

**ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNMENT'S COUNTER-TERRORISM
STRATEGY IN NIGERIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY
(2009 – 2013)**

BY

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MPHIL/SOC-SCI/6360/2011-2012**

**MPhil INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this Research titled “Assessment of Government Counter Terrorism Strategy in Nigeria’s Internal Security (2009 – 2013)” has been carried out by me in the Department of Political Science and International Studies. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this research was previously presented for another degree or diploma in this or any other institution.

Woke Iheanyi Kingsley

Signature

Date

CERTIFICATION

This thesis titled “Assessment of Government Counter Terrorism Strategy in Nigeria’s Internal Security (2009 – 2013)” by Woke Iheanyi Kingsley meets the regulations governing the award of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) degree in International Relations of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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ABSTRACT

The research is an assessment of government's counter terrorism strategy in Nigeria's internal security between 2009-2013. Apart from the challenges of poverty, unemployment, sectarian crisis, economic and political crisis, as well as the Niger Delta Militancy, Nigeria is currently facing a deeper and profound challenge of terrorism, especially at the North-East of the country. The list of these disheartening phenomena includes but not limited to kidnapping, bombing and sporadic attack by gun men at several churches, mosques, public places, police stations, schools and prisons at Bauchi, Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa States. Other parts of the country that were not spared are the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Plateau, Kaduna and Kano States. Government's attempt to adopt the strategy used in curtailing militancy in the Niger Delta failed in the present situation. It is against this backdrop that the study assesses Government counter-terrorism strategy in Nigeria's internal security. It seeks to find out the causes of terrorism, Nigerian Government counter terrorism strategies, performance of Government counter terrorism strategies, challenges of Government counter terrorism and possible solutions to the challenges of terrorism. Relevant and related literature were reviewed using conceptual, thematic and theoretical approaches. Public policy and Neo-realist theoretical framework were adopted to explain the phenomenon. Data was generated from informants knowledgeable about the research topic and strengthened with secondary data from Library materials, newspapers, journals and articles. The findings revealed that the strategy used in curtailing militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria failed to tackle terrorism at the North East region because of the international dimension to terrorism and its religious connotation. The research further revealed that Government strategies failed because Government did not address socio-economic factors that created veritable ground for terrorism, such as unemployment, poverty, corruption and poor economy. The research concluded by recommending the adoption of a strategy which will focus on deradicalization and the introduction of effective psychological reinforcement measures that would deter terrorists from engaging in the act, just as the fear of the impact of the Atomic bomb in Japan ended the Second War World. The research also recommends that Government should focus on good governance, job creation and employment opportunities, poverty alleviation, welfare and provision of modern equipment for the military and other security Agents, as well as effective border patrol.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed series of ethno- religious and resource-based violence that have taken terror dimension and threatened its internal security.

Terrorism, either international or domestic has heightened insecurity in Nigeria. While the country was still grappling with the challenges posed by such crimes as armed robbery, murder, kidnapping and assassination, among others, then came the advent of domestic terrorism. Terrorism took a new dimension in Nigeria with the activities of terrorist groups like the *Jama'atul ahlul Sunna Lidda'awa Wal Jihad*, which means "Brethren of Sunni United in the Pursuit of Holy War" popularly referred to as the Boko Haram, meaning 'Western Education is forbidden' and *Jama 'atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan* (ANSARU) especially when they became affiliated to some notable international terrorist organizations like *Al-Qaeda*, Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb and Al-Shaabab. They now attack with more precision, usually more devastating and rampant. This link also led to the introduction of suicide bombing, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), deployment of highly sophisticated weapons and modern fighting equipment which are strange to the Nigerian military and security agents.

As a result of this development, since 2009, Nigeria's counterterrorism operations has been at a crossroad, largely due to some of the issues raised above but most importantly because policy debates on whether or not, to adopt a counter terrorism strategy in Nigeria has continued to drive

contemporary security discourse. However those debates have provided little strategic clarity on how to counter terrorism in Nigeria. For instance, why has the terrorism war in Nigeria become much more complicated than one would surmise from other countries such as America whose stated goals was to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat *Al-Qaeda* in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to other countries in future. In Nigeria, counter terrorism debates are somewhat short sighted – focusing too much on the strengths and weaknesses of short and long term military commitments while avoiding critical discussions about what a sustainable counter terrorism strategy should consist (Mark, 2010).

Following the bombing of Nigeria Police Headquarters in Abuja and the United Nations building in Abuja in 2011 as well as the kidnapping of over two hundred and fifty Secondary School girls at Chibok, the killing and beheading of innocent civilians including women and children, without adequate challenge by the Nigerian security forces, it appears the group has proved that defeating terrorism is not as easy as it seems. There is a common consensus in the Nigerian public sphere that Government’s response to attack insurgents has been reactionary rather than proactive (Aja, 2011; Abdullahi, 2011). Those who share this sentiment argue that government usually waits for the insurgents to launch attacks on churches, schools, police stations and other public institutions, before it reacts. Between 2009 and 2013, the insurgents have killed more than thirteen thousand (13,000) people (Olukolade, 2014). In addition, Human Rights Watch cited in Fafowora (2013:16) reported that Boko Haram has killed at least 935 people since it launched an uprising in 2009. Between January and May 2012, hundreds of more lives have been lost to the insurgency. The group was alleged to have carried out more than 115 separate attacks in the Northern part of the country in 2011 alone.

In spite of the state of emergency imposed by the Nigerian government, the insurgents are still attacking both security agents and innocent citizens.

Amnesty International stated that “across the world, the existence of militant groups, organized criminal gangs and the nexus between them is not a new phenomenon” (Amnesty International, 2012). In West Africa particularly, “terrorist activities are increasing due to the activities of *Al-Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), *Ansar Dine*, *Boko Haram* and *Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan* (Ansaru) in addition to other sleeper militant networks” (Onuoha, 2012). Further complicating the security landscape is the increase in the outbreak of transnational organized crimes (TOC) that feed into the so-called terrorist loop in West Africa”. (Amnesty International, 2012). It is against the backdrop of the prevalence, persistence and proliferation of several insurgent groups and their devastating consequences that the Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and his counterparts from Benin, Chad, Cameroun and Niger in the year 2012 in Paris, approved an action plan to counter the activities of terrorist group blamed for over 2,000 deaths and the Chibok girls abduction. These countries also agreed to push for the UN sanctions against the leaders of Boko Haram and another Nigerian Islamic group, the *Ansaru Jama’atu Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan*. This was also corroborated by Gadzama and Abubakar (2012) who opined that internal security is a complex area of politico – military that involves strategies and resources deployed for the purpose of achieving the safety of a country.

In fact, safety is primary to the survival of any country. No nation survives under a complex and intense security problem such as *Boko Haram* in the North-East and other socio-economic and politically motivated militancy in the South-South and South-East geo-political zones of Nigeria.

The debilitating effect of insecurity, particularly terrorism on the political system and economic prosperity of a nation cannot be rightly calculated (Amnesty International, 2012). Besides losing material and human lives, insecurity arising from terrorism costs huge loss of investment and because it deters foreign investment in many countries around the world (Amnesty International, 2012). Nigeria is of course, further being plundered into deep socio-economic crisis of instability and stagnation due to the menace of *Boko Haram*. This is raising a lot of questions amongst the populace including researchers as regard the ability of the government to guarantee the safety of its citizens as provided in the 1999 Constitution. The government on its part is showing concern and making efforts at combating terrorism in the country. It is against this backdrop that the assessment of government's measures in combating terrorism in the North-East Nigeria calls for an empirical verification.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

This study assessed government measures in combating terrorism in the North-East Nigeria. The choice of this problem is predicated on the fact that despite government's efforts at combating terrorist activities in the North-East Nigeria, the activities of terrorism has remained recalcitrant. This therefore calls into question the need to interrogate why the persistence and prevalence despite government's efforts. Could it be as a result of the strategies or what could be responsible for the persistence? This therefore requires more in-depth study and analysis that calls for the justification of the study.

In fact, the country is troubled by the apparent capture of some local government areas in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States and other places, where the insurgents have carved out, a supposedly Islamic territory. These and many other developments are deeply disturbing and

increasingly dangerous. It is against this backdrop that the research examined the strategies adopted by the Nigerian Government to counter-terrorism in the North-East Nigeria in order to ascertain why terrorism has persisted and prevailed despite government measures.

1.3 Research Questions

The study was guided by the following research questions.

- i. What are the causes of terrorism in the North-East Nigeria between 2009 and 2014?
- ii. What are the Nigerian Government counter-terrorism measures adopted between 2009 and 2014?
- iii. How effective these measures have been in combating terrorism in the North-East Nigeria?
- iv. What are the possible ways to address *Boko Haram* activities in the North-East Nigeria?

1.4 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of the study is to assess government measures in combating terrorism in Nigeria as from 2009 to 2014. However, the specific objectives include:

- i. To find out the causes of terrorism in the North-East Nigeria between 2009 and 2014.
- ii. What are the Nigerian Government counter-terrorism measures adopted between 2009 and 2014?

- iii. To investigate how effective these measures have been in combating terrorism in the North-East Nigeria.
- iv. To offer possible ways to address *Boko Haram* activities in the North-East Nigeria.

1.5 Research Assumptions

The research made the following assumptions:-

- i. Domestic terrorism could be attributable to the inability of government to put in place sustainable socio-economic programmes for the people.
- ii. That terrorism is capable of transcending Nigeria's territorial boundary and encroaches to other West African states.
- iii. Nigeria's Government counter terrorism approaches the North-East, Nigeria insurgencies have failed to yield the desired result.

1.6 Significance of the Study

As a point of departure, after reviewing relevant and related literature on the subject under study, it was observed that most of the works (Kwanashie, 2013; Alemika, 2013; Otegwu, 2015) reviewed focused on the concept of terrorism, its causes, effects and counter terrorism strategies, but none examined specifically the assessment of government counter terrorism strategies in the North-East Nigeria. It is against this backdrop that this study attempted to interrogate an assessment of Government counter terrorism strategies so as to contribute to the existing body of literature. The study has shown that the military option alone without addressing the socio-economic factors cannot stop terrorist activities. This is essentially because socio-economic factors have not only promoted a fertile ground and environment for the smooth operations of terrorist activities but created veritable opportunity for recruitment of gullible and unemployed youths.

The study would also contribute to the existing body of knowledge as it will serve as a reference point for further research on Government counter-terrorist strategies.

1.7 Scope and Limitations of the study

The scope covered by the study is an assessment of government counter-terrorist measures in combating terrorist activities in North-East Nigeria between 2009 and 2014. The justification of this scope and period is because the activities of *Boko Haram* rose to its peak and also the efforts made by the government of President Goodluck Jonathan at combating Boko Haram activities. For instance, Nigeria is one of the latest to be added to the list of states affected by sectarian insurgencies. Out of the 15 countries surveyed in 2011 by the US Department of State for terrorism, Nigeria ranked fifth. It also ranked 15th in kidnappings with 17 kidnappings reported daily, since then, the tempo of terrorist attacks and kidnappings in Nigeria has certainly increased (Fafowora, 2013).

The researcher encountered some challenges while carrying out the research. Some of the challenges were easily surmounted, while others were not. The challenges encountered, rather than discouraging the researcher, became motivating factors and the driving force for the study.

The study has shown that undertaking a research in a crisis torn area like the North-East of Nigeria is such an onerous task. It took the researcher up to eight months to complete the collection of data for this study, especially those that needed to be collected at the communities within the theatre of war. While the researcher travelled more than seven times to some major towns in the North-East of Nigeria to gather information that generated the needed data from the troops at the researcher's command who were at the theatre of war at the time also assisted in creating the enabling environment to gather the relevant data.

One of the challenges faced by the researcher was the issue of accessibility to vital information as the activities of *Boko Haram* is more dreaded and not everybody is disposed to giving information because of its security implications. In addition, the sporadic attacks in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States did not allow the researcher to visit all the villages prone to terrorist activities but the researcher made use of his professional expertise to get troops protection to gather necessary information and data required for the study.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the review of relevant and related literature and presentation of theoretical framework that explains the study. The literature gathered explain the issues of discussion based on the objectives of the study; it covers the following thematic sections: The concept of terrorism and counter terrorism, types and dimensions of terrorism, causes of terrorism in Nigeria, challenges of terrorism, nature of Nigeria's internal security, strategies for combating terrorism, public policy perspective, theoretical perspective of strategy, Nigerian Government counter-terrorism strategies, challenges of Combating Terrorism and the theoretical framework adopted in the study.

2.2 Literature Review

2.2.1 The Concept of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism

The word terrorism just like some other social science concepts has proved to be one of the most difficult concept to define. Perhaps, the only consensus among analysts with regard to terrorism

is that there is no universally acceptable definition of the concept. Literature survey by the National Research Council (NRC) attempted what it considers a working definition of terrorism in the social and behavioural sciences, consisting of the following elements:

- (i) Illegal use or threatened use of force or violence.
- (ii) With an intent to coerce societies or governments by inducing fear in their populations.
- (iii) Typically with political and/or ideological motives and justifications.
- (iv) An 'extra societal' element, with 'outside' society in the case of domestic terrorism or 'foreign' in terms of international terrorism (NRC, 2002).

According to Schmid (2011;),

Terrorism is a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.

Considering the political definitions' popular in governmental circles, Badey, notes the definition offered by the US Department of State in 1983 are still in vogue today. However, he noted that "terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience"(Badey,1998:).

These definitions implies that every terrorist acts depicts a motivation, tactics and victims in order to achieve certain goals or objective. It also involves the use of violence against a non-combatant targets. Hence, if terrorism is taken to be part of a broader insurgency, countering

terrorism may also form a part of a counter-insurgency doctrine, but political, economic and other measures may however, focus more on the insurgency than the specific acts of terror if it must be combated.

Schbley (2003) thinks that the definition of terrorism must be free from prejudiced approaches. He suggests that the definition should be cleared from politics and asserted into criminal justice. Schbley (2003) sees terrorism as violent behaviours committed against the symbolic civilians or their belongings. Hoffman (1998) pointed out that a terrorist is a violent thinker who is dedicated and ready for coercive power to reach his political ends. He also asserted the need for differentiation of terrorism and terrorist from the other kinds of violent behaviors and offenders. In terms of this distinction, Howard and Sawyer (2004), sees terrorism as grounded absolutely in political goals and motives involved in violence and or intimidation intended to attain consequences impacting beyond the initial sufferers or targets directed and controlled by an organized group which has a chain of command or a cell structure committed by a subordinate group or an informal structure.

Terrorism is a word with great rhetorical power but with limited scientific precision. This is because terrorists in one given situation could be regarded as freedom fighters in another. Drawing a definite borderline between terrorists and freedom fighters continue to pose a conceptual as well as theoretical default (Gandu, 2009).

In Gandu's view (2009), there is a thin line between freedom fighters and terrorists but the case of terrorism in Nigeria today is clear. There is no part of the country that is under foreign rule or dominance. Nigeria has enjoyed unbroken stretch of democracy since 1999 with strong political

structures that guarantee equal representation and appointments to positions of authority as regulated by Federal Characters Commission. Nigeria also established among other things, a strong judicial system where aggrieved parties and individuals can resort to and seek redress. The present terrorist activities in Nigeria is not aimed at fighting for political or religious freedom as the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria guarantees freedom of worship and political association among others. So, terrorists in Nigeria are not freedom fighters. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria guarantees freedom of religion and worship and no individual or section of the country have been denied these fundamental human rights, whether Christians, Muslims, idol worshippers, atheists or any other religion. Any group or section of Nigeria engaging in terrorism with the aim of fighting for freedom to practice their religion or hold political position might not be fighting a just war. The reason is that, the 1999 Constitution guarantees these fundamental human rights. Those engaging in acts of terrorism in Nigeria on the basis of these issues are rather pursuing selfish agenda which is not anchored on fighting for freedom as posited by (Gandu, 2009).

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act cited in (Alemika, 2003:202-203) defines terrorism as a crime involving:

- i. “any act which is a violation of the Criminal Code or the Penal Code and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated to –
 - a. intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce, or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment of thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act or to adopt a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
 - b. disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
 - c. Create general insurrection in a state;

ii. any promotion, sponsorship of, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organisation or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i), (ii) and (iii) [section 46 of the Act dealing with interpretations.

The definition of terrorism in the EFCC Act according to (Alemika,2013:202) is comprehensive and paradoxically may turn out to be a catch-22 provision that covers anything and everything. This may lead to abuse and engender a form of 'law enforcement terrorism' by the government that may invoke it in many circumstances that are inappropriate. It may also lead to unduly wide discretionary powers of enforcement - arrest, prosecution and judicial disposition.

According to the Revised Academic Consensus definition of terrorism cited in (Alemika, 2013:201) refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propangandistic psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties. In another development, Crenshaw (2011:2) defines terrorism as” a form of violence that is primarily designed to influence an audience. Its execution depends on concealment, surprise, stealth, conspiracy, and deception”. She noted that “terrorism is not spontaneous, or does it involve mass participation. The act itself communicates a future threat to people who identifies with the victims”. Crenshaw further noted that the “choice of time, place, and victim is meant to shock, frighten, excite, or outrage”.

Inspite of the complexity and fluidity of the subject of terrorism, definitions have kept emerging. Sandler and Enders (2002) considered terrorism as premeditated use, or threat of extra normal violence to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at large audience by

weaker side in an asymmetrical conflict. According to the convention for prevention and combating terrorism by (African Union (AU) Article 1 (3), terrorism is defined as “any act which is a violation of criminal laws of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of or causes serious injuries or death to any person, any number or group of persons or causes damage to public or private property, natural resources, environment or cultural heritage”.

Terrorism is defined as an organization or party’s method that uses systematic violence to gain their premeditated goals (Sills, 1968). Wardlaw (1982) considers terrorism as an instrument for psychological war and creates a political definition. There are some people who are directly targets of violent behaviours and some people other than the targets who are psychologically impacted by these acts. Political terrorism is the threat or use of violence by individuals or groups against or for the existing authority. Its purpose is to intimidate the majority and force them to act according to their political ends (Gadzama, 2012). Hoffman (1998: 32) points out that, “the decision to call someone or label some organization 'terrorist' becomes almost unavoidably subjective, depending largely on whether one sympathizes with or opposes the person/group/cause concerned”.

After examining some common definitions, Poland (2005) narrows the scope of terrorism on two shared features: fear and attaining various political ends. Almost all terrorist acts are aimed at frightening a target population and ultimately they pursue to gain some kinds of political ends. Hence, he defines terrorism as producing dread and intimidation through planned, intentional, organized slaughter, turmoil, and frightening of innocent people to attain some kinds of political ends. Laqueur (1987), one of the authorities in this area, uses a simple definition for terrorism.

He addresses it as a shifting behaviour by frightening via political or criminal violence. White (2002) indicates that Laqueur's definition does not completely explain the political issues of terrorism, but it provides the practitioners a way to progress outside the problematic argument of a definition.

Wilkinson (1979) differentiates political terrorism from other kinds of terrorism. He argues that terrorism uses criminals, sycophants, sadists, or hooligans to achieve different political ends. Another scholar who draws attention to this distinction by explaining the differences between the terms 'terror' and 'terrorism' is Taylor (1988). He emphasized that there can be some kind of terror like armed robbery, lynching, slaughter, and even in a case involving threats due to the severity or the way of committing these crimes, but it does not cause the act of terrorism. In this context, the term 'terror' can be used for the events that cause severe damage, and anxiety in people. For instance, when several hooligans commit a series of crimes intimidating and threatening other people during the night on the street, it may be called 'street terror' or when somebody or some gang members drive their vehicles very dangerously while they are under the influence of alcohol or drugs and kill many people by causing several severe accidents, it may be defined as traffic terror. Addressing these crimes does not mean to assess them in the same category or definition with political terrorism. Taylor (1988) differentiates them by distinguishing the words 'terror' and 'terrorism'. In this perspective, terrorism is defined as a psychological warfare aimed at impact the political process through violence.

According to Kenneth (2013), counter-terrorism is used to describe force operations. It refers to a drone warfare targeted at killing, most obviously, efforts intended to deny territory to terrorist groups.

Counter-terrorism operations are subject to changes according to the nature of the terrorism threat. While terrorism is a tactic that cannot be entirely eradicated, counter-terrorism will provide the steps that can be taken to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat organizations that use terrorism.

For the purpose of this study, terrorism is defined as the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of the nation, for the purposes of intimidation, coercion or ransom.

2.2.2 Types and Dimensions of Terrorism

Terrorism is the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of the nation for the purpose of intimidation, coercion or ransom. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) () categorizes terrorism as one of two types.

