STATE INTERVENTION AND COMMUNAL CONFLICTS IN GOMBE STATE: A STUDY OF SELECTED CASES

BY

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MSc/Admin/20816/2012-2013

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ZARIA, NIGERIA

DECEMBER, 2016

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BEING A DISSERTATION SUBMITTEDTO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF A MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,
FACULTYOF ADMINISTRATION,
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ZARIA, NIGERIA

DECEMBER, 2016

Declaration

I declare that this Dissertation entitled **"State Intervention and Communal Conflicts in Gombe State: A Study of Selected Cases"**, has been carried out by me in the Department of Public Administration. The information derived from the literature have been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this Dissertation was previously presented for another degree at any other institution.

Ruth Mele JOSHUA		
Name of Student	Signature	Date

Certification

This Dissertation entitled **"State Intervention and Communal Conflicts in Gombe State: A Study of Selected Cases",** by Ruth Mele Joshua meets the regulation governing the award of Master of Science Degree in Public Administration of the Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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Dedication

The study is dedicated to Dadiya, Tula, Kaltungo and Waja communities that are truly one yet refuse to celebrate oneness in contiguity and common values.

Acknowledgements

Deepest appreciation is rendered to God the sustainer and source of all knowledge. My profound thanks go to my two supervisors Dr. Usman Tar and Dr. M.K. Isa for the time and pains they took to read and correct, and guide this work to completion despite their tight schedules. My gratitude also goes to MSc. Coordinator, Dr. Idris Musa for his patience and guidance.

I appreciate my family beginning with my beloved husband Comrade Cromwell Bature, my parents Mr and Mrs Joshua Mele, my kids Abraham, Adoni and Abel and sweet sisters Da-Elma, Rahila and Rebecca for their sacrifice, understanding and support, may God bless you.

I want to place on record, the effort of Dr. Funsho Bello and Mr Shuibu Teme who avail themselves to my constant demands, it is your comments and guide that instilled confidence in me.

I want to appreciate my H.O.D, Dr. Umar Mahmud and Prof.H.Godowoli. I equally appreciate my colleagues Dr. Lawal Oladimeji, Mal. Nasiru Modibbo, Mal.Tijjani Umar, Madam Balkisu Mahdi and Lydia Yakubu.

I sincerely appreciate school mates, Fabian Augustine, Oluwakemi Amusan, Ummi Adamu Gombe, thank you for your support. I want to also appreciate all individuals whose names have not been mentioned here for the shortage of time and space but have contributed to the success of this work in one way or the other, may God bless you all.

Abstract

The greatest threat facing the survival of Nigerian democracy and unity is general insecurity occasioned by various communal conflicts. Communal conflicts in Nigeria are caused by competition over access to land and other natural resources. For over a decade the Gombe southern senatorial district has been enmeshed in communal conflict, resulting into huge human and economic loss. The study assessed state intervention in the management of Dadiya, Kaltungo, Tula and Waja communal conflicts from the period 2006-2013.The protracted social conflict theory by Azar (1990) was used to underpin the study. The study adopted survey research design, where both primary and secondary were used. Quantitative data were analyzed using frequency counts and percentages, while chi-square was used to test the hypotheses. Data generated through interviews were analyzed qualitatively. The study established that the protracted nature of the conflict in Dadiya-Tula, Dadiya-Kaltungo and Dadiya-Waja communities in Balanga and Kaltungo local government areas is as a result of non-implementations of the various committees/panel's recommendations, the study also revealed that, the strategies adopted by the state government are not suitable for the management of the communal conflict. Hence, the study recommended a holistic approach to conflict management, Gombe state Government should adequately utilize peace talks as a strategy for the management of communal conflict in the understudied areas and Gombe state government should demonstrate its political will by implementing the recommendations of the committees' set-up by both state and the local government.

Table of Contents

Title page - - - - - - - - - - i

Declaration - - - - - - - - - - ii

Certification - - - - - - - - - - iii

Dedication - - - - - - - - - - iv

Acknowledgment - - - - - - - - - - v

Abstract - - - - - - - - - - vi

Table of contents - - - - - - - - - - vii

List of Figures - - - - - - - - - - xi

List of Tables - - - - - - - - - - xii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study - - - - - - 1

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem - - - - - - 4

1.3 Research Questions - - - - - - - - - 7

1.4 Research Objectives - - - - - - 8

1.5 Research Hypotheses - - - - - - 8

1.6 Significance of the Study - - - - - - 9

1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study - - - - -- - 9

1.8 Operational Definition of Concepts - - - - - - 10

1.9 Organization of Chapters - - - - - - 12

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction - - - - - - - - - 13

2.2 Literature Review - - - - - - - - - 13

2.2.1 The Concept of Conflict - - - - - - 13

2.2.2 The Concept Protracted Conflict - - - - - - 16

2.2.3 The concept of Communal Conflict - - - - - - 17

2.2.4 Typology and Causes of Communal Conflict- - - - - 18

2.2.5 Cost of Communal Conflict - - - - - - - 22

2.2.6 Conflict Management - - - - - - - - 24

2.2.6.1 Conflict Management Strategies - - - - - - 24

2.2.7 State Responses to Communal Conflict - - - - - 27

2.2.8 State Intervention in Communal Conflicts - - - - - 29

2.3 Review of Related Empirical Studies - - - - - 34

2.4 Theoretical Framework - - - - - 42

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction - - - - - - - - 46

3.2 Research Design - - - - - - - - 46

3.3 Sources of Data Collection - - - - - - - 46

3.3.1 Primary Sources of Data - - - - - - - 47

3.3.2 Secondary Sources of Data - - - - - - - 48

3.4 Population of the Study - - - - - - - 48

3.5 Sample Size - - - - - - - - - 48

3.6 Sampling Technique - - - - - - - 50

3.7 Administration of Instrument - - - - - - - 50

3.8 Method of Data Presentation and Analysis - - - - - 51

CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF COMMUNAL CONFLICT IN GOMBE SOUTHERN SENATORIAL DISTRICT.

4.1	Introduction - - - - - - - - -	53
4.2	Overview of Communal Conflict in Gombe State - - - -	53
4.2.1	Dadiya/Tula Conflict (2006) - - - - - - - -	53
4.2.2	Dadiya/Kaltungo Conflict (2007-2012) - - - - -	54
4.2.3	Dadiya/Waja conflict (2013) - - - - - - - -	55
4.3	Governmental Intervention- - - -- - - - -	57

CHAPTER FIVE
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

5.1	Introduction - - - - - - - - - -	66
5.2	Presentation of Data and Analysis - - - - - - -	66
5.3	Test of Hypotheses - - - - - - - - -	90
5.4	Summary of Major Findings - - - - - - - -	98

CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1	Summary - - - - - - - - - -	100
6.2	Conclusion - - - - - - - - - -	102
6.3	Recommendations - - - - - - - - -	103
6.4	Suggestion for Further Study - - - - - - - -	104
	REFERENCES - - - - - - - -	105
	APPENDICES - - - - - - - -	112

List of Figures

4.1. Map of Gombe State showing study areas……....56

4.2 Ethnic map of Dadiya, Kaltungo, Tula and Waja……..57

List of Tables

Table 2.1 A profile of types of communal conflicts in Nigeria ……20

Table 3.1 Proportional Distribution of Sample Size into Study Areas ----------49

Table 5.1 The Rate of Return of Questionnaire of Respondents ……....67

Table 5.2 Responses from Dadiya on Gombe state intervention in Dadiya/Tula communal conflict ……..68

Table 5.2.1 Responses from Tula on Gombe state intervention in Dadiya/Tula communal conflict ……71

Table 5.3 Responses from Dadiya on Gombe state intervention in Dadiya/Kaltungo communal conflict ……...76

Table 5.3.1 Responses from Kaltungo on Gombe state intervention in Dadiya/Kaltungo Communal conflict ……...79

Table 5.4 Responses from Dadiya on Gombe state intervention in Dadiya/Waja communal conflict ……84

Table 5.4.1 Responses from Waja on Gombe state intervention in Dadiya/Waja communal conflict ……86

Table 5.5 Protracted Conflict in Gombe State(Dependent Variable) Non Implementation of Commission Recommendations (Independent Variable) Cross-Tabulation……91

Table 5.6 Chi-Square Test ……...92

Table 5.7 Management of Conflict (Dependent Variable) Strategies Adopted (Independent variable) Cross-Tabulation……95

Table 5.8 Chi-Square Test ……..96

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The nature of conflicts in the world has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War to the extent that conflicts between or among nation-states have reduced significantly, while the trend is that conflicts have increased within nation-states due to intense struggle for power and scarce resources between and among groups, thereby putting ethnic group against ethnic group and communities against communities. Consequently, Joshua (2014) observed that more than hundred (100) major conflicts occurred in the world, leaving more than twenty million (20,000,000) dead, several millions wounded and millions displaced persons.

In Africa, conflict on sub national level between communities or local militias is a wide spread problem. In fact, the continent experienced 386 communal conflicts between the period 1989 and 2014, with an estimate of 131, 563 people that lost their lives within same period. The countries affected include Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda, withNigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo being the most affected, (Torbjornsson, 2016, Elfversson, 2013).

In Nigeria, this situation became more prevalent since the return to democratic rule in 1999, threatening the survival of Nigerian democracy and unity. Within the first three years of democratic rule in Nigeria, the country witnessed not less than forty violent communal conflicts. From the violent protest of the Niger-Delta over the perceived injustice for resource control and environmental degradation as well as quest for an equitable federal arrangement, to the Itsekiri-Ijaw violence in the Delta over claims of land ownership and boundary claims, the Ife-Modakeke communal conflict in Osun state, the ZangonKataf in Kaduna state, Tiv-Jukun in Taraba State and Eleme- Okrika in Rivers

state. Nigeria has never been confronted with such great security challenge as it presently experience evidenced by protracted communal clashes and killings and abduction by the Boko Haram sect.

No region has been spared the vicious scourge of conflict though their prevalence and intensity have not been the same in occurrences across the length and breadth of the nation. Thus, fingers are swift in pointing accusingly to colonial legacies and continual interplay of external and internal imperialist forces that fan the embers of violence for selfish aggrandisement. The present situation is further intensified by elements of globalisation, natural disasters, proliferation of weapons and light arms, corruption, executive lawlessness and leadership ineptitude (Chinwokwu, 2012: 393).

While some of these challenges are self-imposed and reinforced through greed-based behaviour, others are the result of poor institutional capacity of addressing widespread organised crime, general insecurity and conflict in the country. Furthermore, the institutional fragility of the state in terms of its ability and capacity to manage diversity, corruption, rising inequality between the rich and the poor, gross violation of human rights and contestation over land are the underlying issues of conflicts in Nigeria (Kwaja, 2009:102).

No doubt conflict could be functional especially if it leads to innovations and other positive changes in the society. On the other hand, it could be dysfunctional especially if it threatens order and stability of the very foundation of human society. One cannot overemphasise the fact that peaceful co-existence is a major requirement for any meaningful development to take place in the society, hence the need for order and stability in the society.

Therefore, Nigerian government has been responding to the challenges posed by the various forms of conflict in the country. However, the various government responses

to these conflicts have been ad hoc and were not organised. This fact is supported by Omorogbe and Omohan (2005), when they asserted that there are two major strategies of conflict management often employed by government in Nigeria to tackle the problem of conflict each time they occur, the coercive and the judicial method.

Coercive method as the name suggests has to do with deployment of troops to the areas of conflict with the objective of controlling the conflict. In Nigeria, this method of managing conflict has taken many forms depending on the magnitude of the conflict in question. In a light conflict for instance, the conventional policemen are drafted to the conflict point assisted by the mobile police, but in a very serious conflict or crises, government may be forced to deploy the military for internal security operations, because of the nature of this kind of intervention however, the coercive method is associated with many vices, such as rape, beating and in some cases shooting of innocent citizens (Omorogbe and Omohan, 2005: 556).

On the other hand, the judicial strategy of conflict management entails the use of judicial commission or panel, usually people are selected from varied backgrounds to investigate the problems and submit report to government based on the terms of reference given to it. In Nigeria this strategy has created more bitterness than bring relief, because the commission's recommendations end up being shelved rather than implemented.

These strategies of managing conflict and security have not brought about the desired result because each of the strategies lacked adequate capacity to handle the conflict. These strategies end up suppressing the problem which later re-surfaces in the future with greater intensity and ferocity causing havoc on the people and government. Some of the reasons for the failure or poor performance of the often used conflict management strategies are poor logistics, delay in deployment of troops to the conflict areas, lack of cooperation by the parties to the conflicts, non-implementation of

recommendations or white paper submitted to the government by the panel of inquiry among others (Chinwokwu 2012: 104).

In support of the above view, Isa (2001) espoused that the institutional responses played by the state government or its agencies such as law enforcement agencies either aggravates the conflict by creating more suspicion through delays and non-implementation of government white papers, or suppresses it through the law enforcement agencies without tackling the underlying factors of the conflict, what is apparent is that there is emphasis on conflict suppression instead of management.

Gombe State which is situated in the North-eastern region of Nigeria, especially the southern Senatorial district which houses ethnic minorities, in recent times witnessed communal conflict with such violence and instability. These conflicts started in the 1990s with the Billiri-Kaltungocrisis in 1991, Tula-Awak conflict of 1999, Dadiya-Tula conflict 2006, Dadiya- Kaltungo 2007-2012 and the Dadiya-Waja conflict of 2013, in spite of setting up several committees and commissions such as the 2006 Judicial Commissions of Inquiry,the 2007 Joint Peace Security Committee,Seven Man Ad-hoc Committee, the 2013Peace Mission Committee and the 2014 Committee to Consolidate the Recommendations of All Previous Committees to tackle the communal conflicts by state government did bring the desired result.. Hence the need for this study, which focuses on state government intervention in managing the Dadiya, Kaltungo, Tula and Waja communal conflict, the aim is to draw lessons useful for managing the perennial conflicts in the Southern Senatorial District of Gombe state.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The phenomenon of conflict is not new to human society; this is because wherever you find human beings interacting at whatever levels, there is bound to be conflict. What

is however important is the way these conflicts are managed or resolved to forestall future occurrence and avert massive and colossal loss of lives and properties.

For over a decade now, Dadiya, Tula, Kaltungo and Waja communities of Gombe southern senatorial district have continued to be enmeshed in communal conflict. The conflict started in 1990s with Billiri-Kaltungo in 1991, Tula-Awak 1999, Dadiya-Tula 2006, Dadiya-Kaltungo 2007-2012 and Dadiya-Waja 2013(Gombe state Government Reports to Consolidate All Previous committees' Report, 2014).

These series of conflicts that occurred as aforementioned claimed many lives and caused huge economic losses to communities concerned. For instance, the 2006 Dadiya-Tula communal conflict was caused according to Government Draft White Paper (2006) by boundary dispute during 2006 preparatory census exercise when there were overlapping registrations at GadanTaba, Kakur villages in Dadiya of Balanga Local Government and Tula of Kaltungo Local Government. As a result of this conflict, 8 people were reported dead, a total of 523 houses worth ₦48,030,294.00 were destroyed and plants and automobiles worth ₦3,908,000.00 were destroyed (Gombe State Government Draft White Paper, (2006:67).

Sequel to the above mentioned conflict, the government set up a Seven Man Judicial Commission of Inquiry to among others investigate the immediate and remote causes of the conflict, determine the extent of damages and to make recommendations which might resolve the problem to ensure lasting solutions. Consequently, the Judicial Commission of Inquiry did their work and recommended that a boundary demarcation be made using the Yola Federal highway to be a landmark boundary between the two communities. For reasons best known to the Gombe State government, the recommendations of the commission are yet to be implemented.

Similarly, in 2007, series of conflict occurred between the Dadiya and Kaltungo-east of Balanga and Kaltungo Local government area. Since this conflict broke out on 21st May, 2007 it became an annual affair which lasted up to 2012. The remote cause of the conflict was over a farmland between individuals from Dadiya and Kaltungo in which an Upper Area Court in Kaltungo delivered judgement in favour of a Dadiya man. As a result of this protracted conflict, as recorded in an open letter dated 8th May, 2013, that on 21 to 23rd May 2007 when the conflict erupted for the first time five people were killed and 632 houses from the communities were burnt. In the second clash between the communities on 27th May 2009 one person was killed and 232 houses as well as farm produce worth (N17, 000,000) were destroyed. In third clash which occurred on 6th to 9th February 2010, six villages were burnt down, the fourth incident occurred in July 2011 between the communities mention above but no death was recorded. On 9th and 10th June as well as 1st to 3rdJuly 2012, another conflict occurred in which two villages were completely burnt down (Comrade, 2013) . Consequent upon this conflict, two different committees were set up namely: a Joint Peace and Security Committee of Balanga and Kaltungo Local Government and a 7 Man Ad-hoc Committee. It is worthy of note that these committees were set up by the Local Government Areas mentioned above. The situation was left for the local governments concerned to tackle despite the magnitude of the conflict. The committees recommended further investigations on the farmland to determine the status of the land and the immediate relocation of communities of Lawushi, a Kaltungo community in Dadiya Chiefdom and Shangshang, a Dadiya settlement in Kaltungo chiefdom to ensure their safety. It must be noted here again that the recommendations of these two Committees were not implemented just as the report of the Panel of 2006.

In 2013, another conflict erupted between the settler Waja community and their Dadiya host over the appointment of the District Head of Bambam, this is informed by struggle over power which led to mutual suspicion. The earlier conflicts experienced in these districts and state government ways of managing them, further increased the tension among Dadiya people which created suspicion of some Waja men fighting alongside Kaltungo. Again lives were lost and properties worth millions of naira were destroyed.

In 2014, when Gombe State Government discovered that the conflicts were becoming a yearly affair, it set up a Committee to consolidate all previous Committees' recommendations to a coherent policy proposal to bring about a possible solution to these conflicts. The Committee's report was to help displaced communities to resettle in their former places of abode so as to foster genuine reconciliation and integration. Again till date, the recommendations of the committees are yet to be implemented. For instance, one of such recommendations is that, the State Government, in the event of any conflict in that area, should set up Judicial Commissions of Inquiry rather than set up committees (Committee Report submitted to Gombe State Government 2006 &2014).

Thus, the study seeks to assess Gombe State Government intervention in the management of communal conflict in the understudied areas.

