

**EFFECTS OF POLITICAL DEFECTIONS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN  
JIGAWA STATE, NIGERIA (1999-2013)**

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ZARIA, NIGERIA**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES,  
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**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,  
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ZARIA, NIGERIA**

**AUGUST, 2018**

## DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this Dissertation entitled **Effects of Political Defection on Democratic Governance in Jigawa State, Nigeria (1999-2013)** has been carried out by me in the Department of Political Science and International Studies. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this thesis was previously presented for another degree or diploma at this or any other Institution.

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Name of Student

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Signature

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Date

## CERTIFICATION

This dissertation entitled **Effects of political defection on democratic governance in Jigawa State, Nigeria (1999-2013)** by Ibrahim AMADU meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of M. Sc. Political Science of the Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this Dissertation to my parents, and to late Sa'idu Adamu of blessed memory, who has supervised this work and had always, responded to inquiries I sought from time-to-time in the course of writing this dissertation.

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## **ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS**

AC	Action Congress
ACN	Action Congress of Nigeria
AD	Alliance for Democracy
AG	Action Group
ANPP	All Nigeria People's Party
APC	All Progressive Congress
APGA	All Progressives Grand Alliance
APP	All People's Party
BYM	Borno Youth Movement
CNC	Congress for National Consensus
CPC	Congress for Progressive Change
CWIQ	Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire
DAM	Democratic Alliance Movement
DPN	Democratic Party of Nigeria
DPP	Democratic People's Party
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
GDM	Grassroots Democratic Movement
GNPP	Great Nigerian People's Party
IED	Institute for Education in Democracy
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
JARDA	Jigawa State Agriculture and Rural Development Authority

JISIEC	Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission
JP	Justice Party
LGA	Local Government Area
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDJ	Movement for Democracy and Justice
NA	Native Administration
NARECOM	National Reconciliation Committee
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon
NCP	National Conscience Party
NCPN	National Centre Party of Nigeria
ND	No Date
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NECON	National Electoral Commission
NEPU	Northern Elements Progressive Union
NES	Network of Ethiopian Scholars
NLSS	Nigeria Living Standard Survey
NNDP	Nigerian National Democratic Party
NP	No Page
NPC	Northern People's Congress
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NPP	Nigeria Peoples Party
NRC	National Republican Convention

NTA	National Television Authority
NUS	Nigerian Union of Students
NYM	Nigerian Youth Movement
PDP	People' Democratic Party
PPP	World Bank's Purchasing Power Parity
PRP	People's Redemption Party
Rtd	Retired
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SPARC	State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability
TBO	TheBuhari Organization
TIC	Transition Implementation Committee
UDP	United Democratic Party
UMBC	United Middle Belt Congress
UN	United Nations
UNCP	United Nigeria Congress Party
UNIP	United National Independent Party
UNNP	United Nigerian Peoples Party
UPN	Unity Party of Nigeria
UPP	United People's Party
US	United States

## **ABSTRACT**

This study examines the effects of political defection on democratic governance in Jigawa State. Political defection has manifested itself in the State in the form of frequent political decamping, existence of political moles that belonged to the ruling party while operating in the opposition political parties and anti-party politics among political parties and the electorate. In fact, some opposition political parties are being sponsored and sustained by the ruling party. The effects of political defection include weak opposition political parties, a dominant ruling party, materialism and lack of political accountability and adherence to rule of law etc. The study employs Beatriz Magaloni's theory of dominant ruling party survival as a theoretical guide. It utilized both primary and secondary sources of data using questionnaire, interviews and focus group discussions as measurement instruments as well as election results and statistics on poverty incidence in the study area. The indices used in measuring political defection include trend and rates of political defections, anti-party activities, etc. It reveals that material inducements and political office seeking are the main causes of political defection in Jigawa State and that it has affected negatively on democratic governance in the state. The effects include weak and unstable political parties, lack of public accountability and rule of law, and misplaced policy priority, etc. The study recommends that comprehensive and inclusive economic empowerment programmes should be formulated and properly executed by the government to checkmate the incidence of poverty in the study area so as to reduce materialism especially among the voters. Also, adequate constitutional provisions should be made to ban unnecessary defections by politicians holding political appointments in government

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

Liberal democracy is organized on the basis of political parties and these parties ideally function according to distinct and clearly defined political ideologies. Political parties could be either ruling party or opposition political parties after elections. The ruling party controls the government and directs its activities while the opposition political parties serve as standby alternatives. The role of the ruling party is to formulate and implement policies through the institutions of the State. It executes public policies by generating, distributing and managing resources of the State. It holds these resources in trust and on behalf of the populace. The role of opposition political parties in the proper governance of a democratic state cannot be overemphasized. They act as the voice of the people; they represent, express and protect the interests and opinions of the citizens and groups in the society. They act as the watchdogs of the fundamental human rights and civil liberties of the individuals which are essential components of liberal democracy.

Also, opposition political parties also hold the government accountable by constantly questioning her and making the public aware of what is the actual political situation. In fact, it is part of the role of opposition political parties to portray themselves as credible alternatives to the ruling party in terms of policies and programmes, good governance and leadership. In this respect, they highlight and expose aspects of government policies and activities that are not in conformity with the national interest. They expose the weaknesses of these policies and ensure transparency in official dealings. Opposition political parties provide the basis for more political participation and expand the range of choices for the public as well as act as the agents of political change. They do this by “monitoring,

challenging, and publicizing alternative courses of action” (Fika, 2010). Furthermore, opposition political parties have as their crucial role to oppose the incumbent government, checkmate corruption and inefficiencies in the management of the public affairs.

Electorates participate in democratic governance by electing and holding the elected officials accountable for their stewardship. They also participate through the expression of public opinion and at times referendum etc. In essence, the proper interactions between ruling party and opposition political parties on the one hand, and the populace on the other hand, involve the democratic governance of a state. Thus, democratic governance is achieved when the ruling party, opposition parties and the voters play their roles properly. However, these vital roles have not been performed sufficiently in Jigawa State due to the pervasive spate of political defections.

Political defection is mostly characterized by frequent political decamping from one political party to another by politicians, their party followers or ordinary voters. In Jigawa State, however, the gale of political defections since 1999 has become so pervasive that at a time a sitting Governor with the substantial portion of the party and government officials decamped to an opposition political party in 2006. At that time, power struggle to control the soul of the PDP, the state was characterized by political alignments, realignments and separations characterized by wave of political defection. The net effects of all these are the inherent tendencies towards one-party politics, lack of accountability and adherence to rule of law, compromised democratic institutions, corruption, mismanagement of resources and misplacement of priority as well as the reign of materialism in the state. This level of political defection in the State drew attention toward this research so as to assess its effect on democratic governance in Jigawa State. Thus, the study is a modest attempt to

undertake an examination of the nature and effect of political defection on democratic governance of Jigawa State.

## **1.2 Statement of the Research Problem**

In a well-functioning liberal democracy, democratic governance is achieved and maintained when both the electorate and political parties performed their democratic roles effectively. The electorate elect the government and entrust the act of leadership to it. It holds the government accountable especially during general elections. The political parties become either ruling or opposition political parties after general elections. The role of the ruling party is to form the government, formulate and execute public policies by generating and allocating the State resources. The role of opposition political parties are: to present credible alternative policies, checkmate inefficiencies and corrupt practices in government, promote political participation and protect individual rights and liberties. However, these roles by the electorate and political parties have not been performed effectively in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013 and democratic governance in the State has been subverted due to pervasive spate of political defections by politicians and voters from one political party to another. In 2003, many politicians from the opposition party (PDP) defected to the then ruling party (APP). In 2006, a sitting Governor defected along with many officials in his government to an opposition political party (PDP). The effect of all this is that political defection has given rise to a dominant ruling party and weak opposition political parties, weak political institutions, misplacement of policy priorities, materialism in the State, etc. Thus, the study investigates effects of political defection on democratic governance in the study area.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The questions this study attempts to answer are:

1. What are the manifestations and nature of political defection in Jigawa State (1999-2013)?
2. What are the causes of political defection in the State (1999 and 2013)?
3. What are the effects of political defection on democratic governance in the State (1999-2013)?

### **1.4 Aim and Objectives of the Study**

The aim of this research is to carry out an investigation on how political defection has impacted on democratic governance in Jigawa State. In view of the research problem that guided the present inquiry, this study sought to achieve the following specific objectives:

1. to examine the manifestations and nature of political defection in Jigawa State (1999-2013);
2. to examine the causes of political defection in the State (1999-2013);
3. to assess the effects of political defection on democratic governance in the state (1999-2013).

### **1.5 Research Propositions**

In view of the research questions and objectives, the study is guided by the following propositions:

1. Political defection is a key feature of the politics of Jigawa State within the period under study (1999-2013).
2. Material inducement and political office seeking are the main causes of political defection in Jigawa State's politics.

3. Political defection has impacted negatively on democratic governance of Jigawa State.

### **1.6 Significance of the Study**

Most of the available studies carried out on political defection have only focused on lack of unifying party ideology, inadequate constitutional safeguards and sheer selfish interests of politicians as the bases for explaining political decamping in Nigeria. Even the studies that link political defection to lack of ideology usually do not adequately specify the conditions under which ideology promotes political decamping. There is no emphasis on the search for material gains and office-seeking as the basis for explaining political defection. This study views political defection from the standpoint of material inducement and it treats political decamping quantitatively analyzing its trends, rate, direction of change and its relationships with economic conditions of the voters. In addition, studies of political defection in the literature have generally focused on Nigeria as a whole. They have not demonstrated its causes and effects at a specific restricted area. This study takes a narrower scope, Jigawa State, for analysing political defection in order to assess its effects on democratic governance.

### **1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

This study covered Jigawa State and its time frame is from 1999 to 2013. The selection of this period is based on the consideration that the State has experienced democratic rule without a break for 14 years and the content of party politics and political interactions within the period are sufficient enough for the study to shade more light and draw conclusions about the effects of political defection.

However, a constraint faced by the researcher was the initial lack of readiness by some politicians to grant audience for interview. In fact, former Governor Ibrahim Saminu

Turaki who was to be a very crucial personality for discussion on political defections in Jigawa State had not been available to give audience to the researcher for an interview. The constraint of lack of readiness by politicians was overcome by accessing the politicians through their friends. Some interviews granted by former Governor Ibrahim Saminu Turaki were read by the researcher.

## **1.8 Research Methodology**

This section sets out the methodology adopted for this study. It describes the approach used for the examination of political defection; including the sources of data, the process of data collection and the model for data analysis.

### **1.8.1 Sources and methods of data collection**

This study employed both primary and secondary sources of data collection. The secondary data were sourced from textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, internet, electronic media (recorded radio interviews with politicians) and papers presented at academic conferences. The primary data were sourced through IDI interviews, questionnaire, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and personal experience of the researcher, being an indigene of the area under study.

### **1.8.2 Population of the study**

The population for this study is drawn from the voter's register used in Jigawa State for the conduct of the 2011 general elections. It has been adopted in order to draw a sample for the administration of the questionnaire. The voter's register consists of the total number of registered voters of both genders, aged 18 years and above, as of the time of 2011 General Elections in Jigawa State, which is 1,985,465 voters (Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission, 2011). The 2011 General Elections Voter's Register was adopted because it was the most recent register then. The distribution of the population containing the

registered voters, wards and polling units covering the 27 local government areas of Jigawa State is presented in Table 1.1 below:

**Table 1.1: Distribution of Registered Voters, Wards, Polling Units According to Local Government Areas:**

S/No.	L.G.A.	No. of Wards	Polling Units	No. of Registered Voters
1.	Auyo	10	107	57,142
2.	Babura	11	169	89,706
3.	Birnin-Kudu	11	248	144,356
4.	Birniwa	10	134	66,244
5.	Buji	10	90	41,658
6.	Dutse	11	191	122,818
7.	Gagarawa	10	76	30,810
8.	Garki	11	133	90,597
9.	Gumel	11	82	50,763
10.	Guri	10	85	44,839
11.	Gwaram	11	248	126,702
12.	Gwiwa	11	77	40,527
13.	Hadejia	11	106	62,137
14.	Jahun	11	200	104,207
15.	Kafin-Hausa	11	203	104,922
16.	Kaugama	11	103	61,989
17.	Kazaure	11	99	54,761
18.	Kiri-Kasamma	10	116	67,095
19.	Kiyawa	11	132	88,654
20.	Maigatari	11	142	67,073
21.	Malam-Madori	11	118	74,746
22.	Miga	10	86	52,411
23.	Ringim	10	157	118,767
24.	Roni	11	102	40,374
25.	Sule-Tankarkar	11	138	78,024
26.	Taura	10	128	79,086
27.	Yankwashi	10	57	29,139
<b>Total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>287</b>	<b>3,527</b>	<b>1,989,547</b>

Source: Jigawa State Independent National Electoral Commission, JISIEC, 2011.

### 1.8.3 Sample size of the study

#### 1. Questionnaire administration

In this study, the sample size is 500 respondents. It is based on the general criterion for determining sample size given by Morgan & Kreiche (1970). According to the two authors, a sample size of 384 respondents can represent a total population of one million [1,000,000] or above. They stated that “as the population increases the sample size increases at a diminishing rate and remains relatively constant at slightly more than 384 cases” (Morgan & Kreiche,1970). In addition, they have calculated the Standard Error for

the 384 sample size at 0.5%. The sample was arrived at by dividing and summing up the total number of registered voters in each of the 27 local government areas divided by the total population of registered voters in the State, times 500 all over one. The formula below was used in determining sample size accorded to each local government area in the State:

**Sample size of registered voters per L.G.A. =**

$$\frac{\text{population of registered voters in a local government area}}{\text{Total population of registered voters in the state}} \times \frac{500}{\text{one}}$$

It is assumed that 500 respondents could represent the population adequately based on the criterion described. The distribution of total voters for each local government area and their sample sizes are presented in Table 1.2 below:

**Table 1.2: Distribution of the Total Registered Voters and Sample Size per Local Government Area**

S/NO.	L.G.A.	Total Registered Voters Per L.G.A.	Operation	Sample Size of Registered Voters Per L.G.A.
1.	Auyo	57,142	$\frac{57,142}{1,985,465} \times \frac{500}{1}$	14
2.	Babura	89,706	” ”	23
3.	Birnin-Kudu	144,356	” ”	36
4.	Birniwa	66,244	” ”	17
5.	Buji	41,656	” ”	11
6.	Dutse	122,818	” ”	31
7.	Gagarawa	30,810	” ”	8
8.	Garki	90,597	” ”	23
9.	Gumel	50,763	” ”	13
10.	Guri	44,839	” ”	11
11.	Gwaram	122,702	” ”	31
12.	Gwiwa	40,527	” ”	10
13.	Hadejia	62,137	” ”	16
14.	Jahun	104,207	” ”	26
15.	Kafin-Hausa	104,922	” ”	26
16.	Kaugama	61,909	” ”	16
17.	Kazaure	54,761	” ”	14
18.	Kiri-Kasamma	67,095	” ”	17
19.	Kiyawa	88,654	” ”	22
20.	Maigatari	67,073	” ”	17
21.	Malam-Madori	74,746	” ”	19
22.	Miga	52,411	” ”	13
23.	Ringim	118,767	” ”	30
24.	Roni	40,374	” ”	10
25.	Sule-Tankarkar	78,024	” ”	20
26.	Taura	79,086	” ”	20
27.	Yankwashi	29,139	” ”	7
Total	27	1,985,465	= =	501

Source: Derived from table 1.1 above.

**2. Interview administration:** A total of twelve informants were interviewed. Out of this size, eight were key party officials and leaders, drawn from the four selected political parties, out of a total of twenty-six parties in the study area. In other words, two informants from each of the four political parties sampled were interviewed. The political parties were: the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the All Nigeria People’s (ANPP), the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and Party the All Progressives Congress (APC). The political parties were selected on the fact that they were the major parties in the period under

review. Thus, the ANPP was selected because it was the ruling party from 1999 to 2007 in Jigawa State. The PDP was included because it was the main opposition political party from 1999 to 2007 and the ruling party from 2007 to 2013. The ACN was the main opposition political party in the 2011 Governorship, National Assembly and State Assembly elections. The APC emerged the dominant opposition political party in 2013. In other words, convenient sampling technique was employed in the selection of the political parties. The reason for the adoption of this method of sampling is that most of the parties in the area of study are only political parties in name. Thus, by using electoral performance, the researcher is trying to overcome the problem of including nominal political parties. Of the remaining four informants, two were electoral officials from the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission (JISIEC). While the remaining two informants were staff of Freedom Radio Kano and Radio Jigawa that presented two popular political programmes in Hausa called ‘Ko Wanne Gauta Ja Ne’ (Every Political Party has its Limitations) and ‘Iya Ruwa’(Hard Talks) political programmes which political parties in Jigawa State have actively participated. Officials from JISIEC were interviewed because they organize council elections, monitor political parties and receive complaints from them. In short, they know more about the activities of political parties in the State.

Presenters of the ‘Ko Wanne Gauta Ja Ne’ and ‘Iya Ruwa’ were included in the interview because they have interviewed members of different political parties in Jigawa State on various political issues. Thus, they may be relevant in searching for information about political parties in the study area. The lists of informants interviewed are presented in Appendices 1, 2, and 3 below. However, for the selection of individual interview informants, a systematic sampling technique was used. Though without success; efforts were made to interview the former Governor of the state, Ibrahim Saminu Turaki, who led

a mass defection of his followers including members of his cabinet and some state legislators to the opposition PDP in 2006.

**3. Focus Froup Discussions (FGDs) administration:** The study also employed focus group discussions in order to obtain the views of ordinary members of the political parties about the nature, effects and implications of political defection on their respective parties and the study area in general. A total of eight focus group discussions, two from the PDP (one from the youth wing and the other from women wing of the party); two from the APC (one from youth wing and the other on women wing of the party); two from the ACN (one from youth wing and the other on women wing of the party) and twofrom the ANPP (one from youth wing and the other on women wing of the party) were conducted. The criterion for inclusion in the FGD was that a participant must be a card-carrying member of the parties sampled out. The list of all youth members at the state level were listed down and the sample was systematically selected. The same process was conducted in sampling out their women counterparts. Each of the groups (i.e. youth and women) consists of eight respondents. The lists of the FGDs participants are presented in appendices VI, VII, VIII and IX below.

**4. Personal observation:** The researcher, being an indigene of the area under study also used his personal observations and understanding of issues in the conduct of the study. For instance, the researcher had personal interactions with some politicians in the State and, in this regard; he came to understand the political disposition of many of them. Secondly, the researcher observed the behaviour of both politicians and the electorates during elections periods and understood how vote-buying took place among party representatives and voters. The ruling party representatives sometimes collected voter's cards from the voters a few days before the Election Day. On the Election Day, they gathered these voters in some places, usually in houses close to the polling stations; they gave them money and other

essentials like wrappers and detergents to induce them to vote for the ruling party. Some opposition party members, especially the local party officials and agents also lured voters with money on the Election Days to support the ruling party as against the political parties they actually belonged to. In addition, the researcher attended political rallies organised by political parties where he learnt how party members actually carried out their activities. For instance, the researcher attended political rallies organized by the Jigawa State branches of the defunct ACN, CPC and ANPP for their merger into the APC in Dutse in 2013. Finally, the researcher is a regular listener of the political programmes run in Hausa language by the Freedom Radio Kano (Ko Wanne Gauta Ja ne) and Radio Jigawa (Iya Ruwa) where political party representatives participate to air their opinions, views and positions on various political issues in the state. Nine (9) research assistants, 5 males and 4 females, were employed to assist the researcher in the administration and retrieval of questionnaire from the respondents.

### **1.9 Organization of Chapters**

This study consists of five chapters. Chapter one introduces the study by stating the research problem, the research questions, aim/objectives of the study, research assumptions, scope and limitations and methodology. Chapter two, deals with literature review and theoretical framework. Chapter three outlines the background of the area under study (Jigawa State). The fourth chapter presents and analyzes the data collected in the light of which deductions or findings are drawn and related to the assumptions in chapter one. Chapter five summarizes, concludes and recommends possible ways of mitigating the effects of political defection on democratic governance in Jigawa State.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents an extensive review of the relevant literature in the key areas relating to this study. To gain a meaningful perspective of this phenomenon, the review has thrown an insight into topical issues related to the study while literature from the authorial perspective was also be explicated. In addition, a theoretical framework for the study will be outlined. Such a review provides the basis within which the study revolves.