- ❖ Domestic Terrorism
- ❖ International Terrorism
- ❖ Suicide Terrorism
- ❖ Altruistic Suicide Terrorism

a) Domestic Terrorism

The distinction between domestic and international terrorism refers not to where the terrorist act takes place but rather to the origin of the individuals or groups responsible for it.

For instance, the 1995 bombing of the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City was an act of domestic terrorism but the attacks of September 2011 were international in stature. Domestic terrorism are terrorist activities that focus on facilities or populations without foreign direction.

Boko Haram started as a domestic terrorist group, when it was attacking police stations and some individuals that were opposed to their activities and those perceived to be infidels, till it graduated to an international terrorist group.

b) International Terrorism

International terrorism poses the greatest threat to national security. Hazard Mitigation Plan Update (HMPU) (2011) also defined international terrorist activities that are foreign based and or sponsored by organizations or groups outside the country. HMPU (2011) in its report predicts that global trends indicate that the growing number of terrorist groups will become more networked and even harder to identify and track.

Terrorists often use threats to create fear among the public, to convince citizens that government is powerless to prevent terrorism, and to get immediate publicity for their causes. Going by the definition of international terrorism as provided by HMPU (2011), *Boko Haram*'s affiliation to other international terrorist organizations qualifies the group as a deadly international terrorist group. The groups affiliation are in the following circumstances.

- a. Al-Shabaab and *Boko Haram* share similar ideologies and in 2011, a *Boko Haram* member, Mamman Nur reportedly received trainings from Al-Shabaab in Somalia before launching the attack against the United Nations headquarters in Abuja on August 26, 2013.
- b. Ansar Al-dine and *Boko Haram* fought alongside each other in Mali against the Azawad National Liberation Movement and several reports have documented *Boko Haram* activity in Ansar Al-dine controlled territories.
- c. Ansaru (Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan) splintered off from *Boko Haram* due to ideological differences in January 2012. Ansaru criticized *Boko Haram* for not

adhering to the same interpretation of defensive Jihad. Although the groups ideological differences influenced their tactics and targets selection. Ansaru's goals of eradicating western influence in West Africa and establishing Sharia are similar to Boko Haram's.

- d. In 2012, Boko Haram joined with AQLIM, the movement for oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Al-dine to create the Islamic state of Azawad and rebuffed the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNL) from areas in the Muslim region of Gao. Although Boko Haram clashed with MNL, the group has not been a significant target of Boko Haram's attacks.
- e. Boko Haram's ideology is strongly opposed to western influence in Nigeria. In 2012, Boko Haram released a video calling for Jihad against the United States, Israel and Great Britain. However, Boko Haram has never targeted directly any of these nations.
- f. Since its formation in 2001 and more to greater militancy in 2009, Boko Haram has ideologically and militantly opposed the Nigerian Government. Boko Haram wishes to create an Islamic state in Nigeria and has targeted government security forces and defenceless civilians in its operations. The Nigerian government has responded with military and police forces, attempting to destroy Boko Haram's strongholds and arrest militants responsible for attacks.
- g. In 2010 Boko Haram released a statement offering support and pledging alliance to the Afghanistan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Ideologically both groups have strongly impacted Boko Haram, there is no evidence that either of the groups has provided any material form of support.
- h. The movement for oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) has provided training camps and conducted joint operations with Boko Haram militants in Mali. The groups

are ideologically aligned and wish to establish Sharia beyond the borders of their respective home states (Victor and Karl, 2013).

In Nigeria, Boko Haram was responsible for more than 80 percent of all terrorist attacks between 1980 and 2013 for which a perpetrator group was identified, despite their relatively recent onset of violence in 2009. Likewise, deaths from Boko Haram attacks represented 70 percent fatalities from terrorist attacks in Nigeria during this time period (Sergie, 2014).

The next most active group in Nigeria is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which carried out more than 70 attacks and killed approximately 280 people, beginning in 2006 (Campbell, 2014).

Ansaru, splintered from Boko Haram in 2012 and since then has carried out a number of attacks in Nigeria, including targeted kidnapping of international figures. The attacks include the kidnapping of a French national in December, 2012 and seven foreign nationals kidnapped in an attack on a Lebanese construction company in February, 2013.

The group's operations at Mali and other African countries also confirm that Boko Haram is an international terrorist group. Suicide terrorism is one of the dimensions of international terrorism which also includes altruistic suicide.

c) Suicide Terrorism

There are numerous scholars like Sigmund Freud, Karl Menninger, Alfred Adler, Karen Honey and Emile Durkheim who perceives suicide attacks as criminal behaviours (Grollman, 1971). Some of them used social factors to explain why human beings commit suicide, whereas some

others provided psychological aspects. For example, in classical sociology, Durkheim (1951) provided widely accepted elements for reasoning of the phenomenon of suicide and categorized the performers. He presented social aspects that lead some individuals to engage in suicidal acts such as anomie, egoism, altruism and fatalism in the society (Maris, 1981; Dunman, 2003).

Generally, Durkheim described three categories of suicide. The egoistic suicides which occur because of the lack of social ties between the society and the individual. When an individual cannot integrate into the society, the social control mechanism like the religion, family or some other institutions are threatened. The lack of individual's integration into the society carries him to commit *egoistic* type of suicide. The upper echelon of the societies where the person's life is administered by the traditions or rituals may lead the individual to sacrifice his/her own life for others. Durkheim (1951) identifies this as *altruistic* suicide. The last category, anomie suicide, is the result of the lack of regulation of the members of the community. The desires and pleasures of the persons are regulated by the community. The disruption of this regulation completely changes balance between his end and means. He primarily explained these three categories as commonly applicable typologies.

In the light of Durkheim's typology of social anomie theory, egoistic and anomic suicides have kindred ties, which can be indicated as being caused by the community's inadequate existence in individuals. However, the egoistic type evolves from the deficiency in collective activity leading to individuals not achieving their means and ends, while anomic type springs from the deficiency of individual passions leading them to lack the ability to control themselves. Additionally, altruistic and fatalistic types of suicides have kindred ties with each other because of too much involvement in social integration and moral regulation respectively. An individual's deep

integration into society makes him ready to sacrifice his/her own life as a duty to serve the common good rather than his or her own satisfaction in the altruistic type, whereas excessive regulation, moral despotism and oppressive discipline diminishes an individual's aspiration for the future and leads him to suicide as a better option in the fatalistic type (Durkheim, 1951).

d. Altruistic Suicide Terrorism

This type of suicide is explained by the high end of integration scale representing suicides committed because of too much integration with the society. Altruistic type of suicide occurs in the opposite conditions of egoistic suicide standing for the negative end of integration continuum. Individuals become part of a group or society as a result of deep integration, so they lose their individuality and individual identity. They feel lost in the group and put forward the social values, goals, and rituals over anything. Individuals ultimately gain a sense of readiness to sacrifice for the sake of their group or society (Durkheim, 1951).

Suicide attacks is therefore a unique type of terrorism amongst others because a perpetrator himself becomes a human-missile which can make the last second adjustments to maximize the damage, when he decides to commit this assault. Suicide terrorism was introduced into domestic terrorism in Nigeria when the domestic terrorist groups became affiliated with some international terrorist organizations, with its first suicide attack at the Nigeria Police Headquarters, Abuja on 16th June, 2012.

2.2.3 Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria

Nigerian poverty situation has been described as an embarrassment and irony to her abundant natural resources buoyed by oil wealth discovered since 1953. Poverty has led to frustration and anger amongst the poor and the marginalized cultural and religious groups in the country. Poverty among the unemployed youths fuelled by corrupt leaders has been identified as causes of violence. Most of the recruits used by the Boko Haram and suicide bombers are drawn from the former Almajiris (poor street children, from poor Muslim parentage, who had been denied formal Western education but had been exploited while growing up by rich Islamic clerics who use them as street beggars to ask for alms on the streets of Northern Nigeria). The Boko Haram sect usually offers food, shelter, security and alternative succor to these homeless children and youths to get their support.

Several structural factors associated with presence or absence of terrorism have been identified by Crenshaw 2011; Lutz and Lutz 2011 cited in (:206), includes the following:

1. Political environment (extent of democracy – including freeness, fairness and credibility of elections, efficacy of democracy in addressing the aspirations of citizens; national cohesion, political stability, tolerance among ethnic and religious groups, etc) and impact on citizens and influence of foreign actors. Political repression, especially of specific ethnic, religious or racial groups;
2. Economic environment –quality of living of citizens, extent of inequality (influenced by corruption and economic policies), organized and transnational crime, economic exploitation or/and widespread corruption resulting in gross inequality; widespread poverty and economic discrimination;
3. Political, socio-cultural and religious pluralism that breeds inter-group rivalry and violence;

4. Failing states that lacked capacity to promote the human security of citizens; thereby unable to ensure national cohesion or integration, patriotism and loyalty and therefore citizens may be recruited domestically by disenchanting groups (ethnic, religious, political and economic);
5. Weak state capacity for effective conflict-management (prevention, containment, transformation, resolution, etc) that prolong or entrench inter-group conflicts;
6. Foreign relation alliances that sections of the nation perceive as inimical to their group interests; and
7. Lack of capacity to effectively manage the positive and negative aspects of scientific technological and communication developments in the era of globalization.

Efseh and Robert (2011) observed that terrorism in Nigeria in which ever dimension is stimulated by socio-economic considerations. For instance the Niger Delta agitations are greatly underpinned by the bid for primary material condition. The ethnic driven terrorism is also traceable to economic reason; this is because every ethnic group in Nigeria is in the struggle to achieve control of state resources. Religious extremism for instance, is considered one of the stimuli, and cases abound where Muslims and Christians alike try to overthrow their secular government and replace them with theocracy. Example of countries affected is Nigeria, Egypt, Indonesia and Philippines. In Uganda the Lord's Resistant Army (LRA) wanted to enforce the Ten Commandments on the Ugandan constitutions and violence became the order of the day. In line with this, Walker (2012) further observed that Boko Haram is a violent Islamic militant organization based in the Northeast which strongly opposes man made laws and modern science and seeks to establish Islamic Government and Sharia laws in the country.

Bappah (2009) explained that the real issues are poverty, ignorance, joblessness, frustration, hopelessness, anger, arrogance by official corruption, insensitivity, impunity and generally bad governance. He further argued that it is not wrong to say that terrorism is caused by both internal and external factors. External factors that increase vulnerability to terrorism includes the foreign policies of a country, in particular the U.S. as well as globalization especially in telecommunication which enable likeminded individuals to unite and conspire against common enemies. Internal factors that may lead to terrorist activities include economic deprivation, political oppression, government suppression, ethnic and religious persecutions (Ameh, 2009).

Mu'azu (2010) argued that the environment in which Nigerians live and their dissatisfaction with government policies could be contributory factors to the existence of terrorism. According to this perspective, the living environment of Nigerians give groups the courage to take on the Nigerian state, because of its perception as unjust to citizens, without guarantee for individual safety and security. Where there is widespread perception and evidences to suggest that the citizens are not getting a good deal from the state they could resort to violence.

Many of these conditions pre-date Boko Haram, and Boko Haram's existence and agenda are tangential to these problems. Yet, it is true that the continuing failure of the Nigerian government to address these and other critical issues satisfactorily contributes to general mistrust among its people. Though Boko Haram cannot solve these crises, they are reaping the benefits of a frustrated disillusioned population. Jobless, angry young men who form a massive talent pool from which Boko Haram can draw, while broader northern society somewhat justifiably

views the federal government and security services trying to eradicate Boko Haram with contempt.

2.2.4 Nature of Nigeria's internal Security

Section 14(1) b of Chapter 2 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria captures the importance of security when it states that “security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of Government”. Seen this way, security is a social contract between the state and its citizens in which the former is expected to protect, defend, and provide for the latter in the public arena.

According to vision 20: 20: 20 (2009) Internal Security is a very important concept in international relations. It is conceptualized in actual terms as the potential freedom and safety from the physical/military, political, economic, socio-cultural or psychological danger or attack. That is, it is the protection or defence of people against all kinds of victimization from external/military attack, economic want, poverty, illiteracy, disease/ill-health, political oppression, social exploitation, criminality et.c. and it is perceived in terms of the generality of the population i.e. the physical, political, economic and social security of the average citizen rather than that of the government of the day and its officials.

In conceptualizing national security, Imobighe (1990) broadly conceived security as freedom from danger or with threats to a nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interest and enhance the wellbeing of its people. In this definition, it is implied that security manifest at the level of nation-states, individual e.t.c. and with internal and external dimensions. This definition is all encompassing; it went further than the narrow strategic conception to include other aspects of human endeavour.

Also encompassing is the conception of national security by (Mc Namara, 1968). He opined that, in a modernizing society, security means development, security is not military force though it may encompass it; security is not traditional military activity though it may encompass it; security is not military hardware though it may encompass it; security is development. Without development Mc Namara (1968) argues there can be no security because it gives vent to the connection between internal security and challenges of international terrorism. He further posits that:-

National security is a feeling of confidence that the disaster of war and the vagaries of international political life can be avoided or absorbed either by ultimate victory or good management, so that the state, its institutions and its way of life can continue to exist in a fundamentally unimpaired fashion (McNamara,1968).

What this means is that, he believes that the feeling of security not only involves the maintenance of cherished values and way of life but the freedom to develop and improve its position in future. To him security connotes development.

Mijah (2009:25) posits that national security is determined by both conventional and non-conventional conception. The conventional conception which is the Clausewitzian/Strategic perspective, project images of weapons and weapons system for defence of cherished values.

Strategic/military perspective from where the concept has often been defined deals mainly with security and defence matters. This is the traditional or basic idea. It is the need to protect the political and core interest of the state, this includes a nation's military capability, proportion of national resources, allocation to defence, the nation's military thinking, military strategy and a

proper defence plan, he explains. Mijah (2009) argued that in the national security role, the military legitimacy is acquired through successful performance in the defence of the state during war time. Also in times of peace, military's legitimacy is based on the societal perception of threats and states to meet them. The point of departure of this research is for the state to focus on socio-economic problems of the people and total welfare of the military/security Agents.

The current security challenges in Nigeria seem to have overwhelmed the military and other security Agents. This explains why the Governor of Borno State, Alhaji Kashim Shettima (2014:4) was quoted as saying that "Boko Haram insurgents were better equipped than the Nigerian Federal Troops".

This was further emphasized by the Shehu of Bama, Alhaji Kyari Ibn Ibrahim Elkanemi (2014:6), after the Boko Haram insurgents attacks his Palace at Bama, Borno State, when he said, "the Boko Haram men who attacked my palace came with RPGS and other high caliber weapons while the military was using only AK47 to fight back". He claimed that the Federal security troops had to retreat when they ran out of bullets.

Mijah (2009) posited that the non-conventional perspective or the alternative perspective of security is concerned with human development, this includes a secured food system, health, money, poverty, hunger, e.t.c. The salient point of this non-conventional conception of security is to emphasize security as human security. Mijah (2009) further submits, that human security connotes protection; this is because the security is mutually supportive in the sense that improving the security of the people strengthens the legitimacy, stability and security of state.

From the elasticity of the definition of the concept of security, it is necessary to understand and accept security along the concept of internal security. This is because internal security is an essential aspect of national security.

Adedeji (1997) argued that food remains important in ensuring and maintaining military superiority. Though, if the concept of internal security is defined strictly in terms of the gun, and other military hardware's, the fact remains that guns do not fire themselves, nor do tanks drive themselves. These military implements depends on man in order to function, otherwise they remain useless irrespective of their level of technology, sophistication as inanimate objects of no importance. Hence, welfare of troops is very vital in achieving the desired success on the war against terrorism in the country. This position was corroborated by Abubakar (2012) who opined that the *Boko Haram* terrorist group are better equipped and motivated than the Federal Troops. Consequently, the Nigerian troops easily run out of ammunitions, their allowances are not paid regularly, there is inadequate medical facilities for the men in case of injury. These made them to be vulnerable to suffer defeat.

In addition, Abubakar (2012) has observed that available report indicates that the logistics and weapons available for use by the Nigerian security Agents to fight *Boko Haram* insurgents were obsolete weapons, rickety vehicles, AK 47 assault rifles with limited ammunitions, while the insurgents were equipped with brand New Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVS), Hilux Vehicles, Armoured Tanks, Rocket Propel Grenades (RPGS), high caliber and more sophisticated weapons.

Thus, one of the capabilities of an Army is the soundness of their bodies which determines to a great extent their response to training and discipline which is especially the case in underdeveloped economies where ground troops form the majority and lack of adequate welfare facilities is preponderance. In essence, adequate welfare for troops is essential for their effective performance. A country that cannot sustain a well funded national security requirement cannot withstand any form of invasion (as is the case of Boko Haram in the North East).

According to Vogt (1986) food is a highly volatile weapon which can be used effectively to create instability in a state or even between states internally. It can lead to political instability because, when people are hungry they become disgruntled and violent, they can even become unpatriotic because they believe that government is not responsive to their needs and they would not be willing to lay down their lives in defence of the country in case of any external threat. It is said a hungry man is an angry man, in a situation of socio-economic marginalization and alienation, a hungry man would tend to listen to his stomach than to government explanation. She explain further that lack of food, poverty and unemployment for the teeming population of this country have made the youths including university graduates ready tools in the hands of the sponsors of *Boko Haram* insurgency.

Economically, terrorism compels government and organizations to expend huge sums of money to develop anti-terror infrastructure, which would have been channeled towards beneficial services to the people.

2.2.5 Challenges of Terrorism

James and Jennifer (2011) opined that contemporary and historical scholarship and terrorism in Africa particularly since the early post-colonial years has highlighted the level of international

terrorism (which emerged most prominently during 1970s) as well as domestic incidents where terrorism was employed.

Furthermore, in the last 15 years African countries have not only struggled against domestic terrorism, they have also challenged the emergence of transitional terrorist groups that have used Africa as a veritable ground to carry out attacks against both domestic and international targets as well as to develop and maintain operations. The 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2002 bombing of Israeli-owned hotel and airplane, and attacks against UN building in Algeria and Nigeria offer examples of terrorist attacks in Africa. In addition, the past decade has witnessed the transformation of some domestic groups, some of whom have adopted transitional objectives. Most notably, the 2007 merger of Algeria's Salafist group for preaching and combat with Al-Qaeda resulted in the formation of the organization of Al-Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). More recently, the Islamist extremist group Boko Haram, based in northern Nigeria, has been increasing its rate of domestic attacks against civilians and government targets and also targeted the United Nations building in Abuja. In fact, it is recently observed that the growth of Islamist extremist activity in sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria in particular is beginning to "Sound" like the Middle East (Forest and Jennifer, 2011).

Adebakin (2012), questioned the source of arms and weapons of terrorists, a development that made it easy for terrorist to infiltrate the country and perpetrate heinous crimes and acts of terrorism. He further stressed that the burning question is where does Boko Haram, MEND and armed robbers get their stock of arms, ammunitions and communication? Omaha (2006)

corroborated this and explained how the Nigerian customs service during routine surveillance intercepted large consignment of arms and ammunition worth over \$4.3 billion at border posts.

Okeke (2005) posits that terrorism has become such a worldwide phenomenon that only recently a respected and highly placed Vatican official cardinal Renato Martino, described terrorism as the 4th World War, the 3rd World War being the cold war which ended with the demise of former Soviet Union. Martino was quoted as saying “we have entered the fourth World War I believe we are in the midst of another world war and it involves absolutely everyone because we don’t know what will happen when we leave hotel, when we get on a bus, when we go to a coffee bar, war itself is sitting down right next to each and every one of us”. It challenges the assumption that any nation could guarantee absolute security to its citizens without collaboration with the larger international community.

Batseh and Robert (2011) opined that the act of terrorism imposed social and psychological challenge and global security. The 2001 September 11 suicide attack on the World Trade Centre in America reportedly claimed the lives of about 3000 people. The attack in Kenya and Tanzania killed over two hundred people. The Balam school siege in September 2004 in Russia tragically caused the death of about three hundred (300) persons the affected relatives and victims who escaped with injury from the terrorism act may suffer the psychological trauma for the rest of their lives.

In Nigeria, the fears today is that terrorism could go beyond ordinary explosives and sporadic attacks of security institutions and defenceless civilians but could extend to the deployment of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons now referred to as Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMD). The fear might constitute severe psychological consequences on the way of life of people and this is a serious challenge to the internal security of any country.

Related to the concept and nature of terrorism, are the methods or tactics which terrorists often employ to achieve their goals. Such tactics or strategies which include kidnapping, hostage taking, ambush and barricade, sabotage or vandalism, hijacking, car-jacking, kneecapping, threat or hoax, explosive or fire bombing, assassination, mass murder, exotic pollution, arson, arms smuggling, extortion, violation of diplomatic immunity, shoot out with security operatives, armed attack, suicide attacks and bombings, biochemical attack e.t.c.(Adeoye,2003).