1.3 Research Questions

The following research questions are what this study attempts to provide answers to;

i. What is responsible for the protracted nature of communal conflicts in Gombe State?
ii. What are the strategies used in the management of the communal conflict in Gombe state?
iii. What are the factors militating against the strategies of conflict management adopted by Gombe State government?

1.4 Research Objective

The overall objective of this study is to assess Gombe State government intervention in the management of Dadiya, Tula, Kaltungo and Waja communal conflict within the period 2006 to 2013. Other specific objectives include:

i. To identify the factors responsible for the protracted nature of communal conflictsin Gombe state.

ii. To find out the strategies used by Gombe state government to manage communal conflicts in the studied areas.

iii. To identify factors militating against the strategies adopted by Gombe State government.

1.5 Research Hypotheses

H_{01}: The protracted conflicts in Gombe state are not as a result of government non-implementation of commissions' recommendations.

H_{02}: The strategies adopted by the Gombe state government are not suitable for the management of the conflict in the understudied areas.

1.6 Significance of the Study

Several attempts have been made by scholars in the field of conflict management inNigeria, such as Bashir(2013) whichassessed the activities of Kalare in political violence in Gombe state. Tuduks (2015) examined dysfunctional exclusion within Christians/Muslims in Gombe state. Abdullahi (2007) carried out a research on ethno-religious conflict and political stability in Bauchi state 1991-2001 and Jude (2013) concentrated on thechallenges of government institution and non-governmental organisation in the management Tiv-Jukun in Wukari Taraba. While Isa (2010) assessed the state and management of Jukun/Chamba and Kuteb communal conflicts in Taraba state. Although, Bashir (2013) assessed activities of Kalare in political violence in Gombe

state, his study did not specifically assess state government intervention in the management of communalconflicts in Gombe state. Similarly, Tuduks (2015) from the religious perspective, examined dysfunctional exclusion within Christians/Muslims in Gombe state, the study focused on religious intolerance and marginalization of southern Gombe as sources of crises in Gombe south. However, fail to establish a link between state government and the perennial conflicts. Abdullahi (2007) concentrated on ethno-religious conflicts and political stability in Bauchi state, dwelling on religion and tradition as well as struggle among elites as responsible for conflict in Bauchi, the study did not cover the strategies used in the management of the Sayawa uprising in Bauchi State.Jude (2013) focused on the challenges of Government Institution and Non-Governmental Organisation in managing Tiv-Jukun conflict, the study did not focused on State government intervention in conflict management. While Isa (2010) concentrated on the link between intra class struggle, elite and failure of government to manage sufficiently conflict in Taraba state.To the best of the researcher's knowledge there is a dearth of literature on studies conducted on communal conflict in Gombe state, despite the recurrent nature of conflict in Dadiya, Tula, Kaltungo and Waja communal conflicts, little has been done on State government intervention and communal conflict.

Therefore, the study contributes to the body of knowledge by filling the gap between state government intervention and conflict management studies. Furthermore, the study will assist policy makers, with understanding of the salient issues of conflict management in Gombe state, which will offer interesting basis for fashioning out framework on how communal conflicts can be managed.

1.7 Scope and Limitation of the Study

The study is confined to Gombe State intervention in the management of Dadiya, Tula, Kaltungo and Waja communities of the Southern Senatorial District, covered the

period of 2006 to 2013. The choice of the scope stems from the fact that the period under study witnessed a prevalence of communal conflict.

The study covered two Local Government Areas namely: Balanga and Kaltungo Local Government. The choice of these local government areas is informed by their experience of protracted communal conflicts as mentioned above.

The limitations of this study are the inability of the government officials that is the Special Services Political and Chieftaincy Affairs Bureau, to provide useful information on the issues of conflicts because it is considered as matters that have security implication and refusal of the permanent secretary to grant interview to the researcher. However, these challenges were overcome byuse of the secondary data.

1.8 Operational Definition of Concepts

i. Conflict

According to Wilmot and Hocker, (2011) conflict can be described as a struggle between two or more independent individuals groups over perceived incompatible goals, beliefs and value. In this study, conflict simply means disagreement resulting to acts of violence between two or more parties.

ii. Communal Conflict

Communal conflict occurs among groups organised along shared identity that is they are not formally organised rebel groups or militants but rather a confrontation that takes place along line of group identity (Elferversson, 2013). Communal conflict in this study refers to conflicts that occur between two or more communities over issues such as land dispute, chieftaincy tussle and boundary dispute.

iv. Conflict Management

Conflict managementis concerned with the processes for controlling and regulating a conflict to ensure that it does not escalate. It is also concerned with

techniques involved in the avoidance, prevention, containment and satisfactory resolution of the catalytic factors in a conflict(Best 2006). In the context of this study, it involves the actions or inactions of Gombe state government to contain or tackle and resolve communal conflict in the understudied areas.

v. State

It is a political unit, a group of individuals who are organised in a defined territory for the pursuit of common welfare, the maintenance of law and order and the carrying of external relations with other groups similarly organised, (Anifowose, 2005).It is also seen as the most inclusive organisation which has formal institutions for regulating relationship within its scope. In this study a state simply refer to a political unit with a defined territory, population and government, which exist to provide public goods.

vi. State Intervention

Elfversson, (2013), describes intervention as a third party activity which the intervening actor either helps the conflicting parties to regulate the incompatibility or the level of violence and working as intermediary between the parties in conflict. Thus, state intervention as used in this study refers to the actions taken by the Gombe state government to manage communal conflict in the understudied communities. These includes: Deployment of security forces, mediation effort/ or facilitation of peace talks, setting up judicial commissions and committees.

vii. Violence

The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development, or deprivation.(WHO cited in Osaghae 2007).

viii. **Protracted Conflict**

Protracted conflicts are prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation. In this study protracted conflicts are conflict that persisted for more than one year between two or more communities.

1.9 Organisation of Chapters

This dissertation consists of six (6) chapters, covering all aspects of the study, from the introduction to the summary, conclusion and recommendations.

Chapter one captured the General Introduction comprising background to the study, which gives the study an over view of conflict in Nigeria and in particular the Dadiya,Tula, Kaltungo and Waja communities in Gombe State and how these conflicts were managed.The chapter also covers the statement of the research problem, research questions, objectives, scope and significance of study.

Chapter two explored literatures related to the subject matter and a theoretical framework that underpins the study.

Chapter three consists of the discussion of research methodology. This includes the research design adopted for the study, the methods and sources of data collection, the population of study, sample size and sampling technique and finally the methods used in data presentation and analysis. Chapter Four covered communal conflicts in Nigeria, the historical background of the study areas and Governmental Intervention.

Chapter five covered the presentation and analysis of the data collected from the field, and the test hypotheses earlier postulated in this work.

Chapter six isthe concluding chapter. It containsbriefsummary of the entire work, the conclusion drawn from the analysis of data and some recommendations proffered on the basis of our research findings.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is aimed at reviewing relevant literature on the subject matter under study. The review in this research is therefore intended to analyse the approaches, analytical instruments and facts which previous studies contain, which serves as a starting point for the researcher. Here we consider existing literature on conflict, communal conflict, conflict management and the state institutions of managing the conflicts in Nigeria. Scholarly works were critically reviewed to give a broader view of the subject matter under study, and also identified the major gaps in the literature.

2.2. Literature Review

2.2.1 The Concept of Conflict

Conflict is a friction which may exists whenever two or more persons come into social relationship or interaction with one another. It is an inherent and unavoidable part of human existence entrenched in the pursuit of irreconcilable interest and goals by different groups. Thus, many scholars contend that "conflict is inevitable in social life process; for conflict occurs even in the best of human societies"

Uzuegbunam, 2010:79). It was in this line of thought that Durkheim (1958) opines that "crime is an inevitable and normal aspect of social life; it is an integral part of all healthy societies, it is functional" (cited in Haralambos and Holborn, 2008:322). Chinwokwu (2012a:46) argues that "the functionality of crime (in this case conflict) in a society such as ours has to be viewed seriously because of the social and psychological problems it has caused to many victims".

Deng and Zartman (1991) are of the opinion that conflict is an inevitable aspect of human social interaction and unavoidable consequences of choices and decisions. The

implication is conflict is an unavoidable circumstance of the human society so long as human beings interact in their social relationship with others as they go about in search of their basic needs in the society. Stedman (1991:390) sees conflict as emerging from the social interaction of persons who have partly incompatible ends, "in which the ability of one actor to gain his ends depends to an important degree on the choices or decision another actor will take." According to him, even though conflict may result into violence, however, violence is not an inherent aspect of conflict, but a potential dimensional form that conflict may take.

Robert (1972) observes that "conflict emerges whenever two or more persons seek to possess the same object, occupy the same space of the same exclusive position, play incompatible roles, maintain incompatible goals, or undertake mutually incompatible means for achieving their purposes" (cited in Ikejiani-Clark &Agbo, 2008:3).

Tauhidul (2013) sees conflict as a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aim of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals. The definitions provided by Robert (1972) and Tauhidul (2013) above identified some salient points which must act as triggers enabling conflict to emerge in the society. In other words, there must be available geographical space to contend with and the same interest for a value which may or may not be a scarce resource. The implication is that conflict must always be constantly negative and opposed.

Tauhidul (2013) went further to add that in the process of conflict, an aggrieved group may violently attempt to eliminate the other force. This has serious implications in the struggle for socio-economic and political conflict between nations and ethnic groups. In fact, this is the crux of the matter in Nigeria; conflicting groups are always in the habit of wanting to silence the opposing group or individual permanently in order to have total

and unchallenging ownership of the object in question. This was some of the issues that manifested during the early days before the civil war in Nigeria. The issue of one ethnic group trying to show its dominance over the rest of the country and taking upon herself the duty to clearly erase the minority group from the surface of the earth. This was manifested in the words of Mallam Kagu Damboa shortly before the declaration of war on Biafra "No one should kid himself that this is a fight between the East and the rest of Nigeria, it is a fight between the North and the Ibo…the rebels would be flushed out of Enugu within six weeks"(Awoyokun, 2013:16).

However, Weber (1949) opined that conflict is part and parcel of social life. This means that conflict can be negative and positive depending on the context in which conflict is brought to bear with social realities in the society. This was asserted by Ademola (2006) who argues that conflict can be used constructively to investigate different solutions to a problem and motivate creativity by recognizing and thoughtfully exposing conflicts as a way of bringing emotional and non-logical argument into the open when deconstructing long standing tensions. For example, the case of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and government decision of granting them amnesty after a very protracted conflict between them and government over resource control. We have to be careful here because in this kind of approach the contending groups must understand each other, must be ready to dialogue, must be ready to sheathe their swords, and must be ready to embrace peace and harmony as the only way for progress to be achieved in the society. We note that National Security entails the ability of Nigeria to advance her interests and objectives, to contain instability, control crime, eliminate corruption, improve the welfare, and quality of life of every citizen (Obasanjo, 1999).

In Nigeria such conflicts have been traced to what has been called the National Question. This refers to a combination of several issues such as marginalization of nationalities, denial of rights, self-determination and corruption in the practice of politics. To use the general perspectives of conflict in explanation of communal conflicts appears to be stretching the viability of the theoretical models and is far from adequate. In fact they fail to address the structural causes of the conflicts within the polity and the social conditions that give rise to them. Conflict theories it appears are more meaningful in describing the mechanical appearance and operations of violent identity contestations. In the case of communal conflicts in Nigeria, Conflict theory models look like some generalized, quick-fix, symptom/ remedy profile or tool kit for a far deeper social malaise(Otite,2002).

2.2.2 The Concept of Protracted Conflict

Protracted conflicts are generally characterized by prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation. The most critical unit of analysis in protracted conflict situations are the identity groups, that is, race, religion, ethnic, and cultural. In most cases, protracted social conflicts are vicious cycles of fear and hostile interactions among communal identities (Azar, 1990:17).

Furthermore as posited by Azar, protracted social conflict occurs a result of competition over control of resources such as land, boundaries and other natural resources, as well as struggle for political and social power (such as chieftaincy tussles). Thus, understanding protracted social conflict clearly shows that communal conflicts that are protracted are as a result of variety of factors which are the underlying issues rather than one single factor, such as the communal content, deprivation of human needs and

government roles in managing the conflict, which contributes to the protracted nature of the conflict.

Similarly, Beaudion (2014) espoused that at the heart of protracted conflicts is the failure of governing structures to address fundamental needs, provide space for participation in decisions, and ensure an equitable distribution of resources and benefit.

From the two perspectives, both Azar and Beaudion argued that the frustration and deprivation of human needs and underdevelopment causes conflicts with long term consequences.

2.2.3 The Concept of Communal Conflict

Oji, Eme and Nwoba(2015: 3), describes communal conflicts as those in which the participants are communal groups. A communal group is one in which primary identity prevails. Membership of the group is not attained but ascribed'. Communal conflict is a social conflict that relates to a group or groups in the society. Similarly, (Emma, 2013), views communal conflict as a conflict that between non-state groups which are organised along shared communal identity, but which is not an armed group and do not have formal military structure, what is central about communal conflict is communal identity.Alimba, (2014) sees communal conflict as a state of incompatibility that emanates from commonly shared or used resources by a group or groups in a society. It occurs within or between groups that are defined by some forms of social ties.

Furthermore, communal conflicts can be described as disagreement between two or more communities over disputed resource that both parties want, and they use violence to try gain control over. This is the situation in the understudied areas, where conflict ensued between Dadiya and Kaltungo, Dadiya and Tula, and Dadiya-Waja communities over farmlands, boundary and leadership tussle respectively.

In trying to characterise communal conflict, Schuab, (2014) sees it as a conflict having high degree of symmetry, that is communities are the primary actors fighting each other, while the state (federal, state and local government) intervenes at times, and often merely stand by, another characteristic as identified by him is that, communal conflicts are broad social base, where communities are involved in defence and attack. Therefore, the communities mobilize themselves to fight what they perceive as threat to their communities, or pursue what is fundamental to their survival.

What is apparent is that, at the heart of these conflicts are dispute overland, political influence, and boundary issues, these are further intensified by the provision of the 1999 constitution, which gives privileges to the indigene group in preference to settlers, accompanied by the geometric growth rate of population, these issues are reinforced and become sources of conflict in most communities in Nigeria.(International Crisis Group2012)

2.2.4 Typology and Causes of Communal Conflicts

A fairly extensive literature on social conflicts in Nigeria is now available by several writers. In this section, we examined briefly the typology of these conflicts with a view of locating communal conflicts that have in recent times taken a firm bit that most negatively hold on the social-political landscape of Nigeria. We begin by first sketching what Otite and Albert (1999:18) describe as "The Nigerian context as a social system". Here the authors examine the historical origins of Nigeria as a country rooted in her colonial creation by the British imperialists spanning over seventy years (1897 to 1960). Though not explicitly stated, Otite et al outline what some writers have alluded to the artificial character of the Nigerian federation. This brought together various pre-colonial entities that encapsulate the sheer diversity of the Federal union with ethnic groups each dominant in defined geographical boundaries.

Contaminant with the above characteristics, have also emerged certain significant spatial social entities such as the three main religions – Christianity mainly in the south and Middle- Belt; Islam mainly in the North and traditional religion in about every part of the country. This is besides the sheer diversity of the reported 350 ethnics groups. These straddle the complexity of individual groups of both formal and informal settings which spawn diverse cultural symbols, strategic social institutions. The vegetation, ecologies, economies and occupations cut the picture of a complex and thoroughly diversified country loaded into Nigeria's 923,768 square kilometre boundaries from the Atlantic Coast in the South to the Sahara desert in the North.

On top of these characteristics are differences in educational, social and administrative experiences of the North and the South. Put in the shade of Nigeria's military experience, the authors note the peculiarity of the politics particularly in the concept of "statism" that has created exclusive interests of regionalism and segregation. Writing in the same vein, Dunmoye (2003) also explores in fair details, the political economy of contemporary Nigeria. These span the historical evolution of the country from pre-colonial to colonial times, the allocation of scarce resources through formal and informal ways; the character and direction of public policy making and implementation; the issue of ethno-religious conflicts; the military experience in politics, the democratic project; the character of the Nigerian state; the problem of corruption and prebendal cleavages; the nature of resources allocation. These facts are quite illuminative and as Otite notes, are indicative of the conflict-prone character of Nigeria.

Dunmoye (2003:7) provides three identifiable forms of social conflict in Nigeria. These are inter-communal and intra-communal conflicts and a national conflict. The first types he explains are those that occur between two or more communities. These are: ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, boundary disputes, political conflicts disputes over

farmlands and grazing areas. The intra-communal conflicts are listed as chieftaincy crisis especially succession; religious crisis, political representation, the Native/Settler syndrome and land issues.

Table 2.1: A Profile of types of Communal Conflicts in Nigeria

Inter-Communal	**Intra-Communal**
Ethnic Conflict	Chieftaincy Crises (Succession disputes)
Religious conflict	Religious Conflict (Sectarian)
Boundary Disputes	Political Representation
Political Disputes	Land issues-inheritance & transfer of ownership

Source: Dunmoye (2003:103)

The same kind of scheme for categorizing social conflicts in Nigeria by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution titled "Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria – consolidated Zonal Reports", (2008 second ed.: 8). These are listed under such headings as History, Geographical Spread and categorization of conflict; the importance of prebendal politics. The sheer size and detailed information in the categorization of social conflicts given by these three sources of literature provide a vivid roadmap of the character and social background of conflicts in Nigeria. They avail a fairly basic sketch of the causative factors of conflicts themselves. A panoramic view of these can be outlined.

Aside from the typology of the social conflicts in Nigeria, we can also explore the literature on their causes. Several probable factors are listed here. Otite et al (1999:19) lists seven of these as: the problem of landscape and resources available within there; boundary issues touching on claims of natives and those tagged as settlers. This is the one that the study explores in Benue and Taraba States. There is problem of a clash between farmers and pastoralists, fishermen and acclaimed pond owners, foresters and timber loggers.

The second reason given by Otite(1999) is the problem of disputed jurisdiction between traditional rulers. The other is listed as the creation of local government areas and their headquarters. The fourth is ethnicity with its sectarian fragmentation. The fifth is given as micro and macro factors with cultural and value preferences. The sixth is the demographic problem of population explosion and conflict amidst dwindling resources. The last is given as the non-recognition and desecration of cultural symbols.

