STATE, CLASS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NIGERIA: THE LIMITATIONS OF REFORMS

BY

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STATE, CLASS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NIGERIA: THE LIMITATIONS OF REFORMS

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Department of Political Science
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JUNE, 1990

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to all those who are, by virtue of their class position, dominated, denied and deprived of the benefit of the abundance of wealth located in all the Local Governments, by the dominant class.

To my Mother, Hajiya Takko (Rabi'at) and in Memory of my late Father, Mallam Abul-Hassan (Audi) and late Asma'u Shehu - (the girl I accidently knocked down, 22-12-88, during this study).

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has been written and composed by myself and that it is a record of my own research work. It has not been, presented or accepted in any previous application for a higher degree. All quotations are indicated or distinguished by quotation marks and the sources of information are specifically acknowledged by means of references.

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CERTIFICATION

This thesis titled "State, Class and Local Government in Nigeria: The Limitations of Reforms" by Isah Mohammed Abbass meets the regulations governing the award of the Degree of Master of Science in Political Science of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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Finally, I would like to register my thanks to all the staff of Local Governments under study and other individuals who assisted me, particularly the assistance of Mallam Ahmad Dikko who 'dug' out certain data for me.

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A B S T R A C T

There has been a considerable growth in the studies of the problems associated with Local Government in Nigeria. Most of these studies have only concentrated on the common issues like administration and efficiency to the total exclusion of the role of the state and the concomitant class interests that help dictate the Modus-operandi of the Local Government Councils.

This study attempts to show that the evolution and role of the state has a profound bearing on the activities of the Local Government. Thus, Local Government does not exist in a vacuum, isolated from and independent of the motion of the state. Invariably, our attempts to understand and explain the contemporary system of Local Government in Nigeria provokes such class analysis. Hence, the concepts of class and state provide the framework for historical and dialectical analysis in the evolution of the contemporary Nigerian state in order to show that the present situation has a direct linkage with the past.

This study examines the class character of the Nigerian state which is involved in the processes of accumulation aimed at safeguarding class interest and dominatin^at the local level. It suggests that the peculiar nature of the dependent capitalist state precludes the existence of an effective and people-oriented third tier of government.

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

1. RESEARCH PROBLEM:

Since 1954 when the Native Authority Law came into operation, there were several reforms promulgated by the colonial and post-colonial state rulers. When the Military appeared in the political scene in 1966, it was one of its programmes to reform the system of Local Government. This effort, like other subsequent reforms, was said to be an attempt to find an avenue or machinery of maintaining constant contact with the people, providing the necessary goods and services and maintaining law and order because the previous reforms had failed to bring about the desired results.

Why is it that, over time and space, the system of Local Government in Nigeria has not yet provided the basic panacea to the fundamental problems - the problems of inequality, exploitation and poverty? It should be clearly understood that it is not the Local Government per se that should provide the panacea for the social, economic and political problems of the country. On the contrary, it is the whole social system that should be taken into consideration as the focal point of departure.

A large preponderance of the works on the problems associated with the Local Government in Nigeria is focused on the existing predicaments of the Local Governments. In other words, the symptoms or effects are misconceived for the causes. Thus, precarious explanations of the problems of Local Government as regards the paucity of finances or sources of revenue, the problems of qualified and competent staff, excessive control etc, only express the tail wagging the dog. Government official statements emphasise that efforts would be geared towards providing the machinery for the existing inappropriate institution to function, provide funds, infrastructures, remove excessive politicking and ensure that there is a good 'management orientation'.

The basic premise is that not much attempts have been made to seriously address our minds and situate the persistence of the problem by looking at the central and irreversible positions surrounding class division, class interests, class struggle and class domination in our society, particularly on the current state of affairs in our Local Governments. In other words, it is suggested that class determism or/and class position of those who both control political power and own the means of production determines, more than anything else, the general conduct of the state in general and the Local Government in particular. Therefore, the Local Government can not be isolated from and unconnected with the general trend and motion of the state.

The large body of work on Local Government does not bring out the crucial and spontaneous aspect of class, in particular, the nature and general role of the state in shaping and maintaining class interests, which have consequently turned the Local Government into a colossal gimickry. The contention is that problems of Local Governments are accepted or taken as given rather than being seen as a manifestation of the evolution of the state. It is believed that the problems are inherent in the Local Government system and ought to provide a machinery through which to bail themselves out. Are the Local Governments existing in a vacuum?

This study seeks to explain that the character of the Nigerian state, divided into classes, influenced and directed by capitalist orientation, behaviour or tendencies, precludes the government from being nearer to the people and vice-versa. The immutable issue surrounding the phenomenon of physically 'bringing government nearer to the people' is paradoxically limited to various forms and magnitude of exploitation and pauperization rather than providing them with all the critical needs and solving problems at the local levels.

In this attempt, some people[1] have completely misunderstood and even miscontrued the basic character and role of the state. They consequently perceive the consmetic Local Government Reforms as constituting major 'departures' from the previous ones, rather than attempts by the state to legitimize capital accumulation within the framework of nurture capitalism dictated by the sway of capital. No reform has brought government closer to the people or/and vice versa in a deliberate and sincere attempt to raise people's standard of living, easy accessibility to socio-economic needs and lessen the extent and degree of exploitation. To what extent then have the socio-economic policies of the state and all other infrastructures provided for the benefit of and actually benefited the majority of the population?

Thus, the study proposes that the phenomenon of 'bringing government closer to the people' is only superficial because it does not take into cognizance the intricacies of power, economic and class relations of the state structure that creates and dominates Local Government. This is rationalized as the institutional process of 'grassroots democratization, making Local Government' representative of the community' and the whole aspects of 'bottom-top' and 'catch-up' syndrome of 'development' etc.

Another crucial problem area in our study is the preponderant articulation made in an effort to situate the position and role of the traditional rulers within the framework of the 1976 Local Government Reform. It is viewed that the reform, ipso facto has violently limited or reduced the excesses of the influence and functions of the traditional rulers in the affairs of Local Government. The Emirate/Traditional Council and its accompanying functions have been in existence before the 1954 N.A. Local Government Reform. Hence nothing has organically or fundamentally changed the character and pattern of their role notwithstanding their 'relative exoneration' from openly and actively participating in politics.

This has brought the so-called uniform or standardisation of Local Government seen as a major 'departure' but only in the sense that there is a uniform or - standardisation of interests a la indigenisation (as a preparatory stage for that purpose) on the part of the class that controls the economic and political apparatuses. As such, the state provides a conducive atmosphere for accumulation and directly protects both the local or domestic bourgeoisie and international capital into the rural areas in the form of interventionist projects in agriculture.

2. SIGNIFICANCE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY:

There have been attempts to focus and identify the critical state of affairs and variables which have caused the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the Local Government. The role of Local Government supposedly sanctioned or attributed to the effective and efficient provision of services at the local level has not positively proved spectacular and has therefore not received the acclaimed attention from the majority of the people whom it is supposed to benefit.

This study seeks to provide explanations as to how the role and the entire system of Local Government administration in Nigeria has been subsumed into the dynamics and peculiarities of the state. The study will also seek to show how the Local Government enteres into the general framework of class interests and class struggle of the economic and political power structure within the capitalist state system; thus producing serious contradictions and limitations to all the reforms that came into being.

The nature of the Nigerian state should be understood on the basis of the concrete theoretical and empirical embodiment of manipulating the resolutions of primary contradictions under the umbrella of secondary ones. This is done through the use of the state expressed ideology and agencies including the Local Government. There is therefore, the need to

investigate the character of the state and the role of the state apparatuses. This will enable us situate and articulate class interests of individuals who were to execute the functions of the state in their positions and relations to government in undermining the activities of the Local Government. This study will attempt to create and throw light on this seriously created gap.

The emergence of the Nigerian state led to the evolution of the corresponding social classes and the concomitant class interests, struggle, domination and oppresssion of one class over all others for the perpetuation of the vested interests of the politically and economically dominant class in order to satisfy the requirements for maintaining exploitations as well as safeguarding the vibrant incursion of international capital.

The significance of this study also stems from the stand point of the importance of Local Government in uplifting the intergral aspects of community. Thus, Local Government, being the nucleus of the grassroots of any society, is potential as it relates to the insights that might enhance or inhibit the concerted efforts of achieving the desired goal and consequences which might result from such efforts.

Based on the realisation of the relevance of the Local Government to the continuation and sustenance of the status quo, the role of traditional institutions is very crucial. Thus the state systematically reverts and molds the socio-economic and political environment for the accommodation of the symbiosis relationship between the traditional and the new political leaders so as to fulfil and enhance certain requirements of capital and its accumulation. The role of the state is therefore crucial as it continuously reproduces this hegemonic dominance and control over the activities of the Local Government. This state ascendancy and accentuation are reflected on the concrete reality and manifestations of the state ideology (as far

back as colonial period when the traditional rulers were initially used) to express and assert itself in 'legitimacy' and supremacy over and above all contending forces.

This study will also attempt to analyse the changing conditions which have sustained the traditional and political leadership unity in either covert and overt identifications of class interests in the whole system of production and reproduction. Thus the collaboration of both the traditional and the new political leadership has provided and produced an avenue through which class struggle within the state power structure takes place in the process of controlling state power which is expensively used as a means of accumulation of capital.

It is in realisation of the nature of the Nigerian state that several questions emerged with respect to the state of affairs of the system of Local Government. It is further realised that since colonial times, several reforms on Local Government have all failed to transform the conditions of towns and country side and their inhabitants. This study suggests why such problems emerged and have continued to exist in our society and why the solutions to these problems would directly and seriously affect certain individuals (sacred cows) and interests if they are solved once and for all.

It is also realised that the Local Government, within the Nigerian state system, is completely incapacitated and cannot provide the panacea for inherent social, economic and political problems. Our study therefore proposes that it is the whole social system that should be the point of departure, because the study will attempt to unveil the patterns and trappings of the state control over the Local Government.

The study will try to show that the problem of Local Government is and has not been financial or structural unlike other studies[2] which have made untenable explanations of the causes of the problems of the Local

Government on the basis of the lack of finances, sources of revenue, qualified manpower, management etc. The effects of the problems of the Local Government in this respect, are usually miscontrued for the causes and do not offer any meaningful explanations of the predicaments of the system.

This study seeks to assess the impact of the phenomenon of class, within the context of the ownership and control of the means of production coupled with the possession of the political capacity, on Local Government. The study therefore seeks to determine, among other things, the extent to which Local Government is consciously designed to 'function' the way it is as well as create an environment that exhibits 'local' capital accumulation. This objective is premised on the assumptions that the 'managerial' orientations of the Local Government, since conlonial period, is practically, among other factors, responsible for the low level of performance in the Local Government.

Specifically however and based on the theoretical postulations, our study will attempt to:

a) examine the palpable class character of the Nigerian State that is directly or indirectly oriented and involved in the process of accumulation and appropriation of capital in order to safeguard and enhance the perpetuation of class interests and domination.

b) explore the preponderance in which the system of Local Government is used by the state as an instrument of manipulation and coercion; and then identify the structure and role of the Local Government in the allocation of power and resources.

3. HYPOTHESIS:

Our hypothesis in this study stipulates:

a) that far from being independent of society's class division and class struggle, Local Governments, as agents or extentions of the state power, function primarily for the interest of the dominant class.

b) that the problems associated with the Local Governments are direct manifestations of the historical role apportioned to them, acting on behalf of the state.

4. SYNOPSIS AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY:

In chapter one, we try to situate the study within the marxist classical theory of the state so as to provide the initial basis of the theoretical postulations of the state. Hence, various other postulations of the state are examined with a view to situating, understanding and articulating what kind of state Nigeria is, as well as the nature and patterns of capital accumulation and class struggle. However, class analysis and its role in the state is presented in order to identify its evolution, conceptions and the complementary relationships between and within its production and reproduction cycle as well as the political hegemony and cohesion in the state.

With regard to the applicability of the classical marxist conception of class in the Nigerian setting, care has been taken by synthesizing the controversies surrounding the phenomenon as a result of its historical origin and role in the society. The study of classes in an under-developed or back-ward social formations like Nigeria is very difficult and complex. This difficulty or complexity is predominantly due to the historical relations and the concomitant conditions subjected by the advanced capitalism on the backward social formations. Furthermore, a global perspective and analysis of the role and place of Local Governments within different environments are postulated.

In chapter two, an attempt to situate the study within the historical and dialectical materialism is presented. Emphasis is laid on the examination of the traditional authority prior to colonialism as well as the ecology of the colonial state mechanisms right from the priod of British influence and administration of Nigeria. We look further at the processes

of the establishment and nature of the colonial state as well as the system and role of the Native Authority system where traditional leadership became incorporated and functioned within the colonial state system as stooges.

The organisation and structure of the Native Authority, built on the traditional authority, is expressed within the context of the principal features of the political economy of colonial state. Finally, class character and development in the post-colonial state are examined with a view to projecting and reflecting the nature and class unity between the different fractions of the petty-bourgeoisies to regidify class interests for state hegemony and control right from the local levels.

Chapter three concentrates on vigorous analysis of the 1976 Local Government Reform by situating it within the framework of the Nigerian nurture capitalism and the patterns and procedures of class capital accumulation. The chapter however thro ws light on the recent reforms prior to that of 1976 as a prelude. It further shows the role and consequences of the Nigerian state in capital accumulation through corruption as one of the cheapest and major means. A thorough and critical appraisal or analysis of the client-patron relations between the Local Government and the state is provoked within the stand-point of the imperative manner and processes of the control mechanisms exercised by the state.

Chapters four and five take some case studies in Kaduna State for a critical evaluation of the Local Governments based on the propositions and serious entanglements enunciated earlier on. Invariably, the study will concentrate and be limited from 1976, for data analysis only. Finally, the study concludes by summarising or sifting all the major arguments and propositions advanced.

5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION:

In this work, we are interested in a systematic and historical analysis of the objective class-state unity as it persistently inhibits the desired

and positive socio-economic upliftment of the generality of the people in the Local Government.

The methodology and procedure for data collection in this study are however composed of an examination of all the available and relevant documents and records concerning the subject matter. These documents include:

1) Published books, journals and unpublished theses
2) Relevant federal and state governments' official records - e.g. Decrees, Acts, Laws and Edicts.
3) Relevant Local Government documents or records. Permission will be requested to gain access to them.
4) Collection of seminar, conference papers and newspaper magazine articles relevant to the subject matter.
5) Personal interviews with officials or officers of Local Government.
6) Interview with the People/Questionnaire.

FOOTNOTES

1. This misconception of the role and character of the state as regards the nature of Local Government has been expressed by a number of people. For example, Tatari Ali, in his paper - "Federal, State and Local Government Relationships" contained in the Return to Civilian Rule (1982) edited by Abubakar Yaya Aliyu, a proceeding of the National Conference on Return to Civil Rule, Institute of Administration 26 - 30 May, 1980. He conceived that the relationship between Federal and Local Government is 'very remote' and "apart from the grants that should from now onwards, go direct from the Federal to the Local Governments in addition to the execution of certain Federal Projects located in various Local Governments there is hardly any direct or indirect relationship between the Federal and Local Government" p.256.

In another misconceived view, Joseph Egwurube expresses that 1976 reform constituted a major departure as it "drastically if not totally curtailed the excessive influence and functions of traditional rulers in Local Government system since 1900. Similarly, the standardization of the Local Government system in Nigeria is in itself a unique characteristic of the 1976 reforms and another major departure from the past. Finally, the reformed Local Governments have not been deliberately designed to institutionalize commercial capitalism. The functional responsibilities devolved to the present Local Government --- were not exclusively meant to satisfy Wall Street or Park Avenue in New York but to be of immediate benefit to the rural population." See "Bringing Government closer to the people and the 1976 Local Government Reform in some selected states" in The Role of Local Government in Social, Political and Economic Development in Nigeria 1976-79 edited by Abubakar Yaya Aliyu, pp. 269-270.

See also "Government at the Grassroots" by Olatunji Olagunju in Local Government Reform in Nigeria edited by Suleman Kumo and Abubakar Yaya Aliyu. A report of the conference on Local Government Reform in Nigeria, Institute of Administration, A.B.U. Zaria, 14 - 17 May, 1979, pp. 51-56.

2. For instance, see Omolade Adeguyigbe's "Problems of the new Local Government Structure in Nigeria" in The New Local Government System in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects for Implementation edited by L. Ademollehun and L. Rowland, Heinemann Educational Books, Ibadan, 1979, pp.25-34. Also see "Taxation and other sources of Local Government Revenue" by Musa Mohammed Kigera III in Local Government Reform in Nigeria edited by Suleman Kumo and A.Y. Aliyu, Op.cit. pp. 237-241. See also "Management and Control of Finances" by H.A. Umar. Ibid, pp. 260-262. See Local Government Finance in Nigeria; Problems and Prospects edited by Adebayo Adedeji and L. Rowland. See Rowland Wrath, Local Government in West Africa, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1972, pp.41-56.

CHAPTER ONE

1.00 LITERATURE REVIEW ON THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DISCUSSIONS OF THE EVOLUTION AND ROLE OF THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1.01 THEORETICAL POSTULATIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE

Theoretical postulation on the evolution and character of the state is crucially justified because it throws light on the role of the state, by using its apparatuses, in the processes of class formation intrinsic in class determination, class struggle and class domination, which all constitute the bedrock of our study.

It is therefore of great significance to understand the various conceptions of the state, how it emerged or evolved as well as its functions with a view to appreciating the various dynamics of the society which are fundamentally associated with inherent contradictions.

The literature review will focus on (i) the Classical Marxist Theory, (ii) the Neo-Marxist perceptions of the state, (iii) the Liberal views, and (iv) the Post-Colonial propositions of the state. On the one hand, for instance, emphasis is concentrated on examining the state in the advanced capitalist societies, and on the other, emphasis is shifted to the under-developed or dependent capitalist formations where our area of study falls. All we are interested here is to identify, specifically, the basic role of the state in relation to class formation and the state policy to regiment and sustain or perpetuate class interest.

1.02 THE CLASSICAL MARXIST THEORY:

Marxist political thought constitutes an important embodiment in understanding crucial issues inherent in class division, conflicts or struggles in a society. This is so because the state, in this regard, is not perceived or taken as given. On the contrary, it emerged.

.../13

Classical Marxist theory of the state is concerned with the capitalist formation and shows that it is an institution with established apparatuses purposely and directly motivated to defend and maintain a class domination and class exploitation. The control of the state apparatuses, by the ruling class, is for and in the entire interest of the whole bourgeoisie. Marx and Engels, in the Communist Manifesto show that:

> the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie[1]

Marxist theory of state therefore provides us with the theoretical postulations of its emergence, nature and role or functions. Therefore, the existence of the state apparatuses or structures is fundamental in comprehending the nature and what functions the state serves in the society and how it is capable of maintaining the delicate and contradictory balances of political, social and economic relations. Hence, in the Marxist theory of state, issues of class division, class struggle and conflicts are postulated with a view to showing and emphasising the preponderant nature in which the capitalist state manifest itself in depending and maintaining as well as regimenting class domination and exploitation. All these are, in other words, focused on the state power and general activity.

The economic and political apparatuses are but organised power of one class for the oppression of another[2]. The state is further viewed by Lenin as the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie[3]. According to Engels, the capitalist state is where the means of production, etc. exist in the private ownership whereby both the working class and the peasants are in total or complete subjugation by the propertied class. He further contends that the idea of 'democracy', universal suffrage, parliament, elections, etc. are only presented or constituted in disguise and invariably do not alter an oita of the essential chacter of the state in being oriented, controlled and directed by the ruling class to dominate the other classes.

In State and Revolution, which is an expansion of Marx and Engels' views on the state, Lenin dramatises the validity of such views during the period of imperialism. He stresses that+

> The era of bank capital, the era of gigantic capitalist monopoly capital into state monopoly capitalism has *particularly witnessed an unprecedented growth in its* bureaucratic and military apparatus in connection with the increase in repressive measures against the proleteriat in the monarchical as well as the freest republican countries.4

The point of departure of both Marx and Engels is that the state expresses itself as the coercive instrument of the ruling class related to and connected with the ownership and control of the means of production. The state does not stand for the general interest of the whole society but rather exists to defend the general interest of private property. Thus, the state, in this respect, is essentially for a particular class and functions in the complete perfection of its basic interests. This classical Marxist view of the state may be regarded as constituting the basic or primary conception of the state.

Apart from this primary view of the state, there is another secondary Marxist perception of the state in its classical postulation. This secondary postulation is concerned with the state as being 'independent' from and superior to all social classes, as being the dominant force in society rather than instrument of the dominant class.[5] This second classical Marxist perception of the state arises from Marx's analysis of the Bonapartist State

In the Eighteenth Brummaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx tries to explain the 'relative autonomy' nature of the state at the particular historical conjuncture in the history of France. During the difficult periods in France, Marx shows that the ruling classes found themselves confrontedwith each other, each wishing to "effect the restoration of its own royal house against the other, that merely signified that each of the two great interests into which the bourgeoisie is split - landed property and capital

- sought to restore its own supremacy and the subordination of the other".[6] (emphasis from the original). As a result of the crisis of the whole bourgeoisie, it led to the rise and establishment of the Bonapartist state and:

> The struggle seems to be settled in such a way that all classes equally important and equally mute, fall on their knees before the rifle butt.[7]

The State under Bonaparte seemed to be completely independent of all the fractions of the bourgeoisie. Therefore, the 'independent' character of the state in the political sphere was only to balance the contending vested interests and class struggles peculiar to the state. Hence, the state cannot, in a class divided society, remain neutral but protect a socially and politically dominant and controlling class.

Hence, the 'relative autonomy' of the state has polemically preoccupied Marxist thoughts in both the developed and the under-developed capitalist states or social formations. This stems from the way the state relates to the political and economic forces in the polity. In this regard, however, a polemical question comes to mind - how impartial or autonomous is the state? The debate on the autonomy of the state dates back to Hegel. In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel presents the state as a complete embodiment of the general interests of the whole society. He also suggests that the state stands, over and above, particular vested interests and consequently appears independent, neutral or autonomous.[8]

1.03 THE NEO-MARXIST PERCEPTIONS

In the Marxist theory of state, three major categories for conceptualising a state in a capitalist setting emerged. These categories are (a) the materialist conception of the state, (b) the economic determinist theory, and (c) the policist dimension.

- The materialist conception of state stresses its point on the specific and particular features of the capitalist mode of production. It therefore shows the nature, form, development and functions of the capitalist state taking its point of departure from the contradictory character in the formation and development of capital as well as the relationship between the state and society which eventually consolidates the class division in the society.

Thus, the materialist explanations of the 'tendency of the rate of profit to fall' resulting in a crisis situation of the capitalist state constitutes a dynamic force in the development and general activities of the state[9]. Therefore, there is a crucial need for 'counter-tendencies' to these falling rates of profit, in aggressive manners, in political, economic, social and ideological directions or platforms aimed at restructuring the whole system of social relations of production.

- The economic determinist view or theory of the state is very much linked or related with the materialist conception. In this respect therefore, the state's role is directed in determining how the interest of capital can be adequately guaranteed which at the same time exposes that a class determinist position is vigorously pursued by the ruling class and that policies are essentially made to take care of the ruling class. Hence, there is an intricate relationship, correspondences or agreement between the state and the ruling class or the whole bourgeoisie.

Two approaches may be observed on why the state is playing such a role. The state, in the first place, plays the functional role of the interest of the dominant class and this is done or realised by the use of the ideological and political factors because the dominant class is capable or has the capacity to pressurise the state to protect its interest as a result of the control of the economy it has over and above the other classes.

The second approach, however, emphasises on the structural constraints which the state is subjected to in a capitalist setting. That, irrespective of the orientation of the political leadership, state policies, as a matter of necessity, must ensure the accumulation and reproduction of capital.

It should, however, be clearly understood that the two approaches are complementary to each other. The state is therefore not independent of the social ruling class forces. But there are times, notwithstanding, when the state comes to be perceived as impartial especially in times of conflicts, wars or revolts or during a particular historical epoch or conjuncture.

Again, in state monopoly capitalism, there exists partnership between those who control the machinery of the state, on the one hand, and those who control and own the means of production in the society, on the other. Therefore, the major role or function of the state, apart from the partnership with the economically dominant class, is to ensure accumulation of capital, regulation of class antagonisms as well as the stability of the social order.

The policist explanation was first started by Nicos Poulantzas by drawing his analogy from Marx's analysis of the state in the Eighteenth Brummaire of Louis Bonaparte. Thus, within the framework of the relative autonomy postulation, the work of Poulantzas is very significant in the sense that he first of all "constructs a theory of politics and state as a distinct region of a social formation, stressing the independence or relative autonomy of this region from the economic whilst also stressing the crucial links between the two levels".[10] Secondly, he also attempts to situate this within the Marxist classics but "develops a rigorous approach to them instead of repeating what had become mere shibboleth from the eighteenth Brummaire or State and Revolution, etc."[11]

On the 'relative autonomy' of the capitalist state, Poulantzas maintains that it is rooted in two directions. The first lay in the "precise type of 'separation' between the economic and the political, between the relations of production - consumption - circulation and the state".[12] The second direction which Poulantzas emphasises lies in the "specifity of the constitution of classes and the class struggle in the capitalist mode of production and social formation".[13] He examplifies such specifity of classes on the power bloc and different fractions of the bourgeoisie, on the hegemony within the power bloc, on supporting classes, on the forms of struggle adopted by the ruling class. All these have been attributed to the state with its definite role to politically organise, unify as well as establish what he calls the 'unstable equilibruim of compromises'. This is, according to him, a role constitutively connected with its relative autonomy.[14]

To Poulantzas, the political constitutes the 'jurisdico-political' super structure of the state. The political, according to him, occupies a specific place within a social formation which in turn involves certain social practices arising from the very structures of the social formation. Furthermore, the state, Poulantzas contends, is an indication of "not only the 'autonomy' of the respective structures of the political and economic spheres as reflected in the relationship between the state and the economic class struggle but also the relative autonomy of the state from the politically dominant class".[15]

In this context, the role of the capitalist state is that it takes charge of responsibility of the political interests of the whole bourgeoisie and then realises the functions of the political cohesion and hegemony which the bourgeoisie is incapable to realise. In order to achieve this function, the state assumes a relative autonomy to the bourgeoisie.

Hence, this 'relative autonomy' of the state emphasises its political functions in relation to the various classes in a social formation which is dominated by property relations of production.

For an examination of relative autonomy, Poulantzas shows that the separation of the economic and political provides a general framework within the different stages and phases of capitalism. As such, with this form of autonomy, it precisely depends on the conjuncture of class struggle at any given time. Therefore, this "separation of the economic and the political is itself nothing more than the form taken by the constitution of the classes, and hence it too is a consequence of their struggles under capitalism."[16] Thus, the relativity question of the autonomy may now be addressed.

In this regard, Poulantzas contends that the state is 'relatively autonomous' in relation to the dominant classes and class struggles within each social formation as well as its corresponding state forms. He further contends that the very principle of the Marxist theory of the state "lay down the general negative limits of this autonomy. The (capitalist) state, in the long run, can only correspond to the political interests of the dominant class or classes."[17]

A point presented by Poulantzas in his formulations, exposes that the state reflects the unity of the social formation. This point is ambiguous and unsatisfactory in his treatment of the relation between a 'formation' and the 'state'. As such:

> the state is presented as 'reflecting' this unity of the formation and at the other times the state appears to 'constitute' this unity - - - the state is said to maintain the external conditions of production but it is not clear whether this role involves a 'constitution of unity' or only a 'reflection' of this unity. If the answer is that it is a 'reflection' then where does the unity of formation take place? If it constitutes the unity, then there is a need to clarify and elaborate the patterns of this constitution.[18]

Thus, the problematic of the 'relative autonomy' postulations provokes such questions as to how is it practicable or possible to be autonomous on the one hand and not autonomous on the other? How is it possible for the political and cultural means of representation to be independent of ecomomic classes and their interests on the one hand and yet be constrained to represent those interests on the other? The problem is unsoluble. If the political institution, organisations etc. are not determined by the system of economic class-relations, then they cannot be constrained to function as the means of representation of those relations".[19]

Hence, political institutions, organisations and practices do express adequately the very vested interests of economic classes. This is so because political forms are recognised as being irreducible to economic classes and their interests but no attempt is made to conceptualize their effectivity with regard to economic class-relation or other elements of social formation.[20] This however does not mean that the means of or economic orientation by the state is not indispensable to the economy alone, but also related to and connected with the political and therefore this presupposes a specific and determinate effectivity of the means of domination of one class over the others. This further means that the state cannot present and orient itself or reduce its orientation to economic institutions and interests; it has to possess the political, cultural, institutional or organisational structures to match up with the economic ones.

The problematic of a particular orientation of the state, especially the economic orientation, is also as unstable and incoherent as that of the relative autonomy postulations. For example, is the economic orientation of the state determined by political etc. or is it the polity that is being determined by the economy and directly reducible to classes and interests involved? Consequently, notwithstanding the perceived primacy of the economy than or over the political and ideological forces, with regard to

to the 'base' and 'superstructures' i.e. - a situation whereby the superstructure determines and orients the economy than political and ideological forces cannot be reduced to the effects of economic class-relation. As such, it should be seen as a direct manifestation of the state and economy.

Furthermore, to categorically deny economism is evident of the rejection of the classical conception of economic - political - ideological unity of classes. It is also to maintain that political and ideological struggles cannot be conceived as the struggles of economic classes. In this respect, there is no sitting on the fence or there is no middle way. Therefore, the articulation of economic orientation in the structure of a social formation must be analysed from the stand-point and conditions of the existence of the structure of class-relations and the forms in which the stand-points or conditions are secured, i.e. in the "forms of possession of and separation from the means of production on the part of the economic agents".[21] Hence, Poulantzas' remarks with respect to the modalities of the function of the state illustrate that there are "no techno-economic, ideological or 'political' functions of the state: there is a global function of cohesion which is ascribed to it by its place and there are modalities of this functions over-determined by the specifically political modality."[22]

It is therefore only with regard to the role which the state performs that we can concretely situate, analyse and articulate its orientation and the 'relative autonomy'. In all class divided societies, especially the capitalist societies, the state functions in critically maintaining cohesion and domination as well as managing the capitalist mode of production and the re-enforcing class consciousness and class struggle within the maturity or development of the state.

1.04 THE LIBERAL VIEWS:

A study on the theory of state profounded by Western liberal scholars put forward certain assumptions which preclude any special concern with its nature and role. These assumptions include the view that power in the societies is 'competitive', 'fragmented' and 'diffused'. That everybody, directly or indirectly, can have power and nobody can have too much of it. This is so, according to them, there is free and regular elections, universal suffrage and all sorts of rights and privileges.[23]

The advanced capitalist states are characterized by two common and distinct features. In the first place, they are all highly industrialized, secondly, the largest part of their means of economic activity is under private ownership and control. These characteristics crucially distinguish them from their third world counterparts, like Nigeria, which are under-industrialized or under-developed but whose economic activities are predominantly under private ownership and control.

In all such advanced capitalist societies, there is a remarkable state intervention in every sphere of economic activities. This is not a new phenomenon in the history of capitalism. Furthermore, the state intervention has, more often than not, accelerated the early stages and steps of capitalist development in many countries like Japan, Germany etc. Miliband (1973) further maintains that the scale of state intervention is very pervasive and is now "immeasurably greater than ever before and will undoubtly continue to grow ----"[24]

As a result of these structures in Western societies, notwithstanding, the argument maintains that the government, acting on behalf of the state, cannot afford not to guarantee and fulfil the collective demands of all the varying interests of the generality of the people. Thus, "all active and legitimate groups in the population", according to Robert A. Dahl, "can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision".[25]

As such, there is no, according to this pluralist - democratic views, in the advanced capitalist states, such predominant class because the state guarantees that power is 'diffused' and 'balanced' and that there is no particular interest which can determine the actual operations of the state.

Hence, side by side with the Marxist and the pluralist - democratic views in their theoretical constructions of state activity which, on the one hand, shows its emergence and role as regimented towards maintaining the delicate conflicts between the dominant and dominated classes in economic, political and social relations and, on the other, in fact the opposite, as 'unaware' of class division and interests, cannot show any marked bias towards some and against others but to accommodate and reconcile them all.

But in managerial capitalism, which is also an important phenomenon in the evolusion of capitalism, there exists the state system in the form of government and other coercive forces in the state apparatus, the judiciary etc, all coming together and exercising decisive degree of economic and political power in the ownership and control of crucially important areas of the holistic state life and activity especially in decision making and their implementation which are all directed to achieve and protect class interests.

1.05 THE POST-COLONIAL STATE THESIS:

In order to understand the state activity in the dependent or backward capitalist social formations of the third world and the theoretical debates on the state, we have to centre on the polemics of the 'post-colonial' propositions which was developed by Hamza Alavi, John Saul and the commentari of Colin Leys, B. Beckman, W. Ziemann and M. Lanzendorfer, etc. Many of the characteristics found in the advanced capitalist state postulations appear in the under-developed world but with much more complexities.

But a distinctive difference between the advanced capitalist and post-colonial states is that in the former, it functions to maintain economic and social relations so as to safeguard bourgeois accumulation, while in the latter, because of the nature and level of the development of the forces of production, the state becomes, through its apparatuses or institutions, an instrument for accumulation for the dominant class. Thus, this has profound "consequences for the social class formation and the nature of the state".[26]

The postulations, of the 'post-colonial' state, by Hamza Alavi, show that the state is uniquely characterized by 'over-developed' and 'relative autonomy' nature. These characteristics are "premised on the historical specificity of the post-colonial societies, a specificity which arises from the structural changes brought about by the colonial experience and alignments of classes and by the superstructures of the political and administrative institution which were established in that context and secondly, from radical realignments of class forces which have been brought about in the post-colonial situation".[27]

Thus, the newly politically independent states, now under the patronage of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, due to the weaknesses and the under-developed bourgeoisie, had inherited an 'over-developed' state apparatus or superstructure in relation to the economic base. As a result, the three propertised classes - the indigenous bourgeoisie, metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisie and the landed classes - are now mediated by the bureaucratic - military oligarchy and as such:

> ---it acquires a relatively autonomous role and is not simply the instrument of any one of the three classes. Such a relatively autonomous role of the state apparatus is of special importance to the neo-colonialist bourgeoisies because it is by virtue of this fact they are to pursue their class interests in the post-colonial societies.[28]

However, the relative autonomy is emphasised to vindicate the "far reaching intervention by the state in the economies of post-colonial countries, both by way of a network of controls, in which vested interests of the bureaucracy are embeded, and a direct appropriation and disposition of a substantial proportion of the economic surplus".[29] This has therefore shown the economic aspects of the relative autonomy of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy with regard to state intervention and economic surplus appropriation which enables it to bureaucratically direct and deploy activities in the name of promoting development, within the state capacity to be "able to dispense with the usual mediatory role of politics".[30]

John Saul also argues along the same pattern with Hamza Alavi on the issues of 'relative autonomy' and 'over-developed' post-colonial state thesis. But Saul further develops the need to establish ideological hegemony as occupying a very central position in the post-colonial state. He elucidates this theory of ideological hegemony of the 'over-developed' post-colonial state taking Tanzania's peculiar 'socialist' ideology into consideration and contests that apart from the fact that the military-bureaucratic oligarchy appropriates surplus through the state bureacracy, a forum is made "for mounting socialist development strategies".[31]

Furthermore, third world theories with regard to the issues of 'relative autonomy' and 'over-developed' post-colonial state, have their inherent problems associated with them and are no longer serviceable. For example, Saul's thesis for the need of an ideological hegemony is very much over-sighted because it fails to show any fundamental difference, in the objective conditions of the people and the mode of production in 'socialist' Tanzania and any other African country. Thus, theoretical postulation raise more questions than offer explanations with regard to the class forces within the society and other emerging contradictions.

