THE EFFECTS OF BUHARI'S LOSS AND 2011 POST-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KATSINA STATE

BY

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ZARIA

OCTOBER, 2018

DECLARATION

I humbly declare that this Dissertation titled **"The Effects of Buhari's Loss on 2011 Post-Presidential Election Violence in Katsina State"** is my own original work and has never been presented for any award of degree in any other institution of learning. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided.

…….…… …….. ……..

Name of Student Signature Date

CERTIFICATION

This Dissertation titled "**The Effects of Buhari's Loss on 2011 Post-Presidential Election Violence in Katsina State"** by Tukur Bello is designed under the codes and principles governing the award of Masters degree (Msc.) in Political Science in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Science, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

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DEDICATION

I dedicated this Dissertation to the memories of my late Father Malam Bello Garba and my mother Malama Fatima Bello Garba as well as the entire victims of 2011 Post Presidential election violence in the Katsina State.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I must start by thanking Almighty Allah (S.W.T.), the gracious the most merciful who, in his infinite mercy, made it possible and successful in the pursuit of this degree despite shortcomings. I wish to register my profound and hearty appreciation to my major Supervisor, Prof. Rauf Ayo Dunmoye who tirelessly endured my academic errors and led me to the present achievements. Sir I will forever remain indebted! My special note of gratitude must go to my second Supervisor, Dr. David Moveh who also guided me towards the completion of this work. Thank you very much Sir!

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ABSTRACT

The study examines the effects of Buhari's Loss on 2011 Post-presidential Election Violence. In Nigeria the urge to vote is often influenced by party, ideology, religion or even ethnicity but also personality of the contestant do influences voting especially during 2011 presidential election in the Katsina state. Electorates elect candidate perceived to be honest, Courageous, tested and trusted as well as a man of integrity and action. Unfortunately because of the adulation of a candidate, aggression results in protests, arsons, and even killing, when they alleged that their Candidate was denied victory through unfair and corrupt electoral process instead of taking legal action. This research is an attempt to fill this gap in the study of post-election violence and personality politics. The data was quantitatively and qualitatively generated and analyzed through descriptive Statistics. The research relied on questionnaire and interview to generate data on the subject-matter.Bourdieu's Habitus-Field theory was adopted as the framework of analysis. Habitus in this context refers to the person's unreflected habitus way of thinking and acting. It is formed through the accumulated experience of people in different fields. A field is an area of social interactions held together by legitimate rule. Fields organize the relationship between the elements in the field. The theory was propounded by French sociological, Pierre Bourdieu. The central argument of this theory is that social processes is constituted by dialectical relationship between objective systems of positions and subjective bundles of dispositions people perceived him as tested, trusted, courageous and Man of integrity and action. The study found that Buhari's loss contributed to 2011 Post-Presidential election violence in Katsina State. Good governance, Justice and people should avoid taking law in their hands could curtail future occurrence of post-election violence were among the recommendations offered.

Keyword: Buhari, Democracy, Election, Loss, Violence.

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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Election is central in any democratic practices because it gives an avenue for peaceful change of government but spectre of post elections violence is a regular feature of elections in most of the emerging democracies. In Nigerian context, the most potent threat to election is violence. Elections which are supposed to be a process where a society decides its leaders have now become a major problem for Nigerians. The history of elections in this country has consistently taken the form of violence. If one look at the 1923 elections up to 2011 elections, one will discover that we have always had electoral violence. What changes overtime are the ramifications and intensity of this violence. This is threatening the corporate existence of the country as one indivisible entity.

The 2011 post presidential election violence was outstanding in terms of its magnitude and severity. It has been argued that no election in this country has exposed our weaknesses as a nation as much as this one (Hakeem, 2011). It surrenders our perseverance and pride of nationalism to negativity. Nigeria's economy produces more for the few rich while the masses live in abject poverty, instead of leaders to be committed to work for greater good of Nigeria and welfare of the People. Buhari made accountability and probity his watchword throughout his public career. He sacrificed his time and life for the sake of the nation (Tyodzua, 1998). He remains one of the greatest political figures in Nigeria with largest unpurchased followers due to his credibility. Buhari, even though called the 2011 election flawed, condemned the violence, dissociated himself with it and declared those involved could not be members of his party

Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). Even, the panel in its report moderate on the negative perception of the role of Buhari in the mayhem by some sections of population. Buhari, in an extensive and frank interactive session with the panel argued that "protect your votes" were shared by other candidates including the PDP presidential candidate (Lemu, 2011:25).

As it is known in a democratic setting, it is only through elections that people determine who lead their country. Looking at the economic predicament in the country and large turn-out of the masses during campaigns, one could argue that people have faith and expectations that Muhammadu Buhari, if elected, will lead with integrity and will use public resources to improve their lives. Nigeria is not for one party or for selected group of people, but for all. This antagonism made electoral contests prone to violence.

Buhari is a highly respected politician who started making history in politics when he joined the race to Aso Rock in 2003 under the platform of All peoples' party (APP) with the then incumbent president Obasanjo. He lost the election which domestic and international observers like transition monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of over 90 civil society groups joined in condemned. They argued that the election lacks credibility. In the South-East, the observers contended that election did not even hold and called for the cancellation of such results (Ramalan, 2013). Buhari also contested the Presidency under the platform of All Nigerian Peoples' Party (ANPP) in 2007 with late Umaru Musa Yar'adua of PDP and lost that game of power. In his inaugural speech, Yar'adua admitted that there were high irregularities and promised to constitute a committee to look into it.

In 2011, Buhari contested under the banner of Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) which was found in 2009. The party originated from Buhari campaign organization (TBO) formed in

2006. CPC was formed as a result of the disagreement between ANPP and TBO after election was lost. ANPP decided to join Government for national unity while Buhari instituted a legal action against the victory of late Yar'adua. This disagreement made Buhari formed a new party (CPC). Most of the members of ANPP decamped to CPC because of the popularity and credibility of Muhammadu Buhari in the eyes of the masses. The party was built around the personality and credibility of Buhari who is widely recognized as incorruptible, tested and trusted. Buhari's regular contest from 2003- 2011 and his credibility gave him an edge over other candidates which led desperation of masses to see him on throne.

The properties worth five billion, seven hundred and fifty seven million, six hundred and twenty four thousand, eight hundred and nine Naira (5,757, 624, 809, 00) were destroyed and claimed compensation while about seven people were killed in Katsina state(Lemu, 2011). This is disastrous to socio-economic and political development of our dear nation.

This Research investigates the Effects of Buhari's Loss on 2011 Post presidential Election Violence in Katsina State.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

This study seeks to investigate effects of Buhari's loss on 2011 Post presidential election violence in Katsina State. In Nigeria the urge to vote is often influenced by party, ideology, religion or even ethnicity however credibility of the contestant does influence voting especially in 2011 presidential election in the Katsina state. Electorates elect candidate perceived to be honest, courageous, tried and trusted as well as possessed integrity and being poised for action. Unfortunately, due to adulation of a person, people's aggression result in protests, arsons, and

even killing, when they perceived that their candidate was denied victory through rigging of election instead of taking a legal action. Some people, thought that because their candidate won in their immediate vicinities, he had become president. They equated victory in their own states to a Nation-wide victory. In the political history of Nigeria; many elections have failed to produce governments that are generally considered legitimate. The elections of 1959, 1964, 1965, 1979, 1983, 2003, 2007 and 2011 were alleged to be marred with high irregularities. Habu, (2015) opines that each of these electoral process were marred by various forms of contestation, ranging from violence, disregard of rule of law and electoral rigging designed to avoid alteration of power.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

i. Did people's perception of rigging contribute to the outbreak of post-presidential election violence in Katsina state?
ii. To what extent did Buhari's emergence as main contender from the North contribute to the outbreak of post-presidential election violence in Katsina state?
iii. Did Buhari's candidature as Muslim contribute to 2011 post-presidential election violence in Katsina state?

1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of this study are:

i. To determine whether people's perception of rigging contributed on 2011 post presidential electoral violence in Katsina State.

ii. To find out whether Buhari's emergence as main contender from the North contribute to the outbreak of 2011 Post-presidential election violence in Katsina State.

iii. To find whether Buhari's candidature as Muslim contribute to 2011 post-presidential election violence in Katsina state.

1.5 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY

Although there are several works on post-election violence, most of these works have not specifically focused on relationship between candidate lost and election violence. Presently, there is no in-depth and scholarly study on candidate lost and election violence in Nigeria, eventhough researchers made efforts to conduct researches on different personalities like Stalin by Sarah G. Hunter titled "Love and exploitation: personality cult, their Characteristics, their creation and modern examples (2010), Mao (China) by Cesar Landin titled "To what extent did Mao Zedong's cult of personality during the cultural Revolution help him to regain Authority over China (2013), Mark Bell conducted his on "Charismatic leadership case study with Ronald Reagan as Exemplar" (2013) and "personality cult in modern politics: by Xinlu and Elena Soboleva (2014), there is no scholarly work on candidate's loss and election violence. This is a seeming lacuna in the area of post-election violence and personality politics in available literature. Therefore, this research is an attempt to fill this intellectual gap in the study of election violence and candidate's lost. It is hoped that the outcome of this research work will be of immense benefits and assistance to the upcoming researchers who might be interested in similar research. It is also hoped that the research findings could add to the existing literature and knowledge of the subject matter.

Policy makers could also find this study relevant as the recommendations offered at the end of this study could serve as a guide in making policies relevant to prevention of post-election violence in Katsina State in particular and Nigeria in general.

1.6 RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions are germane to our understanding of the subject-matter under study:

(i) The 2011 post presidential election violence is associated with people's perception of rigging against Muhammadu Buhari..

(ii) The 2011 post presidential election violence occurred because of the Buhari's emergence as Main Contender from the North.

(iii) The 2011 post presidential election violence broke out as a result of Buhari's candidature as Muslim in Katsina state.

1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

The research work studied the effects of Buhari's loss on 2011 post-presidential election violence only due to its magnitude and severity in Katsina state. The study also should have covered the whole of Katsina State, but due to limited time and inaccessibility of the entire areas, the work covered only nine (9) local governments. Therefore, this work depends on information from the sampled areas and available materials for its analysis.

Another problem encountered was that it took the researcher up to a month before the research got a representative from Christians whom he interviewed. The researcher tried many People but all prove abortive perhaps due to the nature of the topic.

1.8 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

This research work is presented in five chapters. Chapter one is the background to the study which includes statement of the research problem, research questions, objectives and justification of the research, assumptions, scope and limitations of the study.

Chapter two reviewed related literature and theoretical framework while chapter three dwells on methodology of the research, background of the area of study (Katsina State), and Buhari's Personality traits. Chapter four presents the data collected, data analysis, discussion of the major findings, and validation of the research assumptions. Chapter five summarizes and concludes this work with a set of credible recommendations based on the findings of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2:1 INTRODUCTION:

This chapter is a review of the relevant literature and by extension, it covers theoretical framework on which this study is based. The chapter however, deals with issues of elections and electoral violence, and ultimately the place of personality politics. The theoretical framework used in this study has also been analyzed in this chapter, which is frustration-aggression theory.

2:2.1 Elections and Electoral Process

Election is one of the fundamentals and very central to the modern democratic system in Nigeria. Election is an important feature of modern representative government and it is so tied to the growth and development of democratic political order. It is now generally held to be the single most important indicator of the presence of observable democratic government. In strictest sense, there can never be a democracy without election. But transitions in numerous countries today have continued to reveal that democracy is possible without election to borrow a Prezeworki's phrase, election is the institutionalization of uncertainty.

Nnoli (1975:3) defined election as "the manner of choice agreed upon by people that enable them to select one or two people out of many to occupy one or a number of positions of authority". Nnoli further argued that election in whatever context used, must include certain basic elements which must be present. These include the selection of a few by a large number to full predetermined political vacancies.

Toluli(1997:8), notes that election is the choice of representative by the method of voting. It is a medium through which a large number of people participate in the political process. The electorate therefore play a legitimate role in ensuring the peaceful change of government, this election is very central to the principle and practices of democracy all over the world.

In his view, Nwolise (2007:155) posits that, election is a process of selecting the officers or representatives of an organization or group by the vote of its qualified members. Anifowose defined elections as the process of elite selection by the mass of the population in any given political system (Anifowose, 2003:21). Election provide the medium by which the different interest groups within the bourgeois nation state can stake and resolve their claims to power through peaceful means (Iyaye, 2005 cited in Bamgbose 2012). Election therefore is a process of entrusting public responsibilities to leaders through voting which was determined by electorates.

As Huntington cited in Bamgbose, (2012), points out, a political system is democratic "to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote".

In Nigerian context, Jinadu (1990) emphasizes the need to place in proper perspective the critical role of elections and the electoral process in laying a strong foundation for a viable democratic culture in Nigeria. In that sense, the electoral Reform Committee (ERC, 2008:1) notes in its main report that:

> Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of every democracy and the primary mechanism for exercising the principle of sovereignty of the people. Through such elections, citizens participate in governance (for) their country by choosing those who govern in the quest for development. By their choices the citizens confer legitimacy and authority on those who govern, making it easier for them to

> mobilize public support and co-operation for the implementation of development programmes. Free, fair and credible elections are therefore a crucial requirement for good governance in any democracy.

Agbaje and Adejumobi note that in liberal democratic theory; elections serve as viable mechanism for consummating representative governance. Apart from facilitating leadership succession, it promotes political accountability, citizen participation and gives voice and power to the people. (Agbaje and Adejumoba 2006).In other words, elections serve as an expression of the people's sovereign will (Adejumobi, 2007).

It has been argued that even though all modern democracies hold elections not all elections are democratic. Election is a process and a process is free only to the extent to which its stages are devoid of all forms of inhibitions and contradictions. Furthermore, it is fair only if the process shows no favour to any persons, party or side, for this, it is important to distinguish between the form and substance of elections, electoral forms may be present but the substance may be missing (Ujo, 2000). The substance is that the voter has a free and genuine choice between at least two alternatives. This is what was entailed by honderich's (1976) phrase un-coerced choosing and influencing.

However, in a situation where the members of the society cannot themselves govern and must entrust government to representatives, elections serve not only to select leaders acceptable to their voters but also to hold the leaders accountable for their performance in office. Moreso, where the electoral process is competitive and forces candidates or parties to expose their record of accomplishment and future intentions to popular scrutiny in election campaigns, elections serve as forum for the discussion of public issues, facilitates the expression of public opinion and generally permit an exchange of influence between governors and governed. Therefore, the possibility of controlling political leaders by requiring them to submit to regular and periodic

elections contributes to solving problem of succession in leadership and thereby to the continuation of democracy (Ujo, 2000).

