THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN ELITE IN THE 1985 - 1993 TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE PROGRAMME

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Thesis has been written by me, and that it is the record of my handiwork. I also declare that works of other authors are fully acknowledged appropriately.

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CERTIFICATION

This Thesis titled: The Role of the Nigerian Elite In The 1985 – 1993 Transition To civil Rule Programme by Nuhu Ramalan Jibril meets the *regulations governing the award of masters degree of Political Sciences of* Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

Dedicated to my parents, Mallam Ramalan Jibril and late Mallama Maryam Mua'z.

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ABSTRACT

The Babangida Military Government came into being on August 27, 1985 in the wake of the ouster of the Buhari Military government. After gathering some momentum, the regime enunciated a transition programme for handing over power to civilians. The regime established a political Bureau to review the political economy of Nigeria. It banned and disqualified various categories of people from partisan politics to 'sanitise' the political atmosphere of Nigeria; formed and funded two political parties ; shifted the handover date four times and annulled the 1992 presidential primaries. This was followed by the nullification of the June 12, 1993 presidential polls.

The Military played the role of insincerity in the transition process through political and socio-economic machination in the name of experimentation. The politicians played the role of pliability, immaturity, imprudence and greediness in the name of managing the Military out of power. The Intellectuals, being the architects of the political and social engineering under the aegis of experimentation, played the role of the opportunists. The Members of the Media played the role of sycophants and opportunists through political coloration and yellow journalism. The Professionals /Bureaucrats played the subservient role by executing policies designed by the ruling regime to stultify the programme. The Traditional Rulers and Clergy played the role of opportunists and subservients.

In retrospect of the aftermath of the Transition Programme, this Thesis recommends that political education, seriousness of purpose, commitment and sincerity on the part of the Nigerian Elite are the only therapy to the Nigerian socio-economic and political trauma.

ACRONYMS

GNPP: *Great Nigeria People's Party* (The defunct Second Republic Political Party).

IBB: Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (A former Nigerian Military leader, 1985-1993).

NCNC: National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (A First Republic Political Party).

NPC: Northern People's Congress (A First Republic Political Party).

NNA: Nigerian National Alliance (A First Republic Political Party).

NNDP: Nigerian National Democratic Party (A First Republic Political Party).

NPP: Nigerian People's Party (A Second Republic Political Party).

NPN: National Party of Nigeria (A Second Republic Political Party).

NRC: National Republican Convention.

NUPENG: National Union Of Petroleum And Natural Gas (One of The Nigerian Labour Unions).

PPA: Progressive People's Alliance (A Second Republic Political Party).

PRP: People's Redemption Party (A Second Republic Political Party).

PENGASSAN: Petroleum And Natural Gas Senior Staff association Of Nigeria (One Of The Nigerian Labour Unions).

SDP: Social Democratic Party (One of the two defunct Political Parties created and funded by the 1985-1993 *military regime* together with NRC).

UPGA: United Progressive Grand Alliance (A First Republic Political Party).

UPN: Unity Party of Nigeria (A Second Republic Political Party).

Table of Content Page

CHAPTER ONE 1

1:0 INTRODUCTION 1

1:1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 5

1:2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY.....11

1:3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 13

1:4 SCOPE 13

1:5 LIMITATIONS 13

1:6 HYPOTHESIS/PROPOSITIONS 14

1:7 METHODOLOGY 14

1:8 VARIABLES 16

1:9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 16

1:10 LITERATURE REVIEW 32

1:11 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 42

REFERENCES 48

CHAPTER TWO 55

2:0 THE NIGERIAN MILITARY AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSITIONS.....55

GOWON'S TRANSITION AGENDA 70

MURTALA/OBASANJO'S TRANSITION AGENDA 71

BABANGIDA'S TRANSITION AGENDA.....75

2:1 ESTABLISHMENT OF A 17-MEMBER POLITICAL BUREAU 77

2:2 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU 84

2:3 THE WHITE PAPER ON THE REPORT OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU 94

2:4 THE REPORT OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU AND THE GOVT WHITE PAPER: AN ANALYSIS 100

REFERENCES.....111

CHAPTER THREE 115
3:0 SECOND PHASE OF THE TRANSITION PROGRAMME.....115
3:1 BANNING OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE FROM PARTISAN POLITICS 115
3:2 THE BAN ON PARTISAN POLITICS : AN ANALYSIS.....119
3:3 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MAMSER 124
3:4 MAMSER : AN ANALYSIS 129
3:5 THE CONSTITUTION REVIEW COMMITTEE (CRC) AND THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (CA) 138
3:6 RESPONSE OF THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION 141
REFERENCES.....146

CHAPTER FOUR 151
4:0 THIRD PHASE OF THE TRANSITION PROGRAMME 151
4:1 *NEC'S RECOMMENDATION OF SIX POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS* FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE AFRC 151
4:2 AN ANALYSIS OF NEC'S REPORT 163
4:3 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRE FOR DEMOCRATIC STUDIES (CDS) AND THE CREATION OF TWO POLITICAL PARTIES BY THE MILITARY 171
4:4 1992 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES, DISQUALIFICATION AND DISSOLUTION 181
4:5 1992 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES, DISQUALIFICATION AND DISSOLUTION : AN ANALYSIS 184
4:6 MARCH 1993 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND JUNE 12 POLLS 187
4:7 ANNULMENT OF THE JUNE 12 ELECTION AND THE FORMATION OF INTERIM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (ING) 193

4:8 MARCH 1993 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES, ANNULMENT OF THE JUNE 12 PRESIDENTIAL POLLS AND THE FORMATION OF ING : AN ANALYSIS 201
REFERENCES 208

CHAPTER FIVE 213
5:0 THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN ELITE IN THE 1985-1993 TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE PROGRAMME: DATA ANALYSIS 213
5:1 PILOT SURVEY.....231
5:2 ELITE VIEWS ON 1985-1993 TRANSITION PROGRAMME..234
5:3 POPULAR VIEWS ON THE TRANSITION 247
5:4 CONCLUSION 260

CHAPTER SIX 264
6:0 SUMMARY 264
6:1 CONCLUSION 272
6:2 RECOMMENDATIONS 279
APPENDIX I 284
APPENDIX II 285
APPENDIX III 286
BIBLIOGRAPHY 291

List of Tables

TABLE 5A:1 235
TABLE 5A:2 236
TABLE 5A:3 237
TABLE 5A:4 238
TABLE 5A:5 239
TABLE 5A:6 239
TABLE 5A:7 240
TABLE 5A:8 241
TABLE 5A:9 241
TABLE 5A:10 242
TABLE 5A:11 242
TABLE 5A:12 243
TABLE 5A:13 243
TABLE 5A:14 244
TABLE 5A:15 245
TABLE 5A:16 245

TABLE 5B:1 247
TABLE 5B:2 248
TABLE 5B:3 248
TABLE 5B:4 249
TABLE 5B:5 251
TABLE 5B:6 252
TABLE 5B:7 253
TABLE 5B:8 254
TABLE 5B:9 255
TABLE 5B:10 255
TABLE 5B:11 256
TABLE 5B:12 256
TABLE 5B:13 257
TABLE 5B:14 259

List of Tables

TABLE 5A:1 235
TABLE 5A:2 236
TABLE 5A:3 237
TABLE 5A:4 238
TABLE 5A:5 239
TABLE 5A:6 239
TABLE 5A:7 240
TABLE 5A:8 241
TABLE 5A:9 241
TABLE 5A:10 242
TABLE 5A:11 242
TABLE 5A:12 243
TABLE 5A:13 243
TABLE 5A:14 244
TABLE 5A:15 245
TABLE 5A:16 245

TABLE 5B:1 247
TABLE 5B:2 248
TABLE 5B:3 248
TABLE 5B:4 249
TABLE 5B:5 251
TABLE 5B:6 252
TABLE 5B:7 253
TABLE 5B:8 254
TABLE 5B:9 255
TABLE 5B:10 255
TABLE 5B:11 256
TABLE 5B:12 256
TABLE 5B:13 257
TABLE 5B:14 259

CHAPTER ONE

1:0 INTRODUCTION

The present day political disposition of the Nigerian society is a synthesis of colonial and post-colonial phenomena. However, historians of different ideological persuasions are unanimous on the fact that the pre-colonial Nigerian societies, like other similar societies elsewhere, placed high premium on accountability, consultations and consensus in their political systems.

Rulership was predicated on the ability of the ruler, whether divine or hereditary, to promote the welfare of his community. The political Bureau Report (1987:26) puts it that "Sanctions were ruthlessly enforced against delinquent behavior" by any ruler. Rulers were accountable to their communities and there was strict adherence to the traditionally held rule of the game in succession.

Consultation and consensus also gained high primacy in the pre-colonial polity. It is noted that issues were democratically discussed on, and consensus arrived at, before its final determination. Some of the prevailing checks against dictatorial tendencies by rulers, as the political Bureau Report (1987:26) puts it include "singing of abusive songs and sometimes open revolt against the ruler by the peasants who provided the fighting force within the community".

The incorporation of the Nigerian state into the orbit of British colonial system in the 19th century changed, profoundly, the character of the political landscape of the pre-colonial Nigerian societies.

By its nature, the British colonial system not only subdued and subjugated the Nigerian indigenous population, but also imposed its political super-structures: political value system, legal and administrative systems on it.

These value-systems are antithetical to the indigenous ones because, while the former were premised on Western liberal thought, a philosophy that sees life and entire human existence primarily from economic perspective, the latter, on the other hand, has morality and justice as germaine or pivotal to the existence of mankind.

Some of the legacies bequeathed to the Nigerian elite are: separatism (regionalism) and fierce economic and political rivalry among them, using primordial and indecent means to capture political power.These negative attitudes have informed their orientation towards addressing national issues.

Before the attainment of independence, the British colonial system made sure that it insidiously sowed seeds of discord among the Nigerian elite. Soon after independence, sharp contractions began to manifest themselves within the Nigerian body polity and subsequently shattered the whole setup.

The Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) was formed to fight the 1964 Federal Election. It was constituted by the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and its Southern ally, the Nigerian National Democratic party (NNDP) which was Akintola's break-away faction of the Action Group (AG).

On the other hand, the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) was made up of the AG, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and their allies in the North, which consisted of, among others, the Borno Youth Movement in Borno. And there was an accord between NPC and NCNC. It was a coalition to form a government after the 1959 election in which no single party emerged with sufficient number of seats to form a government on its own.

There was another alliance between the Northern Peoples Element progressive Union (NEPU) and the NCNC. It was a marriage of convenience to give material and legal backing to the former by the latter.

There was a re-enactment of such alliances in the Second Republic when the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) signed an accord with the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) to shore up Shagari's fledgling government. In response, the Unity party of Nigeria (UPN), the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) and a faction of Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) came together to form the Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA). These political alliances were consummated to satisfy the elite's quest for power in the Nigerian politics.

There was, however, thirteen (13) long uninterrupted years of military interregnum between the First and the Second Republics. This incursion of the Military into politics added another dimension to the existing dilemma. The metamorphosis of the political organ exacerbated ethnic and religious differences and marked the ascendancy of corruption in the Nigerian body polity.

The Nigerian political, economic and socio-cultural setups could be rightly said to have been riddled with problems. While the Nigerian Military sees the politicians as corrupt, the civil populace sees the military as the most corrupt and anti-democratic element in posture. Jega (1986:21) for instance, reveals that:

> Incessant military take-overs and governance of this country have only compounded the problem of democracy in Nigeria. Since the Military cannot pretend to be elected or representing anybody but themselves in government, they pretend to be corrective in posture and even greater preoccupation with 'stability' and 'law and order'.

So the condiments that today feed the Nigerian political machine are corruption, ethnic and sectarian manipulations as vehicles for achieving selfish political power which almost all the time has been under the control of the Military.

Therefore, what prompted me to choose this topic rather than any other one is a desire to assess the factors and forces behind the failure of the 1985-1993 transition programme which is the longest and most expensive transition in Nigeria.

1:1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The 1985-1993 Military regime came into being on August 27, 1985 as a "populist" regime, conscious of, and determined to repudiate the dictatorial tendencies of the Buhari Military government. In his maiden speech to the nation, General Babangida (1993:26) gave a reason as to why he took over the mantle of leadership thus:

> The same government which received tumultuous welcome now became alienated from the people. To prevent a complete erosion of our given mandate..... we had to act so that hope may be rebuilt.

The new regime received a warm and hearty welcome from the nooks and crannies of the Nigerian society, for the society saw the new government as a messiah against gruesome kind of life people were consigned to by the Buhari regime.

The IBB regime immediately began to appeal to Nigerians that it would not stay long in power, rather, it would hand over power to civilians soon.

To that effect, the regime embarked on a transition programme in which a political Bureau was established to review the political economy of the country; a Constitution Review Committee and Constituent Assembly were established; Mass Mobilisation for Social and Economic Reconstruction (MAMSER) was created to 'help' Nigerians formulate their political thought, and a Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) was established to 'teach' Nigerians how to run a democratic government. The Western market economic slogan dubbed Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was embraced by the regime. New States were created in 1987 and 1992 respectively. Moreso, two political parties, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) were formed, funded and bestowed with manifestoes by government fiat. Nigerians were expected to fall in line by joining either the one that was a 'little to the left' (SDP) or the one that was a 'little to the right' (NRC). Party offices at ward, local government, state and federal levels were built. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) was established to carry out its statury obligations related to elections. Elections were held at the ward, local, state and national levels - the last being the June 12, 1993 Presidential Polls contested by Alhaji Bashir Othman Tofa and Alhaji Chief Moshood Abiola of the NRC and SDP, respectively.

The journey was long and tortuous. At the end of the political engineering, the presidential election was held in which Chief M.K.O Abiola is the acclaimed winner. This election is seen by some Nigerians and the international community alike, as the "fairest" and "freest" in the political history of this Country.

The nullification of the election threw the country into a political log-jam, brought it to the brink of disintegration and generated what one may call a crisis of confidence of such magnitude that manifested in the strident calls by its Elite for a 'Sovereign National Conference' to determine if the country were to continue to be in its long corporate existence.

After the cancellation of the June 12 Polls, the Babangida regime reiterated that it would still keep to its promise of handing over power to the civilians. Babangida (1993:3) assured Nigerians thus:

> In annulling the presidential election, this administration was keenly aware of its promise in November, 1992 that it would disengage and institute a return to democracy on August 27,1993. We are determined to keep the promise Since this transition and indeed any transition must have an end, I believe that our transition programme should and must come to an end, honestly and honourably.

But in the final analysis, the transition programme was an unmitigated disaster which sustained a gash that cannot be healed overnight. And from the angle of finance, according to Tempo (1994:4) it was a "disaster that gulped as much as N40 billion".

Inevitably, the development would lead to questions such as: how, where and why did the 1985-1993 transition programme go wrong ? Explanations (which this study wants to examine them empericallry) have been offered. Among others, Hyet (1993:1) argues that:

> Politically, the government started a transition process but postponed handover date four times. It also decreed the annulment of the election held for the presidency indicating insincerity in the transition programme.

According to Mustapha (1993:0), the transition programme ended up a failure because "Babangida never really planned to cede power to a democratic government". And in other quarters, Ake (1993:32) posits that "however, it is not politics or politicians that have failed but the military". Moreover, Mato (1994:6) contends that:

> To a lot of people therefore, the political class was full of disappointment .... the former Military administration over relied on university intellectuals for actions. many otherwise unadoptable theories were experimented a lot of which are simply not adaptable and practicable to the extent that the democratic processes were reduced to the level of political experimentations in the name of learning process.

According to the Nigerian Economist (1993:15) "the chief danger to our polity is that those who don't know have a disproportionate share in picking our rulers". Furthermore, Olagunju, Jinadu and Oyovbaire (1993:252) contend that:

> The transition programme of the Babangida Administration, as enunciated in 1986/1987, can hardly be faulted. In fact, the identification and grasp of the problems of instability of government and society in Nigeria and the policy-actions and strategy for overcoming the difficulties or, at least minimising them so as to engender the foundation of a viable democratic system in the country, are highly unassailable.

The Guardian (1993:1) contends in its analysis of the June 12 elections that the statement issued by the Publicity Secretary of the National Republican Convention, Mr. Okey Uzoho, "signalled the likelihood of an intense controversy over the results - a seeming contradiction of the two parties' earlier promise to accept the electoral verdict with equanimity". The Analyst (1989:5) generally contends on transitions that:

> What has to be understood is that arranged and rigged transitions have a very short -and usually disastrous - life-span. This is because they do not reflect the actual balance of power between social classes, groups, organisations and political forces on the ground. They only reflect the wishful thinking and narrow self-interests of those temporarily in control. But, compulsive, may be, those who are tempted to do so should know that it is fraught with dangers. For he who rides the tiger shall end up inside it.

Toyo (1994:10) argues that if it is democracy Nigeria needs, the Military cannot give it. Not only this, he says, it is a mistake from the onset to expect the institution of the military to give democracy. He says "only a struggle by

mass government under a Civilian rule can give this country or any other democracy".

Therefore, this study sets to find out why despite the much-talked about social mobilisation, political engineering and economic reconstruction engaged by the Babangida government, its transition agenda failed?

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1:2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY.

This study examines the Babangida military regime transition agenda during the period 1985- 1993. It also examines, through inferences, institutions/organisations like Mass Mobilisation for Self-reliance and Economic Reconstruction (MAMSER), Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS), the two political parties (NRC and SDP), the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to see what role they played in the transition programme.

The study traces the role of the Nigerian elite by synthesising, meticulously, what the initiators of the programme (the military) did and how other segments of the elite - the politicians, the intellectuals, the professionals\bureaucrats, the members of the media, the traditional rulers and the clergy responded.

Thus, the whole role is the question of stimuli and response. In essence, therefore, one cannot study response without recourse to or in isolation of stimuli or vice versa.

Consequent to this, therefore, the research work unearths the role through finding answers to questions like: what was the response of the politicians when they were banned and disqualified from partisan politics? What was their response when they were unbanned? What was their response when their political associations were proscribed? What was their response when two political parties were formed, funded and endowed with manifestoes through fiat? What was their response when some party primaries were cancelled? What was their response when the transition programme time-table was shifted four times? What was their response at the last part of the transition programme when the presidential elections were annulled? And what role did the other elite groups play in the transition process?

The study also examines the relevance/significance of the June 12 Polls for Nigeria's quest for democracy. It also examines the option A4 electoral system with a view to finding answers like: What was the aim of the Option? Was the aim of the option achieved? How much interest and attention did the initiators of the decree which established the system pay for the achievement of such desired goal?

In sum, therefore, this study examines the role played by various Nigerian Elite groups during the period with a view to understanding how the role affected the programme from its rudimentary stage up to the time it was aborted. It also aims at examining the significance/relevance of the June 12, 1993

presidential polls for Nigeria's quest for democracy in reference to what the aftermath of the annulment of the polls COSTS Nigeria in all the senses of the word, and proffers solutions to its problems.

1:3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY.

This study is an analysis of an aborted Military transition agenda which plunged the Nigerian society into political impasse in the wake of the nullification of the June 12, 1993 Presidential polls, hoping that the study would enhance our understanding of the current Nigerian political imbroglio and how to find panacea or therapy to the problems.

1:4 SCOPE

This study covers the whole period of the transition programme, 1985-1993 with a view to having a synthetic and meticulous analysis of the role played by the Nigerian Elite in the transition programme.

1:5 LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY.

The annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential polls has polarised the Nigerian society into two camps : the pro and anti-June 12 groups based on the perception and \ or bias of the groups. This makes any discourse on the 1985-1993 transition to civil rule programme contentious and complex because subjectivity surrounds it. This made the research

bedevilled with compounded problems of sieving truth from falsehood and objectivity from subjectivity in trying not to fall prey to any of these sentiments.

Moreover, the study is limited by time and material constraints. An attempt to go beyond this analysis to obtain more primary data, process and analyse is considered costly.

The study is also limited by refusal of many Nigerian elite in particular to respond to the research inquiries especially those who participated directly in the decision-making in the transition process. And those who did not participate directly or were not part of the policy- making in toto nursed fear of expressing their views for what they dubbed security reason.

1:6 HYPOTHESES/PROPOSITIONS.

This thesis tests the following hypotheses:

(1) From its rudimentary stage, the 1985-1993 transition programme was designed by the Nigerian elite to fail.

(2) The failure of the 1985-1993 transition to civil rule programme was the handiwork of the Nigerian elite.

(3) The role played by the Nigerian elites in the 1985-1993 transition to civil programme varied.

1:7 METHODOLOGY.

Two important sources of data collection are adopted for this thesis. They are primary and secondary data. For the

primary data, interview and questionnaire methods were employed. In the sampling procedure, Stratified Random Sampling in conducting interview with members of the defunct 1994/95 National Constitutional Conference was applied. 250 out of 353 Members of the Conference were interviewed. The period covered for collecting the data was one year (1994-1995). Simple Random sampling was employed in administering questionnaire. 3000 people filled the questionnaire from six states. Each state filled 500. Six states were randomly picked from the 30 states of the federation with each state representing its zone out of the six rotational zonal arrangement of the presidency. Sokoto state represents the North-West; Plateau state represents the middle Belt; Taraba state represents the North-East; Anambra state represents the South-East; Rivers state represents the South-South while Ogun state represents the South-West. The period covered for collecting the data was one year (1995-1996).

For the secondary data, magazines, newspapers, seminar and conference papers, articles and other available sources were used.

Let me at this juncture declare that I gathered bulk of materials from magazines, seminar and conference records, articles and newspapers. This has to do with the fact that, the topic of the research in question is very current and not much in form of books have been written on the Transition Programme.

The required and relevant data from the two sources were thoroughly and objectively analysed, interpreted and inferences were drawn from them and recommendations were given.

1:8 VARIABLES.

Independent variable in the research is the Elite, while dependent variable is the 1985-1993 transition programme. Manifestations of the independent and dependent variables are reflected in the questionnaire questions designed in the research.

1:9 (A) THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE ELITE THEORY.

In every field of study, one finds a number of concepts and models being formulated and developed by experts in the field concerned. This is applicable to political science. Over the years, political scientists have formulated and developed some concepts and models in a bid to help us understand and conceptualise our political life. The fundamental idea or purpose behind them are:

(1) to simplify and clarify our thinking about government and politics;

(2) to identify important political force in society;

(3) to communicate relevant knowledge about life;

(4) to direct inquiry into politics; and

(5) to suggest explanations for political events and outcomes.

These concepts and models, amongst others, include Marxist Theory; Elite Theory; Group Theory; Rational Decision-making Theory; Incrementalist Theory; Game Theory; and Institutionalism. Each of these terms identifies a major conceptual approach to politics which can be found in the literature of political science. Each tends to offer a separate way of thinking about political life and suggests some of the general causes and consequences of political events.

However, our own theoretical framework is the Elite Theory. In other words, we examined and analysed the role of the Nigerian Elite in the 1985-1993 transition programme from the perspective of Elite Theory.

Now, it is imperative for us to state that this theory sets to explain about political life in society. According to Smythe and Smythe (1971:4) "the elite concept applies to a group of persons who, in one way or another, have attained the highest ranking in society, who stand at the peak of the social strata. They are the people looked upon by the masses as leaders, as decision makers in political or economic spheres, as the persons at the top in major segments of the society." The New Universal Library (1969:5:150) defines the concept as "a small social group selected by birth and attainment having special power and influence". Moreso, Varma, (1975:228) explains that Parato believes that:

> Elite in different occupation and strata of society generally come from the same class: those who are wealthy also intelligent, have an aptitude for mathematics, musical talent, moral character and so on. Society, thus, consists, according to him, of two classes (1) a higher stratum, The elite, which is divided into governing elite, and a non-governing elite, and (2) a lower stratum, the non-elite.

Varma once again asserts that, Gaetamo Mosca, another Italian political scientist, contends that political formula is nothing but plain and simple fraud cleverly contrived by the ruling class in order to dupe the masses into subjugation. The fact that the policies of the ruling class, even though formulated in its own interests, are covered in a moral and legal garb satisfies a definite social needs and gratifies a deeply felt human requirements that man should be governed at the basis of moral principle, and not by mere physical force.

From the foregoing, therefore, Elite Theory is summarised briefly as follows:

(1) Society is divided into the few who possess power, and the many who do not.

(2) The few who govern are superior to the mass-majority who are governed, and that Elite comes from the upper socio-economic strata of society disproportionately.

(3) The movement of non-elite positions must take a slow pace in order to get rid of revolution.

(4) Elite shares consensus on behalf of the basic value of the social system and the preservation of the system.

(5) Public policies reflect the prevailing values of the elite rather than the demands of the mass-majority. Therefore, changes in public policies will be incremental rather than revolutionary.

(6) Elite influences the common men more than the common men influence Elite.

(B) THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ELITE THEORY.

The theory views the common men as largely passive, apathetic and ill-informed; mass sentiments are ;more often manipulated by elite, rather than elite values being influenced by the sentiments of the mass-majority and that for the most, communication between elite and non-elite flows downward. Therefore, popular elections and party competitions do not enable masses to govern. Policy questions are seldom decided by the people through elections or through the presentation of policy alternatives by the political parties. For the most part, these "democratic" institutions - elections and parties - are important only for their symbolic value.

They help the masses within the political system by giving them a role to play on election day and a political party with which they can identify.

The Theory has it that the common people have at best only an indirect influence over the decision-making behaviour of the elite. It also contends that elites have a consensus about fundamental norms underlying the social system, that elite agrees on the basic "rules of the game" as well as the "stability" of the social system. The survival, depends upon elite consensus on behalf of the fundamental values of the system, and only policy alternatives that fall within the shaped consensus will be given serious consideration.

Furthermore, the theory postulates that, those on top are always the best. That the elite consists of those successful persons who rise to the top; in every occupation and stratum of society: there is an elite of lawyers; an elite of mechanics; and even an elite of thieves and an elite of prostitutes.

Elitism further believes that the governing elite tries to find a moral basis for its being in the citadels of power and presets it as the logical and necessary consequences and beliefs that are generally recognised and accepted. The political formula may not, and generally does not encapsulate absolute truth. It may as well be plausible myth which is accepted by the people.

Changes in the nature of the political system occur only when events threaten the system. The elite, acting on the basis of enlightened self-interest, institute reforms to preserve the system . The values of elite may appear very "public regarding". Elitism does not mean that public policy will be against mass welfare, but only that the responsibility forms welfare trusts upon the shoulders of the elite, not the common men.

However, for practical purposes, this Thesis uses this theory to explain the role of the Nigerian Elite in the 1985-1993 transition programme , from its embryonic stage up to its last stage which was characterised by political trauma resulting from the annulment of the June 12 presidential election. That is to say, the thesis examines and explains the said period within the elite perspective.

Looking at the postulations of Lonsdale and Chabel (1986); Jackson and Rosberg (1984); Huden and Braton (eds) (1991); and Deutch (1991), the common trends of their arguments are that : Conflicts within the political centre are most common form of political strife in Africa. Elites of different backgrounds, favouring diverging policy positions, and often pursuing a multiplicity of interests, have contended with each other to promote their separate concerns and to protest against measures perceived as detrimental to their well-being. Elite conflict is, virtually by definition, extremely confined: it takes place in the capital cities and

among the upper echelons of the government apparatus. It is so prevalent precisely because it relates directly to the everyday activities of the political leadership regarding bureaucratic appointments, policy directions, governmental allocations. They only use the masses as surrogates fight their conflicts in the rural settings.

Strategies and tactics in these kindsof conflict are indicative of the selective nature of demands and the narrow social bases of those articulating these claims. Many of the activities of competing groups take place behind the scenes: Allies are wooed through lavish entertainment, gifts, and promises of appointments or other benefits.

Elite strife is normally of a low intensity. But one should not forget that, deep policies are concerned not only with the way power is exercised but also with the purposes of governance; they may present challenges to policy, to ;the incumbents of public office, or to the dominant political vision. At issue, therefore, are questions of authority and power as well as legitimacy. Participation, collaboration, cooperation, cynicism, dissatisfaction, protest, rebellion, insurrection, revolt, civil war, disengagement, and withdrawal are always reactions to policies of a specific regime.

(C) AFRICAN/NIGERIAN ELITE.

African history shows that elite existed in the continent log before the advent of colonialism. This can be seen from

the fact that prior to the colonial incursion, there were group of people who wielded influence or possessed power of one kind or the other. For example, historians are unanimous on the fact that African societies had their own political system which produced African political elite, for example, Mansa Musa of Mali.

Trade also existed among various communities in Africa especially through trade by barter in which Africans exchanged their commodities in kind. These trading activities created African economic elite who later traded with Arab merchants in the trans-Saharan trade. Similarly, the Trans-Atlantic slave trade was a pointer to this assertion. This obnoxious trade cost Africa enormously in terms of both human and material resources as able-bodied Africans suffered and perished on their way to Europe and those who survived the journey worked in the European plantations and developed their economy at the detriment of the African economy until the slave labour was rendered useless with the development in science and technology.

The existence of the Sankore University in West Africa and Al-Azhar University in North Africa were some of the evidences pointing to the fact that long before the advent of colonialism Africans were in the limelight of knowledge. In fact, the archaeological findings in Africa proved that Africa is the cradle of mankind. The intellectual centres prove to us that educated elite existed in Africa prior to colonialism.

In African communities, people with charismatic power like oratory and bravery exercised significant traditional authority. This is found every where in the world up to today. These are the traditional African elite. In fact, in many societies, your accessibility to power is greatly determined by your degree of boldness. This was demonstrated through periodical festivals in which traditional wrestlings were staged to choose leaders.

It is conclusive that political power, wealth, education and charisma were the features of African elite long before the advent of colonialism.

Coming down to Nigeria as the case study, it is indubitable to assert that elite existed in the pre-colonial Nigerian societies like elsewhere in the continent. The socio-economic and political developments in the sokoto caliphate, Yoruba and Ibo societies, for instance, are admissible evidences pointing to the fact that political, economic, educated and traditional elites existed long before the colonial incursion.

The home-cottage industries in Kano, Katsina, Nupe, for example, pointed to us that commercial activities gained ground in the pre-colonial Nigerian societies. This gave rise to the emergence of economic elite.

