UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN

INTRASTATE CONFLICTS IN AFRICA:

THE CASE OF SOMALIA,

BY

AYUKETAH EDWIN JOSE ENOUKPEN

JULY, 1997.

UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPTNG OPERATIONS IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF SOMALIA

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A Thesis submitted in partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

For the *Award of the Degree of Mast&r of Science in International Relations (Political Science) to the Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeiria.*

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.....

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JULY, 1997.

CERTIFICATION

The Thesis entitled,

"UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN

INTRASTATE CONFLICTS IN AFRICA":

"THE CASE OF SOMALIA",

by

Ayuketah Edwin Jose Enowkpen

Meets the regulation governing the Degree of Master of Science (M. Sc.) International Relations, (Political Science) of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary Presentation.

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D E D I C A T I O N

I gazed onto the mountain in search of internal happiness, but my SORROW multiplies day by day. I looked onto the Moon and Sun to see HATRED Starring at me making me feel unloved. But when I gazed onto your eyes I saw the RAYS OF LOVE shining upon me, rolling away my internal GUILT and SORROW.
I APPRECIATE YOUR LOVE; Oh God.

This Thesis is Dedicated to my dear idols:
F A T H E R,
AYUKETAH ENOW, and
M O T H E R
SUZANAH EBOT AYUKETAH.

For Their love, care and sacrifice.

To your Wife, Mate, and Mother;

Ma-MARY EYERE AYUKETAH

Who rests in the lord on that day:
14 . 09 . 94.

You will [illegible] and SHED
If you KNEW Her.

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ABSTRACT

Euphoria surrounding the Cold War's demise and optimism about the possibilities for democratization have given way to a more sober appraisal of continuing and increasingly violent conflicts in "peace-time" that were hardly imagined by the framers of the U.N Charter The search for order may be no less quixotic at present than it was earliei as decolonization gives way to micro- nationalism and self-determination moves to its logical extrerru In inl rastate conflicts in Africa such as Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, and Liberia ethnic, religious and political cauldron see the, as well as fueling superpower rivalry.

Intervention in such conflicts figures prominently in the policy lexicon and is the subject for numerous international symposia. Although geopolitics are never irrelevant, humanitarian prerogatives gave the U.N a de jure right to intervene, as was the case with Somalia. Actually, literature existing on intrastate conflicts is in the nature of case study; hence there is no statutory way of intervenl ion, and such different results obtained. We argued that with intrastate conflicts, the best means of resolution available to the U.N is the traditional non-violent peace-keeping operation. This concept is strictly based on "Consent" and "Cooperation" of the factions in conflict.

With the special circumstances of the Somalia conflict,

the ground was provided for the **U.N** to set in motion its much acc1aimed concept of the 'New World Order' , which was seen stretching more and more to encompass a wider peace enforcement with little or no result. We argued that the

Somalia conflict resulted **from a deep sc**ission **betwee**n **Ali** Mahdi and Farah Aidid. **The U.N** was to play the role of a Neutral International Mediator in Pacifying **them** based on **what** they want, and ought to have.

With the special guerrilla nature of the conflict some amount of force was necessary, bu t o ne t o o p e r a te w i t h i n strict legal limit. Against this background by its resolution **794** (1992) the U.N, for the first time intervened military for humanitarian purposes. With continuous anarchy and reigning insecurity UNOSOM I could not aheive its objectives . Acting under Chapter VII of the **U.N** Charter the Security Council adopted resolution 814 (1993). This was a gross violation of principles hither to eslablished to guide the deployment of peace keeping missions. Developing countries were not blind to the unprecedented " carte-blanche" given the U.S in the furtherance of the mission In Somalia. Finally, by its Resolution 887 (1.993) **UNOSOM** II's mission dramatically changed to one to re capture Farah Aidid, thereby sowing its seeds of discord.

It is argued that, the U.N created unprecedented depatures in its peace-keeping. Besides, it violated Somalia's sovereignty once the "consent" boundary was crossed.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRASTATE CONFLICTS IN AFRICA.

A comparison of the independent black African States in the area bounded in the North by Islamic polities commonly included in the Middle Eastern zone and in the South by the Union of South Africa shows several common traits. Apart from Ethiopia and Liberia, all are "new" States, having been constituted in the second half of the twentieth century by European colonial administrations on the model of the democratic occidental state (Bozeman, 1976, : 23). Apart from Somalia, non of these States can be convincingly described as a nationally and traditionally unified state, for all are conglomerates of multiple, often hostile, tribal communities. As states, they appear precarious structures since they are composed of two sets of constructive principles that are difficult to be fused or reconciled.

In such states, ethnicity becomes the focus in politics which explains why the state cannot rely on the public's commitment to nationalism, civic loyalty, or territorial integrity. In whatever form tribal competition and rivalry has been the usual corollary and that is why many African States are plagued today by secessionist, separatist

movements, as well as revisionist expansionist designs that often culminate in violence. Yet the very factors that contribute to this instability also explain why successive regimes in many African States are determined to prevent fragmentation and to hold firm to the territorial boundaries bequeathed them by their former colonial rulers.

Since 1945, with the birth of the United Nations Organization (U. N. O.) and the decolonization process, Africa has posed a constant and increasing threat to international peace and security due to the violent eruption of conflicts on the continent. Most of these conflicts are "intrastate, usually provoked by ethnic and political differences between and among the various ethnic groups that constitute the state, although others are purely religious and economic. Such intrastate conflicts are based on ethnic claims, clan segmentation and rivalry as evident in Liberia, Sudan, Rwanda, and Somalia (Evans G. 1994, : 4). In these cases there is hardly any formal determination of an aggressor and the best means of conflict resolution available to the U.N is the non-violent peace-keeping operation force.

Between 1988 and 89, the U.N Secretary-General set up 5 peace-keeping operations. This is a striking increase within two years when it is remembered that only 13 such operations had been established during the previous 40 years. In September 1988, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the "Nobel Peace Prize" to the U. N. peace-keeping forces (Javier

Perez, 1990, : XVIII). In these operations, the U. N. military personnel were employed to monitor or verify compliance by various parties with agreements which they have contrived. But the functions of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia extended far beyond what could be termed traditional peace-keeping.

It is clear from UNTAG's experience that the success of any peace-keeping operation depends on: a clear and practicable mandate, consent and cooperation of the parties, support of the security council and prompt provision of the necessary resources.

Of course, the U.N has been plagued with a deep gulf between theory and practice, between the principles and objectives of the Charter, and the political realities of our time. Nowhere has this gulf been so evident as in the primary function of the U.N; 'maintaining peace and security'. With this in mind, U.N intervention in intrastate conflicts in Africa, either direct or indirect has been more specific than general. Peace-keeping mission aimed at resolving intrastate conflicts, is fraught with operational difficulties giving the relevant provisions of UN charter. In some situations it deviates completely from its traditional concept of 'non-violence' to 'peace-forcement' action which more often compounds the problem thereby culminating in failure of peace-keeping missions.

1.2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

In line with maintaining world peace and security, the U.N and other sub-regional blocs have some useful functions to discharge to achieve their goals and objectives. (Charles P. 1969, : 370) makes a distinction between "real objectives" and contrasts them with the "formal constitutional goals" of any organization when he describes the real objectives as "ends obtained through the actual policies of the organization", and the formal constitutional goals as "the vague and general goals which the organization seeks to attain".

Concerning the functional topology of the U.N, six basic functions of the organization are identified: articulation and aggregation of interests; communication; socialization and recruitment; conflict management; redistribution; and integration (Gregg et. al. 1968, : 69). Still within the functional framework of the U.N six other similar functions were identified, namely; regulating power relationships; effector of agreements among major powers; instruments of political change; tools of partisan interests; creator of norms and a source of collective legitimization; and a contributor to the development of long-term viability for the states and nation-states alike (Orang Young, 1968, : 902 - 22). When such functions are assembled it seems clear that the purpose of the U.N is primarily to maintain peace and security.

The Available literatures on the U.N peace-keeping operations within the collective security framework has been in the nature of case studies. This can be traced to the evolution of international relations after World War II. The Blue Helmets (1990, : 4) noted that after 1945, differences were quickly brought to the fore among member states, and in particular the five permanent members of the Security Council of the U.N. These differences inevitably affected the smooth functioning of the organization. New conflicts arose, particularly during the process of decolonization, and many could not be resolved by peaceful means. A way has to be found to stop hostilities and to control conflicts so that they would not develop into broader conflagrations. Out of that need, U.N peace-keeping operations evolved as essentially "holding actions" within the framework of collective security. There was not and still there is not, any particular theory or doctrine behind them. They were born out of the necessity, largely improvised, a practical response to a problem requiring action.

Collective security embodies the potential roles of the U.N, regional organizations, and the great powers to prevent and control conflicts. For aggression to be resolved or prevented, all countries - large and small should participate fully and equally in defining or responding to security threats or in being subject to collective action. But full

participation demands cooperation between the aggressor and the victim. This view is supported by Thomas G. and Leon G. (Randal F. 1994, : 121). They ask whether it is practicable for all countries to actively participate in collective security initiatives. Thomas G. et. al. are of the view that:

> collective security aims to deter or make short work of aggression, but collective action may lead to wars of long duration, protracted violations of human rights, or grave economic repercussions. Collective security is not meant to change the international system: and peace requires cooperation between the aggressor and victim. Yet to stop aggression, an aggressor must be frightened or damaged; humiliation that reduces domestic support, or a reduction in the military resources available to the aggressor, to say nothing of an outright change in government, would mean a change in the international system.

As the U.N practice evolved over the years, a peace-keeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the U.N to help maintain or restore international peace and security in conflict areas. These operations are voluntary and are based on "consent" and "cooperation". The Blue Helmets (1990: 4 - 5) further contends that, while they involve the use of military

personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the "enforcement action" of the U.N under Article 42 (: 5). Peace-keeping operations have been most commonly employed to supervise and help maintain case-fires, to assist in troops withdrawals, and to provide a buffer between opposing forces. However, peace-keeping operations are flexible instruments of policy and have been adapted to a variety of uses, including helping to implement the final settlement of a conflict.

Peace-keeping operations are never purely military. They have always included civilian personnel to discharge essential and administrative functions, as seen in cases of the Congo, Namibia and Cambodia. In these operations, there was massive cooperation between the parties which is a pre-requisite for success of any peace-keeping mission. Without cooperation, any party to the conflict can defy a peace-keeping force. Haass et. al. (1972, : 23) are of the view that the localized conflicts are easier for the U.N to manage or settle based on the assumption that the weaker parties would not have time to call on their allies to come for their assistance. They further argue that in cases where the Great powers are not directly involved, it is their role in the U.N conflict-management to lead in the cessation of hostilities (: 24).

It appears according to This Claude (1971, : 510 - 11) that the U.N cannot successfully intervene in conflicts

between the super powers since peace-keeping is strictly designed to insulate conflicts against Cold War competition - a sort of "preventive diplomacy". It is on this basis that Rikhye et. al. (1974, : 19) assert that the effective control and direction of peace-keeping operations will continue to depend upon agreement between the two super powers, that is, if one super power tolerates the will of the other.

It follows that where there is cooperation and great power solidarity peace-keeping missions are easily accomplished. Mohammed Ayoob supports the view that collective security is likely to work only in a world of great power solidarity where there is no veto-wielding powers and great nations free from collective sanctions (1994, : 122). In the face of lack of cooperation Ernest Haass and Lincoln Bloomfield (1994, : 122 - 23) propose the use of "enforcement action" to foster peace-keeping and collective security as a whole. They seem to adopt a policy suggesting a shift from a "hegemonic" to a "power-sharing" approach to collective security. To them therefore, force is needed to automatically stop genocide. In such a situation the strongest state like the United States should act unilaterally, engineer a consensus to violate sovereignty, or wait for a multilateral consensus to form on the basis of a compromise that will probably fail to meet United States preferences. In this wise emphasis is shifted from regional organizations like the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of

Islamic Conference (OIC) as security brokers to that of the U.S which will be resented by most Third World States. This might provoke a united front against the intervention force and will eventually culminate into failure in peace-keeping - a situation that occurred with United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).

Civil wars in Somalia and Haiti have reminded us that "peace enforcement" may not speed or ease the process of peace-keeping and nation-building. The West's failure to use force in the former Yugoslavia where civil war and international aggression were intertwined, has confirmed the allegation that the use of force is far more selective and takes place only where there is a particular interest to protect. This view is supported by Mohammed Ayoob when he writes:

> the Gulf war represented a continuation of traditional partisan policies to protect the West's interest (access to oil), not a newly invigorated consistently applied policy of principled opposition to aggression, (1994, : 123)

Scholars have been able to address the various interventions in intrastate conflicts while bringing out the problems associated with each mission. Such problems include the fact that the peace-keeping system is usually makeshift, undertrained, ill-equipped, slow-moving and lacked the

political will to provide the necessary logistical and financial support. Similarly the inappropriate political arrangements, as well as the emergency nature of peace-keeping operations are the other problems that beset such missions. Other scholars have criticized peace-keeping operations, whether the 'enforce' or 'peaceful' type, on grounds that they only preserve the status quo or merely compound rather than resolve conflicts (Rikhye, et. al., 1974, : 16).

In view of the summarized problems which the various U.N peace-keeping missions experienced, Evans Gareth writes that:

> The U.N peace-keeping system is makeshift, undertrained, ill-equipped, and slow moving. Security Council mandates have too often lacked clear objectives and realistic rules of engagement, while communication between the Security Council, the U.N Secretariat, the governments of troop - contributing countries, and the U.N troop-commanders on the ground has frequently been inadequate. And the U.N reluctance to intervene decisively in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda has had much to do with an absence of political will in the Security Council to provide the necessary resources than with any perceived constraints imposed by International law, (1994, : 6 - 8)

Accordingly, scholars argue that the success of any peace-keeping force depends on three basic principles - the willingness of the parties to the conflict to cooperate, the neutrality of an intervention force, and consensus within members of the international organization. If these principles are violated a peace-keeping force is likely to fail. Rikhye, et. al. work is a suitable illustration of UNCEF 1, ONUC, UNFICYP, and UNTAG. Their work exposes the political and military procedures of establishing peace-keeping forces, and their roles in third party interventions of a peaceful nature. These scholars realized that the lack of political will, logistical problems and financial difficulties are the cardinal impediments to the success of peace-keeping missions. They further realized that there is usually the difficulty in interpreting and applying the Security Council resolutions which determine the tasks of peace-keeping forces. Finally, they assert that such resolutions are formulated in unclear or ambiguous terms, when they write:

> There is always the problem of how to interpret policy directives set out in Security Council resolutions. Resolutions are by design couched in ambiguous or at least vague terms and it is for the commanders in the

implementation. (: 171 - 174)

Verrier (1981, : 14) supports the view that Security Council resolutions are usually vague (never specific) in which case their interpretation and implementation becomes difficult. The UNEF 1 mandate, according to him, contained in the November 3 1956 resolution was not specific, albeit it was clearly stated that the force was to secure and supervise cease-fires in the affected areas. To Verrier, with the ONUC operations there were many published accounts indicating that the force succeeded or failed to execute mandates because of their correct or wrong interpretation (p. 41). With this in mind, Verrier concluded that U.N officials as well as military officers took decisions and executed them by personally studying the prevailing situation on the ground (pp. 14 - 41).

scholars like Mohammed Ayoob, Riklye, et. al. as seen above have pointed out that peace-enforcement action can compound conflicts and stiffen resistance by the protagonists rather than resolving it. It is also worthwhile noting that peace enforcement is incompatible with nation-building.

