CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND ECOWAS ACTIVITIES ON INTRAREGIONAL RELATIONSHIP

BY

MUSA ALIYU


A PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AWARD OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DIPLOMACY (M.I.A.D)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY,
ZARIA.

APRIL, 2000

DECLARATION

I, MUSA AJIYA, do hereby declare that, this research work is my original and a product of my research findings. All materials used have been acknowledged accordingly in the Endnotes.



MUSA AJIYA

20th - 03 - 2000.

Date

CERTIFICATION

This project report entitled "*CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND ECOWAS ACTIVITIES ON INTRAREGIONAL RELATIONSHIP*" by MUSA AJIYA meets the regulations governing the award of the Degree of Masters in International Affairs and Diplomacy (M.I.A.D) of Ahmadu Bello University and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

(Name and Signature)
Chairman, Supervisory Committee

Date: 17/4/2008

(Name and Signature)
Member, Supervisory Committee

Date: 17/4/2008

(Name and Signature)
Member, Supervisory Committee

Date: 17/4/2008

(Name and Signature)
Head of Department

Date: 17/4/2008

(Name and Signature)
Dean, Postgraduate School

Date: 05/03/08

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

All praises and thanks belongs to Allah (S.W.T.) for easing my undertakings, especially for making it possible to accomplish this project without hitch.

I am greatly indebted to the following lecturers, who taught me various course modules of the programme on International Affairs and Diplomacy, Dr. A. Sadiq Mohammed, Dr. Sabo Bako, Dr. Paul Izah, Dr. Nwona, Dr. E. Unobe.

My special thanks and gratitude goes to my supervisor, Dr. Hudu Ayuba, who not only impacted sound academic stuff on various international issues, but also by way of his comments and criticism have helped to sharpen my perception about the entire World. No doubt, his effort in counselling and guiding me through this entire course of study and project writing will remain evergreen in my mind.

I remain ever grateful to my parents for their invaluable guidance and blessings. Also, I wish to recognise and recollect the intellectual exercise session with few of my colleagues and friends such as Suleiman S. Mohammed, Adamu Abdulkarim Biu and Mahmoud Usman (Carlos). It has been an exciting moment in the history of my education's career worthy of perpetual remembrance.

ABSTRACT

The entire world is today fast shrinking into global village, as witnessed by various forms of growing interdependence and mutual co-operations amongst Countries irrespective of their political, economic and social differences.

The formation of Multi politico-economic grouping across the Globe, of which the economic community West Africa States (ECOWAS) in the West African Sub-region is one, vindicates the aforementioned assertion. Thus, a review of ECOWAS activity in promoting sub-regional unity and co-operation becomes imperatives. It is widely believed that ECOWAS has not achieved much progress in this regard, as manifested by frequent crisis in the sub-region and the inability to effectively contain the situation as well as attain real progress and total economic co-operation in the region.

This project is out to examine the above. Thus, it is categorised into five chapters, viz: Chapter one provides an overview of integration effort across the Globe vis-a-vis ECOWAS, with key emphasis on the review of some theoretical postulations on integration . Chapter two reviews some literatures on integration effort before and after the formation of ECOWAS in the sub-region; While chapter three focuses on the inter-regional relationship that subsist among some key players in the West African sub-region and areas of disagreement that often lead to conflict. Chapter four attempts to review the mechanism adopted by ECOWAS in conflict resolution. Here reviewed is made on the circumstances that led to the establishment of Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the Peace Accords formulated to manage some crises that occured in the sub-region. Finally, chapter five dwells on the summary of our findings, recommendations and conclusion.

ECOWAS is no doubt a pivotal machinery upon which the history of West African diplomatic relationship moves.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The entire world is today fast shrinking into global village, as witnessed by various forms of growing interdependence and mutual co-operations amongst countries irrespective of their political, economic and social differences.

The formation of Multi politico - economic grouping across the Globe, of which the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) in the West African Sub-region is one, vindicates the aforementioned assertion. Thus, a review of ECOWAS activity in promoting Sub-regional unity and co-operation becomes imperatives. It is widely believed that ECOWAS has not achieve much progress in this regard, as manifested by frequent crisis in the sub-region and the inability to effectively contain the situation as well as attain real progress and total economic co-operation in the region.

Regional integration essentially involved the removal of barrier to the free exchange of goods and services provided by the signatories. It also involved trade and factors integration that allows for a common tariff structure against outsiders. In its advance stage, regional integration also embraces a situation of the common market, in which the pre-occupation is not just with "the removal of internal restraining measures for the purpose of latent market economies", but that, "It seeks the active promotion of a common approach to economic and development policies".[1] This of course encompasses industrial development, scientific research, technological development, and business strategy. Essentially integration is about an economic

community representing a situation of total harmonization of not just industrial, commercial and technological policies, but also a common approach to monetary, fiscal and income policies. Thus regional integration is basically an economic issue. Yet since nation-state are to foster such a process considerable political underpinning cannot be overlooked. Indeed, at certain level, the politics priced the economic posting considerable difficulties at conceptualization. As a process though, it must be seen in its wider ramification as the confluence of political decision making and the inter-linkages of various economic activities between different nations that happen to share a geopolitical location.

The issue about integration of course raises the question of interdependence among nations. Interdependence is a notion that derives from the fact that nations of the world cannot exist in autarky; i.e. in isolation of one another. Economic problem are increasingly becoming complex that no nation can on its own deal with these problems independently no matter how well endowed. The experience of industrial countries, even the United State of America has indicated that the notion of self – sufficiency is simply a myth; it is becoming also less and less plausible that a country can attain self-reliance without incurring some cost both on itself and the international system. The emergence of regional integration scheme among the Less Developed Country (LDC's) has even become urgent, in view of the nature of their economies and the challenges they have to surmount in the world economic order.

"Confronted by intractable economic problems since independence and by their manifest inability to develop separately behind their own national barriers, low

per capital incomes, small population and narrow resource bases, west African countries have come to consider economic co-operation as one of the main pillars of development strategies. Through integration scheme, these countries hope to increase the economic mass, and therefore the bargaining base of their economies... to transform their economies so as to improve the living standard of their people and to extend the struggle for political decolonisation into one economic decolonisation".[2]

Indeed, in the contemporary period in which international trading and financial network have acquired their own dynamics, a re-definition of the economic integration among Less Developed Country (LDC's) has occurred. Integration now moved away from just enhancing bargaining capacity within international system, to maximizing specialization, capital formation and foreign investment as well as equalizing factors and prices of commodities. In essence, this is what "Europe 1992" is all about; the coming together of all the twelve European countries under one monetary union. So also, is the vision of regional economic communities, the ECOWAS inclusive.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union has triggered the awareness in the superiority of economic union. The amalgamation of Eastern and Western Germany, have further fuelled efforts in other parts of the world in order to maximize benefits of development.[3] There is hardly a way in which policy initiatives at the West African sub-region can be divorced from such global change. A further emerging issue is the fact that almost all countries in the sub-region are undergoing series of adjustment efforts, an initiative compelled by severe payment

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and debt crisis that have seem to engulfed almost every country. The conclusion derivable therefore is that efforts at economic integration and the series of constraints or opportunities opened that will enable policy makers pursue particular line of action are complex and are defined by both domestic and international context of development.

ECOWAS is no doubt a pivotal machinery upon which the history of West African diplomatic relationship moves. Since the formation of the Economic Community of West African States, twenty fives years ago, initiatives have been taken in a number of areas. The protocols on the first two phases of trade liberalization programme have been adopted. Also steps have been taken to ensure the employment of ECOWAS citizens in any member state. Special funds have been established in the areas of telecommunication, energy and environmental protection. Also, the problem of currency convertibility although quite intractable is receiving a great deal of attention. However, it is on record that no significant progress has been made on measures and policies for total integration, particularly in industrial and fiscal harmonization. The apparent stagnation in ECOWAS is largely attributed to lack of political will and support among member states, governments and policy makers, in the implementation of the provisions of the treaty. According to Olaniyan (1989)[4] even inspite of the vigorous assistance by Nigeria in many areas that deal with the community's executive capacity and the active support for the formation of the sub-regional institutions such as the West African clearing House and the ECOWAS

Banks which are vital to monetary co-operation and trade expansion, political will as crucial factor in the process of integration is patently lacking.

"The strength of the political will... that a group develops will clearly be a major component on its capacity to move towards union. The way in which the flow of demands for union evolves overtime will necessarily remain constant in strength or direction, and should they weaken or should they focused on increasingly divergent objectives the process of integration is likely to come to a halt or experience serious tensions. In the ECOWAS, the flow of demands for union has been characterized by weakness".[5]

An enduring economic union implies consistency in the implementation of the provision of the treaties. It also presupposes that these treaties are conceived in such a manner that they are flexible enough to accommodate drastic external threat for such is very vital to the survival of the community. One major source of external threat is of course the movement towards European integration and the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in general. Considering the implication of such developments on trade and capital flows across the board; in particular the freeing of the markets in former communist countries there is the prospect for the economic marginalisation of West African sub-region. Resources flows will now move more in the direction of former communist bloc.[6] Even the agreements under the Lome convention may have to be re-defined with serious consequences on the agriculture and exports of the region. There is therefore a legitimate fear of further losses in terms of trade, in

export volumes, private capital flows and investment and therefore continuing economic deterioration.

The Liberian imbroglio has considerably touched on security issues and under-defense capacity of ECOWAS. The formation of ECOMOG has equally called to question the essential of the defense pact that has been mooted but failed to realize. The conflict has to some extent brought to the fore the problem of foreign interests subtle underlined by the colonial orientation of member countries. All these have served as constraining factors on political unity; and on the other hand, economic growth and development has stagnated as a result of certain internal and external difficulties; inadequate economic policies, natural disasters and the impact of foreign indebtedness.

1.2 GENERAL BACKGROUND:

Integration is generally viewed in terms of series of defined arrangements that are established with the sole intention of promoting unity and economic development among different constituent units; especially at the regional level. These arrangements could be at the political level, economic level, or cultural level. As a working agreement, integration has found itself into UN charters and many country's statutes. All in all it is viewed essentially as gateway between supra-national agency and an independent nation state, that is as Olaniyan puts it "a means whereby states, with interest in common that were non-universal could work together".[7]

Even in the pre- colonial days, historical sources have very well documented a sizeable traffic of goods and people among the various communities of the West Africa sub-region.[8] Indeed the different communities have found independent means of co-operating in the areas of trade and other transactions. Thus, the product of the Southern forest easily exchanges in particular with those in the Northern Savanna. The level of interaction has been deeply rooted and it was quite diverse and complex. Thus, kolanut, timber, fish livestock, and grains provided the backbone of this ecological complimentarity and inter-dependence. Even with colonialism that seemed to strengthened the south-north trade in the region, communities still move in an east-west direction along the line of traditional commerce irrespective of the artificial boundaries that separate them. Although this was almost slowed by the requirements of colonial trading arrangements this had implication for the allocation and utilization of resources in the region.

Under colonialism, West Africa countries were administered largely by the French and the British. Albeit, operating from different background and perhaps guided by different objectives these colonial powers administered their territories through some kind of centralization. This was indeed more manifested in the French territories than in the British territories. The later emphasized decentralization. The French in centralizing political and economic activities helped them to achieve and make tremendous impact in economic integration among French West African colonies. In addition to common currency, there was a common custom union and a common language, which has held together a segment of the West Africa sub-region.

The British approach was rather tilted towards decentralization perhaps because of the geographical distance of its territories. Even then, there were efforts at harmonizing certain policies pertaining to marketing, currency, infrastructure, and education.

1.3 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The study examine the extent to which ECOWAS has promoted inter-states co-operation and contributed to resolving the numerous crisis that besieged the sub-region. A lot of factors before and after the formation of ECOWAS impair the peaceful co-existence and socio-economic development of various States within the sub-region. To mention but few include issues such as lack of political will of Head of Government of various member-states to implement and sustain the ECOWAS treaties and protocols, Restriction of movement of goods and people across member states, Political instability, etc.

1.4 THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The objective of the study hinges on analyzing the activities of ECOWAS in promoting West African sub-regional Unity and co-operation in the light of different socio-cultural background and increasing domestic conflict of member states.

1.5 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The importance of this research cannot be overemphasized, especially if viewed within the context of unfolding trend of events in the Globe. The world is today focused toward the promotion of regional integration as witnessed by European Union and the call for the formations of similar bodies. Hence, for any country to be relevant in the comity of nations, it must learn to co-operate with one another in order to harness it resources on a more wider and organized forum.

Secondly, the study will try to fill the gap in literature on regional integration on ECOWAS particularly during the last decade, when economic crunch has come up. Most literature have either concerned themselves with the role or particular position of one nation or the other, or with the quantitative dimensions of certain key issues such as smuggling across the border; movement of citizens, etc.

1.6 METHODOLOGY

An analytical approach will be employed in writing the thesis. Here things like Journals Newspapers, Speeches made by key officials of ECOWAS and various presidents of members' countries and other primary and secondary materials will be used. Also opinion of some academicians and diplomats will be sought.

1.7 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

Like any research, there is bound to be some limitations. First is the issue of time and resources constraints. As such, there is the inability to visit physically the various States in the sub-region in order to empirically assess their condition. However, this limitation is to a reasonable degree mitigated by the rich resources that exist in various libraries and the accessibility to some diplomatic envoys as well as academicians.

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1.8 THEORETICAL FRAME WORK

ECOWAS as an institution is born out of the desired to "integrate" the entire West African sub-region into one formidable bloc where co-operation base on

economics, social, political and cultural affinities can be synergied and realized. In this wise, various theoretical postulates on integration will be review within the context of this study. The most dominant theoretical postulation is the functionalist doctrine.[9] It is essentially borne out of a response to the devastating impact of the second World War II in Europe, in which it was perceived, particularistic interest of nations could be sub-ordinated to the supranational framework. David Mitrany, the leading advocate of this theory has advanced the notion of the "Functionalist alternative" in which he envisaged a situation in which nation states transfer their executive authority for specific ends to a supra-national authority that was expected to replace the system of competing nations, the breakdown of which led to breakdown of order. This process of executive transfers could promote peace and prosperity at regional levels if activities could be organized around basic functional needs such as "transportation, health, and Welfare necessities, cultural activities, trade and production".[10]

The functionalist postulation is rested on certain key assumptions. The first assumption is the separablility of politics and economics in the functions of the state while both may be internationalized without any noticeable loss of sovereignty to the state. This is what Mitrany himself calls "Federation divisions with the spreading web of international activities and agency, and through which the interest and life of all the nation would be gradually integrated.[11]

The second assumption is that there would be an ultimate shift of loyalty and sovereignty to a supra-national organization. This aspect would subsequently involve

the specification of technical issues thus the concentration on common needs. These assumptions in their totality anticipate the gradual emergency of integration through the aggregation and harmonization of activities in variety of economic and social sectors. Consequently, this development is expected to eventually culminate in the fading away of nation state.

The first assumption though appearing practical in nature indicates its inclination towards drawing a line between the economic and political spheres. However, in the general context of a real world, not the least a developing economy, it would be difficult, (given the nature of state formation and the underlying class forces that propels development) to separate from economics, especially in the affairs of newly independent and less developed countries which are by nature sensitive to full control of economic policies as a means of guaranteeing political independence.[12]

On the whole, nation state in Africa can hardly be induced to support any integration effort, by way of joining hands in any functional endeavour before they have settled outstanding political and security issues that divide them in the first place- that is artificial colonial boundaries and sense of freedom the result from independence. The second assumption, the expectation as to shift in loyalty is rarely supported by empirical evidence. In fact, integration may take place in many areas without the necessary shift in loyalty to a supra-national authority. The cooperation of East African Airways for example, as it has been amply documented, did not result in a shift of loyally to it from States.[13]

A variant of functionalism called neo-functionalism has been developed in the 1950s the purpose of which is to introduce some modifications. Haas[14] pioneered this modification based on economic determinism. The main argument here was that economic integration and political union go together but there exist a gap between them and that this gap is linked by a "spill over" effect with which the task and power of the central institutions are increased and integration gradually encroaches on the politically sensitive area, and the political community merges and grow. The underlying implication of Haas's postulations is that the whole process is an automatic one.

"The determinism implicit in the picture of the European social and economic structures is almost absolute. Given all these conditions the progression from a politically inspired common market to an economic union and finally to a politically union among states is automatic".[15]

The fact that the process is seen as automatic abstract from the involvement of key actors in the entire process. It is because of this flaw, perhaps, that Haas himself was compelled to take a hard look of such static conceptualization, with the anti-functional politics of the late President Gaulle of France in regard to the European common market. He acknowledged the fact that "incrementalist" economic integration does not automatically lead to political unity but that integration and disintegration co-exist simultaneously and those crucial political choices are definitely important. In essence therefore, Haas was compelled to see integration in both its

politically and economic manifestations, as a process that have passes through stages, in their dynamic sense.

Considering the "spillover" doctrine it must be stressed that it is fraught with problems when applied to developing countries. Indeed, technical issues are usually resolved through the arena of high politics rather than through the normal process. Even the terrain of finance, industry, and monetary policies are highly politicized in developing countries. This is mainly because they are vital to economic development. Indeed, certain key issues that are taken for granted as settled, in the developing countries, are in most cases highly controversial, that the central political authority must play a crucial part in deciding them. Yet it must be admitted that this is not a peculiar problem, even the industrialized countries themselves are not exception. What with the recent rancor of the European common market over the Exchange rate mechanism (ERM)?

Karl Deutsch[16] has developed a distinctly different theoretical approach to integration by way of identifying a chief indicator of integration, which he termed Index of Relative Acceptance, or the RA factor. This was predicated essentially on the application of communication theory to the study of integration. According to Deutsch, if paraphrase, "communication is essentially what makes a community of persons of Head of States to implement and sustain the ECOWAS treaties and protocols, to mutual benefit and relevance". Thus, as he argued, both the rate and quantitative scope of integration could be measured through various border-crossing communications (for example

mail flows, electronic communication, student travel, and tourism and relative levels of inter-regional trade). These measures in his reckoning compared to what could be expected among nations (given levels of population, education, industrialization, and GNP) would provide empirical evidence of integration as a social process. Indeed, Duetsch's concept of integration encompasses what he calls "Amalgamated security community" and pluralistic security community". The former consist of two or more formerly independent entities merged into one larger unit and the latter is one where the existence of sovereign government continue, yet all reasonably certain they will not make war on each other.

