A PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN BENUE STATE

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APPROVAL

This thesis, entitled "A Performance Analysis of Rural Development Projects in Benue State", by Anongo A.L. LYAM meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to:

1. My wife AWashima, and to my children Terna and Baba for their endurance and patience while they waited for me to complete the work and the wonderful moral support they gave me.

2. My mother Vande, my brother Tsea for their moral and material support and to the honour of my late father Lyam whose departed soul I am confident, rejoices with me for the honour so wone. May his name live as long as time.

DECLARATION

I declare that this study is entirely the author's work and that no aspect of it has been presented for another qualification.



LYAM, A.A.L.

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ABSTRACT

In recent times, development policy in Nigeria has laid much emphasis in the area of rural development. The general aim has been to raise the standard of living of the rural people. The enthusiasm which prevailed during the pursuit of this policy goal had led to the establishment of many different institutions at the different levels of government all of which were expected to collectively achieve the rural development goal. In Benue State, these institutions include the Agricultural Development Projects, The River Basin Development Authority, The Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure, Community Development Associations at cetera.

These institutions have so far failed to achieve the aspirations of the target people. Earlier studies made in this area, blame the failure of programmes and projects on several factors some of which include inappropriate ideological concepts employed and their related strategics of implementation, the lack, of capital to fund the projects adequately, poor use of other material and human resources, inadequate participation of tne target people in the planning and implementation decisions, and the unfortunate political developments of tne different periods.

This research, is also anotner attempt to probe the failures of these government sponsored rural development projects. In this regard, this research shows a significant

deviation from the traditional approach to the investigation of the poor performance of rural development projects. Whereas past studies were mostly concerned with the incidental effects of individual projects and as such were unable to project the performance of all of the projects in the context of the total planning situation involved, this study evaluates the performance of the different rural developments projects against the background of the total planning process. In other words, all of the above outlined causes of failure are subsummed under one central issue, namely, the effectuation of the process of planning and implementating the rural development projects.

The central arguenent in this study therefore is that rural development projects in Benue State have failed largely because there exists in the current process of planning and implementation serious lapses which are capable of inhibiting the achievement of the desired development goals. The study aims at identifying such lapses and constraints inherent in the system through an evaluation of some selected projects and to propose more viable institutional and procedural changes which will facilitate the achievement of the target people's needs and aspirations.

The methodological approach was to take Benue State as a micro region, analyse and assess the appropriateness of the conceptual basis of the rural development practice here,

analyse and assess the current machinery and process of planning with the view to identifying the constraints in the process and in the light of the above, evaluate the performance of a selected number of rural development projects in the context of Benue State environment. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess how much of the aspirations of the target people had been achieved by the projects and if not much has been achieved, to identify the constraints responsible for the poor achievement.

The major findings at the end of the study are that the achievement of the aspirations of the target people through these rural development institutions has been very low. This poor performance has been largely due to:

a. a poor determination of project goals. These are often too wide, implicit, and unrelated to the planning context.
b. the use of sophisticated equipment often in capital intensive projects which are not cost-effective.
c. a lack of local participation in the decision making processes during planning and implementation.
d. a poor use of monitoring and evaluation to enhance the planning and implementation of projects.

Community development projects on the other hand are found to be small, unco-ordinated but relevant and cost effective as individual projects and often achieve the target people's aspirations.

From the foregoing, it is therefore recommended here that, the process of planning and implementation should institutionalise local participation and insist on the related question of setting measurable and achieveable project objectives.

The second recommendation is that the planning machinery particularly at the State level should be reorganised to integrate rural development activities at the community level with the national planning machinery and procedure.

Thirdly, it is also recommended that there should be a more definite and coherent programme for rural development with a defined regional unit for implementation and specific measurable targets to be achieved.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	page
Title Page	i
Approval	ii
Dedication	iii
Declaration	iv
Acknowledgements	v
Abstract	vi
Table of Contents	x
List of Tables	xv
List of Figures	xvii
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM	1
THE RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES	9
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS	13
JUSTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH	14
METHODOLOGY	16
Reconnaisance Survey	16
Data Sources	16
Primary Data Collected	17
Secondary Data	21
Field Problems and Limitations	21
Analysis of Data	24
THESIS OUTLINE	28

page

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

THE CHANGING CONCEPTION OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE PRACTICE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING ---------- 30

Development as Economic Growth ---------- 31

Development as Modernization ---------- 37

Development as Equity and Social Justice ---- 43

THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT QUESTION ---------- 47

The need for Rural Development ---------- 47

The Rural Development Concept ---------- 49

The Varying Approaches to Rural Development -- 53

Example of Approaches of developing rural areas in a few Developing Countries ---------- 55

IN SEARCH OF AN EFFECTIVE PLANNING PROCESS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT ---------- 67

Theoretical Option ---------- 67

Adopting Planning Process to Context --------- 72

SUMMARY ---------- 74

III. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN NIGERIA

INTRODUCTION ---------- 78

THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN NIGERIA -- 79

The Colonial ---------- 79

The 1960s ---------- 82

The Post-Civil War Years ---------- 83

THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS: A REVIEW OF THE OBJECTIVES - 88

The First National Development Plan --------- 88

The Second Plan ---------- 90

The Third Plan ---------- 92

page

The Fourth Plan ---------- 94

Benue State's First Regional Plan ---------- 102

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PLANNING MACHINERY -------- 102

The Colonial Period ---------- 103

The 1955-1966 Period ---------- 105

The Civil War Years ---------- 107

THE PROCESS OF PLAN FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ---------- 113

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS ---- 118

OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE PLANNING PROCESS ---- 123

SUMMARY ---------- 125

IV. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY AREA

THE PHYSICAL SETTING ---------- 130

RESOURCE BASE ---------- 134

Population ---------- 136

Social Organization ---------- 140

Services ---------- 149

ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES ---------- 156

Agriculture ---------- 156

Industries ---------- 161

Income Distribution ---------- 162

NEED FOR A RURAL DEVELOPMENT EMPHASIS ---------- 163

V. THE POLITICS OF PLANNING FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME AND PROJECTS IN BENUE STATE

INTRODUCTION ---------- 166

THE BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT ---------- 166

page

ISSUES ARISING FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROGRAMMES ---------- 173

The RBRDA ---------- 173

BNARDA ---------- 189

DFRRI ---------- 199

Community Development Projects ---------- 208

SUMMARY ---------- 215

VI. ACHIEVEMENTS OF SELECTED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN BENUE STATE

ACHIEVEMENT OF TARGETS IN RIVER BASIN PROJECTS ---- 222

Performance Objectives ---------- 222

Inputs ---------- 224

Land Development ---------- 225

Fertilizer Supply ---------- 230

Other Inputs ---------- 231

Funding ---------- 233

Output ---------- 235

Local Impact ---------- 240

Local Participation and Achievement of Local Aspirations ---------- 251

ACHIEVEMENTS OF TARGETS IN BNARDA ---------- 252

Provision of Extension Services ---------- 252

Supply of Farm Inputs ---------- 263

General Impact ---------- 265

DFRRI ACHIEVEMENTS ---------- 270

Agriculture and Food ---------- 272

Infrastructure ---------- 272

An Overview ---------- 278

page

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ---------- 280

SUMMARY ---------- 283

VII. ORGANISING FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION ---------- 293

TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PROCESS ---------- 298

A SUGGESTED PROGRAMME FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT --- 325

BIBLIOGRAPHY ---------- 330

APPENDIX I - V ---------- 343

LIST OF TABLES

Table		page
1	Growth of Production in Third World Countries ----	84
2	Percentage Change in Food Prices in Nigeria Between 1987 and 1988 ----------	101
3	Density of Population by L.G. Area (1963 & 1978)--	137
4	Population Distribution in Benue ----------	139
5	Density of Cultivation by L.G.As. ----------	143
6	Estimates Hectarage of Major Crops ----------	158
7	Benue - Crop Production Output ----------	159
8	Comparison of Distribution of Annual Per Capita Income ----------	162
9	Indices Growth Rate of Food in Nigeria ----------	168
10	Estimates Output of Major Agric. Commodities in Nigeria ----------	169
11	Food Importation in Nigeria (1970-1987) ----------	170
12	Financial Allocation to River Basins 1979-1983 ---	180
13	Proposed Financial Allocation to RBDAs,1981-85 ---	180
14	LBRBRDA - Summary of FGN Funding, 1977-1988 ------	182
15	BNARDA - Sources of Funds ----------	198
16	Project Funding ----------	198
17	Institutions for Community Development Projects --	218
18	LBRBRDA - Achievement of Targets ----------	226
19	LBRBRDA - Land Development Targets and Achievements ----------	228
20	LBRBRDA - Fertilizer Distribution ----------	230
21	1984 Crop Production by LBRBDA ----------	235
22	LBRBDA - Wet Season Cropping Area ----------	236

Table		page
23	Perceived Contribution of Project to Income -----	242
24	Labour Requirements ----------	245
25	Differencies in Food Sufficiency Levels ---------	247
26	Improvement in Crop Production Skills ----------	249
27	(a - c) Summarised Targets and Achievements -----	253-257
28	Assessment of Socio-Economic Impacts ----------	266
29	Summary of Achievements in Feeder Roads ---------	275
30	Local Assessment of DFRRI Projects ----------	277
31	Pearson's Correlation Coefficient Matrix --------	286
32	Local Assessment of LBRBDA, BNARDA and DFRRI (ANOVA) ----------	289

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure		page
1	Location of Study Area ----------	3
2	Theoretical Conception of the Planning Process --	71
3	The Structure of the Planning Context ----------	73
4(a)	Retail Market Price for 2nd Quarter 1987 --------	99
4(b)	Retail Market Price ----------	100
5	The Planning Machinery ----------	112
6	LGA's of Benue ----------	129
7	Benue State - Drainage ----------	131
8	Water Budget Histogram ----------	133
9	Benue Soil Complex ----------	135
10	Benue Population Density ----------	138
11	Major Ethnic Groups in Benue ----------	141
12	Provision of Health Services ----------	152
13	Benue-Distribution of Health Services ----------	153
14	Benue - Occupational Structure ----------	157
15	River Basins in Nigeria -- ----------	175
16	Federal Government Funding of RBDAs ----------	181
17	LBRBDA Organizational Chart ----------	183
18	BNARDA Administrative Areas for Implementation--	193
19	BNARDA ORGANOGRAM ---- ----------	197
20	Decision-Making Levels within DFRRI ----------	204
21	Structure and Process of Community Development Planning ----------	213
22	Differential Farmer-land Ratio ----------	243
23	Crop Production Schedule in Benue ----------	246
24	Rattinge of Local Aspirations ----------	250

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

For quite sometime now development policy in Nigeria has given increased emphasis to the rural sector. Implicitly this is in response to the increasing urban-rural disparities in all spheres of living conditions and to the many criticisms of government development policies and principles. The rural development strategy is, therefore, supposed to be an improvement on these past development policies and strategies.

As a strategy for development, the rural development programmes in Nigeria have understandably laid much emphasis on agricultural projects or such activities that are likely to enhance agricultural production. The spatial spread of these programmes and projects covers all states of the Federation. At the moment these programmes are planned and run by several agencies or institutions which sometimes have overlapping responsibilities but which all have an ultimate goal of achieving the desired development in the rural sector.

Among such agencies and institutions in Benue State of Nigeria (Fig. 1) which are responsible for the planning and implementation of rural development activities are:

(i) The Lower Benue River Basin and Rural Development Authority (LBRBRDA);

(ii) The Benue Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (BNARDA);

(iii) The Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC);

(iv) The Benue State Public Utilities Board (BSPUB):

(v) The Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI);

(vi) The Directorate of Mass Mobilization for Social Justice and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) which as at now, is the most recent to be established by the Federal Government.

These institutions are in addition to the activities of the traditional ministries of Agriculture, Health, Works, Environment and the Local Government councils which also direct their efforts towards the same goal of improving the lot of the common man.

In recent times, these rural development institutions, like many others in developing countries, have come under severe criticisms for their failure to achieve their set goals (see for instance Wallace, 1979; Palmer-Jones, 1983; KolaWole, 1986; Ogunnika, 1987; Newswatch, Dec. 1987 and March 1988; Famoriyo, 1988; and Alabi, 1988). While some critics disagree with the underlying theoretical conceptions of state intervention policies and the selected programmes and projects, many more have alluded to the management and the administrative arrangements for their implementation as




FIG. 1 LOCATIONAL MAP OF THE STUDY AREA.

the major cause of their failure. These arrangements they contend have led to faulty and even reckless decisions whose ultimate effect has been the failure to achieve set targets. Indeed it is now common knowledge that one of the major characteristics of development programmes in developing countries is the failure of their planning, both past and present, to fulfil stated objectives and bring about desired development (Filani, 1981:283).

Admittedly, many of the factors militating against the development process are outside the control of African people (Briggs, 1983:109). African countries should, however, at least be able to exert some measure of influence which will enhance the right choice of intervention policies and ensure especially the proper planning and application of such chosen ideological concepts. Other development problems that are within the capability of the African countries to handle include those identified by Harrison (1979; 1980) and Roxborough (1979) as inadequate information about resources, the lack of commitment on the part of the leadership (Lea and Chaudhri, 1983) and the lack of adequate user participation (Lele, 1975).

Right from its conception, the process of planning and implementating these programmes and projects in Nigeria appears to marginalise the target people's different forms of participation. The resultant ineffectiveness of these programmes has indeed generated a sense of frustration and

apathy amongst the target population. The usual reaction by Government to these failures had been a shift in policy positions without an adequate study of the circumstances which caused the failure. Such shifts have been observed to be as frequent as leaders come and go (Faniran, 1988).

In recent times some sort of panic measures appear to have been in reaction to the many failures of development programmes. These measures include the establishment of several other programmes that either overlap or are a duplication of the existing ones without a proper framework of co-ordination (Ekong, 1988). Some of these measures may only increase the arteries through which funds are mismanaged, thus further aggravating the process that facilitates underdevelopment.

Perhaps a more rewarding approach at this point as suggested by Filani (1981:282) is to critically reappraise our previous national development plans and programmes. The objective of such a reappraisal would be that of devising and proposing strategies that will require making greater and more effective use of the rural people's knowledge and experiences, identifying their priorities and motivations and incorporating local inhabitants into every stage of the planning process (Briggs, 1983).

Such an approach questions the whole basis of the existing planning and implementation of our rural development projects. It implies a reappraisal of the basic issues in our planning

methods, namely the decision-making process as a factor which facilitates the emergence of appropriate alternative plans, the co-ordination of planning decisions and evaluation of development plans within the prevailing conditions.

A brief look at the Nigerian situation, for instance, shows that past planning efforts before independence and the early 1960s had been directed at the development of plans that aimed at achieving growth in economic terms. The objective was to improve the aggregate product (GDP). This orientation was quite evident in the objectives of the First National Development Plan of 1962-1968):

"Under this approach, strategies adopted included:

(a) Concentration on an export agricultural production so as to generate enough foreign exchange reserves to purchase the much needed imports;

(b) Embarking on an import-substitution industrial strategy so as to incubate local processed which would eventually bring about basic socio-economic transformation; and

(c) Attempting a Keynessian type macro-economic planning whereby public investment is used in a way to maximise capital output ratio in the economy as a whole" (Mabogunje, 1977).

and implementation of the projects within the programmes were not based on any consistent theory. They were also ill-planned (Alabi, 1988; Famoriyo, 1988) and full of inbuilt foreign elements, a characteristic that is typical of the centre-periphery approach to development in which projects were initiated, designed and implemented without any contribution coming from the people for whom they were meant. Thus many projects that were simply handed down to the target population had unrealistic objectives that were difficult to achieve. In other words the planning process had up till now not accommodated adequately the issue of identification of local priorities and resources for the purpose of initiating relevant action programmes.

Until recently, the evaluation of the achievement of these programmes in quantitative terms was not given much attention. Government successes were simply judged by the magnitute of the sums of money allocated to the various sectors. Projects evaluation departments, even where they exist are yet to be developed to have any meaningful impact (also see Tomori, New Nigerian Newspaper, June 12, 1988). So, while governments boasted of higher budgetary allocations over the years and politicians prided themselves in the number of projects whose locations were as a result of their own influence, project officials manipulated data to come up with success stories to safeguard their jobs. In the meantime, the real contributions of the huge sums of money thus invested to actual development remains unknown.

The existence of these lapses in the system has led to a low level of accountability, large scale corruption, wasted funds and the ultimate underachievement of intended targets. The deplorable number of abandoned projects all over the country (Newswatch, 1987) apart from the gross inequalities mentioned above is another indicator of the extent of the short-comings in our rural development strategy.

It is in the light of this apparent short-comings that this study intends to evaluate the ~~agency~~ activities of some selected rural development agencies in Benue State. These are:

1. The River Basin and Rural Development Authority (RBRDA) - Now changed again to River Basin Development Authority (RBDA);
2. The Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI);
3. The Benue State Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (BNARDA) and
4. The Community Development Associations.

1.2 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The aim of this evaluation is to identify the constraints in the process of the planning and implementation of rural development programmes which have aggregated to the underachievement of their goals. Second, the evaluation is also expected to provide a basis for the researcher to propose a more viable alternative approach to the planning of rural

development programmes and projects. The evaluation, is therefore, in terms of the extent to which the planning process being used in these agencies has led to the achievement of the target people's needs and aspirations. The evaluation being attempted here will revolve around the following issues:

(a) The dominant authority that influences planning policy and goal formulation, plan formulation and implementation; is it the target people whom the projects are meant to serve or the planning authority?

(b) The extent to which local participation is encouraged in these agencies in order to ensure the appropriateness of planning actions.

(c) The extent of use of local resources (both human and material) in order to effectuate self reliance through the search for development inputs from within.

(d) The cost effectiveness of the projects.

(e) The level of co-ordination and co-operation with other similar agencies.

(f) The kind of monitoring and evaluation done in the respective agencies to provide the necessary feedback mechanism in the planning process.

The basic assumption here is that for the rural development process to achieve the desired result, the planning goals and objectives should be relevant and appropriate to the target people's needs and aspirations.

This also implies that strategies or action programmes adopted for their implementation must be relevant and appropriate, too, so that they are easily embraced. The action programmes must be cost effective and result-oriented to avoid a waste of resources. It also follows that the process through which plans are formulated and implemented has got a significant effect on the performance of development programmes and projects. In other words a process that is not clearly articulated, participatory and result oriented can give rise to poor quality decisions both at the project formulation and implementation stages, and, this could be a major cause of the underachievement of goals. Even where our leaders have demonstrated sufficient political will by introducing policies in the right direction, poor planning and implementation can still militate against the realization of the desired objectives.

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Bearing these in mind, therefore, the main thrust of the argument here is that past development efforts had failed in Nigeria largely because serious lapses exist in the planning process which are capable of inhibiting the achievement of the desired development goals. For this reason, our search for the causes of underachievement in government projects should not be limited to constant shifts in ideological options but should incorporate appraisals of the planning process with a view to identifying and tackling the constraints ✗ that are inherent in the system and which are

within our capability to handle.

The research aim here then is to assess the extent to which the current process of rural development in Benue State has facilitated the achievement of the target people's needs and aspirations and to propose viable institutional and procedural changes that will improve the planning process. To achieve this aim, the task in this research will involve achieving the following objectives:

1. To examine critically the theoretical underpinnings of rural development.
2. To assess critically the existing planning machinery and the process of goal formulation, plan preparation and implementation within the selected agencies in Benue State.
3. To evaluate the performance of each of the selected projects of the chosen agencies in terms of the achievements of their set goals and the target people's needs and aspirations.
4. To propose an improvement to the planning process which can be generalised for similar areas.

The following propositions are therefore set to serve as a conceptual framework in the evaluation of the performance of rural development projects in Benue State in terms of the realization of the target people's aspirations.

1. A desirable outcome of development is to be able to meet the aspirations of the target people.

2. The planning and implementation of rural development projects should contain quantifiable targets to enable the measurement of expected achievements.
3. The effective participation of the target people in the planning process will greatly enhance the setting of appropriate development goals and a greater result-oriented implementation.

1.3 SCOPE Ø AND LIMITATIONS

The research is confined to a study of the performance of four selected projects. Two projects locations are selected from each of the following rural development agencies: RBDA, DFRRI, ADP and Community Development Projects. Much as it would have been desired to cover all rural development projects in Benue State and evaluate them for the same purpose, the time and money available for this kind of research do not make such a wide scope practically feasible. Consequently the study is limited to a few selected areas of Benue State and from 1976 to 1988. This is expected to serve as a micro regional area. In each category of projects (i.e. in each programme area), the process of planning and implementing the projects is expected to be the same. Unfortunately one cannot study everything in each programme area hence the necessity for limiting the scope. It is hoped that inspite of the limitations, the data assembled will provide a reasonably good basis for useful generalizations.

The projects selected are Jato-Aka and Okete projects in the RBDA programme; TyoWanye and Otukpo for the BNARDA programme; Amaafu-Ugba and Egwanoku-Okpiko projects for DFRRI and SHADA and Otukpo Community projects. The choice of the projects has taken into account the spatial and other social environmental differences in Benue State.

1.4 JUSTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH

The consistent failure of the Nigerian rural development institutions to achieve the desired results has been the motivation in carrying out this study.

It is argued here that a meaningful rural development strategy requires a well articulated planning process which will in turn lead to an improvement in the quality of the planning decisions. That is to say that even where there is the political commitment to appropriate policies, practical details involved at each stage of the planning and implementation of the respective programmes and projects are still important, and such a planning culture must always carry the target people along.

So far in Nigeria the question of the process of plan formulation and implementation which is here considered a significant factor in the achievement of set goals has been treated with grave lassitude. Project appraisals where there have been any are taken as mere formality. The point being

emphasised here is that since every situation that is capable of causing underdevelopment needs to be critically analysed in its own context (Roxborough, 1979), this issue of the ineffectiveness of the planning process is also considered important enough a factor that inhibits the achievement of development goals and must not be ignored. This research is therefore significant as an attempt to articulate the need for and to profer a more effective rural development planning process. By focusing on the process of planning, this study breaks rank with previous ones in which the preoccupation was on ideological alternatives and the incidental effects of particular rural development projects (Wallace, 1979; Baba, 1985; Olapade, 1985; KolaWole, 1986; etc). The study also provides an arguement to support a more effective use of monitoring and evaluation in the process of planning.

1.5 METHODOLOGY

The research approach here is to select a few rural development projects, analyse the process of their planning activities and evaluate their achievement in order to identify the areas of serious defects in the planning process. There is an underlying basic assumption here, that is, that an effective planning process will lead to a greater realisation of the rural development objectives. Such a process envisaged here is expected to give greater prominence to the target people's goals and aspirations; a greater use of local rather than foreign resources; encourage local participation in the

(ii) Secondary sources. The methods favoured in obtaining primary data during the study of these rural development projects include the use of questionnaires for structured interviews, field measurements and participant observations. On the other hand, secondary data came from documentary sources such as existing literature, official documents, official statistics and maps from ministries and other relevant offices.

1.5.2.1 Primary data Collected

Primary data used in this research came from two main sources, namely: (i) the target population for each project site selected and (ii) from the respective officials handling the projects.

1.5.2.1.1 Data from the target population

The questionnaires used solicited the following type of information from the target population:

a) The socio-economic characteristics of the target people;
b) The goals and aspirations of the target people;
c) Social and financial costs and benefits they derived from the projects;
d) Types of labour commonly used by the people;
e) The target people's perceived reasons for failure or success of the projects;
f) The target people's access to the projects;
g) The target people's participation and co-operation.

The method used in collecting data from the target population was structured interviews (see Appendix 1-5). Trained assistants were used to administer the questionnaires. This way, over 90% response rate was achieved in each case, but care was taken in interpreting the data because of unavoidable bias of the interviewers.

The sampled frame: The target population is made up of beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries. In selecting the sample, no discrimination was made between the two groups. The sample was taken from within an area of 10km radius from the project site. The rationale for this limit is that 10km represent an approximate maximum distance which peasants (or users) are willing to commute between their residence and their farms on a daily basis.

As for the DFRRI road users it was inappropriate to use the same frame for sampling since road users cannot easily be limited to an area. An availability sample (i.e. whatever was available) was decided upon. Such interviews were conducted at the two ends of the roads chosen.

The sample size: Since the number of villagers were not found to be more than 250 in any case, no statistical method of estimating sample was used. A sample size of 25% was simply settled upon. This percentage was considered a manageable size which is not too small for any statistical inferences.

Sampling procedure: A list of all the names of the villages found within ten kilometre radius from the project site was made in the cases of projects from RBRDA, BNARDA and community projects. Such lists were ordered alphabetically and systematically sampled by selecting the first and subsequently one out of every other three villages. This gave 74, 81 and 70 villages for RBRDA, BNARDA and the Community projects respectively.

As for the actual respondents, it was the village head or his representative in each village selected that was interviewed. The representative was either his wife or son, or other relative.

1.5.2.1.2 Data from the Officials of the Projects

The information required from the officials had to do with:

(a) Resources used;

(b) Officials' awareness of the objectives of the project;

(c) Officials' assessment of the way decisions are made, financial costs, local participation, working procedures;

(d) Officials' own assessment of the success of the projects and

(e) The level of decentralization within the organization and interdepartmental co-operation.

Much of this information was got from official records but field experience showed that personal contacts exposed more of the constraints which confronted the officials. The method used

in data collection here was informant interviews which were personally carried out by the researcher using sets of questionnaire (appendix I-IV). Due to irregular postings and the overlap of staff duties there was no attempt at setting a representative sample of those to be interviewed. The field officials were interviewed on an availability sample survey while in the headquarters. Only those in the category of managerial and management staff were interviewed. These were selected based on the criteria of their familiarity with the planning of the programmes in the agency, the role they played in the process and how long they had been in the organisation. But in some cases the selected staff would redirect the research to some other person.

1.5.2.1.3 Data from the Project Site

Field measurements and observations were made to ascertain the actual work done and by who, the kind and amount of inputs used, including subsidies by government. The purpose of the exercise was to verify the claims of the respective officials and to identify any form of unequal distribution of any of the inputs.

Since not all claims can be measured on the field, field observations were also used to supplement official record in assessing the quality of ploughing.

1.5.2.2 Secondary data

Data required from secondary sources were in the following areas:

(a) The criteria for choice of projects (indicators used and what is rejected);

(b) The formulation of project objectives, project identification and the expected targets to be achieved;

(c) Plan preparation and the design of projects;

(d) Location and method of implementation of projects;

(e) The technical specifications, forecasts, studies, actual and intended achievements;

(f) Resources used, their nature, source and quality; capital allocations, details of expenditures, and who takes what decisions.

In collecting this data, the following sources were consulted:

(a) Textbooks, relevant journals, papers presented at conferences and seminars and newspapers and magazines.

(b) Documents and statistics which included decrees, budgets, design briefs and plans produced, relevant minutes, statistics and treasury vouchers and registers.

1.5.3 Field Problems and Limitations

Several problems were encountered in the course of administering the questionnaires and obtaining information from the respondents.

The problem of identifying and/or limiting what would be an appropriate target group for the projects has already been mentioned. Without exception all projects have been utilised by people from all parts of the country and there is no clause in the provisions of the projects which indicate who or who may not qualify as a user. It is believed that any Nigerian was entitled to use any of the project benefits. This situation made it difficult to limit who should or should not benefit from the project and be regarded as the target population for whom the projects were intended.

In this case however, the local people assumed that by virtue of the siting of the project in their area, preference should be given to the residents on whose soil the project had been sited. The same criterion was therefore, used here to determine who the local target people are in the case of each project. This criterion presupposes that government has the intention of expanding these services to other rural areas too, or that these services are already there also.

The second problem was that of selecting a respondent in each farmstead. In principle the head of each farmstead was the choice but the field experience showed that it was difficult to stick to this standard as this was time consuming. In many cases the heads were not available and waiting for them could mean several other days of repeated calls. Besides, in the Tiv speaking area, it was discovered that even when the heads

of the farmsteads were there they answered many of the questions in consultations with other relations inspite of one's objection. The use of representatives in cases where the heads were not around was therefore not considered too far out of line.

It was also clear that most respondents were reluctant to answer questions that required details or accurate answers. In some cases they genuinely did not know but in other cases it was out of suspicion. In most cases, people thought the questions were too many, long and boring. It was therefore found necessary to apply some inducement to both the respondents and the trained assistants to get them to spend the extra time required.

It was also interesting to note that many peasants were totally careless about the records of costs they invested in their farms. Thus benefits from the farms were not realistically quantified and were not easy to evaluate.

The same difficulty of obtaining data was experienced when contact was made with officials. Many were suspicious, afraid and, therefore, reluctant to provide even the most basic data inspite of whatever anyone said. What one was told depended on what the officers felt the authorities would want to give out. It was sad to find that in many cases the data were just not there. The records were not just kept or worse still, some were fabricated to please the 'government'. Four top ranking officials and a state commissioner were honest enough to confess this trend.

With all these problems one has very little choice but to rely on published data and make inferences in cases where such are not available or even use tips in getting access to certain records. This problem makes informant interviews simply necessary in such circumstances.

The poor co-ordination and overlap of functions also meant that no one office felt responsible to collate any materials or data relating to rural development functions. This meant a lot of time and money was spent in trying to collect data from officials who were hardly in their offices. So, the lack of adequate funds was probably the biggest constraint in the whole exercise.

1.5.4 Analysis of Data

In relation to the proposition set out in the guiding conceptual framework, the secondary data as well as the primary data were analysed in order to find out how much of the project objectives were achieved and in whose interest these achievements were. The analysis also tried to deduce available evidence on local participation from the documentary as well as the primary data collected. An attempt was also made to see if there is any discernible pattern in all the projects studied.

1.5.4.1 Project Design

Information covering the design of the various projects has been derived from the feasibility studies done for the

various projects including any alteration done later. A content analysis of these documents together with personal observations on the site, provided the information base on which inferences have been drawn about project objectives, intended level of participation and the resources used.

1.5.4.2 Project Achievement

In all of these projects there was an expected level of achievement right from the design stage. Since the projects vary in nature it is not possible to describe these achievements in a common pattern. As stated earlier, the information about their achievements had been obtained through official records. The same official records gave an idea of the achievements made so far. A content analysis of these records provided the basis for obtaining the proportions of the achievements which were used as an indication of how far the set targets had been achieved. The proportions of the different benefits derived from the projects were also compared where relevant (e.g. Appendix I, Qn.10) using the sample variance and obtaining the student t test. The t value was obtained using Norcliffe's formula of

$$t = \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{S^2_1}{n_1} + \frac{S^2_2}{n_2}}}$$

where

$\bar{X}_1$ = mean of first sample

$\bar{X}_2$ = mean of second sample

S_1^2 = variance of the first sample

S_2^2 = variance of the second sample

n_1 = number of cases in the first sample

n_2 = number of cases in the second sample.

The evaluation of the projects here has been considered from the point of view of the local aspirations of the target people. It was therefore considered important to also find out their own assessment of the projects. Questions pertaining to their own assessment of the individual projects (see Appendix 1 - 10, Questions 9, 9, 26 and 19 respectively) were aggregated using frequencies and presented in terms of their percentage scores. Their assessment was also expected to serve as a pointer to the value they attached to the projects. Such a value was obtained by the mean scores of the local assessments in each case. A comparison of the people's evaluation of the three groups of projects (RBDA, BNARDA, DFRRI) was then made using the method of analysis of variance (ANOVA).

In the light of what was observed on the field and the discussions held with the officials as well as the target people, the questionnaires were also analysed in terms of the

major influences affecting local perceptions of the projects, project benefits, local aspirations, project purpose, administrative problems, and the people's willingness to participate in the activities derived by obtaining the mean scores of all the related variables in the questionnaires in each case. A correlation was made amongst these derived variables to find out how they affect one another in the implementation of these rural development projects. The result of this correlation is then presented in the form of a correlation matrix.

1.5.4.3 The Conceptualization of Projects

The stated objectives of the projects have been taken as indicative of the way projects have been officially conceptualized. A content analysis of documents helped to expose these objectives in each case. However, the people's aspirations may always be the same with the stated project objectives. Where this is the situation, a case of incompartibility of interests is noticed. Part of the interview questions therefore seek to identify local priorities and aspirations (see Appendix I-IV, Nos. 18, 20, 30 and 39 respectively). The ratings of these priorities was deduced from the calculated frequencies. The objectives of the projects were then compared with this list to find out if they fell within the local priorities.

1.5.4.4 Local Participation

This has been looked at from the different levels of planning. In some cases such as at the design stage and even the location of projects and implementation the level of local participation has been incorporated in the design. Such information has been obtained through a content analysis of the project documents, minutes of board meetings, et cetera. There were also some interview questions which sought to know from the respondents (the target people) their level of participation and willingness to participate in the implementation of the project (see appendix I -IV Qns. 20 and 21, 26 and 27, and 25 respectively). Proportions of the responses were obtained to find out the number of respondents who participated and their involvement in each case.

1.6 THESIS OUTLINE

The rest of this work is structured as follows. The second chapter discusses the development theories, their recommendations, and how they influenced development strategies and led to the emergence of the rural development advocacy as a strategy of development in the third world countries.

The third chapter discusses the history of planning in Nigeria and how this relates to the theories outlined in the previous chapter. The chapter also looks at the planning practice in terms of the machinery and process of planning in the rural development projects with a view to identifying the

the lapses in such a process.

The background to the study area is discussed in the fourth chapter which outlines the physical and social background issues which need to be taken into account in the application of development strategies in Benue State while the fifth chapter tries to explain the politics of planning for the rural development programmes and projects.

Chapter six deals with the analysis of field ⅌ data. This is intended to evaluate the selected rural development projects with a view to comparing their relative achievements and determining how they have met the initial set goals. The discussion in this Chapter also provides the evidence upon which the conclusions and recommendations in chapter seven are made.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 THE CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE PRACTICE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

In common parlance, development means 'a gradual unfolding' that is, 'fuller working out' or 'growth' (Proeter, 1978). All these terms convey the impression that the term development cannot be conceived as a discrete idea involving one set or sets of actions and activities leading to a finite goal. The purpose of development is the realisation of a people's goals and aspirations. Such goals and aspirations could change when subjected to certain internal and external influences. Implicitly the activities leading to these goals will also change along with the goals. As older development targets are achieved, newer ones emerge and the process thus becomes a continuous one.

The history of national development in Europe and as affected the colonies indicates about three major shifts or epochs in development goals or targets. These are the period of territorial acquisition and economic growth, the period of modernization and the period of distributive justice. Each of these periods was marked by a specific conception of what interests were to be pursued in the practice of development planning. Thus the changes in the prevailing conceptions of development also implied that development actions taken to achieve the broad goals and their mode of operations would

also have to change.

In spite of the emphasis laid on particular goals of any one period, all countries had at all times conceived development to include an improvement of their political might, economic power and the well-being of their citizenry probably for the reason that these complimented each other.

2.1.1 Development as Economic Growth

2.1.1.1 Conception

Development conceived as economic growth means that the goal to be achieved is capital accumulation or increasing the wealth of nations. A developed country in this context was one which, according to the United Nations Organization, had achieved a national growth rate of about five to twelve percent per annum and has an industrial economic base so that the majority of its people are engaged in manufacturing activities. An underdeveloped country on the other hand would not have made that growth rate and the majority of its people are engaged in primary economic activities especially agricultural production (Todaro, 1977).

To achieve this kind of development conceived of as growth, many nations became preoccupied at this time with the process of accumulating and reinvesting their capital in such a way as to achieve specific growth rates in their Gross National Product (GNP). In essence this meant increasing the production

of goods and services within the country to a level that exceeded the rate of population growth.

2.1.1.2 Ideological Basis

This concept of development has been found to be supported by theories propounded by classical and neoclassical economists. Notably amongst these were Adam Smith (1976) and David Richardo (1817). These economists had come to the conclusion that specialization allowed more goods to be produced through the efficient use of different resources including capital, that is, money and equipment. Sustaining this mode of development would, therefore, require a steady supply of capital to be made available through high levels of savings by the people. Other requirements include the specialization of labour and suitable market conditions with a minimum government intervention. According to these theorists, development which begins with the right combination of the above factors will be self sustaining. Later in the 20th century, the neoclassical economists typified by the writings of Alfred Marshal (1930) and John M. Keynes (1939), tried to improve on the growth model by suggesting that savings for investment could be made consistent through appropriate interest rates. To sustain the system well, capitalists of course would have to keep reinvesting their profits in order to expound production and the general level of income within the society. This means inducing employment

opportunities through investment multiplier effects.

2.1.1.3 Development Strategy

Under this conception, the approach to development was predicated on the idea that expanded capital growth even if located in a few selected centres will eventually trickle down to the masses in the form of jobs and other economic opportunities or create the necessary conditions for the wider distribution on economic and social benefits even to the peripheral regions (Todaro, 1977:60).

Translated into practical terms, the necessary development action was seen as industrialization and urbanization. The strategy was to develop the core centres first hoping that the peripheral areas will eventually benefit through the trickle-down effect. Naturally, therefore, the urban centres as well as regions which were richly endowed with resources and whose locations were found convenient in economic terms were better favoured as centres for the location of industries and other aspects of growth. On the international level, the developed countries and their capitals became the core centres while their colonies (mostly coming from among the third world countries) became peripheral and were subordinated to their respective core centres both in terms of receiving the benefits of development as well as in the decision making process.

KASHIM IBRA

Since the colonies were the property of the mother countries, both the colonies and their respective masters were seen as one political unit. Their capital accumulation programme was centrally controlled and the benefits thereof went largely to the core country as well.

The role of the developing countries in this case was to provide raw materials and markets for the finished products. Development policy here, therefore, was limited to the processing of raw materials particularly where much bulk could not be reduced through processing. In many cases it also became necessary to provide the minimum infrastructure needed to produce and transport such raw materials to the ports and the finished products to the markets in the hinterland.

This core-periphery or top-down relationship in the development process was aptly described by Stohr and Taylor (1981) as 'development-from-above', implying that the core is to be considered first in all development matters.

2.1.1.4 Planning Implications

In terms of planning, the approach adopted in the implementation of the growth model of development had several implications. Development policy based on this model recommended tackling what the economists believed to be the critical factors which could inhibit or promote growth. These were identified as specialization of labour, capital

accumulation and a free market. These factors became the determinants of relationships between regions and the basis of development goals.

Europe for instance became industrialised to enhance capital accumulation and adopted a programme of territorial acquisition towards the end of 19th century in order to improve not only the market situation but also to provide an additional source of raw materials for the home industries.

In the case of the Third World countries, the application of these foreign growth model was unavoidable. Many of them were still under the colonial yoke and as such were economically and politically subjected to the policies and planning initiatives of the respective colonial powers. What happened in Europe became the ideal target for the colonies. The supposedly 'primitive' colonial subjects who did not even know what was good for them were hardly given any incentives to contribute to this development process. Specifically the concept of specialisation was extended to the colonies by making them pursue the production of primary commodities for which they were supposed to have a comparative advantage.

Indeed there was hardly any planning. Making arrangements to procure and export the needed resources to the home countries was the simple preoccupation. In Nigeria for example, all development goals and the related actions were determined from the colonial office in Britain. The first

development plan of 1946, almost half a century after colonization, was criticised for not containing the Nigerian opinion and had to be revised five years later (Federal Ministry of Economic Planning, 1962). The Nigerian opinion referred to here of course meant the regional development committees which were again manned by British nationals whose primary interest was that of their country.

2.1.1.5 Development Effects

The general consequence of development based on this conception was that more emphasis went to the development of export agriculture and light industries and the related infrastructural services in the colonies. The core areas and urban centres of the colonies were favoured in the location of these light industries and infrastructure and consequently what was said to be development constantly alluded the peripheral areas. Thus inequalities and welfare issues were not considered to be serious national problems. The interests of the rich class at this time were more influencial and were easily turned into national interests. Unfortunately, planning too was not seen at this time as a serious element in the process of development. Various government departments simply sent to the headquarters with a list of projects they intended to implement for approval. In this sense development was not necessarily for the majority of the people. They were lucky if they received the trickle-down effect and so, most countries

achieved more than the 5% growth rate in the first development decade but there was no development. All the same, this concept of development as growth was seen to be carried into the first development decade in Nigeria and it featured prominently in the First National Development Plan (1962-68).

2.1.2 Development as Modernization

2.1.2.1 Conception

As Mabogunje (1980) had observed, modernization is a component of total social change and that it emphasises cultural changes of regions through the use of modern scientific means. Myrdal (1972) had also noted that the descriptive slogan for modernization was "scientific era". This meant the wide use of machinery for almost every aspect of production thus causing several changes in training and behaviours of both the producers and consumers of such products and, eventually, society at large. In this context, the simple economic growth concept becames a narrower interpretation of development. Modernization requires changing attitudes by the people, embracing new ideas, new economic activities and a new social order. Thus a distinction can now be placed between modernization (as economic development) and economic growth which was not concerned with issues of social change (Seers, 1969).

2.1.2.2 Ideological Basis

Ideologically development conceived as modernization does not differ from the growth theories supported by economists. Modernization which was obviously in vogue by the 1950s also subscribes to the core-periphery, trickle-down model of development. In fact, the spatial theories which were developed at this time were only aimed at either explaining this process further or helping to energise it. Notably amongst these were the 'Polarization and Trickle-Down' analysis by Hirschmann (1958); the 'Cumulative circular Causation' theory of Myrdal (1957); the 'Growth Poles' theory by Perroux (1955) or Friedman's (1972) 'Core-Periphery Interaction' theory. Under these influences, the continued application of the hierarchical diffusion model amongst the third world countries went on even through the 1980s.

Development seen from this perspective however differs in its emphasis on the scientific methods in the production process. It was the belief that if this emphasis were actualised, development would be accelerated and consequently the trickle-down process too, thus boosting the morale of the core countries as well as those peripheral to them. In addition modernization had introduced a spatial element in the development concept. One region could now be compared to another in terms of how modern they are.

2.1.2.3 Development Strategy

Development policies influenced by the concept of

development as modernization were still along the lines of the growth ideas albeit many of the Third World countries had gained political independence in the 1960s. The hierarchical diffusion model of growth continued with industrialization and urbanization still being regarded as the appropriate strategy for development. Lacking the capital accumulation and the specialised labour necessary for industrialization, this approach only encouraged the dependence of the third world countries on incentives from the developed world. The developed world had to provide the capital in terms of loans and training for the white-colar jobs that would trickle down.

In line with what was happening in Europe, some developing countries also attempted introducing some spatial policies such as 'growth poles' or various forms of decentralization in order to help speed up the spatial effect of modernization. The key development strategy however still reamined that of industrialization through what was now popularly known as the import-substitution strategy.

2.1.2.4 Planning Implications

From all indications, the basis of development planning would appear to have been laid when development was conceived as modernization. Influenced by the Keynessian view of the growth process which was based on an employment model, it became necessary to look into the future and project investment outcomes. Keynes believed that for the capitalist

system to succeed, it must be expertly managed. His call for intervention policies through taxation et cetera (Keynes, 1939), was not only a clear departure from the 'laissez-faire' doctrine hitherto recommended by the free enterprise economists but had also led to the use of statistics and quantitative techniques as an important tool for determining the state and direction of national accounts. The national accounts in turn became an important influence in the determination of development policy and the management or monitoring of economic growth.

The five-yearly development plans, too, evolved out of the Keynessian proposals. Through such plans which reviewed past performances and directions before recommending new policy measures, government was able to introduce the necessary control measures.

Political independence did not change anything in the process of planning. It was still top-down. The only change now was that political heads of governments and their capital seats had moved closer to the people. These however remained the cores while rural communities continued to be peripheral to them. With the numerous economic ties still remaining with the former colonial powers, planning in Third World countries still continued to be heavily influenced by what happened in these countries.

Government officials still determined what and who was to be planned for and how the planning was to be done with more regards to international economic trends than the immediate needs and involvement of the local communities. In many cases plans ended up as a list of projects which, due to varying reasons of lack of skills or other resources, or due to the influence of foreign financiers, were simply contracted out to foreign firms for designing and even implementation in some cases. The temptation to become 'modern' also led to many cases of plan indiscipline when many states deviated from approved plans and embarked upon many prestigious white elephant projects such as huge stadia, airports, national airlines, grandiose telecommunication schemes, et cetera.