Leys contends that the concept of 'over-developed' post-colonial state is misleading if it is postulated to refer to its foces of coercion as "weightier and more ramified"[32] contrary than it should have been. On another issue of the post-colonial state, Leys further contends that if we must concretely understand its significance and locate it within the existing body of research on the subject, we must begin from class struggle and not the state. As such, "the idea of the 'over-developed state' functions ... as an apparent reason for reversing the proper order of procedure".[33]

The state in the under-developed social formation is invariably characterised by certain features unique to its under-developed institutions. In this regard, the state is largely dominated by the petty-bourgeoisie. These very characteristics have ostensibly or apparently given the state the mistaken and misleading identity of being 'independent' and 'autonomous' of them. Because of the fact that the state does not "reflect the clear domination of one social class over all others, control of the state itself becomes remarkable suceptible to narrow shifts in alliance, among the ruling petty-bourgeoisie".[34] Therefore, the shifts of power and position among the petty-bourgeoisie in these countries are reflected in the coups and counter coups prevailing.

Because of the nature of the state, characterised by weak and under-developed bourgeoisie under the metropolitan patronage, there is a more direct and frequent intervention in the society so as to perform the functions of accumulation because having achieved political power, these local classes begin to attempt to use foreign capital and against which they are otherwise ill equipped to compete".[35]

Just as the petty-bourgeoisie in the under-developed society is dominated by the metropolitan bourgeoisie, he would definitely wish to (and did) create avenues and circumstances in which he would also have to superimpose his position on the other sub-classes or fractions of classes and the other dominated class in order to situate and maintain his hegemony as well as accelerate the rate of accumulation and appropriation of capital similar to the type done or practised by the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Thus, as the state becomes an economic force, political power becomes an instrument and a source of economic power and not vice versa.[36]

The illusion associated with the 'independence' and 'autonomy' of the state is more often than not perceived as such; because of the fact that the objective position of the petty-bourgeoisie appears arbiters between the working class and both the foreign and local bourgeoisie and "propagandize to effect that they and only they, represent interests that are national and therefore beyond all sections and classes".[37] They systematically use and rely on the armed forces to constantly police their affairs at the expense of the so-called national interest so as to legitimise or rationalize their basic and vested interest which consequently brings the state in its actual role as an instrument of class creation and class domination.

This development results in some crucial dimensions attached to the 'instrumentality' of the state. These important dimensions show the instability and easy susceptibility directed to limit changes among the petty-bourgeois alighnments who are dominating the machinery of the state. Even though the class that constituted the 'petty-bourgeoisie' has been transformed into the bourgeoisie proper. Another dimension is the illusionary appearance of the state being 'independent' in the context of the international capitalist order and within the local class formation.

1.06 CLASS ANALYSIS AND ITS ROLE IN THE STATE:

Analysis has shown that people, in one way or another, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconciously belong to a particular class, either in overt or covert identification of themselves in class determinism or in class position. It is further analysed that classes do not immediately and directly represent themselves nor do we find classes lined up against each other, rather, it is recognized that there is, notwithstanding the very contradictions or antagonisms inherent in or between classes, some form of complementary relationships between them in the production process as well as in the political hegemony and cohesion in a state.

The concept of class and class analysis stem from man's intricate relationship with nature and his fellow human beings in the whole organic processes of production. Hence, there is an economic conception of class which is predominantly defined with respect to both ownership/non-ownership and control/non-control of the means of production. This economic articulation of class is viewed to be a crucial criterion in the determination of social classes and is consequently linked up with the whole fabrics of the social structure of a society.

As a result of man's constant and consequent interaction with nature, nature has invariably become transformed. Thus, the transformation of nature by man leads to the simultaneous transformation of man himself and his very conditions of living which have fundamental bearings on social and class evolutions in the environment where he lives.

However, in an attempt to understand the intricacies of these interactions in the formulation or evolution of classes in social and economic relations, it is crucial to examine labour processes. Hence labour process is categorised into three groups. The first category is the labour itself. Secondly, it is the object of labour and thirdly, the instruments of labour.

In the first place, labour here essentially refers to the labour-power which consists of the totality of man's mental and manual or physical labour, characteristic of man which have enabled him to engage in one form of work or another. Secondly, the objects of labour constitute all that man has at his disposal to use his labour in production. This includes all the constituent parts of land as a factor of production. Thirdly, the instruments of labour are the tools used to link both the labour-power and the objects of labour. Furthermore, instruments of labour have acquired a very special position among all the elements of labour process because of the fact that they are used for the concrete realisation of human needs because nature has been transformed as a result of its usage by labour-power on land.

Hence, in a society dichotomized into classes, man's relationship with nature in production is composed of two types of relations. In the first instance, it is on the forces or agents of production and the means or objects of labour. Secondly, it is on the relations which man invariably and inevitably enters with other men - a class relation or a social relation of production. Therefore, these established relationships result inevitably into economic ownership and real control over the means of production as well as actual possession and the capacity to employ the means of production into reality or operation. Those who have control over the means of production exploit the actual and direct producers. Thus:

> The relations of production must be understood both as an articulation of the various relationships which constitutes them and their union with the labour process. It is this which defines the dominant relations of exploitation characterising a mode of production, and which determines the class that is exploited within this dominant relations.[38]

Class, in its classical Marxist conception, is conceived as categories of economic agents defined exclusively with regard to specific forms of involvement in possession of and separation from the means and relations of production.

It is further conceived as entities that constitute or represented by definite political forces and cultural or ideological forms. There are lots of polemics associated with the reduction of politics and culture to the economy as regards the concept of classes. The question now is: Can we conceive classes, exclusively as categories of economic agents or political and cultural agents? Political struggle is however an inbuilt and inseparable idea or phenomenon that is very much linked with class relations.

The concept of class and class struggle are areas in Marx's writings that are, among others, most elusive. They are elusive in the sense that there is an unsatisfied definition, notwithstanding the interpretations and reinterpretations of his writings in order to situate this concept in empirical and operational settings. In CAPITAL, Marx in his discussion of classes says that:

> The owners merely of labour-power, owners of capital and land owners whose respective sources of income are wages, profit and ground-rent, in other words labourers, capitalists and land-owners constitute the three big classes in the modern society based upon the capitalist mode of production.[39]

State and class are inherently and inextricably tied together. Therefore the existence of the state owes its very origins to the organic division of labour and property ownership within the economy. As we cannot therefore talk or explain class without direct reference to the state because of class struggle and the dialectical materialism inherent, we cannot therefore crystallise the concept of class exclusively within the definite form of ownership or possession and non-ownership or separation of the means and relations of production. This is so because it is tantamount to reducing the concept to a static and therefore not dynamic one which inevitably excludes its inherent constituents of class struggle and the dialectical materialism which constitute the bedrock of Marxist world outlook.

Thus, the exploited class must have its exploiter and that there is no way development which can be adequately explained without its opposites in varying forms and magnitudes.

Political parties or organisations, for example, may claim to represent the interest of a class. But how can we understand those class 'interests' as objectively as possible as determined by economic class relations? Again, class interests are not transferred to politics and ideology by the economy because they have arisen within the political practice and determined as a consequence of a particular mode of political practice which does not recognize class interest and then represent them. It constitutes the interests which it represents.[40]

There is a general uniformity in class definitions. However, as a result of man's transformation of his social relations with his fellow human beings from consanguineous to class relations and interests, a class is defined as constituting a large group of people characterised, principally not exclusively, by the position they occupy in the processes of production. Therefore, their place stems in the relationship of the means of production as well as the entire social division of labour which also include the political and ideological conception of class which exist and enter into class struggle.

Within this economic sphere, it is clear that there is a dichotomy, in the relationship, between those who are "unable to harness nature for the purpose of producing and reproducing themselves and those who are able to do...there are those who possess the vital elements in the labour process, the instrument of labour and those who do not".[41] Those belonging to the first category are the exploiting class while those in the second category, are the exploited class. Exploiters are able to do so because of their very position and possession of the instrument of labour and having control over those who do not possess.

s exploitation therefore takes the form of appropriation of the surplus-value from the exploited class.

Lenin, for example, defines classes as constituting "large groups of people which differ from each other by the place they occupy in the historically determined system of social production...classes are groups of people, one of which can appropriate the labour of one another owing to to the different pl aces they occupy in a definite system of social economy."42

Furthermore, classes are not empirically identified groups of individuals like a social group which is of inter-personal relations. Therefore, the principal factor for class analysis stems from its place in the class struggle and its determination begins from the role played in the place it occupies in economic sphere or relations which is further determined by the processes and relations of production and distribution. Poulantzas emphasises that:

> The economic includes not only production, but the whole cycle of production-consumption - distribution, the 'moments' of this appearing, in their unity, as those of production, which is involved in the overall reproduction cycle of social capital: Productive capital, commodity capital, money capital. In this unity, it is production which plays the determinant role.[43]

In general terms and in every mode of production, it is observed however, that there are two broad classes, in their full economic, political and ideological determination. These two classes are referred to as either the exploiting class which is politically and ideologically dominant or the exploited class, politically and ideologically dominated. This is nevertheless the core of Marx's conception of classes in a given society emphasising on the ownership or non-ownership of the means of production. Engels however wrote that

> "By the bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern capitalist, owners of the means of production and employers of wage labour. By proletariat, the class of modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling labour-power in order to live."[44]

Furthermore, Karl Marx, in the Communist Manifesto shows that:

> The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle...oppressor and oppressed stood in constant opposition to each other.[45]

Hence, class interests, the interest of the 'ruling class' as well as the dominant class interests over time and space, have been the predominant and determining factor in the formulation of policies in order to guarantee and safeguard the continuity of a class stratified society which have, more often than not, been the essential raison d'etre of the evolution and role of the state.

In every class divided society however, classes are distinguished into 'fractions' and 'strata'. This distinction is based on the patterns and role of economic, political and ideological sphere and relations. Classes are further distinguished into social 'categories' also based on the place they occupy in the political and ideological relations within the state bureaucracy and the role of intellectuals to elaborate and deploy the expressed ideology. The significance of these differentiations, within the state apparatuses, is that these fractions, strata and categories may in "concrete conjuncture assume the role of relatively autonomous social forces".[46]

A central question now surfaces - how does class, class interest, relate and enter into particular branches of the state apparatus? This is clearly understood with respect to the role of the state as well as the functions and significance apportioned to the various apparatuses in maintaining the basic dominant interests. As such "the unity and cohesion of the social formation concentrating and sanctioning class domination and in this way reproducing social relations (that is) class relations."[47]

These branches of the state apparatuses include represssive apparatuses - (the army, police, prisons, judiciary, civil service), the ideological, educational and religious apparatuses. Others are information (radio, television, press), cultual and trade union apparatuses of class collaboration and the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political parties. Furthermore, apart from these state apparatuses, there is the economic apparatus in the form of 'business' or 'factory' which as the centre of appropriation of nature, materializes and embodies the economic relations in their articulations with the politico-ideological relations.[48]

Hence, the functioning of the state and economic apparatuses are determined by the state power directed or articulated with class bias so that power is maintained, so that the other class opposed to the dominant class cannot 'smash' the apparatuses expressed in the "configurations of the terrian of class domination"[49] where class interests and appropriate channels through which to express them are rigorously articulated. This therefore constitutes the first and initial part of class analysis.

With regard to the applicability of the classical Marxist concept of class in the third world, a lot of controversy surrounds the phenomenon. This is not unexpected because there are no developed and polarised classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat with the existence of the 'middle class' sandwitched by the two major classes which historically develop and relate to each other in the whole process of production within the corresponding mode of production coupled with the state activity and power.

The study of classes in the under-developed or backward social formation is a very difficult task. This difficulty partly owes its origin to the long historical relations it had with the advanced capitalism which distorted or altered the system of social production and invariably, the classes in these areas could not evolve in the same historical manner and patterns

as classes evolved in Europe. But the question now is - can we adequately articulate and apply the concept of class and class struggle in such a stituation?

Of course there are no classes in the third world reminiscent to that of the Western European states. But it is abundantly clear that we cannot separate the evolution of class from the system of social production which is inseparately determined historically. Classes, every where, therefore develop historically, dialectically and materialistically. They develop out of the evolution or emergence of the state accompanied by the corresponding and specificity of the existing mode of production. Therefore, the existence of the state and social classes owe their origins simultaneously in the specific social division of labour and property relations in the economy. They are therefore both inextricably related to and connected with each other.

The difficulty in this setting has been articulated by Stavenhagen by noting that, in the under-developed states, "class limits will not be clearly defined, class relationships will be ambiguous, structures that belong to different historical epoches will coexist and cut across each other."[50] But notwithstanding this difficulty of class analysis in this situation, the problems are best understood in the perspective of the historical and dialectical materialistic evolusion of the states and the disarticulation of the mode of production which objectively and irreversibly denied or arrested and 'robbed' the evolution of capitalism with the corresponding and historical class formations and relations.

There is therefore a serious error or danger in mechanically applying the classical Marxist concept of class in these societies because the so-called 'national bourgeoisie' in the third world lacks the historical role and maturity of the authentic bourgeoisie. He also lacks the objective economic base.

But the bourgeoisie proper evolved, at a certain stage in time in the Western Societies, through mechantile activities directly connected with and related to plunder, slave raiding and slave trading, in our own societies, which are all part of the processes of the formation of commercial capitalism in the form or method of primitive accumulation. These activities further led to the industrial revolution as a result of the industrial capital. This inevitably led to the struggle between the decaying feudal mode of production and the raising capitalist mode of production which paved the way for the bourgeois revolution and or as a result of the defeat and overthrow of the landed aristocratic feudalists. Hence, modern classes in the third world inevitably developed, historically, under the formal and informal shadow of colonialism and imperialism.

1.07 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:

The evolution, conception and role of Local Government vary in different social settings with respect to the nature of state power and role from time immemorial. Invariably in all the situations, Local Governments have been subsumed into the general motion of the state machine to function in accordance with the direction of the state expressed policy or ideology. Hence the evolusion of the Local Government has characteristically and organically been expressed in all the bearings inherent with the emergence of different state agencies or apparatuses in order to realise certain objectives.

Local Government is generally conceptualized, within which it is designed to operate, as a political agency for the training and realisation of 'democracy' at the local level. It is also conceptualized as a system where provision of amenities to the populace is co-ordinated. Furthermore, local government is more than a political concept because local bodies are also regarded as engines of the vehicle of development.[51]

However, Jackson (1970) contends that Local Government is essentially a method of getting various services run for the benefit of the community.[52]

Empirical evidence has shown that all Local Government bodies are creatures of state statutes and do not have independent existence of their own. In India, with its federal character, Local Governments' share of national importance was negligible and did not have a place in the constitution.[53] There are therefore no such things as inherent powers of Local Government. InChina, 'local people's government' is responsible and accountable to people's congress at the appropriate levels of the administrative organs of the state and it is to work under the state council leadership. Furthermore, 'local people's governments' are to carry out the decisions and orders of the organs of the state administration as prescribed by law.[54] As no local authority does anything which is not specifically entrusted to do by virtue of the state, this principle has been universal differing only in degrees. This principle is empirical in the United Kingdom and many other countries which came under its influence. This general principle is also applicable and operative in the USSR even though the scope of local authority's power, but inevitably local bodies' actions are overrun by higher authorities.

There are complexities and lack of uniformity of the terms used for different levels of government. As such there is no universally accepted vocabulary for the concept. In all repects there is the government of a country. In unitary states like England, France, New Zealand etc. there are parliaments, different government departments etc. and we may talk about the national or central government. In a Federal set up, the terms are more complicated. In this regard, there is the overall government and the existing constituent parts. In the USA for examples, the distinction is between Federal and State but with City Governments which are chartered by

by the states and thus constituting the whole spectrum of the units of government. In Austria the distinction is between Commonwealth and State, while in Canada it is Dominion and Province. However, in certain situations, the terms 'general' for the overall government and 'reginal' for the constituent parts are also used. In Nigeria, the terms 'central' and 'reginal' were used particularly during the 1953-4 constitutional discussions.

In a Federal structure of government like the USA powers are divided betweeen the 'Federal' and 'State' each with its own sphere legislature and government. In this set up, states are not called local government because the latter is thought to be a sub-division of the former. In other Federal and quasi-federal (where states are not autonomous) systems, Local Governments are mostly exclusive matters of the states as regards their legal establishment and all the patterns of control. In this set up, some overriding provision in the constitution may stipulate certain powers to Federal Government and thereby limiting the powers of the states. For example, the basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany leaves Local Governments to the states but provides that in the local units "the people must have representative assembly resulting from universal, direct, free, equal and secret elections".[55] It is further contended that "for local authorities in a Federal system, the centre to which they look is the state whilst in a Unitary system, they look to the general government as the centre. WE can therefore always talk about the 'central government' when discussing Local Government affairs without bothering about whether the country as a whole is federal or unitary. The units of Local Government have to be regarded as sub-divisions of the state. But Local Government is not just government at the local level."[57]

The American institution of 'council-manager' of Local Government is primarily urban and involves local initiatives, professional management and elective council. The theory of council-manager was first experimented and adopted in Staunton, Virginia in 1908 based on the American Presidency in the sense that the Manager became the executive arm of the bicameral local council. This council-manager system was however viewed as a means of improving democracy at the local level and the 'short-ballot' principle of election, elimination of partisan politics and political patronage from city government, reduction and curtailment of corruption and provide 'good' government, make Local Government more responsive to the people. This system has not been popular in large cities but only largely adopted to small and middle size cities which are mostly ethnically homogeneous.[58]

Hence, the ideology of the council-manager evolved from 'popular to good government' to 'neutral' administration to the present emphasis on 'community leader'. The question now is: are the council-managers neutral? As they live in the world of politics their lives and success depended on their ability and capacity in the political activities. As this is similar to private business cooperation, council-manager in practice is an elitist form of Local Government because the council is predominantly composed of individuals as leaders because of their positions in the dominant economic interest and invariably protecting their business interests.[59]

As regards sources of revenue, functions and the entire problems, they constitute a number of matters that affect Local Governments which are universally common. The revenues that are made available to or put at the disposal of Local Governments are generally few, inelastic and increasingly being encroached upon by the State Governments. In the USA for example, it is stated that the responsibilities of the Local Governments are to provide services but are not frequently matched up with adequate financial capacity.

In the UK however, the patterns of central-local relations have caused a lot of tangles as local authorities have continued to fight "rearguard battle but have been too disunited and too unclear to the possible alternatives."[60] In France just like India, the situation is very similar. In the former it is largely "due to historical accident as a result of the negligence of the generations of parliament."[61] In all these countries the problems inherent in the Local Government are quite recognized, ignored and set aside by the state and these have affected the existence of the "vital hyphen relating functions and resources"[62] of Local Government as well as in the allocation of political power. As a whole, there has been a preponderant separation of the functions of the Local Government to that of the state as if Local Governments are separate entities from the dynamism and motion of the state in the patterns of 'mandatory', 'discretionary' and 'entrusted' functions.

It is a universal phenomenon for the state to contribute to Local Governments in the name of grant-in-aid so as to perform their functions. In Britain it constituted what is called General Exchequer or Block Grant. These grants-in-aid vary from country to country. The French system was not as elaborate as that of Britain under taken through what is called the Equalisation Fund (financed from local taxes on business transactions) which replaced 'expenses of general interest' and the 'special subvention d'equilibre', (this involved taking proportionate percentage of collected tax back to Communes and Departments proportionate to the population - A minimum per capita annual revenue was guaranteed to Local Governments and the excess over the national mean was required to be handled over to the fund).[63]

Finanly, with regard to the situation in West Indies and Africa, the background to the imposed and institutionalised Local Government structures had their roots since the beginning of colonialism in different parts by Britain and other colonial powers. In West Indies for example, Britain occupied Barbardos, Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guinea, Bahamas etc. which began since 1625 and involved the policies 'settled' or 'conquered' colonies. In Africa, the systems of 'Direct' and 'Indirect' rule featured very prominently even though there were cases where - 'settler' colonies existed. As a whole, the patterns of the system of Local Government developed through the practices of the 'mother' colonial powers.[64]

FOOTNOTES:

1. Karl Marx and F. Engels: "Manifesto of the Communist Party", in Marx and Engels: Selected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p.37

2. R. Miliband and J. Savilte (eds) - "Marx and the State", The Socialist Register, Marlin Press, 1965.

3. V.I. Lenin - The State and Revolution, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1945, p.29

4. Ibid, p.27

5. R. Miliband and J. Saville (eds), op.cit

6. Karl Marx - "The Eighteenth Brummaire of Louis Bonaparte" in Marx and Engels: Selected Works, op.cit, p.118

7. Ibid, p.103

8. In G.W.F. Hegel's "Philosophy of the State", the Introduction of his Philosophy of Right, Marx made a long critique of this Hegelian philosophy as shown in Tom Bottomore (ed) Modern Interpretation of Marx, Oxford, England, 1981, pp44-54. As Marx moved away from Hegels dialectical approach (p.125), he transcended Hegel's philosophy but still remained under the influence of this philosophical method but negated it in its materialist and idealist speculations. Marx's opposition of Hegel's idea of the State, especially on its origin and value, shows how he attacked its independent character from the individuals who composed it. Marx further attacked the Hegelian *illusions of the abstract functions of the State which treats empirical* individuals as anthesis to the functions of the State. See Leszek Kolakowski - Main Current of Marxism - 1 - The Founder, Oxford, New York, 1982, pp81-92, pp120-152.

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10. Harry Gourbourne (ed) - Politics and State in the Third World, Macmillan Hongkong, 1979, p.50

11. Ibid, p.50

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22. Harry Goubourne (ed), op.cit, p.51

23. Ralph Miliband - The State in Capitalist Cosiety, Open University Set Book, London, 1973, p.4

24. Ibid, p.3

25. Robert A. Dahl - A Preface to Democratic Theory, London, 1965, pp.137-8

26. Eme Ekekwe -Class and State in Nigeria, Longman, London, 1968, p.13

27. Hamza Alavi - "The State in Post-Colonial Societies - Pakistant and Bangladesh", in Politics and STate in the Third World, op.cit, p.38

28. Ibid, p.39

29. Ibid, p.56

30. Ibid, p.36

31. John Saul - "The State in Post-Colonial Societies - Pakistan and Bangladesh", in Politics and STate in the Third World, op.cit, p.345

32. Colin Leys - "The 'Over-Developed' Post-Colonial State: Re-evaluation" Review of African Political Economy, ROAPE No.5, 1976, p.41

33. Ibid, p.43

34. Mai Palmberg (ed) - Problems of Socialist Orientation in Africa - Article by Clive Y. Thomas, titled "Class Struggle, Social Development and the Theory of the Non-Capitalist Path".

35. Eme Ekekwe, op.cit. p.18

36. Ibid, p.15

37. Mai Palmberg (ed) op.cit.

38. Nicos Poulantzas - "Social Classes and the State" in Modern Interpretations of Marx by Tom Bottomore (ed) Oxford, 1981, p.145

39. Karl Marx - Capital Volume III, Moscow Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962, pp.862-3

40. Anthony Cutler, et'al, op.cit. p.237

41. Claude Ake - Revolutionary Pressures in Africa, Zed Press, London, 1978, p.57

42. V.I. Lenin - A Great Beginning - Collected Works, Volume 29, 1965, p.421

43. Nicos Poulantzas - "Social Classes and the State" op.cit.

44. K. Marx, F. Engels - "Manifesto of the Communist Party", 1888, Engels' Note

45. Karl Marx - In Marx and Engels, op.cit pp.35-36

46. Nicos Poulantzas - "Social Classes and the State", op.cit. p.149

47. Ibid, p.150

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49. Ibid, p.154

50. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, see P.C.W. Gutkind and I. Wallevstern, (eds) The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, London, 1970

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CHAPTER TWO

2.00 THE ECOLOGY OF COLONIAL STATE AND THE ROLE OF NATIVE AUTHORITY IN CLASS FORMATION

2.01 TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY BEFORE COLONIAL ISATION

Traditional authority, in the northern part of this country, prior to colonialism began from time immemorial. It may be divided into two major categories, one built on the other as a result of the historical antecedent. This later provided the basis of the colonial indirect rule system of Local Government.

In the initial instance, the first category can be traced back to the processes and rise of states in 'Kasar Hausa' (Hausa Land). This involved the rise of 'birane' (cities) which resulted from the development of agricultural communities in the form of 'Unguwowi' (Wards), 'Kauyuka' (Villages) and other forms of nucleated hamlets formed and organised for the purposes of production which consisted different family groups. Traditional authority in these hamlets appeared to have been of two types but "Overall leadership (Sarauta), vested in one ruler ('Sarki') seems to have been recognised only for specific purposes where communal discipline transcending to family group was required; mainly in the economic field."[1] In this regard, political authority was essentially based on kinship relations.

As the society continued to develop, concomitant establishment of larger settlements emerged and kinship relations in the political arrangements continued to simultaneously reduce. This was as a result of internal and external factors. Migrants came to settle while some other economic activities other than agriculture took off leading to further growth and development of bigger settlements and transforming them into town statuses. However, the introduction and use of iron had a profound impact on this development as these processes of transformation were characterised by wars. Consequently, the political authority became vested in the 'Sarki' who ruled over several kinship groups who fell under his suzerainty. Hence, authority was now

based on territorial control with institutions possessing centralized characters[2] so that social surplus could be easily accumulated as capital by the ruling oligarchy.

'Birane' (cities) were cosmopolitan centres of great trade, commerce, industries and education. Hence, they became the foci and fora where political activities took place. These centres were all fortified (walled cities) to protect outside incursions and engage in the collections of various forms of levies, rates and taxes either from the inhabitants or from those entering to trade in the forms of customs duties. Organisationally, the authority became decentralized as the whole system experienced some forms of complications with respect to the exercise of power in the "whole hierarchy of specialized officials whose titles are still preserved in the Local Government terminology of Hausa-land. But all was the authority of the 'Sarki' who had his seat in the city. This 'Sarki' was not 'Sarkin birni' but 'sarkin kasa' which consisted not only of the 'birni' and its farmlands, but a large tract of surrounding territory containing many 'garuruwa' and 'kauyuka', all in which recognised the superiority of political power in the city".[3] It should however be stated that this 'recognition' was not entirely voluntary but compulsory.

As a whole, the government was characteristically dynastic, autocratic and feudal because it consisted of the king (sarki) and the whole paraphernalia of the fief-holding officials ('masu sarauta'). It should be very clear that the power of the king depended on the maintenance of the contradictory interests of the 'sarki' and other 'masu sarauta' on the one hand and between 'masu sarauta' and the 'talakawa' - people holding no official position on the other.[4] As regards the latter, this contradictory and delicated balances were maintained as the relatives of the sarki - 'masu sarata' - were sent to different places, within the territorial jurisdictions where the sarki theoretically ruled, for local daministrations.

This was systematically done so as to continue to appropriate, coercively, social surplus from 'talakawa'. Hence, some major features of this traditional authority of the Hausa 'sarauta' system included succession to the throne based on heredity. Rulers were absolute and acted arbitrarily. Forced and slave labour was paramount. Excessive collections of several kinds of taxes and dues varied in different forms and magnitude.

The second category of the traditional authority, essentially built on the Hausa 'sarauta' system but with necessary modification, was that related to the rise and establishment of Sokoto Caliphate in 1804. This led to the over-throw of the 'sarauta' system, under Sheikh Othman Dan Fodio. Dan Fodio used the instrument or weapons and power of religion - Islam - to divide the social power base of the Hausa Kings. As the Caliphate became well established, Sharia, as the system of laws, was codified. Hausa dynasties were replaced, weights and measures were unified and standardised throughout as the major events that accompanied the jihad.

The nature of the administration in the Caliphate consisted some forms of centralizations notwithstanding the confederated character of the constituent states. As such, power was concentrated in Sokoto which centred on and revolved around the 'Amir-al-Mumini' (Leader of the faithfuls) as he combined the judicial, legislative and executive functions. Furthermore, the administration, initially and to a very large extent, was based on the philosophy of 'technocracy' whereby only the learned were supposed to occupy political offices. However, the respective emirs in the emirates owed their power or positions to Sokoto as their choice etc. had to be blessed and confirmed by the 'sarkin Musulmi', and each emirate had an obligation of sending annual tributes to Sokoto. Consequently, "regular tours of inspection by Sokoto officials were carried out to

advise and oversee the provincial applications of policy. In addition, a conscious policy was pursued of linking the Sokoto aristocracy with emirates by marriage."[5]

The Sokoto Caliphate was founded by the deposition of the Habe Kings. The system of government was initially based on the then existing Hausa set up but with necessary modifications. These modifications included the alteration of the original state boundaries and the form, nature and machinery of government bureaucracies. It is important to note that despite all these changes in the hierarchies of power or leadership, the entire governmental structure of the Caliphate remained essentially Hausa. Hence, by 1830, almost the whole of the present-day Northern Nigeria, with the exception of Bornu, came under the hegemony of the Caliphate.

In this set up however, the emirs in all the emirates had had centralized governments with their systems of taxation and other sources of revenue generation and forms of extractions. For the maintenance and sustenance of the established socio-economic and political order, state apparatuses, in the forms of prisons, police and courts etc were established so as to prevent any external threat to the succession to the throne. As the succession to the stool of leadership was made and officially based on heredity it was necessary to rationalise such successions on pre-conceived personalities and some historical antecedents.

However, after 1837 when the philosophy of the jihad continued to wear thin, emirs began their lust for expansionism in all directions. It was clear that when the Caliphate became consolidated, majority of the leadership who occupied political offices in the emirates were mere opportunists who even became more corrupt than their predeccessors. Thus the Hausa offensive system was therefore replaced by the Fulani. This new set of leadership manipulated the objectives of the jihad to suit their personal purposes.

They raided towns and villages for slaves[6] and invariably created social tension as well as unstable political atmosphere. They looted and accumulated wealth all in the name of the jihad.[7] Hence, emirs put large tracts of territory under their suzereinty and forced inhabits of those territories to pay tributes, took many women as concubines and relegated others to the status of slaves who were forced to work for the production of food and other essential things to keep the palaces and their inhabitants. As all these events continued to feature in the whole of the Caliphate, bribery and corruption became common places as the courts and other state apparatuses were filled by emirs aides and supporters who were enthusiastic and ready to maintain the sustenance of the status-quo.

It is therefore logical to understand that when Lugard became the High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1900, the policy of using African Chiefs and their aides in the administration of Local Government affairs was already well entrenched. That is why in the Native Authority (N.A.) system, Lugard created Protectorate Courts in each Province which were presided over by the British Residents to give orders or guide the local traditional supporters. These courts were the highest courts in Northern Nigeria. Emirs and Chiefs during this period paid a quarter of all the revenues collected in their areas of jurisdiction from taxation into the Colonial Government Treasury while they used the remainder for their personal purposes or engagements.[8] Subsequently, when the British Colonial authority became more consolidated, an agreement between emirs/chiefs and British colonial administration was reached for the establishment of the Colonial Native Treasuries whereby part of the remaining three-quarters of the revenues they collected from direct taxation, be deposited. However, other revenues from the Native Courts went into these Native Treasuries.

These funds were designed to be used in the provision of local amenities as well as payment of salaries of those employed by the Local Government.[9]

Hence, political hierarchies and authorities obtained during the traditional Hausa government were modified to suit the exigencies of particular political environment, (for example, the Sokoto Caliphate, colonial government and even the past and present arrangements). This is so because under the emir , for instance, was the District Head and downwards to the ward level. Therefore, when British imposed its hegemony over this territory, it directed emirs who in turn directed their subordinate chiefs for the carrying out of orders by the people at the local levels.

2.02 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COLONIAL STATE AND THE NATIVE AUTHORITY SYSTEM

Every phenomena of nature, in all their remifications, and at any given time and space, can be correctly appreciated and understood in their historical, materialistic and dialectical perspectives. Thus, colonialism and particularly the system of Native Authority (N.A.) can only be understood in this light. Therefore, in order to pick up the historical threads of colonial rule and the system of Native Authority, it is crucial to begin even prior to the period of firm establishment of colonial rule on the present day Nigeria.

The sprouts of British influence and administration at least began since 1849. This influence started when some British citizens, stationed *along the Bight of Benin and the surrounding areas*, (*for example*, the cost of Lagos, Brass, Benin etc.) requested their government to come to their aid in imperialistic mission. Mr. J. Beecroft was the first British Consul posted around with Fernando po as his headquarters.

It was not until 1852 that British government had its initial involvement with the affairs of Lagos, when a treaty with some Lagos Chiefs, the British Commodore, Henry William Bruce, and Mr. J. Beecroft was signed.

The objective of this tripartite treaty was, according to the British Crown, to 'abolish the slave treade; encourage legitimate commerce' and 'protect the christian missionaries.'[10]

This three-fold treaty, signed by some Lagos chiefs along with two other British officials, did not consequently go down well with majority of the Lagos chiefs. Thus, under the leadership of Kosoko, majority of the chiefs revolted against the obnoxious treaty and all the ostensible or apparent contents of the said treaty. The chiefs were therefore not ready to abide by the treaty.

Hence, a British government intervention was imminently crucial at this stage of development. It accordingly ordered its Consul, Mr. H.G. Foote, to quickly intervene and occupy Lagos. A Lagos chief was invited, informed and threatened about the British intention. But a preponderant number of the chiefs would not succumb, to the treaty of cession of Lagos to be occupied in 'the name of the Queen'.

But on August 6 . 1861, 'in the name of the Queen of England', King Docemo and four other white capped Lagos chiefs signed the Treaty of Cession which consequently paved the way for the British Crown to take over the possession and control of the activities of Lagos. Part of the Article I of the Treaty of Cession of Lagos by the British Crown of 1861 reads as follows:-

> ....I, Docemo, do with the consent and advice of my Council, give, transfer *and by this present grant and confirm* unto the Queen of Great Britain, her heirs and successors for ever, the and Island of Lagos..... freely, fully, entirely and absolutely. [11](Emphasis added).

Thus, in 1862, Lagos was transformed, by the Crown, into a 'Colony' and a 'settlement' with even a Governor. Furthermore, the oil Rivers Protectorate was established in 1885 and became effectively operational

in 1891. During the same year however, it was renamed the Niger Coast protectorate. This protectorate extended its authority to cover the whole of the districts of the Cameroons in the eastern borders of the Lagos Colony.

In 1886, the Royal Charter of the Royal Nigeria Company was established to primarily and principally cover the central regions along the River Niger. The Niger Coast Protectorate was revoked and renamed the Protectorate of Sourthern Nigeria in 1899 with Sir R.D.R. Moor as the High Commissioner. The amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates was effected on January 1. , 1914 under Frederick Lugard as the first Governor-General.

Particularly, Northern Nigeria was conquered by the British forces through, among other things, the activities of the Royal Niger Company. The Emirates and other Kingdoms of the Northern Protectorate were conquired and occupied by force or by signing of dubious treaties. The conquest and signing of forced treaties can be elucidated by the reports of H.P. Backwell on the Sokoto Caliphate resistence, dilemma and compromise with the British forces which were elaborated upon in the letters of Waziri of Sokoto, Muhammad Al-Bukharin (1840-1910). The Waziri, from 1886, further supporting Backwell, wrote that:

> .... when we stopped at Mornona, the people gathered around me to take council together. They consulted among themselves but they saw no way of making hijra from this land owing to the scarcity of water along the roads or the total lack of it along some of them as well as the severity of heat and the presence of Christians camped along all the routes - Thus the best thing is to negotiate a truce with them (the British forces) and seek settlment with them since truce negotiation is permissible to the Muslim Imam and his deputy when Muslims are too weak to fight.[12]

Hence, in Northern Nigeria, the Native Authority System of Local Government was established, officially, by the British Colonial state

on January 1, 1900 after the proclamation of the Protectorate which consequently led to the imposition of British suzereinty all over the territories. This system is generally and popularly referred to as the 'indirect rule' system of Local Government administration. This was tried or experiemented in conjunction with the Northern Emirates as the Emirs and chiefs constituted one of the central foci of activities and attention.

In this part of the country therefore, especially the former Sokoto Caliphate, some form of native administration has been in existence before the firm establishment of colonial rule. Thus, 'indirect rule' system of native administration was essentially based on the long existing system of native administration. It therefore became crucial and expedient for the British to govern through the existing political institutions of the time.[13]

Lugard however understood and appreciated that the then existing traditional institutions were expediently cheap and dynamic. These traditional institutions, thus suited the attempt to experiment the ruling or controlling of the people through the emirs and their apparatuses of government; for example, their councils, courts, security forces etc. Furthermore, each Em i rate or Province was assigned a British Resident whose function was to supervise, advise and guide the local administration in conformity with the colonial state philosophy.

