TITLE

NIGERIAN GOVERNMENTS AND THE POLICY OF NONALIGNMENT 1960 - 1992.

BY

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CERTIFICATION

This Thesis titled 'Nigerian Government and the policy of Nonalignment 1960 - 1992; meets the regulation governing the award of the degree of Masters of Science in International Relation of Ahmadu Bellow University and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has been written by me and that it is a product of my own research work. It has never been presented in previous application for higher degree.

All quotations are clearly indicated while sources of information have been acknowledged by means of reference.

Ikwue Paul Abounu

DEDICATION

To my brother Joseph Inalegwu Ikwue who NAKED while we cloth; My sisters who toil and labour all day; and all my friends especially Doo for their support.

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ABSTRACT

The study evaluates Nigerian Government Policy of Nonalignment between 1960 - 1992. the Post Second World War international System which faced Nigerian at the time of her independence in 1960 was a conflictual system rather than a harmonious one. Foremost of this development was the emergence of military blocs, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Warsaw Pact Security alliance. All reflecting the ideologies of Communism and Capitalism.

Against this background, most African countries including Nigeria defined their position in relation to this conflict and chose the nonalignment policy. Nonaligned-Movement therefore emerged as a response to this ideological conflict. Most African countries including Nigeria at independence discovered that the liberation of their colonies from Western colonial rule did not mean that they wanted to become anybody's satellite, hence the rejection of bloc politics.

The focus of the study therefore centres on whether Nigeria practices nonalignment policy or not. Nigerian government at independence, rejected the nonalignment. The reason was that during this period, the linchpin in Nigeria's diplomatic strategy was the maintenance of alliance with Britain. This attitude underwent gradual transformation. By 1962 nonalignment was reluctantly accepted as a cardinal principle of her foreign policy.

The movement was conceived in strictly miliary security terms. It began to be seen as a doctrine for economic development. It implied for Nigerian leaders a policy of diversify dependence to

achieve the goals of political and economic development in the face of the cold war.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Eastern bloc, the question has been whether the nonalignment remains valid as a policy and as a movement. It has been argued that the movement will not endure in the emerging new world order. On the other hand, it is believed that the collapse of bipolarity will now provide a renewed interest in consolidating regional self interest. In this end, nonalignment will act as a forum for development question.

The collapse of bipolarity and the emergence of the hegemony of the U.S.A and the European community has both political and economic implications on Nigeria's development. The decreasing share of Africa in the world trade, taken together with the drive towards rapid democratization in Eastern Europe and consolidated EEC, have encouraged both the Easthern and Western blocs to become inward looking. It is also believed that the Western investors and governments would be reluctant at proposing aid to Nigeria. The capital would be diverted to Eastern European countries. The dependent posture of the Nigerian government would need be redefined in the light of the changing circumstance in the international arena, and its commitment to the policy of nonalignment.

In this end, Nigeria's political and economic response to the changing imbalance in the international system should be to create a conducive atmosphere within, through which the release of

resources for development, and by greater emphasis on the non military aspect of securities. Nigeria, given her resource base, could, under the nonalignment forum act as a driving force for development and so propel other countries in the Nonaligned movement in the process of integration.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The study seeks to examine Nigerian's Policy of nonalignment in the light of the changing circumstances in the international political system.

By the start of the 1960s, the international system was altered from what it had been before the 2nd world War. Prior to the War, what was called international relations was essentially the relations among the countries of Europe. The United States of America located outside Europe had been drawn into the system and was as a matter of fact the major belligerent in the pacific phase of the War between 1941-45. The other major powers, however, were the European States (Britain, France, Germany and Soviet Union). Large areas of the world were colonies. The War accelerated the process of internationalization of the system of relations among countries. The major European colonial powers were so weakened by this most devastating war among themselves that they were unable to maintain their dominance over their subject territories in Asia and Africa. The surge to independence subsequently spread to other parts of the World, particularly Africa.

In this end, the international system which faced Nigeria at independence was a conflictual system rather than a harmonious one. Foremost of this development was the emergence of military blocs, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Warsaw Pact Security alliance reflecting the ideologies of the Capitalist West and the Communist East. More fundamental was the events of the Cold

War which threatened global peace and security. It was against this background that the third World countries formed the nonaligned movement.

Conventional research studies more often than not tend to approach the nonalignment from an anti-colonial perspective. The main thrust of this research is a survey of post independent diplomatic overture of Nigeria within the context of the Government's policy of nonalignment in relation to the super powers. And the policy of Nigeria in the present dispensation of nonalignment in the new world order. The study would take both the political and economic aspects of this relationship and show how this has reflected in their foreign relations. The study would establish the basis of this relationship as it is translated within the realm of Nigeria's foreign policy objective. A number of studies have examined Nigeria's relations with the super powers, particularly the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, and their policies on African issues. Foremost of this was the initial low level of concern which these super powers have shown towards black Africa by comparison to other parts of the world. The other, is the inconsistency of their policies on African issues and their pursuit of national interest. There are several explanations given for Africa's low profile in the super-power policies in Africa. It was observed that, the colonial status of most African states before 1960 prevented the U.S. from operating freely in these areas. It was further suggested that official concern towards Africa depends on development elsewhere in the World. For example, America's

preoccupation with the cold war and the Communist confrontation tended at first to raise the significance of Africa.

Africa remained weak, economically underdeveloped, politically fragmented and unstable and militarily insignificant. The overall outcome of this was the unequal relationship which characterised most African states and the great powers at independence. This was compounded by the fact that since the two super powers were neither colonial powers, it therefore meant that their foreign policy preference in relation to African States would be determined by their perceived interest.

Against this background, most African States including Nigeria at independence were faced with a hostile and conflictual international environment. This therefore meant defining their position in relation to the super powers in the international system. In this vein, Nigeria's government at independence chose the policy of nonalignment in the face of the super power confrontation.

1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

The basic research problem centers around whether that aspect of Nigeria's foreign policy pertaining to her relations with the super powers was based on the doctrine of nonalignment. This, being the central theme of the research, it is important to focus on the choice of action by Nigeria in response to the policy of

nonalignment and the principle which persuaded her to make those choices.

The starting point is a detailed analysis of the general features of the post second World War environment with emphasis on the trend of events which determined the formulation of Nigeria's foreign relations. This will involve an analysis of the emergence of the nonaligned movement. The aim is to examine Nigeria's attitude towards the nonaligned-movement and the factors which shaped that response.

Other details involve an examination of Nigeria's ambivalence and reluctant acceptance of nonalignment as a policy. The aim here is to reveal its overt behaviour in accepting the principle and objective of nonalignment as a policy. The research will focus and highlight on Nigeria's conception of the doctrine of nonalignment as a policy and its faithfulness to the movement's objective.

The research will delve into an analysis of the practice of nonalignment policy in the cold war era. This will entail first an examination of nonalignment as a doctrine for economic development. The focus will be an analysis of the political and economic objective of Nigeria's policy of nonalignment in relation to the East and West. The aim here is to show how Nigerian government attempts to diversify relations with the super powers as a means of gaining economic development. An attempt would be made to examine the political principle of nonalignment and its implication for the economic development of Nigeria. Equally important is a highlight on Nigeria-United states relations, Nigeria-Britain, and Nigeria

and the Eastern bloc countries.

With an insight into the demise of the cold war, the research will examine non alignment in a new world order. This entails an assessment of the utility of nonalignment in relation to the changes in the international arena. It will equally reveal if there has been a redefinition of nonalignment's opposition to the hegemony of the remaining super power and the European community. Yet another area the research shall focus is the changing international environment and Nigeria's economic and political development.

In an attempt to qrapple with the above mentioned problems, the research shall go a long way in showing the relevance of nonalignment and the factors which unite and shape the foreign policy objective of the government within the period under review.

1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The objective of this research would be, firstly, an examination of Nigeria's response to the nonalignment, its attitude of acceptance and conception of the nonalignment as a policy. The aim is to be able to assess its attitude of acceptance and the social-political and economic factors which guide and shape her foreign relation in the face of the super power conflict.

The second major objective would reflect on the governments practice of nonalignment as a means of gaining economic and

political development from the super powers. The policy is geared towards a desire to abstain from the conflictual situation inherent in the cold war era.

The third major objective would reflect on the post cold war era and the utility of the nonaligned-movement. The study would examine the intricate changing international environment and the hegemony of the remaining super power (US) and its Western allies on the nonaligned-movement. The backdrop of this, will lead us to an examination of the changing international environment on Nigeria's political and economic development.

1.4 SCOPE/LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The study would cover the period between 1960-1992. The Scope of the study and the depth of its analysis shall be limited to the Nigeria government policy of nonalignment. This limitation is aimed at constraining one from abstract generalization and to systematically analyse the trend of changes and development within the intricate political and economic relations of the new states.

The research and the depth of its analysis has been affected by various problems. Foremost was the limited financial resources available to the writer. Another major constraint along the line was the limited time in which the research was undertaken. but should the study provoke some fundamental questions and

constructive criticisms, then one of my principal objective would have been achieved.

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

The whole question of nonalignment as a foreign policy objective emanated from the events of the second world war and the ideological conflict between the capitalist West and the Communist East, couped with emergence of military blocs. Nonalignment like all national policies, is a response which stems from self interest. This self interested response has shaped and continues to determine the trend of international relations.

One important fact to be noted with the concept of national self interest as proffered within the policy of nonalignment is that such self interest does not transcend the individual state's preference for alignment with either of the super powers or their erstwhile colonial masters. In this vein, the concept does not lend itself to any generally acceptable definition. Hence this gives room to various interpretation of the term national self interest.

It is a widespread viewpoint at least in the western world that nonalignment is a policy of short term expediency which does not have with it element of stability needed to safeguard it against alignment pressure in the power conflict.[1]

Against this background, various studies and critics both within and outside Nigeria assert that while the Nigerian

government espouses the ploicy of nonalignment, it does not practice it, and indeed cannot because of its economic alignment with the west. Douglas Anglin assessed the validity of this thesis, when he put forward the following propositions: that Nigeria professes but does not pursue a policy of nonalignment; that Nigeria is economically tied to the West. In an attempt to ascertain the validity of his arguement, he tried to elucidate on two difficult issues. The first, he asserts, arises from the sensitive subject of the political string. He asserts that no donor countries would readily confess to being a neocolonialist; and no Nigeria government would succumb to a neocolonial pressure. Against this backdrop, he examined the statement by the Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa that;

> "We shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone; so far as is possible, the policy on each occassion will be selected with a proper independent objectivity in Nigeria's national interest. We consider it wrong for the Federal Government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs"

The only question in dispute is whether the government lived up to its public profession. According to him the basic criticism of the Nigerian brand of nonalignment is that it was not neutralism, though the word neutralism is rarely used. While there was unanimity that the government should decide each issue on its merit, in practice, debate has often centred not so much on the fact of the case but on the wisdom of making judgement at all, particularly when this has involved supporting a Western position.

Olatunde Ojo in his analysis rightly observed that, the evaluation of Nigeria's practice of nonalignment has been based on false premise. A premise different from that which under pine actual practice. Ojo holds the view that most Nigeria writers on nonalignment have often imputed to government their own conception of what nonalignment meant or ought to mean, almost without exception. They have defined it as equidistance between the Eastern and the Western blocs. Base on this wrong assumptions, he arqued that many authors have come to the conclusion that "whereas the Balewa government failed to live up to this essentially prescritive policy, the military did"[5]

Assis, Asobie arqued that the few writers including Ojo have attempted to evaluate the practice of nonalignment against the background of a policy makers own conception of the doctrine when he asserts have committed another kind of analytical error. For instance, relying on inadequate and incomplete evidences, they have assumed that all the different regimes held thesame coherent conception of the doctrine. This latter group, he asserts have fallen prey to the trap of basing their analysis of the external behaviour of a State on the declaration of the decision makers. It is infact, a serious analytical error not to distinguish between the use of concept for the purpose of political analysis and its use for political action. He rejected Ojo's analysis that accepted uncritically the Nigerian policy makers interpretation of nonalignment, he therefore reached a bias

conclusion about the application of the doctrine. Thus, he assert that under Balewa as under the post civil- war military regimes, nonalignment meant assertion of Nigeria's right to independence of thought and action, the judging of issues on their individual values. He further pointed out the contradiction in Ojo's conclusion when he asserts that there has been an amazing continuity both in the meaning and application of nonalignment from the time of Balewa to the present.[7] He rejected the assertion which was based on the premise that successive military regimes held thesame notion of nonalignment as the pre-1970 civilian regime. He concluded that an even weaker Nigeria under Balewa pursued a more balanced nonalignment policy. Nonalignment has turned out in this sense to be more pro-West under the military since the civil - war than under Balewa.[8] The validity of these claims lay in the policy decision of the various government's foreign policy relations.

Assisi Asobie contends that little effort has so far been made by analysts of Nigeria's policy of nonalignment to work out a systematic set criteria by which to assess the nation's application of the doctrine. According to him, the indices of measurement of the application of the doctrine of nonalign ment are not often provided by the contending authors of Nigeria's policy of nonalignment.[9] Consequently it is hard to determine whether it is right to hold that under Balewa Nigeria was economically aligned but politically nonaligned,[10] or that since the late sixties there has been some changes in the Nigerian policy of nonalignment in the

sense that greater emphasis came to be placed on independence in the conduct of its relation with great powers,[11] or that within a period Nigeria was both economically and politically aligned to the West - it took a challenge to her sovereignty to jolt Nigeria into real nonaligned posture.[12]

W.A. Ajibola in his view asserts that in practice, the Nigerian government policy of nonalignment was decidedly pro-West.[13] This view was held by Gordon Idang when he succintly pointed out that Balewa could hardly take any major foreign policy decision without first consulting the British government.[14] Ajibola further asserts that in the first three years the general orientation of Nigeria's external policy was directed to the countries of the Western bloc. It was not until 1963 that Nigeria had diplomatic relations with the countries of the Eastern bloc.[15] S.G. Tyoden in his analysis of Nigerian political economy and foreign policy draws a distinction between the nature of the class and the interest of those who make policies and the overall path of social and economic development.

His work has no bearing with the government policy of nonalignment, but throw's light on the policy focus, and orientation of the country's decision makers. It was in this guise that Akinyemi viewed Nigeria's foreign policy and concluded that Nigeria still remains essentially pro-West in both economic and political orientation. [16] Idang observed that towards the end of 1961 Nigeria began to move slowly towards a more neutralist foreign policy.[17]

George Liska held the view that nonalignment and neutrality must be viewed in a double perspective since they resulted from closely interwoven response to external factors and domestic conditions. Nonalignment he asserts can be adopted, on the basis of rational estimate of the conditions required for national security and domestic stability. He concluded that a policy of militant neutralism on the other hand is likely to be strongly affected by nonrational ideological preoccupation and by an almost too pragmatic quest for aid and status internationally.[18]

Kannelo Poulos examined the neutrality of nations when he said that neutrality if it is really to merit the name must be advantageous to neither side or both. A middle position that directly favours only one of the two sides cannot be called neutrality.He contended that the neutrality or nonalignment of Afro-Asia third world - despite the intensions and hope of those who espouse it cannot be called true neutrality.[19]

Bala Mohammed sees the African nonalignment as a much deeper implication in the sense of adjusting to imperialism. He contended that most if not all the independent African countries have maintained the major imperialist powers as their main trading partners. They also established all kinds of coalitions, alliances, agreement and treaties of all sorts. He concluded that their nonalignment in a way is in fact an alignment with imperialism.[20]

The extent in which Bala's analysis could be determine is predicated on the depth of most African states, including Nigeria's

relation with the super powers and their policy preference with their colonial masters. Despite the assertion of nonalignment as an independent foreign policy, to Nigeria, it would be difficult to determine or assess its practice given the derelete state of her economic dependence on the west. In this vein, one is inclined to agree with his arguement that most African states including Nigeria establish all kinds of alliances and coalitions with the imperialists.

Liska examines alignment from economic perspective. Alliance according to him is aimed at maximising gains and sharing liabilities - the decision to align according to him is part of a deliberate policy, made with national interest.[21] This analysis even though not specific on Nigeria's nonalignment, nevertheless tend to illuminate what the general perception the government's policy objective was based upon. Given the validity of this, it will be difficult to extricate Nigeria's nonaligned policy given her economic dependence. In this case, one can conclude that the policy is predicated on the assumption to maximise gains and more fundamental also to serve as a means of achieving economic gains in the face of the super power politics.

Narasimba Rao argued that nonalignment serves as an effective instrument safequarding the interest of the developing and less powerful countries of the world, devolve on a new generation.[22] Even though this arguement could be taken on the surface value the safequarding of national interest; the problem with this analysis when probed deeply lies with the dependent state of the nonaligned

countries. Given this, one is inclined to seek the validity of the nonalignment policy of a dependent state.

