the processes of development. The modes of production are enumerated as - primitive communalism, slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist/communist. On the primitive communal stage of development of societies, marx believed that third world countries could not move from one mode of production to another and accordingly, colonialism was a necessity[9] to change these countries. This belief is a major flaw of Marxism. Marx, in this respect, thought that Britain had done a good job by colonizing India and therefore third world countries could not develop unless they were colonized.[10]

The keynesian contribution to development theory centers essentially on micro-economic issues. John Keynes for example, argued that aggregate demand was important for economic growth[11]. In times of depressions, government would spend more money in order to stimulate or accelerate demand so as to achieve, among others, full employment opportunities. That government intervention in the economy was paramount and crucial.

Economists like Harrod and Dornar believed that economic development was synonymous with capital formation[12]. They contended that third world is not developing because it lacks capital to invest and therefore no surplus generated. That the only difference between the industrialized and under-developed countries was on capital. This belief therefore formed the furtherance of other erroneous views or perception of the bourgeois theory of development and other theories that emerged to rationalize it.

It should be noted that much of the theoretical postulations about development, especially during the post - 1945 era, when a separate or new literature on development economics emerged, were formulated by economists. Since then, these theories have come under serious criticisms; because notwithstanding the apparent success recorded in the industrialized states, particularly

in the economic angles, the economic management of keynesian micro-economic theory and Adam Smith's liberal trade models have not served meaningful expectations.[13]

On capital accumulation approach to development, the Harrod - Domar growth model was however one of the early theories about development. The models attempted to explore viable conditions for a stable growth in the industrialized economies. The primary assumptions contained in the theories suggest that balance in the supply and demand results only when investment equals the changes in the national income in relation to the capital output value, while the equilibrium in a closed economy is directly related to balanced investment and savings.[14]

The attractiveness of the model relates to one of the primary objectives of development - i.e, the rate of economic growth and investment. But is it only the level of savings which restricts investment in under-developed states as the model implies ? In addition, the Rosentein- Rodan (1943) 'Big Push' and 'Balanced Growth' theory of savings - Investment ratio stresses on the basic requirements for the industrial output to provide a broad market for further investments. Thus, industrial investment and big investment push are ingredients for the big push and balanced growth theory[15].

Furthermore, Nurke's (1952) balanced growth theory presents similar ideas and arguments. Since the theories are essentially meant for developing industry in the industrialized states and not agriculture in the under-developed states, the theories inherently under estimate the economic importance of agricultural sector as emphasis is entirely concentrated on large scale investments. Again the theories naively place more emphasis on the appropriateness of capital intensive production techniques by not recognizing the inelasticity of supply of capital and other factors of production many under-developed states face.[16]

The theories of economic dualism relate to the co-existence of modern, industrial or capitalist sector side-by-side with dominated traditional subsistence agricultural sector. The theories suggest or seek to explain how an agrarian economy could be transformed, through dualism, into an industrial economy which dichotomies the theory into two main compartments - Industry/agriculture or modern/subsistence or capitalist/non capitalist. Within these paradigms, it is shown that the phenomenon and problems of dualism have received spectacular attention which provides a significant step towards a clearer appreciation of the mechanism, nature and dimensions of under-development[17].

Whereas Rostow's stages of economic growth of traditional society, transitional stage - preconditions for take off, the take-off, drive to maturity and stage of mass consumption are rather tautological as there exists no distinction between the beginning of one stage and the end of the next phase. But since the poor countries, according to the theory, were to 'begin their process of' development in the pre-condition stage, it has become vividly evident that the theory has woefully failed to accomplish the transition or achieve the take-off stage.

Hence, the Rostowian theory of production places higher premium on the composition of investment and growth in certain leading economic sectors.[18] The growth in these sectors of the economy is instrumental in pushing the economy ahead. Therefore, sequential optimum patterns of investment are determined by the level of income, population, technology and propulsive effects of entrepreneurship with propensity to save earnings for development.[19]

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Max Weber's psycho-cultural development thesis is essentially based on the relationship between protestantism and the development of capitalism. It therefore stresses basic requisites in culture and psychology for development to come into being. Weber argues that for capitalism to have

from the theory of pattern variables of Talcot Parsons. Pattern variables are dichotomized into three polar extremes - universalism and particularism, achievement and ascription - and specificity and diffuseness. - Hoselitz's thesis stresses that third world countries exhibit particularism, ascription, diffuseness, affectivity and collective orientation while the industrialized countries exhibit the characteristics of universalism, achievement, specificity, effective neutrality and self orientation with regard to governance of the society.[24]

However, political development theory like Almond's structural functionalism, democracy and political modernity are within the same terrain of economic theories. Political modernity, according to Almond, should be perceived, for example, in the light of the degree of differentiations taking functional specialization inherent in the political structure. Modernizing the political culture, Almond and Powell stated that five main 'capabilities' of the political system - extractive, regulative, distributive, symbiotic and responsive - should be taken into consideration.

Rowtow's teleological stages of development which all societies were assumed to pass through and reach economic development have also been discarded. Hence,

> *as the teleology receded out of development theories, breaking up both the deterministic economic priorities of Rowstow and the democratic priorities of say, Lipset, an increasing relativistic concept of development emerged which took into account of individual diversities and cultural constraints of different societies*[25].

Since the weakening of the teleological assumptions of the Western Model of development it nonetheless not only made it less important but also led to a re-conceptualization of those assumptions. In retrospect, Western historical experiences were assumed to constitute a series of

*...inescapable crises and responses to crises whose sequence and timing constituted the process of development*[26]

Therefore, there was only one course of action open to the under-developed part of the world in attempts to attain a similar level of standard achieved by the Western World - they must replicate the economic history of the industrialized nations. Their social, economic and political structures must be 'modernized' as a precondition to achieve a high level of industrialization, capital accumulation and investment ratio, etc. Hence, National economies must be open, development of urban industrialization, schumpeter's propulsive effects of entrepreneurship and national economic planning in allocation source resources must be pursued vigorously in line with the 'center-down' model approach of unequal development where productive wealth and capital are in the hands of privileged few.

## 2.04 DEVELOPMENT FROM 'ABOVE' AND 'BELOW': THEORETICAL POSTULATES

The gulf of inequalities in living conditions between the industrialized and the under-developed countries is continuously widening. Inequalities between and within these countries may not be effectively reduced by mere functional integration at national and international levels[27] or by a greater degree of internal self-reliance with 'selective spatial closure'[28]. These two approaches constitute the major paradigms of development 'from above' and its alternative development 'from below'[29].

Development 'from above' emerged from the neo-classical economic theory with its spatial manifestation of the concept of the growth center. The dominance of the development 'from above' strategies has continued, until recently, to constitute the major spatial planning theory and practice in not only the technologically advanced but also the under-developed regions. The basic premise of the theory is that development is derived from

*...external demand and innovation impulses and that from a few dynamic sectoral or geographical clusters*[30].

Thus, development would 'trickle down' to the entire system either in a spontaneous or induced way. These strategies have tended to be urban and industrial in nature and externally oriented. They are however highly characterized by an advanced level of technology and invariably capital intensive.

The disparities between the industrialized and under-developed countries will continue to widen remarkably as long as the latter continue to adopt innovations or strategies that originate from the former. The top-down model is thus imbued with consequences since it does not suggest the development of individual countries free from the international dependency position masterminded by the MNCs. Lasue's argument of the creation of multi-national firms on continental basis as a pre-condition for rapid diffusion of innovation in developing countries is therefore questioned[31] since the extension of MNC operations to the developing countries has negative consequences in development.

One of the dominant aspects of development 'from above' is on center-down paradigm rooted in balanced and unbalanced growth controversy of the 1950s. Vicious circle arguments advanced for the poverty of the under-developed world were sequel to low productivity in labor partly as a result of inadequate supply of physical capital. To complete the vicious circle, the shortage of capital is due to low savings caused by low incomes. All these combined together have culminated in lack of effective demand by low level investments in industry. Thus, balanced growth theory advances that investments be diversified to cover a large number of industries with each complementing another so as to be able to keep themselves viable and profitable[32].

Fleming (1955) challenged the concept and position of balanced growth theory which centered on the demand side of the problem. Thus, inadequate supplies of factors of production - capital and skilled labor - "may make diversified and simultaneous investment projects unfeasible by sharply increasing the costs of production of all industries as they compete for limited supply of factors[33]. Anke (1963) however argued that the balanced growth approach to development implied a closed structure of the economy where a country can have balanced consumption without balanced production by importing goods it cannot afford to produce[34]. Even the 'big-push' thesis would mean an enormous government regulation on subsidized private firms[35].

Earlier on, Singer (1949) had stressed that the balanced growth-via-big-push thesis was not creditable as

> *...resources required for carrying out the policy... are of such an order of magnitude that a country disposing of them would in fact not be under-developed.*[36]

As such, the voluminous and seminal center-down paradigm of unbalanced growth theory contributions of Hirschman, Myrdal and Perroux of the late 1950s were influential and occupied a central place in the growth center literature.

Hirschman's 'polarization and trickle down' thesis' maintained that development strategies should concentrate on a relatively few sectors rather than on widely dispersed projects; the key sectors would be determined by measuring backward-linkage and forward-linkage effects in terms of input and output maxima"[37]. Growth, according to him, is communicated from the leading sectors of the economy to the followers, from one firm to another. This approach, unlike the balanced growth, leaves considerable scope to induce investment decision and therefore economizes principal scarce resources.[38]

The geographical dimension of Hirschman's polarization and trickle down development thesis requires some consideration once unbalanced growth at the regional setting is obvious[39]. The tendency is that the entire economic activity may be concentrated in few growth poles sequel to a consistent external investments in the poles. The resultant effect is that growth points in the hinterland may be dwarfed because of the unfavorable trickle-down effects from the growth poles and therefore their attractiveness is highly dependent on the progress attained at the center.[40]

It should be noted that 'trickle down' effects are generated by purchases and investments located in the hinterland by the growth points which may at the end only produce relatively inefficient production and create false impression about productivity of labor and per capita income in the hinterland. The option offered by Hirschman is the provision of infrastructure necessary to provide inducement mechanisms in economic activities - agriculture, industries, etc.

Myrdal's (1957) Cumulative causation theory contains a number of similarities with that of Hirschman. For example, Mydral's conceptual tools like the backwash and spread effects have corresponded closely to Hirschman's polarization and trickle down effects since the backwash effects involve the workings of Polarization, migration, trade and capital. Like Hirschman, Myrdal also observed aspects of migration from the hinterland to the growth centers but with emphasis on who are more prone to move. He also focused on the higher fertility rate of poor areas and their impact on the working-age group to total population ratio which is likely to be unfavorable in the hinterland[41]. Myrdal further maintained that

> *...a simple model of circular causation with cumulative effects is more consistent with actual social and economic process*[42].

But the expansion of a growth center would lead to the fortification of its growth at the expense impact is a reinforced inequality by flow of savings in the hinter-land where demand for

of other areas in both the internal and external economies, like skilled labor force, etc. As the flow of capital is enhanced by increase in demand and induced investments, the resultant impact is a reinforced inequality by flow of savings in the hinter-land where demand for investment capital remains weak towards the centers of expansion where returns are high and severe. Poverty therefore persists in the hinterlands even by the non-economic factors because of the inability to support adequate health and education facilities[43] which would be detrimental in an economically progressive society.

Thus, the counteracting backwash effects from the spread effect are the increased outlets for the hinterlands agricultural products and raw materials and a tendency for technical advance to diffuse from the growth centers. The spread effects will be stronger and the attractiveness of growth center may be weakened.[44] But irrespective of the similarities in approaches and concepts by Hirschman and Myrdal there are considerable differences of emphasis. Hirschman, in particular, was more optimistic about the long run future of under-developed countries since his theory is explicitly related to these countries. Hirschman however seemed to have taken as given that strong forces will eventually create a turning point once polarization effects have proceeded for sometime.[45]

Perroux's (1955) growth poles theory of development is predominantly concerned with interactions among industrial sectors rather than spatial development process.[46] In contrast to other balanced and steady growth theories (Hirschman 1957 and Myrdal 1955), Perroux maintained that sustained growth of total population should concentrate on the process by which various activities appear, grow in importance and in the same disappear since growth rates vary from place to place and sector to sector. Like Schumpeter, Perroux emphasized on the significance of entrepreneurial innovations in development process preceded by a succession of

dynamic sectors.[47]

Another dimension of Perroux development theory was on dominance consisting of an 'irreversible or only partially irreversible influence' of one economic sector over others because of its nature, strength and position in the dominant economic activity. Spatial implications of the theory include the emphasis placed on development poles or big industrial complexes which are oligopolistic in nature. It should be noted however that since the twentieth century was more or less characterized by an accelerated urbanization, contraction and expansion of centers, they in themselves, have constituted serious problems of the urban growth strategy.[48]

Friedmann's 'core-periphery interaction' development model is essentially non-economic. As a planner, his analysis was set out on a regional development policy of the industrialized societies. But Rodwin's (1963) model of 'concentrated decentralization is set out for 'economically lagging peripheral regions.[49] His point of departure is that induced urban growth centers should be the basis for regional development policy. On the other hand, Friendmann argued that Rodwin's approach failed:

> *... to determine sufficiently among development regions and their problems. Activation of new core regions is not enough nor indeed, always appropriate. An effective regional policy must deal as a system with the separate development of core-regions, upward-and-downward-transitional areas, resources frontiers and special problem areas.*[50]

Furthermore, Friedmann (1972) stressed on the significance of cumulative innovation in the continuous process of development. Emphasis was placed on a relatively 'centers of change' strategically located at the points of highest potential interactions within communication field[51] diffusing from those centers to areas of lower potential interactions. The core-regions or major

areas of innovative change consolidate their dominance over the peripheral regions due to self-reinforcing feedback effects of the core-region growth resulting in all forms of dominance or dependency in forms of resource transfers, increase in interactions and higher rate of innovations and institutional changes.[52]

There are numerous implications inherent in regional disparities and national development. As long as the under-developed countries continue to depend on the industrialized countries, the gulf of disparities between them will continue to enlarge. Therefore, the dependency issue over some of the structural implications of disparities among nations centers on multinational corporations. In this regard, it should be noted that the controversial center-down development paradigm is primarily or essentially centered on international context rather than on economic development of individual countries.

However, the extension of the operation of multi-national corporations into the under-developed countries has serious consequences on developmental contexts as the status of peasants in rural areas and workers in urban centers is continuously being undermined.[53] As such, the notion of 'economic polarization and development integration designed for the UDCs in their developmental purposes has failed because the approach erroneously assumes that there is no structural unit among social, economic and political phenomena; which implies that social objectives can be reduced to purely economic terms. The approach also assumes that international relations take place in a harmonious context. Further assumptions also show that the state is taken as an idealized autonomous element in the social system. Finally, the strategy assumes that polarization mechanisms can be produced independently at any level.[54]

Furthermore, Growth pole strategy of the center-down paradigm of development maintains that

with limited resources it would be inefficient and ineffective to attempt to sprinkle development investments thinly over most of the national territory[55]. Therefore, one of the problems of the UDCs is that they have been oriented to use or explore bourgeois development theories and methods which eventually result in structural dependence. This dependence has manifested itself in under-development; inequalities, deterioration of other material conditions of living etc.

Center-down development paradigm has been criticized on the grounds that the strategy, especially when capitalism entered its permanent crisis, can no longer be sustainable. Hence, the alternative to 'development from above reflects a change in nature and purpose of what development should entail.[56] The primary focus of development from below is that the optimum utilization of each area's natural, human and industrial resources aimed at providing and satisfying the primary or basic human needs. Development in this regard is oriented to address directly on the root causes of the problems of poverty and its control. As development from below strategies are oriented towards the basic human needs, they are essentially labor-intensive, small scale in nature and rural resource based with the application of appropriate technology.

Furthermore, the theoretical underpinnings of the bottom-up development paradigm, is intended to be coherent and systematic in search of appropriate approach for relevant development supported by a variety of disciplines. Thus, basic or common features in the development strategies need to be constructed requiring relative compatibility with the environment where interactions of variables are practical and feasible. The emergence of these strategies would depend on and be adopted to certain alternating phases of development from below paradigm or a mix in both elements.

Whereas development from above constituted the dominant strategy during the past three decades, it has not provided a panacea of reducing disparities in living levels especially in social

strata[57] and geographical areas[58]. Therefore, the 'trickle-down' process from the global level to the dynamic sectors or Shumpteter's entrepreneurial select agents has not filtered downwards to the local integrated units through urban hierarchy[59] or input-output rations[60] or the internal channels of multi-plant business organizations [61] or even large scale government organizations installed to serve as the 'motor of development'[62].

Development 'from below' is an alternative development paradigm to development 'from above'. The point of departure of the development 'from below' states that specific socio-cultural, economic, historical and institutional conditions of any given locality or region have to be intrinsically compatible with the designed policy and strategy for development. In other words, uniform prescription of policy can not be applicable or offered as in the case of the 'top-down' strategy.

Therefore, the primary concern is to mobilize the natural, human and institutional resources to provide effective and efficient services to the generality of masses, device the utilization of adequate and appropriate technology, assign a high priority to projects for the satisfaction of the basic needs of the people, grant a higher degree of self-determination to rural areas for the promotion of diversified development, introduce equitable communal decision-making in the allocation of surpluses generated therefrom and improve all frontiers of social services.[63]

Consequently however, any strategy for development 'from below' for the under-developed portions of the world must indict the spatial strategies' futilities in solving problems of disparities in living conditions in such regions. Such futilities of spatial strategies have been inherently involved with increased urban-ward migrations for the rural areas into restricted urban labor markets with a view to supplying urban dwellers with basic infrastructural facilities and

services.[64] It is therefore important to note that "development 'from below' implies alternative criteria for commodity exchange, specific forms of social and economic organization and a change in the basic concept of development"[65].

√Different strategies in the development from below paradigm have emerged unlike the predominantly uniform and monolithic conception of development strategy 'from above' consisting mainly on industrialization, urbanization, etc. Hence, development strategies would need to be constructed concomitantly with the environmental or cultural conditions where interactions of various 'points of mutual contacts' are feasible and desirable. Thus:

> *...alternative strategies of development' from below need to emerge from, and be adopted to, the requirements of different cultural areas. Such strategies may change over time, possibly alternating with phases of development 'from above'66.*

Development 'from below' aims at full utilization and development of region's natural resources and human skills for the satisfaction of the basic needs of all the strata of the population with largest part of regional surpluses invested there for the diversification of the economy. Hence, through retention of at least part of the regional surplus integrated economic circuits within less developed regions would be promoted and development impulses would be expected to successfully pass 'upward' from the local through regional and national levels[67]. Whereas the policy orientation of development from below would be directed toward territorially organized basic needs services, rural and village development, labor-intensive activities, small and medium-sized projects, technology permitting the full employment of regional human, natural and industrial resources on a territorially integrated basis[68].

The transition of development strategies from the 'top-down' to 'bottom-up' for the under-developed regions is problematic because these regions were historically subjected to external

domination. They were in addition, incorporated within the sectoral and spatial patterns of development 'from above' with a uniform concept to strive and uniform transitional process to follow. Under the development 'from below' strategies, each region/country would device its own model with some required features. This involves a high degree of a mass-based participatory development by all the respective communities with

> *...integrated resource mobilization in a regional context rather than on selective resource withdrawals under optimizing criteria derived from the world market"*[69].

## 2.05 RURAL DEVELOPMENT: POLICY FRAMEWORK AND APPROACH

The theoretical constructions and underpinnings of the concept of rural development emerged out of the perceptive desire to improve or even change the rural socio-economic environment dictated by the prevalence and continuing state of poverty and declining productivity and incomes of the rural inhabitants. The concept has however been strategically underpinned to assault on the abysmal provision and maintenance of basic needs or services; such as feeder roads health and medicare, educational facilities, potable water supplies etc.

Accordingly, rural development is concerned with the direct involvement of the people to actively participate in the affairs affecting their environment and needs. This implies that the people possess the power and freedom to initiate, formulate and execute policies and strategies that are geared to challenge the issues surrounding their social economic conditions, sometimes in direct correspondence or complementary relations with governmental and non-governmental institutions.

The World Bank Sector Policy paper states and conceptualizes rural development as that which is

> *... concerned with the modernization and monetization of rural society, and with its transition from traditional isolation to integration with the national economy.*[69]

The target population to be 'modernized' and 'monetized' as well as to be transformed from their 'traditional isolation' into an integrated national economy are the rural poor; those stricken by abject poverty. The Bank, in its ordained Policies, strategies, programs and objectives of rural development, has put in place an integrated approach to rural question, particularly its great influence in the agrarian transformatory approach.

State intervention in the rural economy of the underdeveloped countries accounts for the World Banks faith and total support for the agribusiness firms with loans to procure agricultural inputs to raise production and incomes. The imperative of State intervention within this approach, was the Bank's designed vision and experiment on how the external capital, via its strategy, could find ways well rooted into the rural economies of the backward countries. Notwithstanding the objectives, the target groups' access to services and infrastructures to avert the pervasiveness of rural poverty, has only exacerbated rural problems since then.

In terms of Policy framework, commitment to rural policy in most countries has been lacking as the state policy has always militated against the poor. In other words, the skewed State policy is more often in favor of the dominant class interests that makes the policy not in sympathy with goal of rural development. With land therefore constituting a crucial part of any rural development program, State policy on land has adverse implications for the rural poor as their entire way of life is dependent on the degree to which they tap its resourcefulness. Invariably the assault on the small-holder over land and the vibrant penetration of new farming technical innovations have hit and displaced the rural peasant in all dimensions.

With the displacement and distortions of the rural poor and economies respectively, organization, planning and implementation of rural development are saddled with the problems of multi-sectoral linkages, decentralization of decision and the direct involvement of the local people. However, the failure to recognize and realize the potentials of traditional rural economies/areas has resulted in concentrating more emphasis on economic growth inimical to the alleviation of poverty. Invariable, the interactions between the 'traditional' and 'modern' sectors, conceptualized by the World Bank aimed at raising and distributing the fruits of growth rates has only reinforced the total surrender to World Bank with a futile exercise in the transformation of the condition of rural dwellers.

Thus, the futility of growth strategy provoked the formulation of alternative strategies for the sustenance of growth and containing the end results of inequality and poverty. Among these alternative strategies were the 'employment-oriented' strategy of the ILO[70] and the 'redistribution-with-growth' strategy of the World Bank[71]. Initially, these strategies began by recognizing the imperative need to broaden the objective base of development far away from the limited angles of the growth of GNP.

It has been argued that these alternative strategies to development have not fundamentally constituted a departure from the growth strategy of the development 'from above' paradigm. The ideas about basic needs and mass participation are key elements advocated by the ILO strategy. Eddy Lee argues that both strategies represent and squarely remain within the macro-economic planning. He further states that:

> *The employment approach argued for a modification of investment criteria to take into account considerations other than growth in output, while the redistribution-with-growth approach required that growth be supplemented by the use of some 'top-down' redistributive instruments.*[72]

For instance, the employment oriented strategy was basically based on the mounting unemployment and under-development rate and perceived as a great manifestation of inequality or persistent destitution. One of the main policy implications of this approach was on the exchange in the structure of production from capital to labor-intensive goods with an appropriate technology. Whereas, the redistribution-with-growth strategy emphasizes on the problems of inequality in income and asset distribution in under-developed countries. Since the magic of 'trickle down' effects has not descended, there is an urgent need for direct government intervention so as to redistribute accumulated output produced through growth thickly downwards.[73]

Such futility of the growth strategy further led to more disenchantments about the assumptions of 'spread out' and 'trickle-down' effects which have continuously proved potent for under-developed regions. Furthermore, other assumptions like international trade which might narrow economic distance between nations have not also been fruitful while the economic system itself has behaved quite differently from the growth equilibrating adjustments predicted by the theory of international trade[74].

As serious problems of poverty and inequality in under-developed regions have continued to remain without a feasible solution, growth has also been unevenly distributed among and within regions[75]. It is argued that inequality and the incidence of absolute poverty have increased not only in countries with a poor growth performance but also in several fast-growing ones[76]. Therefore, the nature of the world economic system and the obstacles the system places on countries/regions make rather impossible for them to deviate or device different approach to overcome the problem.

Basic needs approaches are essentially addressed to the problems of poverty. Some approaches are conservative while others are radical in nature depending on the degree of change envisaged. The World Bank is the most influential international agency involved in the conservative strategy of the basic needs. The official view of the World Bank contends that poverty problem, according McNamara (1972),

> *...arises from factors internal to each developing country, and that its eradication therefore largely depends upon governmental policies and actions directed towards these internal barriers to development"*[77].

Material basic needs include certain levels of private consumption of food, clothing, shelter, and access to certain essential public service, such as pure water, sanitation, public transport, health and educational facilities[78]. Sandbrook further states that for governments in the under-developed regions to satisfy material needs to the poor strata by providing productive services/policies they must encompass three essential principles.

In the first place, there must exist an equitable redistribution of income to eradicate absolute poverty and create a conducive environment for the provision of and demand for the goods and services as constituting part of the requirements of basic needs[79]. This principle largely depends on the nature and resource-base of particular sources. Secondly, the State must supervise a reorientation of the system of production in line with material needs. Old economic behaviors must be rooted out for new ones to be put in place. Thirdly, for basic needs approach to be successful equitable access to expand and reform public services must be pursued through availability of appropriate health and educational facilities, clean water, environmental sanitation and adequate public transport.[80]

As there has always been a growing concern for a growing number of people who have continued to suffer from malnutrition and other epidemic diseases as a result of inadequate services like health care, education, sanitary condition, clean worker etc, the nature and content of the relationship between adequate satisfaction of basic needs and development are very obscure. The obscurity in this relationship hinges on the improvement or satisfaction of basic needs and growth per capita income over time[81]. Therefore, explanations on why basic needs are not fulfilled would unveil some basic questions about development. Explanations on these issues would have to be all encompassing, holistic and within the terrains of international economic environment.

The hostility of the international economic set up is reflected and characterized by the preponderant inequalities in income distribution as the patterns of production, trade, distribution and consumption are determined by a few industrialized nations. Furthermore, domestic patterns of production in the under-developed states are perilously instituted, distorted and indeed out of their control and ownership; thereby tilted towards satisfying outside requirements rather than the basic human needs of the communities. In addition, the international inequality in income distribution is further replicated within the under-developed countries.

The most important of basic needs, indispensable to survival, is food. But capital penetration, through either multinational agribusiness or through the choice of agricultural technology and other inputs, has rendered local production of food adversely, especially by supplementing the "pattern of production with high use-value by one with high exchange value"[82]. Other reinforcing mechanisms in the unfulfilled basic needs strategies include the penetration of the way of life, ideology etc. of the industrialized States into under-developed regions which have resulted in shaping the tastes of the elites. Hence:

> *Imported ideology shapes the goals of the poor countries and through the action of the elites it shapes the pattern of consumption and hence also production and technology. Luxury industrial goods, luxury western style housing, medical services etc. come to dominate the structure of economic activity. The penetration of multinationals of the production process and even the mass media, perpetuates and reinforces these tendencies. It results in situations such as setting up of coca-cola factories before there are even adequate supplies of safe drinking water.*[83]

## 2.06 UDT AND ITS PROBLEMATIC

Bourgeois development theories, based in Western Europe, draw all their empirical backings therefrom. Theoretical postulations indicate that they could be mechanically explicable and applicable in any society. But when the theories were brought to the Third World, distinctive differences between the theory and empirical circumstances began to emerge. As peculiar socio-economic and political features in the third world differ from those in the Western Europe, the need to fill the vacuum has therefore arisen. Issues like population growth, data on, for example; education and health care delivery, institutions, cultural values, religion etc. need a critical analysis. However, political leadership, political systems, democracy etc. also need to be considered.

Having thus examined some of the bourgeois development theories, it is important to generally place them within the criticism of Under-development and Dependency Theory (UDT); and at the same time evaluate the origins and logical position of the UDT with regard to its consistency, validity or reliability or general practical applicability. Therefore the nature, direction and scope of any formulated theory must be grasped by examining the historical and social environment within which the theory is built as well as the class interest it is designed to protect or address. Hence, the existing teleological body of bourgeois development theories have not explained what need to be explained.

Since bourgeois development models lack realism concerning the under-developed regions with regard to the application of orthodox or neo-classical economic theory, the issue of relevance is raised as they are inextricably imbued with preconceptions and biases in favor of policies of laissez-fair liberalism or free trade etc.[84]

As an alternative view to the problems of development and under-development, the UDT was developed within the structuralist/Marxist framework of analysis which also gave rise to the dependency theory. It is important to note that within the literature of economic development, under-developed regions are also described as dependent economies as they were all affected by the phenomenon of colonialism.

However, the genesis of the dependency theory sprouted out of the criticisms of international trade theory under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Thus, the international trade theory conventionally explained the structural failures or obstacles associated with the Latin American and the Caribbean economies. It further adduced reasons why the economies have refused to develop notwithstanding the policies adopted to overcome the problem or even change the structures. For example, the first policy was on 'an inward-oriented' development strategy through import-substituting industrialization while the second was on an increased foreign investment.

These policies brought further barriers and obstacles which required a revision of the adopted strategy with its problematic high import content. The plant industrialization and the preponderant existence of highly unequal income structures, urban-rural imbalance etc. required further revision. The barriers and obstacles were further compounded and became more pronounced when new strategies were adopted.

> *... as the fresh 'layers' of structural obstacles were identified they come more and more to be seen as part of a long term process involving successive stages, each with its distinctive institutional mechanisms reinforcing or modifying economic and social structures, but always reproducing their fundamentally subordinate character, serving development elsewhere, minimizing its benefits and maximizing its costs locally.*[85]

It should be noted that under-development and dependence are not conditions that affect all countries or stages in the path of development. On the contrary, development and under-development, according to Frank, are opposite sides of the same coin[86]. In other words, the development of some countries simultaneously led to the under-development of others. Szentes thus argues that:

> *...it is the product of a specific development which is most closely connected with, moreover deceived from the development of capitalist world economy*[87].

In retrospect, colonialism and other forms of interactions have indeed widened the development gap between the industrialized and the under-developed countries. For instance, different forms of socio-economic and political systems of colonialism and phases of imperialism, characterized by piracy, plunder and slave trade etc seriously devastated the socio-economic and political settings of the under-developed regions of the worlds.

This is an era generally regarded as the period of the so called primitive capital accumulation. However, as a result of the development of industrial capitalism, colonial possessions were incorporated and then transformed not only as spheres of interests but also functioned as reservoirs and suppliers of raw materials as well as potential receivers of industrial products, etc.

At this juncture, it is important to realize that the UDT came out as a criticism of the bourgeois development theory but has inherently remained within the basic structures of the latter theory.

Hence, the UDT has been criticized, just like the bourgeois theory, of using preponderantly and broadly gauged concepts; for example, the 'center-periphery' terminology. Nabudere shows that in many of the UDT studies, especially those of Baran and Sweezy (monopoly capital) and Samir Amin (Accumulation on a world scale):

> *Certain amount of awareness is exhibited of the interrelationship between the two (center and periphery). Yet the emphasis given to narrow analysis of the separate areas has tended to create a distorted and indeed anti-marxist-leninist picture of monopoly capitalism and imperialism.*[88]

Furthermore, the metaphor center-periphery, according to Leys is in fact "seldom if ever replaced by a concrete topology of centers and peripheries".[89] Again, Frank's arguments concerning the under-development of Chile and Brazil shows that it was as a result of 'capitalist development' and the internal contradictions of capital for four centuries resulting in the polarization of the capitalist system into what he refers to as metropolitan center and peripheral satellite.[90]

The center-periphery/metropole-satellite ideology is populist, propagated 'for and by the national bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie to divert the attention away from the class struggle analysis. It is however floated into a neo-classical-keynesian explanation of imperialism which ends in an eclectic and economistic analysis of the center and the periphery; thereby articulating inequality in the exchange of commodities between center and periphery as well as distorting Marx's law of value.[91]

Another problem with UDT also centers around the application of the concept of 'dependence'

in explaining the relationships between the 'developed' and 'under-developed' countries. In this regard, UDT tends to marginalize not only the economic but also political character of the under-developed states and hence treat the ex-colonies as appendages of the capitalist systems. Frank, for example, maintains that the mechanisms which the metropolitan capital appropriated surplus constitutes an organic aspect of dependence. But it has been clearly demonstrated that the dependentists

> *...fail to focus centrally on the productivity of labor as the essence and key to economic development. They did not see the degree to which the latter was, in turn, centrally bound up with historically specific class structures, production and surplus extraction, themselves the product of determination beyond the market. Hence, they did not see the degree to which pattern of development or under-development for the entire epoch might hinge upon the outcome of specific process of class formation, of class struggle.*[92]

Frank's contention emphasizes that under-development is a product of the surplus transfer appropriated by the metropole from the satellite. But such surplus transfer should be understood as a consequence of the inherent peripheral structures serving or acting against productive investment of surplus in the satellite. There are, however class structures where absolute surplus were appropriated with the redistribution of relative surplus value.

Furthermore, certain problems associated with UDT have also been demonstrated in terms of existence of different forms of dependence, and as such, the meaning of under-development is not all embracing. Leys thus contends that:

> *...unless these are identified and differences theoretically explained, the question arises whether this perspective is not a fairly arbitrary way of sensitizing us to one set of relationship of a more complex inter-dependence*[93].

Hence, the simplistic pairings of development/under-development, center/periphery (metropolis/satellite), dominant/dependent are not really by accident as they are direct semblance of those used by the bourgeois development theory like traditional/modern, rich/poor, advanced/backward which empirically vindicates that they are nothing more than the basic polemics of revision or inversions of bourgeois ideology. Thus,

> *...the concepts these words denote are far too weak for making the theoretical distinction needed to analyze the important political question involved here*[94].

UDT is further trapped by a central problem surrounding its theoretical and empirical meanings of 'development' which more often than not appears to be obscure. Like the bourgeois development theory, UDT refers to the concept of development as capitalist development experienced by capitalist 'centers' or metropolis'. A fundamental question surfaces: what prevents or hinders the polarization of capitalism to occur in the third world regions ? It should be realized that some forms or manifestations of eurocentricism have surfaced. But it is contended that

> *...if under-developed countries cannot follow a development path of all similar to that of the metropole, it is matter of great consequence if the analysis of how they become and kept underdeveloped does not itself disclose what 'development' can or should mean for them or how it should be accomplished*[95].

Another theoretical issue faced by UDT is the question of exploitation. This issue is being questioned on grounds of clarity and whether or not the masses of the under-developed countries suffer from exploitation; and if they do, to what extent? Under-development theorists preponderantly maintain that masses of the third world are exploited and oppressed and that the conditions of people in this region are direct consequences of their exploitation resulting in the extraction of surplus value during the period of the so called primitive capital accumulation and colonial era.

Polemics on these issues are rather too abstract but what actually matters is not to device a 'correct' theory of laws and relativity of the concept of exploitation between the third and capitalist worlds and workers therein but to concentrate and focus on the mechanics of economic power of imperialism. It is therefore not necessary to dichotomize workers in both metropolitan and under-developed countries and conclude that one group is more or less exploited than the other. Thus, the technical concept of exploitation in the Marx's context of comparative capitalism of a single social formation should constitute a point of departure with a view to unveiling existing ambiguities surrounding complex relationship between workers and capitalists and workers throughout a world capitalist economy.

> *...the general question about exploitation in the third world needs to be dissolved in a series of more particular questions about the forms, degree and effects of different kinds of exploitation in different national and international contexts and the way these relate to forms, degree and effects of domination and oppression and the struggles waged against both.*[96]

Units of analysis adopted by UDT also constitute another problematic area where conceptual inconsistency and imprecision dominate the theory. These units of analysis include modes of production, social formations, world economy etc. Frank's blanket characterization of the entire Latin American economy from the sixteenth century as 'capitalist" epitomizes a prelude of a systematic analysis of class forces existing there. This is associated with the failure to distinctively show the differences between the capitalist mode of production and feudal mode in extraction of surplus value.[97]

Furthermore, on the 'articulation' of modes of production in the third world countries by UDT, the scheme which is taken through which capitalist mode of production is 'articulated' with pre-capitalist modes of production constitutes an organic contradiction of class struggle in a

particular social formation where such articulation takes place. Hence, the meaning of the 'mode of production' is reduced to that of 'mode of exploitation', 'form of labor process', 'simple category' of analysis and abstracted from a few empirical features[98]. A feudal mode of production is articulated to exist when ever labor is serf-like[99].

In addition, UDT is criticized of being economistic and mechanical in its approach. Its economic tendency is reflected in its treatment of social classes, the state, politics, ideology and other related phenomena as 'derivatives of economic forces'. Hence, classes appear as mere categories sequel to the structural evolution of under-development. It describes domestic bourgeoisie as weak and comprador in nature, wage labor forces as small and highly differentiated, landlords as technically backward and that classes are not prime movers of history. However, theoretical eclecticism where elite is used alongside with class becomes apparent.[100]

Again phenomena are presented and explained as resulting from a 'logic' of mechanism; thereby producing static accounts of the predicaments of the under-development' as an inescapable phenomenon. There exists confusion and vulnerability in UDT with regard to capitalist industrialization in the under-developed regions as to whether or not it is or will be 'dependent' or 'independent'. Warren's example of Taiwan concludes that as "capitalism grows, imperialism declines"[101].

Furthermore, the causes of under-development or why capitalism under-developed some regions are issues within UDT problematic, where no explanations have been provided. For example why has much capital did not get invested and accumulated in the third world are issues that are brushed aside without putting forward a concrete theory explaining the events. Leys further explains that:

> *...Concept which primarily sensitize us do not belong to a coherent theoretical system based on a consistent political stand point as a consistent method of analysis, they are ideological rather scientific. This is why its real gain - the detailed analysis of institutions and structures of under-development-are being appropriated more by the ideologist of international capital than the workers and peasants of the third world.*[102]

There is great deal of ambivalence in UDT towards the concept of imperialism as a historical stage of capitalism reflected on political and theoretical context in the third world. Thus, UDT does not take into account the internal class structure in the periphery on the question or issues of development and under-development. However, the inherent social configuration is not seriously considered towards understanding the extent of imperialist penetration. Hence, UDT ambivalently focuses or tends to focus on the metropolis for capital, in terms of final solutions to under-development and then look inward in trying to manipulate internal forces to 'fight' international capital.

The UDT has further shown its ambivalence within its analysis of the historical role of the bourgeoisie as capable of bringing about development when they have capital which is insignificantly recognized in the third world. The concept of imperialism is barely reduced to mean only the mechanics and institutional framework for penetration and control of capital. The concept is often qualified with such other words like economic imperialism, political imperialism. cultural imperialism, social imperialism, etc. The concept of imperialism is thus refined from what the bourgeois theorists had presented. Therefore there is no concrete exposition on why monopolies fight wars to hold to colonies.

UDT, in its radical or marxified structuralism, identifies problems but goes round to appeal for solutions to the same agencies or organs that caused the problem. This results in a continuous

reoccurrence of the problems in cyclical patterns. For example, the problems of import substitution industrialization, transfer of technology etc. As Marxism is often mingled with structuralism, analysis ends up with "different traditions within the theory of dependence"[103].

## 2.07 THE STATE: THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT

In order to understand the dynamics of the State in the processes of formulating policies and strategies as well as in class formation and struggle, it is necessary, within this framework to analyze its general role and then examine the extent to which it performs its role within theoretical constructs. Hence, what is the role of the State, particularly in the formulation and implementation of rural development policies, program and strategies? What is its role in eradicating absolute poverty that has ravaged rural communities and struck its rural populace

An examination of ~~the~~ these roles requires a critical analysis of the genesis and different theoretical construction and conceptions of the State, especially those that have emerged out of colonial exigencies. This however requires fuller examination and explanation of the patterns and processes of social relations

and capital accumulation sanctioned by the State, through its apparatuses, reflected in the protection of the interest of the dominant classes in the society. Similarly, useful insights into these issues also require considerations of various strategies adopted for rural development.

The theoretical framework of the State in the capitalist mode of production has been postulated on many angles - the classical marxist framework, the neo-marxist postulations, the liberal conception of the State and the post-colonial state thesis. Marxist theoretical framework does not regard the State as given but rather considered it emerged through lengthy and protracted struggles and conflicts. The consequent would be the stratification of the society into classes, the oppressors and oppressed turn out to be in constant conflicts with each other. Classical marxists developed two conceptions of the State. Marx and Engles, in the **Communist Manifesto,** show that "the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie[104] This Marxist theoretical framework of the State provides a tool for understanding its

emergence, character and function. It has been demonstrated that the working of the apparatuses of the State have indicated, over time and space, the character, direction and role of the state which are but organized power of one class oppression by another[105] and thus

transforming itself essentially as the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie[106]. In the capitalist mode, the means of production exist in private ownership. During the imperialist plunder, Lenin further shows that the State character was transformed from

> *The era of bank capital, the era of gigantic capital monopoly capital into state monopoly capitalism... (which) witnessed an unprecedented growth in bureaucratic and military apparatus in connection with the increase in the repressive measures against the proletarian and monarchical as well as the freest republican countries*[107].

As the State does not stand to protect the general interest of the whole society, its only role is to defend the interest of private property. In such a set up, ownership and control of the means of production are paramountly in private hands. This basically constitutes the primary Marxist conception of the State.

The secondary classical conception of the State relates to it (the State) as being 'independent' from and superior to all social classes, rather than just an instrument of the dominant class. This is followed by the Marx's explanation and analysis of the 'relative autonomy' of the Bonapartist State's historical crisis of the ruling class when the State appeared independent of the different fractions of the bourgeoisie. Thus, the independent character of the State in the political sphere was only to balance
the contending vested interests and class struggles peculiar to the State. Hence, the State cannot, in class divided society, remain neutral but protect a socially and politically dominant and controlling class[108].

The neo-Marxist perception of the State is categorized into three parts - the material conceptionist, economic determinist and the politicist dimension. The materialist focuses more on the specific features of the capitalist mode of production. It draws its conclusions on the character, function and development of the capitalist State from its contradictory nature in the formation

and development of capital.[109] There is a great similarity between the economic determinist framework of analysis with that of the materialist. The similarity is on how the State role is focused in determining how the interest of capital can be protected and class domination maintained through formulation of policies.

As the State is not independent of the dominant social forces, it therefore tends to stabilize the social order when it is threatened, particularly during serious intra-class conflicts. In a State monopoly capitalism, for instance, the existence of partnership between the controllers of the means of production and those controlling the machinery of State power enables the State to exercise a major role in ensuring capital accumulation, regulation
of class antagonisms etc.

The policist dimension of the State, started by Nico Poulantzas, was based on Marx's analysis of the Eighteenth Brummaire of Louis Bonaparte. On the 'relative autonomy' postulations, Poulantzas

states that it is an indication of

> *not only the 'autonomy' of the respective structure of the political and economic spheres as reflected in the relationship between the state and the economic class struggle but also the relative autonomy of the state from the politically dominant class*[110].

On the specificity of classes on the power bloc, and different fractions of the bourgeoisie, on the hegemony within the power bloc, on supporting classes, on the forms of struggle adopted by the ruling class, Poulantzas describes them all as the `unstable equilibrium of compromises'. These are all connected with the relative autonomy which in turn depends on the conjuncture of the class struggle.[111] In addition, Poulantzas argues that in a society dominated by the capitalist mode of production:

> *the state can, and indeed must, maintain considerable freedom from the dominant class(es). Such a 'relative autonomy' is necessary if the state is to protect the long term interest of the power bloc. On the other hand, the dominant classes typically lack cohesion and are therefore unable, on their own, to establish their hegemony in society. The bourgeoisie in*

> *particular is susceptible to intra-class conflict, as commercial, financial, industrial and even regionally based fractions struggle to advance their sectional interest. The state in this situation must therefore exercise some autonomy in deciding how to aggregate the interest of the dominant class fractions...*[112]

Hence, the separation of the economic and the political is itself nothing more than the form taken by the constitution of the classes which it too is a consequence of their struggle under different stages and phases of capitalism.[113] The relative autonomy postulation is highly problematic and polemical particularly on the socio-economic and political orientation of the State as they are equally unstable and incoherent. For instance, is the economic orientation of the State determined by political etc or is it the polity that is being determined by the economy and directly reducible to classes and the interests involved?[114]

The liberal conception of the State is based on the view that power is "diffused" competitive and 'fragmented' especially when

democratic processes are put in practice.[115] This is misleading. There are two common and distinctive features in the advanced capitalist societies which are characteristically different from the under developed world. These distinctions are that capitalist societies are all industrialized and urbanized and however, the largest part of their means of economic activity is under private ownership and control.

Early Liberal conceptionist were Adam Smith, Talcot Person, Max Weber and John Keynes. The State is thus conceived as a supreme body which makes and regulates laws and order. The omnipotence of the State makes it not to participate in the societal material production and accumulation. Accordingly, the Liberal view maintained that by late nineteenth century there was no direct state intervention as only monopolies - in the form of state monopoly capitalism- determine the fate of the State.

Adam Smith, in his own conception, maintained that free trade, free competition and free enterprises must be advocated and that all restrictions removed to provide more room for specialization

and division of labor.[116] These, according to the Liberal scholars, are crucial engines for productivity, growth and economic well being of societies.

During the post war years, the advocates of the non-interventionist position of the state began to reverse their stance on the matter. In other words, monopoly capitalism was problematic and thus began to advocate that the State must directly intervene in the societal material production with a view to bailing the system out of its inherent socio-economic quagmire.

John Keynes stressed on the atrocities committed by monopolies and provided some justification for the State to intervene in the economy so as to check the crises confronting the capitalist economy.[117] It should be noted that no meaningful explanation was offered by the keynesians for State intervention as its understanding of the political economy of the state was not concurrent with the dominant class struggle and patterns of capital accumulation. Hence, their view had no relevant

correspondence and articulation with the under developed regions.

Theoretical debates on the post-colonial State have become part of the topical academic issues in the third world countries. To comprehend the current State activity going on in these States that have emerged from colonialism, it is therefore imperative to examine first and foremost, their evolution and the role expected of them to perform. The polemics of these issues were developed by Hamza Alavi and John Saul in addition to the commentaries of Colin Leys and others.

It should be noted, at this juncture, that many features existing in the advanced capitalist States appear to have also been in existence, though in different degrees and dimensions, in the post-colonial States. This is not unconnected with the historical antecedent and the threads that still connect the two societies together.

However, despite the existence of similarities between them, there are also, at the same time, striking and distinctive

differences between them. For instance, the State in the capitalist societies functions essentially to maintain economic and social relations to safeguard bourgeois accumulation. The State in the under-developed societies or post-colonial societies is used, through its apparatuses, as vehicles or instrument for capital accumulation for the dominant class(es). This is accentuated due to the nebulous character of the State as well as the levels of the development of the forces of production existing in such societies, among others.

Alavi has demonstrated that the post-colonial state evolved uniquely with characteristics of what he calls 'over-developed' and 'relative autonomy' structure far inappropriate to its level of socio-economic and political development. He shows that these rather lopsided characteristics are invariably:

> *premised on the historical specificity of the post-colonial societies, a specificity which arises from the structural changes brought about by colonial experiences and alignments of classes and by the superstructures of the political and administrative institution which were established in that context and secondly, from radical realignments of class forces*

> *which have been brought about in the post-colonial situation.*[118]

Alavi further stresses that the post-colonial State that emerged out of colonial circumstances is a client serving and functioning under the patronage and guidance of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. This situation developed largely due to the historical antecedent of the weaknesses and under developed status of the bourgeoisie in the post-colonial State. In essence, the post-colonial State has

acquired only political independence with an inherited over-developed state apparatuses against its weak or under developed economic base. In this circumstance, the indigenous bourgeoisie

the metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisie and the landed gentry classes are all mediated by the bureaucratic - cum-military oligarchy which accordingly:

> *...acquires a relatively autonomous role and is not simply the instrument of any one of the three classes. Such a relative autonomous role of the state apparatus is of special importance to the neo-colonialist*

*bourgeoisie because it is by virtue of this fact they are to pursue their class interest in the post-colonial societies*[119].

Furthermore, Alavi argues that the important characteristics of the post-colonial State have, by and large, indicated its susceptibility or vulnerability for intervention by the State in its economic activities. This is, however, facilitated by the dynamic network of controls and manipulations imbued in the bureaucratic interests which are all geared towards appropriation of surplus by the dominant class.[120]

Thus, the economic aspects of the relative autonomy of the military-bureaucratic elements in the post-colonial State have shown that State intervention is directed with a view to appropriating economic surplus which would enable it to bureaucratically direct and deploy and strategies just in the name of promoting development within the State but in reality only the oligarchy is the sole and direct beneficiary of such so-called development strategies.

In his own contributions to the debate, John Saul apart from

arguing on the 'relative autonomy' and ' over-developed' structures of the post-colonial State similar to that of Alavi, further developed the need to establish ideological hegemony of the 'over-developed' post-colonial State. He elucidates this by examining how the bureaucratic-military oligarchy appropriates surplus

through State bureaucracy as well as at different fora and strategies.

Post-colonial States thus have their own limitations. For example, Saul's proposition for an ideological hegemony is over sighted. It is incoherent and thus lacks distinctive difference between the 'socialist' Tanzania and other Africa countries. Furthermore,
Colin Leys expresses that the concept of 'over-developed' post colonial State is misleading and that to properly understand the issues, our enquiry must begin from the inherent class struggle rather than look at the structures of the State. It is therefore from the angle of class struggle, not the apparent structures of

the State that the operating and contending forces be properly comprehended and for the "apparent reason for reversing the proper order of procedure".[121]

The State is uniquely characterized by its under-developed institutions and dominated by petty-bourgeoisie which have, all together, apparently given it the mistaken and misleading identity of being 'independent' and 'autonomous'. This is due largely to the non reflection of the clear domination of one social class over all others and the control of the machinery of the State itself has now become more remarkable which has narrowed the shifts in alliance and maneuvers among the ruling petty-bourgeoisie[122] as reflected in the incessant and endemic military take-overs.

The local petty-bourgeoisie are therefore ill-equipped to compete within the international capitalist order, who are, to a large extent, dominated or under the guidance of the metropolitan

bourgeoisie. Avenues or circumstances were thus created by the petty-bourgeoisie, particularly the comprador bourgeoisie, to assert its preeminent position and power over and above other sub-

classes so as to establish hegemony necessary to accumulate capital via political means.[123] Thus political power and economic power must promote each other:

> *should the state undermine 'business confidence', then in all likelihood, members of the dominant classes will take certain offensive measures. They will use their economic power to co-opt those who man the state apparatus by means of bribes, offers of lucrative career opportunities or other inducements. Business men, whether foreign or local, will refuse to invest and will seek to withdraw their capital from the country, the subsequent economic dislocation('typically, price inflation, balance of payments crisis, consumer shortages, increasing unemployment) may well distabilize an unrepentant regime. In the last resort, agents of dominant classes or foreign interests may directly intervene to re-orient the state - either constitutionally or unconstitutionally.*[124]

It should be noted at this juncture that the dominant classes in the post-colonial States, particularly in Africa, are recent creation and hence owe their emergence and sustenance to the State. However, the intrinsic relationship between the holders of political power and the controllers of economic power has been organically transformed as a conduit through which both categories reap the fruits of their influences in either way. This process has been well entrenched and in practice leading to sharp fractionalization of the dominant classes dictated by the logic of capital incursions and manifesting directly in the incoherent policies and strategies within the political economy.

The political economy of the development strategy is inherently constituted within the character, behavior and orientation of the State. The state apparatuses, however, are entirely tilted towards performing the State primary role; particularly to the accumulation and extraction of surplus. The development strategy employed will palpably indicate who are the beneficiaries and victims; as well as how the interest of capital and its accumulation would be safeguarded. In other words, which class,

(class fraction class stratum and class category)

> *will take the main responsibility for expanding the economy , and hence benefit from the accumulation of capital. It also suggests, either explicitly or implicitly which classes and or strata will have to bear the major part of the burden of socio-economic change.*[125]

However, policy formulation and the strategy for policy implementation are two different things. The State may, and usually does, divulge from its policy in the implementation processes and procedures. This, in effect, suggests that development strategies may implicitly or explicitly describe and prescribe how a particular policy should be achieved but inevitably, divergence from such practices has become a norm rather than an exception. This, is essence, portrays class aspects in the whole affair and also shows how class interests are projected and protected through the apparatuses of the State which in the final analysis indicates how:

> *State policies influence who will generate economic growth and accumulate capital, the process of accumulation in turn obviously shapes class formation and the emergence of class or classifications within economic power to ensure that the state henceforth represents primarily their interest*[126]

Classes have developed since the beginning of the end of the primitive communal mode. Since then however, the gulf between classes has widen while class antagonisms between and within classes have sharpen and deepen to a stage when issues at stake were resolved by taking up of arms. During the colonial era however class development had an "important bearing on the configuration of political power in the post-colonial era".[127] The imperial power therefore had no alternative other than to recruit local collaborators to ensure the effective control of the system. Hence, the dominant classes were reinforced and protected against the dominated and oppressed. This opened up avenues for both the indigenous and foreign collaborators to accumulate capital because they were placed favorably on influential positions. This

however simultaneously provided favorable conditions for open

confrontations by the oppressed against these forces.

During the colonial period, the imperial regimes subordinated the interests of the indigenous groups in the pursuance of their own interests. The tenacity of this subordination was accentuated through the encouragement of what Sandbrook refers to as the "Primitive colonial accumulations". After the attainment of political independence, the neo-colonial approach and strategy were patterned and designed in such a manner that the indigenous bourgeoisie, acting in an auxiliary position, accepted a dual but subordinate role particular "in relation to foreign capital in order to extract a share of surplus for itself".[128]

It is clearly evident that the hitherto neo-colonial auxiliary and subordinate positions of the indigenous bourgeoisie has gradually

been resisted in the desire to be treated on equal status with their foreign counterparts in terms of foreign capital and its accumulation. This rebellion however called for the adoption of the National Development Strategy in order to reduce the degree of dependency and therefore the aim of the State is to, according to P. Kenneday

> *Use its leverage in order to redefine the terms of dependency and secure a larger share of the economic surplus for a bureaucratic and or private national bourgeoisie. The state squeezes or limits foreign capital by means of taxation policies, selective, partial or total nationalization, substitution of management contracts for foreign ownership and 'indigenization', that is the exclusion of aliens from certain defined economic activities, usually small and medium scale ones.*[129]

Further, even the basic needs strategy has been populist in nature and thus the State needs to develop bureaucracy to implement it. Hence, the extensive and intensive state intervention in economic activities is necessitated to assault poverty which pervades the entire society. Morris, in this regard trenchantly observes and argues that

> *In much of rural Africa and Asia, the bureaucracy itself has become a caricature, and its performance a drama which would be tragicomic if the substance of the issues were not so important. In these settings every one except the rising officials and experts from the headquarters understands the underlying hopelessness of the situation. All but the most routine administrative actions became a charade. Performed only when superior are expected.*[130]

Whereas the dependency thesis sprouts out from classical Marxist theoretical framework, it invariably does not exist independently and outside the Marxist stand point. In essence, the "dependentists" are neo-Marxists as the emergence of the concept and its articulations by scholars in Latin America, Africa and Asia was primarily to offer alternative views of approaches to development in such regions. The frustrated development strategies have thus been viewed by such scholars on the ways and manners imperialism and neo-colonialism have hindered the development processes in such regions, notwithstanding.

As the concept of dependency can only be meaningfully used and articulated within the Marxist theoretical analysis, it thus examines fundamental issues of underdevelopment, the dependent nature and direction of the economies within the global order, the patterned role or constitution of the State, the psyche of its operators, the existing

bureaucracies/apparatuses and the intrinsic role of international capital. Hence, the commonplaceness within the development literature, which gave rise to the dependency school, has characteristically conditioned such regions to be described as dependent economies, with controversies of the process of dependent development taking place but dominated by trans-national corporations (TNCs).

In both 'The development of dependency economics in the Caribbean and Latin America: review and comparison' and 'A critique of Latin American theories of dependency' by Girvan (1973) and O'Brien (1975) respectively, emphasis has been made on dismal failures experienced by such and similar economies. These failures were hinged on the structural patterns of the economy, external forces and the entire society with the essential condition of dependency not eliminated. This partly explains that the dependency theory cannot be perceived entirely on external angles alone; as it will

remain empty in meaning if it fails to analyze class structure and relationships within the framework of interactions between the LDCs and foreign partners.

While arguing within the Marxist perspective and deriving from the works of Baran (1957), Frank (1967, 1969, 1972), Dos Santos (1973) and other leading dependency theorists show that the classical Marxist theory and the dependency (neo-Marxist) school considerable overlap and cannot easily be distinguished and categorized.

Dos Santos in particular, among other things, emphasises in 'The crisis of development theory and the problem of dependency in Latin America' that more attention should be devoted to the impact of imperialism on LDCs. However, a critical study of the history of LDCs will invariably produce a dependency theory since it is a situation conditioned by the development and expansion of capitalism.

As products of capitalist development, Frank's (1967) Capitalism and under development in Latin America buttresses that underdevelopment and dependency are not conditions experienced by all countries in their historical experience. Instead, development and underdevelopment are opposite sides of the same coin. Hence, the gulf in development between the

LGCs and the capitalist countries was fundamentally a product of colonial and other forms of interactions that ensured, over, time within and between such regions.

In essence, in order to understand the conditions of the LDCs, colonialism must be analyzed and understood in its entirety. From the Marxist perspective however, the economic angles of colonialism were illuminated as a period of so called primitive capital accumulation characterized, in its initial phase, with

piracy, plunder of treasures and slave trade. It should be noted that the consequences of such historical epoch were devastating to the economies, socio-cultural and political patterns of the affected countries.

However, in The Political Economy of Growth, Baran (1957) shows earlier that the tendency of capitalist development is to block and destroy the system and process of economic and other activities indigenous to the penetrated societies to suit and meet the objectives of imperialism. Hence, the 'comprador' status of the local bourgeoisie makes them incapable to appropriately respond to local stimuli. Their incapability to retrieve and transform themselves from such tentacles is inevitably sequel to the fact that they solely depend on and work in alliance with the interests of imperialism.

Even Foster-Carter's (1974) 'Neo-Marxist approaches to development and underdevelopment' stresses that the emergence of the dependency school centred on the problem of underdevelopment in such affected regions with inadequate explanations and prescriptions of the ways out of the morass notwithstanding the traditional or classical Marxist theory about the
'backward countries'. It is therefore necessary to note, at this stage, that the traditional/classical Marxist and neo-Marxist views are rather too polemical to perhaps provoke Leys (1975) in 'The politics of redistribution with growth' to suggest that had Marx lived much longer, he would have developed a theory of underdevelopment in line with the dependency theorists.

Thus, underdevelopment and dependency theory must be understood as a body of ideas fashioned out to indicate an epoch of further articulation, while still remaining within the Marxist schema, of the historical problems of LDCs perceived in their own rights with a set of proposals to ameliorate such problems. It should however be noted that due largely to monopoly stage and structure of capitalism which resulted in the internationalization of capital and labour, the orthodox Marxist thinking about LDCs has further been undermined. This is exhibited through the continuous process by which capitalist contradictions of development have generated massive surplus expropriation in the affected regions.

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# PART TWO

# CHAPTER THREE

## 3.00 THE STATE IN THE TRADITIONAL HAUSA SOCIETY BEFORE 1900

> *However, the whole conceptualization of traditionalism either as an attitude or the basis of political system have only limited analytical value for the study of contemporary African societies. If the implication of the impact of traditionalism on modern society is seen as dysfunctional of the modernization process then the political strategy of the modern state may be primarily directed towards supplanting it. However, in many societies undergoing such transformation this is not so, in some instances it is recognized that traditionalism may actually foster change.*[1]

## 3.01 INTRODUCTION

The importance of rural development in the political economy of (the State) development or under-development has been well elucidated. More often than not, it is clear that one of the most palpable distinctions in societal setting is the rural-urban divide. The rural-urban dichotomy had emerged, over time, out of the relative need of the State to evolve a socio-economic and political power structure in the society.

This distinction in the traditional Hausa land ('Kasar Hausa") is exemplified by the **'Karkara'** (rural) and **'maraya'** (urban) dual structure. In pre-colonial times, this meant that the subordination or domination of 'karkara' was undertaken by the State through the process of urbanization intrinsic of specialization and division of labor as well as the development of a class stratified society. Not only did colonialism encourage the process of urbanization but also deepened the sharp contrasts between and within them, particularly in the urban areas by establishing more urbanized 'maraya' settlements in the name of the Government Reservation Areas (GRAs) and 'Sabon Garis'. Hence, the gulf in the **'karkara-maraya'** disparity has

continued to increase from the lowest to the highest degrees as a result of the lopsided relationship. The next chapter will dwell more on this aspect particularly since 1900.

## 3.02 TRADITIONAL SOCIETY AND THE PROCESS OF STATE FORMATION

To unveil the process of rural development **('raya karkara'),** particularly in the traditional 'kasar Hausa', a historical sketch of the traditional '**karkara**' society prior to colonialism must be the beginning of our investigation. In this attempt, it is necessary to go into the antiquity of the process of State formation in 'kasar Hausa' so as to understand the important and peculiar factors that shaped the terrain of societal development as well as the important features of local governance vis-a-vis the nature and patterns of production, exchange and consumption.

The antiquity of the people who lived in this part of the country has not been ethnographically undertaken and hence not much is known. But despite this problem, it appeared that people have existed in the region since time immemorial. The process of State formation in Hausa land should not be taken as given with magical simplicity but what Smith describes as an "arduous, stumbling and protracted practice".[2] This lengthy process of State formation did not take place all at the same time and in every where. It must therefore be admitted, at this point, that this event occurred several times at different locations but no much light has yet been thrown on the actual processes involved.[3]

Notwithstanding the associated constraints, it is sufficient and relevant to point that State formation process in 'kasar Hausa' can be reconstructed not against the background of the Hermetic hypothesis[4] or folklore of the Bayajida-Bawo-cum-kusugu well legends[5] but essentially on the historical traces of the pre-birni and post-birni Hausa socio-economic and political

organization. Hence, sharp distinctions could be made on the 'non-state' - like political structure founded on kinship relations of family political authority which served as the only legitimate source of political power.

Between desiccation and emergence of 'birane' (cities) Hausa patrilineal family groups (**gidaje**) (sig.'**gida**) in different nucleated agricultural hamlets or communities (**kauyuka, unguwowi**) (sig. **kauye" unguwa'**) recognized only their household lineage head (**'Maigida'**) (pl. **masugida.**) The other type of authority, in these communities, was the overall leadership (**sarauta**) vested on a ruler (**sarki**) which was recognized only for specific purposes - mainly in the economic field.[6] Hence, positions of authority were associated with occupational groups in the society. Incidently, the most important ancient office in Hausaland was that of the **"Sarkin noma'** (king of farming) whose role was basically to organize agricultural activities and all other rituals relating to agriculture in the community.

The political authority in these communities was essentially based on kinship relations, characterized by a rudimentary division of labor and specialization as well as the existence of widespread totemism with attendant sacrifices and practices. There were, in addition to the offices of **'Sarkin noma'**, other occupational offices like that of **'farauta'** (hunting) ancient religious organizations and worship. Places of worship which attracted cult services were the great hills and inselbergs like the **'dutsen'** (hills of) Kufena, Turunku, Madarkaci, Tukur-Tukur and Dala.[7] These hills were the lineage totems where great **'iskoki'** (spirits) were worshiped by family groups.

Throughout Hausaland conditions had emerged which transformed the **"Kauyuka'** to accommodate not only members directly related to each other but also with those distantly related or even unrelated families who converged, over time at a particular place. This development led to the emergence of larger settlements not necessarily engaged in agricultural activities but also a variety of other occupations: trade, industrial occupations and other vocations. These larger settlements culminated in the formation of a town **(gari, birni)**, where kinship relations continued to be of less importance in the political organization.[8]

The growth of a **'gari**-like political organization in Hausaland was due to a number of interwoven factors. It should be noted that the development of the **'gari'** or **birni'** with diverse population was not tied to particular lineage groups as a large number of migrants who settled into the city was attracted by existing potential resources like good climatic condition, farm land and iron works. However, the added reputation of the locality's spirit cult practices and trade route convergence point also became factors for large settlement.[9] Political authority vested in the **Sarki** was thus exercised by several kinship groups. The **Sarkin** gari was thus supported by a number of ward heads **(masu unguwowi)** and other fief holding officials. (See Figure 3.1)

The evolution of Hausa States had its direct correspondence with the establishment of birane where social surplus was extracted and accumulated as capital by the ruling oligarchy. Hence, the emergence of the **birni**-political structure, from the one basically of 'stateless' and classless structure, has been elucidated and summed up as the

> *... replacement throughout the greater part of Hausaland of a political system in which authority was based on kinship relations by one in which authority was based on control of territory; accompanied by the replacement of a very large number of very small and mutually independent units by a much smaller number of larger units possessing institutions of a centralized character.*[10]





Figure 3.1
The Distribution of Fiefs and Vassal-states of Fulani Zazzau in the nineteenth century.

Hence, the nuclei of political power were concentrated in the **'birane'. Birane** therefore became the focal points radiating the source of power and other great activities like trade, commerce, industry and education. The power of the **Sarki** was, notwithstanding, absolute as it hinged on the equilibrium of opposing forces of disintegrating the system on the one hand and that of maintenance of the status quo on the other.[11]

Factors at work in this protracted process were generally of economic and strategic considerations. The economic considerations included the availability of fertile land for agriculture, striking industrial and trade locations as well as other important crafts. These features, among others, attracted a large and diverse population and consequently transformed them into more complex cosmopolitan centers. The relative urban type settlements in these areas soon comprised, in addition to those already settled, a population of immigrants with no attachments to kinship relations.

The strategic considerations were essentially military in nature and the need or ability to protect the community against outside aggressions. That explains why almost all the States that had emerged in Hausaland were fortified. The construction of the walls **(ganuwa)** in many cities **(birane)** was associated with the State ability or capacity to protect its population and other factors. This however became an essential feature in the development of **'birane'** as centers of political power.

Furthermore, not only were the **'ganuwa'** constructed purely for military purposes, they were indeed equally for economic considerations like controlling foreign and internal trade, collection of levies, taxes at the entrance gates. In addition, **ganuwa** thus provided or offered places or

served as avenues for political refuge. This meant that, as a center of power, it also exercised considerable influence and power on the surrounding country-side **(kasa)**, beyond the borders of its **ganuwa.** (See figure 3.2)

As the seat of great influence and power (political, economic and cultural), the '**birni**' acquired some characteristics of urban **(maraya)** setting with a cosmopolitan feature. The government thus became more and more complex with autocratic powers concentrated in the established hierarchies of specialized officials of the State. Organizationally, this situation required some degree of decentralization into some fief-holding **(masu-sarauta)** structure like the offices of the **'magajin gari'** (heir of the town); **Sarkin Kasuwa'** (king of the market) **Sarkin Kofa** (gate keeper) , **'mai-unguwa'** (ward head) etc.


The Sarki thus became more powerful and consolidated himself as not only the **'Sarkin birni'** but also **'Sarkin Kasa'** (king of the country). This consisted of the **birni** and its entire farm land as well as the entire surrounding territories with all the **garuruwa** and **kauyuka**[13] In addition all those living in this territories were compelled to recognize the political power and authority located in the city. It is has further been shown that:

> *... the most important development associated with the rise of the* ***birni*** *was the elaboration of the state apparatus and the investiture of senior lineages with hereditary state offices or, to put the matter more succinctly, the emergence of a class society.*[14]

The government of this type of State centered on the authority of the **Sarki** was essentially feudal, dynastic and autocratic in nature, as only the ruling family **(masu sarauta)** has access to political power and thus qualified to rule. The **masu sarauta** thus formed an army of supporters which backed-up its authority. This support could only be sustained if the economic

Figure 3.2

# Map of Zaria Town, 1936.



background of the **Sarki** was sound enough to expand resources to manage not only the military force but other civilian supporters.

In this vein, the **Sarki** had to meet the basic needs of territorial protection and increase economic prosperity of his domain for his government to be sustained. For him to be successful however, he was required to surround himself with a paraphernalia of fief holding officials in all aspects of governance and economic activities. These were, in some cases drawn from **'ya'yan Sarki** (sons of the king or the royal lineage). This transformed the nature of the State as that which rested on the maintenance

> *... of a delicate balance between the interest of the **Sarki** on the one hand and the fief-holding **masu sarauta** on the other"*[15].

This consequently soon developed into a sharp polarization of the rulers and subjects - **masu sarauta** and **talakawa** (people with no official titles). As the relatives of the **Sarki** were posted to man various strategic positions at different locations and at different levels and hierarchies, the crucial business of the State was basically to forcefully draw a large amount of surplus from the **talakawa** (commoners) particularly in the rural areas and thereby create a new set of classes previously not in existence before.

On exceptional circumstances therefore, the talakawa could enter the circles of the ruling class via the changing nature of the fief-holding lineage development. The entry or recruitment of the **talakawa** into the circles of the ruling class could be made through reward for outstanding performances on the military or even in discharging civic duties particularly by the palace officials **(fadawa')** who were all recruited from the **talakawa** stock.[16]

## 3.03 THE PROCESS OF STATE FORMATION IN ZAZZAU (ZARIA) REGION

Before the late fifteenth century, very little information is known about the process of State formation in Zazzau (Zaria) region[17]. However, it appears that the seat of government continued to change from one place to another as traces of **birni**-like settlements were discovered in **'birnin'** Turunku (South of the modern Zaria) and **dutsen** Kufena.[18] Hence, the sites of **'biranen'** (cities of) Zazzau (Zaria) were moved, over time, from one place to another for defence and refuge purposes. More importantly however, the **'birni'** (city) locations were moved for economic purposes. These location were, accordingly at Kargi, Ricoci, Wucicirri, Turunku, Kufena and the present site.[19]

One of the most important features in Zaria is the city's hitherto protective walls. Built hundreds of years ago, the walls were designed for defence purposes as they were all constructed with wide ditches. These ditches effectively prevented aggressors from gaining entry. Apart from serving and constituting the entire security of the State, they were however built for self-sufficiency whereby agricultural land, permanent sources of water etc were guaranteed as well as other defensive mechanisms like large inselbergs were included within the city walls[20].

Smith has emphasized that religious factors were fundamental in the development and settlements in Hausa State,[21] as large inselbergs, like madarkaci, Tukur-Tukur, Kufena, etc, became the dwelling places of great spirits **(iskoki)** which attracted worshippers in great number to settle.[22] The period when such walls near these great inselbergs were built still remains uninvestigated and verified. For example archeological investigations and historical documentation have not established when or who constructed the madarkaci wall. It is speculated that the walls might have existed prior to the times of the Habe **Sarki** Bakwa moved away from Turunku to Kufena in about 1536[23]

Hogben and kirk-Green have further shown that Bakwa had an overwhelming control and domination of the political and economic activities in and around the area - in trade and agriculture. With the acquisition of more powers and influence by Turunku Bakwa, larger walls were constructed to incorporate Kufena, Madarkaci and Tukur-Tukur walls. Other traces of walls were assumed to have been constructed by his daughter, Amina, the famous legendary wall builder and mighty chief warrior unprecedented in the history of the entire Hausaland and beyond. The antiquity of the Habe capital of Zazzau (Zaria) is however said to have been driven from Amina's sister[24].

It should be noted however that fundamental features in the Hausa States were distinctively and strikingly similar or even identical in many respects especially in the following areas: the rulers possessed absolute powers and thus acted arbitrarily though imposition of discretionary taxes, dues etc; there was a paramount use of forced peasant labor mobilized to meet the ever increasing **'Sarauta'** requirements whereas slaves were the main sources of labor supply; the system was patriarchal which emphasized the pre-eminence of men over and above women in all respects.

However, the process of State formation had its direct correspondence with a much more longer historical process. Within two or three centuries before the 1900 Zazzau State was directly involved in a series of country-side integration through conquests of large tracts of territories which were, over time, brought under the hegemony of the kingdom. Villages, towns and cities were brought under the suzerainty of the dynastic rule. This consequently amounted to a process of power consolidation in the city of Zaria with a large paraphernalia of vassal states subdued by the powerful Zaria calvary.(See Figure 3.1)

Consequently, taxes, tributes and other forms of dues were sent to the **'birni'** aristocracy while representatives of the oligarchy were deployed to the conquered areas to effect and oversee the strict compliance of policy. This therefore provided the avenues through which the State exercised its absolute control and power over the subdued territories. As a result of the increased political control and subordination, the commanding height of economic activities also came under direct supervision and control. Thus surpluses, in addition to those extracted through taxation and labor services, were also accumulated by the ruling aristocracy. Hence, Mustapha has specifically and succinctly shown that:

> *... the emergent state was only slightly represented in the country-side... (but later) ... moved to bring rural economy under close supervision in the face of declining state revenues for commerce. This development gave rise to increasing penetration of the rural economy by the state, a process which was only finally consolidated in the post-jihad (1807) era.*[25]

Within the period of the State intervention in rural affairs, which covered over two centuries, a new set of relationship had emerged in the political and economic angles, particularly with regard to the subordination and extraction of surplus. Invariably, the dynamics of the rural political and economic activities were accordingly subsumed within the apparatuses of the State. This resulted in the further intensification and widening of the urban-rural gulf through intense process of urbanization. Rather than benefit from the growing prosperity of the **'Maraya'**, the **'karkara'** has only become a victim and continued to suffer deeply in surplus extraction and appropriation through industrial and agricultural labor services, taxation, dues which all together formed part of, and thus facilitated the pre-colonial capital accumulation.