The communication approach shares some features of the neo-functionalism, that is the absence of casual basis of its assumption. Cantori and Spiegel have argued that;

"The transactionalists... have never been able to set out a casual theory, so it has never been clear whether the transactions been measured are cause or effect of integration process".[17]

Moreso, there has never been any clear determination of an end point or a "goal" of the integration process. It is essentially based on hypothetical postulations.

This particular issue was carefully considered by Fisher who argued further that this approach "is based upon the hypothesis that social assimilation causes political development and, therefore, the social assimilation must exist before political development can occur".[18] Based on this assertion, he attempted to apply the theory to the integration experience in Western Europe. In conclusion, the overall paradigm

variable which other bodies of theory have explored. The other problem relates to the on-going controversy between empiricism and traditionalism in international politics. In other words, is quantitative analysis alone of sufficient value to explain the dynamics of integration?

Morse[19] has suggested that on the account of tight leaning towards empiricism, the communications approach actually represents theoretical poverty, and that as a theory, "it is illusory because it prevents one form analyzing the qualitative nature of international transactions".[20] And this could be easy discerned from its avoidance of the role of political actors in the process of integration, a development that lay at the heart of the limits of empiricism controversy.

A much less utilized theoretical strand is Federalism, which essentially conceived of integration as a process of political unification. This is borne out of the inadequacy of the nation state which in itself cannot generate a community. The ideal was essentially envisaged after the successful experiments of the United States and Switzerland. The idea was thus developed in such a way that a framework could exist in which presently constituted nations could become just sub-units of a larger whole. This conceptualization was to largely inform the establishment of European Economic community (EEC).

An overview of the dominant theoretical postulate shows that they are all restricted to the integration experience of European countries. Mores, they have, hardly, stood the test of them as even contemporary events and the demands of scientific inquiry have rendered most of the supporting assumptions untenable. More

stood the test of them as even contemporary events and the demands of scientific inquiry have rendered most of the supporting assumptions untenable. More fundamentally, a basic problem emanates from the inability to arrive at a consensus on the substance of integration. There exists a strong case for integration to be viewed as an evolving process. Yet, series of questions could also be validly raised as to the kind of form or shape the end product should assume. As simply a "process"' surly is restrictive to conceptualizing integration. It hardly comes to grips with the dynamic elements, the ensuing convergence between the institutional structural factors in shaping the responses and action by political actors.

Therein, lies the issues of implementation efforts have indicated to a particular level of integration attained. The issue again is how we being to characterize that level so far achieved whether there exist a gap between predications and expectations and how wide or close that gap is. In the process of integration, nations undergo series of experiences, peace, conflicts, change in governments etc. Similarly, we notice the steps that are taken to achieve a particular form of integration. All these should not be confused with the resulting definition.

The communication theorists in particular have conceptualized integration essentially as an end product- it is a matter of community building, in which case integration become a terminal condition. Yet, what constitute this terminal condition cannot be fixed as outlined by Karl Deutsch, who simply sees it as "the attainment within a territory, a sense of community enough to ensure for a longtime dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population".[21]

Studies have equally been conducted to shed light on the practice of integration in Africa. Much of the literature in this area deals with the failure or the slow pace of

integration efforts in African countries by drawing attention to the interplay of political and economic factors. As far back as 1967, Arthur Hazlewood in am almost pioneering study contended that economic and political integration among independent African states, rather than being about the coming together of those that are has been one of weakening existing ties.[21] Adebayo Adedeji (1969) was to compoung the Scenatio, arguing that "A Study of integration efforts in West Africa is inevitably study of frustrations".[22] Hazlewood's argument simply was that the transfer of power to national territories, inspits of the inter-territorial links established by the same powers have undermined any effort at integration from the very beginning, as each national territory tries to preserve its sovereignty. In a way, this position is valid, and quite rightly explains why many West African countries for example do not want to compromise on certain issues that they feel their territorial integrity is threatened. The Senegambia Union that came to into force after the botched coup against JAWARA could not last because of this feeling.

Yet, a contrary view exists, which sees the disintegration of the colonial style integration arrangement a normal process.

The ensuring attempts at integration with all it's attendant problems were borne out of the desire of independent African nations to de-construct the pre existing arrangements and to fit into their new status as sovereign nation. Partly to do with increasing national consciousness, and to do with new attitudes that were generated, African nations rise ton challenge of region co-operation. However, this perspective as advanced by Green and Krishna (1967)[23] collapse with Hazlewood's analysis when

it came to answering why integration scheme initiated at different level has not shown considerable improvement. Their contention was that the pursuit of the economic integration was associated with self-interest, which was in turn born by the desire to protect national sovereignty. Yet, they slightly differ with Hazlewood where they viewed this self-interest serve as constructive rather than destructive, since in itself serve as a springboard for co-operation endeavor as they pursue better welfare for their people. They went to advance that the success of co-operative arrangement is always hinge on the perception of the gains and losses (benefit or costs) of participating in such a cooperation. In other words, cooperation among nation states can only succeed if each of them sees a clear prospect of gains, so that even though the distribution questions may arise in due curse, the initial concern is with the quantum of gains perceivable.

Some useful observation whose implication have bearing on the operation of most integration efforts in Africa, both historically and in the contemporary period have been advance by Green and Krishna. The issue centers on the question of self-interest already raised above. This is to do with the fact that most Africa nations are inclined to approach integration in terms of balancing cost and benefit of co-operation (sacrifice and gain). However, these are issues that have to be viewed within a wide long time horizon since no meaningful conclusion could be arrived at a relatively short period of time. Yet, the demand of independence (most of which re valid of course even today) have imposed on independent national governments the obligation to quickly produce results in terms of national growth and people welfare. Partly due

to political expediency and genuine response to domestic pressures, national governments could hardly relate to long term perspectives.

In the view of Green and Krishna, African countries approach the issue of integration purely from economic consideration rather than ideological or abstract reasons. Thus, where existing arrangements militate against the realization of certain national goals, there is bound to be a re-evaluation of these arrangements with the view to adjusting to the national realities, if impossible, to even scrape and replace them with new ones. This contention provides us with some insight into why certain protocol and treaties are not honored by some countries and indeed, why agreements are usually made in stages, to enable countries embark on re-evaluation of their stance, until the learning process is consummated in the final stage. Yet, they did not anticipate the fact that sometimes certain constraints within the political economy may impede the ability of a particular nation to honour its own side of bargain, even if it is going to be beneficial to it. Similarly a country due to an inexperience political leadership or for want of executive capacity or even wrong judgement may perceive a particular arrangement as encroaching into its national interest, where otherwise might just have been the case.

Renniger (1979) has tried to address some of these issues but in a limited manner. For Renninger, the lack of success in past integration scheme has to be squarely located in "history and politics)".[25] Historically, the division of Africa into economic and political spheres of influence different colonial master, relatively different methods of governance and cultural assimilation has further divided the

continent even after independence. The link between them and former colonial master has persisted into a form of neo-colonialism.

At the political level, Renninger identified three major issues. The first is the ideological differences, which rebounds on commitment. The second is rapid political changes, which have unduly created an atmosphere of instability and insecurity. The third is the persistence of nationalism. All these have implication for integration at all level. In reference to West Africa, Renninger posted that "politics is supreme and those who devise treaties for sub-regional co-operation can ignore this fact only at their own peril".[25] A positive contribution of Renninger's analysis is the issue of political dynamics, which is raised, and this requires further exploration by researchers in the area of integration. Many studies viewed the issue of "high politics" as a crucial explanatory variable in African integration.

It is important to realize however, that much as the primacy of politics is well acknowledged, it is most of the time narrowly defined in terms of the sensitivity of nation state to questions of sovereignty. As we can see there are issues that are bedeviled by politics, but whose underlying motivation are far wider.

The historical conditioning of African countries and the structure that were created in the process of the incorporation of countries into the world market have raised another dimension to the issue of integration. Implicit in the assumption about regional integration is the desire to mobilize in order to reduce external dependence on the industrialized countries. Yet, the openness of most Africa countries and their domination by foreign interest constitute a major hindrance to the implementation of

politics for integration. Oghonna (1985)[26] has suggested that meaningful integration would require an explicit consideration of the technological and general dependency problems. In the context of West Africa, he was of the view that the domination of West African countries by foreign interest is an important problem, which the economic integration of the region can overlook only at a very great cost. The seriousness of the problem according to him is further underscored by the fact that "not only will the over-dependence of the region on external interest constitute a hindrance to the achievement of its otherwise noble objectives, but also there is a dangerous likelihood that the operation of the integration will reinforce the dependence of West Africa states on the metropolis". The crucial question remains whether these international factors should be settle at the level of nation or whether they should be overcome within the co-operative union.

There are perspective that are policy-oriented in terms of identifying key policy options that could either overcome the obstacles-political and economic faced by integration; or those alternatives policies that will facilitates the process of integration. Fiscal incentives have been widely identified as central to the harmonization of policy that could be incorporated into industrialization and monetary strategy.[27] Also the inter-related issued of currency and payment problems have been viewed as central to facilitating trade and financial transaction.[28] All these are that imprint on the implementation of programmes at regional level and thus called forth the creation of spra-national institutions to handle them.

Chapter one

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW ON INTEGRATION EFFORT IN WEST AFRICA AND ECOWAS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews some literature on integration effort in West Africa and the circumstances that give birth to ECOWAS as well as her activities in shaping the unity of the sub-region. It sought to put ECOWAS in a historical perspective. It thus begins by examining the series of experiments on economic and trading integration predating the formation of ECOWAS and then focusing on the more crucial phases: the phase of treaty ratification (1975-1980) and the third phase that coincided with the world economic depression in which the entire integration agenda had to be given a hard look (1980-1992). We will then consider the institutional framework of the organisation. The chapter concludes by looking at the current state of the organisation against the background of its stated aims and objectives contained in the treaty.

2.2 INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN WEST AFRICA BEFORE ECOWAS

Then initial stage in the building of a West African community predated the independence of member states. Integration efforts largely reflected the Francophone, Anglophone dichotomy. The Francophone countries because of their geographical proximity and largely because they operate within a similar monetary framework attempted series of integration that rested on bilateral arrangements. Prior to this, their earlier efforts on integration were essentially aimed at preserving or reviving colonial

links. The efforts were designed to aid new political agreements through commercial and economic alliances.

Thus, in 1959, we witnessed the establishment for the first time, of a quasi-custom union between Ivory Coast, Senegal and Benin, others include Mauritania, Upper Volta now Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, called Union Dounaniere des Etats del' Afrique Occidantale (UDAO).[1] Owing to all ill-defined agenda and the over ambition associated with some of its agreements, and coupled with inadequate consultation over crucial matters the UDAO could not survive. In fact, by the time it collapsed, the custom union committee which had been invested with collective decision making responsibility seemed "too supra- national and powerful to allow for a flexible and realistic approach".[2]

Its failure was to immediately spark another meeting in Paris in 1966, in a bid to evolve a more viable, rivalry-free union and so UDEAO- Union Douanere de Elats del' Afrique de ouest was formed; its central focus being to promote inter regional trade via fiscal incentives. With its headquarters in Ouagadougou, it was far a more loose economic arrangement. Yet, internal schisms and breach of agreement could not be contained as they serve further to render it unable to make any desirable impact. However, unlike the UDAO, its collapse was not without laying a foundation for a functional organisation such as the CEAO and the West African regional group.[3]

The Communaute Economique de L'Afrique De L'ouest (CEAO) was then established to replace the defunct UDEAO. Although a preliminary agreement was signed in June 1972, the organisation was not formally formed until almost a year

later, when the final treaty was signed in Abidjan. The treaty of course came into effect on the 1st January, 1974. The CEAO compared to UDEAO was far less ambitious in orientation, and was even more realistic in its structure. It thus on the surface looked manageable.[4]

The West African monetary union; Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UMOA) aimed at resolving primarily the problem of balance of payment was established in 1962, here too involving French Colonies of Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta. Since then several inter-governmental organisations were established, foremost among which were the Niger River commission (1965) Sierra Leone-Guinea Association (1965) West Africa Free Trade Area (1965), and Senegal River Basin (1967).[5]

Perhaps one of the major problems that face all these organizations in their functions and operations was that the initiatives to create them did not emanate from within. Rather they were made under the guidance of France, in which a custom and monetary union was established and which run across Francophone West Africa permitting a common currency and free flow of goods, if they had been essentially designed for mutual needs, they could not have so easily floundered. It is, however, worth noting that although the establishment of these organizations was on the surface motivated by the need for development, they also went to preserve a common political identification among the Francophone countries.

Although earlier attempts at integration were largely associated with the ex-French colonies, a few initiatives also came from the anglophone countries, some of

which were to later give way with Ghana's independence. Indeed, as much of the initiatives were rather attempt at preserving and adapting to an integration arrangement, inspired under the British West African Colonial policies. As pointed already, although there was no formal comprehensive institutional from region integration, there were nevertheless common facilities for currency research, training, school, examination and air transportation Ghana's attainment of independence and its desire to assert its sovereignty saw to the dismantling of such super-national parastatals and institution.

All along developments were taking place along parallel lines. With little or no breakthrough being made in bridging the colonial divide. The Guinea-Ghana-Mali union entered into in 1958 was a pioneering attempt to bridge this gap. Although statement of intent was signed in 1958, it did not come onto effect until 1961. One of the principal factors was to do with a complete lack of commitment-the political will-to make the union work. Thus it was never very effective beyond "diplomatic pleasantries and maintaining a common outside ideological posture".[6]

The more fundamental reasons of course relate to currency convertibility, which was almost impossible to effect. Since then, however, intergovernmental organisation and bilateral arrangement that cut across the barrier were arranged. For instance the River Niger commission which basically concern planing the entire River Niger basin was formed in 1964 by seven West African countries: Mali, Nigeria, Benin, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. The status establishing the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) was also signed in 1964. Thus over the period in

question, it would seem that the regions experiment at economic integration have been beset by a succession of premature unions, dissolution and regrouping as part of a complex game of international politics.

2.3 THE FORMATION OF ECOWAS

The formation of ECOWAS could be traced to the 7th session of the economic community of Africa (ECA) held in Nairobi, Kenya, in which members were urged through resolution 142 (viii) and 145 (vii) to consider seriously strengthening on sub-regional basis on inter-governmental machinery for the purpose of harmonizing their trade, economic and social development. Indeed, the giant strides and relative success of other sub-regional bodies within the continent posed a great challenge to West Africa to evolve an economic arrangement on a regional scale. This was a period marked by bold diplomatic negotiations to achieve fast result. For this reason, member states of West African sub-region hold series of meetings under the auspices of the ECA. In November 1963, the Lagos conference on industrial co-ordination took place. It was to be followed, three years later by a conference on economic co-operation population called the "Niamey Conference". Shortly after the Accra, conference was held in 1967 in which the article of association for the establishment of an economic community was signed. In April 1968, Heads of government of various West African states met in Monrovia to seal the protocol establishing the West African regional group.

Nigeria and Guinea were mandated to conduct priority studies of area of co-operation. The agreed areas of co-operation were trade, transportation, communications, education, cultural exchange, and information. Other areas were research, health, energy, and heavy industries. Liberia and Togo were on the other hand, mandated to prepare a draft treaty and protocol on custom union.

Unfortunately, none of the organs of the group ever met. Furthermore, neither the draft treaty nor the protocols were considered for adoption. This last effort brought the chequered history of efforts at integration in West Africa to a momentum stand still. Then followed a period of inaction until 1972 when Nigeria and Togo decided to revive the process of achieving a West Africa economic co-operation. Then the Head of State of Nigeria General Gowon, undertook personal visit to all West African capitals except Bissau and Abidjan, and engaged in what Ojo terms "Spraying Diplomacy"[7] to ensure that other African countries joined the embryonic West African Economic Community. He was able to win over the anglophone countries easily, but really had a tough time convincing some of the francophone countries such as Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire. He was to finally won them over.

As already noticed, Nigeria played significant role in the diplomatic exercise that brought about the formation of ECOWAS. As Olaniyan[8] argued a combination of circumstance made the promotion of the community an attractive venture for Nigeria. The first was the recognition of Biafra by Ivory Coast during the Nigeria civil war, and experience that taught Nigeria that unless there is a rapport with neighboring countries, it will be pretty difficult for national security to be guaranteed, otherwise, it

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will be difficult that these countries will not in future serve as platform for the promotion of instability. The other reason of course was to do with the emergence of Nigeria as a regional power due to oil wealth. Underlying this was the commitment to make Nigeria an industrial centro, which as Olaniyan further notice "was perceived as part of the politico-economic restructuring needed to enhance co-operation and collective self-reliance basic to redressing the problems of underdevelopment".[9]

The formalization of ECOWAS came about as a result of culmination of Nigeria's efforts over the years and its determination to see to the ratification of the treaty. The involvement of the Nigerian chamber of commerce at this stage in getting the support of other West Africa chambers of commerce as well as the active leadership role it provided in the African Caribbean and pacific countries negotiation helped greatly towards galvanization of the support of West African leaders towards the realization of the community[10]. Thus, on May 28th 1975, the Heads of government of West Africa met to ratify the treaty which formally gave birth to ECOWAS in Lagos. It therefore took practically a decade of painstaking efforts, since the ECA resolution of 1965 for the ECOWAS to be formed, and its treaty formalized.