Lawrence Martins argued that the neutralist policies seem to have a wide variety of purpose both internationally and domestically. Internationally he assert, they maybe designed to preserve newly won independence either by isolation or by an activist policy of playing one great power against another attracting aid from both, and forestalling encroachment by either. He contended that while some countries adopted neutralist or nonaligned policy, it was meant to serve as an opportunity of playing a mediating role between the great powers against another thereby reducing the danger of war that might at best disrupt their economy. The domestic aspect of neutralism or nonalignment he asserts may serve as a distraction from internal domestic problem. An excuse to avoid awkward dispute among political groups and perhaps more fundamental, a device to rally an ill sorted people and inject purpose and coherence into an embryonic state[23]

Whatever his line of contention maybe, the major defect in his analysis by inference to Nigeria carries with it some conceptual problems. His contention that nonalignment is an activist policy of playing one great power against the other underscore Nigeria's principle and practice of nonalignment. Secondly, the newness of Nigeria's political independence, coupled with the dependent economic state meant that an adoption of a policy of nonalignment in the face of the super power politics is a design to relate freely within the international system.

It is evident that the various arquement tended to conteract their views on the principle and practice of Nigeria's policy of nonalignment. In this regard, the failure to have a defined yard stick for measuring Nigeria's nonalignment policy stem in part from the inability to establish a sysmatic frame work for the analysis of Nigeria's foreign relation. More fundamental also is the generalized survey and views of the nonaligned movement by foreign authors. Even though their writings were not specific on Nigeria, their contributions has helped in shading light and insights on the principles and practice of Nigerian government's policy of nonalignment.

Against this background, an attempt would be made in this study to overcome this imbalance and to establish specifically the aims and role of the Nigerian government policy of nonalignment and to determine the factors which shape that role.

1.6 HYPOTHERSES

Since hypotheses are tentative answers to research question, the research would therefore examine the following hypotheses that:

i. Nigerian government preaches nonalignment, but it does not transcend its foreign policy preference as there is more affiliation to the West.

ii. Nigerian Governments emphasise the policy of nonalignment as a means of gaining political and economic development in the face of super power politics.

iii. That Nigerian government policy of nonalignment is more

or less relevant within the context of the changing international politics.

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study would adopt the power theory as a framework of analysis. Domestic and international politics are but two different manifestation of thesame phenomenon the struggle for power. Power is one of the word most frequently used in the study of Political Science especially international relations. Fredrick L.Schuman (1933) held that in an international system lacking a common government, each unit necessirily seek safety by relying on its own power, and viewing with alarm the power of it's neighbours.

Indeed, each nation's national power is se verly limited, although, it is much more limited for some than for others. (That is why we have numencla-tures like super power, world powers and third world countires). In order not to allow its limited national power paralyse it, the sensible nation state breakdown its desires (national interest) into specifics (national objectives). It then tries to grapple with the problem of rationing its limited national power towards achieving each specific or national objective.

National objective are not only numerous but at times conflicting. The plan of action or national policy also includes the rationing of national power and the selection of the instructments or conbination of instruments to be used to attain the objective. thereafter, those who make the policy and those who manage the various instrument come together to work out a carefully co-ordinated plan (national strategy) with which to achieve the desired objective (i.e economic and political development).

It was within this constellation of thought that Nigeria's foreign policy decision makers at independence, viewed the international environment and adopted the nonalignment policy in her relations with the super powers. Robert Strausz Hupe maintains that international politics is dominated by the quest for power and that any given period of history, there were several states locked in deadly conflict, all desiring the augementation or preservation of their power. In this connexion, the importance of maximising all the means of power in a world tilting to a unipolar system bring the concept of national interest into question. It is also important to note that all the instruments that constitute those atributes of a state's power are emphasised for the achievement of internal or external oriented national objective.

The power of a state is said to consist of capacities, some of which are economic in nature such as the level of industrialization and productivity national income and income per-capita. Charles P. Kindleberge assess power in its intertwined economic and political context. The fundamental economic interest of any nation is to satisfy the economic and political aspiration of its citizens. Further more, each nation endeavour to improve its well being in relation to other nations. However, to improve its well being, a nation requires economic strength. Klaus Knorr viewed influence, power and interdependence as inextricably related. Two states can be in conflict over some issues while cooperating on others. When they cooperate, they benefit from the creation of new values, materials or non material. When they are in conflict they attempt to gain value at each others expense. In either case, they are interdependent.

The attribute of influence it is observed consist of human resources, economic strength, or wealth, technology, trade and military strength.

States were ranked in accordance with numerical values attached to each attribute by the use of expert judgement.[29] The authors contended that wealth and military strength in themselves are not necessarily expensive especiaily for poor states in a relatively short period of times.

This was the context the realist school viewed the contemparary international relations.

The post second world war environment ushered in an ideological conflict whose out come led to the emergence of military blocs. It was against this background that nascent state seeks to toil the path of a foreign policy strategy in relation to the super powers in order a attain political and economic development.

The Country that has its own natural resources naturally has a head start. This ability itself can only be brought about by industrial capacity backed by a firm technological ability. However, the motivating force to develop an indigenous and appropriate foreign relation is dependent on the desires and motivation of the Country as reinforced by the Country's idealistic value systems as well as the capacity of the Country to theorize and practicalize ideas.

This idealistic declaration is at variance with the realist view. The realist view central to magarthau holds that "National interest presupposess neither a naturally harmonious peaceful world nor inevitability of war as a consequence of the pursuit by all nations of their national interest. Quite to the contrary, it assumes continuous conflict and threat of war to be minimize through the continuous adjustment of conflicting interest by diplomatic action.[30]

The meaning of interest define as power is an unstable one. However, in a world in which sovereign nations vie for power, it's foreign policies must consider survival as their minimum requirement. The oxthodox conception of nonalign see it as either a principle or a strategy of foreign policy. It was seen essentially as a strategy adopted in the face of Military confrontation between the then Eastern and Western powers in the post second world war.

The interpreation of nonalignment as a foreign policy strategy to achieve the goals of economic development and in the face of Military confrontation between the Eastern and Western bloc constitute a problem in the present Unipolur World order. This, therefore raises the question as to the relevance of the concept of nonalignment and national power. Is a country nonaligned merely because it maintains equal distance in its military, diplomatic, policital and economic relations with the great powers? or are nation's releation with the then power blocs balanced because the nation is nonaligned?

If independence of an actor in the sphere of international politics is nonalignment, if dependence strongly implies alignment; and if most Third World States are known to be dependent, then it is tautological to ask whether dependent States can also be nonaligned. Moreover, it is meaningless to talk about Third World States, i.e dependent state as nonaligned.[31]

As earlier noted, all nations are compelled to protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachment by more power full nations. Against this backdrop, national interest is therefore identified with national survival.

The use of the power theory as a yardstick for measuring Nigerian Government's policy of nonalignment in her foreign relation became relevant given the unequal relationship which characterised her relation with the super power.

But the question is that is it still relalistic to emphasise the power approach as a yardstick for measuring her nonalignment policy? or is it still realistic to pursue a policy of nonalignment in a Unipolar World donimated by the United States and its European allies. The answer lies in the fact that, with the end of the cold war and the demise of the Eastern bloc Countries particularly Soviet Union, it is argued that nonalignment as a movement, and as a policy would therefore cease to be relevant. The demise of the Eastern bloc has therefore launched the nonaligned movement into an international arena of power politics in which individual states would have to reassert its objective in the international system rather than the guest for power.

In this regard, the utility of the theory in this research is an attempt to examine, and analyse the objective which a nation state seeks to achieve in the face of super power interest and within the context of global politics. This will embody the diverse per-ception of national interest and concern as it is in the present changing world order.

1.8 Research Methodology

As a supplement to the conventional Research Methodology, I have decided to adhere to the note of caution sounded by Godan Hyden (1977) that:

> "When writing academic treaties on development, we Social Scientist abstain from presenting the 'Raw' case studies. We slice up events, relationship and behaviour. We go on wrap them up in fashionable analytical attire and

serve them to our leaders cut and dried.

Whenwriting, we think primarily of our fellow professionals. We wish to show them how we are able to rise above our dato by skilfully handling conceptual and analytical tool". Research in Social Science have methods which is often as good as its results for research findings cannot go beyond the tenacity of the paradigm employed. According to Margaret Peil "A research is usually designed to handle a problem, something needs describing, explaining or improving or about which more information is needed so that future occurences can be predicted and policy decided. This implies that a selected research method must be the best that can be summoned for that purpose so as to have valid, accurate, reliable and dependable result.

Data to be used in this research would be through secondary method of data collection. This include among others, text books and unpublished thesis, Magazines, Journals, News Papers, conference and Seminar Papers and other relevant document to the study.

The data collected shall be analysed by "content analysis" which means "a reshaping of available information" (Olson 1976: 159). Although the method has its shortcomings such as the tendency to be repetitive and discreptive, it has its virtues as well. It allows access to past events that might otherwise be unavailable, if such a method like survey research were used. It also broadens the scope of our analysis, as the documents from which the data is collected are also broad, while it also affords the research an opportunity to collect data without necessarily travelling to the place where the research is conducted.

1.9 ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS

Chapter one being an introductory chapters, gives a review of related literature and the theoretical framework of the research work.

For an indept analysis of the study, chapter two looks at the general features of the post second world war environment. This chapter shall examine the trend of events in the formulation of Nigeria's Foreign relation. It shall also look into the emergence of the nonaligned-movement, Nigeria's response to the nonaligned-movement, its attitude, and reluctant accpetance of the nonalignment as a policy. This chapter finally high light on Nigerian Government's conception of the doctrine of nonalignment policy.

Chapter three examines the practice of nonalignment in the face of the cold war. This chapter examines the nonalignment as a doctrine for economic development. It shall also focus on the political and economic objective of Nigeria's policy of nonalignment. We shall attempt to look into the political principle of nonalignment and its implication for the economic development of Nigeria. The chapter shall examine the dominant themes of Nigeria-United States relation, Nigeria-Britain and Nigeria and the Eastern bloc Countries.

Chapter four examines the nonalignment in a changing world order. The focus here shall be an examination of the utility of the nonalignment in a changing world order. An attempt will be made to look into nonalignment's opposition to the hegemony of the remaining super power and the European Community. Here, we shall

also look into the changing international environment and Nigeria's political and economic development.

Chapter five shall draw a general conclusing of the study and give necessary recommendations to the findings.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE GENERAL FEATURES OF THE POST SECOND WORLD WAR ENVIRONMENT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This Chapter attempts to examine the general features of the post second world war environment within which Nigeria embarked on the policy of nonalignment.

The chapter shall examine the trend of events in the formulation of Nigeria's foreign relation. We shall also examine the origin of the nonaligned movement and Nigeria's response to the movement. In the course of the analysis, We shall also examine Nigeria's reluctant acceptance of the nonalignment as a policy. This will enable us assess its overt behaviour concerning the principles and objective of the nonalignment and its adoption as a principle of foreign policy.

Finaly, we shall examine Nigerian government's conception of the doctrine of nonalignment as a policy and the variations in attitude and practice by successive Nigerian governments in relation to the super powers.

2.2 THE TREND OF EVENTS IN THE FORMULATION OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN RELATION.

The international system within which Nigeria embarked on the policy of nonalignment showed some special features and dynamics.[1]

The issues which it faced the cold war and big power interest

and rivalry in Africa however were peculiar to the period and made a lasting impact on the choice of actions by Nigeria and the principle which persuaded her to make those choice.[2]

One outstanding characteristic of the system was that it was essentially a conflictual system rather than a harmonious one. The conflict was seen not primarily as a function of man's acquisitive, competitive or destructive nature or the peculiar socio-political institution which nation states evolved, but rather a function of the super powers.[3] Within this environment, there seem to be two conflict, one was between the United States and the USSR, and the other was between the newly (or not quite) independent nations, and those whom they considered to be exploiters. The two struggles are intimately related.[4]

Although it may be argued that the cold war is over today, such arguement deliberately Ignored the entire phenomenon of de'tente which lasted a decade and half (1962-1976) and which had marked a relaxation of tension in the relationship between the U. S. A. and the USSR. In the late fifties and early sixties - or more precisely in 1960, the cold war was very much in existence. It's feature were as follows: It used vile and hostile propaganda; the major powers involved in this war established military blocs and bases; each imposed severe restrictions on trade between it, its allies and friends on the one hand, and its cold war adversaries on the other; each power developed destructive capabilities in the form of atomic and hydrogen bombs; and , as the gap which had existed between the USA and USSR in this area closed, the USA

achieved an edge over the USSR in the delivery systems for these weapons; each side indulged extensively in spying on the other side; and there was ideological warfare between the capitalist liberal democracy of the West, and the Communist proletarian of the East.

The features of the general level of interaction at the time of Nigeria's independence created tension, instability, and crisis in the world system. The United Nations was faced with the cold War differences, and it was only in the commonwealth of Nations that there existed the understanding and harmony that could span all races, creeds, colours, and continents.[5] It was indeed a source of joy and happiness for those associated with it because it made manifest the fact that world peace and understanding was possible if only world statesmen could work towards these goals.

Nigerian foreign policy decision-makers were deeply affected by the realities of the international system which showed an all pervading cold war, a UN founded by cold war differences and a Common wealth of Nations which was a harmonious grouping of people of all races and continents.

Against this background, Nigeria and the rest of Africa faced the difficult problem of establishing objective relations with the East and West. They had handicaps arising from the fact that by language, eduction, legal and judicial practices and interpersonal relation, and life styles of their leaders, they were culturally bound to the West; by economic links of trade; aid and technology they were bound to the West; militarily some had defence

arrangement, while others such as Nigeria had initiated defence pact with Britain.

Consideration other than those of ideology, came into play. The West perceived all Africa as a vast economic and investment area, and these investments were in oil, Uranium, diamond gold and other resources vital to the industrial growth of the West.[6]

The USSR on its part was desirous of utilizing fully the anticolonial sentiments in Africa. It also perceived positive good will in Africa for (a) Its socialist system which cares for the poor, the peasants, and the down-trodden; (b) its "boot strap" system of self reliance, human rights and the need for the over throw of Apartheid regime in South Africa. There was also the believe in the USSR that the class struggle is international and is not yet over. It's frustration in Europe, it hoped, might not be repeated in Africa, Asia.[7]

By 1960, therefore Africa was concerned with deciding, on how to relate to the big powers, each of which was intent on having its way in Africa. The making of Nigeria's foreign policy occured in an era described as one of decolonization. The British empire was fast yielding place to a sovereign nations, a process not confined to Africa since it include British colonies in Asia. By 1960, the principle of independence and decolonization through self-determination were generally accepted, and largely being enforced although at times, some pressures were required to accelerate the pace and to a few obstinate cases of resistance to the concept of independence under majority rule.

In spite of the cold war differences, the world was able to localize the major conflicts of the late fifties and early sixties. There were the Vietnam war, the Middle East war which remain even today confined to Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt and the civil war in Congo, which did not move the USA and USSR beyond hostile diplomatic exchanges at the UN. Hence if emergent actor such as Nigeria could relate well to the Cold War adversaries, it had a relatively peaceful world international system within which to function. [8]

It was therefore, no surprise that Nigeria perceived itself as a responsible member of the system from which nothing but correct international behaviour was expected. This involved reliance on international law, the application of customary usage and the use of approved channels only. No serious decision-maker in Nigeria in 1960 who perceived Nigeria as a catalyst for the revolutionary transformation of the international system. None questioned the then existing international order, and, there were hardly any sentiment among the political parties, trade unions, the press, or members of parliament.

Because of the Cold War and its dangerous prospect for humanity, and because of Nigeria's desire to base all considerations of foreign policy on Nigeria's national interest, the makers of Nigeria's foreign policy stressed the necessity for world peace, the main idea being that peace within Nigeria would be strengthened if there were peace in the international system. Nigeria's foreign policy makers perceived its interests in terms

of values which could be meaningful and easily understandable to the Nigerian people. These were expected to be related primarily to the political integration, socio-economic advancement, and general well-being of the people of Nigeria. A world community pervaded by peace, and conducive to the realization of these value dictates to a world community characterised by the absence of peace and understanding even if it were not a world community at war with itself.

Nigeria defined its position in relation to the cold war and to the rivalries between the ideological camps of communism and capitalism and decided to adopt a nonalignment foreign policy.