The country's electoral process is a complex web of activities which involves more than her electoral and voting systems. The electoral process includes a broad set of activities, including the creation and maintenance of the legal and political framework for the design of the country's electoral system and more generally for the regulation, management and administration of elections. The most significant components of the electoral process are the electoral system; election administration and management which include constituency delimitation, size of the legislature, voter eligibility rules, voter registration and party system. Election administration and management also include party funding, party access to the mass media, party nomination processes, electioneering, balloting system, distribution of polling centres, vote counting process, announcement of results, adjudication of election disputes and voter education (ERC, 2008).

On electoral democracy, Chukwu (2007:77) notes that the most beneficial way to comprehend the electoral process is to explore a descriptive conceptualization which exposes the distinctive features of the process. This is necessary in order to make the concept of electoral process clear and inclusive since some political commentaries see electoral process (electoral democracy) from narrow prism of methodology of voting (electoral system).To Eya, electoral process is the method adopted in the selection of persons for political offices (Eya 2003). This is the reason why Chukwu's (2007) observation that electoral process suffers diminutive conceptualization in political discourse, such that it is taken to be equivalent to only election or electoral system, to considerably apt since the concept reaches beyond the method of choosing public office holders; or the method of translation of votes into seats or decision as to who has won an election.

The ERC, (2008) notes that the electoral system is a component of the electoral process and is designed to provide a framework within which the electorates chooses among competing political parties and their candidates, contesting for elective political offices. In other words, the term electoral system is used to indicate how many of such offices are to be contested, how votes are to be cast and counted and what formula or rules and regulations governing the voting process are used in transforming votes cast into winners of the elections.

There are different types of electoral systems, but the popular ones are first-past- the-post (FPTP) or winners takes all system, proportional representation (PR) and various combinations of others. Therefore, it can be taken from the above that a country's electoral process is a complex web of activities which involves more than its voting systems. The electoral process Include a broad set of activities that include: the creation and maintenance of the legal and political framework for the design of the country's electoral system and more generally for the regulation, management and administration of elections. The most significant components of the electoral process are the electoral system and election administration and management; which include constituency delimitation, size of the legislature, voter eligibility rules, voter registration and party system. Election administration and management also include party funding, party access to the mass media, party nomination process, electioneering, balloting system, distribution of polling centres, vote counting process, announcement and certification of polls results, adjudication of election disputes and education among others. Possibly that is why Nwabueze (1993) broadly argues that the electoral process embraced within its ambit all the institutional procedural arrangement and actions involved in elections.

> It include the suffrage, the registration of voters, delimitation of constituencies, the right to contest elections, electoral competition between rival political parties, body charged with the conduct and supervision of elections, the method of selection of candidates within the political parties, nomination of candidates, methods of voting, the actual conduct of the elections, the determination of results, trials and determination of election disputes, electoral malpractices and their consequences (Nwabueze 1993:5).

Chukwu(2007), further notes that the electoral process includes election observation and verification activities carried out by local and international bodies. Electoral process also includes the establishment of institutions and structures that mobilize the populace towards involvement in the process. Eya (2003) argued that a fair electoral process must have some basic structures, which include: statutory provisions establishing the electoral bodies, delineation of wards/constituencies, registration of political parties, registration of voter, recruitment and training of ad-hoc staff, procurement of electoral materials, logistic, screening of candidates, provision of polling agents, monitoring agents, actual voting, accreditation of voters, counting votes and providing avenues for settlement of disputed results. In fact the electoral process is an all-encompassing process which involves many issues and operation.

Oddih (2007) elucidates in Nigerian context that the 1987 Political Bureau Report gave a lucid clarification and interpretation of election and electoral processes: it states that four basic conditions are necessary for holding and conducting a free and fair elections. These include an honest, competent, non-partisan administration to run elections, enabling rules and regulations (electoral law); a develop system of political parties; and an independent judiciary to interpret the electoral law. The Nigerian type reflects the view express by mackenizie that an essential requirement of election in a democracy is that it should be free and fair. He identified four conditions necessary for free and fair election earlier.

> an independent judiciary to interpret the electoral laws; an honest, competent and non-partisan administration to manage the elections; a develop system of political parties, well organized to put their programmes and candidates before the electors as alternatives between which to choose; and a general acceptance throughout the political community, of certain rather than vague rules of the game, which limit the struggle for power because of some unspoken sentiment that if the rules of the game are not observed more or less faithfully, the game itself will disappear amidst the wreckage of the whole system (Mackenzie 1967).

Thus, Egwu submits that although these requirements may represents the ideal, they are nonetheless useful in anticipating the outcome of elections and determining the health of an electoral system. More importantly, he states that they are not far removed from those conditions identified by Dundas (1994) as the criteria to be met in order to guarantee transparent, free and fair elections. These include:

> the need for level playing field for the various contending political parties, fixed dates for elections; independence of the electoral and boundary commissions, creation of subordinate entities to enhance transparency; and the involvement of political parties in the election processes. Others are: the role of observers, opinion polls and media; the openness or otherwise of funding for political parties and their campaigns; the effectiveness of limits on campaign expenditure to contain the impact of money on the democratic process; the proper arrangements for the polls on the ground; transparency at the counting place; and the prompt announcement of results (Egwu, 2007:12).

According to Egwu, these checklists of ingredients for the achievements of successful, genuine and internationally acknowledged standard elections, constitute the bedrock of a democratic polity and where they are lacking, as in Nigeria and many third world countries, the consequences is obvious; neither can democracy be enjoyed, nor can its practices and culture be

reutilized. The failure to guarantee these conditions partly explains the difficulty of establishing and nurturing electoral democracy in Nigeria since it attained nationhood in October, 1960.

Therefore, from the above discussion, a genuinely credible democratic election would characteristically be periodic, competitive, inclusive, definitive, free and fair as well as peaceful.

2:2.2 Causes of Electoral Violence in Nigeria

In Nigeria, religion cannot be ignored as a mere object of manipulation by the political elite. This is contrary to the assumptions of the modernization and secularization theorists who suggest the decline or insignificance of religion in the modern politics of the state (Deutsch, 1953, Rostow, 1959; Almond, 196; Apter, 1965, Smith, 1970). Religion has not ceased to occupy a significant position in the political and economic configuration and therefore resurfaced dramatically and virulently in recent time (Onapajo, 2012). Onapajo, further argued that religion represents a strong social force in the politics of the state given its capacity for effective political mobilization.

This view was buttressed by Fox and Sander in Onapajo (2012) in which they provided six major reasons why this is so; One, the restriction of religious activities is often difficult for state regimes. Two, religious organization often enjoy good patronage in the media. Three, religious organizations have the capacity to easily unite differential social groupings in the society. Four, religious organizations have the ready-made platform for political meetings. Five, religious organizations are often strong in weak states and Six religious organizations have strong international links and enjoy global solidarity. (Adogame, 2010). Perhaps that is why Falola (1998) posits that "loyalty to religion is often more important than loyalty to the state among Nigerians".

In Nigerian context, Islam and Christianity form the two dominant religions. The influence of religion starts since before the independence. As Falola (1998) notes the Northern People's Congress (NPC) adopted one raised finger as symbol of the Unity of God of the Islamic monotheistic faith and at the same time passed the message to its people that the two fingered V for victory symbol of its opponents in the South was a sign of polytheism which Islam prohibits outrightly (Falola cited in Onapajo 2012).

Dudley (1973) also argued that in 1964 election northerners were warned by NPC to vote for its candidates. According to him "The Prime Minister and Sardauna need to go back to Lagos to deal with both Azikwe and Awolowo. The Sardauna is a very good Muslim we want your support, if you don't give it, there will be trouble". He further argued that the manipulation of religion and the electoral process became evident in the North, because opposition candidates mostly from the middle-belt and Christian minority were not given the opportunity to register as contestants in the election, a part of the reason eventually led to the violent protest by Tivs in 1964.

The 2011 elections as observed by Hakeem,(2012) appeared to be a political battle between the Muslims and Christians with the two contenders- Jonathan and Buhari symbolizing the major contenders of the religion. Orji and Uzodi (2012) notes that the 2011 post-election violence can therefore be seen as an expression of the frustration caused by the failure of Muhammadu Buhari a Northerner and a Muslim to reclaim the North's control of the presidency taken by Jonathan after the death of Yar'adua in 2009.

Hakeem, (2012) argued that in 2011 general election Muslims, particularly those from the North were made to believe that their faith is under attack and the elections will be like a war they have

to win to defend Islam. Christians were also being made to believe that they are on the verge of destroying the dominance of Hausa-Fulani Muslims. He further notes that no election has used religion and other dangerous propaganda as much as this one in the history of Nigeria.

According to Orji and Uzodi (2012:12), "the Nigerian legal system and law enforcement agencies are not able to arrest, prosecute and convict offenders, as such victims of violence normally receive little or no redress". Probably that is why Omenazu the National Publicity Secretary of African Renaissance Party argued that "it is only in Nigeria that you kill and maim in election days and go about streets unchallenged". No doubt people have been maimed for live, injured and killed as a result of this ugly trend that has found its way in our body politics (National Mirror cited in thenigerianvoice.com).

Human Rights Watch reported that the overwhelming majority of politically motivated cases of violence have not resulted in prosecutions (Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dirt 2010). Therefore in Orji and Uzodi's (2012) view the awareness of the possibilities of getting away with acts of violence has fostered unabated continuation of those acts. Reports indicate that more than 11,000 people were killed in hundreds of separate outbreaks of politically motivated communal violence in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007 (Aniekwe and Kushie 2011). Many of those deaths came about in large scale and were apparently highly organized massacres along ethnic and religious lines. No one has been held to account for their role in organizing or inciting those massacres.

Aniekwe and Kushie (2011) also argued that there is an entrenched culture of impunity at all levels of Nigerian government which started under the military rule and has remained a source of the country's worst human rights abuses since the return to civilian rule in 1999. . . This culture

of impunity is a recurring theme in almost all cases of electoral violence, which started as a carryover from other forms of unabated human right abuses.

The nature of the Nigerian state and its successive political regimes contributed to endemic violence in the electoral process. According to Ake (1996:73) the state is in effect privatized. It remains an enormous force but no longer a public force, no longer a reassuring presence guaranteeing the rule of law but a formidable threat to all except the few who control it, actually encouraging lawlessness and with little capacity to mediate conflicts in society (Alemika 2011). Perhaps that is the reason why Orji and Uzodi (2012) argued that the tendency of political actors to use violence in the electoral process is defined by the state's capacity to enforce law and order because the capacity of Nigerian state to enforce law and order is undermined by the erosion of the state monopoly of the use of violence.

The state performs the role of providing the conditions for capitalist development that is why Hakeem (2012) argued that, the economy produces more for the few rich while our town and cities are bursting with restive population who have no respect for laws, leaders and legions of security personnel.

Similarly, in terms of the manifestation of the Nigerian pluralism, Dunmoye (2003) argued there is problematic of the tyranny of the triad in the country. He further argued that the paramount of the three regions that emerged at independence though now defunct, but the 'ghost' are still principal determinants of political struggle and competition now and possibly in future.

On the military intervention in governance, Dunmoye argued that, the military governed for 29 years out of years of Nigeria's existence as an independent nation. He further argued that the long stay of the military in politics hindered the growth of effective representatives and

democratic institutions. He added that the current socio-political upheavals and economic crisis are traceable to the draconian rule of the military that stifled opposition and constructive discourse (Dunmoye 2003).

2:2.3 Electoral and Political Violence

In the history of Nigeria, election and political violence under a democratic setting have persisted right from the First Republic to the present and had remained a volatile phenomenon that poses a serious threat to the legitimacy of any government.

According to Ogundiya and Baba,(2007:247), electoral violence is used interchangeably with political violence as different scholars studied both political violence and electoral violence, it is worthy to note that political violence is much more broader than electoral violence, because it occurs in different kinds of political system that may not necessarily be democratic. Thus political violence can be distinguished from electoral violence as Honderish, (1989) defined political violence as a considerable or destructive use of force against persons or things, a use of force prohibited by law, directed to a change in the policies, system of government and hence also directed to changes in the existence of individuals in the society.

Equally Aisha Kiru viewed political violence as an act of thuggery and other violent acts that accompany pre-election, election and post-election periods in a given country (Aisha Kiru 2005).

Anifowose, (1982:4) provides an all-embracing definition of political violence as:

> The use of threat or physical act carried out by an individual or individuals within a political system against another individual or individuals…. Or property with the intention to cause injury or death to persons and/or damage or destruction to

> property, and whose objective, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation and effects have political significance, that is tended to modify the behaviour of others in the existing arrangement of a power structure that has some consequences for the political system.

This implies that political violence is carried out in the struggle for acquisition of political power. Thus for a violence to be political, there must be the intent of affecting the political process (immediately or remotely). And the political process according to Anifowose (1982) is considered to be the system of distribution of values carried out by specific individuals within specific institutions. He further noted that this definition excluded accidents and criminal action for personal gain but included acts of both representatives of a government or its dissidents.

Accordingly, electoral violence has been seen as an aspect of political violence that is associated with the process of elections. This form of violence occurs before, during or after elections. Banwo (2003) viewed electoral violence as that process of the use of extrajudicial means in the course of the contest for or in exercising political power. These include intimidation, harassment, assassination, blackmail, arson, looting, physical and psychological attacks and thuggery among others. This reflects the view expressed by Ogundiya (2003) in which he posits that:

> Electoral violence includes all sort of riots, demonstrations, party clashes, political assassinations, lootings, arson, thuggery, kidnapping etc. spontaneous or not, which occur before, during or after elections, it could be regarded as elections motivated crises to alter, change or influence by force or coercion, the electoral behaviours of voting…. Voting patterns or possibly reverse electoral decisions in favour of a particular individual, groups or political party.

These acts are perpetrated by individuals and groups with the intension of influencing the outcome of the elections. These acts indicate the nature of Nigerian electoral system.

As Orji and Uzodi (2012:11-12) put it "once in control of state power, the incumbents try to retain it by all means, including use of violence. At the same time, those aspiring to take over power sometimes pursue their goal by employing extreme measures such as violence".

These conceptions of electoral violence centered on influencing the voting behaviour of the electorate or changing election results in favour of an individual, groups or political party with the use of force, death and destruction of property. Electoral violence is actually a form of violence that is associated mainly with the process of elections in a given society, precisely in a democratic set up or in the process of democratic transition (Afolabi 2003).

According to Ogboaja (2007:5), electoral violence is all forms of organized act of threat, physical, psychological and structural aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing political opponents before, during and after an election geared towards influencing the electoral process to one's selfish desire.