As most of the pre-1900 process of urbanization in Hausaland originated from refugee influxes of different family occupational groups, the growth of urban Zaria was equally due to the tendency of its protective capacities extended to accommodate refugees. Thus:

> *The original impetus to the growth of the city of Zaria happened by means of protective powers of her warrior rulers over the vast hinter land of the Hausa kingdom of Zazzau, among other things, and by means of war conquest of and tributes paid to the city and her rulers from as far a field as Kano, Katsina, Bauchi and the Nupe country to the South of the Niger.*[26]

The rapidly changing traditional scene into modernity has brought about complexities in the correspondence between the traditional and modern sectors of the economy. This, in a way, indicates that the traditional social and political organizations were in such a way and manner that with the passage of every decade, changes have been vividly recorded in all angles including the forces of production.[27]

Hence, traditional social and political organizations were therefore constituted right from the grassroots levels ascending to the highest level. The predominant occupation among other important ones like commerce and industry, was agriculture. With regard to agriculture, Lloyd has shown and explained that the surplus produced by farmers has sustained, among others, a large body of specialist craftsmen, political and ritual office-holders in the urban areas.[28]

Hogben and Kirk-Green have shown that Zaria and other legendary founded Hausa Bakwai[29] (Seven Hausa States) were famous in trade and industry on a variety of items. Of greater importance they emphasized, was the city of Zaria which served as a significant market center for and a chief source of supply of slaves and crafts to far north. It also served as a connecting rod between the far north and far south radiating to the Western and Eastern directions; particularly during both the trans-Saharan and trans Atlantic trades.[30] In addition, local trade routes sprang up and connected the city from neighboring localities for trade and commerce.

The central position of Zaria therefore attracted people from far and near in and around the area. People of different origins came along with their crafts and trading know-how and became engaged in different vocational and entrepreneurial activities or practices. Hence, the influences of Kanuri, Nupe, Yoruba, Arabs and others have had unprecedented impacts on the transformation of the city of Zaria to a very significant level. That is why, for example, traces of such influences can be clearly captured by the names given to localities and settlements like **Unguwa** (ward) and **kauye** (village) in and around Zaria. For example Unguwar Nupawa (Nupe ward) or Kauyen Maigana (Maigana village) depicting the Bornuan influence. Thus, there is evidence of

> *...Bornuan influence in the political institutions in Hausaland which is perhaps to a certain extent confirmed by the Kanuri words in the Hausa political vocabulary. Certainly, for later times (15th century on words) there is much evidence of kanuri political influence in the Hausa State, not only in the establishment of Kanuri political residents in the Hausa capitals and in the payment of tributes, but also in the traditions that state-like politics were founded in the northern Hausaland by immigrants from Bornu.*[31]

These influences, particularly the use of Kanuri vocabulary in the Hausa political institutions included **mai unguwa** (ward head), **mai gari** (town head), **mai girma** (His Highness). Hence Maigana - the name of a village - in Bornuan vocabulary literary means - **Mai= Sarki** (king) and **Gana = karami** (small) which put together means **'Karamin Sarki'** (small king). This is the point Smith buttresses as constituting one of the fundamental features of the Hausa cities. He further states that

> *A basic characteristic of the **birni** is the cosmopolitan nature of its community. These settlements emerged not so much as a result of the natural increases of a single community but rather as centers of immigration. Migration figures prominently in all traditions relating to the foundation of the Hausa States.*[32]

The ancient administration of the State was centrally bureaucratized as demonstrated by the antiquity of different functions performed by political office holders in different State apparatuses.[33] Hence, the bureaucratic inheritance of titles and positions from the top to the bottom indicates this aspect of centralization notwithstanding the fact that other lesser officials were, under certain exigencies. chosen or recruited by the **sarki** from the **talakawa.**

## 3.04 THE STATE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CALIPHATE 1804-1904

As a result of the political disintegration of Bornu in the mid seventeenth century, particularly from 1750s, there was a large exodus of Fulbe migration which reached up to the Benue valleys and dispersing into the Hausa land. The social, economic and political conditions in the Hausaland led to the emergence of the muslim Fulani intelligentsia which mounted serious challenges. It was this intelligence that mobilized people which threatened the existing political system and overthrew the authority of Habe nucleus by waging a Jihad (holy war).

The aim of the Jihad was to establish a theocratic State based on Islamic percepts. Hence, a large majority of the Hausa peasantry embraced the new challenging ideology primarily to rid themselves off from the bondage of the Habe oppressive and exploitative rule. The jihadists, on the other hand propagated and promised to overthrow the Habe rule and establish a just society in accordance with the Islamic injunctions as contained in the shari'a.

As soon as the jihadist aristocracy became consolidated in power, the objectives which the jihad was set to achieve began to weaken as majority of those who participated in the jihad were primarily involved with double-edged motives: to overthrow the decaying system and be involved in the emerging force chiefly for political reasons not to change the status quo. By

1837 for instance, emirs had gone far in their lust for expansionist adventure while corrupt practices; tantamount to reversing the objective of the jihad, were in top gears.

As the caliphate was established by the overthrow of the Habe chiefs, the system of government was instituted on the Habe set up,**mutatis mutandis**, in terms of government bureaucracies and hierarchies of political power and the nature of economic and social transactions. Thus, continuous adoption of Habe titles in the new Islamic political structure had assumed some significant dimensions since the entire structure of the caliphal administration was basically Hausa in its entirety. Hence emirate system of taxation and other sources of revenue generation as well as forms of extraction were not fundamentally changed or altered. By 1827 however, it was reported that there were incidence of

> *...the sale of political office, widespread bribe-taking, self abasement by subjects and compulsory military service. Other abuses involved the sharing of booty, inheritance, divorce, land tenure and women rights. Emirate officials soon resorted to the whole sale extortion of the Habe.*[34]

The changing political process from the one based on the Islamic ideology was reversed and reverted to the old system through the use of an oligarchy created for that purpose and invariably the political system was changed into a patrimonial rule.[35] Thus, the entire community was once again subjected to more tyrannical rule. Even the countryside was further brought closer to the oppressive rule primarily for extortion and clientalism through the use of religious devices.[36] This further shows that the new set of leadership:

> *manipulated the objectives of the jihad to suit their personal purposes. They raided towns and villages for slaves and invariably created social tension as well unstable political atmosphere. They looted and accumulated wealth all in the name of the jihad.*[37]

This situation had created room for resentments and dissensions from and within the system especially by the **ulemaa** (the learned) and other groups of individuals who rebelled against the system through migration.[38] In some cases these resulted in conflicts with the disgruntled political elements through taking up of arms,[39] especially in the territories put under the suzerainty of the emirates. It should be noted that the atrocities committed in these territories included forceful payments of tributes, conversion of many women as concubines and other whole sale extortion; essentially to keep the palaces and other State apparatuses in shape and in accordance to their desires.[40]

The caliphate was characteristically a confederation of States even though there existed some degree of centralization. The **'Amir-Al-mumin** in Sokoto combined the executive, judicial and legislative powers. The emirs were his representatives as they all owed their allegiances and power to him since their choice or selection was approved by the Sultan **(Sarkin Musulumi).** To express this, the emirate had to, on annual bases or at the exigencies of time, send tributes to Sokoto. This sort of political structure and power replicated itself in the emirate down to the lowest political office holders.

The productive sectors of the economy, especially the crafts in the rural areas, were engineered and stimulated by the State. These included dyeing and weaving. Hence, the rural economy was gradually integrated through the gradual penetration of the state power and State apparatuses originating from the **birni**. Consequently, the countryside was fragmented into fief-holding segments managed, in most cases, by absentee chiefs. To perform their functions, the chiefs recruited mercenaries who ensured that taxes and dues were regularly collected so as to ensure that the rural-urban links were effectively maintained.

It should be recalled that the economy of many early urban areas was rurally-based. It could, therefore, only produce meager resources to support the community. Thus, many urban centers could not, on their own resources, economically support themselves and therefore did not, in any manner, contribute meaningfully to the urban economy. In essence, it has been emphasized that

> *...a large percentage of the urban poor who are also below the poverty line normally come from the pre-1900 inhabitants; and ... such areas constitute economically the poorest wards in the cities where existence is largely parasitic.*[41]

Since the largest proportion of the population was based on agricultural occupations, the surplus produced and extracted sustained, among others, the political and ritual leaders as well as the craftsmen whose technology was simple and industries not in complex stage. Even though iron tools were used, basket making and pottery were also well in advance. Since cotton was widely grown to be

> *...woven on both horizontal and vertical looms, and tailors made the cloth into gowns, often of complex design. Such as the Hausa riga ... (and) the royal courts gave employments to men producing regalia, luxury articles of clothing and ritual objects for shrines*[42]

In 1807 Mallam Musa brought Dan Fodio's flag to Zaria and joined his forces with Yamusa's, a Bornuese fulani and thus sparked off the collapse of the Kingdom. However, by 1807, the entire Hausaland was brought under the control of the Jihadist army. It was during Mallam Musa's era that the administrative center of the Fulani Zaria was relocated to its present location. It should however be noted that the pre-jihad administrative and religious center of Zaria was at the Juma ward. (See Figure 3.2)

It was not until 1856 when the religious center was relocated near the new administrative center when a new Friday Mosque was built by famous Muhammadu Durugu. Since 1856 when the religious center was moved to the **'Kofar Fada'** (in front of the palace) the area has increasingly become important in political, administrative, social and religious and even, to a lesser extent, economic activities.

On the nature of the mode of production, a lot of arguments have been put forward on what constituted the dominant mode of production in the rural Hausaland. The argument that categories the entire Sokoto caliphate as dominated by an "Asiatic mode" of production has been described as erroneous, misleading and tantamount to Eurocentric theoretical construction.[43]

But there is a general consensus opinion among scholars that the dominant mode of economic exploitation in the Hausaland during the late nineteenth century was essentially feudal.[44] This mode of production, in many respects and viewed from the medieval features of feudalism, explains why Amin categories it a"tributary mode". But unlike the feudal society in Europe,

> *land was largely controlled, not only by private individuals, but by the State. This control could not be interpreted as 'communal' in the sense suggested by the Asiatic mode for, in practice, the influence of Islam and the inheritance system had led to differing degrees of individualization of land. Furthermore, the system of crafts production which played a large part in production and commerce in the society, was more "commodified" than 'common". It might even be argued that the "State" feudalism of the caliphate is the norm, the exception being the "private" feudalism of Western Europe.*[45]

It is thus necessary to point out that the former Sokoto Caliphate did contain some feudal features combined with that of patrimonialism. In the first place, there was the territorial

autonomy granted to the confederating units to politically decide what to do by the fief holding officials, while on the other hand, there was a concentration of power in the hands of the **Sarki.**

Thus the pre-colonial rural Zaria in particular, was essentially feudal in nature as extraction of surplus from the State, in form of taxes, tributes, etc were appropriated by the ruling oligarchy in the **'birni'.** With respect to political subordination and control, feudal aspects and patrimonialism were clearly reflected in dealing with State matters.[46]

## 3.05 IMPERIALISM AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE CALIPHATE C. 1900

By 1849 British imperial activities or influences and administration had gone deep to be felt in some parts of the coastal kingdoms along the Bights of Benin and Biafra. In 1852 however British imperialism directly involved itself in the affairs of Lagos when an obnoxious treaty was signed with some chiefs. Accordingly, the objective of such obnoxious treaties was to abolish slave trade, encourage legitimate trade and protect the Christian missionaries. In essence, all such treaties were designed for the cession of Lagos to the crown.[47]

In 1861 however, a group of white capped Lagos chiefs consented to, 'in the name of the Queen of England', transfer the Island to her and her successors for ever, freely and absolutely.[48] In 1862 Lagos was thus transformed into a 'colony'. Furthermore, in 1885, oil Rivers protectorate was established by the imperial government which was later renamed the Niger coast protectorate. This was to cover and operate within the districts of the Cameroon in the eastern boundaries of the colony of Lagos.

In 1886 however, the charter of the Royal Niger Company was established to cover the central regions of the River Niger. In addition, the Niger coast protectorate was revoked in 1899 and

renamed the protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Between 1861 when Lagos was annexed and the 1914 amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates, Nigeria was completely subdued by the colonial forces.

Hence, one of the crucial problems confronted by colonialism in Nigeria was how to over-come and subdue the slave trade activities practiced in the society and at the same time ensure a conducive atmosphere to promote its commerce. It should be noted that the society was predominantly characterized by slave population and to either abolish slavery or continue to maintain it would not suit colonial interest. This dilemma was clearly buttressed by Lugard himself.

> *as a British subject, he cannot take part in restoring a fugitive slave, and as a political officer he may create disorder if he does not protect the master.*[49]

Thus, in order to maintain some relative peace in the society, impose its political hegemony, apply its administrative reforms, raise revenue and other vital aspects of control, the colonial regime desperately felt the need, as the only option, to protect the slave master in order to realize what it needed. Therefore, slaves, during the early periods of colonialism, continued to serve as the major sources of labor as operated under the caliphal arrangements. Thus, apart from being turned as important and cheap sources of labor, slaves, in addition, served many other diverse roles.[50]

Improved conditions during the colonial era were no other than improved State security designed to facilitate the effective, and efficient flow of production of needed materials as well as other important commercial undertakings. Hence, anything that did undermine these conditions did

actually undermine the vital fabrics of the colonial system and was therefore frowned at and counteracted appropriately.

Northern Nigeria was over-run by the imperialist forces through the activities of the Royal Niger Company. Emirates and other kingdoms of the Northern protectorate were conquered and occupied by force or by signing of dubious treaties. It was not until 1904 when the final subjugation of the caliphate, after lasting almost a hundred years, by the British imperial forces, was realized and the entire emirates occupied. Crowder explains that these treaties were primarily for international diplomacy within the European nations, particularly during the scramble for and partition of Africa. Thus

> *Whilst the Niger company had made treaties with Sokoto and a number of subordinate rulers, no effective administration had been established in Fulani territory before 1897.*[51]

In retrospect, it should be recalled that efficient administration, initially consisting of **'Ulemaa'**, good and codified laws based on "Shari'a" and fair taxation were well instituted throughout the caliphate during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Bello. However, officials from Sokoto undertook periodic but frequent tours with the objective of, among other things, checking and if need be, forcing the administration of the emirs to comply with the laid down rules. In **Government in Zazzau,** for example, Smith explained the extent of control the caliphate had over Zaria Emirate. Crowder further shows that:

> *The sultan was intimately concerned with the election and deposition of its Emirs and interfered in the election and deposition of its Emirs and interfered in the appointment of officials. He received tributes from them twice a year and frequently summoned them to Sokoto.*[52]

Hence, the powers exercised by Sokoto were considerable and formidable. As the Sultans took part or played important roles in the selection of the Emirs, the situation in Zaria, where there were three ruling families, each contending to the throne whenever it became vacant, was very peculiar. Crowder has, for instance, further shown that:

> *The Sultan was even able to depose the Emir of Zaria in 1860, substituting his own nominee, a man who was not even a member of the families that had so far provided the rulers of Zaria. The Emir of Zaria paid homage as a vassal at the court of Sokoto twice a year, bringing tribute in form of slaves, Zaria cloth, horses and cowries. When Zaria's own vassals had complaints they could always seek the intervention of Sokoto. The Waziri (vizier) of Sokoto, as head of the imperial administration made frequent tours of Zaria and other vassal emirates, assessing tributes, regulating disputes and checking internal administration.*[53]

The caliphal Sokoto was coherently organized as an empire profoundly influenced by the 1804 Jihad. Hence, the advancing British colonialism was vehemently resisted and rejected. But due to, among other things, the decadence of the empire, especially after the death of Sultan Bello, the caliphate began to loose much of its reformist character. Soldiers increasingly became more politically and economically influential and powerful in State affairs than the hitherto **'Ulemaa'**. Consequently, leadership became materialistic and intrinsically thirsty for political expansionism and criminal activities. Many States pursued slave raiding and lived entirely on its proceeds.

During the early period of colonialism, the British exploited the political expediencies and thus gradually began to consolidate its authority through conquests etc. The collapse of the Sokoto Empire was imminent due largely to the destruction of the high standards set by its earlier rulers. Hence, Northern Nigeria was overrun by the imperialist forces through the activities of the Niger Company.


Emirates and other kingdoms of the Northern Protectorate were conquered and occupied by force or by dubious signing of the obnoxious treaties. All these activities as shown in the reports of H.P Backwell indicated that the Sokoto caliphate, for instance, faced serious dilemma in compromising with the imperial colonial army as explained in Wazirin Sokoto's letter Muhammad Al-Bukhari (1840-1910). The Waziri, in 1886 wrote that:

> *... when we stopped at marnona, the people gathered around me to take council together. They consulted among themselves, but they saw no way of making* ***Hijra*** *from this land owing to the scarcity of water along the roads or the total lack of it along some of them as well as the severity of heat and the presence of Christians camped along all the routes. Thus the best thing is to negotiate a truce with them since truce negotiation is permissible to muslim Imam and his deputy when muslims are too weak to fight.*[54]

The sacking of Sokoto was partly due to the decadence of the caliphate and the sultan, **Sarkin Musulumi** Attahiru who could not stand to face the embarrassment decided to take a large group of followers for **hijra**. This inevitably made a larger group to join the mass exodus. It was not until 1904 when the final subjugation of the entire caliphate, after lasting for almost a hundred years, by the British imperial forces, was realized and thus the whole emirates occupied. These mass movements of people resisting colonialism was highly unprecedented:

> *The people appear to rise en masse at the sultan's call, men, women and children leaving their towns and villages deserted to follow him thus showing a fanaticism which I, for one, never for a moment thought they possessed.*[55]

The imposition of 'indirect rule' system of administration finally came into being by the British colonialism in conjunction with the Northern Emirates as emirs and chiefs constituted the bed rock of its sustenance and survival. The system was however established on the long existence


Figure 3.3
ZARIA
G.R.A.
1953
Water Tank
Queen Elizabeth Road
Cricket Ground
RACE COURSE
Sokoto Road
Railway Staff Quarters
Residency
Circular Road
Club
Polo Ground
(Race Course Road)
Church
Residency Road
Forestry Office
Kubani Close
Kufena Road
Cemetery
War Memorial
Station Road
Court House Rd.
L.A. and Court
Post Office
Chediya Road
Galina Road
N
0
500
1000
Feet
Source: Base, Zaria T.P.O. 248.
RBM

of the native administration which appropriately suited the political expediency of the time. J.A. Burdon, one of the early Residents states that the aim of the British system in Northern Nigeria was:

> *...to rule through the existing chiefs, to raise them in the administrative scale, to enlist them on our side in the work of progress and good government. We cannot do without them. To rule directly would require an army of British magistrates... which both the general unhealthiness of the country and the present poverty forbid.*[56]

The influences and impacts of colonial administration in the growth and development of Zaria urban area, on the one hand and the shrinkage and decline of Zaria rural areas since 1900 on the other have been tremendous. The township was thus caught up by the introduction of a series of alien or non-traditional infrastructural facilities and other economic system. The emphasis in the economic ideology of colonialism was strategically on export economy based on the colonial infrastructural development policy.(See Figure 3.3)

The colonial infrastructural development policy was essentially on the construction of rail lines and roads. This policy thus connected Zaria with many important economic routes and thus enhanced and accelerated its urban growth and status. Palpable and distinctive differences between those urban areas affected by the colonial policy and those not affected in the pace and degrees of their urbanization processes could be observed. As the colonial policy of urban infrastructural development affected the growth of some urban areas, it equally affected or accelerated the decline of others due largely to the reorientation of the economy.

Railway development in Northern Nigeria commenced in 1895 while road constructions took off in the 1920s. It should be noted however that these colonial infrastructure by-passed many early

urban areas especially from the early development and consolidation of colonial rule. many urban areas shrinked in population due to migrations to the newly created areas of economic and political activities like Zaria.[57]

# FOOTNOTES

1. A.D. Yahaya - **The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria 1950-1970; A study in political Relations with particular reference to Zaria Native Authority,** ABU Press, Zaria 1980. P2.
2. Abdullahi Smith - "Some considerations Relating to the formation of states in Hausaland", **Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria,** 1970(a), 5, PP329-346.
3. **Ibid**
4. **Ibid**
5. *For details of these legends see* **JAH, Vol 1,** *1966 and Abdullahi Smith, 1970 (a)* ***Ibid***
6. Abdullahi Smith - "The Early States of the Central Sudan", cf. **History of West Africa Vol. One,** by J.F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder (ed), Longman, London, 1977, PP 177-186.
7. These hills were not only centers of social and religious worship but also metamorphosed as centers of political power as well as area of commerce and other economic activities within their vicinities
8. See Isah Mohammed Abbas - 1990, **Op.cit.,** p.23
9. Abdul-Raufu Mustapha - " Peasant Differentiation and Politics in Rural Kano: 1900-1987", Unpublished D. Phil. St. Peter's College, University of Oxford, 1990, P18.
10. *Abdullahi Smith 1977* ***op.cit,*** *P181*
11. Mahdi Adamu - "A Hausa Government in Decline: Yawuri in the nineteenth century", unpublished M.A Thesis, ABU, Zaria 1968,
12. Abdullahi Smith, 1977, **Op.,cit** p.180
13. **Ibid,** *p.182*
14. Cf. Shenton, R. 1986, **The Development of Capitalism in Northern Nigeria,** James currey, P2.
15. Abdullahi Smith, 1977, **op.cit** P183
16. **Ibid,** p.184
17. Dearth of information about Zazzau has been widely noted as there appears to be a lot of uncertainties on the facts and chronology of events. It is suggested that all these could perhaps be connected partly with the shift of political power from at least three major areas. For further information see MG. Smith- "The Beginnings of Hausa Society" **Cf. The Historian in Tropical Africa** (eds) varisina, Mauny and Thomas, London, 1964 pp.338-45.
18. Abdullahi Smith-, 1977, **Op.cit.,** p.185.
19. See M.G Smith, - 1964, **Op.cit.,** p343
20. M. J. Mortimore (ed) - "Zaria and its Region: Nigerian Savanna City and its Environs, ABU, Department of Geography. Occasional paper 4, 1970, P193.
21. Abdullahi Smith, 1970(a), **op.cit** P340
22. M.J. Mortimore - Settlement Evolution and Land Use **cf** Mortimore (1970) **op.cit,** *PP 103-108.*
23. S. Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, **The Emirates of Northern Nigeria,** London, 1966, P 216.
24. **Ibid** P 638
25. *Abdul-Raufu Mustapha, 1990,* ***op.cit*** *P.*
26. H. I. Ajaegbu - **Urban and Rural Development in Nigeria,** Heinemann, London, 1976, P41.
27. P.C. Lloyd - **Africa in Social Change,** Pengium Books, London 1975, P11
28. **Ibid** p.14
29. These consist of Daura, Biram ta Gabas, Kano, Katsina, Zazzau Rano and Gobir.
30. S. Hogben and AH. M. Kirk-Greene, 1966 **op.cit** PP.145-150. See Michael Crowder, **The Story of Nigeria,** Faber, London, PP 38-39.
31. Abdullahi Smith, 1970(a) **op.cit** P
32. **Ibid** P341
33. ***Ibid,*** *P344*
34. **Cf** M.G. Smith, "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Corruptions Among the Hausa", in **Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.6, NO2,** 1964, P176. See also A. R. Mustapha, 1990, **op.cit** P20
35. ***Ibid,*** *183*
36. M.F. Smith, **Baba of Karo: A Woman of the Muslim Hausa,** Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981.
37. Isah M. Abbass, 1990, **op.cit,** P49
38. Murry Last - "Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland 1800-1968", **Africa Vol XL, NO.4,** 1970
39. M. G. Smith, 1964, **op.cit**
40. Isah M. Abbas, 1990, **op.cit** P49
41. H. I. Ajaegbu, 1976 **op.cit,** P42
42. P.C. Lloyd, 1975 **op.cit** P24
43. Samir Amin - **Class and Nation, Historically and in the current Crisis,** *Trans. by Susan Kaplow, Heinmann, London 1980, P.*
44. Buttner, T. "On the Socio-economic Structure of Adamawa in the 19th century: Slavery or Serfdom ? In **African Studies,** 1967, Karl-Marx-University leipzig, P.58.
45. A. R. *Mustapha, 1990* ***op.cit.*** *P25*
46. Bendix R. - Max Weber: **An intellectual portrait,** Methnen London, 1962, P360.
47. T. O. Alias - **Nigeria: The Development of its Laws and Constitution volume 14, The British commonwealth services,** Stevens and sons, London, 1967, PP 1-9.
48. Ibid
49. Lord Lugard, - **Instructions to Political and Other Officers on Subject Chiefly Political and Administrative,** Waterlow and Sons Ltd, London, P141.
50. These roles included serving "as currency in large scale commerce, carriers for transportation, as servants and as labor for agricultural and *manufacturing products". See A. R. Mustapha,* ***op.cit.,*** *1990, P29.*
51. Michael Crowder, **Op.cit.,** 1970, p.194
52. **Ibid** P94
53. ***Ibid*** *P194*
54. Thomas Hodgkin - **Nigerian Perspectives - An Historical Anthology 1**, Oxford University Press, London 1975, PP392-394.
55. Wallance to Chamberlin- "Northern Nigeria- Further correspondence relating to Kano" Africa (West) Colonial office No718, 1904, PP71-72.
56. J.A. Burdon - Historical Notes on certain Emirates and Tribes Nigeria, Northern Provinces, London, 1956.
57. Some of the towns that were relatively cut-off as a result of the Colonial Policy of rail and road infrastructural development included Sokoto, Katsina, Gumel, Kukawa, Maiduguri, Mubi, Kiama, Yola etc. However, many of them could not recover from their tempo or pace of Urban growth until

after the 1960s when certain infrasturctural facilities were extended to them intrinsically accompanied as a result of the political status accorded to some in the course of State creation, among others.

# CHAPTER FOUR

## 4.00 THE COLONIAL STATE AND RURAL ZARIA 1900-1960

> *Why did Britain become interested in this part of Africa during the last years of the ninetieth century and how was it that she decided to establish a formal administration there ? What were the political circumstances of African society at the time ? What relationship was worked out between the two races and in what way was it done ? What were the views of the British as to immediate desiderate, possibilities, obstacles and ultimate aims ? What was the apparent out look of the Africans and how was it taken into account ? As time went on, what changes occurred and how did the parties seem to be influencing and adjusting to one another ? When all was said and done, how do we appraise the British contribution, that is to say, what difference did it make to the Africans that they had the British among them for half a century rather than going their own way as they had done before 1900 ?*[1]

## 4.01 INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapter, the nature of the traditional Hausa society, the processes of the evolution of the urban and rural settlements and their extensions under the Habe, caliphal as well as the commencement of the colonial rule were examined. Thus, the primary aim was to show that these developments have tended to reinforce the basic dual structure of the **'Maraya' - 'karkara'** divide in the Hausa community as well as the State - rural relations.

This chapter will thus concentrate entirely on the colonial period. It will examine the nature of the imposition of colonialism, the State - peasant relation and the entire political economy of colonialism. The perspectives of the rural-urban structures created or enhanced by the colonial State will also be examined. It should be noted that the State-rural relation was reinforced through the urban structures by the network of the indirect rule system. These were all designed to preserve and enhance the authority of the **'masu sarauta'** under the overall authority of

British officials. The State-rural relations during the colonial era were systematically transformed and the desired objective effectively achieved.

## 4.02 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COLONIAL STATE AND ADMINISTRATION

The principal imperial powers in the West African region at the close of the eighteenth century were France, Britain, Portugal and Germany. These were the four major European forces that involved themselves in the fierce struggles for colonies since the 1884/5 Berlin Conference. However, by 1906 most of the entire West African region came under their firm control. The forceful occupation, even though overtly resisted, was achieved because of the superiority of the European military technology. In effect, colonization was, opposed to the initial commercial contacts, a result of the cut-throat rivalry between the imperial European countries. The struggle was to acquire ready markets for goods and strategic sources of raw materials.

On January 1, 1900, what is now geographically described as Nigeria was formally and classically transformed as a British colony. Thus, the formal establishment of colonial State in 1900 was immediately sequel to the revocation of the charter of the Royal Niger Company in 1899. The charter was revoked due to the fierce competition between the rival European States engaged in the scramble for colonies in Africa. The inevitability of the formal declaration of Nigeria as a British colony was therefore the only option. The Royal Niger Company was allowed to face its mercantile and other imperialist activities in the region and equally be shielded and protected from other European companies.

After crushing all opposition which stood against British imperialism, the imperial power exploited the political expediency to monopolize the political power. This was designed

purposely to achieve the repatriation of surplus, from the toil of the peasantry in the rural areas,to the mother country. Thus, colonial Nigeria fell within that part of the international capitalist economy from which surplus was drawn from **karkara** to glitter and sustain **maraya** metropolitan settlement and its populace.[2]

Even though British assumed formal responsibility of Nigeria in 1900, it had no remarkable knowledge of the area. It nonetheless had to contend and go along with the peculiarities of the environment and therefore adopted the policy of directly dealing with the local chiefs. The adoption of the policy of indirect rule system (earlier introduced by the Royal Niger Company) served the purpose of consolidation and legitimization of colonial rule. Local chiefs, in one way or the other, collaborated with the colonial power to achieve control even in situations where local rulers were unpopular.

> *It was not easy to be a chief under the colonial state. The chief was torn between whole-hearted support of state policies, which his subjects might find detestable, and opposition to the State, which was certain to earn him the displeasure of the local Resident with his superior coercive power. For those of them who acquiesced the state's policies and dominance, though they were on the lowest level of its administrative hierarchy, their power and authority were strengthened with the state's coercive apparatus, such as the police or the army. Many of the chiefs also found in their position new possibilities for self enrichment.*[3]

However, the colonial State began to build its own structures to suit its own goals. Invariably,

> *...once the provincial structure was built, there began, almost imperceptibly at first and with great variety from post to post, the processes of accommodation whereby Residents and chiefs came to work in harness".*[4]

The colonial administration was basically designed and put in place to serve as a means of economic exploitation where the local chiefs were used as the conduit pipes. Hence, the colonial

State worked hand in hand with local chiefs to carry out a variety of roles detrimental to the colony but beneficial to the imperial power. One of the most important roles was to maintain 'law and order' with a view to ensuring that proper and conducive atmosphere was created for capitalist expansion and plunder.

The regionalised structure of the Nigerian colonial State was politically and administratively designed to divide and rule the country. The 1914 amalgamation attempt by Lugard was essentially for a different purpose altogether.[5] The imposition of indirect rule in the North was first of all done in conjunction with the compliance of the emirs and chiefs based on the long existence of the native administrative set up. Therefore the application of indirect rule in the North was to, amongst other things, enable the entrenchment of traditional ruling oligarchy to maintain political power.[6]

All important colonial apparatuses were put in place especially the police, the army, the civil service, the Judiciary etc with all the corresponding infrastructure. These therefore enabled the colonial State to be in a position to intervene much more directly in the socio-economic and political life of the people than had been the case previously. Hence, the colonial State did intervene through a variety of means like the enactment of laws, taxation, and in many instances by the use of force to enable it pursue what it deemed it desperate and necessary.[7]

The establishment of colonial State and administration meant the penetration of capitalism into the rural economies and the inevitable integration of the entire economy in the circuit of world capitalism and imperialism. Consequently, these penetration and integration were accompanied with domination and dependence. The organic relationship in these events were channeled in

a network of exploitation through colonization. Hence, the particular mode of articulation of colonization brought about the extent of domination and dependence and thus the degrees of economic exploitation or extortion.

The organization of colonial domination and exploitation was facilitated through the emirs and chiefs. In other words, the colonial State ruled through emirs' councils, courts, security forces etc. In each emirate or province, the colonial administration assigned a British Resident to supervise, advice, guide and in some instances force the local administration to conform or comply with colonial preferences.

In each of the provinces, there were Divisional Officers (DOs) who assisted the Residents at various levels and locations down to the village. In most cases, District and village Heads were selected from a small group of ruling or privileged families who owed their places and responsibilities only to the colonial State. This fostered high loyalty as chiefs complied to work under the colonial trappings which at the same time served as a means to en masse private property.

Emirs and chiefs performed functions detrimental to their communities. These included the collection of **'haraji'** (general tax) 'jangali' (cattle tax) and other forms of tribute and extortion.[8] The native Authority (NA) built on these structures therefore consisted of emirs, their councils, courts, treasuries, provincial district, village and ward heads as well as various State apparatuses which controlled them. Crowder emphasized that indirect rule:

> *at least in theory, did not mean government of African people through their chiefs. In practice, indirect rule laid heavy emphasis on the role of the chief in the government of African peoples, even*

*for those people who traditionally did not have political as distinct from religious leaders.*[9]

The imposition of indirect rule, particularly in the caliphate, was due to, among other factors, the centralized nature of **'Daular Usmaniyya'** (the caliphate), the relative stability of the area, the existence of operational State apparatuses like the law courts (Shari'a) coercive forces **(dogarai),** nature of treasuries **(Beit-el-mal)** and the system of revenue collections or generation and expenditure, the existence of the bureaucratic type or model of scalar chain of officials.

Emirs and chiefs were therefore transformed into the network of colonialism and imperialism and thus formed a single and direct government with clear cut functions. Thus the chiefs' right to place, power and influence, during the colonial period, were highly dependent on the kinds of services they were able and capable to render to the State[10]. In the 1912-18 Amalgamation Report Lugard emphatically states that:

*The first step is to endeavor to find a man of influence as a chief, and to group under him as many villages or districts as possible, to teach him to delegate power and to take an interest in his 'native' treasury to support his authority and to inculcate a sense of responsibility"*[11].

To enhance the penetration of the country-side by the colonial State within the circuit of colonial production, a number of territorial reorganizations, to suit the exigencies of the time, was made. In 1902, for instance, Lugard stressed that the appointment of officers of State under the emirates did not make for what the colonial State chose to regard as good government.[12] In Zaria, there were 65 chiefs who were regarded as " a drawn on the peasantry".[13]

The emirate system of administration was essentially based on the previous age-old traditional administrative practices. This system, according to Lugard,

> *...allowed the exercise of power without responsibility and the subjection of the whole communities to the tyrannies of gangs of 'low-class' and warriors retainers".*[14]

This unacceptable position led Lugard to overhaul the entire emirate administrative system. The administrative reform was a mechanism for the integration of the rural economies to the capitalist system. The modified and adopted administrative schema for the emirate was based on the fragmentation of the protectorate into provinces. In each province, administrative powers rested on the Resident. A province contained a number of emirates or independent chiefdoms.[15] However, emirates within a province were grouped to form 'administrative divisions' run by Assistant Residents.

Emirates were divided into districts run by District Heads. The districts were subdivided into village areas ruled by village Heads. The village areas constituted a major village and neighboring hamlets. In each hamlet there was an enthroned hamlet Head. All these arrangements and the scalar chain of authority functioned under the framework of the NA system within the Indirect Rule scheme. This arrangement thus ensured further systematic grips over the country-side.

As the NA was bureaucratized, it was accompanied with the establishment of institutions to make it really functional. These institutions included the **Beit- el mal** (the Treasury) where salaries of the NA Principal officers were fixed, approved and paid.[16] Hence, the new administrative dispensation made the organs of the colonial State in the rural areas easily penetrating and therefore vulnerable. They thus faced rampant abuses by the paraphernalia of new political arrangements. Mustapha buttresses this point:

> *...by 1926, the essential features of new state structures in the countryside had been worked out, against the background of the alliance between the British and sections of the Jihadist aristocracy. Homologous districts with resident District Heads, replaced the scattered fiefs of old which were subject to the authority of absentee fief-holders, and dominated by visiting* ***Jekadu****. And Homologous village units with village Heads to whom all residents were responsible, had replaced the prior situation whereby villages could owe allegiances to chiefs other than those in the village in which they resided.*[17]

## 4.03 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLONIALISM

### (a) THE STATE AND RURAL ZARIA

Nigeria is still a rural environment. Despite decades of Urban and industrial strides, more than 70 percent of the total population in the country still live in rural areas and faced with abject poverty. Colonialism created modern urbanization with a deliberate design to evolve new settlements. Hence, the colonial administration established low density areas, far away from the native residents, for themselves. These settlements were distinctively different from the so-called African settlements. The newly created European settlements were generally called the Government Reservation Areas (GRAs). These GRAs were thus provided, within the colonial perspectives, with certain infrastructural or modern facilities.

The rural economy has continued to be integrated into much wider urban and international framework primarily designed to transform and orient it towards the colonial export - import structure. Hence, it appeared that the rural areas were almost subsumed within urban description and had almost lost their status except under the urban structure. The continuous or increasing penetration of the rural society by the colonial State was facilitated by the establishment of colonial institutions in the Zaria urban area to draw rural areas much closer for effective extraction of surplus. (See Figure 4.1)





Figure 4.1
SKETCH MAP OF ZARIA
APRIL 1912

Source: 178 P/1913.

RBM

To elucidate the rural nature of the Nigerian State, the report on the sixth Rehovot conference in 1973 stated that the entire world is predominantly rural consisting 61 percent while those who live in cities and urban areas consist of 24 percent and 39 percent respectively. (See Table. 4.1) This indicates that the entire universe is largely rural. In addition, the existing urban percentage is a very recent phenomenon. The report further shows that

> *...prior to 1850, no country, no matter how advanced, had as a large a proportion urban as a whole world does today.*[18]

**TABLE 4.1**
**Percentage of World Population in Rural, Urban, and City Categories, 1950-70**

| | Percentage | | Relative change |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 1950 | 1970 | (Percentage) |
| World Total | 100.0 | 100.00 | - |
| Rural | 71.8 | 61.4 | -14.4 |
| Urban | 28.2 | 38.6 | 36.6 |
| Cities 100,000+ | 16.2 | 23.8 | 46.7 |
| Cities 1,000,000+ | 7.3 | 12.4 | 20.2 |

Source - Urbanization and Developing Countries by Raanan Weitz (ed), 1973, P88.

It should be recalled that during the era of Lugard's administration the entire Northern protectorate was administratively fragmented into 17 provinces but was reduced to 11 during the Cameroon's time. These provinces were further sub-divided into about 40 divisions and each further fragmented into districts etc usually designed on tribal categories.

In the 1930s and 1940s, Zaria province was divided into three Touring Areas. The northern districts of Ikara, Soba, Giwa, Makarfi, Anchau and Kubau were supervised by the colonial

office resident in Zaria, while other districts in the Western part of the province covered Birnin Gwari, Chikun, Igabi etc were looked after by the colonial office in Kaduna. The Southern part of the province had its base station at Lere with a sub-station at Kagoro. This arrangement facilitated the colonial officers to go round and see things for themselves like the economy, politics and traditions as well as the reaction of the people to foreign rule.[19]

It should be noted that the control of these administrative structures was directly under the 'Masu Sarauta' especially the control over State bureaucracies, the power overland, collections of various forms or types of taxes and the recruitment of labor. For example, during the reign of Emir Aliyu, even though he posed serious problems to colonial administrators, he was notwithstanding very valuable to colonial rule as a whole. As railways advanced towards Zaria province, it was the same emir who tremendously helped in the recruitment of labor during the World War 1.

Thus, because of the valuable services he rendered to the colonial State, he turned out to be powerful and influential. This also made him to indulge freely in slave raiding, forced labor, extortion and maltreatment of subordinates. He was further accused of involving in many capital crimes like the employment of paid or highered assassins.[20] Despite all these accusations he was nonetheless considered as a ruler of rare ability who never did wrong in the eyes of the British.[21]

However, the powers and roles of District Heads were complementary in nature. Thus, right from the beginning of colonialism, they were to perform functions of strictly complying with the instructions from the above. It should be emphasized that since rural areas were potentials for

the needed resources for exploitation and repatriation by the colonial regime, the concentration of the colonial State apparatuses was geared towards its realization. Heussler succinctly sums up these relationships.

> *District heads were key men because they linked remote chiefs to the mass of the people. Popular ignorance and passivity ruled out pressure from below. Chiefs were tied to their central administrations much of the time and had to depend on D.Hs for the daily running of districts and for information of condition in the countryside of all the N.A. officials, D.Hs thus had the most independent power bases and the greatest capacity for good or ill. Chiefs were chosen as often as not from among their number. It is understandable that their nature, their indispensability and the various combinations of knowledge, power and capacity to help the people forward or not would bring about a complicated 'love-hate' relationship between them and officers touring their areas. The A.D.O, from his position of incorruptible outside authority, Watched the D.H's performance closely and worked alongside him. If the two had the same administrative standard, relations could have been easy and pleasant. The usual relationship was one of tension, mitigated by A.D.O. realism about the extent to which D.Hs could be made to toe the European line.*[22]

As a matter of routine, district heads, more often than not, were celebrated embezzlers. In some instances, the taxes collected in respective districts were converted into their personal uses. In essence, they robbed the peasants and placed their paid agents at strategic locations and occasions. The strategy was to organize systematic cheating on groundnut, cotton and other commodity payments and assessments.

The case of the extortionist District Head of Paki, a village located between Zaria and Kano, for example, shows that he paid wages to road workers far below those indicated on the N.A accounts in 1936. In addition, he pocketed a quarter of the laborers wages and then added fictitious names of laborers completely unknown to have done any work. It was further discovered that apart from the 'ghost' laborers put down by the district head, other laborers who genuinely worked had never been paid at all.[23]

It should be recalled that right from the beginning of British direct rule, the Zaria provincial, district, village etc administration were created and established. All the structural arrangements were thus put under the control of the '**masu Saranta'.** They were established at different locations with traditional set of bureaucracies and powers managing over a variety of issues like land, tax collection recruitment of labor etc. Thus the role and power of the paraphernalia of offices were, right from the onset, clearly set out by the colonial authority. Greater emphasis on rural areas was elaborately made clear because the country-side was seen as the potential areas with abundant resources for effective exploitation.

In retrospect, during the Habe era in Hausaland, rural life was characterized with insecurity due to the incessant slave raiding and inter-state wars. Furthermore, the caliphal period was characteristically corrupt as fief-holders extorted the peasantry while the British colonial system, in collaboration with the local chiefs, was marked by an unprecedented exploitation, repression and extortion of the peasantry which consequently exacerbated the already rural problems.[24]

For further integration of the rural areas within the circuit of the State apparatuses, the colonial administration established its own local police force **(Dogarai, pl. Dogari, sig.)** dressed in the traditional attire, armed with a whip. This police force was designed to replace the WAFF troops, armed with rifles, and give a local touch in the countryside. The recruitment of **'Dogarai'** was carried out in such a way and manner that their loyalty was unquestionably assured - from being transformed as the targets of oppression to the instruments oppression. In other words, the **Dogarai** were recruited strategically from amongst the slaves or ex-slaves and courtiers of the traditional nobility. But the expediency required far higher than what the **Dogarai** could handle.

Hence, there was a growing need, over time, for a better trained and disciplined police force to handle a relatively complex colonial situation. That need invariably led to the formation of a separate police detachment called the **'Yan Doka**.[25] Like the **Dogarai,** majority of those recruited into **'Yan Doka** were also from the class of ex-slaves of the ruling oligarchy. In addition, other complementary coercive apparatuses like the NA prisons and lock-ups were established at various strategic places.

The police force, prisons and lock-ups were not the sufficient apparatuses necessarily to draw the country-side within the trappings of the colonial State. In addition to all these, the colonial government introduced far reaching measures in the British administrative system and dispensation of justice; even though the system of Native or **Alkali** courts were operational at the district levels. The administrative and legal changes as well as the modification of security forces were primarily designed to provide the basis for effective and efficient control to guarantee the extortion and oppression of the peasantry at an inconsequential cost.

However, when the peasantry was left at the mercies of the NA administration, particularly during the World war I, when the staff of colonial administration were drastically reduced, the condition of the peasantry was worse. This was because the new generations of local rulers took office under a system that was geared towards the protection of the integrity of the rulers rather than the ruled.[26] Thus, as the native administration was left to its own devices and exigencies:

> *the District and Village Administration, as also the muslim or pagan courts, were almost completely unsupervised, and not unexpectedly there was a serious decline in the standards, both administrative and judicial, within the NAs and an unfortunate increase in irregularities, extortion, injustice etc.*[27]

Thus, the judicial, district and emirate administrations were gradually bureaucratized and rationalized sequel to the 1926 reforms. Accordingly however between 1925 and 1930 there witnessed throughout the Northern Nigeria the full establishment and consolidation of Native Administration. Furthermore, the development of administration in health and education began to spread into rural areas. This, in addition, further consolidated the process of centralization and consolidation of the powers of the emirs under the NA system under the system of colonial rule.[28]

(b) **Taxation**

One of the effective ways of drawing the rural communities closer and within the realm of the colonial State was to develop a machinery whereby the system of extortion and oppression of the peasantry could be legitimized or legalized. Hence, the legal backing to modify the traditional tax due to emirs and chiefs in pre-colonial period was contained in the First Land Revenue Proclamation of June 1904. The intention of the colonial State to convert the traditional tribute system into its own source of revenue was also contained in the 1904 Colonial Annual Report.[29]

During the colonial era, the peasantry was confronted with an oppressive system where total compliance was a necessity for the survival of colonialism. The commercial aspect of colonialism was thus designed to achieve its goal at a minimum cost through the cheapest way to maintain law and order. The colonized, however, had to dearly pay for being colonized in the system of tax payments to the colonial State. Even though the system of traditional taxation had existed long before colonization, the way it was forcefully introduced or modified appeared as if no taxation had been in existence previously.

The 1906 native Revenue Proclamation was comprehensive. It taxed not only the agricultural products but also the entire activities of the peasantry. However, the powers of the chiefs to levy any tax without colonial approval were prohibited or curtailed.[30] Mustapha shows that under the 1906 proclamation, the pre-colonial taxes[31] were all integrated into 'Land Revenue' or 'General Tax' levied in accordance with the status of the individual.

Another category of taxes integrated into the system was the cattle tax (Jangali) and the **'kudin sarauta'** paid by all office holders on the occasion of their appointments.[32] The government share of the 'General Tax' and 'Jangali' was half while the other half went to the Native Administration. The share of the Native Administration showed that the emir retained from 50 to 60 percent for the up keep of the palace and other related services while the District Heads had 30-40 percent and the village Head about 10 per cent.[33]

The introduction of compound Tax, based on residency, in 1909 by Temple not only bolstered the authority of village Heads but further changed and deepened the nature and degree of control the colonial State had over the peasantry. Furthermore, land and compound tax assessment based measurements **'Taki'** - system, became the renewed mode of tax assessment whereby the State thoroughly taxed the peasantry from head to toe.

The land measurement was further developed with advancing technology and therefore became the mode of squeezing the peasantry and drawing the country side much more under the trappings of the State. It should be noted that the new class of the peasantry that evolved in Nigeria was sequel to the articulation of the colonial economy within the purview of the world capitalist economy. The peasantry was thus intrinsically tied to the international market economy through the network of colonial agencies heading towards its proletarianization.

It should be emphasized that during the colonial administration every activity of human endeavor was tied to taxation paid in the preferred colonial currency. Mustapha explains that

> *the system of Native Assessment of taxation, conducted by the Native Administration, was to be replaced by a system of land Revenue Assessment, run by the British administration but conducted by the Native Administration. The objective was not so much the protection of the peasantry from fraudulent activities, but the enhancement of the receipts accruing to the colonial treasury.*[34]

Rodney also observes that:

> *Colonial taxation system was to provide requisite funds for the administering of the colony... (to ensure) that Africans paid for the upkeep of the governors and police who oppressed them and served as watch-dogs for private capitalists... to recover the cost of the armed forces which colonial powers dispatched to conquer Africa.*[35]

Hence, more and more funds for the sustenance of colonialism through taxation were pursued by the colonial office. Traditional rulers, in their usual form and routine, continued to extort the peasantry without remitting to the colonial office. On many instances, peasant resentments started and thus continued to become prevalent because the degree of extortion was high, enormous and no longer bearable.

In certain situations however, many villages flagrantly refused to pay tax because of the District Heads' extortionist character or attitudes. Paki, a Zaria rural area, was such a village where the District Head was investigated, reprimanded and who later fled and escaped to Kano for fear of being imprisoned. He was dismissed while his other accomplices were imprisoned.[36]

The extent of repression during colonial rule was enormous. Several instances developed elsewhere whereby not only were the burden of taxation and levels of extortion unbearable but

the nature of collection crude and uncivilized. For instance, the houses of defaulters were forcefully broken into and goods estimated to represent the equivalence of tax defaulted were confiscated. This method further accelerated peasant over taxation without a corresponding degree of the provision of amenities to the rural communities.[37]

As taxation, extortion and other forms of oppression of the peasantry continued unabated, further incidence of injustices also ensured. Particular reference must therefore be mentioned of the WAFF soldiers who were noted for their terror, extortion and oppression in the country side. In addition to the WAFF troops' terrorism, there were also other categories of "bush-soldiers" who unleashed all sorts of miseries in the country side. These bush solders consisted of 'uniformed scroudreds,' discharged carriers and colonial employees.[38]

The expansion of the market economy was one of the crucial agenda of colonialism. Thus, the colonized had to shoulder the burden of the cost of the newly established colonial government. The colonized came to bear the burden through the imposition of modified taxation. Thus, the effective production of the materials needed or required to support the economy of the metropolis became further intensified. It was trenchantly shown that the increase in productivity of important resources was an essential goal of the colonial rule. Thus, such an

> *...increase (in productivity) would provide revenue either through export or import dues, or through the ability of the producers to support direct taxation.*[39]

Lugard further states that

> *direct taxation is a moral benefit to the people by stimulating industry and production. ... there is no civilized state in the world where direct taxation has not been found to be a necessity, and African communities which* ***aspire to be regarded as civilized must share the common burden of civilization.***[40] *(emphasis added)*

Lugard, in addition, saw taxation as a triple-edged weapon: as a stimulus to production, as a source of revenue for the support of the colonial administration, which is a mark of recognition by the local community of the colonial power, and finally as the basis for the development of the system of indirect rule which meant the modernization of the traditional institutions.[41] Thus, without income from taxation, the colonial State could not provide for development, let alone the payment of officials on regular basis.

Furthermore, without a tax there could not be treasury to make expenditure for the colonial enterprises.[42] What made the colonial government impose taxation was primarily to have effective firm grips or control of the colonial situation. It was also imposed for effective maintenance of law and order which in essence meant the maintenance of the conditions most favorable for the expansion of capitalism and the plunder of the rural economies.[43]

It should be recalled that the British colonial administration in Nigeria had recourse to forced labor as an alternative means to taxation. Forced labor was thus recruited, as a colonial policy, to make Africans work on a number of projects. Able bodied men were forcefully recruited to do public works in road, railway and other colonial constructions. All these projects depended heavily on the compulsory labor. In 1925 for example,railways construction in the north had 38 percent of the 12,500 laborers forcefully recruited by the traditional rulers.

In most cases therefore, forced labor was administered by the 'native authorities' because they were responsible for the maintenance of roads and other public projects. Since traditional rulers were the sole organs for 'compulsory recruitment of labor, the British consequently and effectively formalized the traditional rulers with absolute powers to forcefully recruit labor

amongst their subjects. Consequently, the introduction of taxation was therefore seen, by Lugard, as "the corollary of the abolition, however, gradual, of forced labor".[44]

(c) **AGRICULTURE**

Between 1900 and 1960, the degree of colonial governments' intervention in the Nigerian peasant mode of production was very enormous. In the first place, the agricultural sector was gradually incorporated in the main stream of the world capitalist market economy. Secondly, the State power was used to force or reorient peasants' allocation of factors of production to suit the colonial exigencies. Furthermore, monetary economy was articulated over and above the subsistence and taxation was introduced to ensure concentration of labor in the production of cash crops. Peasant labor was further used in the construction of roads, railways etc for easy repatriation of the agricultural raw materials.

The colonial economy was regionalized and oriented towards exports. The colonial agricultural policy violently intervened in the peasant mode of production deliberately intended or designed towards simultaneous production of export crops side-by-side with the subsistence crops; but without attempting to develop the forces of production. The regionalized agricultural policy was predominantly based on cocoa/rubber from the West, Palm oil from the East and groundnut/cotton from the North.

> *These three major exports suggest that each region had a fairly distinctive agricultural base. This being so, it appears that the regional administrative division was in effect a territorial division of labor within the colonial economy. The division of labor already appeared 'national' by reason of economic advantage or specialization of each region. The territorial economic division was later invested with constitutional and political legality by the 1946 Richards constitution.*[45]

Peasants who engaged in the production of the preferred exportable crops had their labor excessively exploited by a chain of individuals starting from their kith and kin, traditional rulers and other groups of local businessmen. Furthermore, the clerks of the UAC, the major successors of the Royal Niger Company, also exploited the ignorance of the peasants by undercutting their pay for groundnut and cotton in addition to the company's cheaply fixed prices.[46] Rodney further elucidates this point and states that

> *Cash crop peasants never had any capital of their own. They existed from one crop to another, depending on good harvest and good prices. Any bad harvest or fall of prices caused the peasant to borrow in order to find money to pay taxes and buy certain necessities. As security, they mortgaged their future crop to money lenders in the middlemen category. Non-payment of debt could and did lead to their farms being taken away by the money lenders. The rates of interest on the loan were always fantastically high amounting to what is known as 'usury'.*[47]

A pre-capitalist economy was gradually integrated into the international capitalism through a process of monetization. The objective was to take over the process of production and divert it to suit conditions of exchange. Even though a medium of exchange had been in existence long before colonization, it is pertinent to note that it was colonialism that monetized African economies pervasively with a preferred medium of exchange (currencies). This process was realized through

> *...annihilating the pre-colonial currencies... and imposing taxes and insisting on payment of taxes with the European currency.*[48]

A modern credit system was further introduced which culminated in the establishment of banking system like the Bank of British West Africa (1894) (Standard or First Bank). The monetization

of African economies was essentially to tailor and extend them to correspond with and have relevance to the economies of the metropole. Ake further emphasizes that the important point to consider is not the exploitative character of the colonial monetary system and monetary policies but

> *... the nature of the colonial monetary system as a cause, as well as an effect, of integration of African economies into Western capitalism. The process of monetization went hand in hand with the spread of the capitalist relations of production, particularly because it led to the proletarianization of the African peasant as well as some African entrepreneurs. It also went hand in hand with the development of capitalist institutions such as money market. The monetary system not only helped to create a capitalist economy, but also a capitalist economy structurally dependent on foreign economies.*[49]

As the economy was entirely integrated within the capitalist circuit of production, capitalist institutions came to a face-to- face confrontation with the peasantry. These institutions were the colonial trading companies. The most notorious ones were the UAC, Uniliver, John Halt, Cadbury and Fry. These colonial trading firms were famously known for their activities especially in the expatriation of great proportion of the wealth produced by the peasant labor. Consequently, they made huge fortunes at the detriment of the colonized. There existed no social infrastructure and meaningful investment on the land where the wealth was produced for the benefit of the local communities. This can be buttressed by Table 4.2 which shows the value of exports of major agricultural products in Nigeria from 1900 to 1960.

It should be recalled that 1920s and 1930s were years of great world depression which resulted in wars in Europe. During the years of depression and thereafter, peasants were squeezed under an unequal exchange of their products and expensive imports. In order to ensure that profits were at all times maintained as high as possible, the colonial trading companies made sure that

prices paid to peasants were fixed and kept down to the minimum. In addition to the spreading of their tentacles in all aspects of peasant economic life, it was designed

> *...in such a way as to introduce several straws for the sucking out of surplus.*[50]

**TABLE 4.2**
**VALUE OF EXPORTS OF MAJOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS: 1900-1960(#000)**

| Year | Palm Kernels | Palm Oil | Cocoa | G/Nuts | Cotton | Rubber |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1900 | 834 | 681 | 9 | 4 | 0.5 | 186 |
| 1905 | 1,090 | 858 | 17 | 7 | 16 | 248 |
| 1910 | 2,451 | 1,742 | 101 | 9 | 76 | 312 |
| 1915 | 1,693 | 1,462 | 314 | 72 | 56 | 38 |
| 1920 | 5,718 | 4,677 | 1,238 | 1,120 | 717 | 57 |
| 1925 | 4,937 | 4,166 | 1,484 | 2,394 | 797 | 108 |
| 1930 | 3,697 | 3,250 | 1,756 | 2,196 | na | 150 |
| 1935 | 2,245 | 1,656 | 1,584 | 2,093 | na | 62 |
| 1940 | 1,500 | 1,099 | 1,583 | 1,476 | 621 | 265 |
| 1945 | 3,496 | 1,894 | 2,150 | 2,696 | 63 | 1,220 |
| 1950 | 16,694 | 12,072 | 1,894 | 15,504 | 2,975 | 2.935 |
| 1955 | 19,196 | 13,151 | 26,187 | 26,286 | 9,380 | 5,577 |
| 1960 | 26,026 | 13,982 | 36,772 | 28,198 | 6,207 | 14,239 |

**Source** - G. K. Helleiner: Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria, Home Wood, I.R.D Irwin Inc. 1966 Table IV-A-7.

Peasants were forced to produce cash crops no matter the low prices fixed for the products. The introduction of money taxes covered a variety of the totality of peasant economic activities in cattle, land, houses etc. To obtain the currency for the payment of a number of taxes, the peasants had to cultivate the preferred cash crops or in the alternative, sell their labor on colonial farms or in construction works.

In addition, peasants were physically coerced for the inadequate labor requirement in building prisons, barracks, colonial offices, roads, railways and other colonial infrastructure. It should

became avenues through which peasants were excessively taxed, exploited and extorted. The prices paid to the peasant farmers by the marketing Board began to drastically fall after 1947. From 1948 onwards the peasants conditions continued to worsen then when no Marketing Boards were established. The low and fixed prices Marketing Boards persistently paid to peasant farmers in view of rising prices of the commodity during those period contributed to more than anything else.[51] Furthermore, Olatunbosun trenchantly explain how peasant farmers were excessively taxed and exploited.

> *The marketing boards became an effective mechanism for taxing the rural sector to finance 'development' in order to increase capital formation... in Nigeria in 1946 the boards paid only ₦33.5 for a ton of palm oil and sold it for ₦90 as a gross profit of 488 per cent. Ground nuts which received only ₦30 per ton when bought by the boards, were later sold in Britain at ₦220 per ton at a gross profit of about 633 per cent. Over 75 per cent of the surplus accumulated was invested.... Rather than stabilize the prices, the boards distabilized the prices and deviated completely from the declared purpose of their existence.*[52]

As instruments of direct State intervention in the colonial economy, the marketing boards decided out-rightly what prices to pay the peasant producers. Even after 1960, the role which the boards played during colonial era continued unabated. Thus, rather than the surplus to increase the condition of rural communities, the total bulk went in to serve the interest of the colonial and post colonial State. After the political independence, the surplus went in to serve the dominant political parties of the regions.

Foreign firms dominated and monopolized the export-import character of the Nigerian economy with no local competitor. The colonial State policies on such economic sectors emanated from such firms. Nigerians were only at the periphery and could not have even been allowed to

participate in the decision making and sharing of the gains. The most important firms included the United Africa Company (UAC) the successor of the Royal Niger Company, John Halt, Patterson Zochonis (PZ), Compagnie Francaise de l' Afrique Occidentale (CFAO), Societe' Commerciale de l' Ouest Africain (SCOA) and the Swiss Union Trading Company (UTC). It was not until after world war II that Lebanese and others were able to make any headway and participate in commercial activities.

(d) **SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE**

The aim of colonization was basically to control the economy (control the production - what to produce, how and in what quantities). The control of the structure of demand and supply in the colony was thus crucial and fundamental. With the establishment of the basic patterns of State institutions in the country side, intensification of the presence of the State was now focused on the provision and development of social services primarily to serve the colonial interests. These social infrastructure include transportation system, provision of education and health facilities. Others were construction of concrete wells, building and expansion of markets etc.

One fundamental means of penetrating into the country-side was the system of transportation network which colonialism had developed. In the first place, the Rivers Niger and Benue, for example, were the transportation artery used by early explorers into the hinterland and many other parts of the country. This was, however, the means through which the Royal Niger Company used to penetrate inland for its mercantile activities. In addition, faster and more adequate means of transportation network (roads, railways) were required to fuller facilitate the process of capitalist penetration.

Hence, the colonial government took upon its responsibility to construct roads and railways. These undertakings were purely for political, military and economic considerations as dictated by the economic, political and military exigencies of the metropole. The roads and railways were not designed for regional integration since the routes were dictated by the economic consideration of colonialism. Thus, the roads and railways opened up the country for easy penetration of foreign trading firms. With this came trade imperialism and the resultant integration of the economy with that of the colonizing power. Furthermore, the new transportation system changed the pattern of trade and therefore created consumerist tendencies. These stimulated the growth of a money market economy and the evolution of capitalist financial institutions in the colony.

The patterns and flow of trade previously undertaken were drastically changed as a result of the change of the transportation routes. This resulted in the decline of some urban centers and simultaneously the growth of some rural areas. many former urban centers shrinked due to the fact that they were no longer relevant and could not be served or reached with the new transportation infrastructure being put in place. All these were designed to tie the peasant producers and the countryside into the new colonial political economy. The penetration of foreign firms however was inimical to the growth and development of local crafts which were confronted with relatively cheaper imported manufactured goods.[53]

Colonial education was not designed for the development of human resources geared towards the overall benefit. It was, therefore, essentially to train personnel to serve the colonial exigencies with a view to making the apparatuses of colonial State operational. Both the missionaries and colonial administrators had intricate linkages in their deceptive civilizing

missions of imperialism where both the Bible and the maxim guns became mutually or intrinsically linked together for a desired goal:

> *for more than two decades after the imposition of colonial state, its policy on education amounted to little more than aiding the mission schools to provide it and the commercial houses with junior staff - 'clerks, accountants, dispensers, dressers, sanitary and other inspectors, station masters, railway guards etc...*[54]

It should be noted that the type of education or knowledge imparted to the colonized was restricted and limited. Colonialists feared that any things imparted beyond that would threaten the basic foundation of imperialism and colonialism. Thus, in every province there were European staff to give guidance on the direction on the education policy within the purview of colonial philosophy. For instance, 'Anecdotes illustrative of the value of kindness and honesty', 'Biography of good men-' 'lessons in patriotism' 'Essays on duties of the state', 'Respect for authority' and 'Values of good government and citizenship' were some of the curricular imparted.[55]

During the early period, there was the total lack of intention by the colonial State to give modern types of education to the colonized. Only occasional grants were disbursed to missionary activities in complementing efforts of giving Africans the rudimentary aspects of clerical work primarily to serve the colonial bureaucracy. The issue of getting Africans educated for self-determination and self-actualization were never thought let alone contemplated. Until much later, especially in 1920s and 1940s, that the State showed some interest in enhancing education by establishing educational institutions.

The colonial education, notwithstanding the change of heart by the State between 1920 and 1940, was still imbued with imperialist character. The education was still a means of 'cob-webbing'

the African within the trappings of the colonial State. The so-called educated elites continued to develop the mentality and behavior repugnant to African settings.

> *the philosophy of educated gentlemen - the refined elite... that select group, of like mind, who form the cream of society, leaders necessarily chosen and trained for the purpose and not a spontaneous outgrowth of a whole people participating in their attempt to solve problems.*[56]


In Northern Nigeria, the Hausa/Fulani trenchantly turned away from Western education when it was first introduced in complete repugnance. This was because of its missionary origins and character. This therefore accounts for, among other factors, the unevenness of the spread of Western education between the Southern and Northern parts of the country. In 1958 for instance, in the entire Northern Region, there were only 2,290 educational institutions as against 7,273 and 6,880 in the Western and Eastern Regions respectively. (See Table 4.3). Hence both Western and Eastern Regions had over one million pupils and students at different levels of educational institutions while the North recorded less than a quarter a million at similar institutions.

**TABLE 4.3**
**NUMBER OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS* AND PUPILS BY REGIONS, 1958**

| Region | No of schools | Enrolment Male | Enrolment Female | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| West(+Lagos) | 7,273 | 735,517 | 438,206 | 1,173,723 |
| East | 6,880 | 812,880 | 438,049 | 1,250,929 |
| North | 2,290 | 179,058 | 59,040 | 238,098 |
| Federation | 16,443 | 1,727,455 | 935,295 | 2,662,750 |

*includes primary and secondary schools, teacher training colleges and technical and vocational schools.

Source - Adapted from Otoni Nduka, **Western Education and the Nigeria cultural Background,** Ibadan, OUP, 1964, P127 table V.


Fig. 4.1 Zaria 1904
Gunda
Dandamissa
Kotonkori
Zakadi
Lokoro
Sabi
R. Shika
Camp
Danduwa
Villages
0
5
miles
Tukur Gate
Daka Gate
Fort
Res.
200
Bai Gate
Jatau Gate
ZARIA
Gala Gate
Kuyembana Gate
Gayam Gate
Ato Gate
Ralin Aski
Kinbat a

## 4.04 COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIONN IN ZARIA

1900 was a major phase in the process of colonial urbanization in Nigeria particularly in the Northern part. This period however constituted an important dividing date between the periods of urban growth or development as distinguished from the previous traditional urbanization or the process of State formation in the area treated in the previous chapter.

The development of the site of Zaria as a colonial urban areas was facilitated by its morphological changes in the urbanization process, particularly in its strategic and central location, climatic condition as well as its topography. It should be recalled that as the capital of the Zazzau kingdom, the location of Zaria continued to stimulate further growth in and around the area. It thus played an important and principal role in connecting or linking other principal economic and political centers particularly during the trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic trades. Apart from serving as a principal market center, important commodities and services were obtained especially since the establishment of the Sokoto caliphate in 1807.


Birnin Zaria was overrun and taken over by the colonial forces in February 1900. The surrender of the city was accepted at the Kofar Gayan (one of the major entrance gates of the walled city) open space.(See Figure 4.2). In 1901 however, the Sarkin Zazzau was reported to have requested the British colonial regime to send in troops to protect the city and environs from the external attacks the kingdom was faced with during that period.

Hence, a detachment of the West African Frontier Forces (WAFF) was immediately stationed and by March 1901 the province of Zaria was established with a colonial Government Station added to the WAFF camp. In 1904, a newly built cart road linked Zaria with Zungeru, the

Figure 4.4

# ZARIA TOWNSHIP PROPOSAL, PLAN 'C'

1926, with 1927 Revisions




Source: K 874, Vol. I, Layout of Zaria Township.

RBM

Figure 4.5




ZARIA TOWNSHIP PROPOSAL, PLAN 'D'
1927, with 1932 Revisions
Kabama Stream
Zabi Zabi Village
Proposed Site for WAFF Barracks
Building Free Zone
PROPOSED E.R.A.
Building Free Zone
Bindare Stream
N
Police
Prison
Boundary
RAILWAY
Township Boundary
Supreme Court Boundary
COMMERCE and RESIDENCE
Race Course
Native reservation
Township Boundary
B.C.G.A.
Old commercial area
Railway
Nigerian
River
Kubanni
1000 0 1000 2000 3000
Feet
Tudun Wada
Source: Zaria Plan No. A. 4695, June 1927, Survey Dep't., Kaduna.
RBM

Figure 4.3

# ZARIA TOWNSHIP PROPOSAL, PLAN 'A'

**1914, with 1918 Revisions**




Source: Plan A 175 (17-2-14) with revisions to 1918, Survey Dep't., Kaduna.

proposed capital of Northern Nigeria. Furthermore, a telephone wire passed through Zaria to link Kano and Bauchi with the Northern capital in the same year (1904) However, a barrack for the mounted troops was established.(See proposed Township Plans for Zaria-Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6)

The British colonial urban policy in Northern Nigeria was greatly influenced by its traditional policy of 'indirect rule' system. In theory the native political, administrative and governmental bodies were relatively left more or less untouched but under close supervision of the colonial watchful eyes through its paraphernalia of officials. In 1906, Lugard, the British High Commissioner, chose the site of Zaria and designated it as a provincial Headquarters after due consultations with his Principal officers (Medical officer, Director of public works, the Resident and the Military officers of the Government station). Under this circumstance, the attention of all the officers of the Zaria colonial government station was drawn so as to improve the conditions of the station as well as maximize all advantages to be derived therefrom.[57]

The initial infrastructure provided for further urbanization process of the town continued unabated. The Government station was modified as the Government Reservation Areas (GRAs) to serve further requirements or needs of the European settlers.(See figures 4.3, 4.4, 4,5, 4.6). However, the structures that accompanied the modification of the Government Station in Zaria were the construction of the race course and polo ground, the Residency or Government Lodge the Provincial Office, the Circular Road buildings for important colonial officers.[58] For many years, during the colonial administration, all colonial physical development for residential quarters for its officials in Zaria urban area were sited within the race course-circular road-government lodge axis.[59] (See Figures 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6).

Hence the urban areas that emerged after 1900 are the products of the colonial urban development policy, consequent upon the colonial economic reorientation for economic growth and the introduction of the colonial infrastructural development up to the 1950s. After 1900, however, initial colonial policy on urbanization had changed in certain circumstances. Thus, completely new settlements were either economically or administratively (Politically) chosen and developed as urban areas from their hamlet or small village statuses.[60]

The economic considerations were essentially in areas of mineral producing areas with a view to opening up the area for effective exploitation. Jos provides a good example. On the administrative consideration efforts of the colonial regime were concentrated at locating a comfortable or suitable center. The center would therefore serve as an easier means of accessibility to the hinterland from all directions as well as a means of effective control. Thus, Kaduna, administratively served this purpose. Thus, both Jos and Kaduna developed entirely out of "a colonial colliery"[61] since they were founded to support the purposes for which they were created.[62]

Urban settlements were sited and developed during colonial period through the enactment of laws, directives, guidelines and memoranda. For example, one of the early laws in Northern Nigeria dealing with this aspect of urbanization process was essentially directed at taking care of the safety of the colonial officials in terms of public health. Lugard, in his First Annual Report of Northern Nigeria states that:


> *... the policy shall be gradually to move the native town six or seven miles downstream and so do away with pollution of the water and other evils such as the proximity of a haven for thieves and prostitutes, the infection of mosquitoes with malarial germs, and the insanitary condition inevitable around a large native town.*[63]

This perhaps explains why in 1903 the British military camp in Zaria was moved further north of River kubanni while the Government station finally completed its movement in the same direction in 1905.[64] Whereas the 1904 Cantonment Proclamation NO 28 brought out clearly the legal background of the Northern Nigerian municipal regulations.[65] In it, Lugard elaborated the two segments of the cantonment as that consisting of government station and the native quarter.[66]

The design in this set up was to separate and segregate the two communities especially with regard to the provision of infrastructure. For instance, the only Africans to reside in the European community were clearly stipulated belonging only to those who were to supply the needs of the cantonment. Thus, this further reflects the social class differentiations and the continuing desire to polarize the community, within the urban set up, into classes and categories. It must be noted that the urban-rural gulf had already been enlarged in all angles. However, the need or desire for physical segregation and separation between the European and native quarters was further buttressed by Lugard when he wrote that:

> *The first object of non-residential area is to separate Europeans, so that they should not be exposed to the attacks of mosquitoes which have become infected with germs of malaria and yellow fever, by preying on Natives and especially Native children, whose blood so often contains those germs. It is also valuable as to safeguard against bush fires and those which are so common in the native quarters, especially in the dry season in the Northern provinces. Finally, it removes the inconvenience felt by Europeans, whose rest is disturbed by drumming and other noises dear to the Natives.*[67]

Further provision of infrastructure indicated that when the rail line reached Zaria in 1911, the old cart road which linked the city with Zungeru was abandoned. This was however sequel to the Baro-Kano route survey of 1905 which showed that Zaria was an important cotton producing area. Furthermore, another rail line connected Zaria with Jos in 1913.[68] In addition, the report


figure 4.6 ZARIA TOWNSHIP PROPOSAL, PLAN 'E'
1929
Proposed Aerodrome and Parade Ground
Northern boundary to be determined
Proposed European Residential Area
Boundary
Township
Proposed
Free
Building
Zone
Proposed Township Boundary
Proposed Extension
for Railway Corporation (or Industry)
To Be Maintained as Recreation Area for Old E.R.A. & N.R.C. Qtrs
Mixed commercial and residential area
Nigerian Railway Corporation
(Existing or Proposed Lands)
N
Existing European Residential Area
(E.R.A.)
Sabon Gari
B.C.G.A
Existing commercial area
commercial area
Alternative Township Boundary
Proposed Township Boundary
0 1000 2000
Feet
Source: K 874, Vol. II, Layout of Zaria Township.
RBM

by the colonial government stated that Northern Nigeria was, indeed, the best cotton producing area in the entire West African region. The report sparked off a chain of reactions as a number of European commercial interests began to pour into Zaria from 1908 to exploit the resources. Hence, the representatives of the British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) were the first to arrive.

