NIGERIA'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ECOWAS

1975 - 1992

BY

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DECLARATION

I Johnson Ngozi Thelma do hereby declare that the study is an original work of research by me. To the best of my knowledge, it has never been presented partially or wholly anywhere for the award of a degree in any form. All quotations and literature cited from other sources are fully acknowledged.

CERTIFICATION

This dissertation by Johnson Ngozi Thelma meets the regulation governing the award of the degree of masters of science, Political Science (International Relations) of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for acceptance in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree.

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DEDICATION

To my most loving parents Mr and Mrs A.U. Johnson and to my sisters and brother: Betty, Doris, Laura, Maureen, Peggy and Uche. With you all my life has achieved its essence.

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ABSTRACT

The study is concerned with the assessment of Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS. Evidently Nigeria has the potential to play a leadership role in the West African region because of her human and material resources. in assessing Nigeria's actual role the study examined propositions which aimed at determined the extent to which her comparatively prepondrant resource endowment has facilitated her playing a leadership role in West Africa. The work made an assessment of Nigeria's leading role in ECOWAS between 1975-1992 to buttress her unique position in the sub-region.

The historical background to the formation of ECOWAS was examined to place the study in proper perspective. Then we examined Nigeria's economic contributions to ECOWAS. In doing this, hei efforts at promoting intra-regional trade, Trade liberalisatior scheme, industrialisation, financial assistance and aid to membei states were discussed. In this section, it was also pointed out that Nigeria is the highest contributing member to ECOWAS budget and the Fund with about 32.8% of total contributions. Her role in this regard has been remarkable and she has continued to be concerned with the interest and well-being of the people of the region.

An assessment of Nigeria's political contributions revealed that the peace and security of the region is foremost in her policy, but the devergent views among the member states have affected this idea. The member states seem to give priority to national interest rather than to community goals. This not withstanding, Nigeria has been commited to maintaining peace and security in the region and this is reflected in the various crisis situations she has helped to pacify. This work made an in dept, study of three of such situations. Nigeria has used her leadership role in ECOWAS to champion the cause of the region in the international arena. This has portrayed her as a power and a force to reckon with in the region.

Based on our findings, we suggest among other things that Nigeria should plan her leadership role so that it would be played to her interest and satisfaction, improve her economic and financial situation to enhance her role, improve her military capability and relationship with France and her neigbours especially the Francophone Countries.

CONTENT

Declaration..... i
Certification..... ii
Dedication..... iii
Acknowledgement..... iv
Abstract..... vi
Content..... viii
List of Abbreviations..... x

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 General background..... 1
1.2 Statement of the problem..... 2
1.3 Literature review..... 4
1.4 Significance of study..... 9
1.5 Theoretical framework..... 10
1.6 Proposition..... 13
1.7 Definition of Concept..... 13
1.8 Methodology..... 15
1.9 Organisation of study..... 15
Notes..... 17

CHAPTER TWO
Historical background to ECOWAS

2.1 Introduction..... 21
2.2 Pre-Colonial West Africa..... 21
2.3 Colonial West Africa..... 25
2.4 Intergration in Post-Colonial West Africa before ECOWAS..... 26
2.5 Nigeria and the formation of ECOWAS..... 33
2.6 Aims and objectives of ECOWAS..... 38
Notes..... 42

CHAPTER THREE

The economic Contributions of Nigeria to ECOWAS.

3.1 Introduction..... 45
3.2 The socio-economic structure of Nigeria..... 46
3.3 Trade Relations in West Africa and Nigeria's contributions..... 53
3.4 Indutrial cooperations in West Africa and Nigeria's contributions..... 60
3.5 Financial contributions of Nigeria to ECOWAS.. 63
3.6 Conclusion..... 70
Notes..... 71

CHAPTER FOUR

Nigeria's political contributions to ECOWAS

4.1 Introduction..... 74
4.2 ECOWAS and regional security..... 75
4.3 Nigeria's Role in conflict mediations in West Africa..... 78
4.4 Factors affecting Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS..... 87
4.5 Conclusion..... 92
Notes..... 93

CHAPTER FIVE

Summary and Conclusion

5.1 Summary and finding..... 95
5.2 Conclusions..... 96
Recommendations..... 97
Notes..... 101

BIBLIOGRAPY..... 102

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEAO -- Communante Economique de I' Afrique de I'ouest.
ECOWAS -- Economic Community of West African States.
EEC -- European Economic Community.
ECOMOG -- ECOWAS Monitoring Group.
MRU -- Mano River Union.
OERS -- I'organisation des etats Riverrains du Senegal.
OMVS -- I' organisation pour la mise en valuer du fleuve Senegal.
UDAO -- Union Douaniere de I'Afrique Occidentale.
UDEAO -- Union douaniere des etats de l'ouest.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION.

1.1 General Background.

> "Nigeria is no doubt one of the foremost of the new middle powers" that are assuming an increasing importance in world affairs"[1].

The rational and motive behind the study is to assess and ascertain the notion that Nigeria plays a leadership role in the economic community of West African states (ECOWAS). We also intend to find out if she has the capacity to enhance the nation's image in the community. In this regard the analysis will involve an assesment of the efforts made by Nigeria between the period (1975-1992) towards the community to justify her assumed leadership role.

ECOWAS was the first regional cooperation in West Africa, combining the francophone and anglophane countries of the subregion. The Nigerian and Togolese initiatives of 1974 culminated in the signing on the 28th may 1975 of the ECOWAS Treaty in Lagos.

Right from inception, Nigeria has supported immensely, West African efforts towards regional integration. She worked actively to encourage other West African states and even pressurised their governments towards regional unity. Nigeria was able to do this because of her human and material resources which accorded her unique position in the region. From the perspective of realist scholars, elements of state power (size of population, military capability, technological advancement, quality of diplomacy, national character) which are used as parameters for measuring the relative power of states[2]. Nigeria occupies a "core position in West Africa with these resources. As Karl Deutsh observed, the development of a strong 'core' state seemed to promote intergration if the 'core' state had certain capabilities[3].

In other words, integration normally starts from a developed area which will eventually serve as the leader for that region. Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS has been manifested in several aspects with regards to the community's activities. In her determination to see to the implimentation and success of ECOWAS, the Nigerian government spent large sums of money as aid mostly in the form of grants and low interest loans to other West African states[4]. She has also assisted in building the communities structures, paid a large part of the budget funds, mediated in conflicts and disputes between member states. The Liberian crisis which is a case in point has enhanced Nigeria's image in the region and emphasised that she has the capability to play the leadership role.
It is in this regard that professor Joseph Frankel described Nigeria as "a regional power" in black Africa[5].
For a critical analysis, the study will also be concerned with the problems hindering Nigeria's leadership role and examine if the continuation of this role is justified.

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The objective of this study is centered on finding answers to questions relating to Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS between 1975-1992.
The questions germane to this study are :-

1. To what extent can Nigeria be regarded as a "regional power" in West Africa? Answer to this question will involve an assessment of Nigeria's capability as a regional power. This also includes the analysis of Nigeria's initiatives for peace in the region (ECOMOG), regular contributions to ECOWAS's budget, financial and technical assistance to member states, which is essential to the success of ECOWAS. Essentially, her leading role in handling regional affairs will be analysed.

2. At what cost is Nigeria playing the leadership role ? According to Donald Puchala, every international objective carries a price tag marked "cost" in terms of national resources[6]. From this it implies that in international politics, for a nation to be able to pursue a particular objective, no matter how small or big, it must be able to allocate resources to the objective and must be willing to pay the expected cost. Therefore, to play the leadership role effectively, Nigeria must allocate and spend resources to that effect.

Nigeria's activities have been commited to the benefit of the other nations in the subregion. She has on many occasions, given largesse in the form of financial assistance, military aid, diplomatic shuttle to make peace or to bring certain order into being. For instance, Nigeria offered to Dahomy (Benin Republic) a N1 million interest free loan[7] and contributes 32.8% of community's budget[8]. The Federal government has also given active support towards the formation of ECOWAS bank and in the restoration of peace in Liberia. In short, Nigeria appears to be playing the role of a " big brother".

Going by the thesis of international relations of power theory, Nigeria is doing what she is doing with the intention of pursuing her national interest in the region. National interest is that interest which is dictated by a nations power[9]. This, in the Nigerian context is defined as the promotion of Nigeria's national security or the enhancement of national power. Addressing the 'All Nigeria's peoples confrence on foreign power in Kuru in 1986, Babangida noted that it would be useful and necessary to think of national interest as national security interest[10].

3. What impediments has Nigeria encountered as she attempts to play a leadership role ?
Right from the begining, when Nigerian delegates were shuttling within the region to see to the reality of ECOWAS, she has encountered problems, especially from the Francophone states and France. There is the fear of domination on the part of the Francophone states that Nigeria with her endowments will dominate them. This prompted the suggestion by senghor to include Zaire in ECOWAS to serve as a counter weight to Nigeria's power[11]. France on her own part had been suspicious of Nigeria's role in the region as she is scared of Nigeria usurping her role in the region. To this end, she pionnered the communante Economique de l' Afrique de l'oust (CEAO). The problem posed by France is better assessed in the words of Mazrui when he declared that "the natural rival of Nigeria is France. [12]

4. What are Nigeria's ultimate benefits in playing the leadership role ?
Every action taken by any nation in the international system is geared towards a goal. With the happenings in the world, the international scene has become a place where "might is right". Nigeria does not want to be left out of the events taking place in the international system. For this, she aspires to be recognised as a state to be reckoned with in the region. These issues form the central set of problems which this study examines.

1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW

Many authors have worked in this field of study. They have made significant contributions in their bid to offer theoretical explanations relating to Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS. In analysing this topic, many scholars have assessed it from different perspectives. Some have argued in favour of Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS while some others have argued against.

In his assessment of Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS, Udo Udokang, observed that the survival of ECOWAS is in the interest of Nigeria and for this reason, he asserted that it is necessary for Nigeria to lead and speak for the region. He views this role in terms of her national power and argues that the nation's human and material endowments precipitated her status as a "regional power" and participation in the comity of nations.
As he puts it, "In the life of the nation's economic power, that is, the control and exploitation of wealth is the fundamental basis of national power, it is also the criterion of a state's influence and prestige in the international community."[13] The economic base, he argues would provide opportunity for Nigeria's industrialization, thus making her an independent economy and increase her national bargaining power.

Similarly, Eghosa Osagie views Nigeria's role in terms of her population and natural resources. He is also of the view that economic endowments are essential for the growth and development of a nation. This he says, has enhanced the image and role of Nigeria in the region.He contends that, "Population and rich natural resources which include crude petroleum _____. The potential wealth of Nigeria suggest that Nigeria can dominate other countries."[14]

In the same vein, Ezenwe, echoes the leadership capability of Nigeria using her preponderant endowments. According to him, "The hope of ECOWAS was Nigerian core state leadership. Nigeria's core state capability was based on its overwhelming prepondrance in the region, it's possession of oil and its internal market"[15].He notes that during the oil boom when the Nigeria economy was strong, the member states benefited from her generosity. She channeled efforts towards industrialisation and development of the community.
Ezenwe further argues that the leadership role which Nigeria played based on her oil eroded with the slump in oil prices.

As he puts it,

> The slump in the world oil market that began in 1981 reduced petroleum export earnings from N11,200m in 1980 to N10,500m in 1981.
> In 1983, export earning declined to N7,800m and in 1986 earnings fell to N5,000m[16].

The views expressed by these authors have their merits but with some flaws. The assertion that Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS was precipitated by her rich human and natural resources is an overstatement, it is infact too simplistic. The possession of these endowments is not enough prerequisite to enhance a nation's development and status in the international system, unless the power resource is translated into actual power by acquiring the necessary skills or 'will', to use its power resource effectively.

However, some scholars have viewed Nigeria's leadership role from other perspectives.
Joy Ogwu, perceives Nigeria's role in ECOWAS from the context of her security interest. Her opinion that Nigeria should play a major role[17] in the region is borne out of this analysis. She is of the view that, as most of our neighbours are Francophone countries with French military influence and considering France's role in the region especially its activities to prevent the formation of ECOWAS, Nigeria's security is threatened. For this reason, she says that Nigeria places more emphasis on economic cooperation, development, financial assistance and good relationship with her neighbours to deter their external dependence, which is not in the best interest of Nigeria. As she puts it,"Nigeria's bilateral economic relationship with it's immediate neighbours was in tune with its policy of heigtened cooperation to reduce the vulnerability to external economic influence, perhaps thereby remotely ensuring its own security."[18]

Recognising the need for Nigeria to provide leadership for the

region, Olaniyan notes that Nigeria has taken it upon herself to participate effectively in the cause of the community. This includes building the community's structures, supporting the funds, establishing financial institution etc. For example, in June 1985, the federal government settled a sum of N80,000 outstanding, in respect of house rents for the community technocrats[19].He argued that the president has a role to play in the pursuit of our leadership role. He contends that: "The future of the community could be greatly enhanced through the role of Nigerian political leaders, particularly the president. As the national leader, the president can presumably call on whatever reservours of support and solidarity within his polity"[20].

Similarly, Assisi Asobie, views Nigeria's role in the region as determined by the government in power. He is of the belief that frequent changes in government affect our role in ECOWAS. He states that "With the passing of years and with frequent changes of government in Nigeria commitment to West African integration weakens"[21].The Gowon regime, he says, was sentimental to the cause of the community, took necessary steps to lure and convince member states of the success of the organisation.
The Murtala/Obasanjo regime, he accuses of being too nationalistic and not in favour of the organisation. For instance, he points out that General Obasanjo, formulated a new set of criteria for the extension of foreign aid to other African countries (including West African) states. These new criteria included, prominently "promotion of national interest (45%)" and "contributing to national economy as well as creating productivity for Nigeria (25%)[22].

Shagari and Buhari regimes, he says implemented some obnoxious measures which in turn affected our role in ECOWAS. This he says included explusion from Nigeria of a large number of citizens of other states and the closure of borders with neighbouring countries.

Some other authors, however believe that Nigeria's leadership role was not necessary, especially when her ailing economy is taken into consideration.

In its cover story of September 28 1992, The African Guardian opined that Nigeria's role in ECOWAS in relation to ECOMOG has become a matter for concern in terms of its financial implication on the domestic economy.The writer points out that "ECOMOG,surely from an economic point of view,represents a huge financial albatross pit for Nigeria whose economy is reeling under a straining deficit"[23].
He opines that Nigeria is spending so much on the operation such that her financial involvement has reached "a conservative estimate of N3 billion_____ till date[24].
He argues for a change in the composition of ECOMOG and the reduction of Nigeria's role in it.

In the same vein, Ayo Amale contends that, in the context of a declining economy, debt problem, etc, there should be some constraints in playing this role.As he puts it, " Caught in the web of debt Nigeria no longer has the initiative, dedication and foresight which informed her doggedness in championing the establishment of ECOWAS."[25]
He suggests that, "Nigeria should concentrate on those objectives which are directly linked to the immediate realization of her national interest."[26]

Similarly, Jide Owoeye, notes that Nigeria has used Its considerable financial leverage and other economic instruments at her disposal to enhance her international roles as a sovereign nation but that caution should be taken especially with the dwindling economy.
He argues further that : " If Nigeria aspired to international positions at all cost during its oil boom period, should it also do so when the economy is no longer bouyant."[27]

All told, the fact that Nigeria plays a pre-eminent role in ECOWAS is indisputable. Our economic base alone does not determine our leadership but the role of the leader or president is important in analysing our leadership role in ECOWAS. For instance, when the nation was bouyant, she was commited to the community; with the present economic situation, she is even more commited.
Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS has been very vibrant especially under the Babangida administration. It has drawn attention to the instability, cross-border conflicts, championed an ECOWAS committee to mediate in disputes and pioneered the ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) to bring peace in the war-torn country of Liberia.

In playing this role, Nigeria has encountered some internal social economic contradictions like the expulsion of community members as 'illegal aliens' and the closure of borders which have implications for the regional integration.
However, since the motivating force behind Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS is self- interest, then there is no contradiction in her expelling aliens and the closure of borders.

Finally, Nigeria's power and position in the region is still unique in spite of her domestic problem, compared to other countries in the subregion Nigeria is the most effective to act as the catalyst for integration[28].

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY.

The main objective of the study is to examine and bring to focus the leadership role played by Nigeria in ECOWAS.
Since its inception, Nigeria has been actively commited to the cause of the community which has earned her the mantle of leadership.
This study will provide useful ideas for policy makers in formulating policies relating to Nigeria's external

relations with regard to ECOWAS.

It will also be essential in re-examining Nigeria's foreign policy thus enhancing her status as a regional power.

Also essential is that the study will be approached from the perspective of power as against the economic aspect which it has always been approached.

1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In international politics, there is no universal theory that explains the behaviour of states. As Rosenau puts it, foreign policy is devoid of a general theory.[29]
A theory is essentially an explanation of the relationship and underlying principles that appear to charactrize the particular phenomenon the researcher selects to study.[30] This consists of statements that explain the relationships between the factors or variables the researcher intends to use. Some form of theory is essential for every research work, to serve as a guide to the researcher for understanding the chosen topic .

The work : Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS could be analysed from the framework of power. The concept has been an important tool in international political theorising and has been associated with realist scholars as Edward H.Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, George Kennan [31] etc.
Power is percieved as an inescapable factor in the relationship between nation-states (which are regarded as the major actors in the international system). Each state is a self seeker and is motivated basically by its desire to fulfil self in its relations with other states.[32] This is to say that the pursuit of self interest of a state in the international scene influences its relationship with other states. This relationship could be understood in terms of their struggle for power.

