STATE AND ECONOMY IN KANO C1894--1960: A STUDY OF COLONIAL DOMINATION

by

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DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to the memory of my father Alhaji Bello Ibraheem and his grandson Alhassan Mohammed Bello.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that it is a record of my own research work. It has not been presented for any higher degree elsewhere. All quotations are distinguished by quotation marks and the sources of information are specifically acknowledged by means of references.

(SULE BELLO)

Date: 4th Oct. 1982

ABSTRACT

This thesis is the study of the establishment, development and consolidation of British colonial domination in Kano from 1894 to I960. Its specific focus is the relationship between the colonial state and the colonial economy. The process of the establishment and consolidation of colonial domination as treated in this thesis falls into three broad phases. The first phase covers the decade immediately preceding the qbnquest, when the character of economic organisation. especially the system of production, operating in the Kano Emirate proved inimical to the development of capitalist economic interests, and consequently hostility developed between the Emirate aristocracy and the colonial trading companies. The second phase treats how this hostility led to the development of war fare between the Emirate and the British state in 1903 and how the formerly independent Emirate was brought under the political control of the British imperialist state. The third phase covers how, under the auspices of the colonial state, the colonial economy was created, developed and consolidated. It is argued that the distinguishing feature of colonialism was the entrench ment of British Capitalist control over the production and commerce of Kano society through the systematic

destruction of the pre-existing economic system *it* could certainly be demonstrated that the struggle for independence and the c o n s e n t transition to neo-colonialism constitutes the fourth stage in the davelopaent of colononial donation. This, however, does not for. part of tne subject of this thesis.

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I am, however, wholly responsible for the views and opinions expressed in this thesis.

A final word: It is my sincere hope that the contributions made in the thesis towards understanding the nature of colonialism (and by implication neo-colonialism) will prevail over any mistake or oversight that I might have committed.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A.B.U.	Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
A.D.O.	Assistant District Officer.
B.C.G.A.	British Cotton Growers' Association.
B.S.O.A.S.	Bulletin of the School of African and Oriental Studies.
C.F.A.O.	Compagnie Francaise d' Afrique Occidentale.
C.I.O.	Commercial Intelligence Officer.
C.J.A.S.	Canadian Journal of African Studies.
C.O.	Colonial Office.
D.O.	District Officer.
G.B.O.	G.B. Ollivant.
J.A.H.	Journal of African History.
J.H.S.N.	Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria.
KANPROF	Files of the Kano Provincial Office now in Kaduna Archives.
K.I.L.	Kashim Ibrahim Library, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
N.A.	Native Authority.
N.A.K.	National Archives, Kaduna.
N.C.O.	Non-Commissioned Officers.
N.H.R.S.	Northern History Research Scheme.
P.W.D.	Public Works Department.
R.N.C.	Royal Niger Company.
R.W.A.F.F. or W.A.F.F.	Royal West African Frontier Force or West African Frontier Force.
S.C.O.A.	Societe Commerciale de L'Ouest Africain.
S.N.P.	Secfetariat of the Northern Provinces.
U.A.C.	United Africa Company.

A GLOSSARY OF HAUSA TERMS

(Words whose meaning is stated in the text have been largely left out).

Singular (S) Plural (P)

1. Aikin gayya - Communal work or labour. This form of labour mobilisation is common among peasants in the mutual cultivation of each others farms. It is also used by the authorities in the construction of town walls, etc.
2. Alkali, qadi - A judge.
3. Barade (P) Barde - Title given to high ranking military commanders of the Emirate.
4. Burtali - Cattle routes.
5. Ciroma, Chiroma - Royal title given to members of the Emirate Aristocracy who were apparent heirs to the throne.
6. Dan Rimi - Title of a Palace official in the Emirate.
7. Fadama - Marshy areas or swamps.
8. Fansar Kai - Self redemption by slaves through the payment of an established fee to their master.
9. Galadima - Title of a leading Emirate official.
10. Gayauna - Plot of land given to slaves on which they cultivate their own crops.
11. Jakada (S) Jakadu (P) - Messengers or Emissaries.
12. Jangali - Cattle tax.
13. Karofi - Dye-pit(s)
14. Lebura(S) Leburori (P) - Wage-labourers.

15.	Lamban Gudu	-	Illegal Tin Mining.
16.	Ma'aji	-	Treasurer.
17.	Mabudi	-	Palace Official in charge of stores.
18.	Makama	-	Emirate official.
19.	Malaman Fada (P)	-	Palace intelligentsia
20.	Murgu	-	A practice whereby slaves performed menial jobs elsewhere in return for payments and in turn surrendered part of their earnings to their master.
21.	Sallama	-	Title of a palace official in charge of the armoury.
22.	Sarki (S) Sarakuna (P)	-	Head or King i.e. a leading figure.
23.	Sarkin Dogarai	-	Head of the Emirate's police force.
24.	Sarkin Pawa	-	Head of the Butchers.
25.	Sankurmi	-	Official in charge of Prison for freemen.
26.	Sarkin Makera	-	Head of the Smiths.
27.	Sharifai	-	A special category of Islamic mystics.
28.	Sarkin Yara	-	Official in charge of the Prison meant for slaves.
29.	Taki	-	Steps or pacing. A method for the measurement of farmland at the early phases of colonial domination.
30.	Talakawa	-	Commoners, non-members of the aristocracy, principally the artisans, farmers, etc.
31.	Tsangaya	-	A tract of land given to scholars and their students in the Emirate society for the production of their sustainance.

32.	Ulama'a or Ulema'a	-	Scholars.
33.	Wakilin Daji	-	Forest Officers responsible for colonial forest reserves.
34.	Wakilin Waje	-	Administrative officers of the new settlements e.g. Fagge, Sabon-Gari, etc.
35.	Wambai	-	Title of an Emirate official.
36.	Waziri (S) Wazirai (P)	-	Vizier.
37.	Yan Kodago	-	Farm labourers.
38.	Zakkat	-	An Islamic Tax assessed on wealth or earning per annum.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. APPROACH AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of the colonial state in the development of the Kano Colonial economy. With this focus in mind the study also seeks to establish the most basic political-economic features of the colonialist domination of Kano society.

Central to the approach adopted in this thesis is the assumption that the nature and character of each society is determined by systems of social relations - especially relations into which people enter in the process of production. It is also such relations in production which distinguish one form of society from another. In fact, the various institutions (political, economic and social) can, in the writers opinion, only be understood if they are seen in the context of these relations of production.

Previous studies of colonial domination in general, and of the case of Kano in particular, tend, in the writer's opinion to largely ignore the above-mentioned question of relationships. They view the various institutions and activities of the colonial society in isolation from each other, and the result is a series of virtually abstract studies of such aspects as commerce, administration, colonial

policy, urbanisation and land tenure, to mention only a few. These approaches thus fail to establish the comprehensive nature of colonial domination and the inter-relationship of these various aspects within the particular colonial context in which they obtained and operated. In most of these studies, there is consequently a failure to identify the most basic factor which prompted, defined and distinguished colonial domination as a specific and distinct historical phenomenon. In contrast this study seeks not only to identify the relations between the colonial state and the colonial economy and in the process examine the characteristic features of colonial domination but also to provide a basis for an independent comparison and contrast of the colonial society with that which preceded it. Hence, the interest of this study partly lies in the critique it undertakes of the dominant existing works on colonialism, especially those which deal specifically with Kano.[1] In this connection, mention

1. A.Fika, The Political and economic re-orientation of Kano Emirate, Northern Nigeria C.1882-1940, Ph.D.Thesis, University of London, 1973.
   C.N.Ubah, Administration of Kano Emirate under the British 1900-1930, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Ibadan, 1973.
   J.S. Hogendorn, The Origins of the Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria, Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1966.
   I.A. Tahir, Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1904-1974; the pattern of bourgeois revolution in an Islamic society, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1975.
   J.N. Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano, London, 1973.
   Abdul-Malik Mani, Zuwan Turawa Nijeriya ta Arewa, Zaria, 1970.
   Abubakar Dokaji, Kano ta Dabo ci gari, Zaria, 1958.
   Polly Hill, Population, Prosperity and Poverty: Rural Kano 1900 and 1970, London, 1977.

should also be made here about primary sources.[2] For this study is also, among other things, an attempt to question the uncritical utilisation of primary sources. In this sense it provides a reinterpretation of colonialist archival sources. A review of the major primary and secondary sources is undertaken in the section on bibliographical notes.

The scope of this study is restricted to the area formally constituting Kano Emirate. The major advantage of an in-depth study of this nature is the extent of detailed evidence it brings to light on the basic workings of colonial relation-

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2. Some of the major published sources are:

Heinrich Barth, Travels and discoveries in North and Central Africa, Vol. I. London, 1857

P.L. Monteil, De Saint Louis a Tripoli. Le Lac Chad, Zaria, 1894.

C.H. Robinson, Hausaland, London, 1897.

" " Nigeria, Our latest protectorate, London 1920.

Johanna E. Moody "Paul Staudinger; an early European traveller to Kano" in Kano Studies, Vol. I, No.3, June 1967.

C.W.R.S. Miller Reflections of a pioneer, London, 1936.

Paul Staudinger An autobiography, Zaria, 1950.

H.R. Palmer (Trans.and ed.) The Kano Chronicle in Sudanese Memoirs, London, 1928.

Anonymous Wakar Bagauda ta Kano, Zaria, 1969, Translated by A.M. Hiskett as The Song of Bagauda.

Mischlich Adam Mitteilungen des Seminars Für Orientalische Sprachen (BSOAS) Berlin, 1907.

Mary Smith (Trans. and ed.) Baba of Karo London, 1954.

Kirk Green & Paul Newman (trans. and ed.) West African Travels and Adventures, London, 1971.

Neil Skinner (trans. & ed.) Alhaji Mahmoud Koki; a Kano Mallam, Zaria, 1977.

ships. Needless to say, in terms of specific detail, the Kano experience may often be seen to differ from that of other parts of Nigeria and from the other colonies. Yet the overall evidence provided by these details tends to point to the fact that the essential features of the development and consequences of colonial domination are largely the same everywhere. It is, after all, the presence of these essential features which defines the societies in question as colonised.[3] Nigeria is an especially interesting example of this point. On the one hand, it was administered throughout by a single authority - the colonial administration of the British state. On the other hand, variations in local conditions necessitated a wide variety of different approaches to the details of colonial administration. In other words, despite the existence throughout the territory of various administrative units which might differ in their geographical and cultural features, the fundamental relationship which constituted colonial domination remained invariable. This is particularly illustrated by the fact that the territorial divisions and re-divisions undergone by Kano province itself as various administrative units, numerous as they were, were consistently prompted by the needs and the convenience of the colonial administration.

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3. J.F. Ajayi and M. Crowder: History of West Africa Vol.II London, 1974, p. 515.

Finally, one of the most difficult problems in a study which seeks to establish and outline the basic features of the development of a specific type of political and economic relationship lies in assigning definite and specific dates to various phases and trends. Except for specific events and occasions, dates given here are rather tentative and meant to serve as a general framework. Similarly, such dates are used merely to emphasise the specific moment in time when the phenomena under examination originated, or the period within which the basis for their development was created and consolidated. Consequently, the dates necessarily tend to overlap, and specific aspects of any given phenomenon, of course, continue to develop beyond the period when the basis of its growth was laid, and as a logical outcome of the latter. Thus, one cannot assign a definite date to the development of colonial commerce for example, since it not only predated the conquest but also postdates the "achievement of independence". The period 1894-1903 brings us up to the conquest of Kano Emirate by the British. The year 1894 is considered a starting point because it marks the dynastic crisis in the Emirate which led to the outbreak of a civil war and which ultimately ushered in a new administration. Although the terminal date of the thesis is 1960, i.e. the year of "independence", the main concern of the thesis is the establishment, development

and consolidation of the colonial economy and society which need not take us beyond the mid-fifties. In this respect, a consideration of the independence struggle does not fall into the theme of the thesis.

The origins and development of colonialism can be categorised into four major phases. The first covers the commercial relations between the Emirate and European States up to the end of the nineteenth century. On the part of the European capitalist countries, these commercial relations revolved around the need for cheap raw materials, wage labour force and profitable markets. On the other hand, these interests were largely constrained by the effective control over the Emirate's resources on the part of the Kano ruling class, who encouraged cottage industries, slavery, internal commerce, etc. This conflict of interests was resolved by the conquest. The conquest of the Emirate by Britain and the consequent establishment of the colonial state constitutes the second and most crucial phase in the imposition of colonial domination.

The third phase involves the crucial role of the colonial state in the creation and consolidation of the colonial economy. Through various policies and measures the colonial state destroyed the former Emirate aristocracy and slavery, as well as independent cottage production and commerce. In turn it actively facilitated the development of

a wage labouring class, peasant production of raw materials for export as well as a market for imported manufactures. Finally, due to the maturation of the colonial economy, the colonial state further instituted the industrial dependence of the colony on foreign capitalist countries through implanting factories which are financially and technologically dependent on foreign capitalist concerns.

Although the struggle for, and the achievement of, independence does not form part of the subject matter of this thesis it is worthwhile to mention that this forms the fourth phase in the development of colonial domination. It is a process which essentially transferred administrative power to local executive and commercial intermediaries which are already tied to, and have a stake in ensuring, the dominance of capitalist interests.

2. ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY

This work is organised such that the central arguments are brought to the fore. Chapter Two, for example, is a treatment of the Emirate society before the conquest and it is designed to provide a yardstick for evaluating the extent and character of changes brought about by colonialism. Chapters Three to Seven treat in detail the most essential political and economic changes brought about as a result of colonialism. In the final chapter we take a look at the basis and nature of colonial commerce with a view to showing that

the over-emphasis on commerce, usually encountered in the secondary sources, has tended to blur our understanding of the colonial economy in two ways. Firstly, it abstracts commerce from production which, actually, is the basis of th former. Secondly it obscures the most far-reaching changes brought about by changes in the relations of production through the agency of the colonial state. Let us now consider in detail the arguments posited in the various chapters.

Chapter Two deals with the political-economic structure of the Emirate in the decade preceding colonial conquest. Two central features of the Emirate society which have a bearing on the consequent colonial conquest and domination are highlighted. Firstly it is shown that, politically, an aristocracy had control over the economy - an economy characterized by a strong internal industrial and extensive agricultural production and resultant to this was a tremendous development in commerce. Secondly there was the partial economic integration of the Emirate into the emergent colonial relations - particularly in the area of commerce and finance. These were achieved through the slave trade and the increasing, by the last decade of the 19th century, exportation of raw materials (hides, skins, ostrich feathers, sheanut etc.) on the one hand and the importation

of manufactures (iron goods, calicoes, threads etc.) on the other. Tied to this was the increasing financial integration of the Emirate into the European economic system. The pattern of this financial integration included a number of merchants, principally Arabs, financed by European trading companies and individuals, the prevalence of European currencies such as the Maria Theresa Dollar and the control over the importation of cowry currencies by European trading companies In sum it is argued that despite the strong nature of internal cottage based industrial and agricultural production, the Emirate's economy was partially integrated into the colonial economic system. The internal organisation of production prohibited further development of the interests of colohial companies. On the other hand the Emirate's aristocracy had interests in preserving and promoting their control over this form of economic organisation. It was this contradiction which largely led to warfare and ultimate British conquest of the Emirate .

Chapter Three discusses the causes and nature of the British conquest of the Emirate in 1903. It is basically argued that contrary to the much peddled logic of "pacification" and "law and order" the British conquest was spurred by the desire to establish control over the Emirate's resources, production and trade. The chapter closes with a

consideration of the significance of the immediate measures taken by the colonial conquerors.

Chapter Four considers how, between 1903 - 1912, after the conquest and the establishment of colonial administration, the latter played a crucial role in facilitating and promoting the development of a colonial economy. It is emphasized that the previous Emirate administration was not preserved but rather transformed into the Native Authority which was the local executive and judicial organ in the colonial political hierarchy. It is further argued that the developments of colonial relations in production and exchange were principally achieved through the specific nature of the colonial state's fiscal policy, as well as its policies in relation to labour and land tenure. We conclude that the engagement of the colonial state in production and exchange was designed to establish and protect the control of the various colonial companies. This particular chapter, in the main, outlines the arguments developed in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.

In Chapter Five we attempt to outline the tremendous development in the production of vegetable, animal and mineral raw materials for export. We also highlight how the colonial state ensured the control of British capitalist firms over such resources as mines, wage labour and

peasant production. The development of this control in turn further ensured the mass development of a wage labour force, a concurrent decline in food production and the gradual decline of manufacturing activities.

Chapter Six goes on to show that the destruction of independent cottage based manufacturing created the real basis for industrial and technological dependence. An attempt is also made to emphasize the crucial, though often neglected, role of the colonial state in the destruction of cottage based production with reference to five specific industries viz: iron working, textiles, leather-working, wood-working and food processing.

Chapter Seven considers some factors which led to the establishment of branch factories by British capitalist firms in the colony after the second world war. It is argued that this process was related to the maturation of the colonial economy such as the availability and need for proximity to desired raw materials, an abundant cheap labour force, the development of infrastructural facilities such as pipe borne water, electricity, communications, industrial estates etc. and above all the crisis 'free' industrial environment guaranteed by the colonial state. Lastly with the development of such control over industrial and agricultural production as

well as the establishment of various export statutory monopolies by the government as from the mid-forties the consolidation of the colonial economy was effected.

It is necessary to consider the specific basis, nature, character and significance of colonial commerce. This is particularly so in view of the way in which major works on colonialism have over-emphasized the nature and contribution of commercial relationships to the overall development of the colonial economy. Related to this is the fact that the role of the colonial state as well as colonial production relations are underplayed in explaining the nature of colonial domination. Chapter Eight is solely devoted to examining these issues. In this chapter a lot of evidence is adduced to show how the colonial state, in conjunction with the colonial companies, in fact controlled and directed the pattern of commerce in the colony.

In conclusion, we attempt to outline the nature of colonial domination and the role of the colonial state in this process. We draw attention to the distinctive character of the various classes of colonial society.

CHAPTER TWO

STATE AND ECONOMY IN KANO EMIRATE ON THE EVE OF THE COLONIAL CONQUEST

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter an attempt is made to identify the essential political-economic characteristics of the Emirate society in the decade preceding the British conquest of 1903. This general outline of the political and economic structure is intended to provide a basis for comprehending the nature and extent of changes brought about as a result of colonial domination of Kano.

The dominant class in the Emirate during this period was the aristocracy. This aristocracy was made up of the Emirate officials among whom the entire Emirate was divided into various official fiefs. At the head of the aristocracy was the Emir who derived his authority from the Caliph at Sokoto. The aristocracy was partially involved in the capture and sale of slaves as well as utilising them on various agricultural estates. They also taxed production by peasant households in kind, cash and labour as well as regulating commercial activities. Simple commodity production had largely developed on the basis of household peasant and artisan production. Although peasant production relied on the labour of

individual members of the household the holding and utilisation of slaves by large peasant families was quite common. On a marginal scale paid labour was also developing especially in areas such as transportation and apprenticeship in handicraft production such as weaving and dyeing. With the development of simple commodity production and the slave trade there developed a substantial merchant class involved in internal and external trade. The power of the merchants was particularly visible in such areas as credit and the development of private agricultural estates. One other significant factor is that merchants involved in external trade with Europe were becoming subordinated to European firms through financial credits and commodity supply.

Finally it is argued that by this period there had also developed a great deal of hostility between European capitalists and the Emirate's aristocracy. This was largely centred on the fact that the European capitalists wanted to extend their control over the regulation of production and commerce. On the other hand the emirate's aristocracy obstructed the development of capitalist control over internal resources and in turn defended and developed relations inimical to the further development of capitalist relations in production e.g. slave labour and the predominance of independent household peasant agricultural and

handicraft production. This contradiction and the hostility it entailed culminated in the conquest of the Emirate by the British in 1903. Thus the argument developed here is largely that the sources for conflict and consequent colonial conquest of the Emirate had developed by the end of the nineteenth century. The major conflict or contradiction was that on the one hand the Emirate was characterised by an economy which was partially integrated into the European capitalist economy while on the other hand the dominant political and economic structure of the Emirate constituted an obstacle to the establishment of external capitalist control over the economy. The detailed discussion undertaken in the chapter is structured to show the pattern of administration within the Emirate and the dominance of the aristocracy. After this we briefly touch on the most essential features of the Emirate's economy and major policies of the state towards the development of the economy. Finally, we briefly discuss the nature of relations with European states by the close of the nineteenth century.

2. SOME CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF THE EMIRATE SOCIETY

The general outline of the political and economic structure of the Emirate treated here is largely to provide a basis for comprehending the nature and extent of the changes brought about as a result of colonial domination.

(i) The Emirate Administration

The Kano Emirate, together with the other Emirates, constituted the Sokoto Caliphate under the sovereignty of the Caliph. The Emir was therefore responsible to, and

derived his authority from, the Caliph. On the other hand, he in turn controlled the Emirate through an administration composed of aristocrats and various other officials, all subordinated to him and deriving their authority from him.[1]

The relationships between the Caliph and the Emirate and the powers and rights of the Caliph over the latter might, for our present purpose, be summed up as follows:[2] the Caliph had the final word in approving the succession of an Emir, he co-ordinated many of the activities in which the various Emirs collaborated (e.g. the defence and expansion of the Caliphate), he was the arbiter of disputes among the Emirs and external relations between the Emirates and foreign governments went through his office or at least obtained the seal of his approval.

Before looking in detail at the internal organisation of the Emirate, we should add a word here regarding the relationship between the Emirs. While each Emir was ultimately responsible to the Caliph, the Emirs also related directly to each other on a number of levels. Besides collaboration over the defence of the Caliphate, they also cooperated with one another in terms of day to day administration to enforce policies designed to promote

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1. See R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906: The Sokoto Caliphate and its enemies, London, 1971.
   N.A.S. Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto, Oxford, 1967.
2. For more detailed treatment of this see:
   Adeleye, op.cit.
   Johnston, op.cit.
   Dokaji, op.cit.

the type of political and economic relations which characterized the Emirates, e.g. capture of runaway slaves, payment of ransom money, on matters of law, etc.[3]

As we have said, the Emir derived his authority from the Caliph, but in turn controlled the Emirate through a body of administrators which he himself appointed and could dismiss, and which derived its authority entirely from him. This administrative body was made up of a number of officials drawn largely from the aristocracy but also from other groups.

The aristocracy was composed of a number of "ruling houses" derived from the original contingents responsible for the conquest of the Emirate during the Jihad. They derived their names from their areas of origin or their military leaders or sometimes a combination of both.[4] Their offices, which became virtually hereditary within the respective families, included the control of large tracts of land which they held more or less as fiefs. The totality of the Emirate was in fact divided up into these huge official estates. The principal fief-holding office and the areas they controlled can be seen in the

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3. In fact the various letters translated by Backwell in The Occupation of Hausaland, London, 1969, are all on such subjects. Similarly are the collection of letters in -Al-Rasailu, and The Bauchi Letters available at N.H.R.S., A.B.U., Zaria.

4. Dokaji, op.cit., p. 36 ff.
Also Hogben and Kirk Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria, London, 1966, p. 196.

following table:[5]

TABLE I EMIRATE OFFICIALS AND THEIR TERRITORIES OF JURISDICTION

OFFICE	AREA OF JURISDICTION
1. SARKIN BAI	Danbatta, including Danbatta, Kunchi and Bauchi
2. GALADIMA	Fogolawa, Babura, Garki and Garun Godia
3. MADAKI	Dawaki, Tofa, Bichi, Dan Zabua and Bogwoi
4. WAMBAI	Gaura, Sankara, Ringim and Dabi
5. Bardon Kano	Miga, Jahun and Aujara
6. Sarkin Dawaki Maituta	Godia, Kabbo & Yelwa
7. Turaki Manya	Gora, Kura, Kiru and Bebeji
8. Makama	Wudil
9 Sarkin Dawakin Tsakar Gida	Birnin Kudu, Buji, Gwaram & Fagam
10. Sarkin Dutse	Dutse
11. Sarkin Gaya	Gaya
12. Sarkin Rano	Rano
13. Sarkin Karaye	Karaye
14. Ciroma[6]	Kano City & Surroundings

5. Compiled from oral interviews and other documents. See e.g. NAK/SNP/1267/1909 "Administration Division in Provinces - Maps of."

6. This territory is further subdivided among the following officials: Ja'idanawa, Dan Buran, Dan Amar, Dan Mokoyo, Dan Iya, Barde Kerarriya, Mai Mindubawa, Dankade, Tafida, Dan Tube and Dan Isa.

The functions of these territorial heads included the collection of tribute, recruitment of tropps, maintenance of law and order, etc., together with certain special functions e.g. Barde being the military commander. These territorial heads were all resident inside Kano and exercised their influence over their respective territories through a body of messengers or Jakadu.

The Emir also appointed resident village heads whose responsibility consisted of day to day administration. For example they collected taxes, part of which they retained, sending the remainder through the Jakadu to the territorial heads who in turn retained a portion and delivered the remainder to the Emir. The Emir retained most of this while sending annual gifts to the Caliph at Sokoto.[7]

Another distinct pattern of authority was related to various occupational categories. Once again the heads of these occupations were appointed by the Emir. Such included Sarkin Noma or head of the agricultural community,

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7. Johnston, op.cit., p.67.

Sarkin Makera, head of the Smiths etc.[8]

Besides the aristocracy, and the members of the village and occupational heads there were the palace officials who were also appointed or dismissed by the Emir. These palace bureaucrats were for the most part recruited from the slave class, a device, no doubt to ensure their loyalty since as slaves neither they nor their descendents had any legal entitlement to the offices they held. Such officials included Sarkin Dogarai, in charge of police and Sallama who was in charge of the armoury.

Related to this palace bureaucracy was the judicial authority. The Emir, territorial heads, palace intelligentsia (Malaman fada) and the heads of influential communities (such as Kutum bawa and Sharifai), constituted the highest legislative and judicial body in the Emirate.[9]

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8. P.J. Jagger "Kano City Blacksmiths: Precolonial Distribution, Structure and Organisation". Savanna, June 1973, VOL.2, No.I Fika, op.cit,, p.62.

9. Dokaji, op.cit,, p.85.

The Emir himself was the highest judge, and the palace the highest court of appeal. All other judges were appointed by the Emir.[10] Attached to this judicial structure were the prisons of which there were two sets. One, under the Sankurmi, was for criminals who were not slaves while the other, under the Sarkin Yara was for slaves.[11]

We therefore see that the aristocracy was the dominant class in the Emirate and it was in the service of this aristocracy that the village and occupational heads, as well as the bureaucracy, functioned. Before we discuss the policies of the Emirate State in relation to the economy it would be worthwhile to examine briefly the structure of the economy.

(ii) Basic features of the Economy.

The major features of the Emirate economy can be discussed under two headings, that is, the general way in

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10. Ibid, p.85.

11. Ibid,
Also Skinner, op.cit., p.9.
D.E. Ferguson, 19th Century Hausaland being a description by Imam Ubaru of the Land, Economy and Society of his people, Ph.D., California, 1973, p. 125.

which production was organised in the Emirate and, secondly, the various types of goods produced and how they were distributed.

It is obvious from an examination of the major sources that production was predominantly organised around households both in agriculture and industry. This production was based on the labour of peasant families, slaves and a very small proportion of hired artisans, apprentices (in for example dyeing) and labourers (e.g. Yan Kodago) in agriculture. In agriculture, for example, slaves were largely employed on the estates of aristocrats and wealthy merchants although the former also utilised corvee labour (aikin gayya) from peasants. Wealthy peasants also employed some slave labour. Similarly, industrial production, such as textile, smithing, smelting, dyeing etc., though largely organised around family labour, also

utilised slave labour as well as apprentices.[12] Paid workers included porters, guides, construction workers, farm hands, etc. At the close of the nineteenth century, for example, masons and construction workers employed in such works were said to be fed by the employer and at the end of the job the former received 1,000 cowries and the latter 300 cowries each.[13] The implements used were mostly hand-operated tools such as blast furnaces, hoes, looms, diggers, etc. These, as is discussed in Chapter Five, were mostly owned either by each individual worker or by the head of the household (e.g. furnaces)[14]

One outstanding feature of the Emirate's economy was that mining and agricultural production supplied, among other

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12. Adam Mischilich "Uber Sitten and Gebrauch" (in Hausa) in Berlin Universitat Seminar Fur Orientalische Sprochen, Vol.12, 1909, p.257.

    Ferguson, op.cit., ch.1,7 and 8 .
    Jagger, op.cit., passim.
    Bovill ed., Missions to the Niger, p.654.
    C.K. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, vol.I, London, 1925, p.151.
    Monteil, op.cit., pp.269-289.

13. Ferguson. op.cit., p.337.

14. Meek, op.cit., p.151.
    See also Bill Freund Capital and labour in the Nigerian Mines, London, 1981.

things, the raw material needed for internal cottage handicraft production and the latter provided most of the needed manufactures and tools for internal consumption and reproduction as well as for export. This integral relationship between mining, agriculture and handicraft production provided the basis for the development of commodity production and commerce for which Kano is well known.

One could further identify various specialisations within different branches of production. For example, in agriculture we had cultivation of both food and raw material crops, household rearing of livestock as well as extensive development of hunting, fishing and pastoralism.[15] Household/handicraft industries were involved not only in the processing of various food crops but also other manufactures such as leather working, textile production etc.[16] Mining, smelting and smithing

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15. G Mischilich, op.cit., No.11, 1908, pp.46-51.

16. Monteil, op.cit., p.283.
NAK/SNP/1267/1909 Administration Divisions, op.cit., p.3.

also provided various implements as well as orn:-
ments and weapons.[17]

The integrated nature of this economy is testified by even the colonial assessment reports compiled immediately after the colonial conquest. In the assessment of Dutsi District in 1911, the colonial officer reported that:

> "Out of a population of 26,000 odd adult males returned considerably more than one-third(in addition to farming) all engaged in various industries and trades...
>
> If we consider the value of the products of the soil, the livestock, poultry etc. and the various trades and industries then the general wealth of the district must be very considerable. There are large stock of grains in almost every village and a general absence of poverty throughout." 18

The effect of colonial domination, as we shall show later, was to destroy this pattern of production, centralis it under capitalist control and thereby cause a substantial destitution of the rest of the population.

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17. Jagger, op.cit., passim.

18. NAK/SNP/7/2715/1911 Assessment Report Dutsi District - Kano Province 1911-1912, para.113.

Despite the view held by writers like Tahir, Hogendorn and Fika that 'foreign commerce' was the major factor responsible for the development of Kano Emirate society, the evidence clearly shows that this was itself based on extensive internal production. Barth, Staudinger, Robinson and Monteil maintain that Kano commerce was essentially based on 'native' produce.[19] Lastly these productive undertakings and commercial activities were facilitated by a variety of communication networks and transport facilities. Footpaths, for both men and animals, criss-crossed the Emirate. These connected various settlements to forests, farms and ponds. There were routes for pastoralists involved in migratory shifts i.e. burtali.[20] There were also various trade routes within the Emirate as well as those radiating from the Emirate in all directions. Arguments usually posited in respect of communication tend to negate this evidence and preoccupy themselves purely with

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19. Barth, op.cit., Vol.I,
Moody, op.cit., passim.
Robinson Nigeria our,... op.cit., p. 150.
Monteil, op.cit., p.282.

20. See NAK/Kanprof/1532/S.2 Grazing areas and routes Kano Division.

problems of transportation associated with the profitable operations of European trading companies.[21]

Let us now consider the major specific policies of the Emirate aristocracy in relation to the economy.

(iii) Major State policies of the Emirate Administration

(a) Land Tenure

The land tenure system was directly related to the territorial overlordship of the aristocracy we have already outlined. Although these aristocrats did not have ultimate individual ownership over the land, we have seen that they had official estates and regulated use of land through various offices in general. On the other hand estates were also owned by wealthy individual families. On most of these estates resident slaves were usually provided with a plot by their masters. It was on such a plot (gayauna) that they produced food for their own sustainance.

Rights to use the land by peasant households were usually acquired from the officials and particularly

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21. See below p. 98.

the village heads. While these rights were usually transferred through inheritance, in some cases such rights were also transferred through gifts, loan, pledge, sales or as debt settlements.[22]

Although there is no evidence to suggest stringent laws guiding acquisition of new land it seems that there were conflicts related particularly to fertile lands such as fadama (marshland) and lands that had been cleared and subjected to cultivation for a long period of time. This is supported by a number of court cases on inheritance as well as the use of farmlands as securities for debts.[23] There was also the practice of Kasa mu raba whereby a person worked a piece of land and shared the crops from it with the owner.[24] Similarly pastoralism flourished largely due to the fact that the Emirate aristocracy did not pursue, unlike the colonialists, policies which prohibited or limited utilisation of pasture grounds such as forest reserves.[25]

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22. C.W. Rowlings, Report on Land tenure, Kano Province, Kaduna, 1949, p.5 .
23. Ibid. p.52 .
24. Ibid.
25. Ferguson, op.cit., p.65.

Koranic Mallams and students were also provided with plots of land where they cultivated crops for their needs. These were called tsangaya.[26] For use of lands for fishing, mining, hunting etc. there were no special permits except that in a number of cases levies were made, in kind, on the basis of the produce obtained therefrom. Two points seem to characterize this land tenure system and to distinguish it from the one that came to predominate under colonialism. The first is that special rights to land were restricted to the aristocracy and rights to land by other sectors of the population do not seem to have been based on special financial requirements but on the need and capacity to work it. Secondly, there were no special levies on the basis of land holding per se - levies always related to the produce derived from the use of the land.

(b) Organisation of labour

We have already indicated that cottage production was largely based on the labour of members of the family using their own instruments such as hoes, looms etc. In a number of cases peasant families undertook to cultivate individual family farms collectively and this was referred

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26. NAK/Kanprof/41 Dawakin Kudu, Gazetteer, Vol.2, Para.10 ff. Skinner, op.cit., p. 22.

to as aikin gayya. However this differred from communal labour to the state which could be distinguished into two. The first was production for the community in general such as the building of town walls or communal production of weapons by blacksmiths. On the other hand was 'communal' production by peasants on the farms of individual aristocrats.

The Emirate state policy, as is evident, not only encouraged state capture of slaves (although discouraging activities of kidnappers) but also keeping them in subjection.[27] It was largely illegal for slaves to refuse to work for their masters or to attempt to run away. For example, the various letters of correspondence from the Emirs of Kano to the Emirs of Bauchi, covering the last quarter of the nineteenth century, were largely requests to sanction or effect the recapture of slaves who had run into the territory of Bauchi Emirate.[28].

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27. Mary Smith, op.cit., pp.69-72.
Robinson, Hausa Land op.cit., p.131.
See also Johanna E. Moody, op.cit., p.57.

28. See the collection of Bauchi letters op.cit., especially letters Nos. 72, 127, 180, 302, 304, 305, 308, 311, 312, 314, 315, 317, 320, 321 and 325.

In cases where free people captured and sold into slavery were discovered by their relatives, such relatives had to pay ransom fee to the owner and this was organised by the State.[29] It is clear, therefore, that the state participated in the capture of slaves and at the same time forbade the slaves to run away or escape. Furthermore, the slaves could not sue, be sued or given any judicial appointments. [30]

It would also seem that there was the gradual development of slave labour being replaced by paid labour although in general the former predominated. Two systems indicated that the holding of slave labour was becoming less rewarding. The first was murgu, where the slave went out to sell his labour so as to earn some money and in return handed a portion of this to his master. The second was fansarkai, where slaves who wanted to become free were allowed to purchase their freedom. The slaves usually paid, over a period of time, an amount of money

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29. Mary Smith, op.cit., p.69.

30. Fika, op.cit., p.70.

agreed upon with the master by going out to do various menial jobs.[31] The aristocracy did not seem to have been concerned with paid labour in general. It only seems that, on their part, they did not utilise this form of labour to any appreciable extent.

(c) Taxation in the Emirate

There was no single and uniform system of taxation in the Emirate. What could be described as taxation was largely a variety of levies or tolls on various economic undertakings in the Emirate. There was a tax on most agricultural households called Kurdin Kasa or Kurdin Gandu - which was paid in cowries by the heads of various households.[32] There was also a religious levy on harvested grains called zakka. Among the non-Moslem population this due was collected under the title of jizia. In the Fagam hills, for example, the inhabitants, Ajawa, paid their taxes in goats.[33] Apart from these the

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31. Skinner, op.cit., p.19

32. Barth, op.cit., vol.I p 523.

33. Kanprof/5570/1909 Kano Province assessment report for 1909, para.109.

pastoralists were also taxed in livestock or currency under jangali. There were also levies on various crops such as sweet potatoes, cassava etc. called Kurdin shuke-shuke or kurdin nome-nome.[34] In this regard major raw materials and foodstuffs such as cotton and indigo, henna (lalle) and beans (wake) were exempted. Fishermen were taxed under the kurdin rafi system. Dyers were also taxed per dye pit and this was called kurdin karofi. Baba of Karo gave a vivid account of this taxation:

> ".. the tax was paid in cowries. They counted them in 'mats' - Keso daya, one mat, was one large Bornu mat, sewn up, containing 20,000 cowries. The chief of Zarewa would send his men to collect the money. His courtiers went to each household and collected the money for tax. In those days there was not only the household tax, gandu tax, there were also taxes on all sorts of different farmings - groundnut tax, sweet potato tax, sugar cane tax and others; we called them kudin nomi nomi, the farming taxes; there were craft taxes, for instance a dyer paid 2,000 cowries for every dye-pit he had."35.

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34. Mary Smith, op.cit., pp.80-81.

35. Ibid., p.81.

In the Kano Province assessment report of 1909 it was reported that "cotton ... (was) free from tax." Apart from this it was also reported that blacksmiths were "exempted from Kurdin Kasa on payment of one hoe of the nominal value of 800 cowries per compound head in lieu."[36]

Traders were however taxed. The Sarkin Kasuwa was the official responsible for the supervision and control of the market place. For every animal coming into the city there was a levy of forty cowries. Natron transported from Bornu via Kano to Nupe was taxed 500 cowries per load. There was also a levy on any slave captured or sold in the market.[37]

" In general, therefore, we see that although the Emirate's forms of taxes were highly numerous, the burden of taxation per adult male was limited in the sense that they were largely levies on specific economic activities and were assessed largely on the basis of the whole household and not individuals. They were also paid in cowries or in kind and there was no compulsion on the

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36. Kanprof/5570/1909, op.cit., para.49-88.
37. Dokaji, op.cit., p.85.

media of tax payment. Lastly the evidence also suggests that the taxes were designed to develop the availability of raw materials and expansion of cottage manufacturing activities as this is evidenced by the exemption of such vital raw materials as cotton, indigo etc. from tax levies.

The viability of this economy is attested to by a British commercial officer who, after an intelligence survey, reported in 1907 that iron working provided the society:

> "not only with rough tools (hoes etc.) but knives, scissors and even razors from the iron found in the country, and which by some process they are able to turn into steel. They make their own earthen ware water and cooking pots and even smoking pipes. They are really expert tanners and leather workers and turn out excellent sandals, slippers, riding boots etc., in addition to saddles and horse furniture generally. They make their own ropes, fishing nets etc. Even implements used in their various manufactures, cotton gins, spindles, looms shuttles etc. are all home made. They grow their own dye stuff and their own tobacco. And from the groundnut they make oil for lighting and cooking purposes; and I have even seen candle made from beeswax."38

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38. SNP7/1765/1907 "Mr. C.A. Birtwistle: C. .O. - Lagos, Southern Nigeria: Report on his recent visit to Northern Nigeria", 1907, p.23.

We can therefore see that commerce operated on the basis of this internal production. It facilitated the importation of those items which were either deficient or absent within the Emirate as well as the export of essentially manufactured items such as iron goods, cloth and leather goods. For example, Kano imported salt from Asben, Bilma and Dallo Fogha; natron from Bornu; Kola-nuts from Salaga, Ashanti and Gwanja; cotton from Zaria and Katsina as well as indigo from the latter; dried fish and palm oil from the coastal areas around Ekb. It, in turn re-exported some of these items e.g. natron. The major export, however, was cotton cloth.[39]

3. COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN STATES

Relations between Kano and Europe had been established for a long time and probably date back to the late fourteenth century.[40] These relations were of a commercial nature. These commercial relations appear to fall into three distinct phases which are distinguished on the

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39. Johanna E. Moody, op.cit., p.41.
Backwell, op.cit., p.41.
Robinson, Hausaland, opcit., p.113.
Monteil, op.cit., p.510 ff.

40. E.W. Bovill, The golden trade of the Moors, London, 1958.
A.A. Boahen, Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan 1788-1861, London, 1964.
"The Kano Chronicle", op.cit., passim.

basis of the types of commodities that predominated at any given period. The first and the earliest of these seems to be the period when Kano exported, largely, manufactured goods such as the famous Morocco leather and cotton goods.[41] The second phase, which would appear to have taken shape by the sixteenth century, was the period when the export of slaves assumed increasing importance and this seems to have lasted up to the second half of the nineteenth century. Lastly there was a noticeable development of the export of raw materials by the closing decades of the nineteenth century.[42]

" The increasing development of commodity production and commerce brought about two major concomitant developments. The first was that internally there was a substantial development of a class of wealthy merchants (Masu Dukiya) who increasingly came to control certain facets of production through making direct credits to cottage producers, ownership of agricultural estates,

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41. Bovill, op.cit., passim.
Boahen, op.cit., passim.

42. See below, p. 40.

livestock etc. On the other hand it also led to, as we have already indicated, marginal development of a class which was compelled to sell out its labour. The second development was that European trading firms became increasingly predominant in the area of external commerce. The increasing dominant position of European capitalists is particularly related to their control over the supply of currency, financing Arab merchants and territorial control over such areas as the Maghreb States and the River Niger.[43] Despite this control, however, internal commerce as well as production was independent of external capitalist control and firmly controlled by the Emirate's aristocracy.