The acts of terrorism take place around the world for a variety of motives, whether the terrorists style themselves as separatists, anarchists, dissidents, nationalists, or religious believers. What makes them terrorists is that they direct violence against persons (and property) with the goal of terrorizing a wider audience than the immediate victims thereby attempting to gain political influence over the larger audience (Friedlander, 1992).

Shafritz (1988) observed that terrorists organizations have shrewdly sought to come under the umbrella of legitimacy. They typically assert that they are seeking self-determination and are engaged in a war of liberation, such tactics, designed to further legitimacy, have often succeeded. Terrorism has been adopted as modus operandi of national liberation movements and as the ultimate weapon of self-appointed, political, ideological, ethnic, religious, national or social groups seeking to topple existing regimes or secede from established entity. Therefore, it is not surprising that at the outset terrorism has become the last refuge of the hopeless cause (Ninalowa, 2005).

Rashid (2012) asserted that the perpetrator will need to know about security agencies movement in and around his theatre of operation and it is wrong to always believe that he is an insider. The perpetrator will need to know what adaptable vehicle is necessary. It is wrong to believe cars and motorcycle are choice vehicles to carry out murderous rampage. The killers could have arrived on foot and seized security agencies vehicle at gunpoint. The perpetrator will need to return as safe as possible but does not fear to die. It is wrong to think that these killers are always on suicide mission. The perpetrator will need to buy his weapons or he is supplied such weapons from sponsors. The security agencies are dead wrong that these killers are sponsored all the time.

In the words of Alozieuwa (2012), one of the outcomes of the security challenge imposed by the Boko Haram insurrection on Nigerian society has been the emergent preponderance of theories that attempt to explain the motive of the Islamic group. Unlike the Niger Delta militancy which preceded it, and which predicated its desire for a separate state from Nigeria on decades of conspiratorial neglect by the Nigerian state and multinational oil prospecting companies in the Niger Delta region, Boko Haram has refrained from articulating and formally presenting its grievances, apart from its declared desire for the strict interpretation of Islamic Law in Nigeria. The confusion also grows out of the dynamics in operations of the sect. For instance, its terror campaign, which initially targeted security formations and personnel, has expanded to include civilians and non-government targets, and the Nigerian public generally.

A number of trends have emerged from Boko Haram's claimed attacks, each demonstrating increasing capabilities and sophistication. Accordingly, in June 2012, a report on Nigeria issued by the Congressional Research Service states that "Boko Haram's attacks has increased

substantially in frequency, reach, and lethality, now occurring almost daily in northeast of the country, and periodically beyond". As detailed later on, they may have also taken steps to penetrate Nigerian security forces. If it is true that level of sophistication is an indication that the group has continued to further advance their operational strategies, and expand their threats. There has also been an increase in the group's use of suicide bombings. As of May 14, 2013, Boko Haram engaged in at least sixteen different suicide attacks, according to the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups and Nigerian media reports. These attacks targeted at places of worship, police stations, local newspaper offices, and government buildings. In comparison, between Boko Haram's first suicide attack on June 16, 2011 and December 31, 2011, they conducted only six suicide attacks. This development indicates two things: that the group has attracted a core of recruits willing to die for their cause, and that it possesses the capability to build sophisticated explosives at a rapid pace.

Boko Haram's effort to wreak havoc in Nigeria have driven interreligious relationships to an all-time low and have created a culture in which the public does not trust in the security institutions that are supposed to protect them and thus resort to violence to protect themselves (Centre for Security Studies, 2012).

Nigeria has had its share of the cankerworm of terrorism in the last couple of years as it has manifested in an alarming proportion particularly in Northern parts of the country. Since the last few years, there have been incidences of mind blowing suicide attacks on military and police formations and particularly places of worships and villages. Nigeria has experienced the rise and falls of different terrorist groups. For instance, the Yoruba nationalist's organization popularly

known as the *Oodu'a Peoples Congress* unleashed terror attack on the police and police stations from 1999 to 2003. Also, the Niger Delta militants have and continue to sabotage oil production through pipeline vandalization and establishment of illegal refineries, kidnapping of foreign oil workers and the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to cause mayhem. Furthermore, the kidnapping of citizens by bandits, wanton killing of security personnel and innocent civilians is a common scene in Eastern part of the country. The Northern parts of the country which used to be relatively peaceful despite the low income and poor state of education of the people compared to other parts of Nigeria is now engulfed in the worst form of killing and wanton destruction of properties. These atrocities are unleashed by members of the terrorist group called *Boko Haram*. For instance, a participant of the just concluded national conference said that Nigeria as a nation is going through a lot of security challenges which has threatened its peaceful existence in all ramifications, be it political, economic, education, social or religious. Nigerians are now afraid of their fellow Nigerians due to the extent to which terrorism has eaten deep into the fabrics of our society.

In a video clip released in October 2010, Abubakar Shekau declared that the “Jihad has begun in July, 2010. That his Nigerian-based movement known to the outside world as Boko Haram” is known to its members as *Jama'atu Ahlisunnah Lida'awati Wal-Jihad*. The group appears to have Africa's most violent insurgent group. Since Boko Haram's first attack in September 2010, the group has murdered several thousands of security personnel, Christians, government officials, Muslim leaders, and civilians in Nigeria. In 2012, for the first time, Boko Haram claimed to have gained control of more than ten municipalities in northeastern Nigeria. The alarming expansion of the group's activities prompted President Goodluck Jonathan to declare a State of Emergency in the three north-east states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe resulting in

military operations against Boko Haram's safe havens in Nigeria's borderlands with Niger, Chad and Cameroun. The militaristic approach succeeded only temporarily. Boko Haram re-emerged at the end of 2013 and has carried out massacres of civilians on a greater scale than any time since the start of the insurgency.

The first implication of the terrorism is that it is a demonstration of the extent of discontent in the polity. As one analyst argued, "at the bottom line of the Boko Haram onslaught is injustice" (Bayo, 2013). In July 2009, when Mohammed Yusuf was killed in a suspected extra judicial manner, members of the sect felt the culprits were not immediately brought to book. This no doubt angered members of the sect and they have literally been on a rampage since then. In spite of the massive deployment of security personnel to deal with the sect, especially in Borno State, they seem to be waxing stronger. What has happened since the killing of Yusuf has been an attempt to suppress justice. As Adesina puts it, you don't suppress injustice, you address it, if you ever want peace (Ezea, 2012).

Another implication of the Boko Haram crisis is that it has fanned the embers of religious crisis in the country. Boko Haram, an Islamic sect, apart from attacking the security personnel and social joints across the country, have also targeted Christian places of worship, thus giving their activities an anti-Christian outlook. For example, the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria (CSN) recently issued a statement in which it stated that "violence, under any guise, is not the exclusive right of any particular group of people and Nigeria as a nation is greater than any religious or political group forbidding any one from committing a crime with impunity without being called to order" (CSN, 2011). The implication of these positions for inter-religious harmony in the

country is adversely affected. Boko Haram has continued to target Christian places of worship and it is needless to say that Christians now perceive themselves as targets.

Furthermore, as a consequence of Boko Haram activities, many southern states have evacuated their citizens from the North (Onwukwe, 2011). Also, many southerners in Borno have left on their own for safety (Olaoye, 2011; Ibrahim, 2011). Since Boko Haram commenced its violent activities in 2009, many southerners, especially Igbos, have come under attack and have lost their lives and property which has adversely affected businesses at that part of the country. Also, in response to an order from Boko Haram for southerners to leave the north, many Igbos decided to do so (Abubakar, 2012). This mass exodus of the southerners from the north brings to clear focus the precarious security situation in the north in particular and the country in general. The southeast governors and some prominent Igbo leaders have appealed to the Igbo to remain in the north but this call has hardly been heeded (Onwukwe, 2012; Abuh, 2012; Editorial, Vanguard, February 4, 2012). In reaction to the treatment meted out to southerners in the north, radical southern groups like MASSOB, MEND and OPC have threatened to retaliate appropriately to the Boko Haram menace (Olaoye, 2011). For a country that is technically not at war, the implication of people moving to their own regions is clear. It shows how divided the country has become as a result of the activities of Boko Haram. Also the stance of MASSOB and OPC has the potential of charging up an already heated crisis.

Given the above scenario, it is clear that all is not well in Nigeria as a country. The tensions generated by the activities of Boko Haram have stretched Nigeria's famed resilience to the limit. The acts of terror carried out by the sect have negatively affected education (Edet, 2011; Ibrahim, 2012). It has impacted negatively on commerce and the economy (Abubakar, 2012; Adekoya, 2012; Olaoye, 2011; Musa, 2012). It has also affected the judiciary (Idris and Ibrahim,

2011). It has hindered the work of the legislature (Sani, 2011). Generally, it has put the lives of many Nigerians on the brink (Ijediofor, 2012). With the emergency rule declared in some parts of the country, the tension across the country is still high and this has called to question capacity of Nigeria as a state to guarantee the security of her citizens (Ahmed, 2012). The following tables 1-6 shows record of Boko Haram attacks from July 2009 to May, 2014 in the North Eastern Nigeria (Source: Nigerian Dailies).

2.2.6 Challenges of Combating Terrorism

The general weakness of African government, as well as the civil strife which exists in several countries makes parts of the continent habitable grounds for terrorist operations (US Congress, 2001). International terrorist cells are believed to be operating in several African countries. The abundant natural resources of the continent provide a ripe target for unscrupulous exploitation, which include terrorist organizations seeking financial gains. (SUDOC YA.IN8/16:AF.8/23(2001).

According to the US Congress report, the sub-committee was particularly concerned by recent reports that Al-Qaeda has been dealing in diamond with Sierra-Leone's Revolutionary United front, and also with Liberia's former President, Charles Taylor. A small number of Africans, predominantly Muslims, have expressed anger and opposition to the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign against the Taliban.

Anti-American protest have taken place in Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and elsewhere. Some believe that segments of Africa's largest Muslim population will make it difficult for certain African governments to provide continued support to the United States and

may even prove to be a recruiting base for international terrorist organizations (U.S. Congress Committee, 2001).

Dagne (2002) opined that some African countries are reportedly sharing intelligence and are coordinating with Washington to fight terrorism in Africa. The governments of Kenya and Ethiopia are working closely with U.S officials to prevent fleeing Al-Qaeda and some African officials are concerned that despite the strong support African governments have provided to the anti-terror campaign, they are not seen as real coalition partners in the fight against terrorism. Rebecca (2002) posited that although the 9/11 attacks on the United States were horrific and unprecedented, a worst case scenario could arise which America's European allies remember 11th September, 2001 as an once-in a lifetime event. Even only a few months after the attacks, there was evidence that Europe was viewing them as "an aberration that is now behind us", should the world be so fortunate that another large scale unconventional attack does not occur. Washington will have to reinvigorate allied enthusiasm to make sure Brussels does not lose focus in the fight against terrorism. If no more attacks happen, and Europe loses its concentration, the American-led campaign, could increasingly like a global version of the decade long enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq, where all the allied forces dropped out, except Great Britain. For American's European allies to express outrage against terrorism but then forget that horror would send the wrong signal message to the world, and could be the source of the perpetually feared rift within the alliance.

Sloan (1986) in looking at the adequacy of forcing Airport security said given the escalating threat of international terrorism against airports and aviation in general, concerned governments and/or airport authorities should provide the additional security required to combat this threat . In

light of the fact that virtually all aircraft hijacking have been committed by fare-paying passengers, the importance of passenger and carry-on baggage screening cannot be over-emphasized.

He posited that the military must provide the doctrinal leadership in what has become a very real war. In a discussion on how such a doctrine can be evolved and implemented into a framework for action, it concluded that neither the discussion nor the framework should be taken literally. They are primarily meant as a base point for further necessary discussion on an area of investigation that has largely been ignored because of a concern over immediate experience. The challenge before the military is that terrorism is a new warfare. The military must learn to fight the new form of warfare. It may not be the type of war that they would prefer to fight, or a war of their making, but it is a real and on going war.

Hof (1985) on the Beirut bombing of October 1983, argued that the killing of 241 Americans at Beirut international Airport was not an act of terrorism, but an unconventional military assault against a military target. The victims and their chain of command never seemed to realize they were at war in Lebanon only serves to compound the tragedy that the United State may be considering a multifaceted policy of activism against 'terrorism' may only make matters worse. Indeed, whatever merit there may be in a "proactive" stance toward terrorism, it should not be derived from the American experience in Lebanon of all places. To do so would be to adopt the wrong policies for the wrong reasons, and perhaps to prolong the loss of American lives in Lebanon.

Sloan (2003) Speaking on terrorism, religious extremism and regional stability in central Asia, stated that, the region faces a number of serious transnational threats, chief among them, religious extremism and terrorism. Following the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, there was a great revival of religious activity in central Asia. Mosque construction mushroomed, partly supported by Pakistani and Saudi Money. A brand of radical international Islam, Washabbism, gave birth to many radical movements, including the Islamic Government of Uzbekistan. The former's views are highly radicalized advocating the overthrow of governments through out the Muslim world and their replacement by an Islamic State. Islam has grown quickly in central Asia and has been met by heavy handed repression which threatens to radicalize adherents still further and sow the seeds of greater Islamic extremism in the region (108th U.S. congress session, 2003). In theory the group rejects terrorism, considering the killing of innocents to be against Islamic law. However, behind this rhetoric, there is ideological justification for violence.

The report further explained that, as we think about what must surely be the long term nature of terrorist challenge in Asia and its implications for the United States, it is critically important that we strive to maintain the right balance of our policies. Throughout Asia we need to address the root causes of despair, disease, hunger, the perceived lack of respect, dispiriting of society that occurs when governments succumb to the practices of corruption that are robbing so many of their future. In south east Asia, the good news is that depending on regional intelligence and police co-operation are reaping substantial dividends. The more awkward news is that al-Qaeda, affiliated groups like Jemaah Islamiyah appear to be more capable, more active and more deeply rooted than many previously believed.

Just as lack of preparedness can invite attack, overreaction can obviously jeopardize liberties and acts of terrorism and state support for such acts can take multiple forms, requiring highly differentiated responses. Combating terrorism, therefore, may require either comprehensive or selective approaches and flexible strategy, including such elements as a firm non-concessions policy which utilize established communication techniques in incidents involving hostages; clear crisis management authority at Federal and local levels, close co-ordination and consultation among all responsible agencies; advanced methods of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination and the availability of trained units prepared and ready for swift deployment (95th U.S Congress Session, 1978).

The likelihood of terrorist incidents occurring varies from country to country depending, at least in part, upon the stability of the local government and the degree of frustration felt by indigenous groups or individuals. Alert individuals, prepared for possible terrorist acts, can minimize the likelihood that these acts will be successfully carried out, , there are a number of reasonable and common sense precautions that can provide some degree of individual protection and can serve as psychological and practical deterrents to would be international terrorism poses. This was underscored by the December, 1999 arrests in Jordan and at the US/Canadian border of foreign nationals who were allegedly planning to attack crowded millennium celebrations. Today's terrorists seek to inflict mass casualties, and they are attempting to do so both overseas and on American soil. They are less dependent on state sponsorship and are, instead forming loose, transnational affiliations based on religious or ideological affinity and a common nature of the United States. This makes terrorist acts more difficult to detect and prevent (US National Committee on Terrorism, 2000).

2.3 Theoretical Framework (Neo-Realist theory of human security and pluralist theory of international politics)

The theoretical framework for this research are drawn from the two theories of international relations, which are the Neo-Realist theoretical framework, otherwise called the ‘new security thinking’ and the post-modernist or critical human security approach. .

The Neo-Realist theoretical framework, maintains a continued emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualization of (human) security.

The Neo-Realist Approach to human security has been advocated by “structural or neo-realists such as Barry Buzan (1983) in his seminal work: *People, States and Fear*. Buzan argued that the ‘strait jacket’ militaristic approach to security that dominated the discourse during the Cold War was ‘simple-minded’ and led to the underdevelopment of the concept. He subsequently broadened it to include political, economic, social and environmental threats, in addition to those that are militaristic. Although Buzan (1983) examines security from the three perspectives of the international system, the state, and the individual, he concludes that the most important and effective provider of security should remain the sovereign state. His analysis provides the most extensive contemporary examination available of human security from a state-combined perspective (as originally proposed in a similar form by Clausewitz).

The strength of the Neo-realist theory is captured in Section 14 (1) b of Chapter 2 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which states that “security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of Government”. Seen this way, security is a social contract between the state and its citizens in which the former is expected to protect, defend, and provide for the latter in the public arena.

Looking at the current security challenges in Nigeria caused by terrorism, the public perception is that the state has failed in her social contract with the people of Nigeria by her inability to secure life and property from the rampaging insurgents at the North-East of the country. There are reports of poor welfare package for the security personnel fighting the insurgents, lack of sophisticated weapons, modern equipment and inadequate training of the troops.

The weakness of the theory lies in the fact that, there is no state that can single handedly fight the war on terrorism alone, no matter how strong and how advanced technologically the state might be because terrorism is a transnational crime. It requires regional economic blocs, interstate co-operation, Non-Governmental Organizations among others. This aspect is vividly captured in the pluralist theory of international politics which is known as post modernist or critical human security approach. This approach is based on a set of assumptions that essentially attempt to place greater emphasis on the interdependency and trans-nationalization of Non-state actors.

While this can be seen as the weakness of the theory, its strength lies in its ability to explain one of the causes of terrorist activities which constitute one of the objectives of the study situated within the context of the failure of the state to provide its social provisioning functions to the people thereby creating the problem of unemployment, poverty and lack of socio-economic programmes. However, for the purpose of the other objectives of the study which essentially deals with assessing government counter terrorism strategies, it behooves on us to provide another theoretical paradigm for explanation. Hence, the need for the post-modernist or critical human security theory.

The critical or post modernist approach to human security is the work of Ken Booth (1992), who also advocates a broadened conceptualization of security that goes beyond a military determination of threats. But advocates of the post modernist approach stress quite explicitly that (human) security should encompass a wide range of non-state actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, Multi National Corporations (MNCs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and just about all humankind.

While watching Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), nine o'clock news on 19th March, 2014, I saw where the Chief of Defence Staff of the five countries bordering the Chad Basin held meeting in Younde, the capital of Cameroun, with a view to resuscitating the Multinational Joint Task Force, in order to wipe out terrorism within the sub-region and Nigeria in particular. The Multinational Joint Task Force (M_JTF) comprises Nigeria, Cameroun, Niger, Chad and Mali, with its Headquarters at Borno State of Nigeria. It is important to note that, even as we have the Military Joint Task Force (JTF), there is also the Civilian JTF component, playing very important role in the war on terrorism at the north east of Nigeria. Each of these, is a non-state actor but all are contributing towards eradicating terrorism in Nigeria and within the sub-region. These facts justify the application of the two theories of international relations in this research.

Both approaches attempt to address the threats to human security. Their fundamental difference lies in the way these analyses point to action. The broadening of security to conceive of more than just military threats raises the contentious questions: 'What is it that is to be made secure?'

Argument for the state to remain the primary referent of security should not mean maintaining the state as the sole or unitary referent of security. But rather it means that the security of the state, in particular a state that is weak, should continue to remain primary, since the 'main aim is

to build the capacity of the state to provide and maintain security for its citizens'. In other words, although the conceptualization of security must make the security of people and human beings its end, the state as the means, cannot be dislodged as the primary referent. After all if the state is to provide and maintain security, it has to be secured itself or to use Buzan's words, 'it has to be or become a strong state'.

This explanation, of course, needs clarification. What constitutes a state? Using the conventional interpretation, a state is made up of a government, people and territory. In other words, the whole (that is the state), comprising of all its constituent parts, has a reciprocal relationship with the individual parts. The state cannot be secure if its constituent parts are insecure or unstable. At the same time, if the state as the institution representing its constituent parts is weak or insecure in relation to other states, its elements will also be affected by such weakness or in security.

Booth (1992:29) has argued that state security was used by "governments that posed as guardians of their peoples' security, to cloak reality and hide what essentially was the security of their regime and its supports and should therefore be dislodged as a primary referent of security". This argument does not mean the termination of the state per se as a referent of security, but rather that the type of state that has been unable to deliver security to its people should be questioned.

The neo-realist in theory and practice places human security 'alongside state security as a twin referent of security'. In equating state and human security, Buzan (1983) makes reference to "the fate of human collectivities" as being the primary object or referent of security. "Human

collectivities” are the citizens of a state. The state becomes the referent of security as the representative institution of human collectivities.

