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NIGERIA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND ROLF IN THE DECOLONISATION PROCESS IN ANGOLA

BY

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE POST-GRADUATE SCHOOL, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE A WARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (MlSc.) IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

SEPTEMBER, 1992

DECLARATION

I, AKPAR Terver M., do hereby declare that the data contained in this study is the result of my original research.

All the works and speeches of other authors made use of in this study have been appropriately acknowledged and duly referenced.

To the best of my knowledge, this thesis has not been submitted to any other institution or organization other than the Ahmadu Bello University for examination.

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CERTIFICATION

This thesis entitled "Nigeria's Strategic interests and Role in the Decolonisation Process in Angola" by Akpar Terver M. meets the regulation governing the award of the degree of Master of Science (m.Sc) Political Science (International Relations) of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

Chairman, Supervisory Committee	Date
Member, Supervisory Committee	Date
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Dean Post-Graduate School	Date

DEDICATION

Dedication to my father and mother, Mr & Mrs Akpar Nor symbols of the dream that is the hopeful past whose faith and stoic patience nourished my desire and my wife, Mrs Mngupinen Terver, a symbol of the nameless but faithful present and my dear little ones, Zindzi, Mimidoo, Anase, symbols of the mist that is the future who sustained my inspiration to take this one more little step and my almighty God whose guidance and protection made it all possible.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am heavily indebted to many people for the successful completion of this work. Foremost among these is my supervisor, Dr O.G. Ajene, whose searing critical judgement I must confess, caused me many a headache but in truth threshed into fine grain, the formless idea that I started win. My heartfelt gratitude also goes out to my brother, Honourable Terseer Amise whose financial and moral support stood by me through the trying times,Nice Mfanyi Dzer whose enduring love I could never forget, my uncle, WO II Nick Nor for his ever-ready support, to Anumbe and Natyav Alaaga, fellow traveller whose esprit-de-corps nourished me, to Kunde for his selfless effort, to Mrs Vaatia, Mrs Adu, proprietresses of Tiny tots Makurdi and Vital Years Zaria Nursery and Primary Schools respectively whose care for my daughter helped immensely, to Miss Beatrice Ugwanyi and all the Library staff of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, to brother Xhaq Orbunde, Godwin Kyado, Felicia Iorshagher whose one year sacrifice made a great difference, my brothers Mbayevukar and Akpehe Ishor. Many thanks and praises to God for the care and accuracy of brother Pius Ailigh Tyoakaa who did a wonderful job of the typing part of this work. To him, I am indelibly indebted.

I am also happy to acknowledge the invaluable love, criticism and contributions of my classmates and friends, Saidu Mamman, Inye Briggs, Tim and Simon, Ajala, Adache. I also wish to acknowledge all the negative forces that gave my life such a meaningful measure of experience through all kinds of opposition. I own up to any errors that may be found in this work. To all mentioned and unmentioned, I than and praise God for their help in the completion this work. God bless you all.

ABSTRACT

This thesis entitled "Nigeria's Strategic Interests and Role in the Decolonisation Process in Angola" examines the security implications of the south African invasion of Angola to Nigeria. The study examined the extent to which Nigeria's strategic interests were at stake in Angola. The analysis of Nigeria's role in Angola revealed what the strategic interests were and how these were protected.

We established that basic strategic interests actually motivated Nigeria's involvement in Angola. These on a broad level involved Nigeria's socio-political, economic and military concerns that define her security interests in the South Atlantic region within which Angola is located. In Angola itself, these security interests were apparent in the threat posed by the South African military aggression. Also examined is Nigeria's capacity vis-a-vis South Africa, Zaire and Cuba that also played crucial roles in Angola: South Africa as the main antagonist of the MPLA and scalator of the war; Zaire as a haven for and supporter of FNLA a major liberation movement; and Cuba as the ally of the MPLA that provided the military capability to repulse South Africa's aggression. Furthermore, a critical assessment of Nigeria's strategy in Angola is also made through the examination of the insiruments of foreign policy employed. That is Diplomacy, economic measures and propaganda. Analysis of the use of these instruments by Nigeria in Angola revealed the situational nature of power depending as it does on such factors as historical circumstances, i he moral force that moulds the national psyche and the disposition of domestic public support. The clear conclusion we found here was i hat power, especially the military aspect of it, is not absolute.

We came to the conclusion that the south African invasion of Angola threatened Nigeria's security interests. The employnont of all the foreign policy instruments by Nigeria without military force discredits the hypothesis that achievoinont of security Lnterests is related to the efficacy of military power. This is

moreso when the study proves that South Africa, the militarily stronger side in angola lost the war.

Furthermore, the study affirms the inter-relatedness of all the instruments of foreign policy. It also proves that Nigeria's interests justified her role there and the strategy employed was effective in achieving her goals in Angola.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

C.I.A	-	Central Intelligence Agency
F.G.A	-	Fighter and Ground Attack
F.N.L.A.	-	Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (Portuguese for National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
G.N.P	-	Gross National Product
M.I.C.	-	Military Industrial Complex
M.P.L.A.	-	Movimento popular de Libertacao de Angola (Portugueses for Popular Movement for the Liberation of angola)
M.A.T.O	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
N.I.I.A.	-	Nigerian Institute for International Affairs
O.A.U.	-	Organisation of African Unity
O.P.E.C.	-	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Recce	-	Reconnaissance
U.N.I.T.A.	-	Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (Portuguese for National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
U.N.O.	-	United Nations Organisation
U.S.a.	-	United States of America (sometimes also US)
U.S.S.R.	-	The former Union of soviet Socialist Republics

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 GENERAL BACKGROUND

It is often stated that the study of the foreign policies of African states is underdeveloped.[1] A related argument holds that the systematic analysis of their strategic policies (that is their use of military power to support foreign policy in pursuit of their use of military power in conjunction with the economic, diplomatic and psychological instruments of power to support foreign policy in pursuit of their security interests) is almost non-existent.[2] While there exists an appreciable effort on different aspects of African security issues - decolonisation, arms races, conflict resolution, foreign intervention - it is difficult to find a similar effort on African Strategic Studies.[3] It is a reflection of this general state of negligence of strategic analysis that it is difficult to find the distinct examination of its influence on Nigeria's foreign policy.[4]

This study will attempt to assess the nature and scope of the impact of strategic principles on Nigeria's foreign policy. It will use the Angolan war of decolonisation to illustrate the various ways and the extent to which strategic principles influence Nigeria's foreign policy pursuit of its strategic (security) interests. This will be done by examining Nigeria's role in the war.

The conception of strategic interests in this study will encompass the examination of the impact of one of the most central concepts of strategy - Realism. Realism more than any other concept, so generally characterizes the contemporary meaning of strategy. Therefore, our examination of the nature of

Nigeria's strategic interests and role in the Angolan wars of decolonisation will be made within realist principles. This will be the focus of our work.

Core realist perception regards states in the international system as actors with a sense of purpose and direction and as being capable of rational action. Given these characteristics of the state, realist thought assumes that every state in every political situation has a calculated `national interest'. The `national interest' is often identified with security. This is because security is considered the primary goal of foreign policy.

According to realists, unless a state is secure it cannot hope to survive. Thus realist thought regards the acquisition of power as a central objective of the state.[5] This power is for security and is most often directly identified with military power. Therefore our examination of Nigeria's strategic interests and role in angola will be done within the context of the major concern of realist thought with security interests.

The Angolan decolonisation war is suitable for this study because it represented a threat to Nigeria's strategic (security) interests. The Angolan war was a threat to Nigeria because of South Africa's major and active involvement. The reality of the threat to Nigeria is understood in the light of the fact that south Africa is an enemy state. An enemy state because of its repressive racial policy of Apartheid in which whites discriminate against and exploit Black Africans.[6]

Nigeria's perception that an attack on another African state is a threat indicates a conception and definition of strategic (security) sphere of interest on the African continent. a sort of reasoning that indicates the nature of her strategic interests and role in the decolonisation

process in Angola. It also clearly shows the impact of strategic principles on her foreign policy. As already stated the basic realist problem of inter-state relations is security. Ever since the very beginning of organised political groups, a feeling of insecurity has always haunted man. Thus states have the constant fear that other states would develop the power to overwhelm them. Most of the warfare that has been witnessed in world history has been caused by this problem of security.[7] Nigeria's perception of the South African invasion of Angola as a threat is best appreciated in the light of this problem.

Realist principles are based on the belief that the international system is characterised by anarchy because of the lustful nature of man. A lust for power that is responsible for the violence that characterises much of inter-state relations. South Africa's invasion of Angola and Nigeria's role in the conflict is a reflection of the security problem. A brief examination of some of the historical developments witnessed in Nigeria's foreign policy experience indicate and explains her concern with security as seen in her role in Angola.

At the time of Nigerian independence from British colonial rule in 1960, the decolonisation process in Africa was already in full swing. This period also marked the intensification of super power rivalry between the United States of America (USA) and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in a cold war. Nigeria's foreign policy

at that time emphasized non-alignment which means maintenance of a balance of support for or balanced benefaction from either of the super-powers. However, Nigeria's non-alignment was more favourable to a position of neutrality that would not be prejudicial to her commitment to the liberal democracies of the West.

Nigeria's thinking then was that her close relationship with the West would ensure aid and investment from the Western Capitalist economies. This posture notwithstanding she took a firm stand against Apartheid. This obnoxious policy practised by the white Beers in South Africa was propped up with Western capital investment. Nigeria's stand hleped to ostracise South Africa from the international community by her expulsion from the Commonwealth and the United Nations. But Nigeria's stand on decolonisation was moderated by her close relationship with the West. This stand was characterised by a cautious and conservative pro-Western foreign policy that excluded radical views on decolonisation, although she continued to contribute to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) liberation fund.[8] However, the experiences of the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) were to have a dramatic effect on Nigeria's foreign policy orientation.

The civil war taught Nigeria some lessons about the motives of friendship in inter-state relations. She had hoped that her support for her Western friends would be

reciprocated but was disappointed when they turned their back on her request for arms and diplomatic support. The lesson appeared to be that interests are more permanent than friends. This marked a turning point in Nigeria's non-aligned policy. She began to cultivate more ties with the then Socialist East through trade and arms.[9]

The civil war also brought home to Nigeria the threat to her security posed by the continued existence of white minority (racist) and settler regimes on the African continent. Racist South Africa had aided with arms, mercenaries and advisers the secessionist attempt that would have dismembered Nigeria if it had succeeded. These regimes were the illegal government of Ian Smith in Rhodesia which had unilaterally declared independence from Britain, the racist Boers in South Africa and the Portuguese colonial regimes of Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Mozambique and Angola.

The decolonisation process soon turned against the Portuguese who at the same time also faced stiff opposition at home against her futile and expensive colonial wars in Africa. The Salazar regime that favoured continued colonial rule in Africa was overthrown. The fall of the Portuguese government also marked the period of independence for her African colonies. In Angola, the Portuguese did not hand over power to any party or group. There were three liberation movements that had been fighting the Portuguese: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).

Of all the three liberation movements the MPLA was more broadbased and nationalistic. It seized power in Lauanda with the support of the USSR and her allies. The FNLA and UNITA formed another government based at Huambo. The assumption of power by the pro-marxist MPLA enkindled the super-power rivalry of the cold war. South Africa with the collusion of Zaire, UNITA and the FNLA under US covert military shield invaded Angola in 1976. This interference in Angola's march towards independence sparked off a war that brought in the Cubans at MPLA's invitation. The balancing of the South African military threat with the socialist Cubans triggered a war that brought in the super-powers on either side.

Nigeria identified the South African invasion of Angola as a threat to her strategic interests. In view of the vital lessons learnt from her civil war experience, Nigeria supported the MPLA and her allies against her traditional Western friends.[10] The study would, through Nigeria's role in the Angolan war, reveal her strategic interests in Angola and on a broader level, help us to understand the nature and scope of the impact of strategic principles on Nigeria's foreign policy.

1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The achievement of the objectives of the study will be attempted through an examination of the following problems: What were Nigeria's strategic interests in

the decolonisation process in Angola? Here it is necessary to understand why Nigeria, a state that is thousands of kilometres away from Angola's borders can lay claim to strategic interests in that country ?

The problem of Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola (in view of her role in the crises there) is related to yet another one: how did nigeria achieve her strategic interests in that country ?

So to sum up the problem of the study, we have two important questions to answer. These are: What are those strategic interests at stake in Angola for Nigeria ? How did Nigeria achieve these strategic interests ? The answers to these questions will give better understanding of the nature and scope of Nigeria's strategic interests as well as the means employed for their achievement in the decolonisation process in Angola.

1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The interest in conducting a study on Nigeria's strategic interests in the decolonisation process in Angola lies in the following reasons:

Firstly, if the Nigerian civil war marked a major shift in Nigeria's foreign policy orientation, the Angolan crisis and Nigeria's role there was a dramatic watershed in her foreign policy formulation and performance.[11] This is because the invasion of Angola by South Africa presented

a major strategic threat to Nigeria's interests. To allow the racist Boers the freedom to redefine the geographical boundaries, political and socio-economic order of Africa to their dictates amounted to a very serious threat to Nigeria. Moreso (as already explained), the experiences of the civil war did not leave any doubts about South African designs on Nigeria. It is therefore important to undertake a study of so crucial a foreign policy situation as the Angolan crisis.

Secondly, it is important to examine Nigeria's role in the Angolan crisis in order to show her foreign policy performance in such high stakes situations. This way, it is hoped that crucial lessons would be learnt from the experience. The importance of the study for the same reason could also be understood in view of the fact that the fo rtunes of a resurgent African nationalism and African self-determination depended on Nigeria's role in the Angolan war. Angola in this regard then demands serious attention in order to draw vital lessons for further policy formulation and performance.[12]

It is also of interest to examine the Angolan situations in order to understand how Nigeria without the employment of the foreign policy instrument of force was still able to achieve her strategic interests. It is essential for us to understand how the other instruments of foreign policy can be employed with or without military power.

The study also has the benefit of giving us an indication of the impact of strategic principles on Nigeria's foreign policy. It would enable us to understand the nature and scope of this impact. As already explained, this means the impact of Realist principles on foreign policy. This is important because as Ajene succintly puts it the international politics within which Nigeria exists is characterised by the essential features of realist tenets. This is why Nigerian foreign policy which reflects more of idealist strains is occasionally shocked into the stark naked reality of irrelevance and futility. One such situation was the South african invasion of Angola. It is also one of the few times when Nigerian policy showed "temporary outbursts of realism". Therefore the Angolan situation affords us an opportunity to know the level of impact of strategic principles on Nigeria's foreign policy.

Finally, the Angolan situation affords us an opportunit to contribute to the almost non-existent body of knowledge of strategic analysis of the policies of African states. The study is therefore a modest effort in this regard. It would therefore accomplish the goal of acquiring knowledge for policy guide and reduce the negligence of strategic analysis of policy. This and all the other reasons given make it important to undertake this study.

1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW

Our review of literature in this study will be done within the context of the problems earlier posed; what were those strategic Nigerian interests at stake in Angola and how were these achieved ? The nature of Nigeria's strategic interests in the decolonisation process in Angola will revolve around the cardinal realist objective of security. Principally, the review will be concerned with Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola and how these were achieved given her capabilities.

It is important that we first touch the key realist principles that underlie Nigeria's perception of her role on the African continent. It is not just enough to undertake a description of Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola without starting from the background of Nigeria's vision of her role in Africa. Nigeria's perception of her role is primarily motivated by her status as the most populous black nation with vast economic potentials and a large army. These generally accepted (though quite illusive) indices predispose Nigeria's perception of her role in Africa as that of a continental power.[13]

The definition of Nigeria's strategic motives in Africa are starkly shown in the conclusions of the working paper of a policy Review Conference for Nigerian Ambassadors held in Lagos in 1966. The paper dwells unambigously on Nigeria's perception as a continental power and affirms that:

> Africa is Nigeria's natural sphere of influence. To shirk this manifest destiny is not to heed the logic of history.[14]

The paper also gives five basic principles of Nigeria's foreign policy among which is pragmatism, a key realist principle. Putting it even more succintly that paper notes that:

> Our interest in African affairs has naturally been far from attruistic. Indeed, our African posture and attitude has been shaped and guided by the traditional concept of protecting and promoting our national interests.[15]

However, the paper is quoted by Stremlau (1977) in his work which is specifically on the Nigerian civil war. It does not give us an adequate background of the influence of realist principles that helped to define Nigeria's strategic interests in the decolonisation process in Angola. Besides, more statement of principles of foreign policy does not constitute one.[16] Policy goals and means of their attainment must be clearly related to the actual process of implementation for a state to claim a foreign policy. How do these realist principles concretly relate to Nigeria's foreign policy actions particularly the decolonisation process in Angola ?

One distinctive work on the influence of realist principles and Nigeria's strategic interests and role in Angola is the short contribution of Ajene (Oculi ed. 1987).[17] He introduces Nigeria's African policy which,

quoting successive government enunciation of policy (Garba, 1976; Gambari, 1984) states that Africa is "the centre-piece" of Nigerian foreign policy. This Afro-centric focus means the right of Africans to shape and determine their continental affairs by themselves. These, taken with earlier mentioned principles of Nigeria's foreign policy in the ambassadors' working paper means a more active Nigerian involvement in African affairs in view of her perceived status as a continental power. This Afro-centric focus of foreign policy is also supported by Wayas (1979).[18]

Wayas goes even further to admonish Nigeria for her naivity in observing the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other African states. Non-intervention he says, is not a safeguard of sovereignty but an invitation to outside power meddling in Africa (p. 38). This would mean a usurpation of Nigeria's perceived role as a continental power.

But how is this Afro-centric policy related to Nigeria's performance particularly her role in the Angolan decolonisation process ? Identifying that in view of the fact that the environment of international politics in which Nigeria exists is characterised by the "essential features of realist tenets", Ajene reasons that Nigeria's African policy lacks understanding of man, the international society, rationally motivated self-interest and the best strategy for the pursuit of national interest. This is because Nigerian foreign policy, he points out, is stuck

in a "utopian-Idealist frame". The irrelevance of this policy action is why Nigerian foreign policy if often jolted into awareness of reality. This he says is what happened in the decolonisation process in Angola.[19]

The Angolan crisis is seen by Ajene as one of Nigeria's epileptic outbursts of realism. The shocking revelation that South Africa (Nigeria's impeccable enemy) had invaded Angola in collaboration with Zaire and Zambia reverted an earlier Nigerian stand in support for a government of national unity embracing all the liberation movements. The Angolan crisis as Ajene explains created a realist fervour that re-oriented the perception of the Nigerian government on the hard facts of realist policy making. It brought home to Nigeria the intricacies of linkage between the local and external forces involved in the conflict. Sadly, however, Ajene points out, these occasions of realist orientation of Nigeria's foreign policy constitute the exception rather than the rule.

Ajene's contribution though very incisive on the influence of realist principles on Nigerian policy is too brief and is not an indepth study of Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola. The remedial measures that Ajene profers at the end of the contribution though quite relevant and helpful are too general for our study here. it is, however, quite illuminating given that it is not specifically a focus on Nigeria's role in Angola. It provides a firm foundation in which to ascertain the strategic lessons that can be learnt from the Angolan situation.

If Ajene's contribution gives us a brief glimpse of the strategic motives of Nigeria's role in Angola, the works of Ogunsanwo, Wayas and Wilmot make plain, what strategic Nigerian interests were at stake in Angola. In his work, Ogunsanwo credits internal and external factors as being the compelling forces in Nigeria's policy on Angola.[20] The former he says is political leadership and the latter, the external threat posed by an enemy, South Africa (p.57).

In the first reason, the background and feeling of the Nigerian leadership (the Murtala/Obasanjo regime) on apartheid ensured that an irrevocably belligerent stand on South Africa's invasion of Angola would be taken. In the second reason, and which shows the strategic interests at stake in Angola, the discovery that South Africa had violated the territorial integrity of a fellow African state necessitated a most vigorous Nigerian opposition. Only this would safeguard Nigeria's security interests.

It is made very clear in Ogunsanwo's book (1986) that the shifting northward of the defense perimeter of racist South Africa represented a most grave threat to Nigeria (p.57). This is why containment, a policy of the strategic concept of Deterence had to be adopted.[21]

Although Ogunsanwo emphasizes the shared insult and indignity of the Boer invasion of an independent African state, the real issue at stake was Nigeria's security. The racial insult only reinforced this strategic interest of national security. As Ogunsanwo points out, the South

African racists were demonstrating their laager mentality determined as they were in halting the advance of African nationalism southwards.[22] They desired a situation in which they would be surrounded by weak and pliable regimes that they could manipulate for their own ends (p. 57).[23] Clearly here too, the issue at stake was the strategic interest of national security. Although this conclusion is not so overtly stated by Ogunsanwo but his analysis of the South African threat means exactly so.

Taking the role played by the United States of America (USA) in the crisis, Ogunsanwo sees Nigeria's role in Angola beyond a mere safeguard of narrow Nigerian interests. The USA had not only supported the South African invasion but had also sought to rally round African diplomatic support for it. A cynical ploy that could be likened to stabbing a person in the heart and asking him to remove and return the knife to the assailant. As Ogunsanwo puts it, if Nigeria with all her population and resources could be so roundly disregarded by the USA on an essentially African matter, what hope was there for much smaller and weaker African states? (p. 58). The issue then involved not just Nigerian interests but also the very (independent) status of African states particularly those contigous to South Africa.

Therefore we can understand Nigeria's strategic interests in Angolan as seen by Ogunsanwo in his book at two levels: at the level of Nigeria's own interests and at the level of a general anti-imperialist, anti-

apartheid stand. The first level consists essentially of Nigerian interests and the second relates to the threat posed by the anti-MPLA alliance forged under the aegis of the USA.[24]

As shown by Ogunsanwo (1986), the real turn for the worse and in internationalising the Angolan decolonisation process started with the fall of the Portuguese regime in April 1974. This change of government in Portugal marked the collapse of the South Atlantic alliance of Portugal, South Africa, Rhodesia, Chile, Argentina and Paraguay that had been nourished by American support (p. 61).

The Lisbon-Pretoria-Salisbury alliance was self-serving for the parties involved. For the racist Boers it meant an invaluable international leverage that would help stem the tide of surging African nationalism. For the Portuguese it was an invaluable strategy to keep their restive empire in control and for the USA, to keep out the Soviet Union from the strategic South Atlantic. Only African interests were not protected by this alliance. This explains why these states saw the Angolan (MPLA-led) decolonisation process as a threat to their interests. This perception also on the other hand represented a threat to African and Nigerian interests. The issues at stake as examined by Ogunsanwo touched at the core of Nigeria's security interests.

However, Ogunsanwo's work is overshadowed by a largely discriptive analysis of foreign policy issues, particularly the Angolan war. It is helpful in establishing Nigeria's

strategic interests in Angola but does not indicate how these were promoted. It is therefore for the specific purpose of this study, too general analysis of Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola.

Another book that captures the issue of Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola is the work of Joseph Wayas (1979).[25] It is a book that sets out an aggressive Nigerian agenda for the acquisition of power in Africa. This agenda is consistent with the realist principle that states acquire power and expand not to justice but to opportunities.[26]

Wayas however (as all realists) tries to refute his leadership role agenda for Nigeria as an unproductive and a crass game of becoming a superpower on the model of the USA and USSR. In the second chapter (p. 20-28), he refutes the notion that Nigeria is an African power; rejects the engagement in a power acquisition game that would mean sacrificing the needs of her people; and the illusion that Nigeria is rich. He rather suggests an "honest" recipe for her assuming leadership in Africa (Chapter 2). Yet the same vision that has had the "illusion" cleared is able to see the way to Nigeria's leadership in Africa given her material and human resources:

> Now it should be clear to Nigeria that the leadership mantle, although it may be graciously imposed on her from the outside, it has no sweet or smooth paths.[27]

The point being made here is that the notion of a so-called leadership role for Nigeria by Wayas is only

a legitimising cloak for a power acquisition agenda for Nigeria. We can see Nigeria's strategic interests in Africa better when we understand Wayas' leadership notion in this light. As realists put it, countries are at their mischievous best in the power game when moralising about their intentions.[28] We therefore understand Wayas properly when his leadership role is seen in this context. Particularly his analysis of Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola.

The strategic interests that motivated Nigeria's role in Angola as shown by Wayas (1979: 63) is to be seen from economic, political and military dimensions. Wayas' work is actually an inversion of Ogunsanwo's. While the former looks at Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola from the point of view of anti-MPLA Western alliance, the latter does so from the pro-MPLA African view point.

Wayas explains the dramatic change in a decolonised Angola. A change that adversely affectd South Africa and her western supporters, the USA, France, Britain and Germany. The fall of the Portuguese empire in 1974 and the assumption of power by radical pro-Marxist and anti-Western regimes in Mozambique and Angola radically redefined the strategic balance of forces in the region in favour of African nationalism. This was a rude shock for Western capitalist supporters of Portuguese colonialism and apartheid South Africa. Suddenly the racist Boers found themselves helmed in on both ocean-flanks (the Atlantic in the west and the Indian Ocean in the east), by the surging tide of African nationalism

that they had held at bay with the aid of western capital and diplomatic support (p. 63).

Consistent western support for the Portuguese and South Africa is explained by certain economic realities that touch the strategic interests of the countries involved. Strategically, the sealanes around the Cape sea route are of great importance to the western world. About 240 million tons of oil (90% of which is destined for Europe) and the highest concentration of strategic minerals are the west's raw material paradise. The words of Lord Chalfront adequately sums up the situation which is that:

> if the mineral resources of Southern Africa or the oil routes around the Cape can be effectively denied to the west, the global balance of military and economic power will have undergone a fundamental and dangerous shift.[29]

The implication of this situation as Wayas sees it is western insensitivity to black African interests as shown by the narrow-minded perception of the infamous Kissinger National Security Council Memo Option Two. This recommended a more flexible US attitude towards the white minority regimes in Southern Africa in the belief that "the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them".[30] (p. 59). The important point to note in Wayas' book is the background to the strategic significance of the decolonisation process in Angola that he gives.

For Africa and Nigeria, South African success in Angola would have done almost irredeemable damage to the cause of nationalism and compromised Nigeria's security.

It would have meant the triumph of western interests and apartheid. This book by Wayas adequately shows the strategic interests at stake in Angola. He urges Nigeria to assume leadership of a weak OAU. In the third chapter (p. 28-47), Wayas seeks to analyse the structural weaknesses of the OAU and his vision of Nigeria's role in that situation. This chapter provides an ideal build-up for the next one.

In the fourth chapter, Wayas establishes Nigeria's interests in the Southern African region with an analytical illustration of the Angolan war. He advocates for a concerted effort to deal with external linkages that strengthen the racist Boers and weaken Africa. He thinks the way to this is to target vulnerable European areas and to chart a new course in the liberation struggle. He cites France as one example of such a possible target (p. 77).

The book, useful as it is, suffers from being too general. This is perhaps because his quite informative analysis of the strategic interests in Angola is made with the objective of his leadership agenda for Nigeria. Consequently, it does not explain how these interests in Angola were achieved. These are the inadequacies that the study would attempt to remedy.

One book that also shows Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola is that by Wilmot (1980).[31] He clearly shows the South African threat. South Africa had supplied weapons, food, technical advisers and mercenaries to the secession that almost dismembered Nigeria. If the above facts left any sceptic second guessing what threat South Africa constituted

in her invasion of Angola, she took her mission seriously looking at the arsenal in tow. She deployed a full division of troops equipped with heavy armour, long-range artillery and helicopter gunships. South Africa had not only fought side by side with the Portuguese to prevent independence of Mozambique and Angola but her pilots had flown several combat missions against Egypt, another OAU member. The same South Africa helped Ian Smith in Rhodesia to defy the world with an expeditionary force of 5,000 and had illegally occupied Namibia with over forty thousand troops (p.2).

When one examines South Africa's justification for her military aggression on the African continent, one is left with no illusions about the cruel logic of her designs on independent African states (Nigeria included). Wilmot reveals that Eschel Rhodie, Secretary of State in the South African Ministry of Information listed as South Africa's economic and political objectives, the aim to

> harness all natural and human resources from Table Mountain to the border of the Congo River.[32]

This view Wilmot points out, is consistent with the ambition of Jan Smuts, one time South African Prime Minister. He wanted a superstate consisting of Zambia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Switzerland. Meaning of course that South Africa has identified her 'spheres of interest and influence'.[33]

The devious logic of the South African Boers was amply demonstrated when in 1976 her invasion of Angola was revealed. Her parliament passed a law that permitted her "Defence forces"

to intervene in any African country South of the equator. Wilmot explains that this means allowing South Africa military latitude in twenty-two member states of the OAU. South Africa would have then realised its goal of a regional police state if it was allowed to get away with its invasion of Angola. Even more threatening was the fact that South Africa had the military capability to implement its goals. In collaboration with the western powers, it had an awesome arsenal and was believed to have acquired even nuclear weapons (p.3).

Wilmot (1980) so luridly shows the compelling strategic considerations and interests at stake in Angola. Specifically the whole political, economic and cultural interests of Africa were in danger in allowing South Africa the booty of Angola. It was simply and directly a question of today Angola, tomorrow Nigeria ! Therefore the defeat of the racists and protection of Angola from the goal of making it an apartheid South African satellite were then important strategic Nigerian objectives.[34]

This quite informative book by Wilmot is however focused on the nature of the apartheid system and not per se on the strategic implications of policy in Angola. It is in the light of this that this study would try to move further, the research on the strategic importance of Angola.

The strategic implications of Angola is also analysed in detail in an essay by Ogwu, U.J. (ed. 1989)[35]. This essay examines Nigeria's security interests in the South

Atlantic region from the domestic and external dimensions. It defines the South Atlantic region as that part of the Atlantic Ocean South of the Tropic of Cancer encompassing the entire western ridge of the south Atlantic Ocean and the eastern seaboard of the southern cone of America. On the southern cone sector, it is bounded by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. On the eastern front, the south Atlantic is bounded by Nigeria, Cameroun, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Gabon, Namibia and Apartheid South Africa.