He further argued that, the vehicles through which political and electoral violence are committed were the youth-undergraduates, professional thugs, politicians, villagers and other important masses who are misled into taking arms against one another. Ogboaja further maintains that electoral violence is categorized into three types with regard to the timing of the act such as pre-election violence, election-day and post-election violence.

The major source of pre-election violence, according to Ogboaja (2007) is the prevailing situation where some powerful individuals within the party deliberately frustrate all efforts at popular participation. According to Orji and Uzodi (2012) the activities of political godfathers create so much dissatisfaction in the political process because of their disregard of the formal

procedures for party elections and nomination of candidates. These individuals hijack the party machinery and try to select those that would run for elections.

According to Albert,

> At the inter-party level; the violent manifests in terms of physical and verbal assaults of political opponents. This type of problem could also manifest in the form of certain unbecoming attitudes by INEC or security officials. Politicians become very agitated and begin to think of how to manipulate the electoral process when INEC is seen not to be transparent in how it relates with the political parties. INEC could also be blamed if it is seen not to have put the right structures in place for ensuring that an election is free and fair. Certain statements by electoral officials at this stage could constitute one form of violence or the other on political parties. The way security agencies intervene in pre-election conflicts within and between political parties could also constitute one form of violence or the other (Albert 2007).

Election day, Albert (2007) argued that this is the most documented. At the structural level, it includes absence or inadequacy of election materials or even election officers at polling stations. It includes partisan behaviour by security officials. At the physical level, this type of violence includes killing and maiming of voters, electoral officials and security operatives. Ogboaja (2007) further notes that politicians also use things to destroy electoral materials and prevent voters perceived to be in support of their opponents from voting. Some politicians even kidnapped their opponents on Election Day.

2:2.4 Electoral Violence in Nigeria

According to Oyediran (1997:8-9), from the 1950s, elections in Nigeria approximately a war that was waged to determine "who got what, when and how". All weapons were available for these combatants to use religion, ethnic sentiments, bribery, the power of incumbency, corruption, the

abuse of electoral process etc. Indeed, evidence abound in the literature that at least up to the decade of independence, electoral behaviour in Nigeria was not guided by ideology, party programmes or the merit of those standing to be selected, but by a political calculus based on ethnic geo-politics, the means to assume power by all costs, either singly or by a fluid conglomeration of small power blocks around a big power bloc for the purpose of fighting the war to win which would give the right to rule and share the national cake (Agunbamah, 2008).

The country became exposed to diverse electoral violence. The Richard's Constitution which divided the country into North, East and West set the stage for violent electoral battles among the three main ethnic groups (Bamgbose 2012:209). This encouraged the emergence of three major political organizations National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) 1944 later renamed National Council of Nigerian Citizens, Action Group, (AG) 1951 and Northern people's congress (NPC) 1951 which dominated politics in the East, West and North of the country respectively. In each region, the dominant party in the area dominated the political space and as such, the fortunes or misfortunes of Nigerian political development were determined basically by these three political parties.

However, apart from the pockets of electoral violence that took place in 1952 (the case of Azikwe's defeat in Western Regional House of Assembly and how he eventually settled down in the east and displaced Chief EyoIta and become the Premier of the NCNC and that of the electoral violence that followed the 1959 general elections), the real electoral violence emerged in 1964 federal election. To contest the election, two major allies were formed, that is the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) consistency of NPC, NNDP and Midwest Democratic Front (MDF) the second alliance being United Progressive Grant Alliance (UPGA) consisting of NCNC, AG, NEPU and UMBC. According to Agunbamah (2008:6) the Nigerian National

Alliance (NNA) brought the NPC and the Akintola led NNDP and other minor political parties together under one umbrella. The umbrella used its power of incumbency to ensure that it hung to power even in the so-called "wild-wild west". Dudley (1965:15) presents a vivid description and account of the election of 1964 in the following words:

> The electoral officers were terrorized into absconding from their offices once they received the nomination papers of government party candidates, leaving the opposition candidates with no opportunity of registering their nomination papers. So flagrantly was the electoral procedures abused that at the close of nominations, some 88 out of a total of 174 NPC candidates in the North had their candidature unopposed. In the west, about 30 percent of the NNDP candidates were unopposed. The situation in the east was not different (Dunley 1965:15).

On the Election day UPGA leaders directed that their supporters should boycott the election for the arrest and imprisonment of their members who were to contest election in the North and West. Ofeimun declared that 'it was an election so-well orchestrated with violence and so much normlessness that, NnamdiAzikwe, the president of the newly declared republic, initially refused to call Alh. TafawaBalewa, the prime minister, to form a government' (Ofeimun, 2011:72).

However, it was not long when similar occurrence took place in the western Nigeria when election came up in that region. In 1965, the stage was set in the western region for both the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) and Action Group (A.G) to determine which of these two political parties would rule the electorates. Before the commencement of the election, there were all indications that there was no going to be peace in the region. On 30th September, the NNDP announced that 15 of its candidates had been returned unopposed. In addition, ballot papers were mysteriously disappeared from the police custody. The legal action institution by A.G to stop the 15 unopposed candidates failed (Bamgbose, 2012:210).

Furthermore, on the eve of the poll, an electoral officer was shot dead in the electoral office at Ibadan. On the Election Day, two electoral officers and two polling agents were shot dead. Contradictory election results were heard from radio and on pages of newspapers. Akintola was announced the winner and on the other hand, Alhaji Adegbenro was also announced. This further polarized the division between the two leaders (Ibid).

In effect, the political environment in the First Republic before the advent of military rule in 1964 was crisis-ridden, marked by victimization of the opposition by the governments at the federal and regional levels. According to ERC report, disputes the over census results, the 1964 general election results, the western regional crisis, the TIV riots, among others, dispelled the optimism that greeted the nation's independence, and it was ostensibly to arrest the drift towards disintegration of the country that the military intervened in governance. Nwabueze (Osinbajo, 2009:7) notes that by the closing year of Nigerian First Republic, the institution of free elections, the cornerstone of democracy had ceased to have any meaning in Nigeria, so blatantly had it been perverted. As long as an election posed any possibility of defeat for the government, the same preserve techniques perfected at every turn, would again be called into use to avert the imminence of defeat.

Consequently, the military took over in 1966 and during the first period of military rule, all political activities were banned. When the ban on politics was lifted in 1978, elections were to be conducted based on the new 1979 constitution. The new constitution provided for presidential system to replace the parliamentary system of the first republic. However, in order to ensure the emergence of truly national political parties, national spread provisions were made in the constitution.

The 1979 elections were not supervised by civilian rather; they were supervised by the Obasanjo's military regime. There was not much violence given the fact that the military played midwife to the elections and also given the desire of Nigerian to rid the nation of military rule, the transition to civilian rule took place in 1979, but not before a major legal battle settled the issues involved.

In second republic, the consequences of not learning from past mistakes proved costly in the 1983 general elections. There was massive rigging, part of which was made possible by criminal manipulation of the election register in 1983. The rigging resulted into uncontrollable violence in some states like Ondo, Oyo and part of Anambra. The reaction of the electorates was spontaneous and destructive.

The quest for votes pushed the NPN to rig the 1983 elections. Perhaps that is why Tijjani argued that:

> It is very clear that the Nigerian election of 1983 is a shame election. It was massively rigged and nobody can honestly, truthfully and scientifically state that Shagari and his lieutenants in the state capitals were democratically voted into office. A massive collusion involving the NPN, the FEDECO, the police and some sections of the judiciary had produced governments that could not claim legitimacy by dint of even the most rudimentary requirement of bourgeois democracy (Tijjani 1986 cited in Orji and Uzodi 2012:20).

The manipulation of the 1983 elections triggered violent protests in some parts of Nigeria. In indo state, Chief Akin Omoboriowo was announced to have defeated the incumbent state Governor, Chief Micheal Ajasin, violence of unprecedented levels reduced the state to huge smoldering rubble (Ogbaoja, 2007:10). The "victorious" Omobariowo hide in Lagos and several important personalities in Ondo state particularly NPN officials and key allies of Chief

Omoboriowo were killed. Among the dead were then majority leader of Ondo State House of Assembly, Hon. Tunde Agunbiade, his wife, two children, a driver and five other people as well as Hon. Olaiyafa gbamigbe, a member of the national assembly and secretary of NPN in Ondo State, who was burnt a long with ten members of his household (Guardian 22 August 1983 cited in Orji and Uzodi 2012:21) when the protests had calmed down, over 300 houses, including the office of FEDECO in Akure were destroyed. The situation was the same in many other cities of Ondo State such as, Ado-Ekiti, Ifaki, Okiti Pupa, Ikera, Efonalaye and Akemo.

The violent attitudes of the political class in the second republic warrant the return of the military to governance. Expectedly, the military seized the opportunity of the post electoral violence to terminate the Nigerian second experiment of democratic rule in the country. As a result of much before Buhari and Idiagbon to commence another transitional programme, they were overthrown in a palace coup and this brought in Babangida administration into power. The 1993 elections were inclusive. As a result of the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, most of the gains of the democratic experiments especially the new democratic institutions were lost. After Babangida stepped aside in August 1993, interim government was instituted led by Chief Shonekan which was swept following the palace coup led by General Sani Abacha. Abacha was suddenly struck with death while he was planning to transform himself into a civilian president. Abdussalami succeeded Abacha and started another transitional programme.

In the 1999 general election, there was relative absence of violence in these elections as the departing political authority was relatively independent of the political forces contending to capture power.

The 2003 elections were the first to be organized by a civilian regime since the rebirth of democratic governance in 1999. The elections did not pass the international standard as many people argued it was massively rigged. Akume (2006) contends that the elections were "characterized by large scale malpractices including rigging at all levels" while General Muhammadu Buhari describes the election as "a dark period in our history" (Buhari 2006 cited in Animashaun, 2010:8). After the elections, violence broke out in Kwara State after the ANPP candidates lost the race for a House seat was hacked to death with a machete (Ilorin April 2003 cited in Adebo et'al 2003:37). On July 10, 2003, Governor Chris Ngige was abducted from the government House, Awka, Anambra State. A team of policemen led by AIG in charge of a Zone A, Umuahia broke into security operatives and abducted the governor alleging that he had resigned his position as Governor of the state. The abduction was said to have been sponsored by his estranged political god-father, Chief Chris Uba. It took the invention of many powerful forces including the People Democratic Party (PDP) to secure his release.

In Oyo state, supporters of Chief Lamidi Adedibu on December, 22, 2005 led the group of 18 law makers to forcefully take over the house of assembly complex in Ibadan, as a prelude to impeach the then Governor of the state Chief Rasheed Ladoja. Armed with sophisticated weapons, Chief Adedibu supporters acting in consonance with the police sacked loyalist of the former Governor and chased civil servants away from the state secretariat complex. These two groups engaged themselves in exchange of gun shorts and other dangerous weapons. In the process, not less than two people were fired dead and many were wounded.

Therefore, in the 2003 not many states were spared the orgy of election related bloodletting. The report by Nigerian domestic observers' group, Transitions monitoring Group (TMG) confirmed numerous reports of fraud and violence in many states across the country (TMG, 2003). The

European Union observers' team also reported widespread election related malpractice in a number of states in the middle belt, the south- East and South -South (EU 2003).

The 2007 elections when it actually came were most deadly and frightening in nature. In Anambra state, INEC offices in Onisha North, Onisha South, Nnewi South and a local government office in Akwa North were burnt in protest. In Ekiti state there was confrontation between the PDP and Action Congress supporters and election results were blatantly falsified in many areas. (Bamgbose 2012:211). In Katsina State, post-election violence was equally reported in the northern part of the state, where opposition supporters were alleged to have burnt down government buildings in protest as the announcement that the PDP swept the state's Gubernatorial polls (Ibid 2012).

According to EU Election observation Mission (EU, EOM, Nigeria 2007) final report, the 2007 state and federal elections fell far short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections. They were marred by very poor organization, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities substantial evidence of fraud, widespread voter disenfranchisement at different stages of process, lack of equal conditions for political parties and candidates and numerous incidents of violence (EU EOM, 2007:1).

While describing 2007 general elections as problematic, Iwu (New swatch, 2009) said INEC encountered problems in the conduct of elections due to four things and single out violence and threat of violence as the most predominant problem. He believes that violence associated with elections in Nigeria has not been curtailed because politicians want power at all cost. These are people who have gone to shrine to be able to negotiate their way to power. These are people who

prepared to kill or even sell their mothers for power (Newswatch, August, 31, 2009:34 cited in Tunde, S. 2010).

2:2.5 2011 Post Presidential Election Violence

The Nigerian presidential election of 16 April, 2011 was the fourth in the series of presidential elections conducted since the country's return to democratic rule in 1999. Even though election received high praise for being well-managed by some people, but some viewed it as election that was riddle with malpractices, logistical deficiencies and procedural inconsistencies which led to eruption of violence in some northern states following the announcement of the results. The violence took ugly dimension, because as many as 1,000 people may have been killed, which were far higher than the number killed during and after the heavily rigged elections of 2007 (ISC Situation Report, 2011).

The violence swept through twelve (12) northern states of Adamawa Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara where lives and properties worth Billions of naira were lost (Abutu and Abdullahi, 2012).

Kaduna state was another centre where these violence affected, several people were said to have been killed while properties worth billions of naira, including churches and mosques were set on fire. The independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) headquarters as well as houses belonging to PDP chieftains in Hayin -banki and Tudun Wada were set ablaze by the irate youth. Others areas that the violence reached included Kafanchan, Zonkwa and Zaria. In Zaria, several people were reported killed while Baptist church was razed. In areas such as

AnguwarMu'azu, Kabala west, Rigasa, Kawo, AnguwarRimi and Sabo, angry youth were said to have mounted roadblocks attacking perceived political opponents (Akhaine, 2011 cited in Bamgbose, 2012).

In Kano state, the violence started on 18 April, 2011 by 10:00am. The violence defied political, ethnic or religious interpretation as virtually all segments of the Kano society were badly affected (Bamgbose 2012). Aside, property worth hundreds of millions of naira owned by the Emir of Kano, Dr. Ado Bayero, the Galadiman Kano, Alh. Tijjani Hashim, former speakers House of Representatives, Ghali Umar Na'abba and Salisu Buhari were reduced to rubble. Furthermore, Former Presidential Candidate of the Defunct National Republican Convention (NRC), Alh. Bashir Tofa's residential building was also burnt. Hundreds of Kano residents were severely injured and their cars were damaged. In Zamfara state, thousands of youth went on the rampage in Tsafe local government area of the state whereby they destroyed dozens of shops and vandalized three churches. Major roads were barricaded, bonfires were made to disrupt vehicular movement. In Katsina state, violence broke out escalated to many areas such as Daura, Malumfashi, Kankara, Jibia, Funtua, Faskari, Danmusa, Bakori which claimed scores of cars and churches. PDP secretariat, private residence of local PDP chieftains and Governor Shema campaign office were destroyed. In Niger state, angry youth protesting the results of the elections stormed the Nigerian Christian Corpers Fellowship Secretariat in Minna, and locked 50 corps members serving in the state in the building and set it ablaze (Bamgbose 2012).