Hence, in each division of the Emirate or Province, there was "placed District Officers who assisted the Resident at various levels down to the village within the Province. District and village heads chosen from a small group of ruling and privileged families were directly responsible to their superiors for their respective areas of authority".[14] These groups of individuals were to function primarily for the effective collection of haraji (general tax) jangali (cattle tax) and other forms of tributes appropriated from the people by the agents or apparatuses of the

colonial state directly and indirectly aimed at the transfer of surplus. Thus, the emirs, the council, courts, treasuries, provincial, district, village and ward heads etc. on the one hand and all the institutions and agents controlling them on the other, constituted the whole embodiment of the Native Authority System.

It is emphasised and argued that the system of 'indirect rule' "at least in theory, did not mean government of African peoples through their chiefs. In practice, indirect rule laid heavy emphasis on the role of the 'chief' in the government of African peoples, even for those people who traditionally did not have political as distinct from religious leaders".[15] Thus , indirect rule under colonialism characterized the local government with all the symbolism and manifestations of oppression and terror because, in many instances, the traditional monarchs were transformed into mere tyrants under the Native Authority.

Furthermore, more 'traditional rulers' were created or established in even the areas where such had never existed before colonialism.[16] This was notwithstanding the resistence or rebellions associated with or which provoked such distortions of the local political values.[17] Therefore, the British colonial rule or the indirect rule system in Northern Nigeria, particularly in the form Sokoto Caliphate was imposed with certain degree of uniformity as a result of inter alia:

a) centralized and fairly or relatively stable political institutions in the caliphate.

b) operational Muslim courts and the codification of Shari'a as the basis of the law.

c) the existence of native treasury and the system of revenue collection, generation and expenditure.

d) the existence of the bureaucratic type model of scalar chain officials or the hierarchy of officials.

Lugard, in order to suit and conform with the expediency of the time, attempted to make or effect changes in the then existing structure. Therefore, on the 'new' syste m or structure of 'indirect rule', Lugard in his 1912-18 report of the amalgamation of both the Northern and Southern Protectorates contends that:

> The first step is to endeavour to find a man of influence as a chief, and to group under him as many villages or districts as possible, to teach him to delegate power and to take an interest in his 'native' treasury to support his authority and to inculcate a sense of responsibility.[18]

Consequently, the appointment and delegation of emirs and chiefs emerged as the scheme of the philosophy of the authority in their areas of jurisdiction. British 'Residents' were then posted in each of the emirates or provinces to give the emirs and chiefs general guidelines and directions in the running of the affairs of the state. This attempt resulted in fostering a relatively high loyalty because some privileged *citizens, ready to comply, were given some important functions in conformity* with the colonial administration. Thus, 'local rulers' were encouraged and given the blank check, by the colonial state system, to amass private wealth whenever and wherever the situation developed.

It was evidently clear that the chiefs and emirs had been transformed and incorporated into the circuit and cohesion primarily as a direct link or contact group between the 'conquered natives' and the colonial imperial power. Hence, they formed a single and direct government with well defined and clear cut responsibilities or functions.

In this regard, the chiefs' right to place, power and influence, during colonial period, were highly dependent on the kinds of services they were able and capable to render to the state. Among these services, included, the effective flow of production of raw materials for exports as well as

other forms of exploitation, appropriations and transfer of surplus in various forms of tax collection which characterized Local Government institution under the threat of imperialist coercion.[19]

This has further vindicated the Native Authority System within the context of the political economy of primitive accumulation. This is so because the NA was transformed or incorporated into the colonial capitalist social formation accompanied with all the colonial trappings. This was further geared towards effective facilitation of the appropriation of surplus from peasant production of cash crops to the metropolitan centre as well as divorcing the peasant from his means of production and livelihood. In 1922, Lugard put this very explicitly -

> The prestige and influence of the chiefs can be best upheld by letting the peasantry see that the government treat them as an integral part of the machinery of administration. That there are not two sets of rulers - British and Native - working either separately or in cooperation but a single government in which Native chiefs have well defined duties and acknowledge status equally with the British offcials. Their duties should never conflict and should overlap as little as possible, they should be complementary to each other and the chief must understand that he has no right to place and power unless he renders proper services to the state.[20]

Thus, a series of ordinances, to legitimize and rationalise the system, were enacted by the colonial state between 1914 and 1918, particularly. These ordinances were aimed at safeguarding and establishing the patterns of Local Government through the system and powers apportioned to the Native Authorities. Some of the ordinances established during that period had however remained after 1945.

Furthermore, since 1939-45 wars, the traditional Native Administration was gradually converted into a classical colonial system of Local Government with greater rapidity to firmly and vigorously establish British rule and hegemony. In Northern Nigeria however, there were several attempts "to

make different arangements for local administration of certain cosmopolitan towns from those in the purely traditional areas under the NA.... A series of township ordinances were later ena cted by the colonial legislative Council to provide for other towns, and the Governor was given the power to declare any area or place to township."[21]

In 1950, as a result of the demand[22] to reform the N.A. system because of what the then Nationalists (Northern elites) regarded as a complete usurpation of powers, the ruling colonial oligarchy set up a Joint Select Committee of the then Northern Regional Council" in consequence of whose recommendation of the N.A. ordinance was amended so as to abolish the institution of the Sole NA and to make the Emirs carry their local councils with them the task of local administration."[23] This subsequently led to the setting up of the Moddocks-Pott Commission which resulted in the enactment of the famous 1954 Native Authority Law of Nothern Nigeria.

The basic aim of capitalism is to incorporate, through the mechanism of colonialism and imperialism, any social formation into the dynamism of the world capitalist mode of production. This incorporation therefore extends far beyond the period of the formal colonial plunder. It further preceeded long before the Berlin Conference of 1884 which signalled the Scramble for and partition of Africa by the Western European imperialist powers. Hence the African traffic for slave trade had constituted a crucial period and a form of 'symbiosis' relationship between the two continents generally.

Furthermore, the advent of imperialism in the nineteenth century witnessed the overthrow of competitive capitalism by monopoly capitalism. Imperialism had therefore transformed the socio-economic settings of the entire African societies in restructuring and reorienting them into dependent and backward capitalist formations and direction. Imperialism, according to Lenin (1968:223):

> ... is capitalism at the stage of development of which the dominance of the monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance, in which the division of the world among the International trusts has began, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.[24]

Therefore, the primary function or role of the colonial state was to integrate Nigeria particularly, into the intricate working syndrome of the global phenomena of capitalism and imperialism. This was primarily aimed at serving as a supplier of raw materials needed for the home and metropolitan industries and simultaneously as a ready market for the products of the industries.

Hence, in the first place, the "Process of peasantization and later rural proletarianization were unleased, requiring political structures for keeping the uprooted tribesmen under effective control."[25] This has been the basic historial functions of Local Government (in externally dominated societies) as "it remains the primary function of the societies forced to adopt, through these processes of incorporation into the world capitalist system, the class structures in the capitalist metropolies. Thus, Local Government in post-colonial Nigeria has remained essentially an intrument of class domination."[26]

2.03 ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE NATIVE AUTHORITY (N.A.)

Organisationally, the former Northern Nigeria, was divided into a number of provinces. These provinces were put under the direction of British Residents (later referred to as Provincial Commissioners). These Provinces were further sub-divided into divisions. The divisions were put under the administrative control of the Divisional Officers (D.Os). These divisions contained one or more Native Authorities which constituted the primary units of Local Government.

The Native Autorities thus consisted the traditional emirate boundaries in operation when the country became a protectorate. They vary in area, population and wealth. As the N.A. was built in around the traditional authority of a chief or groups of chiefs, its authority had wide implied powers under the law."[27]

For administrative convenience, however, some Native Authorities had subordinate native authorities. Both the NA and subordinate ones were constituted by the Governor in council. Thus, "the Governor may by notice in the Regional Gazatte direct that any office of native authority constituted for any specified area shall be subordinated to another office of native authority."[28] Most of the NAs, according to the provision, constituted of different types of authority under a chief together with a council.

These were known as either chief-in-council or chief-and-council. In the chief-in-council, the chief was defacto and could veto decisions of the council. In the chief-and-council, the chief was Primus inter Pares and to be governed by the decisions of the majority of council members. Furthermore, the situation in the former was where the chieftancy was essentially a traditional one while the latter was usually associated only with an artificial chieftaincy or in cases where a chief under the chief-in-council 'misbehaved' or 'misgoverned.' He would then be demoted to a chief-and-council status.

On several occasions, a Native Authority might be a council not really associated with any particular chief. This was as result of putting several Native Authorities by the colonial administration under a 'federation.'[29] On certain circumstances, however, the colonial government might suspend a Native Authority and then appoint a caretaker. Therefore, after the spliting of the provinces and divisions, the area of N.A. consisted of other administrative sub-areas called either districts or towns or villages.

Other sub-divisions were the hamlets and wards. The districts and villages were respectively headed by district and village heads. In this regard, the "monopoly enjoyed by the native authority in respect of these instruments of coercions helped to further its political domination, albeit the dominance heavily dependent on the polical climate of the time."[30]

2.04 PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING OF CLASSES IN UNDER-DEVELOPED SOCIAL FORMATIONS

There are lots of complexities and difficulties in the study of classes and class formation under imperialistic capitalism in the backward and dependent social formations like Nigeria. Such attempts should however be made on the basic structures of the colonising power as regards finance capital. It should also be based on how this has constituted some specific forms of organising and reorganising labour-power directed towards satisfying the interests of imperialism and capitalism.

Coupled with these however, the indigenous petty bourgeoisie has collaborated, especially after the formal political independence, as agents, with the representatives of the imperialist or international capital. Therefore, to comprehend the nature of classes, vigorous understanding of how the petty-bourgeoisie, as well as the comprado stratum have contributed to the endemic dependence of the country and how the international capital has worked systematically towards maintaining such situation. Nigeria, in particular, has been integrated into the mechanism and working syndrome of the world capitalist economy within the historical specificity of imperialism and colonialism. This intergration, notwithstanding, has not created an entirely capitalist social milieu.[31] Therefore, the mechanisms of intergration are very crucial in analysing the basic features of class structures and the role of the dependent capitalism.

This can precisely be done by comprehending the workings of imperialism and monopoly capitalism. Thus, the introduction of capitalism within the framework of colonial system of imperialism had "a deforming effect on theevolution of class structure".[32] This is because the emergence of social-classes that evolved in Europe were different from those in the third world. This result was due to the distortion of the economy, exploitation, transfer of surplus in the form of raw materials by foreign capital. This further dilutes the complexities of the class structures with regard to their evolution.

The nature of class formation, development and structure in the underdeveloped world is constituted as a result of the violent abortion, penetration and subjugation of the economy from the pre-capitalist mode of production to its incorporation into the world capitalist setting. As a result of the colonial situation, the people and other resources were transformed and exploited in order to satisfy certain requirements for the metropolitan capitalist class.

Thus, the colonial situation had produced many consequences on the people, economy and society at large. It brought wide changes in the complete network of social relationships. It also brought about the growth of towns, the development of an urbanised and proletarianized population. It further led to the transformation of subsistence economies to a cash crop economy. New forms of social differentiations based on education (emergence of new system of social stratification) further affected the people directly and differently.

Furthermore, to understand the class structure in this setting, the genesis of colonial capitalism should constitute our contextual framework. Again, analysis of the current class structure should be based on the patterns of surplus generation from the workers and the concomitant transfer of surplus to the metropolis and other local beneficiaries in the colony.

As classes are analysed on the levels and specific mode of production, they should therefore be concretely understood on the basis and levels of economic categories of a particular system of social production. This is expressive of the class contradictions central to the mode of production as a whole.[33]

Within the colonial political economy, class division continued to become regidified and class struggle intensified. During the colonial rule, inequitable economic relations had also continued to become more pervasive not only between the colonizer and the colonized but also between the colonized. Furtheremore, the structure of the colonial politcal economy, the dominant means of production had continued to remain and belong to foreign capital and control. Classes in this regard did not evolve an historical process of material and cultural conditions of the society. They were therefore "created by decree to serve a distant imperial metropolis."[34]

In essence, the colonial capitalist mode of production, determined the principal classes that emerged during the colonial era. For example , Brett's (1973:284) analysis of the differences between the class structure in the metropolitan countries and the class structure in the colonies show that the organic and endemic evolution of capitalism in Western Europe and the subsequent injection and imposition of its certain features in the colonies were faced with serious resentments. Unlike in the colonial world, the emergence of indigenous capitalist class in the areas of origin had its roots in the correponding social, economic, political and cultural structure s of the society. This involved the predominant opposition between the old feudal order and the emerging protetariat. All these features were absent in the colonial world. The third world external domination over the economy has its impact on the emergence of the indigenous social classes designed to replace the externally dominant class in the exercise of political and economic power.

Hence, the central class contradictions within the colonial capitalist mode of production were between metropolis and the various interest groups within the colony. Therefore class structure should be understood on the context and extent of exploitation of resources and labour as well as how surplus is destined to be appropriated to the foreign destination. Classes that 'emerged' were largely related to the existing economic sectors that survived during colonial rule purposely to serve the interest of the entire colonial economy. Colonial capitalism was able to exploit the colonial economy. Colonial capitalism was able to exploit the colonial society because of the colonial state power. The use of colonial state apparatuses, the inabil ity and incapacity of the dominant members in the colonial state could not allow any competition with the colonial order. This was because of the subservient and dependent characteristics of the social classes.

However, during the 1939-45 wars, Northern Nigeria witnessed the development of Local Government structure through the native authority pattern which "continued to struggle for survival by manipulating the political environment and thus maintaining active participation into the political process of the era."[35] Furthermore, "the customary authority of traditional chiefs was supplemented by political, economic and judicial powers conferred on them as instruments of indirect rule. Social difference was consequently accentuated, and with it the movement of labour"[36] from various colonial purposes in plantation, mines, construction of roads, ports, railways and other commodity production entirely for export. Class conflict in this regard usually manifested itself between "those social classes (cololizers) controlling the 'modern' sector through their economic power and those subordinate classes (colonized) exploited through traditional social relations which frustrate the development of a truly class consciousness."[37]

Not only was the political environment manipulated in Nigeria during the colonial period, but the traditional chiefs were also used to manipulate the social, economic, political and even judicial exigencies of the time. Therefore, right from the beginning of colonial rule, the emirates were progressively transformed into the basic units of Local Government administration. By the end of 1945, the emirs and chiefs were developed into powerful political organs of the state. They were further supported by other paraphernalia of bureaucratic branches of the N.A. Local Government based on the traditional native administration. But since the N.A. was essentially based under the chiefs and emirs, political power in the emirates was "vested in the office of the emir and the emirs thus became recognized as the authority responsible for Local Government."[38]

As the Native Authority was essentially a foreign institution, it was primarily based on the then existing adulterated traditional setting; mutatis mutandis. These traditional institutions were modelled and used to "safeguard the values considered vital for the survival of the social force it (colonial rule) represented".[39] Hence, colonialism was not only a system of exploitation but that whose essential purpose was to repatriate the profits to the so-called mother country.

This therefore, led to the continuous expropriation of surplus produced by the African labour. This is what Walter Rodney (1972:162) refers to as the development of Europe in the same dialectical and historical processes in which Africa was under-developed.[40] However, the evolution of social classes shows that the emergence of independent bourgeois class in this region of the world became highly impracticable as the society is dominated, dependent and backward in all ramifications. Hence the working class would therefore remain as a segment within the peasant subsistence economies. Furthermore, Poulantzas (1974:148-9) puts it that:

> The organisation of class relations and state apparatuses in the dominated and dependent formation reproductes within itself the structure of the relation of domination characterising the class(es) in power in the dominant social formation(s). This domination corresponds to both indirect (through the position of the dominated formation in the imperialist chain) of exploitation of popular masses of the dominant formations. This exploitation is articulated with the exploitation they suffer at the hands of their own classes in power. Each phase of imperialism is marked by different form of realisation of this domination and dependence.[41]

Thus, the colonial structure represented the basic interests of social force which controlled the N.A. However, the structure of the colonial political economy in the Local Government should be understood in terms of the relations of the colonial state to "the international power structure and the social classes in theis power structure reproduced within the dominated (social) formation"[42] resulting in strustructuralist dependency and vicious circle.

The preponderance in the use of local political institutions and expediency for the purpose of running of the affairs of Local Government was contingent on the local institutional changes. These changes were perceived as regards the constitutions of the traditional authority strongly disliked or not in consistence with the ideas of British forms of authority. Secondly, these changes were also based, designed and inserted so as to satisfy the basic aims and other essential requirements of colonial rule with a view to their subsequent accomplishments. These involved the introduction of taxes for the stimulation of cash crop production and the subsequent repatriation.[43]

Hence, indirect rule, as a system of Local Government was conceived by Lugard as a very dynamic style of government. The use of the indigenous political institutions directly under the guidance, advice and direction of the European Resident official was meant to continually develop it into

"more efficient units of administration, responding to and adopting themselves to the new situation created by colonial rule."[44]

In the former Northern Nigeria, the newly enacted Native Authority Law was officially formalised in 1954 with its wide and general powers. Its functions in the regulations of the social, economic and political activities of the area under its authority included the maintenance of law, order and 'good' government. The Native Authority (N.A.) was further engaged in trade and industry. It also engaged in the acquisition and control of land by modifying the land tenure system existing at that time.

2.05 SOME FEATURES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLONIAL STATE

Some important features, forms and directions of the state of affairs which the colonial state expressed itself were positioned within the entire aspects of the colonial political economy. The main features of the colonial state's political economy included taxation, transportation, education and agriculture. This has therefore explicated the general role of the colonial state in the exploitation of resources, promotion of trade, creation of classes and the so-called Christian and civilising mission. Hence, the role of colonial state was to "supervise the initial and necessary penetration of the pre-capitalist formation, to organize conditions of exploitation of labour and land."[45] in the form of land alienation and appropriation of agricultural and mineral commodities. All these features had their bearings, manifestations and enforcement starting from the local level administration.

2.05.1 Taxation

The 'natural economy' of the colonial state was initially destroyed as a result of the penetration of commodity relations through the incursion of capital. It therefore affected the initial break in the entire reproduction cycle which directly separated the producers from their means of productio

This was accompanied and accomplished by monetization achieved through the methods of imposed taxation, curves and other forms of organized labouf by the state in publich construction works etc. Taxation was essentially a systematic way in which the peasant producer was tied to the political economy legitimised and rationalized as a means of fulfilling some forms of obligations to the colonial state.

The Sokoto caliphate inherited a system of tribute imposed on the society from the former Habe rulers. This system of revenue collection or generation was quickly legitimized and rationalised by the colonial state in order to maintain, expand and channel this source into the coffers of the state. This meant that "the colonized had to pay for the maintenance of the instrument of their colonisers"[46] as a necessary condition for the fulfilment of the colonial state. Taxation in the colonial economy was given a primary place and rose astromically as years passed by, for example, in 1907 the revenue realised from taxation was £61,000 which rose steadily to £124,000, £180,000 and £215,000 in 1909, 1911 and 1913 respectively.[47]

Taxation, during colonial era, had a crucial role within the patterns of market relations. The surplus collected went directly to support and maintain the state for further forms of exploitation. In the first place, currency in the form of coins was introduced which consequently eliminated all other forms of exchange that existed before. All levied taxes were therefore to be paid with the introduced currency so as to fulfil the desires and requirements of the colonial state. People had to obtain these currencies by selling their labour power and cultivating the preferred cash crops. This was designed for peasant producers to be paid in such currenceies, so as to purchase some imported good; and more importantly, pay their taxes as part of the fulfilment of the state obligations.

2.05.2 Transportation

Adequate transportation networks were crucial to the dynamic functioning of the colonial state so as to effectively and efficiently penetrate, exploit and repatriate the needed resources from their sources. Initial methods or means of the colonial transportation was by the use of r ivers Niger and Benue and their tributaries. These were not adequate and efficient for the actual realisation of the philosophy of colonialism. Therefore, railways as a means of colonial transportation became very much indispensable for the survival and dynamism of the colonial state economy which was equally indispensable for the political and military exigencies of the time.

Railway constructions began in 1909 which was later supplemented by road construction started from 1919. The aim was to feed the raillines so as to facilitate the easy penetration of the hinterland. This opened a passage for the foreign trading firms to systematically affect the patterns of trade and production. It also had a simultaneous impact on the growth and decline of urban areas or centres where transportation network cut across or div erted from them. Furthermore, the spreading colonial administrative tentacles had to "consolidate the colonial economy and begin the transformation of the existence pattern of stratification"[48] beginning from the local levels.

2.05.3 Educaction

The colonial education was essentially elitist in its patterns. It was also an ideological apparatus or instrument of the state with its concomitant role in the direction of social stratification of the society. This type of education had its initial foundation from the imperialistic missionary activity and ideology. Both the colonial state and the missionary groups existed on a symbiosis manner. The missionary received protection from the state while the missionary provided the state with some required manpower. Both were therefore complementary to each other .

"In this imperialistic mission both maxim guns and the Bible found mutual support and benefit".[49]

The role of colonial education was fundamentally to orient Nigerians towards upholding the values and ethos of capitalist relations of production. It was also to essentially evolve the preferred leadership to occupy the post-colonial state and induce particular consciousness, tastes and life-styes akin to those of the colonial masters. Thus, the colonial philosophy of education was to train those "who form the cream of society, leaders necessarily chosen and trained for the purpose not spontaneous outgrowth of a whole people participating in their attempt to solve problem."[50]

2.05.4 Agriculture

The colonial state partially incorporated Nigerian agricultural sector into the world capitalist economy. Colonial State agricultural policy included a rigorous intervention in the peasant mode of production. Officially however, there was the absence of a settler population as well as the foreign plantation economy. The colonial agricultural policy also included the deliberate intention to allow the peasants to simultaneously engage in the production of the export cash crops side-by-side with the subsistence crops. This deliberate attempt was aimed at sustaining or maintaining the traditional techniques of organising production characterized by low level of technology.

Therefore, there was no serious attempt to develop or allow the forces of production to move forward as it simultaneously "blocked the emergence of a bouyant agricultural sector and the creation of a large plantation owing class - - - because the peasant small holder producers were atonized and could not organize themselves and demand for better prices."[51] In 1940s however, as a colonial policy, Marketing Boards were established. There was also the establishment of the British Cotton Growing Association

(BCGA) so as to develop and maintain a steady flow of raw materials for the textile industry. Marketing Boards therefore became the fora and mechanisms where farmers were taxed and exploited. They further served as the instruments of the state for direct intervention in the entire colonial economy with regard to price standardisation, regularisation as well as the diversion of surpluses from the producers into the state treasury and into the whole capitalist structure of the economy.

2.06 CLASS CHARACTER AND DEVELOPMENT IN POST-COLONIAL STATE

The British imperial and colonial government was, as a result of political and economic expediencies both in the colony and the metropolitar centre, eager to relinguish its power to the already manufactured 'middle class'. This 'class' was oriented and modelled to occupy positions of political (and to some extent economic) power. The basic requirement was to conform with the philosophy of the colonial programming of the economy in its transformation into the main streams of capitalist production.

These created elites like the teachers, doctors, lawyers, journalists etc. constituted a 'class', with the metropolitan backings, because their class position, not class determinism did not stem from ownership of the means of production. On the contrary, they were class agents of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Hence, this was the 'class' that dominated the post-colonial state and economy.

During the colonial period, one of the inherent characteristics of the state was to regiment the external dependence of the colony. This dependence was intended to be transformed and transcended, as part of the 'package' of the flag independence of dual domination and dependence, into an internal domination by the 'inheritors' of the colonial state apparatueses.

To facilitate a clear understanding of the post-colonial development in class formation and its consolidation, a reflection of the nature of

the colonial state is crucial. It is further explicated that the third world external domination, at least with regard to the expatriates' control over the commanding heights of the economy, has its impact on the emergence and concomitant development of the indigenous social classes to 'replace' the externally dominant class in the exercise of political and economic power in their respective localities.

The proclamation of political independence in 1960 with all the accompanying forms of international trappings of nurture capitalism coupled with other technocratic reformism, accelerated class contradictions rather than resolved them. This was because of the regimented tendencies and orientations of the inheritors of the colonial 'treasures' in their attempts to accumulate, using the very colonial privilages capped on them. As such, at independence the state has been very much incapacitated in providing infrastructural amenities in social and economic angles. This is because not only were the political leaders dislocated socially and economically from the aspirations of the teaming population, but also such provision of amenities would temper drastically with their privileges and positions.

Hence, there were no sufficient schools, for example, to educate the entire young population, at least. Even the type and pattern of education inherited from colonialism were selective and directed towards creating and dislocating the educated from the main stream of the community and thus creating the differentials among the population. Consequently therefore, the state became essentially a major economic force within the context of accumulation, legitimising and disbursing the surpluses between the state functionaries. This was specifically shown to have coexisted with monopoly capitaland pre-capitalist formation, diamerically antagonistic leading to the evel ution of a distorted social setting.

Furthermore, the socio-economic and political consditions of the state inhereited from colonialism are also very fundamental. This is viewed in the sense that colonialism has, in the post-colonial societies, left social, economic and political structures it previously created. Therefore, the class structure in such a situation was essentially a matter of relations between the classes created by colonialism that occupied state apparatuses and whose power emanated or originated from imperialism.

It is therefore misleading to see any fundamental distinction in the transformation of the colonial state to the post-colonial because the very philosophy of colonialism had not ceased to exist. The state is further engaged in its historial role of capital formation and accumulation because of the inherent characteristics of the indigenous capitalist class. This is with respect to the lack of hegemony within itself as a result of the development of colonial capitalism. Furthermore, it created and regimented the separation of the peasantry into the urban and commercial workers and agricultural workers. At the same time, it led to the creation, growth and development of antagonism between town and country which historically became a "Pivot of class conflicts around which the whole economic history of society unfolded."[52] Hence, the expression of town, country relationship exhibited colonial class inequality. Therefore, the urban class structure vindicates the stark reality of economic situation.

Class domination and control over the peasantry at the local level is very essential to the state as empirically exhibited in government persistentt and costly interventionist projects in agricualtural activities since independence. The desire to dominate, control, exploit and pauperize the peasantry by the political and economic class in alliance with international capital has been in dire attempt to facilitate the smooth extraction of surpluses and concomitant accomplishment.

Essentially however, the neo-colonial state is charaterized by structural dependence in the patterns of production, forms of capital accumulation as well as the whole cycle of reproduction. It is also characterized by structural distortion of the levels of economic development as a result of the intergration of the economy into the circuit of the capitalist system of production. Furthermore, the mode of production has invariably became structurally disarticulated. All these structures and the accompanying functions of the neo- or post colonial state inevitably dictates to the very structures and roles of the local government. Therefore, "it is in the performance of these functions that Local Governments from colonial times have been critical for the stability of the colonial and now neo-colonial state"[53] in the facilitation of the primary objective of control in all its manifestations.

The import-export character of the Nigerian economy which surrounded the domestic prod.uction, connected with and related to the logic and mechanisms of commercial capitalism from the period since colonial rule created the class character and structure. Within this pattern of class character created by colonialism, some Nigerians, on the one pole, benefited and made huge profits while majority, on the other pole, impoverished. Consequently, the local petty bourgeoisie that emerged were only limited to commerce and comprodo status in alliance with the foreign bourgeoisie and enterprises.

More and more Nigerians were transformed into the capitalist programming of class structure and character as to state bureaucracy, administrative machinery and capacity expended. This group of Nigerians constituted both the traditional and new political leadership who became professional business extrepreneurs. They consequently developed into different fractions of the petty-bourgeoisies and performing the role of the enhancement of the process of surplus extraction, social reproduction

and maintenance of the dominant political balances, domination and leadership manipulations. Both the traditional and political leaders of the petty-bourgeois class fractions dominated the politico-economic processes and engaged in any uneasy balances of intra-class struggle.

The petty-bourgeois class ideology was within the milieu of *'modernization' and 'development' and considered the traditional leaders as a cog in the wheel of progress. The struggle between them ostensibly appeared as if to abolish traditionalism and expressed in a manner as if* the interests of traditional rulers and the new political leadership were never concurrent and equal. However, the struggle to control the state apparatus and gain access to capital was also ostensibly expressed by the two leaderships with a view to promote welfare to the generality of the people which inevitably turned out to be the promotion of the welfare of the dominant class.

Essentially, their basic or real interests were never openly expressed and put in jeopardy. They were able to constantly and consistently press for certain concensus to participate in the local business ventures within the economy with the identical motive to accumulate wealth and capital. The role, struture and pattern of the bureaucracy further facilitated the realisation of such petty-bourgeois class interests as many of them occupied positions in the bureaucracy and enmassed wealth through appropriations in the name of 'development' and/or under the umbrella of marketing boards *established since colonial rule. Other avenues for such agrandizement includes partisan politics based on the political party platform.*

The weak and peculiar character of the bourgeois class was evolved out of the colonial situation. Hence, its political importance disproportionated its economic status which consequently affects its political will and capacity as a result of the deliberate attempt and activities of the

foreign oligopoly. This was initially supported by the colonial state which thwarted the emergence of the dominant local bourgeoisie controlling over the commanding heights of the economy. Political power, at the time of independence, was transferred to the petty-bourgeoisie. As they gained political power, that by itself was turned into an instrument of accumulation of wealth and capital.

This is facilitated because, in the post-colonial situation, foreign bourgeoisie does not have to physically control the political power. The local and/or dominant class identifies its interests within the framework of the determined position of imperialism as both the domestic and foreign bourgeoisies, even though in an unequal partnership, are in alli ance with each other. The state now caters for the intersts of the local bourgeoisie which is reflected in the patterns of nurture capitalism of the country.

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14. T.O. Alias, op.cit p. 79.

15. Michael Crowder - West Africa under Colonial Rule, Longman, London, 1970, p.169.

16. Areas where 'traditional rulers' were the direct product of colonialism included all the stateless societies in Nigeria in the Jos Plateau, Cameroon mountains, Mambila Plateau, the Jukun, Igala, the Igbo group, the Ibibio, the Edo villages, the Ijo, the Tiv, the Idoma, the Birom, the Angas, the Yako, the Mbembe, the Ekoi, the Kalabari. Further, in all areas where 'Federated' Native Authorities were established, the local political values and institutions were also distorted. Among the Yorubas however, it meant more powers to the Obas than they traditionally and costomarily held. For further reading, see Stateless societies in the history of West Africa by Robin Horton in J.F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds) History of West Africa, Volume One, pp. 72-113.

17. For example, the notorious Aba riots of 1929. The demonstrations were sequel to the British colonial administration imposed taxation, appointment of certain 'Africans' by force 'Warrant chiefs' to serve the purpose of Indirect rule system. The imposed colonial taxation led to the 1918 Egba riots, Some warrant chiefs were singly selected as 'Paramount Chiefs' especially in the areas east of the Niger which subsequently led to the Women riots of 1929 when many of them were short down. The 'chiefs' were given 'certificates of Recognition' and were required to engage in trying cases, recruiting and supervising labour to build the colonial system.

18. Fredrick Lugard - The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, Blackwood and Sons, London, 1922. For further elaboration, see the Diaries of Lord Lugard Volume 14 Edited by Margery Perham and Mary Bull, Faber and Faber, London, 1963.

19. Isa M. Abbass - op.cit. p.33.

20. F. Lugard, op.cit. For further reading and elucidation see Lugard - The Years of Adventure - 1858-1898 by Margery Perham, Collins, London, 1960.

21. Rowland Wraith - Local Administraation in West Africa, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1972, p.74.

22. The demand for the Native Authority reform was tabled in a motion for the commission of inquiry instituted into the state of affairs of the Local Government in Northern Provisinces by Mallam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (as he was known) in th Northern House of Assembly in August 1950. A joint select committee discussed the issue between July and August, 1950 which consequently led to the Moddocks - Pott Report, (November, 1950) to be released.

23. Rowland Wraith, op.cit. p. 78.

24. Quoted in V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: the Highest Stage of capitalism: Progress Publishers, Moscow and lifted from The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa by Peter C.W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds), op.cit. pp. 174-175.

25. Aaron T. Gana - "Local Government and class Domination". Paper presented for the Conference on 'State of the Nation', organized by the Department of Political Science, ABU Zaria, December 1983, p.6.

26. Ibid. p.6

27. M.J. M.M. Campbell, et'al - The Structure of Local Government in West Africa. Hutchinson, London, 1965, pp. 271-272.

28. Northern Nigeria - The Native Authority Law, 1954, No.4 of 1954 Government Printer, Kaduna, 1961, Section 208(1).

29. There were ten 'federations' all over the former Northern Nigeria. These were Pankshin, Akwanga and Lowland (Shendam) in the present Plateau State, Wukari (Benue), Zuru (Sokoto) Kwara (Kwara), Numan (Gongola), Tangale-Waje (Bauchi), Biu (Borno) and Jema'a (Kaduna).

30. A.D. Yahaya - Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria ABU Press, Zaria, 1978, p.10.

31. P.C.W. Gutkind and I. Wallerstern (eds) - The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, London 1970, pp.169-170

32. Ibid. p.70

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. A.D. Yahaya - op.cit, p.3

36. P.C.W. Gutkind and I. Wallerstern, op.cit.

37. Ibid.

38. A.D. Yahaya, op.cit. p.3

39. Ibid. p.5

40. See Walter Rodney, How Europe Under-developed Africa Howard University Press, Washington D.C., 1974.

41. This quotation is lifted from the Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, op.cit. pp. 184-185.

42. P.C.W. Gutkind and I. Wallerstern, op.cit.

43. Michael Crowder, op.cit., p.169

44. Ibid, p. 170

45. Henry Bernstein - "Notes on Capital and Peasantry" in Review of African Political Economy Number 10, 1977, p.61

46. Eme Ekekwe - Class and State in Nigeria, Longman, London, 1986, p.25.

47. Polly Hill - Population, Prosperity and Poverty: Rural Kano 1900-1970. Cambridge University Press, London, 1977, p.28

48. Eme Ekekwe, op.cit. p.35

49. Ibid. p.35

50. P.U. Okelle - "Background to the problems of Nigerian Education" in Okechukwu Ikejiani (ed) Education in Nigeria, Praeger, New York, 1965, p.10.

51. R. Ayo Dunmoye - "Technocratic Reformism and Nurture Capitalism: The Agrarian Policy of the Post-Colonial State". Paper presented at National Conference on "Nigerian Government and Society in the 21st Century: organised by the Department of Political Science, ABU Zaria, May 4th-9th 1987, p.5.

52. P.C.W. Gutkind and I. Wallerstern, op.cit. p. 193.

53. A.T. Gana, op.cit. p.10.

CHAPTER THREE

3.00 THE 1976 LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM: NURTURE CAPITALISM AND THE PATTERNS OF CLASS CAPITAL ACCUMULATION.

3.01 A PRELUDE TO THE REFORM:

When the Military struck in 1966, the Nigerian State had become more characterized by conflicts and thus the intensification of class struggle. Immediately after the creation of states in 1967, the military regime accordingly proclaimed its intension to reform the system of Local Government. Initially and generally, the intended reform was launched in 1968 and by 1970, the proposals for the reform put forward by the Federal Military Government were geared for implementation. For example, the abolition of the Native Authority Police Force and Prison Departments, the Emirs' Judicial Councils and Judicial Authorities. Furthermore, the Native Authority Alkali Courts were converted into Area Courts under the jurisdiction of the State Judicial system.

Hence, as the Federal Military Government abolished the Native Authority it replaced it with the the Local Government Authorities (LGAs). The Native Authority was invariably reorganised as the 'Administrative' or 'Development' Areas were established in their place. These were "mutually independent but directly related to the Local Government Area and to the State Government".[1] The exclusive control over the Police, Prisons and Justice which were previously controlled by the NA was also appropriated. This was in order to maintain and project the enforcement of law and order as it became a crucial coercive nature for the cohesion of the state, especially at that period. The State Governments however absorbed some services like the Judiciary, Land matters and some sources of revenue.