In geopolitical terms, the essay defines the South Atlantic region as encompassing the immediate territorial waters of Nigeria and Cameroun extending to the Bight of Bonny, the Bakasi peninsula and the Rio-del-Rey. it also incorporates Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Sao Tome and Principé. It is significant to note that all of Nigeria's territorial waters are located in this south Atnaltic basin. The essay concludes that these unique geopolitical characteristics confer on Nigeria a key strategic position as a south Atlantic maritime state. Also consonant with this geographic position is the enormous responsibility thrust on Nigeria for defending not only its own territorial waters, but also ensuring that its off-shore oil and natural resources are not rendered vulnerable by hostile forces.

Ogwu's essay identifies vital forces at play in the area demarcated as the south Atlantic. In fact this area constitutes Nigeria's most strategic environment and security interests. First, it is an area that impinges on several

vital aspects of her national security interests because it is open to hostile intrusion by sea, particularly on the open high seas beyond her territorial waters.

Secondly, from an economic viewpoint, most of Nigeria's oil resources which accounts for a substantial percentage of her external earnings is exploited off-shore. Thirdly, Ogwu sees the south Atlantic as a vital waterway to Nigerian trade with North and South America, as the main shipping route transit into the Atlantic corridor. Fourthly, it is Nigeria's key to the enormous resources of the Ocean. It is in the light of these factors and given Nigeria's geographical position, Ogwu sees it as hardly surprising that Nigeria had long viewed the south Atlantic and the west coast of Africa as an area vital to the country's national security.[36]

From Ogwu's definition of Nigeria's geopolitical position in the south Atlantic region, South Africa in its opposition to genuine independence of African states, constitutes the most obvious threat to Nigeria's vital interests. Her invasion of Angola seen in the context of the strategic importance of the region really brings out Nigeria's strategic interests in the decolonisation process in Angola. It is also due to the importance of the area that the western world viewed with alarm, the MPLA assumption of power in Angola. This view-point also accounts for the consequent internationalisation of the Angolan decolonisation process by the USA and the idea of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation consisting of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and South Africa.[37]

Having established Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola as seen in our review of literature on the subject, we are left with the problem of understanding how Nigeria achieved her interests in the Angolan war. This problem is to be seen in the context of the instruments of foreign policy that Nigeria employed there. Here the contributing essay by Ajene earlier mentioned proves helpful once again. The intensive diplomatic and propaganda role played by Nigeria in support of the MPLA is seen by Ajene as the multilateral legitimisation of Nigeria's African policy. But the failure of the OAU to resolve the conflict diplomatically casts doubt on the efficacy of this instrument of foreign policy.

Wilmot (1980) assents to this view when he points out that those twenty-two African states that voted against the recognition of the MPLA and therefore against repelling the racists were in truth inviting their own doom seen in the light of the nature of the white supremacists in South Africa.[38] So if diplomacy failed to resolve the conflict and only force provided by the Cuban deployment of combat troops and Soviet arms aid prevailed, how then did Nigeria achieve her interests in Angola given that she did not play a combatant role there ?

Nigeria's role in Angola necessitates a careful look at the instruments of foreign policy she employed in the war. It is Sotumbi's view that Nigeria's military weakness compared to South Africa made the diplomatic option more acceptable (p.7).[39] He shows how the decision to recognise

the MPLA was executed. He explains that on December 8, 1975, Nigeria announced a grant of $20 million to the Angolan regime. She also made an additional gift of material assistance worth one hundred million dollars ($100m).[40] Beyond a mixture of economic, diplomatic and propaganda instruments, Sotumbi does not show how Nigeria achieved her interests in Angola in the face of the quite formidable South Africa (U.S. sponsored) military deployment in Angola.[41]

The objectives of establishing Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola and their mode of achievement in view of her role there then assumes more importance. The literature reviewed so far shows that we can identify those Nigerian strategic interests in Angola but it is difficult to show how these were achieved. This is the area that the study will focus on. For only in so doing could the study accomplish the goal of showing the strategic significance of the decolonisation process in Angola.

1.4 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

POWER

Power is the main idea on which the strategic concept of Realism is built. Hans Morgenthau is credited with the earliest systematic and precise definition of power (1948). This he explains as man's control over the minds and actions of other men. This means for instance, the establishment of a relationship of influence by A over B.

The controversy about power has been partly due to making it synonymous with physical violence. True, power includes physical violence but is not just that alone. The most subtle psychological influence is also power. The idea that power is all about violence also creates the impression when discussing state power that it refers to military power alone.

In this study, power is used in a relationship between one state and another or between states in the international system. It means the influence of one state over another. It includes military power but only in conjunction with other aspects of power like economic, propaganda and diplomacy. Each aspect of power is used in the context of all the aspects mentioned.

NATIONAL SECURITY

National Security has proved to be a very elastic concept. Sometimes it is thought of as representing the narrow class interest of a ruling class in power. It is inextricably linked with the definition of national interest. National interest is also thought to be the reserve of a ruling class. Realists however see National interest as the acquisition of power. Power for the protection and promotion of National security. National security then in this context is the promotion of the national interest which is the acquisition of power.

National security as used in the study means the protection against all threats to the promotion of Nigeria's national security interests. These are the

preservation of her sovereign existence and protection against threats to the geo-political, economic and strategic resources that are of vital importance to Nigeria in the south Atlantic region in which Angola is situated.

STRATEGY

Strategy is a word derived from Greek and initially meant the "art of the general" or "generalship". It originally meant the art of manoevering for an advantage on the field of battle. It has outgrown this narrow military mearing. In its contemporary meaning it has become the ways in which military power can be used to implement political goals. A satisfactory definition of strategy must now also take into consideration the peace-time application of strategic thinking. It must locate the use of military force in the general context of foreign policy making.

Strategy used in the study means the overall plan for the use of military power in conjunction with economic, diplomatic and psychological instruments of power to support foreign policy effectively either by overt or covert means.

1.5 HYPOTHESES

The study will be accomplished through the testing of the following hypotheses:-

1. Increased strategic interests enhanced Nigeria's role in the decolonisation process in Angola.

2. Increased security interests raised the stakes of Nigeria's objectives in Angola.
3. The achievement of strategic security interests is related to the efficacy of the foreign policy instrument of military power.

1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study will use power as a theoretical framework. The meaning of key concepts and methodology of power theory are dodged with controversy but a general sketch of its basic proposition can be made. Hans Morgenthau is generally credited with laying the foundation of its major premises in the twentieth century.[42] Some of the principles of power theory hold that states are actors in the international system with a sense of purpose and direction and are capable of rational action. Given these state characteristics power theory assumes that every state in every political situation has a discernable "national interest". This national interest is often identified with security because it is considered the primary goal of foreign policy. To power advocates unless a state is secure, it cannot hope to survive.

The basis of power principles lie in certain assumptions that power theorists hold about the very nature of man.[43] They hold that man is dangerous and untrustworthy. He is controlled by passions such as love, fear and a lust for power. Thus in order to

survive, man must have protection for himself against other men who are naturally evil. The more strength a man has the less risk he runs of being attacked. The world in which man lives is one of a disharmony of interests.

In view of the foregoing assumptions, there exists for the state but one cardinal goal - to maximize power. This is because the international system has no central authority to enforce rule and order. This leaves states in a survival of the fittest situation. Power in this context becomes not only a means to an end but almost and end in itself. Only with power will a state be well placed to pursue other goals such as prosperity and peace.

Power theorists think a successful foreign policy is that which increases a state's power resources. This state behaviour is compelled by the nature of the international system regardless of culture and ideology. States must have minimum trust in the pledges of other states and must remain ever alert for threats or even potential threats. They must always be prepared for the worst possible situations such as war. The capabilities of other states must be guarded against rather than their intentions. Aggression is always latent, even proportioned to the degree to which a state can misbehave with impunity. States expand not according to legality and justice but opportunities and military power is the only source of power.

The historical roots of power theory can be traced as far back as the works of Thomas Hobbes, the English philosopher of the 14th century and Nicolo Machiavelli, an Italian of the 17th century. Power theory has two broad methods of analysis: the classical approach which is characterised by a historical method and the post behaviouralist (scientic) approach in which scientific method such as quantitative data collection and analysis form the central part.[44]

The distinction then in the two approaches lies in the methodology employed. The classical approach used ahistorical method that sees history as having an important tool in the understanding of international politics. In this approach, power theory looks at itself as a model inductively arrived at by the study of international relations of the past and the present. In the classical approach, history serves to test the accuracy of hypotheses presented. A proposition is followed by a historical case. This is explained by Rosecrance for instance when he says that history is a laboratory in which our generalization about international politics can be tested.

The scientific approach came into being with the behavioural revolution in the social sciences in the post-second world war period. The behavioural revolution in the social sciences marked the re-orientation of disciplines from normative value to empirical fact

objectives. It witnessed the application of scientific techniques in the analyses of social phenomena. In power theory, the quantitative techniques of data analysis has seen the attempt to subject power to an empirical explanation. This attempt to explain power through the use of data techniques has been steeped in controversy. This notwithstanding has not obscured the relevance of power theory as an important tool of understanding interational politics.

1.7 METHODOLOGY

The study will adopt power as a tool of analysis. The meaning of power is as earlier explained in the definition of concepts. The choice of power as a methodological tool is influenced by the main theme underlining the motives and roles of all the parties involved in the Angolan decolonisation process. The theme of power for the protection of security interests. This accounts for the actions and roles of all states and liberation movements involved in Angola. The South Africans moved into Angola to protect their security interests largely dictated by their security conscious laager mentality. The USA and the Soviet/Cuban alliance saw the Angolan situation in the cold war doctrine of Deterrence which is based on the objective of containing the growing power of a perceived threat. The white Rhodesians were literary fighting for their own survival. Zaire and Zambia wanted room to manoeuvre

to influence events in a country on which they were so economically dependent for exports. Nigeria was simply alarmed at the added reach the South Africans would acquire if they conquered Angola.

The choice of power as a tool of analysis is also the more suitable because the motives and actions of all the actors in Angola for whatever purposes conform to the basic characteristic of power seekers. That the element of power in international politics is frequently camouflaged by ethical, legal concepts. The real nature of the policies of all the actors in Angola is concealed by ideological justification. Even apartheid, for instance is primarily a struggle for power under the guise of race.

Various sources of data will be used for the study. These materials from books, journals, magazines, periodicals, newspapers, theses and official documents. The fact that the Angolan war took place more than a decade ago will avail the study of more objective and informative sources. This, it is hoped, would ensure an objective study that would contribute to the lean research on strategic analysis of Nigeria's foreign policy.

N O T E S

[1]Mark Delancy, 'Current Studies in African International Relations', AFRICAN JOURNAL, 7(3), 1976; pp. 197-239. Austin, D. goes to the extreme of regarding African foreign policy making as a "doubtful exercise" in Roger Morgan (ed), 1972, pp. 167.

[2]Claude Welch, 'Emerging patterns of Civil-Military relations in Africa: radical coups d'etat and political stability', in Bruce Arlinghaus (ed), African security issues: Sovereignty, stability and solidarity (Bowder: West-view, 1984); pp. 128.
The absolute negligence of strategic studies of policy makes it appear as though the African Scene is still an "isolated frontier for field research bearing little or no relevance to issues of global dimensions" - Ibid., pp. 3.

The consequence, as William Wallace puts it, military-strategic policy phenomena have been the unwanted step-children of foreign policy and military sociology, assumed by disciplines and properly studies by neither. William Wallace, Foreign policy and the political process (London' MacMillan, 1971); pp. 13.

[3]See inter alia, Arlinghaus (ed), op. cit., G. Nweke, African security in the Nuclear Age (Enugu: Fourth Dimension), 1986; Edward Kolodziej and Robert Har Kavy, Security policies of Developing Countries (Lexington; Heath), 1982; Kenneth Adelman: African Realities (New York: Crane, Russak), 1980; Arthur Gavshon: Crisis in Africa, (Harmondsworth: Pengiun), 1981; Celin Legum et al: Africa in the 1980s: A Continent in Crisis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979) and Wasserman, G. Politics of Decolonization: Kenya European and the land issue (Cambridge University Press), 1976.

[4]One is yet to find works on African strategic studies with the conceptual, methodological refinement easiliy noticed in the works of Thomas Schelling, Klaus Knorr, V.P. Sokolovskiy, Bernard Brodie, Kenneth Booth, George F. Kennan among others. See Celestine Bassey, 'Underdevelopment of strategic studies as a sub-field of Africa's international Relations: A Critical appraisal' in NIGERIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1989; pp. 1-24.

[5]See TRevor Taylor, Approaches and Theory in International Relations,(London), Longman, 1978; Chapt. 6, pp. 122.

[6]Apartheid - A racist and segregationist policy of the whites in South Africa implemented between 1924 and 1956 during the tenures of James Hertzog, Daniel Malan and Johannes Strijdom. The removal of the other races from the common electoral register was meant to reinforce baaskap - white supremacy. A central feature of apartheid came with the creation of Bantustans by Verwoerd which set aside for Africans, so-called self-governing regions.

Apartheid is however better understood as a vicious system of economic exploitation of black Africans by whites. The racial segregationist pass laws (similar to the Nazi laws in Germany that Jews wear armbands showing the star of David) in which black carry identity cards, Group Areas Act in which the races live apart, the inferior Bantu education for Blacks are only conducive measures for economic exploitation. P.F. Wilmot, Apartheid and African liberation, Ile-Ife, University of Ife Press Ltd., 1980, J. Watson, Success in 20th Century World Affairs, (London) John Murray Ltd., 1974; pp. 324.

[17]Ajene, O.G. 'Nigeria's African Policy since Independence: an analysis of the Character and conduct of foreign policy' in Oculi, O(ed). Nigerian Alternatives (Zaria), Department of Political Science, A.B.U., 1987; pp. 309.

[18]Wayas, J. Nigheria's Leadership role in Africa (London and Besingstoke), MacMillan Press Ltd., 1979.

[19]It is noteworthy that without an effective intelligence setup, Nigeria continued to maintain the absurd OAU stand for a government of National Unity embracing all three liberation movements. Military missions to Angola were to reveal that the South Africans were 100 miles to Luanda, a penetration of over 500 miles ! Sotumbi, A.O. 'Nigeria's Recognition of the MPLA Government of Angola: A case-study in Decision-making and implementation' (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Monograph Series, No. 9, 1989, pp. 21.

[20]Ogunsaawo, A. Our Friends, their friends (Yaba-Lagos), 242 Communications Ltd., 1986.

[21]A strategic doctrine adopted by the USA after the second world war. It had the objective of 'containing' the spread of Communism. In the same manner, Nigeria had to 'contain' the South Africans in Angola. See Watson, J. (1974), op. cit. pp. 265.

[22]A defensive encampment, especially inside a circle of carts or wagons used by the South African Boers to ward off the onslaught of the Zulu impis (platoon-strength Zulu Army Division) used to connote hostile, introvertive defensive mentality, Ibid. p. 325.

[23]For similar views, see Davies, R.O. 'Total strategy in Southern Africa: An analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978' in JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES II(2), April, 1985; pp. 183-211. South Africa, he says, has a sophisticated mix of both "incentives" and "Coercion", the aim being the creation of a constellation of Southern African States.

[24]The USA had actually wanted to militarily intervene in Angola but the Congress dissented. The CIA then 'fingered' the South Africans to do the job and continued to run covert operations in aid of the invasion. John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies (New York), W.W. Norton, 1978.

[25]Wayas, J. Nigeria's Leadership role in Africa (op. cit).

[26]Butterfield in Trevor Taylor (op. cit), pp. 122.

[27]Wayas, op. cit., p. 47.

[28]Taylor, T. (ed), op. cit.

[29]Wayas, op. cit. p. 52-53.

[30]Henry Kissinger, American Secretary of State had little regard for African interests. He is said to have asked "What's Chad ?" when Chad was mentioned in a discussion. He is also said to have 'exiled' a key US foreign Affairs Officer to Nigeria as ambassador ! Ogunsanwo, op. cit., pp. 57.

[31]Op. cit.

[32]Dreams really die hard. This vision of a Constellation of States pliable to the whims of the Boers actually started with the dream of Cecil Rhodes, the architect of imperialism in Southern African who wanted to build a railroad from Cape to Cairo. Wilmot, Op. cit., p. 2.

[33]This is the Domino theory of strategic doctrine. It gained popularity with American involvement in Vietnam. In the perception of her Containment Policy, America had the belief that if Vietnam became Communist, other States in South-East Asia will follow, falling like a row of soldierly dominoes - Watson, J. Op. cit., pp. 274.

[34]Wilmot, Op. cit.

[35]Ogwu, U.J. 'The South Atlantic in Nigeria's National Security Agenda' in Peters, S.B. and Aminu, L.S. (ed). NIGERIAN FORUM (A National Security Agenda for Nigeria to the year 2000) Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, May/June 1989, pp. 170.

[36]Wayas (Op. cit), pp. 67, discusses the same threat to Nigeria by the intended South Atlantic treaty Organisation (SATO) which supported by the USA, includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile and South Africa - the west's praetorian guard in the region.

[37]The speech of the Angolan foreign Minister at the United Nations General Assembly in New York to mark Angola's admission into the world body is instructive here: "the South Atlantic Alliance is in effect, an offensive military pact against Southern Africa and it constitutes a menace for world peace - AFRICA No. 71, July 1977.

[38]At the Extra-ordinary OAU Summit on the Angolan conflict in 1976, a stalemate ensued on the recognition of the Angolan HPLA government with twenty-two votes a-piece. This was largely due to the intense lobby of the USA Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Records, (London), Rex Collins, Vol. 8, 1976; pp. B799.

[39]Sotumbi, O.A. Op. cit.

[40]The Angolans are said to have actually asked Nigeria for military aid but she provided only weapons and other supplies. Lack of public opinion support for foreign wars and a suspect military capability may have been some of the reasons for non-deployment of Nigerian troops in the war. Sotumbi, Ibid.

[41]The South Africans are said to have deployed a full division with their latest armoury on display which included their home-produced G55 long-range artillery pieces. Wilmot, Op. cit. pp. 3.

[14]Stremlau, J.J. The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-70 (Princeton University Press, Princeton - New Jersey, 1977, p. 12.

[15]Ibid.

[42]Morgenthau, H. Politics Among Nations - the Struggle for Power and peace (New York), Alfred A. Knoff, 1963.

[43]Trevor Taylor (ed). Approaches and Theory in International Relations (London), Longmans, 1978; p. 122

[44]See Toma, P.A. (ed), Basic issues in International Relations, Allyn and Bacon inc. (Boston) 1974; p. 9.

CHAPTER TWO

THE BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANGOLAN DECOLONISATION PROCESS AND NIGERIA'S ROLE

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the historical background of Angola with a view to providing a clear understanding of the decolonisation process there and Nigeria's role. With this objective in view, the chapter will examine the imposition of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola; its economic, political and social philosophy; the development of Nationalism and the decolonisation process leading to the invasion of Angola by South Africa; the politics of race settler white rule and external linkages of the conflict and Nigeria's role in the war.

2.1 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND - COLONIALISM

Angola is a country in Southern Africa bordered in the west by the Atlantic Ocean, in the south by the Republic of Namibia, in the east by the Republic of Zambia and in the North by the Republics of Zaire and Congo. Angola's 1,246,700 square kilometre area (excluding the enclave of Cabinda - 7,270 sq. km) is made up of seventeen provinces.[1] The estimated population of 6.3 million (mid-1977) is made up of six major ethnolinguistic groups: Ovimbundu (37% of the total population), Mbundu (23%), Kongo (14%), Lunda-Chokwe (8-9%), Nganguela (7%) and Mesticos/Mulattoes (2-3%).

Historically, European intrusion into the affairs of the indigent nationalities that inhabit present day Angola actually predated the discovery of America. Beginning with exploration into the hinterland in 1483, Portugal had the semblance of a colonial government in 1592 based at Luanda, a coastal fortress city they had built.[2] As elsewhere in the pattern of European penetration into Africa, penetration and subjugation of the indigenous Angolan was gradually affected from settlements established at the coast. That is from Luanda and Benguela.

Angola did not feature prominently in the designs of the Portuguese concentrating as they did on the despoilation, pillage and plundering of the Golden East - the cities of the East African seaboard and beyond - India, Malaysia.[3] However with the rise of Portuguese slave economy in Brazil from 1550, Angola then became a reservoir of slaves until late into the 19th century. The end of the slave trade brought in its wake European commercial penetration into the African hinterland followed by plitical control of African nationalities.[4] As elsewhere in Africa, a period of resistance to subjugation followed. This featured the nationalist resistance of the Bailundu which involved the thirteen independent kingdoms of Ovimbundu in central Angola, the Cuanhama, the Dembos, the Kongo and the Mdongo. However after the Berlin Conference of 1885 which established in principle, the

limits of Portuguese claim to Angola, the colony was secured by 1915.[5]

The colony under Portuguese rule was governed by a policy which was the expression of a given colonial philosophy. As with other colonial rulers like the English and the French, Portuguese colonial policy was based on a racist notion of a God-given injunction to redeem the savagery of the uncivilised African native with a christianizing mission. The legal and moral justification for the colonial venture gave direct inspiration for the "native policy" known as Assimilation which the Portuguese used in administering their colonies.[6] A policy that almost denied the humanity of the African. His human status notwithstanding, the African the policy meant, was only a child who needed the Portuguese to lead and to guide him to civilised European maturity.

This paternalistic policy administratively translates into categorizing the African into "Assimilado" and "indigena". The Assimilado is the African who has become "civilised" and "Europeanized" after satisfaction of certain stipulated conditions.[7] The indigena is the opposite of the Assimilado. He is the non-assimilated. He is symbolised by an identity card, the Caderneta.[8]

A world of difference separated the two - Assimilado and indigena in the Portuguese colonial system. While the assimilado had in theory the same rights as a European in Portuguese civil law, the indigena simply had none.[9]

His esteemed status notwithstanding, in practice in personal relations, assimilados continued to be addressed by the second person 'tu' which derogated the African relative to the European to a pupil - teacher or servant-master relationship.[10] In addition, segregationist laws and practices sanctified racial discrimination which showed in "right of admission reserved" signs in restaurants, theatres and clubs. To make matters worse, the assimilado could not question these practices.

Between the Assimilado and the indigena lay a racial group that had a significant effect on Angolan society and the decolonisation process. These were the Afro-European crossbreads or Mulattoes called Mesticos.[11] They were products of Portuguese racial co-habitation practices. But Mesticos became outcasts in both black and white communities. They became a forsaken group that each race did not want to accept. The cynical humour that "God made whitemen and blackmen but mulatoes were made by the Portuguese" showed the dilemma of the mesticos under racial segregationist practices that were inherent in Portuguese colonial policy.[12]

At the other extreme lay the majority of Africans not affected by the colonial system - the indigena or non-assimilaTED. The indigena encompassed over 90% of the total Angolan population.[13] As expressed by colonial administrative law, government as far as the indigena was concerned was the adaptation of law to native customs. Just like British colonial policy (Indirect Rule), the

Portuguese also used the traditional structures and functions of authority in African societies in their own interests. But unlike the British, the Portuguese replaced the kings and chiefs with their own officials such as Administrator and chefe de posto. Only the sub-chiefs and headmen (Sekulus) were left to Africans but these were pressed into service in the collection of native tax (imposto).[14]

Portuguese colonial policy in Angola was vicious and unjust. Although the Sekulus were themselves exempted from payment of tax, there was much injustice in the discharge of their responsibilities. This suited the Portuguese as it got things done easily for them. They therefore preferred to overlook such practices blandly explaining the vicious system they had unleashed as an attribute of the indigenous culture.

The fate of the indigena under the civil and criminal Portuguese common law in colonial Angola was hazardous and without recourse to redress.[15] Local administration officials assisted by Africans in the Native Police force administered justice. An accused was not permitted the aid of legal defense counsel while the prosecution and judgement of cases rested squarely on the local administrative official. There was no appeal against judgements except in very rare cases. Portuguese colonial penal code in Angola subjected Africans (the indigena) to the humiliation of beatings on the palms (palmatorio) which they likened to the practice of parents punishing erring children.

The most vicious and repressive Portuguese colonial policy that subjected Angolans to the most inhuman abuse and degredation was a so-called contract labour.[16] This was simply slavery. A lot of oppression through Portuguese policies was neatly hidden under cynically ambigous laws. The Portuguese for example emphasized the voluntary aspect of contract labour (voluntarios) side by side with another law that all Africans are subject to contract labour unless they are gainfully employed. This gainful employment however excluded subsistence farming, the occupation of the majority of Africans. Indigenas in effect faced an ever-present threat of being seized for some form of contract labour or another.

The cynical ambiguity of Portuguese colonial laws also revealed itself in article 146 in the Colonial Constitution which deprived Africans of any protection against systematic exploitation of their labour by local European interests. According to this article, "the state":

> may only compel the natives to work on public works of general interest to the community, or tasks of which the finished product will belong to them, in the execution of judicial sentences of a penal character or for the discharge of fiscal liabilities.[17]

A lot has been done by various scholars to document and expose the horrors of the contract labour system operated by the Portuguese in Angola and other colonies.[18] One particularly tragic account recounts that of some 70,000 to 100,000 Angolan contract workers shipped off

to Sao Tome by the Portuguese within a thirty-year period, none returned to his native home in Angola.[19]

The 1947 report of Henrique Galvao then inspector of the Portuguese overseas ministry sums up the fate of the indigena under the contract labour system. It reads that:

> In some ways the situation is worse than simple slavery. Under slavery, after all, the Native is bought as an animal: his owner prefers him to remain as fit as a horse or an ox. Yet here the Native is not bought - he is hired from the state, although he is called a freeman. And his employer cares little if he sickens or dies, once he is working because when he sickens or dies, his employer will simply ask for another.[20]

Other notable accounts on commission by HARPER's magazine have also depicted the terrible abuses of the contract labour system.[21] The contract labour system helped to foster feeling of solidarity over common grievances and thus sowed the seeds of nationalist awakening in Angolans against the inhuman Portuguese exploiter. This essentially forced labour system did much in upsetting the family life of Africans and led to neglect of the production of subsistence crops, creating famine in many areas. In fact in many cases, the principal cause of unrest and nationalist actions had been due to the distablishing and dehumanising effects of forced labour.[22]

The forced labour system could be explained as a direct consequence of the Portuguese colonization policy of settling white Portuguese in Angola. These soon found out how ill-suited they were in plantation

management and cash crop production. The aim of the colonization policy itself was an attempt to make black colonies (so-called provinces) Portuguese.[23] The policy failed as the white colonizers could not cope with the roles expected of them. The white colonization policy consequently had the effect of alienating Africans totally in the economy such that even the most menial and unskilled jobs were snatched up by the poor whites who left their ill-fitting rural circumstances for the urban areas.[24] While in other colonial territories who had a sizeable class of educated elites this marginalization in the labour market fuelled Nationalist hatred for the foreigner, in Angola, this class was almost non-existent due to an equally non-existent educational system with even a pretext of giving Africans some form of education.[25]

The contract labour policy however had an important effect of forcing a great number of Africans in Angola to emigrate to other colonial territories in the Belgian Congo, Northern Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa. This emigration particularly of the Bakongo to the Belgian and French Congo had the important effect of radicalising nationalism by exposing them to external influences. This as would be examined later, helped the birth and development of nationalist movements in Angola.[26]

In effects the total condition of Africans in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique were a true reflection of the absolute failure of Portuguese

colonial policy. An overwhelming majority of Africans were hardly touched by the civilizing mission of the Portuguese. For instance, in the early 1960s, out of ten and a half million people (Angola - 4,500,000 and Mozambique - six million), over ninety-nine per cent were illiterate.[27] By 1956, there were only 49,142 African students enrolled in various schools in Angola.[28] In fact the acute inadequacies of Portuguese education became clearer to Africans when compared to what was obtainable in neighbouring colonies. Thus for example, in 1958 the total enrolment of all grades in Northern Rhodesia was 248,905 or 11% of the total African population.[29]

The inescapable conclusion that Portuguese colonial policy miserably failed in its objective of civilizing Angolans cannot be overdramatized. Haven described in such detail, the brutal account of slavery as instituted and practised by the Portuguese in Angola as seen in the contract labour system, it is puzzling to explain the relatively slow pace of Nationalist awakening there. It is surprising that Nationalism in Angola did not develop at a pace that adequately mirrowed the abject nature of Portuguese colonialism when compared to other colonial territories under the British and the French.

The nature of colonialism in Portuguese African territories was however different in many respects from that of the British and the French.[30] Compared to other colonial societies, the Portuguese applied heavy consorship on dissident matters. This coupled with other methods like border control secret police action and retrogressive

control of education all contributed to the retardation of the process of availing nationalism a leadership cadre. Sometimes Africans who were educated in Portugal were even prevented from returning home.[31]

Besides, cognizance has to be taken of the rather special relationship between Portugal and her colonial possessions. The absolute backwardness of Portugal relative to other European powers explains why to her, colonies were not only measures of prestige and achievement but also necessary for her economic survival.[32] It was a fact that Portugal's economy relied heavily on her colonies and an end to the empire would bring about her economic disintegration. This explains the implementation of the salazist policy of Estado Novo (New State) by which Portugal integrated her colonies into full Portugese political units.[33]

2.2 THE DECOLONISATION PROCESS IN ANGOLA

Haven established the nature of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola, it is necessary for the study to understand how these features of colonialism gave root to the awakening of Nationalism. The nature of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and the development of Nationalism there, provide a useful background for the study of the decolonisation process in Angola.

The growth of Nationalism in Angola in a way resembled the pattern taken in other African colonies. It started from protest against certain aspects of the colonial system and the call for reform.[34] In Angola, the high ratio of male to female Portuguese (in 1846, 1073:100) led through

through miscegenation to a growing class of (mixed race) Euro-Africans called Mesticos. Mesticos were a race of cross-breeds or Mulattoes.[35] Before 1900, the Mesticos had engaged in a variety of commercial and governmental roles favoured as they were over the indigent Africans. However white Portuguese came to outnumber them and their status and roles consequently declined. in fact statutes in 1929 limited the bureacratic level to which mesticos and the very few African assimilados could rise to that of first clerk and established different salary scales for Africans and Europeans. It is only then understanding why the first protests against Portuguese rule were instigated and led by the mesticos.