The probable reasons for the conflicts are informative but provide us with too generalized a picture for us to have an informed, analytical fact- based blueprint of the communal conflict in the chosen study area. For one thing, we can neither explain nor predict the malignancy and sheer persistence of communal conflicts. For these reasons therefore, an informed resolution of the problem appears elusive. This is why we have to dig deeper into the conflict landscape to unravel evidence for the persistence of communal problem particularly in the study area. These reasons provide us with only clue patterns. They do not exactly give us a clear- cut indication of the primary and secondly actors in the conflicts. We cannot also see the intimate dynamics of the conflict situation.

By far, the strategic conflict Assessment of Nigeria by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) goes deeper in analyzing the social reality of settler/indigene conflicts. They point out the structural causes of conflict along such lines as security, political, economic and social. Like Dunmoye (2003) the analysis is done at the levels of international/regional, National, State, and local. Only perhaps the last three issues are directly relevant to the study here. The first two are only marginal. Some of the issues listed in the Assessment as the Security-related manifestations of conflict as, proliferation of Small Arms, Inefficiency and Corruption of law enforcement agents, Vigilant Groups, Foreign Mercenaries and International tension and the subordination of All and Sundry to Civil Authority.

The Assessment also looks at political conflicts as the political manifestations. Also included here are succession and Dethronement conflicts, manipulation of political and Electoral Outcomes and Territorial Disputes. All these are also relevant to the study. The Assessment Report lists Economic Manifestation of the conflicts at the general level. It goes on to look at Poverty, Unemployment and Inequality; Resources Competition (dividing the benefits from oil) and access to land.

These issues touch directly on the communal conflicts in the understudied areas of Gombe State providing a vivid picture of the structural causes. On the social manifestations of conflict, the Report lists Ethnic and Communal Conflicts, religious conflicts, Unemployment Youth, Women, Breakdown of social values, psycho-cultural dispositions, Vulnerable Groups. From the above analysis communal conflict occurs in various forms and can be caused by different reasons depending the conflict situation and the communities in question. The concern is that, if communal conflicts continue, many lives will be lost and property worth millions of naira will destroyed.

2.2.5 Cost of Communal Conflicts

Conflict erupts in the pursuit of incompatible goals, needs and interests. A communal conflict always comes with costs of varying dimensions and degrees,Oji, Emma and Nwoba(2015:4) observed that, 'In Africa communal conflicts have caused havoc to political and economic activities. Violence provoked by them has very often turned the people's attention from creative production to creative destruction'.

The destructive tendencies of communal conflicts are such that have largely affected the developmental prospects of the country.Describing the dysfunctional consequences of conflict, Collier, (2007) noted that, conflict is a "trap" that keeps the world's poorest countries poor and confines the world's "bottom billion" people to a life of poverty in stagnation of shrinking economies. To this extent therefore, the cost of

conflicts far out-weighs their benefits. In the same vein, it is now widely believed that violent conflict is the major hindrance to the development of the African continent. It inflicts human suffering through death, destruction of livelihoods, constant displacement and insecurity.

Albert (2001:70) explained for example, that the cost of community conflict (or conflict generally) could be human, social, political, psychological, financial and material. He added that the cost of conflict is usually calculated by comparing the pre and post conflict environment with pre-conflict environment. What seems to have been lost? How many people were killed, maimed or displaced? How many houses were destroyed during the conflict? How many years will it take for the conflict to turn society to be put back to shape? By this understanding, cost of conflict means the extent of damage or destruction suffered by society/community as a result of violent conflict in terms of human, material, infrastructure, economic, social, political, psychological and ecological damage.

- Humanitarian cost: number of death, wounded refugees, internally displaced person and famine.
- Political cost: state collapse, anarchy, subversion of democratic process, political corruption and criminalization of power.
- Economic cost: loss of revenues, trade and tourism, destruction of economic, transport and educational infrastructures, diversion of resources away from development.
- Ecological cost: loss of arable land, soil erosion, deforestation and desertification.
- Social cost: breakdown of family structure, female victims of sexual violence, war orphan.

- Cultural cost: breakdown of traditional socio-cultural value, institutional and life style.
- Psychological cost: psychological disorders, post traumatic syndromes, fear and mutual hostility between groups in conflict.
- Spirit cost: lost of values related to the sanctity of life, development of a culture of violence

  By and large, communal conflict affects the economic, political, socio-cultural. Have been experienced in the understudied communities, for example in 2006 when conflict ensued between Dadiya and Tula communities, according to the white government draft, eight persons were reported death a total number 523 houses were destroyed.

2.2.6 Conflict Management

Conflict management is seen as a broad concept including conflict resolution and transforming the nature of the conflict to be good and foster peaceful coexistence. It is more of a long term arrangement involving official organisation and institution for preventing the conflict whenever is about to arise (Mohammed, 2006).

Conflict management is often considered to be distinct from conflict resolution. In order for actual conflict to occur, there should be an expression of exclusive patterns, and tell why the conflict was expressed the way it was. Conflict is not just about simple inaptness, but is often connected to a previous issue. The latter refers to resolving the dispute to the approval of one or both parties, whereas the former concerns an on-going process that may never have a resolution. Neither is it considered the same as conflict transformation, which seeks to reframe the positions of the conflict parties (Loimeier, 2007).

Conflict management refers to the long-term management of intractable conflicts. It is the label for the variety of ways by which people handle grievances, standing up for what they consider to be right and against what they consider wrong.

2.2.6.1 Conflict Management Strategies

Conflict researchers have identified a number of conflict management strategies that can be employed in the constructive management of conflict situations. For example Wilmot and Hocker (2011) identified several modes of conflict management strategies to include facilitation, mediation, counselling and therapy organisational development, conciliation, quasi political procedures, informal tribunals, arbitration of several types and criminal and civil justice system. In a research conducted by Jude, (2013), he highlighted the following conflict management strategies: mediation, conciliation, litigation, arbitration and mediation.

2.2.6.1.1 Mediation

Jude (2013) maintained that, mediation is "the voluntary informal, non-binding process undertaken by an external party that fosters the settlement of differences or demands between directly interested parties. In the same vein, Akpar, (2012) defined mediation as any process for resolving disputes in which another person helps the parties negotiate a settlement. In mediation parties in conflict submit their consent to the mediator who assist them to find a mutually acceptable solution to their conflict. The process is usually initiated by the intended external mediator such as an international organization, a government, or non-organisation or by the relatively weaker party of the conflict. The contending parties nonetheless, maintain considerable control over the process and the outcome.

2.2.6.1.2 Arbitration

It is a conflict management strategy which is a step higher than mediation and negotiation.Arbitration is the use and assistance of a neutral in the setting of a dispute between conflict parties. The arbitrator hears the evidence from both parties and therefore, renders a decision which is often called “award” and this is normally expected to be binding on the parties in conflict. Arbitration is voluntary at the initial stage in that the disputant have control over the process but once the arbitrator decide on the issue, it is binding by law, just as a court ruling (Jude, 2013).

2.2.6.1.3 Conciliation

Conciliation is almost synonymous with mediation, but there are some few difference between the two concepts. There are:

- Conciliator may give an opinion or suggest agreement fo the parties.
- It is normally backed up by law.
- Most times the conciliator is a government official and this is usually the case in law backing the process.

2.2.6.1.4 Adjudication or Litigation

Adjudication and litigation simply means the same thing. To adjudicate or litigate means to settle conflict in the court. In a litigation process, the judges listens to the complainant and defender and the judge takes decision based on the merit of the argument of the case. This approach or strategy to managing conflict is usually not the most preferred because it is time wasting, expensive and does not promote friendly relationship.

2.2.7. State Response to Communal Conflict

According to Omorogbe and Omohan (2005), there are two major strategies of conflict management often employed by governments in Nigeria to tackle the problem of communal, ethnic, religious conflicts each time they occur. While, Abdulraham and Tar (2008) are of view that state may respond in different ways, or sometimes not taking concerted action at all.

These strategies as mentioned by these scholars can be categorised into the coercive and the judicial methods. The coercive strategy often involves the security forces being deployed in to order to halt the violence, and monitor situation after calm has been restored. In Nigeria, this strategy of managing conflicts has taken many forms depending on the magnitude of the crises in question. In a light communal conflict or crises for instance, the conventional policemen are the first to be drafted to the crisis point and to be assisted by the mobile police-men in case the conventional corps cannot cope. But in a very serious outburst conflicts between communities, government may be forced to make use of combined military force made up of the army, navy and the air-force. However, this strategy deals with the symptoms of the conflict and is geared at controlling the level of physical violence and often associated with many vices such as rape, beating and in some cases shooting of innocent citizens (Omorogbe and Omohan, 2005; 556, Abdulrahaman and Tar 2008).

Consequently, this strategy in managing communal conflicts has not been a successful mechanism. While commenting on the problem with the deployment of security forces (troops) to conflict areas to quell the crisis, Oromareghake and Akpator (2005) have this to say:

> …the problem with the deployment of security forces that are not backed by intensive mediation effort is that it unnecessarily prolongs the stay of such security forces deployed in different parts of Nigeria. This is because the units of mobile police or armies frequently deployed to quell disturbances in Nigeria have neither the mandate nor the training to act as conflict resolution facilitator (p. 601).

The establishment of judicial commission or panel remains the second major conflict management strategy used by government in Nigeria to intervene in ethnic and communal conflict. It involves the selection of people from varied backgrounds to investigate the problems and submit report to the government based on the terms of reference given to the commission to work with. Such commission often operates by calling for memoranda, organizing public hearing and paying visits to the areas of conflict. The objective of such visits is to get first-hand assessment of the extent of the conflict (ibid).

The judicial strategy of conflict management had it set back, as rightly observed by Oromareghe and Akpator (2005), such method has created more bitterness than bringing relief, this is because of the non-implementation of white paper or recommendations submitted to the government by the panel of inquiry.

At other times, or in conjunction with the above strategies, state representatives mediate in the conflict or cooperate with local actors in arranging talks or peace conference (Hagman and Mulugeta, 2008). Omorogbe and Omohan (2005), attributes the poor performance of the often used strategies to poor logistics, delay in deployment of troops to conflict areas, lack of cooperation by parties to conflicts and non-implementation of white paper or recommendations submitted to the government by the panel of inquiry. Therefore this impinges on conflict management in Nigeria.

2.2.8 State Intervention in Communal Conflict

Wilmot and Hocker(2011) considers intervention as when a person, institution or body with legitimacy acting on behalf of the entire society intervenes and imposes mandatory terms of resolving the conflict on the feuding parties. It is a situation whereby parties in the conflict submit their consent to the third party with a view to assisting them to resolve and manage their conflict.

The maintenance of peace and security is critical to the responsibility of the state. Thus, Section 14 (1) of the Nigerian constitution states that; *"*the security and welfare of the people shall be a primary purpose of government". Hence, it is expected that, the state government intervenes when communal conflict erupts. The emerging consensus on the study of communal and religious conflicts in Nigeria emphasizes the role of the state as the both the regulator of competition among the diverse ethnic groups as well as the guarantor of security (Osaghae, 2007:171). Osaghae's opinion truly holds ground because the constitution clearly outlined the primary purpose of governments which is security and welfare of the people, therefore if a state cannot perform this primary function then such a state is a failed state. This calls to mind the capacity of state governments in Nigeria to manage communal conflicts.

Kwaja (2009) observed that the inability of the state to effectively perform its core functions of providing or guaranteeing security for the people as well as act as regulator has led to a weakening of its bargaining strength and capacity in relation to the ethnic and religious groups in society, which poses a serious challenge for national security. In this light, loyalty to ethnic or religious cleavages is being placed far and above the state, in view of the fact that people prefer to be seen and described based on the ethnic or religious groups they belong rather than their status as citizens of Nigeria.

Similarly, Egwu (2001) affirms that ethnicity and religion as manifestations of conflicts that are rooted in the crisis of identities, provides a vehicle for organization and mobilization across ethnic and religious fault-lines in the struggle for space, power and resources as a form of open resistance to the brutality and the coercive nature of the state (Egwu, 2001:5), while this is true in some cases of conflicts in Nigeria such as the Niger Delta, the conflicts experienced in communities under study that Dadiya, Tula, Kaltungo and Waja inter communal conflict over shared resources not a form of resistance which can be managed if taken seriously.

Many scholars have questioned efforts put in place by the state to contain or resolve tensions as reflected above, the continuing communal conflicts witnessed in the country in the last ten years, raises serious questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the state and its institutions in managing pluralism. As Jinadu (2007:11) rightly observes about the nature and character of the state:

> …the state and its institutions are ethnicised and immersed in clientelist ethnic and religious networks and in ethnic/religious based struggle to implant and entrench ethnic or religious 'gatekeepers' in critical, key positions in the bureaucracy and educational institutions, and in other public sector institutions and even in the private sector, which in many African countries relies heavily on the public sector.

Jihadu's claim is quite affirmative because the state and its institutions have themselves been embedded with ethno-religious sentiments. This further affects the capacity of the state to manage conflict it also exposes its lack of autonomy and ability to stand above society as a neutral agency.

Furthermore, there are various strategic and operational mechanisms in which government adopts in addressing issues of insecurity and conflict in the country. One of the foremost strategies of government in response to insecurity and conflict is the use of

government intervention agencies established under the law. Some of the agencies created to respond to cases of insecurity and conflict in the country include: National Orientation Agency (NOA); National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA); and other government agencies, this leads us to state institutions for managing conflict.

2.2.8.1 State Institutions for Managing Communal Conflicts.

Institutions can be broadly divided into formal and informal types. Formal institutions are attached to the state apparatus and it includes the political and bureaucratic "role of the game". Formal institutions defined the rules and norms that regulate human behavioural conducts and engagements which are mostly codified in the constitution. On the other hand, informal institutions are controlled and regulated by the state (Jude, (2013).

In Nigeria for example, there have been arguments revolving around the fact there is lack of capacity on the part of the Nigerian state to effectively manage social conflict within its domain. One of such arguments is the one presented by USAID (2005) that the Nigerian government's capacity for managing conflict is weak. This is because the pattern of conflict management that is usually adopted by the Nigerian state is militaristic in nature. In thesame Jude, (2013) noted that, when conflict erupt, the inability of the police to manage them usually prompts the Nigerian Government to deploy the Nigerian military to the scene of violence where military are usually ask to shoot on sight. This pattern of responding to conflict sometimes leads to serious human right violations and escalation of violence.

A study by Dantata, (2011) also revealed the role of governmental institutions in the management of conflict. These institutions include:

2.2.8.1. Police

The Nigerian Constitution establishes the Nigerian Police Force as a body charged with maintaining law and order. The Police Act 142 provides that: The police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of live and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged.

The above section of the Police Act places the security of the state in the Nigerian Police Force. The police by this provision is the institution responsible for the prevention and detection of ethno-religious conflicts in the country by gathering intelligence on the possibility of the occurrence of such conflicts before they occurred and preventing them from occurring. Where the police failed to prevent ethno-religious conflicts from occurring, the police, relying on the above section and another section of the Police Act, which provide for public safety and public order, are empowered to control and suppress the conflict. Though the provision of section 10(1) of the Police Act is informed by the need for the President and the Governor as chief security officers of the nation and the state to have control over the Inspector General of Police and the state Commissioner of Police., the countervailing necessity for maintaining peace and order appears to be more critical than the need for executive control over the police force. Police generally are responsible for the enforcement and maintenance of law and order, which includes suppression of riots in the interest of public safety. A relevant question to pose here is whether the Nigerian police have lived up to its responsibility. Hardly, is the response, with regards to communal conflicts. In most cases, police fail to respond on time until the situation has escalated out of hand, except for a few cases such as the 1982 Kano religious uprising where the police reacted promptly to a complaint from a Christian church group and succeeded in saving

the church from being burnt down even though the rioters attacked other churches instead (Dantata, 2011).

2.2.8.2 Judicial Commissions of Inquiry

The Nigerian Police Force essentially is the institution charged with the responsibility of investigating crimes pursuant to its constituting law and terms of reference. In ethno-religious conflicts however, most investigations are done by Judicial Commissions of Inquiry

The use of judicial commissions of inquiry to investigate matters of interest to government started from colonial times, and it is one of the inherited colonial traditions that continued after independence. over the years, there were proliferations of Commissions to investigate ethno-religious disturbances. This was tantamount to total lack of confidence in the police, who have a whole detective department manned by trained officers, dedicated to criminal investigations. In most cases, the police are excluded from the membership of Commissions of Inquiry into ethno-religious conflicts and come in only as witnesses, and experts, when invited by the Commissions. One such Commission, midway into its assignment, found the need to co-opt a police officer, who was involved in the investigation of the disturbance from the onset, and who was assisting the Commission as a witness and an expert to become a full member of the Commission (Dantata, 2011).

In some cases, members of the judicial inquiries are appointed from the warring parties, who end up representing the interests of their groups. Government treats ethno-religious disturbances more as political rather than criminal matters. This sets the tone for commissions work, and government's overall reaction to conflicts. Invariably, attention was paid more to "remote" causes of conflicts, at the expense of "immediate" causes that could form the basis of prosecution and jailing of

offenders. efforts at addressing so-called remote causes of the conflict such as the creation of chiefdoms and local governments. The judicial commission then recommends to the government, which it accepts or rejects the commission's findings and recommendations, Government then publishes a "White Paper", which is a summary of the Commission's Report and the decisions of government on the Commission's recommendations, which becomes government policy. It has been claimed that conflicts reoccur because of governments "non-implementation of recommendations of Judicial Commissions of Inquiry, which encourages people to take the law into their own hands (Dantata, 2011).

2.2.8.3 The military

Operation for maintenance of law, order, and public safety are essentially police responsibilities. However, the military can be called upon to restore law and order and maintain public safety when necessary. Under the 1999 constitution, sections 21(2)(C), the armed forces have the statutory role of suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon by the chief security officer of the state. However the unprofessional behaviour such as brutality, rape, looting and other forms of attack against citizen by the security forces compounds the problems.

The foregoing further confirms the earlier claims by Isa (2001), that institutional response by the state government and the law enforcement agencies rather emphasizes conflict suppression instead of conflict management.

2.3 Review of Related Empirical Studies

Isa (2010),examined the state and ethnic conflicts in Taraba state focusing on Jukun/Chamba and Kuteb communal conflict, the study investigated the tractable, persistent, perennial and persuasive nature of ethnic conflicts in Taraba state and the state government and its institutions to sufficiently manage the conflicts within the polity.