The administration of each 'Administrative' or 'Development' Area was done through the Administrative Area Council. This consisted of the local heads of Department who acted as ex-officio members, while the Divisional

Officers, (D.Os) acted, in many instances, as Chairmen. But during the same period however things have not changed as District and Village Councils continued to exist and function as before. Local Government Authorities thus functioned under the canopy and directions of the Emirate or Traditional Councils. These therefore marked an important epoch from progressive transforming the 1938 status of the Emirs as the Sole Native Authority to the 1954 positions as Chief-in-Council to the present Emirate or Traditional Council branded as the 'fathers' of the peole. In these reforms however, Local Government Areas/Councils were to consist of the traditional electors (King Makers) with the Divisional Officers. They were also to consist of two-thirds elected and one-third nomin ated members who are wholly filled by the Governor from the Emir's recommended nominees as the 'popular representatives' of the people.[2]

In 1967 however, the government of the then North-Central State (former Kaduna State, now split into Kaduna and Katsina states) started to establish its organs of government. In compliance with the current trends in the reformation processes and exercises throughout the country, the State Government, on its part, proposed what it referred to as a 'sweeping' reform in the entire system of Local Government and a 'radical departure' from the previous system. In these exercises, the state was initially divided into nine Administrative Areas.

The proposals to bring about these 'sweeping' reforms in the system of Local Government was initially disclosed to the Emirs and Chiefs by the State Military Governor in an attempt to review the functions of the N.A. and then solicit their opinions. This attempt was, according to the Government, 'inevitable' because of the changes taking shape and place in the socio-economic and political fields. Furthermore, the review of the role of the N.A. was in line "to enable people participate directly in the administration of their areas"[3] (emphasis added).

During the reform period however, certain important features embodied in the N.A. were identified for modifications. Accordingly however, the reform was aimed at:

i) abolishing the term Native Authority because of its derogatory colonial connotation;

ii) the abolished N.As were to be renamed Local Authorities (LAs);

iii) abolishing the distinctions between a Chief-in-Council and a Chief-and-Council and that all chiefs were to comply with the decisions of L.A. Councils. They however retain their traditional authority which would enable them to continue to provide the 'right leadership';

iv) all powers of the L.A. under the L.A. law or any other enactment were vested in the L.A. Council as a corporate body. The chief or one of the chiefs in a Federated Local Authority shall be the Chairman of the Council;

v) stricter control over L.As would be exercised by government representatives especially over finances and appointments;

vi) the composition of the L.A. Council would be on two-thirds elected and one-third nominated members. The life of each Council would last three years;

vii) democratic port-folio councillor system replaced the executive port-folio councillor system.[4]

Certain modifications were however proposed and effected to ursher in the original reform of 1969 by the State Government in 1971 under the Latest in Local Government REform. There were now ten Administrative Areas instead of nine in the former reform. The major aims of the Latest Reform were:

i) to bring Local Government closer to the people;

ii) to encourage the participation of the people in the management of their own affairs;

iii) to inject democracy in the state Local Government system;

iv) to ensure even and uniform development throughout the state.[5]

Consequently, to finance their activities the 'new' system had to remain financially depended, just like the former N.A. notwithstanding the percentage allocations to the community and cattle tax revenue collected with the L.G.A. Thus, they invariably lacked not only an independent revenue base and capacity but also the executive and absorbtive capacities for their activities. Thus forms of control extend to other facets of the Local Government because D.Os were sent to monitor and report the activities of the Local Government to the office of the Military Governor. It was against all these backgrounds that the 1976 Local Government Reform was perceived, initiated, formulated and implemented.

Hence, this reform had not attempted to provide a uniform framework for Local Government throughout the country. However, the reform exercise had not also attempted to make any structural or functional changes. Also, the so-called Administrative Area Councils did not have a "life of their own, separate and independent of the L.G.As but were simply grafted on the L.G.As which had managed to preserve its traditional powers and authority except in those matters relating to the police and judiciary."[6]

3.02 THE 1976 REFORMED LOCAL GOVERNMENT: PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION ON THE ROLE ISSUES:

A portion of the 1976 Guidelines for Local Government Reform had offered a suggested definition of the Local Government in Nigeria as that which implies:

> Government at local level exercised through representative Council established by law to exercise specific powers within defined areas. These powers should give the council substantial control over local affairs as well as the staff and institutional and financial powers to initiate and direct the provision of services and to determine and implement projects so as to complement the activities of the State and Federal Governments in their areas and to ensure, through devolution of functions to these councils and through the active participation of the people and their traditional institutions, that local initiative and response to local needs, and conditions are maximized.[7]

Hence, the 'representativeness of the council', the 'exercise of specific powers' and the 'active participation of the people' established by the Military Law are only limited to the phenomenon of the 'return to civil rule' programme. On its own part however, the Military junta made it explicitly clear, in its 'return to civil rule' programme, on why it initiated the reform on Local Government in this perspective:

> The Reform of our system of Local Government is not only important and desirable in itself, but it is a crucial element in the political programme of the Federal Military Government (FMG). ---In embraking on these reforms, the FMG was essentially motivated by the necessity, entail the decentralisation of some significant functions of the state Governments to local levels in order to harness local resources for rapid development.[8] ((emphasis added)

The introduction of 'bicameralism' in the Local Government consists of a Local Government Council and the Emirate or Traditional Council engrafted into the whole system. This was envisaged as a form of 'decentralisation' of authority aimed at harnessing local 'resources for rapid development'. The Reform further expresses that the traditional rulers showed unanimous *agreement with the philosophy contained in it and as such:*

> Nothing in these reforms could be construed to mean an attempt *at reducing or abolishing the traditional functions of our* Emirs, Obas and Chiefs. On the contrary, the reforms recognised the crucial nature of the provision of the traditional authorities *and care has been taken to preserve the organic unity of our* traditional institutions and societies.[9] (emphasis added)

Indeed the reforms had, in reality, transcended to 'mean nothing' to the generality of the people since 1976 as not 'every stratum' of the Nigerian society benefited from the 'continued prosperity' of this country through the availability of amenities and necessities.

In general, the functions which the Local Government bodies should perform, according to the Guidelines, include those:

i) which require detailed local knowledge for efficient performance;

ii) in which success depends on community responsiveness and participation;

iii) which are of a personal nature requiring provision close to where individuals affected live, and in which significant use of discretion or understanding of individuals is needed.[14]

On the issues of how the Local Government can generate its revenue to perform its other role, it is provided that two major sources are available. On the one hand, it will be from its local sources which comprises property ratings, notwithstanding the hanky-panky nature or problems associated with and attached to valuation, sources of revenue occuring from undeveloped plots allocated and used for commercial purposes (which should attract levies whether by rating or licensing their use). Sources from community tax or its equivalent and other miscellaneous fees in the forms of licensing of bicycles, etc.

The other major source of revenue, on the other hand, include statutory allocations coming from both the state and federal governments. Both the State and Federal Allocations are only to take care of the recurrent and capital expenditures of the Local Governments. The Federal Grants however, especially with regard to primary education under the UPE Scheme, the health care services and any other comparable schemes in any sector are not included in these statutory allocations.[15]

It is however expressed in the Guidelines that in the 1976-77 financial year the sum of ₦100m (one hundred million Naira) was allocated to the state governments for onward transmission to Local Governments by the Federal Military Government.[16]

In this reform package however, two powerful standing committees were to emerge and determin the day-to-day running of the affairs of the Local Government. These are the Finance and General Purposes Committee (FGPC) and the Education Committee. In addition, other ad hoc committees may however, as the need arises, be established and constituted for that specific purpose. Therefore, in order to maintain a constant vigilance in making sure that 'law and order' are constantly checked and/or reviewed, a Law Enforcement and Police Committee was also established and constituted in each Local Government Area.

3.03 THE REFORM IN KADUNA STATE:

On 23 . August, 1976, the Kaduna State Chapter of the Local Government Reform was launched by the state Military Governor. It was launched after "a committee of experts was appointed---to review the Local Government set up throughout the state and make appropriate recommendations".[17] The recommendations showed that there was a need "more than ever before to define specifically what contributory role Local Government should play in nation-building[18] in the performance of the important or requisite role to the generality of the community.

The Emirate Council was however established with Emirs as Presidents. Their duties included proposals and harmonisation of the activities of the Local Government Councils as well as "the determination of customary law and practice on all matters including that relating to land."[19](emphasis added).

However, there would be a maximum of six departments in each Local Government Area. These are:

i) Administration-Planning, Information, Local Government Community Development, Trade and Co-operatives;

ii) Education and Adult Education with Local Education Authorities (L.E.As) in each local government;

iii) Finance (Treasury, Revenue etc.)

iv) Agriculture and Natural Resources;

v) Works, Land and Rural Water Supply;

vi) Medical, Health, Social Welfare and Sports.[20]

3.04 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATE IN THE PROCESS OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION:

The linchpin ideology of all the Local Government Reforms in Nigeria constitutes the amalgam of 'development', 'participatory democratization', 'bringing government closer to the people', 'decentralization', 'mobilisation' etc. all linked to each other and unmistakably under the umbrella of bourgeois championing slogans and limitations. This was done, crucially, in order to situate and accommodate the visible pre-eminence of nurture capitalism in the country. This was in consistence with the evolution and development of capitalist class and invariably serves in the process of capital accumulation by the petty-bourgeois political elites in alliance with the traditional leaders who gain and maintain access to the state apparatuses.

The Nigerian state is officially based on the confused 'mixed ideology' expression as a result of the state's busy role in promoting and nurturing capitalist development. The state also plays the role of dispensing wealth through institutionalized organisations in the promotion of capital accumulation. This was achieved through corruption and regimentation of class formation with several legislations legalising, promoting and backing the capitalist class to take active part in the capitalist expansion of the country.

But the state promotion of the expansion of capitalist production relations are notwithstanding imperfect, inefficient and ineffective. This is not only because the state emerged out of colonial situation but also as a result of its organic trappings with imperialism and international capital. Such a situation has therefore and invariably not produced any useful results to the National Question, for example, mass poverty, deprivation etc. Nigeria has been grappled with. In whose interests, then, does the Nigerian state emerge, exist and operate.? The Nigerian state simultaneously, but contradictory, within the promotion of the complementarity relationships, serves both the interests of the emerging bourgeoisie as well as the international capital in a mediatory symboisis patterns. Consequently, the 'domestic' bourgeoisie is predominantly being used by the foreign bourgeoisie. Hence the primary role of the Nigerian state is to "establish, maintain, project and expand the conditions of capitalist accumulation"[21] so that the prosperity and propensity to dispense such accumulated capital by both the Nigerian and foreign bourgeoisies could be properly enhanced.

To enhance such prosperity and regulate competition, the Nigerian state, in 1972, perhaps in an attempt to simultaneously encourage, reconcile and rationalize the contradictory relationships between the local entrepreneurship and foreign interests, introduced the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, popularly referred to as the Indigenisation Decree/Act. This attempt was logical in the sense that, since the formal political independence in 1960, the created previleged class in Nigeria desired and pressed to be integrated into the proper bourgeoisie. However, the 'comprado' stratum of the bourgeoisie also desired that their ranks be expanded within the terrain of International Capital. This is as a result of their participation and access to the established institutions of the state related to the implementation of the programme.

Class and private capital accumulation are more expressed and realized by the acquisition and use of political power. As they occupy the leading positions in the state power structure, that political power, used by the political occupants, has become an avenue to increase and protect their enrichment and economic class interests. Thus it is contended that:

> It is not economic power which results in wielding of political power and influence and which shapes political decision making. It is rather political power (which also means here administrative and military power) which creates the possibilities of enrichment and which provides for the formation of an economically powerful class--- The state is here the source of economic power as well as instrument of it: the state is a major 'means of production'[24]

Therefore, political power is an instrument for the enhancement of economic purposes in different forms to effect both economically and politically dominant interests of the dominant class.

Hence, state power is expediently and cheaply used by the occupants of the political power for private capital accumulation. This is seen by the dominant class as a normal and necessary process. Therefore in order to engage in this capitalist accumulation process, accessibility to the state decision making process is imperative. This is because those who occupy state power tend to monopolize the use of it and strengthen their very economic and political conditions.[25]

Central to the process of accumulation is the State. The State therefore creates and clears the way for the petty-bourgeoisie to mold and pressurise the capacity and resources of the state for its own interests. The means and capacity to engage in such process is the ability to effectively maintain and control or gain access into the political power structure of the state.

At any level of government, all high offices are turned into avenues and means of personal enrichment by their occupants. These political office holders have tried to eliminate all forms of competitions or pressures against the contenders of such offices either from the fractions of the dominant class or from the dominated class. This is possible only when the politically dominant class engages in a systematic and continuous depoliticalization or reducing the effective participation of all the likely contenders or challengers.

The 1970s were years of great oil wealth, generally referred to as the period of oil 'boom' in the economy. This period was equally characterrized by construction, projects, policy and programme 'boom'. Among such policies or programmes during this period was the promulgation of the Local Government Reform of 1976, the Universal Primary Education (UPE) Scheme, agricultural programmes, Land Use Decree etc. and other concomitant construction works which invariably and spectacularly characterized the Nigerian state of some nouveaux riches. This was more stimulated with loans obtained from World Bank and other international capital agencies. Construction work engaged in this fashion involved that of the construction of Local Government Secretariats or Capitals, roads, UPE schools and/or classes etc. These have become lucrative sources of fortunes for many political office holders and all sorts of contractors who were able to have the necessary access or connections; 'long legs' - with the top political office holders of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy.

To appreciate some patterns of the relationships that exist, constitute and enter into the state and local government, it is logical to situate such appreciation within the 'fundamental objectives and directive principles of the state policy'.

This is to determine the extent or degree of capital accumulation, personal enrichment and class development. To clearly understand the state patron-client relationship with the local government which to a larger extent sustain the pattern and types of mode of complementarity between them, it is essential to determine the nature and predicament of the local government in the processes and conditions for capital accumulation and personal or self aggrandizement.

In the local government, a lot of material benefits and avenues for huge fortunes to make or engage in private accumulation exist. Invariably, a lot of energy and anxiety are aggressed and exhibited on the part of those who understand and directly control the day-to-day activities of the Local Government especially in areas like land, markets, motor parks, provision of services etc. The control and accumulation of material benefits or sources open to Local Government officials to aggrandize, have their long historical correspondence or connections and relevance since colonial Native Authority. This agency of the colonial state, in collaboration with its local partners, accumulated a lot of resources and almost entirely repatriated them outside while the local agents substantially had their own share.

As there are enormous resources at the disposal of the Local Government, it is glaringly evident that these resources are not geared towards improving the lots of the people. Rather, they are preponderantly aggrandized and used for private capital accumulation. Simultaneously, people are constantly exposed to the proportionate levels of subjugation and continuous extraction of surplus and resources. These are expressed in the payments of various forms of taxes or levies as the state gives all the necessary canopy of protection and rationalization. Particularly in the Local Government, those who occupy the state or political apparatuses and anxiously engaged in personal aggrandizement of wealth and accumulation

of capital are those belonging to the lower strata of the petty-bourgeoisie. They are the improverished and who always struggle to acquire more political positions higher than in the Local Government so as to 'catch up' with their big brothers at the exigency of the time.

The fourth schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 stipulates the patronage - clientage patterns of functions of both the State Government and Local Government which invariably determine the organic inter-governmental relationships. The functions itemized are broadly categorized into two. In the first category, there are functions referred to as the main or exclusive responsibilities of the Local Government while the second categoary is called the participatory or concurrent functions. (See Appendix - 'B')

In the former responsibilities, Local Government is expected to exclusively execute the items while in the latter, both the State and Local Government is said to only participate in these affairs. But in circumstances where the Local Government cannot participate this responsibility, function or role, the state government should, at that expediency, exclusively perform them. These functions are the provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education, the development of agriculture and natural resources, other than the exploitations of minerals, provision and maintenance of health services and such other functions as may, from time to time, be conferred on the Local Government.[26]

It is however evident that the Local Government does not have the capacity and ability to enforce or execute most of its exclusive functions. These capacity and ability absolutely lie on the general powers of the state. Thus it is really on what the state is willing to provide. If or when such execution of Local Government exclusive functions touches upon some vested interests of some powerful individuals, the Local Government may be instructed or directed to even abandon such responsibilities for example the assessment of privately owned houses or tenement and business premises

for the purposes of levying rates etc. As regards the participatory functions of the Local Government, these have, more often than not unconstitutionally and unilaterally been left to the Local Government by the State Government, under close examination of the Federal Government. It is apparently clear that the Local Government is ostensibly pictured or expresssed to lack the resources for execution of its basic functions within the corresponding orientation and direction of the state and the economy.

Over time and space, inter-government relationships have been expressed in several perspectives. These relationships, since colonial times, have been expressed as not 'healthy' and not 'complementary' with the state. Notwithstanding the ironic and rhetorical recognition of these relations by the military in the Guidelines which shows that overtime the Local Governments have "suffered from the continuous whittling down of their powers. The State Governments have continued to encroach upon what would normally have been exclusive preserves of Local Government"[27] What specifically are the 'powers' of Local Government continuously whittled down by the state? Did or have the Local Governments been given any powers apart from the role apportioned to them by the state? What are these 'eclusive preserves' of the Local Government? What provisions were made during or after the 1976 reform to curtail the excessive control and the 'encroachment' of the state over the Local Goverment. Are not the functions of the Local Government determine its powers thus complementary with identical interests to the state?

As Local Government doe s not exist in a vacuum within the operation of the state, it is therefore cheaply used by the state in whatever is the demand of the expediency of the situation. This is so because the delivery of goods and provision of critical needed services by the Local Government are absolutely dependent on the patterns of these patron-client relationships with the other levels of government's willingness and interest to provide or patronize. Corruption however constitutes, enteres and plays a crucial role in these relations with serious impact in not transcending the transformation of the community. Hence, what are these relationships that

enter into various layers or levels ('tiers' as it is so-called) of government which constitute and determine the patron-client statuses?

3.05 The State's Control of the Local Government

The State Government is the most immediate higher level of authority to the Local Government. Their relationship is direct and patterned in certain inter-connented consitutents; for example, financial, legal, administrative, political etc. The most appropriate word to describe these patron-client relationships is control. This phenomenon of control of the Local Government had its origins since colonial period. This has not just occured unconnected with and unrelated to the essential raison d'etre of the state and the accompanying role to different state apparatuses or agencies which further enter with the intricate patterns of control and usurpation of role and legitimacy. The types of state control over Local Government are Political, Administrative, Financial, Land etc.

3.06 Politico-administrative mechanisms of control

Section 7 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 provides that the existence of the system of Local Government is under it guaranteed and consequently "the state Governmdents of every state shall ensure their existence under a law which provides for their establishment, composition, finance and functions --- that the Local Government should participate in economic planning and development of the area"[28]. It is therefore within this and other official provisions that we can situate and determine the nature, extent or degree and patterns of the state-local patron-client relationships. Hence, Local Governments are created by and derive their powers, roles etc. from the higher levels of authority of both the Federal and State Governments.

How do we then examine, assess and understand the imperative manner of these control mechanisms exercised by the State Government over the conduct

of the affairs of the Local Government? Inv ariably these control measures are postulated as having or constituting the organic weaknesses of the Local Government. These eventually mean that Local Governments are officially and deliberately made sterile, ineffective, inefficient and above all ineffectual. This is for the satisfaction and sustenance of certain requirements of the dominant class interest, in executing even the functions officially vested on Local Governments when these functions are even characteristically rudimentary.

As the Local Governments are characterized to posses these features of incapacity and incapability, these symbolise and automatically reflect *the essential character and performance of the state in all ramifications.* When things do not properly work, Local Governments are usually turned around and accused as its ideal role is completely twisted to perform other directed dutires by the controlling authority. This is vindicated by the state orientation and direction in order to protect, sustain and accommodate the entire dominant class interest of the social system par excellence. This is expressed in an ostensible but imperceptable manner and design by the state intervention to bail out the Local Government. Thus, it is not the state that has failed in fulfilling the aspirations of the people but the Local Government!

Why should such state control over Local Government exist? Official reasons are numerous and indeed more fallacious. Hence, it is plausibly shown that the exercise of these control mechanisms are aimed at the state desire for 'even social and economic development' of all the Local Governments. That if left alone, and to compete between themselves, some will be 'shooting *up' while others 'lagging behind' or even 'whither away'! Therefore, Local* Governments are essentially political creations and designed to purely perform or execute relative political functions according to the limited political dictates of the government. Thus, despite the semblance of autonomy to the Local Government, the higher levels of Government have objectively and profoundly refused to devolve, without sanctions or strings attached, any

meaningful role.

The state of affairs of the clientage status of the Local Government, manifesting in political control, is now expressed within the predominant mechanism or system of military regimes. This is characterized by authoritarian and dictatorial or even fascist postures with their hierarchies of power which emphasises control. Invariably therefore, there is a considerable concentration of political power in the hands of the Military Governor who could, at any time, dissolve the Local Government Councils and appoint new ones if or when they are found 'wanting'. The Military Governor may, but with prior consent or approval from the higher level of authority, abrogate or legalize any document within the confines of his powers.

The 1976 Local Government Reform Edicts have explicitly expressed this autocratic powers of the Military Governors. For example, the procedures or processes partaining the nature of election of chairmen and councillors vindicates the abrassion of the State Government supremacy over Local Government. In other words, he who pays the piper dictates the tunes. Accordingly and officially however in this respect, the whole aspects of political control centre around the appointment of Chairmen and Councillors to be approved by the Military Governor to fill in the political fora. Even during the civilian administration, 1979-1983, Local Government Chairmen and Councillors were either nominated by the out-going Military Governors or Civilian Governors on political Party Platforms sanctioned by the traditional institutions in many instances.

Further on the politico-administrative mechanism of the patron-client relationship, the Federal Military Government has recently issued some 'new' Guidelines pertaining the conduct of the state over Local Government. Therefore, to 'solve' the frictions between officials and the state and within the officials, the chairmen and councillors would have 'a consultative conference' with the state government while at the same time the State

Government while at the same time the State Governments are directed to issue expedient administrative procedure to the Local Government. Among such things are to include the "conduct of council business, functions and responsibilities of the principal council functionaries, petitions, award of contracts and settlement of bills, press release, brief and interview, staff matters etc."[29]

The techniques of the state patronage over Local Government affairs also centre around the dynamics of Local Government administration whereby the State Government considers them as mere extensions of the administrative structures, while the officials see or are made to see themselves as administrative 'respresentatives' and therefore as political extensions of the State Government. The role of the Secretary to the Local Government, for example, as an employee of the state civil srvice is reminiscent to that of the D.O. during the colonial N.A. system. The Secretary, as an official of the State Government is sent to supervise, advise, guide or direct the affairs and other officials of the Local Government as well as report to the government on the situation of things. He is further vested with powers according to the 1976 Local Government Edict, to perform all such other functions as may from time to time be assigned to him by the Government. The Secretary, now as the 'chief executive' 'accounting officer,' is therefore under the whims and caprices of the state directions.

This clientage position or status of the Local Government with all the trappings of the ostensible transient, albeit eroded autonomy, vindicates these very contentions of the Local Government as nothing more than an extension of state administration whereby they are reduced to mere field or monitoring units of the state. They are therefore 'governments' of the state at the local level.

However, the Local Government Service Board/Commission (LGSB/C), as an agency of the State Government and its inherent function further vindicates and constitutes some other aspects or forms of the patron-client relationship between the state and the Local Governments and therefore dilutes the mechanics or techniques of control over the entire personnel and coordination of all activities of the Local Government. The functions of the LGSB/C include, employment, posting, discipline etc. of all the senior staff members of the Local Government service with relative form of 'delegation of powers' to Local Governments as regards the junior staffers. But the confirmation and promotion of all the staff are under the prerogatives of the board. It further acts as a 'court of appeal' for all cases emanating from the Local Government with its final verdicts.

Another state government agency within this framework of control relationship between it and the Local Governments and which further constitutes an interventionist stance is the Ministry (now a Department, under the State Governor's Office) of Local Government. The functions of this agency are also reminiscent to the supervisory role of the Local Government during the colonial period. These functions include monitoring of all activities of the Local Government. Consequently therefore, paragraph 30 of the 1976 Guidelines for the Local Government Reforms shows that the Local Government "will need a great deal of financial and technical support from the State Government which will need to monitor the way these resources are used."[30] Within the Directorate, there is an Inspectorate Division which is referred to as its nucleus and discharges functions on behalf or under the directions of the State Government.

The inspectorate division further duplicates the exercise of control over all the activities of the Local Government in finance and administration. Thus Local Government Inspectors are posted to each Local Government to monitor the activities therein. Circulars issued for example, from time

this illegal act but also cooperated with the state executives to make things go unchallenged"[31]

to time, have indicated that all correspondences coming should be referred to the Inspectors for their information or guidance. However, all correspondences going out should simultaneously be copied to them for similar purposes. The Inspectors are also to attend all the Local Government Council or any other meetings and further have access to all books of records and accounts of the council. Therefore, there is a strong state hold over the Local Government which simultaneously enters into the strong hold of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy characterized by the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois anxiety to preside over the state apparatuses and resources where terrian control is effectively articulated, pursued and sustained within the transcendentalism of imperialist penetration through political and military power.

3.07 Financial Control

For a LOcal Government to exist, its finances and other sources of revenue should be viable, vibrant and dynamic. But as regards politico-administrative mechanism in the exercise of control relationships by the State Government, Local Governments financial status in their relations with all other levels of government are important testimonies whereby the clientage relationship is further exhibited within the general financial powers of the state. Hence most of the funds en route into the coffers of the Local Government would have to pass through the State Government notwithstanding the policy of direct allocation. The passage of these funds provides a conduit pipe necessary for the easy or conducive process of accumulation on the part of the political office holders. These funds are frequently 'hoarded' or 'hijacked' which is 'justified' in an ostensible manner of executing some expedient projects which have only proved to be imaginary. However, "the passage of the funds made them to be used for other purposes and Local Government officials not only sat back to watch this illegal act but also cooperated with the state executives to make things go unchallenged"[31]

The technicalities of preparation and submition of estimates or budgets for the approval of the State Government by the Local Government, is however expressive of the manifestations of state control. A lot of state interventions in these aspects of budgeting are obvious, open and direct. On many occassions, Local Government budgets have been rejected as they are inconsistent with the budgetary guidelines where they do not include projects which the state wants included. The Kaduna State Local Government Edict, 1976, for example, stipulates that every Local Government shall, in each year:

i. cause to be prepared in accordance with any general directives made in that behalf by the executive council, a detailed estimate of its revenue and expenditure for the next ensuing year.

ii. consider and approve, with or without modifications, such estimates; and

iii. submit to the Exco within such time and such manner as may be directed by it a copy of the estimates approved by the Local Government Council given such approval.[32]

However, the Exco shall consider the annual estimates submitted by the Local Governments "in order to ensure that the general budgetary measures adopted for the state for the succeding financial year. And in any case where the estimate is found inconsistent, the Exco may give such directives as may be appropriate in the circumstances to Local Government concerned and such Local Government shall comply with such directives.[33]

With regard to the provision of and control over some sources of generating revenues, Local Governemnts are not permited to independently divice new sources of revenue without prior requests and approval. They are therefore and invariably limited to operate within the stagnant, inadequate and antiquated colonial legacies of sources of revenue. However, because of the vested class interest of the oligarchy in this bourgeoise society, Local Governments do not poke their nose over such revenue sources like

tenement and property rates of buildings that are owned by powerful political economic and traditional figures. Rather, they engage in such areas where the ordinary people are mostly affected. A thorough and critical study of the internal sources of Local Government revenue will vindicate that far less than twenty percent of the whole Local Governments in Nigeria is in a position to generate fourty percent of its total revenue. Hence, the bulk of the Local Government sources of revenue is therefore coming from the grants and statutory allocations of both the state and Federal Governments and invariably Local Governemnts have to bow down to the higher levels of government.

3.08 Control Over Land

Virtually all issues on land concern allocation, protection, seizures and other forms of transactions and speculations. However, the traditional owners of land are increasingly being thrown out of their possession by both the state and private property claims on land leading to systematic pauperization and 'peasantarianization'. These acts in themselves are being rationalized by the provisions of the laws of the state. This facilitates and enables further appropriation, on commercial basis, by not only the emerging bourgeoisie in an alliance with the traditional rulers but also with the foreign firms. Local land speculators are increasingly engaged in various forms of illicit land transactions in connivance with both state officials and traditional segments in their quest or thirst for personal agrandizement.

There is therefore no any provision for protection over lower peoples' right to property as regards their farmlands, houses, etc. This is so because of the preponderant evidence of the frequent cases of land seizures. Even the law courts, based on the provisions of the bourgeois society, rationalize such seizures and claims coupled with other rationalization and backings of the other oppressive apparatuses of the state; for example

the police, prison and even the traditional 'dogarai' etc. With regard to land allocations, it is however quite evident that the allotees are preponderantly those members responsible for the allocations, or their masters, relations and close associates manifesting in the whole circuit of corruption and brazen nepotism. The so-called policy of 'one man one plot' is only plausible and formal expressions to suit and protect vested interests in the desire and design to engage in the 'accumulation of land' and the concomittant accumulation of further wealth and capital.

The Land Use Decree, 1978 has specifically expressed that all land, particularly in urban areas shall be under the control and management of the state and that all other land shall be under the control and management of the Local Government. However, Section 2(5) of the law enables the Local Government to establish a Land Allocation Advisory Committee "which shall consist of such persons as may be determined by the Military Governor".[34] This advisory committee is virtually and invariably under the whims and caprices of state control. Furthermore, whether or not in the urban area, the law stipulates that the state, in its supremacy over the Local Government shall:

a) grant statutory rights of occupancy to any person for all purposes
b) grant easement appurtenant to statutory right of occupancy
c) demand rental for such land granted to any person
d) rivise such rental:
    i. at such intervals as may be specified in the certidicate of occupancy, or
    ii. when interval are specified in the certificate of occupancy at any time during the term of statutory right of occupancy.

e) impose a penal rent for breach of any convenant in the certificate of occupancy requesting the holder to develop or effect improvements on the land the subject of certificate of occupancy and revise such penal rent as provided in section 19.

f) impose a penal rent for a breach of any condition, expresssed or implied, which precludes the holder of the statutory right of occupancy or any part thereof by sale, mortgage, transfer of possession, sublease and bequest or otherwise however without the prior consent of the Military Governor.[35]

Hence the exercise of 'power' over land by the Local Government under its area of jurisdiction is done only under special or exceptional circumstances. This very circumstance is when the Local Government is discharging its apportioned role on behalf of the state as it is specifically directed notwithstanding the other provisions which stipulate the following relatively transient powers to the Local Government in this fashion:

I. It shall be lawful for Local Governments in respect of land not in urban areas:

a) to grant customary right of occupancy to any persons or organisations for the use of land in the Local Government area for agriculature residential and other purposes.

b) to grant customary right of occupancy to any persons or organisations for the use of land for grazing purposes and such other purposes ancillary to agric. purposes as may be customary in the Local Government concerned.

2. No single customary right of occupancy shall be granted in respect of an area of land in excess of 500 hectres if granted for grazing purposes except with the consent of the Military Governor.
3. The Local Government shall have exclusive rights to land so occupied against all persons except the Military Governor.[36]

But what now exists between the Local Government and the Emirate/ Traditional Councils is a struggle over who 'controls' or who has more relative powers or even more appropriately, who exercises more 'exclusive rights'. Traditional rulers more often feel that they have the long 'honoured rights' over land. The Kaduna State Local Government Edict has expressed this view taken by the traditional rulers as notwithstanding any of its provisions, the emirate council shall "determine customary law and parctice on all matters governed by customary law including land tenure under customary law".[37] How is this provision related to the Land Use Decree? Has the Decree not caused a lot of violence on matters relating to land? Obviously this issue has not only created confusion at the Local Government level, but at the same time asserted the supremacy of the state over all other things and constitutes an important forum of friction between the political and traditional fractions of the bourgeoisie as the political leadership almost all the times triumphs, especially on matters of policy, over their traditional colleagues.

3.09 The Federal - Local Government Relationships:

Under the revenue act of 1982, the devised revenue allocation formula for the three levels of government was based on 55% Federal, 35% State and 10% Local Government. Thus, grants and statutory allocations to the Local Government by the Federal Government constitute some of the crucial areas

of these Federal-Local Government relationship. These funding and subventions to the Local Government are all enshrined in the guidelines and the constitution whereby a system of block grants and statutory allocations by both the Federal and State Governments is explicated. But there are always "problems about the money reaching the destination because the law did not allow the Federal Government the liberty to give the money directly to the Local Government".[38] The question now is this - is it actually the 'problem' of indirect disbursement or the inherent tendency for the money to be diverted into the bank accounts of the political office holders in the process to accumulate for personal enrichment? How would the 'present' liberty as the law now allows the Federal Government to give the money directly to the Local Government change the 'past' situation or occurances?

3.10 Grants and Statutory Allocations

Between 1976 and October 1983, the following grants and statutory allocations from the Federal Government were paid into the State-Local Government Joint Account. This staggering amount would resolve the current debate as to whether finances per se have constituted an organic problem of the Local Government or not.

TABLE 3.1

GRANTS AND STATUTORY ALLOCATIONS TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Year	Amount Allocated	
1976/77	₦160,000,000.00	(Grants)
177/78	250,000,000.00	"
1978/79	150,000,000.00	"
1979/80	300,000,000.00	"
October 1979 - Sept. 1982	3,508,622,310.37	(State allocations)
November 1982 - March 1983	1,296,162,099.38	" "
April 1983 - October 1983	545,362,439.08	" "
Total	5,210,146,848.83	

Source; Shehu Musa - "Federal Government's contribution to the evolution of Modern Local Government system in Nigeria."

Paper presented by the Secretary to the Federal Government at a conference in Zaria on the 'State of the Nation' December 12 - 16, 1983.

In 1976 however when the Local Government Reform came into operation, there were "unspecified and ad hoc grants for elections and other initial expenses for the inception of the scheme"[39] allocated or disbursed to the Local Government by the Federal Government. Hence grants and statutory allocations between 1976 and 1983 total to over five billion Naira (₦5 billion) were poured into the Local Governments. Furthermore, between 1979 and 1980 the Federal Government disbursed some additional ad hoc grants to the Local Governments totalling ₦800 million. Increasing this staggering amount, the disbursement of funds by both the Federal and State Governments into the Local Government between 1979 and 1986 reached the tune of over eight billion Naira (₦8.357 billion.[40] The question now is: Where have all these monies gone?

Hence a cursory look at the statutory allocations to the Local Governments from the Federation Account and the Local Governments' share of the internally generated revenue from the State Governments between 1979 and 1986 on the tables below shows that the Local Governments' revenue during that period was enormous (i.e. ₦8.357 billion). Furthermore, the total Local Governments' revenue between 1979 and 1986 stood at ₦9,286.81 million. It is however maintained that the estimate figures range from 4% to 30% of the total revenue and that if 10% average is taken into consideration, Local Governments must have realised a total of ₦928.68 million[41] during the same period.

TABLE 3.2

STATUTORY ALLOCATIONS FROM THE FEDERATION ACCOUNT (IN MILLIONS OF ₦)

YEAR	AMOUNT ALLOCATED
1979	₦ 261.4
1980	352.6
1981	1,085.0
1982	1,018.7
1983	996.8
1984	1,061.5
1985	1,327.5
1986	1,166.9
TOTAL =	₦ 7,270.4

Source: The Analyst Vol.2, No.6, 1987. p.8.

TABLE 3.3

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' SHARE OF STATES' REVENUE (IN MILLIONS OF NAIRA)

YEAR	AMOUNT ALLOCATED
1979	₦ 28.36
1980	132.77
1981	104.92
1982	131.58
1983	137.09
1984	170.41
1985	223.86
1986	158.74
TOTAL	₦ 1,087.73

Source: The Analyst, Vol.2, No.6, 1987, p.8.

3.11 The UPE and Federal Grants to Local Governments

When the Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme was intorduced in 1976, it constituted and entered into the Federal-Local Government relationships especially with regard to policy and grant allocations in the

in the form of subsidy for the scheme. Between 1976 and 1979, particularly this pattern of Federal subvention was really very crucial for those who assumed the position of decision making machinary to device ways and means of diverting the disbursed funds. For example, the subsidy was based on initially, ₦70.00 which dropped to ₦35.00 and later in 1979/80 revised and increased to ₦40.00 per every enrolled child into the primary school. In this regard however, every enrolled child from the period of the scheme was subsidized by the Federal Governemnt to cover his current expenditure. The inflation of the enrolment figures during that period characterized the attention of the political office holders to generate substantial amount.