It will amount to an under-statement to assert that West African co-operation started with ECOWAS. Numerous data of inter-west African co-operations that predicted colonial abound. Going into historical analysis to escalate such co-operations will make this work cumbersome. However, it is important to point out that there was political, social and economic co-operation such as the old Sudan Empires, the Jihad, the Trans-Sahara trade etc. Which had brought the West African

people together before the cross and flag came to this part of the continent. And during colonial rule, association like the national congress of British West Africa (NBWA), West African Student Union (WASU) etc. Were found to oppose obnoxious colonial policies and agitate for national independence for west African countries. But these co-operations became pronounced and meaningful within the formation of ECOWAS.

The realization by West African Leaders that the region should meet up with the rest of the world economically gave impetus to the emergence of ECOWAS. Having realized their backwardness and dependence with hope of breaking the backbone of this dependence except there was co-operation among their different countries, ECOWAS became a last resort.

The pioneers of ECOWAS also realize that even the traditional trade relationship (though in unequal terms) which evolve between West Africa and Western Europe through a century of imperialism and colonial domination (whereby the former became the producer of raw materials and the latter the manufacturer of finished products) has been on the decrease as their erstwhile trading partners (i.e. Britain, France, West Germany, U.S.A. and Japan) have of late embarked on protectionist and discriminatory policies against our economies and the growing development of synthetics to replace our raw materials. For example, chicle is no longer demanded for chewing gum, synthetics has taken over many of the uses of natural rubber, nylon fibres have been steadily introduced into the market for finer textile, while steel is giving way more and more to titanium, magnesium and the new

harder plastics. All these have led to the deterioration of trade activities between Western Europe and the sub-region.

Worst still is the dwindling of tantalizing foreign aids that use to some to West African countries from Europe and Japan. Hence they cannot be relied upon as surest sources of capital for economic upliftment in the region. generally. ECOWAS is aimed at bringing self-reliance to West Africa.

AIMS OF ECOWAS

The aims of the community are stated in Article 2 of the Treaty of Lagos, which was signed on 28th May 1978. The treaty states the aims as follows:

The aim of the community is to promote co-operation and development in all fields of industry, transport, telecommunication, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial matters and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the region's citizens, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relationship among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.

To achieve these aims, the Treaty of Lagos made provisions for the establishment of the following organs:

The Authority of the Heads of States and Government.
The council of Ministers.
The executive Secretariat.
The Tribunal.
The Technical and Specialized Commissions.
The Fund.

THE AUTHORITY OF HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENT

Article 5 of the Treaty of Lagos states that this body shall be composed of the Heads of States and Government of members-states of the community. The authority is the principal governing organ of the community and is charged with the responsibility of general direction and control of all functions of the community. The decisions of the Authority are binding on Member-Stets. The Authority meets once a year.

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

This organ is made up of two representatives each from all member-states of the community. Its functions are to review the activities of the community, to recommendation to the Authority of Heads of States on policy matters aimed efficient and harmonious functioning and development of the community. The council of Ministers meet twice a year, and her decision and directive are binding on all other subordinate organs. Whenever the council of Ministers can not reach a consensus on any matter, such a decision has to be referred to the Authority of Heads of States and Government.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

The Treaty of Lagos states that:

An Executive secretariat of the Community must be established and should harbour the following:

1) An Executive Secretary who shall be appointed by the Authority to serve in such office for a term of four years and can be re-appointed for another four years shall head the Executive Secretariat.

2) The Executive Secretary can only be removed on the recommendation of the Authority of the Council of Ministers.

3) The Executive Sectary of the Community to be assisted by two deputy executive secretaries which shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers.

4) There shall be a financial controller and such other officers in the Executive Secretariat as the Council of Ministers may determine.

5) The terms and conditions of service of the Executive secretary and other officers shall be determined by the council of Ministers.

6) In appointment (staffing), due regard shall be given to the paramount importance of securing high standard of efficiency and technical competence to the desirability of maintaining to such posts among citizen within member states.

7) The executive Secretary and members of the Executive Secretariat in the discharge of their duties owe their loyalty to the entire community.

8) The Executive secretary shall be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the community and all its institution i.e. from Authority of Heads of States and Government, to Council of Ministers, Secretariat, Tribunal and Special and Technical Commissions.

9) The Executive Secretary shall

a) As appropriate, service and assist the institutions of the Community in the performance of their duty.

b) Keep the functioning of the Community under continuous examination and where appropriate, report the result of its examination to the council of Ministers.

c) Submit a report of activities to all session of the Council of Ministers and all meetings of the Authority.

d) Undertake such work and studies and perform such services relating to the aims of the Community as may be assigned to him by the Council of Ministers and also make such proposals there to as may assists in the efficient and harmonious function and development of the community.

THE TRIBUNAL

As a result of the numerous problems that will arise in the process of harmonizing the economies of the sixteen countries that make up the Community, the Treaty of Lagos provides for the observance of law and justice in the interoperation of the Treaty's provisions and settle disputes that may be referred to it.

TECHNICAL AND SPECIALIZED COMMISSIONS

The Treaty of the Community established four technical and specialized commissions namely:

a) Trade, Custom, Immigration, Monetary and payments commission.

b) Industry, Agriculture, and Natural Resources commission.

c) Transport Telecommunication and Energy Commission.

d) The Social and Cultural Affairs commission.

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Each Commission is made up of a representative each from all the member-states of the Community. The function of each Commission is to submit from Council of Ministers; reports and recommendations in its own field of specialization either through its initiative or at the request of the Council of Ministers or the Executive Secretary.

The fund

In addition to the main organs of the Community the Treaty also established the fund for co-operation, compensation and development as a mechanism for equitable distribution of the benefits and cast of integration. Article 2 of the Treaty states some of the principal purposes of the fund thus,

a) To provide communization and other forms of assistance to member states which have suffered losses due to the application of the Treaty's provision?

b) To provide compensation to member-states which have suffered losses as a result of the location of community enterprises.

c) To provide grants for financing national or community research and development activities etc.

Article 50 of the Treaty states that the Fund is to be financed from member's contributions, income from community enterprises, external receipts, and subsidies and contributions from other sources.

2.4 SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

The socio-economic background of West African nations reveals alot about their developmental trends, structures and how the circumstances that triggered them to clamor for Integration. Reliable statistical indicators are hard to come by. However, the little publications in World Bank Development Reports extensively are used here. We followed the classification of ECOWAS in which Member States according to their level of development i.e. relatively less developed and the relatively more developed.

The general background of course, is the way in which the forces of Geography and History coupled with under-development combine to determine the nature of economic and social organisation found today in the West African sub-region. First because of the abundance of easily exploitable agricultural and mineral resources, colonialism had been accompanied by entrenchment of external trade sectors which in turn determine to a very large extent the level of available money supply, government revenue and domestic prices.[11] Along similar lines, because the stimuli for growth and development comes from the external trade sector and because external trade is largely controlled by foreign owned enterprises, it turned out almost predictably that "the level and structure of saving investment, money supply, price level, taxation, income and employment are determined significantly by the behaviour of those enterprises.[12] Secondly, the relatively small size in both surface area and population means that the national market is usually not large enough for massive industrialization programme from table 2.1, it could be seen that Nigeria alone constitute about 57.4 percent of the total population of the region.

Also, four countries that are considered to be the relatively more developed, which constituted twenty-five percent of the total number of ECOWAS member states have about 75.07 percent of the population, with a total population of 126.5 million, whereas the remaining 12 member states have only 42 million representing 24.93 percent.

Table 2.1 SOCIO ECONOMIC INDICATOR

COUNTRY	POPULATION MILLIONS %(A)	AREA 000 SQ. KM (b)	GNP/PER CAPITA (c)	GDP MILLION (d)	1974/76100 IND OF AGRIC PRODUC-TION. (e)	LIFE EXPECTAT ION YEARS	EXPORT (g)	GROWTH MERCHA NDISE IMPORTS (h)
Mali	7.3(4.3)	1240	140	980	106	45	106	344
Burkina Faso	6.6(3.9)	274	160	900	100	44	99	288
G/Bissau	0.9(0.5	36	180	145	84	38	-	-
Niger	6.3 (3.7)	1264	190	1340	122	45	301	443
Togo	2.9 (1.7)	57	250	720	99	49	242	284
Gambia	0.7 (0.4)	11	260	220	79	36	242	284
Guinea	3.9 (3.5)	246	300	1910	85	37	390	279
S/Leone	3.7 (2.2)	173	270	600	98	48	382	383
Benin	3.9 (2.3)	123	200	600	95	46	85	523
Maurtania	1.7 (1.0)	1031	450	700	102	46	246	227
Liberia	21.(1.2)	111	470	980	92	49	841	415
	42.0			9345				
Ghana	13.4 (7.9)	239	350	3720	65	59	895	719
Senegal	6.4 (3.8)	196	380	2570	71	46	585	984
C/D'ivoire	9.9 (5.8)	322	610	7090	108	52	2068	1814
Nigeria	96.8 (57.4)	924	770	64570	98	52	17509	17600
	126.5(75.07)	6139		87395				

Source: a and b: African Economic Hand Book (London Euromonitor Publications) 1986-1987

c: Calculated from dividing d by a that is a, d, e, f, g, and h: financing adjustment with growth in sub-Sahara Africa, 1986-1990,The World Bank, April 1986.

The long distances from the coast add to the problem of these small and land locked nations. Although in the West African sub-region, very few nations are land locked-Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania- they nevertheless suffer from inaccessibility.

On the whole, a combination of factors, namely population, size, proximity to the sea and colonial pattern of production have combined to lay an initial economic structure that most West African countries tried to break away from at independence. Indeed the major problem of development that these countries have faced was to do with how to reverse the trend of colonially induced structures. By and large, it would seem that no significant progress has been made in this direction. A major indicator of this weak performance is the fact that the West Africa sub-region is today a major recipient of aid. This is not only in terms of the relative magnitude of the aid, which it receives compared to other regions or even other continents (Asia and Latin America). But also in terms of the high proportion of its total income received from official foreign assistance. Table 2.2 indicates the total aid and resources flows from 1984 for the West African countries minus Cape Verde for which data was not available. There is a high dollar per capital, which on the average was 45.15 for the less developed member states.

TABLE 2.2(a) INDICATORS OF AID AND TOTAL RESOURCES FLOWS 1984

COUNTRY	*TOTAL RECORDED NET FLOW OF RESOURCES PER CAPITAL*	*PER CAPITAL DOLLARS*	*AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP*	*AS PERCENTAGE OF GDINV*	*BILATERAL % TOTAL*	*FROM OPEC % BILATERAL*
Mali	*43.4*	*43.9*	*32.0*	-	*69.7*	*4.3*
B/ Faso	*28.3*	*28.5*	*19.7*	*144.5*	*64.8*	*9.9*
Guinea Bissau	*68.3*	*61.2*	*41.2*	*134.4*	*55.2*	*7.6*
Niger	*21.7*	*25.7*	*14.8*	-	*62.9*	*8.1*
Togo	*40.0*	*37.9*	*16.7*	-	*48.1*	*3.8*
Gambia	*91.0*	*79.9*	*35.1*	-	*62.1*	*2.6*
Guinea	*21.9*	*20.9*	*6.8*	-	*34.2*	*70.5*
S/Leone	*19.5*	*16.4*	*6.2*	*68.6*	*37.0*	*60.7*
Benin	*43.3*	*19.8*	*8.0*	*125.2*	*51.0*	*0.5*
Mauritania	*102.2*	*99.1*	*24.6*	*103.8*	*40.7*	*62.8*
Liberia	*-69.3*	*63.4*	*13.6*	-	*80.7*	*0.1*
Cape Verde						
		Av-45.15				
Ghana	*17.3*	*16.1*	*4.5*	*45.8*	*44.1*	*-4.7*
Senegal	*68.9*	*52.0*	*14.7*	*91.6*	*73.7*	*9.8*
C/D'Ivoire	*43.5*	*12.9*	*2.2*	*14.8*	*89.3*	*0.1*
Nigeria	*8.1*	*0.3*	*(.)*	*0.4*	*44.2*	*0.7*
		Av.20.3				

Source: Financing Adjustment with Growth in Sub-Sahara Africa, 1986-1990, Statistical Annexe.

TABLE 2.2 (b) FOOD AID IMPORT

THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONES, GRAIN EQUIVALENT

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	Per capital KG for 1984
Mali	21.8	50.2	66.4	88.1	110.9	14.4
Burkina Faso	36.5	51.2	80.9	49.4	19.4	8.7
Guinea Bissau	17.6	26.2	30.3	34.9	19.4	22.0
Niger	9.1	11.0	71.4	11.8	12.7	2.1
Togo	7.4	4.2	4.6	6.7	8.8	3.1
Gambia	6.8	17.2	21.0	12.8	18.8	29.8
Guinea	24.2	33.8	38.6	25.0	42.6	8.0
Sierra Leone	36.4	11.8	28.9	29.0	15.9	4.5
Benin	5.0	11.1	8.3	14.0	5.6	1.5
Mauritania	22.9	106.0	86.4	71.3	128.8	70.4
Liberia	3.2	26.3	42.4	57.4	47.0	22.3
Cape Verde						
Ghana	110.0	94.3	43.1	58.4	73.8	5.7
Senegal	60.7	152.6	82.7	91.0	150.5	23.7
Cote D'Ivoire	2.0	(.)	0.9	(.)	(.)	(.)
Nigeria	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Source: Financing Adjustment with Growth in Sub-Sahara Africa – 1986-1990 (Statistical Annexe)

For specific countries, there is wide variation, for example, Mauritania per capital dollar of aid is almost 99 percent, Gambia 79.9 percent, while Liberia 63.4 percent and Guinea-Bissau 61.2 percent, but it was raised by the disproportionate position of Senegal. For Nigeria it is barely 0.3 percent.

Total aid as percentage of Gross National Product and Gross Domestic Investment also show a very high trend indicating an overall massive dependence on foreign assistance, but also a very wide disparity among member states.

Throughout the first decade of independence, most West African nations intensified their development efforts. These countries following the footpaths of colonial administrative policy extended the fronties of government intervention in their development process by building roads, installing power supply and providing education and health facilities depending on the budgetary constraints.

They also encourage manufacturing activities and the development of banking and finance. Above all, through some administrative control, they sought to encourage agriculture.

The intensity of economic activities in this period went along the way to enhance the domestic savings capacity of most countries. On the average in the 1960s, it was estimated that the saving product ratio was between 12.5 percent and 16.5 percent.[13] However, this state of affairs did not at all weaken the external trade orientation as well as the flow of foreign investment during the period in question. This is evident in the way in which an increase in surplus created by foreign investment is followed by the massive repatriation of this surplus. It is also quite

manifest in the fact that the dynamic sectors of the economy were also dominated by foreign capital.

TABLE 2.3: STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION

Distribution of GDP (percent) Growth of Production 1973-83

COUNTRY	AGRIC	INDUSTRY	MANUFACTURE	GDP	AGRIC	INDUSTRY	MANUFACTURE
Mali	46	11	5	4.1	5.0	0.6	3.5
Burkina Faso	41	19	13	3.5	1.3	5.1	
G/Bissau	43	11	-	2.1	-3.1	1.3	
Niger	33	31	9	5.2	1.6	10.9	
Togo	22	28	8	2.3	1.1	2.6	
Gambia	27	12	-	3.2	-2.4	2.7	
Guinea	38	23	2	3.1	3.4	6.7	
S/Leone	32	20	3	1.9	2.2	-2.9	2.5
Benin	37	21	6	4.8	2.7	6.9	
Mauritania	34	21	-	2.5	2.6	-	
Liberia	36	26	5	0.2	2.0	-1.5	0.5
Ghana	53	7	10	-1.3	-	-7.0	
Senegal	21	26	19	2.6	0.3	6.1	
C/D'Ivoire	27	24	16	0.2	4.0	7.4	10.7
Nigeria	26	34	18	1.2	-1.91	0.3	
				3.1%			

Source: World Development Report 1985 p.182

As table 2.3 shows most of the growth trend and structural weakness of the 1960s were carried through into the seventies and early 80's. Firstly only in Ghana was the annual rate of growth GNP (1973-83) negative. Indeed for all of the rest, growth was positive, it average about 3.1 percent per annum for the entire sub-region. There was of course the usual significant variation among individual countries.

Secondly, there continued the trend in structural shift towards industrial developments. This is indicated in the way in which for most countries, the over all growth rate of GNP moves far ahead of the annual growth rate of their agricultural sector.

Yet the industrial section and particularly manufacturing remained largely small, in terms of its percentage contribution to GNP due to high cost, low quality and simple process outfit: most manufacturing concerned are import substituting with low value added content.

The consequence of this type of industrialization was of course high inflation rate owing to the devastating effects it has on agricultural via high protection.

It could be argued at this point, that base on the statistical indicators (see table 2.3) for the West African sub-region, some modest economic growth as reflected in the structural shift of national product as well as new levels of per capital income (table 2.1). Yet, this can not be said to be a satisfactory performance. Indeed if we exclude Nigeria no country in West Africa commands a total gross national product of up to $10 billion a year. It will be a terrible picture indeed even when the figure for Nigeria is added when the over all gross domestic product is placed side by side with say South Africa.

It will be useful to make some few comments on the position of Nigeria in this context. Nigeria as stood out first as the most populous nation constituting of more than half of population in the sub-region. At the same time, in terms of GNP per capital it has the highest, apart from having the biggest Gross Domestic Product,

about 73.8 percent of total GDP for the sub-region (see table 2.1). Apart from oil it is endowed with enormous mineral resources, which as table 2.4. shows, it is indisputable the most endowed nation in the sub-region. It has also used oil money to diversify its industrial base especially in the Capital Good sector, Steel, Aluminum, Cement, Petrochemical, and a host of others. It has also relatively witness significant progress in its import substituting industries through manufacturing domestically, wide range of consumer goods, some of which even find themselves via smuggling to most parts of West African sub-region. Thus in view of its population, size and wealth, Nigeria is certainly in possession of key variables that make a country key to regional integration. No doubt, it is the only country in the sub-region that could be classified as belonging to the League of Middle Powers which Akinyemi has tried to promote while in office as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria.