#### **2.2 Conceptual Perspectives**

##### **2.2.1 Political parties**

The study of political parties has a distinctive status, and in the literature of political science it is termed as ‘stasiology’ (Adebayo, 2005). According to Izah (2003:2), “political parties are often defined in terms of shared ideology or common issue orientations.” As to the distinctive nature of political parties from other social groups, Izah (2003) observed that; “Although there is a wide disagreement among political observers about the definition of a political party, but it is generally accepted that a political party is composed of three elements 1.) they are electoral organizations, 2.) governing organizations and 3.) psychological affiliation”. Similarly, the Institute for Education in Democracy (IED) (1998: 4) has identified specific features unique to political parties which include i) Ideology, ii) Party Manifesto: iii) Organizational Structure and iv) Membership Base. The party ideology “consists of the shared beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that cause a certain group of people to join together and develop and advocate specific political programme” (Institute for Education in Democracy, 1998: 4). Ideology may be liberalism or socialism, etc.

A party manifesto is a blueprint, an action plan and a statement of the goals and principles the party promises to pursue if voted into power. The organizational structure of the party includes party constitution, officers and a network of local branches and membership base which is usually mass and incorporates people of different gender and socio-economic backgrounds (Institute for Education in Democracy, 1998). Ball (1972:3) defines a political party as "... a political party is a political institution which has the following characteristics: i) An organization that has a recognized degree of permanence. ii) This organization contests elections and seeks to place its members in positions of influence in the legislature. iii) It either attempts to occupy executive positions in the political system, such as those in the cabinet, or such offices by virtue of its position in the legislature. 4) It has a distinctive label which distinguishes it from other political groupings. Omoruyi (2006) argues that political parties differ from other groups in the political system in that they perform peculiar functions and possess special characteristics. He says, for political parties to be called political parties, "they would have to meet the test set by Joseph Lapalombara, that a political party is so-called, if there is an intergenerational transfer of political affiliation." Thus, political parties are distinctive social groups which operate within a political system but are not independent of other elements of the system like the media, civil society organizations etc. Political parties are important institutions of liberal democracy. A competitive multi-party system is a precondition for the consolidation of democracy.

Scholars have studied the structure of political parties and have differentiated between internal and external party organisation. The internal party organisation is concerned with the types of political parties. In his classical study of political parties, Duverger (1972) has isolated elitist or traditional parties and mass parties within European political history and showed that there are intermediate varieties within the two extremes. The elitist parties,

according to Duverger (1972), only recruit notable individuals. The mass parties, according to Duverger, were developed by the socialist movements but adopted by the communists, fascists and parties in underdeveloped countries. Mass parties are characterized by mass membership and organization but Duverger concluded that the communist parties modelled along the former Soviet Communist Party were the most effective. They were organized around cells at the working places and promoted easy communication among party members.

The external organisation of parties refers to the interrelationships or interactions between or among political parties. It is otherwise known as the party system. Here, party system varies from zero-party, one-party, two-party, and multi-party systems. A zero-party system is one in which no political parties exist in the political system. It existed before the modern time. A one-party system exists when the constitution of a state legally permitted only one political party to operate within its political system. The two-party system is at work when two parties are legally allowed to exist in the constitution. A multi-party system operates more than two political parties. Some analysts talk of a one dominant or two dominant party systems where there are many parties but a single one or two dominate the others.

The origin of modern political parties dates back to the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Lapalombara & Weiner, 1966). They began in England with the organisation of local registration societies supported by the liberals following the reforms of 1832. According to IED (1998) the first political groupings which were the precursors of the modern Liberal and Conservative parties were the Whigs and the Tories that emerged in the course of the eighteenth century. In the United States of America, political parties appeared in the 1790s with the Republicans led by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson and, the Federalists led by

Alexander Hamilton and James Adams (Janda, 1972:71). In other European countries including France and Germany, political parties evolved with the transformation of legislative cliques or political clubs into mass-oriented organisations in 1848. In Africa, political parties began as nationalist movements which mean reactions against colonial rule aimed at restoring the lost sovereignty of the indigenous people (IED, 1998).

### **2.2.2 The key functions of political parties**

Political parties whether ruling or opposition, in developed or transitional democracies perform certain key functions for the proper working of the democratic system. In fact, parties are an essential component of liberal democracy where they serve as mechanism for the organisation of elections in which the electorates choose their representatives. A careful study of the literature reveals that political parties perform the following main functions in a democracy:

**1. Aggregation and articulation of interests:** Political parties under a democratic system aggregate the interests, demands and preferences of the electorate, articulate them or make them clearer and coherent and channel them to the government for translation into public policies.

**2. Recruitment of political leadership:** The aim of political parties is to get into power or to retain it (Duverger, 1972). Political parties nominate candidates for public offices, support them in campaigns and rallies and ensure that they win elections and form a government. In other words, political parties are the vehicle through which political leaders are elected to corridors of power in democratic systems.

**3. Political education and communication:** Political parties in a democracy act as a link between the government and the governed. The wishes, aspirations, preferences and

demands of the people are channelled to government by the political parties. In the same manner, the public policies as outputs of the demands of the society are communicated back to the people through the platform of political parties. Furthermore, political parties educate their members and electorate about their duties, rights and obligations.

**4. Mobilization and structuring of votes:** According to Tanko (2007:75-76), political parties “mobilise the consciousness of the citizenry or people towards the country’s socio-economic and political development through their programmes”. Thus by doing that, the parties gain the support of the electorate. In other words, political parties publicise the values of democracy so that individuals would behaviourally and attitudinally accommodate democracy and its culture.

**5. Provision of alternative policies:** Political parties must be able to provide to the electorate alternative policies in place of those of the government. They should be ready to serve as an alternative government when the incumbent government fails the electorate.

**6. Integration and legitimizing functions:** In a democratic system, political parties serve as instrument of conflict resolution, consensus and compromise. In plural societies like the United States of America, political parties helps in integrating different section of the society by providing them with a common sense of belonging and ensuring that the system is stable. They do this by ensuring that government comes through free and fair elections.

Apart from the general functions opposition parties perform as political parties such as interest aggregation, presentation of candidates for electoral contest and political socialization, they also played a number of roles as parties out of government. There seems to be a wide range of recognition of the activities of opposition parties in the democratic

process. The Network of Ethiopian Scholars (NES) (2005) asserts that a key component of democracy is the toleration of the dissent. In the same line, Egbewole & Etudaiye (2010) submitted that “the only duty an opposition party need is to provide an alternative view and this must be properly dissected, articulated and effectively communicated to the general public”. In essence, Sauthal (1970) has categorized the functions of opposition parties in a democracy into three:

**1. The voice of the voiceless:** Here, opposition political parties represent, express and protect the interests and opinions of the citizens and groups in the society. They act as the watchdogs of the fundamental human rights and the civil liberties of the individuals which are the essential component of liberal democracy. They articulate grievances against government and ensure views and interests not represented are not neglected. Opposition political parties hold the government accountable by constantly questioning her and making the public aware of what is in issue.

**2. Alternative to the government:** It is one of the fundamental roles of opposition political party to portray itself as a credible alternative to government in terms of alternative policies and programs, good governance and leadership. Opposition political parties highlight and expose aspects of government policies and activities that are not in conformity with the national interest. They expose the weaknesses of the government policies and ensure transparency in official dealings. Opposition political parties provide the basis for more political participation. They expand the range of choices for the public and act as an agent of political change. They do this by “monitoring, challenging, and publicising alternative courses of action” (Fika, 2010).

**3. Official opposition to the government:** Opposition parties have as their crucial role to oppose the incumbent government, checkmate corruption and inefficiencies in the management of the public affairs. In a parliamentary system of government, recognition of the vital role of the opposition led the government to confer official status to it. The leader of the opposition receives salary and is offered official car and residence just like every other minister. The opposition as a whole is regarded and described variously as the shadow cabinet; the shadow government or the government in the waiting. In the presidential systems of government, the minority leader in the legislature coordinates the activities of the opposition party(s) but lacks official status as in the case of the United Kingdom where the opposition is considered his/her majesty's opposition. The Nigerian First Republic was a parliamentary system of government and the Action Group (AG) was regarded officially the opposition party. As it has already been indicated, the opposition parties are very essential for a good democracy. They provide vertical accountability, maintaining the balance of the system.

Lapalombara & Weiner (1966) outlined three theories which explain the origins of political parties. These are:

**1. The institutional theories:** These theories focus on the interrelationship between early parliaments and the emergence of parties. The proponents of these theories included Lapalombara & Weiner (1966), Duverger (1972), and Weber (1972). Both Duverger & Weber show that cliques and the elite political clubs were the precursors of modern political parties in Europe but they were not political parties (Lapalombara & Weiner, 1966:8). According to Duverger (1972:3), "Political parties developed simultaneously with electoral and parliamentary processes. They first appeared as electoral committees that procured for a candidate the sponsorship of certain prominent citizens and raised the fund

necessary for the election campaign.” Weber divided the evolution of parties in Europe in three stages of aristocratic cliques, small groups of notables, and plebiscitarian democracy.

**2. Historical-situation theories:** They focus on the historical crises or tasks which systems have encountered at the moment or time when parties developed. Political parties experience crises as they move from traditional to more developed forms. According to Lapalombara & Weiner (1966), three types of crises were identified that have impact on party formation; the legitimacy crisis, integration crisis and participation crisis. The political parties developed by nationalist movements after the Second World War in the developing countries were good examples of political parties created by crises of legitimacy, participation and integration.

**3. Developmental theories:** These relate the origins of political parties to the broader process of modernisation. That socio-economic changes such as “increases in the flow of information, the expansion of internal markets, a growth in technology, the expansion of transportation networks; and above all, increases in spatial and social mobility appear to have profound effects upon the individual’s perception of himself in relation to authority” (Lapalombara & Weiner, 1966). These are some of the variables which may condition the emergence of political parties.

### **2.2.3 Democracy**

Political scientists have not reached consensus on a single definition of democracy. In other words, there are many definitions of democracy (Kaoje, 2003); (Ayodele & Bolaji, 2007); (Aluaigba, 2009); (Dode, 2010). According to Kaoje (2003), democracy does not have a universally accepted definition and as a concept it has been abused by different interests and guises; the only essence remained of it are human rights.

The term 'democracy' has been broadly conceptualised from two perspectives, the classical Greek and the modern liberal conceptualisations. In the classical Greek perspective, it has been defined as popular power or sovereignty. It means a system of government in which common people directly participate in the process of decision making. The former president of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, has defined democracy in its traditional popular sense as "the government of the people, by the people, for the people" (Lincoln, 1863). According to Claude Ake (2000), the marrying of democracy with the capitalist, industrial values and practices as a result of the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution led to the trivialisation of democracy and a shift in its original Greek meaning, hence the concept of liberal democracy. However, in its modern liberal sense, democracy has been conceived in terms of "freedom of choice, rule of law, fundamental human rights, popular participation in decision making processes, accommodation of opposing views, respect for minority rights, openness or transparency, accountability to the people and so on" (Aluaigba, 2009:55). Aluaigba concluded that "All these elements must be present and practised in a polity for it to be characterised as democratic" (Aluaigba, 2009:55). Ayodele & Bolaji (2007) have defined democracy as a system of government with three essential conditions: 1) meaningful and extensive political competition among political parties, individuals and groups; 2) inclusive political participation and; 3) political liberties.

Similarly, Ogundiya, (2011) has conceived democracy as "a system of government usually involving freedom of the individual in various aspects of political life, equality among citizens, justice in the relations between the people and the government and the participation of the people in choosing those in government". Basically, scholars widely agree that for a country to be accepted as democratic, certain basic characteristics must be present which, according to Kaoje (2003) include; periodic election, freedom of speech

and the press, right to vote and be voted for, adult suffrage, multi-party system, rule of law, supremacy of majority will and minority rights.

Democracy is a continuous process which has undergone various changes since its Athenian Greek origins. During its Greek phase, it derived from the Greek words *demokratia* (people) and *kratos* (government or power) (Kaoje, 2003). In its classical Greek form, democracy was practiced where only male adult citizens participated in the decision making process or the affairs of the polis (state) Thus, women, children and slaves were excluded. According to Lively (1975), the Greek city-states were small primitive communities where direct “face-to-face relations prevail and issues are simple”. In addition, others have argued that classical definitions of democracy are faulty because they picture conditions entirely absent in the real World.

In modern societies where a state could cover a large extent of a territory, direct democracy as practiced in Greece is not feasible. Thus, the concept and theory of liberal or representative democracy (pluralist democracy) were developed. The idea of pluralist democracy derived from the premise that society is composed of different groups and individuals pursuing their self interests which are diverse. Because of this, public decisions and policies are arrived at on the basis of majority rule but the interests of the dissent and the minority must be respected. According to Schumpeter (1954), a system is only democratic when the rulers are chosen by the ruled. The role of the ruled or the electorate is to produce the government. When that is done, they should respect the political division of labour. That is, any issues regarding the government are left to the leaders. Periodic elections should be held in order to empower the electorate to hold rulers accountable. Here, the role of political parties comes in where they educate the voters, recruit leaders, organize elections and act as a watchdog on government. Elections must be free and fair

and, civil and political liberties be protected. The judiciary needs to be independent to achieve that. The views of the dissent should be respected as long as they act in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.

Even the assumptions of liberal democracy have been criticized by some scholars. That is, most of the democratic civil rights the theory advocates are political and meaningless if not grounded within economic terms. In other words, political rights can only be exercised by the citizens when the latter are materially empowered. Two, Schumpeter's theory was developed out of Western democratic experiences without relevance or attention to the peculiarities of African societies. On this point, Ake (2000) has stressed the need for developing a democratic model that would take into consideration the peculiarities of African States.

#### **2.2.4 Democratic governance**

Several scholars have defined the term 'governance' differently (e. g. Hyden & Bratton, 1992; Matlosa, 2002; Oluwa & Sako, 2002; Sharma, 2007, etc.). However, Oluwa & Sako (2002), Matlosa (2005) and Sharma (2007) posit that governance has both broad and technical meanings. In its broad sense, governance means "the management of a nation's affairs by organs of government and other key non-state actors at both national and local levels of the nation-state". Thus, governance "...encompasses all aspects of the way a country is governed" (Sharma, 2007). In its technical sense, governance involves institutional and structural arrangements, decision-making process, implementation capacity and relationship between state officials and the public (Matlosa, 2005). Oluwa & Sako (2002:37) have defined governance as "a system of values, policies and institutions by which society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interaction within and among the state, civil society and private sector". From the technical meaning of governance as it is provided above, we can deduce that it involves institutions of the

state both formal (e.g. constitutions, laws and regulations and organs of government) and informal (such as the social norms, customs, traditions and political parties, the electorate etc.), policy and decision making processes, the government and the governed. Matlosa (2005) has stated that “...governance (a process of running a nation’s affairs) is distinct from the state (institutions for governance) and government (officers who man state institutions for governance) and a regime (policies and procedures for running national affairs)”.

There are two related terms to the concept of governance----good governance and democratic governance. According to Mafeje (2002), good governance was introduced by the World Bank for the success of its Structural Adjustment Programme needed for efficient, transparent and incorrupt governments in Africa. Thus, the World Bank conception of good governance had undemocratic connotations because there are efficient governments in terms of economic management, but lack democratic governance.

However, in the literature both concepts of good governance and democratic governance are used interchangeably. For Eyinla (2000:22), good governance “means accountability, security of human rights and liberties, devolution of powers and respect for local autonomy, which all constitute a change to democratic regimes”. For Sharma (2007), good governance has several characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective, efficient, equitable, and inclusive and follows the rule of law”. Oluwa (2013:318) has argued that democratic governance involves ...”all the mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests and exercise their rights and obligations. It concerns the way that people mediate their differences, make decisions and economic and social development.

Government therefore is about relationships between citizens and the state, relationships whose success or failure may reflect the legitimacy of the operators of state power”.

### **2.2.5 Political defection**

Political defection refers to changing political parties. It is political decamping by a member of a political party from his party to another political party as a result of discontent in his existing party (Jiddere, 2015:173). Malthora (2005:9) has referred the term political defection as “Party defection, cross-carpeting, party-switching, floor-crossing, party hoping, canoe-jumping, decamping, party-jumping, etc.” Political defection is the practice of decamping from one’s political party to another or the act of abandoning one’s political principles. According to Jiddere (2015:173-178), political defection does not include changing political party as a result of merger of two or more political parties, split in the existing party, shifting political support to another or other political parties by the electorate through voting in elections or even members of parliament who may vote in line with the opposition party (s) in the parliament for certain reasons. In contrast, for Magaloni (2006), political defection encompasses the electorate shifting their votes to other political parties in elections. It also includes voting in line with opposition political parties by the ruling party parliamentarians on certain policy issues. However, the effects of political defections are manifested in several forms including anti-party politics, lack of alternative credible policies by opposition political parties, compromised democratic institutions, weak opposition political parties, misplacememnt of policy priorities etc. According to Mubita (2014), most politicians and supporters of political parties in the contemporary times base their defence of it in the words of Stanley Baldwin, a British Conservative statesman who once said “I would rather be an opportunist and float than go to the bottom with my principles around my neck”. In essence, the underlying object of political defection is the search for material gains, political power or influence.

Political defection from one political party to another by elected leaders and party officials whether in developed or developing democracies may be connected with compromise of political principles and at times abandoning them. Political defection, otherwise known as political switching or political hopping is not restricted to developing democracies. For instance, in the United States of America, Hilary Clinton, who was once a hardcore Republican, and who had campaigned for Richard Nixon for presidency and worked for Barry Goldwater's campaign in 1964, defected to the Democratic Party because she disagreed with the stance of the Republican Party over the Vietnam War (Mubita, 2014). Similarly, Ronald Reagan was formerly a member of the Democratic Party. He had campaigned for the Senate Candidate of the Democratic Party, Helen Douglas and even encouraged Dwight D. Eisenhower to contest for president in 1952, he (Reagan) decamped to the Republican Party. Reagan's political views shifted to the extreme right of the political spectrum when he started working for General Electric (Mubita, 2014). The point is that, political defection is not in itself bad because it is in consonance with the freedom of political assembly and association. It only becomes dangerous when it develops effects that profoundly undermine democratic governance. Political defection is much more pervasive in less advanced democracies because of lack of clear-cut ideology among political parties and weak political institutions (Mbah, 2011; Unahon, 2014).

### **2.3 The Evolution and Nature of Political Parties and Party Politics in Nigeria**

Politics is said to be the struggle for power (Morgenthau, 2012). Party politics is the struggle for power among political parties within certain set down rules, regulations and conventions usually embodied in a constitutional framework. To understand the nature of political parties and party politics in Nigeria, we need to understand the process of party formation and the environment within which the parties emerged, evolved, developed and operated. On the one hand, the early Nigerian political parties emerged under dictatorial

colonial rule which was based on force, arbitrary, repressive, and oppressive policies (Ake, 2000; Kazah-Toure, 2006; Fika, 2010; Dode, 2010). The first political association in the country, the People's Union, emerged in protests to: the general rate meant to finance a new water scheme in 1908, the Sedition Law of 1909, the decision of the Supreme Court of Southern Nigeria of 1910 which said that ownership of land in Lagos was transferred to the Crown with the Treaty of Cession of 1961, the introduction of land tenure in the South similar to the prevailing system of land tenure in the North Region in 1911. All these were oppressive policies out of which the precursors of, and later the modern political parties emerged, developed and operated in Nigeria. On the other hand, political parties were developed largely by a westernized elite operating within traditional African institutions. For instance, according to Sklar (1963: 47), the NNDP was composed of chiefs, Imams, market women and intellectuals such as Herbert Macaulay and his peers.

In the Northern Region of Nigeria, the emergence and development of political parties was dominated by aristocratic elements of the native administration (N.A.) opposed by the radical tendencies of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and other minority movements within the overall colonial environment. In short, given the nature of multi-ethnic, multi-national and religious diversities in Nigeria and the attitude of the colonial administration towards the early development of political parties in the country, it was asserted that the state was formed and built before the nation or the civil society (Izah, 2003; Tanko, 2007).