The existence of democracy, semi-democracy and theocracy in Iboland, Yoruba kingdoms and Sokoto caliphate respectively, indicated that political/religious elites existed also. The

prestigious and prodigious literary works of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio and Abdullahi Fodio pointed to the fact that the jihad left prestigious legacy for humanity in the socio-economic and political spheres of influence. The jihad produced erudite Islamic scholars who were the educated elite throughout the areas which the jihad covered especially in the Northern part of Nigeria. Education at that time was not a privilege because all and sundry had access to it.In short , justice prevailed until the time decadence pervaded the society .

The existence of traditional elite can best be seen where charisma like oratory and bravery were regarded as the yardstick for choosing leaders. Through these, people exercised influence over others in their respective societies. For example, somebody with bravery could be made farmers' leader. These kinds of people were found in all the pre-colonial and even colonial and post-colonial Nigerian societies.

It is noteworthy that the pre-colonial African/Nigerian elites had their people at the bottom of their hearts because their policies were people-oriented until their societies became decadent.

The advent of colonialism destroyed the socio-economic and political structures of the pre-colonial Nigerian societies through conquest and subjugation. The British colonial masters entrenched their hegemony over those societies after facing serious resistance.

Graf (1983 :(93) noted that "the major criteria of pre-independence elite formation...can be summarised as wealth, education and traditional authority".

According to the Report of the Political Bureau (1987: 22-23) the contemporary Nigerian elites constituted by the traditional rulers; landed gentry; industrial and commercial elite; intellectuals, military and bureaucrats. And according to Osoba (1969 : 368) the Nigerian power elite is catogarised into two broad categories:

> The business elite and the technocrats. The Business elite comprised mainly of those self-employed Nigerian men of substance who were in commerce or industry and were closely identified with the governing parties in the region or in the center, or both. The technocrats included those Nigerians with considerable academic and professional training - the diploma holders - who worked in the public and quasi - public services, the big foreign firms or were in full or partial self-employment as lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, insurance brokers, accountants, and engineering consultants.

Osoba argues that the ranks of both categories have grown rapidly since 1952 primarily, it might seem, because of the way and manner in which government patronage and policy-making over the years have been directed towards favouring them and as well fostering their growth. He buttresses his argument by

saying that the Nigerian government broke the monopoly of foreign banking institutions by liberalising the work of credit facilities to indigenous business tycoons so that they could take the advantage of the new business opportunity.

Moreover, the year 1952, according Osoba, marked a significant turning point in the growth of the Nigerian business elite because all the governing parties were committed to a "free enterprise" economic system and used their growing control of fiscal policies in the regions and center to create conditions favourable to the emergence of a Nigerian capital-growing people.

But he notes that the policies were made specifically to favour businessmen and politically influential elite. Hence, governments patronage came through issuance of loans, contracts, bank credits and so on.

Osoba also argues that foreign firms contributed to the growth of an indigenous (Nigerian) business elite. He contended that for fear of being legislated out of existence in Nigeria, foreign firms entered into "business partnership with many politically influential Nigerians, whose active support and protection they sought to obtain by giving them a share, albeit a minor share, of profits which they earlier monopolized", Osoba (1977 :373).

On the part of the Nigerian technocrats, Osoba argues that they also grew dramatically both in number and capital-owning capacity since 1952 with the introduction of

representative government in Nigeria. With decolonisation, the technocrats emerged as a significant section of the power elite. He contends that:

> Even though most of them, being in government employment, could not engage directly in politics, a whole series of political decisions, or lack of them, had far-reaching implication for the development of this section of the Nigerian power elite. Osoba (1977 : 373).

Osoba argues that the most crucial factor in the numerical growth of the technocrats, could be informed by emphasis laid on the expansion of educational facilities by all Nigerian governments from 1952 onwards. For example, the Action Group government of Western Nigeria drastically amended the first budget to create rooms for securing scholarships tenable in British and American Universities .Consequently, Osoba (1977 : 376) argued that:

> Many young Nigerians who had taken advantage of the new educational opportunities at the higher and professional levels were skyrocketed almost overnight into high position in the public and quasi-public services, commerce, and industry-- positions which earlier on had been almost exclusively held by expatriate British personnel.

The role and behaviour pattern of the power elite in Nigerian political system, argued Osoba, can be seen in the western educated elite who occupied a commanding position in the three tiers of Nigerian government, except may be, in the Muslim emirates, so much so that "it played the dominant role in the sector of the national economy not directly controlled by foreign business interests, it virtually monopolized all the key decision-making positions in the regional and federal bureaucracies, and exerted an unusually strong influence on the value orientation of the people at large". Osoba (1977 :377)

With that orientation, therefore, they viewed politics as a means of amassing public wealth, hence, in a situation like this there was no room for creative intellectualism or idealism in Nigerian politics". And "kleptocracy or institutionalised robbery of the state by its very custodians- an all-pervading phenomenon in the Nigerian political system- was another understandable, though suicidal, instrument used by members of the power elite to satisfy their ambitions for personal wealth and power"., Osoba (1977 :378).

From the foregoing, therefore,it is incontrovertible to state that the attitudes of the elite towards politics were some of the factors which informed the collapse of the First and Second Republics. And the same reasons among others, provided the Nigerian Military rooms to be steering the political ship of Nigeria. And the Military on its part has

not been different from the politicians. In fact, it is only good in terms of power manipulation and control.

On the whole, it can be understood that the colonial Nigerian elite were colonial creation as it were groomed by the colonial administration like else where in Africa. The members served as licensed buying agents dealing with marketing boards of the colony by engaging in import and exporting activities under the colonial setup.

The British colonial masters openly implanted regionalism, ethnicity and inordinate quest for power and wealth before their departure. This was a baneful orientation to politics and politicking in Nigeria. The first generation of the Nigerian western educated elite inherited the state power from the colonial masters.

In a nutshell, those Nigerian elite maintain the status quo which is the colonial legacy in terms of socio-economic and political setting. They see politics as a mud-slinging affair and they are sectionally and regionally inclined .

This study classifies the Nigerian elite into: the military; traditional rulers; clergymen; politicians; members of the media; intellectuals and bureaucrats. These are the people who control the socio-economic and political fibres of the Nigerian society.

The Nigerian students are considered by this study as aspiring elite or an appendage of the elite. For this reason, they are considered not relevant enough in this study. But the

main focus of this study is on the role played by the military, politicians, members of the media, intellectuals and bureaucrats.

The Nigerian elites as the focus of this thesis, dominate the political and socio-economic scenario of this country from independence to date. For this reason, the non-elite is nothing more than mere instruments that are used by the Elite in manipulating and monopolising the political and socio-economic affairs. This shows the applicability or fitness of the Theory to this thesis. Moreso, the incessant coups d'etat in Nigeria are pointers to the fact that they are attempts to prevent occurrence of drastic change in the country by making reforms here and there to resolve the self-crisis of the contending Elite groups. This ensures the continuity of the system.

The research examines the Nigerian political crisis during the Babangida era, the forces involved and why, how and what caused the crisis which culminated into political instability in the country by using the mirror or model of the Elite Theory.

In conclusion, this study argues that the Elite Theory is applicable to Africa in general and Nigeria in particular because elites existed as proved above long before the advent of colonialism. And factors like ethnicity, regionalism and religion play decisive role in African and Nigerian political life which the elite Theory recognises unlike the Marxist

theory which regards those factors as secondary issues. This study sees those factors as powerful so much so that neglecting them is tantamount to inadequate understanding of their role in Nigerian and African politics in general.

1:10 LITERATURE REVIEW.

A lot has been written on the subject matter - Democracy and Democratisation, especially pertaining to Africa. Some of these writers include: Dudley (1973); Oyovbaire and Olagunju (1989) ; Amdi and Hinjari (1990); Caron, Gboyega and Osaghae (1992); Ake (1992/1993); Umoden (1992); Jinadu, Oyovbaire and Olagunju (1993); Nwabueze (1993 & 1994); Kukah (1993); Toyo (1994); and Omar Khalid Osman (1994). They have written basically to suggest or explain features of an ideal democracy with much emphasis on civil society.

I selected the most related literature on the topic of the research - The Role of the Nigerian Elite in the 1985-1993 Transition to Civil Rule Programme in Nigeria. For instance, the Gabriel Umoden's book - The Babangida Years, and Adele Jinadu, et al, - Transition to Democracy in Nigeria, 1985-1993. The books are directly relevant to this research work because they discussed some aspects of the Babangida transition agenda. The review of them will reveal this assertion. Consequently, this research work will fill in any gap they created.

Ake (1993), in his annual Guardian presentation, touches on many issues on democracy which could be summarised as an analysis of the Obstacles or impediments to the establishment of a viable and genuine democracy.

Ake opens the piece by arguing that democracy is ideally an instrument of human development. But ironically ,it is now manipulated by some forces to protect and promote their interests. And that we are no longer in the world of bi-polar powers. The demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) has made the United States of America (USA) to entrench hegemony to a certain degree in world politics through capitalism, an ideology built on the so-called liberal democracy and free market economy, he contends.

Furthermore, Ake argues that, at the continental level, our elites who parade as champions of democracy only support democracy as a means to power. And at the international level, international development agencies support it to perpetuate their economic exploitation. Similarly, the mentors of the elite - the Western and American Governments, in spite of their proclamation of being mentors of democracy, continue to show growing indifference to Africa and its desire to promote its way of life.

He maintains that one of the remarkable features of democratisation in Africa is that the character of the state is still colonial in nature. The African colonial agents are still those who are controlling the state apparatus. The

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mass-majority are always left to choose between oppressors. And that the ingredients conducive for politics of common goals and common concern are absent, and the domination of the elite of the political scene at the expense of the mass-majority leads to doom.

Ake (1993:3) also explains that our society is politically parochial. The elite exploits this institution by manipulating ethnic, tribal, geographical and religious differences to divide and rule the society. He goes on to say that the elite is the natural enemy of democracy. He stresses this point by saying that its:

> Involvement in democracy movement is mainly a tactical manoeuvre. It is a response to internal contradictions and power struggle within a group for whom democracy is essentially a means of power.

Hence, Ake says, the elite in Africa has been burdened with false expectations of being what it can never be. He further asserts that the transformation of Africa progressively cannot be done by the elite as it wants to continue subjugating the common people. It does not condone opposition but it bends democracy into a strategy of power by using elections to disempower the people. He also contends

that there cannot be Democracy without Democrats. Ake(1993:10) further buttresses his argument by citing the example of Nigeria that:

> Nigeria is feeling from the antics of a political elite which is as allergic to democracy as it is neurotic in the pursuit of power. While posing as the champions of democracy, they readily collaborated in an anti-democratic transition programme, a highly complicated subterfuge which ended, predictably in confusion.

However, inspite of the soundness of that analysis, there are some flaws.One, he contradicts himself in the course of his presentation by saying that the military will take the blame of the failure of the transition programme in Nigeria and not politics or politicians. In his loaded statement, Ake(1993:10) puts it thus:

> However, it is not politics or politicians that have failed but the Military. To begin with, it was the Military that produced the politics and Politicians whom we are now encouraged to blame. It cultivated a politics dissociated from issues, ideology and social parties abstracted from social realities,

> parties belonging to everyone in general and to no one in and thus constituted as an anarchy of ambitions.

Therefore, this loaded statement contradicts the preceding paragraph where Ake points out that the politicians are blameworthy. He would have put it in such a way to show that the blame should be laid at the doors of the two groups which constitute part of the Nigerian elite, either equally or proportionately. Similarly, the statement points that Ake is yet to know or forget that the military belong to the same people who reduce the mass-majority to paupers. Ake (1993:35) also contends that:

> Like the military, <u>we</u> ourselves <u>are</u> a problem for democracy too. The great problem for the matter. We are submissive to those who have power over us as we are oppressive to those who are weaker than we are. We corrupt those who are stronger by allowing them indulgency, including the liberty to abuse us. We have no will to resist. Our inclination is to worship it. We think nothing of submitting to all manner of indignity to get those in power to notice us or to throw us some crumbs. Even without the crumbs, we will still-- with desire to please them.

That is a positive assertion because those who are supposed to fight for democracy show deprecatory acts by aiding and abating those who are corrupt in the society by allowing them indulgency.In short, they submit to what does not have human face.

Nwabueze (1993) is more concerned with the ingredients of democratisation. His book dwells much on explaining that democratisation is concerned, not only with the aim of government known as democracy, but includes a virile civil society, a democratic society, a free society, a just society, equal treatment of all citizens by the state, an ordered, stable society and above all, a society infused with the spirit of liberty, democracy, justice and equality. In other words, a government, will not be termed democratic unless and until it fulfills those conditions or features.

Nwabueze does not say much on the 1985-1993 transition programme and the little from his mind about the regime has not been critical. This is probably because he had been part of the decision-making as a Minister in the Babangida government. For instance, he does not justify or show the fallacies of the creation, funding of the two political parties by government fiat and their endowment with manifestoes by the same process.

Furthermore, the book has not covered much as far as the recent Nigerian politics and government are concerned.It was

into the Babangida transition agenda for their experience as insiders in the government.They contributed to literature as their book is documentary. The book has unequivocally covered much on the transition programme. Notwithstanding, there are lots of criticisms to be labelled against the book. To begin with, the authors were one- time insiders in the Babangida government as political advisers/ministers. Their ideas are value-laden in the sense that they have not been critical of the transition programme.For instance, they have seen nothing wrong with the creation and funding of the political parties by the government. They have argued that:

> There is no doubt that as long as Nigeria continued to grapple with the historical intricacies of emergence of a viable democracy, the establishment of the two-party system would remain an enduring contribution of president Babangida administration (1993:251-252).

Why in spite of the creation, funding and endowment of the two political parties with manifestoes and despite the government ban and disqualification of the old political brigade and the establishment of some political institutions by the same government, the most expensive transition programme in the political history of Nigeria ended up a failure?

The writers were among the Nigerian political scientists who could be tagged as theoretical postulators of weird theories on the transition programme. Oyebode (1991:11) succinctly argues that Nigeria has been turned into a political laboratory whereby all sorts of outmoded theories were tried out in the name of experimentation. He accentuates his argument thus:

> .... Democracy is being unduly mystified in this country. All things they are d o i n g a r e ahistorical: those esoteric, tangled political theories from the lab of Nwosu and his ilk. In fact, I have often wondered; all the political scientists in the Babangida's kitchen cabinet, what books have they been reading? Somebody like Adele Jinadu is a rigorous theorist, Sam Oyovbaire is not a novice either, so is Moyibi Amoda. Can't they rescue government from itself? They are giving the academic a bad name. The situation is so embarrassing that I fear that our students may not believe us anymore.

In their attempt to relate the economic situation of the country with the political transition, the trio (1993:15) contend that the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) is not an end in itself, it is a short-term strategy for attaining

the long-term objectives of democratic consolidation. With regard to the intricacies of a transition to democracy, they argue that the transitions "are prone to both externally-and internally -induced subversion and distortions. For this reason, they must have in-built, self-correcting and self-adjusting mechanisms"(1993:15).

Now, with the negative effects of SAP, how true is the above assertion that SAP is a short-term strategy for attaining the long-term objective of democratic consolidation? And also, what reasons can they advance as to why the transition programme failed despite the embracement of the SAP? And were they not able to trace the forces that could undermine the 'success' of the transition programme, internally or externally or both of them? What did they provide as in-built, self-correcting and self-adjusting mechanisms to shield the transition programme from hypertensive political nerve-wrecking?

Moreso, the trio are so critical of the politicians, but subjective, sycophantic and submissive to the Babangida regime. The following statement of theirs supports our contention:

> Much more than previous military and civilian regimes in post-independent Nigeria, the Babangida Administration has pursued an integrated, multi-dimensional, bold and complex project of economic,

From the foregoing review of the related literature, this work will fill in the gaps found in those writings to explain what led to the failure of the Babangida transition agenda.

1:11 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS.

(i) Annulment:

According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1973:1:2297), annulment is a "legal invalidation of marriage". But in this study, it means cancellation, invalidation, nullification, annulment or bastardisation of an election.

(ii) Democracy:

According to the World Book Encyclopaedia, (1977:5:340), democracy means "a form of government, a way of life, and a goal or ideal". The term also refers to a country that has a democratic form of government. The word democracy means rule by the people. It explains that Abraham Lincoln described such self-government as "government of the people by the people, for the people". But according to Musa (1981:9) democracy means "prevalence of majority determination in political and legal participation and administration, in social and economic activities of production and consumption with individuals exercising their rights and privileges in line with the collective interests". In simple and short words, a genuine and viable democracy is that system of governance which is grounded on true representation in a free,

fair and periodic elections. It is a recognition and protection of fundamental human rights, with probity and accountability in all walks of life.

(iii) Democratization:

Simply refers to a process to democracy.

(iv) June 12 elements:

It refers to the leading 'sympathisers' and 'pro-June 12 elections' people.

(v) MAMSER:

It refers to Mass Mobilisation for Social and Economic Reconstruction. It was a body established by the 1985-1993 military government for political, social and economic engineering.

(vi) New breed politicians:

It refers to those politicians who did not participate in the 'politics' of the First and Second Republics in Nigeria, as far as the Babangida government was concernd.

(vii) Old breed politicians:

It is the opposite to new breed Politicians.

(viii) Option A4:

It was a new method of election from ward, through local government, State to national levels through open-ballot system. It was invented by the 1985-1993 Military regime.

(ix) Open ballot system:

It was a system of election conducted through open head counts. It was adopted by the 1985-1993 military regime.

(x) Parochialism:

It refers to Political narrow mindedness.

(xi) Political party:

Harris (1976:14) contends that "a political party pursues interests and attempts to obtain the best possible advantage and position for its members". Like an interest group, it tries to justify by means of an ideology or a pattern of belief showing by its name that it aims at some good. And by its nature, it concerns itself with exerting power over governmental decision-making especially when it captures power. To Musa (1981:9), "it is a voluntary structural organisation which sets out to represent and achieve a cause, by ensuring a cohesive administrative convenience and discipline through mass participation."

It is notable that while interest groups are merely a voice, a political party brings together and aggregates a number of interests in one association. And while interest groups try to gain access to decision-makers thereby influence their actions; political parties come with plans of action called manifestoes which they intend to translate into action when they are elected into office. In other words, while an interest group merely seeks to divert some of the resources of the state to its direction, political party seeks to put its members in power permanently.

The military on its side, comprises the Navy, the Army and the Air force. By the way, the Military is ideally a

particular type of interest group which by its organisation, discipline, and power of coercion cannot only exert pressure on decision-makers, but can even go as far as to take over the entire running of a country. This kind of seizure of power is popularly known as COUP D'ETAT.

(xii) Political Class:

It is loosely referred to the Political activists. But in its real connotation, is referred to the Civil and Military political groups. Nwabueze (1994:84) lucidly puts it that "the term is here used to embrace all who are actively involved, in an occupational capacity as politicians or otherwise, as actors or participants in the politics of the modern state".

(xiii) Political Bureau:

It was a body established by the 1985-1993 Military Government to search for a "New political order" for Nigeria.

(XIV) Structural Adjustment Programme:

It is an economic policy characterised by devaluation of currency, removal of subsidy, removal of import restrictions and so on.

(xv) Transition Programme:

According to Olagunju, Jinadu and Oyovbaire (1993:4), transition programmes are "projects... and process of democratization". In a simple way, it is a designed and packaged programme meant for military 'disengagement' from the political scenario. It is also a transformation of an undemocratic society to one which the majority have a 'say'

and a level of 'participation' in the political, economic and socio-cultural activities.

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CHAPTER TWO

2:0 THE NIGERIAN MILITARY AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSITIONS

This chapter will examine the Nigerian military in relation to the politics of transition to civil rule. It will examine the historical experience of the Nigerian military; how it metamorphosed into a political force as against its traditional role of being a purely defence institution. It will also discuss the interests it seeks to protect before and after handing over 'power' to civilians, and how it guides and controls the type of democracy it proffers.

It will also examine the establishment of the POLITICAL BUREAU. In view of this, the chapter will examine the assignment given to it by the Babangida Military Government in 1986 and the Report it submitted to the government. The chapter will examine the Report vis-a-vis the Military Government White Paper on the Report.

The chapter hopes to provide an insight into the 1985-1993 transition to civil rule programme right from its embryonic stage, for an understanding of what the 1985-1993 transition may likely end up with.

The Third World nations experience incessant military intervention in politics. This is not surprising when we consider the nature of the military institution and its

historical experience after the pre-colonial Third World societies were subjugated by imperialism.

For instance, Kwanashie (1990:31) laments that the Nigerian Army was an offshoot of a colonial force designed like the British Army in organisational format and professional training. Hence, the officer corps was trained in Britain along the lines of political neutrality of the institution. And that the military institution was seen as a passive instrument under a political leadership, mainly trained to inculcate 'discipline' and operational efficiency and to see that politics was incompatible with the military profession. He goes on to say that politics was seen as not a preoccupation of the military officers of the colonies who were used by the British. But on the other hand, the British Officers in the colonies were not themselves insulated from the politics of the colonies. With the attainment of independence in 1960, he adds that:

> The Nigerian Army was seen as a traditional force whose primary function was defending Nigeria against external attacks and assisting in maintaining internal cohesion and security. At periods of emergency the army could be called up to assist in and welfare duties or in peace keeping abroad.

However, a sober reflection on the military institution shows that it has frog-jumped from playing that traditional role to total participation in Politics. Kwanashie (1990:32) argues that "barely a year after the British Commander of the Nigerian Army left, the army had come to the centre of Nigerian politics".

The resultant end is that the military tastes the 'goodies' of being at the chamber of power. It capitalises on any opportunity it thinks to be an alibi and pulls the political lever from the hands of the civilians. It sees itself as 'corrective' in posture and that the civilians are 'indisciplined' and corrupt. Nwankwo (1987:29) contends that "coupologists" see military takeovers as at worst, being a "product of deficient political structures, and at best " being "the evidence of beneficent modernization and technocracy at work".

But on the contrary, a critical analysis will prove that constant military usurpations of power have not contributed to progress, neither do military leaders perform different from the civilians they replace. In fact, some people see the military as worse than the civilians. Jega (1986:4:21) mordantly argues that:

> Incessant military takeovers and governance of this country have only compounded the problem

> of democracy in Nigeria. Since the military cannot pretend to be elected or representing anybody but themselves in government, they pretend to be 'corrective' in posture, and even greater preoccupation with 'stability' and 'law and order'.

The military has become a phenomenon in the Third World politics particularly in African politics so much so that it has metamorphosed into a potent political force capable of power manipulation and control. Various theories/models have been formulated by political scientists explaining reasons for military intervention in politics especially in Africa and.

Two major schools of thought emerged explaining the intervention of military in politics. Janowitz (1968) in his explanation of military intervention in the politics of the developing nations in general, provides what is today regarded as Internal Characteristic Model. According to him, one can understand and explain military intervention in the African politics in particular and that of the developing countries in general by considering the internal structure of the military. He contended that factors like internal social cohesion and cleavages, social background of the officers, professional and political ideology from within the military and skill structure and career lines as well help in explaining the

appearance of the military at the centre stage of the politics of those countries.

In essence, therefore,the postulations on of Janowitz is that the character of the emergent new nation states affects the military institution and also facilitates its intervention in the internal affairs of those states.

Huntington (1968) on the other hand, upholds a contrary view to Janowitz. He argues that military intervention in the developing nations cannot be explained by military explanations. He argues that the issue of military intervention in the developing nations only represents specific manifestation of general politicisation of social forces and institutions. Therefore, according to him, social forces and institutions mostly, are highly politicised so much so that they have political bureaucracies, clergy, universities, labour unions, corporations and political armed forces. Consequently, these politicised political groupings became involved in political matters of their environment which affect their particular interest or that of their group and the society at large. And the resultant effect of this is that of political rancour and absence of legitimate and authoritative ways of conflict resolution.

But Adekanya (1978) contends that military intervention in the political affairs of Africa and Nigeria in particular can only adequately be addressed by synthesising the two postulations advanced by Janowitz and Huntington.

We concur with Adekanya in his proposition because looking at the military from only either of the two angles is tantamount to providing inadequate understanding and explanation of the phenomenon of military intervention in the political affairs of the countries in question.

Two major schools of thought also emerged explaining reasons or causes of military intervention in politics in the developing countries and Africa in particular. Dudley (1985: 77-78) classifies the causes thus: Reference Group Theory and Custodian Theory. The former theory postulates that, military takes over the rein of power when civilians fail to perform up to expectation and when the military feels disadvantaged to other groups. And the latter postulates that the military intervenes because it sees itself as the custodian of the nation, hence, it takes over power when the Constitution of a nation is flouted.

With reference to Huntington (1968), Oluyemi-Kusa (1990:111) contends that the Reference Group Theory lays emphasis on societal and structural weaknesses- institutional fragility, systemic flaws and low level of political culture. But the Custodian Theory lays emphasis on organisational theory which contends that professionalism, nationalism and austerity are the causes of military intervention in politics - to save the state from crisis which politicians subject it to.

At this juncture, we would like to argue that the incessant usurpation of power by the military in the developing countries is partly a product of failure of the politicians to fulfil obligations rested in their hands by the electorate and to as well conduct politicking in mature ways. The intervention is also partly a product of military sophistication in terms of power manipulation and control by capitalising on one reason or the other to dislodge civilian government. The operation of alien systems of government, presidentialism, for example, also contributes to this baneful act because the politicians find it difficult to operate successfully. A clear case in point was the operation of presidential system of government in Nigeria in the Second Republic. The military president operated on decrees.

Three main types of military government can be identified, viz: caretaker military government like that of National Interim Council of Sierra Leone which ousted Juxton Smith in 1968 and then within few days handed over the mantle of leadership to late President Siaka Steven. Military Revolution is one which is established by revolutionary and charismatic leaders in their bid to change the status quo. An example of this was the Ethiopian military government of Colonel Mengistu. There is another type called corrective

military government. It is a mid-way between the Revolutionary and Caretaker Governments. An example of this was the one established in 1962 in Togo in the wake of the assassination of Olympio Sylvanus.

It is noteworthy that only in rare cases that mass-oriented military government is obtained especially in the contemporary Third World Nations. By and large, military regimes always appear at the centre-stage of power through unconventional means. They thereby don't appear responsible and responsive to the demands of the society.

In the process of governance, the military designs a programme as a way of handing over to civilians. Modalities and interests which the military wants to protect before and after such handing over, constitute the nature and type of civilian regime that emerges.

But in the first place, why does the military 'disengage' from politics and return to the barracks? According to Ayam (1990:51-52) the reason behind such a thing could be as a result of fission of the officer corps. Subsequently, the succeeding coup may not receive tumultuous welcome from the entire army. Those officers who see the military as a professional institution and also insist that it must not be seen as a political force, may constitute a threat to that faction of the officer corps which has seized power. This attitude, says Ayam, breeds instability within the military and hence, compels a disengagement from politics.

To buttress his argument, he cites the example of General Gowon's government. That the regime saw no need for handing over power to civilians, because according to it, the civilians did not learn lessons from their past mistakes. On the contrary , General Murtala, who belonged to those who saw the military as a professional institution and defence instrument, overthrew the Gowon's regime. On ascension to power, among other things, it preoccupied itself with the implementation of a programme of return to civil rule.

Yet another factor which compels the military to disengage from politics could be ethnic divisions, contends Ayam. That where one ethnic group dominates in the exercise of political power, and "where this proves to be potentially explosive, the military may map out plans of a return to Civil Rule". For instance, the January 15, 1966 military coup had so much divided the Nigerian Army that Major General Ironsi thought of making a plan of a return to civil rule as the best way-out.

Another compelling factor is public disenchantment. By 1974, the Nigerian public became disenchanted with the Gowon regime when it announced the deferment of the return to civil rule programme.

Besides charges of corruption, Nigerians were beginning to experience economic hardship. This situation discredited the Gowon Regime and sort of engineered the Murtala group to stage a coup. Ayam puts it that:

> The apparent attempt by Gowon to institutionalise military rule, apart from the crisis the nation experienced, provoked public disregard for the Gowon Military Government. The Murtala Muhammad regime therefore had no option than to plan for a return of the armed forces to the barracks.

The military disengagement from politics could also be tied down to objectives which the officer corps that seizes power seeks to achieve for itself. These objectives are a reflection of the period that a military regime stays in power.

However, if these objectives are mainly institutional in nature, for instance, granting the armed forces sufficient funds, then the military may stay in power for a short while. But if the objectives transcend the military institution by involving the larger society, then the stay could be a longer one. To this effect, Ayam contends that Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings staged his first coup in Ghana as a result of what he considered to be the "damaged image of the armed forces". He therefore planned to clean the armed forces of

> This model clearly fits the Nigerian case. The military Officers who seized power in August 1983 certainly felt that Nigeria was confronted with economic problems which the civilian regime was incapable of handling. From their own points of view, once the economic problems plaguing the nation are reasonably solved, the armed forces must handover to civilians.

But we should not forget the fact that Buhari did not enunciate apolitical programme that could even give a clue to how long or short it would stay in power.

A second model as Ayam argues is the process of civilianisation in which the military casts aside its uniform and in its stead wears the suit or agbada. This process, he argues, takes a long time to implement and it is started with forging of close ties between the military and civilian leaders.

Ayam then goes on to argue that within the Nigerian context, there are certain fundamental interests which the military have protected and will still continue to protect even after handing over to civilians. That one of such

interests is in relation to the extent to which in-coming administration attempts to dislodge policies imposed on the society by the incumbent military regime. He puts it to the open that a possibility exists that an in-coming civilian administration may decide to dismantle some of the International Monetary Fund harsh conditionalities which have been imposed on the society. To make sure that the I.M.F. package continues, the Officer Corps presently holding political offices may not retire from military service after handing over power to civilians. These officers, who are part and parcel of the implementation of the conditionalities of the I.M.F could easily stage a coup to ensure that the policies continue to be implemented.

Ayam also argues that the question of defence budget is another crucial interest which the military protects. Over the years, he says, the defence budget has continued to soar under Military regimes. He backs his assertion by citing the example of the First Republic expenditure where only 29.7 out of 71.5 million pounds was expended on defence. This situation contrasted markedly within the Second Development Plan of 1970-71,when #78 million was allocated and spent on defence. And also the budget on defence rose by 1975-80, a period of military rule. "N2,827,937 billion" was spent on defence. He continues thus:

> It is interesting to note that under the

> Shagari administration projected defence expenditure dropped slightly to N1.4 when compared to the over N2 billion expended under the military between 1975-79. Thus the pattern seems to be one in which defence expenditure jumps up whenever the military is in power while it drops when civilians are in power.

