A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF NIGERIA'S AFROCENTRIC FOREIGN POLICY (1979 - 1989)

BY

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DECLARATION

I declare that this study is entirely the author's work and that no aspect of it has been presented for another qualification.

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CERTIFICATION

This is to satisfy that this thesis has been carefully read and approved as having satisfied the conditions for the award of Masters Degree in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

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DEDICATION

To ALLAH, the Mighty, the Capable;

MAY Peace and Blessing of Allah be with my father who took me to school, my wife, Khadijat L. Mahmud, my children Abdul-Hakeem, Luqman and Nnako Aisha.

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria's foreign policy is said to be Africa centred. This is the focus of this study - tho examination of the degree of Afro-centricism in the Nigerian foreign policy (1979 - 1989).

This study attempts to prove that because Nigeria has boen so much pro-West in her external relations, it has not boon able to pursue a viable and dynamic Afro-centric foreign policy. This has been done by looking at some vital foreign policy issues of tho respective regimes from 1979 - 1969.

The findings indicate that all the administrations studied have been too pro-west and as such could not achieve much on the African front. The economy, that is, trade and commoce have been monopolised by multinational corporations from the Western nations, the U.S.A Britain, etc.

I have however pointed out that the Buhari administration has tried to break this monopoly which has consequently been porccivod as a threat by the U.S.A, and Britain. I also concluded that of tho regimes studied, his fared better.

I also identified the reasons why we havo not boon able to pursue a viable, dynamic African centred foreign policy. These include the nature of Nigeria's dependent economy which suffers from among other things, the extension of excessive credit to private sector, heavy dependence on oil sector as the main source of foreign exchange earnings and government

revenue, heavy external debt burden, tying tho country'o economy to .those of Western nations, and a consumption and production pattern that lacks domestic resource base.

All these economic ills have been traced to be the effects of the total integration of the Nigerian economy into international capital accumulation and concentration which has been made possible by the material incorporation of *the* various factions of tho Nigerian ruling elites into foreign business as shareholders or agents. The ruling olltos whath soldiers or civilians therefore, have a perception of opportunity in their relations ,with the U.S.A. and Britain. Western nations are perceived not as threats but as friends and big brothers. They are not perceived as imperialists. Because of this, Nigeria's foreign policy is rather pro-West instead of being African centred;

In conclusion, a recommendation was made as to how the Nigerian foreign policy could be made more viable and dynamic with a view of achiev ing its Afro-centric stance with a framework for better foreign policy articulation in general/

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of Problem

Nigeria has claimed that Africa is the centre-piece of her foreign policy. Majority view is that Nigeria has not been able to justify this her foreign policy stand. They argue that Nigeria has been more pro-West in her foreign policy orientation or pursuits.

This study therefore seeks to critically appraise Nigerian foreign policy from 1979-1989 to justify her foreign policy inclinations, that is, whether it is more pro-West than Africa which she claims is the centre-piece of her foreign policy.

In doing this, this study will seek explanation to the following questions and address the following issues:

1. What is foreign policy?
2. What factors or variables - both independent and dependent has shapped Nigerian foreign policy from 1979-1989?
3. An identification of key foreign policy decisions taken by the respective regimes from 1979-1989.
4. An examination of how the variables or factors identified have shaped Nigerian foreign policy over the period.
5. The extent to which the super powers have contributed to Nigerian foreign policy being pro-West rather than Africa centred.
6. An evaluation of the changes that Nigeria should make in its foreign policy in order to have a much reliable and dynamic foreign policy towards Africa.

1.2. Rationale for this Study

Nigeria and most African countries are products of Western colonialism. The bulkanization of Africa is a product of this colonial past! In fact the continent of Africa was almost completely colonized. It was more colonized than any other continent. The traces of her colonial past can be seen today in her distorted and jambled social, economic and political structures. Even after independence, African countries are areas of exploitation for the super-powers. The colonial epoch was exploitation with responsibility on the part of the colonialists, they built schools, clinics, and constructed roads to tap raw materials to service the industries in the metropolis. The post-colonial Africa today in which Nigeria finds herself constitutes a zone or sphere of new exploitation. Exploitation this time around without responsibilities. Raw materials are still exploited to the metropolis to service the industrial and military complexes of the West particularly the United States of America. An exploitation whereby Africa and Nigeria in particular is dependent on the Western capitalist economy. Whereby all facets of the economy is dictated and directed from either the Pentagon or the British parliament. This puts a lot of pressure on both the renewable and non-renewable resources of Nigeria and consequently her economy and foreign policy. This is more depressing because the hitherto responsibility of building schools, roads construction by the colonialists is no longer there with flag independence. It is a cheaper form of exploitation for the colonialists. Our independence is a symbolic independence. Nigeria and African states are neo-colonial states. African states and Nigeria in particular

are in a hybernating type of relationship with the metropolis. This is a relationship hatched and created by colonialism. Nigeria is incorporated into the economy of the West. The balkanization of Africa has a negative foreign policy impacts on the post-colonial state of Nigeria. The role of the Nigerian colonial masters and the post-colonial masters have contributed to the perpetuation of imperialism and the continuous domination by the United States, Britain, Japan and France. Actions of individual African states in dealing with each other and the external environment has to do with their history and their past problems. Nigeria operates within the same setting. Nigerian foreign policy orientation has to be looked into in this neo-colonialist fashion. Foreign policy pronouncements like the concentric circles, economic diplomacy and attempts to forge African identity in terms of Pan-Africanism, Non-alignment, African socialism, etc. are not related to the African realities and conditions. These pronouncements and actions which seem contradictory are the results of their colonial past. In dealing with each other, these contradictions are therefore at play. The essence of this study is therefore to critically examine how these forces of contrddictions have influenced the Nigerian foreign policy conceptualisation and implementation from 1979-1989.

Secondly, no adequate or significant work has been done looking at the Nigerian foreign policy that takes into consideration the interplay of the independent variables as would be seen later for the period under study.

It is therefore hoped that this work will be a foundation for others at this level to build on in the years ahead.

2.3 Literature Review

A lot has been written on Nigerian foreign policy in relation to African states and the external environment to Africa (the super-powers). However, most of the literature has not delved enough into the period between 1979 and 1989. There is therefore a need to systematically examine the foreign policy perception of Nigeria towards other African countries. Writings on Nigerian foreign policy especially towards African states can be classified into: power theorists approaches, linkage politics approaches, domestic sources of foreign policy approaches and the radical schools approaches. Belonging to the powers politics approach of Hans Morgenthau are, L. Gray Cowan, Joseph Wayas, Olajide Aluko, Bolaji Akinyemi, etc.

Joseph Wayas in his analysis concentrated on the country's domestic resources and how these have been used or manipulated by the leaders of the respective regimes in Nigeria to play leadership roles in Africa south of the Sahara. Gray L. Gowan, shortly after independence argued that "Nigeria has been expected to play a decisive role in the politics of Africa."[1] Bolaji Akinyemi in the same vein had predicted a "Pax Nigeriana",[2] in Africa in one of his works. Olajide Aluko on his part argued in one of his works that, Nigeria cannot readily give up her leadership role in the Organization of African Unity. People like Jean Herskovits have described Nigeria as Africa's "New power",[3]. She has argued in one of her essays in 1978 that Nigeria is important to the United States of America because of its growing leadership in Africa and elsewhere in the third world. Nigeria's domestic capabilities which results in her role in Africa has been used by the above analysts. This denotes

that domestic sources and linkage politics has been used by them. The notion of these analysts is that domestic politics determines her external behaviours. To understand or explain a country's foreign policy, you have to understand her domestic style, the influence of her internal conflicts on her external behaviours. Ibrahim Gambari and J. Idang have also used similar approaches.

Claud Phillips Jr. in his own work opined that "Deliberate attention is paid to details in an effort to etch a picture of the internal struggles attendant upon foreign policy formulation in those seminal years."[4] The various positions taken by various political parties, interest groups, leaders, governments and oppositions were analysed by him as they affected the foreign policy decisions especially as these relate to Africa and the super-powers, Pan-Africanism and foreign economic relations.

Gambari in his book Party Politics and Foreign Policy, analysed foreign policy and federalism. He analysed the effects of politics of federalism on foreign policy and the disagreements on foreign policy issues, such as the relations with Isreal, the Nigerian role in the Congo crisis, etc.

Olajide Aluko on the other hand focused on the interactions between the external and internal environment in his analysis. Although Ray Ofoegbu challenges the above mentioned analysts arguing that their works contained lapses, he too ended up with similar draw backs in his book, The Nigerian Foreign Policy 1979, because he also ended up tracing the Nigerian foreign policy to internal and external influences. The new approaches in the book which one could say makes it different

from other linkage politics analysts is that he reflected on the role of the Ministry of external affairs. He also delved into the link between foreign and defence policy. Foreign ~~policy~~ defence matters until after the civil war in Nigeria were unduely tied to the apron strings of the former colonial masters - British. In fact Ofoegbu also used the linkage politics as the parameter for evaluating the Nigerian foreign policy perception. Again instead of concentrating purely on the domestic approach he tended to have brought a balance between the internal and external variables or domains, that is, he argues in the book that, "the Arabs are not aiding African development and liberation; they expect their aids to yield political dividends."[5] To this however, Gambari disagrees in his review of Ofoegbu's work. According to Gambari, "Saudi Arabia and Algeria probably contributed more to African liberation than many African states South of the Sahara, and most Arab members have paid their dues to the OAU and special liberation budgets regularly. Furthermore, who gives aid nowadays without any consideration ~~a~~for political dividends."[6]

Olaba Ogunsawo writing on the Nigerian foreign policy, Our Friends, their Friends, wrote the following prolificly; the Nigerian foreign policy has been British oriented. This he argued is based on the British oriented training which the Nigerian external affairs officers received. He stressed that they tended to look at the external environment with a "tainted prism."[67] He argues that both the soldiers and the police that had served Nigeria had this perception. Alaba Ogunsawo argued that because the Nigerian foreign policy was pro-West, Nigeria never gave U.S.S.R. land to build her embassy while Britain was given. He

further argued that Nigerian students were not allowed to go to U.S.S.R. He stressed that because the Nigerian foreign policy was shaped towards Britain, there was no dynamic foreign policy. Because there was no unanimity in the stand of the Nigerian leaders on Isreal, there was no Nigerian Embassy in Tel-Aviv, while Isreal had an embassy in Nigeria. Alaba Ogunsawa further stated that even the pronouncements by Nigeria were not followed with actions. Trade links flourished between Nigeria and Isreal/Portugal even with her condemnation of their policies and actions in South Africa.

The Ironsi regime he further opined could not take serious decisions either, though aids were given to Africa and there was serious participation in the OAU. There was no good relations with the United States of America because of her role in Zaire. As to why the Ironsi regime did not take serious decisions, Alaba did not explain. On Murtala-Obasanjo regime(s), Alaba commended it for the bigger boost it gave the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and the establishment of the Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS). He pointed out that this regime also marked the inclusion of journalists and professionals into the foreign policy making. Even with the Angolan crisis Nigeria still maintained economic relations with the United States (ITT). Alaba touched on a number of issues, that is, the Bissala visit to the U.S. as a guest to Pentagon even with the uncompromising role of the West in Africa. His argument that the Nigerian foreign policy at the time adopted the technology of any country irrespective of ideology was substantiated with the Nigerian crash programme, when Nigeria

citizens were sent for training all over the world. Army personnel he claimed were also sent to the United States for training. Alaba Ogunsawa followed this narrative approach of the Nigerian foreign policy of all the regimes from 1960-1985. The main deficiency I find in Alaba's work is that he failed to point out any rationale behind each foreign policy issues. What motivated the respective regimes to take such actions, etc. Alaba failed also to realize that both the Ironsi and Buhari administrations had very short life spans and could not have achieved much. In his assertion also that some opposition members in the last civilian administration of Shagari did not find it easy supporting the crusade urging the restoration of diplomatic relations with Isreal, is deficient in explanation. He failed to realize that Alhaji Baba Kekere and Lateef Jakande did not find it easy to support the "crusade" principally because they were muslim Yorubas in the opposition government of U.P.N. and that there is a spiritual inclination between nearly all Nigerians muslims with the Arab world.[8] Their reason for not supporting does not therefore have a political or strategic underpinnings as he seems to assert in the book. Though Ogunsawa followed the events chronologically, he could have pointed out what led to such decisions. Nigeria, I believe, had a strong economic base during the periods Ogunsawo looked at more than any other African nation. But nations like Ghana tended to have been more dynamic in their foreign policy decisions than Nigeria. Ghana for example, though with a weaker economic base, had a leader with a more dynamic vision. Though there was a change of style during the Murtala-Obasanjo regime there was no change in substance, Alaba Ogunsawa asserted, but he

nas not been able to give reasons for these changes of style and lack of change in substance.

To sum up Alaba's work, he seems to have embarked on a descriptive comparative analysis of the foreign policy of the regimes. He could not pin-point the variables that were responsible for foreign policy decisions. His is a mere descriptive expedition.

On his part, Joe Garba concentrated mainly on Murtala-Obasanjo regime in his diplomatic soldiering. He poured praises on the regime. He opined that the regime was able to pursue a dynamic foreign policy especially towards Africa because the government had a clear vision of its foreign policy objectives. Africa, he stressed was the centre-piece of Nigerian foreign policy; addin that foreign policy of the regime was a very activist and dynamic one because of the commitment of the leadership both in words and actions. The country was particularly aided in her foreign policy pursuits because the country had a relatively sound economic base and was thus able to match words with actions. "Nigeria's economic fortunes so changed after the early 1970s that the potentials for new stature and forceful initiatives was greater than ever before."[9] He delved into the Angolan crisis, that is, the recognition of the MPLA, the nationalization of Shell B.P. and the liberation struggles as the yardstick for measuring the Afro-centric posture of the regime's foreign policy.

There are, however, a number of drawbacks in Joe Garba's thesis. In the first place, his strong emphasis on the ingratitude of the Angolan government towards Nigeria for her role in

Angolan crisis is uncalled for. I feel he overstressed the need for Angola to have shown gratitude to Murtala's regime. He had this to say as part of the overemphasis he laid on the above:

> Throughout the period, the Angolans never sought to have any strategy meetings or, indeed, any bilateral contact with the Nigerian delegation. Even when General Murtala arrived, Heads of States and foreign ministers were rushing to meet him (it was his first appearance on the international scene), the Angolans did not pay even the usual courtesy call. The Nigerian delegation was of course shocked."[10]

I believe that the Angolan crisis provided the opportunity for Nigeria at that time to prove to the world that her foreign policy is Africa centred. It was an opportunity for her to accomplish her much claimed foreign policy responsibility to the continent at that time, and realising her foreign policy interest does not therefore demand anybody's gratitude.

There are again some missing links in Joe Garba's thesis; some key African issues at that time that really demanded Nigeria's assistance as good neighbours that were not given necessary attention were ignored in Garba's analysis. For example, it is quite glaring that Nigeria's struggle with Niger Republic over a United Nations security seat at that time does not show good neighbourliness as potrayed by Garba. The regime also failed in her attempt to mediate in intra-African crisis, that is, the Rhodesian struggle for independence. Her over dependence on Nyerere and Kaunda for vital information regarding the struggle probably lead to her inability to handle the issue. Also in 1977 Nigeria also failed to prevent Ethiopia and Somalia from embarking on the Ogaden war. These instances all potray the

regime's inability to play her leadership role in Africa as she claims.

Joe Garba's work is a mere description of his experiences as an executor of decisions already taken by the Head of State and the attendant protocols and propaganda that entailed during his tenure as a foreign affairs minister. The book also lacks professional academic ingredients necessary for good analysis of the Nigerian foreign policy. The indicators that really shaped the foreign policy perception(s), that is, the motivating factors like the domestic and external variables are poorly taken care of. For example, Joe Garba failed to realise that the massive political support which the Nigerian citizens gave to Murtala-Obasanjo regime gave it a lot of impectus in pursuing activist and dynamic policies at that time. Most of the foreign policy decisions were taken outside the ministry of external affairs (in Dodan Barracks) but the task of executing such policies fell on the ministry.

Despite these limitations in the book, it provides a primary source of research in the Nigeria foreign policy of the regime and a foundation for studying the preceeding regimes which are the main focal of this study.

Joy Ogwu's Nigeria foreign policy, alternative futures (1986), covers a wider area than most of other writers. She provides a linkage between the past and present regimes and postulates future alternatives for Nigerian foreign policy pursuits. She summarized the National interests of Nigeria focusing on the goals, objectives and values, etc. She also did some academic bush clearings in her analysis of the intercourse

between the internal and external forces that shape the Nigerian foreign policy behaviour. The impact of the constitution, the super-powers and economic variables were also treated in the work.

The role of the super-powers, Nigeria's role in African events right from independence, etc. are coverei in the book. Chapter four of the book takes a look at Nigeria's images and perceptions.

Although Joy Ogwu did a nice academic work in the book, it still fell within both the linkage and power politics approach. Also the work did not cover the regimes of Buhari and Babangida. She must have gone to press before the inception of those regimes.

Next after the above writers are the radical marxists. They mostly adopted the political economy approach. They argue that Nigeria is a dependent neo-colonial state; that the Nigerian society's external behaviour is largely controlled by its position within the world capitalist economy. Some of them look at the relationship in terms of class struggles. There seem to be a point of departure by classical Marxists like Acron Gana, Yusuf Bangura and those that i might refer to as dependency theorists. Bala Usman, Claude Ake and others belong to the dependency school of thought.

Bala Usman and his associates argue that the oil economy has made Nigeria to become poorer and become a more dependent country especially to Britain than ever. Bala refers to this as "a dependency [illegible] has crystallized in a leadership whose values, looks, houses and even egos are located between

Zurich and London."[11] This type of dependence will not allow Nigeria to formulate a reliable and dynamic foreign policy in relation to her African neighbours. Her foreign policy will continue to be pro-West, Bala and his co-radical analysts argue. They see Nigeria as part of a bloc that is being dominated by another bloc., that is, the peripheral bloc being dominated by the Metropolitan or core bloc.

Classical Marxists like Aeron Gana, Bechman and Yusufu Bangura, though express the same domination phenomena, argue that capitalism has transcended an epoch when it should be looked into in the perspectives of bloc(s) subordination and domination.

Rather, it should be looked at in the perspective of class struggle. A capitalist is a capitalist and a proletariat a proletariat whether in the third world or western world. You are either poor and sell your labour or you are a capitalist who employs wage labour. Capitalism, they argue, has transcended national frontiers. There are Nigerians who also employ wage labour just like their western world counterparts. Global capitalist class exploits the oppressed global working class. This is the stand of this class of marxists or radical scholars. However, whether classical, dependency or ul-tra marxists, they all have the same drawbacks as they do not only trace their steps back to the linkage politics method of analysis but also dance to the tune of the music of the state-centric approach of power politics analysts. The Marxist approach is generally weak again because it is not able to explain adequately the distinction(s) between what their analysts refer to as proletariat, lumpen bourgeoisie, bourgeoisie, peasant,

petit bourgeoisie, etc. especially as the Nigerian situation is concerned.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework to be used in this study is the social psychology approach. Cognitive theories that have explained inter-personal relations have been explained by social psychologists. They explain how human beings have been able to harness their knowledge to be able to live and function within their respective environments. Their explanations go further to point out how individuals have been able to turn an unsuitable and unpredictable environment into suitable and predictable environment and be able to respond to such environments positively and progressively. The theoretical contributions by social psychologists to the explanations that human beings have been able to interact among themselves over the years in their respective environments resulted in the development of similar theoretical explanations of the behaviour of nations within the international arena. Efforts have been made all over the years by international relations analysts with varied results to systematically explain knowledge about foreign affairs as the outcome of human behaviour. Decisions making theories in international relations have mainly focused on decision-makers and the ways they define the totality of their decision making environments based on socio-psychological explanations.

Social psychologists have argued that during the psychological process that takes place within the mind, human beings - foreign policy decision-makers - form their actions as models, stereo-types, schema, images, mental constructs, etc.

There is cognitive perception of other states within their mind(s). The significance of perception in the study of international relations and foreign policy has been demonstrated by notable scholars like Richard Cottam, Abercombie (1960), and Minjari (1984).

In 1960 Abercombie demonstrated the selective and interpretative nature of social psychology in the study of international relations when he argued with the use of perception that, "the information that a person gets from a specified part of the outer world depends on the context, or total situation and on his past experiences, which is usually thought of as being organized into schemata."[12] She argued that human relationship plays a significant role in determining the conceptual images nations hold of one another in the study of international politics. In international politics social psychologists have argued that interactions among cognitions, especially cognitive conflicts, uncertainty,. and inconsistency, have the character of motivational forces and hence can trigger behaviour and determine the direction of foreign policy makers. They argue that due to the psychological processes that take place in the mind, psychological traits, images or stereotypes are formed. These are either of liking or disliking. Liking images lead to friendliness while perceptions of disliking leads to distrust, suspicion, etc. They have also stressed the role of motivation, that is, means and ends in perception of states.

Social psychologists have also ~~mas~~ argued that images and stereotypes have certain characteristics in which they may not reflect the true situation(s) about the observed objects. Hence

perception and misperception. They are only a representation of the contruct of the reality of the observer that tend to give meaning to his existence. Images and stereotypes are held by individuals to give meaning to the world around them and also to serve as defensive mechanism. It has been argued by Hinjari that the individual attributes to other people, impulses, feelings and other attributes which exist in the individuals which they cannot admit themselves. By so doing, according to Hinjari, the individual is then able to transmit impulses withim himself that are objectionable to others. The individual is then able to dismiss his own weaknesses by blaming them on other people.

It has been proved by social psychologists in international relations that individuals just as they have images of other individuals, also have images of national entities. The same stereotypes processes that exist between people also in a sense determine the relationship between nation states. In international relations, especially in foreign policy making, nations are required to negotiate; and as negotiators, they communicate positions, make demands and concessions, respond to changing signals and arrive at outcomes.

One may therefore not be wrong to argue that foreign policy perception depends on the following: individual needs of the negotiating elites of nation states based on their personalities.

The personality compatibility of foreign policy actors including his persuasive mechanism employed to modify bargains.

It is this relationship between foreign policy and human perceptions that make the social psychology approach very relevant to the study of foreign policy especially in the Nigerian context.

Studies by William Buchanan and others show how national entities tend to hold favourable stereotypes of their own nations and those of nations that are friendly to them, while at the same time hold unfavourable stereotypes of nations that are hostile or not friendly to them. The belief system is made up of a number of images which help to organize the foreign policy decision maker's perception into meaningful guide for behaviour, establishes goals and other preferences. The foreign policy decision maker is helped by images to define international situations.

Dean G. Printts has stressed also that:

> Situation for the decision maker by articulating for him clearly the characteristics of other nations, what relevance such characteristics have to the goals of his nation and what behaviour would be appropriate for his nation to undertake towards those of other nations." 13

Dean Printts identified four ways in which images influence the perception of foreign policy makers. These are: perception of trust, perception of distrust, perception of threat, and perception of responsiveness.

Perception of trust in this regard refers to the notion of expectation, of goodwill, likeness. It is a perception of expectation that another nation will be helpful. It has been argued that nations that have perceptual image(s) of trust

of each other hardly take actions that will pose a threat to one another. Trust increases cooperation and possibility of hostility is minimized. The opposite of image of trust is image of threat. It is argued here that the foreign policy of a nation would tend to be less unfavourable towards nations which they perceive their actions will be harmful to them in some ways. There would be distrust. Enermy image is the outcome of such a relationship. This is so because there is anxiety or feeling of apprehension due to such a perception of threat. Through the enemy image, a perceived image of distrust is had for a third party who is perceived a friend to the enemy. Psychologically, one would tend to like a person who is friendly to one whom he likes as opposed to one who likes a person he dislikes. It may be inferred here that Nigeria's hostile foreign policy towards Isreal now is because it is friendly with South Africa which is an enemy to Nigeria. The United States of America in another vein is hostile to Nations that have communist links because Socialist Russia is her enemy.

The more responsive nations are to one another, the more they trust each other. This is of course, the reality. Nations may misperceive one another (perceptions and misperceptions); in which we misperceive the beliefs and motives of others in relation to ours. Accordin, to Printts harsh tactics like subversion, propaganda contingent threats, show of force, etc. and mild tactics like discussions, compromise contingruence promise are all embodiments of the responsive images.

Different perceptual images or steroetypes like the proxy image, child, etc. would be conceptually explained in the next paragraphs.

METHODOLOGY

This study will concentrate on the pronouncements of Nigerian key foreign policy spokesmen of the regimes under study. This is in view of the fact that the statements made by such spokesmen are considered more authoritative than other sources in Nigerian foreign policy decision process. These categories of persons include past and present Nigerian Heads of state, members of the house(s) of representatives and the Senate of the Shagari administration, Ministers of external affairs of the Shagari, Buhari and the Babangida administrations.

Also, face to face interviews with some Nigerian authoritative spokesmen would be sought and synthesized, to carefully bring into focus the world images they held about the issues examined.

Conferences/seminar papers and publications of major institutions like the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, the Nigerian Institut of Policy and Strategic Studies, etc. would also be consulted. Nigerian newspapers and magazines would be used too.

All these are in addition to the normal literature search and the use of statistical information in the areas of political science and international relations.

1.5 Hypotheses:

The working hypotheses of this study holds that because the Nigerian foreign policy has been subject to the dictates of the western super-powers, it has not been able to maintain its Afro-centric claim that Africa is the centre-piece of her foreign policy. The thrust of the thesis is to clearly bring out how western influences have thwarted Nigeria's move(s) at achieving the much desired Afro-centric foreign policy from 1979-1989.

1.6 Definition of Concepts

Perception: There are a number of structural and situational factors that influence foreign policy choices. However the choices are made by those in authority on the basis of what is perceived by them. "It is not the domestic or the national belief system of a nation that determine the choices made in foreign policy; rather it is the question of how these various factors are perceived by foreign policy decision makers that become critical in foreign policy choices."[15] International events are perceived by foreign policy decision makers on the basis of images they hold about the world. These images are not only those of the individual foreign policy makers but must have been shaped over the years through myths, traditions that prevailed in the society. The foreign policy perception of the respective regimes under study would therefore be based on pronouncements and actions of those in position of foreign policy making or those that can influence it.

Foreign Powers: This is mainly used to refer to the U.S.A., Britain, France, Japan and other western industrial or imperial nations. The U.S.S.R. would be addressed in the same vein too where she comes into play in this thesis. Generally, ex-colonial nations would be termed foreign powers. Powers in the sense that they are superior in capability and culture.

National Interest: The term National Interest has been differently defined by many scholars. Olajide Aluko has defined national interest by enumerating its essential features:

(1) Self-preservation of the country.
(2) Defence and maintainance of the country's independence.
(3) Economic and social well-being of the people.
(4) Defence, preservation and promotion of ways of life especially democratic values.
(5) Enhancement of the country's standing status in world capitals, especially Africa, and promotion of world peace.[14]

For the purpose of this study, the term National Interest, though denotes Aluko's definition, above, ultimately refers to whatever the officials of the nation (Nigeria) seek to perceive and enhance. Richard Snyder asserts that "national interest is what the nation; that is, the decision-makers, decide it is."[15] As far as Nigeria is concerned these are classified into vital and secondary interests.

Vital interests according to Aluko include, self preservation, defence and maintainance of the country's independence, economic and social well-being of the people. In his own view Aforka Nweke says, the irreducible core of Nigeria's vital interest

is national unity and security.

Secondary interest include the desires that Nigeria like to obtain for which she will not fight or go to war. These could be achieved through diplomacy especially by negotiation. Nigeria's secondary interest include socio-economic development, welfare and equality of the people, African unity, human equality, justice, world peace and security. From the above therefore, National Interest encompasses the core values of the society perceived by the decision makers. National goals and aspirations of the society which are the primary consideration of the decision makers.

Foreign Policy: Foreign policy is a collection of specific policy strategies chosen from a variety of alternatives and implemented over time and space in order to achieve specifically, set goals, and objectives that could lead the society towards the attainment of preferred values. Contained in this definition is the notion that there are sets of values of the society for which certain deliberate actions out of variety of options are undertaken in order to achieve a set of values preferred. If this is the case therefore, the power politics, linkage and the radical scholars approaches in their Nigerian foreign policy analysis do not clearly set out and analyse the substance of the Nigerian foreign policy.

Godfather: This is used in this study to mean a situation where a less powerful nation in terms of economy, military capability, and industrial advancement looks forward for the assistance of a more powerful nation especially any of the super-powers, that is, U.S.A., Britain, U.S.S.R., France, etc. The super-power is referred to as a Godfather.

Big brother: This is used to refer to nations who are looked upon by nations in the same region as superior in resources both human and material. A perceptual image of trust and reliance exist in the observer nation towards the observed. Many African nations look up to Nigeria as a big brother in Africa because of its resources, population, etc. Nigeria recognises this big brother role, hence it is looked upon to play a leadership role in Africa. It is a situation in which the observed state is perceived to be superior in capability but comparable in culture.

Bully: When there is a perception of threat to preferred values especially when the observed state that is perceived threatening is superior in capability and equal in culture. Hinjari has argued that in this type of perceptual pattern, the observed state has overt and aggressive desire to manipulate the political leadership of the observer state. The role of Libya in the Chadian crisis could be said to have amounted to the bully.

Neo-colonialism: This is a relationship that exist between the developed world and the developing world in which the social, political, economic and strategic aspects of the third world nations are being manipulated by the developed nations for their own developments and benefits. It is a stage in which the political control by the colonial power has changed from direct formal to indirect, non-formal through the achievement of political independence and not economic independence.

Motivation: Motivation would be used to refer to what inspires nations to perceive and act the way they do in foreign policy decision making. Why do they perceive some nations friendly and others enemies?

Proxy Image: This would be used to refer to a situation in which one nation in alliance with another plays surrogate or acts on behalf of the nation with which it is in alliance. The nation who acts as a proxy of another nation may either be superior in capabilities and culture or may be equal in capabilities and cultures with the nation it is acting on its behalf.

Afro-centricism: This would be used to refer to the notion that Africa is the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy. It then denotes that Nigeria's foreign policy is more inclined to the cause of promoting Africa's interest. This would be examined from time to time; to really determine how much is African problems Nigeria's problems. As indicated in the literature review, there exist adequate sources of information in previous works done on Nigeria's foreign policy that could be harnessed to examine the Afro-centric nature of Nigeria's foreign policy 1979 - 1989. A.B. Akinyemi, Olajide Aluko, Joy Ogwu, Ray Ofoegbu, Ibrahim Gambari and W.L. Hinjari have done some works on Nigeria's foreign policy. If these are harmonized with the foreign policy pronoucements by the respective heads of states and external affairs ministers, a nice piece of work on the Afro-centric nature of the foreign policy would emerge.

1.7 Organization of Work

Chapter II is concerned with the identification of the key variables that shaped the Nigerian foreign policy (1979-1989).

i. Historical origin, that is, colonial past.
ii. Party politics and foreign policy.
iii. Religious factors.
iv. Economic problems and government policies.
v. Role of multinational corporations.
vi. The African condition - South African liberation movements
vii. Global influences - Western capitalist nations and the super-powers' influences.
viii. Idiosyncratic factors .
ix. Application of the variables to foreign policy issues of the respective regimes.

Chapter III considers the Shagari Administration and looks at the following issues:

i. The Chadian Crisis.
ii. The Nigerian/Cameroon border clash.
iii. The OAU Summit meet in Libya - Nigeria/Libya Relations - USA/Libya relations.

IV. Liberation struggles - South Africa and Namibia.

Buhari Administration:

i. Recognition of Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic.
ii. Nigeria's relation with neighbours - closure of borders.
iii. Economic recovery and foreign policy - counter trade.
iv. Liberation struggles - South Africa and Namibia.

Babangida Administration:

i. O.I.C.
ii. Structural Adjustment Programme, SFEM, FEM, IFM and
iii. Britain, U.S.A., etc.

iii. Relationship with Isreal and the Arabs.

iv. Nigeria and the UNO and the Commonwealth.

v. South Africa and Namibia.

Concluding Chapter:

A summary of how variables spelt out in the introductory chapter that is, chapter I have shaped the Nigerian foreign policy over the years and a forecast into the future years.

FOOTNOTES

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17.

CHAPTER II

THE KEY VARIABLES THAT HAVE SHAPED THE NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY (1979 - 1989)

2.1 Historical Origin or Colonial Past

The territory of the present day Nigeria, except for the former German controlled Cameroon, was conquered by the United Kingdom, in several stages, during the second half of the 19th century. The two British protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria were merged into a single territory in 1914; and a legislative council, initially with limited African representation, was created in 1922. However, most of the administration remained under the control of traditional native rulers, supervised by the colonial authorities. Nigeria was during this period linked to Britain and the West economically, politically and to a certain extent culturally. The economy of Nigeria at this time was planned by the British administrators to complement that of Britain and to a lesser degree, Britain's western allies."[1] Nigeria's economy was consolidated by Britain in what she referred to as the imperial preference - a policy under which Britain closed its colonies and dominions against outside competitors for many years. Everything of Nigeria was "modelled along British lines."[2] The lingua franca was English. Even after independence a carry over of these British colonial legacies still dominated both the internal and external policies of the nation. The Nigerianxx constitution(s) both in the first and second republics were fashioned in line with those of the west-minister and the White House. At independence, Nigeria sought to diversify this colonial legacy by identifying more with Africa, find avenues for establishing links with the communist and socialist states.