Motive and resources are essential for power to be effective. According to Burns, the two are interrelated. Lacking motive resources diminishes, lacking resources motive lie idle. lacking either one, power collapses[33].
Power wielders have varied motives which they pursue with the resources at their disposal. Some may pursue not power but status, recognition, prestige and glory or may seek power as an intermediate value instrument to utilize those lofty goals. [34]

In some writers' definition, the concept is equated with "influence" and the ability to influence the behavior of others.

George modelski, defines power as the capacity to act.[35] Hence having power is synonymous to having control over means or resources for action.

Hans Morgenthau defines power as a relationship between two political actors in which actor A has the ability to control the minds and actions of actor B.[36] From this, power involves anything that establishes control over others.

Burns defines power as power of A over B as equal to maximum force which A can induce on B minus the maximum resisting force which B can moblilize in the opposite direction.[37] This implies that power is relational.

K.J.Holsti, views power as the general capacity of state to control the behavior of others.[38] From this it is evident that power is fundamental and ever present in analysing inter-state relations.

As no generalized means of exercizing power exists, it becomes difficult to quantify the concept. Some scholars have conceptualized it to include tangible and intangible elements. Robert Dahl for instance lists such tangibles as money,

wealth, information, time, political allies, official position and control over jobs and such intangibles as personality and leadership qualities.[39] While some others have criticized it on the grounds that it can not be measured because no parameter exists for that purpose. They believed that it is impossible to measure many elements of power and it will also be difficult to synthesis them into a single useful concept. Theodorea for instance, argues that power which is an important concept in political theorising is difficult to define, isolate and measure. He argues further that the concept is best portrayed by elusive qualities such as prestige, status and reputation.[40]

In relation to the upheld view of some scholars that the resources accruing to a nation determine its status and participation in international politics, it is pertinent to note that the acquisition of endowments is not an end in itself but the ability to transform them to actual power that matters. So if a state is endowed with adequate natural resources and does not possess the technology, industry, to process, market and dispose them, then it is reduced to the status of a weak state.[41]

In essence these endowments or elements of state power which Hans Morgenthau has defined as geography, military resources, industrial capability, state of military preparedness, population, quality of diplomacy[42] are essential as they determine the participation of a state in the comity of nations.

In comparison with all other countries in the region, Nigeria is blessed with a disproportionately large share of these elements of state power. This has afforded her a predominantly overwhelming position in the region. It accounts for 75% of G.N.P, 60% of the population, 75% of the exports and 55% of the manufacturing industry in the region[43]. As Steven Wright observed, the country (Nigeria) is as strong economically as all the other (ECOWAS) members put together[44].

Even in terms of military capability, Nigeria surpasses those of the other states. Her role in the formation, deployment and operation of the regional peace-keeping force (ECOMOG) have portrayed her as a nation to be reckoned with. Her potentials have been put into use in her pursuit of power, which have been demonstrated in her socio-political and economic initiatives in the region.

1.6 PROPOSITIONS.

The propositions for this study derive essentially from the assumption that self-gratification is at the root of the role nations choose for themselves in international relations. Therefore we pose here that:-

1. Nigeria's role in ECOWAS is informed by the desire to gain interest(s) of a political and economic nature for herself.
2. That the attempt to play this leadership role can not be without some cost to Nigeria particularly in her domestic setting.
3. Highly endowed nations tend to be powerful. Nigeria 's endowments are likely to place her in leadership roles in the sub region.

4. That the deployment of resources (human and material) to enhance her drive for a leadership role will win her the loyalty or suspicion of her co-members in ECOWAS.

1.7 DEFINITION OF CONCEPT.

Almost any task related to organised activity involves leadership or at least is associated with it.[45] Leadership as a concept has several meanings, it has been associated with the excercise of influence over other persons and as an aspect of power.

According to Edwin Hollander, leadership is a process of

influence which involves an on going transaction between a leader and his/her followers[46]. From this it implies that leadership is a two- way process between the leaders and the followers who share leadership function for the promotion of the mutual goals of the group or organisation.

Burns also views leadership as the inducement of followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and the motivations - the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations - of both leaders and followers[47]. From this, leadership is excercised when a person with particular motives and purposes uses his resources to satisfy his followers and also achieves his own goals.

As put by Bennis and Nanus leadership is what gives an organisation its vision and its ability to translate that vision into reality[48]. Here the task of leadership involves taking action to realize a perceived vision.

In articulating the task of leadership, Nixon said that a leader must be willing to take unpopular stands when necessary. And when he does find it necessary to take an unpopular stand, he has an obligation to explain it to the people, solicit their support and win their approval[49]. The effective leader must be articulate and must be able to offer new visions and take initiative to transform and give direction and a new meaning to the organisation.

In this study, leadership refers to the ability of Nigeria to effectively coordinate the goals of the organisation with the cooperation of other member states for the effective performance of the organisation as a cohesive unit. The quality of leadership in any organisation is fundamental, as it determines its participation or commitment of followers. If the leadership is not in the interest of the followers, there is the likelihood for them to withdraw their support from the organisation.

1.8 METHODOLOGY.

The study holds that the human and material resources accruing to Nigeria have enhanced her leadership role in ECOWAS. To arrive at relevant answers to the objective, the study will employ the primary and secondary sources in collecting data.

The primary sources will include ECOWAS documents, other documents, interview with some officials at the ECOWAS secretariate, statistical abstracts, discussions with some experts in the field like Dr. J.A. Arije, Mr. O. Agbola and professor Ezewe to serve as complement to other sources.

The secondary sources include newspapers, unpublished papers,journals, articles, relevant books from researches carried out by other authors on the subject, other publications in international relations and foreign policy analysis in political science and economic development will also be used.

1.9 ORGANISATION OF STUDY.

The work is divided into five chapters, the introduction and four others.

Chapter one gives a general background to the subject. It provides the statement of the problem, significance of the study, proposition, the theoretical framework, definition of concept, methodology, organisation of the stady and the literature review which is an analysis of what has been done by other authors on the subject.

Chapter two focuses on the back ground to the formation of ECOWAS and Nigeria's role in it. This will involve an assessment of integration in the subregion before ECOWAS, events leading to its formation and Nigeria's role in it. The chapter will also contain the aims and objectives of ECOWAS and

the structure of the organisation.

Chapter three is based on Nigeria's material contributions to ECOWAS; it also surveys Nigeria's generous aid programmes in the region, her economic contributions towards the development of the community. For instance, the contribution to ECOWAS budget, technical assistance to member states, trade creation, building of the secretariate at Abuja.

Chapter four highlights Nigeria political contributions. This chapter will unravel Nigeria's mediatory roles, its immense contributions towards achieving peace in the war-torn country of Liberia. It will also focus on Nigerias contributions to ECOMOG and the problems she has encountered in playing the leadership role.

Chapter five is the concluding chapter and it is a summary of the study. It will also include some recommendations which may be helpful in promoting Nigeria's leadership role and enhancing its status as a "regional power".

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CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO ECOWAS.

2.1 INTRODUCTION.

The treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was signed in May 28th 1975. However, efforts at bringing about regional integration in the region predates the formation of ECOWAS. The anticedents to ECOWAS were quite significant to the evolution and nature of ECOWAS itself. It is therefore important to examine in historical perspective the background to ECOWAS. In this chapter therefore we will examine the West Africa subregion in pre-colonial and colonial periods. We will in addition, examine the numerous efforts at integration in West Africa in the immediate post independence period. This chapter will also examine the formation of ECOWAS and Nigeria's role in it as well as the aims, objectives and structure of the organisation.

2.2 PRE-COLONIAL WEST AFRICA.

The idea of economic integration in West Africa did not start with ECOWAS, it had a long history behind it. Although the West African states were not in existence prior to colonialism there were hegemonic states such as Ghana, Songhai, Mali, Ashante, Hausa,and Oyo empires. These were of various sizes and importance and they exercized their influence in the region. The inhabitants of these hegemonic states comprised various ethnic and linguistic groups which interacted freely among themselves. These contacts had facilitated the process of integration at the economic, cultural, political and demographic levels.

Pre-colonial West Africa was a centre of intense trading activities that attracted people from distant places. The trade known as long-distance trade or trans-saharan trade, cut

across the desert from the forest belt of West Africa to the Saharan region of North Africa. The traders moved in caravans which consisted of professional and client traders, their supporting staff and the beasts of burden, one estimate has it that the caravans could number between one thousand and two thousand men and women. The caravan is often refered to as moving markets. The caravans from North Africa brought into the commercial centres of the Western Sudan goods not only made in North Africa and the Middle East but also in Western Europe. Commodities traded included gold,kolanut, copper,etc,which were sent northwards and cowries, salt, weapons, beads, books, especially the Koran, silk,etc,which journeyed southwards. These commodities played an important role in the economic and political structures of the states that purchased them. For this reason they ensured the safety of the goods in transit and the trade routes by providing security which went a long way to stimulate and facilitate trade in the region.

The trans-saharan trade developed a network of routes, some of which included the ones from Ghana to Mogador and Fez via Awdaghost;and then those through Borno to Tripoli via Bilma and Murzuk, etc.

Some towns along these routes especially those near rivers or settlements were used as halting places, where goods were packed, camels, foods and fresh water could be obtained[1].

With trade exchanges, these halting places developed into major trading towns such as Kano, Bob-Dioulasso, Timbuktu and Gao, with sophisticated economic systems which flourished in trade. These trading activities was of immense importance to the West African region. It turned the region into a single currency zone as all the areas covered by the caravan accepted cowries, cyprea moneta[2] as a medium of exchange, which greatly increased interaction and population movement in the region.

Religion, especially Islam,was another fundamental factor which motivated contacts and interactions in the precolonial era. Islam was introduced to the West African region through a diaspora of Fulani pastoralists and through the caravan

traders whose leading traders were moslems; they had brought the religion with their trading wares. Islam played a central role in the development of states,the movement of scholars,as much as it produced many moslem scholars who offered their services as teachers, Imams, judges, secretaries and advisers to the rulers[3]. The spread of islam gave the West African region a kind of cultural identity, irrespective of the differencee in language, tribe, etc. This common religious affiliation facilitated the absorbtion of strangers in new settlements. According to Ajayi, in the 15th and 16th centuries Hausa states absorbed migrated people of Songhai, Tuaregs, Shuwa Arabs, Kanuris, Nupe and others in evolving an outreaching Islamic and commercial culture[4].Even in the West Africa of today, the spread of moslems from Senegal to Nigeria (across the region) demonstrates the cultural spread and integration.

Islam also facilitated trade by the introduction of modern trading facilities like checks and balances of accounts, account keeping, unit of measurement etc, which were used in the Arab world. The major trading towns were cities of Islamic practices and learning. Prominent among which was Timbuktu which became the commercial and education centre of Western Sudan. The university attracted many moslem scholars, traders, artisans and people from all works of life who were in search of further Islamic knowledge or for commercial activities. Through this, Islam became a unifying factor that facilitated trade, communication and integration throughout the West African region.

At the political level, the expansion of state formation and even their collapse led to the spread of people in the West African region. When there were conflict situations people would migrate to other areas for safety or sometimes, a defeated leader could chose by himself to go into exile, taking a whole group of supporters with him to look for new homes. Also in conflict situations, a victorious state usually annexed a defeated one and emphasised its control over it.

The Sokoto Jihad is a good example of this process. Almost everywhere that the Jihad had been successful, the flag-bearers had overthrown the old dynasties and proclaimed their authority. These states known as emirates are under the control and inflence of the Sokoto Caliphate. Thus expansion of states is a mechanism for integration.

These activities (Islam, trade, politics, etc.) have fostered population movement and concentration of people of diverse cultural groups in a particular place. It has been estimated that three of the largest towns in the Western Sudan namely, Gao, Timbuktu and Jenne had population which ranged from 15,000 to 80,000 in the 15th and 16th centuries[5]. A look at the composition of modern day West Africa could attest to this. For instance, the Hausas are found almost everywhere in the region and the Yorubas are in Nigeria, Benin and Togo. The migration and population enhanced the process of integration in the West African region.

The advent of the Europeans in the 15th and 16th centuries saw the evolution of the trans-Atlantic trade along the coastal areas of West Africa. They wanted slaves who were in high demand as plantation labourers in the New World (America) and also to have control of the source of their supplies which they got from Mediteranean through the trans-saharan trade. In 1807, slavery and slave trade was abolished and replaced with legitimate trade (trade in raw materials and cash crops). The trading staples were no longer of local specialisation but trade was dominated by cash crop export and local consumption shifted to manufactured European goods.

The eventual partition of Africa in 1884 - 85[6] was what dealt the final blow to commercial link between the Mediteranean and the coastal areas. The colonial administrators imposed restrictions at the frontiers of their colonies and insisted on entry requirement for traders. Also the revolution in transportation like railways, ships, motorcars, etc, made the

pack animal and human portage expensive and obsolete[7]. The collapse of the caravan trade is of immense consequence to the West African region: it disrupted the agricultural and industrial development initiative of the region. Interactions among the west Africans continued at a very low level which made the trans-saharah trade unpopular because of low patronage.

2.3 COLONIAL WEST AFRICA.

The conquest of colonies in West Africa by the imperial powers was done on the basis of sphere of influence for trade and raw materials for their home countries. The partition of 1884-5 saw Britain and France having most of the West African region. They developed new economic and political measures to administer these colonies. The process of administration favoured colonial interest and a continued domination of the colonies. Which were considered as part and parcel of the metropolitan countries. This was better articulated in French West Africa.

In the sphere of trade, for instance, the colonialists controlled the transaction for their interests. Between 1935 and 1960, roughly 75% of the total trade for French West Africa was with France. In British West Africa between 1900 and 1930, Britain supplied About 75% of British West African imports and received approximately 50% of her colonies exports[8]. The introduction of colonial currency not only accelerated but facilitated trade between the home countries and the colonies. France introduced the West African CFA (Communaute financiere Africaine) and the West African pound was introduced by Britain in British West Africa.

The colonial administration established certain institutions which worked towards the purpose of regional integration. France for instance, pursued the policy of assimilation which is the acculturisation of the Africans to black Frenchmen. The French government administered her colonies towards common

objectives which aimed at preserving historical commercial and economic links between them and France.

The British approach to administration was decentralised, but there was need to integrate for effective governance since the territories were not contiguous. They created the West African Court of Appeal, common currency, West African Air Transport Authority, etc. These institutions rendered useful services to the British administrators, but on attainment of independence, the British West African countries opted out of these joint services and established similar institutions in their respective countries.

The colonial era witnessed some forms of official inter colonial state visits and agreements between the French and British administarators. For instance, the Anglophone-French Entente of 1904[9], the visit of Governor Clozel of Ivory Coast to the Governor of Gold coast in 1904 and that of Governor Fourn of Dahomey to Sir Hugh Clifford of Nigeria in 1923[10] . These visits and agreements were to establish common channels of communication to discuss common problems and interests. These activities promoted cooperation and mutual understanding within the region. Even at the local level, cooperative activities continued across the boundries inspite of the political partitions. This period left some imprints which have proved useful for regional integration. For instance, it has forged unity through the languages (French and English) and culture which are common in the region and which ECOWAS has adopted.

2.4 INTEGRATION IN POST-COLONIAL WEST AFRICA BEFORE ECOWAS.

The area known as West Africa extends roughly between latitude 5 N and 20 N with a total land area of about 6.1 million square kilometres[11]. The area is bounded on the North by the sahara desert, on the West and South by the Atlantic ocean and on the East by the Mandara (Cameroon highlands)[12]. The sub region is blessed with a variety of climate conditions, the

humid and hot coastal region and the hot and dry sahel region, it can also boast of several belts of vegetations such as the tropical forest, the savanah, the grasslands and the desert. The West African region thus forms geographical unit ideal for an economic community.

With the attainment of independence, the West African states formed themselves into organisations to maintain and strengthen economic relations among them.

The first of such integration experiments in West Africa was the Union Douniere Entre les Etats de l'Afrique occidentale (UDAO) . A customs union of West African states formed by the Francophone states of Benin, Ivory coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and upper volta (Burkina Faso) in 1959. These countries aimed to maintain customs union in effect before independence and to establish a common external tariff amongst them. UDAO was short lived. It was beset by many problems such as disparity in the level of development,the absence of institutions to carry out the function of the organisation. It made no significant impact on the member states.

With the demise of UDAO, another customs union - Union Douniere des Etats de l'Afrique de l'oust (UDEAO) was formed in 1962.The signatories to the UDEAO applied a common external tariff and uniform laws and regulations[13]. It allowed for the free movement of local products among member states and set up a conventional organisation to carry out its objectives. The organisation encountered some problems which weakened the objective of the system. For instance, the Ivorian trading relations with some of her Entente members like Niger and Upper-Volter (Burkina-Faso) discriminated against other UDEAO members. Also, it did not succeed in setting a common tariff against non members, rather their tariffs varied from one member to another.Furthermore,it had low intra regional trade as compared to that with Europe. Also most of the benefits that accrued to it went to the more developed countries of Senegal

and Ivory coast. For instance, the share of Ivory coast and Senegal in UDEAO foreign trade was of the order of 75% in 1965-67, while the less developed countries were disadvantaged on benefit sharing[14]. These internal inconsistencies led to its failure and in its place was established the communante Economique de l'Afrique de l'oust (CEAO) in 1972.

