A HISTORY OF CLASS FORMATION IN THE PLATEAU PROVINCE 1902 - I960: THE GENESIS OP A RULING CLASS.

BY

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July, 1932

D E C L A R A T I O N

I hereby declare that this Thesis is the product of my own research and has been written by me. It has not been presented for higher degree in any other University. All quotations have been acknowledged and distinguished by footnotes and quotation marks.

M.Y. MANGVWAT.

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A B B R E V I A T I O N S

ARNN	=	Annual Reports of Northern Nigeria.
ABU	=	Ahmadu Bello University
AG	=	Action Group
FHR	=	Federal House of Representatives
KIL	=	Kashim Ibrahim Library (the Main Library of the Ahmadu Bello University).
CMS	=	Church Missionary Society.
CUMP	=	Cambridge University Mission Party - a branch of the Church Missionary Party.
MHA	=	Member, House of Assembly.
MZL	=	Middle Zone League.
NAK	=	National Archives Kaduna.
NCNC	=	National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon.
NEPU	=	Northern Elements Progressive Union.
NPC	=	Northern Peoples Congress.
RCM	=	Roman Catholic Mission.
SIM	=	Sudan Interior Mission.
SUM	=	Sudan United Mission.
UMBC	=	United Middle Belt Congress.

A B S T R A C T

This thesis traces and analyses the historical processes of class formation in the Plateau province under colonial rule in an attempt to locate the genesis of the present ruling classes and the structure of current political attitudes and contestations in that region. We argue that three major colonial institutions, in addition to the colonial economy, were chiefly responsible for the distortion and deformation of the precolonial social classes as well as for the creation of new classes which, in due course, assumed positions of dominance in the politics of the Plateau colonial province. The thr institutions whith we identify and discuss are the native authority, colonial education and the christian missions and the churches which they founded. We demonstrate that these were amongst others, institutions concerned with the establishment of colonial social order and control but were also crucial in servising colonial economic exploi-tation,a process which further intensified the formation of classes in the province. We thus show that in its selective use of African agents to serve on institutions of social control and economic exploitation in the new social order which it established, coloni capitalism groomed a crop of Nigerians which over the period of colonial tutelage, developed into petty beurgois

and proto-ruling classes in that region.

We then proceed to demonstrate that the decolonisation processes of the mid 1940s and the decade of the 1950 provided for the commencement of petty bourgeois politics through which these proto-ruling classes, by sheer political opportunism, consolidated and entrenched their own positions as 'leaders' of the Plateau masses whose collectively interest, as the working peoples of the province, the former subordinated and stifled in favour of their own interests as local ruling classes up to and after independence.

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

This thesis is the product of my interest in capitalist exploitation which arose, in 1978, from my study of Contemporary World History, a course which, amongst others, the history department of this university offers at the graduate level and one which I offered. I found this course extremely useful and rewarding in terms of perceiving capitalism; its historical origins, development and rise to world dominance, the inherent contradictions within it and the historical implications of this for now and for the future.

It was at this stage of my intellectual development that I firmly grasped the full implications of the materialist conception of history and the methodology which logically flows from this philosophy. It was also at this time that I came to grips with the fact that historical reality is a dynamic contradictory relationship; that in every age and in every society there have always existed two antagonistic and conflicting cultures - the culture of the ruling classes on the one hand, and the culture of the oppressed classes on the other. And that the dynamics of historical reality is the unity-in-conflict of these two cultures. It is through this perspective that I have examined class formation in the Plateau province under colonial rule. If this study throws more light on the historical developments of the

Jos Plateau region in the period covered than similar attempts hitherto, the credit for this should go to all those who led me into discovering the potency of historical materialism as a tool of explaining historical reality whether directly or through books.

I would, however, like to specifically thank, at least, certain people whose contribution to this study must be noted here as a matter of academic courtesy. These include, amongst others, Professor A.J. Temu, my supervisor, whose experienced handling kept out all forms of frustrations from my way throughout the six years of work on this project. His criticisms of the drafts of the work were sometimes very severe and incisive but, at the same time, still kept my interest high. His frequent discussions with me and some of his recommended literature for my consultation helped to sharpen my ideas on many of the issues which the thesis discusses. Above all, the personal concern for and pride in the work, which the Professor constantly showed, were an immense source of inspiration for me. Besides these, I had free and unlimited access to Professor Temu both in his office and in his residence where I was always warmly welcomed by both himself and members of his family alike.

I am also greatly indebted to Dr. Y.B. Usman who assisted me in the initial conception of the thesis. He helped in shaping the topic of the thesis and, in this regard, he offered a written critique of my original formulation and proposal. I must, in addition, emphasise that it was Dr. Usman's handling of the post-graduate course on Contemporary World History, in particular, which pushed me in the direction of marxism for which I remain grateful.

I would also like to thank Dr. B. Swai of this department for his inspiring comments. For although he was not my supervisor, he maintained an interest in my work and read some of the drafts. This kept my morale high inspite of the length of time involved.

I must also register my sincere gratitude to the Department of History, especially under the headship of Dr. Y.B. Usman, for employing me as a staff-in-training through the Graduate Assistance programme of the Ahmadu Bello University which made me teach and yet sponsored me, with funds from the University Board of Research, to undertake postgraduate research to this level. Similarly, I would like to thank successive Plateau State Governments for the two scholarship awards (M.A. and later Ph.D.) which they gave me through the Plateau State Scholarship Board. These awards made it possible for me to cover the frequent travelling and lodging expenses

including photocopying materials and feeding during my stay at the National Archives Kaduna and in the field.

Finally, I would like to thank all those who helped me in one way or another in the execution of this research project who are too numerous to be mentioned individually both in the department and in the field, especially, between May and December 1979 when the bulk of the field-work was conducted. I only wish to risk the specific mention of Mr. Martin Obayemi, the history departmental secretary, who, with patience and forbearance, typed all the drafts and the final copy, after working hours, often at very meagre stipends. These various contributions have made the thesis what it is.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the assistance which I received from the various individuals and institutions acknowledged above, this thesis is entirely the product of my research and I take full responsibility for the views, assertions and shortcomings contained in it.

JUNE, 1984.

P R E F A C E

To date, Nigerian historiography is still rooted in colonial and neocolonial ideologies. For inspite of the apparent advances and achievements of past and current researches, studies and writings on Nigerian history, the concept of class and class analysis is yet to receive its overdue attention. Yet, there are talks of transforming the Nigerian society for the better. This is an irony.

Nigeria is a neocolonial society and the dominant ideas and explanations offered about its history dialectically reflect this neocolonial status. Admittedly, Nigerian historians and academics, in general have, to their credit, moved away from the preoccupation of proving that Nigeria had a history - a history capable of and one that is worth indepth scholarly study - to a preoccupation of studying history for nation building.[1]

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1. See, Professor Akinjogbin, I.A. "History and Nation Building." Inaugural Lecture University of Ife, 22nd Nov. 1977; Professor Dike, K.O. "African History Twenty Five Years Ago And Today" Keynote Address: Nigerian Historical Society Silver Jubilee 29th Sept. 1980, Ibadan; Professor Afigbo, A.E. "Some Thoughts on the Teaching of History in Nigeria" (occasion not indicated); Professor Ifemesia, C. "Current Demands of African Historiography: The Igbo Example" Paper Presented at the Silver Jubilee Anniversary of the Historical Society of Nigeria. Ibadan, 26th Sept. - 3rd Oct. 1980; Professor Ayandele, E.A. "The Task Before Nigerian Historians Today" Keynote Address: Annual Conference of the Historical Society of Nigeria. Calabar, 5th April 1979; Professor Temu, A.J. and Dr. Swai, B. "History for Development". Paper presented at the Nigerian Political Science Conference. Kano, 13th - 15th April, 1981.

But the nation which is to be built, however, retains all the socio-economic structures, institutions and classes which colonial capitalism created. Indeed, the dominant concept of development in Nigeria is one that is dedicated to a consolidation, expansion and advancement of these structures, institutions and classes. Inevitably, this concept of development also retains the contradictions and conflicts of a neocolonial social formation. For no system of justice can justly defend a situation where only 5% of its population enjoy over 90% of its total wealth which is created by over 90% of its working population who are forced to scramble over the remaining 10% of the wealth of the nation which their collective labour has created in the first instance.[2] The apparent contradictions pregnant in such a society and the social conflict to which it gives rise are capable of producing upheavals in which the toiling masses violently and, with justification, overthrow the neocolonial ruling classes and usher in a new concept of development and era in Nigerian history.

A historical analysis based on the class concept has the potency of exposing these contradictions and paving the way for the working masses - the real makers

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2. This is a hypothetical description which reflects the Nigerian reality.

of history in any historical epoch - to take control of state power and decide their own destiny. Unfortunately, the Nigerian professional historian and scholar, who is himself a petty bourgeoisie and, therefore, a beneficiary of the neocolonial situation, is caught up in this contradiction. For he fears to adapt marxism and the class analysis because the logical consequences of such an approach inevitably lead to committing a class suicide and giving up the social and material benefits which he enjoys under the status quo. For in the final analysis, we must emphasise, history is a study of change for change. The historian may either take sides with history or betray it, but there is no middle course.

Therefore, this thesis, which employs the marxist concept of history, focuses on class formation and politics on the Jos Plateau region, is a modest attempt to contribute, not only to the study and writing of Nigerian history in general, but also to an exposition of the fundamental and less fundamental contradictions of that society, its contending classes and, through the awareness arising from this exposition, to the making of history.

The concept of class and class struggles is central to the marxist philosophy of history and the scientific methodology which logically developed from this

philosophy. Classes[3] are contradictory relations. They are relations of power andqppropriation and, therefore, relations of antagonism and conflict. Class relations are therefore relations of material existence and politics. It is for this reason that class struggles has been the motive force of history ever since the emergence of organised society.

Classes are created in the process of social and material production due, principally, to the inevitable interdependence of the factors and forces of production and the division of labour which necessarily accompanies social and material production itself. For men - individuals, groups and communities - must produce the material basis on which they live and reproduce themselves. In the course of doing this, they inevitably enter into definite relationships with nature and with themselves, independent of their will, because no one can produce, by himself alone, everything on which he lives and which

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3. Lenin's definition of the social class remains the most widely accepted and used. According to Lenin classes are:
large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically defined system of production, by their relation (in some cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production; by their role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently by the dimensions and modes of acquiring the share of social wealth which they dispose.
Lenin, V.I. Collected Works. Vol. 29 Moscow, 1977 p. 421.

he needs.[4] This is the essential basis for the development of division of labour which carries with it, the role and value of peoples input to social production and, therefore, the portion of the proceeds of social produce, so created, which they get in return. Depending on the level of technology, the specific historical circumstance, and the nature of labour applied, these processes lead to the social differentiation of the members of the society and which, in due course, become consolidated into socio-economic differentiation thereby creating class differences. For those who have been favoured by the long process of social production and the inherent division of labour in it, eventually, emerge as the beneficiaries, defenders and perpetrators of such a mode of production. They become its ruling classes.

But these very same long processes and conditions which led to the development and emergence of the beneficiaries and the ruling classes of the mode of production ipso facto produced those who have been exploited, oppressed and, therefore, striving to upturn the mode of production

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4. Marx, K. and Engels, F. Selected Works vol. one Moscow, 1977 pp. 16 - 80; but see, in particular, Marx, K. "Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" in Marx, K. and Engels, F. Pre-Capitalist Socio-Economic Formations, Moscow, 1979 pp. 137 - 138.

in their own favour. They are the ones who yearn for change and, therefore, the movers of history. For it is the contradiction between those who enjoy and perpetrate a given mode of production on the one hand, and those who dislike it and want to change it (because it exploits and oppresses them) on the other, which produces the fundamental social conflict of all social formations in history.

Of course, the processes involved are complex and, depending on other variables (such as the specific historical conditions, geography etc), vary from one society to another just as they vary from one epoch to another. Nor is the division and antagonism between the rulers and the ruled always so clear and self-evident. For on either side, there exists different strands as well as sub-classes which tend to blur the basic class divisions. Hence, we talk of ruling classes and the oppressed classes. History is, thus, a struggle of these oppressed individuals and groups (classes) to better their living conditions against their oppressors who, in turn, struggle streneously to defend and maintain the status quo which benefits them. This is the essence of class struggle whether in a slave society, a feudal or a capitalist one. Politics is the practical form which the struggles of these classes take. Therefore, any study which seeks to discover the fundamental parameters of a given political

process must identify and penetrate the competing classes and the interests which they represent at the level of social production and the relations of production of the polity in question.

Bourgeois historians and scholars in Africa no longer doubt the superiority of the marxist methodology over empiricism beyond the complaint that the former is 'ideological.' This is so because, historically, marxism has proved its case, both, as a mode of inquiry and as a theory of changing society. The contemporary histories of the USSR, China, Cuba, Mozambique and other countries of the world attest to this. Thus, bourgeois scholarship is on the defence and it is increasingly finding it difficult to defend capitalism from the right. Consequently, bourgeois scholars also study marxism, but they do so by misinterpreting its key concepts in an attempt to show that marxism cannot apply in certain places or under certain conditions. Thus, it is often either argued that African societies had no classes and, therefore, no history or, even more subtly, that African socio-economic formations defy marxist analysis because marxism, it is alleged, arose from the study of European societies and conditions which, either differ, or, do not exist in Africa and, therefore, cannot apply to Africa.

Such neo-empiricist views can only apply to the unimaginative historian who remains at the level of eclectic reproduction of categories and forms without employing the creative Marxist - Leninist approach. For all human societies whether Asian, African, American or European engage in social and material production and reproduction. Thus, while the forms which these take may vary from one area to another due to geographical and other environmental factors, giving rise to specific historical developments for the societies concerned, the essential production links and the institutions and classes which are bound to be created in the process of social and material production still remain the focal point of all marxist inquiry. Indeed, the discovery of these variations is a pre-requisite condition for undertaking any meaningful revolutionary struggle for the societies in question.

We must emphasise that the task of the marxist historian is to painstakingly search for empirical data, scrutinise, penetrate and interprete this data in the light of the production process, the division of labour and the resultant social relations of production, legal and non-legal, of the particular society under examination at any given point in time. It is not a search for the existence or otherwise of preconceived stereotypes and categories which Karl Marx's study discovered and labelled

many years ago. For such an exercise is bound to be futile because it is ahistoric by denying the historical peculiarities of human societies and development and, thus, failing to recognise the historicity of such societies or even to come to grips with the basic fact of unequal development, not only, between and within specific societies and communities, but also between and within regions and spheres at the global level.

This study of the Plateau province has therefore been undertaken and conducted from the creative Marxist-Leninist approach. It has no apologies for refusing to do otherwise.

The thesis itself is organised into six main chapters. Chapter one discusses the socio-economic formations of the Plateau region on the eve of colonial conquest as an attempt to bring out the class structure of the region against which colonial capitalism grafted its institutions of social control and economic exploitation of the area. Chapter two deals with the conquest of the Jos Plateau region, the deformation of the precolonial class structure which was discussed in chapter one and the establishment of colonial institutions of social control and economic exploitation, namely, the native authority system, colonial education and the Christian missions and the churches which they founded. It is further argued that these institutions themselves served as agents of class

formation. This is followed by chapter three which discusses the colonial economy, the raison detre for the establishment of colonial rule. The chapter identifies and critically examines the key sectors of the colonial economy not only to demonstrate the peculiar nature of economic exploitation in this region, but also to show how the use of African agents in the process of economic exploitation itself was an important agent of class formation.

Chapter four then ties together the essential link between the colonial institutions of social control (chapter two) and those of economic exploitation (chapter three) and brings out a comprehensive and vivid picture of the colonial state and society by identifying and discussing the major socio-economic classes, within it, which formed the basis for its politics. This is followed by chapter five which examines class relations in the province against the background of the wider colonial setting of the Northern Region of Nigeria in which the Plateau province formed only a small part. It also examines the subjective forces within this setting all of which cumulatively gave rise to the dominance of a Plateau petty bourgeois class and the petty bourgeois politics peculiar to that province. The last chapter then exposes the class essence of petty bourgeois politics in the Plateau province, inspite of mystifications to the contrary, and demonstrates the political opportunism of

its emergent ruling classes and how they consolidated their position and perpetuated their dominance over the mass of the working peoples of the Plateau province up to independence.

As it is self evident in the text, the thesis draws its main body of data from oral and archival sources as well as field observations of some of the major scenes of the historical activity under examination. The bulk of the fieldwork was conducted between May and December 1979 but subsequent field trips were also undertaken as the work progressed. As for the archival material, the bulk of it comes from the National Archives Kaduna. These are, however, supplemented with documents from the former native authority headquarters (specifically those of Jos, Pankshin and Shendam), the Ministry of Local Government in Jos, the Jos National Museum and the Documents Sections of the Kashim Ibrahim Library of this university which contains an array of documents ranging from the provincial gazetteers, statistical digests to parliamentary hansards and newspapers from the colonial period to date.

M.Y. MANGVWAT
ZARIA, JUNE, 1984.

CHAPTER ONE.

PLATEAU SOCIETIES ON THE EVE OF COLONIAL RULE

INTRODUCTION.

This first chapter attempts to survey the nature and character of the peopling of the Plateau region, the organisation of social production and consequently, the political superstructures which arose from these among the communities of the Jos Plateau before 1900. The aim is to expose the structure of social organisation and political power in these communities just before the colonial conquest so as to provide a clear background against which the colonial deformation of these structures should be grasped.

THE PEOPLING AND FORMATION OF GROUPS ON THE JOS PLATEAU.

Evidence of human habitation of the Jos Plateau region goes far back to Sangoan or even Achulean periods.[1] A linguistic and ethnographic survey of the area suggests that the various peoples who inhabited the Jos Plateau region at the beginning of the 20th century had been

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1. Daniels, S.G.H. "The Early Stone Age" in Shaw, T. (Ed) Lectures in Nigerian Prehistory and Archaeology. Ibadan, 1969 p. 14-29; Connah, G. "The Coming of Iron: Nok and Daima". in Shaw, T. op.cit. p. 30-36; Soper, R.C. "The Stone Age in Northern Nigeria" in Journal of The Historical Society of Nigeria (JHSN) Vol. 3, No. 2 1965 p. 175-194; Fagg, B.E.B. "The Nok Culture in Prehistory" in JHSN Vol. 1 No. 1-4, 1956 - 1959 p. 228 - 293.

living there for several hundreds of years.[2] However, on the strength of these pieces of evidence alone, it is difficult to say with certainty that the various groups who occupied the Jos Plateau by the beginning of the 20th century were the direct forbears of the prehistoric civilisations revealed by the evidence.

On the other hand, the oral traditions of most of the major linguistic groups tend to suggest immigration into the Jos Plateau area from outside it.[3] It is clear then that a scientific correlation of these prehistoric civilisations and the current inhabitants of the Jos Plateau must await further research although the general inclination of the literature on this subject favours a positive association of the two.[4]

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2. Ballard, J.A. "Historical inferences from the Linguistic Geography of the Nigerian Middle Belt" in AFRICA 41, 1971, p. 294 - 305; Greenberg, J.H. The Languages of Africa. Indiana University, Bloomington 1966 p. 46.

3. Field notes. These traditions are widespread particularly among the Angas - Mwaghavul complex and the Birom but less so among the Jerawa groups, Kulere, Mama, Wana and many of the Southern Zaria groups. Many of these traditions were documented in the Gazetteers of the Plateau Province. A more recent effort at compiling these and other aspects of Plateau history can be found in an invaluable two-volume work undertaken by the History Department of the University of Jos as; Yearwood, P.J. (ed) Jos Oral History and Literature Texts; Vol. one and, Esichei, E. (ed) Jos Oral History and Literature Texts; Vol. two 1981.

4. Fagg, B.E. B op.cit. p. 288 - 289.

But while further research is required to throw more light on the relationship between the prehistoric cultures of the Plateau and the present occupants of the area, a few concrete statements of a general nature can be made even under the present state of our knowledge of the Jos Plateau. In this regard, the peopling and the formation of groups on the Jos Plateau area can be traced in several phases leaving aside the complexity of the details of these processes. The first phase, C. 200 BC to C. 1000 A.D;[5] was the prehistoric one. The second phase, C. 1100 to C. 1700 A.D.,[6] was occasioned most largely by developments in the Kanem-Borno region, particularly, the establishment of the second Kanuri Empire and the emigration of groups who refused to be incorporated into the new Kanuri polity to other regions especially the Jos Plateau..

The third phase, C. 1600 to 1800 A.D.,[7] was associated with Jukun-Kwararafa activities. The fourth

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5. Ibid.

6. Abdullahi Smith: "The Early States of the Central Sudan" in Ajayi, J.F.A. and Crowder, M. (eds). History of West Africa. Volume one, Longman 1971 p. 184; Sa'ad Abubakar: "Peoples of the Upper Benue and Bauchi Plateau Before 1800 A.D. in Ikime, O. (ed) Groundwork of Nigerian History.

7. Meek, C.K. A Sudanese Kingdom - an ethnographical study of the Jukun speaking peoples of Nigeria. New York, 1969 (original 1931) p. 21-44.

phase, C. 1800 to 1907, was related to the Fulani herders and Hausa traders which culminated in the Sokoto jihad.[8] The fifth phase was the colonial period, 1907 - 1960.[9] This phase was marked by colonial conquest and domination and it witnessed, among other things, a further massive immigration into the Jos Plateau by more Hausawa, Fulani, Kanuri as well as Igbo, Yoruba and other groups from all over Nigeria. These migrants were largely labourers and artisans attracted to the tin mining activities of Jos.

The formation of communities on the Plateau was influenced by three main factors namely; its rocky and mountaneous terrain, social reproduction within it, and as we have pointed out above, a progressive immigration into the region by waves of migrants. The nature of historical interaction between these three factors ultimately moulded the settlement patterns, political and cultural groupings on the Jos Plateau as they existed by 1900. One important consequence of the historical

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8. Abubakar, A.Y. "The Establishment and Development of Emirate Government in Bauchi, 1805-1903" Ph.D. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. 1974 pp. 1 - 225; Adamu, M. The Hausa Factor Zaria, 1978 pp. 29 - 30; pp. 36 - 37.

9. The year, 1907, marked the effective conquest of most of the Plateau communities in a series of patrols and expeditions ordered by Horward, the Bauchi Resident. See; SNP 6. C1140/1907 "Bauchi Province - Patrols and Expedition" NAK.

interaction between the above factors was the multiplicity of numerous autonomous politico-cultural groupings in the area quite unlike historical developments in the surrounding Hausa Plains during the same period. For example, my own computations from the oral and colonial sources renders a total estimate of some 400 chiefdoms for the whole province at the time of conquest.

The numerousness of these chiefdoms obviously raises serious methodological problems concerning the depth to which a researcher can go if these groups are to be treated separately in a study of this kind. For each of these chiefdoms form legitimate entities of research on their own and, indeed, some attempts have already been made in this direction. However, an overall historical picture of the whole Province is yet to emerge, hence, the reason to attempt to do so here.

ORGANISATION OF SOCIAL PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE COMMUNITIES OF THE JOS PLATEAU ON THE EVE OF COLONIAL CONQUEST: C. 1850+ A.D.

We must now turn to a discussion of the way in which these Plateau communities subsisted and sustained all the socio-economic and political institutions which they had evolved on the eve of colonial conquest and rule. A meaningful reconstruction of this is only possible by an examination of the organisation of social production and distribution on the eve of colonial conquest.

In other words, we must survey the prevailing modes of production of the Plateau communities just before the establishment of colonial rule. This is necessary for a proper grasp of the objective conditions which had given rise to the political, religious and other institutions of the various groups.

In doing this, however, our concern is not to discuss the general history of economic transformation of the Plateau from time immemorial to 1900 A.D., for useful as this is in the history of the Plateau, it is outside the scope of this thesis. Rather, we intend to bring out only the main features and essence of the economy of the region just before colonial conquest and subsequent alien rule.

There is evidence to suggest that by the close of the 19th century, the economy of some parts of the region had not changed much since very ancient times. This is particularly true of some of the groups of the communities who occupied some of the caves of the high granite outcrops who were still largely practising hunting and gathering and using relatively primitive tools. Theirs was a primitive economy and it existed among the Angas group of Dileng; among the Montol and the Kulere

for example.[10]

The economic base of the whole region however, was, and still remains, agriculture. It was supplemented by fishing, hunting, mining, smithing and craft manufactures. Livestock keeping was also very important among all the groups.[11] A good understanding of Plateau societies and communities must therefore centre on who owned and controlled the use of land for other forms of social relations, other than biological, sprang from this.[12]

LAND.

Thus, to start with, an examination of the concept of ownership of land among the various groups on the Plateau is necessary. Land was the most basic means of

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10. These groups of communities had not changed much even as late as the 1960s. Some of them were still in the hills and engaged in very simple economies. Fieldnotes, together with my personal knowledge, of these areas.

11. The various Plateau communities kept a large variety of livestock which included, amongst others, the humpless cattle (muturu), sheep, goats, horses, cats, poultry, and dogs - the last being very important for compound security and hunting.

12. Marx, K. "Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" Marx, K. and Engels, F. Pre-Capitalist Socio-Economic Formations. Moscow, 1979 pp. 137 - 138.

production for no economic activity was divorced from it. Hunting, fishing, mining and herbs collection were all related to land and the concept of territory. Even secondary and tertiary economic pursuits such as services and manufacturing, inspite of their "sophistication", were not carried out in the air. For indeed, even the concept of the ownership of airspace by state systems in modern societies derive from the claim of the respective ground territories in question. Since all human settlements and economies have always been carried out on the ground - on the earth's surface - the significance of land cannot be overemphasized.

Oral evidence suggests that at the intellectual and philosophical level, almost all the groups believed that neither an individual nor a group owned land. For they maintained that one could only own that which one makes.[13] The real owner of land therefore was God who was strikingly perceived by most of the groups as female. However, they employed the concept of ownership

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13. This position is strengthened by the existence, among some of the Plateau groups, of certain proverbs and sayings pertaining to a wicked ruler or chief. For example, among the Mwaghavul, a wicked chief is told by an agrieved subject on land as follows: "a mang yil faha a ku ha yit mu Nan di wan" = take the land which belongs to you and leave for me the one from God. Its meaning and implication are clear, namely, that nobody is born with and owns land; not even the chief.

at the level of control and usage. In other words, it is possible, in this conception of ownership, to appropriate the use of land without necessarily owning the land itself. This depicts a definition based on man-and-man relationship rather than man-and-land. Central to this conception is the recognition and acceptance from other potential land users that one of them, be he an individual or a family or a lineage, is the sole user of the particular piece of land. And this recognition and acceptance itself was decided by a definite territorial principle which derived from a further principle and acceptance, on the part of all, that whenever a person or a group was able to prove that it had been the first settler of a particular territory, the other groups would acknowledge that group as the sole users of such a territory. Of course, conquest often reversed this principle.[14] From the foregoing therefore, ownership of land was concerned with the recognition by other potential land users that one person or group was the de jure user which meant that any other person or group other than the de jure user was an intruder.

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14. Many of the Angas traditions and those of the Mwaghavul attest to this.

Once a particular lineage was considered as the de jure users of a particular territory, that some lineage, ipso facto, had control over the territory. But the exercise of that control was an issue decided internally within the lineage. The way this was decided upon varied from one community to another but generally age was an important consideration. In other words, the eldest members of the lineage decided on which households should use particular portions.[15] Two points need to be emphasized immediately. The first is that the basis for territorial claim was one of being the first settlers of a particular territory or conquest of it from some others. Thus, if an individual was able to trace his or their ancestorship, in most cases, patrilineally, to the founding settler or conqueror family, this qualified him as one of the de jure users of the piece of land in question. To trace ones history was not difficult because the spatial distribution of settlements often reflected the closeness of the households to the lineage.[16] The second point is that lineages owned the land rather than individuals. But individuals and families of the

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15. Netting, R.Mc.C. Hill Farmers of Nigeria - cultural ecology of the Kofyar of the Jos Plateau London, 1970. p. 181 - 192. Dr Netting's findings pertaining to this is not limited to the Kofyar but widespread on the Plateau.

16. Ibid.

lineages had equal rights to the use of the land. Often, the eldest member of the lineage was in charge. He, in council with the heads of the major households or sub-lineages, were taken to have the knowledge of the history of the whole lineage and with it, the overall territory.

The basic unit of production was the household which often contained several families. The household could split, and this was more the case, as the household became too large and quarrels among its segments became too frequent.[17] Apart from the organisation of production at the household level, individual families were free to clear and own extra patches of land on which, mostly their women folk, worked during their freetime.[18] Each household had one central barn in which they stored their harvest which was then distributed on regulated basis by the head of the household.[19] The produce from

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17. Examples of these abound. For example, the chiefdoms which came to constitute Ndut (Shendam) district; the Angas chiefdoms of Kwir, Amper and Gyangyang are accounted for on this basis; among the Mwaghavul, the nomenclature Mwaghavul is said to have derived from "mun a vul" = we are two. etc etc.

18. Netting, R.Mc.C. op.cit. p. 163 - 170.

19. In many of the Plateau communities, there were household barns or "central barns" controlled by the head of the household from which the wives of the particular household collected rations at regulated intervals. In some large households however, sub-household barns were allowed.

"private farm" was kept by each housewife for her immediate family. This provided, in some cases, a significant supplement to the main portion received from the centrally owned barn.

The whole year was calendered on the basis of agriculture - farm clearing, burning, cultivation and tilling, sowing, weeding, harvesting, threshing and storing. Dr. R. Mc. C. Netting[20] has brought out a detailed and impressive calendar of activities on the Kofyar, one of the groups occupying the southern escarpment of the Plateau massif. This calendar of activities is applicable to a majority of all the groups. Supplementary activities like hunting, fishing and crafts manufacture were done variously between December and March; always after farm produce had been brought home and stored. These supplementary activities were not compulsory except when they were carried out as festival requirements.

In the case of hunting, a group of friends or brothers merely walked into the bush or the rocks accompanied by their hunting dogs (usually after their morning meal or after the evening meal in the case of

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20. Netting, R.Mc.C. op.cit. p. 64.

night hunters) and hunt-game. They often returned with a variety of killed game such as porcupine, grass-cutter, deer, bear, buck and other lesser animals.[21] For the hunting of large and often dangerous animals, such as leopards and lions, a more organised expedition was planned, usually, by the village chief after consulting a diviner especially if the animal had been a source of menace to the village. These expeditions provided opportunity for men of prowess to demonstrate their special capabilities in playing decisive and crucial roles in killing the monster. In due course, they became the community heroes. The head of the killed lion or leopards was taken to the community chief while the skin was left with the actual killer, not only as a mark of his vital role in the expedition, but, in some cases, as a title of honour.[22]

Generally, hunting was organised at two levels. There was the ordinary hunting carried out by individuals and groups as described above. Then there was the yearly hunting festivals organised by the community chief

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21. Ames, C.G. (compiled) Gazetteer of the Plateau Province (Nigeria), London 1972 (first published 1934, Jos) p. 322-323 excluding bush cows, rhinocers etc.

22. Especially among the Angas, Chip, Mwaghavul Kaje and Goemai.

and the elders which was attended by all the male adults together with adolescents among some groups.[23] The latter was often accompanied by ceremonies varying from one cultural group to another.[24] Such festivals enabled the adolescents to know the sacred shrines of the community land and to know, from men in the bush away from women, why certain animals should not be killed nor eaten. It further enabled and encouraged them to feel like adults and to identify with the community as a corporate society. Hunting was not the exclusive occupation of a particular family or lineage but certain individuals and families tended to specialise in it. They exchanged their dead or captured animals for more grains, swords, knives, spears or anything they needed provided the items of exchange were acceptable to both parties. The skins were often processed to serve as dresses, bags and sleeping mats.

Blacksmiths and iron smelters like the hunters exchanged their wares for other things which they needed. For many communities in the Plateau region, iron smelting and smithing are very old industries and those engaging in it do insist that it is an art given

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23. Particularly young men who were about to be initiated into adulthood.

24. Among the Mwaghavul, this opened the various festivals of horse-racing, mock battles etc etc.

their forefathers by providence from time immemorial.[25] The blacksmiths generally made hoes, cutlasses, knives, swords, spears, arrow heads and so on during the dry season but which the people referred to as the resting period. They became busiest at the onset of the rains because most of their manufactures were agricultural tools. In most societies, blacksmiths were a highly respected class of people although neither their wealth nor their social status was above that of most members of the society. This was because these smelters and smithers were basically cultivators, like other members of the society, and only practised their art or science during off season but also during the farming period on request by desperate households whose farming implements needed repairs or complete replacement by new ones. Payment for their manufactures and services, in the case of repairs, were made mainly in grains; sometimes, in

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25. These claims are valid in the light of the archaeological evidence we now have. Connah, C. op.cit. p. 30 - 36; the finds of Fagg, Soper and Shinnie cited above. This is supported by a recent Ph.D. Thesis by David Tambo on iron working on the Plateau judging from my discussions with him and my participation in his project. The thesis has been completed but I have had no access to a copy and, thus, have not read it. His field interviews have been transcribed in microfilm and stored in the Northern History Research Scheme, Zaria.

addition to beer. The exchange basis was standardized[26] in most societies but other influences such as marriage and kinship relation of the customer to the blacksmith led to a discount especially in the case of repairs.

Other members of the communities other than hunters, smelters and smithers found something to do during this "resting" period. This was the time for building new huts and repairing old ones, renovating the walls, thatching the roofs and the like. They also engaged in crafts such as basket making, calabash, goard and pots which were done by both sexes.[27]

Fishing[28] was also carried out at this time not only because it was now "resting" season but because the streams, rivers and lakes had low water at this time. We are not here interested in the reproduction or description of the sequence of economic activities throughout the year, for this has been ably documented by Dr. Netting to whom we have referred. Rather we are interested in the significance of land and agriculture to the various communities. For agriculture dominated the lives of the people to the extent that they referred to the period during which they were not directly

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26. Standard calabashes were used - among the Mwaghavul, such a calabash is called du - diyar = the barn dish.

27. Women, however, tended to specialise in basket making and pottery.

28. Ames, C.G. op.cit. p. 294.

engaged in farm work as the "resting" period. Yet, it was during this "resting" period that equally important supplementary economic activities which we have mentioned above were undertaken.

On the whole, society was well organised. In learning about and pursuing occupations other than farming, individuals simply joined their parents, first as apprentices, in whatever the latter happened to be doing. In due course, they matured into experts and joined the relevant "guilds" for their chosen crafts. Only metal smelters and smithers seemed to have developed some form of occupational organisation very much like guilds. Iron smelting was not widespread in the Plateau region inspite of its claim to great antiquity. The hill communities and those on the Plateau massif seemed to have been the main producers of iron tools in the region. And even in the communities where iron work was undertaken, the skill was often confined to particular lineages. These iron smelters and smithers tended to spread certain beliefs about the qualifications to enter into this profession. As a result, the profession remained exclusive to these lineages who also had contact with each other across the various chiefdoms.

It was in this way that they constituted a kind of guild.[29]

Technology was at a relatively low level. There were no sophisticated machinery employed in the production process. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, only simple tools such as hoes, knives, spear and arrow heads were made and used in the various economic activities described above. This means that labour was of paramount significance as a factor of production. It is therefore necessary to discuss how labour was organised in the production process.

LABOUR.

Labour was freely exchanged for goods; for seedlings, grains, metal tools and beer. There was no unemployment because all individuals in society ultimately belonged to one household or another and therefore fell within the productive schedule of that household.[30] Besides this, most of the communities frowned at idleness. Indeed, one found it difficult to get a wife if his

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29. Fieldnotes records and visits to some of the major ironworking sites and communities. One extensive former iron mining site still exists at Bwanzuhum on the way to Mangun.

30. Urban centres had not yet emerged to absorb rural migrants running away from the chores of village life such as is the case presently.

image in the community was one of a lazy person. The household was the basic unit of production. However, labour was sometimes organised around the gaya.[31]

Gaya was the coming together of several households or in some cases, the whole village, to constitute a single work-force on a particular project both free and for part-payment. It was organised at two levels - at the community level; and at the individual level. If the work at hand was of community interest such as working on the Chief's farm, ridding the community of some impending monster, deepening the community water source, repairing the ancestral grove and thelike, the whole work-force of the community would turn up at the fixed date and time. There was no necessary payment although a good community chief would provide some water and beer to help "quench thirst" as the saying went. Although the chief was not compelled to provide water and beer, failure to do so, more often than not, impaired the prestige of such a chief in the eyes of his subjects. In some cases, corvee labour was organised on farm of the chief. For example, among the Mwahavul, corvee labour was known as ushat.[32] Some chiefdoms,

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31. There are local names for the different variations of the gaya phenomenon which Dr. Netting has discussed with regards to the Kofyar and related groups. Netting, R.Mc.C. op.cit. p. 138.

32. Fieldnotes records and personal acquaintance with this group.

however, did not practise this at all. This was community work.

However, at the individual level, the head of a household invited the whole community or a section of it to perform such tasks as cultivation, weeding, harvesting, threshing or any aspect of farmwork. In such instances most communities laid down specified requirements which the head of such a household must meet. These requirements differed from one community to another as did also the nature of the work under request; but beer was a common requirement in all of them.[33] Sometimes these work parties spent the night on the farms. In such cases, the host household did not only prepare plenty of beer but slaughtered a stipulated number of livestock in addition. These requirements were not considered as payments for the gaya labour but were recognised as tokens of gratitude. For it was believed that nobody could actually compensate labour adequately. On this basis a beneficiary from this form of labour had to be grateful to the members of his community for willingly offering to take a day off from their own work to assist him on his farm (or in the building of a new house - etc etc). Nevertheless,

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33. I am not aware of any group, except possibly the sub-emirates, on the Jos Plateau who do not brew and drink beer for and on such occasions.

as a result of these specified requirements, which were regarded as tokens of gratitude, only the household units which were wealthy could afford to invite *ngya* labour.

In all thecommunities, the head of the household attended the farms unless he was too old to work. And even as an old man, the household head helped in cleaning and guarding the compound while the productive members of the household went to the farms. Additionally, he sometimes helped to work on "home plots" as a cure for idleness while, at other times, he helped the herds-boys to look after livestock.

The lineage chief was in a similar position. He controlled his own household which was often the largest in the village or chiefdom. The large size of the chief's lineage meant that it was also the wealthiest by virtue of the size of its work-force.

Furthermore, "gifts" and tokens of respect from the other households easily augmented the wealth of the chiefs household beyond those of the ordinary households.[34] Thus it is no wonder that these lineage chiefs

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34. I have not been able to locate the genesis of these "gifts" which should not be too difficult to uncover. However, the groups that practise them simply said that they had always done so. It is not unlikely that such gifts would have arisen in the process of evolving and developing the chieftaincy offices themselves - the chiefs, as their powers increased, compelled these gifts under the ideological guise of respect and reverence for the office etc etc; processes which, in turn, begat more wealth on the part of the chiefs and, thus, more political power.

were called gwolong and long among the Angas and Goemai respectively. In both languages, gwolong and long mean the samething; namely, "the possessor of wealth".[35] It is necessary to emphasize, at this juncture, that it is in this differential accumulation of wealth that one can locate the latent or embryonic basis for the development and subsequent emergence of semi-class and class societies on the Jos Plateau. These structures are central to the major theme examined in this thesis for colonialism could not thrive without them.

Some of the households were very wealthy; others were not so wealthy; and still others were less wealthy. The differences in wealth did not necessarily arise from the exploitation of one household by another, but by the initial advantages which occured in the sharing of cultivated lands, harvests, sizes of households or even some natural hazards - drought, flood, pests and such like. Households which were adversely affected by such hazards undertook to work, for a specified number of days, on the farms of their more fortunate colleagues in return for grains or seedling; whichever they needed more.[36] Some of the households so affected

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35. From my linguistic knowledge of these languages.

36. Especially if some fire disaster had destroyed some households, in which case, they had to start afresh. The terms of these "helps" varied from place to place.

sometimes recovered over time but even then, they could not compare favourably with those households from whom they had borrowed and for whom they had worked. For since wealth tends to create more wealth, these initial advantages and disadvantages affecting the households tended to take on a more or less permanent status in differentiating the various households of the Plateau communities. In this way, households gradually became differentiated into wealthy, not so wealthy and poor ones over time.

At this stage, one can also see the beginnings of differentiation in wealth not only between the different households, but between the heads of households and the lineage chiefs on the one hand, and the ordinary members of the households on the other. These heads of households and the lineage chiefs together controlled the use of community farmland and the produce from it. Yet, they were not effective or direct producers in the sense that they actually worked on the farms. It was the remaining members of the households who engaged in either direct work or social production. Thus, it is at this point, that we can locate the genesis and potentials for the subsequent separation of the direct producers from the means of production, a key essential of class societies.[37] On the eve of colonial intrusion,

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37. Ivanov, Y.M. Agrarian Reforms and Hired Labour in Africa. Moisseyev, P.P. (ed). Moscow 1979 pp. 94.

a large number of communities on the Plateau were about to reach this stage.

One other form of labour must be mentioned. This is slave labour. Slave labour was very popular among the Hausa polities that surrounded the Plateau region but not among the Plateau communities themselves. This is curious in view of the widespread use of this form of labour over the rest of the Nigerian area during the same period.[38] Prior to the 18th century, there was a conspicuous absence of slaves and slave labour in all the communities of the Plateau massif.[39] Often there were a few captives in some of the occasional inter-community forays, but these captives were either absorbed or, in some cases, allowed to return home eventually. As such, there were no slave estates like the gandaye so characteristic of many of the rulers in Hausaland.

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38. A good example is the widespread of estates worked by slaves common in Hausaland societies. These were called gandaye (gandu - singular). For a more detailed, though rather exaggerated, discussion on this see; Lovejoy, P.E. "The Plantation Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate" in American Historical Association, Ninety-First Annual Conference. Dec. 1976. Washington. It only need be mentioned that these gandaye to which Lovejoy refer as plantations predated the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate.

39. Orr, C. The Making of Northern Nigeria, London 1911, 2nd. edt. 1965 p. 195.

Where the captive was kept permanently by his captors, all effort was made to integrate him as full member of the community and his children only came to know of their servile origin when there was a quarrel between them and someone from among the member of the community when the latter would, in anger, remind the former of his servile origin. And in most cases, the latter was reprimanded by the elders for unguarded utterance.

Thus, slave labour was of little or no significance in the history of the Plateau prior to Jukun and Hausa contacts.[40] And even from the 18th century, when slaves began to feature on the Plateau, they were sold off to Hausa traders instead of recruiting and organising them as a work-force on household farms. The relative absence of slave labour in the economic history of the Jos Plateau is explicable in the fact that historically, organised slave labour tends to be associated with well developed class societies, particularly, fuedal-type societies where the slaves are made to work on the farms or some state projects such as the construction

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40. A slave was difficult to define in some of these societies. In most of them, a slave was actually a war captive. He was not necessarily regarded as an inferior or sub-human being especially if he had been captured during a fierce battle. Captives however came to be viewed with contempt only with the ugly uses to which they later (19th C) became subjected e.g. trading in them, employing them on menial jobs etc. More importantly, none of the groups has a tradition of organised slave labour as distinct from the household work-force. The slaves were often assimilated.

the centrally owned barn. The amount given to each was determined by the size of the family.[42] A bachelor however had no ration because it was held that he had no wife to cook such a ration. He thus fed from the food prepared by the wives of the other members of the household. However, it was the household which paid the dowry for his wife when he was ready to marry.

Among the Chip, Angas, Mwahavul and Mapun, for example, food rations were given according to the number of wives a man had. Thus, the more wives one had the larger the ration he would collect. For example, if the head of the household decided to give each women ten calabashes of grain (during a sharing session) then someone who had ten wives would collect a hundred calabashes while a family of two wives collected only twenty. The rationale behind this was that a family of ten wives had many people to feed because each wife was expected to have children. Another justification for this formular of sharing out social produce was that a family of ten wives had contributed to the production process by the labour of ten women in contrast to the contribution of a family of two wives by only two women.

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42. All the Plateau communities were polygamous. There was no limit to the numbers of wives a man could marry and inherit. These ceased to apply to those who became Moslems and later, Christians.

'However, this formular had some inherent problems. For since the number of children which a wife had were not taken into account by the formular, women who had many children got the same food ration as those without children thereby resulting in injustice to the former and their children. This problem was often compounded if some of their children had grown old enough to join the household work-force in theproduction process. Consequently, grumbles, complaints and open quarrels were constant features of the lives of such households. As a solution to this problem, many large households split into two or more depending on the gravity of the problem as well as the anticipated fortunes associated with the new households. Some of these splits led to migrations if the hostilities between them persisted even after they had split.[43]

On his own part, the head of the household often ensured that he was not extravagant by strictly regulating the intervals for rationing produce from the central barn. Since the procedure for rationing did not take into account the number of mouths that a family had to feed but the number of wives someone had, it meant that some

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43. This phenomenon accounts for a lot of the intra-migrations within the region. Often, the groups involved did this without losing contact and identity with the parent group. Many examples of these exist among the various groups on which I have field notes.

families had not enough food to live on. In order to supplement this, therefore, some wives took their own initiative and opened up their own farm over whose produce they had absolute control.[44]

This stringent method of managing the central barn by the head of the household enabled the entire members of the household to reach the new harvests with some surplus,[45] With this surplus the head of the household paid for other services rendered to the constituent families, which included medical treatment, dowry for a wife to one of its members, purchase of new farming hoes and the repair of damaged ones and the like. From it also the head of the household fulfilled the obligations of the household to the lineage chief, as well as to invite other household members to a gaya service on their farms if it was a wealthy household.[46]

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44. However, the husbands did "influence" the use of such produce. During the colonial period, some "good wives" were said to have paid their husbands' taxes from this source.

45. That is, what remained after the next harvest had come in. Some households were able to conserve and, thus, accumulated huge surpluses sufficient to offset a "moderate" period of famine.

46. There was always an occasion for such in all the communities many of whc had several festivals yearly.

In the absence of any large-scale trading connections for exchanging some of the surpluses for luxury goods characteristic of the ruling classes of the savana and forest states, the Plateau communities consumed their surpluses in the form of beer which featured in virtually all the various kinds of ceremonies and festivals practised by the groups.[47] And since most of these ceremonies were sanctioned and controlled by the heads of the households acting as elders, and the lineage chief, they were by the same token, the greatest beneficiaries of this mode of production.

The role of the heads of households in this social formation therefore require some emphasis. Firstly, they controlled the central barns since it was they who decided on the amount of food ration which each family received. They also decided how often this ration was to be given. It was they who decided when a young member of the household was ripe for a wife which affected the central barn by way of paying the dowry as well as increasing the number of wives who collected ration from the central barn. Secondly, they decided what new fields were to be cleared, the crops

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47. All forms of rewards ultimate found expression in beer except in some cases of rituals relating to healing-even so, beer came in indirectly at one stage or another.

grown and the amount to be grown on them. Thirdly, they defined the problems whose solutions required household resources and those whose solutions required only family attention. Fourthly, they decided on the services and "contributions" or "gifts" for which surplus produce from the household barn could be engaged.

In short, although they did not appropriate and privatise the surplus directly, they effectively controlled it; some, less effectively than others. Thus they were conspicuously the greatest beneficiaries of the household surpluses. For as the custodians of the traditions, they formed the central and sometimes exclusive classes at the festivals and ceremonies being the ones who offered the food and drinks to the ancestral spirits, the incantations and libations.[48] In this way, they constituted themselves into insipient ruling classes of the various Plateau communities.

In summary therefore, one can say that the mode of production of the communities of the Plateau prior to colonial rule was predominantly communal and it

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48. In all the societies, contact with the ancestors through the means described in the text was an exclusive preserve of the "elders". However, being an elder was not just a matter of age. Demonstrated ability in the relevant field and being a member of the relevant lineage for the particular priesthood were additional considerations or qualities.

remained so for long but gradually progressed towards the development of class structures. By the 18th century, from all indications, one could talk of a progressive disintegration of this communal mode, particularly, among the communities of the lowland. This process was accelerated by contacts with Jukun and Hausa peoples and traders.[49] The Sokoto Jihad hurried this process further still and by the mid-19th century, some of the communities became "tributory" polities to the Sokoto Caliphate. For example, Wase, Kanam and Jemaa had become sub-emirates under Bauchi and Zaria emirates respectively. Even those communities which had not been incorporated into the Sokoto Caliphate either by direct conquest or aman, such as the Birom, Anaguta and Jere chieftaincies, took on more centralised political structures in the process of organising opposition to the jihad.[50] Still some others, especially those inhabiting the mountain and rock heights such as Dileng, Kadung, Chakfem and Jipal had remained relatively unaffected.[51] These issues are examined in greater detail

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49. Adamu, M. op.cit. p. 27; p. 28 - 29.

50. Other examples of these included the Angas chiefdoms Wokkos, Pankshin, Ampang, Kabwir; the Mwaghavul chiefdoms of Pianiya (Panyam), Pushit, Ampang, Kerang; the Shendam district of the Lowland; etc.

51. Most of them were in Pankshin Division of the colonial administration. Ames, C.G. op.cit. pp. 122-136.

in the section which follow.

POLITICAL UNITS AND RELATIONS

From the discussion of the organisation of production which we have attempted above, it is evident that the dominant mode of production of the Plateau communities was communal. The main feature of this mode was that there was the absence of a clear separation of the direct producers from the means of production.[52] In other words, the direct producers were also the owners of the means of production as well as the proceeds of production and clear-cut property distinctions characteristic of the feudal and, particularly, the capitalist modes were not possible, Consequently, the appropriation of surplus by a non-productive clique and the subsequent class contradictions to which this gives rise were minimal and difficult to discern beyond the simple distinction between wealthy and poor households; the basic productive units.

But the absence of a sharp class contradiction should not be taken to mean the absence of economic differentiation. Indeed, an attempt was made above to

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52. Ivanov, Y.M. op.cit. p. 94, Shivji, I.G. op.cit. p. 6.

show not only the distinction between wealthy and poor households, but also the distinction between the socio-economic status of the heads of the households and the lineage chiefs on the one hand, and that of the other ordinary members of the households together on the other. It was contended that the social status of these heads of household and lineage chiefs already exhibited, in embroynic forms, ingredients for the development and emergence of class societies. This social status which they enjoyed was maintained and enhanced by the cultural and intellectual attitudes which informed the whole outlook and worldview of these communities. And these outlooks and attitudes were traceable to the alledged events of the traditions of origins, settlements, migrations and the consolidation of the lineage groups themselves,[53] occupying specific territories of land - the basic means of production. It must be emphasized that these traditions invariably belonged to the controlling lineages - the dominant "classes" in the communities.[54] Therein lay the dialectic.

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53. Kinship ties were certainly associated, infact central in most cases, with the formation of these lineage groupings either en route or from the source - habitat or even in the new abode. Yearwood, P. and Esichei, E. (eds) Jos Oral History and Literature Texts, Vols. 1 and 2. Jos, 1981.

54. Fieldnotes from the chiefdoms of Kabwir Amper, Panyam, Shendam and many others. For more examples, see; Jos Oral History and Literature Texts.

The ideology of the dominant classes in these communities had become the ideology of the masses in the communities. In all human societies, this has always been the case.[55] In this section, an attempt is made to identify the substantive political units (lineage or otherwise); their internal organisation, their relationships with others and how they were changing and transforming over the centuries particularly in the 19th century. Since it is impossible to cover all the political units separately, only the essential features of all the groups are discussed with examples randomly picked for illustration and substantiation.[56] This approach necessarily differs from those of A.Y. Abubakar and J.O. Agi both of who decided to solve the problem by resorting to a classification of the political organisations of the communities of this region

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55. Marx, K. and Engels, F. Selected Works Vol. I. Moscow, 1977 p. 47.

56. An essential feature in all the political organisation of all the communities is the community chief, whether secular or spiritual, in its outward expression. Then there were the sub-chiefs or "task-chiefs" many of who were priests of one cult, shrine, age grade or another. These often had the backing of the householders who, together with these variety of chiefs, constituted the ruling classes in embryonic forms in the communities.

into typologies.[57] I reject such an approach and classification because to do so would be to treat political phenomenon at the level of form rather than substance. Furthermore, the criteria for their classification obscures rather than illuminates the nature of political organisation of the people. We take them one after the other.

Dr. Abubakar identified three main types of political organisation in this region, namely, the priest-chief system; the territorially defined chiefship system; and the state system.[58] He did not demonstrate the bases for these but he went on to show their characteristics. For example, he contended that the main characteristic of thepriest-chief system was "the almost complete sub-mergence of the political sphere within the kinship structure."[59] On the difference between territorially defined chiefships and the priest-chief systems Dr. Abubakar observed that "while in the priest-chief systems members of the community lived in dispersed villages and related to the total community in terms of their individual lineages, the

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57. Abubakar, A.Y. op.cit. p. 4; 248 - 59. Agi, J.O. "Protest and Rebellion against British Rule in Lowland Division of Plateau Province"; draft of a Ph.D. thesis for the Ahmadu Bello University pp. 51 - 2.

58. Abubakar, A.Y. op.cit. p.4; 248 - 259.

59. Ibid. p. 248.

members of the territorially defined chiefship communities of the Bauchi region prior to the 19th century lived in compact villages and gave their allegiance directly to the chief in whom territorial, secular and religious authority was combined."[60]

The first point to note is that these so-called characteristics are seen as given and not having been historically determined. Secondly, even the formulation of these alleged characteristics contain some inherent flaws. For example, if the priest-chief system showed "the almost complete submergence of the political sphere", why did Abubakar call it a "political" system? For it is not true that members of the community in the priest-chief system always lived in dispersed villages and even if they did, this tells us very little. If the implication is that because they lived in dispersed villages under lineages, they had no clear definition of their territory then this is false. For elders of the lineages and the lineage chiefs often knew where their territory ended and where that of the neighbouring lineage begun. Where this was under doubt, there were often some forays at the boundaries. Nor is it true that because the territorially defined systems lived in compact villages, they had a clear definition of their

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60. Ibid. p. 259.

territory acceptable to the adjascent political systems. Which came first: the delimitation of the territorial boundary or the compact settlement? Is Dr. Abubakar suggesting that the priest-chief had no territorial and secular authorities? If so why did he call them chiefs and in what ways did their dispersed villages relate to the total community? These and many other questions cannot be cleared by the ahistorical approach of Dr. Abubakar and the conceptual confusion which pertains to it.

John Agi uncritically accepted Dr. Abubakar's characteristics and proceeded to classify lowland communities into chiefdoms and theocracies[61] without any clear basis for doing so. Neither a theoretical distinction between chiefdoms and theocracies in general was offered, nor was a historical analysis of how the political organisations of the communities in question attempted so as to show the basis and the forms of political authority which these communities exhibited in the period under examination. Agi's categories tell us very little about the societies because the categories themselves are not exclusive of each other. In other words, a chiefdom can be said to be theocratic if the chief claims to derive his authority and sovereignty from divine origin or sources.

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61. Agi, J.O. op.cit. pp. 51 - 2.

The basic inadequacy in both Dr. Abubakar and Agi is one of concept and approach. Both of them made no attempt to relate the political institutional forms which they identified to the forces and factors of production and the consequent social relations of production. Rather, they merely dealt with the superstructure and left it at that. The data now available suggests that the superficial political appearances (institutional forms) of these communities from which Abubakar and Agi derived their classification were actually manifestations of the internal socio-economic dynamics of these societies as well as the varying intensity of outside contacts. These contacts had become widespread in the Plateau and Bauchi region by the 18th and 19th centuries. These were the contacts of islam, trade, Hausa, Fulani and Jukun peoples referred to earlier.

Besides these, it must be emphasised that the geography of the Plateau tended to encourage a rather exclusive nature of settlements and a multiplicity of polities, often based on lineages. Certainly, it is clear that it was the historical interaction between the new areas of contact on the one hand, and the hitherto communal formations in this unique geographical area on the other, which produced the predominantly communal mode of production superintended by communal

chiefs.[62] Thus, a marked feature which cut across the political organisation of the various polities which were, in reality, predominantly lineage groupings was the communal chief - whether the nature of his authority was priestly, secular or otherwise. The ultimate authority of the communal chief was related to his control of the territory claimed through traditions which he stood as symbol.

As a result of the above considerations therefore, the concept of the office or institution known as chief is as old as the development of the communal mode of production itself. Initially, the office merely meant the head and overseer of the lineage-based communities. The antiquity of the chieftaincy office can be seen in the fact that most of these communal chiefdoms on the Plateau have local and indigenous names for the office. The Angas and Goemai call their chiefs gwolong and long respectively. The Mwahavul call theirs mishkaham; the Pyem, rit, the Birom, gwom: the Tarok, ponzhi; the Rukuba, utu, the Jarawa, ogomo; the

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62. As in existence in the 19th century. It may be noted that what ultimately decided the potential ruling classes in each group was their control of land through the perpetuation of traditions of origin which legitimised their claims to the "ownership" and control of these domains.

Mada, chun; the Eggon, lokop and so on.[63] These are not loan words.[64] Many of these communities have claimed that from time immemorial, they had always had chiefs. Their traditions often associate the office with the founding fathers of the particular settlements and polities. The royal families (dynasties) of the communities traced their descent patrilineally[65] to these founding fathers. And this provided the basis for their claim to being the class of people who inherited and knew the history of the exact extent of the territory belonging to their respective communities and, consequently, their own control of it.[66]

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63. Fieldnotes in these areas. Also see; Ames, C.G. op.cit; Yearwood, P. and Esichei, E. (eds) op.cit. concerning the various groups.

64. I made efforts to see if they were loanwords but failed; these words were certainly indigenous to the communities concerned.

65. So far I am not aware of the existence of any matrilineal community in the Plateau area although there appeared to have been semblances of this among some of the Rukuba, Birom and Miango groups. Even here, the offices of the utu, gwom, were not inherited matrilineally.

66. David Dimka (30/5/79); John A. Kwashi (13/9/79); Ayuba Kumm (30/5/79) and others.

In most cases this control was not absolute because all the sublineages and households within the whole community claimed kinship relations of the same traditions. The chiefs were usually just general overseers and directors of the whole community; a function for which they were sometimes remunerated and in others not remunerated at all.[67] This is because in exercising this responsibility which involved directing the rest of the community, the chief employed the services of other sub-lineage heads and heads of households as allegely defined by the traditions.[68] For example, among the Mwahavul chiefdoms, specialised functions such as the regulation of the hunting festival, dancing involving flutes, initiation ceremonies and other rituals, were assigned to sub-chiefs who were also elders and heads of specified sub-lineages directed by the traditions.[69] The same can be said of the Angas chiefdom in relation to the position of the various

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67. Most remuneration took the form of "corvee labour" and "gifts". The articulation of these differed from one community to another and, in general, there was little that was standard and precise about them.

68. Most communities practised this "traditional" delegation of lineage and household functions, often, these functions were alleged to have been first performed by the progenators of the respective lineages and households.

69. Ibid.

gwolong and the organisers of hunting, the various dodo masqurades and the mwostar festival.[70] The last was a very important festival.[71] In the Rukuba chiefdoms the chief, utu, was assisted in specific duties by title holders from specific families such as the offices of onifachanda and utu fichi. The duties of the former were to kill, prepare and cook all animal flesh eaten by the utu. The latter was the principal assistant of the utu in ritual matters.[72] Similar specialisation of politico-social functions can be found among the Lowland chiefdoms and so-called theocracies described by Agi.[73]

Evidently, therefore, a chiefdom was a territorially defined community of lineages with spatial distribution of settlements reflecting the closeness of the families, households and the sub-lineages. Within this system each chiefdom was part of a wider and larger linguistic and cultural group and all the chiefdoms of particular

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70. David Dimka; Timothy Dimka (30/5/79) in connection with Mwostar among the Angas.

71. During the mwostar festival, the history of the Angas people was recited and it is alleged that the festival was accompanied by many miracles remiscent of the Angas founding fathers e.g. some people were known to have voluntarily died and returned to life again. I have never witnessed one even though the festival continues to the present.

72. Ames, C.G. op.cit. p. 90.

73. Agi, J.O. op.cit. p. 51 -98.

linguistic and cultural groups were territorially contiguous to each other.[74] This tended to facilitate colonial efforts in trying, although unsuccessfully, to create and erect paramount tribal chiefs for the various linguistic groups. For until the 18th and 19th centuries, none of these wider linguistic and cultural groupings constituted politically integrated entities.[75] Instead, each linguistic-cultural grouping contained within it several autonomous chiefdoms. This was because the dominant communal mode of production in this area had been developed on the lineage units rather than the wider clan or linguistic group. The direct producers were also the owners of the means of production and the produce therefrom. A separation between direct producers and the owners of the means of production that is, land, had yet to occur. Consequently, there was no appropriation of surplus by anyone or by any group outside the lineage.

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74. However, the resettlement schemes of the colonial period changed this especially among the Yergam. Also the relatively easier mobility of the colonial period facilitated in voluntary migrations in some areas.

75. I am yet to find an example of this before 1900.

And even within the lineages themselves there was no appropriation of surplus beyond the control and management of the surplus of the households or lineages by their respective heads. This position did little more than to generally elevate the social status of elders; the heads of households; and lineages, above the ordinary members of the society. Therefore, when we speak of political units on the Plateau prior to the 18th century, we are actually referring to these communal chiefdoms based on the predominantly communal mode of production. Because these chiefdoms were based on lineage rather than linguistic groupings, they were numerous.[76]

But even though each linguistic and cultural grouping consisted of many chiefdoms, this did not militate against the formation of mutual relationship between them. On the contrary, the whole linguistic and cultural block which contained several chiefdoms was united by a common tradition of descent, origin, language, customs, festivals as well as [illegible].[77]

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76. It is not possible to know their exact number because they never remained static for any one period. In Pankshin Division alone, the districts established by the colonial administration following these chiefdoms, closely there were over seventy districts. Since a district consisted of two or more chiefdoms, the number of chiefdoms in Pankshin Division were certainly over one hundred.

intermarriages.[77] At the cultural level, the whole linguistico-cultural group was well united through attending dances, festivals, ordeal trials, marriages and installation ceremonies which they carried out together as allegedly defined by the traditions concerning these activities. In some cases, the whole group came together in the face of a common enemy after which they reverted to the status quo.[78]

However, there were a few areas of conflict which occured during the festivals and ceremonies which, in many instances, were enhanced by intoxication from the beer provided for such occasions. But the major areas of conflict were border disputes as well as disputes over hunting. These were directly related to territorial claims and subsequently, the sovereignty of the chiefdoms. These sometimes led to open armed confrontation between the chiefdoms and, occasionally, between villages.

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77. Marriages outside the cultural groups took place sometimes through kidnapping. Within the whole cultural group, however, most of the groups favoured inter-lineage marriages although intra-lineage marriages also occured.

78. In this regard, it may be remarked that even the devastating attacks of the jihadists failed to produce a pan-Angas chiefdom or even an Angas confederation.

The kidnapping of women constituted no serious conflict as claimed by colonial writers.[79] A kidnapped lady stayed to her husband if she liked him or escaped home when she had the opportunity to do so. Alternatively, her parents and other members of her household would organise for her return home by force if necessary, or even organise for the kidnap of a maiden from the "offending" community in retaliation. The latter was kept as a wife to one of the members of the household should she like him. Otherwise she would escape home. The point is that the "encounters" during women kidnapping were not wars - although they sometimes took violent forms.

On the whole, the occasional conflicts and forays between the chiefdoms and between villages were, in the final analysis, of little consequence and were considered normal occurences.[80] Thus, contrary to colonial writers, during such conflicts no captives were taken and loss of life was minimal.[81]

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79. See footnote 77 above.

80. Besides, a lot of the vengeance missions were self-organised by the households or sub-lineages concerned. The consent of the chief was not necessarily sought for.

81. None of the traditions I collected could recollect capturing up to 20 captives in a single encounter. Lost of life was rarer still.

A distinction between these quarrels and conflicts must however be made. Wars usually occured between territorially adjascent chiefdoms of different ethnic groups, and it was only in this kind of conflict that the concept of the "enemy" was applied.[82] Here, there was loss of lives and captives were taken by each side.[83] These wars lasted only for a day or two although reprisal attacks could be anticipated from the chiefdom which had lost in the conflict. These were the "inter-tribal wars" which the colonial administrators perceived as racial and genetic attributes associated with Plateau communities. Consequently, colonial administrators wantonly accused the peoples of the Plateau of lawlessness and hatred for authority.[84] These wars had more

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82. Among some groups (the Mwaghavul and Angas complex) the flesh of "an enemy" was permitted to be treated as a "war meal" not only in order to embrave the warriors but also to show that such a category of enemy did not require mercy.

83. But the number involved was very few. Many of such battles were decided without death casualities.

84. Fitzpatric, J.F.J. Some Notes on the Kwolla District and its Tribes" in Journal of African History (Collected Papers on Nigeria) Vol. 2 No. 7 pp. 19 - 20; Orr, C. The Making of Northern Nigeria. London, 1965 p. 56 - 57.

to do with issues of sovereignty and prestige than with actual shortage of land even though they often started as boundary disputes. For land on the Plateau was plentiful for most communites.[85]

The chiefdoms were also linked by trade. Thus, apart from the internal exchanges of crafts and metal manufactures there was long-distance trade which entailed the exchange iron tools from the Plateau communities for salt from Keana area.[86] Colonial administrators commented on this flourishing trade, a situation which would contradict the general insecurity of the region they spoke of since it was highly unlikely that trade would flourish in a situation of insecurity. Most of the chiefdoms had their craftsmen and smithers who produced the requirements for the households as well as agricultural tools. This sort of interregional and regional trade only supplemented the main base of the economy which was agriculture.

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85. Except parts of the Kulere, hill Angas, hill Yergam, the Amo-Bassa-Miango axis (Jerewa). In these areas, terracing was highly developed in response to land shortage.

86. Long-distance trade within the context of the Plateau region before 1900 means any market centre attended outside ones own cultural group. Thus trade between the chiefdoms was internal and short-distant. Long-distance trade entailed protection and organisation which the traders provided for themselves. Yearwood, P. and Esichei, (Eds) Jos Oral History and Literature Texts. Vols I and II, 1981.

At this point, emphasis on the relative isolation[87] of the Plateau region from the major centres of trade and trade routes of the West African savana must be made for reasons which will become clear shortly. We have noted that an embryonic ruling class existed among the Plateau communities as the lineage chiefs, heads of households and elders. They controlled the surplus and were the chief beneficiaries at the feasts, festivals and ceremonies. However, the absence of wider trade contacts meant that their opportunity to use the surplus under their control for the purchase of luxury goods and other items which would enhance their prestige and political power was limited. As a result the transition from the communal mode to a feudal mode was very gradual. In other words, the relative isolation of this region from other major centres of culture and trade tended to enhance the perpetuation of the communal mode for longer than might have been necessary. Consequently, the consolidation of the heads of the lineages and households as powerful ruling classes in these societies did not materialise prior to the 18th century. However, from about the 18th century, changes in the power and prestige of these heads

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87. Adamu, M. The Hausa Factor; note the apparent isolation of the Plateau region in the map linking all the important centres of trade in West Africa. p. 58.

and elders of the communities occured resulting from new areas of contact, namely, the immigration of Hausa traders and Fulani herders and settlers into the region.

These new elements established their own centres in various parts of the region and performed the role of middlemen between the Plateau communities and outside centres of commerce such as Kano, Zaria, Bauchi, Benue valley and Borno.