In the north east region particularly Gombe state, 17 people lost their lives during the post-presidential polls violence in Gombe. The Acting Head of clinical services and Training of the Federal Medical Centre, Gombe, Dr. Ali Shazali stated that 71 patients of post-election violence were brought to the Hospital and 300 casualties were attended by the Red Cross (Sabiu et al,

2011:53). In Bauchi state, 10 youth corpers who served as election umpires, a divisional crime officer (DCO) and a Police woman lost their lives. Over 4500 people were displaced following the mayhem unleashed on the resident of Bauchi, by people alleged Supporters of the congress for progressive change (CPC). Four INEC offices were equally burnt down in Bauchi, Dambam, Misau and Jama'are local government area while 500 Laptops used for the voter registration exercise were looted by the irate youth (Bamgbose, 2012). In Taraba State, many people were shot dead by police during a protest at Mutum-Biyu headquarters of Gassol local government council. Also in Ardo-Kola local government area of Taraba State, four cars were burnt following the alleged attempt by one of the political parties to tamper with the results of the presidential elections. Those who lost their lives were the youth that took to the streets in the town over the alleged manipulation of the presidential elections results. The secretariat of the PDP in Gassol local government area was not left out as the entire building was burnt down by protesters. (Bamgbose, 2012). Also Adamawa state, irate youth were up with arms in Madagali and Mubi local government councils, claiming that the result figures were changed overnight.

2:2.6 Personality and Politics

The term personality has been defined in many ways. According to Britanica encyclopedia (2008) "It is the consistent differences that exist between people". The study of personality focuses on classifying and explaining relatively stable human psychological characteristics. The second meaning emphasizes those qualities that make all people alike and that distinguish psychological man from other species.

Hornby (2000) defined politics as "the science and art of government". It is the science dealing with terms, organization and administration of state or part of one and with the regulation of its relation with other state. According to Aristotle who coined these words, in Markle (1967:32) cited in Ngele (2008) he saw man as a political animal. He stated three guiding principles to politics in which he argued that, it involves a state, it requires entering into relationship with other people as a way of satisfying man's unlimited wants and also it involves rival groups as to it make competitive.

In Leshe's view (1970:6) Politics "a sphere of purposeful behaviour through which we seek to live better than we do now, ''while Markle (1967:12) defined it from two perspectives. Positively he said, "Politics is a noble quest for good order and justice" while negatively he said, "politics is a selfish grab for power glory and riches". (cited in Ngele 2008).

As observed by Alan, the focus of political discussion often on leaders, the politics cannot be fully understood without carefully considering the behaviour of its "common" citizens.

Markovic (2010) argued that people differs from one another in countless meaningful ways, some are liberal, others are conservative, some are well informed and some are not. These differences matters because they have an effects, in terms of what we think and how we behave not only politically but also in other aspects throughout the course of our live.

As Greenstein observed, the "personality and politics" literature is largely made controversial by the very features that make it intriguing (Greenstein and learner 1971 cited in Geldenhuys and Kotze 2007). There are some scholars who are skeptical about the relevance of a political leader's personal characteristics in shaping public policy, some of them are Bendix (1952), Spitz

(1958) and Hardgrove (1973). While on the other hand, it is argued that personal characteristics are some of the most important factors in this regards. Some of these scholars are Greenstein (1967), Barber (1974) and Paige (1977).

Direnzo (1974), notes on the effects of personality on decision making.

> No analysis of political behaviour can be complete without an examination of the political actor who is the agent of that behaviour. For what a person does, or can do, is linked to what that person is- not only in respect to human nature, but in terms of the unique psychological structure and dynamics of the individual

And Hermann (In East et' al 1978) mentions style of leadership is probably one of the first differences notes when heads of state change.

However, Geldenhuys, and Kotze (2007) observed that, political scientists owe an obvious debt to their colleagues in psychology on researching the connection between personality and politics. It is perhaps in this particular area that "the greatest number of self-conscious efforts had been made to connect the two disciplines" (Greenstein in Greenstein and lerner, 1971).

In a survey by the Indonesian Survey Institute found that leadership (Candidate appeal and self-identification with a political party) were the two important factors shaping electoral choice in 1999 and 2004 (Mujani 2010).

Furthermore, the qualitative leadership to a greater extent impacted in transforming many nations across the globe, the experience of Botswana could serve as a reference point under presidents Khama, Masire and Seretse Khama. The major challenge which Khama faced in 1966 was that, there was no economic base from which the development of the country could proceed. There were just 12 kilometers of paved road, only 22 Botswana had graduated from University, only 100 children had graduated from secondary school. Botswana was a predominantly tropical,

landlocked country and was perceived then by many economic as a disadvantage. Nevertheless from 1965-1995, Botswana was the fastest growing country in the world. Its average growth rate within this period was 7.7% per year. Poverty has been reduced, since the population of poor people fell from 50% in 1985 to 33% in 1994. Education has become more widespread because the proportion of people completing at least primary school rose from less than 2% at independence to about 35% in 1994 (Leith, 2005). All these were achieved partly by critical decisions made by the post-independence leaders particularly president Khama and Masire (Beaulier…….). Diamonds have been important for social and economic growth in Botswana. This shows that visionary leaders and their commitment to the utilization of resources play a vital role in the transformation of their countries.

Buhari is highly respected politician who started making history in Military, Executive chairman of Petroleum (special) Trust Funds and later on in politics. He earn credit to the masses when he was a executive chairman of the petroleum (special) Trust Fund. Buhari in 1994 was invited to serve as newly created petroleum (special) Trust Fund (PTF) by the then Head of state General Sani Abacha. Buhari was considered to be tested, trusted, strict disciplinarian and an incorruptible man. He was for this reason expected to ensure that the fund was properly and justly utilized.

The major areas in which the PTF intervened were: Roads and waterways, supply of educational material and rehabilitation of educational infrastructure, food supply, Health sector etc. Even though, at elites' level there were alleged lopsided or imbalanced distributions of projects between the North and South, but still the poor man could see the manifestations of government's projects on roads, hospitals educational sector (rehabilitation of primary and secondary schools) from July 1994 to May 1999.

In 2011 election in Nigeria, Orji and Uzodi (2012) argued that the close association of Muhammadu Buhari with C.P.C provided the basis for the party's support. They further argued that Buhari has cast an image of himself as can-do, courageous, "man of integrity and action". These personality traits of Muhammadu Buhari being honest and his Zero tolerance to Corruption attracted massive supporters to the party.

On the personality traits of the people, Almond and Verba argued that, it is expected of democratically oriented citizens to be actively involved in politics, to show behaviour that is lead by conscious mind and not by emotion, to be well informed and to make clear decision (Markovic, 2010). Lasswell cited Ascher and Ascher, (2005). also tried to specify the personality character or traits of Democrat. This democratic trait, according to Lasswell included: open human ego (warm and inclusive attitude toward other human beings), capacity for sharing values with others, multi-valued rather than single valued orientation and lastly freedom from anxiety.

Markovic, (2010), further argued that these Lasswell's democratic traits are not specifically political attitudes and feeling. He argued that they may actually be encountered in great frequency in societies that are not democratic in structure (Markovic, 2010). Lasswell further added that political behavior and political attitudes stem from personality structure.

According to Maslow's (Markovic 2010) theory of hierarchy of needs, after satisfying basic instincts, the needs of a higher order are actualized. He further argued that human being has a need to take a creative role in society. Changes in society always go together with changes in economy and politics. These changes reflect changes in personality.

In view of the literature reviewed above, there were no specific empirical studies conducted on the impact of credibility of candidature on post elections Violence while researchers made efforts

to conduct research on different personalities like Stalin by Sarah Hunter titled "Love and exploitation: personality cult, their Characteristics, their creation and modern examples (2010), Mao (China) by cesar Landin titled "To what extent did Mao Zedong's cult of personality during the cultural Revolution help him to regain Authority over China (2013), Mark Bell conducted his on "Charismatic leadership case study with Ronald Reagan as Exemplar" (2013) and "personality cult in modern politics: by Xinlu and Elena Soboleva (2014), but none of these researchers relate it with Election Violence. Therefore the intellectual gap that this study filled was that there was relationship between credibility of candidate and outbreak of the 2011 Post-Presidential election Violence in Katsina State.

2:3 Theoretical Framework

Given the focus of this study, which is to investigate Buhari's candidature and 2011 post-presidential election violence in Katsina state, Bourdieu's Habitus-Field theory was adopted as the framework of analysis. Habitus in this context refers to the person's unreflected habitus way of thinking and acting. It is formed through the accumulated experience of people in different fields. A field is an area of social interactions held together by legitimate rule. Fields organize the relationship between the elements in the field. The theory was propounded by French sociological, Pierre Bourdieu. The central argument of this theory is that social processes are constituted by dialectical relationship between objective systems of positions and subjective bundles of dispositions (waquant cited in Annette and Matthews, 2015).

In Bourdieu's (1972, p72) own words, Habitus constitutes "a set of durable, transporable dispositions" which regulates mental activity to the point where individuals are often unconsciously aware of their influence.

Bourdieu further argued that objective social structure absorption into a set of dispositions of a personal, cognitive and that subjective structures of action of the agents are then proportioned to existing objective structures and requirements of the social field create a doxic relationship.

Field is formal and informal norms governing a particular social sphere of activity (e.g. family, public school, higher education, art, politics, and economics). Fields are organized around specific forms of capital or combinations of capitals, which 'are both the process within, and product, of a field' (Thompson cited Edgerton and Roberts 2014). It is both the basis for and product of the competitive struggles that take place in social spaces as well as struggle that (re) produces the unequal distribution of resources, values and power within a social setting.

Bourdieu also suggests that those born into a higher socio-economic background will be more likely to accumulate more cultural capital, as it is linked with the amount of time needed for acquisition (years of schooling) of this capital. The length of time a person spends in school (time of cultural acquisition) depends on the length of time for which one's family can provide one with time free from economic necessity. (Bourdieu, 2001). The interrelation between Habitus and Field is the interrelation between incorporated history and objectified history which produce popular belief in the social setting. The Habitus is necessity internalized and converted into a disposition that generate meaningful practices. The implication of the relationship between field and habitus is the class struggles which are largely unconscious and indeed are predetermined by class division.

The researcher found it relevance to this work, looking at the outbreak of post-election violence in Katsina state as an expression of disappointment and frustration that their candidate Muhammadu Buhari failed through what they perceived as unfair electoral process. They thought that because Muhammadu Buhari won in their immediate vicinities, he had become president. They equated victory in their own state to a Nigeria-wide victory.

People have faith and expectations that Muhammadu Buhari, if elected, will lead with integrity and will use public resources to improve their lives, looking at the large turnout of masses during campaign. There is gap between what the masses expected and the actual result announced this lead to frustration and later aggression by some supporters which was later hijacked by mobs and unemployed and illiterate youth which degenerated to violence.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3:1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3:1.1 Sources of Data

The research used both primary and secondary method of data collection. In view of this, available related materials on the subject-matter were reviewed. To be specific, data for the study was collected from numerous research materials in forms of academic books, official documents, articles, journals, magazines, media report, workshop proceedings as well as internet. However, the researcher administered questionnaires and oral interviews with selected stake holders such as members of state assembly and Politicians.

3:1.2 Primary Sources

An open-ended oral interview was used to extract relevant information from selected stakeholders and some eye-witness in Katsina State during April 2011 election. These include politicians across the dominant political parties (C.P.C and P.D.P) such as members of the state assembly from both parties and active Politicians. Religious leaders from both Muslim and Christians were also interviewed.

The justification for the selection of these two dominant political parties is that, these were the parties that filled contested positions during election from president down to state Assembly members. They had also party structures and machinery. Politicians selected participated in the

electoral process either as party stalwarts, election monitors, candidates or indeed as electorates. Clergymen were also selected to ascertain the view of two dominant religions that available in the State.

In addition, closed-ended structured questionnaires was administered to the sampled population in Katsina L.G. Kaita, Dutsin-ma, Daura, Kankia, Baure, Musawa, Malumfashi and Funtua, Local Governments to complement the interviews conducted.

Lastly, the use of closed-ended questionnaires is to complement and have balanced information concerning the subject matter under study.

3:1.3 SECONDARY SOURCES

Under the secondary source, the researcher made use of existing literature on cases of electoral violence for the purpose of discovering whether personality of Buhari influenced the post-presidential election violence in Katsina state. Therefore, academic books and papers, journals, articles, newspapers, election reports, magazines, internet materials, and related government publications were reviewed to dig out the needed information. Also, the reports of Sheikh Ahmad Lemu, Human Right Watch, among others, on post-election violence were reviewed.

These materials were assessed and collected from the Kashim Ibrahim Library (KIL) ABU Zaria, Postgraduate Library of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, ABU Zaria; Faculty of Social Sciences Library; Centre for Democratic Development Research and Training, Zangon-Shanu, Samaru, Zaria and other sources of information.

3:1.4 Data Presentation and Analysis

The method for the presentation of data was both qualitative and quantitative analysis as the researcher presented data collected in the field by way of tables and content analysis, which is a method of transferring data from its gathering instruments to a statistical form and it was systematically examined. In quantitative analysis, the researcher used statistical measures of central tendency like simple percentage and frequency distribution table in summing up the mass information generated during field work, so appropriate analytical method was further applied to discover if there is relationship between personality of Buhari and 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina State.

However, in qualitative descriptive analysis, on the other hand, the researcher explained literally the statistical results (interpretation) of the findings from the generated information so conclusion was drawn based on such findings in order to either confirm or disconfirm the research assumptions advanced for the study.

3:1.5 POPULATION AND SAMPLE SIZE OF THE STUDY

Population here refers to the totality of people living in a particular geographical location (Musa 2014). Sample size according to Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2006: 175), refers to sub-group or sub-set of a total population of a given study. Kerlinger also posits that sampling is a portion of a total population as a representative of that population (in Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2006).

The study area is Katsina state. The state has thirty four (34) local governments. According to 2006 census, the population of the state was 5,792,578. The researcher adopted multistage

cluster sampling techniques in order to get the population of interest for the study. This technique involves sampling in successful stages such that at each stage, selection is made by using any of the well-known probability sampling methods (Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2006).