Another important feature that further characterized the UPE scheme was also based on ₦3,500 and later revised and incresed to ₦5,000 per class room approved for construction. this was a period characterized by spectacular construction boom on many projects which was also spectacularly characterized, through contracts, by a lucrative source of making quick wealth. Hence, classrooms or schools earmarked to be constructed never got built and preponderantly pupils were taught under tree shades, personal car garages, traditional 'Zaure' and similar other inappropriate and non-permanent structures. The old classrooms or schools were however too congested for any effective teaching to take place. While the money meant for the kids with regard to materials to be used for teaching them and the accompanying set of infrastructures for such teaching to take place were privately diverted and accumulated. As capital grants for the scheme, an initial provision of ₦30 million[42] was made available and shared among the states supposedly for the onward transmission to the Local Governments.

3.12 Federal Contributions of Pension Schemes to Local Governments

Pension scheme contributions from the Federal Government also constitute another form of fund disbursement to Local Government. However, each State Government shall maintain this pension fund on a three tier basis for the

annual contributions to the fund. But more often than not, because of the level of corruption in the whole social set up, pension and gratuity allocations are usually diverted for other purposes through fictitious claims made with fake dead persons' living offsprings.[43] The following table shows the allocated pension scheme funds by the Federal Government between 1979 and 1983.

TABLE 3.4

PENSION SCHEME FUNDS ALLOCATED TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

YEAR	AMOUNT ALLOCATED
1979	₦5,810,000.00
1980	3,858,940.00
1981	5,000,000.00
1982	5,290,500.00
1983	5,435,750.00
TOTAL	₦25,395,190.00

Source: Shehu Musa - "Federal Government's Contributions ------"

3.13 Local Government and Traditonal Leadership

There is no arguing the fact that the system of Local Government is not analogue to traditional institution. They are completely and seriously opposed or contradictory to each other. In other words, there is a clear distinction and incompatibility between what Max Weber calls the 'rational legal tyupe of authority' and the traditional type of authority. Under our present dispensation, Traditional /Emirate Councils have been established in most of the Local Government Councils. The question now is how did this pseudo-traditional authority come to constitute an essential phenomenon dominating the Local Government administration and thus forming a bi-cameralism in the Local Government with conflicting impulses?

The roles of traditional institutions in the administration of the Local affairs are historical which emanate from time immemorial and change over time and space. One important irony about the insertion of 'tradional' institutions in our Local Government is the immutable fact that the so-called traditional rulers have never regarded themselves as part and parcel of the local community's wishes and aspirations. Hence, actual transformation of the people's conditions of living will threaten, among others, the reproduction of all the paraphernalia of social exploitation. They only relate to the community on territorial and ceremonial grounds. Therefore, their 'relevance' to the community is limited to the general coercion and exploitation of the people they derogatory refer to as their subjects. Hence these pseudo-traditional rulers, especially the Western educated and the more senior ones aspire for more political offices and activities of the state under the pseudonym of tradition.

In our own setting, the organisation of emirs, obas, obis chiefs and other equivalent or lower 'traditional' office holders constitute what is referred to as traditional institution whose ascendancy to the stool of power stems from heriditary through ascription by virtue of their incidence of birth. This group of people is further diluted by the preponderant soliciting and purchase of traditional titles by the predominantly wealthy individuals or the economic and political office holders. These titles are offered and accepted with a view to romanticizing and 'acceptability' with the masses to 'identify' with them in deceptive fashion.

Hence a fundamental contradiction exists, since colonial period, as the requirements of the new political system are repugnant and incompatible to the traditional leadership or authority. They were both set to participate, as partners with civilian and military political leadership, in the ideologial orientation of the state and as such "far from being an irrelevant artifact, the institution has become an important actor in social, political

and economic realm of the state".[44] Consequently, the institution of 'traditional' rulers has largely been misunderstood and miscontrued.

In the first place, they are not viewed as 'partners in progress' with the military and civilian leaders in a complementary setting as a result of convergence of their class interest. More often than not, 'traditional' rulers usually portray to insulate themselves or are usually said to be insulated from the state of affairs of the state under the rudimentary and vague assignment of symbolic and advisory role. Secondly, it is not seriously viewed as an exploitative institution and it does not identify with the majority of those who dogmatically identify with it. Thus, the ex-officio position membership they occupy in the Local Government Councils, their political appointments as chairmen of parastatals, chancellors and prochancellors of universities etc. have all refashioned them into the local political arena and provided the avenues to be in possession of enormous power. Thirdly, these so-called traditional institutions or rulers are however not seriously viewed as stooges, in collaboration with the bureaucratic - military oligarchy of international capital where serious exploitation and pauperization of the people they claim to protect take place. They solicit and accept positions of chairmen, managing directors of foreign firms or multi-national co-operations, banks etc.

Traditional leadership and its authority in Local Government in Nigeria should be understood wihin the philosophy and direction of the state. A clear appreciation on how this institution exists and enters into the general motion of all the paraphernalia and branches of the wheel of the state should be clear. It was invariably within the framework of Local Government that this institution was nurtured and projected as constituting one of the avenues for their initial aggrandizement. Hence 'traditional' rulers or institutions were crucially relevant to the colonial state particularly in the N.A. system of Local administration, mutatis mutandis, as they were molded

to suit the necessary requirements of colonialism and imperialism. This 'new breed' of 'traditional' ruling class was enhanced and strengthened by colonialism as it was given an immense and enormous power to abuse. Many were handpicked and imposed under the philosophy of indirect rule; on people against the traditional norms and practices of the community especially in those areas where institutionalized traditional rulers never existed and they vehemently objected such colonial practices.

Before the colonial ascendancy in Nigeria, particularly in the former Sokoto Caliphate, Emirates under the hegemony of the emirs functioned and formed the basic nuclei of Local administration. They maintained and sustained their supremacy until the promulgation of the 1976 Local Government reform and the concomitant progressive transformation of the entire 'traditional' institutions.

During the colonial rule, the introduced monetary and the export cash crop economy substituted and distorted the predominatly subsistent peasant production. This further enahnced the emergence of the involvement of the Nigerian state into the world wide circuit of capitalist production. This simultaneously provided a conducive atmosphere for the 'traditional' rulers, who initially constituted the favoured and dominant social class in the society, to start evolving and nurturing the social, economic and political order and to use this opportunity to accumulate capital at the local level. The 'traditional' rulers within the framework of colonial politcal economy therefore stood between the peasant producers and the colonial masters especially through the institutionalized Marketing Boards established for effective exploitation of the peasantry. Furthermore, not only did the traditional nobility and their appointed agents directly connected with the institution collaborate and agglomerate their interests with the colonial rulers in surplus exploitation and repatriation, but were also involved in direct collection of taxes, control of the colonial treasuries, distribution of land and all other forms

and patterns of expropriation for the inevitability of oppression, domination and accumulation.

The frictions of interests, manifesting in intra-class struggles between the 'traditional and new plitical leaderships are not openly very frequent. These occassional frictions occur as the new political leadership wishes to have some overwhelming control over the traditional nobility. As these take many forms and dimensions, the former always emerges victorious over the latter because of its control over the apparatuses of the state. But as a result of the need for 'peace and unity' of the social setting and for the sustenance of the mutual economic interests, accommodation of each other has become primarily crucial and paramount for the hegemony of the state which have accelerated the traditional nobility to merge "their traditional roles with that of the modern requirements of the state".[45] This development is also due to the fact that modern traditional title holders and their members have been recruited into the civil services of Federal, State and Local Governments, foreign service, parastatals, military, foreign firms etc.

Hence the agglomeration of the political and traditional leadership interests centre around the initial needs of the former to conveniently use the latter, as similarly used by the colonialists, (which has now developed into a symbiosis relationship whereby both use each other alternately) to capture political office as traditional rulers ostensibly appear as having an unchallenged control over the people. By chauvanistic appeals on 'traditional' ethnic and religious cleavages, traditional nobility obtains allegiances of the masses. Consequently, the traditional leadership has to be maintained and nurtured in order to satisfy certain requirements of state cohesion while the possibility of abolishing it is completely out of the political agenda as its disruption will not guarantee

the needed interest aggrandizement of political power and class capital accumulation as well as the perpetual social reproduction of its class.

More significantly, the military regimes have enhanced the positions of the traditional leadership. As it will and can not dispose it, the military regards the institutions as indispensable to its legitimacy. During the military regimes, creation of new chiefdoms and emirates occured. Many traditional title holders were elevated to first, second and third class statuses accompanied with the constructions of their palaces and the concomitant upward revisions of their salaries, allowances (including transport and housing) and other fringe benefits which have been astromical. For example, recent revisions show that first class chiefs have their domestic and housing allowances increased to 100%, permanent and part-time traditional councils up graded, horse allowance increased with at least ₦600 per horse per annum while commissions payable to ward heads are to be directly disbursed to the senior 'traditional' rulers by various Local Government Council Treasuries.[46]

This is in line with the Dasuki recommendation accepted by the Government which states that "in order to ensure that payment is made regularly and promptly, the Committee recommended that where a Local Government is responsible for the payment of remuneration of traditional rulers, the amount due to traditional rulers be deducted monthly from the allocations due to Local Government concerned from the Joint State Local Government Account and paid through the traditional council where it exists or directly to individual traditional ruler; it requires that each Local Government council concerned passes a resolution authorising such deductions".[47]

The Kaduna State Local Government Edict provides the instrument for the elevation of the status of the traditional rulers for the appointment of a chief as a president of the Traditional Council comprising more than one Local Government Council and could perform the functions vested on the chairmen of the Local Government Councils.[48] However, the functions

of the Traditional or Emirate Council are of greater influence than the Local Government Councils as 'elected' and nominated members (who are vouched by them) have to obtain the 'blessings' of the Traditional Council before approved by the Governor.[49] Furthermore, the chiefs are to be fully and constantly informed on all the preceedings of the Local Government Councils. The Dasuki report has therefore rebounded the feudal aristocratic revival in the Local Government Councils and hence subverted any genuine democratic practices. It has recommended that "in order to minimise the frictions in the management of district and village heads affairs and ensure the unity of command, District and Village Heads should be responsible to traditional councils ----"[50] and not the Local Government Councils.

However, further recommendations by the Dasuki committee and accepted by the government show that:

a) Draft estimates of each Local Governemnt Council should be sent to the office of the Traditonal Council well in advance for advisory comments within a reasonable time and such comments should be carefully considered by the Local Government Council. Thereafter, as a matter of courtesy, the secretary to the Local Government should inform the Traditional Council of the action taken by the Local Government on their views.

b) When the management audit is established, copies of their reports should be promptly and regularly sent to the Traditional Councils for any follow-up action deemed necessary.

c) Copies of minutes of Local Government Council meetings should be sent to the Traditional Council within three days of the confirmation of the minutes.

d) Copies of draft development plans and draft bye-laws proposed by Local Government Councils should be made available to the Traditional Councils for comments before they are approved or adopted.

e) The committee supports the request to change the name of the State Council of Chiefs to the 'State Council of Traditional Rulers'.

f) Every traditional ruler should as the father of the people, throw the full weight of his traditional authority to accelerate the task of mass mobilisation of the people for active participation in community development programmes within his area of jurisdiction.

g) That paragraph 20(d) of the Guidelines be modified as follows: Assist in the compilation of nominal-roll for community tax, as the announcement of tax and, as in the usual practice, in in collection of tax (Paragraph 7.15).[51]

In theory, both the 1976 Local Government Reform and the 1978 Land Use Act appear to assign only symbolic responsibilities to the 'traditional' *rulers/institutions with the affairs of the Local Governemnt. But in practice* this nobility exercises enormous power and control over the conduct of the Local Govenment especially on matters surrounding land distribution, allocation and the pauperization of the peasantry.[52] They have therefore constituted one of the direct beneficiaries of the state indigenisation programmes as they share dividends in the firms they bought and controlled shares. Furthermore, they are given strategic places in the state World Bank sponsored agricultural projects in obtaining or securing the loans and other agricultural inputs. All these have further revolutionalized their role to meet the new requirements of the state which created favourable conditions for their survival and social reproduction. This has irreversibly vindicated their irrelevance to the people and system of Local Government they are potrayed to preoccupy and therefore inconsequential.

3.4 Local Government and Decentralization

Central to the 1976 Local Government Reform is the debate on the decentralization of authority. The issues addressed to this phenemenon raise certain questions as to whether or not authority in the Local Government is decentralized. Hence how do we determine that a structure or organisation is centralized or decentralized? Why is there a need to decentralize authority at the Local Governemnt and to what extent or degree? Has the reform achieved (what may be referred to as) the tripolar Local Government values[53] of participatory democracy, administrative efficiency and political autonomy? What is it actually decentralized - is it power (to decide and implement) and to whom? Who actually participate at the local level?

The reform theoretically envisages an institutional decentralization of authority as a linchpin ideology where mobilization of people could take off. Practically however, there is no empirical evidence of either deconcentration of power or devolution of authority at the local levels. This is because there exists no demarcation of powers between those of the State and Local Governments. In other words, the principles underlying the distribution of powers between different segments of government are lacking. What now exist are but overlapping and contradictory.

This is evident on the grounds that any genuine transfer of power has to go hand-in-hand with the corresponding or relevant resources. The principles underlying power distribution in the state ensure that power transferred to the local bodies must not lead to control by one local authority over another as a result of the hierarchical distinguishing of the Local Government bodies. Furthermore, transfer of power should also lead to the acquisition or confirment of new powers to local bodies rather than abrogation, unsurpartion or deprivation of the powers already held.[54] All these have fundamental bearings on the concept of decentralization.

Empirically however, what exists is a situation whereby the state participates and dominates the affairs of the Local Governments. This is natural as the Local Governments are the creations of the state which *essentially serve as the administrative units of the immediate higher levels* of government where their powers, legitimacy and ressources are drivative of state. As the state possesses enormous power to create new Local Government units, it can therefore enact new Local Government laws as well as the instruments for each Local Government units.[55] Invariably, Local Governments have to operate within the worked out law and practice as well as the procedures inherent in the laws and other accompnaying circulars and rules being established by the state.

Thus, this has manifested in an intricate control with no autonomy for the Local Governments to manoeuvre and thereby frustrating the spirits enunciated in the decentralization of authority. For example, the way and manner in which Local Government council members are appointed in Nigeria encroach upon the issue of the autonomy of Local Government and therefore, thwart the principles of a genuine decentralization. Since 1976 however, no election into the Local government has proved spectacular as Local Government Councils are predominantly dissolved and Sole Administrators appointed. To exacerbate the principles of decentralization of authority, the Guidelines provides that members of the Local Government Councils should consist of 75% elected and 25% nominated by the State Government.

On staff matters however, Local Government councils lack control. The Local Government Service Board (LGSB), an agency of the State Government, is vested with the appointment, approval or confirmation of staff. It is also vested with any other matters affecting Local Government staff as regards decipline, promotion, transfer etc. On finances and sources of revenue, Local Government Councils are dependent. Furthermore, the existence of two councils in the Local Government contradicts the tenants

of decentralization and thereby bringing serious limitations to the reform. Hence both the Local Government and the Emirate/Traditional Councils have their own legal identiy with overlapping and contradicting functions.

Further empirical evidence has shown that, as a necessary corollary to decentralization of authority to Local Government, deconcentration and devolution of power and authority have only meant that the common man predominatly feels the existence of government only through the coercive agents in the form of regulative and extractiv e manners. The common man is therefore far alienated from the government while the government far distant from him in directly addressing his basic problems and needs. Consequently, power at the local levels has fallen into the hands of the local oligarchy who are too intolerant with the aspirations of the majority of the people and too eager to accumulate wealth. To portray otherwise is to threaten their own established vested interests. To engage in the promotion and acceleration of socio-economic development is invariably to engage in class suicide. Thus the problems of transforming the 'idiocy of rural life' are exacerbated and consolidated in the usual practices of an under-developed and backward social formation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Abubakar Yaya Alibyu - "Local Government Reforems: An overview" In Local Government reform in Nigeria. Edited by Suleiman Kumo and A.Y. Aliyu. The Report of the Conference on Local Governemnt Reform in Nigeria held at the Institute of Administration, ABU Zaria 14 - 17 May 1979. Published by the Department of Research and Consultancy Institute of Administration , ABU, Zaria, P.3.

2. Ibid, pp 3-4

3. North Central State - Local Government Reforms in North Central State Government Printer, Kaduna, 1971, p.2.

4. Ibid, P.4

5. North Central State - Latest in Local Government Reforems in North Central State Government Printer, Kaduna, 1971, p.2.

6. Abubakar Yaya Aliyu - Op.cit, p.5

7. Federal Government - Guidelines for Local Government Reform Government Printer, Kaduna, 1976, Paragraph 3.

8. Ibid, Paragraph.

9. Ibid, FOREWARD.

10. Ibid, FOREWARD.

11. Ibid, Paragraph 1

12. Ibid, Paragraph 2.

13. Ibid, FOREWARD

14. Ibid, Paragraph 4

15. Ibid, Paragraph 58

16. Ibid, Paragraph 54

17. Kaduna State - Address by the Governor on the occassion of of Local Government Reform, Government Printer, Kaduna, 1976 p.1

18. Ibid, p.1

19. Ibid, p.2

20. Ibid, p.3

21. Bjorn Beckman - Whose State? State and Capitalist Development in Nigeria" Review of African Political Economy No.23, 1982, p.46

22. Eme Ekwekwe, Op.cit. p.109

23. Bjorn Beckman, Op.cit, p.44.

24. Ralph Miliband - Marxism and Politics, Oxford University Press London, 1977, pp.108-9.

25. Eme Ekwekwe, Op.cit, p.109.

26. Federal Government - The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Government Printer, Kaduna 1979, Fourth schedule

27. Federal Government - Guidelines ---- Op.cit, foreward

28. Federal Government - The Constitution ---- Op.cit, section 7.

29. Augustus Aikhomu - Address delivered by the Chief of General Staff, Vice-Admiral Augustus A. Aikhomu at the opening of Orientation conference for newly elected Local Government chairmen, Durbar Hotel, Kaduna, 8th March, 1988, p. 12-13.

30. Federal Government - Guidelines ---- Op.cit. Paragraph 30.

31. Isah Mohammed Abbass - "Local Government and Development: An Assessment of Performance; 1976-83 Zaria Local Government as a Case Study" PGDPA THESIS, Department of Public Adminstration ABU, Zaria, June 1984, p.89.

32. Kaduna State - Kaduna State Local Government Edict, Government Printer, Kaduna, 1976.

33. Ibid,

34. Federal Government - Land Use Decree, Government Printer, Kaduna, 1978, Section 2(5).

35. Ibid, Section 5(1).

36. Ibid, Section 6(1,2 and 4).

37. Kaduna State - Local Government Edict, Op.cit, Section 77(1)K.

38. Shehu Musa - "Federal Government Contributions Towards Evolution of Modern Local Government System in Nigeria. Paper Presented by the Secretary to the Government at the National Conference on the state of the Nation, Zaria December, 12-16, 1983, p.6

39. Ibid,

40. The Analyst (Magazine) Volume 2, No.6, 1987, p.7.

41. Ibid, p.8

42. Shehu Musa, Op.cit

43. These claims were endemic in all Local Governments, among the State and Local Government officials as well as pensioners as discovered during the research.

44. R. Ayo Dunmoye - "Traditional Leadership and Political Hegemony in Nigeria. Past, Present and Future". Department of Political Science, ABU, Zaria (Revised) p.1.

45. Ibid, p.8

46. The Guardian (Newspapers) 4th October, 1989, p.20.

47. Dasuki Report - Views and Comments of the Federal Military Government on the findings and Recommendations of the Committees on the Review of Local Government Administration in Nigeria, Section 7 Paragraph 56, p.24.

48. Kaduna State - Local Government Edict, Op.cit. Section 16(1)

49. Ibid, Sections (2(1) 42 and 81.

50. Dasuki Report - Op.cit, Paragraph 57

51. Ibid, Paragraph 54.

52. The Reports of the 1983 Land Investigation Commission in Kaduna State is a clear testimony where traditional rulers featured prominently.

53. Authur Maas (ed) Area and Power, Glencoe, Illinios, the Free Press 1959, pp.9-10.

54. Jean Clauzel - See "The Decentralization Reform" and "Decentralize Planning in France". These were two seminar papers presented by the author during a seminar organized by the Department of Local Government Studies, ABU, Zaria on 14:11:1984.

55. M.J. Campbell - Law and Practice of Local Government in Nigeria, Africa University Presss, Lagos, 1966, p.29.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.00 STATE - CLASS INTEREST ALLIANCE AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE PROVISION OF SERVICES (SOME CASE STUDIES IN KADUNA STATE)

4.01. The Politics and Limitations of Local Government Reforms

The greatest impediment to the realisation and provision of goods and services to the people by Local Governments has been the involement and consequence of the state-class alliance. The development of under-development was therefore rooted in the class structure of the whole system of production based on the exploitation of labour within the structure. Hence, the use of rhetorics by the political leadership at the federal, state and local levels during and after the reform period in the country has become the cheapest and effective propaganda used to achieve their desires for embourgeoisment.

The provision of services to the people at the Local Government level by the state is one area that has been greatly politicised. This has constituted an organic preoccupation of the leadership as it relates its functions or role within the imperialist chain. Certain questions are raised as regards who actually occupy the position of leadership in the Local Government and who they represent, and the interests they protect. How are these officials appointed? What requirements would they have to fulfil, before and after appointment to remain or maintain their positions, for the effective transformation or transcending of the general principles and directive principles of the state expressed and symbolic policy? What actually is at stake for the political office holders and how would they continue to guarantee both 'local' and state-class accumulation of capital? How do we link and relate the chain of the class interest relationships between those who control the means of production with those controlling the political realm of the state as well

as those appointed to run the affairs of the Local Government?

The execution of the functions or role of the state undermines the activities of the Local Government. The undermining of the role of the Local Government is a logical manifest form of materialist tendencies fuelled by capitalist orientation of the state and economy. This is directly related to the material acquisition of private property and desire for quick wealth. Hence, high offices in the Local Government are filled by individuals who can be relied upon by any new set of leadership in their potencies or capacities to mediate and easily influence or manipulate class interests. These positions are solicited or vouched by the traditional nobility and other vested interest so that those chosen will guarantee the sustenance of the status quo. These are effectively achieved in order to ensure that contracts and other opportunities as regards accumulation remain.

Hence, how has the poor state of the performance of the Local Governments in the provision of services affected the tempo of consciousness of the people? These events were palpably felt as people mobbed and molested certain Local Government officials and some traditional office holders during land investigation panel instituted by the civilian administration of the Second Republic.[1] How is this type of class antagonism mediated or silenced through the usual alliances between the elites and traditional rulers or by the state coercive apparatuses? As conflicts of individual interests are bound to occur, there exists other vested interests reflecting empirically which manifest themselves in class antagonism and class struggle.

As the costs of the provision of essential services are exhorbitant, and the pains of the denial or total lack of such services are vivid, while on the other hand few others have continuously exhibited arrogance of abundance of wealth (in building elegantly high houses, possessing different kinds of the means of transportation, with fantastic or high degree of social condition of living in both health facilities and educational

attainments etc.) social tension is bound to feature constanstly or at least sporadically. The maintenance of such exclusive social privileges of a particular class for its further reproduction has continued to be sanctioned or legitimised by the state.

The reforms on Local Government have only refined and rigidified inequality, poverty, class exploi tation, domination and regimentation. Therefore, such intricate and organic relationships with the state and class interest have militated against the objective of bringing government nearer to the people and vice-versa. This is so because the so-called political representation based on the populist democritization rationalizes the very existence and role of the state in the maintenance of the social order.

Such political calculations are preponderantly employed so as to invoke a reductionist conception of class and the concomitant interests therein. Therefore the resolution of the primary contradictions are cheaply camouflaged under the secondary ones as "interests" are shown to be represented from their political, cultural, ethnic or religious branches of 'representation'. This shows that the issue of class interests and how to protect those interests are seriously manipulated and miscontrued. For example, civil servants and other state officials are frequently employed to run the activities of Local Government, teach the local communities the democratic values in accordance with the dictates and orientation of the state and economy coupled with the necessary periodic distribution of largesse[2].

Whereas the colonial Native Authority of Local Government was traditionally unpopular and undemocratic, the N.A. reconstituted Local Authority of Local Government designed after the formal political independence had not changed the nature and composition of the Local Government. The 1977 Local Government elections that ushered in the Local

Government Councils especially in the Northern part of the country were indirect. Members of the councils were only handpicked as they were initially vouched by 'traditional' rulers and other vested interests within the locality as the 'true representatives' of the community. Thus, as these 'representatives' were nominated, they were presented for the so called elections.

Furthermore, as the elections were indirect, the council members were invariably 'elected' by those who had previously nominated them or their representatives. It is therefore logical that those who occupy offices will only protect the interest of their nominators. However, even in those states that elections were styled 'direct', majority of those declared Chairmen and Councillors were stooges of the state government, traditional nobility and other group interests. Invariably, the compositions of the 1977 Local Government Council and indeed in the subsequent years were seriously undermined by undemocratic principles as they were composed or constituted during the colonial era. This is so because the colonial NA Local Government conouncils had 10% members injected into the local bureaucracies while the 1977 compositions of those nominated into the Local Government councils was 25% with 75% symbolically elected[3]. It should be noted that the 1976 Local Government Reform has not only maintained the status quo but constituted a retrogression to it and consequently reformed nothing.

Even the recent reform activities with elections into the Local Government throughout the country were only limited to the political exigencies of the military regime. It was not therefore surprising when the reconstituted Local Government councils throughout the country were dissolved by the same military junta. The decision to dissolve the councils was instigated by the provisions which give the President the dictatorial powers to terminate the life of the Local Government councils[4]. Hence, the dissolution of the Local Government councils was, inter alia, to "ensure that justice

is done and is seen to be manifestly done to all persons who are lawfully engaged in the political process"[5]. Consequently, because of the present government attempts to hand over power to civilians as contained in the transitional programmes of the government, the dissolutions of the Local Govrnment councils was further justified on the grounds that the former elected council members were not elected on political party platforms and as such, "it will neither be fair, just, nor equitable to prolong their tenure into the period of registration and operation of the two political parties ---"[6]. All these have expressed some forms of limitations of Local Government Reforms and thus its political exacerbations.

4.02 The Funding of the Local Governments

Since the enactment of the Local Government Reform in 1976, provision for the funding of the Local Governments in Nigeria was made or established and funds disbursed. In the initial stage, the Federal Military Government wrote off all the debts incurred by the Local Governments to the State Governments. In 1976/77, the Federal Government made a grant of ₦100 Million to the Local Governments throughout the country. Furthermore, another additional grant of ₦250 million was disbursed to the Local Governments through the State Governments during the 1977/78 budget. This amount only represented 5% of the Federal Government's retained revenue. In addition, the State Governments were expected to contribute 10% of their recurrent revenues. As a whole, Local Governemnts were then expected to share 7% of the nationally public revenue and to receive 10% of the Federal Government's revenue as well[7].

Sequel to all these arrangements, Local Government Fund was established. In April 1979, this fund was officially reconstituted into the State Joint Local Government Account. During the 1979/80 financial year however, the Federal Government allocated and disbursed only 3.4% of its retained revenue to the Local Governments. In April 1979 however, Local Government

pension fund was created and all the three levels of government were obliged or expected to continuously contribute based on the agreed formula.

Furthermore, the State Governments would shoulder the responsibilities for the retiring benefits of the Local Governments which had been incurred prior to the 1979 provision. The State Governments would also meet the administrative cost of the Pension Boards. Between April and December of the 1980 financial year, the Federal Government allocated ₦278 million to Local Governments. This amount only constituted about 3% of the Federal Government's retained revenue. It is therefore important to note that the constributions of both the Federal and State Governments to Local Governments have constituted or accounted between 80% and 95% of the funds officially released and available to the Local Governments.

4.03 Fede ral and State contributions to the State Joint Local Government Account in Kaduna State

In compliance with the stated objectives contained in the Guidelines for Local Government Reform, both the Federal and State Governments were to contribute into the State Joint Local Government Account. In the 1979/80 financial year, for example, the Federal and State Grants to the Kaduna State Local Governments stood at ₦16,749,000.00 and ₦3,000,000.00 respectively while other receipts stood at ₦9,927.32k. This gave the total revenue of ₦19,758,297.32k with the total expenditure of ₦16,037,696.08k leaving a surplus (brought forward to 1980) of ₦2,072,782.82k (See Table 4.1)

In 1980 however, the total revenue stood at ₦29,539,782.84k with the total expenditure of ₦29,522,336.36k leaving a surplus of ₦17,446.48k. As the game of politics continued to gather momentum, more contributions were recorded with less surplus and more deficit or over-payment. For example, in 1981, the total revenue that accrued into the Local Government Accounts in the state stood at ₦84,980,015.87k with the total expenditure of

₦106,449,623.60k which recorded a deficit of ₦21,469,607.73k. In 1982, similar things were recorded. Table 4.1 below shows the whole revenue and expenditure between 1979/80 and 1982. In 1983, for the month of November alone, the sum of ₦5,639,802.43k was allocated or disbursed as contributions from Federal and State Governments to the Kaduna State Joint Local Government Account.

TABLE 4.1

STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE FOR THE PERIOD 1979 TO 1982

	FEDERAL	STATE	OTHER RECEIPTS	TOTAL REVENUE	EXPENDITURE	SURPLUS	DEFICIT
79/80	₦16,749,000.00	₦ 3,000,000.00	₦ 9,927.32	₦19,758,927.32	₦ 17,686,144.50	₦2,072,782.82	-
1980	₦22,037,000.02	₦ 5,400,000.00	₦2,102,782.82	₦29,539,782.84	₦ 29,522,336.36	₦ 17,446.48	-
1981	₦68,821,309.06	₦16,000,000.00	₦ 158,706.18	₦84,980,015.87	₦106,449,623.60	-	₦21,469,607.73
1982	₦69,454,310.32	₦10,349,999.98	₦6,037,091.38	₦85,841,401.68	₦ 85,877,734.84	-	₦ 36,333.16

NB - The break-down of 'Other Receipts' for the following years are as follows:

a) 1979/80 - ₦9,927.32 = (₦1,923.29 interest; ₦8,004.03 refund of 50% commission on Turnover)

b) 1980 - ₦2,102,782.82 = (₦2,072,782.82 - 1979/80 balance B/F and ₦30,000.00 refund of loan)

c) 1981 - ₦158,706.81 = (₦141,260.33 interests, and ₦17,446.48 - 1980 balance B/F

d) 1982 - ₦6,037,091.38 = (₦145,258.48 - interests and ₦397,488.00 rederal contribution to Pension Fund, and ₦15,875.00 refund of expenses, and ₦5,478,478.97 - 1981 balance B/F.

SOURCE: - Department for Local Government, Military Governor's Office, Kaduna, December, 1989.

With regard to pension funds, the Kaduna State contribution to the scheme, with effect from 1989, has been put at a fixed rate - ₦492,607.72 monthly. This represent 5% of the total pension rate payable to the fund. The remaining 10% is set aside to go directly to the payment of Pensioners prior to the 1989 provision. Table 4.2 however shows the amount disbursed to the Kaduna State Pension Scheme by the Federal Government between 1979 and 1983.

TABLE 4.2

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S CONTRIBUTION TO KADUNA STATE PENSION SCHEME FROM 1979 TO 1983

YEAR	AMOUNT ₦
1979	301,207
1980	232,424
1981	384,270
1982	397,488
1983	408,401
TOTAL	1,723,790

SOURCE: - Shehu Musa, "Federal Government's contributions to the evolution of modern Local Government System." A Seminar paper presented for the National Conference on the state of the Nation, Zaria 12-16 December, 1983.

However, grants disbursed or allocated to the various Local Governments in Kaduna State are based on the existing revenue allocation formula. This formula is on 50% population, 40% equlity, 5% revenue derivation and 5% primary school enrolment figures. Between 1979 and 1983, the Federal and State grants to the Local Governments in Kaduna State were expressed in the following table:

TABLE 4.3

FEDERAL AND STATE GRANTS TO KADUNA STATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1979 - 1982

LOCAL GOVT.	1979/80 (₦)	1980 (₦)	1981 (₦)	1982 (₦)	TOTAL (₦)
KADUNA	1,123,313.36	1,943,989.78	8,369,029.84	7,471,198.19	18,907,531.17
B/GWARI	322,578.00	657,526.58	1,454,792.54	1,120,396.64	3,555,293.76
JEMA'A	842,425.38	1,612,378.20	8,159,185.52	5,752,066.34	16,366,065.44
SAMINAKA	827,111.15	1,483,615.42	5,375,797.92	5,516,111.16	13,202,635.65
IKARA	1,139,330.04	2,023,641.39	5,873,837.21	5,037,619.88	15,074,428.88
KACHIA	1,125,589.27	2,009,258.41	9,512,572.88	7,952,194.23	20,599,723.79
ZARIA	1,329,230.29	2,373,041.50	11,449,418.19	10,069,735.99	25,221,425.97
DAURA	956,334.64	1,822,299.92	5,744,886.90	5,388,213.58	13,911,735.02
DUTSIN-MA	1,487,025.05	2,617,802.75	8,015,478.27	4,980,193.98	17,100,500.05
KANKIA	1,397,282.89	2,466,780.65	8,312,027.78	4,930,380.21	17,106,471.53
MANI	1,364,727.12	2,428,152.33	7,706,140.77	5,512,154.42	17,011,174.63
FUNTUA	1,517,607.45	2,639,818.64	8,430,222192	7,158,150.99	19,745,800.00
KATSINA	1,510,449.08	2,796,948.54	9,209,476.78	10,245,361.62	23,762,236.02
MALUMFASHI	1,094,692.38	1,936,409.76	6,683,899.89	4,404,744.42	13,134,546.45
TOTAL	16,037,696.08	28,814,663.87	105,296,876.45	85,537,521.65	

SOURCE - Department for Local Government, Military Governor's Office, Kaduna, December, 1989.

It can be observed from the above Table 4.3 that between 1979 and 1982 over ₦235 million was poured into the Kaduna State Local Governments. Furthermore, between 1984 and 1988, the actual total revenue of all the Local Governments in the state can also be observed from the Table 4.4 below which shows that the finances in the Local Governments increased steadily within those years (1984-88) as they rose to almost ₦470 million.

TABLE 4.4

ACTUAL TOTAL REVENUE OF ALL THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN KADUNA STATE FROM 1984 - 1988 (₦)

YEAR	INTERNAL REVENUE	STATE GRANTS	FEDERAL GRANTS	TOTAL
1984	5,780,840.11	-	66,993,403.59	72,174,243.70
1985	5,865,077.52	2,095,000.00	80,093,456.31	88,053,534.13
1986	7,090,983.70	3,620,967.61	71,112,131.33	81,824,082.64
1987	7,324,226.66	3,135,885.36	112,885,802.58	123,435,914.60
1988	6,168,737.67	3,970,604.89	94,283,453.39	104,422,795.95
TOTAL	32,299,865.66	12,822,457.86	425,368,247.20	649,910,571.02

Source - Department for Local Government, Military Governor's Office, Kaduna, December, 1989.

4.04 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE PROVISION OF EDUCATION

The provision of Western Education by the various tiers of the state started during the colonial era. It was during the Gowon era that the Federal Military Government introduced the Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme. As a social service, the provision of primary education within the scheme took off with responsibility of funding and management as a joint action of the Federal, State and Local Governments largely through the Local Education Authorities (LEAs). But with the enactment of the Guidelines for the 1976 Local Government Reform, the various State Local Government Edicts and the coming into operation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, the provision and management of primary education were unilaterally transferred to the Local Government Councils and local communities by the State Government[8] for further implementation of the scheme. These events have therefore brought about further implications notwithstanding the provisions made in the Guidelines and Constitution. The 1979 Constitution stipulates the functions of the Local Governments and categorises them into two[9]. Hence, the

provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education constitute the participatory functions in which both the state and Local Governments are to participate cuncurrently but not equally. In a situation whereby the Local Government is incapable, the State Government should, under such expediencies execute this function alone.