2.1.2.5 Development Effects

For the Third World countries, modernization had in effect become synonymous with copying the historical experiences of the West, including the process of planning and implementing development projects. This led to the continued use of sophisticated technology that was difficult to manage and the adoption of the consumption patterns of the developed nations. Consequently locational as well as migratory preferences were given to the 'modern' urban areas.

Planning and its implementation at this time aimed at achieving the 'modern' outlook through prestigious projects

which were not adequately designed to take care of issues of inequality and social justices. Since the interest of the central authority took preference over those of the poor rural majority, planning was overcentralised, capitalist and elitist, both in terms of plan formulation as well as in reaping the benefits of the planning outcomes.

With a poor industrial, base government intervention policies through taxation and interest rates had made little impact on the general living conditions of the majority of the people. On the contrary increased public spending in the wrong direction was supported through crushing foreign debts. The donor institutions and countries on the other hand have continued to mount pressure on beneficiaries of these loans to allow market forces to dictate development terms. In the meantime, the serious consequences of poverty and the increasing disparities which seem unabated within and between these nations were now becoming embarrasing to national pride and, therefore, led to the questioning of the whole development process.

Many Third World nations, Nigeria inclusive, achieved impressive industrial growth under these policies (Olaloku, et al, 1979) but the socio-economic problems confronting these countries continued to escalate and the general low level of well-being of the people still remained unchanged (Filani, 1981). The same problems of rising unemployment, growing numbers of

illiterate, ill-housed, malnourished and sick people; increasing disparities of all kinds; growing external debts and worsening international terms of trade still remained issues for development planning to tackle (Higgins, 1979: 4-7 and Shaw, 1972: 1-5 in Ariyo, 1982:6).

The magnitude of these problems had sufficiently intimidated many of these Third World countries to begin to search for policies and strategies that will do more than simply improve the Gross National Product. What Third World nations now needed were policies and strategies that would attend to the serious political and moral questions of where and what should be developed, by whom, for whom and when.

2.1.3 Development as Equity and Social Justice

2.1.3.1 Conception

The failure of the application of the growth and modernization models to provide solutions to the emerging political and moral questions of how development should be conducted and what it should achieve brought into focus another dimension of the concept of development. Based on these emerging questions which became obvious towards the end of the 1960s, it was now believed that development efforts should endeavour to create equal economic opportunities for all citizens and deal with their welfare issues too. Development in this context is conceived as

having to deal with several issues at once: economic growth, modernization, and the question of the distribution of the benefits of growth in a just manner to all concerned. In this sense, development is conceived as really a multi-dimensional process which involves the reorganization and reorientation of the economic and social system (Todaro, 1977).

2.1.3.2 Ideological Basis

The first noticeable deviation from the purely economic model of development came from Karl Marx (1913-1919). Marx Was of the views that the capitalist goal of maximising profits through the exploitation of the poorer working class countries would systematically impoverish further the already poorer consumer population who were also the workers. He attributed the underdevelopment in many of the poor countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to the colonial exploitation by the capitalist nations. Although Marx had argued for the transfer of the means of production to the masses and by implication the search for self-reliance (Marx, in Ariyo, 1982), his excessive reliance on intervention policies resulted in an overcentalization of planning decisions which in the end became counter productive and unattractive.

By the beginning of the second half of the 20th century issues of regional inequalities and rural poverty had increased to such a magnitude that had attracted a wave of calls from

several social science scholars for a change in development theory and practice. Prominent among these were Meir (1964), Myrdal (1968), Seers (1969 and 1977), Todaro (1977), Mabogunje (1980) and Filani (1981). These had argued variously that the measurement of a country's growth by its GNP only would not necessarily reflect the standard of living of the generality of its people. They contended that a reformulation of a newer development concept should deal, not only with questions of output, but also its distribution and the general impact on poverty. This would mean radical changes in institutional, social and administrative structures as well as popular attitudes, customs and beliefs in anticipation of a change which would lead to a vissible improvement in the quality of life of the people.

Seers (1977) also found it necessary to include along with the question of poverty, unemployment and inequality, the issue of self-reliance which Marx had earlier been concerned with as one of the factors to be considered in planning for development. The issues of inequality and self-reliance have thus been given further emphasis in the spatial dimension of the concept of development with several implications for planning.

2.1.3.3 Development Strategy

That development should now be concerned with the economic prosperity as well as the welfare of the generality of the target people is now the apparent resolve in the debate on the

concept of development. Thus more goals which should be achieved by development efforts became obvious. What remained unresolved was the problem of what appropriate development action should be adopted to achieve the varying development goals of the different regions.

Tackling inequalities and achieving self-reliance, however, implied improving the economic activities commonly found amongst the majority of the people. There were, therefore, suggestions that development policy and practice aimed at achieving these newer goals should source for inputs from within a country's geographical boundaries. The suggestion implied an attempt to reduce the dependence on the outside world for development incentives and the control of economic growth. Stohr and Taylor (1981) described this approach as 'Development-From-Below' (or the bottom-up approach). Due to the multidimensional nature of its conception, a variety of methods had also been employed by different countries and institutions to achieve what they considered to be the priority goals.

2.1.3.4 Planning Implications

Whereas the growth model had recommended a clear development action, namely, industrialization and urbanization, a similar clear perception of an appropriate development action in the case of the 'development-from-below' proposal was illusive for quite sometime. This was due partly to the acceptance

that no universal formula can serve all cases. Second, many countries found it difficult to initiate meaningful projects that did not have to depend on foreign capital nor were they able to effectively plan for the achievement of the combined effect of these projects such that the multidimensional nature of development could be realised.

As it were, many were in the name of modernization still lured into the old trap through policy proposals which appeared to be rural in outlook but whose implementation was not subordinated to endogenous factors and thus undermined self-determination and self-reliance and effective public participation in general.

Redirecting development efforts towards achieving the ideal of development from below has culmunated in a development strategy commonly referred to as 'Rural Development'. This rural development advocacy was largely welcomed at this time because it filled up the apparent vacuum created by the lack of an appropriate development action amongst the bottom-up theorists. As a development strategy, however, rural development has varied both in its conception as well as in the approaches adopted by the various countries.

2.2 THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT QUESTION

2.2.1 The Need for Rural Development

As indicated in the preceeding section, the rural development idea could not have come at a better time. Many

Third World nations had decided to push the rural development issue to the top of their development agenda with the belief that:

a) Major regional disparities in living levels have emerged as the negative consequence of integrating the developing countries with the practices and systems operating in the developed world.

b) An appropriate concept of development depends on the natural and social environment of different communities and the development of specific cultural and institutional conditions. These represent major factors of development and should not be subordinated to the short-term pressures of any externally dominated or 'anonymous' market mechanism. This view is also in line with Kim's (1973) earlier contention that true development represents changing the resource allocation pattern in a way which allows the majority to have access to developmental resources and decision-making power.

c) The basic impulse for the formulation and implementation of such differentiated concepts of development must come from within the respective communities and not through the intermediaries of the developed communities nor in response to the demands of the richer ones.

d) There should be greater national and regional self-determination on the degree and type of interaction needed in these traditional units (Stohr and Taylor, 1981: 16-20).

As these views suggest the underdevelopment problems of the different Third World countries cannot be all identical. Their causes and history vary and so, each will need to be treated on its own merit. This reasoning led to the rejection of the holistic view of underdevelopment in the Third World by people like Ian Roxborough (1979) and Andre G. Frank (1981). They think it will even be ahistorical to simply lump all their development problems of Third World countries together. What Roxborough and Frank too advocated was a search for answers from within the respective individual countries.

Under this conviction, the rural development idea offered the opportunity for implementing different programmes and projects which were intended to erradicate poverty and improve the life of the majority of people in Third World countries. Since there was no commonly accepted strategy for implementation of these programmes, however, most countries tended to copy or rely on the methods recommended by the countries or institutions which had helped finance such rural development projects. Consequently a variety of things were down under the guise of 'Rural Development'.

2.2.2 The Rural Development Concept

To the ordinary mind, rural development cannot be conceived any better than the visual impression expressed by Akinbode:

> for operational purposes, I see rural development as that stage when the people in my village and other villages in Nigeria can turn on their tap and get clean water inside or near their houses, have medical facilities, roads and mobility, banks, electricity,comfortable houses, functional educational opportunities for adults, good clothes to wear, balanced nutrition, efficient sewage system, participation in decision-making that affect their lives, with inner satisfaction and pride to remain in their villages (Akinbode, 1986: 127).

This view captures clearly the different action areas in any meaningful programme of rural development.

The World Bank on the other hand conceives of rural development as a strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of a specific group of people, the rural poor. It involves extending the benefits of development to the poorest among those who seek a livelihood in the rural areas (World Bank, 1975a: 3). The group includes small scale farmers, tenants and the landless who were believed to be poor basically because their means of production is still primitive and therefore their major economic activity which is agriculture was not developed.

These two conceptions of rural development are indicative of the divergent views of rural development in which the focus is on different interest groups. Whereas Akinbode's views emphasise the welfare implications of rural development for the people concerned, that of the World Bank appears to lay more emphasis on the economic implications omly. Consequently, external financiers saw rural poverty as the principal enemy

which has resulted from such endogenous factors as lack of capital for rural investment, lack of achievement motivation in rural dwellers, lack of technical skills and other inputs such as tractors, harvesters and fast growing seeds (World Bank, 1975b). They see rural people as traditional whose values and institutions constitute barriers to development. With such a diagnosis, the prescription was to marginalise or completely replace these values and institutions with modern ones through drastic actions. Usually, this meant a drastic change in the process and method of production. Such recommendations implied the transfer to large-scale and mechanised agriculture with the provision of huge sums of money in the form of loans or sophisticated machinery.

Thus even at this time, the pervading influence of the modernization theories were still noticeably projected into programmes and projects supported by the World Bank and other international agencies. Together, such pioneering programmes and projects appeared to lay emphasis on increasing production, raising productivity, increasing employment and mobilising what land, labour, capital or any other contributions were available. The major economic activity was agriculture. In this context, rural development was seen as the development of agriculture, using the methods and means already known to the developed world.

The objective of reducing poverty and inequalities from

a Welfare point of view was only recognised as a by-product of the main economic concern (World Bank, 1975b: 3-5). Also recognised but secondary to the major economic goal was the idea that development involved values and the quality of life issues; that the poor too should participate in planning activities and be involved in decision-making.

In all cases then, rural development had been presented as a pursuit of several objectives. It was this multi-purpose nature of rural development which makes it difficult to be achieved without proper planning. To get round this problem, the idea of integrating all the rural development goals into one programme was adopted. Integrated Rural Development was then developed to accommodate all the variables that contribute to rural development. Integrated rural development has an elaborate set of goals and objectives involving numerous variables as outlined below.

a) To improve the living standards and well-being of the mass of the people by ensuring that they have the security and their basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing and employment met.

b) To make rural areas more productive and less vulnerable to natural hazards, poverty and exploitation and to give them a mutually beneficial relationship with other parts of the regional, national and international economy.

c) To ensure that any development is self-sustaining and

involves the mass of the people (this involves other things, encouraging self-reliance and public participation in planning).

d) To ensure as much local autonomy as possible. The former usually means promoting administrative decentralization and political self-government (Lea and Chaudhri, 1983: 12-13).

From all indications, there appears to be a consensus on what rural development should achieve. Lea and Chaudhri (1983) have observed that the core idea of rural development itself is not new. It would appear that what has given popularity to the rural development drive today is the review of the approaches to it and the emphasis on its role in the improvement of the national image. They further contend that most rural development programmes focus upon a land policy, a technology policy, an employment policy, an education, research and extension policy, a rural institutional policy, a price policy and linkages with the rest of the economy. According to them, the manner in which each and collectively these issues have been pursued is related to some guiding principles, that is, the ideological orientations. Thus different ideological orientations have given rise to different strategies in the pursuit of rural development objectives.

2.2.3 The Varying Approaches to Rural Development

2.2.3.1 Approaches of External Institutions

It has been suggested earlier that various interest groups

have influenced the implementation of rural development. Western financial institutions, for example, had prescribed drastic changes in the process of production in the rural areas and as such rural development projects they financed were characterised by western ideas and technology. Since they were capital intensive their regional coverage was also limited and individual projects were located in a few selected centres with the hope that their effect will gradually spread over the adjoining areas. Ariyo (1982) tried to relate these projects to three main strategies, namely,

a) An employment strategy. This strategy which was supported by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), aimed at solving the growing unemployment problem and the attendant low income amongst the Third World countries by promoting labour-intensive production techniques while improving the people's excess to capital at the same time, especially in the informal sector (ILO, 1972, 1976 in Ariyo, 1982:9).

b) The second strategy supported the World Bank aimed at redirecting investment from large scale, centralised projects to projects which benefit the poor directly. This implies a change in emphasis from the ILO strategy following assessment reports made of the existing development programmes. The development of this strategy later led to the human resource development and integrated rural development ~~and~~ ideas though the integrated rural development projects were themselves capital intensive (Chinery, et al, 1974).

c) The basic human needs strategy. This was supported by the United Nations Organization (U.N.O.). Encouraged by the achievements in low-income countries like Sri Lanka for instance, it was believed that it would be possible to eradicate poverity in the world if development planning and aid programmes were organised around the principles of meeting basic human needs such as food, water, shelter, clothing, medical care, education and participation in decision-making.

This externally induced strategies differed markedly in conception and implementation from approaches which had originated from within the individual third world countries. Although not completely successful, such rural development experiences had achieved a greater spatial impact and offer many lessons for future rural development planning.

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2.2.3.2 Examples of Approaches of Developing Rural Areas in a Few Developing Countries

These are cases where the individual countries concerned had decided , for different historical reasons, to accelerate their pace of rural development. In each case, the philosophy of the individual country's rural development would thus become the bedrock for planning for the whole country.

a) The Israeli Experience: This experience has an orientation towards reciprocity. Programmes of this nature are guided by a

strong value orientation with ideological emphasis on the group welfare more than individual interest. When it started in Israel, the basic unit of production was the Kibbutz, a cooperative settlement which was an indigenous institution to Israel. The whole experiment was motivated and sustained by the strong determination of the Jewish people to settle and live in the home of their ancestors when they were forced to return to Palestine for various political and historical reasons. Dedicated to the idea of Jewish national revial in their ancestral home, they were determined to fight off all kinds of hostilities within this environment. The intensive search for a new social organization pattern to promote land settlement yielded the Kibbutz.

The institutional structure and organisation of the Kibbutzim was opposed to private farms. It was based on full collectivism (Klayman, 1970). Other forms of settlements later evolved for reasons which were related to the strict nature of the collective principles practiced by workers.

The Kibbutz, however, provided the stimulus for government to organise and distribute rural development inputs and to continue the settlement programme based on its communal principles and the force of its organization.

As a development strategy, it is important to appreciate the fact that certain exceptional circumstances had coaleased

to shape the Isaeli rural development experience. These include the ability of the immigrants, most of who had no prior farming experience, to easily adopt agricultural innovations. Second, there was the strong sense of nationalism which evoked cooperation, discipline and respect for one another. Thus there was the zeal to work and implement socialist ideals in which the superiority of communal life style was practiced without compulsion. There was also the structural flexibility to accommodate all persons such that men and women, too, were made equal both at work and in the decision making process of the Kibbutz. Third, the Kibbutzim had acquired the necessary national respect and prestige through their defence of the Jewish communities in a hostile environment, their role in the reception of immigrants, their economic development role in this desert situation and their readiness to undertake tasks for the common good and the competence with which this was done. The frequent appointment of ministers and prime ministers from amongst them (and to which they often returned) also enhanced their political influence and status and the morale of individual members (Dooren 1982: 127-128).

It should also be noted that while ideology played an important role in the founding and process of organising all the different types of cooperative villages, the farm leaders and settlers were also pragmatic idealists who were dedicated and molded their villages to the practical needs of the country. These needs and their solutions were also

determined from amongst them and not elsewhere. The solutions were also within the competence of their skills and the reach of their resources. Attempts in the defunct Western Nigeria and elsewhere to establish democratic production cooperatives without the precondition of very intense mobilization has not met with similar success. The prerequisites of commitment, a strong determination, adequate incentives and discipline on the part of all concerned are also necessary even where the material resources are available.

b) The Tanzanian Experience:

Convinced that the African brand of socialism was the ideology needed to support and envigorate rural development in Africa, the Tanzanian political leadership decided to reorganise the whole of its rural communities into Ujamaa villages. The term 'Ujamaa' refers to 'familyhood' or 'brotherhood' and connotes the extended family system (Omari, 1976: 87). An Ujamaa village represented the basic production or social unit.

Reorganising communities into Ujamaa villages entailed the physical movement of the villagers from their old established homes (in many cases through the use of compulsion) to the newly established villages, many of which were not adequately prepared to receive them. Along with the reorganisation programmes were other prerequisites such as land redistribution, the provision of infrastructure and

welfare services, changed attitudes and the decentralization of administrative and political powers to enable the people have control over the planning of their own development. This concept of African socialism also meant bringing under public control all the key sectors of the economy.

The implementation of this brand of rural development brought about several problems both for the government which was the implementing agency and the target people in the rural area. First the movement was not orchestrated by any such historical event that was capable of evoking any serious emotions towards nationalism and the achievement of such a development goal as was the case in Israel. Coupled with a poor education among the villagers, this meant government had to carefully plan its programmes and incured high costs in mobilising people towards this objective. Invariably coercion had to be used where peaceful appeals failed to work.

The movement of people from homes (in which they would have prefered to remain) meant a lot of disruption in their social and economic life. Implicitly, the benefits awaiting those who moved had to be visually seen to be more than these economic and social costs so incured in order to entise them to move. As it turn out in this case, these promised benefits were slow to come thus making the job of further mobilising people to freely move into Ujamaas extremely difficult.

To fulfil its promise of providing the necessary

infrastructure, social services and agricultural inputs, to the new villagers, also meant government had to go into heavy debts since local funds were inadequate to villagise people at the rate government had intended.

The growth of Ujamaa villages was therefore slow by government expectations consequently certain interventionist measures had to be taken to speed up the process (McCall and Skutch in Lea and Chaudhri, 1982:253). The paternalistic relationship which later became prevalent had resulted from more and more control by the state and technical experts and less economic power for the villagers. This was contrary to the initial conception of the democratic objectives of the Ujamaa and resulted in the alienation of peasants from the actual control and power which was intended to be given to them (Hyden, 1980).

Even ideologically, Ujamazation was faulted by the attempt to run a monetary economy based on traditional values which support a non-monetary economy. Under such circumstances, efforts to achieve the desired goals meant a lot of restructuring which took up much energy and resources only to witness a very slow rate of goal achievement.

The apparent failure of Tanzania to achieve the desired rural development through social control and ownership was therefore due to a mixture of both ideological and

implementation problems. Zealous party officials overlooked the fact that changing attitudes and values amongst villagers needed time and care particularly where there was no national issue like that in Israel to whip up emotions in support of such an exercise. In their hurry to achieve results, coercive methods had to be employed thus undermining local participation, over-ambitious and unrealistic promises which could not be fulfilled were made and poor estimates of both the material and human resources required were submited only to find them inadequate shortly after. These in the end left the villagers faithless and frustrated and thus drastically reduced the level of achievement that could have been made in this approach.

c) The Korean Experience:

The Koreans had used the opportunities within the prevailing circumstances to improve their economic base through the reliance on the market system. They introduced land reforms, commercialised agriculture, and with foreign assistance established industries and trade links (Douglas, 1983). The gains recorded from this were then chanelled into their rural development programme of 'Saemaul Undong'.

Inaugurated in 1971, 'Saemaul Undong' was the New Village Movement which did not result from the application of any theoretical concept. It evolved as a consequence of determined efforts which had shown signs of paying off if continued in

the same direction. Essentially it was a self-help programme initiated and supported by government in an attempt to start a process of 'planning from below'. Central planners also hoped to achieve self-sufficiency in grains, a slowing down of rural-to-urban migration and a support for the incumbent highly autocratic government through this programme. The past history of the rural people in South Korea was clad with stories of exploitation and the impoverishment of the rural areas by successive governments as well as the 1950-53 Korean war, such liberal movements for which the Saemaul stood were therefore embraced gladly.

The basic unit of the Saemaul Undong is the village. It began by government giving each of Korea's 35,000 villages 335 bags of cement, leaving the villages with strong suggestions but essentially to their own devices concerning how the cement was to be used (Kim, 1975 in Douglas, 1983:210). This introduction was to initiate self-help projects among villagers. Later, progress made amongst these villages was evaluated and on the basis of this, model villages were then selected from those that had made good progress. These model villages were rewarded by another phase of more intensive government support.

Although there had been no design to specifically move people into these villages, the Saemaul movement implied that people had to live in such villages to receive the benefits

of planning and development. The movement strictly maintained the principle of private ownership of property inspite of the nature of the land reforms which were intended to encourage cooperative efforts and discourage domination by local elites. It is also noted that villages that appeared to have responded well right from the beginning of the programme were those with minimal social divisions, strong leadership and a favourable attitude towards the local bureacuracy. Government's concentration of efforts on progressive villages also helped to reduce unneeessary waste of resources and hoped that a demonstration effect would spread to other villages thus making them want to take part in the Saemaul projects in future.

Inspite of the success of the Korean rural development experience it would appear unsuitable to suggest that it should become universally applicable to other countries due to some of its fundamental weaknesses. Douglas (1983) notes that the model rests on a set of ectremely fragile relationships which include:

1. The contradiction between private ownership and collective action;
2. The relationship between agriculture and industry, especially with regard to treating the village as the basic economic unit;
3. The contradiction between top-down and from-below exercise of power;
4. And the contradiction between an open economy and, the

desire for self-reliance (Douglas, 1983: 205).

These contradictions had resulted to several problems. For example, the land reform created a pattern of small-owner cultivators who without a cooperative section could not gain much from other subsequent reforms. The land redistribution on its own did not help much and future growth appears to require land consolidation as a necessary basis. Private ownership also made it difficult for some of the village projects to take place and for large scale projects much compensation and/or negotiations have to be made to get them started.

Another problem area was the emphasis placed on agriculture to the detriment of any manufacturing activities in the rural areas. The agriculture village policy did not attempt to diversify the economy. Together with the price support policy, the resulting specialization tended to limit the range of off-farm activities. Indeed the spatial policy of a single village being used as an independent regional development unit was inadequate and inappropriate in achieving self-reliance. Further development would require combining several villages into a single cooperative development region if this aspect of self-reliance were to be seriously pursued. Even so, one still questions the idea of self-reliance in a situation where much of the inputs in the rural development programme have been heavily subsidised by the gains of export-led industrialization which in turn depends very heavily on foreign capital and raw materials. With these inherent weaknesses it

is clear that even though one acknowledges the material successes of Korea's national and rural development policies (albeit several areas of inequalities still exist), sectoral policies directed towards agriculture and self-help activities to modernise rural villages do not separately or together comprise a viable strategy for accelerated rural development (Douglas, 1983: 204 and 209). As a development process, the Saemaul Undong has been hung too much and it was too dependent on adjusting to the valgaries of an export oriented industrialization policy.

In general the above experiences have been considered fairly successful (Lea and Chaudhri, 1983) but what one notices in most rural development efforts made in developing countries with supposedly free enterprise economies is that of attempting to combine the presumably ideal features of the group welfare approach, social control and ownership (collectivism) and free enterprise. This has given rise to what is now commonly refered to as the reformist strategies of rural development. The issue of an ideological base may therefore be important in spelling out the basic values for a rural development programme but the crucial element for its success as can be seen is its planning and the process of implementation.

2.2.3.3 Implications for Planning Rural Development

Another look at the approaches and strategies so far used in tackling the rural development question shows that the

strategies which had originated from external institutions had culminated into programmes and projects which instituted changes that were considered too drastic. Such changes had undermined local values and did not adequately mobilise the target people for effective participation. The success of these programmes and projects was noticed to be very much reduced due to the inbuilt foreign values and technology which was difficult to manage and the capital intensive nature of the programmes. Consequently the strategies were slow in achieving a widespread spatial impact.

Amongst the Third World countries the culture of copying development ideals from the developed countries left many developing countries confused as to which direction they should focus rural development planning. The preceeding discussion has indicated that although there had been some fairly successful cases where some countries had laid emphasis on some particular ideological area, most of these countries had resorted to the reformist model which meant combining the ideals of the different ideological principles. The application of this model in effect often led to conflicts arising from a mixture of a monetary economy and traditional social values as examplified by the Saemaul Undong and the Tanzanian model of 'African socialism'. In this case the issue of determining development goals becomes a delicate one which must be carefully handled with respect to both the national interest as well as the interest of the

target populations.

The implication here is that planning should adequately take into consideration the context of the planning environment and effectively tie up the means (the needed development strategies) and the end (that is the goal of development). It is the belief here that a carefully designed planning procedure offers the opportunity to achieve this objective.

2.3 IN SEARCH OF AN EFFECTIVE PLANNING PROCESS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

In the colonial era, a top-down planning procedure was simply handed down to the colonies with the planner as the master who knew everything. The planning practice even after political independence was attained by these countries, did not appear to be significantly different. The top-down planning process has not produced laudable results in most developing countries, hence the search for a more effective alternative.

2.3.1 Theoretical Options

Ariyo (1981) has attempted a classification of procedural planning theories which as an adaptation of a theme used by Bolan (1974) provides a deeper insight into their inherent strengths and limitations. The differences in the procedural planning theories outlined below reflect the fundamental difference in orientation with respect to societal structure,

the role assigned to government and planning, both within and external to the public sector.

2.3.1.1 The comprehensive planning theory involves an extensive analysis of the existing situation by the planner who then produces utopian constructs in the form of plans to solve the identified problems. The whole exercise of planning is based on technical rules and the process is rather mechanical. The individual 'master planner' like a master builder, depends almost entirely on his own inspiration and creativity.

In a procedure such as this it will be difficult to accommodate all the socio-spatial variation and sectoral differences in a large country like Nigeria where the objective of self-reliance implies an understanding and application of the useful traditional values and involvement of the people in the planning process.

2.3.1.2 The rational planning theory represents a procedure which calls for the identification of alternative solutions with the view to selecting which one can best achieve the identified unitary public interest. This process is not preconditioned by any set of values. It is scientific in methodology and appears to be independent of context. Both the comprehensive and the rational procedural prescriptions appear unsuitable in the Nigerian context if applied without dilution. Both are oblivious of context which is considered

to be a crucial factor in rural development.

2.3.1.3 In the transactive planning theory, the planning process is initiated by an open discussion which is iterative and exploratory. It involves a form of social learning for both the planners and the target people. The objective in this process is to achieve desired social ends. This kind of process may be suitable in small organizations but essentially requires a literate clientele for effective results. In a large community, it becomes slow and achieving a consensus of opinion for a plan document becomes difficult.

2.3.1.4 The advocacy procedural planning theory on the other hand depends on an advocate planner whose duty it is to mobilise the resources for planning decisions which favour the disadvantaged groups. In developing countries the resources are just not there to implement the plurality of plans which the advocacy theory assumes. Besides most of the disadvantaged groups in these countries are not sufficiently motivated or mobilised to want to participate in the planning procedure by employing an advocate planner to help solicit for a change in their state of deprivation.


2.3.1.5 The radical theory prescribes an open process where there is maximum participation amongst the target people and a minimum state intervention. This procedure tends to encourage self-reliance and mutual aid but again depends largely on an educated clientele for better results. Another serious

disadvantage is that the absence of state intervention implies a disaggregation of programmes which would then seriously lack coordination and thus inhibit the attainment of national goals.

2.3.1.6 Incremental planning theory to some degree also has this problem. Here the process adopted is that of a mutual adjustment in the light of constraints that were previously encountered. It does not take on the whole problem at once. In other words, it is partisan and partial. The process is thus seriously constrained by its high dependence on the context of the problem being planned for.

While they vary in the matter øø ø of detail, the essential activities which are inherent in the procedural planning theories sketched above are summarised in Figure 2. The sequence of activities indicated in Figure 2 begins with the decision to plan which is triggered by a feeling of dissatisfaction with the present state of a particular system. The next three stages in the planning process - the articulation of the system's problems, the formulation of goals and more specific objectives and the identification of alternative courses of action are motivated by and derived from a thorough analysis of the system or subsets of it, projections and predictions, and the image of the desired state. The evaluation of the identified alternative ccourses of action and the selection of particular courses of action for implementation is influenced by specific values and the costs and benefits of the alternatives.

Figure 2. The Theoretical Conceptions of the Planning Process



Source: Adapted from McLoughlui (1970), Chadwick (1971) and Hall (1974).


The sequence of activities outlines here is reiterative through a feedback loop of monitoring and review to make planning a continuous process.

2.3.2 Adapting Planning Process to Context

It is evident from the foregoing that each of the procedural planning theories has its strengths and weaknesses. But their true test will be in a societal-cum-institutional setting where they are directed towards the formulation of goals and the production of specific action programmes. So far much of the discussion about the differences in the procedural theories has remained abstract and confusing to many practitioners thus making many planning practices theoretical. The translation of these procedural theories into practical details could have perhaps allowed practitioners more room for a critical evaluation in the context of the situation of developing countries. But as noted above, the acid test of the effectiveness of any planning process is within the context of a given society with a defined resource base and social values.

If as Stohr and Taylor (1981) observed, planning should truly be a reflection of personal values conditioned by the societal framework in which one lives, then such goals as are formulated in a plan must represent a proper integration of local needs, national goals and external concerns. In other words, the process should be flexible enough to accommodate the positive and alternative negative environmental conditions respectively.

Fig. 3: The Structure of a Planning Context



Source: Field Sources

In this context, the nature of the local community plays a very central role. What ever the policy, adjustments muct have to be made to accommodate conditions of the local environment. It will be emphasised here too that a process which does not explicitly identify the characteristics and nature of relaltionships with key contextual conditions will as pointed out by Ariyo (1982) end up in confussion and without a clear means which will be consistent with ends and responsive to potential consequences.

This is to say that a process which takes account of context must recognise the potentials and limitations imposed by both local and external conditions. It must also reflect on the complexity and dynamic properties of external conditions and facilitate the establishment of new and more effective links with these conditions at both the conceptual and an applied level.

It is in this context that we would like to postulate here that an effective planning process for rural transformation in a developing economy like Nigeria must contain the superior aspects of the procedural theories outlined ∅ above. The process of rural development project planning must, therefore, be comprehensive but not encumbered by too much detail; rational, but reflective of the socio-economic milieu; transactive but result-oriented; advocatory, but cognisant of the needs of all rural groups; radical but not too disaggregative; and incremental, but within a perspective framework of rural needs.

So, in addition to evaluating the selected rural development projects in Benue State on the basis of physical achievements, the foregoing elements which we consider as essential ingredients of an effective planning process will provide the conceptual framework which will guide us in assessing the procedure used in planning these projects.

2.4 SUMMARY

The literature review here indicates that development

as a general rule, must embrace attributes of economic growth, modernization, socio-economic transformation and distributive justice. This implies a rejection of the earlier emphasis on growth to the disadvantage of socio-economic transformation and social justice. In its "Human Development Report 1990", the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) contended that human development needs more than money, "..while growth in national product is necessary to meet all essential human objectives, what is important is to study how this growth translates or fails to translate into human development in various societies" (African Concord Newsmagazine, 11th June 1990). To this end, the process of correcting the imbalance created by earlier development practices which had laid an undue emphasis on growth alone implies redirecting development efforts of to the majority of the people and resolving the problems of inequalities. Since the majority of the people in developing countries live in rural areas which had for long been disadvantaged by being peripheral to the centres of development, the rural development question has now become a central issue in many developing nations.

Experiences in other countries have shown that in planning for and implementing rural development, several problems have been encountered both in the ideological areas as well as the methodology of implementation. The biggest question has been which strategy is most appropriate. The review here shows that several options have been attempted by different countries with

due respect to their socio-political and economic environmental circumstances. Although ideological differences are seen to exist in the area of emphasis, many planning strategies and methodologies have emerged out of the blending of some of the useful ingredients of the various ideological areas. The general problem has been that many of the development and planning theories lack that quality of being translated into practical implementation thus making it difficult for one to evaluate their individual usefulness and applicability.

This problem not withstanding, past rural development reviews have been constrained by an overdue emphasis on ideological pursuits and not much has been done to improve the process of planning and implementation. It is necessary, therefore, to broaden the scope of the academic pursuit in the development question to include the search for a more effective process of planning and plan implementation. Among the rural development experiences which have achieved some measure of success, it has been noticed that regardless of ideological differences, the basic factors which appear to enhance success include:

1. A well articulated package of action which serves as a long term plan but which is not totally divorced from the fundamental traditional values of the society.
2. A suitable land policy.
3. An organised pattern of settlement with a definite unit to plan with (usually the village).
4. A democratic process - not coercion.

CHAPTER III

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN NIGERIA

3.1 INTRODUCTION

"...It seems your planning here is on ad-hoc basis", querried the interviewer.

"All planning in this country is on ad-hoc basis", the Economic Planning Officer replied.

This part of a dialogue that ensued between this writer and an official of the Ministry ø for Finance and Economic Planning in Benue State summarizes what actually happends in practice in the name of planning in Nigeria. Things are rushed around in the name of getting something done in response to the usually late orders from the Federal Authorities to produce a plan document. As soon as this is done, everybody then relaxes and waits again for the next 'season'. The whole exercise is not continuous and does not appear to reflect a sincerity of purpose.

The history of planning in Nigeria indicates that some changes have taken place in the structuring of development planning with the ultimate intention of making it more responsive to prevailing needs. The rampant cases of abandoned projects and wasted billions (Usen, et al, 1987: 14-20; Agbo, et al, 1988: 8-12) imply that there is still a serious need for improvement in the process of planning

and plan implementation in the country.

3.2 THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN NIGERIA

Although several people have narrated the history of development planning in Nigeria (Filani, 1981: 283-304; Ariyo, 1981: 104-109), paraphrasing the same history here is still considered important in the underscoring of the nature of development problems which now bedevil the country. Given the advantage of hind-sight, development in Nigeria can be reviewed under three different periods in her socio-economic and political history. These include the colonial period, the 1960s and the post civil war years. The review focuses on what had been the perception of development generally and rural development in particular and how this influenced policies and planning action in Nigeria.

3.2.1 The Colonial Era

The earliest attempt to plan for Nigeria's future was when the Colonial Office in London published in 1946 'A Ten Year Plan for Development and Welfare for Nigeria. The plan was as a result of the Colonial Administration to submit a ~~ten~~ ten- development plan to guide the allocation of development and welfare funds.

The plan contained a list of projects whose ultimate goal was the development of a limited range of export crops needed to feed British industries and for the construction of transport and communication systems to facilitate the movement of these crops to the sea ports of Lagos and Port Harcourt, and the colonial administrators around the country. The Central Planning Office only noted many years after, that many of the projects in the earlier plans were neither cordinated nor related to any overall economic goal (Central Planning Office,1978).

In

In a real sense the Ten-year Plan of 1946 was not a perspective plan. The main strategy for industrial development in the plan was was that of export promotion, involving only the first-stage processing of raw materials. All of this was done to the advantage of British industries except in a few cases where there were efforts to also meet the needs of colonial administrators. Small and medium-scale-activities meant for this purpose included printing and baking.

From the early 1950s, there was a shift from the export-promotion strategy to that of import-substitution. In this case industrial development aimed at esta lishing industries which would produce consumer goods that were heavily marketed in the country, but which would depend on imported inputs of capital, machinery, technical expertise and the semi-processed raw materials. As a process that only put finishing touches to manufactured products in the country that consumed it, import substitution can only give an ellusive political feeling of development. It can not bring about real exonomic emancipation. Yet the eight years after political independence the import-substitution industries were to account for 75% of the total output in manufacturing (Mabogunje 1977).

The 1946 plan and the revised one of 1951-1956 were all prepared under the same principle. There was no elaborate planning machinery which existed in the country for the preparation of plans. Allthat happened was that the exonomic and social departments maned by British personnel, submitted their individual requirements to a central development office in form of projects which wer hardly integrated intoa a consistent and pragmatic course of action. Planning at this time, Tomori (1988) too observed, was essentially a disjointed set of individual projects grouped under departmental headings which reflecte the administrative structure of the colonial government rather than the coordinated sectoral division of the exonomy. The whole process was a simple one relecting the concentration of power at the centre in Britain and in the hands of colonial officials who were government representatives.

The mid 1950s saw serious constitutional developments in Nigeria and these were to affect the political structure of the country in such

a way that a simple planning machinery for the whole country was no longer feasible. A Federal system of Government was adopted in 1955 and the three Regional Governments (the North, the East and the West) were to each draw up their development plans. The process of planning and the so-called plan that followed was no different from what was known in the past. Regional governments tried to stick to their proposals with little compromises. Consequently, the end result was simply a list of projects which were uncoordinated and as Adeniyi (1978) put it, not a plan in the strict sense of the word.

It is note worthy here to state in Baba's words that Colonial development policies were governed by the socio-economic processes which had come into existence in Western Europe as a result of the Industrial Revolution (Baba, 1981). In Nigeria these policies resulted in the construction of roads, etc to aid the search for raw materials. This in turn led to the regional specialization in export agriculture with groundnuts in the north, cocoa, timber and palm produce in the west, rubber and palm products in the east. The colonial administration saw the Nigerian rural folks as producers of these materials and their well-being was seen ~~as~~ only in terms of the provision of rudimentary health-care centres and primary schools. Other infrastructure only became important if and when they enhanced the exploitation of the needed resources. Under such circumstances the views of these rural people were not considered important in the determination of the use and the

consequences of the allocation of resources that were supposedly theirs.

3.2.2 The 1960s

Since independence in 1960 the centre of political power moved from London to Lagos although many of the economic factors that have continued to affect planning as well as skills for planning still had their roots in Britain or indeed with a gang of the industrial countries of the West. At the expiration of the 1955-62 plan, Nigeria adopted a five-year development plan style. Mabogunje describes the new planning strategy as the Keynesian type macro-economic planning and he states that the main characteristic of this strategy is the reliance on 'monetary and fiscal policies to generate the appropriate stream of total spending so as to assure steady growth with full employment and no inflation' (Mabogunje, 1977:19). This strategy was to form the basis of all the development plans up to 1985.

Analysis of the first National Development Plan (1962-68) by Stolpher (1962), Wells (1974) and Olatunbosun (1975) have all pointed to the fact that there is no marked difference in the development policies from what it used to be in the development policies from what it used colonial days. The importance of agriculture was not in doubt as it still accounted for 56.7% of the GDP in 1960 but the plans accepted that the task of modernizing agriculture was going to be formidable. Consequently FAO was requested

to produce a report based on which action will be taken.

The policies were in any case still export-oriented. Indeed the leading conception was that since agriculture was the main economic activity, the development of it was equivalent to rural development. Existing inequalities between the rural and urban areas in Nigeria however, became more obvious towards the end of the 1960s. The Civil War (1966-1970) only helped to expose the rural situation further and increase the challenge to National Development.

3.2.3 The Post-Civil War Years

Past planning exercises had encouraged economic growth without socio-economic equity thus leading to continued existence of large scale inequalities within and between regions. Mabogunje's (1977) criticism of even the Keynesian-type macro-economic planning adopted in the post independence years was that development plans ended up being nothing more than fiscal budgets for public investment and avoided planning the whole economy and to that extent, lack operational control. Little attention was therefore paid to planning of taxes and other measures to finance expenditure. Budgets became a way of accounting for public expenditures and consequently, plan-fulfilment was discussed in terms of how far various authorities had succeeded in spending money alloted to them and not in terms of concrete physical achievements or how far the plans had succeeded in overcoming the real constraining factors in the development process.

Second, there was and still is in existence a dual structure in the country's economy, namely, the subsistence or traditional structure represented by the informal sectors including agriculture on the one hand and the modern highly monetized structure represented by the formal sector that is the urban and industrial concerns on the other. The development strategy adopted placed too much emphasis on the modern sector using monetary or fiscal policies to generate responses in the economy. This strategy was quite inappropriate because it neglected a much larger section of the country. Furthermore, the goals and objectives of the plans including those for rural development schemes were set by bureaucrats and professionals who were largely urban-based. These bureaucrats and professionals managed to impose their ideas and value judgements on the rest of the people thus marginalising the population being planned for in the whole process.

Third, planning in the immediate post-civil war period presupposed that requisite attitudes, techniques and institutions, were either in existence or could automatically be made to adjust appropriately without intentional and direct policy intervention by government (Mabogunje, 1977:22). This was not always the case. Plan indiscipline in the form of changes, alterations or additions to planned programmes regardless of the costs and inconveniences that may be incurred was common during this period (Filani, 1981). Thus the main characteristics of development planning in the early

post civil-war years were, according to Filani (1981);

(a) excessive centralization of the planning machinery in government ministries, providing little or no scope for popular participation;

(b) concentration of development efforts on some selected sectors of the economy without any appropriate linkage among the sectors and with the rest of the economy; and

(c) concentration of socio-economic activities in the main urban centres hoping that this would generate the 'trickle down' effects that might improve conditions for the virtually neglected rural majority.

Most of the problems outlined above have their roots in the exclusion of the people being planned for. Although the 1975 years began to see an increasing concern for rural development programmes, the policies and programmes were largely designed and financed by foreign institutions whose purported support was only to enable them achieve their economic goals.

By the second National Development Plan period however, indications of a decline in agricultural growth coupled with the aftermath of the Civil War resulted in a panicky establishment of several institutions and programmes that had a rural bias, e.g. Green Revolution, Operation Feed the Nation, Agricultural Development Programmes, River Basin Development, etc. Then there was also the Creation of more States and the Local Government Reforms of 1976. State creations and Local Government Reforms ~~of~~ appeared to be an indication of awareness

of the need to reorganise the country spatially for effective planning. But up till this time, rural development was not given the pride of being planned for in the development drive.

By the second-half of the 1970s however, the change in direction became obvious. The 1975-80 plan for instance had for the first time introduced some welfare indices to the idea of rural development. For the first time too one could see a government policy which specifically drew attention to the need to reduce the rural-urban disparities in living standards.

> The main objectives of the rural development are to increase rural productivity and income, diversity rural economy and generally enhance the quality of life of the rural areas....
>
> In addition to raising agricultural productivity, effort will be made to improve the quality of life in rural areas, through the provision of basic social amenities. With this approach, it is hoped that the disparities in living standards between the rural and urban sectors would be minimised. (Third Plan, 1975-80 Vol.I, p.292; also see Fourth Plan, 1981-85, guidelines, p.29).

The policy still laid emphasis on agriculture but it was soon discovered that the upliftment of living standards meant more than agricultural development. This led to the need for greater efforts on the part of government to change its conception of rural development and probably informed the creation of The Directorates of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) the restructuring of the objectives and organization of the River Basins and the Agricultural

Development Projects and the formation of the Directorate of Mass Mobilization for Social and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) in the second-half of the 1980s. Within the same time, there was also a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) introduced in 1986 which aimed at encouraging private and public sector production to rely more heavily on the use of resources within the country, and at reducing government expenditure in all but the defence sector.

It was clear by the middle of the 1980s that government had a strong desire to adopt a course of action that would reduce its dependence on foreign influences and at the same time achieve in the long run, a drastic change in the living conditions of the majority of its people most of whom were living in the rural areas. But the push to achieve these goals and impress foreign investors and creditors as well as political critics only led to the adoption of several sectoral measures leading to a proliferation of programmes and projects which were not carefully planned and which in many cases either overlap or duplicate efforts already being made.

Although an evaluation of these changes has not yet been made, the number of abandoned projects which littered the country and the billions of Naira wasted imply that some of these efforts were perhaps counter productive. Following Myrdal's criticism of past experience, one can also point out in this situation that it will appear too many changes

have been introduced at once in Nigeria and within too short a time for effective management (Myrdal, 1968).

3.3 THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS: A REVIEW OF THE OBJECTIVES

Periodic plans have been produced by countries to help them achieve short and long-term objectives. In Nigeria, the history of development planning shows that although planning experience goes back into the mid-1940s, the development of well articulated goals and objectives was not noticed untill the first development plan period (1962-1970). The review here intends to look at these development plans in terms of their objectives and to see how the interests of the rural majority has been progressively taken care of and whether or not such objectives are directed towards self-reliance which is regarded as the basis of rural stability. Since the colonial plans were criticised for their lack of coordination which could be related to an overall economic target (First National Development Plan, 1962-8), the review here starts with the first National Development Plan of 1962-68/70.