The CEAO agreement was signed in Bamako in June 1972 and came into effect in April 1974. Its membership comprised six states: Ivory Coast, Senegal, Niger, Mali, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. The mission of the CEAO is to promote the harmonious and balanced economic development of member states with a view to improving living standards as quickly as possible[15]. The treaty also provides for a development fund (CDF) to finance development projects, subsidize state budgets, aid investments and compensate those states which might experience some negative impacts as a result of the formation of the community. To achieve its aims and ensure success, the organisation set out institutions such as the Confrence of Heads of States and Government, which is concerned with the appointment of top officials of the Community and the approval of the budget. the Council of Ministers whose composition varies according to the subject under discussion and the General Secretariate which is responsible for carring out the decisions of the higher organs. This consists of a number of organs and ad hoc study groups such as the Community Bureau for Industrial Development (BCDI) and the Community Trade Promotion Office (OCPE).[16]

The CEAO in its over two decades of existence has shown some elements of progress. It has completed a comprehensive trade liberalisation scheme and promotion programme[17]. Also the four less developed countries of the community (Niger, Burkina-Faso, Mali and Mauritania) have benefited reasonably from the organisation. In addition, those states that have lost customs revenue as a result of taxe de cooperation (trade liberalisation) have been compensated from the fund.

The CEAO has however been faced with several problems which have made its future uncertain. There is the problem of benefit sharing between rich coastal states and the semi-desert land-locked states, for instance, export entering the CEAO market from Senegal and Ivory Coast currently accounts for 70% of the total[18]. In addition, the internal cohesion of the Francophone states seems to be crumbling. There is tension between the land-locked and coastal states, for instance, mauritania which has some Arab links is compelled to lean towards that (Arab) direction to benefit from the flow of petrol dollars of the Arabs. Also Nigeria's role in discouraging other west African countries from joining the CEAO was a big problem. Nigeria used Naira and shuttle diplomacy coupled with the differences of opinion among the signatories of the Treaty to woe Benin and Togo whose economic interest lie more with Nigeria, a neibouring country with a more viable economy than Ivory Coast and Senegal which were and still far from them. They were also interested in the formation of a wider economic community which would comprise the countries of the entire region.

Another early experiment towards integration was Counsiel de l'entente which was set up in 1959. It comprises of Ivory Coast, Niger, Burkina-Faso, Benin and Togo. It had the aim of harmonizing the developmental plans of the countries for the establishment of a solidarity fund through which Ivory Coast, which is the most economically developed state would subsidise the funds of the other states. It was also to promote intra-regional trade.

The status of Ivory Coast as economically developed,led to the criticism of the other states. As a result of this misunderstanding the Entente was given a new face. Houphouet Boigny proposed for a dual nationality for member. This was not successful as it was opposed by the Ivoriens because it would deprive them of the employment opportunities in their country.

In 1966, the "Solidarity fund" was replaced with the Mutual Aid and Gurantee Fund which would stimulate investment within

the Entente area by giving assistance to its members. The organisation recorded some degree of success as it was able to get some assistance for developmental purposes. For instance it got a laon of US $75m from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)[19].
Apart from the dependence on external assistance, the major problem of the organization was the over dependence of one member country which is Ivory Coast and the increasing role and influence of Nigeria in the region.

Another significant attempt at integration was l'organisation des Etats Riverians du fleuve Senegal (OERS).
The OERS was formed in 1968 by Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and Guinea, with the objective of maintaining cordial relationship among members and enhancing economic development through an increased mobility and exchange of goods and services. The organisation was short lived because of the inter state controversy between Senegal and Guinea. Senegal was accused by Guinea of conspiring with Portugese mercenaries to invade her. This led to Senegal's boycott of meetings and her subsequent resignition from OERS in 1971. With this deteriorating condition, the organisation ceased to be effective and a new one was formed in 1972 by Mali, Senegal amd Mauritania.

The l'organisation pour la mise en valuer du fleuve senegal (OMVS) was an off shout of the defunct OERS. It was formed in 1972 by Mali, Senegal and Mauritania. The objectives were mainly economic such as the planning and development of the Senegal River, to engage in crop cultivation and livestock raizing, and to improve the wellbeing of the people. Some of its achievements include the building of Mantantali Dam in Mali on the Bafing River to regulate river flow and produce hydro-electric power for the development of the area[20]. The OMVS is faced with financial problems which has inhibited it from carring out most of its proposed projects.

An addition to the West African economic schemes was the Mano River union which was founded by Sierra-Leone and Liberia in 1967. It came into legal existence in 1973 when the heads of states of the two countries signed the Mano River Declaration in Malema. Guinea later joined the union in 1980. The founders hoped that the union would accelerate the economic development of the countries and reduce their external dependence, to remove trade barriers and ensure fair distribution of the benefits of economic cooperation.

The Mano River union did not encounter problem of disparity in the distribution of benefit or development because the three countries that make up the Mano union are at the same level of development, this will inturn reduce the problem of disparity in the distribution of benefit or development. Like any other intergration scheme, the Mano River Union has its own problems. There is a high rate of smuggling. This involves locally manufactured products, primary agricultural produce, third country products which have been illegally imported, as well as diamond and gold[21].In addition, the different currencies used in three countries that make up the union are barries to intra-union trade. In Liberia, where the US dollar is legal tender, there are no foreign exchange restrictions, this is however not the case with Guinea and Sierra-Leone which use local currencies-the inconvertible Franc and Leone respectively[22].
Futher more, the union has little impact on the people. They are at the same level of development, no local technology, most citizens are illiterate and poor, majority of its citizens are not aware of its existence nor do they understand its functions. This has hampered the easy movement of goods and sevices within the union.

In spite of its problems, the Union was able to build a bridge (the Mano River Bridge) between Monrovia and Free-Town. The bridge cut accross a distance between the two capitals from 111 to 620 kilometers[23]. It was also able to get some assistance from some foreign countries and international organizations. For

instance, the government of Netherlands in 1975 gave the Union $2million over a three year period to be spent on technical experts and equipments[24].

Another attempt at integration is the Seneganbia Union, which is one of the earliest attempts at integration between the Francophone and Anglophone states.
The formation of the Senegambia Union was based on expediency rather than choice. Gambia on her own, is not economically viable and because of her unusual geographical position, she poses a security threat to Senegal because she could be used as a stage for subversion by external aggressors or even Senegalese opposition elements. With the Senegambian Union, Senegal was to provide Gambia with economic, political and military support but with the breakdown of the Union in 1989 Senegal withdrew her support to Gambia. She had to make other arrangements. For instance, she had an aggreement with the Nigerian Army to train Gambian Soldiers and give her an effective Army. The brakdown of the Union was the major reason why senegal did not attempt to restore the ousted President Jawara, as she did in the 1980 coup d'etat in that country .
The Senegambia confederation provided for an economic union with a simple customs union at the initial stages. It is a Free Trade Area with import restrictions in the Gambia, under this customs Union, frontiers will be abolished. In this Union Gambia was given an overall import quota, base on recent import level to which reduced rates of duty would apply[25]. In the Senegambia Union provision was made to curb smuggling and for the unification of their currencies for the smooth movement of trade. Since the two countries are not at the same level of development the issue of benefit sharing will be unfavorable for a small conutry like Gambia unless there is an adequate system of compensation to avoid such a trend.

Its small size not withstanding, the senegambian confederation has recorded some success. For instance, a telephone link has recently been set up between Basse in Gambia and Velingara in

Senegal. This is fully financed by the two countries.

Apart from the above economic groupings, there were specific ones like the Lake Chad Basin Commission, comprising the Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. And the River Niger Commission which comprises of nine countries namely, the Cameroons, Benin, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Mali and Niger. They both have the same responsibilities of encouraging economic cooperation between member states and coordinate studies and programmes relating to the development of the river basin.

The integration schemes before ECOWAS have been many and were fashioned along cultural and linguistic lines. Some had shown some success while some did not. Economic arrangements between the Francophone and Anglophne did not achieve much because of some political misunderstanding among the members which usually lead to their disintegration. For instance, The Free Exchange Zone among Guinea, Sierra-Leone, Ivory-Coast and Liberia in 1964[26] died a natural death due to the political misunderstanding between Guinea and Ivory-Coast.

2.5 NIGERIA AND THE FORMATION OF ECOWAS

Nigeria has since the 1960's been commited to the idea of a West African economic integration as a way of enhancing economic development and interdependence. West African leaders then, especially Kwame Nkrumah, advocated for a continental union Government to institutionalise the concept of pan Africanism. Nigerian leaders opposed this idea because they saw it as an attempt to constrain their power in West Africa. Nigeria however proposed an economic integration which she suggested must begin at the subregional level and proceed in stages to encompase the whole region.

The pursuit of regional integration in West Africa has more to do with the impact of the proposed regional markets and

other economic integration scheme considered at the 7th session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) held in Nairobi, Kenya in 1965, during which Resolutions 142(VIII) and 145(VII) had recommended that member states of the commission should establish as soon as possible sub-regional inter-governmental machinery for harmonising their economic and social development[27]. The ECA was later to divide the continent into four sub regions, namely, the North, East, West and central[28] to effect this intergration idea.

The propounders of ECOWAS were motivated by the tremendous success achieved by some other economic cooperations in the African continent. According to Professor Gambari, the relative success of the integrative process in other regions of Africa, especially the East African community (before its demise), MAGREB in North Africa, the UDEAC in central Africa[29] constituted a major challenge to the leaders of the West African subregion. This motivation towards intra-regional cooperation prompted series of meetings under the auspieces of ECA. The first of these was the confrence on economic cooperation in West Africa held in Niamey in October 1966. This meeting was attended by 11 states in the region[30] and recommended the establishment of a permanent transport and energy committee, as well as the adoption of Articles of Association for a proposed economic community of West Africa[31]. At the Accra confrence of 1967, the Article of Association was adopted and signed. The spirit of understanding exhibited at these meetings led to another one in Monrovia in 1968; where Nigeria and Guinea were mandated to prepare a position paper detailing areas of cooperation,while Liberia and Senegal were to prepare a draft treaty as well as the protocol on customs union. The Monrovia confrence also agreed to remove barriers standing in the way of increased trade between member states and to set up a West African common market.

The efforts towards a region wide economic community was slow and difficult. The period between 1968-1972 was that of lull

and inaction, because most countries experienced one internal problem or the other and there was no time for regional matters. It was also characterised by military overthrows with regimes that were occupied with domestic problems which would indeed have little time for international relations. Also, the political upheaval of the civil war in Nigeria was a fundamental factor for the delay of an all West African economic integration. It interrupted the active participation of Nigeria in international affairs. She could not look beyond her borders because her financial position was not bouyant enough to undertake any economic experiment with her neighbours which were relatively poor. With the end of the war Nigeria became more united and stregnthened to look beyond her borders and participate in regional affairs. There was also the economic boom that came as a result of her revenue from oil, which helped her in the process of post-war effort and gave her enough resources to pursue her foreign policy objectives. This made her a dominant economic factor in West Africa in relation to other states of the sub-region.

With this favorable conduction, the Nigerian government set out to play the role of a "big brother" ready to make sacrifices for the benefit of other states. She aided them in financing development projects which were aimed at improving their economy. In attempt to woo Nigeria's immediate neighbours and weaken their support for CEAO, Gowon used 'Naira' and shuttle diplomacy, when he sent representatives to every West African states and with cheque books in hand obtained Togo, Benin and Niger[32]. These diplomatic efforts contributed immensely to the formation of ECOWAS.

This favourable condition and the fact that Nigeria stands to gain from the community spurred the public and private sectors to rush into the campaign for the creation of ECOWAS. The Nigerian chambers of commerce and industries, among others, embacked on an active move to solicit the support of other chambers of commerce in the various countries of the region to

support an economic community and a common market. This move initiated the formation of a federation of chambers of commerce in West Africa which served as advisers in the negotiations leading to the ECOWAS treaty.

Furthermore, the Nigerian government used the diplomatic techniques of issue linkage in a bid to win the support of the anti-ECOWAS Francophone states. She decided, for instance to tie the joint negotiation between the ACP (African, Carribean and Pacific) states for associate status with the EEC in Lome as a stepping stone to greater cooperation in the region, because it brought together the French and English speaking states. As Gambari observed, it the countries of West Africa were able, together, to sign an agreement to promote trade with the EEC, it should be possible for them to conclude an agreement for the same goal within the region[33].

Also central in Nigeria's effort towards the formation of ECOWAS was the issue of security. Going by the attitude of some west African state like Ivory-Coast and Republic of Benin during the civil war, government had been alarmed as they could easily pose a threat to internal security of the country. Ivory-Coast, for instance, recognised and supported Biafra during the war and put pressure on France and other Francophone states to do same. This strengthened anti-Nigerianism among the Francophone states. Since the pursuit of economic objectives can not be divorced from security issues, General Gowon had a rapproachment with the West African states after the war to maintain cordial relations with them as a tranquil atmosphere could usher in a more effective economic transaction and ensure unity and stability in the region. Subsequent governments in Nigeria have recognised the issue of security and have put in efforts for it to prevail in the region.

The announcement of the formation of the CEAO intensified Nigeria's diplomatic efforts at woeing the Francophone states to accept the idea of a West African community. Togo which had

maintained cordial relation with Nigeria was the first to be woed. Nigeria-Togo relations date back to 1962 when Nigeria intervened and assisted Togo after Ghana's complicity in Sylvanus Olympio's assasination. Nigeria warned publicly then that: " For purposes of security Nigeria considers that its boundary extends to the Ghana-Togo border "[34]. Ever since the two countries had maintained brotherly relations and constant consultation. This diplomatic initiative precipitated the creation of a West African Economic Community (WAEC) by the two countries in Togo in 1972. They persuaded other West African states to join. Benin,and Niger later joined to avoid isolation, since most of her imports and exports pass through Benin and Nigeria. According to Ojo, " If Benin, Togo and Niger would form an economic community with Nigeria what would be left of the proposed CEAO?"[35].

In 1972, a joint Nigeria/Togo ministerial delegation led by professor Adedeji toured all West African states to prepare the ground for a meeting of all the countries to inagurate the Community, according to Adedeji, the leader of the Nigerian delegation, claims that in the countries visited, not only did they submit the text of the proposals, they also had meeting at ministerial level and were recieved in audience by the heads of states and government[36]. This tour resulted in the ministerial meeting held in Togo where the proposals were considered to work out details of a draft treaty that was considered and adopted by a summit of Heads of States and Government in May 28, 1975 in Lagos.

The treaty pronouncing the formation of ECOWAS was hailed as a break-through in the long series of effort to institute a regional integration body and a bold step towards cooperation and improvement of the wellbeing of the people of the subregion. ECOWAS embraces most of the countries in West Africa and cut accross cultural and linguistic barriers. In other words, it is not peculier to the Francophone, Anglophone or Lusophone countries, it represents all of them.

2.6 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF ECOWAS.

The rational behind the formation of ECOWAS is predicated on three important goals of public policy. Ensuring success in the struggle against economic domination and subjugation by external forces. To ensure success in the struggle, small states need to cooperate as much as possible to enable them to effectively resist external domination. A strong regional economic base will no doubt be an effective weapon in making such resistance effective.

-Allevation and eventual elimination of poverty, the achievement of which also depends on a strong and bouyant economy.

-National economic development. The failure of economies of most West African states to develop during the two United Nations Decades on Development was due, among other things, to the fact that the pattern of development in the region was isolationist, based as it were on small national markets in several cases. It is hoped that a large community market comprising 150 million consumers should be a big boost to production. It should encourage the expansion of the existing industries and the creation of new ones. This would make possible the reaping of economies of scale[37].

with these rationales, the general aim of ECOWAS as specified in Article 2(1) of the 1975 Treaty of Lagos is:
To promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity, pariculauly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions; and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the living standard of its peoples.
Also to increase and maintain economic stability and fostering of closer relations among its members and to contribute to the progress and development of the African continent in general[38].

To ensure effective implementation of these aims and objectives, ECOWAS has set up structures and institutions with ascribed functions.

The first of these is the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the member states. This is the principal governing institution of the community and it is responsible for the general direction and control of the performance of the executive function of the community. Its decision is binding on all members of the community. It meets once a year.

The council of ministers comprises two representatives from each member state. It is responsible for policy making and ensures that the functions of the organisation are carried out as stipulated by the treaty. It meets once a year prior to the annual meeting of the assembly.

The Executive Secretariate, as the name implies is the executive organ of the community. It is headed by an executive secretary appointed by the Authority of Heads of States to serve for a term of four years with the possibility of being reappointed for another term. He is assisted by two deputy executive secreties (one each for Economic and administrative matters) appointed by the coucil of Ministers for the day to day administration of the community and all its institutions.

To counter the problems likely to arise in the process of harmonising the economies of the member staters a tribunal was established to ensure the observarance of law and justice in the interpretation of the provisions of the treaty and settle disputes refered to it.

The ECOWAS Treaty also provides for the establishment of four technical and specialised Commissions consisting of:-

(a) The Trade Customs, Immigration, Monetery, and payments Commission.

(b) The Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission,

(c) The Transport, Telecommunications and Energy, Commission

and

(d) The Social and Cultural Affairs Commission[39].
Each of these Commission has one representative from every member State.
Their function is to submit reports and recommendation in their respective fields of investigation to the council of ministers from time to time.