Commercial relations between the Emirate and most European States were effected through the trans Saharan and Atlantic trade networks. While the Atlantic trade network was under the control of such companies as the Royal Niger, the trans-Saharan trade system was, by the close of the nineteenth century, also operating under the control of various European financiers. In fact the various governments of the Maghreb States, as well as

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43. Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa, London, 1981, pp.32-37.
Philip Ehrenstaff "The Political economy of informal empire in Precolonial Nigeria 1807-1884", C.J.A.S., Vol.vi, No.3, 1972.

a number of Arab merchants were financed, and therefore indebted to, various European financial institutions. This made it easy for the European governments to exercise some influence on the trans-Saharan trade. This was reflected in the attempts made by European States to halt the traffic in slaves and fire-arms.[44] Similarly, European States established political and commercial agents in Kano. For example, there was one Sidi Rashid in Kano who was "an agent of Her Majesty's Vice-Consul" at Mur Zuk.[45] Indeed it was Sidi Rashid who sent the news of the death of Emir Mohammed Bello in 1894. The news of his death was conveyed to the British Consul at Tripoli in a letter from Sidi Rashid dated Kano 28th February, which the Consul then passed on to the British Colonial Office in London.[46] This amply demonstrates the role of Sidi Rashid as a political agent. On the other hand a number of the Arab merchants were financed by European Trading companies. For example, there was a Jewish family,

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44. See: B. Shenton, "A note on the origins of European Commerce in Northern Nigeria;" paper presented to History Departmental Seminar, A.B.U., Zaria, February, 1977.

45. Barth, op.cit., vol.II, p.502.

46. Adeleye, op.cit., p.98.

the Arbibs, resident in Tunis and engaged in the purchase of esparto grass and whose principal agent in Kano was Haji Khalifa Zonnad. There was also an American, Warsell Riley, who "had by the 1890s become an important figure in the North African trade exporting over a million tanned skins a year from Tripoli to New York."[47]

The Arab merchants were largely domiciled in Kano City and in a particular ward.[48] They imported largely currencies, luxury goods, and various kinds of European manufactures such as cotton prints, razor blades, needles etc. Their main exports, during this period, were largely raw materials such as hides and skins, ostrich feathers, ivory and a diminishing number of slaves.[49]

By the close of the nineteenth century the Royal Niger Company (RNC) was becoming a monopolishing trading company on the river Niger. While its major imports were cotton cloth, salt, metal goods, cowries etc. the Royal

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47. Shenton, op.cit., p.3.

48. Monteil, op.cit., p.270.
Robinson, Hausaland..., op.cit., p112.

49. Computed from various sources.

Niger Company also bought raw materials such as ivory, sheanuts, leather etc. for export.[50] There were also American slave merchants importing dollars and other commodities.[51] It seems that the various trading companies operated largely through agents, such as Adamu Jakada, who undertook purchases from the interior for them.[52]

It is apparent therefore that one of the major features of the relations between the Emirate and European trading companies was the increasing influence the latter came to have over the supply of currency. The effect of such was that it, in itself, contributed to the further development of production for export.[53].

Cowry currency was said to have been introduced into the Emirate via Nupe.[54] According to Hopkins the cowries were imported from the Maldive Islands.[55] Marion Johnson has said that cowry shells were also being imported from East Africa during the palm oil trade.[56] By 1700,

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50. Obaro Ikime, The fall of Nigeria, the British Conquest, London, 1977, p.64.
51. Barth, op.cit., p.470.
52. M. Junai'du, Tarihin Fulani, Zaria, 1956, p.55.
53. Frederick Pedler, The lion and the Unicorn in Africa: The U.A.C. 1787-1931, London, 1974.
54. Ferguson, op.cit., p.360.
55. A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, London, 1973, p.68.
56. Marion Johnson, "The Cowrie Currencies of West Africa" JAH, 11, 1970, pp.331 - 353.

however, Britain was importing cowries from Morocco.[57] Although it has been reported that cowries were sold in Mali and "Gawgaw" as early as the fourteenth century, it appears that they came to be used in Kano only around 1750.[58] By the second half of the nineteenth century the Royal Niger Company was one of the principal importers of cowries.[59]

Related to the importation of cowries was the importation of Maria Theresa Dollars (minted in Vienna in 1780) by European and American merchants. Robinson reported that this currency was, in the 1890s, very current in the Western Sudan and estimated its value as ranging from 3/- to 4/6d.[60] According to him it must have been current since 1846.

The prevalence of these currencies, especially cowries, in the Emirate is reflected in the fact that most forms of internal and external transactions, as well as some payments of taxes, were conducted with them.[61]

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57. Ibid., p.335.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Robinson, Hausaland..., op.cit., p.62.
61. Marion Johnson, op.cit., p.342.

The widespread circulation of cowries in Kano is illustrated by the fact that when the Caliph, at Sokoto, purchased some goods from F.I.Monteil in 1891 he had to give the latter slaves which he was to sell in Kano and thereby recover his value in cowries or in dollars.[62]

The increasing control of European States and trading companies over certain areas and trade routes in the West African region and the supply of currency were some of the major factors which encouraged the development of exchange of some raw materials for some manufactured goods.[63] By the end of the nineteenth century this was evidenced in the increasing export of feathers, hides, skins, sheanut, cotton and ivory from the region.[64]

Despite these commercial and financial influences, however, the further development of European capitalist control over the economy was constrained by internal economic and political organisations. Economically, production was based on family labour, slave labour and a small proportion of paid labour. Internal commerce

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62. Monteil, op.cit., p.251.
63. This, for example, is one of the results of the R.N.C.'s control over the Niger.
64. Barth, op.cit., vol.I, p.517.

within the Emirate and with other parts of West Africa was also based primarily on internal produce. The dominance of the aristocracy was the principal obstacle that prohibited the extension of further control by European capitalists over the rest of the economy. Related to this was that the prevalence of cottage - based agricultural and handicraft production as well as slave labour restricted the establishment of capitalist monopolies and the mass development of a wage labour force. Similarly this internal political and economic condition not only prohibited the establishment of capitalist control but the cost of transportation of commodities from Britain across the Atlantic and up the River Niger to the interior made trade largely unprofitable for such trading companies as the Royal Niger Company. What capitalist interests needed was not only monopoly over production and supply of commodities but also cheap transportation system as well as preferential fiscal and tariff policy which the aristocracy was neither interested in nor in a position to establish and guarantee. The resolution of this contradiction is fully

discussed in Chapter Four. At the initial stages, however, various European associations of industrialists, trading companies and governments started more direct relations with the Caliph and the Emir, with a view to inducing them to adopt a more favourable stance to the development of European commerce. Towards this end various explorers were sent from Europe to the Caliph at Sokoto as well as the Emir in Kano. The essential role of these explorers was largely to identify routes into the interior as well as to report on the general (political, social and economic) condition in the Emirate. These explorers were also expected to establish "peaceful relations" with the Caliph as well as with each individual Emir for the purpose of trade. The fact that this trade was largely supposed to be in manufactured goods in return for raw materials is illustrated by the active attempt to stop the trade in slaves, and to encourage the export of minerals and agricultural products as well as the importation of manufactures.[65] Thus, the various travellers brought samples of the goods to be traded with them, some of which they gave out as gifts

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65. See Adeleye, op.cit., esp. appendices.

to the authorities while they sold others.[66] For example, between 1850 and 1855, the British government sent an expedition "which was to study the trade routes from Tripoli to the Sudan," and to "explore Central Africa."[67] The expedition was headed by James Richardson. His companions were Dr. H. Barth, an expert in "colonial commerce," and Adolf Overweg, a geologist and astronomer.[68] Another European traveller, W.B. Baikie, was said to have visited Kano in 1862. Similarly, two Italians, A.M. Massari and one Mattuchi, also visited the Emirate between 1880 and 1881.[69] Between 1881 and 1883, two other European travellers, Dr. Van Flint and Marquis de Boufenti, also visited the Emirate.[70] In November, 1885, two Germans were sent by the German government with the purpose of establishing "friendly relations for the purposes of trade."[71] The leader of the expedition,

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66. Robinson, Hausaland.., op.cit., p.77.
Barth, op.cit., Vol.I p.455.
Monteil, op.cit., p.251 .
Mod op.cit., p.41.
67. Hogben and Kirk Greene, "The Emirates of Northern Nigeria, London, 1966, p.587.
68. Barth, Vol.I., op.cit., p.xii.
69. Ibid. Fika, op.cit., p.86 .
70. Ibid., p.86 .
71. J.E. Mo op.cit., p.38.

Paul Staudinger, was an entomologist. The German-African society and the German Colonial Society jointly sent Herr Flegel to Sokoto in 1885.[72] On the 24th November, 1891, a Frenchman P.L. Monteil also arrived at Kano.[73] William Wallace, on behalf of the Royal Niger Company passed through Kano Emirate on his way to Sokoto and was accompanied by the vizier of Sokoto, Bukhari.[74] H. Robinson also arrived in Kano in 1894.[75]

In 1900 another expedition was sent to Kano. This included W.R.S. Miller, Bishop Tugwell(the leader), A.E. Richardson, Claud Dudley Ryder, and the Rev. B.E. Whingston all from various missionary and intellectual circles while "from business circles in London came Burging". In preparation for their journey, besides the scriptures, hygiene and first aid, the Christian Missionary Society also taught them "anthropology and the understanding of money" as well as "survey, map making, writing good business letters, a decent ability to deal with varied correspondence and the keeping of accounts."[76]

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72. Robinson, Hausaland..., op.cit., p.5.
73. Monteil, op.cit., p.269.
74. Junaidu, op.cit., p.52.
75. Robinson, Hausaland..., op.cit., p.5.
76. C.W.R.S. Miller, Reflections of a Pionner, London, 1936, p.16.

Reporting on their Mission, Miller wrote:

> "it had been vaguely realized from the writing of Barth, Clapperton and the others that a solid block of Muslim States occupied this territory between the latitude 8°S and 13°N; how strongly entrenched was the slave trade in the hand of the Arabs, Senegalese, and Fulani and how great a struggle for supremacy must inevitably precede the complete break of these powerful interests."77

The Royal Niger Company's relations with the Caliphate continued to assume a more aggressive character with the former's conquest of some of the Caliphate territories. Similarly, the drive to control the Caliphate is evidenced in the treaties which above all, always claim to have secured control over (1) foreign trade and mineral resources as well as (2) the right of the Royal Niger Company to regulate the external relations of the Caliphate.

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77. Ibid. p. 22.

4. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is worth noting that the economy was characterized by a widespread production of agricultural and mineral produce on which internal handicraft industries depended for the bulk of their raw materials. Production was based on the labour of independent peasant families, slaves (especially on estates owned by wealthy merchants and aristocrats and, marginally, wage labour - especially in transportation and handicraft 'guilds.' This production formed the basis for the extensive development of internal and external commerce. Alongside this there was also the export of slaves. We have also seen that relations (especially commercial) with European capitalist states had led to the latters' increasing predominance over the Emirate, especially through the control of the supply of currency and the direct financing of Arab merchants. On the other hand the control of the Emirate by the ruling aristocracy inhibited the development of European capitalist control over the Emirate's resources. At this point it is worthwhile to note some specific features of the Emirate

aristocracy and the Emirate's relations with European States. Firstly we have seen that the Emirate aristocracy had carved up the Emirate among themselves into official fiefs and estates and did not, as was the case in classical feudalism, own such lands as personal and private property. Secondly although members of the aristocracy derived part of their wealth from official estates cultivated by slaves and through peasant corvee labour, a great proportion of their wealth also derived from the regulation and taxation of cottage - based peasant production, commerce, booty and other state dues such as fines. Thirdly we have seen that the extensive development of commerce also brought about the development of an increasingly powerful class of internal and external merchants. Internal merchants tend to increasingly become owners of agricultural estates, and livestock as well as money lenders. On the other hand, the predominance of capitalist trading companies in the commerce of the region tended to lead to the subordination of merchants involved in external commerce through the supply of commodities and currencies as well as credits.

In the next chapter we discuss how the conquest of the Emirate was occasioned by these contradictions and how the establishment of the colonial state led to the subordination of the Emirate to the British.

CHAPTER THREE

THE BRITISH COLONIAL MILITARY CONQUEST OF KANO EMIRATE IN 1903

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we treat the conquest of Kano Emirate by the British colonial troops in 1903 - i.e the origins and causes, the actual conduct and the consequentes of the war. The conquest of Kano Emirate by the British, it must be emphasized from the beginning, was caused and determined in both its development and consequences by one central factor: the desire to dislodge obstacles hindering British capitalist control over the Emirate, in particular the Emirate aristocracy. The defeat and overthrow of the Emirate aristocracy paved the way for the establishment of the colonial state and consequent creation and development of the colonial economy and society under the former's auspices.

In reconstructing the colonial conquest of the Emirate, and in fact the colonial conquest of all of the African continent, two basic issues confront the researcher. The first is the Predominance and easy availability of colonial documents. The second, largely

associated with the first, is the prevalent perspective on this particular feature in the development of colonial domination encountered in this prevailing source material.

Primary information on the conquest of Kano, for example, is available from written sources such as the various publications of the WAFF, Northern Nigeria; military surveys and reports; confidential military reports; personal diaries; biographies; correspondences and some extracts in the annual reports. One of the obvious advantages these have over oral sources is the detail and accuracy of information on such things as the composition of the colonial troops, weapons, dates and even times, exact location, etc., whereas such details relating to the number of the Emirate troops, exact dates and times from oral sources have to be approximated. These sources, however, have two main limitations. The first is that such details were largely confined and related to the colonial troops alone and are therefore sectoral. In the second place, although these records do not make any explicit or scientific attempt at explaining the activity of the colonial conquerors, they are pervaded by definite view points which, although justificatory and partially explanatory, have tended to become in secondary sources, established 'historical'

explanations of the colonial conquest. There are four major premises to this stereotype. The first is that such records, normally, emphasized and concentrated on wars. For example, most of these records are reports on the progress of colonial warfare or claims to the effect that the Emirate was involved in chronic, mostly intertribal, wars. A picture of internal turbulence, to justify colonial invasion, is thus created. From this the second theme follows: colonial invasion was aimed at "pacifying" these "troubled" areas. The third theme is that these areas had to be protected from colonisation by rival colonial powers and hence a 'protectorate' had to be established. Lastly, there are also allusions to 'humanitarian' considerations - particularly the abolition of the slave trade. From these premises the final conclusion is arrived at, namely, that the conquest consequently led to the establishment of peace, law and order which guaranteed production and trade and hence modern economic development.

J.S. Hogendorn, in chapter one of this thesis, captioned "The Pacification of 1900-1906 under Lord Lugard", argued that the history of the Caliphate and Kano in particular "before 1900 (was) a long toil of wars

and raids, subjugations and tributes."[1] After the conquest and "pacification", law and order and consequently peace were established. By 1906, when the Satiru rebellion was crushed by the colonial troops, "the North's centuries long reputation as a land of turbulance came to an end and peace was permanently established."[2]

In his own thesis, Adamu Fika argued that the war was caused by the need to stop "intertribal wars" and "check the French" and "in the end it was the hostility of the Northern Emirates, particularly Sokoto and Kano, towards Lugard's administration which finally drove the latter to arms."[3] This led to the establishment of a "protectorate" in which the "administration was secularized and humanised in certain fundamental ways" particularly in law, education and taxation.[4] For example, law and order were established as well as

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1. J.S. Hogendorn, The Origins of ....., op.cit., p.14.
2. Ibid., p. 17.
3. Fika, The Political and Economic Re-orientation..... op.cit., p. 146-147.
4. Ibid., p. 165.

"The provision of those requirements, such as means of communication, which would enable the population to satisfy its more basic and elementary needs."[5]

Such appears to be the dominant view. According to C.N. Ubah, the "subjugation" led to the "enunciation of the principles of indirect rule",[6] which among other things, led to "peace and stability" and consequently "economic revolution centred on export of groundnut."[7] It is necessary to make some general comments at once before we go into the details of the war itself. The general impression of wars and turbulence is one which is not only contradicted by the colonial records but also by internal primary sources. A case in point is that a number of colonial agents who traversed the Emirate in the nineteenth century testified to the prevalent peace in the Emirate which allowed them to travel and conduct their business safely.[8] Secondly, slave raids, which are usually cited as examples, were

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5. Ibid. p. 411. See also below p. 316.
6. Ubah, op.cit., p. 345.
7. Ibid., p. 419.
8. See for example, Robinson, Hausaland, op.cit., p.54. H.Barth, op.cit., p. 487 - 489.

certainly prevalent. Their prevalence could, however, only be understood in the context that they were the major means through which the transatlantic slave trade flourished.[9] It would similarly be simplistic to assume that colonial invasion was occasioned by the desire of the British to merely stop slave raids and not principally destroy slave relations in production in favour of the development of capitalist relations. In any case, colonial warfare represented the most major "turbulence", in both its scope and repercussions, and it cannot therefore be explained as pacification-turbulence to stop turbulence(s). It is similarly a tautology to argue that British colonisation is an attempt to save the colonised from German or French colonisation - colonisation to stop colonisation! It was an attempt by Britain to colonise to the exclusion of other colonial powers. In the two subsequent chapters we show how British colonial conquest led to effective British colonial domination: the dismemberment of the aristocracy and the establishment of colonial

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9. Walter Rodney, How Europe Under-developed Africa, London, 1972, p. 103 ff.

political-economic structure. It is needless to argue, as Fika, Ubah and Mogendorn do, that these colonial political structures brought about the establishment of law and order, for every type of political structure brings about the establishment of its own specific system of law and order.

In the subsequent pages we treat the causes, nature and consequences of colonial invasion. We attempt to show that the causes, conduct and consequences of the war are inter-related and inseparable. It is this inter-relationship which makes the whole episode the war that it was - a colonial invasion. Thus, whereas the major causes of the war were related to the obstacles posited by the Emirate's political and economic structure to the establishment of external capitalist control over internal resources, the consequences of the war were such that these major obstacles were largely removed. It is here argued that:

(a) The relationship between the Emirate (albeit the Caliphate) and the European States had, by 1900, developed contradictions whose resolutions necessitated armed conflict - and that was why there was armed conflict. For example, in all the corres-

pondence both from the Caliph and Lord Lugard, there were allusions to peace but the basic interests at stake appeared to have made this impossible.[10] On the one hand one must consider the interests of the European capitalist firms involved in the marketing of manufactured goods produced in their home /country e.g. cotton cloth, iron utensils, salt etc and also desiring to purchase raw materials such as nuts, hides and skins, cotton etc. On the other hand, both the raw materials in question and also the internal market had up to this time been controlled by local handicraft producers. This conflict of interest between internal handicraft producers and European capitalist firms was one of the major causes of the war. Similarly, the slave trade and internal utilization of slaves was a hinderance to prospective European commercial and industrial companies preferring the utilization of cheaper wage labour. Lastly, the political structure was dominated by an aristocracy which had complete control over rights to the land and its resources, trade and labour organisation and was particularly interested in the utilization and sale of slaves,

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10. Adeleye, op.cit., especially the appendices.

promotion of internal manufacturing and trade (for revenues) etc. Thus at the initial stages of the conflict these were largely the causes of the conflict between Kano Emirate aristocracy and the R.N.C. and specifically with respect to control over tfade (financial as well as the imports/exports structure), mineral rights and the slave trade.

(b) The development of the conflict was in turn dictated by the internal political-economic structures of the two states and their relationship. In this respect Britain was economically more developed and, therefore, technologically superior while it was also dominant in its commercial relationship with the Emirate. Its dominant position in commerce (and hence finance) ensured it allies in merchants, and the recruitment of wage-workers as troops, whereas the political and economic nature of the aristocracy (in terms of its basic interests) further limited its ability to mobilise the mass of the population.

(c) The immediate measures taken after the conquest support our explanation of the causes of the war. As is fully discussed in chapter four, these measures were designed to subordinate the Emirate politically and economically to the British capitalist system.

2. THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

In the last chapter, we discussed the political and economic supremacy of the aristocracy over Kano Emirate. We have also shown how relations between the Emirate authority and European trading companies, and travellers, had tended to become more and more hostile towards the close of the nineteenth century. The hostility between the two tended to centre on two basic factors - control over external trade, and the control over land and in particular over mineral rights. In this connection, the claims of the treaties between the R.N.C. and the Caliphate as well as the WAFF proclamations are particularly instructive.[11]

When in 1900 it became clear that the R.N.C. could not handle profitably and successfully the enormous cost of bringing the Caliphate under its control, its Royal charter was abrogated by the British government.[12] In its place a military detachment of the British Empire, directly under the colonial office in London, the Royal West African Frontier Force, was created.[13] Formerly, the

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11. These treaties and proclamations are reproduced as appendices in Adeleye, op.cit. Ikime, op.cit.

12. Backwell, op.cit., p. 2.

13. S.C. Ukpabi, "The West African Frontier Force: an instrument of Imperial Policy 1897-1914," M.A. Thesis, Birmingham, 1964.

R.N.C. constabulary force was under the R.N.C. Board of Directors which constituted the governing council.[14] The RWAFF was the organ that undertook the military conquest of the Emirate. The basic objective of the RWAFF was to wrest control of the Emirate polity for the British State. This goal is clearly illustrated by Lord Lugard's proclamation of 1900 in relation to the Caliphate.[15] In a confidential dispatch dated 23 January 1903, on the eve of the expedition against Kano, Lord Lugard wrote that:

> "the sovereignty of the Crown (with its rights over minerals and land) cannot be recognised unless it is established."[16]

The relationship between the RWAFF and the trading companies in Northern Nigeria does clearly bring out the fact that the RWAFF was established to solve the problems which stood in the way of the British capitalists and

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14. Backwell, op.cit., p. 2.

15. Ikime, op.cit., Appendices I and 2.

16. Colonial Office Reports, on Microfilm available at K.I.L. Library, A.B.U., Zaria, No. 863, p. 265.

prevented them from operating at a profit. Thus, the subjugation of these areas heretofore unsuccessfully attempted by the constabulary force of the R.N.C. was now taken over by the RWAFF, thereby relieving the R.N.C of the costs of establishing their enterprise.

These basic factors have been more obscured than highlighted in secondary works dealing with the area, largely due to the fact that the writers had uncritically reproduced primary sources which in many cases were contradictory, inconsistent and even falsified. The treatment by these writers of the role assigned to the RWAFF by the British government in the conquest of the Emirate is a good illustration of this type of distortion. In this connection there are three major considerations. The first was that this political control was to be established, largely, along the guidelines set out in the proclamations. The second was that the conquest was to be achieved with minimum costs and as far as possible through "peaceful persuasion."[17]

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17. Colonial Office Reports, op.cit., p. 54, where despatches from the colonial office in London were cited urging Lord Lugard to exhaust "all means of arriving at a peaceful settlement."

Thirdly, the British colonial troops were to "protect" this colony from colonisation by any other state but Britain.[18] These considerations, as well as the practical problems of the war, as we shall see, were responsible for the contradictory and sometimes false nature of the colonial correspondences which have been accepted and reproduced as gospel truth by many writers.[19] The contradiction was on the one hand to make the Caliph and the Emir "accept" British colonial domination "peacefully" without resistance, or on the other to "convince" the colonial office that war was "necessary", its costs justifiable and its conduct not such as would alienate potential allies of the British.[20]

Before the attack on Kano, Lord Lugard gave three major reasons for the need to conquer the Emirate. The first of these was a vague reference to the "war policy" and "unjust rule" of the Emir of Kano, Aliyu Babba.[21]

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18. Ibid. p. 60.
19. The falsity of some documents written by Lord Lugard is illustrated numerously by D.J.M. Muffet in his book Concerning Brave Captains, London, 1964. In particular on p. 50 he went to great lengths to show how Lugard, in collaboration with some of his subordinates, forged a letter.
20. Colonial Office Reports, op.cit., p. 54,and pp.245-265.
21. Ibid., p. 552.

Lugard did not mention any specific example, but during the colonial campaigns he made a comment which contradicted his earlier assertion:

> "It is very striking comment on the situation here that although fighting is going on between the British and the Fulani rulers of a district close by, the road I am travelling is as safe as Piccadilly. I met today caravans which must have numbered scores of loaded donkeys, ponies and oxen and flocks of sheep for sale down south numbering many hundreds. These are being taken from Kano itself and the traders I met saluted with smiles and unmistakeable goodwill. Women travel alone along the road and the men are all unarmed except a few normal herdsmen who carried their inevitable spear."[22]

This is despite the fact that in earlier despatches Lord Lugard gave, as reasons for the attack on Kano, the claim that the country was generally far from peaceful and caravans were even prohibited by the Emir from leaving Kano to the South.[23] Such a perspective has been

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22. Ibid., p. 552.
23. Ibid., p. 114.

reproduced by Hogendorn and Fika.[24] The former argued that trade was "virtually impossible" before the "pacification" while the latter ascribed the attack on Kano to the Emirate's "hostility", clearly forgetting that Kano, being on the defensive, could not have been the one "hostile" to those on the offensive.

The second major excuse Lugard gave for the attack on Kano was that the Emir, Aliyu Babba, had sheltered the Magaji of Keffi who had "murdered" Captain Moloney. In a letter he addressed to "Kano People" Lugard stated that:

> "The English white men are coming to Kano; they have no quarrel with any one except with the Magaji of Keffi who murdered a white man and those people who received Magaji with honour. Therefore, let everyone stay in his place in peace and no harm will happen to them and no gun will be fired except against those who fired and desired to fight."[25]

It is notable that Lugard had written to the Colonial Office, just before the attack on Kano maintaining that "disciplinary measures" against the Emirate were necessary.[26]

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24. See above.
25. Colonial Office Reports, op.cit., p. 267.
26. Ibid., p. 267.

The issue of sheltering Magajin Keffi, however, served merely as a pretext, since the formation of RWAFF, the correspondence between the Caliph and Lugard, as well as the conquests of some of the territories within the Caliphate clearly predated, and consequently triggered the Magajin Keffi affair.[27] In any case the Emir of Kano had sheltered Magajin Keffi because he was aware of the activities of the colonialists and the significance of the resistance the Magaji had offered against them. For he had prior knowledge of the R.N.C. letters, the WAFF proclamations and the conquest they had made upon other territories within the Caliphate. Furthermore various Emirates had written to him on the activities of the British in their Emirates prior to the Magaji affair.[28] Finally, during the attack on Kano it was quite clear to the British that the Magaji"and those people who received Magaji with honour" were not in Kano but Sokoto, yet the British proceeded with the conquest of the Emirate. After British colonial troops had occupied Zaria, Lugard claimed that it was necessary to attack Kano in anticipation of the latter's probable attack on colonial troops stationed in Zaria.[29] Once again, this

27. See relevant sections in Adeleye, op.cit.
28. See below, pp. 78-79.
29. Colonial Office Reports, op.cit., p. 52.

merely served as a pretext in view of the fact that the colonial occupation of Zaria clearly set the stage for the British encroachment on Kano Emirate, and the Emir had to embark on precautions against this envisaged encroachment. Similarly the claim that the war was waged due to the need to defend British "border commissioners" and "check the activities of the French"[30] still only serves to emphasize the fact that the war was only a means to promote British colonial interests through protecting its colonial officials and checking its rival colonial powers. From this, it is evidently clear that the British went to war with the Emirate in 1903 to establish colonial political control over the Emirate. It was the realisation of this motive which made the Emir to ignore the false overtures Lord Lugard made to him for "peaceful coexistence,"[31]

3. THE NATURE OF THE WAR

The development of the war, like its causes, was largely determined by, and its success heavily dependent on, the economic relations and consequent inequality

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30. Ibid., p. 60.
31. Backwell, op.cit.,p. 3.

between the British state and the Emirate aristocracy. On the one hand the industrial revolution had ensured the mass production of superior weapons for the British troops. Similarly the increasing commercial and financial predominance of Britain ensured it allies in merchants (and middlemen) tied up to European trade as well as tremendous potentiality to employ wage workers as troops, clerks, spies, porters, etc. Coupled with this was the almost universal experience and training gained by the British state in colonial warfare. On the other hand, and largely due to the centuries old slave trade, the Emirate was relatively under-developed. This was partly responsible for its increasing industrial dependence on European sources particularly for weapons. The aristocracy for its part was torn by patriarchal rivalry over claims to the throne and largely alienated from the mass of the people.

The technical disparity is illustrated in the weapons used as well as the military formation associated with these. This acute problem was further aggravated by the policy adopted by colonial powers of banning the

importation of firearms.[32] Those weapons acquired by the aristocracy through the Arab merchants could not all be used due to lack of trained personnel. It is also obvious that during the campaign one of the drawbacks of the Emirate forces was that shots were "ill-directed."[33] Furthermore such weapons as bows and arrows, spears and swords proved largely useless in a combat that was far from close range. The colonial forces were particularly disposed towards "winning over" traders and giving them special attention and the latter also supported the troops in a number of cases. For example immediately after the conquest, Captain Abadie, the Acting Resident, made each of the headmen of the fourteen quarters in the town responsible for his quarters. In his report he stated:

> "On the questions of importance they (were) all to meet at the house of Mallam Dan Namarawa the most influential man in the town, who has been for 41 years head of the market and caravan quarters and Arab portion .... I have given him authority to catch thieves and criminals and send them to me."[34]

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32. See above, p. 39.
33. Colonial Office Report, op.cit., p. 465.
34. NAK/SNP 17/16976 - Historical document on the Capture of Kano, para. 12.

There are several illustrations of the close relationships between the colonialists and the traders. For instance, a special report was compiled on "the merchant and caravan question".[35] In addition, Morland reports that on the very day of the conquest, he interviewed the leading Arab traders and intended to do the same with the Hausa traders the following day - "they (were) quite quiet", he said.[36] On 10 January 1903, after the colonial troops had occupied Zaria, it was reported that:

> "a number of wealthy merchants and traders are leaving Kano on account of the attitude of the Emir. Several have arrived at Zaria where they know they are safe in spite of the large force assembled there. They are all most friendly disposed towards us."[37]

Lugard even claimed that the Emir decided to fight despite the contrary advice "of the trading section and others."[38] The colonialists in fact never attacked traders or closed trade routes.[39]

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35. Ibid., para. 15.
36. Colonial Office Report, op.cit., p. 467.
37. Ibid., p. 114.
38. Muffet, op.cit., p. 75.
39. Ibid., p. 195.

It is quite obvious from the primary sources that the trading community assiduously avoided any involvement in the resistance mounted against the invasion. On the contrary, under the leadership of a certain Abande, they were heavily involved in attempts to persuade the ruling class to surrender.[40]

The role of the merchants as described above can be explained in part by their dependence on European sources for financial credits and the supply of certain commodities. The financial predominance of the Europeans was one of the factors which made it easy for the European capitalists to establish their hold on other levels e.g. for the recruitment of manpower in the form of troops, porters, clerks, guides and spies. Another factor which facilitated such recruitment was the existence within the Emirate of a ready made body of destitutes and wage seekers. These included "freed slaves", itinerant clerics, bankrupt traders, as well as destituted peasants and artisans.

The WAFF recruited its troops locally from a number of voluntary wage seekers. According to the Commandant Colonel A. Lowry Colo, the "natives of the protectorate"

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40. SNP 17/16976, op.cit., para.708.

were "for purposes of recruiting divided into three classes" - the "ruling race", "traders and farmers" and "the slaves". Although they preferred recruiting farmers and traders, the bulk of the recruits available "consist(ed) largely of runaway slaves" while there were practically none from "the class" indentified as "the ruling races."[41]

In a table dated 29.9.05 showing recruitment into the WAFF the breakdown was given as follows:[42]

Table 2

PATTERN OF RECRUITMENT, WAFF 1905

MONTHS	FREE-MEN	SLAVES	TOTAL	MONTHS	ARTI-SANS	TRA-DERS/ LABOUR-ERS	FARM-ERS	TOTAL
April	17	10	27	April	3	-	24	27
May	80	22	102	May	9	1	92	102
June	68	-	68	June	11	6	51	68
	165	32	197		23	7	167	

41. Ibid., See attached sheet "Reply to report from the Secretary of State, 29th September" 1905, p.2.

42. SNP 15/ACC 23, Inspector General's Report on the Northern Nigeria Regiment and related papers 1902-1905, p. 3.

In a confidential report it was stated that "if there is any difficulty in getting recruits, I would suggest that during the dry season a recruiting party be sent to Loko on the Benue. I understand that many of the caravans pay off their carriers there and perform the rest of their journey by canoe".[43] The Brigade Major, C. Barlow, reported that experiences in Kano had proved that recruits were always forthcoming and added that he was "of the opinion that the pay a soldier receive(d) alone induce(d) a native to enlist."[44] Major F.J. Gunliffe further stated that "the thickly populated districts of Zaria and Kano, furnish the greater proportion" of his battalion.[45] The "deferred pay" of soldiers was said to be "about £30.0.0 which was enough to start them as traders and that was what many discharged soldiers used to become, and they never returned unless their business failed."[46] In the words of Lord Lugard "the native frequently - perhaps generally - enlists in order to earn his deferred pay and gratuity and with this capital to set up as a petty trader."[47]

43. Ibid., "Enclosure to confidential despatch of 29.9.1905 p. 1.
44. Ibid., para. 4.
45. Ibid., para. 3.
46. Ibid., para. 4.
47. Ibid., See enclosed letter by Lord Lugard dated 19 Nov. 1905.

Similarly, the colonial troops employed a number of spies such as Ibrahim, Captain Abadie's spy.[48] Besides, the colonial troops also used their intermediaries such as Adamu Jakada as well as "independent travellers, missionaries and spoftsmen, the employees of the company and other non-officials" as spies.[49] For example, on the eve of the colonial conquest of Kano, Maimaina was sent by the colonial army to spy in Kano. He reported as follows:

> "Why, of course, I had come to Kano was to find out and repoft back to Lokoja whether the rumour was true that the Emir had a well-disciplined army. I was also to discover whether, as was said, he had sent some of his slaves to Lokoja to join the army there who, after their training, had returned to Kano and were now instructing the Emir's men in the arts of European warfare. The Emir was also said to possess immense supplies of rifles and ammunition, which he had bought from Tripoli merchants. I found out that he certainly had a lot of rifles but no disciplined army."[50]

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48. SNP 17/160976, op.cit., attached sheet dated 15 Feb. 1903.
49. Nigerian Army Museum, item 86B.
50. Kirk Greene and Newman, op.cit., p. 143. Also Muffet, op.cit., p. 57.

The rival claimant to the throne, Abdu Lele, son of the ousted Tukur, also supported the imperialists in order to have himself installed Emir by the British and Abadie reported to the high commissioner as follows:

> "There was a man, Abdu, son of Tukur who has sent to me several times from Damagaram, where he had taken refuge, to know if he could come back again to Kano. This man, whose claim to the throne I show on the chart, has now come to Kano having met Major Burdon on the road and come with him. I have taken no official notice of him purposely until your Excellency arrives, but he may be a useful man to have in case none of the others return. He is sure to have a large following in Kano of men who were in office under his father. His elder brother is now at Katsina."[51]

Probably the most important single factor accounting for the success of the British troops was the fact that the Emirate aristocracy was not capable, economically and politically of resisting the British. This could be seen at the level of development of the two societies, the

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51. SNP/17/16976, op.cit., para. 9.

nature of their relationship and the internal crises of the Emirate ruling class. As we have already discussed, the disparity in the level of technological development between the two societies had made the Emirate to become dependent on European sources for a number of vital commodities such as, for example, weapons. Coupled with this was the control over the supply of currency exercised by European companies and thereby resulting in their tremendous influence over that sector of the economy that was becoming capitalised. It was this, as we have shown above, that enabled the invaders to engage a number of traders and wage seekers against the Emirate forces. On the other hand not only did capitalist opposition to the international slave trade weaken one of the major sources of revenue for the Emirate aristocracy, but the latter was torn by patriarchal rivalry which led some sections to support the colonialists in their bid to succeed to the Emirship. Lastly, a number of peasants and slaves, at best, adopted a nonchalant attitude to the invasion. Thus during the resistance not only was the aristocracy divided into those who wanted to surrender and those who wanted to flee, but the staunchest supporters of the resistance were the "slave officials" and certain sections of the peasantry. We now turn to the pattern of this invasion and resistance.

4. THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE EMIRATE

(i) Response of the Emirate Ruling Class

The Emir's reactions to the activities of the RWAFF are reflected in his sheltering of Magaji Dan Yamusa of Keffi in October 1902. Similarly, the collection of letters discovered at the house of Wazirin Sokoto after the conquest in 1903 also show that the Emir was supplied with information on the activities of British troops in certain parts of the Caliphate. Most of these letters were written around March 1902 when the expeditionary forces, under Colonel Morland, reached Gujba.[52] Two letters from the Emir of Jemaari, Mohammed Wabi, reported that the British had captured and deposed the King of Yaiyu.[53] Two letters from the "Emir of Bornu" (Katagum), Abdulkadir, confirmed the capture of Yaiyu and also reported that "Sarkin Bornu" Ahmadu (Emir of Missau) had fled his kingdom.[54] There was a letter from Sarkin Missau confirming his flight.[55] There were also two letters from Magaji Dalhatu, son of the Emir of Zaria,

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52. Backwell, opccit., p.3.
53. Ibid., p. 68.
54. Ibid., p. 69.
55. Ibid., p. 69.

Uthman (1890-97). One of these letters reported that the British had arrived in Zaria and were forcing people to build roads.[56] The second letter reported the various preparations which the colonial troops were making for the invasion of Kano.[57] Aliyu Babba certainly received all these letters as this is confirmed by his own letter to Caliph Attahiru summarising the information he had received from Magaji Dalhatu, Sarkin Katagum, Jemaari and Missau.[58]

In 1902 it was reported that Aliyu sent "a messenger named Dan Kul Kul to Jerabab with a letter and presents asking the Senoussi to pray for him that the whitemen should not enter his country."[59] In another letter to the Caliph, he said,

> "we leave this country all of us - this is my clear conviction -- as these dogs have surrounded us and threaten to overcome us. May Allah grant that your eyes are opened speedily."[60]

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56. Ibid., p. 71.
57. Ibid., p. 68 .
58. Ibid., p. 72.
59. SNP 17/16976, op.cit., para. 17.
60. Backwell, op.cit., p. 72.

It is reported that on the second of January 1903 the Emir left Kano for Sokoto,[61] to visit "the graves of his forebears" at Wurno, since "with the prospects of the Europeans coming he did not know what will befall him, either death or flight."[62] Before his departure he made some arrangements for the defence of the Emirate in general and the city in particular. Although he had gone with all the headmen and "their retainers from the western area of his Emirate ... and every single office holder of note"[63] as well as the Magaji of Keffi and his forces, he left some for the "defence". The town was left in the hands of (a) Sarkin Shanu, (b) Mallam Ibrahim - Sarkin Gherko, military adviser and in charge of wall defence (c) 'King' of Kunchi, and (d) Sallama. The last two were to mobilise peasants for the resistance. Similarly, Sarkin Gaya and the headmen of southern villages and towns were ordered to hold Bebeji - one of the principal towns on the Kano-Zaria border.[64]

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61. SNP 17/16976, op.cit., para. 2.
62. Muffet, op.cit., pp.95-96.
63. Ibid., p. 99.
64. SNP 17/16976, op.cit., para. 6.

(ii) Colonial War Preparations against the Emirate.

The preparations for the expeditions against the Emirate were both detailed and meticulous. Even though Lord Lugard and his subordinates worked them out they were approved and sanctioned by the Colonial Office.[65]

The main body for the attack of Kano (Emirate) was under the command of Colonel T.L.N. Morland D.S.O. The composition of the expeditionary force was given as follows:[66]

A. 1. Commanding expedition - Col. T.L.N.Morland, D.S.O.
2. 2nd in Command -Lt.Col. C.H.Festing,C.M.G., D.S.O.
3. Staff Officer - Major T.A. Cubitt.
4. Orderly Officer - Capt. R.E. Skeffington Smyth.
5. Chief Transport Officer - Capt. Wallbach
- 1 officer
- 1 N.C.O.

B. Royal Artillery:
No. 1 Battery - 2 officers, 1 N.C.O, 40 R. & F. and 2 MM guns.
No. 2 - 1 officer, 30 R.&F. and 2 MM guns.

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65. The totality of the records of correspondence between the colonial office and the troops confirm this.

66. Colonial Office Reports, op.cit., confidential despatch of 15 January 1903, p. 162.

C. Infantry:

1. Commanding - Lt. Col. A. McClintock, D.S.O.

2. Adjutant - Capt. M.A. Kempthorne

(a) 1st Battalion: 10 Officers, 4 NCOs, 3 Maxims, 450 R & F, 3 Companies.

(b) 2nd Battalion: 9 Officers, 8 NCOs, 4 Maxims, 470 R & F, 4 companies.

D. Mounted Infantry:

3 officers, 1 N.C.O. and 100 R & F.

E. Field Treasurer and Camp Quarter Master:

Lieut. & Quarter Master D. Lees.

F. Medical: Dr. W.R. Langley, 2 Medical Officers and 2 Medical N.C.Os.

Apart from this force it was said that "Captain Merrick, who (had) 250 men and a 75 MM gun (had) been ordered to take a strong defensive position near Argungu, which (would) be impregnable to attack by Sokoto."[67] Similarly, the colonial office alerted troops of Lagos, Southern Nigerian and Gold Coast to act as reserves.[68]

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67. Muffet, op.cit., p. 76 .

68. Colonial Office Report, op.cit.,p. 47.

(iii) Bebeji Encounter

Morland and his troops left Zaria on the 29 January 1903. Their destination was obviously Kano City - the capital of Kano Emirate. Although not much information is available on what determined which routes they took, this can be surmised from the military surveys and reports. From the reports, it appears that the political and economic significance of towns was quite important for they were related to administration, commerce and direction of trade routes. Not only did Bebeji have these attributes but it was also a border town between Zaria and Kano.[69] On February 1, Morland's troops arrived at Bebeji, 41 miles from Zaria. In the ensuing battle it was reported that 30 people were killed on the defenders side "including the King and 2 chiefs" while on the invaders side Lieut. Wright and two privates were "seriously wounded".[70]

(iv) The Conquest of Kano City

On the 3rd of February, Morland left a number of carriers at a camp situated 16 miles from the capital. These were defended by wire entanglements, 3 officers and 75 men.

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69. Nigerian Army Museum Zaria, item 86B, p. 212.
70. Colonial Office Reports, op.cit., p. 464.