It must be emphasised here that Hausa and Fulani traders did not introduce the idea of centralised political organisation into the Plateau. For to say so would be failing back on a variant of the Hamitic hypothesis which has long been burried. Rather, the point is that contact with these new elements opened the region to influences and opportunities which the embryonic ruling classes of the Plateau communities turned to their advantage to consolidate their position in society. Certainly, contacts outside the region created avenues to use the surplus, however small, by the heads of households and lineages to obtain prestige and luxury items[88] instead of consuming it in beer drinking and feast making as they did hitherto. The change in

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88. Such items included kakaki (royal trumpet); rawani (turban); alkyabba (royal garment); shoes and umbrella which the communal chiefs now began to wear.

prestige also enhanced a change in the power and authority of these classes of elders and heads. For they were now no longer only controllers and superintendents of the household andlineage surpluses but they took unilateral decisions concerning their households and lineages thereby assuming political power. This development occured gradually in most of the communities. The Sokoto jihad however accelerated this process among many of the Lowland communities, the so-called plain Angas, Pyem and some of the "Southern Zaria" groups.

Thus on the eve of the Sokoto jihad of the early 19th century a majority of Plateau communities had taken on semi-feudal structures. The social and economic status of the heads of households and lineages became more powerful and, as expected, their political power also. For they now constituted a rudimentary ruling class within their respective communities although their position was not very strong. In other words, rudimentary class societies had emerged on the Plateau.

Contact between the communities of the region and the Fulani and Hausa traders and herders in the 18th century also introduced this region to the endemic slave raiding and slave trading that had characterised the activities of the surrounding regions. The hitherto few war captives that were either integrated into the

community, or, returned to their homes after some period, were now sold off to these Hausa and Fulani traders who took them to centres like Bauchi, Zaria and Kano. These developments continued and increased in the 19th century.

One other result of this contact must be noted. This is the fact that the gradual penetration of parts of the Plateau by Hausa traders and Fulani herders throughout the 19th century resulted in the establishment of settler-communities of these ethnic groups in various parts of the region.[89] Before the Sokoto jihad, these Hausa settler-communities introduced certain kinds of textile, iron, grain (guinea corn and maize) and cocoyam, garments and regalia[90] into the areas where they settled. In return, they obtained other types of grains (millet, acca), kalwa (locus bean seed), tosali (galena), jute, mats, livestock and slaves.[91] It was in this

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89. Adamu, M. op.cit. pp. 52 - 53.

90. Gowns - See footnote 88 above. iron - the lambi light type imported as distinct from the heavy indigenous ones guinea-corn - the red type maize - the type popularly refered to as Fulani maize
Cocoyam - Wali type.
For these and others see Netting, R.Mc.C. op.cit. pp. 53 - 113; Cpt. Fonlkes, H.D. "Angas Customs" JOSPROF 1; 379/1910: NAK; SNP. 9 1788/1922 "Tshendam District - Reassessment Report" 1922 NAK.

91. Ames, C.G. op.cit. pp. 297 - 300.

period that the sale of slaves to which reference has already been made, became important in the trade sector of the economies of the Plateau chiefdoms.[92] The exchange of other items of trade were carried on by adult members of the communities but the sale of slaves was undertaken by the "elders" on the instruction of the community chief. The proceeds of this exchange were taken to the chief who in turn shared it with the head of the particular household that had captured the slave.

The period also saw the development of a well organised system of cattle theft from the Fulani Kraals which Dr. Awogbade[93] misinterpreted as an indication of systematic hostility meted out to Fulani immigrants into the Plateau by the indigenous peoples and chiefdoms. Some of the stolen cattle were slaughtered for meat while

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92. There were a few runji settlements in some places. A runji is an exclusive slave settlement, which originated as a slave rendezvous for onward transportation to the big markets of Kano, Bauchi etc. This should be distinguished from the gandaye which were farm estates, in Hausaland, worked by slaves. I visited the runji in Gindiri chiefdom which, according to some informants, was the biggest in the whole province.

93. Awogbade, M.O. "Migration, Settlement and Patterns of Socio-Economic Organisation: A case study from the Fulani of Jos, Nigeria" International Seminar on the Pastoralists of West African Savana. Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 16th to 20th July, 1979.

others were herded into the indigenous humpless muturu breed of cattle.[94]

The establishment of settler-communities on the Plateau had two important effects on trade. Firstly, it led to the recognition and establishment of their settlements as permanent market centres which were attended on regular week-days.[95] The catchment areas of these market centres extended beyond the territorial limits of the host chiefdoms and included all neighbouring chiefdoms.[96] Secondly, it led to the establishment of a uniform means of exchange - cowry shells, cloth, iron bars and salt bags.[97] These market centres came to be effective means of spreading British currency the pound sterling, during the colonial period.[98]

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94. Fitzpatric, J.F.J. op cit. p. 23. I have not been able to establish the origin of the muturu or its domestication.

95. These market centres were encouraged by the colonial administration which deliberately founded new ones. Most rural communities on the Plateau still operate these regulated market days although some have changed. Weekdays are remembered by petty traders in Plateau on the basis of market days e.g. Friday - Mangu; Tuesday, Shendam and Daffo; Wednesday - Mararaba etc.

96. These markets, some of which I attended, are well attended. Mangu market, for example, attracts traders from Lagos, Kano, Zaria, Maiduguri, Onitsha etc etc.

97. Fieldnotes. But also see, Izard, T.A. "Wase District, Shendam Division - Reassessment Report on by." SNP 9 520/1923.

98. Tukur, M.M. "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States, 1897 - 1914: A Reinterpretation of the Colonial Sources" Ph.D. Thesis Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria 1979 pp. 749 - 761.

At the social level, the dresses these Hausa settlers wore, the food which they ate, particularly, kalaci, and the "gifts" which some of them made to their host chiefs begun to change the habits and outlook of some of their hosts. In some of the settlements they were numerically large enough to have their own Sarkin Hausawa (chief of the Hausawa) although such sarakuna were approved and installed by the host community chiefs to which they were subordinated.[99] The respect which the settler communities gave their sarki had demonstration effects on the way in which their host communities came to regard their own chiefs. In this regard, it should be noted that the Sokoto jihad succeeded on the Plateau precisely in those areas which had muslim communities prior to the jihad.[100] Thus, some of the chiefdoms of Southern Zaria which came under Islamic influences from Zaria and Nasarawa were soon coerced by the jihadists into the Jemaa Emirate despite the apparent instability which characterised the existence

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99. Examples of these were in Pianiya (Panyam), Pankshin, Chika, Kombun and the Jemaa Fulani.

100. Adamu, M. op.cit. pp. 52 - 53.

of that emirate.[101] Similarly, the Burum, plain Yergam, Namu, Kwande and Kwalla had also come under islamic influences from the Hausa settlements in these areas.[102] In their own cases, they received inspiration from Bauchi, Kano and Muri emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. Those chiefdoms which were taken by the jihadists without prior contact with moslems were largely located in the adjascent plains of the Plateau massif; they had been subjected to continous raids by the moslem communities and governments which surrouned them.[103]

Some of the chiefdoms which were defeated militarily, but which were not integrated into the Caliphate, initially paid tributes; but they soon stopped payment whenever they felt strong enough to withstand another encounter.[104] The bulk of the chiefdoms on the plateau

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101. Pashi, M.I. "The Formation and Evolution of the Pastoral Fulbe Community in Jemaa Area C. 1800 - 1933." B.A. Essay Department of History, A.B.U. Zaria. 1976 pp. 40 - 55.

102. Ames, C.G. op.cit. pp. 30 - 31; 123; 136 - 138 and Adamu, M. op.cit. p. 36.

103. Zaria, Nassarawa, Muri and Bauchi.

104. The continuing wars with Kabwir, Dawaki, Dass Southern Zaria chiefdoms. Even Kanam sub-Emirate rebelled after the death of Yakubu. For the details of the rebellions, see; Abubakar, A.Y. op.cit. pp. 669 - 670.

massif however remained relatively unaffected by the military activities associated with the jihad. The Mwahavul's (actually only the chiefdom of Pianiya - Panyam) defeat of the jihadists in 1840 seemed to have sealed all hopes of military penetration of these chiefdoms.[105] Yet Hausa and islamic culture spread to these chiefdoms peacefully through trade just as Fulani herders continued to enter the region.

However, communities which had fallen to the jihadists became the main agents of trade. The intensification of these trading activities and the jihad led to an increased number of Hausa and Fulani settlers in the Plateau region.[106] It should be pointed out that many of the Plateau communities did not perceive the jihad as a comprehensive movement involving the whole savana region of which they only formed a tiny portion. For example, among the Mwahavul, who retain the pride of having repulsed the jihadists militarily, the episode is simply referred to as the Bauchi attack.[107]

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105. Ames, C.G. op.cit. p. 31.

106. More settlements were founded such as Monguna "A", Monguna "B", Halle (Mangu Hausawa) Panyam, Chika etc.

107. Fieldnotes - Pastor David Lot; Gujihir Punshak (d. 1975); Yaktong Kopsam (d. 1980).

The political and economic significance of the jihad in the Plateau region therefore cannot be perceived merely in terms of the satelite emirates which it founded, nor in the reorientation of some of these chiefdoms towards centres in Zaria, Bauchi, Muri and Nasarawa but in its assistance to breaking the age-old relative isolation of this whole region from centuries of flourishing trans-Saharan trading system. The relative isolation of the Plateau region from participating in this long-distance trading system had helped to keep most of the communities at a predominantly communal social formation for several centuries.

From the foregoing, a number of observations can be made in connection with the political configuration of the communities of the Plateau on the eve of colonial conquest and domination. Firstly, that the peopling and formation of the people into linguistico-cultural and political groups had occured centuries before the advent of the British. This process, as well as the process of transforming these groups themselves, was still going on when the British intervened. Secondly, the communal mode of production was dominant. The widespread nature of the communal mode of production gave rise to several political developments some of which had begun to change radically only in the previous two hundred years.

In summary, the political configuration and development of the communities of the Plateau exhibited the following features albeit in varying degrees. The first feature was the absence of a sustained, consistent and well developed system of tribute payment or taxation until the 19th century, but even then, only a few communities were involved. Secondly, there were communal chiefs. However, these chiefs did not earn their living from their office although they took "voluntary gifts" from other members of the community. In many cases, they were actually heads of lineages; they belonged to households and had household farms on which they themselves and other members of the households worked. Different varieties of corvee labour was employed to help on their farms. There were no slave-worked farms typical of the emirates. These chiefs and the heads of the households constituted an embryonic ruling class in formation. Thirdly, these chiefdoms were lineage-based, numerous and, politically, autonomous entities of identity. Linguistic and cultural ("ethnic") groups constituted a cultural entity or a "field of communication" but not necessarily political entities because an ethnic group usually contained several chiefdoms. Fourthly, the Sokoto jihad, which the British terminated, was still going on in some parts of the Plateau. Some of the

chiefdoms quickly transformed into feudal structures as a result of direct subjugation to Bauchi, Zaria, Nasarawa and Muri as sub-emirates. In other communities which were not conquered by the jihadists, the chiefs became more powerful in the process of organising their communities to fight the jihadist, a process very similar to the emergence of tor agbande (Drum Chiefs) among the Tiv during the Chamba wars.[108] This state of affairs was still in progress when the British invaded, occupied and began to rule the whole region.

Thus far, I have attempted a survey of the peopling of the Plateau region - its character and its nature; the organisation of production; and consequently the political superstructure which developed in the Plateau society. This has been necessary for it provides the background for an understanding of the deformation of these structures which colonial rule brought about. It also helps to explain the nature and structure of the widespread resistance against colonial conquest and rule which characterised British rule in this Province throughout its first thirty years. And most importantly,

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108. Makar, T. "A History of Political Change Among the Tiv in the 19th and 20th Centuries" Ph.D. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. 1975 p. 102.

it helps to explain the peculiar nature and character of colonial exploitation and rule on the Plateau which accelerated class formation - the major focus of this thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

THE BEGINNINGS OF A PLATEAU COLONIAL ELITE 1902-1945.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is necessarily prefaced by a discussion of colonial conquest and the establishment of a colonial society and rule on the Jos Plateau as distinct from the existence of these communities as examined in chapter one. The bulk of the chapter focuses on the key colonial institutions of domination and exploitation which were crucial in the formation of classes in the colonial society of Plateau province. Three key colonial institutions are thus identified and discussed; namely, the Native Authority (N.A.); colonial education; and the Christian missions and the Church.

The first of these institutions, the Native Authority, was concerned with social control by concentrating on the maintenance of colonial law and order through the use of local chiefs, colonial police, courts and prisons. It represented the colonial state at the grassroot level. More importantly, the Native Authority inevitably created a colonial bureaucracy and a working class in the process of providing services which assisted colonial exploitation of the province.

The other two related colonial institutions, namely, colonial education and the church were also concerned with social control but moreso at the ideological level. For the existence and activities of these institutions in the Plateau province led to the development and emergence of a group of people who not only formed a segment of the Native Authority workers, but who also regarded colonialism as a positive and desirable historical development by linking it to Christianity - of course, capitalist Christianity - an ideological tool of capitalist Europe.

It is argued in this chapter, therefore, that the classes of people which these three colonial institutions together produced eventually formed the most important segment of the proto-ruling classes of the Plateau province. For indeed, as the subsequent chapters demonstrate, the politics of decolonisation in the Plateau province emanated from this proto-ruling elite of the early colonial period.

COLONIAL INVASION AND SUBJUGATION

Most commentators,[1] including the British invaders themselves, saw the conquest of the Plateau merely as an appendage of the conquest of Bauchi emirate to which they regarded the former as subordinate. Nothing could be further from the truth, and the British soon discovered the folly of this assumption. For Bauchi emirate gave the British no battle and the latter took the palace of the emir on 17th February 1902 without a gun being fired. But within two months of this date, however, a mining expedition under Colonel H.W. Laws was already in Keffi on its way to the Jos Plateau, then, erroneously regarded as part of Bauchi emirate.

Lugard had preceded the expedition with a letter to Temple, the Resident of Bauchi Province, asking him to provide information on the tinfields in his

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1. The main archival files dealing with the conquest of the Bauchi emirate and the Plateau region are: SNP 15/1 Acc. 29; SNP 15/1 Acc.39; SNP 15/1 Acc. 40; SNP 15/1 Acc. 94; SNP 6 C. 140/1907 etc. Most of the commentators and scholars on this area have derived their information chiefly from these sources at the NAK. The principal commentators include: Adeleye, R. Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1840 - 1906. London, 1971 p. 237 - 243; Ikime, O. "The British in Bauchi, 1901 - 1918: An Episode in the British Occupation and Control of Northern Nigeria" in JHSN Vol. VII no. 2 1974 p. 271 - 301; ABUBAKAR, A.Y. op.cit. p. 736 - 762; Morrison, J. "A History of Jos Division" Ph.D. Thesis, University of Ibadan, 1977 p. 160 - 213.

province.[2] Temple replied that he could not get satisfactory information about the mines or the natives emphasizing that "by common report, the natives are hostile pagans."[3] He then promised to undertake a tour of the areas and to report subsequently.

Meanwhile, Laws, having assessed his military strength discovered that he needed reinforcement and accordingly, applied to Lugard for same. Lugard was initially reluctant but Laws, together with Scarborough,[4] the major tin prospecting sponsors, persuaded him to change his attitude. Jim Morrison seems to have interpreted Lugard's reluctance to mean Lugard's abhorance for the possible loss of life anticipated in the expedition, as if Lugard had concern for the natives.[5] The imperial career of Lugard however, does not warrant this interpretation.[6] For Lugard's main

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2. SNP 15/1 Acc. 39: "Bauchi Report" No. 3 April 1902: NAK.

3. Ibid.

4. Major J.L. Victoria "A Tin Mining Anniversary at Jos". Reprinted from The Nigerian Field Vol. XIV no 3 1954, Jos Museum; also, SNP 15/1 Acc. 39 op.cit. NAK.

5. Morrison, J. op.cit. p. 178 - 179.

6. Nicolson, I.F. The Administration of Nigeria 1900 - 1960: Men, Methods and Myths. Oxford, 1969 p. 124 - 176.

concern had more to do with how to make available a sufficient military force for the expedition; and yet, have enough soldiers to maintain law and order in Bauchi as well as the possible military engagement of the French in Bornu, the ultimate object of the Lower Bornu expedition. Furthermore, Temple had made it clear to Lugard that it would not be possible for him to meet all the military assistance required of him if the newly established fort at Bauchi was to remain effective in checking any possible outbursts.[7]

In the circumstances, a Company of the 1st. Battalion commanded by Captain Callagher was sent. Accompanying him were two political officers: Webster, the Resident of Nasarawa Province and G.F. Philips, the Assistant Resident of Bauchi Province, who joined the expedition at Daroro.[8] The Royal Niger Company (RNC) supplied Laws with provisions and equipment to last 12 months and it took 600 carriers to convey these supplies from the Southern provinces to Naraguta, his first station. An additional escort of 25 men of the 2nd Battalion (Yorubas), considered as inferior to Hausa, were given him at Lokoja.[9]

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7. SNP 15/1 Acc. 39: NAK.
8. Major J.L. Victoria op.cit. p. 108.
9. Ibid. p. 108.

When all was set, Lugard was still doubtful of the military strength of the expedition and told it's command "to turn back if opposition was met".[10] But in their first encounter with the Kwaki of Ganawuri, a hundred Kwaki were killed."[11] Vwang (Vom) gave no battle. On the Christmas eve of 1903, Laws made his journey to Bukuru after establishing his Naraguta base.

In order to assist Laws, Temple, the Resident of Bauchi, now undertook a "tour" of the tinfields between April and June 1902.[12] The tinfields were believed to be part of what the British had designated as Dass District[13] of Bauchi emirate. It was a very vaguely defined district and they themselves were not sure of its territorial limits. The tour convinced Temple of the huge task that lay ahead if this region was to be effectively occupied and administered by the British. For, inspite of the military might at his command, Temple could not subdue the chiefdoms with ease. Furthermore, due to the heavy and crashing defeat which

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10. Ibid. p. 112.

11. Morrison, J. op.cit. p. 180.

12. SNP 15/1 Acc. 40: "Bauchi Reports April-June 1902;" NAK.

13. Ibid.

some of these chiefdoms had inflicted on the jihadists between 1830 and 1900, many of the former had come to believe that they were militarily invincible. Even the jihadist themselves had come to share this belief about the military prowess and invincibility of the "pagan" whom they sought to convert.[14] For at Jengre, for example, the Fulani could not give Temple any information about the people for fear that the British would be defeated and they (the Fulani) would be the worse for it.[15]

It is not necessary here to relate the numerous battles which the British fought with each of these communities in this "tour" or any subsequent ones. For as enlightening as these are, they fall outside the main focus of this chapter. Suffice it to mention that in this "tour" and subsequent ones, the British ensured that the conquest of the various communities was not only thorough but brutal.[16]

These expeditions on the Plateau were thus characterised by excessive killings, injuries, arson, looting and the consfication of cattle and other livestock. Furthermore, the British laid down extremely harsh conditions for submission, an aspect

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14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

of the conquest which the archival records bring out vividly.[17] So too, do the oral accounts of these various battles which are pationately remembered and easily related by some participants who are still alive today.[18] For example, in the first two days of this particular encounter with the people of Jengre, sixty-five people were killed, the chiefs palace was burnt down, the madaiki was taken captive, and herds of livestock were looted by the British.[19] It was only on the second day that Jengre people "managed to shoot and kill two" from the enemy's side who were loitering behind. Another fierce battle occured a few days later with the Gustig, a Jarawa group, in the Shere heights. At Koji, still among the Jarawa, Temple recovered "the sword, shield and Koran of the Turakin Bauchi whom

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17. SNP 6/3, 61/1907 "Sura Expedition: Severity of Punitive Measures," NAK; SNP 6/3, 40/1907 "Bauchi Province, Patrols and Expeditions," NAK; SNP 10/1, 194p/1913 "Central Province: Pankshin Disturbance, Yergum, Pe and Thal" NAK; SNP 10/3, 61p/1915 "Hill Angas Disturbances" NAK; SNP 15/1, Acc. 94 "Bauchi Operations 1905" NAK.

18. During my fieldwork, I was fascinated by the number of oldmen, alive, who vividly remembered and recalled their experiences during the invasion and conquest of their country by the British. See also, Ikime, O. op.cit. p. 278 - 283.

19. SNP 15/1 Acc. 40: NAK.

they killed in the fight a year and half ago", and Temple "sent them to Emir of Bauchi who was immensely pleased to receive them."[20] This cruel and ruthless action was repeated in every place. Temple ended this first round of "tour" in June and returned to Bauchi to compile a report which he subsequently sent to the High Commissioner in Zungeru. Concerning the excessive massacre of the natives, the Resident minuted as follows:

> I greatly regret that this loss of live should have occured, at the same time I do not see how it could have been avoided. I gave the natives every opportunity to meet me in a friendly manner ... It is evident that they had been for so many years accustomed to do as they pleased, having never been conquered by the Fulanes, that they had come to consider themselves invincible ... they had no idea at all of the power of the whiteman.[21]

This line of apology for the Jengre massacre was to be used in many more cases and the end of the April - June "tour", the British had defeated a majority of the communities in the northern section of the Plateau. It would be recalled that Colonel Laws had taken the western communities in his Naraguta expedition earlier

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20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

that same year. The south and south-eastern communities were yet to be subdued.

But, even in the defeated northern and north-western portions of the Plateau, now the area of the tinfields, Temple was, apparently, not very certain of his successes. For in 1905, anxious to open a direct route to Keffi via Lere, Pyem and Bukuru for mail delivery, Temple set out again to clear this same zone. The Mwahavul chiefdoms of Pianiya (Panyam), Kifong and Komyal, which lay only partially on the way, were attacked and they held Temple up from March 1st to 3rd 1905. In the fighting which followed, the war leaders of all three groups were killed and the houses of the chiefs and their headmen were burnt down. On the 4th of March, the people attempted, a night attack in vain. The leading chief, the madaki of Pianiya, was made prisoner only to die at Mangu on the 5th of March. Temple rounded up this feat confessing, "I roughly estimate Sura losses at about 60 killed - no wounded were seen. We had no casualties."[22] The British then moved to Bassa where they killed twelve warriors.[23]

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22. SNP 15/1 Acc. 94 "Bauchi Operations, 1905"; NAK.

23. Ibid.

At Zagun the British faced stiff opposition but the former lost with 130 killed and "very many wounded."[24]

About mid 1906, Oliver Horward replaced Temple as Resident of Bauchi Province. Horward apparently inaugurated yet a bloodier phase in the history of the British conquest of the Plateau, particularly, in the Mwahavul and Angas countries. For between July 1906 and January 1907, he had ordered four expeditions into those "pagan areas". These patrols, as they were then called, were carried out with an unrestricted slaughter of any groups that came in their way. For example, among the Mwahavul, who had already been defeated in 1905, a further 247 were massacred.[25] The Angas chiefdoms of Wokkos, Weseli and Ampang, suffered similar massacres. In their cases, the services of about 1000 Sayawa mercenaries were employed to scorch the Angas rocks while Horward and the main regiment took positions at the foot of the rocks shelling the inaccessible heights.[26] Many lives were lost and the missionaries cried out against Horward's sanquinary excesses.[27] It is no wonder, therefore, that Horward died, in September 1908, of an overdose of morphine

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24. Ibid.

25. Morrison, J. op.cit. p. 204; SNP 6 C. 140/1907 - NAK.

26. SNP 6 C. 140/1907 "Bauchi Province: Patrols and Expeditions" - NAK.

27. Morrison, J. op.cit. p. 204.

which implies suicide.[28]

By 1907, British law and order had been established over the greater part of the Plateau communities. However, the records also make it quite clear that these military expedition continued well into the second and third decades of the twentieth century. For although the communities acknowledged British military superiority and defeat, they rose up in arms whenever the opportunity arose. In most cases, taxation and the way it was collected constituted the main source of grievance which sometimes led to violent resistance. In this way, some colonial officers, policemen, local collaborator-chiefs and messengers lost their lives.[29] Other instances of armed rebellion were shown during the movement of military garrisons from one location to another. For example, on noticing the redeployment of the Pankshin garrison troops in 1915, widespread unrest and murders occured in the Mwahavul chiefdoms

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28. Ibid.

29. Colonial records do not document all the numerous instances of the loss of lives in this regard. The often-cited cases were those of the Montol Rebellion 1916 and the Dimmuk Rebellion 1930. In both cases, colonial officers F.E. Maltby and C.M. Barlow (A.D.O.s) respectively lost their lives. See; SNP 9, 393/1927 - N.A.K; JOSPROF 1, 5/1941: N.A.K.

of Kadung, Mirwa, Komhun and Jipal. These communities had mistaken the redeployment exercise to mean that there were no longer troops at the disposal of the colonial administration and so rose in arms.[30] Even as late as in 1930 some of the communities still believed that the British would soon leave and there were rumours of British evacuation being entertained in those areas leading to open confrontation with the colonial authority in these places.[31] Similarly, up till 1930 some districts of the province were termed as "Closed Districts," which meant that any European trader, missionary, miner or their African agents who entered such districts without the expressed permission of and Police escort from the respective District Officers in charge, did so at their own risks.[32] All these demonstrate that up to 1930, the British were occasionally involved in putting down rebellions by one Plateau community or another.[33]

Generally therefore, the nature and character of the conquest of the Plateau province had certain implications for class formation in the province. Firstly, the stiff resistence offered by the numerous

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30. JOSPROF 1, 417/1915: NAK.
31. JOSPROF 1, 5/1931: NAK.
32. JOSPROF 1, 1937/1922: NAK.
33. Ames, C.G. op.cit. p. 44.

autonomous chiefdoms had important implications for the application of Lugard's indirect rule system in the province. For, unlike in the emirate areas of the Northern Region, no single ruling house was relied upon to provide the British with a ready machinery for the administration of the whole province. Secondly, the relatively extreme brutality which accompanied the conquest of the Plateau province ensured that the confiscation of "native" land was made possible with minimum opposition. This land confiscation had important consequences for class formation; a subject which is treated more appropriately and in greater detail in the next chapter. Furthermore, this deliberately brutal conquest of the Plateau province aimed at total submission to colonial authority paved the way for the formulation and implementation of obnoxious agricultural, industrial, commercial and administrative polices peculiar to this province all of which were aimed at elevating tin mining to the neglect of other sectors of the economy. We must now turn to an examination of the colonial institutions which we have identified as crucial to class formation in the province.

I. THE NATIVE AUTHORITY INSTITUTION (N.A.)

The native authority institution, popularly known as the N.A., in Nigeria has been a subject of

some considerable academic interest.[34] A survey of the historiographical trend in Nigeria in the1960s, suggests that it was considered to be an important institution in the colonial domination of Nigeria. There is little doubt that the Native Authority was an important colonial institution for the establishment of law and order during the colonial period in the Plateau and indeed, the whole of Nigeria. But it must be emphasized that the Native Authority institution itself was only a means to an end, and not an end in itself. Consequently, the question must not be posed wrongly. For example, it was often asked; was British "rule" in Nigeria direct or indirect?[35] This was essentially a

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34. British Administration became a major theme of historical study and research in the 1960s. Indeed between 1963 and 1968, no less than four Ph.D. theses were written on the subject at the University of Ibadan. Several of these doctoral theses were abridged for publications in the JHSN. These theses were: Afigbo, A.E. "Warrant Chief System in Eastern Nigeria 1900-1927" (1964); Atanda, J.A. "The New Oyo Empire: A Study of British Indirect Rule in Oyo Province, 1894 - 1934" (1965); Ikime, O. "Itsekiri-Urhobo Relations and the Establishment of British Rule, 1884 - 1936" (1965); and Igbafe, P.A. "Benin Under British Administration 1897 - 1938" (1967). For a comprehensive round-up of the debate on the direct or indirect nature of British rule in Nigeria, see; Ikime, O. "Reconsidering Indirect Rule - The Nigerian Example" JHSN Vol. 4 no 3 1968 p. 421 - 438.

35. See, for example, the formulation of British domination and exploitation in Nigeria in the following works: Afigbo, A.E. "Warrant Chief System in Eastern Nigeria: Direct or Indirect Rule?" JHSN Vol. 3 no. 2 1967; and Igbafe, P.A. "British Rule in Benin, 1897 - 1920: Direct or Indirect?" JHSN Vol. 3 No. 4 1967.

question of <u>form</u> which accepted British "rule" as given. The inadequacy, and infact danger, of this approach is that it accepts colonial domination and exploitation as given, that is to say, as a natural process and aspect of our history and not a violation and rejection of it.[36] In this way, the essentially naked and brutal[37] aspects of colonialism were covered-up as the inability of certain colonial officers to properly apply or not apply policy. Policy, in this connection, was the rule of the colonised by these colonial officers either directly or indirectly. Nothing can be more misleading.

A further danger of this approach lies in the uncritical acceptance of the Lugardian mythology of "direct" and "indirect" rule especially as Lugard propounded them. For Lugard had fraudulently provided the myth of direct and indirect rule simply to create the false impression that these modes of administration were evolved as a mark of respect for "native" institutions by the British thereby legitimising colonial rule. This had the effect of making some of its colonial

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36. Samora Machel: "Knowledge and Science Should be for the Total Liberation of Man in our Ahmadu Bello University." <u>Speech at the Convocation Ceremony of A.B.U.</u> Zaria Dec. 1977 p. 4.

37. Fanon, F. <u>The Wretched of the Earth</u> 1970 p. 48.

subjects, particularly, some of the ruling classes of the emirates, to accept the view that the British conquerors respected them and their societies more than others.[38] This acceptance of a British colonial ideology led to the false, yet widespread, notion that the Lugardian indirect rule system was successful in Northern Nigeria vis-a-vis the South where it failed and where the British had to apply direct rule. Yet, evidence of opposition to the indirect rule system by patriotic Moslems in the various emirates and at various times abound.

The futile preoccupation with searching for areas where direct and indirect rules succeeded or failed carried an implicit idea that British domination and exploitation of Nigeria was, somehow, in the interest of the colonised. For it is not clear why scholars of colonial administration should have concentrated on this wrongly posed question and thereby helped to spread these false claims of colonial rule when the evidence clearly pointed to the contrary.

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38. Smith, B.S. But Always as Friends London, 1969, pp. 240 - 257; but see, specifically, Okonjo, I.M. British Administration in Nigeria 1900 - 1950. New York, 1974 pp. 293 - 336. However many of his ideas and contentions about the North should be treated with caution.

The historiographical explanation for this, in my opinion, is that even as Africanists historians, these scholars were still circumscribed by colonial ideology and the historiographical tradition rooted in this ideology. For when Lugard was commencing his imperial career in Nigeria, he was very clear and explicit about his idea of direct and indirect rule and the subsequent institutions to which they gave rise, namely, the warrant chiefs system and the native authority system respectively. There was no need for any serious discourse over the differences between the two since the corner-stone in the two systems was the existence and use of a native agent. On the function of these native agents, be they warrant chiefs or obas or emirs, Lugard declared:

> "The essential feature of the system is that the native chiefs are constituted as an integral part of the machinery of the administration. There are not two set of rulers - British and native - working either separately or in co-operation, but a single government in which the native chiefs have well-defined duties and an acknowledged status equally with the British officials ... The ruling classes are no longer demi-gods, or parasites preying on the community. They must work for the stipends and positions they enjoy. They are trusted delegates of the Governor, exercising in Moslem States the well-understood powers of "wakils" in conformity with their own Islamic system, and recognizing the King's representative as their acknowledged Suzerain".[39]

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39. Lugard, F. The Dual Mandate ... London, 1965, pp. 203 - 204.

The Dual Mandate which contained Lugard's elaboration of native rule system came out as early as 1922, yet this misplaced debate on direct and indirect rules continued. A close reading of that work should have terminated the debate in the way in which it was formulated.

Thus, on the clear understanding that indirect rule meant British rule through local agents, as quoted above, Lugard proceeded to legalise its formulation. He therefore drew up oaths of allegiance to which the emirs swore on appointment; he graded and fixed salaries for them; and deposed those emirs who refused to conform to these new conditions of service.[40] There is no doubt that the system worked to a certain extent. But the reason for this was not due to its popular acceptance derived from its claim not to tamper with native institutions. For both claims were false. It must be emphasised therefore, that the Lugardian indirect rule and the Native Authority system which it produced in Northern Nigeria worked the way they did simply because colonialism found in the emirate societies ready institutions and classes of domination and exploitation through which it operated.[41]

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40. Ibid. p. 211 - 213.

41. Tukur, M.M. op.cit. p. 835.

And even in assessing this allegedly successful rule of the British in Northern Nigeria vis-a-vis other parts of the country, the roles of the colonial army and the police in backing up the British agents - the local ruling classes and institutions requires a serious attention.[42] All these are issues of perception which are extremely important if a scientific history of colonial rule in Nigeria is to be written. Nevertheless, a rigorous discussion of them falls outside the main scope of this thesis which focuses on an examination of the Native Authority from the narrow perspective of class formation on the Plateau. The main focus of the analysis offered here is therefore necessarily centred on the development, size and activities of these Native Authorities, regardless of the changing colonial policy on them, as institutions which created new social, economic and political classes in the province.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIVE AUTHORITY SYSTEM IN PLATEAU PROVINCE 1903 - 1954.

It is generally acknowledged that the Native Authority formed the cornerstone of the British indirect rule system of colonial administration in Northern Nigeria

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42. Ames, C.G. op.cit. pp. 50 - 51.

to which the Plateau Province belonged. Central to the workability or otherwise of this indirect rule system was the existence of an indigenous ruling aristocracy whom the British conquerors converted to their own use.

In this regard, only Hausaland and Borno which formed the greater portion of colonial Northern Region, had historically developed elaborate state systems with well-entrenched ruling aristocracies. The Sokoto jihad of the early 19th century merely modified, consolidated and codified these state systems on the basis of a progressive interpretation of the Sharia - the Islamic law and code of conduct.[43] The jihad also expanded the territories which came to form the post-jihadist political community known as the Sokoto Caliphate. For even Borno which had a longer history of political evolution lost territories to the Sokoto Caliphate which was made up of separate political and administrative units known as emirates - a progressive reincarnation of the former sarauta systems in Hausa-land. These emirates and the Borno Shehunate (Sheikdom), we must emphasise, formed the cornerstone of British Native Authority system in these areas.

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43. Last, D.M. The Sokoto Caliphate Longman, 1977 pp. 46 - 60.

Among the communities of the Plateau province, however, the position was different. For only very few communities here had evolved clearly discernible ruling classes. The bulk of the communities, as we discussed in chapter one, were in transition from a predominantly communal mode of production to some other mode approximating the feudal mode.[44] Consequently, there were no ruling classes of the emirate type on which the British would graft colonial authority. There existed chiefs but these hadn't developed the power and bureaucracy characteristic of the emirates. Furthermore, there were so many of these chiefs exercising authority over hardly more than a few hundreds of people scattered over small territories or domains. This created a problem because the British would have had to maintain an army of some 400 chiefs[45] to administer a territory with a population smaller than some of the emirates which were being effectively ruled by only an emir and a handful of subordinate officials.

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44. Rodney, W. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa Dar es Salaam, 1976 pp. 46 - 47.

45. From my own computation of these chiefdoms using the colonial village Heads as a basic chieftaincy unit.

Thus, between 1908 and 1934, various schemes of Native Authority system were tried on the Plateau but none succeeded.[46] These attempts legitimately form the subject of an administrative history but our focus here is on these Native Authorities as agents of class formation once they were established, no matter how crude and unstable.

For this reason, only a necessarily broad outline of the evolution and development of the Native Authority system on the Plateau is offered here as a basis for comprehending the specific nature and character of the socio-economic classes which emanated from these Native Authorities in this area.

In this regard, the development of the institution of the colonial Native Authority as an administrative arm of the colonial state on the Plateau can be discussed in four major phases. For between 1908 and 1954, there were four major attempts to fashion out an "acceptable" Native Authority system in the area based on the alleged principles of indirect rule.[47]

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46. For the various attempts aimed at establishing "acceptable" Native Authority institutions on the Plateau, see; SNP 9/11, 1430/1924" Pagan Administration, Northern Provinces" NAK; SNP 10/9, 370p/1921 "Memoranda on Treatment of Pagans" NAK; SNP 15/1 Acc. 338 Pagan Administration" NAK; JOSPROF 1, 2/4 336/1912" Hill-Plain Angas Amalgamation" NAK; JOSPROF 1, 3/1, 512 "Pagan Administration" NAK; Ames C.G. op.cit. p. 46.

47. Ballard, J.A. "'Pagan Administration' and Political Development in Northern Nigeria" SAVANA vol. 1 No. 1 June 1972 pp. 1 - 14.

The first phase was characterised by the initial attempts to create paramount chiefs throughout the province with full colonial powers under bigger chiefdoms on ethnic basis. This phase, which coincided with the period of Lugard's amalgamation of Nigeria and his own rule over it represented the formative years of indirect rule in Nigeria, particularly, on the Plateau.[48] It ended with Lugard's departure from Nigeria in 1918. It only need be stressed that the creation of bigger chiefdoms out of the numerous chiefdoms which existed on the Plateau failed woefully.

The second phase began with the attempts of Lugard's successor, Hugh Clifford, at correcting what he regarded as the short-comings of the indirect rule system particularly regarding the creation of paramount chiefs where non had existed previously. He therefore ordered a revision of the criterion for the creation of paramount chiefs in such areas and, instead, suggested that the objective of creating bigger chiefdoms should be achieved by a federation of the various autonomous Chiefs involved under a Chairman - chief where this was possible.[49] This phase came to a sharp end, in 1925,

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48. Annual Report for Northern Nigeria (ARNN) 1900 - 1911 pp. 26 - 27.

49. Ballard, J.A. op.cit. p. 8.

following the appointment of H.R. Palmer as the Leutenant - Governor of the Northern Provinces upon the departure of Clifford.

The third phase, under Palmer's direction, began with the creation and formal establshment of the Plateau province itself. This period witnessed an almost fanatical return to the Lugardian indirect rule system. On the Plateau, it witnessed not only a second attempt at the creation of bigger tribal chiefs, but, more seriously, a rationalisation and legitimisation of imposed District Heads over some communities notably in the Jeaman and Lowland Divisions of the Plateau province.[50] This phase came to an end with the withdrawal of Palmer in 1929.

The fourth phase, probably the most important since the time of Lugard, began in 1931 with the appointment of Sir Donald Cameron as Governor-General of Nigeria to the displeasure of many British administrators serving in the Northern Region.[51] For Cameron had served as an officer in the North before he was transferred to Lagos as the Chief Secretary of Governor Clifford. Both of them were known critics of the

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50. Ibid. p. 10.

51. Heussler, R. The British in Northern Nigeria London, 1968, pp. 64 - 82.

Lugardian and Palmerian perception and application of indirect rule.[52] Cameron therefore came to Nigeria with a mandate to apply, in Nigeria, the experiences which he had gained in Tanganyika where he had succeeded in establishing a stable local government system for that territory which, like Nigeria, contained centralised and non centralised political systems; moslem and non moslem communities.

The pivot of Cameron's conception and application of indirect rule as a system of local government rested on the ability of the colonial officers to identify and locate the locus of precolonial political authorities within and amongst the various communities and peoples of Nigeria through whom colonial political authority should mediate to the subjects.[53] All other details hinged on this. Consequently, he ordered a nation-wide research into the nature and structure of precolonial political organisation and institutions of all the communities and groups in Nigeria. These studies were intended, amongst others, to inform his reorganisation strategies based on "traditional tribal authority".

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52. Ibid.

53. Cameron, D. The Principles of Native Administration and their Application. (Lagos, 1934) JOSPROF I 512 "Pagan Administration" NAK.

And in order to assist the field officers in charge of these studies, Cameron issued guidelines along which such officers should conduct the inquiries.[54] For example he strongly advised that:

> The proper way to search out that authority is from the bottom. Build from the bottom; do not attempt, as I found in Nigeria when I returned there in 1931, to make, as it were, a crown or a king at the top and then try to find something underneath on which it might-perhaps-appropriately be placed. Begin with the people in the lower course of the structure, the family first, the extended family, and so on through the various grades right up to the authority, whatever it may be, that they all acknowledge as the authority that has regulated the society of the unit according to their own law and custom.[55]

He rounded up by warning against the failure to adhere to the real nature of precolonial political authority. He stressed:

> Shun as you would shun evil the make-believe "indirect Administration," based on nothing that is true. It is a monster and a very dangerous one at that.[56]

The tribal studies which Cameron ordered resulted in the production of volumes of tribal histories and

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54. Cameron, D. "Pagan Administration - Notes for the guidance of Officers engaged in enquiries connected with". JOSPROF I 512: NAK.

55. Ibid p. 1.

56. Ibid. p. 2.

notes which formed the basis of the provincial gazetteers which were published on each province. But more importantly, these studies formed the main bases of the administrative reorganisations of colonial local administration in Nigeria which began in 1934. The impact of these reforms varied from province to province but it was most noticeably felt among the so-called pagan areas of the North especially those areas over which colonial alien authorities had been imposed.

With regards to the Plateau, the reorganisations which followed Cameron's instructions formed the fourth phase of colonial administration on the Plateau. The main feature of the 1934 reforms on the Plateau was its flexibility and its link with precolonial sources of political authority. For no uniform Native Authority was established for the whole province. Indeed, none of the five Divisions which it established was a sole Native Authority. Rather, all the chiefdoms within each Division were organised to form federations of Chiefdoms including some paramount chiefs. For example, Bankshin Division was formed into a Federation of District Chiefs (Native Authorities) which included the Emir of Kanam who retained a separate bureaucracy of his own.[57] The

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57. Ibid. p. 175.

same concessions were made to the emirs of Wase and Jema'a in Lowland and Jema'a Divisions respectively.[58] Having been rooted in the precolonial sources of political authority, the Native Authority systems which were fashioned from 1934 on the Plateau including the boundary adjustments which accompanied them were more acceptable to the various communities and, therefore, remained in force throughout the colonial period until a new local government edict was passed for the Northern Region in 1954.[59]

Such were the major phases in the evolution of Native Authorities on the Plateau. And as we shall see, presently, they had important implications for class formation in the area. We must therefore move directly to a discussion of the functions and activities of these Native Authorities which formed a basis for the creation of new socio-economic classes on the Plateau.

FUNCTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE NATIVE AUTHORITIES

Professor Ikime has identified three main institutions as constituting the bedrock of the Lugardian indirect rule system in Northern Nigeria. These were;

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58. Ibid. pp. 217; 250.

59. Ahmadu Sardauna Local Government Development in the Northern Region; Kaduna, 1953 p. 14; Ballard, J.A. op.cit. pp. 11 - 13.

the Native Authority (chiefs, emirs, Shehu etc); the Native Courts; and the Native Treasury.[60] To these we should add the Native Police and the Native Prison. All these were institutions for the domination and exploitation of the Plateau, and, by implication, they were negative institutions. For it was through these various functionaries of the Native Authority system that colonialism recruited forced labour; imposed and collected taxes; confiscated "native" land, livestock and cattle; forced down prices and wages; and imposed a common currency on the various Plateau communities.[61]

In their discharge of these obnoxious duties for the British, these chiefs, judges (alkalai: pl.), police (yan doka; pl.), and the other Native Authority workers (ma'aikata) unleashed a reign of terror on the communities of the Plateau as well as cornered wealth. Many of these atrocities were documented by the colonial officials themselves but current memories among the various communities recall even more. It is not possible to enumerate all the known instances of land confiscation, forced labour, taxation and such like but a few deserve

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60. Ikime, O. "Reconsidering Indirect Rule - The Nigerian Example" JHSN Vol. 4 no. 3. 1966 p. 423.

61. These are demonstrated in various parts of this thesis.

to be documented at this juncture in order to dispel any doubts about this but, especially to show that in their discharge of these functions and duties, the Native Authority staff inevitably developed into a proto-ruling class over the generality of the Plateau populace.

✓ Thus, with regards to the recruitment of forced labour, six instances were documented which effected the whole province. These were; the construction of the Jos-Bauchi road, completed in 1922;[62] the Jos-Akwanga road;[63] the Jos-Pankshin-Shendam road, completed in 1926;[64] the Bauchi Light Railway, from Zaria to Jos, 1911-1914;[65] the main Eastern Railway from Enugu to Jos, completed in 1925;[66] and, lately, the Panyam - Shendam road, 1953-1956.[67] These colonial construction works provided the District Heads with opportunities to demonstrate their newly acquired power by coercing their

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62. SNP 9: 2399/1920 "Jos-Bauchi Road (i) construction (ii) Maintenance" N.A.K.

63. SNP 9: 3887/1920 "Dukuru - Jemaa Road Construction of ..." N.A.K. By 1936 "two native-owed lorries" already established regular passenger and goods services between Wamba and Gudi railway station. ARNN for 1936 p. 42.

64. SNP 9: 1271/1922 "Bauchi Province Annual Report 1921". N.A.K.

65. Ames, C.G. op.cit. p. 301.

66. SNP 9, 3524/1923 "Plateau Province - Railway Construction Political Labour" N.A.K.

67. Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province - Annual Report for 1956" ARNN p. 135.

subjects to the various construction sites.

Furthermore, some of these chiefs, the main agents of recruitment, turned the occasion of these construction works into making personal fortunes by exploiting their subjects and amassing wealth. For, apart from taking bribes from unwilling subjects so as to evade reporting at construction sites, many chiefs embezzled monnies meant for payment to their subjects for doing these road works. An example is provided by the Chief of Gashish, who, in 1924, embezzled money given him for payment of the Birom villagers of Gnar during the construction of the Eastern Rail line.[68] Oral sources suggest that the District Heads of Vom, Kuru and Gyel embezzled more.[69]

Besides recruiting forced labour, some of these construction works demanded special financial levies from the Plateau peasantry outside their normal taxes. Thus, in 1922, a Resident, sought for and obtained, a special warrant of £500 to be paid by the Jerawa villagers living along the Jos - Bauchi road in addition to their normal poll taxes which they had paid.[70]

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68. Morrison, J. op.cit. p. 359.

69. Gyang Jugu and others. Interview at Kuru 29/6/79.

70. SNP 9, 2399/1920 "Jos Bauchi Road (i) Construction (ii) Maintenance". N.K.

But forced labour and special levies were more rampant at the local level-constructions and maintenance of local roads, schools, dispensaries and particularly, Rest Houses. For as a matter of policy, each district had to build and maintain a minimum of one Rest House where the colonial officers on tour lodged. For example, in 1927, Shendam Division alone comprising only seven recognised districts had a total of 24 Rest Houses maintained with a token vote of only £20![71] Yet each Rest House had a salaried attendant, not even to mention the food and other important provisions which must be in a Rest House at any given moment.[72] It is obvious that the burden for all these fell on the shoulders of the Shendam peasantry.

Another example of the use of forced labour at the district level is provided among the Zagun and Bassa people in the present day Bassa Local Government Area. Thus, in 1922, a violent fracas erupted between the two villages which led to the intervention of the District Officer in charge of Jos Division. In the settlement which followed, all the villages which took

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71. JOSPROF 1, 28/1928 "Shendam Division - Annual Report for 1927" NAK.

72. Pastor David Lot. Dec. 79; my own personal knowledge of the one located at Panyam.

part in the scuffle were taxed half their money for that year. And in order to find money to pay the fines imposed by this settlement, a road project to Jos was started so as to employ the people but also to connect Bassa and Jos with a motorable road for faster movement of troops in the event of a future occurence.[73] According to a recent source,[74] the community chiefs and their dogarai (body-guards) enjoyed the "boom" because it provided them with an opportunity to undertake another tax collection session.

With regards to tax collection itself, nearly all the various Native Authority officials partook in it at various points between assessment, collection and delivery. It must be emphasised that taxation was a new phenomenon among most of the Plateau communities whom, as we have already shown, had not developed centralised political systems with, governmental functionaries. Nevertheless, the collection of taxes provided opportunities for bribery and corruption. Thus, the district scribes who toured the Fulani kraals took bribes in order to undercount the cattle of the

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73. SNP 9, 1623/1922 "Friction between Basse and Zagun villages, Jos Division - Bauchi Province" NAK.

74. Peter Abichei; Wilfred Lugwet and others. Interview at Bincin 14/3/79.

former for the purposes of cattle tax (jangali) assessment.[75] The chiefs, on their own part, and their relatives enjoyed the period of tax assessment and collection, which usually took place from October to December, for it afforded them the opportunity to amass plenty of livestock and grains which the peasants were forced to auction in order to obtain cash for the payment of tax money.[76] This was besides the outright confiscation of properties by some of these chiefs purportedly for entertaining tax officials on tour even when no taxes were due for payment by their subjects. Indeed, some of these chiefs or District Heads colluded with their District Scribes to force some of their subjects to pay taxes twice a year by refusing to issue receipts to the latter when they had duly paid their taxes in the first instance.[77]

As if these were not enough, many of the District Heads and District Scribes embezzled some of the tax money they collected. The District Scribes, in particular, were in the habit of falsifying the receipt books

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75. JOSPROF 1, 63/1926 "Bankshin Division - Annual Report for 1927" N.A.

76. David Dimka; John A. Kwashi; Pastor D. Lot; Ayuba Kumm; Yakiban Mangywat. Interviewed at various dates *passim*.

77. Ibid.

or even issuing false receipts in order to illegally corner public money and cheat the peasants and the cattle Fulani alike. Of course some of these cases of embezzlement and cheat were discovered by colonial officials and recorded, but many of such cases were not discovered. A famous example of a case of embezzlement in Jos was that of Barde, the Sarkin Jos from 1918 to 1921. Barde was the second Sarkin Jos after Bunu, both of who were sent by the Emir of Bauchi to rule the Jos Native Town. In 1921, Barde was convicted of embezzlement of tax money.[78] He was not only dismissed from office as the Sarkin Jos, but the practice of sending rulers from Bauchi to rule over Jos was stopped thereby throwing the office open for occupation by any qualified Hausawa settled in Jos native township itself.[79]

It must be emphasized that the atrocities perpetrated against the Plateau communities by the Chiefs during tax collections formed an important dimension of colonial exploitation and terror. For these sometimes led to open riots against colonial authority. For example, in 1916 an imposed paramount chief of the Angas, one Lankuk, was murdered along with fifty-one members of his

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78. SNP 9, 1271/1922 "Bauchi Province Annual Report 1921" NAK.

79. Ibid.

tax-collection entourage by the people of Tal who were contesting his authority over them in the first place.[80] Similarly, Morrison records that one Madugu, the District Head of Vwang (Vom) collected taxes three times from his people who resisted paying the third round. Madugu then sent for the police and in the scuffle which followed, two people were killed.[81] Instances such as these were many throughout the province.

So far, we have concentrated mainly on the chiefs, their dogarai and scribes as agents of colonial exploitation through various ways. It must be emphesized that there were other agents such as the local and state police, the yan doka and yan sanda respectively; the judges; secretarial staff and the messengers all of who functioned side by side with the colonial chiefs. For example, the judges, the police of all categories, the prison warders and the chiefs co-ordinated their activities very well. Instances of arbitrary arrests on the order of a chief; indefinite custody of accused by the police without trial; Kangaroo trial of cases; embezzlement of court fines and the taking of bribes by the judges are many in both the colonial records and

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80. JOSPROF 1, N. 618/1912; 336/1912; 70/1970: N.A.K.

81. Morrison, J. op.cit. p. 236.

the oral sources covering this period.[82] In all these misdeeds, the police stood out distinctly as a group who had special powers to terrorise and exploit. For as early as 1921, the heydays of colonial rule, the Resident of Plateau province, Mr. J.M. Freemantle threw much light on the social status of the dogarai - the lowest cadres of the three categories of police - when he observed that:

> I have admiration for thedogarai force as a whole, and am sanguine of their development among the pagans. The few dogarai of the Jos pagan administration have done some useful work. It is evidently a coveted ambition to have, or to be, a dogari, and I do not mean this in a cynical sense.[83]

If this could be said of the dogarai, much more was true of the yan doka (Native Authority Police) and the yan sanda (the colonial government police) in that order.

To these Native Authority chiefs, scribes, police, messengers, judges and so on, should be added an increasing army of Native Authority teachers, dispensary assistants and attendants, forest guards and road labourers, particularly, from the 1930s when the Native Authorities had settled down to their prescribed routine duties and as colonial exploitation intensified. Together,

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82. Orr, C. The Makin of Northern Nigeria London, 1965 pp. 232 - 233.

83. SNP 9, 1271/1922 "Bauchi Province Annual Report 1921" N.A.K.

all these categories of Native Authority workers formed a distinct class in all the five aministrative divisions of the Plateau province.

But it must quickly be pointed out that although the Native Authority staffs collectively formed a distinct class as salary and wage corners vis-a-vis the peasantry, they in turn could further be sub-divided into low, middle, and upper classes depending on the position which they occupied within the Native Authority hierarchies. At the bottom were the messengers, cleaners, road labourers, forestry attendants. These together formed a majority of the Native Authority workers in all the Divisions of the province. Above them were the clerical staffs, teachers, dispensary assistants and such like all of who had received formal training in their various fields. The numerous District Heads belonged to this group although they did not require any formal education. In terms of salaries, they were worse than even the lowest group of workers which we have identified above. For not only were their salaries very meagre, but some of them only depended on the yearly tax commissions which depended on the sizes of their districts. Nevertheless, they enjoyed enviable positions as rulers of their Districts as noted earlier. Finally, the upper class consisted of the emirs (Kanam, Wase and Jemaa), paramount chiefs (after 1947), head-teachers,

departmental heads, councillors and grades 'B' and 'A' court judges. These were in direct contact with British colonial officials in their various capacities.

At this juncture, some indication of the size of the newly created classes of the Native Authority staffs in relation to the rest of the population is necessary as a basis for gauging their impact on the colonial society of the Plateau province. But this is a task which cannot be accomplished with a high degree of accuracy due to the limitationsof our sources. For example, differences between emolument registers and the actual workers on the ground were not uncommon.[84] Furthermore, there was difficulty in compiling and computing the number of teachers in the Native Authorities due to the fact that the Christian Missions, who were in the first place reluctant to give information, and the Native Authorities both owned schools and kept separate records notwithstanding the apparently increasing number of teachers following the expansion programmes of both in the 1940s and 1950s.

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84. Solomon Dingshak; Ibrahim Tashi; Bongs Dimka - former Native Authority clerks - interviewed in group, 26th and 29th May, 1972 at Kankshin.

Nevertheless, some reasonable impression of the sizes of those classes of workers can be made both from the limited records available and from common sense calculations. For example, it is obvious that each District had only one District Head (chief) at a time. The same was true of District Scribes. In this regard, therefore, it is instructive to take Jos Division, the largest division in the province, as one containing the maximum size obtainable for the Native Authority staff.[85] In 1954, the whole of Jos Division had a total number of 19 District Heads; 23 messengers; 19 District Scribes, 30 Secretarial staff including the Chief Scribe and Accountant; 53 representatives (wakilai) and 88 dogarai.[86] The figures, however, did not include the Native Authority police proper (yan doka), nor, the increasing number of teachers, road labourers, forest guards, health inspectors (duba gari-sia), dispensary assistants and such departmental staffs. These ranged from a staff strength of some 20 or above in the departments of forestry, livestock and agriculture; to some 40 and above for the education and public works

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85. JOSPROF 1, 430/1931 "Organisation and Administration of Plateau Province" NAK.

86. Jos N.A. Council - Personal Emolument Registers 1950 - 1961.

departments.[87] According to Fom Bot, who was the Chief Scribe of the Native Authority Council until 1960 when he was installed as the Gbong Gwom, the Native Authority with all its departments and units never employed up to, and certainly not more than, 1000 workers of all categories throughout its life before 1960.[88]

The next Divisions close to the size of Jos were those of Pankshin and Shendam, followed by Southern Division with Jema'a Division as the smallest.[89] These individually contained lesser numbers of Native Authority workers than that of Jos Division. For example, in the same period, 1954, Pankshin Division had 24 District Heads (chiefs); 54 [illegible]; 24 District Scribes, 44 Secretarial staffs which included the Treasurer, Chief Scribes down to the messengers and cleaners.[90] Apart from Gindiri Training Centre, about which we shall say more later, this division had similar numbers of schools and dispensaries with that of Jos Division. The Shendam Division had almost the same number of workers as Pankshin.

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87. Fom Bot (Gbong Gwom Ngong Ngwom) 3/12/1982.

88. Ibid.

89. JOSPROF 1, 430/1931 "Organisation and Administration of Plateau Province" NAK.

90. File No. C/137 "Background to Pankshin Politics".

From the above, it is clear that the total number of Native Authority staff for all the five Divisions of the Plateau province by 1954 did not exceed 5000. This figure was out of a total population estimate of 819,025[91] for the whole province and thus represented a mere 0.6% of the total population of the province. In other words, only one out of every two hundred persons in the Plateau province was Native Authority worker of some sort.

But the tiny size of the Native Authority staff vis-a-vis the remaining population notwithstanding, their impact on the Plateau colonial society was significant. For, as mentioned earlier, this group had clearly distinguished itself from the bulk of the Plateau peasantry not only by the amount of money which they received as salaries and wages, but, more importantly, by the positions which they occupied as agents and local beneficiaries of a new socio-economic order - the capitalist order, at that historical juncture. To be sure, not all of them accumulated wealth nor succeeded in substantially improving their standards of living. For example, the lowest category of Native Authority workers, some of whom we have already identified above, remained a

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91. Counsell, E.H.M. Plateau Province, Annual Report, 1954" ARNN.

relatively poor lot and some of them were known to have been perpetually in debts.[92] However, their positions and status as Native Authority workers gave them access to the new opportunities of the colonial order such as sending their children to schools which became the most important agent of socio-economic elevation in the colonial society of the Plateau province.[93]

The upper categories of the Native Authority workers, however, developed into the local ruling elites of the various Plateau communities. This was demonstrated by the high positions which they occupied in their various communities. For as big Native Authority officials and chiefs, they were the first groups of people to build modern houses, own cars, radio sets and such other expensive properties in the villages. As a group, they certainly enjoyed a better standard of living than the mass of the peasantry who looked up to them for political leadership.

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92. Particularly those of them who no longer cultivated their farms believing themselves to be government workers (maaikatan gwamnati) and "putting up with" a life-style commensurate with their perceived social status.

93. Colonial education and its impact on historical developments, particularly, on class formation in the Plateau province is discussed below.

Thus, it is significant to note that regardless of their political parties, occupations and religions, all the representatives from the Plateau province in the national and regional houses of legislature, came from this group. For example, the Plateau leaders of the Northern Peoples Congress, the ruling party in the Northern Region; Alhaji Ali Kazaure, Alhaji Gobezantashi, Alhaji Audu Danladi, Alhaji Muhammadu Dankarfalis, Alhaji Isa Haruna, Mr. Deshi Toklen, Chief J.Y. Dimlong, and Mr. Michael Audu Buba were all representatives (wakilai) of the various districts of the Native Authorities of the province.[94] The same was true of the leaders and representatives of the opposition parties in the province such as Patrick Dokotri, Bitrus Rwang Pam, Choji Davou, Dangyang, Pastor David Lot, David Dimka, Gabriel Wuyep, Nyam, Joseph Makingad and Solomon Lar including all the paramount chiefs who qualified to be members of the House of Chiefs.[95] It is instructive to note that some of the representatives in the House of Assembly were also sons and relations of these colonial chiefs. Examples of these included, David Dimka, Michael Audu Buba, Bitrus Pam and H. Bronviyat (Kurnap).[96] Such were the statuses and class character of the upper

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94. Field note records. See appendix II.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

classes of the Native Authorities of the Plateau province.

The main point we have thus demonstrated above is that the Native Authority system in the Plateau province brought these categories of workers and their class positions, collectively, into being. We must now turn attention to another agent of class formation in the Plateau Province.

II. COLONIAL EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

Colonial education, like colonial administration, has been a subject of considerable academic interest and research.[97] A general picture of the evolution and development of colonial education in Nigeria has, therefore, emerged. But what has not yet clearly emerged is an accepted explanation of certain important features of, and issues concerning, colonial education in Nigeria. For example, the conventional explanations for the educational backwardness of the former Northern Region vis-a-vis the Southern Regions; the beneficiaries of colonial education; and the content of this education,

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97. The basic general texts on this include: Ajayi, J.F.A. Christian Missions in Nigeria: The Making of a New Elite. Longman, 1965; Graham, S.F. Government and Mission Education in Northern Nigeria. Ibadan, 1966; Ayandele, E.A. The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria 1842-1914. Bristol 1966; Fanfuwa Babs, A. History of Education in Nigeria London, 1974.

are still far from acceptable and are yet to be seriously attempted.[98] But while the resolution of these are eargerly awaited, it is incontrovertible that colonial education - these features and issues apart - was an important agent of class formation. What follows in this section, therefore, is an attempt to show the role of colonial education in the formation of socio-economic and political classes in the Plateau province.

However, before we embark on this exercise, the conceptual framework of this thesis makes it imperative to explain, very clearly, what is meant by colonial education. This is the more necessary for providing a concrete appreciation of the role of colonial education in the formation of classes on the Plateau, but, even more importantly, in comprehending why the beneficiaries of this education developed into a sub-ruling class in the province.

Thus, in this thesis, colonial education refers to what is conventionally regarded in the literature on this subject, as "Western Education." The term western education is rejected here because it is imprecise, unscientific and is actually a euphemism for the capitalist system of education. For no system of education

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98. Dr. M.M. Tukur's recent Ph.D. Thesis to which reference has been made, is an exception in this direction.

exists outside the concrete social and material conditions of a given mode of production.[99] And any system of education at all; is, fundamentally; a manifestation of the ideology of the dominant classes of such a social formation. For as Marx observed:

> In so far therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the whole extent of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in their whole range and thus, among other things, rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age. Consequently, their ideas are the ruling ideas of the age.[100]

We cannot, therefore, scientifically define education by vaque geographical reference such as "western" but by a rigorous and critical examination of the social relations of production to which that education pertains. This necessarily calls for a critical examination of the dominant classes of such a society and their ideology by employing the historical method.

Accordingly, with the conquest of the Jos Plateau and the imposition of the Capitalist socio-

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99. Marx, K. and Engels, F. Selected Works. Vol. one Moscow, 1977 p. 47.

100. Ibid. p. 47.

economic formation in the area through colonialism, the education which the British conquerors provided for their conquered aimed at rationalising and legitimising the capitalist mode by perpetuating colonialism in the province. I_t was education for subservience. For it ensured that the skills and ideas which it imparted to the Plateau people was one which facilitated colonial exploitation and domination of the province.[101] Colonial education therefore became a prerequisite for socio-economic elevation within the colonial society no matter the occupation one pursued. Inevitably, its beneficiaries gradually developed into a distinct class - a petty bourgeoisie - serving in the numerous colonial institutions of exploitation and domination of the Plateau people one of which we have discussed above as the Native Authority. An examination of the processes through which colonial education achieved this is, therefore, necessary.

THE INTRODUCTION, DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OF COLONIAL EDUCATION IN THE PLATEAU PROVINCE.

On the Plateau, which as we have noted, was initially administered as part of Bauchi Province, the government made no attempt whatsoever to start schools after 1908,

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101. Tukur, M.M. op.cit. 836.

when their conquest of the region had been firmly established. For the North as a whole, the earliest attempts at opening schools was probably in 1902 in the emirate of Yola.[102] But it failed. Then four years later, one was started successfully in Sokoto. In 1911, the famous Nasarawa School in Kano was opened. This school was established exclusively for the training of the children of the emirs.[103] Another school was also opened in Zaria at about the same time as an alternative to Dr. Miller's school there which had, by 1910, embarked

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102. Ibid. p. 836.

103. Graham, S.F. Government and Mission Education in Northern Nigeria, Ibadan, 1966 p. 79; Orr, C. The Making of Northern Nigeria, London, 1965 p. 266; p. 268; Palmer, H.R. "Kano Provincial Annual Report for 1915" SNP 10 170P/1916: NAK. It may be remarked that even as late as 1939, the emirs and chiefs of Northern Nigeria were unwilling to allow these schools admit the children of the commoners. For Dudley records that at a conference of chiefs in that year, the Emir of Kano observed that: "association with children of common people would be inclined to inculcate the outlook of the peasant". And supporting the Emir of Kano, the Emir of Kontagora added that: "the character of the chiefs children was adversely influenced by association with the children of ordinary people". Conference of Chiefs of the Northern Provinces, Summary of Proceedings, 1939. (Confidential). pp. 20 - 21. quoted in Dudley, B.J. Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, London, 1968 p. 16.

on active proselytisation. In Bauchi Province, however, the emir was apprehensive of colonial education due to the activities of Missionaries in Wase which was then administered under Muri Province. As such the emir of Bauchi was not initially enthusiastic about the introduction of colonial education in his emirate.[104]

The feelings of the emir of Bauchi and his lieutenants were known to the Resident who cautioned the High Commissioner about any further encroachment of missionary work in Bauchi Province, particularly, Bauchi emirate.[105] To be sure, there was no missionary school worthy of the name except for the two which the Cambridge University Mission Party had established at Panyam and Kabwir in 1908 and 1910 respectively.[106] The Sudan United Mission had opened a station in Langtang in 1906 and attempted to start a "school" but Mr. Burt[107] who was in charge of the station there had

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104. Howard, H.O. "Bauchi Report no. 27" SNP 127; NAK.

105. Gowers, W.F. "Bauchi Provincial Report for the December Quarter, 1908" SNP 7, 335/09: NAK.

106. SNP 9, 1271/1922 "Bauchi Province Annual Report 1921" NAK.

107. John G. Burt was one of the original party of four (Sudan United Mission) who arrived in Nigeria in 1904. The others were; Dr. Karl Kumm (leader), Dr. Ambrose Bateman (died before reaching Nigeria) and J. Lowry Maxwell, the author of Half a Century of Grace. For a fuller account of Burt's activities in Wase, See Maxwell, J.L. op.cit chapters 2 to 6 pp. 35 - 74.

antagonised the people to the extent that they lost interest in his stay in the area. For, according to the Resident, Mr.Burt ordered work to be done for him without any real payment and demanded gifts from the Sarki without any reciprocal gesture from himself. His behaviour antagonised the people to the point that they threatened their Sarki with emigration if he did not expel the missionaries.[108]

Even though between 1907 and 1920, the missions sought permission from government to open missionary schools in many parts of the province no such permissions were given except one given to the Resident to open three schools in Bassa if he could find Hausa teachers.[109] Thus, instead of establishing a government school in Bauchi like in the other Northern Provinces since government was reluctant to allow the missions to do it, the pupils from Bauchi were sent to schools outside the emirate, particularly, to Kano Nasarawa school and Zaria "Provincial" school.[110] The idea of the "provincial" schools such as were established for the major emirates,

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108. Howard, H.O. "Bauchi Report no. 27" SNP 127: NAK.

109. JOSPROF 1, 676/1913 "Pagan Education" NAK;
SNP 9, 2894/1918 "Bauchi Provincial Mission School - Est. of in Pagan Areas," NAK.

110. Tukur, M.M. op.cit. p. 849.

most of which had then been constituted as provinces, found no footing in Bauchi emirate nor indeed, Bauchi Province. The only other attempt, that I know of, at opening a school in Plateau was by the Roman Catholic Mission after their settlement in Shendam in 1906. It may be noted that, in 1914, the whole of the Northern Provinces put together, had only 58 mission schools and a total enrolment of 1682 pupils.[111] These were mostly found in the riverain provinces of Kabba, Benue and Ilorin.