In discussing the state as a source of both threats to, and security for individuals, Buzan (1983) maintains that citizens ultimately have to decide on the lesser of two evils, which is either to accept the threats that come from the state, or accept the threats that arise in the absence of the state. He stated that:

The assumptions that the threats which emanate from the state are likely to be of lower magnitude than those arising in its absence, grows as society develops around the state, becoming increasingly dependent on it as a linchpin for social and economic structures of security. In seeking human security, state and society are sometimes in harmony with each other, sometimes opposed. Its bottom line is about survival (Buzan, 1983:21).

One of the relevance of the theory to the problem under study is derived from the meaning of the concept of counter terrorism. The concept of Counter Terrorism denotes a mix of public and foreign policies designed to limit the actions of terrorist groups and individuals associated with terrorist organisations in an attempt to protect the general public from terrorist violence. As a type of policy, counterterrorism encompasses a range of actions (e.g., freezing financial assets of terrorist organisations), specific decisions (e.g., a decision to joint international treaties aimed at addressing different aspects of terrorism), general guidelines (such as provisions allowing for the use of military forces on the territory of other states), observable behaviors of states (e.g., police raids on possible terrorist sites), and verbal pronouncements of policy makers (e.g., promises of military and economic aid to other states struggling with terrorism).

It is important to note that international problems require collaborative international solutions. No state however powerful can defend itself unilaterally against transnational terrorism. This is

because terrorist network move operations, money and materials across borders and through the walls of global economy. Therefore, combating terrorist activities requires an extensive cooperation on financial flows, intelligence and police action.

Buzan (1983) further opines that the weakness of the state creates an environment where centres of power outside the government pose a threat to authority of the state. These groups he argued may include religious groups, local self-defense, militias, tribal systems, drug lords, smugglers, parastatals, and businesses. As such, the state is only an actor in the midst of so many groups and power structure hence, it becomes practically difficult for state alone to combat terrorist activities. This therefore creates a need for collaborative and multi approach for combating terrorist activities.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the steps and dimensions taken to conduct this research. That is the procedure used for data collection and instruments used for data analysis. The chapter was discussed under the following: section 3.2 describes the location of the study, section 3.3 describes population and sampling techniques, types and sources of data, were discussed in section 3.4, while methods of data collection and analysis are contained in sections 5 and 6 respectively.

3.2 Location of the study

The study area for this thesis is the North East geopolitical zone of Nigeria comprising Adamawa State, Bauchi State, Borno State, Gombe State, Taraba State and Yobe State but with specific focus on Adamawa State, Borno State and Yobe State because of the prominence and prevalence of the activities of Boko Haram in these states. The choice of this zone was predicated on the fact that since the return to democratic rule in Nigeria, the zone has been the major axis of the operations of terrorist activities.

3.3 Types and of Sources of Data

The types of data used for this study are both primary and secondary. The primary data was obtained directly from respondents who are knowledgeable about the research topic and those directly affected by the activities of terrorism in the areas affected. The information were extracted through in-depth interview conducted by the researcher and Focus Group Discussion

(FGD) technique. Information was obtained from some top military and paramilitary personnel, Police officers, senior government officials, legislative Arm of government, Non-Governmental Organizations, Human Rights Organizations, some members of the just concluded National Conference and Community Leaders. The secondary sources of data included relevant documents, published and unpublished materials like Newspapers, Magazines, Journals and other related materials. The rationale for the choice of the two sources of data was to complement each other in order to strengthen the facts.

3.4 Techniques of Data Collection

The techniques adopted for data gathering include in-depth interview (IDI) and Focused Group Discussion (FGD) for the primary sources and analysis of relevant documents such as published and unpublished materials like the Newspapers, Magazines and Journals as for secondary sources of data. Qualitative method or technique was adopted because it was not easy to administer questionnaire as the zone is still a war theatre due to the ongoing battle against the terrorists.

- a. Interview Guide for in-depth interview:- Qualitative data employed was concerned with the quality of data generated and not on the quantity of the data. As such a structured in-depth interview guide was used to obtain qualitative information from informants. The respondents were those earlier mentioned in the preceding section. In selecting the respondents, the researcher made use of non-probability sampling technique such as purposive and convenience techniques. The justification for the choice of these categories of respondents was because the issue under study is the type that not everybody can be contacted and not all people are willing to respond to such. Hence, we selected respondents whose contributions could add value to the quality of work. Issues discussed

were related to causes of terrorism such as economic, political, religious, and bad governance/leadership and government counter terrorism measures. These informants were selected using the purposive and convenience non-probability sampling techniques. The reason for the selection of these types of techniques was because of the nature of the problem under investigation which everybody was not disposed to talking about. As such, the respondents were selected using purposive techniques that their response would serve the purpose of the study. In addition, some of the respondents were selected as convenient to the study. The purpose of using the two is for complementarity. Other issues probed into were Nigerian Government Counter – terrorism strategies which considered government policies in combating terrorism, performance of government counter – terrorism strategies, challenges of counter terrorism strategies in Nigeria and the possible solutions to these challenges.

- b. **Focused Group Discussion (FGD).** This involved dividing the respondents into five (5) groups made up of 10-12 for each group across different strata including male adults, female adults, youths, professionals and public servants. They discussed issues bothering on the problem under investigation. The response of these groups are corroborated in the chapter dealing with the data analysis.

It is important to state that no single technique can adequately serve the purpose of research and that explains why the researcher employed both techniques to enable one complement the other in order to strengthen our findings.

3.5 Sample Size and Sampling Technique

The nature of this study required that data should be generated from relatively informed individuals who are most likely conversant with terrorism, especially the activities of *Boko*

Haram in the North-Eastern of Nigeria. Consequently, a confidence (purposive) sampling method was used for the selection of respondents. The sample size for this study was Eighty (80) which comprises of 20 informants selected for In-depth Interview(IDI) based on respondents who are knowledgeable about the subject under investigation and Sixty (60) were selected for FGD and is made up of five (5) groups, with each group made up of 8-12 on the average. The categories of respondents selected for the FGD consists of adult male, adult female, professionals, youths and public servants. The choice of selecting the informants was guided by the judgment that they are knowledgeable and willing to be interviewed on the subject matter under investigation.

3.6 Variables of Examination

The key variables of the study are:- “Government measures to combat terrorism” and “performance”. Government measures to combat terrorism that constitute the independent variable, explains the dependent variable (performance). The main indicators for the independent variables (Government Measures Combating Terrorism) includes job creation, employment opportunities, human and infrastructural development, educational opportunities, and social welfare, which are germane to creating a veritable environment for social disorder and recruitment of gullible youths where they are lacking. It also includes the militaristic approach which comprises procurement of state of the art equipment and modern sophisticated weapons for the military as well as other logistics and troop’s welfare to enhance the performance of the troops against the terrorists.

On the other hand, the indicators for dependent variable (performance) include restoring security to the North East and other parts of Nigeria by defeating the terrorist group, arresting or capturing terrorists and bringing them to justice. This entails taking the terrorist for questioning

or interrogation, prosecution (by bringing legal action against the terrorist) for the offence of crime against humanity; arraignment (which will involve bringing the accused) before any competent court of jurisdiction and conviction in terms of successful sentence of the accused. The other aspect of performance includes role of the state in human and capital or infrastructural development, employment opportunities, job creation and general welfare of the citizenry that are tangible. These measures should translate in improved living standard of the people. The success of Government counter terrorism strategies or its failure (performance) depends largely on the interplay between the independent and dependent variables as identified.

3.7 Technique of Data Analysis

The data generated were subjected to a descriptive analysis. First, data generated through in-depth interviews (IDIs) were transcribed from its original raw state to a more manageable form. The descriptive analysis was mainly narrative in nature and in fact, combined probable explanations of cause and effect of terrorism with field observation in content analyzing the in-depth interview obtained from the informants and response from the FGDs. This helped to strengthen the results and findings of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is designed to provide in historical perspectives the development of terrorism and terrorist activities in Nigeria.

Since the return to democratic governance in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed successful changes in government through the electoral process. Even though the Nigeria's democratic dispensation is still in its infancy, the relatively stable democracy is threatened by recent security challenges.

The country is facing various insurgencies that threaten to distract the Government from its reform agenda. However, the government is making concerted efforts to curtail the spate of attacks. This is reflected in the Government's allocation of about 20% of the 2012 budget and 13.6% of the 2013 budget to address the security challenges (NBS, 2013).

4.2 The Rise of Terrorism as a Global Phenomenon

In modern history, examples of insurgencies and terrorism go back to at least four centuries, spanning many continents and states. These include the French revolution of 1789 that ended the Bourbon monarchy in France, replaced by a new French Republic, and the 1776 American war of independence from British colonial rule. The 19th century was an even more unstable and turbulent era during which German unification was brought about by force under Chancellor Bismarck. The unification of Italy was also achieved by force under the leadership of Garibaldi. In the Balkans, the old Hapsburg Empire was overthrown by a series of insurgencies including the murder at Sarajevo of Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a Serb nationalist. This incident led to World War I and the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire and Monarchy. The Ottoman Empire that had for centuries held sway in central Europe and the Balkans also fell after World War I. It was replaced by modern Turkey. In Russia, the Romanov Empire was brought down in the 1917 revolution against Imperial Russia. This bloody conflict, in which the entire family of the Tsar was wiped out, gave rise to the new Communist Empire of the Soviet Union. More recently,

internal dissent and grievances led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and its replacement by several separate republics, once part of the Soviet Union (Fafowora, 2013:20-21)

In addition to inter-state conflicts, we now have internal insurgencies and insurrections directed at the overthrow of the established social and political order in the affected states. The sources of this new kind of insurgencies range from political and economic factors to religious causes. Examples of these include the Tiananmen revolt in China, brutally put down by the Chinese government, and the continuing sectarian conflict in Afghanistan between the insurgents, the Taliban, an extremist Islamic sect, and the Afghan government. This conflict is being fought by the Afghan government with the military support of the US led allied forces in Afghanistan. In Pakistan and India terrorist groups, mainly extremist Islamic sects, have continued to pose serious security problems to those countries. In the Middle East, the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians remains unresolved, with bands of insurgents and terrorists moving freely from one country to the other.

In Africa, there have been incidences of domestic terrorism in one form or another. For instance, the August 1998 bombings of the USA embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which killed hundreds of people and the October 2002 Soweto bombing by the White Supremacist Boeremerg Organization in South Africa are worth mentioning. Likewise, in Egypt, the assassination of President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981 by the Al-Jihad terrorists is a form of domestic terrorism.

The point of all this is to underline the fact that insurgencies have become a more global phenomenon and Nigeria has now joined the ranks of states affected by terrorism. For instance, the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI, 2011) placed Nigeria 156 out of the 187 countries surveyed, thus placing her as one of the 25 poorest nations in the world.

Since the return to civil rule in 1999, Nigeria has experienced different dimensions of domestic terrorism ranging from the bomb blast, kidnapping, Suicide bombings, etc.

The dimension of domestic terrorism in Nigeria especially the activities of the dreaded Islamic sect, Boko Haram has become a major concern for both the Nigerian state and the international community.

The North-East and North-West geopolitical zones are the areas of high rate of prevalence. Incidentally, these regions have the highest poverty in Nigeria.

4.3 Terrorism in Nigeria

There have been signs and symptoms of terrorism in Nigeria before now because; according to McNamara (1990:17), any society that seeks to achieve adequate security against the background of acute food shortage, population explosion, low level of productivity and per capita income, low technological development, inadequate and insufficient public utilities and chronic problems of unemployment; (religious intolerance criminal politicking) has a false sense of insecurity. Although Nigeria has remained a relatively peaceful and terror free country between 1967 and 1970, Obene (2012) has argued that the killing of Mr Dele Giwa by a Letter Bomb in October 1986 marked the beginning of violent killing and use of Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) in Nigeria. Subsequently, the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy (MAD) hijacked a Nigeria Airways aircraft in October 1993 following the annulment of Chief M.K.O. Abiola's presidential election. After this, a vicious bomb blast ripped shed 6 of Ilorin stadium in August 1994.

Several other incidents have occurred since then. For instance, between 1996 and 1998 there was bomb blast attack on the car of the then Chief Security Officer of Federal Aviation Authority of

Nigeria, Dr Omoshola. Subsequently, the escort car of the former Military administrator of Lagos state, Brig General M.B. Marwa (Rtd) was attacked.

In addition, other notable acts of terrorism in Nigeria can be summarized thus: General sectarian violence in Jos 2004, 2010 and 2011. Series of bombings and killings in Maiduguri since 2004 to date. The 2010 New Year Eve bombing of Mogadishu military cantonment Mammy market Abuja. The May 29, 2010 presidential inauguration bombing in Abuja. The 1st October 2010 bombing in Abuja that disorganized the marking of Nigeria's 50th Independence anniversary. The mammy market bombings in Bauchi, and Zuba near Abuja in 2011. Presidential election violence in the Northern part of Nigeria, April 8, 2011 Suleja INEC office bombing. May 29, 2011 bombing of social drinking sports in Maiduguri and Zuba an outskirt of Abuja; June 16, 2011 Nigeria Police Force Headquarter bombing in Abuja. August 26, 2011 bombing of UN House in Abuja. November 4, 2011 bombing of Army Task Force operational police Headquarters and other government buildings in Damaturu Yobe state and Maiduguri Borno state. Christmas day bombing at St Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla near Abuja. Mubi, Yola, Gombe and Maiduguri bombings 5-6 January, 2012. Kano bombing 20 January, and February 1, 2012. Headquarter 1 Division Nigerian Army and Kawo bridge bombings in Kaduna, 7 February, 2012. It is important to note that most of these bombings have been attributed to the Boko Haram; a group that emerged out of the Taliban founded by Mohammed Yusuf.

The Boko Haram insurgency first emerged in some parts of Northern Nigeria in 2009. Before then, it had become obvious that the North was restive. It was preceded by the Maitasine Islamic rebellion which President Obasanjo succeeded in putting down. Most of the Northern states have since come under the savage attacks of the Boko Haram insurgents. There is now a serious

danger that the insurgency may extend to other non-Fulani parts of Northern Nigeria. A recent country report on global terrorism by the State Department of the United States showed that:

In 2011, 136 attacks were carried out in Northern Nigeria by Boko Haram resulting in the death of 590 people. In terms of the global number of casualties in the Boko Haram attacks, Nigeria was placed fifth, after Afghanistan (3,353), Iraq (3, 063), Pakistan (2,033), and Somalia (1,103). It was reported that in 2011 there were some 978 terrorist attacks in Africa with Nigeria alone accounting for over 20 per cent of those attacks. The report stated that the sect was more deadly and vicious in its attacks in 2011 than in 2010. In 2010 only 31 attacks by Boko Haram were reported by the media. This figure increased in 2011 to 136. This year the number and frequency of Boko Haram attacks are likely to be even higher as the sect has increased its tempo during the current year. Already, it is estimated that Boko Haram attacks have resulted in the death of over 1,000 people in Northern Nigeria since 2009 (Fafowora, 2013:26-27).

4.3.1 Poverty and Boko Haram Terrorism in the North-East Nigeria

Nigeria is the biggest producer of oil in Africa and the sixth oil producer in the world but despite its vast resources, it ranks among the poorest countries in the world. A recent World Bank (2010) report released at a United Nations summit rated her as second poorest country in the world with most Nigerians living below poverty line. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 2012) about 60.9% of Nigerians in 2010 were living in 'absolute poverty'. In 2011, the figure rose slightly to 61.9% and in BBC news (2012), the number of Nigerians living in poverty was put at 61%. According to NBS (2011), the Northern states of Nigeria of Borno, Yobe, Zamfara and Sokoto had the highest rate of unemployment in 2011. The states have remained undeveloped with a high rate of unemployment, poverty, poor health and educational facilities and infrastructures. The highest poverty rates are recorded in the North-West and North- East geopolitical zones with a poverty rate of 77.7% and 76.6% respectively (NBS 2012). The reason is not far-fetched considering that these zones are riddled with conflicts. Absence of basic services, unemployment, bad governance and corruption provide an avenue for disgruntled

members of the society to be radicalized. The situation is such that no day passes without news of one form of killing by insurgents or the other. Many properties have been destroyed and lives lost to these insurgents who advocate the jettisoning of western education and the imposition of Sharia law. Insecurity in the North led to the declaration of a state of emergency in three states in the zone namely; Yobe, Adamawa and Bornu states. Despite this, the killing continues and the worst aspect of it is that in recent times, educational institutions have become targets with many male students killed and hundreds of young girls abducted. Besides, there is a spill-over effect with insecurity spilling over to other parts of the North like Zamfara state which had for long been a peaceful state compared to other states in the North.

As indicated above, poverty rates remain high in Nigeria, particularly in rural areas. These rates declined between 2003-2004 and 2009-2010. Poverty rates and their dynamics differ considerably in different parts of the country. According to the Nigeria Economic Report (2013), the country ranked 153 out of 186 countries in the 2013 United Nations Human Development Index. Unemployment rates have been steadily increasing and younger Nigerians are encountering increasing difficulty in finding gainful employment.

A disaggregation of Nigeria's socioeconomic indicators by geo-political region and state reveals that many of the states in the north east and north west lag far behind on many of the health and education MDGs. Indeed, if Nigeria will make good progress on many of the health and education MDGs, concerted effort would need to be made in these two geo-political zones in particular.

In 2004, Nigeria's relative poverty measurement stood at 54.4%, but increased to 69% (or 112,518,507 Nigerians) in 2010. The North-West and North-East geo-political zones recorded the highest poverty rates in the country with 77.7% and 76.3% respectively in 2010, while the

South-West geo-political zone recorded the lowest at 59.1%. Among States, Sokoto had the highest poverty rate at 86.4% while Niger had the lowest at 43.6% in the year under review (NBS, 2010).

According to a recent global report on terrorism by the State Department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Ambassador Dan Benjamin, cited in Kwanashie (20) terrorist attacks in 2011 were more than 10,000 in 70 countries, resulting in more than 12,500 deaths. The largest number of reported attacks occurred in South Asia and the Near East. Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, together accounted for 85 per cent of attacks in these regions. The activities of Islamic sect, Boko Haram, in Nigeria is said to have worsened the African situation. It said Africa experienced 978 attacks in 2011, an 11.5 per cent increase over the previous year, attributing this to the aggressive attacks of Boko Haram, which it said conducted 136 attacks in 2011, up from 31 in 2010.

The current insurgency in Nigeria according to Kwanashie (20) is driven by two economic forces- one local the other external. On the domestic front the economy has over the years sustained a large pool of marginalized citizens that benefit little from the natural resources of the country. A series of social and political issues have intermingled with an initial economic condition to ensure that this segment of society remain at the fringes of the economic system. While poverty and economic marginalization does not automatically result in insurgency evidence from history suggest that the existence of this segment of society provides a veritable manpower for insurgency.

On the external front colonized people generally have a history of resistance which most often has resulted in one form of insurgency or the other. Opposition to oppression and economic injustice are often the starting point for insurgencies. In each case of

insurgency in Nigeria it is imperative to interrogate the nature and character of the insurgency – their economic, political, social and cultural dimensions.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT'S COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGIES

5.1 Introduction

Boko Haram, a terrorist organization in Nigeria, though came into limelight around 2009 following the extra judicial killing of its purported leader, Yusuf Mohammed by the security forces, it was around 2011 the organization became so deadly and began massive scale of coordinated killing and mayhem of mainly the civilian populace particularly in the Northeast of the country. Starting from Borno State as its operating base, Boko Haram swiftly swung into action and spreading fast its activities to the neighbouring states of Yobe and Adamawa simultaneously. They were equally targeting and carrying out sporadic attacks in other states like Kano, Bauchi, Kaduna and the FCT, Abuja. With the group gaining ground acceleratedly and on daily basis, the government responded by deploying and reinforcement of military troops to the epicenters of the crisis namely Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states to curtail their excesses.

This chapter therefore, attempts to interrogate Nigerian government's counter terrorism strategies, in order to establish the strength and weaknesses of government counter terrorism measures adopted over the years.

5.2 Strategies of Combating Terrorism

In his classic work on war, Karl Von Clausewitz (1966:165) defined strategy as "the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of war". However, Liddell Hart (1967:333) pointed out that this definition narrows the meaning of strategy "to the pure utilization of battle, therefore conveying the idea that battle is the only means to the strategical end". In the views of Helmuth Von Moltke (1967:334) strategy is "the practical adoption of the means placed at the general's disposal to the attainment of the objective in view".