Other important provision of the Treaty include the appointment of an External Auditor of the Community to audit its account and the setting up of a Committee of west African Central Banks to oversee the system of payments within the grouping and the establishment of the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development as a mechanism for the equitable distribution of the benefits and cost of intergration.
The Fund is to be financed by contributions from member states, income from community enterprises, external receipts, subsidies and Contributions from all other sources[40]. The Fund which has its headquarters in Lome, Togo, shall be used to ;-

(a) Provide Compensation and other forms of assistance to members states which have suffered losses as a result of the application of the provisions of the Treaty;
(b) Provide compensation to member states which have suffered losses as a result of the location of community enterprises;
(c) Provide grants for financing national or community research and Development activities,
(d) Grant loans for feasibility studies and development projects in member states;
(e) Guarantee Foreign investments made in member states in respect of enterprises established in purshance of the provision of the treaty on the harmonization of industrial policies;
(f) Provide means to facilitate the sustained mobilization of internal and external financial resources for the member states and community and

(g) Promote development projects in the less developed member states of the community[41].
Support of member states and those of prospective international investors are very important to achieve the challeging objectives of the Fund.

The activities of the board is regulated and directed by a Board of Directors which is made up of two representatives of each member-states, one of them being a member of Coucil of Ministers of Community while his alternative director is exepected to be a " Person Possessing high competence and wide experience in economic, financial and banking affairs" [42] . The board is responsible for the approval of the annual and operational budgets, the making of decisions of a general policy nature subject to Comfirmation by the Coucil of Ministers and approving the administrative policy proposal Submitted by the Managing Director.
The Board meets twice a year and elects its Chairman annually from within its own membership. It does not interfere in the day to day runing of the affairs of the Fund. The Managing Director is the chief executive of the Fund. He is backed by an 80-man team of professionals and other categories of staff, including a Deputy Managing Director, is entrusted with the day to day administration of the Fund. The Fund has authorised capital of US $500 million, of which $50 million is the paid up capital[43].

Membership in the community remains open to other West African countries who are not original signatories. And ECOWAS members are permitted to belong to other regional or subregional associations,as long as such concurrent memberships do not "derogate from the provision of the treaty"[44].

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CHAPTER THREE

THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF NIGERIA TO ECOWAS.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The main concern in this chapter is to examine the economic contributions of Nigeria to ECOWAS. We will examine the various ways in which Nigeria has been of assistance to the community and its member states. No nation however well developed can exist in isolation, states need to promote interdependence in order to attain the maximum of their potentials. For this reason, nations enter into bonds of friendship with each other, these could be for economic gains as in ECOWAS or for political or mutual defence such as in NATO. In these organisations, the small poor and weak nations come under the wings of the big, rich and strong nations to be protected.

Recent happinings have shown that the trend in contemporary international relations is towards economic cooperation and mutual interaction among nations. This has become popular as a means of achieving rapid economic growth which will in turn make economic planning much more practicable and profitable on a semi-continental scale than for individual states. Nigerian foreign policy clearly manifests this fact because she pursues special relationship with other African countries, especially with her West African neighbours with which she maintains a cordial relationship. Nigeria pioneered the formation of ECOWAS and has been the pillar behind the organisation; her assistance to the other West African states is a fulfilment of this reality.

As a major oil producer, her economic power is largely derived from oil, her main source of foreign exchange. With this solid economic background, Nigeria is able to foster economic coperation with the countries of ECOWAS. To maintain this economic relations, she has utilised institutions such as the Trade liberalisation scheme (TLS), the Ecobank etc, which were put in place by ECOWAS, to effect her contributions to the commonunity. Aside from this, there are other forms of relations

between Nigeria and her West African neighbours in such areas as financial assistance, joint economic projects,etc. in this, Nigeria's contribution to the ECOWAS budget is very substantial. These contributions of Nigeria will serve as a measure of her effectiveness with regard to the community and her leadership role within the region and beyond.

3.2 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF NIGERIA.

The socio-economic base of a nation as an instrument of political power and foreign policy can be measured by the quantity and quality of her human and material endowments, national production capacity, military capability, etc. They represent a sort of foundation that provides the resources for a nations power and influence. All these elements are the bases of Nigeria's economic strength.

In the West African region there is no doubt that the socio-economic base of Nigeria surpases those of the other countries. She occupies a land area of over 350,000 sq miles (560,000kms). She has a provisional population figure of 88.5m, which some observers like the United Nations estimates to be probably higher. In the Africa Recovery Report of September 1991, it quoted Nigeria's population as 108.54m[1]. Within ECOWAS, Nigeria has more than half of the population of the region (88.5m out of a total of 150m)[2]; the above figure coupled with the current rate of population growth, she will, with time, become one of the most populous countries in the world. The population size is a very vital asset for Nigeria because it provides a large labour reserve which could be mobilized for economic growth and development.

The table below reflects Nigerias population in relation to the other countries in West Africa.

TABLE 3.I :- Population of West African countries.

	Countries	Population in millions for 1990.
	Benin	4.63
	Burkina Faso	8.99
	Cape-Verde	0.37
	Cote d'Ivoire	11.99
	Gambia	0.86
	Ghana	15.02
	Guinea	5.75
	Guinea-Bissau	0.96
	Liberia	2.57
	Mali	9.21
	Mauritania	2.02
	Niger	7.73
*	Nigeria	88.5
	Senegal	7.32
	Sierra-Leone	4.15
	Togo	3.53
	Total	173.6 m

Source Afriacan Recovery, September,1991, Vol 5, No 2 & 3, P.28 29.

* 1991 census provisional figure.

Mineral resources consititute another indicator of Nigeria's power. She has a wide range of mineral resources which include minerals of strategic and industrial values such as uranium, petroleum, natural gas, columbite, coal, iron-ore, etc. The petroleum industry has been the dominant sector of Nigeria's

economy and a major determinant of her economic growth. The sale of crude petroleum provided about 90% of Nigeria's total annual export earnings between 1973-87[3]. Oil has played an important role in putting Nigeria into the limelight and it has backed up her diplomacy and influenced her external relations. The oil sector has boosted industrial production which has expanded to include car and truck assembly plants, various petro-chemical industries, pharmaceutical enterprises, steel industries, etc. These resources have increased Nigeria's Gross National Products (GNP)as she produces 78% of the overal GNP of the region[4] which implies that she is the richest country in West African region. Her economy has been greatly transformed as a result of this.

The table below reflects this .

TABLE 3.2 :- GNP in millions of dollars for West African states for 1990.

Countries	GNP for 1990 (US.$ M)
Benin	1,759.4
Burkina Faso	2,876.8
Cape-Verde	281.2
Cote d'Ivoire	9,472.1
Gambia	206.4
Ghana	5,857.8
Guinea	2,472.5
Guinea Bissau	172.8
Liberia	NA
Mali	3,407.7
Mauritania	989.8
Niger	2,241.7
Nigeria	22,125.0
Senegal	4,758.0
Sierra-Leone	913.0
Togo	1,376.7
Total	58,910.9

Source-African Recovery September,1991, Vol 5, No.2 & 3, P.28 - 29.

NA - Not Available-probably because of the crisis in that country.

From the table above, Nigeria's GNP of $22,125.00 is the highest in the region. It is almost equal to that of all the other countries put together which is $36,785.9.

This economic base has made Nigeria a power in the region and enabled her play a leadership role.

Generally, Nigeria has the largest and the most powerful military capability in the West African region. This is evident in the size and quality of her military strength which has been tested in various peace keeping missions in which she has participated. The most glaring being the ECOMOG peace keeping mission in Liberia.

The table below shows the military strength of the West African countries.

TABLE 3.3.:- The military strength of the West African states

Countries	Number of men in the 1988 forces
Benin	4,350
Burkina-Faso	7,000
Cape-Verde	1,300
Cote d'Ivoire	7,000
Ghana	10,600
Guinea	8,000
Guinea-Bissau	9,000
Mali	7,000
Niger	3,000
Nigeria	94,000
Sierra-Leone	3,150
Mauritania	11,000
Liberia	5,000
Togo	4,350
Senegal	9,000
Total	184,050

Source-Africa South of the Sahara, 19th edition, 1990.

From the figure above, there is a gap when we compare Nigeria's 94,000 men in the forces with those of the other countries. The sum total apart from Nigeria's, is 90,050, so going by the table, the number of men in the forces in Nigeria is still higher by 350 men.

In the area of education and technology, Nigeria stands out among the others. With 33 universities and other tertiary

institutions, she produces far more skilled man-power than any other country in the subregion. This educational success and it's significance is reflected in the Technical Aid corps scheme (TACS) which was introduced in 1987. It provided young Nigerian professionals particularly in the field of medecine, nursing, engineering, survey, law, etc, the opportunity to be deployed to other African and third world countries where they would work for two years. The TACS would not only provide economic growth in these countries but would also forster mutual understanding between the states and Nigeria.

The good performances displayed by these volunteers have earned some of them permanent employment (their retainment) after the expiration of their two years contract period. For instance in 1993 about 50 of such volunteers were retained by their host countries[5]

The various tables presented above go to support the assertion that Nigeria is a power within the region and her action may be backed by the advantages of these power indicators. Acknowledging this fact, Olaniyan assertes that,

> Nigeria is the most important country in West Africa. It has the world largest black population and is rich in natural assets including oil. Nigeria produces the bulk of its own food and has made considerable progress in building up its secondary industries. The domestic market is large and the country is expanding its educational system and should in the foreseable future be able

> to train as many of its citizens. It needs for its future development[6].

These power indicators have enhanced the need for Nigeria to accept to make sacrifices and contributions to the region. She also feels that she can not exist as an oasis of prosperity in the mist of poverty stricken neighbours.

3.3 TRADE RELATIONS IN WEST-AFRICA AND NIGERIA 'S CONTRIBUTIONS.

In the field of trade, Nigeria's contributions to ECOWAS have been tremendous. Her trade promotion activities in the region could be seen in the role of trade promotion institutions, agents and operators like the Export Promotion Council, Federal Ministry of Commerce and Tourism, the various chambers of commerce, etc. These institutions have realised the advantages of trade in the community and what Nigeria and the region stand to gain from her participation in this sector.

Trade is a central factor to the formation of ECOWAS. The community objective in this area is to rechannele the historically conditioned North-south pattern of trade in the region and create intra-regional trade which would strengthen the economic base of the sub-region. Despite the mutual benefit of intra-community trade. The volume of intra-West African trade is so low as available statistics show the level of official intra-regional trade as below 6% of total external trade of ECOWAS countries put together[7].

This low level of trade could be attributed to several problems such as high tariff walls which discourage entry into some markets; inadequate transport and telecommunication facilities to facilitate the movement of goods and services within the region, the ignorance of some economic operators in these states to use the facilities of the West African Clearing House (WACH). Another problem is that almost all the countries of the region are primary producers and their products are likely to compete with and not complement each other within the envisioned ECOWAS area. A closer glace at the products of these ECOWAS states shows that the possibility of trade is limited to a very narrow range of goods such as oil, mineral ores, coal, livestock, a few food stuffs, beverages and very few industrial products. It may also be argued that the volume of intra-regional trade is low because the desired types, assortment, quality and quantities of technologically modern machinery and equipment capable of producing high level and quality goods in all lines of industry are still in short supply in the region[8]. These problems have placed official intra regional trade at a disadvantage, and increased unofficial trade (smuggling).

To combat these problems and boost commercial activities in the region, ECOWAS introduced the Trade Liberalisation Scheme (TLS) which took effect on the first of january 1990. The TLS in ECOWAS terms, as stipulated in Articule 12 of the ECOWAS treaty means the gradual establishment of a customs union among its member states. Within the union, custom duties, quotas, quantitative restrictions and other administrative obstacles are

to be eliminated within 10 years and a common external tariff will be applicable to all goods imported into member states from third countries. Within the framework of the TLS, products of community origin were divided into processed, traditional handicraft and industrial products to facilitate the scheme. Moreso, for the gradual elimination of custom duties and tariffs, member states have been grouped into three based on the following criteria.

- Level of industrial development.
- Percentage of the national budget derived from custom revenue.
- Problems arising from the inaccessibility of the countries concered (ie, transport problems, especially those concerning islands and land locked countries)[9].

For the effective operation of the scheme a compensation fund was established in Togo for their forgone tariffs as a result of the implementation of the scheme. It was also to maintain their confidence and participation in the scheme.

The table below reflects the countries of ECOWAS and the rate at which tariffs are to be elinated in the scheme.

TABLE 3.4 The ECOWAS Tariff Reduction Schedule

Group of countries	Period within which tariffs are to be eliminated	Rate reduction of custom duties & taxes.
GROUP I Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea - Bissau, Burkina - Faso, Mali, Mauri-tania and Niger	10 years	10 % reduction each year.
GROUP II Benin, Guinea, Lib-eria, Togo, and Sierra-Leone	9 years	12.5 % reduction each year
GROUP III Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana Senegal and Nigeria	6 years	16.6 % reduction each year

Source -:An ECOWAS Publication, October 1992, P.33.

From the table above, the richer countries, like Nigeria, have the highest percentage in the rate of reduction of customs duties and taxes. It also has a small span within which to eliminate taxes in the scheme. All products exported under this scheme must be accompanied by certain relevant documents like the ECOWAS certificate of origin and the movement certificate which must be endorsed and stamped before they are acceptable for transaction in the ECOWAS countries[10]. To facilitate the scheme,its proponents set out modalities for evaluating losses and paying appropriate compensation to members as a result of the application of the scheme. A compensation budget is put in place

each finacial year. This budget is equivalent to the total loss in revenue suffered by the member states as a whole, as a result of the scheme[11].

The provision of the budget comes from the contributions of member states which exported within the community during the period under review. This is calculated on the basis of the member states exports against the total volume of intra community export of industrial products[12]. Although not all west African states are participating in the scheme those taking part have involved serveral of their companies.
In a paper delived at the 1993 Kaduna Trade Fair, the list of Agreed Enterprises and Industrial products to the Intra-Community Trade liberalisation Scheme 1990-1993, reflects the nature of the products (See Appendix). The paper, showed the ranges and nature of the products, the volume of products into the ECOWAS countries and the percentages constituted in terms of the exported products are not stated. It is obvious from the paper that Nigeria has the highest number of participating companies.
She has a product range of 60 from 25 participating companies. Her premiere position is further emphasied when one looks at the next highest participant which is Ghana with 19 and 34 companies and product range respectively. Nigeria's activities in the cooperation scheme is a reflection of her relative contribution in terms of diversification of products and her contributions to other countries in the West African region.

Many Nigerian companies, both public and private have utilized the advantage of this scheme to boost production and export to West Africa countries. For instance NESTLE FOODS Plc , which is the 26th participant exported Nestogen worth $38,000 to Ghana in 1993 to boost the scheme[13]. The activities of these companies have further been enhanced by a number of decrees enacted by the Nigerian government to boost intra-regional trade e.g. the crucial export incentive and miscellaneous provision decree to aid non-oil export and the 1990 budget which indicated that some primary commodities could be exported in semi-processed and

processed forms. This implies that processed products e.g. cocoa products, (cake butter, powder or cocoa liquor) may enter into the market of ECOWAS member states who are producers of cocoa beans. These economic polices have stimulated trade between Nigeria and other countries of the region, as such products will no longer be considered as competitive but complimentary.

Many Nigerian business men have made their mark in these countries. For instance Chief Machael Ibru, has severa companies in the sub-region, among which are:- Societe Beninoise des Produits de la mer (SOBEPREM) based in The Republic of Benin and the Societe Togolaise de Mareyeurs (SOTOMAREY) in Togo[14]. Nigeran citizens are scattered all over West Africa, where they live and have established business. Nearly one million of them are are in Cote d'Ivoire alone. Their number is so great in these countries that if one goes into the interior, he is sure to find a Nigerian doing one business or the other. Their activities have in no small way contributed to the economic development of these countries. Given the existing exchange rate, Nigerian products are very cheap especially in the Francophone countries . The variety of Nigerian goods displayed at the West African markets clearly indicate her contribution to trade promotion in the region. Indeed, West Africa has become the most potential market for Nigerian exports. A trip to the international airports or borders will testify to this.

Moreso, the increasing volume of smuggling across the Nigerian borders could be regarded as an economic factor which has increased the volume of trade between her and other West African states. There is a growing out-flow of Nigeria's agricultural products, petroleum and petrol related products, subsidized goods and other locally manufactured commodities to the member states.These businessmen use the CFA obtained from the sale of these smuggled commodities to import banned or scarce commodities like cigarettes, textiles, used cloths, rice, flour, wheat, etc, into the country through Benin, Niger, and Togo which have been active as transit points. Custom statistics in Niger, for

instance, suggest that the value of parallel (unrecorded) imports transiting through Niger alone was as high as 7 billion CFA in 1986[15]. Most Nigerian neighbours tend to support smuggling activities because they benefit from it. A good example is the Republic of Benin which does not produce cocoa but exports the product through her national cocoa marketing board (SOCAB). It is believed that Nigerian cocoa make up one third or more of Benin official cocoa exports[16]. Although the official literature on regional integration does not accept unrecorded trans border trade flow as part of inter-regional trade, it could in this regard be seen as an economic factor which has increased trade expansion between Nigeria and other ECOWAS countries, especially her neighbours like Niger and Benin.

Furthermore, in a bid to promote regional trade, the federation of West African chambers of commerce which was pioneered by Nigeria has promoted a private initiative to create an international financial institution in West Africa known as ECOBANK. The bank will eliminate some of the problems retarding the economic development of ECOWAS especially in trade promoting,trade finance, mobilization of venture capital, project development[17]. By providing modern banking and financial services which are pre-requisites for the development of commerce and industry.