Andrew S. Natios asserts that the Somalia intervention was one of confusing objectives. He highlights that the Security Council has been undistinguished in meeting the need for clear thinking when considering the use of military force in support for humanitarian goals, (1993, p. 19). Where there is continuous insecurity to satisfy humanitarian goals, peace-enforcement action provided for in Chapter VII of the U.N

Charter becomes an exigency. He however, concluded that the Security Council has tended to write ambiguous statement of the missions, employ weak rules of engagement, and send underarmed troops to countries still in conflict as in Somalia. When U.N rules of engagement do not mandate sufficient force and weaponry, nations committing forces will find themselves in the position of having responsibility without authority.

Although enforcement action may provoke conflict resurgence if the root causes of the war are not addressed, it is desirable to give a peace-keeping force some degree of authority to use force in a bid to accomplish the tasks specified for it in the forces mandate.

The experience of ONUC operations supports the fact that enforcement action is a viable means of resolving some conflicts. Young (1967) further supports the view that the use of force in a peace-keeping mission should not completely be ruled out because it has been successfully applied in the past, why not to the present and future. But it failed in Somalia. What was responsible for this ? Can a clear understanding of the factors responsible for this failure assist us in demarcating the boundary between situations in which the use of force may succeed and those in which it will not ? We hope that the Somalian case contains certain specificities whose understanding will help us address this issue.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The nature of the Somalia conflict was purely 'ethnopolitical' as is usually the case with conflicts in most African States. In such conflicts the aggressors can hardly be formally determined, in which case intervention method available to the U.N is the non-violent peace-keeping operation.

Based on the success of U.N peace-keeping operation missions in Namibia (UNTAG), Congo (ONUC), New Guinea (UNSF) it is assumed that if such "traditional non-violent concept" was applied and strictly followed in Somalia, the same result (success) would have been obtained. In fact, the Somalia intervention was one that soon stretched its traditionally accepted concept of peace-keeping to accommodate a wider peace-enforcement action, all culminating in failure of the mission. The question is, why did the U.N fail to follow the traditional method of peace-keeping? The central concern of this study therefore is the identification and analysis of the factors responsible for UN's failure to strickly abide by the tenets of traditional peace - keeping mission and the extent to which this was responsible for the failure of the mission in Somalia.

1.4 STATEMENT OF PROPOSITIONS

The following propositions have been formulated to guide this study:-

i) If the statement of the mission does not address what the protagonists want and ought to have peace-keeping will fail.

ii) To be able to address what the protagonists want requires neutrality among other things on the part of the Intervenor which the nature of intrastate conflict makes extremely difficult if not impossible.

iii) The tension between the neutrality requirement and the dynamics of intrastate conflict is likely to produce inconsistencies in the programme and activities of a peace-keeping mission and this is likely to result in the failure of the mission.

iv) The inability of an intervention force to be neutral fails to win the support of the factions which leads to failure.

1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A theoretical framework is required in a study like this in order to provide a theoretical foundation on which the study will be based. We will also establish the relationship

that exists between the theory and the particular study. It is essential to adopt a definite theoretical framework in order to arrive at a systematic and logical approach to issues under investigation.

To understand what the term "conflict" connotes William Zartman et. al. consider it as an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an unavoidable concomitant of choice and decisions. Conflict can be prevented in some occasions and managed in others. Conflict can be resolved only if the term is taken to mean the satisfaction of apparent demands rather than the total eradication of the underlying sentiments, memories and interests, (1991, : 229).

Following Coser A. Lewis' view, conflict results from the interaction of individuals having incompatible ends, in which the ability of one actor to exploit his ends depends to a large extent on the choice or decisions the other actor(s) will take, (1968,: 233).

The Somalia conflict resulted to a large extent from a deep scission between Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Farah Aidid. Within this fragile context, the U.N's role was to be limited to and clearly made to appear, as that of an "International mediator" to reconcile these protagonists as well as their ethnic groups or clans by using a peace-keeping operation based on what they wanted and ought to achieve.

The need to understand the role played by the U.N in attempting to resolve the crisis has actually informed us to

employ the "structural functionalist approach" as the framework for analysis. The structural functionalist approach - *a psychological-anthropological doctrine applied by students* of politics to suggest that there are certain functions any political system must perform to survive. And, wherever one finds a political system, structures must exist to perform those functions, (Ralph Pettman; 1975, : 134).

Functionalism was propounded and developed by Professor David Mitrany (1975, : IX) in the 1930s and 40s, which itself is more remarkable as an approach to the problems of international order. David Mitrany's work is a description of his thinking over a very long period in relation to a range of practical, political, economic, and social problems. The crucial role of functionalism in contemporary international relations theory is sharpened and our understanding of the nature of international society has been deepened by Mitrany.

In fact, despite its weaknesses, functionalism has triumphantly survived the wide span of years since its inception and Mitrany's work centers on major problems of the day and those solutions to resolve such problems through cooperation by individuals or organizations.

The major principles of functionalism are that man can be weaned away from his loyalty to the nation state by the experience of fruitful international cooperation; that international organization arranged according to the requirements of the task could increase welfare rewards to

individuals beyond the level obtainable within the state. Finally, the rewards would be great if the organization worked, where necessary, across national frontiers, which very frequently cut into the organization's ideal working area. To Mitrany, individuals and groups could learn the proceeds of cooperation and would be increasingly involved in an international cooperative ethos, creating international dependencies, pushing for further integration, undermining the notion of the nation state. In such a situation, there would be a kind of irreducible set of "relations among things" (David Mitrany, 1975,: 37), which are distinguishable from those relationships suggested by a constitution. Leaving it to themselves, they would be able to suggest the ideal geographical extent of such a problem's resolution and the best administrative set up shall be installed.

Functionalism relates to social, economic, technical, and humanitarian matters (non-political issues). Because politics is central, functionalism deviates from political to non-political issues, since social, economic, technical, and humanitarian problems can lead to the resolution of political problems. The main political problem to resolve is the question of war, that is, resolving the non-political problems one is indirectly eliminating or resolving war.

On the contrary, war erupts due to social, economic, technical and humanitarian problems. Thus in solving global problems, nations must unanimously come together, and work

collectively other than just leaving them peacefully apart. In essence, Functionalism represents a horizontal approach to solving the problem of war rather than emphasizing on a vertical stratification of nations that could lead to war. It is a horizontal approach because it is binding those interests which are common, where common, and the extent to which they are common.

In understanding an international conflict, functionalism is important to those who understand the general underlying causes of violence, rather than the circumstances of a particular quarrel. Functionalism holds that violence has its roots in the social and economic circumstances of the people, and that if we give them a "moderate sufficiency" of what they want and ought to have, they will keep the peace, (David Mitrany, 1944,: 15).

In line with conflict resolution by the U.N, the international community, as well as regional organizations, Functionalism points to the potential contributions of the specialized agencies of the organization to improve conditions which otherwise encourage violence. It has less to say about the 'fire brigade' function of the U.N - the specific actions needed when the fight has started.

In international relations, the common themes are; conflict and cooperation, swords and ploughshares, war and peace. Functionalism is mainly concerned with the development of a "working peace system". In a nutshell, Functionalism

suggests that the resolution of conflict or maintaining peace and security is achieved through the changing attitudes of people within an organization and experiencing their economic technical, social, and humanitarian concerns. By so doing "function" and "enmeshment" would prevail and make war less prevalent. When attitude change and enmeshment are fused, there would be a resolution of the conflict. This can be done only after international institutions have been established in regions of their highest functioning (Paul Taylor, 1971, : 234 - 45).

Furthermore, the functionalists believed that when people are brought together in an organization, the international institutions will use their endeavours in establishing further and more energetic institutions and as they share common ideas they tend to drift from their national loyalties which in turn will stimulate attitude change and abandon the notion of absolute sovereignty of states. This will then enhance international peace and security. In such a circumstance, the world would become united in a network of international cooperation than one of competition and bitter rivalry, if they were in isolation.

Going by the above analysis, Mitrany's view about functionalism seems to be more idealistic. In fact, the question of separating the non-political problems from the political problems is idealistic. Mitrany believes that there are three causes of war which include: poverty, the psyche of

military men and diplomats, and the state structure. He suggests that since the states are incapable of resolving such problems, they should surrender their sovereignty to a world body, like the UN which is capable of pulling global resources to this effect. But little is known of the willingness of states to do so especially as states priority rests on power and power depends on sovereignty and as such the quest for both power and sovereignty leads to war.

Inis Claude further attempts a criticism that functionalism recognizes a systematic development of transnational transactions which fits in a "peace workshop". But this does not tie states to a unified framework for cooperation. And to this end he hammers on the inability of states to possibly separate the political from the non-political problems in order to prevent or resolve a conflict by subjecting them to a systematic mutually - binding interests framework, (1967 : 67 - 69).

Nevertheless, Functionalism still survives the test of reality and the philosophy that informs the formation of international organizations. In fact, it forms the bed rock of an understanding of the formation and functional character of any organization. It is widely believed that Functionalism forms the kick-off of all other theoretical frameworks in international relations with respect to prevention and resolution of conflicts.

Based on the fact that functionalism purports that

violence has its roots in the social and economic circumstances of the people, and that if we give them a "moderate sufficiency of what they want and ought to have they will keep the peace": and based on the fact that functionalism points to the potential contributions of the improvement of conditions which otherwise encourage violence, it was used to investigate how the U.N attempted resolving the conflict in Somalia.

Based on this premise, this study is out to investigate and examine the role played by the U.N in just one specific aspect that borders on "maintaining international peace and security", which is the primary motive for the creation of the organization. Although the U.N failed to restore peace in Somalia it however succeeded, to an extent, in eliminating some conditions which would have intensified the clan factionalism and armed brutality.

1.6 METHODOLOGY

In this study, data used were strictly secondary. The data were collected from Books, Newspapers, Magazines, Pamphlets, and Journals. The data collected were subjected to content analysis.

1.7 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

From the background of the study and the statement of the problem highlighted above, it is abundantly clear that all has not been well with intrastate conflict resolution by the U.N; particularly in Somalia.

The principal aim of this study is to find out if following strictly its guiding principles a 'peace-keeping operation' can succeed in resolving an intrastate conflict.

1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

The international status and wide recognition accorded the U.N peace-keeping operation in resolving intrastate conflicts on the African continent has made it a vast enthusiastic field of research. It is not physically feasible to cover all the conflicts on the continent; more especially in this austere period. This study therefore; focuses on Somalia and the results obtained shall be generalized on other African States with similar conditions of conflict.

The study is therefore, confined to the period between 1990 - 1995. It examines and evaluates United Nations peace-keeping operations as a viable mechanism for resolving intrastate conflict in Somalia.

Fortunately; this period contains the most current and

reliable information on peace-keeping operations. It is also within this period that much emphasis has been laid on intrastate conflicts in Africa and its resolution.

1.9 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

1.9.1 CONFLICT

Conflict as used in this study means any social or political situation in which two or more entities are linked by at least one form of antagonistic interaction often ending up in armed confrontation or violence.

i) Interstate Conflict

Interstate conflict is that conflict, war, or violent confrontation between and among states. More often, it occurs between one political boundary and another.

ii) Intrastate Conflict

These are conflicts, wars, or violent confrontations between or among different ethnic, religious, or social groups that constitute a single state or nation. This can be as a result of clan factionalism and rivalry, political, economic, religious grievances or other forms of state structure in which discontent as well as mutual suspicion and mistrust can emerge thereby culminating in violence (A. Fink 1975, : 135).

iii) Ethnopolitical Conflict

These are conflicts in which groups that define themselves using ethnic criteria make claims on behalf of their collective interests against the state, or other political actors. In such societies, there is the struggle for political domination and hegemony between and among such ethnic groups. In fact, the greater the competition and inequality among those groups in heterogenous societies, the greater the salience of ethnic identities and the greater the likelihood for open conflict (Robert T. Gurr, 1994, : 348).

1.9.2 INTERVENTION

It is any influence on a system of rule from outside, whether exercised in a violent or non-violent way. The system of rule is the "internal affair" (Neuville B. Moff, 1992, : 71). Intervention as used here is not a unitary phenomenon, but rather a spectrum of actions taken by the U.N and independent state governments to alter the internal affairs of a state. It ranges from the telephone calls of a foreign ministry, to intelligence gathering and the dispatch of troops.

International intervention as well means those coercive actions (economic, political, military) taken by the community of states - the U.N to alter the domestic affairs of a targeted government or insurgency that flouts international norms and resists the expressed will of the international

community (Hornby A. S. : 447).

1.9.3 PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

Peace-keeping as used here is taken to mean any measure taken by the U.N to peacefully provide a solution to a conflict be it intrastate or interstate. A peace-keeping operation is part of a larger machinery for maintaining international peace and security. Its operation involves military personnel, but without enforcement powers to maintain peace in a conflict area (The Blue Helmets, 1985, : 3). This type of conflict resolution is traditionally a non-violent one.

1.9.4 PEACE-ENFORCEMENT ACTION

A peace-enforcement action is the careful deployment of conventional forces by independent state governments to resolve a conflict. This force usually surrenders its sovereignty to the U.N. But little is known of this. The military forces realize their objectives by the use of armed force and not diplomatic negotiation like a peace-keeping operation.

1.9.5 COOPERATION

The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English defines cooperation as "working or acting together" (: 189).

Cooperation here is the collective effort made by the Member States of the U.N (especially the Permanent members of the Security Council) as well as the conflicting factions to unanimously resolve the conflict.

In such a situation all states have to surrender their national interests in that state and be fully committed to the resolution of that conflict. Cooperation on their part will include the prompt provision of the necessary resources such as finance, arms, logistics, personnel and others needed to sustain a peace-keeping operation. When this is done, it becomes clear that the intervention force is neutral and this will win the cooperation of the parties to the conflict.

1.9.6 COLLECTIVE SECURITY

As defined by the "Dictionary of Politics", (1966, : 80) collective security is a system by which the security and territorial integrity of each country are guaranteed by all countries. This principle was embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the U.N Charter.

As used in this study, collective security requires the

acceptance by individual countries of collective decisions, and their willingness to carry out those decisions, if necessary by military action. Under the U.N Charter, the power to deal with threats to peace is vested in the Security Council which can only act if its permanent members agree to cooperate.