3.3.1 The First National Development Plan (1962-1968)

The first plan which was estimated to cost 675.7 million was really an amalgamation of five plans prepared by a skeletal staff of expatriate economists who had little or no background on the Nigerian economy. But as one of its chief architects warned, "it is dangerous to formulate a bargaining plan (among

the regions) and then proceed as if it were a realstic plan" (Stolpher, 1966:81). Inspite of this, a set of objectives had been outlined as the target to be achieved by the plan. These were:

1. To increase the average annual growth rate from the previous 3.6 to 4 per cent.
2. To raise domestic savings ratio from 9.5 per cent of the GDP in 1960-61 to 15 per cent or more by 1975.
3. To achieve an investment ratio of 15 percent of the GDP by 1975 in order to raise annual per capita consumption by 1 per cent.
4. To create more jobs in the non-agricultural sectors.
5. To attain a modernised economy and a more equitable income distribution among people and regions (Federation of Nigeria, 1961:7-23).

It is obvious from these objectives that the tradition of the neo-classical and liberal economists had heavily influenced the first plan. The emphasis on growth through rising capital-output ratios, the high rating of the non-agricultural sectors on the priority list and equating development with modernization obviously places the objectives of income distribution in a peripheral position.

From the point of view of the rural majority, Nigeria's first plan had not laid the necessary foundation for effective participation or self-reliance in the development process. The plan was obviously the work of a few expatriate

professionals who had made little consultation with the people. It also marked the country's growing dependence on foreign inputs and the relegation of agriculture and the rural sector to a secondary position on the list of the development schemes. This can not have been a proper start in the pursuit of self-reliance. The strategies of this plan were to lead inevitably to the concentration of investments in the so-called modern sector which were invariably located in the urban areas to the continued disadvantage of the rural areas.

3.2.2 The Second Plan (1970-1975)

By 1970, the civil war was virtually over and in setting up the objectives of the second plan, influences from the war experiences and lessons were obvious. There were also indications of an attempt to turn away from the purely economic objectives of the first plan. The second plan which was estimated to cost three billion Naira therefore had the following objectives to achieve:

1. a united, strong and self-reliant nation,
2. a great and dynamic economy,
3. a just and egaliterian society,
4. a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens,
5. a free and democratic society (Federal Ministry of Economic Development, 1970:32).

Unlike the first plan, the second was drawn up with a greater influence and control from the Federal Government whose major

goal in the country now was reconciliation and national unity. The creation of 12 states in 1967 had considerably undermined the political strength of the former regional administrations but there was still a need to solicit support for the plan among the states. To achieve this support, the objectives in this plan were stated in broad non-specific terms. Ariyo (1983:118) observes that such objectives, are really long-term goals which all nations should constantly seek to achieve. They are not specific quantifiable objectives, to be achieved within the life of a single plan which was only five years.

The general nature of these objectives was bound to have problems amongst implementing agencies. At the State level, serious cases of plan indiscipline were noticed as it was common practice to pursue policies which were inconsistent with national aspirations and to execute projects which were not in the plan but which were in many cases simply considered prestigious (Ariyo, 1983). This was not in consonance with the national strategy which called for investment in industries which would enable Nigerians to control the economy. These conflicts and distortions rendered useless the totality of the planning efforts put in the second plan (Adeyemi, 1980 in Ariyo 1983:119).

As indicated above, the second plan also marked the beginning of government's interest in social programmes. Hitherto, many of these serivces were supported or ran by voluntary agencies or individuals.

These included schools and health services. About 1972 however, increased government involvement in this area led to the take over in many states of these services thus greatly reducing the participation of the people in these vital areas. Government's excuse for the take over was that it wanted to make them afordable to a larger number of people though it was discovered soon afterwards that the cost of running these services was enormous. The people had withdrawn their support and governments inability to put in sufficient funds and personnel eventually reduce the quality of these services.

3.3.3 The Third Plan (1975-80)

The extravagance exhibited in the second plan encouraged by the rapidly growing export earnings from crude petroleum had been the influence behind the military government's launching of their amitious third plan. The total capital expenditure for this plan was set at 30 billion Naira. At this time, the Federal Government too had staffed the planning department with professional planners who were also itching to exhibit their skills in plan preparation. The voluminous plan document that was eventually produced had hoped to achieve an annual growth rate of 9 per cent. Besides the five long-term goals of the second plan which were summarised as a broad view of the ultimate aspirations of the society, the following more specific objectives were stated in addition:

1. Increase in per capital income
2. More even distribution of income

3. Reduction of the level of employment
4. Increase in the supply of high level manpower
5. Diversification of the economy
6. Balanced Development
7. Indigenisation of the economy (Ministry of Economic Development, 1975:29).

The objectives as is the case in the second plan, had commendably tried to move away from the purely economic growth interests. However, many of these objectives are considered to be too broad for any operational utility. They needed to be restated in more specific operational and attainable terms and to be scheduled within a certain time frame against which progress can be measured. This habit of stating objectives in such broad terms was noticed even in the specific projects and as such many of them were implemented without a proper yardstick of measuring success. Probably this also explains why implementing agencies have not considered evaluation and the progress reports an important aspect of the planning and implementation process. In a way this is also an indication of adequate project preparation as was also noted by Dar Al-Handasah Consultants (198 :39)

While the third plan adopted fiscal measures such as progressive taxation, revised wage structure that would narrow income gaps and the provision of low income housing to improve the urban communities, the rural communities were to

benefit from such measures as the revision of the marketing board system (applicable only to the export crops) to pay reasonable prices to farmers and to augment farmers' income with subsidised agricultural inputs (Ariyo, 1983:126). In addition, water, education and medical facilities were to be provided in the rural areas. Such rural incentive policies could not have possibily reached the majority of the rural population as only a limited number of less than 20% (Quarterly economic Review, 1976:7) of Nigerian agricultural out put was involved in the production of cash crops for instance. Extension efforts too were carried out in such a Way that they were more inclined to benefit a limited class of former, rather than involve all farmers (Dunmoye, 1986, Watts and Shanton in Ariyo, 1983:127). In this way, economic diversification too Was not sincerely pursued and there Was the continued dependence on the oil revenue While agriculture continued to decline.

Benue State also came into existence during the period of this third plans. It Was created in 1976 out of the former, Benue Plateau and KWara States and therefore had to complete the projects of the Benue Plateau and KWara States as they applied to it. There Was no attempt to create a plan for itself until 1979 When the state entered into agreement with Dar Al-Handasah Consultants to produce a regional plan for it.

3.3.4 The Fourth Plan (1981-1985)

The 1981-85 plan Was also an ambitious one. The expectations

were that the oil revenue would continue to provide a steady capital although the uncertainties about a continued oil boom had began to surface even before the end of the third plan. Such a situation created the awareness of the need to caution in the next plan period that prudence and diversification will be necessary. This in addition to the previous objectives, the plan had the following other objectives:

1. Greater self-reliance (increased domestic resources);
2. Development of Technology;
3. Increased Productivity and reduction in the level of underemployment;
4. Reduction in the rural-urban migration;
5. The promotion of a new national orientation conducive to greater discipline, better attitude to work and cleaner environment (FMNP, 1981:19).

The strategy in this plan placed a lot of emphasis on

(a) Self-reliance and a self sustaining development (with a considerable reduction of the depenence on the external sector in general and on the petroleum sector in particular); and

(b) democratization of the development process (FMNP, 1981:2021).

These objectives like those of the previous plans suffered from lack of an evaluation criteria. Consequently the criticism of the third plan also applies to it. For example, the issue of self-reliance has been emphasised everywhere

but in practical terms, this has only been related to such inexact terms as "the will to succeed life through productive labour to experiment to be resourceful and" to conquer new frontiers" (FMNP, 1981:21).

In any case the emphasis on increased self-reliance and the democratization of the development process in this plan what makes it different from the previous ones. The reduced dependence on the external sector in general and the petroleum sector in particular implied that agricultural production (including domestic food this time) would be encouraged. This showed a remarkable move in favour of the rural sector. Thus while restraint was used in the importation of other items, agricultural machinery and other inputs were given a liberal treatment in this regard.

In principle, Local Government Councils were also given increased consultation in the planning process as their representation was also given a place on the national planning machinery. This was in fulfilment of the democratization of the development process.

These measures were not put into operation throughout the period of the plan as the in-coming civilian administration revised the measures to suit their own perception of the planning situation. The Oil glut at this period was to prove the miscalculation of the Civil Administration and a lot of resultant effects were to be noticed in the implementation of

the Fourth Plan. The country's foreign reserves were depleted, oil prices fell and the country's economy suffered a serious down turn thus forcing government to drastically cut down its expenditure across the board including the agricultural sector.

The Plan was however, to be noted for its green Revolution programme which sought to boost agricultural production through the implementation of a number of state-run and private agricultural business projects. Among some of these projects were the large scale irrigation projects, the encouragement of private foreign capital investment in agricultural enterprises, and the provision of subsidised inputs to farmers. In addition the National Livestock Production Company, the Nation Root Crops Production Company and the National Grains Production Company were also established by the Federal Government to engage in both the direct production and partnership with foreign and domestic private investors.

By 1983 and again in 1986 the administration of the country changed hands and consequently the changes in

the implementation of the plan too. The 1983-85 Buhari regime was too short-lived to effect a serious impact though they attempted to re-introduce the earlier restraint in importation. The Babangida administration continued in this direction too but the introduction of SAP was to herald a whole set of new measure which were to have a serious effect on the economy of the country.


3.3.4.1 S.A.P.

Considering the sweeping changes that have taken place under this programme and their effects on the economy it may be worthwhile to briefly discuss it here too. As indicated earlier, the objective of SAP was to encourage private and public sector production processes to rely more heavily on the use of domestic resources. It also aimed at drastically reducing government expenditure and building up external reserve to beef up the ailing economy. The programme was the Babangida's administration's way of introducing self-reliance and laying a foundation for a sustained economy.

The objectives appear laudable but the drastic devaluation of the Naira in the process and the hurry with which all the aspects of the programme have been introduced and the nature of its implementation have led to wide spread hardship particularly among the poorer groups. Unemployment has shot up, food prices had skyrocketed (see Fig. 4a, 4b and Table 2) as there were no visible measures to control inflation. Many small scale industries were forced to close down as they could not raise enough naira to pay for the foreign components required in their business. The high inflation also made nonsense of what was regarded in government circles as an improvement in the farm-gate prices.


SAP was the prescription of the IMF and typically of the usual tradition of the economic theories, it emphasised

Fig. 4(a) RETAIL MARKET PRICE FOR 2ND QUARTER 1987 IN ₦/Kg.



SCALE:: 1CM REPRESENTS ₦1:00

Fig. 4(b) RETAIL MARKET PRICE FOR 2ND QUARTER 1988 IN ₦/ Kg.



industrialization, exportation, external investment, reduction of subsidies, liberalization of trade and dependence on market forces to dictate the direction of the economy (Obasanjo, 1989:48). The measures imply a change of direction from the social policies earlier intended by the Fourth Plan. In this case while big business concerns with foreign investment are making large profits, the depressed areas for which SAP was created to salvage continue to be further depressed. In the words of Obasanjo (1989:48), "The programme (SAP) deals essentially with the balance of payments problems and prescribes the classic solution of an industrialised economy" with little attention to factors affecting steady growth among the rural population. This shows clearly once again that the masses are marginalised right from the planning objectives in this country.

Table 2: Percentage Change in food Prices in Nigeria between 1987 and 1988 Levels

Food Item	Percentage Increase in National Average Prices
Garri	124.8
Millet	172.5
Guinea Corn	162.0
Yam	167.4
Maize	81.3
Beans	58.7
Milled Rice	60.6
Paddy Rice	62.5
Ground Nuts	32.3

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Source: West African Magazine 14-20 Aug. 1989 (pp.13-20).

3.3.4.2 The Benue State First Regional Plan (1981)

By its intentions, the Benue State government's plan was to mirrow the national goals of the Fourth Plan. However past experience had shown that attempts to follow the directives as expressed by the national objectives had always been constrained by difficulties of inadequate finances. For example in the Guidelines for the Fourth Plan, figures were originally suggested for the various states' expenditure only to be withdrawn for a new formula which was being awaited when Benue State was about to produce its own plan. The State was in no position to know what funds could then be available for its planning. In this case such an unhappy situation (which is fairly common) caused government plans to be based on consolidation debt clearance and caution generally (Dar Al-Handasah, 1981:14) but not a bold attempt to go for the national objectives as they stand.

By the beginning of this plan period, the States major objectives were to create self-sufficiency in foodstuff and generate surpluses for export; and to provide the necessary infrastructural services currative medicine and education. This posture led the consultants to recommend a rural development strategy for Benue, a strategy which it has adopted and tried to follow since then.

3.4 THE EVOLUTION OF THE PLANNING MACHINERY

As had earlier been pointed out the machinery for planning in Nigeria has evolved over time in response to the changing

political and economic circumstances discussed below.

3.4.1 The Colonial Period (1944-54)

When the first attempt to institutionalise development planning in Nigeria by 1944, was made, there was no elaborate planning machinery as we now have. The first planning exercise had caused the establishment of a Development Branch under the Development Secretary in the colonial office. In Nigeria this branch worked through the Central Development Board (CDB) which was charged with the responsibility of a general coordination of development activities, the overall control of finances and for the preparation of the general principles of development planning and the major policies underlying it. It was also the final deciding factor subject to the approval of the governor in regard to overall priorities and the proportionate allocation of various development activities between one part of the country and another on a yearly basis.

The composition of the Board was made up of the Secretary as the Chairman, three Chief Commissioners from each of the regions (North, East and West), the Financial Secretary, the Commissioner of the Colony, and the Director of Public Works.

On the regional level, each of the chief commissioners and the commissioner of the colony had a similar but larger Advisory Committee. Such committees were known as the "Area Development Committees" (ADC) and consisted in each case of all Residents (provincial administrative officers), the regional representatives

of departments and any other such members as the Commissioner may consider desirable.

The responsibility of these committees was to assess the relative merits and priorities of proposals emanating from the individual provinces, advise upon allocations of work between provinces and act as a screening authority for schemes and other proposals which will ultimately be taken to the CBN.

At the provincial level too, there were the Provincial Development Committees in each of the 24 provinces. The Resident in each case was the chairman, a representative from each of the departments and appointees of the Resident made up the members. Such an appointment gave the auth opportunity for different viewpoints to be represented on the committee but such representation did not always represent the local views as many were those who looked at the ideals in Britain as their target of development.

The function of the provincial committees was to prepare local schemes which are put forward for consideration by the Regional Area Development Committee and where necessary by the CDB. It is noted that although there was a deliberate effort made to have both the inter-departmental and inter-governmental consultation in the preparation of development schemes and that the planning machinery tried to satisfy the requirement of being a two-way process (i.e. top-down and bottom-up), the separation of the planning and plan implementation and the lack of a strong

national representation diminished the effectiveness of the machinery as a forum where the local people could learn and direct themselves towards management and self-reliance (Ariyo, 1983:14).

3.4.2 The 1955-1966 Period

The machinery described above had laid a foundation for the subsequent planning machinery. However several events which took place between 1955 and 1966 were to have serious consequences on this machinery and process of planning too.

First, by 1955 there was the introduction of Regional Governments which gave some relative autonomy to the groups of provinces under the North, East and Western Regions. At about the same time the World Bank's Report on Nigeria was received. This report recommended a comprehensive planning for Nigeria and the establishment of a National Economic Council (NEC) as a consultative body. At this forum the officials of the central government and those of the regions were expected to meet and discuss the many economic problems common to them and the consequences of their development actions which go beyond their constitutional spheres (Clarke, 1963 in Ariyo 1983:149). NEC was therefore established by 1955 under the chairmanship of the governor General (later the Prime Minister) with equal representation from the Federal and Regional Governments.

By 1958, it became necessary to establish another body known as the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) due to the ineffectiveness of the NEC. According to Adedeji (1971 in Ariyo, 1983: 149-150) the ineffectiveness of NEC resulted from inadequate legal powers, the constant changes in the choice of membership by Premiers, the uncompromising attitude of representatives, infrequent meetings, inadequate contribution from technical officials and the exclusion of the private sector and the grass root representation. NEC thus degenerated into an unserious body which became ineffective.

The JPC was to be responsible to the NEC in an advisory capacity. It was supposed to be a committee of experts chaired by the Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister with the following terms of reference:

1. To examine and report upon any matters by the NEC or individual government.
2. To advise the NEC, in particular by
   (a) preparing a statement of fundamental objectives for the guidance of the planning committee of the several governments in the formation of their development plans for each succeeding period;
   (b) examining the plans formulated by the government and advising what modifications should be made to them in the light of the fundamental objectives, agreed for this purpose, in order that the plans together may form a coherent whole.

3. To direct its Secretariat in:

   (a) the preparation of studies, reports and surveys; and,

   (b) the collation, co-ordination and dissemination of information (Clarke, 1963 in Ariyo, 1983:150).

The JPC met more frequently than the NEC and was to play a key role in the preparation of the First National Development Plan. Within this time too, an economic planning unit was established in the Federal Ministry of Economic Development and in the Corresponding Ministries in the Regions. Those units were to play an even more important role in the preparation of subsequent national and state plans.

The JPC was later noticed to also have a reduced impact due to the quality of its members and the fact that it was not really allowed to perform its role.

3.4.3 The Civil War Years (1968-1970)

The period of the civil war had caused considerable interruptions in the operation of the existing planning machinery. Movement around the country was not safe and as such the functioning of NEC and JPC became considerable impaired. A new body known as the National Economic Advisory Group (NEAG) was therefore to replace the NEC and JPC. Its limited functions were to include:

1. Reviewing the progress of the economy since independence;
2. Identifying the critical points that require urgent

government action or modification of existing policies and recommend possible measures;

3. Make projections into the future and submit recommendations about the direction of long-run economic policies (Second National Development Plan, 1970:8-9).

The NEAG operated under such difficulties or inadequate resources (as a lot had to be spent on executing the war) and the erratic nature of a military rule and as such could not achieve much.

Indeed when the creation of 12 states came into existence by 1967 the existing machinery became obsolate and at this point the Federal Government decided to take on a greater role in development planning because many of these new states lacked the necessary personnel and the machinery for planning. The Federal Ministry of Economic Development therefore because the central agency for coordinating Federal and State plans all through the Civil War period.

3.4.4 The Post Civil War Period (1970-Present)

The post-civil war years had come with an increased complexity in the planning machinery for the country. In order to tackle the many problems resulting from the reconstruction efforts at the end of the war and an accumulated revenue from the bouyant crude oil export, the Nigerian government decided to enlarge its planning machinery. At the Federal level, the central planning unit of the

Ministry of Economic Development (later known as the Ministry of National Planning) was expanded and renamed the CPO in 1971 and staffed with professionals. It was to act as the Secretariat of all national planning consultative bodies and charged with the responsibility of preparing medium and long range development plans and to assist in establishing planning units in both the Federal and State Ministries.

Three consultative bodies became established after the civil war, namely, the JPC (Board) which was resuscitated and its membership broadened to include senior federal and state officials, representatives of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Nigeria Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER). Its job was to coordinate the economic policies and development activities of the Federal and State governments and their agencies and to advise government on all aspects of economic planning.

Second, there was the establishment of the conference of commissioners, responsible for economic development in all the states. Its function was to review the plan through all stages of its preparation including implementation, progress reporting and all other matters of economic importance to the nation. Third, there was the National Economic Advisory Council (NEAC) which was a forum for airing private sector interests and views. The membership included those drawn from the Federal Ministry of Economic Development/National Planning, the Nigerian Labour

Congress, the Nigeria Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Agriculture, the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), cooperatives, the professionals and universities. These are consulted for their views before guidelines are prepared for project planning.

At the appex of the planning machinery in the 1970s were the highest decision-making bodies, that is, the Federal Executive Council and the Supreme Military Council. These made the final decisions of the plan.


In the 1980s the machinery basically remained the same except for a few changes. The Federal Ministry of Economic Development was renamed the Federal Ministry of National Planning and the final policy decisions are now made by the National Economic Council which comprises of the President of the nation and the State Governors.

At the state level too, corresponding changes had been made during the 1970s. State ministries of Economic Planning were also revamped to prepare and coordinate state plans and to serve as the State Secretariat of the state planning and implementation committees and act as the link between the Federal and State Governments in the formulation of national plans. The executing state ministries were also made to have planning officer which were to co-ordinate departmental projects and programmes. In consultation with the central or state planning offices they are also expected to identify projects

and programmes to be included in the plan.

The 1979 constitution had provided for the establishment of planning committees in the Local government Councils too but in Benue State for example such standing committee hardly exists in any local government council. The Local Government Council Chairman and his councillors also along with the departmental heads constitute themselves into ad-hoc committees to settle planning matters as they arise. Their proposals are forwarded to the CPO through the state planning office.

Fig. 5: Planning Machinery



Source: Ilugbuhi (1981).

3.5 THE PROCESS OF PLAN FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

The evolution of the planning machinery in the country also indicates the development of the planning process. Up to the time of the first National Development Plan, planning was solely the responsibility of a new foreign experts who determined the goals and objectives, set the priorities and selected the strategies for achieving them. The division of the country into a federation of three (later four) regions did not very much change the situation as the powerful political heads in these regions prefered preparing their own individual plans independent of one another and remained inflexible during negotiations for a consolidated national plan.

The existing process which has really evolved since the post-civil war years consists of eight distinct stages (Ariyo, 1983:159). These stages are summarised as follows:

3.5.1 Stage 1: Workshop/Seminar

This signals the beginning of the process for a national plans. The seminars and workshops are organised jointly by the Central Planning Office (CPO) and the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER) involving a cross section of the society. This exercise was first done in 1969. The ideas and materials so obtained are then used in preparing a draft of guidelines for the succeeding plan.

3.5.2 Stage 2: Issue of Guidelines

With due regards to the recommendations from the workshops and seminars, the Ministry of National Planning prepares the draft 'Guidelines' for the succeeding plan. In the guidelines is contained a summary review of the previous plan, the perceived state of the economy, projections of the key economic variables and resources for the new plan. The guidelines also include the identification of the policy objectives and strategies to be followed.

The draft is then discussed amongst the officials of the ministry before the consultation and necessary negotiations are made at such advisory bodies as first, the JPC, then the Conference of commissioners of Economic Planning and NEAC. The CPO then in corporates the views of these bodies in the new version of the guidelines which now goes to the National Executive Council and eventually to the Supreme Military Council (SMC) or the National Economic Council (NEC) as the case may be. After the guidelines may have been appeared, they are then published and circulated to the Federal and State Ministries and parastatals.

3.5.3 Stage 3: Project Preparation

At this stage the guidelines have been circulated and are within reach of the Federal and Stage Ministries/agencies and Local governments. A call is now issued to them by the CPO inviting them to send in their projects for the new plan.

Ideally these agencies should have already been preparing their projects immediately the negotiations over the draft guidelines are concluded but in practice, they often wait till the approved guidelines are sent. Sometimes the guidelines come along with a call for the projects thus giving very little time for serious thought over the projects, preparation business at this level.

The projects submitted to the CPO are carefully analysed by its various sections and at the end of it, all section's reports are examined in a series of internal seminars to produce the CPO's final recommendation.

3.5.4 Stage 4: Project Review and Negotiations

Equipped with these recommendations the CPO then arranges bilateral meetings with each executing agency that sent in project proposals to discuss their recommendations. Such meetings are reechoed at the State level too that is, between the State Ministry of Economic Planning and other Ministries and the local governments. These bilateral meetings provide the opportunity for the CPO to make its position clear on each project and for the other parties to either supply additional information where necessary or clearify any ambiguities or defend their positions.

3.5.5 Stage 5: Preparation of the Draft Plan

At the end of the bilateral meetings, each executing agency will have been aware of which projects are likely going to be

in the plan. The draft plan stage involves reconciling the proposed expenditures in the proposed projects with domestic resources and foreign exchange earnings to ensure a consistency between objectives and the means. Each section of the CPO and/or State Ministry of Economic Planning would draft the Chapter whose subject comes under its schedule.

3.5.6 Stage 6: Review of Draft

The CPO then combines these chapters into a draft plan and sends it to the JPC, then the conference of Commissioners and the NEAC for review. The CPO will then incorporate their recommendations into the draft plan and submit it to the Executive council and then the NEC, that is, the highest decision making bodies in the country for further discussions and ammendments where necessary. Most considerations at this stage are more political in orientation than technical issues. This stage offers political leaders the chance to drop some projects or add some or alter the phasing of the plan as they deem it necessary for whatever political reasons.

3.5.7 Stage 7: Plan Approval

The CPO incorporates these ammendments and sends it to the Federal Executive Council and then the National Economic Council for approval. After the Plan has been signed by the Head of State, it is then published and formally lauched and circulated to all the executing agencies for implementation.

3.5.8 Stage 8: Plan Implementation

Implementing agencies depend on the respective Federal or State or Local government budgets to give them the necessary authority to incure expenditure. The respective annual budgets try to phase their relevant aspects of the national plan into annual plans and make the necessary financial allocation available for their execution. These annual budgetary allocations are expected to be more realistic since they are based on a more up-to-date assessment of cost estimates from tenders and the assessment of the activity to be implemented.

The task of the State Ministry of Economic Planning and the Ministry of National Planning now is to monitor and review the progress of the implementation of the plan. Such progress reports are then compiled and discussed by the different fora constituting the highest decision-making bodies in the country and finally approved and published. The reports are supposed to serve as a feed back to the planning process when seminars/ workshops will again be organised for the next plan.

At the end of the Fourth Plan there was no longer a definite plan. The period of the Fourth Plan seemed to have been extended and much of what was done was by means of annual budgets. The seemingly 'no plan period' lasted till 1989 when the idea of the rolling plan was introduced. The process of producing a document of the incremental items to be included on the existing plan follows the same pattern as earlier

described. Call letters are sent to the State Governments and Federal agencies who will have to prepare and send in their projects. State Governments and Federal Ministries and agencies are also expected to go and defend their proposals before a final document is prepared.

There are however many questions which still remain to be made clear. For instance, a rolling plan presupposes that there should be perspective plan from which increamental plans are rolled over until the perspective plan is fully implemented eventually. In this case however, the rolling plans have commenced without a perspective plan. Another question is the relationship between the annual budgets and the rolling plans. When do budgets and rolling plans start and end for instance? Once again this is a demonstration of how changes in government in the country have also affected the country's planning process. The future of the planning process appears to be uncertain at the moment but it does not appear to have any more prospects for popular participation that was the case previously.

3.5.9 Public Participation in the Planning Process

All along, the history of planning in Nigeria has indicated that the intention of the top policy makers is to have some form of local participation in the planning of their own development. The quality and nature of this participation however has been questionable from several points of view.

Colonial administrators made it clear that planning was the responsibility of economists and administrators although they needed a good deal of local knowledge of the available resources which could come from the people or local representatives. Several political and administrative changes introduced in this country and the policies thereof do not appear to have very much improved the issue of effective representation of the majority of people in the decision making process of development.

Since the end of the Nigerian Civil War, all development plans have by their objectives indicated a progressively greater commitment to the course of the rural majority. Unfortunately in the process of planning the interests of such a group is supposedly represented by the bureaucrats, a class whose objectives are never usually the same with the interests of these rural people. Consequently, past development plans have in the words of Ake (1990: 8) "turned into concerted aggression against the common people, producing a threatre of alienation in which all the majority agents of development have collaborated."

The organization of planning in Nigeria has been rather insincere to the question of public participation. The planning machinery rests on a political structure which appears to be properly decentralised and the machinery itself appears comprehensive and cooperative in nature. It involves a large number of agencies both at the Federal and Stage levels indicating

several consultations with apparent compromises. In the real sense of it these consultations are being made only within the class of the urban elite groups. It is important to note here too that the supposed involvement by the people has been limited to the participation of a few LGA officials in planning workshops/seminars preparatory to the issue of guidelines.

Besides, in practice, the effectiveness of this planning system is usually limited by the amount of time actually allocated to those consultations. In the mean time, the bureaucrats use this opportunity of lack of time to seek popular views, to include anything into the plan without a proper evaluation.

The closest point to which the elitist tailored consultation gets to the grassroot in this process is at the local government level. This too became noticeable only during the preparation of the third plan but even then local government councils are treated with much levitude.

It had been assumed perhaps that the Ministry for Local Government can adequately speak for all the Local Government Councils. Thus even though the councils were supposed to have been receiving statutory allocations from both the Federal and Stage Governments, they had not found any serious need to have a planning department or even a standing committee as approved in the 1979 constitution. Consequently local governments have

very little to offer when there is a call for inputs into the preparation of guidelines for a development plan. Such a preparation therefore lacks grassroot support and much of the information for planning then relies on economic indicators.

If projects were prepared properly, one would have hoped to have local views represented in them but as noted earlier, many of these failed in the third plan for reasons of inadequate preparation and consultation with the target people (Dar Al-Handasah, 1981: Vol. I: 3-125).

In the same vein, the local government councils in turn have not been consulting with nor adopting in any formal way any of the local development association projects as part of their planned course of action. Thus the rural people have been systematically marginalised by this process both in terms of the spatial coverage and the depth of consultation. The practice of plan formulation is ad-hoc affair which ministry officials become engaged in only when a call is made for it by the NPO. All the five top officials of the Benue State Ministry for Economic Planning interviewed are in support of this view. They feel that the exercise is often rushed through at the last hour. The result is that apart from the selected organised bodies such as the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Institute of Bankers, Labour leaders, etc. (mainly urban), the purported public consultation is not very meaningful in rural development matters and cannot be expected to take care of

local details. Besides being elitist, irregular, urban based and top-down, the kind of consultation noticed here is capitalist oriented and cannot be expected to take adequate care of rural interests. It favours the business world, the exploiters of the masses, by keeping them involved right from the stage of the formulation of objectives.

Perhaps local interests are expected to be taken care of by representations sent in through the federal and state ministries and/or corporations. But here again these ministries lack both the administrative structure and the technical capacity necessary for planning and the political drive to plan. Even though a little progress has been made in this area in that most ministries now have at least an office referred to as the planning section, such offices are not equipped nor are they given any real power to plan. The quality of the job of identifying and preparing projects in the respective ministries is still poor as many projects still leave the ministries in form of ideas which have not been properly studied, designed or costed. It is also observed that, the period within which information is required about projects and plans is so short that what gets sent to the CPO is not representative of hard thinking, honest and serious planning efforts on the part of the officials of the respective ministries concerned. So, even where there is a reasonable capacity to plan, the short notices which characterise, the call for submissions to the CPO can only help to undermine the effectiveness of planning at the ministry level.

3.5.10 Other Factors Affecting the Planning Process

Related to the issue of inadequate planning capacity in the ministries is the serious perenial problem of availability of relevant data for planning. Many programmes and projects are bedeviled with a lack of the necessary physical social and economic data for success. The issue of improper record keeping too has now assumed such an alarming proportion that in the words of one of those interviewed, 'it is better described as criminal'. This problem is widely known and discussed but what appears intractable is the inordinate desire of officers to falsify records and their unwillingness to respond to inquiries. The long time-lag in publishing audited government accounts and the failure of successive population census are all part of the problem. Ilugbuhi (1981) also noted that much as the problem of lack of reliable and up-to-date data has to do with the effectiveness of the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS), not all data problems are the responsibility of the FOS. Delays in publishing relevant materials for example means many officers will not have access to current statistical figures.

Together, the problems of inadequate planning capacities of the ministries, 'plan indiscipline' on the part of officials and Chief Executives and the lack of reliable up-to-date data often encourage officers inappropriately exclude or include many items on the plans (see for example,Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 1985 Training Workshop Reports). As one

official in the Benue State Ministry for Finance and Economic Planning puts it, "the plan becomes simply a list of projects under Ministerial headings". In such circumstances, the numerous interest groups in the elitist category find it easy to divert resources meant for the public into their pockets. (See for example the New Nigerian Newspaper of 19th July 1988 and Newswatch, March 28, 1988.)

The poor attitude to planning is further encouraged by the fact that the NPO and its Ministry for National Planning has no formal authority over the Ministries and agencies whose programme it has to coordinate and as such, all plan indiscipline and issues of non-compliance or deviations from approved programmes etc., cannot be punished appropriately. This undermines seriously the usefulness of the NPO's coordination of programmes.

Another dimension to this problem is the constant change of governments and officers. With every change of government is the inevitable change in the governor, Ministers, Commissioners and sometimes even the technical staff in the Ministries. Along with these changes also are changes in outlook and the level of experience in planning matters. These changes are more frequent at the State level and as such State representatives on planning boards and institutions keep changing. The new in-coming persons are often lacking in experience and initiative and as such, State representatives

tend to limit themselves to the examination of only issues proposed and/or modified by the NPO. Even though their role at the Joint Planning Board for example is supposed to be advisory in a technical area, their poor experience and lack of indepth knowledge makes them merely advocate those points of view which are favoured by their respective governments. The same problem is experienced at the level of the National Economic Council where State governments meet to advise the President. Issues like this only go to show that the effectiveness of planning can also be constrained by what happens in the process too.

3.5.11 Summary

In the light of the theoretical planning procedures earlier outlined (see fig. 2), the present planning process has not yet been adequately attuned towards achieving the goals of the more recent conception of development particularly with regards to the rural development objectives of the country.

With so many cases of underdevelopment staring the country in the face, it is difficult to miss the general objectives of development. At the moment therefore there is a feeling of dissatisfaction with the present state of underdevelopment among the ruling class as well as the rural majority which appears to make planning an obvious requirement. Even the capitalists from outside the country will want the economy planned in order that the resources may be put to fuller use. The need to plan was therefore obviously felt from all quarters concerned.


The motives for planning do however, vary with the different interest groups competing for the outcomes of planning. This means that the process of goal formulation and the articulation of objectives must be clear about whose interest is being pursued. The planning we have discussed here professes rural development goals and objectives but the process of goal formulation and the articulation of the objectives both at the national level as well as the project level does not afford the target population any meaningful opportunity to influence these goals and objectives. The process presupposes perhaps that the urban elites represented by government officials mostly will honestly represent the interest of the rural people too. Past experience has of course shown that this manner of representation has not always been a fair one. It has already been noticed how the colonial administration through government officials pursued the policies of export crop promotion just to serve foreign manufacturers though these crops were grown by the rural people in the name of development projects. Another example is how the urban people faced with the threat of hunger began to think of ways to improve food production locally thus leading us to our so called rural development programmes. The rural people's interest groups even though their ultimate goals appeared to be the same, it is therefore unfair to allow only one group to dictate the terms of development as participation in this process does not go beyond the token consultation at the local government level.

It also follows naturally that in the identification of alternative courses of action for the implementation of the policies, the western educated government officials will view things from their own stand point. In the seminars/workshops preparatory to the guidelines up to the issue of guidelines and even at the project preparation level there is no forum through which local views can be obtained nor is there any form of public education over the projects that are expected to affect their lives. As it will be seen later, community development projects have however, shown that when these people have to plan for themselves, their projects, are most manageable and are usually more successful. Their choice of action is not based on uncertain resources and is not complicated. The evaluation and selection of alternative courses of action is also done at the same time in a general meeting. This shows that with the education of the people on probable projects in their areas, they could have so much valuable information to offer.

The present process of the rural development planning is observed to the devoid of that legitimacy which effective participation shows have given to the resulting programmes. In an attempt to avoid the cumbersome exercise which grassroot participation might entail, the essential ingredient which enhances the appropriateness of development objectives is being overlooked. The advocatory role so far played by government officials does not appear to be producing the desired results

as many of the rural development projects resulting from their planning process are found to be unproductive, not cost effective and therefore fail to provide the socio-economic benefits they were intended to give. Inspite of this, planning in this country does not appear to be adequately utilising the results of monitoring and evaluation. Thus making the planning process to appear open ended. This situation makes the ruling class obvious of the actual causes of failure in the planned activities and thus encourages them to continue imposing planning objectives and their implementation on the rural people.

Fig 6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS OF BENUE STATE.



CHAPTER IV


BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY AREA

4.1 THE PHYSICAL SETTING

Created out of the former Benue Plateau and Kwara States in 1976, Benue State lies between longtitudes 6^{o} 35'E and 10'E and latitudes 6^{o} 30'N and 8^{o} 10'N. With a total area of approximately 46,300 km^{2}, Benue State is the seventh largest State in the country. It has an estimated population of 5.8 million people (1990) which makes it the eight most populous state in the Federation (Directorate of Information, Makurdi, 1981). The State is bounded on the East by Gongola, to the North by Plateau, Kwara and Bendel States to the West, Anambra and Cross River States to the South and the Cameroon Republic to the South East. This location places it within the Middle Belt of Nigeria.

A large part of the State is made up of plains which lie along the rivers Niger and the Benue and open up into the expansive undulating eastern plains along the Katsina/Benue trough. The Niger, Benue and Katsina-Ala are also the major rivers that drain the State. The remaining area is a heavily denudated plateau surface covering southern Ankpa, Okpokwu and the eastern part of Idah local government areas. The Kashimbila complex also covers the south eastern areas that border the Cameroons. (See Fig. 7).

FIG. 7 BENUE STATE : DRAINAGE




About 60 per cent of the State is made up of vegetation mosaic involving reminants of cultivated and secondary vegetation instead of the guinea savana derivation. The State has a 7 to 8 month rainy season which usually comes between the end of March and early April and ends between October and November. Annual rainfall of between 1200 and 1400mm is experienced in the State with the shortest rainy season of about 200 days found just east of Katsina-Ala (Dar Al-Handasah, 1980:16).

As illustrated by Makurdi temperatures which are representative of the State there is a marked seasonality with temperatures increasing after the rains under the influence of the north-easternly airstream and peaking at 32 - 38°C in the February-March period.

Figure 8 shows the evapotranspiration rate of Makurdi. The rainy period and growing season are indicated at the base of the histogram. A large portion of the initial rainfall is utilized by the soil and is not available for plant growth. The water budget presents a general view of the water situation for planning purposes although modifications would be required to suit individual crops.

All soils found in Benue State have a low fertility and the organic matter content is subjected to intensive and extreme climatic conditions for the ∉entire year (Dar Al-Handasah, 1980:33). By 1968 Bohannan had cause to describe

Fig. 8 Water Budget Histogram



STATION : MAKURDI

KEY

Dry period eliminated by late onset of rains

Additional period of water deficit created by late onset of rains

Evapotranspiration rate

Max. potential Evaptr. rate by 10 days period

Mean annual rainfall curve

Projected Rainfall curve following late onset of rains

Source: Agroclimatological Atlas of Northern States of Nigeria.


the soils of Benue as being fertile but noted that soil deterioration is mostly due to wasteful and destructive methods of cultivation adopted by the people. This observation appears to be corroborated by Udo who also feels shifting cultivation is one of the biggest constraints in this area (Bohannan, 1968; Udo, 1970). The major soil types include Dystric Nitosols, the most widespread, or the Acrisols and Ferric Acrisols which between them account for approximately 70 per cent of the surface area. Inspite of this soil quality, the State is almost entirely agricultural and there is a clear relationship between population density and the density of the farmland.

4.2 RESOURCE BASE

4.2.1 Material Resources

It has already been noted that the vast plains of the riverine areas support agriculture in Benue State as the main economic activity and that the development of forest resources has been greatly minimised by the rapid depletion of the forests through agricultural activities. Agricultural activities in the State yield such products as yams, rice, soyabeans, beniseed and groundnuts which constitute the main items for Benue's share of the inter-regional trade in Nigeria. In recent times, the production of gari and the dry white flour from cassava, oranges oranges and vegetables have also increased the range of materials for the regional trade.

Fig. 9 BENUE STATE: SOIL COMPLEX .



In terms of minerals, limestone and coal are currently mined at Yandev and Okaba respectively. Other limestone deposits are also found at Igumale. Sandstone deposits largely found around Makurdi and Agwu are said to be rather unsuitable for a variety of industrial uses because of their poor quality. However clay deposits are common in Benue and have for ages been utilised by the local people.

4.2.2 Population

The 3.8 million people of Benue State consist of three major tribes namely, the Tiv who make up over half of the total population, the Igala and the Idoma. Other smaller tribal groups include the Igede of Oju Local Government Area, the Bassa people; the Etulo (Utur), the Utonkon (Ufia), the Nyifon (Iordaa) and the Abakwa people. About 15% of this population is said to be living in urban areas of more than 5000 people each (Dar Al-Handasah, 1980).

Looking at the population distribution and the varying growth rates in Benue State, Idakwo (1987) had observed that there are indications of intra-state migration taking place particularly from the densely populated Kwande and Vandeikya areas into Katsina-Ala and Makurdi Local Government Areas. Table 3 and 4 below shows the population distribution and their densities.

Table 3: Density of Population by Local Government Area

Local Govt. Area	Total Population 1963	Total Population 1978	Rural Population 1978
Bassa	32.1	34.3	30.4
Dekina	45.6	67.9	44.5
Idah/Ofu	41.4	52.1	40.8
Otukpo/Apa	24.8	62.3	50.6
Okpokwu	103.7	106.7	99.0
Oju	59.5	103.7	101.0
Makurdi/Guma	71.8	116.9	63.2
Gwer	44.1	48.4	46.7
Gboko	63.5	98.9	81.3
Vandeikya/ Konshisha	72.7	105.7	99.2
Katsina-Ala	28.8	54.0	47.8
Kwande/ Ushongo	55.9	71.6	67.3

Source: Regional Plan of Benue State, 1980.

Dar Al-Handasah Consultant, Ministry of Economic Planning, Makurdi.

Fig 10 BENUE STATE POPULATION DENSITY 1980.

Source: Data from Dar-Al-Haudasa




Table 4: Population Distribution in Benue State 1963, 1989 and 1990 Projections

L.G.A.	1963 Census	% of Total	1990 Projection (at 35%)	% of Total
Ado	82,867	3.41	196,613	3.43
Ankpa	156,234	6.42	370,686	6.43
Bassa	64,898	2.67	153,979	2.67
Dekina	123,805	5.10	293,744	5.10
Gboko	228,452	9.42	542,040	9.41
Guma	120,752	4.98	286,500	4.98
Gwer	197,026	8.12	467,470	8.11
Idah	143,012	5.89	339,315	5.89
Katsina-Ala	178,648	7.36	423,866	7.36
Konshisha	98,753	4.07	234,305	4.06
Kwande	152,407	6.21	361,606	6.28
Makurdi	53,967	2.22	128,044	2.22
Ofu	88,288	3.64	209,475	3.64
Oju	110,956	4.57	263,258	4.57
Okpokwu	164,092	6.76	389,330	6.76
Olamaboro	108,643	4.47	257,770	4.47
Otukpo	140,038	5.77	332,259	5.77
Ushongo	99,679	4.11	236,502	4.10
Vandeikya	114,500	4.72	271,666	4.72
Benue State	2,427020		5,758,426	

Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Makurdi.

Whereas Idakwo's observation could be correct, Dar Al-Handasah consultants also point out that the irregularities in the pattern of population growth could be due to inaccuracies in the 1963 data and boundary changes. They also note that the principal towns (e.g. Makurdi, Gboko, Idah) all show growth rates in excess of 4.5 per cent per annum which is considerably higher than the growth rate for


the State as a whole. There is the contention here that a possible rural to urban migration is also taking place inspite of the lack of industries to offer employment or that more people from outside the State are coming into the major towns.

Gwer and Oju Local Government Areas have substantially lower population densities and this Dar Al-Handasah say is caused by the apparently high rate of out-migration. On the whole the population in the State according to the consultants is unevenly distributed and there had been little change in the distribution between 1963-1978. This result the consultants also pointed out, is corroborated by the relatively low rate of urbanization indicated by an urban-rural differential of 1.8 per cent. This negates the suggestion that there is a high rural-urban migration rate and supports the contention of intra-state migration and that the excessive growth rate of the major towns may be partly accounted for by the people coming in from outside the state.