Hart (1967) defined strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy”. From Liddell’s definition, strategy is concerned with the application of given military resources to achieving particular political objectives. The two important points about this definition is that, first, from this perspective, strategy makes its application in both peace time and war possible. Secondly, it emphasizes the subordination of war to politics.

Booth (1974:79) sees strategy as “A deadly business”. It is concerned with the darker side of human nature, in the sense that it examines the way in which military power is used by government in pursuit of their interests. Since military power refers to the capacity to kill, to main, coerce and destroy, it thus follows that it is a crude instrument. However, its use, determines not who is right in any dispute, but whose will is going to prevail. Its utility lies fundamentally in the depressing fact that human beings, their property, and the society in which they live in are easily destroyed.

Etymologically, strategy is derived from the Greek word, strategies, which means “the art of war” or “the art of generalship”, or simply “generalship” (Stratos: Army: ago: lead) (Momah, 1993:1). Momah (1993) maintained that in its historical terms, strategy is “the management of an army or armies in a campaign, or the art of moving troops and war arsenals so as to impose on the enemy the place, time and condition for fighting”. As we have it today just as in the days of ancient Greeks and Romans, strategy still involves the consideration and evaluation of the various choices available to states in their use of military force and clearly defined by political authorities.

Recently, purely military definition of strategy is gradually disappearing but that notwithstanding, military no doubt, still have a place in the narrow field of tactics. Any satisfactory definition of strategy must consider the peace time applications of strategic thinking, and must endeavour to identify the use of military force in the more general context of foreign policy making.

According to Osgood (1962:5) military strategy must not be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion in conjunction with the economic, diplomatic and psychological instruments of power to support foreign policy most effectively by covert, overt and tacit means". The other concept that is very important to this research is the concept of "Grand Strategy", which is generally seen as an amalgam of both the military and non-military means of a nation's capability, e.g. economic, political, industrial, psychological, technological, intelligence, military, diplomacy, among other strategies.

In the views of Edward Meade Earle (1943), Grand strategy integrates the policies and armaments of a nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.

Georges Clemenceau (1841 – 1929) once said "war is much too serious a matter to be left to the generals", it is as well too serious to be left to the politicians. Today, what is required is the sharing of ideas between the political elites and the military class on issues of war.

Kessinger (1957:422), warned:

...a separation of strategy and policy can be achieved only to the detriment of both. It causes military policy to become identified with the most absolute application of power and it tempts diplomacy into an over concern with finesse. Since the difficult problems of national policy are in the area where political, economic, psychological and military factors overlap, we should

give up the fiction that there is such a thing as “purely” military advice.

The views we have examined so far emphasized that strategy is fundamentally about “means”. Rather than “ends”. It is convenient in the circumstance to assume that setting political goals is the business of politicians and that strategic planners are only interested in how given military resources can usefully be applied to the achievement of these goals. The duty of military strategists is to harness military power to achieve national interest and their mandate does not extend to determining what the national interest should be.

This explains why in tackling militancy and domestic terrorism in the Niger Delta Region, the Federal Government adopted a strategy whereby the militants were granted amnesty and urged to lay down their arms in exchange for economic gains, educational scholarship and vocational training. The strategy introduced by President Yaradua’s administration, worked perfectly well in dismantling militancy in the Niger Delta region giving rise to increased crude oil production for the country.

Also in addressing the insurgency and terrorism challenge in the North East Nigeria, President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration tried to replicate the same strategy by setting up the Presidential panel on amnesty for Boko Haram insurgents. Unlike the success the strategy recorded in the Niger Delta region, it failed in the North East region with Boko Haram insurgents. It rather spurred the group to step up its attacks against innocent civilians, old people, women, children, military and other uniform personnel. The group even declared an independent state which it referred to as “Islamic Caliphate” within the Nigerian state. It appears the group was having an upper hand and winning the war against the Nigerian Military whose

morale is at its lowest ebb, and lacked modern fighting equipment and state of the art sophisticated weapons. Their depleted armoury was stocked with very few outdated and obsolete equipment.

The successful strategy which was adopted in the Niger Delta region but failed in the North East, where Boko Haram have their stronghold, could be attributed to the group's link to Al-Qaeda which are presently pursuing a global agenda for international terrorism campaign and another factor could be the religious dimension, where the group claimed it was fighting a war of Jihad. A group that already has in its ranks foreign fighters, modern equipment and sophisticated weapons cannot accept Presidential amnesty because of their overall set goals and objectives which is clear in this analysis. Therefore, to win the war on terrorism, there is need for the Federal Government to change its strategy, which is considered as our point of departure for this research.

5.3 Perspective of Counter Terrorism Strategy

Looking at counter-terrorism through policy perspective that allow the policy makers to examine the relationship between different forms of terrorism and the general policy principles necessary for countering it, since counter-terrorism efforts constitute actions taken by the government to hinder attacks or curtail the consequences of terrorism, the formulation of counter-terrorism should reflect its underpinning goals and mission. Distinguishing the types of counter-terrorism practices available to government is one way of structuring theoretically based suggestions for future measures. Pointing out the difference between proactive and defensive measures, for

example, Sandler (2005:75) attempts to draw conclusions on the implications each has for coordinated multilateral counter-terrorism actions. Sandler (2005:78) took a proactive measure targeted at terrorists and their supporters with the aim of weakening the ability of the enemy to operate and subsequently reducing the occurrence of attacks. Defensive measure, on the other hand aim to protect potential targets and seek to decrease the amount of damage caused by an attack. Further outlining the goals governments may have in countering terrorist threats, Ganor (2005:26) distinguishes between three aims of counter-terrorism policies: eliminating terrorism, minimizing damage caused by terrorism and preventing escalation of terrorism. The goal of eliminating terrorism is grounded in the desire to eradicate the adversary by removing the incentive to commit terrorist acts and use violence (Ganor, 2005:26). In other words, the destruction of a terrorist organization is the ultimate goal, albeit perhaps one of limited probability.

Minimizing damage caused by terrorism may include efforts to reduce the number of future attacks or prevention of certain types of attacks such as suicide bombings or mass killings. A decrease in the amount of damage done to property and infrastructure may also be of relevance. Preventing the escalation of terrorism, according to Ganor (2005) is based on ensuring that the conflict does not spread as well as making certain that the scope of attacks does not escalate further. As such, governments will seek to preclude an organization from gaining certain political achievements, including receiving support from foreign countries. For instance, clearly demarcated goals allow policymakers to formulate counter-terrorism policies that are based on an analysis of successful tactics that have been used in the past. Additionally, policies should be

“within the bounds of some basic assumptions about the sorts of actions acceptable to a democratic society and capable of absorbing change as a result of research and new data”.

Within the policy perspective therefore, Nigerian government counter terrorism strategies seeks to pursue several key principles such as:

- **Upholding core Nigerian values**, including rule of law, civil rights and civil liberties of all Nigerians,
- **Harnessing every tool** at a country’s disposal, including intelligence, military, homeland security and law enforcement, and maximizing cooperation between communities.
- **Building partnerships** with international institutions and partners so that nations can take the fight to Boko Haram, its affiliates and adherents in their own countries;
- **Applying tools appropriately**, recognizing that different threats in different regions demand different tools;
- **Building a culture of preparedness and resilience at home** to prevent terrorist attacks and ensure we can quickly recover should an attack occur, and
- **Putting into consideration the economic cause of terrorism** that is working to improve the economic conditions of Nigerians through job creation, improve education, health, security, industry, e.t.c.

5.4 Nigerian Government Counter-Terrorism Strategies

On March 23, 2014, Col. Sambo Dasuki (rtd), the National Security Adviser (NSA) to the President of Nigeria released a statement announcing that the office of the NSA has unveiled a new approach to counter-terrorism. It defines the roles and responsibilities of Ministries, Department and Agencies, as well as that of the civil society on how to fight against violent

extremism. Dasuki said the programme which is tagged the Nigeria's National Counter-Terrorism strategy was developed by the NSA office, international partners, experienced academics and selected non-state actors based on the experience of other countries in tackling terrorism. The strategy was developed taking into account the root causes of terrorism.

This approach involves the establishment of Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC), under the office of the NSA. The CTC comprises of two departments, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Branch (JTAB) and the Behavioural Analysis and Strategic Communication Unit (BASCU) the CTC has also developed a dynamic and comprehensive National Counter-Terrorism, Strategy (NACTEST), in consultation with expert and international partners. This approach from limited understanding will be premised on rehabilitation of apprehended terrorists; providing needed infrastructure in the North; employment opportunities, e.t.c. There is also another positive indicator which is the pronouncement that Nigeria, Chad, Benin, Cameroun, and Niger Republic have reached a multilateral agreement on Joint Border Patrol.

The Behavioural Analysis and Strategic Communication Unit is designed to develop a programme that seeks to implement the programme of our national counter-terrorism strategy. Hence, they visited Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore, Algeria and Australia to talk with officials from the United Kingdom, United States and the European Union, academics and members of Civil Society Groups both at home and abroad. Simultaneously, the Economic Intelligence Unit to explore the efficacy of economic interventions that will contribute to the programme. The team is to investigate what other nations facing terrorism have done successfully in the areas of job creation, poverty alleviation and economic development. Based on these, identification of the need for an economic turnaround initiative in the aftermath of the

State of Emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States was made. These activities gave birth to our soft approach to countering terrorism (Dasuki, 2014).

The soft approach to counter-terrorism has resulted in the development of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme that is both vertical- involving three tiers of government, federal, state and local and horizontal involving civil society, academics, traditional, religious and community leaders. It consists of three streams with different layers of partners: Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA), including the civil society. The programme utilizes existing structures within and outside government to deliver targeted programmes and activities that further the overall goals of stemming the tide of radicalization.

The first stream is: De-radicalization of convicted terrorists, suspects awaiting trial and those might be released through court orders or such other government decision arising from the ongoing engagement and dialogue with repentant suspects. The de-radicalization program is prison based and the Ministry of Interior along with the Prison Service will drive the program. The initiative will require substantial capacity building of prison staff in areas such as psychology, sports, and arts therapy, faith-based instructors and vocational training experts that would engage beneficiaries. The objective is to engage violent extremist convicts/suspects in theological, ideological, physical and entrepreneurial value change that leads to a change in their behaviour. Families, community leaders and NGOs will be given access to participate in the process in a fair and transparent manner to speed up easy assimilation of convicts/suspects back to society. Two prisons were refurbished for this purpose together with international development partners to provide appropriate structures for this programme within the premises. The second will move from government to societal approach on counter-terrorism thinking.

The third is built on capacity through strategic communication for the military and law enforcement agencies.

The fourth stream is based on the understanding of the economic root causes of terrorism and global best practice in addressing them will be working with the governors of the six North-Eastern States to design an economic revitalization programme targeted in each state most impacted by terrorism.

The NSA added that under the strategy, government would build resilience to violent extremism through families, communities and faith-based organizations.

The NSA added that government will also build an inter-party collaboration for counter-terrorism to ensure party affiliation is not a hindrance to contributions against efforts to counter-terrorism and will equally develop a monitoring and evaluation framework that would track the implementation of each stream of the CVE programme (Dasuki, 2014).

The sum of the administrative framework within which much of the counter-terrorism policies have been implemented, especially within the context of Boko Haram are as follow:

- Troops have been reinforced
- The international Joint Task Force (JTF) has taken over the provision of internal security (declaration of state of emergency).
- A curfew has been imposed
- GSM services have been banned and restored
- Civilian JTFs have been established
- Road blocks have been set up

- Invest heavily in security equipment, bomb detector units, communications and transport; and Chinese CCTV System.

The sum of the Government administrative framework within which much of the counter-terrorism policies have been implemented, especially within the context of Boko Haram are as follows:-

- Troops deployment and reinforcement
- Putting in place the multinational Joint Task Force
- Military take-over of internal security following the declaration of state of emergency
- Imposition of curfew
- Banning and restoration of GSM services
- Establishment of civilian JTF
- Setting up of road blocks

All these measures are in line with international known standard of counter terrorism strategies.

The Nigerian Government also adopted and implemented the recommendations of US General Accounting Office (GAO) which are:

- 1) Prevent terrorist attacks
- 2) Disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations
- 3) Respond to terrorist incidents and
- 4) Co-ordinate efforts to combat terrorism.

Any government confronted with a challenge such as the one posed by the Boko Haram sect must devise means of tackling it. Even though the government seems to be hesitating on negotiating with Boko Haram and vice versa, engagement between government and Boko Haram

has to be undertaken (Akhaine, et al, 2011; Ola, 2012). Some writers have also advised the government and the sect to embrace dialogue (The Guardian Editorial, November 4, 2011). Dialogue is not a sign of weakness on the part of the government. On the contrary, it is a sign of responsibility. The government needs to engage Boko Haram in order to understand their grievances. The military approach is not the only approach for now, (Hammagam, 2011; Ebijem 2012). So far it does not seem to have achieved much.

More importantly, the problem with military solution is clearly expressed in Mohammed Zagga's rhetorical question: 'Is there a military solution in dealing with a man who is ready to die for his course?' (Zagga, 2012:51). That members of the sect are willing to die for their struggle is clear. They even pray to Allah to have the privilege to die for Him. A political solution to Boko Haram issue is possible (The Guardian Editorial May 14, 2012).

Even the government appears to realize the futility of a military solution and is in fact desirous of a political solution. Nigeria's Senate President, David Mark, had this to say recently:

There is no government that would fold her arms and watch innocent citizens being murdered in schools, markets, churches as well as mosques. This carnage has to stop. As brothers and sisters, we must listen to each other's grievances. I believe that the government in line with this has expressed readiness for dialogue and I urge the members of Boko Haram, their representatives, sponsors or sympathizers to key into this dialogue. (Musa, 2011:3)

In the Guardian Editorial, Nigeria was listed as a failed state (The Guardian Editorial June 30, 2011:14). One of the indices for measuring a failed state is insecurity. No doubt the activities of Boko Haram and other militant groups such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger

Delta (MEND) may be some kind of corroboration for Nigeria's failed state ranking (Ciroma, 2012; Ijediofor, 2012).

Some Nigerians have suggested that activities of terrorists are better curtailed by nipping it in the bud. Already, there are reports of similar sects springing up across the country. Sani (2011) has made the following suggestions:

- Reform and improve on the welfare of the Almajiri.
- Create effective poverty alleviation policies and enforcement by the government.
- Isolate and address grievances of all interest groups as fairly as possible.
- Initiate government's regulation of preaching in religious gathering.
- Effective job provision and sustainability by the government.
- Enhance criminal intelligence by the security agencies.
- Implement effective police reform policies
- Enhance border patrol and regulations of the influx of immigrants or aliens.
- Put in place good policies to promote effective and efficient leadership, good governance, transparency and a mechanism to check, prevent and totally eliminate corruption.
- Put in place an effective mechanism for conflict mediation and resolution and also an alternative dispute resolution.
- Enhance the Nigerian security agencies relationship towards maintenance of internal security and stability (Sani, 2011:38).

In a similar gesture, the Government of Borno State has proposed “to adopt a holistic approach, enveloping all the socio-economic challenges confronting us” (Shettima, 2011:51). This approach, which has interim and long term measures, incorporates among other strategies, compensation of all victims of the Boko Haram crisis, provision of jobs, improved health care delivery and education and the revamping of the agricultural sector (Shettima, 2011). If the government at all levels in Nigeria adopt such proactive measures, it would be easy to deal with challenges posed by Boko Haram. Considering the enormity of the Boko Haram challenge, the Nigerian government should collaborate with countries that have the expertise to deal with such problems. There are already indications that some countries are willing to partner with Nigeria in this direction (The Leadership Editorial, February 24, 2012).

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2011 also solved a legal problem the police and the directorate of public prosecution had been facing, by saying that terrorists will no longer be treated like other criminals who are charged under the penal code. Instead, terrorists are to be charged under a separate criminal law. As terrorism was being addressed through these measures, the Nigerian military also intensified efforts to eliminate terrorist activities in all areas. To succeed, the military needed to attack these terrorists in their hideouts and points of origin and to ensure that their supply lines were blocked.

5.4.1 Soft Approach

The Nigerian government use the term in attempts to suppress insurgency, lawlessness, or subversion or to reduce the conditions under which these threats are expanding. According to Dasuki(2013), government's new approach to fighting terrorism would be anchored on 'a robust public diplomacy' that would involve all facets of the society, and aggressive mass media

participation. He explained that the new approach is aimed at defeating the ideology of hate and building consensus against violent extremism through strategic communication. The strategic communication programmes would aim at fostering unity and indivisibility of the country as a nation; democracy and fundamental freedom of worship and belief; public safety and good governance; and zero-tolerance for violent extremism. His office, he added, has resolved to build capacity for Muslim students association to serve as intellectual assets in the battle against terrorism and to enlist their support for counter-terrorism.

In all, the strategic communication goals are targeted at all Nigerians with a view to creating a nation that is in constant conversation with itself, employing communication to heal wounds and build trust as it confronts violent extremism. Themes of the strategic communication were listed to include: Terrorism is un-Islamic; Counter-terrorism is not against Muslims; Encourage and empower Muslims to speak out against terrorism; Muslim-Christian relations; Mass literacy and Counter-terrorism is apolitical.

The president signed into law the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011, which was further improved upon by the legislature in the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013. What we know and have learnt from other countries is that terrorism compels a nation to reform its laws and processes. Since 9/11, the United States of America has had to make probably the most comprehensive reform of its security architecture that has helped detect and prevent threats to their homeland. Section 1(A) of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 rests the coordinating role in matters relating to terrorism on the Office of the National Security Adviser and further provides the office with the mandate to: ensure the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, build capacity for the effective discharge of the functions of relevant

security, intelligence, law enforcement and military services under the act and do such other acts or things that are necessary for the effective performance of the function of the relevant security and enforcement agencies under the act(Dasuki,2013).

Pursuant to this mandate, Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC) within my office that houses the Joint Terrorism Analysis Branch (JTAB) and the Behavioral Analysis and Strategic Communication Unit was established. The establishment of these structures has enabled us to better perform a coordinating role that has ensured intelligence sharing and cooperation amongst agencies. This new spirit of cooperation has led to the disruption of plethora of terrorist cells and prevented attacks across the country. The strategy was developed taking into account the root causes of terrorism.

The Soft approach to countering terrorism which has resulted in the development of a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programme, that is both vertical involving three tiers of government, federal, state and local and horizontal involving civil society, academics, traditional, religious and community leaders. It consists of three streams with different layers of partners: ministries, departments and agencies (MDA's), including the civil society. The programme will utilise existing structures within and outside government to deliver targeted programmes and activities that further the overall goal of stemming the tide of radicalisation and through families, communities; faith-based organisations build resilience to violent extremism.

The first stream is: De-radicalisation of convicted terrorists, suspects awaiting trial and those who might be released through court orders or such other government decision arising from the ongoing engagement and dialogue with repentant suspects. The President has emphasised the need for dialogue toward a final resolution and we continue to explore credible channels to

actualise this option. Indeed, the ministerial dialogue committee has made many successes in this area where many suspects have indicated their preference for ending the crisis while providing useful information that has aided the process. The lack of clear Counter Terrorism Strategy in Nigeria is affecting the containment approach adopted against Boko Haram and unfortunately, due to the inability of Nigeria Police Force to have a rapid response force to tackle insurgency within Nigeria (Dasuki,2013).

The federal government's Soft Approach to combating insurgency and acts of terror, despite coming five years after the emergence of Boko Haram, must be framed from the perspective of a poverty reduction strategy that seeks to address issues of poverty, inequality, and unemployment as key factors that could lead to acts of insurgency and terror. There is a strong conviction among Nigerians and the international community that good governance and political will on the part of policy makers is needed to be able to realise human security and development in the country. It also requires a regional response, given the cross-border nature of insurgency and terror, as evident in the international links between Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and other criminal networks beyond the shores of Nigeria.

Nigeria's experience with insurgency and terror can be located within a continuum of a challenging process of state-building. Conditioned by this dominant reality, the goals of this project can best be realised in a democratic Nigerian state that provides for and protects its citizens, and guards against the vestiges of militarism and militarised responses to discontents that still abound in our body polity (Dasuki,2013).

5.4.2 The Military in Counter-terrorism

Military force is a powerful tool for good or ill, and it can prove instrumental in combating terrorism. The potential effect on terrorist capabilities can be immediate and unqualified, as when a strike kills or otherwise disables a prominent terrorist leader. Military strikes or the threat of such strikes can disrupt terrorist operations. The limitations and drawbacks of using the military, however, are numerous (Hoffman,2009).