Sequel to this development, the colonial administration established an experimental cotton farm at Maigana. In addition, the BCGA on its own part, established cotton buying stations at other neighboring villages like Soba, while others were established at Fatika, Gimi, Maska etc. However, the BCGA built a cotton processing firm in Zaria in 1911.[69] Furthermore, other British commercial firms subsequently established themselves in and around Zaria.

For instance, the Niger Company built its ware house near the BCGA in 1911.[70] While John Holt and Company had its own grips around the commercial area. The Niger Company was essentially an export trading firm which dealt with a variety of local products. According to the 1914 Zaria province Annual Report, the Niger Company exported 315 tons of hides, 243 tons of sheanuts, 112 tons of ground nuts, 14cwt of gutta percha, 118 lbs of beeswax, 10cwt of skins and 8cwt of cotton.[71]

Under the Lugadian design, the Zaria commercial area, within the European location, was mainly occupied by British and German trading firms. By 1918 however, 21 more commercial firms, in addition to the BCGA, the British Bank for West Africa (1912), the colonial Bank (Backlay's Bank) and two African trading companies. Lebanese later joined the race while in the 1950s several other firms were established in the area.(See figure 4.7)





figure 4.7

ZARIA TOWNSHIP
COMMERCIAL AREA

Source: Base, Zaria T.P.O. 248, 1:4800, 1953 (with additions), Survey Dep't., Kaduna.

Another important firm in the commercial area was the Nigerian Tobacco Corporation (NTC) which in 1958 was a factory north of the Gusau rail line. However, the land reserved for railway extension in 1928 was in 1955 converted to a light industrial estate. Consequently the NTC provided the

> *...siding of the Nigerian Regional Development Funds for the roads and the Northern Nigerian Marketing Board sheds for storing cotton lint.*[72]

Furthermore, the industrial estate now consists of Northern Nigerian Development Corporations Oil Mills, the Northern Oil seeds processing Development, the Northern Nigerian Marketing Board's groundnut storage pyramid, John Halt Agricultural Engineers Ltd, Zazzau Textiles Ltd, British Petroleum Storage Tanks, and A.J. Seward (Nig) Ltd's Cosmetic Factory.[73]

The establishment of the railway, trading firms and the cotton processing firm required the composite establishment of facilities essential to facilitate in carrying out their activities. Furthermore, all these establishments invariably attracted African laborers from many parts of the colony. Hence, by 1910 there were several distinct groups living in Zaria near the Government Station engaged in a variety of activities. Hence, the origin of Sabo Gari (New Town) Zaria, as contained in the Zaria Half-yearly Report NO66 1914 by the Resident H.S Goldsmith, as an agglomeration of different ethnic groups is as follows:

> *...when the railway was approaching Zaria (Governor) Sir Hesketh Bell directed that a properly planned native town should be surveyed for the occupation of the railway labours and petty traders using construction camps on line. At that time there was no native settlement nearer Government Station than Zaria town except for the few native built quarters occupied by clerks in Government Service (South of Baro-Kano line, north of Fadama*

> *Kubani). After the construction of the work was completed, the newly planned Sabon Gari was found to be inhabited by numerous natives born in Nigeria by no particular occupation and not employees of Government. Many of them had undoubtedly taken up their residence in this new settlement with the object to evade paying their customary taxes and to escape the properly constituted native authority. To surmount this difficulty, the Sabon Gari was placed under the Native Administration but the experiment of placing a cosmopolitan community such as then existing in Zaria was not a success.*[74]

In addition, the appointment of Sarkin Sabon Gari by the Native Authority in 1930 gave it wider powers through the representative of the Emir. Further role of the NA in Sabon Gari was later accentuated by the establishment of a new Sabon Gari Alkali court in 1932. In 1940 however, the entire Sabon Gari, except the WAFF camp, was completely excised from the Township and placed under the the jurisdiction of the NA.

Thus, the growth of Sabon Gari continued in trade, commerce and construction with high speed. This trend which increasingly attracted more immigrant natives from different parts into the urban area up to the period of world war II. It should however the realized that the Sabon Gari settlement was essentially designed and characterized by its foreign character. Even its near-by villages possess such characteristics. In 1958 however, it was estimated that the population of Hausa/Fulani in the area was about 40 percent. In addition, the character of the Sabon Gari as initially constituted is still that of a 'strangers' town with which the rest of the old colonial Township is a different world from Birnin Zaria.[75]

The colonial urban Zaria had encompassed important structures and designs which befitted its status at the time. In 1910, Hesketh Bell's plan to enlarge the colonial settlement was realized when the request to layout the new town and improve facilities was approved and began to take

effect. All these were designed to carry out Bell's vision of Zaria's future as the capital of Northern Nigeria.[76] In 1912 Governor Hesketh Bell, recommended to the colonial imperial government to make Zaria the capital of Northern Nigeria.[77]

It must be realized at this juncture that the basic patterns for the British urban structure were designed and developed from 1904 to 1914 when the Government station, military post, railway, commercial firms Sabon Gari and other important infrastructural elements were established. Invariably, when the Baro-Minna-Zaria -Kano rail line was opened in 1912 the North-South rail line from lagos was also connected with Minna end to join the Northern line. In addition, the Gusau rail line from Zaria was constructed in 1926 while the railway junction was also expanded.

In the 1920s however, the road constructions that had taken place complemented that of the rail line constructions. Another important infrastructure was a telegraphic line which passed through Zaria and connected Kano and Bauchi with Zungeru. All these made Zaria an important route center linking many parts of the country up to the sea port. Important agricultural and other economic bases of Zaria's hinterland were thus opened up.


Even though colonialism affected the inland water ways' means of transportation and economic activities in terms of trade and commerce which had flourished in pre-colonial periods in those areas, it is noteworthy to recognize that the road and rail transportation flourished equally the growth of the areas which were passed through them and thus became major export or producing areas.[78]

All these triggered off the immigration of people from different part of Northern Nigeria and even Southern part to converge and reside in the area. All these were partly due to the opportunities available. It also served as an economic center where establishment of new residential areas in the city and suburbs outside the city wall were provided for. Zaria thus transformed more as a new commercial, educational, residential and industrial area. Thus, Sabon Gari and Tudun Wada and the railway station accentuated this urbanization process which in essence accorded the area with twin statuses of urban description - the old and the new center.(See Figures 4.8,4.9)

It should be noted that segregation and separation of the township was the strategic policy of the colonial regime. The township was clearly separated and segregated to satisfy the European locational area with an objective to complying with the Township Ordinance. Thus, the township emerged out of the Lugardian plan to achieve the colonial objectives. Hence by 1906 when Lugard left the colony, the major characteristics of the colonial town were already established and functional elements specified.[79]

Zaria continuously became important as a center of Northern Nigeria with the establishment of many other infrastructure. Hence, in 1915 Zaria became the headquarters for Agricultural Development. In 1916 it was also designated as the headquarters for the Northern section of the Public Works Department while in 1917 it became a center for the veterinary Department and in the following year (1918) it was made a major camp of WAFF. It was expressed that these institutions

> *...along with the railways, provincial headquarters and commercial firms made Zaria the major administrative center of Northern Nigeria rivalled only by the new capital city of Kaduna and the commercial center of Kano.*[80]





source; aerial photographs

When Lugard returned to Nigeria in 1914 as the Governor - General, he reversed the Bell's design for Zaria township. Lugard thus reversed the layout for Zaria which were all incorporated in the Township Regulation of 1917 and Lugard's **Instruction to Political and Other Officers... of 1918.** Hence, Lugard's return to Nigeria was designed to amalgamate both the Northern and Southern protectorates into one country.

In the 1917 Township Ordinance for example, the terms 'Government station' and 'cantonment' were abrogated and in their places, 'Township' and 'urban District' were put in use. Townships were thus categorized into three with their respective municipal responsibilities.[81] The only first class Township in the country was Lagos until Port Harcourt was so designated in 1948. By 1919 and in accordance with the 1917 Township Ordinance in Northern Nigeria, only Zaria, Kaduna and Jos were designated second class Township.[82] In addition, Zaria had previously developed as a major center of Islamic education, popularly referred to as the fountain of knowledge.

Hence, the Lugardian design for the 1914 Zaria Township was to bring together all separate units under a single platform as the this framework indicates. Thus

> *The policy governing the setting up of Township was to provide trading plots and siding facilities for European an Non-European Merchants, to provide building plots for permanent employees of Government,the Trading firms, native shop keepers and native foreigners of African descent, to collect rents, levy rates and consultancy fees and generally administer the Township on European line. The cantonment proclamation was applied to the Township (April 1914) and the native community not coming under the above category were to be compensated and expropriated and removed to a new settlement (Tudun Wada) situated within the jurisdiction of the Emir of Zaria and subject to native courts.*[83]



Figure 4.9
ZARIA
LINKS of the URBAN LANDSCAPE
to Sokoto
to Kano
SAMARU
AHMADU BELLO
UNIVERSITY
N
Air port
Industrial Park
SABON GARI
TOWNSHIP
Army
Major Highways
Local Roads and Streets
Gaskiya
TUDUN WADA
to Jos
Wusasa
Palace
BIRNIN ZARIA
Market
to Kaduna
1 ½ 0 1 2
Miles

It should be recalled that Kaduna town was founded in 1917 as an administrative center of Northern Nigeria. With the rail line going across the town, with major road and river junctions, good climatic, topographical and agricultural conditions all combined together help to explain its urban growth and development. The continuous rapid growth of Kaduna urban area, sequel to the colonial attention given to it, and further subsequent attention since 1960, continued to dwarf the growth and development of urban Zaria particularly with regard to the infrastructural facilities put in place. The only advantage Zaria has had was the emphasis placed on the area, not by design, was the siting and provision of modern educational institutions and thus making the town as an educational center.

From 1945, some towns that were created or evolved by the colonial government since 1900 had suffered some stagnation and decline while others prospered and developed largely as a result of some form of decentralization policy adopted by the colonial regime through the creation of provinces, divisions, districts etc. On economic and transportational facilities, Kaduna was very much advantageous which thus resulted in the rapid urbanization of the town. Notwithstanding, there has been considerable urban problems which corresponded to time and space and thus manifested in economic circumstances and resulted in an unprecedented rural-urban drain. The swelling population in the urban areas is usually characterized or stimulated by the glittering infrastructure provided.

> *For the growing towns founded after 1900, the planning problems have arisen because of the site and size of their administrative urban limits, their internal structure and character when they were founded and their rapid outward sprawl and the conflicts on the urban-rural fringe. These sources of trouble have, in addition, led to the intensification of congestion and slums, deterioration, ghetto development and the establishment of an urban-rural fringe.*[84]

fig · 4·10 ZARIA TOWNSHIP 1966





SOURCE: NIGERIAN NATIONAL SURVEY, KADUNA ZARIA 1:12'500

0 1000 2000 3000 4000

FEET

Urbanized areas are vastly surrounded by rural areas. Thus the creation of satellite rural areas on the fringes of the urban areas is an endemic feature of all urban settlements in Nigeria. These areas constitute the bulk of the supply of the cheap and abundant supply of labor. They are thus susceptible and constantly harassed by the infinite propensity of the urban enlargements. (See figures 4.10, 4.11). These could be in the areas of increasing industrial, commercial, administrative and other growing need for more residential plots. These are caused largely by the over-swelling population as many immigrants continued to troop into the town for employment, criminal activities and other varied reasons.

This outward growth or expansion of urbanized areas into the immediate rural communities since 1900 has had its own attendant consequences for both the urban and rural areas. For instance, land and building speculators as well as the activities of the land lords have completely turned the entire enterprise into a process reminiscent to the primitive accumulation. All these have therefore constituted the major or fundamental backbone problems of rural areas and any strategy to develop them must take due cognisance to the colonial debilitating urban policy and the subsequent urbanization processes.


figure 4.11
ZARIA - URBAN LANDSCAPES
1975
SAMARU - AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY AREA
ZARIA TOWN
TUDUN WADA
BIRNIN ZARIA
Traditional residential area
Modern residential area
Elite government residential area
Staff government residential area
Commercial and industrial areas
Public office and institutional areas
N
0 1/2 1 2 3
Miles
RBM

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# PART THREE
# CHAPTER FIVE

## 5.00 PERSPECTIVES ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

> *...the problem of this country is not the lack of excellent Policy Objectives and Strategies and well conceptualized and articulated Programmes (of rural development) but our inability to convert these into concrete reality for the benefit of the great majority.*[1]

## 5.01 INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is predominantly a rural environment. Thus, the socio-economic and political circumstances and influences surrounding the Nigeria's countryside present a rather chronic albeit with alarming or threatening situation. Discussions on the perspective of Nigeria's rural malaise and the critique of the State Policies and strategies, designed to alleviate the rural society from socio-economic quagmire, concentrate more on the secondary than the primary issues.

Thus, items contained within the matrix of the objectives of rural development are wide. These objectives consist of the totality of human needs required for a meaningful or purposeful existence. Therefore, the concept of rural development, as used by all the levels of the governmental and non-governmental organisations or agencies, is always portrayed and designed to concretize efforts to increase and transform the socio-economic conditions, productivity and per capita incomes of the targeted rural population.

The central issue is therefore to develop the rural poor from their socio-economic and physical condition of existence. To achieve this goal, there is the undisputed need for increased involvement of the rural poor to directly participate in the provision of amenities as well as the affairs that affect their existence. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

(UNECA), for example, emphasizes that rural development must be understood and strategized within 'an integrated milieu' geared towards raising and sustaining enhanced condition of living of the inhabitants of rural areas.[2]

In essence, rural development is expected to bring about not only changes in productivity and incomes of the rural populace but at the same time transform their social attitudes in a well coordinated set of policy orientations and projects. It also implies that the rural populace acquisition of the science of their environment will replace the old dependent attitude on government for social services. Hence, sequel to the increased consciousness, zeal and ability of the rural inhabitants to influence, challenge or even force changes in their environment, the State must assiduously cultivate the habit of involving them in the affairs that affect them.

The tragedy of rural development in Nigeria is that rural areas are taken as given and therefore not understood or accepted on their peculiarities or the extent of their ruralness. This partly exaplins the State application of general and blanket solution, with a huge amount of funds, infrastructures etc to address completely non-material and non-financial local problems. Thus, World Bank's conception of externally derived and imposed strategies have not helped even to understand the issue let alone apply appropriate solution despite huge finances involved.

The World Bank's solution of removing traditionalism for modernization (Westernization) with a belief that traditionalism impedes development is catastrophic. Since rural development has demonstratively shown that it cannot be imposed from outside, based on the fact that when the programs took off with funds from outside, it only remains imagined that some thing is being achieved. Therefore, whenever the funding stops the images of rural development automatically ceases and vividly unfolds to its barest realities.

## 5.02 APPROACHES TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT

National Development Planning in Nigeria dates back to 1946 when the ten year (1946-1955) plan for Development and Welfare for Nigeria was launched by the colonial regime. The plan was terminated when a revised edition of the plan (1951-1956) appeared. The plan was designed essentially to, **inter alia,** guide the allocation of development and welfare funds in the country; oriented towards educational, health, water supplies, transport and communication sectors. It is therefore illuminating to note that the problems which the plan highlighted ranged from environmental congestion to the lack of planning in the towns and emerging cities as expressed, thus:

> *... there is scarcely a town in Nigeria that is not in very serious need of replanning and the further laying out of further extension... In the villages, the situation is usually just as bad, the people generally have not yet* ***appreciated the value of orderly planning and properly considered layouts.3*** *(emphasis added)*

It was not, therefore, until the Third Development Plan that an explicit recognition was made on "issues of disparities existing between rural and urban areas in particular as well as the general levels of development with a view to providing and bridging in the gaps through the urban and regional planning instruments.[4] For urban planning therefore, the inadequate planning and urban infrastructure became the issues of development policy. They are those primarily designed to meet the needs of integrated rural development. However, the Federal Government placed more emphasis, as a policy, to develop cities and integrate them with rural community in a form of the trickle-down strategy.[5]

It must be recognized that the character of the Nigerian development policy has consistently and remarkably been tailored and pursued towards a sharp urban bias. Prior to the boom in the mid 1970s, the transfer of resources from the rural economy to develop urban areas was

western socio-economic and political traditions. Invariably, the conditions of the peasantry or rural communities, in recent years, have consistently worsen or deteriorated as more and more Rural Development Programs and strategies have been unfolded.

Approaches to Rural Development have, over time and space, varied and consequently produced different results. But despite huge financial expenses and arduous struggles for social and economic development in Nigeria during the last three decades, Rural Development strategies pursued or adopted have been inappropriate, irrelevant to the environment and needs of the people, misdirected and misplaced.[9] Thus, the solutions to the problems of unemployment, land pressures, equitable income distribution and the improvement of the living conditions of the poorest strata of the people have been lamentably unmet; leading to further and aggravated problem of poverty, pauperization, inequality as well as the creation of a new breed of 'peasantariat'.

To achieve a realistic range of Rural Development strategy, there is a great need to develop practical and workable objectives that take into cognizance of all the forces and factors that militate against it. Until quite recently, Rural Development had been perceived as a strategy mainly related to agricultural productivity and primarily tied to economic growth.[10] In other words, increased agricultural productivity by itself would solve problems of rural communities and their inhabitants. For example, the establishment of Maigana farm center and the siting of the headquarters of the ADP in the village were probably designed to address such issues.

Other earlier misconceptions of Rural Development were embedded in the promotion of investment ratio, setting up of import substitution industries, expansion of education etc. But

it was soon realized that there are a number of countries that had attained rapid economic growth without a corresponding increase in the condition of living of the majority of the people[11] as the number of rural populace that has remained or dropped below the poverty line is incessant, endemic and elastic.

In essence, there is a need to have a long range Rural Development goal which is synonymous with complete transformation of the entire social and economic institutions, relations and processes of production. This is a goal that connotes Rural Development not necessarily and simply as an agricultural and economic growth **per se** but a complete and continuous social and economic progress with an equitable distribution of resources and incomes for generating new productive ventures as well as wide-spread improvements in health, nutrition, housing with a broadened social relationship and harmony[12]. Hence, the United Nations Agency for Social and economic Development posits that:

> *rural development is the quantitative change or upliftment in the standard of people in the rural areas, brought about through integrated approach, by both governmental and non-governmental agencies and the people themselves.*[13]

The integrated approach to Rural Development suggests some multi-sectoral efforts by the State which involve the provision of infrastructural facilities like roads, dams, schools, electricity etc, introduction of new techniques, establishment of banks and other service agencies as well as organizing and mobilizing people for productive activities.

In essence, three basic strategies of Rural Development have been suggested and tried in many countries and in between them there exist different mixtures. These strategies, according to Griffin (1974), are (a) technocratic, (b) reformist and (c) radical.[14] The objective of the first strategy is to increase agricultural output within the framework of capitalist ideology. In this

strategy, competition within the free market enterprise with a widely dispersed and guaranteed private property are some of the vital and sufficient conditions for achieving the objective.[15] The beneficiaries of this strategy are primarily the land owing elites, bourgeoisie and international agribusiness. Those that pursue this strategy are mostly the under-developed countries.

The reformist strategy aims at redistributing income and increasing agricultural output. The basic ideology here is nationalistic and populist while the major beneficiaries are the middle peasants, 'progressive' farmers and international agribusiness. The eclectic assumption of this option is the fallacy of borrowing certain policies in other countries that are alleged to have been successful. Reformist governments, more often that not, vacillate in their policy options with a lot of inconsistencies and confusion between what they proclaim and what they actually do.[16]

The third strategy is the radical approach with socialist outlook. Its objective is a complete social change, redistribution of political power and factors of production. Essentially, the major beneficiaries are the small peasants and landless laborers. Since this strategy emphasizes on equality of opportunities and collective ownership of the means of production, it therefore aims at rapid economic progress and a more equitable distribution of income and elimination of absolute poverty.

In other mixtures, the approach to rural development is basically socialistic but

> *blended with some political and institutional innovations which permit semi-socialist ownership, some scope for private ownership and a greater freedom of mobility and occupation.*[17]

Others are however based on the eclecticism of technocratic and reformist strategies. However, there is no country that can be rigidly placed on one of the three categories. In other words,

there is no definite and standardized path to Rural Development for all even within the same country, since rural areas differ greatly in their historical background, natural resource endowments; culture, religion, social relation, political structures,etc.

It should however be noted that rural development strategies and their several variations pursued by several countries have inevitably produced ad-mixtures with mixed results. Some have been successful while many others including Nigeria have woefully failed. The failures in these countries are well established. Thus there exists no universal criteria to determine the course, objectives and the result of development. The failures in these countries are therefore not unconnected with the political will of the leadership, the nature of the economy and the class struggle therein.[18]

## 5.03 NIGERIA'S APPROACH TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT

The Integrated Rural Development (IRD) approach was officially introduced in Nigeria during the Third National Development Plan, 1975-1980. It was regarded, within the official circles, as an entirely 'new dimension' to Rural Development and constituting a multi-dimensional, multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral approach which is deeply rooted in the understanding of the realities of the rural life. This approach had come to operate under the auspices of Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) sponsored by the World Bank which brings about a set of programs ostensibly to improve the lots of the rural folks.

The primary conception of the IRD is embedded in the assumption that economic growth and improvement of productive process are means towards socio-economic development. The central focus of this approach is people and their social and physical environments. Thus, people have

to actively participate in the social, political and economic affairs that affect them through community development efforts. In essence, the main features of Integrated Rural Development indicate that: the primary target for identification is the rural poor, the objectives of the program range from agricultural productivity, equitable distribution of income to agrarian reform, popular peoples' participation and employments. Other features include the holistic conceptualization of development as well as the recognition of local initiatives to expand the scope of the program.

Nigeria has had a number of programs promulgated by various regimes for Rural Development. These programs have however become more pronounced, than all the previous regimes combined together, under the Babangida administration. But notwithstanding, there has been a noticeable, though symbolic, shift of government perceptive views on Rural Development. Recent government pronouncements on the issue show that it is not only rhetorically inclined but at the same time financially committed to the programs.

Since 1962, Nigeria has spent (and is still spending) billions of Naira toward execution of the five National Development Plans in various development programs. But within three decades of political independence, the conditions of rural communities, who constitute over 80 percent of the population, have virtually deteriorated. These events could partly be explained on the structural defects contained in the development plans, especially with regard to the allocation of the highest percentage of the resources to a very tiny stratum of the population and thereby constituting a serious diabolical situation of the Nigerian State and economy. The authors and implementors of these plans have completely misconceived what development entails, except that which suggests the physical erections of structures, building of institutions and the likes.

The attainment of political independence since 1960 has not changed the pursuance of development policies and strategies of the Nigerian State by those who inherited the political apparatuses. Since the political and economic structures inherited at independence had not been smashed, the policies and strategies adopted are bound to be in conformity with an already established order.

The adopted neo-classical approaches to development are basically rooted in the Rostowian theory of 'short-cut' path to development with Gross Domestic Product (GNP) or income per capita as the guiding principles.[19] The general approach, during the last two or three decades, was to establish import-substitution industries in the urban centers so that profits realized would 'trickle down' to the rural areas. This Rostowian - cum - Industrial and technological determinist theory has not served any useful purpose for the rural sectors or the State as a whole. Unfortunately, rural life has deteriorated because each plan period or at least an annual budget has only come to create a lot of unfulfilled promises.

During the first plan period, 1962-1968, Nigeria's priority was in agriculture with about 14 percent budgetary allocation.[20] During this period, agricultural productivity was considered synonymous with Rural Development. Therefore, the State and agriculture in the post-colonial Nigeria cannot be separated from colonialism, but as an integral, connected and extended policy. Peasant farmers, during that period, were further squeezed to produce cash crops, at the expense of the subsistence crops, for export. This essentially reinforced the dependency and neo-colonial position of Nigerian State on International capital. It should be noted that the prevalence of urban unemployment was not a serious problem during the 1950s but had become an incessant and endemic one by 1962 and multiplied in folds by later years.

By the end of the first two decades of independence, agricultural productivity has suffered a lot neglect resulting in an enormous downward trend in production[21] in both food and cash crops. This was as a result of the myopic policies adopted by the State which deliberately squeezed the peasant farmers through the activities of the Marketing Boards.[22]

It should be observed that agricultural products constituted about 80 percent of the total value of exports in 1960. This position dropped to six percent by 1980. The sector also contributed 53 percent of the GDP in 1965 but dropped to 27 percent by 1985.[23] This decline was due partly to the spectacular increase in the production of petroleum as well as the poor state of affairs in the agricultural sector which have become compounded, in recent years, as a result of the erratic situation in the petroleum sector.

The second development plan, 1970-1974, objectively aims at achieving a just and egalitarian society.[24] The plan therefore places a high premium on reducing the degree of inequality among the social classes and between urban and rural areas. This was the period that witnessed an astronomical increase of foreign earnings realized through the oil revenues. Attendant social and economic problems subsequently followed especially the rural-urban (peasant) migration. This event contributed to a very high reduction of the number of agricultural producers and a simultaneous increase of the urban consumers.

It should be emphasized that during the early years of 1970s, immediately after the civil war, agricultural sector became characterized with crisis which became more compounded and complicated as a result of the devastating drought that affected the northern part of the country. Similarly, it was during this period that the phenomenal oil 'boom' was witnessed. This was

the period when the oil sector remarkably overtook agricultural productivity in foreign earnings. Hence, huge import of food characterized the State activity and agriculture, the main stay of the economy, was relegated.

From 1975 to 1980 Nigeria executed its third development plan. During this period, attempts by the Nigerian State to engage on what it calls Integrated Rural Development (IRD) commenced. This generally refers to the Agricultural Development Projects sponsored by the World Bank. A colossal sum of money has been sunk in these projects but the condition of life in rural areas has not changed for the better (see Table 5.2 below). During this period however, the country resorted to the pathetic importation of food. (See Table 5.3).

In 1976 while intiating the strategy for Integrated Rural development, the Nigerian State established a Department of Rural development. This Department was charged with responsibility of monitoring and coordinating the progress of the five pilot Integrated Agricultural Development Projects in Funtua, Gusau, Gombe, Ayangba and Lafiya. With additional two projects at Bida and Ilorin in 1979 and 1980 respectively, the Department was saddled with more responsibilities, particularly in area of coverage. Furthermore, with the completion of more projects in Oyo, Ekiti-Akoko and Egbodo, the projects, with amazing speed, became nationwide with every state boasting of at least one agricultural project.

With their highly capital intensive nature, the projects are jointly funded by the World Bank on the one hand and the Federal and State Governments on the other but with a very heavy reliance on the World Bank Loans. Table 5.1 shows the expenditure and sources of funds of some of the World Bank sponsored projects in Nigeria, from inception to 1978.

## TABLE 5.1
## EXPENDITURE AND SOURCE OF SOME AGRICULTRUAL PROJECTS TO MARCH 1978 (N'000)

| | APMEPU | AYANGBA | FUNTUA | GOMBE | GUSAU | LAFIA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Expenditure Naregin 1978 | 1,158 | 1,360 | 26,046 | 14,998 | 21,400 | 804 |
| Date of Commencement | June'75 | Nov.'77 | Nov.'74 | June'75 | Nov.'74 | Nov'77 |
| **Sources of funds** | | | | | | |
| State Government | - | 550 | 7,452 | 6,226 | 6,500 | 1,000 |
| Federal Government | 728 | 667 | 4,127 | 3,610 | 4,500 | 640 |
| IBRD Loan | 408 | 150 | 12,105 | 6,556 | 9,000 | 20 |
| Miscelleneous | - | - | 34 | 26 | 300 | 6 |
| Total | 1,190 | 1,377 | 23,998 | 16,318 | 20,300 | 1,666 |
| Total Planned Exp. | 6,200 | 63,941 | 30,000 | 30,751 | 30,600 | 52,500 |
| Total IBRD Loan | 3,100 | 19,100 | 19,000 | 13,000 | 13,125 | 16,600 |

Source: Integrated Rural Development Project Nigeria, 1978, Department of Rural Development, Lagos.

It can be observed in Table 5.1 that the strategy is to attract huge influxes of external resources to finance the agricultural and rural development in Nigeria. With the Loans obtained from the world Bank, the economic development envisaged is put to a very serious question. The influxes of international capital have only provide a conducive atmosphere for the foreign banks and transtional corporations to assult further structural dependency and under-development on the Nigeria economy.

With over 900,000 hectres of land cultivated in the pilot project areas, the focus was primarily on agriculture with no room for non-agricultural occupations. Thus, peasant farmers in the affected areas were violently expose to all sorts of agricultural techniqes or machinery not easily adaptable, conceiveable and acceptable over night. With no corresponding services ostensibly inserted as part of the rural development package, the situation becomes even worse.

Within the perspective approach to rural development in Nigeria, we must not ignore the continuing wastes that have always featured in the conflict of authority and institutional duplications inherent in the strategies; particularly on Nigeria's renewed emphasis on agricultural development. Thus, all the agricultural projects introduced in the country have reamined uncoordinated and irrelevant to the bulk of rural population and consequently disastrous to the economy as a whole. For instance, Ministries of Agriculture, ADPs, RBDs, National Seeds Services, DFRRI, NDE, Research Institutes etc, stand on their own, duplicated and in direct conflict with each other. They therefore became only extensions of the State bureaucracies used to siphon material resources in the name of rural development. They thus turned out to be not more than national revenue sharing projects with all states scrambling for funds from Federal Government and International finance agencies.

During the period of oil glut, when petroleum could not attract as high foreign exchange as before, it became clear that agricultural and food crisis was imminent. Thus international markets forced Nigeria's economic capacity from further financing food importation and other capital intensive agricultural machinery and inputs as previously done. Therefore some of the factors that contributed to the low agricultural productivity and concomitant food deficiencies have stimulated an array of policies to 'arrest' the situation.

The State policies or strategies have been exemplified and oriented towards romance with and promotion of capitalist relations of production in the rural areas. This was achieved by creating a new sub-class of 'kulak' farmers on the one hand and the pauperization of the rural peasant farmers on the other.

## TABLE 5.2

## SOME AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 1975-1984

| S/NO | YEAR | LOCATION | PROJECT | BANK LOAN | TOTAL COST |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | 1975 | Imo | Oil Palm | $ 19.0m | $ 37.5m |
| 2. | 1979 | Niger | ADP | 23.0m | 64.4m |
| 3. | 1979 | Kwara | ADP | 27.0m | 64.4m |
| 4. | 1979 | Kwara | ARMTI | 09.0m | 18.2m |
| 5. | 1979 | Ogun, Ondo, Anambra Fed. Govt. | Forestry | 31.0m | 79.3m |
| 6. | 1980 | Oyo | ADP | 28.0m | 69.4m |
| 7. | 1981 | Bauchi | ADP | 132.0m | 350.6m |
| 8. | 1981 | Kano | ADP | 142.0m | 482.2m |
| 9. | 1981 | Ibadan, Kaduna, Enugu, Benin, Jos | ATAP | - | 120.1m |
| 10. | 1982 | Sokoto | ADP | 147.0m | 498.7m |
| 11. | 1984 | Nationwide | Fertilizer import | 250.0m | 832.4m |
| 12. | 1984 | Kaduna | ADP | 122.0m | 194.0m |
| | | | Total= | $930.0m | $2,813.2m |

**Source-** African Farming-September/October 1986, Adopted with modifications, from L.A. Ega **et'al, Developing Rural Nigeria: Problems and Prospects,** 1989, pp. 28-32.

**TABLE 5.3.**
**FOOD IMPORTATION IN NIGERIA, 1970-1989**
(Value and percentage share of total imports)

| YEAR | REVENUE FROM PETROLEUM EXPORT (₦ MILLION) | TOTALIMPORTS (₦ MILLION) | FOOD IMPORTS (₦ MILLION) | PERCENTAGE SHARE OF FOOD IMPORTS OF TOTAL IMPORTS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1970 | 510.0 | 756.4 | 57.7 | 7.6 |
| 1971 | 953.0 | 1,079.9 | 87.9 | 8.1 |
| 1972 | 1,176.2 | 990.1 | 95.1 | 9.6 |
| 1973 | 1,893.5 | 1,224.8 | 126.3 | 10.3 |
| 1974 | 5,365.7 | 1,737.3 | 155.7 | 8.9 |
| 1975 | 4,563.1 | 3,721.5 | 277.9 | 8.0 |
| 1976 | 6,321.7 | 5,148.5 | 438.7 | 8.5 |
| 1977 | 7,072.3 | 7,093.7 | 702.0 | 10.4 |
| 1978 | 5,401.6 | 8,211.5 | 1,108.7 | 12.4 |
| 1979 | 10,166.8 | 7,472.5 | 1,105.9 | 14.8 |
| 1980 | 13,523.0<br>14,186.7 | 9,658.1 | 1,091.0 | 11.3 |
| 1981 | 11,000.0<br>10,952.1 | 14,000.0 | 2,115.0 | 15.1 |
| 1982 | 10,000.0<br>8,792.1 | 11,400.0 | 896.0 | 7.9 |
| 1983 | 7,502.5 | - | 5,591.04 | - |
| 1984 | 9,088.0 | 4,484.5 | 945.0 | 21.0 |
| 1985 | 11,720.8 | 5,536.9 | 996.3 | 17.99 |
| 1986 | 8,919.2 | 5,973.6 | 926.8 | 15.51 |
| 1987 | 30,360.6 | 15,695.3 | 1,704.2 | 10.85 |
| 1988 | 31,192.8 | - | - | - |
| 1989 | 57,971.2 | 25,177.7 | 1,777,558 | 7.06 |

**Sources:-** (1) CBN (1981) Billions News 6. (2) Federal Office of Statistics (1983), (3) CBN (1984) Bullion Vol. 6., (4) CBN (1990) Economic and Finance Review, Vol. 28 NO.2, June 1990.

It can be observed from Table 5.3 that the total imports for some years have superseded the total revenue from petroleum exports. However, the food imports have generally increased year after year while the percentage share of food imports of the total imports during the years under consideration has been nothing but a catalogue of embarrassments to the entire economy.

However, between 1984 and 1989, the total food imports have been combined with the total animals and vegetable oils imported. It can however be observed that from 1980 to 1982 we made double entries under the petroleum sector perhaps due to certain reviews over time from CBN bullion News to Economic and Financial Review. Notwithstanding, it can be noted that food imports bills have continued to increase probably due to the annual increase in the revenue realized from petroleum.

## 5.04 DRAWBACKS IN RURAL PROGRAMS AND STATE INTERVENTION

Failures of the past or even the current strategies are due largely on a number of factors. Hence, from the colonial era to date, the State-capital alliance, and how this inter-dependent relationship has continued to subject the peasantry, constitute a very serious challenge to Rural Development in many forms and dimensions. Since 1960, for example, the productive output of the peasantry in essential food production has been declining.

This is due not necessarily as a result of the State role but also to the fact that high technology and capital intensive agriculture in Nigeria are inconsistent with the predominant peasant system of production. In other words, since no objective distinction between the existing technology and traditional system of production is made, the imposition of new methods has combined to subject the peasantry to hardships and disarray.

Furthermore, it should be recognized that one of the fundamental defects of planning processes in Nigeria since colonial era has been the relative exornoration of the civil service as well as its orientations towards detailed or comprehensive planning procedures. This act, in part therefore, constituted a crucial debilitating factor in the achievements of rural development objectives.

When Nigerians took over the realm of political leadership, the implications inherent are many and diverse.

In the first place, it meant that a relatively young and inexperienced generation of Nigerians found itself with responsibilities it could not adequately understand, handle or cope with. This was due largely to the built- in structural or institutional mechanisms in socio-economic and political realms. That was why, for instance, the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) always prepared plans with greater expenditures than the available resources could cater for.

In addition, the National Economic Commission was nothing but a body of politicians. Thus, due to the nature of politics, the politicians more often than not, engaged in politically rather than economically inspired and viable projects. These were designed partly to enhance political survival in the respective geo-political roots. Therefore corrupt officials and their clients, coupled with poor economic management and in pursuance of irrelevant and negative policies, have all combined to transcend a very lamentable situation. Hence, any policy designed to effect changes in the financial or monetary system, industrial production as well as role of the State in the entire economy have had a far reaching negative repercussions on the rural economy.

At this juncture, it is imperative to realize that any meaningful achievements in Rural Development strategy can not be measured in terms of growth rate, tons of output of agricultural productivity and number of jobs created. However, we must move from quantitative data to certain social indicators of progress reflected in income distribution, educational and health facilities and equality of opportunity. But it is often of greater significance to go beyond these economic and social indicators and capture the profound change that has created a 'new man' and brought him into harmonious relationship with himself and with other human beings.[25]

In retrospect, it was clear that Rural Development strategies in the last two decades had centered on agricultural productivity. This effort was designed largely due to the fact that agriculture has been the most important economic activity in the Nigerian rural sector. Hence Nigeria's strategy to solve the rural poverty had been embedded in ad hoc and lopsided agricultural extensions, community development, integrated rural development etc. through the injection of international capital under different agencies, both local and international.[26] The main thrust of the strategies was centered on modernization of agricultural technology and inputs.

Despite all these strategies over the years, the country has not been able to feed its teaming population. For a country to feed its population is invariably a spectacular manifestation of progress in Rural Development. Nigeria, over the years, has witnessed a serious decline in grain production. The proportion of the malnourished population is ominously increasing and there is no pursuance of a concrete food security policy except mere rhetoric. In short, if the country were to keep a steady pace with food and agricultural needs for a modest rise in living standards, Nigeria's agricultural production must have substantially increased a higher annual rate than in the last three decades.

Nigeria's widening gap of inequality and dwindling supply of reserve arable land as well as new pressures on further increase of output through higher yields are again compounded by the newly introduced technologies alien to the environment. But since there is an increasing pressure on the available but limited land, further progress on Rural Development is inevitably being challenged due to the excess of the existing labor force brought about by land pressures and the continuous migration of the rural unemployed to the urban centers.

This persistent neglect of the rural areas has therefore produced certain distortions and then challenges the overall Rural Development. Both rural and urban areas have certain degrees of inter-dependence in the entire processes of development and are therefore symbiotic. But the social gap and absolute poverty between the urban and rural population have ominously deepened resulting in not only creating socio-economic but also political tension.[27]

There is a growing emphasis on how the roles of both the State and international capital have combined together to constitute serious drawbacks to Rural Development programs in Nigeria. The crisis in the Nigerian political economy has resulted in the decline in foreign exchange earnings, debt and balance of payment problems which all together make the country more susceptible to capital incursion (both merchant and finance capital through the World Bank). The vibrancy of the penetration of international capital in all the sectors of the economy has assumed a tremendous dimension and given Nigeria a very prominent position among not only the poorest but also the most highly indebted countries.[28]

In retrospect, we shall begin by focusing on the agricultural programs and bringing out the inter-related factors for the declining productive output of the peasantry in terms of the state and agribusiness role in Rural Development. However, the central theme of Rural Development program, particularly that of the Babangida regime is basically on agriculture and the justifications for creating the Agency for Rural Development (ARD) popularly known as the Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI) are that:

> *Since the country's potentials are immense and since the country's major food producers are resident in the rural areas, the Directorate will endeavor to deliberately and consciously use agriculture as the center piece of its rural development programs.*[29]

Nigeria's political system and its ideological inclinations of 'mixed economy' are embedded in materialist factors of the traditional discipline of laissez-faire of Rural development. It is necessary to identify certain key elements and their end results and then explore how these are workable under several strategies pursued in connection with international capital. It is therefore against this framework that an assessment of the programs and their consequences be postulated.

It is already argued that agricultural productivity is not synonymous with Rural development but constitutes a very crucial aspect in achieving it since agriculture is the main stay of the economy and that most of the people are engaged on land. Within the framework of Rural Development, agricultural programs have come to play some prominent roles in the Integrated Rural Development which suggests an interdependence between welfare and productivity especially in the Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs).

As a whole, Nigeria has been engulfed in a galloping chronic food crisis which is compounded by several strategies devised by the State and foreign or international capital. This has invariably affected the State's economic capacity and ability to feed its teaming population. Hence,

> *the accumulation and production needs of capital which bears the type of agricultural policies that are pursued have tendered to constitute major drawbacks to agricultural development and rural infrastructures (and) the capitalist path to agricultural development, while satisfying the short-term, the accumulation needs of capital, necessarily leads to the pauperization of the majority of the peasant producers, it exacerbates rural differentiations and creates new breed of landless peasants.*[30]

Tina Wallace has shown that these government policies tend to be based, essentially on the assumption that increase productivity can be achieved with the newly imported technology under

trained management and teaching farmers to become commercial businessmen. But these government strategies have completely ignored the basic needs of the peasant farmer in terms of food, health, education, accessibility and other infrastructure. Rather, it concentrate predominantly on large scale farmers, sophisticated equipment. These were assumed at the means of enhancing productivity. Thus, the bulk of the farmers are considered 'conservatives' and repugnant to current state to develop.[31]

It is against these chronic problems, among other factors, that the State engages in the interventionist projects in agriculture which inevitably opened the avenue for the capital incursion in the sector in the recent times. These interventionist project include large scale and capital intensive programs in the forms of irrigation schemes, dams, integrated Agricultural Development Projects, River Basin and Rural Development Authorities, Provision of improved inputs and technology. Others include the programs of Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP), Provision of credits through Bank, all of which combined together under the deceived canopy of the Green Revolution rhetoric. The very essence of such projects has been to fulfil certain requirements so as to provide a significant bureaucracy to bridge between outside capital and technology and small producers.[32]

This point is exemplified by the State heavy or absolute reliance it places on consultants, management of agricultural companies and wealthier farmers. Strategies which could increase the ability and capacity of the poorest farmers such as cooperatives of land, labor and marketing, improved rural roads and health etc. have completely received a perfunctory consideration. It

is clear that the State interventionist projects in agriculture advocates and emphasizes increasing capitalist methods of farming over any other alternative which cannot change but compound the food problems and cannot, because it is not intended to, benefit the teaming rural population. All these government projects are thus executed through loans obtained from bilateral and multilateral capitalist agencies.

These strategies invariably were engaged to eagerly and haphazardly embark on highly capital intensive projects in construction and agriculture. However, they were centrally and strategically designed to 'address' the issues concerning ways to raise production of food and encourage the production of import-substitution crops. Hence, this act was characterized by constructing big dams and irrigation canals followed by supportive legislative policies to go hand-in-hand with the programs; for example, the Land Use Decree/Act.

Hence, the consequences of the incursion of capital into Nigerian agricultural sector involves an application of all the projects manifesting in economic, political and social ramifications of the strategy. How then does the international capital find its way into the agricultural sector ? First of all, the nature of the Nigerian State is very much vulnerable to capital incursion. Hence, the State is generally assuming greater responsibility for continued capital accumulation and invariably acting as the sole organizer in agricultural production. The nature of the state therefore determines the organic relationship with the International Finance Institutions.

The major organ of this capital is the World Bank - the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). This also includes the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and International Development Association (IDA). These agencies lend money at high concessional

rates. Other International Finance Agencies include the European Economic Community (EEC), European Development Fund (EDF), the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Almost all these agencies belong to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) which liaises and affiliates with the World Bank. Their lending conditions are all similar.

By 1970s World bank loans had assumed new dimensions in the agricultural sector particularly in the Agricultural Development Projects which began in 1972. By 1986, World Bank gave loans to Nigeria which totalled to about $1.5 billion to the agricultural sector, particularly the ADP, with about N1 billion to other sectors.[33] The basic aim of getting these loans from the World Bank was to nurture capitalist orientation in agriculture.

In the ADPs for example, the consequences of the capital incursion are enormous. They involve heavy financial and technical commitments, occupy as well as affect larger areas and occupants. They also involve a sophisticated, largely expatriate management and heavy use of extension workers, improved seeds, chemicals, fertilizers, insecticides, ploughs, tractors etc. Furthermore, the projects focus on credit schemes, bigger or richer farmers and actively geared towards increased cultivation of crops meant to be purchased by industry e.g. groundnut, cotton, maize for livestock feeds. Emphasis is not placed on crops meant for consumption by the population.

Consequently therefore, the farmers altered their cultivation patterns in order to suit the desired market requirements but without any dramatic increase in production. The farmers were

therefore forced to abandon some of the risk minimizing seeds which are not fertilizer responsive and capable to resist drought. They were left to depend on the imported and improved' seeds which require a lot of fertilizer and hence not capable to resist drought. Other complementary programs further compound the agricultural crisis as a result of their capital intensiveness for example, the OFN and NAFPP, etc.

The introduction of new technology means that the Nigerian farmers will continue to depend on the West for such machinery. The result is and thereby consolidated with the success of the direct spread or penetration of International capital, multinational corporation and other big transnational agribusiness. All these have therefore continued to cause a great drawback in the nation's food potentiality at the expense of cash crops demanded by them. A substantial amount of N23 million[34] was allocated to NAFPP but there has not been any empirical success on the focus set to cover and achieve.

Furthermore, other consequences of the capital incursion into the agricultural sector are also focused on the peasant farmers. It led to the consolidating or exacerbating inequalities in the rural areas as the capitalist relations of production are nurtured leading to the proletarianization of the peasantry. 'Progressive' farmers were favored by the projects leading to many peasants lands bought up by the 'kulak' farmers. These landless peasants turned out to become the rural proletariat thus creating a new class of 'peasantariat'.

The RBDAs which have turned out to be regarded as the 'while elephant' projects, also involved a high or huge financial outlays, a more substantial capital expenditure than all the rural-agricultural development programs put together. But can the injection of such huge amount of

money raise productivity or enhance and modernize new forms of hunger ? Is increased agricultural productivity synonymous with improved rural development and welfare ? The projects absorbed over N2.1 billion between 1979 and 1984.[35] These projects further depend heavily on foreign consultants to do the feasibility studies, design the project, import the needed machinery and inputs which invariably meant that the funds borrowed from the international agencies found their ways spent in the places where they emanated and therefore beneficial to them.

These also involve the use of new technology as well as a change in the farming system to 'modern' type so that particular emphasis is placed primarily on the cultivation of wheat in the dry season and therefore importation of the specialized crop. Of what importance is wheat to the food needs and its cultivation crucial to the rural dwellers ? The cultivation of wheat also involves the usage of increased inputs which consequently affects the potential ecological characteristics of the land.

Productivity has continued. to fall. The whole process of wheat cultivation contradicts and threatens the very existence of the peasant farmer and the generality of the Nigerians. Productivity is inhibited on two dimensions. On the one hand, low yields of wheat and on the other a low productivity of the staple food crops. This means further importation of both wheat and food items from the same places where the program was designed. Thus, this has a far reaching and compounding effect on the debt balance of payment figures, etc. The problem is therefore manifesting simultaneously in the concomitant short fall in foreign exchange. This inevitably leads to further invitation of the transnational and agribusiness companies to salvage the situation.

The impact of the scheme (a result of the capital incursion in the agricultural sector) with regard to the construction of the big dams has spectacular and negative effects on farmers downstream. Thus, in their incomes and their resources base (land) has become depilated and less productive. Fadama' and dry season farming were lost as a result and further loss of other irrigation land and economic activities. The topography of environment has been altered and land indiscriminately levelled, destroying all trees, vegetation which invariably increased the risk of desert encroachment and soil erosion. Hence, it created more landlessness, pauperization and alienation of the peasantry.

Furthermore, the onslaught of capital has a tremendous consequence on the disarticulation of the peasant productive forces. This structurally inhibits further progress because the peasant farmer has found it extremely difficult to adapt to the changing new style or mode of production to suit his peculiar environment. Therefore food sufficiency has become a complete mirage leading to further consolidation and dependence on international finance capital.

It should be recalled that the 1973 National Accelerated Food Production Program (NAFPP) of Gowon regime, the 1976 Obasanjo Program of Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), the Shagari era of Green Revolution rhetoric and other related packages for Rural Development in their successions have, during their periods, succeeded in not only plunging the rural sectors in complete confusion and creating successive and further illusions, but at the same time raising a lot of dust in the eyes of rural communities.

The OFN failed not only from the operational inefficiency in the supply of inputs to the large section of the population and at the appropriate time but because the crucial agrarian issues in

Nigeria were overlooked or side-tracked with a mis-allocation of resources. However, the adopted Green Revolution program had no relationship with the societal values and levels of development. The new technology introduced was primarily assumed, from the official circles, to offer solutions to agricultural problems which nonetheless produced new problems without solving the previous ones.

In 1987 the Babangida Military junta decreed yet another version of Rural Development (urbanization/modernization of the rural area). It should be re-called that during the 1987 budget speech, the President stated that the government would (a) launch a National Food Security and Storage system to be operated by farmers, (b) establish a small farmers' credit program to be provided with production and post harvest loans and (c) make a provision of a food market information dissemination service.[36] All these, combined with others, later constituted the core of the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI).

To facilitate in the execution of functions, DFRRI was envisaged to be completely decentralized down to village or hamlet levels. The Directorate has ten functions lined up for execution. Among these functions, DFRRI was to

> *identify, involve and support viable local community organizations in the effective mobilization of rural population for sustained rural development activities, bearing in mind the need for providing greater community participation and economic self-reliance of the rural communities.*[37]

Accordingly, the Directorate would accelerate efforts in building a national network of rural feeder roads and implement the national rural water supply scheme. The Directorate would however launch a national rural market program to be closely phased in with the rural feeder roads, launch a national rural electrification program with emphasis on rural agricultural

industrialization and then implement its articulated programs in the fields of crops, livestock, fruits, vegetables, rural housing, rural health, rural education and social organization.[38] Other complementary agencies include the establishment of the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) Better Life program for rural women/dwellers,(now styled Family Support Program), Peoples/Community Banks and perhaps the Directorate of Mass Mobilization for Social and Economic Recovery (MAMSER).

The social, economic and political objectives of Rural Development and the manner with which to achieve these objectives vary. Thus, they are differently conceived and formulated in different social formations with different backgrounds and socio-economic and political systems. Even within the same country the conceptions of Rural Development vary from one regime to another. More often than not, the objectives tend to be mere political rhetoric and propaganda. They may appear visibly spelled out but are seldom backed by concrete and coherent economic policies and political direction and commitments.

In some cases, however, there are always conflicts and inconsistencies between various objectives. Furthermore, circumstances have always produced issues whereby the basic causes of inequality or poverty can not be swiftly tackled. These issues are partly related to the traditional ownership and control of land and partly because of the social relationships existing or imposed in the society over time.

Since the basic needs of the rural communities can not be realized without a sustained increase in agricultural production, successful Rural Development strategies must involve a lot of multi-dimensional requirements and a number of crucial issues. For example, there has to exist some

degrees of equal (or equitable) distribution of land and resources whereby large holdings are abolished. In essence, small farmers and other landless peasants should be absorbed or completely integrated into the main streams of production with well entrenched cooperative activities. This would therefore form the basis of complementary or division and specialization of labor as well as diversification of products and activities.

The nature of land use in Nigeria, especially under the Land Use Decree/Act, does not categorically impose any ceiling on land holdings. It does not however suggest a redistribution of land to the constituent land users. It should however be noted that redistribution of land **per se** due to land reforms may not necessarily change the nature of social relationship in the society or a social transformation of rural settings. Hence, social transformation of the rural sectors is only realistic when land reforms are completely drastic

> *...not only in achieving a more equitable distribution of all the arable land but in changing the nature of social relationship in a manner that will eliminate exploitation and create a greater equality based on egalitarian ethics.*[39]

Challenges of Rural Development strategies are therefore rooted in and situated within these contexts and should address themselves on, **inter alia,** how the country is able (or unable) to adequately feed its over 88m people, meet the basic requirements of housing, clothing and elimination of absolute poverty. The challenges are also centered on how the country has been able to solve problems of employment (despite the establishment of the NDE) and the astronomical increase of the prices of goods and services. All the strategies for rural transformation in Nigeria have not concretely addressed on the causes and factors that still militate against viable solutions to rural question.

Solutions to employment problems, spirit of national self-reliance and insecurity have not been addressed and checked as there exist constant influx of rural workers into the urban areas. Diversifications of the rural economy by creating institutions in the rural areas to absorb the abundant and redundant labor force, is imminent. These will constitute viable opportunities for higher incomes for every one to engage in useful and varied activities or ventures. Alas, these institutions, whenever established, have been elegantly and practically illusionary.

Thus, social indicators of Rural Development strategies which consist in the expansion of educational and health facilities have been very much retrogressive. For example, the number of schools and hospitals/clinics with facilities (human and material) in the rural areas is lamentable. Improvement of the status of women has come only under the populist Better Life or Family Support Program for Rural Women. This therefore serves as a conduit through which only the aristocratic, petty bourgeois and royal women in the urban areas are lured and nurtured into accumulation spree. They therefore become the focus of attention and beneficiaries.

FOOT NOTE

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4. Nigeria - National Development Plan 1970-1975, Government Printer, Lagos, p.67
5. **Ibid** p68
6. It is pertinent to note that even the industrialized countries are currently debating on the development of their rural areas. Emphasis here is based on the paramount need to go back to the rural areas due to the enormous social and other problems in the urbanized cities e.g crimes, drugs, delinquency, diseases, general insecurity etc. Those moving to rural from urban areas are different and contrasted, in all respects, from those moving from rural to urban areas. Pressures from each group of people have forced or caused the migrations from both the urban and rural and vice versa with the state intervention and probable solutions.
7. Uma Lele -**The Designs of Rural Development: Lessons for Africa,** The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, pp. 41-43.
8. Richard Sandbrook -**The Politics of Basic Needs: Urban Aspects of Assaulting Poverty in Africa,** Heinema p.12
9. Sartaz Aziz -**Rural Development: Learning from China,** English language Book Society & Macmillan, Hong, Kong, 1982, PP xv.
10. S.T.K. Williams -**Rural Development in Nigeria,** Unife Press, 1978, pp. 12-22.
11. Sartaz Aziz. 1982, **op.cit.** p.89.
12. **Ibid,** p. xvi.
13. United Nations - "Integrated Approach to Rural development in Africa" (Proceedings of International Conference organized by Agency for Social and Economic Development, 20-25 November, 1971, Uganda.
14. Keith Griffin -**The Political Economy of Agrarian Change,** Macmillian, London, 1974 p.202.
15. **Ibid,** P.204.
16. **Ibid,** P. 259.
17. Sartaz Aziz. 1982, **op.cit.** p.VIII.
18. **Ibid,** P.XVIII.
19. **The Economic Development of Nigeria:**Report of a Mission organized by IBRD at the request of the Governments of Nigeria and the United Kingdom, the Johns Hopkins Press, 1955, pp.20-33.
20. The **National Development Plan, 1962-1968,** Lagos and **Plan Implementation in Nigeria, 1962-1966,** Edwin Dean, OUP, 1972, Ibadan, Nigeria Institute of Social and economic Research.
21. The downward trend in agricultural output had culminated into the vibrant importation of all kinds of foodstuff into the country.
22. The Marketing Boards, as discovered by panels of inquiries, embezzled funds through extraction of surplus from the peasant farmers which they used to finance political party activities in different regions.
23. R. Ayo Dunmoye, -"Technocratic Reformism and Nurture Capitalism: The Agrarian Policy of the Post-Colonial state in Nigeria," paper presented at a National Conference on **Nigerian Government and Society in the 21st Century** A.B.U Zaria, 4-9 May 1987.
24. Federal Republic of Nigeria -**Second National Development Plan,** 1970-1974, Lagos.
25. S1. L.A. Ega, **et'al** (eds) -**Developing Rural Nigeria: Problems and Prospects.** Nigerian Rural Sociological Association, 1989.
26. See Walter B.Stohr & D. R. Fraser Taylor (eds.) **Development from Above or Below; The dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries,** John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1981, pp. 288-303.
27. Philip H. Coombs, Manzoor-Ahmed -**Attacking Rural Poverty: How Nonformal Education can help.** The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London, 1974, PP. 11-12.
28. See **World Bank News,** December 22, 1988.
29. See Lerry Konyain (Avm)" Food self-sufficiency and more and more is possible by 1992. A DFRRI publication, 1988.
30. R. Ayo Dunmoye -"The Political Economy of Agricultural production in Africa: State, Capital and the Peasantry", **Peasant Studies** Vol. 16, NO. 2 (Winter 1989).
31. Tina Wallance -"The challenge of Food: Nigeria's Approach to Agriculture 1975-80," **The Canadian Journal of African Studies,** Vol.15, 1981, P.24.
32. Peter C.W Cutland & Immanuel Wallerstein (eds), **The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa,** Bervely Hills London, 1976 p.123.
33. R. Ayo Dunmoye 1989 **op.cit.**
34. Tina Wallance 1981 **op.cit. p.252**
35. T.A. Salau -"River Basin Planning as a strategy for Rural Development" **Journal of Rural Studies Vol.2, No.4,** Pergamogun Press, England, 1986. p.330.
36. See the full text of President Babangida's budget speech 1987.
37. Federal Military Government of Nigeria -DFRRI Decree NO. 4 of 1987.
38. 1987 Budget Speech, **op.cit.**
39. Sartaz Aziz 1982, **op.cit.** p.88.





FIGURE 6.1
SKETCH DIAGRAM OF MAIGANA

# CHAPTER SIX

## 6.00 RURAL MAIGANA:[1] SOCIO-ECONOMICS SETTING

> *To many people, rural development appears discrete and recognizable, changeless and by its contrast with the town, offer peace and naturalness. Rural life harbors activities and values which are revered, trends which are seen to be quite alien to the impermanence and frivolity of urban life.*
> *There are those whose dominant concern is the production of more food efficiently, both in technical and economic terms... Others wish to retain the countryside pattern and activities of their youth... all have different conceptions of how a country-side of the future should develop and the degree of control and direction that should take place.*
> *... The case for Urban planning is largely accepted; to many people, the idea of planning the country-side is not only anathema, but a contradiction in terms... the country-side is the country-side only because it is assumed to be natural and unplanned and in terms of physical planning, this is, in many ways, still largely true.*[2]

## 6.01 INTRODUCTION

What is obvious and mundane is that there is a crisis in the entire rural society. Various solutions to the problem so far advanced to ameliorate the crisis have become debilitating and elusive. This Chapter attempts to examine, within the Nigerian context, the nature and extent of rural crisis against the background information set out in parts one and two as well the rural development policy and strategy adopted in Nigeria.

The crisis in the Nigerian rural economy has thus manifested itself in many forms and dimensions: a fall in rural productivity and incomes with serious consequences on food shortages, chronic rural poverty, persistent and increasing rural unemployment and underemployment with inadequate rural infrastructure, relative rural-urban migrations resulting in labor shortages as well as increase in the wave of urban crimes, incessant out break of epidemics and other ecological problems - draught, floods, locus invasion etc. The crisis in the

rural economy is thus a direct manifestation in the crisis of the entire Nigerian political economy which is therefore a product of the prescribed and adopted development strategy of dependence and underdevelopment.

The Nigerian development policies and strategies are nonetheless rooted in the world Bank-IMF design for firmer grips of the rural agricultural producers. This has been strategically designed to consolidate their operationalisation of the rural agenda embarked on the Third World Countries. This chapter will further seek to mainly analyze the extent to which **"raya karkara"** program, within the endorsed World Bank-IMF prescriptions, via KADP has enhanced higher productivity and incomes as well as community participation. It is imperative, therefore, to provide a synopsis of the history and sociological outline of the Maigana rural community with a view to placing it within the purview of the subsequent chapters.

## 6.02 MAIGANA: AN HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC SETTING

Sketchy oral sources on the history of Maigana have indicated that the village is an old settlement. Maigana, which is about 30km North east of Zaria, off Zaria-Jos highway, is said to have been initially settled and founded by a group of people who migrated from the East headed by its leader, Kargi, over 500 years ago.[3] The leader of the group, Maji Kargi, according to oral traditions, is believed to have migrated from Borno, as the name of the village (Maigana) suggests.

Thus, as the history of Maigana indicates a pattern of the Bornuan influence in the history of Hausaland, other socio-cultural evidence around the locality have shown that even the surrounding villages or hamlets like Gimba and Soba are also believed to be of Borno origin.

However, it is further argued, though hypothetically by oral traditions, that the foundation of Maigana probably presented the Bornuan influence and expansion experienced throughout Hausaland. Apart from Barebari (people from Borno) within the socio-historical setting of the community, there are, in addition, other influences from other groups, particularly the Fulani who, over time, have come to settle in and around the area as well as the neighboring localities.

Maigana has a large number of principal hamlets[4] which are appendages to the ancient walled settlement.[5] These hamlets altogether constitute what is now referred to as Maigana District, with its traditional District Head. This has therefore given the village a very important position or status where socio-political and economic activities radiate from the village to all the surrounding localities.

As Maigana is the major center of social and economic activities, numerous wards, hamlets and villages look towards it for leadership because of its long history. However, the smaller hamlets and wards which directly fall within the purview of our area of study are Kwadaro, Tofa, Unguwar Sarki, Sabon kaura, Unguwar Rimi, Bauda, Tashar Itace and Sabon Gari. It should therefore be noted that the period of the foundation of Maigana, similar to all State - like formations, was characterized by efforts at State building and expansion as well as the improvement of security in the area hitherto noted for insecurity.

The remnants of the ancient though dilapidated walls can be clearly observed with their traditional gates (**Kofofi** pl., **kofa** sig.) tagged or named according to the direction they were sited: **Kofar Arewa** (North gate), **Kofar Gabas** (Eastern gate) and **Kofar Kudu** (Southern gate). In addition the remains of the dilapidated minaret (**hasumiya**) built several years ago are





Figure 4.2
Map of Saba Local Government Area

important historical features of Maigana rural community. It is speculated however that the **hasumiya** is as old as the village itself. It should be noted that no archival and anthropological studies have been carried out at the site of the minaret or the wall.

In Maigana, agriculture is the major, if not the only occupational pursuit of the people. Both cash and food crops are grown in large quantities in the area. Cash crops grown by the peasant farmers include tobacco, cotton, groundnut, sugar-cane, lettuce, cabbage, tomatoes, pepper, onions etc. Food crops grown include maize, guinea corn, yams, millet, rice, beans, cocoa yams, bene seed, irish and sweet potatoes, cassava, etc. Apart from these crops, there are lots of fruits and other vegetables grown in the area mostly through irrigation canals and '**fadama' (fadamu-pl.)** programme during the dry season.

The expansion of dry season farming in Maigana was facilitated by the establishment of irrigation schemes in the area around the river beds. Other agricultural activities include livestock, fishing and mixed farming activities. These were all boosted sequel to the establishment of the Maigana Farm Center a long time ago.[6] It should be noted that the farm center (and all other institutions or infrastructure established in the area) was essentially conceived and designed to offer training and give necessary guidelines to the so-called 'progressive farmers' in the surrounding community.

The economic activity of Maigana rural community, since its political foundation, was further complemented by other earlier groups of settlers. The settled Fulani who rear cattle of different varieties are the second largest groups in the locality.






figure 6.3
Map of Kaduna State



As the rural economy initially revolved around the production of essential food crops, the coming of colonialism completely disrupted and distorted that traditional patterns and relations of production. The result was that the economy was changed to predominantly revolve around the production of cash crops such as tobacco, indigo, groundnut and cotton for export.

It should be noted that the Maigana farm center later became a joint venture run by the Kaduna State Ministry of Agriculture and the Nigerian Tobacco Company (NTC) Zaria to primarily boost the production of tobacco. Until recently, most of the activities of the agricultural division were taken over by the Kaduna State Integrated Rural Development project (KSIRDP) established in Maigana on April, 1 1980.

## 6.03 THE COLONIAL PERSPECTIVE AND RURAL MAIGANA

Prior to 1945, there was a very limited colonial State intervention in the Nigerian agricultural production. During that period however, State interventions were predominantly on the promotion of trade as well as the experimentation of new varieties of crops. This initial colonial policy, for the time being, gave a lot of impetus to both the peasant farmers and the foreign agricultural firms. In the Northern part of the country, all these culminated in the establishment of experiment stations put under the auspices of the Department of Agriculture established in 1912. In general, however, the rural economy was predominantly

> *...left to the 'invisible' hand of the market, to the peasantry, to the market capital and a network of agents and buyers.*[7]

Due largely to the support given to the metropolitan capital, the colonial government actively and directly intervened in the spread of cotton cultivation. This, in essence, had a remarkable impact on the transformation of the rural economy. While as a result of the powerful cotton

lobby and parliamentary connections, finances were however secured to extend rail line from Ibadan to Kano with a primary view to easing the extraction of the cash crop commodities. Thus, with the formation of the BCGA in 1902, the Association had, by 1904, concluded arrangements with the imperial government to secure land, purchase cotton, erect ginneries, establish model farms, and the necessary grants to be paid to the Association.[8]

With the take over of the new Moor plantation from the BCGA by the colonial government in 1907, the new Department of Agriculture established in Zaria similarly took over the plant breeding and distribution of the Allen long stable variety from the Association in the Zaria area in 1912. It should therefore be recalled that the BCGA had been the sole exporter of cotton since 1822.

Later on the Association gradually began to withdraw from buying and thus restricted its activities essentially to ginning, whereas the Department of Agriculture worked closely with the BCGA which mounted a consolidated pressure for the erection of ginneries sequel to the extension of rail line. It was expected that transport costs would be drastically reduced and at the same time raise the prices of the producer. In 1923 it was estimated that about 14 percent of Agricultural Department's total expenditure of ₤7,000 was accrued from the cotton extension work in the North.[9]

The expansion of cotton cultivation was particularly very remarkable in Zaria environs and to some extent Funtua areas. It was therefore illuminating to note that despite the expansion of cotton cultivation in the 1920s, the export of the commodity was not correspondingly remarkable as it accounted only for an average of ₤570,000 while in the 1930s less was recorded. This situation had put the cotton lobby in a problematic and embarrassing position.[10]

The colonial government began the program of mixed farming extension work throughout Zaria and Kano provinces in 1927 after its five-years experimental work at Samaru. This program was carefully designed to fulfill the requirements of NAs and the officers controlling the administrative machinery. The programme was launched to strategically focus on the emirs, NA officials and village heads. Hence, the NA administration was primarily responsible for farm centers, demonstration units, advances for bullocks and implements as well as extension works. In 1935, however, it was shown that out of a total of 621 mixed farmers, half were classified as emirs, NA officials and village heads.[11]

It was assumed that the introduction of mixed farming by the colonial government would automatically increase the acreage of cotton cultivation and production. For example, one of the most successful mechanized schemes, under the mixed farming settlements, was the Anchau scheme started in 1937. Hence, the Agricultural Department and Development Boards promoted mechanization by introducing tractor cultivation and thus Samaru, in addition, served as a workshop for the experimental tractor farms. By mid 1950s, however, most of the initial enthusiasm for tractor cultivation had wound down and Samaru only turned out to be concentrated on methods to improve cultivations.

While still in that assumption, mixed farmers were continuously encouraged to extend their acreage of export crops. For example, at the commencement of the mixed farming campaigns, locally manufactured ploughs were used. Since 1934, importation of ploughs commenced with the Ransome steel ridging plough later to be replaced by superior Emcot ploughs. All these technical importation therefore had crucial impact on the productive forces and subsequently on the productive relations. In addition, the policy of mixed farming was diabolical on the rural

economy in general as it strengthened the landed class with dialectical and symbiotic strangulation of the peasantry and thereby creating a class of landless laborers.

With the expansion of peasant production, the growth, concentration and penetration of merchant capital swayed the entire rural economy. Hence, production was effectively controlled and any form of competition drastically curtailed. Merchants were thus given the necessary protection and freedom to engage in all forms of trade and commerce at the detriment of all others; local or foreign. For instance, the UAC, Halts etc were given the monopoly to transport commodities. Their activities therefore depressed groundnut prices which consequently forced producers to switch to foodstuffs.[12] Other forms of appropriation of surplus were unleashed as merchant firms were given advances to control buyers. This act invariably forced peasants to go aborrowing from the commodity buyers by pledging their crops before harvest at ridiculously give away prices.

The ideology of colonial development policy served as a basis for the colonial State to effectively pursue its development planning. In 1940, for example, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act was promulgated. For the economic growth of the colony, the desire was to transform the entire peasant agriculture by introducing mechanized cultivation and irrigation in the country side. This therefore marked the beginning of the flow of foreign experts, other materials and international reports (IBRD 1954, FOA 1966, etc to determine the course or direction of the Nigerian economy, particularly agriculture.

During the war years of the 1940s, the colonial regime initiated and established Marketing Boards as statutory export monopolies to regulate produce trade in the essential cash crop

commodities. The tripartite regionalization of the Commodity Boards in 1954 was therefore sequel to the constitutional changes that ensured or followed. The impact which these Boards had on the relationships between the peasants and the colonial State towards the entire primitive capitalist accumulation in Nigeria was enormous:

> *Whereas the colonial state prior to 1940 had held the ring for accumulation by merchant capital and ultimately metropolitan capital, the appropriation of surplus value was now brought through its pricing, tax and credit policies. Public finances were used to support and subsidize the establishment of capitalist relation within Nigerian and merchant capital lost dominant role within the colony. Licensed produce buying was taken over by Nigerian traders who had previously established themselves as agents of merchant capital. At the center, an Urban based bureaucratic and political elite, which derived its power and wealth from education access to state machinery, and commence, rather than agriculture and land ownership, endorsed a mechanism by which wealth generated in peasant sector could be appropriated. At the same time, as the state came to be held responsible for rural development and the provision of amenities, there was little incentive for debate about rural development or agrarian policy within the nationalist movement.*[13]

The operation of the State export commodities was devastating on the economies of the rural sector which, in addition, led to the deprivation of the peasantry, increasingly enhanced State power, broadened scope of expenditure and curtailed the promotion of general welfare. Thus, the heavy levels of taxation levied on the peasantry continued to produce high levels of pauperization. The devices of channelling a portion of the export earnings through the Marketing Boards further exacerbated the problems of rural producers; as funds were appropriated and squandered via the colonial State apparatuses or agencies, the Marketing Boards' system of Licensed Buying Agents (LBA) and later by the political parties and individuals.

The establishment of Maigana Farm Center was therefore not by accident. It should be noted that the 1908 Annual Report on Zaria province showed that the 1906-1907 harvest of the region under study was generally good despite the abnormalities of the rains.[14] However, it was reported that in spite of the draught that hit the locality in 1908, the harvest, particularly of cotton, groundnut, tobacco etc was incredibly fair. It was therefore during this particular reporting period that the entire Maigana area attracted the attention of the colonial commercial and intelligence officer, Mr. Birtwistle. He was thus particularly struck by the abundance of shea butter trees, quality of the nuts and the by-products.

Furthermore, other colonial officers who visited and travelled through Maigana (the cotton district as it was then referred to as) expressed the same opinion and described the land as large and the soil rich and qualitative for the cultivation of cotton. In view of all these, therefore, the Resident, Zaria province, Mr. C. W. Orr suggested in his 1905 Report that:

> *...it would be a good thing if the Association (BCGA) were to open a small buying station at Zaria with hand machines for ginning and processing. The Transport Department would no doubt be able to quote low rates for taking the cotton down to Zungeru on returning cart during the dry season, and the purchase of cotton would give the necessary impetus to its production on a larger scale than is the case at present, where the demand is merely local. Seed cotton sells at present amongst natives at the rate of about 1/2d per lb and in a good year I have known it purchased at an even lower rate. I feel convinced therefore that given a generous rate for cart transport from Zaria to Zungeru, cotton would at this moment be exported from Zaria and landed in Liverpool at a cost which could leave a few margins of profit.*[15]

Consequent upon the expressions and suggestions of colonial officers over Maigana, the colonial regime, in June, 1910 acquired a farm in Maigana to experiment several varieties of seed cotton. Hence, 200 bags of seeds were distributed to the peasant farmers in the area. But because of

late planting and the unexpected cessation of the rains, the harvest for that year was not gratifying or satisfactory.