Nigeria is therefore undoubtedly a core member within the organisation. It is therefore no wonder that Nigeria's diplomacy since the formation of ECOWAS was largely backed by its oil revenue.[14]

This unique position of Nigeria even among the richer third world nations and African countrieskas made it prone to suspicion especially in the way in which it may deploy its resources to subject other member states either politically or economically. Nigeria has fortunately employed its economic might in relation to the member states only in few instance, notably against Ghana when Fit. Lieutenant Rawlings overthrew the democratic government of Hilla Liman in his second- bid to power. The then government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari imposed oil sanctions on Ghana that almost

destabilized the Rawlings government. Yet, countries like Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal, the most developed of the Francophone states, have always lived under the fear of Nigeria's possible usage of its economic clout.[15] Thus, the differentials in national endowment and associated disparities have from the outset introduced constraints in the building of an economic unity. Different perceptions, corrects or otherwise on the part of member states have gone a long way to determine their relationships with each other.

Nigeria's core status and its level of development relative to other less developed member states have also posed considerable questions in relation to the humanization of industrial development efforts and other policies within the regional framework, because it is quite obvious that Nigeria is a better stead to attract foreign capital and investment. Its relative advancement however may be interpreted in a different light, undermining the efforts of other member state to develop their industrial base.

In the subsequent section, we would be looking at the background of the socio-economic profile of the sub-region and the underlying structural imbalances, which constitute problems for implementing the treaty. You may recall that the ECOWAS treaty provides for the creation of a customs union and harmonization of economic policies over a period of fifteen years. The practical outcome of this initiatives have hardly yielded the desired result particularly in the envisage break with prevailing patterns of neo-colonial in co-operation by way of re-orientation of existing trade patterns, control over foreign investment or shifts in the location of industrial

activities within West African sub-region.[16] This state of affairs of course is largely related to the problems of development policy.

Table 2.4

COUNTRY	COLONIAL POWER	MAJOR MINERALS	MAJOR AGRIC. PRODUCT	MAJOR TRADING PARTNER	CURRENCY	LOCK OR COASTAL
Mali	France		Millet, Rice, Cotton	France, Cote D' Ivorie	CFA Franc	L
Burkina Faso	Manganese	Manganese, Gold	Millet, Sorghum, Rice	Cote D' Ivoire	CFA Franc	L
Guinea Bissau	Portugal	Bauxite	Coffee, Peanut, Cotton	Portugal, France	Pesso	C
Niger	France	Uranium Coal Iron	Peanut, Cotton	France, Nigeria	CFA Franc	L
Togo	France	Phosphate	Ginger, Coffee	France, UK, FRG, Nether Land	CFA Franc	C
Gambia	Britain	-	Peanut, Rice	UK, China, EEC	Dalasi	C
Guinea	France	Bauxite	Banana, Rice	France, US, FRG USSR	G Franc	C
Sierra Leone	Britain	Iron, Diamond	Rice, Coffee, Cocoa, Ginger	UK, Nether land	Leones	C
Benin	France	Oil	P/Oil, Cotton, Coffee, Tobacco	France, UK	CFA Franc	L/C
Mauritania	France	Iron Ore Gypsum	Dates Grain	France, Italy, Japan	Ouguiya	C
Liberia	United States	Iron Ore, Diamond	Rice, Rubber, Timber	FRG, US, Italy Lib.	Dollar	C
Cape Verde	Portugal	Salt,	Rice, Banana, Sugar	Portugal, Angola, UK	Escudo	C
Ghana	Britain	Gold, Diamond	Cocoa, Coffee	UK, US, FRG, Nigeria	Cedi	C
Senegal	France	Phosphate	Rubber, Coffee	France, Netherlands, CFA, US, Italy, Japan	Franc	C
Nigeria	Britain	Oil, Coal, Tin, Zinc	Tin, Cocoa, Cotton	US, EEC	Naira	C

Source: COMPILED FROM AFRICA ECONOMIC HAND BOOK, 1986

Chapter Two

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CHAPTER THREE

INTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF SOME WEST AFRICAN STATES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The context of economic integration among West African States could be viewed from historical perspective vis-a-vis the present day unfolding events in the Sub-region.

The scramble and partitioning of Africa by the Colonialists, as manifested by the present day existing boundaries, brought about as a result of colonial exploitative economic and political relationships, have made it necessary for the African States to review their brotherhood relationship among themselves and explores the avenues of Continental/Sub-regional Unity. After the political independence of many African States, the problem of poverty, unemployment, income inequality and underdevelopment in wider sense have become a common and permanent feature of Africa Landscape that their resolution must entail certain kind of integration. Furthermore, the variation in development rates and resource endowment of Africa States have meant that some countries must bear the burden or share in the overall losses or benefits of development of others in the region. For instance, in the West African sub-region, the position of Nigeria which is relatively developed in relation to say Burkina Faso or the Gambia which are less developed, must be view differently. It is in this context that we examine the interstates relationship and crises that subsist among some prominent countries within the West Africa Sub-region and the developments that shape their unification within the ambit ECOWAS organisation.

3.2 INTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF SOME WEST AFRICAN STATES

The inter and intra-states dispute have become chronic features of the landscape of West African politics. One of the central causes of such disputes can be safely traced to arbitrary defined state frontiers by colonial powers. More than any other region in the World, Africa has the largest number of Countries in the Globe. About 1/3 of the total number of countries in the Globe falls in African Continent. Interestingly, the West African Sub-region habours sixteen countries with diverse cultural and geographical settings.

From the desert North Africa down to the Atlantic Ocean, the sub-region presents an intriguing mosaic of States whose relations are complex and diverse. The West African sub-region, more than any part of the continent, appears to capture various States with intrigue diversities of interest, population size and historical colonial background. These Countries are entangled in the wave of competition for the defence of their national interest. Thus, tensions among Governments and frictions across borders are common in occurrence. Alliances and counter alliances are usually formed in response to specific problems, and at times this alliances are forged with even Countries outside the sub-region. Inspite, of this striking similarity of features with the rest of the World, the West African sub-region has developed quite unique and different attributes. One of which include the creation of ECOWAS to address the socio-politico-economic difference and foster co-operation of member Countries. There is an increasing realisation that solidarity at Sub-regional level will respond to and address the region's dependent position in the global economic system. Thus, the

merous States with diverse national conditions, will now have a common purpose ne pursuit of economic development.

This Chapter will examine inter-state relationship in West African sub-region as its bearing on the integration process. It is argued that the heterogeneity of this on contributed to the inter-state rivalry.

For analytic purpose, we shall adopt the classification of ECOWAS States ording to their colonisation, vis: Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone. ded, the West African countries have been demarcated more by political raction-both competitive and co-operative since independence, than by patterns of ce or cultural orientation.

Our objective here is to delineate these interactions at the political level as pression of the policy goals of the numerous State actors in the sub-region. The nole process of course actually boils down to foreign policy choices of respective ember states.

Much of the substance of inter-state relationship predated the formation of COWAS. As we have discussed in chapter 2, it would be disheartening to note that nce 1960, the year most countries got their Independence, the process that led to the rmation of ECOWAS was in a way turbulent and characterised by multiple rivalries n frustrate the numerous attempt in building Custom Union and Diplomatic alitions. This period came to an end with the formation of the ECOWAS in 1975. ring this period to 1980's, Member States acknowledged the Sub-regional thority of the Organisation. The emergence of Liberian Crisis paved the way for

Conflicts Resolution and Crisis Management" by the Member States. The dissension in Northern Benin, the border tensions between Liberia and Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and Mali, Guinea Bisau and Senegal and Mauritania, have all been further perturbed by the events in Liberia as well as by economic crisis throughout the Sub-region. Infact, the succession of crisis and rivalries in the region have made commentators to ask the question whether the Organisation will survive at all.[1] There were skirmishes personality problem and legitimacy question being asked that impede ECOWAS from the attainment of some of its political goals of Unity and the harmonisation of economic objectives. We will examine the patterns of inter-states relationship in order to delineate their implication on integration. The analysis is based on considering the prominent States within the sub-region i.e. Nigeria, Ghana (Anglophone) and Ivory Coast, Senegal (Francophone).

2.1 NIGERIAN PERSPECTIVE

Nigeria is undoubtedly the most populous country and by far the most endowed. As the only Oil producing country and member of OPEC within the sub-region, it has sought to use its human and oil wealth influence to shape Africa regional and continental environment. Its geographical position has put it in direct relationship with Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea. Nigeria's position and interests have led it to develop an important and strategic role in the overall region.

Nigeria's initial diplomatic relationship with States within the West Africa sub-region was defined by the role some countries played during her civil war. The basis

for persistant rivalry between Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire was not unconnected to this. Thus, Nigeria's foreign policy within the context of ECOWAS was used to settle some scores with countries that recognised Biafra during the civil war. When Nigeria civil war broke out in 1967, Abidjan followed her colonial mentor (France) to support the Biafra successionist bid and hoped to overthrow Nigerian leadership in the region. In this regard, Nigeria came to view France influence in West Africa as a threat to her national security and therefore devised a long term strategy to reduce France's role in the region. Thus, it is widely believed that the formation of ECOWAS was part of this grand strategy. However, there was also the underlying fact of wanting to form a West African Common Market in order to contain the Francophone countries, especially Cote d'Ivoire which is the strongest economically among the Francophones countries. Thus as Ojo[3] pointed out the decision to work for a regional common market was an important step in redefining West African geo-political space, for it implicated Lagos in matters beyond economic co-operation.

Therefore, in assuming a leadership posture in the region, Nigeria had to respond to security issues as well. Perhaps the most unacceptable issue that will ever happen to Nigeria's security interest was the new found love between apartheid South African and Cost d'Ivoire. Nigeria safety was assured only, after realising that South Africa cannot attack her straight from Pretoria without landing in a nearby countries to refuel their aircraft in order to contend with possibility of South Africa using Cost d'Ivoire as a launching pad to attach Nigeria.[4] This more than any other reason, is

elieved to account for Nigeria's decision to check Ivoirian "excesses" in the sub-
gion.

As mentioned earlier, the broad policy thrust of diplomatic objective of Nigeria had become more pronounced with the overthrow of General Yakubu Gawon in 1975 and the accession of power of Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo. The Mohammed/Obasanjo regime (1975-79) broaden and articulated Nigeria's foreign policy interest to cover Africa in general, as Shaw[5] described it as Afroncentric activitism. Under Obasanjo regime, Nigeria assumed the status of a frontline state together with Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Bostwana. It was plausibly argued that the Southern African policy was "a logical extension of the drive to build a structure of influence in West Africa".[6] The implication of this on ECOWAS, on Pan-African stance taken by Nigeria, are two-fold. Firstly, the leadership provided to the ECOWAS by Nigeria considerably reduced its commitment, because it was felt that leadership at that level was assured and so a more global view will permit the struggle to reduce France's influence in its immediate environment to be waged more vigorously. This perhaps explained Obasanjo's attitude to ECOWAS as could be seen later in the Chapter. The other implication, is that it hightens the suspicion already in-build in many Francophone countries of Nigeria's ambition for regional leadership. In this wise, France having perceived the efforts of Nigeria to displace it in terms of influence, intensify its neo-colonial hold on the countries in the sub-region.[7] Aid, debt relief and even foreign investments by France to the Franco-West African States came to be tied to the

conditions of taking one position or the other. For instance, during the OAU debate on Angola. Nigeria came openly behind one of the contending parties-the MPLA and was willing to use even sanction against countries in the West African sub-region that opposse its point of view. Niger obliged because of the threat of cutting of oil supplies from Nigeria. However, Cote d'Ivoire, probably out to opposed Nigeria pitched tents with the FNLA and UNITA which were then puppets of Western powers. But more fundamentally Cost d'Ivoire was said to be working on the orders of France. On the whole, the attention of Nigeria became rather divided, that ECOWAS was then just as secondary or just adjunct of the wider Southern Africa strategy.

The 1979 election that brought Shehu Shagari government to power, although slightly conservative, sought to continue essentially along the same lines. During his tenure, Nigeria proposed to take the lead in establishing an intent to act as a regional hegemony. In this regard, there are two instances that Nigeria's inter-state relationship touched the nerve of the ECOWAS. The first was the coming to power of Samuel Kanyon Doe in 1980 (through one of the bloodiest coup in African), in Liberia. The second was its response to Rawlings coming to power, after the overthrow of a democratic government in 1981.

The coming of Rawlings (both his first and second coming) was to jolt sense of fairness of the international community. His first coming in June 1979 witnessed the trial and subsequent execution of all past leaders of the country. His second coming in December was through the overthrow of an elected government of Hilla Liman. In both cases Nigeria had to impose sanctions on Ghana. Obasanjo reacted by reviewing

the 90-day oil credit facility to Ghana; the Shagari government had to cut off oil deliveries to Ghana in order to coerce the Rawlings government to surrender to civil rule. In particular, Nigeria automatically withdraw the concessionary oil sale to Ghana and reduced the duration of credit facility granted to it from 90-days to 30-days, Nigeria at the same time also demanded the full payment of arrears to the tune of 150 million dollars owed by Ghana.[8] This singular act was to force Ghana to look for alternative source of oil outside the sub-region. It thus readily found the support of Libya, who in its own calculation will have Ghana as a critical nation to be used to neutralise the Pan-African hegemony of Nigeria at the continental level.

Samuel Konyan Doe came to power in 1980 in Liberia. His attempt to consolidate himself on throne was carried out through the total elimination of the entire Tolbert's family, the then Liberian leader. This was condemned globally. Nigeria by then had just taken off its experiment with democratic style of governance. The action of Doe was therefore considered by Nigerian Government as unethitical to world wide movement for democracy, to which Nigeria was part. Shagari single handedly seek the co-operation of Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Senegal to exclude the new Liberia leader, from both the OAU and ECOWAS sessions in 1980. Relations were strained between Nigeria and Liberia, with Doe temporarily withdrawing for the Organisation.

The diplomatic sanction by Nigeria in concert with the countries it carried along on both Liberia and Ghana had far reaching consequences for the community. In the case of Ghana, the oil sanction had serious effect on the Ghanaian economy. It

also led to strained relationship and makes co-operation rather difficult. Moreso, the reduction in oil supplies to Ghana only went further to undermine intra-regional trade which was significantly low. That Ghana went to Libya to source its energy needs meant that the community losses the growth and welfare effects of such trade. Tremendous costs is thus imposed on the community. By and large, it has introduced a destabilising foreign element into the community which for ideological reasons may be counter productive. On the other hand, the temporary withdrawal of Liberia may have created considerable problem for the community. Liberian citizens had been denied free movement in other parts of the sub-region and such regional isolation have gone along way to reduce significantly Liberia's commitment to the community.

The coming of Buhari to Power (December, 1983) had led to closure of Nigeria borders for about twenty months. It was clear that Nigeria in pursuit of national-oriented strategy of recovery have almost undermined the economies of other countries in the sub-region, and in the process thwarted free movement of goods and services. However, the coming of Babangida to power was marked by spirited moves to restore confidence into the organisation. Efforts were made to resolve institutional and administrative problems that have for long worried the Organisation. The rivalry with Cote d'Ivoire seemed to have resurfaced again in a bid to restore the relevance of ECOWAS. Boigny, in October 1990 summoned an extra-ordinary summit of Heads of State of Member States at his home town Yamoussoukro, but was forced to cancel due to the public opposition made by Nigeria and Gambia. It took the frantic effort

f Togo to heal the rift by persuading the Ivorien leader to wait for another summit to hich ECOWAS Chairman Dauda Jawara had fixed for the end of October that year.[9]

2.2 GHANAIAN PERSPECTIVE

Ghana on independence started on the crest of Pan-Africanism. This initiatives ame from Kwame Nkrumah the then president, who convened the conference of ndependent African States (CIAS) for which he carefully laid the diplomatic roundwork on Pan African from August 1957 through to April 1958. However, this ien was down played by several African Countries because of the suspicion of hana's activitism and ambition to lead Africa.

Ghana's relations with its neighbours historically bordered on unification of frica. Nkrumah in his pursuit of African unity often was quite impatient with those frican leaders who would not surrender their "petty national interest and vereignty" due to imperialism. Nkrumah's neighbouring States were therefore prehensive to such designs. For instances, Togo had to ward off Ghana's efforts to xploit the idea of Ewa unification. Yet, "the frontier between the countries was a site r frequent incidents and perpetual tensions for several years. On the Western border ith Cote d'Ivoire, Nkrumah encourage separatist movement against the government Cote d'Ivoire but he was to be promptly stopped by Boigny in a major counter ensive.[10] Subsequent leaders of Ghana, however, could not afford to push the ited Africa" agenda too far, because Ghana did not have the financial wherewithal control events in the regional environment, talkless of the entire continent.

Ghana's relations with neighbouring countries have considerably deteriorated. We can cite some few instance to illustrate this contention. Ghana and Burkina Faso maintained fair and warm relations under the late Thomas Sankara. This mutual friendship was seen as essential to the survival of both leaders who represented a brand of radical populism in the sub-region. Under Blaise Campaore however, relation between the two has been severely constrained because in a way Rawlings did not take it kindly with the killing of his friend Thomas Sankara by Compaore.

Rawlings relations with Cote d'Ivoire have not been very friendly because of reports that the country was arming anti-Rawlings forces.[11] Rawlings, however, needed the co-operation of Cote d'Ivoire badly in order to please western creditors of his new position towards them. He thus arranged a visit to Cote d'Ivoire which however. did not yield any fruit as the Ivoiren government refused to give Rawlings any elaborate executive treatment. Although tensions have reduces, there is still potential area for disagreements.

Ghana's relationship with Togo have been rather rough due to the presence of anti-Eyadema forces led by Gilchrist Olympio, a personal friend of Rawlings and son of Sylvanus Olympio the ex-president of Togo. Thus, there exist deep seated suspicion between the two countries. This suspicion and mistrust was hightened when Rawlings attempted to stem the threat against him from Ghanian exiled soldiers resident operating in Lome applied to France to pressurise Eyadema of Togo to expel some selected Ghanians in their enclave (mostly soldiers). Eyadema fulfilled this side

of the bargain. Rawlings however, to plot with Gilchrist Olympio to topple Eyadema's regime.