1.9.7 FUNCTIONALISM

According to the Dictionary of Social Science, functionalism has been defined as "the comparative analysis of social functions, or the doctrine that all social and cultural elements are functionally interdependent In all social systems and cultural systems (Hugo F. Reading et. al., 1976, : 91).

Functionalism here is taken to mean the functional character of the U.N and its agencies as regards the resolution of a conflict in line with maintaining international peace and security.

This chapter which constitutes the bedrock of the study is made up of the following sub-themes:- general introduction to intrastate conflicts in Africa, U.N's intervention to resolve such conflicts using primarily a peace-keeping method, review of related literature, the statement of research problem, the theoretical framework that guides us in data collection and analysis, the objective of the study, limitations and scope and finally the clarification

of concepts as used in the work.

The next chapter, that is, chapter two is strictly limited to examining the background of the Somalia conflict. It traces the root causes of the crisis in order to acquaint ourselves with the particular method or approach to be used in resolving it.

Chapter three gives us an in-depth understanding of the originality, meaning, and conditions that determine the success of a peace-keeping operation, as well as the principles guiding it. It also focuses on the formation, principles and Charter of the U.N and the particular Charter provisions that guide international peace and security. Finally the chapter looks at intervention by the U.N in intrastate as well as interstate conflicts.

Chapter four which is the main chapter investigates and discusses UN's intervention in Somalia.

Chapter five sums up the whole discussions, draws conclusions and proffers solutions. In this chapter we have been able to present a logical summary of facts, conclusions derived from it and finally, proffered solutions to the U.N to guide it on maybe future interventions in intrastate conflicts in Africa on humanitarian grounds.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 BACKGROUND AND DYNAMICS OF THE SOMALIA CRISIS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Since 1945 most African States have been plagued with intrastate conflicts. Such "domestic" affairs of states do not call for external interference in line with the preservation of "state sovereignty" which has evolved since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, (Thomas G. Weiss, 1994 : 110). Most of these intrastate conflicts are a clear violation of human rights due to the genocide that is usually associated with them. At times, they pose a severe threat to international peace and security as the affected populations seek asylum in neighboring countries thereby swelling up the population and administrative problems there. The resultant effects of such conflicts include; threat to life, suffering and human rights abuses. These adversities have become legitimate international concerns thereby compelling the U.N to intervene, at least for humanitarian reasons, to provide an international solution.

The eruption of conflict in Somalia which necessitated U.N intervention is not an isolated case.

However, this chapter focuses on the root causes of the Somalia conflict and its implications which necessitated U.N

intervention to provide an international solution. In fact, the resolution of such a crisis demands a well grounded knowledge of its structural causes so that one can ascertain if the U.N peace-keeping mission addresses them or not.

2.2 STRATEGIC POSITION OF SOMALIA AND EAST-WEST RIVALRY

Geographically, Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa surrounded by 400,000 sq. miles of the Savannah grassland. It is bounded by the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. European penetration in to Somalia began since 1869 with the opening up of the Suez Canal. By 1898, the Somali Peninsula was divided up into territorial spheres of influence into: French Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, Ethiopian Somaliland, and subsequently, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. This partition failed to recognize "ties" and "kinship" with the result that the population was dispersed. About 3.5 million people lived in the Somali Republic, 2 million in Ethiopia's Ogaden, 246,000 in Northern Province of Kenya, and 150,000 in the Republic of Djibouti, (Arthur S. Banks, 1992 : 73).

Gavshon is of the view that the geographical position of Somalia as well as the resources of the Horn of Africa rendered it important to Europe as well as to Africa and the Middle East. The strategic location of Somalia was made clear with the construction of the Suez canal, and consequently the imperial powers' need to defend the routes that linked

Europe with the West and East Africa. The United States and the Soviet Union set up separate bastions at the Suez, the Babel Mandeb strait at the Southern tip of the Red Sea, as well as, at the tip of the Horn itself, (A. Gavshon, 1981, : 280).

Because of this strategic position, Russia contrived a treaty of mutual understanding in the mid 1960s with the Republic of Somalia. Within this treaty was a hidden agenda to penetrate into a more strategic post, the "heart of Africa" and the seat of O.A.U. - Ethiopia. The Red Sea basin was another important factor that could not be neglected. Strategically, it is located at the junction of Africa and Asia. It provided access to the Indian Ocean and opened key sea lanes that linked oil producing countries with America and Europe. It is estimated that in the 1970s Western Europe imported about 70 per cent of oil and valuable raw materials through these sea routes. For Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State of the U. S., Soviet power and influence in the world had to be contained, and Somalia according to him, was in a unique position in the Horn of Africa. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union in 1962, 1966, and 1977 negotiated substantial military and economic aid agreements with Somalia. Unfortunately, the military aid coincided with the famines of 1965 and 1967 which affected the whole of the Horn with devastating repercussions on the economy.

When Siad Barre seized power in 1969, he set up his

military junta based on what he termed "scientific socialism", and consequently Soviet military aid almost doubled, (A Gavshon, 1981, : 282). Consequent upon what Samatar terms "Lineage segmentation" (1993, : 18), caused by their dispersion, Barre, in July 1977, against Soviet advice, moved into the Ogaadeen but without the latter's support for they have redirected their support to Ethiopia (: 16 - 21). In despair, Somalia turned to the U.S who posed as a condition for their support any design by Somalia upon Ogaadeen. Unfortunately this condition was not met . Consequently, the failure to conquer Ogaadeen led to an influx of refugees pouring into the devastated economy-ruined by war and a feeling of betrayal by army officers who attempted on several occasions to overthrow the government between 1978 - 1981.

As can be observed from the preceding discussions, the Somalia Conflict had deep historical roots linked with the history of the region. As S. Samatar (1993) puts it; the superpower involvement made,

> the Horn of Africa, one of the World's most unsafe places to live, not only engulfing the region in disastrous conflicts but also endangering the security of Africa by turning a strategic part of it in to an area of superpower conflict, (: 16 - 17).

The historical factors, as shall be discussed in the next section, affected negatively the search for a unified state of

Somalia. Although superpower rivalry based on the strategic location of Somalia, and ideological reasons as seen above sparked off the crisis, it cannot be totally denied that it was an "ethnic" conflict because at the height of the crisis the various "ethnic groups" or "clans" exploited clan differences for political ends thus earning it the appellation 'ethnopolitical' conflict.

2.3 THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE BIRTH OF A UNIFIED SOMALIA, IRREDENTISM, AND THE SOCIAL DISLOCATION FACTORS.

Like many African States, Somalia was a victim of its own ideal of unity. As seen above, the British administered Somalia (except Djibouti) between 1942 and 1952, encouraged the formation of the Somali Youth Club - which later became the Somali Youth League (S. Y. L.). Under the British, the idea of a 'Greater Somalia' became an exigency. There soon developed a 'crack' within the SYL when the members belonging to the DIGIL and RAXANWEYN clans, otherwise called the Sab, protested against the domination of the DAAROOD. At Independence on June 26 1960, the South proclaimed union with the North. In a popular referendum in 1961 the North voted for federation, but the South preferred a unitary state. Unfortunately for the North, a centralized state was imposed. As a result, the North manifested their discontent by staging

an abortive coup d'Etat in December 1961.

Another force of conflict that contributed to the civil war was the Irredentist factor. It can be recalled that Somalia was divided up by the imperialist powers into British Somaliland, French Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and Ethiopian Somaliland. At Independence, the territorial boundaries bequeathed the country were protested without success. During the Cairo resolution of frontier settlement in 1963, Morocco and Somalia intensified their refusal to accept these boundaries. On its national flag, only two of the five branches of the blue star (the ex-English and Italian Colonies) constituted the Republic. Furthermore; development was concentrated in the South; which, coupled with the government fear of isolation from increasingly hostile neighbors leading subsequently to laying to rest the Irredentist vision, facilitated the removal of the government in 1969.

Consequently, in October, the President of the Republic was assassinated, but in the view of Gascon the foundations of state, due to clan opposition, had been changed.

In another development, there developed cracks in the unitary state that culminated in violence. The causes were deeply rooted in the history of Somalia itself. It must be emphasized that contrary to what a great many analysts will convey, it is not essentially a clannish war - the concept itself remains unclear - but it may be more correct to posit

that differences, according to Gascon, (pp. 1404 - 1411) were exploited by Siad Barre in order to consolidate and possibly legitimize his hold on power. In carrying out this design, Barre relied on three main clans forming part of the Federation of the Daarood - the Mareehaan, the Ogaadeen, and the Dulbahante. Officers of the Ogaadeen within the army received higher promotions at the same time that rebellion developed among the Majerteen officers. The latter in distress crossed over to Ethiopia where they received aid and formed the Front Democratic du Salut Somalien (F.D.S.A.). In 1982, in the same year that the latter carried out attacks in central Somalia, Barre broke off ties with leaders of the Issaq clans of the North. The latter formed the Mouvement National Somalien (MNS) and demanded independence for ex-Somaliland. They also crossed over to Ethiopia and obtained arms to carry out designs of overthrowing the government. The suspicion that developed towards the Issaq and Majerteen caused Barre to alienate them from power and to place in positions of responsibility members of his clan. This policy of divide and rule is common with many African States, and of course a source of friction for them.

By 1988, "the reign of terror" as Rakiya Omar calls it, was such that the Issaq and Ogaadeen were not forgiven (1988, : 230). Barre broke off ties with the Hawiyye and recruited anti Issaq militias from Djibouti. Rival factions took control of Hargeysa, Burco, Berbera, Belet Uen (the centre),

and Kismayu (the South). The policy of divide and rule, added to the reign of terror unleashed on the population, Clan groups and militias who, to sustain themselves, obstructed the international aid coming into the country to the detriment of the population in need.

In January 1991, Siad Barre fled to Kenya and was reported to have proclaimed much later that "brother will eat up brother", (23 December, 1994). By February 1991 Somalia was a country in shambles and in dire need of help from the international community. But, the process of "clan segmentation" and rivalry was followed by territorial segmentation. The centre itself could not hold when the Hawiyya clan split into two - sub clans, and fought each other for the control of the capital - Mogadishu.

At the heart of the Somalia political problem was a more corrosive factor the disintegration of the economy.

2.4 ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION AND CONSEQUENCES

Somalia, like most African States today, is predominantly an agricultural country. About 70 per cent of the working population are employed in the agricultural sector and about 60 per cent of the 70 per cent agriculturalists are strictly nomadic cattle pastoralists who lived mostly in the less developed Northern region of Somalia. In fact, the gross uneven development among regions and groups, according to

Markakis, is another important source of conflict in Somalia, as well as the other parts of the Horn (1993, pp. 216 - 236). Since the state owned, managed, and controlled the modern economic sector, it became a key actor in the production and distribution of material resources. Because of this fact, if it has to redress the imbalance between the North and South, it had to decentralize power as a first step. By 1983, Somalia was again stroked by a severe dry season which among other consequences distorted the activities of cattle rearers: their major source of livelihood. This led to migration to the urban centers and a sharp fall in the proportion of stock rearers. Between 1955 and 1958, international aid, representing about 40 per cent of state budget was not reaching the Northern destinations, on account of the fact that it was diverted by government officials. The uneven development coupled with anarchy which reigned during the period of Siad Barre had finally taken its toll and in the mid 1980s Somalia fell constrained to request for aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

It has been observed that besides the regional imbalance and famine, International Financial Institutions compounded the helplessness of the Somalia government through reform projects that failed to address the situation. These institutions first suggested a reform programme which put the balance between the nomadic segment and the sedentary portion of the population at risk, when they devalued the Somalia

shilling in June 1981. This devaluation did very little to prevent the fall in parity, thus leading to an alarming increase in prices of inputs, (1993, pp. 5 - 9). This reform measure seriously affected the irrigated zones of Somalia and in the cities where the purchasing power fell drastically. The inability of the I.M.F. reforms to resolve the situation compelled the Somalia government to rely on FOOD AID to the extent that production was neglected. Drug prices were tremendously increased which coincided with massive reduction in cattle - which contributed about 90% of government foreign exchange earning mainly from Saudi Arabia - in the main producing centers of Somalia. The World Bank Report is of the view that one can be tempted to think that this phenomenon was not altogether an accident. According to the report, by contributing to the progressive removal of Africa's vegetative cover, we should not ignore the fact that the potential of overgrazing constituted "a major cause of environmental degradation", (1989,: 97 - 99).

The World Bank went further to recommend the transfer of veterinary services to the private sector for more "efficient" management, for in the view of the World Bank, Cattle rearers were largely responsible for the degradation of the environment which by the same token eroded the "sustainability of the Somalia development. Saudi Arabia, her main market, by 1984 turned away from Somalia and was furnished with meat by European markets, this contributed in reducing agricultural

expenditure by 85% compared to the level of the 1970s.

Within the ecological context, Somalia being situated in a fragile environment, pastoralists were required to move across the borders to the neighboring countries like Kenya and Ethiopia in search of pasture lands, water resources and markets. With the main water sources found in Somalia and pasture lands in Ethiopia and Kenya, conflicts were bound to exist in an attempt to exploit these resources, between or among these countries. Such conflicts resulted to the closure of borders thereby compounding the problem. Somalia pastoralists were not able to cross over to these neighboring countries and the resultant effect was overgrazing on the land which drastically distabilize the balance between forage, cattle and man. This competition consequently led to famine and hunger in 1965, 1967, 1973, and 1979.

As this situation continued to deteriorate, the herdsmen turned to the farmers who by 1985 were trading cereals for cattle. This has a serious effect on the agricultural sector and reduced drastically the Balance of Payments position of Somalia in International trade. By 1990, efforts by the international community to arrest the situation proved futile. During the mid 1980s food aid was sold on the local markets to finance development projects. The principal agricultural sector was neglected and the adverse balance of payment position was as a result of the negligence of agricultural exports mainly cattle. By 1989, salaries of the public

sector were slashed alarmingly. Poor administrative set-up and other problems arose but the International Financial Institutions did little to restore the infrastructure. They were rather pushing for measures which were aimed at reducing public expenditure even further.

Based on the inability of the International Financial Institutions to sustain Somalia in her state of helplessness, based on the intensity and dynamics of the crisis, and based on its impact on not only Somalia, but the Horn of Africa, and the World, it can be concluded that by 1991 Somalia had become not only an internal problem, but a regional and international crisis which necessitated U.N intervention, at least on humanitarian grounds.

In fact, this conflict offered a unique opportunity to put to test the United Nations' traditionally accepted concept of peace-keeping operation that was seen to accommodate a wider peace-enforcement in the post-cold war era.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER PROVISIONS ON PEACE-KEEPING AND JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The Somalia debacle which resulted from a deep schism between Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi had its roots deep in the socio-economic and politico-military circumstances of the people of Somalia. By January 1991 when the government of Siad Barre collapsed, Somalia was a country in need of aid from the international community. Continuous chaos and anarchy in Somalia was gradually followed by 'clan segmentation'. The various sub clans which formerly united against Siad Barre's 'reign of terror' turned dramatically against themselves in a violent struggle for power with grave consequences on the Somali populace.