The state was divided into three senatorial zones politically. Katsina, Funtua and Daura senatorial zones. In each zone, the researcher writes the name of each local government in a separate piece of paper, folded and squeezed the pieces and then put into a container (tin). The researcher then randomly selected three names from each senatorial zone. Eventually Baure, Daura, Kankia were selected from Daura Senatorial zone. Dutsin-ma, Kaita, Katsina from Katsina senatorial zone and Funtua, Malumfashi, Musawa local governments from Funtua Senatorial zone were selected. Therefore, a total of nine local governments across the three senatorial zones were selected.

The sample size of this study is 600, it conforms to the Morgan and Kreiche's criterion that a sample of 384 and above can represent the total population of 1,000,000 (Morgan and Kreiche, 1970). Furthermore, total votes casted both valid and invalid in Katsina State Presidential election were 1,622,063(Inec, 2011). Therefore sampled size of 600 is considered to be representative enough to the total population of the state. The distribution of the total population of local governments selected and the sample size according to the Local Government under study is presented in a tabular form below:

TABLE 3.1: DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLED POPULATION AND THE SAMPLE SIZE ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

No of L.G.s Selected	Total Population of LGA Selected	Sampled LGA
Daura	219,721	72
Baure	197,425	65
Kankia	151,434	50
Katsina	318,459	105
Kaita	184,401	61
Dutsin-ma	169,671	56
Funtua	225,571	74
Malumfashi	182,920	60
Musawa	171,714	57
TOTAL	1,821,316	600

The local government Sample size of the study was obtained through the use of the

Following Formula;

L.G. Sample Population= $\frac{TotalPopulationofL.G.}{Totalpopulationofselected LGAs} \times \frac{600}{1}$

Using the above formula, the LG population size was obtained by dividing the number of population per LG with the total population of the sample local governments selected across three senatorial zones multiplied by the desired sample size of the study. This is what gave the sample size of each LG selected in proportion to its population.

However, each of the local government selected is divided into eleven (11) Political Wards. Having divided each local government into wards as cluster of convenience, systematic sampling method was then used to alphabetically arrange the population according to the wards for determining the selection interval of the individual respondent. The target population was the adult males and females especially youth and the population figure was used to determine the selection interval of the individual respondent at the ward levels.

More so, 20 respondents were through oral interview in nine selected local governments. One from each Political party i.e. C.P.C. and P.D.P across the local nine governments. Others were two religious leaders of Muslims and Christians across the state. Therefore, a grant total of 620 respondents constitute the population of interest for the study.

3.2:1 KATSINA STATE: BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Katsina State is one of the thirty six states (including the federal capital territory, Abuja) that constitute the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The state was created on 27 September, 1987 along with AkwaIbom by the then head of state, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, after many years of agitation by the people now known as Katsinawa and Daurawa. The state was carved out of the former Kaduna State.

Katsina state, on creation took off with seven (7) local governments initially inherited from Kaduna state, now had thirty four local government areas, carved out from the old ones. The first old seven were, Daura, Dutsin-ma, Funtua, Kankia, Katsina, Malumfashi and Mani. Other additional twenty seven carved out of the old ones were, Bakori, Batagarawa, Batsari, Baure, Bindawa, Charanchi, DanMusa, Dandume, Danja, Dutsi, Faskari, Ingawa, Jibia, Kafur, Kaita, Kankara, Kurfi, Kusada, Mai'adua, Mashi, Matazu, Musawa, Rimi, Sabuwa, Safana, Sandamu and Zango.

The apex of the administrative areas is the capital 'Katsina'. According to the 2006 census report, the state had a population of 5, 792, 578 people with common history, culture and language. Katsina state has two emirate councils (Katsina and Daura emirates). The Emir of Katsina is the Chairman of the council of Emirs in the state. Katsina Emirate has forty-four (44) Districts while Daura has ten (10) in its domain. Katsina state is the fourth largest state in Nigeria in terms of population (2006, census).

3.2:2 ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE

The economic activities of the people of the state can be seen from commercial, agricultural, industrial and civil service. According to Lawal, Katsina as far back as 15^{th} to 17^{th} Centuries was a centre of commerce. It became the hub of the trans-Sahara trade, linking the Northern Sudan region, the Magrib-West Africa, North African port and Songhai Empire of West Africa to the southern areas of Kano, Zaria, Sokoto and Borno (Lawal, 2009).

In agricultural sector, Katsina state is among the states plays leading role in the production of cash and food crops. The state produces cotton, groundnut, millet, guinea-corn, maize, beans,

rice, sugar cane, and vegetables. Livestock include cattle, sheep, goats, camels, poultry, donkeys and horses etc. The state is also serving as a shining example in irrigation. (Ibid, 2009).

In industrial sector, viable industries were established in the state which includes cotton ginneries, oil mill, flour mill, kaolin processing factories, Funtua Burnt Bricks Factory and Funtua Textiles Limited. Based on these, it can be said that the settlements of the state are divided into two. Urban settlements are mostly civil servants and traders while the rural dwellers are mostly farmers.

3.2:3 EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE STATE

The state is blessed with a number of higher institutions of learning: such as Umar Musa Yar'adua University, Katsina, Al'qalamUniversity, Katsina, Federal University, Dutsin-ma, School of Basic and Remedial Studies (ABU) Funtua, Federal College of Education, Katsina and Isa Kaita College of Education Dutsin-ma. There is also Hassan Usman Katsina Polytechnic, Bala Usman College of Legal and General Studies, School of Nurses Katsina, School of Health Technology in Kankia and Daura, all providing educational needs of both the state indigenes and others from all parts of the country.

The state has a total number of 2209 primary schools (public) and 274 secondary schools both public and private schools (WAEC Office Katsina).

3.2:4 GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE OF KATSINA STATE

Katsina state covers an area of about 23, 983 square kilometers. It is located between latitude $11{:}02^0$ and $13^0\ 03^0$N longtitude $6^0 52^0$E and $9^0$02E.The state borders Zamfara state to the West,

Kano and Jigawa states to the East, by Kaduna state to the South and Niger Republic to the North. The state can be classified into two zones climatically, tropical continental and semi-arid continental. The south of the state (from Funtua to Dutsin-ma) belongs to the former with total annual rainfall figures ranging from 1000mm around Funtua to over 800mm around Dutsin-ma (Lawal 2009).

The North of the state (from around Kankia to the extreme northeast) has total rainfall figures ranging from 600-700mm annually. The climate differences vary considerably according to the months and seasons. There is harmattan season from December to February. A hot dry season from March to May signaling the arrival of the raining season, a warm wet season from June to September, a less marked season after rains during the month of October, characterized by decreasing rainfall and gradual hovering of temperature. The state is composed of undulating plains which rise gently from 360m in the northeast around Daura, to 600m around Funtua in the Southwest. The state also has two geological regions. The south and central parts of the state are underlain by crystalline rocks of the basement complex (from Funtua to Dutsin-ma), but in the northern parts cretaceous sediments overlap the crystalline rocks.

The Katsina-Daura plains lie at a lower base level than other parts of the state. Southwards of the Katsina-Daura plains, is the flat to gently undulating surface which is the end result of years of erosion action on the surface rock. In areas around Funtua and Dutsin-ma, there are numerous quartzatic and granitic hills that rise 60200m above the surrounding plains. These hills are probably the result of the intrusion of older granites into the basement complex, which have undergone long periods denudation (Buchanan and Pugh in Lawal, 2009).

3:3 BUHARI'S PERSONALITY TRAITS

Muhammadu Buhari was born in Daura on Thursday 17 December, 1942. He started his Education in Mai'adua primary School, 1948-52, Katsina Middle School 1953-55. Katsina Provincial Secondary School (now Government College Katsina) 1956-61. Buhari Joined the Nigerian Military School (now Nigerian Defence Academy) as an officer cadet in 1962. He studied at U.K, India, and U.S.A.

Buhari worked at various capacities while in service with Nigerian military. He rose by sheer hard-work to the apex of his military career by heading the Nigerian armed Forces and by combination of destiny and providence to the apex of Nigeria's political leadership (Mahmud, 1998). He believed in values of justice and fairness, honesty and probity, humility and supremacy of the community's interest over individual interest. He received awards/Honours which signify his inbuilt behaviour of honesty, selfless service to humanity. He held various Command and staff appointments in Nigeria and abroad. His numerous appointments over twenty years from 1963-1983 include platoon commander, 2nd infantry Battalion at Abeokuta; Brigade Major e.t.c.

Contrary to the belief of some people that in Nigeria, honesty does not pay, Buhari was repeatedly persuaded by many important personalities to join Politics. After acceptance, he joined the race to the presidency which failed (2003, 2007 and 2011).

Buhari could be understood from his deeds and speeches because he means what he said, he is really a Nigerian. The achievements recorded in Petroleum Trust Funds (PTF) testified that and in one of his speeches Buhari argued that "what I say today is for all Nigeria christians and Muslims, Southern and Northern, rich and poor, young and old, man and woman. We are all

citizens of Nigeria. There is no dividing line among us that I care to honour. Either we advance as one or fail altogether". He further argued also that he will tolerate no religious, regional, ethnic or gender bias (Buhari, 2015 cited in Jammaje 2015)

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EFFECTS OF BUHARI'S LOSS AND 2011 POST-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KATSINA STATE

4:1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter contains the presentation and the analysis of data collected through both secondary and primary sources on the subject matter under study. The Findings are drawn and verified against the assumptions posed in Chapter one. A total of 547 out of the sampled 600 Questionnaires were retrieved which represented 91.2%. This implies that 53 administered questionnaires (i.e. 8.8%) could not be retrieved. Furthermore, twenty (20) people including eighteen (18) Political Stake-holders and Two (2) religious leaders of Muslims and Christians were interviewed. In each of nine (9) Local government areas, two People were selected from CPC and PDP. Two religious leaders were selected to represent views of the two dominant religions across the State. Our analysis of results and findings are therefore based on the 547 Questionnaires that were retrieved from the respondents in the study areas, Political stake-holders and religious leaders interviewed. The analysis is presented in a tabular form using frequency and percentage as the tool of analysis.

TABLE 4:1.1 ADMINISTRATION AND RETRIEVAL OF QUESTIONNAIRE

LOCAL GOVERNMENT SELECTED IN THE STATE	QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTERED	QUESTIONNAIRE RETRIEVED	VALID QUESTIONNAIRE
Daura	72	72	72
Baure	65	52	52
Kankia	50	49	49
Katsina	105	97	97
Kaita	61	61	61
Dutsin-ma	56	46	46
Funtua	74	72	72
Malumfashi	60	53	53
Musawa	57	45	45
Total	600	547	547

Source: Field work research March, 2015

As the above table indicates, a total of 600 questionnaires were administered in the selected local government areas, based on their respective population as calculated in Chapter one (Table 1) out of the 600 administered, 547 (91.2%) were retrieved and all were properly filled.

ANALYSIS OF BIODATA OF RESPONDENTS

TABLE 4:1.2 AGE BRACKETS OF RESPONDENTS

AGE	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
18 – 27	268	49
28 – 37	225	41.1
38 – 47	30	5.5
48 and above	24	4.4
TOTAL	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

Table above had shown the age bracket of the respondents from the above, 268 of them representing 49% were between 18-27 years. 225 of the respondents representing 41.1% were from 28-37 age brackets, while 30 of the respondents representing 5.5 were between the age brackets of 38-47. Only24 fell within the age bracket of 48 and above. This implies that the researcher obtained data from all the categories of adult population of the local governments under study, especially the youths (90.1%) to ascertain their opinion on the personality of Buhari on the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina State.

TABLE 4:1.3 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BASED ON SEX

SEX	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Male	529	96.7
Female	18	3.3
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

Table above indicates the gender or sex of the respondents. The table (4:3) shows that out of the 547 respondents, 529 representing 96.7% were males while 18 representing 3.3% were females. This implies that, in most of the respondents chosen, men filled the questionnaires more than their women counterparts. This might not be unconnected with the nature of the cultural and traditional settings of the areas under study whereby women, especially married are bound to remain indoors while the men (husbands) go out to search for food, hence the difficulty of easily accessing the Females sex in large number. Furthermore, majority if not all, of the participants in the violence were men, (Yandaba, Almajirai, unemployed youths).

TABLE 4:1.4 RELIGIONS OF RESPONDENTS

RELIGION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Islam	521	95.2
Christianity	26	4.8
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

As shown on table above, majority of the respondents under study in this research (521 representing 95.2%) were Muslims by religion while 26 of them representing 4.8% were Christian by their religion. None of the respondents claimed affiliation to traditional religion. Majority of the respondents 95.2% were therefore Muslims because Islam is the predominant religion in the areas under study (Katsina State). Nevertheless, the findings on table 4 .4 implies that the researcher was able to study people from at least two religious groups.

TABLE: 4:1.5 MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS

MARITAL STATUS	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Married	209	38.2
Single	338	61.8
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The above table shows that 209 representing 38.2% of the respondents were married men and women while 338 of them representing 61.8% were not married. This implies that the researcher was able to have access to many people who were considered responsible people in their respective families as respondents to express their views on Buhari's personality on the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina State.

TABLE 4:1.6 EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF RESPONDENTS

EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Primary	41	7.5
Secondary	166	30.3
Tertiary	333	60.9
Others	7	1.3
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

As it is shown in the table above, 41 of the respondents representing 7.5% were holders of primary school leaving certificates. 166 of them representing 30.3% were holding senior secondary school (ordinary level) certificates. 333 of the studied respondents representing 60.9% have attained tertiary institutions and were holders of certificates of higher institutions such as OND, NCE, HND and Bsc. among others. Only 7 of them representing 1.3% were holders of other certificates. This implies that majority of the people in the areas understudy were highly educated as most of them attended advanced levels of their educational pursuit. That might not

be unconnected to the History of Katsina people as learned people since the colonial period. These percentages shows that researcher sought the opinions of people considered enlightened enough to understand and appreciate the phenomena under investigation and hence offer correct views that could lead to reliable findings as regards to the Buhari's personality on 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina State.

TABLE 4:1.7 EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF RESPONDENTS

EMPLOYMENT STATUS	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Employed	270	49.3
Unemployed	260	47.6
No response	17	3.1
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The above variable informed us more about the respondent's information about their employment status. There are only two categories, as either employed or unemployed. While 270 respondents representing 49.3% are employed, 260 respondents, representing 47.6% are unemployed. The remaining 17 respondents representing 3.1% did not respond. This simply shows how the researcher consulted people of diverse economic and social status in the areas. As at 2011 unemployment rate was 23% and 32% of those affected were between the ages of 14 and 44(Lemu's report 2011:54).