After 1920, government gave permission to the missions to open schools in more areas of the "pagan" parts of Bauchi province.[112] As a result, formal "classes" were started by the Sudan United Mission at Kerang, Kombul, Takkas and Ampang and, later, several other villages particularly in Jos and Pankshin Divisions.[113] These schools were supposed to be inspected frequently, by both mission and government officials, to ensure that minimum standards were attained. Yet, these standards were a subject of controversy between the mission and the

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111. SNP 9, 1513/1915 "Education Dept. - Annual Report for the year 1914" NAK.

112. SNP 9, 2894/1918 "Bauchi Provincial Mission Schools - Est. of in Pagan Areas" NAK.

113. SNP 9, 1271/1922 "Bauchi Province Annual Report for the year 1921" NAK.

government. However, up to 1921, the only schools worthy of mention in the provincial report for that year were the ones at Panyam and Kabwir.[114] The two schools were said to be "flourishing" and the Resident found time to visit the one at Panyam where, inspite of their flourishing status, he noted that:

> these are infant schools rather than primary. The mission has its own syllabus and I am rather sorry to find that the idea of becoming assisted schools does not appeal, chiefly I gather because of the religious clauses in the Regulations of the Ordinance. They do not desire to risk being bound to a secular curriculum for any of their pupils.[115]

These remarks clearly show that these schools were far below government standard but were regarded as flourishing only in relation to the informal classes which had begun to emerge after 1920, or, even in relation to the generally low level of educational development of the "pagan" areas of Bauchi Province in general. Why did the colonial government surrender the establishment of schools in this province to the missionaries inspite of the gross inadequacies of missionary education which government was aware of and which government claimed to dislike?

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114. Ibid.

115. Gall, F.B. "Bauchi Province Anjual Report for the year 1914" SNP 10, 168P/1915: NAK.

The answer to this question lies with the needs of the colonial state in the province at the time as perceived by the colonial government. For, as we noted earlier, the colonial government only wanted schools for the drilling of the children of the ruling classes who would succeed their parents, not only as emirs and hakimai, but also provide personnel for the management of the native authority infrastructures. In Bauchi province, only Bauchi and Gombe were emirates with a few satelite polities like Kanam and Wase, The remainder of the province consisted of non-moslem chieftaincies. These chieftaincies were mostly on the Plateau and were in 1926, constituted into a separate province of their own. This means that Bauchi Province had very few children of the ruling classes of the emirate type to warrant the establishment of a school in the emirate. Government therefore found it more expedient to educate these few in the schools which existed in the neighbouring provinces especially Kano and Zaria. For example, in 1914, of the 15 boys admitted to the so-called Provincial school in Zaria from Bauchi Province, 9 came from Bauchi emirate alone, 4 from Gombe emirate and only 2 from Naraguta Division.[116]

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116. JOSPROF 1, 87/1927 "Pupils in Kano and Bauchi Schools" NAK; JOSPROF 1, 676/1913 "Pagan Education" NAK.

The Naraguta Division consisted of most of the non-moslem communities of the province. And with the probable exception of only one, all the 15 boys were the sons of rulers.

The graduates from Zaria and Kano schools returned and served in the various departments of the native authorities. With the educational needs of the Moslem rulers being met under this arrangement, government permitted the missions to open schools in the province for the children of the "pagan chiefs" including the children of the commoners who were welcomed to attend especially if the missions were willing to support them.[117] But, in granting the permission to the missions to build schools, government reserved the right of inspection.

In their own endeavour to win converts through schools and having secured government permission, the missions initially adopted the same policy as government, namely, wanting to enrol only the sons of the community. For the missionaries believed that once chiefs were converted into the Christian faith, their subjects would follow suit. But this method quickly run into trouble as it was bound to do. For the missionaries immediately discovered, much to their disappointment,

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117. EDUCATION ORDINANCE AND RULES UNDER ORDINANCE - No. 41 Northern Provinces, 1933.

that these chiefs were, indeed, the patrons and guardians of the very "heathen" institutions and practices which their christianity sought to destroy. Consequently, some of them began to lobby for the deposition of certain chiefs such as exemplified by the deposition of the chiefs of Panyam and Kabwir.

But as has been noted with regard to the native authority institutions, the missionaries found themselves engaged in an uphill task; namely, that of discouraging the very institutions on which the government wanted to graft its grassroot administration. The missionaries therefore turned to those for whom the status quo had been noticeably unfavourable.[118] The majority of the pupils who attended the mission schools initially, belonged to the families and households of such people. For example, when in 1915, the Sudan United Mission opened what they called a Training Institute at Wukari; out of its first enrolment of 13 students, three were freed slaves, two were Yangam, one Fulani, one Tiv and

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118. A classic example of this is Daniel Lot, the father of Pastor David Lot, a leading politician on the Plateau between 1949 and 1966. For a biography of Daniel Lot, see Cheal, C. His Workmanship: The Story of Daniel Lot, Great Britain, 1958.

a "boy whose grandfather had been a white man".[119] However, some children of the Native Authority c Chiefs, to whom we have referred previously, notably, David Dimka, Y. Dimlong, Rwang Pam, Michael A. Duba etc - found their way into some of these schools. This mixture of pupils together with the type of education which the missions provided tended to restrict the recepients to service in the church. This trend did not please the colonial government. For government wanted to employ such indigenes in the services of the native authorities so as to redress the overwhelming preponderance of the Hausawa and moslems in these services, in the non-moslem areas.[120] This was why the government wanted the missions to broaden their curriculum to include secular subjects such as were required outside the church.

To lure the missions into changing the curriculum, government was willing to share the cost of education with the missions through a system of grants. The missions particularly, the Sudan United Mission, by far, the most preponderant of the missions on the Plateau,

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119. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 114.

120. JOSPROF 1, 273 "Pagan Scribes for Pagan Areas" NAK.

refused this government offer and insisted on merely opening more literacy classes as a pre-requisite for baptism. It was the mission refusal to improve and standardise their schools and their claim of a "sphere of influence" in the Plateau area which principally accounted for the relative absence of a standard elementary school in this area throughout the first two decades of colonial rule. Indeed, as it turned out, by 1930, Bauchi and Plateau together had a total of 13 elementary schools but only one was actually located in Plateau Province, up to May of that year; it was sited in the emirate of Jemaa! And its pupils were confined to moslem boys from that town.[121]

It must be pointed out, at once, that government had no excuse whatsoever to surrender the education of this Province to the missions. Firstly, it had the power to force the missions to accept their regulations governing the education of the Region. Secondly, government should have built alternative schools for those who did not want to become Christians like the Resident of Zaria found it necessary to do when he was faced with the political implications of Dr. Miller's school activities to which the Resident responded by

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121. J@SPROF 1, 448/1930 "Provincial Schools in Bauchi and Plateau Provinces - Annual Report for 1930". N.K.

opening a secular school. Furthermore, why was government reluctant to back the enthusiastic effort of the Emir of Wase, who as we shall soon see, became disillusioned with government effort and began his own school?

Thus in explaining why up to 1920 and well after, no serious effort was made by both government and the missions, to provide the Plateau people with schools, the records present us with a false dilemma, namely, mission intransigence on the one hand, and government surrender to the missions on the other. These are superficial in the light of the performance of both colonial organs elsewhere in Nigeria.[122] The real explanation for this is still subject to further investigation but it may be observed, provisionally, that owing to the uniqueness of the Plateau as a mineral province based on unskilled and cheap labour, much care was taken by both government and the missions not to do anything that might hasten the political consciousness of the people whose labour was being grossly exploited. Schools were vital institutions which could bring this about and so they had to be deliberately delayed for as long as it was

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122. Ajayi, J.F.A. Christian Missions in Nigeria: The Making of a New Elite. Longman, 1965 pp. 90 - 126.

politically expedient and possible. Besides this, the years between 1908 and 1930 were years of conquest and consolidation which did not require the establishment of schools since government effort was mainly focussed on the maintenance of law and order.

But while the Plateau was lacking in schools up to 1920, schools built for the sons of the "philosopher kings", to borrow from Plato, were flourishing in Kano, Borno, Yola, Katsina and Sokoto.[123] This contradicts the widely held belief that colonial education began in the south and then moved northwards thus to mean that "the areas of the Middle Belt region had the advantage of an early start through missionary works"[124] over the more northerly areas of Kano, Sokoto, Borno, Katsina and Zaria. To this we may add the now worn-out allegation that the pace of colonial education in these northerly areas was slow, and that the reason for this was the unfavourable influence of islam which was hostile to the so-called western education.[125] The latter view has been effectively punctured, in my opinion, and finally laid

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123. Graham, S. op.cit. pp. 148-149; Tukur, M.M. op.cit. pp. 836 - 857.

124. Ijagbemi, M.A. "The Northern Nigeria Scholarship Scheme and the Northernisation Policy". Paper presented at the Social Science Staff Seminar. A.B.U. Zaria, January 1980 p. 24.

125. Ibid.

to rest.[126] For it has been abundantly demonstrated that many people in these emirates strove to get colonial education, even in the face of high fees, but were denied it by the colonial government. This was so because the colonial government was only interested in giving their education to only a selected few - the children of their agents and collaborators - the Emirs and chiefs, who in turn, showed keen interest in sending their children to these schools.[127] Yet, these same emirs were the very defenders of Islam!

As for the allegedly earlier start of colonial education in the Middle Belt, in contrast to the northerly emirates, and the alleged role of the missionaries in bringing this about, it must be pointed out that more clarification is required. For the missions, particularly, the Sudan United Mission, were just as reluctant, if not more reluctant, as government was in establishing

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126. Tukur, M.M. op.cit. pp. 869 - 879; Fafunwa, A.B. History of Education in Nigeria. London, 1974 p.100.

127. Ayandele, E.A. "The Missionary Factor in Northern Nigeria, 1870 - 1918" in JHSN Vol. 3 no. 3; Tukur, M.M. op.cit. pp. 869 - 879. The class of people who actually opposed colonial education were the mallams and qadis who correctly suspected that it would subvert their statuses and positions in the emirate system as the scholars and judges of society respectively.

proper elementary schools in this region.[128] Besides this, we have no concrete evidence to show that the Plateau people had any earlier start over their northerly neighbours. On the contrary, we have noted that while schools had been in existence in the far North between 1906 and the 1920s, there was no school, worthy of that name, in the Plateau area then. It was only in the 1930s, when the need to train African clergy resulted in a change of attitude on the part of the missions, then, that they began to address themselves more seriously to providing education to the people by attempting to meet government requirements.[129]

It is clear, then, that any meaningful attempt at understanding the development of colonial education in the North, and the role of the Missions in this process, must scrutinise the data more rigorously and take into

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128. For example, in 1922, instead of improving the standard of education in the mushroom classes for religious instructions which they had built, the SUM was more busy requesting the government to prepare "special" certificates for its sub-standard teachers for these sub-standard schools. See, SNP 9, 3440/1922 "Teachers of SUM Grant of certificate based on an examination different from that required in schedule "F" of Education Ordinance." NAK.

129. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. pp. 165 - 175.

account the general historical development of the Region as a whole. This would then place the missionary factor in its proper perspective. At the moment, the alleged role of the missions in the development of colonial education, particularly in the so-called Middle Belt areas, suffers from gross generalisation if not unwarranted exaggerations.

To be sure, the Sudan United Mission who predominated in the Plateau Province concentrated their first thirty years on spreading mere literacy and established nothing near to what the government had established in the northern emirates. Nor were they keen in using the schools as baits to win converts.[130] It was the Church Missionary Society (C.M.S.) who used their schools as baits for winning converts. This is evidently shown by the numerous schools which they established in the southern part of Nigeria where the government was more tolerant about their activities.[131] Even in the moslem north, the Church Missionary Society made concerted efforts to establish schools for the "sons of emirs" and

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130. Crampton, E.P.T. Christianity in Northern Nigeria. Zaria, 1976 p. 108; Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 163.

131. Crampton, E.P.T. op.cit. p. 108. But for a more detailed discussion on C.M.S. enterprise in Nigeria, particularly, with regards to education and schools, see: Ayandele, E.A. The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria 1842 - 1914. Bristol, 1971 pp. 283 - 304; Graham, S.F. op.cit. pp. 32 - 56.

chiefs between 1902 and 1906 in Zaria, Katsina and Kano except that the respective Residents of these provinces refused them permission to operate even though, the respective emirs appeared to have condoned this mission.[132] For example, it is already known that in Zaria, the base of Dr. Miller, a C.M.S. school was already in existence by 1906.

With respect to the Plateau Province, it may be noted that the two "flourishing" schools at Panyam and Kabwir, to which we have already referred, were established by the Cambridge University Mission Party, a branch of the Church Missionary Society. For as Crampton has pointed out, the Sudan United Mission did not look upon schools as tools for evangelism, rather;

> Schools were to grow out of the needs of the Church; they were not considered the means by which the Church would be brought into existence.[133]

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132. Ayandele, E.A. "The Missionary Factor in Northern Nigeria 1870 - 1918" in JHSN vol. 3 no. 3 1966 pp. 517 - 518; Graham, S.F. op.cit. p. 52.

133. Crampton, E.P.T. op.cit. p. 108.

This S.U.M. policy lingered on well into the 1960s.[134] It, however, resulted in the spread of literacy classes all over the Plateau Province before 1930.

Government, as we noted earlier continued in its obnoxious policy of sending school pupils from Plateau to outside provinces to receive education. For this policy necessarily limited the number of pupils who could be sponsored due to extra transport, lodging and fee costs.[135] Under these circumstances, one of the chiefs on the Plateau, Mamman Sambo, the Sarkin Wase, took up the challenge.

As a progressive sarki that he was, Mamman Sambo decided to set up a school of his own in 1920. Between then and 1923, his efforts bore fruits for his school received the attention of the government. Thus, in the government Reassessment Report on the conditions of that area which was compiled by one Mr. T.A. Izard, in 1923,[136] it was reported that there were 37 pupils in Sarkin Wase school and there were three teachers who were paid as follows: £24 p.a.; £18 p.a.; and £12 p.a. It was further reported that Sarkin Wase himself boarded 30 out

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134. For example, no student of Gindiri Teachers College was allowed to register for GCE while at College throughout the 1960s for fear that this would qualify them for further studies which the SUM frowned at. The author was a student of this college from 1963 to 1967.

135. JOSPROF 1, 37/1927 "Pupils in Kano and Bauchi Schools" NAK.

136. Izard, T.A. "Wase District, Shendam Division - Re-assessment Report" SNP 9, 520/1923: NAK.

of the 37 students and a wide range of subjects vis-a-vis the mission schools were taught.[137] Already, three of the pupils of this school had been employed in important positions by the Native Authority.[138]

Apart from this school, there was no other school which was established either, in the Sauchi, or, in the Muri, sections of what became Plateau Province by either government or the mission throughout the 1920s. And even in 1926, when government opened the Jos Townships school, government did so mainly to cater for the children of the immigrant population which began to congregate in Jos following the arrival there, in 1925, of the Enugu railroad and the expanding commercial activities of Jos township. It was not a school built for the children of the Birom, the Jerawa and the Jarawa, the indigenes of Jos Division who were doomed to be perpetual labourers in the tin mines.

Belatedly, however, in 1929, a centre for the training of "pagan" teachers was established at Toro. This centre came seven years after a similar, and, even a better one, had been established in Katsina for the emirates. Aimed at providing trained teachers for the numerous missionary "schools" which had by then begun to conform to government requirements, Toro Training Centre

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137. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

was established for the training of teachers for the non-moslem areas of the Province.[139]

The arrival in Jos, in 1925, of the Eastern Rail Extension together with an expanding commercial and administrative function of the town itself gave rise to a high concentration of population from the southern provinces of Nigeria and from other West African countries, especially, since, in 1926, Jos became a Provincial headquarters. These constituted the bulk of the clerical and other grades of African staff servicing the colonial economy of Jos itself and the whole Province.

Apparently, faced with the shortage of subordinate staff then that Plateau was a province and the optimism which the tin industry promised after the Depression, government began its first concrete attempts at the establishment of schools in the Province.[140] Thus, in 1930, an elementary school was established for Jema'a emirate as we have noted earlier. In April 1933, three primary schools were established for the whole province and located at Gyel, Dokkos and Haifam respectively.[141]

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139. EDUCATION DEPARTMENT: Annual Report on Schools in Bauchi and Plateau Provinces, 1932. pp. 1 - 24.

140. Middleton, H.H. "Annual Report for 1933, Plateau Province" JOSPROF 1, vol. 1 301/1933: NAK.

141. Ibid.

The government considered the establishment of these schools as a great feat and ostensibly referred to them as "seats of learning." For in his report for 1933, the Reseident delightedly observed:

> Education, so long neglected in this province save by missionary enterprise, has at last made a genuine and promising start through the establishment of three elementary Pagan schools under the "aegis" of the first batch of local graduates from the Toro Training Centre. The chosen seats of learning are at Ngel and Haifam (in the Jos Division) and Bokkos (Pankshin) and although they were only opened in April, the number of scholars (ranging in age from 6 - 60) is already large enough to justify the foundation of these Institutions.[142]

'Coincidentally,' it was also at this time that the missions realised the futility of their thirty-years of reluctance and, in some cases, outright refusal, to give their converts even the lopsided "aristocratic" education that the government was giving to the children of the aristocracy. They then realised that their concern to train and develop an African clergy needed education beyond the literacy classes which they felt obliged to give. But the outbreak of the Second World War and its aftermath made the need for better schools in this area even greater. For by the 1940s, general political developments in Nigeria such as agitation by

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142. Ibid.

the "nationalists" to participate more actively and fully in the colonial economy and in the decision-making processes, now impressed upon the missionaries that the days of formal colonial domination in Nigeria were numbered.[143]

But, more importantly, was the fact that, hitherto, they had not produced a group of "native" clergy who would eventually administer the Church after their own anticipated departure from Nigeria. Similarly, they had discouraged their converts from taking secular appointments in government and in the native authorities. They now realised that the Church which they had founded might suffer political and other setbacks because of the absence of Christians in the decision-making processes and governing institutions of the Province and, indeed, the whole Region.[144] This particular problem was compounded by the fact that their converts were a minute minority; firstly, in the Province; and, secondly, in the whole Northern Region. For the bulk of the population of the Province was still neither Christian nor Moslem. Besides this, the whole Plateau Province including the other non-moslem provinces of the north (the upper

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143. Maxwell, J.L. op. cit. p. 268; pp. 229 - 260. But for a fuller account of the political and other developments in this period, see; Coleman, J.S. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Los Angeles, 1958 pp. 271 - 284.

144. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 294.

Gongola and Benue communities), even if they were wholly Christian, constituted only a minority within a predominantly moslem Northern Region. The missionaries therefore began to nurse the fear that Islam might eventually swallow up the whole Province. In expressing this fear, Maxwell[145] observed:

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145. At this stage, it is necessary to highlight the historical and historiographical significance of J. Lowry Maxwell whose work has been cited in various parts of this thesis.

As mentioned earlier, Maxwell was one of the original party of four (Sudan United Mission) which left England in July, 1904 and arrived in Nigeria later in that year. He personally worked in and visited many of the stations which their Mission established. He also attended the various interdenominational conferences of the Christian Missions in Nigeria and Africa. The book, Half A Century of Grace, which he completed in 1952 was not only a reflection of his own work-years in Nigeria but it also drew considerable information from the entries which he used to make in his diaries while on service. Some of these entries were letters and other information from his colleagues in the other stations. Maxwell was, thus, not a mere witness of the things about which he wrote but, a historical participant and hence very involved. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that his views reflect the general views of his colleagues with whom the was always in contact. This is especially the more so since he has not been contradicted by some other source and evidence, especially, the SUM mouthpiece - The Light Bearer - a journal whose publication has continued down to the present time.

> If they [that is, the non-Moslems] do not stick together in these days of a new Governmental order, when the executive and legislative work of Nigeria is being transfered to African hands, they may find themselves being exploited by the Moslem peoples of the north... The only unifying force for the non-Moslems is the Christian Church.[146]

It must further be emphasised that the missionaries viewed Islam with great awe and much misgiving. For they even prefered the people to remain "pagans" rather than become Moslems because their belief in "the darkness of paganism, the deeper darkness of Mohammedanism."[147] lent support for this. Thus, an understanding of missionary attitude towards Islam and the political developments they anticipated for Northern Nigeria becomes necessary in order to appreciate the amount of energy and time which the various missions expended on forestalling an eventual Islamisation of the Plateau province.

Furthermore, Maxwell believed that his colleagues in government were ignorant of the dangers which Islam posed in Northern Nigeria and he expressed great concern over their tolerant attitude towards Islam. According to him;

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146. Ibid p. 294.

147. Ibid. p. 329.

> People just do not know the terrible gulf that separates the Moslem from the Christian. One grieves to think of the way the Mohammedan faith is sheltered and forwarded by some Europeans. One could wish that they might realise the true inwardness of Islam, that it is utterly anti-Christian, and really blasphemous in its misrepresentation of the character of God, setting Him forth as guilty of such abominable cruelty as even an ordinary decent man, with all his sinfulness, would regard with horror ...[148]

Such was the general feeling among the Christian missionaries on the relationship between their colleagues in the administration and Islam.[149]

Finally, the point should be made that the attitude of these Christian missions towards Islam is understandable. For the very objectives of the various Sudan Mission Parties Sudan United Mission, Sudan Interior Mission etc. and their different European headquarters - was to put a stop to the expansion of Islam in the Sudan.[150] What these missions, like their counterparts in government, had not forseen, however, was the limited timespan within which colonialism would last in Nigeria. For even Perham reminds the critics of Lugard and his lieutenants that the time-scale within which the British officials

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148. Ibid. p. 222.

149. Conference of Missions Northern Provinces Nigeria 1926. (Minutes) pp. 11 - 12.

150. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 161.

foresaw developments was very unlimited. According to her, most of the British officials including Lugard's critics, did not anticipate that self-government would come as fast as it did.[151]

Thus, caught in the 1940s by an awareness that colonialism would soon be terminated, the missionaries began preparing for this problem in two main fronts; in the Church and in politics. The success of both depended, to a large extent, on education; hence, towards the end of the 1930s and throughout the 1940s and 1950s, a reluctant, if not forced, expansion of schools and training centres was embarked upon, especially, by the Sudan United Mission. Their foremost concern was the training of an "educated" and dependable clergy; an elite which would eventually succeed them inspite of the need to have some educated Christians in government.[152]

In the political front, they now began to instill in their trained clergy and converts as a whole, the idea of an impending moslem subjugation and islamisation

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151. Perham, M. "Introduction to the Fifth Edition" of Lugard, F. The Dual Mandate in British Policy. London, 1965 p. XLVII.

152. Maxwell, J.L. Op.cit. p. 161.

of all non-moslems living in the Northern Provinces.[153] In this way, the missions helped to shape the political attitudes of Christians on the Plateau, lower Borno, upper Gongola, and the Benue basins; their main fields of operation.

Meanwhile, in the sphere of education the Sudan United Mission decided to establish a training centre at Gindiri in 1932; and, the first students of this centre were admitted in 1934.[154] This centre began as a training

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153. Ibid. pp. 293 - 294. But it must be emphasised that the behaviour of the Moslem leaders in Northern Nigeria, especially, that of the Sardauna of Sokoto himself tended to justify the belief, among the minority groups, in an impending onslaught of Islam and their own subjugation by adherents of that religion. Even some of the closest British officers and "friends" of the Northern ruling classes admit this fact. See, for example, Bryan Sharwood Smith: But Always as Friends. London, 1969 p. 303. These issues have been discussed in some detail by Sklar, R.L. Nigerian Political Parties. New Jersey, 1963 p. 346; Whitaker, C.S. The Politics of Tradition: Continuuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946 - 1966. New Jersey, 1970 p. 351; Crampton, E.P.T. op.cit. p. 96.

154. In the same period, the Church Missionary Society (CMS) formerly handed over their mission stations at Panyam and Kabwir to the Sudan United Mission. JOSPROF 1, 5/1931 "Annual Report Plateau Province 1930; JOSPROF 1, 47/1935 "Annual Report on the Plateau Province for 1934". NAK.

ground for the African catechists and pastors mostly from the Plateau. But in due course, it also became a training centre for school teachers for the various schools of the mission.

The Sudan United Mission embarked on training their own teacher mainly in order to avoid sending them to Toro where, in their view the moral and religious aspects of their training as required of Christianity were not sufficiently catered for. Besides this, they needed a training centre of their own because Toro could not cope with the huge programme of training which they had then embarked upon in order to meet the needs of their changing policy on education. As a matter of fact, according to the admissions regulations of Toro, only a total of six places were given to all the Christian missions, put together.[155]

The training of teachers and thegovernment standardisation of the curricula of the schools and teachers certificates which government carried out since 1909 meant that the salaries of the teachers of government and grantaided mission schools were harmonised, and government undertook to pay these salaries.[156] But the

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155. No. 937/49 EDUCATION DEPARTMENT - Annual Report on Schools in Bauchi and Plateau Provinces, 1932. NAK.

156. SUDAN UNITED MISSION, GINDIRI - Board of Governors - Constitution - Article 11, Finance pp. 5 - 6.

standardisation of certificates and salaries created a problem for the Church because, as it turned out, the teachers earned more than the pastors whom the missions regarded as the cornerstone of evangelism and the church in whose service the schools and their teachers only constituted an aspect. It was therefore difficult to maintain the clergy when their "inferior" co-workers in the teaching service were earning more money and enjoying a higher standard of living. Maxwell explained the problem very vividly. He observed at some length that:

> "If Government salary scale means that a teacher in a tribe of mountain pagans receives £100 a year, while the local Church pastor can, perhaps, only be given £50, and the local catechists less even than that, one can easily see that there may be difficulty in carrying out our stated principles of indigenous Church life, where in the African Church must be, from the first, self-supporting. There will be a violent contrast between the resources of the school and the Church, because the salary of the teacher is met by a government grant, which is given on a nation-wide basis, whereas the Salaries of pastor and catechist are found by the local Christians, who themselves are all comparatively poor. They cannot, & simply cannot, be expected to maintain the salaries of their agents at the rate of those paid to the teachers by government. Money can have such a desperate devilish effect on human relationships. And do what we will, the political development of the country will not stay our convenience. We therefore need to pray".[157]

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157. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. pp. 287 -288

Thus, even in the 1930s, the training of teachers was haunted by the fear that the consequence of the disparity in salaries between the clergy and the teachers could adversely affect the church which they had by now embarked on strengthening through their new attitude towards education. Therefore, even the educational expansion of the1930s was carried out cautiously. For example, except Gindiri, and to a very small extent Kabwir, no other training centre was established by the Sudan United Mission before 1945.[158] Thus, before 1940, two Teacher Training Centres existed for the Plateau Province, Toro and Gindiri; the former belonged to the government and the latter to the missions. No secondary school was yet established. Similarly, no technical school or even a craft school, worthy of the name, had been established in the province even though the need for one in Shendam was expressed as early as 1923.[159]

The point which emerges from this is that even after 1930, when both the government and the missions decided to give colonial education to the people of Plateau Province, they concentrated on teacher training to the neglect of secondary and technical education. Yet, in the same period, the government was already

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158. Ibid. p. 233.

159. Izard, T.A. "Wase District, Shendam Division - Re-assessment Report on" SNP 9, 520/1923: N.K.

becoming alarmed at the army of local school products who could not secure gainful employment within the new economic order.[160]

The first generation of those who received colonial education beyond the elementary school were therefore teachers. The social and political implication of this is that most of the political elite that emerged in the Province in the 1940s were teachers many of who were also Church leaders.[161] Their role as light-bearers, not only of Christianity but also of the Colonial social order, meant that they constituted an effective rallying point from which the rural populations sought advice and clarification in times of political action. But before going into this any further, it is necessary to offer a brief discussion of the development of secondary schools in the Province.

Secondary School Education

Before 1958, there were only three secondary schools which were in full operation for the whole of Northern Nigeria apart from the Boys Secondary School Gindiri.[162] These schools were Zaria Government College, formerly,

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160. JOSPROF 1, 1533 "Employment of Boys Leaving School in Jos." NAK.

161. See appendix II.

162. Crampton, E.P.T. op.cit. p. 118.

Katsina College established in 1922; Keffi Government College (1948); and St. Johns College Kaduna.[163] The last one was a Roman Catholic Mission school. These schools recruited their students from what were then called Middle Schools. For each province in the North, there existed, at least, one Middle School by the 1940s.[164] But in the Plateau Province, it was only in 1954 that one was built by the government in Kuru.[165] These Middle Schools provided education for two and, sometimes, up to four years and the "cream"[166] of their pupils were admitted in Government Colleges. In Plateau Province, most of the students at Kuru Middle School initially came from the Native Authority schools noted earlier in Gyel, Wankos, Haifam, Jemaa and the few that were later built in each Division. Many of these students were Christians but moslems were also included.[167]

The Sudan United Mission established a Middle School for boys in Gindiri as early as 1944.[168] This was the first serious attempt by the Sudan United Mission to provide education beyond elementary school in

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163. Ibid. p. 118.

164. Ibid. p. 119.

165. Log Book: Provincial Secondary School, Kuru.

166. Crampton, E.P.T. op.cit. p. 119.

167. Log Book: Provincial Secondary School, Kuru.

168. Log Book: Boys Secondary School, Gindiri.

Plateau Province. It was a boarding school designed to board a maximum of seventy-two boys, all, "sons of those who were serving in the church".[169] In addition, admission to the school was conditional to passing a competitive examination. A fee of £6 was charged per year and £1 for the boys who won the mission scholarship.[170] Soon, Gindiri became a big mission training centre for various categories of manpower required in the service of the church. Indeed it expanded so quickly that its training facilities soon became inadequate. For example, in 1946 there were over 200 students of various kinds receiving training in Gindiri. But in the same year, "many good men and women" were refused admission in the Gindiri Training Centre owing to inadequate training facilities.[171] In the following year, the first batch of the Middle School pupils passed out. All the nine of them received the First School Certificate, a government certificate which made the occasion remarkable and memorable given the previously conservative attitude of this mission. However, it is instructive to note that all the nine boys offered to become teachers and so they were admitted to the Teacher Training department of the Gindiri Training Centre.[172]

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169. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 253.
170. Ibid. p. 271.
171. Ibid. p. 257.
172. Ibid. p. 257.

By 1949, buildings were already going up in this same centre for a Girls' Boarding school and a Boys' Secondary School and preparations for the admission of blind children were started in 1950. By 1951, all preparations were completed for the first Protestant Secondary school in Northern Nigeria to start.[173] Six years later, the first set of Girls were admitted into the Girls High School in the same centre.[174] Thus, the story of Sudan United Mission educational development in Plateau province is, largely, a story of the establishment of one centre, namely, Gindiri.

It must be emphasised, however, that by the 1950s, the Sudan United Mission, in particular, fully realised that they could no longer delay providing "higher" education to their converts due to a fear that these converts would turn "elsewhere" in search of functional education. For according to Maxwell:

> It is obvious that the people will look elsewhere if we fail them; and there are others, who have another gospel which is not a Gospel, who will give them what they want... The ground so hardly won by our mission could very well be swept away by such a flood.[175]

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173. Log Book: Boys Secondary School, Gindiri.

174. Log Book: Girls High School, Gindiri.

175. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 271.

But it must be recognised that the initial reluctance of the Sudan United Mission to open schools was not necessarily due to a lack of sincerity of purpose and commitment on their part concerning their work. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that many of the individual missionaries were genuinely committed to the cause for which they believed to have been called upon to undertake.[176] The point is that they were locked up in an ideological straight-jacket rooted in the acclaimed virtues of capitalism which dictated how they perceived their work and how to evaluate it. Thus the rigid racial stance which they took about "educating" the

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176. Further research on this is required but it is, so far, evident that many missionaries left better conditions of work in Europe and America to come to Africa. Some of such missionaries may have come to Africa due to reasons of personal frustration but these are yet to be documented and studied. On the other hand, it is worth noting that some of the African communities, among whom these missionaries worked, still remember and honour these missionaries. For example, in 1968, the Mwaghavul Christian community built a secondary school at Panyam in memory of Miss Webster of the CMS whom, they believe, worked selflessly for the sake of educating their people. The school was deliberately named after Webster - Nakam Memorial Secondary School - Nakam (teacher) being the local name by which Miss Webster was known throughout Mwaghavul land. At the time of writing, the Angas Christian community at Kabwir have completed arrangements to start a similar school in memory of Mr. Lloyd who worked among them. This school, Generit Memorial Secondary School will start classes in 1983. Similar examples exist elsewhere in Nigeria such as Hope Wadell's Institute, Calabar; Mary Slessor Hospital, Itu and so on.

African arose out of a genuine, but colonial, belief that they acted in the best interest of the Plateau "pagans." For their unalloyed loyalty to the capitalist ideology, which justified colonialism, made them believe that the Africans were a subhuman race who needed missionary paternal guardianship to develop. Therefore, the Church which they sought to establish was one whose membership would, apart from showing indifference to earthly matters in preference for those of a Heavenly Kingdom in the hereafter, develop a keen appreciation for the socio-economic norms of capitalism.[177] Besides this, to expect that the Christian missions or the colonial government should have begun building schools immediately after the conquest of Nigeria is to demonstrate a lack of proper grasp of colonialism. For Africa was not conquered to be educated and developed, but, for the precise opposite of these; namely, domination, exploitation, and, therefore, underdevelopment.

Thus, beginning with the establishment of Toro, the colonial government took steps to build a secondary school to cater for the lower provinces of the North,

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177. Crehan, K. "Missionary Ideology in Early Nineteenth Century South Africa" p. 13; Boer, J.H. Missionary Messengers of Liberation in a Colonial Context. Amsterdam, 1979 pp. 79 - 80.

namely, the Plateau, Kabba, Ilorin, Benue and Niger. In 1948, Government College Keffi was therefore established to fulfil this need.[178] Most of the students who attended the Keffi College, however, came from the Native Authority primary schools rather than from the Sudan United Mission primary schools most of who initially prefered to go to Gindiri even though they had to pay fees.

Meanwhile, in 1957, the Kuru Middle school converted into a Provincial Secondary School and was renamed as such.[179] By then, each province in Northern Nigeria had a provincial secon ary school. Government College Keffi, however, continued to be a Regional Government School. There were now three secondary schools for boys on the Plateau, namely, Keffi, Kuru and Gindiri.

As a matter of government policy, only the best pupils were admitted to Keffi while Kuru catered for some of the rest of those who passed the common entrance examinations.[179] Althought Gindiri operated outside government policy as far as admission was concerned, in practice, it always selected the best pupils especially those whose parents were Christians and who could afford to pay the fees. This was because Christian parents feared

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178. Crampton, E.P.T. op.cit. p. 120.

179. Log Book: Provincial Secondary School, Kuru.

that their children might be converted to Islam should they go to Keffi or Kuru which were owned and controlled by government.[3] Their fears were not without some justification because the manner in which the Native Authority primary schools were conducted tended to suggest a desire, on the part of the authorities, to islamise the pupils.[180] The government and provincial secondary schools were conducted in a similar manner. For example, the school uniforms were designed in tune with Hausa dressing and imams were employed and paid by government to take care of the sallah and other religious needs of the moslem students. No similar arrangements were made to cater for the Christian students. According to Mr. Crampton, a notable scholar of the educational history of Northern Nigeria, some pressure was exerted on Christian students in the government and in the provincial schools to become Moslems although this pressure was not manifestly official.[181] These are issues which by their nature are difficult to prove with documentary evidence. But it is sufficiently clear that the tone and norms established in these schools

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180. Crampton, F.P.T. op.cit. p. 122.

181. Ibid.

were weighted in favour of Islam.[182]

But this covert encouragement given to Islam did not create any noticeable political problems in Plateau Province because most of the Christian students, who would have taken strong exception to these manoevres, went to the schools at Gindiri. However, as the demand for education on the Plateau increased, especially in the 1950s and the 1960s, and mission (S.U.M) scholarship schemes saturated, many Christian parents began to send their children to both Kuru and Keffi.

Thus far, it should be noted that in comparison with the missions, the role of the Native Authorities and government on education in the Plateau province up to the 1950s was minimal. This in no way contradicts our earlier observation on the reluctance of the missions to give colonial education to the Plateau people before 1930. The fact of the matter was that their widespread, but poor, literacy schools which were the only ones available to the people before 1930, turned out to have made the greatest impact on the Plateau societies since the bulk of those who attended school before 1930 invariably went to these mission schools. Therefore,

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182. Fieldnote records - Mr. S.D. Lot; Mr. L.A. Lohor; Mr. L. Dakwahar etc etc. Recollections from their personal experiences of boarding and school life in Pankshin, Bokkos, and later Toro, Kuru and Keffi colleges.

in order to appreciate the significance of the overwhelming infuence of the missions in the educational history of the Plateau and the class character of the educated elite which it produce, a brief discussion of the Gindiri Centre is necessary.

The Role and Significance of Gindiri Training Centre

To start with, the choice of Gindiri and the eventual concentration of schools in it does not appear to have been a subject of any debate among the missionaries of the Sudan United Mission. Some indication of the type of consideration which led to the choice of Gindiri can be gleaned from Mr. H.G. Farrant, the Field Secretary of this Mission. He wrote:

> ... I wanted a site cool for Europeans, and not too cold for Africans, fertile and well wooded to provide scope for the students to farm, accessible by motor, central to the group of tribes it aimed at serving, surrounded by people who were pagan but spoke Hausa, and surrounded also by a population which would provide scope for the evangelistic efforts of the students ..."[183]

Gindiri met most of these considerations. But these factors also provide some insight into the type of function which Gindiri was to carry out. Thus, from the start, the centre was concieved as multifunctional; it was to be a Training School for African workers

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183. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 180.

"elders, preachers, pastors, teachers, and helpers in various ways".[184]

Conceived in this way, the centre was bound to develop into various branches of specialisation. At first, its work was largely centred on the training of men as evangelists.[185] But it soon became obvious that some form of auxillary or supplementary training and services had to be organised for their wives and children. As a result, a day school was started for their children although the children of the Pyem people, the people around Gindiri, were also encouraged to attend. Their wives were taught basic child-care, cookery, needlework, and of course, reading and writing. As time went by, the demand for pastors, teachers, and other services related to the expansion of the Church called for the development of specialised training schools.

Within some twenty years of its establishment, Gindiri developed into a huge training complex with several departments and requiring an administrative co-ordinator refered to as Warden.[186] For there was a Pastor's Training College; Women Training Institute; Teacher Training College for vernacular teachers, grades three

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184. Ibid. p. 182.

185. SUDAN UNITED MISSION, GINDIRI: Board of Governors - Constitution - Article 1 item 'C' p. 1.

186. Ibid. p. 2.

and two teachers; Demonstration School which was the former Middle School; Girls Boarding School (primary); Boys Secondary School; Girls High School (secondary) and the School for Blind Children. Apart from the first two, all the rest received government grants. The students admitted into these schools were drawn from all over the Northern Region but, in accordance with the policy of Sudan United Mission, a majority of the students were admitted from Plateau province and all of them professed Christianity.[187]

Gindiri had relatively little staffing problem because the Sudan United Mission easily appealed, with success, to its British headquarters for the various categories of staff which it required. Thus many British graduate teachers and ex-service officers took up appointments as missionary teachers in Gindiri. Consequently, a consistently high standard of performance was recorded at the various Teachers' Certificate examinations and that of the West African School Certificate throughout the existence of Gindiri. For example, all the sixteen boys who offered the West African School Certificate in 1955 passed with 9 receiving

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187. Ibid.

Division one; 5 in Division two and 2, in Division three.[188] In 1957, a meeting of its Board of Governors recorded that "six of the sixteen boys who left in 1955 have gone on to the Nigerian College to take G.C.E. (Advance Level).[189] The report added that one each had joined the Forestry Department, Samaru Agricultural College, Kano Medical School, Government Printing Department, Kings College Lagos, West African Airways Corporation and two had joined the Post and Telegraphs Department.[190] This distribution of the first graduates of Gindiri is indicative of its growing contribution to the manpower needs of the colonial economy of Northern Nigeria, just as it did to class formation on the Plateau.

The significance of Gindiri did not only lie in the fact that it offered training to students leading to the award of various types and grades of certificates. For, like it, Toro, Kuru and, particularly, Keffi, offered training which led to the award of similar certificates; and yet they did not acquire the unique social and political significance which Gindiri did. Significantly, Gindiri was unique because it was the only comprehensive centre in Northern Nigeria which offered different kinds

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188. SUDAN UNITED MISSION, GINDIRI - Board of Governors' Meeting held at Gindiri on 24th January 1957 p. 3.

189. Ibid. p. 4.

190. Ibid.

of training leading to different types of certificates and its catchment area embraced the whole of the Northern Region.[191]

Huge as it was, with several departments and schools, Gindiri was like a miniature university. Between 1934 and 1966, it became a significant melting pot for the numerous and diverse populations of the communities of the Plateau and beyond. Thus many of the people from the Plateau who trained as pastors, masons, teachers, evangelists, farmers, housewives and students preparing for the West African School Certificate and eventual university education, met in Gindiri.

While it had not been possible for all the generations of scholars who trained in Gindiri to meet personally, it was of great significance that they all went under the same system of moral and religious training with

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191. Except in the case of Moslem students who prefered to attend government colleges but who, at any rate, were not encouraged to come to Gindiri by the authorities there. However, in the late 1960s, some Moslem students attended the Gindiri schools. For example, in 1968, a Senior Teacher in the Boys Secondary School, one Mr. Michael Hirse, proposed that a mosque be established to cater for the few Moslem students of the Centre. The authorities of Gindiri found his suggestion "offending" and together with his open criticisms of Gindiri some of which was beginning to reach the students, Mr. Hirse was expelled from Gindiri.

a particular world outlook and ethos reflecting the colonial ideology to which the Sudan United Mission subscribed and advocated. Herein lay the main significance of Gindiri. The missionaries were quick to appreciate the significance of Gindiri in this respect. Thus, for example, in his normally racial outlook, Maxwell noted that the Gindiri Training Centre:

> "produces a feeling of brotherhood among our very much divided people ... The close and daily association with members of other tribes in study and work and worship helps to bring about a real experience of the oneness of the Christian Church, when the Yergum and Angas, Birom and Sura, Jukun and Jari, Montol and Kulere, all learn that in very deed and truth they are brothers and sisters in Christ. This is important in more than the spiritual life of the country, for it is precisely in this matter of a sense of solidarity and mutual loyalty that one great danger lies for our non-Moslem people. If they do not stick together in these days of a new Governmental order, when the executive and legislative work of Nigeria is being transferred to African hands, they may find themselves being exploited by the Moslem peoples of the north. The only unifying force for the non-Moslem is the Christian Church."[192]

It remains to add that most of the products of Gindiri returned to their various districts to serve in different areas fitted to their training. And whether as teachers, pastors, catechists, evangelists, nurses, dispensary assistants, etc they were all

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192. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. pp. 293 - 294.

operating from within the same intellectual and ideological orbit with the Church which served as their chief employer. More importantly, these categories of workers constituted the newly emergent elite in the Plateau Province. For whether serving as teachers or pastors, they were looked upon by their communities as the torch-bearers in the struggle for the new social order. Gindiri thus became a reference point in the lives of its products in a manner which transcended the ordinary alumni associations of the other institutions of learning in Northern Nigeria. It was probably more like, but certainly more united, than the jamboree of the aristocratic children of the emirs represented by the Katsina College.[193] For as we noted earlier, Gindiri was not just a centre for the production of various certificate and eventual employment, but, more importantly, it was in essence, a big ideological centre in which the various certificates were only attractions.

Thus, Gindiri products, meeting in Councils and Boards as leaders of the Church and Schools, had no fundamental disagreement with each other as to what development in the new social order was and what their role, as leaders and that of the followers, ought to be.

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193. Whitaker, C.S. The Politics of Tradition... New Jersey, 1970 p. 462.

When party politics began, therefore, they merely announced to their members in the Churches which party they should vote for.[194] They also had a firm grip on the district heads and paramount chiefs, some of who had sent their children and relations to Gindiri; these chiefs considered them to be most knowledgeable people who knew the intricacies of party politics and what interests the parties represented.[195] Consequently, many of them changed from one party to another without losing the supporters in their constituencies.[196]

Gindiri it might be observed was not without a challenge. It's greatest challenge came from the Roman Catholic Schools and Training Centres which this mission established at Jos, Zawan, Shendam, Zonkwa and Vom. This challenge, however, did not prove as strong as it first appeared for two main reasons. Firstly, the challenge was not fundamental. For both the Catholics

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194. From field records and the authors personal knowledge of the activities of Pastor David V. Lot among the Mwaghavul. Pastor Lot rose to the rank of a Senior Minister in the Northern Regional government in 1955. The same was true of most of the legislatures from Plateau province.

195. It may be remarked that these groups of people were the pioneer organisers and leaders of the "tribal" solidarity groups and unions of their respective localities in the 1940s and the 1950s which explains why their leadership role and advice were readily accepted.

196. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 347 but more is said on this in later chapters of the thesis.

and the Sudan United Mission defined the development and politics of Plateau Province in terms of Christian solidarity against Islam.[197] Secondly, the Catholics never managed to establish as many mission centres and schools in the villages as the Sudan United Mission had done because of the claims of the latter over almost all the villages, especially, those in Jos and Pankshin Divisions, as its own sphere of operation. Beside this, the Sudan United Mission covertly discouraged people from accepting the Catholics.[198]

However, the Roman Catholic Mission which had established a mission station in Shendam in 1906, managed to predominate in the Shendam area and, to a lesser extent, in Akwanga Division.[199] In 1933, they established a school for the training of native teachers in Shendam, from where Bishop Ganaka began his career.

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197. Proceedings of the First Mission Executives Conference, Woodlands - Eastbourne. November, 1959; Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. pp. 293 - 294.

198. People who tried to join the Catholics were rediculed by the Protestant converts of the S.U.M. as those not willing to stop the drinking of alchohol because the Catholics tolerated the taking of beer. Thus, one Daniel Umaru, a government store keeper at Panyam tried, in vain, to start a Catholic Church there. For members of his Church consisted of mainly "backsliders" and "disgruntled" elements from the S.U.M. Church at Panyam. The small Church which he built soon crambled down never to be rebuilt since his transfer from Panyam ended the attempt.

199. Mouren, J.C. (Society of African Mission) The Catholic Mission in Northern Nigeria: Foundation and First Years, 1906 - 1910. Written as a Souvenir. Bishop's Office, Jos.

But Shendam never developed into anything like Gindiri since its graduates were sent to other Catholic institutions and Seminaries such as those in Jos and Kafanchan instead of continuing further training in Shendam itself. This was so because the Roman Catholic Mission did not establish one big centre like Gindiri to serve the whole Province, or northern Region as the Sudan United Mission did in the case of Gindiri. To be sure the Roman Catholic Mission established separate centres at Jos, Zawan, Vom, Zonkwa, Pankshin, Akwanga and Kafanchan.[200]

The preponderance of the Sudan United Mission in Plateau Province therefore meant that the Gindiri outlook was also proportionately widespread in the Province. The R.C.M. and the S.U.M. sometimes quarrelled on points of doctrine and spheres of influence but when it came to politics, they were solidly united and their constituency transcended the Church to include all the non-Moslems and non-Christian peasants alike, who, up to 1960, constituted an overwhelming majority of the population of Plateau province.

This solidarity was demonstrated by the formation, in 1949, of the Non-Moslem League, a political organisation in Northern Nigeria whose chairman became Pastor David Lot.[201] Virtually all the Christian members of

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200. Ames, C.G. op.cit. p. 314.

201. Sklar, R L. op.cit. p. 346.

the then Northern House of Assembly joined the League. We shall return to this later. In the meantime suffice it to note here that the followers of both the Roman Catholic Mission and the Sudan United Mission succeeded in constituting Christianity into a political constituency which represented Plateau province in the legislative bodies of the Nigerian polity.

From the above discussion, a few salient observations may be made with regards to colonial education in the former Plateau province. Firstly, the education which was given to the peoples of the Plateau was not universal education but one centred on "the training of docile and efficient servants of the bourgeoisie, of slaves and tools of capital".[202] Secondly, both government and the missions were only forced by compelling circumstances to provide this lop-sided education to the people. Thirdly, in contrast to the emirates, the recepients of colonial education were not limited as a matter of policy to the children of the ruling classes because no such classes existed on the Plateau. Consequently, the bulk of the recepients were christian converts. Fourthly, and perhaps the most important with regards to this thesis, because the Christian missions predominated in the field

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202. Lenin, V.I. On Public Education. Moscow, 1976 p. 66.

of colonial education in Plateau Province, the educated elite, and, ipso facto, the political elite, that emerged were mainly Christian intellectuals who were united in an undeclared war of defence against Islam. Missionary education was therefore not only instrumental in the formation of classes on the Plateau, but also in the formulation, though not the determination, of political sentiments and attitudes in that Province. For this reason, together with the fact that the Churches which these Christian missions founded were also agents of class formation on the Plateau, a brief discussion of these missions and their churches becomes necessary.

III. THE CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AND THE CHURCH

INTRODUCTION

As noted earlier, another important colonial institution which created new classes as well as a political base for petty bourgeois politicians on the Plateau was the Christian missionaries and the Church which they founded. Some historians might object to the view that the missionaries and the church were colonial institutions. For example, it may be contended that missionary activities long preceded the formal establishment of the colonial society and, therefore, could not

have been part of it. In this view, missionary enterprise is connected with colonialism only because the former "paved the way" for the latter. This contention is too superficial generally and it is specifically false with regards to Plateau Province, and, no doubt, many other African societies. For missionary enterprise and colonialism were objectively united because they were both products of capitalism and merely represented different facets or dimensions of its expansion.[203] They were in no way fundamentally contradictory; on the contrary, they complemented one another.

In the case of the Plateau, missionary activity and colonialism arrived together; indeed, the latter paved the way for the former.[204] Even in the communities where missionary enterprise is alleged to have "paved the way" for the formal establishment of colonial rule, it has been observed that such missionary enterprises made very

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203. Boer, J.H. Missionary Messengers of Liberation in a Colonial Context: a case study of the Sudan United Mission. Amsterdam, 1979 pp. 1 - 10; Crehan, K. op.cit. pp. 13 - 14.

204. There is no evidence, of which I am aware, which suggests that Christian missionary activities in the Plateau province preceded the conquest of this region. This is further discussed in the text.

little headway until the colonial conquest and subsequent rule of such areas had been established.[205] This is not to say that all the missionaries consciously identified themselves with imperialist ambitions. But whether they did so or not is besides the point. For, as Hirji has pointed out, history is rarely preconceived and very few men ever act with an awareness of their objective historical roles.[206] It is against this background that we should view the historical role of the missionaries and the church which they established on the Plateau and, indeed, most parts of the African continent.

We must therefore preface the examination of the missionary enterprise on the Plateau with some brief general but relevant discussion of the objective historical role of missionary enterprise itself as a historical phenomenon. This will help to drive home the point that both the colonial government and the missionaries were working towards the achievement of one and the same goal, namely, the establishment, consolidation and expanision of the capitalist relation of production on the Plateau.

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205. Ayandele, E.A. The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria 1842 - 1914. Bristol, 1971 pp. 329 - 345.

206. Hirji, K.F. "Colonial Ideological Apparatuses in Tanganyika Under the Germans" in Kaniki, M.H.Y. (ed) Tanzania Under Colonial Rule London, 1980 p. 192.

It has been established[207] that beneath the explicitly religious content of missionary Christianity, lay certain fundamental assumptions which shaped the missionaries' views and attitudes about their work and its scope. And these assumptions are not to be found in the Christian dogma but within the wider society from which the missionary enterprise itself sprang. Therefore, in order to analyse the concrete effects of missionary enterprise, it is what they believed to be the concrete manifestations of conversion rather than the specific theological beliefs that they tried to instil which become crucial. This means, for example, that "the missionaries' assumptions as to theform that any genuinely Christian society must take in terms of the social relations of its members, the occupations they engage in, the nature of the communities they live in etc; was not a product of their explicitly religious beliefs, but derived from certain beliefs about the nature of 'civilized' society that are part of the basic ideology of capitalist society".[208] It is possible, Kate correctly insists, "to discern, beneath the frequent disagreements and disputes [between the missionaries themselves and government] an interlinked set of assumptions

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207. Boer, J.H. op.cit. pp. 1 - 80; Crehan, K. op.cit. pp. 13 - 14; Ayandele, E.A. "The Missionary Factor in Northern Nigeria 1870 - 1918" in JHSN vol. 3 no. 3 1966 pp. 508 - 509.

208. Crehan, K. op.cit. p. 14.

about the nature of human society in general, assumptions which shaped missionary perceptions of what, in concrete terms, missionary activity ought to involve".[209] It is these assumptions and perceptions about the nature of a civilised human society which, in my opinion, explains why the missionaries imposed and outlawed certain practices (monogamy; beer drinking in some cases etc) upon their converts even though the doctrinal bases for these are highly controversial.

The point that emerges from all this is that the missionaries and their counterparts in government were in complete agreement about certain basic premises on which a "civilised" society rested. This civilised society, as observed above, was the milieu of a capitalist society such as Britain had attained in the 19th century. For this reason, any meaningful attempt at analysising the "missionary factor" in the historical developments of the colonial period, such as is sought here, must therefore appreciate, fully both the objective and subjective connections between the Church, the missions and the missionaries on the one hand; and, capitalism, to which the former were locked, on theother. This will permit a concrete grasp of the type of Christian converts and the African Church (and Churches) which they founded.

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209. Ibid.

Let us substantiate this a little further. X Christianity had long been brought to Africa before the 19th century by earlier missionaries from the same European continent. But the Christianity which the missionaries between the 15th and 18th centuries then brought permitted and encouraged beer drinking, "inter-tribal" wars, enslavement and, indeed, the all important slave trade.[210] Some of these missionaries brought the guns, the spirits etc and personally partook in the lucrative trade in slaves.[211] For to these missionaries of this early phase of capitalism, the selling and buying of human beings by fellow, equal, human beings offered no doctrinal difficulties. This period, it has been noted, marked the roots of theunderdevelopment of Africa.[212] The Church, the Missions and the missionaries of this era were themselves, independent of what else they were, products of this phase of capitalist development

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210. Vansina, J. Kingdoms of the Savana. London, 1966. Virtually, the whole of this book is a clear testimony of the significant role played by the Christian missionaries in the history of the Kongo kingdom.

211. Ibid. p. 58. For example, in Sao Thome alone, slave exports numbered some 8,000 as early as 1548.

212. Rodney, W. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Dar es Salaam, 1976 pp. 103 - 124.

and expansion. Consequently, the Christian ethos which they sought to instil in their converts were those which reflected this merchantile phase of capitalist development. The activities of Christian missionaries in the Kongo, which probably suffered the greatest from the slave trade on the continent of Africa bring out these points very clearly.[213] Similarly, early missionary activities in Benin, Old Calabar and other coastal areas of Nigeria tell the same stories.[214]

But with the 18th century industrial revolution, and the subsequent irrelevance of slave labour, capitalist development advanced to a higher plane. Machinery, mass production, concentrations, banking, the direa need for raw materials and markets, as well as, the extreme competition among the European powers for these raw materials and markets which culminated in colonialism,

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213. "Political leadership was therefore closely linked and conditioned by the slave trade". Vansina, J. op.cit. p. 197. See also his exposition of the role which these missionaries and the Portuguese Church etc played in the reigns of Affonso I; Diogo I etc right through down to the destruction of the Kongo kingdom and the emergence of Angola and other polities.

214. Hodgkin, T. Nigerian Perspectives. London, 1975 p. 126.

in the 19th century, represented "the highest stage" which capitalism had yet attained.[215] Like their counterparts of the earlier era, the Church, Missions and missionaries of this colonial era were, independent of what they thought, products of this highest stage of capitalist development and expansion. Consequently, the Christian ethos which they sought to instil in their converts reflected the ethos. of the epoch of imperialism.

Thus, unlike their predecessors of the merchantile and slave era, the missionaries of the colonial era "abhored" and fought against "inter-tribal" wars, beer and spirit consumption and the hitherto lucrative slave trade.[216] Yet, the missionaries of both mercantile and colonial era were committed to the proselytisation of the same Christian faith. We must, therefore, emphasize that in analysing the historical role and significance of missionary enterprise, neither the dogma nor the sincerity of individual missionaries themselves is crucial, but the nature and structure of the wider society whose norms and values the missionaries and their dogma expressed.

Thus, in adopting the historical method in assessing the role and significance of missionary enterprise and

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215. Lenin, V.I. Selected Works Moscow, 1977 p. 231.

216. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 134.

the Church in a colonial situation, one is not necessarily calling into question the personal integrity of individual missionaries nor challenging Christianity as a dogma, but drawing attention to the important and major forces of history in which the Christian dogma and its missions only found expression. It is against this conceptual background that the specific discussion of missionary enterprise in the Plateau province is undertaken as a colonial agent of class formation.

The Christian Missions and the Evolution of the Church.

It is not often realised that concerted missionary effort in Northern Nigeria began in the early part of the 19th century. For quoting a vatican source, rather uncritically, Ayandele has asserted that;

> B7 1708 [1908?], it is recorded, there were not less than 100,000 Christian adherents in the Kingdom of Kororofa and a sixty-bed hospital had been built by the Roman Catholic priests. About this time, too, Rome attempted to introduce Christianity into Borno and one Father Carlo de Genova was appointed Prefect of the Projected Mission.[217]

While the information contained in the above quotation is highly contetious, the assertion as a whole indicates that Northern Nigeria had begun to receive the attention

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217. Ayandele, E.A. "The Missionary Factor in Northern Nigeria 1870 - 1918" in JHSN vol. 3 no. 3 1966, p. 503.

of European Christian missions by the 19th century. Indeed, Ayandele contends, with some justification, that "no part of Biled es Sudan received as much attention from the Christian missionary world as Northern Nigeria"[218] in the second half of the 19th century. For during this period, no less than seven Christian Missions in Britain, the United States, Canada, and Italy expressed desire to begin work in the territory.[219]

However, their enthusiasm for work in the region derived from the "idyllic racial superiority of the Hausa" which Goldie and other Europeans had painted.[220] For due to the comments of these Europeans, the view had gained widespread acceptance by many missionary bodies that only the Hausa, with a high literacy rate and material culture, were capable of grasping the metaphysical truths of such a religion like Christianity. It was therefore hoped that once the Hausa embraced Christianity, they would help "the less healthy and less enlightened parts of the [African] continent".[221]

The missionaries were further attracted to the Hausa of northern Nigeria because they mistakenly believed that the Hausawa (Hausa people) were not real

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218. Ibid. p. 503.

219. Ibid. p. 503.

220. Ibid. p. 504.

221. Ibid. p. 504.

moslems, since Islam, they believed, had only been imposed on them by the jihadists whom they saw purely as Fulani.[222] Because of these reasons, missionary enterprise was concentrated in the emirate areas of Northern Nigeria throughout the 19th century. It was not until the missionaries discovered that their anticipated mass conversion of the supposedly suffering Hausawa had been misplaced that they turned to the "pagan" peoples of the Plateau region.[223]

To be sure, the Church Missionary Society had been working in the emirates of Nupe, Nassarawa and Zaria but it did not conceive of stretching its salvation to the Plateau "heathens" inspite of a clear government preference for them to work among the non-Moslem communities of the Protectorate.[224] For the leaders of the Church Missionary Society still entertained the

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222. Ibid. p. 504.

223. Ibid. p. 507.

224. Particularly after the infamous Kano Party of Bishop Tugwell and Miller in 1900. But even in the non-moslem areas, government was reluctant to grant permission to the missions to open schools and stations randomly, particularly, schools. See, for example, SNP 9, 2894/1910 "Bauchi Provincial Mission School, Est. of in Pagan Areas" NAK and SNP 9, 1176/1919 "Christian Missions in Many Lands", Est. of in Northern Provinces" NAK.

activities under severe censure from government.[226] Under these circumstances, they turned their attention to the Plateau region, the home of the so-called "pagan" communities.

Meanwhile, in England, this event together with an apparent lack of general progress in prolytisation among the Hausawa of Northern Nigeria led to the formation of a new multi-denominational missionary body known as the Sudan United Mission (S.U.M.). This mission was formed in 1904 under the leadership of Dr. Karl Kumm, a German nationale to work among the non Moslem Communities of Northern Nigeria.[227] In that same year, a party of four led by Kumm himself and supported by J.G. Burt; A.H. Bateman and J.L. Maxwell arrived in Nigeria. The Sudan United Mission had the expressed goal of expanding Christianity in five "fronts", among, the Jukun of Wukari and Donga; the Yergam at Langtang; the Birom at Du; the Mbula in Yola province; and down the Benue river at the Freed Slaves Home at Rumasha.[228] They established

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226. Ayandele, E.A. op.cit. p. 516.

227. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 35.

228. Olusanya, G.O. "The Freed Slaves Home - An Unknown Aspect of Northern Nigerian Social History" in JHSN vol. 3 no. 3, 1966 p. 532.

their headquarters at Ibi and real work among the communities in that area began in 1907.[229]

In the previous year, however, the Cambridge University Missionary Party, a branch of the Church Missionary Society, had reached Panyam and Kabwir, in the heartlands of the Mwaghavul and Angas respectively, and, established stations there in 1907. An out-station of the Kabwir station was started at Bwoi, twenty years later (1927), among the Sayawa.

Also in 1906, within the same period, the Society of African Mission (SMA) set out from Ibi under its leader, one J. Mouren, to establish a Catholic Mission station "anywhere north of the Benue."[230] When the party left Ibi, the Royal Niger Company which had a station there provided it with forty-five carriers.[231] The Society of African Mission established its first station in Shendam in 1907 and began work there. This was the origin of the Catholic station at Shendam. By 1913, the Roman Catholic Mission, which was controlled by the Society of African Mission, had also established stions at Jos, Kwande and Zonkwa in addition to Shendam.[232]

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229. Ames, C.G. op.cit. p. 311.

230. Mouren, J. (Society of African Mission - SMA) The Catholic Mission in Northern Nigeria: Foundation and First Years 1906 - 1910 written as Souvenir Bishop's Office, Jos p. 2.

231. Ibid. pp. 10 - 11.

232. Ames, C.G. Gazetteers of the Plateau Province, Jos, 1934 p. 311.

In 1913, one Rev. C.N. Barton of the Sudan United Mission settled in Forum; this station quickly grew faster than that of Du and thus became the main Sudan United Mission station in Biromland. According to Maxwell, Barton was greatly assisted by the mining company there who placed three of their huts at his disposal.[233]

In that same year, the original band of four Sudan United Mission missionaries had increased to forty and they were scattered in seven stations in the region.[234] Except for the American branch of the same Sudan United Mission, known as the Sudan Interior Mission (S.I.M.) which settled and established stations at Jos, Miango and Zagun, no further missionary societies settled in the Plateau region until in 1931, when the Seventh Day Adventist Mission established a station at Jengre. The Sudan Interior Mission later opened stations in Kagoro and Kwoi to work among the Katab, Kagoma and Jaba communities of Jema'a Division.

Thus by 1913, most of the main mission stations had been established in the Plateau Province and the preponderance of the Sudan United Mission stations from Britain over their American, South-African (in Mada) as well as the Catholic missions, in the province was firmly

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233. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 101.

234. Ibid. p. 100.

established. It is important to emphasise this preponderance of the Sudan United Mission because the Christian elites who developed out of these missions initially tended to suspect one another which affected political developments on the Plateau, particularly, at the level of leadership.[235]

As we pointed out earlier, the military subjugation of the Plateau and missionary enterprise took place simultaneously, but with the former greatly facilitating the latter. An important effect of this dual operation of both government and the missionaries on the communities of the Plateau was a relatively high frequency of missionary interference in the spheres of government. For except in Zaria Province, where Dr. Miller of the C.M.S. seemed to have constituted himself into a sort of complaints, bureau[236] for his "cherished" Hausa talakawa whose mass conversion, he believed, was being obstructed by the "tyrannical" Fulani ruling caste, missionary involvement in the affairs of the Native Authorities in the emirates was minimal.

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235. Sklar, R.L. Nigerian Political Parties New Jersey, 1953 p. 346.

236. Whitaker, C.S. The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946 - 1966, New Jersey, 1970 p. 47.

However, on the Plateau, this missionary involvement had reached its peak in thevery formative years of the Native Authority institutions in that region. For example, the events in Panyam and Kabwir provide good illustrations of missionary interference in local politics and both have often been cited as such though with some misinterpretation.

Thus, in 1908, a certain Mr. Wedgewood, a Church Missionary Society missionary stationed in Panyam, caused the District Officer of Pankshin Division to appoint one Dakwa as the "secular" chief of Panyam in preference to Punshak, the incumbent, who was apparently unenthusiastic about missionary work in his Panyam domain.[237] Dakwa was neither from the ruling house nor from the ruling lineage located at the Sekop ward of Panyam Chiefdom. After three years of rule by Dakwa, the District Officer was forced to depose him following a formal complaint from the Sekop ruling house that the British had stolen their chieftaincy and given it to where it had never belonged. They ended with a threat to "deal" with Dakwa if the British did not rectify the misdeed.

Similarly, in Kabwir, one Mr. Lloyd also a C.M.S. succeeded in lobbying for the installation of Bewarang

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237. JOSPROF 1, 542 "North Sura District Panyam.." - NAK.

as Chief of Kabwir.[238] Bewarang belonged to the ruling lineage of Kabwir chieftaincy but he had fled the main palace for a new missionary settlement at Tuwan.[239] This made it impossible for him to take charge of his palace obligations which included inheriting all the widows of his predecessors, protecting the tsafi house, and performing other daily rituals associated with the palace and the Kabwir chieftaincy. The Kabwir king-makers and elders had opposed his installation on account of his close association with the missionaries. At any rate, he could not rule Kabwir from Tuwan because Kabwir elders correctly interpreted this as imposing Christianity on their people. In the circumstances, succession to the Kabwir chieftaincy became complicated and the situation was only saved by the personal intervention of the Resident who had to travel to Kabwir to settle the affair. Bewarang was subsequently deposed.

But contrary to missionary opinion on these two cases, an opinion to which both Crampton[240] and Ayandele[241]

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238. Gonyok, C.K. "The Ngas and the Coming of the Colonial Administration 1906-1935" B.A. Research Essay Dept. of History, ABU, Zaria, 1973 pp. 40 - 44.

239. JOSPROF 1, 451/1929 "Provincial Report, 1929" NAK.

240. Crampton, E.P.T., Christianity in Northern Nigeria, Zaria, 1976 pp. 71 - 72.

241. Ayandele, E.A. "The Missionary Factor in Northern Nigeria 1870 - 1918" in JHSN vol.3 no.3 1966 p. 519.

subscribed, those chiefs were not deposed, primarily, because of their conversion to, or, open support for, Christianity at an era of government support for "heathen" institutions against Christianity in the former's implementation of indirect rule. For in the two cases, the missionaries had clearly illdirected the District Officer of Pankshin in appointing wrongful candidates for the chieftaincy office of the two districts. In the particular case of Panyam, Dakwa was, not only a wrongful candidate, but, an illegal one smuggled into power through the machinations of Wedgewood.