Both the civilian and the military leaders of the respective regimes since independence exhibit apparent sentimental attachment to the West. Nigeria had always looked up to Britain and her Western allies for direction. Nigeria has an imperial image of Britain and the U.S.A. This makes her to be very responsive to the wishes and aspirations of the western super-powers. Capitalist societies use capitalism and imperialism, and neo-colonialism as ideological instruments for shapening, determining and fostering of the social, economic and political systems of third world countries like Nigeria. These same instruments in turn inform the social system that dictates directly the foreign policy preferences of those in control of the economy and hence the foreign economic relations.

In Nigeria the foreign policy elite, constitute a dependent capitalist segment, the hegemonic role is played by international capital. The imperial role of international capital in Nigeria had made it to be able to form alliances with the most advantageous groups in any regime that come to power, civilian or military. The inability of the Nigerian state to pursue an Afro-centric foreign policy since 1979 is associated with its colonial history, that is, the nature of a neo-colonial dependent capitalist system and her overdependent nature on the West.

As has been mentioned in the literature review the colonial and imperial patterns are crucial in this case. The imperial pattern which is a response to perceived opportunity to achieve something at the expense of the Nigerian state by the imperialists. Nigeria is inferior in both culture and capability. There is a

considerable capability and cultural distance.

Another dimension of the effect of past history on the conducte of Nigerian foreign policy over the years could be viewed by trying to look at the two parties that have ruled Nigeria since independence, that is, the military and the civilian. Since the attainment of independence, the conduct of foreign policy had been more in the hands of the military. If Nigeria has hot been able to pursue an Afro-centric foreign policy, it is due to either the post-colonial Nigerian state was neither trained in the act or governance nor had acquired the legitimacy through any previous activities like armed struggle for political independence.

Secondly, until 1965, the commander of the Nigerian army was a Briton. Barely a year after he had left the scene, the army continued to rule Nigeria. The argument here is that the military is better seen by the British and her western allies as better in the game of international capitalism. During the colonial period, Britain had appointed its military officers to rule Nigeria and Nigerian commissioned officers had western orientation. The fear that the Nigerians who struggled for independence might not compromise adequately as a result of the nationalistic rhetorics could have led to early intervention and continuous conduction of Nigerian foreign policy by the military. It is he who controls the government that plays the major role in foreign relations of a country.

The military in Nigerian politics and consequently the conduct of foreign policy has consistently marginalized the majority of Nigerians. It has led the Nigerian economy to

succumb so much to the imperialist manipulations, that mortgages the economy and the destiny of the nation, and relegates the Nigerian people to the periphery of a global economic system. This has contributed in no small way in the Nigerian foreign policy too pro-West rather than African centred.

The colonial and dependent nature of Nigeria has not allowed for the survival of democracy in Nigeria. The military, having been in power for most of the time since 1960, has not given the country the chance to develop political institutions and be able to forge a political culture that is African oriented. A democratic and solid polity is an ingredient for the pursuit of a viable and activist foreign policy by a nation and Nigeria is no exception. In conclusion, I am emphasising that though the military has ruled the country longer since independence, the dependent and weak economic base of the ruling elite, domestic bourgeoisie and the dominance of imperialists interests in the neo-colonial state of Nigeria has made her foreign policy to be too pro-West to the detriment of her pronouncements that Africa is the centre-piece of her foreign policy.

2.2 Federal Character and States' Consciousness

"The creation of states was a master solution to the problems of regional and ethnic domination. The recent election has shown the wisdom of this bulkanization..."[3]

Centralization of decision making in a country with a federal structure especially in Nigeria is a significant factor in foreign policy pursuits. In Nigeria, foreign commerce and trade is manifested in the federal structure.

While the Northern states have commercial and trade links with the Arab world, the southern states also have trade links with the western nations. This could be linked to the country's colonial past. This, of course, has had serious impacts on the foreign policy orientation of the country. Pressures for regional or states participation in foreign affairs is very great in Nigeria. The typical elites of the North do not want to have anything to do with Lagos which they think is a haven of Western cultures and values while the South in the same vein, look at the North as purely Islamic and pro-Arab. For instance, Sir Ahmadu Bello was very glad not to be a member of the council of ministers (central government) and complained that "Lagos was alien to our northern ideas of life."

The North and South division of the country continue to form the 'framework' for economic and political struggles and development even with the creation of states. Ethnic groups domination of decisions regarding national resources, financial allocations, constitution making, etc. dominated the first civilian government. This was the assertion of Gambari. Foreign economic relations is part of foreign policy. As much as this assertion is true, the influence of the federal structure on the foreign policy formulation of this country cannot therefore be overstressed. Another manifestation of the role of the federal structure on foreign policy pursuit was the attempt by the Ibo tribe to establish a separate state of Biafra. This attracted a lot of foreign intervention and a tilt in the foreign policy direction of Nigeria for the first time when Nigeria turned to the eastern bloc for military aids. The pervasiveness of federal divisions within Nigeria was so high during the first civilian government

that regional governments often made foreign policy statements that contradicted the position of the federal government.

> Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the Northern regional government and leader of the N.P.C. had a clear perception of his government's stance on the middle east issue...the central government had not taken any decision adverse to Isreal; but Sir Ahmadu Bello made his contrary pronouncement when he declared that, 'the state of Isreal does not exist'," 5

Despite the fact that the state of Isreal had an embassy in Lagos.

In 1961, the eastern regional Premier visited New Delhi and expressed support for an Afro-Asian bloc that was opposed by the central government. ' Federal structure increases the chances of manipulating the international affairs of Nigeria. The O.I.C. debate also, though manifested positively through Islam and Christianity was purely geo-political as it was a debate between the Muslims mainly dominated elites and the southern elites mainly represented by the Christians. The structure of a political system is an essential ingredient in defining the scope of a nation's foreign policy. The structure of present day Nigeria was designed by the British colonial masters which never took into account the heterogenous nature of the society. "Inter-regional boards composed of ministers tended to be like meetings of the UN Security Council. Each government states its position."[6] This has not really changed much. The influence of the federal structure on foreign policy formulation in Nigeria is therefore vital in analysing Nigerian foreign policy.

2.3 Political Parties and Foreign Policy

Political parties may also affect foreign policy choices, although some of them may be distant from the country's decision makers. However, most of the political parties that have come to power in Nigeria have had impact on foreign policy. In the last civilian government of Shagari, one can rightly say that the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) had a significant impact on foreign policy making. Like other decisions, foreign policy decisions to be taken by the president is subject to senatoral approval in a democratically elected government. Various interest groups in the government lobby before the executive and the legislative groups to influence the foreign policy process. Chief executives of countries like Nigeria also would normally need to generate support for foreign policy programmes. This is because, members of the houses of Senate and the representatives of the last civilian administration belonged to different political parties. It is in this context that we need to have a quick look at the political parties that emerged in Nigeria at independence and also during the Second Republic. The first republic witnessed political parties emerging from ethnic groups. Action Group (AG) emerged from Egbe Omo-Oduduwa, N.P .. from Jamiya Mutanen Arewa and the NCNC was mainly made u of Ibos.

> The NCNC was for the first and for a long time, the only national political organization...in the sense that it had branches all over the country... yet, the predominance of the Ibo elements in the NCNC was discernible.[7]

Rival political parties that tried to destabilize the country prevailed in both the Balewa and Shagari's administrations. Since the administrations were always trying to maintain internal

stability, there was not much time for the government to pursue a dynamic foreign policy. "The inherent feuds among political parties, and lack of consensus on vital issues, the fledging of political institutions, the lack of institutionalization of the political processes, all created an atmosphere of domestic instability."[8] This therefore affected Nigeria's capacity to actively engage in a strong, credible foreign policy. The role of political parties in foreign policy pursuits of a country has earlier been mentioned when we discussed the federal structure. Since the political parties were formed along ethnic cleavages, the central government of Nigeria has often been left hanging on the balance on major foreign policy issues. With regards the normalizing of diplomatic relations with Isreal, she is cautious not to offend the North which was represented at the federal level by NPC in the first Republic and the NPN and PRP and the GNPP in the Second Republic. At the same time she never wanted to offend the other parties that had southern cleavages, viz, NCNC, AG and NPP and the UPN respectively. It is on this ground that business with Isreal thrives in Nigeria up till date while the issue of restoring diplomatic relationship remains an illusion. The Anglo-Nigerian defence pact could be cited as another test case. It is true that the different arms of the government were all behind the signing of the pact as all political leaders to the 1958 Constitutional Conference in London unanimously agreed to the ilea. About two years later, bitter controversy erupted because of it. To this, Professor Gambari simply concludes that, "This is due to political parties ideological differences."[9] I believe this is true because the altimate

objective to London when the pact was signed was to struggle as a team for power to be transferred to them (Nigerians) by the British ruling elite. Controversy later erupted due to struggles by the different parties to control the newly independent government. To confirm this, Gambari concluded that, "the cardial relationship between the major political parties came to an abrumpt end with the 1959 elections."[10] The ways the various political party leaders perceived one another based on how power was being shared and the consequent effects of this on the various leaders access to the national wealth both internal and external, I believe was the major cause of the rift.

Just like the Balewa administration, the Shagari administration also witnessed political rivalries. The Shagari administration had internal political unrest right from its inception that did not give the administration time to tackle external issues. The 2/3 of Nigeria case and threats by other political parties to sue FEDECO to court for irregularities and other intra-party conflicts did not allow N.P.N. to face the external environment and particularly the African environment adequately. The interlocking political squabbles and selfish interests during the Shagari administration lead to her forming an accord with NPP, with the hope that it would gain the support of NPP legislators and then command a comfortable majority in the Senate and House of Representatives on internal and external policies. Intra-party rivalry was also manifested in leaders pronouncements. While NPN was silent about normalization of diplomatic relations with Isreal, Awolowo's U.P.N. in its election campaign openly declared that the first item on its agenda would be the normalization of diplomatic relations with Zionist Isreal.

2.4 Religious Factors

> Nigeria's relationship with Isreal and the Arabs was and may be still characterized by three conflicting pressures: the northern regional ties with the Arab world and the south sympathetic disposition to Isreal; the North's political rejection and the South's acceptance of Isreali loans and economic aids and finally the North's partisanship in the Middle-East conflict as opposed to the federal government's evenhandedness. 11

It is my argument that the Muslim dominated North has a reliable ally in the Arab world through the transnational Islamic culture, that is predominant in the North. The south sees the same opportunity with the Isrealis. Apart from the religious factor, both the muslim North and the Christian south gain materially from the Arabs and the Isrealis respectively. Most muslims go to Mecca annually mainly to trade. The same can be said of the christian south. Each group is therefore desperate to attract external support to buttress its unique religious fortunes. The muslims therefore exploit Islamic faith to achieve political power while the Christians do the same, the result is that such political power is used to direct the foreign policy of the country.

Both Islam and Christianity either in domestic politics or foreign policy is used as a strategic device to win elections into the central government in Nigeria to be able to effectively control and direct the external relations of the country. In the same vein, though I agree with Professor Gambari that, both Islam and Christianity are influential forces in this political game; I believe that religious forces are used by the two faiths to achieve political control of the government to exploit the attendant trade links that are attached.

Religious conflicts have tended to threaten the internal stability of the country on a number of occasions to the extent that some regimes found it difficult to pursue a dynamic foreign policy. The recent Kafanchan riots could have torn the country into pieces were it not that it was a military regime.

It is also glaring that the recent changes in the federal cabinet of Babangida administration has some religious underpinning. It has been argued that one of the basic tenets is to creat a forum for the government to make Nigeria an Islamic state by joining the O.I.C.

> "Lukeman's redeployment is viewed with suspicion because of his link with Nigeria joining the OIC. In 1986 Lukeman was said to have lead a secret government delegation to Fez, Morocco where Nigeria was allegedly admitted into the body..." 12

Under the OIC charter, ministers of Information, External Affairs and Petroleum must be moslems. These ministries were held by moslems at the time of writing. Even top senior military officers called the changes, "the last coup towards achieving the O.IC. status.Q[13] Whatever Nigeria stands to gain from the O.I.C. in her foreign policy perception is left for Babangida, but one thing that is clear is that it has significant foreign policy implications. Religion will continue to contribute to the shapening of the country's foreign policy.

2.5 Economic Problems and Government Actions

Economic factors have been used to explain why nations behave the way they do. Plato, saw money as a cause of war and he went ahead,to suggest that nations should be poor so that it should not be attacked. Karl Marx has also used

economic determinant in explaining the political behaviour of states. Economic factors have become vital parts of foreign policy, given the increased involvement of nations in economic foreign relations.

Economic considerations are very vital to foreign policy choices because economic resources are needed for the implementation of most policies. It is the economic resources of a country that decides whether such a country can be a donor or recipient of foreign aid. Achievement of favourable external balance of payments, entry into armament races and involvement in foreign trade are determined by the economic base of a country. Nigeria is not an exception.

It utilizes economic means to obtain both political and security objectives. Nigeria has faced many economic problems since independence. The dependent nature of the economy in terms of its mass productive capacity, distributive efficiency, survival and overall development of its citizens have caused problems that continue to influence her foreign policy perception(s). The economy is controlled by external forces beyond the influence of the indigenous authorities.

The politics of food production has become a very crucial aspect of the country's economic international relations most especially since the 1970s and particularly from 1985 to date. Strategies like the Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs), River Basins Development Projects (RBDP), the National Accelerated Food Production (NAFP) etc. have been undertaken.

Other economic measures like the austerity measures, the counter trade and the structural adjustment programmes have been

taken by the respective regimes. This study argues that economic factors determine the direction of Nigeria's foreign policy pursuits in a number of ways. It is our argument also that because the economy is too pro-West, Nigeria has not been able to play her leadership role(s) in Africa. Professor Ishaya Audu worried about this economic dependency and its implications on the external image of Nigeria, argues that the "..magnitude of a nation's potentials normally determines the extent of its international influence." An underdeveloped nation, he further argues, will merely be ignored or at best honoured in international relations, therefore, Nigeria cannot afford to remain weak, impoverished and underdeveloped. We must be prepared to organize our resources to ensure rapid economic growth,[14] he added.

It is on this type of economic base that Nigeria pursues her foreign policy. It will therefore be ignored in most of her foreign policy initiatives unless she is able to organize her economy. Both the civilian and the military regimes in Nigeria have pursued foreign economic problems almost the same way but using different weapons. Shagari ran to I.M.F. and also introduced the austerity measures; Buhari introduced the counter-trade and shun the I.M.F.; while Babangida swallowed the I.M.F. pills and carried out the structural adjustment programme - after a 15-month economic emergency period was declared during which a stabilization programme was introduced. It should be noted that in July 1986 when the structural adjustment programme was introduced, it was supervised by the World Bank and the I.M.F.[15] The Structural Adjustment Pr gramme can be said to be one of the I.M.F. and World Bank conditionalities based on the objectives

of SAP as announced by the government. Therefore, "it is a capitalist manifesto which cannot be given a human face and which is inherently anti-people."[16] All these policies by the respective regimes from 1979 - 1989 would be assessed on their respective basis as they affect their foreign policy pursuits. This is necessary because "what has become increasingly clear over the years is that the attainment of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives has been persistently undermined by her economic weaknesses."[17] She has not been able to pursue her Afro-centric foreign policy and play her leadership role in Africa. This is because as earlier been mentioned she lacks the economic base. The government has no control over the economy. The economic policies are dictated from Washington, London and Paris. "The goals of foreign policy has not changed, but Nigeria lacks the economic base for achieving these goals at least in the short term."[18] Nigeria's problems are many, viz: foreign debts, the sharp decline in oil revenue, stagnation in both agricultural and industrial economy, These make her foreign policy orientation to be weak, pro-West and thus breed injustice (social economic) abdication by government of its responsibility, etc.

2.6 The Role of Multinational Corporations

Particular attention has been paid to the recent spectacular rise of multi-national corporations in Nigeria by radical scholars in their attempts to advise the government to revive the country's economic policies which are strongly being directed and manipulated by the imperialistic and exploitative Western based multinational corporations. "Multi-National

Corporations tend to threaten, to overwhelm many nation states in terms of size and global control."[19] Multinational corporations and their home governments have been blamed for many of the world's economic, social and politicsl ills. "Some of the multinational corporations have assets and sales that far surpasses the gross national product of an overwhelming majority of the world nation states."[20]

Because of their mammoth size(s) multinational corporation: constitute serious concerns for foreign economic policies of many nations especially those in the Thirld World. They also assume the role of actors in the international scene, sometimes operating at the expence of their home governments.

Because of multinational control of the economy of Nigeria and most African countries, that is, when to buy and sell products and when and how they will make investments, they have a major influence on the balance of payments of Nigeria and the value of the Naira and consequently her foreign policy. It has been stressed by Jesen Lloyd that, "the currency speculations engaged in by MNCs, many of which are American, undermined the dollar and lead to its devaluation in 1973."[21] If this could happen to the U.S. their main home base, one can imagine the extent of havoc they can do to a dependent economy like that of Nigeria.

Multinational corporations have been very active in extracting special considerations in support of their overseas activities because of their huge resources. In Nigeria for example there is generally a very good relationship between the multinational corporations and the governments. A relationship

in which, due to bribery and curruption, the MNCs simply do the bidding for Nigeria. Multinational corporations and their home governments often make efforts to protect and further their economic interests in Nigeria. MNC with the collaboration of their governments have often overthrown regimes of smaller states that are hostile to their imperialistic policies. It is therefore the reason why Most administrations in Nigeria have often formulated foreign economic policies that will place the MNCs and their western governments at an advantage. The regime of Allende was overthrown because of his anti-American policies. The case of Noriega of Panama is a recent testimony. I am of a very strong belief that the assassination of General Murtala Mohamm was sponsored by the MNCs and their Washington or British based governments.

The influence of American, British, Japanese and French multinational corporations on Nigeria's domestic and foreign policies are glaring. A test case is the British/American tobacco company which has been adequately assessed by in Freedom in the grave:

> It employs a quarter of a million people, has its office in London, branches in many countries. More than £16,000,000,000 dollars turnover is made annually, 40% of its shares are held by Nigerians, 90% of its managerial staff are Nigerians and 97% of raw tobacco is grown in Nigeria by farmers. B.A.T. has long been associated with the country that it" 22

has been an import substitution industry for a long time now. So its tobacco is got cheaply from the farmers; labour too is cheap. Annual profit is always not declared but very high as the company contributes "₦40 million annually to the federal government in customs and excise duties and personal tax."[23]

There are hundreds of such multinational corporations operating in Nigeria. The romance between MNCs in Nigeria and the Nigerian foreign policy decision makers is one of the dominant factors that have shaped the Nigerian foreign policy over the years. There has been strong clinging to the aprons of these capitalist nations and their multinational corporations. Economic policies by the respective regimes since 1979, apart from those of Buhari administration have been dictated by the activities of Western imperialist nations and their multinational corporations.

> I would like to take this opportunity once again to re-state our warm welcome to genuine foreign investors and reiterate our preparedness to ensure that no impediments stand in their way... For their part foreign investors should show greater appreciation of our sacrifices so far and their confidence in the path of economic recovery which we have embarked upon by investing more in our economy." 24

This is how the domestic and foreign economic relations of Nigeria is tied by our leaders to the West. This is a very unprogressive foreign policy statement by a head of state indeed.

2.7 <u>African Condition - South African Liberation Movements</u>

The African condition cannot be adequately analysed without rooting it in the global capitalist system. Apartheid, and the remaining pockets of colonial territories have been the main concern of Nigeria. It is to this effect that the enhancement of Nigeria's standing and status in world capitals especially in Africa is among Nigeria's national interest spelt out by Aluko in his analysis - when he stressed that, "Nigeria's foreign policy goals have been world and African centred."[25] Successive Nigerian governments have opined that Africa is the

centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy. Nigeria's Afro-centric foreign policy can be viewed in the perspective that African security is national security because if African security is threatened, Nigeria's survival is directly or indirectly threatened. Nigeri cannot therefore, claim to be independent unless Africa is totally liberated. Nigeria can only claim to be totally independent only if the goals of Pan-Africanism are achieved. Ultimate political and economic integration of Africa is a must. The Afro-centric nature of Nigeria's foreign policy is often reflected in addresses and speeches of Nigerian leaders, for example, Professor Ishaya Audu was quoted as saying that:

> During the past few months as I have watched events occuring in other territories in Africa, I have come to realize that Nigeria has not only a right but also a tremendous duty to become independent so that she may play her proper part..., As the country of African continent, having by far the largest population, we shall inevitably occupy an important position." 26

In another vein, Ibrahim Babangida had this to say:

> This administration wishes to reiterate its support for the liberation movements in Africa. The apartheid system in South Africa is still unquestionably the most intolerable political and social arrangement for human race in contemporary world. 27

So many comments like these have been made by Nigerian policy makers. In fact, Nigeria has committed a lot of funds to the liberation of Africa. The struggle for Angolan independence was spearheaded by Nigeria during the Murtala/Obasanjo regime. Subsequent administrations have also contributed to make the struggle a near success. Despite these struggles by Nigeria and African brothers to liberate the continent from the shackles

of colonialism, Nigeria has not been able to achieve much. This is because of the nature of African international relations. The international relations of Nigeria and indeed Africa in general is a product of a number of complexities, that can be located in economic, ideological, social, political and cultural realms. The colonial past of Africa has it that it is the only continent that was almost totally colonized. It is also the only continent with parts of it still under colonialism. The continent was again colonized by different colonial powers, Britain, France, Portugal, etc. An impediment is therefore created by the diverse orientation of African countries towards liberation struggles. The countries are dependent on their colonial masters for technology, military supplies, financial aids to execute projects, etc. etc. Their dependence on these imperial masters is a colonial tool for the manipulation of the international relations of African countries to suit the later. Because of these dependencies, African countries and Nigeria have found it hard to work as a collectivity. Sanctions against South Africa for example, have been frustrated by Britain and the U.S.A. Despite these obstacles, Nigeria has really tried to make her leadership role in Africa as concerete as possible. She has been able to show that as an African country, she has no any other continent but Africa. According to Ishaya Audu, then Minister of External Affairs:

> We are an African nation, and our first point of reference in whatever direction or by whatever criterion is Africa. It is our firm belief that the destiny and survival of our working closely with our African brothers and sisters...to exterminate the forces of oppression, racism, and exploitation of our continent. 28

this statement presupposes a perception of threat to the shared interests of the African continent and the need for an alliance to counter that threat. Nigeria and African can only achieve meaningful transformation in South Africa by working together as a team for the total liberation of Africa. Nigeria has tried to do this. For example the Shagari administration played a vital role in South Africa's decolonization. It stood strongly behind Zimbabwe's patriotic front negotiators when it appeared things would break down. The same administration later pledge a ten million naira donation to the then newly independent Zimbabwe. Other regimes have equally contributed to African liberation movements in South Africa. In looking at the respective regimes, efforts would be made to bring out glaringly their foreign policy towards the South African subregion, that is, Angolan, Zimbabwean independence, her role in Namibian struggle and Apartheid South Africa. One thing needs to be clearly understood in the foreign policy of Nigeria towards Africa. Nigerian national interests dictates her foreign policy. The vital interest for which it can take up arms against another nation centres around self-preservation of the country, defence and maintainance of the country's independence, economic and social conditions of the people, etc. Her interests towards Africa are secondary. They can only be achieved through diplomacy, that is, she can not go to war for secondary interests.

2.8 Global Influences - Western Capitalist Nations and Superpowers Influences

Super-powers here means Great Britain, U.S.A., France, China and Japan. This therefore means those nations that have acquired military capabilities which are generally accepted globally. The U.S.A., Britain and France are most important in this study. These countries dominate the foreign economic relations of Nigeria and consequently her foreign policy. Nigeria depends solely on these countries for the sale of raw materials and importation of finished goods. According to the central Bank,

> total inflow of capital (from all sources) increased by 5.9 percent from ₦664.7 million in 1978 to ₦704 million in 1979 and by 11.7% to ₦786.4 million in 1980, but declined by 25% to 584.9 million in 1981. The total outflow of foreign capital increased by 24.4% from ₦332.9 million in 1980 to ₦414.1 in 1979 but declined by 22.9% to ₦319.4 million in 1980. There was outflow of foreign capital up to the tune of ₦447.1 million in 1981, i.e. an increase of 40%. 29

All these transactions were between Nigeria and Western capitalist nations. The implications of this situation is that because Nigeria's economy is dependent and hence subjugated to international capitalist institutions of which the super-powers and the western capitalist nations are protagonists, it would be impossible for her to talk of an objective national foreign policy without incurring serious cost to her position as an integral part of the world capitalist system. The western nations are the Godfathers of Nigerian rulers. Nigeria under the respective regimes have played the role of the "responsible child". This explains why as would be seen in the next chapter, the apparent pro-Western policies of the various regimes in

Nigeria, despite their sentimental claims of the ideals of non-alignment. Nigeria has been a victim of western propaganda against eastern European countries. Also her economy has become tied to the economy of the western capitalist nations with which the Soviet Union is involved in cold war. The struggle between capitalism and communism had made it mandatory for Nigeria to perceive the eastern countries as friends enemies. She has been pro-West. To this end, Nigeria banned Soviet and communist literature. Turned down scholarship awards from the Soviet Union. Travels to the Soviet Union and other eastern European countries were discouraged. Balewa's assurance of not "forgetting our old friends" was meant to assure her western capitalist nations (allies) of Nigeria's unflinching acceptance of her (FANATIC CHILD IMAGE).

Despite this pro-West nature of Nigeria's foreign policy, Britain and the United States maintained the wait and see attitude during the Nigerian civil war. They initially refused to fulfil Nigeria's request for the supply of arms. The regimes that followed have in little or no way escaped this domineering relationship of the western capitalist nations. These western capitalist nations are the home bases of transnational corporations. These nations also dictate who qualified for the capitalist World Bank or I.M.F. loans. They also command global industrial and military complexes of the world. These are areas where Nigeria is lacking and Britain, America and other capitalist nations has assisted. They had played the Godfather roles, the capitalist way. Nigeria continues to be responsive child to the western powers (except during the Murtala/Obasanjo era). This is one side of its vulnerability as a dependent

nation in dire need of development assistance, such as technology and ability to dictate and sustain the price for its raw materials. Low technological base, illegal collaboration with the super-power, multinational corporations by the Nigerian ruling elite are what the super-powers expect of any of her allies in the Third World. Nigeria is a fertile ground for such. In such a situation, therefore, Nigeria's foreign policy cannot be independent of the wishes and aspirations of the Western capitalist nations. The exports of Nigeria goes to these nations while her imports come from them. See Table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1: Direction of Flow of Nigeria's Exports and Imports 1983 - 1985

% SHARE OF COUNTRIES	ORIGIN OF IMPORTS			DESTINATION OF EXPORTS		
	1983	1984	1985	1983	1984	1985
France	41	-	-	20.9	21.8	16.7
Western Germany/ Netherlands	41.9	43.0	38.1	12.3	10.4	16.7
United Kingdom	16.4	18.4	19.8	8.8	12.8	11.9
U.S.A.	11.7	12.6	13.3	22.9	13.7	17.7
ECOWAS	0.5	1.2	0.5	2.1	3.5	3.2
Eastern Europe	4.6	3.7	4.2	-	-	-
Asian Countries/ Japan	9.3	8.2	7.3	-	-	-

Source: Economic Development and Foreign Policy in Nigeria, NIIA, p.134.

As can be evidenced from the above table the bulk of trade during this period was with the western capitalist nations while the least was with African nations, that is, ECOWAS countries mainly.

Nigeria's underdevelopment apart she is tied to the apron strings of the super-powers in many ways. Their TNCs thrive fine in Nigeria. They milk huge profits from Nigeria yearly. This is done through the collaboration with the local commercial and bureaucratic bourgeoisie, various types of indigenous businessmen (importers and exporters, etc.). These local commercial and bureaucratic bourgeoisie form a sort of symbiotic relationship with the capitalist countries and foreign economic policy makers. Because this economic linkages goes beyond the borders of Nigeria, foreign policy making is thus dictated from beyond the borders (from the super-powers especially). Foreign policy in such a situation therefore bears no relationship to the actual conditions of life, needs and hopes of Nigerians and Africans at large. The problems of Nigeria pursuing an Afro-centric foreign policy is due to her inability to organize its internal political and economic policies, which could make her economically self-sustaining and diplomatically independent in the community of nations. Again, Nigeria in its pursuit of technology and development has developed almost umblical linkages with the centres of capitalist nations. Since their MNCs massively invest in the Nigerian economy, they thus dictates the trends of Nigeria's foreign economic policies. The voting powers of the super-powers at the U.N.O. security council and the global strength of their economic policies are equally significant in this respect of shaping the foreign policy

of most African countries and Nigeria in particular. The capitalist countries have this edge over Nigeria because they are able to discourage Nigerian industrialization for fear that their industries would come to compete with theirs especially when they are able to acquire technology to exploit and retain their own raw materials. Nigeria is thus forced to concentrate on extractive industries for export. This means she imports, finished goods, paying for their processing and transportation as well as profits skimmed off at various stages of production by the handiwork of the capitalist countries and their multinational corporations. These have serious implications for the foreign policy pursuits of Nigeria for the period under study. The super-powers are perceived with the imperial image. Nigeria then is playing the role of the responsive child.

2.9 Impact of Idiosyncratic Variables

"Constitutional provisions form the skeleton; they are the bare bones. It is the personality of people running the system that puts the flesh on the skeleton, giving us the recognizable form."[31]

"Personality and psychological factors are crucial determinants of foreign policy. This is what Rosenau calls the "idosyncratic variables."[32] Idiosyncratic variables such as the psychological desposition and belief systems of the decision makers in the making of the Nigerian foreign policy (1979-1989) are important in this study because there have been changes in regimes and thus changes in foreign policy decision makers. The characteristics and belief of top

decision makers do make some difference in foreign policy output. The state is nothing more than a legal abstraction. Ultimately, human beings must make decisions. The interest of the decision maker in foreign policy matters, his ability to withstand domestic stress or pressure, his charisma as a leader, ability to cope with contingency foreign policy situations are important in determining the activeness of foreign policy outputs. He added that there could, however, be some constraints like ideology and tradition, an obstinate bureaucracy or parliament. The personality of the decision maker also determine how he is able to manipulate these constraints to pursue a verile and active foreign policy. For example, Balewa's policies were regarded as either too reactionary or conservative. His (Balewa's) government's hesistant approach to African issues was partly a manifestation of his personal predilection and thus never permitted any vigorous posture in Nigeria's external relations."[33] Balewa settled for a policy of moderation and accommodation.

To Balewa, Nigerian foreign policy towards Africa especially in areas of decolonization should be settled through diplomacy instead of through arms struggle and other volitile means as was being pressed for by Ghana, Guinea, etc. This he defended by an argument that Nigeria did not get her independence through arms struggle. He therefore tended broadly to seek an accommodation with the colonial powers in areas of decolonization of Africa particularly in the light of his conviction that "the Congo's disintegration into chaos soon after independence in July 1960, was the result of a pre-mature decolonization." This of course, I believe was due to Balewa's

low headedness. The same could be said about Nigeria's refusal to recognize the legitimacy of Algeria's national liberation struggle and its hostility to both the Mozambican and Angolan national liberation struggle. During the Murtala era, an attempt was made to properly articulate Nigeria's foreign policy interest as it affected Africa because of his charismatic leadership.

It was due to this that the regime was able to spearhead and helped to push a logical conclusion, the MPLA struggle for the liberation of Angola. It was also due to the charismatic leadership that Nigeria was able to support African freedom fighters against the government of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Azania, and Namibia. The regime was very active in the OAU Council of Ministers and Heads of States. Because of the quality of Murtala Mohammed, Nigeria was able to forge for herself a respectable image in the international arena. Because of the leadership Nigeria was able to pursue a dynamic foreign policy by demonstrating performance capabilities. Goals were pursued with renewed vigor, enthusiasm and single minded devotion . The Murtala/Obasanjo era was credited for the dynamic foreign policies that became a source of tremendous satisfaction, pride and honour to Nigeria. This therefore connotes that idiosyncratic variables, that is, the personality components of foreign policy decision makers are vital for proper foreign policy pursuit.

FOOTNOTES

1. The long [illegible] to Nigeria's Africa-centred foreign policy - By [illegible]. In Nigeria's African Policy in the Eighties. NIPSS Publication, 1989.