In September 1986, Togo was invaded by a combined force of selected Ghanians soldiers and exiled Togolese with active support of Rawlings. Eyadema with the help of French paratroopers avert the coup, the consequence of which led to the death of several Ghanians soldiers.[12] Even though the Eyadema regime have tried to downplay this event on the surface, the two leaders seem to go along whilst relationship between the two countries have been frosty.[13]

Another contributing factor was the association of some key members of Ghanian government with the Togoland Liberation movement (TOLIMO), a secessionist movement which operated from some part of Volta region and Togo. Eyadema is still opposed to this idea of greater Eweland, because for him such constitute a latent problem for Togo. During the violent 1991 pro-democracy riots in Lome, president Eyadema closed the Ghana-Togo border and put his troops on the alert.[14] For his part, Rawlings has never given up his designs of destabilising the Eyadema regime and supporting the successionist movement in "Ewe Togoland".

Ghana's relation with the rest of the community has been generally friendly. The relationship with the Republic of Benin has been cordial both under Kerekou and presently under Soglo. The relationship with Nigeria has so far been on good terms, in particular, the personal relationship between Rawlings and General Babangida. Relations with General Babangida is in particular significant because of the hostility of Togo and Cote d'Ivoire towards the Rawlings regime. However, doubts are being

raised as to the sustainability of such cordial relationship with Nigeria. The decision of Nigeria ship MV Duke of Nneni at Tema Port around the second week of 1 October 1992 has raised serious questions about the peaceful relationship that exist between Nigeria and Ghana. The ship according to reports was being detained because it has on board pharmaceutical products produced in Nigeria but regarded as contraband in Ghana.[15] It was believed that the detention of the ship may be the handiwork of some overzealous officials of Ghana customs and preventive service. Yet, the selective treatment against Nigeria can hardly be rationalised in view of the need that exists to expand trade among member States.

2.3 COTE D'IVOIRE PERSPECTIVE

Cote d'Ivoire shares a lot in common with Ghana and Nigeria at least at two levels. Both countries are major Cocoa producers, and exporters as well. The other level is the fact that there is a shred cultural network as well as having an extended coastline. Cote d'Ivoire however differed from the rest in term of its relative stability. Houphuet Boigny has ruled since Independence uninterrupted, until recently with the spate of pro-democracy protests demanded that Boigny should go. Cote d'Ivoire shares boundary with Ghana to the East, Guinea and Liberia to the South-West, North are Mali and Burkina Faso to the North.

Cote d'Ivoire under Boigny has not pursued an energetic African policy. Nevertheless, its relative stability and good economic base have made it one of the major State in the region. It always maintain a conservative approach to both Sub-

gional and Continental issues. Boigny maintained close ties with France and was extremely careful to create a zone of insecurity around his country, as a strategy to winning economic aids and concessions require from France. Cote d'Ivoire stood at the forefront in creating a politico-economic organisation called the Couseil de l'Entete. which brought three other French colonies into its orbit: Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), Niger and Benin (then Dahomey). Although the Counsel was originally conceived to counter a Senegalese project of regional federation, it served through the 1960's essentially as an organ to march Ghana and to assure the Ivoiren Cocoa and Coffee plantations vide a supply of cheap labour from Burkina Faso.

Boigny foreign policy has been largely oriented toward maintaining ties among Francophone States. Boigny openly backed CEAO (a Francophone group) whose members are Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire. This Francophone group was revived in 1970 after several failures in the 60s following the formalisation of the treaty of Abidjan establishing in 1973 due basically to the fears Francophone countries of Nigeria's dominance in the region. In effect Cote d'Ivoire employs its resources in making CEAO a paralleled Organisation with ECOWAS. It is also committed to the ultimate establishment of a unified regional market based on a more feasible approach than is obtainable in the ECOWAS.

Personalisation of foreign policy has become part and parcel of Cote d'Ivoire policy towards its neighbours and the rest of the members States. This was well illustrated with the Liberian coup in 1980 that brought Samuel Doe to power. Doe had killed almost all members of the Tolbert government including Alphonese Tolbert

ho incidentally was the son-in-law of Boigny. Boigny did not take it kindly and this rained their relationship. This explained the main reason why Cote d'Ivoire upported Charles Taylor when he took up arms against the Doe's administration in iberia, December 1990. Indeed, Taylor's armed resistance movement, National atriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), has its headquarters in Danane, an Ivoiren town rough which regular supply of arms gets to the rebel group Boigny saw and take very opportunity to deal with Doe. Boigny was able to muster the support of Blaise ampaore, the Burkinabe leader who incidentally is married to his daughter. In this ise rivalry with Nigeria manifested itself, when both Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire lt that they could challenge and confront Nigeria's might, alleged to have been upporting Doe militarily. In fact, they went to muster a support of Libya to re-nforce their efforts, knowing fully too that Libya is one of the arch rival of Nigeria at ... continental level. Libya obliged them by supplying arms to Taylor's NPFL.

Furthermore the personalisation of inter-regional relationship was also xpressed at the level of Cote d'Ivoire-Burkinabe relationships during Sankara's ime. Sankara of Burkina Faso came to power and proclaimed radical populism overnment to which Boigny greatly detested. Burkina Faso radical government ostures. being a member of CEAO as only heighted serious tensions and suspicion ith Cote d'Ivoire due to instigation of the latter by France and order to safeguard its ational interest. Cote d'Ivoire effectively decampinged for Sankara vying of ECOWAS Chairmanship. This has also led to strained relationship between the two eaders. to the extent that even when Sankara was assassinated by his closest ally,

laise Campaore, many believed that it was at the engineered by Cote d'Ivoire and ..her conservative States within the region.

Ivorien relationship with other member states could be said on the whole to be ..ided by personal sentiments of Boigny and perhaps France's interests. By and large i. is a reflex action against every Nigeria's move in the region, all in search of ..egional hegemony. This no doubt has not been healthy to the entire community ..nce many desirable policies are just being adopted not due one excuse or the other, ..hose underlying dynamics is simply the expression of high politics.

3.2.4 SENEGALESE PERSPECTIVE

Senegal's initial influence in inter-regional relations has stemmed from the ..obal status of its leader Leopoled Senghore, an internationally acclaimed writer and ..ct. Its prominent status as a nation derived from the fact that during the colonial ..riod, Dakar its headquarters served as the capital of the entire colonial Federation of ..ench West Africa (AOF). This status, Senghore, sought to retain – a West African ..deral structure - after independence. However, this could not be achieved to its ..llest. The nearest he succeeded to establish was a federal union with Mali ..sintegrating almost immediately. Yet, Senghore remained undaunted in his mission. .. was able to succeed in regrouping four of the former Federation of colonial French .. Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and Guinea., in the organisation of Senegal River states, .. renamed Senegal River Development Organisation (OMVS).

Senegal's regional ambition was limited to its confederal arrangement with Gambia. Senegal has been closely involved with the affairs of the Gambia, even though they share different colonial background. Perhaps what strengthened their relationship, was the similarity in ethnic composition. Initially Senghore had encourage the integration of the Gambia with Senegal, but when the Gambian independence came in 1965, he could not avoid it. He rather opted for a policy of close co-operation, which eventually produced a sense of Sene-Gambian Community, especially at the level of trade and security.[16]

When a set of disgruntled army of the Gambian security forces attempted to topple the regime of Sir Dauda Jawara in 1980, Senghore deployed troops to Gambia to quell the coup. Immediately a defence pact was entered between the two countries and a kind of loose federation was worked out. However, later developments and the fear on the part of Gambians that their national sovereignty may be tempered and severed that relationship, President Dauda Jawara sensing the permanent subordinate role of his country in the confederation as untenable demanded a rotating Presidency in the confederation. Abdou Diof who viewed this demand as unreasonable decided to withdraw the last batch of Senegalese gendarmes stationed in Gambia since 1981 without announcement, putting an end to the confederation.[17]

Senegal had its share of border problems with other Member States. The most significant was to course its border conflict with the neighbouring Mauritania, that almost degenerated into a state of actual war.[18] In May 1989, a border conflict between Senegal farmers and Mauritania herdsmen over grazing rights sparked off

violent attack against nationals of both countries in their respective capitals: Dakar and Nouakchott. At first, it looked as if the whole conflict will fade and relation between the two countries will return to normal. However, the crisis assumed another dimension, which calls for the deployment of the UN, OAU, ECOWAS and the Francophone summit in order to mediate and resolve the crisis. Indeed, the end result was the complete severing of ties between the two countries. Abdul Diof, the Senegalese leader, who was faced with a lot of opposition, at home did not find it difficult to resort to such line of action as a means of pacifying the opposition.

In view of the foregoing, one particular development that was said to worsen Senegal-Mauritania relations was the incipient racial policies of the Mauritania government of Ould Taya. The Senegalese government had accused the Ould Taya Moorish-Arab government of exploiting the State of affairs between the two countries, by expelling its unwanted population into Senegal. Mauritania argued that it expelled some of the black population (many of whom settled for a long period of time), because most were illegal immigrants. Also relationship between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau is rather sour. The little island that was separated by the Atlantic from Senegal threatened Senegal in 1989 over the Maritime border dispute.

Senegal being active actor in the Francophone grouping (the CEAO) has never hidden its fear and suspicion of Nigeria's position within the region. As far backs as 1979, ex-President Senghor of ECOWAS sees "ECOWAS as yet another channel through which Nigeria seeks to expand her wings over Africa South of the Sahara in her role as "Big Brother." This statement was so pregnant with serious implication

the unity of the organisation that it has to attract rebuttals from Nigeria's leadership overtime.[19]

Senghore's view indeed has remained the official attitude of subsequent Senegalese foreign policy executors. Even though in two occasions Abdul Diof has pressed for Nigeria's Chairmanship of the organisation, it just represented a change in tactics rather than rethinking on strategy on the part of his regime.

In essence Senegalese relations with other member states was like Cote D'Ivoire confined to its neighbours and much of its substance dictated by domestic conditions and stature of its leadership.

The whole attempt under this section is to bring out clearly the picture of inter-regional relation. The choice of these dominant countries to illustrate the patterns of these relations is essentially dictated by the fact that much of the substance of inter-state relation is dictated by the foreign policy of these dominant countries within the sub-region. The other member states are in most cases either made to take side, or rather are just part of the spectators, as best mediators. For their concern are largely not the wider interest of the organisation but their survival within the scheme of things. Indeed, there are minor border guarrels, for instance, betwee Togo and Benin and between Ghana and Toto and also between Sierra Leone and Liberia. Al these reveal a lot about the fragility of nation states and the artificial nature of their boundaries, that perhaps best expalin the entire problem.

These conflicts and connections that underline inter-regional relations have several implication for the ECOWAS. In their complexity and the varying interests

and motives that define the various levels of relationship, they defy any embracing formular that will bring to an end border clashes and rivalries; thus preventing any effort at maxmising sub-regional co-operation. For what brought about border clash between Ghana and Togo may not expalin a similar incident between Sierra Leone and Liberia.

More fundamentally these conflicts tend to diver the attention of the authorities in the member states from facing serious regional concerns towards resolving the conflicts. Indeed, in some situation the machinery of the organisation have to be deployed for moths just for the purpose of trying to resolve one creise or the other. We will expore this further when we consider the issue of crisis management within the sub-region.

As we have ssen in almost all cases the President or Heat of State is directly involved in the ensuing conflicts. This is likely to evoke nationalistic sentiment that is likely to be carrried over to the meeting of the Head of State.

The implication is that the formulation or implication of certain decision are likely to be undermined as a result of this inter-regional disputes. It is therefore very difficult for a consensus to be arrived at espeically on issues that would have positive impact on the integration process. It is inconceivable to expect the authorieis in Senegal to allow free movement of Mauritania nationals when Mauritania government is deporting Senegalese nationals, with the result of evoking exenophobic feelings.

However, what stands to suffer must is the economic relations between the member states and the aspects of the treaty that were speciffically designed to foster

ich economic relations, namely trade liberalisation, factor mobility and the equitable distribution of cost and benefits through compensation fund.

In many cases where border quarrels ensued, usually borders are closed, for quite a considerable length of time. This greatly hinders free movement of goods and people. Similarly it may lead to an official policy of suspending trade relations, for instance in the case of Senegal-Mauritania relations. Muritania has been a major trading partner of Senegal after France. There have been cross boder trade between the two countries in cattle and other livestock, vegetables and consumer goods. The volume of trade really went down during the peiod in which their diplomatic row reached crisis point.[20] Also, as a result of lack f co-operation, a big question mark was put on the workability of the OMVS agricultural scheme that was internationally sponsored and designed to benefit these Sahelian states in their quest for self-sufficiency in food shortage and higher prices further excebating the economic problem of the two countries and forcing them to relay on food aid.

In the final analyisis border closures, and the consequent lack of mobility and reduction in volume of trade undermine the efforts of the member states to optimize and maximize their integration efforts. They led to reduction in the volume of trade among members states, as minor quarrels led a member nation to either start to show disinterest in the affiars of the community, or begin to reduce some of it commitment to the implementation of some protocols.

2.5 LIBERIAN PERSPECTIVE

The Liberian crisis had involved all West African countires via its impact upon the ECOWAS. At the regional level, the inter-connections are especially intricate because they exposed the underlying differences that exit among member states and the set of network each build to achieve it purpose.

Fundamentally, the crisis is an internal affair in the history of Liberia. The crisis erupted between the rebels and the constituted government of Liberia. This gradually involved all the major actors in ECOWAS. Each particpants, both within and outside Liberia, called upon its allies for diplomatic and military support, embrolling almost all member nations in the conflict in one manner or another. The crisis has its origin in the nature of African politics that is largely characterised by political instability.

Samuel Doe's rule since 1980 was characterised by high handedness, and gross mismanagement of the economy. In Janaury 1986, Doe transormed himself from a military leader to an elected civilian President of Liberia. Thereafter, the opposition manisfested and transformed into an armed movement. That precisely coincided with the period when the Charles Taylor led NPFL and invaded the Nimba county in an attempt to oust Doe. Charles Taylor had vowed to depose Doe and the state of affairs had provided a fertile groundfor such an adventure. By June 1990 Charles Taylor had over run 13 of the country's 20 counties including the most economically strategic areas: the sea ports and fire Stone Rubber plantation. The NPFL derives its social

rise largely from the ethnic groups that were not only marginalised but were persecuted by Doe and members of his armed fores of Liberia.[21]

Very soon the armed resistance movement splitted into two with the major body held intact by Charles Taylor, and the aplinter but dangerous and effective groupd under the control of Prince Yommie Johnson. The latter was to subsequently led the prosecution and subsequent murder of Samuel Doe. The struggle between these forces and the government was bitter and bloody.

Thus, following the escalation of intenral crisis in Liberia due to power struggle between Doe and Taylor some leasers of ECOWAS member nations met and decided to set up a peace monitoring force to act as a buffer beteen the two warring factions.[22] The formation of the group nearly brought an ideological tussle between Francophone and Anglophone speaking countries of the region. The monitoring group as it is designated ECOMOG-Economic Community Monitoring Group was supported to bring about peace in Liberia without itself being embroiled in the imbroglio. At the outset the Francophone countires viewed the project as initiative of their English neighburs, hence most them steered clear. thus, when ti was formed only Nigeria, Sirerro Leone, Gambia, and Ghana contributed troops. The only Francophone country that pledged to enter Liberia as part of ECOMOG forc was Guinea and it was followed later by Senegal.

Even as ECOMOG was put in place after the Banjil summit, they were to be stucked for over a week in Sierra Leone and conakry, unable to make any move into

Liberia. Two main factors almost thwarted such effort at community security arrangements. The first opposition that came from Cote D'Ivoire and Burkina Faso.[23]

Incidentally Taylor used both countries as military base and source of arems Campaore, the Burkinabe leader protested loudly that the ECOMOG was without defined mandate and that no enough consulatation toop place to warrnat it and hence, according to him "ECOWAS (is) not competent to intevene in a memebr state internal conflict."[24]

But perhaps what slowed the whole process was Taylor's change of heart that his armed group will treat ECOMOG as "interventionist troops", which essentially made the countries concerned to have to redefine their strategies in confronting Taylor who was in charge of voer 70 percent of the country. ECOWAS had originally asked Doe to step down as a precondition for restoring peace. Due refused further complicating matters. Still, the shadow of Nigeria looms large that many member states saw the whole arrangements as part of Nigeria's alledge "expanisonist tendencies."

ECOMOG was to face stiff resistance from the NPFL.[25] ECOMOG which had the order of ensuring the installation of an interim government that exclude the warring factions, apart from rehabilitating destroyed social infrasturture and restoring peace found itself in a serious military misadventure. Initially it was put under the Ghanian leadership of General Arnold Quinno in order to dispel the suspicion over Nigeria's motives. However, the Ghanian-Liberia soured relations was to manifest itself when Quinno acquiesce to the murde to Doe and was immediately replaced by a

Nigeria, Major General Joshua Dogon Yaro. Since the, two Nigeria Commanders have successively led the Group.

At the level of ECOWAS up to sixteen meetings and summit were held at various levels to deal with the Liberian situation.[26] The first extral-ordinary summit was held in Babamo, Mali in November, 1990 at which the NPFL leader Charles Taylor was forced to sign a ceasefire accord. Since then, there was the Yamoussokro accord which took place at the instance of the Cote D'Ivoire President between 31st October 1991 in which Charles Taylor was given ultimatum to compy with the ECOWAS proposals fro peace in Liberia.