According to Sklar (1963:41), "It was the natural destiny of Lagos, the leading port, administrative capital, and commercial centre of Nigeria, to have been the cradle of its political party system as well. European civilization had an earlier impact of magnitude on this Yoruba town than on any other traditional community in Nigeria". On June 24, 1923,

the first indigenous Nigerian political party, the NNDP was formed by Sir Herbert Macaulay and his associates (Fage & Alabi, 2006; Fika, 2010). The Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) was limited to Lagos and its political activities were mainly restricted to elections to the Legislative Council (every five years) and to the Lagos Town Council (every three years). The NNDP stated as its aims the “attainment of municipal status and self-government for Lagos, the provision of facilities for higher education in Nigeria, the introduction of compulsory education at the primary school level, the encouragement of non-discriminatory, private economic enterprise, and the Africanization of the civil service” (Sklar, 1963:46). According to Fika (2010), the NNDP’s success was minimal because the participation of Africans it secured in the Legislative Council was limited by income qualification and the Council was dominated by the white officials.

The Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) emerged in 1936 out of the Lagos Youth Movement, formed in 1934 by the students and graduates of the King’s College in Lagos. The founding members of the NYM were: Dr. J. C. Vaughan, Ernest Ikoli, H. O. Davies and Samuel Akinsanya. The NYM won the three elective seats in the Lagos Town Council and the Legislative Council in 1938. The franchise, which gave rise to the formation of NNDP and NYM under the elective principle embodied in the Clifford constitution of 1922, was limited to Lagos and Calabar and only adult male with a certain amount of annual income were eligible to vote or be voted for (Fage & Alabi, 2006). The “party formation and partisan politics was then conceived as nothing more than a mere gathering of vote, and gathering associations, who could not exercise control over executive powers” (Tanko,2007:83). The NNDP and NYM acted as the opposition political parties waging opposition to colonial rule. Their main role was expanding participation for Africans in their affairs. They established newspapers (the West African Pilot, the Lagos Daily News and the Comet, etc) as veritable means for mass education of their members and the public

at large. They were the voice of the voiceless against British Administration dominated by the white men. However, the ideology embedded in the parties was strong as they were a response to the nationalist movement which became more intense after the Second World War.

A new rebirth in the party formation and party politics in Nigeria came into being in mid 1940s and early 1950s when the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC), the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the Action Group (AG) were formed. The four parties, with the exception of NEPU, undoubtedly emerged from cultural organizations in the then three regions which were formally created by the Richards Constitution of 1946. The NCNC developed as a result of the meeting convened by the Nigerian Union of Students (NUS) on June 10, 1944 in Lagos (Sklar, 1963:57). The objectives of the meeting were to consider 1) the King's College strike, 2) the possibility of raising funds for national school, and 3) the immediate formation of a representative national committee. The meeting was presided over by Herbert Macaulay and at the end it was resolved that a National Council or Committee be established. The inaugural meeting of National Council of Nigeria was called on August 26, 1944 whereby over forty organisations attended. Herbert Macaulay and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe were elected as President and General Secretary of the new organisation respectively. It was the National Council of Nigeria which was renamed the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons following the incorporation of three Cameroonian groups (Sklar, 1963: 58). Initially, the NCNC was a party with a nationalistic and nationwide appeal before it was later dominated by the Ibos.

According to Sklar (1963:91), the NPC developed as a result of merging two political societies--- the Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa A Yau, formed on October 3, 1948 at Kaduna

and led by Malam D. A. Rafih; and the Jam'iyar Jama'ar Arewa, formed on October 12, 1948 at Zaria and led by Dr. A. R. B. Dikko into the Northern Nigerian Congress, popularly known as the NPC. However, the Citizen's Association of Kano and the Sokoto Youth Social Circle affiliated to it later. The inaugural meeting of the Northern Nigerian Congress was held in Kaduna and its first President was Dr. A. R. D. Dikko. The NPC was initially not formed as a political party. It was converted into a political party on October 1, 1951 following a defeat by the rival NEPU at the parliamentary elections (Sklar, 1963). The NEPU was established by radical members of the NPC who were expelled because of their radical approach towards the Northern aristocracy and British administration. It was the first political party in the North and Sa'adu Zungur and Malam Aminu Kano were elected as its President and Vice President, respectively, at its first annual convention held in August, 1951 (Na'agin, 2014).

The AG developed from a Yoruba Student Cultural Organisation in London, called Egbe Omo Oduduwa. The AG was formed on April 28-29, 1951, and Chief Obafemi Owolowo and Chief Bode Thomas were its first President and General Secretary respectively (Sklar, 1963:106). According to Tanko (2007:84), "The NCNC was dominated by the Ibos, and controlled politics in the east, the AG that was Yoruba based controlled and dominated politics in the western region and the NPC the dominant party in the north dictated the tempo of politics in the region". These three parties dominated the political scene up to the period of the first military coup in Nigeria in 1966. These parties through their actions and utterances subsequently laid the foundation upon which parties in the subsequent republics were to be formed. The NPC/NCNC was the ruling party at the centre while the AG and NEPU were the major opposition parties in the First Republic. The role played by the AG was to provide official opposition to the then Federal Government under a parliamentary system. According to Alhaji Balarabe Musa (2014), Alhaji Muhammed Na'agim (2014)

and Alhaji Sule Lamido (2014), prominent members of NEPU and People Redemption Party (PRP), the roles played by their party in pre-independence period were to “...eradicate foreign rule. But, in the First and Second Republics their role was to empower the common man to vote and be voted for”. Similarly, Ake (2000:101) stated that the role played by opposition political parties in the First Republic was to challenge the dominance of the NPC, NCNC, and even the AG.

In essence, in the period before independence, the role played by political parties in Nigeria was to dislodge colonial rule. The struggle was between the colonial government as the ruling party and Nigerian indigenous political parties acting in opposition to colonial rule. In the First and Second Republics, the struggle changed dimension and turned to be between the dominant parties in each of the three regions of the country and the new political parties as described by Ake above. The aim was to achieve “Second Independence” from the dominant ethnic groups and to enable common man to participate actively in the democratic process or to achieve democracy as popular power.

As it was indicated earlier, at independence the nature of Nigerian state did not change despite succession to the colonial masters in the administration of the country by the native African leaders. According to Izah (2003:3), “ After independence, rather than diminishing, the role of the State, in regulating and promoting economic, social and political life of the people, have been all embracing”.

Another factor reflecting the nature of the Nigerian political environment is that Nigeria is a multi ethnic, multinational society and it was upon this foundation that a west minister model of parliamentary government based on multi-party system was formed with an official opposition at the centre and the regions. Party politics in the First Republic was

characterized by rivalries, tension and political violence because it was practiced along regional and ethnic lines. Thus the NPC/NCNC-led government came to an end on 15 January, 1966 when the military took over. The military rule lasted for thirteen years and in 1979 party politics was restored with a new civilian administration; this time modelled on a presidential system of government of American type and a multi-party system, led by Alhaji Shehu Shageri was instituted. Scholars generally believed that the political parties of the Nigerian Second Republic, the National party of Nigeria (NPN), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP) and the People Redemption Party (PRP) had no or little difference in their conduct and ideology with their previous predecessors in the First Republic. In other words, they were the direct reincarnations of the NPC, AG, NCNC and NEPU (Izah, 2003, Tanko, 2007, Dode, 2010 & Omoruyi, 2006). However, the UPN, the PRP and the NPP were the major opposition political parties in the Second Republic, while the NPN was the ruling party. The role of opposition political parties in the Second Republic as indicated earlier, was to achieve a larger political participation for the common man (in the case of PRP) and to defend ethnic interests (in the case of UPN and NPP).

The formation and character of political parties and party politics had changed in the Nigeria's Third Republic. All the 13 political associations that applied for registration were declared unqualified by the National Electoral Commission (NEC). The federal government decided to establish two political parties in reaction to that: the National Republican Convention (NRC) which was a little bit to the Right and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) which was a little bit to the Left in terms of ideology. Thus, "the conduct of partisan politics under this transition was done within the context and confines of two parties (SDP and NRC) in spite of Nigerians opposition to it (Tanko, 2007:92). The differences in the character of party politics in the aborted Third Republic and politics in

the previous Republics that preceded it were that, first, the government determined the number of parties to be formed and registered; second, it established two political parties and asked Nigerians to join; third; it provided the manifestoes and ideological make-ups of the parties.

Izah (2003), Omoruyi (2006) and Tanko (2007) and a number of other political observers argued that the two party system of the Third Republic has reduced to minimal ethnic, religious and regional tension and the election held under the transition was free and fair. But, only that General Babangida has diminished his place in the political history of Nigeria for his annulment of the election on 12<sup>th</sup> June, 1993 (Izah, 2003). In November 1993, an Interim Government was formed headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan but shortly replaced by another military regime- the Abacha military government. The regime registered only five political parties in its transition program. The parties were: the United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), the Congress for National Consensus (CNC), the Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), the National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN) and the Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM) (Tanko, 2007:92). Furthermore Tanko also (2007:93) posits that, “a major setback recorded in party formation and partisan politics during this period, was that the five parties to a large extent exhibited and pursued identical goals and objectives and as it later came to be, they were all tailored towards realizing the ambition of the then Head of State General Sani Abacha to succeed himself, which strips them and the politicians that formed them any ideological roots”.

With the sudden death of General Abacha, General Abdulsalami Abubakar became the Head of State. His first major challenge was how to restore the reputation of Nigeria in the eyes of the international community. Thus, he paid visits to various western nations soliciting support for his government. This was because Nigeria was served with a series

of sanctions by the international community as a result of massive Human Rights violations by the Abacha regime (Momoh & Thovoethin, 2001). The Abubakar's one-year transition programme ushered in the Nigeria's Fourth Republic in 1999. In his effort to restore confidence in the mind of Nigerians, Abubakar dissolved all the institutions established by General Abacha in his transition programme e.g. the Transition Implementation Committee (TIC), the National Reconciliation Committee (NARECOM) and the National Electoral Commission (NECON). He established the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to register new political parties and prepare General Elections. At first, nine political associations were registered provisionally as political parties. These include, the Alliance for Democracy (AD), All People's Party (APP), Democratic Alliance Movement (DAM), Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), United Democratic Party (UDP), the United Peoples Party (UPP) and Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJ) (Momoh & Thovoethin, 2001). The result of the Local Government Councils' elections held on December 5, 1998 showed that only PDP, APP and AD were qualified to participate in the subsequent elections. On January 9, 1999, Governorship and House of Assembly elections were held in which the PDP won 21 Governorship seats, the APP won 9 seats and the AD won 6 governorship seats in south western states (Momoh & Thovoethin, 2001).

The major problems with political parties and party politics in the Fourth Republic were: first the transition program was military authored and implemented; second, the political parties were hastily prepared by the military and handed over to the politicians without proper organization; third, the political parties had no any form of ideology (Momoh and Thovoethin, 2001). The same trend continued through the 2003, 2004, 2011 and to date where the ruling party, PDP, dominated the political scene, albeit, with some contradictions. The current merger of the opposition parties into one, the APC forestalls

little hope with the unprecedented threat to security of life and property which unfortunately seems to become unmanageable.

In essence, the nature of political parties and party politics in Nigeria shows that there is little progress towards democratic consolidation because of colonial heritage, the multi ethnic nature of the country, the multi-party system adopted, prolonged military rule, and the challenges faced by the political parties especially the opposition parties which seemed too fragile to present alternative way of party politics. Thus, Omoruyi (2006) concluded that “the political parties in Nigeria are still in search of role, hence since 1999 the role of political parties in Nigeria is still fluid. In many cases, the so-called political parties since 1999 have become a major part of the problem in Nigeria”.

#### **2.4 Political Parties and Political Defection in Nigeria: Origin, Trends and Dynamics**

The origin of political defection in Nigeria is traced back to 1951 when members of the then Western House of Assembly, elected under the platform of the NCNC, defected to AG in order to deny Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe the prospect of attaining the premiership of the region in favour of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, an ethnic member of the area. The NCNC was the dominant party having won 42 members of the Regional House of Assembly out of 84, but within 24 hours, 20 of them cross-carpeted to AG under the pressure of Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Mbah, 2011; Jiddere, 2015; & Godwin, 2015).

In the First Republic, Chief Ladoke Akintola defected from AG to a new party, the NNDP, as a result of personality clash between him and Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Mbah, 2011).

In the Second Republic, Awolowo’s loyalists in the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) such as Adisa Oladosu, Akintola, Anthony Anahoro, Richard Akinjide, S.G. Ikoku and even Chief Akin Omoboriowo, a gubernatorial candidate in Ondo State, had defected to the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). Alhaji Abubakar Rimi who was elected under the platform of the

People's Redemption Party (PRP) had decamped to the Nigeria People's Party (NPP). In fact, many politicians had decamped to the NPN during the Second Republic (Mbah, 2011:5).

During the Third Republic, the military junta attempted to mitigate politics of political defections by establishing two political parties, SDP and NRC and by making it mandatory for each political party to have a national spread of at least two-thirds of the states of the Federation. However, the Third Republic was aborted by military junta. Thus, the political parties of the First, Second and Third Republics, though bounded by party ideology, had not been insulated from the travails of political defections (Enefe, 2008).

In contrast to the first, second and aborted third republics' parties that developed from cultural organisations and had clear-cut party ideology, the Fourth Republic political parties lack political ideology. According to Tanko (2007:99), "Most of these parties that were formed in 1999...could merely be described as 'marriages of convenience', contrived to wrest political power from the military rather than coming together of individuals bound together by a common ideology". Saka & Solomon (2015:44-52), describing the nature of some of the Nigerian political parties of the Fourth Republic stated that "The Peoples Democratic Party is not perceived as a party with a particular strong ideological identity, but has been described as a centrist party..." However, for Domingo & Nwankwo (2010), the PDP is a political party composing of various organisations with different political positions. The party usually maintains "conservative position on social issues" but preaches economic liberalism and welfare protection. In fact, Tamen (2012:63), is of the opinion that "The PDP comprises mainly old political parties within it. It contains NPC-NPN-NRC, NCNC-NPP, NEPU-PRP, BYM-GNPP, UMBC-UNDP, PF, SDP, NRC etc. The AG-UPN is the only party formation that is not in the PDP". Tamen further stated that

the PDP is a “centrist” political party comprising various groups of diverse backgrounds and political inclinations. It had conservatives (e.g. Dr. Alex Ekwueme, Chief Sunday Awoniyi, etc.), liberals (e.g. Chief Solomon Lar, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi, etc.) and reformists (e.g. General Shehu Musa Yar’adua, Chief Tony Anenih and Alhaji Atiku Abubakar etc.). Like the PDP, the APP/ANPP is also a party that lacked a political ideology, though it was the second largest political party in the country in terms of seats in the national assembly, control of states and their houses of assemblies (Tanko, 2007:108). The Alliance for Democracy, AD, was the third largest political party following the 1999 elections.

However, Godwin (2015) asserted that “...it was only the Old Alliance for Democracy, AD, (1999-2003) seemingly had ideological semblance to the Second Republic’s UPN, and both parties maintaining the Southwest of Nigeria as their stronghold”. Even the AD’s ideological identity was not strong as Tamen (2012) concluded that “explains one fact that political parties in Nigeria lack ideological base”. In the same vein, Tanko (2007:113) asserted that “Most of the other new parties, particularly the NDP, UNPP and APGA which came after the first three [AD, ANPP and PDP]...seem to have no better plans or methods than their older contemporaries, as their motives remain unclear and unknown to Nigerians” In 2006, the Action Congress (AC) was formed out of a merger of the AD, the Justice Party (JP) the Advanced Congress Democrats (AD) and several other minor political parties. The party maintained similar ideological identity with AD and in 2010 it changed its name to ACN. On December 2009, the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) was registered by INEC as a political party. Its formation was as a result of the friction between the presidential candidate of the ANPP, General Muhammadu Buhari (Rtd) and the ANPP national leadership. The national officials of the ANPP accepted appointments in the former President Yar’adua’s unity government and thus pressurised

Buhari to withdraw the suit he instituted in the court against the PDP over the 2007 presidential election. General Buhari refused to withdraw and instead formed CPC with the backing of his supporters in the Buhari Organization (TBO). The CPC did not have a clear-cut ideology. It floated around personality cult of its main founder, General Muhammadu Buhari.

In 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic rule, political defections were witnessed more than ever before because of the fact that the strong political opposition provided by opposition political parties during the first and second republics withered away in the fourth republic. With regards to frequent political defections in the Fourth Republic, Vice President Atiku Abubakar had defected from the ruling PDP to the Action Congress (AC) in 2007; Owele Okorochoa joined the All Progressive Grand Alliance where he contested and won the governorship of Imo State; Bola Tinubu, Bisi Akande and Lam Adesina were in the Alliance for Democracy (AD) but defected to the Action Congress (AC) and later to the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) (Jiddere) (2015:108). The politics of the control of the State power for easy access to state scarce resources results in a series of defections and cross-carpeting by politicians from one political party to another in the Nigeria's Fourth Republic. For instance, between 1999 and 2003, Chief Evan Enwerem in Imo State decamped from APP to PDP, having lost gubernatorial primaries in the former; in Plateau State, Alhaji Alhasan Shua'aibu defected from the APP to the PDP; in Cross River State, about seven prominent members of the APP and the AD decamped to the PDP (Godwin, 2015). Godwin asserted that the trend of defection in the period mentioned was one-sided "essentially into the ruling party; predominantly PDP. Only little percentage seems to be decamping from PDP to other parties or to form a new political organisation" (Godwin, 2015). Other important political personalities which took part in the gale of defection in

2007 were: the incumbent governors of Imo, Bauchi, Jigawa and Zamfara States (Godwin, 2015).

In essence, the character of political defection in Nigeria takes several forms. It may be prior to party primaries or immediately after it; it may be towards election periods or after elections. It can even be mandate-stolen form of defection where the defector moves back to his original party after he won in the new party e.g. former governor of Bauchi State, Isa Yuguda. Lastly, political defection could be security-induced where the defector usually from the ruling party in the state level moves to a different ruling party at the national level in order to avoid facing law over his deeds while in office e.g. Governors Saminu Turaki and Aliyu Shinkafi of Jigawa and Zamfara States, respectively, who moved from the ANPP to the PDP to avoid probe by the EFCC.

In the legislature, especially the State House Assemblies and local government councils, the impact of political defections was characterised by lack of alternative policies by opposition political parties. Most of the State Assemblies across the country were one-party dominated, usually by the ruling party. The presence of opposition political parties in many states and local councils of the Federation was virtually absent. This resulted in the dominance of the ruling party.

Political alliances have been a frequent feature of political defection in Nigeria in the sense that members of one political party may shift their support and votes to the party with which they have allied. For instance, the APP had entered into alliance with AD in 1999 and according to Tanko (2007: 109), “a strange aspect in this alliance was that the ANPP leadership (which is the the second largest party in the country with 9 governors at that time and more seats in the National Assembly and State House of Assemblies), decided to

relegate its presidential candidate Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi, to be the running-mate (vice) of the AD's presidential candidate, Chief Olu Falae". The implication is that the ANPP, a strong political party, had moved (defected) its presidential candidate to contest under a weak opposition AD as vice president. Similarly, the ANPP "went into silent alliance with the UNPP, by welcoming its members like Augustine Aikhomo into its fold. Aikhomu quickly dislodge (sic) Harry Akande (a founding member and financier of the party) as Chairman Board of Trustees" (Tanko, 2007:110). Still in 2007, the ANPP party officials accepted appointments in the PDP led by former President Umaru Musa Yar'adua's administration in the name of 'government of national unity'. The implication is that the ANPP officials in the government might be PDP in policy making because they could not oppose government's policies, but nominally, they belonged to ANPP in membership.

In February 2013, the ACN, ANPP, CPC and a faction of APGA merged into a new political party---the All Progressive Congress (APC). The APC received INEC approval on July 31, 2013. However, as a party formed by people of different bedfellows, the APC also lacks a distinct ideology (Hassan & Olaniyi, 2015:155). But, it is interesting that the formation of the party "seems to have changed the face of opposition politics in Nigeria" (Hassan & Olaniyi, 2015:155). In essence, politics of ethnicity and regionalism rather than politics in pursuit of national interest or service to majority, political decampings, self-serving political alliances/anti-party politics and fragmentations in political parties were some of the major indices of political defection in the political history of Nigeria. These indices dictated the origin, trends and dynamics of political defection in the country. In the First and Second Republics and the beginning of the Fourth Republic, political defection was ethnically and regionally-based. At present, the ruling APC and opposition PDP are not ethnically and regionally based. They are nationally spread, but are punctuated by massive, frequent defections especially from opposition political parties to the ruling party.