2. See Ibid, [illegible].

3. The Nigerian Standard Newspaper, Oct. 1, 1979.

4. Ibrahim Gambari, Politics and Foreign Policy, Nigeria Under the First Republic. A.B.U. Press, 1980, p. 8.

5. Joy Ogwu, Nigerian Foreign-Alternative Future. NIIA, 1986. P. 18.

6. Ibid page [illegible].

7. Ibid page [illegible].

8. Ibid, [illegible].

9. Ibid, [illegible].

10. Gambari [illegible]. P. 34

11. Gambari [illegible]. pg. 95.

12. Newswatch Magazine - Vol. 11 No. 3, Jan. 15 1990. Page 19.

13. Ibid, p. [illegible]

14. Ishaya Audu, External Affairs Minister, Keynote Address at NIPSS, [illegible], 25 - 28, August, 1980.

15. Newswatch [illegible], July 24th Page 15.

16. Ibid p. [illegible]

17. C.O. Olusanya [illegible] (ed) Economic Development and Foreign Policy in Nigeria, NIIA, 1980, p. 64.

18. Ibid p. 64.

19. Jessen [illegible]. Explaining Foreign policy. Prentice Hall, 1982. pg. 16

20. Ibid p. 16[illegible]

21. Ibid p. 16[illegible].

22. Heinecke [illegible], Freedom in the grave - The political economy of Nigeria, Gaskiya Corporation Ltd, Zaria, 1986.

23. Ibid p. 47[illegible].

24. Ogwu Joy [illegible] p. 247.

25. Ishaya Audu, [illegible].

26. Babangida [illegible] Address - A review of Nigeria's foreign policy, 1979. NIIA, annual dinner party. p. 245.

5. Nigerian Forum, Op.cit, p. 245.

6. Ishaya Audu, Kuru 1980, op.cit.

8. G.O. Olusanya, op.cit., p. 130.

9. Op.cit., p.131.

11. Joy Ogwu, op.cit., p. 82.

12. Ibid, p. 51.

13. Fafowora, "Nigeria in African Setting", in Nigeria's African Policy in the Eighties, Op.cit., p. 31.

14. Imobighe, T.A. (ed.) Nigerian Defence and Security Issues and Options for Security. NIPSS Publication, p. 193. 1993

CHAPTER III

SHAGARI ADMINISTRATION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to critically examine the Shagari administration in respect of how foreign policy was conducted between 1979 - 1983. It is however, to be noted that the Shagari regime inherited some specific internal and external contradictions and problems as at October 1, 1979 when it came to power. The five different political parties had different views on how they would conduct foreign policy on assuming office. However, none of the parties made any radical declaration(s) with regards the conduct of foreign policy. The conflicting views of the five political parties apart, the constitution of 1979 restricted the powers of the President on some vital foreign policy issues. The President could not declare war with another country without the approval of the national assembly. Senate approval was also required under section 5(3)(b) before the President could send any members of the armed forces on combat duty outside Nigeria. Expenditure from the consolidated fund by the President also attracted the approval of the national assembly. The same applied to the appointments of heads of diplomatic missions abroad. However, section 19 of the 1979 constitution stipulated that:

> The state shall promote African unity, as well as total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of international cooperation conducive to the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states and shall combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations. 1

it is in the light of these that the Shagari administration would be critically examined in this chapter, that is, an it tackled the following issues: (1) The Chadian Crisis, (2) the Nigerian/Cameroon border clash, (3) the OAU Summit in Libya - Nigeria/Libya relations - USA/Libya relations and, (4) the liberation struggles in South Africa. The interplay of the independent variables mentioned in the second chapter on these issues would be critially examined, especially the economy which was already on the brink of collapse when the administration took over. When the administration took over, "inflation was well over 30%, unemployment and labour unrest were on the increase and import bills were worth over N600 million per month. By 1983, import bills had reached N1 billion per month. Total exports had declined by 34.5% by 1981, and by 1982, it had worsened. By August 1983, the total debt stood at N16 billion."[2] With this poor economic situation coupled with corruption in high places and misplacement of priorities, there is no doubt that the administration was in no position to pursue the type of foreign policy as set down by the constitution, especially as it concerned its African centredness. Again, a critical examination of the foreign private investments in Nigeria showed that they were dominated by the Western industrial nations. Below is a table that shows the net flow of capital invested in Nigeria from 1978 - 1982 and the countries of origin.

Table 3.1: Percentage of Foreign Capital Investment in Nigeria 1978 - 1983

Year	U.K.	U.S.A.	W/Europe	Others	Total
1978	36.9	16.7	32.7	13.7	100%
1979	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1980	68.0	0.1	28.1	3.7	99.9%
1981	54	92.6	176	11.0	100%
1982	37.7	45.1	12.3	7.4	100%

N.A. = Not available.

Source: CBN, Economic and Financial Review, Vol.18, No.2, June 1980, Vol. 19, No.2, 1981, Vol.22, No.3, Sept. 1984, p.25.

During the same period, the leading importers of Nigeria's crude oil were not different. See table below.

Table 3.2: Leading Importers of Nigeria's Crude Oil (%)

Country	1982	1983	1984
U.S.A.	35.4	22.9	13.7
France	16.3	20.9	21.8
Italy	8.6	11.5	16.5

Source: CBN, Annual Report, 1984.

Nigeria's African trade during the period had nothing to write home about to justify her Afro-centric foreign policy claims. See table below.

Table 3.3: Nigeria's African Trade, 1973-1983 (as % of Total Trade) Non-Oil

Year	Non-Oil Imports	Non-Oil Exports	Oil Exports
1979	1.2	3.7	3.4
1980	1.1	3.4	2.8
1981	1.1	3.4	2.9
1982	0.7	2.5	2.6
1983	0.7	2.5	2.2

Source: CBN, Annual Reports for the Various Years in Nigerian Forum, Published by NIIA, 1984.

At the same time, Nigeria was heavily indebted to the Western capitalist nations: Britain, the U.S.A. and other western European nations more than the previous regime(s). It is within these circumstances that Nigeria sought to pursue a dynamic and activist foreign policy especially as it affected Africa with regards to the earlier policy issues mentioned.

3.2 The Chadian Crisis

3.2.1 Background to Crisis:

Chad gained her independence from France in 1960. Like other French colonies, the policy of French Assimilation was introduced to the Chadians; this was, however, successful only in the Christian south. It failed in the Northern part because the people had already embraced Islam. So, on independence, the southerners who imbibed the imported culture and represented the western educated elite, that power was handed over to. The Muslims felt that they were underrepresented in the new

government which was formed under the leadership of Tombalbaye. The muslim North organized itself and formed FROLINAT which sought to safeguard the interest of North in the government.

Since the founders of Frolinat came from the Muslim North, they won the sympathy of the Muslim states of North Africa especially Libya, Sudan, Algeria, etc. It had its main base in Sudan. FROLINAT as a movement, was essentially formed to fuel a leadership crisis between the Northern Muslims and the Christian south which had the backing of France. With time, the support from Libya to the Muslim North increased especially from the time Gaddafi came to power in 1969. The leadership tussle further worsened when disagreements ensued among Frolinat leaders. Many factions of Frolinat emerged. Crisis in Chad has been on right from independence. The height of the crisis was when Habre broke away from Frolinat to form his own force (FAN) because of the support which Weddeye received from Libya. The leadership tussle fueld by Libya, U.S.A. and France led to the emergence of many splinter political groupings in Chad especially of Frolinat. There was unrest in Chad and her neighbouring countries like Nigeria felt that if something was not done to bottle the waring factions in Chad, the crisis may spread to them. It was at this instance that Nigeria in collaboration with other neighbours and members of the OAU, through several attempts tried to bring a lasting peace to Chad. Several conferences spearheaded by Nigeria whre held. Two were held in Kano in March and April 1979, and another in Lagos in August 1979. It is important that at the time of these conferences, Goukoni Weddeye was firmly in control of

the Chadian government. Hassen Habre was more of a leader of a rebel faction.

The result of the first Kano Accord did not bring peace to Chad. In the end, Nigeria was requested to make provision for a neutral O.A.U. peace-keeping force in Chad. This force, according to the accord, was to perform the following functions:

1. "Demilitarization of N'Djamena and the surrounding district up to 100 km.
2. Control of Chadian airforce.
3. Security of all important Chadian personalities.
4. Enforcement of the Ceasefire, and
5. free movement of civilian population throughout Chad."[3]

The accord (Lagos) allowed for the formation of a transitional government with Goukouni Weddeye as President, Abdulkadir Kamougue was made the Vice-President and Hassen Habre as the defence minister. Hassen Habre was to integrate the Chadian factional armies into a national army. Due to certain misunderstandings, Hassen Habre used his position as defence minister and the backing of France and U.S.A. which he had to take over the administration of Chad.

It should be noted that at the Lagos accord, French troops were called upon to withdraw from Chad and their replacement with an African force drawn from neutral countries. At the same time Goukoni Weddeye who then controlled Chad and N'Djamena with the support of Libya agreed to the conditions of the Lagos accord. At the same time, due to pressure from African leaders, the Libyan leader, Gaddafi ordered for the immediate withdrawal

of his troops from Chad.

It was immediately the Libyan troops who had assisted Weddeye in overcoming the insurrection by his former defence minister, Hassen Habre left the territory that Hessen Habre's rebel forces launched another offensive. This though contradicted the aims of the OAU for love and tranquility in Chad, the OAU suddenly left Chad without calling Habre to order based on the Lagos accord of August 1979. The OAU should be blamed for this, I suppose. This is because, the military vacuum created in Chad by the pull out of Libyan troops must have given Habre's French and U.S. backed troops an edge over Weddeye. It is also my contention that adequate arrangements were not made in advance to ward off such a misadventure carried out by Habre's forces.

I venture to say that Weddeye and the present African leaders have just made the same mistake as it was in Congo. Weddeye's mistake was to succumb to the pressure from the African leaders and extra-continental powers to expel from Chad, the friendly Libyans who had helped him to crush the Habre forces. "African leaders know, even if they do not want to admit that the presence of French troops in an African country is more dangerous to their security than the presence of any other African troops (except South Africa)."[4]

Goukouni Weddeye himself was very sad about the role played by the OAU forces. "We do not agree with this and we can in this case ask these troops to return to their own countries."[5] The peace-keeping force instead of making sure it consolidated itself in Djamena to properly ward off an aggressive faction, it allowed Rebel Habre's forces in. The

Chad venture was a test of the OAU role in intervening in the internal affairs of sister countries. The OAU never came out with any clear cut directives which made it mandatory on all African countries contributing forces to the peace-keeping operations in Chad to bear the financial burden of their men. To this, the Nigerian commander of the peace-keeping forces wondered how many countries could sustain such expences. The role the African leaders played in convincing Goukouni Weddeye to order Libya to withdraw her troops and the inconsistency of their foreign policies especially Nigeria was best demonstrated in the Chadian crisis. Nigeria masterminded the formation of the peace-keeping force. "I call on the OAU to send peace-keeping forces into Chad immediately to maintain peace and stability there."[6] If the OAU had moved quickly and sent troops into Chad, Libya could not have intervened there."[7] Shagari was making this type of suggestion knowing fully well that France and the U.S.A. has never hidden their interest in Chad. They had stationed their troops in Central African Republic and Sudan (Chad's next door neighbour). How bitter France and the West were about Libya's presence in Chad was not a hidden fact. The dubious role played by the African leaders in outsmarting Weddeye out of the throne for the pro-West rebel Habre is clear.

> Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire received both financial and logistic aids from Western Europe and the United States. Washington provided some $12 million dollars Largasse enabled Mobutu's Zaire to shift from covertly supporting Hassen Habre to publicly and unilaterally announcing the post-ponement of the departure of Zarian contingent to the peace-keeping force.[8]

Also as the peace-keeping force pushed Goukouni Weddeye out of office for Hissen Habre, Weddeye fled Chad as his transitional government collapsed. First he went to Cameroon and later to Algeria and then Nigeria. He was refused assylum. These crafty manoevres by Nigeria and other pro-Western agents (leaders) of Africa showed that the peace-keeping force was purely and deliberately meant to edge out Goukouni Weddeye in preference for the Western backed Habre's troops. Nigeria allowed herself to be used by the West to achieve their imperial motives. It is Nigeria's inability to define her interest in Chad that has lead to the flip-flops and the zig-zags that have characterized her foreign policy posture in Chad. The role of Nigeria and in fact the OAU peace-keeping force was purely a design to install the Western stooge, Hussen Habre to power. The role the peace-keeping force played in Chad was therefore a failure and a betrayal of the African continent. Nigeria should have taken into account Western nation's foreign defence and military agreements with her neighbours. These agreements have strategic reasons for the imperial nations. To have allowed herself to be used against her sister country means she is still ready to be in alliance with imperial nations (see Table 3.4 on page 66 for such defence and military agreements). African leaders allowed themselves to be misled to perceive Libya as a potential threat not only in Chad but to other countries in the sub-region with Nigeria inclusive. Given the military capabilities of Libya and Nigeria alone, I argue that no signle country in Africa can pose a threat to Africa or any of its sub-regions. Any threat to the African continent

can only be from the imperial powers. Any threat to any of Africa "from black Africa can and will only come from a collective defence rather than from a signel African country."[9] South Africa and Nigeria being the two most powerful nations in Africa depend on the western imperial nations for their sources of power. Moreover, the table on page 66 is a clear testimony that the presence of Western powers all over Africa especially within the Chadian sub-region including Chad itself which shares borders with Libya are threats to the perceived opportunities of Libya. Gaddafi is perceived a threat because he is seen to be friendly with the Soviet Union. An enemy's friend is an enemy; secondly, the western powers' interests in North Africa which is free from any seas or oceans except at the North African borders also makes the Western powers to perceive Libya a threat to their opportunities of establishing military bases in Africa. Both the presence of Uranium and Oil in Chad, and the Pan-Islamic ambitions of Gaddafi could be reasons for Libya's interest in Chad.

But one thing is apparent, both Nigeria and Libya share borders with Chad and as such a crisis in Chad could be perceived by both Nigeria and Libya to be a threat to their nations too. The influx of refugees into Nigeria during this period is a manifestation of this. Nigeria is even protected from direct invasions from the infantry in case of escalation by Lake Chad. But there is no water separating Libya from Chad. So to ward off the imperialists in Chad from crossing the Northern frontiers into Chad, Libya and Gaddafi had to come into alliance with a favourable faction of competing groups. Hence Gaddafi's support for Goukouni Weddeye.

Table 3.4: Foreign Defence and Military Agreements with Nigeria's Neighbours

Nigeria's Neighbours	Foreign Powers	Nature of Agreement
Benin	France	Technical military assistance agreements and financial assistance.
	Soviet Union	Soviet technical assistance and presence
Niger	France	Military assistance agreement including the provision of basic facilities.
Chad	France	Defence agreement including the provision of basic facilities.
	U.S.A.	Provision of military assistance.
Cameroon	France	Military agreement and provision of basic facilities.
	China	Military assistance agreement.
	Isreal	Military assistance agreement and presence of technical personnel.
Equatorial Guinea	Spain	Military agreement.
	China	Defence agreement.
	South Africa	Seeking communication and airbase.

Source: W.L. Hinjari: Paper presented at the 14th Annual National Political Science Conference, held at A.B.U., Zaria, 12 - 16 May, 1987.

The Shagari administration failed to have rallied round a dynamic African leader to redeem the war-torn Chad from the hands of the imperialists. The Administration wooed Goukouni Weddeye away from Libya so as to install the imperialist stooge Hassen Habre. The administration after all did not condemn Libya's action. Another testimoney of the crafty nature of the Nigerian government was manifested in Nigeria's pronouncement about the merger arrangement between Chad and Libya. That only a government with full legitimacy conferred upon it by free choice of the Chadians could possess the mandate to negotiate such association with any state. The federal government described the proposal as unfortunate and against the OAU's accord. The foreign policy perception of Nigeria was directed by the U.S.A. and France in this crisis.

5.2.2 The Nigerian/Chadian Border Clash

There are several explanations to the Nigerian/Chadian border clash. A lot was been written on it. Some of the arguments are: That the conflict was caused by poor border demarcations. That the Islands are floating Islands, that is, they have no definite positions like landmasses. The two that caused the border clash of 1983 were the two large Islands of Kinasara and Kofuya. The Chadian security forces seeing that Nigeria lacked security guarantee, usually harrassed Nigerian nationals occupying these islands. The border conflict occurred because Nigeria was not able to define her border on the lake, let alone protecting it. This, one may say, amounts to domestic weakness. "This is more so, if one takes into account the initial clashes that had taken place

between 1977 - 1983 especially in Gundarom, Kolorum, Bumarum, Titowa and Madari.[10] People who argued on poor boundary demarcation based their arguments mainly that Nigeria had often wanted to maintain friendly relations with her neighbours - especially for her leading role claims in Africa. "The real basic areas of controversy between Nigeria and Chad are on fundamental issues."

i. The problem of fishing rights on the lake as the incessant harrassment of Nigerian fishermen by Chadian soldiers and fishermen has revealed.

ii. The problem of land and water utilization capable of affecting the general water system of the lake and its basin as undertaken by the Nigerian Chad Basin Development Authority (CBDA).

iii. Nigeria's diminishing interest in the lake Chad basin commission (LCBC) in favour of the CBDA which is demonstrated by the huge financial commitment estimated at ₦493,000,000.

iv. The Perenial problem of boundary demarcation on the [illegible] surface area.

v. The expulsion of aliens particularly that of an estimated 700,000 Chadians effected by the Nigerian deportation order of 17 January 1983.

vi. The enormity of Nigeria's bungling in Chad since 1979 Kano and Lagos accords." [11]

Ishaya Audu who was external affairs minister at that time had attributed the cause of the conflict to anti-Habre's Chadian guerrilas inciting both Chadian and Nigerian security

forces on the border islands which lead to the serious clashes between the 18th and 24th of last month, I believe this was rather too speculative.

However, reports from certain French publications claimed that "the fighting was influenced by pro-Gaddafi elements in the Nigerian army on the one hand and suspicion by Habre, of the Nigerian-Libya detente at the end of April on the other." Another charge was that Governor Goni of Borno State was an agent of Gaddafi or has control over the action of Nigerian troops is preposterous."[12] Although some newspapers like the Tribune termed the non-retaliatory action of Nigeria militarily as a national disgrace, it has been adequately proved that Nigeria did not really want to use force on Chad. However Nigerian soldiers at the borders under Major General Mohammadu Buhari had launched a counter attack on the islands to regain back the islands lost. The Nigerian army is totally pro-West. It is therefore not a tenable argument that they would have been pro-Gaddafi to that extent.

Secondly, the same Nigerian army which mustered and installed Habre to power could not have sought to foment troubles especially in the southern part where Col. Kamouge controlled at a point and later by Habre himself. It can therefore be inferred that the boundary argument is more significant in explaining the crisis. The expulsion of illegal aliens must have contributed to aggravate the situation.

However, the Chadian crisis and the Nigerian/Chadian border clash, demonstrates continuity in the perception and pursuit in the Nigerian foreign policy. These have been

pro-West, conservative and does not demonstrate the Afro-centric nature which it claims is the corner stone of its external relations. Nigeria still did not learn from her civil war in which she was betrayed by the western powers.

The civil war between Biafra and the Federal Government began in July 1967. "In the early stage of the conflict, the secessionist forces, supplied with weapons by France and Portugal achieved some success."[13] The secessionist forces had advanced into the Western and mid-Western region.

Since her peace-keeping forces had ordered for a neutral ground, they should have forced Hassen Habre backed by the [illegible] Western forces to the OAU regulations. The foreign policy of Shehu Shagari administration was dominated by the super-powers and the Western imperialists. It is however pertinent that Shagari's personality helped a lot not to have allowed the border clash between Nigeria and Chad to degenerate further. It was really a clash that had to do with the protection of her existing territory. It was a threat which Shagari handled with cautious diplomacy. If we believe that African insecurity represents a direct or indirect threat to the survival of Nigeria, our foreign policy perception should not coincide more often than not with imperialist interest. It is then that Nigeria can properly articulate and pursue her foreign policy that is African centred.

3.3 The Nigerian Cameroon Border Clash

The Nigerian/Cameroon border clash broke out in May 1981. Cameroon had attacked and killed five Nigerian soldiers. This

nearly escalated into a face-to-face confrontation in which the nation could have been eye-ball to eye-ball in a bloody confrontation with her next door neighbour, Cameroon. Even before the United Nations plebicite when Northern Cameroon decided to join Nigeria instead of unifying with their kith and kins to form a nation, border disputes had been going on between Nigeria and Cameroons.

However, very serious border disputes started when Cameroon continued to annex Nigerian villages after the discovery of large oil fields near the border to the south. Before the gunning down of the Nigerian soldiers that lead to this clash, the Cross Rivers State government had complained that people at the Cameroonian borders were being killed.

The regimes through Gowon-Murtala-Obasanjo maintained a non-challant attitudes towards such complaints. This is because they perceived Cameroon to be of the same culture and inferior in capabilities. Nigeria did not really perceive Cameroon a potential threat. It is therefore because of this non-challant attitudes of our past leaders and their wrong perception of Cameroon that encouraged Cameroon to be so bellicos to Nigeria. Her conviction was that Nigeria will continue to do nothing.

However, the nation (Nigeria) could no longer sit on the fence with the killing of five of her soldiers. Many Nigerians especially those who belonged to the opposition parties felt it would amount to cawardice if Nigeria does not return fire for fire. To many, the war would be a walk over, that is, it

would be like a war between the elephant and the ant. Numerically and in terms of military waron Nigeria was and is still at an advantage over Cameroons. Others had argued that war between Nigeria and Cameroon over the age long border dispute would do neither Nigeria nor Cameroon any good. Nigerians felt so provocated in this dispute because apart from the killings of the Nigerian soldiers, Cameroon neither apologized nor sent any delegation until on the 25th of May, almost 10 days after the killing. The apology which was tendered in writing did not meet the requirements of the Nigerian government. Nigeria had protested to the Cameroonian authority in Yaounde, demanding for an unequivocal apology within a week of the incident. It also requested for an apprehension and proper punishment of the murderers as well as compensation to the families of the murdered and the three wounded soldiers. Prior to the written apology from Cameroon, Nigeria had waited but all in vain expecting a word from Cameroon. It was this silence stance of Cameroon that stirred up a lot of provocation(s). According to the then Nigeria's External Affairs Minister, "Nigeria would fight back. We feel it is in the best interest of Cameroun to settle this matter peacefully..."[14] It will not be in her interest to take on Nigeria militarily," he added. Alh. Abubakar Rimi, then Governor of Kano State under the P.R.P. had this to say: "If I were President Shehu Shagari, I will not sit and allow Nigerians to be slaughtered like that."[15]

Others referred to Nigeria as a proper tiger, that is, a toothless bull-dog. They called on the Shagari administration to delcare ware on Cameroon. Shagari knew the implications of

a war and again the administration did not want anything that would contravene her foreign policy objectives in as much as a solution could be found through peaceful diplomacy.

> The present administration like its predecessors, regards Africa as the centre-piece of its foreign policy. We are African nation and our first point of reference in whatever direction or by whatever criterion is Africa. It is our firm belief that the destiny and survival of our nation lies in our working closely with our African brothers and sisters to exterminate the forces of racism oppression and exploitation from our continent. 16

It is therefore glaring that the administration's total commitment to the African cause in her foreign policy pursuits and her leading role in peaceful settlement of disputes in Africa would not enable her go to war with Cameroon except she could not avoid it. Shagari personally believed that Cameroon was used as an instrument to sabotage Nigeria's effort at uniting Africa. Some white officers were confirmed to be among the Camerounians that killed the Nigerian soldiers. Cameroon did not respond to Nigeria's call for a written apology and an undertaking to pay compensation to the families of the murdered soldiers until the National Security Council met on the 25th May, 1981. The same day Cameroon sent a written apology. The composition of the Council included:

- The President - Chairman
- Vice-President - Deputy Chairman
- Minister of External Affairs
- Chief of Defence Staff
- Head of the N.S.O. now SSS
- Inspector General of Police.

The written apology from Cameroon was rejected because it was considered too late. It had only come after Edem Kodjo, the O.A.U. Secretary General's shuttle diplomacy between Nigeria and Cameroun a few days to the move. The shuttle diplomacy was sequel to Shagari's boycott of the OAU Summit in Nairobi as the Organization relaxed about the clash. The cardinal anchors for peace and stability in the continent of Africa rests on the OAU's belief in the inviolability of the national boundaries as they were inherited from the colonial masters.

A Nigerian house committee on defence paid a two day visit to the disputed area on the Nigerian/Cameroon border to have an on-the-spot assessment of the events that lead to the killings. The members included Laven, J.C. Ojukwu, E.A. Atandq, R. Ratelyenjue, Bawa N, Gapsole and Mohammed Tudun Wada.[17]

It was discovered that "Cameroons attempted to remove the bodies of the five Nigerian soldiers but fled on spotting another Nigerian boat. Nigerian soldiers did not shoot back because they were under instruction not to fire at anyone."[18]

The Army Brigade in Calabar was to be expanded into a division, establish a security post at the border, build an airforce base in Calabar and Ikang where the incident occurred. "A road was also to be constructed to Ikang to facilitate the movement of troops."[19] Shagari was further called to renounce his honourary citizenship of Cameroon in protest against the killings of the Nigerian soldiers.

As a matter of fact, the above measures plus "the actual

military and airforce action that Nigeria started to take against the Cameroonian villages that actually prompted Ahidjo to yield."[20] In all ramifications of warfare Cameroon is no match for Nigeria. But she probably felt assured of strong military support from France that she felt bold enough to ignore Nigeria's superior military force and threat. Many Nigerians wanted Nigeria to march on to Cameroon and teach Ahmadu Ahidjo the lesson of his life. The credibility of Shagari's administration ebbed very low as a result of this dispute, as to many people it tended to portray that Nigeria lacked a credible defence force even against the weak insolent neighbours, such as Cameroun. Such views are too militant of the border clash between Nigeria and her sister country. Shagari opted for the diplomatic parameters and this triumphed. It is therefore to the credit of the Shagari administration and Nigeria at large that the incident was not allowed to degenerate into a shooting war between the two countries. Shagari was patient and maintained a superior approach throughout his reign. No wonder therefore that President Shagari chose the path of peace. He resorted to articulated peaceful negotiation and not war. It was not due to weakness. This I believe was a fine example of logical decision-making which involves both national and international politics in conflict resolution. It is a demonstration of good statesmanship. Afterall Nigeria from her civil war experience knows the pros and cons of war. In every warfare, there is always an aggressor who behaves irrationally and in every bloody war encounter people always have the tendency of isolating the victor from the vanquished. No country ever

wins a war without losses.

Shagari was very cautious of the fact that decision makers do not always fight wars and they do not suffer as such from them. They do not see the battle fields. They are guided in protected quarters and only receive reports of casualties not even in names or personalities but in numerical orders.

Shagari therefore did not want to involve Nigeria in another war again bearing in mind the experiences of the civil war.

3.3.1 Causes of the border clash and subsequent Resolutions taken to prevent re-occurence

Impreciseness of colonial boundaries. There has been conflicts in Gongola boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Cross Rivers State and Cameroon. South West Cameroon was part of Nigeria before independence. The most contentious area is the maritime boundary with Cameroon. Many Nigerian farmers and fishermen who lived in these areas before independence still lived there. The same was applicable to the Camerounians. The problem had prevailed for long. In 1975 the Garua agreement was signed to prevent Cameroun from installing oil rigs in coastal areas believed to be part of Nigeria. The agreement was signed but not ratified and treated as an international agreement and as such the border disputes continued. The accord was further argued, to a large extent was no more than a gentleman's understanding between the two. The Nigerian supreme military council never ratified the agreement. No regime, military or civilian was known to have ever accepted the accord.

It again looks as if the accord was over assumed by Cameroon to a decision of the federal military government which really was not. However, the Cameroon government later agreed to the Nigerian terms:

> The government of the Cameroun Republic under President Ahmadu Ahidjo at long last came off its arrogance when it declared her intention to reparations and has rendered unreserved apologies. 21

Though this came almost two months after the clash it allowed the two countries to burry the hatched as no sooner did the OAU panel set up on the 15th July 1981 to look into the dispute went to work. According to the Camerounian statement:

> President Ahidjo regretted the death of the Nigerian soldiers and extended to President Shagari and the people of Nigeria, his heartfelt condolence. The situation should not be allowed to degenerate into an open confrontation between the two countries. 22

In conclusion, the sentiments generated by the conflict made it to nearly lead to a war between the two nations. If left to the two governments, it could have been settled without necessarily going through the OAU. This is because of two broad reasons.

First, the two leaders were muslims and of the same cultural background. This could be seen in the "inflamed publications" of some southern based newspapers except the Daily Times where the government held equity shares of "sixty percent". 23 The newspapers that inflamed war sentiments were owned by southerners, that is, the National Concord, the Daily Sketch, the Tribune, etc. All the proprietors of these newspapers held no "cultural affinity with any of

"Cameroon or its leaders."

"Students behaviour during the crisis is equally informative. The students union of Nigeria's most politically active campus, Ahmadu Bello University, did not get involved in the Nigeria-Cameroon border crisis."[24] While the students of Ibadan and Lagos universities both of which are based in the southern part of Nigeria, violently reacted to the crisis. They demanded that Nigeria should wage a total war against Cameroon.

Also the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria also demanded a total war against Cameroon. The only Northern leader who supported those who called for war was Alhaji Abubakar Rimi. It is on record that both Awolowo and Abubakar Rimi never saw anything good in the National Party of Nigeria led by Shagari and mostly dominated by the Northern muslims who had had long historical and cultural affinities with the Cameroons. The Cameroon Embassey in Lagos was destroyed by irrate students of the University of Lagos.

Despite the inflamed war sentiments by the southern students, the pressure for war brought to bear on the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the Cameroon/Nigerian border clash suggest to a far reaching extent the role religion/cultural factors could play on belligerent emotions in similar crisis.

Furthermore, the crisis is a clear manifestation of how policy makers respond to situations at hand based on the "policy-makers perceptions of reality".[25] The Nigerian/Cameroon border crisis is a display of how foreign policy makers

perceive the psychological environment within which they operate bearing in mind the reality of the physical environment in foreign policy decision making. President Shagari was less than two years old in office with hostile political opponents who neve wished his party to succeed. They therefore called for war in a crisis that involved a sister country. He knew that it was better to solve the crisis using peaceful diplomacy than violence. Policy makers have intentions. Such intentions may be misinterpreted by hostile and distrusted political opponents both internal and external. "In many developing countries, the values of rapid economic development, national unity, freedom from foreign control, and prestige serve as the main criteria against which to judge one's policies and those of other states."[26] It is on the basis of these criteria I believe must have shaped Shagari's perception of the Nigeria/Cameroon border clash and the subsequent line of action he took.

> This was the reason why the patient and persevering aspect of him (Shagari) was brought to bear on his decision not to go to war with the Cameroon knowing fully that the provocation was foreign instigated and designed to divert Nigeria's attention from the economic goals she had set for herself. 27

It is also my contention that Nigeria/Cameroon border clash being a clash that resulted from colonial bulkanization of the African continent can be said to be rooted or have resulted from the colonial past of the two countries and thus western powers inspired especially as the area in question is believed to have oil deposits. This has been glaringly brought to light by the fact that some white soldiers were said to have

been involved in the murder of the five Nigerian soldiers. However, the real cause of the killings has not been made known to the public. Chamber Ngou's assertion that religious and cultural factors prevented Shagari from ordering Nigeria to go to war with Cameroon, seem untenable. The reason(s) why the federal government refused to wage a war against Cameroon on this issue may be better known to Shagari and the military. It is also my belief that the immediate cause of the murder of the Nigerian soldiers goes far beyond the flimsy reason that it was due to the undefined nature of the Nigerian/ Cameroon borders. Also, by merely saying that the killing was foreign inspired, seem untenable too. This is because the foreign power so involved was never concretely identified.

In conclusion, I am tempted to argue that the five Nigerian soldiers killed could have been involved in an unofficial mission. This is because, it has not been stated in any literature that the murdered soldiers were on any particular official mission as directed by the government. Also, the boat involved in the said incident has never been confirmed a naval boat. How infantry men got themselves into Cameroon territorial waters raises a number of questions that still need to be answered by the military. Shagari and Ahidjo must have had their reasons other than religious/ culturhl to have resorted to diplomatic means for settling their scores. This is particularly so, taking into consideration the argument between the military and the Shagari administration as regards the crisis. The army wanted war to be declared on Cameroon while Shagari did not. It has been mentioned somewhere in this work that the military

unilaterally without government approval embarked on secret military actions against Cameroon before Ahidjo tendered an apology. The way the dispute was settled portrayed how idiosyncracies (personality factors) of both Shagari and Ahidjo were maturedly displayed. A newspaper simply put it that, "Nigeria and Cameroon burry the hatchet. They have signed a communique not to allow a re-occurence of what happened at the border."[28] Many people read different interpretations as to the magnitude of the conflict and how it was amicably and diplomatically settled quietly. This was a conflict which made the President decide not to attend the Nairobi, O.A.U. Summit. Although some have argued that President Shagari did not boycott the Summit because of the Nigerian/Cameroon conflict. It has to be recognised that not everybody in Nigeria accepts the towering importance of the Cameroon border incident in keeping the President at home. "Some people a long way from Cross River States",[29] believed that the President did not attend the Summit because of the domestic political disturbances that the impeachment proceedings against Governor Balarabe Musa was likely to cause in Nigeria at that time. That some public disturbances persuaded the President, that his primary duty lay at home rather than abroad at that time. Domestic affairs has been less smooth running. This means that Shagari would have attended the Summit were it not for the lack of calm at the home front. Threat was more perceived from the home front. This statement significantly confirm that Shagari did not take the Nigeria/Cameroon border clash too serious to have deprived him from attending the O.A.U. Summit as against the general belief by the ordinary Nigerians.

5.4 The Failed OAU Summit in Libya (USA/Libya Relation, Nigeria/Libya Relation)

The squabbles over the OAU Summit in Libya had a number of complexities that could be attributed to its failures. It is therefore important to critically examine these complexities for one to really pin-point the causes of the failure of the Summit.