The low productivity was in addition attributed to, according to J.W Withers Gill, the Acting Residents, Zaria province, the 'tiredness' of the soil to produce creditable crop while the pressing need during that period was in the improvement of fertility of the soil which the average farmer could afford; J.W Gill further elaborates as follows;

> *...the average farmer can neither afford to pay Fulani to herd cattle on his farm, for their charges are high, nor will he waste in green manuring nitrogenous green stuff like bean straw and husk or groundnut straw, for these are always saleable as fodder. He is thrown back entirely on weeds. It is true that the price he obtains for each fodder is insignificant compared to the estimate benefit that would accrue to the farmer if he put the green stuff into the soil. But he does not look beyond the needs of the moment.*[16]

Hence, interesting and revealing experiences at various cotton markets are worthy of note, especially where the commodity was targeted to be bought. In addition to these factors, there was another variable which affected the production of cotton in Maigana area during the period. It was thus reported that at the beginning of every cotton season there existed far more profitable markets over the Northern border for the commodity than the BCGA could offer.[17] The Report showed that even a BCGA official remarked that:

> *If I had ₤100, I could lay out every penny of it in cotton at 1 1/2d per pound. But at every stage I am faced with the traders from Zinder who offered higher prices than 1d per lb out of 300 kororo in kudan market, I had 600 bought for me which I weighed but every trader declined my offer. I succeeded in buying 13 kororo but I am convinced they were only sold to me "domin tsoro", because the settlers thought the white man could trouble them if they did not sell.*[18]

The BCGA representative consequently resorted to sending cotton buyers to the various village markets in and around Maigana but at the end of the whole adventure, only a little over 2,000

lbs of cotton was secured at one penny a pound whereas in the far north the large demand by native buyers, especially in Kano and Zinder, the selling price was close to the region of 1 1/2d per lb.[19] Experiences, however, of other BCGA cotton buyers in the rural areas of Soba, Takalafiya, Marmara and the environs were similar. At Soba market, for example, it was reported that:

> *... there were many native buyers from the North who paid 5l for 40lbs and 6l for 50lbs. At Takalafiya he first met with no success but he introduced himself to the Sarki who sold the buyer two bags of his own four encourages less autre.*[20]

The strategy which the colonial government (BCGA) adopted was to side track cotton buyers from the North and make the commodity obtained at a minimal price and therefore less scarce and competitive. Thus, in order exclude cotton buyers from the North and make the commodity sold very cheap to BCGA, each district head in Zaria province was "ordered to collect two-thirds of his Land Tribute in cash and one-third in cotton....(while) the collection of land Taxes will probably force the sale of a good deal cotton".[21]

Further steps were also taken to ameliorate the deplorable condition of cotton production, in the area. In this direction a suggestion towards remedying the problem was advanced so that the government experimental farm at Maigana be enlarged to 100 acres of the already demarcated land area "where ploughing, green manuring and fertilization by means of crushed cotton seed, could be carried on, as well as seed selection".[22] Advancing further reasons towards salvaging the problem, Whithers Gill maintained that the peasant farmer would welcome the suggestion advanced earlier:

> *knowing the value an object lesson to the native and how quick he is to seize the advantage put before him by a concrete instance, I think we may by some means of much method teach him how to increase production, and ultimately hope to glut the native market.*[23]

Invariably, the operations of the Maigana farm center was extended, among other things, for the purposes of selecting seeds for distribution to farmers as well as teaching cotton farmers the art of improving the fertility of the soil and therefore secure greater yield per acre. As every effort was made to stimulate cotton production, improved cotton seeds were widely distributed to farmers with a practical demonstration of the ways and means of increasing soil fertility to enhance productivity yield.

Furthermore, the colonial government at this stage felt that one of the best ways to achieve greater yields was to buy the entire local cotton through the BCGA with a determined view to enforcing the cultivation of the so-called improved seeds. This move was primarily designed to destroy local, referred to as inferior, seed cotton, so as to ensure the cultivation of the introduced seeds for higher yields and maintenance of a steady supply to exceed local demand and subsequently bring down the price.[24]

The introduction of the colonial economy had remarkably caused fundamental changes in the economy of rural Zaria. Thus cotton production and to some extent groundnut took roots in Maigana in the early period of colonial rule. When rail line reached Zaria in 1911, and particularly when it passed to and reached Jos in 1913,[25] attempts to boost the production of the commodities took unprecedented trends, turns and dimensions since the rail facility provided and boosted potentials for the easy evacuation of the products down to the coast. This further contributed to the intense penetration of the rural economy as Maigana became a center of experimental agriculture production owned by European firms.

It should be emphasized that cash crop production in and around maigana and particularly trade in cotton during the early decades of colonial era had gained a lot of prominence in the rural

economy. As colonialism continued to establish its infrastructure and tentacles over the rural economy, the peasantry was automatically integrated into the colonial economy.

Thus, notwithstanding the state patronage cotton production had received from the colonial government with subsidies made in terms of improved or high yielding seeds distributed to the peasant farmers, the price of cotton in and around the area remained high relative to other areas in the far North. In other words, given the resources allocated, cotton production was not as successful as desired. In this view, however, cotton was stymied to gain a permanent position as an export commodity notwithstanding the attempts by the BCGA to establish cotton growing villages in the cotton producing Zones.[26]

The colonial onslaught on the economy of Maigana rural community in particular was fundamental; as it affected the nature of economic and social setting of the locality. For example, local craftsmen in Maigana, as in all other places penetrated by colonialism, were completely dislodged from their activities by the colonial policy. The cottage industries that were in existence and boosted the local economy eventually disappeared. These included dyeing industries, pottery, tanning, cloth weaving and garment, wood carving (for mortar and pestle, among other things) leather works, black-smithing etc.[27]

Traces and relics of such local industries can be observed in certain locations (where they were practiced) of the village while others which have remained but practiced in rudimentary patterns and with no seriousness were only lamented over by the old man interviewed.[28] Thus, some of the wards (unguwowi, pl. unguwa, sig.) in Maigana bear and depict the terrain of the economy practiced before colonialism, like **'Unguwar makera'** (black-smithing ward) etc.

rural populace. Generally, part of these problems was the failure to obtain reliable and quantifiable data. Hence a variety of information supplied were rather falsified ignorantly or deliberately by the respondents.

With regard to the sampling frame and sample size of the community, we were unable to obtain an estimated population of Maigana village. Thus, the issue of analyzing the different categories in the population of the area did not even arise which invariably compounded more problems to the study. The problem was further complicated by the inability of the study, due primarily to lack of resources to undertake a house-to house census of the locality.

But for the sampling frame, a number of households was complied with a view to randomly selecting a few for questionnaire interviews in addition to the various informal and formal interviews conducted with a number of individuals who cut across the social groups in the community (District Head, School Teachers, old and young men, students, peasants, large scale farmers, civil servants as well as non-indigenes residing in the area).

In selecting our sample from the number of households compiled, a third of its entirety was therefore randomly selected to constitute our focus of the study and for result analysis. The process of analyzing our results therefore includes, **inter alia**, coding of the interview response with the observations made etc whereby each coded item, was placed under its own appropriate category.

However, the entire data obtained were tabulated and also placed in their own respective categories. In addition, statistical computations were performed to, among other things,

ascertain the consistency or otherwise of responses. Hence, each selected sample within the frame was, for example, assessed to ensure relative accuracy of the sampling method applied.

Added to the main focus of the study sample was a number of specially selected households and individuals palpably observed as socially, economically and politically 'heavy' in the community who are, by virtue of their peculiar position/status, in complete contrast to the rest of the rural community. This was aimed at ensuring that this particular category of people was not left out of in the sample frame.

It should be noted however that the design is essentially to assess the dual role and impact of the state and capital on different categories of people within the entire strategies of rural development in Maigana and generally how all the realities on the ground have affected the level of production as well as the condition of living in the rural community.

With the sample consisting households, the selection criteria included families with very high income. This is based on their position in the rural community as well as the apparent nature of their dwelling places with the range descending downwards to the lowest social ladder.
The questionnaire/interview form was intended for and administered on a randomly selected sample of the population of the area under study. The sample was selected from individuals and house-holds affected by the state rural development programs in the area. Since most of the affected individuals or house-holds, if not all of them, could not handle the questionnaire themselves, the investigator, sometimes assisted by some individuals, were directly involved in asking and receiving responses from the respondents-in the language they understand. A tape recorder was however used for this purpose.

The first set of questionnaire is divided into three sections. Section one dwells on the demography of the subject enquiring on different characteristics of the people with rather fixed alternative questions. Section two takes a census of infrastructural facilities available, built, provided or maintained by different organs in the locality ranging from the construction of bridges, roads, dams to the entire provision of social services. The intention here is to seek and identify what type of infrastructural facilities are provided by the people themselves or Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), the costs and maintenance of such facilities.

Section three focuses on the congruence between the respondents' perception and expectations of rural development strategies and those of the state. Issues such as accessibility, quality, quantity and the sustainability of rural infrastructure provided to the rural folks are enquired especially on how those strategies have changed or affected the living conditions or social settings of the rural community in the provision of agricultural inputs, social services - health care, education, water supply, electricity, commercial activities, transportation etc.

The questionnaire finally solicits and elicits the opinions of the respondents on how rural development strategies can be more sustainable and meaningful. The questions in this section are open-ended essentially designed to allow a free response from the subjects without necessarily restricting them with stated alternatives.

The second set of questionnaire was designed for institutions or establishments directly involved in formulating, or executing rural development programs and strategies. The aim is primarily to get data or information on the activities, problems and achievements of the organizations related to raising the living standards of the rural communities; particularly Maigana rural

community.

## 6.05 MAIGANA:ECOLOGICAL AND TOPOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION

Distinct physical infrastructures, clearly in complete contrast to the Maigana rural environment, are clearly and easily observed at a small hamlet of Tudun Saibu which accommodates the Headquarters of the Maigana Agricultural project (ADP), the staff houses, experimental farms as well as the famous Maigana Farm Center. Structures in this location are rather planned and thus possess some features akin to an urban setting, even though most of the infrastructural facilities are not functional.

In addition to all these, however, there are other structures, located between Maigana and Tudun Saibu, which again stand distinct from 'natural' rural situation. These structures are the Soba Local Government Secretariat, the Peoples Bank building, a police post, the NACB building, the Junior Secondary School established recently.

At the entrance of the dilapidated walled Maigana Village, a big water tank, three tap heads, a generator house supposed to pump water into the water tank from the bore hole commissioned in 1993 are other major structural attractions to any visitor to the village. On the right hand side, whilst advancing towards the entrance gate, the defunct SDP political party office, very close to the walls, stands distinct, isolated and deserted.

Within the walled rural community, however, other important structures are the rural health clinic with a new elegant one being constructed, while very close to it is an edifice of the District Head's palace which also attracts attention as it stands distinct from all other structures around. Adjacent to it is the primary school building.

As one goes further down, rural community life and environment begin to unfold to their naturalness. The houses are predominantly roofed with thatch **(Jinka)** and **aduruku** - cum-stalks walls. In almost all cases, the houses are built with unbaked clay**(ginin kasa)**, with rains washing away most parts of the building particularly the unplastered dwellings.. Some of the houses are however roofed with clay **(soro)** while only a few spotted ones are roofed with iron sheet **(rufin kwano)** which also stand distinctively in contrast with others.

The rooms in almost all households look narrow with no provision and consideration for ventilation. Another distinct structure in the village is the Central Mosque building. However, the Agricultural Development project (ADP) site and its staff quarters at the outskirts of the walled village are also other structures that stand in contrast to the typical rural setting.

Maigana is an unplanned rural environment. The houses are poorly built and substandard. In most cases, the houses are fenced with the famous **aduruku** trees and stalks traditionally called **gidan danni**. The **danni** fence with **aduruku** surrounding the rural house holds are the prevalent features of any typical rural area around. The **danni,** made up of long stalks/grasses is attached to the growing **aduruku** trees to provide cover to the households. This empirically exhibits a feature of rural poverty. During the dry seasons the entire rural communities most particularly of the hinterland become vulnerable to fire incidence. When it occurs houses are completely reduced to ashes.

As they are unplanned, slummy and poor with very limited facilities and amenities, one observes a chaotic settlement pattern with a very little regard for ventilation, drainage and comfort. The streets or foot paths are narrow and motorably unaccessible. Hence, drainage and sanitation in

the entire locality are abysmally inadequate and poor with pools of stagnant waste materials spilled over the paths, while dirty refuse could be found in spotted area. Hence, the community is very much vulnerable to a number of health related epidemics.

The village scenery is relatively quite and cool. The main entrance road leading the locality was recently but shabbily tarred. Vehicle and pedestrian traffic going into the village is sparse. The traffic of people, especially during the rainy season is mostly towards the farms. It is very often to capture scenes of small groups of old men of almost the same age bracket, chatting to pass away the time. In another scene, however, bare footed children looking dirty while some naked or halfly dressed with torn and dirty clothes could be found wandering about and playing throughout the day with no regard to attending school while a few others are hawkers who roam from one house to another selling petty things in form of cooked food or materials to make food intrinsic with unhygienic practice.

However, the poor condition of living in the rural area has made almost everybody appear in shabby or worn-out dresses. The airy and silent environment is occasionally interjected albeit with polluted and disturbed by the vibrating fabricated foodstuff grinding machines. Added to the beauty of the village scenery is the infinite melody of the sound of birds as well as other domesticated animals and birds which altogether depict the natural habitant.

Commercial activities within the rural setting assume their natural rural character, particularly with the concentration of exchange of commodities on specified market days as well as a specific place. Other goods are either hawked within the village or sold at the open **'tasha'** (motor park) off Zaria-Jos high way.

Sabon Gari (popularly referred to as 'Tasha') Ward is strategically situated opposite the Maigana rural town, across the Zaria-Jos highway, in the eastern corner. It is bordered by Tudun Saibu, in the South, where the headquarters' buildings and official staff quarters of the KADP, Farm Centers, Secretariat of Soba L.G.C, the Junior Secondary School, the Community Bank, the Thursday weekly Market, Police Post and other infrastructure are sited.

In the western direction, the locality is dissected by a KADP feeder road which runs to other localities like Gimba, Richifa etc. In the northern direction the high road goes to Tashar Itace Ward. Sabon Gari is, apart from the weekly thursday market, a daily rural mini market and commercial or nerve center of the locality par excellence. Invariably the **danni** type structures of the Maigana weekly market vividly exhibits its ruralness. As the name 'Tasha exactly refers, the locality is thus a radiating and rallying point, a junction and a stop-over to and from all the adjoining localities in a variety of commercial activities.

The numerous commercial activities and undertakings in the area include the vital service sector of the rural economy. This comprises of the mechanics of both bicycles and motorcycles. Others include welders, vulcanizers, rewires (electricians) battery chargers, etc. Besides this category, there is a group of '**kabu-kabu**' or 'express' commercial motorcycle transporters. This group's business is essentially to commute passengers to and from various hamlets and wards. Attached to this category also are the shops of assorted vehicle spare parts sellers. All of these groups are complementary to each other and therefore depend on each other for the sustenance of each group's business endeavors.

Another side of the business nerve center in the locality accommodates different varieties of commercial undertakings. These include food canteens, patent medicine stores etc. Under the

In most households, there exist open wells which in most cases do not retain water all the year round due largely to their shallowness. In each household, a family predominantly lives in a two-room apartment - a parlor and a bedroom with kitchen sited in an open space which only the rains can cause it to be temporarily transferred to the 'sitting room'. In some households the kitchen is a permanent structure shared by two or more families.

On a rare occasion could a family head posses his own room **(turaka).** If a family head has two or more wives with no **'turaka'** he would be required to be a 'guest' and thus to go round on each wife's room (on her duty days) at a two-day intervals or any arrangement agreed upon which must be on equal basis. Thus, grown up children of the wife 'on duty' would sleep in another wife's room who would not 'host' their father.

There could be one or two or more latrines in each household depending on the size and space. In some cases human excreta are disposed of in the open space. It is necessary to note that the seepage of water underground where shallow wells and latrines are dug is invariably vulnerable to the spread of epidemics and therefore hazardous to healthy environment due to the poor quality of drinking water. Even though three concrete wells exist within Maigana walled village but none sustain water supply all the year round.

In terms of climatic conditions, the entire savanna zone, where our area of study falls, is warm or hot with a varying degree of temperatures depending primarily on the time of the day, season of the year, or even the altitude. Cold conditions or seasons are generally experienced from November to February. The hot or humid period assumes intermittently and is uncomfortable. This gives rise to clouds and consequently the rains.

Rains in this area generally commence from March to September or October with some variations from season to season. The average rainfall in the area is between 20 and 60 inches (500-1500mm) with variations from year to year and place to place. Maigana, in particular, has an average annual rainfall of 52 or 58 (1050 or 1375mm). On the whole the cyclical life of the cultivator or even the pastoralist still remain unaltered - to cultivate or migrate except there is an epidemic or plague. The KADP Annual Report 1988 describes the weather of the area as follows:

> *The weather (is) generally favorable throughout the year, with dry hot afternoons and cold nights in the first quarter, changing from dry and harmattan winds to hot and warm humid weather in the second quarter, at the same time changing to winds blowing from North, west to north-east carrying heavy rainfall in the third quarter, and changing less humid to cold weather again in the fourth quarter.*[29]

Even though Savanna vegetation is the dominant feature of the area, it should be realized that the temperatures in this climatic zone are much more tolerable to human beings than the upper north due to its lower relative humidity. Thus the natural vegetation of this region is the sudan Savanna which is sometimes moist whereby during the wet season, grasses are shorten after being burnt. The luxuriant feature of the vegetation gradually recedes towards the dry Savanna and further north.

The characteristic feature of the landscape is predominately grass cover exhibiting two different characteristics- tall and green grasses during the rains particularly at the river beds and dry and light-colored during the dry season. The soils contain essential nutrients for a variety of crop cultivation. Laterised soils are common and are generally reddish-brown in color and rich. But in the 'fadama' areas, the soils are naturally dark or black with fertile alluvium and thus retain water or moisture even during the dry season.

There are, however, areas where irrigation farming activities are undertaken, particularly the sites where the Maigana Agricultural Development Project (ADP) are demonstrated. It must be noted, therefore, that even though the soils are rich, agricultural productivity can only be enhanced with the application of chemical fertilizers and other related chemicals with the accompanying high yielding varieties or improved seeds. Hence, the soils and crops have, over time, been polluted with such chemicals and have therefore become highly fertilizer responsive.

# CHAPTER SEVEN

## 7.00 THE WORLD BANK AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN MAIGANA

> *The World Bank-sponsored projects fall within the category of integrated rural development schemes, ... They are joint federal-state schemes with World Bank management and are fairly autonomous vis-a-vis state governments and their ministries of agriculture .... With its own command system and anxious to bypass the Nigerian ministerial organization, the World Bank operates a characteristically neocolonial organization*[1]

## 7.01 INTRODUCTION

Analysis of the study of the socio-economic setting of Maigana can not be complete and accurate without being situated within the canopy and role of the State and International finance agencies, particularly the World Bank, and the serious impairment on the rural peasantry and the rural society as a whole. Maigana is thus one of the few rural communities in the entire third world where direct capitalist intervention was unleashed. Unlike other agricultural projects sponsored by the World Bank in Nigeria, Maigana therefore stands out distinct compared to the rest of the ADPs as all are either urban or semi-urban areas.

Hence, in measuring the extent of the attainment of rural development; in terms of enhancement of improved socio-economic condition of the rural poor, rural productivity and incomes as well as providing a range of social and welfare services, Maigana stands to be a good example where the World Bank approach to rural development policies can be assessed. As the history of Maigana is incomplete without the ADP and State direct intervention, it is diabolical to note that despite the claims of huge investments in the agarian community, the exercise, over time, is yet to advance or transform the condition of the inhabitants.

The impact of the ADP on the socio-economic setting of the people of Maigana rural communities; through the role of the State and Capital, particularly in terms of the encapsulated

peasantry is well established. The major theme of this chapter therefore is to identify the role of the World Bank in its relation to the prescribed policies and investments made on the one hand, and the performance of the ADP in relation to agricultural productivity and condition of the people in Maigana on the other. It should be noted that Maigana is situated within the hitherto cotton growing areas known to the international firms since the early periods of colonial rule.

When cotton production failed to yield the expected results during the colonial period and essentially its retrial in the mid 1970s at the initial introduction of the ADPs, the World Bank began to shift and concentrate its emphasis on the production of groundnuts. With the collapse of both cotton and groundnuts export-oriented crops, the Bank swiftly planned a new policy of continued onslaught of the peasantry when it introduced the high yielding varieties of yellow maize. The crop, not categorized as an export commodity, was nonetheless regarded as a 'commercial' rather than staple food crop by the World Bank.

As 'commercial' crops, the high yielding varieties of yellow maize were primarily introduced with the objectives of producing for chicken feeds used by the battery chicken firms. Despite the fact that both farmers and consumers respectively prefer to cultivate and consume local maize, sorghum and millet than the so-called improved variety, the ADP has continued to promote and retain its preferred crops. It should be noted, however, that not only are the introduced crops by the ADP problematic to local condition, the mechanical farming processes or procedures but also too expensive and cumbersome to the small holder-farmers. Futhermore, they are at the same time highly vulnerable to insect pests and diseases.[2]

## 7.02 MAJOR FEATURES OF WORLD BANK PROJECTS

Since its inception, the World Bank has geared all its efforts towards lending of money for a variety of projects in the under-developed regions of the World. Invariably, the World Bank is the major thrust of the agricultural and rural projects in Nigeria. The World Bank's conception of rural development is thus hinged on externally package of imposed programs and resources yet to bear any fruits anywhere.

Among the range of the World Bank agricultural and rural development projects, the ADP is the most outstanding and popular. Thus, the endosed agricultural development strategy adopted in Nigeria was lured by the World Bank's prescription. This strategy was ostensibly designed to develop the small holder farmers but the sponsorship of capital intensive projects for large scale farmers and irrigation projects was smuggled instead with adverse impacts particularly on the RBDAs and ADPs focused areas.

Between 1975 and 1984 the World Bank loans totaling over 977 million U.S dollars were concluded and signed for over a dozen of agricultural projects in Nigeria. Within this period, Maigana served as a Zonal headquarters of the FADP but when States were created in 1987 with the former Kaduna State split into two, Maigana automatically assumed the status of the KADP main area of focus. It should further be stated that between 1986 and 1988 additional World Bank agricultural projects were also approved. These were the South Borno ADP ($21m), multi-State ADP ($16m), Livestock Development II ($128m) and Forestry ($77m)[3]. Table 7.1 illuminates the renewed or fresh World Bank projects with loans obtained.

**TABLE 7.1**
**NIGERIA: RENEWED AND FRESH WORLD BANK LOANS FOR ADPs 1975-84**

| Year | ADP Site | Bank Loan | Total Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1975 | Ohaji, Imo | $19.0m | $37.5m |
| 1979 | Bida, Niger | $23.0m | $64.4m |
| 1979 | ARMTI, Ilorin | $9.0m | $18.2m |
| 1979 | Ilorin, Kwara | $27.0m | $64.4m |
| 1979 | Forestry | $31.0m | $79.3m |
| 1980 | Oyo North | $28.0m | $69.4m |
| 1981 | Bauchi, Gombe | $132.0m | $350.6m |
| 1981 | Kano | $142.0m | $482.2m |
| 1981 | Agricultural Asst. Project ATAP | Ibadan, Kaduna Enugu, Benin, Jos | $120.1m |
| 1982 | Sokoto, Gusau | $147.0m | $498.7m |
| 1984 | Fertilizer Import | $250.0m | $532.4m |
| 1984 | Kaduna, Funtua KADP | $122.0m | $194.0m |

**Source:** Extracted, with modifications, from **African Farming** September/October 1986.

Contradictions are part of the World Bank's constitutional and institutional policy. Its policy purportedly intends to help the poorest rural inhabitants but the reverse is the case as there is no reflection of change, over time, in the improved condition of the target groups. In essence, there is no evidence to show that any of its rural development projects possesses the institutional capacity to transform rural condition of living and realistically designed to benefit the poorest.[4] As it lends money to government with high investment rates, the Bank

> *... is committed to promoting free trade, free currency exchange, and thus freedom to invest and repatriate profits.*[5]

As Table 7.1 clearly shows, World Bank-funded agricultural projects are huge and in a variety of forms. While governments are continuously lured into taking up the loans, repayments have all become problematic which invariably favours the donor agency particularly in the promotion of further structural dependency especially in the import-substitution industrialization. Thus, on

lead crop of the area like cotton or groundnut. Without considerations to environmental and historical factors of the area, the Bank has continued to induce production essentially for market by tempting the peasant farmers to undertake risks which inevitably offers the Bank

> *... a confirmed technical package, an assured outlet, a means of cost and credit recovery, and favourable after effects on cereals production from fertilizer applied to the lead crop.*[6]

Hence, commercial adventurism, rather than the social dimension, has concentrated World Bank Projects as only areas considered with high commercial potentials are the targets. Invariably, the Bank's managerial approach beclouds its path to recognise and accord any regard to farmers' priorities of producing food crops vis-a-vis those of the scheme management which are antithetical to each other. This partly explains why food import figures have increased astronomically despite the existence of the projects all over and coupled with the assiduous efforts made by governments and other external sources of finance for increased productivity of staple foods more than ever before.

As these features of the World Bank are replicated all over the World , the Bank has, among others, been explicitly shown to

> *... have operated with high budget on a large scale, using expensive and usually foreign technicians and administrators. They have sought to introduce new technologies untried in local environments, without regard to local variations in soil, climate, social structure, farming systems or market demand. Project appraisals have quantified dubious "data" and been programmed to predict appropriate discounted internal rate of return.*[7]

## 7.03 STATE, CAPITAL AND PEASANTRY

The State is grasped as the factor of cohesion with institutionalized power or relations within a social formation. The relationship between the State and society is understood within the

dialectics of its (State) form and activity or functions; its role in the process of production, capital accumulation and placed on class struggle.

The State, in the performance of its role, has always acted, **inter alia**, to protect the interest of capital accumulation and its reproduction. Since the logic of capital accumulation provides the necessary requirements for its contingent relationship, its dynamic behavior therefore satisfies necessary conditions of capital or the ruling/governing class against other classes; particularly the peasantry. Miliband, for example, shows that:

> *It is for the satisfaction, or for its (state) control, that men compete, and it is against the state that beat the waves of social conflict.*[8]

Attempts at rural development, particularly in the under-developed States, have not been successful. However, further attempts to understand why this is so have largely been scored on how the system of production, operating in the rural areas, are determined by the joint operation of the State and capital with detrimental consequences on the peasantry, in particular.

The growth in the study of the peasantry, particularly during the last three decades, has produced some vital issues and insights related to the role played by the state and the logic of capital accumulation in shaping and regulating the nature, and form of peasant economy, peasant political mobilization and participation. There seems to be a great consensus in the definition of the peasantry.

Thus, the existence of the State constitutes a fundamental criterion in the definition of peasantry which is concomitant with a structural dependency on urban centers. Hence, peasants live in

class societies where the social setting is clear and specific - states, classes and markets - and at the same time the labor process is familial. In essence, peasant economy is where the family is basically the unit of work and consumption.

Notwithstanding, it should be noted that as an agricultural producer, peasant lives in a class society where he produces for expropriation by the center - the State or non-producing class. In essence, peasants relatively look alike universally with similar characteristics and role. As small holders, they are subjected to State laws and their production is essentially subsistence based/oriented with control over the land. Accordingly:

> *The peasantry consists of agricultural producers who, with the help of simple equipment and the labor of their families produce mainly for their own consumption and for the fulfillment of the obligations to the holders of economic and political power.*[9]

In the socialization of labor process however, the peasantry should be grasped in similar ways as a wage worker is situated particularly in terms of capital, labor-power and the opposition between the use value and exchange value.[10] There is nevertheless a need to conceptualize the peasantry within specific and concrete historical conjunctures from the primitive to capitalist modes of production.

The peasant economy possesses what Chayanov (1966) describes as a special unit of production and consumption. Its specific economic system constitutes a combination of land, labor and means of production within the natural process of family development. Hence, the labor product provided by the peasant family is the only possible source or category of income since the social phenomenon of wages and profits found in the capitalist economy does not exist.[11]

The peculiarities of peasant economy is grasped within the inherent mechanisms found in its economic system. For example, there exists an internal balance or equilibrium between family consumption and self-exploitation of labor. It is shown that in situations of decreasing prices of agricultural products, peasants try to maintain the level of consumption through intensification of production.[12]

It should be noted that the invariant natural process theory of peasantry is weak because peasant economy is originally centered, constructed on natural process determined composed and played by the producing group.[13] This is because the social character of the labor depends on age, sex and upon the natural conditions and differences in season.

But Kerblay, on the contrary assets that the theory of peasant economy is an analytical concept where changes within the peasant economy in operation do not alter the nature of the peasant society.[14] Invariably, a consideration of the relationship between producers and non-producers in the entire process of production has to be made. The general assumption is that peasant societies are societies where the use-value of products predominates.[15]

Peasants, as producers of essential agricultural products, use simple technology (tools) and family labor to produce for the needs of the family. They are however further oriented, consequent open the use of the instrumentality of State power, towards the fulfillment of the requirements of the State in the extraction of surplus. The most significant aspect of peasant economy is that the peasant owns or has some claims over the land he cultivates.

Invariably, peasants are found in many or different modes of production. Therefore, the specific dominant productive relations in various modes of production make peasants in each mode of production fall within a specific social category.[16] Hence, the basic characteristics and role of the peasant show that he produces for himself, he produces for the State where surplus is appropriated; therein fulfilling other State obligations through payment of various forms of tax.

It is in the fulfillment of state obligations, Marx shows that in order to make the specific mode of production fully developed, peasants must have the ownership of the land they cultivate. He argues that the peasant economy may not be regarded as a separate mode of production of itself as it excludes a

> *...rapid development of the productive forces, social form of labor, social concentration of capital, large scale cattle-raising and the progressive application of science*[17].

Thus, the peasant economy is merely

> *...a sectorial mode of production which is articulated and does not articulate others and which is dominated and does not dominate others.*[18]

Classical theorists had debated on the existence of classes within the peasantry. For example, Lenin schemed peasantry into a number of classes. All the reverential schemes may be reduced to three simple divisions (a) the poor peasants, usually tenants, cultivating landlord's land, (b) middle peasants, who are usually independent small holders, (c) rich peasants - very often capitalist farmers and exploiting wage labor.[19]

Invariably, peasant differentiations may be discussed under the labor process; (wage or family

labor, cash or food crops cultivation) property holding (economic surplus spent to accumulate capital) and relations to the markets (in terms of economic status of the employed by both wage and family labor with regard to the degrees of exploitation).

It is necessary to note that capital has, to a large extent, caused the expanding differentiations within the peasantry especially by those who own the means of production and substantial capital. For example, how is it possible for the peasant to produce cash crops for his own livelihood and at the same time produce food for his family and surplus extracted by the state?

The modern view however agrees that beyond a certain point in the socio-economic differentiations of the agrarian population, the term peasantry is no longer applicable[20] except that today there is even reluctance to accept a generalized class division of the peasantry. Defined as a class-in-itself, as a body of people who have the same kind of relations to the means of production as well as other common economic and social characteristics.[21]

Capital penetration into the rural areas is usually precipitated by increased polarization of an already differentiated peasantry. However, the greater the degree of penetration of capital into the country-side, the greater the degree of extraction and exploitation of the peasantry and the greater the degree of peasant differentials into the rich and landless peasants ('kulak' and 'peasantriat').

The process of subsuming subsistence into capital should be seen to have taken a tremendous and wider dimension even before the formal imposition of colonial rule. Therefore, colonialism had provided the umbrella for the participation of rural economic intervention through the

penetration of capital. The subsuming of the subsistence economy under the tentacles of capital has had adverse consequences on the peasantry, in particular, and the entire socio-economic and political set up, in general.

For example, the commoditisation process was essentially designed as an avenue for a dramatic exchange from subsistence to cash crops in order to regulate and control the peasantry. Hence, the integration and subjugation of the peasant economy into capitalist mode of production, through the process of monetization and surplus appropriation, were to enhance the requirements and sustenance of capital accumulation in one of its primitive forms.

The state has not been able to extirpate the peasantry but has reorganized it in such away to serve capital in many forms and dimensions. Invariably, capital subordinates peasantry by distorting the natural economy through slave trading, economic plunder, colonialism, alienation of land by settlers, establishment of peasant commodity production etc. Thus, most of the state capital regimentation on peasantry are too much and therefore peasants have not been able to survive the conditions set by the State. Furthermore, the squeeze on simple reproduction, where the mode of production is being blocked because the requirements of capital are too much, has assumed a very tremendous dimension.

Since agricultural activity is the sole occupation of the peasantry, it is necessary to examine how the State-capital alliance has affected the small-holder sub sector. There are several theoretical explanations on the poor state of agricultural productivity in the under-developed States and the persistent rural poverty and differentiations ranging from the Malthusian to free market theses. The major organ of international finance capital, where the state serves as an intermediary, is the World Bank.

Since its establishment in 1946, the World Bank, as part of its policies over time, has evolved a policy of granting loans for the development of agriculture with a view to combating poverty. Under the McNamara presidency the bank earmarked about 70 percent of its agricultural loans essentially for the small-holder peasant sub sector with a view to increasing peasant productivity in the under-developed States. The policy package generally induced acceleration in the rate of land and tenancy reforms, better access to credit, availability of water through irrigation, improved and expanded extension services and intensive agricultural research, creation of new rural institutions and organization.[22]

This means that capital must be set to freely move about into the countryside of the under-developed States. Since then and particularly from the 1970s the Bank has pumped over 111.19b US dollars into the agricultural sectors of the UDCs but notwithstanding, agricultural sectors in those countries have continued to face chaotic situations. The state is therefore an agent of capital.

In the under-developed world not only does the State, within the performance of its primary role, invite capital to penetrate but at the same time, provide conducive atmosphere for its operation. The State intervention, in various economic, political and social activities, is only a manifestation of the various forms and magnitudes of how capital dictates to the wills of the state.

Historically, the sequence and stages of the commoditization of the peasantry are long, striking and without uniformity. The unevenness is extreme depending on the level of social development, nature, and intentions of colonial actors as well as how international capital penetrated and consequently destroyed pre-capitalist mode of production.

The historical stages on how the peasant production and reproduction are conditioned by the operation of capital in league with the state differed over time and space. Bernstein presents a vivid and lucid explanations on how the natural economy - where the production of use-values was dominant with simple exchange - was distorted and destroyed.[23] The distortion and destruction took a variety of forms beginning from the epoch and methods employed for primitive accumulation - slave raiding and slave trading, the collection of natural products by coerced labor and other forms of plunder.

The primary objective of the colonial State was to destroy the natural economy by systematically introducing commodity relations. This was followed by the gradual break in the reproduction cycle of the system of production by employing various forms of coercion available to the State. Thus, the supervisory role of the colonial State since the initial period of the penetration of pre-capitalist formation was crucial in the effective organization of the conducive atmosphere of the exploitation of resources; particularly land and labor.[24]

Different patterns of exploitation took place with regard to land alienation and appropriation for the production of preferred agricultural and mineral commodities. A peasant commodity production was established which directly separated producers from the means of production and thus without any change occurring in the instrument and the forms of labor process.[25] Therefore the incorporation of social formations within the circuit of the world economic system has thus been assumed.

The break in the reproduction cycle as a result of the incursion of capital was accomplished. This was accompanied by a monetization mechanism used as a canopy to impose taxation,

introduce cash crops and incomes and then control corvee labor in public works (to provide basic infrastructures for easy accessibility and movement of commodities for the maintenance of 'law and order'. Thus, the erstwhile economic system were systematically undermined sequel to labor withdrawals from the use-value production in a variety of agricultural and non-farm activities like craft, manufacturing, hunting etc.[26] It should be further noted that

> *the rapture in the reproduction cycle of the natural economy was affected through the substitution, in the sphere of necessary consumption, of commodities for use-values previously produced locally or acquired through simple exchange. The needs of simple reproduction came to include the consumption of commodities and new needs to develop this process involves erosion of an entire culture of production and the 'disqualification' of many traditional production skills, particularly in non-agricultural activities.*[27]

The form, extent and specificity of the commoditization of the peasant economy during the colonial era must be analyzed from "the relationship that commenced between capital and peasant in the form of commodity production which occurred historically. Capital, in league with the state, therefore regulates the conditions of peasant production as well as exchange.[28] As peasants, particularly during the colonial era, were tied to particular techniques of production or cultivation, the movement and operation of capital in the country-side had undermined peasant conditions of commodity production and exchange. Hence the congenial condition for the expropriation of the peasantry may be summed up as follows:

> *Production and supply of cash crops in the colonial economies had been of great interest to the metropolitan industries which consumed the crops as elements of constant capital; the large trading companies which organized the collection of cash crops and the subsequent export to the industries of the particular colonial power or to the world market; the colonial state which was interested to the extension of commodity relations for several reasons: to increase its source of revenue, to ensure the supply of raw materials to the industries of the home country, and at the ideological level, to turn Africans into 'economic men', producers and consumers of commodities as part of the programme of the 'civilizing mission'*[29].

Hence, subsequent events culminated into further distortion of the peasant economy as a direct consequence of the forceful introduction of the colonial economy. The primary objective was not only to effect and perpetuate colonial cohesion but at the same time effectively and systematically break the then existing reproduction cycle by the penetration of commodity relations. The peasant system of production, based entirely on simple tools and family labor, constituted the predominant way of life of majority of Nigerians.

## 7.04 THE WORLD BANK AND KADP IN MAIGANA

In pre-colonial times, Nigerian society could classically be described as agrarian but without an agricultural policy.[30] During the early epochs of colonial rule, identifiable sets of agricultural policies did not however exist until colonialism began to show its bias in the cash crop economy.[31] The political economy of rural development in Nigeria is undulating to urbanism dictated by the waves of the world economic order. Urbanism is therefore an inundating world phenomenon with the fastest rate of urban growth in the under-developed part of the world where economic development is perceived and tailored along the state policy of import-substitution industrialization.[32] Brian Goodall buttresses that:

> *... as an urban area grows in population, acquires new functions and expands existing activities, its relationships with its hinterland and with the system of urban areas are altered, its physical territory is extended and its internal arrangements undergo adjustments.*[33]

Thus, Myrdal arguments on the new status or role acquired by an expanding or growing urban area further buttress **inter alia,** that market forces, more often than not, tend to play crucial role in increasing rather than decreasing socio-economic and physical inequalities.[34] However, Michael Watts remarks that the dramatic stagnation of rural agricultural productivity is a direct

refection of the patterns and orientation of State public spending which exhibits its distinctive urban bias against the rural sector.[35]

Agricultural productivity further suffers a diabolical set back despite the oil-based economy of the Nigerian State. Capital accumulation within that sector has, however, ironically produced adverse consequences in the countryside. Watts further shows that:

> *...construction boom produces rural labor shortages, profit squeeze in agriculture and particularly state responses to lagged productivity in a predominantly peasant sector... Oil deepens rather than transforms the existing political economy...*[36]

The consistent and sharp urban bias contained in the Nigerian development and planning policies has made the State to justifiably intervene directly in the rural sector. This therefore brings the rural economy directly vulnerable to the State-capital incursions through the World Bank - IMF sponsored agricultural project. These projects - the ADPs and the large scale irrigation under the RBDAs- were officially or ostensibly targeted at the small holder peasants. The poor state of the political economy of the Nigerian agriculture was thus hinged on, according to the World Bank IMF diagnosis and prescription, as contained in the Third National Development Plan, 1975-1980:

> *...a backward land tenure system, scattered land holdings, primitive cultivation methods, outmoded technology, scarcity capital and the vagaries of nature.*[37]

The World Bank, on its own part, further identified certain constraints inhibiting agricultural productivity in Nigeria: Low inputs of fertilizer (insecticides, fungicides) low level of irrigation acreage, a skewed marketing system that kept marketing costs high and lack of credit facilities, uncoordinated research and inadequate overall planning at the National level.[38]

The direct beneficiaries of the projects are the so-called progressive farmers or rural bourgeoisie who are supported and mediated by the predominantly oriented commercially middle or upper middle peasants. This is part of the entire process of embourgeoisment of the potentially supported classes. The expansion of the rural bourgeoisie paved way for the social erosion of the rural poor with phalanxes of state machine which have all together produced new dimension for appropriation, accumulation, class alliances and class struggles.

To this end, the peasants have taken the entire process of rural development with great repugnance. Thus they have responded vigorously, collectively and sometimes violently to maintain their independence and traditional set up.[39] The political dimension of rural development therefore hinges essentially not only on territorial displacement through capital incursions but at the same time provided channels for labor movement and mobilization from rural to urban areas.

It is therefore against this background or framework that a proper understanding of the World Bank Mission and the activities of the ADP in Maigana, in particular , be properly comprehended and analyzed. However, an analysis of the impact of the World Bank-IMF policies on Maigana rural economy has to be examined under or within the purview of the entire aspects of the Nigerian dependent and backward economy.

Since its 1954 Report [40] on the economic development of Nigeria, it should be recalled that the World Bank prescribed a capitalist development strategy which, in essence, would enable the preeminence of international or even private capital to expand and consolidate in the rural economy with a view to accelerating capitalist transformation of the agricultural sector.

The abundance of the Nigeria's revenue realized in the 1970s had therefore reawakened the hitherto World Bank's determined interest and desire to effectively siphon it; coupled with the Nigerian 'problematic' as at that period, on how to spend it.[41] The situation thus culminated in the publication of another Report[42] on Nigeria with a recommendation to engage in rural development through the Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) and River Basin Development Authorities (ABDAs) under the auspices of the Green Revolution (GR).

Maigana featured prominently within the roots of colonial economy as well as other colonial commercial enterprises. During the 1975-80 National Development period, the Nigerian government introduced the integrated rural development program. This action was thus a response to the appraisal reports sponsored and sanctioned by the World bank which, in essence, looked into ways or devices of further strangulating the economies of the under-developed World right from their roots. The program thus provides "the means to exploit the productive reserve of 90 percent of Nigerian's farming population" and according to the World bank program, some five billion dollars were expected to be expended in the 1980s.[43]

The primary, if not only objective and emphasis, of the scheme has always been on commercial ventures rather than on social aspects. That is why, for example, the "under-consumptionist" theory of Rosa Luxemburg[44] is relevant and therefore instigates societies with "over produced" products to rally around World Bank proposals. This is with a view to mopping up the economies of the underdeveloped world and thus leaving them poorer than they had found them. This is accentuated primarily to the inevitability of

> *...the continuing contradiction between the ends of production of capitalism as a historical system for expanding capitalist surplus value.*[45]

From the inception of the ADP program, there were three pilot schemes located at Funtua (formerly in Kaduna now in Katsina State since the 1987 State Creation), Gusau (Sokoto now Zamfara -1996- State ) and Gombe (Bauchi now Gombe -1996- State). Each project cost well over 30 million US Dollars for its initial establishment.[46] The scheme is therefore a joint Federal-State venture with the World Bank management as the third party.

With loans etc obtained from the World Bank based on its (Bank's) diagnosis, the Nigerian Government massively extended the scheme throughout the country. Since the 'Local' capital has been subsumed under the orbit of international capital, the World Bank with its own characteristic neo-colonial outfit, operates anxiously without any due regard to the sovereignty of the nation.

As an offshoot of the Funtua pilot scheme - Funtua Agricultural Development Project (FADP), whose five year development phase with the World Bank terminated in 1979, a wider coverage proposal for the Kaduna State Agricultural Development Project came into operation.[47] The rationale for the extension of the project was prepared by the World Bank in 1977. It should be recalled that the Kaduna State government under Balarable Musa could not come to terms with the World Bank on crucial matters of funding and other programs of the project.[48]

Hence, the fundamental differences between the State Government on the one hand and the World Bank and the Federal Government on the other, over the Agricultural Project in the State centered around vital agricultural policy directions and control over the entire staff of the project, particularly foreign staff and their remunerations.[49] In particular, the cultivation of some crops like maize, cowpeas and sunflower, essentially beneficial to a handful of large scale

farmers, at the detriment of a broad range of stable food crops and the peasant farmers, were vehemently rejected.

The state government further explained that it did not want a repeat performance of the FADP be applied to the entire state whereby the government had no effective control of the foreign agency, the policy of massive application of chemicals with the inherent impacts on soil, food question and other ecological distortions capable of rendering the entire area into an "acidic wasteland."[50]

Another essential issue was that since over $30 million spent on FADP alone, a design to cover the entire State (now Kaduna and Katsina States), the amount must be staggering which, according to the stand-point of the government, must be properly organized, coordinated and therefore not entirely left in the hands of the World Bank.[51]

Furthermore, since the project is essentially an agricultural service, it must not justify the absolute surrender to the World Bank since there are Nigerians who are in a much better position, with better local knowledge, background, local training and experience, to perform better than the expatriates in dealing with local problems. This point was basically hinged on the systematic and rationale provision of essential but sustainable services to the peasant farmers on the basis of self-reliance and overall development.

However, since the loan is repayable, not a largesse, the World Bank must not assume the responsibility to control staff or determine its remunerations, with the ₦12 million per annum set aside for expatriate staff.[52] The World Bank, accordingly, insisted to recruit a substantial number (45) of the vital positions for expatriates with fantastic salaries, fringe benefits and

allowances as follows:-

*( i ) The salary of each World Bank official will be about ₦40,000.00 per annum, tax free and paid in foreign currency in foreign Banks.*
*(ii ) They shall receive, in addition, 78% of the gross salary as cost of living allowance.*
*(iii) ₦733 per annum, per dependant, as dependant allowance.*
*(iv ) 25% of the gross salary as "Post allowance" (Whatever that means ?)*
*( v ) 75% of the children school fees to be paid abroad in foreign currency.*
*(vi ) Free-air conditioned and chauffeur driven vehicle.*
*(vii) Free-air conditioned and 'furnished-to-taste' housing.*
*(viii) Free-electricity and water supply.*
*(ix ) Free trip return air ticket to anywhere in the World for annual vacation.*
*( x ) Forty working days leave per annum (whereby they could proceed on leave without the clearance of the project or State Government but at their own wills).*[53]

Invariably, the political imbroglio, imbued with admixture of the PRP executive and NPN dominated legislature did not, in part, allow the then Kaduna State Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) to take roots and function effectively. Thus, after the impeachment of Governor Balarabe Musa, the State reconsidered the earlier stance taken and thereby compromised such fundamental issues with the World Bank. Hence, renewed negotiations between the World Bank and Kaduna State Government resumed in 1983 which resulted in the signing of the loan agreement in December, 1984.

With the agreement signed, initially for a five-year life-span, the state wide ADP took off in July, 1985 with a $122.00m loan. The aim, accordingly, was to increase

> *...the productivity, incomes and standard of 450,00 rural families in the State by producing range of farm support services in association with infrastructural and institutional improvement.*[54]

Thus, funded on a tripartite basis, the project heavy funding rested on the World Bank with 63 percent share followed by the Federal Government with 20 percent and the State Government trailing with only 17 percent.[55]

It should be noted that the initial or original plan and emphasis enshrined in the ADP's scheme was the cultivation of cotton, as all the three pilot schemes are the main cotton producing areas. On the contrary, the ADPs have shown marked bias over maize cultivation. Thus the major pre-occupation of the project in Maigana include fertilizer importation and distribution along with other accompanying chemicals and implements etc. However, many farm centers were established and extension workers employed.

There are a number of program activities which the project has undertaken to execute ostensibly to benefit the rural communities. These activities included the construction of rural feeder roads; aimed at opening up rural areas for a face-to-face contact with international capital, construction of earth dams, seed option and distribution as well as specialized services (farm planting, credit for the purchase of bullocks, tractors etc) and so on. But the major activities undertaken by the project, over the years, have rather indicated clear disproportionate benefits derived.

Prior to the 1987 state creation exercise, Maigana was an arm or station of the main KADP headquartered at Funtua. After the split of Kaduna State in 1987, the project was subsequently bifurcated and reconstituted accordingly. The project was divided into two zones: Maigana and Samaru Katab. In 1990 and 1992 Birnin Gwari and Lere zones were created. With the bifurcation of the project, Maigana thus acquired a new status as a headquarters covering Zaria, Soba, Sabon Gari, Giwa, Makarfi and Ikara Local Government areas.

Accordingly however, the activities of the project in the new dispensation were re-examined with a view to prioritizing programs that were hitherto overlooked in the zone. One of such matters

to address was the way funds loaned from the World Bank were utilized. After the split of Kaduna State in 1987, a total of $25.7m of the loan had been drawn while $96.3m remained undrawn. Thus, Kaduna was given a liability of $13.2m from the drawn loan while Katsina had $12.5m. Whereas $44.9m and $51.4m from the undrawn loan went to Kaduna and Katsina respectively.[56]

A cursory look at the statement of IBRD loan disbursed in 1989, for example, a year after the bifurcation of the project, has indicated a rather an exacerbated situation with regard to the utility of the World Bank loan, especially when each category of the item of the loan is assessed as exhibited in Table 7.2 below.

**TABLE 7.2**
**STATEMENT OF IBRD LOAN DISBURSEMENT IN 1989**
**BY CATEGORIES (FIGURES IN N'000)**

| S/NO | ITEM | COST | PERCENTAGE |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Building House etc | 12,516.00 | (22.17%) |
| 2. | Vehicles spare parts, plant etc | 16,498.00 | (29.23%) |
| 3. | International Staff, Consultants | 14,099.00 | (24.98%) |
| 4. | Chemicals and implements | 11,489.00 | (20.35%) |
| 5. | Roads, rural water supply etc | 1,845.00 | ( 3.27%) |
| | TOTAL= | 56,447.00 | |

Source: Kaduna State Agricultural Development Project Annual Report, 1989. p.58.

It can be observed that items 2,3 and 4 of the entire loan disbursed ended up in foreign lands since all the materials were imported. These accounted for 74.56 percent of the total loan disbursed. However, a number of building materials in item 1 and other essential things for

item 5, substantial portions were also imported which invariably meant that over 90 percent of the disbursed loans were spent where they were secured. On the capital and recurrent expenditure of the project, however, the story is the same with a staggering amount tilting more to the capital expenditure column.

On capital and recurrent expenditure, for instance, between 1985 and 1989 over 68 percent was for capital expenditures while less than 32 percent was allocated for the recurrent activities. With regard to the recurrent expenditures, however, it should be noted that the fat salaries, executive accommodation, varied allowances of World Bank staff and other provisions for International staff and Consultants plus other entertainments are all incorporated. What is left is perhaps very meager for their local accessories. Table 7.3 below exhibits our point.

**TABLE 7.3**
**CAPITAL AND RECURRENT EXPENDITURE OF KADP 1985-89**

| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Expenditure | 1,003 | 12,706 | 38,750 | 16,940 | 54,449 (68.74%) |
| Recurrent Expenditure | 9,175 | 14,282 | 20,407 | 15,766 | 24,766 (31.26%) |
| Total | 10,178 | 26,988 | 59,157 | 32,435 | 79,215 |

Source-Kaduna State Agricultural Development project Annual Report, 1989
Figures for 1985-87 are for both Kaduna and Katsina State's ADPs while figure for 1988-89 are for Kaduna State ADP only.

Furthermore, according to the KADP Annual Reports for eleven years (1985-95) the total cash flow shows over-drawn expenditures against the actual total collections and budgets. It is observed that during the entire period of the Reports consulted (1985-95) a total of

₦950,207,075.10 was expended against the ₦933,555,124.50 total collections from the sources of funding of the World Bank (IBRD) Federal Government, Kaduna State Government and other internal sources. This explains in essence that a total of ₦86,382,461.37 was the average annual spending of the project throughout the period. (See Appendix 4 ). However, the disbursement schedule of the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) Budget and the Actual on Table 7.4 exhibits a similar situation.

TABLE 7.4
KADP DISBURSEMENT SCHEDULE
AMOUNT DISBURSED IN US $ MILLION CUMULATIVE

| YEAR | SAR BUDGET | ACTUAL | % ACTUAL TO SAR/BUDGET |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1985 | 10.7 | 12.2 | 114% |
| 1986 | 4.1 | 15.3 | 373% |
| 1987 | 5.8 | 19.3 | 333% |
| 1988 | 6.1 | 15.0 | 246% |
| 1989 | 4.0 | 2.9 | 73% |
| 1990 | 10.4 | 10.8 | 104% |
| 1991 | 6.2 | 5.5 | 89% |
| 1992 | 15.3 | 19.2 | 125% |
| 1993 | 2.9 | 2.1 | 72% |
| TOTAL | 65.5 | 102.3 | 1529% |

Source: Implementation Completion Report, (ICR) KADP Headquarters, Kaduna July, 1996, P171.

Under the technical services program of the ADP, for example, the project's activities in Maigana include adaptive research, seed multiplication and crop protection services. Among the various ways to pursue these services, a large amount of resources and time have infinitely been spent on various staff attendance of training, workshops and seminars, within and outside the country. In addition, there have also been the senior staff attendance to various meetings to discuss plans, progress and problems of implementation of various programs.[57]

However, other institutional liaison, cooperation and contacts also pre-occupy the activities of

However, other institutional liaison, cooperation and contacts also pre-occupy the activities of the project more than any vital aspect of the peasant farmer. Thus, in collaboration with national and international agencies, the KADP in Maigana undertakes this program, in direct consultations with the headquarters,

> ...***aimed at regular supply of well tested, suitable and promising technological innovations for the extension service to promote and the farmers to adopt***[58](emphasis added).

These institutional contacts were between the Institute of Agricultural Research (IAR), Federal Agricultural Coordinating Unit (FACU) and the project on the one hand and the project's participation in the Monthly Technology Review Meeting (MTRM) as well as regular field visits, the thematic mission from the World Bank to supervise OFAR and OSAR trials.[59]

In 1989, the farmer's field day on Yam/Rice 'mixture technology' was organized at Maigana. This is part of the project's annual ceremonies to ostensibly demonstrate its rather indoor selective farmer activities to propagate its reflections and mechanical applicability to the generality of the peasantry. It should be noted, however, that these so-called mixture technology devices are already well entrenched within the traditional peasant agricultural technology practiced since time immemorial and therefore there is nothing 'new' or 'innovative' about it.

This therefore calls for an empirical insights into what relevant agricultural facilities are provided. Accordingly, Table 7.5 evaluates the feelings of the residents on the provision of agricultural infrastructures to the broad majority of the rural communities.

**TABLE 7.5**
**MAIGANA:PROVISION OF AGRICULTURAL FACILITIES**

| Response | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 22 | 28.0 |
| No | 53 | 64.0 |
| No response | 7 | 08.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

As the zonal headquarters of the KADP, a large spectrum of rural residents in Maigana and environs are expected to be endowed with the provision of modern agricultural facilities and inputs. According to our surveys, the reverse is diabolically the case. What obtains, according to the peasant farmers, are the official infrastructures for demonstration purposes located within the headquarters with results enjoyed by favored farmers.

Hence, peasant farmer's access to such facilities is highly limited, relative and occurs only as a windfall. It is therefore no surprising that our sample in Table 7.5 has indicated that more than 70 percent of our respondents are unaware of provision of any agricultural facilities let alone drive any benefit therefrom. Invariably, the 28 percent of the total sampled respondents in Table 7.5 perhaps portrays those beneficiaries of agricultural facilities so provided by the State through the KADP. It should be noted that these facilities are indeed limited to Maigana alone and sometimes to the immediate localities.

It should further be noted that there exists a number of supporting agricultural institutions which were created ostensibly to enhance productivity and improve rural condition of living. These

institutions were invariably designed to increase the tempo of agricultural and rural development in all its entirety. These institutions included the Federal Agricultural Coordinating Unit (FACU), Agricultural Project Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (APMEU), Forestry Management and Coordinating Unit (FORMECU), National Agricultural Land Development Authority (NALDA) etc. With such institution, more lands were open up for agricultural and rural development programs in collaboration with large funding from external bodies.

While all these institutions are urban based or oriented, they invariably function primarily to serve both the interests of capital and the State. The purpose of storage policy, like grain silos, are to strategically serve at buffer-stock for stabilization of markets in times of scarcity, food security and minimization of post-harvest losses. The inflationary trends in the country and the overwhelming poverty manifesting in the society have rendered all these institutions practically inconsequential to the genuine transformation of rural life.

Hence, these so-called adaptive research of maize/sorghum mixture, maize/cotton, yam/rice etc based on the project's predominant farm laboratory trials are mechanical in nature which therefore do not allow or give room for variations and deviation to the natural phenomenon and economic capacity of the peasant farmer.

Thus, even though the station research as well as the experimental research farm trials may produce an astounding yield per kg per hectare, but when applied to the natural conditions and circumstances of the peasant cultivator, the results have continued to show a remarkable contrast. Thus, majority of farmers have continued to express disgust and repugnance over the procedural aspects of the so-called technology as well as the activities of project staff who exploit the exigencies of the situation to further their personal whims.

In Maigana, there exists two seed multiplication farms essentially established to produce and provide "high quality seeds of good and suitable crop varieties"[60] for maize, sorghum, millet, rice, groundnut. The performance of these farms, since their establishment, has been recorded as 'far below expectations' even when applied to the project's laboratory seed farms managed by the project's staff or even by those favored farmers who willingly cooperate with the project.

Invariably seed multiplication exercise has rather turned out to mean the multiplication of farmers' problems. Thus, the withdrawal of local variety seeds compatible with the local environment or conditions was the greatest tragedy the peasantry is paying dearly. The expectations of an overall food sufficiency and an enhanced condition of living towards alleviation of poverty have further become as elusive as ever. The 1989 KADP Report buttresses that:

> *An analysis of price data for 1984 - 1989 showed an increasing trend in prices in respect of all agricultural commodities. However, the increase in prices of agricultural inputs as well as consumer goods was much higher during this period.*[61]

Furthermore, prices of agricultural commodities have, notwithstanding all devices applied by the State, continued to escalate. This is exhibited in various commodities as follows:

> *Large increases were observed in case of stable food grains as compared to other commodities. Among the former group prices increases ranged from 44% for rice to 20% for guinea corn. It was 174% for millet, 180% for cowpea. The price increase for groundnut and soybeans was 37% and 54% respectively.*[62]

Perhaps there might have been some technical foul plays involved with which the project had become entangled with since its initial conception and operation. Peasant farmers, in particular, have suspected that the so-called improved seeds might have contained some ingredients which are incompatible with the soil, notwithstanding. Hence, the technical innovations of promotion of seeds of improved crop varieties, use of correct fertilizers and their application and use of

agro-chemicals for effective crop protection against pests and diseases[63] cannot be comprehended by the broad base of the peasant farmers.

Hence, farmers who however do not make use of the improved seeds" do not relatively suffer the same fate. This could be explained partly to the fact that the requirements expected to be strictly adhered to cannot be fulfilled given the local or traditional circumstances. A situation whereby the pollen grains, particularly of maize, would affect productivity is an issue of great concern to be taken seriously.

On a number of occasions, cases of incidence of pests and diseases were reported to have occurred at various locations in Maigana area over the years. From the initial stages, for example, the growth of groundnut was affected by aphids pests or disease.[64] Hence, according to the KADP Annual Report, farmers had no alternative other than to painfully destroy some of their groundnut and replace with cowpeas, cotton or BES sorghum as the case may be.[65] Subsequently, cowpeas, suffered both the insect and fungal attack which resulted to a severe loss of yield.

Even though cases of incidence of pests are rampant in the area since the commencement of the project, there was, for example, an occasion when such an epidemic was reported which caught the attention of the Minister of Agriculture and thus ventured to see things for himself. The project officials wiggled the Minister around but fortunately or unfortunately there was no any evidence, as at that time because the report was indeed false. The intention was perhaps to make sensational report with the hope that governments or indeed World Bank might send in materials and cash which would invariably end up in the pockets of the officials. [66]

Under the livestock services of the project, the official goal, accordingly, is to encourage large scale production and conservation of improved pastures in order to combat shortage and enhance productivity.[67] But livestock services in Maigana Area,according to the project's Annual Reports, have not been satisfactory, notwithstanding the activities carried out in terms of the Training and visit (TV) system of extensions and other related works. The reports constantly express that lack of mobility has been a constraint which less than 30 percent of the entire extension staff have vehicles to move. More after than not, even those with vehicles engage more in private rather than official function for which vehicles distributed are meant to serve. Furthermore, pasture area for the cattle has always become an issue of frictions between the pastoralist and farming population.

It should be recalled that the failure of the livestock services became accentuated when the federal work on bulls project took off where a sizeable number of bulls were purchased and distributed to some farmers throughout the state under the Green Revolution rhetoric. Many of the bulls died while others were slaughtered due to an epidemic leading to the collapse of the entire project.[68] In spite of all such issues, renovations of dilapidated veterinary clinics took off. Furthermore, procurement of cold chain equipment and other clinic equipment were undertaken but all in vain.

In addition, a drug revolving fund program was established where livestock farmers could supposedly obtain drugs for their livestock easier and at affordable prices. The irony of the whole exercise has been that the genuine individuals have never come to benefit. The infrastructure put in place and the entire program only end up to directly favor officers and officials of the project. They thus exploited the opportunity to engage in corrupt and brazen

practices leading to, among other things, drugs and medicaments etc becoming no longer affordably procurable to the officially targeted subject.

The economics of **fadama** irrigation development in Maigana has assumed a very fundamental position in the entire activities of the project. Fadama cultivations have great potentials in generating farm income and dry season employment opportunities in the rural areas, especially the wheat production and the issues enshrined in the political economy of its cultivation in Nigeria as a whole. Various Reports of the project have indicated that in the entire Maigana zone, many washbores and tubewells were drilled in order to bring large areas of Fadama land under irrigation. These acts actually complied with the entire process of agricultural mechanization practices manned by large scale farmers.

Under the National Fadama Development Program (NFDP), a loan of $1.232 million was obtained from the World Bank in 1994.[69] The Bank contributed $0.788 million while the farmers, Federal and State Governments contributed $0.336 million, $0.054 million and $0.053 million respectively.[70] In addition to the supervisory role of FACU in this activity, a subsidiary loan agreement was entered between KADP and FACU towards realizing the objectives of the program.[71]

The Fadama development program in Maigana has suffered a number of debilitating problems. The project's Implementation Completion Report (ICR) explicitly shows that the exercise was a failure. Thus:

> *... non availability of hydrogeological and hydrological data establishing ground water potential as well as surface water resources, drilling was done on hit-and-miss basis resulting in high failure rate (i.e. abortive tubewells)*[72]

However, the aquifer studies carried out had no concrete and reliable results and thus, turned out to be a colossal exercise in futility. It should therefore be noted that the entire programme suits only the large scale farmers and not the peasantry in its design and operations. Spare parts of the components and other vital equipment were rather too problematic to obtain or procure; and also too cumbersome to handle by even the so-called progressive farmers.

Furthermore, the program was anxiously and haphazardly set in motion without proper planning, with no adequate, qualified and experienced staff. There were however inadequate drilling rings, hand drilling tools, inadequate field monitoring of the activities etc.[73]

It should be noted that the fadama irrigation development has constituted and posed serious threats to the nature and patterns of the dwellings of Maigana rural houses. The long grasses used for thatched roofs **(Jinka), danni** house cover etc on the rural localities cannot longer be allowed to grow in such swampy areas. Large areas of land in Maigana area have come under a large scale 'Fadama' cultivation undertaken by large scale farmers or the State. This has forced rural dwellers to resort to the **'soro'** roofing or use iron sheets **(kwano)** which even the urban dwellers cannot easily afford. The **'soro'** rooting is highly cumbersome and dangerous which requires annual maintenance with no certainty to leakage proof rainy season, notwithstanding. In addition, due to the inadequate pasture land for the cattle, cattle rearers often go to such areas which further exacerbates the growth of adequate grasses.

In addition to other activities, a number of pilot boreholes were also drilled. Reports have also shown that many irrigation farmers were identified and offered advises, particularly those using pump system. Whereas those farmers using the traditional shadoof system of irrigation were

advised, by the project officials, to abandon the system for pump without necessarily considering certain factors: sustainability of the pump system, farmers' capacities, economic status of the broad base of the farmers and the consequential threats to sustainable practice - (in terms of the continues demand and procurement of spare parts and the escalating rise of materials and implements).

With the introduction of the special program for wheat production in 1988 by the Federal government, Maigana zone was directly and strategically involved in wheat production. In that year alone official records have shown that the project "constructed 1,080m irrigation canals/channels on 60ha pilot irrigation scheme."[74]

Furthermore, sequel to introduction of the tubewell programme, the official report not only recognized the great enthusiasm shown by the few informed peasant farmers in Maigana but also realized their bitter complaints over the initial cost of the irrigation pumps as well as that of tubewells. Most farmers in the communities are therefore not accessible to these infrastructures.[75]

It is important to note that the 1988 special strategy for accelerating wheat production was a national program. On its own part, the Kaduna State Government appointed a Task Force to draw up an action plan for accelerating wheat production. Members of the Task Force were drawn from the Zonal KADP Managers, representatives from Niger River Basin Development Authority and Irrigation Division of the State Ministry of Agriculture. The Task Force was to, among other things, identify potential resource farmers, both small and large scale, to be involved in the wheat production program. With 10,250 hectares of land acquired, the

took off with an orchestrated campaign and provision of inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pumps etc) to farmers at subsidized rates.

As a whole, a total of ₦16.46m[76] was expended in the state for the production of wheat - an essentially urban-based consumed commodity used to produce bread, beer, etc. It should be stressed that the production of wheat does not have much relevance to the rural members of the community and in the entire stable food production. The connections of the World Bank via Federal Government campaigns for wheat production were obvious and clear especially when the first batch of RBDAs were introduced to produce wheat. The money gobbler RBDAs thus structurally dwarfed the ADPs because of their areas of coverage and indeed the funds poured into them.

Thus, to bail the ADPs out, wheat production was also introduced whereby the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and a Federal Government Sponsorship of monitoring and evaluation mechanism was set up for implementation. Hence, all data collected were submitted to the Agricultural Projects Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (APMEU) - an appendage unit of the World Bank.

The activities of the KADP in Maigana have continued to be disrupted by a number of factors. Official records indicate that there have been inadequate 'counterpart funding' as so many operations of the project were either delayed or abandoned. However, there were cases of frequent breakdown of heavy equipment as spare parts were not easily procurable. All these, accordingly, have caused remarkable decline, from the initial momentum, in the production of even the preferred crops. Farmers, due to high cost of fertilizers in 1990 and its scarcity in 1996 for example, abandoned maize to the lesser fertilizer responsive crops.

## 7.05 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE IN MAIGANA

Rural residents constitute the prime target population of measuring the successes or failures of rural development policies and strategies. In other words, rural dwellers are the fucus of the rural development policy output. Hence, rural development programs embarked upon by different regimes over time were strategically aimed at providing essential goods and services to the bulk of the rural residents. Our attempt in this section is to empirically assess and show the extent and dimension of such policies and strategies in Maigana.

There is no disputing the very fact that in spite of all the efforts put and all the resources poured, a lot of obstacles have surfaced and therefore persisted in the successful implementation of such rural development strategies. Many of such obstacles have invariably been less emphasized and thus received perfunctory attention by both the policy makers and policy implementors. In the first place, an analysis the socio-economic background of rural localities must be a prelude to any plausible policy making and implementation appraisals.

The efficacious solutions to the issues and problems which rural development present are well established by the end recipients of the State policy. Within the purview of the rural environment therefore neither can this attempt be fully established from the beneficiaries alone but more importantly from the victims of the policy as well. It is, therefore, indisputable to state that rural development policies and strategies have hit two groups of recipients within the rural areas disproportionately and between the rural and urban areas inequitably.

Our preoccupation in this section is also to analyze the perception of rural development from the rural localities in focus, appraise policy implementation and how all these are appropriately

situated within the rural communities. This has thus become a crucial factor in our understanding of the efficacy rural development in Maigana fucus areas and the dynamics of the socio-economic structure in the rural communities.

In this analysis, therefore, 82 sample frame of respondents were drawn from the rural communities of the study area. The questionnaire was primarily designed to abstract data, among other things, on the socio economic backgrounds of the respondents, the role the State plays and what the rural communities feel the State should or should have done in ensuring a sustainable rural development.

The questionnaire further enquiries on the provision and maintenance of vital rural infrastructures placed in the communities, the quality and quantities of such facilities as well as their functional utility. It also sought to know the nature of land ownership and factors likely to be influencing and determining government policy. On the provision of infrastructural facilities, the questionnaire finally seeks to know the role of NGOs and CDAs in rural development.

Responses from such data are aggregated, quantified, analyzed and presented in tabular and graphic forms to empirically show the extant and extent of rural development in Maigana. Since rural development policies are always targeted to the rural residents, it is therefore proper and indeed incumbent on our part to give rural dwellers the opportunity to appraise the impact of such policies.

**TABLE 7.6**
**MAIGANA:LOCALITY OF RESPONDENTS**

| Locality of Respondents | Quest. | Response | No. Resp | % of Total Respond. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bauda | 12 | 09 | 03 | 11.0 |
| Kwadaro | 06 | 04 | 02 | 05.0 |
| Maigana | 19 | 15 | 04 | 18.0 |
| Sabon Gari | 18 | 13 | 05 | 16.0 |
| Sabon Kaura | 07 | 06 | 01 | 07.0 |
| Tashar Itace | 10 | 08 | 02 | 09.0 |
| Tofa | 09 | 07 | 02 | 09.0 |
| U/Rimi | 07 | 05 | 02 | 06.0 |
| U/Sarki | 16 | 13 | 03 | 16.0 |
| Gimba | 02 | 02 | 00 | 02.0 |
| Total= | 106 | 82 | 24 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Our respondents are drawn from the entire study area made up of nine wards which constitute the political Maigana. However, a deliberate attempt has been made to include a rural area in our sample which is outside the political control of **Sarkin** Maigana as Table 7.6 exhibits. Thus, with a fairly equitable and balanced representation, it may be observed from the Table that 34 percent of the total respondents have come from the more 'open' (Maigana and Sabon Gari) than the 'enclosed' rural communities.

These two communities are closer to Zaria and likely the best to demonstrate or experience the so-called 'trickle down' development from urban areas and other orthodox theories of the deliberate concentration of development in the urban centers. Thus, from the Table, it can further be noticed that the highest response is from the Maigana locality representing 18 percent followed closely by Sabon Gari and Unguwar Sarki wards with 16 percent each.

**TABLE 7.7**
**MAIGANA:AGE GROUP OF RESPONDENTS**

| Age Bracket | Nos. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Less 30 | 17 | 21.0 |
| 30 - 39 | 21 | 26.0 |
| 40 - 49 | 16 | 19.0 |
| 50 - 59 | 15 | 18.0 |
| 60 + above | 13 | 16.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.00 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Table 7.7 indicates that a great number of rural dwellers who responded to our questionnaire are between 30 and 49 years representing 45 percent. It also shows that 21 percent of our respondents are below 30 years. Thus over 60 percent belong to the most active and productive socio-economic group. As this age group is the most agile, mentally sound, it also possesses the potentials to be actively involved in all development programs. Furthermore, this virile and versatile group of rural dwellers is also very vulnerable to abandon rural life for urban centers in search of a variety of urban employments or engage in a number of urban crimes. But the reverse is however the case. Many of such still remain shrouded with the conditions in rural Maigana bothering less about what the frivolity urban life seemingly offers.

Our respondents who fall within the range of 50-59 years constitute 18 percent of our entire sample frame while those who are over 60 years of age make up of 15 percent. It should however be observed that the age group respondents of our sample has been rather equitable

within each age range as can be observed more empirically in Table 7.7. Thus, there is no much remarkable distinctions and disappropriateness of responses in and within each age group, the overall sample distribution of respondents and opinions expressed present a broad spectrum of the reflections of the entire rural communities in focus.

Since we deal primarily with households in the study area, headship in such very circumstances are males; except in very rare situations. Thus, an overwhelming majority of our respondents are males as Table 7.8 indicates. The male respondents invariably represent 87 percent of our total sample. The prevalence of Islamic injunctions of not allowing the exposure of women accounts for the predominance of male over female respondents.

Accordingly, the female respondents in the study area accounts for only 5 percent of the total sample size. These female respondents were either the aged or non-muslim residents in the area, particularly in the sabon Gari (Tasha) locality where a variety of people from many cultural backgrounds are engaged in a number of commercial undertakings. However, about 9 percent, i.e 7 percent of the sample frame have not responded to this question.

**TABLE 7.8**
**SEX OF RESPONDENTS**

| Sex | No. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Male | 71 | 87.0 |
| Female | 4 | 05.0 |
| No. Response | 7 | 08.0 |
| Total | 82 | 100.00 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural development in Maigana, 1996.

One important in ication of this disproportionate male-female response in such communities reflects the preemi ence of male over female gender. There is therefore no disputing the crucial role men play over the affairs of women. Thus, women in the rural localities under study are unlikely to be socially mobilized independent of their spouses and are not potentially to be independently involved in a variety of rural development program designed either by the State or the local communities. With most of the women put in purdah or enclosed compounds, explains, in part, the patriarchal nature of the society.

**TABLE 7.9**
**MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS**

| Status | No. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Married | 72 | 88.0 |
| Single | 9 | 11.0 |
| Widow | 1 | 01.0 |
| Divorced | 0 | 00.0 |
| Separated | 0 | 00.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Table 7.9 portrays the marital status of the sample of the rural communities in focus. Thus, an overwhelming number of our respondents are married, and in almost all cases with children and a large number of dependents. These dependents serve strategically as a potential work force for the households. As regards male and married respondents, a sizeable number has more than one wife; some up to four wives as prescribed by Islam. These married respondents consist of 72 people representing 88 percent of our sample.