## **2.5 Major Causes and Effects of Political Defection on Democratic Governance in Nigeria**

There are various causes put forth by scholars as to why political defections occur in Nigeria. For instance, Mbah (2011), Godwin (2015) & Jiddere (2015) have attributed political defections to lack of clear-cut ideology by political parties of the Fourth Republic. As a result of lack of ideology, political parties struggle for power for power's own sake, not for getting hold of power in order to transform the society along certain ideological lines. In other words, power is regarded as an end for serving selfish interest, not a means for advancing a form of political and social order along a particular ideological line. The underlying cause of politics bereft of ideological identity in Nigeria derives from the nature of the post-colonial state (Mbah, 2011).

Post-colonial states in Africa monopolised political power through state capitalism as the only access to state resources and this explains struggle and competition for power and hence political defections (Mbah, 2011). Thus, the political class in the country chose to relegate or abandon party ideology in their struggle for scarce resources through the control of the state power. However, a critical examination of the party politics and political parties of the First, Second and Third Republics in Nigeria would reveal that these parties had party ideologies but still experienced political defections. For instance, The NPC was a conservative party which professed free market economy; while the NCNC, AG and NEPU were on the left (Abdurrahman, 2014). The political parties of the Second Republic were direct reincarnations of those in the First Republic and thus, "...ideological politics was strong with the People's Redemption Party, PRP and the Unity Party of Nigeria, UPN on the left while the other three parties [NPN, NPP and GNPP] leaned to the right of the political spectrum (Liebowitz & Ibrahim, 2013). The political parties of the aborted Third Republic, NRC and SDP were based on the ideological leanings "...with

NRC being a little to the right of the centre, while the SDP was a little to the left of centre” (Saka & Solomon, 2015:38).

However, some analysts and commentators linked the causes of political defections to the inadequacies and contradictions in the Nigerian 1999 constitution and the 2010 Electoral Act. For instance, Section 68 1(a) of 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides an escape route to politicians who may defect to other political parties if there is a division in their party or the party merges with another party (s)(Mbah (2015). Yet, other scholars link political defection to lack of internal democracy among political parties etc. However, for Nnoli (1980) and Enefe (2008) the main determinants of political defection in Nigeria are ethnicity and regionalism. Enefe (2008) has summarised the effects of political defection in Nigeria to include: 1) engendering bitterness and disunity among the political leaders; 2) effects on the standard of weight in the allocation of political seats, revenue allocation, citing of industries, appointments, promotions, recruitments and general implementation of development policies; 3) factionalisation of political parties; 4) corruption and electoral fraud; and 5) military intervention.

## **2.6 Gaps in the Literature Review**

Political parties are the hallmark of liberal democracy. The existence of political parties in a democracy distinguishes liberal democracy from other dictatorships. Parties recruit candidates for political offices. They aggregate the interests of diverse people within the polity and act as a link between the government and the governed. They checkmate the excesses of the government and the ruling party as well as provide alternative policies and programmes for electorate. Furthermore, political parties expand the horizon for political participation in the democratic process. However, the evolution and development of political parties in Nigeria especially in the Fourth Republic leaves much to be desired with regards to the roles expected of opposition political parties in the unfolding

democratisation process. In the current Fourth Republic, political parties are characterised by frequent spate of political defections. There are various reasons advanced as to why politicians easily defect from one political party to another. Many scholars have attributed it to lack of clear-cut ideology by political parties, inadequate constitutional provisions that can restrain politicians from defecting, selfish interest of some politicians, ethnicity and regionalism and even lack of internal party democracy. The origin of political defection in Nigeria was traced back to 1951 when some members of the NCNC in the House of Assembly of the defunct Western Region defected to the defunct AG. The NCNC, led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, emerged after election winning majority seats in the House of Assembly, but the defection by some of its members to AG, allowed the latter to form the government.

Although various reasons for political defection in Nigeria have been highlighted in the literature, there has been no emphasis placed on the effects of political decamping on democratic governance in the country especially in the study area. That is, political defection has not been emphasized as a challenge to the process of democratic governance in the country. There have been no clear explanations of political defection and the roles of opposition political parties on the one hand, and the persistence of dominant ruling party tendency on the other; and the impact of all these on democratic governance. Secondly, even with regards to the reasons for political defection in the country, there has been inadequate attention given to the impact of money politics on political defections. In other words, the monetisation of the political process has not been clearly considered among the reasons for political defection in Nigeria. Thirdly, the literature only emphasized elite political defection, with little or no attention given to voter defection. The incidence of poverty in the study area is assumed to have sustained money politics which is the basis

for voter political defections. Thus, it is these gaps identified in the literature that this study set out to fill.

## **2.7 Theoretical Framework**

This study adopted the theory of dominant ruling party survival as a framework of analysis to explain political defection in Jigawa State. The theory was developed by Beatriz Magaloni in 2006 in order to explain the survival of a ruling political party and political defections in Mexico, a similar semi-democratic polity like Nigeria.

### **2.7.1 Beatriz Magaloni's theory of dominant ruling party survival**

The theory analyses the nature of political defections by the ruling party and opposition political parties on the one hand, and the voters on the other. Thus, political defections are not restricted to political parties or political leaders. The voters could also defect on individual basis from one political party to another or from the opposition political party to the ruling party or even vice versa. At times, an electoral constituency could defect and/or an ethnic group might do so from one party to another.

According to the theory, ruling parties in developing democracies ensure their survival and dominance in the political process by promoting divisions in the opposition political parties and by encouraging political defections of opposition parties' members to the incumbent parties. In trying to promote defections from opposition political parties, the incumbent party makes advances for possible nomination of the willing defectors in the ruling party during elections. The ruling party makes government transfers to the willing defectors available. Within the ruling parties, political defections are discouraged by denying nominations or appointments to potential ruling party defectors. In order to maintain voters' loyalty, the ruling party gives government transfers such as funds, lands, fertilizers, etc to the voters. However, any act of disloyalty to the ruling party by either

recalcitrant politicians or voters is treated with stringent punishment regimes such as denial of government favours and even imprisonment.

The theory consists of three major components which form an organic whole that enables us to understand political defection in its entirety. The components are:

- 1) how the ruling party maintains its dominance by application of side-payments and deterrence;
- 2) how political defections occur among political parties; and
- 3) the patterns of voting behaviour and the nature of voter political defection.

The three components are discussed in detail below:

#### **2.7.1.1 How the ruling party survives in a semi-democratic system: application of side-payments and deterrence**

The ruling party employs different strategies according to Magaloni (2006) in order to maintain elite unity and deter defections. The strategies range from constitutional constraints to application of punishment regime. To maintain unity and deter defections among ruling party elites, the party employs government spoils in which large amounts of government bonuses and direct cash transfers are made available to the elite especially prior to elections. Cash transfers are paid to the politicians for their continued loyalty to ruling party (Magaloni, 2006). The ruling party ensures that fiscal resources are highly centralised to the extent that a politician who decides to defect can expect that he will be cut-off from access to government spoils and profitable State contracts even if he wins an election under an opposition political party. Secondly, since constitutional limits are usually set for executive terms in office, the politicians remain loyal to the party in anticipation of being rewarded by a nomination in the future; or the president or the governor can use nomination to keep deceiving the party elite by making each of them secretly believe that he will be nominated as the incumbent's successor until the end of the

tenure. The ruling party could also “...increase the entry costs to the electoral market, making it costly for former ruling party politicians to form opposition parties that would nominate them” (Magaloni, 2006). For instance, the ruling party may tinker with electoral rules or reform the electoral law by introducing registration requirements that will be difficult for the defecting politicians to fulfil.

The ruling party also maintains the loyalty of its voters and deter them from defecting to opposition political parties by both side-payments and punishment. The government makes available to the voters: cash transfers, credit, food subsidies, land-titles etc. These are called pocketbook evaluations in the voting literature (Magaloni, 2006). However, the ruling party can punish defectors by cutting them off from these patronages. Finally, Magaloni (2006) asserts that good economic performance helps the ruling party to keep its survival.

#### **2.7.1.2 Political defections among political parties**

Political defection among political parties is either from ruling party to opposition party or vice versa. However, whether from the ruling or opposition political parties, political defections take place under certain conditions and they are as follows:

##### **1. Political defections from opposition political parties to a ruling party**

Magaloni (2006) develops what she described as the ‘decision theoretic problem of a politician who is evaluating whether to remain loyal to the ruling party or to split’ (defect) in her attempt to shed light on how the ruling party manages to deter political defections from the party to opposition political parties and the factors which account for elite divisiveness that ultimately leads to their defections to other parties. According to Magaloni (2006), the tendency of a politician to remain in the ruling party or to defect from an opposition political party to the ruling party depends on i) the possibility of his

winning under the ruling party; ii) the likelihood of obtaining ruling party's nomination; iii) the level of utility of office and; iv) the minimum costs to be incurred for campaign by running under the ruling party.

Magaloni (2006) has interpreted "utility of office" to mean access to government spoils and the opportunity to advance some policy goals or ideology. However, the effect of spoils and ideology in preventing a politician from defecting from the ruling party depends on the weights (significance) he attaches to them. Thus, a politician who has a strong regard for ideology is likely to remain in the party when he is given chance to promote it within the ruling party. Likewise, a politician who has little regard for party ideology, but has a strong concern for government spoils is likely to remain in the ruling party as long as he is allowed access to them. In addition, party members or politicians from the opposition political parties who have little regard for ideology and who expect to get more government spoils from the ruling party are likely to defect to it. Moreover, politicians from the opposition political parties who hold similar ideology or positions over some policy issues with the ruling party may eventually join it, although, even Magaloni (2006) herself believes that "...ideology rarely accounts for support for a hegemonic party". In the same manner, opposition parties' politicians who think of the possibility of obtaining nominations and winning under the ruling party, incurring less campaign costs and greater access to government spoils under the ruling party, are also likely to join it.

## **2. Political defections from the ruling party to opposition political parties**

The tendency of a politician to defect from the ruling party to an opposition political party according to Magaloni (2006) depends on 1) his possibility of winning under the opposition political party; 2) the likelihood of obtaining nomination under the party or the possibility of surpassing legal barrier where he can form and register his own ad hoc, candidate-centred organisation to challenge the ruling party; 3) access to government

spoils and the opportunity to advance some policy goals or ideology 4) minus the costs to be incurred in campaigning under an opposition political party.

A politician with strong regard for ideology and one who feels that he will have better chance of promoting same in the opposition political party is likely to defect from the ruling party. Likewise, a politician who thinks that he will have more access to government spoils when a particular opposition political party wins is likely to defect to it; and 5) the little cost of campaigning under an opposition political party, access to the government-controlled mass media, absence of harassment by members of the ruling party and minimum level of electoral fraud. Thus, if the cost of campaigning under an opposition political party, harassment and expected electoral fraud by members of the ruling party are low and access to government-controlled media is high, a politician will be likely to defect from the ruling party to an opposition political party, especially when the other conditions specified in 1, 2, 3 and 4 above hold. However, if the cost of campaigning under an opposition political party, harassment and expected electoral fraud are high, and access to public media is low, the politician is likely to remain in the ruling party, thus, avoiding political defection. For Magaloni (2006), “a politician who is more ideologically oriented is assumed to face a stronger trade-off between the incumbent party and the opposition; if he joins the incumbent, he will have to compromise his ideology in favour of the ideology of whomever happens to become the next president; if he joins the opposition, he will be able to advance his true policy goals, at the expense of access to government spoils”. As a general rule, under this simple choice theoretic framework, defections are less likely as the politician perceives that the chances of winning elections by joining the ruling party are larger than the probability of gaining office by joining the opposition political party. That is, when the possibility of winning under an opposition political party is minimal, the incentives for defections from the ruling party are also minimal. This is

why Magaloni (2006) posits that, the ruling parties “strive to create an image of invincibility”; by “winning with margins of victory of 75% or more, a hegemonic party generates a public message that only by joining the party could a politician stand a chance of attaining office and that outside of it there is nothing but limbo”. However, this condition may be altered when electoral support enjoyed by the ruling party begins to wither; then, the “potential defectors stand better chances of going on their own and defying the ruling party by mobilising disaffected citizens to the polls” (Magaloni, 2006).

In essence, Magaloni (2006) noted that: 1) the threat of electoral fraud reduces the incentives to defect by politicians from the ruling party; 2) defections from the ruling party to opposition political parties are less likely when the amount of government spoils given to elite increases; 3) the likelihood of defections from the ruling party decreases when the probability of obtaining the nomination increases; 4) political defections from the ruling to opposition political parties are less likely as the politicians perceive that the chances of winning elections by joining the ruling party are larger than the probability of gaining offices by joining the opposition parties; 5) defections are less likely as the costs of campaigning as a candidate from the opposition relative to a ruling party’s candidate increases; 6) defections from the ruling party to opposition political parties are also less likely among less ideologically oriented politicians, since the incumbent party is ideologically heterogeneous; 7) a more open nomination process translates into fewer incentives to defect.

### **2.7.1.3 The patterns of voting behaviour and the nature of voter political defection**

Nweje (2013:4) observes that generations of families vote and belong to one party in the United States. In fact, according to (Jiddere, 2015:174), “it is seen as political apostasy for a member of the party to carpet-cross to another party” in the United States of America). This reveals that voter defection is more associated with the politics of developing

democracies. As such, Magaloni (2006) developed some voting models which she calls “decision theoretic models” in her theory of dominant ruling party survival in order to explain how voters make their voting choices, what factors shape these choices and under what conditions voters defect from their political parties to others, all in a dominant party system.

However, Magaloni (2006) built her theoretical models on the analysis of voting choices proposed by Dominguez and McCann (1995) about voting behaviour in Mexico. Dominguez and McCann’s model was a “two-stage model” in which voters first make decision on whether to support or oppose the ruling party. At the first stage, voters’ decision is mostly based on their assessments of what will become of the national economy if the ruling party loses the election. It is only in the second stage that voters think of supporting the opposition political parties based on other national issues. In essence, Magaloni (2006) constructed her model on the basis of three fundamental questions: 1) How voters calculate the expected economic performance under the alternative parties? 2) How voters calculate their chances of receiving transfers from each of the parties? 3) What shapes voters’ calculations about expected levels of post-electoral violence? The three questions above have been answered by Magaloni (2006) as follows:

**1. Expected economic performance of voters: the macroeconomic/sociotropic evaluations of the national economy**

Voters decide to vote for the ruling party or an opposition political party based on the expected economic performance each political party can deliver if that party is elected. To assess the expected economic performance of either the ruling or opposition political party, voters use their prior knowledge about the performance of each of the parties in the past. They then gauge the prior information against the current state of the economy and the campaign promises presented by each of the political parties in order to assess their

credibility. If they find that the ruling party's past average economic performance is good, they will assume that its campaign promises are credible and the expected economic performance will be positive. They will then support it because it is a reliable ruling party. However, if the past average economic performance of the ruling party or her previous campaign promises are negative or not implemented and the current state of the economy is bad, the voters will assess the ruling party's campaign announcements as incredible and will not vote for it because it is an unreliable ruling party. Magaloni (2006) assumes voters should be forging towards a reliable ruling party even when the election year comes in recession. The opposition political party will find it very difficult to convince voters to give support if it has never been in power (an unknown opposition party) or its average economic performance was poor while in office (a known opposition political party). An opposition political party which performed well while in power will be a credible challenger to a reliable ruling party and will possibly defeat an unreliable ruling party. Lastly, Magaloni (2006) selected growth rate out of the other macroeconomic indicators: inflation, interest rate, employment or unemployment etc and applied it to illustrate the working of the model in two hypothetical dominant political systems. In this study, the researcher will adopt the "incidence of poverty" for comparing ANPP and PDP governments under Alhaji Saminu Turaki and Alhaji Sule Lamido respectively.

However, Magaloni (2006) draws these generalisations: 1) the higher the growth rate during election year, the higher the incumbent's chances of winning and, conversely, the more severe the economic recession, the more likely the incumbent will lose; 2) voters can punish the ruling party for being unreliable and betraying its campaign promises, because there is no retrospective information on the opposition; voters will not be able to actually grade its reliability---how much its words resemble its actions; 3) older voters might have observed different periods of party performance---realignments eras, economic booms,

recessions or even wars---not directly experienced by the young. Consequently, if the party's historical record is good, older voters will be less likely to defect from the party in times of economic crisis.

## **2. The pocketbook evaluations: side-payments**

The second question which Magaloni (2006) tries to answer is: how voters calculate their chances of receiving transfers from each of the parties? She noted that "voters are not only concerned about societal outcomes. They also care about government transfers or targeted side-payment such as cash transfers, food subsidies, credit, land-titles, and the like...these are particularly relevant, I argue, for accounting for voting behaviour by the poor" (Magaloni, 2006). She (2006) assumes that voters are in a strategic interaction game with the ruling party which unilaterally controls fiscal transfers and government programmes. The voters must decide either to support the ruling party or the opposition political party. However, the ruling party observes voters' behaviour and targets side-payments, rewarding supportive voters with patronage funds or punishing defecting voters by withdrawing these funds. The effectiveness of the punishment regime in deterring voter political defection "...depends on the ruling party' ability, first to screen between supporters and opponents, and second, to target benefits only to those who will vote for the party" (Magaloni, 2006). There is also the problem of non-commitment where voters receive government transfers but refuse to vote for the ruling party. Effective local organisational networks are used by a political party to minimise the problem of non-commitment.

In her analysis of voting and the trade-off between ideology and transfers, Magaloni (2006) shows that ideology can prevent defections but sometimes promotes them. If a voter has similar ideology with a political party and the economic performance of the party is positive, there is a probability that voter may defect to that particular party. According to

Magaloni (2006), "...the utility of voting the ruling party autocrat increases as the economy grows; as the size of the financial punishment increases; and as the ideological distance from the ruling party is small...For a voter to choose to defect to the opposition the utility differential attributable to economic performance and ideological proximity must outweigh the expected punishment of forgone financial resources".

In essence, Magaloni (2006) has drawn out these propositions about voting behaviour and/or voter political defections in relation to government transfers and ideology: 1) the price necessary to buy off political support increases as the ideological distance between the voter and the ruling party becomes large; 2) the price necessary to buy off political support increases as the voter is less concerned about financial punishment. This indicates that middle and high-income voters will be more likely to make ideological investments in democratisation despite the risk of financial punishment; 3) the price necessary to buy off political support increases as the economic situation deteriorates. Deteriorating economic conditions compel the ruling party to increasingly rely on vote buying and patronage to survive in office; 4) the more fiscal resources, subsidies and economic regulations are under the government's control, the more leeway the autocrat will have to buy off electoral support and deter voter exit. This is consistent with the finding in comparative literature that oil wealth can inhibit democratisation; 5) vote-buying should be primarily directed toward the poor and more ideologically akin voters 6) because the effectiveness of this punishment regime in deterring voter political defection largely depends upon the ruling party's ability to screen between supporters and opponents. It follows that dominant party autocracies will receive more support in smaller, rural localities, where it is easier to acquire local knowledge about voters and where the party's clientelistic networks are likely to be more effective. It is in these settings that party autocrats also tend to more

easily get away with violating the secrecy of the ballot. As urbanisation and voter heterogeneity increases, support for the autocrat should diminish.

## **2.8 Relevance of the theory to the study**

The relevance of Beatriz Magaloni's theory of a dominant ruling party survival to this research cannot be overemphasised. In the first place, the theory guides the researcher throughout the study. Secondly, the theory specifies the nature and conditions under which political defections, whether elite, mass, or voter can take place, which are the subjects of the study. In the study area, there had been political defections by the leaders of the main opposition party, PDP, to the ruling APP in 2003. In 2006, Members of the ruling party including the serving governor alongside many commissioners and members of the Jigawa State House of Assembly defected to the opposition PDP. In 2003, members of the opposition parties defected to the ruling party in order to get access to government appointments and resources. In 2006, members of the ruling party defected to the opposition PDP in order to access nominations and contest elections. These are some of the conditions specified by Magaloni's theory of dominant party survival.

The theory also explains the trade-off between ideology and government transfers in triggering or deterring political defections. In Jigawa State, between 2003 and 2007, huge government transfers were made to voters by the ruling party under Option 4 policy in order to buy the support of the electorate. Thus, in Jigawa State, political defection was not driven among voters by lack of ideology; it was propelled by search for material gains and office-seeking. In general, the theory advocates the role of economic growth in determining voting behaviour and the interactions between ruling and opposition political parties. Thirdly, while the theory is an economic approach to voting behaviour; the study is an attempt to explain political defection, an aspect of that behaviour, in the light of incidence of poverty in the study area. That is to say, in Jigawa State between 1999 and

2013, incidence of poverty was high as a result of lack of economic growth and this situation made vote-buying prevalent and political defection frequent by politicians in order to have access to power and control economic resources of the State.