4.2.3 Social Organisation

There is a strong similarity in the social organisation among the ethnic groups of Benue State. The compound (farmstead) is the basic production unit as well as the unit of social structure (Armstrong, 1955; Bohannan, 1968). It is referred to as 'Ya' in Tiv, 'Ododle' in Idoma and 'Odo Oko' in Igala while the smallest unit of sublineal group consisting of a number of compounds in a territorial block is variously

Fig 11 MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS IN BENUE STATE.



referred to as Ipaven (Tiv), Ipooma (Idoma), or Oloopu (Igala). A survey carried out by Dar Al-Handasah Consultants (1980) shows that compound size varies considerably. They are generally larger in the less accessible Tiv areas which are still more traditional and become smaller in the high density areas of Southern Tiv and Okpokwu. The larger compounds could have up to 100 members while the smallest range from 5 - 20 members.

Among the Tiv, the parternal lineage is the basis of inheritance and most other forms of social organisations are calculated in the service of this lineage structure. The rights and duties involved in work relationship according to Bohannan, are seen in terms of family and lineage values and not in terms of labour values and sanctions (Bohannan, Ibid). At the level of the sublineal group, work is organised on the basis of the compound, kinship and neighbourhood. People's positive response to work is in respect of the family ties in their social organisations with fathers, sons, brothers, husbands or wives being involved in the same work unit. By this act, they also retain a right of the reciprocal work from their families.

The most important asset to the rural Tiv is the farmland. Every Tiv has right to farmland which is communally owned by each ipyaven. Each ya under the ipyaven has its own area of jurisdiction on the farming area of the ipyaven. This however is in accordance with the utsa (older farm plots) which were

TABLE 5

DENSITY OF CULTIVATION BY LGA IN BENUE STATE

LGA	Total Area (sq. km.)	Percentage under Cultivation					Total	Approximate Area Under Cultivation (sq. km.)	Percentage
		Over 60%	35%–59%	10%–34%	Under 10%	Reserved			
Ankpa	3 680	6.8	21.9	43.1	23.7	4.5	100	888	24.1
Dekina	2 507	1.3	15.9	36.3	28.9	17.6	100	426	17.0
Idah	5 085	2.4	8.9	27.6	45.6	15.5	100	736	14.5
Bassa	1 900	3.2	7.8	23.5	54.7	10.8	100	237	12.5
Okpokwu	2 357	8.0	19.6	40.1	29.8	2.5	100	563	23.9
Oju	1 845	2.3	35.1	42.3	20.3	0.0	100	491	26.6
Otukpo	4 092	2.9	18.1	48.3	28.0	2.7	100	866	21.2
Vandeikya	2 652	29.0	30.8	31.2	8.0	1.0	100	1 072	40.4
Makurdi	2 185	2.5	9.2	46.9	41.1	0.3	100	536	24.5
Gboko	3 250	13.3	47.1	34.3	4.5	0.8	100	1 257	38.7
Kwande	4 051	5.5	22.5	35.1	36.4	0.5	100	893	22.0
Gwer	4 017	0.2	10.9	51.2	36.6	1.1	100	699	17.4
Katsina Ala	5 610	8.2	43.9	35.6	12.0	0.3	100	1 838	28.2
TOTAL BENUE STATE—	43 231							10 502	24.3

Source: LRD aerial photography and field surveys, 1968–74.

claimed by their fore-fathers. Accordingly, each man in the ya also claims the farmland that had earlier belonged to his father. Since a man could have several wives and children from them, each male adult particularly when married would be given his share of the farmland from those farm plots which were supposed to be under the care of his mother (though legally owned by the father). Land owning rights were therefore on lineage basis (Suswam, 1979: 6-24), with the Tiv genealogy and descent providing the basis not only for this purpose but also for the subsequent social and territorial grouping. With the increasing population amongst the uya (compounds), there is more and more fragmentation of farm plots amongst relatives. In some parts of southern Tiv particularly, an individual's farm land may no longer meet even the subsistence needs (e.g. 0.14 h.a. per person in Korinya; also see Table 5), although a favourable man-land ratio is still noticed in Gwer and parts of Katsina-Ala and Eastern Kwande where competition for land is relatively less.

Labour is also organised on similar lines. The age group (Kwav) constitutes the strongest social group that can organise effective labour. Labour groups (or communal labour) could either be in form of 'sule kwav' (age group farming), 'ihumbe' (reciprocal farming group) or 'sule lohon' (invitation to people to come and lend a hand on one's farm). Sule lohon could be to any specific group such as Mbabamegh (members of a financial savings and credit institution), Kwav or Ityo (literally meaning one's people) etc. or it could be an open invitation to anyone.

Another consequence of the over fragmentation of the farmlands is that the more abled bodies soon finish what they have to do on their own farms and are free for hire. Thus there is often a seasonal movement of labour from the southern and central Tiv land to the northern and north eastern parts of Tiv beyond in search of extra farmlands and farm work for money. This migrant labour appears underutilised during the dry season after most crops are harvested.

Disputes among the Tiv are settled by a hierarchy of authority. Issues within ya are under the jurisdiction of the Orya (owner of the compound) who also is usually the eldest person. Matters that were beyond the ya were settled by a council of elders in that ipyaven or tar (also referred to as Ityo). Tar is a number of related upyaven put together. The ityo therefore has a hierarchy of authority over which it is supreme in judicial matters and issues pertaining to social order. For a long time the council of elders ruled Tiv until the introduction of the idea of chiefs by the colonial government.

In the Idoma speaking area, Armstrong (1955), had observed that the basic unit of social structure which is the compound family consists of a man, his wives, children and their wives and the children of his sons. In both Tiv and the Idoma situations, the compound is a self-supporting unit. Many compounds families form a village or town whose spatial structure reflects sublineal sections (Idakwo, 1982), and labour

at the village level is organised on this sublineal unit.

Idakwo (1982) also points out that the titular heads play an important role which features prominently in the social organization of the Idoma people. Such heads constitute 'elders-in-council' with the clan chief and they form the highest authority for the group. Each title occupies a hierarchical position to the throne. In this way each sublineage has a chance to present a clan chief.

The age-sets amongst the Idoma also play a similar role in their communities like those in Tiv. Together with other associations, they function as mutual aid clubs for social activities among the groups. In Idoma age-sets are however more active among the youth. While adult associations expressed in cult activities are concerned with maintaining order, children's associations are concerned with community works and entertainment through dances.

Both the Idoma and their neighbouring Igede depend almost entirely on land as the major source of livelihood. The increasing fragmentation of land is beginning to affect the rural people in these areas too although the nucleation of village settlements in Idoma land does not make this problem too obvious as is the case in Tiv. In both the Tiv and Idoma cases, the rural to urban migration rate appears to help to minimise the land shortage problem.

In the Igala speaking area which includes Bassa, the basic unit of social organisation is the hamlet. Unlike the situation among the Tiv and Idoma where the compound units within the settlements are the focus of attention, the entire hamlet is brought into focus in the case of Igala. But here too, the social relation is woven on the basis of tight kinship networks (Boston, 1968) in which the hamlet head is the overall authority. Like orya in Tiv, it is his responsibility to settle land disputes, divorce cases, criminal allegations and other matters. Usually hamlets are grouped together though loosely to form villages. The villages in turn relate to one another through ties of economic interest.

The Igala social structure is organised on a three tier hierarchical level, namely, children, young people and the elders. Within each tier, the group is reclassified into age-sets and grades. Seniority is highly respected within and between groups. The authority of the clan is then vested into this hierarchy of groups within which each group is free to manage its own affairs. Each group is however subordinated nominally to the senior group above it (Boston, 1968).

An interesting aspect of the Igala social organisation is the cooperative labour. This is the groups and age-sets relations being applied to farm activities in different forms of cooperation. The organisation here again is similar to the Tiv organisation of communal labour. A few individuals usually among age groups, may organise (like ihumbe in Tiv), to work

together in a reciprocal manner at the peak of farm work. Several households may also decide to have a cooperative arrangement to tackle their farm work during peak periods. The Igala too organise financial contributions along the lines of the Tiv financial savings and credit institutions. Interested members of the village include friends or relations from neighbouring villages meet on a regular basis to contribute a fixed amount of money to a common pool. The total amount collected or a substantial amount is taken by different hamlets in turns. The amount taken is allocated within the hamlet to one of its members subject to that member's position on the queue and how pressing his needs are. A person could be allowed to jump the queue if his problem is terribly pressing. Several authors have demonstrated that this type of cooperative efforts based on kinship relations exist among several rural communities in West Africa (Haggblade, 1978; Epale, 1978; De Lancey, 1978). In the absence of banks and foreign aids, such financial institutions evolved amongst the rural communities provide valuable development outlets to its members.

Clan-level relations and inter-group relations are handled at the level of clan heads, Idakwo, however, notes that it is relatively more difficult to achieve cooperation amongst Idoma groups especially outside the lineage circle because of their segmentary nature.

Altogether therefore the majority of rural communities in Benue State are organised on kinship relations with the extended family system basically structuring the basic unit of production. A basis has thus been laid for a cooperative system which if properly organised can help to stimulate and harness rural resources for a more effective rural development.

4.2.4 SERVICES

4.2.4.1 Infrastructural Development

For a long time Benue's resources had not sufficiently attracted the nation's interest and since the infrastructural provisions in the country were usually related to the location of resources meant for export, the State was also poorly provided for in terms of infrastructure. Being an essentially rural area, a large part of the state is serviced only by the Local Government and community roads many of which are seasonal. The Federal and State roads which make up only about 2% of the total kilometres of road in the State link up the major urban areas and the adjoining States. They also carry the heaviest traffic. But even these had been in a poor state of repair until the 1980s when about 70 of the existing Federal roads had been tarred. But up till now, many of the State and the Local Government roads and community roads would need to be reconstructed or rehabilitated for more effective use.

Like the Federal roads the only rail line traversing the State was meant to link up the tin mining area of Jos and the administrative areas of the northeast with the eastern

sea port of Port Harcourt. Since the major purpose was to transport raw materials for export, Benue State did not attract the extension of the rail lines into its rural areas and the existence of the only line traversing the State is almost unknown to the majority of the rural people just like the only air port provided by the courtesy of the Nigerian Air Force.

Similarly the State is poorly supplied with electricity. The only towns connected to the national grid are Makurdi, Otukpo, Gboko (thanks to the Benue Cement Company), Katsina-Ala, Idah, Dekina and Ankpa. Unfortunately the voltage of these connections is so low that it cannot support big industries. Efforts made by the State and now DFRRI to provide electricity to the smaller towns in the State are yet to create a substantial impact as even the existing generators are full of technical problems and they keep breaking down.

Through the current efforts of the Federal Government more rural communities are being provided with pipe water which was hitherto a prerogative of the big urban centres of Makurdi, Katsina-Ala, Gboko, Ankpa, Idah and Otukpo. But none of these towns can even boast of a regular water supply even for just three continuous months. Under the rural development scheme, many boreholes were supposedly sunk but hardly any have been operational for over a year.


4.2.4.2 Health Services

The health picture of Benue State does not look impressive. Poor sanitation, insufficient and poorly treated or polluted water and other unhygienic living conditions added to the poor nutrition of both children and adults are among the common causes of the high incidence of epidemic and other diseases. Epidemic diseases are common and range from a small scale such as the Gboko prisoners' skin disease (Jan. 1988) to the large scale type like the Oju yellow fever of 1987/88 (Sunday Voice, Jan. 10, 1988).

The rural inhabitants who constitute about 85 per cent of the total population are widely dispersed over sometimes inaccessible locations and are the most hard hit in this respect. The policy of locating medical facilities in nucleated centres (usually urban areas) places many in a disadvantaged position. Thus local patent medicine stores (or 'chemists') have largely exploited this situations often worsening it by selling expired or fake drugs and employing unprofessional methods in handling many health problems.


Statistics from the Ministry of Health show that as at 1986, the State had only a total of 658 health institutions made up of 43 hospitals, 26 health centres, 516 clinics and dispensaries, 47 family planning clinics, 12 maternity and child welfare clinics, 5 epidemological units and 9 government health offices. All together the Ministry records 1696 beds for impatients in all the hospitals and health institutions

Fig 12 BENUE STATE-PROVISION OF HEALTH SERVICES



SOURCE : FROM MIN. OF HEALTH, MAKURDI 1986

g 13 BENUE STATE - DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH SERVICES BY L.G.AREAS : 1986



under the Health Management Board. The distribution of these institutions shows clearly the deficiency in their provision. Matters are further compounded by the acute shortage of drugs and personnel in these institutions.

As at June 31st 1989 the Ministry reported the availability of 86 medical doctors in the State with only 14 of them as specialists (M.O.H., 1986). This figure implied there are over 45,000 persons per medical doctor. Although these figures (as given in the Medical and Health Statistical Bulletin (M.O.H., 1981) may contain some inaccuracies, the general impression given does not appear to be far from the true health picture of Benue State. Rough estimates from the Dar Al-Handasah / Consultants (1980:345) also indicate a life expectancy at birth to be 50 years while well over 20 per cent of children die before the age of 5 years and the 'crude' death rate stands at 24 persons per thousand. These poor health indicators also bear witness to the rural neglect in Benue State.

4.2.4.3 Education

Although the state is regarded as an educationally better-off state in the north, the level of education here is generally low in comparison to the rest of the country. The survey carried out by Idakwo (1982) shows that 64 per cent of the population is illiterate while 14 per cent received religious education and 17.5 per cent formal education up to at least class six in primary school.

The significance of Education in the State has never been misplaced. The missionaries who have for long been the major partners of government in the provision of this service were largely responsible for the social upliftment of most indigenes in this State. Seen as a social process which can aid in a quick change in one's social status, many communities too have made local efforts to bring this service to the door steps of their children in the face of competition for the few government owned institutions. Since the introduction of the Universal Primary Education (UPE) in 1976, the quest for better schools has considerably increased and has the number of community and privately owned schools. But along with them has also come the problem of standards and proper supervision.

Government efforts to find outlets for the graduands of the post secondary institutions culmunated in the creation of a polytechnic, 4 Advanced Teacher's Colleges (2 are now phased out) and a technical school. These are obviously inadequate as many qualified candidates are unable to gain admission into them every year. The Benue State Government faces difficulties in the development of education because of its poor financial position and the shortage of manpower and facilities (Dar Al-Handasah, 1980:415-7). But curiously enough, apart from the shortage of teachers in the areas of science and technical education, government does not appear to be seriously in need of skilled manpower in other areas of its endeavours, because these are not expanding fast enough to accommodate more personnel.

In line with the Federal Government directives, plans also underway to set up a Directorate of Adult Education to improve the state efforts in this direction.

4.3 ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

4.3.1 Agriculture


From the 1979 election data (FEDECO, 1979), it was estimated that 78 per cent of the productive population of Benue State are engaged in agricultural work.

Idakwo's (1982) survey also allocates 84 per cent of the productive population to farmers, 9 per cent to retail traders and 6 per cent to wage earners.

As indicated earlier, the major cash crops of Benue include rice, yams, soyabeans, and groundnuts. Beniseed which used to be an important cash crop up to the 1960s has diminished significantly while fruits, vegetables and cassava products are now picking up.

For a long time agriculture in Benue State had been on a subsistence level and what products one found in the markets were only surpluses from the peasants food reserves. The awareness of production for sale started towards the second half of the 1970s. But even up till now agriculture in Benue State cannot be described as commercial even though almost every farmer now grows something specifically for sale.

FIG. 14 Occupational Structure in LGAs of Benue State .



Source: Regional Plan , 1980
Dar Al-Handasah Consultant Report,
Min. of Economic Planning , Makurdi .

TABLE 6

ESTIMATED HECTARAGE OF MAJOR CROPS BY LGA ('000 ha.)

LGA	Yams	Cassava	Maize	Guineacorn	Millet	Rice	Soyabeans	Groundnuts	Benniseed	Cowpeas	Total
Ankpa	7.4	11.1	14.8	3.7	4.9	6.0	–	2.5	1.2	2.5	54.1
Dekina	5.1	8.5	11.2	2.9	3.8	4.3	–	1.9	1.1	2.1	[illegible]
Idah	6.1	8.1	12.2	3.0	4.1	4.6	–	2.0	1.0	2.0	43.1
Bassa	3.8	4.7	6.5	1.6	2.1	4.0	–	0.9	0.5	1.2	25.3
Okpokwu	12.8	10.3	1.8	7.4	3.4	9.4	–	3.9	0.7	–	49.7
Oju	12.1	10.3	1.7	6.9	3.4	9.2	–	3.4	0.7	–	48.1
Otukpo	14.7	17.3	10.5	12.1	6.1	11.3	0.1	4.3	1.1	1.7	79.2
Vandeikya	21.3	17.7	8.9	10.6	3.6	16.0	7.0?	14.2	7.1	7.1?	113.4
Makurdi	3.4	4.0	2.4	3.5	4.9	5.7	–	4.9	0.8	1.8	31.4
Gboko	18.5	15.4	6.2	12.3	7.9	23.3	6.4	12.3	0.3	3.1?	105.7
Kwande	18.5	10.0	4.9	9.7	1.3	10.6	0.4	4.8	0.1	0.2	60.5
Gwer	5.3	7.8	8.4	7.7	2.4	6.8	0.1	2.0	0.2	0.5	41.2
Katsina Ala	32.5	17.4	6.5	12.0	7.6	9.1	0.8	7.7	2.4	2.3	98.3
TOTAL	161.5	142.6	96.0	93.4	55.5	120.3	14.8	64.8	17.2	24.5	790.8

Source: MANR Estimates for 1978, and aerial photography interpreted by LRD, 1968–74.

Table 7: Crop Production Output in Benue

Crop	Yield (unimproved)	Yield (improved)
Yams	7.60	12.20
Cassava	6.50	12.00
Guineacorn	0.80	1.70
Millet	0.70	1.10
Rice†	1.10	2.00
Maize	1.00	1.90
Groundnuts	0.70	1.30
Soyabeans	0.90	1.30
Cowpeas	0.30	1.00
Benniseed	0.30	0.50
Oranges*	10.00	10.00
Melons*	0.13	0.13
Oil Palm (kernels)*	0.22	0.22
Oil Palm (oil)*	0.52	0.52

* Rough estimates (no data from Benue exist).

† No figures exist for the area devoted to swamp and upland rice separately.

Source: Revised and adapted from the yields recorded from the demonstration and control plots supervised by the MANR Divisional Officers of Benue State 1978. Other sources include MANR, FDA, Kentings, AADP and Phillips, An Agricultural Notebook, Longmans, 1964.

Several difficulties now confront farmers in their efforts to increase their production. These range from the problem of lack of capital, tractors, and the control of weends to the intractable problem of land fragmentation, lack of adequate input distribution, production skills and appropriate marketing strategies.

Current efforts being made by the various institutions to improve agriculture do not yet appear to be making a significant impact among the peasants, except perhaps in the use of fertilizers. Thus cropping patterns are still very much unchanged more so as they are partially dictated by the soil and climatic conditions. The only cropping season is during the rainy season is during the rainy while leisure time activities during the dry season such as dancing, marketing and hunting do not seem to adequately employ still depend on their relatives' salaries, profits from the sale of surplus crops and other trading activities, money realised as dowry or money borrowed from local credit institutions as their most reliable source of finance for agricultural work.

A noteworthy deviation from the normal pattern is the institution of cooperative activities in Igala area by both the missionaries and the ADP. The success of the management of these groups is still uncertain. Due to the p maintenance data, it is extremely difficult to really know the exact contribution of agriculture to the gross product of the State. Inspite of its dominance ~~ÁĞÁ~~ amongst the economic activities

only about 24 per cent of the cultivation (Dar Al-Handasah, op.cit). This means that the State is generally sparsely cultivated and that what is cultivated under the bush fallowing system is far below the potential arable land available. The density of cultivation too varies widely from 40 per cent in the east to about 14 per cent in the west. Yet from all indications agriculture is poised to be the main business of the State.

4.3.2 Industries

As at now, Benue has not got many major industries to boast of. A list of the ones available includes the Benue Cement Factory at Yandev, the Benue Breweries, the Benue Bottling Company, Gyado Foods, the Rice Mill at Makurdi and the Vegetable Oil Factory in Taraku. The spatial pattern of these industries does not appear to disturb the imposing rural posture of the State. Substantial efforts are however, being made to bring into production the Burnt Bricks Factory at Otukpo, the Idah Sanitary Wares and the Okura Olafia Saw Mills.

The smaller industrial businesses include vehicle mechanical workshops, block industries, black smitting, tailoring, small rice and corn mills, etc. Here again, the absence of any agglomoration and the character of their ownership makes their spatial description difficult. Since most of these are service oriented, their sizes and numbers are also related to the sizes of the settlements they serve, most of them are established by poor individuals without government assistance and can be abandoned at anytime something better turns up.

While the big industries suffer from inadequate capital and infrastructure, the smaller ones fuffer from lack of serious government patronage.

4.3.3. Income Distribution

The survey made by Dar Al-Handasah also attempted to calculate compound and per capita incomes for the villages surveyed. The results are presented here below. In the absence of more reliable records elsewhere, these results are discussed but with the understanding that the survey is relatively small for the whole State therefore its use and interpretation must be with the highest caution. Nevertheless it has illustrated some of the problems facing Benue State.

Table 8: Comparison of Distribution of Annual Per Capita Compound Income between Villages

	TATYOUGH	TSEMKOVOR	KORINYA	BUBELA	IJEGU	OKPOGA	AJENGO
Number of Compounds	5	13	14	13	13	12	16
Mean per Capita Income	96	126	108	100	101	189	175
Median per Capita Income	90	109	106	82	76	144	129
Standard Deviation	29	80	69	73	56	104	134
Proportion of Cash	38%	60%	53%	34%	50%	52%	60%

Source: Dal Al-Handash Consultants Villages Survey April - Oct. 1979, Ministry of Economic Planning, Benue State.

These survey results showed that the mean per capita income was lowest in the remote Tiv compounds (Tatyough and Bubela), and highest in Okpoga, the Local Government headquarters and in the relatively fertile sparsely populated Igala land. In the richer villages, income is more unevenly distributed among compounds but the general standard of living in these villages the Consultants noted, is not necessarily higher. Rather, there are more rich compounds in such villages. In general, in the richer villages, a higher proportion of income was from the sale of crops with the exception of Okpoga. Cash remittance recognised as part of the income and in some cases this could be quite substantial. Non-farm earnings also play a part particularly where big rural markets are within the villages.

The problem of income gaps is therefore not just between the relatively rural rich and the poor. Many rural development programmes are not designed to take these problems into consideration and thus end up widening instead of closing income gaps.

4.4 NEED FOR A RURAL DEVELOPMENT EMPHASIS

This brief examination of the study area clearly shows that the area is not a well developed one. The examination portrays Benue as an area which is predominantly engaged in subsistence agriculture, with low urbanization and low quality of rural life, with the absence of productive incentives and full of the hazard of epidemic diseases. These indicators obviously place Benue

among the poor States of the Federation. A continued top-down, urban oriented development policy in Nigeria with inadequate organisational superstructure and a poor coordination among the various governmental institutions is sure to place Benue and other similar States into a worse underdeveloped situation and aggravate the regional disparities that are already noticed.

If the goal of government is to raise the level of rural living standards and envigorate the declining economy of the regional disadvantaged areas, then the emphasis on rural development must now be practicalised through programme which will benefit the low-income people.

Agriculture is the sole means of livelihood in Benue State and yet according to Idakwo, over 76 per cent of farmers use the hand hoe and cutlass as their only implements for production. The majority of farmers under this situation are able to cultivate less than one hactre of land a year. There is no wonder then that many are in the low income groups.

The needed rural development emphasis will have to accommodate the issue of income redistribution. As at the moment attempts to promote rural development in Benue State are poorly implemented. Most financial arrangements made to handle rural programmes end up in favour of the few urban and rural rich people.

On the level of policy, government has made significant efforts aimed at improving the rural situation but the poor

impact so far achieved means that these policies can have the desired effect only if the programmes are properly planned and implemented. An effective rural development emphasis should therefore centre on proper planning and implementation. The review of the socio-cultural practices in Benue State also shows that the rural communities posses several characteristics which suggest the presence of spirit of cooperation and participation. Such characteristics which are demonstrated in such institutions as 'Kwav', 'Ihumbe', etc. can be effectively utilised in the planning and implementation of rural development projects. These can also provide the basis for organising rural development programmes. Government should capitalise on these qualities to mobilise the people into viable rural units for rural development activities which can have legitimacy within the communities. Since the people have already organised themselves into local development associations which operate on the basis of arrangements, these can be modernised and channelled into productive rural institutions for the distribution of farm inputs for example and other self-help projects.

CHAPTER V

THE POLITICS OF PLANNING FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In trying to highlight the politics of the planning and implementation of the selected rural development projects in Benue State, efforts will be made to discuss the origin, the design and implementation process of the RBRDA, BNARDA, DFRRI and community projects. The objective of the discussion here will be to identify the dominant influences in the planning of the programmes and projects, the rationality and the flaws in the decisions and the decision-making process in each case.

5.2 THE BACKGROUND OF THE SELECTED PROJECTS

Although the objectives of the Second National Development Plan (1970-75) and the subsequent other ones had progressively directed attention to the issue of improving the rural situation, the stimulus for this later strategy does not appear to have been initiated by a benevolent desire for the upliftment of the rural life. This 'welfare' strategy appears to have evolved out of, or at least was envigorated by, attempts to tackle the nagging problem of food shortages in the face of a rapidly increasing population and urbanization (Kolawole, 1980).

By 1952 when the colonial government had commissioned the World Bank to prepare a general economic survey of the country,

it had recommended in part, the development of agriculture (Dunmoye, 1986). Since a large part of the country was affected by long periods of dry season, a continued reliance on rainfed agriculture would not be adequate. Thus a study in this regard was commissioned by the then Northern Nigeria government. One of the outstanding problems noted by the FAO which carried out the study was the drought spells experienced in the northern parts of the country and the consequent drying rivers (NAK/File No. IRR-115, 1959). The FAO's recommended strategy was the capital intensive, large scale irrigation programme. This however the FAO said, would be for the production of sugar cane, wheat and rice which were not the common traditional food crops known to the local people at that time. The intention was most likely to grow them as export crops.

Feasibility studies showed that the magnitude of this project was beyond the capability of the then North-Western State Government which inherited it and it was consequently transfered to the Federal Government. Its implementation was not immediate but this draught-satisfaction psychology was to later form the basis of a suitable activity for revamping the rural economy. Through this programme, it was hoped that agriculture would be modernized and then rural incomes, too, would be raised. The programme would also involve resettlement schemes and a change in cropping patterns with a view to making these more amenable to mechanised farming.

Towards the end of the 1960s the need for increased agricultural output became more and more obvious. Central Bank returns had shown that food bills ₦ had continued to increase due to increased population and urbanization. The World Bank actually gave the rise in the rate of urbanization as 8 per cent before 1960 to 22 per cent by 1984 (World Bank, 1984 in Kolawole, 1986). But whereas these food bills were increasing, there was no corresponding evidence of improvements in local food production to meet up the apparent demand for food. On the contrary the rural areas were now noticed to be facing a decline in agricultural productivity as agricultural land was gradually being impoverished, fragmented and thus losing its carrying capacity (Salau 1986).

Table 9: Indices and Growth rate of food Production in Nigeria 1960/61 - 1974/75 (Base:1964/65 = 100)

Year	Index	Growth %	Year	Index	Growth %
1960/61	82	17.1	1968/69	80	-10.1
1961/62	92	12.2	1969/70	90	12.5
1962/63	92	0.0	1970/71	94	4.4
1963/64	100	12.0	1971/72	87	-7.4
1964/65	100	-2.9	1972/73	63	-27.6
1965/66	102	2.0	1973/74	72	14.3
1966/67	89	-12.7	1974/75	82	13.9
1967/68	89	0.0			

Source: Ojo (1977, in Salau, 1986:323).

Table 10: Estimated Output of Major Agricultural Commodities('000 Tonnes, other stated).

Crops	Year						Percentage Change Between Year				
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1982&1983	83&84	84&85	85&86	86&87
Maize	766	694	1,058	1,190	1,336	1,202	-9.4	52.4	12.5	12.3	-10.0
Millet	2,666	2,783	3,349	3,684	4,111	3,905	4.4	20.5	10.0	11.6	- 5.0
Sorghum	3,710	3,674	4,991	4,991	5,455	5,182	-0.4	24.7	8.3	9.3	- 5.0
Rice	212	145	157	196	283	297	-31.6	8.3	24.8	14.4	4.9
Wheat	n.a	n.a	n.a	113	132	139	n.a	n.a	n.a	11.8	5.3
Acha	n.a	n.a	n.a	25	27	26	n.a	n.a	n.a	8.0	-3.7
Beans	616	664	477	611	738	688	7.8	-28.2	28.1	19.8	-6.0
Cassava	592	723	1,209	1,378	1,564	1,486	22.1	67.2	14.0	13.5	-5.0
Potato	n.a	n.a	n.a	43	46	45	n.a	n.a	n.a	7.0	-2.2
Yam	5,385	4,998	4,600	4,738	5,809	4,886	- 7.2	- 8.0	3.0	9.9	-6.6
Cocoyam	n.a	n.a	n.a	232	373	354	n.a	n.a	n.a	60.8	-5.1
Plantain	1,054	1,067	1,086	1,113	1,127	1,071	1.2	1.8	2.5	1.3	-5.0
Vege-table	n.a	n.a	n.a	1,254	1,293	1,241	n.a	n.a	n.a	3.1	4.0

n.a = not available

Source: Compiled from CBN Annual Report Dec. 1984 and Dec. 1987.

Table 11:Food Importation in Nigeria, 1970 - 1982 (value and Percentage share of total imports)

Year	Total import (N million)	Food import (N million)	Percentage share (of food import of total imports)
1970	756.4	57.7	7.6
1971	1078.9	87.9	8.1
1972	990.1	95.1	9.6
1973	1,224.8	126.3	10.3
1974	1,737.3	155.7	8.9
1975	3,721.5	277.9	8.0
1976	5,148.5	438.9	8.5
1977	7,093.7	702.0	10.4
1978	8,211.7	1,108.7	12.4
1979	7,472.5	1,105.9	14.8
1980	9,658.1	1,091.0	11.3
1981	14,000.0	2,115.0	15.1
1982	11,400.0	896.0	7.9

Sources: 1. Centgral Bank of Nigeria (1981) Bullion News and

2. Federal Office of Statistics (1983) In Salau, A.T., 1986.

Food & Live Animals

1983	6,555.7	1,296.7	19.8
1984	4,484.5	843.2	18.8
1985	5,536.9	940.6	17.0
1986	-	802.1	-
1987	-	1,537.7	-

Source: CBN Economic and Financial Review, 1984 and 1988.

It was also in response to this trend that studies and surveys were commissioned in 1968 and 1972, all aimed at improving agricultural production. One of the recommendations from these studies included Integrated Agricultural Development Projects (IADP) which called for the development of agriculture as the main economic activity and the necessary infrastructure that would enhance this development. Thus in 1973 the Federal Government promulgated decrees No 32 and 33 establishing two River Basin Authorities for the development of the Chad and Sokoto Rima Basin.

The IADPs together with the large scale irrigation projects (the River Basin Development Projects) were to later form the primary activities of government's rural development programme. It should be noted, however, that the initiative for these projects was heavily influenced by foreign agencies whose recommendations did not take any bearing from the traditional practices of the Nigerian rural population. Apart from the unfamiliar exegenous and uncontrolable factors, the FAO recommendation had also warned of the capital intensive nature of project which were not planned to be later handed over to the local people for execution or administration. This the level of involvement of the rural people was limited right from the conception of the programme.

Government was also of the view that the oil wealth will provide the necessary capital. Indeed the pattern of the

spatial distribution of these projects is also linked with the political desire to use them as a means of ensuring that the oil revenue is shared as equitably as possible amongst the different units of the federation. In this way the governing class had hoped to strengthen the economic position of the states as well as build a prestigious image for the country as a whole.

The spread of such projects was further based on government's illusion that the projects were working in terms of raising productivity and increasing incomes of producers.

DFRRI was of course conceived as ploy to provide the necessary infrastructure for the improved performance of the agricultural programme. It was therefore intended to cover the whole country at one and the same time.

From the foregoing, it is clear that government did not perceive the food crisis situation as a rural development question initially and as such it did not envision the solution in one coherent package. In the process of providing the solution however, it was discovered that government had to deal with all the aspects of development in the rural areas. The evolution of the rural development programme out of segemented projects intended to raise local food supply was therefore bound to have an effect on the overall planning and coordination of rural development in the country.

5.3 ISSUES ARISING FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

The rural development programmes under discussion here include the RBRDA, BNARDA, DFRRI, and the community projects in Benue State.

5.3.1 The RBRDA

It had earlier been indicated that the large scale irrigation projects represented by the RBRDA's was a recommendation made to the country while it was in search of ways to improve agricultural production. The first of such projects were the Sokoto Rima river basic and the Chad Basin Development Authority. After these two, the government went ahead to create 9 more River Basin Authorities in 1976 of which the Lower Benue River Basin was also among. In the Third National Development plan, reference was made to the first two basins authorities as having indications of a high potential for crops such as wheat, maize, rice, etc. This would appear to be the primary reason for the creation of 9 more basin authorities in 1976. It has however been noted also that other political reasons had influenced this proliferation of the river basin authorities.


Since the first two authorities were established less than three years ago it is unlikely that their performance would have been properly evaluated to give cause for the establishment of

more basin authorities. It was therefore obvious that the illusive oil wealth had made the Federal Government completely oblivious of the FAO's warning that the success of the river basin programme would depend on a 'heavy capital' and of course the 'indoctrination' of the farmers. The proliferation of these authorities had now become politicised more on the basis of each state getting its own share of the national cake than the fact of real need and the cost effectiveness of the programme. Thus again in 1984, the number of the river basin authorities was raised to 18 in order to reflect the Federal character in the programme (Dunmoye, 1986).

All this while, the decisions to commission studies for the projects and that of commiting the Federal Government to their implementation were taken at the top hierarchy of government. (Shagari, 1983:42-43). The first time state governments were involved in the decision over the programme was in the site selection for the projects. In Benue State, officials from the Ministry of Agriculture were requested to indicate where the projects ~~ø~~ could be sited. Accessible fadama sites that were already being earmarked for development by the State government were then recommended and approved by the Federal government. The specific sites so located included fadama areas around Makurdi, Katsina-Ala, Jato-Aka and Okete under the Ambi-Konshisha basin.

Fig. 15

MAP OF NIGERIA SHOWING THE RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT UNITS.



[Source : Singh (1979) Cited by Baba,1982]

5.3.1.1 The Design and Management of the Programme
Benue State

The 1976 creation of the river Basins had mandated them to perform such duties as summarised below.

1. Undertake comprehensive development of both surface and ground water resources for multipurpose use.
2. Development of irrigation schemes for the production of crops and livestock and leasing the irrigated land to farmers or recognised associations in the locality of the area concerned for a fee.
3. Provision of water for rural and urban water use request.
4. Development of fisheries, livestock and processing of crops produced in the authority's area.
5. Controlling water pollution and resettlement of persons affected by the authority's activities.

More specifically relating to the Lower Benue River Basin, were the following objectives:

(a) to regulate the flow of Benue river and its tributaries for the purpose of navigation, flood control, soil erosion, irrigation, fisheries, Hydro Electric Power, etc.

(b) to afforestate and reafforestate the affected areas; to embark on soil conservation, urban and industrial development and the provision of recreation facilities.

(c) to provide solutions to the problems of acute

shortage of water and also to control water pollution in the basin area.

Although these objectives appear to be very much related to those of the Third National Development Plan, the magnitude of the programme and the broad nature of its objectives imply several planning problems. First it has been observed that these objectives were formulated through a bureaucratic process that lacked grassroot participation. This is evident in the broad nature of the objectives which clearly lack such specific operational targets that could only have been derived and from the target people. The activities on the individual project sites are subsumed in the general goals and objectives with no particular consideration for the pecularities of individual sites which might introduce significant variations at the site level. In this case policy decisions were made and were being implemented without a guide from detailed project studies done at the respective sites.

Second, the policy statements and these broad objectives around which the river basin plans were made had fused together three major components or area of activity under one institution, namely the RBDA. In this regard each authority was expected to handle an engineering component which had to do with designing and constructing dams, bore holes, wells, control of erosion and floods (possibly with dykes, etc), the maintenance of polders and the improvement of navigation. There was also the management and maintenance component where the authorities'

were not only expected to develop and maintain irrigation schemes, draingge systems, lease out irrigated lands but also to resettle persons affected by such works and control pollution in rivers, lakes et cetera, within the authority's area. The third component in the design of the programme was that of direct production. Each of the basin authorities was expected not only to go into direct production of crops, livestock, fish and vegetables but could also engage in the processing of same. In addition to these, the authorities were also charged with the responsibility of providing water from their sources to urban and rural areas within their jurisdiction on request. These responsibilities were enormous. Each one of the components was enough to engage the attention of the managers of the institution for a very long time before appreciable results would be achieved.

The implementation of this set of multiple objectives which also disbursed the meagre funds individually and collectively would require a heavy amount of capital was soon faced with the problem of how to mobilise enough resources to cope with the task that was certainly not easy to be achieved within a single project design. In trying to reflect the federal character in the distribution of the basin authorities, (that is, one for each state), government had created a situation in which it now found it difficult to match the available resources with the goals it had set out to achieve (see for instance Tables 12, 13, and Fig. 16). Besides, by their very complicated design,

these projects could not easily be handed over to the local people to run bearing in mind the costs and skills involved.

Apart from the issue of justifiable costs and uncertainties in the mobilization of adequate resources, areas of conflicts are also observed to be embeded in these objectives. As Kolawole (1989) had also observed, the spirit and goal of self-sufficiency in food production and of import-substitution crops (such as rice and wheat) may conflict with the goals of local self-sufficiency. The importation of technology and dependence on foreign expertise also contradicts the goal of a self-reliant development. Likewise the settlement of the rural population becomes illusory when the vast majority of the rural masses are displaced and only a few are resettled. It would therefore appear that the terms of reference and the objectives in this case are not directed towards achieving a coherent goal. Within this maze of uncertain targets and compounded by the meagre resources disbursed irregularly by the Federal government, the managers of many of these river basin authorities simply chose what they felt they could do and underplayed the other areas that were considered difficult. Such decisions of course had to be approved by the Minister and included in the budget.

The following chart (Fig. 17) shows the working relationship and the decision-making levels within the LBRBDA.

Table 12: Allocations to the River Basin Development Authorities - 1979-1983 (000'Naira)

RBDA	1979/80	1980	1981	1982	1983
1. Anambra/Imo	5,005	9,550	48,000	35,282	20,470
2. Benin/Owena	3,200	3,000	41,000	20,771	20,449
3. Chad Basin	60,810	86,450	80,660	36,667	22,020
4. Cross River	2,250	3,620	25,000	12,237	14,523
5. Hadejia-Jama'are	40,200	28,000	70,000	64,877	83,733
6. Lower Benue	8,790	5,625	45,000	20,330	22,398
7. Niger Delta	4,000	12,000	28,000	13,866	18,795
8. Niger River	4,190	2,000	55,000	22,545	46,229
9. Ogun Oshun	5,700	57,520	60,000	38,523	27,852
10. Sokoto Rima	59,000	246000	116000	127277	102,382
11. Upper Benue	7,290	5390	51000	37419	38425
TOTAL	203,615	454255	629006	419144	427,276

Source: The Guardian, Lagos, April 29, 1984.

Table 13: Proposed Federal government Financial Resource Allocation to River Basin Development Authorities During the 4th Development Plan, 1981 - 1985

RBDA	Estm. Total Project Area (Hectares)	Financial Allocation 1981-85(mn)	Approximate Allocation/ Hectare (N)
Sokoto	103,470	597	5,770
Upper Benue	154,300	118	765
Ogun-Oshun	41,100	145	3,528
Niger River	110,650	146	1,319
Lower Benue	74,056	102	1,377
Hadejia-Jama'are	82,900	127	1,532
Cross River	76,800	80	1,042
Niger Delta	313,500	85	2,711
Chad Basin	134,000	170	1,269
Benin-Owena	28,640	132	4,609
Anambra-Imo	40,400	105	2,599

Source: Okogbo (1981).


Table 14

LOWER BENUE RIVER BASIN AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
SUMMARY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF LOWER BENUE RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY FOR THE PERIOD 1977 – 1988

PROJ	N(m) 1977/78	N(m) 1978/79	N(m) 79/80	N(m) 1980	N(m) 1981	N(m) 1982	N(m) 1983	N(m) 1984	N(m) 1985	N(m) 1986	N(m) 1987	N(m) 1988	N(m) Sub-Tot
MADA	7·373	1365	·577	·770	10	6·460	6·430	1·677	1·368	4·843	2·762	1 234	44·864
S'KAR	1·607	·598	·493	·658	1	869	·436	.263	·868	–	–	·012	6·811
DEP	842	1225	721	962	2·5	1·600	·786	·530	·885	–	–	·250	10·303
K/ALA	657	700	385	500	2·5	·819	2·771	·890	·960	·339	1·721	1·033	13·260
FADANA	–	–	–	–	11	2·230	2·716	·768	1·051	·844	·197	·125	18·915
OKONOA	–	–	–	–	3	1·928	·786	·822	·422	–	–	·012	6·995
'WASE	–	–	–	–	1·5	1·300	·436	·031	'592	–	–	–	3·860
OMBI'K	–	–	–	–	7	1·260	1·573	·316	·821	–	·183	·125	11·877
OFUIMA	–	–	–	–	–	–	5·219	1·117	·963	–	–	·057	10·514
WATER DEV	–	–	–	–	–	–	·743	·157	–	3·532	·050	–	4·403
EARTH DAMS	–	–	–	–	–	–	·706	·150	–	–	1199	·258	2·395
EFFA UN'B	–	–	–	–	–	–	·173	–	–	–	–	–	·173
STORAGE	–	–	–	–	–	–	·043	·150	–	–	–	–	·193
BOREHOLE	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	·402	2·671	·258	3·332
FORESTRY	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	011	–	–	·011
ANKPA EROS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
SPARE PARTS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1·200	·408	–	1·608
HYDRO DATA	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	·012	·012
ELON ARREARS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	·397	·397
HEIP/OPC JOS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	·088	–	–	–	·088
BOKKOS POTATOES	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	·055	–	–	–	·055
PRESS(DOMA DAM)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	7·500	–	–	7·500
OUST LIAB	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4·933	–	–	4·933
FMAR (SALS)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2·00	2·000
TOTAL	10·461	2·888	2·178	2·890	4500	20·328	22·904	6·854	8·078	23·608	9·195	6·597	161·987

Source: LBRBRDA. MAKURDI

Fig. 17: LBRBDA ORGANISATIONAL CHART



While the other staff are all subjects to the General Manager's authority, he is in turn answerable directly to the Federal Minister of Agriculture and Water Resources. The General Manager's subordinate staff implement decisions handed down from the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, prepared reports and accounts of work done and make budgets and proposals for the subsequent planning period. A committee of the General Manager and his assistants deliberate on these issues and eventually pass them over to the Ministry for approval and incorporation in the general report, national budget or plan proposal as the case may be. In practice however this system is inflexible as most General Managers will do anything to keep their jobs. In such a case, accounts, reports etc are often done with the objective of satisfying the perceived wishes of the superior officers.

5.3.1.2 The Katsina-Ala (Jato-Aka) and the Ombi-Konshisha (Okete) Projects

For a more specific analyses of the planning issues, these two projects in the LBRBDA are discussed as cases at the operational level which is perhaps the only time in the programme when the operationers have direct contact with the rural people. Feasibility studies were received for the Jato-Aka and Okete projects in 1982 and 1983 respectively.

The Jato-Aka Project

The engineering designs for this project were contracted to a foreign firm known as Kenting Earth Science Limited. They were

to embark on the construction of dykes or embankments along the river Katsina-Ala to control flood water on the chosen sites. The Jato-Aka site was to be irrigated through pumps for agricultural purposes. The whole project was estimated to cost N1,332,040 (LBRBDA,June 1982:45). Because the expected money could not be made available, the authority ended up depending on the ordinary flood water which was virtually uncontrolled.