At about 8.00 a.m. the force moved for the attack against Kano City. Morland's estimation of the force defending the town was put at 800 horsemen and 3,000 footmen. In the course of the battle it seems that the colonial troops found it particularly impossible to scale or batter down the walls and gates and therefore Lt. Dyer had to make an opening at "a gate half a mile further to the west." It was also reported that the Emirate forces kept up a "heavy though ill-directed fire". Morland reported that their casualties were Lt. Dyer and Lt. Farquhar wounded as well as 12 other men six of whom were wounded from gunshots.[71]

The casualties on the sidd of the Emirate were reported by Morland as 300 killed and the Sarkin Shanu died defending the palace.[72] The King of Kunchi, M. Ibrahim and Sallama fled to join the Emir at Sokoto with about 100 horsemen.[73] Similarly, the King of Gaya and some village headmen were said to have fled to Gwarmo and "thence with about 300 to 400 horsemen joined Aliyu."[74] It was also reported that the "Kings" of Jahun, Aujora and Dawaki had left with what headmen they had and that they

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71. Ibid., p.467-468.
72. Ibid., p. 467.
73. Ibid., p. 468.
74. SNP 17/16976, op.cit., para. 6.

had all gone westwards into Katsina country.[75] Abadie's spy, Ibrahim, reported that many men, numbering about 1000-1500 horsemen were running from Kano to Sauri to join the Emir.[76] While these members of the resistance movement were fleeing to join up with the Emir, Captain Abadie set about the administration of the town as well as "enquiring" for somebody to head the Native Administration.[77]

(v) The battle of Kwatarkwashi and the final defeat of the Emirate forces.

Aliyu Babba received the news of the capture of Kano City from a messenger at Maru while he was on his way back from Sokoto.[78] At Birnin Goga the Emir met Sallaw, who had escaped with the Emir's wife, Kabura, after the capture of the capital. Before dawn the Emir, Aliyu, his wife and five servants fled towards the east.[79] However, Aliyu did not get far. He was detained by the King of Gobir at Chiberi -"close to the frontier, near Maradi". The King of Gobir sent to Lord Lugard informing

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75. Ibid., p. 1.
76. Ibid., p. 2.
77. SNP 17/16876, op.cit. para. 7.
78. Muffet, op.cit. p. 100.
79. Ibid., p. 101.

him of Aliyu's presence. Lord Lugard in turn sent Captain Foulkes to arrest Aliyu. After his arrest, Aliyu was exiled to Lokoja by the colonialist forces where he died in 1926.[80]

The resistance force was therefore led by Waziri and Sallama together with the support of some district heads. Others in the resistance included Dan Rimi, Sankira, Usman Mabudi, Wombai Abbas and Chiroma Abdulkadir, Aliyu's son.[81] Magajin Koffi Yamusa on the other hand collected his men and left for Sokoto.[82] It appears that forces were being formed in various parts of the Emirate, either to join up with the Emir at Kwatarkwashi or to attack advancing colonial troops. The major detachment of the colonial troops was under General Kemball, who was also the commander of the general operation. There was also a division under Colonel Morland and two others, - one under Captain Porter and the other under Lts. Wright and Wells. On the 25 February, the troops under Kemball and Porter arrived at Kamanne road and fought a group of men who where said to have left Modamawa that morning to join up with the Emir.[83]

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80. Ibid., pp.135-137.
81. Ibid., p. 124.
82. Ibid., p. 103.
83. Colonial Office Reports, op.cit., p. 667.

On the 25th of February, the division under Lts. Wright and Wells, consisting of mounted infantry men, who were heading for Kwatarkwashi claimed to have encountered "an advance party of about 200 men" which they "successfully repelled". They were also said to have been attacked by a certain chief on the caravan route to Rawaiya.[84] These series of ambushes certainly disprove the reports usually sent to the Colonial Office by Lord Lugard to the effect that "every where" people hailed and welcomed the arrival of the colonial forces.

It was not however before 1 p.m., on the 2$th of February, that the division under Lts. Wright and Wells met with the main body of the resistance force at Kwatarkwashi. After this battle most of the leaders "Sallama, Waziri, Mabudi, and Yamu - the son of Waziri died."[85] Lt. Wright put the defenders' losses at 65 horsemen died. Among those were "the Waziri and 10 prominent chiefs."[86] A number of defenders therefore fled. The British government awarded a Victoria Cross to Captain Wright. With this conquest the Emirate aristocracy was effectively defeated by the colonialists.

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84. Muffet, op.cit., p. 119.
85. Ibid., p. 123.
86. Ibid., p. 117.

(vi) The Surrender and Installation of Wombai Abbas as Head of the Native Administration.

Wombai Abbas managed to escape from Kwatarkwashi, and thence fled to Jazai in Katsina.[87] Together with 2,050 horsemen and 5,000 footmen he surrendered to Lord Lugard on the 6 March 1903. There were conflicting explanations surrounding this surrender. Lugard reported that Wombai "sent a messenger with a letter notifying (him) of his willingness to come back."[88] It also seems that the colonialists had already decided to install Wombai Abbas as the head of what later came to be the Native Authority. One report stated that after the battle of Kwatarkwashi the colonialists sent a letter to Wombai Abbas who was then at Malikawa through "Adamu Jakada, a man called Mairumfa and another called Inua" to the effect that he would be the next "Emir of Kano". It is also possible that this was in response to the earlier letter claimed by Lord Lugard to have been written by Aliyu. In any case Wombai Abbas was subsequently installed as the first head of the Native Authority.[89]

The colonial war was a political contest between the British and the aristocracy. With the defeat of the latter the British gained political control over the Emirate.

87. Ibid., p. 125.
88. Colonial Office Reports, op.cit., p. 669.
89. Muffet, op.cit., p. 125.

The British secured effective political subordination of Kano with the installation of Abbas as head of the Native Administration. How subordinate the position of the so called Emir was is illustrated by the fact that in 1908 Wombai Abbas was said to have written an Arabic letter to the Resident which read,

> "This is to bring to your notice that at present I have nothing to do; and I would like you to give me some proper work to do - formerly I was nobody, before the whitemen made me a king - now that I am sitting down doing nothing I always feel sick - and as you are the big white men I trust you would give me some strong work to do that will please the government - I have already rolled up the sleeves of my gown waiting to start the work you will give me."[90]

(vii) The battle of Burmi: Resistance under the Caliph.

When Sokoto was defeated and occupied by colonial troops under the command of Morland on the 15 March 1903, the Caliph, Attahiru Ahmad I, fled to the East. His

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90. SNP 15/ACC 381 Letter from Sarkin Abbas to the Resident saying that he wants work to do. "I have rolled up the sleeves of my gown;" with a pencilled minute by the Resident on the answer which was returned to him.

flight started a mass exodus and resistance which was concluded at Burmi. It has to be noted that the defeat of Sokoto marked the effective subjugation of the Caliphate.

Although the Caliph's resistance provided the toughest opposition to colonial warriors, it appears that the Caliph was more preoccupied with flight rather than military resistance.

It was on the 20th of March that the Caliph entered Kano territory.[91] In his company were various office holders from Sokoto and the Magajin Koffi, Yamusa. A number of office holders from Kano e.g. Madakin Kano, Alkalin Kano, Chiroma Musa of Kano, Sarkin Rogo, followed him. After the battle the following officials from Kano were identified - Dan Buram, Chiroma Musa, Sarkin Duse (Dutse), Sarkin Dorki (Garki), Sarkin Karaye, Sarkin Keffi Musa, Limamin Zangaya (Limamin Tsangaya) and Limamin Wudil.[92] In fact it was partly due to this exodus of the Emirate officials that the colonial administration was worried. For example, Dr. Cargill, the Resident, reported that he met the Emir, Abbas, who was

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91. SNP 15/1/ACC p.57, Mr. Tompol's report on the circumstances ATTENDING THE FLIGHT, PURSUIT, AND DEATH OF ATTAHIRU I SULTAN OF SOKOTO, 8th August, 1903, para.1

92. Ibid., para. 31.

"quite loyal, but anxious; and says that some of the Kano princes are dissaffected and awaiting developments. I had them called together and informed them that anyone joining the movement whould have his property confiscated. They all professed loyalty", and the Emir sent out a circular of warning to the effect that anybody who left his farm or town to follow Attahiru would be punished on his or her return.

The colonial reports are also full of evidence that the Caliph enjoyed a large following of the people' - "peasants, women and children. One of the strategies of the colonial troops was to keep on "harassing" the Caliph so that he could not settle in one place and thereby raise up a formidable force while at the same time sending back refugees going to join the Caliph.[93] In pursuit of the Caliph were troops under Major Plummer from Bauchi; Captain Sword from Kano; Captain Browne from Gujba; Majof Barlow from Zaria and further reinforcements from Bauchi under Temple.[94]

Despite the political-economic odds, however, it is clear that the mass support of the Caliph and the tactics they adopted enabled them not only to prolong the resistance,

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93. SNP 15/1/ACC 57, op.cit.para. 15-16.
94. Muffet, op.cit., p. 172 ff.

but to, in some cases, inflict defeat on the colonialist forces. On the 12th of May, Captain Sword was defeated by a force under Imam Musa at Burmi.[95] Although the Imam died during the battle the inhabitants of the town rallied around Attahiru who had moved there from Dutsen Bima. Again when on the 1st of June Major Barlow's force attacked Burmi it was repelled and chased by the Caliph's army to Ashaka.[96] Then from the 18th of June to the 22nd the Caliph's forces launched two attackes by night and one in the daytime on Major Barlow's forces at Ashaka. In these clashes the town was burnt down.[97]

On the 27th of July at 11.30 a.m., Burmi was attacked by a combined force of colonial troops consisting of "two political and 19 military officers, 3 British N.C.Os, 2 M.Os, 445 rank and file infantry, four maxims, sixty rank and file mounted infantry and fifteen rank and file R.A. with one 75 MM Gun."[98] The fight ended "towards eight O'clock at night". The Caliph and a number of the defenders were killed.[99] With this defeat the major powers of resistance to the British by the forces of the Caliphate and the Emirate were effectively broken.

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95. Ibid.
96. SNP 15/1/ACC 57, op.cit., para. 14.
97. Ibid., para. 14.
98. Ibid., para. 26.
99. Ibid., para. 31.

5. CONCLUSION

The immediate measure taken by the colonial forces after the conquest was to announce and establish the basic colonial principles which would guide and direct colonial control over the territory. These principles were read to the defeated aristocrats and a translated copy of the proclamation posted in Kano for the people's attention. The content of this is, as we have indicated above, related to the content of the R.N.C. "treaties" essentially outlining the principles of colonial political-economic domination as treated in the following chapter. It is clear that control over Kano polity and its resources were the causes and goal of colonial warfare. Those who have argued that the scramble and rivalry between the European colonial powers were the causes of colonisation have tended to forget that this scramble and rivalry were caused as a result of the drive to colonise.[100] Similarly, to argue that it was to stop the slave trade does not state why the slave trade had to be stopped. It is also clear that claims made by Lugard were only excuses to implement decisions which had already been arrived at in British parliamentary circles.

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100. See for example, L.H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960 Vol.IV especially the introduction.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COLONIAL STATE AND ITS ROLE IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF KANO COLONIAL ECONOMY.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter we have treated the conquest of the Emirate by the British colonial army - the RWAFF. In this chapter we will attempt to show the significance of this colonial military conquest in terms of the colonial framework established and how through this the coloniser created the basic foundations of economic dependence. There are two major problems associated with the reconstruction attempted in this chapter. The first is the nature and character of the colonial state itself. One central feature of the colonial administration in Kano, typified by the Residents, District Officers and Native Authority, was its relationship to the protectorate (colonial) government headed by the Governor-General and thence through this to the colonial office in London through the Secretary of State. This in turn was subordinated to the British Imperialist State. As such it was a state which was externally determined and geared towards executing decisions externally formulated. On the other hand the development of the colonial economy in turn

led to further expansion of the colonial state in regulating and controlling such activities.

The second problem is related to sources. The bulk of the source material on colonial policy are the colonial archival records which do not include any significant information on the purposes or functions of such measures as fiscal policy, customs and tariffs etc. Similarly, there is virtually no information on the relationships between the administrators, traders, peasants and farmers, artisans, pastoralists, colonial companies and labourers in the context of such policies. The administrative records are also impaired by the cautious regard of the administrators to the reactions of the governor and parliament.[1] Lastly, the destruction of administrative records dating from 1903 to the end of 1906 by Resident Dr. Gargill, who was said to have gone a bit "touchy" in the head, has not helped matters. Although there is no

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1. NAK/SNP 7/472/1901 Annual Report for 1908. Correspondence between the governor and the resident on the Dawaki tax revolt seemed to have been extremely guarded. For example the Governor wrote that, "It was discovered that taxation was increased from £3,000 to £30,000" and the Governor seemed concerned that the matter should be covered so as not to attract "parliamentary investigations"; "The people are said to have been truculent and the troops forebearing. It is fortunate the truculence did not go further. 1,000% addition to rentals would produce more than truculence in any other farming population."

specific study (within a general political and economic framework) dealing with the role of the colonial state in the economy, this role could be discerned from various writings. This is particularly noticeable in the primary sources written by colonial administrators.[2] These primary sources have in turn had considerable influence on, in fact have dictated, the secondary works that have been written especially on the general framework of the colonial system.[3] Due to the apparent consensus of these sources, there has come to be established a stereotype explanation of colonialism in this area. In summary the view is that the colonial state was an indirect rule administration - British colonial officials ruling through indigenous native officials and institutions. The role of such an administration in the economy was both light

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2. See Lord Lugard, Political Memoranda, London, 1918 of Revision of Instructions to Political Officers on subjects chiefly political and administrative, London, 1919.
   F.D.Lugard The dual mandate in British tropical Africa, London, 1922.
   C.L.Temple, Native Races and their rulers, Cape Town, 1918. For a good compilation of such major colonial documents, see also A.H.M. Kirk Greene (ed. & introduced by) The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected Documents 1900-1947. London, 1965. The policies embodied in these are in turn reproduced, in bits and pieces, in various colonial reports, despatches, minutes, circulars, directives, etc. as in the Annual Reports, blue books, confidential reports, etc.

3. See relevant sections in bibliographical notes below.

and limited (i.e. laissez-faire) to peace, law and order as well as the provision of infrastructure. The colonial economy, on the other hand, was propelled by free competititon and was characterized by its import-export structure, alongside which was a gradual development of industrialisation. This colonial economy, furthermore, was divided into two sectors. The first under the colonial government and meant for the promotion of public welfare was the public sector. The second was the private sector made up of free, competing individuals in the economy.[4]

The first problem of these studies, as we have indicated earlier, is the conception of the colonial state. Although the colonial administration in the colony was impoftant, it cannot be seen in isolation from the Colonial Office and the state in Britain. Secondly, the argument of law and order, established by the State, is rather tautological, for every state has got to have and maintain law and order. It is the content and purpose of this law and order which is at issue. Thirdly, the ability of the colonial state to impose and maintain law and order does not appear to have

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4. Hopkins, opcit., especially chapter 5.

represented peace for those dominated unless it is being argued that the British conquest, suppression of uprisings and resistances of the local population was the imposition of of peace, law and order.

On the other hand it is difficult to comprehend how direct military conquest can lead to an indirect domination (or "rule"). It is obvious that the British created the Native Authority directly and employed its officials not as independent units but as subordinate executive agents. As for infrastructure, it is difficult to see how this could be developed without, in the first place, the pre-conditions for developing it, or how it could create a new type of economy. It can only connect various centres of production in a given manner and direction. Similarly, although import and export are very important indicators of the colonial economy, they do not in themselves graphically define the colonial economy or its basis. Lastly, the colonial government, although utilising public funds for its activities, was not concerned with the promotion of public welfare. The public was in the main the colonised population and the activities of the colonial government were largely geared towards serving the interests of colonial companies.

It is here shown that the central role of the colonial state was to subordinate the colony to the British capitalist economy. In this process the subordination of the former Emirate state through its loss of sovereignty facilitated the subordination of the merchant class and consequently the productive classes - the peasantry, artisans and wage labourers. The revenue accruing to the colonial government as a result of this subordination was in turn used in maintaining and expanding the administration, investing a part in Britain while another part was used for the development of various facilities such as communication and transport, training institutions etc., which served to entrench the administration as well as create more conducive and profitable conditions for the operations of colonial companies. The crucial factor determining the colonial economy was the control exercised on the internal manufacturing and agricultural sectors. The major instruments in achieving this were the colonial troops and policies; currency, taxation, land tenure, and labour.

2. THE INCORPORATION OF THE EMIRATE INTO THE COLONIAL POLITICAL SYSTEM.

(i) The establishment of the colonial state and its major policies.

The colonial military conquest of the Emirate in February 1903 laid the basis for the establishment of the colonial legal system, outlining the kind of society to be created as seen by the conquerors. In his speech, read to some sections of the Kano aristocracy, (a similar version of which was read at Sokoto on the 20th March 1903) Lugard stated the major politics that were to inform the colonial administration as follows:[5]

(a) Every 'Sultan' and 'Emir and the principal officers of state will be appointed by the high commissioner...

(b) All land and mineral rights were vested in the British crown.

(c) The coinage of the British will be accepted as Legal Tender.

(d) Taxation was to be levied and collected on behalf of the colonial state. Traders were

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5. Kirk Greene, op.cit., pp.43-45. Also see Film No.96937 re: 52, Group Two; Lord Lugard "Protectorate of Northern Nigeria 1906-1913 Annual Reports published by E.P. Microfilm Ltd., London, 1974. Available K.I.L., A.B.U., Zaria, p. 93.

not to be taxed by the Native Authority but only the protectorate government.

(e) Capturing and transactions in slaves were forbidden. Domestic slavery was left to continue.[6]

The former Kano Emirate was incorporated as a division within Kano Province.

(ii) The Creation of the Kano Native Authority

The Native Authority was the arm concerned with the day to day administration of the colony. The actual position of the Native Authority was explicitly stated in the Political Memoranda:

> "The Native chiefs thus recognised were not to be regarded as independent rulers. They were the delegates of the Governor whose representative was the Resident. The central government reserved to itself the sole right to raise and control armed forces, to impose taxation of any kind, to make laws and to dispose of such lands as are under native law and custom vested in the paramount power. These limitations, were

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6. Ibid., p. 93.

specifically set out in the letter of appointment under which each chief of the higher grades held his office."[7]

Furthermore, Lord Lugard stated that:

"Apart from these four main limitations, there are others which are expressed or inferred in the ordinances. Thus the disposal of the annual revenue of the Native Authority, the appointment and dismissal of the important chief and officers of the Native Authority and indeed all the important executive acts of a native ruler, though emanating from himself are subject to the guidance and advice of the Resident."[8]

All appointments in territorial administration became subordinated to the colonial government and this formed the basis of the Native Authority. Wambai Abbas who surrendered to the British on 1st April, 1903, was installed as the new Emir by Lugard after he had sworn

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7. Ibid., p. 93.
8. Ibid., p. 77.

the oath of allegiance.[9] He was presented with the staff of office - a dagger as well as "a letter of appointment from Great Britain."[10] Similarly, the officials who died on the battle fields, absconded or opposed the colonial government were replaced by those who accepted the colonial government's terms of office. For example, Salihi, a junior brother to Abbas, was appointed as the district head of Kura and in Rano, Ismail replaced the Sarkin Rano who fled to Burmi.[11] The effects of these changes were, firstly, to dislodge those officials (of the former Emirate) such as Sarkin Yaki, Sarkin Shanu, Barde etc., from the services which were no longer needed by the colonial government.[12] Secondly, the dominant lineages constituting the aristocracy ceased to have control over land and lost most of their "fiefs", except those which were assigned to particular offices such as the "Emirs", the "Alkalis" and members of the

9. The oath of allegiance was said to have run as follows: "I swear, in the name of Allah and Mohammed his prophet to serve well his Majesty King Edward VII, and his representative the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, to obey the laws of the protectorate and the lawful commands of the High Commissioner, of the Resident, provided that they are not contrary to my religion.... So may Allah judge me". See Lady Lugard, "A Tropical Dependency," London, 1906, p. 457.
10. Ibid., p. 456.
11. NAK/SNP/1267/1909 op.cit., Maps on p. 1.
12. Lord Lugard, Protectorate of... op.cit., p. 796.

"Emirs Council".[13] As a result most of the colonial Native Authority officials came to depend on the share from taxes allocated to them by the government and in a few cases the income from the lands attached to their offices.[14] Related to this is the fact that the new administrative changes destroyed a number of former Emirate tax collectors or Jakadu; according to Resident C.L. Temple, for every district assessed not only was there "a map", a "census", and an "assessment" but also "one Jakada abolished."[15] The newly created offices of the 'Emir' and his council, district heads, village heads, ward heads and alkalai had Arabic Mallams assigned to them to serve as clerks.[16] This new administration would appear to have increased the number of administrative staff over

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13. Ibid., p. 796. There is also evidence that estates or gandaye not attached to offices were subjected to tax. Similarly, lands of "dignitaries" formerly exempted from taxation were subjected to tax. See NAK/SNP 7/ 3272/1009 Kano Province, Kano district assessment by H.Q. Glenny.

14. Lord Lugard, op.cit., p. 801. Other forms of revenue which used to accrue to the aristocracy such as kurdin garuta (accession fees), gado, gaisuwa as well as court fees and fines were diverted to the Native Treasury.

15. Ibid., pp. 611-612.

16. Skinner, op.cit., pp. 65-67.

and above that of the former Emirate. Apart from the Resident, District Officers and the Native Authority officials, it was reported that village heads used their own "Jakadu - employing large staffs or servants to do the work for which they themselves are being paid. Needless to say these do not do the work for nothing and look for their remuneration to what they can exact from the peasantry."[17] It was even said that they were collecting "illicit tax."[18] On the other hand the ousted Jakadu were replaced by "paid messangers".[19] There was also evidence of "sales of village appointments". For example, it was reported that the district head of Gaya made "over £1,000 from sales of village appointments during the first quarter of 1920."[20]

Thus through the opposition of the colonial state to slave labour and its control over land and taxation it effectively transformed the former Emirate aristocracy into a dependent, salaries executive colonial bureaucracy.[21]

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17. Kanprof 140/1918, Kano Province Report for 1917, para. 8-9.
18. Ibid., para. 10.
19. SNP 10/9/120/1921, op.cit., para. 14.
20. Ibid., para. 14.
21. Lord Lugard, Protectorate of ..., op.cit., p. 750, Table 2.

(iii) Functions of the Native Authority

The essential functions of the Native Authority were the collection of taxes, maintenance of law and order as well as the marshalling of forced labour.[22] It had no connection whatsoever with legislation. According to Lugard: "the Native Authority is the executive power, as distinct from the native courts (the judicial power)".[23] The Emir was to draft as orders such colonial policies as cotton growing, veterinary work, etc., "in the shape of rules under the Native Authority ordinance, to be enforced by the Emirs judicial council."[24] In connection with forced labour it was reported "that in practice the powers to call out labour would be exercised through the Native Authority - an important point in this connection."[25] It was the enforcement of these various legislations through the Native Authority that was to effect the subordination of the merchants and the productive classes.

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22. See Fika, op.cit., ch. 2.
23. Kirk Greene, op.cit., p. 74.
24. SNP 10/316p 1920 Kano Province Report, para 3. Also 416p/1920, para. 6.
25. Kanprof ND (Confidential 83) Forced Labour 1931, p. 13.

3. COLONIAL CURRENCY, TAXATION AND DISTRICT REORGANISATION

Colonial taxation was characterized by four definite features. Firstly, it came to be paid only in colonial currency. Secondly, throughout the period of colonial domination, it was becoming increasingly heavier than the former taxes. Thirdly, it was discriminatory, particularly to peasants, pastoralists, labourers and independent internal merchants. Fourthly, it was characteristically and progressively imposed on the basis of individual adult males and not households. It led to a situation in which currency was available from the colonial companies and state and was needed by the taxpaying peasants, pastoralists, merchants and artisans. This contributed immensely to the production of raw materials for export, the circulation of British currency, the development of a wage labour force, peasant indebtedness and the increasing privatisation of communally owned land, as well as the accumulation of large revenues.

(i) Introduction of Sterling Currency

Immediately after the conquest, the colonial state fixed the rate of exchange between silver coins and cowrie shells at one shilling to 1,200 cowries. Simultaneously,

the importation of the Maria Theresa Dollar was abolished. In 1904, the importation of cowries was also abolished.[26] Stalls for the exchange of coins and cowries were set up in the markets while the payment of caravan tolls up to 1907 was largely made in silver coins.[27] This, together with the payment of troops, police, carriers and later railway and mineworkers, salaried administrators, taxation etc., laid the basis for a fuller financial integration of the Emirate into the British colonial system.

(ii) 1903 Caravan Tax Proclamation, Customs and Tariffs

The caravan toll proclamation of 1903 deprived the aristocracy of this form of revenue. Although there were intermediaries of the colonial trading companies, such as Adamu Jakada, before the conquest, most of the indigenous traders were virtually independent of foreign control and based on the exports of internal manufactures of leather-goods, cotton cloth and foostuff e.g. livestock as well as imports and re-imports of such items as natron, salt,

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26. Skinner, op.cit., p. 73.
27. Lord Lugard, Protectorate of ..., op.cit., p. 129.

horses, kolanuts, blades, etc.[28] They also imported such raw materials as cotton, indigo, iron ore, copper, etc.[29] Although mostly attached to various European financiers, the Arab merchants, on the other hand, were not under the sole control of British capitalists.[30]

The effect of the imposition of colonial currency, caravan tolls, customs and tariffs as well as the predominance of colonial trading companies was to effectively subordinate all traders to the latter. The levy on caravans was 5% for every province traversed by a caravan up to a maximum of 3 provinces i.e. 15%, and this was largely paid in cash.[31] The colonial government claimed that this facilitated the spread of coins which "circulated more in Kano City than in any other part of the protectorate."[32] Up to 1904, caravan tolls were levied only on "down" caravans i.e. caravans carrying "native produce" to the south.[33] Consequently, traders

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28. Ibid., p. 119. Local Trade was given in four categories, all being virtually in internal produce and goods imported from other parts of West Africa e.g., cloth, livestock, leather works, kolanuts, potash, salt, cotton, textiles, etc.
29. Ibid., p. 120.
30. Ibid.
31. Lord Lugard, Protectorate of ..., op.cit.,p.129.
32. Ibid.,p. 298.
33. Ibid., p. 293.

complained to the Resident that the taxation "operated against native manufacturers as well as against various classes of traders."[34] The new proclamation of 1905 therefore exempted all caravans taking native produce for export overseas from tolls. The taxation therefore helped to promote colonial export and import trade only. By the end of 1905, merchants in Lagos were complaining that the cafavans no longer reached the coast while in Kano various Arab merchants were complaining of the "excessive nature of the caravan tolls."[35] To prevent attempts made by caravans to evade the payment of caravan tolls, the colonial government used troops to pursue and capture them.[36]

The customs post created on the Northern frontiers with the French territory in 1903 collected £544 for the year 1903-1904, while in the year 1907-1908 this rose to £3,435.[37] In the report for 1913 it was stated that:

> "of the 14 cases (tried in the Northern Frontier) 12 were for smuggling over the frontier or in connection with the breaches of the Custom

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34. Ibid., p. 393.
35. Ibid., p. 424.
36. Kano Province Annual Report for 1907, para. 72.
37. Ibid., para. 47.

Management Act. It has been found that confiscation of the salt smuggled across the Frontier does not act as a special deterrant and the more drastic penalty of confiscation of transport animals has had to be enforced in bad cases; for it is on the dyed cloths of Kano for which the importer barters his salt that his profit is made."[38]

By the time the caravan tolls were stopped in 1907, and the collection of customs due in 1913, it was said that the trade across the desert had been "practically extinct for 3 years."[39] The loss of revenue to government, as a result of the abolition of the customs station, was about £30,000 per annum. It was suggested at the time that some of this would be made up "by assessing more highly ... those who no longer (had) to pay these duties."[40] Up to 1920, "there were plans to impose ... a super tax on the wealthier people of the town" which had been postponed from year to year owing to lack of staff to implement it."[41]

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38. Kanprof 606/1913, Report No. 42, para. 37.
39. Kanoprof 95/1914, Report for 1913 No.46, para. 84.
40. Ibid., para. 43.
41. SNR/10/316p 1920 Kano Province Report, half year ending June, para. 7-8.

By 1921, ten such Attajirai were assessed.[42] The discriminatory nature of this form of colonial taxation was clearly expressed by Lord Lugard in a sharp reaction to protests by the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce. In a letter dated January 1918 and addressed to the Acting Secretary of African Trade Section of the Chambers, he stated:

> "you are no doubt aware that European merchants at Kano and elsewhere in the Northern province are at present exempted from income tax which is imposed on the natives of the country, neither do they pay any other form of taxation (except

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42. SNP 9/357/1021, Kano City increase of tax for 1921-22. Assessment report by Harris A.D.O., Appendix D., where the list of tax assessed was given as follows:

1.	Alhaji Dantata		£22- 5 - 0
2.	Sharubutu Dan Abubakar		
	- Kurdin Sana'o	£13-12-0	
	- Kurdin Gona	3- 4-0	
	Total		£16-16-0
3.	Mai Kano Agogo (including general)		20- 0-0
4.	Sadra Ben Sal.	" "	8-12-0
5.	Sadiq Ghenaba	" "	12- 4-0
6.	Ibrahim Baima	" "	8-19-0
7.	Yayaya Ousman	" "	6- 4-0
8.	Damino Ousman	" "	6- 4-0
9.	Aki Abubakar	" "	4- 0-0
10.	Musa Falalu	" "	4- 0-0

the indirect taxes which are transferred to the native producer and consumers)."[43]

Furthermore, attempts were made to induce the caravan traders going north to use the Kano-Zungeru-Lagos route instead. These attempts, however, failed.[44] In 1905, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, Lugard had promised "to divert the trade principally to the south" and the Resident in Kano was ordered to buy hides and skins, untanned, and send them to the coast.[45] Alongside these were the development of new trades in the colony, for example, the supply of provisions and necessities to troops and government employees were only conducted in cash. There were also traders carrying grains and other food items such as kuli-kuli to railway and mine workers.[46] On its part, the colonial government disposed of the grains it had collected as tax in kind by using it to feed its troops and the rest were sent to the mines at Bauchi and Naraguta or to Zaria.[47] Cowries derived from revenues by the government were disposed of through purchase of cotton,

43. SNP 11/950[m]/1917 Chamber of Commerce Liverpool protest against government methods in granting leases of land in Northern Provinces, para. 4.
44. Lord Lugard, Protectorate..., op.cit., p.
45. Ibid., p. 429.
46. Skinner, op.cit., p. 39.
47. See NAK/SNP 7/3835/1910 Kano Province Report for June 1910, para. 94.

hides, sheanuts, etc., which were transported to Zungeru and sold to the colonial companies "at a profit".[48] The colonial government also engaged in trade through the Crown Agents.[49] Such were the major factors which gradually transformed the long distance traders into the intermediaries of the colonial trading companies.

(iii)Land Revenue Proclamations and Policy, 1904.

Direct taxation of producers-peasants, pastoralists, artisans and labourers fell under the kharaji (land tax) jangali (or cattle tax), compound, industrial and labour taxes. The land revenue proclamation of 1904 provided the legal sanction for the colonial government to collect a quarter of the taxes from land produce as well as a half of the jangali which it had already started collecting in 1903.[50] The share from land tax, kurdin kasa, was raised to a half in 1906. The major taxes at the early stages were kurdin kasa, zakka, jangali, shuke-shuke and karofi: (The last two were dropped in 1909 and replaced

48. Lord Lugard, Protectorate of..., op.cit., p. 423.
49. Ibid., p. 310.
50. Ibid., p. 791.

by other types of taxes such as compound, industrial and labour taxes. The colonial government was very strict over the collection of taxes and many officials were dismissed for "embezzlement".[51]

From 1903 to 1908 district re-organisation, which came to form the basis of subsequent district adjustments, were undertaken. In 1904 the colonial government arranged for the collection of taxes from the cities by dividing each into four parts of fuska and each of these parts was in turn under a wakili with his masu unguwa: a quarter of the tax collected from each city went to the colonial government, a quarter to the Native Authority, another quarter to the tax collectors, and the last quarter went into the fund for city development and sanitation.[52] Outside the cities, various settlements were merged into one district which could be assessed "lumpsum" - on the basis of the population and the income of each locality. The village heads and the ward heads in turn ascribed to each individual his share of taxation as well as collecting it.[53] This was the major factor in dislodging the former

51. Ibid., p. 791.
52. Ibid., p. 223.
53. Lord Lugard, Political Memoranda, op.cit.,pp. 195 and 19

"fief holders" and their "jakadu".[54] On the other hand, "natives resident in a township (had) to pay the rate levied in townships in the northern provinces and rent for the government land they occupy." Furthermore, this township rate had to be "equal or greater than the tax (paid in general) - otherwise they (were) liable to pay as tax, the differences between their rate and the tax which would be demanded from them if they lived outside the township."[55]

4. THE NATURE OF COLONIAL TAXATION

We have already indicated the general character of colonial taxation. In this section, we shall try to touch on some specific aspects, distinguishing between it and taxation under the Emirate, showing how it operated and indicating some of the far-reaching effects it had on the society.

The evidence we have, clearly shows that colonial taxation made heavier demands on the taxpayer than was the case under the Emirate. To begin with, in purely quantitati terms, the assessment figures reached by the colonial tax

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54. Lord Lugard, Protectorate ..., op.cit., p. 796.
55. Lord Lugard, Political Memoranda, op.cit., p. 202.

assessors were higher than the assessments under the previous regime. This is implicit in Lord Lugard's attempt to reconcile the taxpayer to the new order: "the taxpayer must clearly understand that demand (assessed) contains and is not in addition to the old taxes."[56] In other words, assessment under the Emirate was low enough to be contained within the new colonial figures and still leave a margin.

Secondly, the colonial tax assessment figures, already relatively high at the outset, rose steadily year by year.[57] The following figures of tax (jangali and land) collected in Kano province from 1903 to 1911 illustrate this:[58]

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56. Lord Lugard Political ..., op.cit., p. 195.

57. The former Emirate taxes were basically kurdin kasa zakka, jangali, shuke-shuke and karofi. The colonial government retained the first three and introduced new ones i.e. compound taxes, Taki assessments, industrial and labour taxes, taxes on wealthy traders as well as numerous indirect taxes.

58. Lord Lugard, Protectorate ..., op.cit. p., 75, Table IV.

1903 - 1904	-	£2,428
1904 - 1905	-	7,149
1905 - 1906	-	7,141
1906 - 1907	-	13,442
1907 - 1908	-	24,556
1908 - 1909	-	51,842
1909 - 1910	-	56,588
1910 - 1911	-	69,659

In the report for the year 1913 we are informed that "taki assessment in the first district assessed in 1913 produced an increase in revenue to the tune of £30,000."[59] The total jangali for 1913 was £64,424, compared with a figure of £54,024 for the previous year. It was stated elsewhere that from 1908 to 1913, the average annual increase in jangali was 22%.[60]

Two other factors contributed to aggravating the burden of colonial taxation for the taxpayer in comparison with that of the Emirate. Colonial tax was assessed per individual adult male, whereas Emirate taxation had operated in terms of households. Thus, any given household could end up, under the new system, paying several times what it had previously paid. The other factor, which again

59. Kanprof 270/1913, No.46, para. 62.
60. Kanprof 95/1914 Report for 1913, para. 65 ff.

distinguishes the two systems from each other, was that, whereas under the Emirate, allowances were made for exceptional situations e.g. years of drought and famine, the colonial government made no such allowances. For example, despite the bad harvest of 1907, we are informed in Major Festing's report on migration that "zakka in kind was levied as usual"[61] and despite the famine and cattle sickness recorded in the Annual Report for 1915, the figures for that year and the subsequent one actually show an increase in tax.[62]

Table 3

1914-1916 GENERAL TAX AND JANGALI, KANO PROVINCE

	1914	1915	1916
GENERAL TAX	£67090:16:9	£72977:18:3	£79821:10:11
JANGALI	£23239: 7:0	£25557:10:0	£29970: 7: 0

61. NAK/SNP7/5490/1908, Report by Major Festing on Migration of Agricultural Classes.

62. Kanprof 202/1917 Annual Report for 1916, para. 55.

The writer adds that this was possible, thanks to "the loyal and vigorous action of the Native authorities when it was brought home to them that unless active measures were taken there would be a serious drop in revenue."[63]

Perhaps the aspect of colonial taxation which had the farthest-reaching effect was the insistence by the colonial government that tax be paid in cash rather than in kind. In 1907 the colonial government ruled that its share be paid only in cash and instructed the Native Authority to press for payment in cash alone. One of the reasons proferred by Lord Lugard for this insistance on cash was that fostering the habit of cash transaction among the peasantry was one of the prerequisites (the other being an adequate transportation network) to establishing an efficient commercial system which would "enable sales to merchants for export."[64] If at all goods could be accepted in lieu of cash, they should be of the type "most easily convertible into cash, such as cotton, livestock, produce which can be sold for export, or possibly food which can be issued as rations to soldiers or police."[65]

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63. Kanprof/108/1916 Report for 1915, para. 105.
64. Lady Lugard, op.cit., p. 486.
65. Lord Lugard, Political ..., op.cit., p. 206.

Labour was also accepted in a number of cases in lieu of cash.[66] But every effort was made to induce payment in cash, and the Native Authority accordingly "advised" the peasantry to insist in their turn on cash payment from traders coming to buy produce[67] and, through a series of campaigns and demonstrations, informed the peasant producers of prospective buyers guaranteed to pay in cash.[68] To encourage the use of cash in even petty transactions, the colonial government went to the lengths of introducing one penny and one-tenth penny coins, where previously the lowest amount had been the threepenny piece.

Lord Lugard chooses to emphasise the fact that the insistance on cash payment of taxes acted as "a powerful stimulant to labour and industry."[69] But perhaps a more interesting aspect of the matter was that, the cash in question being inevitably British currency, the result was

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66. Ibid., p. 806.
67. Lord Lugard, Protectorate..., op.cit., p. 614.
68. Mary Smith, Baba of Karo, op.cit., pp. 42-43. Also, Kano Province Annual Report for 1911, para. 16.
69. Lady Lugard, op.cit., p. 486.

a virtual monopoly in trade for the British companies. Thus, hitherto, independent local merchants became intermediaries between the producers of raw materials, now in dire need of British currency to pay their taxes, and British companies who could purchase the produce in this currency. To further reinforce the monopoly and bind the producers even more tightly to the British companies, such as the Royal Niger, Lagos Stores, etc., a preharvest credit system was operated. Thus middlemen like Dantata, Adamu Jakada, Maikano Agogo and Umaru Sharubutu collected such items as cloth, salt and, of course, cash from the companies for distribution to the peasantry as a form of advance payment for the produce of the coming harvest.[70]

The above aspects of colonial taxation - the heavy rate of assessment, the inflexible demand that taxes be paid regardless of conditions of drought, etc., the insistence on cash payment and the subsequent financial binding of the local producers to the British companies - all had far-reaching effects of a nature unknown under Emirate taxation. As could be expected, the preharvest

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70. Interview with a group of elderly miners at Riruwai Kano, August, 1980.

credit system, combined with the frequent occurrence of famine, caused many of the peasants to fall heavily in debt to middlemen and local administrators.[71] Destitution was much more rampant than before. But more important, the burden of colonial taxation brought about a general instability in the society, as people were forced to leave their farmlands and move about either in attempts to evade taxation altogether or else in search of work as wage labourers, in order to earn the necessary cash for tax payment.[72] The annual Report for 1907 speaks of migration "in all difections".[73] Twenty thousand people were said to have crossed from the western part of the Emirate into Galadima district, and other movements of population were recorded in the direction of Zaria, Nigi, Bauchi, Jos etc.,[74]

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71. Glenny in his assessment of Kano District, 1909, para. 79, came across a case of indebtedness to tax collectors and reported as follows: "Garkwa (the resident Jakada) of Gwanna last year during months of famine gave a lautai fula 3 bundles of guinea corn priced at 6/3d each on credit until next harvest at 12/6d each and rogo priced at 10/6d for 21/- on like terms. Garkwa stated that he had several exactly familiar transactions and this man alone had neglected to pay up in full." This was said to be the general practice by most "Jakadu and Dagatai" para. 78.

72. Annual Report for 1908, para. 41.

73. Annual Report for 1907, para. 41.

74. Glenny, Kano district assessment 1909, op.cit. para. 41.

In an attempt to circumvent tax evasion through migration, Lord Lugard made the following suggestion:

> "It is important that taxes be collected simultaneously in different provinces, especially from villages on the borders of the province to prevent evasion by transmigration."[75]

The result of this constant population movement was an inevitable decrease in food production and the increasing alienation of land.[76] The Annual Report of 1914 gives a striking illustration of the food shortage problem - groundnuts sold to companies earlier in the year had to be brought back from Baro and resold to the peasants.[77] And as early as 1908, a certain Major Festing, at Government request, had carried out a survey in which he already warned that taxes were driving "able-bodied men" to leave the land in search of work as porters and permanent labourers. Of those who left, he calculated, 25% never returned.[78] In the light of all of this evidence, we can only agree with the colonial government which commissioned the Festing

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75. Lord Lugard, Political..., op.cit., p. 195.
76. See C.W. Rowling, Report on Land Tenure in Kano Province, Kaduna, 1949.
77. Kanprof 376/1914, Annual Report, para. 60.
78. NAK/SNP7/5490/1908 Report by Major Testing ..., para. 7 and 8.

Report on the suspicion that "there was (something) wrong in the administration of the country."[79]

The general character of colonial taxation we have been discussing so far is clearly illustrated by the compulsory universal taxation in British coins[80] introduced into the colony by the colonial government in 1911. This legislation particularly affected the peasantry and artisans who had to look for Sterling Currency to pay their taxes. The result was that a massive quantity of ground-nuts was produced and offered to the colonial companies in return for cash.[81] In fact the colonial authorities, with this legislation, envisaged this massive production for export and so decided on 3 November 1912 - the harvest season - for the official launching of the railway line which was completed and started operating in 1911. The need for the nickel currency was so widespread in the colony that even the colonial authorities, by 1916, were reporting of its great demand among "country folks."[82] With this development the peasantry became more effectively subordinated to the capitalist economy as producers of exportable agricultural raw materials, tax payers, seasonal labourers and consumers of largely imported manufactures.