### **2.8.1 Limitations of the theory as applied in the study**

The first limitation of the theory as applied in the study is that much of the mathematical aspect of the theory could not be empirically applied. In other words, the theory is too abstract and theoretical. The second limitation of the theory as applied in the study area is that there is low level of education in Jigawa State to make it easier for the bulk of the ordinary voters to assess the rates of poverty in the State annually and reflect them in their voting choices. In other words, although voters feel the severity of poverty in the state, they did not know the rates objectively. The third limitation is that the theory assumes that dislodgement of a dominant ruling party by opposition political parties leads to further democratisation. In Jigawa State, however, it is not clear whether dislodgement of the ruling PDP by the opposition political parties will necessarily lead to democratic governance or it will only breed another cycle of a dominant ruling party/weak opposition political party syndrome. This is because the current trend is that members of the main opposition political parties always tend to defect to the ruling party rather than the other way round.

**CHAPTER THREE**  
**BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY AREA AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT**  
**(1999 -2013)**

**3.1 Introduction**

This chapter outlines the background of the area of study and political environment in Jigawa State. The key issues examined are as follows:

**3.2 Brief history of Jigawa State**

Jigawa State is one of the nine states created by the General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida military administration on 27 August, 1991. It was carved out of the Old Kano State through Decree No. 37 which was popularly known as the “States Creation and Transitional Provision Decree of 1991”. The other states created along with Jigawa State were: Abia, Delta, Enugu, Kebbi, Kogi, Osun, Taraba and Yobe States (Directorate of Information and Culture, Jigawa State, n.d.:9). According to the Directorate of Information and Culture, Jigawa State: “In the historic speech marking the sixth year of his administration, General Babangida identified the principles that informed the creation of Jigawa State along with its sister states as the principles of Development, principles of Social Justice and principles of Balanced Federation”. In the same vein, the President noted that quite a number of factors were considered in the creation of new states. These were:

1. The re-alignment of boundaries of the old Colonial Provinces as at 1960/61, such re-alignment is considered inevitable to achieve the objectives as out-lined by the Political Bureau; 2. The expressed wishes of the people and community based on such objective factors as common socio-cultural ties and institutions; 3. The historical associations of the communities at the time of independence from the colonial rule; 4. Geographical contiguity, especially the need to avoid the ‘divide and rule’ syndrome inherent in the present power structure and resource allocation. The need to achieve a measure of

relative balance in population and resources distribution. (Directorate of Information and Culture, Jigawa State, n.d:9.). The creation of Jigawa State and its sister states can be understood within the evolution and transformation of Nigeria as a political organism especially with statecraft which informed the Post-colonial era.

Since its creation on 27 August, 1991 to date, Jigawa State has been ruled by seven Governors, four (4) of which were military administrators while the remaining three were democratically elected. Major General Olayinka Sule (Rtd) was the first Military Administrator of the state who ruled from August 1991 to December 1991. Barrister Ali Sa'adu Birnin Kudu was the second governor who was democratically elected under the platform of the defunct SDP. He ruled from January 1992 to November 1993. The third governor of Jigawa State was Brigadier General Ibrahim Aliyu (Rtd) who was the second military administrator. He ruled from December 1993 to August 1996. The fourth governor of Jigawa State (who was also the third military administrator) was Colonel Rasheed Alade Shekoni (Rtd). He ruled from August 1996 to August 1998. The next military administrator of the state was Colonel Abubakar Zakariyya Maimalari (Rtd) who ruled the state from August 1998 to May 1999. Alhaji Ibrahim Saminu Turaki was the second Civilian Governor who ruled from May 1999 to May 2007. The present Executive Governor of Jigawa State, Alhaji Sule Lamido, is the seventh and the third Civilian Governor. He was democratically elected and assumed office on 29 May, 2007. Party politics has begun in Jigawa when it was carved out of the old Kano State in 1991.

The first electoral contest was the one which had produced the first executive governor in the state, Barrister Ali Sa'adu Birnin-kudu. There were two dominant political parties that participated in the elections: the SDP and the NRC. The SDP won the polls but the life of the regime was short-lived with the popular annulment of the results of the presidential

election of 12 June, 1993 and the subsequent dissolution of the civilian administration. Hence, the state was ruled by one military administrator or the other up to 1999 when the current 'democratic' dispensation was born.

### **3.3 Geography**

The topography (Geographical features) of Jigawa State is influenced by its geology which is predominantly of Chad formation and largely of tertiary terrestrial origin (Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture, Jigawa State, 2011:2). The north-eastern part of the state comprises sedimentary rocks (of Chad Formation). Thus, Local Government Areas at the north-eastern fringes like Birniwa, Maigatari, and Babura are characterised by arid desert. The southern part is made up of Basement Complex (Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture, Jigawa State, 2011:2). "The topography is generally undulating land with sand dunes of various sizes spanning several kilometres in parts of the state" (Directorate of Budget and Economic planning, Dutse, 2009:14). According to the Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture (2011:2), "Five landforms could be identified, and they are: - plains with grouped hills such as Dakwat plains near Kazaure, Pedi-plains for example the Zalu plains near Gwaram, sandy plains such as the Gumel and Hadejia plains, the clune fields such as the Latenwa near Jahun and alluvial channels complex created by rivers, the most important of which are Hadejia and Jama'are rivers." The highest elevations in the state, reaching up to 750m are found around Birnin Kudu and Gwaram areas. The remaining parts of the state with the exception of some areas around Kazaure are characterised by low level elevations.

There are many rivers in Jigawa State. The major ones among them are Hadejia, Kafin Hausa and Iggi rivers. "The Hadejia-Kafin Hausa River traverses the state from west to east through the Hadejia-Nguru wetlands and empties into Lake Chad Basin" (Directorate of Budget and Economic Planning, Dutse, 2009:14). The state has a total landmass of 24,742 square kilometers as indicated by the Surveyor General of the state, and a total

Fadama lands (wetlands) of 3,433.79 square kilometers as confirmed by Jigawa State Agriculture and Rural Development Authority (JARDA) (Directorate of Budget and Economic Planning, Dutse, 2009:14).

The natural vegetation of Jigawa State is largely Sudan Savannah. The area of Gumel and Hadejia, which form the north most parts of the state have the vegetation type of Sahel Savannah and therefore constantly face the threat of desertification (Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture, Dutse, 2011:2). The Sudan Savannah is characterized by grasses and scattered trees such as baobab and acacias while the Sahel Savannah has thorn shrubs and other plants with thick stems and leaves (Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture, Dutse, 2011:2). The climatic conditions in Jigawa State are made up of wet and dry type. The rainy season is brought by the humid south westerly breezes from the Atlantic coast of West Africa, while the harmatan season characterised by dryness and dust is brought by the north easterly winds from the Sahara desert, from December to April (Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture, Dutse, 2011:2).

### **3.4 Population**

The ethnic composition of Jigawa State people could be divided into majority and minority groups. The majority tribes are Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri. The minority groups include Arabs, Igbo and Yoruba (Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture, Dutse, 2011:3). The Hausas and Fulani have a long history of intermarriage which makes it very difficult for one to define exactly who is a Hausa, hence the use of the term, 'Hausa/Fulani' (Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture, Dutse, 2011:3). The Hausa/Fulani are found in all parts of the state and they are the most predominant group, constituting about 96% (Directorate of Information and Culture, Dutse, n.d.:11). "Kanuri are largely found in Hadejia Emirate with some traces of Badawa mainly in its North-

eastern parts. Even though each of the three dominant tribes has continued to maintain its ethnic identity, Islam and a long history of inter-marriage have continued to bind them together” (Directorate of Budget and Economic Planning Dutse, 2009:15). The minority groups of the Mangawa, Ngzimawa and Badawa are dialectics of the Kanuri and are mostly found in Gumel and Hadejia Emirates. The Arabs, Yoruba and Igbo are mainly concentrated in the State Capital (Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture, Dutse, 2011:3). There are no specific available estimates about the exact composition of the ethnic groups in Jigawa State apart from that of the Hausa/Fulani as indicated above.

### **3.5 Economy**

Jigawa State’s economy can broadly be divided in two sectors: formal and informal. The formal sector consists of relatively more organised forms of economic activities like banking, industries, tourism, solid mineral exploitation and even the civil service. The informal sector on the other hand, comprises agriculture, arts and craft and fishing. Agriculture is said to be the main occupation in the State. According to the Directorate of Information and Culture, Dutse (undated), “about 90% of the population of Jigawa State engages in agriculture which is the backbone of the economy”. Much of the agriculture in the state is not mechanised. It is generally focused on subsistence farming. During the rainy season, food crops like guinea corn, millet, beans, groundnut, and Benin seed are cultivated across the State. In the period of dry season, wheat, maize, onions and pepper are produced in commercial quantities. Thus, irrigational activities are growing rapidly in Jigawa State due to the availability of Fadama Lands. Animal husbandry which consists of cattle, sheep, goats, and livestock like hens, guinea fowls and duck etc., also forms part of the economic activities in Jigawa State. Arts and crafts are another component of the economy of the state which provides gainful employment and complementing agriculture.

“Some of the arts and crafts practiced are weaving (raffia and cloth), pottery, blacksmithing, tanning and leather works. Others are curving, (calabash and wood), traditional textile and architecture” (Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture Dutse, 2011:5). At present, other occupations like mechanics, welding, carpentry, glass-making and modern architecture are growing rapidly especially in the urban centres. In rural areas, where there are rivers or fish ponds, fishing serves a good source of income. Modern fish production too has been introduced in urban and semi-urban areas in the state.

In the formal sector of the economy, there are some state-owned industries located at different parts of the State e.g. Jigawa State Tomato and Citrus Processing Company, Jigawa State Flour Mills, Jigawa State Plastic and Allied Products, etc. Commerce and trade are a good source of income for some individuals in Jigawa State. There are a number of big and small markets across the state, where goods and services are exchanged. Some of the major markets in the state are Sara market, Gujungu market and Maigatari International Market. People from many parts of Nigeria come to these markets for commercial transactions. Banking is also developing rapidly in Jigawa State especially at the urban area centres. At present, there are 21 banks operating in the State.

Tourism is becoming an important source of revenue for the government in the State. According to the Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture Dutse (2011:9), “Jigawa State is blessed with the largest of the undisturbed wetlands in the country which are the Baturiya Game Reserve and the Baturiya Bird’s Sanctuary which hosts over 3000 species of migratory birds.”

Solid mineral is potentially a lucrative venture in Jigawa State. There are many mineral resources in abundance in the state. These are; kaolin, tourmaline, amethyst, marl and marl stone, Potash, silica, iron ore, copper, pedoshper, gold, white quartz, refractory clay, fine clay and antimony (Directorate of Information and Culture, Jigawa State, n. d.:n. p.).

Infrastructure namely roads networks, power supply and information and communication technology are essential for the socio-economic development of a state. They facilitate the movement of agricultural products to markets. In Jigawa State, prior to 1999, governments found it difficult to engage in road construction and rehabilitation due to high cost and dwindling financial resources. However, today existing roads were rehabilitated and asphalted totalling over xx kilometres; and new road projects (about xx kilometres) have been embarked upon (Directorate of Budget and Economic Planning, Dutse, 2009: 43-44).

### **3.5.1 Poverty as the underlying factor for political defections in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

As mentioned earlier, this study employs poverty rates to demonstrate how material inducements and office seeking, as the main causes of political defection, are being sustained by the incidence of poverty in Jigawa State. Survey studies on poverty usually employ one or a combination of objective and subjective poverty measures in order to determine the rate of poverty in a particular society. The objective measurement standards include Absolute Poverty, Relative Poverty and the World Bank's Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Index (US\$1 Per Day Poverty Line). In Nigeria however, relative poverty is the official measure of poverty (NBS, 2011). The objective measures of poverty are often complemented by the self-assessment of the respondents on their perception of poverty incidence (subjective measurement). This study would apply both objective and subjective measures where they are available to depict the incidence of poverty in Jigawa State.

### 3.5.1.1 Incidence of poverty in Jigawa State (1999-2013)

The incidences of objective poverty for Jigawa State are displayed in table 3.1 below:

**Table 3.1: The objective poverty incidence in Jigawa State: (1999-2013)**

Year	Objective poverty rate%
1999	=====
2000	=====
2002	=====
2003	71
2004	90.1
2005	89.54
2006	=====
2007	90.9
2008	=====
2009	=====
2010	74.1
2011	=====
2012	=====
2013	88.5


Source: NBS (2004-2013).

Table 3.1 shows the objective poverty rates in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013. As it can be seen, objective poverty rates of some years are not available. However, the available ones show the rise and fall in objective poverty rates. Thus, the objective poverty rate in the state in 2003 was 71%. This rose to 90.1% in 2004. It fell to 89.54% in 2005. In 2007, poverty rate rose again to 90.09%, fell to 74.1% in 2010. In 2013, it rose a little to 88.5%. The general trend of poverty rate in Jigawa State shows slight fall between the 2010 and 2013. By implication, this means that PDP Government (from 2007 to date) was more successful in poverty reduction than the APP/ANPP Government (1999-2007).

#### **b) The subjective incidence of poverty in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

The APP had governed Jigawa State from 29 May, 1999 to 29 May, 2007. However in 2002, two years into the rule of the APP, a survey was conducted on the general economic situation of the state by the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) (2002). The perception of economic situation (Incidence of Poverty) and economic difficulties by the

respondent households who participated in the survey are presented in Figures 1 and 2 below:




**Economic Situation**

**Source: Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire Survey, July-August 2002.**

**Fig. 1 Perception of Economic Situation of Community and Household Compared to the Year before Survey**

Figure 1 shows the percentages of households' perception of their economic situation in the 2002 CWIQ Survey. As it can be seen, 60% of the households felt that their economic situation worsened compared to the year before the CWIQ Survey; 10% of the households felt that their economic situation was the same as the year before; while 30% of the households felt that their economic situation was better than a year before. In comparison to the household economic situation, 21% of the household said that the economic situation of their communities worsened compared to the year before the CWIQ Survey; only 4% of the households thought that the economic situation of the communities was the same as the year before; 12% of the households believed that the economic situation of the their communities was better than the year before; while approximately two-thirds of the households, 63%, in Jigawa State said they did not know about the economic situation of

their communities a year before the CWIQ Survey. The survey also found that “urban households were less likely than the average to say that the situation had worsened while households in Ringim were more likely to say that their situation had worsened. The female household heads (2%) were more likely to say that things had improved than their male counterparts”. The implication is that more than half of the households felt that their economic situation had worsened three years into the democratic rule in Jigawa State; about 10% of the households had not seen any improvement in their economic situation three years into the democratic rule in the state, only less than one-third of the households felt that their economic situation had improved within three years of democratic rule. In addition, one-fourth of the households believed that the economic situation of their communities had either worsened or remained the same three years into the democratic rule in the state; only slightly more than one-tenth of the households felt that the economic situation of their communities had improved, while almost two-thirds of the households could not even assess whether there was any improvement in the economic situation of their communities or not.



Source: Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire Survey, July-August 2002.

**Fig. 2 Difficulty in satisfying food needs of households during the year before the survey**

Figure 2 indicates the percentages of economic difficulties among the people of Jigawa State in 2002, three years after the return to democratic rule in Nigeria. As it can be seen, 7% of the interviewed often found it difficult to satisfy the food needs of their household during the year; 8% of the respondents always found it difficult to satisfy the food needs of their household during the year; 24% never found it difficult to satisfy the food needs of their household during the year; 17% seldom found it difficult to satisfy the food need of their household and 44% sometimes found it difficult to satisfy the food needs of their household. The implication is that, less than one-fourth of the household heads never found it difficult to satisfy the food needs of their household during the year. However, slightly more than three-fourth of the household heads found it difficult to satisfy the food needs of their household, albeit, with varying degrees of difficulties. In other words, most of the household in Jigawa State were not able to provide adequate foods to their household in 2002, three years into the democratic rule.

Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below show the incidence of subjective poverty in Jigawa State in 2010.

**Table 3.2: Derived Subjective Poverty Measure 2010 (%)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>2010</b>
<b>Core Poor</b>	<b>35.60</b>
<b>Moderate Poor</b>	<b>56.00</b>
<b>Non-Poor</b>	<b>8.40</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>

**Source: NBS: The Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010.**

In Table 3.2, 35.60% of the households in Jigawa State were extremely poor in 2010, that is, they had less than one-third of total Household Per Capita expenditure; 56.0% of the households were moderately poor in 2010, meaning that, their expenditure was greater than one-third of total expenditure but less than two-third of the total expenditure. In other words, the poor category is further subdivided into those in extreme poverty and those in

moderate poverty; where extreme poverty is more severe than moderate poverty. The moderate poverty constitutes the middle class. The remaining 8.4% of the households were the only those who were not poor in 2010. The implication is that 91% of the households in Jigawa State felt that they were poor.


**Table 3.3: Household assessment of livelihood: subjective poverty measurement 2010 (%)**

<b>Household</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Very Poor</b>	<b>4.90</b>
<b>Poor</b>	<b>30.70</b>
<b>Moderate</b>	<b>56.00</b>
<b>Fairly Rich</b>	<b>7.30</b>
<b>Rich</b>	<b>1.00</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>

**NBS: The Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010.**

Table 3.3 presents the household self-assessment of livelihood. It measures the subjective poverty in Jigawa State in 2010, that is, whether households felt that they were poor or not. As it can be seen, 4.9% of the households felt that they were very poor in 2010; 30.7% believed that they were poor; 56.0% thought that they were moderately poor (i.e. they were the middle class); while 7.3% felt that they were fairly rich, only 1.0% of the households considered themselves to be rich in 2010.

The implication of tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 is that poverty incidence in Jigawa State was still high in 2010, five years to the 2015, the year U.N. has set for bringing down poverty rate in Nigeria to 21.40%. However, Jigawa State was not the most poverty-stricken state in Nigeria in 2010. According to the NBS (2010), “Among states, Sokoto had the highest poverty rate at 86.4% while Niger had the lowest at 43.6% in the year under review”. The rate of poverty in Jigawa State had fallen from 90.9% in 2007 to less than 80% in all categories of measurement in 2010.



**Fig. 3: Trend of poverty rates in Jigawa State (2003-2013)**

Fig. 3 displays the trend in the rate of poverty in Jigawa State from 2003 to 2013. In 2003, the rate of poverty was 71% but rose to 90.9% in 2007. From 90.9% in 2007, poverty rate fell to 74.1% in 2010. It rose to 88.5% in 2013. This implies that poverty rates had declined in Jigawa State under the PDP-led government; though, there was a slight rise in 2013.

### **3.6 Administrative structure**

The administrative structure of Jigawa State Government is composed of the State Executive Council, the State House of Assembly, the Judiciary, Local Government Areas and the Emirates (Sparc, 2011:8). The Executive Council consists of the Executive Governor, who is responsible for the daily administration of the state, assisted by his Deputy Governor, Secretary to the State Government, Head of the State Civil Service and various commissioners heading different ministries (Sparc, 2011:8). The “executive council is the apex organ in the administrative structure which is further divided into ministries, agencies, and parastatals (MDAs). Policy decisions are made by the Executive

council and the commissioners are responsible for implementing these policies through their respective ministries” (Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture, Jigawa State 2011:11). At present, there are 15 ministries in Jigawa State and each ministry embodies a number of agencies, boards, departments, directorates as well as other extra-ministerial units etc.

The legislature in Jigawa State, which is known as the State House of Assembly as is the case with other sister states in the country, is composed of thirty 30 elected members, headed by a Speaker and assisted by a Deputy Speaker (Sparc, 2011:8). Other principal officers in the Assembly are the Majority and Minority Leaders as well as the Chief Whip. The state Judiciary forms the third arm of the government. It is headed by the Chief Judge who is also the Chairman of the Judicial Service Commission, a body “... responsible for the appointment, promotion and discipline of the judicial officers”. The Judiciary is responsible for interpreting laws and administration of justice. It comprises the State High Court, State Sharia Court of Appeal, Magistrate Courts spreading across the 27 Local Government Areas in the state and the Area Courts located in important towns.