2.3 THE EMERGENCE OF NONALIGNMENT.

The wind of change which swept across the continent of Africa in the early 1960s brought tremendous consequences to colonialism. Most African countries began to gain their independence. They soon discovered that the liberation of their colonies from Western colonial rule did not mean that they wanted to become anybody's satellite. Thus the rejection of bloc politics and the genuine desire to create a new society which would guarantee the people the condition of dignified life.[10]

Analysts have pointed to a conference at Bogor in 1954 as the begining of the movement among a concert of nations that identified themselves as nonaligned,[11] others pointed to the Bandung Conference of the following year.[12] There was however another purposive conference of the movement in Belgrade in 1961. The Bandung

conference was the first large gathering of Afro-Asia state which brought together twenty five countries. The ground work of the conference which had been prepared at the Bogor conference, was designed to increase interaction and promote cooperation among the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. However, the final outcome of the conference was a communique that outlined directives on a range of issues. The issues that were focused on were largely regional. The following conference held in Belgrade in 1961 had the same number attending as the previous conference. The Belgrade conference broadened the scope of its concern' to global international issues including the cold war, peaceful coexistence and the use of nuclear weapon.[13]

The Belgrade conference was significant for the nonaligned - movement in several respect first, it was a water shed between the expectation of the new states in the internationl arena in which the differences in their economic and military power with the West negated the significance of national sovereignty. Secondly, and as a partial response to the first point, the Belgrade conference helped to solidify a base for identity in the nonaligned movement and thirdly, the initial role and function of the movement was defined at the conference. Subsequent conferences merely broadened the membership and agenda of the movement.[14]

While only twenty five countries participated at the Belgrade conference, the figure doubled at the Cairo conference which attracted 47. The figure continued to increase as new independent nations joined the movement in Lusaka in 1970 where 54 members

attended. 86 members attended the conference in Colombo in 1976. The Belgrade conference had broadened the agenda and resolution of the nonaligned states. Subsequent declaration of the movement reads like the what is what of global international conflict and issues.[15]

The starting point of the nonaligned-movement is in dispute, so are the reasons or circumstances for its emergence. The most common reason given for the emergence of the movement is the evolution, after the second world war of bipolarity as an international regime. The protracted conflict that pitched the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union against each other in a nuclear stalemate, was viewed as potentially dangerous for the nascent state of Africa. The countries according to this view feared the consequence of being drawn into the power game of the two power blocs. Nonalignment was therefore an assertive response that rejected the game.[16]

Proponents of this thesis have therefore attempted to separate the principle and practice of nonalignment to determine which of the countries that profess nonalignment are qualitatively nonaligned [17] While super power rivalry contributed and accentuated the development of nonalignment, there are other contributory factors. Colonialism provided a common historical source of identification for most of the nonaligned countries while nonalignment provided the arena for the articulation of desperate concern of the states.[18]

The economic factor was considered as an important issue address by the nonaligned countries in relation to their under

development.

Another strain of extremity lies in the explanation of the emergence of nonalignment by a Yugoslav diplomat that:

> "In the search for a source of nonalignment, one has to go much further in time than determine date. These sources have to be sought primarily in the process that created conditions for changing the existing International political and economic relations. These process were ushered in by the October revolution"[19]

This represents the attempt by Eastern bloc countries, especially those of them in the nonaligned-movement to find a common ground between nonalignment and their ideological preference.

By contrast, many Western analysts in the 50s and early 60s, were profoundly suspicious of the movement. As Crabb observed, Wastern analysts explained the nonalignment of the Third World countries to lack of realism in the evaluation of global issues. this lack of realism they believed to be deeply rooted in a moral obtuseness.[20]

The different attitude of the Western and Eastern bloc countries either over state or over simplified the complex and desparate needs that created and sustained the nonaligned movement. Some how between the different perspectives lies the real needs of the different countries in the movement than the agenda of the Belgrade conference. The declaration of the subsequent conferences in Bandung covered such broad issues as:

(i) Respect of the right of people to self determination; the fight against imperialism and liquidation of colonialism.

(ii) Respect for territorial Sovereignity and intergrity of states; non interference and non intervention in the internal affairs of states;

(iii An end to racial discrimination and Apartheid

(iv) Promotion of peaceful coexistence among nations with different political and social system.

(v) General and total disarmament, banning nuclear tests; dealing with the problem of foreign military base.

(vi) Study the problems concerning uneven economic development and improvement of international economic and technical cooperation.

This range of issues goes beyond the issue of supper power politics which is usually presumed to be the "well-spring" of nonalignment. The dominant focus in recent times of nonaligned States concern the low politics of "North-South" economic disparities.

The driving force in the evolution of the nonaligned movement can therefore be located in the multiferous needs of the different countries whose largely common history of recent colonial status bound them together. This development launched them into an international arena of power politics in which individually they were insignificant. Nonalignment in the post colonial state was therefore partly an attempt to reassert that identity.

Thus in Africa nonalignment was reinforce by other concepts

such as Pan Africanism, and African Personality. Howerever, the implication of these concepts including nonalignment itself were in despute. At the minimum there was agreement that the concept implied freedom of choice, of action in national and international affairs. Indeed to attempt to define the concept beyond this minimal requirement is to take the preferred narrow view of a particular state or group of states. The various themes which emerged from the nonaligned movement reflects diverse perception of national interest and concerned.[21]

Different countries have different designation for the level of activity which their nonaligned posture grants them. We have such designation as positive, active and dynamic neutrality. Nkruma in describing his country's nonalignment as positive neutrality explained that "Ghana did not choose to play the role of a salient spectator in world affair or in matters which affect (our) country 's vital interest and the destiny of African people.[22] It is a positive policy based on, or firm belief in positive action"[23]

On the question of the relationship of the nonaligned states to the super powers, there is also divergence in attitude. In the nonaligned movement, there is an ideological spectrum covering from highly pro-Soviet States and those that are pro-West. The group of some militant African states, Ghana, Mali and Guinea were pro Soviet states and those that are pro-west. Hence this justified their close association with socialist ideologiy. In reality there are countries close to the middle on the scale of attitude towards boths West and East. These would include a large number of Arab

states who rejected the Western democracy and Socialism. On the other hand are those countries who have maintained close ideological relations with the West. Nigeria in particular fall into this category.

Inspite of the different ideological preferences of these countries, there is a common thread in the insistence that the freedom to be align is an integral part of nonalignment. For instance, the former premier of Algeria assert we are aligned with nobody, not even with nonalignment.[24] The same view was shared by Nigerian Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa who was opposed to all kinds of blocs.

2.4 NIGERIAS RESPONSE TO THE NONALIGNED-MOVEMENT.

At independence in 1960, one of the preoccupation of the new nation was to define it's position in the world. At this period, most small or new states are essentially preoccupied with the domestic problem implicit in forging a nation out of diverse ethnic, racial or religious groups. Yet they are called upon to play a role, and take up position upon, international issues.[25]

As a doctrine underlying Nigeria's foreign policy, nonalignment was rejected by the Nigerian government at independence. The word was carefully and deliberately excluded from the text of the first foreign policy statement which was issued by the Prime-Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, on August 20th 1960. Addressing some pressmen soon after independence, he insisted that;

"None of these terms alignment, nonalignment or neutralism

could adequately describe Nigeria's foreign relation. "Rather he maintained that "the nearest phrase that could serve as a label was independent foreign policy."[26]

It was this declaration that led to the conclusion that the Nigerian Prime Minister had a 'frank distate' for nonalignment.[27] Nigerian Government's rejection of nonalignment as a foreign policy doctrine was matched by and reflected in it's anty-pathy towards the nonaligned movement. In 1960, the Prime Minister maintained that Nigeria would not join the nonaligned group at all. His reasoning was that as a group, the nonalignmed countries were entangled in a contradiction and Nigeria did not wish to be caught in the maze. As he put it, where "a neutral country joined a neutral bloc, it ceases to be neutral."[28] In 1961, arrangement were being made to hold the inaugural conference of the nonaligned movement at Belgrade in Yugoslavia. To this end, a preparatory conference was schedule to hold in Cairo on June 5 - 13 1961. Nigeria was one of the several countries asked to send representative to the conference. Nigeria declined, along with three other countries namely Mexico, Togo and Upper Volta (Boukinafaso).[29] And when the first nonaligned Summit itself was held at Belgrade in September 1 - 6, 1961, Nigeria also refused to participate. What were then the reasons for Nigeria's rejection of nonalignment?

During the first phase of Nigeria's foreign policy, the linchpin in Nigeria's diplomatic strategy was the cultivation of an alliance with Britain and a special relationship with the rest of

the Western Powers especially the US and Federal Republic of Germany. This was a period in which the U.S., the United Kingdom and other major market economy countries were still largely in intense ideological-political rivalry with theSoviet bloc in the cold war. Moreover, the United Kingdom, especially had a crucial political interest in influencing Nigeria's affairs which derived from her preponderant economic and cultural presence in Nigerian Society. The process of economic cooperation with Nigeria- the most important entity in black Africa-necessarily had to respond to this factor. The economic medium provided the most tangible leverage for influencing Nigeria's conduct in foreign policy.[30]

Economic consideration also influenced Nigeria's choice of alignment to the West. For Nigeria's political leaders, economic relations with the United states and other market economy-countries were a necessity partly for economic survival, growth and development and partly for political security. The Balewa government had a political security interest in it's economic cooperation policies with the US and its major allies. The regime clearly appreciated the necessity of forging close economic alignment with these countries as an insurance for their political support, especially in the light of it's tenuous domestic authority and security.[31]

At a broader level, the structure of Nigeria's peripheral capitalist economy and it's external orientation had significant consequence for its foreign policy. In the first place, to close the gap between the agregate value of Nigeria's primary

agricultural exports which was declining and the increasing value of her imports of manufactured goods, Nigerian government resorted on independence, to heavy reliance on external financial aid (i.e. loan and investment). That the countries from which the bulk of Nigeria's external financial assistance would come had to be states of the Western bloc, was obvious, given the existing pattern of financial and trade relations. For instance, Nigeria's membership of the sterling bloc sources. Similarly, Nigeria's membership of the IMF an essencially Western monetary system seemed to open up new avenues for external borrowing in the form of IMF stabilization fund to cushion temporary fluctuations in export earning and soft development loans from the IBRD and its affiliate.

Secondly being linked commercially and financially with the Western bloc in the way described above, made Nigeria's external and internal policies subject to forces within the Western bloc. Thirdly, the overall impact of the skewed pattern of Nigeria's external economic links was to predispose Nigerian policy makers to behave favourably towards the West.[32] The Nigerian political class was and remains the offshoot of Nigeria's political economy, its source of accumulation, material well-being or furtunes derive from and sustained by the pattern of Nigesria's production system as well as her external economic linkages with the market - economy coutries of the West.

Alignment was accepted at this initial stage as a diplomatic strategy because it was the policy most congruent with the maintenance of the status quo-Alignment with the West was in

harmony with a perpetuation of the capitalist system which provided the ideological underpining to the Nigerian political system. This was therefore a case of the definition of national interest being a function of the dominant ideology. A dependent /periphery capitalist economy provided a background which was conducive to the evaluation of alignment than that of nonalignment.

2.5 RELUCTANT ACCEPTANCE OF THE NONALIGNMENT AS A POLICY.

Nigeria's attitude towards the nonalignment as a doctrine and movement underwent gradual transformation between 1963-65. By the last quarter of 1962, nonalignment had been reluctantly accepted as a cardinal principle of foreign policy. One of the earliest indication of this acceptance came from Sir Abubakar Tafa Balewa when he asserted that Nigeria's policy towards the great powers was based on the doctrine of nonalignment.[33]

The external actions of the Nigerian government from 1962 came to be judged in terms of whether or not they conform to the doctrine of nonalignment. For instance in september 1962, the Nigerian prime Minister argued that Nigeria would not seek associate status with the European Economic Community. His reasoning was that to do so would involve the young state in the political and military objectives of Europe, and that would be incompactible with Nigeria's policy of nonalignment.[34]

Nigeria's acceptance of noalignment was also demonstrated in its more positive attitude to the nonaligned movement as earlier

noted, in 1961, Nigeria had been invited, but it declined to attend the inaugural summit of the nonaligned nations held in Belgrade (Yugoslavia). The second conference was held at Cairo on October 5-10 1964. A year before the nonalignment Summit, Nigeria had taken a step which made membership of the nonaligned movement a foregone conclusion. In 1963, the Nigerian Government signed the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and so had become a member of OAU. The OAU Charter had as one of its basic principle affirmation of a policy of nonalignment with regards to all blocs. With all these developments, Nigeria could no longer keep away from the conference of nonaligned nations. Moreover, the invitation issued to states for the second summit of the nonaligned nations was mostly to blocs of states. Nigeria was invited, not as separate entity, but as one of those which subscribe to the charter of the OAU.

This invitation was backed by an appeal from the OAU itself. At the OAU summit that took place in Cairo in July 1964, a general appeal was issued urging all African Heads of states and Governments to attend the forth coming nonaligned summit schedule to take place in Cairo. It is not surprising, therefore, that Nigeria, along with 25 other African States attended the 2nd nonaligned summit in Cairo.[35]

Despite Nigeria's acceptance of nonalignment, its leaders continued to define the doctrine as simply freedom of judgement on important international issues on the bases of national interest and that of world peace. In his foreign policy statement in 1960,

the Prime Minister had stated that:

> "We shall not blindly follow the lead of any one; so far as is possible, the policy on each accassion will be selected with proper independent objectivity, in Nigeria's national interest. We consider it wrong for the Federal Government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs."[36]

As conceived in Belgrade, nonalignment meant therefore much more than either refusal to join a military pact or simply independence of political action and judgement. It was formed mainly to give small and newly independent states greater influence in the determination of the course of world politics in international relations. As Tito of Yugoslavia explained, the conference at Belgrade was not intended to establish any kind of bloc; on the contrary, the division of the world into blocs was mainly responsible for the increasing tension in the world. It was conceived as anti war, pro-peace. Tito noted that the conference in Belgrade was intended to demonstrate to the great powers, the protagonist of force that the majority of the world decisively rejects the use of force, as a means of settling the various important problems inherited from the second world war. Nehru stressed that it was seen as a peace making movement, one that tries to win war mongers over to the path of peace through moral suation rather than partisan denunciation.

As nonalignment gained recognition and acceptance among the African states, its viability as a system acquired more prominence

among Nigerian foreign policy decision makers. This explains the reason why Nigeria's attitude towards the nonaligned movement changed from one of anti-pathy to that of acceptance.

One of such pressure was the external pressure. There were two kinds of pressures reflecting two divergent sources. There was, first the pressure from the West, especially Britain and the U.S., that independent Nigeria would remain committed to the free world, as the policy of nonalignment gained popularity among the states of Africa and Asia emerging from colonial rule, the two Western powers changed tack. They now suggested that their African allies including Nigeria, should follow the diplomatic vogue and adopt a policy of nonalignment. This did not represent a change of attitude to nonalignment on the part of the west. It was simply realised that it would be the best way of securing Western interest in Africa.

It was feared that for sir Abubakar, for instance, to come out clearly and openly for the West, as he had indicated in his earlier address would discredit him in the eye of African people. Such a posture, a brazenly pro-Western one would reduce his credibility and jeopardize his role and that of Nigeria as a sub-regional patron and defender of western interests. It was, therefore suggested by both Britain and the U.S. that Nigeria should follow the diplomatic fashion and adopt rhetoric nonalignment, while firmly retaining her deep-seated preference for liberal parliamentary democracy as exemplified in the West.[37]

The other source of pressure was the movement itself. The

goals and potentialities of the movement were so attractive for small and weak states as to be almost irresistible. In its early days, the nonaligned movement was preoccupied with reducing the level of conflict in East-West relations. Emphasis was placed on military disengagement and freedom from entangling alliance in a polarize world. Peace in a polarized world and the security of its members were thus, its goals. They were attractive goals for small and weak states. Although Nigeria did not at first appreciate this aspect of nonalignment, it later became awake to it, especially when it failed to fulfil its expectations of increased aid from the Western bloc. It came gradually, to accept the idea that, by refraining from entering into alliance with states of both power blocs, aid would flow to it as both powers competed to win its support. [38]

The federal government under Gowon's regime, came to realise that a policy of nonalignment made it easier to turn elsewhere if a donor from one power bloc attempted to attach unacceptable strings to aid. Moreover since ideological neutrality was not insisted upon as a qualification for membership of the movement, nonalignment became acceptable to Nigerian leaders. The events of the Nigerian civil war and the non-conforming attitude of the Western powers clearly demonstrated this fact.

The other source of pressure on Nigeria to join the nonaligned-movement or adopt it as a policy was internal. In the early 1960s, the Federal Government came increasingly under attack from both its opponents and allies; and this attack was directed

mainly at what was styled its pro-West foreign policy. This was necessary in view of the realignment of political forces that seemed to be taking place in Nigeria. By early 1963, intelligence reports reaching the Federal Government revealed that plans were under way by Action Group left wing political organization, notably the Nigerian Youth Congress and the left wing elements in the NCNC and NEPU to form a progressive front. The NPC - led Federal Government took steps to counter this move. One of this steps was to adopt a progressive posture in foreign affairs. Thus when the NPC formed an alliance with a break away faction of, the Action Group - NNDP - the Dynamic Party, and the Niger Delta Congress, it declared, as part of its programme, that it would "maintain the policy of nonalignment ...and build a good image for Nigeria by making friends with all states and peoples"[39]

The decision for choosing the policy of nonalignment arose from the consideration by the government for its political survival. Apart from this, another level of debate pertains to the level of economic alignment. Economic alignment does not guarantee self negating foreign policy. It is true that given all the supporting factors, economic alignment will generally produce political repercussion. In the case of Nigeria, and given her underdevelopment, the policy of nonalignment will produce a veritable basis for economic development.