TABLE 4:1.8 OCCUPATIONS OF RESPONDENTS

OCCUPATION	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Students	125	22.9
Civil servants	265	48.4
Business/politicians	97	17.7
Farming	60	11
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The above table presents the occupational distribution of the respondents in the study areas. From it125 of them representing 22.9% were students, 265representing 48.4% were civil servants. Business or politics as an occupation of the respondents had 97 representing 17.7% and 60 of the respondents representing 11% were farmers. This equally implies that attempts were made to talk to different people with different occupational backgrounds to ascertain their opinion on the phenomena in question.

TABLE 4:1.9 POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIPS OF THE RESPONDENTS

ARE YOU A REGISTERED MEMBER OF A POLITICAL PARTY?	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Yes	305	55.8
No	242	44.2
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The table above shows that a total of 305 representing 55.8% of the respondents are registered members of political parties while the rest 242 representing 44.2% are not registered members of any political party. This implies that the researcher was able to get information from both partisan politicians and non-partisan politicians to ascertain the divergent views of two groups on the Buhari's personality on 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina State.

TABLE 4:1.10: VOTE CASTING IN THE 2011 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

DID YOU VOTE IN THE LAST 2011 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION?	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Yes	454	83
No	93	17
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The table above presents participation in the election of respondents in the 2011 presidential election. 454 of the respondents representing 83% voted in the 2011 presidential election while 93 representing 17% of the respondents did not vote. This shows that most of the respondents voted in the 2011 presidential election. This might be connected to the level of education of the respondents. Educated persons should have the zeal to exercise their franchise. It might also be in connection how importance the election was to people either change or maintain the power.

TABLE 4:1.11: FACTORS INFLUENCING RESPONDENTS' CHOICE OF THE PARTY.

WHAT FACTOR INFLUENCE CHOICE OF THE PARTY?	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Membership of Buhari	360	65.9
Party Affiliation	131	23.9
Religion	40	7.3
Others	16	2.9
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The table above shows the factors that influenced respondents' choice of their parties. 360 of the respondents representing 65.9% indicates that Membership of Buhari. 131 representing 23.9% based it on the party affiliation. 40 respondents representing 7.3% indicates religion as a factor while 16 representing 2.9 indicate other factors that influenced the choice of the party. This clearly shows that majority of the respondents indicates candidature of Muhammadu Buhari was the main factor influence their choice of the party.

Given the percentage of the voters' reflection, it shows that the electorates in the state belief in Muhammadu Buhari's candidature. This was manifested in the elections results released by INEC. In Katsina state CPC won three senatorial seats and it also won twelve (12) out of fifteen seats of members House of Representatives but it lost gubernatorial seat and won only four out of thirty four state assembly members.

TABLE 4:1.12 RESPONDENTS' VIEW ON WHETHER THEY WERESATISFIED WITH THE RESULT DECLARED BY INEC

ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE RESULT DECLARED BY INEC?	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Yes	92	16.8
No	455	83.2
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The table above shows the level of satisfaction or otherwise of the respondents on the result declared by INEC. 92 of the respondents representing 16.8% indicate their satisfaction of the result while 455 respondents representing 83.3% indicates their dissatisfaction with the results. It can be concluded that overwhelming majority of the respondents were not satisfied with the results declared by INEC during the 2011 presidential election. They shared view with the officials of CPC in which they argued that there were huge disparities in south-east between Governors and President, Governors who campaigned for him (Jonathan) received only thousands while president received millions. Crisis Group also reported voter turnout was about 78% in the south-south and south-East during the presidential elections exceeded the national average by at least 50%, suggesting electoral fraud (Crisis Group 2011). In Bayelsa state the turnout was 86%.

Lemu's committee also reported that BBC Hausa made broadcast where election results were announced that CPC presidential candidate had an edge over other candidates this was said to have given the impression to many supporters of the CPC candidate that the official results as declared by INEC may have been manipulated in favour of the PDP candidate (leme's report 2011:38). Many people believed so much on what they heard from BBC, VOA or any foreign media as they can broadcast any new whether against or for the wishes of the government. In other word, domestic Medias are being influenced by government in power.

TABLE 4:1.13 RESPONDENTS VIEW ON WHETHER THEY REACTED

DID YOU REACT?	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Yes	168	30.7
No	379	69.3
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

According to the table above, 168 of the respondent representing 30.7% said they reacted against the result INEC declared while 379 representing 69.3% said they did not react. This implies that majority of the respondents did not react to INEC declared result, even though they were not satisfied with the result. The researcher noticed that some respondents don't want expose themselves because they knew it is a punishable offence.

It indicated that even-though majority of people were not satisfied with results they might preferred legal action then taking in their hand.

TABLE 4:1.14 RESPONDENTS' VIEW ON LIKELY CAUSES OFELECTORAL VIOLENCE NIGERIA

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU CONSIDER AS LIKELY CAUSES OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA?	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
The quest for power, position and materialism	57	10.4
credibility of candidate	110	20.1
A defeat of political opponent in an election is seen as a sin against the opposition that must be paid back through violent means	54	9.9
Election irregularities and rigging	319	58.3
None of the above	7	1.3
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

As shown on table 4.14, several things bring about electoral violence in Nigeria such as the quest for power and position by desperate politicians; materialism which is the quest to possess material things or wealth and these have been felt by 57 of the respondents which represents 10.4%. Meanwhile, 110 of the respondents (20.1%) expressed that the personality of a candidate is a contributory factor to the post-election violence. However, it has been shown by 54 of the respondents (9.9%) that one other thing that brings post-election violence is the fact that a defeat

of a political opponent in an election is seen as a sin against the opposition that must be paid back through violent means.

Furthermore, 319 respondents representing 58.3% expressed that election irregularities and rigging are highly responsible for post-election violence. This implies that part of the causes of the 2011 post-presidential election violence in some northern part of Nigeria (Katsina State inclusive) could be traced to the quest for power, position and materialism, personality of candidate, election irregularities and rigging which combined to shape the violence after the declaration of results.

TABLE 4:1.15 OTHER THINGS THAT ENGENDER VIOLENCE AFTER ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA

WHAT OTHER THINGS DO YOU THINK ENGENDER VIOLENCE AFTER ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA?	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
When electorates felt that their candidate fell through unfair electoral process	100	18.3
Lack of voters education	98	17.9
Manipulation of result by the elites	139	25.4
All of the above	210	38.4
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The table above shows that, about 100 of the respondents (18.3%) to this study observed that one other thing that engenders violence after election is when electorates felt that their candidate fell through unfair electoral process. This propels the electorates to react violently. Similarly, 98 respondents representing 17.9% observed that lack of voter education during the electioneering process in Nigeria tends to produce a wrong notion about the opposition and the entire electoral system. Most of the youths believed that their candidate would surely win if free and fair election was conducted, therefore once their candidate fell they may think the election was rigged so they reacted violently. Meanwhile, 139 respondents (25.4%) expressed that manipulation of result by the elites engender violence after election in Nigeria as the will of the elites prevails in Nigerian politics. The rest of the 210 respondents representing 38.4% believe that all of the above factors engender violence after election in Nigeria. This implies that majority or all of the respondents believed that all the above reasons which include manipulation of result by the elites, lack of voter education and when electorates felt that their candidates fell through unfair electoral process engender violence after election in Nigeria.

TABLE 4:1.16 SOME SPECIFIC ACTIONS THAT IGNITED THE 2011 POST-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN YOUR AREA

WHICH SPECIFIC ACTIONS DO YOU THINK IGNITED THE 2011 POST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN YOUR AREA?	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Election rigging	309	56.5
Political intolerance by elites in the area that 2011 election must be won by the opposition at all cost	65	11.9
Poverty of the people in the area caused by deepening crises of unemployment	44	8.0
All of the above	122	22.3
None of the above	7	1.3
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The table above shows that some of the specific actions that ignited the 2011 post-presidential election violence in Katsina State were as follows; 309 of the respondents or 56.5% indicated election rigging in the areas. About 65 or 11.9 of the respondents observed political tolerance by some politicians or elites in the area who saw the 2011 presidential elections as a game that must be won by the opposition. While 44 or 8.0% believe poverty of the people in the area caused by

deepening crises of unemployment caused post-election violence and the rest 122 or 22.3% believe that all the three reasons above are the causes of post-election violence. In summary election rigging is the specific action that ignited the 2011 post-presidential election violence in the area.

TABLE 4:1.17 ZONING PRINCIPLE IN PEOPLES' DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP) MADE MOST NORTHERNERS TO INSIST THAT 2011PRESIDENCY SHOULD BE WON BY A NORTHERNER GAVE RISE TOVIOLENCE IN SOME NORTHERN STATES.

CAN YOU ARGUE THAT THE ZONING PRINCIPLE IN PEOPLES' DEMOCRATIC (PDP) PARTY MADE MOST NORTHERNERS TO INSIST THAT THE 2011 PRESIDENCY SHOULD BE WON BY A NORTHERNER, FAILURE OF WHICH GAVE RISE TO POST-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN SOME NORTHERN STATE?	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Yes	322	58.9
No	225	41.1
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

Table 4:17 above indicated a total of 322 or 58.9% believe that zoning principle in PDP made most northerners to insist that 2011 presidency should be won by a northerner, which gave rise to the violence after the election in some northern states, while the rest 225 or 41.1% disagreed.

This implies that majority of the respondents believed that the zoning principle in PDP made most northerners to react violently after the declaration of result that showed northerners fell in the race.

Similarly, Majority of the respondents believed that PDP zoning principle partly contributed to the violence because if Buhari fell through fair electoral process, Northern people wouldn't have reacted violently.

Chief Barnabas Gemade, a Former PDP Chairman, said that

> the problem arose from the fact that many of the Politicians from the North gave the electorate the impression that it is the turn of the north. In accordance with the apparently now discarded PDP zoning system, power reverted after the term of President Obasanjo (South-west) ended in 2007, to the north through Yar'adua's election. Following his death, some Northern Politicians argued that another Northerner should receive the next full term rather than the accidental Southern incumbent (Crisis Group, 2011).

Similarly, the panel led by Sheikh Ahmad lemu also argued that disagreement in the PDP over the application of the zoning policy polarized the nation along regional and religious lines and this poisoned the political atmosphere of the country.

TABLE 4:1.18 IMPRESSIONS GAVE TO THE ELECTORATES BYPOLITICIANS

IS IT TRUE THAT MANY POLITICIANS FROM THE NORTH GAVE THE ELECTORATES THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS TURN OF THE NORTH AND ANYTHING SHORT OF A NORTHERN PRESIDENCY WAS TANTAMOUNT TO STEALING OF THE SEAT?	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Yes	255	46.6
No	292	53.4
Total	**547**	**100**

THAT 2011 WAS THE TURN OF THE NORTH

Source: Field work research March, 2015

From the table above, a total of 255 respondents or 46.6% expressed that it was true that many politicians from the north gave the electorates the impression that it was the turn of the north and anything short of that was tantamount to stealing the seat, while the rest 292 of the respondents representing 53.4% said it was not true by indicating No. This implies that majority of the respondents did not agree that politicians from the north gave the electorates the impression that the 2011 election was the turn of the north. But still we cannot ignore statements made by some northern elites about their position on 2011 presidential election which clearly show they prefer northern candidate in lure of that zoning policy.

TABLE 4:1.19: VIEW OF THE RESPONDENTS THAT AGGRIEVED YOUTH FELT THAT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF THE C.P.C. WAS DENIED VICTORY AT THE POLL

WAS IT TRUE THAT AFTER THE ELECTION, AGGRIEVED YOUTH FELT THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF THE C.P.C. WAS DENIED VICTORY AT THE POLL?	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Yes	378	69.1
No	169	30.9
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The above table presents views of respondents that the aggrieved youth felt that the presidential candidate of the Congress for Progressive Change (C.P.C) was denied victory at the poll or not. The table indicates that 378 of the respondents representing 69.1% believedthat the aggrieved youth felt that the presidential candidate of the CPC was denied victory at the polls, while the rest 169 respondents or 30.9% had contrary view. This shows that an overwhelming majority of the respondents believed that it was true that after election the aggrieved youth felt that the presidential candidate of the CPC was denied victory at the polls. Many believed Buhari lost either because the votes had been tampered with in favour of his opponent.

Furthermore, the results released by independent electoral commission, Katsina chapter shows that Buhari won or defeated his opponent in all thirty four local governments.

S/N	NAME OF LGA	CODE	NO. REGD	VOTES RECEIVED BY PARTIES		VALID VOTES	REJECTED VOTES	VOTES CAST
				CPC	PDP			
1	BAKORI	01	109560	48393	19548	69392	2091	71483
2	BATAGARAWA	02	80651	25095	14307	41822	2775	44597
3	BATSARI	03	104183	25390	17042	44913	4842	49755
4	BAURE	04	91343	39130	10294	50978	2807	53785
5	BINDAWA	05	73351	28830	9799	39775	1696	41471
6	CHARANCHI	06	66778	20558	11467	32719	1204	33923
7	DAN MUSA	07	79205	29540	10581	40717	1360	42077
8	DANDUME	08	74462	38647	8495	47847	1266	49113
9	DANJA	09	98966	40905	12832	54405	1698	56103
10	DAURA	10	77824	42698	4861	48336	847	49183
11	DUTSI	11	51988	13382	8855	22800	1013	23813
12	DUTSIN-MA	12	103370	35524	15202	53243	3669	56912
13	FASKARI	13	104836	55078	19850	75972	3370	79342
14	FUNTUA	14	159624	83129	11991	96260	1800	98060
15	INGAWA	15	86791	26970	10958	39352	2423	41775
16	JIBIA	16	101257	30119	10404	43021	3232	46253
17	KAFUR	17	116075	50249	19466	70967	3421	74388
18	KAITA	18	71719	19626	9110	30546	2353	32899
19	KANKARA	19	121846	57239	11566	70158	4010	74168
20	KANKIA	20	77817	35758	7399	43967	1445	45412
21	KATSINA	21	216630	78903	19475	102187	3732	105919
22	KURFI	22	63685	22046	12188	36527	2863	39390
23	KUSADA	23	47166	17134	6787	24393	851	25244
24	MAI'ADUA	24	76665	24308	14006	39933	2158	42091
25	MALUMFASHI	25	137900	67011	12005	80856	2571	83427
26	MANI	26	93519	27823	12828	42524	2586	45110
27	MASHI	27	82171	23118	17127	42936	3856	46792
28	MATAZU	28	59737	22116	13612	36309	1470	37779
29	MUSAWA	29	75896	34632	9218	44523	1181	45704
30	RIMI	30	79505	22303	15003	39102	3062	42164
31	SABUWA	31	60780	19336	14232	34351	1685	36036
32	SAFANA	32	78697	23978	13441	38299	1500	39799
33	SANDAMU	33	65785	17039	13237	30633	631	31264
34	ZANGO	34	60014	17912	11206	29769	924	30693
	TOTAL		3049166	1163919	428392	1639532	76392	1715924

Source: INEC Katsina chapter

The above result released by INEC could be a reason why some people reacted violently. Majority of the people felt that the election was rigged in favour of Goodluck Jonathan.