Jigawa State is made up of “27 Local Government Councils, which are divided into 30 State Constituencies, grouped into 11 Federal Constituencies and 3 Senatorial Districts. In line with the democratic setting in the country, Local Government Councils are elected, and comprise of an Executive with a Unicameral Legislature” (Sparc, 2011:8). Between 27 August 1991 and 23 September 1991, Jigawa State had a total number of 21 Local Government Councils which were: Dutse (the State Capital), Binin Kudu, Gwaram, Kiyawa, Gumel, Maigatari, Hadejia, Birniwa, Kirikasamma, Malam Madori, Jahun, Kafin Hausa, Kazaure, Roni, Ringim, Garki, Babura, Kaugama, Sule Tankarkar, Taura and Gwiwa. In 1996, six more “namely Yankwashi, Gagarawa, Auyo, Buji, Miga and Guri

came into being... with the creation of new states and local governments by the then Military Administration of Sani Abacha” (Directorate of Budget and Economic Planning, Dutse, 2009:17). The 27 Local Government Councils were further subdivided into 77 Development Areas in 2004 “as per law No.5 of 2004 of the State House of Assembly (now abolished)” (Directorate of Budget and Economic Planning, Dutse, 2009:17). In accordance with the provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), the Local Government Councils are elected and are composed of an Executive with a unicameral legislature.

The Emirates form the last component of the administrative structure of Jigawa State Government. It is consisted of five Emirates headed by five First Class Emirs. The emirates are: Hadejia, Dutse, Gumel, Kazaure and Ringim. Under the five emirs are the district heads who supervise their respective districts which are made up of villages headed by the village heads. The village heads in turn, supervise the ward heads that are much closer to the people. The political map (Figure 5) and graphical presentation of the administrative structure (Figure 4) of Jigawa State Government are presented in appendices 10 and 11 below.

### **3.7 Major political parties in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

As at 2012, there were 26 political parties operating in Jigawa State (JISIEC, 2012). However, from 1999 to 2013, only 6 major political parties existed in the state. These parties were the APP (later ANPP), PDP, PRP, ACN, CPC and APC. Distinction between major and minor political parties in Jigawa State was based on electoral performance as records of full membership, financial resources, staffing and logistics of each political party are not usually readily available. Thus major political parties in the state are dependent on election periods. After election, parties which won the highest number of

votes would become the major political parties. These major political parties are either ruling or opposition parties.

To begin with, in 1999, three major political parties fielded candidates to contest for all elective positions in the state. These parties were: the PDP, the APP and the AD. The PDP emerged out of the elections with eighteen (18) chairmen of the local government councils out of 27 but could not win the governorship post. The APP which earlier won six posts of the local government councils produced the executive governor. This led the former, the PDP, to seek redress in court on the allegation that it was deprived of its victory in the governorship election. The outcome of the court ruling was in favour of the APP's candidate and the PDP hence became the main opposition party in the state.

The APP remained in government for eight years, from 1999 to 2007. There was a general election in 2003 but the ANPP swept the polls. The prospects of the PDP under ANPP-led government continuously deteriorated with all the eighteen (18) local government councils formerly controlled by the PDP in 1999 now under ANPP. In 2006 and with the end of the Turaki's second term in office, the ANPP leadership and the incumbent government and their followers decamped to PDP. With key members of the ANPP now in PDP, the latter has opportunity of grafting power. The PDP formed the government following the 2007 General Elections and the remaining members of the ANPP who refused to defect to the PDP now became the main opposition. Thus, from 1999 to 2007, the APP and PDP were the major political parties in Jigawa State, with APP as the ruling party and PDP as the main opposition party.

In the 2011 General Elections, four major political parties participated, with PDP being the ruling party and the CPC, ANPP, and ACN etc., as the major opposition political parties.

The PDP emerged the winner of all the three polls - the Governorship, the State House of Assembly and Local Government posts.

On the 31st July, 2013, the three prominent opposition political parties in Nigeria, ACN, CPC, and ANPP merged into a new political party, the All Progressives Party, APC. With this development, the three major opposition parties in Jigawa State, ACN, CPC and ANPP merged into one. Thus, there was one main opposition party - the APC. The merger of former opposition political parties in Nigeria and in Jigawa State in particular, meant that, fragmentation as one of the challenges of the opposition parties was resolved at least for the time being. Thus, in 2013, the APC was visibly the most outstanding challenger of the ruling party in the state though other opposition political parties still existed and operated.

### **3.8 Political defection in Jigawa State: nature, causes and effects on democratic governance (1999-2013)**

The nature, causes and effects of political defection in Jigawa State are discussed under manifestations of political defection in 3.8.1 below:

#### **3.8.1 Nature and Manifestations of Political Defection in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

The nature of political defections in Jigawa State usually involves political parties, political elites and the electorate. It does not take an ethnic or religious coloration where members of a particular ethnic group, region or religion defect to a particular political party. It includes the types and dimension of political defection, the proliferation of political parties, the pattern of voting behaviour, the level of participation in politics, and trends of political defection. In Jigawa State, there were two forms of political defection between 1999 and 2013; they were elite political defection and the voter's political defection. From 1999 to 2013, about 26 political parties existed in Jigawa State, most of them were nominal. The pattern of voting behaviour was generally towards the ruling

party and the level of participation by the youth was low due to political apathy and limited political choices.

The word ‘manifestation’ simply means that an event, action or objects which clearly justify, show that or confirm that an abstract idea or a theoretical construct exists in reality. Thus, the manifestations of political defection include the events, actions or activities which embody the reality or factual existence of political defection. In Jigawa State, the major manifestations of political defection are: 1) frequent political decampings by politicians and even voters from one political party to another; 2) existence of the ruling party’s moles in opposition political parties; 3) existence of many political parties which are actually sponsored by the ruling party and work in support of the ruling party 4) anti-party politics; and 5) absence or lack of active participation of opposition political parties in parliamentary debates etc.

Political defection is the most important manifestation of political defection in Jigawa State. All the other manifestations like lack of democratic completion, anti-party politics, and compromised political representation in the State House of Assembly are dependent on it. Political defection may be the departure of a political actor e.g. a politician or a voter physically defecting from one political party to another as in the case of former Governor Saminu Turaki along his cabinet members from APP to PDP in 2006. It might be by shifting of support including voting for another political party by a political actor while physically and formally remaining in his party as some members of the PDP voted for the ANPP Governorship candidate because of their dissatisfaction with Alhaji Sule Lamido as the Governorship candidate for the PDP in 1999. This is known as “anti-party politics”. In addition, political defection could take the form of forming some smaller political parties by members of the ruling party, where these minor parties apparently operated as

independent opposition political parties but actually serving the incumbent party. According to Dan Jummai Gumel (Interview, 2012), “most of the opposition party politicians that came here are supporters of the ruling party”. The electorate also involved in political defections in Jigawa State where they voted for different political parties based on material gains made available to them. In fact, most voters in Jigawa State voted for ruling party between 2003 and 2013. In Jigawa State since 1999, politicians and voters had engaged in political defections at one time or the other. Table 3.4 below shows the ruling ANPP defectors to the opposition PDP in 2006 following defection of former Governor Alhaji Ibrahim Saminu Turaki along members of his cabinet to PDP.

**Table 3.4: Some ruling ANPP defectors to opposition PDP in 2006**

Defector	Party	Position	New Party	Position
Alhaji Ibrahim Dandoka	ANPP	State Commissioner of Information	PDP	State Secretary of the PDP
Alhaji Umar Kukuma	ANPP	Commissioner for Local Governments	PDP	_____
Abdullahi Muhammad Bulangu	ANPP	Sports Commissioner	PDP	_____
Hon. Shehu Umar Chamo	ANPP	Commissioner of Gum Arabic	PDP	PDP Vice Chairman Jigawa Central Senatorial District
Alhaji Aminu Sule Sankara	ANPP	Special Adviser on Media Affairs	PDP	Nominated as Senator under PDP
Hon. Babangida Usman	ANPP	Special Adviser on Independent Power Project	PDP	PDP State Vice Chairman
Alhaji Ado Dunari	ANPP	Adviser to the Governor Turaki	PDP	_____
Mallam Bello Dan Sokoto	ANPP	Adviser to the Governor Turaki	PDP	_____
Mallam Umar Jahun	ANPP	Adviser to the Governor Turaki	PDP	_____
Mallam Ibrahim Musa	ANPP	Adviser to the Governor Turaki	PDP	_____
Alhaji Sa'idu Yanleman	ANPP	_____	PDP	PDP State Vice Chairman, Jigawa East Senatorial District
Hon. Sale Danzomo	ANPP	_____	PDP	PDP State Vice Chairman, Jigawa West Senatorial District

Source: OhmyNews, 2006.

Table 3.4 portrays some of the ruling ANPP members who had defected to the the Opposition PDP in 2006. They were members of the Turaki-led administration who represented the ANPP in an interactive forum organized by the PDP's Reconciliation

Committee North-West led by the Deputy National Chairman for PDP South, Chief Olabode George, held at the PDP Secretariat in Dutse, Jigawa State. Many of the defectors were given positions of leadership in the new party, the PDP. The implication of the table is that political decamping is a major manifestation of political defection in Jigawa State during the period under review.

Apart from political defections, activities of the ruling party moles in opposition political parties are also manifestations of cross-carpeting in Jigawa State. In a personal discussion, Mallam Dan Jummai Gumel of the Jigawa State Broadcasting Corporation, presenter of the *Iya Ruwa* (a programme on party politics in Hausa Language on Radio Jigawa), disclosed to me that most leaders of opposition political parties in Jigawa State are moles of the ruling party. According to the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission (2012), there were twenty-six political parties in Jigawa State. However, most of these parties do not have adequate offices and personnel across the 27 local government areas in the state. Their voices are heard only during election periods.

Anti-party politics or the act of supporting another party financially or even voting for that party was a manifestation of political defection. In Jigawa State, during the 1999 General Elections, many PDP members had voted for the APP Governorship candidate because of their disagreement over Alhaji Sule Lamido's candidacy for governorship under the PDP. This was partly why Alhaji Saminu Turaki whose party won only six local governments in the local government council elections defeated PDP's candidate in the governorship election

Lastly, absence or lack of active participation of opposition political parties in parliamentary debates was also a manifestation of political defection in Jigawa State since when most powerful politicians join the ruling party, the opposition political parties would

not be able to win elections and participate or influence government policies in the legislature. From 1999 to 2011, the number of opposition political parties's legislators in the Jigawa State House of Assembly had been woefully decreasing; making political opposition lacking in the state's legislature. Table 3.5 below shows membership by political parties in the Jigawa State House of Assembly from 1999 to 2011.


**Table 3.5: Membership by political parties in the Jigawa State House of Assembly (1999- 2011)**

Year	Political Party	Number of Legislators in Jigawa State House of Assembly	Total Number of Legislators in House of Assembly
1999	Ruling Party (APP/ANPP)	18	30
	Opposition Parties (PDP)	12	
2003	Ruling Party (APP/ANPP)	29	30
	Opposition Parties (PDP)	1	
2007	Ruling Party (PDP)	28	30
	Opposition Parties (ANPP)	2	
2011	Ruling Party (PDP)	29	30
	Opposition Parties (ANPP)	1	

**Source: Jigawa State House of Assembly, (1999-2011)**

Table 3.5 displays membership by political parties in the Jigawa State House of Assembly from 1999 to 2003. As it can be seen, the APP, which was the ruling party, had 18 legislators in the House of Assembly in 1999; while the opposition parties (only the PDP) had 12 legislators. This meant that the opposition PDP could actively oppose any unpopular bill presented by the ruling APP because two-thirds majority of votes (which were 20 out of 30 votes) were needed to pass a bill into law. The number of opposition party legislators drastically fell from 12 in 1999 to 1 in 2003. This meant opposition political parties lost capacity for parliamentary scrutiny of bills presented by the ruling party to be passed into law no matter how unpopular the bills had been. In 2007, the number of opposition political legislators in the Jigawa State House of Assembly increased


to 2 legislators but that was not adequate enough to make any significance in parliamentary debates. Similarly, the number of the opposition party legislators declined back from 2 in 2007 to 1 in 2011. This also conveyed the same message of the weak position of opposition political parties in the Jigawa State House of Assembly in 2011. Thus, Table 3.5 implied that opposition political parties had declined continuously in the Jigawa State House of Assembly while the ruling parties had continued to grow in strength for domination of legislative affairs.



Source: Derived from Table 3.5

**Fig. 6: Trend analysis of relative strength of opposition political parties in Jigawa State House of Assembly (1999-2011)**

Fig. 6 shows the trends in strength of the number of opposition political party legislators in Jigawa State House of Assembly from 1999 to 2011. It can be seen that the number of opposition legislators had been declining. Only in 2007 it had arisen to 2, but the decline continued in 2011. The reason for this was that many opposition party legislators had defected to the ruling party in order to protect their seats.



Source: Derived from Table 3.5

**Fig. 7: Trend analysis of relative strength of the ruling parties in Jigawa State House of Assembly (1999-2011)**

Fig. 7 shows growing trend of the number of the ruling party legislators in the Jigawa State House of Assembly. In 1999, the ruling APP had 18 legislators. In 2003, the number increased to 29 legislators. In 2007, the ruling PDP had 28 legislators in the Jigawa State House of Assembly. In 2011, the number of the PDP legislators increased slightly by 1. This meant that many opposition political party state legislators had defected to the ruling party. The implication of fig. 7 above is that the ruling party had dominated the House of Assembly in Jigawa State from 2003 to 2011. Although the voting pattern that would shade more light on how the opposition party (PDP) behaved with regards to voting on bills at least in 1999 in the Jigawa State Assembly could not be retrieved by the researcher despite efforts to do so, it suffices to note that opposition political parties could not pose any threat to the ruling party in parliamentary debates. This was because of the fewer numbers of the opposition party legislators in the House of Assembly at least from 2003. From 1999 to 2007, 61 laws were passed and assented, while from 2007 to 2013, 98 laws were passed and assented by the Jigawa State House of Assembly (Jigawa State House of

Assembly, 2013), but all these with little or no active contributions by the opposition political parties.

### **3.8.2 Causes of political defections in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

In Jigawa State, the main causes of political defections are material gains and political office-seeking. Voters defected in return for money and other materials like wrappers, detergents and foodstuffs e.g. rice. Political elites defected to other political parties in search for political offices for political survival. For instance, former Governor Saminu Turaki defected from the PDP to ACN in 2011 because he was denied re-nomination for Senate under the PDP. It was alleged that he defected along his cabinet in 2006 from the ruling ANPP to the opposition PDP because he wanted to contest for the presidency under the latter. In addition, people like Ado Sani Kiri, Sa'idu Yusuf Miga, Mohammad Daguro, Abba Anas, Alhaji Farouk Ahmed Gumel, Alhaji Ibrahim Shehu Kwatalo and Yusuf Sale Dunari were in PDP in 1999 before they defected to accept cabinet offices in the ruling APP in 2003.

However, political defection among voters in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013 was sustained by high rate of poverty in the state. The electorate were easily persuaded to support the ruling party in exchange for money. The ruling party on the other hand, employed a lot of public funds in keeping voters support. Between 2003 and 2007, the Turaki-led government introduced a policy, the so-called 'Option 4', where huge government transfers were passed through polling unit agents to the voters in order to keep their loyalty to the ruling party.

### **3.8.3 The effects of political defections in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

The effects of political defections in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013 included lack of stability in the party system as the political process was dominated by the ruling party. In

1999, the ruling APP had 18 legislators in the Jigawa State House of Assembly. It had 6 local government chairmen; while the opposition PDP had 12 state legislators and 18 local government chairmen. But, by 2003, the PDP had only 1 member in the House of Assembly. All the 18 chairmen belonging to the PDP were lost to the ruling APP in 2003. The political space was dominated by the ruling party because, most politicians wanted to stay in government where they would get access to public funds to keep their supporters. This was why the opposition political parties were weak and ineffective to carry out their democratic roles of keeping the government accountable and providing credible and alternative policies. Secondly, political defection impacted negatively on democratic governance in Jigawa State in the sense that huge amount of money which would have been used for developmental projects were diverted for buying political support and luring opposition party politicians and voters to the ruling party. The transfer of funds (N70, 000 for each of the 3,527 polling units) in the state during the ANPP administration was a misplacement of policy priority as the government was not successful in its policy of poverty reduction. This was attested to by the little success of the PDP government in poverty reduction from 2007 to 2013. The PDP Government under Alhaji Sule Lamido abolished 'Option 4' policy. Government funds transfers to politicians were minimal under the PDP-led Government compared to the ANPP years.

Another negative impact of political defection in Jigawa State between 1999 and 2013 was in the area of public accountability and rule of law. Government was not fully accountable to the people and this was proved by corrupt allegations levelled against former Governor Ibrahim Saminu Turaki by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The EFCC sued former Governor Turaki to court on 36-count charges including embezzlement of N36 billion (Akubor, 2012: 413). Apart from lack of political accountability, rule of law was also stifled by political defection in Jigawa State as politicians easily manipulated

constitutional provisions that sanctioned defections by the legislators. As many as half of the members of the Jigawa State House of Assembly had defected from one political party to another between 1999 and 2013 (see Table 4.18 below).

On political participation of voters, political defections had reduced the range of political choices for the electorate both for candidates and alternative policies. Good candidates and politicians that would evolve alternative policies to those of the government had defected to the ruling party for political offices. This was perhaps why opposition parties' representation in the Jigawa State House of Assembly continued to deteriorate right from 2003 (see Table 3.5).

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **POLITICAL DEFECTION AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN JIGAWA STATE: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents and analyses relevant data collected through the various sources described in chapter one on the subject under study. Questionnaire data which are presented in tabular form showing frequencies and percentages of respondents' views backed up with data obtained through interviews and focus group discussions. In addition, Governorship and State House of Assembly election results are presented and used to analyse voter political defection in the State. From all these, deductions were quantitatively and qualitatively drawn.

#### **4.2 Field Data: questionnaire, interview and FGDs**

Under this sub-heading questionnaire, interview and focus group discussions data are presented, analyzed and interpreted in order to demonstrate how political defection affected democratic governance in the study area.

**Table 4.1: Administration and retrieval of questionnaire**

S/N	LGA	Questionnaire administered	Questionnaire retrieved	Valid questionnaire	Percentage
1.	Auyo	14	14	14	3.22
2.	Babura	23	22	19	4.37
3.	B/kudu	36	32	31	7.13
4.	Birniwa	17	16	15	3.45
5.	Buji	11	11	10	2.30
6.	Dutse	31	31	31	7.13
7.	Gagarawa	8	8	8	1.84
8.	Garki	23	18	17	3.91
9.	Gumel	13	13	13	3.00
10.	Guri	11	11	10	2.30
11.	Gwaram	32	27	24	5.52
12.	Gwiwa	10	10	10	2.30
13.	Hadejia	16	16	15	3.45
14.	Jahun	26	26	26	5.98
15.	Kafin-hausa	26	23	22	5.00
16.	Kaugama	16	9	4	0.92
17.	Kazaure	14	14	12	2.76
18.	K/kasamma	17	17	16	3.68
19.	Kiyawa	22	22	21	4.83
20.	Maigatari	17	15	12	2.76
21.	M/madori	19	16	14	3.22
22.	Miga	13	13	11	2.53
23.	Ringim	30	30	25	5.75
24.	Roni	10	10	10	2.30
25.	S/tankarkar	20	20	20	4.60
26.	Taura	20	20	19	4.37
27.	Yankwashi	7	7	6	1.38
Total	27	502	471	435	100.00

**Source: Field Work, 2012.**

Table 4.1 shows the administration and retrieval of the questionnaire. A total of 502 questionnaires were administered, out of which 471 were retrieved. 435 of the retrieved questionnaire, representing 86.7% were answered completely and were thus, regarded as valid for presentation, analysis and interpretation.

## Bio-Data variables analysis

**Table 4.2: Distribution of respondents by sex**

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Male	237	54.48
Female	198	45.52
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field Work, 2012.**

Table 4.2 shows the distribution of respondents based on sex. Out of a total of 435 respondents, 237, representing 54.48% were males while the remaining 198, amounting to 45.52% were females. The implication of the table is that men have greater participation in the survey than women. It is not unconnected with the Islamic culture of the study area where men were more openly accessible than women. However, an effort has been employed by the researcher to ensure that women also participated in the survey by including females among the research assistants used in conducting the study.