Strikes aimed at terrorists can result in death or injury to innocent bystanders and collateral damage to infrastructure. The victims of this violence will often focus their anger on the attacker, generating support and sympathy for terrorists. Pillar and Preble will discuss these and related issues and show how effective counterterrorism balances the immediate gains of particular policies against the unintended medium- to long-term consequences.

Insurgency and counter-terrorism reflect a reciprocal relationship. Technically, insurgency is a problem that counter-terrorism is designed to manage. However, insurgency is not a new form of warfare; it is a new way of practicing a very old form of warfare. Insurgents in Nigeria have been known to have less conventional military capacity than the government (at least in the early stages of insurgency) and so tend to use guerrilla tactics to inflict damage without allowing their fighters to be engaged by equal or larger government forces (Hoffman,2009).

Tactics such as bombing using Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), raids, ambushes, assassinations and sabotage are at the forefront of their methods. They take advantage of mobility, stealth, deception and surprise to weaken, discredit or paralyze government forces. Insurgents try to manage the tempo and intensity of their activities to permit a level of effort they can sustain indefinitely. By prolonging the conflict, they hope to exhaust opposition, seeking to impose unsustainable cost on the government to force capitulation. Although the permutations of

insurgent activity in Nigeria are context driven, historical analysis shows that insurgents typically four basic tactics, or variations of them, to confront government forces.

Military involvement in counter-terrorism in Nigeria however represents an asymmetric kind of warfare that requires belligerents to step beyond accepted norms of armed conflict in order to achieve its desired outcome. Given that the insurgent activities in Nigeria regularly step beyond accepted norms of armed conflict, it is therefore required of the government counterinsurgency forces to also step beyond their conventional methods of managing regular warfare. The insurgency problem in Nigeria reflects a complex interaction between actions, structures, and beliefs. These dimensions should offer the needed framework for analysing and comprehending insurgencies and crafting effective counter-strategies (Hoffman, 2009).

The complex and unique interface between actions, structures, and beliefs determines the path of the insurgency and, in the end, dictates the outcome. To understand the nature of insurgency demands a three-dimensional outlook. Actions consist of those events, behaviours, and acts that characterize and form the visual tapestry of insurgencies. Structures are the conditions that frame an insurgency. Such conditions include corruption, oppression and deprivation. Beliefs comprise those attitudes, perceptions, prejudices, ideologies, worldviews, cultures, and social and individual identities that fuel insurgencies (Terdman, 2007).

A comprehensive method for counter-terrorism in Nigeria should anchor on four basic cardinals: a balance of security; economic development; social justice; and political reform. The difficulty in orchestrating the need for harmonious action of all four cardinals guarantees that in every situation a paradox confronts the government. If economic development

occurs without security, then the government development projects become insurgent magnets that insurgents must destroy in order to gain credibility. If security is gained without responsive economic development, insurgents will easily recruit the unemployed to fight the government.

If security occurs without a rudimentary judicial system, then there is no ability to challenge authority peacefully. If the judicial system is organised but no political reforms, the insurgents would perceive no change in the status quo and indeed a moderation of their grievance. Counter-terrorism in Nigeria needs to be tailored upon three doctrines: Confront Build and transfer carried out by a combination of an assault force, a support force and a security force. Since the JTF counter-terrorism force draws forces from the police, customs, State Security Service (SSS), navy, air force, and the army, it is required that they should be organised under an assault force (1st squad), a support force (2nd squad) and a security force (3rd squad) for strategic and tactical operations with a special uniform irrespective of the security unit they represent.

The military assault force is required to confront secured base and deny insurgents of their sanctuaries. The support force is required to build the host community. Thereafter transfer would be made to the civil security forces to checkmate criminality. A combination of these three holds the possibility of frustrating insurgency. A critical example elsewhere shows that the US counterinsurgency forces in Iraq saw the denial of insurgent sanctuaries as a basic aspect of their strategy (Hoffman, 2009).

5.5 Assessing Nigerian Government Counter-Terrorism Approach

Faced with these real challenges, Nigeria had to act very quickly to curb the deteriorating security situation. The government approached the problem from two angles: preventive actions

and deliberate, disruptive interventions. Before the insurgency attacks in some cities the security forces including the police, military and intelligence services all worked independently to ensure efficient use of scarce resources and to produce effective results, the Joint Terrorism Force (JTF) was created. JTF includes representatives from all security agencies, and its leader reports to a security committee that comprises all security agencies and is chaired by a military officer. More significantly, JTF could not have succeeded without the involvement of the public support (Suleman,2007).

CHAPTER SIX

6.0 ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT MEASURES IN COMBATING TERRORISM IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA (2009- 2014)

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents analysis of data generated from the field. To strengthen the analysis, highpoints of some valid views and other related propositions to the subject of investigation were appropriately cited and corroborated by some other secondary sources in order to strengthen the findings. For convenience of effective presentation and analysis, the chapter is subdivided into sections and each addresses the objective of the study.

6.2 Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria

This section addresses objective one of the study which is intended to ascertain the causes of terrorism in the North-East Nigeria. It analyzes key variables that determine the likely causes of terrorism in the North-East Nigeria. These are political factors, socio-economic factors, religious, illiteracy/ignorance, porous borders, ill- equipped military, reluctance of international cooperation, among others variables.

6.2.1 Economic and Socio-political Factors

According to one of the respondents interviewed who claimed anonymous, he attributed the causes of terrorism as follows:

Terrorism is attributed to political factors. Politicians exploited these youths in order to get political positions and dispensed with them shortly after they have clinched their positions. They used the youths as thugs to rig elections and fight their opponents but

abandoning them thereafter. Since the weapons are still in their hands, they have no option than to use it for their selfish interest. This is the situation we find ourselves today.

The above was supported by Hobswan (2002) who observed that radical groups usually had bases in the peasantry and poor urban groups although, typically their leaders often came from the middle class and many were radicalized intellectuals with a university education. This paint an apt picture of the activities of Boko Haram in the North-East Nigeria.

This position explains why politics that ought to be practiced to ensure harnessing and optimal utilization of resources for the overall benefits of citizenry have been on the contrary in Nigeria and North East in particular. Experience and available information on governance crises in Africa (WB, 1999; 2001; UNDP, 2003, 2010) has shown that politics and obsession for political power in the country has little or nothing to do with serving the best interest of the common people. Instead, it is to serve the best interest of oneself, friends and close associates. Politics is often misapplied to be a highly paid investment in Nigeria, as it practically unlocked the key to national treasury. To worsen the situation in the country, politics is misused for personal gains rather than for improving the general wellbeing of the people. Nigeria, against its huge potentials is ranked high amongst the poorest countries of the world (Anyebe, 2011). Consequently, it makes the politicians to be desperate and ready to pay any prize including recruitment and arming the gullible population to realize this self-ambition. When politics is not geared towards meeting people's need and expectations, it seriously undermines political stability and national security. It leads to violent agitation, civil unrest and other social strife including terrorism.

On the economic factor, Collier and Hoeffler cited in (Solimano, 2005) have argued that the level of per capita income was found to be the main determinant of the risk of extremism and that doubling per capita income reduces approximately by half the risk of domestic violence.

This was given credence by Solimano (2005) who opined that socio-economic growth reduces the risk of domestic terrorism, as it contributes to increase per capita income, thereby making society less risky to violence.

6.2.2 Bad Governance and Corruption

In other words, bad governance with all its attendant problems of transparency, accountability and all related issues of maladministration in Nigeria that has created widening gaps between the ruler and the ruled is capable of generating huge social problem including terrorism. The Nigerian government and its officials are mostly and highly irresponsible, lacked transparency and accountability. In the midst of plenty, Nigeria is poor while those at the helm of affairs and their cronies used their position to enrich themselves. Almost in every corner and around the country, there are one and many abandoned projects due to mismanagement, corruption and indeed, bad governance. For over a decade, Nigeria has ranked among the highest in the world Corruption Perception Index⁹TI, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2013. Hence, she is ranked high among the poorest countries of the world (Anyebe, 2011). This by implication means that people who are denied the benefit of good governance may resort to revolting against the system that has failed or denied them of the basic needs of life. This is one of the reasons that explains why the Islamist insurgents group derived their name, Boko Haram, interpreted to mean “Western Education is a sin arising from the general dissatisfaction in the entire governance system in Nigeria and the North East in particular. This was corroborated by one of the respondents interviewed who opined that:

Bad governance has brought us to where we are today. The politicians will make empty promises to the people and once they are voted to power they will never fulfill those promises again. There is no clear cut plan on how to redirect the energy of our youths to meaningful programmes so they engage in any thing that comes their way. See

our roads are very bad, no supply of electricity, and no water. So what are we talking about, when the basic things of life are virtually lacking, life becomes miserable and people can do anything in life (Anonymous, 2014).

Besides, when the polity is beginning to manifest apparent failure in all ramifications, insecurity of all forms including terrorism would be the prevailing order of the day. For example, one of the respondents had pointed at this clearly when he asserts that:

Social injustice can trigger off terrorism. Can you imagine, how the leader of Boko Haram was killed, I mean late Mohammed Yusuf. It was alleged that, he died while in the custody of security personnel through extra judicial killing. This also was one of the reasons given by the Boko Haram sect that made them rise up against the state (Anonymous, 2014).

Analytically therefore, it is glaring that the country has witnessed series of undemocratic norms and practice for years especially since the return to democratic rule in 1999. Elections, for instance, are usually characterized with violent confrontation, thuggery, agitation, mayhem and killing. It has become a tradition now that a number of thugs one hires and armed goes a long way to determine the outcome of an election. Therefore, the proliferations of firearms in the hands of gullible but frustrated individuals who mostly have no access to sustainable means of livelihood could be used as alternative means of survival by joining bad group including terrorist organization for the purpose of survival. The crisis of bad governance was also confirmed by the September 11 Report of the Presidential Committee on security challenges in the North-East zone which noted the need to address issues of bad governance and delivery of services to the people. The Committee led by Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari, listed factors like high level of poverty and illiteracy, failure to deliver services despite huge resources, extra judicial killing

of Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and the existence of private militias that were dumped by [politicians after having been trained to handle arms.

In addition, bad governance is also associated with the inability of past governments in the North-East to emphasize and enforce on free and compulsory western education. A Report of the National Population Commission (NPC, 2006) reveals that the literacy rates are much lower among states in the North, and that 72% of children around the ages of 6-16 never attended schools in Borno, while Yobe 58%.

Under a compelling condition such as this, it increasingly creates opportunity for terrorism. This was corroborated by the position of most of the FGDs that attributed the crises in the state and other part of the zones to the failure of government to respond to the social provisioning functions of the state thereby creating room for youths for recruited into terrorist activities.

6.2.3 Economic Factors

Terrorism did not develop in a vacuum. Poverty, long neglect and economic disenfranchisement of people, among other plethora of problems, by successive governments in Nigeria combined to generate terrorism in the country. According to the World Bank Report,(2013; 2014), more than 70% of Nigeria population lives below the minimum standard set by the United Nations and the situation is particularly worse in the Northern part of the country. A situation where most people are poor and lack access to the basic means of livelihood such as quality education, shelter, health, water, electricity etc, it necessarily creates desperation and exerts pressure on some persons to innovate an unlawful means like joining terrorist group such as Boko Haram for the purpose of making ends meet. This is even made worse by the very nature of illiteracy and ignorance level amongst the citizenry, including those in urban and rural communities.

One of the interviewees gave credence to this when he stated inter alia:

In my opinion, the root causes of terrorism can be traced to economic hardship faced by the people... You know successive government in Nigeria refused to develop our economy in a way that it can create wealth for the people... Government neglected other sectors of the economy particularly agriculture since the discovery of oil in commercial quantities. By this neglect, a lot of people have been denied means of livelihood and especially that the oil money is not properly managed. With the concentration on oil as the driving force of the economy monolithically, other sectors are completely relegated to the background. Therefore, people whose major occupation is farming are not being provided with the right incentives needed to succeed. Gradually but steadily, unemployment and poverty begin to spread to the very alarming proportion. This is the main reason why a lot of our youths are roaming the streets for lack of employment. Since the economy is monolithic in nature, new companies or industries are not coming on board to generate employment... An idle mind, they say, is the devil's workshop. So it becomes easier for the gullible youth to be lured into criminal act and even terrorism (Anonymous, 2014).

6.2.4 Unemployment and Poverty

Unemployment particularly among youths in the country is another dimension of economic factors of terrorism. A situation where able-bodied persons who are willing and able to work but cannot find a paid employment roam the streets helplessly could compel some to form or join criminal gang such as Boko Haram. Tens of millions of youths lack prospects of decent work in Nigeria. This is not only a tragic waste of precious human resource, it can also have security implications for the country, since desperation often leads young people to fall prey to terrorism, criminal gangs or illegal migration syndicates . This is because the challenges of future are very enormous and the chances are very high that, if you are deprived of having access to the means of livelihood, you will get attracted by very bad alternatives. This is well echoed by one of the FGDs that comprised the professionals, public servants and other categories of people succinctly put it thus:

...the current economic depression which has produced a large number of unemployed persons cannot be an adequate platform on

which to build effective security. Unemployment is a prime trigger and sustainer of terrorism. Where there is preponderance of the unemployed, there is infestation of disenchantment. Profoundly, these idle hands made ready and easy recruits. If Nigeria is to face an invading army, they are finished because it will have to first overcome the problem of low morale of its Army and the citizen's lack of faith in the system as it is now. Simply put, Nigerian government cannot be assured of the full allegiance of its people when confronted by external attacks (Anonymous, 2014).

As noted by the World Bank Report (2010), poverty is steadily on the increase in many parts of Africa and Nigeria is worst for it. This is to the extent that a large proportion of the population cannot afford three square meals in a day. In the North, for example, report by the UNICEF (2009) indicated that many cannot afford to send their children and wards to school including accessing health care facilities. With persistent economic hardship and no sign of it abating soon, it spurs panic and desperation among the people as they increasingly become dissatisfied with the system that does not provide for their basic needs. According to a UN Report,(1989), African countries especially sub Saharan African vulnerability to conflicts of all kinds mainly arises out of poor economic management, corruption, bad governance and its attendant unemployment/under-employment and excruciating poverty among its citizens. Hence the youths are especially and easily get recruited into different arm struggles within and outside the continent including international terrorism.

Viewing from a dissimilar perspective, another respondent looked at it from this angle:

Marginalization, unequal treatment and inequitable distribution of resources can also trigger violence and acts of terrorism. For example, both at the national and state levels including local government area council, development of government projects is not evenly spread. While some continue to enjoy government presence in terms of citing projects like hospitals, roads construction and rehabilitation, etc others are completely neglected. Even in terms of government

employment opportunities, it goes in the same sense of marginalization.... That is why during the last national conference we presented all these issues and urged the federal government to do something urgently to correct these issues (Anonymous, 2014).

In other words, the lopsided nature of our economic practice kills growth and development. An economy that is not able to cater for the basic needs of its citizens is inherently generating contradiction that is capable of throwing the society into chaos and terrorism is certainly a manifestation of this contradiction in Nigeria. As noted by one informant, terrorism...

Germinates like root and fester in an environment of abject poverty, mass illiteracy, corruption, and a yawning gap in socio-economic parity. Poverty gives rise to terrorism and other crimes even though this argument is not new especially when located within the context of the theories of revolution and social change. When people expect a lot but merely get a little, the platform for violence is laid. This is a major challenge to the counter-terrorism strategy put in place by the Federal Government (Anonymous,2014).

6.2.5 Religious Factors

The issue of fundamentalism illustrates the fact that religion appears to be associated with conflict in many parts of the world. In Nigeria for example, past experiences have revealed gruesome accounts of horrors arising from atrocities committed in the name of God (See Appendix one for details of the various religious uprising in Nigeria). Terrorism is most likely to develop in a country that has a long history of religious intolerance and Boko Haram is Fanaticism and extremism arises from the very belief that one's faith or religion is special and in fact, the best and the only assurance of ultimate salvation for man and as such, others' are merely sacrilegious. Attempts at propagating and projecting belief in a manner that promotes intolerance among adherent of same or different faiths is capable of not only generating radicalism, but also promoting religious extremism, conflict and terrorism in the long run. Terrorism is an escalation

of fanaticism into real conflict of violent nature that is aimed at coercing people into accepting a particular doctrine as the best way of life. According to a Respondent who claimed anonymous, religious extremism is the major cause of terrorism in the Northeast Nigeria. In fact, he stated inter alia:

Boko Haram is a clear manifestation of religious extremism in some parts of the country. It is an attempt to ignore Nigeria as a secular society. In fact, advocating a full implementation of Sharia state in Nigeria as is being coercively pursued by members of Boko Haram, is to say the least undermining the rights to freedom of worship as guaranteed by the 1999 Constitution. In fact, to anchor their reason for terrorism on Sharia implementation is contrary to the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria... (Anonymous, 2014).

As is stated above, to agitate violently or otherwise for an establishment of full Islamic state in a country like Nigeria that is so heterogeneous and pluralistic in every sense of the word, culturally, historically, politically, linguistically and even religiously is to obviously threaten the foundation of the country. This is apart from the fact the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria permits and guarantees the freedom of association and worship, among other fundamental human rights of its citizens. Explaining religion as factor of terrorism in the country, a respondent has this to say:

...Boko Haram and the whole issue of terrorism in Nigeria particularly in the Northeast can pathetically be linked to a long history of religious conflict among the same or adherent of the two main religions in the country (Christianity and Islam). With a developing culture of religious violence and conflict and the perpetrators largely unpunished, Boko Haramists gradually grew to become a deadly but well coordinated group of terrorist gang in the country. The inability of the successive governments to effectively handle and deal with the various associated religious crisis in the past partly can be an explanation for the very emergence of this terrorist group. This is not helped by the growing trend of Islamic

radicalization across the Middle East and North Africa which is increasingly taking a centre stage at the international level... (Anonymous, 2014).

This implies that terrorism does emerge from a persistent culture of conflict and violence among adherent of similar or dissimilar faiths who may want to impose a particular doctrine on others. Terrorism in Nigeria can be said to have a historical linkage in the sense that religious fanaticism and extremism in the country has all evolved into a culture of perpetual conflict, violence and intolerance in the North and particularly Northeast (See Appendix two for details). In other words, terrorism in the country can be hinged on the long history of religious conflicts which were not appropriately dealt with and resolved before it grew to a point of large scale social problem in Nigeria.

6.2.6 Porous Borders

As is commonly known, Nigeria shares close borders with many African countries especially Niger, Chad, Benin and Cameroon. The closeness of the shared boundaries cover a wide landmass that are so connected that sometimes, it is difficult to clearly demarcate and effectively monitor the movement of human and material goods across these borders. With the inter-connectedness of the people that provide many routes to and from across the borders, the government is naturally incapacitated in its effort to effectively monitor who and what comes in or goes out at a particular point in time. Most respondents similarly align their views in this direction. In fact, one of them stated inter alia:

From available information, Boko Haram smuggle their arms through porous borders. They are also receiving funding from outside the country. This is why after destroying their weapons, they re-stock again. Am sure this is what is sustaining their operations (Anonymous, 2014).

Additionally, another respondent has this to say:

Nigeria has one of the longest border with her neighbors and the porous nature of the borders makes it easy for illegal immigrant to enter the country and commit all manner of Crimes and get away with it, smuggle weapons, prohibited drugs and contraband goods. The porous borders is the advantage Boko Haram terrorist are using to perpetrate crime in Nigeria with impunity. Terrorists group is responsible for the attack across the country since it is now said that there exist different terrorist group unleashing mayhem on the public (Anonymous, 2014).

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Still on the porous nature of our border with neighbouring countries, a respondent has this to say:

Nigerian borders are open to everybody and as such you can move with arms and illegal goods into the country without fear of any challenge. So, unless our borders are properly monitored and adequate search and checking is done, Nigeria will continue to harbor criminals and terrorists as well as all kinds of illegal ammunitions imported into the country. This is a challenge to the government unless something is done (Anonymous, 2014).

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In other words, a common knowledge has shown that it is difficult to monitor and control movement activities across most borders in Africa and especially in West African sub-region. Therefore it becomes easier for terrorist elements to take advantage of the loopholes in smuggling arms into the country. In fact, one of the informants in the male adult FGD better described the porous border situation when he observes:

...porous border posts; a development that made it easy for terrorists, human traffickers and drug barons to infiltrate the country and perpetrate heinous crimes and acts of terrorism. The above point answers to the burning questions, where does Boko Haram, MEND, Armed robbers get their stock of arms and ammunitions? For example, only recently the Nigerian Customs Service during routine surveillance intercepted large consignment of arms and ammunition worth over N4.3 billion (US\$30 million) at border posts. This seizure confirms the potency of the illegal or illicit

trafficking of arms by unscrupulous elements for perpetrating violence and heating up the security situation in Nigeria (Anonymous, 2014).