There is yet another level of missionary involvement in the local politics of the area in the 1940s, even if subtly and indirectly, which should be highlighted. This involvement was related to the subterranean use of their stations for political meetings. There is, as yet, no direct evidence to prove that the missionaries initiated and openly supported these meetings but they certainly tolerated and probably encouraged these formative meetings. For example, the venue of the inaugural meeting of the Birom Progressive Union was the Roman Catholic Mission School in Jos.[242] Similarly, the inaugural meeting of the Middle Zone League, successor of the Non-Moslem League, was held at Kagoro[243]

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242. Dudley, B.J. Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria London, 1968 p. 93.

243. Ibid. p. 113.

which, as we pointed out above, was a station of the Sudan Interior Mission.

Thus, the mission stations at Du, Forum, Panyam, Kabwir, Langtang, Shendam, Jos, Kagoro, Zonkwa etc were not merely local bases for planning and organising the spread of Christianity on the Plateau, but they were also centres of political mobilisation among the Birom, Mwaghavul, Angas, Yergam, Goemai, Kagoma and Katab respectively. It was not surprising, therefore, that the first generation of political leaders in the Plateau outside Jos township, sprang from the districts where the mission stations had been established and these leaders, it may be recalled, were the beneficiaries of the mission education in these centres.

Thus, it may be remarked that most of the first set of paramount chiefs of the late 1940s and the 1950s were the District Heads of the mission stations or, alternatively, other District Heads outside these stations but who were nominated and backed by the educated elite of these stations. For example, Rwang Pam, the first paramount chief of the Birom was a teacher at Du which, as we noted earlier, was the first Sudan United Mission station in Biromland.[244] The first chief of Angas, Yilsu was a former policeman from Ner,

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244. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 87.

another mission centre in Angasland.[245] Mark Hirse, the first paramount chief of the Sura-Pyem was from Mangu-District but he was nominated and sponsored by Pastor David Lot in the mission centre of Panyam whose District Head was still suspect of Christianity.[246] In the Lowland Division, the paramount Chief of the Goemai at Shendam, a Catholic centre, was by colonial opinion "probably the most enlightened and able pagan chief in the country, who had been in office since 1916, possesses his own car..."[247]

These examples will suffice. The point is that mission involvement in the local politics of the Plateau through the use of their stations and Christian leaders, though somewhat conjectural, was discernible.

On their own part, the missionaries adopted a rather hostile attitude towards government toleration of indigenous institutions all of which they regarded as

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245. No. C60 - "Pankshin Federated Native Authority - Secret" pp. 82 - 85.

246. Till his death in 1975, Gijihir Pushak, the District head of Panyam from 1941 to 1975, never became a Christian nor had cause to trust Pastor Lot.

247. JOSPROF 1, 430/1931 "Organisation and Administration of Plateau Province" NAK.

heathen. For example, they are known to have encouraged their converts to disrespect and disregard the juju of their respective communities, particularly, as this entailed exposing the womenfolk to secrets and sacred shrines of these communities. This caused much sensation and, in some cases, disturbances in many Plateau communitie For example, in 1937, the District Officer of Pankshin was forced to intervene in "a gentle homily" in Kamwai which arose from "the unbecoming behaviour of some Christian women towards the community pagan ceremony."[248] In that same year, according to the same report, friction occured between pagans and Christians at Lankan owing to the latters refusal to await the corn fertility rite before planting millet.

Generally, judging by the minutes and resolutions of some of the Christian Mission conferences which were frequently held, these missions were dissatisfied with the attitude of the colonial government towards Christianity.[249] Their own view was that the colonial government was a Christian government because Britain, the mother country, was a Christian country. Therefore, the British officers serving in the various districts,

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248. Adams, T.S. (Chief Commissioner) "Plateau Province Annual Report, 1937". ARNN p. 47.

249. Conference of Missions of Northern Provinces of Nigeria 1926; and 1929 pp. 11 - 12 respectively.

who were presumably Christians themselves, were expected to openly assist missionary activity regardless of the political and moral consequences involved. But because most of the District Officers were opposed to imposing Christianity on the Native Authorities and their populations, the missionaries often discouraged their followers from taking appointments with the Native Authorities thereby blocking, though with limited success, their followers from active participation in the affairs of the Native Authorities. Yet, compared with the mission institutions, the Native Authorities offered better wages and salaries to their workers. For while the workers in mission stations paid compulsory tithes of 10% of their earnings and made compulsory savings with the mission, apart from their income taxes,[250] their counterparts in the Native Authorities paid only the income taxes and thereby earned more in both absolute and relative terms.

In due course, this attitude of the mission made their Christian converts and their workers to view their counterparts in government and in the service of the Native Authority services with contempt since they

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250. This applied to all workers - teachers, pastors, dispensary assistants, etc - of the Sudan United Mission up to 1960.

believed the latter to be suffering from moral decadence.[251] The effect of this was that the emergent elite of the Church initially tended to be suspect of each others political intentions.[252] Consequently, the support-base of the Native Authority elite consisted mainly of the District Heads, the Native Authority bureaucracy and the larger society which remained outside the grip of the missionaries. The Christian elites, on the other hand, derived their support from the Church members, whose numbers were small, but who were steadily increasing. By the 1940s, however, the Christian elites had become a political force to reckon with, by virtue of their education, despite their numerical insignificance. For as leaders of the Churches, workers in the mission hospitals, dispensaries and as school teachers, government consulted them, from time to time, over the development of these services and enlisted their support on major issues of local policy.[253]

By and large, the most important attractions to the mission centres were the mission clinics, carpentry workshops, model farms, masonries and the schools all of

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251. But this attitude was less pronounced among the workers of the Catholic Church. Patrick Dokotri 3/12/1982.

252. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 345 (fn. 38).

253. Pastor D. Lot; David Dimka; John A. Kwashi etc interviewed on various dates.

which they established at several centres in the Plateau province though with varying degrees of success. The mission medical centres, in particular, had the greatest attraction, obviously due to their healing influences. Regarding the medical work of the missions the Resident specifically noted that:

> it is perhaps through their medical work that the Missions have achieved their greatest success and I cannot express too strongly and sincerely my intense admiration for the relief and comfort they must have brought to thousands of sick and suffering during the past twenty years or more.[254]

However, the farming centres and carpentry workshops which the missions established made comparatively inconsequential impact on the lives of the Plateau people. Nor did these result in the creation of classes in any significant manner. For these mission enterprises were not only too few for the whole province, but they were also poorly conceived and equiped.

But, despite their schools and medical centres, the missionaries had won very few converts by the first two decades of colonial rule. For example, by the end of 1922, the Sudan United Mission, the largest Mission body

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254. Ames, C.G. Gazetteers of the Plateau Province Jos, 1934 p. 312.

on the Plateau, had succeeded in establishing only five organised Churches in each of their declared fronts at Donga, Wukari, Numan, Ibi and Langtang.[255] On the Plateau proper, there were some 22 members at Forum among the Birom in full covenant in the church. Similar figures obtained for Panyam and Kabwir among the Mwaghavul and Angas respectively.[256] By 1930, the missionaries had not succeeded in producing a single Pastor, a fact which indicates a lack of willingness on their part to train African clergy regardless of their denomination. But more importantly, it indicates a lack of interest in thenew faith from the Plateau peoples for whom Christianity and Colonialism meant the same thing.[257]

From 1926,[258] the various Missions thus held a series of joint conferences to discuss general problems facing them. For example, in 1926, a conference was held

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255. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 135.

256. Crampton, E.P.T. op.cit. p. 149.

257. A view representative of the peasantry in general inspite of the artificial and pretentious behaviours of both government and mission officials to the contrary.

258. But it should not be inferred that 1926 marked the first date of such meetings. For the minutes of the 1926 meeting indicate that a sub-committee was set up to review the minutes of an earlier conference held in Lokoja at an unspecified date. Conference of Missions of Northern Provinces Nigeria 1926 held at Miango, November, 13th - 18th, 1926 p. 3.

at Miango in which several important decisions were taken including a desire to combine the various missions in Northern Nigeria into a United Church of Africa to which Africans would be ordained as ministers.[259] This conference was followed by another one held in Ibi in 1928 which became the first African Christian convention.[260] The Ibi conference which drew members from almost all the Churches on the Plateau was attended by 150 delegates including women and girls. Then, in 1931, a conference of the European staff of the missions was held at Numan, outside the Plateau province. Forty-six missionaries from Benue and beyond attended this conference, whose theme, "Preparation for Harvest," was obviously chosen to reflect a feeling, among some of the missionaries, that their efforts were now beginning to yield positive results. The papers presented at this conference centred on three main spheres of missionary evangelical work, namely, education, health, and the growth and development of the African Church.[261] Thus, with regards to the third sphere, to which the missionaries then accorded priority, in 1938, three indigenous pastors were ordained. These African pastors were Toma T. Lot (Birom), David O.V. Lot (Mwahavul); and Bali (Yergam).[262]

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259. Ibid. p. 21.

260. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 157.

261. Ibid. p. 178.

262. Ibid. p. 217; Crampton, E.P.T. op.cit. p. 156.

In order to consolidate these seemingly positive developments, particularly after the second imperial war, the missions introduced a new attraction into their efforts. This time, they decided to concentrate on the youth. Thus, in this same period, they started the Boys' Brigade (B.B),in 1942 followed later, by the Girls' Life Brigade (GLB), in 1948, which later changed its name to Girls Brigade (GB).[263]

The fanciful uniforms of these brigades, their bands (flutes, drums etc) and other paraphanalia created such fancy that some youths were attracted to them despite the heavy fees that they had to pay to become members. This along with the missionary schools and training centres, hospitals and clinics continued to pull in followers to them. By the end of 1939, when the Second World War began, the success of missionary enterprise could be gauged by the existence of training centres at Gindiri, Numan, Lupwe (Kabwir), Kagoro, Kwoi, Zonkwa, Vom, Kafanchan and several institutions within Jos township. There were then three ordained pastors; 87 paid evangelists and teachers; 154 responsible workers appointed by the Church to a charge, but not salaried; 24 dispensary attendants and three midwives in the S.U.M. services alone.[264]

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263. Maxwell, J.L. op.cit. p. 226.

264. Ibid. p. 233.

Generally, the missionries were quite aware of the fact that people were not coming to their new faith as a result of some fundamental convictions about what they were preaching and its superiority to the indigenous philosophies and belief systems, but, mainly, because of the new opportunities which their work, and belonging to their circles in the new colonial social order confered on them. Consequently, the missions were cautious and slow in developing new areas of opportunities especially schools.[265]

Thus, for over two decades of colonial rule, a running debate ensued between the Government Education Department and the Missions, particularly, the Sudan United Mission, over the classes which the latter were opening.[266] The missions insisted that government should not treat what they regarded as their "simple classes" as schools but merely recognise them as classes for Religious Instruction (C.R.I.). Indeed, in 1932 the Missions persuaded the government to reluctantly pass a special ordinance which gave recognition to these categories of "simple classes" so as to distinguish them from schools proper.[267] For according to Maxwell, these

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265. Ibid. p. 183.

266. SNP 9, 2894/1918: "Bauchi Provincial Mission School - Est. of in Pagan Areas". NAK.

267. No. 937/49. EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, NORTHERN PROVINCES, KADUNA. "Third Regional Mission Conference, Toro- Minutes of" 13th May 1933 p. 1.

classes;

> permitted us to arrange for our converts to be taught to read the Scriptures without having to maintain the full Education Department standard in each village class. The CRIs were very vital since the missions as a rule did not baptize any convert, except in special cases, unless he could read and write.[268]

As we pointed out on the discussion on colonial education, this attitude of the missionaries, particularly, the Sudan United Mission, restricted and slowed down the number of people who would have filtered into their orbit of control.

But, as we also noted earlier, the missionaries came to realise in the 1930s that their policy of slow and limited education was suicidal because the political developments which were taking place then were bound to lead to an eventual termination of colonial rule sooner than they had forseen. They now discovered that their education policy had deprived them of a sufficiently trained African clergy to succeed them, a problem which, they believed, would decide the fate of the Church which they had thus far, striven to establish. Thus, reflecting on this regretable policy on their part, Maxwell lamented;

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268. Maxwell, J.L. op. cit. p. 183.

> It would have been much better if we had not been so unwilling, in the past, to venture on a more thorough educational programme. As things were, the Christians were far too backward educationally to be able to take an active part in political leadership. The parents, too, were too unenlightened to see the danger, to which reference has already been made, of being swamped and exploited by the Moslems.[269]

Too lately, therefore, the missions turned greater attention to educational expansion in the process of which centres like Gindiri assume crucial roles and significance. Paradoxically, with all the claims of the missions to representing an interest separate from that of the government, it was only at this time that they discovered the ideological dimension of their work, namely, that;

> the student of today is the leader of tomorrow; the opportunity is now ours to colour his ideals, and above all ... to bring him into touch with the Saviour who has redeemed him...[270]

By the 1940s, the fruits of the new zeal of the missions on education began to bear fruits. For by this time, individuals who had benefitted from their modified education, began to take certificates which were approved by government and private employers. Some of such beneficiaries left the Church Services while a majority stayed

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269. Ibid. pp. 299 - 300.
270. Ibid. p. 329.

on. These developments along with concerted missionary propaganda further attracted more followership as the table below suggests.

MISSIONARY ACHIEVEMENT IN PLATEAU PROVINCE BY 1945.

DESCRIPTION	1939	1945
Classes of Religious Instructions	121	298
Preaching centres	23	43
African Voluntary Workers	143	312
African Dispensary Attendants	21	34
African Mid-wives.	3	11
Average attendance at principal Sunday service	6,881	13,048
Baptisms	211	432
Church Members on Roll	1,442	3,126
Different patients treated in Hospitals and Dispensaries	29,403	46,075[271]

As can be deduced from the above table, in 1939, church membership numbered 1,442 but only 211 of these had been baptized and thus, in full covenant. But church attendance on Sunday worship services, which we may regard as indicative of a general inclination towards Christianity, was as high as nearly 7,000 in the same year.[272] These are

271. Ibid. p. 249.

272. Ibid.

figures for all the Sudan United Mission stations put together. However, within a space of seven years, that is between 1939 and 1945, these figures had more then doubled thereby showin, that the missionaries had by 1940s been able to accomplish in seven years, more than they had been able to do, thirty-eight years previously.

These figures represented less than 1.5 per cent of the population of the province.[273] And since they were concentrated only in a few centres of the province, they were of no social consequence numerically. But in terms of the role which they played in socialising and mobilising people, not only into Christianity but into the new social milieu of the colonial province, they were of substantial consequence; for they became crucial in interpreting to the various communities from which they sprang, the new and changing goals of society and how to succeed in pursuing them. They inherited the missionary frame of political analysis and interpretation of their own existence and possible role in the colonial state. As a result, they also inherited the missionary apprehensions and fears of moslem domination of a region in which they constituted only a minority. Islam which they equated with Hausa domination was thus seen to be the ultimate enemy of the Plateau people.

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273. Computed from the grand total population of over 500,000 given for the Plateau province in 1934. Ames, C.G. Gazetteers ... p. 3 and 8.

Having defined their existence and future struggle within the framework of an Islamic encroachment and domination of its people, the stage was set for all the Plateau communities, including non-Christians (by far, the majority) to rise together and beat off the impending Hausa-Fulani domination under Islam. Even the non-missionary trained elite from the Native Authroties were sympathetic to this view. As we shall see later, however, this interpretation of politics of the Plateau Province tended to find justification in the nature and structure of the colonial economy of the province as well as in the behaviour and utterances of the late Sir Ahmadu Bello during his last years. It will suffice here to emphasize that the Christian Church became a strong social base for many Plateau politicians.

Finally, it remains to show and to emphasise that the African clergy, as distinct from the educated elite on the Plateau in general, formed a sub-ruling class even within the Church as appropriators of peasant labour and surplus product. For therein lay their class character. But in order to explain this, however we must go beyond the Church records which, on this particular issue, are often misleading. For these Church records, most of which consist of big exercise books, were all-purpose registers containing entries on Sunday service attendances and collections,

subscriptions of Church members in covenant, deaths, births, marriages and so on. Formal receipts for payments of any type were unknown in the villages.[274] These records were kept by the catechists, pastors or the evangelists, as the case may be, depending on the size of the Church. The records were inspected at regular intervals to ensure that proper Church administration was adhered to at all times.[275]

To be sure, all cadres of the clergy earned very low in terms of formal wages and salaries and what is more, these varied from one Protestant denomination to another.[276] The Catholic clergy received no formal salaries or wages. But the salaries and wages tell only half the story. For it is well-known that these clergy were heavily subsidized in many ways. For example, they lived in houses built for them by the village congregations and the same congregation worked on their farms - from cultivation to harvest; they did not pay rents nor school fees for the education of their children

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274. A heap of such exercise books existed at Panyam one of the major centres of the S.U.M. My discussion with some of the clergy shows that proper accounting and receipting of payments and transactions was only done at the S.U.M. Headquarter, Jos, which was responsible for banking Church funds, purchases for the schools, dispensaries etc.

275. Benle Gugin; Pastor D.G. Yamden and others interviewed, December 1979.

276. Ibid.

whose admission into the mission schools and colleges was automatic.[277] And these did not preclude any other domestic services which the congregations of their respective stations or churches deemed it fit to render them. With all these important needs of life given them freely, in addition to their relatively low salaries and wages, it is not difficult to appreciate the fact that these Church ministers were a parasitic class living on the sweat of the ordinary, often illiterate, members of their respective congregations, a majority of who were peasants. Thus, like the teachers and other Native Authority and government workers on the Plateau, these members of the clergy were the first owners of bicycles, motorcycles, radio sets, European dresses (apart from their ceremonial dresses and ropes) which manifestly distinguished them as a segment of the emergent Plateau sub-ruling classes from the generality of the peasantry in the 1940s and the 1950s.

To further demonstrate the class character of the Plateau clergy and the special privileges which they enjoyed, a closer look at the admission system in Gindiri Training becomes necessary; the moreso, since education, admittedly,

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277. It is even rumoured, in some circles, that admission names for the children of the ordinary non-Christian peasantry were substituted for those of the Christian teachers, evangelists etc who had neither passed the entrance examinations, nor, the accompanying interviews in thefirst place.

held the key to success in the colonial order. Thus, according to the Gindiri records, less than 20% of the students admitted to the Boys Secondary School between 1949, when it started, and 1955, when the first batch of students passed out, were children of the ordinary Plateau peasants who professed to be Christians.[278] Thus, over 70% of the students admitted during the same period were the children of the clergy and the mission teachers, dispensary attendants and other Mission workers. The Gindiri Girls Boarding School (1956) and the Girls High School (1958) operated the same admissions policy.

Apart from its discriminatory admission policy on grounds of religion, however the Sudan United Mission tried to spread their admissions over as many of the ethnic groups of the Plateau as possible because they realised the socio-economic and political implications of this. Thus, out of a total of 57 places alloted to the boys from Plateau province, in 1956, in the Boys Secondary School, the Birom had 15; Mwaghavul 13, Angas 9, Yergam 12, Ninzam 3, Eggon 2, and Bada, Pyam and Kulere one each.[279] In the Teachers College, the Birom had 6, Angas 10, Mwaghavul 13, Chip 2, Yergam 13, Pyam 2, Ninzam 3, Eggon and Kulere one each.[280] The

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278. Log Book: Boys Secondary School Gindiri. The entries in the log book contain information on tribe, occupation, religion, sponsors etc. of each student and their parents.

279. Board of Governors Meeting. January 24th 1957 p.4.

280. Ibid. p. 3.

conspicous absence of Goemai students from these records is explicable by the prepondrance of the Roman Catholic Mission in Shendam Division whose students went to Catholic Secondary Schools and teachers colleges at Jos, (St. Murumba), Vom (St. Joseph), Zonkwa and Kafanchan (CMI) respectively.[281]

The point being demonstrated is that the privileged position which the clergy on the Plateau enjoyed, in particular, their easy access to education, enabled them and their children to pertuate their own class and to establish their hegemony over the generality of the peasantry. The new opportunities in the public and private sectors of the colonial economy, for which the clergy and their relations had access, transformed them into a distinguishable socio-economic class assisting the colonial exploitation of the province vis-a-vis the generality of the peasantry who remained exploited and dominated. The clergy, thus, formed an important segment of the educated elite directing and indoctrinating the growing numbers of Christians in the Plateau province, and their political significance was bolstered by the widespread fear of Islamic domination of the Plateau province.

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281. Bishop G. Ganaka. December, 1979.

SUMMARY.

From the discussion of the Native Authorities, colonial education and the Missions and the Church which we have offered in this chapter, it is necessary to round up the chapter with a summary of the general and specific character of the sub-ruling classes produced by these colonial institutions vis-a-vis other colonial agents of class formation in the province. For example, as we shall see later, the political behaviour of the ruling classes produced from these institutions tended to be different from that of those produced from the commercial sector of the colonial economy of the province.

Thus, the first general point to note about the ruling classes produced from the above institutions is their size. Here, it is to be remarked that they evidently formed the largest segment of the sub-ruling classes of the Plateau province collectively, and their political base and influence was the rural areas.

Secondly, compared to the commercial and bureaucratic petty-bourgeoisie of Jos township, the above socio-economic classes were economically weak. For, until the late 1950s none of them were company agents, contractors, big government officials and big businessmen such as those in existence in Jos township and Bukuru, since they were not serving in the most lucrative sectors of the economy.

Thirdly, this wealth differential between them collectively on the one hand, and their urban counterparts together on the other, coupled with the ethnic and religious colouration of these wealth differentials, justified the fear of "Hausa-Fulani" and, by implication, Islamic domination of the Plateau province thereby giving rise to, and, credibility to, minority politics in the province.

All these were important issue concerning class formation and politics on the Plateau but before discussing them fully, we must turn our attention to an examination of the colonial economy itself - the most basic factor of class formation and the raison detre for colonial rule.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FORMATION OF CLASSES: THE COLONIAL ECONOMY OF PLATEAU PROVINCE 1902 - 1959

INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter, we attempted to show how the colonial institutions of law and order, specifically, the Native Authorities and the ideological apparatuses, the Christian Missions and colonial education, helped to create a new class of Africans on the Plateau. This class, it should be pointed out, became a crucial nexus in the perpetuation of colonial rule in this area. In this chapter, we shall examine the colonial economy to show how and to what extent it determined and conditioned class formation in the Plateau province; the more so because without an examination of the colonial economy - the raison detre for the establishment of colonial rule - it is impossible to explain fully, the establishment of the institutions of colonial law and order and the ideological apparatuses which we have discussed including the whole basis of the political superstructure about which this thesis is concerned. For in reality, the peoples of this province, like their counterparts in the other regions, their beliefs aside, were basically responding to the objective social relations of production which colonial capitalism had brought in its train.

However, it should be pointed out at the outset that the emphasis of the chapter is on the structure of the colonial economy rather than on the volume of its output even though the latter was also important. For it was at the structural level that the basic production links were established, and it was these production links which dialectically gave rise to the various classes, the inherent contradictions between the classes (and within them), and, inevitably, the subsequent struggle between these classes at the political level.[1]

To start with, a few important general observations must be taken into account in an attempt to concretely analyse and assess the colonial economy of the Plateau province.

Firstly, the province was only one out of twelve similar provinces which constituted the then Northern Region of Nigeria. This means that although the Plateau Province had its own peculiarities, it was not an isolated economy but one which was part of a larger colonial economy of Northern Nigeria and, also, the whole of colonial Nigeria.

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1. Marx, K. and Engels, F. Selected Works Vol. 1 Moscow, 1977 pp. 41 - 42.

Secondly, until late in the 1940s, very little effort was made to encourage peasant cashcrop production in this province despite the fact that many parts of it were suitable for the cultivation of cotton, groundnuts, tobacco, ginger, palm oil and beniseed.[2] On the contrary, a policy of deliberate discouragement of cash-crop production was pursued so as to ensure that the tin industry remained the dominant economic activity in the province. Consequently, unlike some of the cash crop producing provinces such as Kano, Ibadan, Zaria, Owerri, Onitsha and Enugu, the Plateau province did not develop the phenomenon of landlordism[3] and the resultant creation of class characteristic of it. In other words, neither a cash-crop producer class nor a rural peasant gentry developed as was the cases in the cocoa, palm oil, rubber, cotton, tobacco and groundnuts producing areas of Nigeria.

Thirdly, a commercial retailer class and, later, an urban landlord class developed but these classes were made up of predominantly immigrant elements who had come to settle in the province with the inception of the

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2. This point is substantiated later in the chapter.

3. Particularly absentee landlords such as developed among the cocoa farmers of Western Nigeria. See; Berry, S.S. "Cocoa and Economic Development in Western Nigeria;" Hogendorn, J.S. "The Origins of the Groundnuts Trade in Northern Nigeria;" both in Eicher C.K. and Liedholm, C. (eds) Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy. Michigan, 1970.

colonial period. They consisted of mainly the Hausawa, Kanuri, Yoruba, Igbo, Effik and other "southern" elements;[4] and, because of their intermediary role in the commercial and transport sectors of the colonial economy of the province, they constituted a very important class. Their members were mainly stationed in the rural centres and markets as shop-owners and shopkeepers but they also engaged in foodstuff trading between the rural and urban areas of the province.[5]

Fourthly, and perhaps, the most important observation to be made is that the Plateau province contained huge deposits of good quality tin ore. These deposits were concentrated mainly in Birom and Anaguta lands but they also existed in some portions of Jarawa, Jerawa, Mwaghavul and Ron lands.[6] Tin mining, when it began, led to the alienation of these lands from the peasants of these

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4. Field notes in Jos, Bukuru, Tenti, Dorowan Babuje, Manguna Hausawa, Fankshin, Panyam, Mangu, Chika (Amper) etc June - September 1979. But also Plotnicov, L. Strangers to the City. Pittsburgh, 1967 (1969) p. 51.

5. Ibid.

6. Tin was also found in Wamba and Gamber (the latter in Bauchi province) in commercial quantities but these were of lower quality. The tin in both areas were exploited. For the first consignment of the Wamba tin to Jos; see; JOSPROF 1, 31/1928: "Akwanga Division - Annual Report for 1927": NAK.

communities. But being labour-intensive, tin mining also brought into the Plateau a huge influx of labourers and workers from other parts of Nigeria, West Africa and from elsewhere in Africa. Having been dispossessed of their land without any form of compensation, these peasants, mainly the Birom, were turned into an army of "unskilled" labourers for the tin industry while the remaining communities of the province were encouraged to produce only foodcrops the surplus of which helped to feed the huge populations of the mines. Notwithstanding the pressing demands for food exerted on the peasant cultivators of the province, peasant freehold production prevailed throughout the province.

The prevelance of peasant subsistence agriculture in a colonial setting based on mining and production of cash crops implied that the peasants of the Plateau province had very little chance of "success" within the colonial economy of Nigeria beyond subsistence. For these peasants did not have access to the control or even a manipulation[7] of any of the lucrative sectors of the colonial economy, namely, cash crop production, commerce and transport, and mining.

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7. "Manipulation is a better term than control in describing the use or misuse of avenues opened to the African colonial staff in exploiting his fellow colonised. The colonial state controlled while the African staff manipulated. For once colonised, a people lose the control of their economy to their colonial masters. For further elaboration, see: Zahar, R. Colonialism and Alienation. (trans. by W.F. Weiser) Benin, 1974.

Regarding the Plateau province where mining and commerce predominated, these, as we shall show later, were firmly under foreign control. The limited manipulation and, not control, from which some Africans benefitted were mainly in the retail and transport sectors of the colonial economy. These social elements, as has been said already, were immigrants from outside the province. The only sector of the Colonial economy in which the Plateau indigens[8] had some limited share was in the service sector but, even here, this was a much latter development. For as we have noted in the last chapter, colonial education which was mainly responsible for the production of the Biron intelligentsia and elite, was a much slower process in the Plateau region, at least, up to the 1930s. As such, its impact on the societies was hardly felt before the 1940s.[9]

All these had important implications for class formation typical of the province as well as the resultant political developments of the Plateau region. For this reason, a closer examination of these key areas of the colonial economy is necessary. One can identify, at least, five major areas.

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8. A rather intriguing term. For the purpose of this thesis, it refers to the peoples who had permanently settled in this region before 1900 and who had evolved a sense of belonging to the region prior to this period.

9. SNP 9, 1271/1922 "Bauchi Province Annual Reports 1921" NAK; See also, Morrison, J. op.cit. pp. 303-309.

1. COLONIAL LAND POLICY AND TIN MINING IN PLATEAU PROVINCE.

Land, it has to be emphasised, is the most precious of all means of production. This is so because its use and control has been the principal determinant of the nature and structure of all social formations throughout history. The significance of land cannot, therefore, be overemphasised.

To start with, there was no separate colonial land policy for the Plateau province although, as a mineral area, it was probably the one most adversely affected by the series of land Proclamation Ordinances which began in 1900.[10] The most important consequence of these Land Proclamations and Ordinances was the introduction and recognition of the primacy of private land ownership throughout colonial Nigeria despite some "principles of native ownership of land" which were allegedly conceded to the colonial subjects. For it was through such land laws that the colonial government took the first steps in the juxtaposition of a colonial capitalist mode of production side by side with the precapitalist modes thereby undermining and weakening the latter.[11]

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10. For a discussion of the evolution of land and mineral policy of the colonial government and the committees set up to look into aspects of this policy; see Lugard, F. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. London, 1965 pp. 280 - 353.

11. Ibid. pp. 294 - 306.

Thus, according to the colonial government, land still generally belonged to the "natives" who utilised it in ways traditional or customary to them under the general overlordship of the British conquerors.[12] Under this arrangement, land which was not under peasant cultti-vation was regarded as belonging to the whole community but entrusted to the care of the ruler of the particular location of such land. In 1913, however, the Public Lands Acquisition Proclamation was introduced which empowered the Governor to "acquire any freehold land when required for public purposes."[13] Since only the colonial government was qualified to determine what the public interest was and the amount of land required for implementing these interests and pursuing these purposes, government thus became the real or actual owner of land, hence, the concept of Crown Lands.[14]

Consequently, all requests for land were channelled to the government and only the colonial government or its agency could issue land permits.[15] In this way the

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12. SNP 9, 1147/1914 "Northern Nigeria Annual Report 1913". NAK.

13. Ibid.

14. Lugard, F. The Dual Mandate pp. 289 - 291; Orr, C. The Making of Northern Nigeria. London, 1965 (2nd edtn) pp. 244 - 255.

15. Lugard, F. The Dual Mandate p. 292.

colonial government controlled and regulated the establishment and spread of both commercial and "philanthropic" enterprises including the elimination of the possible development of a "settler economy" in Nigeria even though it permitted a restricted establishment of plantation agriculture.[16]

Regarding mineral laws, which affected the Plateau province greatly, the colonial government gave the false impression that the interest of the so-called African "occupiers"[17] of the mineral-bearing land was well protected. For, according to these laws, holders of mining leases had to pay the owner an annual rent fixed by government which was subject to revision at intervals of seven years, while holders of all titles were obliged to compensate landowners for disturbance and damage to buildings and crops.[18] But in the same breath, these same laws stated that the 'owner' of land or other property of a native community was the chief or head of a community unless the land in question was private or held under a grant from the Crown.[19] Since land "occupied" by

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16. Ibid. p. 295.

17. Bower, P. "The Mining Industry" in Perham, M. (ed) Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria Faber and Faber Ltd London, 1947 p. 7.

18. Ibid. p. 8.

19. Ibid. p. 8.

Nigerian farmers was more often of the former type, the question arises as to whether the alleged rent or compensation eventually reached the affected persons especially since no legal provisions were made for the procurement of new farmlands for the dispossessed farmers.

Worse still, particularly for the Plateau peasant, was the absence of any form of restriction placed on tree-felling or an obligation on the part of the mining companies to replant the land.[20] For in order to meet the demands for wood required for mining and fuel purposes, "all the available trees in the neighbourhood" had been felled with the result that fuel had become an expensive item in the budget of both miners and the peasantry alike.[21] At the same time, the associated problems of deforestation and soil erosion had already been described as "serious" as early as 1923.[22] It is important to grasp all these in order to appreciate the plight of the peasant communities who inhabited the tin areas of the Plateau province since their condition, social and material, was crucial in determining subsequent political developments in the area.

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20. Ibid. p. 8.

21. Ibid. p. 8.

22. SNP 9, 86/1924 "Beuchi Province - Annual Report 1923". N.A.K.

Thus, with the "tin rush" to the Jos Plateau between 1904 and 1914, the colonial period in this region had begun in earnest with a serious scramble for land, the main source of livelihood of the Birom and Anaguta peasant communities. For example, by 1911, over 50 companies, all concentrated on the Plateau, had taken up licences to prospect for tin in Nigeria.[23] The number of European tin companies rose to 70 in 1912;[24] to 72 in 1926; and 83 in 1928. Thereafter, these companies began to amalgamate,[25] a process in which individual miners as well as corporate bodies were involved. Land, therefore, began to be parcelled out with the "natives" being ejected from these lands and their crops destroyed without compensation even though government had ruled that compensations were to be paid at a rate of £2 per acre.[26]

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23. Both Morrison and Freund give higher number of companies. We may regard 50 as the minimum number of companies by this date. Morrison, J. op.cit. p. 319; Freund, B. Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines. Longman, 1981 p. 37. But see also; ALLISTER MACMILLAN (compilers and editors) The Red Book of West Africa: historical and descriptive, commercial and industrial facts, figures and resources. London, 1968 (1st Published in 1920) p. 47.

24. SNP 10/7, 215F/1919 "Labour for Mines". NAK.

25. Bower, P. "The Mining Industry" in Perham, M. (ed) Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria London, 1947 pp. 20 - 21.

26. Ibid. p. 14.

Indeed, it was not until 1941, when Birom resistence on the land issue became more hostile, widespread and organised, that compensation began to be paid.[27] Yet, the Birom and other indigenes had by then been deprived of their lands for over forty years while the mining companies, on the other hand, had made away with huge profits annually.[28] Thus, as early as 1913, a survey of only 37 mining areas showed that as much as 100,000 acres of land had already been set aside for mining, and ✓ 98% of it had been leased to the companies involved under exclusive licence rights.[29]

The land problem was compounded by the fact that the best tin-bearing lands were also the most fertile and well-watered areas of Birom and Anaguta lands, thereby making the problem more acute than any figures would suggest.[30] For example, in 1944, a study of Gyel,

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27. Patrick Dokotri 3/12/1982; Dwajok Dangal 29/6/79. Kuru. See also, Morrison, J. op.cit. p. 327 and Freund, B. op.cit. pp. 159 - 160.

28. Bower, P. op.cit. pp. 16 - 19.

29. Gall, F.B. "Northern Nigeria Annual Report 1913", SNP 9, 1147/1914: NAK.

30. Grove, A.T. "Land Use and Soil Conservation on the Jos Plateau" in Bulletin no. 22 Geological Survey of Nigeria 1952 p. 30.

a typical mining district, showed that "10.3% of the original arable land was already destroyed through the operation of the mining companies; 2.2% was taken over for occupation by the miners; 86% was under mining leases though not all [of it] was being necessarily worked; 4% was settled and farmed by "strangers" employed in the mines".[31] Nothing was left for the Birom peasants of Gyel.

Similar results were obtained in a study of Zawan and Shen districts by the same experts.[32] In essence, therefore, the Birom peasants had by 1944 been forcibly converted into tenants on their own lands without any compensation. For what was true of Gyel, Zawan and Shend was also true of Naraguta, Kuru, Heipang, Vwang, Du, Forum, Gashit, and Kop districts though probably less so of Ganawuri, Kwal, Bassa and Jere districts.

Initially, these peasant communities were not aware that their land had all been parcelled out to mining companies. For although they had been conquered by the "whiteman", and were aware of the presence of colonial troops around Jos and Bukuru, it did not occur

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31. Davies, J. Gyel Farm Survey 1944 pp. 196 - 213; a copy at SNP 17/4, 42667: NAK.

32. Davies, J.G. "Reports on Farm Survey of Areas Occupied by the Zawan and Shen Communities of the Birom Tribe, Jos Division." SNP 17/4. 42667. NAK.

to them that their conquest by the whiteman involved also the forfeiture of their land until they actually began to loose it. Had they known, from the beginning, that their conquest also meant the loss of their land, the nature and scale of their resistence to colonial conquest would have probably been very different.[33]

Thus, on realising that they had lost their farmlands to the mining companies, and short of organising a systematic and sustained armed struggle against both the colonial government and the mining companies alike, the Birom resorted to exploiting aloophole in the mineral laws as the only means of redress at their disposal then. Regarding these laws, the colonial government had conceded to an African demand that "native" revered areas - tsafi areas - be kept out of mining operations.[34] The Birom peasants and their chiefs, therefore, capitalised on this concession by declaring many patches of land as tsafi areas, so as to keep out the mining companies from taking them.[35] Interestingly, the pressure exerted on government to revoke the "tsafi lands concession" did not only come from the mining companies but also from the missionaries. In fact, the strongest moral and intellectual

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33. Gyang Jugu and others 29/6/1979: Kuru.

34. Freemantle, J.M. "Plateau Province - Annual Report 1923". SNP 9, 86/1924: NAK.

35. Ibid.

argument advanced against the tsafi areas came from one Rev. T.L. Suffil, a missionary stationed at Forum, whose knowledge about the Birom was regarded as authoritative by government and missionary circles.[36] Suffil argued that government acceptance of these sacred and revered areas-the tsafi lands-amounted to an admission that the "natives" had religion which was a contradiction of terms because pagans, by definition, had no religion.[37] Consequently, seizing upon the support they got from the missionaries, many mining companies disregarded the tsafi provisions in their leases and therefore destroyed such lands.

By 1911, the scramble for land leases by European companies was so fierce that government feared that all the tin-bearing land would soon be exhausted. At the same time, government was not sure of what to do with the indigenous tin-miners and smelters who had been mining tin from times immemorial. Thus, in 1911, the colonial government considered it necessary to allocate a concession of 100 acres of land to the indigenous miners

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36. Both Baker and Morrison who have studied certain aspects of Birom society draw information from Suffil. See, Baker, T.M. "The Social Organisation of the Birom" Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1954 (a copy in Ibadan); Morrison, J. "Colonial Rule and Tin Mining on the Plateau"? Ph.D. Thesis, University of Ibadan, 1970?

37. Morrison, J. op.cit. p. 296.

collectively.[38] But this concession had come too late given the fierce competition for land between the European companies. Consequently, this concession was quickly commuted into a money payment of £26 - 10s per annum to the indigenes involved.[39] It should be emphasised that, meagre as the amount was, it never reached the indigenous miners; yet, by the end of 1911, they had been forced to fold up.[40]

With the indigenous miners put out of operation, the European companies assumed complete control of their lands leaving them with only the margins of rocky and infertile areas which were not suspected to contain tin, Notwithstanding government claim to the contrary, the interest of the peasants was not taken into account.[41] For example, by 1926, out of a total land area of 6,839 sq. miles which belonged to three Districts collectively, 1,039 sq. miles of its most fertile parts were claimed for prospecting licences.[42] For example, the Birom whose land contained tin, were forced to squat and scramble on marginal lands which, under normal circumstances, they would not have cultivated.

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38. Duff, E.C. "Bauchi Provincial Report for the December Quarter 1910" SNP 7, 952/1911: NAK; Duff, E.C. Provincial Annual Report for 1914" SNP 7, 952/1911: NAK Bower, P. op.cit. p. 5.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Patrick Dokotri 3/12/1982 Jukuru.
42. Davies, J.G. "Gyel Farm Survey - report. SNP 17/4. 42667: NAK.

As Bower has graphically observed:

> The dispossessed native farmers are obliged to hire land in other areas at a rent from 5s to £1 per acre without security of tenure which pertained to their former holdings. In the opinion of administrative officials in the Plateau district, this results in overcrowding on the agricultural land fringing the mining areas, tends to shorten the fallowing period, and may cause the farmer to have to walk as much as 20 miles from village to farm. The pressure is said to affect in varying degrees the whole population of the minesfield, or about 50,000.[43]

This contemporary observation brings out very clearly, and, pathetically too, the acute living conditions of the Birom which emanated from the alienation of their lands.

As we shall see later, attempts were even made to remove some Birom peasant families from their land and to resettle them in Old Jemaa[44] firstly because their traditional shifting cultivation had broken down[45] but more so to give way to the mining companies to have absolute control of the mining districts involved. Apart

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43. Bower, U. op.cit. p. 14.

44. A fuller discussion of this scheme is offered in chapter five. A lot of propaganda using the colonial media and film shows were undertaken to persuade the Birom to believe that they were leaving Zawan for a better life - of course, it all failed.

45. Ames, C.G. (compiled) Gazetteer of the Plateau Province Jos, 1932 (new impression 1972) p. 113 Morrison, J. op.cit. p. 297.

from the break down of traditional shifting cultivation, the land tenure system then became individualised by the heads of families instead of being held by the gwom on behalf of the whole village or community as it was the case in the pre-colonial times.[46] The total effect of peasants scramble over marginal lands was that there were poor yields and famine set in.[47]

On top of these terrible conditions under which the Birom were subjected, a capitation tax rate was introduced in 1912, which required the Birom tin-bearing villages to pay 2s 3d per adult while those villages in the outlying areas of the mines paid only 6d thereby coercing all taxable Birom to flock the tinmines in search for tax money.[48] And even as labourers on the tinmines, the Birom were invariably classified as the unskilled type which earned them the lowest wages in the mines.[49] In this way the Birom of the tinfields were constituted not only as the lowest class of people, but also the most

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46. Ibid.

47. Davies, J.G. "Reports on Farm Survey of Areas Occupied by the Zawan and Shen Communities of the Birom Tribe, Jos Division; "Gyel Farm Survey." SNP 17/4. 4266 and 42667: NAK p. 21.

48. JOSPROF 260/1914 and 257/1914: SNP 11N, 681m/1910 "Taxation, Naraguta Div. Bauchi Province" NAK.

49. Bower, P. op.cit. p. 24.

desperate group in the colonial society of Jos Division and, indeed, the whole province. For more than any group in the Plateau province, the victims of the tin-fields experienced the direct harshness and exploitation typical of colonialism in Plateau province.[50]

Thus, even if only from the point of view of the land issues, the indigenous inhabitants of the tin-fields had been sufficiently humiliated and alienated to warrant them to organise a rebellion once an opportunity arose. However, because of the military might of the colonial state which was characterised by a relatively high concentration of soldiers and policemen in Plateau province,[51a] such an opportunity would not easily materialise. Consequently, throughout the colonial period, there were only isolated but persistent incidences of revolts, including tin thefts, which were directed against specific mining companies or their

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50. A fact which is adequately brought out by the excessive violent conquest of the Plateau which we was documented by the colonial officials themselves as we demonstrated in the last chapter. But see also Gonyok, C.K. "Colonial Violence - The Case of the Plateau Minesfield". History Departmental Seminar A.B.U. Zaria, 4th March 1976; Ikime, O. "The British in Bauchi 1901 - 1918: An Episode in the British Occupation and Control of Northern Nigeria" JHSN vol. 11 no 2 June 1974 p. 278.

51a. James, C.G. op.cit. pp. 50 - 51.

agents,[51] as well as against certain government measures. Together, these isolated outbursts represented Birom and Anaguta peasant resistence to colonialism as it affected them. Thus, by 1947, when Birom resistence took on an organised form through the formation of the Birom Progressive Union, the objective class position of the Birom peasantry in the Colonial economy and society of the Plateau had already been determined.

Outside Jos Division, the main tin-bearing division of the province, the land question was less intriguing. For in these remaining four Divisions, which we have already identified in the last chapter, peasant communities were left on their lands and encouraged to produce food mainly for the mines. Although they were affected by the Public Lands Acquisition Proclamation and subsequent modifications of it, in comparison with their counterparts in the tinmining areas, they did not lose as much of their land. At any rate, applications for land, by both government and private firms, from these Divisions were minimal and came mainly from the Christian missionary organisations. But even then, these missionary

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51. But tin theft was not limited to the Birom. Infact, official opinion by 1921, tended to hold the Hausawa, in particular, as responsible for tin stealing. There is at least one recorded incidence of tin stealing by a European who was tried and convicted. See, Freemantle, J.M. "Bauchi Province Annual Report for 1923" SNP 9, 86/1924: N.A.K.

bodies spent so much time awaiting government permission to secure lands for the establishment of their evangelical stations, schools and clinics in the rural areas that some of them, notably, Christian Mission in Many Lands,[52] abandoned their applications thereby leaving the land in the hands of the peasants.[53] Nor were the expatriate trading firms granted automatic permission to open trading posts on the Plateau except only around Wase and Shendam areas which were originally administered as part of Muri Province.[54] Thus, there were not many actual applications for land made by the big expatriate firms to open trading and agricultural stations on the Plateau outside Jos Division which meant that the peasants in these areas were not dispossessed of their lands like those of the Jos Division.

The reason for this relative reluctance on the part of both government and expatriate firms to open commercial stations in the other Divisions of the Plateau province is fairly easy to understand. In the first place, the United African Company and its various subsidiaries

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52. SNP 9, 1176/1916 "Christian Missions in Many Lands - Est. of Mission Stations in Northern Provinces". NAK.

53. SNP 9, 2804/1918 "Bauchi Provincial Mission School Establishment of, in Pagan Areas" NAK; SNP 9, 1176/1918 "Christian Missions in Many Lands - Est. of Mission Stations in Northern Provinces." NAK.

54. SNP 9, 636/1925 "Muri Province - Annual Report, 1924" NAK.

as well as the other big companies such as the Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria (ATMN), JANTAR, Bisichi Tin Mining Company Limited and others were the very firms which had invested much money in the tin industry which also required the cheap labour of the Plateau communities. It would have, therefore, been suicidal for the same companies to encourage more lucrative alternative economic undertakings in this same province since this would deprive their mining ventures of the much needed labour and so jeopardise their investments in the tin industry itself. Secondly, government believed that the main economic contribution and role of the Plateau peoples, as a whole, lay in their provision of cheap labour and food for the mines. This meant that the Birom and Anaguta were to provide this labour while those outside Jos Division would provide food to the mines. As such, government taxed the Birom heavily while the rest of the Plateau communities were less heavily taxed so as to keep them on the land as peasants but, at the same time, to drive them to the tinmines seasonally since the tin industry was theonly major means of getting cash for the payment of their taxes.[55]

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55. SNP 11N, 788m/1917 "Supply and Demand of Labourers for Mines" NAK; JOSPROF 1/1, 1709/54 "Annual Reports, Labour Department". NAK; note in particular, JOSPROF 111, 5420 "Half Yearly and Annual Reports, Pankshin Division, 1943" NAK.

The total effect of all these policies was to leave the Plateau peasants, outside Jos Division, on their farms while ensuring that they moved to the tinmines as labourers all the time. For during the dry season, when there was little work on the farms, many peasants from these Divisions - male and female alike - were forced to go to the tinmines which had become the main means of getting cash to pay their taxes. In this way, these peasants became "seasonal labourers" in the mines, and like their Birom and Anaguta counterparts, they were classified as unskilled labour. But unlike the Birom who had to work in the mines without any option, the peasants of the other Divisions had an option of remaining on their farms to produce food some of which they could sell for cash to pay their taxes.

But even then, these peasants outside the tin districts did not sell their food crops directly to the mining populations; rather, they did so through a network of "food dealers", which deprived them of the profits of the food trade for which they were the producers. Rather, the beneficiaries of the food production bogey were the "food dealers" or brokers and food contractors who bought the food from the peasants and sold it to the mining camps.[56] These food dealers and contractors consisted

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56. Gajere Danladi 30/6/1979 - Bisichi; Alhaji Hassan 7/7/79 - Dorowen Babuje.

mainly of immigrant elements of theprovince, especially, the "Hausawa".[57] But there were also "Yoruba" and "Igbo" elements. Thus, it should be emphasised that even as peasant producers of food crops, the Plateau communities adjoining the tinfields were forced to occupy the bottom position of the economic ladder since a category of brokers, who dictated the prices of their produce, stood between them and their consumers. As peasant cultivators and seasonal labourers, therefore, their basic class position as the downtrodden in the colonial society of the Plateau province had been decided.

But since these peasants collectively constituted the bulk of the population of the whole province, their objective political power was potentially enormous even though subject to their developing a peasant class consciousness. However, as we shall see in due course, peasant consciousness was hijacked and misarticulated by the very elements through whom colonialism exploited the peasantry itself, a development which, we must note, was not peculiar to Plateau province but one which was common throughout Nigeria under colonial rule and, indeed, the whole of colonial Africa.[58]

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57. JOSPROF 1, 1055/S.2 "Mines Labour Camps..." (Conditions of health etc etc) N.A.K.

58. Shenton, B. and Freund, B. "The Incorporation of Northern Nigeria into the World Capitalist Economy" in Review of African Political Economy. No. 13, 1978 pp. 16 - 19.

At this juncture, it is necessary to emphasise, even at the risk of repetition that the economic differential noted above (which is discussed later in this chapter), namely, that between the unskilled labourers and the peasants on the one hand, and the skilled African workers, commercial, and contractor class on the other, were deliberately made to coincide with ethnic differences.

COMMERCE

In chapter one we noted that historically, the Plateau region was relatively isolated from the major trading centres and networks of the West African savana region before the 19th century. We argued that this relative isolation of the Plateau had significantly helped to perpetuate the predominantly communal mode of production which was prevalent in the region. By the end of the 19th century, however, as we noted, pockets of Hausawa trading settlers were found in several parts of the province particularly its lowland sections. These trading communities engaged in trade in crafts, slaves, grains, iron, tin, livestock, textiles, honey, salt, kolanuts, cattle and antimony. Indeed, some lowland markets such as Bashar had already been established as a rendezvous for traders *en route* to Borno and back to

the Guinea savana regions.[59] This implied that until the 20th century, the Plateau region was unable to develop a commercial class typical of the surrounding savana regions of West Africa.

At the beginning of the 20th century when merchant capital began to penetrate the region, the position of these few Hausa trading settlements within Plateau region consolidated. For many of them became agents and 'contact points' for their more prosperous 'kinsmen' in the tinmines and the urban areas of Jos and Bukuru.[60] Nevertheless, as a result of the development of the tin industry which further resulted in the development of big market centres such as Jos, Bukuru, Mangu, Shendam, Kurgwi, Wamba, Akwanga, to mention only a few, a new urban - based group of traders developed. This new group

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59. SNP 9, 520/1923 "Wase District, Shendam Division - Re-assessment Report on, by Cpt. T.A. Izard." NAK.

60. Fieldnote records and visits to Shendam and Kurgwi markets. The author accompanied Alhaji Muhammadu Fwanje and Gujahar Dikle, both of who were food dealers at Panyam, to the above named markets. They represented the indigeneous crop of food dealers vis-a-vis the Hausawa dealers based in Jos, Bukuru and other mining settlements. It is to be remarked that in their competitions to secure grains, beans etc etc from these markets, the local dealers in both Kurgwi and Shendam, most of who were Hausawa settlers, tended to prefer selling to their counterparts from the urben centres of Jos Division rather than the indigenous dealers as represented by Fwanje and Gujahar.

together with the older group handled virtually all the commercial transactions of the rural areas of the province. For these big market centres which they established became major centres of exchange attended on specified and regular days of the week. Much of the local requirements for the tin mining population, particularly, grains and livestock, were collected from these market centres which continued to grow in size and significance. Of course the greatest beneficiaries of these developments were the petty traders identified above who supplied these market centres with merchandize and made profits.

Thus, the huge concentration of labour in the tin mines from 1904 guaranteed a sure market for all kinds of merchandise - textiles, foods, beverages, alchohol, and motor vehicles. 'Yoruba', 'Hausa' and 'Igbo' traders were quick to sieze the opportunity provided by the mining industry to advance their commercial activities. For example, a survey of Dorowa in 1945 revealed the squatting population as consisting of cloth traders, food traders, tailors and others. Their population numbered 98 Northerners, 77 Yorubas from Ogbomosho and 13 Igbo, mainly from Owerri.[61]

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61. JOSPROF 1, 1055/s.2 "Mines Labour Camp..." "(Condition: of health etc) NAK.

Initially, these traders were not reinvesting their profits into further businesses in the Plateau province but, instead, remitted their monnies back to their various home regions. For as early as 1915, Mr. G.S. Gall, the Resident of Bauchi from where the Jos Plateau was administered until 1925, openly complained about this ugly development by reporting that "the growing Syrian trading class is taking money from the province,[62] a development which, he further noted, was causing a scarcity of currency.[63] Apart from operating in Jos and in the mining settlements, these immigrant commercial elements also penetrated the rural markets where they opened shops and some of them actually lived there.

In the case of the Yoruba and Igbo traders, their wives and children looked after the shops while the men constantly travelled back to the West and East respectively to replenish their stock. With the extension of the Eastern railway to Jos in 1925, many of them made arrangements with their home suppliers to refill up the

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62. Gall, F.S. "Annual Report - Provincial for the year ended Dec. 1915" JOSPROF 1, 417/1915 NAK; Also Ames, C.G. Gazetteers... p. 307.

63. Gall, F.S. "Annual Report - Provincial for the year ended Dec. 1915" JOSPROF 1, 417/1915: NAK.

goods to J.s from where they easily collected them.[64] From then on, the Commercial activities of these "Southern" and Hausa elements were facilitated by the establishment of financial and commercial institutions. These included the Barclays Bank and the British Bank of West Africa both of which were established in 1917. Others were the Kingsways, Chanrais, T. Kahale, Karachi, K. Chelerams and a host of Levantine shops which were concentrated to the north of the main U..C. business establishments and the banks in a street which became known as Layin Kwara'a's (Levantine Street),[65] a name which obviously depicted the nationalities of the business proprietors involved. The U..C. and the other bigger enterprises were established to the south of Layin kwaras and these constituted the main business and "industrial" centre of the town. They handled imported machinery, electricals and electronics, construction metals and motor vehicles.[66] As expected, these big concerns were owned and manned by the Europeans themselves but they also employed a few African attendants and clerks some of who were later elevated to higher positions and became salesmen and accounts clerks. Most of them were however,

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64. Plotnicov, L. Strangers to the City. Pittsburgh, 1967 p. 38.

65. Bryant, K.J. (compiled) A Guide To Jos. Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria. 1958 pp. 6 - 10.

66. Ibid. pp. 6 - 10.

immigrant elements who had acquired the requisite clerical, accounting and other necessary skills.

For our purpose here, these African salesmen, clerks and attendants did not constitute an important economic class on the Jos Plateau so long as they remained mere salary earners.[67] These, however, should not be confused with the company African agents or compradors who were mostly centred in Lagos, Abeokuta, Calabar and Kano.[68] But even this latter group did not initially constitute a significant group in the Plateau province where they did not exist in the first instance.[69] Furthermore, the relative absence of cash crop production in the province prevented the rise and development of a Licence Buying Agent class such as it did in Kano, Ibadan and other centres of cash crop production.[70]

Thus, far more important in the commercial history of the Plateau province were the immigrant petty traders and big businessmen who dominated this sector of the colonial economy of the province. For it was they who collectively supplied the various commodities required by the huge mass of the rural peasantry of the province.

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67. Mars, J. "Extra-Territorial Enterprises" in Perham, M. (ed) Mining Commerce and Finance in Nigeria. Oxford, 1947 p. 95.

68. Ibid. p. 95.

69. ALLISTER MACMILLAN (compilers and editors) The Red Book of West Africa: historical and descriptive; commercial and industrial facts, figures, and resources. London, 1920 pp. 95 - 127. But also Shenton, R. and Freund B. op.cit. p. 18.

70. Ibid.

And even in the urban centres of Jos and Bukuru, they dominated the market stalls. In due course, some of the members of these categories of traders began to reinvest their profits in the purchase of land on which they built residential houses for renting out to tenants. They also reinvested in transportation and in hotels businesses in the urban centres, particularly, in Jos and Bukuru.[71] Still, some of them registered with the mining companies and food and labour contractors.[72] Eventually, they became not only a Plateau commercial class, but, simultaneously, a landlord, transport, and petty contractor class. Together with their class counterparts in the

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71. A good example of this was "Prince" the present ruler of Ogbomosho who was then a business tycoon in Jos and was the owner of Hotel Terminus, Jubilee Hotel I and Jubilee Hotel II. Up to 1960, these hotels were the biggest private hotels in Jos apart from government owned ones, namely Hill Station Hotel and Plateau Hotel. Another successful businessman was Olagbenro who is still alive in Jos and who, according to current rumour, was the richest Yoruba-man in Jos owning over 400 houses to rent apart from his stores and other businesses. The Gbong Gwom Jos recalled the following as the richest men Jos in the mid 1950s and the 1960s - F.O. Onyakwelu; Olagbenro; Prince; P.C. Ndu; Alhaji Ali Iliya; Alhaji Na Mallam; Alhaji Garba Jere; Onigbinde (Bukuru); Alhaji Gobe Zantoshi; Alhaji Naborode (Bukuru) and Alhaji Isa Haruna. Interviewed 3rd Dec. 1982 - Jos Palace.

72. Ibid.

clerical and other government departments including the administration, they constituted a powerful immigrant class which wielded not only considerable economic power, but political power also.[73]

It should be emphasised that the political significance of this group began when they started to reinvest their profits in the building of residential houses, buying of lorries and buses, and their engagement in contracts. For it was their domination of these spheres of economic activity which made them the owners and controllers of the means of production even within the colonial setting. Hitherto, they merely accumulated wealth commercially through the practice of "buying cheap and selling dear," a process which, as Marx pointed out, exploits the producer but does not necessarily revolutionise the mode of production.[74] Significantly, their political power began to be felt in the province by the early 1930s. For in 1933, Beck, the Acting Resident, noted with some appreciation that:

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73. Plotnicov, L. Strangers to the City Pittsburgh, 1967 p. 38; pp. 50 - 51.

74. Marx, K. Capital Vol. III Moscow, 1978 p. 328; 334 - 335.

> a sudden interest in municipal affairs and desire for more participation in local government manifested themselves among the intelligentsia of the cosmopolitan African community in Jos Township.[75]

As a means of containing the potential hostility of this group towards government, an unofficial Advisory Council consisting of some of their members was formed in order to advise government but it also became an institution from which government could gauge public opinion on important aspects of colonial administration. This class remained the most vocal and the most dominant in the political developments of Jos and its neighbouring mining camps until 1945, when the Birom Progressive Union was formed.[76]

But within the class as a whole, the Hausawa elements, as we shall demonstrate later, predominated politically over the economically more prosperous Southern elements put together. Even in terms of sheer numbers, the Hausawa were, by far, the largest of the immigrant groups numbering 18,560 out of a total population estimate of 103,744 for the whole of Jos Division in 1921.[77] By 1952.

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75. Middleton, H.H. "Annual Report on the Plateau Province for 1934" JOSPROF 1, 47/1935: NAK.

76. Dudley, B.J. Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria London, 1968 p. 32.

77. SNP 9, 1271/1922 "Bauchi Province Annual Report for 1921" N.A.K. For comparative purposes a local census in Jos in 1952, thirty years later showed the following figures in respect of the Jos Township:

Hausawa (including Fulani, Kanuri etc)	15,170
Egbo	8,889
Yoruba	5,661
Birom and other Plateau tribes	381
Other non-Northern tribes	1,168

MLG 4376 vol. 1 "Jos Town Council Affairs 1954" Jos.

the numerical strength of the Hausawa vis-a-vis other immigrant groups in both the Jos township and in the whole of the Division was overwhelming as demonstrated by the table below:

NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE MAJOR IMMIGRANT GROUPS IN JOS DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE AREA	TOTAL POPULATION	BIROM	HAUSAWA	FULANI	IGBO	YORU
JOS DIVISION	246,406	114,003	45,269	20,238	19,283	6,271
JOS DISTRICT	31,582	270	13,183	914	8,869	5,061
JOS TOWNSHIP	6,945	125	436	164	3,794	835
BUKURU TOWN	8,450	107	2,477	307	3,516	1,108

SOURCE: NIGERIA: Northern Nigeria Department of Statistics: Population Census of the Northern Region of Nigeria, 1952. Bulletin 1 - 13 pp. 18 - 19.

From the above table, it is clear that the indigenes of Jos Division, the Birom, lived in the rural areas of the Division thereby leaving the immigrant groups to dominate the Jos district and townships.

From the inception of colonial rule, the numerical strength of the Hausawa vis-a-vis the indigenes of this Division constituted a political and administrate problem. This becomes apparent when it is realised that while the other indigenous groups remained in their traditional rural settlements, the Hausawa were concentrated in Jos township and in four mining settlements which the

colonial administrators refered to as Hausa Areas.[78] As a result, the population of the Hausawa in Jos township far outnumbered that of the Plateau indigenes of the town put together. Consequently, political developments in Jos Division from 1947 onwards was centred mainly on the struggle between elites of the Hausawa elements on theone hand, and the intelligentsia of the Birom and the other indigenous groups on the other. We shall return to this in subsequent chapters.

INDUSTRY.

Although peasant agriculture was prevalent throughout the Plateau province, this did not preclude the existence of industrial enterprisesby the various Plateau groups in all parts of the province. These industrial activities supplemented agriculture through the provision of cutlasses, hoes, knives, picks and other farming, mining and hunting implements. Thus, long before 1900, the knowledge and use of iron manufactures were widespread

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78. Malcolm, G. Assistant Resident, Bauchi to Political Assistant, Lokoja: "Report on Tin Mining at Bauchi" SNP 7, 3116/1906: NAK; Freemantle, J.M. "Bauchi Province Annual Reports, 1921" SNP 9, 1271/1922: NAK; Ames, C.G. Gazetteers... p. 119; and Perham, M. Native Administration in Nigeria. London, 1936 (1962) p. 151.

throughout the province.[79] So too was that of tin mining and smelting.[80] Indeed, even the European miners were fascinated by the high quality of locally smelted tin which contained about 70% of purity.[81] But as it is common knowledge, colonialism was not in Africa to promote and develop indigenous industrial activity but to destroy this very process. Nor was the destruction of local industries by colonialism limited to the Plateau province; rather, it was widespread throughout colonial

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79. David Tambo who wrote a Ph.D. Thesis on the pre-colonial economy of the Jos Plateau focusing on iron mining and smelting told me that the responses from his research assistants, of which I was one, showed that the knowledge of iron working was very ancient to some of the Plateau communities. To be sure, this was the case among the Mwaghavul and Angas among whom I and others worked for Tambo. David Tambo's field tapes have been transcribed and preserved in microfilm in the Northern History Research Scheme, Department of History, A.B.U. Zaria.

80. Ibid.

81. But the knowledge of tin smelting was developed among the Hausawa tin miners at Kiriwen Dalma (a Plateau region south-east of Kano and south-west of Bauchi) who traded in the product before the colonial conquest. We have, as yet, no evidence of tin smelting among the Birom despite the fact that some Birom groups knew the science of iron smelting. For a detailed discussion on indigenous tin smelting on the Jos Plateau, see; Trevor Roberts, "Tin Smelting at Lirnic-N Delma by Native Process" SNP 9, 2863/1915: N.A.K.

Nigeria.[82]

The struggle for survival between local manufactures and imported European ones did not last the first two decades of colonial rule. Nor was it actually a free struggle since the colonial state, as expected, favoured and promoted European manufactures against the local ones. But even then, the local populations continued to show preference for local manufactures to those imported by the firms, particularly, in the textile industry. For inspite of the "Convenience" of the imported textiles, local manufactures were much stronger and more durable.[83]

The Europeans firms, therefore, prevailed upon the colonial government to outlaw local textiles. This had become necessary because initial attempts to destroy local industries by lowering the prices of imported ones had failed to produce the desired effect. Consequently,

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82. Apart from specific industrial process and enterprises which were destroyed such as some specific case studies have documented and shown, it is no longer in doubt that the overall aim of colonialism was to arrest industrial development in the colonies and make the latter dependent on the metropolitan centre for, virtually, everything they needed and at prices dictated by the colonising power. A clear confesion of this is to be found in Lugard, F. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. London, 1965, P.617 and Morel, E.D. Nigeria: Its Peoples and Its Problems. London, 1976 (3rd edn) pp. 172 - 179.

83. European textiles then consisted mainly of various brands of baft material which was obviously inferior to local textiles. For a fuller account of the British destruction of the textiles industry in Northern Nigeria, see Tukur, M.M. op.cit. pp. 812 - 815.

by 1920, local manufactures which had successfully competed with European ones had been driven out of the market, not only in Jos, but in the whole of Northern Nigeria through government legislation.[84]

As for the metal industries, these took a longer time to destroy and, therefore continued to compete with imported wares. Thus, according to the colonial records, as early as 1921, Bauchi Province, which then included the Plateau, bought some 15,000 hoes of the European type for distribution to farmers through the Native Authorities. This plan however failed because the prices fixed on these hoes were so high that the farmers could not afford them, as such, they continued to patronise local blacksmiths.[85]

In the tinfields, the African tin-smelters, mainly Hausawa from Kano,[86] could not even survive the first decade of colonial rule due to the hostility of the European mining companies and the colonial government. For when Colonel Laws set up his first smelter in 1906, it failed to compete favourably with that smelted by the traditional smelters at Ririwen Dalma. Thereafter, Laws caused the Resident, Mr. F.B. Gall, to ban the

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84. Ibid.

85. Freemantle, J.M. "Bauchi Province Annual Report for 1921" SNP 9, 1271/1922 NAK.

86. SNP 9, 2863/1915 "Tin Smelting at Lirnie-N Delma by Native Process." NAK.

traditional smelters from operating in areas where his Naraguat Mining Company had been granted rights.[87] Inspite of protests from Sarkin Kiriwen Dalma on the ban order, government went ahead and drove the African miners outof the tinfields.[88]

Thus, as we mentioned earlier, by 1911, so much of the tin-bearing areas had been taken up by European companies that it was considered necessary to allocate a concession of 100 acres to the indigenous miners collectively, a concession which, as we pointed out, was quickly commuted into money. Furthermore, in pursuance of its policy to eliminate indigenous miners from operating, government embarked on a series of regulations to achieve this end. Thus, even the mining of minerals of lesser interest and value to Europeans, such as galena (tezali), were discouraged.[89] For as Bower has

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87. Bower, P. "The Mining Industry" in Perham, M. (ed) Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria. London, 1947 pp. 4 - 5. For a fuller account of how the mining companies systematically destroyed the indigenous tin industry on the Jos Plateau, see Freund, B. Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines. Longman, 1981 pp. 27 - 72, i.e., chapter two: "The Capitalist Take-over of the Tin Industry."

88. Ibid.

89. Gall, F.D. (Precis) "Resident of Bauchi 12 Dec. 1914" SNP 17/3, 29105: NAK; Gall, F.D. "Annual Report Bauchi Province, 1914" JOSPROF 1/1, 61/1915: NAK; SNP 17/3, 29105 "Duff to Chief Secretary, Zungeru, 22 Nov. 1911" and "Cock to Chief Secretary, Zungeru, 3 Dec. 1910" NAK.

correctly observed, until 1927, it was prescribed that the agent left in charge of a mining lease and the engineer in charge of any plant with horsepower above 12, must be Europeans.[90] If this law was not intended to discriminate against the indigenous miners, a set of universal qualifications should have been set for the performance of these functions instead of the racial "European" requirements of this law. In other words, even if the indigenous miners had the capital, such laws did not permit them to participate in thetin mining industry.

The net effect of the series of discriminatory laws was to reduce those indigenous miners, who insisted on making a living the old tin mining, to a tributary status.[91] Nevertheless, a few enterprising and brave indigenous miners, chief among who wes D.J. Zang, struggled even within the tributary system to make a success of their mining careers. But inspite of their large number these indigenous miners could not make any significant impact on the tin industry because they did not sell their tin to overseas markets directly but mustsell it to the European companies on whose leases they had won the tin. For according to Bower, in 1938, out of a total

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90. Ibid. but also Bower, P. op.cit. p. 10.