First and foremost is the neo-colonial nature of most African states which left them divided over the admission of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. Secondly, many African leaders had refused to attend the Summit because they had been strongly convinced by the Western powers that Gaddafi was not fit to be the Chairman of the OAU as was to be the case in Tripoli. Thirdly, America perceives Libya as a threat to their economic and strategic interests, that is, in the exploitation of Uranium in the Chadian Aouzou strip annexed by Libya and also there is the long standing American annoyance with Libya over Libya's shift in policy away from the West since Gaddafi came to power. This would be treated in more details when I look at the US/Libya relations. Because of these reasons, African leaders had refused to go to Tripoli as dictated by the interests of their colonial masters. It could be argued that the U.S. sought to use African leaders to destabilize the Tripoli Summit in order to neutralize the Soviet Union impacts in the region.

For Nigeria she had given Libya two conditions to fulfil after which Nigeria would attend the Summit. The first was that all OAU member states would be allowed to participate in

the OAU Summit. Secondly, Libya should withdraw her troops from Chad. "These two conditions were given a year earlier to the OAU Summit by Ishaya Audu."

"By May 1982 when these conditions had been satisfied, Nigeria's Shagari refused to attend the Summit on the absurd argument that he was waiting for a quorum to be formed."[50] Also Arap Moi who was the 19th Chairman of the OAU instead of being the first to arrive Tripoli, said he would not leave for Tripoli except a quorum was formed. I believe that Shagari and Arap Moi should have demonstrated better sense of statesmanship if they had spared no effort in persuading the rejectionists to attend instead of staying at home in Nigeria and Kenya and confining themselves to correspondence. Shagari's refusal to attend the first Tripoli Summit and his soft pedialling at recognising the SADR was the result of the Pro-West stance of the administration. The second Tripoli Summit demonstrated the weakness of Nigeria:

> The previously assumed capability of Nigeria to convir e absenting African leaders to participate in the second OAU Summit has been tested. The result was that the giant of Africa was shown to have little weight on the continent. She could neither by threat nor reasoning persuade even one of the absenteing African heads of state to fly to Tripoli and save the OAU from embarrassment and eventual collapse.[51]

After Shagari had boycotted the first Summit, there was mounting pressures against him in Nigeria to attend the second one. There were also many boycotts of the second one. This second Summit held in November of the same year was attended by Shagari. But unfortunately Shagari could not convince other

African leaders who boycotted the Summit to attend. This was inspite of the fact that Shagari was said to have personally telephoned unrepresented African leaders. A quorum was not also formed at this second Tripoli Summit of 1982.

In fact, Nigeria's insistence that Habre be allowed to participate at the Tripoli Summit and his support for Habre was purely because of the dependent nature of Shagari's administration. It was because the U.S. supported Habre as against Goukouni Weddeye who Gaddafi supported. Whatever be the main cause of the failure of the first and second Tripoli Summits, the fact remains that the Shagari administration, took a pro-Western stand. Her actions were mostly motivated by western influences. The weakness of the administration in pursuing a viable and dynamic foreign policy when it concerns conflict in Africa was portrayed by the Tripoli Summit and Nigeria's support for Habre.

> What was certainly revealled in Tripoli is the unsavoury fact that Nigeria does not have the power in Africa that many have ascribed to her. She is in a sense, a leader without followers. It may be said that a bull-dog without teeth should not bark too loudly because it might be called upon to scare off a fearless attacker and thereby be exposed as useless. The giant of Africa was last month called upon to counter the reactionary attacks on African unity and in the process displayed her gummy growl to the world. 32.

This also portrays the inconsistencies in the pursuit of foreign policy during Shagari's regime. The administration should have known or perceived that other African nations would not take her serious when she was not only among the few that boycotted the August Summit because of Habre and the

recognition of western Sahara. Her quick change of gear made most African nations to have a complex image of her. Nigeria contributed to the failure to host the OAU Summit in Tripoli. This failure was designed and executed through the boycotts of Nigeria and other African countries through the influence of U.S.A. and the western bloc .

> Shagari dictated a style of foreign policy based on waiting for the rest of Africa to take positions and then casting a lot with the majority.... To deny Libya of the leadership of the OAU was the oblige imperialist interests to an astronishingly ludicrous.33

The above statement confirms the fact that the pro-West nature of the Nigerian foreign policy during this period never allowed Nigeria to really pursue her Afro-centric foreign policy - as it concerns the Tripoli Summit.

3.4.1 U.S.A./Libya Relations

The genesis of the sour relationship between the United States and Libya can be traced to the ouster of King Idris in 1969 by a group of young army officers led by Lt. Col. Muammar Gaddafi. The group of the army officers that carried out the coup were generally called the "free officers".[34] The "free officers" pledged their commitment to socialism, Islam and Arab unity. Prior to the free officers coup, the U.S. and the British were deeply involved in the marketing of Libyan oil. Free enterprises and large conglomerates that had their home bases in most parts of Western Europe and the U.S.A. transacted business with Libya. Transactions based on interests flourished. These, however, are contrary to the

doctrines of the free officers and Sharia (Islamic laws), which the free officers firmly upheld. In 1970, the vast Libyan oil fields were nationalized by Gaddafi and his colleagues. This meant the stoppage of the huge profits which the Western transnationals, especially those of the United States were deriving from the huge Libyan oil. The United States and the British in particular were not happy about this new development. Secondly, the socialist inclinations of the free officers' doctrine, posed a threat to the United States in the sub-region. Libya was thought of playing proxy to the Soviet Union in the sub-region. This type of situation is contrary to the American anti-communist foreign policy. This situation therefore placed Libya as an enemy to the West because of her romance with Moscow and socialism. Before Libya under Gaddafi nationalized her oil companies, it had closed down all British and American military bases in Libya and expelled the military personnel of both countries. No African leader(s) had been able to take such bold steps against the Western powers and imperialism. This was not all, Gaddafi also forced all oil companies which mainly came from the West to pay new and higher prices for oil they imported.

> And while the U.S. and Britain were still smarting from humiliation and deprivation suffered in Libya, Gaddaffi's new government managed to squeeze out a separate price agreement with oil companies which were mostly from the west. It then became difficult for the United States to hide its plans against Libya and Gaddaffi. And so began the campaign of calumny against the person of Gaddaffi in particular and Libyan government as a whole.35

Because of these happenings, the bourgeoisie press of the Western capitalist nations, the U.S.A. in particular have continued to term Libya as the biggest financier of international terrorism. Even bourgeoisie African scholars who are pro-West also address Gaddafi in the same context. The terrorism which the United States and these scholars refer to in this case is the aids which several nationalist organizations receive from Libya. Such organizations include the PLO struggling to establish a state of Palestine admist stiff resistance from American sponsored Zionist Isreal, SWAPO, fighting for the independence of Namibia, etc. I wish to state clearly here that the real terrorist organizations are found in Western Europe and the United States of America. They are anti-human (real terrorists). Some examples are Baad Meinhoff of Western Germany, the Red Brigade of Italy, the Ku Klux Klan (K.K.K.) of the United States of America has been trying to bring down Gaddafi's government, because he has been a fanatic child. He has not been responsive to their imperial roles. Instead of African countries/leaders denouncing these retrogressive, imperial moves by the U.S.A. and her allies, they are supporting such. One cannot rule out the possibility of the U.S.A. treating any of her present surrogates in Africa in the nearest future where progressive leaders like Gaddafi might emerge.

American confrontationist policy with Libya could be seen in President Reagan, personally ordering the shooting down of Libyan jets by the U.S. aircrafts, off the gulf of Sidra near Libya, when the U.S. fleet was carrying on

military exercises near the area primarily to provoke Libya. The U.S. has also been quoted by many authorities to have increased its military aids to Libya's immediate neighbours, that is, Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan. This, I feel is done to intimidate Col. Gaddafi.

It is significant to assert that moves to bring down Gaddafi by the U.S. and the West are purely based on the U.S. image of the free officers. The Gaddafi administration is perceived to be fanatical, radical and anti-U.S. while the rest leaders of African countries, particularly Nigeria are responsive, Conservative pro-U.S. and ready to maintain a neo-colonial stance.

Libya has vast natural potentials in the African continent of which if she is given the support, she could co-ordinate efforts with the remaining African countries to form a bulwark against foreign meddlesomeness in the continent. It is one of the biggest oil exporters in the continent and in terms of military hardwares, it is a force to be reckoned with in Africa. African leaders need to understand Gaddafi more, where they feel he is carrying out his policies unconventionally, they could get him to discuss. After all, Gaddafi, heed their order to withdraw his troops from Chad. It was France and the U.S. that betrayed Africa during the crisis. Instead of African countries and leaders swallowing the Western ploy hook line and sinker, they could get Gaddafi reformed. By supporting the U.S. and trying to ostracize Gaddafi, the West, the U.S.A. and other western proxies in Africa, particularly Nigeria are radicalizing Muammar Gaddafi all the more and also boosting

his international popularity. There has been many plots by the U.S.A. and other Western powers to assassinate Muammar Gaddafi.

> There has been plots to assassinate this erstwhile son of A rica Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. 36

The assassination was to be carried out by Libyan exiles trained and equipped by the U.S.A. and France. It was planned that when eventually the bid to assassinate him was through, the U.S. and Britain would use their powerful mass media propaganda to deny any involvement in it. This was to be done if the U.S. capitalist inclined presidential candidate Gis Car D'estang had won the elections. Unfortunately socialist Mitterand won the elections.

Libya's Gaddafi was the first Arab/African country to demand for increase in oil prices. This constituted a threat to the U.S. economy. The United States also perceived it as a security threat from Libya because Libya exchanged her oil for Soviet arsenals and sophis .cated Russian weapons.

The U.S. has also used her bourgeoisie press to increase propaganda on Libya. She accuses Libya of using her oil wealth to forment unrest in Africa and the Middle East. I believe that the West/American governments are never interested in African countries that are willing to pursue a verile and dynamic foreign policy, free from the interventions of the capitalist nations. It is in this context of the U.S. hostility to Libya, that Gaddafi has not hidden his hatred for the U.S. governments neocolonial policies in Africa.

In 1979, Libya burnt down the United States embassy in Tripoli during the Iranian hot dispute with the U.S. May 6th 1981, Reagan ordered the closure of Libyan's peoples Bureau (embassy) in Washington with only five days notice. In the same May 1981, Americans in Libya were also ordered out of Libya while those who intended visiting Libya were ordered to call off their visits. Americans in oil business in Libya ignored the U.S. calls and warnings and her contradictory foreign policy pronouncements and actions with regards to Africa. In July 1981, Reagan was again accused of planning to eliminate Gaddafi. Reagan denied the allegation, charging that it was erroneous.

> But Gaddaffi who Reagan should know is older than him in administration could not take such reports as erraneous. It was with this report that a Libyan group known as Free Unionist Officers was established with the purpose of physically liquidating Americans including Reagan himself. 57

Washington also saw Gaddafi's maritime law interpretation as ve irritating, while the United States could only lay perfect clai to the three miles stretch on the gulf, Libya was and is still constantly maintaining claim over a two hundred mile unit.

In August 1981, Libya and the U.S.A. fought at the Gulf of SIDRA in the Mediterranean. In the clash, two of the Libyan Soviet made SU 22 fighter planes were shot down by the U.S.. Nearly the whole world condemned the American role in the clash. America was condemned for stepping her bounds by both the Western media and the Arab world. Arab nations particularly, PLO, Syria, Algeria and South Yemen

regarded the air clash not only as a conspiracy against Libya but the Arab nations as a whole.

In November 1981, Gaddafi had alleged new moves by the Reagan administration plotting against the Libya JAMAHIRIYA Republic (State of the Masses), which he tought would succeed through France by supporting Mitterand's call for a Pan-African peace-keeping force in Chad.

America has in the past exploited the dependence of African nations like Egypt, Sudan, etc. to launch an attack on Libya through Chad. The United States has been having ostentatious military might in Egypt, Sudan and Central African Republic. This has had serious strategic implications not only for Libya but for Africa in general. Nigeria has never condemned the United States for her military intervention in Africa, especially as it affects her neighbours. The presence of the U.S. in the Chadian crisis is quite glaring. It was the U.S. that back Habre to manoevre the OAU peace-keeping forces in Chad.

The United States contributed immensely to the failure of the Tripoli Summit. This I feel the U.S. did as I have mentioned somewhere in this work, to prevent Muammar Gaddafi from being the Chairman of the OAU at the same time to fuel the Moroccan/SADR troubles.

The relations between America and Libya are very hostile. America feels threatened by the presence of an anti-imperialist, radical leader like Gaddafi, in Africa. They want to blackmail him by whatever means. Gaddafi is aware of the U.S. to use countries like Tunisia and Sudan as

bases for their strategic interests in Africa.

In 1981, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that:

> Under Gaddaffi, Libya has adopted a diplomacy of subversion in Africa and in the Arab world. It is a diplomacy of un-precendented obstruction to our own interests and objectives...we want to help African nations threatened by Gaddaffi's diplomacy. In our fiscal year, 1982, budget, this administration added substantial funds for military assistance to Tunisia, and Sudan...we are seeking ways to help with both economic and military support for others who are similarly threatened. 38

Also in 1981, the American Assistant Secretary for defence, Francis J. West, told the Senate foreign Relations Committee that:

> Libya has signed more than $12 billion in military agreements with the Soviet Union between 1976 and 1980. Libya is able to deliver Soviet-origin weapons to states and factions friendly to Soviets and inimical to our interests. 39

The hostile attitude of the United States to Libya can in this vein be construed as perceiving Libya to be a Soviet proxy in Africa. She is being perceived a threat to the United States imperialist and capitalist interests in Africa. The United States is therefore ready to intervene in any African issue even against the wishes of all African leaders once Gaddafi is involved especially in North and West Africa more particularly in the Afro-Arab nations.

The U.S./Libyan relations and the role of the U.S. in Libya and her neighbouring African nations represents the United States determination of her own interests as a

super-power. The west now lead by the United States still considers Africa to be within the sphere of influence and acts accordingly.

The U.S. expects every African nation to believe in this colonial notion. Any African nation that is therefore gone fanatical and not being responsive is perceived a deviant hostile and a threat.

Unfortunately most African countries are still poor and weak that they allow America to dictate the collective roles that they are to play to enhance African unity and security.

In Western Sahara the United States made it possible for Morocco to sustain its war against Polisario. Morocco's two main sources of weaponry have been U.S. and France. It will be worthwhile to note that the O.A.U.'s charter has been violated by Morocco with regards to SADR and that all African nations were annoyed with Morocco, yet she continued to receive support from the U.S. and France. Yet other African countries could not call the U.S. to order. It was only Gaddafi who openly condened Morocco and openly supported Polisario at the end of June 1983 when he "had rigidly insisted at Addis Ababa without a trace of compromise that the SADR should not give up its seat at the Summit." [40]

He knew the role the U.S. was playing in Morocco. This role had enabled Morocco, to defy the collective decisions of Africa and the OAU Charter.

Though Libya was disappointed by SADR declining the seat

at the request of the pro-West African nations, it is clear that Gaddafi did not like the United States role in the conflicts. Both Washington and Paris have been fearful that humiliation for Morocco in the Western Sahara might cost King Hassan his throne, ushering in a period of uncertainty in a strategically located country astride the entrance to the mediterranean. Both French and U.S. warships have long been able to call at Morocco's excellent deep water ports. Morocco had signed transit rights with the United States giving transit rights at its air basis to its rapid deployed force, etc. Libya has not allowed the U.S. such strategic facilities. Moreover, Gaddafi is against such imperialist penetration in the sub-region. It is within this analytical framework that the American/Libya relations can be synthesized, that is, Libyan diplomacy of emphasizing the evils of imperialism is U.S. concern.

3.4.2 Nigeria/Libya Relations

In Nigeria, individuals who emphasize the least moralistic rhetoric and the evils of imperalism is termed a radical, anti-government and a misfit in the society, however, genuine his cause may be. The same has been perceived by most Nigerian regimes of other nations that are anti-west or emphasize the evils of imperialism of which Africa has been a victim. Libya under Gaddafi has been a radically developing and progressive state, emphasizing the evils of the West to which Nigeria has been knittly married to.

While Libya has tried to maintain anti-West position, at redeeming her country and her African counterparts, particularly

the Afro-Arab nations from the U.S./Western interventions in the affairs that are purely African, Nigeria's economic policies, and consequently her politics and foreign outlooks are dictated from Washington, Paris and London. It is with this background that the Nigerian/Libya relations can better be analysed. Though there has been no war between the two countries, the conservative and pro-West policies of Nigeria and the radical, anti-Western policies of Gaddafi's Libya cannot be harmonized.

Before the quit order given by Nigeria to Libya there has been some diplomatic impasse between Libya and Nigeria. Less than a month before the deterioration of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the Libyan Foreign Minister, Abdul-Salam Ali Treiki was beaming with smiles in Lagos at the end of a three day goodwill mission to Nigeria. He had told newsmen in Lagos that the relationship between Nigeria and Libya was cordial and tight. He had had successful discussions with President Shehu Shagari and the external affairs minister, Ishaya Audu.

Long before the talks, a Libyan aircraft that was suspected to be carrying arms to Chad was detained in Maiduguri for violating the Nigerian air-space. The Ministry of External Affairs, however, refuted the above claim due to the wide-spread outcry that followed the detained aircraft. External Affairs Officers had said that the aircraft had been examined and that it meant no harm.

Many Nigerians had viewed Gaddafi's presence in Chad as being too close to the Nigerian border for any cordial relations; but they had failed to view the presence of the U.S. and France in Chad to be more dangerous not only to Nigeria but to the entire continent of Africa and Libya in particular.

Gaddafi was also quoted to have accused Nigeria of mistreating the Tuareq Arab refugees that had flocked to Nigeria from the war torn Chad. Most African countries and even the Nigerian press condemned the Shagari administration for obnoxious expulsion of Africans that the administration termed illegal aliens.

Nigeria had also felt threatened by the proposed Libya's merger with Chad. If this merger succeeded, Libya/Chad confederation could emerge and that would mean Nigeria indirectly sharing borders with Libya. Nigeria feared and denounced the pact so much. To a large extent, Libya is a threat to Nigeria by merging with Chad. Appraising the unanimity of the public outcry that followed the proposed merger pact between Libya and Chad, N.T.A. Network newschief, John Chiahemen, quiped that, perhaps what Nigeria needs for a verile and vigilant posture is an army at the border.

The Maitatsine riot which some people claim to be the most bloodiest, second after the Nigerian civil war had also been linked with Libya. But this has not, however, been concretely proved.

The Nigeria/Libya relations could be viewed in the contemptous nature most African countries perceived the foreign policy of Nigeria. The Nigerian foreign policy had been

dictated from the West particularly the U.S.A. and Britain. Nigerian foreign policy to African states had been retrogressively pro-West in all its ramifications and as such it is subject to contempt. Libya like any progressive African nation or individual sees Nigeria as a Western stooge and consequently her foreign policy. She lacks the leadership qualities possessed by Libya. The oil boom of the 1970s was a result of Libya's unilateral call for increases in oil prices on a global scale. The way Nigeria is looked down upon even by her immediate comparatively smaller neighbours can be measured from the Nigerian Chadian and the Nigerian Cameroon border clashes. In all the clashes Nigeria had camouflagued under her so-called policy of good neighbourliness and leadership role in Africa to subject her military personnels to embarrassements. For example there was neither the victor nor vanquished in both clashes.

Table 3.5 below shows that the population of Libya is only approximately 3.9% that of Nigeria. The table also shows the military balance of Nigeria was only 140,000 while that of very small Libya compared to Nigeria in population was 458,000 for the same period, that is, Libya had more than three times higher than that of Nigeria.

Another funny proof of the data is that while Libya whose strength of military personnel is three times more than that of Nigeria spent only $448 million, Nigeria expended almost four times the amount Libya expended.

Table 3.5: The Population and Military Balance of Some Selected African Countries 1980-1981

Country	Population (in mill.)	Army	Airforce	Navy	Reserves	Total	Arms Exp(mill
Algeria	15,684	90,000	7,000	4,000	10,000	111,000	$705m
Egypt	37,500	320,000	27,000	20,000	515,000	882,000	$2170m
Libya/	2,437	450,000	4,000	4,000	-	458,000	$448m
Nigeria	63,100	130,000	8,000	8,000	-	146,000	$1700m
S/Africa	125,087	71,000	10,300	4,500	10,000	96,000	$2560m
Morocco	17,504	105,000	7,000	4,000	30,000	146,000	$676m
Zaire	21,191	18,000	1,000	1,000	35,000	55,000	$505m
Tanzania	15,506	50,000	1,000	850	36,400	88,250	$303m
Kenya	13,607	12,000	2,100	650	1,800	16,550	$168m

Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, culled from Chamba M. Ngou Ngwu (1983), 'Nationalism in World Affairs, The basis of foreign policy behaviour.

Column 1 - Population in millions from T.A. Imobighe (ed), Nigeria's African Policy in the Eighties.

Libya thus has more military capability than Nigeria in terms of military personnel. So in any case of emergency Libya is militarily superior to Nigeria. It can therefore not be out of place to assert that psychologically Nigeria has inferiority complex towards Libya. Libya has never accused Nigeria. She has never shown any act of provocation to Nigeria. It is only Nigeria that has allowed itself to be provoked against Libya by the West particularly the U.S. which is a proxy image of Libya

The extravagant nature of the military expenditure probably through contracts inflations, over-invoicing, reward of military contracts for which payments have already being made, corruption in very high places in the army and among top civil servants must have accounted for Nigeria's higher military expenditures as per the table above. There are more than enough reasons for Nigeria to hate Libya while her military expenditure are high and dictated from the West, Libya's military expenditure are comparatively very low and considered a Soviet ally in the sub-region. Nigeria particularly under the Shagari administration was too pro-West. Shagari administration favoured an active alliance with the West, particularly America from which the administrati borrowed the presidential democracy that was then in practice.

Since Libya is anti-West and a Soviet ally, it cannot resemble Nigeria ideologically. Nigeria perceives Libya an enemy to a friend and thus an enemy. Again since the military might of Libya is more attuned to war than Nigeria, Nigeria would normally perceive her a threat particularly in a sub-region where she claims to be a giant and playing a leading role. On the other hand, the psychological readiness of Libya for war could be accounted for by the fact that she is surrounded by states who serve as proxies to Western powers. This and the Western propaganda against Gaddafi are responsible for Nigeria's negative attitude towards Libya.

Given the wealth of Libya and being an African country, Nigeria should have felt better to deal with Libya to help black Africa achieve her objectives rather than U.S.A. and

France. Libya and other Arab nations have been contributing funds generously on colonial issues regarding the liberation struggles in South Africa, Rhodesia and Portuguese colonies. Since Libya identifies with African causes it is retrogressive for Nigeria to continue to yield to the West so much as to continue to perceive Libya a threat.

Shagari administration would have gained more than she did if she had not kept Libya at an arms length. Shagari dodged the first Tripoli Summit for the same reasons given by other American puppets in Africa. Nigeria also allowed herself to be used by the imperialists when she asked for the withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad. These were the masterplans designed to cause instability in OAU and amongst African leaders by the U.S. and France.

The sour relations that existed between Libya and Nigeria was as a result of "superior capable nations manipulating both Nigeria and African leaders within the OAU in order to bring about a crisis situation. The relations between Nigeria and Libya represents a "clear perception of neo-colonial manipulation in order to achieve simple and evil motives" against Gaidafi's person. It was too late for Nigerians to realise the importance of Libya in Chad as opposed to the USA or French presence. Newspapers comments against Libya changed to singing praise songs on Libya only few months later.

Finally, I must say that the inability of Shagari administration to pull other African countries together on issues concerning the continent stems from Nigeria's too

dependent on the Western nations, U.S.A. and Britain for any action it has to take. The inability of Nigeria under Shagari to do what Libya did in Chad or to effectively respond to the voice of reasoning as far as the SADR issue was concerned exposed the fact that Nigeria cannot be relied upon militarily or otherwise in case of emergency in Africa. This is due to the reactionary nature of the ruling Nigerian elite and her neo-colonial posture which makes her to be fully integrated into the imperialist capitalist system especially during the Shagari administration. 'This type of romantic posture with the West was not and is not still compartible with the radical, anti-West ideological stance of Libya and Gaddafi. Their relationship therefore cannot be said to be cordial. An enemy image, especially the proxy type can therefore be said to have existed.

3.5 Liberation Struggles - South Africa and Namibia

The issue of colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination has been on top of Nigeria's foreign policy programme since independence. The second Republic under President Shehu Shagari also sought to pursue the same foreign policy in line with its predecessors. As was clearly enshrined in the 1979 Nigerian Constitution foreign policy objectives, the state shall promote African unity as well as total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of international co-operation condusive to the consolidation of universal peace, mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states, and shall combat racial discrimination in all its

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The Murtala/Obasanjo regime had set a good pace for the new administration to follow. The Murtala regime moved the whole world when it announced the recognition of the MPLA as the sole, authentic and legitimate government of the people of Angola:

> Angola is merely the excuse being used by those who cannot reconcile themselves to the momentous victories of the forces of African nationalism, to assert their neo-colonialist ambitions on the continent... Angola merely provides the occasion to recreat the 19th century partition of Africa into areas of influence where the predominant consideration will be the interests of the big super powers without any consideration for the inalienable rights of Africans. 44.

Speech and other progressive actions were taken by the Murtala administration concerning her foreign policy towards Southern Africa. This was the foundation on which the Shagari administration foreign policy towards Southern Africa and Namibia was laid. On assumption of office it played a key role in the Lancaster House negotiations on the constitutional future of Zimbabwe. The administration worked closely with Carter's administration and applied pressure on the British government not to execute "its diabolical plan to assassinate ZANU forces enmass . On Zimbabwean independence President Shehu Shagari gave 10 million dollars to the newly independent Zimbabwe for manpower training. 45 This did not, however, go down well with the then Nigerian senators who had argued that the President had no such powers to have unilaterally taken such a decision as he (the President) was not a military Head of State.

Despite this, the administration did not relent in making pronouncements to reemphasise her commitment to the liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia. According to a top government official, the administration had always required liberation movements to supply an annual budget. The administration gave assistance to the liberation movements directly. Assistance was also given through the OAU Liberation Committee. It is important to note that SWAPO has an office in Lagos. Materials, military and educational aids were also given through SWAPO to liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. According to a top official of the administration interviewed, money was not a restriction during Shagari's time. No time they never met the needs of the liberation movements. "We have never been denied anything we asked for." [44] The liberation movements were assisted in carrying out propoganda abroad. The Shagari administration was a member of the "five power contact group that was to negotiate independence for Namibia under the auspicies of the OAU. On liberation struggle in racist South Africa Shagari contributed mainly through speeches. In one of them in London, the Sunday Times described it as a "glittering multitude" jolted into reality as he declared, that because he and other Nigerians admired British democracy, they expected Britain to adopt towards South Africa and the horrible state of affairs there, policies that were not only morally right, but were only ones which could benefit the western world." [45]

> Sanctions, represent the only non-violent means of bringing pressure on South Africa. If they fail, armed struggle was

> inevitable as was the triumph of the oppressed. 46

President Shagari had also told Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington, too when "he emphasised his concern for events in Namibia and over the collusion and conivance of Western countries which alone enabled the South African system to survive. Hugo Young, the then political editor of the Sunday Times had devoted a whole column to Shagari's speech which he termed "polite and firm".[47] Shagari made so many statements about the liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia during his tenure that if speeches were actions, he would have been rated high.

When Shagari perceived a threat to her interest in South Africa by the United States intention of offering arms to the UNITA rebels in Angola; he. quickly despatched the then External Affairs Minister to the United States to protest. Protests in forms of peaceful negotiations were the only tools the Nigerian government had in view of her inferior capability compared to the U.S. and Britain that are superior allies of South Africa. "Shagari realised that no U.N. mandatory sanctions against South Africa 'are possible while the Reagan administration in power in Washington or the Thatcher administration in London."[48] Although Shagari had earlier condemned the Russian invasion of Afganistan, he refused to heed to U.S. persuasion to boycott the Soviet Olympic games because similar aggressions were being carried out elsewhere in Africa (South Africa) which attracted no African condemnation. This is an area where the Shagari

administration slightly showed the U.S. that she was not happy with the big brother role she plays in South Africa. But the impact of this in the struggle is however questionable.

On Shagari supporting the Western powers when refused to secure the support of the Namibian parties and nearly all African countries, that any withdrawal of South African forces prior to a three phase independence plan in Namibia must be linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the administration faced a lot of condemnation in her foreign policy pursuit in South Africa. The administration showed clearly that her foreign policy towards the liberation struggles in Africa was subject to dictates from the U.S.A. and Britain. A top official of the administration interviewed argued that the withdrawal of the Cuban troops was perceived by the administration to be more beneficial to both Angola and Namibia. The money used by the Angolan government in paying the Cuban troops could be saved to solve other domestic problems, he stressed. He further stated naively that such a movement would allow for a quick and peaceful negotiation of Namibian independence. This he added was the stand of the contact group which he said operated on the basis of democratic principles. From my own point of view, this call for withdrawal of Cuban troops was wrong since as a sovereign entity, Angola has every right of inviting any foreign nation for military assistance if she feels her sovereignty is being threatened. After all, South Africa is an illegitimate sovereign creation in Africa to further buttress the imperialist's expansionist policies

of the U.S.A. and Britain in Africa. The administration's stand on the Cuban troops did not match the numerous foreign policy pronouncements like this one made by Shehu Shagari:

> We must not relent in our struggle against the forces of apartheid. We should re-affirm the legitimacy of the struggle of our oppressed brothers in South Africa by giving our full material, diplomatic and moral support to the liberation movements as well as those of the frontline states under South African attack and harrassment. Their struggle is our struggle. We must strive for the total elimination of the apartheid regime and exercise the right of self determination by the people of South Africa as a whole. 4)

This statement infers that Shagari perceived a potential threat to her policy towards the liberation struggles in South Africa. Conventionally, that threat is from the U.S. and her allies who back the racist South Africa. Despite this perception of threat, he allowed himself to be influenced by the pressures from the I.M.F. and the U.S. which the administration was highly indebted" on the issue of the Cuban troops. The economic friendliness of the Shagari administration with the IMF and the U.S., and its claims for supporting the liberation movements makes the foreign policy of the administration looked queer and peculiar especially in defining its African interests. Both the U.S. and her conspirators in racist South Africa are superior capabilities to Nigeria. There is also the fact that Nigeria under Shagari had a perception of opportunity from the U.S. and the Western nations. This explains why Shagari's pronouncements and his inaction to match up with them had

On the seriousness with which Nigeria took her commitment to the liberation struggles. This again is butressed by the then External Affairs Minister when he stated that,"it is futile to conceive of a military victory against South Africa."[50] This denotes that Nigeria cannot in the nearest future mobilize Africa to confront South Africa due to her capabilities and her allies - the U.S.A. and the Western nations. "Apart from this rather unethical opposition to violent means of changing South Africa, Nigeria continue to fraternise with forces that have been the main source of moral, ideological, military and economic support for South Africa. For instance, it was reported that by 1983, there were 2,985 western multinational companies operating in Nigeria who have business connections with South Africa. Secondly, Isreal which currently is one of South Africa's closest allies, had by 1983, up to 43 firms operating in through fronts in the country. The largest Isreali firm in Nigeria, Soleh Boneh, has not only been involved in constructing strategic structures such as airports for Nigeria, but in giving loans to some Nigerian governments. Furthermore, the equipment used by the mobile police "during the 1983 elections were said to have come from Isreal."[51]

This neo-colonial and dependent image of the Shagari administration, prevented the pursuit of a dynamic and viable foreign policy towards the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. The opportunities she perceived from the U.S.A. and the West could have been jeopardised if she had maintained an image of the Fanatic Child towards the interests of the western imperial nations. Shagari's foriegn policy thus,

"serve decidedly anti-African interests, and was the antithesis of dynamism except we define African interests, as corresponding to imperialists interests or consisting of globe trotting,"[52] and making empty speeches.

> We have no desire whatsoever to interfer in the affairs of any nation. But we have the right to determine who will take part in our economic prosperity. We cannot be expected to allow any nation or any organization by whatever description to prosper in our nations economy only to turn around and use the prosperity to strengthen apartheid in South Africa.[53]

Here a perception of threat to Nigeria's interest in South Africa is linked to the nation's economy. Despite Shagari's "propaganda and rhetorical postures and gestures," the country's trade relations were completely tied to the USA and the Western world. "The U.S.A. remained the single largest market for Nigeria's mono export (oil)."[54] There were also efforts to raise huge foreign loans from Western financial markets. Nigeria could not therefore play the leadership role she was supposed to in the liberation struggles in South Africa because of this financial romance with the U.S.A. and the West.

"Shagari was ready to go cap in hand negotiating loans from these financial institutions especially the USA".[55] The economic linkages of Nigeria to the West and her political dependence on the USA, especially as it concerned the then adopted American presidential model of democracy were inevitable factors that contributed to shaping the administration's naive foreign policy pursuits in Southern Africa.

Both the Lancaster House negotiations for Zimbabwe's independence and the contact group meetings were more of negotiations between Nigeria and the same imperialists who never saw any immorality in racism in South Africa. The imperial image of Western nations and the responsive child image of Nigeria during the Shagari administration are imperative in assessing the foreign policy of the regime. The administration was too pro-West in all its dealing and therefore could not pursue a dynamic and verile foreign policy in South Africa and Namibia. Nigeria has a neocolonial dependent economy. Because Shagari's regime was no responsive to the interests of the West, the United States and Britain publicly denounced its overthrow in which they lamented that it was the murder of democracy."[56] On the African front at the same period, the frontline states had stopped inviting Nigeria to their meetings. Shagari was neither briefed of deliberations. Worst still, Nigeria was behind in the payment of dues.