Seven (700) questionnaire were distributed as well as in-depth interviews and focused group discussions were conducted. Elite theory of societal conflict as propounded by Pareto was adopted as a guide, the theory postulates that society distingrates when the elites fail to perform the functions of goal attainment, adaptation, integration and pattern maintenance due to selfish interest or breakdown of corporate interest of the elites.The study established that, the causes in Jukun/Chamba and Kuteb of conflicts are: intra ruling class and struggles for traditional authority, creation of local government, land as well as employment, resource allocation, and election into offices. The study also revealed that, the Nigerian state fail to manage the persuasive conflicts because both federal and state government were cowardly in their response to conflict in Taraba state, by their inability to implement the several and numerous panels and commissions of inquiry reports and recommendations andthe elites/petty bourgeoisie manipulated people by mystifying their material interest under the cover of ethnicity and religion. The study recommended that democratic governance and process should accommodate continuous express of autonomous popular decision making through friendly economic policies and considerable decentralisation of power and resources, recognition of the peculiar needs and fears of the minority in the state. The study captures the conflict situation in Dadiya-Tula, Dadiya-Kaltungo and Dadiya-Waja communal conflicts, where in all cases submissions of committees and commissions of inquiry were not implemented. However, Isa's study laid more emphasis on the ruling class, elites/petty bourgeoisie as the actors and generators of the conflicts, downplayingthe role of resources such as land as the major source of conflicts in communities in Nigeria.

In thesame vein, Nwanegbo, Odigbo and Ochanja (2014) examined citizenship, indigeneship and settlership crisis in Nigeria with a view to explaining the violent conflicts of February and May 2013 in Wukari, Taraba State. The paper contended that

the several inter-ethnic conflicts between the Junkuns, Tivs, Kutebs, and the Hausa settlers in the past were significant in shaping the dynamics of the recent Wukari crisis. The study adopted focus group discussions, observation technique as well as secondary method of data analysis. With the aid of Marx's conflict view point, the paper argued that the Wukari crisis was as a result of accumulated grievances, anger and frustration arising from mutual suspicion, distrust and manipulative indigene ship and citizenship status in the struggle for power and scarcecommunal resources between minority Jukun Muslims and majority Jukun Christians cum Traditionalists. The paper recommended that government at all levels and Wukari community leaders should collaborate and constitute a joint reconciliatory panel to resolve outstanding grievances through dialogue and town hall meetings and ensure that relevant laws are reviewed in the on-going constitutional amendment process to give all Nigerians sense of belonging wherever they reside. It also recommended the establishment of mass media outfit to bridge information gap among the people

Bashir (2013), made an assessment of the activities of Kalare in political violence in Gombe state, he asserts that, politics is the major source of political and other forms of violence taking different colorations such as ethnic, religious and communal. The study determined the factors responsible for the change in the role of Kalare from hunting to political thuggery and also examined the effects of Kalare political violence in Gombe metropolis. A total of 385 respondents were sampled in Gombe metropolis, the study found out that, the major sponsors of violence was the government in power, which was the PDP under the leadership of Governor Danjuma Goje's administration. With the aid of Marxist theory of production, the study established that the anti Kalare squad introduced by the government was for political reasons and study revealed that one hundred Kalare members were paid five thousand naira monthly, because government

still intend to use them for forth coming elections. The study recommended that government should create more job opportunities for the youth through agricultural loan, establishing small scale industries and more vocational training centres. Although the study dwelled so much on political violence in Gombe metropolis, which fail to explain other forms of conflicts such as communal conflict, narrowing only on Kalare group in Gombe metropolis, it supports the claim that, in most cases, the youths are used as militias, this view is exemplified in the Dadiya-Kaltungo conflict, where the District Head of Lakweme a village in Kaltungo, affirms that, the Dadiya-Kaltungo conflict recorded fierce contestation and colossal loss of lives and properties, because the elders of the communities misled the youths, by telling them tales that are not true.

From the religious perspective, Tuduks (2015) conducted a study on the dysfunctional exclusion between Christians and Muslims in Gombe state. He asserts that, religion is the major source of conflict in Nigeria and Gombe state in particular, despite the fact that we live in the same communities. The study was qualitative in nature, used secondary contextual data for analysis, and concluded that, the dysfunction exclusion between Christians and Muslims originated since the colonial era, the immediate consequences include, denial of rights of minority religions groups, political manipulation for individual or group interest. The study recommended that, Christians and Muslims should accept the fact that they are living in pluralistic society, politicians should stop the manipulation of religion for whatever reason, and religion and religious symbols should not be used in political campaigns. This study focus on religion as the source of conflict in Gombe state, fail to address other factors responsible for conflicts in Gombe state.

Abdullahi (2007), in his study, ethno-religious conflicts and political stability in Bauchi state in 1999-2001, focused on the ethnicity and religion its effects on the polity. The study identified the Sayawa uprising to establish relationship between ethnicity,

religion and in Bauchi state. The study adapted the historical approach to the analysis of conflict, hence concluded that, the conflicts between Sayawa and Hausa/Fulani was as a result of reverence for tradition and dissolution or subjection to arbitrary rule. He recommended that, the religious leaders should understand that persuasion should be used rather than compulsion, government should penalized parties involved in the conflict and Bauchi state should hasten the creation of Sayawa chiefdom in line with the provision of the Justice Bahalakin commission of inquiry.

George, (2011) assessed the causes and strategies for ethnic conflict management and resolution in southern Kaduna also identified conflict management and resolution strategies adopted in southern Kaduna. The study adopted the integrated conflict management model, which gave a comprehensive picture of range of activities embedded in a proper conflict management process as involving three activities, conflict prevent, conflict abatement and conflict resolution, he explained that, they are not mutually exclusive. Survey research design was adopted for the study; it covered Zango and Jama'a local government areas. The study revealed that poverty, elite struggle for power are the causes of conflict and the strategies adopted by the Kaduna the state government were in effective such as unnecessary arrest and prosecution of suspects, the government officials taking in the distribution of relief materials, unbalanced and unjust resettlement and rehabilitation of victims in the conflict. As a way out the study recommended that government should opt for preventive strategy through timely intervention to early warning signs, expand youth programmes especially civic education and implement submissions of commissions and committees of inquiry.

Aliyu, (2004) examined the link between ethno-religious conflict and political stability in Kaduna state, it focused on the February 21,2000 Kaduna metropolis conflict, the study buttress the fact that conflict abound in both military and democratic

dispensation, but became more prevalent during democratic dispensation as a result of opposition and pro-democracy from ethnic groups and the use of ethnicity to mobilize sentiments. The employed both primary and secondary data and found out that in Kaduna state elites/petty bourgeoisie manipulated people by mystifying their material interest under the cover of ethnicity and religion, which was compounded by government's indecisive action over the years to deal with those fomenting troubleconflicts. Hence, recommended that, perpetrators of conflict should face the wrath of the law and the need to spread development/resources across the state so as to get to as many people as possible/ethnic group as possible.

Oji, Eme and Nwoba (2015) examined the effects of human cost of communal conflict in Ebonyi State from 2008 to 2010. The study adopts a historical materialist approach first articulated by Karl Marx (1818–1883), which is considered quite useful in capturing the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations with respect to the struggle over land, as well as access to local power and also because it provides opportunity to explain the dynamics of these relationships in terms of the material interests of individual actors and groups. The study revealed that the conflict impacted negatively on three major spheres of development namely economic, cultural, social and political development thus constricting development in these spheres. As a way out, the study recommended a conflict management model which is holistic, proactive and which aims at peace building in cognizance of the factors that impel conflicts. This works clearly explains the negative impact of conflict in groups or communities, and it highlights the reasons why there is fierce struggle between communities, this indeed explains the scenario in the understudy communities. However, the study did not cover the role of government in managing the conflict.

Akpar (2012) examined the ideological platforms and the role of politics in settler/indigene conflicts, and to understand the relationship between claims to land, ethnic ideology and politics and how they either cause or escalate the conflicts. The study adopted pluralism as a theoretical guide within a political economy approach. Qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis were adopted in a research design meant to complement both aspects of research. The data collected with triangulation techniques was carefully analysed and the study found that conflicts appear to be motivated by issues that polarize around economic opportunities such as land ownership and political power; a struggle for dominance first between fractions of the same class- namely, richer peasants using ethnic platforms for mobilization on causes that benefit them, and secondly, between a rentier state using power to wrestle control of the means of production from the peasant commodity producers at the marketing stage of production; that in the confrontation between social and cultural pluralism (kinship ties or ethnicity) and social pluralism (citizenship), it is the former that dominates social reality in these conflicts and serves to explain the potency and volatility of the eruptions. In the mutating settler/indigene conflicts, the ruling elites seek hegemony through the use of ethnic ideology anchored to land ownership to dominate the production arena. The study concluded with some candid observations that only genuine democracy and true governance can create conducive conditions that will make such ideological constructions such as settler/indigene platforms less potent.

Also, Mworia and Ndiku (2012) assessed the factors influencing continuous conflict between the Tigania and Tharaka communities in Meru, Kenya. The study adopted a descriptive design and purposive sampling was used to select the sample size. Questionnaires were used to collect data from both the affected people in Tigania and Tharaka Districts. An interview schedule was also administered to collect data about the

conflict from among opinion leaders. It was revealed that there exists continuous conflict between Tigania and Tharaka communities of the greater Meru region. Access to and control of scarce resources was found to be the main cause of the conflict while other factors causing the conflict were politics of self-interest, border disputes, land adjudication and government policy. Impacts of the conflict were; disruption of economic activities, environmental degradation, displacement of people, physical harm and death. Also, the intervention mechanisms to end the conflict included establishment of NjuriNcheke border arbitration committee and peace building initiatives through public gatherings.

Schaub (2014), carried out a research to examine the link between the experience of communal conflict and local collective action in rural Nigeria. The study made use of temporal and geographical information from four rounds of survey data from Nigeria to relate measures of cooperation to past and future incidences of communal conflict. The study revealed that local collective actions measured in terms of community meeting attendance and volunteering is highest before the outbreak of violence, higher than both post-conflict levels and the generally lower levels of cooperation in the regions not affected by violence. The study further revealed that that the positive link between previous exposure between civil war- type violence and cooperation holds for Nigeria too, but that holds for rural areas only. The study concluded by advancing suggestions on how a new pathway to peace may be charted in the Nigeria State; fostering religious tolerance, peaceful coexistence among the various ethnic groups, grass root development and youth empowerment through viable and productive labour.

Onwumah, (2014)discoursed on the origins, causes, and consequences of communal and ethno-religious crises in Nigeria during a three decade period covering 1987 to 2006. The study concluded by advancing suggestions on how a new pathway to

peace may be charted in the Nigeria State; fostering religious tolerance, peaceful coexistence among the various ethnic groups, grass root development and youth empowerment through viable and productive labour.

As seen above, existing studies on state intervention and communal conflicts in Gombe state is very limited in terms of establishing the link between the state government and the strategies adopted in managing communal conflicts. Most studies tend to focus on causes of conflict, nature, ethno religious conflict and political stability, often analyse conflict occurring as a result of struggle among elite or ruling class and the minorities groups, these studies tend to down play the role of resources such as land as the source of most communal conflicts . In similar fashion, most studies on ethnicity, ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria, limited their study on conceptualising ethnicity in terms its negative and positive impact, hardly establishing any link or causal relationship between state, its institutions and communal conflict. Hence, the theoretical explanation of the understanding of communal conflicts in Gombe state and strategies adopted to manage the protracted conflicts.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

A theory is important for any researcher in order to guide on the appropriate approach to use for analysis. Yin (2003) observed that without any guidance of a theory, there will bea misleading in understanding of the case. In other words with a help of a theory a researcher is guided in designing possible solutions to the problem or the case. Therefore, the Protracted Social Conflict Theory propounded by Edward Azar(1990) forms the basis for our analysis.

In order to explain the kind of emergent conflict between the communities under study, Edward Azar's Social Conflict Theory properly underpins the subject matter. Azar (1990), used the term protracted social conflict(PSC) to designate the type of on- going

and seemingly irresolvable conflict, Ryan cited in Azar(1990)S further stressed that protracted Social conflict 'are conflict between ethnic groups which have been going on for sometimes, and which appear to be unresolved. Azar explains that, the root of Protracted Social Conflict is found at the interlocking nexus of underdevelopment, structural deprivation, economic and psychological, communal or identity cleavages'. This implies that there is no single cause for or dimension to protracted social conflict. Many factors account for its emergence and prolonged nature, the factors may include economic, political, institutional, cultural, geographical, psychological and colonial. The conflict usually occurs when specific group is discriminated against by those in authority or deprived of their daily basic needs based on communal identity. He argued that, it is at this juncture of actual physical and psychological deprivation that structural victimization burst into hostile and violent actions. (Azar E. 1990).

2.3.1 The Elements of Protracted Social Conflict Theory

The theory consists of four elements,thatcapture the phenomena they are: communal content, Deprivation of human needs and Governance and the state roles and International Linkages.

Communal Content: This element explains the fact that communities involved in conflict do so to create their own identity groups, which points to the importance of identity groups, racial, ethnic or religious, according to this view, if a society is characterised by multi-communal composition, protracted social conflict is likely to occur. Azar further notes, 'that it is the relationship between identity groups and the states which is the core problem, this condition also explains the communities reliance on their social groups. He holds that in order to overcome this situation, national identity must be stressed over individual group identity. The Dadiya and Waja people residing in Bambam, couldn't accept the fact that the District Head of Bambam could be nominated

from either communities sharing the community, the Dadiya people claim ownership of Bambam and thus claim to reserve the right to produce the District Head of that community, similar situation characterised conflict experienced in other community such as Jos, the Indigene- settler question. As Azar rightly suggested, national identity must be stressed over individual group identity.

Deprivation of Human Needs: Emphasizing on the importance of the human need as a prime factor necessitating conflict in the society, Azar(11990) argued that deprivation of any kind can lead to aggression. For him, deprivation does not necessarily mean economic or material deprivation; it could also imply deprivation in terms of relevance of cultural and religious belief. Deprivation could yet mean degree of social accessibility of the minority groups, like the access to market and political institutions, or recognition of their communal existence. To a large extent, Azar's point of view is relevant in this study, as it can facilitate understanding ona broader scale the needs and crucial factors responsible for the Dadiya -Tula, Kaltungo and Waja communal conflict in Gombe State.

Government and the State's Role: the third element as contained in Azar (1990) protracted social conflict explains the fact that, government is endowed with the authority to govern and use force where necessary to regulate society, to protect citizens and to provide collective goods, the government plays a leading role in the satisfaction of minority and identity groups. It is expected that government is unbiased and impartial such that it will eliminate the dominance of one group over others. He concludes by suggesting that there is need to change government structure so that all citizens are equally cared for and equally represented without bias or corruption (Azar, 1990).

International Linkages: Azar (1990) defined international linkages as political-economic relations of dependency with the international economic system, and /or global pattern which often exacerbate the denial of needs of certain group, distorting domestic

political and economic systems through the realignment of subtle coalition of international capital and state (Azar, 1990:11).

In summary, the protracted social conflict occurs when communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs such as land, farmlands and political and political power. While the role of state in this case Gombe State Government whose responsibility is to regulate and manage the conflict responds in a pattern that may exacerbate the conflict. The outcome is usually a very pessimistic one, leading to institutionalisation of underdevelopment through destruction of physical and social infrastructure.

2.3.2: Applicability of the Theory to the Study

Edward Azar's protracted social conflict theory clearly explains the subject matter, as the elements such as communal content and deprivation of human needs explain the reasons why communities have disagreements (conflicts), that is, what causes conflict between and among communities, this captures the dependent variable (communal conflict). The government and state role as explained by Azar depicts the capacity of government in management of conflicts in any given society, saddled with the responsibility of regulating and controlling the activities of populace to ensure peaceful co-existence, in this study explains the independent variable (State intervention)

The theory postulates that, all factors are not unimportant at all and that conflict is a product of the factors combined, stressing that communal actions and strategies are the initial triggers to be given a very reasonable consideration. Thus, the theory advocates a holistic approach in managing conflicts among groups or communities.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Methodology is one of the crucial aspects of any research work. It largely determines the success of the study and provides basis for drawing up conclusions. This study was aimed at assessing the Gombe State Government intervention in the management of communal conflicts in Dadiya, Tula, Kaltungo and Waja communities. In order to achieve the stated objectives therefore, this chapter outlines and explains the methodology adopted under the following headings: Research design, sources of data, population, sampling technique, sample size and method of data analysis.

3.2 Research Design

This study adopted the descriptive research survey design. A survey research design is one in which a researcher observes the object of study as they are without manipulating them, with the aim of collecting first-hand information (Ojo, 2003). The method also looks at both large and smaller groups of population by selecting and taking in samples chosen from the population to discover the relative incidence, distribution of the independent and dependent variables. The study assessed the intervention of Gombe state government in the management of the Dadiya Tula, Kaltungo and Waja protracted communal conflicts. Samples were drawn from the population of the staff of Special Services, Political and Services Bureau, and population of Dadiya,Tula, Kaltungo and Waja communities of Gombe state.

3.3 Sources of Data Collection

This studyrelied on primary and secondary, as explained below.

3.3.1 Primary Sources of Data

The primary sources of data used include questionnaire and interviews to obtain first- hand information.

3.3.1.1 Questionnaire

The type of questionnaire used for this study is structured questionnaire. It is structured in closed ended format. The close ended questionnaire was designed using Likert question format with multiple choice questions Strongly Agree, Agree, undecided, Disagree and Strongly Disagree. The choice of the Likert questions format helped in determining how respondents agree to a particular statement of the subject matter under study. Dichotomous questions helpedin determining whether the respondent is eligible to proceed to the next question on the questionnaire. By and large, the choice of the closed ended format is intended to ease preliminary analysis and the calculation of statistical data and percentages, as the answers set are known. A total of 520 questionnaires were administered for the purpose of this study.

3.3.1.2 Interview

Interview was conducted to ascertain official claims (Qualitative information) from staff of the Special Services Political Chieftaincy Affairs Bureau, saddled with the responsibility of handling conflict and security issues of this nature in state. Therefore, interviews sessions were conducted with the management staff of Special Services, Political Affairs Bureau, traditional rulers and community leaders from each community were interviewed. Both structured and unstructured interview was employed in the study. The structured interview questions were contained in an interview schedule so as to ensure adherence to the guide. Unstructured intervieware used depending on prevailing circumstances during the interview

3.3.2 Secondary Sources of Data

The study explored secondary source of data, this includes; government reports such as, the government draft white paper on the report of the judicial commissions of inquiry of Dadiya/Tula 2006, the Joint peace and security committee reports of 2007 and 2008, the Peace Mission committee of 2013 and the reports of the committee to consolidate the recommendation of previous committees in respect of Dadiya, Tula, Kaltungo and Waja 2014.