2.6 NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT 'S CONCEPTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF NONALIGNMENT .

Nigerian government's conception of the doctrine of nonalignment has varied from one regime to the other. But what this conception was, for each regime can only be infered. An attempt would be made to examine Nigerian government's conception of the doctrine of nonalignment, the variation in attitude and conception, and its faithfulness to themovement.

In the early 1960s, nonalignment was seen by the government largely in negative minimalist term. What it meant was prinicipally not associating as a matter of routine with any power bloc. It implied for Nigerian leaders a policy of divesified dependence in relations between Nigeria and the Eastern and Western bloc countries. In bilateral relations, it was never seen as a policy of equidistance or balance depedence. Emphasis was placed on the freedom to judge issues with independent objectivity and to take stands that reflected a rational calculation of Nigeria's national interests or an appreciation of the merits of each case and the need to uphold truth.

Under Balewa, nonalignment was seen by and large as a general foreign policy doctrine, defining the outer limits of external behaviour rather than a set of specific pattern of sequence of broad and long moves, designed to propel the state towards its set goals.[40]

The inability of Balewa's government to appreciate the strategic significance and utility of nonalignment was even more

evident in its behaviour in conference diplomacy. As a diplomatic strategy, nonalignment implies unity of action by weak but uncommitted states with the aim of increasing their diplomatic clout and for the purpose of mobilizing world opinion behind their own stand on those issues of common interest. A nonaligned state ought, therefore, to aid the process of harmonization of view points and policies among the non-committed states and strengthening the nonaligned movement. Such a strategy is necessary in order to protect the interest of the smaller and weaker states against the more powerful states and develop a distinct and effective voice for peace and justice.

The Balewa government did not accept this strategic component of nonalignment. Its strategy consisted of unilaterally mobilizing world opinion in support of its independent view point. The snag was that, Nigeria lacked an independent view point because it had neither an independent source of authentic information nor an authonomous ideololical perspective which equip Nigerian leaders with a perceptive precism untainted by the prejudice of other states.[41]

The Balewa government as we have noted had considered its external policies as that of nonalignment and it had infact joined the nonaligned - movement in 1963. Given its noted ideological and economic alignment to the west, it seem probable that the government had a narrow, if not a peculiar definition of nonalignment. It does not seem for instance, that the government saw its attachment to individual countries like Britain, West

Germany as alignment, even though these two were members of one of the blocs from which she had sworn nonalignment. It also seem probable that it did not see its participation in the Commonwealth (which was rationalised on politico-economic and historical grounds), and its political and economic connection with the EEC as falling under its definition of nonalignment. [42]

Under Gowon, Nigeria interpretted nonalignment slightly differently. It came to apreciate the strategic significance and utility of the doctrine in both bilateral relations and conference diplomacy. At the declaratory level, Nigeria's conception of nonalignment seemed in the 1970s indistinguishable from what it was under Balewa. Thus, Gowon also talked about Nigeria's nonalignment as implying not "being concern with ideological conflict, cooperating with all countries which are willing to cooperate with Nigeria in developing its resources, and expanding Nigeria's contact and cooperation with all other friendly countries regardless of their ideological system".[43] At the operational level, however, Nigeria's conception of nonalignment implied diversification of dependence in such a manner as to reduce Nigeria's dependence on the Western bloc.

Nigeria's conception of nonalignment under Murtala/Obasanjo between 1975-79 was similar in several respect to Balewa's interpretation of nonalignment. The regime conceived nonalignment as positive neutrality. As major general Joe Garba, Nigeria's foreign Minister explained;

"We want to take an independent stand on major issues and we

don't want to sit on the fence. What I think we want to do is to be neutral. When you are neutral, you tend to be in a better position to assess issues objectively".[44]

General Obasanjo explained further;

"We like other third world nations have chosen the path of nonalignment as our foreign policy, which means in essence that we welcome the friendship and cooperation of all the nations on the basis of mutual and complete sovereign equality."[45]

The essence of nonalignment was seen as the ability to exercise a reasonable degree of independence of policy and action in world affairs, in relation to the super powers. The Obasanjo/Murtala regime stressed positive neutrality as an aspectof nonalignment. In other words, it saw the need for Nigeria to be even handed in dealing with both the Eastern and Western blocs and to pursue a strategy of equidistance in its bilateral relations.

Shehu Shagari (1979-83) Maintained a similar view of nonalignment. this was placed on freedom of action in international affairs, ensuring that Nigeria's foreign policy is not subordinated to those of the big powers or become a satellite of any bloc, maintening friendship and cooperation with all countries; and maintaining an even hand, a balance in relation between Nigeria on the one hand, and the Eastern and Western blocs, on the other.[46]

It has to be reiterated that all Nigerian Governments have attached a lot of importance to, and adhered to the policy of nonalignment. Whatever may amount to the depth of the variations in

attitude, and the difference in conceptions, Nigerian Government have reiterated their commitment to the nonaligned movement. Even in the 1980s under General Buhari, by which time Nigeria had long been attending the nonaligned conference, the coception has remain the same.

Successive Nigerian Government from Balewa to Babangida subscribe to the principle and objectives of nonalignment. The nonalignment was described in an official (Federal Government Publication) as a body of countries which refused to allow its policies to be dictated by either of the two conflicting ideological blocs, East and West. And it was always asserted that Nigeria has always maintained a balance between the two guided by what its national interest is, on any issue involving the East and West.[47]

2.7 CONCLUSION.

This chapter examined the general features of the postsecond world war environment and the events (i.e. the cold war and super power rivalry in Africa), which determined the formulation of Nigeria's foreign policy. The features of the general level of interaction at this time created tension, instability and crisis in the world system. Most African countries including Nigeria faced the difficult problem of establishing relations with the super powers. In this end, they defined their position in relation to the rivalry between the ideological camps of communism and capitalism and decided to adopt nonalignment policy.

Nonalignment therefore, emerged as a response to this ideological rivalry between the super powers. African countries including Nigeria at independence, discovered that the liberation of their countries from colonial rule did not mean that they wanted to become any body's satellite, hence they rejected bloc politics. Despite this, Nigeria at independence rejected joining the nonaligned movement. The reasons attributed was that, during this period, the linchpin in Nigeria's diplomatic strategy was the cultivation and maintainance of an alliance with Britain and special relationship with the Western bloc.

Although Nigeria's attitude towards the nonalignment as a doctrine and movement later underwent gradual transformation. By 1962, nonalignment was reluctantly accepted as a cardinal principle of Nigeria's foreign policy. Nigerian government's conception of nonalignment has varied, from one regime to the other. What this conception is, can only be inferred. Nigerian government from Balewa to Babangida have subscribed to the policy of nonalignment.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE PRACTICE OF NONALIGNMENT IN THE COLD WAR ERA.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

It is assumed that Nigerian Government emphasised the policy of nonalignment as a means of gaining political and economic development in the face of the Super Power politics. An attempt would be made in this chapter to examine nonalignment as a doctrine for economic development. The focus here shall be an analysis of the political and economic objective of Nigerian government policy of nonalignment in relation to the Western and Eastern bloc countries. We shall also examine the political principle of nonalignment and its implication for the economic development of Nigeria. The issues will be discussed against the backdrop of the Government's adherence to and practice of nonalignment, and as a deliberate policy designed during the cold war to achieve the goals of economic development. Finally we shall examine the dominant themes of Nigeria's relations with the U.S.A., Nigeria and Britain and Nigeria and the Eastern Europ.

3.2 NONALIGNMENT AS A DOCTRINE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Nonalignment in international affairs is normally technically codified in terms of military security alliance. For instance at Lusaka (Zambia) in 1970, an attempt was made to redesignate the

nature of world conflict. The Lusaka declaration on peace, independence, cooperation and decolonization of international relations designed to constitute the charter of nonalignment gave a fresh meaning to the doctrine. It noted that nonalignment was no longer an irreplaceable instrument for the solution of the dangerous contradiction (i.e. East - West conflict). Rather, it should be seen as an integral part of the changes in the international community in its entirety and the product of the anti-colonial revolution. Intstead of seeing the world in terms of East and West, the nonaligned - movement began to perceive the world as polarized between oppressors and oppressed.

It rejected actively the notion of international order based on power blocs, balance of power and spheres of influence. It insisted on the disolution of the major ideological/military blocs which it said became irrelevant in the era of de'etente. It henceforth came to be viewed as a doctrine of economic development and a strategy that would enable the underdeveloped states to loosen the ties which bind them to the developed would. This transformation was set in motion in 1973 at Algiers and reached its peak in 1976 at Colombo.[2]

Despite a redefinition of the goals of nonalignment within the sphere of economic development, for most of the Third World countries (including Nigeria), nonalignment has not been an easy policy to adopt. Nigeria's lack of true freedom and independence of action which derived from it's continued dependence on the Western powers constitutes an extremely difficult problem for a state in

the periphery of world capitalism. To this end, nonalignment served as a means of asserting its independence and freedom of action in the international system. Nonalignment insist on an international system in which all nations are actively involved in the decision making process on all matters especially those directly affecting them.

3.3 THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVE OF NIGERIA'S POLICY OF NONALIGNMENT

It has already been stated that, based on an interpretation of of the first foreign policy statement (in chapter two), it was clear that nonalignment was seen largely in negative and minimalist terms. What it meant was principally not associating as a matter of rountine with any power blocs and not following the lead of anyone blindly. In other words, to be nonaligned for Nigeria meant to be free to establish friendly relations with every nation which recognised and respected its sovereignty and have a free hand to select policies which could promote its national interest. Nonalignment was thus seen as a principle of foreign policy to be followed in both bilateral and multilateral relations.

It implied for Nigerian leaders a policy of divesified dependence, but only in a special sense. The diversification of external links was seen not primarily in cold war terms, rather, it meant the establishment of ties with all great powers irrespective of their bloc. As one Nigerian parliamentarian observed, it implied simply "the freedom to do business with any part of the bloc to

which it belongs".[3]

Given the rudimentary nature of Nigeria's forces of production at independence, Nigeria like most other third world states saw independence as a means toward the enhancement of the coutry's prestige through the process of developmen[4]. To this, could be added the urge among the nationalists to make good the pre-independence claim of being more committed to the development of their country. Nigerian leaders being committed to the capitalist development of their country naturally looked more to these countries that represented the quintessence of this mode of development.[5]

The diversification of external relations that was initiated after the first few years of independence was mainly motivated by the necessity for economic development. It thus took the form of widening in scope with the capitalist world and the establishment of contacts with the socialist states[6]. The diversification maybe in line with the government policy of nonalignment. But the snag is that Nigerian preference is that of alignment to the West. For instance during his independence motion in parliament, the Prime Minister stated that:

> "Nigeria needs to join the Common wealth because her great need for economic development warranted her seeking for investment both of money and technical skill from her richer and more development countries. That, since Nigeria lacked the necessary Manpower for running her foreign offices, we shall have other members of the Commonwealth to look after

our interst"[7].

Similar sentiment had been expressed by Awolowo back in 1957 on the issue of joining the Commonwealth;

> "We have numerous advantages in our favour....Membership of the Commonwealth will almost secure for us sympathy and friendship not only of the Commonwealth but also of countries with which the Commonwealth is in close association"[8].

These countries could be no other than those of the core of the capitalist system. It should be obvious that since Britain was the head of the commonwealth and had the closest of ties with the Nigerian Government, Nigeria's relationship with these other countries would have as much as possible be mediated through Britain.

Inspite of Nigeria's desire to achieve development by relating with the super powers, it was directed towards a total abstainance from any associate status or organization within the international system. For instance, the refusal of Nigeria to accept associate status with the European economic community (EEC) despite British urging was said to be out of abhorence for the neocolonial underpining of such an arrangement and it's incompactability with Nigeria's policy of nonalignment.

Idang has observed that the decision not to associate with the EEC was the result of pressure from radical groups[9]. Anglin on the other hand suggested that it was a decision made by civil service advisers which reinforced the political instinct of the politicians. Although he excluded the prime minster[10]. Philips

rightly observed that Nigeria's membership would make it a partner in helping to create a third economic bloc competing with the U.S. and the Eastern bloc[11].

The fact that Nigerian goods still had their favourable position in the British market was a satisfactory factor for the government's continued abhorence for association. It has infact been argued that Nigeria's willingness for association in 1960 was motivated by the realization that if Britain joined the EEC (as she intended doing), two thirds of Nigeria's external trade would be exposed to tariff discrimination. Moreover, she would also loose the trade preference she had enjoyed in the British Market[12]. Despite the refusal for associate status however, Nigeria set up a mission in Brussel to take care of Nigeria - EEC affairs. This was necessary to off-set any unfavourable effect on Nigeria's goods. This point to the fact that economic necessity took over precedence over any neo-colonial phobia. Infact Nigeria had started negotiating with the EEC by 1963, although it was not until July 1966 that an agreement was finally signed[13].

Faced with a deteriorating balance of payment, falling price for its product on the world market, the capital demand of the 1962-68 Development Plan, and Britain's inability to satisfy the increased demand of the Nigerian government,[14] the diversification of extenal relation's became a conscious and important official policy.

The process of diversification as entrenched in Nigeria's policy of nonalignment was not limited to the capitalist bloc, but

also extended to even the socialist countries[15]. These developments were due in part to the agitation for a Nigerian embassy in Moscow and other Eastern bloc countries. The Prime Minister announced on 22nd of November 1961, that the six year old ban in Nigeria on communist literature would be lifted on 1st December 1961. In this regard, the government embarked upon a policy of entering into trade agreement with other Eastern countries. The first was the Trade Agreement with poland signed on (14th November 1961). Others followed in quick succession with Czechoslovakia (16th March 1962), USSR (2nd July 1963), Bulqeria (28th September 1962. All these were loose agreements Stating only the goods to be imported and exported to the contracting parties[16].

The agreement however had two effects. Nigerian trade with the entire Eastern bloc which was small, began to show appreciable increase. In 1960, the total trade turnover with the bloc amounted to f4.981 million. But by 1965, this had risen to f16.55m. The balance of trade had also turned in favour of Nigeria in 1960, import from Eastern bloc countries amounted to only f630.00million. The corresponding figure for 1965 were £7.801, and £8.75m. In relative terms the bloc accounted for 2.5% and 3.8% of Nigeria's export in 1963. Secondly and more importantly, the agreement provided the government the opportunity to butress its trading relations with the Eastern bloc countries. The government was able to parade the existence of trade with the Eastern bloc. There was no such agreement with the Western bloc countries and yet the bulk of Nigeria's export was with the West.[17]

TABLE ONE

DIRECTION OF NIGERIAN EXPORT : SELECTED EAST AND WESTERN COUNTRIES.

SELECTED	1962		1964		1966	
COUNTRIES	ANNUAL VALUE IN U.S. $M	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORT	ANNUAL VALUE IN U.S. $M	PERCANTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORT	ANNUAL VALUE IN U.S. $M	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORT
A. West						
UNITED KINGDOM	17 . 9	42 . 0	227 . 2	37 . 8	292. 5	36 . 9
UNITED STATES	60 . 9	12. 9	40 . 3	6 . 7	69 . 9	8 . 8
CANADA	4 . 8	1 . 06	6 . 7	1 . 11	28 . 3	3 . 57
JAPAN	4 . 2	0 . 9	7 . 2	1 . 2	12 . 7	1 . 6
BELGIUM	11 . 3	2 . 4	9 . 3	2 . 4	20 . 4	2 . 6
FRANCE	18 . 9	4 . 0	14 . 3	4 . 7	59 . 8	7 . 5
W. GERMANY	41 . 3	8 . 8	28 . 1	12 . 6	81 . 6	
NETHERLAND	65 . 5	13. 2	75 . 7	12 . 6	75 . 3	10 . 3
TOTAL		88 . 4	76 . 0		79 . 2	80 . 8
B. EAST						
USSR	0.1	0. 02	4 . 5	6 . 7	0 .1	0 . 01
CZECHOSLO	1 . 2	0. 3	0 . 2	0 .03	3 . 3	
VAKA						0 . 42
POLAND	3.1	0 . 7	6 . 2	0 . 1	5 . 1	0 . 64
		0 . 9		0 . 28		1. 07

Source: African contemporary Records (London, Rexcollins 1970), cited from unpublished 1984, PHD Thesis by Ajene G.O 'Leadership perception of issues and foreign policy difference.

TABLE TWO
NIGERIAN IMPORT SELECTED EAST AND WESTERN COUNTRIES.