Within this fragile context, Somalia had no central government with which to negotiate for a peaceful resolution. Besides, numerous militia factions divided amongst them the "spoils" of international assistance arriving through the harbor and at the airport. Following the Secretary-General's report, more than 1000 people died daily (United Nations Peace-keeping February 1995, : 127). Apart from engaging in other forms of gross violation of human rights, armed bandits

extorted food and medicine from aid workers at gun point thereby preventing them from reaching the much needy populations. It was against this background that the U.N was to set in motion its resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, which was to create a precedent in the history of that international body.

By this resolution, the U.N for the first time decided to intervene militarily for humanitarian reasons, since as it can be argued, the traditional methods of peace-keeping were not yielding the desired results in Somalia. Acting under chapter VII of its Charter, the U.N gave the United States military 'Extraordinary' powers in the furtherance of UNOSOM II mission in that country - a situation that raised more questions than answers.

It is against this background that this Chapter examines the U.N Charter provisions in relation to maintaining international peace and security. It also looks critically at the traditional peace-keeping principles and U.N unprecedented departures - peace enforcement action in support for humanitarian goals - in its peace-keeping operations. Finally, we will try to find out whether the U.N intervention in Somalia was justifiable in International law.

3.2 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER PROVISIONS ON MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

In 1942, Delegates from 50 Nations gathered in San Francisco for the U.N conference on International Organization. The Charter of the new Organization known as the 'United Nations' was drawn up and signed on June 26. During the proceedings of this conference, many small states objected to the provision that Decision-Making in the Security Council should require the assent of all the great powers, on the grounds that it conflicted with the principle of 'sovereign equality' of states. Further disagreements soon emerged over the casting of votes at this conference. This situation had adverse effects on collective security, or more specifically, maintaining international peace and security.

The raison d'Etre of the U.N is the Institutionalization of International cooperation and the promotion of world peace and security. In this regard, the preamble of the United Nations Charter contains the ambitious declaration that:

> We the people of the "United Nations", are committed "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrows to mankind, (Richard Hiscocks, 1973 : 54).

The preamble and Article 1 of the U.N Charter make references

to human rights. This innovation arises from the Union recent experiences concerning the fears for international peace and security by members of the Security Council. Again the Preamble and Article 2 condemn the use of force except for common interest. Moreover, the covenant forbids a recourse to war.

The committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. senate which had recommended the ratification of the league covenant only after putting forward a whole series of amendments and reservations, approved the Charter by 20 votes to 2. On October 24, with the addition of Poland, the U.N formally came into being with 51 original members. At the last plenary session of the San Francisco Conference President Truman made a speech in which he said:

> you have created a great instrument for peace and security and human progress in the world. The world must use it. If we fail to use it, we shall betray all those who have died in order that we might meet here in freedom and safely to create it.
> If we seek to use it selfishly - for the advantage of any nation or small group of nations we shall be equally guilty of that betrayal. The successful use of this instrument will require the united will and firm determination of the free peoples who have created it. The job will tax the moral strength and fibre of us all. We shall have to recognize - no matter how great our strength - that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please. (Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 1: 291).

The historic statement quoted above was made when the U.N was created. Today, member nations have abdicated the charge given by Truman judging from the irrational attitudes of

American towards the U.N, and the general tendency of member states to use the organization as an instrument for promoting national interest rather than as an institution for furthering international aims, especially peace maintenance.

However, the determination of member states to prevent another global conflagration remains a noble ideal of the U.N Nonetheless, considerable accomplishments have been registered by the U.N in international peace-keeping. And the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, in 1988, to the U.N peace-keeping forces is a clear testimony to the fact that international peace-keeping has become one of the most significant and generally positive activities of the world body.

3.2.1 FUNCTIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE U.N CHARTER.

The U.N Charter outlines all the objectives and programs of that body. The Charter is a multilateral treaty establishing the pattern of agreements and obligations of its members and as such, is an important addition to international law. As a written constitution, the Charter provides the U.N's organizational structures, principles, and powers, as well as functions. Because the U.N is, at most, a weak confederation, its members' obligations are limited and only their cooperation can bring about the implementation of its functions (cfRay A. Bennett, 1980 :54). The organization has no means of enforcing its decisions, unlike individual

are ridiculously accountable for the downward spiral of the U.N vis-a-vis maintaining international peace and security.

3.3 UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION MISSION IN SOMALIA.

Within the framework of maintaining international peace and security, the U.N has been able to intervene in most conflict situations - both interstate and intrastate-around the world (see record of U.N peace-keeping operations, past and present appendix A); with different results obtained in each case. When the U.N was established, a means was created by the framers of its Charter to resolve conflicts between and among states. In such a situation, 'collective measures' was designed to resolve conflicts that violate the territorial integrity of states and which can endanger international peace and security. This principle of 'collective security' was not realized in the Cold War era because of the seething differences that surfaced between the major powers and, more especially, the permanent members of the Security Council; endowed with 'veto' power.

With the eruption of violent regional conflicts in the 1960s, and more especially in the 1990s, a 'peace-keeping operation' came to be a testable device for controlling such conflicts. In response to the contingencies of intrastate conflicts, the U.N has created unprecedented departures in

its peace-keeping operation. The U.N mission in Somalia stretched the traditionally accepted concept of peace-keeping to accommodate a wider peace-enforcement. This was fraught with political, strategic, and tactical problems as our discussion of the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in the next chapter shows.

3.3.1 INCEPTION AND EVOLUTION OF U.N PEACE-KEEPING.

Since its inception, the U.N has developed a range of instruments of controlling and resolving conflicts between and within states. Perhaps, the most important among them, as listed in the Secretary-General's supplement to an agenda for peace, are preventive diplomacy and peace-making; peace-keeping; peace-building; disarmament; sanctions; and peace-enforcement. The U.N of course does not claim a monopoly of these instruments. In some cases, the instruments have been usefully employed by regional organizations, by ad hoc groups of states or by individual states. Nonetheless, the comparative advantages which the U.N has in the tremendous wealth of experience in the use of these instruments and the legitimacy of their use. Hence, the international community has turned increasingly to the U.N for the solution to international conflicts especially since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the U.N system appears to be better equipped than both regional and sub-regional organizations, as

well as individual member - states to develop and apply the comprehensive, long-term approach needed to ensure the lasting resolution to conflicts. In this wise, the role of development and Specialized Agencies of the U.N in post-conflict peace building is of critical importance. It should be noted that peace-keeping, one of the instruments of controlling and resolving conflicts by the U.N has been evolving and changing.

The evolution of International relations after World War II quickly brought to the fore differences which existed among the Member States, and in particular the five permanent members of the Security Council, thus affecting the smooth functioning of the U.N. Two events in 1956 marked the end of the collective peace-keeping the U.N had been striving for. One was the Suez Crisis. This colonial operation against Egypt launched by the two former colonial powers and permanent members of the Security Council - Britain and France - was formally terminated through a U.N resolution. After they prevented Security Council's action through their "veto" powers, they were compelled in a General Assembly resolution to declare an immediate cease-fire. The second was the Soviet invasion of and occupation of Hungary which saw the Security Council's impotence through the Soviet veto. In a resolution, the General Assembly called on the Soviet Union to obey but it ignored the call.

These two events showed that the U.N can only succeed in

carrying out the measures against an aggression specified in Chapter VII of the Charter if this suits the will of the two superpowers, or if one superpower tolerates the will of the other. It also became clear that the U.N cannot take action against the Soviet Union or the United States, like in Afghanistan and Nicaragua respectively. In fact, new conflicts arose, particularly during the process of decolonization, and many of them could not be resolved peacefully. There was a search for a resolution for such conflicts in order not to degenerate into general conflagrations. Hence, U.N peace-keeping operation evolved as essentially "Holding Actions" (The Blue Helmets, 1990 : 4). There was, and there is still, no particular theory or doctrine behind them. They were born of necessity, largely improvised, a practical response to a problem requiring action. The term peace-keeping operations did not gain currency until the 1960s (The United Nations At Forty, 1985 : 90 - 91).

As the U.N practice evolved over the years, a peace-keeping operation has come to be known as:

> an operation involving military personnel without enforcement powers undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in conflict areas (The Blue Helmets, August 1990: 8).

These operations are voluntary and based on "consent" and

"cooperation". While they involve the use of military personnel they achieve their objectives not by force of arms. Peace-keeping is only part of a large machinery for maintaining international peace and security. This machinery includes the Secretary-General and bilateral efforts of member states. The first peace-keeping operations embarked upon by the U.N was an observer mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Operation (UNTSO) in Palestine in 1945. Later observer missions were the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1948, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, United Nations Good Offices Missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) in 1988, United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNTMOG) in 1988 and the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) in 1988. There have been actual peace-keeping forces. The first was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) in Egypt - Israel from November 1956 to May 1967, United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from July 1960 to June 1964, United Nations Security Force in West Irian (UNSF) from September 1962 to April 1963 and the United nations Transition assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia from March 1988 to March 1990.

In the post - Cold War era, there has been a general willingness and determination by members of the U.N and specifically the permanent members of the Security Council to

effect peace-keeping. Many peace-keeping operations as well as observer missions were established in conflict areas. Completed missions include the UNTAG, UNOSOM I, UNAMIC, and ONUMOZ. Some of the ongoing missions include, United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), and United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

The first characteristic of a peace-keeping operation is that, it is established only with the consent of the parties to the conflict. This consent is required both in the operation's establishment and for the way in which it will carry out its mandate. It can be argued that there are some situations where there is an urgent need to deploy a peace-keeping force without the consent of the parties involved. This is true, especially where there is total break down of law and order and a gross human rights violation. This is common with most intrastate conflicts like in Somalia. In this case we realize that the principle of consent is minimized since there is need for the use of force to ensure the reconciliation of combatants and reestablishment of governmental authority. Furthermore, it is a key principle that the operation must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host countries. Here, it can be argued rightly that it

is doubtful how an operation cannot take sides while becoming a part of the conflict which it has been set up to control or resolve. In fact, with such guerilla wars on the African continent, the task of any international peace-keeping initiative must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks. In promoting national reconciliation and reestablishing governmental authority, the peace-keeping force must interfere in the internal affairs of these countries. But, the intervening force must be neutral in the conflict in reconciling the protagonists without which the situation will degenerate into a broader conflagration. Of course, the operation is devoid of enforcement powers except in self-defense as a last resort. If a party chooses not to cooperate, it can effectively defy a peace-keeping operation, a situation which occurred in Somalia.

3.3.2 NEW DEPARTURES IN UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SOMALIA.

United Nations peace-keeping defined as

> the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field hitherto with the "consent" of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well...,

has evolved rapidly in the post cold war era. If one is to consider the established principles outlined by the U.N

Secretary-General (Boutros Boutros Ghali, 1993 : 163 - 64) where the Somalia expedition is classified as a peace-keeping operation, it can hardly be denied that UNOSOM II marked a clear departure from the traditional concept of peace-keeping over the years in which;

. the mandate of the United Nations in carrying out peace-keeping missions must be CLEAR, ACCEPTED, and PRACTICABLE in the situation existing on the ground,

. the continuing SUPPORT of the Security Council which may be asked to intervene if one of the parties fails to provide the necessary support and cooperation, and

. the READINESS and continuous FINANCIAL SUPPORT of the member states to ensure reimbursement by the U.N to governments of states contributing troops.

A critical look at past experience in peace-keeping, it would appear that a clearer perspective emerged between the kind of "Enforcement Provision" provided for in Chapter VII of the U.N Charter and the type of "Peace-keeping Operations" established between 1945 to the present, (Rikhye et. al., 1974 : 10 - 21). The peace-keeping operations in these circumstances have been of two types.

Firstly, there are the peace observation groups such as those deployed in Greece in 1947, Palestine in 1948, Indonesia in 1948, and Kashmir in 1949. Any success it enjoyed was due in part to the cooperation of the parties in conflict in implementing that mandate. Its terms of reference were to

"observe" the peace which was assumed to be agreed upon by the parties to the conflict.

Secondly,there is the type referred to by Rikhye, Harbottle and Egge (1974: 20) as "the force level" peace-keeping operations, such as the Middle East (1956 and 1973), the Congo (1960) and Cyprus (1964).

It would be recalled that the U.N Charter advocated for the use of conventional military methods as part of collective security action to counter aggression. The peace-keeping operations were distinctly different from action under Chapter VII of the Charter for two reasons:

. the interventions have been peaceful, and

. the forces involved have operated within or at the request of the parties to the conflict.

In fact, the severity of the Somalia crisis was to create new dimensions or modification of the traditional peace-keeping. It can be argued that with alarming insecurity and total break down of law and order, alongside banditry; looting and extortion of food by armed bandits at gunpoint, the traditional provisions of peace-keeping were to be violated. At least, force was necessary to secure a calm and secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian and relief assistance as well as pacifying the warlords. In support of this the Secretary- General on 24 November 1992, brought to the notice of the Security Council the need to review the traditional principles on which the U.N was operating in

Somalia. According to the Secretary-General, the review became necessary because "the traditional methods of peace-keeping were not yielding the desired results" (Boutros B. Ghali, 1993 : 164). He then set in motion the process which was to lead to measures of peace-enforcement. This situation, as would be examined, was to raise more questions than answers. One of such questions is whether the extension of the operation beyond its traditional boundaries as earlier on mentioned could be justified in international law.

3.4 JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA.

Disaster relief is widely acclaimed as the most popular form of U.N intervention. However, its relief efforts towards man-made disasters such as those of Somalia, Bosnia, Sudan, Liberia, and Cambodia, differ from its traditional relief responses to natural disasters because of their extraordinary complexity. These complex humanitarian emergencies involve some or all of the following as was the case in Somalia: Civil strife, mass starvation, looting and extortion of aid, collapse of civil society, mass unemployment, refugee and displaced persons movements, and complex political negotiations over the transportation of food and relief commodities through areas of conflict.

In 1992 for instance, the U.S Agency for International Development (AID) - and specifically its Office of Foreign

Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food For Peace (FFP) Programme reported that nearly 58 million people were at risk of death from starvation and of starvation - related illnesses in various places including Somalia, (Andrew S. Natios, Winter 1994 : 129).

Barbara Harff (1993) makes a compelling case for the U.N intervention in Somalia by characterizing the latter as exemplifying: "a distinct type of crime against humanity in which the international community has a legal and moral imperative to intervene".

Having lived through a humanitarian crisis in the Cold War era where unilateral political adventures were classified as "humanitarian" for strategic and political purposes, the "new world order" had to provide sufficient consensus across a broad spectrum of the international community whose "conscience" had been pricked for intervening in such conflicts on humanitarian grounds. The circumstances of the Somalia conflict have already been discussed in Chapter two. It can be recalled that mass starvation was directly linked to the disintegration of political order. The Secretary-General's Report mentioned the over 1000 deaths daily as a direct result of starvation. But at the same time, the humanitarian assistance was seized by armed bandits. The most compelling case of the intervenor would aim at protecting the surviving civilians against mass starvation and prepare the groundwork for establishing an interim government in

Somalia. It can be argued that such a task could not be accomplished by the traditional methods of peace-keeping "EXCEPT" the use of force, as was done in Somalia. In arriving at this conclusion, Boutros. B. Ghali according to Andrew S. Natsios (1994) characterized the changing context of international politics as one in which,

> "the centuries - old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer hold supreme and was, in fact, never so absolute as it was conceived to be in theory" (: 129).