TABLE 4:1.20 WHY PEOPLE VOTED BUHARI

WHY DO YOU THINK PEOPLE VOTED FOR BUHARI? BECAUSE HE IS A….	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Muslim	18	3.3
Northerner	72	13.2
Honest	372	68.0
All of the above	84	15.4
None of the above	1	0.1
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The above table revealed that majority of the respondents numbering 372 or 68% believe that people voted for Buhari because he is an honest person. 72 of the respondents or 13.2% indicated that because Buhari is a northerner while 18 or 3.3% expressed that because Buhari is a Muslim and the rest 84 or 15.4% believe all the above reasons about Buhari made people to votes for him. This implies that because Buhari is honest is the main reason people voted for him. In an interview conducted with P.D.P. stalwart argued that Buhari is reveres by the masses because they believed he could deliver (the goods) in all respect (interview 2015). We are living witness

that People also called him names like ‘mai Gaskiya’ means an honest person. This indicated how electorates admire him more than any other candidate

TABLE 4:1.21 RESPONDENTS’ VIEW ON WHY VIOLENCE BREAK-OUT

WAS THE VIOLENCE BREAK-OUT BECAUSE?	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Buhari loss election	246	45.0
Northerners felt marginalized	150	27.4
Political parties felt election was rigged	72	13.2
All of the above	60	11.0
None of the above	19	3.4
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

From the table above, a total of 246 or 45% indicated that violence broke-out because Buhari lost the election. 150 or 27.4% believed that it was because northerners felt marginalized, 72 or 13.2% also believed that it was because political parties felt the election was rigged. While 60 or 11.0% believe all of the above reasons caused the violence and the rest 19 or 3.4% said none of the above. Given the percentage above this shows that because Buhari lost the election was the reason why violence broke-out. Electorates felt cheated. This is what manifested in most of the northern states.

TABLE 4:1.22 ETHNIC DIFFERENCES, RELIGION AND OTHERRELATED PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE NIGERIAN STRUCTURE IS SAID TO BE CONTRIBUTORY TO THE EMERGENCEOF 2011 POST- PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN YOUR AREA

DID YOU AGREE THAT ETHNIC DIFFERENCE, RELIGION AND OTHER RELATED PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE NIGERIAN FEDERAL STRUCTURE IS SAID TO BE CONTRIBUTORY TO THE EMERGENCE OF 2011 POST-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN YOUR AREA?	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Yes	252	46.1
No	295	53.9
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The table above shows that 252 of the respondents representing 46.1% believe that ethnic differences, religion and other related problems inherent in the Nigerian federal structure are said to be contributory to the emergence of 2011the post presidential election violence in some areas of Katsina state while the rest, 295 or 53.9% did not think so. This implies that most of the respondents didn't believe that ethnic differences, religion and other related problems inherent in the Nigerian federal structure is said to be contributory to the emergence of 2011 post presidential election violence in some areas of Katsina state.

TABLE 4:1.23 RESPONDENTS' VIEW ON BUHARI'S CREDIBILITY IN 2011 POST-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KATSINASTATE.

DO YOU AGREE THAT THE 2011 POST - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN YOUR AREA ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE BECAUSE OF BUHARI'S CREDIBILITY?	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Yes	417	76.2
No	130	23.8
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

From the above table, a total of417 or 76.2% of the respondents agreed that the 2011 post presidential election violence in their areas actually took place because of Buhari's credibility, while 130 or 23.8% didn't agree with this view. This means Majority of the respondents believed that Buhari's credibility was the main reason why 2011 post presidential election violence took place in some areas of Katsina State.

One of the interviewees Observed that Buhari had proven to be an honest, patriotic, prospicient, tested and trusted person and that these qualities made the masses to sacrifice their time and even their life for him (interview 2015). Orji and Uzodi, (2012) argued that Buhari has casted an image of himself as Can-do, Courageous Man of integrity and action. Furthermore, "even before the votes were cast or tabulated, Buhari alleges rigging of election" (Punch, 17 April 2011). He

also called on young people to defend their Votes, Otherwise "if they allow the ruling party to mess them up, it is they who will suffer for next 40 years".

TABLE 4:1.24 THE DIMENSIONS AND MAGNITUDE OF 2011 POST-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN SOME AREAS OF KATSINA STATE.

WHAT DO YOU THINK WERE THE DIMENSION AND MAGNITUDE OF 2011 POST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN YOUR AREA?	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Houses were burnt down, properties worth millions of naira were destroyed and many people killed with others left wounded	204	37.3
People who belong to other religion were attacked	31	5.7
Leaders of opposition parties were attacked	42	7.7
All of the above	44	8.0
None of the above	226	41.3
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

From the table above, 204 or 37.3% believe that houses were burnt down, properties worth millions of naira destroyed, people killed and others left wounded. 31 or 3.7% said that people who belonged to other religion were attacked as against 42 or 7.7% who argued that leaders of

opposition parties were attacked while 44 or 8.0% believed that all the above occurred in the 2011 post-presidential election violence in Katsina State.

Similarly, it had been observed by some other respondents during an oral interview that "almost all the houses belonging to P.D.P prominent leaders were burnt down. I couldn't remember if anyone of them personally was attacked but if they had stayed they would have been attacked" (Interview 2015).

TABLE 4:1.25 RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF THE POST-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KATSINA STATE

DO YOU AGREE THAT THE 2011 POST-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN YOUR AREA TOOK RELIGIOUS DIMENSION?	**FREQUENCY**	**PERCENTAGE**
Yes	194	35.5
No	353	64.5
Total	**547**	**100**

Source: Field work research March, 2015

The above table shows majority of the respondents, 353 or 64.5% expressed that the 2011 post-presidential election violence in Katsina state did not really take a religious but only a political dimension while the rest 194 or 35.5% respondents observed that the 2011 post-presidential election violence also took a religious but not only a political dimension. However, this implies that the post-presidential election violence that erupted in some parts of Katsina state couldn't

actually take religious dimensions in affected areas as observed by the majority (64.5%), of the respondents to this study. It was strictly a political violence, but not religious.

Furthermore, majority of the respondents in an oral interview didn't believe that 2011 the post-presidential election took a religious dimension. As observed by an interviewee "People only takes advantage of religion if they want to cause mayhem in the society or if they want to go beyond the red-line and they also abuse their location within the country when they want to cheat" to him poverty and Joblessness are Contributory to all these (interview 2015).

In Malumfashi almost all the houses belonging PDP prominent members were burnt down and they are all Muslims and Hausas (Interview 2015). a Christian fellow interviewed, argued that this violence was purely political as Properties that belonged to Muslims were put on fire (interview 2015).

4:2 DISCUSSIONS OF MAJOR FINDINGS AND VALIDATION OF THE RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS

DISCUSSIONS OF MAJOR FINDINGS

The major findings of this research are those extracted from assumptions, questions and the objectives of research work. These include the extent of Buhari' credibility on 2011 the Post-Presidential election violence and to examine whether the emergence of Buhari as the main contender from the North Contributed to the 2011 post-presidential election Contributed to the 2011 post-presidential election violence. This is not to say that other issues discussed in the process of data analysis and presentations are irrelevant here, rather the choice of these three

issues here is due to the fact that the earlier research questions, objectives, and assumptions openly suggested the selection of these values for logical examination and simplification.

4:2.1 There is an assumption says 2011 post presidential election violence is associated with

People's perception of rigging against Muhammadu Buhari..

From the responses of the people interviewed as well as findings from the retrieved questionnaires, it is clear that a close connection exists between youths perception of rigging and 2011 Post- presidential election violence in Katsina State.

Statistical record from table 4:19 revealed that majority of the respondents believed that the aggrieved youth felt that the presidential candidate of the CPC was denied victory at the polls, while the rest very few had contrary view. The record indicates that 378 of the respondents representing 69.1% believed that the aggrieved youth felt that the presidential candidate of the CPC was denied victory at the polls, while the rest 169 respondents or 30.9% had contrary view.

This shows that an overwhelming majority of the respondents believed that it was true that after election results were announced the aggrieved youth felt that the presidential candidate of the CPC was denied victory at the polls. Many believed Buhari lost either because the votes had been tampered with in favour of his opponent or Northern leaders counted upon to deliver a Northern presidency failed (Crisis Group, 2011).

As expressed by an interviewee "Buhari had proven to be an honest, patriotic, prospicient, tested and trusted person. These qualities made the masses to sacrifice their time and even their life for him" (interview 2015). Orji and Uzodi, (2012) argued that Buhari cast an image of himself as can-do, courageous, man of integrity and action.

However, Buhari alleged rigging of election" (Punch, 17 April 2011). He also called on young people to defend their Votes, Otherwise "if they allow the ruling party to mess them up, it is they who will suffer for next 40 years". Furhermore, during election the CPC alleged vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and inflation of results by the PDP in the South-South and South-East states, particularly in states such as Delta, Bayelsa, Abia, Anambra recorded an abnormally high voter turnout of up to 98 and 99 percent. This was far above the average turn out which 50 to 60% Some observers suspect that much of the election result in the zones was massaged Orji and Uzodi (2012)

From the above analysis it is very glaring people percept that Buhari's election was rigged which contributed to the outbreak of the 2011 Post-Presidential election violence. Therefore, the assumption that says 2011 post presidential election violence is associated with people's perception of rigging against Muhammadu Buhari was found valid.

4:2.2 There is an assumption that 2011 post presidential election violence occurred because of

TheBuhari's emergence as Main Contender from the North.

Statistical record in table 4:1.17 indicated a total of 322 or 58.9% believe that zoning principle in PDP made most northerners to insist that 2011 presidency should be won by a northerner,

which gave rise to the violence after the election in some northern states, while the rest 225 or 41.1% disagreed. This implies that majority of the respondents believed that the zoning principle in PDP made most northerners to react violently after the declaration of result that showed northerners fell in the race.

Similarly, Majority of the respondents believed that PDP zoning principle partly contributed to the violence because if Buhari fell through fair electoral process, Northern people wouldn't have reacted violently.

Chief Barnabas Gemade, a Former PDP Chairman, said that

> the problem arose from the fact that many of the Politicians from the North gave the electorate the impression that it is the turn of the north. In accordance with the apparently now discarded PDP zoning system, power reverted after the term of President Obasanjo (South-west) ended in 2007, to the north through Yar'adua's election. Following his death, some Northern Politicians argued that another Northerner should receive the next full term rather than the accidental Southern incumbent (Crisis Group, 2011).

Another interviewee observed that even though north was Short-changed as results of the dead of Yar'adua still electorates prefer Buhari to any other candidate. Therefore, the assumption that Said 2011 post-presidential election violence occurred due to Buhari's emergence as main contender from the north was found partially valid because he was not the only northerner in the race but his outstanding qualities made people to prefer him out of the three northerners.

Furthermore, majority of the masses believed that their condition was not natural but artificial i.e lack of good leadership and Buhari in various speeches made his stand on corruption "On

corruption, there will no confusion as to where I stand. Corruption will have no place and the corrupt will not be appointed into my administration" (Buhari 26/02/2015 cited in Jammaje, K. 2015). Buhari further argued that "…poor leadership placed us in the ditch. Continuation of poor leadership will only dig a deeper trench for all of us to fall in" (ibid 2015).

4:2.3 There is an assumption that says 2011 post presidential election violence broke out as a result of Buhari's candidature as Muslim in Katsina state.

Statistical record from table 4:25 revealed that majority of the respondents believed that 2011 post-presidential election violence in Katsina state didn't took religious dimension. The record read thus, out of the 547 filled and returned questionnaires, 353 or 64% respondents believed that the 2011 post-presidential election violence in Katsina state did not really took religious but only political dimensions while the rest 194 or 35% respondents believed that the 2011 post-presidential election violence took a religious not only political dimension.

Furthermore, table 20 shows clearly that 68% of the respondents believed that people voted Buhari because they sees as an honest man, 13% believed because he is Northerner, 3.3% believed because he is Muslim. This implies that majority of the respondents believed that the 2011 post-presidential election violence that erupted in some parts of Katsina state couldn't actually took religious dimensions in affected areas as observed by the majority of the respondents in that study. It was strictly a political violence, but not religious.

Furthermore, majority of the respondents in an oral interview didn't believe 2011 post-presidential election violence took religious dimension. As observed by one of the interviewees "people only takes advantage of religion if they want cause mayhem in the society or if they

want to go beyond the redline and they also abuse their location within the country when they want to cheat" to him poverty and joblessness were contributory to all these (interview, 2015).

Another interviewee argued that in malumfashi almost all the Houses belonging to the PDP prominent members were burnt down and they are all muslims and Hausas (interview 2015). However, Buhari wasn't the only Muslim contested that presidential seat, why people prefer him above any other candidate. One of the Christian fellow, interviewed observed this violence was purely political as properties belonged to muslims in Funtua were put on fire (interview2015).

Therefore, based on the above analysis the assumption that says Buhari's candidature as muslim contributed to the 2011 post-presidential election violence was found invalid.

4:3 RESEARCH FINDINGS

From the relevant data presented and analyzed above the following are the findings or deductions which the research study has yielded.

1. The major finding of this research is that the researcher found among other things there was direct connection between the post- electoral violence and the

Psychological attachment of the electorates to the presidential candidate of the CPC. This attachment hinge upon the belief that given the popularity of the CPC candidate in the North he cannot "fail at the poll"

2. The research further found that in towns like Katsina Metropolis, Daura, Malumfashi, Funtua, Baure, Kankara e.t.c. the electorate were mostly influence by the credibility of the CPC candidate then by believing much more that failing at the polls were not an electoral calculation
3. The research also found that among factors that made CPC became a major opposition party at the polls was attributed heavily on the belief of the credibility of the party flag-bearer in person of Muhammadu Buhari. Though it noted however that the party had majority of its supporters in the where its presidential candidate emanate from.
4. Another Significant Finding is that there is strong evidence that tensions had been Fanned by some Politicians and their Sympathizers that the 2011 Presidential seat should be the turn of the North. But the question is, was Buhari the only Northerner in the race? Certainly no! this Shows that Buhari had Outstanding qualities that People saw in him which were absent in other Candidates.