In fact the Shagari administration call for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola had also created the impression that Nigeria was out of the struggle.

The frontline states had perceived Nigeria a proxy; an ally to the U.S.A. and Britain.

FOOTNOTES

1. Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. Zed Books Ltd., 1985, p.172.

2. Ibid, p.173.

3. Ibid, p.174.

4. Tom Imobighe, "Libyan Intervention in Chad-Security Implications for Nigeria" in The Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Jan. and June, 1980, Vol.4, Nos. 1 and 2, p.26.

5. Sunday New Nigeria, Dec. 6th, 1981.

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CHAPTER IV

BUHARI ADMINISTRATION

In this chapter, the foreign policy issues to be examined are: (1) the administration's recognition of Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic; (2) Nigeria's relations with neighbours, that is, the expulsion of illegal alliens and the associated closure of the Nigeria borders with neighbouring countries; (3) the administration's economic recovery programmes and foreign policy, that is, the counter-trade policy and (4) liberation struggles in Southern Africa and Namibia.

4.1 Recognition of Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)

As portrayed in the last chapter, the Western Sahara issue had been disruptive to the OAU Summit(s) during the Shagari administration. The Shagari administration left the problem unsolved. It was not able to take the bull by the horns, that is, by recognising SADR. Walk-outs and boycotts featured in the last Summits.

When Buhari administration came to power in 1984, he said among other things that:

> the federal Military Government will maintain and strengthen existing diplomatic relations with other states and with international organizations such as the O.A.U., the U.N.O., O.P.E.C., ECOWAS and the Common Wealth organizations. 1

In the same vein, the Head of State told a Malian delegation that, "African nations should not allow any issue to affect the cohension of the Organization of African Unity, adding that Western Sahara was not an Arab problem but an

African affair."[2] General Buhari also appealled to African nations involved in the conflict in Western Sahara, Chad and South Africa "to ensure that the next OAU Summit was held on schedule."[3]

Ibrahim Gambari also had said earlier that the OAU must admit Western Sahara to its next Summit scheduled for November 1984 in Ethiopia.

The Head of State again reiterated that, "Our country's foreign policy would be dynamic and realistic and Africa would continue to be the centre-piece."[4] Under Buhari's regime Africa continued to be the primary environment of Nigeria's foreign policy. This was the root of Gambari's concentric circles theory. This theory fundamentally stressed that Nigeria would like to be seen as playing a leadership role in Africa, particularly in West Africa which is the first concentric circle of her foreign policy, while the African continent constituted the next circle and the outside world constituting the outer circle. Fundamentally, this was meant to be an instrument for weakening the excessive dependence of African states particularly West African states on extra-African powers especially Western Europe. This was manifested in Nigeria's active role in ECOWAS and the OAU. It could be inferred that the administration sought to use the forum to strengthen inter-state commitment and thereby enhancing economic and political co-operation in Africa and for consolidating the bargaining power of the continent on global issues.

With this priority in mind, a major focus was to be on Namibia, Chad and self-determination of the peoples of Western Sahara in particular.

On Western Sahara, Morocco had chosen to hold on desperately to her colonial claims to Western Sahara inspite of the unfavourable rulings on the issue by the World Court, the United Nations and the OAU. In the previous chapter, an exposition was made of how Morocco is saddled with a medieval leadership. Her appetite for colonial acquisitons as further compounded by the the dilemma in which her leaders find themselves in modern politics was also discussed. There had been some embattlement between Morocco and Western Sahara despite Morocco's lack of support from many African nations. Morocco had therefore made too many African enemies in her lust for a modern day colony in Africa. There is no doubt that while King Hassan of Morocco had held the OAU to ransome on occasions with fruitless and fruitless parleys over western Sahara. He had played surrogate for enemy interests in Africa, that is, U.S.A. and South Africa.

As was indicated in the last chapter, the four years of Shagari's rule during which Nigeria accepted to serve on the OAU implementation committee on Western Sahara will go down in history as one of the worst instances by deliberate cowardice. This is because of the extreme pro-Western nature of the administration's policies. Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation failed to take a decisive stand in a situation that called for forthright ness and dynamic leadership. This vacuum was not filled until when the Buhari administration

assumed the leadership mantle. It is true that the Buhari's concentric circles of priority in foreign policy placed Nigeria first. This, however, gave the regime the home support to be able to tackle problems that fell within the remaining concentric circles.

As Buhari rightly puts it,

> No country in the world can command respect and admiration of the international community without a dedicated and purposeful leadership, nor conduct successfully foreign policy without first putting its house in order. 5

This explains why the domestic environment was given a priority in the concentric circles. Thus at the November 1984 OAU Summit, Buhari took a decisive stand on the SADR issue. He had earlier on held secret meetings with African heads of states in Addis-Ababa on the SADR/Moroccan issue, days before the real Summit. This was according to the version of the National Concord of November 13th 1984. Buhari was firm and resolute on the Western Sahara issue. He did not mince his worlds.

The military regime under his leadership recognized the SADR. SADR's recognition by Nigeria also made her admission as a full member of the OAU possible. The fear that the admission of SADR would result into further walk-outs and boycotts did not arise except for Morocco which claimed it had pulled out of the OAU and Zaire which was one of Morocco's allies. The action taken by Buhari in recognising SADR therefore proved to the world that Morocco had not got the power to destroy the OAU as was feared. This decision

by the Buhari administration received great ovation from most African nations and leaders. Because of the revitalization of Nigeria's leadership role in Africa by this recognition, the admission of Western Sahara into the OAU was very easy.

According to the Concord Magazine, "A number of African states said they were pleased with Nigeria's decision and could therefore not oppose the sitting of SADR at the Summit."[6]

Another editorial had this to say about Buhari administration:

> We congratulate the present administration for summoning up the nerves to pull the OAU out of the Morocco tangle. In future however, African foreign policy makers should always bear in mind that a stitch in time saves much. The Western Sahara issue should have been disposed off a long time ago at the African diplomatic level. Perhaps more lives could have been sparred in the process. 7

The Western Sahara issue is one of the problems that were unleased on the OAU by the Western nations (colonialists). They had thought that the OAU was heading for disintegration because its past efforts at resolving the Western Sahara issue had proved abortive. Such imperialist conception(s) were proved wrong as the Summit was successful and also all heads of states and governments pledged that the OAU shall continue to exist. They also pledged to make sure that it does not die through imperialist and neo-colonial machinations.

According to President Abdou Diouf of Senegal:

> But for General Buhari, the OAU would have been wasting time on the Western Sahara dispute. General Buhari nailed the issue and the OAU was able to turn attention to economic questions which he believed were dearest to Africa. 8

I personally praised the Buhari administration for this action because OAU and African nations cannot be calling for sanctions against South Africa while one of its member states is occupying the territory of another. This I believe would provide more grease to the elbows of apartheid propaganda against the call for self-determination in Namibia and South Africa.

With the admission of SADR, Morocco became the first African nation to withdraw her membership of the OAU since it was formed in 1963. Before Morocco withdrew her membership of the OAU, she had been engaged in a protracted war with Western Sahara. Thus, when Concord correspondent asked Buhari whether Nigeria would send troops to Western Sahara if Morocco declared war against SADR, Buhari said, "As far as I know, there is already total war in Western Sahara. This is not a matter I can decide on. The supreme military council has to discuss and decide."[9]

Earlier before the Summit the Nigerian Herald quoted Dr. Ibrahim Gambari, then External Affairs Minister as saying that,

> The government of Nigeria recognizes the Polisario movement, but the issue of the Western Sahara would only be presented to the member states of the OAU at the Summit for consideration. The government does not see the issue a a hard-nut to crack. 10

Prior to the Summit, Nigeria and a host of African heads of States were believed to have held series of meetings. According to the Nigerian Herald, "40 of the 50 OAU member states have come in favour of Polisario, taking part in the Summit including Nigeria."[11] The significance of Nigeria's recognition of SADR and its subsequent admission to the OAU was put thus by a newspaper editorial:

> By this dynamic move, General Buhari must realise that Nigeria is not only contending with King Hassan of Morocco on the SADR issue, but against Reagan the gun-trotting anti-black cowboy President of U.S.A.; against Neo-colonialists and against the enemies of Africa, who are definitely not amused about the latest developments and may therefore fight back.12

From this quotation, it can be inferred that Reagan is perceived a proxy to King Hassan of Morocco. Reagan and the United States and King Hassan are equally perceived threats to Africa. King Hassan was being supported by the U.S.A. because it had played the responsive child image for the U.S. in the continent. It is also clear from the quotation that Reagan and the U.S.A. perceived Buhari to be a threat to their interests in Africa and thus Buhari is being perceived a fanatic child, it is in this context that America could be perceived a bully that could fight back more especially that it has the superior capability and culture to mount aggression against Nigerian leadership of Buhari. Buhari was quite aware of these imperialist forces before he decided to recognize SADR. He knew quite well that it was these imperialist forces that were behind King Hassan or Morocco that made him to continue to defy with impunity, the stance of the OAU and continue to pose as if he was an

indispensable member of the OAU.

It could be inferred here that Buhari's perceptual image of the U.S.A. involvement in the Western Sahara crisis is that of neo-colonial and a proxy of Morocco. The U.S.A. was perceived by Buhari as superior in capability and culture and working to undermine its African preferred interests. But then Buhari refused to play the responsive child image. The administration therefore clearly demonstrated positively that despite all odds, Nigeria was not ready to compromise her Afro-centric foreign policy for imperial materialism any longer. Two things can be said to have influenced the success of the administration on the Western Sahara issue. The first is the idiosyncratic factor, that is, the good personality leadership of Buhari. He had a positive outlook of the situation. He sought to have divorced extra-African forces from the Western Sahara issue. He was a true leader who from all indications put dynamism and realism first above all other interests.

Secondly, Buhari to some extent kept both the U.S.A. and Britain at arms-length during his tenure on regional issues. Because he refused to tie the Nigerian economy to those of the IMF/World Bank and Britain, he was able to take this vital decision which previous regimes had shyed away from. This he did because he was quick to realise the difficulties inherent in the IMF/World Bank conditionalities. Buhari had the neo-colonial and imperial images of the Western nations. These poses serious threats to the economy of Nigeria. He therefore did not succumb to the administration's economic policies from being dictated by the imperialists. This enabled the administration to take such a decisive stand on Western Sahara

by calling off Morocco's bluff. According to Yusuf Bangura,

> The strained relationship with the Principal Western powers allowed the Buhari administration to exercise the popular commitment of the Nigerian people to the principle of self determination and commitment to peace in Western Sahara. 13

The above assertion is true because it is not all African leaders, especially those of Nigeria, can withstand such a deterioration in relationship with Britain as did by Buhari.

So the recognition of SADR was a progressive decision taken at the appropriate time to save the OAU from disintegration.

For Bolaji Akinyemi, "Buhari had done quite well in dealing with issues which were overdue. It was right to have recognized SADR."[14]

4.2 Nigeria Relations with Neighbours

In chapter three the Nigerian/Cameroon border clash was treated in detail. Also, mention was made of the Nigerian/Chadian border clash. Apart from these two countries, other Nigerian neighbours include Benin Republic and Niger. However, Equatorial Guinea is also Nigeria's neighbour although it does not share common borders. All these countries are ex-French colonies apart from Equatorial Guinea which was a Spanish colony. Apart from the fact that most of these countries are comparatively smaller than Nigeria, they are also inferior to Nigeria in both human and natural resources. In terms of military capabilities too, they are inferior.

Good neighbourliness had often been maintained by Nigeria. These countries had benefitted from the economic bouyancy of Nigeria in the past especially during the periods of oil boom. So cordial was the relationship that leaders of those countries had maintained friendly relationship with Nigeria. This friendly neighbourliness explains why Hamani Diori of Niger and Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroon did not succumb to international pressures to allow their countries to be used against the territorial integrity of Nigeria.[15] If they had yielded the Nigerian civil war would have taken a different turn. However, Nigeria had often had problems with these neighbouring countries especially the immediate ones. Such problems had bordered on trafficking in contraband goods, smuggling, currency trafficking and a number of hostile activities including theft and armed robberies. Moreover, Buhari was in government during the Nigerian border clashes with both Chad and Cameroon. They were nasty experiences. There were also strategic problems. Niger and Gabon had the strongest presence of French Security agency (SEDEC) in Africa. Chad has been a troubled spot with both France and America having their armies in that country.

Although many Nigerians work in plantations in Guinea, it was generally reported that the Island was being used by Isreal and South Africa. Nigerian relationship with Benin before the Buhari administration had not been hitch-free either.

According to Ibrahim Gambari,

> Apart from the irritance in our relationship caused by the border closure and occasional border clashes, political cooperation has not been cordial. Her posture at the OAU and the United Nations have often differed from that of Nigeria and other African countries. 16

Extra-African powers are reported to be influencing most of the decisions taken by Benin. The foreign policy of Benin Republic is also influenced by her ideological position. Extra-African powers also influenced their outward look.

Despite those problems, the Nigerian neighbouring countries do recognised the dominant role of Nigeria especially when they seek to use the economic weight of Nigeria to their advantage. They have looked forward to Nigeria as a big-brother. They see Nigeria as being of the same culture but superior in capabilities to them. They had often thought that Nigeria should bear their responsibilities. To continue to assist them economically and not taking measures that would subject them to hardships especially on economic basis.

But then, these are only possible when the economy of the big-brother country is bouyant. This can also be pursued only where the neighbouring countries desist from criminal activities that would undermine the economy and the security of the big brother. But this was not always the case. It had often been a relationship that can be termed a "love-hate" one in general terms. This "love-hate" posture of the relationship was what existed during Buhari administration.

The hatred or irritant relationship between Nigeria and her neighbours during the Buhari administration could be looked into from two perspectives: (1) closure of borders, and (2) expulsion of illegal aliens.

As soon as Buhari came to power in 1984, he observed that the neighbouring countries constituted parts of the major problems Nigeria was facing economically. The administration would not compromise her core interests with anything else. Politicians who were on the run after the military take over were said to be hiding and intended to flee Nigeria through these countries. A test case is that of Umaru Dikko who left Nigeria through these neighbouring countries. Also damage was reportedly done to Nigeria's economy whereby loss of revenue took place when goods of Nigerian origin were illegally exported through neighbouring countries, especially Benin, Niger and Chad.

Unrecorded flight of Nigerian currency was also the order of the day. This according to Gambari made it impossible for Nigeria to know the quantity of currency in circulation. There were also cases of world wide currency trafficking resulting to devaluation of Nigerian currency.

> With heavily devalued Naira they purchased legal as well as contraband goods which our country imported with increasingly scarce foreign exchange earnings. 17

The Shagari Administration was not able to or unwilling to take resolute decisions to manage the economy. It was because of these reasons that the Buhari administration

decided to take concrete decisions both internally and externally to retrieve the economy back to normalcy. It was on the basis of these that the Buhari administration used the border closure as one of the measures. The Second Republic lacked a capable leadership like Buhari to have taken the decision.

However, critics argued that the border closure was designed to curb smuggling in and out of Nigeria. They argued further that for the policy to work, effective policing by security agents was necessary.

Bolaji Akinyemi even argued that Nigeria was the only country that had adopted total closure of its land boundaries as anti-smuggling measures and yet Nigeria is not the only country beset by smuggling and smugglers.

To the first class that argued for effective policing by security agents, their criticism is invalid because there was effective policing by security agents.

A clear testimony of President Kerekou openly confirmed this when he endorsed the co-operation agreement to deal with all illegal trafficking in the sub-region, smuggling, etc. (that is, the Quadripartite agreement) in Lagos on the 10th of December 1984. He confessed that their economy was suffering badly from the continued closure of Nigerian borders. This was because the borders were effectively policed. Gambari had this to say:

> A very shrewd man, President Kerekou probably gave in and endorsed the negotiations for the agreement, if that was what Nigeria wanted before agreeing to re-open her land borders. 18

In fact, such criticisms hold no true substance because Benin Republic was reported to have felt the impact of the closure more. Hence Kerekou started making passionate appeals for the re-opening of the borders as early as 11th January 1984, that is, about only 11 days after the closure. This was when Domkat Bali, then Nigeria's Minister of Defence went to explain reasons for the change of government.

Another main reason why the Nigerian border remained closed despite all appeals was the government's realization that large amounts of the Nigerian currency were in circulation in the neighbouring countries. The government was anxious to prevent their holders from bringing them back into the country for exchange. It was hoped that this would make them suffer losses that would hopefully discourage future trafficking in Nigerian currency.

As has been mentioned earlier, the illegal trade across the Nigerian border was so enormous and never included contraband goods and currency trafficking alone. Petroleum, the life wire of Nigeria's economy was also illegally lifted across the borders.

According to West African Magazine, the quantity of petroleum products not being lifted since the border closure "was equivalent of between 60,000 to 100,000 barrels of crude oil a day."[19] This represents a quarter of Nigeria's previous

demand, and having a market value of N80 million for each month. This according to the Magazine, "represented the products that were being smuggled across the borders."[20]

Goods whose importation had been prohibited in Nigeria for a long time were also smuggled in through the borders. These included spirits, wines, wearing apparels, cigarrette and even food items.

According to another report, such illegal trade was so large that some commentators claimed that up to 40%[21] of cargo handled at Cotonou and Lome ports and a significant part of what passed through Douala in Cameroons were ultimately destined for Nigeria's market.

Smuggling was perceived by majority of Nigerians to be one of the major contributors to the country's economic crisis which the Buhari Administration inherited from Shagari. Shagari and previous regimes had seen the unofficial trade as an unwelcomed development that had to be lived with just for the sake of good neighbourliness. Because of this, Buhari maintained that borders would remain closed until a satisfactory system of regulating the border trade was worked out. He emphasised that,

> The Government has set up a committee to work out an acceptable system. All countries concerned made high level representations to the Nigerian government. They reacted to the border closure with understanding of the special circumstances that have lead to it. Hissen Habre came to Abuja. Members of the supreme council of Niger Republic also came. There were also envoys, foreign ministers of Cameroon, Ghana, Togo and Benin to discuss border security issues. 22

This of course was the preamble to discussions that lead to

the quadripartite agreement on mutual administrative assistance on matters relating to customs, trade and imigration between the countries concerned.

According to the then Nigerian External Affairs Minister, "Reactions to the border closure and alliens expulsion were swift, instructive and generally un-complimentary.

The reaction of Benin Republic and Niger have been earlier mentioned. In one of the messages received by Buhari from Niger's President, he made a passionate appeal that inextricably linked the destiny of Nigeria to the destiny of the neighbouring country and even other African nations when he said:

> Nigeria will continue to find her proper place in Africa and the world (as a whole) economically and politically. Don't let Nigeria down, if you do, the whole of Africa is down. 24

It was the closure of Nigerian land borders that was the genesis of the above plea. Pressures also came from extra-African forces to this effect. Reagan had also sent General Vernon Walters to Lagos two times to persuade Buhari to re-open the borders or at least allow relief materials to be sent to the war torn Chad. The second part of the request was granted with exceptions. Buhari allowed the U.S. to flow relief materials through the ports of Calabar and Port-Harcourt. Food and other essential goods were also allowed to go into Niger through Babban Mutum border post. The U.S.A. was however refused the use of the Lagos port. This was most likely for security reasons.

According to one of the Nigerian weeklies, in a survey conducted in major markets in Lagos around Oshodi, Ajegunle, Surulere and Oyingbo, showed that there had been a sharp drop in prices of commodities whose prices were not only above the purchasing power of the average Nigerian but had virtually disappeared from the markets and shops. They were now available in large quantities . For instance, "medium sized Omo detergent was sold at 80k instead of between N1.50 and N2.00; the giant size which formally sold for N12.00, then sold for N4.50; Peak Milk which sold between N1.00 and N1.50, then sold for 70k."[30]

Food stuff also became available and much cheaper in the market. Government ordered state governors to search for shylock traders and politicians who hoarded food stuff. Such food stuff were auctioned to the public openly in wards and in villages. Co-operative shops, offices were supplied both essential commodities and foodstuff to be sold to the public at much reduced prices as against what previously entailed.

Another report had it that "12,000 bags of rice" retrieved from a hoarder were sold to the public on 2/2/84.[31] In the same vein, the New Nigerian newspaper reported that, "rice and Semovita were back in the market,"[32] and that the samething applied to other food stuffs and essential commodities. The paper further reported that prices were considerably down. The paper mentioned Minna and Maiduguri. In Maiduguri, 1,000 cartons of sugar was also auctioned to the public.

In Lagos rice belonging to Alhaji Aminu Dantata numbering thousands of bags were auctioned near "Ilemaja Bus Stop".[33]

Late Alhaji Danja, a business man in Zaira, and a Kaduna State Assembly member had 426 bags of rice hoarded in his house.[34] These were also auctioned to the public at reduced price.

The government also placed order for both essential commodities and food items and flooded the market with these. This also lead to the dropping of prices and stabilization of prices. For example, consignment of rice arrived and was allocated to states in the following order:

State	Consignment (Bags of Rice) allocated
Anambra	46,000
Bauchi	33,000
Bendel	93,000
Borno	38,000
Cross River	46,000
Gongola	38,000
Imo	36,000
Kwara	56,000
Lagos	25,000
Niger	135,000
Ogun	16,000
Ondo	27,000
Plateau	39,000
	37,000

State	Consignment (Bags of Rice) allocated
Oyo	82,000
Rivers	26,000
Sokoto	65,000
Benue	25,000

Culled from New Nigeria, 15/2/84.

To make the above exercise successfully, some state governments especially the border ones further tightened security at their borders. "In a bid to check smuggling, Borno State banned all categories of vehicles from plying unapproved roads leading to border towns in the state from 7 p.m. - 6 a.m. daily."[35]

In the same vein, then Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon was reported as saying that, "borders will remain closed until measures are taken to safeguard the economic wellbeing of the nation."[36]

From all that has been the focus of this section of the chapter, it is clear that the border closure by the Buhari Administration was meant to revamp the then deflated economy back to normalcy. Closed industries reopened. There was no longer import licence rackets as was the case. Smuggling was put to an abrumpt end, currency trafficking became an issue of rememberance. The Administration was able to manage the economy as a matter of fact better than even most past military regimes.

From all its ramifications the success of the Buhari administration in revamping the hitherto collapsed economy centred on the closure of the borders. His personality and

that of his second-in-command were also significant.

Another triumph card of the Administration in this regard was its ability to alleviate the sufferings of the average Nigerians. This earned the Administration a good home support. This is my belief.

Those writers who claimed that the Administration was not popular at home were simply supporters of ex-politicians and were biased. The responsibility of any government should be first to the inhabitants of the country and the country itself. So, the responsibility of the Buhari administration was to Nigeria and Nigerians first. All other things had to wait. The closure at that time was vital for the economic well-being of the country. It was also meant to protect Nigeria's vital interests especially when some ex-politicians vowed to wage a Jihad against the new administration. Antagonists of the administration are those who did not have the interest of Nigeria at heart. This is because what they complained about was that the administration did not allow for illegal trafficking of currency and exportation of illegal goods from Nigeria. No nation in the world would allow that at the detriment of her domestic economy and welfare of its people.

No progressive government could have helped the Nigerian neighbours under such an illegal and clumsy climate. The prime responsibility of the Buhari Administration was to take care of our people. Even one of the neighbouring countries blamed her colleagues:

> The Ghanaian leader, Flt Lt. Jerry Rawlings remained suspicious of President Eyadema in particular and also President Kerekou. He considered the leaders of both Franco-Phone countries as partners in their endeavour to undermine the security and prosperity of their respective neighbours: Ghana and Nigeria. 37

In conclusion, I believe that Buhari is an example of the type of leadership Nigeria needs. Past Nigerian leaders had looked at laws which are meant to guide the conduct of the society broken carelessly and with impunity by those who are at the seat of affairs. Past leadership had not lacked the ability to formulate good laws and introduce laudable policies that could make Nigeria a happy nation to live in. What has been lacking is the ability to enforce such laws and measures to achieve the desired national objectives. They have not been able to apply laudable prescriptions to solve problems as the Buhari administration was able to do. The validity of this statement has been proved under the leadership of Major General Buhari. We were all living witnesses.

Buhari played the fanatic child image with the West on the issues discussed. This image enabled him to enforce such laws and measures to achieve national objectives; even where they were at conflict with the extra-African powers. This is because Nigeria perceived them as playing neo-colonial roles in attempting to use the border closure to perform other refarious activities like supplying arms to Chad through the closed borders.

4.3 Economic Recovery and Foreign Policy (Counter-Trade)

It has been mentioned in the first part of this chapter, the economic problems which the Buhari administration inherited from the Shagari regime. Shagari's regime was marked by extreme corruption and economic mismanagement, smuggling, currency trafficking, etc. This chapter will look at the foreign economic policies of the Buhari administration and how successful they were; currency exchange, that is, control and of course, the most important one, the counter-trade. Some of the vices and how they were controlled were discussed on the part where we discussed the border closure. The border closure itself however has mostly economic undertones.

When the administration came to power, a lot of Nigerian currency had fled the country illegally through the borders. Currency trafficking was high. Top government officials had stocked public funds in their houses. A state Governor had stored over three million naira in his house.

A then commissioner for Education for Lagos State, Dr. Oluwole Idris was sentenced to life imprisonment for transfering a huge amount of money into foreign banks. He also owned chains of assets which were illegally acquired. Peter Obasa of the N.Y.S.C. and many others were also found guilty of similar offences. It was because of this that the Buhari Administration pursued the course of prudent economic policies which it initiated at its inception. According to one of the Nigerian periodicals, the Federal Government should be praised for the economic policies it has initiated;

> It stopped bunkering, closed the borders both to stymie the flow of the Naira to neighbouring countries and also slowed down the rate of smuggling. In addition, the industries are slowly creeping back to life. Some of the workers initially furloughed as a result of economic down turn have been recalled. 36

Guiness Nigeria Limited, which had retrenched its workers during Shagari's era, recalled all of them (1,189 in number). Volkswagen that had also retrenched was said to have recruited 500 new hands.[37] In one of his speeches in May 1985, the Head of State said that, "the country would be economically stable by the time his policies start to yield results."[38] By the time Buhari made the above statement the austerity measures which he inherited from Shagari Administration had started to yield good dividends, public spending had been reduced, Nigeria's foreign reserves had increased, both agricultural and industrial outputs had increased.

It is worth noting that by late 1984, Nigeria's foreign reserve which stood at ₦801.1 million, barely enough to pay for one month imports in December 1983, had increased to ₦1.1 billion and it continued to maintain that rise.[39]

Also, unlike the Shagari Administration, which incured a deficit spending of about ₦253 million in six months, prior to its overthrow, Buhari within the same period after assuming office, spent ₦249 million less than it earned. This ₦249 million represented a surplus.[40]

It is interesting to note that these achievements were even before the introduction of the new currency and the counter trade. The reversed budget in 1984 by both the federal and state

governments and the border closure probably did this.

The decision by the Buhari Administration to change the Nigerian currency between 26th and 6th May 1984 became imperative. This was because so much of the Naira had been siphoned outside by some politicians and dubious businessmen that it became impossible for the government to retrieve them. The only way out therefore was for the Buhari Administration to change the new currency. The thinking corner of the National Concord of 26/4/84 called it "the second coup"; while a New Nigerian editorial, described it as just right, while an expert simply said it was a dramatic move. These descriptions portrayed the surprise, joy and the respect Nigerians had for the Buhari Administration's change of the colour of the currency - the Naira. The immediate effects of the change in colour were, however, psychological, that is, most Nigerians believed that all ill-gotten Naira kept both at home and abroad had been rendered illegal tender and useless. A Nigerian periodical referred to the exercise as "operation begin again" on a clean state."[42] This action was a bombshell in the war against indiscipline. This is because all the counterfeiting machines, hoarded Naira including those transfered abroad and used for illegal deals in most foreign capitals were rendered useless except those that were changed within the 12-day deadline. This denotes that all hoarded money anywhere in the world except those already banked were affected.

A periodical reported that "business may resurrect but for now and only if we can obey the laws of the land and

and uphold the philosophy of WAI;"[43] I am not an economist, but I believe that the exercise must have also reinforced their belief that Nigeria would emerge from her economic slumber very early. The currency exchange had another profound effect. Since it showed signs of revamping the economy, it was therefore pertinent that it would encourage Nigeria to be externally credit worthy as well as being able to reschedule her debts.

The New Nigerian editorial also believed and rightly too that the exercise would boost the international image of the Naira and thereby raising its value. The paper argued that that was also a trump-card for securing the I.M.F. loan if the need arose.

Professor Ogunsheye, the then President of the Lagos State Chamber of Commerce said, that "the change will discourage smuggling, and trafficking of the Naira."[43]

According to Dr. Femi Aribisala, he agreed that the victims of the exercise and at whom it is aimed are the political detainees, our ECOWAS brother-crooks, London and other foreign naira dealers and black marketeers. Currency trafficking had been the business of most Nigerian neighbouring countries. This had put the Nigerian economy on the verge of collapse. It was on the basis of this that the change in the currency was made. In fact a strong naira denotes a strong economy. But to unpatriotic Nigerians and their foreign collaborators the reverse is the case. Nemesis, however, caught up with many of such alliens from the neighbouring countries, e.g. "Adamu Iya, 28, a Cameroonian was arrested

by the Gongola Police Command for being in possession of ₦270,000 old Nigerian currency."[44]

Daily Times also reported the arrest of five people for being in possession of "fake old ₦102,120 notes" in an attempt to exchange them for new ones.

Apart from these ills which the exchange sought to cure, the exercise put Nigeria in a position to know the amount of its currency in circulation. This I think was important to allow the country know how to manage its economy. Both the change of colour of the Nigerian currency and the closure of the Nigerian borders could be seen in terms of how policy makers' perceptions of the domestic environment can be transformed into reality. It also revealed that the domestic policies and foreign policies are complementary to one another. The closure of the Nigerian land-borders called for appeals from the U.S. especially when it had to send relief materials to the war torn Chad. The effects of the domestic environment on our immediate foreign West African neighbours have earlier been highlighted. Most of the policies so far mentioned about Buhari's Administration have been mostly shaped by economic idiosyncratic variables. These policy decisions of the administration resulted from internal outcries for economic orderliness and response to the undiplomatic, chaos and illegitimate assault on the economy of Nigeria by the Shagari Administration.

These actions of Buhari and his lieutenants could be explained in terms of the policy makers perception of the environmental realities when they came to power. "People act

or react according to their images of the environment."[46] Though there could be misperception of situation, the Buhari Administration in this regard had a very good perception of the then situation in Nigeria; hence both the closure of border and the change of the colour of currency were applauded by the majority of Nigerians.

Another economic policy which the administration adopted was the counter trade. The news of the counter trade was first broken to the Nigerian populace by Professor Tam David-West, then Petroleum and Energy Minister when he said, "that the Buhari Administration was considering proposals to shield the nation's crude oil from price fluctuations and other uncertainties of the oil markets."[47] He said that Liquified Natural Gas project would be financed from the sale of a monthly "quantum" of the nation's crude oil. Then in April 1984, he again told the Voice of America, that his government had adopted a policy of bartering the country's crude oil for needed goods.[48] The government had no alternative then than to adopt the counter trade.

The counter trade was to Buhari's administration, a way between the rocks and the hard ground.[49] This is because faced with a decline in oil revenue which provided about 90% of Nigeria's foreign exchange, a credit squeeze by export credit agencies and international banks and a crushing debt service burden, Nigeria had come under heavy pressure to adopt the IMF approved economic reforms. When negotiations opened between the IMF and Buhari Administration, both parties could not reach a compromise over some of the conditions

which the IMF imposed. The President, Mohammadu Buhari had refused to accept the IMF conditions especially on import liberalization, removal of petroleum subsidy and Naira devaluation.

"These conditions the government argued, would worsen the country's economic crisis because devaluation would negate the purported benefits to the country's exports."[50] This is because of the country's dependence on the importation of capital goods and raw materials which cannot be adjusted on the short-run.

Devaluation could not have any appreciable impact on the country's foreign exchange earnings. Devaluation also causes inflation which would have forced workers to agitate for wage increase. Though the Buhari Administration carried out some adjustments to satisfy the IMF requirements it carried out her adjustments without including the most poisonous of the IMF conditions. These included fiscal adjustments accompanied by effective structural adjustments in partnership with the private sector. The international monetary fund sought for devaluation, liberalization, privatization and the removal of subsidies and subventions.

Buhari was not ready to do all those. The Administration agreed to reduce grants, subventions and loans to states and parastatals. It also agreed to commercialize instead of privatising government parastatals. Added to these, it reduced "public expenditure, controlled wages, retrenched workers and allocated 44% of export revenue to debt repayment.