As regards the provision of primary education, the State Governments were to perform the functions of policy and control of admission, coordination of the activities of the Local Education Authorities and the provision of services for the maintenance and improvement of standards in compliance with the stated rules and regulations. The Local Education Authorities, on the other hand were responsible for the administration, management and quality control of schools. They were however charged with the responsibilities of the siting of new schools, enrolment of pupils, appointment, posting and descipline of teachers as well as the overall management of primary schools within their areas of jurisdiction.

Hence, with the introduction of the UPE scheme, there emerged its concomitant local and national politics reminiscent to population census especially in the enrol ment figures of primary school going children which became a subject of controversy and indeed a matter of guess. However, as a consequence of the 1976 Local Government Reform, especially between 1978 and 1979, the responsibility for the provision of primary education was devolved onto the Local Governments as the functions of the LEAs were transferred to the various Education Departments of Local Governments.

How do we then evaluate the attempts to provide and maintain primary education in the Local Governemnts under study? How have such attempts exposed the Local Governments in their relative incapacity to meet this challenge? In this regard, some basic considerations have to be made and understood with respect to the entrolment patterns and figures, the number of the existing schools, classrooms and other

intrastructures, staffing and instructional position as well as the corresponding patterns of revenue and expenditure as they all affect the provision of the essential infrastructural and instructional materials for conducive and productive teaching and learning to take place.

In all the Local Governments under study, the number of pupils in primary schools outnumbered the capacity of the existing classrooms. With regard to the enrolment patterns, it was expected that new schools and or classrooms would be built while the old one expanded and maintained because of the high expectations of large enrolment figures of pupils from 1976 onwards. But very few schools and/or classrooms were built since 1977, despite the high enrolment rates. As such, most children entrolled for primary education were and have not been adequately catered for. What frequently occured was for the Local Governments to beg individuals to permit them (LGs) to designate and use their car garages and Zauruka (first entrances of the traditional houses) as 'schools' or 'classrooms'. Other pupils were worse off as they were taught under tree shades while others received no teaching whatsoever.

It should be noted that the government declared a scenario when it announced that by 1978, primary education would be made completely free, unversal and compulsory! It is therefore pathetic to observe pupils taking lessons in very difficult and unconducive atmosphere. Hence, this inadequacy of schools and classrooms coupled with high rates of enrolment figures of pupils have forced the Local Governments to introduce shift systems in the primary schools. As such, there are two sets whereby half of the pupils attend classes in the morning while the other half attend in the afternoon with over crowded classrooms notwithstanding. Comparatively, those scheduled to attend classes in the afternoon are relatively worse off than those in the morning.

During the afternoon session, relatively less effective teaching and other activities take place. It is also always characterized by less attendance with frequent late coming on the part of the pupils. However, during the rainy and cold seasons, no effective teaching and attendance take place as most of the classes are without door and window shutters and in some cases without blackboards and the roof blown off by wind. In most cases the classrooms are without the required chairs and desks that pupils are frequently seated on mats or bare floors (if cemented floors still exist).

As these conditions do seriously affect children's health and because of the hopelessness of the situation, many parents withdrew their kids to either privately established schools or simply engage them on their farms and forms of trade while those parents with no children in the schools hesitated to enrol them. Invariably, this has shown the extent to which the state and Local Governments have failed to discharge crucial yearnings of the community in the provision of adequate number of schools/classrooms to confortably accommodate pupils for productive teaching and learning.

In Kaduna Local Government for example, there are (50) fifty primary schools with 1,712 classes, 84,384 pupils and 1,498 or 1,564 teachers. (See Table 4.5) and Appendix 'C' respectively) few schools and classrooms were built since 1976. As almost all schools run a shift system, the teacher-pupil ratio is between 1:60 and 80 in most schools while the overall ratio in the Local Government is 1.54 or 1.57 (See Table 4.5 and Appendix 'C'). Hence, the Local Government would need more than the number of the existing classrooms and more teachers to overcome the shift system. It is necessary to note that not all the children of primary school age were enrolled. In general there is an over-enrolment in schools located in urban Local Government and under-enrolment in rural Local Government Areas.

A cursory look at Table 4.7, on the enrolment figures of pupils since 1976 in Kaduna Local Government, shows or it can be observed that the number of pupils has continued to increase. Even in some situations, the number of female pupils has outnumbered the male pupils throughout the classes almost all the year round. This situation is very unique not only with regard to the number of female pupils as against males but also with regard to teachers as well (see Table 4.5). It can however be observed that there are N.C.E. and other higher certificate holders, it is important to note that they are all out of classroom activity as they are only preoccupied with planning and administration. Even most of those with the celebrated Grade II Pass are headmasters who are most of the time engaged in the school adminstration and payment of salaries. All these features are the same in all Local Governments.

TABLE 4.5

THE NUMBER OF SCHOOLS, CLASSES, PUPILS AND TEACHERS IN SOME LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS IN KADUNA STATE

LOCAL GOVT.	SCHOOLS	CLASSES	PUPILS		TOTAL	TEACHERS		TOTAL
			M.	F.		M.	F	
Kaduna	50	1,712	NA	NA	84,384	640	858	1,498*
Zaria	308	840	70,015	38,370	108,385	1810	1,109	2,919
B/Gwari	63	148	15194+?	6446+?	26,313	NA	NA	NA
Kachia	139	NA	NA		NA	NA	NA	

Source - *Various Education Departments of the Local Governments concerned, March 1990.*

*See a difference of 66 of the number of teachers in Appendix - 'C' where it shows that the number is 1564.

In Zaria Local Government there are 308 primary schools spread all over, 64 in Zaria, 102 in Soba and 142 in Igabi areas (see Appendix 'D').

Additional schools since 1976 were only six in the Local Government, one each in Zaria city, the Kewaye (the Zaria environs), Sabon Gari and Jaji while Giwa had two. Furthermore, the number of classes (840) cannot therefore contain the capacity of the total number of pupils (108,385) while average ratio of the teachers and pupils is 1:38. In the urban areas the ratio is much more than while in the rural/village schools, the ratio is less than 1:38.

In Birnin Gwari Local Government however, the total number of primary schools throughout the area is sixty-three (63) and the total number of pupils is 24,531. The number of the available classrooms throughout the Local Government area is 148 while the total number of existing streams of classrooms is 702 which means that apart from the shift systems in the schools, children are still receiving lesson under certain arrangements (see Appendix 'E' for further elaboration). However, going through the figures in Appendix 'E' it is understood that the number of pupils of the grand total does not correspond with the numbers obtained in each class. For example, the number of female in classes shows that there are only 6,446 while there are 15,194 male pupils.

TABLE 4.6

PUPILS ENROLMENT IN BIRNIN GWARI LOCAL GOVERNMT

CLASS	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
i	3,980	1,545	5,525
ii	3,165	1,478	4,643
iii	2,485	984	3,469
iv	2,005	820	2,825
v	1,858	880	2,738
vi	1,701	739	2,440
TOTAL	15,194	6,446	21,640

Source - Computed from Appendix E - Enrolment and Primary School Statistics 1990, Birnin Gwari LG. March 1990.

We shall now evaluate the instructional facilities in the Local Government. These include teachers, books and other working equipment. The inadequacy that affect the infrastructional facilities also characterized the instructional facilities which further hapers qualitative teaching and learning.

TABLE 4.7

ENROL MENT PATTERNS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL PUPILS IN KADUNA
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1976 TO 1986

	CLASS 1	2	3	4	5	6	TOTAL
1976	M.	1,984	1,582	1,428	1,086	984	849	49,938
	F.	1,056	1,782	1,532	1,196	1,064	1,212	42,252
1977	M.	2,803	2,022	1,914	1,709	1,511	949	38,359
	F.	1,942	2,432	2,011	1,830	1,664	1,214	49,722
1978	M.	3,004	2,502	1,822	1,032	1,022	843	51,946
	F.	3,294	2,804	1,948	1,242	1,133	1,034	31,249
1979	M.	2,540	2,984	2,392	1,940	1,011	794	34,814
	F.	2,464	3,133	3,422	2,130	2,842	931	36,917
1980	M.	4,760	3,930	4,151	2,540	1,491	893	42,252
	F.	5,224	4,224	3,811	3,115	1,930	2,004	28,790
1981	M.	2,540	2,055	1,934	1,809	1,612	1,483	34,324
	F.	2,487	2,148	1,863	1,743	1,664	1,493	36,917
1982	M.	8,050	6,799	6,240	6,109	5,401	4,891	42,252
	F.	8,453	6,693	5,205	5,550	5,339	3,990	28,790
1983	M.	3,647	3,040	2,706	2,390	2,152	494	34,324
	F.	3,585	3,139	2,637	2,516	2,241	843	36,917
1984	M.	4,482	2,555	4,111	5,011	2,411	1,019	42,252
	F.	5,215	4,122	5,205	6,012	3,300	1,840	28,790
1985	M.	6,011	3,940	4,001	3,808	3,011	2,005	34,324
	F.	6,513	4,560	5,330	4,180	4,112	3,154	36,917
1986	M.	8,901	5,950	4,115	3,815	2,241	1,224	42,252
	F.	9,305	7,215	3,096	4,810	3,501	1,750	28,790
TOTAL		49,938	42,252	38,359	49,722	51,946	15,444	34,324
		28,790	34,324	36,917	42,252	19,465		

SOURCE: KADUNA LOCAL GOVERNMENT EDUCATION DEPARTMENT MARCH 1990.

Before the UPE was officially introduced, there was the preparation and establishment or construction of Emergency Teachers' Colleges and other Teacher Training Colleges with a view to training primary school teachers for the scheme. Furthermore, secondary school leavers were massively recruited to attend a few weeks' course and be employed as teachers. Later, secondary school leavers were made to attend 'pivotal courses' in the Teacher Training Colleges. However, primary school leavers and other equivalent or less certificate holders were also admitted to go to the ETCs or TTCs all in preparation and future maintenance of the UPE scheme.

With the initial introduction of the UPE, the quantity of teachers was enough to provide a teacher-pupil ratio of between 1:30 and 40 but the quality of those teachers was far below required standar d. What compounded the problem was the situation whereby the few qualified teachers, who had the Grade II Teachers' certificates left (and are still leaving) the primary school service for further studies in the Advanced Teachers Colleges and other institutions of higher learning. Others aspired and became headmasters, to stop teaching so that they could be directly engaged in handling financial and administrative jobs which tend to be very lucrative in making quick money.

Hence, the untrained or partially trained but unqualified teachers are left in the crowded classrooms while the Local Governments have not done anything positive to further retrain those unqualified teachers. Many, on their own, struggled to obtain the necessary qualifications.

TABLE 4.8

QUALIFICATIONS OF TEACHERS IN SELECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS IN KADUNA STATE

	GRII(P)		GRII(R)		WASC		NCE/DIP.		OTHERS		TOTAL	
	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.
Zaria	387	250	986	636	-	~	39	15	398	208	1,810	1,109
Kaduna	137	218	342	490	01	06	70	82	90	62	640	858
Kachia	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	-	-
B/Gwari	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	-	-

Source: Various Local Government Education Departments March 1990. NA = Not Avaiable.

In the rural areas, the situation is worse in all respects with regard to the siting or building of schools/classrooms, recuiting and retaining of teachers. Teachers resist being posted to rural areas where social (high life) and other amenities are non existence. Many teachers have left the profession for other jobs, for example, immigration, prison services and other clerical jobs in various ministries and parastatals in the state. The conditions of service in our primary schools have completely destroyed the long cherished reputation of teaching profession and teachers. All these problems are traceable to the entire educational policies functioning within the economic system. As such, the introd uction of the UPE scheme without proper and projected forecast, accurate data analysis and adequate provisions coupled with squandamania and private accumulation led to the decline *or collapse of primary education. It is also a fact that no educational* system can be sustained to raise above the quality of the existing teachers, infrastructure and the socio-economic system as a whole.

With the collapse and hopelessness of primary education, the establishment of lucrative and booming private nursery and primary schools especially in the urban Local Government Areas since 1976 became very predominant. In these pri vate schools, most of the relative but essential requirements for conducive teaching and learning are provided as the teacher-pupil ratio is adequate or standard and class-pupil capacity is also adequate. It should be noted that these private schools charge fees per term per child and the least schools charge not less than ₦100.00 per child, per term. It is important to realize that not any parent can afford to send his children to these schools as they are only designed for a particular class in the society. This development is consolidating class division right from the level of nursery education.

In the whole of Kaduna State, the number of primary schools is 1421 while the number of pupils is estimated at 420,960.[10] But only between 1979 and 1980, the state needed additional number of classrooms of 4154[11] to decongest the existing overcrowded classroom situation. As the number of pupils increased there was no corresponding increase in the building of classrooms or primary schools. Not only were the Local Governments faced with the problems of a number of classrooms in areas to build, but the maintenance of the old structures, provision of toilets, furniture, books, chalk, teaching aids etc. were grossly inadequate (or total lack of them), far below imaginative expectations. Situations even did arise when, for example, the supply of primary school exercise books etc. had to be contracted out with high inflated or quoted prices far above their actual market prices. This activity was done with the cooperation of Local Government staff concerned and the contractors.

However, the haphazard nature in which new schools and classrooms were contracted and constructed meant a short life span for them. Pathetically, the cost of rehabilitating them posed serious threats to further construction and maintenance. They were invariably abandoned to collapse, leading to more shortages of classrooms.

On revenue and expenditure patterns of primary education, it is important to realise that initially as a policy, funds were disbursed to the Local Governments based on the enrolment fi gures in the area. In the first place, the Federal Government too k the responsibility of funding primary education. But by 1977, the Federal Government transferred such responsibility to State Governments which was later transferred to Local Governments and then to the local communities. Hence, communities within Local Governments were engaged in building of classrooms and schools for their children (see Appendix 'F'). However, the funds disbursed to the Local Governments were initially based on the projections made on child census obtained between 1974 and 1976.

Recently, especially when the establishment of the primary school Management Boards and Commission by both the State and Federal Governments came into operation, grants and allocations to primary education have steadily resumed but without immediate impact on the situation of primary schools. All that is being done now is the establishment of the administrative paraphernalia. The amount disbursed to Kaduna State primary education to all the Local Governments between January and December 1989 can be seen in Table 4.9. The total amount disbursed in that year alone was over 85 milion Naria.

TABLE 4.9

GRANTS AND ALLOCATIONS TO KADUNA STATE

PRIMARY EDUCATION IN 1989 (₦)

LOCAL GOVT	IKARA	B/GWARI	ZARIA	KADUNA	SAMINAKA	JEMA'A	KACHIA	TOTAL
JANUARY	731,376.59	347,351.21	910,669.97	1,068,722.55	590,318.01	639,253.42	758,208.75	5,045,900.51
FEBRUARY	730,787.35	347,071.35	909,936.28	1,067,861.52	589,842.40	638,738.38	757,597.89	5,041,835.27
MARCH	723,741.17	343,724.93	901,162.76	1,057,565.32	584,155.14	632,579.75	750,293.21	4,993,222.64
APRIL	712,415.77	388,346.16	887,060.98	1,041,016.12	575,014.09	622,680.87	738,552.30	4,915,086.33
MAY	708,003.68	336,250.74	881,569.92	1,034,568.94	751,452.94	618,824.50	733,978.35	4,884,646.44
JUNE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,963,971.52
JULY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,655,564.18
AUGUST	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11,649,459.33
SEPTEMBER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
OCTOBER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,655,564.19
NOVEMBER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,655,564.19
DECEMBER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,9917,434.24
TOTAL								85,018,248.84

SOURCE: DEPARTMENT FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MILITARY GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, KADUNA DECEMBER, 1989.[2]

CHAPTER FIVE

5.00 HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND OTHER STATUTORY FUNCTIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

5.01 The provision of health care services in the Local Governments

The provision of health care services in the Local Governments should start at least theoretically from the general preventive measures. This involves the sanitary and environmental conditions of the locality. It also involves the practical curative and medical care available to the communities in the Local Government Areas. All these have profound consequences on the quality of life as they constitute a vital aspect in the transformations of the socio-economic conditions of the people.

It is necessary to understand the nature of the health system in operation so as to relate this general nature to the functions of Local Governments. The nature of our health systems does not guarantee regulated and established preventive medical treatment. Past government efforts in the provision of health care services since colonial period have been very minimal. After independence, both the civilian and military regimes have not made spectacular or far reaching attempts to address the problem with a view to allocating adequate resources to the critical health needs or requirements of the community. On the contrary, only bourgeoise theoretical pronouncements (like the celebrated gimmick on 'Health for all by the year 2,000) have pre-occupied the minds and attention of the leadership. This was designed with a view to diverting resources for other purposes leaving the entire problem completely unaddressed and unsolved.

In the Local Governments, there are inhibiting factors for the realisation of health care delivery. In the first place, there is no complete policy for universal and free medical care in the country.

Most of the approved financial outlays are spent on administrative matters rather than on drugs, dressings and equipment. As a dependent economy, the country depends on international firms and markets for the supply of drugs, dressings and equipment for the health sector. A sizeable proportion or percentage of drugs and other medical infrastructures are therefore imported. The imported but limited supplies to the health institutions are sporadic in nature and involve huge financial outlays. The final victim is the patient, as the existing health facilities are only limited to a consultancy and prescriptive nature.

The significance of the provision of health care services to the people can not be over-emphasised. Such provisions justify the relevance and existence of any government to the community. However, successful delivery of health services is crucial in changing the quality of living standard of the people. Hence, infrastructures in forms of health centres or facilities, provided by the government are meaningless if the basic and necessary inputs are not available.

With regard to the problems associated with manpower capabilities and capacities in the Local Governments as regards the provision of health care services, it can be observed that the number of trained and qualified medical staff or personnel is far below the required needed to serve the local inhabitants. All these are related in both the quality and quantity to handle the entire medical consultations or presiding over complicated medical problems (see Appendix 'G'). Majority of the staff are junior or auxiliary medical and para-medical personnel. Over 90% of the staff are concentrated in the headquarters or urban areas, with the neglect of rural health centres.

In rural Local Government areas, problems are acute not only in the total lack of facilities, but also personnel and materials. In some of the rural clinics rotational or weekly attendance/consultations are carried out. Medical staff rotate from place to place but this

rotation is only dependent on the availability of the means of transportation which is equally dependent on the availability of materials which are further dependent on the nature of roads especially during the rainy season when they become too impassable.

TABLE 5.1

NUMBER OF HEALTH FACILITIES IN SOME LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

L.G.	Maternity	Dispensary	Clinic	Leprocy	Health Centre
Kaduna	1	6	3	2	-
Zaria	4	4	3	2	-
Kachia	3	3	?	2	-
B/Gwari	1	5	6	1	2

Source: Health Departments of the Local Governments concerned, February/March, 1990

TABLE 5.2

ATTENDANCE FIGURES, NUMBERS OF STAFF IN VARIOUS FACILITIES AND PURCHASE OF DRUGS/EQUIPMENT 1989

L.G.	Health Centre	Marter-nity	Dispen-sary	Clinic	Leprocy	Purchase of Drugs
Kaduna	-	10,102 (24)	13,427 (23)	18,043 (51)	1,090 (11)	₦700,000.00
Zaria	-	65,993 (65)	20,965 (34)	22,532 (9)	160 (4)	₦309,197.90
Kachia	-	- (28)	- (7)	?	- (2)	₦367,107.50
B/Gwari	22,992 (12)	16,343 (14)	17,594 (12)	13,442 (12)	1,038 (-)	₦265,500.00

Source: Health Departments of the various Local Governments mentioned above, February/March, 1990.

Hence, Local Governments cannot achieve their objectives with respect to the provision of basic health services. They cannot also reduce the increasing infant mortality rate, maintain a coordinated and regulated hygienic and anti-epidemic system or preventive innoculation. All these are evident of the yearly and endemic occurances of epidemic diseases which threaten the lives of the people; for example, cholera, typhoid fever, measles etc.

In the Local Governemnts under study, the number of medical inspectors and the amount allocated to health make it impossible to meet the needs of the people. In Kaduna Local Government for example, there are only twelve (12) Local Government health facilities spread all over the Districts. As a whole, there are 109 staff in 1989 (Table 5.1) while the number of patients that attended the health centres was 42,672 (Table 5.2) Thus, there was a 1:392 staff - patient ratio in the Local Government. Zaria, Kachia and Birnin Gwari have thirteen (13), eight (8) and fifteen (15) health facilities respectively (Table 5.1). Attendance figures for Zaria centres were 10,650 while the number of staff was 112 and the amount for the purchase of drugs and equipment was ₦309,197.90k. During the same period, Kachia expended the sum of ₦367,107.50k for the purchase of drugs and equipment while Birnin Gwari expended ₦265.500.20k.

Furthermore, it can be observed from the recurrent estimates and actual expenditures of Kaduna Local Govern Health Department that only ₦10,575,650.70k was expended between 1976 and 1986 for the provision of health facilities as well as the cost of maintaining the administration etc. of the Department. (See Table 5.3). Hence, an average of less than one million naira was expended for the provision of health care services annually for the communities. However, during the same period the Local Government claimed to have built three clinics and purchased vehicles - (Tippers and Ambulance). It is important to note that estimates

made and actual expenditures are largely consumed as personnel emoluments and over-head cost. The same anomaly is experienced in preventive and social welfare units.

TABLE 5.3

RECURRENT AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURES OF KADUNA LOCAL GOVERNMENT HEALTH DEPARTMENT BETWEEN 1976 AND 1986 (₦)

YEAR	RECURRENT ESTIMATE ₦	ACTUAL EXPENDITURE ₦
1976	799,982	785,390.88
1977	794,862	791,035.06
1978	883,636	874,700.89
1979	891,656	887,690.90
1980	892,582	890,232.10
1981	982,806	944,940.80
1982	981,306	959,840.62
1983	995,285	889,982.01
1984	1,031,450	1,003,261.50
1985	1,260,251	1,231,106.05
1986	1,390,872	1,257,469.90
TOTAL	₦10,874,688	₦10,515,650.71

Source: Health Department, Kaduna Local Government - February, 1990

5.02 SOME OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

5.02.1 Finances and Revenues

The conditions of finances and sources of revenues of any organisation are very crucial for its day-to-day activities and Local Governments are not exceptions. In Kaduna Local Government for example, the sum of ₦62,093.00 was collected as internally generated revenues from 1976 to 1986 (See Table 5.4). An average of ₦5,663,190.00k was collected annually. As funds are spent on many projects, our investigations reveal that between 1976 and 1979 the Kaduna Local Government spent over ₦2.8 million supposedly on capital projects but a commission instituted to investigate the activities of the Local Government could not verify the real value or completion of projects because most of the essential documents could not be located.[1]

TABLE 5.4

INTERNAL REVENUE COLLECTED IN KADUNA LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1976 - 1986

YEAR	AMOUNT COLLECTED (₦)
1976	1,046,533
1977	139,508
1978	4,650,075
1979	4,500,053
1980	3,160,071
1981	2,444,807
1982	8,307,575
1983	8,985,872
1984	9,925,189
1985	9,874,263
1986	9,261,150
TOTAL	₦62,295,093

Source: Treasury Department, Kaduna Local Government, March, 1990.

In Zarial LocalGovernment, it can be observed that the internally generated revenue was ₦10,552,050.00k as against statutory allocations of ₦75,131,180.00 from the Federal Government between 1976 and 1988. Internally generated revenues from the Local Government are far below expectations. Table 5.5 shows the pattern of collections of revenues for Zarial Local Government between 1976 and 1986. It can however be observed that the State Government's contribution is not available.

TABLE 5.5

DETAILS OF INTERNAL AND STATUTORY ALLOCATIONS
FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT BETWEEN 1976 & 1988

YEAR	FEDERAL ALLOCATIONS	STATE ALLOCATION	LG INTERNAL REVENUE	TOTAL
1976	1,028,323	-	152,210	1,180,533
1977	2,754,208	-	629,765	3,383,973
1978	1,691,190	-	700,552	2,291,742
1979	5,304,761	-	950,425	6,255,186
1980	5,335,005	-	1,089,255	6,424,260
1981	3,827,111	-	306,488	4,133,599
1982	3,604,558	-	667,022	4,271,580
1983	2,691,763	-	538,653	3,230,416
1984	9,843,272	-	830,668	10,673,030
1985	8,234,005	-	1,469,025	9,703,030
1986	8,169,900	-	1,149,556	9,319,456
1987	12,593,242	-	1,162,965	13,756,207
1988	10,053,842	-	905,466	10,959,308

Source: Treasury Department, Zarial Local Government, February, 1990.

On the recurrent and capital expenditures of Zaria Local Government from 1976 and 1988, the sums of ₦81,482,00k and ₦2,622,675 were spent as recurrent and capital expenditures respectively.

It should be noted that no much capital projects were under-taken as only two million was earmarked between 1976 and 1988.

However, between 1978 and 1983 there was no capital expenditure in the Local Government and indeed the entire Local Governments in the state. Starting from 1984, more funds, relative to the previous years, were received for capital expenditures and have continued to increase. (See Table 5.6). In Kaduna Local Government, ₦1,043,001.20 and ₦1,997,432.37 as capital expenditures in 1986 and 1989 respectively, while recurrent expenditures during the same period were ₦7,530,266.07 and ₦10,213,830.51 respectively.

TABLE 5.6

DETAILS OF RECURRENT AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURES IN ZARIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1976 TO 1988 (₦)

YEAR	RECURRENT	CAPITAL
1976	461,959	218,185
1977	1,698,946	623,860
1978	2,100,541	-
1979	6,108,443	-
1980	6,356,100	-
1981	4,727,847	-
1982	4,107,484	-
1983	3,994,808	-
1984	13,571,457	70,508
1985	9,463,156	74,000
1986	8,976,999	37,533
1987	11,628,363	735,536
1988	8,355,379	177,053

Source: Treasury Department, Zaria Local Government, February, 1990.

On revenues collected from private property, it can be observed that between 1976 and 1987, Zaria and Kaduna Local Government Areas, the most populated and urbanized in the state, collected only ₦503,781.84k and ₦5,045,237.04 respectively (see Table 5.7). Kachia and Birnin Gwari cannot be expected to raise any revenues from this source being the semi-urban or rural Local Government Areas.

But it is interesting to observe that revenues collected from licences, fees, special rates, commercial services etc during the same period reached up to ₦5,223,000.00k for Zaria Local Government and ₦8,469,924.10k for Kaduna Local Government.

It should be emphasised that the revenues from private property are far below expectations especially from these urban centres where a lot of sources of revenues from property ratings exist but are not all being collected or even assessed. These avenues only affect particular class or the community and who in one way or the other influence the direction of the state. But with regard to the revenue collections from other sectors or class in the community and their inherent aggrandisement the Local Government Councils have even designated certain times to embark on 'revenue drive'.

This 'drive for the revenue' by the Local Governments with the assistance of the law enforcement agencies and 'Dogarai' from the traditional nobility is aimed at enhancing effective collections of revenues from licences fees and other related taxes from the people. All these attempts are largely directed at workers, traders, artisans and other related activities or occupations undertaken by the mass of the people. However, the imposition of property tax, has not

been directly aimed at the multi-million naira residential, commercial and industrial buildings, in the urban Local Government Areas, owned by powerful individuals. As the Local Governments do not collect property taxes from mansions, commercial and industrial structures of these individuals, they concentrate more on the shacks or huts of poor and less previleged in the more densely populated areas in the urban and semi urban areas. It is estimated that if tenament rates on building in the metropolis of the urban areas were properly tapped, hundreds of millions of naira would have been realised. But because of the vested interest of the oligarchy, this has not been the case as these properties are not even assessed for the purpose of levying rates (see Table 5.7 below).

TABLE 5.7

REVENUE COLLECTED FROM PRIVATE PROPERTY (₦)

YEAR	ZARIA	KADUNA	KACHIA	BIRNIN GWARI
1976	-	105,151.00	N.A.	N.C
1977	5,008,84	214,848	N.A.	N.C.
1978	444	265,178	N.A.	N.C.
1979	-	443,893	N.A.	N.C.
1980	-	368,167	N.A.	N.C.
1981	14,282	92,707	N.A.	N.C.
1982	30,200	113,138	N.A:	N.C.
1983	36,516	340,677	N.A.	N.C.
1984	66,596	953,765	N.A.	N.C.
1985	169,472	1,167,490	N.A.	N.C.
1986	91,180	980,223	N.A.	N.C.
1987	90,083	-	N.A.	N.C.
TOTAL	₦503,781.84	₦5,045,237.04	-	- -

Source: Various Local Government Treasury Departments
February/March, 1990.

N.A. = Not Available N.C. = No Collection.

However, since 1976 the capital projects undertaken by the Local Governments under study are not spectacular except the construction of the secretariats and few schools and class-rooms (see Appendix 'D'). In Birnin Gwari Local Government, for example, it is claimed by an official of the council that capital projects undertaken included the construction of the new secretariat in 1977 at the cost of ₦200,000.00k, building a veterinary clinic, between 1977 and 1988 at the cost of ₦10,000.00k and the construction of two span culverts and ten open community wells, both at the cost of ₦4,800 and ₦12,000 in 1979 and 1980 respectively. It is important to note that all these projects were located at the Local Government headquarters. It is apparent that no other capital project, contracted under 'open tendering' was undertaken. All these information were obtained through the questionnaire distributed during the research.

According to the Treasury Department, Birnin Gwari Local Government, the actual total revenues collected by the council from 1976 to 1986 was ₦582,176.78k as shown in Table 5.8. It is important to emphasise that all these revenues were collected from licences, fees, special rates, commercial services etc. imposed on the majority of the community. It can be observed that the amount has continued to increase steadily every year. Furthermore, the actual total recurrent expenditure of the Local Government since 1976 was ₦8,400,00k while the total capital expenditures since 1976 was ₦3,233,618.70k

TABLE 5.8

ACTUTAL TOTAL REVENUE COLLECTED BY BIRNIN GWARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT BETWEEN 1976 AND 1986

YEAR	AMOUNT COLLECTED (₦)
1976	18,205.78
1977	30,000.00
1978	35,120.00
1979	35,600.00
1980	40,175.00
1981	48,900.00
1982	50,160.00
1983	50,716.00
1984	58,638.68
1985	71,636.37
1986	138,024.95
TOTAL	582,176.78

Source: Treasury Department, Birnin Gwari Local Government, March, 1990.

5.02.2 Motor Parks and Markets

It is the normal practices of the Local Government to raise or realise revenues from markets and motor parks established and maintained by them. But it is pathetic to observe that the maintenance of these places where revenues are raised does not correspond with the actual tempo and regualarity of collections. In other words, as funds are raised from such places, improvements on them never take place as they are often neglected and invariably people do not benfit from the revenues collected from them.

During the rainy season, for example, most of the markets or motor parks become muddy and slippery as there are inadequate roads and water drainage system for easy passage. It is also clear that the beneficiaries of the revenues generated are no other than the Local Government officials charged with such responsibilities from the bottom to top. Markets become 'gold mines' for those who control

stall allocations which are very much characterized with brazen nepotism and corruption and therefore constitute very lucrative business ventures.

Hence, occurances of renting and sub-leasing of stall with a view to increasing rates are preponderant especially in the urban Local Government markets where fierce competition or struggle to obtain them are more paramount. Favouratism in such activities are possible as stalls in the markets are usually allocated to friends, relatives and other well connected traders of the top Local Government staff because they constitute avenues for self-enrichment aimed at sustaining and promoting vested interests at the expense of the public whom they claim to serve.

5.02.3 Land Allocation

Authority over land allocations has also constituted another 'gold mine' avenue for Local Government staff in alliance with the traditional nobility and other interest groups in the respective areas of Local Government Councils and the Emirate or Traditional Councils. In each District of the Local Government, the Land Allocation and Advisory Committee is composed of permanent and coopted members which also include the District Heads representing the traditional nobility as well as other vested interest groups. Thus, frequent incidences of seized lands from the original owners by powerful figures aided and abated by those inserted to oversee land activities or transactions are evident. Many cases of such incidences have become court cases. In Birnin Gwari Local Government for example, the recent incidence of challenging the Emir of Daura, Mamman Shata and the Emir of Birnin Gwari over the peasant lands is a clear evidence. The land in dispute is said to have been given as a gift by the Emir of Birnin Gwari to his traditional colleague of Daura while the Emir of Daura subsequently gave it out in turn to his praise singer, Alhaji Mamman Shata.

As the Local Governments have been given some relative or transient administrative approval by the state to issue certificates of occupancy (C of O) of land for certain purposes within their area of jurisdication, the State Government has recently but temporarily revoked such administrative arrangements which empowered them to allocate land and issue certificates of occupancy and administer other transactions especially in high density areas. It is therefore necessary to note that notwithstanding such revocation, illicit activities in the Local Governments go on unabated.

The temporary dissolution of the Land Allocation and Advisory Committees in the Local Governemnts by the State Government was necessary in order to cool down tempers as a result of the land allocation cases filed or challenged in the courts by the legal owners with a view to consequently jettison the challenges. The State Government confessed that the administrative arrangements have been grossly abused by the individuals vested with such powers. As the Land Allocation and Advisory Committees were dissolved, new members were appointed or inaugurated by the State Governor.

During the inauguration of the new members, the Governor informed the members that the assignment they were now entrusted with required firmness, tact and care, considering the interest groups in the state. This is necessary because "there are large numbers of people from other states living here, and there are nationals from other countries engaged in economic activites vital to the state and country ..... and overall development provides healthy environment for foreign investments and acce lerated development".[2] (Emphasis added).

It can be recalled that in November, 1979, the Kaduna State Governor, Alhaji Abdulkadir Balarabe Musa established the Land Investigation Commission. The objective was to check the "glaring abuses in the acquisition of land, the allocation of plots and the payment of land compensation"[3] as well as ractify the situation. The Governor, during his inaugural address, stated that the peasant farmers were gradually being turned into landless labourers, and as such, the Land Investigation Commission was to:

1. Investigate and ascertain the validity of all cases of complaints over the acquisition of land by either individuals or corporate groups and make appropriate recommendations.
2. Investigate and ascertain the validity of all cases of complaints over the allocation of urban and rural plot s for both private, commercial and residential purposes and make appropriate recommendations.
3. Investigate all complaints over th e payment of compensation for any land acquired by individuals or corporate groups for public or any other purposes and make appropriate recommendations.
4. Examine the present system of plot allocation in both urban and rural areas with a view to identifying areas where malpractices have occured and recommending appropriate measures.
5. Recommend to the Government an efficient system of land administration in the state. Such systems should be capable of stopping all forms of speculations involving land.[4]

Th e findings of the Commission show that both land acquired by Government or Local Government for various projects and land transfers, allocations, acquisition and seizures by the feudal arm and rich or powerful individuals are interrelated and complementary. That these two arms of the system of land administration or transactions constituted over 95% of the complaints received.[5] Table 5.9 below shows the number of complaints by respondents.

TABLE 5.9

NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS BY RESPONDENTS

RESPONDENTS	NUMBER	%
1. Local Authority	5,889	26.8
2. Traditional Authority	5,383	25.8
3. Local Government/Tradition Authority (Combined)	368	18
4. Government	6,743	32.3
5. Government and Tradional Authority	508	2.4
6. Other individuals	1,046	5.0
7. Other combinations	1,238	5.2

Source: Report of the Kaduna State Land Investigation Commission, 1980, Volume I, General Findings and Recommendations pp. 12-13.

It is also shown in the Report that nearly 70% of the complaints received are over land acquisition for public projects where little or no compensation was offered. However, the type of complaints where land were acquired from the people for various Government or Local Government included Education Institutions and other Social Services, Forestry Reserves, Grazing Land/Reserves, Dams and Small Scale Irrigation Schemes, Road Constructions and Layouts and village Re-groupings. Furthermore, there is the preponderence of private

individual's large scale and insatiable demand for land acquisition or accumulation for agricultural and other purposes especially by the 'kulak' farmers. In all cases the traditional nobility had featured prominently as they connived with the powerful and rich individuals to deprive peasants of their farmlands.

The Report further shows that all complaints with regard to inadequate or total lack of compensation centred around the assessment and payment of compensation (under-assessment or over-assessment of people's properties). Thus, "the Assessors were bribed, to under-assess, by the powerful people and traditional rulers collude with Assessors ..... to include phantom names and names of people with no farmlands and claim compensation which they divide among themselves"[7]. The system of plot allocation in the state is therefore "shrowded in bureaucratic entanglement which only the rich and the powerful and those in one way or the other connected with can be able to penetrate"[8].