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79. Ibid.
80. See Annual Report for 1911
81. See Hogendorn, Origins of ..., op.cit., pp. 174-178.
82. 4121 1916 Op.cit., para. 21.

5. NATIVE TREASURY: REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE - 1909

Revenue for the native treasury was derived from the various taxes we have outlined above. Other levies such as court fees, as well as market dues, were still collected and the income derived from them also went into the native treasury.[83] It must be emphasized here that the income derived from these taxes and dues was equally shared between the Native Authority and the Central Government.[84] The Native Authority's share of this income was partly used to pay the salaries of its staff and finance such projects as the construction and maintenance of markets, courts, prisons and roads. The remaining portion of the Native Authority's Revenue was either invested in England, deposited with the British Bank of West Africa or given to the central government as loans or grants.

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83. Lord Lugard, Political Memoranda, op.cit., p. 204.

84. See 140/1918 op.cit., Form 9. The total "government" and "Native Authority" revenue from 1915-1917 was given as follows:

1913	£183,132
1914	174,482
1915	197,396
1916	220,343
1917	253,310

In January 1909 a treasury, beit-el-mal, to store such revenues, was established and placed under the maaji (treasurer). In 1910, out of a total of £69,460 in the treasury, £41,460 was paid as salaries to the Native Authority officials. A total of £16,027 was also paid for capital projects. There was thus a balance of £12,027.[85] In 1912 Sir Heskell Ben, the Governor, put forward the proposal, which was approved, of investing reserves in Britain through the Crown Agents.[86] This started the process whereby money capital was removed from the colony and invested in Britain. Related to this was the fact that money was also being repatriated from the colony in the form of surpluses obtained as share of contra

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85. See Lord Lugard Protectorate ..., op.cit., p. 750, Table II. The 1910 budget was given as follows:

"TYPICAL DISTRIBUTION OF N.A. TREASURIES"

Salaries - Central Administration	£6,556
" District "	20,910
" Village "	13,940
Judicial	2,760
Police	1,769
Prisons	1,438
Public works Department	4,846
Treasury	540
Land Survey	1,600
Education	1,240
Hospital/Sanitation	1,034
Special Grants for Economic Development	500
Charity and Entertainment	500
Miscellaneous Contingencies	1,000
Balances and Reserves	12,027
TOTAL:	£69,460

86. Lord Lugard, Protectorate ..., op.cit., p.31.

government revenue as well as the profits of trading companies and banks.

By the end of 1913, the Native Authority was said to have "contributed" £1,500 to the public works department and education.[87] In 1914, as part of the war measures, the Native Authority deposited "surplus balances to government credit in treasury".[88] It was also reported that "for 1917, £43,400 has been deposited on loan with the government during the year."[89] In 1918 not only was £28,000 deposited with the government on loan but "most of the native treasuries had opened a current account with the Bank of British West Africa so that from then on there would be no need to accumulate large sums in treasury."[90]

In 1916, it was reported that out of a total reserve fund of £98,460 the Native Authority surplus was utilized as follows:[91]

1.	Invested in England with the Crown Agents...	£11,341
2.	Deposited with government -	£87,119

87. 376/1914 op.cit., para. 24.
88. 447/1914 op.cit., para. 4.
89. 140/1918 op.cit., para. 56.
90. SNP/10/7/93p/1919 op.cit., para. 70-72.
91. SNP/10/295p/1920 Kano Province, Kano Emirate Native Treasury Estimates 1921-1922, p. 4.

Apart from this, the Bank of British West Africa in Kano exported money to the tune of £71,800 for the first half of 1916. Yet, for the same period, the Bank only imported £5,470.[92] This clearly illustrates the extent to which the colonial government, together with private companies, operated to facilitate not only the creation of relations which allowed them to exploit the producers within the colony but also to repatriate the surpluses so derived. It is also clear that the Native Authority's internal expenditure was primarily designed to simply maintain the administration which effected these colonial policies. i.e. the people paid for the machinery used in oppressing them. Thus, by 1921, it was stated that any new item of expenditure was largely due to the employment of paid staff for the district heads in the division. It was also computed that for the period up to 1921, the average annual rise in revenue had been 10.8% and expenditure 10.8%.[93]

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92. 412/1916 op.cit., para 84.

93. Lord Lugard, Protectorate ..., op.cit., para. 102-106.

6. COLONIAL LABOUR POLICIES

The colonial government was opposed to the continuation of slave labour. It, however, particularly at the earlier stages and for the creation of the necessary colonial infrastructure, utilized forced labour. It also did all it could to create an abundant (and therefore cheap) wage-labour force for the colonial companies and administration.

Immediately after the conquest, Captain Abadie went to the slave market and set all the slaves free. He then declared it illegal for anybody to raid for, or transact in, slaves.[94] The 1901 proclamation, which made all children born after this date "free", further undermined the system of slavery. The immediate effect of destroying the legal status of slavery was to make it more difficult to acquire or dispose of slaves. Secondly, slave holding became more difficult and expensive due to the further development of "free labourers" and greater possibilities of emancipation or running away. Moreover, the state further encouraged "free labour contract" relations.[95] Henceforth, each annual report was required to include the

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94. Lord Lugard, Protectorate ..., op.cit., p. 93.
95. Lady Lugard, op.cit., p. 464.

number of slaves freed in the colony. In 1906, 252 slaves were freed in the province and in 1909, seven courts in Kano division recorded 343 slaves emancipated.[96] In fact, officials of the Native Courts found to be enforcing "slave labour" relations were usually dismissed. For example, Alkalin Gwarzo was sentenced to three years imprisonment, and the Alkali of Kano was deposed for such offences.[97] Thus, in a report to the Secretary of State, Lugard said that he had lectured the aristocracy, the major slave holders, that "they would by and by see the advantage of paid free labour, which (the British) consider more profitable and better than slave labour,"[98] and "thus by pressure of circumstances ... the slave owner will cease to exist."[99] For "in the new order of things owners are recognising that it is not merely unnecessary, but an expensive and troublesome form of labour contract."[100]

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96. NAK/SNP7/1538 Kano Province Annual Report para. 449
NAK/SNP 6415/1909 Kano Province Annual Report for 1909 para. 317
97. SNP 10/9/120p/1921, op.cit., para. 78 and 80.
98. Lord Lugard Protectorate ..., op.cit., p. 93.
99. Lady Lugard, op.cit., p. 463.
100. Lord Lugard, Political ..., op.cit., p. 168.

This contributed to the dissolution of slave labour and the further emergence of "free" labourers, who, though not individually owned, only possessed as individuals their labour power and were collectively under those controlling property in land and money, etc., in the colony. In short, the role of the colonial state was to accelerate a process which, as we have noted in Chapter Two, had already started independently of the Emirate aristocracy. The acceleration of this process separates the slave from his conditions of production, i.e. slavery, and thus produces potential labourers for the colonialists.

Forced labour was used by the colonialists principally for the creation of the necessary infrastructure, i.e. railways, roads, colonial residences, prisons, barracks, etc. Village heads were responsible for the marshalling and organisation of forced labour. They undertook to supply a given number of men for a given period. The members of the labour force were responsible for supplying the necessary tools for the work in question, and also in most cases, for their own sustenance while on the job.

According to Lord Lugard, "the single duty which the law imposes upon the people without remuneration is the maintenance of roads and water ways."[101] In 1904, road

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101. Ibid., p. 190.

clearing was effected under the orders of Lugard that the peasantry should be used in the construction of roads and maintenance of the city wall.[102] In 1912, the government of the protectorate sent to the Resident in Kano that corvee or aikin talauchi under beit-el-mal organisation should cease. The Resident replied that in fact "its survival was limited to repairs of roads and town walls as well as carrying grains." The Governor in turn impressed it upon the Resident that "as taxation becomes effective and adequate this aikin talauchi should cease entirely."[103] But even up to 1920 the evidence clearly shows that labour for various constructions was being levied from villages on a "quota" basis and furthermore, the selection process of such labourers provided "a fertile source of bribery and corruption"[104] for the village heads.

In 1931 a colonial conference on forced labour was convened in reaction to the convention on forced labour held in Geneva. After the conference it was concluded that:

> "No pledge had been given to stop forced labour immediately and there would have to be a transition period, but the Secretary of State had given

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102. Lady Lugard, op.cit., p. 241.
103. Annual Report for 1911, para. 1.
104. S16p/1920, op.cit., para. 45-48.

instruction that, in accordance with the convention, regulations must be passed to govern any form of forced labour which remained,"[105] while the "use of forced labour on a large scale for such works as railway construction could properly be abandoned."[106]

The recommendation further stated clearly, ten cases of "minor communal services", involving all adult males, in which labour could be marshalled or forced. Foremost of these was the maintenance of native buildings used for communal purposes, including markets but excluding Juju houses or places of worship, road clearing etc.[107]

Apart from various cases of desertion from labour sites, cases were discovered in Kano in 1909 to show that the "purchase of exemption from "aikin gayya' was not uncommon."[108] Similarly, in 1929, it was still being reported that "the acceptance of quittance money should not be tolerated and district head men should be reminded

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105. Kanprof Confidential ND. 83 Forced Labour, op.cit., para. 7.
106. Ibid. para. 8.
107. Ibid., See enclosed Forced Labour Ordinance No. 22 of 1933.
108. Glenny, op.cit., para. 12.

of this."[109] The colonial government also sent labourers to the mining companies on request.[110] The government thus ensured the supply of labour for its purposes and those of the companies either through the nature of the land tenure and the taxation policies or outright compulsion. In 1931 it was stated that:

> "there are some parts of the Northern Provinces in which the use of forced labour, as generally understood, is no longer required, where a voluntary (sic) labour supply has either developed naturally of has been developed by conscious effort."[111]

This voluntary labour sprang from the increasing development of the colonial society and the preponderance of people who had come to depend on wages for their livelihood.

However, the dividing line between forced labour and wage labour was, at least at the outset, a very thin one.

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109. Kanprof 274/1928 Vol.1, Roads, General Policy, Provincial. See enclosed Memo No. 280/1928/21 from the Resident to the various A.D.O's, item d.

110. See Ch. 5, p. 183.

111. Kanprof ND 83 op.cit., para. 5.

labour,
Wage labour, like forced /was compulsory in many cases, and the wages in question were negligeable. In the early days, the colonial government managed to get away with this policy of extremely low wages precisely because the work force still came largely at this stage from the peasantry, who continued to farm and were therefore not dependent on the wages earned for subsistence. It is this which, among other things, distinguishes the colonial worker from the workers under the capitalist system proper. However, with the increasing distribution of peasants and artisans, there began to emerge a group of people divorced from all other means of livelihood and therefore completely dependent on the said negligeable wages.

The public works department employed labour at the rate of ninepence for "skilled labour" and six pence for so-called "local" labour a day. In 1907 "2000 to 3000" carriers were supplied to Zungeru for collecting public works department materials.[112] The projects of the public works department, especially buildings, were given out on contracts. In 1909 the contracts were given to some Arab

112. Annual Report for 1907, para. 97, Financial Memoranda, government publication available at Institute of Education Library, A.B.U., Zaria. See relevant sections guiding the award of contracts treated in ch. 7.

contractors who, it was reported, employed about 1000 men. According to Resident C.L. Temple this was the first time labour was freely employed and paid for in the protectorate.[113] In 1908, there was a demand for labour from the central government at Zungeru and therefore the Kano N.A. sent 3,523 people among whom 104 were to be employed on the Baro-Kano railway.[114] Between February and June 1908, 292 labourers were said to be employed on Kano works at six pence a day, 104 at nine pence per day and 400 at three pence to clear the Geza Stream.[115] In 1909, 500 men were supplied by the Emir to collect public worksdepartment material from Minna, on arrangement that their farms would be looked after while they were away. In addition, 1400 were sent to the railway.[116] The daily average labourers on the railway throughout May 1910, excluding deserters, was 7502 and each district supplied labour in proportion to its population. These were involved in the earth works for the railways.[117] Similarly, it was reported that, in 1911, for the track laying and completion of bridging of the railway to Kano early in 1912, the "local labour employed was as follows:[118]

113. Annual Report for 1908, op.cit., para. 295.
114. Ibid., para. 76.
115. Ibid., para. 76.
116. Annual Report for 1909, para. 300.
117. Half Yearly Report for June 1910, para. 119.
118. Lord Lugard, Protectorate ..., op.cit., p. 735.

Quarter Ending.	Average Number of Labourers.
31st March	14,897
30th June	11,911
30th September	3,727
31st December	3,638

Thus in 1908, it was reported that there was no difficulty in obtaining "local" labour, "the supply being greater than the demand."[119] To further ensure this development, the colonial government discouraged the use of carriers and encouraged the utilization of pack animals so as to release labour force.[120] The increasing development of this was related to further redemption of slaves, both through manumission, court orders and running away. Similarly the mining rights made it illegal for indigenous miners using blast furnaces to operate in Kiruwai tin mine which was given to the Kano Tin Areas in 1911. There was also the destitution and migration of the peasantry and artisans due to the colonial fiscal policy. This ensured the supply of labour to the government, companies and other individual enterprises owning, and controlling, land and money.

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119. Annual Report for 1908, para. 76.
120. Lord Lugard, Protectorate ..., op.cit., p. 442.

7. COLONIAL LAND TENURE POLICIES

The colonial policy on land tenure had four distinct characteristics. The effects of all these characteristics were to increasingly dispossess the peasants, artisans and pastoralists from the land while, on the other hand, transferring this ownership to the colonial government and through it to the colonial trading companies and their agents. The first of these characteristics was outright expropriation of land by the colonial state. The second was the transfer of this land to companies on the basis of certificates of occupancy or prospecting and mining licences, that is, direct expropriation of land by the colonial government and the establishment of certain largely financial conditions for rights to land ownership and usage. The third factor was the combined effects of taxation and the destruction of cottage industries leading to increasing impoverishment (sales of land inclusive) of the productive sectors. Lastly, these factors laid the foundations of a situation in which there was no legal recognition of land usage which was not based on the colonial certificate of occupancy.

The State reserved the right to appropriate any land for "development" purposes, as well as to grant or refuse to grant rights to any individual or company. In the first place farms outside the city in Fagge, Nassarawa and later Sabon Gari were expropriated and rights to plots were given on the basis of property. This consequently led to the development of house tenancy.[121] As a result, most of these became commercial and residential areas for trading companies or their agents. Similarly, mineral rights were vested in the British Crown and these were transferred to the mining companies.

The township was largely divided into three sections - the European, Syrian and Native reservations.

In 1915, in the Native reservations, a "rent" of 5/- and 2/- conservancy rate was charged quarterly, payable in advance.[122] In a report for 1916, it was stated that:

> "Any alien native who can satisfy the station Magistrate that he is engaged in any bonafide business or employment, or any merchant firm that wishes to take up a plot ... is simply registered on the following "terms of occupation."[123]

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121. Rowlings, op.cit., particularly the appendix.

122. See Chapter Two, p. 27 ff.

123/ Kanprof 108/1916 Report for 1915, report on Kano Township para.7.

20/- per annum rent

2/- per annum rate

8/- per annum conservancy fees.

A six months payment in advance was required before possession was granted. The report was concluded by the note that if "the rental, rate or conservancy fees are insufficient they can easily be raised next year."[124] In his reply to this, the lieutenant governor telegrammed that in order to get the highest bidder there must be a public auction.[125] Due to such rates which most of the people could not afford these lands became largely owned by colonial companies and their agents. In fact, even the colonial trading companies were complaining of the excessive rates and value of plots.[126] This, they said, bore "especially hard on the small individual trader who may not have much capital."[127] Two plots auctioned in London in November 1916 fetched £2,300.[128]

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124. SNP11/81/198m/1917 Kano Township Native location, auction of plots, para. 7.

125. Ibid. See telegram dated 26/3/17 from Goldsmith: "No more plots be granted in the native location of Kano Township without auction X upset rental will be 24/- X No premium X Bidding to be on rental."

126. SNP11/8/950m/1917, op.cit., para.4.

127. Ibid, passim.

128. Ibid, p. 2.

It was even stated that in Fagge the residential qualifications were made so strict that, instead of being "a resort of thieves and prostitutes, it has become a respectable abode of wealthy traders - who are taxed accordingly."[129] In 1917, A. Dantata purchased two plots at an annual rental of £20 per annum in the non-European trading sites.[130] In the previous year, Abdu Maikano had secured two plots at an upset premium of £30 and an annual rental of £20 - the value of the building to be erected within 2 years being £150.[131]

Most of the plots were allotted by traders of various nationalities. The stringent measures imposed by the government on
/the requisition of plots greatly contributed to the scarcity of residential areas. This in turn led to a

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129. Kanprof 412/1916 op.cit. para 7.

130. SNP11/8/165m/1917 Alhassan Dantata Application for Plots 119 & 107 non-European trading sites Kano.

131. SNPII/1/871m/1916 Abdu Mai-Kano application for Native traders' plots 104c and 116c at Kano.

situation in which residences increasingly came to be owned and let out by fewer and fewer individuals while, on the other hand, a great proportion of the population increasingly became tenants. For example, in October 1915, in a surprise raid to the native township where only some 800 people had registered, the police discovered some twenty extra people residing there without permits. It was also found that as many as 25 people were residing in homes constructed on one plot of 50 x 100 feet, which had been subletted to them by a plot owner.[132] The creation of artificial scarcity of residential plots by the colonial government is further illustrated by the fact that when the station magistrate received six written and several verbal applications for plots in the native location, despite his own admission that there were enough plots to satisfy the requests, he decided to put up only ten for auction to the highest bidder.[133]

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132. Kanprof 108/1916, op,cit., para.4.

133. SNP/1/8/198m/1917, op.cit., Letter from Station Magistrate to the Secretary.

Rowlings' study is full of evidence of the development of the landlord and tenant system. He stated that "rents paid vary from about 2/6d for a thatched hut in Tudun Wada to 4/- in the city and a little more in Fagge; rooms in a mud house are a shilling or two higher in Tudun Wada, up to 7/- in the city and Fagge and 10/- in the more popular parts of Sabon Gari."[134]

As far as rural settlements and pre-conquest walled towns were concerned, there are three basic factors to note. All the local inhabitants were legally considered as "temporary". Secondly, the chances for any further expansion as a result of population increases (etc.) could only be made through either purchase or acquiring rights of occupancy. Lastly, the destitution of the peasantry and artisans, as we have seen, tended to force them to sell lands. Thus, the situation was such that these inhabitants were destined to consequently become landless. This could be due to population increases which would lead to further divisions and redivisions of landed property or outright eviction by the government for development purposes.

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134. Rowlings, op.cit., p.22 .

Alternatively, the inhabitants might be compelled by financial pressures to sell these lands.

The most characteristic feature of colonial land policy in relation to mines, as is fully discussed in chapter five, was that the mines became the exclusive properties of capitalist mining companies. One other very important dimension to the relationship between the new owners of these mines and the workers was that, at the earlier stages, these workers (largely comprising former independent miners), used their own tools such as diggers, calabashes and blast furnaces and also their expertise to mine tin for the companies in return for wages. In fact, it was only after the second World War that the tin mining companies started using machinery. The funds for the purchase and installation of this machinery were derived from the companies profits as a result of their monopoly over the mines and their consequent control of the labour process.[135]

The manner in which the colonial government established and protected their monopoly of the mines is illustrated in

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135. Group interview with old miners in Riruwai, Kano.

the various colonial mineral ordinances which prohibited individual independent local miners from mining.[136]

If we turn to farmlands, we find that the major effect of colonial policy was the destitution and migration of the peasants as a result of taxation, their indebtedness and consequent sales of land. The extensive development of the sale of land provoked strong reactions, even from some members of the colonial administration. By 1920, for example, the Resident was complaining of the increasing sales and mortgaging of farms to money-lenders and speculators.[137] This problem led the Native Authority to issue a statement in 1921, to the effect that:

> "the council and the Waziri of Kano are and have always been perfectly clear and emphatic upon the point that they do not recognise the legality of sales of land ... whether the passing of money, either for transfer or loan of land, has caused or will even more in the future, cause the occupier, to consider himself the owner instead of the user, this cannot and should not alter the one fundamental fact that the rights in land tenure are those of user only, recognised and governed by the customary law in this province."138

The net effect, however, of colonial policy was to bring about increasing alienation of land to money owners,

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137. 316P/1920, op.cit., para.25

138. SBP/10/9/120P, op.cit., para.76.

that is to alter "the right of user only" to "the right of ownership." In his study, Rowlings observed that contributory to the increasing destitution in the city and its environs was the gradual absorbtion of farmlands into residential areas, the decline of cottage industries and the ownership of plots.[139] The indebtedness of the peasantry to the middlemen was crucial in this respect. In most cases, such indebtedness to middlemen started with the mortgaging of the farmer's expected yield. The prevalence of this practice led the Emir to impose a ban on the sale of immature crops resulting from advances to groundnut farmers by the middlemen.[140] Where farmers faile to pay their debts, they were sometimes compelled to transfer their farming rights to their debtors.[141] The extensive nature of indebtedness is shown by the fact that the Native

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139. Rowlings, op.cit., p.37.

140. Ibid, p.52.

141. Ibid., p.7.

Authority had to open a special debtors prison on the 18th of March 1916.[142] Not only were the middlemen (e.g. Dantata, Maikano, etc.) owning large farmlands on which they were taxed, but Rowlings found a "rich villager holding 10 fields from which he obtained leases."[143] A clerk's wife at Zakirai had 13 farms[144] and a Syrian trader took over a farm from a farmer at Dan-Batta who had failed to pay him his debt.[145] On the other hand, a number of people displaced from the land were gravitating to the township, which was not only the centre of administration and commerce (and therefore wage employment) but also had the most stringent conditions of land tenure.[146]

In conclusion, therefore, the stage was set for a landowning class and a large landless class - particularly in view of the fact that all holdings not based on certificate of occupancy could at any time be expropriated.

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142. Kanprof 202/1917 Annual Report for 1916. Average Number of prisoners was said to be 21.
143. Rowlings, op.cit., p.10.
144. Ibid. p.11.
145. Ibid. p.11.
146. Kanprof 108/1915, op.cit., p.2.

8. THE COLONIAL STATE AND COLONIAL COMPANIES

It is quite evident that the colonial government's labour and land tenure, fiscal etc. policies were geared towards creating, and guaranteeing the colonial companies with, land holdings, supply of cheap labour, supply of cheap raw materials for export and the consumers of imported manufactured goods. The role of the state, in its capacity as the "public sector", was geared towards promoting and protecting the interests of private enterprise.

There were two problems with the major trading companies such as the Royal Niger, Goltschalk, John Holt, etc. The first was the transport costs of utilising carriers and pack animals to transport gooos inland - such as textiles, salt, utensils, etc. Related to this was the virtual impossibility of moving in heavy machinery for mining, cotton pressing, groundnut decorticators, generator plants etc. - which could not possibly be carried by porters and pack animals.[147] The second problem, which has been largely dealt with above, was the entrenchment of internal traders and manufacturers.

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147. Lady Lugard, op.cit., pp.483 and 498.

(i.) Communications and Transport

A number of steps were quickly taken by the colonial government which went a long way to solving the transport problem of the companies.

In 1904 the colonial government set up a separate transport department, which continued to function for the next eight years, until the official opening of the railway - Kano, 1912. At this point it became a subdepartment within the Department of Public Works. This department undertook to exploit to the full, and improve upon, all existing forms of transport (e.g. the use of packanimals), and, where necessary for the expansion of the colonial enterprise, to introduce new ones (e.g. the clearing of cart-tracks). In terms of the exploitation of preexisting forms of transport, we learn that in 1912 the tranport subdepartment hired 613 donkeys for transporting convoys of stores.[148] In another report: 1913, there is a reference to the need for "improving the breed of animal in use for transport - such as importing Spanish Jacks

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148. Lord Lugard, Protectorate .. "op.cit., Report for 1912, p.27.

to improve the size of the donkey."[149] The same report adds that "every available animal has been used for the transport of saleable produce from distant markets."[150] Where the use of pack animals proved inadequate for certain purposes, e.g. the exportation of bulky produce and the importation, again mainly for commercial purposes, of heavy machinery like turbines etc., the transport sub-section undertook the clearing of cart-tracks between certain key areas and Kano. Within a few years, a number of cart-tracks had been completed i.e. Zaria - Kano (completed in 1906), Katsina-Kano, Katagun-Kano, Bauchi - Kano and Sokoto - Kano (all completed by 1909). We are informed, however, that bridges were still to be built.[151] These tracks were made possible thanks to the forced labour of the peasantry, each of whom was required to devote three days labour per annum for the purpose. The peasants nicknamed the tracks hanyar sarki, or King's roads,[152] indicating the peasants' awareness of the compulsion of labour through the Native Authority.

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149. Kanprof 717/1913 op.cit. para.47.

150. Ibid.

151. Lord Lugard Protectorate ... op.cit., p.241.

152. Annual Report for 1908, para.56-57. Also W.F. Gowers, Gazeteer of Kano Province London, 1921, p.44.

All of the above activities, needless to say, had their point of convergeance at the railroad head in Kano. All roads (or cart-tracks in this instance) led ultimately to Kano, and even the proposer of the introduction of Spanish Jackasses cited above informs us that "the existence of the large purchasing depot at Kano railhead promises a great increase in this form of transport."[153] The railway itself reached Kano in 1911 and was officially opened in 1912.[154] The close link between, on the one hand, the priority which the colonial government accorded to transport at this stage, and, on the other, the expansion of the foreign trading companies, is nowhere more obvious than in the coincidence of the arrival of the railway in Kano in 1911-12 and the escalation in the number of foreign firms which established themselves there from that point on. By 1903, the only foreign companies operating in Kano were that of Ambrossini and the London and Kano Trading Company Limited. By contrast, in 1912 alone the following companies - Patterson Zochonis,

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153. KANPROF 717/1913, op.cit., para.47.

154. Lord Lugard, Protectorate ..., op.cit., p.773.

C.F.A.O. (Compagnie Francaise d'Afrique Occidentale), John Holt and the Royal Niger Company were set up. These were followed in 1913 by others e.g. G.B. Ollivant and Lever Brothers.[155]

A look at the conditions surrounding the use of the railway only serves to further emphasise the link between the government transport policy and the needs of these companies. While special concessions were granted the foreign companies[156] to encourage them to use the railway, individual local traders on the other hand, were discouraged by the prohibitive fares: third class fares were a farthing per mile, or, for example, 7/4d from Baro to Kano (a distance of 356 miles), and the luggage allowance per passenger was only 56 lbs.[157] According to H.Q. Glenny, most of the local traders consequently preferred to travel to Lagos by foot.[158] The fares were generally recognised to be so high that as early as 1911 a group of Arab traders, involved principally in the export of skins and feathers,

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155. Collated from annual reports.

156. See above, p. 109.

157. Lord Lugard, Protectorate ..., op.cit., Annual Report for 1912, p. 28.

158. Glenny, op.cit., para.241.

made a petition to the governor and did manage to obtain a reduction from £12/9/6d to £10/12/9d on the Kano-Lagos fare.[159]

This minor success on the part of the Arab traders should however be seen more or less as the exception which proves the rule that the needs of independent individual traders were anything but a priority with the colonial government in its development of a transportation network. For example, when the same group of Arab traders further requested that a public cart service be set up between the railway station and various parts of the city (for the transporting of goods to the individual traders' bases) they met with a polite refusal.[160]

In fact, once the major needs of the colonial companies were covered by the construction of the railway and cart-tracks between it and the key commercial areas, there would appear to have been a remarkable lack of official urgency with regard to the development of transport for other purposes. Even the general administrative needs of the colonial government would appear to have come second to

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159. Annual Report for 1911, para.79.

160. Ibid.

commercial interests. There were, for example, only two motor cars in the entire protectorate at this stage, based at Zungeru and "used chiefly by the governor when travelling."[161] For the rest, most of the travelling by administrative officers on tour was carried out on horse-back (e.g. the transport sub-department in 1912 reports the hiring of 127 ponies for this purpose.)[162] The Emir purchased a car in 1919, and after the experience of seeing it "dragged across the bed (of streams in the dry season)", expressed his intention "in time to get good roads leading to all (the districts)"[163] But roads to low-priority districts are not made by good intentions, and many of these districts were to remain relatively inaccessible up to the 1950s.[164] Lord Lugard explains the situation as follows:-

> "Distant provinces, like Sokoto and Bornu, must not feel aggrieved if the annual direct expenditure upon them at the present time is not the equivalent of the tax they pay to government. The stem and main branches of a tree must receive the bulk of the sap and be developed before its outlying limbs. The main trunk railways must first connect the centres of trade, and of mineral and other developments with the parts." 165

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161. Lord Lugard, Protectorate ..., op.cit., pp 771-772.
162. Ibid., Report for 1912, p.27.
163. 93p/1919, op.cit., para.32.
164. The Kano Zaria Road was only completed in 1953.
165. Lord Lugard, Political..., op.cit., p.209.

This plea, however, does little to camouflage a government policy by which a transportation network built by the forced labour and taxes of the productive sector did next to nothing to enhance the lives of those who built it, but much to further the expansion of the colonial companies.

(ii) Internal Manufactures.

Not only was it that the manufactures of Kano were "not needed in Europe" but the colonial State was to ensure the dominance of manufactures from Britain in the colony. To this extent trade regulations, customs and tariffs, currency and taxation laid the basis for the destruction of independent iron working and manufacturing in the later part of colonial domination.[166] In this connection, the effect of these policies was to curtail the import and production of raw materials for manufactures.

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166. Lord Lugard, Protectorate, op.cit., writing of the probable future effects of these policies in the annual report of 1904, p.296: "I foresee with great regret the decline of Kano as a commercial centre when European goods supercede her manufactures, and the exports of other provinces are diverted by more direct routes to the factories of British merchants, instead of passing through the hands of her middle-men and brokers. The cotton of Zaria will then cease to come to the looms of Kano, or the skins and hides to her tanneries, etc."

Similarly, the taxation of individual peasants and artisans in cash tended to necessitate their search for other means to acquire cash, especially with the development of export production and importation of manufactures. On the other hand, the various concessions given to the colonial companies tended to put them in a stronger position vis-a-vis the internal manufacturers. For example, in 1903 the colonial government sent samples of indigenous cotton to B.C.G.A. and received seeds for distribution in return. Between 1906 and 1908, 1,000 tons of cotton seeds were distributed by the B.C.G.A. In 1911, a small station was established by the B.C.G.A. which bought 1,500lbs of cotton at one penny per lb. This was apart from its purchases from other areas such as Katsina, and Zaria.[167] Weavers in Kano, who depended on eastern Zaria for the bulk of their cotton supply were said to be in need of nickel coins just like the producers of the cotton and there was therefore a trade in nickel coins with Kano market.[168] In 1914, Maxklein and Company imported safety flaying knives for distribution to various Native Authorities.[169] C.W. Rowlings concluded, in his report on land tenure in Kano, with the comment that the apparent under-employment in Kano in the 1930s was related to the lack of processing industries based on local produce.[170] This development led to later imports of decorticating machines, corn mills, knitting and sewing machines, building materials, food stuffs, etc. The establishment of corn mills in the city was opposed by the Emir on the grounds that the occupation of a number of women was corn grinding.[171] The development of "drifters" led the colonial government to consider resettling some of the

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167. Annual Report for 1911, para. 31.
168. Glenny, op.cit., para. 31 & 54.
169. Kanprof 95/1914, op.cit., p. 16.
170. Rowlings, op.cit., p.16.
171. NAK/KANPROF/6209s. 2, op.cit., p. 1.

population in Kaduna. In1929, the first instalment of 70 families was evacuated.[172] On the other hand, in 1919, the Resident reported that ... "the imports which the native buys are two and three hundred percent higher than they were and he must pay for them by his products."[173]

(iii) Colonial Education

The colonial educational programme was principally designed to produce personnel to operate the administration and provide middle level technical services. The increasing success of such ventures in turn made it less necessary to have personnel at this level from outside the country.

In 1904 there were a series of "serious attempts" to develop the economic resources of the protectorate which resulted in the employment of various "experts" in botany, geology, and zoology to furnish reports on the forest, mineral and animal resources of the colony. In 1909, samples of "Kano Rubber" from Ficus Platyphylla, cotton, groundnut oil and tin were sent to the Imperial Institute for analysis.[174]

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172. NAK/KANPROF/236, Annual Report for 1929, p.11.
173. 93p/1919, op.cit., para.146.
174. Lord Lugard, Protectorate..., op.cit., p.657 .

In 1909, further development of subordinate staff became necessary and three schools were opened - the Sons of Chiefs School, Craft School and Survey School. The first was geared towards producing "enlightened administrators" for the purposes of tax collection, and law and order. The second was to produce technicians skilled in carpentry and metal-work while the last was for the production of surveyors to be employed in the measurement of farms and compounds and in map making. This school produced all the Taki Mallams. Between 1911 - 1912 there was a total of 320 pupils in all the Schools.[175]

In the industrial School, instructions were given on carpentry, and metal work such as cart body building, joinery, wheel tyring, motor repairs, driving etc. In 1916 it was reported that £300 "or so" is "annually spent in England purchasing new carts simply because we cannot build carts here without steel axles and tyres" whereas "given the axles and tyres cheaper and better carts can be produced than those imported from England."[176]

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175. Ibid., p.760.

176. Kanprof 412/1916, op.cit., para. 126.

(iv) Security

The police force in turn appears to have been particularly engaged in defending the properties of the companies and banks from thieves. It was stated that "the work of the police is confined almost entirely to the township".[177] Furthermore, "besides guarding the township (the police) also provide a guard for the Bank of British West Africa" and "escorts for the transmission of specie and munitions from Kano to Zinder and elsewhere."[178] For example, in two burglaries upon Messrs. McIvers Stores, goods to the value of £200 were taken. In another burglary on the African and Eastern Store "all the culprits were caught red-handed and five were sentenced in stations Magistrate."[179] The colonial government also used the excuse of the prevalence of thieves to frequently raid native hamlets and townships in search of vagrants and people without a visible means of income.[180] The commissioner of Police reported that "burglaries at the European Canteens were formely very prevalent, but this sort of

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177. 318p/1919, op.cit., para. 61.
178. SNP10/19.120p.1921, op.cit., para.8.
179. Ibid., para.91.
180. Kanprof 140/1918, op.cit., para.40-45.

crime has now almost completely ceased and this may be attributed to the increased strength and vigilance of the night patrol."[181.]

9. CONCLUSION

It is therefore clear that the colonial State's policies on taxation, labour, land tenure, commerce, research, training and education, construction of roads and railways, and the provision of licences and contracts created the foundation of an economy in which the State played a dominant role as the "public sector" - due to the fact that its financial basis was "public" taxation. But there is a myth as to who exactly constituted the taxed "public". To start with, all those deriving their incomes from colonial taxes such as salaried staff could not be said to have contributed to this tax in the first place, except probably if collecting and storing it is considered as a "contribution". Similarly, taxes on profits and rents, just like these two categories themselves derive from the activities of the productive sector of the population.

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181. 93p/1919, op.cit., para.84.

These revenues and activities of the colonial government were geared towards serving the interests of the mining and commercial companies which came to be identified with the private sector. The logic of this relationship, which came to be known as creating conditions for "private capital investments," can be very easily illustrated as follows:

The establishment of colonial currency wholly under the control of, and produced by, the colonial state and made accessible to the private companies in the form of loans and grants (while they could also acquire it as profits and rents) ensured them a complete financial monopoly. The imposition of tax in colonial currency in turn ensured that tax payers must acquire such cash, through selling either their labour or their exportable produce. The consequent destruction of the internal capacity for production as a result of lack of raw materials, labour and land also led to increasing subordination to European industries. In addition, the conversion of land into private property through government acquisition and grants to private companies ensured the mining companies complete monopoly of the mines.

Peasant indebtedness and sales to moneyed individuals ensured the centralisation of land under colonial companies. Thus, the colonial government established companies having control over currencies, land and tools for industrial production, while needing labour and raw materials. On the other hand, it created peasants, migrants and labourers needing, and acquiring, cash through the production of raw materials and/or sale of labour. It ensured that such raw materials and labour were cheap by fixing low prices for raw materials, direct and indirect taxes, labour laws and the creation of a large reserve of unemployed people. It thus not only created the foundations for, but also promoted and maintained the development of, a dependent capitalist economy.

Thus, colonial law and order or subjugation was essentially geared to subordinating the productive sector of the colony to facilitate exploitation. The subordination of the aristocracy, merchants, peasantry, pastoralists, artisans and labourers was achieved not through the provision of any incentive but through the political - economic coercions of the colonial State. To argue as Hogendorn does that proceeds from export trade were used

to buy imported "incentive goods" such as "cloth, salt, kolanuts and other goods" is to ignore the fact that these were the predominant items of internal trade and this only signifies the development of external control over internal production and exchange. Secondly, there is no evidence of any "capital formation" on the part of intermediaries independent of the increasing development of the colonial economy. As for the "mobilisation of resources" it is clear that the State "demobilised" the miners, laid the foundations for destroying artisans etc., and subordinated them to colonial companies. The tendency to reduce the whole economy to mere farming and trading activities further led to the extensive creation of unemployment. To argue as Hopkins does, that it was only after 1945 that "governments started to intervene in the natural workings of the open economy" is to discount the fact that the central factor in the "natural" workings of the colonial economy was the colonial State.

It seems that the aforementioned notions of what constituted the colonial state and the colonial economy are grossly oversimplified and in some cases falsified. Similarly, the role of the colonial state appears central

in creating, promoting and perpetuating the dependency of Kano Colonial economy on the British capitalist economy. This economy was characterized by the predominance of foreign capitalists, indigenous intermediaries, peasant producers, labourers, and destitutes.

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182. Hopkins, op.cit., p.295.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RAW MATERIAL PRODUCTION IN THE COLONY

1. INTRODUCTION

Of all facets of colonial domination, the subject of this (and the next) chapter, the process of raw material production and the conditions of internal cottage industrial production, seem to be the least documented in the colonial sources, even though they form the basis of the economy and engage the largest sector of the colonised population.[1] This neglect of the activity of the producers in these sources is itself a reflection of the lack of concern with the welfare and development of the productive sector in the economy. Similarly, the lukewarm attitude of the peasant farmers, pastoralists and artisans to "educated people" in the course of interviews, under the suspicion that they might be government officials, especially in matters related to taxation is a reflection of the experiences they have had with numerous tax assessment officers and the extortion

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1. This is due to the fact that information on these topics does not form part of any of the colonial official reports as is the case with occasional reports on administration, trade, finance, revenue etc.

inherent in the relationship.[2]

The significance of the intensive and pervasive development of raw material production, both agricultural and mineral, for export is related firstly to the decline and stasis in other sectors of the economy (manufacturing, food production and processing, etc.) and the increasing dependence on the importation of manufactures and foodstuffs from the colonising country. We have already indicated how this development had started in the nineteenth century.

The colonial state, however, in conjunction with the colonial companies, pursued specific policies designed to develop further this form of production. These included various Native Authority Ordinances relating to the production of various crops, rules relating to the standard of cotton, hides and skins, groundnuts, etc.... provision of seeds and fertilisers, experimental farms and livestock inspections. Promotion campaigns for the production of exportable raw material were also undertaken by the Native Authority. Later these campaigns came to involve the use of film shows, posters etc. There were also rules relating to mining activities. The development itself tended to assume a specific form of

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2. The writer has had this experience not only in relation to the present work but also in writing his B.A. dissertation in 1975.

organisation, viz: the concentration and centralisation of the resources, and hence production process, under the colonial companies and their agents and the consequent decline of cottage or household-based production.

It is worthwhile to note that the development of raw material production is associated with two concomitant developments. The first was increasing food shortage and increasing dependence on imported foodstuffs. The second was the increasing destruction of cottage industries with its related significances - technological dependence, concentration of production and the importation of manufactured items. Related to, and as a consequence of the above factors, was the impoverishment of the majority of the population. The problem of food shortage is treated here while the question of industrial activity, although briefly referred to here, is largely dealt with in the following chapter.

Hogendorn has popularised a myth on the question of the development of groundnut production in relation to cotton production. This particular myth, which has found a number of able disciples, has it that the peasantry preferred producing groundnuts to cotton due, essentially, to the "higher prices" obtainable.[3]

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3. J.S. Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut exports. op.cit., p. 58 ff.

In the first place, even before colonial domination, Kano was the principal importer of cotton from Zaria and Katsina Emirates due to its massive cotton based production of textile goods.[4] Secondly, Kano itself (due to the soil) is not a suitable locality for the cultivation of cotton. Moreover, it does not appear that the colonial government was particularly bent on the promotion of cotton cultivation in opposition, or as an "alternative", to the cultivation of groundnuts. Colonial policy on the matter is explicitly stated thus:

> "It is advisable not to press too strongly the cultivation of any particular crop, but to leave it to the discretion of the planters, after informing them as far as possible of the prices obtainable and the probable extent of the demand. District Officers will forward samples of actual and possible economic products for transmission to the Imperial Institute."[5]

It is evident therefore that the crucial issue is why "the people" had to plant these crops for cash at all. This was

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4. See Chapter Two, p. 36.
5. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Principles of Native Administration...', op.cit., pp. 105-106.

necessitated by the fiscal policy imposed by the colonial state - otherwise "the people" would not even have "responded" to British cash if it was not imposed.

2. THE PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL RAW MATERIAL

To a large extent, a number of issues dealing with agricultural production were, as far as the Native Authority was concerned, contained in specific ordinances dealing with particular issues, such as cotton growing in 1916 and diseases of animals in 1917 which were usually drawn up in consultation with the Director of Agriculture and the Chief Veterinary Officer.[6] The two most important departments in this connection were the departments of agriculture and the veterinary division. Another important aspect to this development was the incorporation of merchants as the commercial agents of colonial companies as discussed in chapter four.

The most extensive type of agricultural raw material produced for export in Kano province were mostly groundnuts, although smaller quantities of cotton and sheanuts were also produced. Animal products, namely, hides and skins, formed a substantial part of the raw material which was exported

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6. NAK/SNP10/416 P 1920 "Roads, rules made by Emir of Kano under N.A. Ordinance regarding the upkeep of" p.6.

from the province. This form of production was largely carried out by peasants and pastoralists. Alongside this form of production there was production based on estates even though it was comparatively on a marginal scale.