Generally, however, the nature of Angolan nationalism underwent a change in the 1940s and 1950s when African perception of Portuguese colonialism began to change. This was particularly so in the districts bordering the Belgian Congo and in Luanda where Africans came under radicalising influences of world politics. Of significance here is the fate of the very few assimilados not unsimilar to that of the mesticos.[36]

Portuguese assimilationist policy had produced this small group of Africans who considered themselves Portuguese. As in the case of the mesticos, their declining status and prestige under the colonial system as well as their increasing alienation from their traditional roots formed the basis for their resentment of their ambiguous social and cultural status.[37] Their acquisition of the use of the Portuguese

language enabled them to communicate with a wider audience in articulation of common grievances. They also became independent of the traditional chiefs whose focus never exceeded their local environment and it's from the ranks of the mesticos and assimilados came the earliest leaders of Angolan nationalism. The associations they formed and their union of a post-colonial Angolan society paved way for the more radical liberation movements of the 1960s.

Some internal and external factors played key roles in the development of nationalism in Angola. In the case of the former, one of these was the emigration of many rural-dwelling Africans to the towns in search of better conditions of living. The population of Luanda in the 1950s almost doubled. Lured by expectations of work they came into contact with terrible inadequacies that existed between Africans and Europeans. This coupled with their experience with the obnoxious contract labour system, became united in their resentment of Porguguese colonial rule.

The white colonization (settlement) policies also helped to push further, African resentment of colonial oppression.[38] The colonial government brought between 1955 and 1960 for example, from Portugal and the Cape Verde Islands, over 55,000 whites who were settled on large tracks of land in creation of Colonatos (Agricultural Communities). Many of these whites were unskilled, uneducate and disabled. They could not therefore cope with the demands of rural agriculturalists and moved to the towns

and competed with Atricans for skilled and unskilled jobs. This not only exacerbated racial antagonism but also helped in uniting Africans against colonial rule.

As for external factors responsible for the stimulation of nationalism, certain external events played a key role in the development of the liberation movements that transformed the early protest associations into potent mediums of struggle against colonialism.[39] The general decolonisation process undertaken by other European colonial powers on the African continent created an impetus for nationalist awakening in other areas still under colonial rule. Not only were the newly independent African States becoming articulate at fora like the United Nations organisation (UNO) in championing anti-colonialist causes, the contacts of the Kongo people with their kith and kin in independent Congo and Zaire in no small measure helped in gingering up nationalist feelings in the bordering Angolan Kongo Community.[40] Nationalist activities started with the formation of protest and general interest associations The formation of these associations by Africans assumed two distinct patterns: first were the associations of African assimilados, urban educated Africans and mesticos.[41] This had a conception of the objectives to be achieved that was elitist and different from the bulk of the African population. The second was the formation of associations on ethnic, religious and social interest basis. These were formed for various specific purposes but later manifested positive under-current of nationalist goals.

Ethnic bias appeared to be a dominant feature of these associations.[42]

Some of these early associations were, the National African League (Liga Nacional Africana - LNA), a Mestico group called Gremo Africano (African Guild or Union) which later became the Regional Association of Natives of Angola (Associacao Africana Regional dos Naturais de Angola - ANANGOLA).[43] All these were based in Luanda. In Nova Lisbon, there was an association of railworkers, African Association of Southern Angola (Associacao Africana do Sul de Angola - AASA) which developed a militant anti-colonial programme but was curtailed by government surveillance. Another association was the Movement of Young Intellectuals of Angola reportedly formed by a Mesticos, Viriato da Cruz in 1940.[44]

All these associations were thoroughly curtailed by the colonial authorities. Their significance lies in their being the roots of united articulation of anti-colonial feelings. As already mentioned, they were not only reformist in nature, ethnically based but also had very narrow objectives that fell short of demanding outrightly for an end to colonial rule. All the associations active before 1961 were all characterized by weakness of organisation, resources, membership and leadership.[45]

Some reasons have been advanced for the ineffectiveness of these associations as nationalist platforms at the time of their formation. One of these was the social and ethnic division of the people - between the assimilados and the Mesticos on the one hand and the indigenas on the other. Besides, a substantial percentage of the white

population favoured a breakaway from Portugal altogether for their own narrow-minded objectives in which they would continue the same slave-master relationship but without Portuguese overlordship.[46] This white settler nationalism did not help the growth of genuine Angolan nationalism as it only served to obscure the real goals of anti-colonial agitation. Another reason lay in the fact that the people were not prepared for either political or military struggles in the 1950s however attractive the nationalist ideals. Lastly, the educated elite were not large enough to provide leadership for the nationalist movement.

The next phase of Angolan nationalism featured a radically different and more concerted approach to the struggle for national liberation. Here our focus is on the liberation movements, the mobilization of the people, use of external alliances and the resolve that wanted total independence that characterised an armed struggle.[47] We shall examine the formation, programmes and activities that characterized a violent armed struggle. Here we shall concentrate on the liberation movements and their activities, their problems and external links that later set the tone of decolonisation. That is the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). A detailed background knowledge of these liberation movements would afford us a better understanding of the armed struggle phase of the Angolan decolonisation process. It is also

through this understanding that we can have a grasp of Nigeria's strategic interests in taking the side she did.

THE MPLA

The earliest political group in Angola founded in 1956 was the party of the united struggle of Africans of Angola (Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola - PLUA). This party in December 1956 teamed up with the organization to form the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola - MPLA). The stated aim of the MPLA was the achievement of independence for Angola by a united front of all Africans. Right from the beginning, the MPLA was associated with the Angolan Communist party which had a hand in the creation of the PLUA in the first place.[48]

The MPLA was a movement controlled by those Angolans most exposed to Portuguese education and most influenced by Portuguese culture. Its core leadership consisted of intellectuals with Portuguese university degrees and civil servants in Luanda and other large Angolan cities. Portuguese culture provided a common bond but the MPLA was radically opposed to Portuguese rule. It shared the same views with Portuguese leftists who were opposed to the authoritarian rule of Antonio Oliveira Salazar and Marcello Caetano. There therefore developed close ties between the MPLA and Portuguese Socialist and Communist parties.[49]

In keeping with its Marxist perspective, the MPLA tended to emphasize the class structure of the Angolan society rather than its ethnicity. It favoured collaboration with white leftists and strove to eliminate the divisive political force of tribalism that bedevilled the other Angolan liberation movements. A noted Angolan historian, John Marcum notes that the MPLA's lack of ethno centrism was aided by the integrative factor of the Porguguese language and culture. This, he points out, is why many Mesticos were attracted to the MPLA more than any other group because it resolved their problem of an ethnic identity.[50] He further maintains that the Marxist stress on class rather than race or ethnicity helped to resolve the alienating ambivalence status of the Mestico.

Thus the MPLA had its greatest support from Mesticos, assimilados and the Kimbundu. The Mesticos constituted a very negligable percentage of the Angolan population (just about 1½%) but had a political impact that far exceeded their numbers. They were mostly urban dwellers (nearly one-third of Luanda) and were favoured by the Portuguese in regard to education and employment. Before 1961 when Angolan citizenship was granted to all, the Mesticos enjoyed a privileged position compared to the Black African indigenas. Although the latter constituted more than 90% of the population, most were not citizens while all urban Mesticos and most rural Mesticos were.

The assimilados (until 1961) were those Africans deemed worthy of citizenship due to their literacy and knowledge of the Portuguese language. They constituted

less than 1% of the population. The MPLA's first president, Ilidio Tome Alves Machado and its president from 1962 to 1979, Agostino Neto were assimilados. Both men were also Mbundu from the Kimbundu people who live in Luanda and in the North-Central region of Angola.[51] The Kimbundu are the second largest ethnic group in Angola (about 18% of the population) and had the greatest exposure to Portuguese colonial influence.

The first president of the MPLA was Ilidio Tome Alves Machado, a Post and Telegraph employee from Launda and its Secretary-General was Viriato da Cruz. After Machado's arrest by Portuguese authorities, Mario de Andrade served as acting president until the return from exile of Agostinho Neto, the MPLA's honorary President. Neto was elected president of the MPLA in December 1962. This undercut the power enjoyed by Andrade and da Cruz and this was to cause a serious rift in the ranks of the MPLA.[52]

The MPLA participated in an uprising in Luanda against the Portuguese in February 1961.[53] The uprising included attacks on a prison, broadcasting station and military barracks. Although largely abortive, this was the first confrontation with the Portuguese and marked the beginning of an armed nationalist liberation struggle. The MPLA had operated from a Headquarters in distant Conakry, Guinea in 1959. It was however able to improve its logistic with the movement of its headquarters to Leopoldville in 1961. It was however militarily dormant except for a raid into Cabinda in 1963. This inactivity was largely due to restriction imposed on the MPLA by the Leopoldville

authorities. It was also due to the difficulty which the MPLA had in recruiting members from the quite large Angolan community in Zaire. This was because most refugees were Bakongo and supported the FNLA.[54]

In 1963, the MPLA shifted its base to Brazzaville (the Congolese Capital) when it was expelled from Leopoldville. The new base made possible forays into Cabinda but land access to the rest of Angola was not possible. The Zairean Government and the FNLA would not allow the MPLA guerrillas movement into Angola through Zaire. The MPLA was however able to infiltrate military columns into Angola in 1966 and 1967.[55]

The fortunes of the MPLA improved in May 1966 with the opening of an eastern front from a rear base in Zambia. It now had direct access to Angola but had to operate in unfamiliar ethnic territory of the Lunda and Chokwe peoples. Meanwhile the Movement continued to face other impediments in other areas in the struggle. One of these was the imposition of increased restrictions on it by a new Congolese government.[56] This necessitated the opening of another Headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia. Another problem was the factional split that developed from Neto's election. Apart from Viriato da Cruz's faction there was also the Revolta Activa (Active Revolt) faction of Mario de Andrade, which was Mestico dominated and opposed to Neto's leadership.[57] Yet another dissident problem within the ranks of the MPLA arose from the threat to Neto's authority from the Eastern Military Commander, Daniel Chipenda.[58]

Chipenda enjoyed a lot of military autonomy and operated from Lusaka and not Brazzaville. He had the support of most Lunda, Chokwe and Ovimbundu party members. While he led the bulk of the MPLA's military forces, he did not enjoy the support of the Mestico and the Kimbundu members of the party. He lacked Neto's international connection but became aligned with the Chinese. He condemned the pervassive Mestico influence in the MPLA. At a meeting in Lusaka, a reconcilliation was attempted but failed. Chipenda was later expelled from the party.[59]

Generally, the MPLA had certain advantages over the other liberation movements, the FNLA and UNITA. It had a well-educated leadership, a cohesive ideology and an appeal across racial and ethnic lines. It had extensive ties with other African liberation movements, European leftists and considerable support within the Organisation of African Unity. It had organized, affiliates with workers, women and Youths and developed an infrastructure in Angola in liberated areas.

THE FNLA

The influence of a tradition of an ancient kingdom and an ideology developed by their Kith and Kin in the Belgian Congo, made the kongo of Angola to exhibit a strong ethnic consciousness.[60] The FNLA (Frente Nacional de Liberatacao de Angola - National Front for the Liberation of Angola) was an outgrowth of Bakongo political movements

originating in the North-West region of Angola and among Bakongo refugees across the border in Zaire. It was dominated by Bakongo cultural values and many of its original members were more concerned with establishing a separate Kongo State than with Angolan independence. The roots of the movement go back to the union of the populations of Northern Angola (Uniao das Populacoes do Norte de Angola - UPNA). This group was founded in exile in July 1957 to protest the installation by the Portuguese of an illiterate puppet, Dom Antonio III, as king of the Kongo.

In December 1958, Roberto the UPNA delegate to the first All African peoples Conference at Accra, Ghana found little sympathy and support for regional ethnic separation. The "Norte" (North) was then dropped and the name changed to Union of Angolan Peoples (Uniao das populacces de Angola - UPA). The group from then on claimed to stand for the liberation of all Angolan people. In 1962, Roberto Holden formed the FNLA by allying the UPA with a number of smaller Northern groups.[61]

The FNLA was less intellectual than the MPLA, less urban but more race conscious and more tribal and traditionist. It lacked any coherent ideology but was strongly anti-Marxist. Its view of the MPLA was that of a group of bourgeois, marxist Mesticos.[62] The FNLA had its headquarters and training facilities in Zaire. It enjoyed the support of successive Zairean Governments except during the premiership

of Moise Tshombe in 1964-65. It had direct land access to Angola and used this advantage to prevent MPLA guerrila cadres from crossing its zone of influence into Angola.

Roberto tried to broaden the ethnic base of the then UPA in 1961 with the admission of an Ovimbundu political scientist, Jonas Savimbi. He later became the Foreign Minister of the FNLA's declared Kinshasha-based Revolutinary Government of Angola in Exile (Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio - GRAE) in March 1962. He left the FNLA in July 1964 denouncing the Bakongo dominance of the party.[63]

The FNLA had more men under arms than the MPLA and UNITA combined and also had the most convenient base of operations, in adjoining Zaire. It however lacked experienced administrators, was weak in Luanda the Capital and at the time of Portuguese withdrawal from Angola, was seeing its support decrease with the OAU. It also had an overly strong identity with Bakongo interests.[64]

UNITA

The Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola - UNITA) lacked educated cadres and was the smallest of the three liberation movements. It however had the largest ethnic base (the Ovimbundu in Central and Southern Angola, about 31% of the population). It had a unified command under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi.

After leaving the FNLA in July 1964, Savimbi was invited to join the MPLA but opted for the establishment of a new nationalist movement under his control.[65] UNITA was founded within Angola in 1966 and had Zambia as a rear base. However, its operations were hampered in August 1967 when it was expelled from Zambia.[66]

UNITA's support came from the rural areas and had fewer arms and men as well as foreign connections than the MPLA and the FNLA.[67] It therefore emphasized self-sufficiency to counter this weakness, favoured guerrilla warfare and stressed Maoist ideas. After the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola, it tried to take advantage of its potential electoral strength and minimize its military weakness by proposing a political solution to Angola's problems. It also tried to win over white support by taking a moderate stand on issues of race and property ownership.

The general background of the Angolan liberation movements give a clearer understanding of the next phase of Angolan decolonisation: the armed struggle. This phase brings into focus Nigeria's role in the Angolan decolonisation process with the involvement of apartheid South Africa. It also highlights the racial factor in the geopolitics of the Southern African region and its economic significance for the strategic interests of the various actors in the conflict. The phase of the decolonisation process itself could be divided into two stages: the beginning of the armed struggle in 1961 leading up to the military stalemate

reached by 1973, and from the 1974 military coup in Portugal leading up to independence and escalation of the civil war and the South African invasion in 1975.

The year 1961 in Angolan decolonisation marks a dramatic change in the nature and method of the anti-colonialist struggle. As shown by the events of that year, the changes shocked the Portuguese into reaction that consequently helped to shape the new phase of decolonisation: the armed struggle. After 1959, the anti-colonialist sentiments intensified just as the Portuguese also became even more determined to stifle the struggle. This they did with increased surveillance and arrests of activists by the secret police, the international police for the defence of the State (Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado - PIDE). This was followed up with reinforcement of military positions particularly int he North West districts.

The armed struggle against the Portuguese was sparked off from an event not entirely within Angola itself but in Portugal and executed by Portuguese nationals. This however had a tremendous impact and helped to ignite the smouldering fires of expectations, resentment and frustration that came with the realisation that Portugal was more than determined to keep her African colonies in continued bondage. A General Delgado and Captain Henrique Galavao sized a Portuguese Cruiseliner and amidst worldwide publicity, headed for Angolan ports to dramatize the plight of the colonial subjects.[68]

Hoping to benefit from this worldwide propagation of their cause, Angolans attacked Police stations and prisons.[69] The violence escalated into indiscriminate attacks on white plantations and farms. A mass exodus of Europeans from Angola began. Africans who had escaped from Luanda organised an uprising of cotton-workers in the Baixa de Casaange, in Malange district attacking Government buildings as well as isolated farmsteads in Uige district. Portuguese whites were not long in organising reprisals and many people (both whites and Blacks) perished. The Portuguese colonial authorities mobilised the Army which at the height of the conflict surpassed 40,000 troops.

However the initiation of the armed struggle found most of the liberation movements wanting. Most participants in the March 1961 uprising were Kongo who were totally unprepared for a sustained guerrilla warfare but among whom UPA influenced had been strong.[70] The fighting was done by the UPA - directed Angola National Liberation Army (Exercito Nacional de Libertacao de Angola - ENLA). This guerrillas later received their training in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Congo (Kinshasha).[71]

The MPLA which had been behind the initial uprising in Luanda in February 1961, suffered a great deal from Portuguese reprisals. Many of its militant leaders were dead or in prison. It also suffered from the disadvantage of having its rear base in Congo (Brazzaville) and with no direct access to Angola. However MPLA guerrillas drew military support from the former Soviet Union and many

other communist states.[72] It also captured much equipment from the Portuguese and received financial aid from private organisations in the West. UNITA received some negligable support from China and the FNLA from North Korea. By the end of this first phase of the armed struggle, there ensued a military stalemate.

The second phase of the armed struggle actually started with the military coup in Portugal in April 1974. The coup overthrew the procolonialist regime of Salazar.[73] Following this change of Government, conflict between the Portuguese and the three movements, the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA was terminated and a transition to Angolan Independence programme worked out. Ceasefires were arranged with each movement and all opened offices in Luanda. At the same time, the MPLA and the FNLA began to jostle for favourable military advantages. In early July 1974, the MPLA started to establish "Poder popular" (Peoples Power) organisations in urban areas. These were supplied with arms and served as auxiliaries to the MPLA regular forces.[74] The FNLA also began to move troops and equipment from Zaire into Angola. Fighting soon broke out between the three liberation movements.[75]

A meeting of Neto, Roberto and Savimbi was arranged by President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya in Mombasa from January 3-5, 1975. An agreement was reached that the three movements should cease fighting and to co-operate with each other.[76]

This meeting was followed by another one in Portugal between the three liberation leaders and the Portuguese authorities. The result of that meeting, the Alvor Agreement of January 15, 1975 called for the installation of a transitional government on January 31, leading to Independence on November 11, 1975. A Portuguese High Commissioner was to be assisted by a three-man presidential council with the chairman rotating between representatives of the three movements.[77]

The transitional government was sworn in on January 31, 1975 but clashes between the liberation movements continued unabated. The conflict deteriorated with external interference by American support for one of the combatants - the FNLA. The United States' Government's 40 Committee authorised a grant of US $300,000 to the FNLA who appeared the strongest militarily.[78] The FNLA and UNITA appeared to have formed an alliance against the MPLA. The OAU tried to mediate and called for a government of National Unity. In line with this position Nigeria suggested a postponement of Independence by two weeks to enable all the aparties to resolve their differences and work for national unity. By this time the former Soviet Union and her allies notably Cuba had also joined in the fray by supporting the MPLA. The FNLA and UNITA who had been collaborating with the CIA and South African Intelligence resorted to active and open collaboration with the South Africans. In early August 1975, South Africa invaded Angola.[79]

2.3 THE FACTOR OF SETTLER (RACIAL) POLITICS IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION AND EXTERNAL LINKAGES IN THE DECOLONISATION PROCESS IN ANGOLA

The issue of race in understanding politics is succintly explained by C.L.R. James, a noted Pan-Africanist when he declared that:

> The race question is subsidiary to the class question in politics, and to think of imperialism in terms of race is disastrous. But to neglect the racial factor as merely incidental is an error only less grave than to make it fundamental.[80]

The significance of race in the Southern African region and in the decolonisation process in Angola understood in the light of the foregoing explanation gives some understanding of the motives for external linkages and intervention by the West and South Africa in Angola. In Angola, the racial explanation is secondary to the strategic one which involved security interests but it is also an error to dismiss it blandly. Generally, the geopolitical context of conflict in the Southern Africa region is explained by racial factors that are however secondary to other strategic reasons. Apartheid for example cannot be explained without the racial issue even though the primary motive of the system is economic exploitation.[81]

Racial motives alone do not explain the motives and role of the West and South Africa in Angola but they do facilitate and justify these. In this perspective, the West and the US felt that granting independence to African states stopped short at the white minority regimes in the South.[82] This explains the transfer of military

equipment to Rhodesia at the time of the breakup of the Federation of North and South Rhodesia. In Southern Africa with White settler minority regimes, racism was the ideologica prop of the strategic factors underlying the West's support. Certain informed segments within the US decision-making process had urged the Government that the MPLA was the more valuable ally than the FNLA and UNITA but was rebuffed.[83] So strategic and racial factors motivated US/South African intervention in Angola first in support of Portuguese colonial rule and later against a popular but radical Black liberation movement - the MPLA.

Thus Portugal had to be supported in her illegal ambition to keep her African colonies by the West and South Africa mainly for various strategic reasons but with significant racial connotation. Thus race serves to explain at a secondary level, Western preference for a perpetuation of white minority regimes in Southern Africa as opposed to Black majority rule. Although the West's primary motive for intervention in Angola went far beyond mere racial consideration, being strategic (economic) interests that motive and sustain her stand on Angolan decolonisation. But racial and economic motives of Western intervention in Angola (as in the Apartheid system) are mutually reinforcing. This helps to explain the economic, . political support that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) gave Portugal in order to keep her colonies.[84]

Racial connotations partly underlay the West's support for the South African invasion of Angola and Nigeria's perception of the situation and role in the conflict.[85] As the foremost Black African State with a declared foreign policy objective of defending the freedom and rights of Africans and promoting respect for the Blackman, Nigeria had a stake in Angola.[86] The Apartheid Boers of South Africa stood for everything against Nigeria's stand on African independence and justice for the Blackman.

2.4 SOUTH AFRICA'S INVASION OF ANGOLA AND ITS MOTIVES

South Africa's motives for invading Angola can be understood at two interrelated levels. First, at the level of the long term (grand) design of the West and its strategic interests in the region which fitted South Africa into the role of executor. Secondly, at the level of South Africa's own strategic interests and very survival. Both levels are interrelated and help to explain each other.

South Africa's military aggression lay in a larger strategic design of the USA and the West as shown by the 1969 Kissinger Memorandum on U.S. strategic interests in Southern Africa.[87] The future of the region as envisioned by this design was seen in terms of preservation of a status quo which featured close co-operation between the racist regime in pretoria, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique and the illegal white minority regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). This explains the support for Portugal by

the USA and her West European allies in her attempt to keep her African colonies against the tide of world opinion and Black Nationalism.

The USA and the West saw Angola only in terms of their overall strategic interests in the region.[88] These interests could only be served by propping up Portuguese colonialism in Angola. This explains why the possible assumption of power in Angola by the pro-Marxist and Black nationalist MPLA elicited such alarm in the West. South Africa, the designated regional super power (then) had to accomplish the task of keeping the region safe from communits and Black nationalists. South Africa's invasion of Angola in this light was only in furtherance to the West's desire to keep the region safe for their vital strategic interests there. To do this, it was necessary to intervene in Angola to stem the surging tide of radical pro-Marxist African nationalism.[89]

At another level, the Angolan decolonisation process threatened the very existence of South Africa. The fall of the Portuguese colonial empire by the coup in 1974 represented for South Africa, a closing cordon around the white minority regimes (itself included) with independent Black African STates on both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans sides. This scenerio gave the racist whites in South Africa a new sense of vulnerability.[90] They were to be flanked by radical and progressive regimes with marxist leanings in Mozambique and Angola. The South African Boer laager mentality therefore interpreted the situation

to require an interventionist approach to cut her encirclement with hostile black majority rule regimes let loose upon her by African nationalism.

In the light of the foregoing, South Africa wanted to install a pro-capitalist, pro-Western, pro-dialogue government in Angola and sought to protect its investments, such as the Cunene irrigation and power complex at Cabora Bassa and the Diamang Diamond project.[91] It also intended to destroy SWAPO (South West African Peoples Organisation) based in Southern Angola. They were assisted in this regard by Daniel Chipenda and UNITA who gave them information about underground SWAPO activities. South Africa may indeed have intended to seize part of Southern Angola in order to set up a Separate State of Ovamboland. It then would have added the Northern Ovamboland area of Namibia to this State, thus solidifying South African control over Namibia. The primarily Ovambo SWAPO movement would then have been deflected from its anti-South African cause.

2.5 NIGERIA'S ROLE IN THE ANGOLAN DECOLONISATION PROCESS

Nigeria's role in the Angolan decolonisation process was initially within the auspices of the OAU. This role continued right to the end of the conflict but after the South African invasion of Angola was confirmed, she became a strong interest group leader seeking the diplomatic and propaganda umbrella of the OAU. She became transformed from a consensous builder to a purveyor of opinion and interest.

Nigeria had supported the OAU stand that the liberation movements should unite and form a government of national unity. She had even called for a postponement of Independence by two weeks to make the task of forming the government of national unity possible. Nigeria condemned the Soviet Union for exacerbating the conflict by its support for the MPLA. Even when it became very clear that pervassive foreign interference in Angola by the USA, Cuba, China, Korea and the former Soviet Union had made the views of the belligerents intractable, Nigeria still supported the idea of a government of national unity. Angola became independent on November 11, 1975 but the Portuguese did not hand over power to any of the liberation movements. The MPLA now firmly ensconced in Luanda the capital declared that it had taken over in a peoples Republic of Angola. The FNLA and UNITA formed their own government in Huambo in central Angola.[92]

However, against all expectations, Nigeria annoucned the recognition of the MPLA government on November 25, 1975. The new Nigerian leadership that replaced the Yakubu Gowon regime was a progressive and radical regime on the issue of African liberation. Besides, the discovery by Nigeria that South Africa had invaded Angola meant that

the MPLA government inspite of the OAU impasse was also partly attributable to Nigeria's role in support of the MPLA.

Nigeria's role in the decolonisation process in Angola show the nature of her involvement in the conflict and enable us to draw certain important conclusions for this study. One of these is that her role in Angola was consistent with a recognition of her strategic interests. Given that Nigeria had since independence tended to side with the West on many foreign policy issues, it was widely expected that the same trend would continue in the Angolan crisis. This is more so when Nigeria did not have a record of sympathy for the MPLA cause. In fact strong interest groups within the Nigerian decision-making structure were firmly opposed to any support for the MPLA. Thus Nigeria's pro-Western orientation and the MPLA pro-Soviet (Marxist) regime were indeed strange bedfellows. However, strategic interests overrode these considerations when Nigeria discovered that Africa's impeccable enemy, Apartheid South Africa had invaded Angola at the behest of the USA.

The general background of the Angolan decolonisation process therefore justify the assertion that strategic interests motivated Nigeria's role in the struggle against colonialism. This background also affords understanding of the crucial issues at stake in Angola. The historical nature of the factors that motivated foreign intervention in Angola also helps to make clear, the nature of the strategic interests at stake in the conflict. Haven placed

Nigeria's role in the Angolan decolonisation process in the context of the historical causes and features of the Angolan war, it is necessary to understand Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola. To fully understand the scope and nature of Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola, it is necessary to look at the interests of the principal actors in the war - the USA and her Western allies including South Africa. This will go a long way in achieving one of the major objectives of this study - Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola.

N O T E S

[1]This population is an estimated figure from the census of 1970 which gave a provisional figure of 5,646,166. It does not take into account some 500,000 Angolan refugees scattered in various neighbouring countries, displaced by the civil war - Kaplan, I: (ed). Angola - a country study, The American University, 1979.

[2]Marcum, J.A.: The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I (Cambridge, Massachusetts), The M.I.T. Press, 1969; pp. 1.

[3]Okuma, T. Angolan in Ferment, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1974; pp. 1-51.
Wheeler, D. and Pelissier, R. Angola, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1978, part one.

[4]Marcum, J.A. op. cit. pp. 2.

[5]Kaplan, I: op. cit. pp. 37

[6]Okuma, T. op. cit. pp. 23

[7]Ibid. pp. 24

[8]Ibid. pp. 27

[9]Ibid. pp. 23-28

[10]Ibid.

[11]Kaplan, I. op. cit. pp. 4

[12]Okuma, T. op. cit. pp. 26

[13]Ibid. pp. 26

[14]These African officials became the most vicious part of the colonial system and were mostly used in recruiting forced labour for private and government contracts.

[15]Ibid. pp. 28
Wheeler, D.D., Pelissier, R. Angola, London: Pau Mau Press, 1971, pp. 133

[16]Okuma, op. cit. pp. 29

[17]Marcum, op. cit. pp 7

[18]John Harris, Portuguese Slavery: Britain's Dilemma; Henry W. Nevinson, A Modern Slavery are quoted in Okuma op. cit. pp. 29.

[19]Harris, J. quoted in Okuma, Ibid. pp. 29

[20]Ibid.

[21]Notably Basil Davidson in 1954, Ibid.

[22]Ibid. pp. 31. Duffy, J. A Question of Slavery, London: Oxford University Press, 1967: pp. 168.

[23]Marcum, op. cit. pp. 6

The Portuguese overseas Council met in 1675 and proposed a law which was accepted by the Crown that all people convicted of non-capital or civil offences could be pardoned if they assent to settle in Angola - Bender, G.J. Angola under the Portuguese - myth and Reality, London: Heineman, 1978; pp. 60-1, Figueiredo, Antonio De, Portugal and its Empire: The Tenth, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1961, pp. 98.

[24]Many of the Portuguese settlers were stark illiterates and soon emigrated to the towns and could be found engaged in unskilled jobs like selling lottery tickets. Figueiredo, Ibid. pp. 129.

[25]Okuma, op. cit. pp. 45, Marcum, op. cit. pp. 5 & 6.

[26]Ibid. pp. 31

[27]Ibid. pp. 40-6

[28]Ibid. pp. 42

[29]Ibid. pp. 45

[30]Marcum, op. cit. pp 8

[31]Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 41

[32]Marcum, op. cit. pp. 7

[33]Okuma, op. cit. pp. 35

[34]Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 41

[35]Bender, op. cit. pp. 30-3, Okuma, op. cit. pp. 26, 38 and 102.