ECOBANK has subsidiaries in every member state which operate normal banking business. The bank will in turn enhance trade and make business transaction across the West African countries easy Realizing the importance of this bank to the monetary cooperation and trade expansion in the region, the federal government of Nigeria gave active support for it to be a reality. As a privately owned bank, majority of the shares (about 30%)[18] are owned by Nigerian businesmen thereby making her the highest block country contributor in the bank's capital. The next country with the highest share Cote d'Ivoire, has only 10%, which is at a far range from Nigeria's.

Nigeria, through her activities in trading relations in the subregion, has in no small way contributed to the financial and economic development of ECOWAS. Indeed, Nigeria's efforts in this area, has afforded the member states the opportunity to benefit from and to have access to the large Nigerian market and even capital through trade.

3.4 INDUSTRIALISATION OF WEST AFRICA AND NIGERIAS CONTRIBUTIONS

The movement in contemporary international relations is towards economic diplomacy as against "gun-boat diplomacy" of the early colonial era. Economic realignment is taking place in many regions of the world, especially in Europe where the movement towards the establishment of a single Western European market and even a monetary union would transform western Europe into an independent player in world affairs as a result of the economic cooperation. It is remarkable here, that since a strong industrial base is a sine qua non for economic development, there is the need for the countries of ECOWAS to come together to build a viable industrial region.

In addition, the world economy is increasingly dominated by economic and technological giants and therefore Nigeria can not be an effective voice or force for change in the confederation that does not favour her. This explains why there is the need to build and utilize ECOWAS as an instrument to reduce the economic and technological dependence of member states on the west. As Gambari pointed out, "collective self determination at economic and political levels must be our new or renewed policy thrust"[19].

Nigeria's efforts towards helping the member states of ECOWAS in industrializing their economies actually started with the Third National Development Plan (1975-80). This plan was to boost industrialisation and invest the then surplus petro-dollars earned from oil revenue. Since then Nigeria had signed series

of treaties on commerce, transport and communication and industrial cooperation with most of the West African states. Some of these projects include the industrial cooperation with Benin Republic which is a joint sugar and cement project located at Save' and Onigbolo respectively in the Republic of Benin. Nigeria's 40% share in the Save' sugar and 41% share in the Onigbolo cement project[20] is to influence the prices of these commodities so as to make them to reach the people. It was estimated that over 70% of the 40,000 metric tonnes of total annual sugar production and about 60% of the 500,000 metric tonnes of total cement output from these industries are to be sold in the Nigerian markets[21]. Although the Nigeria government went into the project with the intention of improving economic cooperation and development , it failed to live up to expectation because the prices of these commodities have gone beyond the reach of the people.

With Niger, Nigeria signed many conventions of cooperation. The most outstanding was the £4.8m electric energy agreement[22] between them in 1972 under which Nigeria will supply Niger with 30,000 kilowatts of electricity annually from the Kainji dam. Other cooperation with Niger include the uranium mining at Afasto-est, Iron-ore at Say and Phosphate at Tahoua and Tapora[23]. The Iron-ore and phosphate are to be used by the Ajaokuta steel complex and the Kaduna fertilizer company respectively.

Nigeria also invested in the Mifergui iron project in Guinea and signed an agreement with her in 1981 to go into joint venture in bauxite and steel projects of which Nigeria's share will be 10% and 13% respectively.

As a major oil producer in the region Nigeria used the oil power to consolidate good relationship and make commitments to ECOWAS member states. Various countries in the region have negotiated with her for the supply of this essential commodity. The Nigerian government agreed to supply oil to them at concesssionary prices on the condition that such countries have

refineries and that the commodity will not be re-exported to a third country. This bonus sparked off bilateral agreement between Nigeria and many ECOWAS states, since they stand to gain from it. From the first month of 1977, Nigeria has supplied 100,000 million tonnes of oil per year to Togo and 500,000m of oil annually to Ivory-Coast[24]. In 1975, a 15-year agreement was concluded with Senegal under which Nigeria will provide Senegal with a new oil refinery at Cayar[25]. Similarly, the Nigerian government, in conjuction with the World Bank, has recently approved the first phase of a $260m gas pipe-line project to Ghana, Togo and Benin[26]. This project will involve the runing of gas pipeline from Nigeria to these countries by the Nigerian Gas Company (NGC) a subsidiary of NNPC. All possible arrangements have been put in place to ensure its smooth take off.

Apart from going into joint ventures with some West African states, Nigeria has offered assistance to most ECOWAS countries like the awards of scholarships and fellowships to their students in Nigerian universities; the offer of facilities for vocational and technical training and the provision of equipment and medical supplies for their use. In this way, Nigeria is involved in the training of highly skilled manpower required for industrialization in West Africa. This is so if one considers the fact that virtually all the countries of West Africa have their nationals attending many Nigerian universities, especially those owned by the federal government.

Also related to the above is the fact that Nigerians could be found operating in the informal sectors of most West African countries. Nigerian businessmen and investors have made their mark (and still continue to do so) in most of the economies of member states of ECOWAS. Added to this is the large reservoir of Nigerian artisans that are found in these countries, they too contribute in no small measure towards the industrialisation of most of these countries. Acknowledging Nigeria's importance in the economic arrangement of the region, one French observer noted that, the industrialisation of Benin, Niger, Chad, even Cameroon

cannot be seriously envisaged without being coordinated with the industrial policies of the federation of Nigeria[27].

3.5 FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF NIGERIA TO ECOWAS.

Closely related to the joint economic projects and industrialisation is the financial assistance given out by Nigeria to ECOWAS member states and her ability to respond to their concerns. Nigeria's economic generosity was spurred by her oil wealth, which has placed her in a position where other West African countries look into her for aid and assistance. Also Nigeria's assistance to these countries was to reduce the financial difficulties which have forced them to depend on foreign powers. As these associations were percieved by the Nigerian government as constituting serious threats to her security, thus she resorted to financial assistance to gain their allegiance. At independence, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde recieved N500,000 and N60,775 respectively as aid from Nigeria. Also, one of the main political parties in Guinea-Jeunesse de la repoblition Democratic Africain received N50,000 [28]. The following countries were given substantial amount of money as relief for varying natural disasters in their countries, Mali, N431,579, Senegal, 333,333, Burkina Faso, N401895, Mauritania, N214912, Sierra-Leone, N20,000 and Niger, N342,102 (Niger recieved another aid of N644,000 for another purpose[29].

In the same vein, Benin recieved N1.8m for construction of a 24km highway linking Port Novo (Benin) and Idiroko (Nigeria). The Lagos-Cotonu express-way was constructed and Nigeria single handedly financed the project which cost $40 million[30]. Moreso, apart from wholly financing roads links between Nigeria and Niger, the Illela-Birnin N'koni double carriage bridge was built by Nigeria at the cost of 280m CFA[31] to ease communication between both countries. These efforts have made other neighbouring countries to innundate Nigeria with requests for similar assistance.

With close ties between Nigeria and Liberian, she, in1988, bought over $30m of Liberia's debt to make her credit worthy[32], when the ADB (African Development Bank) and the IMF refused her any new loans due to her inability to service her debts. In addition, the Nigerian government constructed the Liberian section of the Trans-African Highway.

Furthermore, in financial crisis, Nigeria is readily available. For instance in June 1985, the federal government settled a sum of N80,000 outstandind in respect of house rents for the Community's technocrats[33] and granted a credit at $6 million in 1992 to the Senegalese government to finance the societe textile de kaolack (a textile complex for the production of garments). Nigeria's financial assistance to ECOWAS countries has enhanced their economic development. To highlight the extent of dependence of most community members on Nigeria, Niger's one time president Seyni Kountche once stated that,"When Nigeria sneezes (catches cold) we are already at the hospital[34].

For matters relating to finance, the ECOWAS Fund located at Lome, Togo is responsible, it is the financial institution of the community. It grants loans to member states to finance projects which contribute to their economic development and promote intra-regional cooperation. It is also to mobilize fund from development finance bodies in Africa as well as with the industrialised countries and international institutions[35]. The Fund supplements its inadequate resources with yearly contributions from member states.

Nigeria's contribution to the fund has been enormous, it is a fulfilment of her economic contribution to the functioning of the community and improving the wellbeing of the people. She contributes about 32.8% of both ECOWAS Annual budget and paid up capital of the fund. This is the highest percentage paid by any member state; it is higher than that of many of the countries combined. Her capability to finance the community becomes vivid when one looks at the next highest contributor Cote d'Ivore, with

13%. Nigeria's contributions to all budgets of the community has remained the same, her name has never come under the list of members owing any arears, rather in 1991, she made an over payment of $87,307.45[36]. This shows how economically confident she feels particularly on matters concerning ECOWAS. Nigeria has taken it upon herself to make these financial commitment because it will be a problem to ECOWAS if she does not respond in this way. Most member states barely have enough to cater for their domestic economic problems, talkless of contributing to the budget. In fact three members are owing 100% of their accessed contribution[37]. This lack of payment is not encounraging because it impedes the smooth operation of the community.

Going through the contributions of member states to the compensation budget and the subscription to the first and second tranches to the called up capital to the Fund, Nigeria's percentage is highest compared to any other state. She has fully paid all her contributions to date as the other remarkable evidence that can be gleared from the table below.

TABLE 3.5

CONTRIBUTION DES ETATS MEMBRES AU BUDGET DE COMPENSATION 1990-1993
CONTRIBUTION OF MEMBER STATES TO THE COMPENSATION BUDGET

ETATS MEMBRES MEMBER STATES	CONTRIBUTIONS AU BUDGET 1990 TO 1990 BUDGET	CONTRIBUTIONS AU BUGET 1991 TO 1991 BUDGET	CONTRIBUTIONS AU BUDGET 1992 TO 1992 BUDGET	CONTRIBUTIONS AU BUDGET 1993 TO 1993 BUDGET	TOTAL BUDGET
BENIN	147 332	-	-	401 760	549 092
BURKINA FASO	151 374	-	-	-	151 374
CABO VERDE	11 995	-	-	-	11 995
COTE D'IVOIRE	-	-	-	-	-
GAMBIA	-	-	-	-	-
GHANA	19 918	965 312	769 179	-	1,754,409
GUINEE	-	-	-	-	-
LIBERIA	-	-	-	-	-
MALI	16 559	-	-	-	16 559
MAURITANIE	-	-	-	-	-
NIGER	19 688	-	-	-	19 688
NIGERIA	936 797	624 988	818 721	4 428 685	6 809 191
SENEGAL	130	-	-	-	130
SIERRA LEONE	-	-	-	75 055	75 055
TOGO	-	-	-	-	-
	1,303,793	1 590 300	1 587 900	4 905.500	9,387,493

Source:- ECOWAS Secretariat, 1993.

TABLE 3.6

E C O W A S F U N D / F O N D S D E L A C E D E A O

CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF MEMBER STATES' SUBSCRIPTIONS
TO THE FIRST AND SECOND TRANCHES OF THE CALLED-UP CAPITAL
AS AT MAY 31, 1992

Nº	MEMBER STATE / ETAT MEMBRE	RATIO %	ALLOCATION / REPARTITION		PAYMENT MADE / PAIEMENT EFFECTUE		OUTSTANDING AMOUNT / SOLDE DU	
			US$	%	US$	%	US$	%
1	BENIN	3.0	3000000	100.0	1500000	50.0	1500000	50.0
2	BURKINA FASO	2.6	2600000	100.0	1398379	53.8	1201621	46.2
3	CAP VERT	1.0	1000000	100.0	494929	49.5	505071	50.5
4	COTE D'IVOIRE	13.0	13000000	100.0	6500000	50.0	6500000	50.0
5	THE GAMBIA	2.6	2600000	100.0	1340671	51.6	1259329	48.4
6	GHANA	12.9	12900000	100.0	6450000	50.0	6450000	50.0
7	GUINEE	2.9	2900000	100.0	1706729	58.9	1193271	41.1
8	GUINEE BISSAU	1.5	1500000	100.0	750000	50.0	750000	50.0
9	LIBERIA	6.7	6700000	100.0	2653378	39.6	4046622	60.4
10	MALI	1.9	1900000	100.0	987228	52.0	912772	48.0
11	MAURITANIE	3.6	3600000	100.0	487523	13.5	3112477	86.5
12	NIGER	2.1	2100000	100.0	1050000	50.0	1050000	50.0
13	NIGERIA	32.8	32800000	100.0	27029075	82.4	5770925	17.6
14	SENEGAL	5.4	5400000	100.0	2700000	50.0	2700000	50.0
15	SIERRA LEONE	4.4	4400000	100.0	2200000	50.0	2200000	50.0
16	TOGO	3.6	3600000	100.0	2794363	77.6	805637	22.4
	TOTALS/TOTAUX	100.0	100000000	100.0	60042275	60.0	39957725	40.0

With respect to the construction of the Lome headquaters of the Fund and Abuja secretariate of the Community, 60% of the expenditure is to be financed by the Fund and 40% by member states. The total contract price of the Abuja secretariate is estimated at FCFA 8,127,245,453 while that of Lome is FCFA 6,319,368,635[38].

Most member states have not been able to pay their contributions Nigeria did not only pay her contribution, but granted an interest free loan of 42,582,636.00FF[39] to the operational budget of the secretariate towards the construction of the two headquarters.

The table below shows the contributions of individual member states towards the construction of the headquarters and secretariate in Lome and Abuja respectively.

TABLE 3.7 MEMBER STATES' CONTRIBUTIONS (40%) TO THE FINANCING OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS AS AT MAY 31, 1992

MEMBER STATE / ETAT MEMBRE	RATIO %	ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS/ ALLOCATION FCFA			AMOUNT PAID/ MONTANT PAYE FCFA		TOTAL PAYMENT AS % OF TOTAL ALLOCATION	OUTSTANDING AMOUNT TO BE PAID/SOLDE DUE	
		ABUJA	LOME	TOTAL	ABUJA	LOME		FCFA	AS % OF TOTAL ALLOCATION
BENIN	3.8	85549581	76702950	162252531	20000000	60000000	49.3	82252531	50.7
BURKINA FASO	2.6	74142971	66475890	140618861	74142071	65624000	99.4	852790	0.6
CAP VERT	1.0	28516527	25567650	54084177	0	15000000	27.7	39084177	72.3
COTE D'IVOIRE	13.0	370714853	332379449	703094302	260000000	328120000	88.6	114974302	11.4
THE GAMBIA	2.6	74142971	66475890	140618861	23433282	46000000	49.4	71185579	51.6
GHANA	12.9	367863201	329822634	697685885	0	0	0.0	697685885	100.0
GUINEE	2.9	82697929	74146185	156844114	82697929	74146185	100.0	0	0.0
GUINEE BISSAU	1.5	42774791	38351475	81126266	0	20120000	24.8	61006266	75.2
LIBERIA	6.7	191060732	171303254	362363986	0	80000000	22.1	282363986	77.9
MALI	1.9	54181402	48578535	102759937	30000000	47956900	83.6	16803937	16.4
MAURITANIE	3.6	102659498	92043539	194703037	0	0	0.0	194703037	100.0
NIGER	2.1	59884707	53692065	113576772	10500000	42000000	46.2	61076772	53.8
NIGERIA	32.8	935342092	838618917	1773961009	935342092*	838618917	100.0	0	0.0
SENEGAL	5.4	153989247	138065309	292054556	100000000	100000000	74.0	76054556	26.0
SIERRA LEONE	4.4	125472720	112497659	237970379	0	0	0.0	237970379	100.0
TOGO	3.6	102659498	92043539	194703037	90000000	90864000	92.9	13839037	7.1
ALS/TOTAUX	100.0	2851652720	2556764990	5408417710	1626115374	1808449102	63.95	1949853234	36.05

NOTES : 1. This figure is exclusive of FCFA 978.398.500 representing a cost overrun which Nigeria undertook to underwrite on behalf of the Community.

2. All figures are inclusive of costs of construction, interior design and decoration, furnishing and supply of simultaneous interpretation equipment.

CONCLUSION

It is palpable from the foregoing that Nigeria's endowments have been a major factor which has made it imperative for her to play an active role towards the econnomic cooperation of the West African region. It is pertinent to remark here that in the oil boom days, Nigeria had enough petro-dollars and surplus revenue with which she was able to assist less economically viable West African states. However, with the current structural adjustment programme, a balance of payment deficit, inflation, debt burden, etc, Nigeria has been finding it difficult to play this active role aimed at helping the economically disadvantaged West African states. The reason for this is not far fetched. The most glaring one is of course her own internal economic and social problems.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER FOUR

NIGERIA'S POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECOWAS.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will focus on the political contributions of Nigeria to ECOWAS. It will assess her role in maintaining regional security in West Africa. Nigeria's willingness to play a leadership role in sub regional security matters is a reflection of her commitment to the community. Regional conflicts and in security have constituted a major impediment to progress towards the achievement of the objectives of economic integration in West Africa. This situation has prompted the need for a peaceful and tranquil environment for a sucessful economic transaction to prevail.

Besides maintaining regional security for its economic factor, Nigeria was also motivated by the need to guarantee and preserve her national security interest. It follows that her being the largest country in terms of human and material resources in the subregion, she has to be extra sensitive to issues dealing with security since she has been threatened by her neighbours on many occasions. Instances in this regard included the occupation of a Nigerian village in Sokoto State by Republic of Benin forces and the killing of five Nigerian soldiers across the Nigerian border by Cameroon gendermes[1] a country that is not even a member of ECOWAS.The Nigeria citizens condemed the attack and wanted a retaliation but the government behaved in a mature manner by seeking to beef up her security since it could be endangered in the event of war. It is out of this desire to maintain security that Nigeria has maintained closer relationships with her neighbours as a central aspect of her foreign policy.

The Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) like most regional organisations has evolved security arrangements to maintain peace and regional security, but the lack of cooperation

among member states has made it non-functional. This situation has hampered mediation and conflict resolution between and within member states and escalated conflict situations.

Nigeria with her status in the region has taken it upon herself to intervene and find solutions to conflict situations in the region. In this regard, she has mediated in many crisis prominent among which is the Liberia crises where she has put in so much human and material resources to pacify the situation.

Nigeria has encountered certain problems in her bid to play a leadership role in the region. She has to contend with French rivalry and suspicion and Francophone countries alleged gear of domination because of her resources. Also the ailing domestic socio-economic and political situation has posed an impediment to her leadership role.

4.2 ECOWAS AND REGIONAL SECURITY.

The pursuit of economic objective can-not be treated in isolation from security issues[2], there has to be stability and security for a sucessful economic transaction to prevail. Unfortunately, at the ECOWAS level, the founding fathers were more concerned with economic matters that they over-looked a major ingredient of regional integration - political instrument for conflict resolution among member states. The only provision with regard to dispute settlement was in Articule 2 setting up a tribunal which shall ensure the observance of law and justices in the interpretation of the provision of the treaty[3]. This lack of political disposition could be attributed to the relative peaceful situation at the time of deliberation.

To make the region peaceful for economic transaction and protect the industrial and economic services jointly owned by member states, ECOWAS needs to include security issues as part and parcel of its treaty. According to Togo, one of the proponents of this idea, "If Economic integration and cooperation is to be

meaningful then they have to be accompanied by a defence and security arrangement "[4].

Apart from the above, the region has experienced some external threats for instance, the attempted invasion of Guinea in 1971 by Portugese mercenaries, the mercenary assault on the Republic of Benin in 1977[5]. Coupled with this is the presence of French troops and her imperialist activities through military intervention in the region. This has posed security theaths to some ECOWAS members. It was out of this concern that Ecowas states in 1979, adopted a non aggression protocol which recognised the sovereignty of member states. They also aggreed not to attack each other[6]. Although this protocol was ratified by only a few states, it was strenghtened in 1981 with the adoption of the mutual assistance pact. By this pact member states declared that any armed threat or aggression directed against any member shall constitute a threat or aggression against the Community[7]. They also agreed to provide mutual aid and assistance for defence against armed aggression. This defence pact provides for reciprocal assistance within the region in cases where a country is in difficulty or is attacked. It is under this kind of protocol that it was possible for ECOWAS to decide to provide assistance to the Liberian situation.

With the proximity of member states, one would have thought that they could easily reach a consensus for a joint defence pact but this was not the case. Member states have not shown any serious action towards its ratification. This lukewarm attitude could be attributed to the divergent views of some members towards the region, they consider their national interest and sovereignty more importantly, and this is to the detriment of a single collective regional goal. In the same vein, the Francophone states have not shown any interest in the defence pact because they evolved their own security pact-ANAD- Accord de Non-Aggression et d'Assistance en matiere de Defence- in 1981 in the context of CEAO[8]. The ANAD has similar objectives with the ECOWAS defence pact, only that it encourages the presence of

foreign troops (especially France) in member states, because most of them have defence pacts with her. This action by the Francophone states have made it difficult to have a functional subregional security alliance in West Africa.

In a sense, the twin problems of nationalism and mutual suspicion among the various countries of West Africa have continued to militate against efforts aimed at putting in place a mechanism for conflict resolution in the region. This lack of cohesion on such sensitive issue has made inter and Inter-State conflict resolution a difficult task. The Liberian conflict drew much attention to this security vacuum. It is in view of these problems that the eminent persons that revised the ECOWAS treaty in 1992 proposed for a mechanism for regional peace and security, the stregnthening of the protocol on non-aggression and that on mutual assistance in defence. Since economic decisions can not be divorced from political decisions and we need political will to implement the economic decisions, the eminent persons felt it was meaningful to establish the post of Deputy Executive secretary for political affairs, together with that of a military adviser[9] to put some action into the organisation's activities.

4.3 NIGERIA'S ROLE IN CONFLICT MEDIATTION IN WEST AFRICA.

With her status as a regional power, Nigeria has over the years seen it as a duty on her part to maintain regional peace by interceding in crisis situations between and within member states. Nigeria's participation in conflict resolution dates back to the Congo crisis of 1960. Ever since, her contributions and participation in conflict mediation has been felt in several conflict situations notable among which were the Togo/Ghana, Senegal-Mauritania, Mali/Burkina-Faso, Liberia/Sierra-Leone and some others. This work will provide an indepth analysis of Nigeria's role in Mali/Burkina-Faso, Liberia/Sierra-Leone and the Liberian crises.

4.3.1 MALI/BURKINA-FASO CRISIS.

The Mali/Burkina-Faso conflict was a classical examlpe of the danger of artificial borders drawn by the colonialists during the 1884-5 partition of Africa. The conflict dates back to the colonial era, precisely 1932, when Burkina-Faso was dismantled by the French government on the grounds that she did not produce enough resources to make her self reliant. The southern parts was incorporated into Cote d'Ivoire and the North was divided between Niger and French Sudan (Mali). Fifteen years later, that was in 1947, Burkina-Faso was reconstituted within her 1932 border by a French Bill known as Loi No - 47 - 1707[10].

After the attainment of independence in 1960, crisis developed between Burkina-Faso and Mali over a strip of land (Agacher strip) along their border zone. The land is said to be rich in manganese deposits and supposedly in oil. The area is inhabited by Tuaregs and Bellahs, two groups of nomads associated with Mali. Both parties have their reasons to claim the land. Mali argued that the land is mainly inhabited by an ethnic group associated with her and that the area was incorperated into the

"Arrete General" No 2728 of 27th November 1935[11]. While Burkina-Faso argued that the 1947 law reconsitituted Burkina-Faso within its 1932 border of which the disputed area was part.

In 1973, when a serious drought hit the two countries, the border dispute intensified because the strip is well watered from River Beli which is a tributary of River Niger. The crisis degenerated into a full-scale war by 1974, which called for the intervention of the OAU for a cease fire. A committee was later set up to look into the matter and make proposal towards the settlement of the dispute. The committee ruled in favour of Burkina-Faso, this triggered the annoyance of Mali and increased tension on the disputed area. A clandestine relationship continued to exist between the two countries until 1985, when the Malian authority prevented the Burkina- be government from conducting a census of the disputed area. They both matched troops to the area in preperation for war which eventually broke out on the 25th of december 1985, inflicting heavy casualities on both sides.
Many countries, especially the West African states were concerned about the crisis and sougt for ways to bring it to an end. The Nigerian government mediated in the crisis by sending messages to both countries to resolve the conflict. Nigeria's Foreign Minister then, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, made several trips to Ouagadougu and Bamako to pacify the warring countries. Apart from Nigeria's involvement as a member of ECOWAS and her capacity as the ECOWAS chairman then, her potentials made it possible for her to maintain peace in the region. She set in motion all necessary machinery to bring sanity to the disputed area. Also, Nigeria in alliance with Libya proposed a cease-fire agreement which included sending forces from their countries to monitor the withdrawal of troops from the disputed area.

Although Nigeria put in efforts to settle the dispute, her diplomatic initiative did not make much impact in the resolution of the conflict. Perhaps it is because she did not associate with any member state but chose to team up with Libya which is not a West African state and whose activities towards the region

had been unimpressive. Also the delibrate refusal of the participation of Libyan troops in the operation by the Francophone states could be a delibrate plan to thwart Nigerian efforts for interfering in a purely Francophone matter. This is a reflection of the rivalry between the Francophone and Anglophone countries of the West African region.

4.3.2. LIBERIA/SIERRA-LEONE CRISIS

The Liberia-Sierra-Leone conflict was precipitated by the Liberian rebel, Charles Taylor's plan to destablize those countries that contributed troops to ECOMOG. Sierra-Leone being a neighbouring country to Liberia and a base for the ECOMOG soldiers, her role and contribution to the regional peace keeping force became a threat to Taylor who is said to be angry with Sierra-Leone for frustrating his efforts at siezing power in Liberia[12]. His plan to destabilize ECOMOG by attacking Sierra-Leone is a design to divert attention to another event which will enable him buy enough time to satisfy his desire. The rebels made incursions into Sierra-Leone with the aim of taking over the government and installing a puppet government which would stop Sierra-Leone contributions to ECOMOG and support them. They were also said to have internal support from some Sierra-Leonians who were fed up with President Momoh's regime. The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra-Leone (RUF) that declared war against his regime were believed to enjoy the backing of Taylor. Also, one Mr. Jamie Sahid Mohammed, a wealthy ex-convict and wanted man because of his role in the 1987 coup attempt on Momoh, was said to be bankrolling the rebellion[13].

The rebels captured the district of Kailahun, Kenema, Pujehun and Bo, with some other towns like Bendu and Koindu. They attacked these places and looted markets, police and custom posts causing havoc and casualties on the side of the Sierra-Leonian army and civilians. For instance, when Pujehun fell to them, they freed all the prisoners in Pujehun prison, conscripted all the youths into their ranks and killed those who refused conscription[14].

Residents fled to other towns or outside Sierra-Leone for safety. With increased tension from rebel attacks, fight broke out on the 26th of March, 1991. The rebels were not a military force per se, but they were well armed with sophisticated weapons which gave them an edge over the grossly ineffective, indisciplined, poorly trained, ill equiped and hardly prepared Sierra-Leone army of 4,000 men[15] as at 1991. They retreted as the rebels advanced and captured their cities.

To combat the rebel incursion and the fierce fighting, Joseph Momoh, the then Sierra-Leone leader took a "save our soul" trip to Nigeria to solicit for military assistance to quell the disturbances. The Nigerian government responded by sending 700 soldiers and an unknown quantity of arms and ammunitions[16].It also provided Sierra-Leone with air fighters since the latter has no air force. Speaking on behalf of the Nigerian government, the then Vice President, Augustus Aikhomu, asserted that, "Nigeria will continue to provide assistance to ensure that each state in the ECOWAS subregion attains peace, tranquility and the interest of its people without destabilisation of the subregion"[17].
Nigeria had to assert her leadership role to make sure that the situation was curtailed as it could be a slap on her face and ECOWAS to see the situation deteriorate.

Despite this support, more towns fell to the rebels, thereby worsening the already deteriorated situation. Nigeria responded again by sending a six man strong military delegation headed by Gen. Abacha, then defence minister and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Defence Staff to discuss the Sierra-Leonian situation. Nigeria at this juncture pledged to do everything possible to preserve Sierra-Leone sovereignty because with her status in the region, she could not sit down and watch things go wrong in Sierra-Leone which is a member state. Thus on the 28th of April 1991, she sent more troops and weapons under the command of Lt. Colonel D.R.A.Ndefo to join the 700 Nigerian soldiers earlier drafted there. The Nigerian airforce sent 4 Alpha jets, one helicopter

gunboat and three Charlie transporters[18]. This assistance by Nigeria went a long way to bring peace and normalcy to Sierra-Leone. It also boosted the morale of the Sierra-Leonian people and showed Nigeria's capacity and concern about the security situation in the country and the subregion as a whole.

4.3.3. ECOMOG.

ECOMOG - ECOWAS Monitoring Group- is a regional military alliance set up by some ECOWAS member states to intervene in the Liberian conflict and maintain peace and security in the war-torn country. ECOMOG is the first idea of peace keeping by an African intervention force to deal with crisis situation since Nkrumah's advovcation for the formation of an "African high Command". At this juncture, it will be apropriate to situate the Liberian crisis in its historical context in order to understand and appreciate the working mechanism of ECOMOG in Liberia.

Liberia was established in 1847 as a settlement for ex-slaves from America. These slaves otherwise known as Americo-Liberians represent only about 5% of the total population of Liberia which was estimated at 2.57m in 1990[19]. They were in control of economic and political power to the exclusion of the indegenous Liberians who were subjected to a lot of obnoxious injustices. The Americo-Liberians under the leadership of the True Whig Party stiffled opposition and prevented mass participation in the political process. Before 1964, for instance, indigenous Liberians were not represented in the legislature and any-one interested in "observing proceedings of the National Legislature could do so only upon depositing with Government in Monrovia the sum of $100[20]. They had no voting right and paid taxes to the government to which they were not represented. Although there were moves to integrate them, these moves were not far-reaching enough. There was a lot of corruption in high places; the Americo-Liberians mismanaged government resources to their own advantage.

The Rice Riots of 1979 marked a turning point in the Liberian history. The government increased the price of rice from $22 to $30 a bag to the enrangement of the public. The opposition parties MOJA (Movement for Justice in Africa) and PAL (Peoples Alliance of Liberia) criticised the price increase, challenged the government and called for a general strike to force it out of office. The government fearing their action, rounded up their key officers and charged them with attempting to overthrow the government. With the perception that the government was about to hastily try and execute the ring leaders, the opposition coordinated a coup carried out by 17 non-commissioned and hardly literate officers in the Liberian army[21] on April 12, 1980. The coup, which killed President Tolbert, put an end to over a century rule of the Americo-Liberians.

On assumption of power, Master-Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe and the members of the ruling council of the new government Peoples Redemption Council (PRC) stiffled political participation of the Americo-Liberians; with several government officials being arrested, tried and executed for reasons ranging from misuse of public funds, corruption, violation of human rights, etc. Deo appointed some members of the People Progressive Party (PPP) (formally PAL) and Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) to critical positions in his cabinet; e.g Dr. Togba-Na tipoteh became minister for economic planning and development, Baccus Matteuse, foreign minister, Amos Sawyer, Special Adviser, Charles Taylor, director of the powerful General Services Agency[22].

The alliance of Doe's PRC and the opposition movement was short-lived. He became power thirsty and surppressed any opposition. Indeed his regime was brutal and forced many political activists and military men to flee the country. For example, by 1983, Doe had in one way or theother got rid of all the 16 other non, commissioned officers who formed the gang of 17 that overthrew the government of Tolbert in 1980[23]. Also Major William Jerbo was accused of plotting a coup against the PRC and was summarily executed together with 30 other soldiers[24]. This was followed by

massive violation of human rights. As Doe began to see many enemies both real and imaginary around him, he enacted some obnoxious decrees to back up his actions.

In the 1985 election to usher in a democratically elected government, Doe "civilianised" himself and registered the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL). He employed every means to rig his way to victory. Doe's government was corrupt and tribally centered. There was wide spread corruption and financial misconduct which eventually plunged the country into economic shambles. He appointed people of his ethnic group to sensitive positions in the government and army to protect him.
The repressive regime of Doe led to the rise of a rebellion in Nimba county under Charles Taylor's National Patrotic Front in 1989. Taylor, a close associate of Doe until allegation of embezelment of funds totaling $1m[25] forced him to flee to the United States. Doe sought his extradiction on charges of corruption. Taylor was arrested and put behind bars, from there he escaped and fled to Libya and Burkina-Faso where he recruited and trained young Liberians who were not in support of Doe's regime. Taylor and his men matched towards Monrovia to capture the city. By 1990, a war broke out. As the war intensified, cases of genocide, attacks, kidnapping of innocent citizens became the order of the day, embassies were ransacked and citizens of West African countries, especially those marked by Taylor because of their support for Doe, were killed or taken hostage. This resulted into mass movement of refugees from Liberia into neighbouring countries; disruption of means of livelihood and other essential facilities. The phenomenon generated a lot of concern from the West African states that they sought ways to pacify the situation.

4.3.3.1 NIGERIA AND ECOMOG.

Although Nigeria has been playing important roles in conflict resolution in the region, her actions in the resolution of the Liberian crisis were distinct. She played a more activist role.

As a result of her deep concern for issues affecting the region, it was not surprising when she took the lead to mobilize other countries to quell the crisis. At the 13th ECOWAS Heads of State Summit held in The Gambia, President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria proposed the formation of an ECOWAS standing committee comprising leaders from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra-Leone,The Gambia as well as foreign ministers from Togo and Mali to look into the crisis situation. The committee proposed that a peace keeping force be sent to Liberia to restore peace, law and order and create the conditions necessary for the return of the country to democracy. According to the then Nigerian foreign minster, Dr Rilwan Lukman, ECOMOG was going into Liberia first and foremost to stop the sensless killings of innocent civilians - nationals and foreigners - and to help the Liberian people restore their democratic institution[26].

Nigeria has boldly taken up the responsibility to maintain peace in the region and is backing her action with resources available to her. She bears a substantial burden of the military initiative in terms of men, materials and money since most ECOWAS states were unable to pay their quota of the contributions for the restoration of peace in Liberia. Fortunately, the crisis came about the same time as the Gulf crisis during which Nigeria made as much as 5 billion U.S. dollars due to temporary rise in oil prices. Out of this windfall, she expended between $250 - $500m on the crisis[27]. From the observation made by the then Minister of External Affairs, General Nwachukwu "Nigeria is responsible for 70% of funds used in running ECOMOG in Liberia[28]. This financial back up explains why the peace keeping mission is still operating.