Furthermore, he also contends that the military also protects its institutional interests which have to do with the politicisation of military postings. That a civilian administration would prefer a corp of officers in the military that will man strategic posts, for this will ensure some form of safety against officers that may likely plot coups and will also "guarantee symbiotic" relationship between the military and civilian leaders.

Ayam then criticises that the politicisation of the military postings could lead to posting unqualified officers to offices they do not qualify by rules and regulations of the military cadre which in turn breeds discontent within the military ranks and subsequently affects the civilian administration and the military institution.

Moreover, Ayam notes that the various attempts made by the military in a bid to disengage from politics were not unconnected with the issue of guiding the nature and character

of democracy to emerge. The reasons behind this include: the protection of their interests either for those of them in service or for those who are already out of it. The attending consequence of this, says Ayam, is the abuse of the basic principles of democracy, such as freedom of expression, opposition and competition.

From the foregoing, what has to be understood is that the military, especially nowadays, has metamorphosed from a defence institution to a political force. And what is central to this metamorphosis is the issue of self-enrichment and monopoly of the state apparatus. In other words, the ultimate goal of the military with regard to the issue of its handing over power to civilians is to project its interests, and all means available such as, ethnicity, could be manipulated to achieve those interests. And that with the presence of the military in the political scene and what corrupt people snatch from the control of power, the military does not disengage from power for the interest of the people. Rather, it disengages when certain forces exact pressure on it. In other words, the voluntary aspect of the disengagement is now a ruse.

GOWON'S TRANSITION AGENDA:

After fighting a bitter Civil War, the Gowon regime mapped out and announced a programme of return to civil rule. The programme included:

A.Reorganisation of the Armed Forces

B.Implementation of a national development plan and repair of the damaged and neglect of War;

C. Eradication of corruption in national life;

D. Settlement of the question of state creation;

E. Preparation and adoption of a new constitution;

F. Introduction of a new revenue allocation formula;

G. Recognition of genuinely national political parties and organisation of elections and installation of popularly elected governments in the states and in the centre.

The packaged programme was claimed by the regime to be an attempt for the emergence of civilian rule in 1976. But it was to the dismay of the Nigerian society because the regime threw the programme of the hand over in the dust-bin as it called off the programme by 1974.

The regime contended that it took that decision because, according to it, the civilians did not learn their lesson, hence the hand over was premature and unrealistic.

Its failure to keep to the promise of handing over earned it anger from a segment of them military. It was toppled by General Murtala Ramat Muhammed. Sooner after the seizure of

power, Murtala regime came out with a programme of a return to civil rule, possibly, to redeem the dented image of the military caused by the Gowon regime.

MURTALA/OBASANJO'S TRANSITION AGENDA:

Murtala came to power on July 29 , 1975 and he did not stay long. His programme was an attempt to clean up the Nigerian public service of bribery and corruption. Africa was the centre piece of Nigerian foreign policy, and it was against imperialism and its tentacles. These earned the regime anger or arch enmity from within and from without . Murtala was assassinated on February 13, 1976 in an abortive coup led by Bukar Suka Dimka.

However, General Olusegun Obasanjo took over the reins of government and continued with a five-stage programme of disengagement. In the words of Umoden (1992:98) the five-stage programme was planned this way:

> Stage one involved the creation of states and the drawing up of a new constitution by a Constitution Drafting Committee. Stage two pertained to local government elections (on a non-party basis) and a constituent Assembly to consider the Draft Constitution.

The lifting of ban on political activities and the formation of the parties made up stage three, while various elections at state and federal levels, ending with the full and immediate military disengagement, concluded stages four and five.

This programme ran through smoothly without serious hitches.In spite of the fact that the military is anti-democracy, Obasanjo's transition programme seemed to have sincerity of purpose and was founded on a genuine desire to disengage the military from the political scene. And this perspective informed the relatively short time within which the transition agenda was packaged and executed. However, the regime guided its interests and guarded the type of democracy to emerge in the Second Republic as Ayam (1990:64-65) argues that the military opted for presidential system of government because this system provided the military with more chances of participation in the democratic process than was the parliamentary system of government. That the system provided the military with a greater avenue of teleguiding and watching the activities of politicians and a position of influencing events as they unfolded.

He buttresses his argument by saying that the military could put across its demands through the National Security Council or the meetings of Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than in the parliamentary system where the functions were performed

by the Defence Minister. And that the military intervened in the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly. The issue of Sharia was a clear case in point. The Military decreed that the Sharia could not be elevated to the level of a Supreme Court instead of allowing the issue to be resolved through dialogue and compromise. Moreso, Ayam says, even the practice of democracy had to contend with the military because Shagari once declared that there were two main parties in Nigeria, namely: The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the military. Ayam argues that this statement lent credence to the influence which serving and retired officers had on the Shagari government, a pointer to why the administration did all it could to suppress a scandal allgedly committed by the military of N2.8 billion .

Furthermore, the seeming sincerity of purpose of the transition agenda albatross was the handing over of power to a reactionary and conservative element within the ruling elite. This slowed down the forward march toward progressive democratic civil rule. It also gave rise to the general maladministration and mismanagement of the country which in turn became a prelude to another military incursion in 1983.

The Shagari regime came to an end on December 31, 1983 in a coup staged by General Buhari. Reasons given to justify the ascendancy to power could be rightly transposed to those given by previous coup plotters as, societal lawlessness, economic predicament and political instability.

According to Buhari (1993:66) the main preoccupation of his regime at its early life was to revamp the Nigerian economy by effectively exploiting and harnessing all human and material resources at disposal to improve the quality of life of all Nigerians. On whether the government had a time-table of a return to civil rule, he declared that:

> No.... What we are trying to put across is to make Nigerians understand how much we are in trouble, economically. If we can get that message across then Nigerians will be prepared to work hard and allow the government to pull the country out of the economic mess. After that, they can, if they like, resume their hagglings and squabbles. But for now, we have no time to quarrel, no time to waste, only time to work hard. We have to see it through.

Political analysts within and outside the country consequently concluded that a programme of transition to civil rule was not on the agenda of the Buhari regime by capitalising on the socio-cultural and economic problems to continue clinging to political power. For example, Olagunju et al (1993:67-68) co-writers contended that if the economic and socio-cultural problems of Nigeria were to be solved

before the country was to return to civil rule, then it was to conclude that the country was made to be in for military rule for an indefinite period.

The regime was toppled on August 27, 1985 without leaving a legacy of a return to civil rule. It was ousted through a palace coup staged by General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. According to Babangida (1993:72) they seized the mantle of leadership because the Buhari Government had abused the 'mandate' given to them by Nigerians,that the regime alienated itself from the people. And that the fundamental changes which they expected from the regime was not forthcoming. That the nation continued to head towards disaster, hence, the country had to be rescued and steered away from political misdirection.

BABANGIDA'S TRANSITION AGENDA.

After gathering some momentum, the regime began to appeal to Nigerians that it would come out with a plan of transition to civil rule. Barely five months after being on the seat of power, the programme of transition to civil rule started.

The Political Bureau, Constitution Review Committee, Constituent Assembly, and so on were established. Certain categories of Nigerians were banned and disqualified from partisan politics. Two political parties were created by the government and endowed with manifestoes. New States and Local Governments were created. Local, state and national elections were held.

Despite all the aforementioned items, the transition programme did not reach the final destination of handing over power to a civilian president. But in the process of the transition programme, the Babangida regime reiterated several times that it was sincere in the programme and it would definitely hand over power to a democratically elected civilian government. Babangida (1991:2:2) contends that:

> I wish to reiterate, once more, our solemn commitment to laying such firm foundations of stability in our new political system that will serve our purpose as a nation and that will obviate the need for any further military intervention in the political life of our country. To that end, we have pursued the transition programme meticulously.

Therefore, it is against that background that the transition programme which President Babangida talked about will be critically examined.

2:1 ESTABLISHMENT OF A 17-MEMBER POLITICAL BUREAU.

On January 10, 1986, the Babangida Military Government established a 17-member Political Bureau to 'oversee' and 'coordinate' a debate on the political future of Nigeria. In the light of this, it is to say that the political Bureau was an adhoc committee established by the Federal Military Government to review, as Falana puts it (1986:23):

> Nigeria's Political history with a view to identifying the basic problem that led to the failure of the past and suggest ways of resolving and coping with these problems.
>
> Secondly, and perhaps more importantly the Bureau was requested to identify a basic philosophy of government which determine goals and serve as a guide to the activities of government.

The Report of the Political Bureau (1987:10) explained that its membership comprised Dr. Samuel J. Cookey - Chairman, Pro-Chancellor, University of Benin; Professor E.O. Awa, Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru;

Professor A.D. Yahaya, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria; Mallam Haroun Adamu, Managing Director, Punch (Nig.) Limited, Kudeti Street, Ikeja; Mallam Ibrahim Halilu, c/o Nigerian Labour Congress, 29 Olajuwan Street, Off Ojuelegba Road, Yaba; Mr. Pascal Bafyau, c/o Nigerian Labour Congress, 29 Olajuwan Street, Off Ojuedegba Road, Yaba; Dr. (Mrs.) Rahmatu Abdullahi, Department of Psychology, University of Lagos, Lagos; Professor Oyeleye Oyediran, Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos; Dr. Tunde Adeniran, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.

Others included Dr. Abdullahi Rafi Augi, Department of History, University of Sokoto, Sokoto; Professor Sam. E. Oyovbaire, Department of Political Science, University of Benin, Benin, Mr. Bala J. Takaya, Department of Political Science, University of Jos, Jos. Mrs. Hilda Adefarasin, 4 Molade Okoya Thomas Street, Ikeja, Lagos; Dr. Ola Balogun, 26 Isaac John Street, Igbobi, Lagos; Professor Muhammad Sani Zaharadeen, Bayero University, Kano; Dr. Edwin Madunagu, Guardian Newspapers Limited, Rutam House Isolo, Lagos; and Professor Okon E. Uya, Department of History, University of Calabar, Calabar.

The Bureau was inaugurated by the President on January 13, 1986. In his speech, President Babangida (1992:101) outlines the following as terms of reference of the Bureau, thus:-

A. To review Nigeria's political history and identify the basic problems which have led to our failure in the past and suggest ways of resolving and coping with these problems;

B. To identify a basic philosophy of government which will determine goals and serve as guide to the activities of government;

C. To collect relevant information and data for the government as well as identify other political problems that may arise from the debate;

D. To gather, collate and evaluate the contributions of Nigerians to the search for a viable political future and provide guidelines for the attainment of the consensus objectives.

E. To deliberate on other political problems as may be referred to it from time to time.

To this end, "based on the findings and recommendations of the Bureau, government will announce in the course of 1987 a new Political Programme and prepare for a hand-over of power.", Babangida (1992:101).

The Bureau's terms of reference and the President's speech at the inauguration of the Bureau as well as his 1986 budget speech constituted as the tasks of the Bureau, as adumbrated below:

(a) Stimulating, co-ordinating and guiding the national political debate through:

(i) organising grassroots participation and by mobilising the broad masses of the people in the quest for a new political order

(ii) encouraging the contributions of professional, academic, economic and social groups and organisations; and

(iii) Seeking the views of men of experience in public affairs;

(b) Collecting all relevant data for the work of the Bureau and for possible use by the government;

(c) Collating, analysing and summarising the views expressed in the course of the national political debate;

(d) Reviewing Nigeria's political history and identifying the basic problems therein and making recommendations for resolving and coping with these problems;

(e) Working out a basic philosophy of government for Nigeria'

(f) Preparing a blue-print for a future political model or models for the country;

(g) Providing a blue-print for an economic model consistent with the political order;

(h) providing guidelines for the implementation of the recommended model;

(i) providing a time-sequence for political transition by 1990; and

(j) deliberating on any other political matters that may be referred to the Bureau by the government. Report of the Political Bureau (1987:11-12).

With the tasks of the Bureau defined, it then issued out some guidelines for the political debate. Its Chairman in a nationwide broadcast, February 3, 1986, announced the following issues which the members of the general public should address themselves to in the course of the debate:

(i) A philosophy of government for the future;

(ii) A viable popular and genuinely democratic political system;

(iii) Human rights (economic, social, legal and political);

(iv) The links between economy and politics in Nigeria;

(v) Rural and community development;

(vi) The Local Government system;

(vii) The rural population in Nigerian Politics;

(viii) Labour in Nigerian Politics

(ix) Women in Nigerian Politics;

(x) Youth and Students in Nigerian Politics;

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(xi) Traditional Rulership and administration;

(xii) The Armed Forces in Nigerian Politics;

(xiii) State and Religion;

(xiv) Forms of representation in government;

(xv) Formation of Nigerian political parties; their funding and administration;

(xvi) Elections and electoral processes;

(xvii) Federalism, regionalism, statism, nationality and citizenship;

(xviii) Creation of States;

(xix) Revenue allocation;

(xx) Ethnicity in Nigerian Politics;

(xxi) Interests of minority and under-privileged groups;

(xxii) National Census;

(xxiii) National Languages;

(xxiv) Corruption in public life;

(xxv) Discipline, law and order;

(xxvi) The Judiciary and the Administration of Justice;

(xxvii) Social and Political Mobilization for development;

(xxviii) The mass media and other forms of communication in Nigeria.

(xxix) Bureaucracy and development; and

(xxx) External Relations (The Report (1987:12-13)).

The Report of the Political Bureau was submitted to the Armed Forces Ruling Council on March 27, 1987. Out of the seventeen members of the Bureau, two of them Dr. Ola Balogun and Dr. Edwin Madunagu withdrew their membership. Reasons given for their withdrawal as put by Olagunju, Jinadu and Oyovbaire (1993:117-18)were that Dr. Ola Balogun resigned his appointment ostensibly on the ground that his suggestion that the Bureau should interview not a representative of some of Nigerians, but all Nigerians. However, the reality of the resignation, they argued, was unconnected with his desire to devote more of his time to his professional and business concerns in the film industry. The Political Bureau resolved on December,17, 1986 to stop sending any documents of the Bureau to him, including notices and minutes of meetings because of his refusal to abide by the operating rules of the Bureau. The reason for this accusation, they contended, was the front-page story about the Bureau in the Guardian of November 27, 1986. The members regarded this as way of leaking matters discussed by the Bureau to the press, even before agreement was reached, and a way of pre-emptying further discussions on them. It is a way of influencing or even sabotaging the work of the Bureau. But Olagunju, et al, concluded that "no evidence was adduced to support this allegation".

On the work of the Bureau, its Report (1987:15-16) contends that the debate generally cut across all social,

economic and professional groups - urban elite, businessmen, medical doctors, university teachers, administrators, lawyers, journalists, traditional rulers, market women and men, farmers, youths, students and workers. And that the Bureau received a total of 27,324 contributions to the debate in form of memoranda from individuals and groups, newspaper articles, electronic media discussions, recorded summaries of debates and contributions made at public hearings organised by the Bureau in all the states capitals.

2:2 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU

The political Bureau completed its assignment and submitted its report to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) on March 27, 1987. The Bureau explains that the Report constitutes contributions made by Nigerians from all walks of life. And that the Report contains the Bureau's recommendations pertaining to those contributions. Therefore, the contributions comprise or cut across political, economic and socio cultural explanations regarding the lingering problems facing Nigeria.

According to Olagunju, et al (1993:126), the Report

contains social and political theory within the context which Plamenatz uses the term. He refers theory, according to them, in this regard to connote speculative (philosophical) and explanatory (sociological) compass.

Furthermore,the Report points out that governance and forms of government are not matters of chance or constitutional forms only; and that choice and structures are also important in any political process, but both voice and structures are in themselves subject to material forces, especially historical forces. Therefore, they continue:

> It is in the context of these historical forces that social or human projects like transitions must be understood and pursued. History, properly and broadly defined to include material culture, constitutes, on this view, at one and the same time, the opportunity, the problem and the challenge of social projects and human development in all its facets.

The Report of the Bureau (1987:127) traces the origin, nature, character and structure of the Nigerian political economy. The role of the state and of successive regimes in promoting and consolidating issues and problems pertaining to this political economy have been highlighted by the Bureau with a "view to indicating that the negative factors of mismanagement of the economy, corruption, crass opportunism, failure to effect political succession, political insensitivity and intolerance are informed by the relationship between the country's politics or state power and its economy; and that understanding of the problems of the present social order and the way to a much healthier society could emerge and historically tied down to the country's political economy.

Therefore, according to Olagunju,et al (1993:127) if transitions are viewed as social projects, then transition is a designed project which:

> Requires a methodology which proceeds through the identification of problems (e.g. causes and effects of democratic failures) and the mapping out of refined or alternative strategies for avoiding or minimizing the conditions that encourage or which tend to encourage or give rise to the problems.

On the speculative (philosophical) theory of the political Bureau, Tunji Olagunju and his colleagues explain that the theory is based on the liberal political theory or philosophy. That this theory is a function of the Bureau's analysis of Nigeria's colonial inheritance and the ideological props of radical anti-colonial nationalism in the country. Thus, in the words of the Bureau's Report (1987:43) as a liberal political theory:

> If therefore uniformity is imposed on society by a rigid system of egalitarianism, the aspirations of individuals with high ability may be thwarted. It is therefore necessary to evolve a social system which will leave some room for the individual to exercise his initiative, provided that he is not allowed to trample on the rights and freedoms of other people.

The recommendations of the Report of the political Bureau (1987) can synoptically be said to have mainly comprised the following:

The Bureau recommends that Nigerians should adopt socialism and reject capitalism as a socio-economic system. This is because, the Bureau (1987:55) posits "we have noted that capitalism, the dominant ideology in Nigeria, has tended to foster poverty, ignorance, disease and squalor in the ranks of the masses. We have also noted that inequitable distribution of wealth is a marked characteristic of advanced capitalist societies". For this reason, the Bureau (1987:56) contends:

> We, therefore , recommend that Nigeria should adopt a socialist socio-economic system in which the state shall be committed to the nationalisation and socialisation of the commanding heights of the national economy ...

According to Olagunju et al(1993:128-29), the Bureau recommends socialism and rejects capitalism. The trio argue that the socialism of the political Bureau is fundamentally the socialism of social democracy which the wealth of history shows that it is an attempt to humanise and as well radicalise political theory so as to grip with the contradictions of capitalism in the age of industralisation. The trio also argued that the Bureau recommended only the adoption of the

socialist socio-economic system and not transformation of the political and cultural system along the same socialist lines because "the socialism of social democracy of the Bureau requires at the level of the superstructure, competitive politics and constitutionalism with limitations placed on those who exercise prerogative of power, "Olagunju et al (1993:128-29).

How realistic is the Bureau's recommendation for socialist socio-economic system? why did the government reject the imposition of a political ideology? we shall address these questions when treating the Government's white paper on the Report of the political Bureau.

The Bureau also recommended the nationalisation of the entire oil industry. The Bureau (1987:58) argued pertaining to the de-privatisation thus:

> .... this type of approach to the subject matter(i.e. privatisation) does not, and it cannot, resolve the fundamental ineluctable contradictions and social problems which the country's practice of politics poses for its economy, and vice versa.

In whose interest was the nationalisation of the oil industry? How possible was the call for the stoppage of the

privatisation policy? We shall address those two questions after seeing the Government's white paper.

On the form of government, the Bureau recommends the continuation of the American-style democracy for Nigeria. This is because, says the Bureau (1987:73), the advantages of this form of government outweighed the disadvantages and also because of the "mass support for it". It also argued that Nigerians widely expressed that the problems with politics in Nigeria were not informed by parliamentary system nor by presidential system, rather, they were informed by the immaturity of the "political class".

On the new political economy for Nigeria, the Bureau contended that there was general condemnation by the sampled population on the way and manner with which the Nigerian economy was pulverised by the practice of politics. Hence, the need for distancing it away from negative politicking through limiting "the role of government and the dimensions of politics in the social and economic transformation of the country".

On the whole gamut, the Bureau (1987:73-76) recommends "social economic participation in all structures and organisations of power", and that the Nigerian economy should be restructured along the socialist lines by laying emphasis on self-reliance and social justice. Leadership should also be derived largely from the mass majority in consonance with the socialist ideology and philosophy. And that socio-economic

planning should be carried out through the appropriate authorities in the development of districts, local government areas, states and at the national levels.

The Bureau also recommends that Nigeria should adopt a multi-party system and rejected the idea of one-party system for what it regarded as dictatorial tendencies of the system. The Bureau also recommends, like the 1979 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that, traditional rulers should stay off partisan politics. They should see themselves as fathers of their followers. These attempts actually reduced the previous power of the traditional rulers when they controlled the instruments of coercion - the police, prisons and courts.

The Bureau also recommends that the military should retire to the backstage of politics by confining itself to its duties of defending the nation and the Constitution. To this end, the Bureau(1987:156) recommends continuous sensitisation of both the civilians and the military on the negative impingement of military intervention in politics. This is important, said the Bureau, "since military rule has been found to exacerbate rather than abate the social contradictions and conflicts,...".

The Bureau also recommended that the Nigerian women and youth should be given due regards in reference to their role in nation building. It also recommended that a National Directorate of Social Mobilisation and Political Education be

established for the purpose of conscientising Nigerians. It also recommended the creation of new states for the federation.

The Bureau(1987:220) recommends that ban from partisan politics should be put on the "past politicians" and public or political office holders. On the part of the former, "the entire period covering all regimes and administrations between August 1975 and August 1985, is appropriate; and for the later, since government involves political responsibility", the following political office holders who occupied one office or the other within the aforementioned period should be affected:

(i) President,vice-President,Deputy Governors.
(ii) Ministers,Commissioners,Secretaries to Governments.
(iii) Advisors,Special Assistants,Presidential Liaison Officers,Gubernatorial Liaison Officers.
(iv) Legislator at the Federal and State levels.
(v) Political party officials at the Federal,Stat and local government levels,including party patrons and matrons.
(vi) Chairmen of Boards of parastatals at the

Federal and State levels.

(vii) Chairmen and Supervisory Councils of local government caretaker committees.

(viii) Heads of defunct Nigerian Security Organisation (NSO) and the Nigerian Police force.

(ix) Judiciary and other public officers removed from office for a cause.

(x) Armed forces offices who held political offices, Bureau (1987:220).

The Bureau(1987:220) recommends in that respect "in the interest of political morality and individual integrity" that military personnel as well as civilian " who hold or held political offices between August,1985 until the completion of the political transition programme...,should not contest any elective office or be appointed into any political or party office in the next civilian administration".

Finally, the Bureau (1987:220) recommends that the transition programme should be seen as a learning process, therefore, an element of flexibility should be built into it in order to accommodate certain things that might happen in this process. It accentuated this conception thus:

We wish to stress that the final

determination of the progress from one stage to the other on the programme above should depend on the conviction of the executors that reasonable minimum progress has been made and that proceeding to next stage would not jeopardise the entire programme. We are firmly convinced that with adequate political will and commitment, smooth transition is achieved by 1990.

2:3 THE WHITE PAPER ON THE REPORT OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU.

The political Bureau submitted its report to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) on March 27, 1987.

According to OLAGUNJU, et al (1993:162-69), the Military responded to the request of the political Bureau by sending signals to the rank and file in military formations and institutions throughout the country to debate on the issues and collate view points on them for presentation to the Bureau.

Two groups emerged thereof. Those who supported a more active role for the military in the Third Republic. This group

contended that it was even premature to start talking of military disengagement, talkless of fixing time for handing over. It also opted out for a two-tier system of government, comprising mainly of the central and the local governments.

In the final analysis when the military thought it ripe to disengage, the trio continue, they:

> Would like a constitutional provision to enable the military interpose itself in the political and constitutional process. This would be in the form of a constitutional provision, making it mandatory for the military to alert and warn the president if things were not going on well and to give him a time-frame within which to put the national political house in order or else face action or intervention by the military .

The opposite camp wanted a low-key involvement of the military in the political process, because an activist involvement of the military in politics had tarnished the image of the professionalism of the armed forces. Therefore, this camp saw a return to civil rule as means for the military to regain its professionalism and to 'purge itself' of the odium of its past involvement in politics.

The situation had put the military input into the

preparation of the political Bureau. The Military was not sure whether it should refer the Report of the Bureau to top civil servants to prepare the White Paper or make it an entirely military idea .

This idea was rejected on the ground that the military saw the Report as a strictly an Armed Forces Ruling council document, not a government paper. Hence, a special nine-man panel under the chairmanship of Major General Paul Omu, the Commandant of the Elite and High-brow Command and Staff College, JAji and member of the AFRC was set up on 30 March, 1987 to study the report and prepare a draft white paper for consideration by the AFRC.

After setting up of the Omu panel, people began to express their views that the panel was not the body to look at the Bureau's report. That the task should belong to the Constituent Assembly. The critics even contended that to set up a nine-man body before the establishment of a Constituent Assembly indicated that the Federal Government or the Armed Forces Ruling Council was trying to "vet, sanitise or deny the opinions of the people".

But the trio's response to that criticism was that what those people failed to understand was that the Bureau had already conducted a nationwide survey and had sifted the data it gathered from that survey and used it as empirical evidence for its report. And that it was not the duty of the Bureau to

prepare a constitution for Nigeria, though its work could be, and was to serve later on as an invaluable reference source for the task of two other transition agencies, namely the Constitution Drafting Committee and the Constituent Assembly. They argued that what the critics should have noted was that the nine-man committee was asked to study the Bureau's report and prepare a draft white paper which would serve as an enunciated broad outlines of the regimes transition programme.

The panel, after finishing its assignment had reached a broad consensus on its substantive recommendations to the Armed Forces Ruling Council, and it was accepted by the AFRC, said the trio. But there was a point of incongruence on "how many news states should be created and which ones should be so created".

Olagunju, et al explained that the points of congruence between the white paper and the Bureau's report were, that the former accepted the latter's analysis of what went wrong with Nigeria as well as it characterisation of the nature of the country's inherited political economy. But the White Paper endorsed, with reservations and commented critically on the Bureau's prescriptions for fundamental restructuring of state, society, economy" as well as the country's political culture.

The White Paper shared same view on democratic consolidation in the third republic in terms of participation, accountability, a new political morality and political responsibility. Moreover, their view of democracy was

"anchored on a radical populist foundation".

While rejecting 'socialism' proposed by the political Bureau, the White Paper also accepted all the "Major philosophical, structural/institutional and cultural props of the Third Republic as recommended by the Bureau". And the White Paper also accepted the recommendation of the Bureau that the Directorate for Social mobilisation should be made permanent.

Furthermore, on the issue of a new public morality and the ban of certain categories of previous and present office-holders from partisan politics during the transition that:

The White Paper indicated that the administration would take appropriate action on the guidelines to be adopted. But it merely noted, in view of this, the Bureau's recommendation that all persons who were holding or have held political offices between August 1985 and the end of the transition should not contest any elective office or be appointed into any political or party office in the Successive civilian administration at the

end of the transition.

Has the administration taken the said appropriate action on the guidelines? If yes, why then the failure of the transition programme? Or were the said guidelines merely bookish? These questions, among others, are what this thesis seeks to find answers to them.

Yet again, "the White Paper accepted the minority position within the Bureau that the terminal date of the transition programme should be 1992" instead of the majority proposal of 1990.

The points of departure between the White Paper and the Report of the political Bureau are that the White Paper disagreed with the Bureau's Report on its analysis and interpretations of the administration's macroeconomic policies of SFEM and the privatisation and commercialisation of Public enterprises.It also rejected the Bureau's "recommendation that the policy of privatisation should be terminated and that oil Industry nationalised."

The Bureau's recommendation for a unicameral legislature at the federal level was rejected by the White Paper and also rejected the Bureau's recommendation of the legislative representation on the basis of territory. It also rejected the recommendation that a Special Provision should be made for

labour and women representation in each arm of the legislature, that the "principle of representation in the federal Upper Chamber should be on equality of States" and that at lower Chamber the principle should be on the basis of population.

The Bureau's recommendation for a non-renewable, one-term, five-year tenure for the President and Governors, was also rejected by the White Paper. It rather opted for a "maximum of two terms of four years for the chief executive at the three tiers of government". It also reduced from five to four, the recommendation of the Bureau of the life of the federal and State legislatures.

Moreover, as the Bureau proposed the new electoral body be named as National Commission on Political Parties and Elections, the White Paper endorsed for National Electoral Commission. It also rejected the Bureau's recommendation that two of its members should be military officers. It also rejected the recommendation that at least two members of the Armed Forces not below the rank of a Colonel or equivalent should be Statutory members of the National Population Commission.

In conclusion, the White Paper changed the proposed name for the Agency for Mass Mobilisation, from the National Directorate of Social Mobilisation and Political Education to the National Directorate for Social Mobilisation.

2:4 THE REPORT OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU AND THE GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER: AN ANALYSIS.

We have seen the composition of the Political Bureau, why it was established, what it did and how the Federal Military Government responded to its report.

Was the membership of the Bureau a representative of all shades of opinion? In other words, how democratic was the Bureau's establishment? What were the people's views on the Bureau? How different were the Bureau's recommendations and the Government White Paper? How wide was the framework of the political debate? How socialistic were its recommendations for the socialist socioeconomic system? How realistic was its recommendation for the nationalisation of all oil industry and the discontinuation of the privatisation policy?

On the membership of the Bureau, I will like to argue that it was in the first place elitist in nature, comprising, as it was, eleven people from the academic citadels and the rest of the six, two from the labour union, the same number from the press, One from the film industry and a lady whose professional identity was not disclosed.

In short, the membership did not represent all shades of opinion from nooks and crannies of the Nigerian Society. Youths too were not represented.

Thus, the establishment of the Bureau was not democratic. Added to the above argument, it was not democratic because of the fact that the members were not elected by the Public, rather, they were selected by the Federal Military Government, which by virtue of its professional training, was dictatorial in nature.

However, in the process of undertaking its assignment, many people expressed their dismay over the establishment of the Bureau and indeed on what was going on within its members. For example, the National Concord (1986:9) reported Dr. Adeniran to have contended that the Bureau had "gained tremendous confidence of the people".

A day after that declaration, Dr. Onaguruwa (1986:13) reacted by calling on the Federal Military Government to dissolve the Bureau because it was destroyed by vested interest groups. That it was better to "openly recognise all these interest groups by calling a Constitutional Conference" that would comprise all interest and opinion groups in this country.

Onaguruwa added that it was a waste of public resources on the Bureau considering the way things were going on. And that a conference on Nigerian leaders as well as various interest groups that would deliberate on the future political affairs of the country should be summoned. According to Onaguruwa (1986:13) :

> Dr Bala Takaya's war of words with the Chairman and Dr Madunagu's attack on the Bureau is an indication that the Bureau is a burst pipe.