Our investigations in the study area however reveal that as old as 16 or 17 years, male members, more often than not, are wedded to between 9 and 11 years female counterparts in the localities. This trend is ancillary to the age group analysis of the study area. Thus, the relative social stability and smooth succession without much or any qualms in the rather very extended families are remotely hinged on these.

There is, notwithstanding, a very important implication for this predominant trend of very early marriage in the rural society. Thus, a part from painstakingly managing the uncomfortable dictates of rural situation, there is less concern for any challenges in a variety of socio-economic and some times political endeavors. The exception being that of tilling the soil to produce for sustenance and surplus disposed off or extracted.

Furthermore, the early they are wedded, the less the chance to go to school and the more responsible they become to struggle to find their means of livelihood since they would be gradually phased out of **gandu** (fed from the overall household bowl). It can be observed that only 11 percent of our sample respondents are singles. Most of them are non-indigenes while the few male indigenes are either already engaged or preparing grounds to be wedded with the female counterparts.

**TABLE 7.10**
**MAIGANA:EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS OF RESPONDENTS**

| Standard | Nos. of Respondents | % of Total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Primary | 9 | 11.0 |
| Post-Primary | 3 | 04.0 |
| Post-Secondary | 8 | 10.0 |
| University | 1 | 01.0 |
| Informal | 61 | 74.0 |
| Total | 82 | 100.00 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Table 7.10 shows that 61 respondents representing 74 percent of our sample have not attended formal schools. Thus, there is an overwhelming low level of educational attainments, in both the Islamic and western education amongst the people in the study area. Even the 11 percent respondents of those who read up to primary standard it was discovered that all of them can not properly identify basic letters and figures and thus can not read and write properly.

It can however be noticed that Table 7.10 portrays that between 9 and 11 percent of the total respondents have attained post secondary and University qualifications. This category of respondents was caught in the researcher's net when they called at home during a weekend. As they are all not residents of the rural community, though indigenes of the area, they call at home periodically. They attained this rare qualification not by accident but because they began to attend schools since childhood either in Zaria or Kaduna. Many of those who read up to secondary level, which represents 4 percent of our sample, can not be clearly distinguished from those with the primary standards. This is probably because of the ways and patterns of imparting knowledge has now turned out to be in terms of quality teachers and the condition of poverty pervading the society as a whole.

**TABLE 7.11**
**MAIGANA:MAJOR OCCUPATIONS OF RESPONDENTS**

| Occupation | Nos. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Farming | 49 | 60.0 |
| Civil servant | 7 | 09.0 |
| Business | 4 | 05.0 |
| Others | 22 | 26.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Accordingly, farming is un-disputedly the chief occupational pursuits of the rural residents. Table 7.11 shows that farming occupation constitutes 60 percent of the total rural dwellers who responded to our questionnaire. The Table however reflects the diversified pattern of the rural occupational activities. However, most of those rural residents who engage in other occupational activities also participate in the agricultural pursuits; either as traders (business), civil servants or a variety of activities. In other words, as majority of rural dwellers associate themselves with farming occupational activities, they however assiduously cultivate trading or commercial habits. They thus combine farming with trading or any commercial undertaking as part of the non-farm income to supplement their primary farm income.

It should be stressed here that all the other occupational categories of the rural communities do not require any high or special level of formal educational attainments. All that is required is to be practically under the apprenticeship of an experienced person. Hence, many of those civil servants are, for example, either auxiliary teachers or rudimentary ADP workers and the likes.

There is, therefore, no disputing the relevance of the intricate relationship between educational attainments and occupational distribution of members of the communities. These members directly or indirectly influence the State selective provision of vital infrastructure in their rural areas. Put differently, the educational attainments of members of a locality (rural or urban) and the positions they occupy in government tend to, more often not, pressurize or influence the State to provide social services to the community in question.

While a lot of enlightened members of a community, outside government employments may tend to mobilize, pressurize and agitate for more attention to their areas from government for enhanced social and physical improvement; those inside the government will ensure its realization. The influence of the traditional ruler in Maigana, more than anything else, is always attested by the rural residents as the only personality in bringing certain amenities in the localities.

**TABLE 7.12**
**MAIGANA:ANNUAL INCOME OF RESPONDENTS**

| Income | Nos. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Below ₦10,000 | 6 | 07.0 |
| ₦10,000-₦15,000 | 13 | 15.0 |
| ₦15,000-₦20,000 | 14 | 17.0 |
| ₦20,000-₦25,000 | 5 | 08.0 |
| Over ₦25,000 | 29 | 35.0 |
| No Response | 15 | 18.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

The annual income of the sample respondents through out the study area is exhibited in Table 7.12. While it indicates that 29 respondents across the localities, representing 35 percent of the

total respondents, have an annual income of over ₦25,000, it inevitably shows the degree of poverty amongst the rural communities. Within the current economic crunch in the country, the annual income of ₦25,000 is not in any way spectacular in terms of improvements of social condition of living etc. The extent and intensity of rural poverty have seriously endangered the socio-economic conditions and structures of the rural society, particularly in terms of the distributional dynamics of the average annual income of rural dwellers.

However, the categorization of rural dwellers into three distinct groups of peasantry; the upper, the middle and the lower, can notwithstanding be gleaned from the Table. Category (A) of the upper peasantry **(Masu Arziki or Attajirai)** many consist of those with an annual income of over ₦25,000 while category (B) of middle peasantry **(Madaidaita)** may fall within the bracket of ₦15,000 to ₦25,000. The lower peasantry of the third category may fall within the range of ₦10,000 and below annual income.

It can be observed that over 47 percent of our respondents have annual income of less than ₦25,000 and if added with the 15 percent of the no-response category, it will be over 62 percent. However, the annual incomes of most rural dwellers are equivalent or even higher than the predominately wage urban earners in the public service. Thus, the orthodoxy of rural-urban income gap has since the last two decades, continued to remarkably close and invariably leading to the extinction of the wage-earning class. Notwithstanding the intensity and extent of poverty in rural areas, its shifts to urban areas has hit the wage-earners in a devastating manner to swing the pendulum of enhanced social condition in favor of rural peasant farmers.

In the entire Maigana rural society, the people generally define or consider themselves as **talakawa** in contrast to **Sarakuna** (the nobility) or **attajirai** (the rich or well to do) and so on.

Accordingly Table 7.13 shows that over 68 percent of the rural

**TABLE 7.13**
**MAIGANA:SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF RESPONDENTS**

| Status | Nos of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Talakawa | 56 | 68.0 |
| Attajirai | 7 | 08.0 |
| Business | 16 | 20.0 |
| Sarauta | 3 | 04.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

dwellers who responded to our inquiry have indicated that their socio-economic status and condition are **talakawa**-based characterized by poverty with stressed and constrained agricultural production. This is the category of rural dwellers that directly engages in the production of food and raw materials that sustain urban life. While about 4 percent belongs to the **sarauta** stratum. However the **attajirai** within the community constitute 8 percent while those engaged in a variety of business or trading activities makes up of the 20 percent of our sample.

**TABLE 7.14**
**MAIGANA:NATURE OF FARMLAND OWNERSHIP OF RESPONDENTS**

| Farmland Ownership | Nos. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Gandu | 19 | 23.0 |
| Personal | 36 | 44.0 |
| Jingina | 3 | 04.0 |
| Aro | 14 | 17.0 |
| Shared | 0 | 00.0 |
| No response | 10 | 12.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

The primary activity in rural areas is farming. Therefore, the nature of land tenure is very fundamental in determining sustained ownership of the land cultivated and the socio-economic security of the cultivators. What predominantly obtains in these localities is the customary land ownership passed through customary rules, practices or regulations. Since the entire communities are mostly Muslims the land tenure system is essentially under the Islamic law of inheritance. However, allocations and use of farmlands to some members of the community fall entirely in a different province of land use system.

Hence, the nature of the land tenurial system in the communities does indicate, in most cases, that many of the rural dwellers are not the rightful owners of the farmlands they cultivate. According to Table 7.14, it is shown that over 56 percent of those who responded to our questionnaire do not own the land they cultivate. This therefore has an implication to the degree of investment the cultivator may wish to put in the land for fear of being given a quit notice.

Accordingly, all categories of farmland use in the localities, except that of personal category bequeathed by a chain of ancestors, have a short-term security usage. In other words, there is still a predominance of outsiders/strangers, not bona fide members of the community, to obtain the rights to use farm lands from the rightful owners under a variety of arrangements. Another category is that which involved the so-called original members of the community but have, over a long period, been dispossessed of all other things, including land due essentially by virtue of their class position which consequently transformed them as secondary members of the community.

However, there are(**Hurumi** areas) community land areas whereby no body or group can claim ownership. They are generally called no man's land or grazing land (**Hurumi**). They were

essentially used to tie up domestic animals from morning to evening, during farming season so that they can feed on there rather than leave them move freely to destroy farm crops. This tendency and purpose for such **hurumi** land areas has ceased due to increasing theft of animals tied up there. Rural dwellers over time have resolved to keep their animals right inside their domains. These **hurumi** areas have turned out to be 'given' out to aliens to either farm or build houses as the case may be.

As portrayed in Table 7.14, while 19 respondents, representing 23 percent of the total respondents, are on **gandu** land tenurial system, 14 of the same sample, representing 17 percent are on lease or **aro** arrangements. However, 4 percent of the sample respondents is cultivating farm land on pledge **jingina** basis. The no-response category portrays those members in the community not primarily engaged in agricultural pursuits. This represents 12 percent of our sample. Furthermore, since the traditional system is not all that hostile to non-indigenes or migrants from other rural communities, they are thus easily accommodated within the traditional land tenurial holding and in many cases possess the de facto rights of ownership of the land assigned.

**TABLE 7.15**
**MAIGANA:LABOR EMPLOYED ON FARMLANDS OF RESPONDENTS**

| Labor | Nos. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Personal | 24 | 29.0 |
| Gayya | 3 | 04.0 |
| Family | 28 | 34.0 |
| Kwadago | 16 | 20.0 |
| No Response | 1 | 13.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Table 7.15 exhibits the personal, **gayya,** family and **kwadago** types of labor predominantly employed on the farmlands of our sample respondents. The most predominant type of labor is that of the entire family labor, particularly in such households where there is a large number of family members and dependents. Families of this size are the common features of rural household settlements. Our sample thus shows that 34 percent of the total respondents engages the labor of its family members on agricultural and other productive activities.

Whereas the traditional **gayya** system of labor and production in the rural communities has completely declined or even collapsed (4 percent), the wage labor system **(kwadago)** is rapidly on the increase. This represents 20 percent of our sample. However, even those on family and personal labor do, from time to time and depending on resources, engage wage labor on their farmlands probably to give them time to rest and recuperate. A cursory caparison of land ownership and the type of labor expended within the context of the income range of the our sample, one is tempted to conclude, though hypothetically, that it is quite unprofitable to entirely engage in wage labor, unless it is extreamingly cheap or those engaged in that type of labor on their farms must be extremely rich and that the output far outweighs the entire inputs.

Further on the process of labor mobilization and production in the rural communities, it should be emphasized that the old age institution of the pre-capitalist **gayya** has now been extirpated and replaced by the capitalist system of wage labor **(kwadago)** on farms. **Gayya** as a system of collective labor mobilization exists in the area only in the spheres of community road construction/repairs, clearance of community grave yards and other voluntary public utilities embarked upon by either the NGOs or CDAs for the benefit of the members of the communities.

Thus, the era has gone when the nobility could coerce peasants to work on their farms under the pretext of **gayya.** Even the corvee work on the Mallam's farm which hitherto compelled **Almajirai** can not be practicable without giving them (Almajirai) some token amount of money to spend as well as providing meals from the Mallam's house. In other words, the preponderance of the reliance of wage-labor in the rural communities has over-taken the preponderance of the mere supply of food in exchange of labor under the guise of **gayya**.

The transformation of the entire wage laboring system in the rural areas has reached a situation whereby the **'Yan kwadago** (wage laborers) are even transported to and from the farm especially if the location of the farm is far; in addition the meals provided by the hiring party. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly common in the rural areas to even pay wives and children some token amounts of money or gifts when their labor is specially expended on the farms.

Whereas **taimako** is another important dimension of the **gayya** process of labor mobilization practiced in pre-colonial time, it should be noted that it was essentially executed to assist the ill and the needy in the community. This type of labor mobilization may, by and large, be said to still be in practice in all the Maigana rural communities. It should be recalled that CDAs in various localities contribute resources to jointly cultivate a particular crop, sell it and then collectively decide what to contribute to the ill and the needy in the respective localities. By and large, it can be realized that it is rather a rarity, if not impracticable, for rural households to engage in **gayya** labor mobilization. Thus, the **gayya** system of labor represents only 4 percent of our total sample respondents as exhibited in Table 7.15.

Houses are part of tangible properties owned by rural dwellers. Hence rural dwellers have, since time immemorial, lived in such houses and have continued to change according to the phase and stage of development. In the Maigana study area, as exhibited in

**TABLE 7.16**
**MAIGANA:TYPE OF HOUSES LIVED IN BY RESPONDENTS**

| House type | Nos. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| (a) Jinka | 31 | 38.0 |
| (b) Soro | 15 | 19.0 |
| (c) Kwano | 22 | 27.0 |
| (d) Cement | 0 | 00.0 |
| (e) Comb. of b & c | 7 | 08.0 |
| (f) No Response | 7 | 08.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural development in Maigana, 1996.

the sample survey in Table 7.16, the type of houses lived in by the rural dwellers has demonstrated the prevalence of poverty in the localities.

The grass-roofed laterite (mud) house **jinka** is the predominant type of houses in the rural society and thus constitute 38 percent of the total respondents of our sample. The completely laterite built and roofed houses **(Soro)** is very cumbersome to maintain and may turn out to be very dangerous if shabbily constructed and negligibly maintained on an annual basis. This type consists of 19 percent of our sample. Furthermore, the Iron-roofed leterite house **(Kwano)** is invariably a child of necessity in the rural areas.

Both the **Soro** and **Kwano** types of rural dwelling structures have come into being not because of needs but primarily out of the absolute necessity to change. This necessity has emerged due to the non-availability or scarcity of the preferred long **Jinka** grasses used for roofing of the houses in the area. Rural residents have thus reverted to **Soro** and now **Kwano** to supplement **Jinka** not because of preference but due to a no better alternative. Thus, the iron-roofed laterite houses **(Kwano)** in the rural communities are steadily on the increase as they represent 27 percent of the total sample.

It is further vividly observed in Table 7.16 that iron-roofed and cement-block house types in the rural communities under study are incompatible with the socio-economic conditions of the rural settings. It accordingly represents a zero percent of our sample. However, the mixed-grill rural housing types where the **Soro**, **Kwano** and cement block are combined in a particular household represents an appreciable 8 percent of rural architectural crisis. Furthermore, the housing types built and lived by the Fulani pastoralist are distinct and thus represent the no-response sample of 8 percent.

It is however worthy of note to mention the recent but ridiculous State policy statement, via DFRRI, on rural housing. Rural housing scheme is part of DFRRI's content strategies on rural development. The strategy, accordingly, is to train what it called the Technical Extension Workers (TEW) by the Nigerian Building and Road Research Institute (NBRRI) to popularize the use of clay and laterite bricks in building houses in rural areas. While rural dwellers, over time and space, have understood the science and technology of clay and laterite for many purposes, the relative poverty of the rural folks has thus subjugated them to live in the characteristic shabby housing types. Once their status in living condition is enhanced, they will

compatibly modify or build better dwelling places to live in. It is absurd of DFRRI a la the State to make such a tantalizing housing scheme for rural areas.

**TABLE 7.17**
**MAIGANA:NATURE OF HOUSE OWNERSHIP OF RESPONDENTS**

| House Ownership | No. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Personal | 26 | 32.0 |
| Family | 44 | 54.0 |
| Hired | 4 | 05.0 |
| Others | 1 | 01.0 |
| No Response | 7 | 08.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural development in Maigana, 1996.

It can be observed from Table 7.17 that majority of rural dwellers live in a rather chaotic housing settlements. Accordingly, 54 percent of our sample has indicated that the respondents still live in family houses with grand fathers, parents, cousins, brothers, nephews etc. In addition, their families, with each family living in his own small apartment (Sasa) with different Sasa heads. In this set up all members share common entrance door (Zaure), hand-dug Well, where available, and in some cases toilets if members of the household do not pass excreta in the back-yard or bush.

The pressure of living in the family houses has forced a good number of Sasa heads to build personal homes for themselves alone with their rather large but nuclear families. This represents 32 percent of our sample respondents. These, may over time, turn out to be another set of extended family houses. However, there are a couple of members of the rural communities who live in rented or hired houses. This constitutes 5 percent of our sample. These people are

mainly non-indigenes and others who have recently migrated into communities before they finally build their own domains. By and large the no-response of 7 respondents is represented by 8 percent of our total sample.

**TABLE 7.18**
**MAIGANA:RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AFFECTED BY RESPONDENTS**

| Migration | No. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 16 | 20.0 |
| No | 64 | 78.0 |
| No-Response | 2 | 02.0 |
| Total | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

The spate of the orthodoxy of rural-urban migration has, over time, remarkably and considerably reduced. This is perhaps due to the hopelessness of the adventure. The relative peace, security and less social stresses reigning in the rural area can not be compared with the chaotic and harsher socio-economic conditions of urban patterns and dynamics of settlements. In other words, the socio-economic conditions in the rural areas have turned out to be relatively much better than what is now being obtained in the urban areas for both the rural peasants and urban wage-earners respectively.

Invariably, what in fact is the situation on the ground is the reverse of the spiral of the rural-urban migration. Put differently, rather than the hitherto rural-urban, it is now either rural-rural or urban-rural migration. The reverse of the coin, due to certain crucial socio-economic factors, has consequently forced many urban settlers and wage-earners to back-paddle their biases of the urban and rural life within the angle of socio-economic survival. The revival and reconnections

as well as establishing of completely new relations with rural areas has taken a rather fundamental dimension. All these struggles were aimed at obtaining parcels of land to farm on. However, the unprecedented influx of many influential people in to the rural areas is akin to the orthodox rural exodus into the urban areas experienced in the 60s, 70s and very early 80s.

Our enquiry on whether or not there were any members of the rural households, in our study area who, for one reason or another, have migrated to the urban centers in search of any thing urban life may offer is shown in Table 7.18. Thus, the responses have indicated that, notwithstanding the proximity of the area to the urban Zaria, the trends of migration are lower than generally conceived. Accordingly, our sample shows that only 20 percent are vulnerable to migrate while 78 percent of our sample have indicated that members of their households still remain in their localities devoid of the temptations of misleading urban life. The no-response shows only some 2 percent of the total respondents.

TABLE **7.19**

**MAIGANA:MIGRANTS FREQUENCY OF CONTACT AFFECTED BY RESPONDENTS**

| Contact | No. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Frequents | 3 | 04.0 |
| Occasional | 7 | 09.0 |
| Never | 1 | 01.0 |
| Not Applicable | 71 | 86.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

It should be recalled that only 20 percent of our sample households, as exhibited in Table 7.18 expresses that some members of their families have migrated to urban areas. Accordingly our study shows that those who have migrated from Maigana rural areas to urban areas and lost contact with their roots constitute only 01 percent of the total respondents as shown in Table 7.19. However those who maintain occasional contacts with their kith and kin from their urban locations constitute 9 percent of the total number of our sample respondents.

Furthermore, Table 7.19 has shown that there are those members of the rural communities who migrated to urban areas and have maintained frequent contacts with their relations in the rural areas under study. This category constitutes 4 percent of our sample respondents. It is further interesting to observe that those households not applicable or affected by rural migration constitute 86 percent. In many instances, therefore, the sample essentially shows that socio-economic contacts with rural kith and kin by those who migrated to urban areas are generally maintained and any urban provocation may instigate a return back to the rural roots.

Table 7.20 shows the responses of contributions, as the case may be, made by migrants for the relative upkeep of the households of the affected households. Accordingly, 7.3 percent of the total

**TABLE 7.20**

**MAIGANA:MIGRANTS' CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HOUSEHOLDS OF RESPONDENTS**

| Contribution | No. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 6 | 07.3 |
| No | 5 | 06.7 |
| Not Applicable | 71 | 86.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

respondents indicate that the migrants do really contribute to their erst-while households. This, notwithstanding, corroborates the assertion that constant contact with rural roots is generally maintained by some of those who abandoned rural settlements. On the other hand, it may be observed that 6.7 percent of our sample indicates that no contributions are received from such urban settlers for the upkeep of the affected rural households. This could have perhaps been sequel to the fact that they are not in a position to contribute because their socio-economic condition is worse-off in the urban areas or they are very far away from home.

There exists several forms of contributions which, in certain circumstances, rural-urban migrants make frequently or occasionally to their rural homes. We note that 20 percent of our total sample respondents affirm the existence of rural-urban migrations within

**TABLE 7.21**
**MAIGANA:NATURE OF CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY MIGRANTS**

| Nature of contributions | No. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Money all time | 0 | 00.0 |
| Money sometimes | 1 | 01.0 |
| Come Home | 5 | 06.0 |
| Any other | 0 | 00.0 |
| Not applicable | 76 | 93.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

their respective households (see Table 7.18). It can therefore be observed that Table 7.21 has vividly expressed the nature of the contribution migrants make to their rural households.

To buttress the thickness or thinness of contacts and type contributions rural-urban migrants make to their relatives in the rural areas, it is important to observe that coming home during

every raining season, to participate in agricultural production, tops the list and the percentage of the total respondents affected in the study area. This represents 6 percent against 1 percent of the combined variables of sending money all the time or sometimes and indeed any other form of contributions. Accordingly, the number of households not affected by the plague of migration still remains high-76. This represents 93 percent of the total household respondents of our sample frame.

**TABLE 7.22**
**MAIGANA:FARMING IMPLEMENTS USED BY RESPONDENTS**

| Implement | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Hoe | 35 | 43.0 |
| Tractor | 7 | 08.0 |
| Ox drawn | 27 | 33.0 |
| No response | 13 | 16.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural development in Maigana, 1996.

The predominant farming implements used by the rural communities under focus are the traditional **garma** and **fatanya** (hoe) as shown in Table 7.22 with 35 respondents representing 43 percent of the total of our sample. In addition to the simple hoe implement, the centuries old ox-drawn farming implements are still widely used as our investigations have indicated. Thus, 27 respondents which represents 33 percent of the total households make use of the implement in their agricultural pursuits.

It can however be observed from the Table that only 8 percent of the total respondents makes use of tractor machines in the farming activities. These are undoubtedly the big or large scale

favored farmers. These farmers are invariably the focus of attention of the State, particularly the World Bank sponsored ADP in the area. The no response category of the sample of 16 percent exhibits other members of the rural community who are not directly engaged in farming as their main or predominant occupation.

**TABLE 7.23**
**MAIGANA:TYPE OF FERTILIZER USED BY RESPONDENTS**

| | Type | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|---|
| (a) | Chemical fertilizer | 7 | 08.0 |
| (b) | Local Manure | 41 | 50.0 |
| (c) | Both a & b | 22 | 26.0 |
| (d) | Not Applicable | 12 | 16.0 |
| Total | = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural development in Maigana, 1996.

The 1996 farming season will be particularly remembered as devastating for peasant farmers in recent times due to the problems of chemical fertilizers they were confronted with. Thus, chemical fertilizers, hitherto relatively available but expensive, were not available at all. The government policy on the commodity made the situation even more grievous. Consequently, only the large scale farmers were relatively able to secure fertilizers even though far less than their usual demand.

The small scale peasant farmers had no alternative other than to revert back to the local manure on their farms on the one hand and change the types of crops predominantly grown. Maize and other crops which are highly fertilizer responsive were abandoned as it was clearly risky to plant them. Even those who attempted ended up off-rooting them for less chemically response grown crops.

Hence, Table 7.23 exhibits this very dilemma as farmers cultivated only the crops that could cope with local manure. That is why 50 percent of our sample respondents used local manure absolutely on their farms compared with only 8 percent of our respondents who used chemical fertilizers. Furthermore, 26 percent of those who responded to our questionnaire had an admixture of both local manure and chemical fertilizers, while 16 percent was not applicable in the fertilizer usage. It should be clarified that chemical fertilizers are predominantly in use other things being equal.

**TABLE 7.24**
**MAIGANA:GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO PROCUREMENT OF FERTILIZER**

| Government assistance | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 2 | 02.0 |
| No | 53 | 65.0 |
| Not applicable | 27 | 33.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural development in Maigana, 1996.

Table 7.24 exhibits a portrait of the role of government in providing assistance to rural dwellers to procure fertilizers and other related agricultural chemicals. The picture exhibited illuminates the actual situation rural peasants are confronted with against the ostensible or official claims of government sensitivity to the need of the rural communities. With 65 percent no government assistance in the procurement of vital ingredients of agricultural productivity to rural residents against 2 percent is rather unfortunate and devastating.

With the withdrawal of government subsidy, peasant farmers face the market forces to procure agricultural chemical while the large scale farmers could either obtain them at give away prices

or with much ease. Peasant farmers in the study area during the period of the survey, could only obtain fertilizer from the NTC only if they were the company's sanctioned tobacco farmers. It should however be observed that our sample portrays that 33 percent of our respondents is not applicable to the subject matter.

On whether or not the peasant farmers in the study area make use of any pesticides, the response demonstrates that 56 respondents, representing 68 percent of our sample do not know the existence of pesticides let alone use and thus, do not need them. However, only 12 respondents represented by 15 percent show that they are aware of them and only a few of them make use of them due largely to their relative cost which not many can afford. Furthermore, 17 percent of our sample respondents may not be applicable as shown in Table 7.25.

**TABLE 7.25**
**MAIGANA:USE OF PESTICIDES BY RESPONDENTS**

| Use of pesticides | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 12 | 15.0 |
| No | 56 | 68.0 |
| Not applicable | 14 | 17.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:-** Questionnaire on Rural development in Maigana, 1996.

Having set out the general outlook of the socio-economic structure in Maigana, the next step, based on the foregoing therefore, is to specifically examine the extent to which rural development in the study area has transformed the socio-economic setting of the rural household.However based on the empirical rural environment and the available data, analysis of the households will tend to bear on whether or not the environmental factors, within the socio-economic

structure, has hindered or enhanced rural development. Furthermore, the 'external' variables of the role of State and the incursion of capital in the rural society are equally very fundamental within the nexus and contours of the rural environment

Hence, issues or variables for analysis include the pattern of land distribution, tenancy ownership and commercialization, nature and process of labor mobilization, quality and quantity of asset ownership, family size and potentials of labor force. Of particular importance is the tenancy issue of 'gado' and its inevitability of destroying the organic unity of the rural household, and system of production. Despite the potential resources abundantly available in Maigana, available evidence so far assessed have tended to suggest a negative pattern resulting in increasing level and intensity of poverty and under-development of resources becoming unabated. This, in essence has a great bearing on and directly points at the State policy on rural development.

To further demonstrate on the role of the socio-economic structure of the rural households, it may be necessary to restate that the people in the rural communities have not been considered and given the attention and importance and thus not recognized prime in the State rural development strategy. Thus, the nexus of rural people and infrastructure, particularly in the operation and maintenance, is very vital in the transformation of rural society. But the tragedy is that the nature and extent of rural development practices present a rather distorted relationship between people and infrastructure as well as the entire mechanism of their vital symbiotic roles.

In the entire sample of 82 respondents, we examined a total 69 household heads, 65 headed by males and 4 by females. In all the households they composed of family members with different

sizes, status and assets. For a better analysis of the dynamics of the socio-economic structure in Maigana and the perspectives of rural development, it is important to classify the households into different categories. Accordingly, Table 7.26 contains a total of 120 house wives, 612 children 571 dependents and 529 male work force (taken out from 571 dependents and 612 children). As a whole, the entire sample examines the impact of rural development policies, through the household heads, on the condition of 1372 rural dwellers in Maigana under focus.

**TABLE 7.26**
**MAIGANA:CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS**

| Characteristics | Number in the sample |
|---|---|
| (a) Male Household heads | 66 |
| (b) Female Household heads | 03 |
| (c) Wives | 120 |
| (d) Children | 612 |
| (e) Dependents | 571 |
| (f) Male work force (from d & e) | 529 |
| Total = | 1,372 |

**Source:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Based on Table 7.26, the husband-wife ratio in the locality is approximately 1:2 while the household-head-child ratio is about 1:9. Furthermore, the household-head-dependent ratio in the rural localities stands at 1:8. Whereas the household-male work force ratio is almost 1:8. It can therefore be noticed that households are large. However, the structure of the family size invariably affects the pattern of land distribution, but certainly not on labor to work on the farms. This is also coupled with the number of the dependents, particularly male work force, members of the households.

In the tenancy of **gado**, particularly in event of the death of a household head, the inheritance, **(gado)** usually transforms various **sasa** heads in the household to declare their autonomy, get out

of the **gandu** system, collect their **gado** and establish their own separate households. This situation usually has its own repercussion as the tenancy of **gado** in certain circumstances, tends towards **saye** (sell or purchase) **jingina,** (mortgage) **aro**, **galla** (rented) etc. Due to the inevitability of the split of **gado** land it ends up with the beneficiaries having meager pieces of land not enough for their families. Many thus bid farewell to farm activities and therefore engage fully in other activities around. Inevitably, all types of land tenancy end up being completely sold off as dictated by socio-economic factors.

Major characteristics of the rural households show that they are generally poor and headed by relatively young household heads with very large family members and even dependents. The age at which rural dwellers predominantly get married perhaps explains this situation as shown in Table 7.27.

**TABLE 7.27**
**MAIGANA: RESPONDENTS' AGES AT MARRIAGE**

| Age at marriage | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| 14 | 01 | 01.4 |
| 17 | 07 | 10.0 |
| 18 | 11 | 16.0 |
| 19 | 15 | 22.0 |
| 20 | 18 | 27.0 |
| 21 | 08 | 11.0 |
| 22 | 02 | 03.0 |
| 23 | 03 | 04.0 |
| 35 | 01 | 01.4 |
| 9(f) | 01 | 01.4 |
| 10(f) | 01 | 01.4 |
| 18(f) | 01 | 01.4 |
| Total = | 69 | 100.0 |

**Source:-** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

It can be observed from Table 7.27 that as early as 17 years of age (or even less, at an exceptional age of 14 years or thereabout ) male members of the rural communities get married. As early as 9 years however, female members are wedded. The female wedded at 18 years of age in the sample is represented by the non-indigenes from different cultural and religious backgrounds. Thus about 50 percent of the male population in **Maigana** rural communities, as represented in the sample, can be described and categorized as household heads with either their own respective sasa and family members in a large household or separate households.

According to Table 7.27 however, at 20 years of age, 74 percent of the rural adult male residents are married. The exceptional ages of 14 and 35 years at first marriage of the male members are rather striking and rare in the rural communities. The former being a classical rural resident and the latter is probably to have been exposed to wage - labor and 'high life' in the urban Zaria particularly during the colonial State public works activities. This was subsequent to the further transformation of urban Zaria.

Furthermore, analysis of the rural households requires their classification based on other important variables of the rural dwellers socio-economic conditions. Included in these variables, in addition to land ownership, incomes, family size etc, is the other categories of assets owned by the rural residents. The pattern of certain assets owned by respondents in various locations is shown in Table 7.28.

TABLE 7.28
MAIGANA: SOME ASSETS OWNED BY THE RESPONDENTS

| Localities | R | W | B | M | C | V | Car | TV | CV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bauda | 6 | 4 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Kwadaro | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Maigana | 7 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Sabon Gari | 5 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sabon Kaura | 4 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Tashan Ita | 5 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Tofa | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ung. Rimi | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ung. Sarki | 11 | 12 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Gimba | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total = | 46 | 42 | 43 | 07 | 09 | 01 | 02 | 02 | 03 |

Source:- Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

R=Radio, W=Wrist Watch, B=Bicycle, M=Motorcycle, C=Clock, V=Video, Car=Car, TV=Television, CV=Commercial vehicle.

Since rural development is a strategy to improve or change socio-economic life of rural dwellers, the transformation of the human factor, the provision and sustenance of infrastructures for the optimal utilization of the targeted rural poor, particularly those who live below the 'poverty line', are the ultimate objectives. However, within the matrix of rural development and the socio-economic condition of the rural households, possession and accumulation of assets are invariably dictated not only by surplus generated through income but equally on what rural dwellers prioritized as crucial.

It may be recalled that by mid 1970s, the equivalence of an annual per capita income of $50 or less was considered and defined as those who lived in rural areas to be below the poverty line. It should therefore be noted that the 'poverty line' is now no longer a rural exclusive preserve as it has swiftly jumped and drawn over the heads of a large percentage of urban wage-earners.

Poverty, hitherto a rural phenomenon, has now become vividly prevalent in urban areas and is swallowing its victims more from urban than rural areas.

Thus, pervaded with poverty, accumulation of assets in the face of the struggle to survive is never an issue in the minds of the rural dwellers. Since rural dwellers' accessibility to assets is subject to the resources endowed in them, it is pertinent to observe how the pattern of some asset ownership is distributed in Maigana households as exhibited in Table 7.28. Accordingly 46 respondents have indicated that they own small transistor radios. None of the radios is less than 10 years and purchased as second hand or inherited. Whenever there is an important occasion; broadcast through the radio, rural residents interested in large groups besiege a radio to hear the broadcast.

With regard to possession of wrist watch, about 51 percent of the total respondents claims to have either 'live' or 'dead' wrist watches most which are digital. Bicycles are very important components of tangible asset which have multi-dimensional purposes to the rural dwellers. To possess a bicycle is to possess a means of relatively easier mobility from place to place and from home to farm etc. Only 43 respondents have bicycles which are of course the older generation which have continued to survive rural roads.

While bicycles are important partners of the rural peasants, motorcycles have come to play far more important role. But those who possess them are rather very few. Apart from serving personal mobility purposes, they are equally used for commercial **kabu-kabu** transportation for those who require the services. Other assets like table or wall clock, video, car, television and commercial vehicles(lorries,buses,tractors etc) are owned by top echelon of the rural communities especially traditional mobility and the exceptionally educated elites.

## 7.06 NON-AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN MAIGANA

The main objective of this chapter is to present a clear picture of the dynamics of rural development in Maigana. Thus, non-farm activities will through more light not only on the pattern, extent and intensity of the socio-economic structure of the rural communities but also offer sufficient insights on the perspectives of rural development in the entire rural society. However, the supplementary or secondary occupational activities which the rural dwellers engage in, constitute the other dimensions of the rural economy.

There is no disputing the stark realities that rural development cannot be achieved on sectoral basis or focus, particularly by focusing on agriculture alone; notwithstanding the role modern agriculture plays in transforming rural areas. It is paramount to look at the rural community in its entirety and appraise its economic development potentials in non-agricultural activities. Thus, social, economic and other vital sectors are equally and crucially symbiotic or integral in the entire rural development approach, while the various categories of the rural population have become the vital variables in the measurement of rural development.

Maigana rural population predominantly engages in agricultural activities with accessibility to factors of production. The farm income generated is therefore not sufficient to meet the challenges of the households' basic requirements. Hence, considerable period, after agricultural products are taken home and before the commencement of rainy season, are generally classified as slack with less activities and income. As these slack periods do not economically augur well in the austere village way of living, the threat for survival has forced poor family households

in the rural communities to make use of the slack agricultural periods in other potential supplementary employments.

Even the relatively well-to-do rural residents may not necessarily be farmers alone without combining farming with a number of activities like trading, commerce etc. In Maigana, this group of rural entrepreneurs is very few. As this groups is economically powerful, it monopolizes very vital rural economic sectors, and therefore plays profound roles in the social and economic transactions in the areas. In addition, however, this group easily gains access to State patronage with adverse and fundamental implications for rural development. The client-patron relationship between the group and the State-cum-World Bank/IMF rural agenda renders rural development to be seen only in the eye of the beholder.

Non-farm activities in the rural communities of Maigana are as important as agricultural undertakings. Within the contours of the rural economy, non-farm activities perform crucial roles and provide essential services for the sustenance of the rural households. An examination of this sector, therefore, portrays their role and bearings on rural development especially in areas of rural employments, in manufacturing, services, processing and constructions. In addition, this sector indicates, in a substantial way, the entire process of rural accumulation, exploitation, class formation and class struggle.

However, the existence of a variety of non-farm activities in the rural areas, indicated earlier in this chapter, is a direct manifestation of the prevalence of potential trends in the diversification of the rural economic activities. Otherwise, such trends and proliferation of diverse petty-trading and commercial activities in the rural economy may well reflect a keen

struggle for survival. Almost all the households in the rural communities engaged in one or more kinds of non-farm activities by all the categories of the rural population.

As these non-farm activities spectacularly generate between 20 and 30 percent of the totality of the rural households' primary source of employment incomes[77], they are essentially used in the cushioning of the socio-economic condition. Important characteristics of non-farm activities show that they are 'fluid' and 'gliding' occupations whereby movements in and out of them are very easy as they generally require no much technical expertise or capital. Furthermore, one may begin with a single activity but end up with different or a number of them combined or even abandoning all. Those engaged in such unstable activities are usually the poorest stratum of the rural poor who own or possess no tangible assets and always struggling to survive.

Since non-agricultural activities in rural areas diverge, they may be broadly grouped under industry and service categories. Rural traditional industries like weaving (saka), dyeing (rini) building (gini) etc have, since the opening of the nineteenth century, been destroyed, distorted and modified consequent to the advancing modern industrial outfits.

In retrospect, the pre-colonial Maigana enclosed settlement and the immediate environs had a variety of well developed crafts practiced or located at different households or quarters. That was why the households or quarters where crafts were practiced were named or bear the specific crafts. However, professional titles of the crafts were awarded to the outstanding entrepreneurial households/or heads of quarters. The onslaught of colonialism destroyed such crafts while those that survived functioned only within the specific colonial political economy. For example, the banning of the local seed cotton and the introduction of the new seed cotton in the locality during

the colonial era not only destroyed cotton production but also the **gwado/luru** industries and other textile related crafts.

In the whole of Maigana rural communities, apart from services done by the out-modeled corn grinding machines, there exist no produce cottage industry, which employs wage-labor of any type. There was however an attempt to establish a cement block making industry in the locality but has not yet materialized for the obvious reasons of market or potential users around. However, only the craft production exists, operated and managed by one person (except where necessary, there is a need for an attached apprentice) with no defined division labor and fixed wage.

Demand and supply dynamics of rural environment are usually determined, more often than not, by the growth or phase of rural industrialization. Thus, rural industries not only provide employment opportunities and increase of income but also ensure effective demands towards enhancing a significant contribution to the supply and sustenance of the basic needs of rural dwellers. Under the 'modern' industrial sector, the types of activities engaged in the rural communities include transportation motorcycle repairs and the likes. All these are predominantly or entirely concentrated in the Sabon Gari commercial center of Maigana. In addition, manufacturing and repairs of agricultural implements like hoes for ploughing(**garma**) and weeding(**fartanya**) etc are sought in Zaria and sometimes in Soba.

It should be recalled however that Maigana rural women fierce engagement in the traditional industrial enterprises of making **gwado, luru** etc from cotton was not unconnected in the notable potentials the area was recognized as a cotton producing area. They in addition engaged in the

processing of groundnut oil and thereby making **kuli-kuli** in and around the communities. Furthermore, the abundance of sheabutter trees (**dorawa**) in the areas has encouraged rural women to process the sheabutter nuts (**kalwa**) and produce **daddawa**, the traditional maggi. All these activities have important bearings on rural development, especially on the need to invest and harness these veritable resource for enhanced living condition.

While industrial development in rural communities must be tied to agriculture and agricultural development, it should be emphasized that the remnants of the past industrial activities still exist side-by-side with modernity but with necessary modifications. The linkage between agriculture and industry in the overall rural development cannot be over-stressed. Potentials for rural development exist when existing factors of production, particularly materials, are accompanied with new or improved factors, in form of services, and further improved in organization, management and utility.

The forward and backward linkages between agricultural and industry in the entire development of rural areas have been well established. There is therefore the need for a greater understanding of the role each of these vital sectors plays in an integrated rural development process. For instance, in Maigana rural communities, transportation within the localities is predominantly undertaken by means of motorbike. Thus, the spate of **Tokumbo** or **Achaba** or **'Express'** motorcycle importation will lead to their purchases by rural dwellers, sequel to the surplus accumulated in agricultural and non-form activities.

In other words, improvements in transport services will encourage the production of agricultural products. This, in essence, suggests that the forward linkage to agricultural activities will affect

industry and services rendered, especially in repairs. However, labor expended in harvesting time may lead to the development of local manufacture and more efficient threshing methods. Furthermore, with repairs, it also means that with the development of improved roads in the localities, more vehicles will be required and thus repair facilities and personnel enlarged. The whole linkage chain or circle becomes complete when the backward linkage system begins from agriculture producing foodstuff while from industry it produces textiles and from services it produces transportation and the intrinsic repair machinery.

Within this linkage system however, rural women provide other vital services also. Of particular importance is the grain dehusking or removing the chaff from the grains **(chasa da shika)** and food grain processing **(surfe da daka)**. Others include sales of cooked food/drinks and the petty commercial services. Most households in Maigana engage in such services as dictated by the status of the household, labor and capital. It should be noted however that services like fetching of water and collection of firewood, particularly in the inner rural areas of Maigana play important roles within these dynamics.

It should be emphasized that trade and commerce contributed immensely in projecting the economic potentials of Maigana. Thus, the highest peak of trade and commercial activities in Maigana is on the weekly thursday market days. This is when traders from far and near converge to transact business. The shabby structures of the market **danni** stalls are indications of or exhibit the ruralness of the economy and society and thus points to the preponderant neglect in the provision and maintenance of such vital infrastructure by the local government. While rural markets provide avenues for generation of enormous internal revenues for the local government, they are invariably turned into 'gold mines' for the officials of the LGC and thus affect the roles which local governments are expected to perform.

Maigana and other neighboring rural weekly markets possess inherent local linkage sells of goods and services albeit with individual traders' monopoly of such goods and services. This linkage has helped in no small way in the complementary trade transactions as well as easy location of the principal wholesalers and retailers. However, economic or trade correspondence between various markets, dictated by the demand and supply dynamics, has helped in spreading information on prices of some commodities, market opportunities where certain goods are cheaper to buy or costlier to sell.

Hence, rural entrepreneurs moving from one market to another exploit such economic opportunities. Consumers equally identify and make use of such circumstances within the dictates of their economic perimeters. All these trends have gradually enhanced economic development of the rural communities as a whole. Thus, marketing of products and services within the communities or supplied from outside forms part of the vital ingredients for the overall rural socio-economic development and survival.

# FOOTNOTES

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32. It should be noted that the 'marxified structuralist' approach could not overcome obstacles envisaged in the so-called inward-oriented development strategy. This failure has continued to bring about new structural barriers to development and in the process, the policy continues to defeat or undermine the official principles by bringing in the World Bank and MNCs. See Colin Leys - "Under-development and Dependency: Critical Notes" **Cf,** 7/1 **Journal of contemporary Asia,** 1977. See A.G Frank - **Capitalism and under-development in Latin America,** Bengnis, Harmandsworth, 1971, pp 37-38.
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38. World Bank -**Nigeria: Options for Long Term Development** 1975-1980, pp 129-32.
39. Bjorn Beckman -"Bakolori: Peasants versus state and capital". **Nigerian Journal of Political Science,** 1985 pp 1-2 See also Beckman, B. (1981) "World Bank and the Nigerian Peasantry" Uppsala; AkUT 15.
40. See World Bank Report 1954.
41. It was reported that the Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon said that the problem with Nigeria was not money **per se** but how to spend it since there was a lot of money coming from the petroleum.
42. See World Bank Report 1973.
43. Michael S. Watts,(ed) 1987, **op.cit,** p113.
44. Rosa luxemburg, 'Accumulation of capital', ed; Joan Rabinson, London Routledge, 1951.
45. Michael Barratt Brown, "A critique of Marxist theories of imperialism" **cf**. Rogar Owen and Bob sutcliffe (eds) - **Studies in the Theory of Imperialism,** Longman, paper back, London 1972 p.51.
46. See Nigeria: Ministry of Agriculture, 1980. It is stated, among other things, that two aspects of the entire project would be covered by the World Bank. If we are to believe the official sources, however, the Kaduna State Development expenditure on Agriculture for 1975 - 80 plan was projected to be ₦68M. See Michael Watts, 1987, **op.cit.**
47. See KADP Annual Report, 1985, p.1.
48. It should be recalled that the NPN Shagari controlled Federal Government had introduced the Green Revolution Programme to replace the OFN of the Obasanjo Military Regime, a programme sponsored by the World Bank.
49. It is on records that the entire logistics and records of the World Bank operations of FADP have still remained a mystery or secret only known by the World Bank officials.
50. See Balarabe Musa -**Struggle for social and economic change.** NNPC/Gaskiya corporation, Zaria 1982, p83.
51. **Ibid** P83
52. **Ibid,** p83.
53. **Ibid**, p85.
54. **Ibid,** p84.
55. See KADP Annual Report 1985, **op.cit,** PI KADP ICR PI
56. ***Ibid***
57. See KADP Annual Report, 1989 PII, ICR-o2
58. KADP Annual Report 1985, p12 7.KADP Annual Report 1989 PII

59. KADP Annual Report 1985, p12
60. KADP Annual Report 1989, p45
61. KADP Annual Report 1988, p38
62. KADP Annual Report 1985, p.13
63. *Ibid* p.16.
64. Ibid
65. Ibid
66. See. New Nigeria Newspapers
67. Ibid p.14.
68. KADP Annual Report 1994
69. Ibid
70. Ibid
71. See KADP ICR, P107
72. *Ibid., p 111*
73. KADP Annual Report 1988, p26
74. Ibid p. 27.
75. Ibid pp 11-12.
76. Word Bank Sector Policy Paper: Rural Enterprises and Non-Farm Employments, January, 1978.
77. Ibid.

# PART FOUR
# CHAPTER EIGHT

## 8.00 AN ANALYSIS OF RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN MAIGANA

*... the enormous growth in construction, commercial and service sector has tended to derail the rural agricultural sector of its virile labor force.*[1]

*The most basic elements of rural physical infrastructure comprise rural roads, markets in rural towns, and rural water supply facilities. In some areas, irrigation and drainage facilities would also be essential to facilitate agricultural production. At a somewhat higher level of development, infrastructure also includes rural electrification as well as telecommunication facilities and access to electronic mass media. Defined more broadly, rural infrastructure also includes educational, health, and sanitation facilities.*[2]

## 8.01 INTRODUCTION

The trend of mass rural migration to urban centers is imbued with attendant socio-economic and political implications. To a large extent, the high rates of rural-urban migration are a direct result of deliberate State neglect of rural dwellers' socio-economic conditions. Problems of population influxes are often accompanied by over crowding and housing shortages. Thus, the growth of shanty and squalor settlements at the fringes of urban areas have become topical issues of the century. All these are adduced to have constituted fundamental by-products of abysmal provision, operation and maintenance of basic infrastructural needs in the country-side. This scenario is indeed endemic all over under-developed countries.

These problems have therefore increased additional pressures on urban social services such as health care system, water supply, waste disposal, transportation facilities and educational institutions. Thus, the growing number of lumpenproletarians has exacerbated the

unemployment rate and dwindled the potentialities for agricultural producers in both urban and rural areas respectively. This inevitably leads to swelling crime rate, political tension, violence and continuing instability.

Our point of departure is that, apart from the poverty problem, the prime factor for rural-urban exodus is the attractions of the infrastructural facilities placed in the latter; and this trend would continued unabated until such facilities are relatively or equitably provided and sustained in the former. Hence, the sustainability of rural development; particularly the provision, operation and maintenance of appropriate or relevant rural infrastructures has, over time, eluded the hopes and aspirations created in the minds of the rural folks. But in spite of the efforts to formulate rural development policies by various regimes, their implementations have not yet transcended beyond their written forms or proclamations.

This chapter, therefore, attempts to, **inter alia,** examine the continuing technocratic reformist behavior of the Nigerian State in rural development by analyzing factors hindering the provision and sustenance of rural infrastructural facilities. It also evaluates the collaborative role of the State with international agencies on issues relating to rural development policy formulation and execution, finance and maintenance. However, an analysis of the nature and structure of the Nigerian economy fuelled by the World Bank - IMF prescription, contained in the National Development Plans thus attempts to buttress the persistent urban bias in the provision of basic infrastructures.

It is suggested, among other things, that since the provision and sustenance of rural infrastructural facilities are crucial in realizing the objectives of rural development, the army of

rural peasants must be practically involved, in an integrated approach manner, within the planning, operation and management system. In addition, the facilities to be provided must be relevant to the needs or peculiarities of the environment. Hence, the conventional approach to rural development and debilitating facilities must be transcended to cover a wider spectrum of activities within and between rural and urban communities with the sole objective of raising living standards.

The predominant activity of rural Nigerians is farming. Agriculture thus constitutes the main pedestal of the entire economy and the major source of income and sustenance of rural Nigerians notwithstanding the severe strains and stresses the sector has been subjected. The under-developed rural economic productive process has not been transformed but rather deformed. Rural people use simple implements to produce food and cash crops for their small holding. They are, therefore, the major participants in their own development in their own environment and in their own ways. Other complementary activities that vibrate rural dynamism and diversification and indeed the entire rural economy range from trading or commercial transactions to small scale industrial enterprises in forms of weaving, food processing, carpentry, carving, pottery etc.

Rural communities provide palpable contrasts, among many other things, with urban settlements in the provision and maintenance of infrastructural facilities. As the majority of over 88 million Nigerians are residents of rural areas, the rural-urban distribution of infrastructural facilities still exhibits greater imbalance against the predominantly populated rural areas. Thus, urban policies and preferences, under the pretext of rural development, have continuously been echoed during the budget speeches and other public occasions by all levels of government. Hence, slogans like

'rural transformation' 'improvement and enhancement of quality of life' 'combating and eradication of poverty' 'a just and egalitarian society' etc. have incessantly become the predominant shibboleths.

The phenomenal study of rural setting must intrinsically be linked with the urban social conditions since the former exists in a symbiotic pattern with the latter. In other words, the dialectics of rural-urban relationships indicate that the growth of urban areas and the well being of the inhabitants automatically dwarfs rural settings and dwellers in all ramifications. Whereas issues and problems of deplorable conditions of rural communities are intrinsically or dialectically associated with urbanization or vice versa.

Many studies tend to justify the lack of provision of amenities to the majority of people on the perennial socio-economic predicaments of many States emanating from the current international economic order. This tempting international perspective is misleading and fallacious. World economic recession should not be excused for the persistent or continuing injustice and the abysmal provision of facilities in rural areas despite the enormous growth the economy had attained. To break the linkage of international economic conditions, seemingly regarded to impede an assault on rural poverty, heavy emphasis is required to be appropriately placed to improve conditions of life based on the abundant human and material resources.

It is important to realize that the paradox of the adopted policies and strategies for rural development in Nigeria have only succeeded in hurting rather than pleasing millions of rural communities by officially promoting more social inequality and injustice. To further impinge on the international economic perspective on the provision and sustenance of basic infrastructures in the rural areas, Sandbrook succinctly states that:

> *... the poor may more intensely feel their poverty in the urban than the rural milieu. Absolute poverty appears harder for its victims to bear when they are placed, as in cities, to draw invidious comparisons with the lifestyles of the conspicuously well to do.*[3]

Since agricultural activities constitute the primary, if not the only, rural occupation and source of income, welfare efforts for the rural communities must go beyond the conventional raising of per capita income through the World Bank sponsored Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs). Furthermore, reasonable or adequate provision and maintenance of infrastructural needs are indeed essential to go hand-in-hand with other efforts. Like their urban counterparts, rural dwellers also deserve to be provided with all forms of improved and enhanced health and medical needs, good drinking water, good network of passable roads, electricity, schools etc. However, the traditional approach of rural development, through agriculture, must be shifted from recognizing rural communities as mere food producers - (where only necessary or selected agricultural implements, inputs or infrastructures are supposedly provided)-. Hence, rural folks need to be recognized to be equally or equitably entitled to vital things of good life. Sandbrook further shows that:

> *... any policies that augment urban bias are likely to compound the poverty problem. Relevant here is the paradox that efforts to expand urban employment... with stagnant rural areas will increase urban unemployment and under-development, a consequence of stimulating greater migration to the relatively prosperous cities.*[4]

Infrastructural facilities consist of three major categories or classes. These categories of infrastructure are physical, social and institutional. The physical infrastructures are composed of transportation facilities - made up of warehouses and silos; irrigation and water resources

development facilities - composed of dams, irrigation, water facilities, drainage etc. soil conservation facilities and other forms of processing facilities.

The social infrastructures are also divided into different segments which include health and medical facilities. These consist of hospitals, dispensaries, maternity and health centers. Educational components of infrastructural facilities constitute of primary, secondary and technical schools, vocational and adult educational facilities while rural utilities consist of a wide range of welfare facilities such as water supply, electricity etc.

The components of institutional infrastructures include cooperative societies, farmers' unions, community development programs/projects through self help efforts; financial institutions like banks, post offices, agricultural research facilities - made up of research sub-stations, experimental farms, demonstration plants, agricultural extension and training services, marketing crop and animal protection services; post and telecommunication facilities.

It should be noted that the improvement of the status of rural residents is greatly influenced by the type, quantity and quality of infrastructures placed with regular maintenance. For example, sources of drinking water, condition of personal hygiene, nature of environmental sanitation, nutritional status, literacy levels and the overall socio-economic condition of the community need to be the focus of attention and therefore sustained for a viable rural development.

Thus, the reasons why many rural development policies and strategies have failed to achieve their stated objectives are largely due to the non-recognition and non-provision as well as non-maintenance of the necessary or appropriate infrastructural facilities that need to be put in place

over time and space. Without the appropriate provision, operation and maintenance of basic infrastructures, therefore, no rural development policy or strategy can stand the test of time. Rural infrastructures are therefore the fundamental ingredients capable of preventing or at least reducing the phenomenal rural-urban drift which is always accompanied with swelling socio-economic and political problems.

## 8.02 DEVELOPMENT PLANS AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE

In 1946, the colonial government drew up what it referred to as the Ten Year Plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria. The effort was in response to the colonial office request to all British Colonies to compile development plans for the disbursement of colonial development and welfare funds.

The drawn-up ten year plan was oriented on how the funds would be allocated to education, health, water supplies and transport and communication sectors as well as the schematic approach to expand services and facilities. But before the expiration of the plan period, the colonial government launched A Revised Plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria, 1951-56.[5] It should be realized that the so-called Welfare Scheme had no bearing whatsoever with the Nigerian rural communities.

Planning and provision of infrastructures before 1960s were never oriented towards fulfilling the needs of Nigerians but to attain the objectives of colonialism. Thus, the colonial planning efforts and the provision of infrastructure had their limitations and weaknesses as exhibited in the 1962-68 plan document in the following words:

> *These were not 'plans' in the true sense of the word. More accurately, they constituted a series of projects which had not been coordinated or related to any overall economic target. Many of the individual schemes proposed no more than an expansion of existing normal departmental activities and in large measure, the schemes aimed at building up social as much as the economic services ... little provision was made for industrial development whilst in the agricultural sector, attention was concentrated on a limited range of export cops.*[6]

Rural development policies or programs during the 1962-68 plan period were directly linked with agriculture. Agriculture, during that period, was considered as the major sector of the economy and main foreign exchange earner. At the time of Nigeria's attainment of political independence in 1960; and indeed up to 1963, a tripartite regional structure with a Federal Capital Territory of Lagos existed.

Until 1963, when Mid-West Region was curved out from the Western Region, the Federal structure remained same till the 1967 state creation. During the 1962-68 plan period, government promoted agricultural activities by providing necessary incentives and farmers were motivated to produce both food for consumption and cash crops for exports. However, government provided improved varieties of crops and other farm inputs at subsidized rates.

During the second development plan period - 1970-74, there was a preponderant high level of unemployment and under-employment in the countryside. However, the poverty and poor conditions of rural dwellers were equally recognized by the plan document. All these culminated in the formulation of policies with an attempt to:

(a) ensuring adequate food supply to meet quality and quantity standards for the increasing rural population.

(b) production of agricultural raw materials for exports and for domestic agro-based industrial manufacturing.

(c) creating rural employment opportunities to reduce rural to urban migration.[7]

To achieve the stated objectives, government mounted a number of strategies which included a reform in the land tenure system, construction of irrigation and soil conservation projects and agricultural research. Others were the introduction of improved production techniques, establishment of seeds multiplication schemes and fertilizer procurement, supply and subsidy.

The first official Federal Government pronouncement on rural development planning began during the third plan period 1975-80 which declared that:

> *The main objectives of rural development are to increase rural productivity and income, diversify rural economy and generally enhance the quality of life in rural areas. Since agriculture constitutes the predominant form of activity in rural areas, the most important instruments for achieving these objectives are the agriculture programs of both the Federal and the State Government.*[8]

Because of the seriousness in rural-urban disparities in the distribution of infrastructural facilities, the plan stated that concerted efforts would be made to raise quality of life by providing basic social amenities. Thus, the total Federal expenditure during the period for the provision of rural infrastructures was ₦428,826M. However, when states' expenditures for rural infrastructures were added together, the figure jumped to ₦707,878M.[9]

Furthermore, the Federal government encouraged the promotion of rural employment programs and supported rural self-help development projects. Consequently, the sum of ₦93.29M was earmarked for financial assistance for self-help projects with a view to raising quality of life in the countryside.[10]

The dualism of Nigeria's development processes has therefore shown a great yawning gap between rural and urban areas. The third National Development Plan further states that:

> *Another aspect of balanced development is the relative development of the rural and urban areas. In the past, rural areas have lagged behind the urban areas in development, resulting in increasing disparity between standard of living in the rural and urban areas and the mass migration of population from the former to the latter.*[11]

In retrospect, it should be recalled that the first and second plan documents succinctly described previous efforts at planning as well as implementing (rural) development programs as dismal failures. This led the Federal Government, particularly during the 1970-74 period, to establish a Ministry of Urban and Regional Planning for implementing, among others, urban development policies. This arose out of the need to plan and manage the phenomenal urbanization process and the uneven development of the rural areas.

Notwithstanding the aphorism of "a just and egalitarian society"[12] of the 1970-74 plan, government could still not maintain equitable and consistent approach to, in addition to other things, fiscal policy in relations to rural development strategies. Therefore, the gulf of inequality between the rural and urban areas has continued to widen in all angles. The urban bias in development patterns is thus characterized by imbalanced investments in favor of urban nexus resulting in rural labor drain.

It should be noted however that under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, most of the components of rural infrastructures are under the concurrent legislative list. With such provision, it becomes the responsibility of both the Federal and State Governments to jointly provide and even maintain rural infrastructures.[13] But under the 1976 Guidelines for Local Government Reform, there are specified infrastructural facilities which fall within the orbit of the exclusive Local Government responsibilities.

These itemized responsibilities include motor parks, markets, recreational centers, cemeteries, community centers, etc. Other responsibilities, though not the primary responsibilities of local government, are jointly shared, especially in situations where local governments can not perform, with the state governments or other bodies.[14] These responsibilities include health centers, maternity, dispensaries, nursery, primary and adult education, agricultural and veterinary extensions, roads and street lightening, drainage etc. More often than not the state governments unilaterally leaves these functions to local governments to dabble with.

The Fourth National Development Plan 1981-85 proposed the integrated approach to rural development. The intention was to evolve appropriate types of infrastructural facilities for the development of rural potentials. Thus the plan declared the rural dweller as constituting the 'center-piece' of rural development strategy. The intention was thus to realize new income opportunities through orienting rural communities to produce for markets. It was also the intention of the plan, characteristic of all the development plans scenaria, to rescue rural dwellers, through appropriate devices, from the ravages of diseases, malnutrition and ignorance. Furthermore, the plan declared that balanced development would receive a new boost or emphasis:

> *... the policy of promotion a more rapid development of the rural areas through a sustained effort to raise productivity and provide basic human needs such as hygienic water supply, health facilities, access roads, electricity etc. will continue. This strategy will help to provide a basis for more even geographic spread of physical development throughout the country and help to counter-balance the strong trend towards rural-urban migration.*[15]

During the plan period, 12,065km of feeder roads, 2,650 bore holes, 2,280 wells, 429 farm service centers and 1,249 earth dams were expected to be constructed, drilled or established. However, rural communities were also expected to benefit from improved farming technology

and water supply, health and education facilities, electricity and cottage industries as well as other agricultural schemes. For instance, the Federal government fiscal allocation to the Agricultural Development Projects was ₦637.6M while the combined State governments' allocations to the integrated rural development programs rose to ₦1.3b.[16]

The plan document noted the problems associated with the transformation of agriculture due to the aroused expectations of the sector to provide 'employment opportunities, self-reliance in basic food production, higher per capital real income, foreign exchange and the provision of industrial raw materials".[17] Unfortunately these expectations could not be met largely due to the inflationary trends in the economy resulting in the pathetic food importation. All these worsen food production capacities and therefore exacerbate the phenomenal rural-urban drain.

Within the inflationary pressures in the economy, development plans, more often than not, take care of the urban proletarians. This is done by the periodic reviews of workers' wages and salaries so as to compensate any loss they may incur in their purchasing power; all, notwithstanding, to no avail. But rural dwellers are always left to 'naturally' take care of themselves. As the rural-urban distribution of the welfare materials remain incomparable, the ratio of urban-rural per capita income has lamentably remained un-ameliorated. Thus, poor system of distribution of infrastructures has continued to worsen the already differentiated conditions of life.

To buttress its urban bias, it should be recalled that the Federal government established a Ministry of Urban and Regional Planning in 1974 to achieve the aim of the National Policy on urban and regional development. The second development plan provided a total capital

expenditure of 38 million Nigerian Pounds to the country planning. Moreover, the benefits of increased prices of commodities do not go to the rural produce as 'the marketing of food crops at present gives neither a fair return to the producers nor a fair price to the consumer.[18]

Hence, the deplorable conditions in the countryside, notwithstanding the acclamations contained in development plans, have remained more problematic and unsurmountable. Rural Nigeria can not, for example, find good and safe source of drinking water, basic health and educational services, electricity and accessible roads in and between their localities. The failure to implement the development plans was not only because the government paid more attention to urban areas but more importantly the petro-naira occurred during the phenomenal oil boom era was squandered by the political class to cushion their positions and other vested interests.

Rural infrastructures are the prerequisites for the success of any rural development program. In addition, the distribution, operation and maintenance of infrastructures are other fundamental requirements for a viable and sustainable rural development. Therefore rural infrastructures constitute the necessary components or ingredients for motivating rural residents to be more productive and achieve relative self-reliance. They also aid and enhance the realization of improved rural life.

It is quite noticeable that the distribution of rural infrastructures, over time, has not been equitable and spectacular. Rural societies have therefore become the victims of disproportionate and frivolous attention. Thus, the gross disparities and total lack of infrastructures in the rural Nigeria are not therefore unusual features.

This situation in Nigeria is paradoxical and diabolical. Paradoxically, within the midst of abundant resources, poverty reigns high and is on the increase with widening gulf of inequality accompanied by drastic falling standard of living. Consequently, a great number of young, agile and productive rural dwellers, used in an attenuated form, have been transformed and reduced to lumpenproletarians with diabolical undertones. Rural dwellers and migrants to urban areas are thus bearing the brunt of these sufferings disproportionately and are constantly being denied social welfare and other essential infrastructures of all categories.

It must be emphasized that rural communities have remained poor and continued to suffer from inadequate standard of living. Thus, the poverty and deteriorating conditions in the countryside are entirely attributed to the neglect and lack of commitment on the part of government. The popular assumption stressed that for a reversal of and self-sustaining rural development, the policies and strategies must be matched with sufficient capital investment.[19] But despite such capital investments the situation is un-ameliorated as Table 8.1 below clearly exhibits.

## TABLE 8.1
## NIGERIAN SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF ACTUAL CAPITAL INVESTMENT TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1970 - 1985

| SECTOR | Second National Plan (1970-1974) | | Third National Plan (1975-1980) | | Fourth National Plan(1981-1985) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Value (₦ M) | Percent Value | Value (₦ M) | Percent Value | Value (₦ M) | Percent Value |
| Agriculture (Including irrigation, livestock, forestry and fishing) | 69.322 | 11.74 | 1311.123 | 8.99 | 5400.00 | 18.62 |
| Mining and quarrying | 20.877 | 3.53 | 1469.959 | 10.08 | 5409.000 | 18.66 |
| Manufacturing and craft | 20.281 | 3.43 | 2257.212 | 15.48 | 6368.000 | 21.96 |
| Fuel and power | 103.376 | 17.60 | 1551.550 | 10.64 | 2400.000 | 8.27 |
| Commerce and finance | 15.673 | 2.65 | 281.880 | 1.93 | 586.500 | 2.02 |
| Co-operative and supply | - | - | 156.678 | 1.07 | 32.500 | 0.01 |
| Transport and communica-tions | 360.904 | 64.12 | 7549.919 | 51.78 | 3790.750 | 30.32 |
| Total = | 590.435 | 100.00 | 14578.321 | 100.00 | 28986.5 | 100.00 |

**Source:** Central Planning Office, Second, Third and Fourth National development Plans.

Apparently, capital investment allocations to agriculture have continued to increase tremendously from ₦69.322M during the second plan period to ₦1,311.123M and ₦5400.00M for the Third and Fourth plan periods respectively. Notwithstanding, the growth rates of such investments

were far less than those of other sectors.[20] All the three development plans have shown favorable capital allocations to manufacturing and craft, fuel and power, and transport and communications which are entirely urban in nature. Furthermore, the entire percentage of agricultural capital allocations declines relative to other sectors.

During the 1970-74 plan period, 61.2 percent of the total economic sector share of capital funds was allocated to transport and communications while others were left to share the remaining percentage. It can be noticed however that the percentage capital allocation for agriculture declined from 11.74 percent to 8.99 percent during the second and third plan periods respectively despite the fact that the Third Plan ostensibly challenged the lopsided allocations and lamented the deplorable agricultural sector.

Rural infrastructures are multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral. In this regard, to attain a high and consistent effort of effectively eliminating factors responsible for perpetual rural poverty and poor living conditions, all factors of interrelated rural conditions must be taken in their holistic perspectives with an attempt to 'spread-out' resources thinly or thickly into the countryside.

But since agriculture constitutes the main stay of rural life, agricultural infrastructure must form the basic and not the only condition for rural development. It is pertinent to realize that, notwithstanding the incessant rate of rural depletion largely due to lack of infrastructures, a proportion of between 70 and 80 percent of the total population lives in the rural areas.[21] The efforts to stem the tide of scuttling rural migration have not however been plausible especially in:

(a) improving rural income levels and employment opportunities,

(b) providing necessary infrastructural facilities and community services, and

(c) initiating actions geared towards responsible use of rural resources to preserve the environment and improve the quality of rural life.[22]

It should be noted however that the Nigeria's failure to achieve a minimum level of income above the 'poverty level' for its citizens has its other corresponding failures in providing minimum health, education etc to the rural communities. According to the World Bank, the failure in providing basic needs or infrastructures has

> *"kept 40% of the people in the Third World countries in 'the condition of 'absolute poverty'- a condition of life so degraded by diseases, illiteracy, malnutrition and squalor as to deny its victims basic human necessities."*[23]

Disparities in the distribution of infrastructures between rural and urban areas are palpable. For instance, the distribution of public utilities such as water supplies has been problematic even in the urban let alone rural areas. The type and source of water supply in the rural areas are deplorable and pathetic. This problem has been well expressed in the second national development plan:

> *In the rural areas, where inadequate or absence of good water supply has been found to have a direct bearing on the spread of water-borne diseases, the strategy also would be to improve the quality and source of water supplies in these areas in order to reduce the incidence of such diseases.*[24]

Both the third national development plan and the guidelines for the forth national development plan made a number of references on deteriorating rural water supplies under the integrated rural development program. All these references were made with a view to exhibiting government concern to the problem without necessarily translating them into reality.

Since good water sustains life, its adequacy and sources are crucial for any community especially in the realization of viable rural development strategy. It is well known that the main sources of water supply for the rural people are the rivers, ponds, streams, shallow wells and the likes which are highly vulnerable to all sorts of epidemics. Only in very few rural areas are concrete wells found. Pipe borne and boreholes are a rarity in rural communities. It should be noted that poor water supply is more acute than the provision of schools, health centers or hospitals in rural areas.

It should be recalled that the Federal government launched the National borehole program in 1981 with the objective of providing potable water to most rural people in the country. Ironically, the rural populace was not involved in the program. The entire effort was thus colossal: an exercise in futility. For instance, the operation and maintenance of water pumping machines, fuel etc where they were provided, could not continue to be sustained. Hence, the non-involvement of the people in the communities led to the collapse of the entire program. Partisan politics, however, contributed part of its initial failures.

Scarcity and total absence of commercial forms of energy-electricity - in rural areas have also constituted other dimensions of the problems of public utilities confronting rural communities. Rural energy problems must therefore be tackled squarely. The need to tackle these problems does reconcile with the general consensus for rural industrialization, employment and indeed equity.

A fundamental success in these efforts would curtail, in great degrees, the phenomenal rural - urban drain. Since the important role of rural electricity would be to close the gulf in the socio-

economic conditions of rural and urban residents with a view to installing its maximum utility,[25] the authors of the third national development plan further recognized that:

> *... very limited progress has so far been made with respect to the Federal rural electrification program as only fourteen towns may have been supplied with power by the end of second National Development Plan as against the planned total of two hundred and twenty-five.*[26]

In order to achieve the objectives of integrated rural energy program, as contained in the NEPA's Policy Guidelines on rural electrification, where the rural economy could be diversified and transformed, more efforts are, among others things, required to:

**(a)** increase agricultural productivity by means of adequate irrigation and easy mechanization.

**(b)** make the processing of agricultural products easy e.g. storage and preservation of primary crops.

**(c)** promote rural industries which will generally assist in raising the standard of living of rural community; and

**(d)** reduce migration from rural to urban areas.[27]

In addition, the Guidelines for the fourth national development plan further stressed that any national policy on rural electrification must reflect a mixture of both economic and social objectives in combating rural-urban drifts as well as improving rural conditions of living. On the economic angle, small scale industries need to spring up with the objective of raising rural productivity and incomes, new employment and improved conditions of living. With self-propelling growth mechanisms therefore, self-supporting schemes would gather momentum for a community - centered philosophy for a sustainable rural development.

Hence, the responsibilities of both the Federal and State governments in the rural electrification program would be through extension of national grid and installations of plants respectively. The fourth plan document further stated that during the next plan period, rural electrification scheme would be boosted and considered as an important component of integrated rural development.[28]

But the situation for some rural communities in Kaduna State was different and indeed many other rural areas in the country. Rural electrification project more often than not, has continued to elude rural communities due to, among other things, the abandoning of the project which result to some important items installed vandalized.[29]

## 8.03 THE ROLE OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Infrastructural facilities are crucial ingredients in any nation's drive to development. While they provide a strong basis for socio-economic growth, they also serve as conduits through which alleviation of poverty could be channelled. However, the impacts of infrastructure on agricultural production, stimulation of markets, enhancing household incomes, provision of rural employments and social development are remarkable which, by any standard, cannot easily be quantified or measured.

Studies in poverty alleviation[30] have all indicated that for a sustained socio-economic growth in the rural areas, the provision and maintenance of vital facilities are **sine-quo-non** for a genuine rural transformation. In other words, any attempt to raise the living condition of the people in the country-side must be hinged on the nature and extent of the infrastructure provided and maintained.

Usually referred to and categorized as 'hard ware' projects, physical infrastructure investments, in roads and other structural or construction works, in contrast to the 'softer' segments of infrastructural provision of health, education, water and electricity facilities and services, must intrinsically have a social and cultural consideration as a criterion for success in the nexus of rural development milieu.

Hence, the poverty of rural infrastructure is a plague and an endemic phenomenon pervading the entire fabrics of rural societies. However, the role of the State and capital as well as the impacts they have over the peasantry and rural environment have completely underscored the relevance of any plausible rural development strategy. The actual situation on the ground is that it is a rarity and exceptional, if not abnormal and impossible, to have a relevant and sustainable physical, economic and social infrastructural development in rural communities in terms and context of the modern strategy.

A study on poverty alleviation program in Nigeria has, for instance, clearly indicated that:

> *... many government programs and agencies do not have a physical presence in many local communities. Of those with a presence, existing top-down bureaucratic arrangements have provided little room for the actual participation of the local people and communities in the identification, design and implementation of programs intended for their benefit. This has left most of these communities feeling bitter, excluded and helpless, especially in a situation where the majority of these programs invariably end up as disastrous failures because the community was not given the chance to intervene to correct lapses and mistakes.*[31]

Governments in Nigeria traditionally take upon themselves and possess absolute monopoly to think for rural villagers. Without necessarily involving local communities, Nigerian governments do not also solicit and elicit on what is most vital or relevant to the respective

communities. It is therefore tragic to note that all efforts and resources expended always end up disastrously wasted while expected vision elusive. In this regard, the important role usually played by the NGOs in the transformation of rural environment is not given the necessary consideration and attention it deserves.