6.2.7 Ill-equipped security/military

The entire security network in the country and the military in particular prior to when Boko Haram grew into a full menace were ill-equipped and ill-prepared in terms of resources and facilities it takes to confront them. The military and the entire body of security network were taken aback. The terrorists were more prepared and sophisticatedly more armed and better ready to confront the Nigeria military and even in many instances, forced them retreat. The situation became so humiliating to the military and even worse when people at a point had turned to the vigilante group and hunters for the safety of their community, life and property. In fact, one of the informant painted the scenario when he explains that:

...the Nigeria military were very weak right from the onset and until a few months to end the administration of Jonathan. The reason being that the military were not only ill-prepared, but were poorly equipped to confront a group that is well organized, trained, prepared, motivated and equipped with latest weaponry. In fact, the military were losing the battle against terrorism until recently the government started providing them with latest weaponry and facilities that is overwhelming crippling the terrorists' capabilities and abilities to withstand the might of the government... (Anonymous, 2014).

Corroborating this views, an informant from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, vividly described the situation when he explains that:

Maintaining national security in Nigeria has been hampered by a number of challenges. One of the challenges facing Nigerian counter-terrorism strategy is paucity of well trained security operatives (Police, Army, Navy and Air Force) that can physically and intellectually meet up with the contemporary security

dynamics. Nigeria unlike other developed nations is grossly under policed, considering the ratio of security personnel and citizen. That there is a clear mismatch between Nigeria's population of 160 million and security workforce, as the nation could only boast of about 371,000 Policemen 130,000 Army officers, 15,000 Air force officers and 18,000 Naval officers. For a nation like Nigeria, a total security workforce of 534,000 is grossly inadequate to manage the growing crimes and different insurgency at different parts of the country (Anonymous, 2014).

This view was corroborated by an Air Force Commander who says that:

Even the militaristic tactical approach adopted by Government in tackling terrorism in the North East is faced with several challenges which ranges from lack of modern sophisticated fighting weapons and equipment, rickety vehicles, poor communication system between troops and field commanders, troops with low morale and poor welfare, corruption, inadequate training and the tactical ineptitude of the commanders, as against a well equipped and determined terrorist group (Anonymous,2014).

In another development, another informant who shared similar position had observed that the main reason for the near failure of government's counter-offensive measures is because of the use of the same method (force, administrative panel and negotiation) which was used in addressing the Niger Delta militancy to also tackle Boko Haram terrorism (Anonymous,2014). This was done without a proper appreciation of the enormity of Boko Haram terrorism. The Niger Delta militants had visible leadership and willing to engage the government in order to drive home their demand. Anyone interested in their struggle could encounter them in both print and electronic media. Their struggle became violent in reaction to the government's use of violence to suppress their legitimate demands for a clean environment and a fair share of the proceeds from oil resources found on their ancestral land.

In his own contribution, one of the respondent interviewed observed that there are several factors hampering effective operation against Boko Haram. Beside ill-equipped military, he attributed the reasons to different thus:

As far as I am concerned our government functionaries are corrupt. And it is this corruption that is still making this problem worse. If you look at how they react to terrorism in this country, you will understand that they are hiding something away from the public. They don't release funds in time to purchase modern equipment, even the available ones are not released as at when due. This is always the complaint of our soldier in Maiduguri and even in terms of incentives; somebody will just deliberately refuse to release them. How do you think the government will effectively fight terrorism? (Anonymous,2014).

To give credence to the above, one of the FGDs has this to say:

Our security personnel are not enough because the government doesn't want to employ people but rather transfer the funds to their account and also our security agencies are ill-equipped and the government show I don't care attitude and I never believed that terrorism would become strong in Nigeria. So inadequate funding to the security agencies always make them short of working facilities and when something happen we will only be at the mercy of God but not the government, that is why recently over 500 soldiers flee to Cameroun, mutiny in Maiduguri and protest by some wives of soldiers not to allow their husbands fight the insurgents in the north east. This shows the height of inadequacy of weapons and equipment in fighting the Boko Haram which is a terrorist group (FGD, 2014).

In other words, the poorly equipped, ill-prepared and not adequately motivated military accounted for why the fight against the group was almost lost by the government at the beginning. After all, a government that is so corrupt would most certainly have corrupt army that is badly equipped to face any war, let alone confronting an audaciously well prepared and organized terrorist group like Boko Haram. It explains why the army personnel were

surrendering to the terrorist group and deserting the force at some point and running to the neighbouring countries of Cameroon and Niger for safety. Most of the excuses were hinged on the fact that the military were not equipped with the right facilities needed to confront the Islamist group, Boko Haram.

From the above, it becomes clear from the data generated and presented that the causes of terrorist activities ranges from issues of poverty, socioeconomic factors, bad governance. This primary data was corroborated by Sachs (1989) who opined that inequality generates social polarization, restlessness and resort to violence. This position was supported by Solimano (2005) who asserted that dictatorship, weak democracies and unequal societies have provided the background conditions for domestic terrorism in Latin America. This, when placed side by side with the Nigerian situation, it becomes glaring as the North-East of Nigeria is poorer in all ramifications compared to the other regions or geopolitical zones.

The data presented above has shown that domestic terrorism have persisted in countries where the average growth rate and per capita has been very low. However, it is important to note that the existence of poverty arising from the socioeconomic and political factors mentioned may not be sufficient factors as the terrorists need to recruit people and purchase arms which requires large chunk of fund.

6.3 Nigerian Government's Counter Terrorism Measures Against Boko Haram

This section addresses objective two of the study. It presents and analyzes data on the following identifiable government's counter-terrorism measures against the dreaded terrorist group, Boko Haram in Nigeria. This include: troops deployment and reinforcement; declaration of state of emergency; imposition of curfew; establishment of civilian JTF; and the formation of

multinational task force. Although, the entire counter-terrorist measures can be described as reactionary in nature, but for the purpose of analysis the section takes in-depth view of each measure as follows:

6.3.1 Troops Deployment and Reinforcement

According to an informant, government's first approach which was the deployment and reinforcement of troops was absolutely imperative in view of the mindless and murderous activities of the Islamist group. In fact, to put it in his words, he observed that:

...the government was left with little or no option but to immediately deployed troops and where necessary send reinforcement to counter the nefarious activities of this terrorist gang. Any responsible government would do that, but the question of whether the military is prepared or not is a different issue altogether (Anonymous, 2014).

The deployment of troops to combat the threats posed by the Boko Haram is socially, politically and legally correct. Socially and politically correct because doing so would assure the citizens the government is keeping its social contract with the people by averting the danger of the Hobbesian state of nature where life is seen as "brutish, solitary and short". Legally in the sense that doing so was complying to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which provides that "government must take step to safeguard the security of life and property of the people".

6.3.2 Declaration of State of Emergency

The second counter-terrorism measure against Boko Haram was the declaration of state of emergency. Following the escalation of violence, killing, maiming and destruction of life and property by the Islamist group, Boko Haram,, especially in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, President Jonathan declared state of emergency in the affected states as a measure against the

group. His declaration of state of emergency in the affected states was a clear departure from the former President Olusegun Obasanjo who invoked the measure twice in 2004 and 2006 by removing a democratically elected governors and installed appointed military administrators to manage the affected states. Jonathan's measure retains the governors and other political officeholders to continue to discharge their responsibilities.

Beyond this, the measure was to enable security forces to counter the barbaric activities of the BH whose violence is comparable to a declaration of war. According to a high ranking military officer:

...emergency rule affords the security forces to abrogate some aspect of freedoms as guaranteed by the Constitution. This step was necessary so that the insurgents will know the game has changed. It defines the seriousness of government's readiness to respond in strong possible terms to issues that breached national security. With the emergency rule I place, it necessarily signaled members of the public that some aspect of their freedoms would be restricted for the sake of the overall safety of life and property. It tells the general public to be aware of the intention of government towards tampering or limiting their freedom with a view to improving the threatened security of life and property (Anonymous, 2014).

By virtue of the declaration of the state of emergency, it means the government is prepared to alter through the suspension and/or change some functions of the executive, the legislature and or judiciary during this period of time. It alerts citizens to change their normal behavior and orders government agencies to implement emergency rules. In other words, emergency rule is basically being used as rationale for suspending rights and freedoms guaranteed under a country's constitution or basic law. For instance, under emergency rule, a government can detain persons indefinitely and hold such without trial. In fact, all rights can be derogated under emergency rule.

6.3.3 Imposition of Curfew

Restriction of movement of people at a particular time interval is identified as one aspect of counter-terrorism measure. Curfew is usually an order specifying a time during which certain regulation apply. It is a law that or executive order that effectively prohibit or limit the right to be out in public at certain times or in some cases, require businesses to close during certain hours. Imposition of curfew is a common practice in Nigeria, especially as a measure by the government to swiftly de-escalate any civil unrest at a given place. This enables security forces some reasonable amount of power requires to bring the troubled situation under control. According to an informant, he describes the curfew scenario this way:

There are countless number of times, weeks and even months where curfew was imposed in the three affected states. As soon as military were deployed following the declaration of emergency rule by the Command in Chief of the armed forces, the first starting point of military action was the imposition of curfew which can be indefinite or definite depending on the situation on ground (Anonymous, 2014).

What the imposition of curfew is meant to achieve is that it enable the security forces track down and confront this lawless group to wherever they may be found and at the same time, sparing the innocent population from being caught in the likely cross-fire between the military and the insurgents group.

6.3.4 Military Road Blocks and Checkpoints

As part of counter-terrorism measure, the military mounted a number of checkpoint and road blocks in nearly every 1000 metres in all the areas of major operations. The checkpoint and road block are expected to be a point by point stop and search operations aimed at identifying suspects or vehicle carrying Improvised Device (ID) or any arm and ammunition. The checkpoint and

road block also provided a platform to get information or report from members of the public as it relates to the activities of the Islamist group, Boko Haram. Many of the informants share the view that the military checkpoint and road block were visible in the three states largely affected by the activities of Boko Haram. An informant aptly summarizes the scenario thus:

As you can see, military checkpoint and road blocks are mounted everywhere both within the major towns and on highways in the affected areas of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. This gives people some levels of confidence that government is indeed taking step at combating the insurgents. Many at times, several BH members are being tracked down and apprehended at the checkpoint (Anonymous, 2014).

In other words, military checkpoint and road block provide a strategic attempt at keeping and maintaining vigilance on suspected persons or groups, who may want to escape being detected, arrested or brought to justice and/or attempting to go and cause havoc elsewhere. However, it should be stated that whether mounting of checkpoint and road block have been effective in the prevention of BH attack is a question that shall be addressed in the next section.

6.3.5 Civilian Joint Task Force

Another counter-terrorism approach is the establishment of Civilian JTF. The Civilian Joint Task Force is designated to represent those local hunters and militias who volunteered and rightly recognized so by the authority of military based on their familiarity with the people and the various geography and terrain of their respective areas to form a joint partnership with the military to hunt down the terrorist group in their domain. The civilian JTF are expected to be given some basic training in handling firearms even though they mostly relied on traditional weaponry in the defence of their people and community prior to military engagement. Yet their activities are expected to be coordinated by the military who are directly in charge and

constitutionally empowered to fight both internal and external aggressors in collaboration with other security agencies of government namely the police and DSS.

Shedding more light on establishment of civilian JTF, a high ranking military officer and also an informant for the study has this to say:

...the establishment of the Civilian Joint Task Force was born out of the need to join hands with the government in tackling terrorism. As it has often been known, security they say is a collective responsibility of everyone. The civilian JTF were mostly local hunters and members of vigilante groups in their respective communities and towns. They know the people very well and sometimes, the individual involved in Boko Haram. They are familiar with every nook and cranny of their surroundings and could be helpful and indeed are helpful in the ongoing fight against the terrorists (Anonymous, 2014).

This underscores the importance of Civilian JTF as a counter-terrorism measure introduced to assist the security forces in fighting terrorism in the Northeast of Nigeria.

6.3.6 Formation of Multinational Joint Task Force

The unabated escalation of the Boko Haram activities which resulted to the death of tens of thousands of people in the last six years eventually led to the formation of Multinational Joint Task Force and which came into effect March 11, 2015. The joint task force was established out of concern that terrorism if not confronted and dealt a fatal blow in Nigeria could easily spread to other neighboring countries particularly. The fear is genuine in that Islamist militancy spans from Mali to Nigeria in West Africa, to the rest of Sahel, ISIL forces in Libya further North Africa, Al Shabab in Somalia and in Kenya, let alone the growing militancy in Egypt which further spread movement of fighters and weapons. This singular reason among other concerns necessitated the formation of Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) comprising Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon and approved by the United Nations to join forces against the insurgency in Nigeria.

Nigeria's poor record in battling the insurgents indicate that the country may have to rely on multinational force put together to fight Boko Haram, This view is however countered by the shared by an informant who stated, inter alia:

Many of these crises have been economic and political issues, and the use of force cannot be the ending solution to stopping the problem from escalating. This tallies with the postulations that if the fundamental problem of poverty is not adequately addressed, people are more likely to encourage the formation of better organized violent groups and to confront more aggressive law enforcement agencies. The unacceptable level of poverty in the country should be realistically addressed. Nigerian leaders have failed to recognize that mass poverty and underdevelopment together exacerbate crime. These issues cannot be solved through the barrels of gun, except through non-military approach (Anonymous, 2014).

6.4.0 Effectiveness of Government Counter-Terrorism Measures

This section addresses objective three of the study. It compressed the entire government counter-terrorism measures –deployment and reinforcement of troops; the declaration of state of emergency; the imposition of curfew; establishment of military road blocks and checkpoint; the establishment of civilian JTF; and formation of multinational joint task force – to a single variable of militarism and analyzes holistically the effectiveness or otherwise of the approach. The reason is based on the fact that the identifiable measures are more or less reactionary and militaristic in nature and therefore, analyzing them point by point will amount to repetition and duplication.

Although the militaristic approach at combating the menace of Boko Haram is considered to be a short term solution, the general perception of effectiveness can best be summed up in two ways. While some respondents would view the military strategies as effective in terms of de-escalating the spread of Boko Haram to other parts of the North, particularly the Northeast and effective

enough in curtailing and restricting the activities of the insurgents mostly to the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, others have a contrary perception. To the former, it was assumed that if it were not for the combined military approaches, Boko Haram would have spread to many parts of the North. According to an explanation by one informant, who stated inter alia:

...if it were not for the deployment and reinforcement of soldiers to the epicenters of the Islamist activities, BH would have virtually overrun all the states in Northeast, if not the entire states in the Northern part of the country. Of course, one may agree that the military may have their shortcomings in the fight against terrorism in the Northeast, but considering the manner in which they (Boko Haram) have shown preparedness and readiness to actualize their objective, failure to deploy military option would have proven very costly (Anonymous, 2014)..

In almost a similar reaction, another informant has this to say:

To me, the military approach has been effective in the sense that it restricted the insurgents to the three states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. What would have happened to the entire country without the use of military approach could only best be imagined. These mindless gangs were ready and prepared to take on the entire country.... To me, the military has achieved a lot in the fight against Boko Haram (Anonymous, 2014).

Throwing more light on the effectiveness of the combination of approaches by government to tackle the activities of Boko Haram, an informant from Air force commander of JTF Maiduguri has this to say:

From what I have seen, the sum of the government administrative framework within which much of the counter terrorism policy has been implemented is comprehensive. We have incorporated the local who form the bulk of civilian JTF, as well as the local hunters. This collaboration is indeed paying off in this war against the terrorists (Anonymous, 2014).

Corroborating this assertion, another informant attached to the General Officer Commanding seven (7) Division, Maiduguri, explains thus:

The formation of the multi-national force with Nigeria, Cameroun Chad and Niger Republic has helped our troops tremendously in recent times to deal with the terrorists. The presence of these nations troops helped in blocking all the routes where Boko Haram use to penetrate Nigeria strike and run back to those countries. It is not as if we can not fight Boko Haram alone but we must respect laws on international boundaries, that is why the co-operation of these other countries has been very significant. Also, the federal government has acquired sophisticated weapons and modern fighting equipment for the troops. The welfare of the troops has also improved and their morale has been boosted (Anonymous,2014).

The effectiveness of the use of force against insurgency in the Northeast may not be completely total in terms of degrading the capability of Hoko Haram, but to the extent that the measures has helped to curtail and restrict the spread of Boko Haram to Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states on a minimal scale was a proven attestation to effectiveness

However, other than this, the entire militaristic approach was seen as mere reactionary and adhoc in nature, stating that the failure of the military force to defeat the BH as swiftly as it ought to be alludes to the ineffectiveness of the government mechanisms against Boko Haram. In fact, one of the informants painted the scenario when he observes that:

...what can be the success of the military approach when it cannot prevent the kidnapping of Chibok girls let alone rescuing them. Government houses, schools and places of worship are being reduced to a rubble and to the bewilderment of many that they are security forces on the ground.. At some point, both civilian and soldiers will be fleeing and scampering for safety from the audacious attacks by the Boko Haram. To me, it makes little or no sense deploying troops that are not well prepared, equipped and motivated to fight Boko Haram....(Anonymous,2014).

The phenomenon of Boko Haram and combating terrorism in the Northeast of Nigeria has been characterized by series of system problems. One of such problems is the overreliance on the militaristic approach by government without consideration to how well the Islamist insurgents

were prepared, equipped and motivated to confront the security forces of the state. The apparent and initial failure of the use of force to effectively degrade the capacity and capability of Boko Haram could possibly be an explanation for why they resisted the option of amnesty proposed by government, because the insurgents appear to be gaining upper hand against the military. In fact, the militaristic approach is bound to fail because, according to an informant from CISLAC, a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) affirmed that:

Several incidents have exposed the inadequacies of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategies in dealing with threats to the country's security. These inadequacies stem from lack of clarity of the strategic doctrine that should guide the deployment of forces. What I am saying is in conformity with the communiqué of Security Summit held in Abuja recently, which noted that there is lack of synergy in Nigeria's Security arrangement. The summit noted that there is lack of fusion among security agencies. Specifically, Nigeria security agencies hardly corporate and collaborate in intelligence sharing. Rather they compete much more than they collaborate. When Nigerian citizens are massacred by Boko Haram group, the absence of a clear contingency plan designed to deal with the security of life and property of Nigerians even within her country was exposed (Anonymous,2014).

In other words, what implies from the two opposite views as regard the effectiveness or otherwise of the government counter-terrorism approach is that, while the use of force may not have completely prevented the insurrection of the group in the three states of Northeast, it is fair to say that the de-escalation of the Boko Haram crisis from further spread to other states of the federation shows relative effectiveness of the strategies of government in combating terrorism in the affected parts of the country.

6.5 Discussion of Findings

The results from the findings are here discussed in line with the objectives of the study stated in the first chapter of the work.

The first objective of the study was to find out the causes of terrorism in the North-East Nigeria between 2009-2014. Available evidence from the data generated from the Respondents interviewed and corroborated with the FGD and secondary sources have shown that the causes of terrorism in North-East Nigeria ranges from poverty, socioeconomic factors, political factors and bad governance. This was corroborated by the works of Sachs, 1989; Solimano, 2005; and Hobswan, 2002. The analysis apparently shows that terrorism in Nigeria is a function of variety of factors such as socio-political and economic issues of entrenched bad governance and corruption, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy/ignorance, religious extremism, porous border and ill-equipped and poorly motivated security forces. It shows that a country that is rich but poorly managed can easily get drifted to crisis of unimaginable consequences and Boko Haram is certainly a manifestation of bad governance. It has been shown in that analysis that Boko Haram is a repercussion of polity of mismanagement, corruption, repression and deprivation. This finding affirms the assertion by Bako (1992) that there is a dialectical correlation between the biting economic crisis and accompanying political repression, religious intolerance and revolts. Boko Haram is therefore an expression of dissatisfaction against a system that has failed to address the basic needs of the people. Despite this observation, it is important to note that poverty and other political and socio-economic factors mentioned are not sufficient factors as they are international dimensions to it in terms of the funding and acquisition of arms used for their operations.