91. Bower, P. op.cit. p. 17.

labour force of 31,865; 13,599 was recorded as tributers.[92] If the impact of these tributers in the tin industry was marginal, their political impact in the tin-fields was more aggressive. For many of such deprived indigenous miners expressed their disapproval through tin-theft, a problem which plagued the tin industry throughout its existence.[93]

The main point which emerges from the above discussion is that throughout the colonial period, no powerful industrial class-immigrant or indigenous to the province - emerged as a result of the tin mining industry. This should not however be confused with the emergence of a "powerful" commercial, transport, landlord and contractor class which we have already discussed.

In the rural areas outside Jos Division, no African industrial class was produced either. For the colonial policy of destroying local industries meant, in effect, that such a class could not emerge. Nevertheless, local blacksmiths and artisans of differing qualities continued to produce their wares alongside the imported types.[94] But by 1940, iron mining and smelting by the indigenous groups had virtually ceased in all

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92. Ibid. p. 17.

93. SNP 9, 1271/1922 "Bauchi Province Annual Report, 1921" NAK.

94. Bower, F. op.cit. p. 4; Freund, B. op.cit pp. 46 - 48.

parts of the province.[95] The numerous smelters in existence were now using imported iron instead of the indigenously mined and smelted iron as before.

In the textile industry, indigenous cloth began to give way to imported textile in the very first decade of colonial rule. Firstly, it should be understood that most Plateau communities did not only use cloth to cover themselves but also used skins of animals, leaves and woven grass straw. These were also used for protection against the rain and as handbags. Secondly, prior to European conquest, textile industry in most parts of the Plateau province was relatively undeveloped and most of the cloth required in this region was imported from outside the region.[96]

With regards to the leather industry, locally manufactured shoes, handbags, jackets and carpets were forced out of the markets by massive importation of more "fashionable", but not necessarily, stronger ones. These and other local manufactures (sculpture, weaving etc) were now bought and sold not because of their use-

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95. This should not be confused with blacksmithing which has continued to date. The point is that the blacksmiths switched over to the treatment of imported iron for the manufacture of knives, hoes, spearheads, etc etc instead of using the indigenously mined and smelted iron as was the case hitherto.

96. Field records among the Mwaghavul, Birom, Anaas, Chip, Ron and Kulere, July - Dec. 1979.

values, but because they had then become fanciful artifacts of Africa's industrial past. An impressive collection of some of these can be found at the National Museum, Jos.[97] In this way, a progressive development of indigenous industries in the province was not only stagnated but subverted. Rodney has described the situation in colonial Africa as one of:

> "... 'technological arrest' or stagnation, and in some instances actual regression, since people forget even the simple technique of their forefathers. The abandonment of traditional iron smelting in most parts of Africa is probably the most important instance of technological regression.[98]

Thus, it is significant to note that the destruction of local industries was not accompanied by the establishment and development of modern industries which would replace the allegedly out-of-date local ones.[99] For had this happened, the real objectives of imperialism would have been jeopadised. Thus, instead of encouraging local manufactures or establishing modern industries in the province to produce headpans, diggers, rakes, shovels,

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97. An impressive collection of some of these items exist, for displays, in the National Museum Jos and, more recently, at the Plateau State Council for Arts and Culture, Jos.

98. Rodney, W. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Dar es Salam, 1976 p. 111.

99. Ibid. pp. 112 - 123.

corrugated sheets and other simple but, apparently, vital tools required in huge quantities in the tin industry, these items were imported from England.

After 1945 however, a few industries were established but these were mainly processing industries. These included among others, the Dairy Industry at Vom which was established in 1923, G. Force Tyre Treatment in Jos (1950), Tin Treatment at Barakin Ladi (1954), Cotton Ginning Bukuru (1956), and the Panyam Fish Farm (1955).[100] The commencement of most of these in between 1954 and 1956 is instructive because they reflected a change in government economic policy from using the colonies as mere sources of raw materials and markets to a policy based on import substitution from the 1950s.[101] Thus, by 1956, four years to independence, the annual report could boast of only a total of some 36 industries of unspecified quality for the whole of the Plateau province.[102]

Determined not to invest in producer commodities but only in consumer ones, therefore, colonial capitalism could not produce an African industrial entrepreneur class such as had developed in the metropolitan states

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100. Weatherhead, A.T. "Annual Report, Plateau Province, 1956" ARNN p. 135.

101. Ekundare, R.O. An Economic History of Nigeria 1860 - 1960. London, 1973 pp. 294 - 312.

102. Weatherhead, A.T. "Annual Report, Plateau Province, 1956" ARNN p. 136.

of Europe.[103] Rather, with the determination to import and not produce the necessary wares and machinery for colonial exploitation on a commercial basis, only a comprador class developed in the major business centres of Lagos, Calabar, Ibadan and Kano but certainly not in Jos township.[104] Therefore, in Plateau province as in many parts of Nigeria, no significant and powerful industrial entrepreneural class developed both at the economic andpolitical levels throughout the colonial period.[105]

LABOUR.

We now come to the most important factor of production inspite of its legalistic subordination to capital in the capitalist mode of production. For as Marx has correctly pointed out, labour has always occupied a central position in the production process throughout

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103. Lenin, V.I. "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism." in Selected Works. Moscow, 1977 pp. 176 - 257.

104. For a discussion of the number and expansion of expatriate firms from their Southern stations to the Northern centres of Nigeria, see Mars, J. "Extra - Territorial Enterprises" in Perham, M. (ed) Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria. London, 1947 pp. 46 - 67; but also see, ALLISTER MACMILLAN (compilers and editors) The Red Book of West Africa. London, 1968 p. 47.

105. Freund, B. op.cit. p. 212.

history.[106] Thus, in a colonial setting, such as the Plateau province, the exploitation of labour, apart from its extreme harshness, was very crucial in the under-development process. For the proceeds of labour which the coloniser carried away to the metropole were not necessarily surpluses since no due regard was given to the level of material and social conditions necessary for the sustenance of labour at a humanly acceptable level, whether it was "voluntary" wage, forced or "induced" labour.[107]

In colonial Nigeria generally, the development of a working class was very slow because, as we noted earlier, peasant cash crop production predominated. And in the specific case of the Plateau province, particularly, Jos Division, tin mining dominated the colonial economy even though peasant agriculture still remained important.

Inspite of a rather exaggerated capital outlay allegedly invested in tin mining, labour remained the dominant factor ~~of~~ of production in the tin industry.

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106. Marx, K. Capital vol. 1 Moscow, 1978 pp. 173 - 180.

107. By 'induced labour', colonial officials meant: "indirect government aid, such as direct and much heavier taxation, compelling idlers, of which there are plenty, to perform at any rate a few months' honest work" Freund, B. loc cit. p. 75.

The evidence available show, very clearly, that right from the start, tin mining was labour-intensive.[108] For all the major processes of tin production - clearing, digging, earth removal, dumping, dam building, sluice construction, washing, transportation to port - required much labour.[109] However, between 1903, when the first European export of tin from the Plateau occured, and 1910, when European companies assumed complete control of the tin industry, labour records are difficult to compute.[110] For it was during this period that the indigenous miners still participated in tin mining. What is more, during these early years of European mining,

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108. In reality there were only two major mechanical devices employed in the mining of tin, namely, the drag-line and electricity. The latter generated enough power to pump sufficient water into powerful water jets which were then forcefully directed against the walls of the shaft to break, widen, and deepen it. This hydraulic device was refered to as bututu by the labourers. These together with the imported headpans, picks, shovels, sluices and, later, dredges were what formed the so-called capital outlay much talked-about by the European mining companies. See Bower, P. op.cit. p. 17.

109. Ibid. pp. 23 - 26.

110. Besides this, during the early years of colonial tin mining, the local population did not, on their own volition, seek jobs with the European miners. Even government conscripts escaped from the mines at the slightest opportunity thereby rendering the accuracy of records difficult. See, for example, Elder, D.O. "Biu to Resident, Borno, 19 Sept. 1918: Increase of Supply of Labour for Mining Companies" SNR 11N, 681m/1918 NAK; and JOSPROF 1/1 201/1918. "First Half-Yearly Report, Bauchi Province 1918" NAK.

the labourers kept changing from one company to another in search of higher wages.[111]

By 1910, however, the European companies had already formed an Association which tried to regulate the wages and movements of labourers from one company to another. Formed in 1907, this Association became the parent body of what, in July 1910, became the Association of Mining Engineers and Chambers of Mines of Northern Nigeria, which, became a branch of the London based Nigerian Chambers of Mines in 1912.[112] Once the tin industry became "established",[113] labour records became easier to compile although inter-company migrations of labour still took place. As the following table suggests, the tin industry started with thousands of African labour. As the years wore on, labour figures rose instead of declining thereby underscoring the central position of labour in the tin industry inspite of the fact that the industry became increasingly mechanised. The figures for coal are reproduced side-by-side with that of tin because, in size and in its economic significance, it was the next important extractive industry after tin throughout the

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111. SNP 11/4, 661m/1910 "Increase of Supply of Labour for Mining Companies" NAK.

112. Freund, B. op.cit. p. 30; p. 54.

113. Ames, C.G. Gazetteers of the Plateau Province. Jos, 1934 pp. 301 - 305.

AVERAGE AFRICAN LABOUR IN TIN AND COAL MINING

YEAR	TIN	COAL
1912	12,000	-
1917	20,000	-
1919	22,000	-
1922	13,000	-
1926	31,206	2,001
1927	36,815	2,401
1928	39,333	2,304
1929	38,333	2,086
1930	28,904	2,100
1931	20,763	1,800
1932	18,089	1,470
1933	14,911	1,537
1934	20,138	1,530
1935	21,829	1,418
1936	24,590	1,634
1937	35,142	2,558
1938	31,865	2,848
1942	70,800	-
1952	50,000	-[114]

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114. The sources for the table in the text are: Bower, P. op.cit. pp. 28 - 29 Table IV; Freund, B. op.cit. p. 76. These figures can be cross-checked in the annual reports especially those of the mine's department. The author tried to correlate Bower's table and that of Freund by randomely picking years on both sides and found these to be largely the same except for minor discrepancies. The last two years, 1942 and 1952, are my own computation from the annual reports for those years.

colonial period.[115] From the point of wage labour, therefore, the tin industry probably employed, in any one year, more labour than all the rest of Nigerian industries put together excluding the national corporations and ministries. Wage labour was therefore a very important factor in the economic and political developments of the Plateau province. A closer examination of wage labour in the province is therefore imperative.

Generally, wage labour in the minesfield was categorised into skilled and unskilled. The former included a third category sometimes refered to as semi-skilled.[116] The unskilled labour force engaged in digging (pick), shovel and headpan work.[117] It was made up of peasants from the Plateau area as well as a substantial number of Hausawa and Kanuri who had immigrated, almost on a permanent basis, from other parts of the northern provinces. These group of labourers were largely illitrate and spoke little or no English. They generally worked in gangs under a headmen who was paid his own basic wage plus a small commission for the number of labourers under his charge.[118] Most of these headmen were Hausawa.[119]

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115. Bower, R. Op.cit. p. 4.
116. Ibid. p. 24.
117. Ibid. p. 24.
118. The practice of taking bribes from labourers by the headmen especially during the depressions was widespread. Not a single informent in the field contested this.
119. Browne, G. St. O. (Major) Labour Conditions in West Africa: A Report. London, 1941 p. 54. It should be remarked that Major O. Browne was the Labour Adviser to the Secretary of State for Colonies. Still on the ethnic composition of the tinmines labourers on the Jos Plateau, see Bower, R. op.cit. p. 24 and Freund, B. op.cit. p. 92.

However, a greater part of the digging, shovel and headpan works took the form of an extremely exploitative contract system. In this system, the labourers were paid so much per cubic yard of excavated earth carried away to a dump or an embarkment forming a dam. The payment was made to the headman of the particular group who, in turn, shared it out to the labourers; those digging received the highest pay, followed by shovel workers while the headpan workers, mostly women and adolescents, received the least pay.[120]

In most cases, these payments were made weekly, on Saturday afternoons, which came to be regarded as "pay-days". The wages of these unskilled labourers was the lowest in the tin mines and it kept changing not only in response to changing market conditions of tin but also by what Browne calls the "rake off" which must be paid to labour brokers sometimes so as to retain employment.[121] Until the Depression (1929-31), the average wages per week for this group was 6s 6d per experienced adult labourer. The inexperienced adult, sabon kamu, received much less although a little above the half-pay rate for

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120. Bower, P. p. 11; SNP 17/2, 11242 vol.1 "Particulars of Labour and Industrial Conditions Prevailing in Nigeria, 1926 - 28" NAK; JOSPROF 1/1, 3/1933 "Annual Report, Plateau Province, 1932" NAK; KANPROF 1423 "Need for Minesfield Labour." NAK.

121. Browne, G. St. O. op.cit. p. 24.

adolescents.[122] It must be emphasised that the unskilled labourers formed over 95% of the work-force in the tin mines at any given time.

The semi-skilled and skilled workers were those engaged in minor supervisory works, foremen, headmen in charge of sluice boxes, general fitters, electricians and clerks.[123] These jobs were filled by the "Hausawa" from the north and "Yoruba" and "Igbo" from the southern provinces. The latter tended to fill the clerical, electrical, general fitters and other artisan posts while the Hausawa predominated as headmen and supervisors. Collectively, all these groups were small in size and were scattered among the various companies in their places of daily operations.

Besides earning higher pay,[124] this category of workers, particularly the headmen, extracted money from the unskilled labourers under their charge. As a class, this group was in direct contact with the company foremen and managers who were usually Europeans. Standing between the European managers on the one hand, and the mass of unskilled labourers on the other, this group

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122. JOSPROF 1, 1709" ... Labour Conditions, Appointment of an Inspector of Labour" NAK; JOSPROF III, C. 22 "Conditions and Disputes, Minesfield Labour, 1952" NAK.

123. Bower, P. op.cit. p. 24.

124. Browne, G. St. O. op.cit. pp. 49 - 50. See, in particular, his rate of wages in Appendix IV pp. 80 - 81.

played very important roles during labour crises.[125] Indeed, it was their members who championed the formation of labour unions in the 1940s and who occupied leadership positions within the unions.[126] This middleman position which they occupied in the tin labour organisations made them more powerful than the unskilled labourers inspite of the numerical preponderance of the latter. For example, as late as 1943, Freund estimated that their total number in all the mining companies was just about 9000[127] compared to a figure of over 70,000 for all categories of labourers in the mines by 1942.[128]

Another group of skilled labour in the tinmines were the tributers. Tributing was a system under which the holder of a mining concession (the lessee) arranged with indigenous applicants (tributers) to work on his ground on condition that the latter had to sell the mineral which they won to the former at an agreed rate.[129] The indigenous tributer, in turn , recruited his own labourers, which sometimes included members of his family,

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125. Freund, B. op.cit. p. 89.

126. Ibid. pp. 177 - 184.

127. Ibid. p. 177.

128. Bower, P. op.cit. p. 25.

129. Browne, G. St. O. op. cit p. 26, 46, 54.

to work the land so contracted from the lessee.[130] The tributer was responsible for their up-keep while they worked the ground and paid them a mutually agreed sum of money after selling the tin to the lessee. If the tributer or members of his crew were good at prospecting, then, they won plenty of tin to sell to the lessee within a few days, The more tin they won and sold, the more money they got and shared. Conversely, poor prospecting led to weeks of wasted efforts leading to severe poverty and indebtedness.[131]

The tributory system, therefore, inherently involved some element of gambling. Nevertheless, it was popular among indigenous miners and labourers alike because it enabled them to control and manipulate the proceeds of their own labour. Major Brown's observation that tributing was popular because "the gambling element appeals to the African"[132] is too superficial and misleading. For there is nothing biologically innate in the African which makes him like gambling. What Brown probably failed to grasp was the fact that the indigenes saw very little of gambling in tributing because they believed themselves

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130. Ibid.

131. Ibid. p. 11; Freund, B. op.cit. p. 91.

132. Browne, G. St. O. op.cit. p. 26.

to be good tin prospectors - yan gamajiko.[133] Infact many of them undertook much mapping of the ground before the actual tributing was contracted. Furthermore, only the seasoned tributers, who had distinguished themselves in tin prospecting (gamajikonci) often got labourers to join them precisely for reducing the risk involved in tributing.[134]

During periods of boom, tributing often led to accusations between the tributers and the lessees. For at such times, the tributers hid away some of the tin won which they sold to a different lessee or a company at a higher rate than that originally contracted with their lessee. Much that went under the name of tin-theft in the colonial records was actually what one

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133. Pwajok Dangal; Gyeng Juqu and others, interviewed 29/6/1979 - Kuru. That the indigenous miners were expert tin prospectors is not in doubt. Freund quotes a colonial source which confessed that: "It is stated that all the deposits so far [up to 1912] opened up have been discovered by black men". Freund, B. loc cit. p. 48.

134. Niven, C.R. "Annual Report Plateau Province, 1950" JOSPROF L/2, 61111/S.1: NAK.

might call "guerrilla tributing".[135] Nevertheless, whatever benefits which the indigenes derived from tributing, it occasionally led to serious hardships when, at the end of a contracted tribute work, no tin was won. ~~For, indeed, such occasionally led to serious hardships when, at the end of a contracted tribute work, no tin was won.~~ For, indeed, such occasions were major sources of indebtedness and frustration leading to all sorts of crimes in the tin mining camps.[136]

From the point of class formation and relationships, the tributors formed an advantaged class above the other members of their individual crews because, in most cases,

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135. The natives who engaged in tributing without licence did not see themselves as thieves. Their fellow members, in particular, felt that they had a right to participate in the tin industry since they had lost all their land to it without any compensations. Freund has drawn attention to a discussion of the problem by the Inspector of mines, Langslow Cock, in a letter he sent to the SNP as early as 1913. In that letter, a copy of which is in NAK, Cock admitted tin theft on the roads by interpreters and headmen as well as by miners working on the land of a company and selling it on sly which he observed "was the commencement of a very large question that [was] now becoming acute." I have coined the term "guerrilla tributing" to emphasise the point that unlicenced tributing and tin-theft represented continuing resistence activities by the Birom and the Hausawa alike to the take-over of the tin industry by colonial capital as well as describe the method through which the tin was stolen, namely, cin loto (digging underground tunnels). It is instructive to observe that the Hausaw terminology for unlicenced tributing by whatever method is known as laban rudu (i.e. to mark or to identify-and-run). See SNP 11N, 1141m/1913 "Communication to Government Inspect of Mines; 6 November, 1913 in Relation to Tin Stealing" NAK; Cock, L. "Cock to Secretariat, Northern Provinces: 12 November 1913, Relation to Tin Stealing" NAK.

136. Browne, G. St. O. op.cit. pp. 26 - 27.

the former employed the latter.[137] In other words, it was they who appropriated the price differential, that is, surplus, or what remained of the money when both the lessee and the other members of their crews had been paid the agreed sums of money. In this way, some tributers, mostly, but not exclusively, Hausawa, accumulated sufficient money which they invested in commerce and in petty contracts although others still reinvested their fortune into further tributing.[138] As mentioned earlier, Mr. D.B. Zang, is a typical example of a successful tributer in the tin mines of Jos.

Despite our discussion of wage labour in the tin-mines under colonial categories of skilled and unskilled labour as well as the relative economic and social position which each occupied, more emphasis should be given to both these categories together as a group. For it is obvious that all the categories of wage labour were actually employed by metropolitan capital through the mining companies. Consequently, the tin mines of Jos provided an example of one of the few areas in the colonial economy of Nigeria where a proletarianisation process, however crude or muted, developed.[139]

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137. Ibid. pp. 26 - 27.
138. Ibid. Mr. D.B. Zang and Dung Balang are easily recalled by Birom informants as successful tributers who were non Hausa but Birom.
139. Browne, G. St. O. op.cit. pp. 9 - 10; Freund, B. op.cit. pp. 175 - 177; See also Watts, M. "Peasantry, Merchant Capital and International Firms: Colonial Capitalism in Northern Nigeria". Dakar Seminar on State and Entrepreneural Classes in African Capitalism December, 1980 p. 9.

Directly following from this, was the development of a semi-proletarian consciousness which was represented in the form of strikes and trade unionism. Trade unionism therefore was a significant economic and political force in the politics of Jos Division though much less so in the remaining Divisions. From the main focus of this thesis, trade unionism in the tinmines effectively won some salary and welfare benefits to the labourers in general. However, as an organisational structure, it led to the development of what Freund has rather hyperbolically refered to as a "labour aristocracy"[140] within the union itself. This labour aristocracy was, in part, a reflection of the various strands of labour in the mines. But because these various branches or skills of labour had beendeliberatcly geared to coincide with ethnic groups, trade union leadership itself logically became articulated along ethnic lines.[141] As a result,

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140. Freund, B. op.cit. p. 175.

141. Ibid. p. 181. It should be pointed out that the genesis of the various contemporary social and economic classes which developed, not only on the Jos Plateau but in other parts of the country, arose in consequence to colonial exploitation and rule. For example, one of the factors which created and galvanised the coincidence of ethnic groups with socio-economic statuses was the discriminatory policy of colonial administration and education. For a few case studies concerning class formation and trade unionism in some parts of Nigeria, see Review of African Political Economy No. 13, 1978.

the trade unions which developed in the tinmines became conservative even though their formation and organisation was, in itself, a progressive development. Although Freund has documented the general development and history of these trade unions, there is still the need to identify and discuss some of the salient points in order to show how such a progressive development produced a leadership class which became an instrument of social and political conservatism in the politics of the Plateau province.[142]

Thus, according to the records, the first strike by labourers in the tinmines of Jos occured in 1909. It was precipated by the attempt by the Niger Company to push down wages to 6d a day during the rainy season instead of the 9d rate which the labourers were accustomed to getting irrespective of the season of the year. Other mild strikes occured in 1911 and 1914 when, in both cases, the mining companies attempted to undo the little wage gains which the labourers had managed to secure.[143]

But these strikes do not necessarily presuppose the existence of formal trade unions in the Plateau mines-fields. Rather, these early strikes were part of a

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142. It is the opinion of this author that the whole decade 1950 - 1960 was wasted in dividing rather than uniting labour power in the tinmines of the Jos Plateau. This was certainly a conservative and, probably, a reactionery development.

143. Freund, B. "Niger Company Papers" loc cit. p. 69 fn. 161.

natural hostility brought about by the company's separation of the producers from the means of production which characterises, not only the onslaught of colonial capitalism, but the emergence of class societies in general among hitherto predominantly communal modes of production.[144] In other words, these strikes were part of a general hostility and resistence to the capitalist takeover of native lands and the control of the tin industry itself. Though limited in scale and organisation, these strikes marked the beginning of trade unionism in the minesfields but one which, up to the 1940s, the colonial state persistently discouraged and outlawed.

Thus, throughout the first forty years of colonial rule in Nigeria, no trade unions were allowed to form and function in any part of Nigeria.[145] Indeed, for the whole of British West Africa, colonial labour policy was extremely conservative until the appointment of Major G. St. Orde-Browne as permanent labour adviser to the

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144. Marx, K. and Engels, F. Manifesto of the Communist Party. Moscow, 1977 pp. 35 - 60.

145. Throughout the period covered by Bower's study, i.e. up to 1942, there is no mention of trade unions a fact which, he correctly notes, was, interalia, responsible for the huge profits which accrued to the tin mining companies since it enabled them to keep wage levels low without facing the anger and actions of trade unions. Bower, F. op.cit. p. 23 Table I.

Colonial Office in 1938. For hitherto, colonial officials held the view that African labour was "scarsely classifiable as regular wage earning" and, therefore, not deserving of the formation, functions and responsibilities of trade unions.[146] The truth of the matter, however, was that between 1900 and 1940, despite its abolition in 1931 by the International Labour Organisation, most West African colonial governments still actively employed forced labour and they were therefore not seriously bothered about labour issues in the colonies.[147] In Nigeria, studies have been undertaken which prove this point with regards to the railways constructions although more of the colonial use of forced labour would be uncovered if similar studies were conducted on the colonial motor roads, Native Authority buildings, schools, hospitals and other socio-economic services which the Colonial government claimed to have given to many Nigerian Communities.

In the Plateau province, the employment of forced labour for mining purposes lasted until 1945 despite the claims of the government to the contrary.[148] For

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146. Browne, G.St. O. Labour Conditions in West Africa: A Report. London, 1941 p. 9.

147. Bower, P. op.cit. p. 25.

148. Gall, F.J. "Annual Report, Central Province 1911" JOSPROF 1/1, 87/1912 NAK; SNP 7, 2534/1910 "Secretariat to Resident, Bauchi: First Quarterly Report, 1910"; JOSPROF 1,320/1927 "Taxation - Plateau Province, 1927/28" NAK and Bower, P. op.cit. p. 25.

throughout these years, the main task of the Colonial state, interalia, was to ensure that the tin mines were flooded with labour which it did by ensuring that earning wages in the mines was the only means of getting sufficient money in the Plateau province to pay the taxes. So rather than encouraging the formation of labour unions, to which the mining companies were vehemently opposed anyway, government urged the companies to improve the conditions of work on behalf of the labourers.[149]

The implication of this policy was that the impact of organised labour power on economic and political developments on the Jos Plateau and in Nigeria as a whole was hardly felt before the 1940s. And when, in 1941, trade unions were allowed to form in the tinmines,

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149. Government position on this emanated from its realisation of the fact that the glaring underpayment, poor housing, poor feeding, poor health conditions etc were becoming a fetter in the development and expansion of the tin industry. Besides this, the mines labourers and the Birom peasants had, by this time, developed a political awareness which made them begin to respond to their respective situations of subjugation and exploitation in a more organised manner. Therefore, government saw the formation of trade unions as a "shock-absorber" to an impending labour crisis should the tin industry expand without taking care of these deplorable conditions. For with trade unions, government believed, that there would always be a forum for negotiations without jeopardising the tin industry. See JOSPROF III, MI4/1 Vol.I "Nigerian Chamber of Mines Minutes Meeting, June 1941" NAK; SNP 17K/6899 vol.5 "Nigerian Chamber of Mines" meeting between local council and Richards, 19th Feb. 1944 NAK.

they suffered from the parochial problem of ethnicity. This problem arose historically from the nature of the colonial economy itself following the skills which it required on the one hand, and the unequal educational development in the province and the Region under colonial rule on the other, thereby making skilled labour to come from only certain parts of Nigeria. For, as we noted earlier, skilled labour in the tinmines consisted of predominantly southern elements who had had access to colonial education including the Hausawa headman-commercial contractor class operating in the mines. Naturally, it was members from the skilled category who, apart from their professions, were, invariably, the literate and who, therefore, constituted the bulk of the leadership of the union branches of the various mining companies.

Browne and, very recently, Freund have drawn attention to the ethnic character of trade unionism[150] in Nigeria but only Freund has managed to locate the problem within a historical context.[151] It will be necessary to emphasise here that the problem of ethnicity which weakened trade union solidarity on the Plateau

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150. Browne, G. St. O. op.cit. pp. 24 - 54 and Freund, B. op.cit. pp. 174 - 200.

151. Freund, B. op.cit. pp. 184 - 185.

minesfield arose historically from the unequal opportunities and access to the new avenues of success which colonialism brought about. It was not some innate trait which was peculiar to and which characterised and distinguished Nigerian societies from European societies which made for this ethnicity. In other words, "tribalism," allegedly one of the main drawbacks of political development in Africa[152] was actually an ideological weapon employed by colonialism to divide and rule the peoples and economies of Africa. Ethnicity, it must be emphasised, was the effect rather than the cause of economic and political backwardness in Africa.[153] It is against this background that the "ethnic factor" in the history and development of trade unionism on the Plateau tinmines should be viewed. This certainly weakened trade unionism as an organised labour power because it allowed both government and the management of the different mining

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152. In Nigeria, the most lucid and, probably, the most effective exponent of this bankcrupt neocolonial theory of African political development was Professor James O'connell. See the following of his works: "The Fragility of Stability: The Fall of the Nigerian Federal Government, 1965" in Rothberg R.I. (ed) Protest and Power in Black Africa. New York, Oxford, 1970; "The Inevitability of Instability" in Journal of African Studies Vol. 5 no. 2, 1967 pp. 181 - 191; "Political Integration: The Nigerian Case" in Ilewood, A. (ed) African Integration and Disintegration Oxford, 1969.

153. Nnoli, O. Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Enugu, 1977 p. 229.

companies to manipulate it easily.[154] Consequently, inspite of its successes, the story of trade unionism in the tinmines, is also one of intriques, fission and fussion.[155] In the process, and much to the detriment of labour power solidarity on the tinmines, its trade unions were affiliated with political parties. At this juncture, a brief narrative of these developments is necessary.

In 1941 an African Workers Union was formed among the Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria (ATMN) in Bukuru. By August of that year, the union recorded 800 paid up members and at a meeting, later that same year, it attracted a crowd of 4000 workers.[156] The president of this maiden union was C.W.D. Ansah, from the then Gold Coast. At the same time, it began to form branches in the other major mining companies such as Gold and Base Metal Mining (G.&M.M); EXLANDS; JANTAR; Bisichi Tin Mining Company Limited; Naraguta Mining Company and so on although these branches were not organisationally subordinated to that of ATMN. It is quite clear from the records that the leadership cadres of these unions were made up of mainly the skilled category of workers

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154. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. pp. 239 - 241; Freund, B. op.cit. pp. 174 - 200.

155. Ibid.

156. JOSPROF III, 4243 'Trade Unions - 1943" ATMN Union Meeting of January 1942.

who were, interalia, Ghanaians, Sierra Leoneans, and "Southern" Nigerians.[157]

As would be expected, the management of the different companies were hostile to these trade union leaders and some of them such as Patrick Ummuna, popularly acclaimed as the most famous leader of the period, lost their jobs.[158] At the initial stages of trade union activity, their demands were not radical, centred as they were, on higher wages, overtime pays, annual leaves, sick pays, provision of health clinics in the camps, abitrary dismissals and the like.[159] No fundamental issues were

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157. Freund compiled a list of representatives (leaders) of six of the leading mining companies in 1947 as follows:

ATMN - J.J. Johnson, E.O. Oluwole, M.A. Nzekwu, E.N. Obudigwe.
GBMM - M.O. Okeguma, R.K. Ekpie, J.R. Opene, C.O. Nwaje
NESCO - E.S. Nottidge, O.I. Ikpeminy
EXLANDS - K.C. Mensah, S.I. Emenike; C.O. Ezebuiro, B.W. Umeshi.
JANTAR - Joseph, Dan Fulani, J.D. Darazu.
BISICHI - G. Okeafor, [illegible]li, L. Agu.
NARAGUTA - Nil (i.e. no representation).
Freund, B. op.cit. p. 183. But for further information on these and others, see JOSPROF III LAB/12 "Nigeria African Miners Union" NAK; JOSPROF 1/2, 811 "Annual Report, Plateau Province 1950" Judging by the names, the representatives from JANTAR and BISICHI appear to have been Northerners.

158. JOSPROF 1, DM 77/S.2 "Ummuna to Emberton, 29 Sept. 1944" and also hearings on Ummuna's dismissal by GBMM in JOSPROF III, C.22 - 'Labour, Conditions and Disputes" NAK.

159. JOSPROF III, 4240 "Trade Unions 1943" dealing, amongst others, with ATMN Meeting, January 1942: NAK.

raised relating to the criteria on which the meagre share of the profits alloted to labour was decided which was the cause of poor wages. For until later on, the unions initially accepted the periodic retrenchment of labourers as natural which tended to undermine their job security.[160] Over time, however, their demands sharpened and became more radical, as they became more experienced, and from 1942, they organised strikes almost on a yearly basis.

Then, in 1946, an amalgamation of the various unions was undertaken from which emerged the Nigerian Union of Minesworkers. This development practically converted the various African minesworkers unions into branches of the former and a militant attitude quickly developed among the labourers of the different mining companies. Thus, between 1942, when the first union strike occured, and 1962, there were no less than twelve contemplated strikes, six of which were actually carried out exclusively on the tinmines. In addition, the Nigerian Minesworkers Union, participated in other general strikes in Nigeria especially those of 1945, 1947 and 1950.[161]

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160. Freund, B. op.cit. p. 179.

161. Ibid.

The main method employed by company managements to combat trade union militancy in the mines was to take actions which would cripple union leaderships such as intimidations and dismissals. These methods received government approval particularly in the 1950s when party politics began.[162] For during this period, government feared the potential power of trade unionism and therefore encouraged, indeed, actually spearheaded, splits and divisions within union leadership.[163] Thus, immediately after the partial success of the strike action of 1947 over salary increases and arrears accruing from the recommendations of the Harrigan Commission for public workers, union leaders in the tinmines began to be refered to as "outsiders" by government and company officials. This strike actually started with Gold and Base workers and then spread to several companies lasting for about one month. The reference to "outsiders" aimed at the predominantly "southern" elements in the union leadership cadres who, it was alleged, did not know and could not represent the interest of the "northern" minesworkers who obviously formed a majority of the minesworkers in the Plateau tinmines.[164] Worse still, union officials were

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162. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. pp. 239 - 241; Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 386.

263. Ibid.

164. SNP 17/4, 39435: "Establishment, Labour Advisory Board, Minesfield" and SNP 17K, 6899 vol. 5 "Wreford to Chief Secretary, Kaduna 1945": NAK.

tagged as Igbo (Iniyamurai).

In the course of this particular strike, a trade union officer from Lagos, one R. Curry, was sent to the minesfield to negotiate a settlement of the strike. Curry used the occasion to initiate the formation of a much more tightly knit labour union than the Nigerian Minesworkers Union which was only an association of the various trade unions and which, Curry believed, tended to make negotiations more difficult because of the multiplicity of union leaderships of the trade unions in the different companies. This new union was called Nigerian African Minesworkers Union (NAMU),[165] a name which took into account the non-Nigerian minesworkers also. Unfortunately for Nigerian African Minesworkers Union and trade unionism in the tinmines generally, this very connection with Curry turned out to be a great source of weakness. For as government agent, his concern was to ensure that trade union activity was under sufficient government control, and its areas of activity limited in such a way that government intervention, in the case of a trade dispute, would be more decisive.[166]

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165. JOSPROF III, LAB/12 "Nigeria African Minesworkers Union" NAK.

166. SNP 17/4, 39435 "Establishment, Labour Advisory Board, Minesfiled" and SNP 17K, 6899 vol 5 "Wreford to Chief Secretary, Kaduna 1945," NAK; JOSPROF III LAB/12 "Nigeria African Minesworkers Union" NAK.

Although the tin companies themselves had objected to government intervention, Curry and government prevailed upon them to believe that their interest would be best protected through government intervention. Despite these limitations, the Nigerian African Minesworkers Union remained the main framework of trade union activity in the tinmines of the Jos Plateau throughout the 1940s.

Once formed, NAMU went into action, Thus in 1949, NAMU declared a strike action against the Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria (ATMN) over automatic gratuities, sick leave, overtime pay and other demands which the company refused to meet.[167] Another strike occured in 1950 although without NAMU's sanction.[168] A third strike by the A.T.M.N. workers in 1951 in protest against the dismissal of some workers provoked the first major open dislocation within Nigerian African Minesworkers union itself.[169] The year 1951 also coincided with the formal formation of the Northern Peoples Congress, a Northern political party which formed a government that year, as

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167. JOSPROF III LAB/12 "Nigeria African Minesworkers Union" NAK.

168. Ibid. See also, JOSPROF 1/2, 8111/S.1 "Annual Report, Plateau Province 1950" NAK.

169. JOSPROF III, 6455/S.3 "Plateau Trade Disputes" labour officer to Senior Resident, Jos, 3 November 1951, NAK.

well as the arrival of Mallam Audu Danladi, a "northern trade unionist", who had been working with the Gaskiya Corporation Zaria, to start work with the Bisichi Tin Mining Company Limited as welfare officer.[170] Thus, using the excuse that NAMU had officially refused to back a strike action which they had organised in 1950, the ATMN workers - the largest body of workers in the tinmines - withdrew their support from NAMU leadership when it declared the 1951 strike action.

At this precise period of historical developments in Nigeria, party politics was brought to bear on the crisis. For at this time, party politics had begun and three major political parties which covered the whole Federation of Nigeria, had emerged.[171] As we shall show later, the position of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), which came to power in Northern Nigeria that same year, was very weak in the Plateau province. In Jos township, a strong opponent of the NPC, the Northern Elements Progressive Party (NEPU) was very popular particularly among the Hausawa petty traders and workers in general. Indeed, NEPU won the local council elections of 1951

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170. Audu Danladi Interviewed, 30th Sept. 1979 - Bisichi.

171. Sklar, R.L. Nigerian Political Parties. New Jersey, 1963 pp. 87 - 140.

and dominated the seats in the Jos Local Council on that basis.[172] A major support base of the NEPU was the minesworkers union NAMU, a support which the regional ruling party understandably disliked.

Thus, employing the divide - and - rule tactics, the NPC, the ruling party in the North, began to encourage and sponsor splits within NAMU ranks. An orchestrated campaign of blackmail was unleashed on NAMU leadership accusing them of misleading and manipulating Northern minesworkers (yan Arewa) into a blind support of Igbo domination of Nigeria via the then NEPU alliance with the ruling party in the Eastern Region - the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC).[173] Using the predominantly Hausawa contractor-headmen class and finding a ready tool on the ground in the person of Mallam Audu Danladi of Bisichi, the Northern Peoples' Congress encouraged the formation of a Northern Minesworkers Union (NMU) which aimed at carrying away the

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172. Niven, C.R. "Annual Report Plateau Province, 1951" ARNN pp. 59 - 60. Documents Section, KIL.

173. Dudley, B.J. Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria. London, 1968 pp. 239 - 240; Freund, B. op.cit. pp. 184 - 186.

Northern followership of the Nigerian African Minesworkers union (NAMU).[174] As expected, the founding leaders of the Northern Minesworkers Union (NMU) included Mallam Audu Danladi but also included a deserter, one Alhaji Isa Haruna, a former treasurer of NAMU, both of who were NPC party stalwarts.[175] As Freund has correctly observed, the Northern Minesworkers Union (NMU) proceeded to develop into the mainstay of the NPC political strength in the minesfield.[176]

The point to note is that by exploiting the contractor - headmen network and the manipulation of anti-Igbo sentiments, these two leaders of the Northern Minesworkers Union succeeded in getting a substantial following from the bulk of the unskilled labourers who, as we noted earlier, were mostly Northerners. Apart from its parochial outlook as a Northern union, the Northern Minesworkers Union was overtly hostile to strikes and generally favoured co-operation with company management.[177] This, attitude of the union together with its parochial outlook weakened its national basis for existence and exposed it to blackmail. Accordingly, one Emmanuel C. Okeichama, a

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174. Ibid.

175. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 576.

176. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. pp. 239 - 240; Freund, B. op.cit. pp. 184 - 186.

177. Audu Danladi. Interviewed, 30th Sept. 1979 - Bisichi.

respected NCNC agent who had lived and worked in the North, was sent to Jos to counteract the activities of Audu Danladi and Isa Haruna and to smoothen relations between the NAMU leadership and the workers of the Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria (ATMN).[178]

Naturally, Emmanuel Okeichama found little difficulty in denouncing the formation and activities of the Northern Minesworkers Union as a parochial and retrogressive development which was a great setback for organised labour power in the tinmines. Consequently, inspite of the large following which the Northern Minesworkers Union mastered together with its government support, the Nigerian African Minesworkers Union (NAMU) still remained strong enough to organise effective strikes with or without the support of the former. Typical of such strikes was one which was organised over Gorsuch[179] in 1955.[180] In this strike, the Northern Minesworkers

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178. According to Freund, Okei-Achamba was an Igbo-speaking native of Asaba in Benin Province. He was educated to the Middle II lower level and had worked in the North as a public letter-writer and petty trader. He spoke Hausa fluently and was a leading light among the Zikists of Minna. At the time of his Jos assignment, he was 36 years old. But in a recent interview with Audu Danladi, Okei-Achamba's mission did not pose a serious threat to the NMU because the leadership of the latter, which included himself, were equal to the task.

179. JOSPROF IV, RO/S.105/S.1: "Minesfield Strike" N.K.

180. Weatherhead, A.T. "Annual Reports, Plateau Province, 1955" ARNN pp. 111, 117 and JOSPROF IV, RO/S.105/S.1: "Minesfield Strike" N.K.

Union suffered a severe blow. For while it had agreed to back up this strike which was organised by NAMU, when government sent in the police who made some arrests, NMU's leader Danladi backed out of the strike and even openly attacked the strike and NAMU in the government owned paper, Gaskiya ta fi kwabo. But NMU workers themselves refused to withdraw the strike action thereby inflicting a leadership crisis within NMU itself. Nevertheless, because government and company management supported and patronised the NMU in preference to NAMU, the former continued to exist as a strong union throughout the 1960s.[181] Indeed, its leaders, who also held important offices within the Northern Peoples' Congress, openly boasted that they were able to extract greater gains for the minesworkers without strikes than NAMU could get with strike actions.[182] Clearly, these two unions remained the most powerful labour-cum-political organisations in the tinmines of the Jos Plateau prior to 1960.[183]

We must emphasise immediately that the above discussion shows that the tin industry as a significant

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181. Audu Danladi. Interviewed, 30th Sept. 1979 - Bisichi.

182. Ibid. But see Danladi's correspondence with Sir Ahmadu Bello and Musa Daggash in JOSPROF II, AS1/311 and AS1/427: "Annual Provincial Reports 1959 - 65". NAK. The latter was a permanent secretary in the Ministry of Mines and Power.

183. Audu Danladi. Interviewed, 30th Sept. 1979 - Bisichi.

sector of the colonial economy was the most important instrument of class formation and class antagonism in the Jos Division of the Plateau province. For it gave rise to the development of a semi-proletarian class within an environment which was characterised by communal and semi-feudal relations.

It is equally important to note that this semi-proletarianisation of largely Birom, Hausa, and Anaguta peasants was unable to completely destroy ethnic parochialism amongst these peasants so that no truly proletarian consciousness was able to develop among them. But if we take the rise of these trade unions as a manifestation of a growing workers consciousness, then it can be safely stated that the "ethnic factor".[184] was only important at the leadership level which suggests that ethnicity, inspite of the setbacks it brought to organised labour power, never produced nor represented a fundamental contradiction and conflict in the mines-field.

The manipulation and articulation of ethnicity into a viable political struggle by the petty bourgeois politicians was made possible due to two main reasons.

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184. This author holds the view that in any social formation, ethnicity only becomes a political problem when the ethnic differences within it coincide with socio-economic clearages. Lenin, V.I. Selected Works vol. II Moscow, pp. 109 - 110.

Firstly, as we have discussed earlier, employment policy in the mines produced uneven rewards for labour based on ethnicity through the facade of skilled and unskilled labour. Secondly, the labour union movement on the Plateau was operating within the wider political environment of Nigeria whose leadership had, for the same reasons, successfully manipulated and articulated ethnicity and religion to appear as fundamental contradictions of the colonial society instead of the existing contradictions arising from colonial relations of production.[185]

Nevertheless, the tin industry as a whole and the labour unions to which it gave rise, was a significant agent of class formation. For it provided a significant political power base from which some of the most important political groups and leaders in the Plateau province emerged.

AGRICULTURE.

The primacy of agriculture as the mainstay of the economies of all the Plateau communities continued well into the colonial period and there after. Indeed, during the colonial period, the demand from the agricultural sector of the Plateau economy heightened due to the huge

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185. Nnoli, O. op.cit. pp. 35 - 63.

influx of immigrants from other parts of Nigeria who had to be fed. Thus throughout the colonial period, great premium was placed on food production instead of cash crops as was the case in some other parts of Nigeria.

As in many other parts of Nigeria, agriculture among the Plateau communities was based on peasant free hold. But as a result of tin mining in some parts of Jos Division, the traditional land tenure system in those parts broke down. Besides tin mining, most parts of the Jos Division were infertile due to the poverty of its soils.[186] Indeed, there is evidence that prior to 1900, frequent famines were very much part of Birom societies. According to one informant, some of these famines were so serious that some Birom families exchanged their children for food with the Jerawa and other neighbouring groups.[187] The main food producing areas therefore lay outside the Jos Division and were mainly in Shendam and Akwanga Divisions.

By the first decade of colonial rule there had been so much influx of immigrants into the minesfield that

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186. Buchanan, K.M. and Pugh, J.C. Land and People in Nigeria. London, 1955 p. 39.

187. According to one informant, Pastor Toma Bot, some of the famines were so severe that some Birom household heads resorted to exchanging their female children for food with the neighbouring Jerawa, Mwaghavul and other groups. Interviewed at Kuru, 29th June, 1979.

food had to be imported from outside the Plateau province. Thus, as early as 1911, the annual report mentioned a total of 450 tons of corn imported from Kano alone.[188] In the following year, that is 1912, it was reported, with some sign of relief, that "one company [was] making an experiment of importing maize and Yoruba labour from southern Nigeria."[189] Furthermore, the annual reports for the Plateau province always devoted a paragraph or two to the food problem which demonstrates the seriousness of food shortage in the tin mines. Food dealers and food contractors, a majority of who were Hausawa, therefore, enjoyed a boom in the Plateau province throughout the colonial period.[190]

Much of what describes the lives of the mines-workers, what Freund calls "the life of labour", centred on three basic needs, namely food, accomodation and job security.[191] Of these, food was the most accute.

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188. Gall, F.B. "Annual Report for the year ending Dec. 1911" JOSPROF 1, 67/1912: NAK.

189. Gall, F.B. "Annual Report, Central Province -" JOSPROF 1, 373/1912: NAK.

190. Freund, B. op.cit. p. 79.

191. Browne, G. St. O. op.cit. pp. 11 - 27, pp. 54 - 56; Freund, B. op.cit. pp. 73 - 109.

Indeed, it was the interaction of these three problems through the nexus of poor wages which produced a "mining camp culture" which is vividly recalled and described by participants and informants on the Plateau today. For over the years, the tin mining camps evolved a way of life characterised by what the Hausawa refer to as siyacewa which implied a perpetual condition of poverty and indebtedness or better still, pauperism. This camp culture developed historically through the perpetuel frustration of the mining labourers who were never able to save any money, feed and cloth themselves properly, or even guarentee their regular accomodation.

To be sure, many a labourer had left the village hoping to get money (cash) to meet the necessary needs of the family. But they never returned to the village because they could not get such monnies.. The total effect of camp life, therefore, was to produce a uhique ethos typical of most mining areas under capitalist exploitation whether they were in Southern Africa or in Nigeria - alchoholism, rascality, prostitution, overindulgence in dancing (gore), feeding on credit (uwar tuwo), indebtedness, theft and gambling. These mining camps on the Jos Plateau are still in existence today andrelics of the "Camp Culture" are still discernible in most of them, particularly, among

the older generation.[192]

The food requirements of thetin mines of Jos thus became an important area of consideration and focus by the government. This problem was tackled at three levels. Firstly, and the easiest to organise, was the purchase of food items from other provinces such as indicated above. Secondly, attempts were made to introduce new crops into the province for cultivation by the peasantry of the areas supposedly suited to such crops. Thirdly, there were attempts, especially after the second world war, to develop agro-based resettlement schemes in some parts of the province. The introduction of new crops was intended to meet the needs of the growing European population which was mostly concentrated in Jos, Bukuru and the mining camps.[193]

These new crops were mainly vegetables, fruits and other food crops which, imported from Europe, could easily perish or rot away under poor storage conditions. Market gardening, especially around Jos and Bukuru, began to receive government attention even before the 1920s and an array of vegetables such as cabbages, carrots, lettuces,

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192. The author spent Saturday nights at Barakin Ladi, Tenti, Bisichi, Dorowan Babuje and Manguna Hausawa. Although mushroom modern beer parlours have largely overshadowed the traditional burukutu houses of the 1940s, 1950 and the 1960s, the latter still function and are patronised by the older folk in these mining settlements.

193. Ames, C.G. Gazetteers of the Plateau Province. Jos, 1934 p. 15.

cucumber, spinach and others were keenly grown and sold.[194] Indeed, it was this relatively high concentration of Europeans in the province rather than its often publicised good climate which was the main reason for the establishment of the Vom Dairy Industry here as early as 1923.[195] Already the cultivation of irish potatoes had been introduced with success in Panyam, Mangu, Manguna, Bokkos Heipang and other villages of Jos and Pankshin Divisions.[196] For example, the annual report for 1927 mentioned the reinforcement of potatoe cultivation in these districts by an arrival of four cases of potatoe seeds from England for onward distribution to the peasants of these areas.[197] Rice seeds were also imported from Ilorin and Sokoto provinces for trial in certain parts of the Plateau province.[198] From this, it becomes clear why the colonial

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194. An example of a well developed truck farming or market gardening still exist and is located at Gada Biyu, just before the Jos - Barakin Ladi road branches to Kuru and Forum.

195. Morrison, J. op.cit. p. 341.

196. JOSPROF 1, 43/1930 "Pankshin Division, Report for the year 1929" NAK.

197. Ibid.

198. Ibid.

government became committed to the encouragement of food production in the province.

As for the cultivation of cash crops, neither the government nor the European firms showed comparable interest and commitment. For until the 1940s, there was little or no attempt at all to develop the cultivation of cotton, groundnuts, tobacco and palm oil in the various parts of the Plateau province known to be suitable for these crops. For example, in 1922, a colonial report noted the abundance of good quality palm oil in the Kulere district of Pankshin Division but the colonial official in charge told the Resident in confidence that "they [did] not apparently know how to tap their palms and I hope they will never learn."[199] In 1923, inspite of the low price of 2d per pound offered by the Firms for cotton, peasants in Wase District showed sufficient interest in its cultivation but they were not encouraged by the company to do so.[200] However, in 1927, the high quality of cotton produced there forced the British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) to reluctantly move their buying centre from Ibi to "a small village in Yerigam area.[201]

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199. SNP 9, 137/1922 "Pankshin Division - Bauchi Province, Disturbances in - " NAK.

200. SNP 9, 95/1924 "Muri Province - Annual Report 1923" NAK.

201. JOSPROF 1, 28/1928 "Shendam Division - Annual Report for 1927" NAK.

In the same year, the Niger Company opened a station in Gudi for the purchase of groundnuts, palm oil and kernel, beniseed and sheanuts but it offered so low prices for them that the peasants became reluctant to cultivate the crops.[202] Instead, the mining of the low quality tin ores of Wamba were encouraged and the first consignment of tin from the Wamba mines reached Jos that very year "albeit great difficulty of the bad road."[203] Furthermore, in 1933, some 5000 pounds of native tobacco leaf were bought from Shendam by the British - American Tobacco Company for the manufacture of cheap trial cigarette. The result, good or bad, was never made known but orders for further supplies were not made.[204] Such then was the performance of the Firms in their bid to discourage cash crop production in the Plateau region in preference for the tin industry. The only cash crop whose cultivation appears to have been tolerated before 1940 was ginger, a crop widely grown in Southern Zaria and the then Jemaa Division of the Platesu Province.[205]

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202. JOSPROF 1, 31/1926 "Akwanga Division - Annual Report for 1927" NAK.

203. Ibid.

204. Beck, D.M.H. "Annual Report Plateau Province 1933" JOSPROF 1, 301/1933 NAK.

205. JOSPROF 1, 363/1933 "Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Nigeria, 1933". NAK.

Thus throughout the Plateau province, colonial policy on agriculture aimed at the encouragement of food production for the tinmines in preference for cash crops. As a result, the Plateau province neither produced a cash crop producer class of farmers, nor a licence buying agent class both of who developed in some parts of Nigeria, notably, Kano, Ibadan, Zaria and other cash crop producing areas.[206] These new classes of farmers and buying agents became important in the political history of their respective regions. In the Plateau province, however, no such new classes developed in the rural areas to exercise the same role politically.

The expressed commitment of the colonial government to food production in the Plateau province took a dramatic turn after the second world war. For, in 1942, the flow of tin from British Malaya to America was cut off with the Japanese occupation of the Colony.[207] Therefore, tin production on the Jos Plateau was stepped up in order to help compensate the loss of Malayan tin.[208] In consequence, labour demands in the Plateau tin mines rose to an unprecedented level, a condition made worse

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206. Mars, J. "Extra-Territorial Enterprises" in Perham, M (ed) Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria, Oxford, 1947 p. 82.

207. Bower, P. op.cit. p. 25; Freund, B. op.cit. p. 137.

208. Ibid.

due to the fact that no machinery could be imported to the mines under the wartime measures which governed Britain at this period.[209]

The great demand for labour during the war led to the reintroduction of forced labour in the Plateau minesfield known locally as diban gwamna (the Governor's conscript).[210] Each of the Northern provinces was required to send a specific number of labourers and quantity of food to the tin mines. The emirs and chiefs played a central role in coercing their subjects to the tin mines and even sent their representatives to the mines to ensure that the labourers worked hard.[211] Notwithstanding the run-aways, deaths and the sick, the tinmines of Jos become overcrowded giving rise to serious accomodation, feeding, sanitary and other health problems which caused frequent deaths.[212]

As part of the solution to the enormous food requirements of the tin mines during the War, the colonial government embarked on a programme of optimum employment of the Plateau peasantry to the land despite the fact that the same peasantry were required as labourers in the

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209. Ibid.

210. JOSPROF 1/1, 2018/S.2 "Report on Minesfield Labour - Emberton to Residents, 1942" NAK.

211. Ibid.

212. Ibid.

tin mines. To this end, some of the Plateau communities who occupied the poor escarpments, with limited scope for agricultural expansion and development, were moved down to the adjoining plains to found new settlements where they could grow food for the tinmines, namely, the Shendam Resettlement Scheme and the Shemankar River Project. In other communities, families were forced to surrender portions of their harvests to meet some of the needs of the minesfield.[213]

These attempts at boosting food production were not limited to Plateau province. For example, two of the three big agricultural projects embarked upon by the colonial government were located outside the province. These were the Mechanised Farm Project at Mokwa and the Kontagora Land Settlement Scheme both of which were located in the then Niger Province.[214] The third, the Shendam Resettlement Scheme, was located in the Plateau province.[215] Similarly a few irrigation schemes were also started at Shemankar, near Shendam, and on Sokoto and Kaduna rivers.[216]

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213. JOSPROF II, 2018 Vol. 3 "Supply and Repatriation of Mines Labour..." NAK.

214. Buchanan, K.M. and Pugh, J.C. Land and People in Nigeria. London, 1955 p. 161, 165.

215. Annual Report of Northern Regional Production Development Board 1950 - 1955. Kaduna, 1951 in ARNN, 1951 - 1955. Documents Section, KIL.

216. Buchanan, K.M. and Pugh, J.C. op.cit. pp. 165 - 170.

These schemes were pursued with much vigour although not all of them succeeded in achieving their stated objectives.

But the inauguration of these agricultural projects and the vigour with which the colonial government pursued them should not be misconstrued as evidence of a genuine concern to develop the peoples. On the contrary, these schemes formed part of the post war fever aimed at massive cash crop production in the colonies to meet the needs of the metropole. In the Plateau province, additional efforts were made on these schemes so as to feed the enormous labour force which was coerced into the tinmines during and after the war.

In this regard, three schemes were launched in the Plateau province, namely, the Shendam Resettlement Scheme; the Shemankar Irrigation Scheme and the Jema'a Area Resettlement Scheme.[217] The Shendam and Shemankar schemes aimed at resettling the escarpment communities, the Tarok and Kofyar respectively, in the more fertile plains bordering on Langtang, Wase, Shendam and the river Shemankar basin respectively. The Jema'a Scheme was, however, a crude and brutal attempt to remove away those Birom peasants occupying the principal tin-laden districts of Zawan and Gyel to far-away Old Jema'a in order to allow the tin mining companies to operate freely without any

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217. Ibid.

hindrances from the indigenes.[218] The first two schemes were a success while the Jema'a scheme was a total failure. Although the Shendam scheme is discussed in some detail later, it is necessary to mention these schemes here generally. For by the early 1950s, the colonial records were very appreciative of the contributions of the Shendam and Shemankar Schemes to the food requirements of the Plateau province.[219] On the other hand, the same records persistently complained about the refusal of the Birom to move to Old Jemaa despite the massive propaganda put into it by government to induce the Birom to do so. By 1955, the failure of this scheme had been officially admitted.[220]

The important point which emerges from this discussion of food production for the minesfield is that inspite of the great demands made on the peasants of the remaining four Divisions of the Plateau, no serious strains were exerted on the land tenure system and, therefore, peasant

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218. JOSPROF D41/S.1 "Jema'a Area Resettlement Scheme" NAK.

219. Niven, C.K. "Annual Report, Plateau Province 1951" ARNN p. C1 and also ARNN 1951 - 55.

220. Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province, Annual Report for 1955" ARNN pp. 115 - 116.

cultivation remained dominant. It is equally important to note that this internal market for food created in the tinmines and Jos township led to the development of "food dealers" all over the province. These dealers were not peasants and did not engage in direct crop cultivation. They were essentially traders - middlemen - who bought food cheaply from the peasants and sold to the mines with profits. They, rather than the peasants, were the beneficiaries of the "food trade". As a result, a food dealer class locally known as yan awu developed in all the important market centres of the Plateau province. The position of these yan awu within the colonial economy of the province was comparable to those of the licence buying agents in the cash crop producing areas of Nigeria although the latter made greater profits and were obviously much richer. Together with the other groups identified in this chapter - the Birom and Anaguta intelligentsia, the organisers of peasant resistence; the immigrant Hausawa - Igbo - Yoruba commercial classes; the predominantly Hausawa contractor - headmen class; the largely southern clerical and artisan classes in the mines and company stores; and the trade union leaders - they collectively constituted a dependent sub-ruling class in the service of colonial capitalism in the Plateau province.

Under their "control" and often manipulated by them, but objectively in opposition to these classes, was the huge mass of the peasantry, the unskilled mines labourers and the indigenous artisantry who together constituted the oppressed classes. It was they who directly shouldered the burden of creating colonial wealth on the Plateau but who, at the same time, benefitted least from it as opposed to the metropolitan capitalists, the colonial state officials in their service and the dependent Nigerian semi-bourgeois classes outlined above.

Such was the significance and role of the colonial economy in the formation of socio-economic and political classes in the Plateau province. At this juncture, a comprehensive identification and discussion of all the major classes created on the Plateau by the colonial economy, the Native Authorities, the Church and colonial education becomes necessary and we attempt to do so in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR.

THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF PLATEAU PROVINCE AS A COLONIAL SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION:

In the previous three chapters of this thesis, we traced the structural and sectoral origins of the colonial institutions which this thesis considers to be the principal determinants of class formation in Plateau province. In each case, we showed how new social and economic classes were created and nurtured. At the end of each discussion, we also drew attention to the basic contradictions created by these processes and the antagonisms arising from them. It now remains to bring all these sectors together and examine their corporate relationship as they operated within the colonial society of Plateau province. This is the more necessary because the political and, to a lesser extent, other superstructures about which this thesis is concerned were not rigidly sectoral but comprehensively corporate, embracing all the sectors and institutions of the province as one economic and political entity.

Furthermore, the various elites who came to power at independence and the feuding competitions within and among them, which this thesis tries to penetrate, were drawn from all the sectors of the colonial economy and society albeit in varying degrees of concentration. Similarly, unless a comprehensive discussion of all the classes created in the various sectors of the colonial society is offered, it would be difficult to properly perceive the "unity in conflict" which, irrespective of their socio-economic origins, bound and typified the political elite on the one hand, and the oppressed classes who, unfortunately remained divided among these elite, no matter from what sector, or another.

Such was the complexity of the political process and behaviour on the Plateau. This chapter is therefore mainly concerned with a comprehensive province - wide identification of the various strata of classes and their relationships up to 1956.[1] For by the mid 1950s,

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1. The choice of 1956 as a terminal point for this discussion is guided by the fact that 1956 was the year in which the second general elections were held in the Northern Region of Nigeria which would suggest that, by this date, bourgeois democratic representation had taken off in earnest. But, certainly, class formation and transformation continued after 1956 to thepresent.

when the decolonisation process was in top gear and party politics had begun, inter class and intra-class conflicts took practical expressions along lines which require a separate chapter. This chapter is, therefore, limited mainly to an identification and a description of the major social and economic classes of the province without detailed discussions about the relationships within and between the classes at the political level.

I am aware that such an exercise tends to reduce the vigour of the historical process under examination especially since no substantially new historical process is brought to bear due to the fact that the chapter merely brings together the discussions of the previous chapters as a basis from which to proceed with the remaining chapters of the thesis which focus on class and politics in the Plateau province. The chapter, therefore, appears to be largely sociological and descriptive at first sight, rather than analytical. Whether this weakens or strengthens the thesis will depend on the degree to which it succeeds in creating a clear and comprehensive basis for the next phase of this thesis which deals with historical developments on the Plateau, and central to which is the emergence and development of petty bourgeois politics. The chapter thus provides the essential link between the processes of class formation on the one hand, and the politics which sprang from the

classes on theother, thereby, shaping and tying the analysis of the two processes as one historical movement. Such is the significance of and the justification for this chapter.

To start with, it is important to remark that the strata of classes which this chapter seeks to identify were, at the beginning of the colonial period, more of social groups and aggregates which contain class potentials rather than fully developed classes. In other words, these classes lacked the necessary class consciousness to make them operate as classes proper. For as we noted during the discussions of the various institutions of colonial rule, the very processes which had created these classes also stifled the corresponding consciousness which should have naturally developed with the formation of these classes themselves. Thus, the classes which we identify below, though deriving from the objective social relations of the colonial society of the Plateau province, lacked the dialectical cohesion and power which should have accompanied their emergence and development. This is not to say that the colonial province of the Plateau defies class analysis such as some pseudo Marxist scholars on African societies have, unsuccessfully, tended to formulate.[2] Nor, indeed,

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2. Shivji, I.G. Class Struggle in Tanzania London, 1976, p. 18; Nzimiro, I. "Against the Mystification of Class." Journal of African Marxists, Issue 4 Sept. 1983. pp. 94 - 102.

was this phenomenon peculiar to Plateau province or any colonised society in Africa or elsewhere in the colonial world. For no ruling classes in history have been known to deliberately encourage or even allow the objective and subjective social and economic conditions of the oppressed classes to coincide. Such ruling classes would be committing class suicide!

Another preliminary observation to make is that class formation was an on-going process which continued after 1956 as colonial rule and economy expanded and developed to become more and more sophisticated in accordance with the rule of capital. What is offered here, therefore, is a broad identification and discussion of all the socioeconomic classes in the province. For it is often an aggregate of specific class interests which coalesce into a broader one in terms of political representation about which the ruling elite are in constant quarrel. In other words, political representation.- a major premise of bourgeois democracy - is often an aggregate of many specific class and group interests which eventually coalesce into one broad constituency of interests.[3] It is necessary to emphasise this point

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3. Burns, J.M. and Peltason, J.W. Government By the People (7th edtn) New Jersey, 1969 pp. 253 - 272.

in order to underscore the necessity for an identification of all the identifiable classes in the Plateau society. But due to lack of space, only the major classes are identified in this chapter.

One final remark relates to the criterion used for the determination of the ruling classes vis-a-vis the oppressed classes in a colonial setting. ~~a situation which is obviously problematic although not impenetrable.~~ Thus, in the first place, it must be emphasised that in a colonial setting, we can only talk of African ruling classes in-the-making. For these African groups were mere prefects or what has been more aptly described as sub-ruling classes of their metropolitan overlords.[4] They were thus a dependent ruling class operating only within the general dictates of their metropolitan ruling classes. In effect, they had no control over policy but could only manipulate such policies once they had been formulated. Of course, they could influence policy through suggestions and advice being themselves on-the-spot participants and agents. But they remained essentially subordinates of the metropolitan ruling classes.

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4. Dr. Mamdani has described them as "collaborating classes"; Mamdani, M. Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. New York, 1976 p. 42.

Regarding the Plateau, the problem was compounded by the fact that the local ruling classes were even one step further down the ladder. For they were a Sub-sub ruling class to the extent that many of them, typical among who were the commercial and bureaucratic elite, dependent on patronages from the sub-ruling classes in Kano, Kaduna and other parts of Nigeria.[5] And this largely accounts for the perpetuation of what might be termed an "immigrant hegemony" in the province up to independence and thereafter.

As for the criterion for determining the ruling classes themselves in a colonial setting, we need not depart from the generally accepted formulation of Lenin. Central to Lenin's definition and identification of a ruling class is the latter's claim to the ownership of the basic means of productions under historically determined circumstances, a claim which enables them to appropriate rents in the case of land and profits in the case of movable capital.[6] Owing to their purported ownership of these means of production, they themselves do not engage in actual work, but live on the rents and profits collected on land and other means of production

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5. Dr. Fom Bot (Nbong Gwom Birom) Interviewed 3/12/1982.

6. Lenin, V.I. Collected Works. Vol. 29 Moscow, 1977 p. 421.

respectively. This relationship is central to the creation and perpetuation of a ruling class, no matter the form it takes nor in what historical era, whether it be feudal or capitalist.[7] The only point worth a re-emphasis here is that in a colonial setting, these purported owners of the means of production were far away in the metropole where they had established their hegemony on similar claims.[8]

With the above remarks, it is now possible to identify the ruling classes in Plateau province under colonial rule as those European administrative officers, company managers and directors, and the Christian mission representatives who, together, constituted a ruling oligarchy in the province. They formed the sub ruling classes in the province. But below them was an emergent African elite who, in due course, particularly after independence, developed into sub ruling classes. This African elite was mainly made up of the immigrant elements in the province. Their economic development was slow given the fact of their dependence on the

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7. Marx, K. and Engels, F. "Manifesto of the Communist Party" in Selected Works Vol. 1 Moscow, 1977 p. 108.

8. Marx, K. and Engels, F. "Origins and Development of Capitalism" in Bottomore, T. and Rubel, M. (eds) KARL MARX: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy London, 1974 pp. 137 - 154.

metropolitan ruling classes via their local representatives, the European ruling oligarchy, to whom we have refered above. Strictly speaking, therefore, this African elite was not a ruling class to the extent that it did not (and could not) own the basic means of production in the province since these had been claimed by the British through conquest. They were merely an amorphous elite group to whom the European ruling oligarchy allowed some marginal economic and social privileges devoid of real economic and political power. As was pointed out earlier, this elite transformed into a sub-ruling class only after formal independence and, even then, as it is generally known of their type throughout the colonial world, it was devoid of economic independence; a situation which, in turn, continually threatened its political sovereignty.[9] Thus, this pseudo ruling class is simply referred to in this thesis as an African elite.

In dialectical opposition to these cadres of exploiters and oppressors were the colonial subjects whose labour was exploited to produce and sustain the former. Together, these colonial subjects constituted the oppressed classes of the province irrespective of

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9. The Congo, now Zaire, provides an accomplished example of this. Nkrumah, K. Challenge of the Congo London, 1974.

where they worked. Of course, it should be noted that the demarcation between these classes and within them were not rigid due to what Toyo has referred to as "class dynamics"[10] or what bourgeois sociologists generally refer to as social mobility. For in history, ruling classes have always devised ways of recruiting "the most prominent men of the dominated classes" into their fold and thereby broaden their base in order to strengthen their class position as well as to acquire some measure of legitimacy and stability. Thus Marx observed:

> The more a ruling class is able to assimilate the most prominent men of the dominated classes, the more stable and dangerous is its rule.[11]

The ruling classes under discussion were those of the capitalist mode of production operating in a colonial form.