Nigeria's ability to justify ECOMOG portrayed her as a prime mover in issues concerning the subregion and has proved her seriousness to lead the continent and serve as her mouth piece in the international community. Nigeria's efforts to stop the carnage and destructions in Liberia has been acknowledged by the international community. ECOMOG has recieved support from the

OAU (Organisation of African Unity) and the United Nations, which claimed that the initiative offered so far is the best prospect for achieving a settlement that will restore peace and stability to Liberia and the immediate subregion[29]. The United States has given about $29m in support of the peace keeping and about $203[30] as at April 1993 for humanitarian assistance to the Liberians. Further more, in a message delivered to President Ibrahim Babangida, the United Nation special envoy on Liberia, Mr. Trevor Gordon Sommers,Said, that, the international Community recongnised and appreciated Nigeria's contributions to the resolution of the Liberian crisis and the sustenance of peace in the West African subregion.[31] He remarked that Nigeria had lessned the Uniterd Nation's burden especially now that it is occupied with peace keeping operation in many parts of the world. This shows the scale of support that Nigeria's role in the peace keeping force has commanded.

Despite ECOMOG's role in restoring peace in Liberia, it has drawn some criticism from Nigerians and some other observers. Some Nigerians are of the opinion that the government is diverting a lot of her scarce development resources from the economic need of the people to fight the Liberian war. From an economic view point, ECOMOG represents a huge financial waste for a country that is in serious economic shambles. Nigeria has pumped a conservative estimate of N3b into the effort till date, N2.8b of which is through NNPC facility alone[31]. In fact Nigeria has spent so much money in financing the peace keeping operation that a total picture of her financial involvement may never be known.

Beside the economic aspect lots of human lives have been lost in the peace keeping process. As at January 1992, 137 Nigerian soldiers had been killed in action (KIA)[32]. Some others have their arms and legs amputated or maimed. The government keeps sending and recalling troops that we can not acertain the exact number of men that have lost their lives in Liberia. There were also lots of Nigerian civilian casualties like the two Nigerian journalist, Ayo Awotunsin, of the Daily Champion Newspaper and

kress Imodibie, the political editor of The Guardian Newspaper were killed after being held hostage for many weeks in Liberia[33]

At home, some people have argued that Nigeria has not solved her political problems and had gone to solve that of another country. They argued that Nigeria should first put her domestic problems under control, especially the effects of the annulled June 12th 1993, elections which led to some fall outs between the government and those in favour of the election. This resulted in some political unrest and a state of lawlessness in some states of the federation.

Similarly, the Francophone member states percieve the peace keeping force (ECOMOG) as an Anglophone plot designed to establish Nigerian dominance over regional politics. They argued that they were not consulted before ECOMOG was formed and that the Liberian crisis was an internal problem, which portrays ECOMOG's intervention as contravening the OAU Charter on Non-interferance into the territory of a member state. ECOMOG has also recieved criticism from other avenues like the Pan-African News Agency's Special Report which described it as "ECOWAS political Baptism of fire"[34].

These criticisms not-withstanding, Nigeria has not relented in her efforts towards the peace keeping force, she has continued to play prominent role in her attempt to maintain peace in the subregion.

4.4 FACTORS AFFECTING NIGERIA'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ECOWAS.

Certain factors have combined to militate against Nigeria's leadership role in the West African region. France and her ex-colonies have constituted a major obstacle to the effective excercise of this role. The socio-economic and political situation of the country is also a hindrance. Similarly, the fact that Nigeria is an under-developed, dependent country constitutes a constraint to her leadership position in West

Africa. We shall proceed to analyse more on these enumerated factors

4.4.1 FRANCO-NIGERIA RELATIONS.

The Franco-Nigeria relations has been characterised by suspicion and hostility. The two countries have exercised much influence on the region-france, as a result of her special relationship with her former colonies and Nigeria because of her endowments. Since independence Nigeria has had a difficult political relation with France. Diplomatic relations between them sourced in 1961 when Nigeria reacted to France's atomic bomb test in the Sahara. In the row, the French embassy in Nigeria was closed down and her aircrafts and ships were barred from Nigerian airfield and seaport respectively. The action shocked France. She saw it as an insult on a world power by an insignificant country like Nigeria[35]. As a way of retaliation, France vetoed Nigeria's associate membership of the EEC in 1966. It is against this background of hostility and suspicion that one can understand the attitude of France during the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70. France recognised and supported Biafra and encouraged the Francophone states to do the same. As a result Dr Emile Zinsou, then President of Benin allowed his country to be used as a passage for Biafran supplies. This was all in an attempt to dismember and undermine Nigeria's security so that she would not play her role as a leader in the region. France is percieved to have master minded the formation of CEAO and tried to dissuade Francophone states from joining ECOWAS because it was pioneered by Nigeria, to counter her influence in the region. It is this factor in Nigeria's regional policy that led Ali Mazrui to conclude that 'The natural rival of Nigeria is France[36].

France is more or less a "god father" to the Francophone states; they are so dependent on her that they have become her stooges. France has special relations with most Francophone states - including all Nigerian neighbours on political, economic, military, technical and cultural levels which she could use to

intervene in any problem concerning them. French security arrangement with these states has constituted a great threat to Nigeria's security since it involves the intervention of foreign troops into any crisis area. This assistance has given these Francophone countries the courage to prove difficult and to disagree on issues with Nigeria. This is more pronounced with Cote d'Ivoire - the most economically viable Francophone state in the region. Her relationship with Nigeria is based on rivalry because she has a leadership aspiration in the region and sees Nigeria as a stumbling block. Some analysts of Nigerian - Ivorien leadership rivalry even narrow the problem down to the personality of the Ivorien leader, who being the oldest surviving, African head of state sees himself as the "doyen of African statesman" [37]. The clash of interest between the states degenerated into a deplorable state with the Liberian crisis. With Cote d'Ivoire's influence, the Francophone states percieved ECOMOG with lukewarm and hostile attitude. For instance, Burkina-Faso is being used as a route for Taylors arm supplies, even those who contributed troops-Senegal and Mali- withdrew them, perhaps in solidarity with Cote d'Ivoire. Simillarly, after the Bamako Summit, which was at Nigeria's initiative Houphouet Bougny called another summit in Yamossoukro, this did not augur well with Nigeria as she saw it as an attempt to sieze her initiative in the crisis resolution. She announced that she was not attending, arguing that the ECOWAS protocol on calling such meeting required a total of 2/3 approval by all ECOWAS leaders. This rivalry prompted a senior Ivoien official to argue that ECOWAS members who should be concerned about the Liberian situation were its immediate neighbours, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra-Leone and not any-body else[38]. This is an apparent refrerence to Nigeria.

In the same vein, Nigeria with her position in the region is not able to carry along the other countries in decision making because of the dichotomy on linguistic leanings - Anglophone versus Francophone.For instance, Benin, a Nigerian neighbour, joined the CEAO without the knowledge of Nigeria. The

Francophone countries are very apprehensive of Nigeria's domination. Their alleged fear is related to Nigeria's endowments which they feel would be used as a weapon to dominate regional affairs and impose decisions on them. They argued that with the unequal development between them and Nigeria, the gains of integration would not be distributed equally and economic activities generated by the integration would tend to cluster a round Nigeria because it was more developed and economically advanced than them. The issue of envy can-not therefore be ruled out as some of them are jealous of Nigeria's wealth and the international acceptance of her role in the West African region. To them, Nigeria's enthusiasm for the success of ECOWAS is a cover to fulfil her desire for regional hegemony. This lack of cohesion and differences of opinion between Nigeria and these Francophone countries has lightened her leadership problems and the effective performance of her role in the sub-region.

4.4.2 DOMESTIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

To be regarded as a leader in the subregion, Nigeria will entail some cost to the position and the people. That is to say, she requires the expenditure of resources for the attainment of her goals and has to contend with the large resource demand of her domestic socio-economic situation. With her ailing economy, it will be difficult for her to satisfy the two goals equally. This situation has constituted a problem to her leadership role.

Over the years Nigeria has contributed human and material resources to the sub-region in her bid to play a leadership role. She has spent millions of naira as financial assistance and aid to member states. Besides, she has contributed about 32.8% of ECOWAS budget which is the highest share. In the same vein, her contribution to ECOWAS peace-keeping force in Liberia is very conspicious. She contributes about 70% of the finance and has the highest number of troops. She is doing all these to achieve her goal in the region. The money she is spending on the community is so much considering her economic situation. She is not

producing enough resources to sustain her economy, oil, which is her main stay has recently declined in revenue generation. The government had to resort to massive borrowing to meet up with her domestic and international commitments, this action has constituted a problem for the Nigerian economy. This has pluged her into serious debt crisis. (Nigeria's debt grew from N82.4m in 1960[39] to about N33.3b in 1991)[40]. This crisis has resulted into chronic balance of payment deficit, large cases of unemployment, stricks, student unrest etc, to the extent that the government can not respond to the basic needs of the populace. The government adopted SAP to revamp the economy but this did not help matters, rather it hightened the economic depression and the constant devaluation of naira which further fuelled inflation and eroded workers purchasing power. It also made our economy more dependent on the international market which means that we are tied body and soul to the Western powers.

In addition, the Nigerian society has been characterized by continued ethnic rivalry, religious unrest, border disputes, mass expulsion of illegal immgrants, electoral tensions etc, all this has shaken domestic stablility. Also Nigeria's ratification of the community protocols especially that on free movement of community members has become a problem to her. The ratification of these protocols made her naturally attractive to the citizens of other countries. A large number of them took this advantage and streamed into the country.

Furthermore, the fact that Nigeria is under developed and dependent on the world capitalist countries is a major impediment to her leadership role in West Africa. Nigeria is still dependent on the advanced countries for most of the expertise, skills and technology she needs for her development. Even her military hard-wares are imported, her military force still recieves certain professional training in foreign institutions. This military dependence could hamper any serious conflict or military excercise. With this dependence, Nigeria has become indebted to these countries and this could subvert her leadership

role as these countries could influence her decisions or policies on certain issues. An example of this was the threat from the United States to Nigeria to withdraw from Liberia (her fomer colony) because of the cancellation of the june 12 election and political impasse that followed it which the American government saw as an attempt to suppress democracy in the country. If Nigeria had succumbed to the threat, it would have affected our role and status in the region.

From the fore going, it is plausible to assert that forces - socio-economic and political within and outside Nigeria have hampered her leadership role in the West African sub-region.

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CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The central focus of this study has been to examine Nigeria's leadership roles in ECOWAS. Evidently, Nigeria has the potential to play a leadership role in the West African region because of her human and material resources. The study in assessing Nigeria's actual role examined propositions which were aimed at determining the extent to which her comparatively preponderant resource endowment has facilitated her playing a leadership role in West Africa. It was also of interest to find out the extent to which Nigeria's role in West Africa was informed by a decision to gain interest of a political as well as economic nature for herself. Finally, we were interested in the relative success of Nigeria in performing the leadership role as well as secure its own interest.

The study employed primary and secondary sources of data which include newspapers, magazines, published and unpublished documents and interviews. In order to place the concern of the study in proper perpective, the historical background to the formation of ECOWAS was examined. We noted that the integrative process of the West African states dated back to the pre-colonial era when the inhabitants had political, cultural, religious and trading relations between them, which facilitated population movement and enhanced integration. The colonial efforts at integration were also looked into. The study also examined some subregional arrangements prior to ECOWAS formation, the genesis of ECOWAS and Nigeria's diplomatic initiatives in its formation. She provided the leadership and mobilised her resources for the sucessful formation of the regional body on 28th May 1975. The aims and objectives, the institutions and structures were also examined.

As our research findings suggest, Nigeria's human and material resources are the motive force behind her leadership role in the subregion. She has commited a large amount of resources including financial assistance and aid to the less endowed countries to improve their well-being and aid their development. It brought into focus Nigeria's trade promotions and how she has utilized the Trade Liberalisation Scheme (TLS) to promote intra-regional trade. Nigeria's industrial cooperation and financial assistance to member staes was also examined. The work also revealed that Nigeria is the highest contributing member to ECOWAS funds. She contributes 32.8% to ECOWAS budget and the Fund annually and her commitment to the organisation has been steadfast.

Nigeria's political contribution to ECOWAS was also examined. The findings show that Nigeria's security interest in West Africa is to make the region peaceful and safe for economic transaction and to protect her national security. Nigeria's security ambition has not been successful because of the divergent views held by member states about the organisation. Nigeria's commitment to maintain peace and security in the region is reflected in the various crisis situations she has participated in. The work made an indepth study of three of such crisis situation in the region.

In analysing Nigeria's role in ECOWAS we found facts which show that the presence of Francophone in the region has been a problem to Nigeria. In the same vein, it was noted that domestic socio-economic and political instability have some effect on her role as a regional power.

5.2 CONCLUSION.

The following conclusion could be deduced from the foregoing. In the first place, Nigeria is playing a pre-eminent role in the sub-region. Our findings have revealed that this role is directed towards future gains in the international arena which

would be beneficial to her. Nigeria's desire for a seat as a permanent member of the Security Council may become realistic as a result of her endeavors within the region. She stands a good chance to be elected if the position is to be contested by African countries. This argument is summarised in a speech by General Nwachukwu (rtd) one-time Minister for External Affairs, as follows;

> Africa must not continue to be a region without representative in the permanent membership of the Security Council------ Nigeria, the most populous African nation with the largest economic potential and her proven commitment to the cause of world peace and security, possessses the qualification to fulfil Africa's aspiration in this regard[1].

In addition, Nigeria's commitment to the success of ECOWAS springs from her desire to become the commercial nerve centre of West Africa. Although this desire has cost her some resources, it will achieve some results because she will be an economic and industrial giant within the region. This will result in a huge market for her and her products will circulate throughout the region. This will more than compensate for the expended resources.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS.

The need to play a leadership role has become more urgent in the face of the recent trend in world politics, which has been towards regional realignment. ECOWAS needs a leader to stir and move it towards achieving success in her objectives and promote regional development. Since Nigeria is the Primus inter Pares in the region, it is inevitable that she plays a prominent role in ECOWAS, this will place her in a better position to direct the affairs of the community. In line with our finding, it is necessary to make some recommendations which may contribute towards the sustainance of her leadership role and enhance her

status in the West African region and the world in general. Firstly, Nigeria should pursue her leadership role with vigour, set her priorities right, know her motives and pursue them. Since there is an aim to every role played in the international scene, it is necessary that the leadership role be planned and played in her interest and to her satisfaction. With a good plan, she would be able to estimate what she can achieve from a well played role because it is a means to an end. Since Nigeria aspires to be a permanent member of the Security Council and has to justify this by distinguishing herself in the international arena, she needs to expend some resources to pursue and achieve this motive. She needs to be financially and economically sound with an efficient management of the resources, for it will be impossible for a country to be a leader when there is a breakdown of virtually all institutions. She needs to ameliorate the situation to achieve her motives and be regarded as a power and leader in the region and the international scene.

Also Nigeria should in one way or the other get a reward for the enormous assistance to these West African countries. She should use her leadership to cajole them so that she could have some influence over them and count on their support to her benefit whenever the need arises. For instance, she could be sure of their votes whenever she is vying for any post in the comity of nations, could use her influence in the region to cajole Guinea-which has one of the best iron-ore in the world to give her preference in the sale of the commodity for use in her steel industries. These economic relations could also be used to put pressure on the Francophone states of the region to lure them away from allegiance to France in the interest of regional solidarity. As a leader, she must know how to use the carrot and the stick in directing the affairs of the region.She should ensure that her diplomacy is backed up with power when necessary to enhance its success. Nigeria has to play the leadership role to her advantage, otherwise she will be sacrificing for nothing.

the international arena, she must be self reliant with the capability to produce most of the things that are essential to her leadership role. For instance, she must possess the right type of military technology as well as training facilities which will no doubt enhance her military prowess in the region.

Inspite of the perception that France is a rival to Nigeria in the west African region, the situation is that of mutual relationship. France has invested a lot in Nigeria and Nigera is also gaining from her investments. The Franco-Nigeria economic relations has grown tremendously that France is now one of the most important economic partners of Nigeria.

The Franco-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce and Industry has between 140-150 Companies and they have put the value of French interests in the country at close to $10 billion (about N220 billion). She has about 22 financial institutions these includes, United Bank for Africa (U.B.A), Afribank, N.A.L, Merchant Bank. Societe Generale among others. Other French interest within the country include, S.C.O.A, C.F.A.O, Bouygues, Fougerolle, Socea, Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria (P.A.N.), DHL, TOTAL, ELF[2] etc. which had given employment to thousands of Nigerians. These French investments will discourage any misunderstanding with Nigeria, as she (France) would not want to risk her investments in the event of a threat to nationalize them by Nigeria.
According to Okoi Arikpo, it will be "unwise" for Nigeria and France to ignore each other, the reason being that with a responsive relationship with the France,we could stregnthen our relationship with the Francophone countries who all have economic, commercial and technical attachments with France[3]

Furthermore, the Nigerian government should be able to convince her citizens of the importance of ECOWAS and what she stands to gain from her role in it, so that they will appreciate her role. Otherwise they would continue to question her involvement in ECOWAS especially the enormus resources she is putting in it.

to take advantage of the treaty on free movement of persons, residence and right of establishment to diversify and move to other parts of West Africa and establish industrial projects and other forms of economic activities. This will reduce the influx of aliens that swamp the country in search of jobs. It will also reduce the social and security threat to Nigeria. This effort will in a way forge closer cooperation with Nigeria and her neighbours as they will appreciate it as Nigeria's contribution to promote their development. It will in turn alleviate the fear of domination and hostility towards Nigeria by these countries.