SELECTED	1962		1964		1966	
COUNTRIES	ANNUAL VALUE IN U.S. SM	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORT	ANNUAL VALUE IN U.S. SM	PERCANTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORT	ANNUAL VALUE IN U.S. SM	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORT
A. West						
UNITED KINGDOM	206 . 7	36 . 4	220 . 3	3 . 0	219 . 2	36 . 6
UNITED STATES	41 . 9	7 . 4	81 . 0	11 . 4	103 . 3	14 . 4
CANADA	7 . 6	1 . 6	5 . 1	0 . 72	8 . 1	1 . 13
JAPAN	69 . 6	12 . 2	86 . 3	12 . 1	34 . 4	4 . 8
BELGIUM	8 . 3	1 . 5	9 . 3	1 . 3	9 . 5	1 . 3
FRANCE	18 . 8	3 . 3	27 . 8	3 . 9	42 . 9	6 . 0
W. GERMANY	37 . 6	6 . 6	63 . 0	8 . 9	82 . 6	11 . 5
NETHERLAND	25 . 7	4 . 5	28 . 6	4 . 0	27 . 0	3 . 8
TOTAL		7 . 32		73 . 3		73 . 6
B. EAST						
USSR	0.1	6 . 02	0 . 1	0 . 01		0 . 2
CZECHOSLO	7 . 4	1 . 3	7 . 1	1 . 0		0 . 9
VAKIA						
POLAND	2.5	0 . 4	6 . 4	0 . 6		0 . 6
		1 . 8		1 . 66		1. 6

Source: African contemporary Records (London, Rexcollins 1970), *cited from unpublished PHD Thesis by Ajaie G.O 'Leadership perception of issues and foreign policy difference;* (Wisconsin 1984) p. 181.

The extent of Communist aid in Nigeria by 1965 was very small. In the financial assistance sector, only £5m was furnished by the whole Communist bloc. In the educational sector, 45 and 46 Nigerians were awarded USSR government scholarship in 1964-65. The corresponding figure for Poland were 5 and 19 and Rumania 5 and 4. 27 Nigerians received 247 and 201 overseas scholarship respectively. The communist bloc accounted for 84 in1964 and 69 in 1965.[18]

The political uncertainty and the civil war in the subsequent year further presented Russia with the opportunity to improve her relation with Nigeria. Substantial military assistance was offered to the federal military government. Apart from the military hard ware, Communist aid to Nigeria between 1966-68 was small and restricted to the educational sector. In 1966 Czechoslovakia's aid to Nigeria's educational system was £28,000. In 1967 Nigeria received and accepted 253 and 279 foreign award. The Communist bloc accounted for 114 and 157 respectively.[19]

The extent of the success in the process of diversification can be seen in the fact that while Britain owned 61.4% of the Cummulative investment in the Nigerian economy in 1963, by 1966, this was down to 53.3%. That of U.S. for the same period was 8.7% respectively. In the external trade sector, Nigeria's trade with the West, though declining is still propotionately very great. While Britain took in 48.1% of Nigeria's export in 1960 and provided 43.3% of her import. By 1966, the percentage had moved from 9.5% in 1966 to the 11.2%, falling down to 8% in 1966. While the socialist

bloc countries of Eastern Europe took a meagre 0.4% of Nigeria's export, providing 1.1% of Nigeria's import.[21]

On aid, the Western orientation is even more apparent. Virtually all the aid Nigeria received came directly from Western countries or indirectly through the World Bank and the UN. Moreover, the United State's share is propotionately much greater than in trade field. Whereas less than a tenth of Nigeria's trade is with the US, about one half of the aid currently available in Nigera is America. The investment picture is much the same 8% of the £200m overseas investment in Nigeria is Britain. In fact by 1966 Britain was still providing as much as 53.4% of foreign private capital to Nigeria.[22] Britain accupied a dominant positioon in the Nigerian economy.

From a situation where Nigeria had overseas missions in only the major Western countries and the U.S. in the early years of independence, by 1966, she had one form of diplomatic relations or the other with all Western countries and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe except the German Democratic Republic, Peoples republic of China and Cuba.[23]

The period 1966-1970 was attended with a cataclysmic event in Nigeria's political system. The subsequent outcome led to the civil war. In this end, Nigeria's external relation was perceived in terms of the non supportive stance of her western allies towards her war effort. After the civil war, the federal military government sought to establish stronger economic and diplomatic ties with the Soviet bloc countries. Expanded ties with

the Sovietbloc countries was considered valuable for tactical reasons. In the economic field, for intstance, Nigeria's post civil war tactics seemed to be to use relations with the Soviet bloc to dilute Western direct domination of the Nigerian economy and seek indigenous control over it.[24]

This development led the federal government to seek Soviet assistance mainly in areas where the West was obviously becoming deeply interested, but where, in the past, Western investors had intended to impose such conditions as would maximise the benefit that accrue to NIgeria and to minimize their own benefit. Specifically, this had to do with a comprehensive geological survey of the country with the aim of discovering strategic minerals for Nigeria, and the exploration of these minerals for Nigeria's needs, the development of steel and petro-chemical industries based on them, and the indigenous control of these industries.

Nigerian leaders wished to involve the Soviet Union in these crucial areas of economic growth as a means of reducing Nigeria's dependence on the West, Securing better terms from Western monopolies in Several areas of the economy and building a more credible image for Nigeria as a nonaligned country. On their part, the Soviet bloc countries were willing to reduce the dominant influence of Western monopolies over the Nigerian economy and increase their influence. Therefore an area which from the start the Soviet and it's allies attached great importance during the period was technical aid for education. It involved extending

Soviet Scholarship to Nigerians to enable them study in Communist countries.[25]

It is important to stress that Gowon's government, more than Balewa's government appreciated the strategic and tactical utility of the nonalignment policy. It was fully conscious, for instance of how a diversification of Nigeria's bilateral links away from the Western bloc could confer political advantage on Nigerian government in the areas of both external relations and domestic affairs. That Gowon found it tactically useful to cultivate the friendship of the Communist countries for the following reasons. First, Nigeria's expanded ties with the communist bloc were considered valuable because they believed to off-set Western influence. It was a tactics recommended by Nigerian ambassador's conference in Lagos in 1969.[26] Secondly, expanded ties with the communist countries were valued for their role in strengthening the credibility of Nigeria's nonalignment stance. Specifically support and friendship of the more radical members of the OAU. Moreover, it was hoped that a credible nonalignment policy would fire the imagination of the people of Nigeria and therefore inspire them to greater endeavour,[27] in the service of the nation and world peace.

In multilateral diplomacy, Gowon also appreciated the strategic significance of nonalignment. This was evident in several aspects of Nigeria's multilateral diploacy. Nigeria's membership of OPEC (1971), Nigeria's collective Approach to Bargaining with the European Economic Community (1973 - 1975) Nigeria's more active role in the Goup of 77 (of UNTAD). [28]

In 1979 at Havana (Cuba), the final declaration and resolution reaffirm that "the quintessence of the policy of nonalignment in accordance with its original principle and essential character involves the struggle against colonialism, imperialism and Apartheid as well as against great powers and bloc policies".[29] Three years later in Srilanka (Colombo), this new conception of nonalignment had been under scored. The conference took the view that the most dangerous source of conflict in the world was the growing disparity between the North and South. Thus by 1976 - 79, the cold war conception of nonalignment was over.

We have already stated in places that. In theory, successive Nigerian governments from Balewa in the 1960s to Babangida's government, subscribe to these objectives and principles of nonalignment. But in practice Nigerian government were inconsistent in their pursuit of the objectives and their abhorence to the principle of the movement. Nigeria has since independence opposed colonialism, and racism in Africa. There were several instances when Nigeria either failded to speak out in opposition to the exploitation andexpansion of imperialists forces. For example US and Belgian imperialist maneouvre in the Congo (Zaire) in the 60s, Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the US sponsored overthrow of the government of Allende in chile in the 1970s. Even Nigeria's support for the MPLA in Angola which was (clearly an anti-imperialist posture was not seen by Nigerians at the time as practicalization nonalignment which it was. It was seen as part of Nigeria's struggle against colonialism and Apartheid.[30] It is

illustrative to note Nigeria's cautious role in the 1990 Gulf War led by US to forcibly evict Iraqi toops from Kuwait. This could be veiwed as a practicalization of nonalignment despite the fact that there was no any counter vailing power to warrant Nigeria's stance.

The government as we have noted in places considers its external policies as that of nonalignment and it had infact joined the nonaligned movement in 1963. Given its noted ideological and economic alignmend to the West, it seem probable that the government had a narrow, if not a peculiar definition of nonalignment. It does not seem for instance , that the government saw its attachment to individual countries like Britain and West Germany as alignment, even though these two were members of one of the blocs from which she had sworn noalignment. It also seem probable that it did not see its participation in the Commonwealth (which was rationalised on politic -Economic and historical grounds), and its political and economic connection with the EEC as falling under its definition of nonalignment.

Though, the very idea of blocs was an anathema, it was not so much alignment to any bloc as such that was abhored; rather it was alignment as a matter of routine. In other words, none routine alignment might be necessry as we have already noted, but that has to be in any case consistent with Nigeria's national interest and the path of truth as perceived by the leaders, and as a means of getting economic assistance from the great powes.

3.4 THE POLITICAL PRINCIPLE OF NONALIGNMENT AND IT'S IMPLICATION FOR THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA.

We have earlier argued that the Balewa government relied on the Western Countries for aid, hence it did not see its attachment to Britain, West Germany, as alignment. The government believed that aid was necessary for the purpose of development. It also believed that aid comes with strings attached and the choice to be made was between strings that were **acceptable**, and those that were unacceptable.

However, while greater caution attended the consideration of aid from Eastern bloc countries. There was a tendency to accept aid in good faith from the Westen countries. This was evident when the Soviet Union Offer of £20m interest free loan was rejected by the Balewa government after independence. Whereas when the US offered a £2½m agricultural loan in 1962, the minister of Economic Development decared:

"I hope that we shall be proved right, one must have confidence in a country like the US, Inspite of the doubt which may exist in the minds of some of us if we are to bring about quickly the economic and social development which we have planned".[31]

The intension of Western countries might partially explain the largely Westen dominance of aid received by Nigeria. In the first few years of independence, Nigeria had accepted aid from Britain, Canada, US, Netherland and New-Zealand. The only Soviet bloc assistance accepted before 1965 were scholarship for Nigerian

students.

TABLE THREE

Foreign Governments Aids to Nigeria

1962 - 1964

£M

Britain	25 : 19%
United States	45 : 0%
Western Germany	8 : 5%
Swiss	1 : 5%
Netherlan	4 : 0%
Isleal	1 : 17%
Italian	9 : 0%
Poland	15 : 0%
TOTAL	103: 86

Source: Nigerian National development Plan, Progress Report, Federal Ministry of Economic Development Lagos, 1964, P31,

Nigeria's continued dependence on West with respect to aid and investment has continue to increase rather than diminsh.

It is a widespread view point that external economic forces may influence policies in a variety of ways. To begin with, explicit political conditions may be extracted as the price of economic assistance. Alternatively, the receiving government may on it's own, without external prompting whatsoever, seek consciously

or unconsciously to shape it's national image to appeal to the assume preference and prejudice of benefactors. At the very least, this could mean not going out of one's way to annoy donor states in matters vital to them but only marginal to one's own interest. Give n all this, Nigerian leaders are aware of the calculated risk involved in accepting foreign aid. It was in this vein that the Prime Minister declared:

> " We find it absolutely necessary to rely on outsiders for the development of African territories ...(But) we must take care to know whom we invite to assist in the development of our resources, because ...if we are not careful we may have colonialism in different form". At the same time he stated, "I do not believe that any aid no matter from where it comes from is without strings, but identifying the strings and deciding whether they are acceptable".[32]

Despite this assertion, there is little doubt that economic conditions attached to aid offer have profoundly affected domestic policies. (In this sphere, the Nigerian government has been remakably receptive to foreign aid and specifically American advice). The same is true to a limited extent of economic relations. The impact of tied loan on the pattern of international trade is an obvious example. For instance the government's recognition that the communist power's use of aid as a means of promoting Communism on a world scale was incompactible with Nigeria's objective. Russia like the United States has used her economic power for political purpose in Yugoslavia (1948), Finland

(1958), China (1960).[33] What Could prevent it from doing so in Nigeria.

The acceptance of aid, was to help promote economic development. But economic development was only to be used as a tool for strengthening Nigerian nation hood. It was thought that an in flow of aid from Russia would produce the opposite result. Jaja Wachukwu when the foreign minister observed that

> "People go from the known to the unknown... In the case of the new comers (referring to Eastern European Countries), it will be suicidal if this country were to open its front gate and allow them to flood us...and after one year we find that we have been destroyed. There is sufficient evidence to show that if this country commits such indiscretion, this country will not last for two years before it is destroyed."[34]

The decision not to accept aid from Eastern bloc was not unversally popular in Nigeria. There were criticism by the youths, students and a number of prominent politicians both in government and opposition parties, [35] who resented governments action. Politically those who advocat ed that Communist aid should be accepted thought that the reasons advanced for rejecting it were not convincing. The New York times in a perceptive piece titled 'Parochialism in Africa describe it thus:

> "Repeatly one hears from eminent African Politicians that it does not really matter if their government get aid from Moscow or perping or Washington. There is almost a child like faith that Communism is repugnant to Africa and that they will be

able to handle the Russians."[36]

This believe it was thought was American design to maneouvre the federal government away from it's policy of nanalignment. At thesame time members of the federal government started to show interest in Communist aid.

Although, not much has been documented to bring Nigeria into foreign aid trap. But concrete instances both political and econmic strings attached to aid are descernible in Nigeria's political and economic relations with the super powers.

The events of the Anglo - Nigerian Defence pact and the intension that Britain would establish an Airforce for Nigeria, presupo sed a political string under the guise of econmic gains. This responsibility was later transfered to West Germany. On the 19th April 1963, an Administrative Agreement was signed with the German Government to that effect. The agreement involved the Supply of 56 air craft and the training of 1100 Nigerian Airforce personel. The bulk of the training was to be in Nigeria under the supervision of a seventy five man German Government taking care of its instructors.[37]

The significant thing about this agreement was that it was based on Nigeria's acceptance of West German Helstein Doctrine which precluded recognition of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). As von Basen a Senior member of the German government declared, 'the assistance was given as in other cases in Africa on the mutual understanding that Nigeria had sympathy towards the German people's right to self determination.' This was indeed a

clear case of commercial agreement with political string attached.[38] Although the West German had to pay a heavy price for the preservation of this principle. its effort has on the whole been remarkably successful as most African countries including Nigeria despite the numerous trade agreement signed with most Eastern European countries precluded East Germany. Helstein Doctrine does not specifically refer to the suspension of economic aid, there is little doubt that this would be the inevitable consequence of any diplomatic breach

It is illustrative to note that Nigeria's action in declining aid from the European Economic Community overseas development was not the result of the extension of the Helstein Doctrine. This decision has been taken earlier because of another string tied to the offer. This was the requirement that in order to qualify for aid, she should become an associate member of the Community, with all that was thought to imply political and military commitment designed to bind her to Europe. If the intension was simply not to demand concession in return then as one Nigerian delegate asked at the United Nation; "what prevent the same fund from being available to thesame countries through bilateral or multilateral arrangement not in any way contingent upon belonging to a pariticular trade grouping "?[40] or bloc.

Whether or not these complaint were justified, Nigeria certainly felt they were, the government was convinced, the Prime Minister reported to the Nigerian parliament that:

"Participation in (the political institution which constitute

part of the structure of the community would be incompactible with Nigeria's policy of nonalignment.... and would not be able to make her full contribution towards pomoting African unity. Repeately we are assured (by the British) that association would not involve Africa in the political objective of Western Europe..... we are unable however to conceive of a Community in which it will be possible to separate political and military from economic implication".[41]

Despite the fact that the government's diversification policy extended to the communist bloc countries, it does not undermine government's fear of the intricacies of communist aid. It seems that the paranoia over Communism and communist idea dictated how far these should go for instance, when the Soviet mission visited Nigeria, the delegation was restricted to ten personel compared to one hundred allowed the United States and Britain. That this were acts of deliberate policy can be gleaned from statement by some members of the government. The finance minister had for instance stated that "while the need to look for aid abroad was realised, his government was not prepared to take aid from (just any source come what may).[42]

There were other occasions when Nigeria rejected offer of aid on political grounds. This was when the Britaish offer to assume the responsibility for the inducement, travel and education allowances of British officials serving in Nigera. As the Minister of Economic Development explained;

"Nigeria wished to be free to recruit experts from any part of

theworld and an agreement with British at that time might have given the impression that Nigeria was committed to accept only what Britian offered."[43]

The various instances cited of attempts to attach political conditions to assistance extended to Nigeria do not suggest that Nigeria's foreign policy has as a result been greatly influenced. Only on the issue of relations with the then East Germany has Nigeria accepted a political string, hence Nigeria's interest is so slight that the principle involved was readily sacrificed to expediency. In other words, this was relative given Nigeria's continue dependence and quest for development. The real explanation of the lack of Soviet aid in the early days of Nigeria's independence is undoubtedly to be found in the image which each country has of the other. Although Nigerian leaders are aware of the risk involved, yet they are quite sincere in saying that they would welcome aid from any source.