**Table 4.3: Age of respondents**

Variables (in years)	Frequency	Percentage
18-29	234	54.79
30-39	141	32.41
40-49	45	10.35
50 & Above	15	3.45
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field Work, 2012.**

Table 4.3, respondents were presented based on age groups. The highest frequency is 234, representing 54.79% which fell between the ages of 18 to 29. While the lowest frequency 15 amounting to 3.45% which were respondents of 50 and above years old. This implies that young people participated in the survey more than the other three groups combined together.

**Table 4.4: Highest educational qualification of respondents**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Primary	69	15.86
O/level	122	28.05
Tertiary	189	43.45
School of High Islamic Studies (e tc.)	55	12.64
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field Work, 2012.**

In Table 4.4, 189 respondents which were the highest frequency, representing 43.45% had attended tertiary institutions including colleges, polytechnics and universities. While 55 respondents which was the lowest frequency, equivalent to only 12.64% had obtained certificates in High Islamic Studies etc. The implication of this is that participants of the survey in the study area were educated to tertiary level of western education.

**Table 4.5: Distribution of respondents by occupation**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Civil service	110	25.29
Businessman	71	16.32
Farming	112	25.75
Politician	9	2.02
Student	96	22.07
Crafts	37	8.50
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field Work, 2012.**

Respondents were presented in Table 4.5 based on their respective occupations. Out of a total of 435 respondents, 112, representing 25.75% were farmers; 110 representing 25.29% were civil servants; 96, amounting to 22.07% were students. The lowest frequency which is 9 respondents, representing 2.02% took politics as their occupation. This shows that the study has cut across various occupational groups, and the implication is that most participants in the survey were farmers, civil servants or students; very few of them were politicians.

**Table 4.6: Distribution of respondents by marital status**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Married	255	58.62
Single	168	38.62
Divorced	6	1.38
Widowed	6	1.38
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field Work, 2012.**

Table 4.6 presents respondents according to their marital status. As it can be seen, 255 of the respondents which is the highest frequency, representing 58.62% were married; 12 respondents representing 2.76% were either divorced or widowed. The implication of table 4.6 is that more than half of the respondents were married; only few were divorced or lost their spouses. This is perhaps due to the fact that Jigawa State is a relatively rural and Muslims dominant state where the practice of early marriage is prevalent. According to the Directorate of Budget and Economic Planning (2009:15), in Jigawa State, “Data from the 2006 CWIQ Survey indicates that 68.9 of the population aged 12 years and above are married [men and women] of which 30.4% are polygamous”.

**Table 4.7: Religious affiliation of respondents**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Islam	429	98.62
Christianity	6	1.38
Traditional	0	0.00
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field Work, 2012.**

Table 4.7 shows the distribution of respondents according to their religious affiliations. 429 respondents, representing 98.62% were affiliated to Islam while the remaining 6 respondents, equivalent to 1.38% identified themselves with Christianity. This shows that Muslim respondents had disproportionately greater participation in the survey than other religious groups. The implication is that it has to do with the fact that Jigawa State is a Muslim-predominant state. There are virtually perhaps no followers of traditional religion in Jigawa State for according to Directorate of Information and Culture (undated: 11)

“about 96% of the population (Jigawa State) is Hausa/Fulani and Muslims by religion”.

The remaining 4% are Christian minorities mostly from other parts of the country.

**Table 4.8: Distribution of respondents by ethnic identity**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Ngzimawa	4	0.92
Hausa	382	87.82
Fulani	24	5.52
Badawa	1	0.23
Kanuri	19	4.36
Others	5	1.15
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

Table 4.8 presents the distribution of respondents by their ethnic affiliations. The largest number of respondents, which is 382, representing 87.82%, identified themselves as Hausa. 1 respondents, equivalent to 0.23% identified himself a bade (bade is the singular, badawa being the plural). The implication is that the Hausa were the dominant group in the survey and perhaps in Jigawa State. However, it is practically difficult to determine who is a Hausa or a Fulani among the urban dwellers. Most Fulani who speak Hausa language fluently and have lived in towns and have a long history of intermarriage with Hausa people identified themselves as the latter. The Fulani in table 16 above, therefore, are settled Fulani living in the countryside outside towns. This fact could be buttressed by a statement made by the Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture, Jigawa State (2011:3) that “It is difficult to define who is a Hausa, due to the adoption of the culture, dress and language by other communities”. Moreover, according to Directorate of Budget and Economic Planning (2009:15) “The socio-cultural situation in Jigawa State could be described as homogeneous with Hausa/Fulani found in all parts of the state. Kanuri are largely found in Hadejia Emirate, with some traces of Badawa mainly in its Northeastern parts. Even though each of the three dominant tribes has continued to maintain its ethnic identity, Islam and a long history of inter-marriages have continued to bind them together”.

The Ngzimawa are a dialect of Kanuri who are found mostly in Gumel Emirate. They have been largely subsumed by Hausa language and culture.

#### 4.3 The nature of political defection in Jigawa State (1999-2013)

The study has identified frequent political decamping, lack of credible alternative policies/absence of opposition political parties' representation in the state assembly, political decamping, anti-partyism, weak political opposition and compromised democratic institutions as the main manifestations and indices of cross-carpeting dictating political interactions and public policy processes in Jigawa State.

**Table 4.9: Views of respondents about the more common manifestations of political defection prevalent in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Anti-party politics	54	12.41
Lack of credible alternative policies/ lack of presence of opposition political parties in State house of assembly and Local Government Councils	41	9.43
Compromised democratic institution (e.g. electoral commission, security services, courts etc.)	67	15.40
Party decamping	82	18.85
Weak opposition political parties	55	12.64
All of the above	122	28.05
Others	14	3.22
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

Table 4.9 displays views of the respondents on the more common manifestations of political defection found in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013. As the table reveals, 122 respondents, which is the highest frequency, representing 28.05% believed that all the variables mentioned (e.g. anti-party politics, compromised institutions, lack of credible alternative policies, weak opposition parties and party decamping) were all common manifestations of political defection in the study area. Only 14 respondents equivalent to 3.22% believed that fragmentation or moles are the common manifestations of political

defection in Jigawa State in the period under review. The implication of table 4.9 is that all forms of the manifestations of political defection mentioned were prevalent in Jigawa State. However, other manifestations of political defection like fragmentation and existence of moles in political parties were relatively less common in the state.

#### **4.3.1 Lack of credible alternative policies and absence of opposition political parties' representation in the State house of assembly:**

**Table 4.10: Views of respondents on whether or not opposition political parties had credible alternative policies to those of the ruling party in Jigawa State**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Yes	103	23.68
No	285	65.51
No idea	47	10.81
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

Table 4.10 shows views of respondents on whether or not opposition political parties have credible alternative policies to those of the ruling party in Jigawa State. As it can be seen, 285 respondents, representing 65.51%, did not believe that opposition political parties had credible alternative policies to those of the ruling party. However, 47 respondents representing 10.81% said that they did not have an idea whether or not opposition political parties had credible alternative policies to ruling party's policies. The implication of the table is that opposition political parties in the study area lack credible alternative policies.

Nevertheless, Mutari Gwaki, ACN State Financial Secretary (Interview, 2013) and Ahmed Bako Samamiyya, the APC State Assistant Secretary (Interview, 2013) posited that opposition political parties have credible alternative policies in Jigawa State. Gwanki (Interview, 2012) argued that his party, the opposition ACN, had better alternative policies to those of the ruling PDP. According to him (Interview, 2013), "We have better policies on energy, education, healthcare, transport etc. However, the ruling party has always confronted us with threat and even dismissal of our supporters from the civil service".

While Bako (interview, 2012), asserted that the APC has presented viable and alternative policies in place of those of the ruling PDP. According to him (Interview, 2013), “For example, agriculture is neglected in Jigawa State. According to our estimates, Jigawa State has abundant fertile lands that, if effectively and efficiently utilized can be used to feed itself, its neighbours and even two-thirds of the Nigerian population. But, this does not happen now. People are not provided with adequate fertilizers. There are many ponds and valleys in Jigawa State, but unfortunately, not even one-fifth of these are cultivated”. The fact is that, although some opposition political parties claimed to have better alternative policies to those of the ruling PDP, they did not have adequate presence in the State assembly and local government councils to oppose the ruling party’s policies and persuade the legislators to formulate their better ones. In fact, from 1999 to 2007, 78 bills for laws on education, healthcare, infrastructure, appropriation etc. were passed and assented in Jigawa State House of Assembly under the APP/ANPP Government with no inputs from the opposition parties. Similarly, from 2007 to 2010, 21 bills were passed and assented in the same House of Assembly under the ruling PDP without any inputs from the opposition political parties (Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports & Culture, 2011).

**Table 4.11: Views of respondents on the ways used by opposition political parties to checkmate the activities of the ruling party in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Parliamentary debates	51	11.72
Public criticisms/media debates	319	73.33
Civil demonstrations/rallies	39	8.97
Personal contacts	26	5.98
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field Work, 2012.**

Table 4.11 displays views of respondents on the ways used by opposition political parties in Jigawa State to checkmate the excesses of the ruling party. The question was asked in order to identify the modes of operations employed by opposition political parties in checkmating the excesses of the ruling party/government in the state. As it can be

observed, 319 respondents representing 73.33% thought that opposition political parties in Jigawa State employed public criticisms or debates in media (electronic and print media) to checkmate the excesses of the ruling party; while 26 respondents representing 5.98% attested that opposition political parties in Jigawa State made use of other methods such as personal contacts in checkmating the ruling party. The implication of table 4.11 is that opposition political parties in Jigawa State mainly used public criticisms in the mass media in their effort to keep the ruling party on its toes. In Jigawa State between 2007 and 2013, there was 1 member out of the 30 members of the State House of Assembly from the opposition political party (ANPP) representing Hadejia state constituency. The remaining 29 member were from the ruling party, PDP. So it would be very difficult for the opposition political parties to use parliamentary debates in frustrating unpopular bills sponsored by the ruling party. Similarly, all the local government councils were dominated by the ruling party. Moreover, opposition political parties in Jigawa State were fragmented into ANPP, CPC and ACN before forming the current APC, so it was very unlikely if they could come together and wage a civil demonstration or rally in opposition to the ruling party for some of its activities which went against the interests of the people of the State. This further reveals that opposition political parties relied on private media houses such as the Freedom Radio in order to debate issues with the ruling party. Opposition political parties were usually denied access to state-owned media like the NTA and the Jigawa Broadcasting Corporation, Radio and Television. One of the radio programs in which opposition political party leaders and members used to feature in their debates with the ruling party was the Hausa political program: ‘Ko Wace Gauta Jace’ (literary means every political party has defects). This is buttressed by the position of Alhaji Abdussalam, the then ANPP State Treasurer (Interview, 2013) when he lamented that “...we in the ANPP thought that we were weak and ineffective at checkmating the

dominance of the ruling party, the PDP. We, henceforth, decided to forge a merger with those in the ACN and CPC and to present a formidable front to the ruling party”.

#### **4.3.2 Elite political defections in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

In Jigawa State, two forms of political defections were prevalent: political defection by a full-time politician or by an ordinary voter. Political defection by a politician is known as elite political defection and it can be by a ruling party politician defecting to the opposition party, or by an opposition party politician splitting to a ruling party. However, political defection by the elite is a mass political behaviour because the politician often defects along with his party supporters. Voter political defection on the other hand, can be on personal basis, as when individual voters shift their support from one political party to another without any consideration for ethnicity, geographical location or even constituency. It can also be based on ethnic groups or constituency, as when the some members of a particular ethnic group or constituency shift their votes collectively from one political party to another.

Tables 4.12 to 4.13 below show the patterns of elite political defections among the APP and PDP cabinets and in the Jigawa State House of Assembly from 1999 to 2013.

**Table 4.12: Composition of the APP Government Cabinet showing political defections (1999-2007)**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Defectors</b>	<b>Non-Defectors</b>
Commissioners	7	38
Advisors	2	11
Total	9	49

**Source: Jigawa @20 Our Story, August-1991-August-2011.**

Table 4.12 displays the number of commissioners and other political appointees in the APP government who were either defectors from an opposition political party, notably the PDP or were the original members of the ruling party. As it can be seen, out of a total of 58 members of the cabinet only 9 (7 commissioners and 2 advisors) were defectors from

the opposition political parties. The remaining 49 members (38 commissioners and 11 other political appointees) were original members of the ruling APP (Non-defectors). The implication of the table is that very few members (16%) of the opposition political parties defected to the ruling APP between 2003 and 2007. These defectors were lured to the ruling APP in the build up towards the 2003 general elections on promises of political appointment. The remaining members (84%) were the non-defectors.

The 2003 defection of the opposition PDP politicians to the ruling APP was motivated by the conditions specified by Beatriz Magaloni (2006) that opposition party politicians may likely defect to the ruling party when: 1) their possibility of winning under that party is high; 2) there is likelihood of obtaining that party's nomination; 3) there are prospects of access to government spoils; 4) the costs of campaigning under that party is low; and 5) there is opportunity to advance some policy goals or ideology. As part of its campaign strategies in 2003, the ruling APP created more local government areas in the state, increasing the number from the existing 27 to 60. This made it easy for the party to garner the support of the electorate who would not like a reverse of the policy should the ruling party lose the election. Many of the opposition politicians defected to the ruling party because they saw the possibility of winning under that party given the seemingly support of the voters towards it. To keep the loyalty of the voters and ensure elite unity, the ruling APP selected ten representatives from each of the 286 polling units across the newly created 60 local government areas and channelled project funds. With this, the party elite got access to government fund because there was little supervision and, therefore no accountability on how the funds were spent.

**Table 4.13: Composition of the PDP Government Cabinet showing political defection (2007-2013)**

Variables	Defectors	Percentage	Non-Defectors	Percentage
Commissioners	14	48.28	12	41.38
Advisors	2	6.89	1	3.45
Total	16	55.17	13	44.83


**Source: Jigawa @20 Our Story, August-1991-August-2011.**

Table 4.13 shows the number of commissioners and other political appointees in the PDP government who were either defectors from an opposition political party, notably the ANPP or were the original members of the ruling PDP. As it can be seen, out of a total of 29 members of the cabinet 16 (14 commissioners and 2 advisors) were defectors from the opposition political parties. The remaining 13 members (12 commissioners and 1 other political appointees) were original members of the ruling PDP (Non-defectors). The implication of table 23 is that a significant number (55.17%) of the members of the cabinet of the ruling PDP between 2007 and 2013 were defectors from the ANPP. The remaining members (only 44.83 %) were the non-defectors. The implication of the table is that a greater number of the cabinet of the ruling PDP between 2007 and 2013 were defectors from the ANPP government. If we compare the trend of elite political defections between 1999-2007 and 2007-2013, we can see that the trend was greater in 2007 than in 2003.

In the case of the 2007 defections, the ruling party politicians defected to the opposition PDP in accordance with the conditions for the defection of a ruling party politician to the opposition party as specified by Magaloni (2006); that a ruling party politician is likely to defect to an opposition political party if: 1) the possibility of winning under an opposition party is higher than under the ruling party; 2) there is possibility of obtaining nomination of that party; 3) there is prospect of access to government spoils; 4) there is opportunity to advance some policy goals or ideology; 5) the costs to be incurred running under that party (i.e. there is easy access to government controlled mass media and no harassment by

members of the ruling party) are low; and 6) the expected electoral fraud is low. In 2007, the ruling APP and its government defected to the opposition PDP, which was then the major opposition political party in the state. Thus, the conditions of the possibility of winning, nomination, access to government spoils and mass media, absence of harassment and expected electoral fraud by members of the ruling party were met because agreements on how to share nomination forms, settle campaign costs, etc were reached before the defectors were accepted to the PDP.

### 4.3.2.1 Trends analysis of elite political defections in Jigawa State (1999-2013)



Source: Derived from Tables 4.12 and 4.13.

**Fig. 8: Trend of elite political defections in Jigawa State government cabinets (1999-2013)**

Fig. 8 shows the trend in elite political defection in the APP and the PDP Governments' cabinet from 1999 to 2013. Between 1999 and 2007, elite defection in the APP Government cabinet was 16%. From 2007 to 2013, the number of elite defectors in the PDP cabinet was 55%. The implication of the figure is that there were more defectors in the PDP cabinet than in the APP cabinet. However, it should be noted that the defectors in the PDP cabinet were originally members of the APP. Likewise, the defectors in the APP cabinet were originally from the PDP.

**Table 4.14: Political defection in the Jigawa State Assembly in 2003**

S/No.	Legislator	Constituency	Legislator's party (1999)	Legislator's party (2003)
1.	Hon. Sale Zakari Ya'u	Auyo	PDP	ANPP
2.	Hon. Sale S. Fawa	Gagarawa	PDP	ANPP
3.	Hon. Sale Usman Tsuru	Maigatari	PDP	ANPP

**Source: Jigawa State House of Assembly (1999-2003)**

Table 4.14 portrays political defection in the Jigawa State House of Assembly in 2003. There were only three House Members who were in PDP in 1999 but defected to the ANPP in 2003. In 1999, there were no any defections in the state legislature since it was the year which witnessed first general elections after Nigeria had returned to democratic rule. In 2003, the defections were few and tilted towards the ruling party. This implies that political defection as a tool for seeking and maintaining political offices had begun gaining ground.

**Table 4.15: Political defection in the Jigawa State assembly in (2007)**

S/No.	Legislator	Constituency	Legislator's party (2003)	Legislator's party (2007)
1.	Hon. Babandi Ibrahim	Gumel	ANPP	PDP
2.	Hon. Ibrahim Suleiman	Gwiwa	ANPP	PDP
3.	Hon. Zakari Aliyu	Jahun	ANPP	PDP
4.	Hon. Adamu Ahmed Atamos	Kafin-Hausa	ANPP	PDP
5.	Hon. Suleiman Ibrahim Marke	Kaugama	ANPP	PDP
6.	Hon. Sale Usman Tsuru	Maigatari	ANPP	PDP
7.	Hon. Umar Adamu Anas	Malam-Madori	ANPP	PDP
8.	Hon. Adamu Sarki Miga	Miga	ANPP	PDP
9.	Hon. Garzali Ya'u Mohammed	Roni	ANPP	PDP
10.	Hon. Yahaya Mohammed	Sule-Tankarkar	ANPP	PDP
11.	Hon. Rabi'u Dangabi Kwalam	Tuara	ANPP	PDP
12.	Hon. Abdu Dauda	Yankwashi	ANPP	PDP

**Source: Jigawa State House of Assembly (2003-2007)**

Table 4.15 shows political defection in the Jgawa State House of Assembly in 2007. As it can be seen, the defection was by the ANPP legislators to the PDP following the defection of the former Governor Saminu Turaki along his cabinet to the opposition PDP in 2006. Thus, there were 12 ANPP legislators who defected to and won election under the PDP. This implies that rate of defection rose from 3 legislators in 2003 to 12 legislators in 2007. However, the defection was by the ruling party members to the opposition political party.

This also meant that political defection in the study area involved both the ruling and opposition political party politicians and a whole government could defect to another political party for political survival.

**Table 4.16: Political defection in the Jigawa State assembly from the ruling ANPP to the opposition PDP (2007)**

State assembly members		Percentage
Defectors	12	40
Non-defectors	18	60
Total	30	100

**Source: Jigawa @20 Our Story, August-1991-August-2011**

Table 4.16 displays the number of defectors and non-defectors in the Jigawa State House of Assembly after the 2007 general election. The defectors defected from the ruling ANPP in 2006 to the then opposition PDP and contested and won in the latter in the 2007 State House of Assembly election. As it can be seen, 13 legislators (43%) out of the 30 members of the State House of Assembly were formerly members of the ANPP who defected to the PDP in 2006. However, the remaining 17 state legislators (57%) were originally PDP members. The implication of the table is that it confirms the fact that there was a mass political defection of the party elite from the ruling ANPP to the opposition PDP (later the ruling party) in 2006/2007.

**Table 4.17: Political defection in the Jigawa State house of ssembly in 2011**

State assembly members		Percentage
Old members	17	43
New members	13	57
Total	30	100

**Source: Jigawa State house of assembly (1999-2011)**

Table 4.17 shows political defection in the Jigawa State House of Assembly in 2011. As it can be seen, there were 17 legislators who had been members of the House of Assembly under the PDP since 2007. These legislators were the old members. The remaining 13 legislators were elected into the House for the first time in 2011. They were the new members. This, technically, implied that there were no political defections in the Jigawa

State House of Assembly in 2011. In addition, it meant that no political defections took place in Jigawa state legislature in 2013 the period covered by this study.