Groundnut production for export, as we have already indicated, developed considerably after 1911 due to the imposition of the compulsory payment of taxes in British coins that year. By 1913, it was reported that "purchase of groundnut" was "at a standstill due to the fact that the railway could not evacuate prior purchase".[7] The figures of groundnuts exported via the railways, apart from a few falls during famine years, suggest an increase in the development of this form of production even up to 1960.[8] Apart from the imposition of taxes and coins other related factors which contributed to the promotion of groundnut production were the increasing monetization of exchange (i.e. the penetration of British currency and its predominance in all forms of exchange), cash advances to the peasantry, and increasing development of private land ownership. In addition the colonial state embarked on campaigns aimed at encouraging peasants to produce groundnuts.

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7. NAK/KANPROF/717/1913 Kano Province Report, Sept.1913 para. 39.

8. This is computed from the various annual reports. See also Nigeria: Handbook of Commerce and Industries, Lagos, 1962. See also Jan S. Hogendorn, op.cit., passim.

"Baba of Karo", for example, mentioned the campaign mounted by the Native Authority to encourage the production of groundnuts. On his part, the Emir, as a demonstration cultivated a large farm of groundnuts which was widely publicised.[9] According to Hogendorn "gifts" or "dashes" of "goods and cash" were made by the middlemen to persuade farmers to grow groundnuts.[10] This, however, is not only economically untenable but it is not corroborated by the available evidence. It was reported in 1921, by the Resident, that there was an "extensive", and in his opinion "most objectionable", method adopted which he described as "that of advancing money to the farmer for an option on his future crop."[11] Furthermore, Rowling reported that crops were usually offered as security for loans. This, he noted, mostly led to disputes between middlemen and peasants during the harvest season, when the latter usually preferred to sell their produce and simply repay the loan out of the proceeds rather than surrender the entire harvests whose value was much higher than the loan.[12]

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9. M. Smith, op.cit., pp. 42-43. Also Kano Province Annual Report for 1911, p. 1.
10. Jan. S. Hogendorn op.cit., p. 87.
11. NAK SNP 10/9/120p 1921 op.cit., para. 118.
12. C.W. Rowling, op.cit., p. 53.

In cases where the peasants had bad harvests and were unable to repay the loan, then they were forced to transfer their farming rights. We therefore see that the major effect of the system of cash advances was either to keep the peasants in a perpetual state of indebtedness and therefore the production of raw materials or to simply force them off the land.

In relation to cotton production one of the first problems the colonial state had to tackle was the fact that the B.C.G.A. did not like the type of cotton predominantly cultivated and utilised within the province. To this extent, therefore, the colonial administration undertook to eradicate the indigenous type of cotton grown and in its place distributed, for planting, seeds of the type of cotton desired by the B.C.G.A. In 1916, the Native Authority drew up a rule relating to the cultivation and sales of cotton. The rule stated that:

"The purpose of this rule is to improve the cotton grown in Kano territory.

1. In any district where foreign cotton seed is distributed it is forbidden to grow native cotton.
2. After the cotton crop is in every person who sowed cotton is hereby ordered to dig up and

burn all the old roots before the next rains come, in order to prevent the spread of disease. Any person who omits to do this is guilty of an offence.

3. Any seller of cotton who mixes foreign and native cotton together and thus exposes for sale is guilty of an offence.

Any person who commits any of the above offences is liable on a first conviction to a fine of five shillings or to 7 days imprisonment, on a second conviction to a fine of 10 shillings or 14 days imprisonment, and for subsequent offences to a fine of £1 or to one month's imprisonment".[13]

In 1919, the B.C.G.A. supplied American long staple cotton seed. In Kano division this was distributed in Turaki Ma'nya district. In this respect about 60 tons of the seedlings were distributed.[14] Two years later, it was reported that "the actual areas" in the division under American seed were Kura, Karaye, Tudun Wada and Gwarzo.[15] Not coincidentally these also happen to be most of the major

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13. SNP10/413p/1920 rule III.
14. NAK/SWP 10/7/318/1919 REPORT NO 57.
15. NAK/SNP 10/9/120p/1921 op.cit., para. 129.

centres for internal textile production.[16] It was also reported by a colonial official that there was "a widespread belief that growers of cotton must sell it to the B.C.G.A. or some buyer on behalf of B.C.G.A. or government."[17] To further buttress this, the adulteration ordinance made it a penalty to mix "native" and "American" cotton to the extent that two colonial firms, Lagos Stores and Grace Brothers, were in 1921 prosecuted.[18] This particular measure contributed not only to producing some cotton for the B.C.G.A. but, as is shown in the next chapter, greatly contributed to the decline of internal cottage based handicrafts textile production. The need for cash by pastoralists, butchers, leatherworkers and merchants for virtually all forms of transactions also served as a major stimulant for the supply of hides and skins to colonial companies. We have in Chapter Four argued that the incorporation of the merchants facilitated the export of hides and skins to Britain. Leather tanning, for example, was not only actively discouraged but the Resident was ordered to buy only untanned hides for onward transmission to Lagos.[19]

16. SNP 1267/1909 Administrative Divisions op.cit., p. 3
17. SNP 10 316p 1920 Kano Province Report for Half Year ending" para. 42.
18. SNP 10/9/120p/1921 op.cit.,para. 132.
19. Lord Lugard 'Protectorate..., op.cit., p. 429.

Livestock collected as Jangali by the state also contributed to securing hides and skins for export.[20] Similarly, the establishment of official slaughter houses, as is fully discussed in Chapter Six and the exemption from Jangali of all livestock enroute to slaughter houses, did contribute to the availability of hides and skins.[21] Slaughtering animals anywhere other than in slaughter houses was also made illegal. Active discouragement of leather tanning and flaying also contributed to the availability of raw hides and skins. Related to this was the increasing destitution of pastoralists due to excessive Jangali, droughts, the restriction on grazing areas, the creation of forest reserves and the presence of rinder pests which might have forced a number of them to sell their cattle to wealthy individuals for export. There were droughts in 1914, cattle sickness in 1915 and rinder pest in 1920. In the latter, cattle deaths in the division were estimated at 13,876 - a figure which the Resident suspected of suffering "from so many causes of inaccuracy."[22] Despite all of this, however, Jangali was enforced and collected as usual. The major effect of Forest Reserves was to curtail the availability of pasture

20. See ch. 4, p.120.
21. See ch. 6, pp. 217 ff.
22. SNP/10/9102P/1921 op.cit., para. 134.

for the use of pastoralists. It was reported, in 1916, that the formation of a reserve at Dajin Rubu in Katsina had adversely affected pastoralists being "the chief grazing area in the province."[23] In 1926 forest reserves were established at Bunkuro, Rurum, Iggi and Burdungu in Kano Province. These are not only parts of the most fertile lands in the division but they are also free from tsetse fly.[24] By 1950, it was reported that 245 square miles were constituted as forest reserves and a further 487.47 square miles were about to be constituted.[25] In fact most of these forest reserves were established in those areas which were free from tsetse fly. For example, it was, in 1950, estimated that there were about 1000 square miles of tsetse ridden lands and these were in Tudun Wada, Birnin Kudu, Gwaram and in areas of flooded bush along the valley of Hadejia River.[26] Yet these areas had practically no forest reserves.

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23. Kanprof 6991 S.4 Kano Economic Survey 1950 pp.51-52.
24. Kanprof 278/1926.
25. Kanprof 6991 S.4 op.cit., p. 54.
26. Ibid., p. 50.

3. PRODUCTION OF MINERALS

Regulations guiding mining activities came directly from the central government, through the Department of Mines, although the Resident in Kano had a duty to supply such things as labour force and communications, when requested to do so. The major mineral obtained from the Riruwai - Tudun Wada district was tin, although small quantities of columbite, wolfram, cassiterite, and gold were also obtained. In this respect, there were dominant mining companies securing control over the mining areas from the colonial government and utilising wage labour for profitable production and export of minerals.

(i) Establishment of the Mining Companies

After the conquest and the declaration of all mining areas as Crown property, these were systematically given out to various mining companies. Of these mining companies the most dominant was the Kano Tin Areas which bought out the interests of Kano Syndicate in 1911. The other was the Karacho Mining Company. In 1910, the Kano Syndicate Limited of 206 Gresham House, Old Broad Street, London.E.C. submitted its memorandum and articles of association to the colonial government.[27] The company claimed "a total working capital" of £2,500 i.e. 2500 shares of £1 each. It had the

27. SNP 11/132m *1910 Kano Syndicate Limited. p. 1.

following directors:[28]

1. Francis A. Govelt, British, of 6 Throgmorton Street, E.C. Gentleman.
2. Lestocq R. Erskine, British, of Binfield Manor, Brachell, Berks, Gentleman.
3. James A. Macnair, British, of Gresham House, Old Broad Street, London E.C., Accountant.

However, this company was bought over by Kano Tin Areas in September 1911.[29] Kano (Nig.) Tin Areas Ltd. of Nigeria Office - Gitlspur Street, London E.c., submitted its Memorandum and Articles of Association in 1911.[30] It had a total capital of £200,0(divided into 400,000 shares of 10/- each. Its list of directors was given as follows:[31]

1. Assheton Leaver - Formcist Iven Health, Bucks, (Chairman, Tin Area).
2. Francis Algernon Govett, Esq., 6 Throgmorton Street, London E.C. (Chairman, Lake View Consols Ltd.).
3. Cyril D'Arcy Leaven Esq., Field House, Herpenden, Herts, (Director, Tin Areas).
4. Dermot J. Moorey Esq., Effinghen, Surrey (Managing Director of Kano Syndicate).
5. Lewis Norman Way Esq., Dower House, Ray Market, London London S.W. (Director, Tin Areas).

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28. SNP 13/m/191 - Kano Syndicate Memorandum & Articles of Association, p. 1.
29. Annual Report for 1911. Para. 114.
30. SNP11/344m/1911, Kano (Nig.) Tin Areas Memorandum, Articles of Association and Prospectus of.
31. Ibid., p. 1.

Not much information is available on Karacho Tin Mining Company. It had a total capital of £15,000. It was granted a certificate of incorporation on the 3rd of July, 1919.[32]

The explanations of the financial (working and nominal) capital of these companies are quite wounded and dubious and the Resident, in one note, had to admit that he could not understand what was supposed to be considered as their "working capital" and concluded that "fortunately (they) are not under any obligation to follow the tortuous, and sometimes shady paths of company finance."[33]

(ii) Acquisition of Land

Land was granted to the companies through licences by the government, the major ones being prospecting and mining licences. While the first covers the total area to be prospected for minerals, the second grants the actual rights to proceed with mining activities. Most reports are quite silent about the pre-existing population of these areas. These mining areas have however been given as follows:[34]

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32. SNP11/824m/1919 Karacho Mining Company, Memorandum and Articules of Association of, particularly the letter written to the Secretary, Secretariat, Kaduna by the Manager, Mr. Duncan.
33. SNP11/344m/1911 op.cit. See comments by the Resident on the prospectus submitted by the Company and dated 14/8/11.
34. Ibid., p. 2.

1. Baba Area
2. Shiburo Area
3. Gayia Area.
4. Kwaya Area.
5. Mofuta Area.
6. Satu Hill Area.
7. Magariji Area.

These licences were usually "exclusive" i.e. the companies being the only legally recognised users of such lands. In March, 1916, the new minerals ordinance, which superceddd the 1913 proclamation, came into force.[35] It was said that in formulating its provisions "the local council of the Nigerian Chamber of Mines was given every opportunity to offer suggestions and criticisms" and the two basic improvements upon that of 1913 were that it included provisions "which made it cheaper for companies to acquire land" and that "the possession of tin ore other than by the holders of mining land has been made illegal, and the purchasing of it may only be carried on by persons specially licensed. This will no doubt assist in the prevention of tin stealing."[36] In other words independent indigenous tin mining under colonial occupation was considered to be "tin stealing".

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35. SNP11/209m/1917 Mines Dept. Report (Annual) 1916 para. 20.

36. Ibid., para. 23. Backing this particular ordinance was the state control over all lands as clearly stated in Kanprof No. 57. Land; rural land policy para.3 which states that "the (traditional) ultimate ownership of land whether occupied or not was therefore vested in the hands of the community and is now by the land and native rights ordinance vested in the government."

Mining leases in Kano were granted for a period "not exceeding 21 years." This however was constantly "renewable". For alluvial leases there was a fee of 5/- per acre per annum.[37] Exclusive prospecting licences were said to be £5 per square mile per annum. A royalty of 5% upon the value of metal won was also charged.[38]

In 1911, for the Kano Tin Areas alone the "total area in question" was said to amount to about 44 square miles.[39] Mining lease was granted for 640 acres (1 square mile), exclusive prospecting licences for "some 21 square miles" and "for the remainder of the area formal applications for exclusive prospecting have been made."[40] Even though "the ground already proved ... consituted an extremely small proportion of the total area scheduled" yet it was said that:

> "The total reserves established to date represent at the present market price a gross selling value at Liverpool of approximately £524,000."[41]

By the end of 1917 the mining area had risen to 739.15 acres.[42]

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37. SNP11/344m 1911, op.cit., p. 2. This rate is definitely by far lower than the annual rent, rate and conservancy fee, charged per plot. See Chapter [illegible]
38. Ibid., p. 2.
39. Ibid., p. 2.
40. Ibid., p. 1.
41. Ibid., p. 1.
42. SNP11/643m/1919 Mines Dept. Annual Report 1918 Appendix A.

(iii) Labour Mobilisation

It was already been shown that the supply of labour to the tin mines was greatly facilitated by the fiscal policies of the colonial government or outright compulsion. It was reported that "in 1913 Kano Tin Areas employed 5 Europeans and 97 black workers."[43] In 1938, the number had risen to 8 and 232 respectively.[44] By 1946, the number of ever-be labourers on the tin fields was given as 1,130; 625 "laborers" and 505 "average contributors":[45] For example, in 1918, "efforts were made" by the colonial government "to induce an influx of labour to the tin-fields from all parts,"[46] of the Northern Provinces. It was the 1942 Legal Notice authorised all D.O's to perform the duties of authorised labour officers.[47] Such high information on wages is almost non-existent, it can however be deduced from the 1958 government report on this subject.

It was then stated that there did not appear to have been any minimum wage for labour generally throughout Nigeria.[48] It was even stated, officially, that migrant labourers employed during the dry season usually left

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43. SNP11/643m/1919 Appendix A. op.cit.
44. SNP11/209m/1917 Appendix A. op.cit.
45. Kanprof 6128 Tin Mines Wild Labour Advisory Report, p.3.
46. SNP11/643/1919 op.cit., para. 23. It was further stated that "considerable numbers of labourers arrived, but a large portion of the whole were seen for short periods only."
47. Nigeria. Handbook of Commerce and Industries. op.cit.
48. Ibid., pp.230-231.

for their villages during the wet season and the offer of wage incentives often failed to check this movement away.[49] On the other hand it was stated that mineralized alluvials were more easily workable during the rainy season.[50] The need for compelling labour during the wet season is particularly illustrated here.

Information on the conditions of work is quite scanty. In 1913, however, a dynamite explosion caused the death of two labourers and two more were injured. This resulted in an uprising after which Dogarai were permanently stationed at the site.[51]

Apart from the provision of a cheap labour force, the colonial government created other conditions for very profitable operations of the companies in two important respects. The first was concessions on "tax policies" and the second was the provision of infrastructure. Related to the latter is the fact that the government lowered freight charges (on ships and trains) to the minimum for colonial companies. There is no information on the pattern of taxation of companies apart from minor

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49. Ibid., p. 230.
50. Kanprof 69915.4, Kano Economic Survey, 1950. p. 9.
51. Kanprof "Kano Province, Report for Quarter Ending June 30th 1913", para. 21.

royalties. Most probably a comprehensive scheme for the taxation of companies did not operate during the earlier stages of colonial domination. In any case the disposition of the colonial government on this can be deduced from the various legislations passed in the 1950's. These included, among other things, an income tax relief or "a period of tax holiday" for companies with assets of not less than £5,000 for a period of about 5 years.[53] During this period all profits and dividends were also exempted from tax.[54] Similarly, there was import duties relief for a maximum of 10 years for companies involved in "industrial production" i.e. factories and various extensions of European industries, mining included.[55] Lastly, all profits and dividends "may be freely transferred to the country of origin" and "capital may also be repatriated."[56] On the other hand, we have noticed in the preceding chapter the heavy taxation to which peasants, pastoralists artisans and labourers were subjected.[57]

Secondly, roads and rails were constructed for the companies to evacuate their goods at minimum cost. These

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53. "Industrial Directory" 4th Edition; 1967, published fo Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos. Printed by the Nigerian National Press Ltd., Apapa, Nigeria,p.
54. Ibid., p. 42.
55. Ibid., p. 42.
56. Ibid., p. 43.
57. See relevant sections in Chapter Four.

roads were built by either forced labour and/or the taxation of the "public" i.e. the productive sector of the population. In 1913, for example, two surveyors were sent by the government for road construction plans to "Ningi Mines and Zinder."[58] In 1911, it was said that "a branch line (of the railway) from Zaria to the tin fields (of Riruwai) had been sanctioned by the authorities and the survey and earthwork in progress (were) expected to be completed early in 1912."[59] In 1916, the railway rates as well as shipping freights for tin ore were reduced.[60]

(iv) Profitability of Mining Operations.

Even though the reports on rate of production and profits handed over to the colonial government by the Mining Companies are unreliable even if only due to the attempts to evade the payment of high royalties, a rough idea of the profitability of the venture can be seen from the available, if quite sketchy, evidence.

It was reported that in 1916, the Kano Tin Areas won only 25.5 tons of ore.[61] In 1918, total exports of Wolfram, although not determined, were estimated at 18 tons, all from Liruen Kano.[62] In the same year, the Tin Areas were

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58. Kanprof 717/1913 Kano Province Report September 1913, para. 25.
59. 344./1911 op.cit., p. 2.
60. 209m/1917, Mines Dept. Report for 1916 op.cit., para. 18-19.
61. Ibid., para. 28.
62. 643m/1919 op.cit., para. 18.

reported to have won 90,221 tons of tin ore.[63] By 1939, it was reported that a small quantity of gold was being obtained from Sumaila.[64] In 1949, 318 tons of cassiterite and 109 tons of columbite, which were said to be in small quantities relative to tin, were obtained.[65] In its memorandum, the Kano Tin Areas claimed that:

> "The company should be in a position to produce from Baba Mining lease and deliver in Liverpool concentrate at a total cost of approximately £50 per ton which should at the present market price yield a profit of some £73:10:0 per ton..."[66]

From this it is clear, therefore, that the various companies established control over mines and the previously independent miners, utilising the tools and labour of the latter. It was this condition of production which provided the various companies the profits from which came the wages, the so called "working capital" and the capital for "full operations" (i.e. fixed assets). The memorandum of the Kano Tin Areas put it thus:

> "... profits from the immediate treatment of the more easily worked alluvial, in addition to the working capital provided by this issue, should

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63. Ibid., Appendix A.
64. Kanprof 3512/1939 op.cit., p. 19.
65. Kanprof 6991.4 op.cit., p. 19.
66. 344m/1911 op.cit., p.2.

furnish the company with all the funds that may be necessary for its full operations and its establishment on a large profit-earning basis."[67]

The profits were in all probability larger. For example, the 1918 annual report of the Mines Department gave the average profit for the year per ton as £94.90,[68] and further stated that the record price of £389 per ton was registered in August.[69]

4. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF RAW MATERIAL PRODUCTION FOR THE COLONY

The production of raw material for export led to the general decline of production in other sectors of the economy of Kano. In the first place, agricultural production came to be increasingly reduced to mere farming operations - largely for exportable crops. As a result of this there was a decline in food production, cultivation of raw materials for internal production and the processing of agricultural products. The alienation of land (e.g. forest and game reserves, mining and residential

67. Ibid.,p. 2.
68. 643m/1919 op.cit., para. 9.
69. Ibid., para. 24.

affected not only agriculture, pastoralism but also wood-working and hunting activities. Secondly the decline and stagnation of cottage based production in turn led to the increasing centralization and concentration of production under colonial factories on the one hand and increasing destitution of artisans, pastoralists and agriculturalists on the other.

A number of very critical factors would seem to have contributed to the decline in food production. In the first place it has to be noted that groundnuts themselves constituted a very important food item for the local economy and this was illustrated effectively during the 1914 drought and famine.[70] Secondly, available information on the export-import trade via the railway must be treated with caution for two reasons. The first is that these data effectively block an understanding of the external control exercised over internal production and exchange. This, as will be shown later, has obscured the internal developments which tended to increasingly centralize the ownership and processing and distribution of foodstuffs under colonial companies and their agents. Furthermore, these statistics of the railway seem to represent only a minute fraction

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70. This famine is referred to below. It is known locally as "kakalaba".

of the total trade of the colony and in a number of cases they are not even reliable. For example, it was reported in 1916 that less than 10% of the firms' import-export trade went via the railway "due to delays",[71] while in 1913 it was reported that native traders were "incurring very serious losses" due to the neglect of the railway to provide a reasonable time period for the carriage of perishable goods after accepting them and as such "something like £2,000 woth of kolas were destroyed and many lost their entire working capital."[72] Similarly in 1914, "natives" were still complaining about "total loss and delay in delivery."[73] This suggests that a number of merchants must have carried on their trade by other means such as by foot or pack animals. However, a rough idea could be gained from the railway statistics returns in the annual reports. For the quarter ending 30th June and 31st March 1913, the two dominant exports were ground-nuts and hides and skins. Alongside these were corn, potash, beans and onions.[74] In subsequent reports raw materials tend to become the most outstanding and constant while food imports continue to rise. By 1949, the most ✓

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71. Kanprof 108/1916 Report for 1915, para. 11.
72. Kanprof 606/1913 Report No. 47 Quarter Ending 30th June, 1913. para. 31.
73. Kanprof 447/1914 Annual Report Half Yearly, para. 73.
74. Kanprof 717, 1913 op.cit, passim.

important exports were groundnuts, groundnut oil and livestock while apart from kolanuts and other manufactures there were flour, salt, sugar and soap.[75]

It does appear, however, that the total land area, in terms of acreage utilised for food production, tended to decline not only due to the massive cultivation of groundnuts but also due to the alienation of land by the colonial government for residences (as was the case with virtually the whole of Kano Township and Barracks) roads and railways, government demonstration farms, forests and animal reserves as well as areas granted to mining companies for both prospecting and mining. Contributory to this was the fact that fief holding which contributed tremendously to food production under the Emirate government had been abolished.[76] This decline in total acreage could probably have been offset had there been increasing production on the land under cultivation. The evidence available suggests increasing lack of productivity. In the first place there was a tendency for the agricultural labour force to diminish in both quantity and quality while there was no basic change in the techniques of farming operations.[77] Not only was it that those peasants engaged

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75. Kanprof 69915.4 op.cit., pp.72-76.
76. See above, pp.21 ff.
77. See Chapter Six

on the land were largely involved in groundnut production, dry season migrations to the urban centres and tin mines as well as forced labour on the roads, railways and transportation but a number of "able bodied youngmen" tended to leave the land and become permanent wage labourers - resulting, according to an official colonial report, in less food production.[78] It would also seem that slaves were, formerly largely employed, in farm as well as industrial production.[79] The combined effects of these factors led the Resident to complain to the protectorate government in 1921 on the threat posed to the cultivation of grain and food crops due to the extensive development of groundnut cultivation.[80]

The net result of all these was that there was increasing growth in the number of the non-productive sector of the population (e.g.administrators, commercial middlemen, army and the police, students, destitutes and prisoners. These depended on the productive sector for their sustainance; while the central government and Native Authority establishments had their employees, it was reported that district heads also had paid staff on their lists,[81] and the village heads employed large staff of

78. NAK/SNP 7/5490/1908 Report by Major Festing...,op.cit.
79. See sections dealing with slavery in Imam Umoru's and Baba of Karo's accounts op.cit.
80. SNP 10/9/120p/1971 op.cit., para. 121.
81. SNP 10/9/120p/1921 op.cit., para. 14.

servants to do the work for which they were appointed.[82] There were two sets of police - government and "native". In 1918, there were about 84 of the former while among the latter about 242 were officially recognised by the government.[83] By 1921, the average number of prisoners in Kano gaol alone was reported as 566.[84] In 1914 a number of soldiers plus 300 carriers were further recruited for the colonial army.[85] Similarly, in 1915 it was reported that there were increasing migrations from the rural areas to the township and from various parts of West Africa into Kano.[86]

The colonial staff were supported through the funds from general taxes and Zakka. For example, for the quarter ending 31st June, 1913, about 955 tons of grains were secured; of these 200 tons were supplied to the railway workers at Bukuru extension and 20 tons to the mining survey team. Most of the remaining grain was absorbed locally, that is, it was used to feed troops and police.[87]

The callousness of the colonial state and trading companies, in relation to the peasantry, was graphically demonstrated during the famine of 1914. Despite the

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82. Ibid.
83. SNP 10/7/93p/1919 Annual Report No.56 for 1918 para.82-92.
84. SNP 10/9/120p/1921 op.cit., para. 87.
85. Kanprof 447/1914 op.cit., para. 4.
86. Kanprof 108/1915 op.cit., para. 2.
87. Kanprof 606/1913 op.cit., para. 7.

drought all taxes were collected as usual, by the State, that year, and the colonial trading companies took the opportunity to resell groundnuts to the peasantry at high profits. At the same time the State took "drastic measures to collect Zakka from the same peasantry. Yet it was in this same year that the Native Authority contributed a sum of £10,000 to the colonial war fund.[88] In 1921, in response to the "increasing cost of living" the government decided to raise the salaries of the Native Authority officials.[89] In 1930, however, despite the worldwide slump in prices which particularly affected export crops, it was reported that "it was not found necessary to reduce the taxation" and as a result many farmers were forced to sell food crops.[90] In 1937, Fairbarm stated that in the rural areas not only were there "insufficient payments to producers" but a "scarcity" of fuel, grazing lands and building materials.[91] This would seem to be related to colonial policy on forest reservation and land acquisition. Such were the origins of a large, highly consumptive, unproductive sector and a large, exploited, dwindling and productive sector of the colonial economy.

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88. Kanprof 376/1914 para. 20.
89. SNP 10/9/120p/1921 op.cit., para. 107-108. This pay rise was suggested as follows:

1.	Salaries not exceeding £18 p.a.	50%	increase
2.	" " " £36 "	33%	"
3.	" " " £48 "	25%	"
4.	" " " £60 "	10%	"

90. Kanprof 438/1930 p.7, para. 43
91. Kanprof 4048 pp.30-31.

However, through its policies on foreign trade, availability of raw materials, slave labour and activities in agricultural production, the colonial state set the stage for the progressive destruction of cottage industries - alongside which was the destruction of local food processing. Although information on this process is scanty one can deduce its general features from various fragments. We have already noted how taxation and custom duties in relation to long distance trade facilitated the increasing importation of salt, sugar and other food stuffs. In 1917, was promulgated the Native Authority Ordinance which made it a crime to brew, sell or even possess native liquor.[92] An examination of Imam Umoru's accounts on the economy clearly shows the wide based cottage production and processing of such food items as corn(milling and grinding), bakeries, oil extraction from nuts, confectionaries etc.[93] On the other hand the increasing destruction of these under colonial domination led to their centralisation under colonial companies and their agents. By the 1940's the colonial government was setting up various missions to study and recommend on the "industrial

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92. SNP 10/413p/1920 rule II To Prohibit the Drinking of Native Intoxicants.

93. See above, Chapter Two, pp.21 ff.

development" of the colony. A Sub-committee the "Adc. Industrial and Commercial Sub-committee" after its surveys, investigations and conclusions recommended to the government that there were two basic needs for economic development in the colony. The first was that foreign capital and industries by expatriates were needed. The second was that the government should provide more local arts and craft schools i.e. labour for demand in factories (or "industries"). Such "industries" included poultry farming, corn mills, sugar refinery, henna crushing machines and grinders.[94] By the 1950s private enterprises engaged in the processing of vegetable or animal oils and fats, liquor or beer, food processing, and confectionaries were

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94. Kanprof 62095.2 Productive Industrial and Commercial Sub-committee.

preponderating in the township.[95] These companies were owned by foreign capitalists either directly or in partnership with local intermediaries. The external control over these is particularly illustrated by the patent law which stated that:

> "under the registration of United Kingdom Patent Act, at present in force in Nigeria, only persons who are grantees of patent in the U.K. or any person deriving his rights from such grantees by assignment, transmission, or other

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95. "Industrial directory..." op.cit., for example, on p.24

1. Alhaji Uba Ringim & Co.	- groundnut oils and cake				
2. Dogon Arab Enterprise Ltd.	"	"	"	"	
3. Kano Oil Millers Ltd. (1952)	"	"	"	"	
4. K. Maroun Ltd. (1942)	"	"	"	"	
5. Nig. Oil Mills Ltd.	"	"	"	"	
6. Nig. Processing Co. Ltd.	"	"	"	"	
7. P.S. Mandrides & Co.Ltd.(1949)	"	"	"	"	
8. Rad & Fedoul Ltd.(1953)	- H.P.S. Groundnuts.				

On p. 8.

1. Nigeria Breweries Ltd. (1956)	Beer.
2. Nigeria Bottling Co.Ltd.(1956)	"Soft"
3. Nigeria Sword Brand Co. Ltd.	"Soft"

On p. 7.

1. Chattalas Brothers Ltd. (1955)	Sugar Confectiona
2. Amalgamated Industries Ltd.	Sugar
3. Kano Confectionary Ltd.(1964)	Sweets, Coffee et
4. Nig. Sweets & Confectionary Co.Ltd.(1960)	
5. Nig. Processing Co. Ltd.(1963)	"Local Food"
6. Northern Foods Product Ltd.(1964)	"Local Food"
7. Osman El-Taeb and Brothers	- Bone Crusher.

operation of law may apply to the registration of patents within 3 years from the date of issue of the patent to have such patents registered in Nigeria."[96]

The dominant position of the colonial companies with regard to distribution of commodities also means, and increasingly involved, the control over the processing and distribution of food items. Instrumental to this was the increasing monetization of the economy including other parts from which food was previously imported e.g. Southern parts of Nigeria and the cost of transporting goods by the railway or lorries'.

These two factors - the total decline in foodstuff production and processing and, as is discussed in Chapter Eight the centralization of food imports under colonial companies operating for high profits led to insufficiency (or "scarcity") of food in relation to the total consumption. Secondly the value of food items, in money terms, increasingly rose to the advantage of companies and their agents. Where this insufficiency could be alleviated through imports it was further aggravated by the hoarding and price policies of the companies and their agents. These appear to be the basis of the inflation and rising

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96. Ibid.,pp.43-44.

cost of living. In most of the annual reports there are prices of food items and these seem to be increasingly on the rise. Not only the prices of such internally produced food items such as guinea corn, beans, and rice rose but in the Kano economic survey of 1950 it was reported that imported manufactured goods had been rising at a rate ranging from 450-800% annually while local produce for export had been rising less than 400%.[97] This is amply demonstrated by the famine of 1914. For not only was it more profitable to resell the groundnuts purchased by the companies from the peasants back to them than to export it to Britain but there was also large importation of foodstuffs from Southern Nigeria. This means that for those peasants, pastoralists and other workers who had no remaining cash (having used most of this cash to pay taxes) or resources of debt and/or sales of land/cattle and other possessions there was no possibility of acquiring foodstuff. Those who had such means would in turn become further destituted. This critical situation of the peasants is further confirmed by an official report which attributed the failure of the relief operations to two factors. The first, which would appear to be ineffective, was given as "late arrival" of foodstuffs. The second was given as lack of cash on the part of the victim

97. Kamprof 69915.4 op.cit., p. 77.

to purchase the foodstuff.[98] From the second factor it follows that even if the foodstuffs had "arrived early" the victims could not have been able to purchase them. From the above it is evidently clear that the major reason for the 1914 famine was that the peasantry lacked surplus. For whatever little surplus they had, they used it to pay the numerous taxes of the government as well as creating the profits of colonial trading companies. This had the immediate effect of further dispossessing them from the land and other personal effects thus throwing them into debt, unemployment and destitution (if they had escaped death from hunger).

These developments, we may summarise, led to what is termed "increasing costs of living." But this "living" in terms of food, shelter and clothing etc. was effectively coming under the control of the companies and to the extent that its "cost" increased it did so to the advantage of the companies. Such was the issue that led the government to consider increasing wages for its staff at the same time as taxes for the productive sector were increasing. That is to say that the productive sector contributed to the colonial government (in form of labour and taxes) funds for its operations in creating conditions

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98. Kanprof 447/1914 op.cit., para. 3.

conducive for the colonial companies. They similarly produced various raw materials for these companies and their intermediaries. On the other hand they consumed imports only to the extent that they furthered the profits of private enterprises. The destitution of the peasantry was thus caused essentially by their lack of control over their labour and its products, loss of land and cottage industries all of which resulted in the decline in their material well being viz: foodstuffs, shelter and clothings.[99]

In conclusion therefore, we see that colonial domination led to the development of a specific form of capitalist relation in production. These capitalist production relations are however characterised by three basic factors. The first is the crucial agency of the colonial state in the development of capitalist relations of production. Secondly the very nature of the development tended to centralise in the case of the mines,

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99. This is, in an inverted manner, clearly stated in the reports. It was said that the "objects of British activities in Nigeria" were "according to declared policy" to stimulate economic and social development. In this endeavour, it was said, the "cooperation of the people" was needed. The way they were expected to "contribute" was said to be "through their contributing cash, labour and material." Kanprof 69915.4 op.cit., pp. 1-2.

ownership of resources under British capitalist firms. In other areas of production where direct control is not so apparent such as in agricultural production the State ensured, through indirect methods, that peasants largely produced raw materials for British industrial capitalist firms. Further developments of raw material production itself (largely due to decline in handicraft production, food production and excessive taxation) tends to separate the peasants from their means of production - land, especially through indebtedness to local middlemen. As such the process clearly exhibits trends which tend to further the concentration of land under the control of the middlemen of these same foreign capitalist firms. Thirdly, the monopolistic control of British capitalist firms in turn lead to a fundamental disarticulation of production locally. This is clearly evidenced in the fact that agricultural production was geared basically to satisfying foreign requirements, while mineral extraction had no connection with local requirements. The net result of this control over production is dependence, particularly in manufactured goods and especially in industrial technology. We will consider these facets of production in the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER SIX

THE DESTRUCTION OF INDEPENDENT COTTAGE PRODUCTION AS THE BASIS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEPENDENCE.

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter it is argued that the decline and stagnation of household based manufacturing was principally caused by the active role of the colonial state and not, as is usually assumed, by the cheaper prices of European imported goods. The aim and end result of this intervention by the colonial state and the consequent destruction of cottage industries was the availability of an abundant, and therefore cheap, labour force and raw materials within the colony. The existence of a cheap wage labour force and supply of raw materials, at the disposal of British manufacturing industries, made it highly economical to establish various factories within the colony.[1] We shall illustrate the role of the colonial state in the destruction of cottage manufacturing by showing, on the one hand, how factors such as heavier land tax indirectly affected cottage production and secondly, how the cottage industries were dealt a direct blow by an increase in industrial taxes and by various other restrictions. For this purpose we shall use case studies of five industries, namely iron-working, textiles, leather working, wood working and food processing.

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1. See Chapter Seven below.

2. FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR THE BREAK-UP OF COTTAGE INDUSTRIES

As already stated, it is generally assumed, and sometimes vigorously asserted that the decline of cottage industrial production was related to the better quality and cheaper prices of European imported goods. A thorough examination of all the evidence shows very clearly that such an assumption is unfounded. As we shall argue in Chapter eight, the problem with such an assumption, deriving from the theory of comparative cost advantage and relative prices, is that it concentrates solely on the end result of a historical process while refusing to examine the very process which created the conditions for this type of production.

It is generally assumed that the mere development of the industrial revolution and the increasing mechanisation of production alone were sufficient to destroy cottage production. What is generally negated, therefore, is that this mechanisation of production went hand in hand with the increasing concentration and centralisation of production under the control of privately owned colonial companies. The attempt to establish this control necessarily brought the companies into conflict with cottage producers especially over the control of raw materials and labour. Only the destruction of these cottage industries could release these

two vital elements to the services of the colonial companies. The role of the colonial state, therefore, was largely to dispossess cottage producers from their control over labour / as well as hinder the availability of raw materials for this form of production in order to put these resources at the disposal of the colonial companies. It was only when, after a long period of struggle, these conditions were established and the cottage industries were operating in a highly adverse context but one highly profitable to the colonial companies, that the question of prices began to assume any significance.[2]

We have already discussed the nature of colonial taxation, forced labour and the attitude to slavery. We have seen how these contributed to the decline of slavery as well as household mobilisation of labour on the one hand, and to the emergence of a wage labour force on the other.[3] We will now proceed to show that the heavy taxation levied on household industries as well as land taxes levied on all / households, under the Revenue Survey System, also did a great deal to destroy household production. Apart from this there were the various restrictions placed on the production or importation of raw materials needed for cottage industrial production.

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2. See Chapter Eight below.
3. See Chapter Four above.

(i) Land Taxes

In 1918 a new method of tax assessment, the Revenue Survey, was introduced as an improvement over the previous taki assessment. It was stated that, for this:

> "The principle generally (was) to apply it where there (was) definite land hunger and where farms (had) a definite exchange value."[4]

As such it was applied only in those parts of Kano which are most densely populated and which are usually referred to, in geographical literature, as the "Kano closed settled zone". Such places include Kano City, Kumbotso, Ungogo, Kura, Dawakin Tofa, Kiru, Gezawa, Minjibir, etc.[5] The second feature of this survey system was that the levies were at the initial stages based on a flat rate per acre. The burden of taxation was also aggravated by the fact that in each case the tax per acre was accompanied by a compulsory lump sum "industrial tax" which had to be paid by those paying the land tax.[6] Finally, yet further increases were made possible by the introduction of the criterion of soil quality: increases over and above the flat rate per acre were made on the basis of estimated soil fertility. It was, however, admitted that in a number of cases non-fertile soils were falsely valued as fertile.[7]

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4. Kanprof 1708 Vol.I, Revenue Survey - Kano Emirate, p.6.
5. See Michael J. Mortimore and Wilson, Land and People in the Kano closed-settled zone, Zaria, 1965.
6. Kanprof 1708, Vol.I., op.cit., p. 17.
7. Ibid., p. 6.

With these various improvements on tax assessment in relation to the previous Taki assessment, there was a tremendous rise in revenue. In 1923/24 this system was applied to Ungogo District and the following increases were recorded.[8]

TABLE 4

A COMPARISON OF TAKI AND REVENUE SURVEY TAX ASSESSMENT

UNIT	TAX UNDER TAKI AT 3/- PER ACRE	TAX UNDER REVENUE SURVEY AT 3/- PER ACRE
Tudun Fulani	£122	£343
Ungogo	£387	£1,077
Rafin Zakara	£328	£638
Munchikka	£220	£500

Prior to the introduction of the Revenue Survey, the total Taki assessment revenue for the district, at 3/- per acre, was £5,800. Under the Revenue Survey system, it shot up to £9,674.[9] Regarding this virtual doubling of the Revenue, the Resident remarked that the Revenue Survey "provided increased revenue in a way that no other method (was) capable of doing."[10]

8. Ibid., p. 6.
9. Ibid., p. 6.
10. Ibid., p. 40.

These increases in land tax compelled a number of peasants, who could not meet the new tax demands, to abandon the land. In Minjibir District, for example, the number of abandoned farms recorded for 1923-24 was 229, and figures elsewhere were as follows:[11]

Ungogo	53
Gezawa	243
Kumbotso	19
Kano City	60

The same system was introduced in Dawakin Kudu District in 1938 and by 1940 it was reported by the District Officer that while some people had taken new farms many had abandoned their old farms. He stated:

> "taking these new farms into account there is still an appreciable net decrease since 1928 in the area under cultivation in the district. The village heads whom I saw stated, and the Galadima confirmed, that in recent years many farmers have migrated to Birnin Kudu and elsewhere. This exodus has no doubt been accelerated since the application of Revenue Survey assessment."[12]

It is evident, therefore, how this form of taxation contributed indirectly to the break-up of cottage production. The

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11. Ibid., p. 32.

12. Kanprof 1908, Vol.II, Revenue Survey - Kano Emirate, para. 3.

increase in the migration of labour which was a direct result of increased land taxation accelerated the disintegration of comprehensive agricultural activities, which in turn led to a drop in the production of the raw materials necessary for cottage production. Apart from this, however, there were taxes which affected the various handicraft industries. For example it was reported that there was an "industrial tax of 9/- a head on farmless adult males."[13] Similarly, there were various restrictions on the availability of raw materials as well as, in some cases, the raiding and destruction of cottage industrial locations.[14] Let us however consider these with reference to actual cases of handicraft industries viz: iron working, textiles, leather working, wood working and food processing.

(ii) Direct Restrictions on Cottage Manufacturing

From its inception, the policy that the colonial state adopted with regard to the iron industry was to take over the mines, thus ensuring a supply of raw materials for the colonial companies, while cutting off the main source of supply for local iron-workers. Secondly, a series of official restrictions further inhibited the latters' production. The net result was of course, the destruction of the local industry and the consequent opening up of the

13. Kanprof, Annual Report 1917/1918, op.cit.

14. Kanprof 1494(1) Sleeper Keys - theft of (General Question.)

market to colonial products.