5. Another Significant Finding is that the violence had nothing to do with theBuhari's Candidature as a Muslim. Buhari wasn't the only Muslim that Contested the Post of Presidency. Nuhu Ribado and Ibrahim Shekarau all are Muslims. Why did People prefer Buhari?

6. Another Significant Finding is that the linkage between Political Power and widespread Corruption in the country made many People to have a higher expectation that in 2011 if Buhari was elected, things would be better. So his loss disappointed voters and made some People to react violently.

By this position and belief, the electorate took to street to protest what was felt injustice and declaration of the wrong winner of the election in person of GoodluckEbele Jonathan

These findings confirm the assumption that Buhari's loss contributed to the 2011 Post-Presidential election violence and partially confirm that Buhari's candidature as the main contender from the North has in a way also contributed.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE

5:1 SUMMARY

This study examined the effects of Buhari's loss on 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina State. Variables investigated in this included people's perception of rigging against Buhari, regional Politics and religion on the 2011 Post Presidential election violence in Katsina State.

Thus, a reviewed of Scholarly documents relevant to this study, and analysis of questionnaires, oral interviews, came up with major findings that the 2011 the Post Presidential election violence had connection with Buhari's loss of election and Membership of Muhammadu Buhari to C.P.C. attracted many People to join the party. Other findings reveal that even though tensions had been fanned by some Politicians and sympathizers that the 2011 presidential seat Should be the turn of the North, still Buhari had outstanding qualities that the electorates saw in him which were absent in other Candidates.

The foregoing findings help us to confirm the assumption number one of the study which states that Buhari's loss contributed to the 2011 post presidential election violence and also partially confirm assumptions number two which states that Buhari's emergence as the main Contender from the North, contributed to the 2011 Post Presidential election violence in Katsina State.

5:2 CONCLUSIONS

The 2011 post presidential election violence had threatened the corporate existence of the nation as one indivisible entity. Katsina State was among the States affected by this devastating incidence in which many innocent lives were maimed, killed and properties worth millions of naira were destroyed. It has been hinged lack of voter education, poverty, illiteracy, manipulation of results by the elites and unemployment. This is inimical to democratic principles. This work concludes that Buhari's loss contributed on 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina State because he honest, trustworthy and positive thought people had on him.

5:3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Owing to the Findings of this Study on the effects of Buhari's loss on 2011 Post-Presidential election violence in Katsina State, this research recommends that:

- Good governance, Justice, Transparency, and Honesty Should be Observed "Give to Caesar what Caesar deserves". In fact Peoples' Choice should be respected.

- There is the need for visionary documents for development in our Conduct of governance, every country should have a vision and that is drawing up a path- way for themselves. Majority of these third- World- Countries are now moving simply because they were able to design a Path-way for themselves. We can't develop without guidance, we must have a documents that we follow and find- tuned from time to time.

- Politicians (leaders) should lead with the philosophy of a herdsman, a Herdsman Sacrifice his life, his health, his comfort for his cattle. And majority of our Politicians had no public interest in their mind.

- Politicians should contest with a purpose to serve but not to be served. A leader that Served diligently to the people will live in the hearts of masses for Long. Buhari had served this country at various capacities that is why he lingers in the minds of the masses.

- Nigeria must use its human population for development. Chinese people say thinking is the most inexpensive thing to do on earth, but it produces the most expensive products that man has ever seen. If the quality of population were improved, their thinking and perceptions would Change positively.

- People should avoid taking law in their hand whenever they need redress in respect to election results they report to appropriate authority for necessary actions.

5.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE

This study adds to the frontier of knowledge in the understanding of party politics and personality politics particularly in elections processes. It brings to fore effects of candidate's loss on electoral violence. It also clearly showed how people claim subjectivism in objectivism.

The study also stressed that lack of voters' education contributed a lot on some elections violence.

Finally, in the course of accomplishing this study, certain research gaps were identified with particular reference to the impact of development partners in the promotion of democratization process in Nigeria which calls for further scholarship. Among the issues identified include the following:

i. There is need to study phenomena of Buhari in the Nigerian Political Terrain.

ii. The need to focus on the structural causes of poverty and unemployment in order to check the excesses of political violence.

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APPENDIX “A” QUESTIONNAIRES

Department of political science international Studies

Faculty of social science

Ahmadu Bello University Zaria-Nigeria

Date_____

Dear Respondents,

I' am a post-graduate student of the above named institution, undertaking a research study on the Buhari's personality and 2011 post-presidential election violence in Katsina State.

I will appreciate your honest response to the questions asked below which shall be treated with utmost confidentiality as the final report would not even contain information about any individual respondent. This exercise is purely for academic purpose. Please, kindly tick ( ) the appropriate options in the spaces provided.

Thank you

TUKUR BELLO

M.SC/SOS-SCI/7106/2011-2012

SECTION A: BIODATA OF RESPONDENTS

1. Age bracket: (a) 18-27 ( ) (b) 28-37 ( ) (c) 38-47 ( ) (d) 48 years and above

2. Sex/Gender: (a) Male ( ) (b) Female ( )

3. Religion: (a) Islam ( ) (b) Christianity (c) Traditional ( ) (d) Others ( )

4. Marital Status: (a) Married ( ) (b) Single ( )

5. Educational Qualification: (a) Primary ( ) (b) Secondary ( ) (c) Tertiary( )

(d) Other_____

6. Employment Status: (a) Employed ( ) (b) Unemployed ( )

7. Occupation: (a) Student ( ) (b) Civil Servant ( ) (c) Business/Politician ( )

(d) Farming ( )

Section B

8. Are you a registered Member of a Political Party? Yes ( ) No ( )

9. Did you vote in the last 2011 Presidential election? Yes ( ) No ( )

10. What factor influenced your Choice of Party?

A_____ B_____ C_____

11. Are you satisfied with the result declared by INEC? Yes ( ) No ( )

12. If No, did you react? Yes ( ) No ( )

13. Which of the following do you consider as likely cause (s) of electoral violence in Nigeria?

a. The quest for power and position and materialism.

b. Personality of Candidate.

c. A defeat of Political opponent in an election is seen as a sin against the opposition that must be paid back through violent means.

d. Election Irregularities and Rigging.

e. None of the above.

14. What other factors do you think engender violent after elections in Nigeria?

a. When electorates felt that their Candidate fell through unfair electoral process.

b. Lack of voter Education.

c. Manipulation of result by the Elites.

d. All of the above

e. None of the above

15. Which specific actions do you think ignited the 2011 post-presidential election violence in your area?

a. Election rigging.

b. Political intolerance by some elites in the area who saw the 2011 presidential election as a game that must be won by the opposition at all cost.

c. Poverty of the People in the area, caused by the deepening crises of unemployment.

d. All of the above.

e. None of the above.

16. Can you argue that the zoning principle in some political party made many Northerners to insist that the 2011 presidency should be won by a Northerner, failure of which gave rise to the post presidential election violence in some Northern states? Yes ( ) No ( )

17. Is it true that many politicians from the North gave the electorates the impression that it is turn of the North and anything short of a Northern presidency is tantamount to Stealing of the seat? Yes ( ) No. ( )

18. Is it true that after the election, aggrieved youth felt that the Presidential candidate of the Congress for Progressive Change (C.P.C.) was denied victory at the polls? Yes( ) No( )

19. Why do you think People votes for Buhari? Because he is a …

a. Muslim ( ) b. Northerner ( ) c. Honest ( ) d. All of the above ( ) e. None of the above ( )

20. Was the violence broke out because ...

a. Buhari loose election ( ) b. Northerners felt Marginalized ( ) c. Political Parties felt election was rigged ( ) d. All of the above e. None of the above

21. Ethnic differences, religion and other related problems inherent in the Nigerian federal structures be said to be contributory to the emergence of the 2011 post-presidential election violence in your area? Yes ( ) No. ( )

22. Do you agree that the 2011 post-presidential election violence in your area actually took place because of Buhari's credibility? (a) Yes ( ) (b) No. ( )

23. What do you think were the dimensions and Magnitude of the 2011 Post-presidential election violence in your area?

a. Houses were burnt down en masse, properties worth millions of naira were destroyed and many people killed with others left wounded.

b. People who belonged to other religions were attacked.

c. Leaders of opposition Parties were attacked.

d. All of the above.

e. None of the above.

24. Do you agree that the 2011 post-presidential election violence in your area took religious dimension? (a) Yes ( ) (b) No. ( )

25. What do you think can be done to curb re-occurrence of post- election violence in the Country? Briefly state in your words

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

APPENDIX "B" INTERVIEWEES QUESTIONS

ORAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ON BUHARI'S PERSONALITY AND THE 2011 POST-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KATSINA STATE

1. Are you a registered member of a political party?
2. Did you vote in the last 2011 presidential election?
3. What factor influenced your choice of party?
4. Are you satisfied with the result declared by INEC?

5. If No, did you react?
6. What do you consider as likely cause (s) of electoral violence in Nigeria?
7. What other factors do you think engender violent after elections in Nigeria?
8. What specific actions do you think ignited the 2011 post-presidential election violence in your area?
9. Can you argue that the zoning principle in some political party made many Northerners to insist that the 2011 presidency should be won by a Northerner, failure of which gave rise to the post presidential election violence in some Northern states?
10. Is it true that many politicians from the North gave the electorates the impression that it is turn of the North and anything short of a Northern presidency is tantamount to Stealing of the seat?
11. Is it true that after the election, aggrieved youth felt that the Presidential candidate of the Congress for Progressive Change(CPC) was denied victory at the Poll?
12. Why do you think People votes for Buhari?
13. What do you think were the dimensions and Magnitude of the 2011 Post-presidential election violence in your area?
14. Did the violence broke out because of Buhari loose election?
15. Do you agree that the 2011 post-presidential election violence in your area actually took place because of Buhari's Personality?
16. Do you agree that the 2011 post-presidential election violence in your area took religious dimension?

17. What do you think can be done to curb re-occurrence of post- election violence in the Future?

a._____

b._____

c._____

d._____

APPENDIX "C" NAMES OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

THE LISTS OF INTERVIEWED KEY PERSONALITIES

S/N	NAME	POSITION	DATE, TIME AND VENUE
1	Hon. Rabi'u Idris Funtua	Former Member represented Funtua Constituency at Katsina State House of Assembly From 2011-2015 (C.P.C Member	The interview was held on 28-06-2015 at about12:30pm at his residence in SabongariFuntua.
2	Alhaji Lawal Usman Funtua	Former Commissioner, Former Chairman governing Council Fed. Polytechnic Auchi. Edo State (P.D.P. Member)	The interview was held on 30-08-2015 at about5:30pm at his residence at UnguwarmagajinMakeraFuntua.
3	Hon. Abdullahi Ibrahim Mahuta	Member representing Malumfashi Constituencyat Katsina State House of Assembly From 2011 to date (C.P.C Member before now A.P.C.)	The interview was held on 04-08-2015 at about5:30pm at about 4:25pm at guest house of member represented ingawa at the Katsina State House of Assembly.
4	Alhaji Salisu Hassan Malumfashi	A Politician (P.D.P. Member)	The interview was held on 12-09-2015 at his residence at Gangarawa Quarters.
5	Dr. Lawal Aliyu Musawa	Former Chairman Musawa L.G. (2003-2011) FormerMember	The interview was held on 04-08-2015 at about 1:20pm at about4:25pm at guest house of member represented ingawa at

		represented Musawa Constituency at Katsina State House of Assembly From 2011-015(P.D.P. Member)	the Katsina State House of Assembly.
6	AlhajiSa'iduMusawa	A Politician (C.P.C Member)	The interview was held on 08-05-2015 at about12:30pm at his residence in Musawa.
7	Hon. Yusuf Shehu Daura	Former Member represented Daura Constituency at KatsinaState House of Assembly From 2011-2015 (C.P.C Member)	The interview was held on 04-08-2015 at about at about11:25am at guest house of member represented Ingawa at the Katsina State House of Assembly.
8	. Alhaji Dauda Sabi'u	A Politician (P.D.P. Member)	The interview was held on 14-07-2015 at about12:30pm at his residence in Daura
9	Hon Sale Magaji Rumma	Former Member represented Sandamu Constituency at Katsina State House of Assembly From 2011-2015 (P.D.P. Member)	The interview was held on 04-08-2015 at about2:25pm at guest house of member represented Ingawa at the Katsina State House of Assembly.

10	Sani Sa'idu Salai Babban-Mutum	A Politician (C.P.C Member)	The interview was conducted on phone (20-09-2015)
11	Hon. Bashir Abubakar Kafin-soli	Former Member represented Kankia Constituency at Katsina State House of Assembly From 2011-2015 (P.D.P. Member)	The interview was held on 04-08-2015 at about 12:05pm at about4:25pm at guest house of member represented Ingawa at the Katsina State House of Assembly.
12	Malam Lawal Mohammed Kankia	A Politician (C.P.C Member)	The interview was held on 08-05-2015 at his residence in Kankia.
13	Hon. BabangidaNasamu Katsina	Former Member represented Katsina Constituencyat KatsinaState House of Assembly From 2011-2015 (P.D.P. Member)	The interview was held on 04-08-2015 at about5:20pmat guest house of member represented ingawa at the Katsina State House of Assembly.
14	Malam Shamsu Abubakar Saulawa	A Politician (C.P.C Member)	The interview was held on 08-09-2015 at his residence in Saulawa Katsina.

15	Hon. Halilu Ibrahim Karofi	Former Member represented Dutsi-ma Constituency at KatsinaState House of Assembly From 2011-2015 (P.D.P. Member)	The interview was held on 04-08-2015 at about5:30pm at about4:25pm at guest house of member represented ingawa at the Katsina State House of Assembly.
16	Malam Hamza Musa Dutsin-ma	A Politician and Head Master Sabon-garinSafanaPrimary School(C.P.C Member	The interview was conducted on 25-05-2015 at Unguwar Alkali in Dutsin-ma.
17	Hon. Rabi'u Ahmad Kaita	Former Member represented Kaita Constituency at Katsina State House of Assembly From 2011-2015 (P.D.P. Member)	The interview was held on 04-08-2015 at about5:30pm at about4:25pm at guest house of member represented Ingawa at the Katsina State House of Assembly
18	Malam TanimuSama'ila 'Yan daki	A Politician (C.P.C Member)	The interview was held on 08-09-2015 at his residence in 'Yan dakiKaita LG.
19	Sheikh Mohammad Aliyu	Chief Imam Jabiri Mosque, Funtua Katsina State.	The interview was conducted on 05-11-2015 at his Mosque. Tafoki Road Funtua.

20	Mr. Joseph O. Samuel	A Fellow New Redeem Church B.C.G. Funtua Katsina State.	The interview was held on 05-11-2015 at GGSS Funtua around 12:23pm.