The use of internet for online materials such as published theses, articles and projects on conflicts, communal conflict, conflict management in Nigeria, protracted conflict and conflict management strategies etc. the secondary data is utilized as a basis for comparison with the primary data and to further establish relationship between Gombe state government intervention and communal conflict.

3.4 Population of the Study

The population of the study consists of the people of Dadiya, Tula, and Waja and staff of the Special Services, Political and Chieftaincy Affairs Bureau. In the 2006 census projection by local governments, Dadiya has an estimated population 16,119, Tula 6,111, Kaltungo 45,582 and Waja 9,149 (NPC, 2006) respectively. Meanwhile, the other part of the population includes all the 30members'of staff of the Special Services, Political and Chieftaincy Affairs, put together at 76,991 as total population.

3.5 Sample Size

The objective of a research is to draw inference from a population in order to make generalization on the target population. However, because of the large population, in most studies researchers hardly study the entire population. Therefore, sample is often drawn from the population. In this study the use of Yamane formula was employed to determine the sample size for the study. Yamane formula was used at 0.05 levelof

significance to determine the sample size of thepopulation of Dadiya, Tula, Kaltungo, Waja and Staff of Special Services political and Chieftaincy Affairs Bureau put together as (76,991).

Thus,

Steely formula

$n= N/1+N(e)^2$

Where

n= sample size

e= level of significance (0.05)

N= population of Dadiya, Tula, Kaltungo, Waja and staff of Special Services Political and Chieftaincy affairs Bureau (76,991)

Sample size= $\frac{76,991}{1+76,991\ (0.005)^{\ 2}}$

$= \frac{76,991}{192.68}$

= 399.9 approximately

=400

According to the Yamane formulation, the rate of return should not be less than the sample size. Thus, 30% of the sample size representing 120 copies of questionnaires was added to make a total of five hundred and twenty (520)copies of questionnaires administered to the respondent. The above sample size was further divided into proportion as presented in the table below:

Table 3.1: Proportional distribution of sample size into study area

S/N	Study Area	Proportional sample size	Percentages
1	Dadiya	130	25%
2	Kaltungo	150	30%
3	Tula	110	20%
4	Waja	130	25%
	Total	**520**	**100**

Source: researcher's computation

3.6 Sampling Technique

Simple random sampling was adopted for the survey. 130 respondents were selected randomly from Dadiya community, 150 respondents from Kaltungo and also another 130 from Waja community. 110 respondents were drawn, and administered questionnaire from Tula community of Balanga and Kaltungo Local Government Areas. Bringing atotal number of 520 respondents drawn from three communities in the state.

For purpose of the interview, purposive sampling technique was adopted. The choice of the purposive sampling technique in this study is premised on the fact that, primary data required for this study especially interview can only be provided by community leaders, traditional leaders, elites, youth groups in each community and the managerial cadre of the Special Services, Political and Chieftaincy Affairs Bureau must be consulted so as to generate first-hand information on the management of conflicts in the understudied communities.

3.7 Administration of Instrument

A total of four hundred (520) questionnaires were administered. The questions on the questionnaire are expected to elicit responses from the respondents on Gombe State intervention in the management of communal conflict in the understudied areas, strategies adopted by Gombe state government to manage the conflict and factors militating against current strategies adopted. The responses were measured using five points Likert scale of strongly agree, agree, undecided, disagree and strongly disagree.

While a total of ten (10) respondents were interviewed. Three respondents were drawn from each community in the understudied areas and one from the Special Services, Political and Chieftaincy Affairs. These representatives were selected purposively to represent the major stakeholders in communities, comprising of representatives of youth groups, community leaders and the elites. The focal point of the interview is to access

information on Gombe government intervention in communal conflict in the understudied areas. And also ascertain whether the protracted communal conflict is as result of non-implementation of the recommendations of the commissions' reports and factors militating against strategies adopted by the Gombe state government.

3.8 Methods of Data Presentation and Analysis

Data generated from the field were analysed using both descriptive and inferential statistics, data that were generated through interview were analysed qualitatively using content analysis. Data generated through questionnaires was analysed quantitatively using measures of central tendency. However, for the purpose of testing these hypotheses, inferential statistics was adopted. Chi-square was used to statistically test hypotheses earlier postulated in chapter one, the formula for calculating the chi-square is,

$X^2 = \sum \frac{(fo-fe)^2}{fe}$

Where;

X^2= chi-square

Fo= observed frequency

Fe= expected frequency

∑= summation

To calculate the expected frequency we multiply the column total by the row total and divide the result by the grand total for each cell.

FE $\frac{CT \times RT}{GT}$

The degree of freedom is number of freely varying scores within the sample. The difference is always one less than the sample size and is given as Df = N-1

The level of significance refers to the maximum probability with which we could be willing to risk. It could equally be referred to as probability of making type one error designated as Alpha. That is rejecting a false hypothesis that is in fact true. For the study,

the level of significance to be used is 0.05. Based on the statistical analysis the decision rule for the study will be as follows:

Decision Rule

The study rejects the null hypothesis at 0.05 level of significance if the X2 value (i.e.

Calculated value) exceeds the critical value. On the other hand, if the critical value exceeds the calculated value the study accepts the hypothesis

CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT IN GOMBE SOUTHERN SENATORIAL DISTRICT

4.1 Introduction

The chapter overviewed communal conflict in Gombe state as well as gave an overview of the historical background of the communities engaged in conflict, efforts made by the state government to manage the conflict and the challenges faced by them.

4.2. Overview of Communal Conflict in Gombe State

Gombe State is located in the north-eastern part of Nigeria and its capital is Gombe, being located in the north-eastern zone, right within the expansive savannah allows the state to share common borders with the states of Borno, Yobe, Taraba, Adamawa, and Bauchi. The state has an area of 20,265 km2 and a population of around 2,353,000 asat of 2006 census. Gombe State has two distinct climates, the dry season (November-March) and the rainy season (April-October) with an average rainfall of 850mm. The State is headed by an Executive Governor. Gombe State has 11 LGAs and 14 Emirates/chiefdoms. The LGAs are: Akko, Balanga, Billiri, Dukku, Funakaye, Gombe, Kaltungo, Kwami, Nafada, Shongon, and Yamaltu/Deba (Tuduks,2015).

4.2.1 Dadiya/ Tula Communal conflict (2006)

Beginning from the colonial period that is from 1906, Dadiya relations started undergoing changes manifesting in claims and counter claims over positions of land in and around Bambam town. These counter-claims over land came to the fore in 2006 census exercise when both Kaltungo and Balanga local government wanted to enumerate GadanMayo**,** Kakur and Gadan Taba.

Then a boundary dispute ensued between the two communities, where Dadiya community is claiming the pre-colonial boundary of Kwalli stone wall as their existing

boundary between Tula and Dadiya. The Tula on the other side is claiming the colonial boundary demarcation of 1956 by the colonial masters as their existing boundary between the two communities. As a result of this conflict, eight people were reported dead, a total of 523 houses worth N448, 030,294.00 and plants and automobiles worth N3,908,000.00 were destroyed (Gombe State Government draft White Paper, 2006).

4.2.2 Dadiya/Kaltungo Communal Conflict (2007-2012)

The Dadiya/Kaltungo conflict started on 21st may 2007. The Kaltungo community in Kaltungo local government and Dadiya community in Balanga local government have lived peacefully with one another for years, until the 21st May, 2007, when the conflict started, some people from Kaltungo were seen ploughing a particular land purported to be part of the land awarded to one DahiruKamba, a Dadiya man in 1993 after a judgement that was delivered in his favour. The piece of land in question located at Bakange or Langwalang, is thecontested land. Since the conflict broke out in 2007, it became yearly affairs until 2012.

As a result of this protracted conflict, as recorded in an open letter dated 8th May, 2013, that on 21 to 23rd May 2007 when the conflict erupted for the first time five people were killed and 632 houses from the communities were burnt. In the second clash between the communities on 27th May 2009 one person was killed and 232 houses as well as farm produce worth (N17, 000,000) were destroyed. In third clash which occurred on 6th to 9th February 2010, six villages were burnt down, the fourth incident occurred in July 2011 between the communities mention above but no death was recorded. On 9th and 10th June as well as 1st to 3rdJuly 2012, another conflict occurred in which two villages were completely burnt down (Comrade, 2013).


This situation was also captured in the Peace Mission Committee chaired by the Deputy Governor Mr ThaandaRibainu who asserted that, an undetermined number of lives were lost and over 400 houses were destroyed (Gombe State Government: Peace Mission to Gombe south 2013).

4.2.3 Dadiya/Waja Communal Conflict (2013)

The Dadiya and Waja communities do not share common boundary, instead the Waja share bounders with the immediate northern Cham people and the Tula borders it from the west**.** However, they are in the same local government with the Dadiya people. History has it that in pre-colonial days, a large number of Waja from Kulani, Reme, Jong, Bakasi and Gelenga migrated to Bambam. Since colonial times, relationship between the Dadiya and Waja had been peaceful and cordial resulting into the appointment of Waja indigene as district head of Bambam and traditional title holders in Dadiya chiefdom (Gombe State Government: Consolidated reports on conflict in Gombe Southern Senatorial District 2014).


However, on return of democracy in 1999 the struggle for power between the two communities increased leading to mutual suspicion. The Dadiya-Tula and Dadiya-Kaltungo communal conflict further increased tension between the Dadiya and Waja communities, as the Dadiya suspect the Waja forming alliance with Kaltungo. Due to the growing tension, conflict broke out on the 5th April 2013, between then Dadiya and the Waja communities because one Ibrahim Mainasara of Waja community was attacked and killed and his remains was not found (Report of the Committee to Consolidate the Recommendation of All Previous Committee, 2014).

FIG. 4.1: Map of Gombe State Showing Study Area



SOURCE: Cartographic Lab. Geography Department, Gombe State University,2015**.**

FIG. 4.2: Ethnic Map of Dadiya, Kaltungo, Tula And Waja



SOUCE: Cartographic Lab. Geography Department, Gombe State University,2015**.**

4.3 Governmental Intervention

Elfversson (2013) described intervention as a third party activity which the intervening actor either helps the conflicting parties to regulate the incompatibility in the level of violence and working as intermediary between the parties in conflict. It is what Isa (2001:2) refers to as institutional response of the state to the management of conflict

which includes the role played by the federal, state government and its agencies such as how enforcement agencies and the pattern adopted by such agencies of the state in managing conflict, resolving or bringing it to a terminal end.

With regards to the conflict in the under studied communities, state interventions in conflict focused on the efforts of government at the state government level and their agencies in the management of the conflict. Several peace initiatives have been carried out, which were mainly, setting up of commissions and security forces deployment. These commissions include:

1. **The Judicial Commission of Inquiry, March- August 2006**

On the 3rdApril 2006, his Excellency Alh. Mohammed DanjumaGoje, the then governor of Gombe state in exercise of the power conferred on him under the Commission of Inquiry Law, Capp 33 of 1991 swore in the members and the chairmanship of Hon Justice A, M. Yakubu. The commission was given the following term of reference.

i. To inquire into the immediate and remote cause of 23rd and 24th March, 2006 Dadiya/Tula conflict.
ii. To ascertain the role played by any person or group that led or contributed to the conflict.
iii. To apportion blame where necessary and make appropriate recommendation as may be applicable.
iv. To determine the extent of damages done, injuries suffered and lives lost and make appropriate recommendations.

v. To make recommendations which in the opinion of the commission may resolve the problem and ensure lasting peace and security between the two parties in the affected areas?

vi. To make any other recommendations. (Gombe State Government draft White Paper, 2006)

This Judicial commission of inquiry having successfully exhausted their terms of reference submitted their recommendations and findings to the state government but, it cannot be said to have recorded any achievement because their report has not been implemented, this led to the assertion that non implementation is a major challenge they aced.

2. **The Joint and Peace Security Committee of 2007**.

Kaltungo and Balanga Local Government Area joint peace and security committee under the chairmanship of Hon. Shehu Kanar, chairman Kaltungo local government. The committee consist of 19 members with a term of reference:

i. To restore normalcy in the area.

ii. To ascertain the remote and immediate cause of the conflict.

The joint peace and security committee of Balanga and Kaltungo observed that:

a. Judgement of the Upper Area Court Kaltungo in 2007 wherein the claim of the plaintiffs was dismissed because the same court decided the matter in 1993 was one of the case.

b. The committee found as a fact the parties to the suit in 1993 and 2007 are different, even though judgement was decided and dismissed on the strength of the 1993 judgement.

c. That, parties to the 2007 suit wherein the claim of the paintiffs was dismissed did not understand the extent of the judgement of the court.
d. The plaintiffs were of the view that since the case was dismissed on the strength of the 1993 judgement and they were not part of that suit, they were entitled to go upon the law while the defendant was of the view that since the plaintiffs's case was dismissed he was entitled to the land.

The committee observed also that, the use of provocative and inciting statements at each other by both parties threatened the peace between the communities and overtime began to build tension and suspicion among the people.

Extent of Damage

The joint peace and security of 2007 reported that, when the conflict first erupted:

i. Properties with millions of naira were lost while many were reported injured.
ii. From the Kaltungo community five people died.
iii. From Dadiya eight people died.
iv. The following villages were destroyed:
    - Lawushi
    - Shanshang
    - Loshinto
    - Lofiyo
    - Langwalang

The Committee made the following recommendations:

a. Parties to the judgement of the 1993 and 2007 should respect the judgement of the court and any party who is dissatisfied should appeal against the judgement.

b. Residence of Lawashi and shangshsng who were relocated back to their settlements. That the Mai Kaltungo should facilitate the return of Dadiya people in shangshangback to their homes and Folo Dadiya should also welcome and facilitate the Kaltungo people in Lawashi back to their home. Their return will foster peace.

c. Government should provide relief materials to the victims.

d. The farmlands located at Loshinto/Kangukak and identified as plot A-F has remained a disputed farmlands because of the claims by the people of Lawishi and counter- claims by Dadiya in Loshinto. Thus, the committee recommends that the state government should take over these farmlands or the true ownership of the land be determined by the court.

e. The Joint Peace and Security Committee of Balanga and Kaltungo local government recommends that all the local government in Gombe state should form part of the committee because of the continuous conflict/dispute in the area.(Report of the Joint Peace and Security Committee 2007)

Similar to the earlier discussed Judicial commission of Inquiry, the Joint Peace Security committee of Balanga and Kaltungo Local government completed its assignment but most of the recommendations were not implemented. It is worthy of note that one of the of achievement made by this committee is that the Government and corporate bodies distributed relief materials.

3. Seven Man Ad-hoc Communities of 2007

The Kaltungo and Balanga local government area set up a seven-man ad-hoc committee with a single term of reference:

a. To determine and make recommendations as to whether or not plot G was located at langwalan/Bakange was litigated upon. This committee was set up by the joint

peace and security committee after its sitting on 22nd July, 2008. The ad-hoc committee comprised of presiding magistrates of Kaltungo, Cham and Tallasse, the MagajinGarin Kaltungo (representative of Mai Kaltungo) and the two Departmental Security Officers (DSOs) of Kaltungo and Balanga Local Governments.

4. **Late Emir of Gombe Royal Fathers' Committee 2013**

The committee consisted of all the six royal fathers of the Gombe southern senatorial district with the Emir of Gombe as chairman. The committee was given a single term of reference:

a. To look into the conflict which had engulfed the Gombe southern senatorial district in general and Dadiya chiefdom in particular with the view of helping to restore peace in the areas and proffer permanent solutions to the prevention of the perennial conflict in the southern district. The committee completed the alignment and submitted its report to the government (Gombe State Government:Consolidated Reports on Conflict in Gombe Southern Senatorial District 2014).

5. Peace Mission Committee, 2013

The Peace Mission Committee was necessitated by the persistent/incessant conflict especially that of 6th-8th April, 2013, that engulfed Dadiya chiefdom and environs (Tula, Waja and Kaltungo chiefdom), where lives and properties worth millions were destroyed. The Gombe state government set up this committee under the leadership of his Excellency, the deputy governor Mr.Tha'andaJosonRubainu, and sons and daughters within the state and southern senatorial district. The committee observed the following:

a. It has been observed with great concern that this conflict has been occurring for several years but no actions taken.
b. That committees of inquiry have been set up but reports not implemented.
c. Inadequate sensitization at the community level by elders and traditional rulers.
d. Growing tensions are not communicated to government and security agents on time.
e. Information is usually hidden until conflict erupts.

This committee recommends that:

i. Government should set up a judicial commission of inquiry and the Special Services Political and Chieftaincy Affairs Bureau is to serve as secretariat.
ii. There should be regular meetings among traditional rulers on rotational basis and each district and ward head to do the same in their domains to further understanding and cordial relationship.
iii. The traditional rulers are to send early warning signals to the government and the security agents on any growing tension.
iv. The need to review previous reports and issue white paper on Gombe south conflict.
v. Judicial committee of enquiry to be set up to investigate the root cause of the matter and those found guilty to be sanctioned.

6. The committee to Consolidate the Recommendations of All Previous Committees

The committee to consolidate the recommendations of all previous committees in respect of the southern senatorial district (2014) consisted of four members under the chairmanship of Mr.Adamu Joshua Pukuma with two terms of reference:

a. To consolidate the recommendations of all previous committees into coherent policy proposal for dealing with the people.
b. To analyse possible remote causes of the conflict and suggest way to curtail future reoccurrence

The committee made the following observations:

The desire by the communities ti live together in harmony, those who were displaced by the conflict for instance requested that government should assist them go back to their previous settlements.

i. The committee observed that one of the immediate cause of the 2006 conflict between Dadiya and Tula was the 2006 National Census. Since the enumeration areas in dispute have not been resolved between the two communities and another census is around the corner (2016), there is urgent need to resolve the issue before 2016 to obviate a repeat of the 2006 crisis.
ii. The committee noted that there is unofficial effort at resolving outstanding issues that could lead to conflict. For instance, peace effort by the leadership of Kaltungo DCC chairman to resolve pending cases (farmland) between Kaltungo and Dadiya. Another effort is between Dadiya and Waja led by Godwin Gayus which is on-going positively.
iii. The committee observed that the only committee set to look into the conflict between Dadiya/Kaltungo is the joint peace and security committee set up by Kaltungo and Balanga local government in 2007.
iv. The committee observed that following the incessant conflict over farmlands between Dadiya and Kaltungo, a directive was given to the people from the two communities to suspend farming activities within the disputed areas.