About 37 years ago Dag Hammerskjöld, the then Secretary-General of U.N stated, concerning the status and functions of the U.N Emergency Force (UNEF), that, "a rule ... reflecting a basic Charter principle precludes... the employment of United Nations elements in situations of an essentially internal nature ... 1958 : 8 - 31). The General Assembly in a latter resolution confirmed the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states. The matter was further clarified through a judgement by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case between United Kingdom and Albania where the argument of the Court was that:

> the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international

organization, finds a place in international law, (D. J. Harris, 1973).

It can be argued that, in practical terms states' sovereignty has not necessarily been absolute as it was intended by the Treaty of Westphalia. In this regard, intervention by an international organization acting within "STRICT LEGAL LIMITS" can be justified when massive human rights are being violated. In this regard, international community gives its mandate, as it were, to the U.N to uphold moral principles and defend international standards of justice. If it had been carried out earlier, it is argued, the situation as in other cases such as Bosnia or Rwanda, may not have reached a crisis point that necessitated the deployment of UNOSOM II. In fact, as legally constituted Article 34 of the U.N Charter empowers the Security Council to investigate disputes that endanger international peace and security. As submitted in Chapter two, the break down of law and order in Somalia by 1991, and the threat to peace in the Horn of Africa as a whole provided sufficient grounds for U.N intervention, moreso, as it had greater implications for a wider regional conflagration.

If we subscribe to the definition of humanitarian intervention by Ian Brownlie (1973:116) as: "the threat or use of armed force by a state, a belligerent country, or an international organization, with the object of protecting human rights", we can argue that the conscience of the international community must be shocked to the extent of

helplessness and abuse and the violation must be proven and not assumed. With the special circumstances and implications of the Somalia conflict, we can argue out that the traditional principles guiding the deployment of peace-keeping operation could not deliver the desired results. Unless the peace-keeping force was authorized to use force, the tasks of promoting national reconciliation and resuscitation of governmental authority in Somalia would not be accomplished. In this regard, there is a step further from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement which entails operations carried out to restore peace between parties which do not all consent to intervention and may be engaged in combat activities or even hostile acts against a peace-keeping and peace-enforcement force. The dividing line between peace-keeping and peace-enforcement is "CONSENT" of the parties to the conflict.

It can be argued further that, International peace-keeping demonstrates problems resulting from crossing the "consent" boundary from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement. If perceived to be taking sides or using force in a way that alienates support, the peace-keeping force may lose its credibility as an impartial third party. This situation will prejudice its legitimacy and even the security of its personnel. Hence, the peace- keeping force will then devote more time and resources in protecting itself. If International peace-keepers actually join the conflict which they were put there to police, they may become embroiled in

activities that are irrelevant to the overall purpose of intervention. Such a situation, in the view of Prof. Ibrahim Gambari(1997) will almost certainly result in a loss of popular support, an attendant loss of control and unrestricted escalation in the level of violence which will heighten tension and foreclose opportunities for resolving the conflict. The only way out in such a situation is for the force to withdraw from the theater of conflict. The cases of Somalia and Bosnia Herzegovina are instructive in this respect.

Although, in partial agreement with the argument that the time of absolute sovereignty is over, it would be difficult not to see that the path from the theoretical underpinnings to its practical operationalization is fraught with problems of a political, strategic and tactical nature which, it is hoped, the U.N Mission, UNOSOM II, will serve to demonstrate in Somalia.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA AND ITS AFTERMATH

4.1 INTRODUCTION.

As already mentioned in Chapter three, United Nations intervention in Somalia could be justified on humanitarian grounds. The intervention, force was expected to be ideologically neutral, and at best, to play the role of an "international mediator" in reconciling the belligerents - Ali Mahdi and Farah Aidid - depending on what the latter want and ought to have. In this respect, the only means available to the U.N in pacifying these warlords is the traditional non-violent peace-keeping operation. Of course, peace can only be achieved through negotiations and agreements reached between the combatants themselves. The U.N is to act as an umpire in the implementation of the agreements, and not to impose or enforce them.

With the collapse of the government of Siad Barre in January 1991, Somalia was a state in need of humanitarian and relief assistance from the international community. By March 1991 the U.N established its presence in Somalia with the provision of humanitarian and relief assistance to the affected populations. On April 24 1992 the Security Council

promulgated into law its resolution 751 (1992) which led to the establishment of a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Initially, the operation was traditionally a peace-keeping force, but by its resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December, 1992, the U.N for the first time intervened militarily for humanitarian purposes. Finally, the transition from UNOSOM I to UNOSOM II (the Second United Nations Operation in Somalia) was a clear deviation from the "principles" hitherto established to guide the deployment of peace-keeping missions. Moreover, the method and manner in which the force was used in Somalia became problematic.

This chapter focuses on the early U.N activities in Somalia and how they conform to the traditional peace-keeping principles aimed at providing humanitarian relief to a greatly emaciated people. It also hammers on the U.N deviation from the traditional peace-keeping principles to a more reactionary peace-enforcement action and reasons for failure to follow these principles. Finally, the Chapter looks at other factors (besides the failure to follow strictly these principles) that led to failure of the mission itself.

4.2 THE SOMALIA CRISIS AND EARLY UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS.

In January 1991, the government of Siad Barre collapsed. This development plunged some parts of Somalia into chaos an anarchy. As the crisis in Somalia deepened the various sub-

clans which were formerly united against Siad Barre's nepotism and autocratic regime suddenly revolted and fought each other in the struggle for power and domination. The chaotic situation exacerbated to what can be termed as - clan factionalism/organization and rivalry". This ugly situation turned Mogadishu into a 'melting pot' of clannish rivalry and hatred. While this animosity spread to other parts of the country, the main protagonists of the 'showdown' Ali Mahdi and Farah Aidid exploited the seething clannish differences for their selfish political ends.

Despite the political turmoil that ensued, the U.N continued its humanitarian efforts in Somalia and by March 1991 was fully engaged in that country. It can be argued that, the volatile security situation in Somalia that preceded Siad Barre's overthrow prevented the U.N from accomplishing its objectives, such as creating a buffer-zone and negotiating a cease-fire. This situation forced the U.N on several occasions to temporarily withdraw its personnel from Somalia. However, their humanitarian assistance was intensified due to the encouragement of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Against this background, the U.N Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) became actively involved in the political aspects of the crisis, (United Nations Peace-keeping, 1995:

127 - 28) In order to press for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. On 27 December 1991, the then U.N Secretary-General Javier P de Cuellar informed the president of the Security Council that he intended to take an initiative towards a peaceful resolution of the Somalia crisis (United Nations Peace-keeping, 1995 : 128). After consulting the incoming Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, he asked the then under Secretary for Political Affairs - James O. C. Jonah to visit the area in January 1992, despite continuous fighting in Mogadishu.

During Mr. Jonah's visit, support for a cease-fire in Mogadishu was expressed by all the faction leaders, except Farah Aidid. Unanimous support was expressed for a U.N role in bringing about national reconciliation. Following the result of the visit, the Security Council on 23 January 1992, in its resolution 733 (1992), urged all parties to the conflict to end their hostilities. The resolution called on all states to immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. On 31 January 1992, the Secretary-General invited the LAS, OAU, and OIC, as well as Interim President Ali Mahdi and Farah Aidid to send representatives to participate in consultation talks at the U.N Head Quarters from 12 to 14 February. The two factions in Mogadishu then agreed immediately to a cessation of hostilities and to maintain a cease-fire. They also accepted a visit to Mogadishu by a

joint high-level delegation comprising representatives of the U.N and the three regional organizations to conclude a cease-fire agreement. On 3 March 1992, after four days of intensive negotiations, Interim President Ali Mahdi and Farah Aidid signed an agreement on:

. the implementation of a cease-fire,

. the acceptance of a U.N security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance,

. the deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the cease fire, and

. a national reconciliation conference to which all Somali clans would be invited.

On 17 March, the Security council adopted resolution 746 (1992) supporting the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch to Somalia a technical team to prepare a plan for a cease-fire monitoring mechanism. This team visited Somalia from 23 to April 1, 1992. Following discussions with the team, Ali Mahdi and Farah Aidid signed on 28 and 27 March respectively "Letters of Agreement" on the mechanisms for monitoring the cease-fire and on arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian and relief assistance.

4.2.1 INCEPTION AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF UNOSOM I

Due to the fratricidal tendencies among the Somali factions/sub-clans, - a reign of terror, banditry, looting,

political murder and gangsterism became the order of the day. Equally, the political scenario of Somalia remained unpredictable and created difficulties for the U.N intervening force in its attempt to accomplish its goals and objectives. In response to a recommendation of the Secretary-General, therefore, the Security Council on 24 April 1992 adopted resolution 751 (1992) by which it decided to establish a U.N Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). The Council authorized the Secretary-General alongside the LAS, OAU, and OIC, to pursue consultations with all Somalia factions towards convening a conference on National reconciliation and unity. It also called on the international community for financial and material support for the Security Council's "ninety-days" Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian assistance to Somalia. By this resolution, the Secretary-General was mandated by the Security Council to deploy 50 observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu. The two principal factions in Mogadishu agreed to the deployment of 500 U.N security personnel as part of UNOSOM operation.

Following extensive consultations with the various Somali leaders, Elders, and other personalities, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on the complexity of the political and security situation in Somalia and the need to modify the mandate to ensure safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, recovery programs, and institution-building. In this regard, it can be argued that the U.N was to "ADAPT" its

involvement in Somalia, that its efforts must be "ENLARGED" in order to bring about an effective cease-fire, national reconciliation, and unity. It is further argued that given the particular atmosphere in which UNOSOM was operating, such goals and objectives could not be achieved unless some degree of force was authorized. Against this background, the Secretary-General convened the second Cooperation Meeting on Humanitarian assistance for Somalia at the Conference Centre of Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Addis Ababa (United Nations Peace-keeping, 1995, : 128 - 130) in December 1992. The conference was aimed at: Implementing the "100-Days Action Programme" for accelerated humanitarian aid, and enhancing the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia. Unfortunately, the reigning insecurity and lack of cooperation from some of the Somalia factions prevented the conference from achieving these goals. However, in another conference on humanitarian assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa in March 1993, little was achieved.

In spite of the modest efforts of UNOSOM, Somalia remained without a central government with which to negotiate the peace process. Mogadishu was divided by rival factions resulting to political chaos, physical destruction of lives and property, and extortion and looting of aid supplies. Moreover, the various Somali factions failed to cooperate with UNOSOM. This made the situation more bleak. Within this hostile atmosphere, there was a need to surmount the

situation. Thus, in a letter to the Security council dated November 29 1992, the Secretary-General proposed the following options:

- to continue and intensify efforts to deploy UNOSOM in accordance with its existing mandate,
- to abandon the use of international military personnel to protect relief activities, and that humanitarian agencies make the best arrangements they could with Somali factions,
- to demonstrate a show of force by UNOSOM troops in Mogadishu,
- to undertake a countrywide enforcement by a group of Member states authorized to do so by the Security Council, and
- to undertake a countrywide enforcement action to be carried out under U.N command and control as against the fourth option offered by the United States to organize and lead the force.

It is pertinent to state here that options one and two were rejected by the Secretary-General for being inadequate in resolving the conflict. It is equally obvious that these two options were in accordance with the traditional method of peace-keeping operations. These two options if adopted, it is argued, would have helped UNOSOM's initiatives of peace, reconciliation and Unity of Somalia. But the Security Council decided to adopt the last three options which deal entirely

with 'ENFORCEMENT' action. It is naive to argue, according to the Secretary-General that these options will be capable of handling the situation, though it is consistent with the recent enlargement of the Organization's role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Furthermore it would strengthen its long-term evolution as an effective system of collective security in the post - Cold war era. It can be argued further that, in resorting to enforcement action in Somalia's internal affair the "consent" boundary is crossed, as such, cooperation by the factions might be difficult, if not, impossible. Another problem is with whether the enforcement action was the type provided for in Chapter VII of the U.N Charter. Also, what problems would be faced by the force in accomplishing its mandate?

4.3 FROM UNOSOM I TO UNOSOM II: RESULT OF THE INTERVENTION

In spite of the modest gains achieved by UNOSOM I in its famous "Operation Restore Hope" - when the first contingent of American troops arrived Mogadishu on December 9 1992, - Somalia continued to be ravaged by the bitter and violent fratricidal confrontations with severe repercussions on the armless populace. It was within this context of violence that the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council recommendations towards the transition of UNOSOM I to UNOSOM II on March 3 1993. Besides, the Secretary-General reported

that, since the adoption of resolution 794 (1992) in December 1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) had deployed approximately 37,000 troops to Southern Somalia, covering approximately 40% of Somalia's land surface. Despite this, the necessary security conditions required for safe delivery of humanitarian assistance could not be guaranteed. This was evident by the following:-

- . the absence of an organized civilian police force,
- . the absence of an effective government,
- . absence of a disciplined armed force, and
- . continued incidents of violence.

The Secretary-General then concluded that if the security council deemed it necessary for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II the latter should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the U.N Charter to establish a peaceful environment throughout Somalia for the delivery of humanitarian and relief assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II, under the mandate recommended by the Secretary-General would seek to complete through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF, that is, the task to restore peace, stability, law and order in Somalia. The mandate will also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their economic, social and political life. The mandate will also aim at achieving national reconciliation, and reactivating a Somali state based on democratic governance.

On March 26 1993, the Security Council acting under

Chapter VII of the U.N Charter adopted resolution 814 (1993) by which it modified the mandate of the U.N mission. The mandate's modification and expansion was a far cry from the traditional principles, hitherto established to guide the deployment of peace-keeping missions (Secretary-General's Report on UNEF, October 9 1958, Item 65: 8 - 31). In authorizing the use of force, for the first time, in a nation's internal affairs the Security Council was giving the U.N more powers than it had ever enjoyed in the resolution of an intrastate conflict.

At the same time, developing nations were not blind to the unprecedented 'carte-blanche' that was given to the U.S force (the tactical Quick Reaction Force and Rangers) in pursuit of the mission in Somalia. These concerns were partially addressed by provisions which watered down the resolution and in which the Secretary-General was to be given "oversight" functions in the operation. Arguably, as would be seen, the seeds of discord were sown at the very beginning of the transition from UNOSOM I to UNOSOM II. It can be argued further that, with the particular circumstances of the Somalia conflict (as presented above), some amount of force was necessary to repel the warring factions and provide a secure environment for peace negotiations to begin. In this wise, the Security Council had no option than to resort to the enforcement provision under Chapter VII of the U.N Charter. However, the enforcement action approved by the Security

Council in this particular case went beyond what is provided for in Chapter VII. Furthermore, giving oversight functions to the Secretary-General and the U.S to use "any" means to restore peace and further UNOSOM II's mandate, respectively was a gross violation of Somalia's sovereignty. Finally, UNOSOM soon faced problems of a political tactical and strategic nature in upholding its mandate, with obvious results.