Other operational problems inherent in the design included the wrong assumptions about the local land tenure systems (LBRBDA, June 1982:110) and the labour situation. The consultants in fact had to acknowledge later that labour requirements were likely to limit the success of the programme which was designed to make an extensive use of well trained extension workers. Thus evaluation too assumed the use of extension services and therefore success was to be measured by related gains in productivity and the quality of produce obtained. It was also assumed that with the use of extension services, there would be statistics and records kept for measuring success. The absence of this service also implied the inability to quantify the success at the project sites since farmers were under no serious control or advice once they leased the plots of land for cropping. This then means that one of the FAO's original prerequisites for success, that is, that farmers would need to be indoctrinated was not heeded to.

The Okete Project:

The Okete Project had virtually the same problems. Although a copy of the feasibility study for Okete was not available for detailed scrutiny, a few things were evident from the agreement document signed between the Engineering Project Consultants, an indigenous company, and the Lower Benue Authority. First the consultants were working closely with or may have probably been just representatives of a foreign firm - Magnus Morton Projects of London, England. In any case, the indigenous consultants had made clear their intention to use foreign expertise and equipment in the course of designing the project. How much study the foreigners undertook or time to become acquainted with the local situation before making their proposals, is not known.

Second, the agreement required the consultants to plan the project for optimum development of water and land resources of the basin and to undertake studies into the feasibility of the proposals for the construction of two dams, giving an analysis of commercial returns, construction costs, operating and maintenance costs, cash flow and revenue forecasts (LBRBDA, 1983).

Since in both cases of Jato-Aka and Okete the embankments dykes could not be constructed, a few agricultural staff were posted to the sites acquired to prepare and lease out plots of land for agricultural purposes. Until recently this turned out to be the sole preoccupation of the Lower Benue River Basin

Development Authority while the engineering section was preoccupied with the maintenance and hiring out of plants (machines).

5.3.1.3 An Overview of the LBRBDA

Until recently, the authority tried to fill almost all the vacancies provided in the establishment thus bringing the staff strength to 2094 by 1984. But from the chart presented here (Fig. 17), evaluation appears to have had less emphasis as it is not conspicuous in the planning section. Indeed up to 1984 there was no planning officer represented in the management team. It was not until 1985 when the post of an Assistant Chief Planning Officer was established.

As stated earlier the authority's major activity during the implementation of its programmes was the preparation of land for farmers' use and in this regard the authority relied solely on floodwater and rainfed agriculture. Other activities were supposed to include the provision of improved seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, credit and extension education to boost output. These were all organised directly from the headquarters at Makurdi and field staff sent out to the project sites were expected to carry out instructions from the headquarters.

Apparently the revenue-yielding ability of the authority was far from satisfactory at this stage and so the authority soon felt overburdened by the 2094 staff. Consequently a

retrenchment exercise was carried out in 1984 and some 790 workers were laid off, using the criteria of redundancy, poor performance and misconduct (LBRBDA, 1984). Ironically, however, it was in the same year that the Mada-Development authority, hitherto a part of LBRBDA, was also created for the reason of wanting to achieve a greater spatial spread of the impact of river basin development. This reorganisation of the river basin authorities in 1984 was not tne first nor the last. It is unlikely that the underlying motive for the past reorganisations will ever be made public or admitted by government. What the general public is made to understand is that such reorganizations are always intended to make the programme more effective.

Three years after its creation the river basins' functions were redefined by the Shagari administration. By 1984 there was a reorganisation in which they were reduced from 18-11 by the Buhari administration. This was followed by yet another reorganisation in 1986, in which their functions were redefined by the Babangida administration, 1989 has again seen another reorganisation. With each reorganisation there is a corresponding increase or retrenchment in staff strength. For whatever reasons, these changes are bound to create instability, waste of time and perhaps resources too. Planning becomes difficult and inconsistent while consolidation becomes almost impossible. Such frequent changes are also likely to lead to a poor understanding of the objectives of the programme by the

staff both at the managerial as well as at the junior level of operations.

5.3.2 BNARDA

By the early 1970s when the river Basins were being established the World Bank appeared to be of the view expressed by its President that 70 per cent of its agricultural loans should contain a component for the small-holder (McNamara, 1973). The implication here was that the World Bank was in support of redirecting a large part of its loans to the rural needs. But as Dunmoye (1986) notes, such loans are also meant to cover the foreign exchange component which is used for overseas payments such as goods, services and foreign exports. In quite a number of cases this amounts to a very high percentage of the loan and so, granting loans for projects in developing countries could very well mean boosting the market for home industries. In this regard, foreign loans for rural development projects needed to be treated cautiously. Inspite of other possible ulterior motives, external influences appear to be inevitably dominant in the initiation and design of many of our rural development programmes and projects. Of course it then follows that who pays the piper will also dictate the tune.

Pilot schemes for Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) were therefore planned and with the support of foreign financiers, they were initially started in Funtua, Gombe and Gusau. These projects aimed at reaching the small-holder farmer.

Later in the third National Development Plan period, at least nine ADPs were known to have commenced their implementation at various times. The expansion of the ADPs, it should be noted, was not necessarily based on the rate of success achieved in the pilot schemes as there are no records of evaluation to demonstrate such success. Political statements did, however, attribute success to these pilot schemes and consequently requested for their geographical spread (Dunmoye, 1986). The new ADPs included Gusau (for Sokoto State); Funtua (Kaduna State), Gombe (Bauchi State); Lafia (Plateau State); Ayangba (transfered from Kwara to Benue); Bida (Niger); Ilorin (Kwara); Oyo North (Oyo State); Ekiti-Akoko (Ondo State).

The Ayangba project is the source of the Benue State-wide Agricultural and Rural Development Authority. This project was identified by the International Bank for Regional Development (IBRD) Lagos Resident Mission in June 1974 in the Igala area of the Kwara State. When Benue State was created in 1976, it inherited this project as it was now within its geographical area. By 1985 when the Ayangba project was supposed to have been completed, the state-wide Agricultural Development programme was then launched on the 17th December 1985 to continue its activities. The implementing agency this time was BNARDA which was established by Edict No.28 of 11th July, 1985. The State was now convinced that it had learnt some lessons from the Ayangba project and would now be better able to involve the small scale farmers in the whole State. This decision again was

sequel to a recommendation by the Food Strategies Mission, commissioned by the Federal Government in 1980. The mission had recommended among other things that the Benue ADP be part of the new programme of ADPs in seven states to be supported by the World Bank Agricultural Development sector loan.

5.3.2.1 The Design and Management of the Programme

The Ayangba project was intended to increase crop, livestock, fisheries, and forestry production in Ankpa, Dekina, Idah and Bassa LGAs. Development was to include feeder roads, water supplies and a project headquarters at Ayangba. From these initial 4 local government areas covered by the Ayangba ADP the State-wide programme was now to cover all the 13 Local Government area of Benue State and was intended to achieve the following goals and objectives:

(a) increase food production (e.g. yams, maize, rice, sorghum etc.) and the incomes of some 385,000 farm families;

(b) development of a flexible phased approach to development with initial emphasis in implementing well-proven components geared to the Agricultural potentials and within the financial and managerial capacity of the state, while embarking on an intensified programme of adaptive on-farm Agricultural Research;

(c) reorganisation and commercialisation input distribution;

(d) development of a revitalised and effective extension service;

(e) provision of all-weather access roads to Farm service centres and fertilizer retail stores to facilitate input distribution and sale of farm produce.

The basic aim of the programme still remains that of increasing food production and the incomes of small farmers through improved extension, supply and infrastructural development.

The new programme differs from the earlier enclave Ayangba project in terms of its rural development strategy, planning procedures, including sequential planning and methods of funding. It also differs from the River Basin's objectives by its emphasis on the provision of extension services, farm-inputs, research facilities and the production of food rather than cash crops, Its planning and organization methods also appeared more purposeful than that of the RBRDA. To ensure the fulfilment of the goals and objectives, the institution set out definite targets and phased out what would be done to realise them in reasonable periods of time (BNARDA 'What it is and How it Works' - undated - p.8-9).




FIG. 18 BNARDA-RURAL DEVELOPMENT ZONES.

In order to facilitate the implementation of the project, the state was divided into four zones, namely, Northern Zone: comprising Makurdi, Gboko, and Gwer with the headquarters at Gboko.

Central Zone: Comprising Otukpo, Okpokwu, Oju with headquarters at Otukpo.

Eastern Zone: Comprising Katsina-Ala, Kwande and Vandeikya with headquarters at Adikpo.

Western Zone: Comprising Ankpa, Idah, Bassa and Dekina with headquarters at Ayangba (See Fig.18).

The implementation of the project activities is divided into four main divisions. These include Agriculture (AGR), commercial services (Com.), Engineering (Eng.) and the planning, monitoring and evaluation (PME) Divisions. Of all these divisions handling the rural activities. The PME is regarded as a supportive division. In fact, this composition of the BNARDA and its management are all in line with the World Bank Project Agreement.

Unlike the LBRBDA, the decision making levels in BNARDA do not go too far beyond its Executive Committee though its development proposals will still need to be endorsed by the State planning body and eventually incorporated into the state and the national plans through the appropriate ministry. BNARDA's highest policy making body is the Agricultural Development Project Executive Committee (ADPEC). Its membership comprises of:

(i) The commissioners of the ministries of Agriculture (as Chairman), Local Government and community Development, Finance and Economic Planning, Works, commerce and Industries.

(ii) Secretary to the Military government and head of Service or his representative.

(iii) Director, Federal Department of Rural Development or his representative.

(iv) Head of Federal Agricultural coordinating Unit (FACU) or his representative.

(v) General Manager, Lower Benue River Development Authority or his representative.

(vi) Programme Manager, BNARDA is the Secretary of the committee.

This committee oversees the execution of the project and is responsible for all policy directives.

Next to the ADPEC is the Agricultural Development Project Management Unit (ADPMU) which has the responsibility for implementing the project programmes under the clear policy guidelines contained in the project's Agreement/Documents. The unit is made up of the Programme Manager and his various heads of sections.


The village Extension Agents (VEAs) who work directly with the farmers are supervised by Block Extension supervisors (BES) who are answerable to the zonal Managers

(Fig. 19). Through the VEAs and their supervisors, farmers, are expected to reach the management with their problems but one of the VEAs had cause to think that "we are too small and whenever we say anything, they don't listen to us". The representation in the ADPEC which really matters appears to have in fact taken into consideration more of the political interests than those of professional competence.

In terms of planning, the BNARDA programme is comparatively well organised with clear objectives and methods of achieving them. The programme had however intended to introduce the farmers to better methods and techniques in agricultural practices but the foreign nature of these methods and techniques made them difficult to be assimilated. In the mean time implementation targets were set with the assumption that the target people will assimilate and adopt these 'modern' practices immediately. In reality, changing from the old practices to the new turned out to be a process that required more time and efforts than was probably anticipated. Besides, there was the expectation that financial resources and other support activities would not be a problem. Initial financial and logistic problems had however forced the project to prioritise its operations accordingly.

The programme was thus divided into three phases of four years and three years each with a reduced scale of funding reflecting the reduced financial circumstances facing Nigeria.

Fig. 19: BNARDA ORGANOGRAM 1986



The assistance to be provided by the World Bank on the other hand had been increased to 66% and the remaining 34% was shared between the Federal and State Governments in the proportion of 20% and 14% respectively (BNARDA, 1987). The first phase of the project was estimated to cost N55.7 million approximately and the expected contribution by funding agencies was to be as shown in Tables 15 and 16.

Table 15: BNARDA: Sources of Funds

Funding Agencies	Cost N m		
	Incremental	Base	Total
IBRD	21.4	-	21.4
FGN	9.2	2.8	12.0
BNSG	6.0	15.2	21.2
IFAD	1.1	-	1.1
Total	37.7	18.0	55.7

Source: BNARDA: 'What it is and How it Works, p.12.

In reality however the actual funds released for the project were as follows:

Table 16: Project Funding: (From Inception to 30/10/86)

Source	Total Fund (Nm)	Disbursement (N)	Balance (N)
1. IBRD	24.88	-	24.88
2. FGN	7.54	1.20	6.34
3. BNSG	5.28	0.90	4.38
Totals	37.70	2.10	35.60

Source: BNARDA Overview, 1977-1986, Makurdi.

To some extent therefore BNARDA too was overambitious and lacks legitimacy as its planned activities are totally alien to the traditional practices.

5.3.3 DFRRI

Decree No. 4 of 6th February 1986 gave birth to DFRRI, the National Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure. The Decree was to demonstrate the Federal Government's commitment to the provision of infrastructural services to rural Nigeria. Through DFRRI, government intended to mobilize rural communities by the provision of roads; the basic infrastructure for increased food and industrial raw material output, the stimulation of agricultural activity and any other activities that will facilitate an improved quality of life in the rural areas of the country.

The Directorate was therefore charged with the lengthy list of responsibilities which had to do with the identification of rural institution, organisations, areas of high production potentials, etc, the formulation of rural road and water supply programmes, and the support of rural activities through grants, research or other information etc including the mobilization of labour or other contributions towards the achievement of these rural development activities (See Federal Government of Nigeria, Decree No.4, 1986).

On the 31st of July, 1986, the Benue State government

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inaugurated its own branch of the Directorate following the politics of each state having its own branch.

5.3.3.1 The Organisational Structure and Decision-Making Levels

At the national level, the decree stipulates that an eight-man Board be appointed by the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces to serve as the highest authority in the Directorate. It consists of an Executive Chairman and not less than four but not more than seven other members and its responsibility is to formulate policies, guide, obtain and disburse funds and broadly approve and supervise all the programmes of the directorate. The President could form time to time give the Board directives as to the manner in which the Directorate is to exercise its functions and it shall be the duty of the Board to give effect to such directives. Such directives may also be issued through the budget speech.

At the state level there is the state council at the appex of the State Directorate and this is headed by the state's Military Governor. The council formulates policies for implementation at the state level. It is also responsible for obtaining from the Board the necessary funds and disbursing these to the implementation committees at the operational level. Its membership includes the following:

(i) The Military Governor of Benue State - Chairman.

(ii) Honourable Commissioner for Agriculture and Natural Resources - Member.

(iii) Hon. Commissioner for Works and Transport - Member.

(iv) Hon. Commissioner for Local Government and Community Development - Member.

(v) Hon. Commissioner for Commerce and Industry - Member.

(vi) Hon. Commissioner for Finance and Economic Planning - Member.

(vii) Hon. Commissioner for Health - Member.

(viii) General Manager, LBRBRDA - Member.

(ix) Project Manager, BNARDA - Member.

(x) General Manager, Public Utilities Board.

The Secretary to the Military Governor and Head of Civil Service and the State Director of DFRRI are in attendance at council meetings. The Secretary of the Directorate is the council secretary.

Implementing the policy directives of the state council is the State Implementation Committee (SIC) which has so far been headed by a military officer who is also the Director, In the implementation, this committee is guided by the guidelines given by the National Directorate. This committee is in effect the pivot of all DFRRI actions in the state. It sends directives, and resources to and oversees the activities of the local government area committees. It is also responsible for formulating projects for the approval of the Board. The membership of this committee includes:

(i) Director - Chairman.

(ii) Deputy Director/Coordinator on Rural Housing and

Village Planning - Member.

(iii) Coordinator, Task Force on Rural Water Supply and Sanitation - Member.

(iv) Coordinator, Task Force on Food Productions Processing - Member.

(v) Coordinator, Task Force on Electrification - Member.

(vi) Coordinator, Task Force on Rural Fedder Roads - Member.

At the local government level there is the Local Government Area Implementation Committee (LGAIC) which is headed by the Chairman of the Local Government Council. The committee at this level is responsible for the execution of DFRRI projects and the mobilization of people at the grassroots for the Directorate's programmes in their areas. Although the arrangement is expected to extend right down to the village level, there are no existing committees at this point. It was proposed that district representatives be members of the local government area Implementation committees so that the arrangement stops at the local government level for faster decisions but so far there is nothing that ensures this representation.

From the interviews of the local government officials, it was found that District Heads are asked to submit a list of their requirements particularly in road development and water supply areas and from such a lists a choice of what the Directorate will tackle is then made. This kind of consultation however does not take into consideration the priorities of the people among the items so submitted more so as

they are not represented where the final implementation decisions are being taken. The decisions about what is good for the people and how it will be done for them therefore rests with the bureaucrats as usual. For example, the list of roads first submitted to the Board for approval was simple taken from the state government's earlier prepared list. Thus membership of the LGAIC which is the nearest operational committee to the target people therefore comprises of

(i) Chairman, Local Government Council - Member/ Chairman.

(ii) Supervisory Councillor for Works - Member.

(iii) Supervisory Councillor for Agriculture - Member.


(iv) The Divisional Engineer, Ministry of Works - Member.

(v) The Divisional Agricultural Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources - Member.

(vi) The Community Development Officer, Ministry of Local Government and Community Development - Member.

(vii) Secretary to Local Government - Member/Secretary.

Fig. 20: The Decision-Making Levels ✗ With DFRRI



Source: Field data.

For the purposes of its operation, the Directorate has, in line with the provisions of the decree, drawn its senior staff mainly from within the Benue State Public Service for reasons of saving overhead cost. The snag here of course is that such staff always regard themselves here as 'part-time'

and in some cases have not been consciencious enough in the discharge of their responsibilities. Benue for instance has cases of infrequent changes of the Directorate's secretaries.

At the State secretariat, the Directorate is divided into about eight departments all of which are responsible to the office of the Executive Chairman (Director). These departments are the Organization and social mobilization; Food and Agriculture; Rural Industrialization; Rural Infrastructure; Engineering services, Natural Resources and Technology Development; Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation; Finance and Accounts; and the Office of the Secretary incharge of administration. The Directorate does not have any definite offices in the local government areas. This means that much of the decision powers are concentrated in the state headquarter and this has been a source of complaints from many local councils.

5.3.3.2 Funding

The Directorate depends largely on the Federal subventions which account for 75 per cent of its funds. The remaining 25 per cent is supposed to be state/local government and community contributions. The Federal government is the most reliable source of funds in this case since it is not easy to even quantify how much local contributions for example will turn out to be.

The military secrecy surrounding the accounting system in the Directorate makes it difficult to make a reliable statement on the situation of funds with the Directorate. This situation makes accountability a mere joke. This secrecy also makes it all the more difficult for external participation in the planning and implementation of the DFRRI projects. The Analyst Magazine (Vol.2, No.6, 1987:20-21) however found out that by 1981 Benue DFRRI had been allocated (N13.742 million) about fourteen million naira and that it had physically received the whole amount but that DFRRI left other organisations to execute many of the projects it later laid claim to. The direct control which the National Directorate has over the State Directorate also makes it difficult for the affected people to question or demand explanations for the failures of the Directorate's activities in their area.

5.3.3.3 Mode of Operation

In the implementation of its programmes, Benue DFRRI liaises with ministries and agencies involved in rural development in the state. Prominent among these are the office of the secretary to the Military Government (S.M.G.) and Head of Civil Service (for secretariat staff), Ministry of Works and Transport, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Ministry of Local Government and Community Development, Ministry of Land and Survey (for professional staff, plants and equipment), Lower Benue River Basin and

Rural Development Authority, UNDP for execution of roads, agriculture, water supply and sanitation programmes.

At the Local Government Areas the LGAICs have been provided with earth moving plants and equipments (bulldozers, graders etc.), money and other inputs for the rural roads programme.

The Directorate maintains two teams made up of Military personnel from Nigerian Army School of Military Engineering (NASME) for construction of strategic roads by direct labour. Some of the directorate's project are handled by contractors. Such include supply of spare parts and lubricants, roads, water and seed multiplication.

At the time of this survey, it was proposal that communities will be involved in the rural electrification programme when it takes off and in the maintenance of community roads after construction. Local artisans will be trained to maintain hand pumps installed at the various borehole sites.

In its implementation efforts, the Benue State DFRRI seeks to involve the participation of people at the grassroots in the identification, selection, execution and maintenance of projects based on their felt needs. This approach which has been lauded throughout the country has now become popularly known as the "Benue Formula".

The approach supposedly relies heavily on Local Government Implementation Committees for the location and implementation of projects. The implementation committees are therefore expected to be provided with equipment, lubricants and funds for effective performance. In areas where highly technical services are needed but where the facilities and personnel are lacking at the local government areas, services of competent contractors are employed for quick results (for example, borehole construction and installation of pumps). Unfortunately reports from local government councils imply that this formula worked only on paper. Many councils feel they are not being effectively utilised, and that DFRRI funds are not used judiciously.

5.3.3.4 Community Development Projects

The planning and implementation of community projects among the local communities of Benue State has an old history. Even before the coming of the Europeans, local communities particularly among the Tiv speaking areas, had constructed their own kinds of bridges, settlements, roads, markets, etc. using the community's labour and resources.

Government involvement in community development projects in this part of the country has been comparatively recent. It was not untill about 1968 when six districts were signled out in Benue Province by the then Northern Nigeria Government for the purposes of introducing a community development scheme

in the area on a experimental basis. Communities were asked to be organised on government directives. This gave the initial impression that government was to initiate such projects and community contribution was only going to be in terms of voluntary labour. But this was in fact not the case. Government participation in community projects was in the form of providing assistance in the form of advice, technical skills and in some cases some amount of material resources where these were requested.

Many communities were not even aware of the availability of this assistance. Besides, the staff involved were either not properly trained, were too few in number or lacked the commitment to the job and as such their presence was hardly felt. In addition the process through which projects qualified for grant-in-aid was cumbersome, slow and helped to kill the spirit of the local people for whom it was designed.

There was little or no attempt by government staff to actually organise the communities as expected. Thus even though the operational framework required that project grants be disbursed from the headquarters to the respective communities only after such projects would have passed through several stages of planning, evaluation and appraisal, the government staff responsible for the planning, evaluation, etc. were never working closely enough with the respective communities to be able to afford such communities a good grasp of what the projects were all about. Idakwo (1982) also notes

that the technical staff coopted for the community development projects (CDP) hardly worked as a team. Added to this was the inability of the Community Development Office (CDO) in charge of a local government area to have a controlling influence over these staff while on community work. At other times ministries would compete for control of such projects.

The commulative effects of these short comings had led to communities undertaking projects without reference to any government agency. Thus even projects initiated from amongst the people were not properly channeled by government as a very useful avenue for participation in the rural development process.

5.3.4.1 The Nature of Community Development Projects

Community projects have usually been concerned with issues of immediate relevance to the people in question. They usually aim at solving a problem that has become critical and whose benefits are not too far fetched. Thus the objectives are usually simple, unambigious and within an achievable magnitude.

Local communities do not embark on projects that involve the use of resources that are not within their own reach nor those that are uncertain. This probably explains why there is more emphasis on the labour aspect rather than the financial aspect of local contributions. The social relations within the community do ensure the provision of labour but cannot

be utilised to the same degree to obtain monetary contributions even though this is found to be unavoidable in many cases.

According to Idakwo (1982:225-7), there is also something common about the way CDPs are initiated and implemented. He notes in particular that in each community he had surveyed, the elders constitute the policy makers while the actual project execution is delegated to committees. It is the committees that mobilise both human and financial resources and undertake both the planning and the coordination of the physical construction. It must also be noted that the cooperation of the people and the eventual success of these projects very much depends on the integrity and credibility of the people handling the affairs of the project. Any issue of distrust or a feeling of possible failure can easily scare people away. Thus trusted people in leadership positions were found to be the greatest initiators of successful community projects. But even here, the effect of the 'amoral faimlism' discussed earlier makes leaders who are immediately within the locality to be trusted more.

The problem that arises in this case is that there is a considerable social distance between this category of leaders and government officials. Consequently they may not be promptly or well informed about government policies. In such circumstances, the community projects the people perceive as most relevant to local needs may not always be related to the policy priorities of government. An attempt to use the grants-in-aid as a bait

to redirect the choice of CDPs towards government policy priorities in the past has had the negative effect of dampening the spirit of the local people.

5.3.4.2 The Planning and Implementation of Community Projects

Whoever must have muted the idea of a project will have to pass the idea to either the village or clan head or the committee of elders who will then sell the idea to the people during a meeting of all concerned. If the idea is found feasible, a committee is selected there and then to work out the logistics which will have to be approved at an appointed date. If the task is not a complicated one, then a date is fixed right away for the first day of communal work. In some uncomplicated cases of vital needs, the eldest person may simply fix a date for work and pass word round to the people to come to work. In this case the obvious benefit makes it possible to bypass the more democratic process of an agreement at a meeting of all concerned. All persons concerned are involved right from the planning to the implementation of the community project. The following institutions have been relied upon at the various stages of the planning and implementation of community projects:

(i) Council of elders

(ii) Project committees

(iii) Advisory committees

(iv) Student Associations

(v) Village development committees

(vi) Progressive associations

(vii) Work group leaders


(viii) Social work groups

(ix) Youth associations

(x) Women groups

(xi) Joint village work groups

Fig. 21: Structure and Process of Community Development Planning



Source: Modeled from field Information and Observation.

This list of the kind of institutions involved implies that there could be a lot of external factors influencing CDPs apart from direct government involvement in terms of grants and technical aid. At other times lobbying, petitition writing, protests, et cetera, have been employed among other mechanisms to obtain government approval or support for the local planning decisions (Ariyo, 1989). This means that with careful planning, local institutions such as are listed above can be effectively integrated into the main stream of the project planning process of the government. In the meantime they are treated as independent voluntary organisation whose planning or implementation strategy lacks the necessary legal framework. Thus still at issue is the incorporation of the potentials of CDPs in the national development process.

5.3.4.3 Funding of Community Development Projects

The main source of funds for self-help activities include:-

(a) People's contributions (material, labour, cash, or fund raising activities).

(b) Government Financial assistance (25% of cost is government promised assistance for any viable project embarked upon).

(c) Government subsidised technical assistance.

5.4 SUMMARY

An overview of the planning of the foregoing rural development programmes in Benue State indicates that, except in the case of community development project, government appears to have allowed much of the planning decisions to be taken directly or largely influenced by foreign financiers. The influence of the World Bank in this business is simply overwhelming. They favour large scale regional investments compared to small scale, unsophisticated and manageable community projects. In order to protect their large scale investments, they determine the objectives and means of implementation. During the implementation, government officials interprete and direct the implementation with an air of superiority, often believing that the local target people do not know what is good for them and that the imported ideas must always be superior. Thus irrigation practices and cropping patterns of the local peoples were arrogantly discarded in project areas in preference to the F.A.O. ideas. In the same vein BNARDA too made no efforts to use the existing social structure in the propagation and distribution of farm inputs and the new farming ideas.

The neglect of local resources in the process of planning for these development activities and the preference for the more expensive sophisticated technology and foreign ideas is clearly associated with the River Basin and BNARDA projects. Consequently, such projects have had to be maintained and run

by government officials because the local people will not be able to take over and manage them within their own resources. Bureaucrats have also learned to take advantage of this situation by creating and perpetuating a situation where they obtain and misappropriate government funds without a proper accountability. This has made these projects to be less cost effective and unstable. In the same style DFRRI too relies on a structure over which it has little control and provides priorities which should perhaps better be determined by the target people and in whose implementation they should be fully involved. Many agencies now handle projects that aim at one and the same goal but will object to any serious coordination in fear of lossing their authority and financial control.

This procedure of planning is therefore becoming counter productive and needs to be improved upon. Examples from the rural development experiences of the other countries which were discussed earlier have shown that the alienation of the target people through the concentration of both the decision making powers and the control of resources in the hands of government officials or the ruling class is not in the interest of effective mobilization. For rural people to be effectively mobilised, they need to see the crucial need for these projects by taking part in the decisions that led to their creation and their eventual implementation. In this way the existence of the projects are given some element of legitimacy too.

The rural development experiences also showed that rural people do not want to overstretch their resources. They plan accordingly to what they have. In the Benue case, all except the CD projects were overstretched and imbued with ambitious objectives for different political reasons and the lack of effective participation meant that government officials were not able to learn and if possible apply the local skills and ideas in solving the perceived problems.

If these projects were carefully studied and designed with the view to legitimising them through effective participation before they were included on the national or state plan, then they may have served a more useful purpose. As it is now, they were decided upon and their objectives too set before studies were commissioned. In this case the whole thing is simply teleguided to meet the political goals but not realistic development needs of the affected people. For the same reason, the policy makers have not sufficiently employed monitoring and evaluation to help improve subsequent planning of rural development projects.

Table 17: Institutions for Community Development Projects

Institution	Features	Status	Functions	Potential in the Development Process
1. Council of Elders	Representative, Few, Decesions on Consenus	Continuous	For Policy directives	Knowledge about local situation, source of data for local environment; can be representatives of their people in cases of consultation.
2. Project Committes	Few Restrictive	Ad hoc	For planning and mobilising people for action.	Can liaise between government and the people for local input and mobilization.
3. Advisory Committees	Informative, Anticipatory.	Ad hoc	Advisory, providing information for policy formulation and implementation.	Can also provide feedback particulary where communication and support from government is less effective.
4. Student Associations	Revolutionary, a source of motivation	Continuous	"	Reactionary but have a labour input potential where effectively mobilized.
5. Village development	Patriotic but slow at adopting innovations	"	"	Can be useful if merged and utilised as poject committes but is slow in adopting innovations .
6. Progressive Association.	Progressive, Informative and catalytic	Ad hoc	Informative and providing other contributions e.g. finance and labour.	Elitist but can be effective mechanism for mobilization and participation.

Table 17 (contd.)

7. Work group leaders	Initiative, selectively chosen	Ad hoc	For management directives	Less useful where government staff are effective but have a mobilising potential.
8. Social work groups (usually two or more villages)	Patriotic but require effective mobilization to be useful.	Conintuous	For labour during implementation.	High labour input potential - strongly neat together by social dictates and so better discipline
9. Youth Associations	"	"	"	High labour input potential but less reliable and less disciplined.
10. Women groups	Patriotic but require effective mobilization to be useful.	"	"	High labour input potlential, hardworking but less stable.
11. Joint Village Work	"	Ad hoc	"	High labour input potential but less reliable and more costly to organise.

Source: Adapted from Idakwo 1982 but amplified using Smith's format (cited by Ariyo, 1989).

CHAPTER VI

ACHIEVEMENTS OF SELECTED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN BENUE STATE

For quite sometime in the past, economists were more concerned with the issue of project analysis rather than evaluation. Even when systematic project evaluation started receiving attention, it was at first more concerned with social and industrial projects which were often sponsored by international agencies interested in monitoring their investments. Works on agricultural project evaluation are now emerging following the introduction of the integrated development projects (see for instance D.H. Rodinelli (ed.) (1977)).

Around the mid-1950s a meeting was held in Geneva on the 'Criteria and Techniques of Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Economic Development' under the auspices of the United Nations. Three types of agricultural project evaluations have emerged after the Geneva meeting. These are the special evaluation, the ex-post and built-in evaluation (Weiss, 1977).

Special evaluation is any non-recurring evaluation, excluding audits, undertaken during the implementation of a project. They are usually carried out by people or parties external to the project and the concern is whether alternative means of meeting the objectives could be employed. The ex-post evaluation is undertaken after the completion of the project

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and is geared towards determining the relationship of costs to benefits, and seeing if there has been a change in the schedule of completion. It can also be utilised to garner political and public support for the project, and to determine the possibility of replicating the project in other areas of the country. This kind of evaluation was used for the pilot ADP at Funtua since both Government and the World Bank were interested in replicating the project in other parts of the country.

Lastly, on-going or built-in evaluation is designed as an integral aspect of the project. It provides for the monitoring of the project during the course of its implementation and also after its completion. The advantage of this type of evaluation is that inconsistencies and deviations that may occur during the implementation stage can be quickly rectified. This type of evaluation is what is now used by BNARDA (under the Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation - PME - Unit). Evaluation and monitoring are related but not quite the same. Monitoring is the provision of information and the use of that information to enable the management of a project to assess the progress of implementation. It also enables the management to know whether inputs are being delivered, are used as intended and are having the initial effects as planned. It is an internal project activity. Evaluation on the other hand assesses the overall project effects (both intentional and unintentional) and their impacts (Cassely and Lury, 1982). Sequentially, monitoring will have to come before evaluation. While monitoring occurs during

the implementation stage of the project cycle, evaluation comes in the completion phase, thus covering all the five stages of the project cycle, namely, identification, preparation, appraisal, implementation and completion. More often, the Line dividing monitoring and evaluation is not precise.

The evaluation being made in the present study can be described as special evaluation. The assessment of the performance of the projects will be based on the official records provided with supplementary data coming from field survey carried out. This performance will then be related to the priorities within the target people's aspirations. In other words the objectives in this study is to see how much of the set targets have been achieved and whether or not these meet the people's aspirations. The evaluation also intends to highlight the use of local resources, the level of local participation and the general socio-economic impact of the projects on the target people.

6.1 ACHIEVEMENT OF TARGETS IN THE RIVER BASIN PROJECTS

6.1.1 Performance Objectives

The objectives of the Lower Benue RBRDA have already been presented with the observation that they were wide and varied thus requiring heavy capital outlay for effective coverage and performance. They were also noted to be contradictory in some cases and their implementation was likely to generate conflicts

with the existing value system. More related to the implementation process was the fact that almost all of the objectives did not contain a measurable target to be achieved. They did not appear to have been derived from or can be related to any specific site. What this implies is that there was no thorough preparation and study of the project sites before the programme objectives were drawn up. The broad objectives handed down from above were set to serve various areas and the multiple groups of farmers in the study area could not all fit appropriately to the pre-set project objectives. For example, whereas the basin authorities in the further north required to afforestate the respective areas, such an objective was not a priority in the Lower Benue. Yet in 1980 the Lower Benue Authority had spent up to N11,000 on this item when it had hardly done anything in the other areas.

Of the ten units of objectives none was set in measurable terms to be achieved within a given time. This makes evaluation difficult. Besides the structure and organization of the system did not have an evaluation section initially. The wide ranging and bogus nature of the objectives certainly reflects on the process through which they were arrived at. These inadequacies also made it difficult for the Federal Government to equate appropriately the financial needs with the expected level of achievement. Consequently funds provided have often been far short of what is required (See Table 14 and Section on funding below).

6.1.2 Inputs

Unable to harness the different rivers for purposes of irrigation, the primary job of the RBRDA in Benue was reduced to that of helping to minimise the cost of farm labour through the preparation of land which can be leased out to farmers, livestock rearing, provision of farm inputs and infrastructure, including tractor hiring services. The types of inputs which should be evaluated here will therefore include hectares of land developed for cropping, amount of fertilizers made available to farmers, insecticides and pesticides distributed, livestock provisions and infrastructural development. A visit to the sites during the field work for this study confirmed that no irrigation activity was going on. Even the Katsina-Ala hand-pump for dry season vegetation gardening had been discontinued at the time of our visit.

It was not possible to obtain detailed records of expenditures and achievements on the individual projects inspite of repeated calls and pleas. This was largely due to the fact that there records were either not just kept or could never be located. The fact that there had been no planning or monitoring unit earlier in the planning of the projects made it easier for this issue to be overlooked. Our analysis of achievements here is therefore based on what was available in the annual reports covering the overall performance of the Lower Benue River Basin.

6.1.2.1 Land Development

Somehow, the management targeted land as the 'most vital' input for agricultural modernization on the schemes approved in the Fourth National Development Plan which includes Jato-Aka and Okete. The idea was to prepare plots of land early enough and give out to farmers for either the rainfed or irrigated agriculture. After this the farmers accommodated on the project site are then serviced through the provision of fertilizer, improved seeds etc. For 1984, the authority had a total target of 7913ha. of land to be developed for irrigation during the dry season. While there was a hundred per cent achievement in the dry season target only 4495.8ha. or 57% of the set target was achieved under the rainfed agriculture. All together, the achievement for land development this year came to 53.4%. Data was not available for specific achievements at the Jato-Aka and Okete Site. The 1985 and 1986 records are as shown in Table 18. No records were available for any other year. The poor record keeping is a clear indication of the poor planning which characterises these agencies and it obviously makes the evaluation of the projects extremely difficult and helps in creating a cloud of doubt around the manner the available figures were even arrived at.

TABLE 18: LBRBRDA Achievement of Targetrs

Stated Objectives	1984 Target	1984 Actual	1984 %	1985 Target	1985 Actual	1985 %	1986 Target	1986 Actual	1986 %
1. Regulating flow of the Benue and distribut-tion through i.Navigation	n.r	n.ac.	-	n.r	n.ac.	-	n.r.	n.ac.	-
ii.Flood con-trol	n.r	n.ac	-	n.r	n.ac	-	n.r	n.ac.	-
iii.Soil Erosion	n.r	n.ac.	-	n.r.	n.ac.	-	n.r	n.ac.	-
iv.Irrigation	512ha	512ha	100	500ha	500ha	100	500ha	300ha	60
v.Fisheries	n.r	30,030 .5tons	-	n.r	106022	-	n.r	n.ac.	-
vi.H.E. Power	n.r.	n.ac.	-	n.r	n.ac.	-	n.r	n.ac.	-
2.Aforestation	n.r	157200 seedl-ing	-	n.r	24200 seedl-ing	- -	96800 seedl-ing	96800 seedl-ing	100
3.Soil Conser-vation	n.r	n.ac	-	n.r	n.ac.	-	n.r	n.ac	-
4.Recreation: Gardens/ Parks	n.r	n.ac.	-	n.r	n.ac.	-	n.r	n.ac	-
5.Water Supply	n.r	n.ac.	-	n.r	n.ac.	-	n.r	2 com-muties	-
6.Control of Water Pollu-tion	n.r	n.ac.	-	n.r	n.ac.	-	n.r	a.ac.	-

Table. 18: (Cont.).

7.Agricultural Production:									
i. Land Preparation for crop.	7913ha	4495.8 ha	56	9018ha	3621ha	41	6809ha	3075ha	48
ii.Supply of inputs - improved seeds	n.r	n.r	-	n.r	n.r	-	n.r	n.r	-
-pesticides	n.r	n.r	-	n.r	n.r	-	n.r	n.r	-
-Fertilizer	n.r	74785 MT	-	n.r	217557 MT	-	n.r	2,000 MT	-
iii.Extension Service	n.r	n.r	-	n.r	n.r	-	n.r	n.r	-
iv.No. of farmers Aclcommo-dated	n.r	3,272	-	n.r	2,325	-	n.r	1,403	-
v. Farmers Estimated Revenue	n.r	N7.5m	-	n.r	N4m	-	n.r	N8.6m	-
vi.Total Estimated Grains Product.	n.r	-	-	n.r	-	-	n.r	N7462 tons	-
8.Food Proces-sing In-dustry	n.r	n.ac	-	n.ac.	n.r	-	n.r	n.ac	-
9.Livestock	n.r	10800 birds	-	n.r.	9260 birds	-	n.r.	5500 birds	-

Key: n.r. = no records given
n.ac. = no achievement

Source: From LBRBRDA Annual Reports 1982 - 1986.

Table 19: LBRBRDA - LAND DEVELOPMENT TARGETS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

	1984				1985			
	Target	Actual	% ach.	Farmers Invov.	Target	Actual	% ach.	Farmers Involv.
J/Aka	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	526.5	-	n.r.
Okete	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	406	-	n.r.
Total	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	932.5	-	n.r.
All RBRBDA Schemes	8424	5007.8	53.4%	3,272	9430	4133	43.8%	21315
1986								
J/Aka					1082	471.5	44	260
Okete					674	489	73	76
Total					1756	960.5	54.7	336
All schemes together					6821	3287.5	48	1403

(n.r. = no records)

Source: Compiled fron LBRBDA Annual Reports.

Targets for the whole Lower Benue Project were not always certain. The 1986-1990 proposals for instance gave a target of 10,000ha. to be achieved in land development but the annual report gave 7.321ha. for the same period. The confusion in records kept does not appear to be an incidental problem as it is noticed to reoccur. Records so far only show 48% of the 7.321ha. as what has been achieved. A field observation of the two project sites at Jato-Aka and Okete appear to corroborate the official data given for 1986 in respect of the sites. The farm manager covering the Jato-Aka site also disclosed that the farm had a total area of 500ha. and an average of 400ha. are cropped annually.

Before 1984 and for 1987 and 1988, the only reports available for scrutiny were the auditors reports which deal only with the accounts and the balance sheet.

By 1986, the Authority too had become conscious of its low performance but attributed it to the on-going reorganization of the Basin Authorities which had created uncertainties and a low morale among workers. In the new dispensation, the Authorities were also to disengage themselves from all other farming activities and concentrate on irrigation thus farm operations virtually came to a complete stand still (LBRBDA Annual Report, 1986:10).

By the time we visited the sites no pumps were seen and irrigation activities were completely absent. The reorganisation

led to the auctioning of many equipment and the retrenchment of staff that had by now become redundant.

6.1.2.2 Fertilizer Supply

In line with the on-going activity of the Basin Authority, fertilizer was considered another important input to be made available. Here again no records were available to us to help determine targets and the specific amounts distributed to the various schemes (See Table 20 below).

Table 20: LBRBRDA - Fertilizer Distribution (50kg. Bags)

	1984			1985		
	Targets	Actual Achiev.	% Achiev.	Target	Actual Achiev.	% Achiev.
J/Aka	n.r.	n.r.	-	n.r.	n.r.	-
Okete	n.r.	n.r.	-	n.r.	n.r.	-
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total for All Schemes	n.r.	74785	-	n.r.	217557	-

	1986		
	Target	Actual Achiev.	% Achieved
J/Aka	n.r.	n.r.	-
Okete	n.r.	n.r.	-
Total	-	-	-
Total for All Schemes	n.r.	n.r.	-

(n.r. = no records)

Source: Compiled from the LBRBDA Annual Reports.

It is important to note the inavailability of records on targets because the absence of targets could also mean the inability to figure out the magnitude of the demand for fertilizers. This can help to explain why the supply in this case, always fell short of the demand. The absence of specific records for the various schemes also means that it was not possible to verify exactly how much fertilizer had actually been distributed to each site.

6.1.2.3 Other Inputs

Although the feasibility study had recognised the problem of the cost and scarcity of farm labour, more time was devoted to land preparation while other inputs such as insecticides and pesticides did not seem to receive adequate attention. Available records have not indicated the distribution of such inputs. Much of the planting and weeding on the farms had to be done by hand. The Authority however has some indication of credit facilities being made available to peasant farmers under the Agricultural Credit Scheme. The sum of N237,200.00 was reported disbursed to these farmers in the 1982/83 period and as at 31st December 1984, N222,584.26 was recovered. The Authority calculated this amount to represent a recovery rate of 10.76% which it considered as unsatisfactory. However it is observed that if the figures they have are correct, it means the Authority had recovered about 93% of this money in about a year. This does not show the situation to be as bad as

indicated above. In any case the authority attributed their calculated poor rate of recovery to the depressed state of the economy and the right money supply (LBRBDA Annual Report, 1984:7) but noted also that experience in the state has always shown that credits given to peasants has always had its poor rate of recovery.

Rural community financial institutions on the other hand do not appear to have the same level of difficulty in debt collections. This therefore means that if the Authority actually had a poor recovery rate, possibly explanations could lie with lack of community commitment or the feeling of having no stake by the borrowers in what is branded as 'government money' (which is nobody's money). The consequence of this presumed poor recovery rate of the Authority's money, however, was that no more credit facilities were made available to farmers. The Authority spent the remaining time trying to collect what had been loaned out. Attempts to form cooperative societies were made but one of the major reasons for this was to help collect the loans already given out rather than perfect the system of operating the credit schemes (LBRBDA, Annual Report, 1984:7).

The failure of the credit scheme meant that farmers participating in this project had to depend on their savings and loans from local sources just like their counterparts elsewhere. 57% of the farmers interviewed had in fact indicated that they had financed the cost of their farming from their personal savings while 26% did so from local loans.

6.1.2.4 Funding

But more fundamental than this was the issue of determining how much funds each authority was to receive. The inability to provide measurable objectives and achievement targets in the planning of the projects with a time schedule for completion made it difficult for the Federal Government to equate appropriately the financial needs of the various projects with the expected levels of achievement. Consequently, the funds provided were usually far short of what was required. The budget estimates of the LBRBDA showed that within the 1986/88 plan period, N257.940m was required for the execution of the various objectives (LBRBDA, 5th Dev. Plan. Aug. 1985) but the Authority was able to receive only N39.50m from the Ministry (LBRBDA, Summary of Accounts, 1989).

This represents only 15.27% of what was required. In this case the management too, became tempted to be rather irrational in its choice of the criteria for spending the funds and thus anything could be presented at the end of the day to account for the money spent or the failures of the organisation.