In chapter one, we attempted to describe and analyse the nature and structure of the precolonial - by extension, the pre-capitalist - economies of the Plateau societies and the political and other superstructures to which they gave rise. Chapters two and three discussed, in detail, the imposition of the capitalist mode of production on these societies through certain important

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10. Toyo, E. "Identification and Definition of Class" Pan African Journal of Social Research November 1978 p. 13.

11. Bottomore, T. and Rubel, M. (eds) KARL MARX 1974 p. 108.

agents and process such as colonial administration, education and the economy itself. The classes which are identified below were thus the resultant relations of production from all the processes discussed in these previous chapters together in a comprehensively corporate manner and within the Plateau provincial setting. All these remarks should be borne in mind in conceptualising the Plateau colonial society, the classes which it created and the politics which developed from these classes.

THE RULING CLASSES

i. A European (mainly British) Ruling Oligarchy

This group consisted, essentially, of those who controlled colonial state power. They included the British administrative officers, who formed its caucus, the managers and directors of the expatriate firms in the province, and the local chairmen and secretaries of the major Christian missionary bodies operating within the province. As we pointed out earlier in our discussion of the various sectors within which these groups of Europeans operated, there was constant and continuous consultations among them as a ruling class which demonstrates that, contrary to appearances of constant conflicts, they had harmonious relationships. Furthermore, we cited ample examples to show how their essential unity of

purpose operated. For example, we noted that there was complete agreement among this ruling oligarchy on educational policy, that is, that it should develop gradually rather than rapidly. We also noted that they were agreed on theprinciple of indirect rule despite their differences of opinion on how to implement it. All of them, we further noted, were eager to implant, on the Plateau, the capitalist mode of production and the social milieu or culture which pertains to it such as that which existed in Britain.

That this tiny oligarchy constituted a ruling class in Plateau province is demonstrated, foremost, by the considerable political and financial power which they commanded. But it was also demonstrated socially by the activities which they organised for themselves as well as the facilities which they enjoyed, notwithstanding the racial discrimination which they displayed in the use of these facilities. Such facilities included an exclusive European hospital in Jos[12] - the earliest in the province; Golf and, later, Polo clubs; a Rest House, later Hill Station Hotel; Hillcrest School and numerous 'rest houses' in the divisional and district headquarters.[13]

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12. SNP 9, 88/1924 "Bauchi Province - Annual Report, 1923". NAK.

13. Plotnicov, L. Strangers to the City: Urban Man in Jos, Nigeria Pittsburgh, 1967 p. 82.

These were not places to which Africans belonged or could go. Certainly not before the1940s. The annual report of Plateau province for 1921 had the following comments on European social life in Jos:

> The social life of Jos does not seem to have suffered from the general depression, and at times becomes almost exacting. The amenities are pleasant and the craze for dancing has come into vogue as elsewhere. A race meeting was held on November 13th At these meetings there have been counted as many as 150 Europeans present. Lawn tennis tournaments have also been held. It is a pity there is no polo.[14]

The discussions and activities which occured in the course of these meetings further bound the European ruling oligarchy together as a class.

Thus, in Jos, the provincial headquarters, a ruling class culture typical of that which existed in the metropole developed. This was most noticeable at the weekends when European field officers converged on Jos to enjoy themselves. Similarly, scores of Europeans serving in other parts of Nigeria were fond of spending their short leaves in Jos. In the annual report for 1923, for example, the Resident of Plateau province already felt that Jos and Kenya were very similar in terms of European settlement and activity. He noted inter-alia:

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14. SNP 9, 1271/1922 "Bauchi Province Annual Report for 1921" NAK.

> There is some similarity between the conditions on the Plateau and in Kenya, which goes far to make Jos Division both the busiest and the most ineresting Division in the Northern Provinces.[15]

Such was the status of Jos as a small sub-sub-metropole of the European ruling oligarchy.

Immediately below this European ruling oligarchy was a tiny but an economically well-to-do non European and non African group. This group was made up of the Arab-Levantine elements who, as we noted in chapter three, had established commercial warehouses and transport businesses in Jos along layin kwara'a, a local street name which described these Arab - Levantine elements themselves. Throughout their stay in Jos urban area, where most of them had concentrated, this group never acquired any appreciable degree of political significance. Infact, the colonial records hardly discussed them. Nevertheless, they existed and constituted an important commercial element with a few clients in the rural areas.

ii. An African Elite*

As we pointed out above, this group lacked access to state power and was not, strictly speaking, a ruling class in the colonial province of the Plateau. They were

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15. SNP 9, 88/1924 "Bauchi Province - Annual Report, 1923" NAK.

*I.am aware of thesevere limitations of the used of the term elite as an analytical tool which have been sufficiently brought out by Shivji. It is used here not to show the absence of a ruling class in Africa but to describe a specific category in a specific time and setting.

merely a dignified group with a weak economic base. Although these socio-economic elements were quite heterogenous in composition, they were collectively an immigrant group from various parts of Nigeria. Furthermore, most of them were based in the urban areas centering on Jos township. Most of them engaged in commerce. In many cases too, the initial cash capital with which many of them began their various businesses were loaned to them by patrons from their own provinces of origin.[16] However, some of them got their initial capital from their own salary savings because of the relatively lucrative positions which such elements occupied in the tinmines and government departments. Their numbers were augmented, first, in 1914 and secondly, in 1926, upon the arrival to Jos, of the Bauchi Light Railway and the Eastern Railway lines respectively. Thus, according to the records, they had become a social force to reckon with in the Plateau province by the early 1930s.[17] In terms of composition, they were an amalgum of a comparatively high income group of Africans from the various sectors of the colonial economy and society.

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16. Dr. Fom Bot. 3/12/1982.

17. JOSPROF 1, 47/1934 "Annual Report on the Plateau Province for 1934" NAK.

It is necessary, at this juncture, to specify some of these groups and show the nature of their privileges and influences in order to prevent a generalised discussion of this very important group. For their rise and development is central to the main focus of this thesis.

iii. A Commercial and bureaucratic elite.

These two groups were the most dominant petty bourgeois groups which developed in the Plateau province. For since the Plateau was neither a coastal province nor a centre of commerce like Kano, no significant comprador class developed as it did in these other areas.

Another important observation to bear in mind is that these commercial and bureaucratic elements were not necessarily exclusive of each other in both their existence and struggles. For many bureaucrats used the spoils of their offices to establish business enterprises under the cover of their cousins and other close associates. Nevertheless, a distinction of form existed between the two. For example, while the bureaucrats entered into business by hiding their spoils of office behind close relatives who posed as store owners and suppliers, or, as contractors, the bona fide businessmen did not find it easy to become bureaucrats

due to the educational qualifications which the latter required. Such were the formal differences between the bureaucrats and the big businessmen in the Plateau province.

The commercial elite were the big shop owners both inside and outside the Jos township market. Depending on the size of their businesses, they engaged in both specialised and retail trade. Those of them from the southern provinces tended to concentrate on specialised businesses such as trading in construction wares, electricals, hotels and restaurants and school stationaries while their northern counterparts concentrated on general provisions, textiles (for which the Arab-Levantine elements formed their major suppliers) of the atampa, alwayo etc varieties and grain food stuff.

One of the major handicaps of the colonial reports is that their commentaries on the province overconcentrated on thetin industry to the neglect of other sectors of the economy. Even when passing remarks were made on the other sectors of the economy these were often done in relation to the tin industry. A good example of this is to be found in the constant references to the "food situation" of the province. Another example is the repeated references to the position of labour in the tinmines. For a researcher, therefore, there are no detailed records of individual businessmen and their

businesses to examine except some passing remarks on the generality of the economy and a few corporate businesses most of which were not owned by Africans. At any rate, the African businessmen under discussion here developed in the later part of the colonial period especially from the 1940s.[18]

From these passing remarks, however, it is possible to piece together some impression of a growing business enterprise, particularly, in Jos township even though little is known about the ownership and sizes of such businesses. Thus, by 1920, the colonial records mention that licences for the sale of wine and beer were on sale, and there were plans for the construction of a modern market in Jos township.[19] By 1929, this new market had been completed at a cost of £12,000 which, by colonial standards, was a remarkable feat.[20] Most of those who rented the stalls were the Hausawa traders who, as we have noted already, formed a majority of the inhabitants of Jos township along with some of their "Igbo" and "Yoruba" counterparts. Apart from their numbers, their predominance in the renting of stalls in

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18. Dr. Fom Bot. 3/12/1982.

19. SNP 9, 1271/1922 "Bauchi Province Annual Report 1921" NAK.

20. Ames, C.G. Gazetteers of the Plateau Province Jos, 1934 p. 338.

the new Jos market was facilitated by the Sarkin Jos who, apart from "influencing" the allocation of stalls, was, until 1947, always a Hausaman. It is not without significance that, at this time, there was no Birom with enough money to afford the capital outlay required to participate in commerce at this level;[21] and what was true of the Birom was also true of the Anaguta and the other communities in the whole province.

Having never had this initial grip on the commerce of the province, the indigenous inhabitants of the province found it difficult to redress this unfavourable position in the commercial activities of the province between the 1920s and the 1950s. For much as some of them such as Dung Balang of Bukuru, Patrick D. Pwajok of Kuru, Ishaku Tok of Du and others[22] tried to enter business as petty traders, they remained subordinated to the immigrant businessmen on whom they heavily depended for their supplies and financial patronage. On theother hand, the commercial position of the immigrant groups grew stronger and increased because they often assisted one another as a group.[23] For as we pointed out earlier, wealth creates more wealth.

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21. Gbong Gwom, Fom Dot Interviewed, 3/12/1982 - Jos Palace.

22. Ibid. But also M.C. Kapwen (Research Assistant) compilations July - Sept. 1982.

23. Ali Sura; Ali Dingtok and others. Interviewed, 10th - 13th Dec. 1979.

The dependence of the indigenous businessmen on the more powerful immigrant elements made it difficult for the former to take sides in the ethnic conflicts which characterised the politics of Jos township as we shall show later. For it was difficult for them to join their fellow Birom to fight against "the domination of Jos township by immigrants" since their businesses depended on some members of the latter to succeed. But this dependence also resulted in the islamisation of some of the indigenous businessmen, notable among them were Dako Babale, Alhaji Ali Sura, Alhaji Muhammadu Fwanje and several others within and outside Jos township.[24] All such indigenous businessmen who became Moslems were those who enjoyed commercial patronages, in terms of loans advances and credit supplies, from the Hausawa big businessmen who were invariably Moslems. For there is no doubt that conversion to Islam carried very definite commercial advantages although it is not at all clear whether this was made a formal precondition. In any case, I am inclined to believe that, in most cases, conversion to Islam was a precondition given the explanations I got from some of such beneficiaries.[25] It was under these circumstances

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24. Ibid.

25. I discussed this issue at some length with Ali Sura and Ali Dingtok both of who could not agree with my view that they were "forced" into accepting islam as a precondition for 'successes' in their chosen careers - petty trading and truck driving respectively. They held the view that they merely converted due to their frequent interactions with Moslems without any bait. Interviewed, 11th Dec. 1979.

that some of the indigenous businessmen lost their social and political identities with their kith and kin thereby compounding the ethnic and religious composition of the commercial elite which developed in the Plateau province before 1956 and even thereafter. From a class perspective, however, their change of religion and culture was a logical outcome of a basic change in their socio-economic means of livelihood and, therefore, dialectical. Such were the complexities of economic, social and political behaviour typical of the petty bourgeois in the Plateau province.

It only needs to be added that the commercial elite, like any other group, could be subdivided into further categories on the basis of the sizes of their business establishments which are, at the moment, not easy to assess. For example, a distinction could be drawn, between the apparently successful tycoons (attajirai) of the 1950s such as Alhaji Ali Ilya, Alhaji Na Mallam, Alhaji Gobe Zantashi, Chief P.C. Ndu, F.O. Onyakwelu, Onigbinde etc. who alone owned several shops, rented houses, and patronised lesser businessmen on the one hand,[26] and the myriad of ordinary yan kasuwa (sing. dan kasuwa) who owned a shop or a rented house on the other. Another category of businessmen was to

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26. Dr. Fom Bot. 3/13/1982.

be found in the rural areas who, even though they were not as wealthy as the urban businessmen, occupied a similar socio-economic status in the villages as their urban counterparts enjoyed in the urban areas. But by far, the most important segment of the commercial bourgeoisie were concentrated in J_os township.

The bureaucratic elite, like their commercial counterparts, melted into various sectors and echelons of the colonial civil service; some occupying more lucrative posts than others. In other words, it was not just an issue of possible avenues for rising to the top positions but it also involved the manipulation of certain strategic civil posts, low or high, even by ordinary clerks in some cases. For example, according to Patrick Dokotri, some junior civil service officers in the Ministry of Lands and Surveys, who processed plot allocations made better "business". than, say, a permanent secretary in the Ministry of Forestry resources who was busy organising tree seedlings and afforestation.[27] For crucial to capital accumulation by the bureaucrats was their manipulation of their civil posts as cashiers, treasurers, clerks, surveyors, accountants, store-keepers etc. to divert public funds and properties to their own private use and ownership. In addition, they received bribes

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27. Patrick Dokotri 3/12/1982.

which also swelled their private means. Although examples of individual bureaucrats who used their offices to accumulate wealth are difficult to document because, legal proof aside, no bureaucrat would want to confess that he accumulated wealth fraudulently, we can assume that this was actually true of a number of them since, as Marx says, capital has never been accumulated legally.[28]

It must be emphasised that, like their commercial counterparts, the bureaucratic elites were predominantly an immigrant element. First, we noted in chapter two that colonial education in this province was slow to develop. Besides it's slow pace, colonial education in the province was handled almost entirely by the Christian missions who were, at least initially, only interested in imparting the three Rs and, later on, in the training of an African clergy and school teachers from the select few in their various spheres of operation. As a result, an indigenous educated elite did not develop early which meant that the middle echelons of the civil service were manned by immigrant elements, mainly, from among the Hausawa. Secondly, due to the fact that the Plateau province was only one out of twelve provinces which formed the Northern Region of Nigeria with a single

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28. Marx, R. and Engels, F. "The Origin and Development of Capitalism" in Bottomore, T. and Rubel, M. (eds) KARL MARX 1974, pp. 137 - 154.

civil service machinery, the Plateau provincial civil servants were appointed and controlled from Kaduna, the headquarters of the Northern Region. In this regard, it is interesting to note that from 1954, when conscious efforts to Nigerianise the civil service began, most of the few top posts available for Nigerians on the Plateau - the Divisional Officers, Provincial Commissioners, Provincial Secretaries - were filled by the Hausawa either posted from other provinces or recruited locally from Jos township itself.[29] Two examples may be cited to demonstrate this namely, the first Nigerian Resident in the Plateau province, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, was brought from Sokoto.[30] Similarly, Alhaji Ali Kazaure, a Jos - based administrator, a trader and a politician who dominated the politics of Jos Township Council throughout the 1950s was a Hausaman from Kano.[31] This state of affairs in the Plateau civil service was brought about by the fact that the Hausa-Fulani aristocracies formed a sub ruling class in the Northern Region as a whole and it was to them that the British handed over political power at independence.

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29. John A. Kwashi (MFRN) interviewed 13/9/1979.

30. Ibid.

31. Dr. Fom Bot. 3/12/1982; Also SMG/CG/LAC "The Jos Town Council Affairs II 1957 - 1954" Jos.

But the relative absence of non Plateau indigenes in the Plateau provincial civil service cannot be accounted for merely in terms of lack of qualified indigenes for the posts as we have implied above. For the Hausawa who were posted to the Plateau province were hardly better than the indigenes of similar qualifications who could have been recruited from the Mission and Native Authority institutions of the province. Yet, they were not. Indeed, as late as the 1960s, Professor Dudley has graphically shown that many degree holders from the "Lower North", of which the Plateau formed a part, were serving as subordinate officers under Middle Two and Grade Two teachers certificate holders from the supposedly North proper.[32] It is no wonder, then, that the indigenous intelligentsia in the Plateau province were hostile to the regional government.

The preponderance of non indigenous bureaucrats in the Plateau province was not only confined to the provincial headquarters. For these were also dominant, at least initially, though to a lesser degree, in the Divisional headquarters. Thus, in the Southern Division (Akwanga/Wamba), only one out of five Native Administration

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32. Dudley, B.J. Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria London, 1968 pp. 224 - 226.

clerical staff was a local man by 1930.[33] In Jemaa Division, none of the scribes was an indigen although all of them were from the Je aa Fulani elements settled in the area.[34] In Jos Division, the enduring conflict between the indigens and the Jos township Hausawa has survived to the present day. Only in Pankshin and Shendam divisions were indigens of any significance found even though Hausawa elements were also found. In Shendam Division, for example, the Ma'aji (treasurer), his assistant, and the Alkali (judge) were not natives to the Division.[35] Such a situation where the indigens were discriminated against in the provincial civil service, not because they lacked the necessary qualifications but because of their ethnic origin, was pregnant with danger and the European administrative officers serving in the province began to notice this danger as early as 1935. Then, the Resident of Plateau province, Mr. H.H. Middleton, and his divisional officers expressed concern over the unwillingness of some qualified Plateau indigens serving the Christian missions to join the Native Authority in some of the divisions so as to redress the dangerous imbalance.[36]

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33. JOSPROF 1, 273. "Pagan Scribes for Pagan Areas" NAK.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

The point of emphasis here is that these bureaucrats, in whatever area they were serving in the province, used their positions to harrass and intimidate the peasantry, the workers (labourers) and the lumpen proletariat. But more crucially, they used their positions as sources of accumulating wealth which they invested in commerce, transport, real estate, hotels and restaurants thereby transforming themselves into a bureaucratic - commercial bourgeoisie. Thus, the interest of the bureaucrats, most of who were "alien" to the Plateau, merged with those of the commercial bourgeoisie who were also, mostly "alien" to the province. This meant that the indigens of the province lost control of these vital sectors of the colonial economy. Hardly any social condition could, therefore, form a more volatile basis for conflict than this and it was only the colonial situation which saved it from explotion.[37] However, as soon as the colonial referees began to leave, from the late 1950s and early 1960s, this explosive situation burst forth leading, in particular, to an intractable conflict, in Jos township, between the intelligentsia of the Birom, Anaguta and Jarawa on the one hand, and the leaders of the Hausa settlers on the other.

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37. John A. Kwashi (M.P.R.N) 13/9/1979 and Patrick Dokotri 3/12/1982.

This conflict formed, and remained, the dominant political struggle in Jos Division up to independence and well thereafter.

THE OPPRESSED CLASSES.

The classes identified above formed the ruling classes in the Plateau province. But, as we pointed out, only the British ruling oligarchy was politically powerful because the emergent African elites were subordinated to it and owed their existence to it. This was a necessary class relation within the colonial setting of the province.[38] Thus, as we shall show later, the African commercial and bureaucratic elite, which we identified above, only became powerful from the closing decade of colonial rule. As expected, by 1960, when Nigeria gained its independence, their positions became more entrenched, the more so because many of them inherited the offices and salaries of the departing colonial officers; a process which continued through the sixties and the seventies.

Meanwhile, the very processes which had created and nurtured the rise of the commercial and bureaucratic elite had, ipso facto, created the various categories of the oppressed classes of the Plateau province. There is therefore a need to identify and discuss the

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38. Shivji, I. op.cit. p. 45.

major categories of the oppressed classes of the Plateau in order to enable us to properly comprehend the totality of the dynamics and contradictions which constituted the material and social reality of hist rical developments in this colonial province. For the classes being identified in this chapter - both the oppressors and the oppressed - were the direct consequences of the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism in the Plateau province.

i. The Peasantry.

This group, no doubt, was made up of the vast mass of the population who, by conservative estimates, accounted for over 90% of the total population of the Plateau province.[39] They were essentially based in the rural areas and all of them were native to the province. For as we have noted elsewhere in this thesis, even the Hausawa settler communities in the various parts of the province preferred commercial activities to farming even though they had been given free farmlands by the respective chiefs of the areas where they had settled.

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39. Forde, D. and Scott, R. "The Plateau Pagan" in Perham, M. (ed) The Native Economies of Nigeria London, 1945 p. 192.

Without variation, the peasantry were organised on household units and produced mainly for the needs of their respective households. In addition to the cultivation of foodcrops, the peasantry kept livestock where this was possible. They also supplemented their agricultural activities with industrial and craft manufactures which were exchanged between the various communities of the province through local trade. Peasant production itself was not uniform throughout the province although this came about mainly as a result of differential climatic and soil conditions rather than any marked differences between the levels of technological developments of the various Plateau communities. Thus, the lowland communities were better favoured than their counterparts on thePlateau massif proper. But taking the province as a whole, the peasantry were a poor lot. For they did not produce huge surpluses although most of them certainly lived above the subsistence level.[40]

The common attribute of the Plateau peasantry was their relationship to land which, as usual in societies at similar levels of development, was characterised by small free holdings and a relatively low technological input. At this juncture, therefore, it is pertinent to attempt a discussion of the class implications

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40. Ibid. pp. 193 - 194.

of the allegedly successful Shendam Resettlement Scheme to which reference was made in chapter three. This is the more necessary since it demonstrates the point that, contrary to appearances, colonial development projects did not "develop" the peasantry but underdeveloped them.[41]

ii. The Shendam Resettlement Scheme.

In chapter three, we mentioned two resettlement schemes which the colonial government established in the Plateau province immediately after the Second World war. These were, the Shendam Resettlement Scheme and the Jema'a Resettlement Scheme. We noted that while the Shendam scheme succeeded, the one in Jemaa failed.

There is, no doubt, that the Shendam Resettlement Scheme made some significant impact on the lives of the peasantry involved.[42] These peasants were mainly the Yergam although the Scheme itself was esta lished in Shendamland, a situation which the petty bourgeois politicians of both sides manipulated to their personal

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41. For similar developments in Tanzania, see: Swai, B. "Colonial Development Policy and Agrarian Protest in Tanganyika Territory: The Usambara Case 1920 - 1960" History Departmental Seminar A.B.U. Zaria 1981.

42. Niven, C.R. "Annual Report, Plateau Province 1951" and 1952. ARNN p. 61 and p. 105 respectively.

advantages. The ostensible aim of the scheme was to resettle, mostly Yergam, (both plain and hill Yergam) peasantry in the fertile fadama bounded by the Wase and Shemankar rivers, in which case, the Yergam peasants had to leave their original habitat and move to new settlements in the Wase - Shendam country. These Yergam peasants were joined by others from the adjascent Montol, Kofyar and Dimmuk districts.[43]

It is clear from the records of the time that advanced planning, research and the necessary capital outlay had all been put into the scheme so as to ensure its success. Firstly, all of the 50 initial settlers were intentionally chosen from amongst ex-service soldiers of the Second World war because, it was believed, that their participation in that war had toughened them so much so that they were capable of absorbing the hardships entailed in starting life afresh without much difficulty.[44] Secondly, and more importantly, sufficient relevant planning and research preceded the launching of the project at all levels of participation by the peasantry. Thus, the farms and villages of the settlers was planned for them by the

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43. For details on this scheme, see Hoomkwap H.K. "The Shendam Resettlement Scheme". B.Sc. Dissertation Department of Political Science A.B.U. Zaria. June 1975.

44. Ibid. pp. 12 - 13.

authorities of the scheme. Similarly, the crops which they were to grow, the plots on which to grow them, and the methods of tendering the crops were all regulated by the agricultural experts of the colonial government.

Furthermore, credit facilities in the form of money, tractor and plough services, fertilisers and insecticides were advanced to the settlers.[45] In addition to all these, there were frequent inspections of the activities of the settler-farmers as well as the establishment of demonstration plots to serve as examples from which the settlers would copy. All these ensured that the scheme succeeded. Thus, in 1950, only a year after the scheme was established, there was already enough evidence of success to convince the government of the need to expand the scheme by incorporating it into the ten year development plan which thecolonial government had then embarked upon.[46] Accordingly, in that same year, the Joint Development Council of the scheme secured a grant of £99,440 from the Northern Regional Production Development Board.[47] The settlers whose numbers kept on

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45. 6/III L.A. Shendam. "Shendam Resettlement Scheme: General Correspondence".

46. Perham, M. (ed) Native Economies of Nigeria London, 1945 p. 21.

47. 6/III L.A. Shendam "Shendam Resettlement Scheme, General Correspondence".

increasing put all these to good use.

Not unexpectedly, the total effect of this scheme in the Shendam area was the development of a new breed of peasantry who differed, in several respects, from the generality of the peasantry which we have described above. For these resettlement peasantry were materially a better lot compared with their counterparts in the remaining province because the facilities at their disposal ensured that their farms produced high yields.[48] Thus, even after surrendering portions of their harvests which had to be paid as rents for the use of government facilities, these farmers still had substantial surplus harvests. Although statistics concerning a comparative per capita income of the farmers before the resettlement period and during the period of resettlement are lacking, it is very clear that their harvests were larger in the Resettlement villages than elsewhere, given the massive inputs that went into them. Indeed, it has been observed that harvests were so large at the Resettlement Scheme that some of the Yergam settlers often returned to Yergamland to enlist the assistance of relatives to help carry it home.[49] Food became abundant in

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48. For example, compare Lunin's annual income of £75 - £85 for the settler farmers with Forde's and Scotts computation of £12-10s (1927) for peasants in Vom and Jos. Forde, D. and Scott, R. "The Plateau Pagan in Perham, M. The Native Economies of Nigeria London, 1945 p. 196.

49. Hoomkwap, H.K. op.cit. p. 44.

the resettlement and Hausawa traders from Yelwa and Shendam began to attend markets which were held on the Resettlement to buy food for sale elsewhere in the province. These Hausawa traders, in due course, entrenched themselves there as middlemen in food stuff circulation between the farmers and the distant markets of Jos and Bankshin Divisions.[50]

To be sure, the income of the Resettlement peasants had increased and was higher than that of the mass of the peasantry of the province even though they were far from becoming a Kulax class. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, in 1956, one of the contemporary officers of the scheme, Mr. H.A. Luning, observed, with some accuracy, that the average gross value of farm produce per settler was about £75 to £85 per annum.[51] Although Luning confessed that nothing was known about the original income of the farmers on the Yergam hills, he however estimated that the value of their crops and other produce based on subsistence level was "certainly not more than £50 per annum."[52] A comparative analysis of studies such as those of Forde's[53] confirm

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50. Ibid.

51. Luning, H.A. The Shendam Resettlement Scheme. Kaduna, 1957 p. 120.

52. Ibid.

53. These studies by Professor Daryll Forde and Dr. R. Scott were painstakingly detailed and covered the whole of Nigeria - the former on Northern Nigerian societies and the latter on those of the South. See, Perham, M. Native Economies of Nigeria London, 1945.

Luning's observation on the relative prosperity of the settler farmers vis-a-vis the generality of the Plateau peasantry as one that is fairly accurate.

But this relative prosperity of the resettlement farmers should not be exaggerated at the expense of their class status. For inspite of the relative improvement in their incomes, they remained essentially a peasantry. Everything else about their social status remained the same as the rest of the peasantry of the province. Infact, from the perspective of economic security, they were worse off due to the temporary nature of the tenancy of the land alloted to them which could be withdrawn by the authorities of the scheme should the farmers refuse to comply with the regulations governing their new mode of existence. For it must be remembered that this scheme, and others like it, was not directed at bettering the living conditions of the peasantry per se, but, as we pointed out in chapter two, they were aimed at increasing food production for the tinmines. In the final analysis, therefore, the scheme could only expoit the settler - peasants for the benefit of the British.

Thus, in terms of their relation to the colonial economy of the Plateau province, these settler - peasants were, like the rest, essentially a peasantry inspite of their relative improvement. Their socio-economic status

could be likened to those of the middle peasants of semi-colonial China between 1927 and 1949 - a position below "the rich peasants and the gentry, local tyrants and lawless landlords" against whom the Hunan peasants and those of China generally, violently revolted.[54]

On the whole, the Plateau peasantry as a group suffered the most from the plunders of colonial rule although their social and class status as an oppressed group did not originate with colonialism. Colonial rule, however, heightened the level and intensity of their oppression. For these peasants were the principal targets of colonial exploitation which occured through forced labour, taxation and the confiscation of their land and other property. This excessive exploitation of the peasantry covered the whole of the Plateau province irrespective of 'tribe' or religion. Furthermore, it was so intense that it was capable of arousing peasant resentment, solidarity, and, most importantly, a peasant consciousness against British rule. But it did not. For apart from the several uncoordinated, but spontaneous, instances of violent resentment against some of the exploitative excesses of colonial rule which we mentioned in chapter two, no organised and sustained

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54. Mao Tse Tung, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" in Selected Works vol. 1 Peking, 1967 pp. 23 - 59 (note particularly pp. 137 - 139).

peasant - based solidarity and resistence developed in the province.

But the inability of the Plateau peasantry, or any other peasantry in colonial Nigeria, to unite and fight the extreme exploitation of their members was not due to an absence of a revolutionary potential inherent in the peasantry in general as Marx and, to a lesser extent, Lenin seemed to have thought.[55] Rather, it was due to the absence of a committed revolutionary vanguard and leadership which would educate, organise and direct the revolutionary energies of the peasants' united front to overthrow their exploiters such as the CCP and Mao and his comrades did for the Chinese peasantry. For as Chairman Mao found out in semi-colonial China between 1921 and 1949, the peasantry, especially the poor peasantry who made up 70% of the Chinese society, were a viable revolutionary force.[56] It was the poor peasantry rather than the proletariat who constituted

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55. Karl Marx certainly underestimated the revolutionary capacity of the peasantry. Even Lenin who acknowledged the revolutionary potential of the peasantry believed that the peasantry would join the revolutionary class but do so because of their fear of eventually becoming proletariats - the only class which both Marx and Lenin believed to be "a really revolutionary class". See, Marx, K. and Engels, F. "Manifesto of the Communist Party" Selected Works. Vol. 1 Moscow, 1977 p. 117; Lenin, V.I. "The Class Struggle" Selected Works. vol.1 Moscow, 1977 p. 26.

56. Mao Tse - Tung "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" Selected Works vol. 1 Peking, 1967 p. 20.

the bedrock of the Chinese revolution. Concerning the poor peasantry, chairman Mao wrote:

> Without the poor peasants there would be no revolution. To deny their role is to deny the revolution. To attack them is to attack the revolution. They have never been wrong in the general direction of therevolution.[57]

Unfortunately, in the case of Plateau province under colonial rule, the indigenous intelligentsia who should have played the role of Mao's revolutionary vanguard for the liberation of the Plateau peasantry and the other oppressed classes were themselves agents of peasants exploitation as Native Authority and Mission subordinate officials. As such, they could not perform the historic role of their class. Consequently, the peasants of the Plateau remained a mass of oppressed classes throughout the colonial period, despite their enormous class and revolutionary potential.

Furthermore, the Plateau peasantry was mobilised by the various segments and factions of the emergent elites to foster their petty-bourgeois interests in politics; a process which perpetuated their exploitation rather than terminated it. It should be remarked, at this juncture, that the behaviour of the Plateau peasantry was not abnormal nor markedly different from the Nigerian

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57. Ibid. p. 33.

peasantry in general under colonial rule.' For except in very few cases, which are yet to be properly studied,[58] the peasantry in colonial Nigeria generally did not developed the class consciousness and solidarity required of it because the emergent Nigerian petty bourgeoisie hijacked their revolutionary energy and utilised it to foster their own petty bourgeois political squabbles and struggles. Yet, in one way or the other, the Nigerian peasantry, along with the other working classes, were collectively responsible for producing all the wealth of the colonial society of Nigeria.

The Workers.

The term workers in this study does not necessarily mean only the proletariat as understood in classical Marxism. For according to classical Marxism, a proletariat refers to "the individual who, without capital or ground rent, lives entirely by his labour (a narrow abstract labour) only as a worker."[59] The term workers as used here covers much more than only those who lived entirely as workers. It also includes a group which

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58. Forde's studies remain the earliest detailed study of Northern Nigerian economies. Forde, D. "The North: The Hausa" in Perham, M. (ed) Native Economies of Nigeria, London, 1947 pp. 119 - 179.

59. Marx, K. and Engels, F. Selected Works. Vol.1 Moscow, 1977 p. 81.

was only partly proletariat and partly peasant, that is, a semi-proletarianised peasantry. The main distinction between the two being that the latter were owners of small landholdings on which they partly depended while the former were people who had been completely alienated from both land and capital of any form. Indeed, to the extent that the workers depended only on their labour power as valued and rated by a so-called owner of capital who employed their labour power in social production and who retained portions of the proceeds of this labour as net profit, even the workers' labour power had been alienated.[60] Thus, in talking about the workers of the province, we include some of the dry season peasantry, yan cin rani,[61] who converged on the tinmines as labourers some of who never returned to their rural bases once they had become addicted to city or town life, zaman birni or Zaman dandi and baraki, respectively.[62]

But while the term workers is not applied here in its pure or abstract form, the social aggregates to which the term refers retained their essential characteristics, namely, people who lived mainly on their labour

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60. Zahar, R. Colonialism and Alienation: political thoughts of Frantz Fanon Benin, 1969 pp. 1 - 2.

61. Mahdi, A. The Hausa Factor. Zaria, 1979. p. 15.

62. Ibid.

power. The workers of the Plateau province were, therefore, the wage earners of all sorts employed by the various agencies of the colonial government and the private firms alike. Many of them had come to the Plateau province in search of money in the tinmines to pay their taxes. In due course, some of them stayed on permanently. Others found jobs as night watchmen, messengers and cleaners in government departments and in some of the expatriate firms.

Compared to the peasantry, the workers were collectively a tiny lot numerically even though their members were progressively increasing especially between 1934 and 1959. However, they constituted the next largest producer class after the peasantry in the colonial society and economy of the Plateau province. For example at the end of 1942, the total figure for labour force in the tinmines was 70,800. It consisted of 14,000 labourers compulsorily recruited from other provinces; 15,000 'voluntarily' recruited from within the Plateau province and the remaining 42,000 made up of the permanent employees of the mining companies and voluntary labour from various regions adjascent to the Plateau.[63] Indeed,

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63. Report on the Department of Labour 1942, quoted in Perham, M. (ed) Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria London, 1947 p. 25.

the Plateau province contained more workers than any other province in northern Nigeria throughout the colonial period.[64]

As already indicated, these workers were concentrated in the tinmines although a substantial proportion existed in the Public Works Department (PWD), other government departments and the Native Authorities. Some were also found in the employment of the private firms and the Christian missions. But whether employed in the public or in the private sectors of the colonial economy, these workers generally served as maintenance labourers, cleaners, messengers, gardeners and such like. To these should be added the colonial police and the army ranks-and-file despite appearances to the contrary, at least initially, when these started off as constabularies of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). For they were nothing but a huge army of poorly paid mercenaries in the employment of colonial capitalism.

All these groups of Nigerian workers depended, mainly, on the meagre wages which they received in their respective places of work. It is not easy to compute statistics for their respective wages throughout

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64. Shenton, B. and Freund, B. "The Incorporation of Northern Nigeria into theWorld Capitalist Economy." Review of African Political Economy. no. 13 May-Aug. 1978 p. 18.

the colonial period not only because these wages were far from being uniform but also because they kept changing, particularly, from the 1940s onwards. For example, before 1910, the average pay for unskilled labourers in the tinmines was 6d a week.[65] This rose to 6s 6d in 1926,[66] then dropped to 2s 7d in 1931 and then 3s 6d in 1937.[67] The labourers in government departments were hardly any better. For as late as the 1950s their average pay was £4 - 10 per month with many certainly receiving less.[68] According to Miners, as late as 1956, a recruit in the army received 2s 6d a day rising to 3s 9d when fully trained.[69] At this time, Miners continued, unskilled daily paid government labourers received 4s 8d a day in Lagos and 3s 6d elsewhere in Southern Nigeria.[70] The Nigerian Police certainly earned less than the army while the local police, yan doka, still earned less than the Nigerian Police not to talk of the dogari, the chief's personal bodyguard.

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65. Freund, B. Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines London, 1981 p. 54.

66. Dower, P. "The Mining Industry" in Perham, M. (ed) Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria London, 1947 p. 24.

67. Ibid. p. 24.

68. Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province Annual Report 1955" ARNN p. 119.

69. Miners, N.J. The Nigerian Army 1956 - 1966 Methuen and Co. Ltd. 1971 p. 22.

70. Ibid. p. 22.

These examples will suffice. For what they demonstrate clearly is theextremely low wages paid to these workers irrespective of whether they worked in the public or in the private sectors of the colonial economy of the Plateau province. But those who worked in the tinmines certainly suffered the most. For in addition to the poor wages, these labourers worked from early morning till dusk instead of the ten hours (7 a.m. to 5 p.m) stipulated for government workers,[71] not to mention the fact that they were frequently retrenched and reabsorbed as the profit motives of the mining companies dictated without any consideration given to their means of livelihood and welfare. Furthermore, this army of labourers consisted of mostly immigrant elements who had no land-holdings to fall back on during such periods of depression. Consequently, most of them remained in perpetual debts and misery.

Their colleagues in the government departments were relatively more secure from such abitrary retrenchments typical of the tinmines even though government itself occasionally retrenched what it regarded as "casual" or "daily paid" workers. Therefore, whether as labourers in the tinmines or in the government departments, these categories of wage earners suffered the most from their

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71. John A. Kwashi (MFRN) 13/9/1979.

meagre pays and, subsequently, from very low living standards. As an escape valve from these frustrating living conditions, therefore, many of these categories of workers took to alcoholism and gambling even at old ages and irrespective of their religions.[72]

Because of their direct contact with the colonial state and capital, the workers were the earliest group to develop class consciousness. This had to be so because the contradictions of the colonial economy and society were concretely articulated through their direct involvement. In the tin mines, for example, while the European company managers lived in well-decorated bungalows and enjoyed comfortable lives, the labourers were concentrated in over-crowded and very poorly maintained camps eking a life by the sweat of their brow. They lived on credit, uwar tuwo, and strove unsuccessfully to forget about their misery through excessive consumption of local beer, burukutu. While theEuropean managers arrived in the mines shafts in cars after taking heavy breakfast, the tin mines labourers rushed down to their pits, gandu, on foot as early as six o'clock in the mornings. Also, while the European managers were given police escort to transport their won tin to theports, or, to the banks to withdraw monnies which they spent lavishly, the

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72. Alhaji Baba Choji, a veteran headman in Dorowan Babuje. Interviewed 7th Sept. 1979.

labourers were gathered on Saturday afternoons to receive a few shillings for a whole week's exhaustive work. Such, and many more, were the contradictions which the labourers of the tin mines directly experienced under colonial capital.

The same conditions were true of their colleagues in the government departments who worked on the laterite roads, government forest reserves and other similar works. Even the messengers and cleaners working in government offices experienced the severity of colonial exploitation and domination. For even as people involved in less rigorous mannual work, they were almost a completely dehumanised group of workers given the way they always shivered on thearrival of a colonial officer to office; or, when such an officer pressed the bell-nop to signal the immediate physical presence of the former. We may add that relics of these social relations of colonial capitalism are still to be found in some government departments today.

Under these harsh conditions of existence and with gradual improvement in communication networks, which kept the labourers in contact with one another, the workers soon developed class consciousness and solidarity and, therefore, began to organise some form of systematic resistance to some of the excesses of the rule of colonial capital. But as we noted in chapter three, the

colonial government kept on suppressing and sabotaging this workers solidarity by refusing to permit the formation of trade unions, at least, until after 1940s.

Nevertheless, of all the oppressed classes of the Plateau province, the workers were the only group which could be called a class proper - one with a class consciousness directed against the capitalists. As we pointed out in chapter three, it is useful to remember that most of these workers, particularly in the tin mines, consisted of Hausawa and other immigrant elements. This situation was exploited and manipulated by the petty bourgeois politicians of the province to stifle workers solidarity and, with it, their revolutionary capacity, which made it difficult for them to undertake their historic mission.

Below this working class was a conglomeration of semi-employed and unemployed workers who floated in Jos township and Bukuru. These categories and their historical role in the Plateau province under colonial rule has yet to be studied.[73] However, they were those oppressed groups who engaged in several activities which yielded money although not on a regular basis. They

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73. Most of these were youngstars who could not be regarded as adult unskilled in the tinmines. Furthermore, they consisted mostly of yan almajirai who had flocked into Jos like the adult moslems. Many of them formed the cadres of porters known as yan dako, yan amalanke and yan kura. Freund, B. op.cit. pp. 50 - 51.

consisted, mainly, of porters (yan dako), truck pushers (yan amalanke) 'houseboys', hawkers (yan talle), and artisans of different varieties. No statistics exists about their size outside the occasionally and vague references to unemployment as a source of crime which one comes across in the colonial records. Even more difficult to compute is the size of theunemployed many of who had no fixed addresses. To this group belonged the 'pick-pockets; pimps, prostitutes and idlers who roamed the streets of Jos and Bukuru townships and who, almost entirely, lived on crime.[74] These groups collectively formed the urban destitutes or, better still, 'lumpen proletariats.

Their collective size aside, the role of the semi-employed and the unemployed in the political economy of the Plateau province under colonial rule is not easy to interprete. For although they were clearly an oppressed class, they hardly seemed to have developed class consciousness and solidarity against the ruling classes who deprived them of gainful employment and, therefore, responsible for their socio-economic hardships. The porters (yan dako), in particular, did develop some

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74. Many of them formed the yan tsano (pick-pockets) of the Birni (city) Ali Sura; Ali Dingtok. 11th Dec. 1979.

vague solidarity centred on attempts to harmonise their grievances with the government and police over the payment of truck licences, and the constant harassment from the traffic police on their use of roads.[75] But even then, the yan dako never seemed to have penetrated the underlying connections between their grievances on the one hand, and the whole machinery of the colonial economy and state with its ruling classes on the other which would have enabled them to engage in a class struggle against the latter. On the contrary, they were more of a nuisance to their fellow oppressed classes[76] than to the ruling classes who successfully avoided them by living in far away Government Reservation Areas which were well guarded by the state security forces. Consequently, the petty bourgeois politicians - the objective enemies of the yan dako and the other semi-employed and unemployed classes - found it easy to mobilise and recruit the latter as political thugs against their political opponents.

It is contended here that the inability of the semi-employed and the unemployed to form a solidarity

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75. Ali Dingtok - a former tanker driver who has a long stay and livelihood in the transport business of Jos. I interviewed him on several occasions but, especially, between 10th - 13th Dec. 1979.

76. It was these groups who regarded themselves as towns people (yan birni) and often stole, cheat and defraud many a rural visitor (ba kauye) to Jos of their money, clothes or wares.

front with workers and to struggle in conjunction with them stemmed from their dire need to secure jobs from the very ruling classes whom they should have confronted. Furthermore, the fact that the semi-employed and the unemployed were constantly in competition with one another for jobs meant that they could not easily come together collectively as a deprived and aggrieved group. For the dire need for securing jobs as individuals entailed cooperation rather than confrontation with the ruling classes who purportedly owned the jobs. In other words, the primary concern of most of the unemployed, individually, was how to outmanoevre each other before the so-called job owners rather than cooperate in a struggle to challenge the nature and structure of job ownership itself as articulated by colonial capitalism in the Plateau province. One other point which tended to work against the class solidarity of the semi-employed and unemployed was the fact that these very conditions were temporary phenomena in the lives of most individuals because, over long periods of time, many of them got the jobs. In other words, although unemployment figures were certainly on the increase, especially in the 1940s and the 1950s, the actual individuals involved were not the same.

Finally, it is important to emphasise the fact that the semi-employed and the unemployed people were the most desperate of all the oppressed classes of the

Plateau province under colonial rule. For theirs was not just a matter of increased wages and improved conditions of service but a struggle for survival. This struggle against extreme desperation naturally melted into individual rather than group efforts since it bordered on the preservation of life itself as foremost. For while it is true and desirable that the oppressed classes should unite and fight their oppressors, it is equally important that they remain alive and fit to do so. "Men must be in a position to live in order to make history."[77] Such was the magnitude of the plight of this socio-economic group in Jos township and the other semi-urban centres of the Plateau province in the colonial period. Not unexpectedly, most of them constantly voted for the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) during the elections between 1951 and 1960.

With the discussion on the semi-employed and the unemployed, all the major classes in the Plateau colonial province have been identified. It only remains to emphasise that these classes were historically created and reproduced by colonial rule itself and continually

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77. Marx, K. and Engels, F. Selected Works. Vol.1 Moscow, 1977 p. 27.

expanded or contracted as dictated by the development of colonial capitalism itself. But more importantly, class consciousness began to grow among them as colonial capitalism itself developed which led to the formation of trade unions from the 1940s onwards. These and other developments are taken up in the next two chapters which discuss decolonisation and petty bourgeois politics in an attempt to show how the African elites, identified in this chapter, transformed themselves into a dependent ruling class. For this ruling class forms the focal point of this thesis.

CHAPTER FIVE

CLASSES AND POLITICS ON THE PLATEAU: THE MAJOR FACTORS WHICH CONDITIONED POLITICS, 1947 - 1959.

INTRODUCTION.

We now come to an examination of the political relations of the classes which the colonial economy and society of the Plateau province created. At the same time, we would examine the further development of these classes in the processes of their political struggles and activities because, as we pointed out in the last chapter, class formation on the Plateau was an on-going process which continued even after colonial rule. In other words, this chapter and the next necessarily deal with the emergence and development of petty-bourgeois politics in the Plateau province before independence. For at independence, in 1960, a dependent ruling class, whose power and size continually increased, had emerged on the Plateau. The growth and expansion of this class was accelerated after independence especially during the military regime which lasted from 1966 to 1979 but which, however, falls outside the period covered by this thesis.

In order to discuss the rise and consolidation of petty bourgeois politics in the Plateau province, however,

it is necessary to examine it from the context of the decolonisation process in the whole of Nigeria. Such a study inevitably begins with the end of the First World War. For although this war did not determine the decolonisation process, it nevertheless marked the commencement of the devolution of certain legislative powers from the British government to its colonial territories. In Nigeria, this was marked by the establishment, in 1922, of the first Legislative Council under Governor Clifford.[1] At the end of the Second World War, in 1945, when the demand for political independence sharpened and heightened, these legislative powers and bodies were modified, consolidated and entrenched as part of the transition programme from a colonial state to a neo-colonial one.[2] At the same time, the ascendancy of certain classes and conflicts among them; conflicts which involved the workers, peasants, and the rest of the dispossessed groups; were also entrenched and brought forth as the fundamental conflict of the Nigerian state and society. Hence the decolonisation process marked

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1. Crowder, M. The Story of Nigeria, Faber and Faber, London 1962 p. 225.

2. Coleman, J.S. NIGERIA: Background to Nationalism. Los Angeles, 1965 pp. 369 - 405 ("Final Phase and Self-Government"); Nwabueze, B.O. A Constitutional History of Nigeria. London, 1982 pp. 29 - 59.

the rise of the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie to positions of political power and set the stage for petty bourgeois politics.

This decolonisation process in Nigeria took off, in earnest, with the Richards' Constitution. This constitution confirmed, among others, three regions for Nigeria, namely, Northern, Eastern and Western Regions; it also established regional assemblies.[3] Regional Councils were also established which, in the North, consisted of a House of Chiefs and a House of Assembly while the East and West had only a house of assembly each. The regional councils and the Legislative Council were made up of "elected" and appointed members with the latter always in the majority. The members of the Northern House of Chiefs were the Chief Commissioner as President, all first-class Chiefs and twelve second-class chiefs in the region. The Northern House of Assembly consisted of 19 officials (with the Senior Resident of the region as President); 15 unofficial provincial members selected from among Native Authority members by a provincial meeting of representatives of all the native authorities in the province.[4]

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3. Richards, A.F. Political and Constitutional Future of Nigeria. Lagos, 1944 pp. 5 - 8.

4. Ibid; Nwabueze, B.O. op.cit. pp. 42 - 45.

The regional councils had, of course, no independent legislative power, but any bill coming before the legislative council was required, before its introduction, to be laid before the houses of the regions affected by its provisions and such houses were to consider it and advise the governor thereon by resolution. However, where the appropriate regional houses had failed to deliberate and to advise upon a bill laid before them, or had delayed in doing so, the bill might nevertheless be introduced in the Legislative Council and might be validly passed into law.[5] The declared objective of the Richards Constitution was "to promote the unity of Nigeria; to provide adequately within that unity for the diverse elements which make up the country; and to secure greater participation by Africans in the discussion of their own affairs."[6] From the point of view of our discussion here, the significance of the Richards' Constitution, its merits and demerits aside, lay in the self-evident possibility of self-government for Nigeria which prompted and accompanied its proposals and implementation. For the historical developments, both locally and internationally, which led to the promulgation

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5. Ibid.

6. Richards, A.F. op.cit. p. 2.

of the Richards' Constitution convinced the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie and the traditional chiefs that self-government was only a matter of time. And since they collectively formed the local ruling classes who had emerged, these petty bourgeoisie and the traditional chiefs began a series of struggles and activities amongst themselves which were aimed at consolidating their own individual and group positions to eventually capture political power from their British overlords. Consequently, the years between 1945 and 1951 witnessed the formation of various political and semi-political organisations and groups which competed with one another for political power.[7] Infact, it was the coalition, fission and fussion of these various interest groups under the supervision of colonial referees which has been described as the nationalist movement.[8]

This chapter, therefore, proceeds from a discussion of the major classes in the Plateau province to a critical examination of the factors and forces which conditioned and shaped the politics of decolonisation in this province.

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7. Ibid. pp. 271 - 400.

8. Ibid. pp. 63 - 166. For a similar development in the case of Uganda, see; Mamdani, M. Politics and Class Formation in Uganda New York, 1976 pp. 147 - 188.

Firstly, we shall attempt to show and to explain the behaviour and activities of the classes of people who dominated the Politics of decolonisation in the Plateau province, a phenomenon which is crucial to an understanding of the nature and structure of political struggles and conflicts in the province as the drive towards independence intensified.

Secondly, we shall attempt to identify and to examine the roles of subjective forces, groups and institutions, particularly, ethnicity and religion, as forces which were made to undermine interclass politics on the Plateau and thereby paved the way for the dominance of petty bourgeois politics in the province.

And thirdly, an attempt shall be made to examine and assess the role of the regional government of Northern Nigeria on the politics of the Plateau province. For it must be emphasised that the status of the Plateau province as only one out of twelve provinces in the Northern Region, which had a single government and bureaucracy, affected political and economic developments in the province. Thus, inspite of the internal historical developments within the Plateau province, the wider regional as well as the national environment within which the province operated, must be taken into account in a scientific reconstruction of the political developments of this period such as it is sought here. All these factors combined together to give petty

bourgeois politics on the Plateau its distinctive form and characteristics. Therefore, and examination of each of the se factors becomes imperative.

I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASSES.

As we pointed out in several instances while discussing the creation and development of the major socio-economic classes on the Plateau, the struggles of the oppressed classes against their oppressors was subordinated to the intra-class competitions and conflicts of the emergent ruling classes - the very classes who oppressed and through whom metropolitan capital, exploited the former. This was a necessary outcome of the imposition of the capitalist mode of production as well as the primitive accumulation of capital among its local agents in the various institutions and sectors of the colonial state and society as shown in the previous chapters. But it was also made possible by an intensive and extensive use of the coercive arm of the colonial state which brutally put down all attempts, organised and spontaneous, by the oppressed classes of the province, to resist the establishment of colonial capitalism in the province.[9] This resistance of the

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9. Ames, C.G. Gazetteer of the Plateau Province 1932, Jos p. 44.

in chapter three, the trade unions on the tin fields were not very effective in fighting colonial capitalism because their ranks had been successfully penetrated by the petty bourgeois politicians who won supporters from amongst the mineslabourers and thereby undermined any possibility to combine together to fight these politicians collectively, no matter to which party they belonged.

But the subordination of a fundamental class struggle between the workers, peasants and other dispossessed groups on the one hand; and the petty bourgeois bureaucrats, contractors, merchants, traditional rulers and fractions of the indigenous intelligentsia on the other, should not be construed to mean an absence of class struggles and class politics in the Plateau province. For since the capitalist mode of production had gained dominance over the precapitalist modes which hitherto existed, the politics characteristic to the capitalist mode, namely, bourgeois politics, necessarily gained dominance also.[13] And since the Plateau province was a colonial province devoid of bourgeois classes proper, bourgeois politics typical of that which operated in the metropole also went down a step below into petty bourgeois politics. Therefore, the rise to dominance

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13. Marx, K. and Engels, F. Selected Works Vol.1 Moscow, 1977 p. 110.

of petty bourgeois politics on the Plateau merely implied that the tempo of the inter-class conflicts between the oppressed classes and their oppressors on the Plateau slowed down. It did not however disappear completely because the objective conditions which created these classes, in the first place, were still in existence and were even expanding throughout the colonial period. Therefore, this fundamental conflict could only be temporarily suppressed and slowed down rather than being completely eliminated. For, indeed, inter-class conflicts occassionally surfaced throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods but their precise nature and forms are yet to be properly documented and studied.[14]

Nevertheless, with the rise and dominance of petty bourgeois politics on the Plateau, the intra-class competition for political power heightened leading to the employment and manipulation of religions and ethnic differences as sources of mobilising and wining political support. Thus, irrespective of which sector of the economy they came from; whether they were based in the rural areas

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14. These were represented by the series of 'revolts' or 'rebellions' of the numerous communities over taxation but they took other forms also. These have not been systematically documented and studied. These were in addition to the formation of trade unions and their strikes, from the 1940s, in the tin mines and Jos township which certainly represented some form of inter-class struggles notwithstanding their ideological and operational limitations.

or in the urban centres, all the petty bourgeois politicians on the Plateau made extensive and intensive use of ethnicity and religion to mobilise political support.

Petty bourgeois politics on the Plateau began to be overtly noticeable during the early 1930s, a period which Perham regarded as the commencement of African politics on the Plateau.[15] For the annual report for 1933 ostensibly remarked that:

> a sudden interest in municipal affairs and desire for more active participation in local government manifested themselves amongst the intelligentsia of the cosmopolitan African community in Jos Township.[16]

As we pointed out in chapter three, this development led to the formation of an unofficial Advisory Council through which public opinion reached government. Some of its members were selected by government to attend Court sessions and to help the judges in cases which involved non Moslem Southerners while otner helped government officials with tax assessments.[17]

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15. Perham, M. Native Administration in Nigeria London, 1962 (1st. edtn 1937) p. 151.

16. JOSPROF 1, 47/1935 "Annual Report on the Plateau Province for 1934". N.A.K.

17. Ibid.

But the formation of this Advisory Council itself was a manifestation of growing political and administrative problem in the township. For the original Hausa Area, the core of the Jos Native Town, was a separate entity from the Township in which Europeans and Asians lived in special areas reserved for them. Outside the reserved area of the township, there lived other Northern groups together with the non-Northern Africans who came, largely, from southern Nigeria.[18] The Jos Native Town was a subordinate unit of the Jos Divisional Native Authority and it controlled plot allocations and the native courts whose spread and jurisdiction covered the non-Hausa and non-Moslm sections of the Jos township.[19] It was the subjection of these largely southern elements of the township population to Alkali courts along with other discriminatory policies of the Divisional and provincial authorities against them which gave rise to the formation of the Advisory Council. It also helped to mould the structure of political conflict in the township and the Division which had also become apparent in the same period. For as Perham observed:

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18. Ames, C.G. Gazetteers of the Plateau Province Jos, 1932 pp. 320 - 321.

19. Ibid. p. 49.

> Four classes, as sharply divided as people can well be, are found there - firstly, European traders, miners, and bankers; secondly, southern Christians or at least Europeanised natives who work for the Europeans as clerks, chauffeurs, and so on; thirdly, the Hausa-Fulani Moslem community centred around their mosque and their Alkali; and fourthly, the local pagans who come and go with their foodstuffs and firewood. The Europeans in the township proper present the least difficulty. In the native town the pagans hardly count as yet. The other two classes, by no means easy neighbours, have established an interesting partnership. The southern educated group suddenly began to take an interest in municipal affairs. in 1934 its members were asked to assist in the assessment of town revenue. They also sit as honorary members of the court of the Alkali when he deals with cases in which Southerners are parties.[20]

Thus, as we shall show shortly, the politics of Jos township centred on the political status of the Native Town and the fiscal and judicial powers given it over the other areas of the township throughout the colonial period. This problem was compounded in the 1940s as more and more dispossessed Birom peasantry began to flock into the township and began to claim land rights in it. Three major groups had, therefore, emerged and competed for political power in Jos township; these were, the Hausa-Fulani settlers of the native town, the largely southern and non moslem elements of the township population, and the Birom and Anaguta

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20. Perham, M. Native Administration in Nigeria London, 1965 (1st edtn 1937) p. 151.

indigenes of the township. The sociological character of these groups in terms of religion, occupation and settlement patterns which largely coincided with ethnic differences prepared the ground for the justification of ethnic politics in the township and, indeed, in the whole of Jos Division.[21] The competition among the elites of all the three groups for plots, government appointments and 'commercial connections' was thus turned into a competition among their commoners - the oppressed classes of each of these groups. A closer examination of the ethnic factor as a major force in the politics of the Plateau province is therefore imperative.

II. ETHNICITY.

As we pointed out earlier, the period between 1945 and 1951 in Nigeria witnessed the formation of political and semi-political organisations and groups which aimed at taking control of political power or, in some limited scope, aimed at influencing the direction of the political process. In the Plateau area, the most important of these organisations included the Birom

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21. Plotnicov, L. Strangers to the City: Urban Man in Jos, Nigeria. Pittsburgh, 1967 p. 46.

Progressive Union (1945); Yergam Union (1948?); Nzit Tribal Union; Pan Jarawa League; Non Moslem League (1949); Middle Zone League (1950); Pan Sayawa League; Hausa Tribal Party (1956); Nigeria African Minesworkers Union (1942); Northern Minesworkers Union (1955); Middle Belt Minesworkers Union (1957); Motor Drivers Union (1956?); NESCO workers Union (1942?); United Middle Belt Congress (1955) and certainly several others.[22] Many other informal groups 'came together' with the aim of achieving some 'internal' solidarity without which, they believed, their progress and, possibly, those of their members would be impaired. All these organisations affiliated with some of the major political parties in Nigeria during elections.

It is instructive to note at the outset, however, that contrary to Dudley and Sklar, politics in Northern Nigeria was not fundamentally ethnic in both theory and practice.[23] For were this to be the case, the Plateau province would have registered over two hundred political parties to reflect the number of ethnic groups in this

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22. Some of these are listed by Dudley, B.J. Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria. London, 1968 p. 183.

23. Ibid. pp. 234 - 262; Sklar, R.S. Nigerian Political Parties. New Jersey, 1963 pp. 460 - 512. In addition, the latter stresses 'communal interests'.

province. Indeed, even the most important and overtly ethnic-based unions such as the Birom Progressive Union and the Yergam Union founded their respective unions as a last resort to redressing concrete socio-economic problems peculiar to them. For as the preceding chapters of this thesis have shown, the Birom were not merely conquered and ruled like the other communities but their land - their most basic source of livelihood - was alienated from them for mining operations without any compensations which forced them to work in the tin mines as unskilled labourers with very poor wages. So the Birom Progressive Union was formed ostensibly to fight for land compensation from the mining companies. Similarly, Yergam political consciousness developed mainly in response to the politics of the Shendam Resettlement Scheme which we discussed in the last chapter, namely, the resettlement of Yergam peasants in Shendamland under the political authority of the Long Goemai against whom the former protested.

At any rate, the development of ethnic consciousness amongst many non centralised communities, those of the Plateau being typical, in Northern Nigeria stemmed from colonial rule. For as we pointed out in chapters two and three, the regrouping of these communities into 'tribal' chiefdoms by the colonial administration; the imposition of alien district heads on some communities; the settlement pattern in Jos township; and the categorisation of labour in the tinmines into skilled and

unskilled groups along ethnic lines all evoked sentiments along ethnic lines. Therefore, the elevation of ethnicity to primacy in perceiving, measuring, and analysing political behaviour amongst these communities as Dudley and Sklar have done, is not based on a sound Marxist methodology but one rooted in bourgeois obscurantist empericism and ideology.

With regard to the Plateau province, the group which seemed to have set petty bourgeois politics in top gear between 1945 and 1960 was the Birom Progressive Union. It was also the earliest of such groups in the province. This development came about mainly as a result of the loss of their fertile lands to mining companies without any compensations which reduced them to unskilled labourers in the tin mines. A subsidiary problem to the above was the political status and ownership of Jos township and, therefore, the control of its affairs. For although the city of Jos, the capital of the Plateau province, was located in Biromland, the Birom had no influence over it having lost it to the immigrant Hausawa settlers via colonial administration. Indeed, until 1947, the chief of Jos was always a Hausawa or (Ba Haushe).[24] The Housawa group was the largest

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24. C.252/25 CONFIDENTIAL "C.K. Gufford to the Secretary, Northern Provinces", Provincial Office, Jos, 1st. October, 1947. D.O. File C. 85.

of the four immigrant settlements which colonial officials designated as Hausa Village Areas pending "when the Pagan District Heads were able to take over the administration of everyone and everything in their districts."[25]

Formed in 1945, the Birom Progressive Union was the organisational instrument with which the Birom intelligentsia sought redress to these two basic problems - land compensation and the control of the affairs of Jos township.[26] After independence, in 1964, the goals and objectives of the Birom Progressive Union were broadened to include the educational and cultural advancement of the Birom populace.[27] None of the original founders of the union, namely, Patrick Fom, Lawrence Fom and Frank Adu was a traditional ruler although it had the blessings of all the Birom chiefs. Except the last, all the rest

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25. Ames, C.G. Gazetteers of the Plateau Province Jos 1932 p. 119.

26. The original founders of the Birom Progressive Union were:
    1. Patrick Fom (President) - Forest Assistant - RCM
    2. Patrick Dokotri (Secretary) - Forest Asst. - RCM
    3. Stephen Ajani - School Teacher - RCM
    4. John Fom - driver - RCM driver
    5. Lawrence Fom - Agric. Overseer - RCM
    6. Frank Adu - Nurse. Anglican.

    The obvious Catholic bias of this group gave rise to initial problems. For example, Birom elites in the services of the SUM were suspect of this group. Bong Gwom, Dr. Fom Dot; interviewed 3/12/1982, Jos Palace.

27. The name changed from BPU to Birom Educational Progressive and Cultural Organisation (BEPCO) Patrick Dokotri Interviewed 3/12/1982.

were Catholic Christians engaged in various occupations under the Missions and government.

In 1945, the union demanded for compensation of the land which had been siezed from them and for the abolition of the office of a Hausa Sarkin Jos and his replacement with a Birom chief. Two years later, amidst opposition from the Hausawa elites in the town, government conceded their demand for the abolition of a Hausa Sarkin Jos who was, accordingly, replaced by a Birom - Mallam Kwang Pam.[28] The question of land compensation, however, remained largely intractable but government made some concession and began to force the mining companies to pay some compensations.[29] For as we noted in chapter four, it was during this period that the British embarked on an unprecedented scale of tin production to meet their war andpost-war demands for tin which had been cut short by the capture of British Malaya, the main tin producing colony, by the Japanese in 1941. Even with the return of Malaya to the British after Japanese surrender in 1945, tin supply from Malaya was not assured since the British were engaged in war against the Malay Liberation Movement. This massive scale of

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28. C. 252/25 CONFIDENTIAL "C.K. Gufford to the Secretary, Northern Provinces" Provincial Office, Jos 1st Oct. 1947; D.O. File C. 85.

29. JOSPROF III, "Mining Policy Compensation - Memo by D. de M. Robin, 1945" NAK; Josprof III, 8379: "Annual Report, Plateau Province 1953" NAK.

tin production on the Jos Plateau therefore led to the introduction of forced labour (diban gwamna). It also led to the acquisition of more and more Birom land for such a purpose, a process which provoked more militant demands for land compensation by the Birom. Therefore, in order to avert a major showdown with the Birom, the companies began to pay some land compensation. But, as a long term solution to the Birom question, the colonial state muted the idea of resettling the Birom who occupied the principal tin districts in the infamous Jemaa Resettlement Scheme to which reference has been made.[30] According to Patrick Dokotri, a widely acknowledged Birom leader and a nationalist fighter, the attempted evacuation of the Birom provided him with the finaljustification to abandon his original desire to become a Catholic priest and to plunge, instead, into active politics. He became a founding member and the first secretary of the Birom Progressive Union.[31]

Meanwhile, in meeting the demands of theBirom on the chieftaincy of Jos township, the colonial government evoked Hausawa sentiment and resentment. For they maintained that Jos township was originally settled and founded by Hausawa immigrants from who they descended.

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30. JOSPROF D. 41/S.1 "Jema'a Area Resettlement Scheme 1949" NAK.

31. Patrick Dokotri. Interviewed, 3/12/1984.

Moreover, they argued that since thepopulation of the town was overwhelmingly Hausawa, they alone had prior claim to its chieftaincy over any other group, even the Birom themselves. They therefore opposed the extention of the jurisdiction of the newly created Sarkin Birom over Jos townshiip.[32] In putting forward this claim, however, the Hausawa forgot that the creation of the four administrative Hausawa Village Areas, in 1915, was only an interim measure which would cease as soon as the "Pagan District Heads" were able to take over the complete administration of these Village Areas.[33] In conceding Birom demands over the chieftaincy of Jos township, therefore, the colonial government was merely implementing its earlier policy, namely to return these Hausa Areas to their indigenous rulers whenever the latter had demonstrated sufficient administrative abilities to do so. Infact, as a first step in this direction, Birom chiefs had been allowed, from 1930, to supervise the collection of cattle-tax which was hitherto not within their jurisdiction.[34]

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32. C.252/25 CONFIDENTIAL "C.K. Gufford to the Secretary, Northern Provinces, 1947".

33. Ames, C.G. Gazetteers of the Plateau Province. Jos, 1932 p. 119.

34. Ibid. p. 119.

But in view of the strong opposition from the Hausawa together with the size of their population, the colonial government could not go the whole hog to meet the demands of the Birom. Indeed, so strong was the position of the Hausawa that government could not do so without risking a rebellion from them. Under these circumstances, Mallam Rwang Pam, the newly installed Sarkin Birom who was ipso facto Sarkin Jos, was not allowed to have jurisdiction over the Hausawa of the native town where the status of the Hausa chief had been reduced to that of a *magajin gari* (town chief).[35] The Hausawa struggled, in vain, for the withdrawal of the title of *magajin gari* and its replacement with a Sarkin gari.

Between 1951 and 1953, during which the Birom Hausawa conflict over the rulership of Jos township reached its peak, an exclusively Hausa political organisation was muted so as to effectively counteract the activities of the Birom Progressive Union. This organisation was transformed into a political party known as the Hausa Tribal Party, in 1956.[36] It is important to remark that this party, mainly made up of

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35. Niven, C.R. "Annual Report, Plateau Province 1951".

36. "Petition to Dissolve the Jos Town Council from NPC" Jos Town Council Affairs, 18th May 1956.

NEPU followers, did not enjoy the backing of some of the NPC leaders in Jos and the NPC - controlled regional government which was, at this time, wooing Birom support through their newly installed Sarkin Birom.[37] Thus, by 1956, instead of replacing the magajin gari by a sarkin gari as the Hausawa demanded, even the title of magajin gari was replaced by a mere wakilin gari (town representative)[38] which finally robbed the office of any feudal privileges that were left to it. The abolition of the magajin gari was certainly a trend in favour of the Birom.