As the system of land administration in the state is inefficient and corrupt, it is invariably surrounded by abuses and malpractices leading to deprivation and oppression of the people by the previleged few who increasingly accumulate landed properties at any given opportunity. Futher findings of the Commission showthat:

a) Those whose farmlands are acquired for the making of layouts are invariably not allocated any plot even if it is found that they are desperately and realistically in need.

b) There are many cases of duplication in plot allocation where two or more people are allocated on plot leading to a lot of conflicts and litigations between them.

c) There exist a lot of favouritism in plot allocation to the extent that it will be true to say that allocation of plot is the Sole Preserve of the Power and Wealth.

d) There are many cases where officials in charge of plot allocations use phantom names and in the process acquired several plots in a single layout. These plots they later sell through various shady land dealers to those who can afford. Since they are in-charge of the preparation of the title deeds, it is easy for them to put in the actual name of the purchaser. In this and other ways, officials connected with land allocation amass substantial wealth.

e) Some officials and other people who bribe the allocation officials are allocated many plot s often in a single layout bearing the names of their relatives and children and later on they convert the plots to their own individual use or sell them out.

f) Some people also complained that they paid several sums of money as deposits or are even asked to pay rents for non-existing plots.

g) As far as rural areas are concerned, there are

   (i) Complaints over District and Village Heads or the Mai Unguwa to allocate or rather sell residential and other plots and invariably deposit the money in their own pockets.

   (ii) Complaints over several layout area plots carved out and allocated by the District, Village Heads or the Mai Unguwa as the case may be without the knowledge of the Local Government and without the agreement or full compensation of the land owner himself[9].

Because of the levels of involvement of corrupt and oppressive practices by all those charged with land administration or transactions in alliance with other powerful figures, there is no doubt that the central weakness of the system of land administration in this state is its capacity to be used and maniputlated for the powerful and the rich. To this end, several administrative and official positions are used by those in power to frustrate any effort made in the direction of making the system of land administration serve the fundamental long and short term interests of the people of the state"[10].

5.02.4 Social Welfare

This comprises services and activities like the provision for the control of vermin, establishment and maintenance for the homes for the orphans, destitutes, infirms or the aged etc, the processes of environmental control, prevention of communicable diseases and the whole preventive and environmental health particularly with respect to disposing of refuse. It is pertinent to note that there is no significant attention and allocations placed by the Local Government in these sectorial activities. More importantly however, there is no plan by the Local Governments for the provision of pipe borne water. Even the construction of bore-holes in the rural areas or areas of need is out of the scope of the Local Government agenda and when contracted, they are usually shallow and invariably dry up. Furthermore, road construction and maintenance are also other areas that are neglected. Road maintenance or repairs in the Local Governments are only undertaken when the Governor or Head of State or any other State dignitary is scheduled to visit. However, only the specific routes where the visitor is to follow and be shown are given some temporary face-lifts.

5.02.5 Community Development

With the rapid growth in the decline of services provided by the government, communicty development or self-helf projects and activities are being undertaken by the people in all communities with a view to filling certain gaps left or ignored by the government in the provision of basic and necessary facilities and services.

Hence, communities all over the Local Governments have been engaged in different activities. These activities include building or construction of structures like schools or classrooms, dispensaries, roads, bridges and the like (see Appendix 'F'). The communities in this regard contribute money amongst themselves in order to embark on such projects. Other members of the community contribute either through their labour-power or expertise in a variety of projects. However, both the State and Local Governments contribute funds (when or where available) to these self-help efforts in monetary or technical assistance.

TABLE 5.10

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN ZARIAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT - 1981 TO 1987

YEAR	T.E.C. ₦	STATE CONTR. ₦	L.G. CONTR. ₦	COMM. CONTR. ₦
1981	27,916.83	11,203.73	5,601.87	11,203.73
1982	50,411.00	20,164.40	15,580.20	20,164.40
1983	45,018.00	18,007.20	9,003.60	18,007.20
1984	15,930.00	6,372.00	3,186.00	6,372.00
1985	13,292.00	5,316.00	2,658.00	5,316.00
1986	301,527.65	120,611.26	80,305.53	120,611.26
1987	714,450.00	285,780.00	152,910.00	285,780.00
TOTAL	1,168,545.48	467,454.59	269,910.00	467,454.59

Source: Treasury Department, Zaria Local Government, February, 1990.

T.E.C. = Technical Estimated Cost.

5.02.6 The Role of DFRRI and CDAs

The present regime established the Directorate for Food, Roads, and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI) in February, 1986 with a view to inspiring, promoting and coordinating development efforts and activities at various levels of Government. Fundamentally, the Directorate seeks to bring about the realisation of grassroots development in the rural areas through the formation of the Community Development Associations (CDAs) and other subsidia ry organisations. The CDAs were essentially formed with the objective of raising the levels of social and rural awareness and propelling them towards self-sufficiency. The activities of the DFRRI are divided into three major ways - viz:

i. Organisation and Mobilisation

ii. Food and Agriculture and

iii. Rural Industrilisation[12].

It is envisaged that the CDAs will serve or act as the apex organisation to formulate policy and direct activities in each community, a major point of contact or link with the Government for the realisation of democratic values, processes and practices. They are also conceived as avenues where articulation of communities' desires and aspirations could be channelled so as to respond to the challenges of the overall self-reliant development[13].

Apparently, the objectives of the Directorate are laudable especially when perceived from their projected impact. For example, the programme, if properly executed, will check the present rural-urban drift, housing and transport problems, social and economic hardship, the levels of crimes and the plague of begging in urban areas, as people would be engaged in a variety of activities for their upliftment.

But within the operation of the State and the concomitant class interests therein, the positive realisation of the activities of the Directorate to genuinely benefit rural communities is limited. At present, the operations of the DFRRI are mostly carried out theoretically without empirical impact on both the rural areas and their inhabitants. These have therefore constituted serious drawbacks for the realisations of the set out objectives.

As the reality of the Nigerian situation does not allow the realisation of rural and community development, the programme will go a long way to satisfy the aspirations of the rural communities. As a whole, the programme completely overlooks the class nature of our statified society. It therefore erroneously takes the communities as given without taking into cognisance of the inter-play of forces and interests in emancipating labour from the yoke of capital.

Hence, the fundamental interest of our communities lies in seeking enormous victory over the ownership and control of the means of production. To achieve this victory, it is crucial that resources located in the localities are directly concentrated in the hands and for the benefit of the members of the communities. Furthermore, they should have an overwhelming authority to allocate the available resources and distribute them for their overal welbeing. The existing arrangement provided by the Directorate precludes the realisation of its objectives as it only gives limited political participation, through officially reoganized channels, to the communities especially with regard to elections, leadership and representation.

Invariably the CDAs are only serving as links between the political leadership and communities through the DFRRI to fashion formidable avenues to expand public wealth and open up rural areas and their communities for further exploitation and pauperization. To make any meaningful

attempt at rural and national development and ensure some degree of success, there is a need to overhaul the whole system of production (relations, ownership/control and means of production). It should however be noted that with the establishment and role of the DFRRI in general and the formation of CDAs in particular, the activities of the Local Governments, notwithstanding all arrangements, have become threatened or conflicted as a result of the duplication of their activities.

5.03 The Administration and Personnel of Local Government

Administration is the core of Local Government. This section coordinates all other Departments and thus constitutes the nucleus of Local Government in all its ramifications. Hence, the administration of Local Government covers and affects the entire branches of the Local Government structure, the Emirate/Traditional Council inclusive. For example, the traditional tantacles and hegemony of the Emir of Zaria have been extended to the Sourthern frontiers. Thus, irrespective of ethnic group, religion, culture etc, the principal actors within the traditional nobility, and between them as well as the political leadership, have reconciled or unified their interests within the whole structure of production and reproduction with a view to sustaining the Social Order.

Hence, the frontiers of the metropolitan Zazzau and districts such as Katab, Kajuru, Kaura, Kaje, Kagoro and Morwa had come under the hegemony of the leadership of Sarkin Zazzau.[14] Even the Kaduna Capital Territory, established since 1956, hitherto exempted from the tutelage of the Zaria traditional control and manipulation has recently been returned an d put under the sway or direction of Sarkin Zazzau. All District Heads are to be appointed by and answerable to him. It can be recalled that until 1956, the area referred to

as Kaduna Capital Territory was part of Zazzau Native Authority. It was separated from Zaria N.A. and Emir's jurisdiction and placed under the administrative control of Governor-in-Council through an administrator who had functions and powers similar to the powers of the N.A.[15] Invariably therefore, the involvement of the traditional rulers/institutions in the administration of the Local Government has constituted one of the serious impediments to the evolution, growth and dynamism of the system as a whole.

In all the LOCAL Government Areas no much adequate and sincere primary information could be obtained as there is no documented data. No Local Government has an up-to-date and comprehensive staff list showing details of its staff and schedule of duties. Staff of the Local Government appear as if they work in their private organisations because they go away with whatever data during their period of stay in the office. That is why Local Government can be adequately described as Kara zube (literally means unorganised or scartered stalks). The notority of the administration makes, inter-alia, data or information to miraculously disappear as officers are transferred or any other incidence. It is not therefore suprising to hear an officer saying that such and such information within this period could not be obtainable because he was not there or the information required is too detailed! It is also not unusual to find an officer in the Local Government supplying an information or data off-head without reference to documents which amounts to falsification. Most data from the Local Governments are therefore abandoned in despair.

As such much information or data from Local Government are highly unrealiable even when obtained from their assumed primary source because when or if cross-checked against what had been actually supplied or collected, sharp distinctions could be palpably observed. As data

from Local Government could be seriously incongruent, there is the problem of reliability. But in the absence of any other information, the available data will only serve as a yardstick for measurement, means of analysis and a basis for further research.

More than two-thirds of the Local Government recurrent expenditures are being utilized as administrative over-head costs in forms of personnel emoluments or salaries and allowances. The appointment of Local Government staff is done in two ways. In the first place, the appointment committees of the Local Governments deal with discipline and dismissal of junior and intermediate staff. Secondly, the Local Government Service Board/ Commission is charged with the responsibilities of approval of appointment and control of Senior and Managerial staff.

The procedure and processes of staff recruitment into the Local Government Service involve personal benefits to those officials concerned. These benefits vary but are essentially to acquire and enhance private wealth or property. Particularly engaged in these affairs are Departmental Heads who are involved in sharing of quotas of the existing vacancies in the Local Government in alliance with other officials. They fill up these vacancies, in several instances by people who are desperate and always ready for settlement or offer certain social services (especially female). Included in these activities also is the traditional nobility whose kith and kin are employed in order to be groomed in the politics of Local Government as well as for the future 'traditional' exigencies.

When vacancies exist in the Local Government and the official approval to recruit is received, there is a fierce struggle and conflicts between Department Heads in securing the maximum quota of the vacancies. This is logical in the sense that the more the number of vacancies to 'trade' with, the more the possibilities of enhancing their positions and desires. They use their subordinates in covering up illegal activities

as these subordinates are periodically patronised through the sporadic distribution of illgotten wealth derived from the office.

The main objective of seeking and acquiring a position in the Local Government is to use it as a conduit pipe through which the realisation of the avenues for personal accumulation as well as for acquiring patronised supporters. In the Local Government, Heads of Department and other top ranking officials are clearly distinguished by the ways they create certain behaviour in themselves and certain false beliefs in their subordinates in order to apparently raise above their socio-economic realities. This situation has been transformed in the public psyche into the constant and prepondernat use of position in order to increase personal accumulation of wealth which is not regarded or seen as an illegal or corrupt practice.

Because of the constant use of position or power, persuassion or manipulation and the entire clientele-network within the power structure in the Local Governmentm, it is logical that the traditional nobility is also among the beneficiaries. Hence, the infiltration of the 'traditional' rulers (at least within the role of Emirate Traditional Council) in the activities of the Local Government is very crucial, particularly in the processes of recruitment of not only the junior and intermediate but also the senior members of staff. It is therefore logical to observe that the Local Government Service Board, (LGSB), (the body empowered to approve the appointment of Senior Local Government staff in the State) is predominantly headed by the traditional title holders[16]. The Emirate or Traditional Council plays a vital role in the appointment of Heads of Department for the Local Government Councils and other sectional Heads to the substantive posts. However, some other powerful figures in the Local Government Areas have also penetrated into the Local Government Service Board in determining or influencing

the mode and processes of the recruitment or transfer of staff (especially rich individuals who are engaged in contract or general supply of goods). Consequently, within this power structure in the Local Government, the capacity to enforce any kind of accountability is basically and practically non-existent.

The use of state apparatuses and power in this regard is to serve the primary desires of the positions and interests of the state officials with a view to extracting the maximum amount of benefits or resources. The culture of extraction in the Local Government, like any agency or apparatus of the state are similar. For example, the activities of the Local Government as regards extraction of surplus and personal accumulation are in different varieties depending on the nature or type of activities of each Department. For instance, the constant use of State Machinery or Materials placed at the disposal of the Heads of Department to further their social and economic purposes is preponderant.

Thus, major weaknesses of the Local Governments have appeared to centre around the personnel and the nature of administration as well as other notoriously bureaucratic plat-forms. That there is a general deficiency of sufficient number of trained staff in specific fields to face the challenges at hand. Consequently, these problems make the smooth operation of the Local Government administration not only difficult but impossible. Furthermore, it is necessary to note that the successful execution of the functions of Local Government would also have to be measured in terms of the commitment and sincerity to duty. But more often than not, in the administration of the Local Government, the staff, most especially the senior ones, the councillors inclusive, have always expressed some forms of excesses. They are also known to engage in nefarious activities inimical to the healthy functioning of the Local Government and indulge themselves in organized

and endemic expensive "pastime of avoidable fractions and fratricidal conflicts, all based on gratifications occuring from contract awards"[17] for the purpose of accumulation.

Furthermore, with regard to the expenditure limits of the Department spending and officials, the 1979 approved financial memoranda shows that the limit of spending of Heads of Deparment is ₦5,000.00, Finance and General Purposes Committee ₦50,000.00, the Council ₦100,000.00, Department or Directorate for Local Government (formally the ministry) ₦100,000.00 and above. However, the tender procedure for award of contracts in the Local Government follows the same pattern as. It is often claimed that lack of qualified staff or manpower per se has always inhibited the performance of the functions of Local Government. This claim has no basis as many staff of the Local Government are long serving officers, experienced and now well qualified as they are constantly sent by their various establishments to undergo courses in different fields in different institutions of higher learning. It should be noted that the Federal Government established the Orewa Committee to identify and work out modalities for a comprehensive programme to specially and specifically train Local Government staff in the three designated Universities - Ahmadu Bell University, Zaria, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, and Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. The objective was to ensure and produce high level manpower development for the Local Government with a view to facilitating the provision of services. In these universities, Diploma courses and Masters Degree programmes on Local Government are run since 1979 with special annual grants coming from the Federal Government.

TABLE 5.11

GRANTS TO UNIVERSITIES BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE TRAINING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT STAFF - 1979 - 1983

INSTITUTION	1979 in Million	1980	1981	1982	1983	TOTAL
A.B.U.	₦1m	₦663,759	₦189,433	₦568,848	₦512,042	₦2,934,082
O.A.U.	₦1m	₦553.204	₦157,833	₦456.753	₦426.826	₦2.594.706
U.N.N.	₦1m	₦532.946	₦152,033	₦482,354	₦411,826	₦2,553,558
TOTAL	₦3m	₦1,749,999	₦499,299	₦1,482,354	₦1,350,694	₦8,082,346

Source: Shehu Musa, "Federal Government's Contribution to Evolution of Modern Local Government System" Op.cit.

It can be observed from Table 5.11 above that between 1979 and 1983, the Federal Government disbursed over ₦8 million to the three designated universities for training and retraining of Local Government staff. Thus, A.B.U., O.A.U. and U.N.N. received the sums of ₦2,934,082, ₦2,594,706 and ₦2,553,558 respectively during the same period. These amounts were specifically used for various services in the respective Departments of Local Government Studies which included teaching equipment, research and other academic and administrative activities.

The Federal Government engages in disbursing funds to the designated universities for the training of high level manpower while the State Governments engage in the responsibilities of training of other middle and lower levels of manpower to complement and improve the quality of the activities of the higher level staff. That is why in many Polytechnics and other Staff Development or Staff Training Centres, staff of Local Government are sponsored to attend a variety of courses related to their areas of activities.

Going through the staff lists of some Local Governemnts and the Department for Local Government it was observed that there are long serving as well as newly recruited staff with high levels of educational

attainments from Diploma, Degree and Post-graduate levels in various fields. It should be noted that those receiving training in these universities and other related institutions are administrative and accounting staff. Other categories of staff rarely go for higher studies in their related desciplines as they end up as administrators in their respective Departments because they prefer to go for administrative-cum-accounting courses to prepare themselves for higher administrative posts where higher avenues for private accumulation exist.

FOOTNOTES

1. See The Analyst (Magazine) volume 2 No.6, 1987, p.15.

2. See Governor Abdullahi Sarki Muktar's speech delivered during the inauguration of New Members of Land Allocation and Advisory Committee - 8th February, 1990 or New Nigerian Newspapers of 9th February, 1990.

3. See Governor Abdulkadir Balarabe Musa's inaugural speech to the Members of the Land Investigation Commission, November, 1979 as contained in the Report of the Land Investigation Commission, 1980 Volume VXI - Appendices p.1

4. Ibid. pp. 1-2

5. See the Report of the Land Investigation Commission, 1980 Volume I General Findings and Recommendations, p.13.

6. Ibid. pp. 13-31

7. Ibid. p.34

8. Ibid. p.37

9. Ibid. p.37

10. Ibid. p.10

11. See the message from the Chairman of DFRRI, AVM Larry D. Koinyan (Rtd) on Why You Need To Form Your Community Development Association pp.1-2. See also the Chairman's Broadcast to the Nation on the ocassion of the Declaration of 7 day of February as Rural Development Day in Nigeria, 7 February, 1987, p.3.

12. Ibid. See the Broadcast 7/2/87, pp. 2-8

13. See "Organisation For Rapid Rural And National Development" DFFRI, Office of the President, Lagos 25/5/87, p.4. See also Why You Need To Form Your Community Development Associations, op.cit pp.3-5.

14. J.F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds) History of West Africa Volume One, second Edition, Longman London, 1976. Article by R.A. Adeleye "Housaland and Borno 1600-1800" p.593. See also T.O. Alias, NIGERIA: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, Stevens and Sons, London, 1967, pp 79-80

15. See Local Government Year Books 1963, pp 28-29 and 1968, p.38 Department of Local Government, Institute of Administration, Zaria, Northern Nigeria. Also see the Native Authority Laws, 1954, section 48 and the 1962 Kaduna Capital (Amendment) Law.

16. The recently appointed Chairman of the Local Government Service Board in the state is the Sarkin Fadan Zazzau, Alhaji Ahmadu Fatika. The present incumbent succeeded Dan Iyan Zazzau, late Alhaji Nuhu Bayero. Both of these titles and the bearers are powerful traditional figures in the state.

17. See Vice Admiral Augustus Aikhomu's delivered speech during the Seminar for Local Government in Ibadan, 1989, and Times Internation (Magazine) June/July, 1989, p.16.

CHAPTER SIX

6.00 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

6.01 SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR ARGUMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS

This study has tried to examine the involvement of the Nigerian State and class interests therein which have, over time, inhibited the performance of the Local Governemnts in all its ramifications. These have therefore constituted serious limitations to all reforms on the third tier of government.

(a) The State:

Our major arguements with regard to the theoretical postulations of the evolution and role of the state have shown that the state is not taken as given. On the contrary, it evolves and functions to maintain class interest, exploitation and domination with a view to maintaining the 'dictatorship of the bourgeoisie'. It is also argued that the state is a coercive instrument of the ruling class related to and connected with the ownership and control of the means of production. The means of production exist in private ownership whereby bank capital is transformed into gigantic capitalist monopolies which is further transformed into monopoly capitalim. However, it is proposed that the state does not stand for the general interest of the whole society but to defend and protect the interest of the propertied class.

It has also been shown that most features that are found in the developed capitalist state are also present in the post-colonial state. Some of the distinctive differences between them are that the former functions to maintain economic and social relations so as to safeguard bourgeois accumulation, while the latter, because of the levels of the forces of production, is an instrument for accumulatin for the dominant class through the established institutions or apparatuses.

Here the state is largely dominated by the petty-bourgeoisie who are in turn dominated by the metropolitan bourgeoisie.

(b) The concept of class:

Our major propositions have indicated that the evolution of classes stems from man's intricate relationships with his fellow human beings and the environment in the whole processes of production. All these lead to both economic ownership/control and non-ownership/non-control or possession of and separation from the means of production. Furthermore, classes are conceived as political and cultural agents because politcal struggles are inseparable to the economic and cultural aspects. But our analysis has shown that the concept of class and class struggle are highly elusive and there is an unsatisfied definition.

The state and class are inherently and inextricably tied together. As the existence of the state owes its origins to the division of labour and property ownership within the economy, it is argued that we can not invariably crystallise the concept of class exclusively within definite forms of ownership or possession and non-ownership or separation of the means and relations of production. To crystallise the concept of class would be tantamount to reducing it to a static entity because it would exlude its constituents of class struggle and dialectical matrialism. Hence, the exploited class must have its ecploiter.

It has however been argued that class interests have the predominant and determining factor in formulating policies of the state in order to guarantee and safeguard the continuity of a class stratified society. All these are based on the place they occupy in the political and idiological relations with the state bureaucracies.

(c) The System of Local Government:

The evolution, conception and role of Local Government vary in different social settings with respect to the nature of state power

and role within the economy. However, our study has shown that in all situations, all over the world, Local Governments have been subsumed into the general motion of the state machine to function in accordance with the direction of the state expressed policy and ideology. Hence, as the Local Government emerged organically within the simultaneous emergence of the state and other agencies/apparatuses for the realisation of certain goals or objectives, Local Government is invariably conceptualised and designed to operate as a political agency whereby certain inputs and outputs are realized. It is also conceptualized as a vehicle of development.

Our investigation has further shown that all Local Governments are creations of state statutes and do not have independent existence of their own, no inherent powers and are all responsible to government or state agencies to carry out decisions and orders as prescribed by law. Thus, sources of revenue, function and entire problem are universally and relatively common varying only in degrees. Their 'independent' sources of revenue are few, inelastic and increasingly being encroached upon by the state. Even before the coming of colonialism in Nigeria, (particularly Northern part of the country), there had been long established traditional authority with centralized government, system of taxation, extraction, revenue generation and expenditure, hierarchies of power and authority as well as other state apparatuses like the courts, prisons etc. All these arrangements had provided the basis and necessary conditions for the establishment of the British system of indirect rule.

Hence, the establishment of the colonial rule and the Native Authority system was by force and deception through the signing of dubious treaties. The aim was to incorporate the country within the circuit of the world

capitalist system through the mechanisms of imperialism and colonialism. Thus, by the structure of the colonial political economy, the dominant means of production remained and belong to foreign capital and control. However, it has been shown that right from the beginning of colonial rule, the emirates in the former Northern Nigeria were transformed into the basic units of Local Government administration. 'Traditional' chiefs were used to manipulate the social, economic, political and judicial exigencies of the time as they were subsequently transformed into powerful political organs of the state.

Therefore, contemporary class character in Nigeria is rooted since colonialism in the type and patterns of colonial eductional system which was selective and directed towards creating and dislocating the selected indegines from the main streams of the community and invariably creating differenciations among the people. For example, the contemporary status of emirs and chiefs was progressively transformed since 1930s as the Sole Native Authority and Chief-In-Council in 1954 to the present status of 'fathers' of the people in the Emirate/Traditional Council arrangements.

(d) Nigeria: State, Class and Local Government:

The Nigerian state emerged, exists and operates to serve both the interests of the emerging bourgeoisie and the international capital. The role of the Nigerian state is to establish, maintain, project and expand conditions of capitalist accumulation for the enhancement of both the Nigerian and foreign bourgeoisies. The acquisition and use of political power became/the vehicle through which the expression and realisation of class and private capital accumulation are conducted. Hence, political power at all levels of government is an instrument for the enhancement of economic purposes. the control over the activities of Local Government by the state is in all aspects. The control and accumulation of material benefits or sources open to the Local Government

officials to accumulate have their long historical correspondence and relevance at least since colonial Native Authority.

The Local Government system in Nigeria is characterized by bi-cameralism whereby there exists the Local Government Council and the Emirate/Traditional Council which invariably constitute serious contradictions and limitations to the genuine Local Government system. Hence the realisation and provision of services to the community by the Local Government are inhibited by the involvement of the state - traditional class interest alliance.

The funding of the Local Governments has been consistent and steady and Local Governments should have all the necessary finances at their disposal to run their activities unless the funds are diverted for other purposes. Therefore, it is not the arrangement of funding per-se that has inhibited the activities of the local government but the inherent desire, within the levels and direction of the economy, to accumulate private wealth in place of public provision of services. Invariably, the provision of necessary services and other infrastructures at the Local Government level especially education, health care services etc. have all been reduced to class interest and domination as these have never been spectacular and salutory at least since colonial times. Furthermore, the UPE scheme has only aggravated and exacerbated the seriousness of the problems in the entire primary education system. Revenue collections by the Local Governments have generally been directed on the workers, peasants, artisans and the like while tenement rates and other fees to be collected from the dominant and privileged class have been left completely untouched, as motor parks, markets, land and other related areas have turned out to be the 'gold mining' areas for the Local Governments.

Furthermore, bureaucracy has constituted the primary preoccupation of te Local Governments as lot of expenditure is always incurred in the maintenance of this sector. With its 'progressive' transformation into an 'industry' for 'business' activities, administration is generally seen as synonymous with Local Government.

6.02 CONCLUSION

Based on the above exposition and within the framework of the ruling class activities over the Local Government in Nigeria, it can be seen that so long as the state exists, it plays the primary role with regard to the protection of the interests of the dominant class as well as continue to simultaneously undermine the activities of the Local Government. The peculiar nature of the post-colonial state thwarts any genuine efforts to provide goods and services to the majority of the people because class interests determine and predominate the formulation of policies.

Since Local Government does not exist in a vacuum, its evolution, power and role are simultaneous and concurrent with the nature and direction of the state and economy. Again, the existence of the traditional institutions in our Local Government owes its historical correspondence with the processes of the evolution and establishment of the contemporary Nigerian state when 'traditional' rulers were the initial and main agents for the realisation of colonial rule.

Finally, as the state is central in the process of accumulation, it is logical that to engage in such activities, possession and maintenance of state access to its apparatuses and use of political power is imparative from the local to the highest level of government. Thus social tension and conflicts, class and antagonism and struggle are bound to feature prominently and sporadically as the state officials continue to exhibit arrogance.

Lastly, Since there is no any form of systematic record keeping as well as up dating of documents in the Local Government, it means that a lot of illicit activities go on unnoticed, uncontrolled and as such information on such activities can never be clearly verified.

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APPENDIX 'A'

SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE FORM - 1989

NAME OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT _____

(A) EUCATION DEPARTMENT

1. How many Primary Schools exist in the LG?

2. Names of Schools Yr. Opened No. of Classes No. of Pupils No. of Teachers

	Before 1976	After 1976	Male	Female

3.

Class	1976 M.F.	1977 M.F.	1978 M.F.	1979 M.F.	1980 M.F.	1981 M.F.	1982 M.F.	1983 M.F.	1984 M.F.	1985 M.F.	1986 M.F.	TOTAL M.F.
1.												
2.												
3												
4												
5												
6												
Total												

4. Teachers Qualif.

GRII(P) M.	GRII(P) F.	GRII(R) M.	GRII(R) F.	WASC M.	WASC F.	NCE/Dip. M.	NCE/Dip. F.	OTHERS M.	OTHERS F.	TOTAL M.	TOTAL F.

5. Nursery Schools

Location	Proprie-tor(s)	No.of Pupils	No. of teachers	Fees	Date opened

6. How many Adult Education schools and class rooms exist in the LG?

7. How many vocational Education Centres exist in the LG/

8. Grants and allocations to primary educqtion

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Federal											
State											
LG.											

9. Departmental recurrent Estimate and Actual Expenditures

1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986

10. Personnel emoluments and overhead cost during the period

11. Capital projects undertaken and their costs during the same period

12. Do you hold a shift system in your schools?

13. How many classrooms/schools do you need to build to overcome the shift system?

(B) HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE DEPARTMENT

14. How many of the following facilities exist in the LG?

Name of Facility

Maternity Centres Location Yr. built No. of staff Patients treated

a.

b.

c

Dispensaries

a.

b.

c.

Clinics

a.

b.

c.

Health Centres

a.

b.

c.

Leprosy

a.

b.

15. Health and Social welfare materials and purchase of drugs

	1976 ₦	1977 ₦	1978 ₦	1979 ₦	1980 ₦	1981 ₦	1982 ₦	1983 ₦	1984 ₦	1985 ₦	1986 ₦	TOTAL ₦
Preventive												
Medical												
Curative												
S/Welfare												

16. Departmental recurrent estimate and actual expenditures

1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986

17. Personnel emoluments and overhead cost during the period.

18. Capital projects undertaken and their cost during the same period.

19. Does the Local Government operate:

    a) Home for the Destitutes?
    b) Home for the Orphans?
    c) HOme for the Infirms?
    d) Library Service?

20. List the number and qualifications of the staff of the Department.

21. List down the name, location of private clinics and hospitals established in the LG.

(C) WORKS DEPARTMENT

22. List down the capital projects, location and their cost from 1976 to 1986.

Name of Project	Location	Cost	Year awarded/completed

23. What is the contract system under oeration?

24. What is the composition of the Land Allocation Advisory Committee? What are the actual revenues coming from ground rent on plots allocated since 1976?

25. How many plots were allocated since 1976?

26. Departmental recurrent Estimates and Actual expenditures

1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986

27. How many motor parks exist in the LG?

28. How many markets exist in the LG?

(D) FINANCE AND REVENUE

29. Actual Total Revenues Collected from 1976 to 1986

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Federal											
State											
LG.											

30. Actual Revenue Collected from property ratings

1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986

31. Actual revenues collected from licences, fees, speical rates, commercial services etc. from 1976 to 1986.

32. What are the expenditure limits of departments and officials?

33. What are the tender procedure, expenditure and composition of the tenders' board?

34. List the projects and cost of self-help projects undertaken by the community.

35. Up to date total pension contributions since 1976 from:

    a) Federal -

    b) State -

    c) Local Government -

36. Actual total recurrent expenditures since 1976.

37. Actual total capital expenditures since 1976.

38. Records of Audit Reports conducted.

(E) AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES

39. Departmental recurrent estimates and Actual expenditures

1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986

40. Does the Local Government operate:

    a) Agricultural extension services?

    b) Animal health services?

    c) Vetirinary clinic?

41. Performance of Agriculture and Natural Resources

	1976 ₦	1977 ₦	1978 ₦	1979 ₦	1980 ₦	1981 ₦	1982 ₦	1983 ₦	1984 ₦	1985 ₦	1986 ₦
Input AGRIC:											
Output											
Input FOREST											
Output											
LIVESTOCK											

42. List the number oa qualifications of the staff of the Department.

43. Does the LG engage in training of its staff?

(F) ADMINISTRATION

44. Departmental recurrent estimates and Acutal expenditures

1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	TOTAL
₦	₦	₦	₦	₦	₦	₦	₦	₦	₦	₦	

45. When was the LG Secretariat built? At what cost?

APPENDIX - B
FOURTH SCHEDULE TO THE 1979 CONSTITUTION
FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL

!. The main functions of a local government are as follows:

(a) the consideration and the making of recommendations to a State Commission on economic planning or any similar body on -

(i) the economic development of the State, particularly in so far as the areas of authority of the council and of the state are affected, and

(ii) proposals made by the said commission or body;

(b) Collection of rates, radio and television licences;

(c) Establishment and maintenance of cemeteries, burial grounds and homes for the destitute or infirm;

(d) Licensing of bicycles, trucks (other than mechanically propelled trucks), canoes, wheel barrows and carts;

(e) Establishment, maintenance and regulation of markets, motor parks and public eonveniences;

(f) Construction and maintenance of roads, streets, drains and other public highways, parks, open spaces, or such public facilities as may be prescribed from time to time by the House of Assembly of a State;

(g) Naming of roads and streets and numbering of houses;

(h) Provision and maintenance of public conveniences and refuse disposal;

(i) Registration of all births, deaths and marriages;

(j) Assessment of privately owned houses or tenements for the purpose of levying such rates as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of a State; and

(k) Control and regulation of:-

(i) out-door advertising and hoardings,
(ii) movement and keeping of pets of all description,
(iii) shops and kiosks,
(iv) restaurants and other places for sale of food to the public, and
(v) laundaries.

2. The functions of a local government council shall include participation of such council in the Government of a State as respects the following matters, namely:-

(a) the provision and maintenence of primary education;

(b) the development of agriculture and natural resources, other than the exploitation of minerals;

(c) the provision and maintenance of health services; and

(d) such other functions as may be conferred on a local government council by the House of Assembly of the State.