On the framework of the political debate, Falana (1886:23) contends that the debate cut across the whole country where "Nigerians from all works of life contributed to the debate". The Bureau (1987:16) contends that:

> contributions to the debate in the memoranda from individuals and groups, newspaper articles, electronic media discussions, recorded summaries of debates and contributions made at public hearings organised by the Bureau in all

of the federal and state legislature from the five years recommended by the Bureau to four years.

While the Bureau proposed the new electoral body to be named - National Commission on Political Parties and Elections, the White Paper proposed the name to be - National Electoral Commission.

Moreover, while the Bureau proposed the name for the agency for mobilisation to be 'National Directorate of Social Mobilisation and political Education', the White Paper proposed it to be 'National Directorate for Social Mobilisation'. The differences were only in the change of name but the objectives for which they were established remained the same.

The Bureau recommended in its Report that Nigeria should adopt a socialist socioeconomic system, but how socialistic is this recommendation?

This recommendation is not socialistic in nature. This is because the recommendation is not wholistic for it confined the recommendation to only Socio-economic issues and discarded the political and cultural spheres. Truly speaking, politics and economy are interwoven. That is to say, they must go hand-

privatisation policy, but the government rejected it.

How realistic were these recommendations? Dr. Madunagu (1987:26) also debunks these recommendations this way. That the nationalisation of the oil industry would not be in the interest of the masses. And that if the government had accepted the recommendation, it would have deviated from the capitalist system, because the private sector is helped by the state sector because of its capitalistic posture. And that nationalisation could only be useful to the masses when the workers take over the political mantle of this country and change the present socio-political and economic formations. He goes on to say that those who were asked to nationalise the oil companies are the owners of the companies or have shares in all the oil industries. He concludes by saying that "the acceptance of that recommendation by the government would have surprised many of us".

The above arguments by Dr. Madunagu clearly show his stand of Madunagu (1987:6) that that common people "were not allowed to be part of the Report" because of this intransigent ideological affinity and persuasion.

In response to the recommendations of the Bureau concerning the socialist socioeconomic system, the Federal military Government pushed away the recommendation on the ground that Madunagu (1987:26) puts it thus:

Government rejects the imposition of a Political ideology on the nation. Government believes that an ideology will eventually evolve with time and political maturity.

The organ laid the ground for a theoretical foundation of the Third Republic which was formulated from the practical experience of the political and non-political groupings who wrote or spoke to the members of the Bureau during their nationwide tours.

About 50% of the Bureau's submissions from its findings were assimilated by the ruling regime. 40% of it was assimilated indirectly, while the remaining 10% was either amended or discarded. Those items that were discarded like the recommendation of the Bureau for socialist system of governance seem to be in the interest of the elite in the long run, ostensibly, because the government itself was elitist and

therefore had a thorough understanding of its group interests and how to safeguard them.

This inherent elitist nature of those who govern facilitated the seeing of the Bureau's report as nothing short of a blueprint for the military dictatorship to implement. This means that the military was legitimising itself even when it was supposed to have been preparing its way out of the political scene.

The Bureau's recommendation for experimentation gave the military elite ample room not only to manoeuvre through the BUREAU'S yet another recommendation to ban certain personalities from partisan politics, but also to legitimise the military's involvement in politics and governance. The military translated these recommendations to the latter knowing fully well the political implications of doing so. It is this fact elaborates the reality of the military elite as more sophisticated in terms of power manipulation and control than their civilian counterparts. It is also from this that the new breed syndrome emanated thereby complicating the political scenario of the country. This also weakens the structure of the politicians. In the long run one finds the military creating a whole new class of politicians whose loyalty or sympathy was to the military.

Given the breakdown of the membership of the Bureau of 17 people, 11 were intellectuals from the academic citadels, 2 were from the mass media, 2 from the film industry, 2 from the

labour and a lady whose professional identity was not disclosed, it becomes clear that discussions in the BUREAU'S tour were greatly influenced by the intellectuals. This brings out clearly the fact that the common people had no direct influence over either policy formulation or even passing recommendations to the government, for consideration. This is even more strengthened by the fact that most of them are politically parochial and apathetic. This ensures the continuity of the system because the movement of the non-elite to elite position usually takes a slow pace.

From the foregoing observations, it is evident that the weak points of the recommendations of the BUREAU are responsible for setting a stage for the crisis and ultimate failure of the transition programme. As a result of this, the Nigerian body politic inherited fresh problems with far reaching socio-political consequences. For example, the crisis which emanated in the wake of the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential polls. Matters like rotational presidency have now added lustre to the Nigerian political discourse.

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CHAPTER THREE

3:0 SECOND PHASE OF THE TRANSITION PROGRAMME

This Chapter seeks to unravel reasons for banning different categories of politicians from partisan politics, how they reacted and the implications of such reaction on their political career and on the fate of the transition programme.

It also seeks to find out reasons for the establishment of the Directorate for Mass Mobilisation and Social Justice (MAMSER). Moreover, it seeks to examine the establishment of the Constituent Assembly (CA); what its members did and the response of the Federal Military Government to the assignments given to them.

3:1 BANNING OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE FROM PARTISAN POLITICS

In 1986, the Babangida Military Government banned different categories of politicians from 'participating' in politics for ten years until after the transition programme. This act generated tension from the nooks and crannies of the Nigerian Society.

But the ban was nebulous or hazy because it was not specific. Put differently, the Government did not categorically specify the type of people whom the banning affected. This, too,

generated comments from the general public. What people had to do at that moment, as Adedipe (1986:3) puts it was:

> To wait for the Gazette we are old to spell out who and who are affected before we know what government means when it says the ban affects all politicians.

Moreover, the Report of the political Bureau (1987:219) puts it that in the course of the national political debate, the Government announced a ban on unspecific number of former political office holders. According to it, this decision taken by the Government drew more attention of the general public on the role of those political actors in the new political order which the Bureau was proposing for the country. But the Bureau contends that the preponderant views were in support of certain actions to be taken on them to ensure that sanity is restored in the new proposed political dispensation by putting embargo against those who pulverized the public treasury and flouted the Constitution with impunity.

Therefore, the Bureau contends, the Government's vague statement, according to the public, was that it was not clear how one can determine who among the past politicians to ban without inflicting partiality and injustice on those who had

honestly participated in politics in the past or whose social conduct may not have directly contributed to ills and collapse of the country.

The political Bureau (1987:220) states categorically that the act of banning must be comprehensive in terms of putting a date on "past politicians" and also in the kind of political or public offices to be affected. According to it , "the entire period covering all regimes and administrations between August 1975 and August 1985" would be the appropriate date. And since Government involves political responsibility, the following political office holders should be affected: President; Vice President; Governors; Deputy Governors; Ministers; Commissioners; Secretaries to Governments; Advisers, Special Assistants; Presidential Liaison officers; Gubernatorial Liaison Officers; Federal and State Legislators; Political Party officials at all levels; including party patrons and matrons; chairmen of Boards of Parastatals at the federal and state levels; chairmen and supervisory Councillors of local government caretaker committees; Heads of the defunct Nigerian Security Organisation (NSO) and the Nigerian Police Force; Judicial and other public officers removed from office for cause; and Armed forces officers who held political officers.

The Bureau also contends that those aforementioned who held the offices between August 1975 and August 1985 should be banned from holding any elective, appointive or party office

for a period of ten years with effect from the date of the lifting of the present ban on partisan politics. It also recommended that appropriate machinery for the assessment and verification of the assets of those affected should be activated by the government, and that any "uncountable assets found to be beyond the legitimate means and earning of any such officer should be forfeited to the government".

However, in his nationwide broadcast on September 23, 1987, president Babangida (1987:220) listed the following as those who were banned from partisan politics, thus:

A. Those who have been convicted or removed from office for various misdeeds;
B. Those who have held high offices but who may not have been found guilty of any offence or misconduct but whose disqualification will facilitate the emergence of a new political leadership and
C. All military and police personnel who held or are currently holding office in the administration.

3:2 THE BAN ON PARTISAN POLITICS: AN ANALYSIS

In this part, we shall analyse the data collected on the ban on partisan politics. In short, we shall try to find answers to the following questions: Did the politicians accept the banning? If yes, what were the political implications of such action? How justifiable was the generalisation of the banning? How auspicious was the timing of the banning?

Apart from what were given already as the reactions from the public, still many people reacted to the government's decision on the ban. These reactions were either in support of the decision or the opposite way. For instance, according to Peters, (1986:5):

> The ban on ex-politicians is very much in order judging by mismanagement of national affairs perpetrated by the operators of the presidential system of government during the Second Republic.

But Atunrasi (1986:5) gives a discordant opinion that the wealth of experience of the former politicians as well as their activeness in partisan politics are "necessary ingredients for the success of any political arrangement, come 1990". In the same vein, the National Concord (1986:5)

reports Chief Obafemi Awolowo as saying that the ten-year ban of the former politicians from partisan politics by the Babangida military government is a "deprivation of the fundamental human rights of the citizen. In his words:

> I do not support. Every citizen has fundamental and inalienable right to vote and be voted for in elections. To deprive anyone in a democracy, of that fundamental and inalienable right is to rob him of one of the greatest legal property which the constitution and nature confer on him.

Those were some reactions made by Political actors and non-political actors. The next question is whether they accepted or not. Precisely, the civilians, particularly the political actors, did not resist the banning. They accepted to the banning up to December 18, 1991 when "the ban was lifted" according to Umoden (1992:296). Then, what were the political implications of such government decision. The implications were that the politicians displayed their loyalty or pliability to the military. They became submissive. This was the beginning of the whole mess- up from the side of the political actors. They provided the military the right to do what they wanted with the political transition.

The act also paved the way for the military to think of the idea of "new breed" politicians, the idea which could be said to be a better option on the side of the military, in that, the few resilient, purposeful, honest and committed were classified as part of those affected by the decree. The politics behind this was that, those patriotic citizens were put out of the political scene, so that the Government could go unchallenged.

The banning, therefore, disenfranchised politicians of high calibre who are tested, experienced and well groomed, who could stand on their own without being military stooges. And it conversely brought about the emergence of new breed politicians who looks up to the military as their political mentor who lacked the necessary political attributes to champion any political cause. Therefore, the banning of the old breed politicians was a deliberate design by the military to stifle democracy from its foundation and hence the abortion of the Third Republic.

The banning of certain categories of people from partisan politics was rooted in the Bureau's recommendation. The Bureau felt in its submission that in order to restore confidence and political morality, the system must be "sanitised". And this sanitisation the Bureau recommended should be carried out by disqualifying certain political actors from partisan politics. The general idea was to "free" the already choked up political

scene of Nigeria by allowing new personalities and may be new ideas into the body politic of the country.

Noble as this may sound, its has nonetheless its grave defects. For too long the quest for democracy in Nigeria has been stereotyped to the point of the evolution of myth about it . We have seen that the Bureau's recommendation was a product of the elite and the Military that created the Bureau that was charged with responsibility of implementing the recommendations was only a part of the Nigerian elite. This observation would gradually lead to seeing the Military as solution to Nigerians political problems which is nothing short of a myth. This is because the military are behind the problems besieging Nigeria, going by the example of the Second Republic where the military deliberately handed over power to a particular interest group in the name of the NPN.This clearly shows that the Military should share the responsibility of the wreckage of the country by the NPN ruling regime.

The Nigerian elite as a whole are incoherent in their understanding of the Nigerian problems. Disunity and mutual suspicion as a result of tribalism and ethnicity have blinded them from any positive vision for the country.

The politicians have been tacit supporters of the military and their policies. A politically virile political class should have, one would thing, flooded Nigerian and\ or international media with their resistance. But because of the

their allegiance to military who are in the most cases their benefactors militated against any such action from them (politicians). This can be seen from the fact that most of these politicians rely on the military for their economic well being. This, the military does through the award of contracts, loans and political office appointments. A clear case in point is their embracement or incorporation by the Abacha regime when it came to power. This can certainly be said to have contributed tremendously in the none-revisitation or reinstatement of the June 12, 1993 Presidential polls.

Those factors were responsible for the civil-political class's weakness in the face of the military usurpation of political power. This has the attendant consequences of compounding Nigeria's political problems, for example, what is the way forward after the June 12 crises? What is the relationship between tribalism and ethnicity on the one hand, and politics and politicking for national survival and well being of the common man on the other hand ? There is also the question of banning of some personalities from partisan politics one may ask about the dangers that may come up in future.

3:3 THE DIRECTORATE OF MASS MOBILISATION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, SELF-RELIANCE AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (MAMSER)

According to Olagunju, et al (1993:171) the first major legal instrument which gave birth to the 1985-1993 transition programme to civil rule was the Transition to Civil Rule (political programme) Decree of 1987, otherwise known as Decree 19 of 1987. This Decree empowered the Federal Military Government to take measures necessary so as to ensure the implementation of the political programme set out in schedules 1 to 6 of the decree.

The Political Bureau recommended the name for the agency of mass mobilisation to be the National Directorate of Social Mobilisation and political Education. But the Federal Military Government white paper on the Report of the Political Bureau changed it to the National Directorate for Mass Mobilisation, Social Justice and Economic Reconstruction. Whatever the case, it was the Bureau that initiated it. The Directorate was launched by President Babangida on July 7, 1987.

On July 25, 1987, the president launched the Mass Mobilisation Campaign, and this inaugurated the Social Mobilisation Programme.

At the occasion, President Babangida (1987:4) contended that the mass mobilisation campaign should not be seen, within the context of transfer of power from the military to civilians only, rather, people should see it beyond this to that of aiming at eradicating all pathological features that embedded the Nigerian society, which the present situation was a function of them.

It also aimed at raising the societal consciousness, both individual and collective, so as to attain lofty goal; to seek and attain a position of what is regarded as noblest in human nature; to respect one another's dignity; to know exactly what duty is and as well accept responsibility; to pursue endeavors with honesty; and to take pride in personal advance through dedication land hard work; to be one another's keepers; to believe in rules, respect and play by them; and to have a sober reflection on the past when everyone regarded the community and the nation's interests more than personal interests.

Babangida went on to say that "we must aim to galvanise the natural goodness, the creativity and reasonableness in the Nigerian to help himself and the nation to attain the greatness the past so often promised, but always failed to fulfil". Therefore, what was about to be launched was a mobilisation programme which should lead to the re-awakening and of course re-orientation of the people to face the

KASHIM IB... L...

challenge of taking Nigeria to the greatness it deserves, with renewed faith and re-invigorated vision.

The formal launching of the social mobilisation also marked the establishment of the National Directorate for Social Mobilisation. The aim, according to Babangida (1987:7) was to inculcate the values, the habits and the orientation in Nigerians which will lead, without coercion to the emergence, out of disarray, of a great self reliant civil society in which justice, duty, responsibility, tolerance and commitment to nation shall hold sway.

In the wider society, the focus, according to Babangida, was on the family, so as to rescue it from battered state; the students in order to rescue them from the culture of violence and give them a more meaningful and positive direction,; the youth organisations as instruments of national regeneration; women's organisations as the breeding and disseminating ground for the ideas and processes that will build the future, and also as agents in the nation's search for a more meaningful role of the women land for the family; farmers and farmers' cooperatives for being vehicles in the march towards national self-sufficiency in food and as instruments in the creation of better welfare for our rural dwellers; workers and labour unions as a vanguard in the battle to create a just egalitarian society and in the evolution of more relevant positive unionism suitable to our national purpose; co-operative unions for being vehicles of national growth and

development and as agents in the march towards a more satisfactory distribution of income and for national awareness; the gifted and handicapped as recipients of specialised attention to utilise their creativity in the search for innovations that would lead to greatness, and to assist then to lead useful lives and to contribute to our nations's growth.

Village wards as well as clan councils as instruments of education for responsible citizenship; policy makers and executors to give them and also to receive from them ideas and schemes necessary for the success of national endeavors, and to get them to appreciate the meaning of duty and service; professional and voluntary associations to learn from them and to impart to them the means better to apply their professional skills as well as their resources in the service of the nation's great goals, to utilise them as instruments in the restoration of respect for the respective ethics of their profession, and to make of their unequivocal strength in the social and moral regeneration of the society; and the Armed Forces and other security Agents in order to restore their leadership and ranks commitment to their profession position as loyal instruments in the service of the state.

In conclusion, Babangida (1987:8) stated that his regime would spare nothing with a view to seeing that the mission of the Directorate was fulfilled, the mission of education, enlightening and motivating all citizens towards the goals and

objectives of the Nigerian society, it creates a responsible and responsive leadership via the dissemination of appropriate political rules; to create a responsible and conscious public by disseminating appropriate political rules; to encourage a functional dialogue between the government and the people by establishing and inculcating political norms; and to "develop and sustain adequate political conventions which will guarantee a positive and stable political culture". The Directorate for Social Mobilisation (1989:iii) explains that its membership comprises of the following panel members to assist it in initiation of relevant programmes and advise on their realisation, namely: Professor Jerry Gana, Chairman DSM; Dr. Tunde Adeniran, Secretary/Director DSM; All executive Directors DSM: All members of the Governing Board (representing the Ministries, etc); Head political Education Department, DSM; Professor Claude Ake; Professor Adeoye Akinsanya; Professor Moyibi Amoda; Dr. E.C. Amucheazi; Dr. J.A. Ayoade; Dr. Tony Edoh; Dr. Emeka Enejere; Professor Aaron Gana; Aisha Imam; Mrs. Joy Ogwu; Professor Bade Onimode; Professor Omafume Onoge; Dr. Bala Takaya; Mrs. M.A. Vogt; and Dr. J.S. Zwingina.

However, when Professor Jerry Gana resigned to contest for the Presidency, Dr. (later on Professor) Tunde Adeniran took over the Chairmanship of the Directorate.

In the same month when the Directorate was established, the Federal Military Government rejected majority

recommendation of the members of the Political Bureau of the terminal date of 1990 and accepted the minority recommendation of 1992. Reasons given for such a decision, according to Umoden (1992:280) were thus:

> It would allow for the appropriate lessons to be learnt. It would also create more for the requisite adjustments to be put in place. In addition, the 1992 date would enable the necessary structural, institutional and cultural reforms to take root before the disengagement of the Babangida administration.

3:4 THE DIRECTORATE OF MASS MOBILISATION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, SELF-RELIANCE AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (MAMSER): AN ANALYSIS

This part sets to analyse the rationale behind the setting of the Directorate of Mass Mobilisation for Social justice; self-Reliance and Economic Reconstruction (MAMSER). It seeks to find out the following sets of questions: How realistic were the objectives of the Directorate? How attainable were they? What role did MAMSER play in the transition programme? In whose interest?

To begin with, it is to say that MAMSER was an agency established by the Military Government during the Babangida regime to serve as an avenue for propaganda. For propaganda, as defined by the World Encyclopedia (15:725), is:

> One sided communication designed to influence people's thinking and actions.... Propaganda differs from Education. Educators teach people how to think, but propagandists tell them what to think. Propaganda appeals to its audience in three ways (1) it calls for an action or opinion that it makes seem wise and reasonable (2) it suggests that the action or opinion is moral or right (3) it provides a pleasant feeling such as a sense of importance or of belonging.

Moreover, according to Ray (1980:71) Brown defines propaganda as the deliberately planned and systematic use of symbols with a view to altering and controlling opinions, ideas and values. Therefore, "an effective propaganda is that which has good organisation or agency, ... and has media manipulation", he argues.

To go by the above definitions, the Mass Mobilisation agency was used by the Babangida regime to control people's opinions, ideas and values, especially pertaining to its policies on the transition programme.

That argument could be seen from the point of view of how the regime systematically organised lectures, seminars and so on, here and there, in the country in order to gain the support of the populace. Media, especially electronic, were effectively used by the Government to get its policies on the transition programme accepted. The Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, Kaduna, is a clear case in point.

The apparent objectives for which the agency was established were lofty ones. Put together, they were political, economic and socio-cultural in outlook.

In its assessment of the Directorate, the Citizen magazine (1993:47) puts it that, politically, the Directorate had put great emphasis on political education in a bid to educate the Nigerian masses and elite. And that issues of patriotism, national conscious, political apathy, new political culture, operation know your "1989 Constitution", verification of claims by dissolved political associations, party constitutions, manifesto, party membership registration, voters' education, census publicity, voters education on option A4 as well as the modified open secret ballot system, were all addressed by the Directorate. Thus, it continues:

> Through its imaginative programmes of political enlightenment, the DSM has succeeded in convincing Nigerians to shun the politics of ethnicity, thuggery and religious sentiment in favour of politics of ideas, policies and good programmes of national development.

On Self-Reliance, the magazine contends that for Nigeria to be a self-reliant nation, the Directorate, among others, put in some efforts to mobilise Nigerians to utilise their human and natural resources. Hence, "Operation Food First" was launched all over the country in July 1988. This was aimed at "mobilising small scale farmers to form and operate cooperative combines or production teams" in order to facilitate massive increase in food production. "This increased the number of cooperatives in the country from 29, 919 in 1988 to 68, 408 cooperatives in 1991.

On social justice, the magazine contends that the Directorate laid emphasis on the following approaches: conflict resolution through dialogue and consensus; Enlightenment Programme and cooperation with other Relevant Organisations as the Legal Aid Council, the Code of Conduct Bureau and the public Enlightenment Commission.

The magazine also contends that field experiences testified that MAMSER's Social Justice programme was very popular, especially with the rural dwellers. That the common cases of justice reported for intervention by MAMSER include: "land matters, family matters and criminal cases of all sorts".

On MAMSER in post military era, it puts it that the Directorate should put gear towards tackling social, political and economic problems. Thus:

> The DSM believes that among the major focus of mobilisation in post 1993 will be in the areas of democracy. After the handing over to a democratically elected government, a lot of steam and attention should be directed at nurturing and enhancing the survival of democracy.

Moreover, if the regime wanted to realise positive harvests from the pains of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), economic growth and social transformation should continue to exist and there must be continued mobilisation in the direction of economic self-reliance. Moreover, the "economic realities in the country and the development in the international arena, especially the move

towards a common market by the European Countries pose a challenge". And finally, any action that would be taken to check ethical decay must be "all embracing, totally dedicated, prolonged and must be a continues process".

That was the assessment on the Directorate by the Citizen Magazine. However, this assessment is one sided. One should look at the objectives of the MAMSER critically __ the other side.

Despite DSM, the lives of the majority of ordinary Nigerians face lingering problems. Farmers cannot get helping hand for their farms. Students cannot get three square meals the, lack of patriotism in one way or the other is on the increase. The majority of the populace are still ignorant, workers went on strike everyday to improve their deteriorating working conditions. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) embraced by the regime is still SAPping. House breaking and armed robbery still exist.

No regime had experienced communal and religious unrest like the 1985 -1993 military regime. Did MAMSER curtail or minimise bribery and corruption in the Nigerian society during the time in question? All these happened when the Directorate for Mass Mobilisation was in existence.

Politically, what MAMSER ceaselessly preached for in this respect did not become a reality. It preached "religiously" that the military would hand over power to the democratically elected civilian administration. The 1985-1993 Transition

programme did not lead to the establishment of a democratically elected civilian administration in Nigeria.

The military in conjunction with the Directorate kept on telling Nigerians that after Babangida there will "never be military regime in Nigeria". However,this was not to be

MAMSER could be said to have been established to wage a war with the disappointed politicians, civil rights activists and other pressure groups by showing that the military evolved political programme was the most successful way to a viable genuine and lasting Third Republic. Ohwahwa (1992:12) argues that "the creation of MAMSER (was) to perform a role that was at variance with what was originally conceived for it".

The terms of reference of MAMSER as hitherto quoted, show the comprehensiveness of the elite vision of the 'Nigerian problems'. The copious responsibilities viewed from the intellectual premise is too rigorous for any body to achieve. In fact, some of the responsibilities enumerated under MAMSER can only be achieved through the institution of religion.

That MAMSER was a propaganda tool is doubtless. This is because it was through the organisation that the regime drummed up support for its policies from the citizenry. The organisation worked tirelessly not only to justify policies like SAP but also vigorously campaigned for its support from the Nigerian populace inspite of the harsh economic realities brought about by the policy. In the social sphere, programmes like 'Better Life For Rural Women' proved to be an avenue for

the Nigerian female elite to amass public wealth and advertise their position. This is probably why in spite of the millions of naira sunk in the programme, the rural women are still wallowing in acute poverty, illiteracy and diseases. For the first time in the Nigerian political history, the elite woman was given a chance to rub shoulders with her male counter-parts politically.

MAMSER also served as a buffer zone between the military and the politicians, civil right activists and other pressure groups. This was achieved through the refluent propaganda that condensed the past political actors as the cause of the current problems of Nigeria, while in the same breath it extols the military transition agenda and hammer on the need to trust the military and its transition policies. It also painted the military as same sort of a saviour that would be taking Nigeria to greatness. This flowing propaganda convinced some people actors that the Military could deliver the good for Nigerians. In this bid, media programme were organised with the sole aim of convincing the public on the need to follow patiently the military orchestrated transition programme. Thus, the military connived with these segments of the elite to muddle the political atmosphere of the country. The overall function of the MAMSER can be seen and analysed from the perspective of a raising false hope in the minds of Nigerians.

KASIM IBRAHIM

A cursory look at the three tiers of government and their departments would show clearly that MAMSER was a duplication of their departments of information. These departments could have been strengthened with money and equipment to do the work that was entrusted to MAMSER and without the pitfalls of MAMSER. From the onset, MAMSER seemed it was destined to fail. For one, the work entrusted to it was too big for it to handle. In fact, the enormity of the work can only be handled by an institution of sound recognition in society.

Thus, the principal actors from the military-elite that created the BUREAU to the Bureau's recommendations and its subsequent implementation, one notices the preponderance of the elite and their opinions. This sis probably why the Nigerian common man cannot up to this time pinpoint with any degree of certainty the influence or benefit they derived from all these policies . In fact, the common man has only inherited bad blood, poverty and ignorance from the political misexperimentations of the Nigerian elite as a whole. The Nigerian intellectuals have shown themselves as allies of the ruling regime they compete for political office without showing anything tangible for the positions they hold. This has confirmed them as armchair rhetoricians who are incapable of addressing the problems of their motherland.

3:5 THE CONSTITUTION REVIEW COMMITTEE (CRC) AND THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (CA).

After the establishment of the Directorate for Social Mobilisation in July 1987, the next item on the agenda was the establishment of a Committee to review the 1979 constitution. The Constitution (1989:1) puts it that:

> the Federal Military Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in compliance with the Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme) Decree 1987, set up the Constitution Review Committee to review the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 in line with the accepted recommendations of the political Bureau inaugurated by the Federal Military Government on 13th January 1986.

The Committee, comprised forty-six members which were drawn mainly from the legal profession as well as academic community. Justice Buba Ardo was its chairman. It was inaugurated on September 7,1987 by President Babangida. The working documents of this committee were primarily the Report of the political Bureau, the Government white paper on the Report and the 1979 constitution.

However, president Babangida specifically directed the attention of this Committee to numerous issues and problem areas for their consideration. The issues were the ones which either arose out of the political Bureau Report or which had been problematic in the history of Nigeria. Babangida (1993:181) assured the committee that:

> It is not the intention of this government to put your deliberations in a strait-jacket and force particular viewpoints down your throat.

Some of the issues to be considered by the committee include the following: the type of constitution which the country should have - should it be short but comprehensive statement of the major principles, ideals and aspirations of the society, as well as separation of powers between the levels of government and arms of the state? Or should it provide full explanations on each item concerning the affairs of the nation?

Other issues include how the proposed "two-party system should be protected and secured against centrifugal forces of ethno-communal and religious pressures" with reference to relevant 1979 constitutional provisions on party formation land application of the federal character principle to the composition of party executives as points of departure. And

how a balance can be achieved between rulership and responsibility on one hand, and power and accountability on the other, was another issue. Others were the type of role which traditional rulers should play in the new political dispensation; and how the theory of the separation of powers should be defined in order to ensure a mere balanced constitution.

After the completion, of its assignment ,the Federal Military Government inaugurated a 567 - member Constituent Assembly, on May 11, 1988. 458 out of them were elected nationwide and 117 were nominated by the Federal Military Government. And that this Assembly was established by the Constituent Assembly Decree of 1988 known as Decree No. 14 of 1988. This Decree was then amended by Decree No. 24 of 1988.

The quorum, for deliberations of the constituent Assembly was said to be the chairman or his deputy and not less than 300 members". The Decree also "empowered the Federal military to appoint the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to the Constituent Assembly".

The qualifications for membership to the Constituent Assembly were stipulated in section 3 (1) of the 1988 Constituent Assembly Decree, that a member must be Nigerian citizen residing for at least twelve months in or was indigenous to the state in which the constituency for which he or she was standing for election was located; must have at least secondary school certificate or its equivalent, with at

least fifteen years of working experience or a post-secondary school education with at least five years of working experience. According to Olagunju, et al (1993:183) :

> Other requirements were as follows: Candidates seeking election as members of the Constituent Assembly must not be persons banned from participating in politics under the Participation in Politics and Elections (prohibition) Decree 1987. They must be nominated by ten registered voters in every ward of the local government areas which make up the constituencies in which they are seeking for election, provided that the voters nominating each one of them are not banned or disqualified from elective office.

3:6 RESPONSE OF THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION.

The Constituent Assembly submitted the Draft Constitution to the Federal Military Government on April 5, 1989. However, the Government amended certain areas of the constitution.

President Babangida (1993:191) gave clue on government's intention on the matter that :

> In some cases, this involved our having to identify and remove, from the constitution, issues that are best left to conventions, interplay of political forces and normal governmental processes.

The Armed Forces Ruling Council amended the provisions of the clause 16 (1), the section which sought to make Nigeria a welfare state justifiable. Moreover, the Council also deleted clauses 42 and 43 of the Draft Constitution, partly because, the position of the country's resource then and in the future cannot match the justifiable rights of Nigerians produced for in those clauses; and partly because, putting the clauses in black and white in the constitution would give rise to what one of the members of the Constituent Assembly aptly called "Litigation Industry", Olagunju, et al (1993:120)

On the issue of the Sharia and Customary Courts, the Council decided that the Sharia Courts shall have jurisdiction only on matters pertaining to a Muslim's Personal life, "that these courts shall adjudicate on cases and litigations involving muslims only " and that it would be left to each state to decide at its own discretion, whether it would create

such courts. The major point of departure from the 1979 Constitution is that "non-muslims would no longer be tried by the Sharia Court".