[36]Marcum, op. cit. pp. 21

[37]Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 41, Wheeler D. Pelissier, op. cit. pp. 84

[38]Okuma, op. cit. pp. 31

[39]Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 42, Marcum, op. cit. Vol. II, p.9

[40]Characteristics of one of the Congolese African political parties - The Alliance of Bakongo or Alliance des Bakongo - ABAKO which revealed a strident anti-white orientation influenced one of the major Angolan liberation movements - The FNLA, Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 41 and Marcum,

op. cit. Chapter 2.

[41]Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 43

[42]Ibid.

[43]The stated goals of the Liga Angolana clearly showed that it was essentially a lobby for advancing the interests of assimilados within a colonial system. Wheeler and Pelissier, op. cit. pp. 117.

[44]Viriato de Cruz, a Mestico became the first Secretary-General of the MPLA.

[45]Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 45

[46]Okuma (op. cit. pp. 58) explains that there were two nationalist groups in Angola: European and African. Europeans thought of independence as Angola becoming another Brazil - a Settler's paradise without Portuguese Sovereignty while Africans thought of independence as being without the Portuguese Marcum, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 2.

[47]Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 45, Marcum, op. cit. Part II.

[48]Klinghoffer, A.J. The Angolan war: A study in Soviet Policy in the third world (Boulder-Glorado: Westview Press), 1980, pp. 10.

[49]Wheeler and Pelissier, op. cit. pp. 163

[50]Many early MPLA leaders were Mesticos such as Mario de Andrade (acting President), Jaquim Pinto de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz (Secretary-General).

[51]Marcum, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 53

[52]Klinghoffer, op. cit. pp. 11

[53]Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 46

[54]Marcum, J. op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 66

[55]While operating from Brazzaville, the MPLA maintained an additional headeuarters in Dar es Salam, Tanzania.

[56]Ibid. pp. 67-9

[57]Mario de Andrade was soon joined by his brother, Joaquim Pinto de Andrade together with Gentil Viana and broke off accusing Neto of "Presidentialism", Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 126 and Marcum, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 85-92, 248.

[58]Ibid. pp. 250-258.

[59]Chipenda after leaving the MPLA, joined the FNLA and later gained notoriety by collaborating with the South Africans in their invasion of Angola in August 1975, Klinghoffer, op. cit. pp. 54

[60]Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 123

[61]The UPA merged with the PDA (Partido Democratico de Angola), another Bakongo party in 1962, Klinghoffer, op. cit. pp. 13 and the trade union, Liga Geral des Trabalhadores, (LGTA), Pellisier and Wheeler, op. cit. pp. 223.

[62]Marcum, J. op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 32.

[63]Savimbi is said to have opposed the admission into the FNLA of the breakaway faction of Viriato da Cruz, Klinghoffer, op. cit. pp. 13

[64]Ibid. pp. 49-61

[65]Ibid. pp. 260

[66]Zambia was highly reliant on the Benguela railroad for its Copper exports through the Angolan port of Lobito and did not take kindly to UNITA's sabotage of this important transport life-line, Klinghoffer, op. cit. pp. 14.

[67]Marcum, op. cit. pp. 162, 167.

[68]Figueiredo, op. cit. pp. 88

[69]Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 46

[70]Ibid. pp. 51

[71]Ibid.

[72]Marcum, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 201

[73]Ibid. pp. 241

[74]Ibid. pp. 259

[75]Ibid. pp. 261-264

[76]Ibid. pp. 260

[77]Its members were Lopo do Nascimento (MPLA), Johnny Eduardo Pinnock (FNLA) and Jose N'dele (UNITA), Klinghoffer, op. cit. pp. 15

[78]The U.S National Security Council's 40 Committee according to Stockwell had asked the CIA to outline a program to win the Angolan war. The CIA gave a budget of US $100 million. Stockwell, J. In Search of Enemies, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co) 1978, pp. 21. See also Marcum, J. op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 257

[79]Ibid. pp. 269

[80]Quoted in Jacques Amy, Garvey and Garveyism, (New York: Octogon Books) 1978, pp. 53

[81]Wilmot, op. cit. pp. 2

[82]Taylor, D. (ed). Imperialist Conspiracy in Africa, (Lusaka: Prometheus Publishing Co)., 1974, pp. 85

[83]Stockwell, J. op. cit. Chapter 12

[84]Marcum, op. cit. pp. 231-40

[85]In an interview with AFRICA magazine, the Nigerian *Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo said that right* from his days as a young military officer, he had always felt it a life-time ambition to fight for the liberation of Southern Africa.

[86]Ogunsanwo, op. cit. pp. 46

[87]Klinghoffer, op. cit. pp. 82

[88]Ibid. pp. 76

[89]Taylor, D. ed. op. cit. pp. 85

[90]Ogunsanwo, op. cit. pp. 61

[91]Klinghoffer, op. cit. pp. 46

[92]Ogunsanwo, op. cit. pp. 59

[93]Marcum, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 243

[94]Sotumbi, A.O., op. cit. pp

[95]Ogunsanwo, op. cit. pp. 117

CHAPTER THREE

NNIGERIA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN ANGOLA

3.0 INTRODUCTION

At the end of last chapter, we concluded that Nigeria's role in the decolonisation process in Angola justify the assertion that strategic interests motivated her involvement there. Such interests it is contended were defined and demonstrated by her foreign policy role there. The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to examine Nigeria's definition of strategic interests on the African continent and what specifically these interests were in Angola.

The focus of this chapter will include the following: Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola particularly relating to the decolonisation process; the security implications of South Africa's aggression against Angola against the background of the strategic interests that motivated Nigeria's role in the conflict, and South Africa's threat to Nigeria's interests in Angola. This chapter will emcoompass an examination of Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola and the threat to them posed by the opposing interests of the various states involved in the Angolan decolonisation process.

Nigeria's definition of strategic interests in Angola (and generally in Africa) can be seen within the context of her African policy.[1] This African policy is a broad declaration which outlines the objectives that she will

seek in her foreign policy. It involves a commitment to the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and apartheid as well as external interference in African affairs. It is similar to the United States' Monroe Doctrine.[2] Under the Monroe doctrine enunciated in 1823 by President James Monroe, the USA declared that the Americas (the western hemisphere) were no longer subject to colonization or to be the extension of the European political system. This declaration means that firm and resolute action would be taken against any European challenge to the independent status of states in the western hemisphere.

Similarly Nigeria's belief in and execution of the idea of a continental jurisdiction is a definition of her sphere of interest.[3] This means the exclusion of any outside influence and interference in the African continent. Her African policy is to be seen in this perspective. It is under the definition of a continental jurisdiction in Africa that Nigeria not only recognised the MPLA government in Angola but also gave financial assistance, military aid, diplomatic, political and propaganda support to her in the face of South African aggression with the active collusion of the US and her western allies.

3.1 NIGERIA'S DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN AFRICA: HER AFRICAN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP ROLE

A number of factors are notable about Nigeria's African policy in relation to her strategic interests. It is not a unique doctrine compared to the foreign policy roles

of many African States.[4] Secondly, it pales weakly in performance when considered as a realist agenda and compared to Israel's similar declaration of a world-wide responsibility for all Jews.[5] Thirdly, as noted earlier, foreign policy is not only a declaration of goals. The means available and actual commitment to the attainment of desired goals is necessary. In this light, Nigeria's African policy rates very low in performance and consistency. This is illustrated, for example, by the absurdity of her opposition to apartheid while in the same breath having extensive links with the very western powers that prop apartheid.[6] The distinct exceptions to this assessment of Nigeria's African policy are few and far in between. One of these is her role in the decolonisation process in Angola and specifically in the response to the South African invasion of Agenda.[7] It is for this reason that her African policy is significant in the study.

Nigeria's African policy is essentially a pre-occupation with African affairs. Africa is a declared corner-stone of Nigeria's foreign policy.[8] Successive Nigerian regimes from Balewa (1960-1966) to date have sought to maintain and promote this policy. This orientation has culminated in the constitutional support in Section 19 of the 1979 constitution of Nigeria which states that:

> the State shall promote African unity, as well as the total political economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and the people of African birth throughout the world... and shall combat racial discriminations in all its manifestation.[9]

Generally, three broad strands of Nigeria's African policy are relevant to our examination of Nigeria's definition of strategic interests in Africa. The first is support for the OAU in recognition that it is undisputably the most important continental structure for the attainment of African goals, collective definition of African demands, harmonization of African policies and conduct of African diplomacy with the rest of the world.[10] Thus successive Nigerian governments have given political, financial and diplomatic support to the OAU. In pursuit of this recognition of the centrality of the OAU is the view that solutions to inter-state and intra-state problems in Africa should be sought within the existing process, principles and machinery of the OAU before being referred to the UNO.

The second relevant strand of Nigeria's African policy is anti-colonialism. With reference to the United Nations' General Assembly resolution on the granting of independence to colonies and the anti-colonial Addis Ababa charter of the OAU, Nigeria firmly committed herself to the eradication in Africa, of all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Although Nigeria's performance in

this regard was rather weak during the Balewa regime, it improved considerably in the early 1970s. It is also in the early 1970s that the military regime of General Gowon declared that no alternative exists to armed struggle and the use of force to liquidate colonialism in Africa.[11]

A strain of the anti-colonial strand in Nigeria's African policy is an anti-foreign intervention theme. This was explicitly stated in General Obasanjo's address at the OAU Summit in Khartoun (Sudan). This identified that in the context of foreign intervention in Africa, there are three parties involved: these are the Soviets and their allies, the western powers and African themselves. He emphasized that:

> We African leaders must also realise that we cannot ask outside powers to leave us alone while in most cases it is our own action which provide them with the excuse to interfere with our affairs.[12]

It is thus in the light of Nigeria's hostility to foreign intervention in Africa that we can appreciate her interest and role in the Angolan decolonisation process.

The third relevant strand in Nigeria's African policy in her definition of strategic interests in Africa is an anti-apartheid stand. This involves a moral and political commitment to the restoration of human dignity particularly in Southern Africa. This stand is shown by General Gowon's observation that peoples of African

descent throughout the world see in a strong Nigeria a measure of hope and a means of achieving self-respect for Africans so long degraded everywhere. This anti-apartheid posture particularly hardened during the Nigerian civil war in reaction to South African support for the secessionists.[13] This explains Nigeria's interest and role in the South African invasion of Angola in the course of the decolonisation process there.

The broad strands of Nigeria's African policy provide a useful guide for understanding her strategic interests in Africa. They show the vital areas that constitute Nigeria's a-priori conception of national interest. They do not per se, constitute Nigeria's definition of strategic interests in Africa. This is because these interests are not explicitly but implicitly stated and shown by the cardinal principles that guide her foreign policy. Nigeria's conception of a continental sphere of jurisdiction is therefore an implicit declaration of a strategic area of interest.[14] But what these interests really are is not explicitly stated. Affirming this in a foreign policy speech on February 19, 1977, Brigadier J.N. Garba said:

> Our foreign policy is a combination of our permanent national interests and I would call the higher interests of Africa.[15]

The identification of a continental sphere of interest in Africa by Nigeria is amply shown by General Olusegun Obasanjo's speech on African freedom in 1976. He affirmed

that Nigeria would not relent her efforts:

> until Blackmen all over Africa are accorded the same political, economic and social rights and opportunities that are accorded other racial groups in the sub-region.[16]

The closest explicit declaration of Nigeria's strategic interests in Africa is made by Obasanjo when commenting on Nigeria's African policy he states that Nigeria's interest and that of most African countries should coincide as far as the defence of our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the promotion of justice and respect for blackman is concerned.[17] This is however too general and ambiguous to amount to a definition of strategic interest in Africa.

Nigeria's conception of a continental sphere of interest is related to her belief in a leadership role that is bestowed upon her by certain factors. These factors are her leadership potentials. These are her size, population and economy. Although Nigeria is not the largest African state, she is the most populous.[18] These coupled with her immense oil and mineral endowments radiate the optimism that Nigeria should not only be an African leader but a world power.[19] This leadership perception has sometimes alarmed her African neighbours who are wary of Nigeria's intentions. Countering such fears as unnecessary, Nigeria's External Affairs Commissioner in the Murtala regime, Brigadier J.N. Garba had to state that:

> we have never gone out of our way
> to use our natural resources to
> lord it on any African country.[20]

Such declarations have however never obscured the common Nigerian perception of a leadership role in Africa as J.N. Garba put it succintly that:

> Notwithstanding, we are prepared to
> continue to discharge the responsibilities
> bestowed on us by Africa... Nigeria will
> continue to play a leading role whenever
> any problem of common interest arises.[21]

But foreign policy is more than just a collection of official documents, formal records of action and public statements.[22] It is based upon a-priori conceptions of national interest. It is the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete and specific courses of action in order to attain these objectives and preserve its interest. What concrete foreign policy experiences and notions underline Nigeria's African policy and her conception of a sphere of continental interests ? Is Nigeria's African policy and definition of a sphere of interest based on mere illusion or no practical foreign experiences ?

Certain facts about Nigeria's foreign policy experiences underlie her African policy. Central to the policy is the cardinal issue of security.[23] Strategic (security) interests defined within the context of certain Nigerian foreign policy experiences and assumptions about the international system. Nigeria's perception of her security interests in African is dominated by a concern that the future should not be a replication of the past.

Nigeria, in a typically African perception of the world, understands that every manner of indignity - political, economic and worse still, racial has been heaped upon Africans by outsiders.[24] This is why recism in the form of apartheid, white settler minority and colonialist regimes dominates Nigerian attentions in its threat perception.

Racist and white colonialist regimes are viewed by Nigeria as threatening aggressive forces.[25] These forces in Nigeria's perceptions mitigate against the realisation of her security interests. This perception explain Nigeria's stand in the decolonisation process in Angola and specifically, the South african invasion of that country. From this stand can be seen Nigeria's strategic interests and role in Angola.

3.2 NIGERIA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN ANGOLA AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVASION

Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola were primarily security interests. Nigeria's role in Angola was based on its own strategic interest of containing South African power. If the racists succeeded in dominating Angola, their strategic reach would extend to Nigeria and beyond.[26] This possibility was affirmed by the South African Minister of Defence himself (P.W. Botha) when he declared unambiguously that if his troops could capture Luanda, then there would wo

be nothing to stop them from capturing Lagos or even Cairo.[27] It was therefore not altruism but national self-interest that determined Nigeria's support for the MPLA.

The Nigerian Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed clearly recognised and exposed the threat to Nigeria's strategic (security) interests when he declared in his speech at the extra-ordinary summit of the OAU that:

> Angola merely provides the occasion to recreate the 19th century partition of Africa into spheres of influence where the predominant consideration will be the interests of the big powers without any consideration for the inalienable rights of the African.[28]

In fact as indicated in the exerpt of Mohammed's speech above, the threat to Nigeria's security interests was not posed by the South Africans alone but also by meddling European powers. When one considers that Nigeria and the MPLA regime had no ideological affinities, one is left with a clear picture of the strategic implications of Nigeria's foreign policy role in Angola. This is demonstrated by, for instance, Nigerian response to Sekou Toure's suggestion that an enduring alliance of progressive and militant states in Africa be formed with Nigeria as leader. Such an alliance Nigeria argued, would play into the hands of the enemies of Africa as it would divide the ranks of the OAU on an ideological basis.[29]

The South African invasion of Angola threatened Nigeria's strategic interests when seen in the context of some of the cardinal realist tenets explained earlier in the study. These are specifically, that a state must guard against the capabilities of other states and not their intentions and that states expand (and acquire power) not according to legality and justice but opportunities. Nigeria's strategic security interests were threatened with the added power and reach of South Africa in control of Angola. Just as there was no legality or justice in the South African adventure and in the legislation of its parliament legitimising its right to intervene in any African country South of the equator which we mentioned earlier.

The South African definition of its spheres of influence on the African continent as seen in the implication of the legislation mentioned above amounted to cart blanche military latitude in twenty two African States. But as Wilmot so vividly puts it, those African States not included in the South African legislation have no consolation either.[30] This is because of South African conventional and Nuclear technology status. Considering that the distance from Tel-Aviv to Entenbe is greater than the distances between South Africa's giant military airbases in Grootfontein and Katima Mulilo and several East and West African capitals (Lagos included) Nigeria had cause to fear. The more so when South Africa gets

its long range transport aircraft, its satellite reconnaisance maps and its refuelling facilities from the same Western sources as Israel.[31]

Then also in a related perspective, the South African reach into Angola threatened the security of the South Atlantic region within which Angola is situated and vital Nigerian geopolitical and economic interests are located. Affirming the strategic importance of Angola to Nigeria's security in the South Atlantic region, the Head of State, General Muhammed explained the South African invasion of Angola as being:

> ...because of its strategic importance in the South Atlantic, because of its natural resources and because of the strength and dynamism of the MPLA. *Angola had become an area of great* interest strategically. There are those countries, including South Africa and obviously the United States who are frightened at the emergence of a truly nationalist government who will insist on the sovereign rights of Angola to control both its territory and the seas appertaining there-to.[32]

It was in Nigeria's strategic interest to keep out hostile foreign interests particularly the racist South Africans from Angola because of its strategic location in the South Atlantic. This the Nigerian leadership understood and appreciated particularly seen in the light of the patriotic and militant nationalism of the MPLA. The Nigerian leadership realised that:

> The hope of foreign base to police this part of the Ocean is inconceivable unless puppets are installed in power.[33]

It is necessary to specifically focus on those national interests involved and to provide an analysis of the strategic importance of the South Atlantic which is termed Nigeria's security environment.[34] This security environment is in geopolitical terms defined as encompassing the immediate territorial waters of Nigeria and Cameroun. It is reaches up to the Bight of Bonny, the Bakasi peninsula and the Rio-del-Rey. This also included Equatorial Guinea (Fernado po), the Republic of Sao Tome and Principe extending as far south as Angola and Namibia.[35] It is significant to note that all of Nigeria's territorial waters are located in this South Atlantic region. This places on Nigeria, the enormous responsibility of defending not only its territorial waters but also ensuring that her off-shore oil and natural resources are not left vulnerable to hostile forces in the region. The Nigerian Head of State must have had this security environment in mind when he stated in his speech at the OAU Summit that:

> Then there are the vast natural resources with which the territory is endowed, and which had hitherto been exploited by foreigners.[36]

The problem the Nigerian Head of State explained is not just an isolated Angolan case but that of the whole of Africa. The new weapon of foreign meddlers he pointed out is no longer the Bible and the flag but destabilisation and armaments. Implicitly, the presence of South Africa in

Angola, at an immediate level, posed a threat to Nigeria's security but at a broader level generally to the whole of Africa. This is quite obvious when he advises that Africa:

> ... should show its awareness of this new danger and see the Angolan situation not as an isolated affair but as part of a greater danger which is designed to create instability in the continent and divert our attention from constructive pursuits.[37]

Therefore, Nigeria's primary strategic interest at stake in the Angolan decolonisation process as clearly seen by the leadership was security. Although the Nigerian leadership did not articulate other concrete issues at stake beyond recognising the threat to Nigeria's security interests in the South Atlantic, the main issue is that of security.

Then also from our earlier examination of the broad strands in Nigeria's African policy, South Africa's aggression thre declared foreign policy objectives. These are namely: anti-colonialism, anti-foreign intervention and anti-apartheid postures. Given these foreign policy objectives, Angola in a domino theory consideration was a frontline defense perimeter of advancing African nationalist forces bent on realising these objectives. In strategic consideratio and within the context of the declared objectives of Nigeria's African policy, Angola was a vital link in the defense cordon around racist South Africa. South Africa's invasion of Angola therefore threatened and compromised the interests embedded in Nigeria's foreign policy objectives earlier mentioned.

The threat to Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola as explained in the foregoing was clearly perceived and expressed by the Nigerian leadership. This is succintly explained by the Nigerian leader in his speech at the Addis Ababa Summit when he pointed out that:

> with the collapse of a pivotal point of the Lisbon - Pretoria - Salisbury axis, apartheid was doomed to come face to face with revolutionary Africa. The buffer zone having collapsed, the forces of freedom are at the very doorstep of the racists and the Apostle of Apartheid. This is the crisis situation that has led South africa to embark on the most daring adventure of sending an invading force into Angola.[38]

The invasion of Angola therefore threatened Nigeria's declared objectives of eliminating colonialism, apartheid and foreign intervention. It clearly threatened the balance of forces that was at that moment stacked in favour of African nationalist forces through whom Nigeria worked to realise its foreign policy objectives. A South African conquest of Angola would also have put the fate of the whole Southern African region in their firm grasp. This would have had devastating effects on weaker and smaller neighbouring African States. This in effect, would have meant a whole-scale re-arrangement of the geopolitical, economic, social and military landscape of Africa.

Then at a general level, the Angolan war was a foreign policy issue in which Nigeria staked her claim to a continental sphere of interest and influence. In Angola, Nigeria made bold an unequivocable claim to Africa as her area of jurisdiction in the exercise of

influence and to Angola as representing a vital strategic security interest. The speech of the Nigerian Head of State at the OAU Summit at Addis Ababa is as unambiguous about external intervention in africa as the US declaration in the Monroe doctrine. Making it clear that Africa affirms her right to self-determination, he declared that:

> Africa has come of age. It is no longer in the orbit of any extra-continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country, however powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or to mar.[39]

This speech means a declaration of Nigeria's sphere of interest in Africa. Her stand in Angola was a demonstration of this claim which is cloaked in the symbolism of African freedom. This is understandable particularly understood in the context of one of the cardinal realist principles which states that:

> political realism refuses to identify the moral aspiration of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. All nations are tempted - and few have been able to resist the temptation for long - to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe.[40]

In Angola, it is a situation of Nigeria clothing her own aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the African continent. It is starkly seen in this light, a declaration of Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola in particular and in Africa in general. In Angola as has earlier been stated, these interests were primarily security interests.

3.3 THE SOCIO-CULTURAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY THREAT OF SOUTH AFRICA TO NIGERIA

It has been stated in the preceeding section of the Chapter that the South African invasion of Angola threatened Nigeria's security interests. These interests can be examined in all the various aspects that made South africa's presence in Angola a threat to Nigeria's interests. That is the socio-cultural, political, economic and military aspects of the threat. Some of these aspects of the threat to Nigeria's interests are implicit given South Africa's apartheid system and others are explicit like in the military aspect.

The external linkages that sustain and promote the South AFrican threat shall also be examined. This will involve looking at the interests of the various States that prop up the South African threat. Such states by their relationships with South Africa and their sustenance of the apartheid system are themselves threats to Nigeria's interests. These relationships underscored the external interests and roles of some non-African powers in Angola. In examining the threats posed by South Africa in Angola, we bring out Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola.

A danger exists when examining the socio-cultural aspects of apartheid to hide the central economic reality of exploitation in racial empathy. To emphasize the racial aspects of apartheid is to bury the real issue

at stake just as to de-emphasize them is to "retreat into a kind of abstract humanism and cosmopolitanism under pressure from western 'liberal' and universalist manoeuvres".[41] This is because to understand the racist tenets of apartheid is to understand the economic and political implications of a system which represents a direct threat to every blackman on the African continent. The terrible implications of apartheid were to elicit from the Nigerian Head of State, Muhammed, the deepest feelings of loathing and dread when he declared in his speech at the OAU extra-ordinary summit on Angola in 1976 that:

> Mr Chairman, when I contemplate the evils of apartheid my heart bleeds and I am sure the heart of every true blooded African bleeds. When we talk of these evils we are assured of the sympathy of the western countries but when we call for sanctions to end this shame of western civilization, suddenly the glitter of gold in the form of high dividends becomes more convincing a consideration than the lives, the liberty and the well-being of Africans.[42]

The horror and grief expressed by the Nigerian leader is understandable because put in its pure logic, Apartheid means that about four million whites must totally control and dominate about twenty million blacks in South Africa. This is so, just in order to preserve white, western and christian values of civilization. This logic rests on the dangerous rationale that asserts the racial superiority of the Caucasian over the Negroid and other races. Racism itself is not a new belief having its roots planted in

human society as far back as the historical epoch of Greek civilization.

However, in South Africa, racism was developed by the early Boer settlers with an additional unique character. They sought to entrench it in a religious belief that the adherents of the Dutch Reformed Church were racially and spiritually superior to the indigenous people of South Africa. They believed that it was God's decree that they had been led to a land that was inhabited by a black race who were inferior to them and whose destiny could only be to do their work for them in slavery. They then established a Caste Society based on labour. *All hard labour was "Kaffir work" and socially degrading* for the settlers.

So within a generation the foundations were laid for develping a society of white masters and black servants. A society of people with inherent privileges and others with inherent duties.[44] This logic is practicalised through an educational 'Bantu' policy (the Bantu Education Act of 1953 and the separate University Education Bill of 1957) that aims at equipping blacks with the skills necessary for their defined roles in society.[45]

The socio-cultural implications of apartheid are manifest in the perverted logic that strips blacks of all human values. The apartheid policy is a systematic effort to make routine, the terrorization of the African spirit. It completely dehumanizes the African personality.

Apartheid is therefore a war to annihilate the humanity of the blackman.

The reality of the apartheid war against blacks translates into some of the most vicious legislation that has ever been known in the matter of cultural genocide. The urban Areas Act of 1945 amended by the Bantu laws Amendment of 1864 means for example, that no African shall remain for more than 72 hours in any urban, semi-urban, mining or any other "prescribed" area unless he produces proof that (i) he has since birth, resided continuously in such an area or (ii) he has worked continuously for an employer for a period of not less than 15 years.[46]

The apartheid system has a total control of blacks like laboratory rats. There is the "pass law" in which every African who has reached the age of 16 must at all times, be in possession of a "pass book". Any policeman in any place, at any hour of the day or night has the right to demand of an African his pass book. If he fails to provide this document he might forfeit his freedom with hard labour. Also, the African has no right to worship or to associate with his friends because the apartheid government has the right to restrict, ban, detain or deport him. Under the Immorality Amendment Act of 1950, it is an offence for any member of the four racial groups (blacks, whites, coloureds and Asians) to have sexual relations. Just as under the Mixed Marriages Act, the races cannot intermarry.[47]

Under the apartheid system, the blackman is a stranger, an alien in his own land and is perpetually a prey of the law which he has no say in its making. Apartheid is one of the most serious and sophisticated attempt to socially and culturally obliterate the black race. It is even the more serious because South Africa cannot separate its destiny from that of the rest of the continent. This implies that blacks everywhere in Africa are threatened with the fate of the blacks in South Africa. In this context then, the South african invasion of Angola was only a prelude to the grand and final onslaught on the rest of Africa. It is also with the bitter memories of the socio-cultural "evils" of the apartheid system that Nigeria's Head of State, after Murtala Muhammed affirmed his predecessor's stand by reiterating that the stand taken by Nigeria in the Angolan crisis should not be seen as uncompromising. Rather it should be seen as a logical and necessary stand to be taken by any administration in Nigeria which believes in justice and respectable human dignity, especially justice and respect for black people all over the world.[48]

The pseudo-theological and intellectual prop of apartheid politically defines masters and slaves with attendant privileges and duties. So politically apartheid translates into a "Bantustan policy" of separate development. The political system is based on a complete disenfranchisement

of the black majority and a repression of their rights. The political system also rests on the racist notion of white supremacy. The political marginalisation of blacks under apartheid prompted Nigeria's leader after Murtala, General Obasanjo to declare that:

> We believe that ostentatious 21-gun salure or red carpet treatment given to a black Head of Government or Head of State is meaningless as long as black people anywhere in the world are being treated as sub-human just because of the colour of their skin.[49]

To fully understand the political philosophy and implications of apartheid, we have to look at the historical precedence of racist Nazi Germany. This is because apartheid has more than an incidental relationship with the Nazi ideology. In fact the relationship between Nazism and apartheid has been stated by the exponents of apartheid themselves. Many of them including Verwoerd and Vorster spent some time in detention for pro-Nazi allegiance during the second world war.

It is instructive that both Nazism and apartheid are based on a racist conception of a historical mission. In 1940 for example, the REverend John Vorster, the brother of the South African Prime Minister said that Hitler's Mein Kampf (the Nazi Bible) was the:

> way to the path of grandeur and represents an example for South Africa. Hitler has given the Germans a vocation and a fanaticism that permitted them to retreat from no one. We must follow their example because only a sacred fanaticism such as theirs will permit us to carry out our vocation.[50]

In October 1941, Hertzog, a former Prime Minister said that Nationalism socialism (the Nazi ideology) in its true character was closely attuned to the spiritual and religious outlook of the Afrikaner nation. Prime Minister Vorster himself stated in 1942 that:

> we should stand for christian nationalism which is the all y of national socialism. You can call it the anti-democratic principle of dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called Facism... In Germany National Socialism and in South Africa christian nationalism.[51]

A core component of the political philosophy of National Socialism was the Fuehrer Prinzip or "leadership principle". Hitler, the Fuehrer was the supreme embodiment of leadership in the German nation. The Germans as the master race had the preordained right to lead the rest of the world even if this task or mission necessitated the extermination of large numbers of non-Germans. It is this same sense of predestined leadership of a historic mission that is so clear in the Reverend Jan Vorster's glorification of the Afrikaner "vocation" and his call for a sacred fanatism". He declared that:

> we have a sense of mission in respect of Africa... this is the spirit that inspires us - and this is the spirit that will conquer Africa.[52]

In fact the racist Boers have drawn a parallel between America's role in the under-developed countries of the world as a whole and what they see as South Africa's historic mission in much of Africa south of the Sahara.

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Thus Vorster sees the logical extension of apartheid in a leadership role for South Africa throughout the continent. Within the racist enclave, racial supremacy and the white leadership principle or Baaskap is an established core value of "Bantu education philosophy" Natives will be taught from childhood that equality with Europeans is not for them. Of course outside South Africa, the principle is replicated in the neo-colonization of Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Botswana and the Central African Republic, the colonial domination of Namibia and subversion of Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania and then blatant unprovocked aggression against Angola.[53]

The summary of the political implications of apartheid for the rest of Africa is captured in Mulder's speech in 1970 in which he declared that:

> The high point for Africa lies ahead, and the day will come when Africa reaches its high point and when it will form the empire that will rule and dominate the world. In that Africa, South Africa and the whiteman will play an extremely important role because we have the knowledge of Europe tempered with 300 years in Africa.[54]

In the context of this South African vision of its role in Africa, Angola was the first foothold or booty of the Boers after Namibia. If this mission was a South African dream, it represented a Nigerian nightmare. Nigeria had to stand firm against the South African threat to her interests as we have clearly analysed.