Apart from the above ways of management, the communities and religious groups initiated peace by bringing the communities together to negotiate dialogue and sort ways that, will bring lasting peace. For example, in the Dadiya-Kaltungo protracted conflict, the ECWA Kaltungo under the directive of the ECWA Headquarters initiated a peace mission between the two communities by organizing meetings in their quest to bringabout lasting solution to the perennial conflict.

In spite these aforementioned interventions by Gombe state government in Balanga/ Kaltungo local government it failed to bring about the lasting solution between the understudied.

CHAPTER FIVE
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, data collected through primary and secondary sources are presented and analyzed. Data collected through the questionnaire were presented in tables and analyzed using frequency counts and percentages. The data from the questionnaire were measured on a five-point Likert scale and further interpreted using descriptive statistics. Based on the presentation, analysis and interpretation of data, the hypotheses postulated were tested using chi-square. The data collected through the interview conducted and secondary data were analyzed using the content analysis to complement the response from the questionnaire. These data were used to further substantiate the hypotheses tested. Also in this chapter, the major findings of the study are summarily highlighted.

5.2 Presentation of Data and Analysis

Based on the 400 sample size for the study as indicated in table 3.1 in chapter three of this work, 30% of the sample sizerepresenting 120copies of questionnaires was added to make a total of five hundred and twenty (520)copies of questionnaires administered to the respective respondents; 130copies of questionnaire for Dadiya community, 150, 110, and 130 copies for Kaltungo, Tula and Waja community respectively. Out of this total, 418 were found to be filled and returned representing 80.4% of total rate of return, but for thepurpose of thisstudy,400representing 76.8% was used for analysis. The rate of return of the questionnaires by each category of respondents was presented in table 5.1

Table 5.1:The Rate of Return of Questionnaires of Respondents

S/N	Study Area	Total No. of Questionnaire Administered	Total No. of Questionnaire Returned	Percentage of Questionnaire Returned
1	Dadiya	130	100	19.2
2	Kaltungo	150	120	23.1
3	Tula	110	80	15.4
4	Waja	120	100	19.2
	Total	**520**	**400**	**76.8**

Source: Field Survey, 2015

As indicated in table 5.1, out of 130 questionnaires administered to residents of Dadiya 100 copies were filled and returned representing 19.2% of the return rate. The return rate of Kaltungo is put at 23.1% while that of Tula and Waja is represented by 15.4% and 19.2% respectively. However, of all the categories of respondents, the resident of Kaltungohad the highest rate of questionnaire returned (23.1%) while respondents from Tulahad the lowest return rate represented by 15.4%. Thus, the numbers of returned copies of questionnaires were used for analysis

Table 5.2: Responses from Dadiya on Gombe State Government Intervention in Dadiya/Tula Communal Conflict

The Extent of Intervention	Strongly Agree (SA)		Agree (A)		Undecided (UD)		Disagree (D)		Strongly Disagree (SD)		Total	
	F	**P**	**F**	**P**	**F**	**P**	**F**	**P**	**F**	**P**	**F**	**P**
(1) The prompt response to conflict between the Dadiya and Tula communities by setting up judicial commission of inquiry helped in managing the conflict	11	11.0	28	28.0	20	20.0	17	17.0	24	24.0	100	100
(2) Gombe state government has implemented the recommendations of the commission by demarcating boundary between Dadiya and Tula	9	9.0	8	8.0	5	5.0	44	44.0	34	34.0	100	100
(3) Deploying security forces significantly helped in managing Dadiya and Tula conflict	17	17.0	30	30.0	6	6.0	22	22.0	25	25.0	100	100
(4) Gombe state government or its agencies facilitated peace talks between Dadiya and Tula communities	10	10.0	7	7.0	6	6.0	39	39.0	38	38.0	100	100
(5) The conflict management strategies put in place by Gombe state government can be said to be effective	12	12.0	23	23.0	12	12.0	30	30.0	23	23.0	100	100
(6) The non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflict in the understudy areas	24	24.0	21	21.0	17	17.0	18	18.0	20	20.0	100	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

Table 5.2 indicates that majority of the respondents representing 28.0% agreed with the view that the prompt response to conflict between the Dadiya and Tula communities by setting up judicial commission of inquiry helped in managing the conflict. 11.0% strongly agreed with this assertion. On the other hand, 17.0% of respondents strongly disagreed with the claims that the setting up of judicial commission of inquiry helped in the management of the conflict. It is supported by 24.0% of respondents who disagreed while 20.0% of respondents remained undecided.

Contrary to the views above, majority of respondents overwhelmingly disagreed with the point of view that Gombe state government has implemented the recommendations of the commission by demarcating boundary between Dadiya and Tula. This is visible in the 34.0% response rate representing the majority. 44.0% strongly disagreed with this claim. On the other side, 9.0% of respondents strongly agreed with the premise. 8.0% agreed with this point of view while none of the respondents was undecided.

Looking at the deployment of security forces as a strategy used for the management of Dadiya and Tula conflict, the opinion of respondents were sought on whether deploying security forces has significantly helped in managing Dadiya/Tula conflict. Majority of respondents representing 30.0% agreed with the proposition. 17.0% of respondents strongly agreed with this claim. 6.0% of the respondents were undecided on the issue. While, 25.0% of respondents disagreed with this view, 22.0% strongly disagreed with it.

Responding to Gombe state government or its agencies facilitating peace talks between Dadiya and Tula communities, 39.0% of respondents representing the majority disagreed with the opinion that Gombe state government facilitated peace talks between

the communities above. 38.0% of respondents strongly disagreed too. On the contrary, 10.0% of respondents strongly agreed with the view. 7.0% agreed with this view leaving 6.0% of respondents who were undecided on the matter.

In line with the conflict management strategy put in place by Gombe state government to manage conflict, majority of respondents representing 30.0% disagreed with the claim that the conflict management strategies put in place by Gombe state government has been effective. This is supported by 23.0% of respondents. However, 23.0% of respondents agreed that the conflict management strategy has been effective; it is supported by 12.0% who strongly agreed while 12.0% of respondents remained undecided on it.

Ascertaining responses on the non-implementation of the commission's recommendation and the protracted nature of conflict in the understudy areas, majority of respondents representing 24.0% strongly agreed that the non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflict in the understudy areas. 21.0% of respondents also agreed with this claim. 17.0% were undecided on the issue. While, 20.0% of respondents disagreed with this view, 18.0% strongly disagreed with it.

Table 5.2.1: Responses from Tula on Gombe State Government Intervention in Dadiya/Tula Communal Conflict

The Extent of Intervention	Strongly Agree (SA)		Agree (A)		Undecided (UD)		Disagree (D)		Strongly Disagree (SD)		Total	
	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P
(1) The prompt response to conflict between the Dadiya and Tula communities by setting up judicial commission of inquiry helped in managing the conflict	14	17.5	23	28.7	4	5.0	21	26.3	18	22.5	80	100
(2) Gombe state government has implemented the recommendations of the commission by demarcating boundary between Dadiya and Tula	14	17.5	14	17.5	2	2.5	28	35.0	22	27.5	80	100
(3) Deploying security forces significantly helped in managing Dadiya and Tula conflict	22	27.5	24	30.0	6	7.5	12	15.0	16	20.0	80	100
(4) Gombe state government or its agencies facilitated peace talks between Dadiya and Tula communities	11	13.8	18	22.5	10	12.5	19	23.6	22	27.5	80	100
(5) The conflict management strategies put in place by Gombe state government can be said to be effective	11	13.8	22	27.5	5	6.3	28	35.0	14	17.5	80	100
(6) The non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflict in the understudy areas	26	32.5	16	20.0	4	5.0	21	26.3	13	16.3	80	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

Table 5.2.1 indicates that majority of the respondents representing 28.7% agreed with the view that the prompt response to conflict between the Dadiya and Tula communities by setting up judicial commission of inquiry helped in managing the conflict. 22.5% strongly agreed with this assertion. On the other hand, 17.5% of respondents strongly disagreed with the claims that the setting up of judicial commission of inquiry helped in the management of the conflict. It is supported by 26.3% of respondents who disagreed while 5.00% of respondents remained undecided.

Contrarily, majority of respondents overwhelmingly disagreed with the point of view that Gombe state government has implemented the recommendations of the commission by demarcating boundary between Dadiya and Tula. This is visible in the 35.0% response rate representing the majority. 27.5% strongly disagreed with this claim. On the other side, 17.5% of respondents strongly agreed with the premise. 17.5% agreed with this point of view while 2.5% of respondents were undecided.

Looking at the deployment of security forces as a strategy used for the management of Dadiya and Tula conflict, the opinion of respondents were sought on whether deploying security forces has significantly helped in managing Dadiya/Tula conflict. Majority of respondents representing 30.0% agreed with the proposition. 27.5% of respondents strongly agreed with this claim. 7.5% of the respondents were undecided on the issue. While, 15.0% of respondents disagreed with this view, 20.0% strongly disagreed with it.

Responding to Gombe state government or its agencies facilitating peace talks between Dadiya and Tula communities, 27.5% of respondents representing the majority strongly disagreed with the opinion that Gombe state government facilitated peace talks between the communities above. 22.5% of respondents disagreed too. On the contrary,

13.8% of respondents strongly agreed with the view. 23.6% agreed with this view leaving 12.5% of respondents who were undecided on the matter.

In line with the conflict management strategy put in place by Gombe state government to manage conflict, majority of respondents representing 35.0% disagreed with the claim that the conflict management strategies put in place by Gombe state government has been effective. This is supported by 17.5% of respondents. However, 27.5% of respondents agreed that the conflict management strategy has been effective; it is supported by 13.8% who strongly agreed while 6.3% of respondents remained undecided on it.

Ascertaining responses on the non-implementation of the commission's recommendation and the protracted nature of conflict in the understudy areas, majority of respondents representing 32.5% strongly agreed that the non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflict in the understudy areas. 20,0% of respondents also agreed with this claim. 5.0% of the respondents was undecided on the issue. While, 26.3% of respondents disagreed with this view, 16.3% strongly disagreed with it.

Interview Report on Dadiya-Tula Communal Conflict

In an interview with the District Head of Tula, on the 25th August 2015, the community leader revealed that, a Judicial commission was set up immediately when the conflict erupted, this was further ascertained by the Government White Draft, (2006) that the commission was set up on the 29th of March 2006, after the outbreak of the conflict on 23rd and 24th, which indeed was prompt. In line with the above discussion Mr. ShuaibTeme a member of the committee to consolidate all committees' recommendation set up by Gombe State Government in aninterview granted on 21stJuly 2015. When asked

whether the state government has released and implemented the reports of the Judicial Commission, revealed a contrary opinion that, till date, the draft has not been released nor implemented. Similarly, the District Head of Tula reiterated that if the recommendations of the Judicial commissions are implemented it will bring about lasting solution to the conflict.

When asked if Gombe State Government has initiated peace talks, dialogue/ negotiations and deploy security forces when the conflict erupted, the Youth Leaders from both communities explained in an interview dated 26th August, 2015 at 11.45-12:30pm that, in 2006 no peace initiative was conducted by the state government, peace talks and awareness were conducted only at the community level, that was organized by both chiefdoms. Regarding deployment of security forces, they claim that the State acted promptly. Confirming these claims,the Representative of Folo Dadiya, Alh. DanladiMaina, asserted that what the state government did in 2013 years after this particular conflict in the name of peace mission was just a propaganda, but agreed that security forces were promptly deployed to the area which helped in reducing the number of casualty.

In an interesting development, when asked same question, the District Head of Tula claimed that, the security forces were deployed from neighboring Taraba State, where the then commissioner of Police was a Dadiya indigene, which did not salvage the situation, rather the Tula was placed at the disadvantage position, which negates the ethics of the security forces.

To ascertain whether the boundary dispute between the two communities was settled, as recommended by the Judicial Commission report (2006) that a modest boundary be made on the principle of land and peace, a member of the Judicial

commission Barrister Japhet Maida, explained that the Gombe State Boundary Commission is to act appropriately but till date, that is, nine years after the incidence nothing has been done. Confirming whether the issues discussed above are responsible for the protracted nature of the conflict, the District Head of Tula and the Representative of Folo Dadiya leaders confirmed that, the inability of state government to implement and act appropriately on the recommendations of the Judicial commission created suspicion between the two communities, and they expressed fear that the conflict may reoccur if government doesn't take action promptly. Furthermore, this assertion was confirmed by the Report to Consolidate All Previous Committee's, (2014), that, the immediate or trigger factor of the 2006 conflict between Dadiya and Tula communities, was the 2006 census exercise and since the problem is still pending and another census will be conducted by 2016, government should act immediately to obviate a repeat in 2016.

Table 5.3: Responses from Dadiya on Gombe State Government Intervention in Dadiya/Kaltungo Communal Conflict

The Extent of Intervention	Strongly Agree (SA)		Agree (A)		Undecided (UD)		Disagree (D)		Strongly Disagree (SD)		Total	
	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P
(1) Gombe State govt. intervened in Dadiya and Kaltungo conflict by setting up judicial commission of inquiry	7	7.0	12	12.0	12	12.0	25	25.0	44	44.0	100	100
(2) The setting up of the Judicial Commission or committees significantly helped in managing the communal conflict	12	12.0	15	15.0	8	8.0	27	27.0	38	38.0	100	100
(3) Gombe state government facilitated peace talks between Dadiya and Kaltungo communities	18	18.0	15	15.0	8	8.0	22	22.0	37	37.0	100	100
(4) The deployment of security forces helped to manage the conflict	23	23.0	32	32.0	8	8.0	26	26.0	11	11.0	100	100
(5) Gombe state government has intervened by ascertaining the status of the farmland and relocating the displaced persons in Dadiya and Kaltungo communities	9	9.0	15	15.0	7	7.0	36	36.0	33	33.0	100	100
(6) The non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflict in the understudy areas	37	37.0	27	27.0	9	9.0	12	12.0	15	15.0	100	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015
F = Frequency
P = Percentage

A detailed analysis of table 5.3 indicates the responses of respondents from Dadiya on Gombe State government intervention on Dadiya/Kaltungo communal conflict. Majority of respondents which constitute 44.02% strongly disagreed with the view that Gombe state government intervened in Dadiya/Kaltungo conflict by setting up a judicial commission of inquiry. 25.0% of respondents also disagreed with this claim. While, 12.0% of respondents agree that Gombe state government intervened in Dadiya/Kaltungo conflict by setting up a judicial commission of inquiry. 7.0% strongly agreed with this, while 12.0% of respondents were undecided.

Furthermore, majority of respondents which constitute 38.0% strongly disagreed with the assertion that the setting up of a judicial commission of inquiry has significantly helped in the management of the conflict. The table also indicates that 27.0% of respondents disagree with this view too. Only 12.0% and 15.0% of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed respectively on this view while 8.0% of the respondents were undecided.

In terms of peace talks, 37.0% of respondents which is the majority strongly disagreed that Gombe state government facilitated peace talks between Dadiya and Kaltungo communities. 22.0% of respondents also disagreed with this claim. While 15.0% and 18.0% of respondents agreed and strongly agreed respectively to the claim that the state government intervened by facilitating a peace talks. Meanwhile, 8.0% of respondents remained undecided.

Majority of respondents representing 32.0% agreed that the deployment of security forces helped in the management of conflict between Dadiya and Kaltungo. It is supported by 23.0% of respondents who strongly agreed with the claim. While, 26.0% and 11.0% of respondents strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively on this assertion. The remaining 8.0% of respondents were however undecided.

Meanwhile, the opinion of respondents was sought on the intervention by Gombe state government to ascertain the status of the farmland and relocating the displaced persons in Dadiya and Kaltungo. Their responses indicated that, majority of them (36.0%) disagreed with the assertion. Another 33.0% strongly disagreed with this assertion too. While 15.0% and 9.0% of respondents agreed and strongly agreed respectively on the intervention by the state government to ascertain the status of the farmland and the relocation of the victims of the communal conflict. The remaining 7.0% of respondents were undecided on the matter.

The opinion of respondents was sought on whether the non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the perennial nature of conflict in the understudy areas. Majority of respondents which constitute 37.0% strongly agreed, this was supported by 27.0% who agreed with this claim. 9.0% of respondents were undecided while 15.0% and 12.0% of respondents strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively.

Table 5.3.1: Responses from Kaltungo on Gombe State Government Intervention in Dadiya/Kaltungo Communal Conflict

The Extent of Intervention	Strongly Agree (SA)		Agree (A)		Undecided (UD)		Disagree (D)		Strongly Disagree (SD)		Total	
	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P
(1) Gombe State govt. intervened in Dadiya and Kaltungo conflict by setting up judicial commission of inquiry	-	-	12	10.0	21	17.5	35	29.2	46	38.3	120	100
(2) The setting up of the Judicial Commission or committees significantly helped in managing the communal conflict	-	-	6	5.0	18	15.0	41	34.2	46	38.3	120	100
(3) Gombe state government facilitated peace talks between Dadiya and Kaltungo communities	-	-	7	5.8	13	10.8	64	53.3	30	25.0	120	100
(4) The deployment of security forces helped to manage the conflict	22	18.3	41	34.2	17	14.2	19	15.8	20	16.7	120	100
(5) Gombe state government has intervened by ascertaining the status of the farmland and relocating the displaced persons in Dadiya and Kaltungo communities	13	10.8	15	12.5	8	6.7	46	38.3	38	31.7	120	100
(6) The non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflict in the understudy areas	34	28.3	36	30.0	-	-	25	20.8	18	15.0	120	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

A detailed analysis of table 5.3.1 indicates the responses of respondents from Kaltungo on Gombe State government intervention on Dadiya/Kaltungo communal conflict. Majority of respondents which constitute 45.3% strongly disagreed with the view that Gombe state government intervened in Dadiya/kaltungo conflict by setting up a judicial commission of inquiry. 41.8% of respondents also disagreed with this claim. While, 7.5% of respondents agree that Gombe state government intervened in Dadiya/Kaltungo conflict by setting up a judicial commission of inquiry. No respondent strongly agreed with this, while 16.3% of respondents were undecided.