The second and third objectives the study set out to achieve were to investigate the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism measures and to ascertain the extent to which these measures have been effective. The study has shown that the troops deployment and reinforcement; declaration of state of emergency; imposition of curfew; establishment of civilian JTF; and the

formation of Multinational Task Force, were the government counter-terrorism measures against the Boko Haram terrorist activities. In fact, it is clear from the data generated and corroborated with secondary and official documents examined that the entire counter-terrorist measures of government against the insurgents are militaristic and reactionary in nature. However, studies such as Galtung, (1990); McNamara,(1968) have shown that force alone cannot defeat an act of violence where structural poverty, exclusion, intimidation, oppression, want, fear and all sundry types of psycho-social pressures still constitute the society's mainstay. The result of the study has shown that placing the counter-terrorism measure on militaristic approach will be counter-productive without first addressing the very fundamentals of what causes terrorism. Hence, there is need for government to embark on a comprehensive militaristic and non-militaristic approaches so as to tackle the crises of bad governance, poverty, socio-economic and political factors and let all political office holders, appointed and elected to be accountable and transparent. But in the meantime, the military operation should be adequately sustained so as to protect the lives and properties of the people until relative peace is restored.

From the above, this study has shown that Nigerian government's counter terrorism measures have been reactionary and inadequate without addressing the root causes of domestic terrorism in North-East Nigeria. This is evident from the use of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) to engage Boko Haram sect.

The study has also shown that the failure of these measures has exposed the operational and logistical constraints of the Nigerian security services; further raising the suspicion and doubts about government's commitment and will toward tackling the activities of terrorism.

CHAPTER SEVEN

7.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

This section presents the summary of the research work and the conclusion drawn was based on the assessment of the findings on Government Measures in Combating Terrorism in North-East Nigeria. Recommendations were also made based on the findings of the research.

7.2 Summary

The study basically assessed government's counter-terrorism measures against Boko Haram in Nigeria with a view to determining its effectiveness or otherwise. Based on this, specific objectives were drawn to achieve the aim and these include: finding out the causes of terrorism in the North-East Nigeria between 2009 and 2014; to investigate the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism measures adopted against Boko Haram between 2009 and 2014; determine the extent to which Nigerian Government counter terrorism measures have been effective against the insurgents; and finally to offer possible means and ways to address the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. In view of this, relevant literature (published and unpublished) as it relates to the subject matter under investigations. Theoretically, Neo-Realist theory otherwise called the "new security thinking" and the Post-Modernist or Critical human security approach were adopted to explain the phenomenon.

The data for this study was generated through the employment of both primary and secondary data using the instruments of In-depth interview, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and analysis of official documents and empirical studies for the purpose of one source complementing the other.

This thesis is structured into seven chapters. Chapter one focused on the introduction which presents the outline of the study with the following components. Background to the study, statement of research problem, research questions, research aim and objectives, research assumptions, among others. Chapter two is basically centred on review of related and relevant literature where the gaps to be filled were discovered so as to make our contributions to existing body of literature. In addition to this is the theoretical framework. The third chapter of the work is the research methodology. Here, all the procedural steps taken to generate, collate and analyse data used for the study are described. The types and sources of data used, instruments of data collection, sampling techniques used to draw sample size and respondents were also discussed in this section and finally, the method of data analysis was also described. Chapter four of the work is the historical development of terrorism in Nigeria. The fifth chapter essentially dealt with the Nigerian government's counter terrorism strategies. The sixth chapter on the analysis of the assessment of the Nigerian government's counter terrorism strategies. This chapter consists of the presentation and qualitative analysis of the data collected from both primary and secondary sources. Chapter seven, which is the last chapter presents the Summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations based on the findings above.

7.3 Conclusion

The thrust of this section is essentially on the presentation of major findings on the assessment of the Nigerian government's counter terrorism strategies in the North-East Nigeria, between 2009 and 2014. The following were discovered as the major findings of the study:

The study found that there are multi-dimensional causes of Hoko Haram in the North-East Nigeria and which ranges from the failure of the existing socio-political and economic system to address endemic unemployment and poverty issues in Nigeria; bad governance and pervasive corruption; high level of illiteracy and ignorance; religious extremism; porous borders with neighbouring countries; and ill-equipped and poorly motivated security forces.

Specifically, the study has shown that high level of poverty in the North-East of Nigeria has significant explanation for the incidence of terrorism in the North-East Nigeria. The widespread poverty in the North has provided the Boko Haram insurgents with a formidable instrument for aiding the recruitment of foot soldiers and seeking the overthrow of the existing order in the North.

This incidence of poverty is said to be among other things the function of high rate of unemployment, illiteracy, lack of adequate productive skills, lack of social security, bad governance, etc.

Furthermore, the study has shown that the militaristic (troops deployment and reinforcement, declaration of emergency rule, imposition of curfew, military road blocks and checkpoints among other) counter-terrorism approaches of the government within the period under study were ineffective and counter-productive essentially because the use of force alone cannot defeat an act of violence where structural poverty, exclusion, intimidation, oppression, want, fear and all sundry types of psycho-social pressures still constitute the society's mainstay. As such, the study found that government efforts can be more effective in the ongoing attempts at combating terrorism through multi-faceted approaches. This include remodeling the security architecture of

the country with the best equipment and proper motivation of security personnel; and addressing in particular, the very condition that makes Boko Haram to thrive in the country.

The activities of Boko Haram group in the North-East Nigeria has increasingly been made worse by the very deadly collusion occurring between globalization and the evolution of international terrorism. The government on its part continues to look at Boko Haram as a peripheral threat and therefore preferring militaristic approach which has so far proven to be incapable of degrading the ability and capability of the insurgents to inflicted havoc on the populace.

In the light of the foregoing, it be concluded that terrorism is a response to or product of defects in the social, cultural, economic and political values, structures and relations in society. The governments at all levels and in different parts of the nation need to address the risk factors identified above and also strengthen the country's security and intelligence agencies. In particular, the governments at the federal, state and local levels need to implement proactive measures such as the principles and duties outlined to guarantee security, democracy, justice and welfare of citizens in chapters two and four of the Constitution.

7.4 Recommendations

In order to achieve lasting peace in the present security quagmire, the following recommendations are made which will be grouped into short and long term measures to deal with the problems posed by terrorism in Nigeria.

7.4.1 Short Term measures on how to Combat Terrorism in Nigeria

1. Committed and charismatic leadership is required for social policies to succeed
2. Nigeria and other members of the international community concerned should sustain the current efforts of containing and curtailing the attacks of the terrorist group by the

Multinational Joint Task Force against terrorism. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon; it must be met with short-term military action, informed by in-depth, long term, sophisticated analysis. Thus far, the response has been virtually all the former and little of the latter.

3. In the short term, Nigeria should update its military capability and facility to be able to confront and curtail the activities of terrorism in the North-East Nigeria to the point of degrading and forcing them into negotiation and dialogue for peaceful resolution of the impasse. This requires not only improved steady, long-range power projection capabilities but also agile, highly trained, and lethal ground forces, backed up with greater intelligence, including human intelligence supported by individuals with language skills and cultural training.

7.4.2 Long term Measures on how to Combat Terrorism in Nigeria

1. Nigeria and its counterterrorist allies must employ a much broader array of longer-term policy tools to reshape the international environment, which enables terrorist networks to breed and become robust. The mechanism of globalization need to be exploited to thwart the globalization of terrorism.
2. Redesigning of Nigeria's security architecture in order to be proactively ready to prevent and control acts of terrorism even before they occur. This is achievable through training and retraining of security agencies so that they can be in tune with modern technology and devices that can measure up to the standards of their counter-parts in developed countries. It has to do with intelligence gathering and other quick response measure to

national security threat. The strongest response that Nigeria can muster to a serious threat has to include political, economic and military capabilities.

3. National economic and political restructuring to ensure equitable and transparent distribution and utilization of nation resources. This is possible through strict enforcement of anti-corruption laws and tightening and blocking the condition that allows corruption via computerization and application of information technology and best practices.
4. Government should ensure provision of quality and functional education to improve the literacy level of the citizenry.
5. Government should strive to develop a national employment strategy that is aimed at targeting its employable population. Such strategy should evolve youth employment network where young people are involved as partners in addressing solution to the unemployment issues affecting them. This is consequent on the fact that young adult persons who are either unemployed or marginally employed are easily available and ready to be recruited into any criminal gang including terrorist organizations.

However, in the meantime, there is need for government to fully engage in security awareness campaign in all the dialects in the North-East states of Nigeria so as to reduce the vulnerability of individuals to any planned terrorist attacks and maintain a culture of alertness over their environment. The Federal Government could task the National Orientation Agency (NAO), in collaboration with some other security agencies and Civil Societies Organizations (CSOs) and the Media to step up public enlightenment campaign. Greater efforts should be devoted to preventive and proactive measures than reactive and containment measures. The capacity and competence of security agencies should be developed.

Security agencies should have capacity, competence and motivation to prevent and contain terrorism as well as to respond to humanitarian emergencies associated with terrorism. The capacity and preparedness of the Nigerian security agencies to combat terrorism are limited.

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LIST OF RESEARCH INFORMANTS

1. Senator David Mark - Senate president, Federal Republic of Nigeria
2. Senator George Sekibo - Chairman, Senate Committee on Defence
3. Col. Gideon Dicksion Mamman (Rtd) – Commander Operation Yaki, Kaduna
4. ACP Abubakar Sadiq Aliyu – Police Component Commander Operation Yaki Kaduna
5. Mr. Sergeant Awuse – member National Conference, Representing Ikwerre/Emohua-River State.
6. Mallam Shehu Sani – Human Right Activist, Kaduna
7. Brigadier General; B.A. Fiboinumama – Cammandant Nigerian Army Depot, Zaria
8. CSP Abimbola Olugbenga – Police Component Commander, JTF, Maiduguri
9. Lt. Col. Oku – Military Police Commander, Basawa, Zaria.
10. AVM N.A Balogun – Airforce Commander, JTF, Maiduguri
11. Major General M.Y. Ibrahim – GOC 7 Division Maiduguri
12. Mrs. Sandra Obilji – Member Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)
13. Mr. Ikechi Worgu – Civil Servant
14. Alhaji Mohammed Buba – Yobe State Government Senior Official
15. Godwin Fwah – Adamawa State Government Senior Official
16. Ahmed Ibrahim – Senior University Lecturer, A.B.U. Zaria.
17. Shettimah Galadima – Borno State Government official
18. Umana O. Umana - Director SSS in JTF Maiduguri
19. Alhaji Mohammed Goni – A Traditional Ruler in Adamawa
20. Alhaji Adamu Wafari – A Community Leader, Borno State

APPENDIX 1: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE

Government Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Nigeria 2009 to 2014

INFORMANT BIO-DATA

1. Age _____
2. Occupation _____
3. Place of Work _____
4. Title/Position _____

CAUSES OF TERRORISM

5. What would you say are the major causes of terrorism?

Probe for

- Economic
 - Political
 - Religious
 - Poor/bad governance/leadership
 - Social injustice and exclusion
6. What do you think are the consequences of terrorism on the lives and property of the people in northern Nigeria?

Probe for

- Smuggling of weapons
- Internal and foreign funding

NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES

7. What are the policies of government of Nigeria in combating terrorism?

Probe for

- Types of anti-terrorism policies and/or programmes
- Effectiveness of the policies and programmes
- Any new initiatives that the government is planning

HOW HAS NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGIES PERFORMED?

8. To what extent has Nigerian government counter terrorism strategies performed its role?

CHALLENGES OF COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN NIGERIA

9. What do you think are the major challenges affecting the counter-terrorism strategies in Nigeria?
10. What suggestions can you proffer in reducing the menace of terrorism in northern Nigeria?

Probe for

- Individuals/community
- Civil societies / religious / philanthropists / elder-state men / nongovernmental / organizations
- Government of Nigeria

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

11. What are the possible solutions to these challenges?

APPENDIX 2: Record of Boko Haram Attacks from July 2009 to May 2011 in the North Eastern Nigeria.

| S/N | Source | Incidents |
|------------|---|---|
| 1. | July 27, 2009. Daily Trust, Vol. 18. No 32. | Yobe State: Attack on Potiskum, Yobe State Divisional Police Headquarters, three Policemen and one fire service officer died. |
| 2. | September 8, 2010. | Bauchi State: Bauchi Central Prison was set ablaze and |

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| | Vanguard, Vol. 32 No. 11 | members of the sect freed. |
| 3. | January 21, 2011. Daily Trust, Vol. 52, No. 23. | Borno State: The Borno State Governorship candidate of all Nigeria Peoples Party ANPP, for the 2011 election, Alhaji Modu Gubio, brother to former governor of the state, Modu Sheriff, killed by sect members alongside six others in Maiduguri, Borno State. |
| 4. | March 30, 2011. Leadership, No. 13 | Yobe State: Bomb planted by Boko Haram in Damaturu, Yobe State, exploded and injured a police officer. |
| | April 9, 2011. Leadership, No. 6 | Borno State: Bomb explosion occurred at a polling unit in Unguwar Doki Maiduguri, Borno State, killing the suicide bomber respectively. |
| 6. | April 26, 2011. Guardian, Vol. 17, No. 17 | Three people killed and scores injured in bomb attack in Borno State. |
| 7. | April 29, 2011. Leadership, No. 812 | Bauchi State; Army Barracks in Bauchi bombed. |
| 8. | May 19, 2011. Guardian, Vol. 13, No. 32 | Three policemen killed and two soldiers injured in bomb attack in Yobe. |
| 9. | May 29, 2011. Vanguard, Vol. 36, No. 8 | Bauchi State: Explosion at mammy market of Shandawanka barracks in Bauchi State claimed lives and left many injured. |

Source: Field Survey, 2014 of Nigerian Dailies.

APPENDIX 2: Record of Boko Haram Attacks from May 2011 to August 2011 in the North Eastern Nigeria.

| S/N | Source | Incidents |
|------------|--|--|
| 1. | May 30, 2011. Leadership, No. 2,149 | Borno State: Bombs exploded early morning on Baga road in Maiduguri, Borno State 13 dead and 40 injured. |
| 2. | June 7, 2011. Leadership, No. 409 | Borno State: Series of bomb blasts occurred in Maiduguri, Borno State, claiming five lives and leaving several others injured. |

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| 3. | June 16, 2011. Vanguard, Vol. 24. No. 106 | Borno State: Four children killed in a bomb blast at Damboa town, Maiduguri, Borno State. |
| 4. | July 9, 2011. Vanguard, Vol. 34. No. 621 | Borno State: A clash between Boko Haram and the military left about 31 people dead in Maiduguri, Borno State, also in Suleja, Niger State, a bomb targeted at a church killed four and injured any others. |
| 5. | July 12, 2011. Guardian, Vol. 32. No. 111 | Borno State: Boko Haram threw an explosive device on a moving military patrol vehicle, which claimed five lives. |
| 6. | July 15, 2011. Leadership, No. 1069 | Borno State: Explosion in Maiduguri injured five people. |
| 7. | July 23, 2011. Daily Trust, Vol. 17, No. 892 | Borno State: An explosion close to the palace of the Shehu of Borno, Abubakar Garbai Elkanem, injured three soldiers. |
| 8. | July 25, 2011. Vanguard, Vol. 42, No. 133 | Borno State: Bomb explosion near the palace of the traditional ruler in Maiduguri claimed eight lives. |
| 9. | August 25, 2011. Guardian, Vol. 27, No. 811 | Sect members killed four policemen, one soldier and seven civilians and carted away undisclosed sum of money in a bank robbery by the sect. |

Source: Field Survey, 2014 of Nigerian Dailies.

APPENDIX 2: Record of Boko Haram Attacks from September 2011 to December 2011 in the North Eastern Nigeria.

| S/N | Source | Incidents |
|-----|--|---|
| 1. | September 12, 2011. Leadership, No. 621 | Bauchi State: Seven people, including four policemen, killed during a bomb attack on a police station in Misau, Bauchi State. |
| 2. | September 13, 2011. Leadership, No. 012 | Borno State: Sect members shot and injured four soldiers in an attack in Maiduguri, shortly after the arrest of 15 |

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| | | sect members, during military raids on Boko Haram hideouts in Bauchi State. |
| 3. | September 17, 2011. Daily Trust, Vol. 12, NO. 43 | Borno State: Brother in-law of Mohammed Yusuf, the slain leader of Boko Haram, Babakura Fugu, shot dead in front of his house in Maiduguri by two members of the sect two days after he was visited by former President Olusegun Obasanjo. |
| 4. | October 3,2011. Vanguard, Vol. 36, No. 11 | Borno State: Boko haram attacked Baga Market in Maiduguri and killed three people. |
| 5. | November 4, 2011. Guardian, Vol. 64 | Yobe State: About 150 people killed by Boko Haram in Damaturu, Yobe State. |
| 6. | November,27, 2011. Guardian, Vol. 64 | Yobe State: Seven people killed in attacks in Eidam, Yobe State. |
| 7. | December 18, 2011. Daily Trust, Vol. 30, No. 91 | Borno State: Three members of Boko Haram were killed when their bomb detonated in Shuwari, Maiduguri, Borno State. |

Source: Field Survey, 2014 of Nigerian Dailies.

APPENDIX 2: Record of Boko Haram Attacks from December 2011 to February 2012 in the North Eastern Nigeria.

| S/N | Source | Incidents |
|------------|---|---|
| 1. | December 22, 2011. Leadership, No. 109 | Borno State: Explosion and gunshots killed four people and left several others injured. |
| 2. | December 30, 2011. Guardian, Vol. 11. No. 36 | Borno State: Seven people killed in Maiduguri, Borno State. |

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| 3. | January 6, 2012. Vanguard, Vol. 36. No. 31 | Adamawa State: 17 people died in a Christ Apostolic Church, Yola, Adamawa State while 20 Igbo people were also killed in Mubi in the same state. |
| 4. | January 22, 2012. Vanguard, Vol. 70, No. 27 | Bauchi State: Two churches destroyed in Bauchi State, two military personnel, a DPO and eight civilians also killed by gunmen at the headquarters of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area in the state. |
| 5. | January 28, 2012. Leadership, No. 213 | Gamboru Ngala, (Borno State) One killed. |
| 6. | January 29, 2012. Leadership, No. 213 | Gamboru Ngala (Borno State) Two killed. |
| 7. | January 30, 2012. Daily Trust, Vol. 42. No. 112 | Borno State: Six people killed in Maiduguri, environs including two Air Force Officers. |
| 8. | February 4, 2012. Vanguard, No. 6 | Borno State: Two people killed in Damboa. |
| 9. | February 5, 2012 Guardian, Vol. 30, No. 185 | Yobe State: SSS man killed. |

Source: Field Survey, 2014 of Nigerian Dailies.

APPENDIX 2: Record of Boko Haram Attacks from February 2012 to December 2013 in the North Eastern Nigeria.

| S/N | Source | Incidents |
|-----|---|--|
| 1. | February 10, 2012. Leadership, No. 897 | Borno State: 4 killed in Boko Haram, soldier shot-out in Maiduguri, Borno State. |
| 2. | February 12, 2012. Daily Trust, Vol 31, No. 754 | Borno State: Boko Haram members killed in Maiduguri. |

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| 3. | February 17, 2012. Guardian Vo. 30, No. 12989 | Yobe State: 2 people killed in Geidam, Yobe State. |
| 4. | February 17, 2012. Leadership, No. 1101 | Borno State: 5 people killed in Maiduguri metropolis, Borno State. |
| 5. | June 3, 2012. Guardian, Vol. 29, No. 12 | Bauchi State: 15 people going to church killed in Bauchi. |
| 6. | February 21, 2013. Vanguard, Vol. 25, No. 620 | Borno State: Killings of pupils and teachers in Borno State. |
| 7. | May 7, 2013. Vanguard, Vol. 25, No. 1069 | Borno State: Killings and hostage of women and children in Baga, Borno State. |
| 8. | June 7, 2013. Guardian, Vol. 16 | Yobe State: 42 students and teachers were killed by gunmen in Mamodu Government Secondary School, Mamodu, Yobe State. |
| 9. | December 2, 2013. Leadership | Borno State: Insurgents attacks Artillery Barracks in Borno State. |

Source: Field Survey, 2014 of Nigerian Dailies.

APPENDIX 2: Record of Boko Haram Attacks from March 2014 to April 2014 in the North Eastern Nigeria.

| S/N | Source | Incidents |
|------------|----------------------------|--|
| 1. | March 1, 2014. Daily Trust | Borno State: Football fans killed in Maiduguri blast. |
| 2. | March 1, 2014. Vanguard | Borno State: Over 100 feared dead by Boko Haram in Borno. |
| 3. | March 23, 2014. | Borno State: 90 killed in Borno attack and many missing in |

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| | Vanguard | Maiduguri. |
| 4. | March 25, 2014. Vanguard | Borno State: 74 people killed in mayhem in Borno. |
| 5. | March 4, 2014. Daily Trust | Insurgents raid another village, killed 39 in Maiduguri. |
| 6. | April 12, 2014. The Guardian | Confusion as JAMB redeploys 400 candidates in Maiduguri. |

Source: Field Survey, 2014 of Nigerian Dailies.