Besides the efforts by U.N in pursuit of peace and security in order to enhance a safe delivery of humanitarian relief and other supplies, the priority UNOSOM II gave to DISARMAMENT of all Somali factions and armed groups accentuated the hostilities of a few clan leaders. Apart from refusing to disarm, they resorted to violence in order to frustrate efforts of UNOSOM II to bring peace and development in Somalia. It is argued that since disarmament and reconciliation are not the structural causes of the conflict and the U.N policy-makers did not seek the consent of the main factions in conflict, cooperation from the latter was difficult, if not, impossible. Disarmament was fraught with ambitious policy-making which is not in line with what the factions wanted and ought to have.

Consequently, in the seeming lack of cooperation with UNOSOM II force, the Somali attacked the later on June 5 1993 killing 25 Pakistani soldier, 10 were reported missing, and 54 wounded (United Nation's peace-keeping 1995:134). It was

believed that the militiamen belonged to the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) led by Farah Aidid. Against this background the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on June 6. He strongly condemned this "treacherous act" against peace-keepers "who are on a mission of peace, reconciliation and reconstruction", and urged "prompt and firm" action against the "perpetrators of this crime". The Security Council adopted resolution 837 (1993) of June 6 authorizing the Secretary-General under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the attack.

In fact, the killing of Pakistani members of the peace-keeping force catalysated the U.N mission of "Operation Restore Hope" since attention was now focused on identifying and arresting the culprits. The U.N's attention was thus diverted completely from its mission objectives to one to capturing Farah Aidid. The USC/SNA allied faction identified UNOSOM II troops as its common enemy and fought them violently instead of facing squarely Ali Mahdi for the struggle for power and other grievances already discussed in Chapter two. The failure of the peace-keeping mission in Somalia, besides being attributed to the inability of the U.N to follow strictly the principles guiding the deployment of peace-keeping operations, had other factors both remote and immediate.

4.4 THE MISSION AND REASONS FOR FAILURE

As stated earlier, one of the main reasons for the failure of the U.N operation (UNOSOM II) has to do with its refusal to strickly follow the traditional principles guiding the deployment of peace-keeping operations. Others include imprecision of goals, unclear strategic objectives, and divided interventions and agenda, the U.N and the Ghali factor, United States - U.N rift, and the division in military strategy and other difficulties, unfamiliarity among policy - makers involved in the humanitarian intervention. We discussed in greater details some of these factors immediately below

4.4.1 IMPRECISE POLICIES AND UNCLEAR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES.

As soon as it was established that international standards of human rights were being violated in Somalia, it was not too difficult to admit - thanks to the technological revolution which carried stark images of deprivation and death across the globe - that the U.N should intervene to improve standards which should prevail over assertion of national sovereignty. But as Barbara Harff (1994) noted "the path that leads from recognizing that a crime against humanity is being committed to the prescription of appropriate sanctions and responses is fraught with political difficulties". Such political difficulties, it is argued, led to imprecision of goals and unclear policy of engagement by the U.N in Somalia.

Ofcourse, imprecision of goals and unclear policy of engagement cannot and did not help U.N's mission in Somalia. As clearly expressed in Chapter two of this study, the Somalia debacle resulted to a large extent from a deep seclusion between Ali Mahdi and Farah Aidid, who were the main protagonists of the conflict. Within this fragile context, the U.N role, at best, was to be limited to, and clearly made to appear, as that of an "impartial" or "neutral" international "mediator". Once this failed to be the case, at least in the eyes of the main protagonists, then U.N's mission ran in to difficulties. U.N neutrality was compromised when it appeared that it has taken sides with Ali Mahdi. This partial sentiment of the U.N worsened the internal conflict, and reduced its prestige and image as an international mediator. In his report on Enlargening Preventive Diplomacy, the Secretary-General stated that the principal function of UNOSOM II was to supervise the implementation of agreements between the factions in conflict contrived in the Addis Ababa Convention in January and March 1993. The provisions of the convention include:

- monitoring the cease-fire,
- disarming the warlords, and
- demobilizing and reconciling the warlords.

The report further admitted that it was the responsibility of the factions themselves to implement the aforementioned agreements while the U.N mandate and policy was to be a more

"facilitator", (United Nations Peace-Keeping, February 1995, p. 137).

Meanwhile, the warring factions had agreed in a series of meetings held to set up local conferences to this end. On May 31, the S.N.A. and U.S.C. contrived an agreement to resolve their differences. Unfortunately, the U.N declared that initiative "unauthorized" which elicited a negative response from Mohammed Aidid who suspiciously believed that the U.N was in league with Ali Mahdi. It can be argued that the U.N was not neutral in the crisis resolution process and had a U.N interest to protect, if not, why did it object to the USC/SNA agreements? Did the U.N forget its role of an impartial mediator to FACILITATE the implementation of the agreements reached by the warring parties? As Farah Aidid contended the U.N was not neutral and could not decide the best form of organizing peace for the Somalis. It is quite obvious here that the U.N role as an international mediator dramatically changed to one of an international peace "imposer" to protect its interest in Somalia. But this succeeded in generating hostilities for the U.N as evidenced by the joint action against UNOSOM II by the USC and SNA.

Strategically, the U.N Mission to Restore Hope was a long-term mission which lacked a post intervention strategy. This means that the intervention was not an end in itself but a necessary point in a chain of efforts which was to link up to other missions and development agencies to resolve a crisis

whose roots ran deep in the historical, socio-economic, and political circumstances of the people of Somalia. The case study of the U.N Mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which REACH, HARBOTTLE and EGGE (1974 : 10 - 21) describe as one of the three "force level operations" undertaken by the United Nations, is instructive, if only in the comparison of efforts - though the circumstances are different with regard to the stated policy goal and intended role assigned to the mission. In the Cyprus intervention the Security Council on March 4 1964, authorized the Secretary-General to raise a peace-keeping force for Cyprus. The mandate that was assigned required forces:

> To the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence in fighting and, as necessary, to CONTRIBUTE to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions, (Ibid, : 17).

The relationship between the Cyprus and Somalia interventions is that they are purely domestic crises. But the means and method used to keep peace in each case is totally different. Using the term "CONTRIBUTE" is an acknowledgement that U.N intervention was to "ASSIST" rather than "ENFORCE" the peace, unlike the Somalia intervention. Furthermore, the word "WILL" does not appear in the U.N Charter text of conflict resolution. The justification for its action defined at the

same time its line of responsibility and left the mandate flexible. Anything other than that would have been difficult - given the special characteristics of the Cyprus conflict - to implement.

Following the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly on July 12, 1967 on the UNEF I Mission in the Middle East, it was abundantly made clear that for such a mission to succeed - "a third party peace-keeping force" (Ibid : 19) - it had to operate on the "consent" and "cooperation" of the parties in conflict which therefore established cordial relations with the Arab world. To ensure cooperation, the intervention force was expected to exercise neutrality in the conflict. Care was thus taken to state - in agreement with the parties - that its initial function was "to enter into Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government in order to maintain quietude during and after the withdrawal of foreign troops, (Ibid, : 20 - 21).

There was lack of such precision of goals and strategic rules of engagement in the Somalia intervention. The mission was fraught with confusing objectives which again were beyond immediate reach - long-term achievements. In justifying U.N intervention on humanitarian grounds, relief issues should underline the intervention; then followed by diplomatic and military issues. Relief issues dramatically and immediately became operationally subordinate to diplomatic and military issues in Somalia; although these latter were of only

secondary importance to the protection of the relief effort itself, (Andrew S. Natsios, Winter 1994, : 133).

In addressing the problem of identifying and solidly supporting the structures which could strengthen the peace and avoid relapse into conflict, the U.N Mission envisaged a "peace-building" role which was to be one of the constituent elements in a gradual continuum of peace-keeping in addressing heading the fundamental basis of the conflict. Thomas G. Weiss contends that, it would greatly enhance the efficiency of the U.N involvement if the respective criteria were stated in advance. This according to Thomas G. Weiss will give contributing countries and U.N decision - makers enough time to communicate with their respective publics about what specifically the U.N intends to achieve in particular crises, with what means and role of engagement, as well as the level of resources needed in the Mission. When such an operational concept is strictly applied and followed, there will be a likelihood for peace-keeping to succeed.

This not withstanding, the gulf between theory and practice, between the principles and objectives of the Charter, and the political realities of our time is undeviant, especially with the primary function of the U.N - maintaining global peace and security. In such desolation, the U.N has time and again to fall back on less-well defined measures culminating in the arrogation of powers to the Secretary-General (as submitted in Chapter one of this study). Such unlimited powers given the

Secretary-General in Somalia following the adoption of resolution 837 (1993) of June 6 to capture General Farah Aidid for trial and punishment marked a turning point in the entire Mission and constituted a gross violation of the traditional peace-keeping principles. This in no small way contributed to the failure of this mission.

4.4.2 DIVERGENT INTERVENTIONS AND AGENDA.

The decision by the U.N to intervene in the conflict in Somalia was justified on Humanitarian grounds. With such intervention, it is expected that, in order to achieve reasonable degree of success by the intervening forces, there was supposed to be a "unified" and clearly "defined" intervention and agenda, without which failure will be the end result. The heading does not mean that several interventions took place at different periods by separate powers in Somalia. Rather, there occurred significant divergences that emerged and crystallized between the U.S and the U.N, regarding the instantiation of a "New World Order"; like in Iraq and Bosnia as presented separately below.

4.4.2.1 THE U.N AND THE GHALI FACTOR.

Although the U.N intervention in Somalia was supposed to be a humanitarian venture, the objectives of both the U.N and the U.S had very little humanitarian values in their execution. The U.N suffered at the height of the crisis which brought it in to Mogadishu. G. PRUNIER (1993) calls it an "Original Sin" which could be traced as far back in time to an attempt by the "Moderate" Arab States under the sponsorship of the Egyptian government to organize in Cairo on 12 December, 1990 a conference aimed at bringing together the main protagonists in the emerging civil disorder in Somalia. The Organizer of the conference was Boutros B. Ghali, then Foreign Minister of Egypt. The plan of the moderate Arabs was to realize, as it were, unity between member states of the Arab League. Ideally, the unity was to be organized under the auspices of a restricted group of organizations having under their direction certain political figures with close relations with the Siad Barre regime. It can be recalled that the 'moderates' plan had the support of Egypt whose Foreign Minister subsequently, became the Secretary-General of the U.N and one of the most instrumental figures in the conception of the Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia. On April 28, 1992, Boutros B. Ghali appointed Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun as his special representative in Somalia. Unfortunately, the latter being undiplomatic and "non-bureaucratic brought him, in spite of

the recorded progress made, into conflict with the objectives of the U.N.

The Salmoun Plan which was aimed at reconstructing Somalia was nevertheless, implemented. The Plan (reconstruction of Somalia) was conceived not immediately as "a state" but rather in terms of setting-up regional - administrative units which could provide the solid foundations of a functioning Somalia on a national as well as international planes. Because of the modest objectives which were achievable, the Salmoun Plan was endorsed by the U.S as a "working power-workshop" on humanitarian grounds. Salmoun's personal diplomatic negotiations with leaders of the main clan groups - Ali Mahdi and Farah Aidid - as well as his insistence on this plan consequently led to his dismissal by Boutros B. Ghali in spite of apparent progress made in obtaining an agreement from the initially hostile and uncompromising Farah Aidid. The Agreement reached between them was aimed at increasing the deployment of peace-keeping forces thereby facilitating relief supplies to the affected populations initially blocked by hostile militias. Since this plan was not founded on the reconstitution of the state of Somalia it did not have the blessings of the U.N. But the reconstitution of the state - albeit payed with good intentions - was not consistent with the reality on the ground. G. PRUNIER is of the view that nearly everyone in Somalia knew that the secession of Somaliland was an irreversible fact which, though

in bad taste to some - especially the Secretary-General - had to be accepted. Of course, the U.N wanted a reorganized Somalia under one government.

4.4.2.2 U.S - U.N DIVERGENCE AND IMPACT.

According to J. DECORNOY and M. KLARE (1993) U.S involvement in Somalia was, in principle, important and in line with its philosophical underpinnings in practice was inconsistent with the fundamental requirements of such an undertaken. (: 8). PRUNTER (1993) maintained that the failure of the Mission, was not only foreseeable but probable, judging from the weak foundation upon which it was raised. He argued that, in the Cold War era, collective security was bound to fail due largely to the lack of consensus among the major powers - especially the Permanent Members of the Security Council except where there was a convergence of interests to articulate. A case in point according to him, is the Gulf war which was one of a common interest protection such as, the West's and specifically, America's access to Oil in the Middle East - the World's Oil bunker. But with civil wars, isolated cases of Haiti and Somalia continue to remind us that the theory and practice of collective security (the use of force) cannot upset up the process of nation-building which the U.N desired rightly or wrongly in Somalia. Where such a harmony of interests was found to exist, the role of the U.N

in order to win American participation was found to provide a legitimate "cloak" for what was to be in the main a U.S action. Naturally, we should not lose sight of the fact that the beneficial and salutary consequences of short-term U.S actions, with a minimal cost in human lives as possible is important. If an American president hoped to make meaningful capital for popular support. As it turns out, and this is a point of divergence with the U.N , most conflicts (especially intrastate) require necessary balance between immediate and long-term solutions for which the U.S as an instrumental part of the U.N Forces, is not prepared to observe. As such, conflicts in Western Sahara, Cyprus, Yugoslavia are left to the U.N with an limited U.S participation as possible. The Somalia intervention which the U.S considered as "a low intensity conflict" had as its main objective - the defence of humanitarian values which the U.S was out to protect. But in so far as U.S long-term interests were concerned it became difficult to secure for involvement on purely humanitarian values, a short-term interest, thus making U.S Mission in Somalia ambiguous.

In another level of analysis, about two thirds of Somalia territory had been conceded to American petroleum giants - CONOCO, AMOCO, CHEVRON AND PHILLIPS - during the reign of Siad Barre. CONOCO, a multinational corporation, was documented to have been directly implicated in the American aid action placed under the auspices of the U.N. It is not totally

unreasonable to assume that the U.S did have an interest in bringing about the conditions for peace in a region in which the World Bank had earlier recommended an increase in investments aimed at petroleum research.