The struggle between the Birom and the Hausawa, we must emphasise, was not just over titles and labels but it was significantly over the control of the Native Authority Council and its affairs. For the Jos Division formed a single Native Authority Council which was made up of four subordinate native authorities or councils which comprised a majority of elected members.[39] This council was subdivided into committees which took direct charge of the major portfolios of the whole Native

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37. Ibid. See also; Dalla, G.H. "The Evolution of Chieftaincy in Jos" B.Sc. Dissertation of the Political Science Department, A.B.U. Zaria, June 1970.

38. Jos Town Council Affairs. MLG 4376 Vol. 1. 1953.

39. Jos Divisional Administration - report by K.P. Maddocks (D.O. Jos) 15th February 1945. Jos Town Council Affairs. MLG 4376 Vol. 1.

Authority. These portfolios included finance, establishments, works, education, lands, general purpose, and forestry. Each committee had a chairman who was accountable to the Council. The President of the Native Authority Council was the Sarkin Birom who, from 1954, was also Sarkin Jos. The President of the Council together with the secretary and the Chairmen of the various committees collectively formed an executive committee which directed the affairs and the development of the Jos Division. They reported to the full house of the Native Council which was presided over by the President of the Council and which met at regular intervals. As can be seen, the activities of the Native Council were wide and covered all facets of life within the Division.

Thus, as expected, the Hausa-Birom conflict was essentially a quarrel over who should control the economy and affairs of the Native Authority particularly, that of the township.[40] This came out very clearly during the campaigns and contests for the chairmanship of such lucrative committees as finance, establishments, general purpose, and lands which were often very hostile and bitter. For example, in 1956, Mr. Aitrus Pam, the son of Sarkin Jos was elected the chairman of the Establishments Committee. On the advice of Birom

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40. Jos Town Council Affairs File 123; SMG/LG/8/S1.

elites in the Council, he initiated a move to terminate the appointments of some Hausawa in the employment of the Native Authority Council, a move which the Hausawa representatives in the council challenged and called for full explanations of those whom he had dismissed.[41] Similarly, a bitter hostility errupted between the Birom and Hausawa in 1961 over a dispute involving the same Bitrus Pam, now chairman of the Lands Committee, and Alhaji Ali Kazaure (NPC Divisional President), the chairman of Plot Allocation Advisory Committee (PAAC). Trouble began when Bitrus Pam tried to transfer the functions of the Plots Allocation Advisory Committee to his own Committee in an attempt to divert the spoils of that office from Ali Kazaure and his members to himself and, possibly, his own supporters.[42] As expected, Alhaji Ali Kazaure resisted it and Bitrus dropped the idea. There were many such moves and countermoves on both sides, particularly, with regards to the presidency of the Jos Town Council, a subordinate unit of the Native Authority Council which administered the affairs of Jos township.[43]

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41. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 237.

42. Ibid. p. 237.

43. Inquiry into Jos NA: Sole Commission Report by M. Liman A. Ciroma - Jos N.A. Council, 1961. PM 166/S3.

It is necessary to emphasise here that contrary to what appeared as a war between the Birom and the Hausawa on the Jos Town Council and the Native Authority Council in general, it was in reality competition between the elites of both blocks who together formed members of these councils. For the mass of the Birom and Hausawa populations were peasants and labourers; the former were peasant farmers while the latter mainly worked in the tinmines. It is arguable whether they were seriously bothered about the endemic crises of the Jos Town Council or even the whole Native Authority of the Jos Division. Indeed, the Birom cared less about who ruled Jos as long as their farmlands were not tampered with either for mining or for residential purposes. This was the more so because most Birom and Anaguta peasant families had no taste for township life which, they believed, spoilt their children. So long as the Hausawa were not posing a threat to their farmlands, as was the case in 1945 when the Birom of Vwang District complained about the Hausawa farming their lands without paying rents, the Birom did not appear to be bothered about the stay and status of the Hausawa in Jos.[44] Most

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44. Jos Division, Annual Report 1938; with regards to Vwang (Vom) See "Haifam District Notes - Effect of Mining" D.O. File 709. MLG, Jos.

of the Birom, even up to the present, live in the surrounding villages outside Jos township.

Similarly, the Hausawa labourers cared more about the reduction of their wages in the tinmines which was common throughout the colonial period, compulsion to pay poll tax whether they were employed or not and attending to their daily chores as bicycle repairers and rentiers, hawkers of various items, porter etc. than who ruled Jos.

But the Housawa and the Birom elites brought the ordinary Birom and Hausawa alike into the conflict by mobilising them to take sides with them even though both the Birom peasantry and the Hausawa labourers, who formed over 90% of the population of the Division, were objectively an oppressed group and, therefore, opposed to the inte~~of~~ the elite of whatever ethnic origin. For it is a fact that the corruption and mismanagement of public funds and utilities which characterised the operations of the various committees of the Native Council was not carried out along purely ethnic lines. Nor was politics on the Council carried out purely on ethnic lines. For example, throughout his tenure of office as President of the Native Authority Council and the Sarkin Jos, Wallam Rwang Pam faced opposition not only from the Hausawa elites, but also from some Birom elites

led by Patrick Dokotri.[45] Similarly, the records show consistent co-operation between Kwang Pam and his supporters with some of the NPC leaders of Jos as opposed to NEPU leaders.[46] Many councillors, both Birom and Hausawa, used their positions merely to enrich themselves personally as testified to by the fleet of houses and plots which Alhaji Ali Kazaure, as Chairman of Plots Advisory Allocation Committee and as chairman of the Jos Town Council between 1961 and 1966 'cornered' and built.[47] Even the Sarkin Jos was not free from corrupt practices and capital accumulation. For apart from building rental houses, he tried to entrench his rule by an attempt to constitute his own family into a ruling dynasty over the Birom and Jos township inspite of the fact that, even in his own village at Du, he was a commoner.[48] For in 1959, he introduced the office of Ciroma (heir apparent) on the Birom chieftaincy and in 1961 appointed his son Bitrus Pam to occupy the post.

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45. "Press Release" by Senior Resident, Plateau Province 31st August, 1959. D.O. File S.13, MLG - Jos.

46. Ibid.

47. "Minutes to Permsec MLG, through DPS" Jos Town Council Affairs, SMG/LG/8/S.1.

48. C.252/25 CONFIDENTIAL "C.K. Gufford to the SNP" Provincial Office Jos, 1947. D.O. C. 85.

This move aroused Birom and Hausawa anger alike and led to the burning of Kwong Pam's palace. A commission of inquiry was set up to investigate the conduct of Kwong Pam but the idea was shelved.[49]

Although we cannot fully document the corruption of both Birom and Hausawa elites, it nevertheless existed and constituted the kernel of political competition in Jos Division. To be sure, the elites on both sides appealed to ethnic sentiments and won the sympathy and following of their respective groups to buttress and enhance their personal positions and fortunes. In this regard, the Birom peasantry supported their elite while the Hausawa labourers and petty traders supported members of their own elites.

But the political domination of Jos township politics by the elites of these two groups did not preclude the active participation of the elites of other groups, particularly, those of the Igbo and the Yoruba who formed a majority of the population of the township as distinct from the native town. They also had representatives in the Jos Town Council and contested elections.[50]

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49. Indiscretions of Chief of Jos - D.O. File S.13; Plateau Affairs Jos Chieftaincy PM 166/S 2.

50. Jos N.A. Reorganisation D.O. File S. 13.

Some of them held posts as Ward Heads and they also formed ethnic organisations. Although they constantly voted for the political parties of their respective Regions, they frequently sided with the Birom elite against the Hausawa with whose elites they competed for plots, market stalls and business generally.[51] For example, in 1959 when the popularity of Rwang Pam was eroded following his attempts to make his son the Ciroma, the Ibo Union, Bukuru Branch sent in a letter of "vote of confidence" in the Chief of Jos "in view of the fact that our complaints, demands and problems were on many occasions met without grudges or insinuations cast..."[52] This cordial relationship between the Birom elites and the elites of the Southern provinces displeased the Hausawa elites who on several occasions nicknamed Jos township as Garin Iniyamurai (the town of the Igbos). Indeed, even the regional government was jittery over the growing population and economic power of the southerners in Jos. Consequently from 1954 to 1960 the regional government, discriminated against the siting of schools, industries, construction of roads etc. in the Plateau province on the grounds that doing so would provide those southerners with infrastructures and more opportunities

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51. Inquiry into Jos N.A. Sole Commission Report by M. Liman A. Ciroma - Jos N.A. Council, 1961 PM 166/S.3.

52. Ibo Union, Bukuru Branch: Vote of Confidence - the Chief of Jos 25th July 1959.

to bolster their economic and political development and power.[53]

The point which emerges from the above discussion is that intra-class competition and conflict among the ruling classes over the control of Jos township and Division was manipulated in a manner which divided the huge mass of the oppressed classes into taking sides in the struggle among these competing elites whose collective interest was diametrically opposed to theirs. This development was not peculiar to Jos township. For as Nnoli has correctly observed, the formation of communal unions and their manipulation for achieving political ends by the petty bourgeoisie was typical of most urban centres throughout Nigeria during the period of the nationalist movement.[54]

But political developments in Jos between 1951-1960 had far reaching effects on therest of the Plateau province in several respects. Firstly, Jos, the provincial capital, was also the commercial centre of the province. Furthermore, it was the centre of tin mining, the main source of wealth of this colonial province. All these served to expose Jos Division, in particular,

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53. Plotnikov, L. op.cit. p. 38.

54. Nnoli, O. Ethnic Politics in Nigeria Enugu 1977 p. 140.

rulers, members of who were graded as first, second, third and fourth classes depending on the size and 'history' of the stool.[56] As expected, these qualifications for the membership of the House of Chiefs implied that many of the Plateau Communities who had no big chiefs on the scale of the emirs did not qualify for membership thereby limiting their representation in that House which was, in practice, more powerful than the House of Assembly.[57] In order to qualify for membership of the House of Chiefs, therefore, these Plateau communities devised ways of producing chiefs of similar status and grandeur to that of the emirs of the far North. Consequently, one ethnic group after another began to organise ethnic solidarity as the basis on which to create paramount chiefs.[58] In this regard, the success of the Birom Progressive Union to create a paramount chief of Birom in 1947 who had a seat in the Northern House of Chiefs provided a major impetus for the other

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56. Whitaker, C.S. op.cit. p. 296.

57. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 211.

58. Field interviews at Kabwir-David Dimka 30/5/1979; at Gazum [Langtang] - Ayuba Kumm 30/5/1979; at Jos - John A. Kwashi 17/11/1979 Pastor Let, Dokotri and others. But see in particular, an annual report which rounds these up. Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province, Annual Report, 1956" NAK pp. 129 - 131.

to the hazards of capitalist exploitation on a degree higher than in any of the remaining divisions of the province. It is therefore not surprising that the first political organisations occured here. Secondly, organised occupational groups and trade unions were concentrated in this Division. For since this Division took the lead in commerce, industry and administration over the others in the province, political awareness developed here first also. In this regard, the conflict between the Sirom elite and their Hausawa counterparts which we have discussed above stimulated similar developments in the other Divisions even though there were no visible signs of Hausa domination in these areas. Nevertheless, the fear of Hausa-Fulani existed at the regional government level.

By 1957 when the Macpherson Constitution, which succeeded the Richard's Constitution, had come into operation, the Northern Region had provision for two houses of legislature - a House of Chiefs and a House of Assembly.[55] Elections to the House of Assembly was open to all adult citizens of the North irrespective of birth, religion, social status and so on. That for the House of Chiefs was, however, limited to only traditional

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55. Richards, A.F. op.cit. pp. 5 - 6; Nwabueze, B.O. op.cit. pp. 42 - 45; Whitaker, C.S. The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946 - 1966 New Jersey, 1970 p. 57.

groups in the province to do the same.[59]

But while the Birom demanded for the office of the Chief of Birom (Bonn Nawom Birom) in order to combat Hausawa dominance of the administration of Jos, the other ethnic groups pressed for the same in order to secure political representation in the Northern House of Chiefs. In addition, they also wanted their paramount chiefs to obtain the same conditions - status, grades, salaries etc. - as those which the Birom had been granted.[60] Even though these demands were straight-forward, their articulation required some amount of literacy and knowledge of the changing times to succeed, which these groups generally lacked. Therefore, the Christian intelligentsia, that is, the educated elites, most of who lived in the rural areas; filled this vacuum and took advantage of it to enhance their own personal personal positions and fortunes.[61] For they became the

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59. Ibid.

60. Their written memoranda did not explicitly point to the Birom but field interviews with some of the politicians of these areas reveal that most of them used Jos as their yardstick in gauging the various grades of Chieftaincies they requested for or expected.

61. This author contends that the initial sitting and travelling allowances which these elites got as representatives during the constitutional conferences and the awareness of even fatter salaries and allowances fixed for political offices and posts in the legislative houses convinced them to take to politics permanently. It is not expected that they would agree with this view.

leaders of the ethnic vanguards who articulated the demands and between 1947 and1960, therefore, many paramount chiefs were created among the communities of the Plateau.

In their quest for graded paramount chiefs, it was necessary for some different ethnic groups to combine in order to fulfil the requirements for specific grades of chiefs. For example, in 1956, the Mwaghavul (Sura) and Pyem, in Pankshin Division, joined together to demand for a joint paramount chief of Sura-Pyem which they got in 1957 and who was graded as a third class chief.[62] In the same Division, the people of Kon and Kulere demanded and succeeded in getting a joint chief of Kon-Kulere who was graded as fourth class chief.[63] Similarlefforts among the communities of the Lowland and Akwanga Divisions were mounted which resulted in the creation of sub-Native Authorities in these areas.[64] Even the Fulani cattle rearers who were scattered all over the province grouped together on Divisional basis to elect an ardo. These ardoen secured seats in the Native Authority Councils of each of the Divisions not

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62. JOSPROF 11, 37,/8162 "Sura-Pyem Subordinate Native Authority: Election of" NAK.
63. JOSPROF 11, 37/8163 "Kon-Kulere Subordinate Native Authority: Election of" NAK.
64. Weatherhead, A.T. Plateau Province Annual Report for 1956" ARNN pp. 129 - 131.

only as representatives of the Fulani (wakilin Fulani) but they were also regarded as chiefs of the Fulani (Sarkin Fulani) of their respective Divisions.[65] By 1958, the following communities of the Plateau province had secured graded chieftaincies: Birom, Kukuba, Pengana, Miango, Jarawa, Sura-Ryem, Ron-Kulere, Angas, Goemai, Tarok, Kofyer, Ergon, Mada and Wamba,[66] These were in addition to the sub-emirates that had been in existence in the province prior to colonial rule, namely, Wase, Kanam and Jema'a.

Thus, within a decade, paramount chiefs had been installed, on popular demand, among the communities where the British had tried to do so by force but failed. Ballard, a writer on 'pagan' administration in Nigeria has described this development with some accuracy in the following manner:

> The wheel had come full circle. After attempting for three decades to impose emirate model, the colonial administration had turned its efforts towards divising acceptable forms of tradition-based councilliar administration, only to produce demands from below for the creation of chiefs and district heads on the emirate model...Broader political identities had begun to emerge and achieve institutional expression.[67]

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65. Ibid.

66. Report by the Commissioner Mr. R.S. Hudson, (C.M.G.) PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES, Government Printer, Kaduna 1957 p. 74.

67. Ballard, J.S. "Pagan Administration and Political Development in Northern Nigeria" SAVANA Vol.1 No. 1 June 1972 p. 14.

We may quickly correct the impression created by Ballard that the demand for paramount chiefs was produced by the establishment of tradition-based councilliar administration by the British. For, as we pointed out earlier, the drive towards ethnic solidarities and the demands for the creation of paramount chiefs arose from within the context of the regional constitution which provided for a House of Chiefs apart from a House of Assembly. The phenomenal demand for graded chiefdoms, therefore, boiled down to a fundamental conceptualisation of the constitutional structure and politics of Northern Nigeria by the elites of the various Plateau communities. In this regard, the fear of Hausa-Fulani domination of the key institutions of policy formulation and execution in the Northern Region required that the numerous communities of the Plateau province devised a means of effective participation in these bodies. Hence the creation of larger chiefdoms and the installation of paramount chiefs in areas where none had previously existed.

It should be pointed out that this development was not peculiar to the communities of the Plateau province but was widespread especially amongst the communities of the Lower North whose social and political organisations resembled those of the Plateau. These included the Tiv, Igbirra, Idoma the north-eastern Yoruba speaking groups in Kabba and Ilorin provinces as well

as a host of other chieftaincies in the middle and upper Congola basin who were not regarded as part of the Lower North.[68] Even the Igala who, for several centuries, had evolved an acknowledged centralised political authority comparable to those of the emirates sought to refashion their attahate along emirate lines.[69] As in the case of the Plateau communities, the champions of most of these ethnic movements and their demands were the new breed of educated elites serving as Native Authority staffs, teachers and the clergy.[70]

The demand for paramount chiefs in the Plateau province was important in one other respect, namely, that these demands necessarily accompanied a transformation of the predominantly Christian educated elite into an active political class. Hitherto, most of them merely advised the chiefs (district heads) in their respective communities along progressive lines.

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68. Most of these were located in Numan Division of Adamawa Province and Mura Division in Borno Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 349 and Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 97.

69. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 245 - 247. It should be mentioned in addition that Mallam Ali Ochejo Obaje, the Atta of Igala, became a Moslem.

70. Ibid. p. 247.

But with the political developments which occured in Nigeria from the late 1940s onwards which involved a series of constitutional conferences which required representatives from various parts of the country, some of the new breed of elites became representatives to such conferences which gave them political and economic power. It was not surprising, therefore, that between 1951 and 1966, when party politics operated in Nigeria, most of them were continuously returned as elected representatives of their various constituencies.[71] These educated elements together with the newly created paramount chiefs formed the dominant elements of the ruling classes of the province. As we abundantly demonstrated in the previous chapters, their class bases were rooted mainly in the colonial economy, administrative structure, education, and in the christian missions.

At this juncture, three major observations must be made about the emergent ruling elite in the Plateau province. Firstly, a cordial rapport generally existed between the traditional elites as represented by the paramount chiefs and district heads on the one hand,

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71. Ibid. pp. 90 - 97.

and the emergent educated elites on the other.[72] This was in deference to the situation in the emirates where, inspite of the fact that most of the emergent elites and the traditional rulers belonged to the same families, mutual suspicion seemed to have characterised their relationships. Indeed, it has been argued, no doubt, with some exeggeration, that modern political awakening in the emirate North was centred more on the attempts of the emergent educated elites to curb the undemocratic powers of the emirs and to reform the Native Authority system along democratic lines than on the demand for national independence.[73]

The second observation relates to the class base of the Plateau elites. In this regard, it should be noted that since most of them had received their education and training from the Christian mission schools and centres, they professed Christianity as their faith. Furthermore, most of them came from commoner homes because, as we

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72. This is however a generalisation. It seems to have been the case initially but after the chiefs had been upgraded and appointed to office, some of them, not unjustifiably, became suspect of these educated elites who, firstly, wanted to 'dictate' to the new chiefs; and, secondly, some of the elites, notably Patrick Dokotri and Pastor Lot, are known to have been interested in the chieftaincy stools of their respective communities.

73. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. pp. 77 - 78.

noted in chapter two, most Plateau chiefs were initially suspect of these institutions and refused to send their own children to the schools prefering to send those of their subjects. This meant that the educated elites in the province were almost an entirely new class in terms of their social statuses within their respective communities. But they were, nevertheless, powerful because they had access to the new opportunities which the colonial system had brought about. Again, they differed from their counterparts in the emirates. For as Whitaker has abundantly documented, with regards to the emirates, this new group, being themselves members of the traditional ruling aristocracy retained Islam, their religion, even as 'Western' educated elites.[74] Thus, while the colonial educated elites in the emirates were Moslems, their counterparts in the Plateau province and in the rest of the Lower North, in general, were predominantly Christians.

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74. According to Whitaker:
"Continuity of leadership in terms of elite structure was not only generally sustained in the membership of the 1961-1965 Northern House of Assembly, but that in some aspects there was some intensification of the pattern. Thus, the percentage belonging to the sarakuna class increased from 62% in 1956 - 1961 to at least 85.3% in 1961 - 65..."
Whitaker, C.S. The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946 - 1966 New Jersey, 1970 p. 326.

It is against this background that some of the uneasy relationships which sometimes marred the proceedings of the Northern legislative houses should be perceived. For example, the Northern House of Assembly witnessed an ugly incident which occured in 1956 during a discussion on a bill which sought to establish a Sharia Court of Appeal. During this session, Christians who contributed to the debate were rediculed into silence.[75]

The third major observetion concerns the relatively weak economic base of the educated elite in the Plateau province. For except in a few cases such as those of J.Y. Dimlong, David Dimka, Michael Audu Duba and probably a few others who were local nobilities in their respective communities, most of the educated elites were of commoner origin and, therefore, without any material wealth. Even as local nobilities, the former were not necessarily more wealthy than the rest. For, as we have already pointed out, in most communities of the province, no fully developed and strong ruling classes, on the scale of those of the emirates, developed although they were in the making. Therefore, beyond the prestige of being royal citizens in their respective chiefdoms, these local nobilities had no demonstratable economic advantage over their commoners. However, the royal

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75. Hansard, House of Assembly Debates; 10th March 1956 pp. 347 - 365.

status of the former enhanced their rise to political power over the others.[76] Taken together, therefore, the fact is that except for the immigrant commercial and bureaucratic elites in Jos township, the educated elites in Plateau province were economically very weak, particularly, in comparison with their counterparts in the emirates of the far North as well as those in Borno.

The material poverty of the Plateau educated elites was important for two reasons. Firstly, their relative poverty affected their political strategies, party organisations and election campaigns. For example, they could not afford to operate party secretariats outside the provincial and divisional headquarters,[77] nor did they have the money to produce, publish and distribute political propaganda pamphlets.[78] Secondly, and certainly more importantly, this lack of wealth made them cling very tightly to communal sentiments as their chief weapon for mobilising political support in order to succeed politically. In this regard, it should be emphasised that, as a group, these educated elite were trying to transform themselves

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76. David Dimka; Interviewed 30/5/1979. Kabwir.

77. The lack of formal party structures to administer party activities led to some form of reliance on the district heads and their officials who, in most cases, were under the pro-NPC paramount chiefs and, therefore, the tension between the two.

78. David Dimka; interviewed 30/5/1979, Kabwir.

into a bourgeois class through politics. This naturally affected their performance as political leaders. For the desire to use politics for achieving economic ends meant that their personal benefits were uppermost in their political calculations and activities rather than any other interests which they claimed to serve. This led to much political ambivalence on their part over the basic interests for which they claimed to have represented the Plateau communities in the various legislative bodies of Nigerian politics. We shall return to these issues later.

The point which emerges from these observations is that political leadership in the Plateau province played into the hands of the Christian intelligentsia who served in various capacities as teachers, nurses, native authority bureaucrats and the clergy. The quest for the creation of paramount chieftaincies, representations at the constitutional conferences, and the spread of the Christian Gospel in all of which they had played dominant roles combined to potray them as communal leaders rather than as a new socio-economic group - an image which was certainly to their advantage and which they systematically exploited. Consequently, they always potrayed themselves as community leaders and Church leaders rather than as the emergent socio-economic elites that they objectively were.[79]

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79. Given the history of their emergence which we have discussed in earlier chapters, these elites combined in themselves both objective and subjective bases of social influence and power.

The position of the educated elites as community leaders was further strengthened by the fact that even as their numbers increased over the years, their younger members tended to support rather than to challenge these first generation of elites. In the first place, most of the growing number of the educated elites had been taught by their predecessors for whom they had respect. Secondly, the bulk of these elites were invariably Christians especially in the rural areas of the province. Since these elites were also the leaders of the various Churches, their respective congregations supported them, particularly, in the face of the alleged threat of Islam. Indeed, it was common for prayers to be offered for them as representatives in the constitutional conferences and the legislative bodies of the country, in order to stand against the onslaught of Islam.[80] In a recent interview with Patrick Dokotri who regards himself as a persistent and consistent fighter for the 'Birom cause' and the whole Plateau, this author was informed that the threat of Islam was real and that it still exists even today. According to him, many Christian politicians and traditional rulers were either bribed or

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80. This author recalls the frequent prayers offered on behalf of Pastor Lot at Panyam each time he was leaving the village to attend the House of Assembly sessions at Kaduna throughout his tenureship of that office. The prayer occasions were also used for political briefings leading to further prayers.

forced to become Moslems and he cited himself, Pastor Lot, Chief of Kagoro, Michael Audu Duba and a few others as among those who were bribed to do so but without success.[81]

But while these stories may have been true, it must also be pointed out that inspite of their alleged rejection of offers from the Moslem rulers to convert to Islam, these educated elites from the Plateau were already wealthy and powerful as far as the Plateau was concerned. For their houses were the best in their respective villages, and they were the only group who rode cars.. Besides, their families were conspicuously the best fed and clothed in their respective villages.[82] But because of this deceptive image of the educated elites as protectors of the province against Islam and Hausa-Fulani rule, they continued to secure re-elections to their respective legislative seats at every election and thereby weakened the objective bases for inter class politics which became marginalised in the political competition and struggles that occured in the province. And as we pointed out earlier, even in Jos urban area

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81. Patrick Dokotri, interviewed 3/12/1982, Bukuru.

82. The author visited the residences of the following: David Dimka (MHA); Pastor Lot (MHA); Gabriel Wuyep (MHA); Joseph Makinyad (MHA) Patrick Dokotri (MHA) Michael Audu Duba (MHA) and a few lesser political leaders.

and the tin mines where organised labour developed, political conflicts and struggles remained largely communal, in form, despite the presence of a working class consciousness which should have accompanied the development of trade unionism. For the structure of political competition between the Birom elites and their Hausawa counterparts over the control of Jos Native Authority Council ultimately penetrated the trade unions of the tin mines whose membership was divided among the various political parties which themselves represented regionalist cum communalist ideologies of the Nigerian petty bourgeois politicians in general.[83]

There is no doubt thatethnicity played an important role in political mobilisation in the Plateau province but this role should not be emphasised at the expense of other factors as has often been the case with most commentatofs on Plateau politics. A classic example of these is Kirk-Greene who wrote:

> "... From such an assortment of ethnic groups, with little more than geographical contiguity and similar terrain to bind them together, there has expectedly never emerged any more palpable sense of unity than that of straightforward administrative convenience. In the political Strum and Drang of the 1950s a certain 'Middle Belt' solidarity was discernible in spirit, stimulated by the Plateau leadership of the Middle Zone League (later the Tiv-led United

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83. Sklar, R.L. chapter three, "Regionalism and the Emergence of a Three-Party System". op.cit. p. 87 -140..

> Middle Belt Congress) working for some kind of underdefined, non-emirate, non-Moslem, non-N.P.C. style of state. This movement, born as much from anti-N.P.C/Hausa/Fulani motives as from any positive pan-Christo-animist united front, gradually eroded itself, so that it was not until the State Decree of 1967 that two of the one-time Middle Belt core areas, Benue and Plateau Provinces, came together in formal union."[84]

Views on politics on the Plateau such as the above, are dominant and widespread but, it must be emphasised that they derive from colonial and neocolonial historiographies. For they deliberately downplay the crucial role of colonial capitalism in the establishment of a new socio-economic order which created new powerful classes who manipulated the ethnic groups politically as part of their means of capital accumulation. Consequently, their interpretation of political developments on the Plateau since the inception of colonial rule is superficial and misleading because it fails to penetrate the socio-economic classes which make ethnic politics viable in the province. It is therefore necessary to conclude this discussion on ethnicity with some important general observations on the role of ethnicity in history as a basis from which to assess its specific role in the case of the Plateau such as the above discussion has attempted to do.

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84. Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. "Prefactory Note" Gazetteers of the Plateau Province 1972 edtn p. vii.

To start with, ethnic sentiment is not necessarily irrational under all circumstances and at all times. Nor can ethnic sentiment be generated over every political issue. Secondly, ethnic sentiment is not a given irrational attribute among either Africans or any other peoples of the Third World nations to whom these commentators have assigned this label.[85] Ethnicity is causal; some action has to take place to bring it about. In most cases, it is brought about by unequal development of the groups involved. In other words, ethnicity is historical and its intensity changes with time and under different circumstances, particularly, at the socio-economic level.[86] For ethnicity to succeed as a major determinant of political activity, therefore, a corresponding socio-economic base must exist to justify it. This is so because ethnic sentiment emanates from the existence of a socio-economic system which is discriminatory to the composite ethnic groups of a given polity.[87] Otherwise, what do

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85. O'connell, J. "The Fragility of Stability: The Fall of the Nigerian Federal Government, 1966" in Rotberg, R.I. (ed) Protest and Power in Black Africa. Oxford 1970; "The Inevitability of Instability" in Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 5 no. 2 1967 pp.181 - 191; "Political Integration: The Nigerian Case" in Iewood, A. (ed) African Integration and Disintegration Oxford.

86. Lenin, V.I. "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" Selected Works Vol. 1. Moscow 1977 p. 571.

87. Nnoli, O. Ethnic Politics in Nigeria Enugu 1977 p. 8.

groups become ethnic about? Thus, a state of unequal development of the composite groups in a given society is the primary cause of ethnic politics. Unequal development itself has always existed in history while even development remains a desired objective of the underprivileged groups and classes of all human societies, hence, the struggles between the privileged and the underprivileged; the exploiter and the exploited; the oppressor and the oppressed for even development of groups and classes.[88]

It is very tempting to see the apparent conflict between the Birom and the Hausawa which dominated the politics of Jos between 1947 and 1960 purely in ethnic terms. As we pointed out above, this conflict was essentially an intra class competition by the elites of both sides. For although numerically the largest, the Birom were not the only indigenous ethnic groups in Jos Division. There were others such as the Jengre, the Amo, the Buji, the Rukuba, the Miango, the Anaguta and the Jarawa whose elites took part in the politics of Jos Division.[89] Similarly, the Hausawa were not the only immigrant settlers in the Division. There were substantial Yoruba, Igbo and other southern elements

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88. Marx, K. and Engels, F. "Manifesto of the Communist Party". Selected Works. Vol. 1 Moscow, 1977 pp. 108 - 109.

89. Ames, C.G. Gazetteers of the Plateau Province Jos, 1932 pp. 53 - 121.

settled in Jos not to mention the numerous other ethnic groups from the Northern provinces who were neither Hausa-Fulani nor Birom.[90] And all these groups played roles which were commensurate with the size and the position which their elites occupied in the colonial economy and society of Jos. But due to the apparently dominant populations of the Birom and the Hausawa over all these other groups, their elites dominated the politics of Jos Division. The participation of the elites of the other groups took place within the framework of Birom versus Hausawa conflict even though the decision to support or oppose either side was determined by the specific interests of the elites of these groups.

Thus, the Hausa constantly instigated the elites of the non Birom indigenes of the Jos Division against the Birom as a sure safeguard against possible alliance of all these groups against them. This they did by instigating the elites of the Miango, Kukuba, Jarawa and Jere to demand that their chiefs be allowed to contest the Jos chieftaincy stool rather than confining it to contest between Birom chiefs as was the case.[91] In 1961, the Hausawa politicians even won the support of some of these chiefs to demand for the removal of Sarkin Jos,

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90. Jos Town Council affairs MLG 4376 Vol. 1 1954.

91. Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province Annual Report 1956". ARNN p. 129.

Mallam Rwang Pam.[92] The southern elements generally sympathised with the Birom cause but their active support for Birom elites was reduced by the fear that the regional government which tended to support the Hausawa politicians could take retaliatory measures which would undermine their economic activities and position in Jos.[93] They were further weakened, politically, by the fact that the Yoruba and Igbo, who formed their majority, were split into supporting the political parties of their respective home regions none of which was really strong in Jos Division.[94] Nevertheless, the elites of the two forged ahead economically, and jointly dominated the commercial sector of the economy of Jos township. Thus, even though it took the southern petty bourgeoisie more time and money to secure plots, many of them soon became landlords. These were in addition to their domination of the federal departments located in Jos

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92. From the District Heads of Rukuba, Miango and Kwon to Resident titled A RAWA MU DA RWANG PAM 3rd March 1961 SMG/LG/S/LAC/8. Jos Local Administration Council.

93. The Northernisation Policy was an example in that direction. For example, under it, the total number of plots that could be allocated to "Southerners" collectively (i.e. Igbo, Yoruba, Effik etc) was pegged at 20%. Plotnicov, L. op.cit. p. 58.

94. Jos N.A. Reorganisation D.O. File S. 13.

as artisans, junior clerks and professionals, particularly, the Igbos.[95] It is against this background that the Hausawa propaganda of Igbo domination of Jos, which was orchestrated in the mid 1950s, should be perceived. In either case, neither the southern petty bourgeoisie, nor their Hausa-Fulani counterparts, both of who obviously dominated the lucrative sectors of the economy of Jos Division, had the interest of the Birom and the other indigenous groups of the Jos Division at heart. According to Patrick Dokotri, the Birom elites knew this, hence, their concerted effort to take political control of Jos township and Jos Division from 'foreign' domination whether it was the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo or Yoruba.[96]

Outside Jos Division, however, the only documented example of ethnic politics occured in the Lowland Division of Shendam. Here, the problem arose as a result of the Shendam Resettlement Scheme which, as we pointed out earlier, was established in Shendamland but whose farmers came from the Yergam country. This scheme began operation in 1949 but in 1951, only two years after, it had run into political and administrative problems. These problems arose mainly from the legitimate claim of the Long Goemai to rule the resettled farmers in this domain

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95. Pltotnicov, L. Op.cit. p. 51.

96. Patrick Dokotri; Interviewed 3/12/1982, Dukuru.

while the latter, mmainly Yergam, refused to submit to the authority of the Long Goemai on the ground that their resettlement in Shendamland did not mean submission to Goemai political authority. In the circumstances, the Block 'B' which contained a majority of the Yergam was constituted into a sub-Native Authority of the Lowland Federation Native Authority Council.[97] By 1957, when representative government had been firmly established, these resettlement farmers and their families numbered some 2,000 adults.[98] They continually voted against the N.P.C. and which posed a serious threat to the political fortunes of Mr. Michael Audu Buba who, as we noted earlier, was an N.P.C. representative to the Northern House of Assembly. Thus, during the 1959 Federal elections, the N.P.C. controlled Federal Electoral Commission gerrymandered the Lowland constituencies in order to ensure that Mr. Michael Audu Buba was returned re-elected in subsequent elections since 1959 elections did not affect Mr. Buba as a regional parliamentarian. Although the NPC lost this election in the area, their plan succeeded because in the Regional elections of 1961, Mr Michael Buba won his seat.[99]

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97. Niven, C.R. "Annual Report for 1951" ARNN p. 61.

98. Ibid.

99. Ayuba Kumm; Interviewed 30/5/1979, Gazum.

In the Jema'a Division which was made up of the settler emirate of Je maa and the three sub-Native Authorities of Kagoro, Moroa and Jaba, ethnicity played a role in its politics also. For as would be expected, the emirate of Jemaa supported the N.P.C. while the other three districts comprising different indigenous ethnic groups, from those of the Jema'a emirate, strongly supported the UMBC.[100] It is interesting to note here that the inaugural meeting of the Middle Zone League, predecessor to the UMBC, was held in Kafanchan and not in Jos or Makurdi which goes to emphasise the desire of the elites of these groups to identify with the non-Moslem and non Hausa-Fulani protests spearheaded by the elites of the Plateau province. For like their counterparts in the Plateau province, these groups in Jemaa Division suffered from similar socio-economic deprivations from the regional government, a fact which made them team up with the numerous non-Moslem, non-Hausa-Fulani and non-NPC groups in the Lower North to demand for a Middle Belt State.[101]

Thus, while the Middle Belt movement was misconstrued by colonial officials and their successor Hausa-Fulani

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100. Yahaya, A.D. The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria, 1950 - 1970 Zaria, 1980 pp. 151 - 156.

101. Ibid. pp. 151 - 156; also see, Dudley, B.J. op.cit. pp. 223 - 225.

political leaders alike, as an ethnic movement, it was in essence, and, even in form, a movement against socio-economic deprivations of the areas involved; a demand which transcended mere ethnic nostalgia. For the Middle Belt area was generally discriminated against in the location of industries, allocation of social services, appointments to public boards and in the recruitment and promotion of civil servants.[102] Indeed, the fact that as many numerous ethnic groups as were involved, effectively teamed up together against the mighty NPC interest and its administration is a very strong evidence against the thesis of ethnicity as propounded by colonial and neo colonial bourgeois scholars.

Yet, it is also curious to note that at the time when the demand for a Middle Belt state was at its peak, its supporters in all the sub-Native Authorities comprising the Jema'a Division decided to cede from the Plateau province, in 1957, and to join Zaria province[103] which goes to make a purely ethnic interpretation of political developments in this area more untenable.

Thus, except in the Jos and Lowland Divisions, which we discussed earlier, ethnicity was not crucial in

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102. Bryan, S.S. Dut Always As Friends. Duke University Press, 1969 pp. 332 - 345; Whitaker, C.S. op.cit. p. 389. This is a very controversial issue nevertheless.

103. Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province Annual Report for 1957" ARNN p. 121.

determining political developments in the Plateau province. But even in these areas, we noted that ethnicity arose in response to socio-economic disparities among the ethnic groups involved which tended to justify it. These included the ethnic configuration of those who controlled commerce, contracts, the civil service, restaurants, hotels as well as the landlords of Jos township which coincided with certain ethnic groups. To say so is not to deny that ethnic sentiments played a role in the political alignments in the province. For our concern here has been to determine its essence and the extent to which it influenced political developments in the province. For besides the existence of socio-economic disparities of the ethnic groups in the province, the regional government occasionally employed the tactics of divide-and-rule to penetrate the various communities which tended to reinforce ethnic politics in the province. This it did by systematically upgrading pro-NPC chiefs in the province while it downgraded anti-NPC ones or, at best, ignored them. Examples of these are discussed later but, in so doing, the regional government inevitably provoked ethnic sentiments.

The political leaders of the Plateau province, particularly the educated elites, were smart enough to take advantage of the ethnic factor and the regional government performance in the province to turn these into their advantage politically. For they easily interpreted these

developments to their respective communities in a manner which ensured that these communities chose them as their representatives to fight the 'enemy' and restore the communities to their rightful places in the new scheme of development. Consequently, taken as a whole, the Plateau province remained outside the grip of the NPC until 1958 when the Minorities Commission's report dashed their chances of getting a Middle Belt State.[104]

III. RELIGION.

Like ethnicity, the role of religion in determining and shaping political activity in the Plateau province has been oversimplified and exaggerated. But more so has been the role of the Christian missions in creating and sponsoring anti-Islamic sentiment in the province. Both Sklar and Dudley have asserted that the Christian missions strongly supported, if they did not, indeed, originate, the idea of a Middle Belt State.[105] According to Sklar, the movement for the Middle Belt state,

> ... has been supported openly and clandestinely by the Christian missions, which are numerous in the lower North. It is difficult to find a Muslim in the Action Group - United Middle Belt Congress Alliance; in many places as in Numan Division of Adamawa Province, where the AG-UMBC is dominant, that party is composed largely of persons who are associated with Christian missions.

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104. Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the fears of Minorities and the Means of allaying them. July 1958 pp. 71 - 72.

105. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 348; Dudley, B.J. op.cit. pp. 90 - 91.

> This factor may account for the precipitous decline of Northern Elements Progressive Union influence in the lower North and the apparent decision of NEPU leaders to withdraw their support from the Middle Belt Movement.[106]

The Christian missions on thePlateau may have been involved in this movement but theprecise nature of their involvement is yet to be fully documented. Most of the evidence, so far adduced, are circumstantial. To be sure, the province contained numerous Christian mission establishments with only a few Moslem adherents in its overall population. For as we have pointed out already, the Plateau province was one of the lower Northern provinces in which Christian missionary organisations were allowed to operate. We also noted that the political elites who developed here from the 1940s onwards were invariably Christians because their members were trained in one missionary institution or the other on the Plateau. On their own part, the missionaries, both white and black, certainly showed great concern over the fate and future of Christianity in Northern Nigeria. This is amply documented in their various publications and in their utterances.[107] These missionaries nursed

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106. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 348.

107. The most widely circulated mission magazine was The Light Bearer, a periodical, which contained articles on both dogma and the problems of evangelisation in all the Sudan United Mission establishments in Africa. Occassionally, C.M.S. missionaries contributed articles to it.

the fear of an eventual Islamic domination of the lower North and, partly to combat it, they openly accused the colonial government of protecting the Islamic North from Christian influences while, at the same time, leaving the doors of the lower North wide open to the incursions of Islamic influences. This issue was later to result in open conflict between some of the representatives of the Christian lower North and Islamic far North in the Northern House of Assembly in 1949.[108] The consequences of this conflict were far reaching politically. In the first place, the non Moslem blocks in the House immediately formed a political association known as the non Moslem League to protect their interests in the House and in their respective constituencies mostly located in the lower North and in parts of Adamawa province.[109] By 1951, the Non Moslem League was transformed into a political party, the Middle Zone League, and finally, in 1955, it transformed itself into the United Middle Belt Congress which demanded a separate state of its own, a Middle Belt State, from the Northern Region.[110]

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108. This arises followed a private member's motion in the Northern House of Assembly which called on the regional government to curb the activities of Christian missionaries in the North.
Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 346.

109. Ibid. pp. 346 - 347.

110. Ibid. p. 347.

From this, it is clear that there was mutual suspicion and fear between adherents of Islam and of Christianity in Northern Nigeria. Nevertheless, later developments which we shall discuss in the next chapter, indicate that inspite of the 'bitterness' which the Christian representatives displayed in the House over the private bill which sought to restrict Christianity and their formation of an association to combat similar threats in the future, there was some element of hypocricy in their activities both in the House of Assembly and in their yearning for a separate Middle Belt state. For these same political leaders of the lower North prefered to belong to the Northern Region than to join any of the Southern Regions of Nigeria which contained predominantly Christian and certainly non Moslem - populations.[111] Infact, apart from Ilorin province, where there was a strong movement to join the Western Region, no other province in the Northern Region demonstrated a desire to join any of the Southern Regions.[112] This preference

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111. In this regard, it should be noted that the consistent leader of the pro-NPC faction of the UNBC was Pastor David Lot himself - President of the non-Moslem League as well as the Middle Zone League. He was also a leading Executive of the Regional Church Council - the highest Christian body in Northern Nigeria. But for their attitude towards joining the South see; Hudson, R.S. op.cit. p. 5.

112. Coleman, J.S. op.cit. p. 394.

by the Christian politicians in the lower North to remain under the predominantly Islamic North, rather than joining the predominantly Christian South would seem to suggest that religions differences were not fundamental in determining political attitudes and affiliations in the North despite the fact that there was mutual suspicion amongst adherents of both religions.

The important development which arose from this mutual suspicion and fear of Islamic domination, particularly, in the Plateau province was the fact that the Church inevitably became politicised. It is not therefore surprising that most of the political leaders in the province, including those of the NPC, professed Christianity and were active Church members of their respective denominations. It is this leadership in politics as in elsewhere which the Christian educated elite provided, that has tempted most scholars, notably Kirk-Gree and Sklar, to view the Plateau province as a Christian province. In actual fact, these together with their Moslem counterparts formed only a tiny portion of the population of the province. For the majority of the Plateau peoples still adhered to their traditional religions.[113] The unqualified support which these

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113. Pembleton, E.S. "Plateau Province, Annual Report for 1938" ARNN p. 52. By 1932, "the total number of adherents to the Missions amongst the indigenous tribes [was] less than 3,000 of whom probably not more than half have been baptized." Ames, C.G. Gazetteers of the Plateau Province. Jos, 1934 p. 310.

peoples accorded their political leaders was not necessarily indicative of their conversion to Christianity. Rather, it was an expression of solidarity with their new elites who knew how the new social order operated and, therefore, how to combat the alleged onslaught of Islam and, by extension, a Hause-Fulani domination over them. That was the crux of the matter.

On their own, the tiny Christian population in the province was not in a position to offer any meaningful protection to the rest of the population. Infact, other things being equal, the reverse was the case. But due to the strategic positions which they occupied as educated elites, together with the powerful lobby of the Christian missions on their behalf, they became politically strong. For as we pointed out above, the Christian missions certainly assisted the Christian political elites in urging the colonial government to guaranttee the freedom of worship in all the provinces of Northern Nigeria, an appeal which recurred in nearly all the joint conferences of these Christian missions which were frequently held. A typical memorandum sent to the British government was resolved in one of such conferences as early as 1929. It read:

> Resolution 19. That this Conference of delegates from Missionary Societies having their headquarters in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, United States of America and Denmark, and representing over three hundred missionaries at work in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, requests -

> That the council of Missions of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria shall prepare a memorandum in which shall be enumerated the legislation and acts of the Nigerian Government which have infringed upon the rights of religious liberty guaranteed under British rule and specifically stated in the proclamations made by Sir Frederick Lugard in the early years of occupation of the Northern Provinces, and that this memorandum be sent to the International Missionary Council in London with a request for their further assistance by vigorous and urgent action, the memorandum be made the basis of an appeal to the Christian public should such action not produce immediate satisfactory results...[114]

There is no doubt that the Christian missions formed a powerful pressure group on the colonial government as protectors of the general 'freedom of worship' clause guaranteed by British law but, specifically, as protectors of the so-called pagan provinces of Northern Nigeria which, they believed, were being subtly forced to become moslems through the 'assistance' of the colonial administration.[115] From a Christian standpoint, their concern and fears about the fate of Christians in Northern Nigeria and the further spread of Christianity in the region, so far as available evidence suggests, were genuine. The Nigerian Christian leadership in the North certainly shared and nursed their fears. To that extent, therefore, it could be said that the

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114. Minutes of Conference of Missions of Northern Provinces Nigeria, 1929. Held at Miango, 25th - 30th November, 1929 p. 30.

115. Maxwell, J.L. Half a Century of Grace. London, 1952 p. 253.

Christian missions helped to bring to focus a mutual suspicion and fear for Islam among the Christian leaders of Northern Nigeria. However, we should quickly add that these Christian missions were only partly responsible for this, for the behaviour and utterances of the Moslem leaders and politicians tended to justify the fears of the former.[116]

But the involvement of missionaries or their missions in translating these fears and suspicions into a political demand for a Middle Belt state has only been asserted; it is yet to be established. According to Pastor Lot and Patrick Dokotri, the Christian missions only supported the idea once it had germinated, but they were in no way responsible for seeding it. Beyond this, all allusions to their role in originating the Middle Belt Movement must remain conjectural given the present state of our knowledge.

Taken together, the weight of evidence does not support the view that the Christian missionaries or their missions first muted the idea of a Middle Belt state. For they were not even unanimous in their support for it.[117] The origin of the idea of a Middle Belt State is a controversial subject but it seems to have been started

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116. Whitaker, C.S. The Politics of Tradition. New Jersey, 1970 pp. 348 - 351.

117. Pastor David Lot; Interviewed, 4/12/1982 - Panyam.

by Chief Obafemi Awolowo and leader of the Action Group party as a strategy of breaking the mighty Northern Region.[118] Chief Awolowo's views about the creation of more states or regions in Nigeria before independence largely based on ethnic groups is widely known. None of his writings before 1955, during which time the idea was floating, however, shows a specific commitment to the cause of the Middle Belt state. Both Patrick Dokotri and Pastor Lot believe that Chief Awolowo instigated the Tiv through J.S. Tarka with whom he had very close political ties to organise a movement to demand for the Middle Belt state.[119] But I suspect that these two Plateau politicians merely reproduced what the leaders in the Northern government, with whom they also closely co-operated, had told them. At any rate, the truth or otherwise of missionary involvement with these developments which is

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118. With due respect to Dent, a history of the UMBC and its connection with Chief Awolowo and the Action Group is yet to be documented. To be sure, from 1955, the latter provided the former with financial assistance but very little is clear prior to this time. That the A.G. wanted to break up the mighty North is, however, not in doubt. See Bryant, S.S. But Always as Friends. 1969 pp. 344 - 346; Dudley, B.J. op.cit. 183 - 185; Dent, J.M. "A Minority Party - The UMBC" in Makintosh, J.P. Nigerian Government and Politics, London, 1966 pp. 461 - 506.

119. In 1959, J.S. Tarka became a Federal Vice-President of the Action Group. For further details, see, Sklar, R.L. op.cit. 374 - 376.

our concern here remains conjectural. Indeed, their precise involvement, if any, may never be established precisely because they were not intended to be known.

From the above discussion, it is clear that the fear of Islamic domination of the Plateau province was an expression of deeper socio-economic problems peculiar to the province since a majority of the peoples still followed their traditional religions. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Northern leadership represented by Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, was anxious to spread Islam into the Plateau province and the other areas of the North where it had not made any serious impact before. For example, the governing style of the regional government was certainly supportive of Islam.[120] Whitaker has correctly observed that Sir Ahmadu Bello made no secret of his desire to re-establish the Caliphate. He further remarked that:

> ... the office of Northern Premiership was in the process of becoming a kind of grand emirship, which is the way many people not unreasonably regarded it already in 1959. By 1963, the Sardauna was widely and with deliberate irony being referred to as Sarkin Arewa - Emir of the North.[121]

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120. Whitaker, C.S. op.cit. pp. 348 - 351.

121. Ibid. p. 351.

Crampton, who has made similar observations, has pointed to the fact that government schools and colleges were managed in a manner calculated to advance the cause of Islam.[122] He has further drawn attention to the controversial religious campaign tours which the Sardauna undertook during the last days of his life which naturally caused much anxiety among Northern Christians.[123]

While all these may be true, it is necessary to point out that the fear of Islamic domination was not limited to Christians on the Plateau who, as we have already indicated on several occasions, formed only a tiny minority of the overall population of the province. Therefore, the essence of this fear was not necessarily religious. Nor were the peasantry in the non Moslem provinces in any meaningful contact with Islamic doctrine to resent or contemplate converting to it. Even the Christians who lived amongst the peasantry and whose schools, hospitals, dispensaries and clinics the latter attended did not find it easy to convert them into Christianity. Thus, the bulk of the people on the Plateau remained impervious to both Christianity and Islam.

In reality, therefore, most communities of the lower North perceived Islamic domination in terms of establishing a Hausa-Fulani rule over them, hence their

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122. Crampton, E.P.T. Christianity in Northern Nigeria Zaria, 1976 p. 88.

123. Ibid. p. 96.

unreserved support for the Christian politicians. It was not merely an issue of religion; it was pricipally an issue of political subjugation and all that partained to this. In this regard, many a community chief and their spokesmen in Plateau province expressed disappointment with the British officials who, they believed , made it possible for the Hausa-Fulani rulers to contemplate subjugating a region where their more able ancestrors had tried, unsuccessfully, to conquer.[124] Under these circumstances both the Christian and non Christian populations of the Plateau supported the predominantly Christian politicians of the province.

But as we have repeatedly pointed out, this process obscured andsubmerged the objective class relations in the province. Consequently, it created a situation which made the oppressed classes of the province to continually support a political clique which was making huge economic and political fortunes out of their poor conditions instead of challenging them along with the other groups who formed the ruling classes of the Plateau province.

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124. The author was informed by David Dimka; Patrick Dikotri and Pastor Lot that there was a general feeling amongst some District Heads that colonial Residents in the province should have allowed a few days battle between the Hausawa and their indigenous host communities following which each group would realise and accept their actual status and place in the province.

IV. THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT.

Much of what conditioned political behaviour and activity in the Plateau province has to be explained within the context of the Region to which the province belonged. For as we pointed out in the previous chapters, the Plateau province was only one out of twelve provinces which together formed the Northern Region of Nigeria. The policies and activities of the regional government and its ramifications affected the province as it did the others inspite of the local peculiarities of the Plateau province. Indeed, the attitude and activities of the regional government towards the province provided good cause for the provincial politicians to interprete politics on the Plateau on ethnic and religious lines.

It may be recalled that much of what the British curved out, in 1900, as Northern Protectorate through conquest and which became Northern Region in 1947, under the Richards Constitution, was mainly made up of the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and pockets of numerous independent chiefdoms within this broad region. This historical fact certainly influenced the way in which the administrative provinces of the region were demarcated and operated. To be sure, the overcelebrated indirect rule system took this historical background into account.

One major harm, however, which the British colonial officers succeeded in imparting to the ruling classes of the Caliphate and Borno was the theory of the latters'

superiority to the other colonial subjects of the North or even of the rest of Nigeria as a whole.[125] In the first place, the British regarded the great state systems which had historically developed in the savane region as an evidence of the racial superiority, of the Hausa-Fulani races without who, they believed, such historical achievements were impossible.[126] Consequently, in their administration of the Region, the British always showed preference to the emirates vis-a-vis the non Moslem communities who were regarded as primitive, having been at a much lower level of civilisation, because they lacked centralised state systems.[127] From 1954, when Northern leaders began to occupy positions of authority, to 1960, when more British officials departed at independence, the Hausa-Fulani ruling aristocracies who succeeded the British as rulers of the Northern Region also inherited these prejudices from the British. As a result, the regional government at Kaduna was always dominated by the ruling aristocracies of the defunct Caliphate and Borno to the relative neglect of leaders from the non Moslem chiefdoms of the lower North.[128] Naturally, the

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125. Nicolson, I.F. The Administration of Nigeria 1900-1960: Men, Methods and Myths. Oxford, 1969 p. 132; p. 304

126. Orr, C. The Making of Northern Nigeria London, 1911 (2nd edtn 1965) pp. 51 - 73.

127. Ibid. pp. 56 - 57.

128. Bryant. S.S. op.cit. p. 334.

ruling classes of the far North put their political advantage to good use by perpetuating their rule in the region with all the socio-economic advantages to which this pertained. This led to difficulties concerning the distribution of amenities and services, location of industrial projects, appointments to positions of authority and such like which reflected the structure of political authority and power of the governing classes of the Region.

The Plateau province, it should be recalled, contained a huge influx of Hausawa and Kanuri alike who had flocked into the province in search of money in the tin mines. At the same time, the Birom indigenes of the tin fields had lost their land to the tin companies and were largely a dispossessed army of unskilled labourers. These together with the control of commerce by immigrants rather than the indigenes collectively had a profound effect on class formation in the province. Thus, being so grossly exploited, the Plateau province suffered both from the effects of the tin industry as well as from the discriminatory policies of the British which deliberately refused to develop the area both for its racial contempt for the people as well as a guarantee that all other economic undertakins in the province were subordinated to the tin industry.

The regional government, when it was formed, affected political developments in the Plateau province

at three main levels, namely; at the level of party politics, of local government and provincial administrations, and of political and economic patronage through appointments to the regional and federal government offices and agencies.

Concerning party politics, it should be pointed out at the onset that, generally, politicians from the Plateau province, whether indigenous or immigrant, did not appear to be as active as their counterparts in the other provinces of the North in the formation of political organisations. For they are not known to have participated in the initial town-based welfare associations and groups which characterised most cities in northern Nigeria between 1945 and 1951.[129] This was the more so since it was these discussion circles groups and associations which, in 1950, culminated in the formation of the Northern People Congress - the ruling party in the Northern Region from 1951 to 1966.[130] Thus, even most of the Jos - based Hausawa politicians did not participate substantially in the formation of the N.P.C. For their energies and

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129. These associations and groups included interalia:
Bauchi General Improvement Union (BCIU)
Bauchi Discussion Circle (BDC)
Youth Social Circle, Sokoto (YSC)
Kano Youth Association
Taron Masu Zumunta, Kano
Zaria Youth Association etc.
For further details, see Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 78.

130. Ibid. p. 239.

attention in Jos was more directed towards combating the activities of the Birom Progressive Union which, as was noted earlier, had grudges against them as a group. When in the 1950s, the Hausawa decided to participate in partisan politics, a majority of them join[ed] the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) because of its populist appeal to the talakawa classes (commoner classes) who formed the bulk of the immigrant wage - earning classes in the tin mines.[131]

The NPC was quick to discover the reasons for the strength of NEPU in Jos and quickly laid out a strategy to weaken and to ultimately destroy it. Thus, from 1952 to 1955, the NPC embarked upon a programme of taking over the leadership of the minesworkers union, the only organisation in the Jos area which contained nearly all the Hausawa in Jos.[132] The leadership of the Nigeria African Minesworkers Union (NAMU), as we

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131. In fact, during the second world war and immediately after, not only were the talakawa peasantry conscripted into the tinmines (DIBAN GWAMNA), but even the emirs were summoned to the mines to urge their conscripted talakawa to work hard. JOSPROF 1, 1: 2018/S.2 "Emberton Report, November and December 1942"; JOSPROF 111, 5102, "Annual Report, Plateau Province 1942". NAK.

132. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 337; Dudley B.J. op.cit. pp. 239 - 241.

noted in chapter three, was made up of mainly Igbo clerical, technical and artisan staff in the mines. There were, however, a few Northern members of similar ranks on its executive and its local committees whom the NPC controlled regional government, at Kaduna, used to distabilisie the minesworkers union and thereby also weakened NEPU in Jos urban area. Thus, using 'ethnicity', the NPC government instructed them to resign from Nigeria African Minesworkers Union to form a counter union, the Northern Minesworkers Union (NMU) following which there was an exodus of labourers mostly from the far North from NAMU.[133] This action seriously weakened the strength of trade unionism in the tin mines. Hence forth, there existed two minesworkers unions on the Plateau; the Northern Minesworkers Union, an affiliate of the NPC and the now weakened NAMU. Alhaji Isa Haruna, who became the President of the newly formed NPC-sponsored Northern Minesworkers Union, was also the provincial Chairman of the NPC on the Plateau which testified to the direct connection between the two.[134] Yet the NPC never became really strong in Jos Division before 1960 and even more so in the other Divisions of

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133. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 240.

134. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 337; Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 258 fn. 13.

the province. For its strategy of taking over the mines-workers unions soon backfired.

Thus, when the other political parties became aware of NPC manoevres in the tin mines, they also instigated the non-Hausa labourers in the Northern Minesworkers Union to pull out of the union to form their own separate trade unions based on their own ethnic groups. As a result, in 1956, the Birom Minesworkers Union, the Tiv Minesworkers Union andothers in the lower North formed the Middle Belt Minesworkers Union which became affiliated to the United Middle Belt Congress.[135]

These developments on the tin mines, namely, the formation of an NPC sponsored and affiliated trade union (the NMU); the UMBC sponsored and affiliated union the MBMU); and the original NUMU which became weakened but which supported NEPU and the NCNC together underscored the extent to which petty bourgeois politicians penetrated and manipulated the ethnic configuration of the minesworkers to ruin trade union solidarity in the tin mines. For the political parties, none of which represented the objective interest of the minesworkers, gained while the pursuit of thecollective objective interest of mines-workers was abandoned in favour of the selfish interests

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135. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 240.

of the petty bourgeois politicians through the bogey of ethnic interests. This provided another instance whereby an objective inter-class conflict was deformed and converted into an intra-class squabble. On this, Sklar has observed that it was odd that the NPC, which was the least socialistic or laboristic of all the three major parties in Nigeria as we shall show in the next chapter, showed a greater integration with a trade union.[136] This was planned and achieved by the NPC regional government which demonstrates abundantly the involvement and the central role of the regional government in moulding political developments in the Plateau province.

Apart from its success in penetrating trade unions in the tin mines, the NPC controlled regional government was not very successful in effecting any other significant political gains in the province up to 1959 although there is evidence to show that the NPC government used provincial and divisional administrative institutions as leverage for indirectly coercing civil servants and chiefs to support the NPC.[137] On the Plateau, every Division experienced the misuse of Native Authorities in pursuit of this goal. This was shown in

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136. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 495 (fn. 40.)

137. Yahaya, A.D. The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria, Zaria, 1980 pp. 120 - 168; Whitaker, C.S. op.cit. p. 92; Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 324; Dudley, B.J. op.cit. pp. 186 - 190.

the manner in which some chiefs were deliberately upgraded and co-opted as members of the House of chiefs while the Chiefs of bigger chiefdoms whose support for NPC was doubted were left. Thus, throughout the life of the Northern House of Chiefs, the chief of the small sub-emirate of Jema'a was a member.[138] Yet it was only a small chiefdom compared with others in the province whose chiefs were ignored. Besides, the use of chiefs, the NPC government made use of the provincial secretaries and Divisional officers also, especially, the new cadre of regional officials known as provincial commissioners who came into being after 1960 and whose main duty was to ensure that the tone of administration was conducted to favour NPC supporters whether they be chiefs, civil servants, businessmen, contractors or chiefs.

Nevertheless, these attempts did not produce the type of support which it did in the emirate areas of the far North. For in the latter areas, it was easy for an emir and his district heads, who, at any rate, were members of the same family,[139] to coerce their subjects into supporting the NPC party and government. In the Plateau province, however, it was not easy for paramount chiefs, who had come into existence largely because of the

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138. Hansard, Debates House of Chiefs, 1947. Kaduna p.1.

139. Whitaker, C.S. op.cit. pp. 269 - 270.

struggles of the educated elites of their respective chiefdoms, to mobilise their subjects to fight against these very elites most of who were opposed to the NPC. At any rate, neither these paramount chiefs nor their district heads, had the power to coerce their subjects into supporting or opposing any political party because, unlike their counterparts in thefar northern emirates, these chiefs were a new creation whose political power and authority was not sufficiently rooted in the traditions of their peoples to allow for such coercion.

Despite these limitations, the chiefs were the main instrument which the NPC used in penetrating the Plateau province. As we have pointed out already, this was done by upgrading pro-NPC chiefs while anti-NPC ones were ignored. It should be remarked that upgrading and membership to the Northern House of Chiefs conferred social and material benefits to the chiefs involved through fat salaries, allowances, and fringe benefits such as car and housing loans.[140] These were in addition to appointments to government boards and accessibility to bank loans from which some of the chiefs benefitted. None of the Plateau Chiefs, however, seemed to have benefitted from the chairmanship of the Boards for none of them were appointed to such posts.[141] The point is that these material

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140. Ibid. p. 423.

141. His Royal Highness, Dr. F. Bot; interviewed 3/12/1982 Jos Palace.

benefits were used as a bait for luring the chiefs to support the NPC and most of the Plateau chiefs fell victims of it. For nearly all the Plateau chiefs who became members of the House of Chiefs were NPC supporters.

Again, the Jos Division, the cockpit of Plateau politics, provided a good example of regional government manipulation of the native authorities and chiefs to win support. Thus, at the heat of the crisis between the Birom and Hausawa elites in 1952 and 1953 to which reference was made earlier, the Sarkin Birom, Mallam Rwang Pam, 'declared' for the NPC for which he was promoted to a second class chief.[142] In the following year, 1954, he was ceremoniously installed as a second class chief and accorded a seat of that status in the Northern House of Chiefs.[143] In return, the newly promoted Sarkin Birom supported the candidacy of Mallam Muhammadu Dankarfalla, an NPC stalwart, to the office of Magajin Gari of Jos township in order to defeat the NEPU candidate who had been in control of the Jos Town Council since the 1951

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142. Of course the political opinion of Rwang Pam vis-a-vis the political parties was widely known to favour the NPC although there was no evidence of this in either a written form or his utterances. The records merely, reported his promotion to a second class chief and added that it pleased the Tribal Council. Niven, C.R. "Plateau Province Annual Reports for 1953" ARNR p. 118.

143. Counsell, E.H.M. "Plateau Province Annual Report for 1954". ARNR p. 111.

elections which had given them overwhelming victory over the NPC.[144]

In the same Division, the hitherto three independent Jerewa districts of northern Jos were constituted into a sub-Native Authority under a pro-NPC candidate who became its paramount chief, the Sarkin Pangana.[145] Later that same year, pressure was mounted from below to probe the newly appointed Sarki. And following the investigations, the Sarki and the Chief Scribe of Pangana federated sub-Native Authority were convicted of embezzlement for which they were imprisoned.[146] It was no wonder then that through these machinations, the Regional elections which followed, in 1956, the NPC increased its representation in the Jos Native Authority Council by securing the same number of elected representative as the NEPU.[147]

Another example of the use of the Native Authority system is to be found in Shendam Division especially in its handling of the peasant farmers of the Shendam Resettlement Scheme to which we referred earlier. Here, we noted that not only was the Block "B" of the Resettlement Scheme constituted into a sub-Native Authority,

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144. Niven, C.R. "Plateau Province Annual Report for 1951" ARNN pp. 59 - 60.

145. Niven, C.R. "Plateau Province Annual Report for 1953" ARNN p. 117.

146. Counsell E.H.M. "Plateau Province Annual Report for 1954." ARNN p. 112.

147. Ibid.

but even the constituency was gerrymandered in favour of Mr. Michael Audu Buba. It only remains to add that Mr. Michael Audud Buba (MHA), the President of the Lowland Federation Council, founded in 1953, was the Ciroma and the Wazirin Shendam (heir apparent and Secretary to chiefdom), a staunch supporter and a member of the Regional Executive of the NPC. By 1958, he had already secured appointment as the Regional Minister of Social welfare and co-operatives.[148] His father, the Long Goemai of Shendam, was also an NPC supporter who was allowed to remain in power despite persistent complaints against him from the sub-chiefs of the Lowland Federation.[149]

In Pankshin Division which, in 1956, comprised of four sub-Native Authorities of Angas, Sura-Pyem, Ron-Kulere and Kanam, the NPC made attempts to take it also. Infact by 1958, the only chief in this Division whose support for the NPC was in some doubt was the Sarkin Ron-Kulere, Mallam Ajarmai. The rest had become open NPC supporters. For example, Chief J.Y. Dimlong, the Chief of Angas and President of the Pankshin Federated Council, was a provincial representative of the Regional Party Executive of the NPC.[150] Chief Mark Hirse Dalaham of the Sura-Pyem,

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148. Hansard, House of Assembly Debates, Northern Region, 1958 p. 2.

149. Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province Annual Report for 1955" ARNN pp. 112 - 113.

150. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 516.

who, in 1958, succeeded Dimlong as President of the Pankshin Federated Council not only became an NPC supporter but converted to Islam and, accordingly, changed his name to Mallam Muhammadu Rashid Dallaham.[151]

In Jema'a Division which ceded from Plateau province in 1957, except for the Chief of Kagoro who retained a reputation for resisting the overtures, intriques and manoevres of the NPC regional government and, accordingly, rejected the NPC,[152] the rest of the Chiefs in the area became NPC supporters. Similarly, in Akwanga Division, all the three paramount chiefs constituting the Native Authority of that Division were NPC supporters.[153] Such was the tight grip on the chiefs of the Plateau province by the regional government.

It is fairly easy to explain the success of the government over the chiefs inspite of the fact that their subjects who were led by the educated elites were strongly opoosed to the NPC. For in their support for the NPC government, the chiefs were naturally identifying with a party which was not only in power, but one which was vigorously

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151. The conversion of former Mark Hirse to Islam followed the conversion tours of the late Premier of Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto which he undertook between 1963 and 1965 in all the non Moslem areas of the Region.

152. Patrick Dokotri; interviewed 3/12/1982 - Bukuru.

153. Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province Annual Report for 1956" ARNN p. 131.

determined to protect and advance the interests of ruling aristocracies in the emirates and Borno - an interest which was obviously congruent to those of the emergent chiefly classes on the Plateau. Indeed, it would have been suicidal for the chiefs to have behaved otherwise since doing so would have meant the loss of the fat salaries and the other material benefits which their offices offered them.