APPENDIX 'C'

KADUNA LOCAL GOVERNMENT EDUCATION AUTHORITY
NUMBER OF PRIMARY SCHOOLS, CLASSES, PUPILS
AND TEACHERS

NO OF CLASSES BEFORE 1976 - 431 AFTER 1976 - 552

	NAME OF SCHOOL & YEAR OPENED	NO. OF CLASSES	NO. OF PUPILS	NO. OF TEACHERS
1.	Katsina Road	32	2413	30
2.	Maiduguri Road	35	1147	31
3.	Gwari Road	30	987	26
4.	Lagos Street	29	868	28
5.	Muri Road	20	650	19
6.	Magajin Gari	23	859	22
7.	ABS	29	751	27
8.	Constitution Road	18	484	17
9.	Kigo Road	15	236	14
10.	Girls School	17	392	15
11.	Badarawa	56	3255	54
12.	Ung. Shanu	40	2890	40
13.	Demonstration	36	2332	36
14	Kawo	47	1817	43
15.	Hayin Banki	36	1535	36
16.	Malali	30	1358	30
17.	Ung. Gwari	22	703	22
18.	UNg. Kanawa	33	1435	32
19.	Ung. Maichibi I	52	2700	52
20.	Baban Dodo	44	1734	42
21.	Barnawa	44	2334	44
22.	Makera	37	2564	30
23.	Kurmin Gwari	42	2406	40
24.	Aliyu Makama	34	1432	30
25.	Samaru Road	36	2245	30
26.	Kakuri	34	1547	30
27.	Ung. Maichibi II	26	1680	20
28.	Railway Quarters	21	1223	20
29.	Polytechnic Road	54	2684	50
30.	Tudun Wada	62	3020	60
31.	Faki Road	62	2954	58
32.	Chawai Road	46	2964	45
33.	Maimurna Gwarzo	34	874	31
34	Ung.Sanusi	35	1416	26
35.	Kurmin Mashi	30	1182	20
36.	Nuhu Bamali	30	1671	24
37.	Kargi Road	30	1669	25
38.	Mohammed Kabir	29	2708	26
39	Kagoro Road	28	1416	22
40.	Ung. Muazu	39	2535	36
41.	Badiko	18	1025	16
42.	Ung. Rimi	59	3951	58
43.	Ibrahim Taiwo	39	1786	37
44.	Sultan Bello	34	1391	24
45.	Ung. Sarki	30	1475	28
46.	Jaafaru Estate	33	1594	30
47.	Kabala Costain	28	1143	26
48.	Sabon Gari	31	1112	26
49.	Ung. Kudu	30	1295	26
50.	Yusuf Dantsoho	13	542	10

APPENDIX 'D'
ZARIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
NUMBER OF PRIMARY SCHOOLS, CLASSES, PUPILS
AND TEACHERS

ZARIA DISTRICT

S/No.	Name of School	Year Opened	No. of Classes Before 1976	No. of Classes After 1976	No. of Pupil Male	No. of Pupil Female	No. of Teachers
1.	Pada	1952	9	9	519	412	26
2.	Kaura	1960	9	9	802	473	32
3.	B/Dodo	1960	10	10	626	641	30
4.	Kwarbai	1966	9	9	402	376	31
5.	Lemu	1960	10	10	353	294	27
6.	Faid Sonak	1976	2	2	199	132	11
7.	Banzazzau						
8.	Jushi Gari	1976	2	2	384	304	14
9.	Ang Doya	1976	2	2	128	68	6
10.	Magajiya	1970	7	7	270	147	12
11.	Ang Kahu	1945	9	9	368	299	19
12.	Kofan Kona	1976	2	2	90	18	4
13.	Kofan Galadima	1976	2	2	37	29	3
14.	Ang Liman	1976	6	6	407	321	21
15.	Kofan Kuyanbana	1921	15	15	1183	593	44
16.	Rafin Albasa	1974	5	5	663	357	26
17.	Kofa Gayan	1942	9	9	618	330	26
18.	Ang Fatika	1969	7	7	386	158	15
19.	Danmadami	1976	2	2	316	139	7
20.	Kofan Jatau	1975	2	2	309	94	12
21.	Rimin Danza	1976	4	4	347	128	9
22.	Rimin Doko	1976	2	2	284	198	13
23.	Ang Bishar	1975	2	2	110	59	7
24.	Ang Alkali	1976	2	2	175	145	10
25.	Sarkin Rafin	1976	4	4	322	178	15
26.	Rimin Tsiwa	1976	13	13	320	284	17
27.	Kofan Doka	1957	10	10	1182	1151	39
28.	Dakace	1976	2	2	540	200	12
29.	Dambo	1969	6	6	733	502	16
30	Bizara	1976	2	2	194	72	7
31.	Kakayei	1969	5	5	168	72	5
32.	Tudun Kusa	1976	2	2	144	53	1
33.	Bogari	1976	2	2	210	60	3
34.	Wucicciri	1970	2	2	225	45	1
35.	Rubuci	1972	2	2	204	44	1
36,	Aba	1975	-	-	250	60	2
37.	Zakara	1976	2	2	220	40	2
38.	Kako	1975	-	-	205	65	1
39.	Ang Harau	1976	2	2	170	56	2
40.	Yaskwake	1976	2	2	206	54	2
41.	Dutsen Abba	1976	2	2	211	59	3
42.	Pam Madina	1976	2	2	185	80	3
43.	Ang Malamai	1976	2	2	230	40	2
44.	Majeru	1969	4	4	215	50	4
45.	Dallatu						
46.	Ang Mallam Sani						

APPENDIX 'D' CONT.
ZARIA DISTRICT

S/No.	No. of School	Year Opened	No. of Classes Before 1976	No. of Classes After 1976	No. of Pupil Male	No. of Pupil Female	No. of Teachers
47.	Kwaba	1976	-	-	230	40	2
48	Hange	1976	2	2	153	82	2
49	Karfin Mardanni	1976	1	1	147	72	3
50.	Sayen Kutare	1945	1	1	160	76	3
51.	Sayen Tunkara	1976	2	2	139	76	4
52.	Tudun Wada LEA	1938	34	34	1501	1046	42
53	Nurul Huda						
54.	Gyallesu LEA						
55.	Pampo						
56.	Tudun Jukun						
57.	Gaskiya						
58.	Tukur Tukur						
59.	Ang Dankali						
60.	Wusasa						
61.	Kufena						
62.	Gabari	1976	2	2	210	60	2
63.	Tankarau(Nomadic)						
64.	Prov.Arabic Sc.	1946	9	9	450	-	10

APPENDIX 'D'

SABON GARI DISTRICT

S/No.	Name of School	Year Opened	No. of Classes Before 1976	No. of Classes After 1976	No. of Pupil Male	No. of Pupil Female	No. of Teachers
1.	Ja'afaru	1935	30	30	876	907	45
2.	Army Ch. School	1960	37	37	2407	2259	82
3.	Aminu	1948	24	24	1233	1013	51
4.	Dogon Bauchi	1954	19	19	687	637	24
5.	Sabon Gari LEA	1955	17	17	1233	755	38
6.	Muchiya	1954	16	16	843	497	28
7.	Marmara	1945	14	14	715	467	26
8.	G.R.A.	1970	11	11	864	751	30
9.	Tsugugi	1960	9	9	520	314	19
10.	Ung. Fulani	1962	8	8	619	482	24
11.	Mayanka	1953	8	8	554	520	23
12.	Ung. Kanawa	1970	8	8	242	206	10
13.	Dogarawa	1976	2	2	292	102	5
14.	Jushin Waje	1976	2	2	384	144	14
15.	Katanga	1976	2	2	111	34	3
16.	Ranji	1976	2	2	207	54	3
17.	Shika Dam	1976	2	2	141	51	3
18.	Zabi	1976	2	2	244	92	4
19.	Z/Danbarno	1976	2	2	176	35	3
20.	Sakadadi	1967	2	2	218	50	6
21.	Gwanda	1976	2	2	103	35	2
22.	Ung.Sarkin Kogi	1980	-	-	160	93	6
23.	Amina L.E.A.	1960	13	13	1104	1217	37
24.	Saidu L.E.A.	1954	14	14	1321	1154	31
25.	Lemu/Samaru	1976	4	4	1214	946	20
26.	Samaru LEA	1966	10	10	862	881	24
27.	Basawa A.B.	1973	18	18	1270	1074	31
28.	Basawa LEA	1925	9	9	809	367	9
29.	Palladan	1968	6	6	1101	670	20
30	Kallon Kura	1976	4	4	1050	626	16
31.	Kwangila	1976	4	4	769	236	15
32.	Bomo	1970	6	6	771	303	9
33.	Hanwa	1976	4	4	523	326	14
34.	Jama'a	1976	5	5	396	244	12
35.	Mil Goma	1976	6	6	244	147	5
36.	Kurmin Bomo	1976	2	2	398	567	6
37.	Dan Sa'a	1976	-	-	276	209	5
38.	Ang. Rimi	1976	2	2	377	113	5

APPENDIX 'D'
GIWA LOCAL GOVERNMENT EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
NUMBER OF PRIMARY SCHOOLS, CLASSES, PUPILS AND TEACHERS

GIWA DISTRICT

S/No.	Name of School	Year Opened	No. of Classes Before 1976	No. of Classes After 1976	No. of Pupil Male	No. of Pupil Female	No. of Teachers
!.	Giwa LEA	1935	8	8	619	93	16
2.	Gangara	1969	4	4	356	44	6
3.	Gwalbala	1976	2	2	192	19	2
4.	Geloba	1976	2	2	261	29	3
5.	Ang Shehu	1976	2	2	306	21	3
6.	Ang Rimi	1976	2	2	276	22	3
7.	And S/Fulani	1976	-	-	259	26	2
8.	T/Kakangi	1976	2	2	296	28	3
9.	Tsabtawa	1976	2	2	244	19	2
10.	T/Giwa	1976	-	-	228	26	2
11.	M/Yakawada	1974	3	3	355	35	7
12.	Madara	1976	2	2	263	50	2
13.	Ang Dutse	1976	-	-	274	24	2
14.	Muje Dawa	1976	2	2	256	28	3
15.	Kago	1976	2	2	226	19	3
16.	S/Birni	1976	2	2	274	24	3
17.	Rugoji	1976	2	2	268	13	2
18.	D/Felwa	1976	-	-	236	24	2
19.	Dundusu	1975	4	4	228	28	2
20.	Yalwa	1976	2	2	248	19	3
21.	Shika	1946	12	12	808	112	20
22.	Biye	1976	2	2	341	49	5
23.	Guga Sabuwa	1976	2	2	315	33	6
24.	P/Rafin Yashin	1976	2	2	173	27	2
25.	Salanke	1976	-	-	267	33	3
26.	Tsibiri	1976	-	-	267	43	2
27.	Guga Station	1968	3	3	308	37	5
28.	DanmahawayiLEA	1970	10	10	333	47	6
29.	Maje	1976	2	2	263	17	2
30.	Karfe	1976	-	-	261	29	2
31.	Bijimi	1976	-	-	267	38	2
32.	Madobi	1976	2	2	299	21	3
33.	Kuringa	1976	I	I	294	26	4
34.	Danhauya	1976	-	-	227	20	2
35.	Rafin Yashi	1976	2	2	230	30	2
36.	B/Bako	1976	2	2	249	14	3
37.	Tawatsu	1976	-	-	276	30	2
38.	Daitu	1976	-	-	230	30	3
39.	Kundu	1976	2	2	225	18	2
40.	Fatika LEA	1969	7	7	356	107	7
41.	Yakawada	1969	16	16	490	151	10
42.	Kaya	1936	5	5	263	77	9
43.	Iyatawa	1959	5	5	315	57	4
44.	Kikandan	1972	2	2	285	91	4
45.	Gadagan	1975	4	4	233	97	3
46.	Ang Gaga	1976	2	2	285	101	2

GIWA DISTRICT CONT

S/No	Name of School	Year Opened	No. of Classes Before 1976	No. of Classes After 1976	No. of Pupil Male	No. of Pupil Female	No. of Teachers
47.	Ang Galadima	1976	2	2	249	99	3
48.	Ang Kawo	1976	2	2	260	54	2
49.	Ang Pa	1976	-	-	291	98	4
50.	Ang Ilu	1976	-	-	218	49	1
51.	Bare Bari	1976	2	2	211	55	2
52.	Danzango	1976	2	2	232	53	2
53.	Danza	1976	2	2	196	59	3
54.	Wazata	1976	1	1	223	48	2
55.	Kawo Kadage	1976	-	-	268	86	2
56.	Kadage	1976	-	-	168	42	2
57.	Idasu	1976	2	2	372	83	3
58.	Gogi	1976	2	2	278	48	1
59.	Madugu	1976	2	2	241	56	2
60.	PantanK/Karan	1976	2	2	156	20	2
61.	Karau Karan	1970	5	5	263	72	6
62.	Tunburko	1976	2	2	192	41	2
63.	Turunkawa	1976	2	2	244	96	2
64.	Rafin Sarki	1976	2	2	247	51	3
65.	Tsamin Mayan	1976	2	2	198	84	2
66.	Dako	1976	2	2	160	71	2
67.	Bature	1976	-	-	211	55	2
68.	Murai	1976	2	2	270	49	2
69.	Yuna	1976	-	-	240	93	2
70.	Garke	1976	-	-	181	43	4
71.	Tundun Amada	1976	2	2	187	41	2
72.	Galadimawa	1976	2	2	297	85	2
73.	Dokan Waziri	1976	2	2	195	60	2
74,	Garya	1976	1	1	210	63	2

APPENDIX 'D' CONT
IGABI LOCAL GOVERNMENT EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
NUMBER OF PRIMARY SCHOOLS, CLASSES, PUPILS AND TEACHERS

IGABI DISTRICT

S/No.	Name of School	Year Opened	No. of Classes Before 1976	No. of Classes After 1976	No. of Pupil Male	No. of Pupil Female	No. of Teachers
!.	Mashi Gwari (Rigasa LEA)	1976	14	14	1959	871	34
2.	Rigachikun 1	1943	4	8	419	388	22
3.	Joga	1976	-	-	230	82	2
4.	Kurmin Kaduna	1976	3	3	208	129	3
5.	Zaure	1976	2	2	290	65	2
6.	Lukora	1976	-	-	240	68	1
7,	Ruhogi	1976	4	4	255	105	2
8.	B/Yaro Gari	1976	2	2	252	95	6
9.	B/Yaro Tasha	1970	6	6	380	142	5
10.	Kargo	1976	2	2	238	72	4
11.	Wusono	1976	2	2	233	93	2
12.	Tami	1976	2	2	186	71	1
13.	Jura	1976	-	-	256	84	2
14.	Sabon B/Daji	1953	6	6	301	108	2
15.	Sabon Afaka	1976	8	8	584	425	15
16.	Ifira	1976	3	3	188	52	2
17.	Nubu	1976	-	-	170	55	1
18.	Ang Dankande	1976	2	2	171	71	3
19.	M/Jos	1975	5	5	230	135	8
20	Kangimi	1976	-	-	242	77	1
21.	Bango	1976	4	4	185	77	1
22.	Rigachikun 11	1976	2	2	404	285	9
23.	Kaban	1976	-	-	238	90	4
24.	Maje	1976	2	2	346	148	2
25.	T/Wada Rigachikun	1976	4	4	255	200	10
26.	Girku	1976	2	2	306	135	3
27.	Gwaraji	1976	2	2	165	102	2
28.	Wusar	1976	2	2	252	107	2
29.	Kashirau	1976	-	-	236	107	1
30..	Kudandan	1976	5	5	137	116	6
31	Kote	1976	-	-	245	90	1
32.	Panshanu	1976	2	2	164	37	1
33.	Jaji LEA	1974	14	14	343	273	11
34.	Audi	1976	-	-	227	105	2
35.	Ribako	1976	2	2	182	89	1
36.	Turunkun Tsohuwa	1976	2	2	216	114	1
37.	Farakwai	1970	13	13	366	171	7
38.	Kwaranza	1976	2	2	158	67	3
39.	Mangi	1976	2	2	187	126	4
40.	Kafanin Zango	1976	-	-	167	95	4
41.	Dunki	1976	2	2	192	89	2
42.	S/Birnin Bosa	1976	2	2	104	81	3
43.	Bina	1976	2	2	163	73	1
44.	Marachi	1976	2	2	185	69	1
45.	Gwada	1976	2	2	227	105	2

IGABI DISTRICT CONT.

S/No.	Name of School	Year Opened	No. of Classes Before 1976	No. of Classes After 1976	No. of Pupil Male	No. of Pupil Female	No. of Teachers
46.	Ashehu 1	1970	2	2	249	98	1
47.	Turunku Sabuwa	1976	2	2	227	57	4
48.	Umar	1976	2	2	210	47	3
49.	Sabon Yalwa	1976	2	2	196	54	3
50.	Dumbi Dutse	1976	4	4	251	57	6
51.	Gargai	1976	7	7	178	65	1
52.	Farda	1976	2	2	236	95	2
53.	Labar	1976	2	2	240	94	1
54.	Ashehu 11	1976	2	2	187	107	1
55.	Rikoka	1976	2	2	187	83	1
56.	Dutsen Mai	1976	2	2	212	60	3
57.	Kofato	1976	2	2	142	75	4
58.	Gadan Gayan	1974	4	4	246	128	5
59.	Fan Turawa	1976	2	2	215	118	2
60.	Zangon Aya	1948	6	6	418	125	9
61	Amana	1976	2	2	296	96	3
62.	Igabi	1954	7	7	222	55	4
63.	Kerawa	1976	-	-	202	39	3
64.	Afaka	1954	6	6	166	43	2
65.	Bunu	1976	-	-	168	80	2

APPENDIX 'D' CONT.

SOBA DISTRICT

48.	Alhazawa	1976	2	2	77	70	3
49.	Marwa	1976	2	2	132	65	3
50.	Tamba	1976	-	-	158	88	2
51.	Ang. Tofa	1976	-	-	140	76	3
52	Wadaza	1976	2	2	125	72	1
53.	Karofin Magada	1976	2	2	146	59	3
54.	Fagachi	1976	2	2	158	89	3
55.	Bagaldi	1976	1	1	224	74	2
56.	Madaba	1976	2	2	150	83	2
57.	Mabirni Gimba	1976	2	2	167	87	3
58.	Magada LEA	1976	2	2	149	68	2
59.	Taba Sambirni	1976	2	2	129	71	2
60.	Ang. Alewa	1976	2	2	156	60	2
61.	Danjaba	1976	2	2	119	71	2
62.	Suddu	1976	1	1	118	78	3
63.	Sambirni	1976	-	-	169	83	2

APPENDIX 'E'

L.E.A. BIRNIN GWARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENROLMENT
AND PRIMARY SCHOOL STATISTICS, 1990

S/NO	NAMES OF SCHOOL	PUPILS ENROLMENT																	GRAND TOTAL	CLASSROOMS	
		CLASS I			CLASS II			CLASS III			CLASS IV			CLASS V			CLASS VI				NO OF STREAMS	NO OF CLASS AVAILABLE
		M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T			
1.	Central	140	66	206	93	67	160	99	82	181	95	98	193	99	90	188	97	80	177	1106	32	11
2.	S/Yaki	80	45	125	30	50	80	95	44	139	80	52	132	95	50	145	85	57	142	763	22	8
3.	Bagoma	104	35	139	94	24	118	36	12	48	48	07	55	35	15	50	44	04	48	458	13	4
4.	Ung/Shiitu	46	23	69	60	52	112	24	17	41	09	16	25	16	13	29	12	12	24	300	9	4
5.	Mando	75	52	127	50	46	96	34	08	42	21	15	36	18	16	34	27	13	40	375	11	2
6.	Ung/Liman	62	31	93	90	55	145	118	10	128	32	09	41	27	14	41	22	18	40	488	14	2
7.	Doka	55	25	80	90	28	118	23	09	32	15	21	36	30	10	40	25	02	27	333	10	4
8.	Gayam	96	42	138	81	39	120	21	11	32.	25	08	33	32	12	44	29	06	35	402	11	5
9.	Bugai	58	33	91	51	29	80	33	11	44	39	11	50	28	16	44	28	20	48	357	10	2
10.	Ung/Fari	40	15	55	30	10	40	36	10	46	33	18	41	30	09	39	-	-	-	221	6	2
11.	Magajiya	45	22	67	31	19	50	58	40	98	58	32	90	71	27	98	37	13	50	453	13	-
12.	Kwaga	55	08	63	40	03	43	40	03	43	30	03	33	30	06	36	30	02	32	250	7	2
13.	Kirazo	63	23	86	55	25	80	26	14	40	24	16	40	25	15	40	28	12	40	326	9	2
14.	Labi	45	11	56	36	10	46	32	08	40	30	11	41	30	08	38	36	06	42	263	8	2
15.	Gwaska	58	35	93	45	35	80	30	12	42	26	04	30	29	04	33	34	10	44	322	9	2
16.	Rumana	59	09	68	42	08	50	40	05	45	32	03	35	21	19	40	20	10	40	378	8	2
17.	Old B/Gw.	42	11	53	32	08	40	28	11	39	33	08	41	19	14	33	20	13	32	239	7	-
18	G/Dutse	35	16	51	22	18	40	30	15	45	25	12	37	32	10	42	19	12	31	246	7	-
19.	F/Ruwa	47	12	59	37	11	48	38	12	50	37	08	45	44	04	48	-	-	-	250	7	-
20.	D/Hawa	49	13	62	35	15	50	20	10	30	25	15	40	18	12	30	18	12	30	242	7	-
21.	Kagi	73	22	95	60	20	80	24	01	25	23	03	26	20	04	24	18	05	23	273	8	2
22.	Adabo	57	42	99	37	53	90	62	37	99	28	22	50	41	09	50	37	13	50	438	13	-
23.	K/Gayam	46	21	67	31	17	48	30	10	40	45	01	46	21	13	34	34	-	34	269	8	2
24.	Saulawa	122	45	167	85	49	134	80	40	120	50	30	80	28	22	50	25	20	45	596	17	2
25.	Randagi	99	52	151	78	42	120	49	26	75	56	24	80	47	43	90	30	15	45	561	16	5
26.	Kakangi	85	38	123	52	28	80	28	22	50	28	24	52	20	29	49	29	29	58	412	12	6
27.	Kungi	88	35	123	60	20	80	20	12	32	17	13	30	27	10	37	27	10	37	339	10	2
28.	U/Bagudu	55	15	70	33	07	40	14	13	27	15	16	31	18	13	31	28	12	40	239	07	2
29.	U/Zakara	59	42	101	49	31	80	32	08	40	15	09	24	07	19	26	05	15	20	291	8	2

APPENDIX 'E'

L.E.A. BIRNIN GWARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENROLMENT AND PRIMARY SCHOOL STATISTICS, 1990

S/NO.	NAMES OF SCHOOL	PUPILS ENROLMENT																	GRAND TOTAL	CLASSROOMS	
		CLASS I			CLASS II			CLASS III			CLASS IV			CLASS V			CLASS VI				NO OF STREAMS	NO OF CLASS AVAILABLE
		M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T			
30.	S/Layi	75	28	103	52	08	60	32	09	41	42	10	52	35	15	50	40	12	52	358	10	1
31	K/Gaiya	36	25	61	22	18	40	20	15	35	22	15	35	15	18	33	26	09	35	241	9	2
32.	Ijinga	55	41	96	47	33	80	52	34	86	61	19	80	63	12	75	60	24	84	501	14	1
33.	U/Buba	45	22	67	37	19	56	40	23	63	52	23	75	35	18	53	19	14	33	347	10	2
34.	Kimbi	39	21	60	25	15	40	37	15	52	30	20	50	20	10	30	33	17	50	282	8	2
35.	Shirya	49	13	62	33	07	40	33	08	41	25	15	40	26	17	43	24	16	40	266	8	1
36.	D/Bassa	138	42	180	100	20	120	15	06	21	09	15	24	18	04	22	12	07	19	386	11	6
37.	U/Baduku	27	20	47	19	22	41	22	21	43	15	05	20	04	14	18	-	-	-	169	5	1
38.	Kuki	55	37	92	40	40	80	28	27	55	16	17	33	18	17	35	16	17	33	328	9	2
39.	Cikwarba	42	11	53	30	10	40	21	19	40	28	12	40	24	16	40	35	05	40	253	7	-
40	Nasarawa	35	16	51	25	15	40	75	25	100	68	32	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	291	8	-
41	Kuyello	125	41	166	90	30	120	80	30	110	39	06	45	36	14	50	47	03	50	541	15	6
42.	O/Kuyallo	31	17	48	25	15	40	76	16	92	25	05	30	66	11	77	43	10	53	340	10	2
43.	Dandungu	42	10	52	32	08	40	22	11	33	28	04	32	34	03	37	34	04	38	232	7	-
44.	Kwasakwasa	47	09	56	35	05	40	39	08	47	33	07	40	18	07	25	30	13	43	251	7	2
45.	Shado	42	12	54	30	10	40	50	22	72	46	17	63	39	15	54	29	10	39	322	9	-
46.	Dunya	51	12	63	40	10	50	20	13	33	28	05	33	23	10	33	23	19	42	254	7	2
47.	Tabani	33	13	46	28	12	40	57	10	67	32	05	37	33	04	37	32	03	35	262	7	4
48.	D/Ruwa	41	07	48	35	05	40	40	09	49	13	17	30	26	04	30	30	05	35	464	13	2
49.	L/Lassan	45	05	50	37	03	40	35	08	43	36	04	40	32	08	40	27	09	36	498	14	2
50.	M/Yarruwa	43	25	68	39	21	60	41	04	45	31	00	31	25	06	31	24	06	30	530	15	2
51.	Kwalakwanga	44	14	58	30	10	40	20	10	30	25	10	35	26	15	41	19	11	30	468	13	2
52.	R/Sarki	41	10	51	31	09	40	40	09	49	36	04	40	28	02	30	32	11	43	506	14	-
53.	Ingade	37	05	42	37	03	40	35	08	43	36	04	40	36	08	44	27	05	32	482	14	1
54.	D/Dawa	95	51	146	70	50	120	77	23	100	33	17	50	73	22	95	64	31	95	1212	12	6
55.	U/Danko	43	15	58	32	24	56	31	17	48	37	10	47	40	11	51	88	10	48	616	18	2
56.	Kutemeshi	52	10	62	35	05	40	30	08	38	20	09	29	20	10	30	31	13	43	485	14	4
57.	U/Gajere	61	33	94	55	25	80	37	23	60	45	05	50	39	01	40	22	28	50	748	21	2
58.	Kazage	125	31	156	100	20	120	120	20	140	100	09	109	48	14	62	30	06	36	1246	7	2

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APPENDIX 'E'

L.E.A. BIRNIN GWARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENROLMENT
AND PRIMARY SCHOOL STATISTICS, 1990

S/NO.	NAMES OF SCHOOL	PUPILS ENROLMENT																	GRAND TOTAL	CLASSROOMS NO OF STREAMS	CLASSROOMS NO OF CLASS AVAILABLE
		CLASS I			CLASS II			CLASS II.			CLASS IV			CLASS V			CLASS VI					
		M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T			
59.	Damari	81	25	106	70	25	95	60	20	80	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	562	16	2
60.	T/Jega	85	42	127	132	68	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	654	19	2
61.	F/Badadi	66	25	91	64	43	107	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	396	11	2
62.	O/Tabanni	65	21	86	90	30	120	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	412	12	2
63.	Maganda	51	19	70	69	21	90	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	320	9	2

APPENDIX 'F'

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN ZARIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT - 1981 - 1987

1981 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

	PROJECTS	LOCATION	T.E.C.	STATE GOVTS CONTR	L/GOVT CONTR.	COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTION
1.	Bridge	S/Gari	6570.00	2628.00	1314.00	2628.00
2.	Bridge	Jama'a	6570.00	2628.00	1314.00	2628.00
3.	1No. Culvert	D/Darawa	1121.00	484.00	242.37	484.00
4.	1No. Culvert	Hanwa	1077.00	401.00	203.50	407.00
5.	1No.Culvert	Amaru	1017.00	407.00	203.00	407.00
6.	1No.Culvert	Zura	1017.00	407.00	203.00	407.00
7.	2No.Culverts	Kufena	2034.00	814.00	407.00	814.00
8.	R/Improvement	B/Dodo	2000.00	800.00	400.00	800.00
9.	Bridge	S/Gari	6570.00	2628.00	1314.00	2628.00
			27916.83	11203.73	5601.87	11203.73

1982 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

!.	Bridge	T/Kur	7990.00	3196.00	1598.00	3196.00
2.	3No.Culverts	Panladan	3051.00	1220.40	6102.00	1220.00
3.	Bridge	Guga	11480.00	4592.00	2299.20	4592.00
4.	Bridge	H/Dangoma	1480.00	4592.00	2299.20	4592.00
5.	Incinerator	GTSS Soba	630.00	252.00	126.00	252.00
6.	Pit Latrine	Mujedawa	2000.00	800.00	400.00	800.00
7.	R/Imrovement	Kufena	2000.00	800.00	400.00	800.00
8.	Bridge	Gyellesu	9780.00	3912.00	1956.00	3912.00
9.	2No.Culverts	Wusasa	2820.00	800.00	400.00	800.00
			50411.00	20164.40	15580.20	20160.40

1983

1.	Adult Educ.	Ang. Lalle	12496.00	4998.40	2499.20	4998.40
2.	Dispensary	Afaka	12496.00	4998.40	2499.20	4998.40
3.	Dispensary	Maigana	12496.00	4998.40	2499.20	4998.40
4.	Bridge	Gyellesu	5530.00	2212.00	1106.00	2212.00
5.	Bridge	Giwa	2000.00	800.00	400.00	800.00
			45018.00	18007,20	9003.60	18007.20

1984

1.	Slaughter slab	Maigana	2000.00	800.00	400.00	800.00
2.	Bridge Exp.	BCGA S/G	400.00	140.00	80.00	160.00
3.	2No.Culverts	Giwa	2000.00	800.00	400.00	800.00
4.	Bridge	Basawa	5530.00	2212.00	1106.00	2212.00
5.	4No.Culverts	Samaru	4000.00	1600.00	800.00	1600.00
6.	2No.Culverts	Gyllesu	2000.00	800.00	400.00	800.00
			159300.00	6372.00	3186.00	6372.00

1985 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

1.	Bridge	T/Tukur	5530.00	2212.00	1106.00	2212.00
2.	R/Improvement	BCGA S/Gari	4500.00	1800.00	900.00	1800.00
3.	Dispensary	Matari	3262.00	1304.00	652.00	1304.00
			13292.00	5316.00	2658.00	5316.00

1986

1.	Dispensary	T/Lafiya	22085.00	8834.00	4417.00	8834.00
2.	"	Dunya	22085.00	8834.00	4417.00	8834.00
3.	"	Wazata	22085.00	8834.00	4417.00	8834.00
4.	"	D/Mahawayi	22085.00	8834.00	4417.00	8834.00
5.	"	Turunku	22085.00	8834.00	4417.00	8834.00
6.	"	Kwaro	22085.00	8834.00	4417.00	8834.00
7.	"	Zabi	22085.00	8834.00	4417.00	8834.00
8.	"	Panladan	22085.00	8834.00	4417.00	8834.00
9.	"	K/Dutse	22085.00	8834.00	4417.00	8834.00
10.	"	Dorayi	22085.00	8834.00	4417.00	8834.00
11.	Bridge	Aba	14320.00	5728.00	2864.00	5738.00
12.	"	Kuringa	9894.00	3957.80	1978.90	3527.60
13.	"	Kinkiba	13319.00	5327.60	2663.80	10053.60
14.	"	Igabi	25134.00	10053.60	5026.80	10053.60
15.	"	Kankangi	9215.75	3686.30	1843.15	3686.30
16.	"	Gwanda	8794.90	3517.96	1758.48	3517.96
			301527.65	120611.26	80305.53	120611.26

1987

1.	2No.P.S.Class	Zaria City	7000.00	28000.00	14000.00	28000.00
2.	1No.Matern.	Z/City	95500.00	38200.00	38200.00	38200.00
3.	1No.Dam	Pamadina	60500.00	24200.00	12120.00	24200.00
4.	1No.Bridge	Shika Dam	23000.00	9200.00	4600.00	9200.00
5.	1No.Bridge	Muchiya	18100.00	7240.00	3620.00	7240.00
6.	1No.Bridge	Yelwa	18100.00	7240.00	3620.00	7240.00
7.	2No.Bridges	Richifa	36150.00	14460.00	7230.00	14460.00
8.	1No.Bridge	Igabi	18100.00	7240.00	3620.00	7240.00
9.	6No.Pr.S.Cl.	Rigasa	22500.00	900000.00	45000.00	90000.00
10.	4No.Pr.S.Cl.	Afaka	15000.00	60000.00	30000.00	60000.00
			714450.00	285780.00	152910.00	285780.00

APPENDIX 'G'

EXISTING HEALTH FACILITIES IN SOME LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREARS OF KADUNA STATE

A -KADUNA LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Maternity Centres	Location	Year built	No. of staff	No. of patient attended
Kawo Marwenity	Kawo	1962	24	!0,102
Dispensaries				
Unguwar Shanu	Ung. Shanu	1970	15	6,223
Kawo Dispensary	Kawo	1962	8	7,204
Clinics				
Sabon Gari Clinic	Daura Rd.	1960	14	7,536
Leprosy				
Kawo Lep. Clinic	Kawo	1980	5	556
T/Wada Lep. "	T/Wada	1978	6	534

B -ZARIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Maternity Centres	Location	Year Built	No. of staff	No. of patients attended
Babban Dodo	Babban Dodo	1988	29	40,444
T/Wada	Layin Sarki	1945	17	10,519
Magajiya	Magajiya	1988	12	13,200
Tukur-Tukur	Tukur-Tukur	1988	7	1,830
Dispensaries				
City Dispensary	Durumi	1930	25	11,244
Kwarbai "	Kwarbai	1976	5	1,698
Dambo "	Dambo	1976	2	5,228
Kakeyi "	Kakeyi	1981	2	2,795
Clinics				
Dorayi Clinic	Dorayi	1988	3	?
K/Dutse	K/Dutse	1988	3	8,121
Wuci-ciri	Wuci-ciri	1981	3	6,290
Leprosy				
Leprosy Centre	Saye	?	?	?
Leprocy Clinic	Salmonduna	1938	4	160

C - BIRNIN-GWARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT

M.C.H. B/Gwari	B/Gwari	1947	14	16,343
Dispensaries				
K/Doka Dispensary	K/Doka	1975	2	2,956
Kuyeko "	Kuyeko	1972	4	6,112
Tabanni "	Tabanni	1975	2	2,912
Kazage "	Kazage	1977	2	1,128
Sabon Layi "	S/Layi	1989	2	4,486

C - BIRNIN-GWARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONT.

Maternity Centres	Location	Year Built	No. of staff	No. of patients attended
Clinics				
Gwaska Clinic	Gwaska	1985	2	4,822
Kakangi "	Kakangi	1975	4	3,442
Kuki "	Kuki	1988	2	1,768
D/Dawa "	D/Bassa	1978	2	2,806
Kutemeshi "	Kutemashi	?	?	?
Gayam "	Gayam	1985	2	604
Health Centres				
D/Dawa P.H.C.	D/Dawa	1970	6	16,796
Randagi "	Randagi	1972	6	6,196
Leprosy				
B/Gwari Lep.Centre	B/Gwari	1947	?	1,038

D - KACHIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Family Health Unit	Kachia Town	1970	22	?
M.C.H. Clinic	Kagorko	1976	3	?
M.C.H. Yorbung	Yorbung	1989	3	?
Dispensaries				
Kachia	Kachia	1970	3	?
Kagorko	Kagorko	1976	2	?
Walijo	Walijo	1986	2	?
Leprosy				
Kachia	Kachia Town	1968	1	?
Ariko	Ariko	1976	1	?

APPENDIX 'H'

STAFF LIST OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES
DEPARTMENT BIRNIN GWARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT

AGRIC. SECTION

RANK	QUALIFICATION	DATE OF 1ST APPOINTMENT	DATE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT	GRADE LEVEL
H. O. D.	ND(Animal Husbandary)	15/11/1980	1/11/1988	08
Agric. A	J.A.M.B.	1/9/1989	1/9/1989	05
Clerk/T	STC/Cert.	1/7/1988	1/1/1989	04
S.T. DRI.	T.D.cert.	1/7/1977	1/1/1989	05
T/Driver	"	14/1/1978	1/1/1989	04
A/Asst.	Cert./Agr.	1/9/1989	1/1/1989	03
Messg.	G.C.E.	1/9/1989	1/9/1989	02
	FORESTRY SECTION			
Ranger	Cert/Forest	1/8/1980	1/1/1989	05
"	" "	1/1/1985	1/4/1990	05
"	" "	" "	1/1/1985	04
Forester	" "	1/9/1989	1/9/1989	04
T/Dri.	T/D Cert.	1/2/1976	1/4/1990	04
F/Guard	G.C.E.	!/9/1989	1/9/1990	03
"	Cert. Agr.	"	"	03
"	G.C.E.	"	"	03
"	G.C.E.	"	"	03
"	Adult Ed.	"	"	03
"	"	15/8/1977	1/1/1989	02
"	"	1/8/1977	1/1/1989	02
"	"	" "	" "	02
"	"	15/8/1977	15/8/1977	02
"	"	1/8/1977	1/1/1989	02
N/Att.	"	"	"	02
"	"	"	"	02
"	"	1/9/1989	1/9/1989	01
F/Guard	"		1/1/1989	02
W/Man	"	1/9/1989	1/9/1989	01
	VETERINARY SECTION			
L. Supt.	N.D. (Vet.)	1/7/1981	1/7/1988	07
"	N.D (Poult.)	12/12/1980	1/2/1990	07
L.O. seer	Prim. Cert.	7/7/1977	1/1/1989	03
S.L.Inn.	Cert. Poult.	7/7/1977	1/1/1989	05
L.O.'seer	Prim. Cert.	"	"	03
L. Attd.	Adult Educ.	1/8/1981	"	02
"	"	"	"	02
L.Nesrser	Cert./Agric.	1/9/1989	1/9/1989	03
W/Man	Adult Educ.	1/8/1981	1/1/1989	02
SH. Inst.	H.E. Cert.	June 1971	June 1989	06
AS.H.I.	"	1974	1989	05
H. Instr.	"	1974	1989	03
"	"	1974	1989	03
"	"	1986	1/3/1990	03
H/Demons	Adult Ed.	1985	1/1/1989	02
H/Inst.	H.E. Cert.	1974	1985	03

NUMBER OF STAFF AND QUALIFICATION OF AGRIC DEPARTMENT
ZARIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT

QUALIFICATIONS	NUMBER OF STAFF
H. N. D.	03
O. N. D.	01
CERTIFICATE?	06
SECONDARY SCHOOL LEAVERS	19
MIDDLE 11	01
G. C. E.	01
TRADE TEST?	02
B. A. T. C.	01
H/ECONOMICS CERT.	02
PRIMARY SCHOOL LEAVERS	03
ELEMENTARY 1V	02
FARM TRAINING?	01
ADULT EDUCATION	33
TOTAL	75

H.N.D. - Higher National Diploma
O.N.D. - Ordinary National Diploma
G. C. E. - General Certificate of Education
B.A.T.C. - Basic Apprenticeship Training Course