Our examination of the economic threat of South Africa will involve three interrelated aspects: the economics of apartheid, the foreign linkages that sustain and promote it, and the strategic interests of the western powers that benefit from the apartheid system. All these represent a direct threat to Nigeria's security interests.

As Frantz Fanon so aptly put it when explaining the real basis of racism the fact remains clear that:

> Questions of race are but a superstructure, a mantle, an obscure ideological emanation concealing an economic reality.[55]

The real objective of the apartheid system is economic exploitation. The dominant feature of the apartheid economy is its total dependence on black labour. This is shown by statistics of black labour predominance in all the vital sectors of the economy. For example, blacks outnumber whites by a ratio of 10:1 in mining, by almost 3:1 in manufacturing and 4:5 in construction.[56]

When the Nigerian Head of State, General Murtala Muhammed in his OAU speech talked of the "evils" of apartheid, he did not just use polemical expressions but also went on in the same speech to vividly describe the economic fate of the blackman under apartheid. A fate that South AFrica had illegally transplanted to Namibia and meant to repeat the same process in Aongola. A veritable threat to Nigeria's security interests. He lamented that:

> First we called attention to the diabolical role of apartheid. The main elements of that criminal doctrine are too well known to this Assembly to necessitate my detailed analysis. Suffice it is to say that the whole rationale behind this doctrine which the United Nations Organization has aptly condemned as a crime against Humanity is subjugation of the African in order to create a paradise on earth for the whites. Thus the 4 million whites do not only control all the instruments of government, to the total exclusion of the 15 million Africans, they also inflict on the Africans a repression unparalled in human history.[57]

But the real objective of economic exploitation is shown by the fact that the reward structure of the economy is heavily in favour of whites. White wages for example, in 1971 outstripped black by a ratio of 20:1 in mining, by 6:1 in manufacturing, construction and the universities.[197] In 1971 black wages in the mines averaged 16 Rand while whites averaged 333 Rand per month. In 1973, the black monthly wage had increased to 27 Rand while the white increased to 405 Rand.[58]

If the fate of the black employed is terrible, that of the unemployed is disastrous. They receive no unemployment insurance or other social benefits. He relies on other means of survival like friends, begging, borrowing or stealing. He is the worse off because of the implications of the already mentioned Urban Areas Act. According to this legislation, he could be classified as "idle" or "undesirable" and may be fined, imprisoned, conscripted into forced labour or be deported. This means forced breaking up of families, uprootment and disinheritance.

The logic is that since the blackman within the apartheid system exists only for the use of his labour, an unemployed black might as well not exist at all.

Inspite of the total dependence of the South African economy on black labour, the history and logic of the system shows a ceaseless objective to reduce the human beings who perform this functions to little more than inanimate units of labour. Even more significant, apartheid means affluence for a white minority and stark deprivation for a black majority. Thus even though he is only a mere 17% of the population, the whiteman receives 70% of the country's income while a black majority must struggle for meagre crumbs of 17%.[59]

Apartheid reflects two realities: opulent white and hungry black. The whiteman is what he is because the apartheid system reduces blacks to inhumanity. The terrible realities of the system for blacks is what motivated the Nigerian Head of State, Muhammed in his OAU speech to express his anguish that:

> The Africans are condemned to a life of misery, hunger, disease in a land literally flowing with milk and honey. They are no more than tools utilized by the whiteman in the interest of maintaining his high standard of living; as tools they are made to work in the white man's mines and farms to increase the white man's profit; as tools they are discarded and sent to pine and die in the so-called homeland when they are no longer able to serve as beast of burden.[60]

In essence, the apartheid system represents the most modernised and successful form of slavery.

The apartheid economy is sustained by foreign capital investment and this is significant when examining the economic threat of South Africa to Nigeria's strategic interests. It is in the light of this external linkage that scholars like Wilmot see it as neo-colony of western capitalist powers.[61] The relationship between the apartheid economy and direct foreign capitalist support is characterised by the following features: the predomiance of foreign investment in the South African economy, an extremely high rate of return on profits on investment. These features of capitalist support for apartheid illustrate the interests of the states that prop up the system.

The South African economy is highly dependent on foreign (western) investment. This is revealed by the pattern of her imports and export trade. In 1950 for example, Britain, the USA and the countries comprising the European Economic Community (EEC) were responsible for 64.8% of South Africa's imports and 63.2% of her exports (excluding Gold). In 1960, the figures were imports 66.5%, exports 48.3% while in 1970, they were imports 64.7%, exports 52.3%.[62]

Another significant feature of the relationship between the South African economy and foreign interests shows the predominance of external capital investment particuarly mining. According to the Financial Times of April 9, 1976, direct western investments in South Africa were £6.25 billion sterling. This according to

Newsweek of November 8, 1976 had been increasing until the Soweto massacres at an annual £1.75 billion. All vital sectors of the South African economy show the crucial role that foreign (western) capital investment plays in the production of the strategic minerals that make South Africa such a prized possession in western capitalist interests.[63]

It is for strategic reasons that for example, more than 400 American companies, among them 50 of the top US companies operate in South Africa. Not less than 600 British and over 700 top companies from various European countries have heavy investments in crucial areas of the South African economy.[64] This is most concentrated in extractive industries where for example, the giant Anglo-American Corporation and the Capitalist Boer Oppenheimer hold absolute control. From the production and distribution of Gold and diamonds as a nerve centre, Oppenheimer controls many sensitive areas of crucial minerals production. Nkrumah lists 127 major concerns in which the Anglo-American Corporation has direct investments. These include Finance and investment companies, Gold, Diamond, Copper, Coal, Manufacturing, Prospecting and Real Estate.[65]

Another important feature to be considered in the relationship between the South African economy and western capital is the extremely high rate of profits. The rate of return on profits on investments is usually 400%

or more higher than in the countries of origin of such investments. In the previously mentioned investment figures quoted from the Financial Times and Newsweek, the rate of return on profits on investments ranged between 16% and 21% for the United States and between 12% and 13% for Britain amounting to the highest rates of return on capital for the two countries for any area in the world.[66]

Therefore the volume of exports and imports, the dependence of the economy on western multinational corporations, the volume of foreign capital investment and the abnormally high rate of return on investments all conclusively show the cushion of western capitalist support that South Africa's economy relies on for survival. It is an economy that is propped up by foreign capital first in the interests of the investors of such capital and in the interest of the white South African Boers who benefit from it more than blacks. Blacks have no stake in a system that guarantees them only perpetual servitude and marginalisation. Therefore western capital and the crucial role it plays in the sustenance of the South African economy and apartheid system which promotes socio-cultural and political pogrom against blacks is a threat to the interests of Africa. The economic threat to Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola should be understood in this perspective.[67]

The threat of western capital to Africa is even the more threatening because of South Africa's penetration and control of most of the economies of the African States in the region. The Zambian copper industry, for example, until the Government take over of 51% of shares in 1969, was controlled by Anglo-American and Roan Trust in which South African capital was dominant. The South African group, De Beers consolidated is also prominent in all aspects of diamond production in all countries in the region. South Africa has also invested over £150 million Sterling in the Cunene Dam Complex in Southern Angola, an estimated £115 million Sterling in the Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique and hundreds of millions in various mining ventures in Namibia and Angola.[68]

The scale of South African penetration into what it considers its legitimate sphere of interest is therefore very threatening considering that no African country has direct investments in the Republic. In fact South Africa controls the fragile economies of the region. The South African threat in the light of its invasion of Angola could not be more obvious given the economic logic of apartheid South Africa as examined.

In another dimension, South Africa poses a direct military threat to several "frontline" African States. A threat that manifested itself practically in the invasion of Angola by a whole division of South African troops equipped with heavy armour, long range artillery and helicopters gunships. A threat that showed itself in the

fact that South africa sided with Portuguese colonialism and fought against African nationalist movements in Mozambique and Angola, South Africa as mentioned earlier had aided the secessionist attempt to dismember Nigeria. South African pilots are known to have flown several combat missions alongside Israeli forces against Egypt. Then also Rhodesia's white minority defiance of world opinion in its illegal declaration of independence from Britain was possible with direct South African military support. The South African illegal occupation of Namibia by force till 1990 not only shows the nasty military credentials of the Boers on the African continent but also greatly facilitated her invasion of Angola.

It has been mentioned earlier that the South African parliament passed a legislation which allowed its forces to militarily intervene in any African country south of the equator. It has carried out many military incursions into Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Switzerland, Lesotho. In collaboration with western powers South Africa has developed an impressive arsenal of conventional weapons and is thought creditably to possess nuclear weapons.[69]

South Africa is also strategically important to the western powers as a geopolitical and military base from which to monitor hostile naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the strategic Cape Sea route which for centuries has been a vital commercial waterway.[70] For example, an advanced system of computers, radar scanners and communications

equipment (PROJECT ADVOCATE) has been installed to do military monitoring for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Quite apart from the danger posed by the struggle for command of the southern sea lanes of commerce, there is also the struggle by the powers for possession of the economic resources of Southern African seabed and for strategic military positions like the huge military base at Walvis Bay on the Namibian sea shelf.

South Africa's value as a western ally depends on its location, on its willingness to make naval, air and communication bases available to the west, on its ability to control the southern oceanic routes. Therefore, South Africa's geopolitics, internal policies in conjunction with its strategic attractions form the bond of amity between it (the bastion of apartheid) and the western capitalist powers. It is therefore a highly threatening neo-colonial outpost set to distabilize Africa in the interest of the west. This was revealed in its invasion of Angola. Its strategic importance accounted for the previously tense American relationship with the former Soviet Union in the area posing a danger for African security. The invasion of Angola only brought nearer home, the established military threat of the apartheid enclave to Nigeria's strategic interests.

3.4 THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVASION OF ANGOLA

The analysis of the socio-cultural, political, economic and military aspect of South Africa's apartheid system serve

to depict the security threat of the Republic. A threat not only to Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola but also to the security of the African continent. In the light of this threat, its invasion of Angola was certainly an ominous situation. Drawing from the lessons of the insatiable and ceaseless aggression of the German Nazis and have sketched the 'blood' links between apartheid ard Nazism, we are in no doubt about the real motives of the Boers in Angola. In fact their motives are not in doubt anywhere on the African continent.

Perhaps even more serious is the issue of South Africa's possession of nuclear weapons. This ultimate weapon of modern warfare in South African hands means almost irrevocable consequences as far as Nigeria's security interests in Africa are concerned. it is known that a USA - South African agreement for co-operation in nuclear development including enriched Uranium has been in force since 1957.[71] In 1974, the agreement was amended and permitted South Africa to obtain more enriched uranium up to the year 2000.[72] Collaboration in nuclear development has been on for long even though it is the policy of either party to deny it. The climax of the nuclear conspiracy was the notorious 'Memorandum of understanding' engineered by the western powers under which the West German agency Steag transferred legal rights to the "jet nozzle system" to _South Africa's Uranium Corporation (UCOR).[73]

The possibility of South African conquest of Angola coming on the heels of the illegal occupation of Namibia would have seriously compromised Nigeria's security interests. The economically weak and politically unstable Central African States would not have offered any buffer to Nigeria's very borders. The importance of the Central African region to Nigeria lies in the role of a buffer in the latter's defence strategy given South Africa as the threat. Making this point plain, a former Nigerian Chief of Air Force, Air Vice Marshal Alfa, spoke on the possibility of a massive South African air attack on Nigeria. He declared that:

> this would be possibe only if Angola, Zaire, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroun were to lend their support. They could do this either by allowing South Africa to overfly their territories or to use their territories as launch pads against the territory of Nigeria.[74]

It is important to note here that the Central AFrican sub-region is made up of mostly former French colonies with military ties to France, Zaire and very weak States like Congo and Equatorial Guinea. Of all these countries, Equatorial Guinea is the most strategic to Nigeria's security. Located in the Bight of Benin of Nigeria's south-eastern flank, it is a very strategic beachhead for any maritime or air invasion of Nigeria. To stem this possibility and long-held fears of Nigeria, a non-aggression and Defence pact was signed with Equatorial Guinea in 1987 during President Mbasogo's state visit to Nigeria.[75] Apart from Equatorial Guinea, only Aongola

with its pro-marxist, radically nationalist MPLA regime held any concrete prospect of offering the desired buffer to Nigeria and her security interests in the South Atlantic region. This is why Angola's defence against South Africa was an utmost security interest priority for Nigeria.

3.5 CONCLUSION

We have examined Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola in all vital aspects within the general context of her permanent national interest of security. We can in the light of the aspects of these strategic interests draw some important conclusions from the security implications of the decolonisation process in Angola. This includes the implication of the linkages between the apartheid system in South Africa and the interests of the capitalist West for African security.

The loss of Angola to South Africa would have been vital strategic loss to Nigeria. This costly possibility would have resulted in the sustenance and entrenchment of apartheid in South Africa. It would have also increased South Africa's intransigence on political issues such as liberty, freedom and equality within Southern Africa and on vital issues of self-determination and independence of a greater part of Africa. This would have compromised many African States in the region. The South africans in Angola would have brought their awesome military arsenal within reach of Nigeria seriously compromising her security interests. The conquest of Angola by South Africa would

have led to the escalation of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations in Southern Africa leading progressively to complete distabilisation of the region. It would also have projected the struggle for mastery of South Africa's economic and strategic attractions on to the wider but related issues of African independence, peace and security.

Nigeria is not only part and parcel of the pan-African movement and goals and is also strongly committed to the cause of African security in a muturally interdependent Africa. This implication was affirmed by the Nigerian leadership of General Obasanjo when he declared that:

> for the benefit of Africans, we have to work together to fashion the course of events in Africa, not as patronising or bullying big brother, but as equal partners faced with the same threats and dangers, the same forms of exploitation and working to secure a better future for ourselves and for blackmen all over the world.[76]

Thus Nigeria cannot be directly or indirectly unaffected by events in any part of Africa particularly with regard to the possibility of South Africa's conquest of Angola. Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola were therefore primarily security interests based on the realities of South African and allied threats.

N O T E S

[1]A foreign policy of making African issues a primary focus. From an indealist perspective, this African policy is seen as projection of pan-Africanist ideas that seek to promote African cultural identity and unity. From a realist viewpoint, it has been flayed by critics who point out its incoherence and ineffectiveness. Ajene, O.G. 'Nigeria's African Policy since Independence: An analysis of the character and conduct of foreign policy' in Oculi, O. (ed). Nigerian Alternatives, Dept. of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria; 1987, pp. 309.

[2]What became known as the Monroe doctrine originated in the first instance in a controversy over a portion of the North-West American coastline between the USA and old Russia. In a second instance, it related to the former Spanish colonies in America. These colonies had revolted and their independence was recognised by the USA. It read in part thus:

> the American continents by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by European powers.

Encyclopedia Americana, (New York) Americana Co., 1829, Vol. 19, pp. 273-375.

Ogunsanwo, A. Our Friends, their friends (Yaba-Lagos= Alfa Communications Ltd., 1986, pp. 80.

[3]Ajene, O.G. op. cit. pp. 309.

[4]Israel perhaps rates among the most consistent and successful in pursuit of her goals in relation to Jewish protection world-wide. Examples abound of such actions as the Jewish-inspired U.S. influence of Russia on Jewish emigration from there, the Israeli raid on Entenbe airport (Uganda) in 1977 to free her citizens held hostage there, the airlift to Israel of the Falashas, Ethiopians of Jewish extraction in 1986 and 1991.

[5]Ajene, O.G. in Oculi, O. (ed), op. cit.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ogunsanwo, A. op. cit. pp. 22.

[8]Olusanya, G.O. and Akindele, R.A. (ed). Nigeria's External Relations: The first twenty-five years (Ibadan) University Press Ltd., 1986, pp. 4-5.

[9]Ibid. pp. 5

[10]Ibid. pp. 6

[11]Ibid. pp. 7

[12]Ibid. Other strands in Nigeria's African policy are the promotion of intra-African co-operation and commitment to a peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes.

[13]Nigeria's conception of a continental jurisdiction primarily casts her in the role of protector of African interests. The broad strands in her African policy are guidelines for the performance of this role.

[14]An address by Brigadier J.N. Garba, Commissioner for External Affairs at the University of Ibadan on "Foreign Policy and the problems of Economic Development", February 19, 1977, *quoted in Abegunrin, O.* Nigerian Foreign Policy Towards Southern Africa Liberation STruggles: A case study of the Zimbabwean Independence Struggle, 1979: Ph.D. Thesis, Howard University (Washingto, D.C) May 1979, pp. 104.

[15]DAILY SKETCH, June 8, 1976, pp. 16.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Wayas, J. Nigeria's Leadership Role in Africa, MacMillan Press Ltd., (London and Basisngstoke), 1979; pp. 46-47 and Ogunsanwo, op. cit. pp. 16

[18]Abegunrin, op. cit. pp. 99

[19]DAILY STAR, June 8, 1976.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Abegunrin, O. op. cit. pp. 93

[22]Nweke, A.G. African Security in the Nuclear AGe, Fourth Dimension Publishers (Enugu), 1985, Chapter 1 and Kolodzieg, E.A. and Harkavy, R.E. op cit. pp. 287

[23]Ibid. pp. 287

[24]Ibid. pp. 291

[25]Wilmot, P.F. 'Farewell to Arms: Coup d'etat or Revolutation?' in AFRICAN CONCORD, 12 December, 1988, Vol. 2, No. 37, pp. 12 and Apartheid and African Liberation - The Grief and the Hope (Ile-Ife) University of Ife Press Ltd., 1980, pp. 123

[26]Daily Sketch, June 8, 1976, pp. 16

[27]Ogunsanwo, A. op. cit. pp. 124-125

[28]Ibid. pp. 126

[29]Wilmot, op. cit. pp. 2

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ogunsanwo, op. cit. pp. 127

[32]Ibid.

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[35]Ogunsanwo, op. cit. pp. 127

[36]Ibid. pp. 130

[37]Ibid. pp. 127

[38]Ibid. pp. 131

[39]Morgenthau, H. Politics Among Nations - The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York) Alfred A. Knopf, 1963, pp. 4

[40]Wilmot, P.F. op. cit. pp. 4

[41]Sotumbi, A.O. op. cit. pp 21

[42]Wilmot, P.F. op. cit.

[43]Anyaoku, E. 'The Racial Factor in International Politics', Lecture Series, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Lagos), March 28 - April 1, 1977, pp. 10-20.

[44]Wilmot, P.F. op. cit. pp. 26

[45]Ibid. pp. 20

[46]Ibid. pp. 22

[47]Obasanjo, Olusegun: 'No going back on African freedom' in Daily Sketch, June 8, 1976, pp. 16

[48]Ibid.

[49]Wilmot, P.F. op. cit. pp. 5

[50]Ibid.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Ibid. pp. 6

[53]Ibid. pp. 27

[54]Fanon, F. The Wretched of the Earth, Harmonsworth, Penguin Books Ltd., 1963, pp. 167

[55]Wilmot, P.F. op. cit. pp. 30

[56]Ogunsanwo, op. cit. pp. 125

[57]Wilmot, op. cit.

[58]Ibid. pp. 31

[59]Ibid. pp. 35

[60]Ogunsanwo, op. cit. pp. 125

[61]Wilmot, op. cit. pp. 45

[62]Ibid. pp. 48

[63]Ibid. pp. 49

[64]Schuettinger, R.L. (ed). South Africa - The Vital Link, Council on American Affairs, 1976, pp. 12

[65]Wilmot, op. cit. pp. 52

[66]Ibid. pp. 48

[67]South African generally can only survive because it is part of Western imperialism. Ibid. pp. 78

[68]Ibid. pp. 52

[69]Nweke, op. cit. pp. 55

[70]Ibid. pp. 51

[71]Wayas, J. op. cit.

[72]Ibid.

[73]Wilmot, P.F. op. cit. pp 3, 55, 109

[74]Air Vice Marshal Alfa in an interview with DAILY TIMES of 21st June, 1989.

[75]Peters, S.B. and Aminu, L.S. (ed) op. cit. pp. 165 - these Nigerian fears were aroused in 1989 amidst reports that South Africa was helping to develop the runway of Malabo airport and build communication facilities.

[76]DAILY SKETCH, June 8, 1976, pp. 16

CHAPTER FOUR

NIGERIA'S CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGY IN THE DECOLONISATION PROCESS IN ANGOLA

4.0 INTRODUCTION

The objective of this chapter is to show the major factors that exert significant influences on the actions of the major actors involved in the Angolan decolonisation process - Nigeria, South africa, Zaire, Cuba and the liberation movements, FNLA, UNITA and the MPLA. This will show the range of options available to these actors. It will also reveal the strategy employed by Nigeria in particular in achieving her strategic interests in Angola. Because capability analysis is only meaningful in a comparative sense as a measurement of the power of one state against another this chapter will encompass an examination of the capabilities of Nigeria and some of the already mentioned major actors involved in the Angolan conflict.

Capability analysis in this chapter will feature a comparison of Nigeria's capability with South Africa because it was the military executor of the designs of the anti-MPLA forces; with Zaire because it was not only the haven of one of the major liberation movements that exerted great influence on the nature and course of the Angolan decolonisation process, the FNLA, it also had a major strategic interest in Angola. Cuba is also included

in the analysis because it not only had a declared interest in the conflict, it militarily provided the solution to South African aggression and helped to decide the conflict in favour of the MPLA and Nigeria.

The analysis will however exclude the USA and the former Soviet Union. This is principally because for the USA and the Soviet Union, Angola was a proxy war. A proxy war that prominently featured economic, propaganda, diplomatic and military aid to surrogate actors. In view of this, a capability analysis that features South Africa, Zaire, the FNLA and UNITA on the side of the USA and Cuba, the MPLA and non-proxy Nigeria on the side of the Soviet Union would adequately reflect the capabilities of the super powers as far as the Angolan war is concerned. The moreso because an analysis of the proxies would avail a direct influence of the scale of superpower aid and influence of the war instead of an unwieldly analysis of the superpowers themselves that would have no direct and meaningful bearing on the objectives of the study.

Some important factors that indicate the power of a nation with respect to other nations are called elements of "national power" which some have referred to as "State capability".[1] Some of these are geographical factors, population and manpower, leadership qualities, natural resources, economic potentials and military power.[2] We shall examine the internal and external environments of the actors involved in the Angolan crisis within the context of the international system.

Capability is defined as a nation's capacity to effect changes in the international environment in its own interests.[3] This however, does not include all the actions deemed advantageous to itself. This is because by means of its capability, a nation does what it can, and suffers what it must under circumstances beyond its capability to effect a change. This is also because in the international system, each state struggles to develop its own power. Each state struggles to marximise its power politically, economically and militarily. International politics is essentially power politics-struggle for power.[4] The factors that make the power of a state (as already listed) vis-a-viz other states are the elemental components which determine national power.

To a significant extent, the national power resources of a state avail it the capability to pursue the goals that enhance the achievement of its national interests in the international environment. This capability also determines the strategy that each state adopts in pursuit of its strategic national interests. This is also characteristic of Nigeria's role in the decolonisation process in Angola. A comparison of Nigeria's capabilities and South Africa's particularly with respect to economic and military indices of power will explain the non-combative military strategy adopted by Nigeria in Angola for instance.[5] As subsequent sections of this chapter will show, a combination of most of the instruments of foreign policy were employed

by Nigeria in pursuit of its strategic interests in Angola with a de-emphsis of the military instrument.

4.1 NIGERIA'S CAPABILITIES - SOCIO-POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, LEADERSHIP AND MILITARY VIS-A-VIS SOUTH AFRICA, ZAIRE

Considerable attention has been given by scholars to the linkage between the domestic environment of a state and its foreign policy. It has been forcefully argued that the foreign policy of any government is invariably influenced not just by the external environment, but also by important domestic factors and policies which are naturally projected abroad.[6]

The socio-political set-up of a nation is a major component of its domestic environment. It avails a nation the capability not only to formulate foreign policy but also to support it effectively and to project national power in the international environment. This socio-political set-up forms an ideal machinery for harnessing all resources for national power. It is in fact the wellspring of national capability.

The conservative, incoherent and ineffective stance that characterised Nigerian foreign policy between 1960 and 1966 is seen as essentially being the product of a socio-political arrangement that emphasized regional exclusiveness, religious bigotory, tribalism and mutual suspicion.[7] From 1970 up to the tail end of that decade, certain economic realities conditioned a socio-political

orientation that was to have a profound impact on Nigeria's foreign policy. To a large extent, Nigeria's foreign policy from 1970 was influenced by the bouyancy of her oil economy triggered by the Arab-inspired oil war against the west.[8] Another factor that strengthened Nigeria's socio-political capability was the remarkable magnanimity, reconsiliation and rehabilitation that characterised the end of the civil war. The unity of purpose with which the nation prosecuted the war against secession endowed it with some vital socio-political capability.[9] A capability that was sustained with the memory of the South African aid to secessionists which we have previously mentioned. Especially for the informed ruling elite that comprised the decision-making machinery of Nigeria, the South african involvement in the Angolan crisis could only elicit an aggressive and justifiable determination not to allow the racist Boers another opportunity to imperil Nigeria's strategic interests.

Another component of Nigeria's socio-political capability is the press. The press showed considerable interest in the political developments in Angola following the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in 1974. Although press reports about the Angolan situation cannot directly be said to have influenced the decision-makers on the issue, the balance of opinion of the press was overwhelmingly in favour of Nigeria's stand.[10]

A small but influential segment of the socio-political set-up of the country that helped in keeping on course the popular demand for a resolute stand against the South African invasion of Angola was the Nigerian Student body - the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS). This group which together with the press had been instrumental to the decision on a major foreign policy issue in the early 1960s was virulently vocal in its condemnation of the Boer adventurism in Angola.[11] They helped to keep alive, the purpose and desire of the Nigerian nation to spear-head a determined African stand against South Africa. By the end of the civil war, an increased literacy rate and an expanded Newspaper readership afforded the Nigerian leadership a medium of reaching the public with explanations of foreign policy problems and requests for mass support. A major segment of this enlightened public was the student body. Of course the ethnic differences between Nigerians that had previously caused turmoil and civil war had by no means disappeared. However no foreign policy issue had wrought such a broad-based consensus among the Nigerian population as the Angolan war. Pan-Africanist ideals that had been so de-emphasized by the earlier Nigerian leadership of the first Republic had been pushed to the fore by the military leaders of the 1970s. This conscious articulation of pan-Africanist ideals provided a medium for uniting the citizenry on a popular issue.[12]

One of the most significant developments that had a far-reaching influence on the decision-making process of Nigeria's foreign policy and the Angolan crisis was the increased influence of academics on the Nigerian leadership. By no means is it being inferred here that this development affected a magical transformation of Nigeria's foreign policy. It is however evident that this infused some radical inputs into the decision-making process in respect of foreign policy-making. A manifestation of the academic presence in foreign affairs was the establishment of the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs (NIIA) headed by an academic.[13]

The military leadership maintained a good rapport with the intellectuals of the NIIA perhaps because they (the academics) agreed with the military's more assertive role for Nigeria. In fact an attestation to the influence of the academics in foreign affairs is seen in the fact that one accusation levelled against Gowon by the officer Corps that later overthrew him was that he had ceased to be their leader and that they had lost him to the group of civilians in Lagos who surrounded him. The academic influence on foreign policy had the effect of bringing to bear on the decision-making process, a much more vigorous and effective Afro-centric orientation of policy. In fact the Angolan war is one issue academics were said to have had an overbearing influence on government policy.[14]

Our analysis has shown the socio-political disposition of influential segments of the Nigerian population as a component of the country's capability as at the time of the Angolan war. This is important because to be effective, foreign policy is supposed to be based on a consensus among whom it represents. This rests on the supposition that there is some kind of fundamental agreement on what kind of nation the ruling elite want and what it is, the ruling elite need from the external environment to further develop the national interest.[15]

Prior to 1966, one conspicuous feature of Nigerian policy was not only a perverted ideological commitment to the west but also an inability on the part of the leadership to unify its diverse sectional interests into a united and integrated nation.[16] The foundation for such a nation was laid by the reconciliatory and rehabilitative policies of Gowon after the civil war and the dynamic and effective policies of Murtala Muhammed on the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The basis for a Nigerian socio-political capability to take on such an economically and militarily formidable foe as South Africa therefore existed. One vital component of capability analysis thqat helps us to understand Nigeria's capability and strategy in Angola is that of leadership. it is necessary here that we analyse the structure of the leadership and the background of the leaders. By leadership it is meant the political control of the decision-making

machinery of the state. However our analysis of the Nigerian leadership will be limited to those that comprised the ruling regime at the time of the Angolan crisis. Thus we shall be examining the leadership under the Murtala/ Obasanjo regime. For uprposes of analysis here, the Murtala and the Obasanjo regimes are taken as one and the same. This is because although Obasanjo succeeded Murtala after the latter's assassination, no leadership or policy changes took place in the regime of the former.

NIGERIA'S LEADERSHIP (POLITICAL) STRUCTURE (JULY 1975-76

Following the change of government at the end of July 1975, a new governmental structure was established. It consisted of three organs, namely, a new Supreme Military Council (SMC), a National Council of States (NCS) and a Federal Executive Council (FEC).[17]

THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL

The new twenty-two member Council had the Head of State as Chairman. Also on the Council were the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Service Chiefs and the Inspector-General of Police. Others in the council were Divisional Military Commanders and representatives of senior officers in the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Police. However unlike its predecessor in the Gowon regime, the Council excluded Military Governors.

The functions of the new Council also differed from those of the old SMC. It was the highest policy.making body, providing the general policy-making guidelines within which the affairs of the nation must be conducted. The council's supremacy is obvious especially its function of "general supervision of the work of the National Council of States and the Federal Executive Council". More significantly, it is this council and not the national council of states or the Federal executive Council that is competent to take major domestic and foreign policy decisions. From all indications, therefore, it was only the SMC under the leadership of General Murtala that took the crucial decisions on the Angolan foreign policy issue.[18]

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATES

The National Council of States consisted of the Head of State and senior members of the SMC. It also included Military Governors of the States of the Federation. The decree setting up the three organs states that "the National Council of States is subject to the overall control of the Supreme Military Council".

THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Membership of the Council included the Head of State as Chairman, the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, the Inspector-General of Policy, the Attorney-General and civilian commissioners. The body was responsible for

determining and executing the general policy of the Federal Military Govern within such framework as may from time to time be determined by the SMC.

What emerges from this analysis of Nigeria's decision-making organs is the supremacy of the SMC over all other organs. The control of the SMC by the Head of State, General Murtala muhammed and the character of his personality then becomes crucial to our understanding of the leadership capability of the Nigerian State at the time of the Angolan war. This is because beside economic power and military capability, the quality of leadership has always exerted a decisive influence upon national power.

The objective of this section of Nigeria's leadership is to show how since July 29, 1975 Murtala Muhammed's administration had a major impact on Nigeria's foreign policy towards Southern Africa liberation and specifically on the Angolan decolonisation process. The Balewa and Gowon regimes are not included here because the leadership of Prime Minister Balewa and General Gowon had no major impact if any on Nigeria's foreign policy on Angola. So we shall concentrate on the perception of the Murtala regime. By perception it is meant the total sum of the background, the beliefs, values and preferences of policy-makers. This also mean the factors which influence their attitudes and views - what Brecher called "attitudinal prisms and elite images".[19]

Muhammed was a Northerner from Kano State and a muslim by faith. He came into the limelight during the civil war. He was then a Colonel and a Commander of

the Second Infantry Division of the Nigerian Army attempted, apparently against advice, to take the city of Onitsha in secessionist Biafra from the river town of Asaba in the then Mid-West State. The River Niger separates the two towns and was a serious obstacle which cost Muhammed the lives of several of his men before he was replaced. His stubborn pursuit of Onitsha, despite odds, was typical of his attitude to life. Obstacles were to him not unsurmountable This attitude was manifested in his reaction to the paper presented by his friend and colleague in the army, then Colonel Obasanjo on the African High Command. Muhammed held the view that there was no reason why Nigerian soldiers should not go and fight in South Africa itself alongside the liberation forces, whatever the obstacles.[20]

From these characteristics of his personality it is obvious that Muhammed as Head of State would not hesitate to push Nigeria into a confrontation with South Africa if the situation were to arise. The Angolan situation presented that opportunity when South African troops invaded the country on behalf of the beleaguered FNLA-UNITA group un August 1975. The Nigerian leader believed that he had to resolutely throw Nigeria's weight behind the opponents of South Africa in Angola, the MPLA Government. Muhammed's deep sense of justice partly explains his actions. As a deeply religious man, he believed that he ought to stand by what was right and condemn what was wrong. In the Angolan situation he was convinced

that the MPLA was right in resisting South African aggression while both the FNLA and UNITA were wrong for promoting it.

General Obasanjo's personality and background were different from Muhammed's despite the close personal relationship between them. Obasanjo unlike Muhammed is a christian and an engineer by training. While Muhammed was an idealist, he is pragmatic. Unlike Muhammed, Obasanjo is ready to argue his point of view and reach decisions by consensus. His commitment to the liberation of white-ruled territories in Southern Africa was not in doubt but he was less optimistic about the chances of a head-on confrontation with the white-controlled armies than Muhammed.

Alhaji M.D. Yusuf like Muhammed, was a muslim. As head of International security during Gowon's administration, he knew most army officers as well as had confidential information about them. This enabled him to wield enormous influence in government particularly after the overthrow of General Gowon. In addition, his good personal relations with Muhammed made it possible for him to influence policy issues in which he was interested. He was interested in the MPLA government and he helped to persuade the Head of State to recognise it.

As the Inspector-General of Police, Yusuf should normally have been concerned with matters relating to law and order but was concerned with external security as well. He also apparently shared the belief in high

government circles that if South africa were to succeed in installing a satellite government in Angola, it would ultimately attempt to control governments in Zaire, Mozambique and Nigeria. Then also in his previous capacity as Head of Security, the Inspector-General is said to have had extensive contacts with African liberation movements.

These three leaders of the Supreme Military Council (SMC); Muhammed, Obasanjo and Yusuf were knowledgeable in foreign affairs and together with a few other army officers were also active members of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.[21] Basically, the Nigerian leadership of the Murtala regime was far more pan-African and nationalist than any other before it. These young military officers brought new ideals, progressive and radical changes to the issue of African liberation. An important factor in Nigeria's leadership capability was General Murtala's personal control of foreign policy decision-making as Head of State.[22]

Thus the structure and perception of the leaders during Murtala's regime were a critical component in Nigeria's leadership capability in the Angolan decolonisation process. The obstinate determination and purpose, the deep sense of history, promptness of action, the radical and bold moves of Murtala complemented with the sleek caution and pragmatism of Obasanjo were qualities that were vital assets in Nigeria's leadership capability in the Angolan decolonisation process. This leadership

capability was so effective in favour of Nigeria's foreign policy that it dazzled and surprised friends and foes alike. It provided a most vigorous drive in the OAU's diplomatic machinery in favour of the MPLA government in thwarting the South African and American desire to refuse it international recognition. Even though a decisive victory could not be had at the crucial extra-ordinary OAU Summit on Angola, the stalmate that ensued denied South Africa the desired confusion and delay that it so badly needed to legitimise and consolidate its military offensive against Angola. The South Africans needed the diplomatic ineptitude and collusion of those African States that supported them to use the platform of the OAU to legitimise overt western military support to break the Cuban-aided military fortress of the MPLA. Nigeria's leadership capability as examined and shown was a decisive element in her capability in the Angolan decolonisation process.

One important factor in capability analysis is that estimates of national power are comparative in nature. They make meaning and are useful only when they are comparative. In this study, capability analysis can only then be meaningful when done by comparing the capabilities of the major actors in the Angolan war against each other. This comparative capability analysis could also help us to understand why for instance, Nigeria employed the strategy that she did in the conflict and how this helped in achieving its strategic interests in Angola.

Haven examined two components of Nigeria's capability, let us look at those of South Africa and Zaire. Apartheid South africa is a crisis-ridden society and must continue to live by the logic of its creation - hate and conflict. We had examined in the previous chapter, the socio-political philosophy of Apartheid, its origins, its inherent contradictions and threat to all forms of civilised life. The Apartheid policy of suppression and exploitation of non-white races ensures that the society is permanently at war with itself and with its neighbours. In fact it is a threat to any form of harmonious human existence. In the enclave itself, socio-political development is charted by a series of heinous barberity of the white-.controlled government, one after another.

Overwhelming evidence exists to prove that the history of the Boer Republic of South Africa since 1910 when independence was secured from the British is a history of massacres.[23] Since the implementation of Apartheid with the formal capture of power by the racist Afrikaner Nationalist Party in 1948, the society has lurched from one socio-political upheaval to the next particularly beginning from 1960. The bloody problems of the 1960s opened with Sharpeville: a black uprising against the intensification of apartheid with a police massacre of 67, leaving 186 grievously wounded.[24] The contradictory pressure of the 1950s had come to a head: the racism of Afrikaner nationalism versus the populist demand for

decolonisation and African nationalism. From Sharpeville up to the Angolan war of independence the bloodflood by massacres continued in South Africa unabated. The Soweto Riots of 1976 left 400 dead and 176 wounded. In fact the conclusion that it is sheer anarchy that is the South African society is made valid by the argument of the chief of the South African defense forces in 1977 that "every activity of the State must be seen and understood as a function of total war".[25]

South Africa is also socially and politically under external attack from the international community. In fact the "white tribe" was more isolated than ever at the beginning of the Angolan liberation war. It was on the retreat at all levels - global, continental, regional and national. It was subject to United Nations Sanctions, excluded from western alliances, shunned by African associations and targetted by domestic guerrillas. The April 1974 Lisbon coup in Portugal indicated the closing noose of the decolonisation trap with the independence of Mozambique and Angola. This increasingly led to South Africa's withdrawal into its laager mentality accentuating its cyclical spirals of violence: African resistance - white terror - reaction-backlash. In essence, what is discernible about South Africa at the period of the Angolan war is the full movement toward a garrison State. In fact its military adventure into Angola could be explained as the reaction of a besieged mentality. However as

shall be shown in subsequent sections of this chapter and the final one, South Africa lost the Angolan war not because of economic or military capability inadequacies.[26] It lost the war because of the nature of its socio-political capability which destroyed the very basis of its domestic power resources - its population. A population at war with itself cannot fight an external war and win. South Africa had to use most of her military and para-military at home for suppressing Black resistance to apartheid. In the second place, it could not also mobilize a large percentage of the active reserve who were academic, professional, managerial or skilled white workers without incurring the political hostility of the whites.[27]

Zaire is the other country whose capability is necessary for a thorough examination of the national power resources of the major State actors in the Angolan war. Although Zaire is a minor ally in the alliance against the MPLA because the power to take crucial decisions on the invasion of Angola did not lie with her but she is important in the study. This is because Zaire is the principal haven of one of the major liberation movements that played a crucial role in the Angolan decolonisation process - the FNLA.

Zaire is a country of over fifty ethnic groups that got its independence from Belgium in 1960. Exceedingly disruptive years of Belgian exploitation and misrule were largely responsible for the chaos into which the country plunged after independence.[28] The civil war

that ensued was ended with very biased UN support for the pro-western (capitalist) camp. The radical nationalist Prime Minister who stood boldly against the west was killed. For a while not too long after the civil war, the secession of mineral-rich Katanga and Kasai provinces was bloodily contained. The army intervention in the politics of Zaire in 1965 was to play a very significant role in Zaire's involvement in the Angolan war. That event brought then Colonel Joseph Mobutu to power.

The coming of Mobutu did not begin Zairean intervention in Angola, it only accelerated the already existing support for the Ba Kongo FNLA based in the Katanga province of Zaire.[29] Mobutu coveted the Angolan oil-rich enclave of Cabinda.[30] This factor together with that of Mobutu's filial ties with the FNLA formed a decisive background to Zaire's interest in and invasion of Angola along with the South Africans.[31]

Socially or politically, neither Mobutu's bloody dictatorship nor his unparalleled corruption has wrought any semblance of an integrated nation that can be readily mobilised to fight a war. In fact there was no concrete basis for a credible Zairean socio-political capability to fight a war in Angola. A war which appeared to be only motivated by Mobutu's greed masquerading in Bakongo . Solidarity and the need to pay the price of being a surrogate of the western alliance on whom he (Mobutu) must rely for survival.[32]

Central to the examination of Zaire's socio-political capability is the domineering feature of the dictatorship of military rule under mobutu. Although our analysis of Nigeria's socio-political capability also features the dictatorship of military rule, it is one that is devoid of the demagogic and facist nature of Mobutu's rule. This difference in the character of military rule within which our analysis takes place: extremely facist Mobutu and highly charismatic Muhammed, account for the difference in our approach to both states. In the same manner using the unique character of the apartheid state it is not possible to analyse South Africa's leadership capability using the same criteria that we have used in Nigeria's situation.

Our focus here shall therefore be on the institutions of political control - the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, the Dutch Reformed Church, the Broederbond, the South African Defence forces and the intelligence apparatus. These are the powerful interest groups and institutions that control political power in the South African State. We shall also briefly highlight the South African leadership perception. These features constitute South Africa's leadership capability.

THE AFRIKANER NATIONALIST PARTY

The Afrikaner Nationalist Party is an only white political party that represents the core of Boer racism and first came to power under Prime Minister James Hertzog

in 1924. However the systematic consolidation of apartheid by the Nationalists started in 1948 when Malan came to power.[33] The Nationalists brought a vigour to the segregating of the races with popular white support. Thus in 1956, coloured electors (mixed race) were removed from the common electoral register and the system further purified in favour of whites.[34] The Nationalists were in power under Voster when the Angolan invasion was planned and executed. A comprehensive examination of the political philosophy of the Nationalist Party is made in the third chapter of the study (pp 21-27).

The important point to note here is that apartheid is a sophisticated and integrated system in which all component units are functionally interdependent. What is even more significant here is the fact that Nationalist Party has a membership that cuts right accross that of the Broederbond and the Dutch Reformed Church.

THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH

Generally, the racism of Europeans covers a broad range of bigoted generalisations from Biology to Theology. While in the former field Europe sought some pseudo-empirical rationale in the latter, they insured their christian conscience with Biblical justification for their inhuman ideas and practices ingrained in racism.[35] Thus the Bible became a most effective tool of colonialists to pacify the hearts and minds of colonial victims. But

the Boer settlers developed racism in South Africa with a unique character. They sought devine justification in a religious belief that the adherents of the Dutch Reformed Church were a special people chosen by God. They believed that they were racially and spiritually superior to the indigenous African people. It was their destiny to lead this people as part of a spiritual injunction.[36]

The Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa therefore plays the crucial role of rationalising the christian conscience of the whites, the unhuman brutality that is apartheid.[37] It is the moral fountain of apartheid. The Church is the high priest of the system. In this light, no barbarity of the security apparatus is of any moral consequence. The leadership is thus morally santified in its implementation of the apartheid system.

THE BROEDERBOND

To consolidate its own political base, the Afrikaners created social, political and economic organizations designed to create horizontal links among the Afrinaker elites and vertical links to the base of the Afrikaner nation. The Broederbond which became a secret society in 1922 is the Afrikaner elite organization. Its ideology is based on the dominance of Afrikaner nationalism in the life of the State, its structure on a cross-section of dominant elite organization.[38]

The most basic unit of the Broederbond is any group of about twenty persons drawn from a cross-section of the elite in any given vicinity. It is led by a National Council of 12 (twelve) each representing such areas of specialization as labour, civil service, the press, religion, etc. Recruitment of members is highly restricted to Afrikaner white protestants who must be recommended by existing members and must pass stringent security checks about their political orientation and racial origin.

All Nationalist Party Prime Ministers have been members of the Broederbond. So also are all members of the South African white government cabinet, the diplomatic missions, the chief of Justice, the heads of the Dutch Reformed Churches, the Head of the Civil Service, Head of Defence forces (head of Army), chief of police, Head of Security Directorate, Chairman of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, Editors of all Afrikaner language Newspapers and periodicals, Vice-Chancellors of all Afrikaner and non-white universities.[39]

Besides the central Broederbond which oversees and articulates general Afrikaner interests, specialised institutions have been created in the fields of culture, education and finance. The Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Association (Federasie von Afrikanse Kultur Verenigings, FAK) was founded by the Broederbond in 1929 and exists to advance the interests of Afrikanerdom in all aspects of

cultural life. In 1938 the Broederbond created a financial institution, the Reddingsdadbond (RDB)'n in 1939 it established the Institute for Christian National Education and in 1947, the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA). Learned scholars at the Afrikaner University of Stellenbosch who are members of these organisations and the Broederbond were very influential in developing the apartheid concepts on which the Nationalist Party bases its policies.[40]

The Broederbond is thus totalitarian in concept and facist in principle and organization and creates conditions for the socialization of the Afrikaner into a distinctive ethos of Afrikanerdom. At the same time, because of its total commitment to ideology, organization and discipline, it has ensured control of the political system by committed Afrikaners.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCES AND THE INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS

The laager mentality of the Boers and the centrality of security to the affairs of State has pushed to the fore, the security machinery of the State in matters of state policy.[41] Included here are the South African Defence Forces (SADF) - the Army, Navy and Air Force; and the intelligence apparatus - the Department of National Security (DONS), formerly Bureau of State Security (BOSS).

The involvement of the military in state policy is facilitated by the omnious intelligence reports of DONS. This involvement of the military and intelligence community was actualised in Botha's revived, reorganized and strengthened Prime Minister's Department. This central secretariat services a set of working groups and cabinet-level committees. The most important of these committees is the resurrected statutory State Security Council (created in 1972). A body with the conveniently open-ended function of

> formation of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic.[42]

The totality of the ideological and function influences of these bodies on the South African policy ensures the unity of purpose, determination and resourcefulness that characterises South Africa's leadership capability. These institutions play critical roles in State policy and their influences must have been crucial to the South African decision on and performance in the Angolan decolonisation process. They therefore adequately characterise the nature and effectiveness of South Africa's leadership capability particularly at the period of the Angolan war.

The nature and quality of leadership capability as examined in South Africa is not the same with that of Zaire. In Zaire's case, any meaningful understanding of

leadership capability is possible only within the context of two vital factors - Bakongo nationalism and the totalitarian rule of Mobutu Sese Seko. These two factors explains Zaire's belligerent role in the Angolan war. These factors are however not effective pivots of national consensus particularly with regards to mobilisation of the nation in pursuit of State goals and interests in Angola. Zaire's leadership capability at the period of the Angolan war was absolutely defined by the whims and caprices of Mobutu.[43] Central to this capability was the age-old affinity with the Kongo of Angola which was adroitly exploited by Mobutu's greed for territory and influenced by the favourable deposition of circumstances and Zaire's surrogate role in the western, anti-socialist containment strategic doctrine.

These highly unstable amalgalm of features of Zaire's leadership capability could only achieve an active (bellingerent) but purposeless and disastrous drive of the Zairean military toward Luanda under covert CIA direction.[44]

ECONOMIC CAPABILITY

To a very large extent, a nation's natural and harnessed resources determine its behaviour in the international environment. This resource base as was stated earlier on in the chapter, influences the choice

of strategy that it employs in its pursuit of national interests in the face of the challenges posed by the actions of other States in the international environment. Economic capability is crucial to a state's ability to effect changes in the international environment in its own interests.[45] This economic capability is dependent on the natural resources that a nation is endowed with and how it is able to harness these effectively in furtherance of its interests. These interests are normally enshrined in its foreign policy.

In the years before the large-scale mechanization of warfare when hand-to-hand fighting was the prevalent military technique, other factors such as leadership qualities of individual soldiers were more important than the availability of the raw materials with which weapons were made. In that period of history which extended from the beginning of historical time into the 19th century, natural resources played a subordinate role in determining the power of a nation. But with the increasing mechanization of warfare, which since the industrial revolution has proceeded at a faster pace than in all previous history, national power has become more and more dependent upon the control and exploitation of raw materials in peace and war-times.

As the absolute importance of raw materials for national power has increased in proportion to the

mechanization of warfare, so also have certain raw materials gained importance over others. This has happened whenever fundamental changes in technology has called for the use of new raw materials and increased the use of old ones. Since the second world war, oil as a source of energy has become more and more important for industry and for war. Most mechanized weapons and vehicles are driven by oil. Consequently, countries that possess considerable deposits of oil have acquired an influence in international affairs which can be attributed primarily to their possession of oil.[46] The emergence of oil as an indispensable raw material has brought about a shift in the relative power of nations. This is why for instance the USA and the former Soviet Union become more powerful nations because of their better access to sources of oil until after the second world war when the Organisation of petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) took over as a world oil power.

Nigeria is blessed with many resources of which oil is the major one. She is a member of OPEC and the sixth largest oil producer in the world.[47] Since the end of the civil war in 1970, the state of the Nigerian oil economy determined to a considerable extent, the attention devoted to foreign affairs. This included

the range of options available to the Nigerian leadership on crucial matters of national interest. Nigeria's enormous revenue from exports of crude oil in the 1973 - 1975 period was crucial to the decision to support the Angolan MPLA government head on, inspite of the hostility of the USA and her west European allies to the Angolan regime. The unprecedented increase in the market price of oil that followed the 1973 Arab inspired oil embargo on selected western industrial consumers after the October Arab-Israeli war was to Nigeria's economic advantage.[48] Nigeria had taken advantage of the ensuing scarcity of Arab oil by increasing production thereby boosting her revenue base. The table below shows the remarkable growth of the country's external trade (including the vital oil sector) in the 1973-74 period.

The figures in the table show that the value of exports (especially oil) rose almost three-fold between 1973 and 1974 from ₦2,226.6 million to ₦6,030.7 million. The net balance of ₦2.7 million was unprecedented in Nigeria's history. External reserves also stood at ₦3.5 billion at the beginning of 1975.

The general bouyancy of Nigeria's oil economy led to the origin in the euphoric psyche of Nigerian leaders the idea that the country's problem was no longer lack of money. A reference to the country's

Table I: **EXTERNAL TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1974 (millions of Naira)**

	YEAR	OIL SECTOR	NON-OIL SECTOR	BOTH SECTORS
VISIBLE EXPORTS	1973	1913.6	313.0	2226.6
	1974	5522.8	507.9	6030.7
VISIBLE IMPORTS	1973	77.6	1156.4	1234.0
	1974	170.0	1559.3	1729.3
BALANCE VISIBLE	1973	1836.0	-843.4	992.6
	1974	5352.8	-1051.4	4301.4
BALANCE INVISIBLE	1973	-624.6	-262.7	-887.3
	1974	-561.2	-1007.5	-1568.7
NET BALANCE OF TRADE	1973	1211.4	-1106.1	105.3
	1974	4791.6	2058.9	2732.7

SOURCE: Quoted in Sotunmbi, A.O. Nigeria's Recognition of the MPLA Government of Angola: a case-study in decision-making and implementation. NIIA Monograph Series, No. 9, pp. 6.

past failure to implement development plans due to shortage of funds. The general tone of financial bouyancy and optimism was reflected in the country's foreign relations during the 1973-75 period. The huge proceeds from oil also largely explained the increased financial assistance to foreign Governments and organisations in that period.[49]

Nigeria's role in the decolonisation process in Angola and the considerable financial muscle required in taking on such a formidable opponent as the USA and her western allies should be evaluated against the background of Nigeria's financial prosperity and the consequent growing confidence of her leaders especially in their relations with African and non-African powers.[50]

In contrast to Nigeria's unpredictable mono-commodity economy, South Africa's economic capability rests on two interrelated pillars: the apartheid economy which guarantees privileged economic prosperity for the whites and high profits for the multitude of western multi-national corporations that sustain the economy and South Africa's strategic importance for the west in view of her immense mineral endowment. The significance of the apartheid economy for the whites of South Africa and the western world has been extensively dealt with in the previous chapter (Three). Here, we shall focus

on her rich mineral endowment and her capability to effectively harness these for sustaining her economy in the face of UN embargoes and for maintaining a formidable military machine.

South Africa is so richly endowed with minerals that she has been called the "Treasure House of the world".[51] The country has long been known as the land of Gold and Diamonds, but it is as a supplier of a wide range of strategic minerals that the country is of vital significance for the west. In addition to Gold and diamonds, the country contains the world's largest deposits of platinum group metals, manganese, vanadium and chrome.[52] Her reserves of uranium, asbestos, high-grade iron ore, antimony, vermiculite and flourspar are among the largest known reserves in the world. She also has large deposits of copper and coal.[53] More than fifty different minerals are mined in South Africa on a significant scale and the country contains large known deposits of every industrially important mineral except petroleum.

South Africa is the world's largest single supplier of manganese which is used in the production of most kinds of steel. Her manganese deposits are estimated at 68% of world reserves. She is the world's largest source of vanadium, accounting for almost half of world production and one-fifth of the world's reserves. South

Africa accounts for a quarter of the world's output of chrome. She also produces 43% of the world output of the platinum group metals which are essential as catalysts in oil refining and in the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizers (as well as automobile anti-pollution systems). Her platinum reserves made up 86% of the world's total. South Africa is also the largest producer of antimony in the former non-communist world and has the largest known reserves of vermiculite and Flourspar. She also has billions of tons of coal in thick seams close to the surface which makes it possible for her to have the lowest price of coal in the world.[54]

The country's enormous minerals wealth and production has led to leadership in related technology. South Africa has invented the jet nozzle process for producing enriched uranium which has a 30% cost advantage over the gaseous diffusion and centrifugal separation process. It is of significance that South Africa is also the world's leader in the technology of producing oil from coal.[55]

The significance of this mind-boggling mineral endowment is two-fold: first it means an extensive South African economic leverage in committing the economic fortunes of the industrialised nations to the prosperity of her raw material production. Secondly, it means South Africa could more easily than say Nigeria or Zaire,

harness her mineral wealth and commit it to the full development of her military industrial complex (MIC) as she already has done with her uranium reserves in her Nuclear development programme, and that the western world would avail South Africa every conceivable means in its defense against the forces of African nationalism.[56] These linkages played a significant role in the effectiveness of the South African war economy in the Angolan war. The South African economy had the capability to sustain her military adventure in Angola for an appreciable length of time. The problem of the South African war machine was more political than economic or anything else.[57] Besides, the South African economy had to bear the brunt of being the strongest antagonist of the MPLA regime.

One of the weakest props of the anti-MPLA alliance was Zaire. The major reason for this Zairean inadequacy was her battered economy. In fact the military adventure into Angola was also an opportunity for the Zairean leadership to distract the nation's attention from the explosive economic crisis. It represented an expression of Mobutu's greedy ambition to better Zaire's economic fortunes by sharing in the probable gains of victory in Angola particularly the oil-rich Cabinda enclave which Mobutu had laid claim to.

Like most developing countries, Zaire is an exporter of primary products but its economy is not based on one crop alone. Before 1960 exports of minerals and crops were relatively diversified. But an agricultural economic crisis caused by inflation and political instability have given an added importance to Copper and associated products within the export category. The Zairean exports which play such an important part in the country's foreign exchange earnings are essentially agricultural products (palm oil, coffee, cotton, timber, rubber, etc) and minerals (copper and its associated metals, diamonds, tin and gold). Copper and its by-product cobalt provide between 65 and 75% of Zaire's export earnings depending on the world Copper price.[58]

By early 1975, the Zairean economy took a decisive turn for the worse due to crashed Copper prices world-wide.[59] Plunging copper prices dwindled Zaire's major foreign exchange earning source. Prices which were $3,000 per ton in 1974 had fallen to $1,000 per ton. On the other hand prices of imported goods were increasing steadily as a result of inflation. Thus for instance, petroleum imports had increased from $50 million per year to $200 million per year. Zaire was also spending more than 30% of her foreign exchange to pay for imports of foodstuffs alone. Zaire was forced to turn to foreign assistance notably the IMF. In fact the South African

government had to come to Zaire's rescue in 1975 by increasing Trade particularly in foodstuffs and fuel and by underwriting the losses of South African exporters. To compound the crisis of crashed copper prices, the port of Lobito and the Benguela railway line - the main access route for supplies to the Copperbelt and the cheapest copper export route were closed as a result of the Angolan war.[60]

Zaire's economic predicament particularly at the period of the Angolan decolonisation was belies her economic potentials. She has the biggest known cobalt reserves in the world. She also has considerable reserves of copper, manganese, diamonds, petroleum, coal and the highest hydroelectric potentials of the African continent.[61] All these resources have not been harnessed due to dictatorial misrule, corruption, political instability, national disunity and the distabilising influence of foreign capital.[62] Zaire had neither the economic muscle nor the socio-political will to fight a war in Angola and these inadequacies are reflected in her military capability and role in the war.

A socio-political and economic capability analysis of Cuba is similar to South Africa's. This is because Cuba is also a country with a mass ideology. The socialist ideology is the basis of Cuba's socio-political and economic values and perception of international politics and its interaction with the rest of the world. Socialism

espoused by Karl Marx, Engels and Lenin. In this ideology, politics is seen in terms of a class conflict at the national as well as international levels.[63] The laws of social development are inexonerable. Social development is the product of inevitable social conflict. A conflict of two principal classes that exist in a capitalist society: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In this capitalist society, it is the bourgeoisie that dominates and controls the production process. However inevitable conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will bring about the demise of the capitalist system.

So capitalism will go and so will be the fate of imperialism which is an inevitable product of internal capitalist contradictions and is characterised by economic and socio-political influence, control and domination of other nations by the capitalist powers. International political reality can be understood by the laws of social development as laid down by Marx, interpreted by Engels and applied by Lenin. The conflict of the socialist and non-socialist systems in the international arena is inevitable. In view of this, the moral as well as material support of the socialist states to the slave countries (held bondage by capitalist imperialism) of the world in their struggle for liberation is a scared duty.[64] It is all done with the objective of weakening the forces of the bourgeois capitalist states. Therefore Angola under

the rule of the pro-socialist MPLA deserved the wholescale political, economic and military support of Socialist Cuba against pro-capitalist FNLA, UNITA and racist South Africa.

But what socio-political and economic conditions have sustained Cuba's socialism and endowed it with the capability to give military support to the MPLA ? Cuba is a country of 9 million people and relies mainly on sugar exports most of which go to the former USSR and China. Industrial growth has averaged 6.25% annually since 1961.[65] Since the 1961 US backed invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles, it has not only been economically boycotted but blockaded by the USA. So Cuba has made self-reliance a national priority. So successful has Cuba been in self-sustained growth that it has more doctors per head of population than does France (159 per 100,000 while France has 135 per 100,000=. Life expectancy is high even by the standards of the developed world, 75 years for women and 71.5 years for men and Cuba has eliminated illiteracy.[66]

Cuba's leadership capability immensely underlies her support of the MPLA. This leadership capability revolves around the charisma, courage and defiance of Fidel Castro. A leader whose country is only 90 miles off the US coast but has since the Cuban Revolution defied American blandishments, intimidation, coercion and even assassination attempts. Castro's socialism has not only defied hostile capitalist American forces but has also made a significant impact on

the international arena particularly his espousal of non-alignment. As affirmed by the final resolution of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Conference at Havana (Cuba), Fidel's Cuba believes that the quintessence of non-alignment in accordance with its original principles and essential character which:

> involves the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism including Zionism and all forms of foreign occupation, domination, interference or hegemony, as well as against great power and bloc policies.[67]

Cuba's stand on Angola as declared by Castro and given the socialist socio-political and economic values and underlie her military and definance of one of the most powerful capitalist nations, the USA could be nothing less than solid in favour of the nation liberation of Angola. In fact Castro's declaration is as unambigous as it is bold:

> Yankee imperialism without scruples of any kind, has launched South African mercenary troops in an attempt to crush Angola's independence and is now outraged by our help to Angola, our support for and our defense of Africa. In keeping with the duties rooted in our principles, our ideology, our convictions and our very blood, we shall defend Angola and Africa! Let the South African racists and the Yankee imperialists be warned. We are part of the world Revolutionary movement and in Africa's struggle against racists and imperialists, we'll stand, without any hesitation, side by side with the people of Africa.[68]

This is why Cuba with an Army of 90.000 several thousands of miles away from Angola could afford an expeditionary defence of 20,000 equipped with 122mm Rockets and T34 and T54 tanks in aid of the MPLA.[69]

MILITARY CAPABILITY

To a significant extent, military capability is a product of the other components of capability that we have examined (leadership, socio-political and economic).[70] It physically shows the devotion of a nation's resources in providing a credible weapon to provide for itself, security. The table below gives us some guidance in a comparative analysis of the military power of the States that were directly involved in the Angolan war.