The Armed Forces Ruling Council deleted clause 1 (4) provision which provided that it is criminal offence to effect a change of government by unconstitutional means. The Council argued, however, that there are "sufficient Constitutional and other provisions to deal with this form of breaches of the constitutional".

Moreover, it deleted clause 149(2) which provided for appointment of ministers by Mr. President after consultation with the members of the Senate. This, was substituted with clause 135 (2) of the 1979 Constitution which provided for senate confirmation of such appointment. The AFRC contended that the substitution was effected so as "to bring the constitution in line with standard practice and requirement of the principle of checks sand balances in a presidential system".

The Federal Military Government attached much importance to see young Nigerians participating actively in Nigerian politics. To this effect, the minimum ages for elective public offices prescribed in the Constitution are:
3.0 President (35 years); Governor (30 years); Senate (30 years); members of the House of Representatives (25 years);

Chairman of Local Government Council (25 years); members of the State House of Assembly (25 years); and Councillor (21 years).

Other changes effected in the Draft Constitution relating to the tenure of the President and state Governors were that the President and State Governor as recommended by the Report of the Political Bureau, should serve for one term without the right of self succession. The draft constitution pegged this one-term to six years. However, the new constitution rejected the idea of non-succession, and replaced the relevant clauses of the draft Constitution with the relevant clauses of the 1979 Constitution, the clauses which "Provide for a maximum of two terms four years each for the president and State Governor".

Moreso, the AFRC amended the following in order to reduce expenses which governance would incur. That the number of Senators was reduced to three per State instead of five. The membership of the legislative houses should be on part-time basis, with the days of the session per year as 181 days. The number of special advisers to the President was reduced to three instead of seven. And that the equivalent office of the special adviser to the Governor was cancelled and put in its place a special assistant.

Both the recommendation of the Bureau and the Government agreed that no new local governments should be created, but the" 1989 Constitution contains provisions, though quite

complex and complicated, for creation of new local governments". The creation of new states and local government councils in 1989 and 1991, was another notable change in the Constitution.

In the process of its sittings, people had criticised the members of the Constituent Assembly on the way and manner they tackled issues. For example, the Analyst (1988:3:4-5) contends that when the members of the Constituent Assembly were directed by president Babangida to keep off from discussing crucial matters of the Draft Constitution, as the " two-party system, the federal structure, the presidential system, etc, they meekly surrendered to this dictat". Furthermore, when the election of the Deputy Chairman of the Assembly came up, these members were then divided along ethnic, regional and religious lineage and they would have been at each other's throat, were the elections continued. The Analyst continues thus:

> By the end of November, their activities had become completely paralysed by all sorts of political theatrics over Sharia. When the Chief of General Staff, Vice-Admiral Aikhomu, flew to Abuja, warned them, and made the judicature another "no-go" area, all the noise and fury ended without even a whimper.

From the foregoing, we hereby argue that another ploy of the military was the creation of the Constitution Review Committee and Constituent Assembly. These two bodies like other bodies created by the military served firstly to legitimise the military's involvement in politics. Here, the involvement of a professional class, in this regard judges, widened the acceptability of the Military by the judiciary arm of the Nigerian elite.

The Constituent Assembly was composed of elected and nominated members as indicated. This too widened the popularity of the policies of the Government. In fact, the political actors in these bodies proved beyond all reasonable doubt their elitist leaning in their deliberations which came up to nothing that would benefit the mass majority. In a way, they aided in the divisive tendencies of the Nigerian body politic through fanning the embers of tribalism, ethnicity and regionalism in their debates. National interests were mortgaged for quasi personal interests. The military being more articulate had to come in severally to put the house in order. It is this that goes further to prove that the military elite is more sophisticated than his civilian counterpart. This equally buttresses the myth of the military as the solution to Nigeria's Socio-economic and even political backwardness.

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CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 THIRD PHASE OF THE TRANSITION PROGRAMME

This chapter seeks to explain the Report and Recommendation of the National Electoral Commission on six Political Association for the Armed Forces RUling Council to consider. It also seeks to explain the formation of the two political parties, namely: The National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP). And in the same vein, it will find out implications, if any, of such an act on the political carrier of the politicians and the destiny of the transition programme.

Moreover, the chapter seeks to find out implications, if any, of the arrest, detention and release of eleven banned politicians by the Federal Military Government. It also seeks to analyse the 1992/1993 presidential primaries, and the June 12, 1993 Presidential Polls.

4.1 THE NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON SIX POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE ARMED FORCES RULING COUNCIL

The tradition of every Military takeover is that it suspends partisan politics, hence, the dissolution of all political parties that existed. The politics of this suspension and dissolution is that the Military gets a break that could allow it to consolidate itself for the control of the political system.

After gathering some momentum, the Babangida Government lifted the ban on partisan politics. This, thus, blew the political whistle to mark the beginning of political game on May 3, 1989.

It endorsed the recommendations of the Report of the Political Bureau that Nigeria should adopt a two-party system. In this respect, the Government asked the political actors to produce two political parties.

To this effect, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) was given an assignment to assess political associations that emerged at that material time and come out with a recommendation for Government to register two out of them.

So many political associations emerged, all seeking for registration so that the ones that led the rest could contest for various political offices in the country.

According to Umoden (1992: 107) there were over thirty (30) political associations that emerged at the expiration of the July 19 deadline given by the NEC. But out of them, only thirteen (13) submitted their registration papers to the National Electoral Commission. He identifies them as:

1. The Peoples Front of Nigeria (PFN)
2. The Peoples Solidarity Party (PSP)
3. The Nigerian National Congress (NNC)
4. The Nigerian Union Party (NUP)
5. The Republican Party of Nigeria (RPN)

6. The Liberal Convention (LC)
7. The Nigerian Labour Party (NLP)
8. The Peoples Patriotic Party (PPP)
9. The Ideal Peoples Party (IPP)
10. The Patriotic Nigerian Party (PNP)
11. The Nigerian People Welfare Party (NPWP)
12. The United Nigerian Democratic Party (UNDP) and
13. The All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP)

According to Olagunju, et al (1993 : 212) the party formation process began indirectly with the informal political alignments and coalitions which were a function of the 1987 local government elections on non-party basis, and the elections of 1988 into the Constituent Assembly.

But the party formation began formally in May 1989 when the ban on partisan politics was lifted and the main guidelines on party formation, and Explanatory Notes were released by the National Electoral Commission (NEC). The Explanatory Notes provided a comprehensive elaboration regarding the conditions which the political associations must meet. Olagunju, et al (1993 : 212) continue thus:

> The theory which informed the two documents is best characterised as that of the mass - or grassroots - based party. The party system which they sought to create was highly decentralized and participatory

one, with emphasis on diffuse party hierarchies and the deconcentration of power among various levels and hierarchies of party organizations.

Another unique aspect of the Main Guidelines and the Explanatory Notes was the detailed enumeration of concrete and empirically objective criteria, such as membership size and its spread and organization/bureaucratic staff strength by which to compare and verify the claims put forward by the various associations.

The essence of those conditions which the political associations should fulfil would be to force the political associations to be national in their outlook in terms of membership spread criterion and also "compel them to reflect the democratic ethos of participation and accountability in their organizational structures and hierarchies". In addition to that, they were meant to "provide the conceptual map and institutional structures for the projected reconstruction of party politics along democratic lines".

However, the political associations which submitted their documents for registration bitterly complained that the conditions were so stringent that it would be impossible for them to meet them with regard to establishing themselves, recruiting their members, setting up of fledging party structures and bureaucracies throughout the country, and "Submit their claims for verification, given the logistic and financial outlays these would require".

In a nationwide broadcast, President Babangida (1991) contends that the pre-registration period was characterized by many flaws from the side of the political associations. That ethnic, geographical and religious lines of cleavage re-surfaced in the composition and outlook of the new political associations. And that little attention was paid to organisational structures at grassroots level. That is to say, the associations were only centered around certain leaders and personalities.

Babangida also contends that there was no evidence to prove that Nigerians, have learnt to play the politics of condonement "through voluntary participation and mutual tolerance", the attributes which accept "mergers and the formation of national parties". He continues thus:

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> Thuggery, which was the bane of our past political experiments, and which has been specifically outlawed by the 1979 constitution, surfaced this time as early during the pre-registration phase. Thugs, labelled bodyguards, were recruited for the leaders of this associations and were sometimes used for the summary resolution of intra-group differences.

The President goes on to elaborate by dissecting the National Electoral Commission's Report. That there were factional tendencies in the conflicting claims by the political associations. The resultant end of this, according to him was the betrayal of a view of politics among the Politicians as a "cut-throat" affair, the functions of which were political victimisation and unhealthy rivalry.

Moreso, there were rigging and falsification of claims in which all the political associations made deliberately by producing ghost names and the like just to secure the National Electoral Commission's clearance by hook or by crook.

It was also stated that the political associations violated the Guidelines for registration and did not take Government seriously on Decree No. 25 of 1987 and its amended Decree No. 9 of 1989 which banned certain people from partisan politics. This could be seen from the failure of those associations to produce a satisfactory documentation of their members, including declaration of assets and liabilities of each of the National Executive Committees of those associations and failure to obtain the National Electoral Commission's clearance for those members of the executive committees.

Furthermore, there were poor organisation of some political associations at the levels of the three tiers of Government. There were poor financial records and stage-managed display of political offices at eleventh hour to impress or deceive the researchers

albeit the probability of those offices at all grassroots level was less.

Moreover, the profile of the political associations lent credence to the fact that they operated 'underground' before the lifting of the ban on politics on May 3, 1989. And that the National Electoral Commission (NEC) observed that the top four political associations in order of preference had deep roots in the First and Second Republics' party politics, and the important national figures that were affected by Decree 25 of 1987, as amended by Decree 9 of 1989, with regard to their banning on partisan politics, "have played and continued to play significant roles in their formation, consolidation, finance and organisation".

The NEC also found that the political associations depended largely on "Charity donations form undisclosed sources". Furthermore, there were strong indications which showed that there were some well-to-do individuals in the executive committees of the associations, hence, confirmed fears that the associations were being highjacked by money bags. Consequent to these, according to Olagunju, et al (1993 : 214) was that:

> Results of the verification exercise in order of priority in which the following six political associations have best satisfied the conditions prescribed in the Main Guidelines: Peoples Solidarity Party (43.9%); Nigeria National Congress (42.62%); Peoples Front of Nigeria (41.20%); Liberal

Convention (34.08%); Nigerian Labour Party (17.90%); and the Republican Party of Nigeria (17%).

In his examination of the first four political associations, Babangida (1991 : 8-15) observes that there was reincarnation of a make-shift alliance during the defunct Second Republic with people who disappointed the Parties that elected them into office. That opportunism, old limps of cleavage and primordial loyalties were the function of that reincarnation. There was also an offshoot of the Second Republic political party among these political associations with same ideas and loyalties. And a third of those political associations was a proxy organisation which was founded and funded by those who wielded influence among those who were disqualified from partisan politics during the transition period.

Moreover, a fourth party appeared new in loyalty, controlled by money bags who could determine who would join them and who would not and who could get what, when, how and how much.

What then were the viable options since the military considered that the credentials of those political associations were not creditable? To what effect, President Babangida contends that:

> My fellow Nigerians, given all the foregoing, can we, in all honesty, claim that a new socio-political order can be created through the registration of any of the political association? The AFRC has

> critically examined the development whereby it is clearly indefensible to register any of the existing political associations as a political party. We have also studied the most viable options new available to us, carefully weighing the pros and cons of every option.

The first option as he contended was that some Nigerians had called upon the military to allow all the thirteen political associations to contest the December, 1989 Local Government Elections and then register the two which lead at the polls and subsequently dissolve the rest or merge them into the two.

Babangida argues that there were certain drawbacks associated with this option. One, that the National Electoral Commission entire guidelines and the verification exercise would be made "nonsense". That the "formidable" NEC Report would be relevant only in helping the military to return to the position it were in as at the end of the submission of the application for registration by the political associations.

Two, that parties are elected basically on their legitimacy, manifestos and what the electorate expected of them after the election. Thus, parties are formed to contest elections, not that elections are held to form parties. Therefore, if the Government adopts this option, it means it would take a "reversal normal order of things".

Three, that the electorate would feel disillusioned to vote or not to vote for any association because they would feel embarrassed to see the association they voted for in order to run their Local Government being asked to disband or merge with the Political association which they defeated in their locality.

Finally, that this option was inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution governing the transitional process which allowed for only two parties to contest election. Thus, this option was not viable.

Second, merger conference and voluntary merger among the political associations were the next option. This could be done through giving those associations time to bargain among themselves and then merge together according to the guidelines which NEC would issue out. This option too was not viable, according to the Government. It argued that by so doing, the merger would be imposed on the people against voluntary one and then the transition would be crippled by extension.

Third, that there should be a repeat exercise in which the whole initial verification exercise would be cancelled and a fresh one to be conducted.

The Government argued that it would allow itself to be taken as one not serious by accepting this option and that the pre-registration period was so ample for those associations to work hard and the verification exercise was competently carried out and

the transition programme was well publicized. Furthermore, if the option is taken, more resources would be wasted and that there would be cynicism about the transition programme.

Four, that the NEC finding had shown that the political associations were categorised into two contending camps - "a little to the left" and "a little to the right". Therefore, the Government should register them along these two lines by merging those of the same ideological affinity and persuasions together as one political party.

The Government rejected this option by arguing that it had initially rejected the imposition of any political ideology on Nigerians in its white paper on the Report of the political Bureau and while considering the 1989 Constitution.

Fifth, the next option was that the two-party system should be labour - centric. That the Nigerian Labour Party should be registered as one political party and the rest of the aspiring political associations as another.

The Government argued that this option had ideological attraction and might seem to cater for the masses. But it rejected it on the same ground as that of the ideologically - based option and that it would not be in the interest of the labour party or any party to be concerned with "only an occupational segment of the society". And that it could be argued that rural dwellers might not even see the labour party as a party catering for them.

Sixth, the next option was the Serial order one. It means that the first two associations with high scores should be

registered. The Government also rejected it by saying that the first two were among those ones that did not satisfy the NEC Guidelines and that every claim by the associations was mere ruse. And that they were rooted along ethnic, religious and other old lines of cleavage which were inimical to political development of Nigeria, thus, the Government would commit a suicide by allowing the past political pathologies to resurface.

Seventh, that the Government should establish a grassroots two-party system, with a headquarters for each party in each local government area. The said 'a little to the left' and 'a little to the right' manifestos of the thirteen political associations should be synthesised by NEC and submitted and recommended to the Armed Forces Ruling Council. And NEC should also synthesise a party constitution for them, reflecting 'a little to the left' and 'a little to the right' of the political spectrum.

In addition to that, the Constitutions and Manifestoes of those two parties be translated into local languages. The organs, like MAMSER, should be used for political mobilisation. That every qualified member in each local government area be registered accordingly, thus, all members would be equal founders of those parties. That Government would only sponsor the parties and party officials should be elected from the grassroots to the state and federal levels on the basis of one man one vote.

The Government discerned that this option was of advantage; that old lines of cleavage would be done away with in that the local level should abe the starting point of politics as there

would be emphasis on political organisational structures rather than personalities and the rural dwellers would have a say over decision-making of political arrangements.

The Government rejected this option by arguing that if it were adopted the transition time-table should be re-arranged even though it would not affect the terminal date of handing over, and Government would be accused of imposition. And that Government would be accused of rebuffing political aspirations of all the political associations that sought for registration though the option encouraged grassroots democratic participation. But the issue of grassroots democratic politics is not easy for people's political apathy in which they believe in certain long established lines of loyalty and hierarchy.

Furthermore, Government would be accused of having this option in mind all along thereby made the verification exercise difficult through the NEC. Or that it could be argued that the new system was introduced by the Government following the failure of political associations during the verification exercise, thus, accusing the Government of mismanagement of the resources. And that Government could be accused of manipulating the transition programme through the alleged apathy in the absence of the experienced and seasoned politicians. Babangida then puts it that:

> Such reservations and charge will certainly be studied by Government to see genuine or deliberate fears can allayed. But they do not render the

option inevitable. The option is hinged on mass participation, on equal terms, and this is the cardinal principle which will sustain it.

4:2 AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEC'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON SIX POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE ARMED FORCES RULING COUNCIL

The NEC submitted its Report and Recommendation on the six political associations to the Federal Military Government for consideration and how the Government responded was already seen in the preceding chapter.

In this analysis, we seek to find answers to such questions as: how correct was the NEC's method of assessing the political associations? How realistic were the conditions laid down for the registration of a political association? What are the plausible reasons for laying down such condition? What could be the cost-benefit consideration of the exercise?

The National Electoral Commission used the Stratified Random Sampling technique during the exercise. However, Gahia (1989:7) posits that:

> The rationalisation for SRS as a technique of social research is that it enables the researcher to study the relationship of elements existing in dissimilar

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situations to certain common characteristics.

The NEC, according to him, "chose this method because it had several political associations of varying sizes, and because it needed a method relevant to a determination of comparative differences".

The benefits to be derived from this method, contends Gahia, are, one, that stratified random sampling can enhance "the application of a set of criteria to elements with dissimilar sizes, scope and the like which nevertheless fall within the same population". That the size of the population could be increased willingly with the purpose of ensuring that its small elements which may otherwise be underrepresented, are also sampled. Moreso, the method could apparently accommodate similarities and differences inherently found in the population to be sampled. And finally, the method is said to be useful, particularly "in establishing differences amongst strata".

But unfortunately, this method adopted by the National Electoral Commission, according to Gahia, has a serious defect. This was because, whereas the stratified sampling can throw light on differences observed, it is of little use "to an understanding of the internal variabilities and inner qualities of the individual constituents of the population under study". In other words, he says, "although this method could classify differences between, for example, the NNC and NLP with regard to, say, the administrative set up, it was naturally defective in the crucial area of comparing

them at the level of tendencies, including the merits and demerits of each tendencies".

Gahia goes on to buttress his points that since the method was hopelessly biased in favour of what really existed, the consequence was that it could not trace the origins of social facts, hence, it was totally defective as a study of "alternative futures". Moreover:

> On the whole, it is difficult to see how, on balance the method NEC chose was to confront complexity of the problematic itself. The question of suitability - a critical variable - was not addressed at all. The range of criteria to be used to organise the character of the parties expected to constitute the new party system - detachment from the discredited parties, detachment from banned politicians and public officials, new breedism, non-teleguidance - were not applied .....
> .....

Then, "what could have been more scientific than combined historical, cultural, comparative and materialist approach?". Gahia poses this question. He gave answer to his posed question by saying that historical evidence was part of what the National Electoral Commission would have needed to assess the political associations. He argues that it is because there is still a need

to ask: "does this party system we want to build, something that is evolving in a historical context?".

Gahia argues that sociological data is needed for an understanding of how the party system could be made consistent with the societal structure. And that cultural data would have been sued to explain the variable having to do with national character. On the other hand, comparative data would have been used to disclose conditions and solutions that were or a similar to the country's reality. Materialist data, he says, would have provided a documented "historical process of political-economic contradictions, conflicts and change in the Nigerian setting". He concludes thus, "NEC's disregard of these principal data must remain enigmatic. It clearly failed its own examinations".

There were other reactions from the public explaining flaws in the Report of the National Electoral Commission. For example, according to Oroh and others (1998:24) the NEC Report from what is on the ground, is a portrayal of a picture of associations that are steeped in the decadent past, with exaggerated claims about their membership national spread and other variables". Therefore, they argue that:

> Political analysts have argued that since NEC officials who did the grading were Nigerians, who are susceptible to biases and prejudices of the system, it would not be unlikely that some associations may have found favourable hearing among

some NEC officials. They also argued that the likelihood of NEC officials being influenced through gratifications cannot be ruled out because although NEC officials were reported to have shunned such overtures by some desperate politicians NEC did not reflect this in its report to enable the AFRC act on this.

From the look of things, the conditions laid down for securing registration by the political associations can be said to be stringent. On the side of the politicians, their readiness to accept and abide by the rules and regulations was a wrong measure. This is because a mere cursory glance at these rules and regulations would tell someone that they could never be fulfilled. Therefore, their acceptance to fulfil what was not possible must have made them to bear the consequences of whatever the Government did. The acceptance also made them to give false claims to the NEC. This could be plausibly said that they did so because all they were after was power, therefore, they could do everything to have access to it. This also demonstrated their opportunism. The falsification of the claims also allowed the incumbent government to expose them to the public as dishonest. This is a war which the military maintains with them.

The same argument has been advanced by Adesina (1992:14). He posits that the conditions set for the political association as requirements for registration as political parties were stringent

and the time dimension (May 3 to July 15, 1989) was so short that it was puzzling how their leaders imagined that they could meet them. After the assessment, he says, the National Electoral Commission found that none of those 13 political associations met all the conditions set for them by the NEC. However, he says, it recommended six that had an average scores to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) for consideration.

In the same vein we have argued, that the price for their readiness to go with those conditions made people, subscribes Adesina, to see their "naivety, opportunism, short-sightedness and lack of courage on their part, the readiness with which they accepted the rejection of their efforts".

The civil-military relation has even gone to the extent of making people to postulate, as put by Sumaila (1994:12) that "the Nigerian military has already established an unacceptable theory that they are politically superior than the bloody civilians' who are incompetent, inept, corrupt and indiscipline". The military should know, he says, "that they are Nigerians like other civilians, thus, possessing primordial loyalties, ambitions, frustrations, political/religious patronage/allegiances".

Therefore, the politicians would have rejected the offer of going into the game in order to save their neck as well as their political identity.

On the side of the Federal Military Government, one could arguably say that the conditions were made by the military via the National Electoral Commission. The reason behind saying this is

that, the democratic process was under the control of the military. It was the captain of the democratic ship or the pilot of the democratic plane determining the direction to which it would take bearing.

By mere looking at the conditions laid down for the registration of the political associations, one can say that they were made stringent to make the registration impossible so that at the end of the day the government could take a different decision altogether. That, it might be right to say that the government wanted to change the course of history in which people are the ones who form their political parties. To achieve this aim of creating political parties by itself, it would be foolhardy of it to come out directly to tell people its decision. It had to devise means that could, at least, show people that it was serious, honest and purposeful. For example, Babangida (1992:15) contends that:

> It can certainly ne mischieviously alleged that the proposed system is one that government had in mind all along and had merely orchestrated the NEC and others to prove that the political associations were unregistrable.....

4:3 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRE FOR DEMOCRATIC STUDIES AND THE CREATION OF TWO-POLITICAL PARTIES BY THE GOVERNMENT

In the same broadcast to the nation on the occasion of the registration of two political parties, President Babangida (1991:18) announces that:

> A centre for the study of democratic institutions will be established. It will be an organised research unit that will seek out and identify sources and types of anti-democratic attitudes, beliefs and behaviour in Nigerians and devise measures to correct them through our educational, bureaucratic and political institutions. This seems to be an effective means by which we can prepare our citizens for the demands of a sustained democratic social and political order.

Babangida goes on to say that the proposed institution would be responsible for homogenising the political parties' bureaucrats through training, workshops, seminars and conferences. And in the demand of the legislature, the programmes would similarly train officials of both the national and state assemblies.

After rejecting the options given by the National Electoral Commission (NEC), President Babangida (1991:19) declares that due to the failure of all the country's experiments, the Armed Forces Ruling Council is convinced that something revolutionary needs to be introduced in the country. It is also noted that what should provide the kind of revolutionary tendency for establishing a mass two-party system is only the seventh option which suggests for the grassroots democratic two-party system. To this effect, he declares and approves the registration of two political parties with immediate effect. This, he says, is in fulfillment of the transition to civil rule decree. "The two political parties shall be call: a. Social Democratic Party (SDP). b. National Republican Convention (NRC).

According to the President, the decision to establish the two-party system marked the Governments acceptance of the principles of a grassroots democracy. The belief of Government, by so doing, should lead to the emergence of political parties form the grassroots level; should establish a mass platform for the emergence of a new political leadership; should provide an equity and opportunities to all and sundry of the citizenry in terms of participation in the political process indiscriminately; should de-emphasise money-bagism in Nigeria politics; should reduce, to a minimum level, the tradition of violence in the electoral process; should shun the emergence of political alliances along the same line as experienced in the two defunct Republic; should ensure the

emergence of a new, more committed and more genuine leadership cadre as against a mere proxy or old political warlords; should work out a new modality of political recruitment and participation that would enhance Nigeria's stability; should establish strong institutional structures that could not only sustain future governments, but be strong enough to stand the test of time; and should also establish a political system that would be operated in accordance with the spirit and letter of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

On the modus operandi Babangida (1991:21) explains that each of the two parties would keep a membership register at the ward and local government levels for membership of either of the parties for all Nigerians that were not affected by the disqualification or banning Decrees from political activities, while the disqualified would only exercise their civic right at the polls. That all members of the former political associations could join too in their capacity as individuals and anybody caught manipulating the membership cards on the basis of the former political associations should be thwarted and dealt with accordingly.

Furthermore, the Local Government Area should be the only place for membership registration for qualified people where he or she resides irrespective of it being the local government of his or her origin. NEC should set its eyes and monitor the membership recruitment exercises of the two political parties, and cause party conventions at the levels of the three tiers of government.

Each party should elect its officers at the levels of the three tiers of government, and that all members were equal 'founders' as well as 'joiners'. There should be draft constitutions for the two parties to be approved by the Armed Forces Ruling Council, Subject to the following guidelines:

a. the constitutions of the two parties should be identical.
b. each constitution shall emphasise representative democracy, republicanism, presidentialism, federalism, foreign policy goals, non-adoption of any religion as State religion, fundamental rights, basic freedoms and the two-party system-all issues contained in our 1989 constitution.
c. each constitution shall provide modalities for accountability at an annual congress or convention.
d. the constitution of the two parties shall provide for the same:
    i. number of offices, i.e. members of the executive committees
    ii. mode of financial accountability; and
    iii. machinery for disciplining members
    iv. set of national values under-writing its programmes.

NEC was also to synthesise the draft constitutions out of the input given by the former political associations, with each of the draft constitution to be published by NEC, and publicized by Federal Ministry of Information, MAMSER, state and local governments and the mass media, before the commencement of the actual registration of members. The amendment of each of the draft constitution would be subject to the act of the national convention only after approval by the Armed Forces Ruling Council.

Those manifestoes should reflect in them, programme emphasis of each party; should be published and publicized in the manner with the Draft Constitutions; could only be amended at national convention of each party; subject to NEC guidelines and submit to the Armed Forces Ruling Council for approval after which the draft would become a party manifesto. That they would be translated into dominant languages spoken in each local government area. And that the two political parties should be funded by the Federal Military Government and there should be no financial contributions from any individual or groups to the party treasury be allowed at that stage. The National Electoral Commission should work out a modality for fund raising by political parties later on in the transition period. The accounts of each party should be audited before and after the first elections by external officers to be appointed by NEC at the level of the three-tier of government.

Babangida (1991:23) asserts that party conventions should be held after the registration exercise, and these conventions should be held at the ward, local, state and national levels. During the conventions, officers of the party at relevant levels should be elected; any amendments to the draft constitutions and manifestoes should be discussed and suggested to the National Electoral Commission for onward transmission to the Armed Forces Ruling Council; should "establish modalities for fund-raising within NEC guidelines on fiscal contributions to political parties, and establish strategies for campaigns, within NEC guidelines".

However, after the conventions, the National Electoral Commission would release guidelines pertaining to rallies in the process of campaigns including stipulations on the kinds and language of campaign. Each of the two parties should have its own symbols of identity - flag, emblem as well as colour. These symbols should reflect in them, the goals of national unity as well as the patriotic ethos of Nigerians. That the Federal Military Government would appoint administrative Secretaries for each political party, and for each political party's local government area.

The National Electoral Commission should be responsible for providing membership cards, symbols and the draft constitutions and manifestoes for each local government party office, while the administrative Secretary in conjunction with the local government

office of MAMSER and other agencies of mass media, should publicise and educate the masses about the new parties. Babangida (1991:24) then declares that:

> Following this announcement of the establishment of grassroots two-party system, the thirteen political associations are hereby dissolved with immediate effect. All documents submitted to NEC, and which are not being used for our current exercise, should be turned over to the National Archives. The Federal Military Government shall refund the #50,000.00 deposit all the dissolved thirteen political associations through NEC within two weeks of this announcement.

Then, given the foregoing, it is right to say that "the origins and development of the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) were also not unconnected with or unrelated to this new party formation process". as Olagunju, et al (1993:214) posit.

The idea of forming two political parties for Nigeria could be traced back to the recommendation of the Report of the Political Bureau in 1987. The Report (1987:134) recommends that the country should adopt the system because:

> In the case of Nigeria, it has been observed quite accurately, that many parties are formed and

> registered at the beginning of each specific political era and that sooner or later these normally gravitate around two parties. These parties have tended to cluster around ethno/religious lines, giving us roughly a northern and southern party (the Southern grouping being mainly an inchoate alignment).

However, the reality is what Fadahunsi (1990:18) argues when he says that "what emerged during the periods were alliances - some unholy - rather then political parties. They were UPGA and NNA during the First Republic and the PPA and NPN during the Second Republic". And Olagunju, et al (193:229) categorically argue that:

> The reference here is to what Bureau, wrongly in our views, described as coalition formations on a North/South, Christian/Muslim axes. This is a simplification of a much more complex development. The reality, in our view, was that dynamics and contradictions of federal politics during the First and Second Republics tended to engender the federation of the party system in the form of two grand national coalitions which cut across ethno-religious.

A political party, according to Harris (1976:140):

> pursues interest and attempt to obtain the best possible advantage and position for its members.... tries to justify itself by means of an ideology or a belief pattern, indicating by its very title that it aims at some good--- 'Conservative', 'Democrat', 'National'.

Musa (1981:9) aptly defines it as a "voluntary structural organisation which sets out to represent and achieve a cause, by ensuring a cohesive administrative convenience and discipline through participation".

From the foregoing definitions, one can say that while interest group is merely a voice, a political party brings together and aggregates a number of interests in one association. Moreover, while interest group tries to gain access to decision-makers and thereby influences their actions, a political party comes with a plan of action called manifesto which it intends to translate into action when it is elected into political office. In other words, while an interest group merely seeks to divert some of the resources of the state in its directions, a political party seeks permanent power.