Furthermore, majority of respondents which constitute 45.3% strongly disagreed with the assertion that the setting up of a judicial commission of inquiry has significantly helped in the management of the conflict. The table also indicates that 39.5% of respondents disagree with this view too. Only 2.3% of the respondents agreed with this view while 12.8% of the respondents were undecided.

In terms of peace talks, 66.3% of respondents which is the majority disagreed that Gombe state government facilitated peace talks between Dadiya and Kaltungo communities. 26.7% of respondents also strongly disagreed with this claim. While none of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed to the claim that the state government intervened by facilitating a peace talks between Dadiya and Kaltungo. Meanwhile, 6.9% of respondents remained undecided.

Majority of respondents representing 27.9% agreed that the deployment of security forces helped in the management of conflict between Dadiya and Kaltungo. It is supported by 18.6% of respondents who strongly agreed with the claim. While, 15.2% and 13.9% of respondents strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively on this assertion. The remaining 12.8% of respondents were however undecided.

Meanwhile, the opinion of respondents was sought on the intervention by Gombe state government to ascertain the status of the farmland and relocating the displaced persons in Dadiya and Kaltungo. Their responses indicated that, majority of them (45.4%) disagreed with the assertion. Another 36.0% strongly disagreed with this assertion too. While 9.3% and 8.2% of respondents agreed and strongly agreed respectively on the intervention by the state government to ascertain the status of the farmland and the relocation of the victims of the communal conflict. The remaining 1.2% of respondents were undecided on the matter.

The opinion of respondents was sought on whether the non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the perennial nature of conflict in the understudy areas. Majority of respondents which constitute 33.7% strongly agreed, this was supported by 32.6% who agreed with this claim. None of the respondents was undecided while 12.8% and 20.9% of respondents strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively.

Interview Report on Dadiya-Kaltungo Communal Conflict

In an interview with the District Head of Lakweme, an area under Kaltungo Chiefdom, on the 26th August, 2015 at 3:40pm, the community leader revealed that, with regards to the 2007-2012 Dadiya-Kaltungo conflict, the Gombe state Government did not set up a Judicial Commission of Inquiry to investigate the issues, however, Balanga and Kaltungo Local areas set up two committees in 2007 and 2008 named, the Joint Peace and Security Committee. The community leader claim that due to reasons best known to the aforementioned Local Government, the submissions of these committees were not implemented.

In a similar development, the Representative of Folo Dadiya AlhDanladiMaina expressed the same view as that of his counterpart from Kaltungo. This claim was

stressed in the Report of Peace Mission to Gombe south, dated 18th-19th April, 2013 led by the His Excellency the former Deputy Governor of Gombe State Mr. Tha'anda Jason Rabainu. The committee observed that the conflict has been occurring for years and no action was taken.

Confirming whether setting of commissions/committees significantly help in managing the protracted conflict between Dadiya and Kaltungo, an interview with E.C.W.A DCC chairman a clergy on 14th July 2015 at 12pm, revealed that setting up commission and committees to a great extent helped in investigating the root causes and also recommended solutions, however the implementation is usually the problem, each time such commissions of inquiry are set up, their investigation end up in the shelve. Setting up commission of inquiry and committees can significantly help in bringing a lasting solution if both state and the local governments can implement it.

When asked if Gombe State Government has initiated peace talks, dialogue/ negotiations and deployed security forces when the conflict erupted, an interview with Mal. Abdullahi Ibrahim a Kaltungo man on 6th August 2015, claimed that despite the protracted nature of the conflict, from 2007-2012, the state government did not initiate peace talk, however, religious bodies organized a peace mission between the two communities, this claim was confirmed at the Report of Committee to Consolidate All Previous committees (2014) that, there was peace efforts by Kaltungo and Dadiya communities, the committee recommended that such initiates be encouraged by the government. With regards to deployment of security forces to manage the conflict, the two community leaders interviewed agreed that, there was prompt deployment of mobile Police to areas affected. Contrary to this opinion, Bar. Maida expressed disappointment at the delay by security operative to the areas of conflict; he averred that the security forces appear after the havoc has been done.

To find out whether the state government determined the status of the disputed farmlands, in an interview with District of Lakweme, the community leader explained that the farmlands are the bone of contention, which both communities tried to settle, but to no avail. In the Joint Peace and Security Committees by Balanga and Kaltungo Areas, the farmlands were named Plot A-G, and in the report the statuses of each plot were determined. No action was taken for reasons best known to the Local governments concerned.

To ascertain whether the protracted conflict was as result of in action and non - implementation of committees recommendation, reveals that, Gombe state government did not set up commission of inquiry until 2013 and 2014 five years after recurring conflict between the two communities, despite the fact that it attracted national attention, where National Security Strategy for the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2011:22&28) described the Dadiya and Kaltungo conflict as Chronic. According to the Representative of Folo Dadiya, inaction on the part of government contributed to the perennial nature of the conflict.

Table 5.4: Responses from Dadiya on Gombe State Government Intervention in Dadiya/Waja Communal Conflict

The Extent of Intervention	Strongly Agree (SA)		Agree (A)		Undecided (UD)		Disagree (D)		Strongly Disagree (SD)		Total	
	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P
(1) The Peace mission and conferences organized by the state govt. helped to restore peace in the communities	16	16.0	23	23.0	7	7.0	26	26.0	28	28.0	100	100
(2) Gombe state government has settled the leadership tussle between Dadiya and Waja communities over the stool of the District Head of Bambam.	16	16.0	36	36.0	13	13.0	19	19.0	16	16.0	100	100
(3) Deploying security forces significantly helped in managing Dadiya and Waja conflict	29	29.0	34	34.0	7	7.0	18	18.0	13	13.0	100	100
(4) The setting up of a judicial commission of inquiry by Gombe State govt. in Dadiya and Waja conflict has settled the conflict	13	13.0	14	14.0	14	14.0	34	34.0	27	27.0	100	100
(5) The non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflict in the understudy areas	23	23.0	33	33.0	14	14.0	14	14.0	16	16.0	100	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

In table 5.4 above, it is evidently clear that majority of sampled respondents representing 31.3% strongly disagreed that the peace mission and conferences organized by the state government helped to restore peace in the communities. In fact, another majority of 28.4% also disagreed with this view point. On the other hand, 14.9% and 25.4% of respondents strongly agreed and agreed respectively to the premise while none of them remained undecided.43.3% of the sampled respondents affirmed that Gombe state government has settled the leadership tussle between Dadiya and Waja communities

over the stool of the District Head of Bambam. This group represents the majority, another 16.4% of respondents strongly agreed. 17.9% and 13.4% disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively while 8.9% were undecided.

The responses also show that 40.3% of respondents representing the majority asserted that deploying security forces significantly helped in managing Dadiya and Waja conflict with 34.3% of respondents also supporting the majority. Meanwhile, 16.5% of respondents disagreed with the assertion and 8.9% strongly disagreed while 7.5% were undecided.

However, 40.3% of respondents representing the majority agreed with the affirmation that the setting up of a judicial commission of inquiry by Gombe State government in Dadiya and Kaltungo conflict has settled the conflict. 34.3% of respondents strongly agreed with this declaration too. Only 16.5% and 8.9% of respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively to the claim. While 0% were undecided.

Meanwhile, majority of respondents representing 40.3% strongly agreed with the assertion that the non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflict in the understudy area. 25.4% of respondents also agreed with this position. 10.5% were undecided while 10.5% and 13.4% of respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively with the claims.

Table 5.4.1: Responses from Waja on Gombe State Government Intervention in Dadiya/Waja Communal Conflict

The Extent of Intervention	Strongly Agree (SA)		Agree (A)		Undecided (UD)		Disagree (D)		Strongly Disagree (SD)		Total	
	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P
(1) The Peace mission and conferences organized by the state govt. helped to restore peace in the communities	15	15.0	23	23.0	7	7.0	27	27.0	28	28.0	100	100
(2) Gombe state government has settled the leadership tussle between Dadiya and Waja communities over the stool of the District Head of Bambam.	15	15.0	18	18.0	14	14.0	25	25.0	28	28.0	100	100
(3) The setting up of a judicial commission of inquiry by Gombe State govt. in Dadiya and Waja conflict has settled the conflict	27	27.0	27	27.0	8	8.0	26	26.0	10	10.0	100	100
(4) Deploying security forces significantly helped in managing Dadiya and Waja conflict	17	17.0	19	19.0	13	13.0	25	25.0	26	26.0	100	100
(5) The non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflict in the understudy areas	21	21.0	25	25.0	18	18.0	18	18.0	18	18.0	100	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

In table 5.4.1 above, it is evidently clear that majority of sampled respondents representing 31.3% strongly disagreed that the peace mission and conferences organized by the state government helped to restore peace in the communities. In fact, another majority of 28.4% also disagreed with this view point. On the other hand, 14.3% and 20.9% of respondents strongly agreed and agreed respectively to the premise while none of them remained undecided.

However, 30.2% of the sampled respondents strongly disagreed that Gombe state government has settled the leadership tussle between Dadiya and Waja communities over the stool of the District Head of Bambam. This group represents the majority, another 26.9% of respondents disagreed. 14.3% and 17.5% strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively while 11.1% were undecided.

The responses also show that 34.3% of respondents representing the majority asserted that deploying security forces significantly helped in managing Dadiya and Waja conflict with 30.2% of respondents also supporting the majority. Meanwhile, 28.6% of respondents disagreed with the assertion and 4.8% strongly disagreed while none of the respondents remained undecided.

However, 36.5% of respondents representing the majority strongly agreed with the affirmation that the setting up of a commission of inquiry by Gombe State government in Dadiya and Waja conflict has settled the conflict. 30.2% of respondents agreed with this declaration too. Only 28.6% and 4.8% of respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively to the claim. While 0% were undecided.

Meanwhile, majority of respondents representing 26.9% agreed with the assertion that the non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflict in the understudy area. This is supported by 20.6% of respondents who

strongly agreed with this position. 17.5% were undecided while 17.5% and 17.5% of respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively with the claims.

Interview Report on Dadiya-Waja Communal Conflict

In an interview with the District Head of Bambam a Waja man, on the 27th of July, 2013, revealed that, the Gombe state government intervened by setting up a peace mission committee, not a judicial commission of inquiry, this committee chaired by His Excellency the Deputy Governor of Gombe state helped in bringing the conflicting parties to settle their differences. To ascertain whether the recommendation of the committee was implemented, a mixed reaction revelation was discovered, while the community leader from Waja claims that the problem is solved, the Representative of Folo Dadiya claim otherwise, that, the peace mission committee was just a propaganda.

In terms of deployment of security forces, both sides agreed that, the security forces acted promptly and brought the situation under control. As in the case of the earlier discussed conflict in the area, there was a community based initiative under the leadership Godwin Gayus, to ensure collaboration between the two communities.

Interview Report: Special Services, Political and Chieftaincy Affairs Bureau

In an interview with the administrative officer on 30th August, 2015 the officer revealed that, the Gombe state government intervened by employing the following means:

- Prompt deployment of security forces to the conflict areas whenever conflict erupted.
- Increased police units in the all the affected areas.
- Provided relief materials to the victims.

- Directed the stoppage of farming activities at the disputed sites between Kaltungo and Dadiya communities and
- Setting up committees/ judicial commissions

Confirming, whether the strategies adopted brought about the desired result, the officer claimed that in the case of Dadiya-Tula and Dadiya-Waja conflicts, the strategies helped in managing the conflict. However, he admitted that in the case of the Dadiya-Kaltungo conflict government has not been able to handle it, because all measured taken proved abortive.

To ascertain whether non- implementation of the recommendations of these committees and judicial commission is/was responsible for the perennial conflict, the administrative officers claimed that government alone cannot enforce peace; sustainable peace can only be achieved if people do not take laws into their hands. Citing the Dadiya-Kaltungo conflict as an example, government observed that the sources of recurrent conflict are farmlands identified as Plots A-G. The local government concerned determined their statuses and directed aggrieved persons to take the matter to the court, however, this directives was not adhered to as both communities use unethical means to express their grievances.

Similarities and Dissimilarities among the Understudies Areas

It is important to highlight areas of dichotomy and convergence, discovered from the above analysis. There are three communal conflict analyzed in this study, the Dadiya-Tula 2006, Dadiya-Kaltungo 2007-20012 and Dadiya-Waja 2013, it was observed that in the case of the Dadiya-Tula conflict in 2006, the was a prompt action taken after normalcy was restored, a judicial commission of inquiry was set up, to investigate the matter, which to a great extent manage the inherent tension between the communities,

although the commission extensively carryout the work, its observations and recommendation is yet to be implemented. The inability of the Gombe state government to implement the recommendations submitted to it has generated, suspicion and lack of trust between the two communities, which contributed to a great extent to the development of subsequent conflict in the areas.

In a sharp distinction, with the above situation is the case of Dadiya- Kaltungo communal conflict, this conflict as the study revealed, started in 2007 after the Dadiya-Tula conflict, the Gombe state government was conspicuously insensitive to a conflict of this magnitude, the local government concerned had handle the matter for four years before the State government decided to act. As usual security forces were deployed to quell the conflict each time it erupts, the Local governments concern that is Balanga and Kaltungo local governments set up two committees to look into the matter, as the case always, the reports end up on shelves without any actions. An interesting development is the community based/ faith initiative to resolve the conflict, which is positively on-going.

The case of Dadiya- Waja conflict is a clear indication of power struggle between the two communities, the state government through it peace mission committee of 2013, investigated the matter. However as the case with the aforementioned conflict, the submission of the committee is yet to be implemented, this claim is supported by the overwhelming respondents view of non- implementation of the panels reports.

5.3 Test of Hypotheses

As earlier stated in the methodology aspect, that the operation of Chi-square (X^2) distribution was carried out using the SPSS version 20.0 in testing the hypotheses postulated for this study.

5.3.1 Test of Hypothesis One

The null (H_0) to be tested states that: "the protracted conflicts in Gombe state are not as a result of government non-implementation of commission's recommendations". The independent variable is `non-implementation of commission's recommendations` while the dependent variable is `protracted conflicts`. The study wants to see how independent variable affects the dependent variable.

For the purpose of performing operation of Chi-square (X^2) on the computer for the hypothesis, responses from respondents in table 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4; question 6 for independent and question 5 for dependent variable were coded in the computer using SPSS package to produce the cross-tabulated output presented in table 5.5 below:

Table 5.5 Protracted conflict in Gombe state (Depended Variable) * Non-implementation of commission recommendations (Independed Variable) Cross-tabulation

			Non-implementation of commission recommendations (Independent Variable)					Total
			Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Protracted conflict in Gombe state (Dependent Variable)	Undecided	Count	32_a	0_b	0_b	0_b	0_b	32
		Expected Count	3.0	6.1	5.3	8.0	9.7	32.0
	Disagree	Count	5_a	76_b	59_c	0_d	0_d	140
		Expected Count	13.0	26.6	23.1	35.0	42.4	140.0
	Strongly Disagree	Count	0_a	0_a	7_b	100_c	1_a	108
		Expected Count	10.0	20.5	17.8	27.0	32.7	108.0
	Agree	Count	0_a	0_a	0_a	0_a	75_b	75
		Expected Count	6.9	14.3	12.4	18.8	22.7	75.0
	Strongly Agree	Count	0_a	0_a	0_a	0_a	45_b	45
		Expected Count	4.2	8.6	7.4	11.3	13.6	45.0
Total		Count	37	76	66	100	121	400
		Expected Count	37.0	76.0	66.0	100.0	121.0	400.0

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Non-implementation of commission recommendations (Independent Variable) categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

Source: SPSS Version 20.0, (2015)

Using the cross tabulated values the computer produced the following Chi-square (X^2) output presented on table 5.6 for testing hypothesis one.

Table 5.6 Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)			Monte Carlo Sig. (1-sided)		
				Sig.	95% Confidence Interval		Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Pearson Chi-Square	1085.557[a]	16	.000	.000[b]	.000	.007			
Likelihood Ratio	941.834	16	.000	.000[b]	.000	.007			
Fisher's Exact Test	876.855			.000[b]	.000	.007			
Linear-by-Linear Association	339.945[c]	1	.000	.000[b]	.000	.007	.000[b]	.000	.007
N of Valid Cases	400								

a. 2 cells (8.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.96.

b. Based on 400 sampled tables with starting seed 2000000.

c. The standardized statistic is 18.438.

Source: SPSS Version 20.0 output, (2015)

From the Chi-square output on table 5.6 above, hypothesis testing procedures are as follows:-

Chi-square calculated value is the person chi square value which is = 1085.557[a]

Degree of freedom (df) = 16

Level of significance (α) = 0.05.

Critical or tabulated value at 16 df and α value of 0.05 = 26.296

Decision Rule

The researcher decision rule in this study is to accept the null (H_0) if the X^2 calculated value is less than critical (tabulated) X^2 value if otherwise rejected.

Comparison

Comparing the chi-square computed value of 1085.557[a]with chi-square critical (tabulated) value of 26.296 it is clear that the X^2 calculated value is greater than the X^2 tabulated value. As such, wereject the null hypothesis (H_0) and the accept hypothesis (H_1).

Conclusion

Because the null hypothesis (H_0) is rejected in favour of the alternate hypothesis (H_1), it could be concluded therefore that the protracted conflicts in Gombe state are as a result of government non-implementation of commission's recommendations.

This further proved thatthe non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflicts in Gombe state.

This findings in respect of this hypothesis agreed with findings of Jude (2013), in his study on Tiv-Jukun protracted conflict that, the major challenge with government intervention is that, panel's reports are usually shelved and are not acted upon, which contributed to the perennial nature of the conflict. Similarly, in the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (2014), also observed that, commissions, committees and panels are strategies often employed in managing conflict in Nigeria, but most often reports are never made public and their recommendations hardly implemented. In the same vein, the report of the committee to consolidate the recommendation of all previous committees, (2014) revealed that, Gombe state government most of these commission's recommendations were not implemented. This is why Azar,(1990:9) averred that, when government capacity is limited by rigid and fragile authority is not capable of responding to the needs of the people, its critical role of managing conflict is undermined, any government that fails to satisfy the basic needs in terms security timely is incompetent.

The implication is failure to address these grievances by the government cultivates a niche for protracted social conflict.

5.5.2 Test of Hypothesis Two

The null (H_0) to be tested states that: "the strategies adopted by Gombe state government are not suitable for the management of the conflict in the understudied areas". The independent variable is `strategies adopted` while the dependent variable is `management of the conflict`. The study wants to see how independent variable affects the dependent variable.