As can be clearly seen in a comparative analysis (whether quantitative or qualitative) as shown by the statistics on Table II, South Africa even if taken alone, has a visible edge over all the other countries combined. This is in terms of variety, sophistication, quantity and quality of armaments. Noteworthy here also is the fact (though not indicated on the table) that South Africa shares military secrets with the advanced war industries of the west.[71] As also shown on the table, South Africa is quite unmatched by any of the Black African countries in terms of mobilization and organisation of the civil population for war.[72] The continuous involvement of various groups of the citizenry in military training and even combat roles means that South Africa is better prepared psychologically and physically for war than Nigeria and Angola for instance. When the military capabilities of South Africa and Zaire and compared to those of Nigeria and Angola, it is quite clear that

TABLE II: COMPARATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA, ZAIRE, NIGERIA & ANGOLA

COUNTRY	POPULATION	TYPE OF MILITARY SERVICE	TOTAL ARMED FORCES	ESTIMATED GNP 1975	DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 1976-77	ARMY	NAVY	AIRFORCE	RESERVES
SOUTH AFRICA	26.230.000 (4,300.000 Whites).	12 months	51,500 including 25.400 Conscripts	334.6 billion	1,300 million Rand (21.494 million)	38,000 including 31.000 Conscripts (180 Women) 1 Armoured Brigade 11 Mechanized Brigade 3 Motorized Brigades 3 Parachute Battalions 6 Field and 2 Medium Artillery Regiments 6 Light Anti-Aircraft Artillery	5,000 including 1,400 Conscripts 3 Daphne - class Submarines 2 Destroyers with 2 SAAF helicopters 5 MSM Frigates (2 with 1 WASP helicopter) 1 Escort minesweeper (Training Ship) 10 Coastal Minesweepers 5 Patrol Craft	8,500 including 3,000 Conscripts 133 Combat aircraft 2 Light Bomber Squadrons	138,000 active Reserve (Citizen Force Reservists serve 19 days per year for 5 years in the Army. There is also a 10,200 strong Citizen Force with 1 Frigate and 7 Mine-sweepers for the Navy

TABLE II: COMPARATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA, ZAIRE, NIGERIA AND ANGOLA.

COUNTRY	POPULATION	TYPE OF MILITARY SERVICE	TOTAL ARMED FORCES	ESTIMATED GNP 1975	DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 1976-77	ARMY	NAVY	AIRFORCE	RESERVE
SOUTH AFRICA						8 Field Engineers Squadrons. 5 Signals Regiments.		2 light Bomber Squadrons. 4 FGA Squadrons. 1 Fighter/ recce Squadron 1 Interceptor Squadron. 2 MR Squadrons. 4 Transport Squadrons. 4 Helicopter Squadrons. 2 Communications and Liaison Squadrons.	The Air Force has a 25,000 strong citizen Force in 6 Squadrons. PARA-MILITARY FORCES: 90,000 Commandos (Infantry battalion-type units) grouped in Formation of 5 or more units with local industrial and rural protection duties. Members do 12 months initi and 19 days annual trainin There are 12 Air Commando Squadrons with private aircraft. Men aged between 26 and 3 do 84 days continuous training, followed by 5- week periods of active service in the territoria Forces. Men aged 35 - 3 do 5 week periods of act service with the Police Reserve: The Territoria Force contains 10 battal with an estimated 1,000 support units. There is

TABLE II: COMPARATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA, ZAIRE, NIGERIA AND ANGOLA.

COUNTRY	POPULATION	TYPE OF MILITARY SERVICE	TOTAL ARMED FORCES	ESTIMATED GNP 1975	DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 1976-77	ARMY	NAVY	AIRFORCE	RESERVES
ANGOLA	5,460,000	Voluntary	30,000			30,000	5 landing craft	Some MIG-15/-17/-21, 30-31 fighters, 3 transport aircraft, some helicopters.	
	Some 20,000 Cubans serving with the Angolan forces and operate Aircraft and heavy equipment. Some Portuguese. Soviet advisers and technicians.								
NIGERIA	64,620,000	Voluntary	230,000	$22.8 billion	$1,521 million ($2,434) million	221,000 4 Infantry Divisions. 4 Recce Regiments. 4 Artillery Regiments. 4 Engineer Regiments.	3,500	5,500 24 Combat aircraft.	10,000 Reserves for the Army and 2,000 for the Navy.

TABLE II: COMPARATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA, ZAIRE, NIGERIA AND ANGOLA.

COUNTRY	POPULATION	TYPE OF MILITARY SERVICE	TOTAL ARMED FORCES	ESTIMATED GNP 1974	DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 1976-77	ARMY	NAVY	AIRFORCE	RESERVES
ZAIRE	25,600,000	Voluntary	43,400	$3.5 billion	78.8 million Zaires ($157) million	40,000 1 armoured battalion 1 Mechanized battalion 14 Infantry battalions 7 Parachute battalions 4 Guard battalions.	4,000 170-ton Coastal Patrol Craft. 11 Patrol Boats.	3,000 40 Combat aircraft 1 Fighter Squadron 2 Coin Squadrons 1 Transport Wing 1 Helicopter Squadron	Para-Military forces: 20,000 - 8 National Guard and 6 Gendarmerie battalions.

SOURCE: THE MILITARY BALANCE - THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (IISS) 1976-77

the latter group-stood no chance of withstanding aggression the former group.

Even if we include the 20,000 Cubans that were deployed in Angola, the comparism is still unequal because Nigeria did not commit her troops in support of the MPLA government. It only gave military (logistic) support. The disparity between the South Africans and her allies and the Angolans is becomes even clearer when we consider the actual deployment of forces on either side as could be seen in the next section of this chapter.

4.1.1 THE BALANCE OF FORCES: SOUTH AFRICA, ZAIRE, UNITA/FNLA, USA VERSUS MPLA, CUBA, USSR

The balance of forces in the Angolan war as mentioned and explained in the second chapter was characterised by the following picture on the battle ground: a full division (between 15,000 - 20,000) of South African troops equipped with heavy armour, long-range artillery and helicopter gunships drawing from a reservoir of between 20,000 - 45,000 stationed in neighbouring Namibia were deployed in Angola.[73] The South Africans were also equipped with Centurion and Sharman tanks, panhard armoured vehicles, Aloutte helicopter gunships, Lookheed C47,, Hercules C130 and C141 Starlifter transport planes. In addition they had 140mm Rockets, anti-tank missiles and heavy machine guns.[74]

The South Africans also enjoyed a vast air superiority with over 700 aircraft of all types. They were supported by American, Portuguese, French, British and Belgian merchanaries. Some estimated 21,750 FNLA and estimated 3,000 UNITA forces and 2,750 Chipenda faction who in full collaboration with the South Africans had good intelligence information of the terrain and had established compact supply lines. Backing up all these were regular forces from Zaire.[65]

Facing this almost invincible array of manpower and sophisticated military hardware were at most 20,000 Cubans, some 5,500 MPLA forces supported by small contigents from Guinea, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and volunteers from other African countries.[76] These were equipped with 122mm rockets, T34 and T54 tanks supplied by the Soviet Union and Cuba. While the South Africans enjoyed unassailable air superiority, the Angolan airforce was barely existent with 20 aircraft including some MIG 15 and MIG 17 trainer aircraft. Whereas the anti-MPLA forces from bases within the racist enclave itself were assured of constant and reliable logistics, together with ports or airports along most of the Angolan coast in Southern and Northern Angola, in Zaire, Zambia and Namibia, those of the Angolan forces were restricted to the ports and airport of Luanda, running through Brazzaville to Cuba and the Soviet Union.[77] Whereas Cuba, the main ally of

the MPLA had an army of 90,000 several thousand miles away from which to draw reinforcements, the South Africans could mobilise up to 265,000 troops, could field about 150,000 in two days, and up to 500,000 or more in a period of weeks.[78] *Inspite of the US congress defeat* of the Ford-Kissinger request for funds to continue aiding the racists and their allies, Kissinger had given Vorster private assurances that American arms would be supplied through Iran and Israel.[79]

The conclusive evidence from the foregoing makes clear, the preponderantly superior military capability of the South Africans and their allies. That they lost the Angolan war points to reasons other than military capability. The superiority of the South Africans could only be creditably countered by a full combat commitment of Nigerian forces to the conflict. However Nigeria's role and strategy in Angola was by no means ineffective and peripheral despite her non-combative involvement. For various strategic reasons as explained in the third chapter, Nigeria committed her resources to the conflict to offset the South african armada stacked against the puny forces of the MPLA and her allies. A superior military capability notwithstanding, it is puzzling why the mighty army of the South Africans failed to achieve its military objective in Angola. This poser might be explained by examining Nigeria's strategy in achieving its strategic interests in Angola even in view of her non-combative role coupled with the inferior military capability of her allies.

4.1.2 THE OAU FRONT AND NIGERIAN INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE ANGOLAN CRISIS

The intention of the USA and France had been to prevent a deluge of MPLA recognition from other African leaders, if only to demonstrate to the world that it was only a minority of "militant" and "radical" leaders in Africa who had recognised the MPLA.[80] Without any reliable intelligence sources and knowledge of the massive covert CIA supply of the FNLA, UNITA and Zaire with weapons and advisers, the OAU stuck to its call for a government of National Unity embracing all the liberation movements. This was the position as the OAU ended its annual summit in Kampala in August 1975.

The Nigerian government's efforts in its Angolan policy continued relentlessly in the period leading to and after the extra-ordinary summit of the OAU on Angola from January 11-13, 1976. The outcome of the summit was for Nigerian foreign policy, a resounding success.[81] Inspite of the all-out diplomatic blitz by US President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the underground French subterfuge, it was not possible to make the label of a militant minority of OAU members stick. Some twenty-two African States had recognised the MPLA government although twenty-two others voted against recognition, none had recognised the FNLA-UNITA coalition with its capital at Huambo.

The US administration's position had been undermined by Congress and the opportunity it was looking forward to demonstrate that the majority of African States were opposed to the MPLA government and therefore regain Congress support for its policy failed to materialize.[82] As a result of the considerable recognition of the MPLA, the South African position became quite untenable without continued US backing and support from Mobutu and Kaunda. Therefore, under the credibility of the OAU front (though stalemated position) the MPLA government was universally recognised within a very short time. This recognition of the MPLA owed much to relentless Nigerian diplomacy.

4.2 NIGERIA'S STRATEGY IN ANGOLA - DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENTS AS A SHIELD FOR THE MPLA/CUBAN MILITARY ALLIANCE

Prelude to Nigeria's diplomatic recognition of the MPLA government in Angola on November 25, 1975, a Nigerian fact-finding mission to Angola had revealed that South African and UNITA forces were only 75 kilometres from Luanda.[83] A penetration by South Africa into Angola of more than 900 kilometres. This discovery changed Nigeria's role and strategy in Angola. From a supporter of the western-inspired OAU stand on a government of national unity embracing all the liberation movements, Nigeria redefined its objective in the conflict and declared the South African invasion of Angola a hostile act against its strategic interests. This latter stand defined Nigeria's role and strategy in Angola.

(i) DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

Once Nigeria had taken a stand on recognising the MPLA government she adopted an aggressive diplomatic canvassing approach for worldwide diplomatic recognition of the MPLA. This was aimed at achieving diplomatic recognition that would legitimise and invest the MPLA government with international acceptability.

The announcement recognising the MPLA government was made through a press release in Lagos on November 25, 1975. The statement explained why the Federal Government was no longer interested in pursuing a policy of reconciliation of the three liberation movements and had chosen to back the MPLA alone. The reason was South African military intervention on behalf of the two other nationalist groups. The statement also condemned foriegn troops fostering the division of Angola.[84]

However, only three weeks before, the government had condemned the Soviet Union for attempting to use the OAU Chairman to rally African support for the MPLA. But but by November 25, when she recognised the MPLA government, Nigeria was ready to accept the Soviet role. It is significant that the recognition statement asking for the withdrawal of all foreign troops did not specifically mention Cuba, the Soviet Union's surrogate in Angola, while it condemned South africa. On January 11, 1976, at the Extra-ordinary Summit of the OAU, the Federal Government even praised the 'heroic role' of the Soviet Union in the liberation war in Africa.[85]

The reassessment of the Soviet role in Angola stemmed from the realisation that despite the enthusiasm of Nigerian leaders for the defeat of racist South Africa, no single African country could confront it alone. The Nigerian policy makers knew that when the chips were down, the racist Boers could fall back on the resources of their allies in the west and this made them the more formidable. They were also aware that the USA haven been prevented from intervening openly in the Angolan war had encouraged South Africa in its adventure. There was therefore the need to acquiesce to the Soviet - Cuba intervention. These foreign powers could assist the MPLA government to establish its authority in Angola which Nigeria provided diplomatic and material assistance for the regime. Such assistance would still enable Nigeria to play a leading role in Angola and enhance its image in Africa.

Within Africa, Nigeria become the major external spokesman of the Angolan government. Delegations were sent to several African countries to argue the MPLA case for recognition. Nigeria's reaction to the US anti-MPLA lobby in December 1975 also provided crucial diplomatic support for the Angolans.[86] For the Angolan government, the anti-US blitz was a further demonstration of Nigeria's diplomatic support. The aggressive diplomatic canvassing by the Nigerian government was the one solid support in Africa that thwarted the US attempt to legitimise the South African aggression against Angola.

(ii) ECONOMIC STRATEGY

The desire to play a leading role in Angola led to the commitment of a portion of Nigeria's resources to the MPLA government. On December 8, 1975 the government announced an outright grant of $20 million to the Angolan regime. In addition to this gift Nigeria made a further promise of material assistance worth about $100 million.[87] The Nigerian government further set up a committee to co-ordinate aid efforts to Angola headed by the then Commissioner for Defence, the then Brigadier I.D. Bissalla. The government also promised a lot of weaponry would be supplied to the Angolans. While the material aid to Angola for its defence could be adjudged inconsequential in view of the fact that it did not amount to the expected warchest for prosecuting a war against such a formidable enemy as the South Africans, it complemented the diplomatic efforts. This aid strengthened the cause of the Angolan nationalists.

(iii) PROPAGANDA STRATEGY

The diplomatic and propaganda shield provided by Nigeria in Angola's defence proved invaluable to the cause of Angolan independence and African nationalism. It had been a major objective of the USA to use the OAU to slant the Angolan war in the ideological power struggle of the east-west. This was meant to achieve two major objectives: to canvass domestic (American) public support

for surrogate South Africa and so use the OAU to legitimise the South african aggression against Angola.[88] For these reasons, the Americans were vocal in condemning Soviet Communist meddling in an area that was considered within the western sphere of influence. The real issue of South African aggression against Angola was ignored by the US, its allies and the western media. This anti-MPLA propaganda had been so effective that for sometime Nigeria herself did not believe the MPLA outcry of South African aggression.

There is little doubt in the assertion that American lobby for non-recognition of the MPLA government at the extra-ordinary OAU Summit at Addis Ababa would have succeeded without Nigeria's powerful and articulate expression of the issues at stake in Angola. The speech of the Nigerian Head of State, the late General Murtala Muhammed could not be more blunt and articulate:

> Angola is merely the excuse being used by those who cannot reconcile themselves to the momentous victories of the forces of African nationalism to assert their neo-colonialist ambitions in the continent. Angola merely provides the occasion to recreate the 19th century partition of Africa into spheres of influence where the predominant consideration will be the interests of the big powers without any consideration for the inalienable rights of Africa. Let us therefore make no mistake about the problem which confronts us at this session. It is not the question of simple disagreement between Angolans requiring a simple solution in the African tradition. Rather, it is a much deeper danger of extra-African powers in collusion with the inhuman and obnoxious Apartheid regime in Pretoria trying to frustrate the will of a people who have sustained a heroic struggle against a most brutal colonialist repression to self-determination.[89]

The spontaneous public support for this stand on Angola and its favourable reception by many African countries not only countered the negative propaganda alleging Soviet expansionism but also helped in resolving the will of many countries to repudiate US blandisments and to recognise the MPLA government. Therefore a combination of economic aid, aggressive diplomatic support and relentless propaganda coverage thwarted the US objective to paint the Angolan war in cold war colours and won for Nigeria, a significant measure of international prestige and influence.

4.3 CONCLUSION

Our analysis of the capabilities of the states involved in the Angolan war gives indication of the relative influence of these states compared to each other. Nigeria being one of these states, it has been possible to understand her role and strategy in the war. The combination of economic, diplomatic and propaganda instruments that Nigeria employed indicate the nature of her strategy. An indication is also given by our analysis that Nigeria was successful in Angola in one significant objective - containment of South African military aggression and recognition of the MPLA government. But how Nigeria's strategy achieved her objectives would entail a critical analysis of some of the instruments of foreign policy employed as indicated in the concluding parts of this chapter. That would be our objective in the next chapter.

N O T E S

[1]Charles O. Lerche and Abdul, A. Said. Concept of International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp 60.

[2]Morganthau, for example, lists natural resources, industrial capacity, and military preparedness among his eight elements of national power. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations - the struggle for power and peace (New York) Alfred A. Knoff, 1963, pp 80-108.

[3]Lerche, Jr. and Said, op cit, p. 61

[4]Hans J. Morgenthau, op cit. pp 27

[5]Nigeria did not deploy combat troops in Angola but provided weapons, other supplies and advisers. These limitations may have been partly responsible for the government's caution on the issue of military aid to the MPLA government after its recognition by Nigeria. Inspite of the enthusiasm of some Nigerian military leaders for a direct engagement with the South African army, the question of whether the nation's troops should be sent to Angola was said to have been discussed but not approved. Sotunmbi, A.O. Nigeria's Recognition of the MPLA Government of Angola: A case-study in Decision-making and Implementation, The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Monograph Series No. 9 (1981), pp 8

[6]This is notably the view of Rosenau in J.N. Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (Free Press, New York, 1967).

[7]Akinyemi Bolaji, Federalism and Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Experience (Ibadan University Press, Ibadan), 1974.

[8]See Ogunsanwo, A. Our Friends, their friends (Yaba-Lagos), alfa Communications Ltd., 1986, pp 22 and Sotunmbi, op cit. pp 6.

[9]Ibid. pp 20

[10]It is noteworthy that as soon as the Federal Government recognised the MPLA Government the press also switched its support for the MPLA.

[11]In 1961, student protests and a vigorous press campaign, led to the abrogation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence pact which the nigerian Government had entered into with Britain after independence.

[12]One consequence of this was a greater commitment to the OAU and African affairs. Africa became the centre-piece of Nigerian foreign policy, Ogunsanwo, op cit. pp 22

[13]University personnel were included as Commissioners and members of Boards or Corporations in all the States of the Federation and at the Federal level to such an extent that there was the fear that this might adversely affect the operation of some of the universities. Ibid pp 40-41.

[14]A Nigerian fact-finding delegation to Angola between January 20 and 25, 1976 was for instance dominated by academics. It was led by Dr A. Bolaji Akinyemi Director-General, NIIA and included Alaba Ogunsanwo, Political Scientist, University of Lagos; Bala Usman, Lecturer, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria; Haroun Adamu, Journalists and civil servants, A.O. Sotunmbi, op cit. pp 31

[15]Abegunrin, O. Nigerian Foreign Policy Towards Southern Africa Liberation Struggles: A case study of the Zambabwean Independence Struggle 1979 (Ph.D. Thesis, Howard University, Washington D.C. May 1979, pp 122

[16]Abegunrin, O. Ibid pp 108-109; Ogunsanwo, A. op cit. pp 76.

[17]Sotunmbi, A.O. op cit. pp 3-5

[18]Ibid. pp 4. Apart from the SMC and the other formal decision-making bodies, there also existed an informal group. This group was made up of five members namely, then Brigadier Murtala Muhammed (Head of State), Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo (Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters), then Lt. Col. Shehu Yar'adua, then Brigadier Theophilus Danjuma and then Colonel Ibrahim Babangida. The existence and power of this group is said to have been derived from the July 29, 1975 coup d'etat which some of them are reported to have spearheaded.

For further details about the Nigerian decision-making structure prior to July 29, 1975, see Olajide Aluko's article on "oil at concessionary prices for Africa", African Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 301, Oct. 1976; pp 432-433.

[19]Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy, New York, the Free Press of Glenco (1962), pp.6

[20]Obasanjo presented his paper at the Conference of the Nigerian Society of International Affairs held in Zaria in April 1972. The paper dwelt extensively on the obstacles to the realisation of the African High Command. Both Obasanjo and Muhammed were members of the society. As far back as November 1972 then Brigadier Muhammed had openly expressed the view that military force be used to end colonialism and racism in Africa.

[21]Wilmot asserts that the architects of Nigeria's decision to recognise the MPLA Government was the handiwork of exactly four individuals and not the Nigerian Military. These were Generals Muhammed, Obasanjo and Danjuma guided by M.D. Yusuf, see African Concord, December 12, 1988, Vol. 2, No. 37; pp 12.

[22]In the developing countries, the absence of a tradition of firmly accepted national interests and the strength of the personalities controlling decision-making tend to lead to a higher degree of the personalisation of foreign policy, Ogunsanwo A. op. cit. pp 114.

[23]See Wilmot, P.F. Apartheid and African Liberation - the Grief and the Hope (Ile-Ife), University of Ife Press Ltd., 1980; pp 8.

[24]Kolodsiej, E. and Harkavy, R.E. (ed). The Security Policies of Developing Countries, Lexington Books (Lexington-Massachusetts) 1982; pp 308.

[25]General Magnus Malan, Ibid. pp 305

[26]Wilmot, P.F. op cit. pp 98

[27]Ibid.

[28]Bayly, J.T. Congo Crisis (London and Estbourne) Victory Press 1966, pp 40-57. The make-up of the first post-independence government reflected the type of preparation that Belgian rule had made for African independence. Of the top 23 men, all but four were of the clerk level in civil service or the companies. Only one was university-trained. See also Archer, J. The birth o f a new nation - Congo (London) Bailey Brothers and Swinfen Ltd., 1971.

[29]Klinghoffer, A.J. The Angolan war: A study in Soviet Policy in the third world (Boulder, Colorado) Westview Press, 1980; pp 46-47.

[30]Ibid pp. 48

[31]Mobutu's greedy disposition looms particularly large when examining the motives of Zairean intervention in Angola but much more rational and strategic reasons accounts for it too. Before the war, Zaire sent 25% of its Copper exports through Lobito on the Angolan Atlantic coast and the Benguela Railroad. Ibid. pp 52

[32]Klinghoffer, op cit. pp 83

[33]See 'The CIA and Mobutu' in AFRISCOPE, Vol. 8, No. 5, May 1978.

[34]For a thorough examination of the origin, ideology of the nationalist party and its role in the implementation of Apartheid, see Wilmot, P.F. op cit.

[35]Watson, J. op cit. pp 325 - As far back as 1936, the Natives Act removed African voters of Cape province from the common Electoral roll.

[36]Anyaoku, E. 'The racial factor in International Politics', Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Lecture series) No. 19, March 28 - April 1, 1977 (Lagos) pp 16.

[37]Ibid pp. 20

[38]See also Wilmot, P. F. op. cit.

[39]Vyshinsky, M. Southern Africa - Apartheid, Colonialism, Aggression (Moscow) Progress Publishers, 1984, pp. 37. See also Wilmot, op cit. pp. 66

[40]Ibid. pp 68 - The constitution of the Broederbond is quite explicit on its mission - which is that "the Afrikaner nation was put in this land by God and is destined to continue in existence as a nation with its own nature and calling".

[41]Ibid pp. 67

[42]Kolodziej, E. and Karkavy, R.E. op cit. pp 315-318

[43]Ibid. pp 317.

[44]IT is does not mean that other crucial factors did not exist, as noted earlier in note 31, other strategic reasons also compelled Zairean involvement in Angola. Of particular note was Mobutu's desire to use the opportunity to keep at bay, restive sentiments in his Shaba province. Klinghoffer, A.J., op. cit. pp 52.

[45]Ibid pp 56, 81-84.

[46]Jones, S.B. 'The power inventory and National strategy' in Rosenau, J. (ed) International Politics and Foreign Policy, The Free Press (New York) 1961, pp 254.

[47]The importance of oil as an economic raw material is emphasised by the statement of the French Prime Minister during the first world war, Georges Clemenceau, that "one drop of oil is worth one drop of blood of our soldiers" - Morgenthau, H. Politics Among Nations, pp 115.

[48]Abegunrin, O. op cit. pp 99

[49]Ogunsanwo, A. op cit. pp 22

[50]Ibid. pp 23

[51]During the Arab oil embargoes against the west in 1973, Nigeria was the largest supplier of oil to some of the western nations especially the USA, becoming second *largest supplier after Saudi Arabia after the embargo* - AFRICA, No. 58, June 1976, pp 55.

In 1974, Nigeria gave ₦5 million to Sahelian States affected by drought. In 1975 Grenada received from the country the sum of ₦100,000, an outright gift. See Aluko, O. "oil at concessionary prices for Africa - a case study in Decision-making", African Affairs, op cit. pp 439.

[52]Roberts, P.C. 'The economic importance of South Africa' in Schuettinger, R. L. South Africa - The vital link, Council on American Affairs, 1976, pp 37.

[53]At the time of the Angolan war, South Africa accounted for one-fourth of world chrome output and 43% of world output of platinum group metals, Ibid pp. 38

[54]Dorran, J.E. 'The Strategic importance of South Africa' in Schuettinger, R.L. Ibid pp. 27

[55]South Africa is also important to the west as a strategic guardian of the Cape Sea route through which most of the oil and other strategic raw materials for the west are transported. Ibid pp 38-39.

[56]Ibid.

[57]South Africa's capability for realising the goal of effective utilization of her vast economic resources rests on her well-developed industrial base. It is self-sufficient in most essential industrial goods. These include hydro-electric turbines, locomotives, computers and mining equipment. She also manufactures almost all her military equipment including armoured vehicles, supersonic aircraft and missiles, Wilmot op cit. pp 13.

[58]Ibid pp 97-99

[59]Seiler, J. (ed) Southern Africa since the Portuguese Coup (Boulder, Colorado) Westview Press, 1980; pp 204, 205.

[60]Chatterji, D.N. Storm over the Congo, Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd (New Delhi) 1980, pp 235.

[61]Klinghoffer, op cit.

[62]Chatterji, D.N. op cit.

[63]Johari, J.C. International Relations and Politics - theoretical perspective, New Delhi, Sterling Publishers Ltd., 1985, pp 23-24

[64]Ibid

[65]Watson, J. (1981), op cit. pp 240.

[66]THE ANALYST, December 1986, Vol. No. 5, pp 24.

[67]Olusanya and Akindele (ed), op cit. pp 157.

[68]THE ANALYST, op cit. pp 25.

[69]Wilmot, P-F. op cit. pp 97-98

[70]Wilmot, op cit.

[71]South African forces use American IBM computers, British General Electric radars, French mirage jet-fighters, Italian reconnaissance aircraft, German nerve gases and NATO FN rifles. They also have Sharman (American) tanks, Centurion (British) tanks, panhard armoured vehicles (French). Wilmot, op cit. pp 92, 106-109.

[72]The South African civil population is organised such that "practically every second male over the age of 18 is a member of the Defence Force" Daily Telegraph 16th February, 1976. The potential is that the army is so organised that South Africa can mobilize 500,000 men in a relatively short period. Wilmot, Ibid pp. 95

[73]Ibid pp 97.

[74]Ibid.

[75]According to Portuguese military sources, the fnla military advantage was considerable. An American researcher put it at 21,000 FNLA, 8 ,000 MPLA, 2,000 Chipenda/MPAL faction and 8,000 UNITA. But the MPLA recruited some 3,500 to 6,000 anti-Zairean Katangese gendarmerie and the Zaireans sent in twelve hundred regulars in May 1976, Marcum, JA. The Angolan Revolution, Cambridge, The MIT Press/Vol II. pp 259.

[76]Wilmot, op cit. pp 97

[77]Ibid pp 98.

[78]Ibid.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Ogunsanwo (1986), op cit. pp 58.

[81]Wilmot, op cit. pp 105

[82]Ibid.

[83]Sotunmbi, op cit. pp 21 and Ogunsanwo, op cit. pp 56

[84]Ibid pp. 58

[85]Sotunmbi, op cit. pp 26.

[86]The US President Gerald Ford had sent a patronizing note to Nigeria and presumably to other African Heads of States prevailing on them to denounce the Soviet/Cuban role in Angola. The Nigerian leader not only published the contents of the letter, but also publicly denounced it. Ibid pp. 28.

[87]Ibid, pp 27

[88]Ogunsanwo, op cit.; Wilmot, op cit. pp 123.

[89]Ogunsanwo, *Ibid*; pp 124.

CHAPTER FIVE

ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA'S STRATEGY IN ANGOLA

5.0 Introduction

We examined the various components of capability and the instruments of foreign policy employed by Nigeria in Angola in the last chapter with the objective of understanding her role and strategy there. The objective of this chapter is to answer the second problem of the study - how did nigeria achieve her strategic interests in Angola ? While the third chapter established what Nigeria's strategic interests were at stake in Angola, the fourth and final chapters are addressed to the problem of understanding how these strategic interests were achieved.