However, rural infrastructure must be designed with the primary objective of improving the welfare of rural dwellers as well as stimulating the productive capacities of the peasant farmers. The design of rural infrastructure must thus, within the sociological perspectives, be solidly hinged on the concrete understanding or appreciating of rural peculiarities, resource endowments, skills of the residents and forms of social organization operating within the households in the communities.

Hence, infrastructure investments in rural areas palpably alter the physical scenery. They also remarkably transform the structure of rural opportunities and directions of growth and development. In every rural setting, however, different reactions are usually exhibited whenever new infrastructural facilities are provided to the local residents. This therefore underlie their relevance to the community as the people use the opportunity to restructure their patterns of socio-economic activities as dictated by the specific environmental changes.

At this juncture, it should be recognized that the linch pin principle of the classical economic and growth-oriented development strategies is its excessive dependence on infrastructure investment. This excessive dependence on infrastructure has, over time and space, been criticized. It has been shown that the support which the investments offers to the modern sector, particularly the export industries, turn out to be the sole beneficiaries rather than the targeted subject. In other words, the investments have only succeeded in providing:

> *...access to world markets and make it possible for the expanding urban elite to enjoy a good life approaching that of the developed world. But they did little to alleviate the growing gap between the rich and the poor in the developing countries.*[32]

In the context of the nexus of the entire rural development the critical role which infrastructural facilities play and the services they provide, particularly the development and maintenance of 'human capital' in the rural communities, buttress their indispensable position towards enhancing or raising the living condition of the rural folks. However, the impact of infrastructure development on rural labor productivity and incomes, human fertility (child mortality) and increased literacy or educational attainments; especially female education, adequate accessibility to transport and health facilities as well as water and other social facilities have thus become the challenges unsolvable by the Nigerian political economy.[33]

The crucial role of basic rural infrastructure in overall development is well established and thus can not be over-stressed. The commencement of rural development projects in the 1960s began to open up the potentials inherent in the societies of the third world countries. The earlier intention to provide a range of basic services to rural areas was seen as an attempt to address rural question towards effectively ameliorating the mountainous rural problems. It was soon realized that it was not the provision of services **per se** that was the issue but the urgent need to invest in, establish and maintain relevant infrastructure according to the dictates or circumstances of the rural environment.

During the early rural development projects, items like irrigation facilities, water supply, rural electricity and roads were the major categories of infrastructure investment. Over time, however, other components of infrastructure investment package in rural development project became equally crucial. These include storage and marketing facilities, health delivery and education services, extension and credit programs etc.[34] Among all these categories, rural road infrastructure has all the time being considered as a veritable ingredient and component in all studies of poverty alleviation in rural societies.[35]

## 8.04 RURAL ROADS: A BANE IN RURAL MAIGANA

There is a preponderant lack of all-weather roads leading to all the satellite adjoining hamlets of Maigana. Therefore rural road networks, in the rural road design, have continued to receive perfunctory attention and neglect. The vital or enormous roles which rural road network play in the socio-cultural and economic conditions of the rural communities are too vital, in the development context, to be ignored with an impoverished manner. M.C Cernea succinctly shows that:

> *A road can dramatically alter an area's growth patterns by providing access to markets, services and employment opportunities. The location of roads in relation to particular villages tends to structure regional development, causing some communities to experience rapid changes while others remain relatively stagnant. Road improvements increase adjacent land values and often accelerates socio-economic polarization within communities. These and other social categories can be anticipated and ameliorated if social analysis is made a regular part of the preparation of rural road projects.*[36]

Rural roads in Maigana adjoining hamlets/wards have very inadequate access due largely to their rural nature and characteristics. Transportation or movement between and within the localities are highly deficient and difficult. Hence all journeys between and within the hamlets, villages

etc are covered by motorcycles, bicycles, where available or paid for, but mostly on foot. As there exists no standard all-weather rural roads connecting the localities, where such 'rural roads' are said to have existed, they were shabbily and haphazardly 'constructed' or space cleared in the name of rural roads.

Even though the roads from Maigana to the adjoining hamlets of Unguwar Sarki and Tofa are rough, one can assume that these might have been officially contracted out but certainly not awarded to shrewd contractors but only those well connected to the official circles. In situations where contractors bother to do the job after being heavily mobilized, the quality of the work is greatly affected by the faulty perception of rural road construction and maintenance.

Between Unguwar Sarki and Tofa hamlets, a distance of between 3 and 5km, the 'roads' are for instance, completely washed away by rains and taken over by weeds with lots of difficulties to pass through. During the peak of the raining season, it is impassibly impossible to go to Tofa from Unguwar Sarki due to the overflow of the Kinkiba River. The only way to Tofa therefore is to make a complete U turn to the eastern side of Maigana and going through Unguwar Rimi.

Hence, by coming back to Maigana and taking a complete route through Unguwar Rimi means taking lesser risks by avoiding the greater velocity of river flow in that direction. The over flow of River Kinkiba was accentuated by the other flow of River Kagoma where both Kagoma-Kinkiba River confluence makes the speed of the river water higher to over flow its banks and submerge the roads passage resulting in road erosion etc.

Investments on rural roads should be given a very high priority position within the categories of rural infrastructure. Rural feeder roads thus play crucial roles in the collection and distribution of goods which subsequently generate sufficient traffic volume to support major investments in highways, ports etc. In addition, rural road networks provide access to people of both urban and rural areas and thus facilitate faster flow of communication between and within localities. With efficient rural road networks, their improvements and routine maintenance have, therefore become imperative for the obvious and clear mutual benefits of both the rural and urban residents.

The efficacy of rural road networks in the movement of goods and services to and from rural areas, propelled by the use of motorized transport has given, enhanced or added opportunities for personal mobility and improvements in the quality of rural life. But since rural roads are designed and constructed by the State to primarily serve the needs for the transportation of products to urban centers rather than meet the mobility requirements of the rural communities, and benefit accruing to the rural residents is therefore secondary or rather a windfall. Cynthia Cook elucidates further on this point:

> *When rural road projects are part of a national program of road improvements, this goal is generally fulfilled. In contrast, when they are part of agricultural or road development projects, roads often receive inadequate attention during the preparation stage, and when funds are provided to communities for self help projects, rural roads may be planned hardly at all. Lack of attention to social issues in project design means not only costly delays and technical errors, but also that many opportunities for maximizing benefits and minimizing costs to rural residents may be missed.*[37]

Transport constraints constitute part of the major or greatest rural issues or challenges needing appropriate solutions. As they arise out of the basic needs of rural residents, to address the issue

and overcome or reduce the problematic would mean, directly or indirectly, to improve the standard of rural condition, in social, economic, cultural or even political and psychological dimensions.

Fundamentally, rural roads, must not be perceived and taken as given. In other words, rural roads must never be undertaken solely for the sake of building access roads. Thus, the objectives of the design and construction of rural roads must be explicitly stated, target shown and achievements and consequences highlighted and indicated. Objectively, efficacious rural road linkages must be capable to impeccably achieve the intrinsic road project goals in, among others:

(a) stimulating and increasing agricultural productivity and household incomes whereby access to larger labor markets or feeder markets to sell farm products are boosted as well as further creating avenues for rural employment mobility, trading and investments.

(b) providing not only the means through which people meet their individual needs for mobility but also serving in the maintenance of the socio-cultural contracts with relatives and friends through easy means to go and attend naming, wedding and other ceremonies, death burials and condolences, social visits etc. as the popular Hausa proverb indicates that "**Zumunta a kafa ta ke**" (social or friendly ties are sustained only through constant contracts or visits).

(c) providing avenues where services and amenities to rural population can reach or be used to send children to schools in nearby towns, and attend health centers or hospitals in the towns with ease.

(d) making the provision of vital aids to rural communities in times of emergencies

(floods, draught, fire outbreaks, outbreak of epidemics etc), delivery of vital development inputs or transmission of important information.

(e) allowing personnel required for the delivery of vital services like teachers, health workers, extension agents etc. move easily and frequently or even stay in the rural areas.

With adequate accessible network of rural roads; their constant maintenance and improvements have therefore become a pre-requisite necessity for sustainability. The result will thus lead to the growth of transport services. In the entire locality under study the only private commercial transport services are by means of motorcycles popularly called "express" service which has now turned out to be a new sources of income or occupation of rural residents who own them.

Motorcycles are however being used to convey farm products, farm inputs etc. It should further be emphasized that vital to the sustenance of rural roads are culverts, drainage and bridges. Without proper maintenance and adequate provision of these vital items, rural roads will continue to deteriorate and may not be passable, particularly during the rainy periods.

National Development Plans, particularly the fourth plan (1981-85), have explicitly noted and expressed great concern over the preponderant lack of all-weather rural roads along with the accompanying or supporting physical infrastructure. The response, therefore, to these critical rural problems, particularly from the government, and especially the World Bank have been directed on deliberate investments on road construction and rehabilitation.[38] That is why, for example, the ADP has always responded to have constructed and rehabilitated or maintained rural roads. In areas where roads were actually constructed or rehabilitated,

> *"maintenance achievements have taken short of targets. Rapid road deterioration has decreased expected project benefits.*[39]

It should be realized that rural road construction and rehabilitation have been undertaken by three major organs: by the ADP, financed by the tripartite organs of the State, Federal and World Bank; by the defunct Directorate of Food Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) which emphasized on the construction of new road links; and by a few self-help or community projects executed by the affected communities.

The role or relevance of rural roads can not be over stressed. Thus, due to the acute nature of rural roads and the constraints caused, rural communities have always mentioned road among the top most priorities in any project design and in some cases, the most appreciated project. This is because when road is constructed rural people always express that the 'government' will travel to their areas to see and provide other things the village lacks. Hence, the provision and maintenance of the poor state of rural roads will ameliorate the inadequate or non existing infrastructure.

Construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of highways have constituted the largest and indeed the highest infrastructural investment in road networks within and between urban centers; with very scant attention paid to the condition of rural feeder road networks.(The Petroleum Trust Fund - PTF- Urban roads program is a case in point). Between 1989 and 1991; for example, the KADP had a change of policy in the rural infrastructure investment.

During the period, feeder road projects, dam construction, and borehole drilling hitherto undertaken by 'force account' would only be undertaken by contract vetted by the World Bank. The change of policy was sequel to the financial squeeze which resulted in the decision on all major physical construction. Henceforth, until the project is sanctioned with 'no objection' from the World Bank, no construction work would be undertaken.[40]

As the project continued to face serious problems of cash flow, particularly during this period, supply situation of inputs, especially fertilizers, was also getting worse. Chemical fertilizers thus became grossly inadequate and therefore not easily within the reach of the peasant farmers. Consequently all categories of the activities of the project began to decline and collapse in complete contrast to the initial spending spree.

Rural road networks and improvements are associated with a variety of essential socio-economic results. These included increase in productivity, reduction in the cost of transport and labor. However, improved rural road facilities enhance some degree of improved opportunities, fostering free flow of information on new agricultural inputs, markets as well as new demand and supply of labor and agricultural commodities. All these therefore have direct bearings on the overall enhancement of better rural condition of life and environment.

Furthermore, with improved rural road networks and maintenance, other socio-economic contents can be derived. These include increased division and specialization of labor and production respectively, enlarged trading or commercial opportunities etc. With roads connecting various points of socio-economic activities, therefore, movements of goods, services and people, due largely to the improved markets and entrepreneurial operations, commence easily and swiftly. In addition to all these, new ideas filter very fast; paving ways for rapid changes in human and physical outlook or structures of the villages. As they wear new outlook, they are thus transformed into more diversified and dynamic centers rather than their previous docile position.

The poor condition of rural feeder road structure in Nigeria was explicitly noted and emphasized in the 1980 World Bank- Federal Government joint report on food strategy mission. The report thus states that:

> *Whilst the country's primary and secondary roads are being gradually improved to acceptable standards, the feeder road system has suffered from years of neglect and represents the most serious constraints to agricultural development in Nigeria.*[41]

While rural women bear the brunt of major rural activities they also substantially share the burden of rural transportation of commodities, particularly farm products, mostly undertaken by the traditional head-loading system. Hence, farm products are in certain localities, carried on head by women and children covering a range of three or more kilometers and as much as ten or more kilograms. Three or more trips are averagely made from the farm to the house depending on the proximity of the farm to the household. To supplement these burdens, male members of the household who own motorcycles use the machines to transport farm products home or even to the major road-sides for onward transportation to the consuming centers.

With effective and efficient rural road transportation infrastructure, rural and urban markets would be integrated, price variations/gaps between localities would be bridged. However, farmers would have the incentives and opportunity to switch from subsistence crops to more 'market' crops. Furthermore, surplus farm products 'imprisoned' in rural areas due to lack of effective transportation or have to spend longer period and cover considerable distances to the market, would easily reach consuming destinations when released by road networks.

But Lele has succinctly shown that rural road infrastructure and market integration in the northern part of Nigeria are lacking. There is therefore the lack of the minimum infrastructure

to improve the flow of price information of commodities and the movement of goods and people, which ensure market development.[42] An obvious and important impact of rural road network construction is on the social bearings which accompanies it and in most cases leads to an accelerated rise in the value of land.

Hence, the beneficiaries in this speculative land value are the urban elites, the so-called progressive farmers, wealthy persons etc. In many cases, the multinational corporations (MNCs) or agribusiness companies, state projects etc only end up bringing large tracts of rural land under their control. This act further exacerbates the impoverishment of an already disadvantaged rural peasants. However, the laboring of the rural residents is in turn exploited and resources extracted as they gradually become transformed as wage laborers on land previously owned by them.

Institutional arrangements for feeder roads in Nigeria have, over time, been established, by either the State or international agencies. In certain circumstances, NGOs are also involved in the rural feeder road arrangements. These institutions include the ADPs, Local Government Areas (LGAs) DFRRI and NDE. It is important to note that international agencies like the World Bank, finance, supervise and evaluate such projects. In addition, however, Community Development Associations (CDAs) actively participate in such rural road infrastructural investments.

The ADPs have, since their commencement, been involved directly in the provision of rural road infrastructure in Nigeria. This has been categorized into two: by contract, vetted by the World Bank, and by force account. Not only have the 'force account' rural and constructions

(essentially undertaken by 'local' contractors without rigidly applying heavy equipment and other requirements) weakened the local capacity to have all-weather rural roads but also the 'contract' category of rural road construction have turned out to narrate the same story of the 'force account' category.

With rural roads so provided or constructed, the relative high increase in traffic, without proportionate rehabilitation and maintenance, the volume of goods and the high axle vehicle loads plying the roads, particularly the heavy axle 911 Mercedes-Benz fire wood lorry etc, coupled with the shabby and the light construction done have all contributed, among many other factors, to the rapid deterioration of the roads.

While ex-ante evaluation of rural projects are based essentially on micro economic criteria, it is important to note that in the early ADPs, in fact up to the present stage, there have not been rigorous ex-ante evaluation of roads by the projects. Thus, a supervision report, for example, states that:

> *... non of the Northern ADPs (Statewide ADPs) employs any system for appraisal of road investment. Road Programs generally are compiled from agricultural and LGA (Local Government Area) recommendations with little or no estimation of financial benefit or ranking.*[43]

Edmonds, for example, explains that this situation has been rampant largely because-

> *in practice, data required to carry out the valuation would probably require more man-days than that required to build the roads themselves.*[44]

But Lele emphasized on the need to properly coordinate between development needs of agricultural potentials and that of the rural infrastructural facilities so as to appreciate the fundamental link rural roads evaluation vis-a-vis their maintenance and rehabilitation.[45]

Between 1985 and 1991, a total length of 341.5km of rural roads were claimed to have been constructed while 173.1km rehabilitated or maintained in Maigana KADP zone (see Table 8.2). Since 1988, for instance, the problems of cash flow and frequent break down of machinery precluded any tangible effort of an already strained condition in the ADP. In 1989, however, negotiations were concluded for consulting contracts for the design, construction and supervision of 400km of rural roads throughout the state for implementation during the 1990 period.[46]

Even though 100km feeder road construction, rehabilitation and maintenance was planned by contract for 1990 in Maigana zone, only 25 percent of the work was claimed to have been achieved. The poor achievement was hinged on the breakdown of most of the heavy plants and problems of spare parts.[47] However, the 100km rural road planned by force account could not also take off due to the obvious problems of cash flow. It should be noted further that many contracts were recklessly awarded for the construction of feeder roads. Thus, before completing even the ones previously awarded, fresh ones were awarded. Apart from awards of contracts for rural roads, the report shows that there were consultancy agreements entered on supervision etc of the roads.[48]

It should be noted that even the Projects ICR notes with grave concern that the construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of rural feeder roads by 'force account' are characterized, generally, by a snail speed progression and un-qualitative result. Decisions however taken to repair, rehabilitate or even construct rural roads by force account have, by and large, resulted in negative effects on implementation. The project therefore recommended and accepted that henceforth, purchase of spare parts by international shopping be encouraged for all categories of items irrespective of the amount involved.[49]

TABLE 8.2

## RURAL PROJECTS UNDERTAKEN BY KADP IN MAIGANA ZONE 1985-1995

| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Roads constructed(km) | - | 15 | 132.3 | 123 | 42 | 29 | - | 90 | 2105 | - | - | 2,536.3 |
| | - | - | 46 | 43 | 30 | 54.1 | - | - | - | - | - | 171.1 |
| Culverts (No) | - | 7 | 120 | 97 | 64 | 53 | - | - | - | - | - | 341 |
| Earth Dam constructed | - | - | 1 | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3 |
| Earth Dam rehabilitated | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Boreholes drilled | - | - | - | - | 6 | - | - | 480 | 83 | - | - | 569 |
| Open wells | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 13 | 10 | - | - | 23 |
| Dam constructed | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | 2 |
| | - | - | - | 25 | 21 | 40 | 49 | 78 | 8 | 45 | 6 | 272 |
| | - | - | - | - | 33 | 49 | 24 | - | 3 | 10 | 9 | 128 |
| | - | - | - | 1080 | - | 4763 | 935 | 8026 | 7200 | 4935 | 4.88 | 26,961.88 |
| | - | - | - | - | - | - | 50 | 50 | 20 | - | 93 | 129.3 |

*Figures for these years (1992-95) cover the entire four zones in the state as the reports consulted have only made general provisions.

Source: Extracted from KADP Annual Reports, 1985-1995

Our study shows that the need for all weather rural road networks also tops the priority list of the rural residents, particularly those who responded to our questionnaires. Thus, road infrastructure affirmed by our respondents, makes the life of the rural communities easy and accessible to other parts of the locality in all respects. According to our survey, if accessible rural road network was not the first item mentioned, it was the second or third of rural basic need infrastructure and in some instances the most favorably appreciated by the residents.

The situation conflicts, in many respects, with the seeming Federal Government Infrastructural facilities in Soba LGA which portrays that a large number of communities are accessible to roads in the LGA. The information contained therein is thus misleading and tantamount to over exaggeration and distortion of facts. What generally exists is no more than rural footpaths while the few KADP roads have already deteriorated. For instance, the report inflammably states that:

> *23 of the 28 communities, i.e 82% had roads before 1985. The same 23 communities had additional roads between 1985 - 1992. All roads are provided by Government.*[50]

## 8.05 RURAL WATER SUPPLY IN MAIGANA

Rural Water Supply is another stubborn and key area of rural infrastructure in the entire rural development program. Thus, issues and problems of safe water supply in rural areas are no doubt numerous. It has been shown that less than 20 percent of Nigeria's population has access of safe drinking water[51]. Whereas water supply in rural areas has notably continued to exacerbate, more people are hence exposed to inadequate and dangerous sources of water which have continued to enlarge as the population of rural areas grows.

While sources of rural water supply are numerous; they nonetheless include ponds, rivers, shallow wells, springs and streams which are, more often than not, shared by domestic and wild

animals. Those sources are often polluted or contaminated and thus vulnerable to all sorts of diseases. These diseases are the water-borne types which depend primarily on the bacteriological content or quality of the drinking water supply while the water-washed diseases like trachoma are caused by the quality of water used for domestic hygiene.

Other diseases like typhoid and cholera, contaminated by for instance, excreta disposal system, are transmitted through water. However, water-based diseases of schistosomiasis also depend on the direct contact between the source of water supply and the people. Another category of diseases like sleeping sickness and water blindness are caused by vectors that live in or around the source of water supply. It should therefore be noted that most of the debilitating water-related pathogens in rural areas are essentially dependent on or caused by the non-availability or non-accessibility to safe drinking water.

The scenario of improved water supply services for the rural population has had a special appeal to government and international agencies which thereinafter attracted huge investments in the sector in addition to a high priority it is accorded. Notwithstanding the priority given and investments made, all efforts at rural water supply have only reached an insignificant fraction of rural population.

In addition, many of such services have indeed, due to certain problems of maintenance and operation, turned out to be either abandoned or under-utilized. Furthermore, not only are large resources being poured into the sector but equally what have been expended have not met the designed objectives set to achieve.

Improvements in the quality of water supply invariably leads to considerable improvements in health. Since there is a direct correspondence between safe drinking water and decrease in diseases, particularly infant mortality rates, considerations are always expected to be paid towards the provision of safe or potable water and other related facilities mainly for preventive health hazards. As convenient sources of potable water in rural areas are of enormous benefit to human health and labor productivity, they equally have remarkable impacts on the reduction of infant mortality and child morbidity.

Generally, government is traditionally the major, if not the only, provider of rural water supply and sanitation services. Thus, the intervention of government and international agencies in the rural water supply has been considerable. It is only in the provision of sanitation service (the monthly urban environmental sanitation exercise:- ie disposal of refuse) was the private sector temporarily involved but failed in recent years. As a whole, the entire exercise is essentially urban in nature while rural areas are only involved when their environmental conditions are likely to affect urban sanitary conditions.

Public monopoly in providing social services has characteristically been inefficient and ineffective. Coupled with little or no involvement from the communities in terms of labor, finance, time and other material resources to execute a particular project, infrastructure projects have consequently not been taken as theirs. In other words, a government project or property is not theirs simply because members of the community have limited conception of government. Rural people's sense of ownership and maintenance or care of facilities has generally been non-challant and individualistic attitude as community involvement in undertaking the provision of urban services has been inadequate and poor.

Thus, investments made by governments and international organizations in the rural water supply and sanitation are enormous. It was estimated in 1985, for example, that 65 percent of the entire rural population in the developing world had no access to safe sources of water, while 75 percent was without convenient means of disposing excreta, despite the well over 10 billion dollar investments poured in the sector.[52] Out of this amount, over 90 percent was contributed by home governments.

However, during the 1971 - 75 period, the World Health Organization (WHO) figures in the sector have further indicated that the developing countries (excluding China) invested 3 billion US Dollars annually in water and sanitation facilities. By 1979 however, the figures rose to 6 billion dollars.[53]

It was not until 1961 that the World Bank began to lend in the water related ventures, while direct activities in actual rural water supply began only in the early periods of 1970s. By 1974, the world Bank's annual loans amounted to about one billion Dollars especially in small agricultural components, rural development and water supply projects. By 1979, however, the amount cumulatively hit almost 180 million Dollars. It should be noted however that through 1984, the first ten years of the Bank's rural water and sanitation loans reached about 530 million Dollars.[54] (Table 8.3)

All these investment figures have apparently expressed rather impressive efforts but are diabolical in reality. The investments have had little or no effects on the lives of millions of people ostensibly targeted for who are in dire or desperate need of assistance. Even governments, institutions or agencies for the provision of water as well as NGOs have

TABLE 8.3
WORLD BANK LENDING IN RURAL WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION:
TOTAL LENDING AND PERCENTAGE OF PROJECT LENDING, 1974-85
(in millions of dollars)

| Year | RURAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECT COMPONENT | | | Total lending to rural water supply | Total lending to urban water and sewerage | Total lending to water and sewerage sector | Total lending of IBRD and IDA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Free standing projects | Water and sanitation | Agriculture | | | | |
| 1974 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 173.2 | 180.9 | 4,423.6 |
| 1975 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 22.7 | 24.2 | 143.6 | 167.8 | 5,945.9 |
| 1976 | 0.0 | 12.1 | 11.1 | 23.2 | 322.5 | 345.7 | 6,702.4 |
| 1977 | 0.0 | 3.6 | 28.9 | 32.5 | 297.1 | 329.6 | 7,086.8 |
| 1978 | 9.0 | 0.0 | 29.8 | 38.8 | 366.2 | 405.0 | 8,410.7 |
| 1979 | 20.0 | 19.6 | 11.9 | 51.5 | 979.2 | 1,030.7 | 10,010.5 |
| 1980 | 0.0 | 23.6 | 12.0 | 35.6 | 607.5 | 643.1 | 11,481.7 |
| 1981 | 11.8 | 27.3 | 34.7 | 73.8 | 495.4 | 569.2 | 12,291.0 |
| 1982 | 30.5 | 2.5 | 33.5 | 66.5 | 408.2 | 474.7 | 13,015.9 |
| 1983 | 46.1 | 8.6 | 28.4 | 83.1 | 747.5 | 830.6 | 14,447.0 |
| 1984 | 60.9 | 11.9 | 17.6 | 90.4 | 620.1 | 609.7 | 15,524.0 |
| 1985* | 80.0 | 2.4 | 25.5 | 107.9 | 772.3 | 880.2 | 14,386.3 |
| TOTAL | 258.3 | 113.6 | 263.3 | 635.2 | 5,832.4 | 6,467.2 | 123,725.8 |
| Cumulative percentage of total Bank lending | | | | 0.5% | 4.7% | 5.2% | 100.0% |
| Cumulative percentage of rural water supply investments as part of water sector and agriculture components | | | | 9.8% | 90.2% | 100.0% | |

*Figures for 1985 were calculated on a basis different from that used for previous years

Source: Anthony A. Churchil - Rural Water Supply and Sanitation: Time for change (18) World Bank Discussion papers, The World Bank, Washington D.C 1987, p.62.

recognized and accepted that the resources invested were rather wasted as they have not served the designed goal.

In addition, the problems designed to be solved have only continued to multiply notwithstanding the finances and other resources invested. Thus,

> *rural water supply and sanitation investments have often failed to provide affordable, acceptable services, or deliver all the expected health benefits to a population that remains by and large poor and in fragile health"*[55].

The entire Maigana rural population and its local constituencies are predominantly plagued with inadequate access to safe drinking water. Even though there have been government pronouncements with official documents showing millions of Naira investments to provide water, all but in vain. For the vast majority of rural dwellers, particularly during the dry spell, getting water, not to talk of its safety, is an onerous task which consumes a lot of time and labor.

Even though the International Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade (1981 - 1990) indicated that billions of Dollars have been invested to provide or improve condition of water supply in rural areas, it is necessary to note that during (or even beyond) the decade, no single drop of safe water, except the seasonal rains, reached the rural population under study.

In the Maigana rural localities under focus, the situation of water supply is endemic, perennial and stubborn. In the Maigana rural town, for instance, the over-head water storage tank is rarely utilized or operated to benefit the entire population. The borehole is therefore not even designed to totally satisfy the water needs of the community. It should be noted that this rural water supply system hardly gives adequate and convenient water continuously to 5 percent or even less of the population right into their households.

This issue can be adduced to a number of factors. Majority of the rural community cannot realistically afford to get the service right into their homes and thus bear the brunt of paying for the service in view of the obvious fundamentals and their priorities; particularly the level of poverty amongst the populace. Even for those who can relatively afford the facility have decided, due to the skepticism over its sustainability, not to bring it home because of the inherent character of infrastructural service failures and past experiences they have over government projects.

In this vein, many of those interviewed expressed that it would only be a matter of time for the entire system to collapse. They however express that there were two hand pumped boreholes in the village which have gone dry immediately after commissioning. Not only did they go dry but the instruments have broken down and vandalized. Thus, the hopes of the rural community hitherto raised became rather elusive. While large amount of money expended in commissioning ceremonies of rural water supply is staggering, it is contended that the amount could be utilized to provide adequate, safe and sustainable water to a rural community.[56]

Furthermore, as the water supply service is only benefiting an insignificant number of people in Maigana rural walled village alone, it is worthy of note to realize that it is for only three or even fewer days per week that water runs in the pipes. However the supply each day is for about three hours. On many occasions, two or even three weeks are spent continuously without any water supply. Irregular or non supply of water may be due technical problems; lack of sufficient fuel to start and run the diesel pumped engine or sometimes when the operator decides not to come. In most cases, therefore, the taps go dry until some supplies are made, or when some wealthy persons, those who benefit from the service, contribute to buy the vital ingredients needed.

In such circumstances, particularly where the water supply from the borehole is not serviceable or available, those who benefit from such a source immediately revert or fall back to their conventional sources. Even the hand pump boreholes located very close to residence of 'Sarkin' Maigana are no longer functioning, as the issue of maintenance and operation of such vital infrastructure had never been of any concern. This situation has by and large created more apathy over government and leadership in the minds of rural dwellers. Government, has for quite long ceased to have any meaning and relevance to their existence.

Thus heroic efforts in this direction have not really met the desired plans. To a large degree, all designed plans for rural (or even urban) water supply by government or international organs have continuously and rapidly collapsed much faster than they were conceived, constructed or drilled. Such high rates of breakdown and failures of rural projects have made rural residents to be completely repugnant of any project government conceives.

Rural villagers, unlike before, are now fully aware and sensitive of government deeds and misdeeds. They now quickly understand deceitful actions of government through government officials who use State apparatuses to inflict severe and unnecessary suffering to rural populace all aimed at wealth accumulation. All these acts have continued to erode a substantial amount of confidence villagers hitherto had in government. On many circumstances, however, overwhelming rejection of projects proposed by government has been rampant while the sites of the proposed projects have occasionally been acquired by the State might.

Moreover, as the borehole system erratically supplies water to only a handful of enclosed villagers of Maigana walled community, other localities, very close to the source of the water,

are glaringly not benefiting. Sabon Gari (Tasha) is separated from the Maigana enclosed community only by the Zaria-Jos highway, yet not supplied, even though public taps are provided in the enclosed settlement. It should be noted that the overhead tank of the borehole is much closer to Sabon Gari than the Maigana walled rural town. Furthermore, another settlement, Tashan Itace, popularly know as the NTC 'province' is just about 2km away from Sabon Gari is also not connected with the borehole water supply. The situation in the hinterland rural settlements is just worse and lamentable.

Meanwhile, rapid population explosion, particularly in the third world countries, has continued to exacerbate the challenge for safe drinking water in the rural societies. Notwithstanding the phenomenal rural-urban migration, rural population is steadily expanding even despite the high death rates, relative to urban areas, due to water related epidemics, among others. With a conservative annual average increase of 1.3 percent in the developing world, it is estimated that

> *...from 30 to 35 million new rural inhabitants are in need of arable and other supporting infrastructural facilities, particularly safe drinking water and sanitation.*[57]

Nigeria's situation within this framework is even worse and more problematic. With over 22 percent of the entire sub-Saharan population, rural population growth in Nigeria is in the region of 2.6 percent per annum. This means that more and more rural dwellers in Nigeria face the critical problems of water supply and related facilities. Furthermore, it has been shown that in the entire 50 percent of rural population of the world in the East and West Africa, Mediterranean, Latin America, South Asia, East and pacific regions, Nigeria's net rural rate, based on 64 million people,[58] is only second to Kenya with 3.4 percent and almost at par with Malawi's 2.7 percent.[59]

It should be noted at this juncture that women; and to some extent, children, particularly girls, in rural communities traditionally take the responsibilities and tasks of hauling water. The bearing of the brunt of water supply in the households far outweighed that of their men counterparts. In other words, women's stake for convenient and accessible potable water is highest. In almost all cases, the source of water supply, collection, quantity and for what specific purpose as well as the overall utilization have become the exclusive domestic preserves of rural women. In a more advanced rural areas, there exist the preponderance of **'Yan ga ruwa** - water hawkers - who go round selling water which in essence reduces a substantial part of some women's tedious daily time and labor consuming task of hauling water.

While rural women make use of their children to participate in all their restless routine life, the chain of this domestic chores is having adverse impacts on the children's attendance of schools, particularly girls - in rural communities where such schools exist. In such circumstances, it should be noted that as children do not attend schools, the chain of rural perpetual illiteracy and poverty will continue unabated. In some cases, not only are primary schools not existing but also the Islamiyya/Arabic schools as well. Since the parents did not grow up in an environment where knowledge is sacred and valuable, they in turn do not appreciate any value in it. But with convenient and easy access to water supply, rural women and children will have ample time to rest and recuperate, think more positively and engage in more productive activities, attend schools for their benefit and for a more sustainable rural development.

More often than not, water supply problems are sometimes cornered or blamed on the institutional angles and narrowed down within a broad spectrum of structural and policy weakness. All these may include lack of or inadequate material and human resources as well

as a host of others. Too often, the primary issue is not addressed as to whether or not government itself, in the first place, is effective let alone its institutions. Thus, the base and the structure of the economy should be understood while the political economy of the State clearly analyzed with a view to understanding what services are designed and delivered, how they are delivered, to whom, who ultimately are the beneficiaries and victims and at what costs.

Due to drastic ecological changes pervading the entire rural landscape and coupled with other State programs as well as the phenomenal of desiccation, draught and other ecological hazards, the perennial problems of water supply in rural areas become more exacerbated than ever before. This is because even the steams, ponds, springs, well etc dry up. Rural communities under study especially Kwadaro, Sabon Kaura and Bauda testify during the interviews that during dry spells they resort to digging wells in streams and ponds in order to get water to survive.

Part of the state programs which exacerbates the condition of water supply for the rural communities under study are important for our analysis here. According to Table 8.2, there were three earth dams constructed in the Maigana KADP Zone between 1985 and 1995 (one in 1987 and two in 1998), with only one rehabilitated in 1988. Other sources of rural water supply include drilling of boreholes (six in 1989) open wells and dam construction. In particular, dam construction usually has agriculture as the primary target rather than for the purposes of direct human consumption.

Hence, dam construction inevitably alters the quantity of water flowing the river streams or tributaries which serve as part of the sources of rural water supply. They therefore worsen the search for water in rural areas, which makes communities affected to travel further distances in

search for water in rural areas, which makes communities affected to travel further distances in search for and collect water for domestic use. The direct beneficiaries of dam construction are no other than the large scale farmers and other privileged personalities in the urban areas. In this regard, the communities in and around Maigana have, over time, been affected by the flow of water to various streams and tributaries which has considerably reduced. In addition, the KADP's activities in various earth dam constructions further exacerbate the critical water problems in the rural communities, especially during the day spells of the year.

This situation poses serious health hazards to the communities. There is thus a tenuous link between investments in water supply services and improvements in healthy condition of people and their environment. This, in addition brings about fundamental changes in the general morbidity and mortality rates in the rural areas. The significant benefits of improved water supply are numerous as the availability of clean water produces avenues to determine further spectrum of women production ventures as well as opportunities for acquisition of formal and informal education for children and other complex chains of social welfare.

Clean water and clean environment are symbiotic in nature. It is therefore difficult to separate the effects of non-availability of safe water supply from different factors that aid in the spread of epidemics. In the first place, personal hygiene counts paramount and primary which thus depends on socio-economic levels of individuals. Diseases could be transmitted in water during its transportation or even when put to different usage. As water-related disease transmissions are in cycle, a holistic effort rather than on a certain point in time must be mounted to eliminate their causes.

Clean water with unhygienic environment will alter the health condition of people. Hence, the Diarrheal Diseases Control Program of the WHO has demonstrated that:

> *reductions in morbidity and mortality due to diarrhea are as a result of the use of improved water supply and sanitation facilities.*[60]

Health improvements in other related diseases like malaria, typhoid etc therefore require combined efforts of clean water and environmental sanitation.[61] There should hence be the first control measures to be mounted in order to ensure improved standards of living of rural residents from all directions.

By 1991, 24 boreholes were expected to be drilled throughout Kaduna State spread over the LGAs by the Federal Ministry of Water Resources (FMWR). See Table 8.4 for further details. Accordingly, the Table shows that 17 boreholes were uncompleted while 7 were completed with a number of them not functioning due to a variety of factors.

It should, however, be noted that apart from FMWR, there are other agencies for borehole inventory in Kaduna State; charged essentially with drilling of boreholes in rural areas of the state. In addition to the National Borehole Project of the FMWR, the Kaduna State Water Board (KSWB) and DFRRI are other agencies which have claimed to have drilled 377 and 15 boreholes across the LGA of the State.[62]

**TABLE 8. 4**
**NATIONAL BOREHOLE PROGRAM**
**LIST OF BOREHOLES IN KADUNA STATE**

| VILLAGE | L. G. A. | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|
| Gaya | Zaria | completed. Borehole not functional. Connection of delivery pipes and re-development outstanding. |
| | | Completed |
| Giwa | Zaria | " |
| Paki | Ikara | " |
| Old Birnin Gwari | Birnin-Gwari | " |
| Kwoi | Jema'a | " |
| Rimau | Kachia | Un-completed |
| Danwata | " | " |
| Kudan( ? ) | " | " |
| Kufana | " | " |
| Gwantu | Jama'a | " |
| Kauru | Saminaka | " |
| Jagindi | Jama'a | " |
| U/Sarkin Musulmi | | " |
| Kaura | Kachia | " |
| Kachia | Kachia | " |
| Nwri | Kaduna | " |
| Ikara I | Ikara | " |
| Gimba | Zaria | " |
| Turawa | " | " |
| Maigana* | " | " |
| Tukur-Tukur | " | " |
| Dambo | " | " |
| Yakawada | Birnin Gwari | |
| Ikara I | Ikara | |

Source - Federal Ministry of Water Resources:- **Water Resources Development: The Journey so far (1985 - 1991)** Abuja, June 1991 P.42.

Even though Soba Local government, particularly Maigana District, has a large number of water points, the Federal government Report of the updated National Inventory of Community based Infrastructural Facilities in the LGA does not really reflect the concrete realities on the ground.

Not only are the data highly incongruent but also the quality and type of potable water points and the facilities so-called provided in the area are highly distorted or inflated. As a whole, the data in the entire inventory are dubious and thus built-in with high political undertones primarily to demonstrate seeming achievements on paper only.

Ancillary to this politically motivated and exaggerated 'data' is the DFRRI program of potable water supply in the rural communities. The directorate thus states, among other things, that ₦100 million was expended on a nationwide Rural Water and Sanitation (RUWATSAN) program. The program was accordingly divided in phases (250 Communities in each State under phase one). The program of the defunct directorate consequently never provided potable water and adequate sanitation services to Maigana and environs in all its phases.

Water is of vital necessity to human existence and for a sustained rural development. The availability of safe water in the rural areas under study has been problematic despite its abundant potentials. At the peak of the dry spell of the year, rural residents face acute shortage of water and thus have to trek a range of half a kilometer to about three kilometers to obtain water from any sources available.

In some critical areas like kwadaro, Bauda etc wells dug in the ponds or streams, out of obscure necessity, are very prevalent. The shallow wells dug in or around the households retain only unpurified, colored, odorous, tasty and unsafe water during the rainy season. In only two of the whole areas where concrete wells are available, in Maigana and Tashar Itace, the infrastructures were constructed several years ago which however do not retain enough water to satisfy the needs and requirements of the communities.

Even though the diesel engine generator borehole which supplies water to Maigana rural town, the supply is limited to a very few households. However the supply is erratic and until the beneficiaries to the facility among other things, combine to contribute to buy fuel to run the engine, rectify faults from time to time, the system would have ceased to be functional. Certainly when a major problem sets in, out of wear and tear, the so-called beneficiaries will not be able to bear the burdens; and before government comes in, the whole infrastructure would have completely collapsed.

In Sabon Gari and Maigana Communities a few households have the privilege of having the tap heads of the facility within a short or walking distance. Among the ten localities visited, water problem had been mentioned as the first, second or third priority of the rural residents by the sample of our respondents. (See Table 8.5).

In Bauda locality, eight out of nine respondents put water first, which represents over 98 percent. In Kwadaro, all the four respondents favored water as their priority. In Maigana, only four out of fifteen respondents mentioned water. This low response to water issue was probably because of the existence of the borehole in the locality. In Unguwar Rimi, three out of five respondents mentioned water first as their primary problem.

In Tashar Itace and Tofa Wards, one respondent each out of five and seven respectively mentioned water. Whereas in Sabon Kaura and Unguwar Sarki as well as Gimba no respondent mentioned water. This was not necessarily because they have potable water but essentially they can relatively cope with the nature of the water problem; but still, they need potable water just like all others. (See Table 8.5).

**TABLE 8.5**

**MAIGANA SAMPLE OF HIERARCHY OF NEED OF RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE**

| Localities | W | S | F | H | R | E | P | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bauda | 8 | 8 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 1 | |
| Kwadaro | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 | |
| Maigana | 4 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 | |
| Sabon Gari | 9 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 1 | |
| Sabon Kaura | 0 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0 | |
| Tashar Itace | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 0 | |
| Tofa | 1 | 6 | 22 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 0 | |
| Unguwar Rimi | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 0 | 0 | |
| Unguwar Sarki | 0 | 13 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | |
| Gimba | | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Total = | 30 | 43 | 36 | 43 | 41 | 05 | 02 | |

W- Water, S- School, F- Fertilizer, H- Hospital,
R- Road, Electricity and P- Pasture Area.

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

It is now necessary to analyze other important segments of rural water supply in the study area to buttress further empirical evidence obtained from the residents compressed in tabular form. This analysis is presented as follows:

**TABLE 8.6**

**MAIGANA:PREVALENT SOURCES OF RURAL WATER SUPPLY**

| Water Supply source | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Stream, Lake, Pond | 7 | 08.6 |
| Pipe borne | 0 | 00.0 |
| Borehole | 17 | 20.7 |
| Dam | 0 | 00.0 |
| Well | 57 | 69.5 |
| No response | 1 | 01.2 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

As rural communities face perennial problems of adequate and safe water for domestic and other activities, it can be observed from Table 8.6 that the most prevalent source of water supply in the rural communities under study is the hand-dug wells in the rural households. In some very few cases, concrete wells, constructed several years ago, exist. In all the sources, however, weather hand-dug or concrete, availability of water all year round is never guaranteed. Accordingly, 57 respondents of our sampled households, representing approximately 70 percent of the total respondents rely heavily on these unreliable sources.

Even though 20.7 percent of our total respondents indicates borehole as its source of water supply, it is nonetheless secondary as its erratic supply and total failure forces the recipients to fall back to the traditional hand-dug wells. Furthermore, the source serves only the Maigana enclosed rural town where the sample from the locality is relatively high, accounting for the relatively high percentage. However, the borehole source of water supply in the community has not significantly changed the condition of water situation. The operation and maintenance of the facility, the constant breakdown of the machine etc should be taken into account.

In addition, under a particular point in time, especially during the dry spell of the year, desperate situation of acute shortage of water has always forced the rural dwellers to resort or search to obtain water from any source particularly streams and ponds. Where necessary, wells are dug in the ponds to obtain water notwithstanding its safety or purity. This source represents about 9 percent of our total sample. As shown in the Table, however sources of water supply from pipe-borne and dam do not exist in or around the study area while the no-response indicates 1.2 percent of our total respondents. Due to the endemic problems of water in the area, some community efforts are mounted to procure water as shown in Table 8.7.

**TABLE 8.7**
**COMMUNITY EFFORTS TO PROVIDE WATER**

| Community effort | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 37 | 46.0 |
| No | 12 | 14.0 |
| No response | 33 | 40.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

The commonest water supply facilities in the rural areas are predominantly constructed by the individual household heads of the community. Our study, as portrayed in Table 8.8, reveals that 45 percent of our sampled population of the rural communities obtain water from the privately constructed wells either inside or outside the households. However, government's contribution, in terms of constructing concrete wells, boreholes, dams etc as the case may be, shows that 30 respondents, representing 37 percent of our total respondents, have indicated their water supply coming from those sources.

**TABLE 8.8.**
**MAIGANA: CONSTRUCTION OF WATER SUPPLY FACILITY**

| Organization | No. of Respondents | % of Total Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Government | 30 | 37.0 |
| NGO | 1 | 01.0 |
| Community | 0 | 00.0 |
| Individual | 37 | 45.0 |
| No response | 14 | 17.0 |
| Total | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Even though the Table does not show evidence of community efforts to construct water facility, the wells so constructed privately are not exclusively beneficial to the members of the households

alone. When one facility dries up, the entire neighborhood use the ones yet to dry up. This has invariably transformed them also as community facilities. The role of the NGOs in the rural community under focus is insignificantly represented by 1 percent. However, the no-response is exhibited by 17 percent.

**TABLE 8.9**
**REGULARITY OF WATER SUPPLY SOURCES**

| Water Supply | No. of respondent | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Available | 25 | 30.5 |
| Inadequate | 27 | 33.0 |
| Dries up | 25 | 30.5 |
| No response | 5 | 06.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

SOURCE:- Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Most of the predominant and relatively reliable sources of water supply in the study area, particularly the hand-dug and even concrete wells, streams, ponds etc dry up completely during the dry spell of the year. Table 8.9 shows that the inadequate supply of water in the study area constitutes 33 percent while those sources that dry up during the dry period represent 30.5 percent of our sample. When both are combined together, we notice a rather high percentage of our total respondents which therefore confirms that a large number of the rural dwellers are confronted with inadequate and unsafe water supply.

Hence, the general unreliability of the sources of water supply in the entire communities exposes them to untold hardship and this makes them highly vulnerable to all sorts of water related diseases. It should be observed that only 30.5 percent of the total sample of our respondents

meters to one kilometer, into their households constitute 33 percent of our sample. Where those who cover 1-2 kilometers and 2-3 kilometers to obtain water represent 5 percent and percent respectively. The no response recorded from 14 respondents represents 17 percent o the total sample of respondents.

## 8.06 EDUCATION IN RURAL MAIGANA: RELEVANCE VERSUS APATHY

Issues in rural education cut across a large spectrum of activities which are fundamental t human existence. The monumental task in rural development thus rests on the extent, inter alia, to which illiteracy is eradicated in the rural societies. However, the social and economic gulf between people, between rural and urban areas, between industrialized and non-industrialized nations etc is the only but one dimension that has remained a potential threat to a meaningful human existence. Thus, there is no problem of greater magnitude today than the poverty that has shackled majority of people than that which has emanated from lack of or deficiency in education.

Due to imbalance of educational opportunities, among other things, the social and economic gap created between urban and rural areas, between people therein and within, the poverty-ridden social setting has by and large continued to widen ominously. Hence, the roes of deepening educational crisis in Nigerian political economy reached its peak in the 1970s with the commencement of the Universal Primary Education (UPE). Though with no problem in the financial angle due to the hitherto vibrant petro-dollar economy, the UPE was, notwithstanding, a heightened manifestation of a serious crisis of maladjustment in the educational policy inherited since colonial era and the concrete realities of the dynamic scene.

Since the introduction of the UPE, the crisis in the education sector has deepen. With no adequate preparations, coupled with mismanagement of resources, most children of primary school age were not catered for in terms of adequate classrooms, materials and quality teachers. These therefore indicated that the program had already failed right from its inception or even conception.

Even though there was an astronomic increase in the enrolment figures, facilities for effective teaching and learning were not there. While many parents were lured into the UPE program through persuasions, they soon discovered the hopelessness in the whole scheme and thus had no option other than to withdraw their children. The introduction of the shift system (morning and afternoon sessions) was therefore inevitable due to the obvious acute shortage of classrooms etc. Notwithstanding the shift system, children have continued to receive instructions under shady trees, **Zauruka, (Zaure,** Sig.) and car garages in many households as classes in both urban and rural areas, as the case may be.

It may be recalled that funds for the construction of classrooms were made with ₦3,500 per classroom and later revised higher. The period of the UPE thus witnessed an unprecedented phase of exaggerated contracts; accompanied by poor quality work while in some cases, no construction work undertaken. However, the ₦40.00 per enrolled child to cover the expenses was also exaggerated with overblown enrolment figures designed to attract government subventions.

While it was obvious that funds for the construction of classrooms and for the enrolled pupils were disbursed, very insignificant amount was actually used for the purposes. The rest was

invariably drained by officials from the State down to the Local Governments and Education Departments. However, the existing structures in the schools continued to dilapidate with no rehabilitation in terms of renovations, furniture, books, stationary etc. The most devastating post-UPE impact was the increasing encroachment of the school premises by some influential individuals.

With regard to teachers for the scheme, the number, in terms of teacher-pupil ratio, might be said to be quite sufficient but the quality was far below standard. People of all sorts of qualifications were recruited for the scheme. It must be emphasized here that in the rural areas, the population of children of primary school age, officially declared 'overcrowded', has been sparse and in some instances, non existent. An appraisal report stated, among other things, that the situation of education in rural areas as follows:

> *Schools in the rural areas are at a great disadvantage when it comes to recruiting and retaining qualified teachers. This is because most teachers would rather resign their jobs than accept posting in rural areas where there is no pipe-borne water, electricity or even motorable access roads. Teachers rarely have difficulty in getting other teaching appointments and sometimes apply to (institutions of higher learning).*[63]

The most serious victims, in all respects, of this devastating educational roes are the rural residents. While allocations of educational resources are biased, favored and tilted towards urban areas, it is observed that the incompatibility between where schools are located, what and how teaching is conducted, what are needed to make teaching and learning conducive etc, have become most severe in rural areas.

Notwithstanding the ruralness of Maigana educational scene, clear indications have shown that the entire rural areas possess powerful trends of potential children of primary school age with

serious thirst and implications for education. Unfortunately, with the characteristic lopsided and dwindling supply of relevant and sustainable educational needs of the communities, the situation in Maigana and other localities in focus is grave, filled with apathy and despair.

Hence, the poverty of rural learning environments in Maigana and other localities in focus has tended to present new challenges to the moral obligations or responsibilities of the State. Rural areas are generally renowned to possess relatively poor educational facilities and resources. In Maigana as a whole, it is not an issue of relativity but a total lack of facilities and resources.

The growing repugnance amongst the population to send children to schools where schools do exist has reached a point where they only mind their own business of existence to live and die in perpetual lack of education. In essence, the paucity of organized educational programs in the rural areas have thus constituted part of the inadequate and complete absence of educational opportunities suffered by the broad base of rural residents.

Primary schools in rural Zaria are benefiting far fewer rural children, or even non in most cases, than the official educational figures or statistics usually indicate and imply. For example, the enrolment figures, age ratio, gender, categories or arms in schools, graduation list etc, in the rural areas, furnished by education departments, government institutions etc, always appear tempting to suggest important strides in educational achievements but on the contrary are seriously dubious and misleading. Going right down to the roots, the story is completely a contrast. On many instances, the schools do not exist so also the teachers, pupils, etc.

Much of the official information and data usually used or referred to by international organs are heavily inflated or distorted to suit environmental exigencies. For instance, figures on frequent and high drop-outs of children in schools, due to apathy and despair, inability to bear the brunt of educational requirements, inconveniences and futility to trek long distance, perceived irrelevance to individual needs, marriage and hawking or petty trades, particularly females, and a variety of other salient issues are always concealed. The number of children who have been continuously withdrawn-and-never-to-return from the only primary school in the Maigana rural town is on the increase.

The other eight or nine rural localities of Maigana have no schools to even withdraw their children. Thus it is not only those children with no opportunity to even go school wander about are destined for a perpetual life in illiteracy but also those withdrawn-and-never-to-return. Thus, potential children of primary school age who are out of school in Maigana rural town constitute a vast majority than those going, while far into the hinterland, no child attends schools at all as there exists no schools whatsoever.

The commercial center **(Tasha)** or Sabon Gari, contains or attracts more children, particularly the fairly and relatively grown up, than the primary or junior secondary school has at their respective peak periods. The problem is that the more the children grow older the more they withdraw or are withdrawn from the school to begin preparing their future rather than wait for the uncertainties or hopelessness inherent in what western education presents to them.
The serious crisis is that as children who attend school in Maigana advance in age, the rate of their withdrawals from the school ominously increases. The ways to ameliorate the crisis thus become more problematic. The child's prime age is the best opportunity to mould his character

for easy assimilation. When that opportunity is missed and the child grows older it means that he has gone beyond formal education. To mount informal and non-formal education means more time and resource consuming exercise, cumbersome and limited in nature, which thus requires specialized materials etc.

In all the rural localities under study, female children, as old as four or five, are exposed to all sorts of abuses. As they come under the apprenticeship of their elder siblings, they are thus gradually groomed into the hawking of petty commodities. Attendance of school is not of any importance at all. Since attendance to school and its end results, as perceived by parents in the rural areas, has not helped in keeping soul and body together, its relevance has not therefore been felt to justify all the laborious tasks and expectations of both the parents and children. However, older children, as young as 14 years, are stark illiterates as they can neither read nor write. Even those who might have undergone some level of schooling but withdrawn, have regrettably lost the ability to identify figures or letters, read or write.

Furthermore, the area under study generally presents not only the western education as a debilitating sickness and an issue of concern but also paradoxical in the traditional Islamic education the area is renowned for. The conventional Arabiyya/Islamiyya schools, except in Maigana town, are completely lacking or even non existent. Even in Maigana, the Arabiyya school was established by a wandering Mallam who after collecting children - **Almajirai (Almajiri - sig.)** from different places and parents settled in the rural town. This opportunity therefore opened ways for some lucky or privileged children, whose parents very much care, to attend.

Rural distortions and under-development in Nigeria, through deliberate neglect and marginalization of rural areas and the people, were sequel to the policy of heavy emphasis and concentration of infrastructures and other resources in the urban areas. Therefore, government policy and strategy on urbanization and industrialization since colonial era, was essentially hinged on the speculative assumption of the 'spread effects' theory. This theory of 'spread effects' demonstratively proved not only weak and illusory but also devastating in the entire socio-economic and political condition of the country particularly the rural societies. The gulf between the rural and urban areas has ominously widened; resulting in not only social and economic stresses but also political tensions or hostilities.

Relevant and purposeful education is a fundamental birth right of every child whether in urban or rural areas. This very fundamentality of right to education has been less stressed and perceived within the political economy context. Thus, the use of political power to determine or undermine ownership and control of the means of existence as well as equitable sharing of available resources has been effective and hinged on the nature and opportunity majority of Nigerians have been denied access to education.

Accordingly, our survey empirically reveals that the entire Maigana rural communities have serious apathy for education even though they really appreciate its value or relevance. Education in the entire communities, notwithstanding, tops the priority lists or hierarchy of needs of the rural residents' desire or requirements for a sustained rural development towards improved living condition.

In Bauda locality for instance, education has an overwhelming priority of the sample household respondents as eight out of nine households favored educational infrastructure to be sited in the

hamlet. In the entire locality, there are no schools whatsoever. This perhaps provoked the community to place education very high and expect it to constitute and determine crucial aspects of their livelihood. (See Table 8.5)

Furthermore, in all other communities, except Maigana rural town, no school physically exists and functions even though there are potential children of primary school age. Many of those lads and lasses whose primary school age have expired are really explosive and vulnerable to social malaise as the number is continuously and ominously on the increase. The politics of education under the DFRRI's ostensible proclamation to 'wipe out illiteracy' in the rural areas by 1990 through its ₦43 million Adult Education Program is typical of the political economy bases of education policy that leaves the substance and chases the shadows.

In Maigana rural town, the only primary school in the locality was established under the 1976 UPE exercise while the junior secondary school came into being during the 1980/81 academic session. Pupils, students and teachers attend schools virtually at will. Attendance during the rainy or harsh dry season is even worse not necessarily because of the impacts of rainfall or cold and windy environment on the conduct of teaching and learning but equally and more significantly on what is more relevant at the material time and the individual conveniences.

It was also revealed that the conventional Islamiyya/Arabiyya school in Maigana was established in the rural town by a Mallam in the 1950s. The school traditionally began to draw its pupils/students from different parents within and outside the locality. Those parents who surrender their children to the Mallam inevitability transformed them as **Almajirai** (Beggars). This in essence means that they are vulnerable to all sorts of child abuses. With no specific,

convenient and adequate place to sleep, the children also have no certainty of what to eat. The children spend most of the time either begging for food moving from one house to another, or on the mallam's farms or taking part of the domestic chores of the mallam's wife/wives etc.

However, even though an adult education class was once established in Maigana locality in 1970 and run by the defunct Zaria Local Education Authority (LEA), the 'class' has for long ceased to exist and function. Only very few individuals interviewed could remember its existence. A pioneer adult education student confessed that lessons were erratic and it was only when the teacher called than students were quickly gathered for a lesson. It was further revealed that the teacher rotated to a number of villages for similar lessons and it was not unusual to spend several weeks without the teacher resurfacing again. Finally, the whole program collapsed and never revived, particularly since the eve of the UPE scheme.

It is interesting to note that some communities, particularly and according to the **Mai Unguwar** (Ward Head of) Tashar Itace, donated a piece of land and appealed to the authorities to construct a primary school in the locality during the UPE spree but all the appeals went in vain. However, after the community had erected a structure in the name of a classroom and subsequently notified the relevant authority of its efforts, nothing whatsoever came out of it. The structure has consequently collapsed and is now uninhabitable. Even the Islamiyya/Arabiyya 'school' sited in the household entrance **(Zaure)** is without roof and lessons occasionally and voluntarily conducted.

In Tofa locality, similar situation was also observed. Since 1993, the community has been contributing resources to build a classroom which is still in its uncompleted stage. The

residents, through the Ward Head **(Mai Unguwa),** have appealed to the government but assistance is yet to come. The structure so erected is now on the verge of collapsing as it is not completed, maintained and put into proper use. In other areas like Unguwar Rimi, the situation is the same, while in the rest of the communities, such conditions obtained in Tofa and Unguwar Rimi do not exist at all.

Furthermore, the actual situation on the ground in the whole of Soba Local Government could not be compatible with the Federal Government Report of updated National Inventory of Community based Infrastructural Facilities. The Report, in part, portrays that there are 23 communities throughout the LGA served with Adult Education Centers, 30 with primary schools and 3 with secondary schools. The Report further shows that there are 27, 34 and 4 adult, primary and secondary/technical schools in the LGA respectively.[64] This is not entirely the case as figures have generally been distorted and inflated to suit political circumstances.

**TABLE 8.11**
**WILLINGNESS TO SEND CHILDREN TO SCHOOL**

| Response | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 44 | 54.0 |
| No | 27 | 33.0 |
| No response | 11 | 13.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Table 8.11 portrays the extent of willingness or otherwise of the rural household heads in the study area to send their children to schools. While it shows a predominant appreciation of the relevance and need to send children to schools, the existing educational situation in the rural

communities, the in-built rural dwellers' skepticism and apathy in education have, **inter alia**, shattered the social morale of the communities' response to education generaly.

In other words, the relevance of such adventure which, more often than not, results negatively, has forced most of the respondents to realize the hopelessness of the exercise! Hence, the 54 percent willingness shown is only conditional only on when government plays or puts more emphasis and attention on rural education. Invariably if the reverse was the case, the 32 percent unwillingness and 13 percent no-response to send children to school would have perhaps not featured in our sample, even though the no-response may be those who are unmarried and those yet to have any child since marriage.

**TABLE 8.12**
**LEVEL TO ALLOW CHILDREN'S EDUCATION**

| | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Primary | 1 | 01.0 |
| Secondary | 6 | 07.0 |
| Tertiary | 36 | 44.0 |
| No response | 35 | 48.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

It may be observed that the response in Table 8.12 corroborates that in Table 8.11 in the sense that respondents' willingness to send children to schools approximates the extent to allow their children to read from primary to tertiary levels. Thus, the combined responses from our sample in Table 8.12 of primary 1 percent, secondary 7 percent and tertiary 44 percent (making 52 percent) is corollary to the response willingness of 54 percent in Table 8.11. However, the non applicable response in Table 8.12 shows a 48 percent in the sample which also approximates the

no- response of 33 percent and not applicable response of 13 percent in Table 8.11 put together (46 percent).

## 8.07 DELIVERY OF HEALTH SERVICES IN MAIGANA AND OTHERS

Studies in the delivery of health care services in rural Nigeria are scanty. The sketchy nature of the studies in the sector has further indicated the lopsidedness and inequality in the provision and maintenance of health and medical care services. Rural-urban balance in this sector has continued to cause serious health problems with devastating consequences in rural areas.

The vital issue in the rural-urban health delivery bias is essentially hinged on the socio-economic structure fuelled by the political economy of the State. In addition, as the rural health is questioned, so also the urban health since all is not also well in the urban areas. In other words, living in rural areas is not just enough to be denied access to health facilities but primarily on the class nature of the society. The poverty that has shackled majority members of the society is a serious determinant of accessibility to the modern health care system.

The portrait of health related infrastructural facilities provided in Maigana does not really present a remarkable situation distinct from similar rural communities. Rather, it presents a picture of the continuing trends and directions of how the State, in reality, handles the condition of health in rural areas. The question is that what facilities, ranging from the sanitary condition to the establishment of health structures, personnel and other resources to make health services functional, are now existing in the rural areas ?

Principally, our focus is directed at assessing the nature and extent to which medical services in Maigana are provided to the local population. The crisis endangered in the health sector, the

gloomy and painted picture of the state of health delivery in the entire system is frightening. Since the last three decades however, public health, rather than improve from the previous colonial system has so much exacerbated that has now completely collapsed with adverse consequences.

Since the role which the provision of health services in the transformation of the quality, meaningful and productive life of the people is well established, the delivery of health and other accompanying social services by the State constitutes a crucial milestone in unfolding a genuine and realistic development of rural societies. In Nigeria today, every sickness has become a potential threat to human existence.

The weakness inherent in the delivery of health services has been sequel to the State total neglect and disregard of the condition of the countryside. Thus, cases of all sorts of diseases have continued to be on an astronomical rate and therefore producing very high death rates. In Maigana alone, from January to August 1996, between two and five corpses were daily taken to the burial ground to the extent that a new burial ground had to be cleared. Conditions were even worse in the other hamlets where epidemics of diseases have ravaged the entire communities with the plague of bingiri (mass loss of lives due to epidemics).

Notwithstanding the State public policy and the political pronouncements on improved delivery of health services, particularly to the rural residents, it is pertinent to note that the health related matters actually provided to even the much talked urban population have been minimal, insignificant and inconsequential. Approach to health matters is therefore not an issue of sectoral attention and concentration as epidemics have no boundaries.

Furthermore, factors that impair the State policy in the provision of health delivery services are intrinsic to each other. In the first place, the entire Maigana rural communities have become vulnerably enslaved and endangered to any kind of ailment due primarily to the dwindling and degenerated condition of life. Thus, State public policies on social and economic matters, over the last three decades, have serious and devastating consequences to most households. These therefore forced many families not only to regard medical care a tertiary matter but at the same time drastically reduce food intake. In most households of the rural areas, impoverished and malnourished children and hunger stricken adults, struck by hypertension, heart diseases, diabetic etc are the common sights in the localities.

The decadence of governments brought about the decadence of public infrastructures, particularly for the health delivery system. Those infrastructures established a long time ago stand not only unfuctional but also obsolescent. However, problems of the required number of trained personnel and other materials have continued to be herculean and frightening. Furthermore, the dearth of tools and required staff, drugs and dressing have become most devastating in view of the serious mismanagement the economy has been subjected to over the last three decades.

The symbiosis of health delivery-cum-access and all-weather roads-cum-proper education in rural areas have become the most paramount preventive measures to avert any threat to health. A lot of ailment that endanger the delivery of health system could be alleviated if adequate roads, proper education, portable water supply and sanitized environment were given priority preventive measures. For instance, when there is no access and all- weather roads in rural areas emergency health problems are just impossible.

It should be stressed that, more often than not, health delivery service data gleaned from primary sources stand distinct from data presented by official records which are, by and large, astounding. Official records have thus become seriously unreliable and difficult to validate and when contrasted, compared or cross checked, they are found to be apparently incongruent from the situation on the ground.

In the whole of Maigana rural areas surveyed, the communities are faced with no accessibility to the modern health and medical facilities. It is only in Maigana rural town that a clinic structurally exists since 1972. However, the new Rural Health Center complex under construction is being undertaken by the **Unicef.** Notwithstanding, communities of Maigana and all other localities have to either choose to remain with ailments or travel to Zaria, 30 kilometers away from Maigana for medical attention if only they can afford the journey and expenses involved.

The clinic in Maigana attends only to maternal women. Due to the popular campaigns for birth control, majority of rural women have been frightened to attend the clinic. With fear and repugnance, however, many husbands have prevented their wives to attend the clinic. It is important to note that even though there is no proper documentation and examination of those who bother to attend, the 'consulting' personnel do not possess the requisite professional qualifications to handle the various complicated or complex rural health and maternal problems. In view of the foregoing therefore the situation thus presents a dangerous trend in the medical and health care delivery in the area as a whole. According to our investigations, the issue and problems of health care delivery system in the rural areas under study are immense; which has also attracted a high priority list of infrastructural needs of the rural dwellers.

In Bauda locality for instance, seven out of nine respondents considered health infrastructure as the first priority. In kwadaro, all the four respondents favored health, more than all other infrastructure as the first priority because according to a respondent, who exclaimed that **'lafiya uwar jiki'** (literally means health is the mother of the body/soul) subsumes everything else within the orbit of health. As a whole, health tops the list of priorities of the whole rural communities. Further details can be observed in Table 8.5.

As the entire communities are highly vulnerable to all sorts of health and other hazards, assistance is not likely to come by and epidemic over come before causing the great havoc. However, since there exists no easy accessibility and means of quick transmission of information, added with the total decadence of government, the situation is nothing but grave. Tables 8.13 and 8.14 empirically buttress the point.

**TABLE 8.13**
**PROVISION OF TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES**

| Response | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 0 | 00.0 |
| No | 76 | 93.0 |
| No response | 6 | 07.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

SOURCE:- Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Rural areas are characteristically not provided with telecommunication facilities. Its utility and purposes, therefore, far out-weight the social dimensions; especially when useful information can be immediately transmitted in situations that require emergency and prompt action. As shown in Table 8.13, all respondents affirm the non-existence of telecommunication facility in the area.

But our survey revealed that there is a radio massage equipment at the local government headquarters which does not properly work or put into proper use. Communication between the localities, particularly within them, is always hindered due lack of effective and easy road accessibility.

**TABLE 8.14**
**ACCESS FEEDER ROADS**

| Response | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 23 | 28.0 |
| No | 53 | 65.0 |
| No Response | 6 | 07.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:-** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

The role which access, all-weather and network of feeder roads play in rejuvenating and vibrating the economies of rural societies and enhancing socio-economic conditions of rural dwellers have been well established. Despite that indisputable role, road access into the rural communities of our study area is debilitating as Table 8.14 clearly indicates. Hence, 65 percent of our total sample can be observed to have indicated a deplorable condition of roads in the areas.

Even though 23 respondents, representing 28 percent of the total respondents relatively affirm the existence of road access, it should be made clear that the respondents are from the Maigana rural town where, in reality, there is an access road into the enclosed community. Thus, since the community is just off the Zaria-Jos highway, Maigana rural town practically does not suffer from the menace of road inaccessibility all the year round. In addition, the contract of the

shabby tarred road awarded recently, contributed to this response. However, our sample indicates that 6 respondents, representing 7 percent have not responded to our enquiry.

The Federal Government Report of the updated National Inventory of community based infrastructural facilities in Soba Local Government in terms of health facilities is dubious and misleading. According to the report, out of 28 communities surveyed, 20 were served with dispensaries between 1985 and 1992 while 8 communities served with maternity homes and dispensaries.[65] These have no relationships whatever with the reality on the ground overtime.

Other issues include the provision of pasture areas for the cattle in the localities. It is a tradition or customary to hear serious conflicts or disputes occurring between Fulani nomads and farmers on issues relating to the pasture land for the cattle on the one hand and crops planted by farmers, on the other. As more and more open farm lands are consequently being open up for cultivation, the Fulani cattle rearers have continued to seriously face more and more acute shortage of pasture land for their cattle.

Furthermore, as Fulani nomads bother less about their social condition than the condition of their cattle, nothing is thus primary than their cattle and their means of survival. To a typical orthodox nomad, the cattle is his life and means of existence. Hence, **fadama** areas in Maigana rural environs, where long grasses grow and used for, **inter alia,** dwelling purposes, have over time become continuously threatened by the State policy and program of dry season farming. Apart from that, the **fadama** areas are however part of the traditional and luxurious pasture areas for the cattle.

With the opening up of the land for irrigation, acute shortage of pasture land areas for the Fulani cattle has invariably set in without any corresponding provision for any alternatives. Not only was the issue of farm land products paramount in the conflicts between nomads and farmers but also on the issue of sustained availability of the long grasses for the roofing of peasants' dwelling places. This issue is yet to have a permanent solution. In the interim, a vigilante group was established by the **sarkin** Maigana and charged with the prevention of cattle and any unauthorized persons, particularly from other districts, trespassing the restricted zone.

Other important issues were the establishment of industries to provide employment opportunities to the large army of rural unemployed and under-employed, community participation in rural development as well as the problematic of leadership in exhibiting quality, visionary, sincere and exemplary leadership as well as giving proper guidance. All these issues have articulately featured remarkably in the ways and manners rural development policies and strategies could be formulated and executed as well as how rural communities could be directly involved and transformed for a sustainable development.

## 8.08 RURAL ELECTRIFICATION IN MAIGANA

Rural areas in Nigeria are in complete darkness even when the national grid lines pass through their localities. Within the current dispensation, power is primarily supplied to the urban or semi-urban towns. This further exhibits a remarkable urban bias in the entire development process.

Prior to 1960, plan for rural electrification was not even imagined let alone contemplated by the colonial authorities. Thus, even in most of the towns, electricity service was not served by the

erstwhile inherited colonial Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN). During the 1970s however, some selected towns, when the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) replaced the ECN and became the sole agent for the production, transmission and distribution of electricity in Nigeria, were hooked with the national grid. Others were, however, fed from isolated generators. Later on, the process of rural electrification fed with diesel generators under the auspices of respective state governments was mounted. This culminated in the establishment of Rural Electricity Boards (REBs). The Kaduna State REB Edict NO.10 was established in May 1976.

Provision of electricity inevitably transforms the social and economic life of a community and thus uplifts the entire activities in rural areas so provided. As it permeates all facets of human endeavor, its provision and optimal utilization is, therefore, all encompassing and becomes relevant only to the appropriate stage or growth of the rural areas; all other vital infrastructure being put in place.

NEPA plays a very crucial role in the transformation of rural condition of life and other economic activities. Hence, the necessity and need to provide electricity services to rural areas cannot be over-stressed. The entire transformation of the docile and dormant rural scenery, and rural life brings about vibrant, dynamic or diversified production and provision of goods and services through the electrification process. In rural communities, this process must also be seen, apart from other crucial infrastructures, within the orbit of raising rural living condition higher than the subsistence or poverty level.

In April 1976, sequel to the recognition of the vital role rural areas play and necessity to transform rural environment, NEPA, established Rural Electrification Department, the first of

its kind, to implement the government rural electrification policy throughout the country. Though not in favor of the government policy because of cost, the Directorate of Rural Electrification NEPA, argued that the:

> *... cost of serving rural areas with electricity are high-two or three times higher than in urban areas. For this country, the rate of growth in electricity demand for our rural areas is low and thus electrification is not a viable proposition.*[66]

Notwithstanding the NEPA's repugnant and commercial stance on rural electrification, the Federal Government conceived and sponsored the electrification of Local Government Headquarters (LGHQ) through NEPA. Thus, over 300 towns and villages including LGHQ not previously hooked with NEPA were expected to benefit from the essential social service program. But due to inadequate plans, poor funding and other political patronage etc the program, in its entirety, collapsed. By 1983 the program engulfed well over 58 million naira.[67]

After the military take over of the realm of political leadership in December 1983, the program was resuscitated and restructured. Thus, with some credit line facilities worth about 117.5 million US dollars obtained from Bulgaria and Germany, construction materials and equipment were negotiated between the Federal Government and the donor countries. Of particular importance, special lattice steel towers, which constituted vital components of NEPA to work with, were imported. The Ministry of Power and Steel could not justify NEPA's denial of power of rural areas on grounds of viability and commercialism but rather on government responsibility to provide social services.

> *The rural roads are small and sparsely distributed and the cost of providing power to such an astronomical cost to such scattered small communities though, can not be justified on the grounds of economic viability, yet has to be defended on the basis of needs to provide the basics of life in order to promote development and sustain growth.*[68]

Within our focus area, it is only in Maigana rural town that the government, through NEPA, has recently extended power supply. The commissioning ceremony of the power supply for the locality along with that of Soba was performed in July 1996, NEPA poles and wires can be observed penetrating into the rural community and inside some few rural households who can afford to connect and pay for the service.