The meeting indeed endorsed a 60-day timetable for encamping and disarming all the combatants under the suprovison of ECOMOG. The timetable was set starting November 15, 1991 for the implementation of the resolution that relate to total disarmament and peace in the country. Taylor signed the accord, but he was to immediately decline implementations.[27] Incidentally the ECOWAS member states appear to have been completely exhausted with the controversy over a proposal for another extraordinary ECOWAS summit in cotonou, Bein to discuss the Liberian civil war. According to the current Chairman of ECOWAS Nicephore Soglo of Benin, the summit becomes necessary in view of the introduction of another factor-ULIMO in the conflict. However, such proposal could not attract the necessary quorum for such meeting to hold. Rather, member states settled at having a meeting of the ECOWAS mediation committee and the committee of five chaired by Cote D'Ivoire. Indeed the inability of Soglo to garner suport for his proposal was the inability to ECOWAS to

ully impement the decision of the Daikar summit that toop place in july, 1992, in which comprehensive sanctions were propsoed against Taylor, for refusing to disarm and allow free and fair election by August 1992.[28]

Presently, it would seem that even ECOMOG itself is embriled in the war, having been forced to defend itself, hence incurring several casulatines. The war has persisted, casuing serious political and economic cost to the region and the community. The question is can ECOWAS enforce sanction in such situation? And secondly can Nigeria continue to incur the cost of the war being the underwriter of the group? These questions are not asnwered here for they are beyong our scope. The point worth making though it that for over three years ECOWAS members states have been variously invovled in crisis management that have a telling effect on its capcity for manging political and economic problems.

One area in which the Liberian civi l war has a telling effect on the community was the losses incurred. The trade division of ECOWAS estimate that the community has lost up to about five billion Naira in external trade, both visible and invisible since the Liberia war started. This was incurred principally due to cessation of trade between Liberia and other member states.[29] At the political level, the crisis has further polarised member states. Nigeria on the other hand has shouldered much of the economic cost even inspite of the depressed nature of its economy. It would seem on the whole that the ECOWAS nations have been completely worn down in tryng to find a lasting solution to the problem, indeed diverting their attention from more

crucial issues of integration. But as a system, can anything tangible take place when one sport endanger the economic and stabilty of the region?

In conclusion it could be said that the Liberian crisis have magnified the political obtacles to the implementation of ECOWAS treaty. It is therefore clear that even the formulation of proposals and protocols are informed by political developments which in turn affect the implementation of these protocols including the commitment of the authorities to such implementation. We next consider some important development in ECOWAS.

Chapter three

Endnotes

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CHAPTER FOUR

ECOWAS CRISIS MANAGEMENT MECHANISM

4.1 INTRODUCTION

A crisis situation is the most acute political phase in the development of an international conflict. It has always been and shall continue to be an indicator of a sharp rise in tensions between or within States and may grow into armed confrontation as it did in Liberia. Crisis situation generally can never be ruled out as long as there exist international systems where actors with varying degree of interest clashes in the international scene. Likewise, the possibility for peaceful solution can never be ruled out even though it greatly depends on the actors involved in the conflict. In this wise, this chapter focuses its attention on the instruments and peace accords established in the history of ECOWAS to manage the West African crisis idden area.

4.2 ECOMOG: ITS ESTABLISHMENT AND ITS LEGALITY QUESTION

The evolution of Peace keeping force in ECOWAS and the role Nigeria played in its initiation will be examine. The argument on the legal justification for the formation of ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia called ECOMOG will also be examine. It is pact of the formation new 'military pact' to address any crisis within the region.

The Liberian conflict gave birth to the formation of ECOMOG. The genesis of the Liberian conflict started when late President Samuel Doe failed to address the

fundamental issues that brought him to power. These include the domestic political, social and economic inequalities between the Americo – Liberians and the Indigenous population. These inequalities led to the December 24th 1989 revolt by a guerrilla army, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPLF) led by Charles Taylor. This marked the beginning of the Liberian war. President Samuel Doe at the hit of the crisis sought for Nigeria's military assistance of 2,000 soldiers to bolster his faltering army. The Nigerian government declined to intervene unilaterally, but initiated a multinational approach to end the crisis under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).[1]

At the 13th summit of the ECOWAS Head of States held at Banjul on 6th of July, 1990, where the issued of Liberia was raised; it was observed that some of the Member States of ECOWAS were backing the guerrilla army of Taylor. Cote D'Ivore had given assistance to the NPFL by authorising the supply of arms and by providing passage for arms from Burkina Faso originating from Libya to Taylor.[2] This created some disaffection within the Organisation as this act was considered by some of the Heads of States to be a violation of the age long tradition held by Member States of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) not to intervene in the internal affairs of Member States.[3]

In order to forestall the genocide war which was becoming alarming, Nigeria proposed for the establishment of a Standing Mediation Committee. However, other Member-Countries of ECOWAS, particularly Francophone Countries argued that as a regional organisation, ECOWAS had no judicial backing to interfere in Liberia,

because the Organisation was basically created to achieve economic integration within the sub-region and nothing more. In reality, the ECOWAS Charter did not provide a major ingredient of political instrument for the resolution of conflict among member states. Only Article II of the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence made reference to this. It stated that:

"Member states declare and accept that any armed threat or aggression directed against any member state shall constitute a threat or aggression against the Community".[4]

Some Heads of States argued that ECOWAS cannot achieve "its ultimate objective of economic integration and co-operation unless the sub-region was considerably free of political tension and conflict".[5] Similarly, at the end of the 14th Ordinary Session of Heads of States in Abuja in 1991, the ECOWAS Secretary-General, Abass Bundu, succinctly stressed that:

"You cannot talk meaningfully about economic co-operation and integration by itself without also relating to the underpinning of political stability within the sub-region. The two are inseparable and therefore have to be discussed inter alia. It is clear ... that regional solidarity and commitment to integration will be considerably enhanced where political stability becomes a common identity and is also perceived as a shared responsibility".[6]

On the issue of non-interference clause in the OAU and United Nations Charters, it can be argued that the situation in Liberia has gone beyond that. As admitted by both the then ECOWAS Chairman, Dauda Jawara, and the Secretary-General of OAU,

Salim A. Salim, "the wanton killings going on in Liberia has made the country a slaughterhouse and the situation could no longer be treated as an internal matter".[7] Salim further stated that:

"Before ECOWAS undertook its initiative, many, including the African media, were condemning the indifference demonstrated by Africa. The most desirable thing would have been to have an agreement of all parties to the conflict and the convergence of views of all members of ECOWAS. But to argue that there is no legal basis for intervention is surprising. Should the countries in West Africa just leave Liberians to flight each other? Will that be more legitimate? Will that be more understandable?"[8]

He did not think so, but added that, if the intervention could be construed as a legal error it remained proper because it is better to make a mistake trying to solve a problem than to remain completely indifferent in such a situation.[9]

In fact, the former president of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida, argued that:

"We have heard views about the legality of ECOMOG. But those who raise the preposterous questions are equally but indirectly questioning the legality of ECOWAS. The answer therefore to this rather ambiguous question lies in asking the fundamental question, is ECOWAS legal? Furthermore, people who raise the issue of legality should promptly look at Articles 52 of the Charter of United Nations for the appropriate and expected role of ECOWAS and other subregional organisations world-wide... the Charter of the United Nations... (states that)...

(a) Nothing in the present charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies of dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements of agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

(b) The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the security council.

(c) The security council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the security council."[10]

To further this argument on the justification of ECOMOG's involvement in Liberia, Margaret Vogt insisted that at the time of ECOMOG deployment, "the legal status of Liberia as a sovereign state was in dispute ... there was no government to negotiate with and to hold responsible for the atrocities that were being perpetrated against innocent citizens of Liberia and other African States and for the violation of the immunity governing the establishment of diplomatic mission."[11]

At this state, it is perhaps relevant to look at the 1978 protocol on Non-Aggression and 1981 ECOWAS Defence Pact. These two protocols had their origin

even before the formation of ECOWAS. With the formation of ECOWAS, Nigeria identified her national security within former Head of State during whose time ECOWAS was formed, had once expressed the feeling that the national security of Nigeria extends beyond its national boundary."[12]

Nigeria hoped to secure its national security through ECOWAS – a regional body that would be backed in due course by a security system. This would eradicate the military ties that francophone countries have with France. In this vein, therefore, a former Head of State, General Obasanjo, stated in 1976 that "Africa had no need for an external policeman since there is no vacuum in Africa to be filled militarily by international do-gooders."[13] In fact, in 1982, President Shehu Shagari called to question the "existence of military or defence pacts between some OAU member states and extra-continental powers"[14] referring to Francophone countries.

Clearly, this shows that the formation of ECOWAS was not only necessary but inevitable. Nigeria together with Togo initiated the Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1976, shortly after the formation of protocol. The protocol was signed and adopted in 1978. Under the protocol, member states resolved not to use force as a means of settling disputes among themselves, they also recognise the current borders between them and the pledged not to attack each other.

To consolidate the protocol, another one was adopted and signed in 1981 Relating to the Mutual Assistance on Defence or the ECOWAS Defence Pact. This protocol or Defence Pact states that member states have agreed that any armed threat or aggression directed against member states shall constitute a threat or aggression

against armed aggression (see appendix for the complete agreement). In other words, the Defence Pact has identified three categories of threat which could justify an ECOWAS armed response. These are contained in Articles 16 to 18 of the Protocol.

Article 16 refers to cases of armed threat or aggression directed against a member by a non- ECOWAS country. In Article 17, it refers to conflicts between ECOWAS-member states, while Article 18 stipulates that where internal conflict in a member state is actively promoted and sustained by outsiders,[15] then ECOWAS should intervene. It was this last Article that ECOWAS employed to justify its response to the conflict in Liberia.

But despite the signing of the Defence Pact, it was never ratified by all the 16 members of the Community for two main reasons or problems. The first problem was posed by Francophone countries who expressed apprehension at Nigeria's overwhelming power in the sub-region. They refused to support one of the points in the ECOWAS Defence Pact which called on member states to accelerate plans for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the respective countries. Hence, the Francophone states adopted the Accord de Non Aggression et d 'Assistance en Matiere' de defence or A.N.A.D in 1981, within the context of the C.E.A.O.[16] six years after the formation of ECOWAS.

The A.N.A.D. amongst other things, does not call on member states to withdraw foreign troops from their countries. Obviously, they prefer France assistance in military and defence matters as well as economic matters.

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The second problem was the lack of adequate finance, technology and industrial base to back up the pact. Babajima, a research fellow at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, aptly summarises it this way:

"... the most vexing is the problem of finance. Where will the money for the operations of the A.A.F.C. (Allied Armed Forces of the Community) come from? Where will the money for the enlarged bureaucracy that will arise out of its formation come from? These questions are relevant because the community is having problems with late payments or even non payment of dues by member states. Nigeria has had to underwrite a large part of the running cost of the Secretariat."[17]

Thus, the Defence Pact was never ratified by all 16 ECOWAS member-states, particularly the Francophone countries. Only 10 member ratified the Pact[18] the Liberian crisis and its adverse effect on the stability of the region, made Nigeria to shed more light on the need for a collective regional security framework. Nigeria therefore argued that the Liberian situation falls on one of the categories of military crisis which would justify an ECOWAS armed response as identified by the 1981 Defence Pact.

4.3 ESTABLISHMENT OF ECOWAS STANDING MEDIATION COMMITTEE

In his speech at the 13th ECOWAS Session, in 1990, the former Nigerian President, General Babangida, who proposed the setting up of the Standing Mediation Committee, stated that:

"The noble ideals of the ECOWAS were anchored on solidarity, unity, mutual trust and good neighbourliness. We should always uphold these principal ingredients in our dealings with one another .... In view of the occasional clashes resulting from political misunderstanding among some of our member states, I propose that the summit should set up a Standing Mediation Committee of four members ... such a committee should intervene in timely fashion, whenever such disputes arise. The membership of the Committee could be reviewed every three years..."[19]

The Community, therefore, reiterated that "regional security and stability as well as peace and concord, are necessary conditions for effective sub-regional co-operation and integration..."[20]

Thus, the Standing Mediation Committee was set up and championed by Nigeria to "prevent Liberia, a member state from sinking further into anarchy and destruction."[21] The former Nigerian Vice President, Admiral Aikhomu had explained that:

"... when the crisis in Liberia degenerated into almost senseless killings with a possible invitation for massive extra continental interference and destabilisation of the sub-region, the intervention of the leaders of ECOWAS became an urgent necessity and indeed responsibility. The purpose has been:

- to bring the carnage to a halt;
- to intervene in the fighting between the forces, separate the belligerents and establish a cease-fire; andto restore law and order in the country and help to install an interim government, which will in due course, work out necessary

arrangements and facilities agreeable to the principal actors for a return to normal or democratic government in Liberia."[22]

The Standing Mediation Committee consisted of five members: Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Togo and Mali. The Committee's plan was endorsed by both the OAU and the UNO and included the following:[23]

An immediate cease-fire;

The formation of a peace keeping force;

The establishment of an interim government representing the various political and ethno-cultural interests. None of the leaders of the warring factions were eligible to serve as the president of an interim administration. Similarly, both the President and the Vice President of the Interim Regime will not be eligible to contest the ensuing national elections.

(4) The holding of national elections within a year, under international supervision. This was however rejected by Taylor, because it would prevent him from becoming the president of Liberia, a position he felt entitled to.[24]

After the Banjul summit, in June 1990, ECOWAS Heads of States and government and their respective foreign ministers embarked on a series of meeting and consultations with warring factions and with other interested groups of Liberia. Unfortunately, attempts by the committee to resolve the problem were unsuccessful, because of divergent interests of members which made mediation efforts difficult. Each of the warring party leaders showed willingness to a cease-fire only if he could eventually emerge as the president of Liberia.[25]

On 30th August, 1990, ECOWAS called for a national conference which was convened again in Banjul. All the principal political parties, churches and major interest groups were in attendance except for Charles Taylor, the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. Amos Sawyer was elected as the Interim-President while Bishop Diggs became the Vice-President of Liberia.[26]

By mid September 1990 Sawyer made another attempt to conciliation by proposing the setting up of an interim legislative assembly with Taylor's NPFL having 6 seats while Yormie Johson's INPFL would have 4. This was again rejected by Charles Taylor who was all out for the Presidency. Later in the same month, the United States government mediated negotiations which led to the formal declaration of a cease-fire, but which was promptly violated by the NPFL.[27]

As the war continued with no end in sight, ECOWAS member states continued to seek other measures to end the crisis. Hence, the establishment of ECOWAS Monitoring Group, which was initially proposed since early August 1990, was finally ratified. It decided to move to Liberia as stated in the communiqué of the Mediation Committee:

"The failure of the warring parties to cease hostilities has led to the massive destruction of property and massacre by all the parties of thousands of innocent civilians, including foreign nationals .:. the result is a state of anarchy and total breakdown of law and order in Liberia. These developments have traumatised the Liberian population and greatly shocked the people of the sub-region and the rest of the international community. The ECOWAS Mediation Committee (has therefore)

decided to assume their responsibility that peace and stability is maintained within the sub-region and in the African continent as a whole..."[28]

This implies that "the formation of ECOWAS was inspired by the philosophy which demanded an African solution[29] for the purpose of keeping the peace, restoring law and order and ensuring that cease-fire is respected.[30]

But as preparation for ECOWAS Monitoring Group to take off got to a top gear. Togo the sixth ECOMOG member withdrew from the force, leaving Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea and Sierra – Leone – all Anglophone countries except for Guinea.

4.4 THE PEACE ACCORDS

This section will concentrate on the discussion of ECOMOG activities in Liberia and the various peace agreements signed. An assessment of the peacekeeping force will also be made.

ECOWAS Monitoring Group's involvement in Liberia began by acting essentially as an evacuation force. The peace initiative was initially dubbed as "operation liberty".[31] But even before it was deployed, the NPFL of Taylor had declared war against it hence, ECOMOG forces were attacked as they landed at the Port in Monrovia. Taylor had threatened that he would kill one Nigerian or one Ghanaian for every Liberian killed as a result of ECOMOG activities in the war torn country,[32] adding that:

"There would be a very, very high price to pay for the death of any Liberian in the hands of a West African Peacekeeping Force. I now have a right to ask for help from whoever wants to assist me. I am personally directing the military operations. We'll fight to the last man. We don't consider this force to be a peace force. I have given orders toopen fire on any stranger setting foot on our territory."[33]

It therefore became evident that the evacuation exercises cannot be carried out without a form of law and order before an interim government was put in place. The constant attack by the NPFL forces and occasional ones from Johnson's Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia brought the need for a change in the terms of reference of ECOMOG's mandate, because "ECOMOG cannot keep a peace which did not exist."[34]

Consequently, by mid September 1990, the force was instructed to enforce a ceasefire, "to clear the capital city of all threats of attack and establish and maintain effective buffer."[35] In other words the capacity of the NPFL to attack, must be reduced or neutralised. Hence, ECOMOG forces were increased from 3,000 to 6,000 men, additional troops from Nigeria and Ghana were transformed into NIBATT II GHANBATT II arrived in Monrovia and a second phase of ECOMOG was launched.[36] More offensive weapons were added to its arsenal and aerial bombardment was employed to eliminate immediate threat posed by Charles Taylor and his men. Main vessels were assigned to ECOMOG including Nigerian naval ship, NNS Ambe (an amphibian landing craft with immense loading capacity) and the Ghanaian merchant vessel, MV Tano River. Others are two Ghanaian from Nigeria:

(2) Also, the warring parties agree to constitute a Technical committee to work out security arrangements, under supervision of ECOWAS, for the hosting of the All-Liberia conference.

(3) The warring parties agree to seek assistance from ECOWAS and other friendly governments and organisations to help repatriate and resettle Liberians prior to the All-Liberia conference.

(4) Upon formation of the future Interim Government, the said government shall take appropriate measures, with the assistance of ECOWAS, to begin disarming the warring parties.

(5) The warring parties agree to cease-fire as it is with all parties remaining, where they were as at the signing of the cease-fire agreement in Bamako on November 28th, 1990 and to continue discussions in Liberia on the modalities of monitoring the cease-fire under the supervision of ECOWAS. All efforts will be made to conclude the modalities for monitoring the cease-fire within 30 days.