Against this background, an attempt shall be made to examine the dominant themes of Nigeria's relations with the Western and Eastern bloc countries.

3.5 NIGERIA-UNITED STATES RELATION.

Post independent Nigeria withnessed two events in the 1960s, which considered together, fore ordained the pattern of Nigeria - US. relations. On November 1960 Dr. Wachukwu (Acting Permanent Representative for Nigeria at the UN) was elected Chairman UN conciliation commission on Congo. Nearly one year later, on

December 12, 1961, J.F. Kennedy announced an offer of £225m as long term development aid for Nigeria. These two events had significance one substantive, the other theoretical on subsequent Nigeria - United States relations.[44]

Nigeria's role in the Congo was significant for a number of reasons. First, the direct involvement through the UN in the resolution of the crisis less than two months after independent statehood was a clear international acknowledgement of its leadership potential in Africa. The kennedy aid offer underline the political importance which the U.S. attached to Nigeria in its evolving African diplomacy and in the security of Western position in the continent.

The implementaion of the first aid within the framework of the first National Development Plan, marked the begining of Nigeria's strategy to multilaterised its economic and political dependence in contrast to the traditional exclusive bilateral focus on the U.K. The US as a result emerged as the second most important metropolitan centre in Nigeria's external economic relations before 1967.[45] Since then,

> "Nigeria-United States relation can be described as having covered the whole gamut ranging from the suffocating embrace of the Balewa period, through the cordial and at times lukewarm friendship of Gowon's period, the ice frigidity of Muhammed to the warm embrace of the Obasango's period."[46]

It is worth nothing that Nigeria during the crucial period 1960 - 66, was clearly dependent multilaterily on both the U.S. and

the U.K., that is in addition to the emerging bilateral tie's to the U.S. During this period just mentioned, U.S. and the United Kingdom directly or indirectly accounted for more than 70% of all foreign economic aid recieved by Nigeria in this period. Witness specific case of the 1962 - 68 Development Plan in which the sum of $949.2m was to be raised through external loans and grants. The U.S. alone provided more than 80% while the rest was provisioned through the International Financial Agency (IBRD) mostly Britain and other Western donors. [47] Overall, the U.S. and its related agencies constitute the dominant source of aid for Nigeria.

It should be noted that the pattern of Nigeria's ties in the period in question closely corresponded to, and actually reinforced the external economic pattern presented above. Nigeria concentrated its fullest diplomatic attention on U.S, and cooperated intimately on major contemporary African issues.

Since the 1970s U.S. has emerged in a most functional sense as the dominant focus of Nigeria's external economic policies, especially in the areas of trade. By 1976 Nigeria accounted for about 40% of the total U.S. import from Africa as a whole. U.S. export to Nigeria in thesame year increased by 44% [48]. Perhaps more significant, Nigeria in 1973 - 79, sold to the U.S. about 38 - 56% of the total oil export (ccmpared to 11% of Nigeria's export to the U.S. in 1965), and this accounted for about 18-26% of the total crude oil import. By 1974, Nigeria had emerged next to Canada as the most important source of U.S. oil and by 1976 she was supplying the U.S. 14% of her oil needs ranking next to Saudi-

Arabia as the Major Supplier of oil to the U.S. [49].

Apart from it providing major export market for Nigeria's oil, by 1974 the U.S. was second to Western European countries (excluding Britain) as the major source of foreign capital to Nigeria. Most of this went to the oil industries where presently it can boast of having the largest number of oil companies. From the 1960s when it's participation in the oil industry was limited to Gulf and Mobile, by 1979, the U.S. had at least eight oil companies operating in Nigeria.[50] In September 1979 an agreement was also reached allowing an American Company DU-Pont company to start operations in Nigeria without taking on any Nigeran partner or meeting other requirements stipulated by government for business activities by external firms in Nigeria. Apart from being first of it's kind after the initiation of the indigenization programme in 1972, it was a contradictionof same.[51]

Exchange visits between Nigeria and the U.S. businessmen has by 1979 become a common place. In 1979 a trade delegation representing five American companies was in Nigeria. The same year a strong Nigerian trade delegation visited U.S. cities between June and July during which an agreement was concluded for the establishment of a Nigerian - American Chamber of Commerce in New-York, Princeton, Chicago and Washington.

The United States government and various private organizations (such as Rock efellela and Ford Foundations), have been very active in Nigerian Universities and other educational institutions, increasing governmental cooperation in this field has been evident.

In 1970, talks were held between the Nigerian National Universities Commission and the American Academy of Science on behalf of their respective governements. These talks were said to be aimed at facilitating the working together of both countries and achieve transfer of technology and mutual developmeant.[52]

In the military sphere, American cadets and other military personel have been regular visitors to Nigeria while the latter has been increasing her purchase of military equipment from the U.S. Between 1970 - 76 U.S. supplied only $12.6m worth of military equipment to Nigeria. However in 1976 alone she supplied $5m worth of equipment. Nigeria had also requested for the provision of some Naval equipments that same year. In 1977 Six CH 47 c helicopters were bought by Nigeria at the Cost of $45m. [53]

Cooperation and Understanding also feature in the field of international politics and diplomacy. While it is true that the U.S. was not forth coming in terms of diplomatic support to Nigeria during the civil war, she worked actively behind the scene in the setting of the OAU summit there. The resolution setting up the Committee was also directly relayed to Gowon through thesame chanel from the composition of the Committee being made up of clearly pro-Western countries, it is likely that the U.S. role in this regard was aimed at forestalling what was then seen as Nigeria's movement into the Soviet orbit.

Be that as it may, bilateral ties between the two countries constitute the essential channels whereby influence dynamics in Nigeria - U.S. relation takes place. On the whole they provided the

medium through which American personel and agencies seek to exercise leverage on the policy making environment in a manner that is beneficial to U.S. interest and policy objective.

NIGERIA-BRITAIN

Relations between Nigeria and Britain have ranged from one of close amity of the Balewa days to one of mutual suspecion, acrimony, down right hostility and name calling in the late 60s, at the first few months of the civil war in 1967, the late 1970s especially over alleged involvement of Britain in the assessination of Gneneral Murtala in Fabruary 1976.[54]

Although it is important to state that while the relationship between the two countries in the period 1960-1965 belong to an uncapturable past, a vanish world; it is also true to say that there has been some intervals of close cordiality between them such as from January 1970 to July 1975 coup d'etat, and for much of the second republic from October 1979 to December 1983. It has to be remembered that the Shagari government supported Britain in 1982 over the falkland War. Indeed the political tension between the two countries had not seriously jeopardised cooperation in other fields such as commerce, investmemt, and finance, military and Science. However, it is true to say that Anglo-Nigeria trade suffered under the Buhari government from January 1984 until August 1985 largely because of the counter trade agreement between some countries such as Brazil, France, Australia and Italy.[55] The colonial history left it's tangible factor that has continued to sustain Anglo - Nigeria

relations even in the face of political strains and stress.

Anglo-Nigerian economic ties have strengthened rather than diminished. While the United kingdom's share of Nigeria's trade has slipped from about 12% in 1961 to about 38% in 1975, and to about 25% in 1983, the United kingdom has continued to remain the largest source of Nigeria's imports. Trade between Nigeria and the United Kingdom from 1960 until 1974 was in favour of Nigeria. But since 1975, the position has been reversed. For instance in 1976, the value of Nigerian import from Britain was ₦1.92 million while the value of export to the United Kingdom was ₦162m. In 1983, the corresponding amount was 1.08billion and ₦319.7m.[56]

British share of foreign investment in Nigeria has been declining gradually since the 60s from 56.5% in Nigeria to about 43% in 1972, to about 40% in 1975. The investment of the British Petroleum in Nigeria in 1979 before the nationalization amounted to N2.3billion. Britain's investment in non oil Sector during thesame year was about N3billion.[57] Despite nationalization, British investment in Nigeria are still significant.

Military cooperation and the purchase of military equipments had continued under Gowon for the prosecution of the war. The commercial aspect has been more with the post Gowon regime. In 1972 an eleven man military delegation from the Royal College of Defence Studies were in Nigeria for a visit. Two military delegation one in september 1975 led by Major General Mana and another by Col T.A. Boam in 1976 visited the country in connection with the establishment of the Nigerian Army Staff College Jaji.[58]

Britain is still a haven for Nigerian students, the U.S. has proved a serious challenge and figures in both countries run into thousands (Official 6,336 in 1979 in the case of Britain). Britain had also placed about 217 Nigerian students in her polytechnic and colleges of Education in respect of Nigeria's TMTP.[59]

The Nigeria of 1979 was obviously not a British responsibility as the U.S. Secretary Dean Rush opined in 1967. But the fact that political and economic relations are still very prominent is no doubt.

3.7 NIGERIA AND EASTERN EUROPE

Which ever perspective one may care to analyse it, there was clearly a politically significant but invisible line dividing the countries of the world into two major ideological camps. Even the most nonaligned country in the nonaligned movement could be categorised either in terms of its location, historical bacground, economic structure, and socio-political set up into either the Capitalist or socialist group of nations states.

As for Nigeria, the country has never had a government that could be regarded as pro-East, even though a regime that was decisively pro-West and anti East ruled in the early years of independence. However since 1966 which marked the begining of military in Nigeria's politics, successive Nigerian government have increasingly acknowledged the necessity of perceiving communism simply as the other man's point of view even though one may not agree with the other man's view point. Expectedly therefore, the

countries of Eastern Europe are not seen as the immediate concern of Nigeria's foreign interest. In accordance with the pragmatic models of concentric circles in the preoccupation and conduct of Nigeria's external affairs, the foreign policy makers are firstof all concerned with tackling issues and problem in Nigeria's immediate neigbouring environment, and West African sub-region, then those of Africa.[60] Eastern Europe enjoyed an added significance when one recalls that one country in the sub-region, the then Soviet Union was militarily the strongest regional power on the Europeen continent, and one of the World's two super powers. An attempt would be made to examine the widening in scope of relations with the socialist states.

Economic cooperation expectedly developed between Nigeria and the countries of Eastern Europe (more profound) during the War and after. As Olajide Aluko [61] and other scholars have demonstrated and as we have indicated earlier on, the ambivalent attitude of the countries of the core of Capitalist system towards Nigeria during the Civil war constituted to a more rigorous expansion and deepening of relations with the socialist countries. In 1967, the Nigerian government announced its acceptance of some grants and loans the Balewa government had been reluntant to accept from the Eastern Europe-an countries. These included N30m from the Soviet Union, N20m from Poland N10m. from Czechoslovakia, and 72million from Yugoslavia. In 1968 an aid agreement was concluded with Soviet Union where by she was to help Nigeria build an iron and steel mill at an estimated cost of N120m. Four years later, a Trade Agreement

was signed by the two counties. Under the Agreement, the Soviet Union was to provide Nigeria with technical assistance estimated at about ₦2m for the establishment of an Oil Training Centre at Warri. In another Agreement reached in 1979, the Soviet Union was to train 1,506 engineers, technicians and operational staff for trhe operation of the Ajaokuta steel complex.[62]

The extent to which Nigeria-Soviet relations had changed for the better is demonstrated by the fact that by 1974, the Soviet Union was conducting offshore Seismic studies and exploration activities for NNPC. The signficance of this new phase in Nigeria-Soviet relation, were those central to Nigeria's current and future development, the Oil and Steel Complex This relationship therefore presupposed that Nigeria-Soviet relations was determined by some basic economic necessity in attendance with the country's develpoment.

3.8 CONCLUSION

Technically nonalignment in international affairs was codified in tems of military security alliance. It was seen by the developing countries as the doctrine for economic development. This conception came to the centre stage of discourse in Lusaka (Zambia) in 1970 at the nonaligned Summit. The Lusaka declaration on peace, independence and cooperation in international relations designed to constitute the charter of nonalignment gave it a fresh meaning.

Nonalignment for Nigeria meant to be free to establish

friendly relations with every nation which recognized and respected Nigeria's sovereignty. And to have a free hand to select policies which could promote Nigeria's national interest.. It implied for Nigeria a policy of diversify dependence. The diversification of external relation that was initiated a few years after independence was necessitated by the political and economic necessity of development.

Nigerian governments from independence to the present subscribe to the objectives and principle of nonalignment. They are aware of the risk involved in accepting foreign aid from the super powers. Aid was to help promote economic develpment, But economic development was only to be used as a tool for strengthening Nigeria's independence and forging a nationhood.

NOTES.

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32. Cited in Douglas, G.A op.cit p.250
33. Bulletin on foreign Affairs Vol 1 No3 1971 op. cit p.4
34. Ibid
35. Ibid
36. cited in Bulletin on foreign Affairs Vol No3 january 1971 Ibid.
37. See Tyoden, S.G. op. cit

38. Olasupo, O. op. cit p.6

39. See Douglas, G. A op. cit p. 253

40. Ibid

41. It is the measure of misunderstanding that existed on each side on this question that EEC members expected that the offer of a voice in shaping Community policy on Africa would appeal to the English speaking African states, hence it is been interpreted as a sinister plot to entangle African countries in European Affairs

42. Stablility Budget, the six budget speech, 1963 (federal Min. of finance, Lagos), p.64 also EA Ajayi, op.cit. p3

43. Nigeria at this time rightly became sceptical about foreign aid following the earlier apprehension of the issues of the Anglo - Nigeria defence pact. The official pronouncement by the government butressed its freedom of action in its foreign relations.

44. Bassey Ate "Nigeria and the United States" In R.A.Akindele and G.O.Olusanya (ed) Nigeria's External Relation The first 25 years, (Ibadan ,Caxton press 1986),p.233

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE NONALIGNMENT IN A `NEW WORLD ORDER'

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the nonaligned-movement in a new world order. The focus of this chapter is an examination of the utility of nonalignment in a changing world order. The aim here is to show the relevance of the principles and objectives of the movement in the face of the new world order. The chapter shall also examine, if there has been a redefinition of nonalignment's opposition to the hegemony of the remaining super powers and the European Economic Community. Against the backdrop of this analysis, the study shall examine the changing international environment and Nieria's economic and political development.

The background of this analysis will give us an insight into the trend of events in the on going realignment or integrative alliance system in the East and Western bloc and the intricate response which attended these changes in Nigeria"s foreign relation.

4.2. THE UTILITY OF NONALIGNMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER.

In the face of the altered nature of the post cold war, (the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Eastern Europe), the question is whether the movement of the nonaligned - countries remain valid. An indepth assessment of the principles and objectives of the movement shows, however, that it is as relevant now to international relations and development.[1]

Nonalignment embodies the notion of global collective action of the south in both the political economic domains. Such collective actions remains of crucial importance for the countries of the south; indeed, in the new situation this is more important than ever before.[2]

The nonaligned movement has always been a positive stand for peace, human right and an economically just world which by inference meant the rejection of relationship which involved servitude and sacrifice of national self interest by perpetuating injustice and inequity.[3] The basic values and objectives of nonalignment not only remain valid in the current world order, they need to be promoted and defended vigorously. This world is no less unjust, inequitable, unfair, or dangerous than it use to be. Old problems broadly defined as North-South remains on the internal agenda, unresolved and often more acute. New ones have emerged, posing completely new challenges for international community, and for developing countries in particular. Economic divisions have increased in the North as well as in the South.[4]

Global interdependence in the context of growing inequalities between, and often within nations cannot be managed successfully by sheer power politics or by policies based on narrow cost benefit calculation as championed by the well-off and dominant nations in particular. Such an approach can only exacerbate the already marked tension and contradictions that cloud the prospect of peace which have began to instil a sense of disquiete and uncertainty among the peoples in the South, and also in the North, about what the future

holds in store.[5]

The end of the cold war, and super power confrontation presented a moment of great opportunity. Regrettably, however, it was hostage to the lack of balance on the world scene and the drive by the dominant power centre in the North to impose its own vision on the international system. It has already given rise to resentment and concern among countries of the South. Their powerlessness and marginalization is felt more acutely now than any time since the earlier colonial age. They also have to face new powerful force which erode their economic and political sovereignty and subtle yet highly effective ways which are difficult to resist.[6]

Collective awareness and knowledge are equally important, calling for increased effort by the nonaligned-movement under the new situation which prevails. They provide the foundation stone for collective action, which itself plays a critical role in enabling individual developing countries to advance in a number of ways namely:

i. To strengthen their own national development and to benefit from South South economic cooperation"

ii. to increase their influence and countervailing power vis-a-viz the North, which has strengthened its own mechanism of political, economic and military cooperation and coordination, including those intended to deal with and interven in the South.

iii. to influence the shape and functioning of the

> structures governing international political and economic relations, with a view to democratizing international relations and the world economic system.[7]

The pursuit of these objectives is thus imperative if a just new and equitable international order is to emerged. The nonalignment must take an order and strengthen its unity and cohesion.