At the present stage of the growth of the locality, electricity is by and large not of vital or significant basic needs of the rural communities vis-a-vis other infrastructures (see Table 8.5). In circumstances where there exists no potable water, no health and medical facilities, no access all-weather roads, no functional schools etc, electricity is seriously a misplaced priority of a typical rural resident. This has been buttressed by the Maigana rural inhabitants.

Our random sample survey reveals that electricity, provided to only one locality by virtue of its position or status as the headquarters of the LGA, has not attracted any considerable attention and priority needs of the rural communities. Even in the area provided, majority felt that it was a misplaced priority and what had been expended could have been used to provide relevant infrastructures lacking in the area.

However, the only community that mentioned electricity among its priority needs is Tashar Itace, probably because of its proximity to Maigana. While viewing the glittering of the lights in the night might have perhaps tempted and attracted the attention of the residents to fancy their locality to be at par with Maigana. Moreover, the NEPA wires that have passed to Soba have cut through the village. The villagers felt that its was just a matter of connecting the high tension wires and reducing them to a transformer etc.

At the present stage of rural environment, provision of electricity does not entail any significant stride in addressing the perennial rural question where the primary issues and infrastructures are yet to be tackled and provided. It should be recalled that electricity was provided in Maigana and Soba in June 1996. But the politically motivated and so-called updated inventory report of the Federal Government clearly falsified that

> *...electricity is provided in only two communities in this LGA; namely soba and Maigana. It was provided long before 1985, all by Government.*[69]

As the provision of electricity infrastructure through NEPA in the study area is restricted to Maigana enclosed rural town only, it should be emphatically stated therefore that the provision of such a facility in the locality is rather a windfall sequel to its

**TABLE 8.15**
**PROVISION OF ELECTRICITY**

| Response | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 23 | 28.0 |
| No | 53 | 65.0 |
| No Response | 6 | 07.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:-** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

provision in Soba locality; a more diversified, more populated and 'urbanized' locality than Maigana; notwithstanding the argument on the status of Maigana as the headquarters of the local government.

Since the provision of electricity to Soba must inevitably pass through Maigana, the headquarters of Soba LGA, its provision in local government is not only a windfall but a necessity on the part

of government's electrification policy of all local government headquarters. In Table 8.9, 23 respondents, all from Maigana, representing 28 percent of our total respondents affirm its provision in the locality, while 65 percent express its non-provision in their localities in addition to the 7 percent no-response.

## FOOT NOTE

1. Federal Republic of Nigeria - **The Fourth National Plan 1981-84** Government Printer, 1981 p.78.
2. Kevin M. Clearer and Gotz A Schreiber 1994 **Op.cit.,** p.116
3. Richard Sandbrook, 1982, **Op.cit.** p.166
4. **Ibid**, p. 18
5. Edwin Dean - 1972, **Op.cit.,** p.11
6. **National Development Plan 1962-68** 1962, **Op.cit.** p.6
7. **Second National Development Plan 1970-74** 1970, **Op.cit.** p.344
8. **Third National Development Plan 1975-80** 1975, **Op.cit** p.405
9. **Ibid**, Vol.1 p. 292
10. **Ibid**, p. 292.
11. **Ibid** p. 30
12. **Second National Development Plan** 1970, **Op.cit** p. 33
13. **The Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979**.
14. **Guidelines for Local Government Reform 1976**
15. **Guidelines for the Fourth National Development Plan, op.cit.** p.29
16. **Ibid,** pp. 440-447
17. **Ibid** p. 79
18. **Second Development Plan op. cit.** p. 108
19. T.A. Salau, 1986 **Op.cit.** p. 332
20. **Third Development Plan, op. cit.**
21. Larry D. Koinya," A possible Way Forward". An address to the Nation 1987. See also Organization for Rapid Rural and National Development - FRR/108/Vol.I/1987
22. L. A. Ega, **et'al** (eds) **Rural Development Policies in Nigeria**.
    The proceeding of the Fourth National Conference of the Nigerian Rural Sociological Association, Held at the Kongo Conference Hotel, A.B.U Zaria, from May 17th - 20th 1987.
23. Geral M. Meier, 1976, **Op.cit** p. 11
24. **Second Development Plan**, **Op.cit**, p. 170
25. **Third Development Plan op.cit.** p. 180
26. **Ibid**, p.180.
27. Policy Guidelines on Rural Electrification, NEPA, p. 1
28. **Fourth National Plan op.cit.** p. 55
29. N.T.A. Kaduna Periscope - 15-3-94. The report said that since the award of the contract in 1990, the work only commenced in 1992. Before abandoning, the contractor - ITCC - requested for N800,000.00k to complete the work from the state government which did not materialize.
30. See Nigerian poverty Alleviation Program: Beneficiary consultative Survey on Institutional issue and Delivery Mechanisms. Final Reports June 1995, Ibadan. Zonal Reports:- Central Zonal(3) S.A. Nkom (Leader), South Zone, Joseph A. Olamajere (leader) Eastern Zone (4) Pat Ngwu (leader) North-West Zone, J. Shehu and South West Zone (5). See also poverty Assessment Research program Workshop II 24 -28 January 1994, Sponsored by National Planning Commission Organized by World Bank Mission, Lagos, Nigeria. Supported by UNICEF (Nigeria) and Overseas Development Administration(OAD).
31. See S.A. Nkom - "Nigeria Poverty Alleviation Program..."
32. Central Zone (Zone 3 ) 1995, **Ibid**. p. 11
33. Michael M. Cernea (ed) - 1985, **op.cit.**
34. Kevin Cleaver and Gotz Schreiber, 1994 **op.cit** pp.163-4
35. Juan Gaviria, Vishva Bindlish, Uma Lele **Rural Road Question and Nigeria's Agricultural Development,** Managing Agricultural Development in Africa(MADIA). Discussion Paper 0. The World Bank,Washington D.C., 1990, P.5
    Judith Tendler, **New Directions in Rural Roads,** AID Program Evaluation. Discussion Paper No. 2, Washington D.C. US Agency of international Development (USAID) March, 1979.
36. Michael Cernea, 1985, **Op.cit** p. 295
37. Cynthia Cook-"Social Analysis in Rural Road Project". **cf** M.M Cernea 1985 **Ibid** p. 305
38. Juan Gaviria **et'al**, 1990 **op.cit** p. 5
39. **Ibid**
40. KADP Annual Report 1988
41. F.S. Idachaba, **The Green Revolution: A food Production Plan,** 1980, Lagos, Nigeria: Federal Ministry of Agriculture.
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46. KADP Annual Report. 1989 p. 2
47. KADP Annual Report, 1990
48. **Ibid**. PP 11-12
49. KADP ICR. **OP. Cit.** p. 131.
50. Federal Republic of Nigeria - **The Report of the updated National Inventory of Community-based Infrastructural Facilities in Soba Local Government Area of Kaduna State,** The Presidency Abuja July, 1993, p. 5
51. Kevin M. Cleaver and Gotz A. Schreiber - 1994. **op. cit.** p.116
52. United Nations General Assembly: "Development and International Cooperation- International Water Supply and Sanitation Decade: present situation and prospects" New York, September 18, 1980.
53. **Ibid**.

54. United States Accounting Office - "United State Strategy Needed for Water Supply Assistance to Developing Countries", Washington D.C. August 25, 1981
55. Anthony A. Churchill - 1987, Op. cit. P. 2
56. The Ikara rural Water Project, Colorfully commissioned in August 1996, was the recent case in point where lots of assorted gifts, among others, were distributed as largest to a large number of invited guests, important dignitaries, top government Officials, military Personnel etc, while the cost of organizing the colorful ceremony was also staggering. However, the commissioning ceremonies of the Saminaka Water Works colorfully done previously also attracted far a wide guests which thus amount of expenditures. All these have become mysterious and secret as only the Ministry of Water Resources or the State Government can explain while the State Water Board is but a mid-wife in not only the entire embourgeoisement but also in securing the World Bank loans. It is rather bewildering to discover that another World Bank loan of ₦293m was signed under the German Financial Cooperation in Nigeria, between the Kaduna State Government and the German firm, on 16/01/97 for the expansion work on Ikara water works, commissioned barely five months ago, along with others in Zonkwa, Kwoi and Birnin Gwari.
57. Anthony A. Churchill, 1987. Op. cit., p. 5
58. United Nations- Estimates and projection of Urban, Rural and City population, 1982, Assessment, UN population Division.
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60. Ibid
61. S.A. Esrev, R.G. Feachem & J. M. Hughes, "Interventions for the Control of Diarrheal Diseases Among Young Children: Improving Water Supplies and Excreta Disposal Facilities" Bulletin of WHO, 63(4) 1985, P. 772.
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65. Ibid p. 7
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67. Ibid
68. The Democrat Newspapers, 5.10.90 (Paper by the Minister of Power and Steel).
69. Report of the Updated National Inventory, 1993, op. cit. p. 5.

# CHAPTER NINE

## 9.00 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN MAIGANA

> *Despite the strategic importance of local government to the national development process, its contribution has been minimal... excessive government control and interference in the performance of local government ... the behavior and attitudes of the persons who operated the system... hinder equitable distribution of amenities evenly in the whole local government areas.*
> *Another reason which accounts for the ineffective performance of local government... is the conception of local government as an administrative apparatus established for the efficient delivery of services as for the maintenance of law and order.*
> *The political objective of local government has tended to be ignored. Consequently, efficiency tends to be regarded as an end in itself and the political dimension of local government is usually underrated. The inevitable consequence of this ratification of efficiency is the enhancement of the eminence of the bureaucratic cadres of local government without necessarily achieving optimal efficiency in performance. This means that political processes based on the mobilization of the people and on popular participation are ignored. We are convinced that the performance of local government can only be enhanced when the idea of local government is conceptually redefined.*[1]

### 9.01 INTRODUCTION

The failure of both the Federal and State governments to bring about meaningful development to the people, particularly those who reside in the rural areas, is not in doubt. This failure intrinsically affects the executive capacity, ability and responsibility of the local government in bringing about the needed development. The local government, within the structural arrangements of the Nigerian polity and economy, is logically expected to complement the other tiers of government. People are thus left with no option other than to deal with the challenges of their environment in their own ways.

Despite this undisputed reality, there appears to exist no harmonious relationship between the local governments and the higher levels of government, particularly the state governments. The seminal recognition of the continuous whittling down of the powers of the local government by

the state, notwithstanding the constitutional or statutory provision, stands in complete contradiction of the state governments' blind-folded eyes to go in excess of their powers or limitations. Hence, the interference in the affairs of the local governments, overtime, particularly by the state governments and sanctioned by the federal government has been incessant and total.

The powerlessness of local government, in all its ramifications, has inevitably transformed the institution to be completely amenable to the dictates and manipulations of the higher levels of government. This makes the local government completely as an un-viable instrument for the delivery of social services to the powerless people. As its institutional powers are usurped, local government and the people are incapacitated and thus not in a position to provide panacea to domestic or local problems. For instance, the establishment of special and autonomous bodies and project authorities have continued to erode all efforts to build a viable local government system.

The genesis of such doctrines dates back to time immemorial particularly since the processes of state formation and later on rationalized and modified by the dictates of the political economy at different historical conjunctures. Thus, local government per se is not in a position to perform its functions independent of the structural linkages of the behavior and interest of the State or its actors. Therefore, the symptoms are always presented to camouflage the actual cause in order to ensure the sustenance of the status quo: maintenance of domination and exploitation.

It should thus be recalled that when the NA system was abolished and reviewed under the 1967 'sweeping' reform by the Military junta in the State, it was portrayed that the reform was 'inevitable' in order

> *... to enable people participate directly in the administration of their areas.*[2]

The reviewed NA system was renamed Local Authority (LA) with an established three-year life-span LA council as a Corporate body. It abolished the distinctions between the Chief-in-Council and Chief-and-Council and all Chiefs were directed to comply with the LA Council decisions composed of two-thirds elected and one-third nominated members.[3]

Hence, the ostensible aims of Local government reforms, over time, or bringing the government nearer to the people, the encouragement of people's participation in the management of their local affairs, injecting democratic principles in system and ensuring even and uniform development throughout the area have only resulted in the realization of reverse sides of the apparent intention. Infrastructural provisions and other social welfare services to the bulk of the people, particularly rural inhabitants, have only remained limited and pretentious.

## 9.02 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN MAIGANA

Before the creation of Soba LGA with headquarters at Sabon Gari in 1989 (comprising the current Sabon Gari LGA), the entire area (and even more) was part of the defunct Zaria LGA established since the 1976 Local Government Reform. In 1991, when new LGAs were created, Soba LGA, with headquarters at Maigana, was created, thus producing the Sabon Gari LGA. The estimated population of the LGA as par the 1991 population figures was 187,277 people with over 33 communities.

It should, in retrospect, be recalled that in 1981 a smaller area than the present Soba LGA was proposed to be curved out from the former Zaria LGA as Maigana LGA with headquarters at Maigana. When it was finally created by the Kaduna State House of Assembly Edict, the military coup d'etat of 1983 decreed otherwise and thus reversed the previous local government structures throughout the country.

Section 7(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 as amended sanctions the existence of a democratically elected local government system. The Local Government system in Nigeria was henceforth recognized and guaranteed as the third tier of governmental activity in the country's federal structure. This constitutional recognition of local government, within the scheme of things, mandates local governments to participate, within the state, in the processes of economic planning and overall development.

However, the fourth schedule (part one) to the same Constitution specifies the functions of local governments. The functions are categorized into two broad patterns - the 'main' or 'exclusive' and 'participatory' functions. These constitutional arrangements have, in reality, only demonstrated the powerlessness of local governments while the Constitution or other levels of government seem to be oblivious of the political, fiscal, operational and other limitations of the local governments. This provision partly and inevitably worsens the state-local government relations and drives them asunder by direct conflict between them; particularly in areas of political control and the process of accumulation.

Under the 'main' functions, items of infrastructural facilities consist of the establishment and maintenance of cemeteries, burial grounds and home for the destitute or infirm; establishment

maintenance and regulation of slaughter houses, slaughter slabs, markets, motor parks and public conveniences. Others are construction and maintenance of roads, street lightening, drainage, parks, gardens, open spaces, or such public facilities as may be prescribed. Furthermore, the provision and maintenance of public conveniences, sewage and refuse disposal are also part of the 'exclusive' responsibilities of the local governments.

Accordingly, the 'participatory' responsibilities of the local governments are items supposed to be executed by the local governments in league with the state governments. But in a situation where the local governments are not equipped to perform or discharge this function, the provision makes it mandatory to the state governments, notwithstanding, to execute them independent of the local governments.

These 'participatory' functions are the provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education, the development of agriculture and natural resources, other than the exploitation of minerals, provision and maintenance of health services. Whereas part two of the fourth schedule to the Constitution provides for the functions of the traditional council in local government which shall consist of the

> *...general advisory roles and promoting the mobilization of the people and other resources towards self-reliance, community development and welfare within the area.*[3]

Reforms on local government, since colonial era, are not new in the Nigerian body politic. More often then not, successive reforms have focused more on the defects of the previous ones as a justifiable ground for reform. Reforms on local government, as they have come into being over time, have not succeeded in addressing and tackling the real or crucial issues - the

provision of sustainable infrastructural facilities and raising the living condition of the people affected. It is generally assumed that the local government, being the closest tier of government to the grass-roots, occupies a vantage position in organizing and implementing development programs for its communities.

The most plausible, though populist, local government reform in Nigeria was that of 1976. The reform, among other things, took up the structural and institutional defects of the previous local government system as a linch-pin of its introduction of the 'new' reforms. For instance, the 'continuous whittling down of their powers', continued encroachment by the state governments on the 'exclusive preserves of local governments' as well as lack of adequate funds and appropriate institution in the system have therefore continued to undermine any meaningful progress. The reform further explains that:

> *... excessive politicking had made even modest progress impossible. Consequently, there has been a divorce between the people and government institutions at their most basic levels.*[4]

The objectives of the reform were to ensure that the principles and practice of participatory government, entrenchment of politico-moral responsibility through proper communication and mobilization of resources are guaranteed and realized. Contrary to that realization the reform would inevitably remain irrelevant. Accordingly:

> *... if they did not include the certainty that as from **now**, **every stratum** of Nigerian society would benefit from the continued prosperity of this country, through the availability of amenities, indeed necessities, such as electricity, adequate water supply, improved transportation, health facilities and so on.*[5] *(emphasis added).*

Hence, if the principal aims of the local government reform are to:

*( i )make appropriate services and development activities responsive to local wishes and initiatives by devolving or delegating them to local representative bodies;*
*(ii ) facilitate the exercise of democratic self government close to the local levels of our society and to encourage initiative and leadership potential;*
*(iii) mobilize human and material resources through the involvement of members of the public in their local development;*
*(iv ) provide a two-way channel of communications between local communities and government (both State and Federal)*[6]

then these aims are rather too far from being felt or heard by the people of Maigana, the headquarters of Soba Local Government, particularly in the execution of the supposedly functions of the local government which have ostensibly required-

*( i ) detailed local knowledge for efficient performance*
*(ii ) success (to depend) on community responsiveness and participation*
*(iii) a personal nature requiring provision close to where individuals affected live, and in which significant use of discretion or understanding of individuals is needed.*[7]

As an institution, local government's portrayed responsibility is therefore shown to be in charge with the provision and maintenance of some specific local infrastructural facilities though in limited scope. But with the myriad of institutions involved in the provision of rural infrastructural services, there exists serious problems posed in the delivery of goods and services to the people, and in most cases no service or good is provided. However, the different levels of interventions by different organs and other institutions like the DFRRI, MAMSER, ADPs NGOs CDAs etc have made local governments completely irrelevant in view of their rudimentary or subsidiary functions and the legal or Constitutional provisions which condition their performance and existence.

It should be recalled however that the Government White Paper on Dasuki Committee findings and recommendations on the review of local government administration in Nigeria, shows that

the Federal government accepted the recommendation, **inter alia,** for the local governments to give priority to roads and drainage, environmental sanitation, rural water supply, community development, agriculture and maintenance of law and order.[8]

Although local governments' role in the provision and maintenance of basic infrastructures is duplicated by different levels of government or by many institutions. Yet, none of these levels of government or institutions has ever contemplated leaving any infrastructure provided to be maintained or rehabilitated by the local government. None has however ever confidently involved the local government on the provision of such infrastructural facilities.

For instance, the ADP has never attempted or succeeded, as the case may be, in involving the local government in a joint provision and maintenance of rural roads. In the local government, there is the inherent or persistent disregard of the need to inculcate an effective institutional maintenance capacity within its rather weak system. Thus, because of the weakness and inability of the local government to keep up with the maintenance of infrastructure; some times put in place by different institutions, many of such infrastructure investments end up disastrously wasted.

Thus, with the specific experience of the ADP, particularly in the rural road construction and maintenance, it was initially taken as given that as soon as rural feeder roads were completed, the roads would be handed over to the LGA for routine maintenance. Rather than accept the task with enthusiasm, the local government was not only reluctant but also happy to surrender other vital aspects of its 'responsibilities' which it has not been able to perform ostensibly due to inadequate resources.

Even though local government representation in the design of the project was provided for and emphasized, its participation since the commencement of the ADP was very limited. Thus,

> *...the recent appointment of local government councils and an expected increase in resources, however, seems to open a window of opportunity."*[9]

Thus, infrastructural facilities will only continue to be worse if local governments are left to either provide or maintain them largely because the institutional structures cannot be sustained by the social system operating in the local government

> *All too often, problems have been approached by choosing the institutional structure that will work for a particular delivery system rather than by selecting the delivery system that will work given the limitation of the existing institutional framework.*[10]

It is always, though officially, claimed that one of the primary objectives of creating local governments is to bring government closer to the people or vice-versa. In essence, it is to ensure that people find, see and feel the relevance and existence of government in the provision of amenities and other necessities of life. However, local government is popularly referred to as the nucleus of the grass-roots government; but in real sense lacks the executive capacity and ability to discharged any function.

Hence, the objective of bringing government closer to the people of Maigana is far from being realized. The only way the rural community in Maigana feel the existence of government, via the traditional authority in the area, is through the annual collection of taxes or other forms of coercion and extortions. Thus, the superficial 'bringing government closer to the people' and vice versa is paradoxical and therefore limited to various forms and magnitudes of exploitation and pauperization rather than providing them with all the critical needs and solving problems at the local levels.[11]

Since the entire functions of the local government have been subsumed into the dynamics of the State and the class struggle therein, local government can not practically be excluded from that framework as the system does not exist independent of the State character and direction. Thus, the character of the Nigerian economy, the role and motion of the State and its apparatuses have all provided avenues whereby the class interest of individuals, strategically positioned to execute functions of the State, seriously undermine the role or activities which local governments are seemingly expected to execute. This, in essence, means that while the performance of the role of the State is primary, the perpetuation of domination, exploitation and oppression of the under-privileged is within the orbit of that role.

The motivating necessity to stabilize and rationalize government at the local level is no other than to stabilize and rationalize the expansion of the over- saturated avenues of accumulation of the other levels of government. The decentralization of some significant functions of the State government was not in reality designed to harness local resources for rural development but essentially made out of the necessity and need to provide the atmospheric condition, platform, umbrella and protection conductive for the local elites to assiduously accumulate wealth and then wax their muscles in full preparation of taking over the socio-economic and political realm from their 'elder brothers' at the higher levels.

A study on local government has thus demonstrated that:

> *class determinism or class position of those who control political power and own the means of production determines, more than any thing else, the general conduct of the state in general and local government in particular.*[12]

In essence, the nature and general role of the State particularly in shaping and maintaining class interest has consequently turned the local government into a colossal gimmickry. A point in this

case can be cited as an empirical example. The peasant farmers in the area under study faced acute shortage of fertilizer during the 1996 farming season as a result of the deliberate policy of the government. The politics and economics of fertilizer were immense and unprecedented in the history of the country. Peasants' response to this was devastating (see interviews).

While the chemicals came in trickles, local governments were given allocations to distribute to farmers under their jurisdictions at not more than ₦150 per 50kg bag. The fertilizer consignment allocated to Soba local government remained under lock and key in Maigana undistributed. What came up was a serious fertilizer scandal when the top officials of the local government, comprising of the Chairman, Councilors, Departmental Heads, the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) etc, conspired, connived and secretly distributed the fertilizer amongst themselves to trade with.

As fertilizer became too scarce, it thus became too expensive and only people with 'connections' could secure or purchase a bag. The Soba LGC Chairman and others resolved that the best time for each to pick his booty was at the mid night hours when the innocent minds and souls were asleep. The split was made and each took his own share. They sold a bag at a cost of ₦2,400 to the peasant farmers desperately searching for fertilizers at any cost to be able to cultivate at least to sustain themselves.

July 6, 1996 exposed the 'arrest' of the local government officials throughout the local government area. While the researcher was discussing the issue with peasant farmers at Sabon Sarki and Bauda wards, the remark of **"ba abinda zai same su... ai duk abokan juna ne"** (nothing will happen to them ... they are all birds of the same feathers) was astounding. The

farmers indeed thought right because when taken to Kaduna, the officials were only 'questioned' and 'warned' by the government and the matter was closed. All officers involved triumphantly returned to their respective offices.

This act, on its own has demonstrated a peak of irresponsibility and insensitivity of the leadership of the woes and cries or even the legitimate rights of the rural peasant community. This covered criminal act does not start or end in the local government but is an integral whole, connected with and related to the similar events going on in the higher levels of government. It therefore represents part of the patron-client relationships between the tiers of government.

The period when the local government officials were under 'detention', Maigana and elsewhere were all agitating for a fair justice. The only thing the government did was to reallocate some fertilizer bags, via **Sarkin** Maigana, for distribution to farmers - a bag for ten farmers. The comments by farmers on government was devastating and revealing. (see interview with some farmers).

Offices and positions in local governments have been turned into avenues and means of personal enrichment by their occupants or even contestants. It is a customary practice of the local government top officials, in league with the monitoring authority, to deduct from source substantial amounts of local government revenues for their personal aggrandizement. The arrest, of all 18 local government Chairmen in Kaduna State, due to the uncovering of fraudulent acts, is thus a case in point. The sum of ₦200,000 was reported to have been deducted for them ,to run for six months, from source through the connivance of top officials of the Department of Local Government Affairs and the Federal Pay Office, Kaduna[13].

As local government opens wide windows of wild opportunities, there is always a fierce and wild struggle to occupy such lucrative positions or offices either by government appointment or by **election**. Fighting, intimidation and even blackmail became the 'guns' and the 'bullets' to eliminate potential contenders by those who daily feel threatened if their surrogates or candidates are not there.

Since the State is central in the process of 'private' accumulation, its apparatuses or organs have became the conduits which create and clear the smooth channels for the petty-bourgeoisie to mount pressures, gain access and effectively maintain control in the power structure of the local government directly or through their clients. All these therefore prevent any meaningful work to be performed in the local government other than sitting ideal to split the resources of the area amongst themselves.

The Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI), National Directorate of Employment (NDE) and other institutions were established with the objectives of providing essential infrastructural facilities at the local levels. The two directorates were created in the 1986 presidential budget and thus funded from the office of the President as special task forces for the provision of infrastructures at the grassroots.

The occasional involvement of the State Ministry of Works in the process, particularly in the release of certain equipment to effect emergency repair works in the local government, was not uncommon. The first four years of its establishment, DFRRI engaged on a fire-brigade approach without evolving a blue print on how to go about its activities. That was why DFRRI and local government councils were always at logger heads and therefore could not work properly and understand each other's role and proper place.

The involvement of DFRRI and other institutions in the provision of infrastructure, especially roads, has caused serious rifts as all institutions claimed credit over projects so-called provided. The institutional problem in this arrangement has been the total lack or absence of yet another institution or agency for rural roads that could provide general guidelines for the planning and implementation of rural road construction, maintenance and rehabilitation.

In the first place, local government councils and DFRRI considered each other as abysmal competitors and in direct conflict. Coordination at the local levels was difficult as each undermined the activities of the other. This was accentuated largely due to the 'erosion' of what seemed to be the function of the local government by the DFRRI.

As the local residents have little or no contribution on the location, and design of rural road infrastructure, for example, they invariably are reluctant to assume any responsibility for its maintenance when or if the project is finally completed. The existing rural roads in the study area are not only poorly constructed but are seldom maintained or rehabilitated. The ADP rural road off Zaria-Jos highway thence towards Unguwar Sarki has completely deteriorated while all the institutions - local government council, ADP etc-fold their arms and the local residents only watch the situation in despair.

Since 1986, substantial amount of funds had been expended via DFRRI for the construction, maintenance and rehabilitation of rural roads by the federal government until 1993. The shabby performance of the directorate all over has not attracted any salutary remarks from any quarters. DFRRI since its establishment was to construct 90,000km rural feeder roads in six years throughout the country in three phases.[14].

From 1987 to 1988, the directorate received ₦500 million each year for the provision of rural infrastructural facilities at local government areas, particularly rural roads, approximately $120m in 1987 and $88m in 1988.[15] Thus, if the flow of funding was consistent and maintained, it was expected that about $708 million was disbursed to the directorate for the provision of infrastructural facilities to LGAs between 1986 and 1992.

Huge investments like these, if actually invested properly, should have been more than sufficient to achieve remarkable results but disastrously went down wasted without approximate or corresponding performance. For instance, the much talked about allocations to improve the maintenance capacity for the sustainability of the rural or feeder roads networks are rather populist for political expediency only; since achievements have not justified the expenditure incurred.

The bulk of rural transport in and around Maigana as well as the constituent hamlets or wards is either done by motor cycles/bicycles on the rural roads (foot paths) or on foot across the bush through the shortest routes. Even though the bulk of farm products are transported home, to the road sides and markets by means of 'Achaba 'or 'express' motorcycles transportation. It is important to state that human porterage on foot paths or rural roads are notwithstanding commonly practiced but with a remarkable reduction. To secure a motorcycle from one point to another means to withstand a prolong waiting.

## 9.03 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATIONS IN MAIGANA

In all the rural communities of Maigana, there exist both formal and informal Community Development Associations (CDAs). The establishment of such associations was necessitated by

the abysmal lack of government presence to provide basic infrastructures and needs of the respective localities. A number of self-help activities/projects have continued to be undertaken by the rural residents to make life relatively easy and comfortable for their survival.

A general and uniform activity undertaken annually by all the rural communities is the road construction, repairs and rehabilitation, particularly a few months after the cessation of the rains when all farm products are taken home. This is the period when no agricultural activities take place except the dry season **fadama** farming. Road repair activities are always very competitive and entertaining. Drummers, singers and comedians are always invited to stimulate the young and agile male members of the community with implements to work enthusiastically and almost tirelessly until the target for the day is achieved.

The **gayya** road rehabilitation is usually organized by the CDAs, supported and sometimes financed by the District or Ward Heads. Thus, outstanding performances exhibited by the young men are usually rewarded with money etc and hailed all over the locality. Older men also participate to give the young some inspiration while some few older men do perform extremely wonderful, far more than the younger men and thus hailed with louder and longer ovations. Such older men receive different and special prizes. As this is an exciting occasion of exhibiting strength, courage and endurance, it thus turns out to be very competitive amongst the young in the communities to struggle and be recognized with that heroic status and exhibition.

Apart from the road construction activities the rural communities involve themselves, they also mobilize and organize their members to execute projects beneficial to their respective localities. These projects include building of schools or classrooms, providing and clearing of burial

grounds, constructing culverts, repairs of bridges, water drainage to prevent road erosion and construction of mosques. Other important CDA activities include sanitation work to clear weed on the roads and dwelling areas, assistance to the sick as well as combined social visits and assistance on occasions of joy (wedding and naming etc ceremonies) and grief (death, accident disasters etc) between and within the communities.

In a few areas, the CDAs operate under formal association. For instance, in Unguwar Rimi locality, the **BIYAYYA - DA'A** Youth Association periodically maintains the burial ground through mobilizing members to clear the grave areas and the surrounding from weed and cover all the eroded graves. Other important implements for the digging and covering of the dead are occasionally supplied by the Association. It is through the efforts of the Association that the burial ground was constructed in the first place. The Youth Association is currently undertaking to construct a classroom/school in the locality.

In kwadaro locality, our survey reveals that members of the rural community also participate in similar activities. In addition, they have a standing policy to offer necessary assistance to the ill who, by and large, cannot financially afford to go to the hospital in Zaria through collecting contributions from members. In Sabon Kaura however, a non-functional classroom was constructed by the younger members of the community. Other activities carried out by the agitated members of the locality included provision and maintenance of burial ground.

The Maigana Development Association **(MAIDA)** on its own part built an Islamiyya/Arabiyya school-Nurudeen-which is currently taking its shape in terms of staffing and other vital aspects of funding etc. Apart from other similar programs and activities executed elsewhere, **MAIDA**

also involves in some social variables of the village setting and relationship. The Association, like the **Biyayya-Da'a** of Unguwar Rimi, Offers social, financial assistance as well as moral or psychological support to members during wedding, naming and other ceremonies. Members thus attend such occasions and contribute token gifts, organize entertainments etc to or on behalf of the person affected. When relations of members die, for example, some delegates of the Association stay in the house of the bereaved to mourn the dead and receive condolences from other people.

In Tashar Itace, the efforts of the Youth Association are also remarkable. Members of the association are occasionally mobilized to clear the community from filth through the village environmental sanitation exercise. Filthy and overgrown weed or grasses are periodically cleared to give the village a better looking and safer surrounding especially from snake hideouts. Apart from such precautionary measures or activities, the CDA in the locality involves in an agricultural program whereby members contribute annually to cultivate crops, particularly rice.

When the product is finally sold, the money realized is usually used to assist the weak and needy in desperate condition in the locality, particularly in cases of ill health. Apart from that, the Association established a thrift credit society (**'Adashi'** system) for the members whereby stipulated weekly/monthly contributions are made by a group of between five and ten members and the sum total given to each of the contributors in succession until the circle is complete or rotated.

The importance of this type of contribution, with no interest or loss of capital whatsoever, is to enable a member 'borrow' money from the collectivity and establish a business outfit, buy farm

inputs, marry a new wife, execute some domestic problems or even buy a bicycle or motorcycle etc depending on the peculiar needs of the recipient members. The **gayya** aspects of collective responsibility, as practiced elsewhere in road construction, repairs or rehabilitation, is also very effective in the locality. Due to the chronic problems of water supply in the community, the association makes a desperate hit-and-miss digging of wells at different points to alleviate the community from the acute shortage of safe and potable water supply in the area.

According to the data obtained from the defunct Zaria Local Government, the two community development projects executed in Maigana from 1981 to 1987 which according to the official records, received both the state and local governments contributions were that of dispensary (1983) and the slaughter slab (1984). Table 9.1 shows the projects, costs and levels of contributions.

**TABLE 9.1**
**MAIGANA:COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 1983/84**

| CONTRIBUTIONS | DISPENSARY (1983) | SLAUGHTER SLAB (1984) |
|---|---|---|
| Technical Estimated Cost | ₦12,496.00 | ₦2,000.00 |
| State Contribution | 4,998.40 | 800.00 |
| LG Contribution | 2,499.20 | 400.00 |
| Community contribution | 4,998.40 | 800.00 |

**SOURCE:** See Appendix 'F', I.M. Abbass, 1990, **Op.cit.** p213.

It can be observed from Table 9.1 that the two projects, a dispensary and a **slaughter slab** were said to have been executed by the community with assistance from both the State and Local Governments. While the State Government contributed equivalent amount the community gathered, the LG made up the difference of the technical estimated cost. The costs to construct a dispensary (1983) and slaughter slab (1984) were ₦12,496 and ₦2,000 respectively.

Both the state and community contributions for both projects were ₦4,998.40 and ₦800.00 respectively, while the contributions from the Local Government for the two projects stood at ₦2,499.20 and ₦400.00 for the dispensary and slaughter slab respectively. Our study painstakingly attempted but failed to locate where such projects were located in the study areas. While those confronted with such enquiries were rather unaware and astounded with such privileged information.

**TABLE 9.2**
**MAIGANA:ORGANS DETERMINING LOCATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE**

| Organ | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Community | 45 | 54.5 |
| Traditional Rulers | 22 | 28.5 |
| Influential men | 2 | 02.0 |
| Government | 6 | 07.0 |
| Professionals | 0 | 00.0 |
| No response | 7 | 08.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:-** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Location and maintenance of infrastructure are essential ingredients for a sustainable rural development. For a rural community to have a specific infrastructure located, maintained and sustained, salient variables are usually less emphasized. While it is not due to the needs of communities that infrastructures are located in rural areas but largely to the types of influence and pressures exerted on the providing authority. Hence, determining factors vary in influencing or pressurizing location of rural infrastructures.

Accordingly, Table 9.2 provides a portrait of such factors. It therefore portrays that the rural community as a whole, more than any other thing, determines the location, maintenance and thus

sustenance of its basic infrastructures. This variable represents around 55 percent of our sample. This further demonstrates that community self-help efforts in the area under study are very active and alive. The need for the communities to involve in self-help projects was primarily provoked by the realities on the ground since, according to the residents, government does not know about their existence and plight.

In addition, it should be stated that infrastructures provided by government into the community, particularly the enclosed rural town of Maigana, were associated to the extent of influences the traditional ruler in the locality exerts. Such infrastructure, included the obsolescent hand-pumped boreholes, recent tarring of the road, off Zaria-Jos highway thence into the enclosed community leading to and passing away from Sarkin Maigana's residence. This represents about 29 percent of our total sample. It may be observed further that the combined efforts of the community and the traditional rulers in the community remarkably represents 83 percent of the total sample.

Whereas the role influential people in and around the locality play is very minimal (2 percent), while that of government is rather diabolical in all its entirety. Put differently, the community does not feel the existence of government but it draws only closer to it in times of tax collections which are ironically collected by the traditional oligarchy. Government efforts represents, 7 percent of our total sample. It should be noted however that the role of professionals, according to our sample, is not recognized, while the non-applicable responses constitute 8 percent of the sample.

**TABLE 9.3**
**CDA AS SUPPLEMENT TO GOVERNMENT**

| Response | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 57 | 69.5 |
| No | 17 | 20.7 |
| No response | 8 | 09.8 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:-** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Our investigation on whether the rural communities under study supplement government efforts, if any, in providing rural infrastructures through Community Development Associations (CDAs) is exhibited in Table 9.3. As far as the communities are generally concerned, there is no government in their midst or it is far away from them. Table 9.3 shows the predominant role played by the CDAs of the study area in supplementing government or performing the responsibility of government in the provision of the basic rural infrastructural needs. With almost 70 percent supplement to or what government ought to do, the CDAs in the study area do remarkably well and thus do not wait until government comes to their aid. In the few areas where there exists no organized CDAs our sample frame reflects about 21 percent of the total respondents. About 10 percent shows a no-response variable in the entire sample.

**TABLE 9.4**
**CONTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES TO EXECUTE PROJECTS**

| Channel of contribution | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| CDA | 50 | 61.0 |
| Government | 5 | 06.0 |
| Traditional Ruler | 8 | 10.0 |
| No response | 19 | 23.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**SOURCE:-** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

Our enquiry on the specific situation and through what channels would the rural residents have confidence to contribute their resources for the execution of projects beneficial to their respective localities are revealed in Table 9.4. Hence, the channelling of rural dwellers' energies and other resources to execute projects for rural development is corollary to the extent to which they have specific roles to play or participate, particularly in their provision (initiation) and thus their maintenance or sustenance.

Table 9.4 thus indicates palpably that 50 respondents, representing 61 percent of our total respondents would only contribute their resources for execution of rural projects through the CDA. The rural dwellers' confidence in the CDAs is ancillary to the role they play in determining the cause of events of their condition and the extent to which they participate in the initiation and execution of the projects.

It can however be observed that even the confidence rural communities repose on the traditional rulers has far outweighed that of the government which is respectively represented by 10 percent and 6 percent of our sample. In other words, rural dwellers under study would willingly contribute their resources channelled through traditional rulers more than they would through government functionaries, particularly local government.

The no-response sample of 23 percent is rather devastating as this constitutes those communities, seen by the respective respondents, where virtually nothing is done to ameliorate their condition of living by all the groups - the CDAs, traditional rulers and government. The Fulani pastoralist must be the predominant respondents in this category. Fulani communities protest over the condition of their cattle, pasture areas and their relations with the farming settled communities which occasionally lead to disputes frictions, and sometimes fighting.

## 9.04 WOMEN AND GENDER ISSUES IN MAIGANA

Women are a neglected theme in most studies and strategies of rural development, particularly in the under-developed regions of the World. Thus, the neglect of the role or position of women is essentially historical. To historically unveil this prevalence of neglect and marginalization requires a survey of the factors which have contributed to the assaults on women socio-economic milieu within the historically determined conjunctures of events and time.

In general, the pre-capitalist systems of production systematically but forcefully reduced women to mere land tillers. Thus, plots of land were allocated to wives to cultivate or even compete amongst themselves in the maintenance of the household. Even though women have been the primary commodity producers, the plots allocated to them for subsistence production were never regarded as theirs but for the male household. In addition, the parcels of land allocated to them were also subject to revision depending on the frequency of the husband's propensity to taking up of new wives. This partly explains why women had no or even lost control over the means of production and the products they produced.

The control of the means of production, particularly land, by men meant that surplus produced by women was appropriated by men. This resulted in the subordination and exploitation of women labor on farms and other socio-economic dimensions. As men gradually attained the dominating and pre-eminent position over women, matriarchy suddenly and forcefully gave way to patriarchy in the society. The historical exploitation and domination of women in agriculture and other socio-economic spheres were gradual and conjectural which subsequently produced the patrilineal division of the human society.

In the earliest historical conjuncture, particularly during the primitive communal mode of production, the implements of labor were invented and remained in use at their rudimentary stages. It was the women, as the primary commodity producers, that put the implements into effective use for subsistence living. However, when fire was discovered, women were the sex who productively transformed its usage in all ramifications. This gradually made women to continuously put nature under control through the constant understanding of the environment to satisfy basic needs as well as the challenges of the time.

During the communal epoch, everything was communally owned with equitable distribution of productive forces and materials. Labor was thus collective even though divided among tribes and within them. Thus, the statelessness and classlessness of the society precluded any form exploitation. The emergence of private property began to emerge at the tail end of the period when the productive forces began to relatively develop with more division of labor. Men went for hunting while women were left with the domestic chores including farming, gathering of edible fruits, nuts, roots, etc.

The slave-holding mode of production was rooted out of the intense antagonism in the human society. With the further division of labor and class stratification sequel to the further development of the productive forces, surplus was created which inevitably gave rise to private property accumulation. This chain of events came in though exploitation leading to serious antagonisms and finally giving way for open confrontations and wars for the acquisition of more labor. War prisoners were thus turned into slaves. It should be noted that production in this institution was essentially for exchange rather than subsistence.

It should be noted that the slave mode of production was essentially a patriarchal society with men assuming the preeminent position right from the family level. Women were therefore reduced to domestic labor and deprived of any means of production and inheritance. While women constituted the bulk of the labor force, the efficiency and effectiveness brought in by the improved production relation was hinged on their productiveness. It was during this historical conjuncture of the slave mode that the position of women began to be drastically curtailed and destroyed as the slave-master continued to possess many women as his wives or slaves. The feudal and capitalist modes further assaulted more on the position of women.

Having distorted and destroyed the pre-capitalist social formations and relations, the imperialist and colonialists' demands for cheap products forcefully regimented and compelled the colonized to produce the preferred industrial cash crops. However, when the monetization of production and consumption was introduced it was forcefully intensified to prepare the grounds to impose taxation as well as forced labor. Imperialism and colonialism perpetuated individualism in land ownership which gave men a firmer sole title land holding. The parcels of land hitherto allocated to women for subsistence production were withdrawn by the colonial policy.[16] However, the segregated colonial policy of individualization of land title holding of men helped to encourage land struggle, manipulation and speculation by foreign firms. Furthermore, in direct correspondence with the colonialists, a window of opportunity was thus open and exploited by the chiefs to constantly dispossess peasants of their lands etc.

As women have, over time, been deprived of land ownership and reduced to land users, they have gradually but significantly been denied direct access to land title deed and were therefore reduced to the status of inferiority and landlessness. This position has gagged and limited

women's opportunities to credit facilities and belong to cooperatives. Hence, in the field of increase of production, women have not been exposed to new technologies, extensions and training. All these have adversely contributed in the furtherance of women condition of poverty in addition to the saddled unpaid and unrecognized domestic chores.

However, since labor is the genesis of all development, it is crucial to note that the non-recognition or neglect of women labor was fundamentally sequel to the historical usurpation of their power as commodity producers and the proletarianization process. Hence, the patrilineal division of the society has resulted in historically throwing women into the gallery of development. Notwithstanding, the fact remains and only a few will dispute that the development of any society can only be measured in terms of and thus mirrored and reflected in the level and extent of the development of women in the specific social setting.

In spite of the women dominant role in commodity production, rural women have not been the target group for the newly introduced agricultural policies, techniques and innovation during the colonial and post-colonial periods. The erroneous assumption of the policy makers was hinged on the belief that extension services reaching or given to men would be transmitted down to their spouses. Asseny Muro succinctly buttresses this point:

> *Women have historically been the chief producers, particularly in the sector of subsistence agriculture. Yet little or no consideration has been given to them when measures to improve agriculture are enforced. The introduction of industrial crops drew women's labor, but their involvement has been under-estimated, women are denied cooperative membership as well as credit facilities. In the formal employment sector, women involvement has been minimal and very gradual in growth. The extent and level that women have been involved in the proletarianization process, has received little or no concern from policy-makers and planners.*[17]

Furthermore, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa however shows that:

> *There is a profound contradiction between the women's condition as the chief agricultural producers and the rudimentary nature, sometimes the non-existence of technical and cooperative means designated more specifically for them. The agricultural extension service is almost totally directed to export crops and thus to men. Rural activities programs for women are oriented more towards their functions as mothers and wives than agricultural producers. In these conditions it is perfectly obvious why there are growing frustrations on the part of women about their status and participation.*[18]

The erroneous bourgeois belief maintained that women did not need wage income and that their 'rightful' places are at home. Thus, the beginning of proletarianization of labor attracted and recruited men into wage employment. In Africa, the earliest proletarianization of women was in the rural areas where women were, due to the exigencies of the time, compelled to sell their labor in agricultural and other activities in order to satisfy basic necessities. However, wage labor reduced women and girls to a disadvantaged position in terms of education and training relatively compared to their male counterparts.

It must be realized that the economy of any rural community must take due cognisance of the role of women for its sustenance and growth. Thus, women in Maigana are the industrial entrepreneurs of a large number of rural industries who are at the same time producers of the industrial by products or raw materials, among many others, notwithstanding the other roles they play on the farms and other productive domestic activities.

As women were not left out in the productive activities of the rural environment, Maigana rural women were known for the abundant production of groundnut oil and local biscuit **(kuli-kuli)** sold as far as Soba and Zaria Markets as well as other neighboring hamlets. Apart from

**Mangyada** (groundnut oil), abundant **Mankade** (local butter) made out of shea-butter (karite) tree nuts, was also completely an industry of itself. Hence shea butter trees produce fruits and thus provide food in form of shea butter while locust bean trees with clusters produce long black pods.

Furthermore, other industrial outfits, exclusively dominated by women, were also well entrenched within the rural economy. **Saka** (textile industries) were right inside the rooms of women in the community. Blankets making **(saka)**, popularly known as **luru** or **gwado,** made from cotton looms **(kadin zare),** an economic activity exclusively for women, were also manufactured at commercial quantities. Traditional spinners and weavers of small scale size complement and vibrate the rural economy.

It is thus gratifying to note that it was the pride of every bride to be accompanied with such industrial (textile) infrastructural gadgets to her matrimonial home. Small girls were thus naturally under the apprenticeship of their mothers or grandmothers who were trained such and other enterprises at their tender ages before marriage. Whenever a set of **'gwado/luru'** blanket was completed, it raised hope of an anticipated prosperity for the family especially when the commodity was finally sold. Thus, the popular Hausa adage of '**kakata ta yanke saka**' 'My grandmother has completed a set of blanket **(gwado)** is very relevant to the anticipated prosperity.

Female children barely from the age of four begin the apprenticeship of selling of cooked foods, drinks and hawking of petty commodities, particularly when they start to accompany their elder sisters or other siblings or any other grown-ups in the neighborhood before they are left on their

own. A chain o female children could be observed trooping out of Maigana rural town to Sabon Gari with variety of cooked foods and drinks. A group of these female teenagers, in rows under an o[ ]n sun, looking anxious and desperate to get their commodities disposed of quickly, attempts to woo any potential customer or passers-by through all forms of rhythmical verbal advertisement. A plate of jollof rice with vegetables cost ₦10.00, a bowl of drink **kunu** cost ₦5.00. Fulani women/girls are not also left out as they also besiege the area with their own commodities (**fura da nono**) porridge. Most households in Maigana, Sabon Gari and Tashar Itace localities do not invariably cook food, particularly break fast and lunch, but resort to buying such cooked foods and drinks.

The rationale for predominantly engaging the female rural children in such trades is partly to enable their mothers gather essential assets before the lasses finally part in times of marriage. As the female children usually get married at the age of at least twelve years, it is therefore most embarrassing for the rural mothers if they have nothing worthwhile to show in terms of room assets, for their children. The practice to engage female children from early years in such struggles by their mothers becomes paramount. This is schemed in order to have ample time to engage the kids, at tender ages, be laboriously involved in commercial work towards accumulating essential assets and capital to accompany the female children to their respective matrimonial homes. This is objectively premised on a perspective view to the kids subsequently setting up their own enterprises and thereby maintaining the accepted traditions passed from generations.

The life of a rural woman is thus in this circle. A rural mother that can not make 'effective use' of her child to accumulate and produce commendable marriage assets for her lass is usually

rebuked, satirized and considered irresponsible which inevitably affects the entire life of her children and the traditional conditions of marriage . While this customary practice continues unabated, children, particularly females, have no time to attend to school at all, even when the schools exist, and rest or recuperate appropriately. Thus, education for children and petty commercial activities undertaken by female children in the rural areas, partly to fulfil some requirements of traditions or norms of the society, are in constant conflicts with each other.

It should be appreciated that crucial economic resources for the sustenance of the family in the rural areas are directly connected with women's labor forms expended on family farms and domestic chores at home or even in wage labor. Since economic and social status of a family, particularly in rural areas, is dependent on land, families strive to own and possess large track of land. These automatically give them greater income and enhanced status than those with less or no land, especially the agricultural wage laborers.

Even though agricultural activities are the major preoccupation of the rural dwellers, many families, including agricultural based farmers, diversify their activities to stabilize their unstable sources of income. This is, due largely to the seasonal fluctuations, catastrophes, government policies etc. Many, therefore, engage in wage labor and petty trades.

Wage labor in rural areas is conventionally dictated by sex and age as only men and grown-ups work as wage laborers. It is now obvious and clear that women and children are also engaged in paid labor enjoyed by relatively more prosperous families within the village or by kulak farmers or traditional rulers who bought up pieces of land in the rural vicinity. Thus:

> *From a family's perspectives then, women's labor on the family farm releases men to work as wage laborers or to engage in petty*

> *trade. Thus, women's concentration in domestic or non wage activities is not simply a function of the family's place in the class hierarchy. Indeed, it can also contribute to the family's upward social mobility. Interestingly, research on family-based micro enterprises shows that one of the mechanisms for the survival of small family firms is to rely on the labor of the female members within the family.*[19]

In this regard therefore, the totality of activities engaged by women does not in any way give them time to rest, recuperate and thus enjoy the fruits of their labor. This focuses on the disproportionate status of women vis-a-vis their men counterparts within the household especially on who determines any course of event thereof. The inferiority and superiority complexes of women and men respectively over the entirety of events in the family structure are essentially hinged on customs and practices upheld since time immemorial which intrinsically addresses on the gender inequality. Hence, the household is the primary source of such inequality in the entire societal inequality.

There are a number of methodological constraints in obtaining and measuring activities undertaken by rural women. Consequently data on the nature and extent of such rural women's activities tend to completely underlie the resultant sketchy and perhaps incorrect situation; as a lot of activities which women engage are unpaid and uncounted for.

It must be recognized that the nature of women's work in the household has a direct correspondence to the family's economic prosperity through the improvements of the total income of the entire family. Invariably, the nature of the village economic structure however determines the condition of labor market which in essence influences the degree and level of community participation. Pointing out the nature of such problems in a typical rural community, Mustapha observes that the

> *... inability to collect any coherent data on the contribution of women to the economic activities of the household despite the fact that women maintain some independent economic activities of their own and their contribution are vital to some spheres of the household's agricultural activities such as harvesting and processing. This poses a problem because the extent of women's contribution to the sustenance of the household cannot systematically be taken into account. This problem becomes more pressing when it is realized, through various indirect indicators that women suffer disappropriately, when the survival of the household is threatened.*[20]

Hence, the vulnerability of rural women to be forcefully engaged in wage labor or urban lumpen proletarian work must be due to a number of intolerable circumstances, particularly a loss of a husband coupled with unable to bear children and as who would take care of them at a certain conjuncture of events in time.

## 9.05 NO-RESPONSE ANALYSIS

A number of individuals in the study area declined to respond to our questionnaire and in some cases interviews. The no-response therefore reflects a very serious dimension of apathy and socio-political and economic consciousness exhibited by the rural dwellers on the nature of the political economy of the State. Some rural peasants were aggressive while others only lamented over the prevailing socio-economic changes over time and compared, in some cases, with the previous generations of the economy, society and political leadership (see interview schedules). All those who declined to respond to our questionnaire pointed out that it was just useless and fruitless to repeatedly talk once again. For instance, an old sick peasant farmer in Tashar Itace contacted but repulsed our request said, among other things, that "... da mu a ke rawa da bazanmu... amma mu ne baya". (everything is done/said in our name... but we are the relegated). He narrated that he was approached and asked questions of this nature many years ago but still no change has occurred in the condition of life and the physical structure of the community.

He vowed never to talk again and would repudiate any attempts to make him talk. If something was to be done and the government was sincere and serious the old man emphasized, it could have been done long ago and that the researcher could not have 'wasted' time making all such enquiries. He involuntarily said that fertilizer was the only way alleviate the condition of rural life in order to sustain any rural development strategy.

In Maigana rural town, another old peasant, in aggressive tone, blamed the traditional rulers, civil servants and government in general over the plague pervading the rural society. Just like other personalities, the peasant farmer complained bitterly on issues of fertilizer and the wicked way the local government top officials cornered the scarce commodity, meant for the people, and divided among themselves. Thus **"kura da shan duka, Gardi da kwasan kudi".** This refers to the way a hyena **(kura)**, in a traditional Hausa society when hunted and caught; is masked, loosely anchored, chained on feet and neck and then brought to the town to be heavily beaten at different sports with a heavy wooden stick, injured and humiliated to an entertained gathering, while the principal entertainer **(Gardi)** collects the money thrown in by the crowd.

The popular Nigerian adage of **"monkey de work, baboon de chop"** perhaps gives a brief summary of the relationship between the **kura** and **Gardi** or the victim and the beneficiary. This metaphorical or idiomatic phrase and the issues involved thus reflect rural consciousness of what actually goes on in the rural-urban or peasant-elite relationship. This also reflects on the tactics and deceitful ways the elites and public office holders make use of their offices' vintage positions and the rural population as channels and means of private accumulation through the **Gardi - Kura** relationship.

This is further reflected in a similar but subtle way of **"an san biri na da wuya a kan daureshi a gindi a yi wasa da shi a sami kudi".** This, in essence, idiomatically expresses and refers to the fact that whereas "it is acknowledged that a monkey has a neck, it is nonetheless tied to its waist for paid public entertainments." A careful analysis of the corrupt practices in the Nigerian body politics in relation to the rural - urban situation was articulated whereby all the segments of the society, the State apparatuses - the police, the army, judiciary, civil service governmental and traditional institutions etc have now reached their highest peak of decadence.

Other important infrastructures which, in one way or the other, determine the social and economic conditions of rural residents are the provision of Banking and recreational facilities. Both of these facilities do not have socio-economic bearings on the common rural dweller in Maigana.

**TABLE 9.5**
**PROVISION OF BANKING FACILITY**

| Response | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 23 | 28.0 |
| No | 51 | 62.0 |
| No response | 8 | 10.0 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**Source:** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

In Table 9.5, it can be observed that 23 respondents, representing 28 percent of our total respondents affirm the existence of banking facilities in the rural community. It should therefore be emphasized that such facilities may be in existence only in Maigana locality; taking into account of the condition of People's Bank throughout the country. Thus, non-existence of

banking facilities is prevalent throughout the study areas as exhibited in Table 9.5.

**TABLE 9.6**
**PROVISION OF RECREATIONAL FACILITIES**

| Response | No. of respondents | % of total respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 0 | 00.0 |
| No | 70 | 86.6 |
| No response | 11 | 13.4 |
| Total = | 82 | 100.0 |

**Source:-** Questionnaire on Rural Development in Maigana, 1996.

There is an absolute or total lack of recreational facilities in the entire rural areas. As far as rural dwellers are concerned, these sets of facilities are by the way. Thus, rural dwellers no nothing like amusement, or refreshing the body and mind after work is done except on rare ceremonious occasions. For the rural dwellers, the mind is never at rest and there appears to be some serious constraints or difficulties in getting away with the traditional boredom of the cyclical and restless rural life. Table 9.6 empirically exhibits the total absence of such facilities.

# FOOT NOTES

1. Federal republic of Nigeria **Report of the Political Bureau, March 1987, Reproduced by MAMSER, Abuja P.120.**
2. North Central State Local Government Reforms in North Central State, Government printer, Kaduna 1971, P.2.
3. **The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,** 1979,1990
   Fourth Schedule. **op. cit.**
4. **Guidelines for the 1976 Local Government Reform, op. cit.**
5. **Ibid**
6. **Ibid** Paragraph 1
7. **Ibid** Paragraph 4
8. Views and comments of the Federal Military Government on the Findings and Recommendations of the Committee on the Review of Local Government Administration in Nigeria, 1984.
9. J Gaviria, V Bindlish, U Lele. 1984, **op. cit.** p.16-17
10. Anthony A. Churchill, 1987. **op. cit.**, p.16
11. Isah Mohammed Abbass, 1990, **op. cit** p.2
12. **Ibid**. p. 2
13. New Nigerian Newspapers, 16 October, 1996
14. In Kaduna State, the proposed lengths of roads expected to be constructed in DFRRI's first and second phases respectively were 1,245km (1986-both Katsina and Kaduna) and 1,209km (1988). See DFRRI publications, 1986 and 1988. In 1986 for instance, the disbursement of N200 million to the 19 State-structure, allocated N9.354million to construct, rehabilitate 1,040.1 kilometers of rural feeder road out of the 1245 km proposed. See NNN, Wednesday, August, 14, 1986, p. 2
15. J. Gaviria, V. Bindlish, U. Lele, 1989, **op. cit.** , p. 22
16. Asseny Muro, "Women commodity producer and proletarians: The Case of African Women". **Cf** Fassil G. Kiros - (ed), **Challenging Rural Poverty - Experience in Institution Building and popular Participation for Rural Development in East Africa**, Africa World Press, Trenton, New Jersey, 1985, P.63
17. **Ibid.** P.61
18. See The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 1970, P.34
19. Population and Development Review Vol. 22 No. 1 March 1994 New York, The population control USA, P119.
20. Abdul Raufu Mustapha, 1990, **Op.cit.**

# CHAPTER TEN
# CONCLUSION

## 10.00. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA.

> *In my 1986 Budget, I stated among other things that this Administration would give rural development pride of place. The moral, social, cultural, political, economic and security reason for taking this stand remains valid and compelling for as long as our rural areas where 70 percent of the population lives remain under-developed. To underscore the strategic importance of rural development I established in my office, a Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure...*
> *(The) tendency to neglect rural development programs stems from the powerlessness of rural population to compel attention to their pressing problems... decisive steps to ensure that resources meant for rural projects are not diverted for urban development.... With the hope that benefits would later trickle-down to rural areas, because they rarely do.*
> *Should the emphasis (on rural development) be on merely raising commodity output or on the creation of enlightened, modernizing, productive, self-reliant and highly adaptable rural communities? In order (sic) words, should the primary concern be on raising output or on enhancing the capacity of rural communities to transform their environments so as to ensure not only greater productivity but better living conditions?* - General I.B. Babangida's Address to Military Governors and participants at a seminar on Integrated Rural Development, NIIA, Lagos, 14/10/86.

### 10.01 INTRODUCTION

The most fundamental challenge facing the human race is the dialectics of development. This challenge is primarily directed at improving the quality of living conditions: in productivity and income, in better access to educational opportunities and health care facilities, in equality of opportunities and freedom as well as the alleviation of poverty against all forces that negate their realization. While human societies have been too vulnerably chaotic, the seeming attempts to balance the equilibrium between chaos and peace, to realize the fruits of development, has therefore been the task that is yet to be permanently solved and attained by the State.

Since part of the requirements of sustained development is peace, the instability inherent in the

socio-economic and political system violently threatens it. However, apart from the domestic issues hindering rural and overall development, the State is seriously exposed to the international socio-economic and political order (disorder) whereas the dynamics within the global order have cast clouds of uncertainty in the paths of development most under-developed regions of the world follow.

Thus, the classical and orthodox conception of the State **a la** the liberal view represented by, among others, Rowstow, Easton, Smith, Almond and Coleman etc, exhibited as a neutral benevolent arbiter in resolving conflicts and promoting national interest (for general economic growth and provision of social welfare) does not explain the concrete reality of the actual State Policy direction. This view is thus debunked when placed side-by-side with the Marxist conception along with Miliband's commentaries of capitalist societies.

Since the ruling/governing class, owners and controllers of the means of production, possesses the monopoly of political power, it therefore unleashes its preeminence to dominate, exploit and extract resources for the sustenance of the status quo. State public policies are thus shaped to suit the instrumentalist approach and values the State actors aggregate themselves to achieve. However, the dependency and under-development approach to State, due to its vulnerability to international capital, reflects on Frnak's economistic notion of the State heading towards reformism. The reformist behavior of the State influences Sandbrook to analyze and perceive it as being tailored and directed towards favoring a tiny stratum of a class that dominates and manipulates the political and economic situation. However, the continuing oppression of the poor and the entire rural populace remains unabated.

Furthermore, poulantzas' rejection of the State being seen as an instrument of the ruling/governing class is situated within the prevailing structures and complexities of the inner limits of the institutional or corporate interest that condition or determine the overall rather than the specific individual interest. The relative autonomy posture the State usually maintains from the dominant classes is an ingredient factor used to balance the equilibrium of protracted interest of the State within the performance of its primary role.

Thus, the lack of cohesion within the dominant class, due to intra-class conflicts between the different fractions of the bourgeoisie, makes it really impossible for the State to establish hegemony. The need, therefore, for some levels of freedom to aggregate diverse and advance sectional interests of the different segments of the bourgeoisie is required. This has inevitably indicated that State public policies are tilted to benefit some,even within the dominant class, at the detriment of the dominated.

Hence, Shivji points out that the State and its organs are inimical to rural development. Thus, the little that comes from the State to improve the lots of the people, in form of social infrastructural facilities, are but windfalls. What usually comes out of the State is terror unleashed through various forms of extractions and exploitation. The political economy of reformism, through mounting populist rural development programs, has become the avenues which the bureaucrats manipulate, via the State apparatuses, to aggrandize towards meeting their personal ends. This has made the State and the bureaucrats completely irrelevant to the people as they have become antithetical to the ideals of rural development.This intricate alliance between the State and bureaucrats, between the economic base and public policy in time perspective has been empirically buttressed in Chapters Six ,Seven Eight and Nine.

Our attempts in this study have succinctly demonstrated that the modernization and oriental theories of development have not been meaningful in our search and challenge for development. However, the liberal conception of the State has raised a lot of dust on our understanding of the dialectical role of the State to resolve conflicts or contradictions and thus provide services and improve quality of life to the majority of the people.

Furthermore, the liberal conception of the State is contrasted with the Marxist materialist view, as applied in this study, unveils or unravels the concrete situation. Thus, the former is found to be a more appropriate and acceptable methodological framework of enquiry and understanding of public policies and their directions.In addition, the Marxist materialist framework does not perceive the State as given but that which emerged out of a long protracted conflicts between the two major opposing camps: the oppressed and the oppressors. However, the condition of the State operations remains or dictates exploitation and extraction of surplus. This intricate relationship has been demonstrated in theoretical, historical and empirical contexts in the study area within time perspectives covered by the study.

Our major task in this Chapter, therefore, is to asses the political economy of rural development in Nigeria by way of summarizing the major findings and insights bordering on the politics and failure of the exercise over time. However, based on the empirical situation in Maigana rural communities, a forecast of the future of rural development strategies in Nigeria can be reconstructed to suit the socio-economic circumstances and other peculiarities of our diverse society.

Invariably, the use of political power to determine or undermine the control and ownership of the means of living and the equitable sharing of society's wealth has become the prevalent

political economy of rural development policies and strategies. This very fundamentality of the use of political power determines the extent of rural suffering. In other words, the link between government policies and the poor living condition of the people in the rural areas is shrouded within the State mechanic role.This is thus a crucial political issue yet unraveled and settled.

## 10.02 THE POLITICS AND FAILURE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA.

Based on the data presented and analyzed, our major findings have buttressed that rural development programs in Nigeria, since the colonial era, have been designed and adopted to serve as conduits through which surplus extraction and exploitation of human and other resources could be effectively channelled, rather than provide services and other infrastructural facilities to the rural residents. However, even during the pre-colonial period, events within the study area were not fundamentally different; except in their relative extent and intensity.

Thus, the politics and failures of rural development in Nigeria are reflected in historical course and have given impetus to and characterized the State craft since the post-colonial political economy. The failure of such a colossal and callous rural venture, oven time, is invariably analogous with and symptomatic of a much greater failure of the State resulting in the chronic rural and the entire societal economic rues. These chronic crises and the panacea officially applied to ameliorate the problems prompted this study. As pointed out in Chapter One, relevant infrastructures maintained and sustained in particular, and the direct involvement, recognition and investment in rural residents, in general, have received a perfunctory attention by the State and most studies and analyses of the nature of Nigeria's rural malaise.

Discussion on issu of rural development in Nigeria which do not connect and emphasize the nexus of rural infr ructures and local participation, on the one hand, with that of the State public policy and e in-built class-power structure, on the other, are tantamount to contain distorted and misle ing histography of the development paths Nigeria tracks. Hence, the melee in the social and ec nomic milieu of Nigeria's rural setting, sequel to the historical antecedent and the political ec nomy of the State, is a paradox. It would, therefore, seem more plausible to analyze this position within the context of historical conjunctures so as to have a better perspective picture and understanding of the political economy of rural development.

With the State becoming incontrovertibly the terrace of political aggrandizement, the socio-economic base that regulates its inevitability dictates the spree of capital accumulation. Thus rural-urban divide, exemplified by the **karkara-maraya** continuum in the erstwhile **Hausa** political and socio-economic structure has been on since the completion and consolidation of the processes and establishment of States in the region. Therefore, the subordination of the **Kauye** over **birni** was intrinsic to the entire stratification of the society. This was consequent upon further development of the forces and relations of production from that based on kinship relation to the mode of control over large tracts of lands and people in the successive historical course.

The polarization of the rural and urban areas was thus ancillary to the sharp division of the **masu sarauta** and **talakawa** whereby, the former were posted to man various strategic posts and control the affairs of the latter at different locations. This was designed to realize the crucial business of drawing a large amount of surplus from rural areas in complete disregard for their welfare. Hence, prior to 1800, Zazzau kingdom under the suzerainty of various feudal dynasties with power consolidated at **birnin** Zaria, was politically involved in a series of the country-side

integration throug[illegible]onquests. With taxes, tributes and other dues extracted from the countryside by the **birni** aristo[illegible]acy, it indicates that not only was the State adequately represented in the country-side but a[illegible]o directly linked with the entire rural economy. In order words, the rural economy was pene[illegible]ated and brought under a close supervision to rejuvenate and supplement the declining State revenues.

With rural economies being systematically subsumed within the dynamics of the State apparatuses, the prosperity or resources of the **karkara** automatically turned out to benefit the urban aristocracy. This began to heighten rural extortions through intense urbanization and the abysmal provision of rural infrastructures. Thus, the growth of urban Zaria originating from, among other things, the prosperity derived from the rural areas, influxes of refugees, the tendency of the Zaria political overlordship to deal with complex political issues of accommodating and protecting other influxes, became obvious as its sustenance and development were hinged on the potential rural agricultural surplus extracted. Furthermore, since Zaria occupied a central position, as an important trade route center for the sources of the supply of slaves during the trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic trades, it suggests that its rural expedition was immense and imminent.

By 1804, the entire Hausa States and other political entities were overthrown and replaced by a new political force. Hence, the bulk of the rural peasantry embraced the new jihadist ideology primarily to rid themselves off from the bondage of the **sarauta** oppressive and exploitative rule. The great tragedy was that the genuine objectives of the jihad were hijacked by those still interested in maintaining the status quo. Bribery, corruption and other forms of injustice continued to linger on. Governmental institutions, as previously operated, continued to remain

the violent penetration of the peasant mode of production and its disarticulation. Thus, after the caliphal administration was annexed and subdued by the colonial forces, commerce ensured sequel to some political and administrative reforms. A system called indirect rule was imposed through the collaboration of the chiefs and by amending the existing political structure.

The influences and impacts of the colonial administration on the growth and development of the Zaria urban area and the dialectical shrinkage and under-development of rural Zaria since 1900 was unprecedented. While the designed and established colonial infrastructures, based on the colonial idealogy of export crops, became visible, the construction of such vital infrastructures like the rail lines (1895) and roads (1920) took off. Zaria was thus connected with many important economic routes. This enhanced and accelerated its urban growth, power and status as well as its propensity to penetrate further hinterland to control the production of the preferred export crops.

It should be noted that the establishment of Marketing Board was essentially designed to serve in appropriating surplus from the rural agricultural sector. Whereas the politics of price stabilization of export crops ostensibly became the reason for the chaining of rural dwellers within the colonial preferences. However, the peasantry continued to finance the industrial and urban growth. Hence, the unprecedented transfer of material and human resources from the country-side to the urban centers substantially resulted in the abysmal neglect of the development of rural areas.

The political economy of colonialism and the perspectives of the rural-urban structure were bound to have a direct correspondence with the ideals of colonial rule. The apparent authority

of the traditional nobility under the British remote control, (in the provinces, emirates districts, villages etc) was systematically entrenched within the traditional paraphernalia and outfits. The dual objectives of colonialism and local traditional bureaucrats further exacerbated the already bad rural situation.

When European commercial interests began to pour into Zaria since 1908, the BCGA was the first to arrive and establish cotton buying stations at Soba, Anchua, Fatika, Gimi etc. The experimental farm center was established at Maigana. Other ancillary firms like the NTC, Niger Company, John Halt, the British Bank for West Africa, German firms, the Industrial Estate,Railways, Textile Mills, A.J. Seward etc were all established to give Zaria a socio-economic and political boost.

The Constitutional division of Nigeria into three mono-agricultural regions since 1954 had reinforced the continuing disarticulation of the economy within the cash crop export production. However, by the late 1950s the local political class was busy preparing and waxing its muscles to take over the reigns of power from the ruins of the erstwhile colonial regime. All these were clammed up with how to clinch the political power and share resources. The situation culminated in further reinforcement of the inherited colonial development policies perceived and embedded within the general agricultural programs. Rural development programs thus continued to suffer the same fate it suffered during the colonial era.

In the early 1960s the most populist rural development embarked upon was the community development strategy. This strategy emphasized the role of self-help activities in ensuring the provision of basic needs. But due to the orientations and pretensions of the political class, the

nature of the economy and the peculiarities of the State, the strategy ended up being tailored along government preferences. It inevitably came to be imposed and used as a political weapon on rural dwellers through the different hierarchies of traditional institutions. Not only did the program collapse on that angle, but it also lacked the grassroots support and relevance to elicit rural initiatives and participation.

Since equity and growth in the development programs of the rural residents were not designed to alter the existing structural barriers within and outside the countryside, the power structure in the rural communities was only taken as given. This leads to further strengthening and consolidating the socio-economic position of elites via the rural nobility at the detriment of the broad base of the rural residents. It should be stressed that earlier agricultural and rural development programs embarked upon by the regional governments also failed due to the false assumptions of the problems of the countryside which were taken as given and bordered only on agricultural activities.

When the military ascended to the political throne in 1966 to date, centralization of the policy and decision making organ became more tightened. With agricultural and rural development programs removed from the exclusive responsibility of the regions/states, the "Federal might" assumed a new dimension. The orchestrated and fire-brigade military approach to things, particularly its ostensible concern for rural development, has notwithstanding its fiat, assumed a sluggish and devastating performances of agricultural productivity in both the cash and food crops, among many other adversities.

With the collapse of export crops and the dwindling production of the stable crops, food importation assumed an astronomical rise. The transformation of Nigeria and ranked among the

most highly indebted and poor countries in the world was designed rather than by accident. When farmers abandoned farming sequel to the oil boom of the 1970s, the situation in the agricultural sector posed a very serious alarm. In the midst of abundant resources, poverty reigns high and everywhere. Thus, the failure of the State to feed itself and provide basic infrastructure to the bulk of the people perhaps forced it to desperately begin to focus and pay a seeming attention to agriculture and rural development with a view to arresting the precarious situation.

The unfolding dilemma in agricultural and rural development policies since the Niger agricultural project has thrown in a number of strategies which have now become only archival reference materials. Within the politics of development for example, the Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB) was incorporated in 1972, while the indigenization Decree of 1972 was to pave ways for the embourgeoisment process under the pretext of Nigerians taking over the commanding height of the economy.

The proliferation of States and later local governments since 1967 had opened a wide and wild window of opportunities exploited by a growing class of civil servants or bureaucrats, private businesses and the ever increasing ambitious military officers whose interests are completely inseparable from political power and private capital accumulation. The political contents inherent in such devices portray devastating impacts on the economy and society at large.

The introduction of National Accelerated Food Production Programs (NAFPP) and the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) of the 1970s in addition to the 1977 version of the indigenization Decree, the introduction of the ADPs,RBDAs, the Land Decree etc indicated the chronic and protracted crises and contradiction in the economy, particularly the agricultural sector. These,

social programs like accessibility to education, welfare services, rural health care facilities, farm inputs, access roads, boreholes, earth dams and other complementary non-agricultural activities in the rural areas. It is necessary to note that a lot of resources are heavily concentrated and utilized at the ADP headquarters than the entire rural areas put together. The ADPs have thus become conduits through which private accumulation of capital are channelled by those expected to manage the affairs of the project. This is one of the serious impediments towards the attainment of the goal of the ADPs in addition to the plague of corruption, gross mismanagement and general incompetence to perform which the staff are characterized with.