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APPENDIX

COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE DES ETATS DE L'AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

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LISTE DES ENTREPRISES ET PRODUITS INDUSTRIELS AGREES AU SCHEMA DE LIBERALISATION DES ECHANGES ENTRE LES ETATS MEMBERS DE LA C.E.D.E.A.O. 1990 - 1993

LIST OF AGREED ENTERPRISES AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS TO THE INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE LIBERALISATION SCHEME 1990 - 1993.

LAGOS, DECEMBRE 1992

LISTE DES ENTREPRISES ET PRODUITS INDUSTRIELS AGREES

LIST OF AGREED ENTERPRISES AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS

ETAT MEMBRE D' EXPORT / EXPORTING MEMBER STATE — ENTERPRISE / COMPANY	N°/Nomenclature	Produit/Product — Designation/Description	N D'agrement/Approval Number — Code Pays/Country Code	N°Entr Entr N°	N°.Prod Entr N°	Annee Year
BENIN Usine Africaine de Confiserie	17.04	Autres sucreries sans cacao/other non-cocoa based Confectionery	204	001	01	88
			204	002	01	88
	94.04	Matresses/Matelas	204	002	02	88
P.E.B.(Plastiques et Elastomere du Benin IBER-S.A. (Industrie Beninoise de Refrigeration) MANUCIA	94.04	Mousse/Foam	204	003	01	88
	84.15	Refrigerateurs/Refrigerators	204	003	02	88
	84.12	Climatiseurs/Air conditioners	204	004	01	88
	36.06	Allumettes/Matches				
BENIN Industrie Alimentaire SA. BP. 412 Cotonou	19.03	Couscous sans oeufs/Couscous without egg	204	001	01	92
			204	001	02	92
	19.03	Autres pates alimentaires sans oeuf/Other pastes without egg				
BURKINA FASO FASO PLAT SBMC (Societe Burkinabe de manufature de Cuir)	39.07	Sacs Plastiques/Plastic Bags	225	001	01	88
	41.02	Peaux (Cuir)Hides (Leather)	225	002	01	88

ETAT MEMBRE D' EXPORT EXPORTING MEMBER STATE / ENTERPRISE COMPANY	N°/Nomenclature	Produit/Product Designation/Description	Code Pays/ Country Code	N° D'agrement/Approval Number N° Entr. Entr N°	N° Prod. Prod N°	Année Year
CAP VERT SOCAL	64.02	Chaussures en cuir naturel/ Natural Leather shoes	132	001	01	88
	64.02	Chassures en cuir synthetiques/Synthethic Leather Shoes	132	001	01	88
GHANA Ghana Pioneer Aliminuim Limited	-	Utensils de cuisine/ Kitchen Utensils	288	001	01	88
Ghana Aluworks Ltd	76.03	Feuilles et Bandes en aliminuim/Colis flat flat sheets	288	001	01	90
Alogan Company Ltd	76.08	Cadres de fenctres en aluminuim/Louvre frames	288	002	01	90
	70.21	Lamlles de verres pour cadres de fenetre/ Glass louvre	288	002	02	90
ASAMAN METAL WORKS LTD	76.08	Cadres de fenetres en aluminuim/Aluminuim louvre blades	288	003	01	90
Cocoa Processing Company Densu Industries Ltd	18.06	Chocolat/Chocolate	288	004	01	90
	34.05	Cirages pour chaussures/ Shoe polish	288	005	01	90
	38.11	Antiseptique dentaire/ Dental Antispetic	288	005	02	90

ETAT MEMBRE D'EXPORT' / EXPORTING MEMBER STATE — ENTERPRISE / COMPANY	N° / Nomenclature	Produit/Product — Designation/Description	Code Pays/ Country Code	N° D'agrement/approval Number — N° Entr Entr N°	N° Prod Prod N°	Annee Year
United Glassware Ltd	70.14	Verrerie d'eclairage/Lantern Globes	288	006	01	90
Paramount Distillers Ltd.	22.09	Gin/Paramount Gin	288	007	01	90
	22.09	Schanapps/Paramount Schnapps	288	007	02	90
	22.09	Cognac/Tree Star Brandy	288	007	03	90
	22.09	Gin Totapak	288	007	04	90
	22.09	Brandy Totapak	288	007	05	90
New Match Factory Ghana Ltd.	44.09	Batonnets d'allumettes/Match Splints	288	008	01	90
J.L Morrison Son & Johns Ltd	29.01	Huile Omega/Omega Oil	288	009	01	90
	29.01	Elixir antepa/Antepa Elixir	288	009	02	90
	29.01	Colorant pour cheveux/Hair dye	288	009	03	90
Metalware Ltd.	73.31	Pointes/Nails	288	010	01	90
	73.29	Boucles de chaines/Chain link	288	010	02	90
Pens & Plastic Ghana Ltd	98.03	Stylos bic/Bic ball pens	288	011	01	90
Twifo Oil Palm Plantation	15.07	Huile de palmbrute/Crude Palm Oil	288	012	01	90
Tema Food Complex Corporation.	16.04	Conserve de possion/Tuna flakes				
Ital Ghana Lace Ltd.	50.08	Dentelles brodees/Embroder Laces	288	014	01	90
PEGASUS Beauty Products Ltd.	34.02	Savons medicaux/Medicated Soap	288	015	01	90
	33.06	Produits pour les soins de cheveux/Hair activator	288	015	02	90

ETAT MEMBRE D'EXPORT' EXPORTING MEMBER STATE / ENTERPRISE COMPANY	N° Nomenclature	Produit/Product	N° D'agrement/approval Number			
		Designation/Description	Code Pays/ Country Code	N° Entr Entr N°	N° Prod Prod N°	Annee Year
GHANA						
Aluworks	76.06	Aluminium circles/Profiles en aluminium	288	001	01	91
	76.06	Corrugated Sheets/Toles ondulees	288	001	02	91
AMEEN Sangari Industries Ltd	34.01	Soap/Savon	288	002	01	91
	15.11	Glycerine/Glycerine	288	002	02	91
	15.07	Palm Oil/Huile de Palme	288	002	03	91
Lever Brothers - Ghana Ltd.	34.01	Soap (key)/Savon (Key)	288	003	01	91
	34.01	Soap (Guardian)/Savon(Guardian)	288	003	02	91
	34.01	Soap (Sunlight)/Savon(Sunlight)	288	003	03	91
	15.02	Fry V. Oil/Suifs Comestibles	288	003	04	91
MALI						
SADA DIALLO	28.31	Eau de javel/Bleach	466	001	01	88
	22.10	Vinaigre/Vinegar	466	001	02	88
SIRCOB (Batiments)	69.07	Carreaux/Tiles	466	002	01	88
NIGER						
SONICHAUX	25.22	Chaux ordinaire/Lime	562	001	01	88
Niger Peinture	32.09	Peinture a eau/Emulsion Paint	562	002	01	88
	32.09	Peinture pour sol/Floor Paint	562	002	02	88

ETAT MEMBRE D'EXPORT' EXPORTING MEMBER STATE / ENTERPRISE COMPANY	N° Nomenclature	Produit/Product	N° D'agrement/approval Number			
		Designation/Description	Code Pays/ Country Code	N° Entr Entr N°	N° Prod Prod N°	Annee
NIGERIA						
Delta Steel Co.	73.07	Billettes/Bilets	566	001	01	88
	73.13	Acier Lamine/Laminated Steel	566	001	02	88
GAZAL Industrial Enterprises Ltd	69.07	Carreaux/Tiles	566	002	01	88
CREST Products Ltd	19.08	Biscuiteries/Biscuits	566	003	01	88
GOLDEN GENIUEA Breweries Ltd	22.08	Biere/Beer	566	004	01	88
	22.03	Stout/Stout	566	004	02	88
Berger Paints Nig Ltd	32.08	Peinture/Paint	566	001	01	90
Chemical&Allied -Products Ltd	32.09	Peinture a eau/Dulux emulsion	566	002	01	90
Crital Hope Ng Ltd	76.10	Aluminuim Windows 1/ Cadres des fenctres en alumunuim	566	001	01	92
	76.10	Aluminuim doors 1/Cadres des portes en aluminuim	566	01	02	92
Integrated Vegetable Oils	15.15	Refined Vegetable Oil/ Huile de menage	566	002	01	92
Paterzon Zochonis Industries	34.01	Detergent/Detergent	566	003	01	92
	34.01	Savon/Soaps	566	003	02	92
	30.01	Articles Pharmaceutiques/ Pharmaceuticals	566	003	03	92
	17.04	Confiserie/Confectionery	566	003	04	92
	33.06	Dentifrices/Toothpastes	566	003	05	92
	33.03	Preparations Cosmetiques/ Comstetics	566	003	06	92

ETAT MEMBRE D'EXPORT' / EXPORTING MEMBER STATE — ENTERPRISE / COMPANY	N° Nomenclature	Produit/Product — Designation/Description	N° D'agrement/approval Number — Code Pays/Country Code	N° Entr Entr N°	N° Prod Prod N°	Annee Year
NIGERIA						
Associated Metals & Allied Works Ltd	73.33	Enamelware/Article de en fer	566	004	01	92
Thermocool Eng. Co Ltd	84.15	Refrigerateurs/ Refrigerators	566	005	01	92
	84.18	Congelateurs/Freezers	566	005	02	92
	84.12	Climatiseurs/Air-Conditioner	566	005	03	92
	39.23	Glacieres/Cooler boxes	566	005	04	92
New Draco Cie Nig Ltd	19.05	Biscuits Croustilants/ Biscuits Cripies	566	006	01	92
Passat Industries Ltd	64.04	Chaussures en Cuir/ Leather Shoes	566	007	01	92
Nigeria Tobbaco Compant Plc	24.02	Cigarettes/Cigarettes	566	008	01	92
Biolotun Pharmaceutical Ltd	27.10	Huile de Melange/ Advanced fuel Conditioner	566	009	01	92
	27.10	Huile de Moteu/Advanced Engine Oil Conditioner	566	009	02	92
			556	010	01	92
UAGN PLC: A.J. SEWARD	33.04	Creme de Beaute/Creams - Lotus - Elidd - Shield	566	010	02	92
	33.04	Lotion/Lotions - Gresh - Pears	566	010	03	92
		- Cocoa butter	566	010	04	92
	33.04	Pomades/Pomades				
	33.07	Deodorant/Deodorants - Shield - Impuse				

ETAT MEMBRE D'EXPORT' EXPORT MEMBER STATE / ENTERPRISE COMPANY	N° Nomenclature	Produit/Product		N° D'agrement/approval Number		
		Designation/Description	Code Pays/ Country Code	N° Entr Entr N°	N° Prod Prod N°	Annee Year
NIGERIA						
UAGN PLC: A.J SEWARD (Conglometale)	33.05	Defrisants/Hair prepations - Satin Sheen	566	010	05	92
	33.05	Petroleum Jellies/Vaseline - Pears	566	010	06	92
	30.04	Balm/Baume	566	010	07	92
CADBURY Nigeria Ltd.	19.02	Other preparation containing cocoa(Bournvita)/Autres Preparations alimentaires content du cacao	566	001	01	91
	11.04	Pounded Yam/Fine d'ignname	566	001	02	91
	17.04	Sugar confectionery, not containing cocoa/Sucreries sans cacao	566	001	03	91
	19.02	Other preparations containing cocoa(PRONTO)/ Autres prepations alimentaires contenant du cocao	566	001	04	91
	20.02	Tomato Puree (Tomapep) Puree de tomate	566	001	05	91
BATA NG. Ltd.	64.02	Other footware of artificial plastic material/Autres chaussures en matieres plastique	566	002	01	91
	40.01	Crumb rubber/Latex de caoutchouc	566	002	02	91

ETAT MEMBRE D'EXPORT / EXPORTING MEMBER STATE — ENTERPRISE / COMPANY	N° Nomenclature	Produit/Product — Designation/Description	N° D'agrement/approval Number — Code Pays/Country Code	N° Entr Entr N°	N° Prod Prod N°	annee Year
NIGERIA						
GBO/MDS	33.03	Produits Analgesiques/ Anagetics (Top-Taps)	566	011	01	92
			566	012	01	92
BORSPAK	48.19	Boites et Caisses en cartons ondules/corengated Paper cases	566	012	03	92
	48.21	Etiquettes en papier/Paper labels	566	013	01	92
UAC FOOD	16.01	Saucissons "Gala"/Gala susage rolls	566	013	02	92
	16.01	Saucissons "Satis"/Satis sausage	566	013	03	92
	21.05	Cremes glacees/Wall's ice cream	566	014	01	92
A.T.&P.	44.12	Contreplaques/Plywood	566	014	02	92
	44.07	Bois scie(elements d' ameublement)Sawn timber furniture Components	566	014	03	92
	44.01	Particle board/Plaquettes	566	003	07	92
Parterson Zochonis	33.07	Parfums et eau de toilette/ Perfumery & toiletries	566	015	01	92
Doyin Group of Co.	30.04	Articles pharmaceutiques/ Pharmaceuticals Products	566	015	02	92
	30.16	Tapis/Prayer mat.	566	015	03	92
	34.01	Savons et detergent/ Soaps detergents.	566	015	04	92
	33.06	Dentifrices/Toothpaste				

ETAT MEMBRE D'EXPORT' / EXPORTING MEMBER STATE — ENTERPRISE / COMPANY	N° Nomenclature	Produit/Product — Designation/Description	N° agrement/approval Number — Code Pays/Country Code	N° Entr Entr N°	N° Prod Prod N°	anné Year
NIGERIA						
Nestle Food Nig.	21.06	Autres preparations Alimentaires/Other food preparations (Cerelac, Nutrend, Nestogen, Cerevita, Golden Morn.)	566	016	01	92
	18.06	Autres prep. contenant du cacao(Milo)/Other prep. containing cocoa (Milo)	566	016	02	92
	18.06	Autres prep.contenant du cacao (Nescao)/Other prep. containing cocoa (Nescao)	566	016	03	92
Dunlop Nig Ltd	40.11	Pneu/Tyres	566	017	01	92
	40.16	Revetement de sol/Floor tiles	566	017	02	92
	35.06	Adhsif/Adhesives	566	017	03	92

ETAT MEMBRE D'EXPORTING / EXPORT MEMBER STATE / ENTERPRISE COMPANY	N° Nomenclature	Produit/Product	N° D'agrement/approval Number			
			Code Pays/ Country Code	N° Entr. Entr N°	N° Prod Prod N°	annee Year
NIGERIA						
CMB TOYO Ng. Ltd	70.10	Glass containers/Containers	566	003	01	91
ABPLAST Products	39.07	en verre Kitchen Ware and other household articles of plastic/Articles de menage et d' economie	566	004	01	91
SENEGAL						
SNTI: (Societe Nationale de Tomate Industrielle)	20.02	Concentre de tomate/Tomato puree	686	001	01	90
Senechap	87.05	Silencieux/Silencer	686	002	01	90
	87.05	Tuyau d'echappement/Exhaust Pipe	686	002	02	90
ICOTAF	55.09	Tissu de coton(ARMICO)/Coton fabric Poid 200g/m2/Height 200g/m2 Largeur 11.5cm/Width 11.5cm	686	003	01	90
	55.09	Tissus de fibres synthetiques discontinus/Discontinuous synthetic fibre fabrics	686	003	02	90
	55.09	Tussus de coton (drill super teint) Poids 200g/m2/Width 11.5cm Coton fabric dyed super white	686	003	03	90
	55.09	Tissus de coton(Popeline teinte/Coton fabric (dyed fancy poplin).	686	003	04	90

ETAT MEMBRE D'EXPORT' EXPORTING MEMBER STATE / ENTERPRISE COMPANY	N° Nomenclature	Produit/Product	N° D'agrement/approval Number			
		Designation/Description	Code Pays/ Country Code	N° Entr Entr N°	N° Prod Prod N°	Annee Year
SENEGAL						
ICOTAF	55.09	Tissus de coton popeline faconnee teinte)/Coton fabric (dyed fancy Poplin)	686	003	04	90
	55.09	Basins et Similaires teints/Dyed and like	686	003	05	90
	55.09	Tissus de coton teint MA teint/ Dyed cotton fabric	686	003	06	90
	55.09	Tissus coton decrues, cremes ou blanchis/Scoured creamed, or bleached cotton fabrics.	686	003	07	90
	55.09	Tissus coton avec differentes coloeurs (shirting 90 teint) Cotton fabrics with different colours	686	003	08	90
	55.09	Tissus coton decres, decres, creme ou blanchis (shirting 90 blanc)/ Scoured, creamed or bleached cotton fabric (90 white shirting).	686	003	09	90
Societe Nouvelle conserveries du Senegal	16.04	Pilchards/Pilchards	686	001	01	91
SPIA(Societe de Produits Industriels et agricoles	38.11	Insecticides	686	001	01	88
	38.11	Fongicides/Fungicides	686	001	02	88
	28.12	Calccaires/Limetstones	686	001	03	88

ETAT MEMBRE D'EXPORT' EXPORTING MEMBER STATE / ENTERPRISE COMPANY	N° Nomenclature	Produit/Product	N° D'agrement/approval Number			
		Designation/Description	Code Pays/ Country Code	N° Entr Entr N°	N° Prod Prod N°	Annee Year
SIERRA LEONE Sierra Leone enterprise Ltd.	22.02	Soft drinks/Boissons sucrees	694.	001	01	91
SIERRA LEONE Chanrai Chemical Ltd	34.06	Savons de lessive Laundry Soap	694	001	01	92