The analysis of Nigeria's strategy in Angola involves a critical assessment of the instruments of foreign policy employed. These are economic, diplomatic and propaganda instruments. Military power is excluded because Nigeria did not commit combat troops in support of the Angolan government. She did not use force.[1]

5.1 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY EMPLOYED BY NIGERIA IN ANGOLA

5.1.1 Diplomacy

This is an age-old and well established instrument of foreign relations. It has been defined as the art of providing mutually acceptable solutions to international problems peacefully.[2] It involves skills of a profession

that applies principles impassionately to find mutually acceptable solutions to conflicting state interests. It also involve the application of tact, commonsense and intelligence to contacts involving foreign officials in order to reach agreements, compromises and settlements where inter-state interests are in conflict in the international system.

This was a key foreign policy instrument that Nigeria employed to counter the South African aggression in Angola. It was one of the most reliable weapons in its range of options and featured the use of two kinds of diplomacy: personal diplomacy and parliamentary conference diplomacy.[3] Personal diplomacy involves the use of key decision-makers of the government such as the Head of State, foreign ministers, very senior and experience diplomatic personnel and ministers such as those of defence and treasury and other special personal representatives of the head of state.

To fully appreciate the effectiveness of the Nigerian diplomatic effort, it is necessary to delve into the problems that Nigeria encountered in her role in Angola. These obstacles to Nigeria's stand and all pro-MPLA activities defined the goals of Nigerian diplomacy. One such problem was a Western/South African alliance including some co-opted African States.[4] Another was the credibility of Nigerian diplomacy itself.

The tactical alliance of the west (under the USA), South Africa and some African States was motivated by mutual self-interests. The following developments explain the motives underlying the forging of this alliance. The earliest mentioned aggression of the South Africans against Angola was in late August 1975. Then only time stood between the MPLA and complete victory at the expense of the FNLA and UNITA.[5] The Portuguese handover of power to none of the three liberation movements dubious as it was, turned into a blessing for the MPLA which quickly formed a government based in Luanda and recognised by a number of States. In contrast, the FNLA/UNITA government based at Huambo had not got a single diplomatic recognition even by its own western supporters.

Thg South Africans were then fingered for the dirty job by the west (principally the USA) in order to disstabilise the MPLA and bring the FNLA/UNITA back into contention. Direct US involvement in Angola was thwarted by the Congress refusal despite intensive lobbying by the CIA. This however did not prevent large-scale covert US support for the South African intervention in Angola executed by the CIA.[6] In addition to the South Africans, a coalition of bordering African States were convinced arranged in aid of the aggression against Angola. These were notably . Zaire, Zambia and Rhodesia.[7] The South African invasion was thus the culmination of a well orchestrated plan of a solid alliance forged under the diplomatic and covert direction of the USA.

The credibility problem of Nigerian diplomacy arose from the abrupt reversal of the stand on Angola. The absence of an effective intelligence apparatus to inform foreign policy decisions largely caused this problem. At the onset of the South African invasion, neither Nigeria nor other African non-conspirators had the real facts of the situation on the ground in Angola in hand. Thus the western-sponsored anti-MPLA alliance (particularly the press) either ignored or downplayed MPLA accusations and cries of South African aggression.[8] This ignorance of the real situation in Angola was responsible for the OAU stand on a government of National Unity embracing all three liberation movements as a solution to the crisis. As part of this stand, Nigeria not only condemned Soviet meddling but also called for a postponement of Angolan Independence by two weeks to enable differences between the antagonistic parties to be worked out. The reversal of this stand to one of recognition for the MPLA was dramatic and surprising.[9] It is logical to assume that this Nigerian diplomatic volte face must have created a credibility problem even in her friends. These are the problems that Nigerian diplomacy had to surmount. It is to Nigeria's credit that the types of diplomacy she employed were effective.

One of the arguments in favour of personal diplomacy is that it quickens the processes of decision making, eliminates distraction inherent in excessive dependence on other people's reporting and enables experienced foreign

policy decision-makers to evaluate the general and specific climate or environments within which their counterparts in other states act.[10] The merits of this form of diplomacy weighed in favour of taking a quick decision that reversed Nigeria's earlier stand to one in favour of the MPLA government.

To ascertain the facts of the situation in Angola, Nigeria sent secret military missions right to the warfront. The delegations consisted of military officers some of whom were flown by the Nigerian Air Force.[11] The first landed in Luanda on the eve of independence and the second, a few days later. Members of both delegations went right to the battle fronts to assess the situation for themselves. Their reports, apart from confirming the presence of South African forces within 100 kilometres of the capital also established the deployment of MPLA forces in and around Luanda. Since some members of these two missions were not known for MPLA sympathy, their reports were accepted as authentic and unbiased.[12]

The second instance of the use of personal diplomacy by Nigeria occured after Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA government leading up to the extra-ordinary Summit on Angola. Diplomatic delegations were sent to several African countries to argue the MPLA case for recognition.[13]. It is largely due to the blitz of Nigeria's diplomatic offensives that many African States became convinced or remained so and voted for recognition of the MPLA government at the extra-ordinary OAU Summit on Angola

held at Addis Ababa.[14] Such persuation also resolved a number of fence-sitting African countries.[15]

Of particular importance in effectively putting across its stand on Angola through the use of personal diplomacy was its value in discrediting the vociferous American anti-MPLA diplomatic lobby. The USA President, Gerald Ford had sent a diplomatic note to the Nigerian Head of State, requesting him to assist at the OAU extra-ordinary Summit to convince other African States to not only refuse MPLA recognition, but also call for the withdrawal of Cuban forces deployed in defence of Angola. The note had apparently been sent to other African Heads of State. N igeria denounced the note as symbolising 19th century American gunboat diplomacy and an insult to the integrity of Africans.[16] That many other African countries refused to yield to US pressures owes a lot to Nigeria's employment of personal diplomacy involving Brigadiers Obasanjo, Olutoye, Garba, Shuwa, Captain Dan Suleiman and other federal commissioners to different African States to lobby other African leaders to disregard US demands.[17]

The other form of diplomacy employed by Nigeria is parliamentary conference diplomacy. This takes place within international organisations and institutions. It largely depends on majority decisions in resolving issues that involve states which are members of such institutions and organisations.[18] In Angola, it involved the OAU. This form of diplomacy is so-called because it features voting, veto, majority and secretariat logistic

support for decisions and the administration of decisions (hence the term parliamentary). Some other features of parliamentary conference diplomacy are lobbying, the use of pressure techniques and the mass media. These were the weapons that nigeria employed in swaying half the OAU to support its pro-MPLA stand.

Intense Nigerian diplomatic lobbying through personal diplomacy made easier the objective of garnering favourable African votes at the extra-ordinary OAU Summit that thwarted the US goal to use the OAU to legitimise South African aggression. At the OAU Summit, twenty-two states voted in favour of MPLA recognition and another twenty-two against it. The stalemate was actually a Nigerian diplomatic victory. It was South Africa, the USA and their African proteges that needed an outright OAU majority decision refusing the MPLA diplomatic recognition and denouncement as illegal, the Cuban deployment of troops in Angola. The stalemate drew attention to the support that the MPLA enjoyed within the OAU in contrast to the picture of a few radical, militant Moscow-sponsored states that the US had been painting of the pro-MPLA group.[19]

That the OAU Summit was a diplomatic victory of Nigeria and the MPLA is shown by the fact that many other African countries joined in recognising the MPLA regime after the Summit.[20] The victory at the summit and its consequent bandwagon effect owes much to the persuasive articulation of the MPLA cause by the Nigerian Head of

State, General Murtala Muhammed in his powerful address to colleagues. His evocative use of symbols of racial solidarity and collective insult clearly prevented the Summit from becoming a futile exercise in rhetorics, polemics and long boring formal statements.[21] The speech bluntly and articulately put the bone of contention at the summit: dignity in refusal to head US blandishments or slavery to foreign domination by rubber-stamping US demands. The danger posed by South Africa's apartheid policy and her aggression against Angola could not be mistaken when he stated that:

> ... when I contemplate the evils of apartheid my heart bleeds and I am sure the heart of every true blooded African bleeds. When we talk of these evils we are assured of the sympathy of the western countries but when we call for sanctions to end this shame of western civilisation, suddenly the glitter of gold in the form of high dividends becomes more convincing a consideration than the lives, the liberty and the well-being of Africans.[22]

Without the OAU and specifically its extra-ordinary Summit on Angola, the pro-MPLA lobby would not have had an immediate and relevant forum to unite and air their views on South Africa's aggression. South Africa would have systematically isolated and coaxed the greater number of African states to her position. The stalemate notwithstanding, the US and South Africa were denied the total fragmentation of African support for the MPLA which

was desirable for fostering on Africa the cynical view that the Cubans and the Soviet Union were endangering African security and peace.[23] The unity of half the OAU owed much to the diplomatic efforts of Nigerian foreign policy in its relentless pursuance of recognition for the MPLA. The stalemate rather than divide the OAU only stabilised the organisation.

5.1.2 ECONOMIC MEASURES

While diplomacy is the main instrument of foreign policy, various economic instruments are its supporting tools. These economic instruments include loans, credits and currency control, blockade, blacklisting and pre-emptive buying, boycotts, embargoes, quotas and tariffs, penetration, rewards and foreign aid.[24] Not all these economic measures were employed by Nigeria in Angola. Nigeria's capability and the nature of the Angolan situation to a large extent determined Nigeria's use of some of these economic measures. Unlike a peace-time situation in which a state executes a carefully planned course of action, a crisis situation leaves a state with far less options in terms of economic resources and time with which to support foreign policy. Stakes are also considerably higher in a rapidly escalating crisis situation such as the Angolan war was. This was the situation Nigeria was confronted with.

On December 8, 1975, the Nigerian government announced an outright grant of twenty million dollars ($20M) to the Angolan regime.[25] In addition to this gift, Nigeria made a promise of material assistance worth about one hundred million dollars ($100M)[26]. What the grant was meant for was not publicly stated but the conjecture was that the MPLA was asked to use it to buy arms.

Unfortunately most of the promised assistance did not get to Angola in time and some did not reach there at all. The SMC committee set up by Murtala Muhammed to co-ordinate relief for the MPLA did not get off the ground. It urned out that the Chairman of the committee the late Major General Iliya Bissalla did not support the recognition of the Angolan government and so deliberately set about sabotaging the work of the committee.[37] Although some aid still reached Angola, Bissalla made sure that most of the promised weapons did not get through. The situation was puzzling for the Angolans. Nigeria had on her own made promises of considerable aid including delivery of weapons which were badly needed to fight the formidable South African and FNLA/UNITA forces. Yet the promised Nigerian aid never materialised while the war needs of the Angolan government became even more acute as the fighting progressed. By the time most of the promised supplies reached Angola, the bulk of the fighting was over. This situation contributed to the strained relations between the two countries especially after the death of Murtala Muhammed.

Nigeria also used her influence as a member of OPEC to convince another member of the cartel - Saudi Arabia - to support the MPLA.[28] As shown in other and later theatres of the decolonisation process in Africa, the Angolan war witnessed a gross under-estimation and negligence of oil as a weapon against principally the western supporters of South Africa. The potency of this economic weapon was never in doubt in Nigeria's nationalization of Shell British Petroleum (BP) in 1979 over British intransigence over the independence of Zimbabwe.[29]

Between December 1975 and February 1976, the Nigerian government made more efforts to find out the actual needs of Angola. A fact-finding delegation led by A. Bolaji Akinyemi, Director-General, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) visited the country between January 20-25, 1976.[30] Shortly after, another team led by Lt. General O. Obasanjo followed.[31] While it is true that Nigeria's economic aid to Angola fell far below her own promises, it helped to complement the impressive arsenal sent there by the Soviet Union and their Cuban allies. These relatively token Nigerian efforts provided a much needed boost for the Soviet/Cuban alliance in equipping the Angolans. It would have amounted to a mere diplomatic exercise for Nigeria to help the cause of MPLA recognition and provide nothing material in economically and militarily defending the diplomatic victory gained.

Then also taking the previous pro-western inclination that Nigeria had consistently adopted on many foreign policy issues in the past, the Nigerian stand on Angola denied the west of a most reliable ally. Nigeria's value to the west was evidenced by her influential role in the fate of the MPLA and rather than help the west, denied them of most valuable influence.[32] The economic measures employed by Nigeria may seem token but when taken together with her deployment of other instruments of foreign policy, constituted a powerful force in thwarting South African and western aggressive design on Angola.

Nigeria's role and performance in other subsequent theatres of the Southern African decolonisation process could be credited to invaluable experience gained in her role in Angola.[33] The successful execution of the decolonisation process in Zimbabwe (1979), Namibia (1990) in which Nigeria played crucial roles in nationalization of British economic assets, UN sanctions, formation of political-economic frontline alliance could be seen as the fruits of the vital lessons learnt in Angola. Angola could be seen as a valuable initial test case that set the pace of later performances. It was the foundation on which Nigeria built and improved upon in the utilization of economic measures to effectively support foreign policy.

5.1.3. PROPAGANDA

Propaganda has been consistently used by states in peace and war-time against other states in pursuit of foreign policy goals. It is defined by various scholars as the deliberately planned and systematic use of symbols with a view to altering and controlling opinions, ideas and values using the instruments of communication.[34] Elizabeth and Alfred Lee (1939; pp 22-25) have provided a helpful framework for analysing propaganda techniques. It consists of eight major components and states combine most of the techniques to achieve maximum impact.[35]

Right from the time of the Nigerian decision to reverse its earlier stand to one of recognition for the MPLA government, various propaganda techniques were employed effectively to counter western propaganda and create a more favourable image of the MPLA cause. The framework earlier mentioned will be used in the examination of propaganda techniques employed by Nigeria in Angola. The first technique is name-calling.[36] In this technique stereotypes are constructed and used. These stereotypes are laden with emotive and repulsive connotations. For example, states or actors may be referred to as puppets, clique, satellites, oppressors, murderers, lackeys of imperialism and so on.

This technique featured prominently in Nigeria's attempt to alter and control international opinion of the MPLA who US propaganda had been potraying as the

imperialist lackeys of Soviet expansionism. The speech of the Nigerian Head of State at the OAU Summit at Addis Ababa is replete with the use of this technique. Referring to the hostile western agenda against the MPLA, he explained that:

> the South African regime hopes to install a puppet government in Angola.[37]

Going directly to the core of the anti-MPLA opposition namely the USA, he exposed to world opinion the collaborationist role of the US with South Africa and opposition to African interests by revealing that:

> the most notorious example of this open collaboration for the rape of Africa was the Byrd amendment which permitted the importation of Rhodesian chrome into the US. Once again African weakness was exploited by a superpower which claims worldwide responsibility but whose actions are dictated by economic and ideological self-interest.[38]

Every major actor in the antagonist pro-South Africa alliance was stigmatised in the employment of the propaganda technique in the speech of the Nigerian Head of State. The FNLA/UNITA traitors are accused of:

> joining hands with neo-colonialist adventurers and racist soldiers of fortune, including the apostles of apartheid.[39]

Propaganda also employs the technique of glittering generality.[40] Here propaganda materials tend to make glittering generalisations. They appeal to vague tather than specific concepts. References are made to a free world in which of course, people are not free to do what they like, to for instance, the African giant who

is dwarfed by the achievement of Europe, America, China or Asia. Clearly alluding to Africa's right to self-determination, Muhammed made bold to declare that:

> Africa has come of age. It is no longer in the orbit of any extra-continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country, however powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or mar. For too long have we been kicked around, for too long have we been treated like adolescents who cannot discern their interest and act accordingly.[41]

The use of such bold and evocative language potraying the African condition in the face of powerful overlords craved for psychological identification.

Propaganda also seeks to transfer attributes.[42] To equate for example, communism with progress or dictatorship, capitalism with decadence of full opportunities. The set of attributes depends on the propagandist. One powerful and sensitive cord that Muhammed's speech consistently harped on was the bogey of a foreign despoiler bent on enforcing his evil machinations on the African. He made plain the real situation as that of a slave and master between the African and the westerner because:

> ... for too long has it been presumed that the African needs outside "experts" to tell him who are his friends and who are his enemies. The time has come when we should make it clear that we can decide for ourselves, that we know or own interests and how to protect those interests, that we are capable of resolving African problems without presumptous lessons in ideological dangers which more often than not have no relevance for us, nor for the problems at hand.[43]

In fact this technique appears to have featured much more extensively than any other technique as is blandly put in another part of the same speech. The dubious spectre of the foreign intruder cannot be mistaken when he states that:

> ... the Angolan situation is not unique in the stormy history of our continent - a history which is mostly the making of outsiders.[44]

Propagandists also identify with the values and lifestyles of their targets.[45] They avoid appear ing foreign and use local ideas, accents and values. The common African problem of neo-colonialist influence is highlighted in the same speech by the Nigerian leader at the OAU Summit when he says that:

> We cannot pretend that we are unaware of the machinations and conspiracy against our continent by not just the racists of South Africa, but even by those who pretend to be friends of this continent and those whose sole interest is what they can get out of us.[46]

The identification of common African interests as depicted in the above excerpt of the OAU speech is most lurid. The issues at stake were not only a Nigerian concern but that of the collective fate of all of Africa.

Propagandists also employ the testimonial technique.[47] In this situation, propaganda materials sometimes appeal to the authority of an esteemed person or make a historical event a reference point. For example, non-violent causes

appeal to the authorities of Gandhi, Nehru and Martin Luther King, while the right to self-determination may invoke the momentous American declaration of independence. This technique was skillfully used by Muhammed when he exposed American duplicity in their role in Angola given their anti-colonial heritage because:

> the anti-imperialist, anti-exploitation slogan which led to the American war of independence had a relevance in the Angolan liberation struggle which should have endeared it to successive administrations in the United States. This was not to be.[48]

Yet another propaganda technique effectively employed to rouse the anger of Africans against the western subversion of their independence is that of using a frustration-scapegoat.[49] This technique creates a scapegoat, heaps all the blame and hatred on it, and by doing this, seeks to relieve the propagandist actor of all its pent-up emotions and frustrations. For example, actors may blame imperialists, neo-colonialists, capitalists and communist agitators. This was graphically presented when Muhammed in his OAU Summit speech referred to a situation where:

> it appears some developed countries cast around neocolonialist eyes and once again long for the recolonization of the continent which is still endowed with much of the world's untapped resources.[50]

The cummulative use of the various propaganda techniques as shown served to alter and shape international opinion on the South African aggression against Angola. It

effectively laid bare, the facts that belied the mischievous lies and distortions of American propaganda in its attempt to legitimise South Africa's wanton aggression and attempt to hoodwink African STates into support for what was really a subversion of their independence. The diplomatic victory of the MPLA at the OAU Summit owed much to the relentlessness, boldness and skillfulness of Nigerian propaganda.

The Angolan war on the diplomatic or even military fronts revolved around intense propaganda by both sides to shape international opinion favourably and to win more support. To Nigeria's credit, once the government verified the authenticity of MPLA claims of South African aggression, it set about countering the deliberate silence, blackmail and distortion of facts about the real issues at stake in Angola. As earlier mentioned, the majority of African STates including Nigeria had inadequate knowledge of the truth about the South African aggression. It was because of what was really a CIA disinformation campaign that the USA capitalised on the ignorance of African States to divert attention from the brazen South African aggression and heaped blame on its purported provocateours meaning the Soviet Union and Cuba.[51] US propaganda succeeded in fooling many African States including Nigeria (initially) in perceiving the Angolan was as an East-West cold war crisis that could be settled amicably by the Superpowers among themselves.[52]

However, the eloquence and courageous articulation of Nigerian propaganda of vital facts about the ignominous role of the US and her western allies adequately stood the test of US blackmail and crude arm-twisting.[53] The US President, Gerald Ford had sent a note to African l eaders directing them to refuse the MPLA diplomatic recognition.[54] This was followed by a whirlwind of visits by the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.[55] These American moves were used effectively by Muhammed to discredit her by dramatizing the implied collective insult to the intelligence of African leaders. It was of crucial help to the Nigerian propaganda effort that the Nigerian press and public were unanimous in their interest and support of the government stand on Angola.[56] This press unanimity could be attributed to the fact that the Nigerian press lacked the resources necessary for in-depth reports of the calibre of the international network of the western media. Thus it was hardly in a position to take an independent and assertive stand on the Angolan crisis capable of influencing the public and the decision-making process. This is why it swayed with the stand for an Angolan government of national unity and with the sudden turn-around of Nigeiran foreign policy. Nigerian propaganda was generally effective and credible enough to not only confound its traditional western allies but also the lethargic reasoning of some African leaders tuned to western propaganda.

Haven looked at the instruments of foreign policy employed by Nigeria in Angola, we could further examine their effectiveness in the absence of the use of force. Given that the Angolan war witnessed the employment of one of the most formidable military arsenal in Africa, how effective were these instruments of foreign policy utilised by Nigeria in Angola ? How effective were these instruments particularly in the absence of force ?

Asserting the effectiveness of economic, diplomatic and propaganda without military power in a war situation may seem a futile exercise. But one must not lose cognizance of the fact that the implementation of foreign policy is a continuous and co-ordinated effort specifically aimed at securing international co-operation with a State's stated stand, modified as it might be, on issues of common interest.[57] This co-operation cannot be legally imposed and enforced. It cannot also except in exceptional circumstances, be imposed with the use of force. The Angolan crisis was one such exceptional circumstance. The use of force to enforce co-operation is deemed exceptional because the endless game that is the search for power as explained in the realist objective of the state is a multifaceted and interrelated process. As noted earlier in the definition of concepts, force is not per se the commonest denominator of power. This is luridly explained by Northege when he says:

> *international affairs are by no means*
> the proceedings of a primitive society
> in which brute force counts.[58]

This is similar to our operationalization of power which is seen as inclusive of many components of a whole process involving economic, diplomatic and propaganda measures.

Besides, at the period of the Angolan decolonisation process, due to the bipolar power configuration of the world order, states with immense military resources and with the capability to not only compel but crush weaker ones could not just do so. The example of the confrontation in the subsequent years of the Cuban Revolution, between Cuba and the USA is instructive here. Power is also situational - depending on historical circumstances that dictate the nature of causes, the moral force that emboldens national psyche, the disposition of domestic public support as seen in the US - Vietnamese war in 1969.[59] Another good example of the situational nature of power is the confrontation between the USA and Iran in 1979 over US diplomatic personnel taken hostage by Iranian Islamic fundamentalists. Angola is also a case in which as shown by our capability analysis in the fourth chapter, a militarily stronger state did not win the war.

The use of the situational and relative nature of power is meant to de-emphasize the exaggerated importance of force in conceptions of power. It is also meant to stress the equally effective attributes of other

instruments of foreign policy. Thus the non-commitment of Nigerian combat troops in Angola *notwithstanding*, the employment of the other instruments of foreign policy was equally effective. Considering that 'success' in foreign policy may be broadly conceived of as:

> the achievement of declared, publicized or recognised objects of State policy, the maintenance or advancement of prestige or influence abroad and the abandonment of interests only in return for the gaining of comparable or if possible weightier interests [60]

it can be positively asserted that Nigeria achieved her strategic interests in Angola without the use of force. These were the containment of South Africa and the recognition of the MPLA government.[61] In both goals Nigeria's foreign policy rule can be deemed successful. Particularly given the increase in the influence and role in subsequent areas of the decolonisation process in Southern Africa, Nigeria's role and performance in Angola was fruitful. These are the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990 and the on;going decolonisation of apartheid South africa itself.

5.2 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

We set about establishing the objective of the study (Nigeria's strategic interests and role in the decolonisation process in Angola) by trying to answer two important questions. These are what Nigerian strategic were at stake in Angola and how were these achieved ? In answering these questions, a background examination of the Angolan

decolonisation process was made, pointing out the principal actors involved, the evolution of the crisis and how and why consequently Nigeria became involved. We have shown why Nigeria became involved in Angola by establishing her strategic interests there in the third chapter. These we have shown, are essentially strategic (security) interests arising from threats to Nigeria as seen by her leaders and dictated by purely strategic considerations.

An examination of the capabilities of the main actors in Angola was made in the fourth chapter. The objective achieved in that chapter was an attempt to answer our second research question. This objective is continued in the final chapter in order to show the measures employed in the achievement of Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola. We have also shown in the same final chapter, how effective the economic, diplomatic and propaganda measures were.

Consequently, haven established Nigeria's strategic interests in Angola, her role and strategy in the conflict and the goals achieved, we can make the following conclusions:

The attainment of Nigeria's strategic interest of containment of South Africa in Angola justify her role there and the strategy employed. The indispensability of military in the achievement of strategic interests is not proved in the study as the militarily stronger

side in Angola lost the war. Rather, the study shows the efficacy and interrelatedness of the other instruments of foreign policy, namely diplomatic, economic and propaganda measures.

N O T E S

[1]Sotunmbi, A.O. Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA government of Angola: A case-study in decision-making and implementation (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs), Monograph Series, No, 9, pp 8.

[2]Ofoegbu, R. Foundation Course in International Relations for African Universities (London), George Allen and Unwin 1980, pp 71.

[3]Ibid, pp 72 and pp 74.

[4]American collaboration started as far back as January 1970 with the adoption of a Kissinger memorandum which recommended option two of National Security Study Memorandum 39. This basically meant continued American support for the Portuguese. After the fall of the Portuguese colonial regime and the Alvor agreement of January 15, 1975, the American 40 Committee approved $300,000 for the FNLA. This aid steadily increased to well over $50 million later the same year alongside aid to Zaire. Several West European states played various contributory roles. See Klinghoffer, The Angolan war: A study in Soviet Policy in the third world (Boulder, Colorado) Westview Press (1980), pp 82-85. Also Marcum, J.A. The Angolan Revolution (Cambridge), The MIT Press, 1978, Vol. II, pp 231-236.

[5]The superiority of the MPLA over the other movements was credited to a "manifestly superior organizational and infrastructural capability" rather than arms. Ibid, pp 263, 274 and Klinghoffer, op cit. pp 53-54.

[6]Klinghoffer, Ibid. pp 84 and 85 and Marcum, op cit. pp 257.

[7]Klinghoffer, Ibid. pp 48-52

[8]Marcum, J-A. op cit. pp 272

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ofoegbu, R. op cit. pp 72

[11]Sotunmbi, op cit. pp 21

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid, pp 28

[14]The Nigerian recognition of the MPLA Government was quickly followed by that of Tanzania, Ghana, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Nigeria, Marcum, op cit. pp 272

[15]The Ethiopian delegation to the OAU Summit is said to have hinted that it would recognise the MPLA Government which it did shortly after the summit - Africa Research Bulletin, January 1-31, 1976; pp 3883.

[16]Nigeria scandalized American diplomacy by unmasking its crude arm-twisting exercise to teleguide Africa. Sotunmbi, op cit. pp 28.

[17]Ogunsanwo, A. Our Friends, their friends (Lagos) alfa Communications Ltd., 1986, pp 58.

[18]Ofoegbu, op cit. pp 74.

[19]Marcum, op cit. pp 278; Ogunsanwo, op cit. pp 58.

[20]The potential consequences of a non-recognition resolution of the Kampala OAU Summit is vividly analysed by Wilmot. Quoting the London Financial Times, he says, a certain african leader had requested South Africa's military intervention in Angola. The South Africans are reported on three occasions to have threatened to pull out unless his request was made publicly. That leader, Mobutu however stalled and bought time pleading time to line up OAU support behind an open request for American aid.

That American warships were reported by the London Observer of 9th January, 1976 in Angolan waters was no accident. It was an invading task force awaiting the go-ahead from the OAU Summit. Had the pro-South African American lobby succeeded in carrying the day, an ultimatum would have been given to the MPLA Government, failure to comply with which America would have intervened massively in Angola under the banner of the OAU, Wilmot, Ibid pp 103-105.

[21]These are essentially the weaknesses of parlimanetary conference diplomacy, Ofoegbu, op cit. pp 74.

[22]Sotunmbi, op cit. pp 21.

[23]Klinghoffer, op cit. pp 118.

[24]Ofoegbu, R. op cit. pp 83.

[25]Sotunmbi, op cit. pp 27.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid. Ogunsanwo, op cit. pp 60.

[28]Abegunrin, op cit.

[29]For breaking the oil embargo against South Africa, the Nigerian Government nationalised with effect from August 1, 1979, all assets of the British Petroleum Company (Shell BP) in Nigeria, and a reminder issued that BP was only one of many British Companies operating in Nigeria, Ogunsanwo, op cit. pp 69.

[30]Sotunmbi, op cit. pp 27.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Klinghoffer, op cit. pp 64, 142.

[33]Ogunsanwo, op cit. pp 68 and 69.

[34]Brown (1963) and Qualter (1962) in Ofoegbu, op cit. pp 89.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Ibid. pp 90

[37]Ogunsanwo, op cit. pp 127.

[38]Ibid. pp 126

[39]Ibid. pp 219

[40]Ofoegbu, op cit. pp 90

[41]Ogunsanwo, op cit. pp 131

[42]Ofoegbu, op cit. pp 90

[43]Ogunsanwo, op cit. pp 131

[44]Ibid. pp 129

[45]Ofoegbu, op cit. pp 90

[46]Ogunsanwo, op cit. pp 127

[47]Ofoegbu, op cit. pp 90

[48]Ogunsanwo, op cit. pp 127

[49]Ofoegbu, op cit. pp 90

[50]Ogunsanwo, op cit. pp 130

[51]Klinghoffer, op cit. pp 26; see also Stockwell, J. In Search of Enemies, op cit.

[52]Ibid. pp 139-141; Klinghoffer, op cit. pp 77, 79.

[53]The American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, William Schaufele was sent on a diplomatic mission to Africa. He toured Senegal, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Cameroun and Zaire and stopped ins everal West European States on his return trip to Washington; Klinghoffer, op cit. pp 64.

[54]Ford's letter so angered Murtala Muhammed that the Nigerian leader made it public. Ibid, pp 64.

[55]Ibid. pp 77

[56]Sotunmbi, op cit. pp 8

[57]Northege, F.S. The Foreign Policies of the powers, (Ibadan) Faber and Faber, 1968; pp 12.

[58]Ibid. pp 35

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid.

[61]The Attainment of Nigeria's security interests by containing the South africans in Angola is indicated by various subsequent South African military attempts to eliminate what has become to them, a nagging threat. These are operations 'Shellsmoke' (1980), 'Protea' (1981), 'Super' (1982), 'Askari', December 1983 and January 1984, Strategic Analysis May 1988, Vol. XII, No. 2.

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