Bassey Ate asserts that nonalignment was a platform solely for articulating the aspiration of the people of the newly emancipated countries in an ideal international order. Their leaders including Nigerian leaders were not unaware, however, of the realities of the prevailing system dictated by bipolarity which made it practically necessary for many of their governments to collaborate with member nations of the cold war alliance, even while professing nonalign ment in principle.[8] Nonalignment was a collective undertaking by the weak members of the international community to do battle psychologically with the major powers. The former hoped thereby to nurture the awareness of the public in the latter countries about the dangers of nuclear war, the inequalities in the international system. He argued that since nonalignment was an off shoot of bipolarity, there are grounds to arque that the movement will not endure in the emerging world order. This according to him will produce adverse implication for prospect of South-South Cooperation.[9]

This implies that regional self interest will become more

pertinent as a factor (even within the south) in determining the direction of external economic transaction. It also suggest the likelihood of acute competition within the rank of the South for the product access into Northern market. The rampact protectionism and inward looking trading bloc (the EEC) now threaten free world trade. In this vein, the nonaligned-movement will act as the forum for development question.

The call for a New international Economic Order (NIEO), was first formulated by the Group of 77 in 1964. The demand for (NIEO) received further impetus from its endorsement by the 4th conference of Heads of States and Governments of the Nonaligned-Countries which provided the immediate force for the formulation of the United Nation Declaration on the Establishement of a New International Economic Order and the programme of action on the establishment of NIEO adopted at the sixth summit special session in 1974.[10] Although this proposals have generally been unsuccessful and far too little has been achieved in development.

Since the future of developing countries lies in their economic development and in building new strength, it is also of vital importance to define an up date economic agenda for nonalignment which aim to secure more favourable international economic environment for national development effort-rather than the hitherto political issues. Most member countries of nonalignment, as well as other developing Countries are presently engaged in introducing new orientations to their domestic policies. For most part of these policies are aimed at enhancing the

dynamism of national economies through greater scope for enterprise, Innovation, , and the operation of market forces. The developing Countries have a vital stake in ensuring that conditions are favourable for the success of these policies. Not infrequently, the reversal or modification of earlier policies has involved costs, political and social as well as economic.[11]

For instance, the desire for economic benefit lay very close to the surface in the extra effort made by the Nigerian government in 1986 to either secure or retain the good will of the leading Wes tern powers when it accepted the implementation of the structural adjustment programme as a policy objective aimed at restructuring her deteriorating economy.[12] Moreso, Nigerian government's emphasis on population control; its acceptance and continous depreciation of the exchange rate of the naira, the use of large proportion of her earnings from oil for debt servicing, and the looseness in enforcing the ban on the importation of wheat from the U.S. and other Countries are all evidence of Nigerian government's vulnerability to Western coercive diplomacy. The economic cost of displeasing the West are now considered too high for Nigeria to bear in Nigeria's official circle.[13]

Success, however, is not dependent merely on the soundness and efficacy of the policies themselves. It is also crucially dependent on a supportive global environment without which the best of policies can be undermined and fractured. Such a supportive environment is all the more important since the policies themselves lay stress on outward looking patterns of development

and virtually all Countries are seeking to benefit at the same time from greater integration into the global economy through trade, investment flows and exchange of various kind.[14]

It is for this reason that any economic agenda for nonalignment must place a strong emphasis on the external economic environment for development and on the several elements that constitute each an environment. These embraces such issues as debt service burden, capital flow, market access and commodity prices. Favourable in each of these areas are crucial to the efficacy of domestic policies. The issues themselves have figured on the platform of the developing countries for a long time. But they take on new aspects and new dimensions in a changing situation and are in any case so basic and fundamental that they remain relevant over time.

The quest for change and improvement in these areas is not a quest, merely, for more aid or concession from the developed countries. It is essentially a search for equitable policies, mechanisms and systems that give strength to the development process and hence to the global economy as a whole.[15]

Another growing concern for the nonaligned-movement relates to the growing concern for the environment and social and human development. These are issues of greatest importance and increase attention given to them.[16] The future development of the underdeveloped nations now increasingly described in terms of "sustainable development", depend on two main requirements- "environmental space" to accommodate their industrialization and

rising living standards, that must essentially be made available through corrective actions on the part of the developed countries to reduce current and future pressures on the environment.

In this end, Ike Nwachukwu Nigeria"s Foreign Minister, in an address to the Nonaligned Ministers Meeting in Nicosia (Cyprus), urged all member nations to redoubled their efforts in the areas of debt servicing, science and technology, and the dumping of toxic wastes in developing countries. He further called the conference to support Nigeria's "dump watch" initiative so as to keep the deadly waste away from the third World.[17]

These new issues are not in any way a substitude for the hard issues in the areas of money, finance and trade. There should not, therefore, be any trade off between these sets of issues as subjects for international relations. Many of the major actions called for in relation to the new issues fall within the realm of domestic policies. The hard issues (the economic issues) on the other hand, essentially involve international action and call for responses from the developed countries.

In this direction, South-South cooperation itself must form an important part of any economic agenda for the nonalignment. The countries of the South cannot look to the developed countries to serve as the sole locomotive for their growth. The growing export of the South resulting from the new policy orientations cannot all be absorbed by the countries of the North. Trade and other linkages within the South need, therefore, to grows in importance and to be consciously pursued through cooperation arrangement, both regional

and inter regional. The existing institutional arrangement in Africa such as ECOWAS, AMU, PTA and SADCC and AEC should be reinforced and intensified to achieve the goal of African common market.[18] This would f urther strengthen the position of the developing countries in negotiations with the North.

The implementation of measures corresponding to nonalignment's agenda will also be dependent on the system of international organization and institutions. Such institutions are not only forums for negotiations; they are also sources of research and analytical contribution. It is important that the developing Countries make known their views on the several issues involved. In particular, they should ensure that economic and social role of the United Nation is not diminished by any effort to enhance its political role. They should ensure that vital matters relating to money, finance and trade do not become, essentially the preserve of institution which the voice of the developing countries is weak. Special attention needs to be given to the future role of agencies such as UNTAD that have played a central part in the analysis and negotiation of North -South problem. Nonalignment must take full account of these issues, lest it finds that the implementation of its economic agenda has been pre-empted for wants ,of a supportive institutional frame work.[19]

Implementation is also dependent on the Unity and cohesion of the members of nonaligned-movement and indeed of the developing countries as a whole. Issues in the field of international economic relations are increasing in complexity and require more preparation

and expertise than in the past. The developing countries can count less than before on the secretariat of international organization to provide the analytical background and policy recommendations relating to development issues.

Any political or economic agenda for the nonaligned-movement will need to be adopted to the vast changes that have taken place on the world scene in recent years. The recent political changes have already affected part of the frame which had fashioned the orientation of nonalignment in the past. The end of East-West confrontation has removed for the developing countries the rationale of equidistance from rival power blocs as a way of safequarding their independence and, of furthering their economic and social goals. This does not mean, however, that a new global scenario has now come into place that will ensure that their basic goals will henceforth be met. The logic of the developing countries working together has not weakened merely because East-West tension has subsided. In fact, it was not the East-West divide, but the desire of the new states mostly excolonies to promote the common interest of their own on the global political and economic scene. The logic of collective action will remain valid. The challenges facing them and nonalign ment, is how to identify such interests and the means of promoting them in the changing situation of ourtime.

In this course, the desire for equitable distribution of development resources between the North and the South will continue to dominate the centre stage of discourse of the nonaligned -

independence in the face of the changing world order.

The nonaligned states made a distinction between the nuclear and other military hegemony of the United States and the then Soviet Union -regarding the latter as largely defensive and offering the small middle sized developing states the best form of proctection against the nuclear capabilities of the U.S. and its Western allies. Secondly, there is the political hegemony of the Western alliance, which, in its earlier form of colonialism was shared by all nonaligned countries including Nigeria today. Despite their political independence, most African countries have continued to be dominated by the U.S. and its Western allies.

The economic hegemony has been exerted by the emergence of capitalism leading to the development of multinational cooperation which have penetrated and distorted the economies of the Third World and established lucrative markets for the colonial powers of old - leading as Walter Rodney has lucidly explained to increasing poverty of the third world nations.[21] Finally, and, worst of all, there is the cultural hegemony of the Western alliance system. The Western dominated communication system being the major instru ment of the alliance system for penetrating the developing societies and transforming them from within.[22] It is the prepondrance of the international communication system, it may be added, which has changed domestic consumer patterns in the developing countries. It has transformed the nature of internal politic s in this country and also helped in destabilising political system particularly those opposed to Western alliance.[23]

Nigeria cannot be said to be opposed to the Westen alliance system. But the cultural hegemony of the Western alliance system has constituted a string in her socio-political and economic orientation. The present attempt by the government at privatization and individual ownership of communication could be seen as a response or a break with the continued influx of western cultural hegemony.

While the nonaligned - movement has identified hegemony of the West ern alliance in all its form -military, political, economic and cultural as the major problem in the international system to be overcome before a just and equal world order can be achieved,[24] analysts have suggested that the movement could shift its emphasis from politics to economics, to become a counterpart to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is dominated by wealthy nations. [25]

Another dangerous phenomenon that has taken hold, not only of the members of Western alliance system but also nonligned countries is what could be described as the establishment of a garrison state.[26] Although little or no attempt has been made to transform Nigeria into a garrison state. Except for the calculated attempt by the British to bring Nigeria into the military objective of Europe via the embattled defense pact arrangement of 1962. Despite its failure, it would be observed today that whether in the developed, or in the developing countries, the building up of piles and piles of heavy armament has continued to gulp a larger portion of our foreign exhange. It is not difficult to see the connection between

armament production and the lack of economic development of the underdevloped countries who spend a large amount of their foreign exhange on arms. While the developed countries are in a position to carry on with the development of armament alongside with their economic development, in thecase of the developing countries, it always come in the way of underdevelopment. It is unfortunate that while they seek demilitarization at the global level, many nonaligned countries are becoming engulfed by the arms race.

Although Nigeria cannot be said to be caught in the web of the arms race. Yet it cannot be denied that Nigeria's military strength and arms purchase from the major super powers since independence has continued to increase rather than diminish.

Finally, the Western alliance system, dominated by the U.S. has developed both in theory and practice a justification for intervention including destabilization of the third world most of which small and medium size are unable to resist it. The U.S. invasion of Grenada, and interfernce in Nicaragua are clear examples of the violation of Rio Treaty as well as the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), and the United Nations.[27] Infanct America, France and Britain's coalition force in the Gulf since 1990 are ample challenge to the continue dominance of the globe by the Western countries. This makes it very clear that the challenge from the international system, dominated as it is by the U.S. are growing in nature and extent and threatening the convergence of the alternative international system, based on military non-intervention, political freedom, economic self

reliance and cultural autonomy which the nonaligned movement is trying to build up. In this regards, the nonligned -movement would need to reassert its objective in the light of the hegemony of the U.S. and its European allies. It is believed that the country that seek to dominate the world, would continue to threaten the poor and the weak. The task before the nonaligned movement is onerous given the penchant of the Western dominated allianc of developed countries for proposing aid to developing nations on their self define values.

The public opinion in the world, it may be noted, is changing rapidly against the hegemony of the U.S. and its Western allies in her socio-political and economic relations with the under developed countries. In Western Europe there are powerful movement that have seriously dissociated themselves from the world view of the new international right and are trying to disentangle themselves from the military posture of the U.S. and move towards peaceful orientation. Within Britain as wellas in France there are progressive movements that identify themselves with third world causes. Even within the United States, there has been movement like the Civil Right Movement, the Anti-Vietnam war movement, the peace and Women movements. [27]

The nonaligned-movement should, therefore Cultivate a more positive approach towards, and join hands with, all progressive people in the world in challenging the existing international alliance based on different kinds of powers-nuclear, political, economic and cultural -and greater challenges have to be mounted

for weakening it. It has to strengthen the UN system which due to its support to the nonaligned - movement is now being systmatically dismantled by the U.S. and its allies through the policies of with drawing from UNESCO, refusal for automatic compliance with the decision of the international Court of Justice, threatening to withdraw from the food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the IAED, and the UNTAD, limiting the United States contribution to World Bank, IDA to $2.25 billion over three year, refusal to continue contribution to the UN fund for population activities.[28]

As pointed out earlier, the nonaligned movement has consistently moved in the direction of greater institutionalization but inview of the changing international world order, it may have to think of setting up a new type of orgainzation for seeking peaceful solution to global problems and dealing with economic questions that confront it. It may be a place other than New York, [29] *Geneva, Paris and London, and also for protecting* their culture and developing new forms of communication with one another.

In this end, if the nonaligned-movement is the movement of the economically oppressed in world economy that is stillstructurally unequal and unjust; divided by a domination-subordination line, if it is the movement of the militarily weak in a world dominated by two blocs of nuclear powers, then the movement's continued existence can be taken for granted.[30]

Inspite of the growing spirit of understanding between the super powers in particular and the two economic-military blocs in general, the need for strengthening the movement of the weak of the

world is clear. For the historical basis of nonalignment is not simply that of neutrality in the ideological military struggle for world domination. The movement arose historically, out of the need to defend and enhance, through collective action, the freedom of previously colonised nations which also happens to be the nations that are, today economically dominated.

The rapproachment between rivals for world hegemony has not removed nor even reduced the realities of domination. Indeed, at the risk of sounding cynical, it can be plausily argued that if the global structural imbalance is not redressed progressively with the growing understanding between the rivals, the weak nations will become the victims of the latter power. In other words, we may have the unity of the oppressors against the oppressed. This posibility does not callfor opposition to rapproachment. It call for stronger and more collective action of the oppressed, it calls for the strengthening of the nonaligned movement, in a worldtilting to a unipolar system dominated as it is by the United State and its Western allies.

4.4 CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Given the objective which the nonaligned-movement sets to achieve from its inception, and given Nigeria's commitment to the doctrine of the movement, it will therfore be important to analyse the implication of the collapse of the bipolar system and the

emergence of the hegemony of the United States and its European allies on Nigeria's political and economic development.

We have examined in (chapter three) the politico-economic objective of Nigeria's policy of nonalignment in her relations with the Eastern and Western bloc countries. It was observed that nonalignment policy was adopted as a strategy by the government for freedom of action in the international system, and as a means of getting economic assistance from either of the super powers in the face of the cold war. With the present hegemony of the U.S. and its European allies in the international system, we are inclined to reflect on some of the impact which this realignment or the Western alliance system is likely to have on Nigeria's foreign relation. This development contains many posibilities which could either be positive or negative depending on how countries like Nigeria respond to the emergence of European single market[31] and U.S. hegemony in the international system.

With the recent development in the world economy, as various countries organiged themselves into regional politico economic blocs, and private, mostly transnational investors begin to realign their strategies in order to take full advantage of the opportunities to be offered by the European integration (1992) and to minimize any disadvantage it is likely to cause them. We have stated in places Nigeria's economic alignment to the west. With the changing imbalance in the international environment, this political and economic alignment need be define based on specific objectives and in Nigeria's national interest.

The decreasing share of Africa in the World trade, taken together with the drive towards rapid democratization in Eastern Europe, and Consolidated integration in the European Economic Community, have encouraged both the East and Western blocs to become inward looking. The Soviet in particular have altered their third world policies and indeed, had made selective retreat in the third world. Today, the Soviet Union rather than Serve as an alternative aid donor to Nigeria, has become a recipient of aid from the Western Countries. Joseph Garba in examining the impact of the changing East-West relation was of the view that "In contemporary world politics, security and economic situations are more often than not Skewed.. though not always deliberately .... with the resultant effect that Africa absorbs a disproportionate impact of the negative burden of Such skewed situtions"[32]

Concerned with the economic dimension of the problem, it has already been remarked that Africa including Nigeria has been withnessing a process of disinvestment particularly by Japanese and American investors, as these investors relocate their interest in Europe. In the case of Nigeria, in spite of the numerous investment incentives articulted by the state under the structural adjustment programme, the country has suffered a general capital flight. Although this capital flight may not primarily be attributable to the march towards Europe 1992 (European integration), some of the investors that have left the country did so impart because of a change in their global strategies. Chase Manhattans, Citicorp and Messrs Joufrau Internatioal are three of the foreign investors that

left Nigeria's economy as partof the reorganizaton of their global operation.[33] It is also illustrative to note tnat this capital is being diverted to the Eastern European countries many of which have since 1986, began to open up their economies in the wake of "perestroka" and "glasnot" introduced by Gorbachev's administration in the then Soviet Union.

This development could be viewed as a tactical retreat, as part of the effort by the Western countries to sustain their alliance system. The resultant impact of this on Nigeria is that it will affect the prospect of Nigeria's economc development.