But the IMF was more resolute on its stand that its stand-by arrangement and stabilization must have to be followed, for instance,

1. Abolition or liberalization of foreign exchange control and import control.
2. Devaluation of exchange rate.
3. Domestic inflationary programmes including control of bank credit, higher interest rates and perhaps higher reserve requirement.
4. Control of government deficit and curb on spending.
5. Increase in taxes and prices charged by public enterprises, abolition of consumer subsidies. Dismantling prices controls and greater hospitality to foreign investment.[52]

Buhari refused most of these stringent measures. Buhari argued that by taking the I.M.F. loan based on the conditions mentioned above, "we would have succeeded in consigning our children to the 21st century slavery."[53]

When the administration could not reach a compromise with the IMF over the "$2.5 billion loan, the Buhari Administration turned to Saudi Arabian government asking for a loan of "N1.6 billion,"[54] which represented the balance of an original request for N2 billion which the Shagari Administration had requested for. When it was clear to the IMF that the Buhari Administration was not ready to swallow the bitter pill, the U.S. government was reported to have "prevailed upon the Saudi Arabian government to block the loan."[55]

When the government could not obtain the IMF loan and it was not also able to get a favourable response from the Saudi government on the alternative loan to the IMF, it had to try its luck on the counter trade in order to be able to maintain the previously existing import levels to be able to cope with the falling oil prices. The counter trade entailed the barter of Nigerian oil for goods from other countries that were needed in Nigeria. Among the countries that benefitted from the counter trade were Brazil which imported $500 million, ELF of France, $500 million. Proceeds from the sale was used to finance Nigerian imports from France which included drugs, chemicals, sugar, spare parts and CKD parts for the Peugeot assembly plant in Kaduna. There were also deals with Australia's Voest Alphine for $200 million[56] worth of oil for capital goods, steel and building equipment. There was also a deal with Italy.

Critics of the counter trade argued that oil is not a renewable resource and that continuous barter of it may lead to its quick exhaustion. Consequently Nigeria would in future be importing oil. Those who held this view included Professor Ade Ojo of Lagos University. The drawback in this argument is that even with the IMF loan, the Western creditors would have been paid with oil. It is the same non-renewable oil that could have been used. This would have been at a more exhorbitant exchange rate based on IMF conditions.

The counter trade had no strings attached to it. In line with this, a management consultant in Lagos, Chima Dike likened counter trade to a situation where "a person has his money in his pocket, yet his refrigerator is still stocked with his food requirements."[57]

With counter trade, Nigeria was building up its reserve position and at the same time getting the required industrial materials to keep the factories running. This was more so as 25%[58] of the oil lifted was being paid for in cash.

According to another report, counter trade had allayed the fear that Nigeria would not be able to sell its oil without the IMF. The report opined that counter trade was the only way out of the IMF trap. The IMF pill is suicidal.

The counter trade undoubtedly disrupted the traditional direction of flow of Nigeria's foreign trade or business relations. Most cut-off was Britain which had since the period of colonialism dominated Nigeria's trade. Buhari Administration's economic foreign relations showed a diversionary trend away from the hitherto monopoly of the Western powers, U.K. and the U.S.A. in particular.

Buhari's foreign policy and financial team logically saw counter trade with non-British and American companies as a way of checking British and American uncompromising and strick policies. The policy of the Buhari administration was to carefully consider all offers of loans "provided they fit in with our programme and our national interest."[59] As has been mentioned earlier, negotiations went on from 1983 to 1985

for a loan of N2.2 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it never arrived at a compromise with the IMF over its conditionalities. The Buhari Administration was wise enough to have realized that the IMF is dominated by the market forces of the West. The IMF has allowed itself to be perceived by the regime as essentially an instrument of control by the West, always prescribing the same solution to economic problems of different countries, while protecting and overseeing the global economic interests of the West.

In fact Gusau referred to the IMF "as a bad doctor that prescribes the same medicine to all patients."[60] The Buhari administration sought to build an indigenous capitalist economy and as such would not accept the IMF loan without the traditional monetary and fiscal policies (conditionalities) designed to put the recipient countries to a viable balance of payment as soon as the loan is taken.

It has been said earlier that the adjustment package is often very steff and excessively too. These and other reasons are why the Buhari administration never reached an agreement with the IMF. The Western nations that control the IMF perceived the Buhari administration as a threat to their traditional foreign economic policies and formed an alliance with some retrogressive elements to overthrow him. No wonder the Western press tagged the "Babangida coup, an IMF coup."[61]

4.4 Liberation Struggles in South Africa and Namibia

Social Psychologists point out that co-operation and collaboration occur between human beings when interests coincide. In the same vein, rivalry, competition and conflicts result when interests clash.

The interests of Nigeria and infact those of other African nations have always been in conflict with those of the U.S.A. and other Western powers over the liberation struggles in Southern Africa and Namibia just as it is with human beings as postulated by social psychologists. The U.S.A. has large business in South Africa, so also is Britain and other Western nations. Their capitalist interests in South Africa make these Western nations not to see anything wrong with apartheid in South Africa and their continued delay in effecting resolutions to Namibian independence. They therefore, do not see anything wrong in the continuous existence of the obnoxious, oppressive and debilitating apartheid regime in South Africa.

Nigerian past regimes had worked towards this struggle through the organization of African Unity, the United Nations, the non-aligned nations movement, etc. It also sought to encourage frontline states to maintain the same position. However, due to the weakness of the Shagari administration, it was not able to live up to expectation with regards to the liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia. The administration got engulfed in both internal and external contradictions. It became too subservient to extra-African policy. Because of this it failed to pay up her dues to the

OAU fund for liberation struggles in Southern Africa and stand on the withdrawal of Cuban Namibia. Its earlier troops from Angola as a pre-requisite for Namibian independence was also retrogressive. The administration played the 'responsive child' to the U.S. and other extra-African powers.

It was due to this position taken by the Shagari Administration that lead to Nigeria's image in South African affairs to deteriorate.

It was this situation that Buhari met Nigerian foreign policy. The administration quickly settled debts owed by the ex-regime, Buhari regime then maintained regular payment of her dues to the liberation funds and rendering assistance to the frontline states. It also provided monetary and material assistance to liberation movements like SWAPO, ANC and to a lesser extent PAC.

The Buhari regime followed this up with a series of trips to the frontline states "from May 20th to June 4, 1984"[62] to see things for themselves as they were on the spot. They visited Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana and Angola. They also made stop overs in Dar-es-Salam and Adis-Ababa.

According to Gambari, the trips to the frontline states were made before going to Addis-Ababa to brief the then OAU Chairman, Col. Mengistu of the outcome of the trip.

Also, earlier in March 15, 1984, Buhari sent a delegation comprising the Minister of External Affairs and the Minister of Defence, Dr. Gambari and Major Bali respectively to a

Washington ministerial meeting where the Nigerian delegation voiced out its perception of apartheid South Africa as a threat to the rest of Africa. The delegation, according to the External Affairs Minister, told Mr. George Shultz that:

> the problem of Southern African can only be solved by finding ways of mitigating the debilitating consequences of continuous subjugation of black peoples by the white minority regime which officially instituted a system of racial discrimination inside South Africa and perpetuate colonialism in Namibia. 63

Nigeria also participated actively at the level of the O.A.U. Co-ordinating Committee for the liberation of Africa especially at the 43rd and 44th Ordinary Sessions in Accra and Arusha, Tanzania in January 1985. The 45th Session was held in Lagos. The proposal for the Lagos meeting was made by the Nigerian Minister for External Affairs earlier in Accra. This further demonstrated the commitment of the Buhari Administration to liberation struggles in South Africa. It was agreed that the then Chairman of the OAU and his Bureau be sent to Washington to convey the feelings of Africa against the United States' policy of "constructive engagement" towards the African government. This policy, the African states argued was seriously retarding African liberation in South Africa. The liberation committee rejected the United States linkage of the right of Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

Nigeria also spearheaded the cancellation of Newzealand Rugby tour of South Africa. Newzealand had earlier on closed

down South Africa's consulate in that country. It is interesting to note that a Nigerian was elected the Chairman of the 44th ordinary session of the liberation committee. This was in recognition of her leading role in the struggle.

According to Gambari, Nigeria was indeed often regarded as a frontline state not in geographical terms obviously, but in relation to her commitment to the struggle for justice and the liberation of South Africa. At the 44th session, Nigeria addressed sensitive issues like the financial contributions of member states to the liberation committee fund in support of the struggle for freedom of our South African brothers and sisters. Nigeria urged member states to pay up their arrears. Nigeria reminded the session that:

> the test of African commitment to the payment of contributions when due, otherwise it rings hollow to the denounce apartheid but fail to bear a modest financial burden to speed up the collapse of the racist regime. 64

Nigeria during Buhari's regime vigorously denounced any economic links with South Africa. She felt extremely disturbed that some African states were reported to be having economic and other ties with Southern Africa. Such states were called upon to stop such ties with South Africa. Nigeria argued that no economic plight or potential benefit could justify such links. Such links, Nigeria argued, would not only undermine the fight for freedom by our brothers and sisters in South Africa but in addition, make a mockery of Africa's efforts aimed at the international isolation of the racists.

Nigeria also used the Non-aligned movement forum to press further the issue of liberation struggle in South Africa. In one of the meetings of New Delhi, India, Nigeria reiterated her support for SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of Namibia. This was from April 19 - 21, 1985.[65] The South African attempt to circumvent the United Nations security Councils resolution 435 by promoting an internal settlement through multi-party conference was also seriously condemned by Nigeria. On Namibian Independence talks held in Lusaka and Mindela in 1984, Nigeria also pronounced South Africa guilty of sabotaging it. This was because the racists were reported to be introducing abnormal elements to the U.N. Security Council resolution 435.

Nigerian delegation at the Delhi conference, condemned Western countries for the unfortunate state of affairs in South Africa and Namibia. Western nations were blamed for intensifying their collaboration with the racist regime in Pretoria in "Nuclear, military, economic, financial, technological and other fields contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations."[66] The Nigerian foreign minister demanded a change of heart. The non-aligned movement was urged to translate their declaration for SWAPO into concrete actions in order to bring freedom and justice to Namibia. All African friends, African nations and peace loving peoples of the world were called upon by Nigeria to break diplomatic relations with South Africa as a sign of disgust at "the continuous subjugation of Namibia and the perpetuation of Apartheid."[67] Countries that still maintained diplomatic

links with South Africa especially in Southern Africa were called upon to desist. It was, however, recalled that only Malawi maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa in the continent. She was warned to desist too.

Nigeria also joined other members of the non-aligned movement to the U.S. to request an urgent meeting of the U.N. to discuss Namibia's independence. Nigeria and some African countries were delegated to participate at the Security Council's meeting. Among issues raised, was the call by the committee bureau on the U.N. to implement decree No. 1 for the protection of the natural resources of Namibia in order to reaffirm its validity under international law and to put an end to increasing plunder of Namibia's natural resources. An exclusive zone was also demanded for Namibia in order to assert and safeguard her sovereignty over its offshore and marine resources. The case of Walvis bay was also touched upon. The OAU Liberation Committee Coordinating bureau also sought the international community to severe dealings "with South Africa in accordance with the U.N. resolution to that effect,"[68] for instance:

1. Observance of oil embargo.
2. Disinvestment of existing interests and prohibition of new ones.
3. Withholding overflight and landing facilities to aircraft and docking rights to ocean vessels to and from South Africa.
4. Prohibition of sale of Krugerrands and all other South African minted coins.

5. Strict observance of the sports and cultural boycott of South Africa and
6. ratification and implementation of the international convention on the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid.

The New Delhi meeting also called "on parliamentarians, organizations, media representatives, intellectuals, etc. to raise their voice severally and collectively in support of the Namibian cause."[69] This is because the mobilization of world opinion would be relevant to the United Nations resolutions and decisions. The role Nigeria played in the liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia earned her commendation from the world community during the Buhari regime.

Apart from the African front, the Buhari regime through the Nigerian permanent representative in the United Nations maintained constant contacts with both the Non-aligned states movement, the United States and the United Nations Security Council. Nigerian mission hosted several strategy meetings involving Ministers of External Affairs, of Frontline States and Nigeria. Decisions reached from deliberations of such meetings were useful to the frontline states in their debates at the Security Council meetings. These sessions of the non-aligned states strengthened the bargaining powers of the states at the council. There was solidarity amongst them.

Nigeria was at the 253rd meeting of the Security Council where Mr. Sam Nujoma of SWAPO and the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Khurshed Alam Khan addressed

the Council on the Namibian question.

The South African delegate, Mr. Von Schirnding was also said to have addressed the Council. According to Gambari's interview, Mr. Schirnding's contribution was truly astounding. He attempted to "defend the indefensible". He blamed the victims of South Africa's racism at home and aggression abroad for the worsening situation in Southern Africa. He stressed that the problem of South Africa should be solved on a regional basis, that is, in the environment in which the racists have overwhelming military and economic advantages. He was said to have reaffirmed the linkage of Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. He sought international approval for this. Finally, Mr. Schirnding accused the ANC, arguing that the members were not freedom fighters but were a people whose actions posed a "direct threat to the people of South Africa and Southern Africa."[70]

In reply, Gambari of Nigeria started by saying that:

> The racists have just spoken before this Security Council and (we can all see how) their evasions, their diversions and their lies have multiplied. The stalemate in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 give the impression to us in Nigeria that the issue of Namibian independence was no longer a subject of decolonization but a pawn in the ideological chess game invented by South Africa to draw a super-power to its side. 71

Gambari stressed further that what was then needed was not a new plan, nor more bilateral negotiations, but the will of the international community and particularly the United States to prevail upon South Africa to co-operate with the

Secretary General in ensuring the implementation of resolution 435 of 1978 without any further delay.

Nigeria also maintained diplomatic talks with the United States on the developments in South Africa, although there were major irritations in the relations between the two countries arising from sharply differing perceptions of the political problems in South Africa. The differing perceptions according to the United States Secretary of State for African Affairs, "have constituted the only nuisance in the Nigerian/United States relations. The Secretary stressed in one of the meetings with Nigerian delegation; that the nuisance in their relationships could be removed if the different perceptions on South African situation could be reconciled or reduced."[72] Nigeria sought to use her actual or potential basis of interdependence between her and the U.S. to achieve her objectives in Southern Africa. The need to grant independence to Namibia was also discussed and agreement reached. The Reagan administration, however, was reported not to have changed his policies on Apartheid South Africa. So, fundamental differences remained between Nigeria and the U.S.A. about South Africa under the Reagan administration.

At the 39th session of the U.N. General Assembly in October 1984, Nigeria again held bilateral talks with the U.S.[73] The Nigerian delegation was led by the Nigerian Minister for External Affairs while Secretary Shultz of the U.S. led the American officials. The talks also centred on Southern Africa. Though the talks did not yield fruitful results, hope was not lost on the South African issue. On

30th November, 1984, the External Affairs Minister again held a meeting with Dr. Crocker in New york. In the words of Dr. Gambari, "Crocker was of the view that Nigeria had ceased to have an open mind about U.S. efforts to bring early independence to Namibia."[74] At this meeting, liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibian independence were extensively discussed. The Nigerian delegation at this meeting included Major General J.N. Garba, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, then Director-General of international organizations in the Ministry of External Affairs. The Nigerians expressed regret that the U.S. continued to oppose simple resolutions passed by the United Nations. Nigeria felt that the U.S. could do more by pushing harder for the establishment of "real democratic change in South Africa."[75]

I quite appreciate the feeling of the Nigerian team as it could be seen in the context of the U.N. resolution 435 passed since 1978 but was not implemented. The Nigerian government again contacted the U.S. in writing through the Secretary of State, Shultz prior to the Security Council meeting on Namibia on June 10, 1985.[76] Nigeria again stated its views on the poor situation in South Africa, with regards to sanctions against South Africa. Mr. Shultz was said to have declined accepting the imposition of mandatory sanctions on South Africa, but he promised that the U.S. would continue to work with Nigeria, Angola and South Africa to achieve Namibian independence.

Nigeria refused to be subservient to the United States and the Western world in terms of their policies towards South

Africa. Throughout the period of the Buhari Administration, the Nigerian government opposed or expressed opposition to apartheid and the U.S. linkage and "constructive engagement" policies in South Africa.

To push further Nigeria's stand on the South African issue, Reverend Jesse Jackson visited Nigeria on invitation and delivered series of lectures.

The administration also made contacts with well meaning individuals in the U.S. who had demonstrated anti-apartheid stance, e.g. Mr. Randal Robinson, executive director of Trans-African Foundation. This is the largest black group reported to be organizing anti-apartheid demonstrations in major cities of the United States. According to Gambari, links were also maintained with Mr. David Rockefeller and Anthony Solomon who was the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He is said to be a lover of Africa and Nigerian art. Hope he is also a lover of Africans and art.

Just before the administration was overthrown it received in Nigeria, the United States congressman Mr. Stephen Solarz on August 22nd 1985. South Africa was also discussed. Nigeria sought for a change in the United States' policies on Southern Africa. Solarz was reported to be one of the key opponents of the Reagan administration.

The Buhari Administration pursued a dynamic foreign policy towards the liberation of Southern Africa and Namibia, its economic weakness notwithstanding. This was

because of the personality of the leadership. Buhari himself was not as pro-West as the regimes before it especially with regards her position over the IMF issue. This gave the regime a more vigorous bargaining power with the super-powers.

Furthermore, the then External Affairs Minister, Dr. Ibrahim Gambari was a valuable asset to the regime, being an experienced lecturer in international relations and was also the Director General of NIIA before his appointment. Also the administration thought it wise to have appointed Major General Joseph Garba (rtd) as its Permanent Representative at the United Nations. His experience as a one time External Affairs Minister under the Murtala/Obasanjo regime made him a valuable asset in the administration's dealings with the liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia. There is therefore no doubt that the administration contributed immensely to Namibian independence and liberation struggles in South Africa irrespective of many obstacles.

4.5 Conclusion

From the discussion I found out that the Buhari Administration was able to take the bold step of recognising the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic because of the leadership quality of Buhari who hated the excessive dependence of African States on extra-African powers especially Western Europe. The recognition of SADR also proved to the world that no single nation has the power to

destroy the O.A.U. as Morocco sought to prove.

I also found out that contrary to the general belief by critics that the Buhari administration's closure of borders and illegal expulsion of aliens destroyed the cordial relationship between her and her neighbours, especially with regards the spirit of the ECOWAS and our leadership pretentions, these decisions were taken to promote Nigeria's national interests. Irrespective of such criticisms, it has been mentioned how Nigeria was asked and accepted to host the first Quadripartite Summit meeting attended by Nigeria and her immediate neighbours. Nigeria was also first nominated to assume the chairmanship of ECOWAS at the end of the community's summit meeting. The legality and national considerations of these decisions were not adequately exploited by critics.

On the economic front, the counter trade was adopted as a means of partially disengaging the Nigerian economy from total dependence on the economy of western imperialist nations. To some extent the Buhari administration adopted the counter trade to overcome the obstacles created by the harsh conditionalities of the IMF/World Bank. In this context, he was perceived by the U.S.A. and Britain as a threat to their perceived opportunities to Nigerian resources.

On South Africa and Namibia, the administration's resufal to be subservient to the United States and the Western world in terms of their policies were examined. This goes a long way to show the Afro-centric nature of the administration's foreign policy. The administration took

such stands because it perceived the Western nations a threat to the total decolonization of Africa and African general interests.

In the next chapter we shall examine the foreign policy of the Babangida administration from 1985 to 1989. The following issues will be focused upon:

1. Nigeria and the O.I.C.;
2. Relationship with Isreal and the Arabs.
3. Economic policies: SFEM, SAP and relationship with Britain and the U.S.A.
4. Nigeria, the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Nations.
5. South Africa and Namibia.
6. Conclusions, observations and recommendations.

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CHAPTER V

THE BABANGIDA ADMINISTRATION

5.1 Nigeria and the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)

The OIC was established in 1969. It was made up of 45 countries out of which 22 were African countries, as at 1988. Nigeria was reported to have joined as the 46th member in 1986. This is evidenced in the statement credited to the Organization's Secretary General, Sherifuddin Perzada in 1986. Mr. Sherifuddin Pirzada said, that, "the acceptance of Nigeria as the 46th member of the organization is an important achievement".[1] Mr. Prizada commended Nigeria's great role in Africa and said that, the Organization required Nigeria's regional and international weight considering that it had more than "80 million people, a majority of whom are muslims".[2] North Africa Correspondent of News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) quoted the Arab news as saying that Mr. Pirzada had expressed hope that Nigeria would immensely contribute to the OIC fund.

The OIC is the principal Organization whose name since 1986 has been used to set the muslims and the Christians against one another in Nigeria. Violent conflict along religious lines has resulted from the OIC controversy.

One of the major reasons behind the vicious campaigns around the OIC is the benefits the Islamic segment of the ruling elites stands to derive from it.

Really the OIC is far from being an organization concerned with worship of God, religious faith and service to humanity.

"It is actually a political, financial and an intelligence organization."[3]

According to a source, the Organization of Islamic Countries is a vehicle of rich powerful nations especially the wealthy Islamic fundamentalist nations of the gulf region. It is also believed to have its individual members drawn from both Christians and Islamic countries. For instance in Africa, Benin, Cameroun, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad are said to be members. The founding members are, however, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Arab speaking nations. It believed that rulers of member nations of the OIC are the richest individuals in the History of man.

The OIC operates like the United nations with specialized committees and subsidiary organs for economic, cultural and social affairs. Its 'solidarity fund' for instance, provides emergency aids to members to build schools, hospitals and universities.

Like the U.N. it has a headquarters where it holds most of its conferences in Kuwait. There it has a vast collection of buildings said to have been built with about $340 million. The cost of internal decorations and furnishing, cost of importing trees and flowers from California and Netherlands when added would amount to over $800 million. Another $200 million is believed to have been expended on conference arrangements in 1987 alone.

> The expenditure of ₦1 billion in setting up its conference hall along with palaces for heads of states each comprising of 18 residences, enough to accommodate 108 heads of states, exceeds all the legitimate requirements of Kuwait. 4

This further goes to show that the OIC by far has powers that exceeds that of a religious Organization.

5.1.1 The different perceptions of the OIC by Nigerian, Christians and Muslims Alike

The Christians, that is, the ruling elites amongst them have argued that Nigeria is a secular state. By joining the OIC, Nigeria would be surrendering its sovereignty and embracing the God of Islam as a national creed. They argue further that it would be tantamount to Nigerians being bonded and carted to Islam. They went further to argue that membership of the OIC is not the same as Nigeria's relations with the Vatican. The argument stresses that the Vatican is a state, a sovereign entity. Nigeria, they argue, has ambassadorial representation in the Vatican and thus cannot be equated with the OIC. This is interesting as far as a secular state is concerned.

Before any concrete analysis is done of the way the Christians perceive the OIC it would be interesting to also have a quick look at the Vatican, that is, whose interests it represents.

The Vatican is the headquarters of the Roman Catholic Church. It is located in Rome, Italy. The Pope is the Head of the Vatican. The finances of the Vatican are believed to be in the hands of the 'Institute Per le Opere di Religione'

(IOR), literally, the Institute for Religious Works.

One arm of the institute is Bank (Ambrosiano). The Bank Ambrosiano had been headed since 1971 by one late Robert Calvi.[5] In fact the whole institute is believed to have been under the control of a Chicago born Archbishop Paul Marcinkus. He is said to have been very close to all Popes since 1951.

According to one source the bank controls resources well over $1 billion. The source also has it that Calvi reported to Marcinkus while Archbishop Marcinkus reports to the Pope. Calvi is believed by the source to be one of the most powerful bankers in the world.

One Friday, in June 1982, the body of Calvi was found hanging across River Thames in London. A jury was duly appointed to find out the possible cause of Calvi's death. It was not suicide as the jury wanted the world to know. It was discovered that over $1.287 billion was missing from bank Ambrosiano. So the bank collapsed. Calvi's wife Clara Calvi told the world that the husband was murdered by a faction of the "Opus Dei (6)" a very powerful organization with close ties to the Vatican. What happened to the $1.287 billion and what lead to the collapse of the Bank? These are questions yet to be answered. It is believed that apart from the Bank Ambrosiano, the Vatican run other commercian and industrial ventures.

The leaders of the Christian faith in Nigeria, particularly the Catholics see Nigeria's membership of the

OIC, as a threat to Nigeria's sovereign recognition of the Vatican. They perceive that the OIC was coming to compete with the Vatican; as another sovereign entity under the disguise of a religious body. There is no doubt that Christian elites, particularly the Catholic leaders are struggling to make the Vatican to continue to dominate religious affairs in Nigeria because of the economic benefits that accrues to them from that institution.

They therefore perceive a threat from the OIC when Nigeria becomes a member. They fear that a situation would arise whereby the loyalty of Nigeria would be divided between the Papalcy and the Islamic Ummah (community). They therefore see any move to join the OIC as being mischievous and a way of breaking the hitherto existing hegemony of the Vatican.

I believe that the opposition from the Christian factions championed by various Bishops, under the leadership of Okogie and Ganaka is a deliberate attempt by them to halt any positive change in their access to external sources if Nigeria joins the OIC. They seek to fight against the added advantage to the Muslim leaders' administration of both Nigerian human and material resources. It is on the basis of this that the leaders of CAN, particularly the Catholics succeeded in selling the OIC debate as a national cake, as typical of most elite debates which are often associated with their material interests. The OIC controversy is only being stirred to instigate the poor Christians against their muslim counterparts. Consequently, this would lead to a halt of Nigeria's membership. I believe this is the way the Catholic

leaders of CAN who spearhead the OIC debate, perceive the OIC issue.

5.1.2 The Muslims Perception of the OIC Issue

Nigeria's membership of the OIC has been said to contradict the secularity of the 1979 constitution, section 10, which states that, "the government of the federation or of a state shall not accept any religion as a state religion".[7] To the muslim leaders, this is no longer tenable because of their misperception of the status accorded the Vatican and the Pope by the Federal Government. They feel that the muslim leaders also need to exploit the same avenues to further boost the already existing Hausa/Fulani domination of the federal government. Muslim leaders like Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, Dahiru Bauchi and other Nigerian muslim leaders perceive opportunity from Nigeria's membership of the OIC. This is more so, in view of the fact that the oil rich muslim gulf countries are expected to donate generously to the coffers of the Nigerian government and muslim organizations if Nigeria becomes a member. They also see Nigeria's membership as a way of detaching the people and government of Nigeria from Western imperialism and the Vatican, and replacing it with Islamic or Arab captalism. This is evidenced in the communique issued at the end of Islam in Africa Conference held in Abuja in 1989. Part of the communique says, "the Organization would seek to eradicate all forms of political barriers drawn by Western imperialists to serve colonial and anti-Islamic interests." Another section of the communique says, the Organization (OIC) would seek to ensure that muslims

are elected to political posts of member nations.

It is quite glaring from these declarations that the muslim leaders envisaged a perception of opportunity accrueing to them if Nigeria joins the OIC. The point I am stressing is that the muslim leaders struggled to force Nigeria to join the OIC because of the perceived opportunity from it. They had held the Arabs who are the founding fathers of the organization as big brothers. So Nigeria joining the organization would further cement the already cordial relationship between them and the Arabs; it will further lead to the consolidation of the muslim elites' domination of the Nigerian polity. Consequently, they will be able to manipulate the associated power both domestic, and externally to exploit their perceived opportunity from the muslim world.

Nigeria membership of the OIC is not meant to bring any spiritual change or benefits to the average Nigerian muslim. Nigeria's membership of the OIC and the subsequent controversial debates amounts to attempts by some religious leaders of this country and those in the helm of affairs, uses religion to buttress their social-economically perceived opportunities in external environments. The OIC controversy shows the dimensions to which religion has also been used in the domestic politics of Nigeria and foreign relations. With this analysis, it can be inferred that the OIC controversy is totally a deviation from Nigeria's foreign policy pronouncements that Africa is the centre-piece of her foreign policy. The OIC has no bearing on Africa. It is more or less an artificial making of the ruling elite to achieve their perceived opportunities

from the Arab world. Nigeria should start thinking of joining better organizations that would help to liberate Africa from the shqakles of imperialism rather than being forced into a new form of relationship which will not solve her problems of underdevelopment, poor technological base, poor external reserves, etc. The OIC has its origin from the Islamic/Arab world and thus designed to serve more of their interests.

5.2 Relationship with Isreal and the Arabs

5.2.1 Nigeria Relations with Isreal

> I believe that Nigeria might review her relations with Isreal. I believe that such a review is a matter of time. The circumstances, perhaps, that brought about non-recognition are fast dying away and situation may be different as time goes on. Nigeria has recognized the new Palestenian state declared last December by the P.L.O., and the PLO itself has accepted Isreal's right to exist. More importantly, quite a number of African states have formally recognised Isreal. 8

The state of Isreal was created by the United Nations when Palestine was partitioned between the Jews and the Arabs. This proclaimation was made in May 1948 by David Ben Gurion.[9] The Arabs, particularly those in Palestine were implacably hostile to the whole idea of a separate state for Isreal in what they considered to be their home. There were wars between the Isreali and the Arabs between 1948-49, 1956 and in 1973, the Yom Kippur War broke out. Isreal took advantage of a cease fire proposed by the U.N. to advance deep into Egyptian territory beyond the Suez Canal.[10] Many African nations perceived this Isreali encroachment into the Egyptian territory as an act of aggression against an African

nation. Isreal was thus jointly perceived as a threat by Africans and indeed the Organization of African Unity. Yakubu Gowon was the then head of state and chairman of the OAU. Prior to this, Nigeria had "maintained cordial links with the Jewish State, inspite of the fact that the exigencies of its internal politics prevented it from opening an embassy in Tel-Aviv."[11] Isreal was, however, allowed to open an embassy in Lagos. According to one publication, "the Isreali ambassadors and officials were not permitted to visit the North except Jos and Kaduna."[12] The then Premier of the North, Sir Ahmadu Bello openly declared that, the North had nothing to do with Isreal. He added that, "as far as he was concerned, Isreal is not on the world map, it does not exist. This was the situation of things before Gowon gave an indication of Nigeria breaking diplomatic relations with Isreal in 1983. Gowon had accused Isreal of defying world opinion on the crisis. He had declared that the war which was manifestly a danger to international peace and security, "could have been avoided if Isreal had listened to reason and had withdrawn from the occupied Egyptian territory."

Though Isreal still occupies the West Bank and the Gaza strip which is Arab territory, the problem is further compounded by Isreali close relations with Apartheid South Africa. Nigeria therefore contin.e to perceive Isreal as a threat, being a friend to N.geria's enemy (South Africa).

Internal or domestic conflicting pressures characterizing the relationship between Nigeria/Isreal and the Arabs as

claimed by Gambari are no longer very significant. Eminent Northern Muslims now have serious business links with the Isrealis. For example, the Amiru Imam (the spiritual leader of muslims) in Nigeria and the Sultan of Sokoto confirmed his business links with Isreal. He has business connections with a Sudanese Jew and his company called 'Afro-Continental'. During the riots that marked his installation many periodicals and newspapers pointed out that the aversions to the Sultan, especially by the most intelligentsia are based on his strong Zionist connections. Added to this is the fact that the Isrealis are working with the federal government. According to Bishop Ganaka, they have won big contracts in the country. A monthly periodical had also described President Babangida's sneak into Abuja during the 1988 Independence Parade thus, "He was largely escorted to his villa by an un-usually large number of the Isreali trained Presidential body Guards (PBG) with utmost secrecy without the traditional blarring of sierrens."[4]

The most significant factor in the normalization of diplomatic relations with Isreal now is the South African factor. The religious and ethnic factors seem to have been overtaken by events. Isreal is closest ally to South Africa, even more than the U.S.A. and Britain.

While all parliaments in the West, including the U.S. Congress have expressed their strong condemnation of apartheid in special, often in unanimous resolutions, the Isreal has remained officially silent. This apart, Isreal has continued to openly support the apartheid policy. According to an

Isreali commerce Minister in 1982, Mr. Gideon Patt, "Isreal and South Africa are two of the thirty democracies in the world."[15] This compacent declaration shows how strong Isreal supports South Africa.

Isreal is also reported to be supporting South Africa in the manufacturing of weapons. The "Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ArmCOR)"[16] which now provides South Africa's most needed military equipment was said to have been created with Isreali inspiration and advice. The fact that Isreal continues to play proxy to South Africa which is an enemy to Nigeria and indedd the OAU makes normalization of diplomatic relations with her impossible especially for Babangida administration. This is purely a moral issue. Apartheid entails the violation of human rights. It transcends all religious and material sentiments. Nigeria's diplomatic relations with Isreal is no longer that of Southern Nigeria's inclination to Isreal or the North's hatred for Isreal.

The crux of the matter now is in the intensity of Isreali friendship with the racist regime in South Africa. It is no secret that Isreal helps South Africa to develop capability to produce nuclear weapons which threaten the frontline states. It has also been reported that Isreal used to send some of its combatant specialists to help South Africa in Namibia to deal more effectively with SWAPO. She is said to be the only country in the world to openly provide such facilities to South Africa. It is therefore academically dishonest and hypocritical to argue that Nigeria should not single out Isreal for punishment because other countries like the USA

Nigeria and her allies to fight against imperialism and apartheid in South Africa.

Babangida administration and indeed the past administrations have been engaged in rhetorical deception of Nigerians as far as the Isreali connection is concerned. Nigeria should cut off both military and economic links with Isreal to properly concretise its stand.

5.2.2 Nigeria Relations with the Arabs

Apart from the long existent religious and trade links between Northern Nigeria and the Arab world, Nigeria continue to increase its relations with the Arabs. This is because Nigeria and the Arab nations are both members of the oil cartel (OPEC).