Records of accounts show that funds acquired by the Authority for their projects were largely committed to buildings, plant and machinery, Hydro Flow Pumps, and Dam construction in terms of assets. Other areas of high expenditure include Head Office expenses, salaries and wages, motor vehicle and plant running costs and contract jobs (LBRBDA, Annual Reports, 1981-1986). The credit scheme was the only way through which

money was invested directly into crop production. Its withdrawal therefore increased the significance of farmers' local funding arrangements as a factor influencing their crop production capacity.

The significance of funds at this stage of the project cannot be overemphasised, yet as can be seen, it is often at this stage that project officials relax their efforts in ensuring that the participants get access to a stable source of funds. Thus whereas external financiers often ignore the local character of the place and often plan for and insist on costly machinery and administrative structures which may soon be discarded, the local needs may not really be as complicated and may not even call for such huge expenditures. All field officials for instance agreed that the most important element in the success of the land preparation scheme was the availability of tractors. The cost of buying and maintaining these tractors is high and not within the reach of local farmers yet this did not seem to be a priority area for the Authority even though tractors were supposed to be revenue yielding. Tractors were part of the assets that had to be auctioned in 1987 as a consequence of the last reorganisation. Government's inability to identify this weakness in the planning process is largely due to the lack of proper consultation with the target people at the appropriate stage when their priorities could have been identified.

6.1.3 Output

The LBRBRDA's main preoccupation was in assisting farmers to produce more crops through the provision of prepared land and some infrastructure such as access roads, water supply and electricity in some cases. Other areas of engagement included livestock rearing, forestry and fisheries. Output here then will be discussed in terms of crop production and the provision of infrastructure.

The Authority recorded the following achievements in crop production. No records were available to show what was used for the production of the crops. It was also difficult to separate what was produced by farmers accommodated on the project and that which was produced by the Authority's direct efforts.

Table 21: 1984 Crop Production (Tonnage) by LBRBDA

Crop	Production (Tons)
Rice	3,541
Maize	3,494
Cassava	610
Yams	618
Guinea corn	340
Cowpeas	113.8
Others	193.3
Total	9,910.1

Source: LBRBDA Annual Report, 1984.

As usual, the records of production have been inconsistently kept. There were no more records indicating the tonnage of crops produced in the years following 1984 except the indication

in 1986 that 7462 tons of grains were produced on the Authority's farms. This included 4588 tons of rice (fiving a 29.6% improvement on the 1984 performance) and 2874 tons of maize and other grains (indicating a reduction of 17.7% from the 1984 performance). Some 2010 tons of tubers and 12 tons of vegetables were also reported produced from the farms. The reports have however indicated the hectarage put under cultivation for the different crops in 1985 and 1986 (Table 22).

Table 22: LBRBRDA: Wet Season Cropping Area Put to Various Crops (HA)

Crops		Jato-Aka	Okete	All LBRBRDA Schemes
Rice	1985	220.0	135.0	1463
	1986	202.6	295	1750.1
Maize	1985	29	243.0	140.6
	1986	42	78	2934.5
Cassava	1985	18	16	148.2
	1986	20	15	69
Yam	1985	51.6	1	147.2
	1986	101	10	137
Guinea Corn	1985	117	45	279.5
	1986	30	90	182.5
Beans	1985	2	-	80.0
	1986	-	-	47.5
Ground-nuts	1985	82	-	86.0
	1986	41	-	53.5
Others	1985	6	1	28.0
	1986	35	1	113.54
Total	1985	525.5	406	3,621.4
	1986	471.5	489	3,287.54

Source: Compiled from LBRBDA 1985 and 1986 Annual Reports.

Projected figures were not available for all other crops but the major crop intended to be produced on these farms (i.e. rice) was projected to yield 4.5 tones per ha. (Kenting, 1982a:57). Going by this projection, the Authority should have been able to produce 55,927.35 tonnes of rice between 1984 and 1986 or an annual average of about 18,642.45 tonnes. This amount could have accounted for about 2% of the nation's domestic demand. It is assumed here that if the situation were to be so good for rice production, the other crops too would have benefited from the production arrangements. The actual production for rice however turned out to be only 1,250 kg/ha on the average (about 1.3 tonnes).

By this average, the whole of the schemes for Lower Benue project only produce a 28.9% of the projected yield by 1986, an amount grossly below expectations.

Field observations also show that there was no noticeable improvement on the yield per acre. Analysis of farmers' response to questions on comparative yields indicated that they produce about 500kg of rice per acre (or 1,250 kg/ha) which is same as the average yield per acre on farm outside the project area. This is in fact almost the same as what was observed to be the yield per ha. (1,175 kg/ha) before the project started (Kenting, 1982a:5b). This means that no appreciable achievement has been made by this project in increasing food productivity.

6.1.3.2 Livestock Rearing

In terms of livestock rearing, the Authority was able to raise 23,300 broilers and 2,260 turkeys between 1984 and 1986. It also produced 106,022 tons of different kinds of fish within the same period. It is not certain if this was the expected level of production since there was no set target at the beginning of the project. In any case the great demand for these in the local markets means that whatever was produced was far below the quantity demanded.

6.1.3.3 Infrastructural Development

The Authority also recorded the construction of two earth dams at Umogidi and Naka at a cost of N476,500.00 and N300,000.00 respectively. The two dams were expected to serve an area equivalent to 40km^2 and 10.5km^2 respectively. The Katsina-Ala project also had by our observation opened up about 15km of access road to link up the project sites with the major road. A generator was also provided at the Jato-Aka site for the staff quarters.

The achievement rate cannot be easily figured out in the case of these utilities as some of the decisions concerning them seemed to have been made using the discretion of the management and without regards to the planned targets.

Although the usefulness of the LBRBDA project is not doubted by anyone, its achievement so far is nothing to write

home about. All the staff interviewed, for instance, agreed that the project is functional but 59% are not prepared to agree that it is yielding profitable results. When the target people were also asked to assess the LBRBRDA projects (see Appendix I, Qn.9), their responses gave a mean score of 6.05 for 'true' responses while the 'false' and 'very false' responses scored a mean of 2.918. A 't' test was done to confirm the difference and at 72% of freedom and a 0.05 level of significance a 't' value of 8.48 showed that this difference is significant. This therefore means that with the mean score of 6.05, over 60% of the respondents have agreed that the LBRBRDA has contributed something positively to their existence. The local people's assessment of LBRBRDA must however be interpreted with caution because it is purely based on their own perception of what the project entails, that is, the land preparation aspect. The assessment relied only on what they were able to see happening and where they too were involved. For example when asked to indicate the benefits derived from the same projects, the responses indicated a mean of 3.288 for improvement and 3.205 for no improvement and when these means were tested as above they show no significant difference. This implies that these benefits are not obviously perceived. Federal Government on the other hand was clearly disappointed about the number and degree of achievement of the objectives of the River Basins spread all over the country. Government expectations remained higher than what was and could actually be achieved within the given resources. The result of this was that the objectives themselves

had to be revised several times in several organisations thus wasting more time, resources and causing frustration amongst staff and project beneficiaries.

6.1.4 Local Impact

It has been indicated above that the target people in their assessment of the LBRBRDA, feel that it has something to contribute to their existence even though they were not adequately consulted before the LBRBRDA projects were established. This implies that inspite of the lack of grassroot participation in the formulation of the programme objectives the programme was not rejected on grounds of inappropriateness.

An index of the overall impact of the project was not easy to arrive at since the problem of poor records made it difficult for comparisons to be made. In the questionnaires too, many of the impact statements were deliberately designed to be quanlitative because in the pilot study it was discovered that quantitative questions would simply be avoided by people as they had no quantitative records to answer them. Indeed all local farmers in this area irrespective of their education did not keep any records of their costs of production, thus calculating profits or losses became impossible. More interesting still was the idea that time and labour put into production was always taken for granted and considered significant only where hired labour costing large sums of money was involved. An informal discussion with the farmers accommodated on the sites revealed

that even though the yield per acre may have not improved with the introduction of the LBRBRDA project, there was at least the advantage of having land prepared for them in time and at the cost of between N30 to N45 per acre less than what obtains elsewhere.

The obvious problem here is that there is no extension service offered to the farmers even though the initial proposals had included it. Without these useful techniques, many farmers wasted valuable time and other resources producing crops with little or no profit without realising it. The mean scores for 'no differences' and 'worse off' responses (Appendix I, Qn. 10) were compared to those indicating improvement over such items as tractor services, knowledge of better farming techniques, procurement of farm inputs but a statistical test for significant difference showed that the two means (of 2.90 and 2.82 respectively) did not show any significant difference at 72% of freedom and a 0.05 level of significance. The implication here is that the target people could not perceive any discernable impact of the project as far as they were concerned. However when they were also asked to indicate how significant the project is in terms of contributing to their income, the responses were as follows:


Table 23: Perceived Contribution of Project to Income

Response	Frequency	%
No response	34	46
No contribution	4	5
Minor source of income	28	38
Main source of income	8	11
Total	74	100%

49% of the respondents agreed that their incomes had improved to some extent as a result of the activities of the Authority. These two results imply that the Authority's projects have made some degree of impact on the local people but this is not yet seriously felt. The difficulty in determinning the level of impact here is obviously a consequence of the absence of quantitative data and to some extent the lack of sincerity among the officials as well as the participant farmers. Another noticeable element is the limited number of farmers accommodated on the site compared to population it is meant to serve. This was a situation that was difficult to avoid because the cost of running the project was high and the limited resources became a serious limiting factor to the size of the project.

A field observation however showed that although farmers resident within the locality made up 80% of the total number of farmers accommodated, the remaining 20% who came from outside the immediate locality had a greater land area on the average (see Fig.22). Whereas the local farmers were only able to manage 0.8ha. of land on the average, outside farmers

Fig. 22 **Differential Farmer-Land Ratio**



Source: Field data

(usually retired and incubent civil servants and business people) had an average of 3ha. per farmer. This implies that even though the total land allocated to local farmers may be relatively high, the amount actually farmed by farmers within the immediate vicinity may not be so much. Official records however indicate that all farmers get an average of 1 -2 hectares of land.


With more and more young people leaving the villages into the towns farm labour has become a serious problem and one other area in which the projects could have made an impact would have been in saving labour costs. Labour used could really have been optimised for the accommodated farmers if the schemes had been properly services with sufficient and functioning tractors and planters as was anticipated in the design. It turned out that there were no planters at all on the site and the only two tractors seen at the Katsina-Ala project site broke down at the rate of at least a tractor every week, one of the officials said. According to him some breakdown could take about a week or more to rectify. Such experience frustrated the expectations and the cropping plans of many farmers. At this rate the scheme or projects cannot be expected to change farmers' income drastically.

Table 24 Typical Labour Requirements Per Month for Different Crops (Man-Hours per HA)

CROP	JAN	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Early Rice		6	6	27	28	43	1	10				
Maize-Fresh				5	5	2	6	48	43	2	10	
Maize-Dry	27	26								7	27	
Upland Rice	2	1								16	33	
Guinea Corn	2	16	5							16	22	
Cowpeas	4	26	20							14	22	
Soyabeans	2	31	20							16	22	
Okra	29	46	10					5		20	30	
Unions	65	36	40					5		10	68	
Tomatoes/Peppers	56	76	25					5		44	33	
Fresh Beans	163	150						5		24	65	
Melons	26	11	20					5		29	27	
Vegetable Nursery								15		25		

Source: K/Ala Feasibility study - Agricultural Report March 1982.(Kenting Earth Science Ltd for LBRBRDA).

Fig. 23 CROPS PRODUCTION SCHEDULE.



"The labour requirements for each crop have been calculated for each month during the year and presented as in Table 24. The calculations were based on local experience including two pilot schemes and experience from other projects. The distribution by months of the work requirements has been calculated on the basis of average or intermediate planting date for every crop." (Also see crop Production schedule, Fig. 23).

Asked to indicate their food sufficiency levels before and after the establishment of the project, the response show that the mean score for food sufficiency levels after the project was established indicated a lower value (Table 25).

Table 25: Difference in Food Sufficiency Level

Variable	No of cases	Mean	Standard deviation	(Difference) mean	T Value
Food sufficiency level before	73	4.4247	3.118	1.4795	5.1246
Food sufficiency level after		2.9452	3.312		

The theoretical critical value of t at 20 degrees of freedom 0.05 level and significance is 2.09.

Source: Field Data.

From the data shown above the drop in the level of sufficiency in food supply appears significant. This trend could be accounted for by either one or all of the following explanations. First, the fall in the food sufficiency level may be due to the greater

attention being given to the production of the cash crops (rice in this case) by the farmers and to the neglect of the other food crops. Alternatively, it could be that there has been a higher demand on food crops in the recent years due to increasing population and improved links with the bigger cities and the industrial areas. The later explanation appears to be a continuation of the old trend which led to the establishment of the LBRBDA programme in the first instance. The astronomical increase in food prices throughout the country could have also led to increased food export from the study area too. For the purpose of this research, evidence here may not be conclusive enough to show the real effect of the project on the food sufficiency levels but it at least shows that the project has not yet solved the food sufficiency problem even amongst its target people. There is still the need for the target people to greatly improve their local food supply and this can not be achieved by an over emphasis on the production of rice as is the case in the LBRBDA. Indeed when required to indicate which amongst the ten common crops they have learned to produce better as a result of the project, the response showed that only in Rice, fruits and vegetables that greatest improvement was made. (Table 26.)


Table 26: Improvement in Crop Production Skills

	% of Respondents	
Crop	No Improvement	Improvement
Yam	51%	49%
Cassava	75	25
G/Corn	62	38
Rice	38	62
Maize	66	34
Beans	68	32
Millet	86	14
G/Nuts	51	49
Fruits	47	53
Vegetables	37	66
Total	572 or 57.2%	422 or 42.2%

From personal observation it was noticed, however, that besides the preparation of the fields by ploughing and harrowing, there was no change in the traditional methods of growing any of the crops. The improvements indicated here may be due probably to the general interest which is now being turned increasingly towards rice production, market gardening and fruit production in the area. There is however an increasing application of fertilizers to the production of all crops. On the whole, the implementation of the project was intended to aid agricultural production which is in line with the priorities of the local aspirations (Fig. 24).

Fig. 24 RATTINGS IN LOCAL ASPIRATIONS AMONGST TARGET PEOPLE.

(Source: Field data)



6.1.5 Local Participation and Achievement of Local Aspirations

Concerning the aspect of local participation, it has already been noted that the planning of the projects did not involve the local people except perhaps during the acquisition of land for the project. Further inquiries from the local farmers indicated that consultations with them during the implementation stage was mainly related to the settling of disputes that arose in the course of allocating farm plots.

When required to rate their needs the farmers indicated that their greatest desire was to resolve the problems that inhibit their agricultural production through the supply of inputs and the control of weeds (See Fig. 24). This implies that this programme was not totally irrelevant. However the relatively high rating given to the supply agricultural inputs and weed control appears to indicate that if the people were consulted over the formulation of the project objectives, they would have probably requested that more emphasis be placed on the supply of inputs than on the expensive irrigation schemes that are not being managed properly. A field official noted that the removal of subsidies in form of tractor services, fertilizer supplies et cetera made many farmers withdraw from the project farms. Regretably the LBRBRDA was ordered to disengage itself from the only viable component (i.e. the agricultural aspect) of their activities which evoked the enthusiasm and participation of the immediate local people.

6.2 ACHIEVEMENT OF TARGETS IN BNARDA

Using the same criteria of evaluation as in the case of the LBRBRDA, the evaluation of BNARDA will also be related to the achievement of its set objectives and their relevance to the target people's aspirations. It is noteworthy to point out here that an assessment of the effect of diffusion of an innovation like effective agricultural extension services has not been easy to quantify. Even the BNARDA programme which was conceived more recently and planned by foreign experts did not have particular indices developed for its assessment. Vague gueses in farmers' responses and the magnitude of demand have often been employed among state governments in Nigeria in this regard. The Benue Stage programme is assessed on what it set out to achieve and based on the problems arising thereof, suggestions are then made for a better evaluation criteria.

6.2.1 provision of Extension Service

The objectives of BNARDA as outlined earlier are in line with the aspirations of the target people. Improving agricultural output which is the major economic activity of the local people constitutes a priority in their aspirations as shown in Fig. 24. Unlike the situation in the River Basin Authority the objectives in BNARDA are clear and stated in achievable and even quantifiable terms. The targets are phased in order to facilitate the management and monitoring of operations.

Table 27 (a) BNARDA: Sumarised Targets and Achievements 1986–1988

STRUCTURE OF EXPENDITURE 1986–1988

A: CAPITAL

SUB-PROGRAMME	1986 BUDGET	1986 ACTUAL	1986 % ACHIEVEMENT	1987 BUDGET	1987 ACTUAL	1987 % ACHIEVEMENT	1988 BUDGET	1988 ACTUAL	1988 % ACHIEVEMENT	CUMULATIVE BUDGET	CUMULATIVE ACTUAL	CUMULATIVE % ACHIEVEMENT
1 MAN & ADMIN.	360,062·00	242,098·66	67·24	2,956,970·00	84,643·75	2·86	867,820·00	547,541·74	63·09	4,184,852·00	874,284·35	20·89
2 FINANCE	140,933·00	75·00	0·05	105,780·00	6,760·00	6·39	210,500·00	77,487·50	36·81	457,213·00	84,323·50	18·44
3 PME.	305,201·00	0·00	0·00	312,080·00	6,892·00	2·21	1,325,150·00	68,566·00	5·17	1,942,431·00	75,458·00	3·88
4 MDT.	159,989·00	138·00	0·09	188,860·00	1,151·40	0·61	837,880·00	31,660·10	3·78	1,186,729·00	32,949·50	2·78
5 AGRIC.	2,346,214·00	0·00	0·00	1,004,630·00	200·00	0·02	6,077,710·00	30,854·00	0·51	9,428,554·00	31,054·00	0·33
6 ENG.	2,261,989·00	875·50	0·04	1,848,900·00	10,490·00	0·57	6,957,500·00	284,561·99	4·09	11,068,389·00	295,927·49	2·67
7 COMM.	398,424·00	2,030·00	0·51	363,250·00	597·00	0·16	12,015,450·00	646,341·00	5·38	12,777,124·00	648,968·00	5·08

Table 27 (b)

	ITEM/ACTIVITY	UNIT	1986		1987		1988		CUMULATIVE		2	REMARKS
			TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT	TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT	TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT	TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT	ACHIEVEMENT	
1	AGRICULTURE											
1·1	Extension											
a	Extension Agents	No.	120	114	200	114	385	295	385	295	76	
b	Motor vehicles for Ext.	No.	140	~	441	7	453	57	453	57	12·5	
c	Farmers Field days	No.	N5	~	4	1	4	36	52	37	71·15	
d	Train courses for farmers	No.	N5	~	~	~	16	36	16	36	225	
e	Train courses for EA's	No.	~	~	~	~	26	28	26	28	107·6	
f	SPATS/Crop Package Deco	No.	145(CPO)	78(CPO)	4360	3947	15400	8089	19905	2114	60·85	Relative to No. of VEA's
g	Fort-Nightly Training	No.	15	15	26	26	25	26	67	67	100	
h	M.T.R.M.	No.	~	~	8	8	11	11	19	19	100	
i	No. of VEAs visit to Farmer (208 visits to/VEA/YEAR)	No	24960	23712	80080	23712	80080	61360	185120	108784	58·76	Relative to No. of VEA's
j	Seasonal Training	No.	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	4	133	
k	Contact Farmers	No.	11520	12535	8720	8909	30800	26527	385000	26527	71·7	Relative to No. of VEA's
			14400		10464		36960					
1·2	Agronomy/Research											
a	Diagnostic Survey	No.	~	~	2	1	2	1	4	2	50	
b	OFAR Trials	No.	36	64	271	259	390	414	697	737	105·7	
c	On-Station Trial	No.	15	15	15	15	30	35	60	65	108	
1·3	Seed multiplication											
a	Direct Effort (Area)	Ha	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~		
	Rice	Ha	6	5	5	4·2	20	16·8	31	26	83·8	
	Maize	Ha	16	13·5	2	3·0	25	7	45	23·50	52·2	
	Cowpea	Ha	4	4	2	0	2	1	8	5	62·5	
	Cassava	Ha	5	4	30(600FT)	16·8	44	12	89	26	29	
	Ground Nut	Ha	5	4	2	0	2	0·5	9	4·5	50	
	Soyabean	Ha	~	~	2	4·0	100	15	102	19	18·62	
	(Yield)	Mt.	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~		
	Rice	Mt.	12	~	10	1·75	35	2·05	57	3·80	6·67	
	Maize	Mt.	30	8·2	2	1·60	10	1·6	42	11·40	27·14	
	Cowpea	Mt.	3	0·55	2	0	2	~	7	0·55	7·86	
	Ground Nut	Mt.	4	~	2	0	2	0·05	8	0·05	0·63	
	Soyabean	Mt.	~	~	~	0	100	~	100	2·9	2·90	
	Cassava	Bundles	~	~	~	0	17000		17000	~		
	Procurement of Foundation Seed (Rice)	Mt.	~	~	7·5	2·0	~	~	7·5	2	26·6	

Table 27 (c)

	ITEM/ACTIVITY	UNIT	1986		1987		1988		CUMULATIVE		2	REMARKS
			TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT	TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT	TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT	TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT	ACHIEVEMENT	
b	Outgrower Effort (Area)	(Ha)										
	Rice		20	10	40	34	180	137	240	181	75·4	
	Maize		-	-	135	37	100	75	235	117	49·78	
	Soyabean		-	-	4	4	N5	-	4	4	100·0	
	Yield (Mt)											
	Rice		40	5·37	80	14·24	400	28·9	520	48·51	9·33	Figures will be reviewed as
	Maize		-	-	135	10·7	100	3·66	235	14·34	6·11	soon as entire data is collected
	Soyabean		-	-	4	4	N5	-	4	4	100	
2	COMMERCIAL SERVICES (COMM.)											
2·1	F S C's	No	40	46	N5	4	N5	42	42	46	109·5	
2·2	Inputs											
	a fertilizers											
	Procurement	Mt.	21000	43215	35000	37052·85	23000	40925	79000	121192·85	153·4	
	Distribution	Mt.	21000	313·29	22 000	3876·395	23000	52200	66 000	104098·24	157·7	Cumulative revenue of N18,365,874·50 *realized from sales* of fertilizers
	Agro-Chemicals											
	Procurement											
	Herbicides	Kg	-	780	-	-	-	-	-	-		In 1986 all agro.
		Lt.	6000	13335	15000	570	5000	4413	52200	26000	4983	Chemicals sold were
		Sachet	-	-	-	NA	-	-	N5	-		acquired from defunct
				17000	-	NA	-	-	N5	17000		enclave project
		Lt.	-	60	4000	NA	400	14495	8000	14575		
		Kg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
		Schets										
	Fungicides	Schets	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
		Kg										
	Distribution											
	Herbicides	Kg	N5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		Cumulative revenue
		Lt.	N5	6135	15000	1032	5000	3438	20000	10605	53·02	realized from sales
		Sachets	N5	-	-	-	-	-	N5	-	-	of Agro-Chemicals is
											37·42	N210,720·90
	Pesticides	Kg	3000	-	-	856·8	4000	1763·5	7000	2620·30		
		Lt	-	-	-	462	N5	2126	N5	588		
		Sachets	-	8	-	-	-	-	N5	21·32		

Table 27(d)

	ITEM/ACTIVITY	UNIT	1986		1987		1988		CUMULATIVE		2	REMARKS
			TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT	TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT	TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT	TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT	ACHIEVEMENT	
	Fongicides	Sachets kg		1236	–	2178 –	–	– –	N5 –	3414 –	–	
	C. Fara Equipment											
a	Sprayers	No.	250	16	100	19	100	18	450	53	11·70	A total of N8,375·00
b	Weighing Scales	No.	N5	–	N5	–	N5	7	N5	7		was realised from
c	Fara Implements	No.	N5	–	–	–	–	–	N5	–		sales of fara implements in 1988
2·3	a planting Material. Procurement											
	Rice	Mt.	N5	1·005	30	3·77	20	18·70	50	23·475	46·94	
	Maize	Mt.	N5	0·4	30	2·38	10	16·80	40	19·58	48·95	
	Cowpea	Mt.	N5	–	5	0·2	5	–	10	0·20		Non availability
	Soyabean	Mt.	–	–	–	–	N5	–	N5	–		Non availability
	Cassava	Mt.	–	–	–	–	N5	–	–	–		
	Groundnut	Mt.	–	–	–	–	N5	–	–	–		
	Yam miniset	Setts	–	–	–	–	N5	–	–	2200		
	Sorohua	Mt.	–	–	–	–	N5	–	–	–		
	Distribution:											
	Rice	Mt	N5	0·945	30	3·77	20	15·9	50	20·61	41·2	Cumulative revenue
	Maize	Mt.	N5	0·81	30	2·38	10	20·09	40	23·26	58·1	realized from sales of
	Cowpea	Mt.	N5	–	5	0·2	5	–	10	0·20	2·00	Improved planting
	Soyabean	Mt.	–	–	–	–	N5	0·04	N5	0·04		Material is N54 697 30
	Cassava	Bondles	–	–	–	–	N5	–	N5	–		
	Groundnut	Mt.	–	–	–	–	N5	0·66	N5	0·66		
	Yam miniset	Setts	–	–	–	–	N5	2126	N5	2126		
	Sorghum	Mt.	–	–	–	–	N5	0·16	N5	0·16		
2·4	Agro processing:											
a	Demonstration centres	No.	2	–	–	–	4	–	4	–	0	Machines not purchased
b	Distribution of Agro. Processing machines to Cooperatives	No.	36	–	–		30	–	60	–	0	Machines not purchased
c	Reactivation of Agro. Processing machines in W/Zone	No.	–	–	15	–	15	–	15	–	0	Programme yet to be worked out

Table 27(e)

	ITEM/ACTIVITY	UNIT	1986		1987		1988		CUMULATIVE			REMARKS
			TARGET	ACHIE-VEMENT	TARGET	ACHIEVE-MENT	TARGET	ACHIEV-EMENT	TARGET	ACHIEVE-MENT	ACHIE-VEMENT	
3	RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE											
3·1	Roads											
a	Reinstatement/Rehabilitation	Ka	150	-	500	-	150	-	600	-	0	Delays in road programme
b	Recurrent Maintenance	Ka	100	-	1200	-	1000	-	2300	-	0	Due to lack of plants
	Manual Maintenance	Ka	1000	100	3000	250	800	37	4800	387	8·1	for road work
	Culvert Construction	Ka	40	-	100	18	100	5	240	23	9·6	
	Bridge repairs	Ka	14	-	35	-	35	2	84	2	2·3	
3·2	Water Supply											
a	Borehole drilling	No	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	100	
b	Borehole maintenance	No	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	100	
c	Tubewell drilling	No	-	-	N5	5	10	-	10	5	50	
d	Open well rehabilitation	No	-	-	-	-	6	-	6	-	0	
e	Spring water development	No	-	-	-	-	15	-	N5	-	-	
3·3	Buildings:											
a	Renovation of F.S.Ss	M2	N5	-	N5	-	N5	2438	N5	2438		11 No FSCs 404 N2
b	Construction of F S C's (New)	No	-	-	-	-	4	3	4	3		
c	Residential Quarters (New)	No	-	-	-	-	6	-	6	-		Contract awarded
d	Residential Quarters (Maint.)	No	-	3	N5		N5	12	N5	Various		
e	Renovation of Offices	N2	N5	No.Hq	N5	-	N5	Lump	N5	Various		Ntce work at all the times
f	Construction of Offices (New)	No	-	-	-	-	3	-	3			Contract awarded
g	Block Extension Offices	No	-	-	-	-	20	-	20			Contract awarded
3·4	Mechanical:											
	Aquisition of workshops	No	2	-	1	-	3	2	5	2	66·6	Ayongba and Ber Agbua
	Construction of new W/shop	No	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
	Construction of service	No	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-		
	Fuel Depots	No	-	-	1	-	3	-	3	-		
	Refurbishing of vehicles	No	N5	19	N5	26	N5	10	N5	55	-	
	Rebuilding of heavy plants	No	-	-	-	-	5	3	5	3	60	
4·3	Funding											
a	IBRD											
b	IFAD	Naira M	13·70	-	6·744	-	16·478	5·29	36·922	5·292	14·53	(31·630)
c	FGN	Naira M	2·00	1·54	1·500	1·015	1 600	1·805	5·100	4·360	85·49	(0·740)
d	B.N.S.D.	Naira M	1·40	0·90	5·097	3·915	9·000	4·659	15·497	9·733	62·8	(5·764)
e	Bridging Loan	Naira M		2·00	-	-	-	-	-	2·000	-	
f	D.L.S	Naira M	-	-	-	-	-	10·000	-	10·000	-	

Source BNARDA MAKURDI

This project like other past ones had envisaged planning and monitoring as an on-going and integral part of the programme as indicated in the objectives. Evaluation was thus built into the system right at the initial stage. The planning done here however was still top-down and elitist and needs to be more oriented to the local context. For instance records of official meetings as usual do not show any contact with the people over the planning of the strategies of implementing extension services which was supposed to be the main strategy of this agency. Only 31% of the 81 respondents indicated they were contacted before the establishment of the project but on further questioning it was discovered that the consultation was only in respect of where to build the Farm Service Centres. Yet, the success of such important demonstration activities as the Small Plot Adaptive Technique (SPAT) and the On-Farm Adaptive Research (OFAR) very much depend on their being planned along with the people. Indeed the SPAT and OFAR services are innovations which distinguish the extension work of BNARDA from the traditional extension service carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture.

Generally the official records of achievements in BNARDA show a reasonable amount of success going by their objectives, though this cannot be described as impressive. From the figures given, there is an apparent high success in fertilizer procurement and distribution, (Table 27c, item 2.2) the training of farmers and extension agents, OFAR trials, seed

multiplication in rice and cowpea, outgrower efforts in rice and soyabeans, (Table 27b item I) borehole drilling and maintenance (Table 27e item 3.2). At a glance this appears to be quite an impressive success.

A clear analysis of these achievements however paints a slightly different picture. The whole programme as indicated earlier, emphasises extension services such as providing extension agents to serve farm facilities; training both the agents and the farmers in the more productive methods of agriculture; demonstration activities (SPAT, OFAR, on-station trials, village extension agents (VEAs) visits, Farmers Field days); acquiring contact farmers (progressive farmers). Other activities were meant to facilitate this service. They included seed multiplication (and distribution brobably); acquisition and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and fungicides; provision of infrastructure (roads, water, buildings). The rest of the activities comprised of the support services and atructure to facilitate the performance of BNARDA.

As it is, much of what is contained in the summary of targets and achievements is merely the provision of these inputs and not their real effect on the farmers. How much of the new techniques have been adopted the real effect of the new techniques on yields is not indicated in this summary of achievements (Table 27, b and c). The goal of developing a

revitalised and effective extension service which would link up research and the farmers implies a frequent and purposeful contacts between extension workers and farmers. However, up to 1988, there were only 295 extension agents provided to serve a targeted 385,000 farm families throughout the state. This gives a ratio of about 1305 farm families to one extension worker. Considering the settlement pattern in the state, these agents cannot be very effective in dealing with all their clients. Officially however, there is an impressive record of 76% achievement in this regard.

As expected, interviews with the agents themselves confirmed this problem. All of them complained of the poor spatial spread of the agents and the poor impact they had on the farmers generally. Their problems were further compounded by the lack of vehicles with which they could easily move to cover the large areas under them. The use of progressive farmers as contact farmers who could pass on the newly learned techniques had been employed to reduce this problem but these categories of farmers could not be as effective as the agents, besides as Dunmoye (1986) noted, a continuous use of progressive farmers has the tendency of creating a class differential among the peasant farmers themselves and thus further entrenching capitalist exploitative tendencies even at this level of the society.

Table 27b item 1.1d also indicated that a 225% achievement was recorded in the course organised for farmers.

In reality this means 36 courses for three years or a course every month. This sounds impressive, too, but when one tries to determine how many farmers were involved and what was their spatial spread then this achievement no longer means much and such information is conspicuously absent. Similarly a 107.6% (Table 27, item 1.1e) achievement was also recorded in training courses organised for extension agents. The actual number is 28 courses within 2 years. But in order to appreciate the effect of this training, it will be necessary to know not only the number of extension workers so trained but what geographical area each trained person covers. In any case such figures as given above are responsible for swelling up the overall achievement percentage for the project which stood at 68.6%.

The extension agents were expected to carry out such crucial activities as SPAT, OFAR and OST besides the usual routines of attending to Farmers Field Days, training of farmers and visits to farmers. Official records (Table 27 item 1), show an achievement of 2114 successful SPAT and 737 OFAR trials representing 105.7% of the target while 295 VEAs claimed to have worked with 26,527 contact farmers by 1988. This will also appear to be a very high success rate, yet this does not appear to be the view of the field staff (that is the extension workers) responsible for the promotion of the programme nor the target people themselves.

Asked whether SPAT and OFAR have helped to increase their annual food production, 83% of the 81 responses from farmers

interviewed were negative (see Appendix II, Qn. 91, c and i). Similarly only 40% of the respondents agreed that their farm income had improved due to the assistance they get from extension agents. 65% of the respondents also felt that extension agents were not always available when required.

This trend is corroborated by the view expressed by the agents themselves. Although many of them were unwilling to fill questionnaires or give written information (probably) for fear of identification), almost everyone enjoyed an informal discussion about their problems. In the end, this turned out to be more frank and more useful than filling the questionnaires. The informal interview with the village extension workers and the contact farmers in each zone has thrown more light on the problems besetting the BNARDA extension programme.

All over the state, there appeared to be the problem of poor adoption of the new practices propagated by the extension workers through SPAT and OFAR. Besides the SAPT and OFAR sites being too small and too few both in terms of the geographical coverage and the crops they deal with at a time, the criterion of selection of these sites too raised some problems. The small number was obviously related to what the VEAS could do given their small number in relation to what was to be done. Often the VEA's selected sites were conditioned by the willingness of the contact farmer to offer a plot for such demonstration exercise. Farmers who are always skeptical are often unwilling to cooperate fully. Besides, the desire to have

a plot for every unit area they cover makes the plots too sparsely dispersed to be effectively covered by the VEAs and their consequent failure to produce expected results would further strengthen farmers skepticism. The SPAT and OFAR locations are also inconsistent in terms of their location as well as the crop used for the demonstration.

They vary with seasons just as they vary with crops. Thus when respondents were to indicate whether or not they were applying the advice of the extension staff, only 16% of the respondents admitted that they have been doing so.

Farmers that we talked to complain that they are unable (Appendix II, "n.30 c) to visually see the advantages of the new methods which they consider too tedious, labour intensive and an interference with their normal working calendar. Since neither farmers nor extension workers are able to keep records of costs and benefits, it is not easy for comparative advantages to be made, more so as extension workers are not usually around during the harvest on the SAP farms. Farmers feel government should look for small affordable farm implements which they can own and use to help them cope with the requirements of the new techniques.

6.2.2 Supply of Farm Inputs

Other problems which the agents said they faced were the untimely and short supply of appropriate inputs. Farmers become distrustful of any advice or promises coming from

extension if they have been failed once or twice. The agents also feel BNARDA has overemphasised visits to individual farms rather than collective meetings with farmers which they feel will work better under the present circumstances. Their responses to interview questions also indicated that the poorest decisions made within the organization are always those that do not give enough consideration to the local situation and that costs rather than user-patronage have been the greater influence in decisions taken at the headquarters.

BNARDA's concern was to ensure also that farm inputs were made available to farmers at the right time. Of these, fertilizer is the most important input but there are insinuations that farmers are not receiving enough of these items. By 1988, BNARDA recorded over 150% achievement of its target in this area (Table 27c) yet 85% respondents among farmers said they were unable to get their fertilizer supply from government sources. It is either that in spite of this, BNARDA is still far from meeting the local demand or that much of the fertilizer is diverted to other places even though records show that this is distributed to local farmers. It appears both factors are responsible. In May 1990, BNARDA was forced to account for about 9 trailer loads of fertilizer which was alleged to have been undelivered (Nigerian Voice Newspaper,19th May, 1990). This is evidenced to the insincerity and the inaccuracy of records of fertilizer distribution by the Authority in Benue State.

6.2.3 General Impact

Although an analysis of the responses of the local farmers shows that there is no significant difference in the crop yields before and after the project had commenced, the failure of these processes to significantly improve crop yields may have also been an added cause to increased food prices. However, 90% of farmers interviewed would still not attribute the increased cost of food to BNARDA's activities. In fact about 80% of these farmers agree that the establishment of BNARDA is a useful thing (Appendix II, Qn.11), but when they were asked to assess the different items concerning the socio-economic impact of the project, the frequencies indicated an average of 37.8 per cent for the true and completely true responses (Appendix II, Qn. 9). This response represents a poor rating of the socio-economic impact of the project. If the farm inputs were made available at the FSCs and in good time, farmers would have probably been at an advantage but the lack of this cancels much of the effect of the location of the FSCs nearer the farmers' villages.

The evidence here therefore, is that the success so far of this project in creating the necessary impact amongst the farmers still remains far below the expected targets. In fact when the percentages of the achievements (a shown in Table 27(a), (b), (c) and (e) in the different activities were averaged, seven out of the eleven sub-activity areas record achievements of less than 40%. This corroborates the evidence above that not

Table 28 Assessment of Socio-Economic Impacts

Items	Percentage of Respondents		
	Completely Untrue & Untrue	Indifferent	Completely True & True
a) The activities of SPART/OFAR etc have helped me increase my annual food production.	17	10	73
b) Due to the activities of BNARDA, a feeder road has been constructed which we also us.	70	4	26
c) I feel the increase in my farm income has to do with the assistance I get from the Extension Agents.	64	14	22
d) Extension Agents have helped us secure access to financial assistance from government and or banks	60	17	23
e) Much time is now saved in the procurement of farm inputs with the location of Farm service centres (FSC).	45	16	39
f) Inputs are sold at cheaper rates at FSCS.	49	0	51
g) Inputs are given without delay at FSC.	38	12	50
h) Inputs are usually available in time at the FSC.	63	10	27
i) EAs are always available when required.	63	12	25
j) BNARDA has made it easier for farmers to consult extension.	46	12	42
Average Percentage	51.5	10.7	37.8

much is being achieved judging from what was set out to be achieved. This is indeed contrary to the morale and the visible enthusiasm with which senior officials at the headquarters talked about the activities of the project. This presumed success of the project has unfortunately influenced government to pump money into the project without reappraising the methods and indices used in evaluating the success of the project.

Like the LBRBDA, this programme is also facing the problem of attempting to achieve a multiplicity of objectives. In the provision of infrastructure which is another area of pursuit in this project, BNARDA is faced with problems of lack of plants and machinery. This the BNARDA report explained as the cause of the low achievements in the provision of roads and water supply (Table 27(e).

Judging from the activities in which BNARDA is involved, it would appear that the resources required for its success are not too remote. Its failure to create good impact is more related to the issue of misplaced values in the detailed objective formulation than the lack of appropriate resources. As much as affordable farm implements are desired, evidence at hand imply that success depends a lot more on improving the availability of trained extension workers, proper involvement of the farmers in the planning of the activities that involve them and the coordination of the relevant activities of the other agencies wherever appropriate. For example, while

extension workers are badly needed in BNARDA, many are just wasting away in the Ministry of Agriculture which has its own separate programme.

The multiplicity of goals has become a detraction from the main objective of providing extension services and other farm inputs. It also helps to spread the lean financial resources into areas that could be more effectively handled by other agencies. Without such detractions, the Authority could have perhaps made do with what funds they had been supplied. A summary of the BNARDA's funding in 1988 for example was given as follows:

Funding:

The funding of BNARDA was the responsibility of the following bodies who were expected to provide initial capital for the project.

(a)	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)	- US $1.223m
(b)	Federal Government of Nigeria	- ₦094m
(c)	Benue State Government	- ₦858m

In addition the Federal Government raised a development loan stock of ₦10.00m for sharing among the agricultural development projects of the different states.

Although these funds were said to be 'quite adequate for project activities' (BNARDA), a summarised report of targets and achievements indicated that the total expenditure of N34,455,414.45 which was made between December 1986 and December

1988 only indicated a 53.42% percentage achievement, that is, 53.42% of the total budget requirement. This means that the funds were either not enough but accepted as such for political reasons or that the budgeting itself was questionable. The BNARDA authorities also conceed the fact that there was a sharp imbalance between capital and recurrent expenditures. While the share of capital expenditure was noted to be N2,042,984.84 or 29% of the total expenditure, the share of recurrent expenditure was N30,412,433.61 or 93.70% of total expenditure.

A breakdown shows that fertilizer transportation expenses alone accounted for 38.9% of the total expenditure followed by staff wages and salaries 14.72% and local travelling expenses 2.78%.

The huge sums spent on the procurement of fertilizer too can only be justified if there is a good timely distribution of the input. Unfortunately, the main business of BNARDA which is the provision of extension service and the timely supply of inputs do not appear to be tackled as earnestly as it deserves. Until a more effective network of distribution of fertilizers and other inputs is worked out to the advantage of the rural farmers, the volume of sales of fertilizers as it now stands cannot be said to be a fair indicator of fertilizers distributed to local farmers.

In other words BNARDA needs to win the confidence of farmers by ensuring that the spatial impact of the extension services as well as the consistency of the provision of inputs

is improved and maintained. In this regard, perhaps a better way of evaluating BNARDA's achievements is to include more of the indices which are developed from the point of view of the farmers and the field workers experiences.

6.3 DFRRI ACHIEVEMENTS

As noted earlier, DFRRI was charged with a lengthy list of objectives and programme areas to be achieved. These objectives are so wide-ranging that their implementation is bound to be problematic not only in terms of funding but also in terms of an effective coordination and supervision of the activities. As the programme areas stand, each one of them would require more time and careful planning than the military manner in which their execution is attempted. Because of the size of what has to be done, the activities of DFRRI were divided into several phases. The first phase was to deal with the objective of providing rural feeder roads which is by far the most needed infrastructure according to local priorities. According to the 1988 DFRRI Report the Government had provided the sum of N12,631,750 to the state. Of this amount, N9,131,977 was released to the Directorate by 1987, It shared this sum as follows:

(a)	Road construction	- N7,859,000.00
(b)	Ecological problems	- N1,000,000.00
(c)	Water scheme	- N3,500.00
(d)	Food production	- N272,750.00
		N12,631,750.00

Source: DFRRI Annual Report (1989).

6.3.1 Agriculture and Food

The goal of ensuring adequate food supply was to be tackled by the provision of improved seed, fisheries and livestock.

Improved Seed Production: A total of 652 tonnes of improved seeds and 1,042,500 tree seedlings were to be distributed over a land area of 430 hectares spread all over the state. This was to be done through direct production by the Ministry of Agriculture and contract seed growers. By the end of 1987, 446 tonnes representing 68.4% of the set target was produced over an area of 281 hectares (DFRRI, 1st Quarterly Report, 1988). The Ministerial brief given on DFRRI activities in July 1988 however, gave this figure as 94.3 tonnes of improved seeds out of a targeted 100 tonnes. This represents 94.3%. Such discrepances are not uncommon in all the project studied so far. They are indicative of the state of record keeping, monitoring and evaluation and the overall effect in that they make it difficult for an accurate assessment of the performance of the projects to be made. About 114,155 seedlings of the tree crops were also said to be planted.

Fisheries: About 2.5 million fingerlings were to be raised for distribution but by March 1988 production had not even started because the hatchery was said to be still under construction.

Livestock: Centres for goats, sheep and rabbits rearing were to be established but by the time of this investigation these had not yet taken off.

6.3.2 Infrastructure

The performance of DFRRI in this regard appears to be quite encouraging when judged by records presented by the Directorate's top officials. By this token they rate the organisation as quite successful in Benue State but almost every assessment of DFRRI made by outsiders has failed to give it a pass mark, including the Benue State Committee and the Federal Governments Monitoring Team (See also FOCUS Newsmagazine, July, 1988; Newswatch Newsmagazine, March 28, 1988).

Among the infrastructure to be improved by DFRRI were rural roads, rural water supply, rural housing and rural electrification.