Before the imposition of these restrictions, the local iron industry was flourishing, as was evidenced by C.A. Birtwistle in his Commercial Intelligence Report on the resources of Kano in April 1907. Referring to the iron pits and smelting furnaces near Pawa, Birtwistle states:

> "they (the iron deposits) and the process of working metal are very interesting as indicating how independent these northern natives can be of goods of European manufacture and how entirely self-supporting the districts are."[15]

However, the thriving local industry soon found itself strangled by colonial policies restricting local mining and the possession of iron ore and concentrates. The local blacksmiths strove hard for the survival of their industry by resorting to illegal mining or lamban gudu, which became so widespread that in 1941 the Manager of Gold & Base at Riruwai voiced the following complaint:

> "This matter of thieving is becoming very serious in this district."[16]

The colonial government retaliated by prosecuting those caught under the "mineral ordinance" and raiding and

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15. SNP7/1765/1907, op.cit., p. 23.
16. Kanprof 3562 Prosecutions under Mineral Ordinance especially letter dated 6th June, 1941.

destroying smith quarters in the rural areas.[17] As a result, metal workers were increasingly forced to fall back on scrap metals such as old railway lines.[18]

To appreciate fully the effect of government policy on the position of iron workers, it is necessary to compare the above with the situation prevailing under the Emirate, a situation characterised by the positive encouragement of the local industry. For example, blacksmiths were exempted from Kurdin Kasa or payment of one hoe per compound head.[19] In contrast to this, by 1950 the once thriving and widespread iron industry was reduced to two exclusive prospecting licences and a mere seven leases in the whole of Kano province, employing an average of 1,800 men per annum, and monopolised by the colonial companies.[20]

There is ample evidence to show that the textile industry was also in a flourishing condition prior to the introduction of colonial measures designed to suppress it. In the 1907 report we have referred to, C.A. Birtwistle states the following:

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17. Kanprof 3647 Steel Supply of... instructions, July 1940.
    Kanprof 3867 Tinplate and Wrought Steel Holloware - import of, stampings of.
18. Kanprof 1494 (1) Sleeper Keys-theft of (General question)
    Kanprof 1494 (2) Scrap iron - sale by Nigerian Railway.
    Kanprof 3340 Scrap metal (1) disposal of (2) lowest supply of.
19. See Chapter Two, p. 34.
20. Compiled from annual reports.

> "the spinning and weaving industries are ... firmly established in every town and village - one might almost say in every compound - around Kano."[21]

Locally cultivated raw cotton was totally absorbed by the cottage industries, and indeed was insufficient for the needs of the cottage producers, thus making necessary the importation of further quantities of raw cotton, a fact which was noted in various early reports of the colonialists dealing with the resources of the Protectorate.[22]

Apart from raw cotton, another important raw material for the textile industry, as noted by Barth and others, was raw silk. The silk textile industry, which produced such cloths as sanyan and aleri,[23] was as flourishing as the cotton textile industry, and a 1912 Report states that all local supplies of raw silk were "readily absorbed for local manufacture at a price higher than the exporter would be prepared to pay."[24]

On the other hand, such textiles as baft, imported from Britain, were not at all popular.[25] In 1907, the Commercial Intelligence Officer (C.I.O) observed that throughout Kano

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21. SNP7/1765/1907, op.cit., p. 17.
22. SNP7/6574/1908, Northern Nigeria: Commercial, Agricultural and mineral resources - information as to, para. 4.
23. SNP7/4246/1905, Transmitting a copy of an article in the Board of Trade Journal re-sericulture
24. SNP7/5374/1912 Silk Cocoon Industry, p. 1.
25. SNP7/4246/1905, op.cit., See enclosure titled Mr.J. Arthur Hulton - Purchase of Samples of Native Cloth for, by Resident - Kano.

District, away from the main roads, "no more than 2% of the cloths worn by the natives are of European manufacture."[26] In an attempt to "capture the market" the colonial industry was driven to producing imitations of the local products.[27]

The colonial government took a variety of steps to guarantee the ultimate predominance of colonial textiles. These included measures enabling the British companies to monopolise the purchase of raw materials, and restrictions governing the import of raw materisls by local textile industries and the sale of the latters' products.

To guarantee the supply of raw materials for the production of colonial textiles the colonial government engaged in the setting up of ginneries in Katsina, Zaria and Kano.[28] The attempt to monopolise raw silk can be seen in the "proposed legislation to give the (African silk) company the virtual monopoly of the collection of silk and its degumming at a factory to be erected in Nigeria."[29] Finally, as we shall show, the imposition of numerous conditions or regulations governing the marketing of raw materials, e.g. the setting up of market and buying areas and of storage

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26. SNP7/1765/1907 op.cit., p. 14.
27. SNP7/4246/1905 op.cit., passim.
28. SNP7/5529/1912 Cotton Industry 1912 - Report on.
29. Kanprof 6068/S1 Department of Commerce and Industries - Organisation of. para. 82.

plots, the granting of licences etc., were intended to further ensure the steady supply of materials to the colonial companies and the resulting inavailability of materials to the local industries.[30] Almost every step taken by the colonial government to ensure the development of the colonial textile industry was in fact accompanied by a parallel move to stifle local production. This pattern is common to all of the case studies, but nowhere is it clearer than in the textile industry. Similarly, the importation of indigo and other dyes vital to the local industry suffered from a number of restrictions. Meanwhile, the British companies were busily engaged in experiments designed to enable them to utilize these popular dyes.[31]

The imposition of the cultivation of a particular type of cotton suitable for colonial manufacture went hand in hand with the "endeavour ... to eradicate all native cotton in the outlying districts of Kano province", the latter alone being suitable for the local industries.[32] The imposition

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30. Kanprof 1626 Cotton Marketing regulations according to rule 19 it was an offence to buy, sell or resell cotton for "native hand" manufacture

31. SNP7/2135/1909 Indigo from Northern Nigeria forwarded by Mr. G.C.Dudgeon. Report on by the Imperial Institute.

32. Kanprof 1681 Agric.Report Kano Division. A Report dated May 14th 1937 states:
"An endeavour is being made to eradicate all native cotton in the outlying districts of Kano Province. At present a cotton Mallam is touring the South Eastern District and has reported that all cotton stumps in Gwaram and Birnin Kudu districts have been uprooted and burnt".

on institutions such as police, prisons, schools, etc., of imported British textiles for uniforms (see Chapter Eight) went hand in hand with the ban on any exportation of locally woven cloth. Protest on the part of weavers in Kano and Ilorin in 1946 against the ban on exportation of local textiles and the importation of raw materials was to no avail.[33]

Once again, for a real appreciation of the effects of these colonial government measures on the local industry, it is necessary to contrast the situation described above with that prevailing under the Emirate. Under the Emirate administration, cotton was one of the items exempted from tax, a fact noted in the 1909 financial assessment report:

> "a large quantity of cotton is planted in all parts due, no doubt, to the fact that it is free from tax, also that it provides an easy industry for the womenfolk."[34]

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33. Kanprof 3752 Local Kano Cloth - Supply of. In 1946, a telegram (11.6.46) was sent to the Secretary of the Northern Provinces to the effect that the ban on the export of locally woven cloth and importation of yarn was causing repeated complaints by weavers in Kano and Ilorin. The Secretary insisted that the ban be maintained.

34. SNP7/5570/1909 Kano Province assessment 1909, para. 49.

The development and decline of the Kano cottage leather working industry provides further evidence of colonial government intervention to the benefit of colonial enterprises and the detriment of household-based production.

In 1907, Birtwistle reported of the Kano leather-workers that:

> "They are really expert tanners and leather workers and turn out excellent sandals, slippers, riding boots etc., in addition to saddles and horse furniture generally."[35]

There is ample evidence that leader-working was in fact an old and well established industry by that time. As we shall try to show, it was the colonial leather industry, aided and abetted by the colonial government, and centralised around a few companies such as Bata, Lennards, etc., which reduced the local cottage industry from a producer of essential commodities to a mere supplier of novelty goods geared to the tourist market.

As in previous case studies, there were at work here, on the one hand, a number of government measures designed to encourage and support the efforts of the colonial companies and, on the other, a number of government regulations and restrictions aimed at crippling the cottage industry.

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35. SNP7/1765/1909 op.cit., p.23.

In terms of encouragement, the colonial government helped to ensure the supply of raw materials, especially hides and skins, to the colonial companies. For example, after the cattle collected as Jangali were slaughtered, their skins were made available solely to colonial purchasers. Official research was undertaken into various aspects of the industry with a view to improving quality. For example, in 1908, the Imperial Insitute completed a study of tanning and dyeing methods.[36] The Veterinary Department established flaying and drying sheds in almost every village and trained the Sarkin Pawa (butchers) in flaying and tanning.[37] These skills were also taught in the Shahuci Elementary School which was established in 1919 and also, by colonial government order, in all the prisons. In 1930, after a tour of the Northern Provinces, the Chief Veterinary Officer expressed his "appreciation of the initiative, enterprise and energy shown in getting the scheme of hide and skin improvement launched in Kano and surrounding districts" by J. Heard, the Kano Veterinary officer. He also commented on "the advisability of enforcing

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36. SNP7/6103/1908 Leather, native - Memo by Dr. H.A.Foy on preparation of.

37. Kanprof 4166 Hides and Skins - controlled markets, drying sheds.

shade drying and having skin sheds put up in every market and village as is now being done in Kano Emirate."[38]

The regulations and restrictions to which we have referred, and which adversely affected the home-based leather industry, were aimed mainly at limiting the supply of raw materials to the cottage producers.[39] For example, regulations were instituted forbidding the carrying of wet skins out of slaughter houses. This resulted in the widespread theft of skins from official drying sheds. Offenders against the Wet Skin Ordinance were prosecuted by the Native Authority.[40]

The various restrictions placed upon the industry by the colonial government had so seriously crippled the industry that by 1950 the colonial authorities could report, somewhat naively, that the industry had declined, being largely restricted to the Kano Airport, where it constituted "a small but persistent earner of hard currency" and that "as the importance of the Airport increases" so will "this earning power."[41] In another report it was stated that all "indigenous crafts (had) declined" and were now limited to "minor industries of the tourist

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38. Ibid., See Memo dated 13/6/30
39. Kanprof 4083 Hides and Skins Health Certificates.
    Kanprof 4084 Hides and Skins; Legislation and Controls.
40. Kanprof 4166 op.cit., See letter dated 11.2.37.
41. Kanprof 6068/S.1 op.cit., para. 69.

attracting type, such as ornamental leather work."[42] Ironically enough all these reports attribute the causes of this decline to "lack of training" and see their salvation only in the development of 'tourism'.

Wood provided the raw material for various cottage industries involved in the production of various household utensils, furniture, tool handles and for construction purposes. It was also used in the preparation of various herbal medicines and also as fuel.[43] The major feature of colonial policy in relation to this was simply to curtail the availability of such resources and thereby indirectly cripple the industry. Colonial forestry regulations and other laws relating to farm trees, along with the establishment of forest reserves, were the major forms of restriction used to deny local producers access to wood. The purpose of these regulations, it was explained, was:

> "to allow the wide scale exploitation of forest estates by professional timber exploiters in accordance with working plans as well as by the present method of allowing the taking of individual trees by permit and the payment of fees for each tree."[44]

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42. Kanprof 1762 Industrial and Agricultural Education in Nigeria.
43. See relevant sections in Ferguson, op.cit.
44. Kanprof 1262 Forestry (N.A.) Rules under the Forestry Ordinance (all Kano N.A's) Circular No. 194/1947.

The forestry rule essentially states that permits had to be obtained for either the cutting or lopping of farm trees as well as trees in the forest reserves. Similarly permits had to be obtained before any produce of such trees should be used. The Alkali courts were, therefore, empowered to deal with "forest offence such as the felling of farm trees and trees in forest reserves."[45]

In a letter to the Resident of Kano, dated 1st July, 1942, the Conservator of Forests for Kano and Katsina wrote that:

> "In fixing the prices of the trees (for permits) consideration has been given to the value of the produce from the trees or minor forest produce. The first and second class trees are so classified because of their valuable minor produce and to prohibit their being felled for such things as mortars and tool handles."[46]

The prices of the trees ranged from fifteen shillings per tree in the first class to one shilling in the sixth class, the latter being the shrub class. The effects of these colonial measures were quite farreaching. The hardship suffered by professional woodworkers as a result of them is noted in 1948 by the forest officer in a letter to the Resident, Kano:

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45. Ibid., p. 1.
46. Ibid.

> "There are in many villages professional fuel cutters (some resident, others itinerant), joist splitters and mortar makers. These people are, by the rules, required to take permits and taxed on their professions. It might therefore be unjust to tax them further by making them take permits."[47]

He further went on to show how the peasantry in general were affected by the measures, pointing out that they were "economically dependent" on some of these trees "for food, fodder, fuel or implements" and consequently that "they (were) suffering a certain degree of hardship by not being allowed to lop or fell the trees in any way".[48] The shortage of wood for use as fuel is referred to in the Annual Report for 1952, which states that consequently "local opinion is opposed to further increases "of forest reserves.[49] In some places, for example Dawakin Tofa, this difficulty in obtaining wood for fuel constrained the development of the local manufacture of sugar.[50]

The official colonialist justification for the imposition of the forestry regulations was that they would restrict the indiscriminate felling of trees. But in fact,

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47. Ibid., Letter No. 310/48.
48. Ibid., Letter dated April, 1948.
49. Kanprof 7956 Annual Report 1952 Kano Province, para. 27.
50. Kanprof, Dawakin Tofa, Vol. II, Gazeteer, para. 41.

in some ways they had the opposite effect. As one forest officer observed, the rise in the price of firewood tempted many to fell farm trees which hitherto had not been felled for such purposes.[51] This fact was also pointed out by the Chiroma in a letter to the Conservator of Forests, in which he stressed that the farmers themselves were aware of the value of such trees and only felled them when they were old.[52] The Emirs' council also opposed the inclusion of certain farm trees under such restrictions.[53]

Nevertheless, the policy persisted and offenders were prosecuted. For example, in 1951, the Wakilin Daji of Babura prosecuted three offenders. In Gaya in 1953, 32 people were prosecuted while in Kura "62 persons (were) accused of illegally felling farm trees during August, October and December 1952."[54] In 1953 the District Officer Kano emphasized to the Chiroma that he should:

> "Please instruct all district heads and native courts that persons convicted of taking forest produce illegally without permits must be given a suitable punishment in addition to being made to take the appropriate permit."[55]

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51. Kanprof 1262 op.cit., letter dated 5th April, 1948.
52. Ibid., letter dated 10th December, 1942.
53. Ibid., letter dated 5th April, 1948.
54. Ibid., Kanprof 1297 Forestry Laws Prosecutions taken in Native Authority courts.
55. Ibid., letter dated May, 1953.

The processing of raw materials into food stuff as well as the preparation of various foods and snacks was carried out largely by the womenfolk in various households. To mention only a few examples, they extracted oils from sheanut and groundnut, and prepared cornflour, millet balls, milk, yoghourt, fats, cakes and soup ingredients. The net effect of colonial administrative measures was to, on the one hand, destroy the basis of this cottage production and on the other to centralise and promote such production under colonial companies and in some cases government agencies. Where this was centralised under individual "native enterprisers" it afforded the increasing importation of and dependence on British machinery. For example, the rules relating to sugar production stated that:

> "no person should manufacture sugar without obtaining permit from N.A. ... approved by the Resident."

A necessary condition for obtaining such a permit was the possession of crushers and rollers imported by John Holt.[56] In case of non-compliance, offenders were convicted and subjected to a fine of £50 or, in default, six months imprisonment with or without hard labour. In addition,

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56. Kanprof 3565 Sugar Local Production of, rules regarding; sugar manufacture ordinance 1933 No. 43.

owners of sugar mills invariably had their permits cancelled.[57] In 1944, the colonial government decided to centralise sugar production under a few individuals who could afford to buy imported crushers and rollers, despite the Emir's insistence that such a step would render some people jobless. In Rogo District, where it was discovered that none of the "natives" had the required £5 for a crusher deposit let alone the £10 for "capital outlay", the government undertook to provide loans to a few individuals.[58]

3. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ROLE OF THE COLONIAL STATE

In discussing the role of the state in the destruction of cottage industries we must mention, if only briefly, the activities of its special agency - the Department of Commerce and Industries - to further illustrate the active role of the state in this process. Contrary to what the theorists of the laissez-faire character of the state would have us believe, even the first Acting Director of the Department of Commerce and Industries noted that:

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57. ~~Ibid~~., p. 2.

58. Ibid., p. 2.

> "In the past the administrative service was the maid of all work. In many places in the more remote parts of the country, that position still holds, and it is the District Officer who repairs the washouts, builds the cotton roads, carries out the fertilizer propaganda, and stresses the need for careful flaying. I suggest that the same ... will be required from members of this department."[59]

The validity of this observation can be further appreciated if it is noted that in 1908 there was a request for information from one W.R. Nicholas of Natal, South Africa, regarding the prospects for commerce as well as the exploitation of agricultural and mineral resources. The Secretary of the Northern Provinces replied that:

> "This country is still far from ripe for individual enterprise ... It is futile to disguise the fact that the development of the country is not in a far enough advanced state for individual enterprise except under certain conditions."[60]

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59. Kanprof 6068/S.1 op.cit., para. 116.
60. SNP7/6574/1908 op.cit., para. 3-4.

We have already indicated in Chapter Four how the colonial state created conditions for the profitable operation of "private enterprise". One of the immediate consequences of the increasing destruction of cottage-based production was that it led to the creation of a large reserve of "free" labour force. The increasing development of "drifters" and "vagrants", expecially noticeable in Kano by the late forties, is something which most colonial documents confirm and lament.[61] A comparison of the various figures of cottage producers for every village compiled in assessment reports of the first two or three decades of the twentieth century with the returns of the "census of tradesmen" carried out by the colonial government between 1945-46 clearly reveals that such production was clearly declining and many were losing their means of livelihood.[62]

However, it can be argued that the role of the state was not actually that crucial and that without the involvement of the state in the economy the same could have happened anyway due to the forces of demand and supply, particularly in view of the industrial revolution in Europe. This argument would however be untenable. In the first place the evidence we have given above clearly shows that this process

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61. For example, see Kanprof 506 Dispossessed farmers, land settlement schemes for.

62. Kanprof 6173 Census of Tradesmen.

was largely achieved through the crucial agency of the colonial state. Secondly, it is obvious that the new conditions and relations of production created by the industrial revolution included the dominance of the capitalist class and the role of the colonial state was to extend, entrench and perpetuate the interests of this class in the colonies. We will illustrate this with reference to the role of the colonial state in industrial production during the Second World War.

The colonial government was forced, under war conditions, to resurrect some local industries for the production of various necessities. Although most of these were centralised under the colonial government they were operated in such a way that they promoted "private enterprise". For example, various individuals were appointed as distributors of various commodities and in some cases loans were granted by the state to individuals to establish plants. Related to this was that in a number of cases some machinery such as hand presses, spinning wheels and looms, to mention a few, had to be imported from Britain.[63] In 1940, the Kano Resident stated that the "economic conditions brought about by the war ... led to the development of small local industries,"[64] while

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63. See footnote 59. Also see Kanprof 4842 Spinning wheels and looms.

64. SNP 17 33147 Kano Province Annual Report 1940, para. 14.

in the following year the Secretary of the Northern Provinces stated that:

> "the war has stimulated local industries such as ... the production of butter, sugar, string, native woven cloths etc. It would be a great pity if all this stimulation were followed by a rapid decline after the war and it is suggested that the government should adopt the policy of safeguarding these industries after the war."[65]

However, after the war the colonial state further encouraged the establishment of various factories, as branches of different firms in Britain. We shall turn to this subject in the following chapter.

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65. Kanprof 4493 Local Production of Foodstuffs - Instructions re: para. 5.

CHAPTER SEVEN.

THE BEGINNING OF FACTORY PRODUCTION AND FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF THE COLONIAL ECONOMY.

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, an attempt is made to show that the last and most crucial role of the state in the development of the colonial economy was the initiation of colonial factory production. This development firmly centralised industrial production under foreign capitalist companies. Thus, far from signalling an independent process of industrialisation within the colony, the development of factory production in fact marked a more advanced stage in the effective industrial and technological subordination of the colony to the European capitalist economies.

Factory production, or actual locally-based manufacturing activities as opposed to the mere processing of raw materials destined for export, did not take off on any appreciable scale in Kano until after the Second World War. By that time, the development of colonial relations of production had matured sufficiently to support the establishment of factories by the colonial firms. Given this internal precondition other external factors such as the protectionist policy of the 'traditional' Colonial powers, like Britain and France, and the pressure of the United States, the major capitalist power after the war,

to open up colonies to 'free' foreign investments further stimulated this process.[1]

In chpaters five and six, we have fully discussed how the colonial state, through the systematic destruction of the previous household-based manufacturing industries had made available to the colonial firms the elements necessary for the development of colonial production: raw materials, a cheap wage labour force and a readymade market for the goods manufactured in the home country. In addition, as we have shown, the state had laid the basic infrastructure for the development of a colonial economy centred around the export of raw materials and the importation of manufactured items, viz: roads and railways storage depots etc. Factory production should not be seen as a departure from this structure, but rather as a more advanced stage of the same system. In other words, with the expanding availability of raw materials, and the existence of a basic infrastructure which could now be further developed to provide more sophisticated amenities (e.g. electricity and pipe-borne water), manufacturing within the colony itself became more economically viable in some cases than the import-export system. Moreover, factory production could benefit from the protection of the colonial

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1. See B.U. Ekuerhare, On Industrial under development in Nigeria; a theoretical liberation of Walter Rodney, being a text of Walter Rodney Memorial Lecture delivered at FASS, A.B.U. Zaria, 12th June 1982. pp. 11-13.

government against external competition as well as from government legislation and financial aid.

"Industrialisation" in the colony must therefore be seen for what it was: a proliferation of factories dependent technologically and financially on external sources; it Meant an advanced stage of subordination of the colonial economy to foreign capitalist interests. "Industrialisation" in the colony was made possible only as a result of a long process whereby the pre-existing organisation of production was replaced by colonial capitalist relations of production. Those scholars who try to explain colonial industrialisation in terms of market forces ignore the historical role of the colonial state in bringing about the necessary production relation for the establishment of colonial industry, and thus view the phenomenon in a historic and social vacuum. Likewise, the distinction commonly made between "traditional" and "modern" in this context is clearly an unscientific divice which masks an authentic historical transformation:[2] the gradual destruction of cottage production on the one hand and the growing ascendency of colonial factory production on the other.

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2. Hopkins, op.cit., p. 288.
Ludwig Schatzi, Industrialisation in Nigeria: a spatial analysis, Munchen, 1973.
Peter Kilby, Industrialisation in an open economy, 1945-1966, London, 1969.

The traditional/modern distinction is, in fact, a false dichotomy which isolates and overemphasises the temporal and cultural at the expense of the key factor, viz: the relations of production. How, for instance, does such a distinction help to categorise the use of the pre-existing hand tools within the context of colonial production, as happened, for example, in agriculture & mining? Clearly, it would be a mistake to view this form of production outside of the colonial relations in which it obtained and was articulated.

Finally, those who view the development of factories in the colony as an indication of some form of growing "independence" ignore the fact that true industrial independence starts at the technological level, i.e.. at the level of the tools, or in this case machinery, used in the manufacturing process. In this respect, factory production in the colonial context was totally dependent on foreign technology and completely incapable of generating indigenous technological growth.

In the pages which follow we attempt to demonstrate these propositions firstly by considering the nature of such factories i.e. their field of operation, sources of finance, structure of ownership and dependence on

foreign capitalist manufacturing concerns. We also look at the labour process in these factories and finally discuss how these various developments in themselves, and some specific actions taken by the state, helped to consolidate foreign capitalist control over the colonial economy.

2. THE NATURE OF FACTORIES ESTABLISHED IN KANO

As we have mentioned, locally-based manufacturing did not, largely, take off in Kano until after the Second World War. Before that time, however, a certain form of this type of production had begun almost immediately after the conquest, that is, the processing of raw materials for export. Virtually all the major colonial companies involved, for example, in the skin trade and the groundnut trade had such processing establishments attached to them. This form of industry relied heavily on local skilled labour in such areas as skin flaying, groundnut decorticating and cotton ginning. Among such enterprises were Alhaji Abubakar Tanning Workshop (1912), C.F.A.O. Hides and Skins Department (1922), S.C.O.A. Hides and Skins Nigeria Limited (1935) and Holt's Nigerian Tanneries Ltd. belonging to John Holt Trading Company (1948). U.A.C., G.B.O., Ambrosini

and Western Soudan Exporters Limited also had processing plants.[3]

We have pointed out the reasons why actual local factory manufacturing did not develop until the 1940s. In the last chapter, we have discussed the concern of British capitalists to replace local cottage-produced articles with similar British imports. As early as 1905, various British manufacturers were requesting to be allowed to supply their products to the colony. Some of these items were produced by Handy Patent Pick Company Limited and consisted among other things of picks, spades, shovels, forks, hoes, axes, hammers, wedges, crossbars, steel files, saws, mining machines, etc. Others were the products of J. Stone and Company Limited, such as brass, copper and other raw metals, Magdala Works - artesian well and water works engineers and contractors; Wolverhampton Iron Company, Foster Mason and Harvey Paints, Hawkins and Trimpsons, producers of ropes, twines, flaxyarns, etc., and D. and V. Gibbs Limited, producers of soap.[4] By the 1940s, however, various firms were already establishing branches within the colony.

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3. The Industrial Potentialities of Northern Nigeria, a publication of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Kaduna, 1963. p. 11. See also Industrialisation of Kano.. op.cit., appendix IV.

4. SNP7/2734/1905 Indents on various goods supplied to the Northern government, 1905.

Factory production mainly centred around textiles, food processing, wood and metal working, leather working and construction. These industries, furthermore, in the main utilised such locally acquired raw materials as groundnuts, cotton, animal products etc. Below are some examples of such industries:

P.S. Mandrides Co. Ltd.	(1949):	groundnut and oil cake
Nigerian Oil Mills Ltd.	(1951):	" " " "
Kano Citizens' Trading Co. Limited.	(1952):	textiles.
W.J. Bush and Co. Nig. Ltd.	(1952):	cosmetics and perfumes.
Kano Oil Millers Ltd.	(1953):	groundnut and oil cake
Nigerian Shoe Factory Ltd.	(1954):	
Chattalas Brothers Ltd.	(1955):	sweets.
Nigerian Canning Co. Ltd.	(1956)	
Steel Constructions Co. Limited.	(1956).	
Nigerian Bottling Co. Ltd.	(1957)[5]	

We can now outline some of the major ways in which the colonial state undertook the establishment and regulation of factory production. The first point is that all legislation or matters relating to the establishment of factories was the preserve of the government of Nigeria and the regional governments. Secondly, the colonial government was heavily involved in the financing

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5. Industrial potentialities, op.cit., p. 59ff. The economic development of Nigeria, a publication of the Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Baltimore, 1955 p. 368 ff. Industrialisation of Kano.. op.cit., Appendix IV.

of these factories, and in some cases either partly or totally owned them. Thirdly, the state played an active role in the provision of the various physical amenities necessary for the establishment of industry.

In terms of legislation and policy, the attitude of the colonial state was to facilitate in every way the establishment of factories by foreign capitalist firms. In a Memo dated 22 February, 1937, it was stated that it was "good policy to foster any new industry which (might) employ local labour and consume local products by making its introduction as easy as possible".[6] On the other hand, the state ensured British control of thefactories by insisting that those wishing to establish such enterprises be "grantees of a patent in the United Kingdom".[7] It was part of state

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6. Kanprof 4183 Soap Industry, See Memo dated 22/2/1937.

7. Industrialisation of Kano ... op.cit. p. 32.
In fact the "Independent" nationalist government of Northern Nigeria headed by Sir Ahmadu Bello clearly recognises this dependence on foreign firms, and its role in the new scheme, as is clearly evident from this statement by the then Premier of Northern Nigeria:

> "My government clearly recognises the vital role that overseas capital, and managerial and technical skills must play in expanding Northern Regions economy. We warmly welcome the Industrialist from abroad. It is in particular those who come here in spirit of partnership who are welcome. We do not believe in rigid schemes designed to retain local control of business".

See Industrial potentialities... op.cit., p. 11.

policy to insist on the need for "overseas capital, skills and experience" to ensure the success of the development.[8] A number of laws, as we have already indicated in Chapter Five, were enacted to allow foreign firms to import machinery with very low custom duty, to allow them to establish industries with minimal or no tax at all for a considerable period of time and to protect such "pioneer" industries from the commodity competition of more established industries outside the colony. Such laws include the Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief) Act 1958, Industrial Development (Import Duties Relief) Act 1957, Customs Duties (Dumped and Subsidized Goods) Act 1958, Customs (Drawback) Regulations 1958 and Income Tax (Amendment) Act 1958.[9]

The commitment of the state to the financing of the various manufacturing enterprises was expressed quite explicitly in the following words: "financial assistance in the initiation and financing of an industry, either by way of loan or direct investment, may be given by the government where sufficient private capital is not available."[10] The financial involvement of the state took several forms. Some of the processing

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8. The Economic Development of Nigeria, op.cit., pp.28-30; Industrial Directory, op.cit., p.41ff.
9. Industrial Directory, op.cit., p.41ff.
10. ibid., p.41.

and manufacturing enterprises - especially the less profitable ones - were completely state-owned and controlled. For example, the colonial government was the sole owner of the Kano Ginning Station at Challawa and the Native Authority Printing Press. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture had branches which undertook livestock and dairy production. In certain other cases, the state went into partnership with private firms. An example of such partnership is the Kano Citizens Trading Company Limited. The major role of the state, however, lay in facilitating the financing of private individuals and corporate bodies interested in establishing industrial establishments. This was based on the conviction that "industrial development is essentially a field of endeavour for private enterprise."[11] In this respect, various government parastatals such as development boards and corporations were set up, for example, the Nigerian Local Loan Development Board (1946-51), the Northern Region Development Board, and the Northern Nigerian Development Company Limited (1955). Their fundamental function was the financing, either in terms of investment or of loans, of various colonial capitalist projects. The parastatals undertook the screening of

11. Ibid., p. 41.

local agents desirous of entering into partnership with foreign companies, and the state either granted substantial loans to successful candidates or recommended them for financing by commercial banks.[12] It should be noted that in such partnerships the majority of the shares were always held by the foreign partner, thus ensuring colonial capitalist control over the enterprises.

State policy with regard to the provision of the various amenities necessary to factory production was also quite explicit: "the function of the government is to provide essential facilities as the basis upon which private enterpfise can establish industries."[13] In a letter from the colonial office, dated 22 February 1947, to an officer administering the government of Nigeria, attention was drawn to the "recent considerations of the prospects and the need for the development of the African Territories under the British administration." It was particularly emphasised that there was need for change in "the technique of production" and "land utilisation."[14]

12. Kanprof 6205 Nigerian Local Development Board 1946-51.
" " 6205/S.1 Northern Region Development Board - Lo
" " 6205/S.1A Application for Loans.
" " 6459 Economic Development 1947-1953.

13. Industrial Directory, op.cit., p. 41.

14. Kanprof 6459 African Economic Development - Agric. Development and Secondary Industries.

Thus, the colonial state undertook to provide such facilities as electricity, pipe-born water, office and storage accommodation, township improvements (roads and town planning) and industrial estates, as well as taking administrative and social measures such as improved medical and health services, social welfare, expansion of the police force, prison administration, radio diffusion, housing schemes and market developments.[15]

In a study undertaken by the Department of Commerce and Industry in 1949, it was noted that the major obstacles in the way of "industrialisation" were the absence of (a) electricity and (b) pipe-borne water.[16] The Acting Deputy Director summarised the problem thus: "get the power and the industry will come."[17]

The problem of transportation is one which has always been central to the colonial companies and administration. In this respect the construction of railways, motor roads, and airways converging in urban Kano made it most suitable for the construction of factories. It was out of these considerations that the colonial government created an industrial estate at Bompai, which quartered virtually all the factories in

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15. Kanprof 6205/S.7, op.cit., p. 165 ff.
16. Kanprof 6068/S.1, op.cit., para. 6.
17. Ibid., para. 118.

the colony. Similarly an electric plant and water reservoir were established in Fanshekara, just on the outskirts of Kano, where the colony's largest cotton ginnery was situated.

Concrete examples which illustrate the complex and multi-faceted nature of state involvement in the various enterprises abound. Between 1951 and 1952, for instance, the Department of Commerce and Industry, under the "textile development scheme" or "colonial development and welfare scheme D534", set up four textile centres in the Northern Region. The major portion of the shares was given to foreign capitalists, while a percentage was allocated to local agents.[18] Regarding one of these projects, the Kano Citizens Trading Company which we have mentioned earlier, we are informed as follows:

> "The Kano Citizens Trading Company, a textile manufacturing concern, was formed with the help of the Department of Commerce and Industries which assisted in the formation of the company, buying of the required machinery in the U.K. and erecting the necessary buildings. A textile officer has been posted to Kano, whose sole

18. Kanprof 6068/S.1, op.cit., p. 1.

> activities are centred in this new textile project, viz: selecting and training young men in the varied operations appertaining to manufacturing cotton piece goods on power looms, supervision of the building of the factory and the installation of all machinery."[19]

An even more striking example is that of the company of one J. Menguissoglon registered as Niger Soap Factory: Menguissoglon began by quibbling over having to pay industrial estate charges, then complaining that the coconut oil purchased in Nigeria was too costly to operate at maximum profit. The government responded that it wished to make everything "as easy as possible," and in 1940, the Department of Agriculture, through the District Officer at Badagry, managed to secure coconut oil for the company at £24 per ton as against the £32 - £49 per ton the company had been obliged to pay for imported oil from Ceylon. The state further guaranteed to procure "further supplies."[20] The soap produced was then bought by the government at a profit to the company, for use in the army, prisons and schools. Distribution by European and Arab merchants was also organised. The crowning touch to all these government

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19. Ibid., p. 1.
20. Kanprof 4183, Soap Industry, Letter dated 15th July, 1939.

efforts was the construction of cartons for the soap by the Kano Public Works Department.[21] One final example of the colonial state's role in effecting private control over factories is the fact that the state itself set up a number of pioneer oil mills which it ultimately handed over to individuals when they started becoming profit-yielding.

3. LABOUR PROCESS IN THE FACTORIES

The concentration of factories in urban Kano, primarily Bompai, also led to the concentration of both employed wage labourers and unemployed destitutes in the urban area. Seekers of wage employment came from the old city, the rural areas of Kano province, the French territories of Niger and the Camerouns, as well as from other parts of the country. The factories were not the sole employers of labour, however, for the colonial administration, itself based in urban Kano, employed such wage labourers as street cleaners, construction workers, drivers and mechanics. There were others who made a living largely as casual labourers such as porters and construction workers. Finally there were self-employed people such as mechanics, watch repairers, bicycle repairers, tailors, hawkers, owners of food

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21. Ibid.

canteens etc. In the main it could safely be said that the proportion of permanently employed workers was by far less than the total number of unemployed and casual labourers. Most of the wage workers were accommodated in the wards and villages around the Bompai Industrial Area, for example, Gwagwafwa and Tudun Wada.

With the development of the colonial economy and therefore the extent to which the peasantry and artisans were destituted on the one hand and colonial factories were established on the other, the number of workers who ceased to become migrant labour force also developed. For example, in 1959, it was stated that:

> "In recent years, however, there is a noticeable tendency for more and more persons from rural areas to seek permanent employment and to remain in the urban areas (whereas formerly) as the rains approached a general contraction in the supply of unskilled labour for paid employments was noticeable because the peasants tended to return to their farms until the following dry season. The offer of wage incentives often failed to check this movement away from the urban areas."[22]

22. Nigeria: A Handbook..., op.cit., p. 230.

With the increasing preponderance of destitutes in the urban centre the state undertook active measufes to curtail begging and vagrancy which, more often than not, failed. Similarly, the development of a wage labour force also forced the colonial state to enact and enforce various laws on labour matters. The main purpose of these legislations, the government stated, was to codify: "certain aspects of the law of master and servant in relation to contracts of employment, health and welfare of work people."[23]

Given the near total dependence of workers on their wages for sustainance it is not unusual, therefore, that conditions of work and the disputes arising therefrom have been the concern of workers, employers and consequently the government. Information on the wages of workers is virtually non-existent and this issue does not seem to have concerned the colonial government and as such was largely left to the discretion of the employers.

Evidence on the extensive exploitation of labourers abounds. A comparison of the profits made by colonial companies, as recorded in the various annual reports, and the general conditions of living of the workers

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23. Ibid., p. 230.

validates this. In 1934 the Resident of Kano was requested to report on the development of the then newly constituted system of "petty contract and piece work" in building construction and the repair of roads. In his reply, the Resident stated that from all indications "the result (was) that native foreigners in Kano merely exploit local labour."[24] This was due to the fact that the bulk of such minor contractors was made up of Syrians, Lebanese and Arabs.

The colonial government itself was forced to accept the reality of this exploitation of wage labour. In a circular dated 25 July, 1937, it was stated that the Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos, was directed by the governor to inform the Secretary of the Northern Provinces, Kaduna:

> "that in view of the fact that Section 13A of the labour code gives his excellency the power and consequently the duty, to see that labour in private employment is not exploited, it has been decided that a periodical review of the current rates paid by contractors, miners and estate managers should be made."[25]

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24. Kanprof 3503 Contractors - Employment of - Instructions Memo dated 20 September, 1954.

25. Kanprof 2252 Labour (government and non-government), rate of pay of.

The various companies operating in Kano were therefore requested to send in the details of their wages and other conditions of work. Despite the unreliable nature of these statistics, they still do indicate that in most of the cases the daily wage rate did not exceed the simultaneously quoted cost of daily food per labourer. The problem was in the official reports, however, attributed to inflation.[26]

The labour department, Lagos, organised the occasional tour of work places by authorised labour officers. The purposes of such tours were said to be threefold. The first was that such visits afforded the opportunity for the lodging of specific complaints by the companies, especially in matters relating to technical needs and staff. Secondly, the visit was also designed to advise on the improvement of working conditions. Lastly, it was also geared "to the end that greater efficiency in production may be attained." However, the repoft further "advised" workers against the "erroneous impression that a visit of a labour officer is an appropriate occasion for a demonstration of discontent and that such a visit should inevitably

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26. Ibid., passim.

result in the concession of an increase in wages."[27]

In 1948, the Senior Inspector of Factories visited Kano Province and specifically went to the Tin Mines at Riruwai, as well as factories and work sites in Kano City, the township, Sabon Gari and Fagge. He observed that "the conditions found with regard to health, safety and welfare ... (and) the secure fencing of dangerous machinery" were utterly deplorable.[28]

The hazards involved in work of this nature are indicated in the official records of "industrial accidents" which were periodically forwarded to the Resident by various industries. For example, on July 29, 1942 an aerodrome aircraft crashed over a gang of Native Authority workers. During exploration works, by the Nigerian Tin and Exploration company, a tree fell on, and broke the neck of a certain Momoh. Similarly, during identical operations by the Minerals Research Syndicate, a log fell on the neck of Adamu Ningi. One Sambo Dan Mero also died of suffocation in a pit being worked by Gold Metal Mines of Nigeria Limited. There were also numerous accounts of various types of injuries

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27. Kanprof 5064, Inspection by Labour Officers. See article dated June 1944.

28. Ibid., report dated 14 October 1948.

in these reports.[29] Yet these reports only recorded accidents which had been reported to the government by such companies. Furthermore, they did not include various diseases which could be contracted after prolonged periods of service in the mines and textile industries.

In 1940 the colonial government enacted a Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Enquiry) Ordinance. This Ordinance did not apply to "Naval, Military, or Air Services of the Crown or to Nigeria Police Force and the Native Police Force." The colonial governor had the powers to appoint or dismiss members of the industrial disputes and arbitration panel.[30] In 1956 the Department of Labour reported an industrial dispute between the Kano Chamber of Commerce and their labourers over the following issues: increase in remuneration, compensation for injuries and the issue of identity cards. The colonial government, however, dismissed these complaints on the grounds that the labourers had no "certified union."[31]

Let us now take a look at the government's disposition towards organised labour unions. The colonial

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29. Kanprof 4645 Industrial Disputes (ii) Industrial Accidents - Returns, passim.

30. Kanprof 3470 Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance 1940.

31. Ibid., Memo dated 29 October 1956.

government had three main attitudes to the organisation of workers into unions. Where workers agitations and demands were not vehement and intensive, the state rejected the validity of any union altogether. Secondly, where industrial strikes and unrest, etc., were common and therefore affected the rate and profitability of production, the state set out to organise workers by selecting and training the leadership and consequently charging it with the responsibility of quelling and containing the workers. Lastly, when and where such unions were created, the state ensured that they were, unlike the Chamber of Commerce, for example, fragmented and isolated from each other on tribal or territorial basis.

One of the dominant workers' unions in Kano was the African Mercantile Association, Kano Branch. This was, however, made up of employed managers drawn from the various colonial firms operating in Kano. As such it was only a branch of the main body which was headquartered in the United Kingdom.[32] The Chamber of Commerce aptly described this association as being a body designed "to handle all labour problems."[33] Despite its services

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32. Kanprof 3767, African Mercantile Association, Kano Branch.

33. Ibid., p. 1.

in handling labour problems, this organisation was refused representatives on Sabon Gari and Wade Advisory Council in 1950 because the colonial government did not want representation on the basis of labour or "economic categories." In his reply to the association's request for representations, the District Officer stated that the Council was constituted only for the representation of "tribal elements" and not "economic elements." According to him, to allow representation on the latter basis would result in too large an advisory council.[34] This phenomenon of ethnic or "tribal" representation is peculiar to the colonial administration. Secondly, the excuse that such a representation provides for a small and compact representation is in direct contradiction to the other colonialist myth that the problems of African societies is one of ethnic plurality and ethnic integration. The fact that this is a myth is illustrated in the

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34. Ibid., letter dated 8th April, 1950. See also Immanuel Geiss 'Some remarks on the development of African Trade Unions' JHSN, III. 2. 1965, p. 368, where the author noted that in 1921 the colonial government refused to recognise a Trade Union because:

> "a tribal ruler is elected for each tribe in Freetown by the members of the tribes themselves. These tribal rulers are recognised by law and form the intermediaries between the members of the tribe and the government, and it is not possible for the government to deal with or recognise any rival authority introduced by strangers to the colony."

way the colonial government constituted the Wage Advisory Council. For all the representatives on its Council came from the business category, most of whom were middlemen.[35] From this it is obvious that it was largely the business and administrative classes which were being recruited into the services by the colonial state, on the basis of ethnicity. The same applied to recruitment into the colonial army, police and civil service, to mention but a few examples. This emphasis on ethnicity was further reinforced by the regionalisation of loan-granting institutions. In contrast to this, the workers who, like the middlemen, were made up of individuals from all linguistic groups, were denied representation.