For the purpose of performing operation of Chi-square (X^2) on the computer for the hypothesis, responses from respondents in table 5.2,5.3, and 5.4; question 2 for independent and question 5for dependent variable (management of the conflict) were coded in the computer using SPSS package to produce the cross-tabulated output presented in table 5.7 below:

Table 5.7 Management of conflict (Dependent Variable) * Strategies Adopted (Independent Variable) Cross-tabulation

			Strategies Adopted (Independent Variable)					Total
			Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Management of conflict (Dependent Variable)	Undecided	Count	30_a	2_b	0_b	0_b	0_b	32
		Expected Count	2.4	13.0	10.4	3.4	2.8	32.0
	Disagree	Count	0_a	140_b	0_a	0_a	0_a	140
		Expected Count	10.5	56.7	45.5	15.1	12.3	140.0
	Strongly Disagree	Count	0_a	20_b	88_c	0_a	0_a	108
		Expected Count	8.1	43.7	35.1	11.6	9.5	108.0
	Agree	Count	0_a	0_a	42_b	33_c	0_a	75
		Expected Count	5.6	30.4	24.4	8.1	6.6	75.0
	Strongly Agree	Count	0_a	0_a	0_a	10_b	35_c	45
		Expected Count	3.4	18.2	14.6	4.8	3.9	45.0
Total		Count	30	162	130	43	35	400
		Expected Count	30.0	162.0	130.0	43.0	35.0	400.0

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Strategies Adopted (Independent Variable) categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

Source: SPSS Version 20.0 output, (2015)

Using the cross tabulated values the computer produced the following chi-square output presented on table 5.8 for testing hypothesis two

Table 5.8Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)			Monte Carlo Sig. (1-sided)		
				Sig.	95% Confidence Interval		Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Pearson Chi-Square	1089.981[a]	16	.000	.000[b]	.000	.007			
Likelihood Ratio	833.797	16	.000	.000[b]	.000	.007			
Fisher's Exact Test	774.446			.000[b]	.000	.007			
Linear-by-Linear Association	351.762[c]	1	.000	.000[b]	.000	.007	.000[b]	.000	.007
N of Valid Cases	400								

a. 6 cells (24.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.40.
b. Based on 400 sampled tables with starting seed 421262687.
c. The standardized statistic is 18.755.

Source: SPSS Version 20.0 output, (2015)

From the chi-square output on table 5.8 above, hypothesis testing procedures is as follows:-

Chi-square calculated value is the person chi square value which is = 1089.981^a

Degree of freedom (df) = 16

Level of significance (α) = 0.05.

Critical or tabulated value at 16 df and α value of 0.05 = 26.296

Decision Rule

The researcher decision rule in this study is to accept the null (H_0) if the X^2 calculated value is less than critical (tabulated) X^2 value if otherwise rejected.

Comparison

Comparing the chi-square computed value of 1089.981[a] with chi-square critical (tabulated) value of 26.296 it is clear that the X^2 calculated value is greater than the X^2 tabulated value. As such, we reject the null hypothesis (H_0) and accept the alternate hypothesis (H_1).

Conclusion

Because the null hypothesis (H_0) is rejected in favour of the alternate hypothesis (H_1), it could be concluded, therefore, that the strategies adopted by Gombe state government are not suitable for the management of the conflict in the understudied areas.

This further implies that the current strategies of setting up judicial commission of inquiry, deployment of security forces and the engagement of peace talks by Gombe state government are not suitable for the management of conflict in the understudied areas.

The findings in respect to this hypothesis agreed with the findings of the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (2014) that, in all cases of conflict in Nigeria, there is a strong tendency for government to deploy security forces (police and military), this turned the police and military into critical institution for maintenance of peace in Nigeria.

However, this strategy of managing conflict is often marred with some abnormalities, from the interview source, the District Head of Tula confirms this claims that, in the Dadiya- Tula conflict in 2006, the security forces deployed took side in the conflict. Similarly, Kwaja as cited in the Nigeria Stability and reconciliation Programme (2014) noted that, in the Plateau country side since 2010, the perpetrators of violence were able to make head way because the security forces not only fail to share intelligence among them, but were also suspected of taking side in the conflict.

In the same vein, from the interview response, the District of Head Lakweme expressed that, the security forces only suppress the tension, without tackling the root cause of the problem. This also, confirms earlier assertion by Isa, (2001) that, the institutional responses by the state or its agencies emphasize conflict suppression instead of conflict management.

While, setting up commissions, as seen from both primary and secondary sources is not an effective strategy of managing conflict in the understudy area, for example, in the Report of the committee to consolidate all previous committees (2014) noted that, six commissions/ committees were set up, but most of the submissions and recommendations are not implemented. This is what the Nigeria stability and reconciliation programme (2014) observed as creating an impression that something is being done when in fact very little effort is being made. Also, from primary and secondary sources, the study revealed that, there was an unofficial efforts at peace resolution, these effort as reported by the Report of Committee to consolidate All Previous committees recommendations (2014), are the Kaltungo DCC peace effort, aim at addressing the pending Farmlands dispute between Kaltungo and Dadiya and the Godwin Gayus peace effort to tackle the Dadiya-Waja Leadership tussles, both are on-going.

5.4 Summary of Major Findings

From the data analyzed, the study has come up with the following major findings:

i. Perpetrators of conflict in Dadiya-Tula communal conflict are known as indicated in the reports of the Judicial CommissionInquiry however; they didn't face the wrath of the Law.

ii. The study found out that, there is a growingtension between the communities that is, the conflict between Dadiya-Tula as evident during interview

responses as well as the Judicial commissions' inquiry report, indicated that, if the underlying issues are not tackled conflicts may reoccur in the next census exercise.

iii. Gombe state government inadequately utilized peace talks as strategy for managing the communal conflicts in the understudied areas. As evident from both questionnaire and interview responses that, an overwhelming number disagreed with the fact that, Gombe state government initiated peace conferences/ meetings for the communities, which prompted faith based and community based organizations to organize meeting between the communities.

iv. The study found out that, the recommendations of the Judicial commission of inquiry set up in 2006 and committees' set-up by Balanga and Kaltungo local governments were not implemented.

v. The study discovered that, the recommendations of the committees' set up by Gombe to determine the status of the disputed farmlands between Dadiya/Kaltungo tagged Plots A-G were not implemented.

vi. It also found out that, the communal conflict between Dadiya/Kaltungo started in 2007, the Gombe state government only intervenes by setting a committee in 2013.

vii. The peace mission committee recommendation on the rotation of district head of Bambam among communities was not implemented.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Summary

The study, State intervention and Communal conflict in Gombe state was undertaken in three conflict sites, consisting of Dadiya-Tula, Dadiya-Kaltungo and Dadiya-Waja communities.

The introductory chapter provides a critical background to the study from the communal conflictexperienced across Nigeria, we observe that several violent eruptions of religious, ethnic, political and most importantly communal conflict arise from time to time. It also examines the problem of the study- the challenge of managing communal conflicts in Gombe state and its attendant consequence on social, psychological, political and economic sphere which became a matter of public concern. It focuses on the strategies adopted by the state government in managing the conflicts.

The study attempts to find out what was responsible for the perennial nature of the conflict. The second research question seeks to find out what are the factors militating against the current strategies adopted by the Gombe state government, and also tried to find out suitability of the strategies.

The research question therefore motivates us to set out objectives in the following:

i. To determine whether the perennial nature of the conflict is as a result of non-implementation of commission's recommendations.

ii. To identify factors militating against current strategies adopted by Gombe state government.

iii. To identify suitable strategies that can be adopted to bring about lasting solution to the problem.

Having set our objectives, we frame our hypotheses:

i. That, the constant conflicts in the understudied areas are not as a result of non-implementation of commission's recommendations.

ii. That, the current strategies adopted by Gombe state are not suitable for the management of conflicts in the understudied areas.

The study proceeded to define the scope of the study, which consist of Dadiya, Tula, Kaltungo and Waja communities of Balanga and Kaltungo local government areas in Gombe state. The study covered the period of 2006-2013 and was limited to assessing state intervention and communal conflict in Gombe state. The significance of this study to research and policy makers was stressed.

The literature and empirical studies related to this study were critically reviewed in the second chapter. It also anchors it here with a theoretical framework of analysis. First it explores the conceptual clarification, and attempts a better understanding on the meaning of the concept of conflict, communal conflict, protracted conflict and state intervention. Conflict as identified by most scholarly works is seen as friction, disagreement, struggle and contestation in pursuit of values, claims, power and resources. What is clear is that, conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction.

The review also looked at state intervention, where scholars identified two major ways of responding to communal conflict in Nigeria, the strategies includes coercive and judicial strategies. The Protracted Social Conflict by Edward Azar(1990) was adopted as a framework for the study, which explains an on-going and seemingly irresolvable conflict. The theory consists of four elements namely: communal content, deprivation of human needs, governance or state roles and international linkages. The study adopted three of the elements which explain the subject matter.

The third chapter is exclusively devoted to methodology, it elaborates the research design which was mainly survey research design, consist of the use of questionnaire administered to the understudied communities and interviews were conducted for the staff of the Special Services, Political and chieftaincy Affairs Bureau and purposively selected members of the communities. The total population of the study is 76,991, a sample size of 520, sample size wasderived using the Yamane formula.

Chapter four covers historical background of communal conflict in Nigeria as well as the study areas and also shows the location of the study area.The fifth chapter clearly presents data from the field, representing the views of the respondents presented in tables and analyzed using frequencies and percentages. The views of the respondents were also complemented with secondary data. From the data analyzed, the study revealed that, the perennial nature of the conflict in the understudied areas is as a result of government inaction and lack of implementation of the recommendations of panel's reports. While the strategies employed succeeds only in suppressing tension without tackling the root causes of the conflict, which contributed to the inability of the state government to maintain the conflict and sustain peace in the under studied communities.

6.2 Conclusion

From the data analyzed as well as the hypotheses tested, the study concluded that the conflicts bedeviling the understudied communities are as a result of inability of the government to implement the recommendations of the commissions of inquiry and committees reports, such recommendations includes: clearly demarcating the boundary between Dadiya and Tula communities, prosecute persons or groups found to have led or contributed to the conflict, determine the status of farmlands and settle the dispute between Dadiya-Kaltungo communities and also settle the leadership tussle between the Dadiya-Waja communities. Meanwhile the strategies employed in the management of the

conflict, which is deployment of security forces, initiation of peace talks and setting up Judicial Commission of Inquiry/ committees and panels did not effectively manage the conflict in the understudied communities.

This strategy fails to bring about the desired result because it was marred by abnormalities such as delay in deployment of security forces, taking sides with a conflict party. This was also noted by Nigeria Stability and reconciliation Programme (2014) that, in the Plateau country side since 2010, the perpetrators of violence were able to make head way because the security forces not only fail to share intelligence among them, but were also suspected of taking side in the conflict.

Furthermore, this strategy is known for conflict suppression rather than conflict management as lucidly explained byIsa, (2001) that, the institutional responses by the state or its agencies emphasize conflict suppression instead of conflict management. While setting Judicial Commissions, committee's and panel has become a tradition where it reports and recommendations are shelved. This is what the Nigeria stability and reconciliation Programme(2014), observes as creating an impression that something is being done when in fact very little effort is being made. The study concludes that in term of peace talks, Gombe state government left much to be desired as faith based organizations and traditional institutions were left to organize meeting and initiate peace talks.

6.3 Recommendations

In view of the findings and conclusions made in this study, the following recommendations have been made.

i. Gombe state government should show greater commitment in the discharge of its primary role of guaranteeing security of it people by implementing the

submissions and recommendations of the various committees and commissions of inquiry to prevent future occurrence of this phenomena.

ii. Gombe state government should determine the status of farmlands(plot A-G) in dispute so as to solve the protracted conflict between Dadiya and Kaltungo communities.

iii. The Gombe state Gombe should ensure a rotational system of the title of District Head of Bambam to mitigate acrimony in inter-group relation. This will put an end to the allegation of the domination of particular communal group. It is important that to note that this rotation should be gazette so that no community can manipulate or ignore the rotation.

iv. Gombe state government should employ a holistic approach that encompasses conflict prevention, management and resolution, which will ensure early warning mechanism.

v. Gombe state Government should adequately utilize peace talks as a strategy for the management of communal conflict in the understudied areas.

vi. There is need for the communities to embrace peace and peaceful expression of their grievances, a change in their attitude towards situations considered unfavourable can go a long way in ensuring the maintenance of peace in the communities.

6.4 Suggestion for Further Study

An assessment of Governmental Institutions and Non-governmental Organization in the Management of Communal Conflict in Gombe state.

State Emergency Management Agency and the management of Internally Displaced Persons in Gombe State.

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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction

I am a postgraduate student of the Department of Public Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria currently conducting a research on the topic "State Intervention and Communal Conflict in Gombe State (2006-2013)". With the aim of assessing Gombe State Government intervention in the management of Dadiya/Tula, Dadiya / Kaltungo and Dadiya / Waja communal conflicts.

This questionnaire is therefore only meant for academic exercise to obtain information required for analysis. Information given will be used solely for the purpose of this research and will be treated confidentially.

Thank you for the anticipated cooperation.

Yours faithfully,

Ruth MeleJoshua

APPENDIX B

General guidelines for the survey

1. In the questions, you are required to tick [ ] your answers in the space provided.
2. We would appreciate your honest and complete response to help us understand your views.

   We would like to re-assure you that the information you give will be treated confidentially.

   A: Respondent Profile

1. Gender: Male ( ) Female ( )
2. Age: 18-30 ( ) 31-40 ( )41-50 ( )50 and above ( )
3. Marital Status: Single ( )Married ( ) Widow ( )
4. Educational Qualification
   i. Tertiary institutions
   ii. Secondary school
   iii. Primary school
   iv. None

Part B

Please tick [ ]in the space provided, on the option most suitable

SA= strongly agree

A= agree

UD=undecided

D=disagree

SD= strongly disagree

A. Questionnaire for the Dadiya and Kaltungo Communities

S/N	Statement	SA	A	UD	D	SD
1.	Gombe state government intervened in Dadiya and Kaltungo by setting up judicial commission of inquiry.					
2.	The setting up of the Judicial commissions or committees significantly helped in managing the communal conflict.					
3.	Gombe state government facilitated peace talks between Dadiya and Kaltungo communities.					
4.	The deployment of security forces helped to manage the conflict.					
5.	Gombe state government has intervened by ascertaining the status of the farmland and relocating the displaced persons in Dadiya and Kaltungo communities.					
6.	The intervention by Gombe state government or its agencies is not responsible for the protracted nature of conflict between the Dadiya and Kaltungo communities.					

Questionnaire for Dadiya and Tula Communities

S/N	Statement	SA	A	UD	D	SD
1.	The prompt response to conflict between the Dadiya and Tula communities by setting up judicial commission of inquiry helped in managing the conflict.					
2.	Gombe state government has implemented the recommendations of the commission by demarcating boundary between Dadiya and Tula communities.					
3.	Deploying security forces significantly helped in managing Dadiya and Tula conflict.					
4.	Gombe state government or its agencies facilitated peace talks between Dadiya and Tula communities.					
5.	The non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflict in Dadiya and Tula communities					

Questionnaire for Dadiya and Waja Communities.

S/N	Statement	SA	A	UD	D	SD
1.	The peace mission and conferences organized by the state government helped to restore peace in the communities.					
2.	Gombe state government has settled the leadership tussle between Dadiya and Waja communities over the stool of the District Head of Bambam.					
3.	Deploying security forces significantly helped in managing Dadiya and Waja conflict.					
4.	Gombe state government facilitated peace talks between Dadiya and Waja communities.					
5.	The non-implementation of the commission's recommendation is responsible for the protracted conflict in Dadiya and Tula communities					

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE SPECIAL SERVICES, POLITICAL AND CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS BUREAU.

1. In what ways did the state government intervene in the management of the communal conflict in the understudied areas?
2. What are the strategies adopted by Gombe state government to ensure stability in the areas.
3. Why did the state government adopt these strategies?
4. Are these strategies effective in the management of the conflict?
5. What other means did the state government employ in managing the perennial conflict?

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR DADIYA, TULA, KALTUNGO AND WAJA COMMUNITIES.

1. Did Gombe state government intervened in the conflict in your community by setting up judicial commission of inquiry/committees?
2. Has the setting up of commissions and committees help in managing the conflict in your community.
3. Did the Gombe state government facilitate peace talks in your community?
4. Did the deployment of security forces help in managing the conflict in community?
5. What other means did the Gombe state government employ in the management of the conflict in your community?
6. In your opinion what is will bring lasting solution to the conflict in your community?

APENDIX E

List of Communal Conflicts Across the Country.

Location	Status of the Conflict	Cause of the Conflict	Capabilities Employed
Jos	Chronic	Retaliation/violent competition over resources.	The use of machetes, improvised explosive have been recently introduced**.**
Ezza-Ezzilo (Ebonyi State)	Latent	Competition between PDP leaders in the state**.**	Use of machetes, burning homes and property and stockpiling of firearms.
Niger-Delta	Chronic	Complex web of inter and intra-communal violence	The Niger-Delter is awashed with fire arms.
Ebiraland(Kogi State)	Chronic	Politically motivated violence.	Property belonging to political opponent destroyed, and masquerades are used to terrorise civilians
Abini Town, Jukun v Tiv(Benue State)	Relapsing and remitting	Ongoing conflict between the Tiv and Jukun	There is/was a through arm market in Abinsi town
Kastina-Ala (Benue State)	Chronic	Insurgency	A group led by TerwaseAkwaza has set up a colony in Katsina-Ala, attemps by the police to dismantle it resulted in a violent reprisals.
NtanObu (Rivers State)	Dormant	Dispute over landownership.	Destruction of the entire village of NtanObu.
Mokwa and Larvu (Niger State)	Chronic	Dispute over ownership of a fish pond.	Killings affected by fire arms.
Ugambe and Mbaiase (Benue State)	Chronic	Boundary dispute.	Killing and destruction on both sides.
Dadiya v Kaltungo **(Gombe State)**	**Chronic**	**Dispute over farmlands.**	**Forced displacement**
Kunini Community (Taraba State)	Dormant	Dispute over distribution of chieftaincy.	Forced displacement and destruction of properties.
Achincha Village (Benue State)	Chronic	Conflict between pastoralist and herdsmen.	Killings and destruction on both sides.

Source: National Security Strategy for the Federal Republic of Nigeria, (2011:22).