If we synthesise the manifestoes of the two political parties, we can see that they are merely one and the same. Their only differences, if any, are in their methods of achieving their goals, and terms of emphasis. For instance, their manifestoes (1989) see taxation as a means of economic growth and development. And that SDP states that 'the state will play a leading role in the economy', while NRC states that 'Government will continue to control key sectors of the economy'. And SDP states that 'SDP shall ultimately provide free, functional education at all levels', while nrc states that 'NRC shall provide free and compulsory education at primary and secondary levels and make tuition-free at university level'. And with regard to their foreign policy pursuit, there is no significant differences as noted by Birai (1990:423) notes thus, 'there is hardly any significant difference either in the foreign policy agenda of both the SDP and NRC or in the strategy for achieving the objectives.

From the foregoing analysis, it is conclusive that the conditions laid down by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) for party formations and registrations were stringent enough for the politicians to meet. This is because the time-frame was so short enough for them to prepare all that are required of them. Moreso, the conditions were too demanding, materially and otherwise. But the readiness of the politicians to venture into this herculean task displayed their dishonesty as a means of capturing power.

With regard to that and their readiness to join the two political parties created and funded by the military, Adesina (1992:15) reports that some opinion-makers and political actors are pointing accusing fingers at the politicians for joining the two parties. The report goes on thus:

> The readiness with which the accepted the rejection of their efforts and promptness with which they enlisted in the two government-sponsored parties seemed to critics, that the Nigerian political class was without honour. "They have followed the government like dogs, itching to eat from the palms of their owner", says a Lagos based lawyer.

Therefore, going by that stand, it will be argued that the politicians demonstrated an act of pliability, gullibility and imprudence, thereby giving the military the way to determine the destiny of the transition process.

On the issue of the arrest and detention of the eleven banned politicians and their subsequent release by the government, it is arguable that the military as the initiator did so in order to provide itself with a full grip on the transition process.

4:4 1992 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES, DISQUALIFICATION AND DISSOLUTION

December 18, 1991 marked the end of the arrest and detention of the eleven banned politicians. The ban was lifted and the presidential race was thrown up to all and sundry who wished to go into the race.

After the August, 1992 first round of the presidential primaries confusion greeted the exercise. To that effect, African concord (1992:30) says that, the Federal Military Government promulgated a Decree 37 known as the Presidential Election Basic Transition Provision to spell out the punishments of electoral malpractices, "ranging from disqualification to prosecution of all politicians engaged in electoral malpractices".

Under the decree, the Concord says that, an aspirant would be charged guilty of "corrupt practices" if he is found aiding or bribery, the result of which would be invalidation of his candidature and ban for 10 years.

The decree also spelt out that state governors and other state officials found falsifying or altering results on behalf of aspirants should be "liable for prosecution on conviction of which may be sentenced to a two-year jail term". Umoden (1992:301-2) contended that on September 26, 1992 "the zone C group of the presidential primaries held in Abia, Niger, Kwara, Enugu, Delta, Osun, Adamawa, Sokoto and Kano States, and Abuja. It is marked by

low turn-out of voters, theft of electoral materials and brazen electoral frauds". He contended that the emergence of three northern muslims on the list of the race made prominent Nigerians to detest the emergence, particularly when people complained that there were glaring irregularities and malpractices in the exercise.

In its editorial, the Guardian (1992:1) contends that the presidential primaries were massively, cynically and shamelessly rigged to such an extent that any government produced at the end of it would be regarded as illegitimate. And that the situation was worse so much so that "the two presidential candidates that will emerge are from the far north. This is disturbing, given the national composition of the country". And according to the Newswatch (1992:10), politicians had been accused of sabotaging the presidential primaries "so late in the twilight of the transition period", hence, says the Newswatch the Vice President, Augustus Aikhomu declared that the military would not hand over power to civilians in chaos. The National Concord (1992:9) puts it that the exercise was annulled and the National Electoral Commission was directed to "open a new leaf" in the bid to "produce free and fair presidential primaries". The party executives were already dissolved on October 16, 1992. According to the National Concord, the reasons for their ban was that they had been:

> Undermining, forestalling, distorting the programme within the stipulated time. No specific charges were laid against any of the aspirants. No one was

made to defend himself. The ban, like previous (similar) decisions, reinforces the concept of collective guilt which the present regime has foisted on the political system.

4:5 1992 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES, DISQUALIFICATION AND DISSOLUTION: AN ANALYSIS

In our attempt to analyse the 1992 Presidential Primaries, we seek to find answers to such questions as: Why money bagism is a medium of political adventurism in Nigeria? In whose interest was the withdrawal of ten Social Democratic Party presidential aspirants from the race? Was it in the interest of the nation and the electorate whom the politicians always purport to serve? To what extent was the presidential primaries' confusion and mud-slinging advantageous to the military Government who was the initiator of the transition programme? Why was the government able to dissolve, ban and disqualify people easily? And, is it right to postulate that money would unequivocally be a tool of wooing the minds of the electorate?

An answer to the first question is that politics on Nigeria has become an investment. People go into it in order to make money or more of it by sinking their wealth before and during electioneering campaigns and even on the day of the election. They do not see politics as an avenue through which one can serve his

people.

The people only complain in politics when their machinery of using money failed or when they do not have the machinery of using money, not that they complain because they know that using money as a means of securing an office is illegal nor that even if they have money they will not use it to woo the minds of people. The Newswatch (1992:15) reports that the Commissioner of Police, Katsina State, produced a video recording of an interview of arrested under-aged persons who claimed that they were "paid certain amounts of money ranging from #6 to #10 to vote for some aspirants".

Apart from the use of money to secure an office, other dubious means are used. In the presidential primaries of September 12, 19 and 26, the Newswatch (1992:10) reports that it was characterised by:

> Use of wealth by aspirants to buy votes or achieve undue advantage; threats and intimidation; favouritism on the part the parties' executive committees; and use of state government machinery by some governors.... Others include falsification of figures and allocation of votes where elections did not take place;....

It is right to say, regarding the second question on the withdrawal of ten Social Democratic Party presidential aspirants, that their act was not because they wanted to ensure honesty, justice and fair play in the game neither was it made to protect the interest of the nation and the electorate. Their point of contention was that the party wanted to impose Yar'adua on them. Going by the aforesaid report of the Newswatch Magazine, their allegation could have element of truth. But our argument here is that the nature of their politics can make someone to argue that they only pointed an accusing finger at what they alleged just because they did not have a machinery to influence the party or they had it but it had failed to produce a positive result for them. It is to say that if one of them was the one who got himself imposed by the party he would not reject it.

Regarding the third question on the confusion and mud-slinging which characterised the presidential primaries, it is to say that the military at the time astutely gained a greater advantage and cancelled the primaries, dissolved the parties' executive, disqualified and banned the presidential aspirants. This, in turn, gave the military more chance to study the psyche of the politicians and found out that they were disunited, timid and selfish. This is so because they did not form a common front to challenge the military may abe, they had a skeleton in their cupboard.

Their disunity, timidity and selfishness gave answer to our fourth question on why the military easily dissolved the parties' executive, disqualified and banned the presidential aspirants. These attitudes also allowed the military to shape and control the destiny of the transition programme, the more.

On the last question, certainly, one can rightly say that money could be used to influence the voting right of the electorate. This is so because the military embraced the Structural Adjustment Programame (SAP) and its conditionalities. Therefore, it is not surprising when money is used to woo the minds of the acute-poverty-looking people. They have to be enslaved by the evils of SAP and money-bag politicians, in addition to their political apathy and parochialism.

let us not conclude this part without pointing out that the issue of North-South dichotomy is an instrument used by the Nigerian elite to continue dividing and ruling the common people. This politics is based on sentiments, diversion and hypocrisy through the use of the press, both government and private owned ones. Instead of politics of ideas, issues and collective interest, political chauvinism always holds sway to perpetuate, manipulate and exploit power. It is not the geographical entity - North or South that matters, rather, this country only needs patriotic leaders irrespective of their geographical or ethnic affiliations.

4:6 MARCH 1993 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND THE JUNE 12 POLLS:

After shifting the handover date from January 2, 1993 to August 27, 1993, the national Electoral Commission also announced the adoption of Option A4. It is a system of "selection of state flagbearers through ward, local government and state congress leading to national convention" where each of the two political parties would finally produce a presidential candidate to contest for the presidential seat. The Centre for Political and Economic Research (ECPER) (1993:163) reports that the electioneering campaign by all the aspirants in both the National Republican Convention and Social Democratic Party were low-keyed before the Port-Harcourt and Jos conventions. The low-keyed electioneering campaign was attributed to the A4 System of electoral college which confined aspirants to their localities. And that at the Jos and Port-Harcourt Conventions, the politics of money was freely applied by aspirants in order to buy up delegates. This act was confirmed by the politicians themselves. Hence, the candidacies were won by the highest bidders.

Alhaji Bashir Othman Tofa and Chief Moshood Abiola of the National Republican Convention and Social Democratic Party respectively, were the winners of the game. The National Electoral

Commission (NEC) cleared them for the final show down, contrary to people's anticipation due to the apparent indisputable use of money during the conventions.

The go-ahead given to the two presidential flag bearers allowed them to tour the huge terrain of the country which resulted in their to conduct a lively and peaceful campaigns. This gave birth to the June 12 election throughout the country. This election too, was remarkably peaceful and orderly.

The ECPER adds that the procedure of announcing the results at the ward, local government and state levels was meticulously followed. Most of the result sheets were duly signed by agents, the electoral officers, the police as well as security agents at counting and/or collection centres.

However, there was undue delay in the transmission of the signed result sheets from the state headquarters of the National Electoral Commission to its national headquarters in Abuja where foreign observers were to witness the final assessment and declaration of the results. The ECPER continues that:

> Even though by Sunday, 13th June, some state results had reached Abuja by the date the results were stopped unilaterally by a federal government press release on Wednesday 16th, June. The undue delay in transmitting results to Abuja from some states led to justified suspicion of "doctoring" of the results enroute to Abuja.

The Government's reason for suspending the release of the results was said to be caused by the sporadic Court rulings in Abuja and elsewhere which tended to give an impression of anarchy in the nations judiciary.

Then ECPER puts it that few days prior to the elections, an appeal made by the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) was upheld by an Abuja High Court. The appeal was calling for a stoppage to the June 12 election on the ground that the Social Democratic Party's presidential flagbearer had bribed delegates ar the jos Convention. Thus, there was the need for making his nomination null and void. However, the National Electoral Commission did not abide by this Court ruling by citing a decree establishing it which gave it a power above any court of law.

Consequently, on Monday, June 14, another Abuja Court ordered the suspension of all further action on the June 12 election due to the National Electoral Commission's disobedience of the Court ruling. As a result of this, Courts in Lagos, Ibadan and Benin City gave independent orders for the continuation of the release of the election results.

On the other hand, ECPER 91993:63) reports that the National Republic Convention issued a statement contending that the order given by the Court for the stoppage of the elections on Thursday June 10, had affected its candidate's chance in the sense that many of its supporters did not go out to vote on the 12 of June "in the belief that the elections had been effectively stopped by the

Court". And that "the time lapse of two days between the Court order and election was too short to allow for adequate publicity to mobilise its supporters, most of whom were in the rural areas".

The New Nigerian (1993:1) reports that "the giant National Electoral Commission (NEC) score board at the Abuja headquarters yesterday came alive with the results of the presidential election from 21 states". The 'states' which their results were declared were: Abia, Adamawa, Akwa-Ibon, Anambra, Bauchi, Borno, Edo, Enugu, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Niger, Ogun, Oyo and Plateau. The Federal Capital Territory result was also released.

It also reports that the premises of the National Electoral Commission was thronged by people in their bid to see the result of the June 12 poll. It also reports that the election was free and fair throughout the country.

The Citizen (1993:11) reports that both the local and foreign verdict were at one on the fact that the election was "free and fair". And that the Nigerian Electoral Monitoring Group (NEMG) believed that the Government did everything humanly possible "to make the election indecent-free". Moreover, says the Citizen, "the first Court order asking NEC not to go ahead with the election is one of the reasons the NRC has also given for its poor showing in those states it considers 'safer'".

According to the magazine, the NEC released, officially, the results of sixteen (16) states of the federation, namely: Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, borno, Edo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Kwara,

Lagos, Niger, Oyo, Ogun, Plateau and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.

According to it, the results showed that the registered voters of those states totalled "20,069,722". And that the votes cast for the Social Democratic Party were "4,464,021" as against "2,498,712" for the National Republican Convention. The votes totalled "6,944,661" for the two parties. The percentage of votes cast was "60.52" for the SDP as against "39.45" for NRC. The percentage of the registered votes those states for the two parties was "34.89".

In its editorial, the Newswatch (1993:7) contends that the Association for Better Nigeria is not a political party and neither it is a human rights group, but just a "band of political flunkies who have, curiously, managed to gain high visibility in high places. They subscribe to a sinister manifesto, namely, that the military must sink in its heels till the end of the century or something like that". On the election, it put it that:

> By Thursday night the 30 results, including that of Abuja, had been received and accepted by the collation committee made up of state electoral commissioners, representatives of the NRC and SDP, members of the Presidential Election Monitoring Group (PEMG), and security agents. In fact, Nwosu and other senior NRC officials were convinced that even through result of the election in Taraba State

> was late to reach Abuja, Abiola was already leading comfortably. In anticipation of the result from Taraba, Nwosu had prepared a speech to announce Abiola as winner of the election.

On the incessant call for the stoppage of election, the Newswatch contends that Nwosu addressed journalist a day before the election saying that Ikpeme's judgement which called for the stoppage of the election contravened section 19 subsection 1 of the Presidential Election (Basic Constitution and Transitional Provision) Decree 13 of 1993. That the section provided that any intra-party and inter-party dispute could not affect the time or date of the election. To that effect, "Nwosu, therefore, declared that the election would hold the following day, June 12".

4:7 ANNULMENT OF THE JUNE 12 ELECTION AND FORMATION OF AN INTERIM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Admist the stringent call for the stoppage of the release of the June 12 polls, the military declared the election annulled. In a nationwide address, President Babangida (1993:3) contends thus:

> I address you today with a very deep sense of world history of our great country. In the aftermath of

> the recently annulled presidential election, I feel, as I believe you yourselves feel, a profound sense of disappointment at the outcome of our last efforts at laying the foundation of a viable democratic system of government in Nigeria.

On the political arrangements, the president maintains that the regime faced many difficulties "during the cause of handling the interlocking relationship between the old and new political forces and institutions". These difficulties, he said, forced the regime to tamper with the rules and regulations as stipulated in the transition programme. This decision, he contended, cast suspicion into the minds of the public on the regime's intention and objectives. "Accordingly, we have experienced certain short-falls and conflicting responses to the pulls and pushes to the governance in the course of policy implementation".

Babangida contends that the areas in which the transition programme suffered, especially from the last quarter of 1992 to the time of the annulment of the June 12 polls, were derived from the short-falls of decisions objectively taken by the regime, and that action might have a deviation from the original framework and structure of the programme designed by the government. He goes on thus:

> Fellow Nigerians, it is true that by the cancelled presidential election, we all found the nation at a

peculiar bar of history which was neither bargained for, nor was it envisaged in the reform programme of transition as enunciated in 1986/87. In the circumstance, the Administration had no option than to respond appropriately to the unfortunate experience by terminating the presidential election and judicial actions related to the election. Our action is in full conformity with the original objectives of the transition to the civil rule programme. It was also in conformity with the avowed commitment of the administration to advance the cause of national unity, stability and democracy.

Babangida goes further to maintain that in annulling the June 12 election, the regime was still on its feet on the promise it made in November, 1992 that it would disengage and institute a return to democracy on August 27, 1993.

Babangida re-affirms that the regime was determined to hand over power honourably and honestly. In addition to that, President Babangida asserted that history would beat witness that the regime had always striven to lay a foundation of a lasting democracy in all its policy decisions. This type of democracy, he said "is not a temporary show of excitement and manipulation by an over-

articulate section of the elite and its captive audience", rather, it "is a permanent diet to nurture the soul of the whole nation and the political process".

Furthermore, Babangida explains that every country has its unique history and, therefore, its practice of democracy should invariably differ from that of other countries. He adds that:

> Inspite of the uniqueness and peculiarities of Nigeria, there are certain pre-requisites which constitute an irreducible minimum for democracy. Such essential factors include: a. Free and fair election; b. Uncoerced expression of voters' preference in election; c. Respect for electorate as an unfettered final arbiter on elections; d. Decorum and fairness on the part of electoral umpires; and e. Absolute respect for the rule of law.

The President also contends that the military cancelled the 1992 presidential primaries on the ground that they did not meet the basic requirements of free and fair election. The June 12 Presidential election was annulled on the same thesis. He contended that there were electoral irregularities at the party conventions but the military overlooked them for the simple fact

that it wanted to keep the promise of handing over power on August 27, 1993. He re-affirmed that the regime was determined to hand over power honourable and honestly.

Those irregularities, he says, continued into the presidential election of June 12, 1993, on an even greater proportion. And that there were allegations of irregularities and other acts of bad conduct laid at the doors of two Presidential Candidates but the National Electoral Commission went ahead and cleared them. He continues thus:

> There were frauds as well as documented evidence of wide-spread use of money during the party primaries as well as the presidential election. These were the same bad conduct for which the party presidential primaries of 1992 were cancelled. Evidence available to the government put the total amount of money spent by the presidential candidates as over two billion, one hundred million naira (#2.1b).

That both the allegations and evidence were in the knowledge of the National Defence and Security Council before the June 12 election was held. Despite this knowledge, he said, the Council closed its eyes on them for its determination to fulfil the promise of hand over to elected civilian President on the date. He further buttress his contention that apart from tremendous negative use of

money in the course of the party primaries, the Defence and National Security Council overlooked certain moral issues characterised by conflicts of interest between the Government and the presidential aspirants "which would compromise their positions and responsibilities were they to become president". The Government had documented and confirmed evidence on these issues. He notes that politics and government are not ends in themselves, "rather, service and effective amelioration of the condition of our people must remain the true purpose of politics".

The President then asserts that it was true that the presidential election was generally seen to be free, fair and peaceful. This notwithstanding, he said, there were a huge array of electoral malpractices in almost all the states of the federation before the commencement of the actual voting through the offer and acceptance of money and other forms of political inducement of the officials of the NEC and members of the electorate. Moreso, "there were also evidence of conflict in the process of authentication and clearance of credentials of the presidential candidates".

According to him, majority of the members of the Council were of the view of postponing the electorate of the new dimension. But the Council changed this idea of the postponement, for it was persuaded by the National Electoral Commission that it could liaise with the voters within the few days left the election.

However, after the annulment of the election, a pot pourri of the military and civilians adopted a modus vivendi to form an "Interim National Government", said General Babangida. According to him, there was no alternative to the presidential seat for the country other than by democratic election. And that the adoption of the Interim National Government would be seen as an interim measure taken by the transitional agenda of the regime.

Babangida also contends that the option was adopted to save Nigeria from the current dangerous trend towards undue polarisation of its body politic. And that the adoption seemed to the government a welcome strategic way of providing the "political system with a cooling off period during which to reflect on the current crisis with the view to putting it behind us" and moving the country forward.

In his maiden broadcast to the nation, the ING Chairman, Chief Shonekan (1993:6 and 13) re-iterated the rationale behind the establishment of the Interim National Government. He maintained that the measure was taken to make Nigeria move forward and keep it as a united and indivisible nation. On the June 12 issue, Chief Earnest Shonekan asserts that:

> June 12 has now become part of the political history of this country and it is advisable that we let it remain so. However, the government will put

together the records of the events in detail for posterity.

Chief Shonekan contends that the duties of the Government were enormous. It should conduct elections right from the local government up to the national levels. And that the Government should fight off bribery and corruption that permeated the entire Nigerian Society. He put it that the politicians and the media men were given challenging assignment. The politicians should try and bring sanity to the political atmosphere of the country and the media men must seek to inform, educate and entertain the society in the best tradition of their noble profession with objectivity. The same clarion call went to the traditional rulers. He concludes his speech thus:

I urge you good people of Nigeria to see the events of the past several weeks as nothing in the life of our country. Please give this government a chance to live up to it promise by keeping and maintaining the peace as well as going about your lawful duties without let or hindrance. Thank you and God bless. Long Live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

4:8 MARCH 1993 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES; ANNULMENT OF JUNE 12 PRESIDENTIAL POLLS AND FORMATION OF INTERIM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT: AN ANALYSIS

This part seeks to find answers to following questions: Were the presidential primaries and the June 12 elections free and fair? How cogent was the NRC's complaint on the lack of ample time for campaign after the Court order for the stoppage of the June 12 election? How realistic was the clarion call by Association for a Better Nigeria_for the military to continue controlling the mantle of leadership? Did the military perform better and there was fear that if it relinquishes power the good deed would be shattered by the politicians? Or did it reform badly, hence, the need for its rectification? Why was the "sporadic court rulings"?

From the foregoing, one would say the presidential primaries were not free and fair. It is so because the primaries were characterised by the use of money to buy the votes of the electorate. As argued elsewhere in this thesis, money bagism cannot allow poor people to contest in an election, hence, they are disenfranchised. Money bagism is an ivestment so that by the time one gets into an office he uses it to recoup all that he expended before and during electioneering campaigns.

The politicians should not be blamed_alone. The military should share the blame because it had disallowed will-meaning patriotic and committed people of reputable record to participate

in the transition programme right from its rudimentary stage. The "collective guilt" syndrome is therefore unacceptable. That innocent people should not be lumped with those that were termed as "guilty ones". For this reason, the reputable ones were not able to participate in the transition programme until the journey had gone very far. By the time they came in they could not make any impingement.

A free and fair election is one in which people are allowed to participate, with at least a degree of chances of participation and equal treatment. No doubt that money bagism gained ground since people were pauperised by the Structural Adjustment Programme and the leadership had pulverised the public treasury. Nwabueze (1994:15) argued that:

> But far from being seriously tackled, corruption became institutionalised during his regime, reaching the most buccanering and scandalous proportions, brazenly displayed in fantastic palatial mansions erected all over the place by military officers....

The presidential primaries and the June 12 elections were not free and fair because non-money-bag politicians were in one way or the other disallowed to contest in the primaries, talkless of the final show down. And that money was used to buy people's

conscience. But the primaries and the June 12, 1993 Presidential polls were peaceful. The reasons advanced by the National Republic Convention is not cogent enough to warrant their call for the stoppage of the release of the election. This is because one, they soul have refused to partake in the election so that the authority concerned could consider their grievances. Therefore, one can say that their complaint was an after-thought and probably, they might have realised that victory was not on their part. If it were, they might not have raised any eye brow.

The call by the Association for a Better Nigeria that the military should sink in its heels till the end of the century was uncalled for. From the look of things, if the leadership at that time was serious should have finished all the 'good' it had for the country.

It was on the saddle of power for almost a decade. What additional time did it want? Therefore, it is to say that the Association was not calling for the Government to stay till that time so that it could execute its well-intended and well-planned programmes because the wealth of history does not show that. To conclude, it is to say that the Association for a Better Nigeria might have been formed covertly by the Government and used civilians to propagandise and create rancour so that the Babangida government could continue steering the political ship of the country.

On the issue of the "Sporadic Court ruling", the military cannot tell people that it was unaware of what happened at the conventions. One may argue that it might be aware but hindsightedly waited for a chance to astutely manipulate and take a decision to its advantage, or create and use bodies like the ABN for the same purpose.

The military could have capitalised on the Chief Awolowo's complaint in 1979 in the Court that Shagari did not win the election so that it could continue with the leadership. But the Government in its capacity declared Shagari as the president-elect and handed over power to him. This was the military which Babangida coined its transition programme as one-second-photo-finish phenomenon.

In conclusion, we can plausibly say that Chief Abiola could claim that the victory of the election would be on his side based on the ward, local government and state levels' officers and the police and the security agents signed.

On the issue of the annulment of the June 12 poll and formation of the Interim National Government, President Babangida confessed that he last part of the transition was characterised by profound disappointment. What are the reasons responsible for the disappointment? He also contended that his government had inaugurated and pursued meaningful and justifiable policies and programme of reform in order to fight off problems that besieged that country. What are that policies and programme? How

meaningful and justifiable were they? Could history score them high? Or were the policies and programme of dismal failure? Could democracy be established and be thriving with SAP in operation? Was the annulment of the June 12 election really done in the interest of democracy, national unity and stability? How was the election free, fair and peaceful? How relevant at that material time was the formation of the Interim National Government?
for one to have a vivid picture of what made the last part to be disappointing, he must trace the historical antecedents of the transition programme. The transition did not take an evolutionary process. The problem began with the formation and composition of the Political Bureau, what it did and how the Government responded to its so-called national assignment. It bears no repeating here for we have said much about it elsewhere.

Added to that is that many Nigerians were indiscriminately banned and disqualified from partisan politics. They were allowed to participate at a later stage when, may be, the Government thought their coming in might not cause any disgrace to its plan. The so-called new breeds performed disappointedly.

Political parties were created and funded by fiat. The spirit of partisanship was dampened. The parties, naturally became no more than government parastatals, hence, pliable tools in the hands of the military.

States were created, arguably, not for the betterment of people, but for wooing their support so that the Government could astutely perpetuate itself in power.

The Structural Adjustment Programme was introduced and all its conditionalities were implemented. Democracy and its process cannot gain any ground if SAP is in operation. The Nigerian society was pulverised and pauperised.

Institutions and other bodies like MAMSER, DFFRI, BETTER LIFER, CDS and Peoples' Banks were all established, all in the name of political and economic experimentation. Where is the significance of such set ups? Why despite them the transition ended up in crisis?

The transition was also characterised by a lot of shift of date of handing over power, to the civilians. 1990 was initially set aside as the year. Later on 1992 then January 1993 and then pushed to August 1993. All these were done in the name of a learning process.

Then, how realistic was the contention that the June 12 poll was nullified in the interest of democracy, national unity and stability? Well, from the foregoing, one could be right if he judges the transition programme and ends up by saying that the election was not annulled for the sake of what was said to have been responsible for the annulment. Rather, it was annulled so that the military could continue in power. For Nigerians to be convinced, other reasons, cogent enough, must be provided. We cannot believe a regime which all well-meaning people believe to be the most corrupt and dubious in the political history of Nigeria to tell us that it annulled the election because it was characterised

by bribery and corruption. What credentials has it to argue along this line?

Regarding the mortgaging of the security of the country, we shall say that this could be an after-thought on the part of the Government. Even if it has cogent reason to say that, people may not believe. This because it took many seeming-dangerous decisions against Nigerians and nothing happened, why then should it not transpire what it felt could threaten the security of their beloved nation? Didn't Government's refusal to disclose, in clear terms, what the mortgaging really entails put the so-called security into serious threat?

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CHAPTER FIVE

5:0 THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN ELITE IN THE 1985-1993 TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE PROGRAMME : DATA ANALYSIS

Throughout this work, the term Elite refers to a group of people who have not only acquired education but have also acquired economic and political power. This naturally is followed by social relevance to the Nigerian society. In Nigeria, this group is divided into sub-groups with sometimes different relationship with each other. These sub-groups are the military which is a professional group but which has differed from other professional Elite groups because it has control over power. Next to the military elite is intellectual group. These are mostly found within the walls of the Nigerian universities and the research institutes. They have the singular feature of providing the intellectual framework for the ruling regime. And they are also noted critics of government and its policies. It is in this regard that they achieve their prominence.

The politicians are also another sub-group. These are the political actors who sometimes have a professional background until recently those from the ivory- tower have not been very keen in the Nigerian politics and politicking. The professional sub-group comprises those who have acquired economic and social relevance through their specialisation in

either the business or technical and vocational sectors. These are usually passive when it comes to political matters but they are often called upon to give advice or to handle mammoth contracts by the Nigerian Government. The media as another sub-group of the elite in Nigeria comprises of the electronic media of which the Government is mostly the owner and the print media which is owned by government and private media houses. Over the years, they have been the voice of the Nigerian government and the other elite sub-groups. The last sub-group includes the clergy and the traditional rulers. This sub-group because of its relative proximity to the common man always serves as a bridge between Government and the common man. It also serves as a legitimising institution to incumbent Governments and their policies.

From the foregoing analysis of the 1985-1993 military-brokered transition programme, this thesis is of the view that the role played by the various Nigerian elite groups (the military, the politicians, the intellectuals, the bureaucrats, the members of the media, the traditional rulers and the clergy) in the programme was what determined the fate of the programme.

The Military:

It is noteworthy to remember the fact that the military has been behind whatever political manoeuvering in the political process of Nigeria. Over a long period, the Nigerian military has evolved a level of sophistication from its

colonial army of occupation (the Nigerian military is colonial in creation with all the implications of this fact), and as a result of this their dexterity in the management of power and crisis control, has appreciably increased. The military have now grown to the position of arm-chair political directors employing the services of the various elite sub-groups to further their selfish interests. We see this clearly in the way and manner the military has stage-managed the 1985-1993 transition agenda where the military made use of the various elite sub-groupings to buttress and further its interests to maintain power in the Nigerian political scheme of things. This has the effect of strengthening the military's socio-economic influence in the society at large.

It is those same factors that the military utilised in, for instance, the creation of the Political Bureau of which membership was not only from the intellectual sub-group of the Nigerian elite but were hand-picked by the military. The military were to show themselves as incapable of the political will and action that could move the Nigerian state from the undemocratic state in which it is to a democratically viable nation state.

It is in the light of the above fact that the military's blanket banning of the politicians one should understand the military's incompetence. The military, it should be assumed, should know that no matter how corrupt the Nigerian politicians have become, it is nonetheless foolhardy for the

military to think that the corruption has encompassed most or all of the members of the politicians. So erroneously or calculatedly we see the military banning and disqualifying able minds of the political group. In their place, mediocres were encouraged to occupy political offices.

The attendant consequence of that act was to give the military an upper hand in the matter of tampering with its self-made project. That the military cancels elections, proscribes political associations and creates new "political parties" are indicative of the military's insincerity and ability to manoeuvre in order to further its own interests. This,the military did at the expense of returning of power to the political group. The political group in many instances were used to justify those acts of the military.

The Babangida military regime came into power as a populist regime, populist in the sense that it pretended to be conscious of, and determined to repudiate the dictatorial tendencies of the Buhari military government which ousted the Second Republic civilian regime. Having won over the Nigerian citizenry with its 'benevolence' and 'openness' in its policies, for example, the debate on the International Monetary fund (IMF) loan, the regime embarked on a transition programme which was filled with loopholes, booby traps and 'experimentation' under the guise of learning process and social engineering.