In such a circumstance, if the U.S was to be involved, the terms of reference of the U.N Mission had to be consistent with her interests. Paragraph 8 of resolution 794 (December 3 1992) had to be re-formulated and any mention of 'disarmament' of Somalia factions which was the priority of the Secretary-General - had to be limited to "The creation of a safe environment", for the delivery of humanitarian supplies. There were thus, significant divergences between the U.S and the U.N, even if there was a workable cooperation in other areas. It is argued that the consequent lack of cooperation from the belligerents in Somalia was to prove a greater hinderance than initially anticipated. Initially, Farah Aidid was hostile to the U.N plan to set-up a conference on national reconciliation in Addis Ababa to be held on January 4 1993. In this conference Aidid read or misread a hidden U.N agenda to RECONSTITUTE a UNITED Somalia under the direction of friends of Ali Mahdi - and close friends of the deposed Siad Barre. These were the'same allies who were insisting on maintaining U.S troops in Somalia. It was also assumed that the American government was favorably inclined to the Organization of Somalia on a unitary basis and less inclined towards a particular warring faction (Andrew Lycett,

1993,: 35). It is argued that if Aidid was initially favorable to the stated plan it was on account of the assumption that maintaining U.S troops would provide the necessary and sufficient guarantee that the U.S "marines" would not be replaced by U.N troops. Since U.N troops were constituted mainly by moderate Muslim and non-Muslim states like Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, they were favourable to the position of the Arab League - National unity of Somalia under Ali Mahdi. Farah Aidid objected to U.N troops on this account.

The Salmoon Plan was a gradual and regional approach towards reconstituting the administrative set-up in Somalia. Besides, the plan embraced the blessings of Farah Aidid and was a first step towards reinstating the elements of state machinery. Contrary to this, the U.N favored a rapid, direct approach of political reconstruction which brought it into direct conflict with Farah Aidid. This friction and disagreement between Aidid and the U.N decisively sealed the fate of an ill-begotten, vaguely conceived, and strategically limited U.N humanitarian intervention to provide "Hope" in a country which needed more than good intentions and neutrality in keeping the peace.

Against this background, in its resolution 946 (1994) the Security Council declared its readiness to consider sending a peace-keeping mission to Somalia to convey directly to the political factions the Council's views on the appropriate date

for the end of the mandate of UNOSOM II. It should be noted that none of the Somalia factions had requested a longer extension of the U.N mandate; nor did the humanitarian agencies or NGOs. These efforts besides being abortive in the face of unpopular nature of the mission as a whole, precipitated the adoption of resolution 954 (1994) of November 4. In this resolution, the U.N extended its mandate to 31 March 1995. The Security Council on the other hand, decided that every effort should be made to withdraw UNOSOM II military force and assets from Somalia in a secure and orderly manner. It also requested Member states to assist in the withdrawal process while urging the factions themselves to negotiate an effective cease fire and the formation of a transitional government of national unity, (United Nations Peace-Keeping, February 1995, : 154 - 57). With such unsuccessful efforts, the United Nations mission to pacify Somalia and reconstruct it on democratic governance came to an end.

4.4.3 DIVIDED MILITARY STRATEGY AND DIFFICULTIES.

The U.N military command in Somalia was fraught with lack of a unified command and control and underwent subtle changes with time. Besides being contrary to the characteristic conditions of success of a peace-keeping operation, it ushered in some troubling difficulties for the intervening forces. With

such an intervention, certain difficulties and short-comings were inescapable, (J. Ruggie, 1994, p. 23, Thomas G. Weiss, 1994 pp. 154 – 55) where interest is at stake especially with the command and control of military operations. No doubt, the U.S troops including the Quick Reaction Force and the Rangers were outside the U.N command structure. They were commanded by Major-General William Garrison, a U.S Special Forces officer who reported to the U.S Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida (Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, 1996 : 73). This situation suggests that the independent state governments who intervened in Somalia had hidden agenda and as such their objectives had little or not humanitarian values to defend as they claimed.

Furthermore, the existence of multiple languages, and procedures involved as well as lack of common training of separate military units from different countries posed great difficulties to the intervening forces. To what extent this controversy affected negatively the operation may require statistical evidence which is not readily available. It suffices to say that the present "peace-keeping" force finds itself in a "gray" area between "classical peace-keeping" and "enforcement action". As such there do not appear to have been sufficient preparation, logistic and military resources to successfully internalize the required changes, (see Table on appendix C on the Composition and strength of UNOSOM II by various countries). Probably, strict adherence to the

Charter, especially Article 47 (3) provided for a Military Staff Committee - comprising the chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council to give: "the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council", (LeRoy A. Bennett, 1980, p. 67), may have avoided the strategic short-comings arising out of the fact that the various forces were commanded by their home governments rather than the U.N command structure - a new trend with peace-keeping in the post-cold war epoch. This short coming emanates from the fact that those who drafted the U.N Charter did not deal with the command of U.N forces. As such, this phenomenon came to gain autonomy recently of which the forces are more committed to their national loyalties than the collective interest of the U.N. Another problem is that those who drafted the U.N Charter did not take in to cognizance the eruption of domestic conflicts. For this reason, the concept of 'peace-keeping operations' came to gain currency only in the 1960s as a technique to control and resolve such conflicts, lacking in its military command structure. WEISS contends that the only U.S forces which were under the direct command and control of the U.N were the Nigerian unit. It would be recalled that the U.S Rangers were ambushed in Mogadishu on 3 October, 1993 and due to slow communication, it took several hours for Malaysians and Pakistani forces - lacking a unified military strategy - to come to their assistance.

A crisis also developed between the Italian military commanders and the U.N joint - command structure where the Italians insisted on taking orders from their national military command structure for certain operations. There is therefore, in the view of Ruggie (J. Ruggie, 1994 : 154) a doctrinal void and erratic command and control arrangements, which added to the other institutional deficiencies, only help to complicate U.N peace-keeping where a minimum level of force would be required - especially in its recent involvements in intrastate conflicts.

Beyond the lack of a unified and strategic command and control of military forces it can be rightly argued that the U.N harbors deeper "institutional" handicaps which militate against a "peace-enforcement" posture which it attempted to effect in Somalia. Hardly can we justify U.N intervention in Somalia on mainly humanitarian grounds with the use of enforcement action that runs contrary to the notion of state sovereignty guided by international law. The U.S - led operation came to be seen as a gross violation of Somalia's Sovereignty and a defiance of international law, and its search to extend its influence anywhere and everywhere, to suit the notion of the much acclaimed "world policeman" in the post - Cold War era. With the awareness of Somalia of U.S - U.N designs, besides popular demand for their leave, it stiffened opposition and armed attack on their U.N troops and its facilities, a situation that finally led to the failure of

the mission itself.

4.4.4 UNFAMILIARITY AMONG POLICY-MAKERS WITH HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION.

The desire to capture and subject Aidid to criminal justice led to an intractable situation and questioned the basis for justifying U.N intervention in Somalia on Humanitarian grounds.

When U.N launched an "ambitious" operation on June 5, 1993 to "disarm" General Aidid to the apparent exclusion of any other warlord, it only compounded the conflict alongside increasing the casualties involved. The expedition to capture Aidid - the "Ill-Fated Mission" cost the lives of 24 Pakistani Soldiers. On May 41 a similar armed attack had taken away the lives of 49 soldiers and 4 journalists. On a more semantic level, Aidid characterized the 5 June attack not as an "aggression", but as a "massacre" by the U.N Secretary-General. The Security Council in view of the situation promulgated its resolution 837 (1993) of July 6 1993, authorizing the Secretary-General to take "all necessary measures" - similar in words with Resolution 678 (1990) of November 29, 1990 - to capture and detain culprits for fair trial. Both resolutions deal with enforcement action. The U.N Mission was thus deviated to one aimed at capturing Aidid, surprisingly portrayed as the main (if not sole) culprit

responsible for the thousand deaths in the civil war. The capture of Aidid dramatically became itself an end of the mission. With national support amassed by Aidid, he successfully characterized the expedition as "Imperialistic" and rallied support not only from Somalis but also from other African countries for a return to the original terms of the U.N Charter. The ambitious - U.N expedition to capture Farah Aidid and disarm all Somalia warlords, it is argued reduced drastically U.N credibility as an international organization charged with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and Security. The sudden and dramatic change of the U.N mission in Somalia misleads our reasoning and understanding of humanitarian intervention in intrastate conflicts in the Post-Cold War era. It can be argued that the oversight functions given the Secretary-General in Somalia as well as the unprecedented "carte-blanche", that was given the U.S to further the mission went far beyond the enforcement provision under Chapter VII of the U.N Charter. As the situation became compounded and intractable, the resultant effect was the violent demand by Somalis and other African States for the withdrawal of U.N contingents and facilities from Somalia.

Beyond the above-mentioned short-comings we can argue that the U.N harbors deeper institutional handicaps which militate against a 'peace-enforcement' posture which it attempted to effect in Somalia. As we have analyzed in Chapter one of the present study, the operationalization of

the 'New World Order' concept challenges the foundations of the much more traditional concept of sovereignty. The United States - led U.N operation came to be perceived as an infringement of Somalia's sovereignty guaranteed by international law and as an attempt to help U.S in the ambition to extend her influence 'anywhere' and 'everywhere' to conform with her self imposed role of a 'world policeman' of the new world order.

In the resolution of intrastate conflicts in the post - Cold War era, Somalia and Haiti are a distinct proof that peace-enforcement is not a panacea for international peace-keeping. Furthermore, the use of force is not synonymous with nation-building in Somalia and may not usher in lasting peace any where in Africa. Finally, peace-enforcement is not a complementary means of resolving a domestic conflict Somalia whose roots, like the one in Somalia run deep in the socio-economic, historical, and politico-military circumstances of the people.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

5.1 INTRODUCTION.

This phase of the study is devoted to a synopsis of the preceding four chapters from which a conclusion shall be drawn. Based on our conclusion, recommendations and suggestions for policy options will be propounded. This will be done bearing in mind that peace-keeping operations have a prominent and indispensable role to play in the resolution of intrastate conflicts, if its lapses are surmounted and strictly applied consistently and generally; not selectively.

5.2 SUMMARY

The preceding chapters have attempted to address the failure of the U.N peace-keeping mission in Somalia. This failure resulted from both immediate and remote factors which are to be revisited later in this Chapter.

Chapter one which is the introduction comprises the statement of the problem and the objective of the study. It also includes the theoretical framework adopted by the study, the methodology used and ends with a review of related

literature to situate the work in the mainstream of existing literature. In this chapter, it was discovered that literature existing on intra-state conflicts is in the nature of case studies. It was asserted that in most intrastate conflicts there is no formal determination of an aggressor in which case, the means of conflict resolution available to the U.N is the traditional non-violent peace-keeping operation. We discovered that the operational concept of the peace-keeping operation has never been practicalised. More often, the U.N takes decision to intervene in conflicts depending on what the international political situation will bear. In some cases, the peace-keeping force deviates completely from its traditional concept of non-violence to a more reactionary peace enforcement without taking into account problems to be faced by the intervention force, like in Somalia, which in most cases, is prone to failure.

This Chapter also encapsulates research questions which constituted the gaps in knowledge. The questions revolve around the factors responsible for United Nations failure to follow strictly the traditional principles guiding the deployment of a peace-keeping operation and the extent to which the failure to follow the principles was responsible for the failure of the mission itself? To allow us address the questions we adopted David Mitrany's Structural - Functionalist approach as the framework for investigation and analysis. We argued that this approach will help us come to

grip with the structural causes of the conflict which in turn will enable us appreciate the desires of the factions. This is important, we argued, because any efforts at securing peace in Somalia not based on a clear appreciation of such desires were bound to fail.

In Chapter two we were able to give a detailed account of the Somalia crisis. This was in an attempt to situate the crisis within the context of intervention by the U.N to provide a solution to it. The chapter gives an in-depth understanding of the root causes and nature of the conflict on one hand, and its severity which then provided ground for U.N intervention, with what means and legal limit to observe.

The conflict in Somalia was by no means 'ethnopolitical' nor was it uniquely an 'inter clan' confrontation, though it cannot be discarded totally that at the height of the crisis clan differences were exploited for political ends. At the heart of the Somalia political problem was a much more pervasive and corrosive factor; the economic disintegration and imbalance, that weakened the viability of the state which led to its eventual disintegration.

Finally, by 1991, Somalia had become not only an internal problem but a regional and international crisis which necessitated an international solution to it. The crisis offered a unique opportunity to the U.N to put to test its much acclaimed concept of a "new world order" in which it was to be seen stretching its traditional accepted concept of

peace-keeping to accommodate a wider peace enforcement.

In Chapter three we were able to bring out the basic principles and functions of the U.N as well as its Charter provisions guiding the maintenance of international peace and security. It was observed that during the Cold War era the means provided by the U.N (collective security) to realize this basic objective was never met due to the differences that existed between the major powers and their "veto" system. With the demise of the Cold War the high expectations for a new world order did not materialize. The reality of increasing intrastate conflicts, poverty, and social disintegration all over the world contrasted sharply with the expectations that the demise of the Cold War would enhance the prospects for a "new global order" capable of strengthening world peace and security as well as international cooperation. Moreover, while the developed countries talk about globalization of economic relations, the Third World and Africa in particular are concerned about the danger of marginalization in world affairs.

With the resurgence of violent intrastate conflicts in Africa it was believed that the only means of resolution available to the U.N is through the traditional non-violent peace-keeping operation. We should remember that peace-keeping one of the best known instrument (others are preventive diplomacy and peace-making, peace-building, disarmament, and sanctions) for maintaining peace and

security, is not specifically provided for in the U.N Charter. It is a concept that has evolved as a pragmatic response to a variety of international conflicts placed on the U.N agenda over the years. Within this context, there is usually wrong interpretation of U.N Charter provisions on peace-keeping thereby leading to obvious result. In situations wherein the actual task of the peace-keeping force extends to the resuscitation of governmental authority and national reconciliation, like in Somalia, force is needed to secure a safe environment. But, the force is to operate within strict legal limits and to pull out immediately it achieves its objectives. In this wise, the "consent" boundary is crossed. Being that, in the view of Dr. Onoja, the concept of peace-keeping is predicated on the "CONSENT" of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict, the traditional principles of peace-keeping could not deliver the desired results (The Guardian, Tuesday February 25, 1997 p. 11). The conflict in Somalia, among others on the African continent presented a new form of challenge to the traditional principles, hitherto established to guide the deployment of peace-keeping operations.

Finally, Chapter four structures its area from statement of the problem through the propositions and theoretical framework

...ual to the factors that led to the failure of U.N Mission (UNOSOM II) in Somalia. Following its resolution 751 (1992) the Security Council established a U.N operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) on traditional peace-keeping lines. The operation was to provide massive humanitarian relief to greatly emaciated people of Somalia. With reigning insecurity caused by the factional fighting, and lack of a central government with which to negotiate the peace process, the results were not in sight. It was against this background that the Security Council, on December 3 1992, promulgated into law its resolution 794 (1992) in which the U.N for the first time intervened militarily in a country's internal affairs. The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, besides endowing the latter with unlimited powers, was a clear violation of the traditional principles hitherto established to guide the deployment of peace-keeping operations. In using military force to support humanitarian goals, UNOSOM II faced political, strategic and tactical problems which eventually led to its failure to keep peace in Somalia.