Secondly, African Arab nations are members of the O.A.U. of which they have been actively participating. Again the Arab nations particularly African Arabs have common interests with Nigeria particularly with regards to issues of decolonization of Africa. They continue to identify with Nigeria and Africa with "regards to the liberation of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies."[17] Furthermore Arab countries have been giving development aids to African governments. These relationships/opportunity exist between Nigeria and the Arabs. In fact Nigeria and African nations stand to gain from loans and development programmes of the economic organizations in which Arabs and Nigeria are members.

Significantx in this context is the OPEC special fund for development to which $1.6 billion[18] was said to have

been committed in 1976/77 alone.

This cordial relationship between Nigeria and the Arabs can be seen in the support of the Arab nation members of the OPEC in the appointment of the Nigeria Minister of Petroleum as Chairman of OPEC for two consecutive terms.

Also significant is Nigeria's membership of the OIC due to the economic benefits attached ot it. Nigeria hosted the first conference on Islam in Africa in 1989. It was tagged Islam in Africa. The Babangida foreign policy with Arabs and Isreal has been that of a continuity except that the administration has taken a more capitalist path in its relations with both. For example, Isreali companies now conspicously operate in Nigeria while at the same time, there is considerable capital flow between the Arab world. The administration of Babangida therefore tends to deal with both Isreal and the Arabs fairly on economic basis. However, in diplomatic circles, the administration has tended to be careful in not restoring diplomatic relations with Isreal. Otherwise, restoration of such a relationship would contradict Nigeria's African policy particularly in relation to South Africa.

Nigeria therefore should continue to perceive Isreal as a threat to Africa and the OAU as long as it continues its support for racist South Africa. Babangida administration's foreign policy towards Isreal and the Arabs is that of a continuity.

5.3 Economic Policies (SFEM, SAP) and Relationship with Britain and U.S.A.

When the Babangida administration came to power on August 27, 1985, it lambasted the Buhari's foreign economic policies. The counter-trade was attacked and the IMF issue was thrown to national debate. Despite this, most of the regime's previous adjustment programmes were still accepted. In fact the Babangida administration has been bold to push the economic adjustments initiated by the previous regimes to extreme conclusions.

During the IMF debate th vast majority of Nigerians strongly and openly opposed the taking of the IMF loan. The transnational corporations and their agents in Nigeria supported the IMF loan. Nigerians rejected the loan because of the conditionalities which they thought would make life unbearable for them. Some people, that is, traders, mechanics, etc. even suggested, "taxing their members or raising loans from rich patriotic Nigerians as an alternative to the IMF loan."[19] The other reason for the rejection, was the devaluation effects the loan would have on the Nigerian currency. "The local bourgeoisie that opposed the loan was afraid of the adverse consequences of devaluation for their limited capital base and lucrative deals in foreign exchange."[20] This denotes that even the local bourgeoisie did not support the taking of the IMF loan. Since the issue had been debated and rejected, one would have expected the government to respect the feelings of the majority of Nigerians. This was not the case. Sooner after the debate, the government

came up with a pro-Western adjustment programme which clearly showed every Nigerian that the Babangida administration was still bent on dinning with the IMF. This was first manifested in the budget speech which spelt out some adjustment programmes that were believed to have been designed by the IMF and the World Bank. These included, review and curtailment of public expenditures, reduction to total withdrawal of government subsidies, "review of interest rates, vigorous export promotion, wage freeze, trade liberalization, reduction of subsidy on petroleum and the devaluation of the naira.[21]

The Buhari administration objected to most of these conditionalities which the Babangida administration implemented without human face, that is, without considering their political and economic consequences on the generality of Nigerians. Such considerations are important in the process of foreign economic policy decision making, especially as these affected the domestic environment. Petroleum subsidy is meant to reduce the hardships of the common man especially in transportation. Despite this, the Babangida administration bowed to compelling pressures of the Western financial houses by announcing an 80% reduction in existing petroleum subsidy with effects from January 1, 1986. Worse still, the administration went and instituted what it called realistic adjustment of the Naira with a view of reducing the degree of over-valuation. Since that time, there has been an unofficial and a crawling depreciation of the Naira, not necessarily in response to international economic trends. I mean here that, the current depreciation of the Nigerian

currency is imposed by the IMF/the World Bank. It has no relation with any global economic recession at all. In fact, the Structural Adjustment Programme under the Babangida administration has made Nigeria a protectorate of the IMF and the World capitalist nations of the world. To be able to carry out the structural adjustment programme and sell it out to the world, the External Affairs Minister was said to have travelled to most Western nations. It could even be inferred that the decision to even normalize diplomatic realations with Britain was taken to mobiliz. her support for the structural adjustment programme. This is informed by the big brother image which the Babangida administration perceive the U.S.A. and Britain. It did not perceive them as imperialists and thus not a threat. With the introduction of the SFEM and SAP, the U.S.A. and Britain with other Western nations agreed to extend new loan facilities to Nigeria. Both the Paris and London Clubs of creditors were also contacted to reschedule debts owned to them. This goodwill which the regime now enjoys with the imperialist countries poses serious problems for the conduct of an Afro-centric foreign policy that would be devoid of Western powers manipulations. It could be stressed that given the cordial economic ties with the Western powers, that is, in terms of the structural adjustment programme and its associated economic policies, the Babangida administration's policies have been geared towards the IMF aspirations and not to the needs of Africa and Nigeria in particular.

5.3.1 Consequences or Implications of the Foreign Economic Policies of the Administration

One of the major problems that is associated with any economic policy that is outwardly designed, is that it does not serve local interests. It also follows that a country that rely on borrowing money from international creditors is vulnerable to pressures from such creditor nations and their multinationals. Such pressures normally entail the introduction of economic measures prescribed by such creditor countries. The structural adjustment programme is typical of such pressures. Measures arising from such pressures are always harsh and poses challenges and unlimited hardships to the citizenry of the receiving countries. This is exactly what is happening in Nigeria under SAP.

The immediate cause of the 1989 students SAP riots are that:

> Cost of feeding is outrageously high, but the standard is very low. Textbooks are scarce and when available are very expensive. In 1987 the real worth of N125 minimum wage was N35, at a time when four naira was equal to one dollar. The value of the naira has further depreciated that most economists think that the N125 of 1987 is probably less than N15 today. 23

In most sectors of the economy prices have gone up astronomically, yet workers salaries have not been increased. Prices of staple food items have gone beyond the reach of the common man. A recent World Health Organization report on Nigeria is said to have given a "terrible picture of malnutrition in Nigeria" caused by the economic policies of the Babangida administration.

Things have gone so bad. Prices of petroleum products have spiralled. Gasoline which sold for 62/42 kobo per litre was increased to 90 kobo. NEPA too has increased tarriff for power generation. Transport fares have consequently increased over 300% since Babangida came to power. For instance, Onitsha to Zaria which used to cost between N20 and N25 is now between N80 and N100. Minna to Zaria used to be N8.50, it is now between N29 and N31. Furthermore, privatization of public enterprises has rendered many people jobless through mass retrenchments in establishments like the river basin authorities, ports authorities, airways etc. According to Odumegu Ojukwu, 'One needed a pocketfull of money to buy a basket full of food before SAP, but now with SAP, one needs a basketfull of money to buy a pocketfull of food items. Deppite these hardships, the administration has maintained that there is no alternative to SAP. In response to this, people like Professor Aluko have argued that 'SAP is a kiss on death. Everything has an alternative. Even 'death' has 'living' as its alternative.

Ex-head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo had also pleaded with the administration to give SAP "a human face."[29]

The I.M.F. and the World Bank conditionalities have no human face. SAP is the brainchild of these institutions and cannot therefore have progressive outcomes. SAP is an imperial tool of Western capitalist nations. Babangida is too pro-West in his policies that he does not see any thing wrong with their designed economic policies for Nigeria.

> It is gratifying that the Western group of 7 at its Toronto Summit early this year, made proposals for selective write-off of debts of African countries, (Nigeria inclusive). We are also pleased with the growing acceptance by the international financiers including the London and Paris clubs of the idea of multi-year debt rescheduling at reasonable interest rates.... The growing recognition that the debt problem is not just an issue for debtors alone but one of the international Monetary Fund (I.M.F.)and the World Bank, provides us with another cause of optimism. 30

These statements were made after the structural adjustment programme had been implemented for over one year. The above proclaimation is an indication that the Babangida administration has a perception of opportunity from Paris and the London Clubs of creditors. The administration has this image because it sees the Paris and London Clubs as God-fathers that would grant it more financial aids and even reschedule or even write-off existing ones. The U.S.A. and Britain on the other hand perceive Nigeria as a child, that is, immature and child-like in handling its own affairs especially financially. It is clear that the Babangida administration owns up to this image, judging from his declaration above. The pro-West nature of the administration can be also seen in its pattern of foreign trade. For example, Nigeria exported $24 million about ₦120 million of cocoa to U.S.A. in 1988, NAFCO imported fertilizer worth $4.8 million from the same country in the same year. Shell-fish worth ₦30 million was also exported to U.S. alone in 1987.[31] Nigeria was reported also to have imported goods worth $3.8 billion (₦19 billion) in 1987 from the U.S.A. Apart from this, trawlers and other goods worth $13.8 billion were also imported from the U.S.A. in 1987.[32] This is believed

to have trippled by now. The same thing applies to its trade links with other Western nations. There is relative insignificance of Africa in Nigeria's external trade - compared to the significance of Western super power nations in Nigeria's external trade. Nigeria's economic and technological underdevelopment explains and indeed strengthens the inevitable relationship of dependence that has emerged between her and the Western great powers. Its possession of agricultural commodities and industrial raw materials and the existence of a large internal market for foreign manufactured goods combine to transform this relationship with the industrial nations of the West into one of perpetual dependence.

This western hegemonic relationship with Nigeria has always been to the favour of industrialized Western powers. This dependence is glaringly manifested in the conduct of Nigeria's external economic relations, with particular regards to external loans transactions and foreign private investments in Nigeria particularly during the Babangida administration.

The administration's free economic policies, backed by open marketing of the naira through SFEM, FEM and now IFEM is seen by many Western imperialists as the most laudable in recent years from any third world country. To further cushion this liberalization policy, the Babangida administration has been using every weapon at its disposal to woo foreign investors - particularly from the West.

At a dinner party in NIIA in Lagos, President Babangida said that:

> I would like to take this opportunity once again to reinstate our warm welcome to genuine foreign investors and to reinterate our preparedness to ensure that no impediments stand in their way. 33

This is a clear testimony of how responsible the Babangida administration is to the yearnings and aspirations of the Western imperialist nations. Reports have it that transnational corporations belonging to these nations are making huge profits in Nigeria due to the laudable policies of the Babangida regime. For example, apart from unrecorded profits which Julius Berger makes from other sources in Nigeria, the company declared a N6.2 million profit in the first half of 1989.[34] The source claimed that the company had hopes for better prospects in 1990 and beyond. To confirm that SAP and indeed the administration's economic policies are Western in origin and design, the Minister for Budget and Planning, Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji had also said that the successful rescheduling of Nigeria's debts by the Western capitalist nations is due to the confidence which Nigeria has generated through the Structural Adjustment Programme. According to him, this has lead to further release of loans to Nigeria by countries like Japan, Britain, U.S.A., Western Germany, etc. Below is a breakdown of the loans received in 1987/88:

1. Japan - N1.42 billion
2. U.K. - N120 million
3. France - N73.2 million
4. U.S. - N263 million
5. W. Germany - 60 million German marks.35

Other loans have been taken from these Western nations and the World Bank/IMF. The most recent being $900 million for the development of Nigerian universities and another N700 million for the execution of the national identity cards scheme. The New Nigerian newspaper also claimed that the World Bank has so far committed N29.6 billion[37] to Nigeria as loans since Babangida came to power.

Out of this only N1.477 billion[38] was said to be yet received as at October 1988.

It is no longer a secret that the official policy of the Babangida administration has always been to play the responsive child image to Western imperialists. He seeks to encourage and attract private foreign investors. He does this by creating the domestic structures and political climate necessary to give incentives to foreign investors. Although Nigeria has been a market economy with a strong liberal democratic tradition, Babangida has pursued this liberal capitalist economic policies with too much vigour than any of the previous regimes in Nigeria. It is therefore not surprising that the MNC's that have invested heavily in Nigeria come from the West particularly from the U.K., the U.S.A. and Western Europe. Trade between Nigeria and African nations has thus been very small in proportion of her total external trade. The insignificance of Nigeria's external trade with African countries is important in explaining the non-commitment of the Babangida administration to the Afro-centricism that pre-occupies the administration's foreign policy.

Under development and poverty of the Nigerian state and the role(s) of the multinational corporations and their super power nations of the West are very significant variables that have shaped the foreign economic policies of the Babangida administration. The philosophy and ideology of SFEM, FEM, IFEM and indeed the Structural Adjustment Programme are by far contrary to the wishes and aspirations of the totality of Nigerians and Africa in general. These are the aspirations of the I.M.F., the World Bank and their allied imperialist home countries.

5.4 Nigeria, the United Nations (UNO) and the Commonwealth of Nations

Nigeria has been active in her participation in international organizations especially the U.N.O. and the Commonwealth. The Babangida administration has maintained this commitment with some vigour. A manifestation of this is in the election of two Nigerians to key positions in these organizations. This apart, Nigeria has in UNCTAD conferences, rallied with other less developed nations, to demand, among other things, "the liberalization of international trade, higher prices for agricultural raw materials in world market, and more emphasis on multi-lateral aids through global agencies."[39]

Nigeria has also contributed immensely to the United Nations police force that supervised both the Namibian independence and elections. In fact, the Nigerian policy was said to have been singled out and commended by the international community for a job well done in Namibia.

The Babangida administration also used the U.N. forum to press for "global adoption of nuclear waste dump watch, to curb the activities of those involved in trans-boundary movement of waste."[40] The plight of frontline states is continuously being discussed by Nigeria through the United Nations. Addressing the 1988 session of the U.N. General Assembly, Nigerian External Affairs Minister, urged the world community to "call for a special U.N. session to consider the destructive consequences of South African aggression against frontline states."[41]

The Nigerian army is also among the United Nations' peace-keeping force in Lebanon. The Babangida administration has also used Nigeria's influence in the United Nations to make good use of specialized agencies like the I.L.O., UNICEF and WHO. UNICEF and WHO are being used to pursue the eradication of guinea worms by the year 1995. The United Nation's contribution towards this end was made known at a conference tagged "Target 1995, global eradication of guinea Worm."[43]

The United Nations industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) is still helping in rural salt production by women in selected parts of Nigeria particularly in Plateau State.[44] Refugees problems in the world today especially in the Third World has been very alarming. Africa is believed to have a total of 4 million persons outside their countries of origin. There are about 1000 refugees in Lagos alone. They are reported to have received one form of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) protection and

assistance. A United Nations high commissioner for refugees was appointed for Nigeria in 1979. He is Mr. Lamin Sidibeh Gambian.[45]

The United Nations under the UNICEF development programme approved the sum of ₤50.9 million for Nigeria. This is under its special fund and expanded programme of technical assistance for the third world. The sum of ₤13 million was also approved for Nigeria in 1987 under the UNFPA population assistance.[46] This is to help Nigeria to carry out its population programmes.

The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has also contributed to assist Nigeria in its food needs. The Director of GAO in Nigeria, "reinterated the United Nations' commitment to the eradication of hunger and poverty in Nigeria."[47] He promised that the United Nations will continue to fight the problem.

Nigeria also lead other African nations to the U.N. Special Session "on the critical economic situation in Africa."[48] Nigeria was repr sented by Bolaji Akinyemi and Kalu Idika Kalu - then Minister for National Planning.

Mr. Joseph Garba, then Nigeria's Permanent Representative at the United Nations was appointed President of the 44th United Nations General Assembly in September 1989. Nigeria also took part in the December 1989 special session of the General Assembly on the destructive effects of apartheid.

Nigeria's Adebayo Adedeji has been and he is still heading the United Nations economic Commission for Africa

for the past fourteen years.[49] Nigeria has worked with the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, that is, "the implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action which aims at the surmounting of underdevelopment in Africa."[50] Nigeria continues to retain her position as the Chairman of the United Nations Anti-Apartheid Committee. The role of Nigeria in the United Nations was summarized by Nigeria's head of state, Ibrahim Babangida when he said, that, Nigeria's active participation at the United Nations General Assembly vividly demonstrates her "commitment to world peace and respect for the charter of the U.N."[51]

> We are convinced that the relation of international tension, respect for the right of self determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the U.N. and strengthening of international peace and security are directly related and should be perceived as an organic whole. 52

This denotes that his administration has been so committed to the United Nations because it feels that global and African problems can only be effectively solved through the United Nations.

Nigeria has equally been very active in the Commonwealth of Nations since Babangida came to power. Like the previous regimes, the Babangida administration continues to also play an African leading role in the Commonwealth of Nations. To this end it had participated in all the Commonwealth conferences. For example at the Commonwealth Summit in Nassau, the Bahamian capital, Nigeria was among the 46

nations that endorsed some recommendations to impose more stringent sanctions against South Africa. At the Summit, members declared:

> We rededicate ourselves to the principles of self determination, non-racialism, human freedom and equality and co-operation between nations in the service of international understanding, development and world peace which have guided the commonwealth through its evolution. 53

An accord was signed by the members. South Africa was called upon to take five specific steps including the opening of a dialogue with a view of establishing "a representative, non-racial government".[54] It was decided to set up a group of Commonwealth eminent persons "to facilitate such a dialogue".[55] Nigeria's ex-head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo is a member of the Commonwealth eminent persons. They also agreed at the Nissau Summit, on a series of economic measures to signal their opposition to apartheid.

Nigeria also participated in the Harare Commonwealth mini-Summit in October 1986. At the Summit, all members except Britain placed on record their repugnance at apartheid and their determination to help South Africa's majority achieve their freedom.

At the Commonwealth Committee of foreign Ministers held in Toronto and earlier in Lusaka, the committee submitted an interim report on the evaluation of the application of the sanctions against South Africa.[56] Nigeria's External Affairs Minister, Ike Nwachukwu was said to have effectively participated. He was quoted to have called

on member states at the Summit, to continue to harness their "scarce resources to inflict decisive blows on the forces pitched against the freedom fighters."[57] He stressed that sanctions would work in South Africa. According to him, he found it difficult to accept the views of those whom he termed were "influenced by the desire for national economic advantage and profit, who argue that sanctions would hurt the black majority" and that it would have little or no effect on the apartheid regime.[58] Nigeria through the Commonwealth have increased diplomatic campaigns to increase economic pressures on South Africa. She has sought to persuade other commonwealth member states to adopt sanctions against South Africa. The effects of sanctions on South Africa was confirmed in the Commonwealth interim reports in 1988. It was confirmed that, "South African trade with countries which imposed sanctions fell by $1.2 billion or 7% between 1985 and 1987."[59]

On economic front, Nigeria has also been committed to the Commonwealth of Nations. At the Commonwealth Finance Ministers Conference in Cyprus in 1987, Nigeria and other Commonwealth countries "proposed a Commonwealth equity fund, a vehicle for private investment in developing countries market.

In view of Her commitment to the Commonwealth, Nigeria has succeeded in pressing for the election of a Nigerian as the Secretary General of the Organization. He is Chief Emeka Anyaoku. He was elected at the Secret ballot held in Kuala-Lumpur in October 1989. Chief Anyaoku is reported to be the first African to head the major association of the

Commonwealth 49 member nations",[60] which encompasses a quarter of the world population. A Nigerian, "Dr Olugbenro Ajayi has also been appointed an adviser in the industrial and development Unit of the Commonwealth fund for technical cooperation."[61]

Nigeria's head of state has also been nominated and selected to be a member of the committee of ten (10) Commonwealth heads of states t meet later in 1990. They are to assess "the future role of the Commonwealth and to examine whether its institutions, including the Secretariat are adequately equiped for the tasks ahead."[62]

From the above assessment of Babangida administration's relations with the U.N.O. and the Commonwealth, it is significant that the appointment of Nigerians to key posts in both the U.N.O. and the Commonwealth are the main achievements of the regime. This does not, however, mean that Nigerians have not held posts in these international organizations in the past. Taslim Elias had presided over the International Court of Justice, However, the thrust of the argument is that the Babangida administration has played the responsive child role to the leading imperialist nations (USA and Britain). These nations wield considerable influence in both the U.N.O. and the Commonwealth. They have the veto in the U.N.O. for example. Since the Babangida administration allows Western creditor nations to pursue their imperialist economic policies in Nigeria, it is pertinent that she is supported when she contests for such prestigeous posts in international organization. Nigeria is given these posts

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because the administration has ensured an alignment on the international capitalist community with its policy of economic reconstruction and the structural adjustment programmes. The support and rapport she gets in these international organizations dominated by America, Britain and other members of the capitalist Western creditors is because it had allowed them to pursue their imperial activities in Nigeria without any hinderance.

Its liberal economic policies backed by the open marketing and the devaluation of the Naira is seen by the Western creditor nations, who dominate these organizations as the most liberal in recent years from any developing nation. It is therefore on this basis that she is being motivated by these world bodies with such top posts as President of the U.N. General Assembly and the Secretary General of the Commonwealth. It is important to stress that the Transnational corporations belonging to the nations that dominate these organizations are having a field day in the Nigerian economy. Julius Berger for example made a profit of 6.2 million Naira alone in 1989.[63] The publication also claimed that 1988 was even better for the company and forcasted a brighter 1990s.

In as much as Nigeria's economy continue to be tied to foreign capital, that is, from America, Europe, Japan etc. it will not be able to pursue her Afro-centric foreign policy despite being given key positions in international organizations. She has to desist from depending on the flow of financial capital to sustain her economy to be able

> not interested in having a dialogue
> with the racist minority regime... 64

Like the previous regimes the Babangida administration recognises the efforts of the anti-apartheid movements and has directly supported those charged with the responsibility for executing the struggle. Nigeria during the Babangida administration has not relented in the provision of material and financial support for the liquidation of the obnoxious regime. Nigeria has also during this period mediated in disputed areas of South Africa, that is, Angola.

According to Ike Nwachukwu, Nigeria having actively supported the achievement of Angolan independence will continue to back the legitimate MPLA government of that country in settling the existing differences in Angola.

On Namibia, Nigeria played a significant role both in her independence and the elections. President Ibrahim Babangida further reiterated Nigeria's position on apartheid when he said that: "Our position on apartheid remains unshaken while our commitment on Namibian liberation is not negotiable."[65] These have been lofty pronouncements. The degree to which these pronouncements have been pursued with concrete actions is the concern of this section.

As early as 1985 when the administration came to power, Nigeria at the Ministers of non-aligned states proposed to member states in the Luanda Conference to appeal to the U.N. Security Council to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa. The Nigerian External Affairs Minister added that "repression in South Africa had

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Nigeria's repugnance for the racist regime in South Africa was further demonstrated by the Babangida administration when "Equatorial Guinea - Nigeria's neighbour in the Bight of Benin was caught flirting with racist South Africa early 1988."[68] Nigeria showed her unequovocal objection to the presence of the racists in her neighbouring country. Nigeria's objection made the government of Equatorial Guinea to send the South Africans packing within a fourth night. This of course was not easy.

Earlier in 1987, President Ibrahim Babangida was believed to have turned down an invitation by President Reagan to visit the U.S.A. because the "U.S.A. had not supported comprehensive sanctions against racist South Africa."[69] Nigeria also continue to be the Chairman of the United Nations Committee for the Liberation Struggles in South Africa. It has therefore been possible for her to liaise with the OAU and the frontline states in seeking solutions to the South African problems.

In October, 1988, "Nigeria pledged fresh aids to SWAPO".[70] President Babangida promised fresh aids to SWAPO to help her prepare for elections in Namibia. This was on the occasion of Sam Njoma's visit to Nigeria on 5th October, 1988.

The role Nigeria played under the Babangida administration to impose sanctions on South Africa, at the Nassau Commonwealth Summit has been mentioned somewhere in this work. The role of the organization's group of eminent

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persons in South African liberation struggles have also been treated earlier.

Nigeria played a significant role in the unbanning of the African National Congress and other anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa.

On Namibian independence, Nigeria has given both financial and material assistance. Apart from pledging $10,000[71] annually for five years to liberation movements in South Africa including Namibia, the Babangida administration has been committed in rescuing Namibia from the racist South African oppression and from apartheid. In this regard, the administration has pursued vigorously the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions on the question of Namibia and Apartheid. She has pursued the implementation of these resolutions by adopting the following measures:

Like the previous regimes, the administration does not have any form of diplomatic relations with racist South Africa. She has not got any form of investment, grant or obtained any form of loans from the apartheid regime like some African states do. Furthermore, Nigeria has not got any military links with the apartheid regime, rather it discourages other countries that have to desist .

Nigeria under the administration "paid her assessed contribution of $162,469 to the United Nations transition group (UNTAG)."[72]

Nigerian police officers and some civilians also served as "part of the non-military components of the UNTAG to supervise the Namibian elections".[73] Nigeria thus played a very active role in the implementation of both the independence and election processes through consultations and advice to the leadership of SWAPO. Nigeria has also made substantial contribution to increase the assistance to victims of apartheid in South Africa both in cash and material grants to SWAPO in the following order:

1. 1988 - £91,900 cash gran'
2. 1987 - £306,000 towards providing water to SWAPO vocational centre.
3. March 1989 - £100,000 towards repartriation of Namibian refugees and exiles.[74]

Other assistance given to the liberation struggles in South Africa include "£66,990"[75] in 1987 towards the nationhood account of the United Nations' fund for Namibia. She also gave the sum of "£50,000"[76] in 1987 to the trust fund for the United Nations Institute for Namibia.

Nigeria's head of state, ministers and members of the Nigerian diplomatic corp went as far as Windhoek to grace the occasion of Namibian independence, on March 21st 1990.

From the above examination, the Babangida administration foreign policy towards the liberation struggles in South Africa has been a success. This does not mean that it has pursued his foreign policy in this regard different from his predecessors. His is a continuity of the foreign policy of the past regimes as has always been claimed. So all the

variables like the influence of the super powers, the dependent economy of Nigeria on the Western imperialists, have significantly made most Nigerian regimes to pursue foreign policy actions based mainly on pronouncements and boycotts of social activities for pressing for their interests in South Africa. This is because of the support which the South African racist enjoys from the U.S., Britain and their allies. The capability and cultural distance between Nigeria and these South African allies makes Nigeria powerless to take any other actions, rather than pronouncements and boycotts. These Western allies of South Africa also play some imperial role in Nigeria and most African nations. Nigeria cannot therefore pursue a dynamic foreign policy in South Africa based on her limited capabilities both militarily and economically.

Again there is the problem of commitment of both past and present Nigeria to the Western model of modernization. This does not allow for proper articulation of foreign policy objectives that will allow her to take vicious steps at carrying other African states behind her to impose sanctions against both racist South Africa and her Western allies.

There is also the problem of perceived threat from these imperialist nations. African nations and Nigeria in particular cannot openly declare them their enemies. This is because Nigeria and Africa lack the technology, economic power and even the military capability to counter the joint military might of South Africa and her Western allies.

However, with the latest developments in South Africa, there seem to be cause of optimism in the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Arms struggle should not be relaxed. At the same time, Nigeria and African nations should continue to use international organizations (that is, U.N.O., the Commonwealth and the OAU) to press for the total eradication of apartheid in South Africa. To quicken this, Nigeria should encourage other African nations to form a United Military force that can be based in South Africa to supplement the efforts of the liberation struggles in South Africa. Now that Namibia is independent, it could be envisaged that the super powers are gradually relaxing their tough policies in South Africa. The release of black political prisoners and Thatcher's recent call for one man one vote in South Africa (racist enclave) are significant in this regard.

Nigeria must therefore continue to put to optimum use, the scarce resources at her disposal to mobilize her African brothers to put a final end to the burning issue of Apartheid in South Africa. This should be made central to her national interest. It is an obvious fact that many African states look up to Nigeria as a big brother. Nigeria is looked up to for inspiration for the total eradication of all forms of oppression and racism in South Africa. It is a mantle that Nigerian foreign policy decision makers cannot shy away from. By boldly leading Africans to struggle for the end of apartheid in South Africa, Nigeria will be according commensurate dignity to her own freedom and enhancing her own sovereignty and national security and her Afro-centric foreign policy.

4.6 Conclusion

The foreign policy principles of Nigeria on Africa for the period this study covers have remained by and large stable. It has mediated in African conflicts, it has continued to support liberation movements in Africa, it has sought to foster the unity and solidarity of Africa. In terms of economic interactions, all the regimes have tended to look more to the West and the U.S.A. than Africa. Because of this, Nigeria has marginalized African countries from her foreign economic relations. It looks as if the regimes studied have all been too pro-West because of the overdependence of Nigeria on the U.S.A., Britain and other super powers (West in particular). The technological base is not African in conceptior conception. The "Operational Savouir" of the Nigerian economy is "largely foreign".[77] Even much of oil which constitute the taproot of Nigeria's foreign earning is refined in most of these Western nations. The three refineries were constructed by foreign Western companies. The Warri refinery was built by an "Italian state oil company (ENI). The Kaduna was constructed by a Japanese company.[78] According to Chamba Ngou, "the fortunes of the Nigerian economy are tied closely to the managerial and technical cadre of the big firms.[79] These firms are mostly American, British, French, Italian or Japanese in origin. These foreign firms in collaboration with their Nigerian subsidiaries, repartriate huge profits to their home countries.

Coupled with these, is that despite Nigeria's large population it is weak in modern warfare capabilities. It

therefore relies on the Western super power nations for the supply of military hardwares and the training of its military personnel.

These have continued to militate against its pursuit of a viable African centred foreign policy. For a viable Nigerian Afro-centric foreign policy to be pursued, therefore, Nigeria need to act, very quickly, to analyse the causes of its now seemingly permanent state of dependence on the West. She should seek to pursue and implement a realistic, attainable, yet radical plan of action in order to turn the tide. Otherwise, with the present weak, vulnerable and underdeveloped economy, with externally derived institutions foreign to African culture and expectations, Nigeria cannot pursue a dynamic Afro-centric foreign policy.

It is therefore pertinent for Nigeria to change her imperial perception of the Western imperialist nations. She needs to really play the fanatic child image to be able to pursue a foreign policy that will have within it, the necessary ingredients for successful African centred foreign policy. This I believe could be attained if domestically Nigeria adopts a plan of action based on Nigerian or African's own cultural and political revolution. This I believe is the only way to actually put Nigeria on the right path to the culturally derived democracy, self-reliance, and a sustainable development. This internally achieved Nigeria will be on the right path to take a firm control over African affairs in future. The Lagos Plan of Action is a right step towards this direction; but it has to be rooted

firmly in the context of African history. A foreign policy framework based on papers drafted from Washington, Paris and London will never favour the interests of Africa. Such programmes like SAP which are meant to supplement the IMF/World Bank, imposes constraints and further marginalizes Nigeria and Africa and thus would serve to underscore any plan for redirection of development strategies. Such a relationship with Western nations would also undermine any plan by Nigeria, emphasizing greater African co-operation, self reliance in terms of food security, regional trade and marketing agreements at African regional or continental levels.

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CONCLUSION, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main thrust of this work is to critically look at the Nigerian foreign policy from 1979 - 1989 with a view to examining its Afro-centric content. I have argued in this work that because the respective regimes have been too pro-West, Nigeria has not been able to pursue an Afro-centric foreign policy which they have continued to claim.

Apart from the introductory chapters, the main work is divided into three chapters; each chapter devoted to each regime since 1979.

Starting with the Shagari regime, I examined the administration's role in Chad, its actions during the Nigerian/Cameroon border clash, Nigeria's role in the OAU Summit in Libya and her relationship with Libya.

Under Buhari administration we looked at Nigeria's recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, the closure of the Nigerian borders to neighbouring countries, the counter trade, etc.

Lastly, we took a survey of the Babangida administration. We looked at the Nigerian membership of the O.I.C. and the debates it generated. The structural adjustment programme, Nigerian/Isreali/Arab relationship, Nigeria and the U.N.O./ the Commonwealth of Nations, and liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia. In all the chapters, we examined regimes in respect to South Africa and Namibia. My exploration shows that the Nigerian foreign policy as

related to her Afro-centric stance has been mainly influenced and hampered by the structure and orientation of the Nigerian economy, poor leadership and extra-elites struggles. Other factors like underdevelopment and the influence of the super powers are closely linked with the above.

The structure and orientation of the Nigerian economy was proved to be too pro-West and capitalist oriented. This has been more predominant with the Babangida administration and lesser with the Buhari administration. This is because the respective regimes have perceived the Western creditor nations, the U.S.A. and Britain as big-brothers. They did not perceive them as threats. This however has worked against the fundamental basis of our for ign policy especially as it concerns its Afro-centre ness. We tried to portray how the foreign policy perception of the respective regimes has been too pro-West because the economy suffers from among other things, the extension of excessive credit to private sector, heavy dependence an oil sector as the main sources of foreign exchange earnings and government revenue. We also discovered that the negative domestic impacts of these pro-Western economic policies is high inflation, unemployment levels, low productivity, heavy external debt burden and a consumption and production pattern that lack domestic base. These were highlighted in the work.