The establishment of the political Bureau by the military was elitist in nature as the membership did not cut across various shades of opinion, because the membership was drawn through nomination in the country. This denied many competent minds from participating in the exercise. And as the composition of the membership of the Bureau was elitist so also was its Report because those who spoke or wrote to the Bureau in form of, for instance, memoranda were not the common people, coupled with its recommndation for experimentation of the transition agenda . This marked the beginning of setting the transition programme into calamity.

The indiscriminate ban and disqualification of various categories of Nigerians in the name of cleansing the hazy political atmosphere of the country, and in their place, supplanted with the so-called new breed politicians, were a greater demonstration of insincerity.

With the benefit of hindsight, the military in connivance with the National Electoral Commission (NEC) set up stringent guidelines for the formation and registration of political parties which in all honesty the possibility of meeting the requirement was zero.

Therefore, the submission of the six political association by the NEC for the military to consider, which it did not, was also another demonstration of the hidden agenda syndrome - the desire by the military to create and fund two

parties by fiat. As we know, parties always evolve and crystallise as a result of various peoples with common political aspirations coming together to achieve those aspirations. But the two parties created and funded by the military decree ended up as if they were government parastatals. This gave the military room to twist the parties at will as the politicians played into the hands of the military by joining those parties.

The embracement of the Western imperialist slogan of market economy in the name of structural adjustment programme (SAP) by the military also allowed it to have firm grip on the transition programme as the Nigerian society was economically handicapped, hence politically crippled as economics and politics are indispensable to one another.

The military also changed, at will, the handover date four times, from 1990 to 1992; from 1992 to January 1993; and then to August 1993. This was a ploy to have more time to grip on the control of the destiny of the programme.

Similarly, with the benefit of hindsight, the military's choice of option A4 out of a number of options proffered by the NEC, was probably done bearing in mind the fact that it was bound to be cumbersome and crisis-ladened with its requirements that sixty (60) candidates each from each party from each state of the federation to be considered for the presidency.

Despite banning, unbanning and disqualifications, and other draconian acts, the military politically miscalculated and allowed Bashir Tofa and M.K.O Abiola, of the NRC and SDP, respectively, to contest the presidential seat, thinking that crisis could erupt somewhere along the line so that it could find alibi to sideline the election and the contestants, thereby to prolong its stay in power.

Therefore, the role played by the military as the initiator of the transition programme was that of insincerity as it shackled the programme with so many over-regulations, hence, the programme did not take its normal course.

The Politicians:

The inability of the politicians to form a formidable group to either reject their banning and disqualification by the military or to stay off the transition process was a demonstration of immobilism. And their readiness to seek for party formation and registration amidst the stringent guideline was an exhibition of both dishonesty and gullibility. Dishonesty in the sense that they knew that they could not meet the requirement of the set rules and regulations but they went ahead to take part in the exercise. And gullibility in the sense that their desire to capture power, come rain or shine, blindfolded them to the political implications of their readiness to venture into the exercise.

This attempt made them to play into the hands of the military and consequently exposed their dishonesty before the world.

Moreover, their readiness to join the two political parties that were created and funded by military fiat again demonstrated their greed for power because they see political office as a reward rather than a responsibility. They were at liberty to refuse to join either of the parties to save their necks from the political rope thrown on them by the Military. It would have been better to allow the military to continue on the mantle of leadership than to soil their image before the world. In fact, their readiness allowed the military to study their psyche thereby took them for a ride throughout the period of the transition process.

Again, their refusal to pinpoint any accusing finger at the military for changing the handover date four times was a manifestation of their pliability. This gave birth to the scuttling of the transition process by the military at will as the politicians appeared to be passive and errand-boys of the military not knowing that they were swimming in rocky and stormy water.

And in the final analysis, the nullification of the June 12 poll clearly demonstrated the absence of unity, mobilism, doggedness and commitment to politics and politicking as well by the politicians as they were reluctant to pursue for the de-annulment of the election. The political group demonstrated its ignorance of the mechanics of power manipulation, when in

the National Assembly, some of the members started clamouring for Babangida to continue with the leadership of this country. It may be observed that this group of politicians .may have reached that view point as a result of their ignorance of how to continue with the leadership of the country at that material time. And so they felt the only option available was the "able" hand of the military that invariably has brought the country to that point of political development. In any case, the Assembly as a whole did not mount any attack on either the Babangida regime or even those who were clamouring for Babangida to stay on. And their readiness to accept appointments such as ministerial post under the General Abacha government ostensibly pinpointed their greed and lack of commitment to politics and politicking, thus they aided the continuation of military rule in Nigeria.

On the whole, the Nigerian politicians as a sub-group of the elite in Nigeria have shown themselves as lacking in understanding of the total concept of politics and what - it entails. Patriotism for their motherland is still far away from their thoughts and actions. They prefer to see politics as a lucrative business where they can invest and wait for' their personal dividends. They have so far failed to • Lee politics as a profession and a vocation -- an all - life affair which requires skills that is meant for the benefit of everybody in society. These attitudes are unequivocally the problems of the Politicians. As a Nigerian elite sub-group,

the politicians have not displayed any difference from the military, the intellectual and the media in terms of their feelings and actions toward their motherland. Their role in the transition programme was that of immobilism, dishonesty, pliability, immaturity and gullibility which weakened them and turned them into political pawns, touts and floaters in the hand of the military.

The Intellectuals:

It is a stark reality that the Babangida military regime made use of the intelligentsia more than any other regime in the political history of Nigeria as they were appointed political advisers, chairmen of various agencies and institutions and ministers in the Babangida government.

Over the years, the most vocal among the intellectuals, particularly those who hail from the academic circles, were known with a culture of criticising government policies. They exposed the regime of the First Republic as conservative; that of Gowon as corrupt; that of Murtala as progressive; that of Shagari as corrupt and conservative, and that of Buhari as fascistic.

But surprisingly, they adopted a culture of silence with the advent of the Babangida regime. Their radical opinion in retrospect produced no dividend, therefore, they took to silence as their opinion was rejected already by previous

governments. Two, their morale was lowered or dampened by the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR).

They were cunningly and astutely embraced by the Babangida government. They served in agencies like MAMSER, NEC, CDS and DFFRI. They were the architects of all the political and social engineering in the name of transition. They turned the country into a huge political laboratory where all sorts of weird theories were tried.

However, it is noteworthy that those institutions and agencies they served were mere duplication of those that existed before them. For example, in the creation of MAMSER one finds a duplication of the local, state and federal governments' Departments and Ministries of Information. NDE displaced the work of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity. DFFRI on the other hand usurped local government and State Departments of Agriculture. The Departments of political science of the Nigerian Universities were frustrated by the creation of the CDS. And the Mathematical Centre situated in Abuja usurped the role of the Departments of Mathematics across the Nigerian Universities.

The regime cunningly absorbed them into its scheme of things to silence them. They followed the regime religiously up to its dying days. This act of blind followership depicts the Nigerian intellectual group as selfish for all to see. The role, therefore, played by the intellectuals in the transition process, was that of sheer or crass opportunism as they became

military apologists by playing up to the gallery.

Closely associated with the intellectual elite group are the students who often look up to their tutors for guidance. These are simply an appendage to this elite group. This means that the intellectual elite group always use them to buttress their interests. This can be seen from the fact that the national union of students adopts socialism as their ideological compass quite in line with their teachers. The students also have demonstrated this penchant in their support for their teachers during the ASUU national crisis with the government.

The Professionals:

As observed earlier, the professional elite group is another formidable group in the classification of the elite in Nigeria. In this sub-group are found the members of the judiciary, the bureaucrats, the technocrats, the business group and bankers. It is the submission of thesis that the military have also incorporated this sub-group in the transition programme. It is noteworthy to start with the judiciary .

The judiciary which comprises highly professionalised lawyers and judges were often made the monitors of the Constitution Drafting Committee and over and above this it was the judge who adjudicate between the Government which was represented by NEC on the one hand and the SDP, for example,

on the other. Here one may say that over the issue of the June 12, the SDP was representing the two political parties. The flagrant disregard of Court orders by the NEC and the lack of political sophistication in considering political matters on the part of the Courts and their judges culminated in the political impasse of the transition programme.

The technocrats on the other hand and in conjunction with the business and banking sections handled the aspects of contracts and advised the Government on vital economic and strategic issues. The military sub-group found recourse to them in the political stalemet of 1993 When the military hand-picked Chief Earnest Shonekan to head the Interim National Government. This was a very clever ploy because these sections have been silent in the political drama of the country. So the feeling of their impartiality is strengthened in the minds of Nigerians and even within the ranks of the Nigerian Elite. This also boosted the image of the military government abroad.

The nature of the Nigerian bureaucracy changed dramatically right from the Murtala regime when the position of the permanent secretary was changed to a political appointment. This bred a sense of insecurity to the bureaucrats. Moreover, the 1988 Civil Service Reform professionalised the Civil Service prior to which there was the office of the permanent secretary as the chief accounting officer of all ministries, state and federal levels of government. The office was changed to that of Director General

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(DG) and was politicised. If a government comes, it appoints him, and while going, it goes with him.

Before that time, the Permanent Secretary rose, as a civil servant, to the rank of the Permanent Secretary. But with the reform a Minister or Commissioner becomes the Chief accounting officer of the Ministry. Therefore, each Ministry was professionalised. For instance, the Minister of Education rose to the rank as a teacher, so also the Minister of Finance who rose to the post as a career Civil Servant. But with the reform anybody can be appointed to occupy the posts no matter his civil service career.

It was also during the 1988 reform that the organisational structures of ministries were rationalised. For example, the eight Departments were reduced to Personnel Management; Finance and Supply; Planning; Research and Statistics Departments for (according to the reformers) effective co-ordination and reduction of the overhead costs. And at local government level before the reform, the Secretary was the Chief Accounting Officer, but with the reform, the chairman is the chief accounting officer as signatory to cheques as well as Director of personnel management. The Departments were reduced to three, and the career offices were professionalised.

The political implications of the reform were that of politicisation of the offices of the Directors General and Permanent Secretaries, thus, the likelihood of incompetence

and dancing to the tunes of god-father, corruption, dampening the morale of the career Civil Servants as they can not aspire to be the Director General.

One of the fundamental features of all civil servants is that of non-partisanship. But during the 1985 to 1993 transition programme they were made to dance to the tune of the military as they were afraid of losing their jobs. They danced to the gallery of the Military by implementing whatever they were asked to do so, particularly those of them whose offices were politicised.

Therefore, the role played by the bureaucrats in the transition process was that of subservience or total loyalty to the power that be as opposed to their ideal role of non-partisanship which consequently affected the profession as a lot of them did not know whether they were civil servants or politicians.

The members of the media:

During the Ironsi period, the media in the Northern part of Nigeria was not in good terms with that regime. Apart from condemning the massacre of the Sardauna by Nzeagwu, the Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo went ahead to condemn General Ironsi's Decree 34 which abolished the four regions as they saw the act as a clear move towards establishing an Ibo hegemony in the country.

The Nigerian media criticised the Gowon regime via the Politicians as it declined in 1974 to return the country to civil rule. The media also condemned the regime for its corruption and even aided in the ousting of the regime by the Murtala forces. The media popularised this new regime through the intellectuals who saw it as a messiah. The popular Addis Ababa adage of "Africa has come of age" was publicised by intellectuals through the media.

The media went along with the Obasanjo government as they saw it as an off-shoot of the Murtala's. With the return to civil rule, they enjoyed the dictum of expression of opinion as various political parties and governments made use of them.

The atmosphere changed completely at the inception of the Buhari military government. The media were shackled by the regime's Decrees 2,3,4 and 7 during which many journalists were arrested and detained, for instance, Mrs. Tunde Irabo and Thompson of the Guardian newspapers as well as Mallams Hamza Aminu and Abubakar G. Sule of the Amana newspaper.

It with the inception of the Babangida government, the media went along with him as they were given 'freedom' except in certain cases. In fact, it was the media that gave Babangida the political colouration of IBB, Maradona and so on. The media in the southern part of the country only parted company with the regime when the June 12 poll was annulled.

The regime promulgated Decrees 35, 43, and 48 in relation to what it called "the abandonment of the press of the cardinal tenet of truth, objectivity and self-restraint, moderation and a due sense of responsibility". The Decree 35 empowered the president to proscribe or authorise the seizure and confiscation of any publication, newspaper or magazine which contained anything inimical to handing over power to civilians, and could disturb peace and public order.

To that effect, the Concord Group which is made up, among others, of the African Concord owned by Chief Abiola; the Punch Group which is made up, among others, of the punch, the Saturday and Sunday punch, the Sketch Group, which is made up, among others, of Daily Sketch and Sunday Sketch, were all proscribed and their circulation was prohibited and their premises shut.

On the whole, it is to say that the Nigerian Media had displayed an appreciable degree of immaturity because they tend to play the role of mediocre in the transition period. Their corruption that is manifested in the popular brown envelope syndrome made them subserviant to the military. Worse still is their penchant for deliberate false reporting. The Media during this period tended to fan the embers of divisiveness and unpatriotism. In this way, they represented all the attributes of the segment of the Nigerian elite who are selfish.

The concluding sections of the Nigerian elite sub-groupings whose role needs mention here are the traditional rulers and the clergy.

The traditional rulers and the clergy have assumed their prominence in Nigeria's socio-political arrangements as a res lt of their closeness to the people. The traditional institution enjoys the people's popularity as a result of their historical significance which still commands respect from the society. In the Northern part of Nigeria, pious figures like Usman Dan Fodio and their achievements spiritually and politically are still venerated and the words and actions of their great grand children (the traditional rulers and the clergy) are worthy of emulation.

In the Southern part of the country where the religious affinity is to christianity, the people still see their clergy as the embodiment of fairness and love. This has given them the rare quality of being most close to the people who they meet with at least once every week. The overall effect of this relationship creates respect for the opinions of the christian Clergy not only in spiritual matters but also in socio-political as well as economic matters.

During the period of the transition, these groups had managed to stay clear of partisan politics. But it is good to note that the military had adequately made use of them to rubber stamp their policies and programmes. Traditionally, the

Nigerian constitutions through the years have elevated them to the level of fathers of the nation who, though, very close to the people, must not be 'soiled with politics'. But this for any observer is mere theory because the traditional rulers often justify and then legitimise whatever government comes to power. We often see the traditional rulers being called upon to pacify the Nigerian populace in moments of crises. This often happen during the military regimes. Examples here can be found in the various calls for peace by traditional rulers during the June 12 political trauma. Closely associated with these role were the role played by the Clergy. This group played the subserviant role in the transition process by rubber stamping government policies.

5:1 Pilot Survey

Pilot Survey is a survey conducted at a lesser degree before the main statistical survey.By lesser degree, we mean taking a smaller sample size and smaller area of coverage compared to the sample size and area of coverage of the main survey.

Significance of Pilot Survey

One, pilot survey provides an opportunity to determine the workability or otherwise of the questionnaire designed before the main survey.

Two,it affords the adjustment of the administration of the questionnaire.For instance, you may realise in the process of the administration of your questionnaire that your population target are always available at a particular time of the day, so you have to adjust so as to get them for this purpose.

Three, based on the proper conduct of the pilot survey, a researcher can better estimate the cost, manpower requirements and other resources needed for the main survey.

Four, to the enumerators and supervisors recruited for the exercise, the pilot survey will serve as a testing ground for them. For example, enumerators who performed very poorly during the pilot survey, may either be re-trained or dropped completely before the main survey.

In sum, therefore, pilot survey allows a researcher to assess the suitability of the questionnaire and gives an insight into possible areas of correction, amendment and incorporation.

The report of the various enumerators who participated in the pilot survey greatly assisted us to better equip the enumerators to participate in the main survey vis-a-vis the difficulties encountered in the pilot survey.

For the interview, 100 people were randomly sampled during the pilot survey in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria; Federal College of Education, Zaria; Zaria-City and University

of Abuja. 40 people were selected from ABU and 20 were selected from F.C.E, Zaria and the same number from Zaria-City and Abuja University. For the questionnaire, 500 people were randomly selected (100 each) from Sabon Gari, Ikara, Kaduna South, Saminaka and Chukun Local Government Areas.

5:2 RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON THE 1985 - 93 TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE PROGRAMME INTERVIEW : THE ELITE VIEWS

Structured or written interview was adopted to avoid bias. This is in the sense that questions were posed to individual respondents in the same way and sequence. This method is more official and orderly. Stratified random sampling was adopted for data collection. This is because, we realised that there were two categories of members of the Constitutional Conference. Category 1 are those who were duly elected by the electorate in their respectivestates,nationwide. And category 2 are those who were nominated by the incumbent Abacha military government.

We were of the view that the nominated members might have different political orientation, philosophy and d ideas from those members that were democratically elected.

From the population of 353 members, 230 belonged to stratum A, that is the democratically elected members, while the remaining 123 belonged to stratum B. But after the preliminary analysis of data collected from the two categories of respondents, we realised that there wasn't any significant difference in the opinion held by the two categories of respondents as earlier hypothesised. Hence, the merger of strata A and B.

Since it has been established that there is no difference between strata A and B, we now treat the two population as one, giving us a total population of 353 Constitutional Conference members out of which a sample of 250 respondents was drawn using the simple random sampling technique (SRS). SRS is a process of drawing n sample from N population in such a way that each and every element of population N is given equal chance of selection.

Out of 250 members of the National Constitutional Conference interviewed on the assessment of the 1985-1993 transition programme, 210 respondents representing 84% of the sample were of the view that the exercise was a failure. See the table below.

Table 5A.1

Respondents' views on the success or failure of the transition programme.

Response	No of response	%
Success	40	16
Failure	210	84
Total	250	100

Source:Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

Empirical evidence will make us agree with those who view the transition programme as a failure. This is so when we consider the claims of the initiator of the programme that it

set to handover power to civilians. The programme was long and tortuous. In fact, the Murtala\Obasanjo transition agenda was a success when we consider the way and manner the enunciated programme was executed meticulously and religiously.

The table shows clearly that even within the Elite the transition programme has not been rated highly. That the interview was taken from the National Constitutional Conference should leave no one in doubt as regards to the failure of the Transition programme. The NCC drew its members from across the Nigerian society. It is needles to say that those elected including those who were nominated by the Government were all people with a remarkable degree of interest in politics and politicking in Nigeria. So their opinion must carry some weight.

On the issue of the blanket banning and disqualification of certain categories of people from partisan politics by the military, 205 respondents representing 82% of the sample were of the view that the act was unjustifiable. See the table below.

Table 5A.2

Respondents' views on the blanket banning and disqualification of certain categories of people from partisan politics by the military.

Response	No. of response	%
Justifiable	45	18
Unjustifiable	205	82
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995

On the blanket banning and disqualification of certain categories of people, we concur with those respondents who view the act as unjustifiable in the sense that the act was indiscriminate. By and large, the reason advanced by the Military for taking that draconian decision - to clean the "polluted political atmosphere" of the country was unrealistic and defeated. Unrealistic and defeat because if the Military was sincere it would have allowed those with undenied records to participate in the programme right from the word go. But since it was looking for pliable tools it introduced the NEW BREED syndrome, the step which was also defeated. In short, despite the so-called political experimentation, the programme colourfully called "broadly - based" did not lead the country to a Third Republic.

On the issue of the establishment of such agencies like MAMSER and Centre for Democratic Studies, 150 respondents representing 60% of the sample were of the view that it was irrelevant to the transition process. See table below

Table 5A.3

Respondents' views on the establishment of agencies like MAMSER and Center for Democratic Studies.

Response	No. of response	%
Relevant	100	40
Irrelevant	150	60
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995

That the military have only used white elephant programmes like MAMSER and Centre for Democratic Studies to way-lay the public has been corroborated by the survey. That the large percentage of those interviewed were of the opinion

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that these creation (of MAMSER and CDS) were irrelevant to the Transition Programme. It is unfortunate that despite this irrelevance, a lot of material (human and economic) were lost in maintaining them. It is only natural that this affected the overall economy of the nation as resources are in dire need in other vital sectors of the socio-economic life of the nation.

With regard to the creation and funding of the two political parties (NRC and SDP) by government fiat, 230 respondent, representing 92% of the sample were of the view that act was irrelevant. See the table bellow.

Table 5A.4

Respondents' views on the creation and funding of the two political parties by government fiat.

Response	No. of response	%
Relevant	20	8
Irrelevant	230	92
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

We are congruent with those who view the creation and funding of the two parties by government fiat as irrelevant in that the rules and regulations set for registering the political associations were stringent and the two parties were reduced to government parastatals. Therefore, the parties did not take a natural course. And the act of creating political parties by government is simply undemocratic.

Pertaining to the readiness of the Politicians in joining either of the parties, 150 respondents representing 60% of the sample viewed it as unjustifiable. See the table below.

Table 5A.5

Respondents' views on the readiness of the Politicians in joining either NRC or SDP.

Response	No. of response	%
Justifiable	100	40
Unjustifiable	150	60
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

On the other hand, we are at one with those who view the readiness of the politicians in joining the two parties as unjustifiable because their doing so paved the ways for the Military to twist them at will, thereby became pliable tools by playing in the hands of the military. This had serious consequences on the transition programme on the one hand and politics and politicking in Nigeria generally.

When they were asked on why the military did not hand over power in 1993, 200 respondents representing 80% of the sample said it was because the military did not want to go. See the table bellow.

Table 5A.6

Respondents' views on why the military did not hand over power in 1993.

Response	No. of response	%
Unwillingness of the military to go	200	80
Electoral malpractices	50	20
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

We are also in the company of those of the view that the military did not handover power in 1993 fundamentally because it was not willing to go. It over stayed in power, and in retrospect of what it did in the transition process, it pays to say that it wanted to continue clinging on the mantle of leadership. This has also been proved by the props the military created to help it maintain strong hold on power in the country.

When asked on the reasons advanced by the military on the nullification of the June 12 poll, 200 of the respondents representing 80% said the reasons were not genuine. See the table below.

Table 5A.7

Respondents' views on the reasons given by the military on annulment of the June 12 polls.

Response	No. of response	%
Genuine	50	20
ingenuine	200	80
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

On the reasons advanced by the military for the nullification of the June 12 poll, the respondents' view that they were ingenuine may be rested on the fact that the military was more corrupt than any government we had in the country. The military may not have the moral courage to annul the election on that thesis or if it annulled the election on that thesis there could be other reasons behind the curtain.

On the 1988 Civil Service Reform, 221 of the respondents representing 88.4% of the sample viewed it as unideal. See the table below.

Table 5A.8

Respondents' views on the 1988 Civil Service Reform.

Response	No. of response	%
Ideal	29	11.6
Unideal	221	88.4
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

That concurs with this Thesis's view that the Reform only created more problems in the Nigerian civil service. It goes without Saying that the already weak civil service was further weakened by the innovations of the military. The politicisation of certain offices portend more troubled days for the Nigerian civil service as pinpointed earlier on.

On the Decrees 34, 35 and 38 promulgated by the military on the media, 200 hundred of the respondent viewed it as unideal. See the table bellow.

Table 5A.9

Respondents' views on Decrees 34, 35 & 38 on the Media.

Response	No. of response	%
Ideal	50	20
Unideal	200	80
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

The response of the people interviewed on the question regarding Decrees 34,35 and 38 on the media shows that both the media and the military have their peculiar problems. Both the media and the military are protecting their interest as elite not the interests of the common people. They only

squabble when one group treads on the path of the other. It also hints on the dictatorial tendencies of the Military when it is faced with formidable opposition.

On the role played by the military in the transition programme, 200 respondent representing 80% of the sample said it played a negative role. See the table below.

Table 5A.10

Respondents' views on the role played by the military in the Transition programme.

Response	No. of response	%
Positive	50	20
Negative	200	80
Neutral	nil	nil
total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

On the role played by the intellectuals in the transition, 230 respondents representing 92% of the sample said the role was negative. See the table below

Table 5A.11

Respondents' views on the role played by the intellectuals in the Transition programme.

Response	No. of response	%
Positive	20	8
Negative	230	92
Neutral	nil	nil
total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

On the role played by the politicians, 155 of the respondent representing 62% of the sample said they played a negative role. See the table below.

Table 5A.12

Respondents' views on the role played by the Politicians in the Transition programme.

Response	No. of response	%
Positive	95	38
Negative	155	62
Neutral	nil	nil
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

On the role played by the members of the media, 186 of the respondent representing 74.4% of the sample said they played a negative role. See the table bellow.

Table 5A.13

Respondents' views on the role played by the members of the media in the Transition programme.

Response	No. of response	%
Positive	64	25.6
Negative	186	74.4
Neutral	nil	nil
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

On the role played by the bureaucrats, 110 of the respondent representing 44% of the sample said they played a negative role. see the table below.

Table 5A.14

Respondents' views on the role played by the bureaucrats in the Transition programme.

Response	No. of response	%
Positive	80	32
Negative	110	44
Neutral	60	24
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

Tables 10-14 above indicate the role played by the various elite groups. We agree that the role was negative, ranging from insincerity, sycophancy, pliability, apology and subservience. For example, the 1988 Civil Service Reform had politicised the bureaucracy, and to a certain extent the promulgated decrees on the media were draconian.

The media, apart from their sycophancy, encourage divisiveness, ethnicity and sectional politics and politicking. This understanding, probably helped the military to promulgate those decrees that shackled the media. The politicians on the other hand were not quite different from the members of the media in the sense that they had no coherent vision of politics and politicking. This gave them the outlook of ethnic warriors and sectionalists which greatly undermine their patriotism. The intellectuals gave the theoretical framework of the military's misadventure in politics and future prominently in the day-to-day formulation and execution of the policies of the military. For the

bureaucrats and or technocrats, the story is no different. They followed the military in all its policies here and there aiding the military with advice that it needed to continue steering the political ship of Nigeria.

Pertaining to the fate of the June 12 poll, 160 of the respondent representing 64% of the sample said it was a by-gone issue. See the table bellow.

Table 5A.15

Respondents' views on the fate of the June 12 polls.

Response	No. of response	%
Alive	71	28.4
Dead	160	64
Pending	19	7.6
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

On how Nigeria can move forward, 160 of the respondents representing 64% of the sample said it should be through federal character. See the table below.

Table 5A.16

Respondents' views on what can move Nigeria forward.

Response	No. of response	%
Federal Character	160	64
Actualization of june 12	71	28.4
Pending	19	7.6
Total	250	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1994-1995.

Tables 15 and 16 above on the fate of the June 12 polls and how Nigeria can move forward can be understood thus: That there is no pointer to the actualisation of the election as the power that annulled it is gone as well as the institutions and structures that brought about the June 12 polls. The politicians are not serious as they are opportunists. In short, the election is gone though for the crisis that greeted its annulment to be resolved, the election must be revisited. And this will provide the way forward for Nigeria not the Kangaroo or stage-managed arrangement in form of federal character, rotational presidency or any other hotch-potch.

5:3 RESPONDENTS' (POPULAR \ NON-ELITE) VIEWS ON THE 1985-1993 TRANSITION PROGRAMME QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTERED IN SIX STATES OUT OF THE 30 STATES OF THE FEDERATION.

In each zone out of the six zonal arrangement for the presidency, one state is picked to represent the zone. In this survey, middle Belt is represented by Plateau state; North-west is represented by Sokoto state; North-East is represented by Taraba state; South-West is represented by Ogun state; South-South is represented by Rivers state; while South East is represented by Anambra state. In each zone, 500 questionnaire were administered, totaling 3000 questionnaires.

On the impact of the political Bureau on the Transition Programme, 2010 respondent representing 66.33% of the sample said it was a failure. see the table bellow.

Table 5B.1

Respondents' views on the impact of the political Bureau on the Transition programme.

Response	No. of response	%
Success	990	32.67
Failure	2,010	66.33
Total	3000	99.00

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

On the issue of blanket banning and disqualification of certain categories of people from partisan politics at the initial stage of the 1985-93 transition programme, 1900 respondents representing 63.27% of the sample said the act was irrelevant. see the table below

Table 5B.2

Respondents' views on the blanket banning and disqualification of certain categories of people from partisan politics at the initial stage of the Transition programme.

Response	No. of response	%
Relevant	700	23.3
Irrelevant	1900	63.27
I don't know	400	13.32
Total	3000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

On whether the establishment of such agencies as MAMSER, Center for Democratic Studies and so on was relevant to the transition programme, 1,800 of the respondents representing 59.94% of the sample said NO. See the table below.

Table 5B.3

Respondents' views on agencies like MAMSER, CDS and so on.

Response	No. of response	%
Yes	1,200	39.96
No	1,800	59.94
Total	3,000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

On the creation and funding of the two political parties- NRC and SDP by government fiat, 2,100 of the respondents representing 69.93% of the sample viewed the act as irrelevant. see the table below.

Table 5B.4

Respondents' views on the creation and funding of the two political parties by government fiat.

Response	No. of response	%
Relevant	900	29.97
Irrelevant	2,100	69.93
Total	3,000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

The creation of the two political parties marked a historical event for the first time in the political history of Nigeria. Political parties were created and funded by government. The consequence of this act is seen by this study firstly as undemocratic, then as a dictatorial act of the military. The respondents of the questionnaire on the relevance or other wise of this political party creation see it as irrelevant for the obvious reason that apart from the newness of the act of creating political parties by the government but also for the reason that the political parties in the long run turned out to be an extension of the government institution.

Tables 1,2 and 3 above talk of the Political Bureau, banning and MAMSER respectively. The Bureau was central to the transition programme of the military. It therefore occupied an essential position right from the beginning of the Babangida military government. It has been the view of this thesis that the onus of the transition agenda laid on the propositions of

the Bureau. The failure or success of the programme then was a responsibility of the Bureau. This thesis is of the opinion that the Bureau did not do its home work well. This consequently gave room for the Political misadventure of 1985-1993. Some of the suggestions of the Political Bureau were " seemed only founded on myths. Suggestions like sanitisation of the political terrain of the country gave the military the idea of blanket banning of Political actors. The finding displayed by the survey agree with the propositions of this thesis that both the Bureau and the banning were irrelevant to the transition to civil rule programme. This means that the transition could have done without them.

It is in the light of that, that MAMSER is to be viewed. It was another child from the recommendations of the Political Bureau. Its lack of vision and penchant for theory were its major weaknesses. These hampered the progress of MAMSER in every turn. The sycophantic and propaganda aspects of MAMSER seem to be the only legacy it has left behind in the minds of Nigerians. This is substantiated by the findings of this survey.