From 1985, changes in the management of the ADPs were introduced from the World Bank to the State governments. But the projects performance, notwithstanding, continued to worsen and the objectives far from being realized. Hence, the Small Plot Adoption Technique (SPAT) of extension services was limited to selected formers who had access to the bureaucrats. Poor farmers were not only side-tracked but completely unaware of the range of the ADP programs. In rare situations where peasant farmers were involved in demonstration exercises etc, it was only official and done with a view to fulfilling certain requirements of the World Bank/State so as to ensure the release of funds or renewal of new agreements.

With regard to inputs and services, it is an undisputed practice that fertilizers, for example, have never been released and sold on time, adequate and subsidized to the peasants. Only the urban bureaucrats, traders and favored farmers have access to and are the sole beneficiaries of such inputs and services. Peasant farmers procure inputs from the open markets sold not even in bags but in LG **mudus** measured like grains. Rare and exceptional feeder roads, wherever they exist, are shabbily constructed and easily washed away by the first heavy rains of the year (perhaps

to justify the endless need for reconstruction or rehabilitation). In many situations, feeder road construction, rehabilitation and maintenance are only officially indicated on papers, while other services like water supply etc, are never practically provided as indicated.

The money gobbler RBDAs are the second most important and expensive agricultural and rural development strategy the Nigerian State has ever undertaken. With the objectives of developing the river basins for agricultural productivity towards establishing agro-industries, the strategy, like the ADPs, favors large scale farmers, mechanized agricultural techniques involving large track of land. Their function are similar to ADPs which are but a duplication of efforts, over-lapping and a waste of resources. Since both the ADPs and RBDAs have not stemmed the food crises, the latter only bring and exacerbate new agricultural problems rather than solve the old ones. The new challenges in agriculture consequently forced many peasant farmers, after being marginalized within the project sites, to abandon farming for urban areas in search of odd jobs or becoming laborers on their own land.

The rhetoric of Green Revolution and rural development became the political party slogan of the Second Republic. The intense application of acid into the agricultural land of the rural areas continued unabated. The politics of Green Revolution was ostensibly to solve the roots of the under-development and poverty ridden rural areas. The so-called backward and primitive technology used in agricultural productivity was premised by the strategy as the main factor. To surmount the problem, importation of chemicals and acids, modern implements and transfer of technology was vigorously pursed as prescribed.

Inevitably the Green Revolution program failed to solve the question it raised. With increasing stagnation and decline of productivity, peasant farmers continued to be marginalized while the program, essentially used to obtain foreign loans, inputs, etc, deepened the increasing levels of structural dependency and under-development. The failure of Green Revolution was also attributed to the centralized decision making organ. Thus, issues purely local in nature were dabbled with by the central bureaucracy.

Nigeria's rural environment is further trapped and wrapped within the confluence of the World Bank-IMF structural politics; side-by-side with the intrinsic and complementary oil-based political economy. Within the confused and desperate State craft of the over glorified Nigerian economy, the deepened crises lured the State actors to resort for other dangerous and destructive strategies of the World Bank - IMF sponsored Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). The State was convinced that by introducing SAP, it would lessen the economic sectors that have been over-extended and unproductive, especially the public expenditure projects like ADPs and RBDAs. It was further believed, though erroneously, that by introducing SAP the erstwhile traditional export crops would be rejuvenated to accord Nigeria a competitive advantage within the World economy. Thus, SAP conditionalities included complete withdrawals of all sorts of subsidies considered as distortions of prices inimical to the development of local production.

In agricultural and rural development, SAP strategies were expected to restrict importation of some agricultural products and in some cases total ban, reduce the excessive State intervention, impose devaluation of the Naira with increased reliance on the market forces to determine prices and exchange of commodities, abolishing of commodity boards as well as commercialization and privatization of public utilities to enhance efficiency.

The impact of SAP on agriculture and rural development was devastating when prices of grains, production cost, services, inputs etc astronomically went up to over 350 percent. Thus, the open markets, where the rural communities buy commodities etc, pose serious threats to a meaningful condition of living. Peasants inevitably reduced the use of all inputs while the size of farm and labor expanded were equally reduced with the intrinsic fall in productivity and incomes.

The populist and indiscriminate promotion of export crops inevitably undermined the stable food production. However, with the deregulation, not only were the peasant farmers finding it unbearable to farm but also those engaged in the non-agricultural activities. Even the small and medium scale enterprises as well as the so-called progressive farmers and the political hangers-on of the military were not saved.

To ostensibly cushion the impact of SAP, the State devised certain strategies to popularly justify its action. This was done through the establishment of agencies like DFRRI, MAMSER, BLF etc to desperately attempt to contain the socio-economic stresses in a diversionary tactic. In terms of scope, finances and other resources expanded as well as the political articulation, DFRRI Program stands out distinct as the most populist strategy for rural development in Nigeria. When the Directorate was established, the President Babangida's Budget of 1986 stressed, among others, that henceforth:

> *Rural development policy will move away from past narrow sectoral pre-occupation with the generation of food and fibre surpluses to overall formulation of a National Rural Development strategy with* ***emphasis on the alleviation of rural poverty and the enhancement of quality of rural life.*** *(emphasis added)*

But SAP policies defy all measures to counteract them. With the wider social crises generated out of application of SAP policies, increased waves of criminal activities assumed a wider

dimension. These equally increased the State authoritarian tendencies with serious implications for security budgets sequel to the intense vulnerability to the break-down of the social order. Inevitably therefore, the international monetary organizations (World Bank,IMF) which lured or forced the Nigerian State subsequently urged it to impose harsher measures. The burden of such policies, placed on the ordinary rural dwellers, was adverse as it affects the entire pattern and trends of planning and development of the rural areas.

In the study area, over time, the research reveals that a great majority of the beneficiaries of rural development programs were the bureaucrats responsible for the implementation of rural development. These bureaucrats reside in urban areas and corner, as circumstances dictate, a lot of resources for themselves. While the bureaucrats, particularly in the ADP, enjoy all privileges, they therefore assist in ensuring that loans obtained from the World Bank are completely exhausted. A number of programs for the effective exhaustion of the funds are designed which, among others, include training and trips (both local and overseas), contracts, importation of tools and equipment. Incidently, most of the tools and equipment become out of use due to lack of spare parts and expert knowledge for maintenance.

All these have been exhibited in the study. Thus, majority of the rural communities do not feel the positive existence of government in terms of provision of basic rural needs. Where infrastructures are so provided they become unproductive and irrelevant. For example, boreholes dry up after being commissioned, there is a complete lack of medical care, shabby rural road constructions and low level of formal education which has resulted in the complete withdrawal of children from the schools. In most cases, schools do not exist to even enrol the children. Thus, dwellers have clearly understood that all approaches to provide facilities to rural areas present golden opportunities for the dominant class to entrench and defend their material interest.

The politics of **karka** in rural Zaria has a very far reaching dimension as elites of rural Zaria have continued to st ggle against their urban counterparts. Thus, the seeming fear of the hitherto predominance and furtherance of the interests of the elites of urban Zaria brought into being avalanches of resistance from the elites of rural areas. This resistance is based on the long history of urban elite extortions and denials of the rural areas' basic necessities and opportunities. The emergence, therefore, of the **karkara** elite-based political force in rural Zaria was a clear demonstration of the struggle for access to opportunities and necessities.

This powerful, agitating and influential **karkara** force came out initially in the political dimension: in partisan politics and the civil service bureaucratic wrangling; especially in the appointments into key government positions in Kaduna State. Thus, in partisan politics and other avenues, the **karkara** elite groups, in alliance with their hangers-on mobilize resources to block the chances of **'Yan birni** elites to occupy or succeed in the State sensitive political and elective position for their own rural folks.

Perceived as celebrated oppressors, people from **birni** still receive intense but subtle political aggression from the **'yan karakara** elites. This is primarily strategized to enhance their struggle to better groups' interest rather than a deliberate attempt to improve the well being of their rural kith and kin. While rural elites continue to champion and agitate for improved rural condition, albeit with **karkara** sentiments and in a divide and rule tactic, ordinary rural residents have thus continued to be further marginalized as resources meant for their welfare end up being spilt amongst the very **'Yan karkara** elites. The happenings in the Local governments, therefore, testifies these trends.

It may be recalled that State intervention in rural Maigana during the colonial era was predominantly strategized to promote the cultivation of cotton for export. Despite all efforts and resources expended, the strategy failed to yield the expected results. Again, mixed farming irrigation and mechanized farming were introduced to boost its production. However, the Maigana farm center, the BCGA and Marketing Boards were only established to regulate prices geared towards primitive accumulation. The current State sponsored agencies of rural development have thus failed to positively change the material and social life of the rural communities. These strategies and chronological failure in transforming rural areas are still entrenched in the political economy.

## 10.03. THE FUTURE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

The future of rural development in Nigeria requires a reconstruction of the policies and programs as well as the strategies currently adopted. To depart completely from the current practices demands a critical understanding of the challenges of development and what threats or otherwise the year 2000 and beyond may potentially contain.

Thus, based on the theoretical postulations and empirical situation buttressed in the previous Chapters and the foregoing summary and analysis of the politics and devastating failure of rural development in Nigeria, it is crucial to stress that while our propositions in this study state that (i) the ability of the Nigeria State to design rural development policies and strategies and provide infrastructures for rural communities has been necessitated by the need to attract the influx of external resources and to maintain class domination (ii) If appropriate and sustainable infrastructures are provided to the rural communities, rural development would have been effectively and meaningfully realized thereby enhancing the socio-economic condition of the

majority of rural inhabitants; (iii) far from being an instrument of rural development, the involvement of the Nigerian State, in alliance with international organs, supported by the economic base, will entrench structural dependency and under-development; (iv) should a people-oriented policy, with popular and direct participation of rural inhabitants, be considered and taken primary in the rural development strategies, and the State actually involves the participation of the people in the policy making and implementation, the imported packages of rural development programs would have no place whatsoever in our development pursuits have all been vividly shown and supported by the available theoretical and empirical evidence as well as logical explanations and deductions.

Whereas rural development is conceived and strategized to improve or even change the socio-economic life of the people residing in the country-side, the reality on the ground has indisputably exhibited a complete reverse.Thus, with increasing trends and propensity to accumulate, rural policies provide avenues for the dominant class to continuously struggle to maintain and project its vested interests. Put somewhat differently, the inordinate power of the State is a direct reflection of the material interests of the dominant class. Thus, the striking paradox of the State's irrelevance to the bulk of the citizens is buttressed in its extractive behavior rather than providing basic necessities.

Hence, the use of State power to accumulate and the ubiquitous monopoly of coercive instrument are preponderantly more forthcoming and felt by rural inhabitants than the provision of social welfare services. The privileged bureaucrats' propensity and insatiable desires to accumulate as well as their growing ascendancy to political power have become as formidable as to deny the powerless access to essential or basic needs. Thus, political power has increasingly become a

means of private accumulation, used by the bourgeoisie, to consolidate a sound economic base.

Rural development is hindered by the growth of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie: their attitudes and interests are in direct conflicts with the ideals of rural transformation. As they exert a lot of pressure and influence on the State apparatuses they manage(?), policies and strategies are bound to correspond with their well being. During the colonial era, for example, rural development was never regarded to provide service to the rural populace but to ensure that the rural populace was kept alive to produce the required commodities for appropriation. Thus, social welfare services were indisputably limited to the social categories who are vital for the extension and realization of the ideals of colonialism.

Nigeria's attainment of political independence in 1960 did not change but rather continued with the same trends and intensity of the colonial development policies and orientations. Post-independence policies still maintain that rural development is a residual item of agriculture or even seen as one and the same thing. The continuation of colonial policies has made the State to expend heavily in the development of agriculture mechanization and irrigation through the establishment of bureaucracies like ADPs,RBDAs etc. This was accompanied by the importation of highly sophisticated machinery consuming huge foreign exchange and opening new avenues for private accumulation.

When DFRRI was decreed in 1986, the directorate was accorded a seeming responsibility for rural development and thus charged to provide food, roads, agricultural inputs, rural water supply, health care services, educational facilities and all other rural infrastructures to rural Nigerians. By so doing therefore, other statutory institutions already put in place, like the State

but particularly local governments etc to provide such items, were drawn into an inevitable silent and open conflicts with DFRRI as well as other complementary agencies like the BLP, MAMSER, NDE etc.

In view of the foregoing therefore, it can be logically and broadly concluded that:

(a) despite the huge financial expenses and arduous struggles for social and economic development in Nigeria during the last three decades, the rural development policies and strategies pursed have been inappropriate, irrelevant to the environment and needs of the people. As they were strategically misdirected and misplaced, the unfolding strategies have continuously exacerbated people's living condition by redistributing poverty among a wider group of people. Thus, unemployment, land pressure, income imbalance etc. have become the common features and sights in the society.

(b) as rural development programs, over time, have disastrously collapsed, they will continue to collapse as long as they are not inherently built-in with grassroots support and relevance. Thus, the only option to rid-off the morass of rural development lies squarely on an a avowed declaration to avouch the recognition of people's potentials, feelings and opinions in initiating and executing rural development. The deliberate intensification of the human factor most be mounted in the entire rural development policy by assiduously cultivating, involving and putting the needs of the people first before anything else.

(c) the thinking of development which up-holds that local people are antithetical to their own development is fallacious. For a sustainable rural development, people and their institution must be integrated. Our propositions in Chapter one state that in order to

ensure r l rural transformation rural development must be inwardly and people-oriented s tegies have been copiously and empirically supported.

(d) that the State, with all its powerful apparatuses, is incapable to transform rural life. Its irrelevance to the rural and dominated groups is a direct manifestation of its inability to shield the ordinary people and provide essential infrastructures since its indisputable behavior is to extract and appropriate surplus. While local people face serious constraints and limitations to independently transform their environments, the State cannot however succeed when local people face limitations. Thus an interplay of workable forces from the people and the State is crucially required for a sustainable rural development to take roots.

(e) the role of local people and CDAs has been underrated and less recognized in development planning and rural development on the pretext that local people and their institutions are inimical to development. It is realized that these false oriental ideals and policies were adopted and directed to control local people for the onward State-bureaucratic aggrandizement.

(f) CDAs, like modern voluntary organizations or NGOs, particularly in Maigana rural communities, have been aroused in the localities in direct response to the abysmal absence of basic infrastructural facilities. The desire to bail themselves out, CDAs have thus been used and become the most important and powerful practical demonstration and instruments for a sustainable rural development which the future holds with high esteem. Within the umbrella of the CDAs in Maigana, other vital factors in rural development

Within the umbrella of the CDAs in Maigana, other vital factors in rural development also feature significantly especially the cooperative thrift **(Adashi)** contribution and the **Gayya** labor mobilization. These inevitably made the **Biyayya-Da'a** and **MAIDA** etc to be perceived, by rural residents, as **de facto** governments in their various localities. Thus, the encapsulated peasantry, under the State-bureaucratic behavior, sees the CDAs as avenues for self expression and self actualization than the State which only portrays its relevance in coercive tendencies;

(g) Local government, with all its statutory or constitutional provision is powerless and therefore presents an abysmal and paradoxical failure in transforming rural areas. While detaching people from government and governance right from its official conception, reforms on the system of local government are only limited to reforming and ensuring further class domination and extensions of bureaucratic conditions of accumulation albeit with the creation of more Local and State governments.

(h) Since the productive implement of the peasant - hoe - has continued to sustain the economy, particularly the colonial economy with surpluses extracted, the abrupt disarticulation in the peasant productive forces was to destroy rather than enhance it. Thus, the entire package of the introduced mechanization of agriculture has only succeeded in plunging the whole economy and the peasantry in endless crises. With socio-economic setting distorted and industrial outfits destroyed, the State, while linked bureaucratically with foreign capital and technology has produced the bad wind that blows no peasantry and the entire political economy any good.

(i) since every in-coming regime in Nigeria considers it 'fit' or 'mandatory' to introduce

introduced by the pervious regime(s) must be done away with. Such acts are preponderantly done to establish, assert and exhibit relevance of the regime's coming into power. By such 'statutory' political practices, there is no dispute to finally conclude that there exists no national policy on rural development per se, as only transient political statements, programs and strategies, at the exigencies of the regimes, are decreed and pursued.

The State and its perpetrators are the great obstacles or impediments to rural development. In other words, the role and policies of the State run counter to the noble ideals of rural transformation. Since the material interests of the dominant class are un-compromisable, it therefore frustrates the provision of necessities and a people-based policy on rural development proposed in this study. To establish relevance, political crises are hatched by the dominant class in addition to various economic predicaments inserted within the unstable political environment.

While a lot of sabotage efforts have always been mounted to thwart efforts and agitations for extending welfare services to the countryside, the State bureaucrats' preoccupation has symbiotically been to introduce a number of reforms and strategies aimed at dividing and distracting the minds of the people. All these have continued to go on particularly through the creation of more States and Local governments dictated by the whims and administrative convenience of the junta. The exercises of creation of States and Local governments have only reduced them to become mere administrative extensions of the bureaucratic class desire to enhance socio-economic and political aggrandizement.

SAP policies introduced were therefore a direct indication of the ruling/governing class to

SAP policies introduced were therefore a direct indication of the ruling/governing class to perpetuate domination. By systemically destroying the economic power of the people as well as their psychological and physical being, the State enforced SAP with a view to reducing people's agitations and to dumps down their spirits for improved living condition. As all the principles of SAP are chiefly and mischievously used as justifications to deny basic needs to the people, the only way out, accordingly, was to outrageously privatize and commercialize public utilities so as to generate surplus and revive the ailing economy.

Consequently, a decree establishing a Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization (TCPC) was enacted. The State thus directed all public enterprises, in a bid to generate revenues, to increase their charges/rates by at least 100 percent. All categories of the public, irrespective of their social and economic status were inevitably affected. The unprecedented rise in the cost of all categories of goods and services has rendered condition of the already 'scorched earth' rural communities more precarious than ever before.

The current military junta, which dramatically ascended to power as a result of a chronic political and economic crises, has as usual announced a transition plan to return the country to civil and democratic rule in 1998. It should be noted that since the demise of the Second Republic, which lasted 4 years 3 months, the country experienced nothing, save the First Republic (5 years 3 months), but military dictatorship.

Thus, dictatorial imposition of policies and strategies inimical to the progress and development of the capacities of the Nigerian dominated classes were imminent. Not only the current military junta initiated a plan to disengage (?), but also designed what it refers to as the Vision 2010.

the behavior of the junta precluded any meaningful and practical panacea to the problems now and in the future, particularly rural transformation as well as the literal understanding to the so-called return to civil democratic rule.

Since the so-called Vision is not hinged on the ideals of democracy and collective efforts as well as the needs of the majority of the population, the short-sighted vision, like all the previous ones before it, will collapse as it unfolds as designed. With the current marginalization and alienation of progressive forces in Nigeria, the toying of the Third Republic by the junta makes 1998 vulnerable and clouded with uncertainties while beyond year 2000 may by the 'Vision' envisaged.

In the first place, the imprisonment of political contenders, statesmen of military stock etc,the authoritarian manipulation of the political barometer of the country, coercion, deposition and threats of deposition of the traditional oligarchy have all frightened many other forces to die down. However, with the systematic elimination of the progressive parties within the State guided party formation, all the paraphernalia of the State apparatuses must ensure the attainment of objectives. To be 'qualified' and selected as a State party, controllers within the Political Associations have to be sanctioned surrogates of the junta.

Traditional institutions are not however excluded within the matrix of the State agencies. For instance, because of fear of being deposed, while at the same time enhancing firmer control, **Sarkin** Zazzau via **Sarkin** Maigana would have field day in enforcing compliance of government policies in rural communities. Therefore, by aiding to suppress tensions that may arise out of

people's cynicism, apathy and repugnance to government policies, traditional nobility would have to be constantly on their toes in order not to hurt the junta.

A decree on the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) with the stated goal of channelling the petroleum funds into vital socio-economic sectors was enacted. Thus as Nigeria is plagued with high inflation, dilapidated infrastructural facilities and stagnation in the provision of vital goods and services, the Fund is expected to address such areas affecting vast majority of Nigerians. As the oil boom period of the 1970s was paradoxical to the process of change in Nigeria, the political resiliency of the PTF, headed by the erstwhile fascist military Head of State, Maj. General Muhammadu Buhari, harbors immense avenues for private local petroleum accumulation than provide critical services to the majority of the people, particularly in the rural areas.

While the PTF begins to concentrate more on cosmetic resurfacing of selected GRA urban roads and rehabilitating the highways linking urban areas, it is however bewildering to note that the Consultancy and Construction Firms executing the projects and contracts are but guided business outfits of an economic clique floated and sanctioned by the PTF bigwigs. It is very doubtful if such huge petroleum resources would make a difference in transforming the socio-economic setting of the rural society, or even sustain the vital social services in the urban areas.
Finally, it is pertinent to note that the tiny but powerful dominant class is only preoccupied with limiting the extension of facilities to itself. The way out is perhaps to strike a formidable front by all the agitated groups against the injustice perpetrated by the dominant class, particularly the military and its civilian surrogates. Thus, rather than accept the infinite and deceitful transitions to civil rule, it must be recalled and noted that power was, in the first place, not 'transitioned' to the military.

The historic triumph of the ASSU, when for example it brought the military junta to its knees in the agitations of its rightful place in the political economy, is a testimony which indicates that other well intentioned forces or groups in Nigeria like the NMA, NBA, Students Unions, Tanker Drivers and other Road Transport Workers' as well as Trade Union Associations and even a section of the agitating civil servants etc can come together, in a united front, and mount a blockage strategy with a view to ensuring that justice, equity and fair play reign, particularly in allocating appropriate resources to vital areas for real development.

For the rural peasantry, however, agitations and vicissitude struggle for improved living conditions and excessive violations of their fundamental rights can be checked through coalition of their Community-based Development Associations on the one hand and other agitated forces in the country on the other. Even though each case presents its specific bottle-necks, there is, notwithstanding, the need to start from some point. The pitfalls will inevitably bring reinforcements in every disadvantaged group to address its problem with a view to complementing and making strategic mobilization for total emancipation.

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**INTERVIEWS**

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Mal. Alhassan Salisu 97 yrs 26/2/93
Mal Shehu Ismaila 33yrs 26/2/93
Alhaji Dahiru Maigana 12/2/96
Alh Nuhu Sarkin Fada - Maianguwa Aug Sarki 3/6/96
Alh Yahaya S/Kaura Mai Anguwa S/Kaura 11/5/96
Magajin Garin Maigana, 73 yrs 20/6/96
Mal. Lawadi Kwadaro Maianguwa Kwadoro 17/5/96
Mal. Tanko Maianguwan Bauda 4/5/96

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## APPENDIX 1

This questionnaire form is for randomly Selected indivuduals and house holds affected by rural development in Maigana and environs. Please tick the oppropriate option or supply additional information from the following questions. Thank you for your kind response.

PLACE OF RESIDENCE----------

1. Age-
   (a) Below 30 years (b) 30-39 years
   (c) 40-49 years (d) 50-59 years (e) 60 years and above
2. Sex-
   (a) Male (b) Female
3. Marital Status-
   (a) Married (b) Single (c) Widow (d) Divorced
   (e) Separated
4. Highest Education Attained-
   (a) Primary (b) Post-primary (c) Post-Secondary (d) University (e) Informal
5. Occupation-
   (a) Farming (b) Civil Servant (c) Business (d) Other (Specify)
6. estimated Annual Income-
   (a) Below ₦10,000 (b) From ₦10,000-₦15,00 (c) From ₦15,000-₦20,000 (d) From ₦20,000-₦25,000 (e) Over ₦25,000
7. Position/Status in the family----------
8. No. of wives----------
9. Year of first marriage----------
10. No. of children----------
11. No. of Other members in the household----------
12. No. of male workforce----------
13. Are there any members of your household who have migrated to Urban Areas (a) Yes (b) No
14. If question 13 is Yes, how many and what is the frequency of contact ?
    ----------
    (a) Frequent (b) Occasional (c) Never
15. Do the migrants contribute to the up keep of the household ?
    (a) Yes (b) No
16. If question 14 is Yes, what do they contribute ?
    (a) Send money all the time (b) Send money sometimes (c) Come home every raining season to participate in production (d) Any other (Specify).
17. Do you approve members to migrate ?---
    (a) Yes (b) No (c) No alternative

18. If question 17 is Yes, give reasons----------
19. From which of the following do you belong ?
(a) Commoners (Talakawa) (b) Rich and well to do (Altajirai) (c) Businessmen/Traders (c) Noblemen (masu sarauta)
20. On what type of land do you farm ?
(a) Family (gandu) (b) Personal (inherited/bought) (c) Hired (Jingina) (d) Borrowed (aro) (e) Shared.
21. What type of labour do you employ on the farm ?
(a) Personal (b) Gayya (c) Family (d) Hired (Kwadago)
22. What type of implment do you use on the farm ?
(a) Hoe/'garma' (b) tractor (d) Ox drawn
23. What types of crops do you cultivate ?----------
24. What type of fertilizer do you use on your farm ?
(a) Chemical fertilizer (b) Local manure (c) both (a) and (b)
25. Do you make use of any pepticides ?
(a) Yes (b) No
26. If question 25 is No, why ?----------
27. How often and from which source do you procure and make use of these Chemicals ?----------
28. Do you receive any assistance from government in the procurement of these Chemical
(a) Yes (b) No
29. Do you keep livestock/poultary in your household
(a) Yes (b) No
30. What type of house do you live in ?--
(a) Grass-roofed laterite house (Jinka) (b) Laterite roofed house (Soro) (c) Iron-roofed laterite house (Kwano) (d) Iron-roofed cementblock house (e) Combinations of (b), (c) & (d)
31. What is the nature of ownership of the house you live in ?--
(a) A house built by myself (b) A family house shared with brothers etc (c) Hired (d) Others (Specify)----------
32. Tick which of the following you own and posses.
(a) Radio (b) Television (c) Video (d) Wal clock (e) Wrist watch (f) Bicycles(s) (g) Motor cycle(s) (h) Car(s) (i) Lorry/Tippers(s) (j) Bus(es) (k) Others (Specify)
33. What is the source of your water supply ?
(a) Rain/Stream, Lake, Pond (b) Pipe Borne (c) Borehole (d) Dam (e) Well (hand dug/concrete).
34. How regular is the source of water supply ?
(a) Available all the year round (b) Inadequate supply during dry season (c) Dries up completely during dry season
35. Does the community contribute/participate in the provision of potable water in your area ?
(a) Yes (b) No
36. If question 35 is Yes, give evidence----------
37. What is the average distance (where applicable) between your household and the Water facility ?----------
38. When was the facility constructed ?----------
39. Who constructed the water facility your community uses ?
(a) Government (b) Non-Government organisation (c) Community (d) Individual

40. Which of the following health facility (ies) exist in your locality ?

| | Health facility | Year built | Provider* | Non-existence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. | Government Hospital | | | |
| b. | Rural Health Centre | | | |
| c. | Maternity Home | | | |
| d. | Clinic | | | |
| e. | Dispensaries | | | |
| f | Primary & Basic Health Centre | | | |
| g. | Private Clinic/ Chemist | | | |

*Provider-state any of the following - Government, NGO, Community or individual. If it is not existent write "Non-existence". If it exist and does not function write "Non-functional".

41. What is the average distance between your household and the health facility available ?---

42. How does your family solve its medical problems ?----------

43. Which of the following educational facility(ies) exist in your locality ?

| | Education facility | Year built | Provider* | Non-existence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. | Primary Schools(s) | | | |
| b. | Secondary School(s) | | | |
| c. | Vocational School | | | |
| d. | Adult Educ. Class(es) | | | |
| e. | Islamiyya/Arabic School | | | |
| f. | Private Nursery and Primary School | | | |

44. Do you send your children to school
(a) Yes (b) No

45. If question 44 is Yes, at what level would you send them ?
(a) Primary Only (b) Secondary Only (c) Tertiary Level

46. If question 44 is No, why ?----------

47. Is your community served with electricity ?
(a) Yes (b) No

48. Is your community served with banking facility ?
(a) Yes (b) No

49. Is your community served with recreational facilities such as Town Hall/Centre, Hotel, TV. Centre, Play ground etc.
(a) Yes (b) No

50. Is your community served with agricultural facilities ?
(a) Yes (b) No

51. If question 50 is Yes, state the facilities----------

52. Is your community provided with communication facilities ?
(a) Yes (b) No

53. Is your community accessible by road all year round between and within the locality ?
(a) Yes (b) No

54. Who determines the location of rural infrastructure in your community ?
(a) The entire community (b) The traditional Ruler (c) Influential people (d) The government (e) The professionals

55. Does your Community supplement government efforts (if any) in providing infrastructure through Community Development Association (CDA).
(a) Yes (b) No

56. If question 55 is Yes, Name the CDA and the projects undertaken
---
---

57. At what situation would you contribute your resources for the execution of projecs beneficial to your locality ?
(a) Through the CDAs (b) Through appeals by government (c) Through appeals by traditional Ruler

58. State the mineral based cottage industries available in your community
---

59. State the Agro-based cottage industries available in your community
---

60. In your opinion, how would the transformation of rural community development be formulated, effected and sustained ?----------

?

(a) Yes (b) No

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59. State the Agro-based cottage industries available in your community
---

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## APPENDIX 2a
## INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

**Schedule One (Peasant farmer, Maigana)**

Farmers were given only two measurers of fertilizer each. It was not however enough to go round to all members of the community. Those who could not get, agitated bitterly. Some even got only one measure (**mudu**) while some were not even aware that fertilizer had been allocated and distributed in the locality. They thus complained that if it were tax collection or some labor mobilization, they would have been quickly notified.

The quantity of fertilizers allocated, one **mudu** to each farmer, was ridiculous. One **mudu** is inadequate for a ridge. People are really worried about the state of fertilizers and highly disappointed with the government. This is because we rural dwellers rely heavily on fertilizer. Our silence over this sad development does not suggest we accept the situation. We are totally dismayed, unhappy and unconfortable.

For us, modern fertilizers have been with us since when we were given small quantities (free of charge) in measured tins, for tests and trails on our farms. They used to specify to us which fertilizer was for millet or for corn. I think it is at least twenty years ago or even more. This is just a rough estimate, it is indeed more than twenty years. All types of fertilizer particularly those for groundnut were given to us free of charge.

We were not then enthusiatic to use fertilizers on our farms, we were not keen. We were often

reminded by extension workers to use fertilizers. Gradually farm extension workers came to teach us on the technicalities or methods of applying and using the fertilizers for better yield. Extension workers guided our parents while we observed learned and later instructed us also to apply the fertilizer on the plants.

A time came when we had to buy the fertilizer. It was then cheap. We were gradually lured to buy the commodity to enchance productivity and increase our income. We have now reached a stage when we do not even see the fertilizers to buy! (₦1,000, they said or ₦2,400) it is still not available even at that exhorbitant price, unless you are connected to the NTC.

The only way to procure fertilizer with ease is to be a sanctioned NTC farmer; as sufficient amount of fertilizers are distributed to grow tobacco leaves. It is from that supply, that NTC farmers divert and apply on their maize farms. Even yesterday NTC distributed fertilizers to its farmers. I have a space for maize but due to lack of fertilizer, I can not farm. I used to cultivate maize in great quantity but now...

You see, there is no fertilizer, there are many peasants like me spread in all the localities. This year is particularly very tragic it is really a great loss whenever you go people will complain about it. You see a peasant whose farm is far in the bush cannot use local manure; instead it can only be used on farms not far away from the household. Farms located far away from home normally yield 50-60 bags when moden fertilizers are applied . While farms close home are essentially cultivated to produce for domestic consumption. I cannot cultivate my far away farms like others for want of fertilizer. I have boys that could have tilled the farm but was cautioned that fertilizer was not going to be available.

I am among those who have not yet planted because of obscure uncertainty. I have not planted rice as many farmers have resorted to and could not therefore replace the maize which I have discarded due to the futility of the venture.

**SCHEDULE TWO (Peasant farmer, Unguwar Rimi)**

We rural dwellers do not benefit from anything. Has the government done anything to us in terms of facilities ? No concrete well, no hospital, no road, no school... government has done nothing to us. This road was constructed and occasionally rehabilitated by a Zaria based farmer-Civil Servant, Alhaji Uba. His farm is close to mine. He has a farm house in his farm. He first intiated the construction of the road with the use of hoes. The road project continued till it reached and even passed our farms to the nearby locality.

Look at that stream, it requires a bridge but to whom do we complain ? The road could easily link you to Bauda... (I was there and have seen the place)... well then you are in a good position to assess the situation. Besides you have been to the roots of the problem rather than relying on second hand information. With your knowledge about our plight I hope what you will report is going to provoke the government to do something for us.

Lack of access roads and bridge hinders easy contact between communities particullarly from here to Tofa or Bauda. Whenever it rains heavily, we are isolsted till the water passes away. I forgot to tell you that the feeder road constructed by that man received a lot cooperation from CDA in Bauda and **Mai Unguwa** Mallam Tanko mobilized his subjects to assist in the road construction.

If we could be assisted to have a bridge constructed, it would ease a great problem, since the river floods its banks every year and people have to swim across to find a means of survival. An access road around will unite localities and improve social interaction and sources of livelihood. In that very stream, a couple of years ago, some youths while returning from a wage labour were drowned and died in attempts to cross. Their graves are in my farm...

I hear you went to many localities. I heard that you were coming here. Government officials rely only on verbal and speculative submissions without ascertaining what is on the ground. They never want to know and understand our ways, attitude and predicament. At Junu settlement, there is no school, no hospital, and do not have a bridge yet they are close to the main road...

SCHEDULE THREE (Sule Salanke, Tashar Itace)

There is a **fadama** program being undertaken... land has been cleared in the north and east thence to Dauri. Through self-help efforts, the land was cleared for the day season farming since we do not have a dam we had to improvise by damming this portion as well as the construction of the bridge that links us with Maigana. The project was intiated by Alhaji Magaji single handedly and later people joined him.

The long grasses (for roof making) are ruined by cattle reared by the fulani. Meanwhile, Alhaji Dahiru, **Sakin** Maigana, issued a stern warning to cattle fulani from taking their herds into the prohibited long grass zones. Thus, fulani are restrained and restricted from entering the **fadama** areas. If this measure was not taken, the fulani will willfully continue to destroy the grasses by taking their cattle into the grass zones thus rendering our houses without the materials to rehabilitate our thatch roofs.

Tractor machines are for the big farmers. You have gone to all parts of this locality and must have observed that in August, this locality is too waterlogged or flooded. We are really suffering in this village. During the peak of the raining season, we are completely isolated. We can not visit or be visited; even the occasional attendance or wedding or naming ceremony is sometimes impossible.

SCHEDULE FOUR (Sarkin Pawa- Chief butcher - Sabon Gari)

These are the essential needs of the poor. For hospitals, all fees should be cancelled. Then schools, then fertilizers. All these services are designed to benefit the **talaka** do not reach him. We do not benefit from anything. Since Balarabe Musa's era, no fertilizer was brought to us. I have five male children and each has his own farm. I was allocated only four **mudus** of fertilizer to buy, what would I do with it ?

Imagine what the NTC does. It employs the poor to cut long grasses and branches to trees to construct shades used to spread tobacco leaves to dry up. Farmers are paid ₦200 per shade and in addition given three bags of fertilizer free of charge. That is how NTC assists us till the commencement of the rainy season. Those employed are required to process the tobacco leaves. A 'boy' called Shehu Kore, has been intracting with the NTC in this manner. He is popularly known as 'Ghana' because of his successes with the NTC.

However, the NTC has been paying considerable atention on his farm by constantly visiting the farm and subsequently making it a model. They distributed over 500 bags of fertilizer

yesterday. You could have also witnessed the distribution had you come eailer. They had been around since on Tuesday. Many farmers got between one and five bags. All these are great assistance to some of us.

I have over 30 children, all relying on me. One of them died today; that is why people are condoling me. I just sneaked out of the crowd when I saw you interviewing that man. I am a poor man; look, the wall of my house has collapsed. You can see my family is completely exposed. I have 35 grand children from my female children. I am the chief butcher (Sarkin Pawa) I soldom slaughter animal. I rely heavily on the farm for survival.

## APPENDIX 2b
## INTERVIEWS SCHEDULE (IN HAUSA)

**Schedule one (Peasant farmer, Maigana)**

Wannan gida, gidanshi kenan, amma bai kawo kofar gidan ba kar ace ya sako buhu daya a gida. Sai ya ce ku sauke mani nan ayi ma mutane yekuwa kowa kwano biyu kowa kwano biyu-kowa kwano biyu. Amma bai gama garin ba. Wasu sun je suna mashi bakar magana, "anzo da taki na gwamnati ba mu samu ba." Shi wannan yaro da ya yi maka wannan tambayoyi, ba kaji ina dada nannaga maganar taki ba ? (e) ba shi ne ya **rayar** da karkara ba ? (Haka ne). To, ai kukan haka sai ko kuma samun karin takin. Yau ma ko kwana biyar ke nan, kwano dai-dai, kwano dai-dai, wani ma bai san an zo da shi ba. Sun zo nan su na ta mashi koki kaza-kaza, "da haraji ne" "da wani aiki ne". Na ce ku yi hakuri ni ma ban samu ba. Kwano daya-kwano daya, dai-dai.

To, an baka kwano daya, ka gama ba zai fitar maka da kuyya daya ba ke nan (kuyya daya ? Ai, tushe nawa ne ma za'a sa ?) To, ka ji abin da yawa! Damuwar jama'a; rashin taki, damuwar ya back. Tun da mu mutanen kauye muna amfani da taki ba kima ba, mun yi shirun ne kawai an dangwalo ta. Amman **wawwara,** e, ba'a dangwalo ta mai dadi ba, an dangwalo wawwara, eb, kwarai kwarai an dangwalo wawwara.

(Kaman tun yaushe ne ka fara amfani da takin zamani din nan ?) Iye ? (Tun yaushe ka fara amfani da takin zamani ?) Ai mun fara anfani da takin zamani zai kai shekara....., tun ana ba mun kadan-kadan, ana kwalanta mana da dan wani dan kofi (e) a ce wannan na gero, wannan in kun zo dawa ku zuba. Na ko san zai kai ma shekara kamar ashirin ko ma fi. Watau na takura ne a shekara ashirin muna amfani da shi. Da wadda kasa mashi sai ka ga na gyada daban duk ana ba mu.

Wani lokacin ma ana bayarwa kamar kyauta ne (e), kyauta ne ake badawa dao can!) e, sai ma mu ba mu garajen sawa. Sai a ce sai ka zo da abu ka zuba ma takin amfani., To, shikenan sai ana kokarin yi malaman gona su na zuwa su na ja ma iyayenmu kunni, ku sa iya'yanku su rika zubawa haka, mun ayi-mun ayi kuma **anda** mun yi din nan sai mu ga ya yi amfani. To, sai a zo kuma ana sayarwa cokin saukin kudi ana yin shi dai muna ganin amfani. To ga shi an wayi gari sai ka ce a saya maka mallam, jakkuna! (Dubu da aka ce. Dubu biyu da dari hudu). Ba shakka! A nan ya kai ma haka. Ba shi ma, tunda a inda ma zaka sayan ka fito da shi in ba kamfanin Taba ne ta bayar ba (e) To, ana tare mutum kan ya sama gonanshi.

Ga shi mun yi ma malaman gona magana suke ce su sun sami taki ne saboda su suna shuka taba) e (To, kamfanin Taba take ba su taki sun samu su dan sama masaransu ?) Yawwa! ka ji dalili.

To, an baka kwano daya, ka gama ba zai fitar maka da kuyya daya ba ke nan (kuyya daya ? Ai, tushe nawa ne ma za'a sa ?) To, ka ji abin da yawa! Damuwar jama'a; rashin taki, damuwar ya back. Tun da mu mutanen kauye muna amfani da taki ba kima ba, mun yi shirun ne kawai an dangwalo ta. Amman **wawwara,** e, ba'a dangwalo ta mai dadi ba, an dangwalo wawwara, eb, kwarai kwarai an dangwalo wawwara.

(Kaman tun yaushe ne ka fara amfani da takin zamani din nan ?) Iye ? (Tun yaushe ka fara amfani da takin zamani ?) Ai mun fara anfani da takin zamani zai kai shekara....., tun ana ba mun kadan-kadan, ana kwalanta mana da dan wani dan kofi (e) a ce wannan na gero, wannan in kun zo dawa ku zuba. Na ko san zai kai ma shekara kamar ashirin ko ma fi. Watau na takura ne a shekara ashirin muna amfani da shi. Da wadda kasa mashi sai ka ga na gyada daban duk ana ba mu.

Wani lokacin ma ana bayarwa kamar kyauta ne (e), kyauta ne ake badawa dao can!) e, sai ma mu ba mu garajen sawa. Sai a ce sai ka zo da abu ka zuba ma takin amfani., To, shikenan sai ana kokarin yi malaman gona su na zuwa su na ja ma iyayenmu kunni, ku sa iya'yanku su rika zubawa haka, mun ayi-mun ayi kuma **anda** mun yi din nan sai mu ga ya yi amfani. To, sai a zo kuma ana sayarwa cokin saukin kudi ana yin shi dai muna ganin amfani. To ga shi an wayi gari sai ka ce a saya maka mallam, jakkuna! (Dubu da aka ce. Dubu biyu da dari hudu). Ba shakka! A nan ya kai ma haka. Ba shi ma, tunda a inda ma zaka sayan ka fito da shi in ba kamfanin Taba ne ta bayar ba (e) To, ana tare mutum kan ya sama gonanshi.

Ga shi mun yi ma malaman gona magana suke ce su sun sami taki ne saboda su suna shuka taba) e (To, kamfanin Taba take ba su taki sun samu su dan sama masaransu ?) Yawwa! ka ji dalili. (abinda ya sa suka samu taki ke nan) e, kamfani tana **ba bbayarwa** ko jiya ta bayar, ta bayar masu biya wanda su zo su dan saya su daura a keke su je su dan mammanna kadan-kadan-kadan. Ni din nan ina da wurin da ya ke ba masaran tunda ba takin. Kuma da na kan yi amfani da masaran ba kadan ba.

To, ka gani taki an rasa, an rasa, kuma **irina-irina,** in mutum ya yi tafiya a kauyuka, da abin a zagaya kauyuka ne, a keke sai ya ce laile bana an yi asara. (Ai, na je kauyukan na je Tofa na je Bauda na je Kwadaro duk mun yi magana da su; duk komi a takin da takin nan, ban da shinkafa da suka ba komi). Kuma ko'ina ka je **maka** kukan dai taki ne, daman tun da an riga an saba da shi an raja'a da shi ana ganin amfaninshi. Mai gona a dauji kusan ba zai sama jakuna su kai mashi takin gargajiya ba. Sai gonan cikin gari shi ne zai dibi na gargajiya ya zuzzuba-ya zuzzube na cikin gari (haka) amma gonan dauji wanda za ka yi kamar buhu 50, (Hamsin) 60 (Sitin) a ciki sai takin zamani ya gama maka gonan kayi amfani da shi sosai.

Wannan amfani naka zaka ci da iyalanka yanda ya kamata ya zama maka kuma dan wani samun abin da zaka aje. To, amma yanzu bana haka ne kawai. Ni ina daga cikin wanda ban sa ko kwaya ba. Ni har ina nufin lafiyar, ina da yara su na dan nomawa. To na sa an noman an ce ba daman bada taki, takin ba zai samu ba an hana sayarwa shi ke nan, ina daga cikin masu zullumin abin da za'a ci saboda rashin takin; ni din nan. To mai ya sa ba ka samu shinkafa ka shuka ba ? Na ga wasu su na ta sawa da naje nan na ga shinkafa su na ta sawa, wasu sun sare ma abin su na ta sa shinkafa) e, to ba'a sa shinkafa ba lokacin, ai na yi amfani da masara ne kuma an zo an hallaka ta.

**SCHEDULE TWO (Peasant farmer, Maigana)**

To, an bar ta kawai (ba ma sha'ani na rashin taki, ba ma wasu abubuwa na da ya-kamata, ana kawo was nan) mene (Na najin dadin mutanen kauye) a'a. Mu mutanen kauye ba mu ganin komai. A zo mana da wani abubuwa daban bamu ganinshi (A ce an maku rijiyan kwakware, an maku rijiyan burtsdtse, an maku Asibiti, an maku hanya, an maku makarantu an maku kaza. (Babu komai. (Nan an rubuta an ce an maku). A'a ba'ai mana ba.

Wannan gyaran hanya da kake gani wani ma'aikaci nan a Zariya Alhaji Uba (e) ka gane ko, ga gona na ga na shi shi ne ya yi gidan gona a nan da kake jin. Wannan ya ba ka bayanin shuke-shuke (e) ka gane ko (e) to, shi ne ya kan yi hanyan har can zuwa gonan takai ma gonar ta goce ma ta nufi wani Unguwa don kyautata hanyar gonanshi.

Ka gani ko, da rafi nan ya kamata mu muyi kukan ayi mata gada kaman guda gada daya, gada daya kuma zuwa Bauda rayayyen guri ne (Haka ne. Na ga gurin) kaga wurin ? (Naga gurin, sosai) To, kai ke da ikon bada bayanin lungu-lungu tunda ba za ka zo ne ka tsaya a bakin nan ka ce ka yi aiki ba. (A'a) to, duk sako sakon nan na san shi na bi.

To kai mai aiki ne ba wasa ba tun da ka gane wannan lungu, lungu ashe ko kai ma in ka rubuta ya isa kawai in za'a ji kukanmu a ji (yana shiga yana gani) yawwa, tun da kai ka shiga watau lallai ka gane cewa ka gane kauye (Anguwan Sarki, muka je wancan makon) e(muka ja Tofa) yawwa (muka kama hanya da Dan Galadima muka kasa wucewa saboda ruwa ba gada) To ka ji (Daga can Tofan abin da suke cewa abin da yake su wannan hanyan ba hanya) ruwa ya zo (su sun tsaya nan haka, haka ma ah su da an yi ruwa ya yi yawa sun san ba shiga ba fita).

Can, nan ma inda nake gaya maka na hanyar shi wannan mai gonan shi ne ya sa ake kagawa kuma nan ai kungiya a cikin gariya har a hada a can Bauda Unguwan (Mai unguwan Tanko) e, mai Ungwa Tanko, ke gane ko ayi kungiya amma ai muna da rafi a nan **wataya,** da za a yi mana gudunmuwa ne tun da bine damu Hardo da fulani da juddun babu rani babu damina, dan yi kadarkko, shi ne wannan gona shi ne aka danyi wani kadarko haka wanda ruwa zai kama ka nan kana lalube tilas ne ka haura don neman abincinka.

A wannan rafi da nake gaya maka akwai shekaran da yara sun dawo kwadugo, to da sun wo gangara a keke da yaron ya subuce ya dulmiya a ruwa a gona na ne kabarin ina noma ina kewaye kabari. Ka ga da da gada za muyi amfani da shi hanyar gayya daman ana yi za'a bule da ta Gimba a hada da Dinya, ka gani, to, an fara kyautata hanyar to, ina.

Ai kai mai aiki ne sosai, tun da na ji ka fadi lungu-lungun nan ka tafi, in yaso za su je su tsaya ne nan a hanya in sun tambayemu shike nan ba su gane cikin lungu-lungun ba, ba su san laifin kauye ba, kai ko kai ka san, kasan gari na bakin hanya ka san kauye, tunda naji ka fadi nan sakon nan, kowa in ka kawo shi nan to kai ka gama kawai wahalan kauye kai ka gama, tunda ka san wannan lungu (A nan anguwan Junu da muka je su ba su ma da Makarantan, ba su da Asibiti, in ruwa ya zo sai dai kawai su kalle shi) kuma a ce ga kwana kan titi.....)e, to ka ji mutanen nan da ke nan hanyar su ke nan su je nan su shiga mota.

To idan ruwan sun zo nan sai sami ruwan fari har ba kuma gada sai illa masha Allahu. To shike-nan wani sai ya koma hidimar nashi ya daina, wani kuma ya zaga ta haka can an yi wani irin dan dagogo namu wai na gadan ice yana lalubawa yana lalubawa yana lalubawa, to su hauro su tafi Zariya, tafiyan ya kama shi, to, sai ya yi wannan. To, wane sunan Malamin (Suna na

Isah Moh'd Abbass) To, Madalla, madalla.

**SCHEDULE THREE, (Sule Salanke, Tashar Itace)**
(Alhaji mene sunan shi wannan)
Salanke
(Salanke ?)
Sule,
(Sule, maddalla) (Za'a je gonan kenan ?) Za mu je gonan, za mu je ofishin namu.....
Kai mutumin Zariya ne ? (e, mutunmin Zariya ne) cikin gari ? (e, cikin gari) Na'am wace Anguwa ? (Anguwan Juma) Unguwan Juma! Na'am. Wani ko ya taba zama a nan, unguwar Juma e, ba shakka, wani Tela ba ? Amma yanzu ba ma ganin shi, wanene sunan shi kuwa ? Ya taba zama a nan, kuma ya ce man daga Zariya ya ke na ce ma shi wane unguwar ya ce Anguwan Juma wani dogon mutum haka (Akwai wani na ce ma shi Na'iya dogon Tela a Anguwanmu) Baki ne ? (e, baki ne) Amma mu tunda ya bar nan ba mu sake ganin shi ba, har yau wallahi, ka ji, wallahi ka ji.

Wannan maganan na maganan fadama, fadamar da ake yi na abin nan na rani, na ga da na je can duk su na samun matsala) (Nan, kaman wata matsala ne ake samu ?) Mhm (Na maganar fadama da ake ce sai an, za'ai **clearing**wuri a ce za'ayi aikin fadama (Nan a bakin ra-fi ne nan ya ce nan ne shi Saulawa. To shi ne da ka ji ya ce ana aikin gayya a yi gada dai-dai yanda in ruwa ya soma sauki, to in ya zo a wannan rafi abin da ya yi gabas ta zuwa Dauri (Haka ne) To, kuma hayi da hayi masu garare, in kana da guri naka na gado ka aikata, kuma wanda ba ya da guri na gado, mai gurin gado ya ba shi aro shi ma ya aikata. (e) To, shi ne ake haduwa a yi fili ya tafi, a yi amfani da shi da rani.

Amma in ba haka ba tunda ba mu da Dam (e) Ba Dam, to shine wannan datsi da ake gayya ya soma ainihin kafa wannan gada yana cikin magana ana ce mashi Alhaji Magaji (e) to shine ya fara tushen wannan gadan (e) da ma yakan yi ne daga shi sai yaranshi sai kuma wadda ya yarda, to kuma har a ji dadin abin sai a hadu, a hadu, ai wannan aiki. Amman tushensa Alhaji Magaji a Maigana. Shi ne tushen wannan yin aikin.

A yau fadama na ga yana hana mutanen kauye yin Jinka saboda basu samun ciyawan jinka wurin) A'a, wannan dabbobin Fulani suke kashe ciyawa, idan kuma rani ya yi kaka ya yi, sai Alhaji Dahiru Sarkin Maigana ya kan yi yekuwa kada wani Agwai ya shiga fada (Hakane) ? To, idan ba ya yi haka ba, shi Agwai ba shi da hankali shi ma mai dakin ciyawa ne, mu ma masu dakunan ciyawa sai su bar shannun nan su cinye shi tun bai yi karfi ba su cinye. Dalilin da ake rasa ciyawa kenan.

To amma in ya sa ma su doka yace duk Agwan da an gan shi a kamo shi a yi mashi hukunci, to ba su shiga har ya yi dan karfi a yanke. Wannan yanke sai an sake yankan kaman wawa ne (A je wurin inda ruwa ke taruwa din, duk a yanyanke komai a sa garma "**tractor**" a huhhude wurin don a yi aikin fadama). U, Um sai kai wadda za ka yi na kwatanta maka wurin ke nan to, shikenan wannan ciyawa, kamar bakega yaro ya fita da fartanya nan ba ? (Haka ne). To shi ne zai karce ya karce ko shi daya ko da yaranshi, to shi kenan da hanunshi ne zai karce da garma, fili ya kafce ya buga ya buga sai ya zo ya sa hanya, amfanin da mu ma mutanen kauye mu ke da shi ke nan.

Kaji mu amfanin mu mutanen kauye kenan. Amma dubbai ko kai da mu zare kai yanda ka ji

shi wannan yaro mai Ungwarmu ya yi ta yi to a ko'ina ba kaman takin nan, kuma raya hanyoyin mu ji dadi don taimako da gada kaman. Kai dai na gaya maka tunda ka bi lungu-lungu ka gaya man ta inda ka biyo, to can idan can an fara "August" shi kenan an takura mutanen kauye.

Ba yanda za ka bi ka ziyarci wani wuri, sai dai in sha'ani ya kama a nan, sai ka kasa zuwa sha'anin ko daura aure, ko sa suna, ruwa ya cika ba gada, ba zaka iya tafiya ba sai a yi ba ka ga shi kuma ya kama ka, e, ya kama ka, a ganka a wurin saunan ai hukuncin su nan, to ga ruwa ya hana ka. To da ko an yi wani gudunmuwa gwamnati ta taimaka an yi wani gada sai ka ga tuni an yi da kai, e, rayuwar kasa kuwa duk bai fi sashin nan ba, tunda ka zaga ma na ce maka ni kai'na ina daga ciki. Tunda ko bai samu na zaba ba, e, kwarai. (To zan koma can) e (zan koma can) To, sai ka koma (A huta lafiya) To, madalla, madalla, madala.

**SCHEDULE FOUR (Sarkin Pawa - Chief Butcher- Sabon Gari)**

Na biyun shi sai Makaranta. Na ukun shi..... shi kenan don in gaya ma wurin da za'a taimaki talaka, Asibiti, irin kudin nan a soke shi, shi kenan Makarfanta, sai taki shi kenan. Kama abubuwa da aka ce za'a taimaki talaka da shi ba su zuwa gareshi (Ba ya zuwa gareshi ? ) Ba ya zuwa gareshi (Yaushe ne ya bar bayar da takin ? tun bayan Balarabe Musa. Yanzun na gwamnati ni din nan yarana ka ga daya, biyar ne kowa da gonarshi, an ba ni taki kwano hudu ya ya zan yi da shi.

Ka ga NYC ta zo nan wani ba shi da sisi ta sa an yanki ciyawa dubai kan ₦20 ko ₦30, ₦30 an ci rani ana yi da suka gama wannan suka sa aka sari itace na rumfuna na shanya masu taba kan ₦30. Da aka gama wannan in ba ka da wani dan kokarin da za ka yi sun bude wani kamfani, a wannan kamfanin naira goma-goma (lafiya lau, lafiya lau, sannu da zuwa, yaya gona ?) Ka na ji ko (e) naira goma-goma Bayan an gama wannan suka nemo masu jinka, kai zaka nemo mai jinka ka kafa rumfarka, su nuna maka yanda zaka masu rumfar nan, su biya ka, a baka taki buhu uku kyauta, jin dadin ka yi masu rumfar nan akan naira Dari biyu-biyu. (Ba Dari shida ba kenan) (Gaka ne).

To haka suka yi. Har aka je ruwa ya fadi, ka daka masu tabar nan in sun ba ka buhu goma ne, a dari bibbiyu ne. Ga tabar nan yansu wani yaro ya daka a na ce da shi Shehu Kore tana nan tayi haka. Ko da suka yi baki daga wannan gari a na ce da shi "Ghana", sun zo har gonarshi sun gani. Dari biyu ne za su baka ko buhu nawa ne. (To, ai yanzun) su na yi ko da jiya ka je idonka zai ga taki sama da buhu dari biyar, a jiya, Jumma'a, Alhamis, Jumma'a, Talata ka gansu.

To, wadannan kamfani ba karamin taimako suke yi ba, buhu sama da dari biyar za'a fita-r gaba daya. Wani yana da uku, wani yana da hudu, wani yana da Biyar, wani daya, wani ma bai samu ba, ka ga an yi taimako. (Amma yansun fadama kuma ta cinye jinka can ((ya ya ake ciki. Fadama, aikin da ake ta yi na fadam din nan ta cinye jinka, ba jinka) kenan na ciyawa (e) Al ciyawa akwai wurare wanda shanu su na (suke cinyewa), ana dan kewayewa, kamar Dahiru Maigana ka ga ya na taimako. Kaman nan gaba kardan zai sa a yi shela.

Duk wanda aka ganshi ya shiga wurin da ya na yin ciyawa mai kyau yana batawa, dika ya hana. Don in an bar ciyawan, nan ya yi, mu Hardo muna so ne, su Fulani ma su na so, ka ga zai amfani da shi. (Haka) Idan an yi amfani da shi masu yanka sun yi jinka ai ka ga shanu su ne zasu shiga sauran ba mu nan su na ci har damina, kaga a nan ya yi kyau, amma in an bari an kona ka ga ya zama barna (barna sosai) wallahi kamfanin NTC ta yi ko kari (Yanzu dai ka san

ka dade kane aikin gona, lokacin da taki ya zo, auki ba da taki din har aka zo ana ba da kyauta).

Ni,, lokacin nan da taki ya fito an tura mu Awai da ni da Baba lokacin nan yan Unguwa Tsoho wanda ya mutu, mun tafi Awai kan hanyar Alhazawa gidan wani Bayarbe da can ake awon taba lokacin Ja'afaru, kan hanyar nan na Alhazawa in ka wuce Awai, gaban Asibiti, can hayin rafi, A gidan Lawan, Lawan shi ne za a bar mashi ajiyan taki ya tafi ya dauko shi.

Da muka dauko shi, da ni da Babana, muka je da shi gidanmu an aje shi. An sake tura mu mun dauko shi (e) ka san da a na yin gadon kasa wanda in kayi aiki ka gaji, akwai itace bayan wahala za ka tura shi a tsari, ka kwanta ka juya ya fi yanzu lafiya, Allah. Za ka ji ba kasala, mu din nan lokacin nan za mu je mu yi aiki mu yi har Azahar, La'asar in kai aiki ba wani ciwon jiki ba komi, a tashe ku in ka ga za ka dawo gidanku, ka dawo, in ba za ka dawo ba ka huta ka tafi naka bayani.

Daga nan har mun doshi La'asar, muna nan, muna nan muna nan kuma kai din nan ka taba tanadin kaman in za ku je gona gobe za'a tura ka, to kasan rogo (e) to kasa a gona, kafin a gama abincin rana ka tai ka dauko. Ba yunwa za ka yi aiki, in kuma jiko ne na gargajiya, itace, kwarai, ka gani. Kuma ba wani maganan manja ko daddawa irin na da, sai ya ji kawai da gishiri. To, daga baya wannan taki ana shafa gado shi ke nan sai aka zo ana dan watsa shi a titi ko juji haka a gona, sai aka ce a'a ai wannan ya na da amfani sai ake sake ce da mu lokacin mai Unguwa Sarkin Yaki gidanshi ya na Arewa da wannan wurin.

Aka sake samun masauki, Mr. Malady, Malamin Taba wanda ya zauna a Tudu gaba da Masallaci, Malady, sai Alawo. Bayansu, nan jikin gidan sabon Sarkin Doya nan ne gidansu. Gidan Alhaji Idi gidan Mr. Alawo. Yarbawa ne shi ne za su dauko kamar amfani yana tafe haka, a lokacin da sai kai haka. Kai "round" ka saka ka zuba taki, ka gani.... yana samun a saiwanshi amfanin nan yana tsaye haka (e). To daga nan yana samuwa, yana samuwa har a ji dadinshi har ana daukan na NTC. Lokacin ne ma in za ka sayar da takin NTC (e), a lokacin nan Sarki Adamu kakan wadannan Sarkin Tudun Saibu kenan (e).

To, Sule bakwai ni ke saye. Wani lokacin in ka matsu, kaman matsattse ne ma to Sule biyar (haka). Duk an yi wannan. An wayi gari an ji dadin takin, lokacin da aka kira taro, a kira mu, Soba ke nan, wajen iyan awaki na Soba daga Tudu barin yamma. Sarkin yaki ne wanda ya koma Makarfi shi ne suka kira taro da makadan gargajiya da iyan hoto na gargajiya aka hadu ana kida, tunda ni na tafi ma dai ba ni daya ba. Lokacin da aka jeru aka ce makada su yi kida.... don kusa sun saba da su jefa garma ne gaban masu arziki kaman Sarakuna na gargajiya su na karban kudi, (haka).

To, irin su Sarki dahiru maigana, lokacin nan ba yana Sarki ba ne kai dai su na 'yaya' ga Sarki Audu Shamuwa wanda ya mutu (e). Ya shiga jama'a goman dada ya na nan Unguwarn Sarki Yamma haka da Maigana ya kamo shi a riga ya ce ya zo, to, da aka jeru ya nuna masa samfur din hula shi ne ya ce ya kawo kudi ya wuce cewan ma wai ko ya sa hannu ya kwashe shi, ana tattara mai a riganshi daga nan ya wulle. Aka ce akwai **"super"**, akwai **Sulphur** akwai NPK ka ga wani ya yi arziki ya buga kwano. Ka ga yanzun ina da yaya da nawa da na 'yan Uwana yanzun a guna ina da talatin daidai ya Allah ya karbi kwanan daya ka ga ana zuwa muna karban gaisuwa ne, sai na zo nan na dan boye da na ga ana ma wani tambayoyi na koma. Amma da yarana a cikin gidana.

Ka ga Allah bai hore man na sa kwano ba. Allah bai hore man ba. Katangan ma ta fadi a can ma abu a fili nake, ka na lekawa za ka gani katangan ta fadi babu abin mayarwa. Haka Allah yake so ya ganni. Amma 'ya'ya da ka ke gani, lalle akwai 'ya'ya. Jikokina yanzun wallahi in za ka tambayi wani ina da jikoki (35) Talatin da biyar na aurada da yara gomasha daya. Duk inda na juye 'ya'yana ne amma kaga da ya ke Allah bai gajiyaman ba ina nan ina ciyar da su. Nan zan shekara ban yi sana' a ba shi yasa na ce randa ta zo ina yi.

Ni ne Sarkin amma randa ta zo ina yi na iyata. Randa Allah bai ajiye man ba ka ganni nan sai in dauki fartanya in je gona in kuyya daya ne Allah ya sa na noma in na sami kwano daya ya fi in tafi kasuwa in sayo. Tun da kila baiwan da Allah ya yi maka, ba mu san baiwan da Allah ya yi maka ba, kila ka masa, amma mu nan ba a mana taimako da masu kudin garin da Sarakuna garin. To, sai dai in wani ya mutu, in wani ya mutu kila wasu in mun kira malami ya ga kudin zai ce Allah ya ji Ikan wane to shi kei nan. Kowa ya tafi inda za shi. Domin ba wani taimako.

Yawwa, mu ba wani taimako, sai dai in Allah ya yi ruwa Allah ya taimake mu. Amma mu yanzun sam tsakanin nan wanda suke jin dadi su na jin daidi wanda suke shan wuya su na shan wuya, ba'a taru an zama daya ba. Amma mu bangaren nan wani ba ya ta da wani. Tunda dai manya ba zaka je ka rage murya kan sana'arka ba. In an san kana caca ko neman mata, ko kana a'a mugunta a ran wane in ka saya ba zai biya ba, ka ga in ka tambayi ba shi ma in ya hana ka, kai ka kashe kanka. In ka dauki dabban wannan ka yanka ba ka biya ba kai ka kashe kanka. To ba wani wanda zai dafa maka. Kai ba ka da abin da za ka je ka sayo balantana kai sana'an ba wani wanda zai dafa maka. Babu wani wanda zai zo ya ce a'a bari in dafa maka kai sana'a.

A'a in an san ka na caca, in ka sayar ba za ka biya in an hana ka wannan kai ka ja ma kanka, kai ka kori kanka. To, ba wannan, mu wurin nan namu haka ya ke. Gun da Allah ya zaunar da kai in Allah bai cece ka ba ka hakura. Domin a bana na yi niyyan ta shi, ka ga dai ga gidana nan amma wallahi bana na yi niyyan ta shi a gidan (Ka koma ina ?) gun da Allah ya kai ni. Amma wallahi na yi niyyan wajen kasuwan Magani din nan, har na je na leko, Allah ne bai tashe ni ba, saboda muguntan wurin nan. Ka ga kuma ni ne na fara zama ban da dakin nan duk filin wurin nan ba bukka, duk unguwar nan ba bukka, daidai kaman wannan ba shi sai ni kadai.

Ba don an san asalina ba, an san uwana an san Ubana, za a ce wani rikakken maye ne ko wani rikakken barawo ya zo ya zauna zai yi fashin kai. To, Allah ya sa dai an san Uwana an san Ubana. Uwana ma tana nan da rai ta na nan a cikin gidan. Kwanaki ma na kaita asibiti kaman ba zata yi ba. Jakkar ruwan nan sai da aka sa mata ashirin a jikinta, amai da zawo din nan. (Yanzun a ra'ayinka, Alhaji, me ka ga ya kamata a yi na raya karkara, wanda mutanen karkara shi suke so kuma ya kamata a ba su ko kuma a kawo masu. Menene ya fi muhimmanci in ba kaman abinda Allah ya zarban mana abinda ya ke mafi alheri shi ne Ubangiji abin da ka ga a rayuwamu ka ga mafi alheri shi ne Allah zai ci da mu.

A kwakwalwanka, a Ilminka abin da ka ga zai mana amfani shi Allah zai taimake mu, ka taimaka mana. Domin in mun riga mun ce a'a ga abinda muke so, manyanmu ko an fara yi wani ya katse, tun da ba mu da karfi a wurin, tun da ya ke da manya-manya a wurin wani zai katse. Sai dai in Allah ya taimake ka, ka taimaka mana sai dai ka ga kawai an zo ana yi. Ka ga ba yanda za ayi a tsayar. Amma mu mun san cewan rayuwanmu in mun ce muna son abu ka za, muna son abu ka za, 'yan bakin ciki a wurin za su hana mu ne tunda yake da su, sune mafi yawa a wurin.

Sai dai in Allah ya taimake mu ka taimaka mana, ba sanannen ciki kawai, ko rijiya, no ko sauran fegi na ne zan bayar a yi mana rijiya, kankare. Haka nan, akan sana'anmu. A'a ko yanzun in ka ce a'a yanzun za ka rika ban kudi in rinka zuwa duk garin Allah in ya waye na yanka sai ai ni ina da kokarin wannan. Ka ga ina da shi ni, duk inda saniya take lalle zan sayo ta in yanke mata kai. Yanzun in na je na dauko maka dammin wuka na pawa da na gada wallahi za ka ce tsintsiya ce. Wani in ka saya ₦100 guda daya ba zai kula ka ba. Ka saye ta ₦100 wallahi ba zan saurare ka ba. Nasan dadinta.

## APPENDIX 3

## MAIGANA: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS

**BAUDA**

| Wives | Age at Mrg. | Children | Dependents | Male W/Force |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 17 | 14 | 12 | 10 |
| 4 | 20 | 24 | 3 | 10 |
| 2 | 23 | 9 | 3 | 5 |
| 1 | 18 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| 1 | 19 | 0 | 6 | 3 |
| 1 | 19 | 14 | 5 | 10 |
| 2 | 22 | 15 | 10 | 10 |
| 2 | 18 | 5 | 2 | 4 |
| 1 | 21 | 9 | 5 | 10 |
| 16 | | 93 | 58 | 66 |

**KWADARO**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 20 | 15 | 0 | 11 |
| 2 | 20 | 12 | 50 | 52 |
| 3 | 21 | 25 | 60 | 35 |
| 2 | 20 | 13 | 5 | 7 |
| 9 | | 65 | 155 | 105 |

**MAIGANA**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 19 | 8 | 0 | 4 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | 20 | 19 | 2 | 8 |
| 3 | 17 | 20 | 2 | 17 |
| 1 | 19 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 18 | 5 | 0 | 3 |
| 2 | 19 | 17 | 0 | 10 |
| 2 | 35 | 12 | 4 | 10 |
| F* | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 4 | 21 | 26 | 4 | 7 |
| 2 | 19 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | 21 | 13 | 3 | 7 |
| 1 | 19 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 21 | 5 | 2 | 3 |
| 23 | | 137 | 19 | 71 |

**SABON GARI**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 23 | 6 | 2 | 3 |
| 1 | 19 | 7 | 2 | 7 |
| 2 | 20 | 12 | 10 | 7 |
| *Wive | Dead 20 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| 1 | 17 | 6 | 3 | 7 |
| 1 | 20 | 4 | 0 | 6 |
| 1 | 18 | 8 | 2 | 4 |
| F* | 21 | 13 | 0 | 5 |
| 2 | | | 4 | |
| 9 | | 59 | 23 | 42 |

**SABON KAURA**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 20 | 5 | 4 | 7 |
| 1 | 18 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 3 | 17 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| 2 | 23 | 10 | 0 | 4 |
| 1 | 20 | 9 | 1 | 2 |
| 2 | 19 | 7 | 2 | 2 |
| 10 | | 35 | 9 | 18 |

**TASHAR ITACE**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 19 | 6 | 4 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | 17 | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| 2 | 19 | 9 | 4 | 5 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | 18 | 3 | 31 | 12 |
| 8 | | 21 | 42 | 23 |

**TOFA**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 22 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| 4 | 14 | 20 | 15 | 5 |
| 2 | 19 | 17 | 14 | 6 |
| 1 | 20 | 2 | 6 | 8 |
| 1 | 18 | 1 | 7 | 7 |
| 1 | 18 | 7 | 4 | 5 |
| 2 | 20 | 10 | 50 | 32 |
| 12 | | 59 | 98 | 63 |

**UNGUWAR RIMI**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | 21 | 15 | 5 | 7 |
| 2 | 20 | 6 | 2 | 3 |
| 2 | 20 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| 3 | 20 | 7 | 3 | 4 |
| 2 | 17 | 4 | 2 | 6 |
| 12 | | 35 | 14 | 23 |

**UNGUWAR SARKI**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 18 | 6 | 16 | 7 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 20 | 15 | 30 | 13 |
| 1 | 18 | 2 | 15 | 19 |
| 1 | 19 | 4 | 13 | 8 |
| 2 | 19 | 6 | 13 | 7 |
| 2 | 20 | 7 | 15 | 15 |
| 1 | 18 | 7 | 30 | 5 |
| F* | 9 | 9 | 12 | 4 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 3 | 17 | 13 | 20 | 8 |
| 3 | 21 | 17 | 15 | 19 |
| 1 | 19 | 9 | 6 | 8 |
| 17 | | 95 | 185 | 113 |

**GIMBA**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 18 | 11 | 2 | 5 |
| 2 | 20 | 2 | 6 | 0 |
| 4 | | 13 | 8 | 5 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 120 | 612 | 579 | 529 |

APPENDIX 4
PROJECT CASH FLOW 1985-1995 (FIGURES IN N'000)KADP

| | Opening Balance | IBRD | F G N | KDSG | Others | Total | Expenditure | Closing Balanc |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1985 | | 272,322.00 | 4,140,000.00 | 7,190,000.00 | 130,549.00 | 11,732,871 | 10,179,525 | 1,284,670.00 |
| 1986 | 1,284,670.00 | 11,020,133.00 | 4,725,000.00 | 6,360,000.00 | - | 22,105,133.00 | 26,989,727.37 | -4,884,594.39 |
| 1987 | 2,674,696 | 79,344,000.00 | 4,258,000.00 | 8,110,800.00 | - | 94,387,496.00 | 107,556,500.00 | - |
| 1988 | 650,578.24 | 1,727,354.37 | 10,196,848.70 | 10,459,524.37 | 398,219.04 | 22,781,946.48 | 19,538,322.76 | 3,894,201.96 |
| 1989 | 651,000.00 | 56,447,000.00 | 4,324,000.00 | 13,200,000.00 | 1,330,000.00 | 75,952,000.00 | 79,215,000.00 | -3,263,000.00 |
| 1990 | -3,263,000.00 | 109,081,000.00 | 6,974,000.00 | 15,200,000.00 | 1,375,000.00 | 129,367,000.00 | 131,779,000.00 | -2,410,000.00 |
| 1991 | -2,410,000.00 | 61,057,000.00 | 6,010,000.00 | 21,333,000.00 | 1,555,000.00 | 89,225,000.00 | 87,170,000.00 | 2,055,000.00 |
| 1992 | -2,045,000.00 | 107,184,000.00 | 3,950,000.00 | 31,887,000.00 | 1,077,000.00 | 145,154,000.00 | 145,808,000.00 | 0,346,000.00 |
| 1993 | 0.346,000.00 | 124,374,000.00 | 4,146,000.00 | 42,787,000.00 | 1,766,000.00 | 173,073,000.00 | 173,579,000.00 | 0,160,.000.00 |
| 1994 | 0,160,000.00 | 61,004,000.00 | 5,753,000.00 | 54,809,000.00 | 1,530,000.00 | 123,096,000.00 | 122,569,000.00 | 527,000.00 |
| 1995 | 0,350,000.00 | - | 3,765,000.00 | 38,324,000.00 | 4,514,000.00 | 46,953,000.00 | 45,823,000.00 | - |

Source: KADP Annual Report 1985-1995 KADP Headquarters Kaduna.