Rural Electrification: Work was in progress to supply electricity to four communities in different local government areas, namely Okaba, Zakibiam, Ushongo, Ugboju and Ajaka. These have now been completed under the first phase but it is not sure if they were completed on schedule since there was no completion time indicated when targets were being set.

Rural Housing: Details of implementation were still being worked out at the time of the survey for this study, In the meantime surveys to determine the existing situation were reported being done.

Rural Water Supply: This was to be provided in 1,692 villages with the help of existing agencies such as The Utilities Board and Ayangba ADP. The original target was later scaled down by the National Directorate to 250 communities.

Fig. 25 BENUE STATE INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION



Source: Compiled from (1) Benue State Rural Electrification Programe
(2) Paterson Candy International Ltd., Rural water supply for Benue State, Nigeria.

On their own, the Directorate was able to serve only 5 communities. These include three boreholes in K/Ala Local Government Area, a tube-well in Ogobia in Otukpo Local Government Area and the Ogodu water works in Ankpa Local Government Area. The figure of rural communities provided with water rose to 45 by March 1988. Through the efforts of State Government and The United Nations Development Project (UNDP), work was in progress to provide 84 other communities with water. DFRRI is not known to have contributed anything to these other agencies. Even with the completion of all of these, the state would have been only able to achieve 51.6% of its target.

Rural Road Improvement: Minutes and Quarterly Reports indicate that the State DFRRI sent a request of 2,777km of roads to its National headquarters but only 893km was approved for improvement in phase one. About 1677km was reported improved by December 1987 either through regrading or rehabilitation (See Table 29). This represents 70.3% of what the Directorate later fixed as the target for the State (i.e. 2387km). Rural road improvement was the major objective of DFRRI in the first phase of its activities which happened to be the time this survey was also conducted. It was extremely difficult to get any reliable data on the extent to which this objective had been accomplished in the State. However by scrutinising information obtained from field observation, minutes of the State Council meetings, and reports from state and local government committees, a summary of achievements in this regard was arrived at as follows:

Table 29: Summary of Achievements in Feeder Road Improvements by Benue DFRRI

(Distance in Kilometres)

Name of L.G.A.	Presented to National Directorate(km)	Re-Constructed (km)	Rehabilitated (km)
K/Ala	232	9.6	24
Kwande	17.1	-	8.3
Vandeikya	267	-	45.1
Gboko	215	23	-
Gwer	173	-	-
Makurdi	194	-	-
Oju	212	26.6	8
Otukpo	230	-	-
Okpokwu	198	-	-
Ankpa	217	-	26
Dekina	249	-	22
Bassa	181	-	-
Idah	238	-	-
Total	2,777	59.2	137.5
Grand Total	=	196.7km	

It was the view of the Presidential Monitoring Team on the Final Comprehensive Inspection (FCI) of phase one of the rural Feeder Roads Programme in Benue State that the implementation was woeful and shoddy and that the rural populace had not benefitted from the Government laudable efforts. The Local Government Councils as the prime executors of the programme in the state were grossly under funded. All Local Government Chairmen complained of lack of funds as the critical reason for the failure of the programme in the state. For instance the monitoring report shows that less than two million naira was disbursed directly to the Local Government Council Committees

out of the 9,370 million naira received from the National Directorate for this purpose even though this is where the bulk of the work was supposed to be handled.

Site visits on the Amaafu-Ugba road for example showed that about 25km out of the road length of 64km were graded and the grading had also resulted in decreasing the width of the road in some places. The same problem applied to the Augaji Egwanokwu-Onyande road which seem to have also been graded some time ago. Much of the work DFRRI has done in this rural road improvement area has to do with grading and not any new construction (Table 29). A few culverts where the old ones had completely broken down were also repaired.

On their part, the target people have hardly realised any lasting effect of the activities of the Directorate. Except where culverts had been constructed road improvement by grading did not last long before the roads again deteriorated into corrugations and pot holes. Respondents in this study therefore felt that even though the work of DFRRI was a highly desirable, what had been done so far had little impact (See Table 30).

Table 30: Local Assessment of DFRRI Project

Item	Percentage of Respondents		
	S/Disagreed and Disagreed	Indiffer.	S/Agreed & Agreed
a) Do you agree that the DFRRI road project is a useful thing?	7	3	90
b) Do you agree that the project has improved the quality of roads in your area?	7	4	89
c) Do you agree that the establishment of this project has helped in any way to improve the water supply in your area?	66	24	10
d) Do you agree that the DFRRI road has improved your social life generally?	66	28	16
e) Do you agree that the project has helped to improve the quality of your house?	67	24	9
Average Percentage	42.6	16.6	40.8

All respondents indicate that they do not think DFRRI project has anything to do with the change in food prices (Appendix III, Qn.20). Also from the discussion with the respective Divisional Engineers, it was learnt that the grading of the two roads concerned was a decision made by the local government officials. About 47% of the respondents had thought DFRRI officials made such decisions while 39% did not have any idea who made such decisions.

6.4 AN OVERVIEW OF DFRRI

A reflection on the general performance of DFRRI in Benue State highlights the following issues and problems. There is the serious problem of inadequate funds budgeted for the programmes even for what has been approved for implementation. This problem has been made worse as these funds are often not released in time and not honestly distributed to the appropriate target points for implementation at the state level. The Presidential Monitoring team also noted for example that of the N9.370 million disbursed to the State, less than two million naira was disbursed directly to local government who are the prime executor of projects. There is also the lack of a consistent criteria for the disbursement of these funds. For some reasons, the accountability and supervision of these projects has not been thorough and as such, returns of achievement records are sometimes falsified in order to impress the public and thus account for what has been said to be spent for the project. The placement of military personnel at the helm of affairs makes it difficult for other persons to try to even find out what is actually happening within the Directorate since they are answerable directly to the President. Their accounts are not subject to public scrutiny neither are they supposed to be audited by external auditors. Inaccessibility to DFRRI records and the discrepancies in the presentation of such records has created much public distrust in the whole organization. (Also see The Analyst Newsmagazine, Vol.2, No.61987).

In order to emphasise its power at the state headquarters, the Benue DFRRI centrally purchased materials and distributed them to the Local Governments Areas. This process caused several problems which ranged from waste of time to unnecessary costs in distribution and inadequate determination of the relevance of materials so bought.

Generally there appeared to be an absence of specific guidelines for the implementation of DFRRI projects in the state operations. DFRRI depended largely on other organizations for implementation but was not provided with any legal authority to control or stem their non-performance except, perhaps, to report back to Lagos. There was also a little confusion as to the extent to which DFRRI could directly carry out operations. It was generally accepted that their role is complementary but besides the decree saying that they shall liaise and cooperate with other institutions etc, nothing else clearly identifies this role.

Like the river Basin Programme, DFRRI has overspread its arms without the necessary supporting resources. Moreover the struggle for bureaucratic control by the various officials concerned has made it difficult to appreciate the contextual nature of the problem at stake and to properly involve the target people in the decision-making process. This indeed goes contrary to the whole idea and process of mobilising the rural communities whose resources have thus remained underutilised. On the whole, the implementation of DFRRI projects in Benue

state is more of an ad hoc business and does not show any evidence of systematic planning.

6.4 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Records of community development projects in Benue State are difficult to collate because many of the projects are not even brought to the awareness of Government authorities. Although Government aid to community self-help projects had not been forth coming for the previous years, in 1988 Government made a provision of N2m as grants and technical assistance to self-help projects with the promise that any viable self-help project embarked upon by a community would receive final assistance from government worth 25% of the cost of the project. It was after this promise that Community Development (CD) associations were being registered for more effective monitoring. The evaluation made here is therefore based solely on the projects studied in the course of the research, namely, the School Community Development Projects at Koti, Ishangev-Ya in Kwande Local Government Area and Upu in Otukpo Local Government Area.

In terms of their set targets, these institutions were expected to be established as full secondary schools with at least two streams in each class. Until the reorganisation of post-primary schools into junior and senior schools by the State Ministry of Education, each of these schools had been fully functional as secondary schools. They each started functioning barely three years after the

initiation of the idea. They had also each attained the senior secondary school status after five years of commencement of classes. This was a normal growth rate as only one new class could be added to the existing ones each year. While the Ishangev-Ya Community Secondary School, Koti now has 8 classes with a total enrolment of 265 students, the Otukpo Community Secondary School, Upu now has 12 classes with a total enrolment of 420 students.

Both schools are still fully operational but have staffing problems and lack the necessary equipment in the laboratories and workshops. These problems are common in all community secondary schools in the State. This may probably be due to the unattractive conditions of service that were existing in community schools compared with other schools owned by Government and missionaries. The staffing situation is now being tackled with the institution of the unified teaching service now in operation under the Teaching Service Board.

It is interesting to note however that the issue of the establishment of a school does not rank high amongst the priority list of local aspirations. It is not likely that schools are unwanted but more probably because since the area can make do with what is now available, the need for extra schools is no more there or at least it is not so pressing compared to the other issues.

All respondents in this study are not in doubt of the purpose of the school project which they themselves have established and put in efforts to maintain. Indeed 99% of the respondents have something to do with the school in one way or the other. That is to say either their children or their relations' children are going to school there or their relatives are working in the school. This gives them an extra commitment to what is going on in the school. Strong reasons given for their interest in the school are that they now have their school to which their wards have a fair access it is near their home and therefore convenient to the children; and that they too can now have a say in what happens in the school. All respondents agree that the community project is beneficial and successful.

When compared to government-run projects, the following points become noteworthy. First the objectives of the school and any other community projects is usually simple and uncomplicated. What is to be achieved is small and clear to everyone and usually within the reach of the resources of the community. The choice of what project is to be carried out is strictly guided by the urgency of its need within the community. It is this need too that advertises the project and mobilises people for its implementation. The whole process is democratic and highly related to the local situation both in terms of resources as well as the social structure. The qualification for leadership roles in the implementation process is usually beased largely on honesty and ability of the appointees to perform the expected tasks effectively.

Community Development projects however do not have a wide resources base like that of Government projects. They often lack technical skills and have to look elsewhere for them. In some cases they find it difficult to pay for the skills unless grant-aided as in the case of schools. Where such projects require long term management and continuous investment, their maintenance is also found difficult. In the case of schools Governments has to take over the payment of teachers and regulate the running of the schools too.

Community Development projects by their nature, have to be limited to a small geographical area. This is due largely to the nature of linkages that govern communities and the strong dependence on socio-cultural dictates in the execution of these projects coupled with the limited resources. All these make communities unable to undertake projects on a regional level. The process of planning and implementing rural development projects therefore has to be designed to appropriate the advantages of the capacities and capabilities of both systems of planning on the local and regional levels, taking care of local details but at the same time coordinating and directing the local objectives towards the achievement of national goals.

6.5 SUMMARY

This evaluation of the rural Development Projects has brought into focus some issues and problems which need mentioning at this stage. Government in its zeal to raise

the level of living conditions of the rural people has instituted several programmes and projects without being able to provide the matching financial resources to prosecute these programmes which are large both in numbers and in scope. The Federal Government is tackling this rural development problem at two main levels. First it takes on the large scale regional programmes such as the River Basin Authorities while the state is entrusted with the provision and promotion of inputs and infrastructural development. The Federal Government still has the responsibility of funding these programmes. There is no specific programme which directly involves Local Government councils and community Development Associations.

In all the cases looked at, participation in the planning process has been unfairly skewed to the elitist group and financiers of such projects. The context of the environment for which plans are made is not usually brought into proper focus and the users of the planned outcomes have thus been constantly marginalised in the process. Under these circumstances, the mobilization of the rural people either for the support or sometimes even the use of these projects becomes difficult.

The evaluation of these rural development projects indicates that the major problem areas in the whole process of the planning and implementation are related to:

(i) The achievement of the aspirations of the target people.

(ii) The local people's perceived purpose of the projects.

(iii) The administrative problems facing the running of the projects.

(iv) The socio-economic benefits derived from the projects (which also has to do with the level of production/ achievement in the project and consequently,

(v) the willingness of the people to participate in the project activities.

All these factors influence the local people's overall assessment of the projects. Responses relating to each of these factors were computed to obtain a mean score. These mean scores were then considered as new variables described respectively as local assessment (LASSMT), project benefits (PRBNFT), production achievement (PRDCTN), local aspirations (LASPR), administrative problems (ADMPROB),perceived purpose of the project (PURPOSE) and the people's willingness to participate in project planning (WILLING).

In order to find out the interrelations of these derived variables in influencing the performance of the project, each of them was correlated with all the other remaining variables using the Pearson's product-moment correlation method. The results of the Pearson correlation Coefficient is presented in the form of a matrix as shown in Table 31 below.

Table 31: PEARSON'S CORRELATION COEFFICIENT MATRIX

	LASSMT	PRBNT	PRDCTN	LASPR	ADMPROB	PURPOSE	WILLING
LASSMI	1.0000						
PRBNT	.5497 t=5.5452	1.0000					
PRDCTN	.4421 t=4.1534	.6675 t=7.5536	1.0000				
LASPR	.3356 t=3.0019	.2652 t=2.3176	.3752 t=4.4108	1.0000			
ADMPROB	.4990 t=4.8518	.4946 t=4.7935	.4349 t=4.0694	.3453 t=3.1002	1.0000		
PURPOSE	.3871 t=3.5376	.3056 t=2.7043	.5648 t=5.7672	.4112 t=3.8012	.6035 t=6.3772	1.0000	
WILLING	.4393 t=4.1207	.5036 t=4.9119	.5739 t=5.9057	.3387 t=3.0332	.6602 t=7.4063	.5564 t=5.6423	1.0000

Source: Derived from field data.

The sample correlation coefficients in this table indicate a reasonably strong correlation in almost all cases as shown by the t values which are calculated as

$$t = \frac{r\sqrt{n-2}}{\sqrt{1-r2}}$$

The t values indicate that all of the coefficients

show a significant correlation when tested at 72 degrees of freedom and at 0.05 level of significance. The implication in this analysis is that these variables are interrelated and produce commulative effects on the achievements of the rural development agencies under study. For instance a reasonably high correlation (0.5497) between the project benefits and the local assessment of projects and that between willingness and project benefits means that the more people see and actually benefit from the activities of the existing projects, the more prepared they will be to patronise future projects. Conversely the failure of these projects is likely to create mistrust and lack of faith in government projects.

In the same manner, the failure to satisfy local aspirations can also affect local participation and consequently the project benefits too. It is observed here too that although there is a significant correlation between local aspirations and the project benefits and between purpose and the project benefits, the correlation is a weak one. This may probably be a pointer to the fact that the relationship between the identification of appropriate project objectives may not

automatically mean a successful implementation. The process leading to a successful implementation will also need to be carefully followed inorder to produce the desired results. The correlations however imply also that the way the people assess these projects will be a reflection of their own disposition towards such projects. Consequently the local assessment variable discribed above was used as a measure of the preferences the people had given to the various government projects. Under the nul hypothesis that there was no difference in the disposition of the people to the three government-sponsored projects, namely KRBDA, BNAKDA and DFRRI, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out using the model (Silk, 1979:175-179).

$$\sum_{i=1}^{g}\sum_{j=1}^{n}\left(X_{ij}-\bar{\bar{x}}\right)^2 = n\sum_{i=1}^{g}\left(\bar{x}_i-\bar{\bar{x}}\right)^2 + \sum_{i=1}^{g}\sum_{j=1}^{n}\left(X_{ij}-\bar{x}_i\right)^2$$

Where g = the number of samples or groups (i.e the columns in the matrix)

n = the number of observations of samples (rows in the matrix)

X_{ij} = the value in the ith group on the jth observation.

$\bar{x}$ = the mean of all observations (the grand mean.

$\bar{x}_i$ = the mean of the ith sample.

The quantity on the left side of the equality sign is the total sum of squres (TSS). The first quantity on the right side is kthe between-sample sum of squares (BSS) while the second quantity is the within-sample sum of squares.

Table 24: ANOVA TABLE FOR THE LOCAL ASSESSMENT OF LBRBRDA, BNARDA AND DFRRI

Source	Sum of Squares(SS)	Degrees of Freedom(DF)	Mean Square or Variance(MS)	F Ratio
Between group	174.7	2	S_B^2 =87.35	$\left(F=\frac{S_B^2}{S_W^2}\right)$ =143.2
Within group	136.2	224	S_W^2 = .61	
Total	310.9	226		

The theoretical F value at 0.01 level of significance = 4.01 and at 0.05 level of significance = 3.00.

Source: Field Data.

The F ratio in Table 32 shows that a statistically significant difference exists in the sample means of the local assessments of the various projects (LBRBRDA =

6.0548, BNARDA = 3.9422 and DFRRI = 4.7945). The greater disposition towards the LBRBRDA and DFRRI compared to BNARDA may be explained by the fact that the first two were engaged in activities that were more directly related to the local people's daily needs. The SPAT or OFAR project which was one of BNARDA's principal extension activity in the villages was found to be alien, hardly understood and not very much appreciated. BNARDA did not even appear to be associated with the sale of fertilizer which turned out to be its major engagement. Its therefore not surprising that BNARDA was assessed lowest. On the other hand, rice production within the LBRBDA and the road improvement activities were easier for the people to appreciate. The result of this analysis also shows that even though these projects were not rejected as earlier noted, their assessment here implies that the local people's problem with these projects is being able to understand and become involved with the activities of the project. They are concerned with the relevance of the project and how these are planned and implemented but not so much about who choses such projects for the people.

Analysis of data in this evaluation further shows that specific objectives and a clear perception of the projects are qualities which appear to be more associated with less sophisticated and small scale projects. There is therefore a noticeable absence of the confusion which led to several reorganisations in the regional large scale RBDAs as one moves to

projects that have attempted to tackle more specific goals. The failure of the RBDAs to pursue all its earlier set objectives and the resort to a land development scheme in the end is also an indication of the difficulty these large-scale, sophisticated rural development projects have in managing their affairs.

All these projects have been planned in a rational manner and have not been comprehensive enough to accommodate local details and interests and therefore lack that element of integration necessary for effective implementation. This poor integration of the people into the project planning therefore makes it madatory for the policy makers to also place the administration of such projects in the hands of a management that does not feel morally or sometimes even politically commited to achieving success. The erroneous assumption that foreign ideals were always better and would also work anywhere irrespective of any contextual difference made the planners of these projects lose sight of any advantages derivable from an iterative and exploratory discussion with the target people which should make a greater success of the projects. As they now are, the users of the projects who value the success of the projects can not take over the administration of these projects because they were not planned to be eventually transfered to the target people. This high degree of control by technocrats in the rural development projects does not help the achievement of self reliance among the rural people. An

after-taught of transfering the project to the local people will require reappraising the whole programme with the approval of the funding agencies. This will also require a great deal of educating such local people in the complex technical features which often represent a radical change from the existing technological tradition. Rather than get involved with all these intricacies, these projects are often allowed to face the unfortunate process of degenerating to a state of complete abandonment.

Related to this problem is also the issue of lumping together multiple groups as beneficiaries of rural development projects. The RBDA projects in Katsina-Ala for instance had problems with the Etulo and Mbagen communities and outside participants being lumped together as the target people. Indeed in all RBDA projects in Benue State, no categorical statement was made defining who the target people were. A few clashes between these groups had thus been recorded on the farm. This non-definition of the target people implies that no one group or persons is responsible for the costs involved nor will the benefits go to a defined group. Again this also means that no group can be trusted to make decisions for the other. This further encourages bureaucrats to continue handling down decisions to the users of the projects. This type of situation does not augur well for rural mobilization and local commitment to government projects.

CHAPTER VII

ORGANISING FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

7.1 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The general conclusion drawn from the research findings here is that the achievements of the government-sponsored projects aimed at rural development in Benue State are very much below expectations. The analysis of available information indicates that many of the constraints hindering greater success indict the process of planning and implementation. The planning objectives are not specific and poorly related to the local context; the planning and implementation processes are dominated by technocrats with little participation from the users of the projects; regional development programmes and projects are too ambitious and not properly planned or phased into meaningful achievable units; Government lacks both the resources to cope with these large scale sophisticated regional programmes and the managerial ability to co-ordinate the activities of the individual projects towards an overall desirable regional impact; Consequently there are still gross shortages and a poor distribution of the available agricultural inputs while the infrastructure meant to enhance agricultural production and improve rural life has not yet succeeded in creating the cumulative impact desirable in the rural areas. The food problem which these development programmes were supposed to solve has still remained largely unresolved.

7.1.1 Project Objectives

The research findings here show that the general aims of rural development in Benue State fall under two major areas. The first area is to increase food production (that is, the output of rural farmers) and the second area is to provide the necessary infrastructure such as rural roads, water supply and electricity to support the rural economy and also help to improve the living conditions of the people. The translation of these objectives into reality meant breaking them down into operational project objectives. The objectives of the projects reviewed, though generally in line with the aspirations of the target people, were not adequately related to the context of the projects' environment.

In the top-down relationship governing the planning process, the project implementation simply meant the allocation of money to carry out a given set of activities. The objectives were found to be too broad and without any target for measuring achievements. They also needed to be more anticipatory of the resources required for implementation.

The top-down relationship in the planning process implied that comprehensive and rational processes were employed in formulating even the project objectives with little, or in some cases, a total lack of opportunity given to the target people to contribute to the formulation of the operational objectives and the design of the projects. In other words the present process has not encouraged proper project planning and

appraisal before approval. This, in turn, encourages project managers to submit anything considered fit for the money provided in order to answer the question of accountability. The usual outcome in the failure of the projects to match what is required with what is available is that projects are either poorly completed, abandoned or are very much delayed depending on how government responds to the problem of inadequate resources.

7.1.2 Weakness in the Current Planning Process

At the point of execution, therefore, the project performance objectives were not sufficiently specific, measurable, manageable and were too dependent on uncertain resources. While it is expected that extension services in BNARDA for example could have worked better if planned with the effective participation of the target people, the excitment of using foreign ideals did not allow for the efficient use of the local knowledge. Similarly the desire to implement prestigious programmes such as the RBDAs and impress foreign investors made policy makers ignore the factor of manageability and self-reliance in the planning and implementation of rural development programmes. Consequently resources were wasted through projects which could not be managed and had to be abandoned or run at a loss. Thus the issue of cost effectiveness in these projects, too, has not been properly addressed.

The result of the analysis in the research therefore leads to the conclusion that government had relied too much on the

incidental effects of the individual projects in its rural development efforts. Thus within the existing planning process and the structure of the planning machinery, rural development implementation lacks both the lateral and vertical integration and the coordination necessary for its overall success. What is now required is a more effective process of planning and implementation of rural development projects with a view to achieving the overall national goals. For a start, therefore, this will require a well articulated planning process which will guide and integrate all planning activities towards the overall development of rural areas.

The planning of the rural development programmes and projects reviewed and their designs disregarded much of the physical and the social context in which they were located because there was not enough consultation with the affected people. The review of the projects has clearly shown the absence of serious efforts on the part of government to institutionalise grassroot participation in planning through the integration of local community institutions into the mainstream of the planning process. There is no stage in the current process where the mobilization of the target people towards participation in the decision making process either for plan formulation or implementation has been incorporated, neither is there any provision for these people to be properly educated on the planned activities.

The purported rational considerations of public interest in all planning issues makes planning look like a business for only those who are in government to the exclusion of even the local development associations with all their years of contribution in the rural development process. At best, it is hoped that the local governments will serve as the associations' advocates in this process but even the local governments themselves do have the opportunity of entering into direct dialogue with the central planning authority. The central planning authority (represented by the NPO) on the other hand does not have any constitutional authority which empowers it to compel the defaulting authorities (e.g. state governments) to conform to its directives. Under such circumstances, local governments and their community institutions are also completely under the control of the state authorities even though technically they are supposed to serve as a third tier of government.

The current process has also been weakened by its poor use of monitoring and evaluation as a mechanism for improving the formulation and implementation of subsequent plans. In the past accounting records were usually taken for evaluation documents. The LBRBDA annual reports of 1982 are typical examples of this practice. Plan evaluation reports are now being compiled by the NPO but these are hardly utilised beyond the NPO and a few other research houses. State governments receive them only to simply store away while local governments and project offices hardly see them.

The following suggestions which are made, therefore, with the aim of integrating the planning activities at the rural level with the national planning process and to promote grassroot participation in planning decisions beyond the present rhetorics. The suggestions also aim at the increased use of monitoring and evaluation as a means of enhancing success in the planning and implementation of rural development. The proposals have also taken cognizance of the prescriptions of the procedural theories discussed earlier in addition to the past experiences of other people.

7.2 TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PROCESS

One issue that clearly stands out in the examination of the selected rural development projects in Benue State is the unfortunate impression that planning these projects is simply a matter of itemising what projects are to be carried out and detailing who should do it. Up till now, bureaucrats, politicians and particularly soldiers in Nigeria do not appreciate that there is any advantage in a systematic planning process. There is the tendency to view the planning process as the periodic production of a plan document rather than viewing planning as a process or series of activities designed to enhance management performance in the production process in rural areas.

A review of past rural development efforts in other

places indicates that there are certain features which reoccur in most successful cases. There are noticed to include a well articulated programme which had either evolved or was designed to take place in a proper time perspective. Such programme usually enjoyed a reasonable period of an atmosphere of relative peace and stability in government. Subordinate to these conditions would then be a suitable land policy and an organised pattern of settlement with a definite unit to plan with (usually the village). Also required is the mobilization, education, discipline and willingness on the part of the affected people to adopt innovations.

The units of settlements were usually organised in a cooperative arrangement. This would be done by the people themselves in a democratic manner not by coercion, although relying on government financial support. The cooperative arrangements seem to work better where they are based on the social structure or experiences of the people. All of these were possible where there was also a strong commitment and discipline on the part of government.

The Nigerian planning experience has, however, been constrained by the lack of almost all of the above prerequisites apart from the weaknesses in the planning process highlighted above. Whereas it is true that local situations vary, the official stand in the rural development issue is to envisage the planning and implementation of all rural areas

as if they were in one homogeneous area with no respect for local variations. Thus plans produced by technical experts have been found to be either too expensive to execute like in the case of the River Basins or are unclear, difficult or too tedious for the untrained minds of the rural people to internalise as in the case of BNARDA. Such plans often become irrelevant to the actual local development options open to the planners, even where the general goal is found to be appropriate.

For a long time, rural development in Nigeria has been predicated on the premise that what is required from the rural areas is the supply of adequate food to the nation and their role in the earning of foreign exchange through the export of primary products. Thus past agricultural policies too have been very much influenced by the need to either export and earn foreign exchange or substitute imports and save foreign exchange. This strategy is in disharmony with Igbozurike's view that agricultural success should be related, not to the farm contributions to GDP, or to the national balance of payments. Rather it should be measured by the degree to which agricultural operations lead to as large a quantity of food and related farm products as possible per unit of physical and non-physical inputs; how safe the produce is for human consumption; and to what extent the process of raising the products damages or does not damage and land through pollution and erosion (Igbozurike, undated:1). Such measures are also familiar with the rural people. If the proliferation of these

projects was earnestly pursuing these measures, agriculture in the rural areas would have had a more stable base.

Unfortunately, the uncoordinated nature of the activities of those proliferated projects implies that the projects have hardly been seeking to achieve a common goal and neither have they been sufficiently integrated into the planning process nor have their ultimate overall effects been even identified.

At the local level rural development planning meant the presentation of lengthy want lists by officials involved. Such lists of ill-prepared projects were often too much for the financial resources available. It was also not uncommon for such officials to 'cook' some records and send to the headquarters as their achievement if only this will help them keep their jobs. (cf The Analyst, Vol.2, No.6, 1987:20-22; FOCUS Newsmagazine, July 1988: 10).

In spite of the unimpressive achievements in the rural development projects, Government appears to be under pressure to continue with these programmes because first, there is this understanding that the oil bonaza will not last forever. The Federal and State governments are, therefore, determined to use the oil revenue to improve the agricultural productivity which can then be relied upon when the oil money is depleted. Second, after having invested so much money in these programmes, it seems economically unwise at this stage to completely abandon

them in the usual style. In any case if these were to be abandoned, what would be their replacement? Political problems were also likely to arise from such an action. By 1986 for example, Government had an external debt of US $11.39 billion and a third of this was spent on agricultural programmes (Daily Times, Jan. 3, 1986). Third, there has been a continued decline in the share of agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors in cumulative foreign investment which started in 1980 and was noticed to be still low up to 1985 in spite of the fact that Federal Government had permitted substantial foreign equity participation in this sector since 1984 (CBN, 1987:25). Now that the economy is in trouble, it is all the more imperative for states to ensure the success of these projects in order to be able to service the country's debts. Such projects must therefore have to improve their performance even if this is only in economic terms.

Government's measures aimed at improving the performance of these projects have been to redefine the objectives and/or reorganise the programme by prunning down the numbers and sizes or at other times expanding the number or sizes of the various rural development institutions such as the RBDAs and the ADPs. Such ad hoc measures have fallen short of tackling the fundamental question. In the final analysis, the main problem boils down to how to make the public sector agencies more effective in the national rural development drive. The contention here is that one

of the ways rural development agencies can be made more effective is by paying more attention to the process by which their programmes are planned so as to imbue it with the necessary ingredients for success.

7.2.1 CONTROL AREAS

In trying to propose institutional and procedural changes that will improve the efficiency of the planning process in rural development, some key issues appear to press for attention. These include the question of where the planning agency should be located, the problem of coordination of the planning activities, the feedback system in terms of monitoring and evaluation and the issue of effective local participation.

7.2.1.1 Location of the Planning Agency

The issue of the optimal location of the planning agency has been under discussion by planners for a long time but opinions still differ as to the type and prefered administrative location of the agency. While others worry about where it should be located, others think its a residual issue and are not particularly bothered where it is located provided it is there (Oga, 1985: 10). Thus different countries have adopted different types of planning agencies and have located them in diverse administrative arms of government. What we have seen in our case here is that while at the Federal level the location is consistent, the situation remained rather

confusing among the state governments until 1984. Within the local governments councils, many do not even have planning departments. Usually, development committees have been formed 'under duress' as it were to handle planning issues.

When Benue was a part of the defunct Benue Plateau State, the government in this state had rotated her planning agency among four different locations between 1968 and 1976. From 1968 to 1971 it was in the Ministry of Finance; between 1971 and 1973 it was in the Office of the Governor; from 1974 to 1975 it was a separate Ministry and in 1976 it again went back to the Ministry of Finance from which point Benue State took over.

Although the problem of the physical location of the planning agency has fairly stabilised amongst state governments, the problem of lack of cooperation between the chief executive of the planning ministry, other ministries and parastatals still remains. Locating the agency in other operating ministries made the chief executive of such ministries pay less attention to planning matters. They are generally too busy with other pressing functions and always felt planning matters can always wait. Thus many planning issues have been laid away only to be hurried through at late hours, particularly the long-range activities which had to suffer so much postponement. Even as a separate ministry, the planning agency still suffers from a lack of cooperation from other ministries

and parastatals. This is because the agency has no legal power to penalise defaulting ministries or parastatals.

It is the recommendation here that what is more important is to ensure inter-ministerial and inter-agency cooperation. Whether we have a National Planning Commission as suggested by Oga (1985), instead of a Ministry and replicate this among state governments, experience shows that what will make the agency more effective is its ability to enforce the necessary cooperation.

Related to this question is the issue of Integrated Rural Development Planning as separate and unique activity of government. Like the general development planning, rural development planning in this country is also inconsistent and confusing. The absence of well articulated ideology (programme and strategy) for rural development has regretably given government the impression that rural development can be subsumed into agricultural development projects and related parastatals. This makes it difficult to achieve a proper rural development focus and so rural development has continued to mean largely agricultural development in Nigeria in spite of rhetorics from government officials.

Thus while some states see Rural Development as part of the Ministry of Agriculture and so place it there, others like in Benue State merge it with some parastatals. The Federal Government has included rural development with almost anything. It is part of the Ministry of Agriculture, it is part of DFRRI,

the river Basins and it is also expected to be part of the Agricultural Development Projects funded by the Federal Government though managed by States. Under this arrangement one finds it difficult to see how government can seriously concretise its own planning for a proper rural development. What is happening is not integrated rural development per se but integrated agricultural development in the rural areas.

The recommendation here is that a ministry for rural development should be created to accommodate all the activities of DFRRI, BNARDA (or ADPs elsewhere), Community Development and Rural Cooperatives. The Ministry should also be responsible for coordinating any other related activities that may not be under its immediate jurisdiction. The activities which are currently being carried out will be redefined and programmed in the light of a rural development ideology and strategies which centre on a basic spatial unit of development.

7.2.1.2 Coordination of Planning Activities

The need for coordinating planning activities cannot be over emphasised. Besides restructuring the institutional framework for this purpose there is also the need to tackle the substantive issue of organising the planning process in such a way that horizontal coordination at the local level between specialised development agencies in both plan formulation and implementation will be achieved. Even if a

Ministry for Rural Development is created as suggested above, with the hope that the activities of the various departments will be more complementary, there will still be other arms of governments such as the Utilities Board, the Ministry of Agriculture, Works,etc. whose related activities will need to be coordinated in both plan formulation and implementation.

The second aspect of coordination necessary is in the area of integrating the large number of local and regional plans in a consistent and equitable manner into the overall framework of the national development plan. It is hoped that the development of a coherent rural development programme will provide the basis for this integration.

7.2.1.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

The near-absence of monitoring and evaluation in our planning system is a serious inhibition to the development process. An inbuilt monitoring and evaluation department is like a dignostic clinic of the system which will inform management about which direction the system is going and warn of any negative performances. It should therefore be necessarily incorporated into the public sector rural development activity and used as a feedback loop for system management whereby implementation experiences can be utilised to improve the specifications of the subsequent plans. The present projects seriously lack the necessary details for evaluation even if one wishes to do it. As they are, they neither provide for or

benefit from the experiences of the field workers at the local level nor does subsequent planning make use of such experiences. An evaluation which is only concerned with accounting records or one that simply plays around with percentages may not be very helpful. The success of monitoring and evaluation as a tool for enhancing achievements in rural development projects must rely on the honesty of field and supervising staff and the commitment of the chief executives to adequate supervision and the idea of achieving success.

7.2.1.4 Participation

The problem of marginalising the local people's contribution whether in terms of materials, labour or ideas has also been noticed as an important factor to be tackled in order to achieve success in future rural development programmes. In suggesting an improved planning process there is the need to take cognisance of local socio-physical variations.

These variations are often noticeable in the people's aspirations (local priorities) and their production environment. It is the view here that local participation needs to be institutionalised through a process that mandatorily requires public sector agencies or any other related agency to comply. The serious absence of social data to provide a large reservoire of information that can be relied on in the planning process makes it the more necessary to identify and utilise valuable

local ideas. There are also many socio-economic issues that may appear insignificant and non-quantifiable but which are capable of causing problems during programme implementation. Local participation should be designed to identify and tackle all these issues in every project.

7.2.2 Proposed Improvements in the Process

Due to the complexity and the multidimensional nature of rural development activities, it will be difficult to configurate a simple procedural system. The system discussed here is not expected to be totally new but simply an attempt to invigorate the existing planning process. It takes into consideration the question of economic costs and benefits, the use of evaluation to improve subsequent decisions and the question of equity and participation in the decision-making process in planning. The National Planning Office is here conceived as the pivot rather than the appex of the whole planning system in the country. In this conception, the process involves feeding the National Planning Office with the past planning experiences of satisfaction or dissatisfaction along with the influence of external factors and local aspirations (that is, local priorities). These will be obtained through the usual seminars and workshops, the prevailing economic indices and international events and trends. In addition, the reports of the monitoring and evaluation of the completed and on-going programmes and consultation with local government representatives

through workshops and seminars will also form part of the report on experiences of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. National planning at this point will need to be both comprehensive and rational to some extent. At this stage, planning decisions will have to cover all sectors comprehensively. It means putting together various bits of economic and social data or information which can be analysed to produce the general pattern of the social and economic trends. Such trends now become experiences of satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

The comprehensive approach may become unproductive if strictly applied with the planners relying too much on their inspirations in proposing the solutions. The socio-spatial variations in a country like Nigeria in particular require planners to take into consideration the physical and social context of the spatial units under consideration. This implies that in taking national decisions concerning national goals regards should be given to the social and economic trends and available alternatives profered. Such decisions cannot be based purely on the rational scientific reasoning by the NPO officials as is required by the comprehensive theory. The role of a properly organised representation of the various interest groups in decision making is here considered important, not only in identifying the contextual issues which should influence the respective planning decisions but also in the negotiation among the various interest groups on which of the issues and to what degree they can be allowed to influence these decisions.

In this regard, the question then is what kind of representation will be considered appropriate? Considering the literacy level of the country at present and its share size, it will not be easy to have the open iterative and exploratory discussions with all interest groups in every spatial unit of development before the formulation of national goals, although in a viable on-going planning process this issue will be taken care of by research and the regular collection of up-to-date social and economic data. What planning at the national level needs then will be a careful determination of the representation of all the varying interest groups, giving due regard to the majority groups which in this case refers to the rural people.

In the present dispensation, these also happen to be in the disadvantaged group, but do not have the resources and the education nor are they sufficiently mobilised by the system to be able to engage advocate planners who can ensure that their interests are taken care of in the planning process. For the same reasons of limited resources, a low literacy level, and a high degree of various types of inequalities, government intervention is still desirable and not all planning decisions can be totally left in the hands of local communities. This could be possible at the community development association level but of course this will then call for a better integration of the local plans and projects into the national process in order to achieve the overall national interest.

In the light of the foregoing, it is proposed that the existing planning fora for consultation at the national level, namely, the Federal Executive Council or the National Economic Council (NEC), the Conference of Minister and Commissioners for Economic Planning and the Joint Planning Board be retained. However, their performance can be enhanced by improving the quality of advice supplied to them. For example the effectiveness of NEC depends on the quality of advice supplied by the secretariat. In the same manner, the effectiveness of the conference of Minister/Commissioners of Economic Planning depends on the quality of advice they receive from their respective planning offices. In terms of grassroot participation, therefore, it is proposed that the NPO organises workshops/ seminars for Local Government chairmen and officials of community development associations twice in every state under the auspices of the States' Ministry for Finance and Economic Planning. This will be in addition to the usual forms of consultation undertaken by the NPO. The first session of workshops and seminars should be done just before a call is sent out for the beginning of the plan period. The purpose of this round of consultation is to receive from the Local Governments and development association their experiences of the projects and general performance of the last plan implementation and, in return, provide them with the highlights of the general success and failures of the last plan and the development trends as analysed in the national plan evaluation report. This will enable the Local governments to

understand national issues better and be able to keep a better balance between their demands and the resources available as well as the national interest.

The second session of consultation will have to be during the usual negotiation period. Technically local governments are also expected to have their own session of negotiation over the projects they propose but in practice they are represented by the state officials who tend to see the state projects as superior and therefore argue more for them.

These rounds of consultations will provide the NPO with a better understanding of the planning context and thus hopefully improve the quality of advice they also offer to the various national planning fora.

Armed with the existing situation report (ERS), and the pre-plan consultations with the local governments, etc., the NPO can then prepare the draft guidelines which will have to undergo the usual process of approval and circulation.


The planning guidelines are circulated and projects prepared and sent to the NPO through the States' Ministries of Planning. The NPO then arranges the examination and analysis of each agency's projects in consultation with them. On the basis of this examination, programmes can then be developed with tentative projects earmarked. The general public concerned will then have to be informed and educated

about these projects especially their economic and social costs and benefits.

It is the view here that where public opinion is strongly against the establishment of the project, it should be stalled although where local goals and past experiences have been allowed to influence the formulation of national policies this extreme situation should be rare. The objective at this period is not just to inform but also mobilise people in support of government programmes. After this, the NPO drafts the plan which after discussions and approval, is then circulated for the implementation of the projects. These projects should be designed to have an in-built monitoring and evaluation should not only help to improve the internal system of the projects and programmes, but also to be used to influence decisions made in subsequent plans at both the local and national levels.

The present planning process has seriously under-utilised the factor of evaluation both in terms of its internal validity as well as its role in the planning process. More important perhaps is the emphasis on the continuity of action in the planning offices at the lower tiers of government, including the community level. For this reason the research here is really more concerned with the integration of planning decisions made at the rural level with those made at the state and national levels more so as the rural development activities are actually carried out at this level. Details of this integration are provided below. The whole idea is based on

Fig.26 Recommended Planning Process




Source: Modeled from Research conclusions (also related to CD Experiences).

a hierarchical planning and control system (Belshaw et al, 1975). The proposal here is of course an attempt to model this system on the Nigerian situation where it very much matters who is doing what at each stage.

Basically the practical operation of the system will comprise of the structure and its interconnections. The interconnections are the different decision levels and their communication links. The system works on the assumption that we have three basic subsystems at work, namely, The Public Sector Process (all other Government agencies), the Private Sector Process (in this case the rural process), and the planning machinery. Both the governmental and the rural activity processes act on the rural environment with the government process trying to modify and accelerate the rural activity process.

Fig. 27: The Basic Subsystems within the rural Development Planning Environment



Source: Belshaw et al, 1975.

The role of the planning process here, therefore, is to use the available machinery in such a way as to control the implementation of rural development plans and to evaluate the performance of both the public and the private sector processes using the public and the private sector processes using the yardstick of set targets. This information can also be used in updating current plans as well as improving on the subsequent ones, particularly now that we have adopted the rolling plan. What had obtained in past planning practice does not conform to this pattern. In the past most of the key decisions affecting the rural areas were taken on the basis of information flows occuring within the political and social system. In order to make this recommendation more feasible, there is also a deliberate attempt to try as much as possible to retain the existing structure of the government civil service. Therefore, in terms of the structure, the process will operate through four levels, namely, the National level, the State level, the Local government level and the Activity level.

The national level plays the same role of issuing guidelines in form of national Development Plans; controlling and distributing resources through taxation, revenue generation and allocation (including loans). The role of the State government will comprise of the formulation of plans, within the framework of the National Development Plans (policy directives). The state plans will have to represent the overall objective for rural development within its area for the plan period. In the

new dispensation, the states must demonstrate that political will and commitment to take on more seriously their role of inspection, supervision and where so required, to release the resources to the appropriate point of implementation. Legal provisions will be necessary from the Federal level at this point to ensure compliance. Constitutional provision alone without a way of penalising defaulting states have always been ineffective. Through the suggested ministry for Rural Development, the state is expected to compile and appraise monthly reports on the progress of the different rural development activities; do the appraisal of the natural and social environment at the various Local Government Areas; conduct research necessary to help the various rural development activities including market research, organise for the supply of inputs (e.g. fertilizers, tractors, pesticides, insecticides, infrastructure, etc); carry out the annual evaluation of the performance of rural development activities and set up new directives. This will imply having divisional planning offices at all Local Government headquarters to coordinate the activities and collate information from the various activities.

At the Local Government Level, the Divisional Planning Officer will have to supervise village workers and prepare monthly reports along with the village workers. He will in addition serve as an advocate in the Local Government Planning machinery. He will help in the drawing up of plans for the L.G.A. (Local Government Area) or for a particular project;

setling of targets and advising on the location of activities and the persons incharge. For special programmes (e.g.RBDAs), such persons incharge, that is, the rural contact agents or village workers will have to be selected by the State government machinery but for the routine rural development activities, there will be known as community workers or village workers and their selection must be based on a function of their knowledge of the local language and environment.


It is also assumed that Local Government must by this token have a standing planning committee and a trained planning officer (or the state officer) under the office of the Local Government Chairman. The membership of the standing committee should comprise of all Heads of Departments, all conncillors, all district heads and representatives of the different Development Associations.

What is regarded here as the Activity Level could either be the projects implementation site in the case of special regional project or programmes or the villages in the routine rural development process. At this point we have the officials who look after the different activities of the village level on a daily basis. It is necessary to detail out a clear work programme for specific rural development projects. Basically four procedures are found necessary at this activity level. These include:

1. Phasing of the work schedule - Usually a form will be prepared for this purpose to make the job easier for the VW (Village Worker). It could be called (APF) 'Annual Phasing Form'. This is a work sheet which is meant to assist in detailing the different operations and their sequences overtime.
2. Another procedure is the charting out of the annual programme. This is information collected about work done during the previous period in the process. It will normally be portrayed in a bar chart.
3. The Divisional Planning Officers are expected here to carry out monthly supervisions and checks on the progress made. Monthly area meetings are organised and attended by all programme executive heads including representations of Development Associations, farmers organisations and local politicians. Corresponding adjustments could then be made on the original schedule where necessary.
4. Monthly reports are then produced by the state officials to identify bottlenecks which require appropriate action from government agencies.