(6) The warring parties agree that immediately upon signing this statement, all seaports and airports will be considered military free zones. Towards this end, warring parties controlling the seaports/airports to be utilised will work out the appropriate security measures whenever use of the seaport/airports is desired. For each arrival/departure, two inspectors of ECOMOG will work along with the warring party controlling the seaport/airport each time it is used.

The parties thus, agreed for the enlargement and disarming of their troop. ECOMOG was also to incorporate Malian troops into its force.

All – Liberia Conference 15th March, 1991:

The Lome summit and agreements brought relative calm to allow for the much talked about All-Liberia conference to take place on 15th of March, 1991 under the triumvirate chairmanship of Ambassador H. Brewer, Archbishop M.K. Francis and Sheikh K.K. Konneh.[45] The purpose of the national conference was to find a peaceful means of ending the unfortunate situation in Liberia through the formation of an interim government acceptable to the Liberian people.

The NPFL submitted proposals to the conference but later walked out of the meeting after refusing to agree on several issues both of substance and of procedure.[46] This setback by the NPFL did not however stop the conference from forming an interim government known as the Interim Government of National Unity in which Professor Amos Sawyer was endorsed by the conference as the President of the I.G.N.U., while the INPFL nominated Dr. Peter Naigow as the vice-president, who replaced Bishp Ronald Diggs.[47]

A Unicameral Interim Legislative Assembly made up of 51 members was also established with 26 members from 13 countries, 13 representatives from the Assembly in Gbarnga and 13 representatives from the Assembly in Monrovia, 5 members came from the NPFL and one member from the INPFL, while 2 members were from the interest groups and 6 from the 2 existing political parties.[50]

Prior to this national conference, a joint declaration on the Liberian situation was held on the 1st of March, 1991, at the invitation of the Togolese president, in which the warring parties agreed to co-operate fully with ECOWAS and to refrain from taking any action that might be prejudicial to the arrangements being made to ensure the successful convening of the All-Liberia National Conference".[51]

However, shortly after the National Conference, clashes continued to occur between the rebel groups to the extent that another meeting was called, this time in Yamoussoukro in June 1991, at the invitation of president Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire because, "war appears to be defying all efforts to bring sanity to the place and at every crucial turn, it has been Mr. Taylor frivolously throwing a spanner in to the peace works."[52]

Consultative Meeting of Heads of States in Yamoussoukro – Yamoussoukro I 30th June, 1991:

On 30th of June, 1991, a meeting was convened under the chairmanship of President Boigny in which the warring parties attended as well as the Heads of States of Nigeria, Gambia, Togo and Burkina Faso and the Interim President of Liberia.

The Heads of States present at the meeting requested president Boigny to launch an urgent appeal to both Sawyer and Charles Taylor to accept a cease-fire, as preliminary national reconciliation and restoration of peace to the war torn country. The proposals made which included the maintenance of security in each of the zones

under the control of the two parties (Sawyer and Taylor) were accepted of the five Heads of States.[53]

The 14th Summit of ECOWAS Heads of States and Government Abuja I, 4th – 6th July, 1991:

Few days after the Yamoussoukro agreement, the 14th ECOWAS summit was held ion Abuja – Nigeria. During the session an extensive review of the Liberian situation was made, while the communiqué released at the end of the summit stated that:

"The Authority stressed the need for the five member committee to ensure that a proper environment conducive to the holding of free and fair election are held; such environment include the effective supervision and control of the armed forces belonging to each of the parties, the facilitation of the repatriation and settlement of Liberian refugees prior to the elections, and the effective restoration of conditions necessary to guarantee free movement of persons and unfettered campaigning the political parties, considering that the elections are envisaged to be held within a period of sex months, the authority requested the committee of five to do everything possible to expedite the creation of these necessary conditions. Recalling the fact that the All-Liberia National Conference had agreed on the composition of the Interim Election Commission, the authority requested the Interim Government of Liberia to expedite the constitution of the Commission to enable it commence its works."[54]

The summit also re-affirmed the need for other ECOWAS member states to contribute troops in strengthening the capacity of ECOMOG to overcome the Liberian problem.

First Yamoussoukro summit of the Committee of five – Yamoussoukro II:

This summit took place on the 29th of July, 1991 following the endorsement by members at the Abuja summit. The Cote d'Ivoire president again chaired the meeting. Others present included the Heads of States of The Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Senegal, a representative of president Eyadema of Togo, Professor Amos Sawyer, Taylor and the representative of International Negotiations Network (INN).

After reviewing the Liberian situation, commendation was made to former president of United States, Jimmy Carter, for responding to the invitation and for making the INN assist in organising electoral process in Liberia.[55]

Second Meeting of the Committee of Five – 16th – 17th September, 1991 – Yamoussoukro:

As agreed during the Yamoussoukro II meeting, another meeting was convened again under the same chairmanship of president Boigny. It was maintained at the meeting that ECOMOG should be remodelled and reinforced.[56] Similarly, the warring factions agreed for the disarming and encampment of their troops in designated locations by ECOMOG forces.[57]

Both the Interim government of Liberia and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia agreed to:

(1) Set up a five member Elections commission for the organisation and supervision of the elections in Liberia.

(2) Establish a five member Ad hoc Supreme Court to adjudicate disputes arising from the electoral process as provided by the Liberian constitution; and

(3) To co-operate fully with the International Negotiations Network of the Charter Centre invited by the Committee to assist with the electoral process.

Third Meeting of the Committee of Five, 29-30th October, 1991, Yamoussoukro IV:[58]

As agreed in the previous meeting the committee of five met again, with other members of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Guinea and Sierra-Leone in attendance. Others invited to the meeting were Salim A. Salim, the Secretary-General of O.A.U. and Mrs. Dayle Spencer of the International Negotiations Network.

As usual, the review of developments relating to the Liberian situation was made. The parties were urged to speed up preparations for the commencement of the Interim Elections Commission and the disarming and encampment of combatants. Other agreements reached include:

(a) ECOMOG now to cover the whole of Liberia, as ECOMOG troops have to be deployed all over the country for the supervision of the encampment and disarming of all warring factions.

(b) ECOMOG shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout Liberia.

(c) All warring factions will voluntarily abandon their fighting locations and move into designated camps.

(d) Eminent persons of the International Negotiations Network will visit Liberia during encampment and disarmament to reinforce the confidence of warring factions.

(e) All parties will recognise the absolute neutrality of ECOMOG and demonstrate trust and confidence in it.

- Lost weapons need to be located and recovered.
- Obstacles and minefields have to be neutralised.
- ECOMOG troops to monitor all entry points into Liberia.

On the other hand, ECOMOG was given certain tasks which will enhance the smooth encampment and disarming of the warring factions. These include among other things, the elimination of external threat to the disarmament process, patrol and static guards to monitor all avenues of approach to Liberia, providing security for all VIPs and local dignatories where necessary and the stationing of guards in strategic installations.[58]

However, these anticipated development did not all happen because of obstacles created by Charles Taylor. Instead of working for the implementation of the agreement, Taylor was reported to have recruited 5,000 men to boost his army that was supposed to be disarmed by January, 1992.[59]

Several attempts were made to ensure that Taylor heeded to the agreement signed in Yamoussoukro, but to no avail. For instance, the Interim Government of Sawyer imposed economic sanctions against the NPFL and its controlled territory in December 1991 because, "... (Sawyer) had seen the peace process stalled by the

NPFL and watched that body build up a vast arsenal mainly to ensure that the pillage continues".[60]

Similarly, people in Liberia had expressed their unhappiness for the delay in the implementation of the peace accord. Taylor on the other hand refused to commence the process of the implementation until United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia has withdrawn into Sierra Leone.[61]

Finally, in February 1992, Sawyer offered the post of vice-president to Taylor on condition that the NPFL disarmed and encamped within the stipulated period. Several cabinet and legislative positions were also offered to top NPFL members but yet the efforts yielded no fruitful results.[62] Hence, the Informal Consultative Group of Committee of Five decided to meet again to further the peace process.

Informal Consultative Group Meeting 6th – 7th April, 1992:

Five months after the Yamoussoukro rounds, an Informal Consultative Group meeting was held in Geneva at the invitation and under the chairmanship of president Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire. Present at the meeting were Heads of States of Senegal, Burkina Faso and Amos Sawyer, Taylor and the vice president of Nigeria who represented the Nigerian president.

It was observed during the meeting that positive development were recorded amidst the stalemate created by the NPFL – which include the appointment of the members of the Interim Elections Commission, the ad hoc supreme court, the

completion of reconnaissance visits by ECOMOG to the areas held by the NPFL and the opening of some of the trunk roads in Liberia.

At the end of the day, however, it was also observed that several aspects of the Yamoussoukro accord had not been implemented, particularly those relating to the establishment of a buffer zone along the Sierra-Leone – Liberia border and the encampment and disarmament of all combatants.

The meeting, therefore, clarified several issues which include:

(a) That the buffer zone on the Liberia – Sierra-Leone border envisioned by the Accord should be established without further delay. ECOMOG alone shall secure the zone. NPFL may send unarmed observers to the zone.

(b) That all entry and exit points into and out of Liberia in particular the seaports and airports, shall be secured by ECOMOG. NPFL may maintain an unarmed administrative presence at these points through police, customs and immigration in the areas under its control.

(c) That the encampment and disarmament of all combatants shall be carried out by ECOMOG as envisioned in the Yamoussoukro Accord.

(d) That Mr. Charles Taylor may maintain a personal security of company strength equipped only with small arms.

To this effect, the ECOMOG field-commander was directed to implement the Yamoussoukro Accord without further delay. The new date for the commencement of ECOMOG operations for implementing the Yamoussoukro IV Accord as April 30th, 1992 (See appendix for Time Table).

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15th Summit of ECOWAS, 27th - 29th July, 1992:

As with previews ECOWAS session, the Liberian crisis was given top priority at the 15th summit of ECOWAS. It noted with disappointment the uncooperative attitude of the NPFL in foiling any peace agreement reached especially in the area of disarmament and encampment of its combatants and the insertion of buffer zone long the Liberia – Sierra-Leone border.[64] The summit, therefore, resolved that:

(a) The Field Commander of ECOMOG shall complete the implementation of the programme contained in the Yamoussoukro Accord of 30th October 1991, clarified by the Geneva meeting of the Committee of Five, not later than thirty days from July 29th 1992.

(b) That unless Charles Taylor and the NPFL comply fully with the implementation of the said programme, the Authority shall impose comprehensive sanctions against Charles Taylor and the NPFL-controlled areas of Liberia and other party(ies) that fails to comply with the implementation of the programme.

(c) That all the member states of ECOWAS shall take all necessary measures to give full effect to this decision.

(d) That the Committee of Five, in consultation with the Standing Mediation Committee, shall seek the assistance of the security council of the United Nations to make whatever sanctions that are imposed effective and binding on all members of the international community in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Just as in the previous signed the summit reiterated its appeal to the international community to aid ECOMOG in anyway possible, to see to the end of the Liberian problem.

Following the 30 day ultimatum which expired in August 1992, given to Taylor to heed to the Yamoussoukro Accord, an economic embargo was imposed by ECOWAS to starve the NPFL of arms.[65] Consequently, ECOMOG was able to liberate 20 towns and villages under the control of the NPFL which include towns of Buchanan, Kakata, Herbel and the strategic Robers Field International Airport.[66] Similarly, Gbenga, the headquarters of the NPFL was "mistakenly" bombed by ECOMOG troops.[67]

The fall of Kakata only instigated Taylor rather than mollify him. He stated in a radio broadcast of the BBC that "we may suffer some setbacks but we will continue to fight this war, this year, next and the next 10 years. ECOMOG will gain no military victory because if peace is forged without Taylor's input, the fighting will reoccur".

Following this threat, more contingents of 5,000 soldiers mainly from Nigeria and Guinea arrived in Liberia to boost the already 16,000 there. In addition, the Nimba Redemption Council – a militant group whose mission is to chase Taylor out of Nimba county, launched an offensive near the Cote d'Ivoire border.[68]

The Cotonou Agreement 25th – 26th July, 1993:

The signing of the Cotonou agreement took place in Benin, a month after more than 500 civilians were killed in the general Harbel area 64 kilometres from

Monrovia.[70] The National Patriotic Front of Liberia was accused of committing the massacre because a radio message was intercepted in which Charles Taylor was heard saying, "if you have men among them, chop them and for the women, rape them ... all I want now is a reign of terror..." Whole villages and displaced centres were set ablaze shortly after hearing this intercepted message.[71]

During the Cotonou meeting, it was agreed that ECOMOG troops together with Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops will work jointly in disarming the warring factions.

The Liberian National Transition Government was proposed, hence Taylor insisted that this new LNTG be installed first before disarmament takes place.[72]

The Accord also gave the NPFL the right to nominate members to a number of cabinet posts in the new Liberian National Transitional Government. The peace accord was however threatened in August that year when the Interim President, Amos Sawyer, sacked Ma Kayon, the elected chairman of the reconstituted transitional government which was formed during the Cotonou meeting.[73]

By November 1993, about 300 United Nations observers arrived in Liberia to supervise the disarmament process as requested by Charles Taylor. Zimbabwe and Tanzania sent a reconnaissance team two months later.[74] Zimbabwe and earlier threatened not to commit its troops unless the United Nations was ready to write off the entire cost of its peace keeping operation,[75] which the United Nations apparently did.

Following this development, the Nigerian government further reiterated its commitment to see to the end of the Liberian fracas. This went counter to earlier announcement by the Nigerian Interim Head of State, Shonekan (27th August – 17th November, 1993) to withdraw Nigerian troops from ECOMOG by March 1994 due to economic reasons.[76] The Abacha government that took over in November 1993 argued that, "it will be a great disaster if at this stage of development in Liberia, we should pull out without realising the sacrifice in terms of men and materials which we have put in... while it was not Nigeria's desire to keep the troops in Liberia a day longer than necessary, it is not neat to just pull out without bringing... the peace process which was initiated by ECOMOG (in) which Nigeria played a substantial role, to a logical conclusion".[77] No fewer than 11,500 Nigerian troops were in ECOMOG at that time. The Nigerian government further stated that ECOMOG had completed the first and most important phase of its mandate which was the enforcement of a cease-fire between the warring factions and thus what remains was for the establishment of an institution of a lasting peace through political negotiations.

With this renewed effort by Nigeria, Taylor also agreed for the disarming of his troops and urged other warring factions to do the same.[78] Similarly, by March 1994, some war-weary combatants from the ULIMO faction handed over their arms to the ECOMOG encampment site at Todee after the attack on Kakata by ULIMO in which lorries carrying 250 tonnes of food items meant for refugees were hijacked.[79]

The request by Charles Taylor that the new Liberian National Transitional Government be installed first before disarmament takes place finally agreed upon in

March following the meeting between Asmos Sawyer and the warring groups. Charles Taylor's opponent still harboured the suspicion against his motive. It was not surprising, therefore, that shortly after the meeting the struggle to maintain power in the LNTG came to the force.

Taylor wanted his NPFL to have their ministers in Agriculture, Lands and Mines Ministry in order to control the resources of the nation, as well as the labour and International Affairs Ministry so as to control and manipulate the political appointees in the various subdivisions of the nation and to control the dissemination of information in which government policies will be presented to the world.[80]

The United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO) on the other hand wanted to control the economic heights of the government apparatus. ULIMO has also shown the desire to control the Defence and Finance Ministries and also put forward names of candidates to fill the posts of Chief Executive of key corporations such as Liberian Telecommunications and the National Bank of Liberia.[81]

Thus, from the pattern of distribution, the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was alienated and treated as the faction rather than a legitimate party, because most sensitive posts were denied it. Already, ULIMO had taken charge in the Ministries of Commerce, Public Works and Health and are bidding to get the Finance Ministry. But the Defence portfolio was vehemently objected to by the other parties. The Justice Ministry later came under the NPFL (i.e., the Minister of Justice was nominated from the NPFL).[82]

ULIMO has also taken over the Ministry of State which is the heart and soul of the Executive Presidency inspite of the fact that they have been reluctant to comply fully with disarmament.[83]

The IGNU was given portfolios in Posts and Telecommunications and Education Ministries. Though these are vital ministries their importance will be greatly reduced in a government made up of hostile partners where the complementary port folios are held by groups which have shown no inclination to co-operate effectively with the IGNU nominees, except in areas of convenience.

In April 1994, a month after disarmament had started only 1,447 fighters had surrendered their arms out of 60,000 estimated by the United Nations.[84]

This slow pace of the disarmament process has made the LNTG to be influential only in Monrovia; the combatants have to be disarmed and demobilised for the Liberian National Transitional Government to survive. In fact, another fighting broke out again between ULIMO faction under Kromah and Roosevelt Johnson's faction, a break away group from ULIMO; and also between the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) and NPFL.[85] But then, by October the same year, ECOMOG troops were reduced to cut logistic costs. Akinola, ECOMOG spokesman also called on the international community to "review its role... in the Liberian peace process especially in the area of logistics requirements, to enable ECOMOG carry out its mandate succesfully."[86]

The Akosombo Agreement – 21st December, 1994:

Another attempt to find a lasting solution to the crisis was made by Rawlings of Ghana, who was then the ECOWAS Chairman. The warring factions agreed for the establishment of the Council of State which is a collective presidency that will run the country until elections were held in November 1995.[87]

The meeting was adjourned to December 28th and January 11th but it finally ended in a deadlock three days later before it was reconvened on January 23rd 1995. However, by early February, the peace accord collapsed when the disagreement arose among the warring parties on who should head the six-men Council of State.[88] Right from the on set, the meeting have had to cross several hurdles.