On why the politicians joined the parties formed and funded by government fiat, 1,700 of the respondents representing 56.61% of the sample opined that they did so to acquire power and wealth. see the table below.

Table 5B.5

Respondents' views on why the Politicians joined the two parties formed and funded by government fiat.

Response	No. of response	%
They had no alternatives	600	19.99
It was ideal	500	16.65
To acquire power and wealth	1,700	56.61
Others (specify)...	---	---
I don't know	200	6.66
Total	3000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

The selfish interest of the politicians was clearly depicted by the respondents' views as the chief aim of the politicians. The respondents pointed out power and wealth as the major goals of the politicians. This is in harmony with the analysis of this thesis which sees them as a bunch of people after power for its material benefits. It therefore goes without saying that this sub-group of the Nigerian elite is no more different from the military, the media or even the intellectual sub-groupings of the Nigerian elite.

On whether or not the politicians accepted the ban and disqualification, 1,700 respondents representing 56.61% of the sample said yes they accepted the act. see the table below.

Table 5B.6

Respondents' views on why they accepted/not accepted their banning and disqualification.

Response	No. of response	%
Yes	1,700	56.61
No	600	19.98
I don't know	700	23.31
Total	3000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

The fact that the views of the respondents largely point out to the acceptance of the banning by the politicians is an indication agreeing with this thesis which sees the politicians as ignorant of the mechanics of power manipulation. They also lack coherent vision for their country and the repercussions of certain political actions like banning and the disqualification of political actors to the Nigerian body politic. Their acceptance also clearly shows their subservience to the military.

On the part of those who did not subscribe to the reasons advanced by the government, 2000 of the respondent representing 66.6% of the sample were of the view that the election was annulled because the military did not want to relinquish power. See the table below.

Table 5B.7

Respondents' views representing those who did not subscribe to the reasons advanced by the military for nullifying the June 12 polls.

Response	No. of response	%
The military didn't want to go	2000	66.6
The election was the fairest and freest ever held in Nigeria	200	6.66
Since it was held, it shouldn't be annulled.	300	9.99
All of the above.	500	16.65
Total	3000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

The finding of this research on the sincerity of the military to hand over power to the civilians through a carefuly mapped out strategy was seen as a farce by the respondents' views. This strengthens the doubt expressed in this thesis on the seriousness of the military to relinquish power. The apparent neglect of this fact by the politicians, the intellectuals, members of the media, clergy, traditional rulers and the bureaucrats amounted to a conspiracy against the common man and Nigeria.

2,600 respondent representing 86.58% of the sample said the politicians did not pursue the june 12 poll actualization because they called for and participated in the Interim National Government (ING); there were inter and intra party crises and the electorate were indifferent. See the table below.

Table 5B.8

Respondents' views representing those who did not believe the Politicians pursued for the actualisation of the June 12 poll.

Response	No. of response	%
They called for and participated in the ING.	100	3.33
There were inter and intra party crises	200	6.66
The electorate were indifferent.	100	3.33
All of the above.	2,600	86.56
Total	3000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

On the role played the military in the transition programme, 2,600 respondent representing 86.58% of the sample said the role was negative. See the table below.

Table 5B.9

Respondents' views on the role played by the military in the transition programme.

Response	No. of response	%
Positive	400	13.32
Negative	2,600	86.58
Neutral	---	---
Total	3,000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

2,390 respondent representing 79.587% of the sample said the role played by the politicians in the programme was negative. See the table below.

Table 5B.10

Respondents' views on the role played by the politicians in the transition programme.

Response	No. of response	%
Positive	610	20.313
Negative	2390	79.587
Neutral	---	---
Total	3,000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

2,800 respondent representing 93.24% of the sample said the role played by the intellectuals was negative. See the table below.

Table 5B.11

Respondents' views on the role played by the intellectuals in the transition programme.

Response	No. of response	%
Positive	200	6.66
Negative	2,800	93.24
Neutral	---	---
Total	3,000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

2,200 of the respondents representing 73.26 of the sample said the role played by the members of the media was negative. See the table below.

Table 5B.12

Respondents' views on the role played by the members of the media in the transition programme.

Response	No. of response	%
Positive	800	26.64
Negative	2,200	73.26
Neutral	---	---
Total	3,000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

2,100 of the respondents representing 69.93% of the sample said that the role played by the Bureaucrats was negative.

Table 5B.13

Respondents' views on the role played by the Bureaucrats in the transition programme.

Response	No. of response	%
Positive	200	6.66
Negative	2,100	69.93
Neutral	700	23.3
Total	3,000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

As in the analysis of this thesis, the respondents' views in tables 11-18 above see the military's role as negative. This is because, after the span of almost a decade, the military was not only incapable of returning the mantle of leadership to the civilians but have also managed to take the country into a deeper chasm of socio-political crisis and economic doldrums. The thesis and the respondents' views tally on this important point.

In the question of the role of the politicians, the respondents' views are not on the side of the politicians. They feel that the politicians have played a negative role in he transition programme. It is noteworthy that the politicians have been incapacitated both by the military and by their own lack of sophistication. This role has affected in no small measure their respect in the eyes of the public and politics and politicking in the nation. Through this, they have discredited themselves in eyes of the electorate who forms the bulk of the respondents to the thesis's questionnaire.

The role played by the intellectuals has equally been seen as negative. The intellectuals, it should be remembered, provided the intellectual foundations of the transition programme. This sub- group of the Nigerian elite also played key roles in the execution of the military policies. It is interesting to note that the socio-political and economic diseases of the nation were first diagonised by this elite sub-group, and the medications were equally prescribed by them. Understandably, the respondents' views of the intellectuals becomes justified if we consider the total failure of their prescriptions.

The media as another essential sub-group of the Nigerian Elite have played a vital role in the transition programme. The survey of this research work shows that the media like the intellectuals have been identified as part of the problem rather than the solution in the 1985 - 1993 military orchestrated transition programme. The media were also identified as having encouraged socio-political dichotomies of fanning sectional and ethnic interests as against the national and the patriotic ones. Worse still, the media have succumbed to the brown envelop syndrome which totally corrupted them. The professionals- cum- bureaucrats did not play a prominent role in the early part of the transition programme. They were rather contented with giving suggestions on matters relating to the economy and those of strategic significance. But at the dying minutes of the transition programme, the military installed Chief Earnest Shonekan, a prominent member of this sub- group to take care of the political problems it created. Needless to say the experiment failed with the Abacha regime sweeping it aside.

Closely associated with the rest of the elite sub groups are clergy and the traditional rulers who have during those days of the transition played important role in maintaining law and order and loyalty for the military government and its

policies. Because the clergy and the traditional rulers enjoyed a certain degree of respect from the public because they are closer to the people. They have access to them. This sub-group have recently been noted for their callousness in matters of serious importance to the common man. It can be observed that the interest of the common man hardly informs their suggestions to government and they always wave the necessity of peace and stability in the face of the common man whenever he threatens to go berserk.

On what can move Nigeria forward from its political trauma, 1,800 of the respondents' representing 59.94% of the sample said that, that should be rotational presidency. See the table below.

Table 5B.14

Respondents' views on what can move Nigeria forward.

Response	No. of response	%
A fresh election now	200	6.66
Continuation of military rule	200	6.66
Revisitation and actualization of June 12	600	19.98
Rotational presidency	1,800	59.94
Adherence to the current three-year transition programme and Abiola should contest	200	6.66
Total	3,000	100

Source: Author's Survey, 1995.

On the question of moving of Nigeria forward, a greater percentage of those consulted by this survey seemed to opt out for the rotation of the Presidency. The viability of this needs to be seriously studied and the public should be enlightened on the findings of the study. This is because, the system has an in-built problems of further dividing the country along sectional and ethnic interests. Besides, it shows that the Nigerian elite and Nigerians generally are not prepared for unity because inherent in the idea of rotating the number one position in the land goes with distrust between the various components of the country. This further explains how the ideas of the elite influence the thinking of the mass majority. This is because, the idea of the rotational presidency is the elite framework in their wishful thinking to solve their self-created crisis. So the question of rotational presidency would institutionalise ethnic and sectional jingcism.

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5:4 CONCLUSION

From the foregoing survey and analysis, it becomes clear that the respondents' view on the role of the Nigerian elite generally was negative. The cumulative actions of the elite during the transition programme encouraged the formation of these views. That the transition programme failed and with its failure have gone a lot of resources and time proves that the Nigerian Elite is incapable of stirring the nation and its vast human and material resource to greater heights. The role played by each of the sub-grouping only complicated the Nigerian problems.

The elite have been depicted by their actions. Sometimes as unpatriotic who first think of their interests before the interest of the nation. Their neglect of the interests of the common man who they often purport to represent also complicates matters of development of the country. This is because it is impossible for the country to move forward without the masses of its people. The Nigerian Elite have also been caught in the wave of unbridled materialism which makes them easy targets of corruption.

The Nigerian elite have assumed the status of a sectionalist, ethnic, or regional champions. The Nigerian elites are often heard only when their vital interests are under threat. This accounts for why after almost thirty seven (37) years of independence they could not give the country a

philosophy or even an ideology which can forge the country ahead. The fact that Nigeria is made to run around the globe searching for a political system speaks volumes on the incapacities of the Nigerian elite.

This chapter argues that "money bagism" cannot be eradicated in the Nigerian politics so much that political office is regarded to be a reward rather than service . politics in this country has been an investment and every investment is aimed at realising profit. The resultant end of such an indecorous venture is emptying the public coffer and subsequent subjection of the mass majority into Utter poverty.

On the issue of the June 12 presidential polls, this chapter argues that the reasons advanced by the military as to why the election was annulled, are not be cogent enough to warrant the act. In other words, there should be more to it for Nigerians to be convinced. Otherwise, it would be regarded as an after-thought. They would continue to raise and nurse doubts going by the fact that the regime was the most corrupt one and the one which institutionalised corruption in the Nigerian society.

The annulment of the June 12 polls marked the ultimate crises which characterised the 8-year transition programme. Before the June 12 polls so many people were banned and disqualified. However, the Social Democratic Party presidential hopeful in the name of Chief M.K.O. Abiola has

every reason to claim to be on the winning trail going by the results which party and security agents and other electoral agents obtained.

On a serious note, this chapter argues that if the June 12 issue is not seriously and honestly addressed, the Nigerian society may continue to witness perennial political, economic and social problems. Rotational presidency and all that go witn it are mere mysterious political scheme which will only compound the country's pathologies. Yugoslavia is a clear cases in point where rotational presidency subjected the country to untold turmoil.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6:0 - SUMMARY

This study has analysed the role of the Nigerian elite in the 1985-1993 Transition to civil rule. This was done by studying, meticulously, the stages of the transition programme from its embryonic stage up to its final stage during which the 1993 June 12 poll was held. It categorised the Nigerian elite into six groups, namely: the military, the politicians, the intellectuals, the professionals, the members of the press and the traditional rulers and the clergy.

The first chapter dealt with the general features of Nigerian politics from pre-colonial to colonial and post-colonial periods. It portrayed to us that the pre-colonial societies placed high premium on service, accountability, consultation and consensus in their political systems. However, with the advent of colonialism, these societies were incorporated into the orbit of British colonial system in the 19th century, and this act, changed profoundly the societies. With the attainment of independence, the British handed over the power of the state to the indigenous British groomed elements after insidiously sowing seeds of discord within the social and political fibre of the country.

The chapter also included the "Statement of Problem". In this regard it introduced to us that the Babangida military regime had introduced various programmes and policies as ways of preparing theground for handing over power to the civilians: it set up Political Bureau, Constitution Review Committee, Constituent Assembly, MAMSER, two political. Parties, the Centre for Democratic Studies, and so on Lots of money were sunk into what the regime called "political experimentation and social engineering". Elections were held from local government up to the national Levels. However, despite the experimentation of what the regime dubbed "broadly-based" transition programme, power was not handed over to the civilians after the 1993 June 12 polls. In fact, the nullification of the election had put the nation into a political log-jam.

The chapter also comprised the "purpose of study" and its significance. On the purpose of the study, the Chapter explained that the research sought to examine the role played by various Nigerian elite groups in the transition programme. On the "significance of study", it is said to be an analysis of the Babangida transition agenda hoping that the study would enhance our understanding of the Nigerian Political problems and how to go about solving them, and also hoping that the study would serve as a guide for those who might want to re-examine the question in the future.

Moreover, the Chapter included some "hypotheses" which the research wanted to test, for instance, "from its rudimentary stage, the transition programme was designed to fail". They are tentative answers to the research questions. The research method included: secondary (documentary) and primary (interview and questionnaire) sources of data collection. "Scope and limitations of study" are part of this chapter. It was stated that the study was an examination of the IBB Political transition programme from 1985-1993. It was limited by the complexity and contentious nature of the transition agenda.

Another item in the chapter was the "Theoretical Framework". The Elite Theory was chosen to serve as the conceptual approach to the study of the role of the elite in 1985-1993 transition programme. In other words, the examination and the analysis of the role of the elite in the transition programme rest on the perspective of the elite theory which sees society as being divided into the few who possessed power and the majority who did not.

The chapter also consisted of "Literature Review". In this part, related literature was reviewed and attempt is made to fill in gaps created by the reviewed literature.

been a topical one and even many people argue that the plight of the country had almost been the handiwork of the military, hence, they lay the blame at the military's door.

General Babangida, being part and parcel of the military in Nigeria, supplanted the Buhari regime in a palace coup on August 27, 1985. After gathering some momentum, he began to convince Nigerians that he would hand over power to civilians through what he coined as "broadly-based" transition programme as against what he branded as "one-second-photo-finish" transition programme of Murtala\Obasanjo.

To start with, the chapter explained that he established a political Bureau. The Bureau was peopled by selected intellectuals, among others, to review the political-economy of the country with a view to "finding solutions" to its pathologies which led to its backwardness.

The chapter explained and analysed the Report of the Political Bureau as well as the Government White Paper on the Report. Things like points of congruence and incongruence between the Report on one hand, and the Government White Paper on the other, were also pointed out.

However, the chapter concluded that the political Bureau was an ad hoc committee set up by the military, and that the organ laid the ground for a theoretical foundation of a Third Republic. The Report was formulated from the practical experience of the Nigerian elite who wrote or spoke to the members of the Bureau during their nationwide tour.

The Third Chapter dealt, amongst others, with the act of banning of different categories of politicians from partisan politics; the establishment of Mass Mobilisation and Social Justice (MAMSER) and Constitution Review Committee, and Constituent Assembly.

On the issue of banning of different categories of politicians, the chapter argues that indiscriminate banning of them was unjustifiable. On the other hand, it argued that the attitude (response) of the politicians on the act could be regarded as a demonstration of pliability, short-sightedness, immobilism and self-defeat. The political implication of this attitude, the chapter argued, provided the military with a room to guide and control the immediate and future destiny of the transition programme.

It also went beyond seeing the agency for Mass Mobilisation and Social Justice as an agency established by the military to educate the Nigerian citizenry. Rather, it argued that the agency could also be seen as an instrument used by the military to maintain a war with the disappointed political actors, civil right activists and other pressure groups by displaying that the military-evolved political programme was the most successful way to a viable, genuine and lasting Third Republic. That, in summation, was regarded as a propaganda machine.

disorganising the programme.

Chapter Four deals with the Presidential primary elections of 1992, and issues pertaining to the June 12 Presidential polls. On the Presidential primaries, evidences of massive rigging were found. Therefore, the chapter is at one with the power that annulled the primaries. On the June 12 issues, the chapter analysed the conduct of the elections from its beginning to the end. It agreea that the election was peaceful but it was associated with money bagism. It also analysed the formation of the Interim National Government in the wake of the annulment of the June 12 polls.

Chapter Five dealt with meticulous analysis of the role of the various Nigerian elite groups in the transition process by analysing the data collected through the interview it conducted with some members of the defunct National Constitutional Conference, Abuja; as well as the questionnaire it distributed in one of each states in the six rotatory presidential zonal arrangement. The general views of the respondents who were interviewed and those who filled the questionnaire were that the 1985-1993 Transition to Civil rule programme was a failure. Similarly, their views showed that the role played by the various elite groups in the transition programme was negative. The analysis of this thesis dovetailed with the respondents views that the role of the entire elite groups was negative and that the transition agenda was a failure.

6:1 CONCLUSION

On the basis of our findings, we can restate the penchant questions we posed in our statement of problem and see to what extent have they been answered? Thus: How did the transition programme go wrong? why did the transition programme go wrong? These are wedded to the issues raised in our hypotheses.

How the Transition programme went wrong was through experimentation where, for example, the party system was supposed to take a natural course but two political parties were formed and funded by government fiat. And where the initial stipulated handover date was supposed to be followed religiously, it was rather shifted four times. Then, why the programme went wrong was because the elite groups did not play positive role which would exhibit their exuberance in making the programme a success.

From the foregoing, we shall now test our hypotheses to see to what extent have they been validated or otherwise? The membership of the political Bureau was through nomination. Its Report was elitist as those who spoke or wrote to the Bureau in form of memoranda were elites. The Report served as a blueprint for the military dictatorship to implement. Its recommendation for the experimentation of the Transition Programme including its recommendation for banning certain categories of personalities from partisan politics gave the

military-elite more room to legitimise its involvement in politics and to manoeuvre the entire transition process. These recommendations, unequivocally, set a stage for crises and ultimate failure of the transition programme right from the onset. This validates our hypothesis which states that "from its rudimentary stage, the 1985-1993 transition programme was designed by the NIgerian elite to fail".

The role played by the various Nigerian elite groups in the transition programme can be seen thus: The military played insincere role; the politicians played the role of immaturity, immobilism, opportunism; the intellectuals played the role of opportunism and apology; the members of the media played the role of opportunism and sycophancy; and the professionals played the role of subservience and opportunism, while the traditional rulers and clergy played the role of subservience and opportunism. Therefore, the various Elite groups played negative role in the transition process. This role validates our hypothesis which states that "the failure of the 1985-1993 transition programme was the handiwork of the Nigerian elite".

That also indicates that the role played by each elite group, though can generally be dubbed negative, varied. This, therefore, validates our hypothesis which states that "the role played by the Nigerian elites in the 1985-1993 transition to civil rule programme varied".

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The nullification of the June 12 polls plunged Nigeria into serious political trauma which, since the end of the Nigerian civil war, the country did not experience. The annulment would have led to the break away of the country as a single political entity, as one section of the country (South-West) called for secession, rightly or wrongly, as it felt victimised for disallowing its "son" to steer the political ship of the country. The other (North) called for the opposite and even contended that its "sons" suffered many victimisations before but it did not raise any dust. This thesis is of the view that the only way to resolve the political log-jam is by revisiting the election and finding solution to it. But rotational presidency is not an answer to the political doldrums as it is surrounded by dangerous trends. The actualisation of the election is not possible as the government which annulled it was out of power, and the structures and institutions put in place at that time are not in motion now. The incorporations of the pro-June 12 elements into the scheme of things under the Interim National Government (ING) as well as under the incumbent Abacha Government marked the nailing of the June 12 political coffin. It is noteworthy that the transition process did not give or lead Nigeria to a Third Republic for the following reasons.

Throughout the eight-year period, the political dispensation was governed by chains of decrees. And throughout their stay, the members of the National Assembly - the Senate and the House of Representatives did not pass a single legislation. Therefore, the so-called legislature was only allowed to address trivial issues, not fundamental issues. In fact, the National Assembly merely existed to give a semblance of a civilian administration for a window dressing. The National Assembly was undermined by the so-called no-go areas.

Furthermore, the 1989 Reviewed Constitution, as term of reference, was not employed in for executing day-to-day domestic and foreign affairs. It is known that constitution is the source of governance in civilian administration. But this is a case of military regime in which promulgated decrees are terms of reference.

Moreover, the Interim National Government was an option imposed on Nigerians by the military to defuse, and act as a bu fer zone to the tension generated by the cancellation of the June 12 poll.

Ultimately, there was an absence of the usual handing over celebration for marking the coming in of a president-elect and the departure of an out-going leader. This ceremonial affair is what marks an "end" of a military-brokered transition to civil rule, and marks a beginning of a transition from civil to democratic rule.

The occasion was absent because the person-- Abiola who claimed to have been on the winning trail was not given the mantle of leadership, and on the other hand, Shonekan was not elected by Nigerians.

Therefore, if there was anything like a Third Republic, it was an abortive one, since the civilians did not grip on the mantle of leadership. They only served under the military.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JUNE 12 POLLS IN NIGERIA'S QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY

The June 12 presidential poll is very significant in the political history of Nigeria. This can be understood from the fact that the election demonstrated to Nigerians that they can shun primordial issues, like ethnicity, and elect their leaders on issues they present to them. The election also exhibited to Nigerians that they can have peaceful elections, if they so wish.

The June 12 Political saga was not without its own consequences. The annulment of the elections estranged a section of the country thereby disturbing the otherwise precarious unity of the Nigerian electorate. This distrust culminated in the mass exodus of people from sections of the country where they were engaged in trade for a long period and have even become 'indigenes' of those areas.

It is the effect of the annulment of the June 12 polls that produced the political theory of Rotation. This theory postulates that at least the highest executive position in the country be rotated among the various segments of the Nigerian state as represented by their elite. This, no doubt, shows clearly the extent to which ethnic and sectional chauvinism have taken control of the political thinking of the Nigerian elite.

In the recent time in the Nigeria's political history, Trade Unions were to be seen playing a decisive role in political matters of the country. The nullification of the June 12 elections produced the reactions of NUPENG and PENGASSAN which culminated in an industrial action. This industrial action was one of the worst of its kind the nation has ever experienced. It brought the nation down to its knees as the entire population, may be, for the first time, have realised how vital the petroleum industry is to their life in general. But for the decisive action of the military, the nation would have run into total chaos and possibly witnessed the emergence of a period of anarchy.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TRANSITION PROGRAMME

The IBB transition programme which was started in 1985 and ended in 1993 was not without serious repercussions, politically and socio-economically. Politically, the transition has proved to be a cumbersome 'experiment' without result. This experiment which took almost eight years created a lot of uncertainties in the minds of Nigerians as to what will be the political arrangement of Nigeria in the future. For the first time in 20 years, the Nigerian political scene was made to face the threat of secession by a section of the country which, rightly or wrongly, felt cheated in the June 12 saga.

Socio-economically, Nigeria lost a lot in terms of human relations which has serious implications on politics and politicking in the country. The transition engulfed about N40 billion without anything coming out of this massive investment. This colossal sum of money Nigerians witnessed its misappropriation to the Nigerian elite who are its architects. Funding of political parties and the construction of the political party offices were some of the ways through which this amount of money was dispensed. This left the Nigerian common man in doubt and in the danger of hunger, poverty, diseases and ignorance.

6:2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the research, this thesis recommends the following as panacea to the political log-jam that bedevils Nigeria. That the incumbent Abacha military regime should, as a matter of necessity, look into (revisit) the June 12 issue and come out with a comprehensive report on why the poll was nullified. This requires sincerity and functional dialogue. But so long as the issue is swept under the carpet, so long will the country continue to be in political trauma, hence, more and more interference by the Euro-American countries into the domestic affairs of Nigeria. Revisitation does not imply actualisation.

This Thesis is of the opinion that rotation of the key political positions in the country will not move the country forward as the arrangement has an in-built crisis which can lead to the break away of the country as a single political entity. It is worth reiterating that failure to address the June 12 issue squarely is tantamount to subjecting the country into ceaseless political unrest.

Moreover, the well-meaning and tested Nigerian intellectuals should endeavour to infiltrate the rural areas to educate the rural dwellers as they constitute the majority

of those who vote during elections. The ultimate result of this is the emergence of a virile political culture with people voting on the strength of issues presented before them.

On the other hand, the incumbent Abacha regime should drop the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as the programme is detrimental to the economic well-being of Nigerians; it affects their political conscience by being wooed by money-bags. The issue is that economy and politics are indispensable to each other, thus, when any of them is in shamble the other is affected.

On the part of the politicians, they should adopt a very serious approach to politics. This requires commitment, confidence, resilience, trustworthiness, purposefulness, prudence, and accountability. They should see politics as a profession (an-all-life affair) not amateurity so much so that their age-long naivety of seeing politics and politicking as a part-time affairs should be discarded. They should also unite and form a common front against the incessant military intervention in the political affairs of Nigeria. They should see political offices as trusts rather than rewards or booty to scramble for. They should also shun mud-slinging politics by playing the game according to its rules, for every game has its own rules. They should see politicking as an opportunity to serve people not to cheat them.

spheres of development. Indeed, the elite should know that they, like every ordinary Nigerian, have no other country but Nigeria.

Finally, the entire Nigerians are implored to give their quota towards the development of this country as everyone has a role to play in this direction.

Appendix I

Department of Political Science,

Ahmadu Bello University,

Zaria.

July 1, 1994.

Prof/Dr/Mal/Alh/Mr :

_____

_____

_____

Dear Sir,

INTERVIEW ON THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN ELITE IN THE 1985-1993 TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE PROGRAMME

I hereby wish to request for an audience to conduct an interview with you on the aforementioned topic.

This is to seek for your opinion on certain issues on the said topic.

I am a post-graduate student of the above mentioned University currently writing my M.Sc Thesis on the above topic.

I thank you for your anticipated support.

Yours faithfully,

NUHU RAMALAN JIBRIL, ZARIA

Appendix II

Questions posed to some members of the 1994/95 National Constitutional Conference, Abuja.

Section A

. . . . . Biographical Information

(1) Sex ☐ (2) State ☐ (3) Membership:

Elected ☐

Nominated ☐

(4) Occupation/career ☐ (5) Qualification ☐

Section B

(1) You witnessed or participated in the 1985 - 93 transition to Civil rule programme. How do you assess it ?

(2) What is your view on the blanket banning and disqualification of certain Categories of Nigerians by the military ?

(3) How do you view the establishment of the Political Bureau and such agencies as MAMSER, Centre for Democratic Studies and the like ?

(4) What is your view on the creation and funding of the NRC and SDP by the military ?

(5) How do you view the readiness of the politicians in joining the two parties ?

(6) The military organised an election in 1979 which gave us the second Republic. Why was the military unable to do so in 1993 ?

(7) The military nullified the June 12 poll on the ground of "tremendous negative use of money" and "fear of mortgaging the security of Nigeria". What is your view on this ?

(8) What role can you say the military played in the Transition programme ?

(9) What role can you say the intellectuals played in the transition programme ?

(10) What role can you say the politicians played in the Transition programme?

(11) What role can you say the members of the media played in the transition programme?

(12) What role can you say the bureaucrats played in the transition programme?

(13) In your view, what is the fate of the June 12 poll ?

(14) Looking at the political crisis of Nigeria, how can it move forward ?

Appendix III

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this survey is to seek people's views on the different aspects of the Federal Military government's 1985-1993 transition to civil rule programme. Any information collected will only be used strictly for academic purpose and respondents' views and comments will be kept confidential.

Nuhu Ramalan Jibril, Zaria,
Department of Political Science,
A.B.U. Zaria.

SECTION A

. . . . . BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(1) Age ..... (2) Sex .....
(3) Local Government ..... (4) State of Origin ....
(5) State of Residence: ..... (6) Occupation.....
(7) Highest Educational Qualification .....

SECTION B

1. The issue of blanket banning, and disqualification of certain categories of people, including Politicians at the initial stage of the 1985-1993 . Transition programme was:

(a) Relevant ☐ (b) irrelevant ☐

(c) I don't know ☐

2. What, in your opinion was the impact of the political Bureau set up in 1986 by the Military Government (to find solutions Nigeria's socio-economic and political problems) on the 1985-1993 Transition programme ?

(a) Success ☐ b) Failure ☐

3. Was the establishment of such agencies as MAMSER, DFFRI, NDE, Centre for Democratic Studies etc relevant to the Transaction Programme:

(a) Yes ☐ (b) No ☐

4. How do you view the creation and funding of the two political parties, National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) by the military?

(a) Relevant ☐ (b) Irrelevant ☐

5. In your opinion, what made politicians joined the two political parties created and funded by the military?

(a) They had no alternative ☐ (b) It was ideal ☐

(c) To acquire power and wealth (d) Others

(Specify).....

(e) I don't know ☐

6. Do you believe that those who were banned and disqualified accepted the banning disqualification because they had no alternative ?

Yes ☐ No ☐ I don't know ☐

7. The military nullified the June 12, 1993 Presidential Elections contested by Alhaji Bashir Osman Tofa of NRC and Chief M.K.O Abiola of SDP on the ground of tremendous negative use of money "and fear of mortgaging the security of Nigeria".

Do you agree with these reasons ? Yes ☐
If yes Why ?

(a) To respect the court order that demanded the suspension of the result announcement. ☐

(b) To punish the politicians for the above reasons given by the military. ☐

(c) To avoid inter-party conflict between NRC and SDP ☐

8. If No on question 7, why ?

(a) The military did not want to go ☐

(b) It was fairest and freest presidential election ever held in Nigeria ☐

(d) Since it was allowed to hold, it should not be annulled ☐

(e) All of the above ☐

9. Do you believe that the politicians pursued the actualisation of June 12 election ? If Yes, what was the major reasons ?

(a) They cautioned the military at various fora and time ☐

(b) They formed formidable group ☐

(c) Their agitation made Abiola to swear-in himself ☐

10. If No to question 9, Why ?

(a) They called and participated in the Interim National Govt. ☐

(b) There were inter and intra-party crises ☐

11. How would you like to asses the performance of the 1985-93

transition programme ?

very good ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ poor ☐

Very poor ☐

12. What role can you say the military played in the transition Programme? Positive ☐ Negative ☐ Neutral ☐

1 3. What role can you say the Civil- Politicians played in the Transition Programme? Positive ☐ Negative ☐ Neutral ☐

14. What role can you say the Intellectuals played in the Transition Programme ? Positive ☐ Negative ☐ Neutral ☐

15. What role can you say the Members of the Media played in the Transition Programme? Positive ☐ Negative ☐ Neutral ☐

16. What role can you say the Civil servants played in the Transition Programme? Positive ☐ Negative ☐ Neutral ☐

17. How can Nigeria get over the problems arising from the political crisis?

(a) A fresh election now ☐

(b) Continuation of Military rule ☐

(c) Actualisation of june 12 ☐

(d) Rotational Presidency ☐

(e) Adherence to the current three year program and Abiola should contest ☐

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