In its totality, the second U.N Mission in Somalia - UNOSOM II's short comings were both remote and immediate. Perhaps, the change in the statement of the mission objectives that is central to so many critiques was a result of ambitious policy-making and unfamiliarity among U.N policy makers with humanitarian intervention, or much more complex emergencies.

Before delving into the conclusion and recommendations,

it is worthwhile to situate the relationship that existed between the research problem, the literature review and theoretical framework in the mainstream of the research finding.

So far, it is observed that there is no statutory way of U.N intervention in resolving intrastate conflict. As such, literature existing on intrastate conflict is in the nature of case studies. The U.N Security Council takes decisions to intervene in such conflicts depending on what the international political situation will bear, thereby resulting to different means, methods, and results in specific cases. More often, the intervention, like in Somalia, deviates completely from its traditional non-violent concept to enforcement action. Besides, the need to investigate whether the U.N followed strictly the principles in Somalia, and if not the extent to which this failure to abide by the principles resulted to the failure of the Mission itself remain valid since existing literature, in our view, fail to address the issue. It was against this background that a theoretical framework, 'Functionalist Approach' was adopted to guide us in our analysis of the data collected. All the propositions formulated to guide us in the course of data collection and analysis based on the statement of problem were confirmed on grounds that the mission objectives of UNOSOM II were not in line with what the factions in conflict wanted and ought to have. The intervention itself was not neutral in

execution, the mission dramatically changed in 1993 following resolution 837 of the Security Council to that of attempting to capture Farah Aidid and initiating the process of nation-building without addressing the structural causes of the conflict. The mission did not seek the 'CONSENT' of the factions which resulted to lack of 'COOPERATION' which are the cardinal principles on which the success of a peace-keeping operation is based. Of course, the change of UNOSOM II mission is cardinal to the failure to keep peace in Somalia by the U.N. The change was as a result of the fact that U.N policy-makers got ambitious and were unfamiliar with the structural causes of the Somalia conflict. They understood just the circumstances of the conflict that could not keep the peace. Finally, it was observed that the problem with UNOSOM II was how to use arm force in support for humanitarian goals. With the reversal of priorities (humanitarian and relief issues became operationally subordinate to diplomatic and military issues) the operation was already foundering, which in combination with other factors led to its failure.

5.3 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The American-led intervention in Somalia that began when U.S Marines hit the Mogadishu beaches in December 1992 continues to affect the debate over U.N intervention. The Clinton administration's refusal to respond to the genocide in Rwanda that began in April 1994 was due in part to its retreat from Somalia, announced after the deaths of 18 U.S Army Rangers on October 3 1993. In Bosnia, U.N peace-keeping force under fire or taken prisoner by Serb forces over the last three years were expected to turn the other cheek for fear of 'crossing the Mogadishu line'. This expression reportedly coined by lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose, former Commander of the U.N Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) describes the need to maintain neutrality in the face of all provocation for fear of becoming an unwilling participant in a civil war (Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, 1996 : 70 - 74).

In fact, the doctrines of both the U.S and U.N were clearly affected. President Clinton issued a political directive in April 1994 shortly after U.S forces left Somalia, that implied a sharp reduction of U.S involvement in future ara humanitarian intervention. This reduction also marked a retreat from his administration's earlier rhetoric of assertive multilateralism. Similarly, in the 1995 (second) edition of an "Agenda for Peace", the fundamental political

document on U.N peace-keeping, Boutros Boutros Ghali expressed less optimism about the possibility for intervention than he did in the 1992 (first) edition, largely because of the U.N bitter experience in Somalia.

While Somalia should be an important precedent for humanitarian intervention in the post - Cold War era, it is not clear whether the right lessons have been learned. Much of the received wisdom on the intervention is based on patent falsehood hurriedly transmitted during the U.N intervention in Somalia. Some individuals and governments have re-interpreted the intervention in Somalia to protect their reputations and interests. The task now is to re-evaluate the Mission considering the harsh realities of the facts, separate and acknowledge the errors unique to the Mission in Somalia, and distill some guiding principles for future interventions on humanitarian grounds. Based on the fact that "CONSENT" and "COOPERATION" are the principal determinants of success in peace-keeping, the intervention did not enlist the former and could not achieve the latter from the factions in conflict. In our view, the intervention was not neutral. This point is supported by Walter Clarke et. al., in the sense that no massive intervention in a failed state, even one for humanitarian purposes can be politically neutral in execution, assuredly short by plan, or wisely parsimonious in providing nation-building development aid, (1996 p. 71). We should note that nations do not descend into anarchy overnight, so

interveners should expect neither the reconciliation of belligerents nor the reconstruction of civil society and national economies to be swift. There is an inescapable reciprocity between civil and military goals. Military commanders cannot expect a failed state to be inherently peaceful and stable without the work of developmental and civil affairs experts. Likewise, humanitarian workers must recognize that the relief goods they handle in failed states can become the currency of warlords.

The most common charge about U.N mission in Somalia is that it changed dramatically from a peace-keeping operation to a peace-enforcement action designed to capture General Aidid. The general argument is that the extremely limited U.S-led intervention by President George Bush to feed Somalia in December 1992, the UNITAF was a success, but the operation began to founder when the second U.N operation, UNOSOM II took over in May 1993. Besides expanding the mission to include the rebuilding of basic state institutions - 'Nation-Building', it eventually became one to capture Aidid and subject him to criminal justice as the main culprit of the several thousand deaths daily. It is argued that the Security Council adopted a sweepingly ambitious nation-building resolution in March 1993 that marked a major break between the U.S and U.N Mission in Somalia. The New York Times echoed this in many editorial pages where it lamented that the nature of the mission changed in June 1993, right after Washington

turned control over the U.N.

Richard Haass, a special assistant for National Security Affairs to George Bush, distinguishes between humanitarian intervention, which are intent on 'providing protection and other basic needs' and much more complex endeavours such as nation-building which envisioned 'recasting the institutions of the society', (1994 : 26 - 27). It is argued rightly that, the U.N Mission widened to include nation-building because policy-makers got ambitious.

Based on the conformity of Haass' analysis with the research findings we therefore recommend that there should be a STRICT DIVISION between "Humanitarian Intervention" and "Nation-Building" and this should be clearly stated by the U.N to the intervening force and the factions in conflict in advance.

In another development, Somalia became a case study in improving policies and confusing strategic objectives. Finally, the U.N Mission was intent to reconstruct the country, disarm every Somali, or create a functional democracy. Such objectives may well prove impossible to achieve in Somalia in the foreseeable future. Secondly, relief issues were operationally subordinate to diplomatic and military issues, although these latter were only of secondary importance to the protection of the relief effort itself. This reversal of priorities cannot be blamed on malicious intent. It was rather the result of unfamiliarity among U.N

senior policy-makers with humanitarian relief operations. In this regard, we are calling on the U.N to institute CIVIL and DIPLOMATIC Experts to discharge this function because the present U.N policy-makers lack such expertise required to deliver the desired goals.

Following its resolution 814 of 26 March, 1993, and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter the Security Council modified the mandate of the U.N mission, a far cry from the principles hitherto established to guide the deployment of peace-keeping operations. It cannot be excluded that in authorizing the use of force, for the first time, in a country's internal affairs the Security Council gave the U.N more power than ever, even greater than had been the case in the Persian Gulf war. At the same time the U.S force was given extra-ordinary powers in the furtherance of the Mission in Somalia. The implication of this is that problems are bound to occur in crossing the "consent boundary" from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement. If perceived to be taking sides or using force in any way that alienates support, the force may lose its credibility as an impartial third party, a situation which occurred in Somalia. This situation will prejudice its legitimacy and even the security of its personnel. If international peace-keepers actually join the conflict which they were put there to police, they may become embroiled in activities that are irrelevant to the overall purpose of intervention. This situation results in a loss of

popular support, an attendant loss of control and unrestricted escalation in the level of violence, like was the case in Somalia. In such a situation tension is heightened and opportunities for resolving the conflict are foreclosed.

It is against this background that we recommend that intrastate conflict resolution on the African continent should be the sole Responsibility of Africa through "SUB-REGIONAL BLOCS" while the U.N should discharge just ADVISORY FUNCTIONS such as, providing logistics, financial, air, and medical support to the peace-keeping force. The unbroken success of ECOWAS Monitoring group, "ECOMOG" is illustrative enough. When such a sub-regional bloc undertakes peace-keeping initiatives, it is believed, problems like common language, national interest and unified command structure associated with UNOSOM II in Somalia will be minimized greatly, or eradicated totally. Better still, with the development of civil and diplomatic experts, problems like unfamiliarity with the causes of the conflict will be controlled, since they have a better understanding of the nature and structural causes of friction in states within the sub-bloc.

Concerning the tactical and strategic problems posed by UNOSOM II we advocate for a sub-regional "MILITARY ACADEMY" to be established to train the contingents earmarked for peace-keeping.

Furthermore, most Third World states like Nigeria, Ghana, Egypt and Libya resent being marginalized in the U.N. The

Security Council is largely responsible for maintaining international peace and security. The Permanent Members - U.S.A., Russia, Britain, France, China - are vested with "Veto" power which has negative impact on peace-keeping mandates in both the Cold War and post - Cold War epochs which Nigeria, Egypt and other African Countries contribute troops to the operations. In this respect we prefer that the present Security Council should be DISBANDED. There should be a new organ embracing representatives from all the continents with a mandate of not more than ten years. The regions should provide Three States each which are powerful enough to maintain international peace and security to replace the present permanent members of the Security Council. We are proposing Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt to represent Africa.

In another development, one of the characterisation of intrastate conflicts on the African continent is their guerilla nature. Since in most cases, like in Somalia, the peace-keeping initiatives extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks to include the promotion of national reconciliation and reconstitution of governmental authority, the traditional peace-keeping provisions are incapable of producing these desired results. There should be some 'DEGREE of AUTONOMY' granted the peace-keeping forces to use force, not only in self defence. This force should by precisely limited in time and operate within legally defined limits. It should withdraw as soon as there is a secure environment for

peace negotiations to begin on traditional peace-keeping process.

The oversight functions given to the Secretary-General of the U.N, in the case of Somalia, that is central to critique and problematic is not insurmountable. In this wise, there should be an independent 'CONFLICT MANAGEMENT COMMISSION' headed by an International 'JURIST' elected by the U.N General Assembly, for a specific mandate.

In most conflicts in Africa requiring the use of force in support for humanitarian goals, like the case in Somalia, we should note that the functions of the offices of the Secretary-General and the Security Council are complementary and work best when separated on the dividing line involving the use of force. Under the U.N Charter, the use of force is decided and managed by the Security Council and the Secretary-General has been most successful in implementing Chapter VII resolutions when it sub-contracts out those duties directly or to a subsidiary organ. The office of the Secretary-General is inherently inappropriate to manage the use of force since it doesn't have the tools needed. Equally important, by involving itself in decisions on the use of force, the office of the Secretary-General compromises the impartiality critical to its capability as a negotiator. So we are claiming that the 'INSTITUTIONS' of both the Security Council and the Secretary-General should be clearly 'SEPARATED' according to the various tasks when it comes to the use of force or invoking Chapter VII

provisions of the U.N Charter.

Finally, in the view that 'peace-keeping operation' is considered a panacea for the resolution of intrastate conflicts, it should be 'RESTRUCTURED' and 'LEGALLY' constituted as a binding concept in the U.N charter somewhere between Chapter VI and VII. This will greatly minimize its lapses and define 'Code of Conduct' of International peace-keeping Missions in the post - Cold War era.

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APPENDIX A

PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS PAST AND PRESENT

UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization June 1948-To Present.

UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan January 1949-To Present.

UNEF 1 First United Nations Emergency Force November 1956-June 1967.

UNOGIL United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon June 1958- December 1953.

ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo July 1960-June 1964.

UNSF United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) October 1962-April 1963.

UNYOM United Nations Yamen Observation Mission July 1963-September 1964.

UNFICYP United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus March 1964-To Present.

DOMREP Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic. May 1965-October 1966.

UNIPOM United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission September 1965 - March 1966.

UNEF II Second United Nations Emergency Force. October 1973-July 1979.

UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force June 1974 - To Present.

UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon March 1978-to Present.

UNGOMAP United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan April 1988 - March 1990.

UNIMOG United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group August 1988 - February 1991.

UNAVEM I United Nations Angola Verification Mission I January 1989-June 1991.

UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group April 1989 - March 1990.

ONUCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America November 1989 - January 1992.

UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission April 1991 - To Present.

UNAVEM II United Nations Angola Verification Mission II June 1991 - To Present.

ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador July 1991 - To Present.

MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara September 1991 - To Present

UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia October 1991 - March 1992.

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force March 1992 - To Present.

UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia March 1992 - September 1993.

UNOSOM I United Nations Operation in Somalia I April 1992 - April 1993.

ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique December 1992 - December 1994.

UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II May 1993 - Present.

UNOMUR United Nations Observer Mission Uganda - Rwanda June

1993 - September 1994.

UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia August 1993 - To Present.

UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia September 1993 - To Present.


UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti September 1993 - To Present.

UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda October 1993 - To Present.

UNASOG United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group May 1994 - June 1994.

UNMOT United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan December 1994 - To Present.

APPENDIX B


ONUCA
1989 – 1992
DOMREP
1965 – 1966
MINURSO
1991 –
UNFICYP
1964 –
UNOMIG
1993 –
UNMOT
1994 –
UNIKOM
1991 –
Completed missions
Ongoing missions
UNAVEM I
1989 – 1991
UNAVEM II
1991 –
ONUC
1960 – 1964
UNOMIL
1993 –
UNTAG
1989 – 1990
ONUMOZ
1992 – 1994
UNASOG
1994
UNAMIR
1993 –
UNOMUR
1993 – 1994
UNYOM
1963 – 1964
UNOSOM I
1992 – 1993
UNOSOM II
1993 –
UNIPOM
1965 – 1966
UNEF I
1956 – 1967
UNEF II
1973 – 1979
UNAMIC
1991 – 1992
UNTAC
1992 – 1993

APPENDIX C

COMPOSITION OF UNOSOM II BY 1992

COUNTRY	POLICE	TROOPS
Australia	1	
Bangladesh	1	939
Egypt	1	1,176
Ghana	6	
India		4,689
Indonesia		6
Ireland		3
Italy		4
Malaysia		1,135
Nepal		2
Netherlands	1	
Nigeria	5	57
Pakistan		5,988
Philippines	1	
Republic of Korea		3
Zambia	6	
Zimbabwe	5	939
TOTAL	27	14,941

Source: United Nations Peace-Keeping -Information Notes, February 1995 pp. 158 - 159.

. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical mov-con, staff etc.

. UNOSOM II also included a large civilian component, consisting of approximately 800 international and some 1,800 locally recruited staff.

. United States (United States Rangers and the Quick Reaction Force) were deployed in Mogadishu in support of UNOSOM II mandate, but were not under United Nations command or control.