All of these would then provide the basis for a Feed Back Review which can be done on an annual basis to provide data on the implementation of public sector programmes and their impact on the rural areas. The Annual Implementation Review (AIR) summarises the lessons learned in the course of implementation and can then be followed by the 'Annual

Fig.28: A Hierarchical Structure of Planning and Control in the Rural Development System



Source: Adapted from Belshaw et al. 1975

Evaluation Review' (AER). This is designed to elicit information required to compile cost effectiveness and cost benefit indices of programmes and it preceeds the annual estimates which now complete the annual cycle of activity.

The suggestions made here are based on the assumption that government will make it mandatory for any feasibility study or any proposal for a rural development activity to include a detailed implementation work plan which includes specific set targets and the phasing of their implementation. The set targets may also come in form of an impact statement.

7.2.3 Plan Formulation and Participation for Rural Development Activities

It has been indicated earlier that the application of the procedural theories in this planning process suggests strongly that combining the useful ingredients of each procedure into a viable process implies institutionalising local participation. It was also noticed that the useful elements of the comprehensive and rational procedural theories can best be applied at the national level of planning. At the local level where participation can involve more of the target people, the radical, transactive and advocacy procedures have become more applicable.

As earlier proposed, the NPO is expected to organise some consultations with the Local Governments and Community Development Associations (CDAs) before projects are prepared for

the subsequent national plan. Preparatory to this meeting, local government councils and development associations must have held meetings to discuss what would be presented at the pre-plan consultation meetings. During this session of consultation, local governments as well as development associations receive information about the current social and economic trends in the country and possible options open to government. They, too, will highlight their own problems, resources and options available to them. In this way while the NPO becomes better informed about the local issues before projects are sent to it for the new plan preparation, the local people, too, are better informed of the national issues which have to be planned for and will have to take this into consideration while drawing up their plans.

Armed with this information, the local governments and community development association officials can now go back to organise meetings in which they conduct open, iterative and exploratory discussions about which projects are viable proposals. With the aid of Development officers or village workers, the Development Associations can then make a list of what projects they want, how they want it, the resources there are and what government assistance they need. This list which now serves as the tentative plan should be arranged in order of the priority attached to the projects. All of these decisions will have come from the general meetings of the associations.

This tentative plan is then forwarded to the planning office of the respective Local Government Councils. These are then deliberated upon by the standing planning committee. It is then expected that Local Government Area plans will also be drawn with due regard to these various plans made by the different Development Associations. Those aspects which seem to be common among the Development Associations' plans will then form the basis of plan formulation by the Local Government Councils. Such projects which are not adopted by the Local Government will then remain the responsibility of the Development Associations who now will have to readjust their plans accordingly. The final plans of both the Local Governments and the Development Associations are then sent to the State Planning Agency. A forum will also have to be created at the state where Local Government Council Chairpersons, and their planning officers now acting as advocates to the Development Associations will have to present and defend their plans which will need to be integrated in the same manner as was done at the Local Government level. By the time the call for submission of projects for the next plan comes in from the NPO, these round of consultations and preparatory work will have set the climate for the beginning of a proper plan formulation.

In cases where large regional projects or even small ones are to be designed and implemented by government, the self-reliant element must have to be given due regard and the

Development Associations will have to be used in mobilising the people and providing the necessary information and resources which can be obtained locally.

7.3 A PROGRAMME FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

It is the view here that if Government is really seriously committed to the idea of a Rural Development, then it has to come to grips with the question of appropriate spatial units for its development activities. It is no longer meaningful to talk about improving the living standard of millions of people living in the rural areas through ad hoc measures which lack articulation in the operational spatial units, the programme definition as well as the indices of measuring success at this moment, Government must now decide on the least unit of settlement in the rural areas and the indices it will use to measure this pledge of raising the living standards. So far money has been pumped into rural areas and not many of the spatial units can visibly be identified as beneficiaries.

The recommendation here is that the Nigerian Village should be taken as the target to which rural development should be directed and from which performance indices of achievement should come. In the specific case of Benue State, the problem is that of organising the villages into conceiveable coherent 'decision areas'. In other words getting the scattered farmsteads into nucleated villages which will be viable development units.

Such a programme cannot be a short-term affair, but it has to be started and pursued vigorously. It is hoped that the village registration by DFRRI will culminate into such a programme. The people need to be enlightened or persuaded where necessary to live in such villages. Government will need to have a programme for this. Already DFRRI is supposed to have started registering these villages. This should continue and the list constantly kept on display for people to know which ones have not yet been registered. Rural Development activities can start with the registered viable ones with the hope that others will then be inspired to also get organised. In this regard, efforts should be made to amplify the reorganization of settlements in Benue State along the lines suggested by Ortserga and Ariyo (1990) and Idakwo (1982) taking into consideration the lineage relationships and the existing settlement patterns (See Fig.29a-d).

For each village there should be a development programme which should be spread out in a time perspective and should be within affordable resources and operated with the active participation of the village community. The rural development programme for each village will only differ in the matter of details but should have to cover the following areas:

(a) Clean water supply
(b) Accessibility
(c) Input supply (fertilizers, access to tractors services, pesticides, insecticides and herbicides).
(d) Easy contact with village workers (VW), extension agents

(VEA) (preferably within 10km distance).

(e) Access to, or arrangements for developing indigeneous financial institutions.

(f) Access to Health facilities (with a target of one dispensary or Health care Centre within a 10km distance to all villages).

(g) Minimum housing standards.

(h) Education that is nonformal and is production and health related.

For such items like input supply, VW/VEAs, financial institutions and health facilities, villages could be grouped around a central location in any convenient decision-area for their administration. Such a central location can be targeted to be no more than 20km, 10km or 5km distance from any village depending on available resources to government to execute this. The progressive reduction in this distance to these facilities could in itself be an indicator of progress made. The provision of all of the above listed items can then become a target to be achieved with a set period.

The other issues of mass literacy, income redistribution, self actualization, et cetera, will also be planned and executed on a more systematic basis under this arrangement. But until the above listed items have been handled convincingly there will be no basis in hoping that the others can also be achieved.

Under this arrangement, the VW/VEA will become a very important advocate and change of agent for rural transformation

and as such will need to be properly trained in this vocation. Already the Benue State Government, for example, has established an institution with similar goals. What is required is to develop the curriculum so that graduates from the institution will be able to cope with the expected challenges and expand the institution as the need arises. The training of local community leaders should also be included in its programme. The expected tasks for these agents will have to include, inter alia:


(a) helping to organise resettlement programmes
(b) helping to organise and run cooperative movements under their jurisdiction.
(c) coordinating extension services
(d) collecting data on rural settlements, project executions, and market research.
(e) helping to organise where necessary the running of local financial institutions.
(f) helping to formulate local plans for the village or the decision area as the case may be.

It must however be made clear that the success of this programme strongly depends on the political will of our leaders to improve the rural areas, the honesty among bureaucrats and their willingness to be dedicated and supervise those under them to ensure continuity.

The second point to note is that these recommendations are to be carried out over a long time. A serious rural development


programme can be more honestly pursued when it is encompassed in a perspective plan. In line with this, therefore, it is also recommended here that the 3 year rolling plans should serve only as the periodic segmentation of a perspective plan to be developed. In such a perspective plan, achievement targets can then be phased in line with the human capacity and available resources of both government and the local communities and in this case, the three-year rolling plans will be a convenient way of pursuing these targets.

FIG. 29a EXISTING SETTLEMENT PATTERN AND THE DESIGNATED REGROUPING.




SOURCE: ORTSEAGA, D.S. AND ARIYO, J.A. (1990)

FIG. 29b POPULATION REGROUPING IN MAKURDI L.G.A.




SOURCE: ORTSEAGA AND ARIYO, (1990)

FIG. 29c PROPOSED SETTLEMENT PATTERN AND CONNECTIVITY NETWORK .



SOURCE: ORTSEAGA AND ARIYO (1990)

FIG. 29d PROPOSED RURAL DEVELOPMENT UNITS FOR AGATU DISTRICT.



SOURCE: IDAKWO (1982)

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APPENDIX I

QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN BENUE STATE

SECTION 'A': For the LBRDA Target Population - Jato-Aka and Okete Projects Only

INSTRUCTIONS

The information required is purely for academic research. Respondents are assured that it shall not be used for any other purpose and that all information given here shall be treated as confidential.

Where appropriate, indicate the answer by a tick (/) or circulating the number or letter of your choice. Write n.a. (meaning 'not applicable') at the end of any question that does not apply to you.

PART I: PERSONAL DATA

1. Sex: (a) Male
   (b) Female

2. Age: (a) 1 - 15 years
   (b) 15 - 20 years
   (c) 21 - 30 years
   (d) 30 - 40 years
   (e) Over 40 years

3. Educational Background:
   (a) Cannot read and write
   (b) Can just read and write
   (c) Completed primary seven
   (d) Have some post-primary qualification - indicate any area of special training:

   ---

4. Working Status:
   (a) Peasant
   (b) Civil servant
   (c) Retired civil servant
   (d) Businessman
   (e) Any other: State ----------

5. If currently earning a salary, indicate grade level:
   (a) Below level 07
   (b) 07 - 10
   (c) 10 - 13
   (d) Above level 13.

6. Residence (Name): ----------

7. In which of the following categories does your residence fall:
   (a) A farmstead (compound)
   (b) A village (a group of compounds)
   (c) A town

8. Within what range is your residence from the project farm:
   (a) 0 - 10km radius
   (b) 10 - 30km radius
   (c) 30 - 60km radius
   (d) 60 - 100km radius
   (e) Over 100km.

9. How true are these statements?

	Very true 5	True 4	Don't know 3	False 2	Very False 1
a) The Lower Benue Project has now helped to reduce the problems of land shortages					
b) Due to the project, one can now grow crops even during the dry season					
c) It is cheapter to crop a given area of land on the project site than outside it					
d) Farm inputs (fertilizers, etc) are now sold at cheaper rates due to the project					
e) Farm inputs (fertilizers, etc) are obtained without delay					
f) Farm inputs are usually available in time					
g) Farm inputs are always available at the project office					
h) Yields on an equivalent area of land on the project farm are higher than outside it					
i) Farmers who have been cropping on the project farm are generally more prosperous than their counterparts					
j) I want this project to continue operating					

10. Has the project help to improve your life in any of the following areas?

Advantages	Worse off 1	No difference 2	Little Improvement 3	Substantial improvement 4	Tremendous improvement 5
a) Access to extra farmlands					
b) Improved (feeder road connection to my residence from all directions					
c) Access to financial assistance (loans)					
d) Knowledge of better farming techniques					
e) Time saved in the procurement of farm inputs (fertilizers, etc)					
f) Access to improved seeds					
g) Access to tractor services					
h) A reduction in the cost of basic food items					
i) The water supply in your house or compound					
j) The quality of the house in which you now live					

11. How much do you agree that the following are disadvantages caused by the location of the project in your area?

Disadvantages	Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Undecided 3	Disagree 4	Strongly D/agree 5
a) Loss of access to land that was previously mine					
b) Waste of land that would have otherwise been cultivated					
c) Increased cost of farm labour					
d) Greater problems in hiring tractor services					
e) Difficulty in procuring fertilizers					
f) Local farmers no longer use their initiative					
g) Too much pressure from extension workers on farmers to apply new techniques					
h) Farmers are now reduced to producing only one major type of crop					
i) Subsistence cropping is now receiving much less attention					
j) Cost of food items has now increased unusually					

12. Which one of these crops have you learned to produce or can produce better as a result of the establishment of the project?

(a) Yam (d) Rice (g) Millet (j) Vegetables
(b) Cassava (e) Maize (h) G/nut
(c) Guinea corn (f) Beans (i) Meat

13. Indicate against the following list of food items by ticking in the appropriate colum your food sufficiency level

Foot Item	Before Project				After Project			
	Not enough to eat	Just enough to eat	Surplus to sale	Purely for sale	Not enough to eat	Just enough to eat	Surplus to sale	Purely for sale
a) Yam								
b) Guinea corn								
c) Rice								
d) Maize								
e) Millet								
f) Beans								
g) Meat								
h) Fruits								
i) Cassava								
j) G/nuts								
k) Vegetables								

14. Please, indicate the labour cost for the following farm activities:

Activity	A Cost per Acre by machine		B Cost per Acre by hand		C No. of man-working hrs per acre (days)		D No. of hrs by machine per acre	
	Force reals	For Tuber crops	Force reals	Tuber crops	Ce-reals	Tu-bers	Ce-reals	Tu-bers
i) Preparing the field								
ii) Ploughing and borrowing								
iii) Planting								
iv) Application of fertilizer								

15. Since the project started, how regularly do you get tractor services?

a) As often as I ask for.

b) Whenever I am lucky with the tractor operators.

c) As difficult to get as before the project.

16. If as a result of the project, your residence is now connected with the main market in your area, how much time do you save in travelling to this market?----------

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17. How significant is the Lower Benue River Basin Development Authority Project to you?

a) Provides the main source of my income.

b) Only subsidises my major source of income.

c) Does not contribute anything to my income.

18. Which of the following do you now need most in your area?

	Urgently needed 7	Greatly needed 6	Needed 5	Indiferen. 4	Not needed 3	Terribly unwanted 2	A wasteful thing 1
a) Post-primary school							
b) More River Basins and Extension Services							
c) Making farmland available to everyone							
d) Providing an effective way to handle the problem of weeds (grass) on the farms							
e) Increasing the supply of fertilizers and other farm inputs							
f) Improving the timely supply of fertilizers							
g) Improving the transp. services in the area							
h) Pegging down the cost of transport							
i) Provision of electricity in the area							
j) Reduction of inflation							
k) Provision of clean drinking water							
l) Provision of a Dispensary in the area							
m) Reduction of community tax and other taxes paid in the market							
n) Provision of irrigation land for dry season farming							
o) Provision of Adult Educ. Services							

19. Do you agree with the following statements?

Problems of Administration	Strongly agree 5	Agree 4	No opinion 3	Disagree 2	Strongly Disagree 1
a) Local farmers do not understand what the project is all about					
b) Local farmers are not interested in the project					
c) Local farmers have been deprived of their rights to these farmlands					
d) The practice of allocating farm plots does not favour the people in the immediate locality					
e) Rural Development workers are not given enough authority					
f) The target people i.e. people in the immediate locality, are not consulted sufficiently on issues affecting them					
g) Enough information on government activities is not provided in our area					
h) One had to give 'something' to the project staff in addition to the official charges before one secures anything					

Problems of Administration	5	4	3	2	1
i) One has to be friendly with the project staff to be allocated farm inputs					
j) One has to wait for a long time to obtain anything from the officials					
k) One is subjected to too many disappointments in trying to obtain anything from the officials					
l) Local farmers are usually unable to finance the cost of cropping the minimum size of the farm plots that can be allocated to them					
m) The LBRBDA Project is unnecessary					
n) Local farmers want to continue using their traditional implements					
o) Never heard of the project farm before					

20. Have you ever applied for a farm plot on the LBRBDA farm?

(a) Yes

(b) No

21. If you have ever been allocated a farm plot on the project, indicate as follows:

Allocation	Year	No. of Acres
1st Allocation		
2nd Allocation		
3rd Allocation		
4th Allocation		
5th Allocation		
Every year since		

22. How much do you agree with the following as the purpose of this project?

	Strongly Agree 5	Agree 4	Undecided 3	Disagree 2	Strongly Disagree 1
a) To make land available to the needy by utilizing land that had been underutilized					
b) To control ownership of land					
c) To improve farmers' ability to produce more food					
d) To create a situation where Government can get more revenue					

23. How willing are you to do the following?

	Most willing	Willing	Indifference	Unwilling	Most Unwilling
a) Are you willing to offer your farm land for the establishment of a similar project in your area?					
b) Are you willing to contribute money for such a purpose?					
c) If you have been allocated a farm Plot on the Project site, would you be willing to donate part of your yields on the given farm plot to the authority to help offset part of the running cost?					
d) Are you willing to attend any meetings that are organized to discuss how to approve the operation of the project?					
e) Are you willing to be employed on the farm project by anyone?					
f) Are you willing to apply a Farm Plot here again or use the provisions on the Project?					

24. How many times did you have to go to the farm office for the purpose of checking on your application?

    a) Once

    b) Over five times

    c) Between one and five times

    d) Over 10 times.

25. What is the average cost per acre of producing what you have or had cropped on the Project Farm?

    N ----------

26. What is the average cost per acre of producing the same crop outside the Project Farm?

    N ----------

27. What was the average yield per acre on the Project Farm?

28. What has been the average yield of same crop outside the project farm?

29. Within what range was your profit?

    a) at a loss - no profit

    b) broken even no profit

    c) less than ₦100 profit

    d) between ₦100 profit

    e) over ₦500 profit

30. What kind of labour did you prefer in ploughing?

    a) Tractor b) Hand-hoeing

31. Was your choice (in No.30) easily available?

    a) Yes b) No

32. What did you prefer in tackling the weeds?

    a) Use of herbicides b) Hand-weeding

33. Was your option easily available?

a) Yes b) No

34. Where did you obtain money to finance the cost of cropping on the project?

a) Bank loan

b) Co-operative Assistance

c) Local loans (Bam, Adashi, etc.)

d) Personal savings.

35. If you did not obtain a farm plot on the Project farm, why were you unable to do so?

a) Never heard of the project farm before

b) Unprofitable to crop there (too expensive)

c) Not interested

d) Applied but was not considered

36. How serious is the land shortage problem in your area?

a) No problem

b) Little need for extra farm lands

c) A great need for extra farm lands

d) Acute shortage of farm lands

37. Did any government official hold any meetings with you or consult you before the LBRBDA Project was established?

a) Several times

b) Only a few times

c) Only once

d) No meetings of any kind at all.

38. Did you as an individual or as a group complain to any government official that you needed these services before the establisnment of the LBRBDA?

a) Several times

b) Only a few times

c) Only once

d) Never

39. Do the LBRBDA staff now hold regular meetings with you?

a) No meeting at all

b) Once a month

c) Once every cropping season

d) Many times in every season

40. When you have a problem connecting the Project operations, who usually decides what the solution should be?

a) We the users and the officials together at a meeting

b) Only the officials

c) Only farmers

d) Don't know.

APPENDIX II

QUESTIONNAIRE ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN BENUE STATE

SECTION B: FOR THE BNARDA PROJECT ONLY

INSTRUCTIONS

The information required is purely for academic research. Respondents are assured that it shall not be used for any other purpose and that all information given here shall be treated as confidential.

Where appropriate, indicate the answer by ticking (_/) or circling the number or letter of your choice. Write n.a. meaning not applicable at the end of any question that does not apply to you.

Part I: PERSONAL DATA

1. Sex:
   a) Male
   b) Female
2. Age:
   a) 1 - 15 years
   b) 16 - 20 years
   c) 21 - 30 years
   d) 31 - 40 years
   e) Over 40 years
3. Educational background:
   a) Cannot read and write
   b) Can just read and write

c) Completed primary seven

d) Have some post-primary qualification

Indicate any area of special training _____

4. Working status:

a) Peasant

b) Civil servant

c) Retired Civil servant

d) Businessman

e) Any other: state: _____

5. If currently earning a salary indicate grade level:

a) Below level 07

b) 07 - 10

c) 10 - 13

d) Above level 13

6. Residence: (Name)_____

7. Which of the following categories does your residence falls:

a) a farmland (compound)

b) a village (a group of compounds)

c) a town

8. Within what range is your residence from the Agro service?

a) 0 - 10km radius

b) 10 - 30km radius

c) 30 - 60km radius

d) 60 - 100km radius

e) Over 100km

PART II: SOCIO-ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS

9. How true are the following statements?

	Completely true 5	True 4	Don't know 3	Untrue 2	Completely untrue 1
a) The activities of the SPAT/OFAR etc.etc. have helped me increase my annual food product.					
b) Due to the activities of BNARDA a feeder road has been constructed which also serves us					
c) I feel the increase in my farm income has to do with the assistance Iget from the Extension Agents					
d) Extension Agents have helped us secure access to financial assistance from government and/or banks					
e) Much time is now saved in the procurement of farm inputs with the location of FSC.					
f) Inputs are sold at cheaper rates at the FSC					
g) Inputs are fiven without delay at the FSC					
h) Inputs are usually available in time at the FSC					
i) EAS are always available when required					
j) BNARDA has made it easier for farmers to consult extension workers					

10. To what extent do you agree that the following statement apply to the activities of Agro Service Centre (ASC) in your area?

	Strongly Agree 5	Agree 4	Don't know 3	Disagree 2	Strongly disagree 1
a) One has to wait for a long time to obtain fertilizer or other inputs					
b) One has to be friendly with ADP staff to buy fertilizer or other inputs					
c) One has to give the ADP staff 'something', to obtain what one needs					
d) There is always disappointments in obtaining inputs					
e) ADP has led to loss of access to land that was previously mine					
f) ADP activities have led to loss of opportunity to farm or weed for other people for a fee					
g) ADP activities have now led to a lesser pay per area cultivated or weeded					
h) Never heard of ADP or FSC before					

11. Do you agree that the ASC is a useful thing?

a) Strongly agree

b) Agree

c) Indifference

d) Disagree

e) Strongly disagree

12. Do you agree that the same ASC is necessary?

a) Strongly agree

b) Agree

c) Indifferent

d) Disagree

e) Strongly disagree

13. How significant is the ASC to you?

a) Cannot do without it

b) Only partially useful

c) Does not contribute anything to my farming activity

14. BNARDA activities have helped increase my farm area under cultivation by:

a) No change in the increase

b) ½ an acre or less

c) 1 acre

d) 1½ acres

e) Up to 2 acres and above

15. How much of the newly introduced farming techniques have you now adopted?

a) 75% - 100% or all new techniques introduced

b) 50% - 74%

c) 26% - 49%

d) 0 - 25%

e) Nothing new is adopted

16. Do you agree tnat the establishment of this project has helped in any way to improve the quality of tne house in which you now live?

    a) Strongly agree

    b) Agree

    c) Not sure

    d) Disagree

    e) Strongly disagree

17. Do you agree that the project has in any way helped to improve the water supply in your house or compound?

    a) Strongly agree

    b) Agree

    c) Not sure (undecided)

    d) Disagree

    e) Strongly disagree

18. Do you agree that the establishment of this project has helped in any way to improve tne quality of the cloths you use?

    a) Strongly agree

    b) Agree

    c) Not sure

    d) Disagree

    e) Strongly disagree

19. If as a result of the project your residence is now connected with the main market in your area, how much time do you now save in travelling to this market?

---

20. Which of the following do you need most in your area?

	Urgently needed 7	Greatly needed 6	Needed 5	Indifferent 4	Not needed 3	Terribly unwanted 2	A wasteful thing 1
a) Primary school							
b) A College (Secondary or Technical)							
c) Making farmlands available to everyone							
d) Providing an effective way to handle the problem of weeds (grass) on the farms							
e) Increasing the supply of fertilizers and other farm inputs							
f) Improving the timely supply of fertilizers							
g) Improving the transport services in the area							
h) Pegging down the cost of transport							
i) Provision of electricity in the area							
j) Reduction of inflation							
k) Provision of clean drinking water							

21. Has this project helped to increase or reduce the cost of food items? Indicate the cost if you know (A tiya = 2 jato-aka mudus)

Food Items	Reduced Costs (from what to what	Increased costs from what to what	Project Not Responsible for costs
a) About 10 average size yams			
b) About 10 average size cassava			
c) A Tiya of Gari			
d) A Tiya of Guinea corn			
e) A Tiya of Cassava			
f) A Tiya of Millet			
g) A Tiya of Cassava flour			
h) A Tiya of Rice			
i) A Tiya of Beans			
j) A leg of Goat			
k) An average size chicken			
l) 5 Average size of oranges			

22. Which one of these crops have you learned to produce or can you produce better as a result of the introduction of the ASC?

Food Items	Production Before F.S.C.		Production After F.S.C.	
	Acres	Total Yield	Acres	Total Yield
a) Yam				
b) Cassava				
c) Guinea corn				
d) Rice				
e) Maize				
f) Millet				
g) Beans				
h) Fruits				
i) G/nuts				
j) Meat				
k) Vegetables				

23. Indicate against the following list of food items by ticking in the appropriate column your food sufficiency level:

	Before Project				After Project			
	Not enough to eat	Just enough to eat	Surplus to sale	Purely for sale	Not enough to eat	Just enough to eat	Surplus to sale	Purely for sale
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
a) Yam								
b) Guinea corn								
c) Rice								
d) Maize								
e) Millet								
f) Beans								
g) Meat								
h) Fruits								
i) Cassava								
j) Groundnuts								
k) Vegetables								

24. Please indicate the labour cost for the following farm activities:

Activity	Cost per Acre by machine		Cost per Acre by hand		No. of main working hrs per acre		Cost saved	
	For cere-als	For Tub-ers	For cere-als	For Tub-ers	Cere-als	Tub-ers	Cere-als	Tu-bers
Prepared the fields								
Ploughing and harrowing								
Planting								
Application of fertilizer								
Weeding								
Harvesting								

PART III: PARTICIPATION AND CO-OPERATION

25. Has anybody ever approached you to obtain your views on the establishment of the ADP?

a) Yes (state year) ----------

b) No

26. Have you ever indicated your intention to participate in the ADP?

a) Yes (state year) ----------

b) No

27. Were you given a chance to do so?

a) Yes

b) No

28. Did you have to spend any extra money to use the facilities provided by the project?

a) Yes (state amount) ----------

b) No

29. How many times did you have to go to the office before you succeeded (or without success)?

a) Once

b) Between one and five times

c) Over 5 times

d) Over 10 times

30. Which of these farming techniques have you been applying as a result of the introduction of ADP?

a) Use of tractor and harvester where available

b) Use of herbicides

c) Application of all advice from extension staff

d) Use of fertilizers

e) Group farming techniques

31. What in your view do you understand is the purpose of this project?

a) To help you improve the quality and quantity of yields on your farm.

b) To make farmers grow only crops that business people and government want to buy

c) Just to find employment for agricultural staff

d) Any other (state) ----------

32. Why were you unable to get access to what the project could offer?

a) Never heard of the project before

b) Not interested

c) Unprofitable to use the information

d) Attempted but could not get assistance.

APPENDIX III

QUESTIONNAIRE ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN BENUE STATE

SECTION C: FOR THE DFRRI PROJECTSONLY

INSTRUCTIONS

The information required is purely for academic research. Respondents are assured that it shall not be used for any other purpose and that all information given here shall be treated as confidential.

Where appropriate, indicate the answer by ticking (_/) or circling the number or letter of your choice. Write n.a. (meaning not applicable) at the end of any question that does not apply to you.

PART I: PERSONAL DATA

1. Sex:
   a) Male
   b) Female
2. Age:
   a) 1 - 15 years
   b) 15 - 20 years
   c) 21 - 30 years
   d) 31 - 40 years
   e) Over 40 years
3. Educational background:
   a) Cannot read and write
   b) Can just read and write
   c) Completed primary seven
   d) Have some post primary qualifications
   e) Indicate any area of special training ---------- ---

4. Working status:

   a) Peasant

   b) Civil servant

   c) Retired Civil servant

   d) Businessman

   e) Any other: (state): ----------

5. If currently earning a salary indicate grade level:

   a) Below level 07

   b) 07 - 10

   c) 10 - 13

   d) Above level 13

6. Residence: (name) ----------

7. In which of the following categories does your residence fall?

   a) A farmstead (compound)

   b) A village (a group of compounds)

   c) A town

8. Within what range is your residence from the project farm?

   a) 0 - 10km radius

   b) 10 - 20km radius

   c) 30 - 60km radius

   d) 60 - 100km radius

   e) Over 100km radius

PART II: SOCIO-ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS

9. To what extent would you agree with each of the following statements as the purpose of the project?

	Strongly agree 5	Agree 4	Not sure 3	Strongly disagree 2	Disagree 1
a) To increase the mileage and quality of rural roads					
b) To create an excuse for officials to spend money					
c) To help officials improve the roads to their villages					
d) Any other, (state)					

10. Has DFRRI constructed a new road for you?

a) Yes (state km): ----------

b) No

11. Has DFRRI extended your road?

a) Yes (state km):----------

b) No

12. Has DFRRI help to maintain your local road so that it is now always in use?

a) Yes

b) No

13. DFRRI has taken over the maintenance of our local road but has not yet done anything to it:

a) True

b) False

14. DFRRI has done nothing for us:

    a) True

    b) False

15. How far is the nearest DFRRI road to you?

    a) Less than 2km away

    b) 2 - 4km away

    c) 4 - 6km away

    d) 6 - 8km away

    e) Over 10km away

16. How much did you have to pay by motor cycle to get to nearest motorable road before the DFRRI road was made? ₦----------

17. How much time did you have to use to treke to the nearest motorable road before the DFRRI road was made?

    Hrs ---------- Mins ----------

18. Before the DFRRI road was made, how far away was the nearest motorable road? Km ----------

19. If DFRRI has done no road in your area, how much time do you have to use to treke from your house to the nearest motorable road?

    Hrs --------- --------- Mins ----------

20. Do you think the establishment of this project in your area has helped to increase or reduce the cost of the following food items. If you think the project has nothing to do with any change in prices, just put a dash (-) all through:

Food Items	Cost before projects	cost after projects	What you want the cost to be
e.g. about 5 average size yams	₦10.00	₦5.00	₦7.50
a) About 10 average size yams			
b) About 10 average size cassava			
c) A Tiya of Gari			
d) A Tiya of Guinea corn			
e) A Tiya of cassava flour			
f) A Tiya of Millet			
g) A Tiya of Rice			
h) A Tiya of Beans			
i) A led of Goat			
j) An average size of chicken			
k) 5 average size of oranges			

21. Indicate against the following list of food items which once you were producing before the introduction of the project and what you now produce after the project. Please indicate the average quantity produced per acre of land and whether or not you think the project helped you to increase your yield:

Food items	Production before project, state acres and average yield per acre		Production after project, state acres and average yield per acre		With assistance from projects
	Acres	Average	Acres	Average	
a) Yam					
b) Cassava					
c) Guinea corn					
d) Rice					
e) Maize					
f) Millet					
g) Beans					
h) Meat					
i) Fruits					
j) Ground-nuts					
k) Vegetables					

22. Indicate against the following list of food items by ticking in the appropriate column your food sufficiency level:

	Before Project				After project			
	Not enough to eat	Just enough to eat	Sur-plus to sale	Pure-ly for sale	Not enough to eat	Just enough to eat	Sur-plus to sale	Pure-ly for sale
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
a) Yam								
b) Guinea corn								
c) Rice								
d) Maize								
e) Millet								
f) Beans								
g) Meat								
h) Fruits								
i) Cassava								
j) G/nuts								
k) Vegetables								

23. Please indicate the labour cost for the following farm activities:

	Cost per acre by machine		Cost per acre by hand		Number of main working hrs per acre		Cost saved	
	For cere-als	For Tu-bers	For cere-als	For Tu-bers	Cere-als	Tu-bers	Cere-als	Tu-bers
a) Preparing the field								
b) Ploughing and harrowing								
c) Planting								
d) Application of fertili.								
e) Weeding								
f) Harvesting								

PART III: PARTICIPATION AND COOPERATION

24. For how many acres out of what total did you have to use a tractor provided by the project centre in the last farming season for ploughing and harrowing?----------

acres out of ----------

25. Are you willing to join co-operative unions or any organisation to propagate the activities of DFRRI?

a) Most willing
b) Willing
c) Indifferent
d) Unwilling
e) Most unwilling

26. How much do you agree with the following statement?

	Strongly agree 5	Agree 4	Indifferent 3	Disagree 2	Strongly disagree 1
a) Do you agree that the DFRRI road project is a useful thing?					
b) Do you agree that this project is necessary?					
c) Do you agree that the establishment of this project has helped in any way to improve the quality of the house in which you now live?					
d) Do you agree that the project has in any way helped to improve the water supply in your house or compound?					
e) Do you agree that the est. of this project has helped in any way to improve the quality of the clothes you use?					

27. Would you have preferred another organisation to handle the work DFRRI is doing now?

a) Yes (state which) ----------

b) No

28. Have you any reason not to want DFRRI?

a) DFRRI only makes our roads worse

b) DFRRI has done nothing for us but claiming much

c) DFRRI has spent too much money for work that could cost less

d) DFRRI chooses which roads to work on without consultation with us

e) The roads DFRRI has chosen to work on are only those that lead to important people's homes

f) DFRRI's work will not last long

g) Any other (state) ----------

29. If as a result of the project your resident is now connected with the main market in your area, how much time do you now save in travelling to this market? ----------

---------- ----------

30. Which of the following do you now need most in your area?

	Urgently needed 1	Greatly needed 2	Needed 3	Indifferent 4	Not needed 5	Terribly unwanted 6	A wasteful thing 7
a) Establish a primary school or college in our area							
b) Make farmland available to everyone							
c) Provide an effective way to handle the problems at weeds in particular							
d) Increase the supply of fertilizers and other farm inputs in the area							
e) Improve the transport services in the area							
f) Effect the timely supply of improvement on fertilizer and other farm inputs							
g) Make more consultation with the target people before establishing projects							
h) Provide electricity in our area							
i) Improve the water supply in the area							
j) Provide a health care service in the area							

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
k) Reduce the community tax and other taxes we pay in the local markets							
l) Provide irrigable land so that people can farm even during the dry season							
m) Provide adult education service in the area							

31. Are you willing to attend to any meetings that are organised to discuss how to imppove the operation of the projects?

    a) Most willing

    b) Willing

    c) Indifferent

    d) Unwilling

    e) Most unwilling

32. Did anybody hold any meeting with you or consult you before the DFRRI road was embarked upon in your area?

    a) Several times

    b) Only a few times

    c) Once

    d) Never

33. Did you as an individual or as a group complain to government official that you need the DFRRI services before it was made available?

    a) Several times

    b) Only a few times

c) Only once

d) Never

34. When you have a problem connecting tne project, who usually decides what tne solution shall be?

a) All of us togetner at a meeting

b) Only the officials take the decision

c) Don't know

APPENDIX IV

QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN BENUE STATE

SECTION D: FOR THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION PROJECT ONLY

INSTRUCTIONS

The information required is purely for academic research. Respondents are assured that it shall not be used for any other purpose and that all information given here shall be treated as confidential.

Where appropriate, indicate the answer by ticking (_/) or circling the number or letter of your choice. Write n.a. meaning not applicable at the end of any question that does not apply to you.

PART I: PERSONAL DATA

1. Sex:
   a) Male
   b) Female

2. Age:
   a) 1 - 15 years
   b) 15 - 21 years
   c) 21 - 30 years
   d) 30 - 40 years
   e) Over 40 years

3. Educational background:
   a) Cannot read and write
   b) Can just read and write
   c) Completed primary seven
   d) Have some post-primary qualifications. Indicate any area of special training: ----------

4. Working status:

   a) Peasant

   b) Civil servant

   c) Retired civil servant

   d) Businessman

   e) Any other: state -- ----------

5. If currently earning a salary, indicate grade level:

   a) Below level 07

   b) 07 - 10

   c) 10 - 13

   d) Above level 13

6. Residence, (name) ----------

7. In which of the following categories does your residence fall?

   a) A farmstead (compound)

   b) A village (a group of compounds)

   c) A town

8. Within what range is your residence from the project farm?

   a) 0 - 10km radius

   b) 10 - 30km radius

   c) 30 - 60km radius

   d) 60 - 100km radius

   e) Over 100km radius

PART II: CONCEPTUATION AND OBJECTIVES

9. Which of the following do you need most in your area:

	Urgently needed 7	Greatly needed 6	Needed 5	Indifferent 4	Not needed 3	Terribly unwanted 2	A wasteful thi 1
a) Primary school							
b) A College (secondary or Technical)							
c) Making farmland available to everyone							
d) Providing an effective way to handle the problem of weeds (grass) on the farms							
e) Increasing the supply of fertilizers and other farm inputs							
f) Improving the timely supply of fertilizers							
g) Improving the transport services in the area							
h) Pegging down the cost of transport							
i) Provision of electricity in our area							
j) Reduction of inflation							
k) Provision of clean drinking water							

	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
l) Provision of dispensary in the area							
m) Reduction of community tax and other taxes paid in the market							
n) Provision of irrigated land for dry season farming							
o) Provision of adult education services							

10. What in your view do you understand is the purpose of this project? (state reason(s):

i) ----------

ii) ----------

iii) ----------

11. How significant is this project to you?

a) Is the only school and have been able to send my children to

b) Our children can now go to school near thieir homes and so suffer less

c) We too can now have a say in what happens to the school our children attend.

d) I still do not have much to do with the school.

PART III: SOCIO-ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, AND CO-OPERATION

12. What have you gained so far from the project?

i) Number of words (children/relations) enrolled ----------

ii) Employed: ----------

iii) Any other (state) ----------

13. Have you ever participated in the work on the community school?

a) Yes

b) No

14. How much money did you spend as part of your contribution?

₦ ----------

15. How much time did you spend as part of your contribution?

₦ ----------

16. Was your contribution voluntarily?

a) Compelled

b) Voluntarily

17. Are you willing to attend any more meetings that are organised to discuss the operations of this project?

a) Most willing

b) Willing

c) Indifferent

d) Most unwilling

18. Are you willing to attend any other meeting to discuss any other development projec in/of your area?

a) Most willing

b) Willing

c) Indifferent

d) Most unwilling

19. Do you agree that the community project is successful?

a) Strongly agree

b) Agree

c) Indifferent

d) Disagree

20. Do you agree that this project is necessary?

    a) Strongly agree

    b) Agree

    c) Indifferent

    d) Disagree

    e) Strongly disagree

21. How valied are these statements with regards to the projects? Score the validity between 1 and 5, with 5 being most valid and 1 being least valid.

	Completely true 5	True 4	Not sure 3	Not true 2	Most untrue 1
a) The project took too long a time to complete					
b) The project lacks patronage from among the local community					
c) The community could not get enough money to execute the project properly					
d) Community did not have the necessary skills to carry out the project					
e) Project is most welcome					
f) Project is successfully completed and is functional					
g) Most of the resources required for the project were from within the local community					
h) Project was not impeded by any govt. bureaucracy					

22. Do you agree that the establishment of this project has helped in any way to improve the quality of the house in which you now live?

    a) Strongly agree

    b) Agree

    c) Not sure

    d) Disagree

    e) Strongly disagree

23. Do you agree that the project has in any way helped to improve the water supply in your house or compound?

    a) Strongly agree

    b) Agree

    c) Not sure (undedided)

    d) Disagree

    e) Strongly disagree

24. Do you think the establishment of this project in your area has helped to increase or reduce the cost of the following food items. If you think the project has nothing to do with any change in prices, just put a dash (-) all through:

Food items	Cost before project	Cost after Project	What you want the cost to be
e.g. about 5 average siz yam	₦10.00	₦15.00	₦7.50
a) About 10 average size yams			
b) About 10 aver. size cassava			
c) A tiya of Gari			
d) A tiya of G/corn			
e) A tiya of cassava			
f) A tiya of millet			
g) A tiya of rice			
h) A tiya of beans			
i) A leg of goat			
j) An aver.size of chicken			
k) 5 aver.size of oranges			

25. Indicate against the following list of food items which onee you were producing before the introduction of the project and what you now produce after the project. Please indicate the average quantity produced per acre and whether or not you think the project helped you to increase your yield:

Food Items	Production before project, state acres and average yield per acre		Production after project, state acres and average yield per acre		With Assistance from Projects
	Acres	Average yield	Acres	Average yield	
a) Yam					
b) Cassava					
c) Guinea corn					
d) Rice					
e) Maize					
f) Millet					
g) Beans					
h) Meat					
i) Fruits					
j) Groundnuts					

26. Do you agree that the establishment of this project has helped in any way to improve the quality of the clothes you use?

a) Strongly agree
b) Agree
c) Not sure
d) Disagree
e) Strongly disagree

27. If as a result of the project your residence is now connected with the main market in your area, how much time do you now save in travelling to this market? _____

APPENDIX V

QUESTIONNAIRE ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN BENUE

SECTION E: FOR PROJECT OFFICIALS: LBRBDA AND BNARDA OFFICIALS ONLY

1. Present office (name) e.g. accounts office etc.) ----------

---

2. Location (place): ----------

3. Would you consider yourself:

   a) A headquarter staff, or

   b) A field worker?

4. Indicate in which of these categories you belong?

   a) Management staff

   b) Managerial staff

   c) Intermediate and Junior Staff

5. Indicate the adequacy and sources of finances needed for this project:

Finance	Amount	Source	Alternative suggested	Source
Capital				
Annual salaries				
Other annual running costs				
Annual revenue				

6. Has the cost been reviewed? If so, state the new cost: ---------

---

7. Which of the following components do you think have often influenced decisions in the Authority. Score each of the components as follows:

   1. Never considered

   2. Occasionally considered

   3. Always considered

	Decisions	Reasons
a) Cost effectiveness		
b) Keeping project working		
c) Easy implementation		
d) Consideration of equity		
e) Encouraging user patronage		

8. Against each reason, indicate the poor decision(s) that can be associated with it. (Simply use the appropriate number e.g. i, ii, or iii etc.):

   i) Wastefulness or excessive costing

   ii) Difficult implement

   iii) Non-consideration of local situation

   iv) Lack of patronage from users

   v) Decisions based on wrong indicators

Decisions	Reasons
a)	
b)	
c)	
d)	
e)	

9. If it were possible to avoid any extra cost, please indicate in which of the following areas?

   a) In the purchase of machinery and other items

   b) Through the use of local resources

   c) By employing less people

   d) By giving more autonomy to the target population

   e) By giving more autonomy to field staff

   f) Any other reason (state) ----------

10. Which of the following in your view constitutes the major constraints to the success of the project?

   a) Inability to use and to maintain sophisticated implements (including lack of spare parts)

   b) Excessive control from headquarters (i.e. field staff and users are not given enough authority to operate)

   c) Lack of money and other resources

   d) Lack of skills

   e) Corrupt practices among staff

   f) Lack of co-operation from the target population

   g) Any other (state) ----------

11. What was the number actually involved?

(FOR THE RBDA AND ADP STAFF ONLY)

12. For how much do you hire out a tractor to do a hecter of land? ₦ ---------- -- ---------- --------

13. For how much do farmers hire tractors to do a hectre of land outside your organisation ₦----------

14. Do you agree that this project is working?

   a) Strongly agree

   b) Agree

   c) Don't know

d) Disagree

e) Strongly agree

16. What in your view do you have to achieve in this project in order for you to be called an efficient officer, please list:

a) ----------

b) ----------

c) ----------

d) ----------

e) ----------

17. Indicate your interest in the following by ticking along the appropriate column of your choice as follows:

	Most desi-rout 5	Desi-rout 4	Indiffe-rent 3	Unwil-ling 2	Most unwilling 1
a) To continue working in their station					
b) To work with the locals on the field					
c) To be co-ordinating the activities of contractors and the agency					
d) To work in any office at the Head Office					
e) To get another job outside their organisation					

18. Please list below what indicators will make you think an area is developed:

a) ----------

b) ----------

c) ----------

d) ----------

e) ----------

19. Are your meetings:

a) Always fully attended

b) Well attended

c) Often a quorum is barely formed

d) Meetings often go on without a quorum

e) Meetings are often cancelled due to poor attendance

20. In which of the following ways are issues debated at your meetings?

a) All issues are always thoroughly debated

b) Most decisions are only made by the executive head

c) Most meetings are only to rubber-stamp decisions already made

d) We rarely have management meetings

e) Any other (state)----------

21. How would you rate the staff performance in the following areas? (Indicate as follows: where 1 most dissatisfactory and 5 most satisfactory):

	Most satis-factory 5	Satis-factory 4	Undeci-ded 3	Dis-satis-factory 2	Most dis-satisfac-tory 1
a) Staff moral					
b) Hard work					
c) Staff co-operation					
d) Honesty					

22. Have you ever come across or read the status aims and objectives of the Authority?

a) Yes

b) No

23. How regular also you have meetings with other similar organisations e.g. M.O.A.?

a) Very regularly

b) Occasionally

c) Never