Furthermore, this office offered the incumbents the opportunity of close contacts with the emirs and shehus in Kaduna which enabled them to learn, first hand, the grandeur of the latter to which they became increasingly attracted.[154] This, in turn, inculcated in the former the tastes and foibles associated with the ruling aristocracies whose objective interest the NPC practically represented. Most of the chiefs on the Plateau thus endowed, strove to prove that they were supporters of the NPC and the ideals for which it stood. It was even more so if they could prove to their mentors that their own subjects were also supporters of the NPC.

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154. This process began as early as 1929 when the colonial Governor of the North had convened an Advisory Council of Chiefs. In the following year, 1930 the Governor formally launched the Council of chiefs which henceforth, continued to hold annual conferences. At this early stage, the representatives from the Plateau province were the Emirs of Jemaa and Kanam, the Long Goemai (Shendam) and the Sarkin Jos who at this time was a Hausa. JOSPROF 1, 5/1931 "Annual Report - Plateau Province - 1930 -" NAK; but also see annual reports for 1929, 1930, 1931 & 1932 - ARNN.

But the manner in which many of these Chiefs coerced support for the NPC gave rise to another level at which the regional government involved itself in the politics of the Plateau, namely, that these chiefs often collaborated with the local police and the other institutions constituting the coercive arm of the colonial and post colonial state to harass and intimidate political opponents. Indeed, more often than not, the NPC organised thugs to burn the houses and offices of staunch UMBC and AG leaders and supporters. Since these thugs were sponsored by NPC officials, they were hardly prosecuted for the offences which they committed especially with the backing of the chiefs who were also local agents of the coercive arm of the colonial and postcolonial state. Sometimes these chiefs framed up charges against the leaders of the other political parties which led to the unjust arrest of the latter by the police. Many examples of these incidents exist but they are yet to be properly documented.[155] However, the educated elites who led the

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155. According to Mr. P.F. Datok who successively served the Regional government, the Benue-Plateau State government and the Plateau State government as a very senior administrative officer, political victimisation heightened during the 1964 elections in particular because the Plateau politicians, having switched over to the NPC, faced serious challenges from the younger crop of leaders who had seen through the bankruptcy of the old timers and were busy explaining it to the masses. Some of them, notably, Solomon Lar succeeded in wining elections but most of them were simply frustrated into silence by the older politicians who employed and unleashed all kinds of intrigues on them. Mr.Datok is a local historian who watched these developments with a keen interest. He is the author of A Short History of Sura Jos, 1982. His last post was that of a Commissioner for Local Government in Plateau state 1979 - 1983 when he voluntarily resigned. I held several discussions with him on various aspects of this study.

UMBC and the AG fought back especially if their support among the populace was overwhelming. One example which is easily remembered among the Angas of Pankshin Division is the fight which Mr. Gabriel Wuyep, an AG leader in that Division, gave to Chief J.Y. Dimlong whom, we have already noted, was a provincial representative on the Regional Executive of the NPC. Thus in 1958, the latter tried to manoevre himself into becoming a life President of the Divisional Council but Mr. Gabriel Wuyep who was an Angas elite linked up with the other non Angas chiefs not only to block the proposal but to remove Chief Dimlong from office as President of the Pankshin Federated Native Council and whose removal was effected later in the year.[156]

But the interference of the regional government in politics on the Plateau was not only limited to the use of chiefs for the provincial and native authority bureaucracies were also used. For example, on numerous occasions, the provincial secretaries and the Divisional officers instructed the police not to grant permits to non NPC parties in the province for holding political rallies. And on occasions when the police had no excuse to refuse the permits, such rallies, when they held, were dispersed almost as soon as they had started under one form of pretext or another. For example, during the 1959

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156. Warren, K.D. "Plateau Province Annual Report for 1958" ARNN p. 118.

Federal elections, NPC leaders got permits well in advance of the time to prepare for their rallies while opposition parties were reluctantly given such permits only on the very day of such rallies which made it organisationally impossible to hold such rallies.[157] The judges were similarly used. For these judges freed NPC thugs and criminals whenever they were accused or merely reprimanded them even if their crimes were serious especially where they could not be covered up by legal technicalities. A good example of this instance occured in 1958 in the episode which we related above concerning Mr. Gabriel Wuyep and Chief J.Y. Dimlong. For when Chief Dimlong failed in his bit to become the life President of the Pankshin Federated Native Authority and was removed as President, he organised thugs who burnt up the residence of Mr. Wuyep. Four of these thugs were caught and handed over to the police who deliberately framed very weak charges against them and, subsequently, the judge accordingly discharged the culprits.[158] On the other hand, supporters of the UMBC and AG were jailed and fined, after much physical beating and humiliation, on very flimsy charges which ranged from disrespect to traditional rulers to that of inciting the public. Examples of these abound

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157. Mr. P.F. Datok; David Dimka; Patrick Dokotri etc. Passim.

158. David Dimka; interviewed 30/5/1979 - Kabwir.

especially those gathered from oral interviews. Note, for example, the case of Mr. Othniel Sekirong and Mallam Hosea Yabal, both of Panyam District and supporters of the AG, who, in 1959, were remanded on the orders of Pastor Lot who alleged that they had been impolite to him in a reference alluded to himself during a rally.[159] Similarly, Mr. Y. Kopsam, a trained teacher with the SUM was arrested in Pankshin for a charge of "undermining government efforts" in his village at Chip.[160] When he was eventually discharged he was put under strict surveillance by the Church also on order of Pastor Lot. Yet all the three victims were communicant members of Pastor Lot's Church.[161]

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159. Mr. O. Sekirong, interviewed 29/12/1979 - Panyam.

160. According to Mr. Yadang Kopsam, the N.A. police refused to give him a copy of the charge, when he demanded it, which was written in Hausa - haddin makarkashiya akan aikin gwamnati (organising the subvertion of government work). The police released him after a day when they realised that they could not prosecute such a charge in court successfully but more importantly for fear that Chip people might riot on hearing the news of his arrest. Interview with Mr. Y. Kopsam 4/12/1982 - Jos. He is now a Principal Education Officer (Special Education) in the Ministry of Education HQS. - Jos.

161. Although Chip District was administratively an Angas district, it was under Panyam District in terms of Church administration. Infact, Mallam Hosea Yabal was eventually "excommunicated" from the Church on the grounds that his son, who was already adult member of the Church, had committed adultery. He was however, reabsorbed later.

Besides the intimidation and harassment meted out to non NPC leaders and supporters, some native authority staff were forced to campaign for the NPC. Failure to do so was taken to mean that such a staff was a supporter of the opposition party which often resulted in lost of promotion or, in some cases, outright dismissal. All these helped, in no small measure, to shape peoples' political attitudes either for or against the NPC regional government.

In terms of patronages, the regional government tended to neglect even its leaders in the Plateau province especially those outside Jos township even though the Plateau province was a major contributor to the revenue of the Region in lieu of the royalties accruing from the tinfields.[162] Yet, in terms of general economic development, the Plateau was conspicuously neglected. For apart from the promotion of some chiefs to which we have referred, the regional government did very little to develop the province. No major industry was located in the province between 1951 and 1960 except a Fish Farm located in Panyam which began production in 1955[163] in

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162. The revenue estimate for 1919 showed that royalty on tin export and leases amounted to about £80,800 out of an estimated total royalty of £85,000 for the Northern Provinces as a whole. The tin industry thus accounted for about 95% of the estimated total royalty for the Region. This trend continued throughout the colonial period despite the relative decline in the percentage of tin's contribution as other sectors of the economy grew. See, SNP 9, 1915/1919 "Northern Provinces: Revenue Estimates 1920" NAK; also NIGERIA: NORTH's ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION A Publication by the Ministry of Information, Kaduna, 1967.

163. Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province Annual Report for 1955" ARNN p. 118.

addition to the Shendam Resettlement Scheme about which we have said much. In the case of the latter, it will be recalled, that the scheme was established by the colonial government in 1949. When the NPC government came to power in 1951, it neither expanded the scheme nor reviewed the goals and objectives of the scheme with a view to making it benefit the local communities more than before. Nor did the regional government develop adequate infrastructure in the province which would enhance economic growth and development.[164] All its major roads, hotels and such like were built by the colonial government and not the NPC government which even refused to tar the road linking Jos and Kaduna, the regional capital.[165]

The position of the Plateau province was even worse in terms of appointments both in the regional civil service proper and into its public boards. For despite the fact that, by the 1950s, the Plateau was one of the provinces with a relatively high proportion of qualified personnel or manpower, not even one regional permanent

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164. It has, however, been argued in terms of social services, that although government did not actually establish schools, hospitals etc. it heavily subsidised the ones established by the Mission and, therefore, did not neglect the province. See Bryant, S.S. But Always As Friends 1969 p. 335. But see, in particular, Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the fears of Minorities and the means of allaying them. July 1958 p. 58.

165. Bryant, S.S. op.cit. p. 335.

secretary was appointed from the province up to independence. At the political level not even the Jos - based Hausawa NPC leaders like Alhaji Gobezanteshi, Alhaji Ali Kazaure, Alhaji Isa Haruna (Bisichi), Mallam Muhammadu Denkarfalla and others were able to secure serious political appointments at the regional level other than the contracts which they often won. For the maximum number of regional ministers that could be appointed from the whole of the Plateau province were pegged at three.[166] By 1964, four years after independence, only one minister from the province, Mr. Michael Audu Duba, was serving in the cabinet of the regional government.

Nor did the Plateau province fared well in terms of securing board membership of any of the several Regional Boards. Professor Dudley has documented the structural distribution of some of the boards memberships which show very clearly the groups and classes of Northern Nigerians who the regional government favoured. Some of these are reproduced below:

A. Of the total membership of 144 of the Provincial Loans Boards existing in 1958 in the twelve provinces of the North:

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166. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 203. But according to Bryan S. Smith, the Colonial Governor of the North 1952 - 1957, the three ministerial positions were initially allocated to the whole of the Lower Northern provinces together; and, even so, at his own insistance. Bryan, S.S. op.cit. pp. 237 - 8.

8% were Emirs and Chiefs
17.5% were district and village heads
37.6% were Native Authority Councillors and Official
15% were legislators.
14% were traders.
8% were auctioners, pastors and others.[167]

B. Of the 20 people who at one time or the other were members of the Northern Regional Production and Development Board 1950 - 1955;
40% were emirs i.e. 8 members were emirs
55% were Legislators i.e. about 11 members were Legislators ⌊25% of those legislators were district heads.⌋[168]
5% were District Heads i.e. 1 member.

C. Of the 23 people who in one year or other formed the Board of the Northern Development Corporation (Loans) from 1950 - 1958;
26% were Emirs
69.5% were Legislators of which 17% were district heads.
4.5% were traders.[169]

Any scholar who is familiar with the social structure of the North would have very little difficulty in deducing, from the above statistics, what classes of Northerners benefitted from these boards. For within the context of Northern Nigeria; the emirs, legislators, district heads and the Native Authority councillors, were all members of the ruling aristocracies, except in some parts of the lower Northern provinces such as Benue, Kabba and Plateau

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167. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 142.
168. Ibid. p. 142.
169. Ibid. p. 142.

where the educated elites, who rose from the ranks of commoners, occupied similar positions by virtue of their education.[170] Thus, even without mentioning names, the Plateau province which had only three tiny sub-emirates; several 'upgraded' chieftaincies; and compound native authority systems could not produce the grand emirs, district heads and native authority councillors typical of the Caliphate and Borno who were the obvious beneficiaries of these 'development' boards. In practice, these boards were important mechanisms for capital accumulation by the Northern ruling aristocracies,[171] because they provided the means by which the wealth of the Northern Region which was produced by the talakawa of its twelve provinces (13 from 1961) was appropriated by these ruling classes.

Thus, deprived of the benefits from these facilities as well as of general economic development, the Plateau province remained relatively poor; it had neither a strong nor a credit worthy entrepreneural classes especially among the indigenes. This had effects on political attitudes and activity. For it provided evidence of discrimination against the province which, together with the fear of Islam and Hausa-Fulani domination, justified the demand for a separate state out of the Northern Region.

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170. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 323.

171. Whitaker, C.S. op.cit. p. 389.

From the above discussion, therefore, it is clear that inspite of the internal contradictions within the Plateau province and the conflicts to which they gave rise, external factors, especially the activities of the regional government, also affected the nature and form of these conflicts. For, as we have indicated in various parts of this thesis, the behaviour and performance of the regional government tended to encourage religious and ethnic fears which, when grafted on to the peculiar economic discrimination and general underdevelopment of the province, produced an objective basis for the fear of domination by the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy of the Northern Region.

In this regard, it is important to point out here that the Willink Commission, popularly known as the Minorities Commission, which was set up in 1958 to look into the fears of minority groups in Nigeria and to propose recommendations for solving them, did find that the fears of minority groups in Nigeria were justified.[172] From the benefit of hindsight, the Commission only erred in its' recommended solutions to the problem.[173] This fear

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172. Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the fears of Minorities and the means of allaying them. London, July 1958, pp. 72 - 73.

173. Ibid. pp. 87 - 106.

of domination, we may emphasise, was central in providing the educated elites in Plateau with a 'Plateau enemy' against whom they 'fought', and thereby, perpetuated their own political leadership in the province. For as we noted earlier, the raison detre for these educated elites to plunge into active politics was to defend and protect the Plateau peoples against this seeming threat of socio-economic and political domination by the Hausa-Fulani ruling classes.

CHAPTER SIX.

PARTY POLITICS AND PETTY BOURGEOIS AMBIVALENCE 1951 - 1959.

INTRODUCTION:

So far, we have shown how the drive towards independence gave rise to certain constitutional developments such as the establishment of legislative houses. These developments, in turn, led to the rise of a class of educated elites who spearheaded and represented the peoples of the Plateau province in the march to self government in both the Regional and Federal legislative bodies of Nigeria. We also showed how the peculiar internal contradictions within the Plateau province enabled the emergent ruling classes, both indigenous and settler alike, to transform their intra class competition for power and wealth into a competition of the masses of the Plateau peoples in general, thereby, obscuring the basic contradiction between them collectively on the one hand; and the workers, the peasantry, and other dispossessed groups, as an oppressed class, on the other. This competition, we further noted, was articulated in predominantly ethnic and religions terms, as well as, in terms of "development" associations. The role of the regional government in intensifying political competition in these forms was also examined.

It only remains to highlight how the emergent ruling classes perpetuated their hegemony on Plateau politics by entrenching themselves as political leaders of the province during the last decade of colonial rule, that is, from 1951 - 1959, a period dominated by party politics all of which were fighting to wrestle power from the British. This entrenchment of thepetty bourgeois politicians on the Plateau continued after independence, in 1960. However, this development falls outside the period covered by this study.

In order to show how the Plateau political elites entrenched their hegemony over the politics of the province, therefore, it is necessary to examine their roles in party politics and in the regional and federal elections which took place between 1951 and 1959. For it was at the level of their relationship with political parties and the socio-economic interests which such parties represented that the political leaders of the Plateau, especially the indigenous educated elites who formed the majority, exhibited a high degree of political ambivalence. This ambivalence necessarily arose from the objective class position and interest of the educated elites which could not be dialectically reconciled to their alleged role of protecting the objective interests of the workers and peasantry of the province against colonial capitalism. For as a ruling class, the educated elites were now an

oppressor class. The dialectical relationship between them and the Plateau peasants, workers, and the other dispossessed groups, therefore, was one of antagonism and conflict rather than that of harmony and accomodation.[1]

THE POLITICAL PARTIES.

By 1951, there had emerged three major political parties in Nigeria: the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) formed in 1950; the Action Group (AG) formed in 1950; and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) formed in 1944.[2] Although these parties claimed to be national, each of them was basically regional - the NPC was mainly a Northern party, the AG a Western party, while the NCNC was a party based in the Eastern Region.[3] The NPC, however, controlled the centre by virtue of its size and the population of Northern Region which it controlled, a situation which created much political irritation, bitterness and resentment among southern political leaders. In the North itself, two political parties in opposition to the NPC were formed. These were the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) formed contemporaneously with

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1. Marx, K. and Engels, F. Selected Works Vol. 1, Moscow, 1977 p. 198.

2. Sklar, R.L. Nigerian Political Parties New Jersey, 1963 pp. 93, 102 and 57 respectively. He adds that in 1961, the NCNC changed its name to the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens p. 390 fn.

3. Ibid. pp. 87 - 112.

the NPC in 1951[4] and a separatist party already referred to previously, the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) formed in 1955.[5] The aims and objectives, organisation, leadership, followership and elections performances of these political parties at both the federal and regional level, have already been amply investigated and documented.[6] Our concern here is to discuss them with a view to demonstrating the political ambivalence of the Plateau educated elites.

In the Plateau province, however, neither the NPC nor the NEPU was strong even though the NEPU had the massive support of the Hausawa settlers in Jos township and in the mining camps.[7] For until 1955, when the UMBC was formed, the majority of the peoples of the province belonged to particularistic organisations and associations which were rarely registered as political parties. However, these particularistic unions and associations were affiliated to the pan-regional and religionist

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4. Dudley, B.J. Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria London, 1968 p. 80.

5. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 345.

6. The major works on these are: Coleman, J.S. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism Los Angeles, 1965; Sklar, R.L. Nigerian Political Parties. New Jersey 1963; Whitaker, C.S. The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946 - 1966; New Jersey, 1970; Dudley, B.J. Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria London, 1968; Mackintosh, J.P. Nigerian Government and Politics London 1966.

7. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 239.

Middle Zone League (MZL) which was discussed in the last chapter. As we pointed out then, the MZL was the successor to the Non Moslem League which was formed in 1949 following an attempt by a member of the House of Assembly to sponsor a motion restricting the activities of Christian missions in the Northern Region. With its headquarters in Jos, the MZL dominated the politics of the Plateau province prior to the formation of the UMBC in 1955.[8] But before we examine the political and electoral struggles of the MZL and the UMBC, a brief discussion of the roles of the NPC and the NEPU in the politics of the Plateau province is necessary; the more so since these two parties were strong and competed with the UMBC as well as with each other in the province.

As it is generally known, the NPC represented the interest of the traditional ruling aristocracies in the emirate areas of the North who, between 1900 and 1960, were undergoing transition from feudal to bourgeois ruling classes.[9] As the Native Authorities of their respective enclaves, these emirate aristocracies formed the bedrock of British indirect rule system of local administration in Northern Nigeria. Therefore, colonial exploitation of the North was mediated through their collaboration. The

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8. Ibid. p. 93.

9. Whitaker, C.S. op.cit. p. 308.

NPC was, thus, a political party founded in order to advance their interests as local exploiters during the necessary transition from a predominantly feudal mode of production to that of Capitalism through colonial rule. Consequently, the leadership of the NPC was drawn from the traditional ruling classes who already occupied important positions in the Native Authority hierarchies of the North. This control of the Native Authority systems by the NPC enabled it to manipulate and to use the Native Authority functionaries to propagate its political ideas, canvass for political and electoral support as well as to punish members of the opposition parties.[10]

Although the NPC was clearly unpopular among the majority of the Plateau peoples, its activities were nevertheless felt in each of the five Divisions of the province. For as we noted earlier, most Plateau chiefs supported the NPC and used their positions as leaders and chairmen of the Native Authorities and sub-Native Authorities to coerce the people to support the party in their respective domains. Nevertheless, it was only in Jos, the provincial capital, that the NPC made its greatest impact inspite of its initial setbacks between 1951 and 1956. For here, as in most of the other urban centres of the North, successful businessmen

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10. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. pp. 185 - 190.

and contractors embraced the NPC. These included people like Alhaji Gobe Zan-tashi (NPC Divisional Chairman), Alhaji Muhammadu Dan Kafalla, Alhaji Alin Iliya, Alhaji Ali Kazaure, Alhaji Isa Haruna (NPC Provincial Chairman), Audu Danladi and several others in Jos township and the surrounding mining settlements.[11] These provided the financial resources with which the NPC organisational structures in the province were funded in addition to their use of the Native Authority structures to coerce support from the people.

But inspite of these financial and administrative advantages in its favour, the NPC was unpopular among the talakawa in Jos as it was in many other provinces of the North.[12] Nevertheless, between its inception in 1950 and 1956, it gradually grew stronger and stronger. For by then, it had not only penetrated the ranks of the tin mines workers unions but it had equalled NEPU in the number of representatives in the Jos Township Council.[13] Outside Jos, the NPC had very little support except in Pankshin, Kanam sub-emirate, Shendam and Jema'a sub-

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11. Jos Town Council: N.A. Reorganisation D.O. File S. 13, Jos.

12. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 80; Whitaker, C.S. op.cit. pp. 379 - 380.

13. Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province, Annual Report for 1956" ARNN p. 129.

emirate. Even in these areas, NPC support was focussed on individual leaders rather than on its ideals and programmes. This was certainly the case for Pankshin where the people had personal respect for Chief J.Y. Dimlong (MHR).[14] The same was true of Kanam and Jema'a sub-emirates whose social structure was akin to the emirates of the far North, the stronghold of the NPC. Infact, from the inception of the House of Chiefs, the Madakin Jema'a, Malam Muhammadu, was a member.[15] Similarly, the strength of the NPC in Shendam town was a mark of support for the Wazirin Shendam, Mr. Michael Audu Buba, rather than the Goemai's identification with the ideals and programmes of that party.[16]

The NEPU on the other hand, was popular among the Hausawa petty traders, bicycle rentiers, labourers and junior government workers, butchers and, generally among the oppressed classes of the Hausawa settlers in Jos Division.[17] For as a populist party, the NEPU appealed

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14. David D. Dimka (MHR) The same constituency. Interviewed 30th May 1979 - Kabwir.

15. Hansard, Debates, Northern House of Chiefs, 1947, p. 1.

16. Apart from his formal education which was an obvious advantage in terms of political leverage, Mr. Michael A. Buba was the son of the Chief of Shendam against whom it was difficult to organise opposition. He began the formal use of the title of waziri in 1954. Hansard, Northern House of Assembly Debates 1954. p. 3.

17. Patrick Dokotri; Interviewed 3rd Dec. 1982 - Bukuru.

to all the talakawa of the emirates many of whose parents or they themselves had migrated to settle in Jos as mines-workers.[18] Ideologically, the NEPU represented a movement which sought to secure more humane treatment of the talakawa from the ruling aristocracies of the emirates, and athough it did not appear to be committed to wrestling the reigns of political power from the control of the emirate aristocracies, it fought for democratic reforms of the native authority system to provide for adequate participation of the talakawa in local government.[19] Within the context of the time, the NEPU was the most progressive party in Northern Nigeria since it was primarily concerned with popular participation and public accountability at all levels of government.[20] Naturally, its professed commitment to bettering the conditions of the talakawa made it appeal to the talakawa peasantry against whom the exploitative machinery of the Native Authorities was directed. Furthermore, it has been alleged that the NEPU also represented a growing resentment to Fulani hegemony via its preference for the Tijaniyya sect as against the Qadiriyya to which the emirate ruling aristocracies invariably belonged.[21] This

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18. Ibid. But also see; Dudley, B.J. op.cit. pp. 234 - 235.
19. Ibid. p. 169.
20. Whitaker, C.S. op.cit. pp. 358 - 359.
21. Ibid. pp. 396 - 397.

implied that the bulk of the NEPU followers were Hausawa talakawa as opposed to the predominantly Fulani ruling oligarchy which the Sokoto jihad and Caliphate had brought into being.[22]

In terms of leadership, most of the NEPU leaders were drawn from the lower cadres of the Native Authority functionaries such as school teachers and the Koranic mallams, but its leadership also included a substantial number of petty traders and artisans. Indeed, according to Dudley, up till 1962, apart from the two lawyers which it coopted from the NCNC, only its leader, Mallam Aminu Kano, had received university education.[23] For it has been observed that although the NEPU doctrines generally appealed to a large number of the Northern intellectuals including many salaried officials of the Native Administrations, many of them were anxious for personal advancement within the NPC - controlled system and, therefore, were disinclined to openly identify with NEPU radicalism because this would bring them into conflict with the ruling classes who decided the formers appointments and promotions.[24] This problem of leadership naturally limited the funding of the NEPU and,

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22. Ibid. 382 - 383; 396 - 397.

23. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 178.

24. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 335.

its activities also. For, unlike the NPC which was patronised by the wealthy merchants (attajirai) such as Ahmadu Dantata,[25] NEPU was not only void of this class of tycoons but could not manipulate the native administration functionaries which were already under the firm control of the NPC. Inspite of these limitations, NEPU activities were felt in all the provinces of the North particularly in urban centres such as Zaria, Funtua, Soba, Jos, Bauchi, Maiduguri and in its base at Kano.[26]

In the Plateau province, the activities of the NEPU were confined to Jos Division, particularly, Jos township and to the mining settlements where, as we noted earlier, there were concentrations of Hausawa settlers from Kano, Bauchi, Zaria, Sokoto and other centres of the North. It was mainly these Hausawa settlers who embraced the NEPU in Jos. The NEPU failed to expand outside Jos township and the mining settlements mainly because its programme did not articulate the problems of the dispossessed Birom and the other indigenous peasantries such as land compensation, compulsory recruitment to the tinfield as labourers, heavy poll taxes etc. This was partly due to the failure of the NEPU leadership to

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25. Ibid. pp. 334 - 335.

26. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 80.

articulate the egalitarian ideals and principles of the party in a manner that would win the sympathy of the dispossessed Birom and the other indigenous peasantries so as to identify with it. The failure to do so was the more serious because instead of cultivating a comradely relationship with the indigenous talakawa and other oppressed classes of the province, the NEPU leadership was overtly indifferent to and, in some cases, even hostile to these oppressed groups who formed the objective allies of the NEPU in Jos.[27] In this regard, it may be remarked that the NEPU in Jos was curiously more reactionary in its attitude towards the indigenes than the NPC from whom such a disposition would have been expected. We shall cite examples to demonstrate this.

Firstly, following the overwhelming victories of the NEPU in the Regional elections of 1951, when the control of the Jos Town Council went to it,[28] in the following year, NEPU demanded that the Jos Native Town be severed from the Jos Native Authority Council and that its 'ruler', the *magajin gari*, be reinstated as *Sarkin Jos*.[29] These demands unnecessarily sought to reverse the

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27. "Complaints to Resident J.T.C. from Hausa Tribal Union" 23rd April 1960. Jos Town Council P. 18. Jos.

28. Niven, C.R. "Plateau Province, Annual Report 1951" ARNN pp. 59 - 60.

29. Niven, C.R. "Plateau Province, Annual Report 1952" ARNN p. 103.

legitimate political hegemony of the Birom over Jos which the Colonial government had returned to the latter since 1947. Secondly, it was the NEPU leadership in Jos under Isiaku Gwamna, Mallam Tanko Waziri, Adamu Dan Garkwa, Saadu Shema, Jibrin Zololo, Ahmadu Gwaram and others[30] who spearheaded the formation of the Hausa Tribal Party in 1956, as a Hausawa organ to counteract the legitimate demands and activities of the Birom Progressive Union. These actions and many others naturally alienated the Birom elites and the peasantry from the NEPU, and they do explain why the NEPU was, despite its populist stance, not popular with them.

On the other hand, it is to be noted that it was the NPC leaders, especially Alhaji Isa Haruna and his supporters, who, because they perceived the Birom question correctly, succeeded in wining the support of some of the Birom elites especially Mallam Kwang Pam and his supporters. For they duly recognised Kwang Pam as the Sarkin Jos who, in return, asked his supporters and the Birom representatives in the Jos Town Council and the Jos Native Authority Council as a whole to co-operate with the NPC representatives in the two councils.[31] Thus, in

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30. Jos Town Council; M.A. Reorganisation D.O. File S. 13, 1960. Jos.

31. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. pp. 236 - 237.

1952, the same year that the NEPU sought for his replacement, Rwang Pam began to use his position as Sarkin Jos with the full backing of the NPC leaders to appoint Mallam Muhammadu Dan Karfalla, an NPC stalwart, to the post of the Magajin Gari of the Jos Native Town.[32] This move, which was eventually ratified by the Regional Government in 1954, enabled the NPC to take control of the Jos Native Town, the main Hausawa settlement base in Jos Division. Consequently, in the second regional elections which took place in 1956, the NPC registered substantial victories which brought its membership on the Jos Town Council at par with that of the NEPU.[33]

Thus far, we have shown that apart from the UMBC, only the NPC and the NEPU made any significant impact in the Plateau province, particularly, in Jos Division. To be sure, the AG and the NCNC had supporters in the province but these were mainly drawn from the Southern elements who were mostly settled in Jos and Bukuru townships. The Yoruba generally supported and voted for AG while the Igbo and the other groups from the East voted for the NCNC.[34] Both parties won elections in some of the electoral wards of Jos township but lost at the second stagewhich finally decided which of the

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32. "Resident Plateau to SNP" 8th October, 1952. Jos Town Council Affairs, MLG 4376 Vol. 1 - Jos.

33. Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province, Annual Report 1956" ARNN p. 129.

victorious candidates were to represent the province in either Kaduna or Lagos.[35]

Nevertheless, both parties continued to exist and their impact became markedly felt with the commencement of party alliances from 1954. For example, in the 1954 Federal elections, the NEPU and the NCNC, consummated a victorious alliance pact which, as we noted in chapter three, the NPC feared and accused the NEPU of selling out the Hausawan Jos to the Igbos (iniyamurai). Similarly, during the 1959 Federal elections, the AG and the UMBC contracted an alliance which resulted in a resounding victory for the UMBC - AG alliance in the Plateau province by wining 5 out of 9 seats allocated to the Plateau province leaving the remaining four to be shared between the NPC and NEPU.[36] For this alliance enabled the UMBC to get financial assistance from the AG for its election campaigns without which the result would have certainly been different. So much thus far for the fortunes and manoevres of the different "regional" political parties on the Plateau. We can now return to a discussion of the MZL and, its successor, the UMBC, the

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35. Niven, C.R. "Plateau Province Annual Report 1951" ARNN p. 60. The same report mentions the appointment of one Mr. S.O. James, to the Northern House of Assembly as a special member. He was a Yoruba, and according to Sklar, an employee of the United African Company (UAC) Jos. See Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 34 fn.

36. The Nigerian Citizen, 19th December, 1959.

dominant party in the Plateau province throughout the last decade of colonial rule.

Although the MZL was supposed to bring all the non Moslem peoples of the North together, its core was made up of only Christian politicians from the Plateau supported by those from Adamawa, south-western Bauchi and southern Zaria provinces.[37] This was due to two major reasons. Firstly, the Plateau province was one of the Northern provinces where Christianity had won a substantial following. It must be observed here at once that the statistics on this important subject for the province or even for the whole Region are not easy to compute owing to the fact that each Mission denomination kept separate records which are not readily given to researchers even today.[38] However, an impression of the size of the Christian population in the 1950s can be gleaned from the Willinks Commission on minorities, in 1958, which gave a figure of only 547,000 for all the Christians in the Northern provinces put together as against 11,322,000 Moslems and 4,279,000 animists.[39] We may surmise that the Plateau, which

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37. Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the fears of Minorities and the means of allaying them. July 1958 p. 72.

38. This author made attempts to use the SUM library in the Headquarters in Jos but was unsuccessful. The Bishops office which appeared to co-operate confined me to its general library and the Bishop also granted me an interview after which I left.

39. Report of the Commission...fears of Minorities... July 1958, p. 72.

together with Benue and Kabba provinces had the highest concentration of Christian institutions and churches, had a substantial proportion of the above figure.[40]

Secondly, except for the Birom Progressive Union and the Yergam Union, no other serious ethnic organisations were formerly founded in the province even though attempts were made, here and there, to form such unions. Therefore, avenues through which political expressions could be channelled were few if any at all. In Benue and Kabba provinces, where Christian missionary activities had made similar impact on the peoples, ethnic unions emerged before the development of party politics. This was due to the fact that the dominant elites, two in each, of both provinces were more preoccupied with competition for the control of the local government machineries in their respective provinces than with anything else.[41] In Benue, the rivalry was mainly between the elites of the Tiv and the Idoma while in Kabba, it was mainly between the elites of the Igala and those of the Igbirra.[42]

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40. In a querry to the Minister of Education concerning the total number of Teachers Colleges and their spread over the region, the Minister gave a figure of 35 colleges, 20 of which were owned by the Christian missions and located in the Lower North, the names and other details of which he provided. The same was true, but with variations, of Hospitals, dispensaries etc. Hansard, House of Assembly Debates, 1958. 11th Dec. 1958 p. 198.

41. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 245.

42. Ibid. pp. 245 - 254.

Nevertheless, it was the politicians of the Benue province particularly the Tiv, who first articulated an open demand for a separate Middle Belt State.[43] To this end, they formed the Middle Belt Peoples Party (MBPP) in 1953.[44] It was the merger of this party with the MZL, in 1956, which became the United Middle Belt Congress.

Ethnic rivalry of the types in Benue and Kabba were relatively absent in the Plateau province because, firstly, there were numerous ethnic groups none of which was big enough to dominate the others. Secondly, the province was divided into only nine constituencies which meant that only a few individuals could be elected to both regional and national houses of legislature. Yet, there were a total of over 40 ethnic groups.[45] Thirdly, and, more importantly, perhaps, was the fact that most of the educated elites who led the MZL were former graduates of Gindiri which served as a link between them.[46]

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43. Pastor Lot, President of the MZL published an article dissociating the MZL from the MBPP. See, The Nigerian Citizen, 23rd July 1953.

44. The first Convention of the Middle Belt Peoples Party was fixed for the 10th October, 1953. The Nigerian Citizen, 1st. October, 1953.

45. Ames, C.G. Gazetteers of the Plateau Province Jos, 1932, p. 6.

46. The important exceptions to this were Mr. Michael A. Buba, Patrick Fom, and Moses N. Rwang all of who were members of the Northern House of Assembly. They were trained by the Catholic Mission and therefore did not attend Gindiri.

The MZL basically sought to protect Christian interests, particularly, from the perceived threat of Islam. From this, one would assume that the bulk of the peasantry in the areas where it claimed to represent did not want to become Moslems even though they were not Christians. Clearly, by 1951, the educated elites in the Plateau province had taken control of political leadership in their respective communities mainly because these communities looked upon them as people who were knowledgeable in the politics and general developments of the new era.[47]

Gradually, this 'protective' role of the MZL developed into a demand for a separate state through continuing discussions between the MZL leaders and those of the Middle Belt Peoples Party (MBPP) based in the Benue and Kabba provinces.[48] Thus, as we pointed out earlier, after two unsuccessful attempts at a merger, these two anti-Fulani cum Islam sentiments gave rise to a formal merger, in 1955, to a movement aimed at creating a separate Middle Belt Region from the Northern Region. This movement, the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) was also registered as a political party.[49]

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47. David Dimka; Ayuba Kumm; Patrick Dokotri and others. Interviewed at various dates passim.

48. Dudley, B.J. op. cit. p. 94.

49. Ibid. p. 94 - 95.

The years between 1951 and 1959 were very decisive years for the Northern U^{i} n. For it was then that struggles and debates c< acerning the continuation I

Ion as one unit or two units w< i c< ncluded. In process of the tes over this issue the- inconsistency, ambivalence, and lack of commitment of most of the elJ of the Lower North provinces to the cause of Christia- nity and the 'liberal,; i' their , usa - Fulani domination which the Middle Belt represented was

sod. This was clearly manifest' in the elect performances of the UM3C as wi I s in theen emic in- within its 1 i ranks whic i t< splits, explulsions nter expulsions of i its I ders - a situabion ssi n interpreted as indicative lack if "very settled convictions on thepart of the UMBC itsi If.

Thus between 1951 " '9, bl re were ir elections. Two of those elections, 1951 and 1956, were for the election of representatives t: the North rn i: >use of Assembly in Kaduna, while the other two, in IS and 1959, wer ! or the elecT,i< n • senti I Lv o t the Federal House of Repres in Laj s. On the Plateau, burning issue which the politician in these elections woo the protection of non M>sl< :

50. Rpport of the Commission... July 1958 . 72*

rumours naturally went round that Pastor L t

51. This is the singl* is runs thr i ;h histories of b md th C. j • tw ; represented dif res ns< the "fear of dominati a." On this, all autl Northern n 'gional • ' the Mi bi< s Commission or. or . real or imagj [, is ither matter,

5>2. Patrick Dokotri; I$_n$tervi« 3rd December] Bukuru. It woul r that i L< t Dokotri had th r their actJ n • two of the influential Chiefs in th ' >ne ~ those were, the Chi s, Rw; and the Chief of Ka ro, Llam Gwamna .Vwan.

the crisis within the MZL and the MBPP, and especially the future of the Plateau province within the context of the Middle Belt movement and the Northern Region which had preceded the election generated noticeable political awareness among the generality of the Plateau peoples.[65] To be sure, the annual report for that year paid more attention to this aspect of the elections than with the results. Wrote the acting Resident;

> What was more remarkable was the pronounced development in political feeling and consciousness that has taken place during the last three years ... To those who had taken part in the conduct of the 1951 Elections, it was remarkable how far and in how many areas, including some of the more primitive, the people have progressed both in organising themselves for elections and in their understanding of what was involved.[66]

Fearing that they might be blackmailed, during late 1954, Pastor Lot and Patrick Dokotri agreed to a reunion of all the separatist movements in the lower Northern provinces. Consequently, at a meeting in Kafanchan, in June 1955, called specifically for that purpose, the MZL and the MBPP formerly merged into a single movement which was, at the same time, a party known as the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC).[67]

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65. Counsell, E.H.M. "Plateau Province Annual Report for 1954" ARNN p. 111.

66. Ibid. p. 111.

67. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 95.

in the defunct MZL at Kagoro where they took the decision to ally the UMBC with the NPC.[71] As a reward, the NPC government appointed him a Minister without portfolio in the Northern Regional Government. His right-hand man, Patrick Dokotri, secured the post of a Parliamentary Secretary in the Ministry of Mines and Power in the NPC controlled Federal Government.[72]

At this juncture, it must be emphasised that the action of the Lot faction of the UMBC amounted to a betrayal of the UMBC; a treachery of the Christian and the communalist interests of the Plateau peoples and communities which they claimed to represent. More importantly, it was a concrete manifestation of petty bourgeois opportunism. Yet, Pastor Lot's ministerial appointment was locally celebrated in his District at Panyam and prayers of thanksgiving and protection for him were offered in the Panyam Church.[73] It was believed that God was

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71. As we said earlier, from all indications, they had the support of two important Christian Chiefs - Mallam Gwamna Awan, the Chief of Kagoro and Mallam Rwang Pam, the Chief of Jos. Apart from the fact that the latter had been promoted to a second class chief in 1954, his son Bitrus R. Pam belonged to Pastor Lots faction. See Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 96 and Counsell, E.H.M. "Plateau Province Annual Report for 1954" ARNN p. 111.

72. It is interesting to note the specific posting of Patrick Dokotri to the Ministry of Mines and Power at a time when Birom demands for land compensation was acute. See, Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province Annual Report 1955" ARNN p. 111 and the Annual Report for 1953, ARNN p. 119.

73. Mr. P.F. Datok; interviewed 4th Dec., 1982 - Jos.

In order to forestall the possibility of the NPC to manoevre wavering politicians of the Lot's type to cause a split within the newly formed UMBC, the delegates resolved that the UMBC would not affliate to any other party.[68] Furthermore, to cement solidarity within the new party, it was also resolved that those who were members of other political parties should resign their membership from such parties.[69] Finally, to ensure that the NPC would not succeed in splitting the UMBC, Pastor Lot - probably the most opportunistic politician within the leadership of the Middle Belt movement - was elected as its President.[70]

All the above safeguards failed. For while these arrangements were going on, Pastor Lot was secretly discussing the possibility of taking a ministerial appointment with the NPC government; and, to cap it all, in September 1955 - three months after the Kafanchan meeting, without the knowledge and approval of his party, Pastor Lot summoned a meeting of some of his old loyalists

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68. Ibid. p. 95.

69. Ibid. p. 95.

70. Pastor Lot strongly rejected this view of his election as President of the UMBC. For according to him, the fact of the matter was that delegates from both sides, rightly or wrongly, believed that he must play a leading role in the Middle Belt movement if it was to succeed. Interviewed 30th December, 1979 - Kanyam.

behind the appointment and would use Pastor Lot to make Northern regional leaders sympathise and patronise Christianity in Northern Nigeria. Wishful zealots even believed that God might use Pastor Lot to convert some of the Moslem leaders in the Northern government into Christianity.[74]

It should be noted that Pastor Lot's influence was not limited to his own electoral constituency in Pankshin-West, or even just to Pankshin Division, but to the whole of the Plateau province and the Christian populations in the North in general. For it will be recalled that Pastor Lot was one of the first three indigenous pastors ordained in 1938 on the Plateau. As a pastor and politician, he provided a vital link between the Church and the state through the political process. For as a Church leader, it was believed that Pastor Lot put forward the Christian position before government as well as opposed any contemplated law or policy by government which was detrimental to the Christian cause.[75] On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Moslem political leaders in the Regional government regarded Pastor Lot's opinions as those

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74. Ibid.

75. Ibid. This view about Pastor Lot was widely held particularly in his constituency where he was simply refered to as Mai Gida a title and connotation approximating to "Father".

MINORITY POLITICS AND ELECTIONS: THE UMBC LEADERSHIP.

Following the decision of Pastor Lot to ally the UMBC with the NPC in September 1955, Moses N. Rwang and Ado Ibrahim summoned a meeting of the remaining members of the UMBC in Jos later in the year. At this meeting, whose attendance showed that the Moses Rwang faction were the majority; Pastor Lot, Mr. Patrick Dokotri and their followers were expelled from the UMBC.[77] At another meeting of the Rwang faction held in Ilorin, in November 1955, the delegates proceeded to take concrete decisions on the future of the UMBC. In, particular, they restated their support for and commitment to the creation of a Middle Belt state.[78] At the same time, they drew up plans for the next Regional elections scheduled for 1956.

Fearing that they would lose their seats in the following elections, isolated as they had become, the Lot faction made desperate efforts to return to the mainstream of the UMBC.[79] Thus, just before the 1956 Regional elections, both Pastor Lot and Dokotri resigned their appointments with the Regional and Federal governments respectively. Contrary to penetrating the NPC caucus which the Lot faction had claimed was tactically necessary and

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77. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. pp. 95 - 96.

78. Ibid. p. 96.

79. Ibid. p. 96; also Sklar, L.S. op.cit. p. 347.

possible, when they forged an alliance with the NPC government, the latter had used their appointments to ministerial positions as a justification to intensify NPC activities in Jos. For example, NPC leaders in Jos openly instigated the Rukuba to break away from the Jos Native Authority Council in order to weaken the political militancy of the Birom and, with it, their 'domination' of the Native Council.[80] Furthermore, the purely ethnic party which we have discussed, the Hausa Tribal Party, demanded for the restoration of a Hausa Sarkin Jos.[81] Although this party was made up mainly of NEPU followers in Jos, the Birom whose interest Doketri claimed to represent saw the party as representing Heusawa desire to rule Jos whether they were NPC or NEPU followers. To worsen matters, the NPC Regional government appointed an NPC official to conduct an enquiry into the activities

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80. Weatherhead, A.T. "Plateau Province Annual Report for 1956" ARNN p. 129.

81. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 236 Dudley claims that the Hausa Tribal Party was affliated to the NPC. This would be an oversimplification of the problem. For like he correctly points out, the NPC in Jos was always divided between factions of Alhaji Gobe Zantashi (The Division Chairman) and those of Alhaji Isa Haruna (Provincial Chairman). The latter did not live in Jos township but in Bisichi; his lieutenant in Jos township was Mallam Muhammadu Dan Karfalla who, with the cooperation of Sarkin Jos, Rwang Pam, was made the Magajin Garin Jos. This author is in possession of a letter from NPC officials to the Resident urging the latter to restrain the activities of NEPU yan iska (i.e. NEPU hooligans) under the guise of Hausa Tribal Party. "Complaints to Resident JTC" Jos Town Council Affairs. F.O. File 18, MLG - Jos.

of the Sarkin Birom who, it was alleged, had imprisoned some 'pagans' from Bauchi for refusing to accept a Hausa man as their chief.[82] Issues such as these, were ones against which Dokotri and other Birom leaders had been elected in the 1951 and 1954 elections to fight and it was hoped that once they were elected into the various legislative houses of the country, they would solve them to the advantage of their electorate. But instead of settling these problems permanently in favour of the Birom, Dokotri and his ilk had allied with the government which the Birom, rightly or wrongly, believed to be the perpetrators of the socio-economic and political problems in Jos Division. As pressure from the Birom populace mounted, Dokotri was compelled to resign his appointment with the NPC Federal government in order to retain some measure of political credibility.[83] So in 1956, just before the elections, both Pastor Lot and Patrick Dokotri resigned their ministerial appointments with the NPC governments in Lagos and Kaduna respectively.[84]

In yet another effort to intensify the demand for a Middle Belt state, therefore, the Lot-Dokotri faction of the UMBC was readmitted into the majority faction led

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82. Hansard, House of Assembly Debates, Northern Region 26th February 1957 p. 252.

83. Patrick Dokotri, interviewed 3rd December 1982 Dukuru.

84. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 347; Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 96.

by Moses N. Rwang for a second time early in 1956. In the Regional elections which followed, in October 1956, all the candidates who contested under the UMBC were re-elected into the Northern House of Assembly inspite of the growing strength of the NPC in Jos township and the tinmines about which much has already been said. Following the UMBC victories at the elections, a formel meeting to readmit the Lot faction was convened in Jos late in November 1956.[85] At the meeting, temporary officers were also elected to run the affairs of the party, and Patrick Dokotri was made temporary secretary while one Mr. H.O. Abaagu (MHA), a Tiv, was made the temporary Chairman.[86] Participants at this meeting appeared more determined than even before to pursue the cause of a Middle Belt State; infact, the meeting itself was nicknamed the "unity meeting."[87]

But inspite of its apparent strength, the UMBC was in a poor financial condition. In the first place, its poor financial condition very seriously threatened the survival of the party as an electoral machinery. Secondly, it considerably limited its campaigns for the general education and mobilisation of the Middle Belt peoples to actively identify with the proposed state since propaganda

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85. Dudley B.J. op.cit. p. 96.

86. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 347.

87. Ibid. p. 347; Patrick Dokotri, interviewed 3rd December, 1982.

materials and tour of the area could not be carried out without funds. As part of the solution to the financial problem of the UMBC, Moses N. Rwang and Bello Ijumu began talks aimed at forging alliances with the NCNC and AG respectively.[88] Their efforts in this direction did not go down well with the other leaders of the UMBC. Consequently, in January 1957, at the party's Conference convened to consider the next line of actions, both Moses N. Rwang and Bello Ijumu were expelled from the party for anti-party activities.[89] At this meeting also, permanent officers of the UMBC were elected and Hon. J.S. Tarka (MHR) became President while Mr. Patrick Dokotri retained his post as Secretary.[90]

Just about this time, news of the London Conference and the setting up of a Commission to look into the fears and demands of minority groups in Nigeria were circulating.[91] The UMBC began to make preparations for

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88. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 96.

89. Ibid. p. 97.

90. Ibid. p. 97; Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 347.

91. This Commission was appointed in September 1957 by Alan Lennox-Boyd (MP), Secretary to the State for Colonies with the hope that its findings and recommendations would go along way to prepare Nigeria in its drive towards independence which had become apparent that it must take place within very few years. Members of the Commission were: Henry Willinks (Chairman), Gordon Hadow, Philip Mason and J.D. Shearer. Their terms of reference was reproduced at the beginning of the main report. Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the fears of Minorities and the means of allaying them. July 1958.

a strong submission and representation to the Minorities Commission, a task which required much money and organisation, if it was to succeed. The UMBC leaders correctly reasoned that it would be futile to seek the financial and moral support of the NPC for the cause of the Middle Belt State since it challenged the NPC political power as well as its concept of the North. It was, therefore, resolved that the UMBC would not ally with any of the Northern parties. At the same meeting, its leaders were mandated to begin negotiations for financial and other forms of assistance with any of the Southern political parties, in particular, the NCNC and the AG, both of which were anxious to strengthen their positions in the North.[92]

At this historical juncture, the AG, desirous to penetrate the mighty North during the independence elections scheduled for 1959, made the most attractive offer to the UMBC. For apart from promising to donate huge amounts of money to the UMBC,[93] the AG also promised to raise the Middle Belt State question at the independence

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92. This decision was curious in view of the explusion of Moses N. Rwang and Bello Ijumu whose offence was stated as an attempt to do just precisely what this particular meeting revolved to do, namely, contacting southern politicians for financial assistance. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 96 - 97.

93. According to Dudley, the AG spent over £100,000 on behalf of the UMBC - AG alliance in the 1961 regional elections, while its expenditure on the UMBC specifically was £22,000. Sklar has suggested that £50,000 was spent on the UMBC by the AG in the fiscal year 1958/9. See Dudley, B.J. op cit. pp. 194 - 195n; Sklar R.L. op.cit. p. 435n.

constitutional conference scheduled to hold in London early in 1959. Consequently, on May 6, 1957, a formal pact was signed between leaders of the UMBC and the AG.[94] According to Sklar, this alliance was only announced in October, five months later, and it was only ratified at Minna in May of the following year.[95]

It is not clear what the strategy behind the delay in announcing the alliance with the AG was for there was no way under which a State could be carved out of the Northern Region secretly. Nor was it prudent to assume that the NPC would not know about the alliance deal because the money given to the UMBC was bound to make the activities of the latter more noticeably felt throughout its areas of operation. At any rate, by the time a joint UMBC - AG meeting was held in Jos in September 1958, the Minorities Commission report was out. The case of the Middle Belt was lost and this formed a subject of bitter criticism at that meeting.[96]

Meanwhile, preparations were set in motion for the Federal elections of 1959 for the Federal House of Representatives. This election was important not only because it was the last general election in Nigeria before independence but also because it decided which of the political parties would form the first 'independence'

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94. Sklar R.L. op.cit. p. 347

95. Ibid. p. 347.

96. Sklar, R.L. op.cit. p. 349.

government of the Federation. This explains why the AG could spend so much time and money helping the UMBC.[97] The UMBC - AG alliance itself remained intact despite the unfavourable report of the Minorities Commission. But, at this time, it was the seemingly consistent Moses N. Rwang who curiously declared for the NPC in 1959.[98] Thus, except for Kanam, Akwanga and the Jos - based central constituencies which were NPC strongholds, the rest of the Plateau Constituencies solidly supported the UMBC-AG alliance which won 5 out of the 9 seats for the province. These were:

AKWANGA	-	Mall. Yakubu Allahnana	(NPC)	5,842
JOS CENTRAL	-	Sumaila Dichi	(NEPU)	12,067
JOS SOUTH	-	Alh. Isa Haruna	(NPC)	9,764
JOS NORTHWEST	-	Abubakar Isandu	(AG-UMBC)	8,693
LOWLAND EAST	-	Mr. Solomon S. Lar	(AG-UMBC)	6,179
LOWLAND WEST	-	Mr. George Yilgwen	(AG-UMBC)	9,230
ANGAS	-	Mr. David Dimka	(AG-UMBC)	10,439
KANAM	-	Mall. Aliyu Zungum	(NPC)	4,982
PANKSHIN WEST	-	Mr. Joseph Makingat	(AG-UMBC)	14,783[99]

But immediately after the elections, the UMBC - AG representatives from Plateau crossed over to the NPC because it became clear, after the elections, that the NPC was still the strongest party in the Federation and had a near monopoly hold over Northern Region. And since

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97. Ibid. pp. 266 - 267 ("The Action Group" i.e. AG).
98. The Nigerian Citizen, 5th August 1959.
99. The Nigerian Citizen, 19th December 1959.

there was no hope of creating the Middle Belt State the Plateau politicians believed that they stood to gain more from cooperation with the NPC then to continue with the AG-UMBC alliance.[100] Thus, by 1961, the terminal date of our discussion, the Plateau province had become a stronghold of the NPC as shown by the elections result below.

PARTY PERFORMANCES AT TWO ELECTIONS IN PLATEAU PROVINCE:

Year of Election	Name of political parties	Total number of constituencies contestable	Total number of constituencies won
1959 (Fed. House of Reps)	NPC	9	3
	NCNC-NEPU	9	1
	UMBC-AG	9	5
1961 (Regional House of Assemb. North)	NPC	9	7
	NCNC-NEPU	9	1
	UMBC-AG	9	1

Source: Dudley B.J. Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria. Table 6. p. 140.

AMBIVALENCE AND OPPORTUNISM.

It must be emphasised, immediately, that the eventual victory of the NPC in the Plateau province, as shown

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100. Asked, in 1961, why he crossed to the NPC Pastor Lot gave his often-quoted reply: "If you cannot beat them, join them." Dudley, B.J. "The Northern Peoples Congress" in Mackintosh, J.P. Nigerian Government and Politics. London, 1966 p. 539.

above, did not come about as a result of some major changes in the socio-economic policy of the Northern regional government in favour of the Plateau province. Nor did it come about as a result of a change in leadership of the UMBC which represented the interest of the Plateau peoples. Rather, it was brought about by the very same leaders who set out as representatives of the peoples of the Plateau province, a decade ago, against the same NPC Regional government. Our attempt here has been to establish this point. For nothing more than this demonstrates the opoortunism and ambivalence of Plateau politicians on the various interests and serious issues concerning the various communities on the Plateau who they represented in the various legislative bodies to which they had been elected to tackle. We have shown that between 1951 and 1955, once elected on the platform of 'fighting' the NPC interest and governments, the emergent Christian petty bourgeois on the Plateau, rather than fighting the NPC, found one excuse or the other to cooperate with it in order to secure personal gains at the detriment of the purported Plateau interest for which they had been elected to protect and advance.

Towards the end of their first terms of office (i.e. before the 1956 elections) they returned to their communal bases, mystified the objective causes of their actions in the legislative bodies before the peasantry and Christians alike, and demanded fresh mandates to return

to their respective legislative seats in order to tackle those very same problems for which they had been elected four or five years previously. This circle was repeated from 1956 to 1961.

By 1961, they argued before the same electorate that the only strategy of dealing with the 'enemy' - the NPC and what it stood for - was in fact to vote for the NPC so long as they remained their representatives.[101] But by then, they had served as representatives of the Plateau peoples of Nigeria for ten years during which they earned extraordinarily fat salaries, car loans and allowances as well as other fringe benefits, parading as Plateau warriors against the NPC and the interests which it represented. It is notable that, at thesame time, they had developed into an economically strong petty bourgeois class and had graduated as a ruling classproper combining in themselves both political and economic power in the Plateau province. Such a high degree of political ambivalence is typical of this kind of class in history.

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101. With regards to the insincerity of the Middle Belt leaders for demanding a separate State, the Minorities Commission drew attention to a portion of the manifesto of the UMBC during the 1956 elections which stated that "... we feel that the creation of a separate Region, though desirable, is for the present unpractiable. We are of the opinion that with a reasonable number of representatives in the Regional Legislature we shall be in a position to take active participation in running the Government and that the interests of the peoples of the Middle Belt shall be adequately protected..." Report of the Commission... July 1958 p. 57.

For having no initial capital from which to forge an economic leverage to political power, this class had to first "seek the political kingdom" before the economic and other benefits were added unto them.

Another point which must be emphasised here, even at the risk of repetition, is the fact that the rise of this petty bourgeois class to power was accompanied by a disarticulation of the objective class relations and struggles in the province. Consequently, objective class antagonisms and conflicts within the province were obscured, mystified and subordinated to the less fundamental competitions and conflicts, within the ruling classes, for dominance. Thus, instead of the peasants, workers, and other dispossessed groups closing ranks to challenge and fight the commercial, bureaucratic, the educated elites, and the chiefly classes combined, the former, as we have seen, became divided in support of the various fractions of the latter.

In this regard, it may be remarked that the commercial and bureaucratic elites ironically drew their main supporters from the workers, the semi-employed and the unemployed based in the urban centres of the province especially in Jos and Bukuru. With a similar irony, the educated elites and the chiefly classes drew their support from the rural peasantry who formed the bulk of the population of the province under the direct exploitation of the former. Thus, the conflict of interests

between the urban-based commercial and bureaucratic elites on the one hand; and the indigenous educated elites and chiefs on the other, correspondingly, became a conflict between the urban workers, labourers, semi-employed and the unemployed on the one hand; and the rural peasantry of the province on the other. And given the ethnic composition of each of the contending camps whose histories we have traced, as mainly Hausa-Fulani settlers against the indigenes, and as Moslems against non Moslems, the conflict appeared fundamental. It appeared to have an objective base.

Our analysis has, however, shown that these were only true in certain respects. For it must be emphasised that the danger which the urban commercial and bureaucratic elites posed in the province was their domination of the lucrative sectors of the economy rather than in their being immigrants per se. At the regional level, we contended that the Plateau province, along with other provinces of the lower North, suffered under unfavourable social and economic policies of the NPC regional government which tended to provide a justification for a separatist movement. For these judicial, administrative and economic policies provided justification for the fear of Islam. At any rate, the task of redressing these socio-economic 'injustices' meted out to the Plateau peoples provided an opportunity for the educated elites of the province to

invest in politics as representatives of the peoples of the Plateau in the legislative bodies of the Northern Regional and Federal governments; this process necessarily entailed transforming these educated elites into a local ruling class in the province.

There is yet another point which needs to be emphasised. This is that by 1961, the number of educated people in the province had substantially increased.[102] As a result, the activities of the educated elites began to be

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102. Figures do exist on annual turnout of students from the various institutions established within and outside the province whether by the Missions or the government. These can be computed and brought together to provide an overall picture of the educational progress of the Plateau province but the author did not attempt the exercise since it is incontrovertible that substantial progress had been made in this direction. For example, Gindiri Teachers College alone had produced over 900 teachers by 1961; over 500 holders of the West African Schools Certificate; while Government College Keffi, which mainly catered for the Lower Northern provinces (including Plateau province), was admitting an average of 420 students, in 1958, for Higher School Certificate which prepared students for degree programmes in the universities. By 1964, the percentage of children attending school in Plateau province was put at 26.5% which placed the province as the fourth highest in the North after Ilorin 45.5%, Kabba 44.5% and Benue 27.8% in that order. It is to be remarked that it was the 'refusal' of the NPC regional government to absorb qualified diploma and degree holders from these provinces in preference to "experienced N.A. personnel" from the emirate North which justified the allegations of discrimination against Middle Belt provinces in appointments into the Northern Civil Service. Dudley touched on some of these issues. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. pp. 218 - 226.

challenged and exposed by a younger generation of Plateau 'patriots' who could not reconcile the rapidly changing socio-economic status and political power of the Plateau politicians and their professed claims as protectors of the Plateau peoples. These developments lie outside our period but suffice it to say that, by this time, these politicians had already entrenched themselves both economically and politically and could not easily be dislodged.

Firstly, they used their positions as Native Authority Councillors, chiefs and Church leaders to punish noticeably ambitious teachers and other workers through transfers to remote places and demotions while those who were under the Church were placed under strict surveillance. Secondly, the politicians and the chiefs closed ranks since, by 1961, they had invariably become NPC supporters for their personal gains. This provided them with a common interest which, together, they defended and advanced, thereby making it very difficult to challenge them. Thus, through an organised system of intimidation, harassment and humiliation, the younger generation of politicians who emerged around the 1960s to challenge the first generation of politicians, were discouraged and their activities were sometimes proscribed. Thirdly, and in conjunction with the above, the older generation of politicians, being richer than the younger ones, used money to corrupt the electorate to vote them into power.

Finally, and as a natural corrollary to the observations we have made above, the movement for a Middle Belt state gradually dwindled in the Plateau province especially after independence in 1960. For the leading politicians of the province had decided to fight against Islam and the socio-economic deprivations of the Plateau province on the platform of "One North, One people, irrespective of religion, rank or tribe." Therefore, as most scholars of Plateau politics and the Lower North[103] have correctly observed, by 1961, nearly all the leaders of the various groups supporting the Middle Belt state movement had given up and "the UMBC tended to become more and more a protest movement of the Tiv".[104]

The failure or success of the MZL and, its successor, the UMBC, per se, is not the main subject of this thesis. However, we have gone into a discussion of these at some length because they formed the most effective smokescreen

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103. In addition to footnote 6 above, see Dent, J.M. "A Minority Party - The UMBC" in Mackintosh, J.P. Nigerian Government and Politics London, 1966 pp. 461 - 506.

104. Dudley, B.J. op.cit. p. 98.

behind which the emergent ruling classes in the Plateau province consolidated their positions and accumulated wealth via petty bourgeois politics. It must be emphasised, as a concluding remark, therefore, that even after 1961, the UMBC continued to serve as a smokescreen inspite of a growing political awareness of the working masses of the Plateau province. For although the UMBC grew weak as an organ for mobilising people and capturing political power, the socio-economic structures, conditions, classes and problems which sixty years of colonial domination and exploitation had created in the Plateau province - socio-economic structures, conditions, classes and problems which had given rise to petty bourgeois classes and petty bourgeois politics typified by the emergence of the MZL and the UMBC in the first instance - still existed and, even, intensified. It is against this background that the creation of the Benue-Plateau State, in 1967, as well as current political prejudices on the Jos Plateau region, should be perceived and understood. For such was the magnitude of the impact of colonial rule on class formation and politics on the Plateau province.

APPENDIX II.

A SELECT LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES OF PLATEAU PROVINCE IN THE FEDERAL AND REGIONAL HOUSES OF LEGISLATURE 1951 - 1960.

NAME	YEAR OF REPRESEN-TATION.	DISTRICT OR CONSTITUENCY	QUALIFICATION OR STATUS	OCCUPATION	RELIGION	POL. PARTY	HOUSE	REMARKS
Rwang Pam	1950-1966	Jos Division	Teachers. IV. Grade IV	Grade IV Teacher	Christianity	does not apply	N.N.C.C.	died in 1969
Pastor David Lot	1951-1966	Pankshin-West	Std. 6(Zaria)	Pastor	"	MZL; UMBC; NPC	MHA	alive joined NPN in 1979
Michael Audu Buba	1951-1966	Lowland	Std. 6 ?	N.A. Councillor	"	NPC	MHA	joined NPN in 1979
Moses Nyam Rwang	1951-1956	Jos-Central	Std. 6	Forest Ass.	"	UMBC; NPC	MHA	-
Patrick Pom	1951-1956	Jos-South	Std. 6	"	"	UMBC; NPC	MHA	-
Gwana Awan	1955-1966	Kagoro	Std. 6	Chief of Kagoro	"	does not apply	NHC	still on thron
J.Y. Dimlong	1954-1966	Angas	Std. 4?	Chief of Angas	"	-	FHR; NHC	?
David Dimka	1959-1966	Pankshin	Grade III Teacher	Teacher	"	MZL;UMBC	FHR	joined NPP in 1979
Joseph Makingad	1959-1966	Pankshin-West	Grade III Teacher	Teacher	"	MZL;UMBC	FHR	"
Abubakar Isandu	1959-1966	Jos North-West	Grade II?	-	"	UMBC	FHR	joined NPP in 1979
Isa Haruna	1954-1966	Jos South	Middle II	Labour Lead leader contractor , businessman	Moslem	NPC	FHR	-
Aliyu Zungum	1959-1966	Southern-Zaria	-	N.A. Councillor	"	NPC	FHR	-
Yakubu Allahnana	1959-1966	Wamba	-	N.A. Councillor	Moslem?	NPC	FHR	-
George Yilgwen	1959-1964	Lowland-West	Grade II	Teacher	Christ-ianity	UMBC	MHA	-

NAME	YEAR OF REPRESENTA-	DISTRICT OR CONSTITUENCY	QUALIFICATION OR STATUS	OCCUPATION	RELIGION	POL. PARTY	HOUSE	REMARKS
Solomon D. Lar	1959-1966	Lowland-East	Grade II Teacher	Teacher	Christia-nity	UMBC	FHR	joined NPP in 1979
Muhammadu Kwore	1953-1966	Wamba	-	Chief of Wombe	Moslem	-	NHC	-
Abdullahi Maimako	1953-1966	Wase	Koranic Educ.	Emir of Wase	Moslem	-	NHC	-
Gabriel Wuyep	1957-1966	Pankshin	Std. 4	N.A. Councillor	Christia-nity.	AG	MHA	-
Mallam Muhammadu	1947-1966	Jemaa	Koranic Educ.	Madakin Jemaa	Moslem	-	NHC	-
Patrick Dokotri	1954-1959	Jos	Std. 6	Forest Assistant	Christia-nity.	MZL;UMBC; NPC	FHR	joined NPP in 1979
Adamu Nyelong	1930-1966	Lowland		Chief of Shendam	Moslem	-	NHC	died in 1971
Deshi Toklen	1959-1966	Angas	Std. 4	Teacher/ NA Councillor	Tradition-al Religion	- NPC	NHC	-
Mark Hirse (later Mohammadu R. Dallaham)	1957-1966	Sura	Primary 3	Chief of Sura-Pyem	Christian later Moslem	-	NHC	died in 1975
Isiaku Gwamna	1957-1961	Jos	-	Business-man	Moslem	NEPU,NPC	MHA	

KEY MHA = Member of the House of Assembly.
MHC = Member of the House of Chiefs.

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D. A SELECT LIST OF INFORMANTS.

NAME	OCCUPATION	DATE OF INTERVIEW	PLACE
Ali Dingtok	transporter	26/6/1979	Jos
Alhaji Ali Sura	businessman	26/6/1979	Jos
Audu Dabuluk	black smith	10/8/1979	Panyam
Ayuba Kumm	district head	30/5/1979	Gazum
Baksar Punshak	peasant/tin labourer	9/8/1981	Panyam
Christopher Maduka	Trader	12/12/1978	Mangu
Chibi Manguna	Mines Labourer	21/9/1981	Manguna 'A'
David Dimka	politician	30/5/1979	Kabwir
David Lot	pastor/politician	30/12/1979	Panyam
Dalyop Pwajok	mines labourer/ farmer	28/6/1979	Bukuru
Davon Dung	petty trader/ farmer	23/9/1981	Du
Dikam Met	black smith	10/8/1981	Ampang
Dung Balang	businessman	1/9/1979	Bukuru
Fom Bot	Nbong Gwom Jos	3/12/1982	Jos
Gajere Danladi	labour leader-tinmines	30/6/1979	Bisichi
Gideon Emmanuel	Tutor	14/10/1979	Zaria
Gyang Jugu	district head	29/6/1979	Kuru
Alhaji Hassan	trader	7/7/1979	Dorowan Babuje

NAME	OCCUPATION	DATE OF INTERVIEW	PLACE
James Okafor	businessman	12/12/1978	Panyam
John Kwashi	teacher/educ. inspector	13/9/197	Jos
Sarkin Makera Bagiri	black smith	10/8/1981	Mangu
Othniel Shamchet	revenue officer		
Onesimus Nerle	" inspector	26/6/1979	Jos
Patrick D. Pwajok	businessman	1/9/1979	Bukuru
Patrick Dokotri	politician	3/12/1982	Bukuru
Polycarp F. Datok	educationist	several discussions between 1979/82	
Peter Daniong	Student	3/2/1981	Zaria
Philomena Tete	Student	7/3/1979	Zaria
Pwajok Dangal	ward head	29/6/1979	Kuru
Toma Bot	pastor	29/6/1979	Kuru.