The root of these economic setbacks is caused by the total integration of the Nigerian economy into the economy of Western imperialist nations. This integration I argued, has been possible because the various factions of the

Nigerian ruling elites are incorporated into foreign business with Western business houses. The Western nations have also used their influence to also integrate the Nigerian economy to the same direction. They have the child image of Nigeria, America and Britain have this perception of Nigeria because Nigeria is perceived by them to be inferior in capability and culture. They see Nigeria to be immature and child-like. She cannot identify and choose its preferred values. This justifies why the respective regimes, the Shagari and the Babangida administrations in particular took Western positions in foreign policy. For example we argued that both the Lancaster House talks, and the contact group meetings for the independence of Zimbabwe were more of diplomatic negotiations with the same imperialists who do not see any immorality in the apartheid policy. The respective regimes have pursued economic policies the same way because they did not perceive the Western imperialist nations as threats. They all had the big brother image(s) of them. Their foreign policies have therefore being dependent capitalist oriented.

We however, pointed out that the Buhari administration tended to have performed better in this context. It had quickly recognized the potential obstacles to an early settlement with the I.M.F. He had taken to the counter trade temporily to overcome such obstacles. He was able to do this because they perceived Western nations as imperialists and threats to Nigeria. Shagari and Babangida did not perceive them as such. Babangida administration has been

more pro-West than the other administrations. We argued that this is probably significant in explaining how the administration has received aids and other incentives, that is, support for Nigerians being appointed to top positions in international institutions. This is because the Western nations have the responsive child image of Nigeria under Babangida. It was under him that the structural adjustment programme was pushed to its logical western nations/I.M.F. inspired conclusions. The U.S.A. government awarded Babangida the title of master strategist. He was being awarded for being too responsive to the yearnings of Western nations, (its big brothers). This is to motivate him to work harder in the interests of the West to the detriment of Nigeria and the African cause.

We also discovered that in the liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia, all the regimes pursued the cause by financial donations to the liberation movements and the frontline states. They all made use of the U.N.O. and the Commonwealth in making pronouncements condemning white domination in South Africa. None of the regimes showed any interest in the use of force because of the country's inferior culture and capabilities.

Our conclusion is that because of Nigeria's overwhelming dependence on the West, the various regimes have pursued foreign policies that are consonant with the Western economic interests. Opportunity is being perceived from the Western nations. They are not perceived threats. This of course to my belief is a misperception. Because of this, Western

interests has become crucial determinants of Nigeria's foreign policy. Nigeria is thus denied its freedom by these western nations economically and at times politically (indirectly). Nigeria is perceived by these Western nations as not being ready, able or willing to accept the responsibility and duties of a/ civilized political institution. Because of this position that Nigeria occupies, the Western nations uses Nigeria to achieve their perceived opportunities by imposing their will. This probably explains why the Nigerian leaders believe that the South African question can only be solved on peace-meal basis.

The second most significant factor that has shaped the foreign policy in relation to its Afro-centricism is poor leadership and intra-elites struggles. These domestic variables have caused the formlessness of domestic policies. There has been internal violence. In an environment of violence and internal strife, there cannot be a stable democracy and thus a viable foreign policy. The SAP riots is an example.

Furthermore, fwequent military interventions in governments were caused by instability and also created instability. In an environment of internal political inconsistencies, one cannot talk of articulating a viable and dynamic foreign policy. This has been the situation since 1979 in Nigeria.

Recommendations: After due considerations of all the issues raised in this study, I finally arrived at the conviction that the problems of Nigeria's Afro-centric foreign policy are not different from the general foreign policy problems confronting her.

Her distorted socio-economic and cultural set-up is significant. The imperial rule produced a dependency relationship with the West as well as certain domestic maladjustments. A relationship which turns Nigeria a responsive child of the imperialists. The result is a distorted economy which relies on the production of essentially primary raw materials for export and the importation of highly priced manufactured goods. This denote that the Western nations otherwise perceived by the respective regimes in Nigeria, have used the Nigerian state and its people to achieve its perceived opportunities related to their economic, political and strategic interests. This make it impossible for the respective regimes to pursue an Afro-centric foreign policy.

Therefore, for a foreign policy that would have Africa as its cornerstone, all the present structures that make for a neo-colonial capitalist economy should be abandoned or at least relaxed considerably. Self reliance based on indigenous socio-economic formations, taking into cognisance local technological base should be pursued. This would, to some extent, safeguard the nation from any potential threat that would arise from withdrawing from Western manufactured goods. This is in view of the fact that the Western nations would

perceive Nigeria a threat to their perceived opportunity If she takes the above step, a relationship of hatred would ensue. If Nigeria is able to take the fanatic child approach, hunger, ignorance and unemployment would be checked as our economic policies, both domestic and foreign would be decided by us.

The present situation in which farmers are being indoctrinated to produce for export, to satisfy the perceived opportunities of the Western nations, rather than to produce to service the local industrial base should be stopped to allow our economic foreign policies to be decided internally and not from the West. This is particularly important in view of the fall out of the SAP policies especially on the average Nigerians. For example, high cost for agricultural investment farm machinery, agricultural pesticides and fertilizers have combined to liquidate large scale farms, reduction of cultivable land areas for medium scale farmers and reduced outputs for small scale farmers. Many local industries have thus folded up with SAP. In fact the I.M.F. and Western imposed SAP have rendered families in depressed p. arts of urban areas as well as farm families with small holdings to suffer from chronic food shortages. This also applies to low and medium income workers in both private and public sectors of the economy.

This change of attitude I believe will also solve the problem of the Nigerian currency which have been too devalued under SAP. This will also lead to increased productivity and increased employment opportunities for the generality of

Nigerians who are presently thrown out of jobs by SAP. The need to device economic foreign policies and programmes to effect incomes and welfare for Nigerians positively cannot be overemphasised.

It is therefore pertinent for Nigeria to perceive the Western nations as imperialist and threats which really they are.

Added to the above is the need to abolish the manipulation of particularistic sentiments, that is, religion, ethnicity, etc. in the conduct of national affairs. This is because these are always transferred to the conduct of external affairs (See sections on Nigerian/Isreali relationship and Nigeria in the O.I.C.).

Furthermore, the present situation in which Nigerians are entangled with Western investments either as agents or shareholders need to be revisited and checked or even abolished as this further consolidate Nigeria's responsive child image. This done will enable Nigeria to clearly assess and handle effectively the imperial roles being played by these companies for their home countries. If this is done, the way we perceive these western MNC and their home countries would change. They will be perceived as threats and their influence on our external relations would be greatly reduced. We can then have the chances of looking better inwardly into our strategic interests in Africa.

Over dependence of our trade on Western imperialist nations, especially our oil economy should be arrested. We

should emphasize a new oil policy. A policy of oil for use rather than oil for export. This would arrest the present situation in which price of transportation, energy consumption, food, etc. have skyrocketted in response to removal of oil subsidies as dictated by I.M.F./Western creditor nations. This should entail diversification of the economy with the involvement of other sectors towards the re-orientation of local industries and business.

Nigeria should improve diplomatic relations with all African countries better than the Western leading nations. Trade links should also be intensified with them. This would be more beneficial as they share the same culture and almost the same capabilities with her. This will allow for his aligning with them to pursue common African interests and at the same time forging new perceptual patterns in the eyes of the Western nations and on the other hand to be able to perceive the Western nations as threats and imperialists as they are. Only with this can Nigeria accomplish an Afro-centric foreign policy, devoid of extra-African manipulations.

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APPENDIX I

TEXT OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS
(Signed in Lagos, December 10, 1984)

1 (1) EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF BENIN, THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TOGO

P R E AM B L E

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REOPLES' REPUBLIC OF BENIN,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TOGO.

HEREINAFTER referred to as "the Contracting Parties";

ANXIOUS to preserve peace and security among their States;

DESIROUS of maintaining and forstering the firm relations of Friendship and fruitful co-operation which unite their peoples

PROMPTED by their common desire to work in peace, security, solidarity and harmony for the economic, social and cultural development of their countries;

DESIROUS of strengthening further legal co-operation; and

DESIROUS of fighting against crime in all its forms by facilitating the apprehension and trial of fugitive offenders from the territory of any of the Contracting Parties to the territory of each other;

HAVE agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

The Contracting Parties undertake to extradite to each other on the basis of reciprocity, in accordance with the rules and conditions stated in this Treaty, those persons who being accused of convicted of any of the crimes or offences referred to in Article 2, committed within the jurisdiction of one

party shall be found in the territory of the other party.

ARTICLE 2

RETURNABLE OFFENCES

(1) Extradition shall be granted in respect of persons accused of crimes or offences punishable by the laws of the contracting Parties by at l ast two (2) years imprisonment.

(2) Extradition shall also be granted for participation in any of the afore-said crimes or offences provided that such participation be punishable by the laws of the contracting Parties.

(3) Extradition shall also be granted in respect of persons who have been convicted by the requesting state for extradition offences whether they have served part of their sentence or not.

ARTICLE 3

TIME LIMIT

Extradition shall be refused if the time limit for the action or sentence has expired under the legislation of the requesting or requested state at the time of receipt of the application from the requesting state.

ARTICLE 4

POLITICAL OFFENCES

Extradition shall not be granted for crimes or offences of a political nature or if it is proved that the requisition for his surrender has been made with a view to trying or punishing him for a crime or offence of a political nature or if the request is to persecute or punish him on account of his race, religion or political opinion.

ARTICLE 5

SPECIALITY RULE

The individual who shall have been surrendered may neither be tried, judged nor detained to serve a term for any offence shall be extradited except in the following cases:

(1) If having had the liberty to do so, the extradited person did not leave the territory of the state to which he has been surrendered within thirty (30) days following his final release, or if he returned to that state after leaving it;

(2) If the state which delivered him agrees, a request shall be made to this effect, accompanied by the documents stipulated in Article 7.

ARTICLE 6

LAW GOVERNING EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS

The Extradition of the fugitive criminals under provisions of this Treaty shall be carried out in the requested state in conformity with the laws of the requested state.

ARTICLE 7

EXTRADITION PROCEDURE

(1) The request for extradition shall be communicated through diplomatic channels. It shall be accompanied by the original or certified copy of a judgement of conviction or warraht of arrest or any other order having the same effect and issued in the form prescribed by the requesting state.

(2) The legal description of the offences for which extradition is requested, the time and place of their commission as well as the relevant laws under which the offences fall shall be stated as precisely as possible, the description of the person claimed as well as any information which can help determine his identity and nationality.

(3) In case of urgency, on the request of the competent authorities of the requesting state a provisional arrest shall be made pending the formal request for extradition and the documents mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.

(4) The request for provisional arrest shall be transmitted to the competence authorities of the requested state either directly by letter or telegram or by any other means in writing. At the same time such a request shall be confirmed through diplomatic channels.

(5) It shall mention the existence of the documents listed in paragraph 1 of this Article and that it is intended to send a request for extradition. It shall state the offence for which extradition is requested, the time and place of the its commission as well as a very precise description of the person claimed. The requesting authority shall be informed without delay of the result of its request.

(6) Provisional arrest shall be terminated if within a period of forty (40) days after the arrest the authorities of the requested party have not received the documents mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article. The termination of provisional arrest shall not preclude a new arrest if the request for extradition is received later.

(7) If supplementary information is required to ensure that the condition required under this Article have been fulfilled, the requested state shall, where the commission seems liable to be corrected, inform the requesting state through diplomatic channels.

This information shall be provided within a period of forty (40) days. This period begins from the date of the receipt of the request for supplementary information. After this period the requested state shall provisionally release the offender. The release does not preclude his rearrest if the supplementary information is received later.

ARTICLE 8

COMMUNICATION OF DECISION

The requestd state shall communicate its decision on the extradition request to the requesting state through diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE 9

MULTIPLE REQUESTS

If extradition is requested concurrently by more than one state, either for the same offence or for different offences the requested party shall make its decision having regard to all the circumstances and especially the relative seriousness of the case, the place of the commission of the offences, the relative dates of the requests and the possibility of subsequent

extradition to another state.

ARTICLE 10

TRANSIT THROUGH ANOTHER STATE

Extradition involving transit through the territory of one of the contracting Parties of an individual delivered to another party shall be granted on application by the requesting state. This application shall be supported by the relevant extradition documents.

ARTICLE 11

CONSENT FOR RETURN

(1) If the offender, where the law of the requested country permits, consents or voluntarily and with understanding ask to be extradited, the competent judicial authority shall examine his case and decide whether he should be detained or released on bail pending his extradition.

(2) The requested state may subsequently order his extradition within fifteen (15) days starting from the date of his committal.

(3) In that case the provisions of Article 5 shall be applicable to the offender unless waived by him.

ARTICLE 12

PROPERTY OF EXTRADITED PERSONS

(1) When extradition is granted all the articles connected with the offence or which can serve as exhibits found on the person sought at the time of his arrest or which shall be discovered later shall, at the request of the requesting state be seized and returned to the authorities of that state.

(2) The articles may still be returned even if the extradition does not take place because that person has excaped or is dead.

(3) If, however, the said articles belong to a third party, they must be returned to the requested state as soon as possible and without any charges, after legal proceedings in the requesting state. The authorities of the requested

state may keep the seized articles temporarily if they deem it necessary for legal proceedings.

(4) The requested state may also transit them while reserving the option of asking for them to be returned for the same reasons, if they undertake to send them back as soon as possible.

ARTICLE 13

EXTRADITION EXPENSES

The requested party shall bear expenses incurred by reason of the extradition except cost of land, sea and air transport to and from the requesting state.

ARTICLE 14

TRANSFER OF CONVICTED PRISONERS FOR EXECUTION OF SENTENCES

(1) Any national of one of the contracting Parties, sentenced to a term of imprisonment may, at the request of his country and with written consent of the convicted person, be surrendered to the authorities of the State of which he is a national to serve his sentence. The transfer charges shall be borne by the requesting state. The release of such a person from prison before his term has ended may only be effected with the consent of the Contracting Party which convicted him.

(2) Only the state which passed sentence has power to grant a pardon or amnesty.

ARTICLE 15

FINAL PROVISIONS

(1) A Contracting Party may submit proposals for the amendments or revision of this Treaty.

(2) Any Contracting Party may withdraw from this Treaty.

(3) Notice of withdrawal shall be communicated through diplomatic channels at least six (6) months in advance to the depository state which shall inform the other Contracting Parties

(4) This Treaty shall enter into force provisionally upon the signature by Heads of States and Government.

(5) It shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

(6) The instruments of ratification shall be forwarded to the Government of the Republic of Togo which shall inform all signatory States when it receives each instrument.

(7) The present Treaty shall enter into force definitively after the last instrument of ratification is deposited.

DONE at Lagos this 10th day of December, 1984 in two original versions in English and French, both texts being equally authentic.

.....
H.E. General Mathieu KEREKOU
President of the Republic of Benin.

.....
H.E. Flt. Lt. Jerry John RAWLINGS
Head of State and Chairman of the
Provisional Defence Council.

.....
H.E. Major-General Muhammadu BUHARI
Head of the Federal Military Government,
Commander-in-Chief othe Armed Forces
of the Federal Republic o Nigeria.

.....
H.E. General Gnassingbe EYADEMA
President of the Republic of Togo.

1 (ii) CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF BENIN, THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TOGO

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF BENIN,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TOGO,

HEREINAFTER called "the Contracting Parties";

CONSIDERING the need to fight against the upsurge of crime which poses a serious threat to security, peace and stability and hampers the development of the sub-region;

CONSIDERING that the fight against cime is worldwide, constantly requiring very rapid action and consequently, the movement of security agents from one country to the other;

CONSIDERING that within the framework of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) a form of co-operation already exists between the security agencies of the Contracting Parties;

CONSIDERING the need to adapt this co-operation to the realities of the Contracting Parties by making more flexible the regulations applicable in this area;

PREOCCUPIED with the promotion of very close co-operation between the security agencies of their respective countries with a view to ensuring adequat protection of life and property;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 1

A Criminal Investigation Co-operation Agreement is hereby established between the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 2

The competent security agencies of the Contracting Parties shall assist in searching for persons involved in ordinary law crimes in the territory of any of the Parties.

ARTICLE 3

The National Central Bureaux (INTERPOL) shall be the co-ordinating bodies between the security agencies of the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 4

The Heads of the National Central Bureaux assisted by appropriate officials of INTERPOL of the Contracting Parties shall meet at least once a year to appraise the level of co-operation among them.

MISSIONS ABROAD

ARTICLE 5

The officials of the Contracting Parties so empowered by their national legislations shall be competent to carry out criminal investigation operations abroad.

ARTICLE 6

(1) The movement of police officials of the four states outside the frontiers of their countries shall be planned and organized through the National Central Bureaux.

(2) To this end, the requesting National Central Bureaux shall first forward to the requested National Central Bureaux a request in line with the conditions and norms stipulated by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

(3) However, in emergency cases, a letter of introduction addressed to the Head of the National Central Bureaux of the requested State prepared in line with the same conditions and norms as the request and duly certified by the Head of the National Central Bureaux of the requesting country shall suffice to enlist the assistance of the requested country.

ARTICLE 7

The Heads of the National Central Bureaux (INTERPOL) shall contact the competent Authorities of their countries in order to facilitate the accomplishment of the mission being undertaken by the foreign officials.

ARTICLE 8

The police officials of the host country shall carry out investigations on the subject on the arrival in the host country of police officials from the requesting country.

However, on authorization by the Heads of the National Central Bureaux, the police officials of contracting states may be associated with the execution of various investigative operations.

ARTICLE 9

(1) Culprits arrested may be handed over to the delegation of the requesting national Central Bureaux (INTERPOL).

(2) Any other culprits wanted by the competent authorities of the visiting country who shall be found in the process may be placed under provisional arrest pending the accomplishment within a maximum period of 30 days for the formalities prescribed by this Agreement before being handed over to the requesting National Central Bureaux (INTERPOL).

(3) The provisions of this article shall be without prejudice to the national legislation and existing Agreements between the contracting parties.

ARTICLE 10

(1) To facilitate investigations, the officials on missions may be accompanied by any person neecessary for the investigation.

(2) At the request of the officials on missions any such persons may be placed in the custody of the security agencies of the host country during the entire period of the mission. They shall be handed over at the end of the missio, even if they are nationals of the host country.

ARTICLE 11

The National Central Bureaux of the four states shall assist each other in the proper application of the provisions of this agreement.

APPENDIX II

AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN MATTERS RELATING TO CUSTOMS, TRADE AND IMMIGRATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS OF BENIN, GHANA NIGERIA AND TOGO

P R E A M B L E

THE GOVERNOR OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF BENIN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TOGO

HEREINAFTER referred to as "the Contracting Parties"

CONSCIOUS that offences against Customs Laws are prejudical to the economic, fiscal and commercial interests of their respect countries;

CONVINCED that action against these offences can be made more effective by co-operation between their respective competent authorties;

ANXIOUS to re-inforce on the basis of complete equality between parties in the mutual interest of their peoples, close and continuing co-operation in the spirit of solidarity which unites the four states within the framework of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);

HAVE agreed as follows:

CHAPTER 1: DEFINITION AND SCOPE

ARTICLE 1

For the purpose of this agreement:

a) The term "Customs Legislation" means all statutory or regulatory provisions applicable by the Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties on the importation, exportation, transfit or Circulation of goods, capital or means of payment whether involving the collection of duties or taxes or the enforcement of prohibitions, restrictions or exchange control regulations as well as those relating to security.

ARTICLE 8

The police officials of the host country shall carry out investigations on the subject on the arrival in the host country of police officials from the requesting country.

However, on authorization by the Heads of the National Central Bureaux, the police officials of contracting states may be associated with the execution of various investigative operations.

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(2) At the request of the officials on missions any such persons may be placed in the custody of the security agencies of the host country during the entire period of the mission. They shall be handed over at the end of the missio, even if they are nationals of the host country.

ARTICLE 11

The National Central Bureaux of the four states shall assist each other in the proper application of the provisions of this agreement.

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

ARTICLE 12

The contracting states shall exchange regularly amongst themselves information likely to facilitate the search for and arrest of criminals. Such information shall include:

(a) Movement and activities of criminals;

(b) New devices employed by criminals in the commission of crimes;

(c) Arrest of a national of any of the Contracting States.

SEIZURE

ARTICLE 13

All articles relating to the offence found and seized in the host country shall be kept and handed over to the visiting country, without prejudice to the right of third parties.

FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 14

(1) This Agreement shall come into force on the date on which the last instrument of ratification shall be deposited.

(2) Any Contracting Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving notice of such withdrawal through Diplomatic channels at least six (6) months in advance to the depository state which shall inform the other Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 15

(1) This Agreement shall be ratified by the signatory States in line with their respective constitutional procedures.

(2) The instruments of ratification shall be forwarded to the Government of the Republic of Togo which shall notify all signatory states as and when it shall receive each instrument.

DONE at Lagos this 10th day of December, 1964...in two original versions, in French and English, both texts being equally authentic.

.....
H.E. General Mathieu KEREKOU
President of the Republic of Benin,

.....
H.E. Flt. Lt. Jerry John RAWLINGS
Head of State and Chairman of the
Provisional Defence Council.

.....
H.E. Major-General Muhammadu BUHARI
Head of the Federal Military Government,
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

.....
H.E. General Gnassingbe EYADEMA
President of the Republic of Togo.

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P R E A M B L E

THE GOVERNOR OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF BENIN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TOGO

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CONSCIOUS that offences against Customs Laws are prejudical to the economic, fiscal and commercial interests of their respect countries;

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a) The term "Customs Legislation" means all statutory or regulatory provisions applicable by the Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties on the importation, exportation, transfit or Circulation of goods, capital or means of payment whether involving the collection of duties or taxes or the enforcement of prohibitions, restrictions or exchange control regulations as well as those relating to security.

b) The term "Customs Offences" means any breach or attempted breach of Customs Laws.

c) The term "Competent Administration" means any national Customs Department or other National Authority appointed to assist the administration of the Customs Laws.

d) The term "Trade offences" means infringment of the rules in the Territories of the Contracting Parties governing importation and exportation of goods including false documentations used in the export and export trade.

e) The term "Foreign Exchange Offences" means any offences connected with the financial legislation regarding declaration of currencies either without conforming with written procedure or requisite formalities or without being in possession of requisite authorisation or satisfying laid down conditions stipulated in this authorisation.

ARTICLE 2

The Competent Authorities of the Contracting Parties shall afford each other mutual assistance on terms set out in this agreement for the prevention, and investigation of Customs, Trade, Immigration and Foreign Exchange Offences.

CHAPTER II: PROVISION CONCERNING CERTAIN GOODS

ARTICLE 3

1. The Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties shall annually communicate to each other list of goods, the exportation and importation of which are prohibited or restricted in their respective countries.

2. The Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties shall not permit the exportation of goods, the importation of which is prohibited or restricted in the country of destination by any of the Contracting Parties without evidence that the importer has obtained proper licence to import.

3. The provisions of paragraph 2 above are applicable to goods in transit.

CHAPTER III: TRAFFICKING IN ARMS AND AMMUNITION

ARTICLE 4

The Contracting Parties shall not permit the exportation of the transit of arms and ammunition into the territory of another Contracting Party without prior permission from the Competent Authority of the country of destination.

ARTICLE 5

Any person in possession of arms on the territory of one of the Contracting Parties has to declare them as soon as he enters the territory and conform to the laws in force in the country.

CHAPTER IV: TRAFFICKING OF DRUGS, NARCOTICS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES

ARTICLE 6

The Contracting Parties shall not permit the exportation, or the transit of drugs, narcotics and psychotropic substances into the country of the Contracting Parties without prior permission from the competent authority of the country of destination.

ARTICLE 7

With the help of the Competent Services like INTERPOL, the authorities of each Contracting Party shall communicate for useful purpose any information to each other on the nature of drugs or substances seized and the identity of traffickers.

CHAPTER V: CURRENCY TRAFFICKING

ARTICLE 8

The Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties shall take every necessary step to arrest the wave of illegal trafficking of currency between the territories of the Contracting Parties. All such currencies transported shall be subject to declaration at the point of entry.

ARTICLE 9

Payments between two or more of the Contracting Parties shall be made in the currencies acceptable to the parties or through the West African clearing house and in conformity with the Foreign Exchange Regulations in force in each member country.

ARTICLE 10

The possession of currency is subject to the exchange control regulations in force in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties.

CHAPTER VI: BORDER TRADE

ARTICLE 11

1. The Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure that goods exported and imported through their common borders pass through the approved Customs routes and in conformity with their respective Customs Regulations.
2. The Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties shall as soon as this agreement comes into force and when changes occur communicate to each other a list of their respective Customs Offices situated along the Common Borders as well as approved routes including details of the powers and the opening hours of these Customs Offices.
3. The Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties shall endeavour as much as possible to co-ordinate the powers and the working hours of the officers at the corresponding Customs offices.

ARTICLE 12

In order to promote relations of good neighbourliness among the border populations of their respective stages, the Customs Authorities shall show tolerance towards the movement of goods across borders devoid of any commercial character and meant for personal consumption of the said populations.

ARTICLE 13

The movement of goods referred to in Article 12 which shall be properly valued is exempted from Customs formalities.

CHAPTER VII: FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS

ARTICLE 14

1. The Contracting Parties will as far as possible facilitate the free movement of persons and goods in the promotion of normal trade among their States.
2. When the need arises to repartriate on illegal immigrant whether he is involved or not in illegal activities, the Contracting Parties shall do everything possible to alleviate the sufferings of the affected persons.

In the event of expulsion, the safety of such persons and that of their families shall be guaranteed and their personal effects safeguarded and returned to them.

The Government of the affected persons shall be informed of the measures taken against them.

When the need arises and after due consideration, the Contracting Parties shall do everything possible to help immigrants regularise their stay.

3. The Contracting Parties shall undertake to educate their citizens on the nedd to conform with entry requirements into the territories of member States.

CHAPTER VIII: SURVELLIANCE ON PERSONS AND GOODS AND MEANS OF TRANSPORT

ARTICLE 15

The Competent Administration of each of the Contracting Parties shall maintain special surveillance on the means of transport and the movement of goods along the common borders with a view to detecting and stopping goods known to be subjec of illicit traffic.

ARTICLE 16

The Competent Administration of one of the Contracting Parties shall at the express request of any of the other Contracting Parties, maintain special surveillance over:

a) The movements, particularly the entry into and exit from its territory, of particular persons suspected by the requesting party, to be habitually engaged in activities contrary to the Customs Laws of the requesting party;

b) Movement of particular goods stated by the requesting party to be the subject of illicit traffic towards its territory;

c) Particular places of the requested party where stock of goods have been built up and in respect of which the requesting party furnishes reasons for suspecting that the goods are earmarked for illicit importation into the territory of the requesting party;

d) Any particular vehicle, ship, aircraft or other means of transport suspected of being used to commit Customs Offences in the territory of the requesting party.

CHAPTER IX: COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION

ARTICLE 17

The Customs Authority of one of the Contracting Parties shall proprio motu communicate to the Customs Authority of any of the Contracting Parties any available information regarding:

a) Any operation in the territory of one Contracting Party which is suspected will give rise or has given rise to Customs Offences in the territory of any of the Parties;

c) New means or methods of committing Customs Offences;

d) Goods known to be subject of illicit traffic.

ARTICLE 18

On express request, the Customs Authority of one of the Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Customs Authority of the requesting Contracting Party, as promptly as possible any viable information:

a) Contained in Customs documents relating to movement of goods between their two countries, which is suspected to be breach of the Customs Law of the requesting Party;

b) Enabling false declaration to be detected, especially with regard to dutiable goods;

c) Concerning certificates of origin, invoices or other documents known to be relevant to the illegal importation or exportation of goods.

ARTICLE 19

1. On express request, the Customs Authority of one of the Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Customs Authorities of the requesting Contracting Party where appropriate in the form of an official document, information concerning any of the following matters:

a) The authenticity of any official document produced in support of a goods Declaration made to the Customs Authority of the requesting party;

b) The proof that the goods which have benefited from a favourable regime from the country as a result of their destination to another country will be consumed in the country of destination;

c) Whether goods imported into the territory of the requesting party have been lawfully exported from the territory of one of the Contracting Parties;

d) Whether goods exported from the territory of the requesting party have been lawfully imported into the territory of any of the contracting parties.

2. The Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties may be the issue of a special document, make special provisions for the control of goods which are known to be subject of illicit traffic. Such special document issued by the Customs Authority of the country of exportation shall be surrendered to the Customs Authority of the country of importation in order to certify that the goods are lawfully imported.

CHAPTER X: INVESTIGATION AND NOTIFICATION

ARTICLE 20

At the express request of the Custom Authority of one of the Contracting Parties, the Customs Authority of the requested Contracting Party shall, within the limits of its

b) Enabling false declaration to be detected, especially with regard to dutiable goods;

c) Concerning certificates of origin, invoices or other documents known to be relevant to the illegal importation or exportation of goods.

ARTICLE 19

1. On express request, the Customs Authority of one of the Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Customs Authorities of the requesting Contracting Party where appropriate in the form of an official document, information concerning any of the following matters:

a) The authenticity of any official document produced in support of a goods Declaration made to the Customs Authority of the requesting party;

b) The proof that the goods which have benefited from a favourable regime from the country as a result of their destination to another country will be consumed in the country of destination;

c) Whether goods imported into the territory of the requesting party have been lawfully exported from the territory of one of the Contracting Parties;

d) Whether goods exported from the territory of the requesting party have been lawfully imported into the territory of any of the contracting parties.

2. The Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties may be the issue of a special document, make special provisions for the control of goods which are known to be subject of illicit traffic. Such special document issued by the Customs Authority of the country of exportation shall be surrendered to the Customs Authority of the country of importation in order to certify that the goods are lawfully imported.

CHAPTER X: INVESTIGATION AND NOTIFICATION

ARTICLE 20

At the express request of the Custom Authority of one of the Contracting Parties, the Customs Authority of the requested Contracting Party shall, within the limits of its

competence and in accordance with its legislation:

a) make enquiries and obtain evidence concerning any customs offences under investigation in the territory of the requesting party;

b) take statements from any person connected or suspected to be connected with those offences; or from any withnesses willing to give evidence in the matter and transmit the result of such enquiries to the requesting Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 21

The Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties shall take measures to ensure that the services which are specially or mainly charged with the investigation and repression of smuggling maintain direct and personal contacts among each other with a view to exchanging information. In this way they can prevent or discover violations of customs regulations in their respective countries.

The information thus provided could be produced as proof in the minutes, reports and evidences as well as during procedures and trials in the courts and tribunals.

ARTICLE 22

At the request of the Customs Authorities of one of the Contracting Parties, the Customs Authority of the requested Contracing Party shall in accordance with the laws in force in its territory take all necessary measures to communicate:

- The names of persons connected with Customs Offences;
- Any action or decision taken by the administrative authorities;

It shall also inform the Customs Authority of the requesting party of all measures it may have taken in connection with the offence.

CHAPTER XI: ACTION OF CUSTOMS [illegible] THE CONTRACTING PARTIES IN THE TERRITORY OF A CONTRACTING PARTY

ARTICLE 23

1. Where in the investigation of any Customs Offence it is necessary to obtain proof of the facts alleged against named persons, officials specifically appointed by one of the Contracting Parties may on written request by that Contracting Party and after being duly authorised by the requested Contracting Party, inspect relevant books, registers and documents and extract any information or particulars relating to the offence.

2. The officials designated under paragraph 1 above may make copies from the books, registers and documents referred to in that paragraph.

3. In the application of this Article, all possible assistance and co-operation shall be given to the authorities of the requesting party to facilitate their investigation.

ARTICLE 24

Upon the request of the Competent Authority of one of the Contracting Parties, the Customs Authority of the requested Contracting Party may authorise its officials to appear as witnesses before a court or tribunal in the tteritory of the requesting party, in any proceedings relating to Customs Offance.

CHAPTER XII: FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 25

1. Any communication received, or information obtained under this agreement shall be treated as confidential in the sense that it shall be used only for the purpose of prevention, investigation and repression of Customs Offences.

2. Any communication received, or information obtained under this agreement may be used during procedings and prosecutions before administrative or judicial authorities, of one of the

Contracting Parties, unless the Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties have made specific reservations to the contrary.

ARTICLE 26

The requested Contracting Party shall not be required to give the assistance provided for by this Agreement if it considers that such assistance is likely to prejudice its sovereignty or security.

ARTICLE 27

Within the framework of this Agreement, representatives of the Customs Authorities of the Contracting Parties shll meet at least once a year in the territory of one of the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 28

The implementation of the provisions of this Agreement shall be without prejudice to any existing Agreement between the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 29

This Agreement shall come into force on the date on which the last instrument of ratification is deposited. Any of the Contracting Parties may withdraw from this Agreement.

Notification of withdrawal shall be by diplomatic channels at least six months in advance to the depository state which shall inform the other Contracting Parties about such withdrawal.

ARTICLE 30

This Agreement shall be ratified by the signatory States in line with their respective constitutional procedures.

The instrument of ratification shall be forwarded to the Government of the Republic of Togo which shall notify all signatory states as and when it shall receive each instrument.

DONE at Lagos this 10th day of December, 1984 in two original versions, in French and English both texts being equally authentic.

.....
H.E. General Mathieu KEREKOU
President of the Republic of Benin.

.....
H.E. Flt. Lt. Jerry John RAWLINGS
Head of State and Chairman of the
Provisional Defence Council.

.....
H.E. Major-General Muhammadu BUHARI
Head of the Federal Military Government,
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

.....
H.E. General Gnassingbe EYADEMA
President of the Republic of Togo.