In 1943 a Council of Trade Unions, which was said to be an incorporation "of all trade unions functioning in Kano Township and Province," was formed. Its composition shows that it was primarily an organisation of 'white collar' workers. The Council had four members, drawn

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35. Kanprof, op cit. The names of the representatives on the council were as follows:

Mr. D.O. Sanyaolu	-	Yoruba.
K.F. Hanid	-	"
F.E. Okwonkwo	-	Ibo.
C.H. Anyaogu	-	"
J.E. Taylor	-	Gold Coast.
A. Walker	-	Senegalese.
M. Mahamma	-	Hausa/Sabo Gari.
M. Danwawu	-	Hausa/Fagge.

from each of the affiliated unions and associations. Membership of the Council was granted to the following: the Mercantile Association, Kano; the Kano Native Authority African Union; S.C.C.A. African Union, Kano; the Pan American Airways African Union; the Railway Staff (Station) Union; the Railway Workers Union and the London and Kano Staff Union. Each of these was allowed four members on the Council, whose president was J. Galba Bright of London and Kano Trading Company. The Secretary, who was also the President of Kano Native Authority African Union, as well as a sub-contractor, was A.O. Omage.

The function of the Council, as explained by the Secretary, was to act "as an intermediary between the government and the trade unions in Kano province."[36] Most of these organisations, however, did not transcend their immediate locality and were limited to their immediate employers. A research survey conducted between 1970-72 concluded that there was not one active factory union in Kano and that the official records of the United Labour Congress of Nigeria list no factory union in Kano.[37]

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36. Kanprof 5417, Council of Trade Unions Report dated 23 September, 1943.

37. Lubeck, op.cit., p. 140.

4. FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF THE COLONIAL ECONOMY

We have traced how the colonial state, through the various measures it took, laid the foundations of colonial economic relations in Kano. We also saw how the colonial state helped to establish the dominance of foreign capitalist companies utilizing local labour and raw materials, and made them the new additional features of the post 1945 colonial economy. After these initial relations were developed their further reproduction came to lie, principally, in private investments and reinvestments of profits by various companies. We have indicated how the establishment of government finance houses provided some of the sources for various capitalist enterprises. Apart from this, the profits made by the various mining and trading companies also provided the capital for reinvestment. Then, there were also commercial banks which provided capital or loans to various individuals. The colonial state took two measures to further consolidate these economic relations. The first was the creation of various institutions, especially government statutory monopolies, which controlled and guided the various economic activities. The second was thefurther formulation of various legal and constitutional provisions to safe-guard these relations. Let us examine these measures in detail.

In 1947, the government of Nigeria established some produce marketing boards to handle Nigeria's main exports.[38] In 1949, the Nigeria Groundnut Board and the Nigeria Cotton Marketing Board were established. In 1954/55, these boards were regionalised as Regional Marketing Boards, under one central Marketing Board, to serve as a common shipping and selling organisation for the 'regional' boards.[39] There was established for Northern Nigeria, the Northern Regional Marketing Board. These boards were, however, not responsible for produce marketed and shipped by private firms.

In October 1958, the Central Marketing Board was reconstituted as the Nigeria Produce Marketing Company Limited and charged with the overall policy and the practical arrangements for the purchasing, marketing and overseas sale of Nigerian produce.[40] The Northern Regional Marketing Board (N.R.M.B), established in 1954, was empowered to deal in groundnuts, seed cotton, palm kernels, palm oil, benniseed, soya beans, cocoa and any derivatives of the above.[41] The principal functions of this board were twofold. First, it was designed to keep the prices of farm produce at the minimum level. This was possible because, to a great

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38. Nigeria: A Handbook..., op.cit., p. 132.
39. Ibid., p. 132.
40. Ibid., p. 132.
41. Ibid., p. 133.

extent, peasant producers also produced their own means of subsistence. Secondly, the marketing boards kept the surpluses derived from groundnut sales overseas. These surpluses were in turn used to finance local middlemen.[42] For example, the N.R.M.B. fixed the prices of produce: the price of groundnuts was fixed at so low a level that it forced many peasants to smuggle groundnuts across the border into French territories, where they fetched higher prices. This led to the capture and prosecution of many such "groundnut smugglers."

Apart from the control of producer prices, the board had the "additional function" of supplying produce to the various factories established in the provinces. For example, the board also supplied various local factories with the raw materials they required, at very cheap prices.[43] Lastly, various legislative measures, such as the Factory Acts, Labour Laws, Patent Laws, etc., ensured the predominance of these relations.[44] During the struggle for independence and the constitutional revisions, the state also entrenched these laws into the constitution. Thus with the development of these economic relations, and the codification of major aspects

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42. Ibid., p. 133.
43. Ibid., p. 134.
44. See relevant sections in Chapters Four and Five above.

of them into colonial laws, the legal framework for manipulation was laid. Thenceforth, changes in the legal structure only tended to indicate developments in the actual relations prevailing in the economy. Thus, the colonial state, apart from being the major agency ensuring the dominance of foreign capitalist firms, also increasingly, became the major source of financing the local class of colonial middlemen.

The further consolidation of the colonial economy through the introduction of factory production therefore has two very significant dimensions. The first is that production became essentially controlled by foreign capitalists and dependent on the developments and needs of foreign capitalists. This is most clearly illustrated in the ownership of industries such as mines and manufacturing establishments. I_+ is also illustrated in the field of financing and in control over the necessary tools for production such as machinery. Associated with this control was the increasing development of a middlemen class which became fundamentally dependent, for the promotion of its own interests, on the preservation, development and expansion of colonial capitalist relations which were circumstantially dependent.

The second feature characteri-ing this consolidation process was the active and pervasive role of thecolonial state in ensuring that there were no obstacles or threats to the further development of these production relations.

5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion it is worthwhile to mention that the most significant consequence of the development of factory production is not simply that it introduced the application of machinery to production but, above all, that it led to further subordination of the colony to metropolitan capitalist interests. This subordination is clearly reflected in technological dependence on foreign industrial capitalist firms in terms of the availability, operation and maintainance of machinery. Furthermore, the factory production process was largely owned and controlled by these interests.

We have argued that the major factor determining the evolution and operation of this form of colonial production is the centralisation of resources and production under the control of foreign capitalist firms and their local agents. This centralisation of resources,

through the destruction of the previous mode of production, created also a large group of destitutes who supplied these firms with a cheap labour force. Thus while the earlier phases of colonial domination were marked by various measures undertaken by the colonial state to separate cottage producers from their means of production, after the Second World War the colonial state became more preoccupied with the establishment of colonial factories and regulating the protests of the workers. Thus the colonial factories came to operate at a profit largely through the exploitation of their own labour force as well as the acquisition of cheap raw materials from peasant producers.

Associated with the development of factory production is, also, the increasing development of a local class of agents who, previously only based in commercial middlemenship, tend to become more involved as junior partners in factory production. To this extent a lot more were financed by the commercial banks as well as the state to engage in small scale enterprises such as bakeries and cane crushing or to invest as partners in giant factories. The development of this class became a stabilising factor for the foreign capitalists as is

illustrated in their role in the transition to neo-colonialism.

The development and consolidation of colonial relations of production mark, therefore, the effective subordination of the colony and the major achievement of the colonial state. We see therefore, that the colonial administration itself, although important, did not constitute the most essential element in colonialist domination. The role of the colonial state itself was largely propelled by the needs of the dominant classes in Britain and geared towards creating the conditions necessary for the realisation of those interests within the colony.

Having shown how the colonial economy was firmly entrenched through the various changes at the level of production, it would be worthwhile to close our investigation by looking at the nature of colonial commerce and reviewing some of the popular notions associated with the role of commerce in the development of the colonial economy. This we undertake in the next chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE BASIS, NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF COLONIAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

We have already considered, in Chapter Four, the limitations involved in seeing colonial domination purely from the administrative angle, i.e. as simply a 'rule.' This perception abstracts administration from the context in which it operates and empties it of its content - i.e. of what was being administered. Such an abstraction in turn ends up in a tautology. Similarly, attempts to explain the origins and operations of, as well as changes in, the colonial society which primarily focus on exchange, and seeing production and state policies as determined by market forces also end up as a tautology. In this chapter we marshal evidence to show firstly, that the colonial state was responsible for the development of colonial commerce, particularly in the way it attempted to organise production and control the various processes of trade, and secondly, that the most important functions of this commerce were basically two. Firstly it was the process through which commodities were exchanged at prices which were generally determined through the various controls

already established by the state at the level of production. Secondly that this commerce in turn further deepened and continually reproduced the colonial capitalist system of production already developed.

Before considering the details of colonial commerce, it is necessary to look at the arguments usually put forward in favour of the theory of exchange, i.e. demand and supply.

2. AN OVERVIEW OF MARKET ECONOMY ARGUMENTS

The fact that the colonial economy is seen as primarily distinguished by its commercial relationships is illustrated in the way such economies are variously characterised as export, open market, exchange or money economy. The economy preceding colonial conquest is mostly identified and distinguished from the colonial economy as one, among other things, characterized by lack of exchange, and it is described as subsistence, static, traditional or agrarian economy. These definitions have, in general, two major flaws. The first is that various studies of the 'precolonial' period have established that there was wide ranging inter-regional trade in Africa as well as trade relations between Africa and other continents. So at this level, to distinguish

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1. See . Adamu, op.cit., passim.
Lovejoy, Kolanut Trade of..., op.cit., passim.

the colonial economy from the precolonial economy of Kano, or any other part of Africa, the absence of exchange is taken as a criterion without any evidence at all. From this it follows that such an economy cannot be distinguished from the colonial one on the basis of the means of, and the facilities used in the process of exchange, such as money, markets, communication or transportation. The second flaw in such definitions is that they are also based on the assumption that production in the colonial economy was meant for exchange whereas in the precolonial economy it was meant for "subsistence" - i.e. immediate consumption. However, this is contrary to the available evidence. As we have shown in Chapter Two, the division of labour, in the Emirate society, had led to tremendous development of specialised production and consequently exchange between various sectors and also between regions. The subsistence versus exchange argument is therefore rather superficial, since it posits exchange as the factor distinguishing the colonial society from the Emirate, while, in fact, exchange was a common feature to both of these societies. It might be argued that the scope and character of the exchange varied in the two societies, but the explanation for this difference must be sought at the level of production rather than in commerce itself.

Let us now consider in more detail the basic principles of the market economy argument.

In his argument for the best approach to Africa's economic history, A.G. Hopkins states that:

> "An organising principle is required which is broad enough to cover the totality of economic activities over many centuries, yet specific enough to provide a coherent theme... The organising principle which best meets these criteria is that of the market. This concept as defined here has three dimensions: first the volume and value of goods and services transacted ...; second, geographical variations in exchange activity,...; and third, the number and social status of the parties engaged in exchange."[2]

On this basis, he sees the colonial period as one which "marked a new, and broadly speaking expansionist phase in the evolution of the modern market economy: its main achievement was to remove the constraints which had hindered the development of the export sector in the nineteenth century."[3]

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2. A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History ..., op.cit., p.4.
3. Ibid., p. 167.

Indeed, Hopkins, defines an "open" or colonial economy as that 'country' which is: "heavily dependent on primary products for exports before and after independence."[4] In his book, The Kano Civil War and British Overrule 1882-1940, A.M. Fika focusses his investigations on "indirect rule, with its laissez-faire economics and emphasis on administrative matters" and states that "the most fundamental influences on the Emirate during the period are seen to have been the establishment of British colonial overrule and the resultant development of a more export oriented economy."[5] Similarly, Peter Kilby argues that the development of so-called market economy and industrialisation were due to the "free entry to foreign capital, foreign entrepreneurship and foreign technical skills."[6] He further stated that the absence of so called "extensive intervention" was crucial to the development of this economy. He thus does not see his own inconsistency, for if he assumed that foreign capital was allowed free entry,

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4. Ibid., p. 168.
5. A.M. Fika, The Kano Civil War and British Over-rule 1882-1940, Ibadan, 1978, p. 268.
6. Kilby, , Industrialization in..., opcit., p.1.

this could have only been done due to the intervention of the colonial state.

Likewise Gann and Duignan, in their introduction to Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, maintain that: "African economic development during this period was left mainly - though by no means entirely - to individual entrepreneurs."[7]

Basic to all these arguments is the assumption that colonialism was fundamentally characterised by laissez-fairism. Furthermore, it is also assumed that the most profound characteristic of the colonial economy is its import-exports structure, as if import-export had not existed before the colonial period. In the subsequent pages we shall attempt to prove the contrary, namely that the assumption that the colonial state was laissez-faire is not supported by actual evidence. Rather, the state was very central in creating the conditions and facilities necessary for the development of colonial commerce through its role in the regulation of production and exchange. Also, we shall show that the prices of commodities did not constitute the motive factor in the prevalence of this trade but were themselves determined by the production and consumption

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7, L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, (eds.) Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, VOL.II, London, 1970, p.4.

patterns already created and largely regulated through combined actions of the state and syndicates of colonial companies.

3. THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE COLONIAL STATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLONIAL COMMERCE

The role of the colonial state could be seen in two stages. The first was the process through which the basic structure, largely in production, that supported the development of colonial commerce, was laid. The second was the series of measures the state took, to ensure the monopoly of British colonial firms over this trade.

The laying of the basic structure consisted of two inter-related developments. One was the establishment of control over trade routes and trade policies which was made possible by the conquest. As we have indicated in this Chapter Four, in turn led to the imposition of customs and tariffs which on the one hand, facilitated the export of agricultural products and the imports of British manufactures while, on the other hand, it stifled the further development of precolonial patterns of trade. The second was the role of the state in compelling or inducing production of raw materials for export. For example the appropriation of mines and their consequent control by

British firms ensured tin was produced primarily for export to Britain. Related to this and as we have discussed in Chapter Four, is that compulsory taxation of agricultural producers in British currency ensured that they sold their produce, especially groundnuts, to British firms for export. Thus the production of mineral and agricultural raw materials for export was institutionalised. Similarly the gradual destruction of handicraft production meant that the colony increasingly came to rely for its manufactures and machinery on British capitalist industries. This was the basic structure of production which compelled the export of raw materials on the one hand and the imports of manufactures on the other. Thus the notion of the laissez-fairism of the colonial state, as propounded by some of the writers we have mentioned above, is not supported by the evidence. And indeed, as soon as the basic structure of production geared towards export had been set up, the state again took active measures to ensure that the structure continued to operate profitably for British firms.

Some of these measures were aimed at ensuring the continued supply of cheap raw materials to the British companies. The carrying out of such an aim had several

dimensions. Firstly, the government fixed the prices of certain products to ensure that they were available to British firms cheaply. In some cases, for example, that of hides and skins, the control price was so low that smuggling to neighbouring French territories, where prices were higher became common, and there were several cases of prosecution of smugglers in Kano courts.[8] On the other hand, the pegging of prices of certain other products was sometimes geared to a different effect, that is, to discourage the production of one crop in favour of another more vital to British firms. Thus in 1943 and 1944, the government pegged the price of corn on Kano market "to induce planting of groundnuts."[9] To ensure strict adherence to the control price, official government markets were set up outside of which it was illegal to sell certain products. Thus, for example, the cotton marketing regulations made it illegal to sell cotton outside gazetted cotton markets,

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8. NAK/SNP 17/41986, Kano Province Report, 1946, para.64.

9. NAK/SNP 17/39157 Kano Province annual Report, 1944, para. 5.

although the prices outside were higher. The following were the gazzetted cotton markets of 1937-1938.[10]

Market Areas	Buying Areas
Karaye District, Gwarzo District, (Special cotton only) Birnin Kudu, Dawakin Kudu District, Southern Tudun Wada.	Kiru, Northern Tudun-Wada, Rano, Wudil, Dawakin Kudu, Dawakin Tofa, Kumbotso, Kano City, Ungogo, Gazawa, Gabasawa, Minjibir, Bichi, Dan Barta, Babura, Kazaure, Gaya, Sumaila, Dutsi, Gwaram, Hadejia, Gumel, Garki, Ringim, Taura and Jahun.

In addition, the government also engaged in mass campaigns to induce farmers to plant one type of raw material or another. It was, for example, reported that in 1944, with the establishment of the radio,

> "much groundnut propaganda, talks on local history, customs and activities were put on the air: so too were local songs, drummers

10. NAK/Kanprof/1626 Cotton Marketing Regulations.

bands etc., all aimed at making the native radio conscious."[11]

In the 1943 annual report it was stated that the groundnut campaign had "overshadowed all other events of the year."[12] The Ministry of Information was particularly important in this regard, especially with respect to radio programmes, films, publications, etc.[13]

The use of colonial currency is another example of colonial state intervention which favoured the colonial firms. The role of this currency in the colony has been surrounded by mystification. It has been depicted as merely a modern, handy and durable currency.[14] This view tends to obscure the fact that the major purpose and result of the imposition of this currency was to facilitate the financial integration of the colony and to subordinate both production and exchange to the colonial finance houses

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11. NAK/SNP 17/39157, op.cit., para.24.
12. NAK/SNP 17/37005, Kano Prov. Annual Report 1943, para.1.
13. NAK/SNP 17/39157, op.cit., para.2 and 3. Even then it was stated that the colony was over-reliant "on B.B.C. Programmes" for "groundnut and health propaganda."
14. See I.A. Tahir, Scholars, Sufis etc., op.cit., p.34. Also A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History, op.cit, pp. 206 - 209.

and other companies. Apart from this, the establishment of this currency did not actually simplify transactions for the mass of the population but rather complicated it with the result that they were mostly swindled. In 1907, for example, Birtwistle noted that cowries were in fact better suited to the transactional requirements of the poorer people. He listed the prices in cowries of some popular commodities (a piece of meat was sold at two cowries, a bundle of firewood for five cowries, etc.) in order to show that, all of these items being below the value of a farthing, they could not be handled by colonial currency without some amount of loss and confusion. Birtwistle also pointed out that, on the other hand, the cowries which were better suited to petty transactions, were cumbersome for the large transactions of wholesale trading.[15]

The colonial Government also offered various forms of direct aid to the colonial firms. For example, storage depots were set up for goods waiting to be evacuated, and the government also supplied petrol and subsidised the transportation of goods purchased by colonial firms for exportation.[16] In some cases, the peasant producers

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15. SNP 7/1765/1907, op.cit., Appendix B, para.4.
16. NAK/Kanprof/6179, VOL.II, op.cit..

themselves were forced by government measures to subsidise such transportation. For example, during every groundnut buying season the government fixed the price of this commodity for railway line buying stations at different rates from those bought at gazatted stations away from the railway line by deducting the approved cost of transport from the railway line.[17]

In addition, the state also heavily patronised colonial products. In fact, the colonial government, as a matter of policy, patronised only expatriate capitalist firms in its own expenditure. It should be noted that government expenditure was higher than any other type of expenditure in the colony. The British firms were well aware of its importance to them, a fact which is illustrated by the request of Manchester Chamber of Commerce in January 1905 that the colonial administration provide them with "a copy of the estimates of revenue and expenditure for the year 1905-1906 and future years."[18]

In 1908 the administration made it a policy, for the

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17. NAK/Kanprof/6388 Groundnut Production Control Scheme. See enclosed "Public Notice No.36 of 1950

18. NAK/SNP 7/730/1905 Copy of Estimates for Manchester Chamber of Commerce requested.

purposes of "establishing textile trade", for all government departments to order uniforms for administrators, police, army, customs, students etc., from British companies. In 1913 the following orders, for police, were put through the Crown Agents: 7,800 suits; 300 yards of khaki; 200 yards white drill; 100 yards shortings; 100 black linen.[19]

Colonial government patronage of British manufactures is further illustrated in the case of the purchase of motor vehicles. A letter to the Undersecretary of State., Colonial Office, from the Crown Agents, dated January 1936, mentions an already existing "scheme initiated by the colonial office to encourage the purchase of British motor cars by colonial government officials"[20] and a circular dated 31 March 1936 reminds the officer administering Nigeria of the "system introduced by Crown Agents for the colonies in 1928" whereby colonial officers could purchase British cars on the same terms of export discount as the Crown Agents themselves.[21]

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19. N.A.K/SNP 7/6576/1908, op.cit., see letter dated 14 February, 1913.

20. N.A.K/Kanprof/C.25 Confidential Purchase of Motor Vehicles through Crown Agents. See circular dated 31 March 1936.

21. Ibid.

The most important aspect of government patronage however, is to be seen in the contract system. This system ensured, on the one hand ,that the construction of necessary "public" facilities or supply of goods needed by the government were undertaken and, on the other hand, it also ensured profits to colonial companies.

In July 1929, the Secretary of the Northern Provinces sent a circular to the Resident of Kano, stating that the British government considered "the development of private enterprise as a matter of the greatest importance for the future of Nigeria."[22] The circular therefore said all works formerly handled by the public works department should, at both the levels of the government and the Native Authority, be undertaken by private contractors. This, the circular explained, was because:

> "It is understood that there are, at present moment, several reputable firms of sound financial standing in Nigeria who are able and anxious to undertake such works for the N.A."[23]

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22. NAK/Kanprof/3503 Contractors - Employment of - Instructions para.6.

23. Ibid.,para.2.

This development largely rendered the Public Works Department redundant, despite heavy government expenditure on this department. For example, the circular clearly reduced the role of employees to rendering advice, preparing plans, and the supervision and inspection of works undertaken by contractors. The development of the contract system provided a very profitable business for private contractors, who were predominantly foreign. As the secretary stated:

> "while at the moment and for possibly many years to come only European firms will be in a position to undertake the carrying out of major works, it is none the less important that efforts should be made to encourage native contractors by employment on minor works and as petty contractors for the carrying out of portions of a work or the supply of local materials. Even task work is a simple form of contracting and its development will encourage individual enterprise and eventually lead to complete works being undertaken."[24]

This process served as a major means for disbursing state revenue to foreign capitalists and their agents.

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24. Ibid., para.2.

The other major feature of the development of the contract system was that it compelled the purchase of materials from the metropolitan country. As the circular put it, "all materials shall be of 'British manufacture." Finally, the contract system boosted business for British insurance companies, since the contractors were obliged to "insure and keep insured against loss and damage" all contracts with an insurance company approved by the Resident.[25]

Even at this early stage, many of the corrupt practices today associated with contract works were already being identified. The circular earlier referred to mentions both poor standards of workmanship and the use of inferior materials and admits that the contract system provided loopholes for failure and extravagance.[26] The price at which contractors sold goods to the government was often highly inflated in comparison with the price at which they offered the same goods to the public.[27]

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25. Ibid. See rules 9 and 14 on the enclosed Building contract form.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid. See circular dated 31 August, 1933.

Default was already a part of the system, as is evidenced in a memo of 18 March 1932, which refers to a European contractor who, failing to discharge his commitments "absconded and made good his escape from Nigeria".[28]

Having enumerated some of the major ways in which the colonial state contributed to the successful development of colonial commerce, let us now take a look at some specific institutions set up by the British State and its colonial organ, both in Britain and in the colony, for the same purpose.

We have illustrated how the colonial state endeavoured locally to create favourable conditions for the development of the colonial economy. It was also essential that information regarding these effects be communicated to industrialists and commercial agents resident in Britain. One of the most important institutions for the dissemination of such information was the British Board of Trade with its headquarters in London. The principal function of the Board of Trade was to communicate to "interested" British manufacturers and traders information regarding the condition of the colony. For this purpose, it had a number of branches,

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28. Ibid., memo from Secretary of State to the Resident, para.

two of which, the Commercial Intelligence Branch and the Imperial Institute, were perhaps the most important. It was admitted in 1906 that:

> "The Commercial Intelligence Branch of the Board of Trade has been in the habit of forwarding to chambers of commerce for confidential use of their members, but not for publication, information to which it has appeared desirable in the interests of British trade to draw attention confidentially."[29]

It was further explained that:

> "The intelligence branch of the commercial department of the board of trade is intended to be a centre at which information on all subjects of commercial interest shall be collected and focussed in a form convenient for reference, and at which, so far as the interests of British trade permit, replies shall be given to enquiries by traders on commercial matters."[30]

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29. NAK/Kanprof 4574/1906 Handbook to the Commercial Intelligence Branch, p.7.

30. Ibid., p.5.

In the main, this board obtained its information from the various colonies through their respective governments, and from its commercial correspondents in such colonies. It in turn diffused this information to its members and others through journals as well as an exhibition and reading centre it maintained in London. For example, there was established the Board of Trade Journal, a weekly publication for the dissemination of "information about trade movements and openings for British enterprise in the colonies and foreign countries."[31] There was also the Board of Trade Gazatte, published monthly, which covered virtually everything relating to the availability, rate of pay and conditions of labour. In addition, the Board held various exhibitions in London, at which were displayed various types of raw materials as well as samples of goods and articles in competition with British goods "including native manufactures."[32]

The other important branch of the Board of Trade, the Imperial Institute, had as its principal objective the task of promoting:

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31. Ibid., p.1.

32. Ibid., p.13.

> "the utilisation of the commercial and industrial resources of the Empire, by the chemical and technical investigation of raw material, by the supply of information relating to such materials and their production, and by the maintenance of comprehensive exhibits illustrating the economic resources of all the countries of the Empire overseas."[33]

Furthermore, the institute maintained close association with manufacturers and users of raw materials in Britain for whom it organised large scale trials of promising raw materials.[34] For this purpose it published a bulletin, in one of whose numbers it was stated that "a cinema /had/ been installed where films depicting the life, sports and industries of the various countries of the British Empire Overseas /were/ shown daily, free."[35]

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33. The dominions office colonial office list p.28, p.xxxi.
34. Ibid., p. xxxii.
35. Ibid., p. xxxiii.

We also learn that, in the public exhibition galleries, exhibits of raw materials, arranged geographically, were displayed for the benefit of manufacturers.[36] To fulfill its various functions, the Institute was divided into two specialized departments, viz: the plant and animal products department and the mineral resources department. The Institute was directly related to the various colonial governments over the whole of the British Empire. In fact, the Institute worked hand in hand with the Departments of Agriculture and Mines and with other technical agencies in the colonies. It supplemented their operations by undertaking investigations and enquiries relating to the composition, uses and commercial value of products such as animal, vegetable or mineral raw materials.[37]

Another institution through which the colonial state realised its commercial responsibilities was the Crown Agents Limited. This body acted as "commercial and financial agents in the United Kingdom for the governments of all the colonies."[38] Crown Agents were appointed by

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36. Ibid.,
37. Ibid., p. xxxii.
38. Ibid., p.xxii.

the Secretary of State for the colonies, who fixed their salaries and pensions. He also appointed, and determined the salaries and pensions of the staff of the Crown Agents, and exercised a general control over the funds by which their office was maintained. They and their staff were therefore in a similar position to Civil servants.[39]

Transactions carried out by Crown Agents included the purchase, inspection, insurance and shipment of stores. They also oversaw the design, specification and examination of engineering works. They handled contracts and were responsible for the negotiation of loans. The investment of surplus balances, depreciation funds, etc., were also in their hands.[40]

The two institutions above were principally concerned with the promotion of colonial commerce within the colonising country and to this end they worked in co-operation with the various local administrations. Let us now consider the major institution which was concerned with the promotion of colonial commerce within the colony of Kano.

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39. Ibid., p. xxii.

40. Ibid., p. xxii.

The Provincial Department of Commerce and Industries, Kano, was established in May 1949. Prior to this time, its functions had been carried out by the colonial administr tion itself, namely the Resident, District Officers and the Native Authority.[41] This branch was the main agency for implementing government programmes relating to commercial and factory developments in Kano. A circular from the Department, signed by the Assistant Commercial Officer, A.B. Farlow, sums up the objectives and activities of the Department as follows:

> "The aims of the department are to render assistance and to give advice to the local traders who desire guidance in their trading problems. The trade branch is open to visitors who wish to obtain addresses of manufacturers in the U.K. Information can be obtained in this office whether export or import licenses are required and whilst the Kano office is not in a position to issue locally all licenses, a fair number can now be obtained on the spot and an assistant commercial

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41. See Chapter Four above.

officer is instrumental in obtaining those which have to be applied for in Lagos."[42]

The department also noted that a great deal of propaganda work needed to be done among the Hausa traders so as to attract them to the office.[43] Enquiries about the trade potentialities of Kano were being received from various firms in the United States of America, South Africa, Australia, Canada, Ireland, England, Italy and Belgium.[44]

In the 1948 Annual Report, the Resident of Kano, like a number of scholars after him and contrary to the evidence, maintained that the department was set up to promote a "free economy devoid of government intervention.[45] We have shown in this thesis how crucial the active role of the state was for the development of the colonial economy.

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42. Kanprof 6068/S.1., op.cit., See Circular signed by Assistant Commercial Officer A.B. Farlow.

43. Ibid.

44. Kanprof 6362 Annual Report 1948 - Kano Province p. 11 29.

45. Ibid. See Memo titled "Statement on the activities of the department of commerce and Industries Lagos 1933," para.7.

Finally, as one further illustration of the role of the colonial state in furthering the interests of the colonial companies, we shall look at its relationship with the Kano Chamber of Commerce.

The Kano Chamber of Commerce was made up of the representatives of the big firms, although smaller companies were free to apply for membership. The Chamber was formed in 1922 with 12 members; by 1952 there were 28 member companies and in 1955 there were 55 including seven African companies.[46] The Industrial section of the Chambers was formed in 1955.[47]

Some of the earliest members were Messrs London and Kano, British Bank of West Africa Limited, John Holt, Compagnie Francaise d'Afrique Occidentale, L. Ambrosini, Paterson Zochonis, United Africa Company, Barclays Bank D.C.O., Western Soudan Exporters Limited, Societe Commerciale de L'ouest Africain, G.B. Ollivant Limited, S. Neuman Jurgens Colonial Products, Goltschalk and Company, British Bata Shoe Company Limited, etc.[48]

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46. NAK/Kanprof/2104, Vol.V. Kano Chamber of Commerce Minutes of 1940-1950.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 2.

The main functions of the Chamber were threefold. The first was to liase with government in matters relating to price, quality, control and quantity of products. Similarly the government contacted them when it needed certain supplies, jobs, or advice on policy formulation etc. The second function was co-ordinating the activities of the Chamber with other Chambers elsewhere while the third was co-ordinating the general concerted action of the companies in such matters that ensured them monopoly prices i.e. forming price pools and cartels, withholding supplies, etc.

In most meetings of the Chambers, government officials were also present to explain certain government actions as well as to listen to various advice, recommendations and requests from the Chambers for future policy formulation. In fact there was one member of the Chamber on the Legislative Council.[49] Similarly in 1940, the Chief Secretary to the government invited comments from the Chamber on a suggested amendment to clause 112 of the companies ordinance.[50] We will illustrate the above with reference to specific developments.

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49. Ibid., See Minutes of Meeting held 9th Jan. 1940, p.1.

50. Ibid.

On 15 January 1940, there was a meeting of the Chamber which was held in Kano Club. In attendance, apart from representatives of the various companies, were General Manager, Nigerian Railways, Mr. J.H. McEwen and the Assistant Traffic Officer, F.C. Parr. The two were welcomed and told that the major issues the Chamber wanted to discuss related to "the question of evacuating produce from the North."[51] The Manager said that with the advice of the Chamber they would improve the transport system although, he assured them, even then, that "wagons were kept moving as fast as possible."[52] The Chamber further requested the General Manager to reconsider the question of "free storage facilities" at the stations and extend them beyond the normal two to three weeks. The manager replied that this was not possible although "any real case of hardship on account of unusual circumstances would be dealt with on its merits."[53]

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51. Ibid., Minutes of Meeting held 15th Jan. 1940. p.1.

52. Ibid.,

53. Ibid., See Minutes of 6th February, 1940

4. CONCLUSION

From the above discussion, two facts concerning the nature of colonial commerce clearly emerge. The first is that the essential characteristic of colonial commerce is not, as many writers contend, its import-export structure, but rather the exploitative production relations on which it is based. Secondly, the role of the state in setting up relations of this type, and in maintaining and developing the type of commerce founded on such relations, far from being non-existent or at most insignificant, as many writers also contend, was in fact crucial.

We have already shown how capitalist control over mining and agricultural production ensured the supply of raw materials. Similarly the decline of cottage industries increasingly led to further dependence on imported manufactures. The further development of the colonial capitalist system, with its general transformation of labour and land into commodities, also ensured the control by capitalist financiers over the means of production. We have also shown how the colonial state's policies ensured the monopoly of colonial capitalist firms, both at the level of the import-export trade and at the level of internal distribution.

In other words, the colonialist trade monopoly was brought about by the agency of the colonial state and made possible by the nature of colonial capitalist relations of production. The more firmly entrenched the colonial system of production became, the more the role of the state became a merely regulatory one. State trade policies in the form of import-export licences, sales permits, bankers' drafts, etc., made it impossible for anybody other than the British companies or their appointed agents to engage in either external or internal trade. Thus importation and exportation were solidly in the hands of the major British companies, while local traders served as their middlemen whether at the level of produce-buying for export or of the distribution of imported goods. For example, a report of the Department of Commerce and Industries admitted that:

> "The surprising thing in Northern Nigeria is the fact that in general supplies are obtainable only from branches of the large firms... Unless a product is exported by one of the big firms it is not exported at all."[54]

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54. NAK/Kanprof/6068/S.I., op.cit., para. 9-10.

The extent of this monopoly can be seen in the fact that many of those major firms were involved in both import and export trade and could therefore exploit their double role to tighten their monopoly. Thus in a letter dated 2 July 1947, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nigeria, Western Soudan Exporters Limited of Kano complained that:

> "As exporters of hides, skins, gum, and as dealers in groundnuts, we are now facing the impossibility of getting our normal supplies, (even to get 20% of them), and consequently to cover our running expenses. The reason for this state of affairs is that controlled goods such as textiles, salt, sugar, tea, etc., are being offered as a reward to local traders and middlemen against deliveries of hides, skins, gum, groundnuts, by Importers who do also deal in the various country produces enumerated above. Middlemen and local traders do overpay to get hold of the country produces which they must supply if they are to receive controlled goods which they resell at prices well above the officially fixed prices. Their profits on such

black marketeering operations are stupendous, and cover them well against their losses for securing the bait, in this case the country produce.

Presently, the control of goods do not benefit the consumers, but only certain exporters, and their middlemen, namely, those exporters who are concurrently importers of controlled goods. As Importers, they take advantage of this incredible situation to buy country produces at low prices, and at the same time, they do not lose this golden opportunity to render the position unberable to exporters unable to fight against what we estimate to be unfair, and uncorrect trading practices."[55]

The kolanut trade affords one of the best examples of how the state machinery operated to control commerce in the colony to the benefit of the colonial companies, even in commodities imported not from Britain but from other parts of West Africa by indigenous traders. The number of

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55. NAK/Kanprof/3724,Vol.II., op.cit., letter dated 2 July 1947.

kolanut importers was strictly controlled by licence. Those selected for licence were necessarily agents of colonial companies, who also had to present such documents as bankers drafts and way bills. Normally kolanuts were not railed unless they were accompanied by permits.[56] Furthermore, even after these kolanuts had been imported into the province, distribution to other districts was also under licence. This sort of control over preexisting commodities for interregional exchange in West Affica thus helped to consolidate the class of colonial middlemen.

In fact the colonial administration in Kano Province was well aware of its role in establishing control over "local trade" and in the annual report of 1941 it was reported by the Resident that:

> "without the police of gestapo-like ruthlessness and thoroughness it [had] not been possible to bring about controls free of a great many weaknesses."[57]

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56. NAK Kanprof/3553/S.2. The N.A. Licencing of Itinerant hawkers and petty traders in kolanuts Rules 1946, p.21.

57. NAK/SNP 17/342 Kano Province Annual Report 1941 para.19.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion, we will identify some of the major findings of this research. It should by now be evident that all aspects of our study point to the following fact: that colonialism in Kano can be summed up as the systematic imposition of British political control for the purpose of subordinating the colony's production and distribution systems to foreign capitalist firms. This process was largely carried out through the agency of the colonial state which was an organ of the British capitalist state.

We noted in chapter two that the major source of conflict between the Emirate ruling class and the British capitalists by the end of the nineteenth century was the fact that the very system of production and commerce on which the Emirate aristocracy subsisted was antithetical to the further development of foreign capitalist interests. The system in which the aristocracy flourished was based on slavery, the taxation and the promotion of an independent form of production in agriculture, mining and the cottage industries, and a similar independence in commerce. Such a system precluded, for example, the establishment of British capitalist control over mines and over the availability of agricultural raw materials for British industries - such materials being

almost entirely absorbed by internal cottage production. Similarly, the Emirate system was antithetical to British control over markets for her manufactured goods, since the various households of the Emirate produced most of their own needs, both in terms of food and manufactures, and supplemented these, where necessary, through trade within the Emirate and also interregional trade. Another dimension of the prevalence of this system of petty commodity production was that it in turn rendered the local or internal traders independent of European trading companies, since the commodities involved in their trade were obtained from local producers. The system thus restricted the degree to which British trading companies could attempt to monopolise the internal and external trade of the Emirate. Finally, the Emirate system stood in the way of the British capitalists in terms of the availability of wage labour. The two forms of labour in use in the Emirate - slavery and the independent labour of the producer - together effectively constrained the development of a wage labour force essential for capitalist development. Thus, due to these prevalent relations of production the Emirate was characterised by a dominant ruling class i.e. the aristocracy, a merchant class, peasants and slaves.

The fact that the problems we have enumerated did indeed constitute the essential stumbling blocks to the British capitalists, and that they themselves were fully aware of this, is reflected in the various treaties, drawn up at this time. In these treaties, the British claimed to have won from the Emirates concessions centred around the control of land, especially mineral resources, over the import-export trade and over foreign relations. However, the failure of the British to "convince" the ruling class in the Caliphate to surrender their interests in favour of British capitalists, as we have shown in chapter three, ultimately led to war and the overthrow of the Emirate aristocracy. This, in turn, led to British political control over the former Emirate which, as we have indicated in chapter four, was crucial in the development of a dependent form of capitalism in the colony.

The role of the colonial state was mainly to establish a British capitalist monopoly (commercial, industrial and financial) over the economy of the colony. In more specific terms, it could be said that the actions of the state led, directly or indirectly, to the expropriation of resources which, centralised in the hands of British capitalists, became capital, and, on the other hand, to the creation of a cheap wage labour reserve in the form of

a class of destitutes which came about as a result of the increasing disintegration of the system of independent production. These changes in the character of production, led to the development of new classes and therefore a society which is distinctly colonial.

The colonial state, as we have noted in chapter four, was an organ of the British state and was constituted and directed by the British Parliament through the colonial office in London. After the conquest, the British set about reconstituting remnants of the pre-existing authority structures within the Emirate into local agencies of the colonial state. We have indicated how members of the former ruling class, the aristocracy, devoid of their former control over the territory, which was subdivided among them as fiefs, devoid of slave-holding estates and the capacity to collect levies on various forms of production and commerce, were now reduced to a fetish of their former selves. However, when the colonial state decided to select from former members of this class a body of employees to serve in the Native Authority, it effectively created a colonial bureaucracy in place of the former aristocracy, employed on salary by the Resident and with terms of employment which were characteristically colonial.

With the establishment of the colonial state, major changes which transformed the former Emirate into a proper colonial economy were set in motion. The direct expropriation, in favour of capitalist mining companies, of mines formerly worked by independent producers is one of the best illustrations of the role of the colonial state in effecting the development of dependent capitalism. We have similarly noted how, through individual taxation, in British currency, not on income but on supposed yields derivable from the amount of land held, the peasantry was compelled to produce raw materials, mainly groundnuts, for export. The development of export production, combined with the hostility of the colonial state to cottage producers, which manifested itself in various forms such as excessive industrial taxes payable only in British currency, prohibitions on the importation of raw materials, various restrictions on the production and availability of raw materials locally, as well as bans on the export of various manufactures, as we have illustrated in chapter six, led to the tremendous decline of internal cottage production and consequent reliance on British imported manufactures. This was parallelled by a decline in food production within the colony, as the cultivation of crops for export increasingly displaced the

production of food. These changes, in turn, created the development of a peasantry which is distinct from the peasantry that existed under the Emirate, and which essentially serves the purposes of capitalist prdduction.

A further stage in the development of capitalism under the colonial state was ushered in the mid 1940s. By this time, the process of dissolution of the cottage production system had reached an appreciable level and had ensured the abundance of raw materials, the development of a class of cheap wage labour force and the existence of a large population depending, to a great extent, on imported manufactures and therefore constituting a ready-made market. Thus, the preconditions for a more profitable form of production viz: factory production by British capitalist firms within the colony, were firmly entrenched. We have discussed in chapter seven how the colonial state, once again, played a vital role in the establishment of these factories in the colony.

The substance of our discussion so far, therefore, is that, although the conquest and the establishment of British colonial control were important, the fundamental feature of colonialism was British capitalist control over the economy. We have shown in various ways the nature of this control over production. The pattern of control is,

however, not complete until one final key element is noted, i.e. control over the production of the tools themselves, or machinery, used in the process of production. It was this control at the technological level by the colonial firms, aided and abetted by the colonial state, which led to the development of dependent factory production within the colony and ensured the effective economic subservience of the colony to the mother country.

An important theme which emerges from our study is that the various changes in production relations brought about under colonialism, as discussed in chapters four to seven, in turn created a new class structure in the society. In order to appreciate the uniqueness of the colonial system it is necessary to point out the major classes it created and how they differ from the major classes within the Emirate society.

The former Emirate society, as earlier mentioned, was basically divided into a ruling aristocracy, a merchant class, peasants and slaves. There was also, marginally, a group of people who sold their labour. Under colonialism the aristocracy and the slaves as distinct social classes, were completely wiped out. In turn, five major classes developed. The first, the British capitalists, who constituted the dominant class and

controlled the various means of production such as the mines and finance as well as the import-export commerce. The dominant position of British capitalists is directly related to the development of a class of wage workers - labourers in the mines, in various companies and factories as well as with the colonial government. The peasantry which developed under colonialism is, for all practical purposes, different from the peasantry that existed under the Emirate aristocracy./ For example, whereas the Emirate peasantry were mainly petty commodity producers in agriculture, handicrafts and livestock, under colonialism they were increasingly reduced to mere producers of exportable raw materials and consumers of capitalist manufactures. The personal food production they continued to carry on, on a marginal scale, subsidised them and thus ensured the low prices of their export produce. Due to the disintegration of the cottage industries, and to financial pressures imposed on them by the colonial system, they tended now to become part-time wage workers for colonial concerns during the dry seasons. Furthermore, where they were not directly expropriated from the land, the exploitation they were subjected to, especially excessive indebtedness, tended to force large numbers of

them to sell their lands and become full-time seekers of wage employment. The process of gradual and systematic expropriation from the land and other means of livelihood is in fact one of the most characteristic features of the peasantry as it was constituted under colonialism. A further ramification of this process of expropriation was the formation in the colony of a class of destitutes which constituted a cheap labour reserve for capitalist employers.