One of the chief objectives of European integration is to boost intra EEC trade while simultaneously increasing the community's share of total world trade. The import policies of the industrially developed countries have played a major negative role in our foreign trade perfomance. The (Lome 111 convention) not withstanding, protectionism and restrictive agricultural practice in the EEC, the USA have resulted in an over-supply of some agricultural commodities and thus reduced world wide demand and depressed world prices.[34] Nigeria's principal trading partners are mainly Western European countries and the country's export to them consist of mainly crude oil and agricultural commodities. Given the complex quota system operated by the EEC in its trade relations with the African, Carribean and Pacific (ACP) Countries with which it has a pact (the Lome Convention), and also because oil export are largely governed by the Organization of petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas, there does not seem to be too much scope

for the expansion of the Nigeria's agricultural and petroleum export to the EEC. Other outlet would have to be sought especially in Eastern Europe, North America and Asia.[35]

As to manufactured exports, this has only recently attracted serious attension from the government as part of the strategy for managing and overcoming the country's economic crisis and dependence. Much of Nigeria's current manufacturing export takes place within West Africa and is largely unrecorded as the business is carried out primarily by informal sector particularly women traders in the sub-region. Manufacture export to Europe, North America and Asia remain insignificant part of the country's overal external trade profile. The task of expanding manufactured export to the EEC would seem to be made even more difficult as the single market countries unite behind one set of tariff barriers in relaion to the rest of the World or, as some have argued, to the exclusion of the rest of the World..... the so call fortress Europe. [36]

Once the single market is established, the already strong culture of consultation among the EEC countries is likely to be further strengthened.

It is reasonable to expect from 1992 onward a closer coordination of the country's aid policy to the third world. Owing to the oil boom of the 1970s and early 80s, Nigeria ceased to be a major recipient of aid and grants. Indeed, the country became donor extending financial support to African countries. With the on set of the Nigerian economic crisis in the 1980s, the country's per-capita income fell dramatically such that Nigeria sought and

became classified as a "low income" as opposed to a middle income country. Since the mid 1980s, Nigerian Government officials have been campaigning for increase aid and concessionary financial flows to the country.[37] Over the years the external trade of thecountry has deteriorated. For example, 1980-1983, export earning had declined by 40% but improved slightly in 1985 to 1986. Petroleum price fell dramatically after 1985. Prices for many agricultural commodities (including cotton, cocoa, rose from 1987 - 90. This has considerably affected the country's foreign earning. Whatmore, many donors have had difficulty in treating Nigeria as a low income country.[38] Thus, not very much has been received in aid and grant from the Western countires, and it does not seem that this is a situtaion that is likely to alter after 1992 even though the Lome Convention may have undergone an increase in absolute term. It does not seem obvious that the achievement of the single market by the countries of the EEC will bring about any significant changes in the terms on which Nigeria's external debts, especially those owed to groups within the community would be rescheduled or refinanced.[39]

The agreement by western creditors (private and public)to reschedule Nigeria's external debt was contingent upon the acceptance and implementation by the state of the IMF/World Bank sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme. Once the programme was adopted in 1986, Western financiers organized into the London and Paris Club, and EEC governments agreed to reschedule the country's outstanding obligations. It can be expected that, as with aid and grants, EEC member countries will act even more closely together on

how to handle the global debt crisis. For as long as the Nigerian state continues to submit to IMF/World Bank supervision, it can be expected that the EEC will continue to support debt rescheduling arrangement for the country. Whether the terms of rescheduling will be better after 1992 than those negotiated is open to debate, in our estimation, it is not likely that Europe 1992 will lead to a better debt rescheduling terms for Nigeria.[40] This presupposed that Nigeria's economic policies would for long continue to rely on the dictates of the Western capitalist countries.

Apart from the economic implication, the collapse of bipolarity has a number of other fundamental implications. In the areas of security, African countries including Nigeria now have a unique oppotunity to devise an authonomous system to address present and further occurence withouth cold war interference. Indeed African intellectuals and political leaders should now conceptualise national and regional security to conform to the developmental needs of the African masses. In the past, cold war conception of security in Washington, Moscow, were simply transposed to the continent to be implemented in maintaining bipolarity.[41] It is illutrative to state that the present effort by the Nigerian government through its leadership of the ECOMOG in Liberia, Served as an evidence of the colapse of bipolarity and super power politics and rivalry hitherto prominent in Africa.

The renewed emphasis on multiparty democracy and the observation of human right (which were the basis of anti-colonial agenda) owes much to the collapse of bipolarity. The whole world is now

embracing Western democracy and free enterprise.

While the need for an accelerated development among the nonaligned nations is incontrovertible, there are still considerable doubt about the success given the dependent state of nonaligned countries. The need for an equitable distribution of development resources between the North and the South has become one of the recurrent themes of the nonalignment. Analysts have argued that, despite the espousition of the policy of nonalignment by the Nigerian government, the movement could not offer anything tangible to Nigeria. While it lacked the wherewithal to contribute to the economic needs of the country like the European Economic Community. This therefore presuppose a redifinition of the objectives of the policy of nonalignment in the light of the changing circumstances inthe international environment.

The nonaligned-movement has over the years called for an equitable distribution of development resources and a better terms of trade between the North and South. It is worth noting that, the tariff and non tariff barriers to trade by Western Countries have discouraged value added of semi-processed agricultural imports from African states. For example, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)has estimated that 50% reduction in Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s trade barriers would result in a net annual increse of about $87million worth of Africa's exports. Thus, Africa's export to the major trading OECD partner states have suffered as a result of undue protectionism.[42]

This development is not likely to be made easy bythe move of

the EEC to consolidate integration by 1992. Integration would be strengthened through monetary integration. It is envisaged that this would lead to economic growth that would ensure demand for greater imports.

It was against the backdrop of this development that analysts have suggested a redefinition of the objectives of nonalignment in the light of the changeing international environment. It Suggested a shift of emphasis from politics to economics in opposition to the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development which represent or, protect the interest of the West. At the Continental level, various integrative alliance have developed. the idea of an African Economic Community was first mooted in the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980. The authors of this plan, the United Nations Economic Commision for Africa (ECA), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) assumed that this ought to be part of the long term strategy to tackle the problem of undevelopment and the menace of economic recession in the continent. This move was re-echoed at the 1991 OAU Summit in Abuja on the need for the establishment of an African Economic Commision (AEC). The Abuja declaration has the following objectives; to promote development, cooperation and integration among its members in all economic, Social and Cultural field. The attainment of these objectives would inter-alia occur through the elimination of tariff barriers among the member states and the establishment of a common external tariff against Third World Countries. The African Economic Commission (AEC) as envisaged in the treaty, would serve as the general umbrella for the existing

sub-regional integration scheme in the continent.

This development will enhance the prospect of regional integration to promote self reliance. If these integrative schemes ECOWAS, AEC, are relenthlessly implemented, then the out look for the Socio-economic development will be brighter than in the cold war era. The prospect of conducive political system will be achieved without the hitherto super power interest. General Nwakhucwu Nigeria's foreign Minister noted that:

> "the rapidly changing international power alignment requires a critical assessment of the Third World movement and the conceptual frame work that will continue to make it most relevant to the Current Situation." [43]

He furthered that:

> "Nonalignment should now be seen by all of us as a commitment to specific goals of improving human conditions, particularly the removal of poverty... that "the direction of the movement's future course should be now to seriously address the issues of international economic relations in all its dimension, that the political climate in the world might have improved for members, the economic environment has been deteriorating".[44]

In this end, He urged that necessary measures to improve the Global System of Trade Preference (GSTP) regime which was essential for rapid economic growth as well as useful mechanism for expanding South - South trade be made.

Nonalignment could not ignore the need to demonstrate greater

determination to strengthen cooperation within the south in view o the effort by the industrialized North to harmonize their economi strategy which might result in a single market by 1992. Nigeria a a regional power could use its resources in promoting this South - South cooperation.

4.5 CONCLUSION

With the altered nature of the post cold war order (i.e th demise of the cold war and the disintegration of the Eastern bloc) the question has been as to whether the movement of nonaligened countries remains valid. An assessment of the principle an objectives of the movement, however, shows that it is as relevan to international relations and development.

The objective of the movement include among others; worl peace, elimination of colonialism and all forms of imperia domination and the democratization of international economi relations.

However, with the changing inbalance in the internationa system, it has become imperative for the nonaligned-movement t reassert its objectives and principle, in order to demonstrate it utility. The policy entails deep reflection and the maximizatio of 'various country's relation in international politics Nonalignment was solely a platform for articulating the aspiratic of the people of the unerdevelop State in an ideal internationa order.

Since nonalignement was an offshoot of bipolarity, it has bee

argued that the movement will not endure in the emerging would order. It is believed that the colapsed of bipolarity will now provide a renewed interest in consolidating regional self interest. It also suggest the likelihood of acute competition within the rank of the southern countries for the product access into the Northern market. In this end, nonalignement will act as a forum for development question.

Despite this, the developed States have continued to maintain their hegemony on the underdevelop States. What we have today, is the emergence at the international level of a transnational system, the Western alliance System. This hegemony is based on the clear political, economic and cultural domination of the world by the Western alliance. In this end, the movement in opposition to this hegemony, could shift its emphasis from politics to economics, to become a counterpart to the (OECD) which is dominated by wealthy Nations.

The colapse of bipolarity and the emergence of the hegemony of the US. and its European allies has both political and economic implication for Nigeria's development. This development contains many posibilities which could either be positive or nagetive. It was observed that, the impact of changing East-West relations in contemporary politics, security and economic situations more often than not is skewed though not always, with the resultant effect that Africa absolve a disproportonate impact. Nigeria for one has been withnessing a process of disinvestment by Western invests despite the numerous incentives articulated under the structural adjustment

programme. With the new realignment process, it is believed that Western investors would be reluctant in proposing aid to Nigeria moreso most of the Western countries would hencefort derect their capital to Eastern Europe which has since 1986 began to open its economies.

In this end, the dependent posture of the Nigerian government on the West need be redefined in the light of these changes

The nonaligned-movement has over the years called for an equitable distribution of development resources between the North and the South.

NOTES

1. Guardian 23 September, 1991.
2. Nonalignment in the 1990s Contribution to an Economic Agenda, (South Centre, August 1992), P1
3. 1bid P.1
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CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 GENERAL CONCLUSION

The study examined Nigerian Government's policy of nonalignment between the period of 1960-1992. By the start of the 1960s, the international system was altered for what it had been before the war. Before the war, what was called international relations was essentially the relations among the countries of Europe, where the nation states had developed. The US. located outside Europe had been drawn into the system and was as a matter of fact, the major belligernt between 1941-1945. The major powers, were Britain, france and Germany. Large areas of the world were colonies. The war accelerated the process of internationalization of system of relations among countries. The major European powers were so weakened by the war among themselves that they were unable to maintain their dominance over their colonies. The surge to independence subsequently spread to other parts of the world particularly Africa.

In this end, the international system which faced Nigeria at independence was a conflictual one rather than a harmonous one. foremost of this development was the emergence of military locs, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Warsaw Pact Security alliance reflecting the ideologies of the Capitalist West and the Communist East. More fundamental was the events of the Cold war which threatened global peace and Security.

Against this background, most African sates including Nigeria at independence were faced with a hostile and conflictual

international environment. This therefore meant defining ther position in relaion to the Super powers. In this end, Nigerian Government chosed the policy of nonalignment in the face of the Superpower politics.

Nonalignment therefore emerged as a response by the third world countries to the ideological rivalry between the two super powers. African countries including Nigeria at independence discovered that the liberation of their colonies from Western colonial rule did not mean that they wanted to become anybody's satellite. Hence the rejection of bloc politics. Despite this, Nigeria at independence, rejected the nonaligned- movement. The reasons attributed was that during this period, the linchpin in Niger's diplomatic strategy was the cultivation and maintenance of an alliance with Britain and a special relations with the Western bloc.

Nigeria's attitude towards the nonalignment as a movement and doctrine later underwent a gradual transformation. By 1962, nonalignment was reluctantly accepted as a cardinal principle of Nigeria's foreign policy. Despite Nigeria's acceptance of nonalignment, its leaders continue to define the doctrine as simply freedom of judgement on important international issures and on the basis of national interest and that of world peace. As conceived in Belgrade, nonalignment meant much more than either refusal tojoin a military pact or, simply independence of political action and judgement. It was formed mainly to give small and newly independent states greater influence in the determination of the course of

world politics in international relations.

The movement was conceived in strictly military security terms in its early stage. It began to be peceived as a doctrine for economic develoment. The Lusaka (Zambia) 1970 declaration on peace, independence and cooperation gave fresh meaning to the movement. Nonaligment for Nigeria meant to be free to establish friendly relations with every nation. It implied for Nigerian leaders a policy of diversified dependence but only in a special sense. The diversification of external relations that was initiated a few years after independence was necessitated by the politico - economic necessity of development. It thus took the form of widening of scope in relations with the capitalist world and the establishement of ties with the socialist world.

Successive Nigerian Governments from Balewa to Babangida Subscribed to the objectives and principles of nonallignment. But in practice, they were inconsistent in the pursuit of their objectives.

A closer look at the politics of diversification of Nigeria's external relations reveals that it was not diversification without discrimination, but, that the whole process was ideologically determined. It does not for instance seem that the government saw its attachment to individual coutries like Britain, West Germany as alignment as these were members of the bloc to which she had sworn nonalignment.

Nigerian leaders are aware of the calculated risk involved in accepting foreign assistance from the super powers. Aid was to help

promote economic development. But economic development was only to be used as a tool for strengthening Nigeria's independence and forging a nationhood. In this end, even though not much evidence has been documented over attempts to bring Nigeria into foreign aid trap, concrete instances are discernible in Nigeria's political and economic relations with the super powers. The U.S., West Germany and the European Common market are offenders in this direction. Whatever amount to the depth of this relationship, Nigeria's dependence on external assistance has continued to increase rather than diminish.

With the altered nature of the post cold war order (the colapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Eastern bloc), the question has been as to whether the movement of the nonaligned countries remains valid. An assessment of theprinciples and objectives of the movement however shows that it is relevant to international relations and development. With the colapse of the Eastern bloc and the demise of the Soviet Union, it has therefore become imperative for the nonaligned movement and the nonaligned countries to reassert their principles and objectives in the face of the hegemony of the Western coutries and the United States.

Nonalignment was solely a platform for articulating the aspiration of the people of the underdeveloped states. Since nonalignment was an offshoot of bipolarity, it has been argued that the movement will not endure in the emerging new would order. It is believed that the collapse of bipolarity will now provide a renewed interest inconsolidating regional self interest. It also suggets

the likelihood of acute competition within the rank of the south for the access in to Western market. In this end, the nonalignment will act as the forum for develoment question.

The Collapse of bipolarity and the emergence of the hegemony of the U.S. has both political and economic implication on Nigeria's development. With the changing imbalance in the international environment, this political and economic alignment to the West need be redefined based on specific objectives and in Nigeria's national interest. The decreasing share of Africa in the World trade, taken together with the drive towards rapid democratization in Easten Europe and consolidated integration in the European Economic Community, have encouraged both the Eastern and Western bloc countries to become inward looking. Nigeria for one has been withnessing a process of investment. Some of the investors that have left the country did so in part because of a change in their global strategies. Chase Manhattans, Citicorp and Messrs Joufrau Internatioal are some of the investors that have left Nigeria's economy. It is also believed that Western investors and governments would be reluctant in proposing aid to Nigeria. This capital world henceforth be diverted to Eastern European countries many of which have since 1986, began to open up their economies in the wake of perestroika and glasnot inroduced by Gorbachev's administrtation in the Soviet Union.

In this end, the dependent posture of the Nigerian government would need be redefined in the light of the changing circumstances in the international system, and its commitment to the policy of

nonalignment. The nonaligned-movement has over the years called for an equitable distribution of development resources and a better terms of trade between the North and South. It suggest a shift of emphasis from politics to economics in opposition to the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which represents the interest of the Westen countries. This development will enhance the prospect of self reliance. If integrative schemes such as ECOWAS, AEC, are relentlessly implemented, then the outlook for the socio-economic development of Africa will be brighter than in the cold war era. The prospect of a conducive political system would be achieved without the hitherto super power interst in Africa.

Nigeria in this regard, and as regional power could use its resources in promoting this south-south coopertaion.

5.2 RECOMMENDATION

Given these developments, Nigeria's political and economic response to the changing imbalance in the international system should be to create a conducive atmosphere within, through which the release of resources for development, and by greater emphasis on the non-military aspect of security. In this reqard, emphasis should be placed onthe exploitaion of its resource for a sustained economic development rather than the continued dependent posture on the West.

The need for African countries to pool and harmonize their

resources together to take advantage of the opportunities, and challenges offered by thevarious integrative alliances in the East and West has become more relevant. Nigeria, given her resource base, could (under the nonalignment forum) act as a driving force for development and so propel other countries in the nonaligned movement in the process of integration. More important is to mobilize public opinion in favour of integration with a view for them to realize its significance within the ECOWAS, AEC, and to diversify production in order to have access into, and be competitive in the European market.

The fixation that we must always look forward to the North has to be re-examined.

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