In the first instance, the issue on the number of the council members became a crucial one, while some did not want it to be less than four, others wanted it to be extended to six. For example; Bowen of the Armed Forces of Liberia wanted the council to have five and even six members and the traditional rulers to be included because it will be to his advantage.[89] On the other hand, the choice of a chairman of the council was the most contentious and intractable issue which finally became the waterloo of the Accra peace talks. Every body wanted to be chairman, particularly, Charles Taylor.[90]

Ghana bemoaned this failure of the peace talks describing it "as very frustrating and disappointing. We had thought their personal ambition will be subordinated to the overall interest of Liberia."[91]

With the failure of the Accra meeting, ULIMO forces once again incurred into Nimba county. Similarly, the Liberian peace council fought the NPFL over the control of Grand Bassa county[91] to drive out Taylor and his NPFL. Kromah argued that he entered Nimba county in order to "to stop Taylor from violating the cease-fire", but Taylor retaliated, claiming that his army, "is too big a meat for Alhaji Kromah to chew" and vowed to stay in his capital to fight back.[92]

Similarly, in April 1996, ECOMOG had to intervene and drive out troops of ULIMO faction when fighting between Kromah and Roosevelt Johnson rebel group prevented relief materials from reaching the people of Turbman-bug . Armed robbery was also reported to be on the increase. ULIMO was also reported to have killed 62 people in Tosi.[93]

With all these developments, peace continued to elude Liberia. However, in June 1996, Taylor held talks with Nigerian Head of State, General Abacha to discuss relating to disarmament of his troops and finding a lasting peace and to uphold the Cotonou Accord which had already worked out a gradual programme for election in Liberia and of course, the final withdrawal of all the forces contributed by participating nations. Thus, the main concern of ECOMOG, according to Nigeria's military spokesman Fred Chijuka, is "to disarm the warring factions to ensure a workability of the cease-fire agreement they signed, when that is done, it will be easy for participating countries to withdraw their troops."[94]

Abuja II Accord – 20th August, 1995: [95]

After the meeting with Charles Taylor, a general meeting of all the leaders of the warring parties, ECOWAS members, representatives from OAU. INN and a host of others, took place in Abuja, Nigeria's capital in August 1995, where another cease-fire would take off on August 1995, where another shaky agreement was signed. Under the agreement, a mandatory cease-fire would take off on August 26th 1995, the council of state comprising an independent chairman and five vice chairmen with equal status would become operational from September 2nd.

Tamba Kongoh was picked up as the chairman. The council was established by the Cotonou Agreement which also established that the second vice chairman but the other factions agreed to jettison that part of the accord and suggested that a neutral person be chosen and the vice chairman should have equal status – that went well with the group of nine.

In the long run, San Kawolo, a Kpeller from Liberia's largest ethnic group, was elected chairman of the council of state. All the five others are to be vice chairmen with equal status. They are: Taylor, G.Y. Kromah, George Boley and Oscar Quiah. Former chairman, 90-year old Kongoh, is the only member to represent civilians of Greater Liberia.

Also under the agreement, factional leaders and members of the council wishing to contest elections will be represented by civilian members. The chairman shall be ineligible for elective office in the first presidential and legislative elections.

Ministerial and statutory posts are to be shared among the factions as enshrined in the Cotonou Accord. The council of states life span is twelve calendar months.

However, Bonecult Johnson, a leader of the breakaway faction of ULIMO did not sign the agreement because a proposal sent to the facilitators to make Hezekiah Bowen, a General and Commandant of the Armed Forces of Liberia, the Chief of Staff was rejected. In place of the proposal, Bowen was offered a ministerial portfolio which was not named, Bowen refused to take it. The Akosomboh agreement which had made Bowen head of army, meant he would be responsible for restructuring of the army.

Other leaders, however, did not agree with Johnson and Bowen on this issue. Mr. Boley leader of the Liberian Peace Council had argued that "I am a commissioned officer of the Liberian Army and a Major. I tell you Bowen is not the only competent soldier in the A.F.L.", insisting that Bowen had been adequately protected by the Abuja Agreement and that his ministerial position could not be determined except with the consent of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine. [96]

Despite Bowen's objection, representative of ECOWAS who brokered the Peace Agreement said it was binding on all parties. However, Taylor had argued that the facilitators should look for a majority vote and not an endorsement by all parties, "total consensus is not even a feature of democracy" – said Taylor.

The Abuja II Agreement was described as the most comprehensive in that it incorporated that Akosomboh and Cotonou Accords and the inputs of the five factional leaders who met before the full conference started.

Commenting on the Agreement signed, Ghana's Foreign Minister had said that "Everyone is tired of war, and everyone is tired of talking. This Agreement is an Agreement whose time has come". [97]

Nigerian's Foreign Minister, Tom Ikimi, had also urged the two parties yet to sign the agreement to reconsider their stand because "Liberia is greater than any individual".

Canaan Banana, representative of the OAU's Eminent Group, had this to say: "Agreement on Liberia are not in short supply, what is in short supply is the determination and commitment to implement them; we hope that this would be the last meeting and the next one would be to celebrate a new government and a democratic parliament". [98]

Chapter Four

Endnotes

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CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

From the foregoing discussion so far, the West African country just like any other third world countries have come to appreciate integration as the solution to their economic predicament. However, these countries have accorded integration serious attention for its impact to be felt. Essentially, integration entails a common approach to economic and development policies. It revolves around collective initiative in economic, social and cultural platforms. Albeit, these issues have been acknowledged and amplified in the ECOWAS Treaty, but how to address them has been the most crucial issue disturbing the organisation. Indeed an enduring economic union implies consistency in the implementation of the provisions of the treaty evolving it, which to say the least, is lacking in ECOWAS.

One of the reasons attributed for the apparent stagnation in the activities of Ecowas is lack of political "will" by heads of States and governments of member countries. Inspite of the zeal to change the economic disequilibria that exist in the sub-region, the political "will" crucial to the process is lacking. Although, integration is more or less an economic phenomenon it nevertheless has political undertones which member countries of ECOWAS consistently refused to acknowledge.

Similarly, the differentials in national endowment and other related disparities between ECOWAS member countries have constituted serious impediment to the

building of a viable and enduring economic union in the West African sub-region. Different perceptions, correct or otherwise by member states have always determine their relationship with each other.

This unique position occupied by Nigeria has made her prone to suspicion by other member countries. Countries like Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal, which are the most developed Francophone countries live in perpetual fear of Nigeria's usage of its economic clout.

Nigeria's core status and its level of development relative to other less developed member states have also posed considerable questions in relation to the harmonisation of industrial development efforts and other policies within the regional framework because it is quite obvious that Nigeria is in a better state to attract foreign capital investments.

In addition, the issue of trade liberalisation on industrial products has met with some hitches due to the ensuring controversies as to the criteria for the sharing of the burden of losses and benefits arising from trade liberalisation and the associated compensatory mechanisms that would be adequate in this context.

Most of the Francophone countries fall under the category of "Less developed". The economies of this countries are fragile such that they rely heavily on the export sector to mobilise public finance. Countries like Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia and Sierra Leone rely on taxation on foreign trade for their revenues. Therefore their dependence on customs and excise duties, had made the issue of an integrated market through a common external tariff with other third world

countries and the elimination of all barriers to trade within the community very nauseating. For this category of countries, reduction in tariff implies a corresponding fall or reduction in government revenues. Considering how important economic development is these newly independent countries, any reduction without adequate compensation may create serious resource gap which may have serious economic and even political consequences. Against this background therefore, the less developed member states perceived the implementation of this scheme as inimical to their development effort.

Another impediment to intra-Ecowas trade is lack of the full realisation of the Community's monetary co-operation programme that will culminate in the adoption of a single currency.

Free movement of people across the borders as stipulated in Article 27 of the ECOWAS Treaty is hindered by boundaries, borders and immigration laws artificially created by colonialists. The socio-economic and political situation such as poor infrastructure, unemployment, urbanisation and crime rate in some countries make it very difficult for these countries to take due cognisance

Conflict has also become an integral part of the post colonial West Africa, as had the quest for national stability. The economic deterioration and social malaise which characterised the West African sub-region brought in its wake political contradictions which now gaze solemnly on the sub-region.

The conflicts in Liberia which defy solution and those in Sierra Leone and Senegal are just but a few of the conflicts that threaten sub-regional existence.

Religious riots, with political undertones has also been an unmistaken landmark of the West African sub-region. So also are inter-state conflicts.

The authoritarian or 'personalistic' concept of rule prevalent in the sub-region has necessitated the emergence of the 'military political class' to bring about political change. However, this has more or less brought in its wake political instability as coups and counter-coups become alternatives to unacceptable governments.

Similarly, economic stagnation, social inequality and state of uncertainty are often used as good reasons for staging coups by the military. These political fluctuations and uncertainty has often led to lack of continuity in the process of integration with each regime bringing up new policies and areas of priorities which may run contrary to that of its predecessor who might be more inclined towards integration efforts. More often than not change in government means a temporary halt to integration policies in favour of national interest oriented programmes and policies.

The West African political scene is also infested with chronic inter and intra-state wrangling which are traced to arbitrary defined frontiers by colonial powers. The Anglophone and Francophone divide has always act as our bloc to responses to problems in the sub-region's integration efforts. The sub-region is demarcated more by political interactions than by patterns of trade or cultural orientation. The Francophone have hitherto refused to be part of ECOMOG, a body put together to check the bloody war in Liberia. Thus only Anglophone countries contributed troops to the buffer army and were later joined by Guinea and Senegal.

The multiplicity of Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGO) in the sub-region has also hindered the smooth operation of ECOWAS. ECOWAS member countries belong to about thirty-two IGOs, with each member belonging to a range of two to twenty five IGOs. Furthermore, the IGOs cover areas of co-operation already covered by ECOWAS. Hence they have similarly, if not identical objectives. This give room for divided loyalties among ECOWAS countries. In addition, with the present world wide economic crunch, most countries are in a dilemma as to which of the IGOs should receive financial support given their poor financial stand. Hence, certain institutions in the Sub-region that rely on financial contributions from the West, now face neglect which in the long run tell on their activities in the Sub-region. ECOWAS as a body lacks the co-ordinating and monitoring machinery to place their activities within a comprehensive framework of integration.

The most crippling activity to ECOWAS is the Francophone CEAO which can be liken to a miniature ECOWAS. It has all ECOWAS Francophone Countries as members. The composition of the organisation and its activities is detrimental to the corporate existence of the ECOWAS. The CEAO members refuse to surrender and compromise some of their trade agreements to conform with those of ECOWAS. The CEAO have, despite repeated calls by the ECOWAS, refused to extend their trade and tariff agreements to other non-CEAO countries. This made moves towards trade harmonisation impracticable.

Furthermore, the impact of colonisation has continued to impair the rate of development of West African Countries. It has tied the economies of these States to

that their colonial mentors and the West. There exist varying degree of poor economic base, poverty, unemployment and income disparities in and between these Countries amidst high inclination on consumption of imported goods at exorbitant prices. Whilst, these Countries experience downward price fluctuations of commodity exports in the International markets in relation to what they import. In other word, there is high dependence on Industrialised Countries by Less Developed Countries for imports and exports. In fact only small volume trade is recorded between ECOWAS member countries.

Furthermore, the economies of West African countries depend on one or two minerals sold to the industrialised countries of Europe and North America, the prices of which fluctuates occasionally. West African economies remained open to external trade influences so that their growth and stagnation is closely linked or influenced by development in the foreign trade sector. They also rely on imports for a substantial proportion of their raw materials needs, as well as machinery, capital equipment, intermediate product and consumer product to feed their industrial expansion and satisfy their consumer needs. Size of foreign trade in the economy of each Country and the entire Sub-region shows the extend of dependence. The greater percentage of the Sub-region's trade is with the outside world while the percentage of inter-regional trade is rather minimal. Most West African countries depend on one or two major commodities for over 50% of their export earnings.

The trade of the Sub-region with the Developed Countries is about 90% of the total trade in relation to the trade within Sub-region. This indeed inhibits intra-

regional trade and therefore renders the provision for trade liberalisation and trade among Member States within the context of a common market rather ineffective particularly in the area of implementation.

The world economic recession has led to a considerable drop in both imports and exports of West African countries. This means a sudden contraction in the sources of development and even trade. Losses are also incurred by exporters of raw materials as a result of fluctuation in the exchange rate of the dollar. This has an adverse effect, given that over 75% of the Sub-region's trade is done in dollars. This often lead to unfavourable balance of payment situation, with the value of import exceeding export. The consequence of which result in borrowing funds from multi-lateral agencies to manage the balance of payment deficits resulting in debt mounting upon debt and standard of living crashing at a frightening speed. This development compelled ECOWAS Countries to find solutions to the problem of balance of payment deficit tend which do divert their attention away from co-operative efforts.

Institutionalisation of monetary control by former Colonial Masters or monetary dependence of some of the Member States on their Colonial Masters further compounds the problem of integration in West Africa. This is more applicable to Francophone countries. They are not able to control or determine the value of the currency vis-à-vis other countries. Most of the Francophone countries operate under the framework of the France monetary zone, with the CFA franc – tied to French franc serve as the medium of exchange. There is also a multilateral Bank which further preserve Franco-Africa monetary relations. Under this arrangement, the

devaluation of France currency affects the CFA franc also. The CFA franc is not protected and there is no mechanism for compensation.

The CFA franc is freely convertible and allows for monetary transfers between Member States over the repatriation of capital out of these countries. This constitute a basic impediment to domestic capital accumulation which is necessary for integration. Similarly France guarantees payments made by these countries even if their accounts with the French treasury is in deficit.

Another implication of this monetary control is lack of sovereignty in controlling the fate of the CFA franc and this by implication means any attempt by these countries to enter into any monetary co-operation with other countries would have to be circumscribed by France. French Government, Multi-National Corporations and other Agencies operating in these countries exercise control over monetary matters more than even the sovereign governments to these countries and that is why they still dominate the commanding heights of the economy of these countries. This is indeed an impediment to the attainment of self reliant economy and development. By dominating the Francophone countries and monopolising their economies, it means France control prices of commodities and enter into long term procurement contracts within the framework of the interdependent relationships. It would indeed require disengagement from such entrenched and complex arrangement before a sound basis for co-operation could be entrenched or formed. Indeed harmonisation of budgetary and fiscal matters, would be rendered ineffective taking cognisance of the huge economic interest of France over its former colonies.

Moreover, the framework for the settlement of their account has served well some of these countries since when they are in deficit the treasury in France guarantees payments of goods and services purchased by these countries, which made it the more difficult to shore of such arrangement for a sub-region alone. Therefore, article 36 of ECOWAS Treaty which specifically deals with the issue of monetary and fiscal co-operation could not be effected since these countries are not in control of their monetary matters.

Similarly, the quest for technological development made it imperative for third world countries to depend on developed nations for technological know-how and expertise which are by and large controlled by Multinational Corporations (MNCs). Hence the expansion of the activities of Multinational Corporations in West Africa. These MNCs control much of the productive activities in the Sub-regional i.e. foreign trade and exchange of technological know-how. Hence the proliferation of Mercantile Companies such as Royal Niger Company, United African Company (UAC), Liver Brothers etc.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the above findings the following recommendations are offered to ensure viable and durable economic integration in the West African sub-region.

- A viable democratic policy should be evolved by member countries to guide the political life of the community and those of member states, and also to ensure

political stability and cohesion relevant to national development and sub-regional co-operation.

- Since the political dimension of integration can no longer be ignored, the community members should make a joint effort to address it squarely and with utmost urgency. Heads of state and government should have the political 'will' and zeal to go about integration.
- To avert sad incidences of inter-state wars and political turmoil such as the Liberian imbroglio special attention should be given to the protocol on security and non-aggression. To this end a defence and security pact should be put in place with the support of all member countries. The provisions of the protocol on non-aggression of 1978 and the protocol of Mutual Assistance should be adhered to strictly.
- The various heads of state and governments should be committed and dedicated to the general activities of the organisation.
- The policy decisions already taken should be implemented before new ones are embarked upon.
- Cumbersome policy decisions should be streamlined and redefined to ease implementation.
- There should be general public enlightenment activities through the media to keep the populace abreast with the activities of the community.

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- Members states should guarantee free mobility of citizens for proper utilisation of human resources and for the citizens to have sense of belonging. To this end necessary checks and balances should be instituted.
- Community members should endeavour to pay up dues and contributions to various funds and project in the organisation so that projects are disposed of with speed and new ones embarked upon.
- As much as I recommend sanctions to be imposed on defaulting members I feel this should not be given undue attention as it might derail the implementation of important decisions.
- Inter-governmental organisations should be rationalised to enhanced participation.
- West African countries should as much as possible break free from the tendencies of the superpowers.
- Capitalist multinational corporations should rationalised by governments and their activities monitored.
- Indigenous multinational entrepreneurs should be encouraged to set up firms to replace foreign ones.
- The 'authority' of the organisation should be depoliticised and should be autonomous to allow for easy formulation and implementation and policy decisions. In other words, the scope and authority of the community's organs should be redefined.

- Industrial and agricultural development policies should be harmonised to facilitate proper planning and implementation. An intra-union pricing policy should be put in place to facilitate fairness in the distribution of costs and benefits.
- The different national control regulations should be harmonised within a regional framework. Exchange control regulation for inter-regional transactions should be relaxed to foster inter-regional trade.

5.3 CONCLUSION

The non-implementation syndrome prevalent in the ECOWAS could not be left to persist particularly at this crucial period when the whole world (West Africa in particular) are yearning for economic development. Indeed, West African Countries have come to accept the concept of integration as the most viable alternative to underdevelopment and economic stagnation. What is needed for the realisation of this concept (i.e. integration) is the unwavering support needed by the Organisation from various States within the sub-region to stand the test of time.

The benefits to be derived from integration in West Africa is enormous. Apart from enhanced human and resource development it would also guarantee speedy emancipation of the sub-region from the shackles of imperialist powers and their devastating influence. An integrated West Africa could be pictured as a sub-region with stable political structure, national and international cohesion, reliable and independent economy, and sound industrial base.

The 1980s have been a decade of reassessment and renewal of commitment towards integration, we expect that the new millennium should be a decade for enforcement and implementation of obligations by member countries. The fast changes around the globe call for nothing less. That is if West Africa is to fall into steps with the rest of the world in economic development.