The fifth class which we have identified is that of intermediaries. In commerce, for example, we have noted how the colonial state, through customs, tariffs and caravan tolls (paid in British currency) increasingly stifled the class of independent merchants which existed prior to colonial conquest. With the tremendous development of the import-export trade, a class of commercial middlemen tended to develop in the form of produce-buying agents and distributors of imported goods for the dominant commercial firms. We have also highlighted how this class increasingly became subordinated to the capitalist firms as petty contractors and local "partners" in factory production by the late 1940s and early 1950s. Similarly, within the colonial administration a cadre of indigenous bureaucrats developed. Although these bureaucrats were salaried, it is clear from the records that

their other illicit sources of income were embezzlement of taxes and the extortion of the peasantry. Furthermore, given the centrality of the colonial state in the development of various economic ventures, such as contracts, financing of private entrepreneurs, etc., a very strong relationship tended to develop between these and the private middlemen. This is particularly manifested in developments after independence.

Finally, it is essential to note that although colonialism introduced new and better means of production (in the form of industrial machineries), however the colonial relations of production only tended to accelerate the pauperisation of the mass of the population, on the one hand, and the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

1. ASSESSMENT OF PRIMARY SOURCES

I have used a variety of primary (and secondary) sources in the process of this research. Despite their variations, however, virtually all the primary sources are part of the historical process under study. In the main, they comprise the official and personal accounts written by various organisations and individuals as well as oral testimonies covering both the colonial and pre-colonial periods. We will deal with all of these in detail below.

Official written records can be classified into two major groups. The first are those dealing mostly with the precolonial period. These are largely correspondences. The first group is made up of letters between Emirs of Kano and the Caliph as well as letters between the Emirs of Kano and other Emirates. The first of these is Al-Rasailu which is a collection of letters recovered at Sokoto and which span the last decade of the nineteenth century. The second collection is made up of letters recovered at Bauchi - the Bauchi Collection, which also covers the last decade of the nineteenth century. These are available at N.H.R.S., A.B.U., Zaria. Into this category also fall the letters captured at Sokoto after the British conquest, some of which have been translated by Backwell in his book The Occupation of Hausaland. Parts of these letters are also kept at the Kaduna National

Archives under the heading "Kad Captory". Apart from these there were also letters of correspondence between the British expeditionary force under Lord Lugard and officials of the Caliphate especially the Caligh himself.

The second major written official source is made up of colonial government and trading company records. While some of these are published, most are kept at the National Archives. Given the general focus of this study as the role of the state in the development of the colonial economy, the colonial official sources, especiall government records, have been more extensively used. This is for two reasons. The first is because they most clearly state the position of the colonial state on various matters relating to the development of the colony. In fact, these documents contain the basic policies of the colonial state. The second reason is that due to the relative ease with which such records are procured and the fact that they, in some cases claim to represent the history of these societies, they have been reproduced verbatim and rather uncritically in most secondary works as the scientific description and explanation of the historical origin, purposes and 'decline' of colonial domination. It is in this respect that a critique of the

secondary sources has to, necessarily, include a re-interpretation of these dominant colonialist primary sources. This, we have done by questioning the theoretical validity of the assumptions prevalent in these sources as well as bringing to light other official reports which actually falsify or contradict such sources, and which have therefore been largely avoided in most of the secondary works. In this respect I have cited, in the bibliography, the archival sources fully because contrary to what is suggested in most secondary works the subjects that the various files deal with infact indicate the extent and nature of the involvement of the colonial state in the colonial economy. A reconstruction of this nature, even given the centrality of official documents, can however only be balanced and comprehensive if it is corraborated by other unofficial sources. Before we consider other sources however, let us consider in some detail these official colonialist sources.

As I have already indicated these include published accounts as well as various, largely government, records kept at the archives. The publications include the gazetteers, the dominions office and colonial office lists, annual blue books of the colony and protectorate of Nigeria, publications by the various ministries such as

information, commerce and industries etc., Nigeria Year Book, The Nigeria Civil Service List, Encyclopaedia Britannica, the stock exchange official year book etc. The archival files include various administrative reports, memos, notes, etc., such as provincial annual reports, assessment and reassessment reports, confidential reports, memoranda, special reports, touring notes, district note books etc. Before assessing the nature of these sources it will be worthwhile to take a closer look at some of the most important ones.

The annual blue books - Colony and Protectorate, printed by the Government of Nigeria, is a collection of statistics on various aspects of the colony - such as administration, trade, production, natural resources, communications, currency and banking, public works, revenue and expenditure, customs and tarriffs etc. Although these are quite useful they offer no explanation of the context from which such statistical data derive.

The dominions office and colonial office list is a publication of the British Colonial Office which presents a very broad policy on the role of various colonial institutions and organisations such as the Crown Agents, the colonial office, the Imperial Institute, Bank of British West Africa etc. in relation to the colonies

worldwide. It also has a section on the general structure of colonial rules and regulations. Lastly, each particular colony is treated on its own in a specific section. One of the major attributes of this publication is that it provides insights into the direct relationships of the various colonial states and economies to the British state and economy.

The publications of the Ministry of Commerce and Industries of Nigeria, Northern Provinces and Kano Province (later Kano State) clearly show the commercial and industrial policy of the colonial state, the efforts made to develop such commercial and industrial relations as well as the achievements of the ministries.

Among the archival records the provincial annual reports are the most comprehensive and chronological in that they were written annually and cover, in a neat standardized schema, such topics as the administration - "central, district and village", boundary, area, population, staff, "trade and economic", "medical and sanitary", public works etc.

The reports were written by local administrators (e.g. district officers, touring officers etc.) and compiled annually by the Resident. The method of writing such reports - procedure and outlay - is clearly stated in the colonial regulations. The relevance of such

reports, as stated by the Resident of Kano, was as follows:

> "Provincial annual reports are our books of reference for the information and guidance of those who will follow us in future years".

It was also stated in same memo that the opinions expressed in such reports, except for details, were largely those of the writer except if such were the repetition of policy directives. (Kanprof 37005 p. 39). One of the major limitations of this source is that there are in some cases actual inconsistencies in various sections of even an outright attempt to cover up information which might incur the wrath of superiors. Secondly, they are rather empirical and do not show the actual and historical relations of the forces and events they were recording. For example, at the level of the administration they exclude the role of the residents, high commissioners, colonial office and ultimately the British Parliament. On the other hand they perceived themselves as mediators between the Emirs on the one hand and the Talakawa on the other. This it was which led the Resident of Kano to write that he sometimes though "it is a pity" that "Emirs (could) not write annual reports on the work of the government European staff - including the Resident. The result might be salutary, educating and humbling." (Kanprof 37005, p. 39). Moreover most of the writers of

these reports, being merely adminstrators, tended to see colonialism as simply their "rule" and the nature and content of such rule never formed any important part of their considerations. However, despite these limitations, and due to the conveniences of such reports, they have been largely reproduced as the history of colonialism, in the secondary sources we will soon consider.

The assessment and reassessment reports, as their name suggests, are files compiled in the process of assessing various villages, districts and the provinces for purposes of tax levy and collection. The reassessments were undertaken as a result of protests by taxpayers due to the high rate of taxation.

These reports are highly detailed on the local situation including "local history", geography etc. They also include detailed records of the population, their land acreages, types of crops cultivated, number and ownership of livestock, poultry etc. There is also a wealth of detail on the rivers, tree crops, etc.

These sources have not been given the attention they deserve in the secondary works I have consulted. Depite their impressive details these files do not provide information on the nature and purposes of colonial taxation, and the corrupt practices of tax assessors - including European staff. Such can only be obtained from

oral sources. Similarly, their writers do not pretend to be experts on the nature of the colonial economy nor, as far as I can see, do they offer information on the nature and consequences of their activities. On the other hand, they, like all the other repofts, are notorious for wild generalisations and baseless claims on the nature of the precolonial economy and society.

The confidential reports, classified at the NAK under "ND Confidential files" are very informative and particularly contradict or falsify official colonial policy which was meant for public consumption.

The special reports which are classified as NAK - "speical subject files" are important in the sense that they focussed on the development of specific issues such as mining activities, industrial development, conditions of labour, chamber of commerce etc. They were, moreover, reports by various commissions set up to specifically study such subjects.

I have also used a number of independent personal accounts and testimonies which provide information largely on the nature of economy and society in the Emirate before the colonial conquest. These include the accounts of various European travellers and indigenous writers, as well as other internal records such as the Kano Chronicle and the Song of Bagauda. These provide a basis not only of reconstructing the political and

economic structure of the precolonial Emirate society but of cross-checking the assumptions expressed in colonialist sources.

Lastly, the oral sources can be broadly classified into two - those which were narrated by oral informants and recorded in writing by various individuals and those I have personally collected in my field work.

The major recorded oral evidence are the accounts of Imam Umoru, Maimaina Na Jega, Mahmudu Koki and Baba of Karo which are fully cited in the bibliography. There is also the LoveJoy collection in which various oral interviews were transcribed.

A number of factors should be noted regarding the fieldwork. One of the problems I encountered in this was that most people were not disposed to talk when they observed that I was recording the information. Apart from this, I observed that informants seemed to talk more when I let them pursue the line they wanted without my interrupting them with side questions. Similarly, I gained more when I simply relented to the crowd in a conversational manner and chatted on various topics. In this way I gathered a lot of impressions of people's various experiences during the colonial period which I would not have achieved had I concentrated solely on the question-answer approach. Despite the particular value

of these oral materials, however, on matters of detail I have preferred to stick to written documents where they are not at variance with the oral sources, since the written sources could most easily be cross-checked. For this reason it would therefore appear that the work has not been heavily based on oral sources. This would however not be correct since most of the impressions informing my own analysis are derived from these sources. Related to this was my personal observation of the various communities' economic activities, standard of living, settlement patterns, migrations etc., I visited. This provides a vivid comparison with some of the colonial observations in the various assessment reports.

I however provide a short and selected list of some of my informants in various parts of Kano. The interviews were conducted during the months of July, August and September of 1979 and 1980.

2. ASSESSMENT OF SECONDARY SOURCES

Under this section we consider secondary works, both published and unpublished, which are concerned with Kano under colonial domination. The purpose is to assess their general view of what constituted colonial domination as well as its consequences. This is related to an examination of the types of, and their attitudes to,

the primary sources they used. The assessment of individual perspectives related to particular aspects of colonialism was carried out in the course of the thesis. For example, individual explanations of the causes of the colonial conquest were treated under military conquest of the Emirate. Therefore, our assessment of secondary works here does not include those related to the period before the colonial conquest of 1903 and after independence of 1960. Such works are also treated under relevant sections of the thesis.

The works considered here are:

(a) Unpublished theses - Fika, Ubah, Hogendorn and Tahir.

(b) Published works - J.N. Paden, Abdul-Maliki Mani, Abubakar Dokaji and Polly Hill.

I have particularly selected these works because they constitute the most influential and dominant treatment of colonialism in Kano.

The conception of colonialism held also tends directly to be associated with a corresponding, mostly opposite, conception of what constituted the Emirate society before colonial domination. There is a major view which appears to characterize the history of this area into two distinct periods - demarcated by the colonial subjugation of 1903. This dominant perspective

is that which views colonialism as punctuating the history of Kano, with colonial conquest, into two distinct periods - Traditional and Modern. The traditional, usually called precolonial period, is seen as a single system defined by ethnic groups, traditional islamic religion and a primitive economic system of production and exchange. This period, it is claimed, was characterised by conflict between ethnic and religious groups and this, coupled with primitive technology, traditional economic attitudes, lack of infrastructure, lack of economic incentives and lack of capital accummulation caused a substantial amount of under-employment and under-utilisation of resources which in turn resulted in general economic under-development and poverty. Colonial domination or the modern period therefore provided the necessary law and order, infrastructure, technology, and economic incentives which led to change in economic attitudes, general increase in living standards, and the accumulation of capital. These developments in turn led to the industrialization of Kano in the 1940's and 1950's. Having engineered all these developments, therefore, the colonial state granted 'independence' or 'self determination', to the colony in 1960. Thus a traditional society of tribes and religious groups was, besides being unified under colonial political structure, also developing into a nation through the integration of these diverse groups.

(a) Unpublished Theses

1. Adamu Fika. The Political and Economic Re-orientation of Kano Emirate, Northern Nigeria C.1882 - 1940.

In this thesis, submitted to the University London in 1973, the author argues that the conquest of Kano Emirate led to the establishment of a British system of Indirect Rule, which was secular and humanitarian, over and on a traditional theocratic administration. /Fika, p. 165_7 This administration which utilized indigenous institutions was further characterized by an insiduous conflict between the British arm, represented by the Resident, and the traditional arm represented by the Emir. This system however, guaranteed law and order, stability and peace in place of tribal and religious wars. /Fika, p.411_7 The colonial state, as a consequence of this, concentrated on the development of infrastructure and 'other things' "which would enable the population to satisfy its more basic and elementary material needs". /Fika,p.411_7 This particular phrase, infact, seems to be a direct carry over and a re-wording of the official version of what constituted the objectives of British 'rule' which was given as:

> "The creation of such physical and psychological conditions as will provoke among the mass of the people a desire for a fuller and more satisfactory life; political, economic and social and, simultaneously, to provide the means to achieve this end as far as local circumstances permit. /NAK/KANPROF/6991. S.4, Kano Economic Survey, p. I.7

These cummulative developments led to the emergence of an export oriented economy based on groundnuts. The average producers, Fika argued, "gained little" and the bulk of the profit went to "non-Northern traders" especially Lebanese, Syrians and Southern Nigerians. /Fika, p.414/ By 1940, however, the political system as well as the economy were set on a modern basis /Fika, p.414 ff./

2. C. N.Ubah, Administration of Kano Emirate under the British 1900 - 1930.

Like Fika, Ubah, in the above quoted thesis , argued that a system of Indirect Rule, which was consolidated by 1930 replaced a traditional system of Islamic administration. /Ubah, p. 450/ This system brought about peace and stability which, conbined with the influx

of new traders, the abolition of caravan tolls, the destruction of trans-Saharan trade, and the emergence of oceanborne commerce led to an economic revolution centred on the export of groundnut and this marked the "triumph of agriculture over industry." /Ubah, p.419/ As a consequence of this revolution there were "more profits for traders and more money in the pockets of Talakawa" /Ubah, p. 435/

Ubah, like Fika, derives his information and views predominantly from official colonial archival sources.

2. J.S. Hogendorn, The Origins of the Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria 1912 - 1914, University of London, 1966.

Hogendorn, using the vent-for-surplus model argues that the foundation of groundnut export took two years (1912-1914). This trade furthermore not only integrated the economy into world economy but it created a new order and laid the basis for modern economic development. The most important aspects of this development were three. /Hogendorn, p. 3-10/

Firstly, the colonial state established law and order as well as infrastructure and better means of transport.

Secondly demand in Europe provided for the vent for surplus labour and land where as goods brought by European

firms and Lebanese provided incentives for agricultural production.

Thirdly, the indigenous producers and traders responded to these incentives and utilized such high prices from the trade in purchasing "cloth, salt, kolanuts and other goods" as well as "preferring" to pay their taxes in cash. Indigenous traders on the other hand who responded by becoming agents of colonial trading companies accumulated profits which represented internal capital formation for economic development.

Hogendorn's sources are largely colonial official records.

4. I.A. Tahir, 'Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1904 - 1974: the pattern of Bourgeois revolution in an Islamic Society,' Oxford. 1975.

According to Tahir, the preconquest "theorecratic autocracy" ruling over a "traditional Islamic society" was incofporated into "British over rule" resulting in transforming the political system "under secularising caveats and populist ideas." /Tahir, p.347 Economically the Emirate was incorporated into world economy due to "infusion of metal coinage, paper money, communications, impofted machine technology and such institutions as banks

and open market lending". /Tahir, p.347 The key role of the merchant and ulema'a classes in initiating major economic ventures and other developments, stimulated by the imposition of colonial domination, led to a bourgeois revolution and industrialization. Moreover, this revolution involved the development of local capitalism and industry under the control of local capitalists. /Tahir, p.5307 After this bourgeois revolution there was a "reinstatement of the traditional structure and traditional value orientation of Kano Islamic society." /Tahir, p. 5317

Tahir seems to have had access to a number of indigenous Arabic sources as well as oral evidence. Most of these however, emanate from the administrative and merchant circles. Although the work seems to be lightly based on official colonial sources its perspective is largely influenced by the secondary sources on which the work relies heavily and which in turn depend on official colonial sources. Similarly the work is to a great extent dictated by Weberian theory of puritanism and the rise of capitalism as well as ethnic pluralism. /Tahir, p. 1 ff./

(b) Published works

1. J.N. Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano, London, 1973.

This work is couched in the much denigrated theoretical framework of plural societies - in this case ethnic and religious pluralities. This is the theoretical racist - imperialist justification of capitalist exploitation and its consequences in the third world.

According to Paden the political history of Kano Emirate, up to 1960 could be delineated into four distinct periods. /Paden, p.45/ These periods were characterised by ethnic and religious pluralities. The colonial period which is the fourth marks the stage of the integration of ethnic and religious groups.

The first of these periods he called the pre-Islamic period which he dated from the earliest time to 1500. This was characterised by Abagayawa and Maguzawa. The second period, from 1500-1800, he calls the Hausa Muslim period. This period was characterised by the existence of Hausa and Arab Islams with Hausa Moslem Sarakuna. The third, 1807-1903 he calls the Fulani Moslem period characterised by the existence of Hausa, Fulani and Arab Islams with the Fulani Moslems as the aristocracy.

The fourth period, 1903-1960 is called the colonial period. Under this domination there developed a religious and ethnic integration which led to "city state nationalism" in the 1960's. Alongside these were economic, political and social integrations. To start with the writer argued that colonialism created "geographical boundaries of a secular nature." /Paden, p.3907 In the 1920's there was the integration of rural and urban areas as a result of the groundnut trade. In the 1930's there occured the integration of religious (Arab, Hausa and Fulani) systems. In the 1940's there was social integration evidenced by ethnic intermarriages. In 1950's political integration was exemplified by the development of trans-ethnic parties. /Paden, p.3917 Alongside these, however, the development of industries bfought about "new ethnic divisions of labour." /Paden, p. 277

Although the writer used a great deal of official colonial sources there is also evidence of internal literature and oral traditions. However, his conception of this area's historical process is solely determined by 'ethnic pluralism' and the colonial sources. Thus, even where the evidence concretely contradicts his impressions the writer proceeded along with the same conception. For example, on page 70, the writer states that:

> "while the Jihad is often described by outsiders (or even local reformers) as 'Fulani conquest', the prevailing contemporary view among both Hausa and Fulani in the Northern urban centres is that the Jihad was a feligious movement which happened to be led by Fulani".

And yet, he persisted in categorising this period under ethnic categories.

2. Abdul-Malik Mani, Zuwan Turawa Nijeriya ta Arewa, Zaria, 1970.

This book treats the coming of the Europeans to the Caliphate. It treats not only the nature of European societies by 1900 but also that of the Caliphate. It goes on to treat the causes and consequences, of the colonial conquest of the Caliphate as well as the detailed account of the conquest of individual Emirates. The book was written in 1956 in collaboration with a colonial district officer by name A.N. Skinner. The central concern of the book appears to be an attempt to justify and legitimate colonial conquest and domination.

According to the writer, the pre-conquest Emirates of 'Northern Nigeria' were characterized by ethnic wars and slave raids. /Mani, p.14/ This affected the develop-

ment of agriculture and trade. /Mani, p.167 This situation plus tremendous exploitation (Kama-Karya) of the Talakawa by the ruling class as well as persistence of the slave trade, which was 'abolished' by 'European powers', led to colonial conquest and domination./Mani,p.177 As a result of this conquest there was peace and consequently developments took place in the fields of communication, administration, education, medicine, mining and agriculture. These in turn led to the development of trade and increasing welfare of the population. /Mani, p.2047

The author had access to travellers accounts such as Barth's and official colonial publications. These appear to have been supplemented with oral evidence and his own observations. There is clearly an intensive influence of Skinner, the sources and colonial education on the author in that internal sources holding contrary views were not even used in the text.

3. Abubakar Dokaji, Kano ta Dabo Ci gari, Zaria. 1958.

The author was asked to write this piece by Muhammad Sanusi in 1954 who was the then head of the Native Authority. The text, as a consequence of this, lays great emphasis on the dynastic chronologies of the 'Emirs' as well as their 'achievements'. There is also undue flattery of Muhammad Sanusi, his father and grandfather. /Dokaji, p.817

According to Dokaji the period before colonial conquest was characterized by wars and the predominance of an administrative aristocracy composed of Fulani. /Dokaji, pp. 1-27 Colonial change, according to him, was made up of such developments as schools, hospitals, bridges, mosques etc. /Dokaji, p.767

Dokaji was one of the earliest people to attend colonial schools in the colony and he served in various capacities in the Native Authority. /Dokaji, p.17 His predominant sources seem to be the Kano Chronicle, Song of Bagauda and some oral traditions. His view of the Emirate administration as exclusively Fulani is apparently adopted from the colonialists who have been trying to justify their conquest and domination by referring to the Emirate ruling class as a Fulani domination. He is clearly trying to justify why the 'Fulani' were the ruling aristocracy and that it was not a domination. /Dokaji, p.81/

4. Polly Hill, Population, Prosperity and Poverty in Rural Kano 1900 and 1970, London, 1970.

This work which is the only one based on an intensive survey of a single village - Dorayi, contrasts rather sharply with the others not only in territorial scope but in that it is the only one which identifies

growing rural poverty which she calls "rural stagnation or impasse". /Hill, P.xxi/ She provides a lot of evidence on the growth of wage labouring, migrations, unemployment, squalor and ever increasing centralization of land by wealthy individuals etc. She however ascribes this poverty not to colonial exploitation and its consequences but to the growth of population and consequent pressure on land.

She seems to have done a detailed survey of Dorayi village which is however cushioned and conditioned by her reliance on official colonial sources.

Before we go on to assess these explanations of colonialism we will start by assessing the usage of, and attitude to, official colonial sources used in these studies. We attempt here to highlight how they affect secondary works.

(c) The influence of colonial primary sources on secondary works.

We have already referred to official colonial archival records dealing with day to day administration which include reports, memos, touring notes, district notebooks etc. They are largely concerned with effective executions of colonial objectives and therefore comprise reports made on administrative progress, tax assessment

and collection, roads and railways, trade etc. for future policy formation. It has even been argued in one colonial gazetteer that these records constitute one of the most advantageous legacies of colonialism after its political unification of Nigeria./Gazetteers of the Northern Provinces, Vol.I., The Hausa Emirates, London, 1920, p. vii./ The records of trading companies also deal with the reports of the progress and accounts of their activities and as such they represent an integral part of the historical process and are restricted to the rendering of reports by appointed military, administrative and commercial officials. Thus, they exclude the forces governing the activities of these various agencies. Similarly their perception is limited to the premise from which they executed their duties. Lastly, in the colony, the administrative and commercial executives formed the dominant class in shaping and guiding colonial policies and this consequently ensured the dominance of their views.

Excessive over-reliance coupled with uncritical attitude to these sources have resulted in a number of shortcomings. Even where this over reliance is not explicit especially with regards to Tahir, Palden and Dokaji, the influence of these sources is carried through secondary works largely based on these or on an uncritical

attitude to the limited number used. Similarly, an uncritical attitude, for example, on the part of Tahir and Paden, to information derived orally and from internal sources which more often than not derived from Native Authority officials and middlemen give not only a lopsided impression but one akin to the official colonial ones - these classes having engaged in joint ventures with the European administrative and trading organisations in the colonial context.

One of the first limitations imposed by these primary sources on these studies is related to their theoretical scope. This is because such records do not provide any explanation of the colonial state and trading firms and the nature of their involvement in the total colonial system. Even where there is an attempt to explain and justify such involvement on the part of the colonial state and firms, an uncritical attitude to the sources leads to wholesale adoption of such explanations. Thus most of these studies are effectively limited to indirect rule and colonial trade - particularly in groundnuts.

Besides this limited scope even the informational details relating to this are encased in a point of view which is characteristic of the imperialists and does not necessarily reflect the reality of the colony. The first of these is the basic distinction between the period

before and the period during colonial domination as traditional and modern respectively. Thus, it is constantly hammered, that changes started with colonial domination. Moreover, it is further stated, that the character of change, was evolutionary. This evolution led ffom simple primitive to more developed and industrial economy. Similarly, the categories comprising the unchanging precolonial period are religious and ethnic. With the 'establishment' of colonialism however there resulted political, economic and social unification and a gradual formulation of a nations. This view sharply contradicts information derived from internal primary sources as well as availagle evidence on the pattern of settlements, occupations and political authority in both the period before and during colonial domination.

Similarly, key words and terminologies derived from the colonial sources are not assessed in relation to the activities of the colonial state. For example, Hogendorn has explained 'pacification' which even from the colonisers viewpoint meant effective subjugation of the population as'stopping inter-tribal wars and slave raids'. /Hogendorn, p.147. Similarly, Ubah has explained development which implies the developments of the interests and activities of the colonialists as the development of the

colonised, /Ubah, p.435/ while Tahir has described industrialization which appears to be related to importation of machine tools as indigenous industrialization. /Tahir, p.437

A second major influence is derived as a result of the pervasive nature of colonial domination. In the first place these sources are the most common and easily available. Secondly, the institution of colonial education trained the scholars viewing this history and it is only to be expected that by their very 'nature' and experience they have 'internalized' such a view. Similarly, most of the earlier secondary works were undertaken by colonial research fellows such as D.E. Carney and Allen Mcphee, informed by such a conception and using these sources. Furthermore, the characteristic development of the colonial society which approximated the colonisers and colonised with racial categories and the consequent racist policies of the colonial state had an effect in shaping people's perspective growing up under such a system. Lastly and more importantly however, this is also due to the close identity of the indigenous administrative and commercial classes with the activities (and interests) of the colonisers which tended to perpetuate and promote ethnic and 'cultural' perceptions. The

administrative class tended, for example, under the colonial system, to acquire, maintain and legitimise its position in the management of colonial affairs by reference to its traditional, ethnic and religious position whereas the middlemen secured and promoted their interests by claims to indigeneity and ethnicity. This was initiated and promoted by the colonial state. Thus, it came to pass that the administrators and middlemen were doing what they were doing not because it was of material benefit for them to do so since the only way to acquire such wealth was through the promotion of the interests of colonialism but because they were traditional, indigenous, tribal and religious.

We can illustrate the type of bias inherent in the colonial primary records by reference to the way they characterise the Emirate society on the one hand and they distinguish it from the colonial society on the other. The impression they create of the Emirate society being 'traditional' and unchanging as well as 'agrarian and 'pre-industrial' is, in the first place, contradicted by a number of available primary sources as we have indicated in Chapter Two.

Secondly, the hostility of the capitalist countries, especially Britain, to the Emirate, of which the conquest and the subsequent transformation of the society by the

colonial state was the logical outcome, is nowadays taken for granted. What might not be so obvious, perhaps, but is certainly apparent upon a critical examination of the colonial documents is that this same hostile predisposition permeated all descriptions and explanations of the Emirate by the various colonial administrators, soldiers and trading company officials in their reports etc. Yet many of the research works on the colonial period such as those of Ubah, Fika, Tahir, Hogendorn etc. seem to have largely taken the opinions expressed in these colonial documents at their face value. The net effect is that these studies have amply re-echoed the wishes, hopes and aspirations of the colonial invaders.

A more authentic interpretation of the political and economic structures of the Emirate can only be achieved through a critical evaluation and interpretation of these colonial sources.

Other primary sources, as we have already mentioned, relating to this period contrast rather sharply with those of the official colonial records in their perspective on the Emirate society. Those include the various observations recorded towards the close of the nineteenth century by European 'travellers' such as Heinrich Barth, P.L. Monteil, Robinson, Staudinger etc. Similarly, there

are internal primary records. These include various documents, written in Arabic, such as the Kano Chronicle. These internal sources are further supported by various biographies and accounts of contemporary individuals, delivered ofally and transcribed, which also contain information about the political and economic structures of the Emirate. Among these are the accounts of Imam Umoru, Dorugu and Maimaina Na Jega, Baba of Karo etc.

My own oral interviews and those recorded by P.E. LoveJoy also provide insights into the nature of the political and economic structures of the Emirate.

One should mention the various research works dealing primarily and independently with the political and economic system of the Emirate before the colonial conquest. Scholars such as P.E. LoveJoy, Philip Shea and Mahdi Adamu all indicate, in their studies that the Emirate was neither static nor solely pre-industrial and 'agrarian' and thus contrast sharply, as do the primary sources they are based on, with interpretation given in studies solely concerned with the colonial society.

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3530	Population statistics - Kano township: Europeans, Syrians, Arabs, native foreigners, etc.
5518	Arab expatriates Kano province, status under direct taxation, land and native rights and native court ordinances - policy and instructions.
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4186s.1	Prison trade instruction, N.A. prisons, Kano province.
1974/1908	Patrol in the Madawaki's district - Kano province.
3508	Paupers and vagrants.
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6835s.1	Grans for cotton roads 1951-56.

5367	West Africa Produce Control Board.
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6726	Primary Products Committee.
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6459	African economic development: agricultural production and secondary industries.
4048	Reports on the sylvan conditions and land utilisation in North Kano and Katsina provinces of Northern Nigeria by W.A. Fairbairn, 1937.
1681	Agricultural report, Kano division 1936-40.
5365	Groundnut cultivation, Kano province: area of land under.
6388	Groundnut production control schemes.
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5365A	Guinea corn - area of land under.
3628 vol.II	Local butter supply - Kano. Dairy distribution and price control 1943-44.
3565	Sugar - Local production of.
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1262	Forestry (N.A.). Rules under the forestry ordinance (all Kano N.A.s.)
1297	Forestry laws: prosecutions taken in N.A. Courts.
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6029	Disintegration of towns and villages and its effect on the local agricultural economy.
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1708 vol.I	Revenue survey-Kano Emirate.
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8354	Capitation tax - Northern Nigeria.
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1966	Railway labourers - taxation of.
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2654	Minerals research syndicate. Application for an exclusive prospecting licence over three square miles situated about five miles west of Malamawa in Tudun wada district, 1938.
2116	Mining and prospecting rights - instructions 1935-1953.
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6128	Minesfield labour - advisory report.
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7905	World produce prices.

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3548	Trade with French Niger Territory.
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4455	Disturbances in rural districts by groundnut traders 1939-1940.
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3553	Local foodstuffs, periodical review on prices - control of.
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2007	Groundnut prices and general tax.
5531	Groundnut return of stocks - middlemen.
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3985s.2	Tenders for supply of motor vehicles.	
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ND 66	Annual confidential reports - departmental officers.
ND 83	Forced labour 1931.
C 25	Purchase of motor vehicles through Crown agents 18 October 1927.
C 55	Non-native income tax.
C 153	Non-native income tax collection 1940-41.
111/1908	Confidential preliminary report - Kano province.

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2724 vol.II	Rano District notes 1938.
2757	Gwarzo District notes 1921-55.

5248	Emir of Kano inspection notes 1943.
5821	Kano Division handing-over notes 1948-53.
2568 vol.II	Provincial Gazatteer 1934.
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33 vol.1	Bichi District notebook.
34 Vol.II	Bichi District Gazetteer.
40 Vol.1	Dawakin Kudu inspection notes.
41 Vol.11	Dawakin Kudu Gazetteer.
42 Vol.I	Dawakin Tofa inspection notes.
43Vol.II	Dawakin Tofa Gazetteer.

(ii) Secretariat of the Northern Provinces (SNP)

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2734/1904	Indents on various goods supplied to the Northern Government - 1905.
2033/1905	Copper coinage - circulation of.
1511/1905	Laws affecting patent and trade marks.
1688/1905	Cheque for £1500 drawn by Niger Company Limited in respect of payment by S. Nigeria for loan of troops for the Aro expedition - collection of by Crown agents.
4000/1905	Messrs. Sciama & Co. - respecting exploitation of the trade route from the west coast to Kano.
730/1905	Copy of estimate for Manchester Chamber of Commerce - requested.
2771/1905	Outstanding hospital fees - recovery of by Crown agents from officers now in England.

3023/1905	Bills of exchange on Crown agents.
2028/1905	" " " "
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3730/1905	Skins for Colonial Secretary, Lagos.
4249/1905	Transmitting a copy of an article in the Board of Trade Journal re sericulture.
355/1905	Requisition for a hundred miles materials for temporary telegraph line.
479/1905	Cheques for collection by Crown agents during 1905.
1307/1905	L. & K. Trading Company application for permission to sell spirituous liquors to Arabs.
1396/1905	Shipment of specie £4200 from Lagos.
2139/1905	Specie - reduction of the fortnightly shipment from £9000 to £6000.
4000/1905	Trade routes to Kano.
4286/1905	Asking for information as to inducements offered by government to those desirous of settling in this protectorate for purposes of industrial cultivation.
4545/1906	Caravan tolls and canoe tax, abolition of.
3194/1906	Collection of tolls in Northern Nigeria on goods that have paid customs in Southern Nigeria - report as to.
255/1906	Return of approved increments for the year 1906 to Crown agents.

1551/1906	Sir Alfred Jones re medal for chiefs growing good cotton.
1550/1906	Re minerals worked in provinces.
1283/1906	The Niger Company's employees travelling free when in charge of stores.
645/1906	Ginned cotton shipped free to England by this government for B.C.G.A.
1552/1906/	Pledges made regarding cotton grown in Northern Nigeria.
4574/1906	Handbook to the Commercial Intelligence Branch.
2099/1906	Traffic in slaves.
2752/1906	Asking for the information regarding the amount of trade done in Zungeru and the cheapest rates from Kaduna river to Zungeru
1867/1907	Trade possibilities Kano province - report on.
1765/1907	Mr. C.A. Birtwistle: C.I.O. Lagos Southern Nigeria - report on his recent visit to Northern Nigeria 1907.
2798/1907	Cotton from Northern Nigeria - results of examination by the Imperial Institute of, samples of.
1767/1907	Reuters agency, news for.
1049/1907	African produce price list - forwarding copies of
671/1907	Arrival of Arab trader at Zungeru.
621/1907	Colonial Exhibition.
1086/1907	Traders from Tripoli requesting for free passages and reduced fare.
1867/1907	Trade possibilities - Kano Province, report on.
1864/1907	Animal transport, Northern Nigeria, report on.

6574/1908	Northern Nigeria, Commercial agriculture and mineral resources - information as to;
525/1908	Returns of imports and exports of Northern Nigeria for the year 1907.
6103/1908	Native leather - memo on.
6576/1908	Textiles - samples of and adaptation of standard by Northern Nigeria.
1768/1908	Kano Government Station - cantonment, creation of.
5169/1908	Kolas and Natron - Kano trade in.
5506/1908	Transport for traders.
6383/1909	Iron ore from Mount Patti - Northern Nigeria report on by Imperial Institute.
2133/1909	Indigo from Northern Nigeria forwarded by Mr. G.C. Dudgeon - report by the Imperial Institute on.
5585/1909	Wombai District Assessment Report 1909.
6166/1909	Assessment 1909 on Bardes District.
5570/1909	Kano Province Assessment.
1267/1909	Administration Division in Provinces - maps of.
959/1911	Assessment Dankade's subdistrict - report on.
6667/1911	Taxation - mines labourers.
2715/1911	Assessment report Dutsi District Kano province.

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3577/1921	Kano City increase of tax for 1921-1922. Assessment report by P.G. Harris A.D.O.

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SNP/10/7	93P/1919	Report for 1918.
	318P/1919	Report for half year ending June 1919.
	316P/1920	Report for half year ending June 1920.
SNP/10/9	98P/1914	Kano province annual report 1913.
	139P/1915	" " " " 1914.
	170P/1916	" " " " 1915.
	518P/1916	" " " " 1916.
	179P/1918	" " " "
SNP 10/1/1	Arabic letterbook No.1.	
SNP 10/1A/2	Miscellaneous WAFF Correspondence 1899-1906.	
SNP 10/2a/7	Arabic documents found in Sokoto 1903, translated by Captain Merrick.	
SNP 10/2a/8	Treaties, leases and Crown lands.	

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93m/1910	Tin areas of Nigeria - memorandum and articles of.
132m/1910	Kano Syndicate Limited.
131m/1910	Kano Syndicate Limited - memorandum and articles of association of.
344m/1911	Kano (Nigeria) tin areas memorandum and articles of association and prospectus of.

789m/1916	Tin, Wolfran (samples) Kano (Nigeria) Tin Areas Limited - Permission to export.
737m/1916	Mines accidents - enquiries into - compensation.
871m/1916	Abdu Mai Kano application for native traders plots 104c and 116c at Kano.
209m/1917	Mines Department Report (annual) 1916.
165m/1917	Alhassan Dantata application for plots 119 and 107 non-European trading sites, Kano.
950m/1917	Chamber of Commerce, Liverpool protest against government methods in granting leases of land in Northern Provinces.
198m/1917	Kano Township, Native location, auction of plots.
1063m/1919	Kano township correspondence affecting township lands and conditions of tenure, etc.
574m/1919	Sites (trading and residential) granted at Kano, Zaria, Minna and Jos.
643m/1919	Mines Department Annual Report 1918.
824m/1919	Koracho Mining Company memorandum and articles of association of.

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Acc. 23	Inspector General's report on the Northern Nigeria Regiment and related papers 1902-1905.
Acc. 57	Mr. Temple's report on the circumstances - the flight, pursuit and death of Attahiru 1, Sultan of Sokoto, 8th August 1903.
Acc.371/A5	Some papers by Mr. Palmer containing evidence that the Emir of Kano was intriguing against the Emir of Katsina and against our rule.

Acc. 381	Letter from Sarikin Abbas to the Resident saying that he wants work to do: 'I have rolled up the sleeves of my gown,' with a pencilled minute by the Resident on the answer which was returned to him.

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12004 Vol. 1	Kano Province Annual Report				1921
K105 Vol.II	"	"	"	"	1926
K6892	"	"	"	"	1927
9043 Vol.I	"	"	"	"	1928
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21326 Vol.I	"	"	"	"	1933
27810	"	"	"	"	1936
29652	"	"	"	"	1937
30847	"	"	"	"	1938
32098	"	"	"	"	1939
33147	"	"	"	"	1940
34242	"	"	"	"	1941
37005	"	"	"	"	1943
39157	"	"	"	"	1944
40234	"	"	"	"	1945

41986	Kano	Province	Annual	Report	1946
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SELECT LIST OF INFORMANTS

S/NO	NAME	LOCALITY	AGE
1.	Alhaji Ibrahim Makeri,	Kofar Nassarawa, Kano City.	67
2.	Alhaji Mahmoud Ibrahim,	Cikin Gari, Kano.	60
3.	Alhaji Uba Makeri,	Gyaranya, Kano City.	71
4.	Alhaji Yusufu Lamba,	Warure, Kano City	55
5.	Baba Musa,	Cikin Gari, Riruwai.	67
6.	Bappa Saminu,	Bakin Kasuwa, Kano.	75
7.	Bashiru Tela,	Cikin Gari, Birnin Kudu.	58
8.	Damina Kurgwi,	Tsohon Gari, Kano.	82
9.	Danladi Gora,	Maiadiko, Jos.	70
10.	Hajiya Yadikko,	Maiadiko, Jos.	84
11.	Idrisu Dan Halima,	Cikin Gari, Kura.	65.
12.	Jibrin Mohammed,	Tashar, Tudun-Wada	70.
13.	Madu Sabo,	Bakin Kasuwa, Birnin Kudu.	75
14.	Mallam Abdu Magini	U/Gini, Kano City.	77
15.	Mallam Adamu,	Fagge, Kano.	90
16.	Mallam Ado Sule Makeri,	Kasuwar Rimi, Kano City.	58
17.	Mallam Baba Abdu,	Yada Kwari, Kura.	75
18.	Mallam Baba Dangwa Dabawa,	Maiadiko, Jos.	68
19.	Mallam Babaji,	Cikin Gari, Riruwai	48

S/NO	NAME	LOCALITY	AGE
20.	Mallam Bature,	U/Gini, Kano City.	80
21.	Mallam Baba Messenger,	Tarauni, Kano City.	70
22.	Mallam Ibrahim,	Adakawa, Kano City.	57
23.	Mallam Isa Marini,	Dala, Kano City.	62
24.	Mallam Kawu Yunusa,	Maiadiko, Jos.	72.
25.	Mallam Maineman Na Fura,	U/Gini, Kano City.	67
26.	Mallam Mohammad Isa,	Kofar Mata, K/City.	75
27.	Mallam Mohammadu Makeri,	Bakin Kasuwa, Kano.	68
28.	Mallam Sani Marini,	Kofar Mata, Kano.	70
29.	Mallam Sani Mohamman,	Yada Kwari, Kura.	70
30.	Mallam Shehu Marni,	Cikin Gari, Kura.	72
31.	Mallam Shuaibu Tela,	U/Gini, Kano City.	65
32.	Mallam Yau Wali,	Buduku, Adakawa.	69
33.	Mamman Musa Helima,	Bompai, Kano.	72
34.	Mikailu Musa,	Cikin Gari, T/Wada.	67
35.	Mohammed Dankuturwa,	Cikin Gari, Riruwai.	68
36.	Mohammed Tanko,	Bakin Kasuwa, Kano.	70
37.	Mudi Salihu,	Cikin Gari, T/Wada.	70
38.	Namadi Sambo,	Cikin Gari, T/Wada.	57
39.	Sallau Isiyaku,	Bakin Kasuwa, Birnin Kudu.	66
40.	Sarkin Kofar Fada,	Fada, Kano.	78
41.	Sarkin Makera,	Kabawa, Kano City.	73
42.	Tukur Mohamman,	Cikin Gari, Riruwai.	63