**Table 4.18: Political defections in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

Year	Number of legislators in the State assembly	Number of defectors	Percentage
1999	30	0	0
2003	30	3	10
2007	30	12	40
2011/2013	30	0	0
Total	30	15	50

**Source: Jigawa State house of assembly (1999-2011)**

Table 4.18 summarizes the number of political defections in the Jigawa State Assembly from 1999 to 2013. As it can be seen, there were no defections by any of the 30 members of the House of Assembly in 1999. In 2003, 3 legislators amounting to 10% had defected from their party to another political party. In 2007, 12 legislators, corresponding to 40% of a total of the 30 members in the House of Assembly had defected from the ANPP to the PDP. However, no political defections in the State House of Assembly were recorded in 2011 and 2013. Generally, the implication of table 28 above is that half (50% or 15 legislators) of the Jigawa State members of the House of Assembly had defected from one political party to another between 1999 and 2007. This further reveals that a good number of Jigawa State legislators had manipulated section 68 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria which outlaws political defection by legislators unless if there was a division or crisis in the party. In other words, the rule of law regarding the operation of party politics was violated by many of the Jigawa State Members of the House of Assembly.

#### 4.3.2.2 Trends analysis of elite political defections in the Jigawa State house of assembly (1999-2013)



Source: Derived from Table 4.18.

**Figure 9: Trends of political defections in the Jigawa State house of assembly (1999-2013)**

Fig. 9 shows the trend of political defection in the Jigawa State House of Assembly from 1999 to 2013. As it can be seen, in 1999, there were no defections into or out of the State Assembly. However, in 2003, there was a defection of 10% defectors from the APP to the PDP. In 2007, there was a mass defection of 40% of the ruling ANPP legislators to the opposition PDP. In 2011 and 2013, no mass defections were recorded in the State Assembly. The implication of figure 4.2 is that members of the State House of Assembly were less likely to defect massively to the opposition political parties compared with the members of the executive arm of the government. A possible explanation for this is that members of the executive arm of government like Governors, Chairmen, Commissioners and Advisors are not constitutionally or statutorily constrained from defection, but, the legislators are constitutionally barred from defection. They could only defect if there is a deviation or crisis in their party. Section 68 1(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria stipulates that a legislator shall vacate his seat if he defects from the party that

has sponsored him to another political party except if there is division or crisis in the party in which he won the seat to the legislature. The constitution has not defined the nature of the division or crisis in the party that may legitimise political defection, but legislators exploited section 68 1(a) according to how it would favour them. In 2006, in Jigawa State, when the then executive Governor was defecting from his party, APP to the PDP, there was a division in the APP because members of the party like Alhaji Farouk Adamu Aliyu and his supporters were not ready to follow the Governor to the PDP. This allowed the APP legislator to sideline constitutional provision and defected to the opposition PDP. In 2011, members of the State House of Assembly in Jigawa State did not have to bother to defect from the PDP because they were expecting to get nomination for re-election.

#### **4.3.3 Voter political defections in Jigawa State (2003-2013)**

In advanced democracy such as the United States of America, generations of families vote and belong to one political party (Nweje, 2013). In contrast, voters easily shift their support from one political party to another in developing democracies. This raises the question of voter political defections in Nigeria. However, it is not easy to identify, analyse and explain voter political defections on an individual basis by showing such and such voter has defected from the ANPP or ACN to PDP or vice-versa, etc., in the study area. But, the election results of different election years in the study area can be used to show how political parties lose voters' support from time to time, and this indicates voter political defection. Secondly, voter political defection is only important during the election year because of the electoral value or strength it adds or gives to political parties. The study utilises the results of the governorship elections of 2003 and 2011 to show the patterns and trends of voter defections in Jigawa State. It was unfortunate that the researcher could not retrieve the governorship election results of 1999 to allow him make a more comprehensive comparative analysis of the voter political defections of the periods:

1999-2007 and 2007-2013. The results of Governorship and State House of Assembly election won by political parties in the State are presented below:

**Table 4.19: Results and seats won by political parties in the governorship and State House of Assembly Elections for Jigawa State (2003)**

Political Party	Number of Votes and seats Scored	
	Governorship (Votes)	State House of Assembly (Seats)
APP	816,385	30
PDP	_____	_____
Others	293,153	_____
Declared Winner	APP	APP

**Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 2012.**

Table 4.19 shows the results of Governorship and State Assembly elections of 2003. The APP won 816,385 votes. Other political parties including the PDP scored 293,153 votes. Thus, the implication is that the APP became the ruling party while the PDP and other political parties became the opposition political parties.

**Table 4.20: Results and seats won by political parties in the Governorship and State House of Assembly Elections for Jigawa State (2007)**

Political Party	Number of Votes and Seats Scored	
	Governor (Votes)	State House of Assembly (Seats)
PDP	523,940	30
ANPP	269,055	_____
ACN	_____	_____
CPC	_____	_____
Others	175,453	_____
DECLARED WINNER	PDP	_____

**Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 2012.**

From table 4.20 the PDP scored 523,940 votes in the Governorship election and won all the 30 seats for the State House of Assembly. The ANPP scored 269,055 votes while other political parties got 175,453 votes in the Governorship election. Thus, the implication is that the PDP became the ruling party while the ANPP became the major opposition political party in the state.

**Table 4.21: Results and seats won by political parties in the Governorship and State House of Assembly Elections for Jigawa State (2011)**

Political Parties	Number of Votes and Seats Won	
	Governor (Votes)	State House of Assembly (Seats)
PDP	676,307	30
ACN	343,177	_____
ANPP	12,124	_____
CPC	56,911	_____
Others	5,911	_____
DECLARED WINNER	PDP	PDP

**Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 2012.**

Table 4.21 displays the results of the 2011 Governorship and the State House of Assembly elections in Jigawa State. In the Governorship election, the PDP scored 676,307 votes and won all the 30 seats for State House of Assembly. The ACN, ANPP and CPC scored: 343,177; 12,124 and 56,911 respectively. Other political parties scored 5,911 votes in the Governorship election. The implication is that the PDP became the ruling party while the ACN, CPC, and ANPP became the major opposition political parties in the state.

**Table 4.22: Voter political defection by major political parties (2003-2007) Governorship Elections**

Political party	No. of votes won: 2003	No. of votes won: 2007	No. of votes increased	No. of votes decreased
APP	816,385	269,055	_____	547,330
Others	293,153	175,453(PDP=523,940)	_____	117,700

**Source: Election Results 2003-2007, INEC 2012.**

In Table 4.22, the APP won 816,385 votes in 2003 but scored only 269,055 votes in 2007. It had a decrease of 547,330 votes in 2007 ( $816,385 - 269,055 = 547,330$ ). The other political parties (including the PDP) won 293,153 votes in 2003 but scored 175,453 votes in 2007. They had a decrease of 117,700 votes in 2007 ( $293,153 - 175,453 = 117,700$ ). The PDP had won 523,940 votes in the 2007 governorship election in Jigawa State. In 2003, the PDP, together with other opposition political parties only won 293,153 votes. The implication of table 29 is that more voters had defected from the ruling APP and other minor opposition political parties to the PDP which became the new ruling party in 2007. That is to say, voter political defection occurred largely from the opposition political parties to the ruling

party. The possible reason is that the ruling party had used government transfers in the 2007 election which the opposition political party easily afford as a result of lack of funds. This was confirmed by one of the Questionnaire respondent when he marked that “Of course they (The PDP party representatives) gave me N300...”

**Table 4.23: Voter political defection by major political parties in the (2007-2011) Governorship Election**

Political party	No. of votes won: (2007)	No. of votes won: (2011)	No. of votes increased	No. of votes decreased
PDP	523,940	676,307	152,367	_____
ANPP	269,055	12,124	_____	256,931

**Source: Election Results (2007-2011), INEC 2012.**

In table 4.23, the PDP won 523,940 votes in the 2007 governorship election, while it (PDP) won 676,307 votes in the 2011 governorship election. The difference of votes in the two elections is 152,367 votes, which means that 152,307 people whether as first-timer voters or regular voters had shifted their support to the party from other political parties, notably among them, the opposition APP. It is true that some of the 152,307 voters might have voted for the first time, but they still opted for the PDP not the other opposition political parties. Some other voters among the 152,307 voters were regular voters of opposition parties in 2007 but defected to the ruling PDP in 2011. Similarly, the ANPP (formerly, APP) won 269,055 votes in the 2007 governorship election, but scored 12,124 votes in the 2011 governorship election. The difference in the two elections is 256,931 votes, which means the APP had lost 256,931 voters in the 2011 governorship election. The APP/ANPP lost these voters to the ruling party and other opposition political parties, including the newly emerged ACN and CPC, which each scored 343,177 and 56,911 votes, respectively. In other words, 256,931 voters had defected from the ANPP to other political parties in 2011. This voter’s mass political defection had repercussion on the political role of the ANPP. The ANPP had declined from being the main opposition party in Jigawa State in 2007 to the third player in 2011 (the ACN and CPC were the first and second

player opposition political parties, respectively). The implication of the table is that voter's political defection had affected the stability of the political parties in Jigawa State.

**Table 4.24: Voter political defection by major political parties (2011-2013)**

Political party	No. of votes won:2011	No. of votes won:2013	No. of votes increased	No. of votes decreased
PDP	676,307	_____	_____	_____
ACN/ANPP/CPC/APC	412,212	-----	.....	_____

**Source: Election Results (2011-2013), INEC 2012.**

In table 4.24, the PDP won 676,307 votes in the 2011 governorship election, but scored no votes in the 2013 because there was no governorship election then. The difference of votes in 2011 and 2013 is nothing, and that means that the PDP had suffered no defection of its voters in 2013 in Jigawa State. The combined votes won by the ACN, ANPP and CPC in the 2011 governorship election were 412,212 votes. The three parties merged into one party and became known as the APC in 2013. However, they had won no votes in 2013 because there was no governorship election held then. The difference of votes of the ACN, ANPP and CPC in the 2011 and 2013 was nothing. And that means, neither PDP on the one hand, nor ACN, ANPP or CPC on the other, lost any voters to one another in the 2013. In other words, no voters had defected from the ruling PDP to other opposition political parties in Jigawa State. This means that the PDP remained the ruling party in Jigawa State in 2013. This also implies that voter political defection is only important and occurs only during elections.

By comparing the figures of decreased votes in Tables 4.23 and 4.24, in which the opposition ANPP lost (256,931 votes) from 2007 to 2011 and the opposition APC, (ACN/ANPP/CPC merger) lost (nothing) from the 2011 and 2013 governorship elections, respectively, it can be seen that the opposition ANPP experienced more vote losses than the opposition APC. In other words, more voter political defections were experienced by the opposition ANPP from 2007 to 2011 than by the opposition APC from 2011 to 2013.

This, by implication, means that the trend of voter defection between opposition parties was greater in 2007 than in 2013. Again, if the figures of votes increased in the same tables, where the then ruling PDP gained 152,367 votes in 2011 (this is above what it scored in 2007) are considered, the increased votes (none) got by the ruling PDP in 2013 were equal to the ones it scored in 2011. It can be seen that less voter political defections in the ruling party were experienced from 2011 to 2013. In other words, fewer regular voters of the ruling party defected to the opposition political parties between 2011 and 2013. The combined implication of Tables 4.23 and 4.24 is that there were more voter political defections from the opposition political parties to the ruling party than from the ruling party to the opposition political parties from 2007 to 2013. This confirmed the views expressed by the respondents in table 41 that the ruling party had employed government funds to buy political support during elections in the period under review.

**Table 4.25: Distribution of votes won by ruling and opposition political parties in Jigawa State (2003-2007)**

Political party	Year	No. of votes scored	Percentage
Opposition parties	2003	293,153	26.42
Ruling party	2003	816,385	73.58
Total	2003	1109538	100
<hr/>			
Opposition party	2007	444,508	45.90
Ruling party	2007	523,940	54.10
Total	2007	968,448	100

**Source: Election Results (2007-2011), INEC 2013.**

Table 4.25 displays the total votes scored by the ruling and opposition political parties in Jigawa State in the election years 2003 and 2007. In the table, Opposition Political Parties in the state won a total votes of 293,153 in 2003 election, which are equivalent to 26.42% of the total votes cast in that election year (Total votes cast: 1109538 votes). On the other hand, the total votes won by the ruling party were 816,385, which was equivalent to 73.58% of the total votes cast in that election year (2003). In the 2007 election year, the votes scored by opposition political parties in Jigawa State were 444,508, which were equivalent to 45.90% of the total votes cast in that election year (Total votes cast in 2007

election year: 968, 448 votes). The ruling party, on the other hand, won total votes of 523,940, which are equivalent to 54.10% of the total votes cast. If the percentages of votes gained and lost by both the ruling and opposition political parties in the election years (2003 and 2007) are calculated, it would be found that opposition parties got an increase of votes of 19.48% (45.90%-26.42%). However, the ruling party made a vote decrease of the same percentage, 19.48% (7358-54.10%). By implication, 19.48% of the voters of the ruling party had defected to the opposition political parties between 2003 and 2007 election years.

**Table 4.26: Distribution of votes won by ruling and opposition political parties in Jigawa State (2007-2011)**

<b>Political party</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>No. of votes scored</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
All opposition parties	2007	444,508	45.90
Ruling party	2007	523,940	54.10
Total	2007	968,448	100.00
<hr/>			
All opposition parties	2011	417,400	38.16
Ruling party	2011	676,307	61.84
Total	2011	109,370,7	100.00

**Source: Election Results (2007-2011), INEC 2012.**

Table 4.26 displays the total votes scored by ruling and opposition political parties in Jigawa State in the election years 2007 and 2011. In the table, all Opposition Political Parties in the state won combined total votes of 444,508 in 2007 election, which are equivalent to 45.90% of the total votes cast in that election year (Total cast:968,448 votes). On the other hand, the total votes won by the ruling party are 523,940, which is equivalent to 54.10% of the total votes cast in that election year (2007). In the 2011 election year, the combined votes scored by all opposition political parties in Jigawa State were 417,400, which are equivalent to 38.16% of the total vote cast in that election year (Total votes cast in 2011 election year: 109, 370, 7 votes). The ruling party, on the other hand, won total votes of 676,307, which are equivalent to 61.84% of the total vote cast. If we calculate the percentages of votes gained and lost by both the ruling and opposition political parties in the election years (2007 and 2011), we can see that opposition parties got a decrease of

votes of 7.74% (45.90%-38.16%). However, the ruling party made a vote increase of the same percentage, 7.74% (61.84%-54.10%). By implication, 7.74% of the opposition parties' voters defected to the ruling party between 2007 and 2011 election years.

**Table 4.27: Distribution of votes won by ruling and opposition political parties in Jigawa State (2011-2013)**

Political party	Year	No. of votes scored	Percentage
Opposition parties (ACN,ANPP,CPC)	2011	412,212	37.87
Ruling party (PDP)	2011	676,307	62.13
Total	2011	108,851,9	100.00
<hr/>			
Opposition party (APC)	2013	412,212	37.87
Ruling party (PDP)	2013	676,307	62.13
Total	2013	108,851,9	100.00


**Source: Election Results (2007-2011), INEC 2012.**

Table 4.27 shows the total votes scored by ruling and opposition political parties in Jigawa State in the election years 2011 and 2013. In the table, major opposition political parties (ACN,ANPP and CPC) in the state won combined total vote of 412,212 in 2011 election year, which were equivalent to 37.87% of the total votes cast in that year (total cast:108,851,9 votes. I excluded votes scored by others in 2011 election year because the votes scored by others in the 2013 election year were not available to me. So, I made the analysis based on votes won by the major opposition political parties and the ruling party which were available to me). On the other hand, total votes won by the ruling party were 676,307, which were equivalent to 62.13% of the total votes cast in that election year (2011). In the 2013, the combined votes available to the major opposition political party (APC) in Jigawa State were 412,212 , which were equivalent to 37.87% of the total votes possessed by the ruling party and major opposition party in that year (Total votes owned by the ruling party and major opposition party in 2013 was: 412,212 votes. There was no election held in 2013, thus political parties retained their 2011 scores). The ruling party, on the other hand, had total votes of 676,307, which were equivalent to 62.13% of total votes cast. If we calculate the percentages of votes gained and lost by both ruling and opposition

political parties in (2011 and 2013), we can see that major opposition parties got an increase of votes of 0% (37.87%-37.87%). However, the ruling party suffered a vote decrease of the same percentage, 0% (62.13%-62.13%). By implication, 0% of the ruling party voters defected to the major opposition party between 2011 and 2013 election years.

Furthermore, if we calculate the percentages of the total votes gained and lost by ruling and opposition political parties in election years: 2007, 2011 and 2013 from the two tables above (Table 4.26 and Table 4.27), we can see that all opposition political parties suffered a vote decrease of 7.74% (2007-2011); major opposition party made a vote increase of 0% (2011-2013). By implication, the number of opposition parties' voters who defected to the ruling party between 2007 and 2011 was greater than the number of the ruling party voters that defected to the opposition parties between 2011 and 2013. In other words, voter political defection was greater between 2007 and 2011 than between 2011 and 2013. Again, the ruling party made a vote increase of 7.74% (2007-2011); it also suffered a vote decrease of 0% (2011-2013). By implication, the number of opposition party voters who defected to the ruling party between 2007 and 2011 was greater than the number of the ruling party voters that defected to the opposition party between 2011 and 2013. In other words, voter's political defection from opposition political parties to the ruling party between 2007 and 2011 was greater than voter political defection from the ruling party to the opposition political parties between 2011 and 2013. In short, more voters had defected from opposition political parties to the ruling party between 2007 and 2011 than between 2011 and 2013.

### 4.3.3.1 Trends analysis of voter political defections in Jigawa State (1999-2013)




Source: Derived from election results (1999-2013)

**Figure 10: Trends of voter political defections in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

Fig. 10 shows the trend of voter political defections from 2007 to 2013. In the 2007 election year, the rate of voter defection was 19.98%. This fell to 7.74% in 2011 and subsequently became 0% in 2013. The implication is that voter's political defection had been diminishing in Jigawa State from 2007 through 2013. A possible reason is that the incidence of poverty in Jigawa State had slightly declined from 2007 under the PDP-led government; that also implies that the ruling PDP had succeeded in poverty reduction through its economic empowerment program (see figure 4.4 below for the relationship between voter political defection and poverty rates; and see fig. 4.3 above for the declines rates of poverty in Jigawa State from 2007 to 2013).

#### 4.3.3.2 Trends analysis of the likely relationship between changes in poverty rates and changes in voter political defections.



Source: Derived from percentage change in poverty rates and percentage change of voter defection.

**Figure 11: Relationship between changes in poverty rates and changes in the level of voter political defections based on the Election Years (2003-2013)**

Figure 11 shows the relationship between poverty rates and voter political defections. In 2003-2007, the percentage change in the rate of poverty in Jigawa State was 19.9% ( $90.9\% - 71\% = 19.9\%$ ); this corresponded to 19.48% percentage change of voter defection in the Election Years, 2003-2007. In 2007-2010, the percentage change in poverty rate was 16.8% ( $90.9\% - 74.1 = 16.8\%$ ); it corresponded to the percentage change of voter political defection of 7.74% during the 2007-2011 election years. The percentage change in poverty rate for 2010-2013 was 14.4% ( $88.5\% - 74.1\% = 14.4\%$ ); it corresponded to the percentage change of voter political defection of 0% during the 2011-2013. The poverty rate for the 2011 was not available to me, so I represented it with poverty rates of the 2010 which was readily available. Thus, the poverty rates for Jigawa State in 2010 and 2013 were 74.1% and 88.5% respectively. In essence, figure 7 shows that there is a likely relationship between change in poverty rates and change in voter political defection. In

other words, the rate of poverty determines the trend of voter political defection. As the percentage change in poverty rate rose in figure 7 to 19.9% in 2003-2007, percentage change in voter political defection also rose to 19.48% in the same period. Similarly, as the percentage change in poverty rate in figure 7 fell to 16.8% in 2007-2010, voter's political defection fell from 19.48 to 7.74% in the 2007-2011. Finally, as the percentage change in poverty rate fell to 14.4 in 2010-2013, the percentage change in voter's political defection also fell to 0% in 2013. The implication of fig.7 is that both incidence of poverty and voter political defection were related as they slightly declined in Jigawa State from 2007 through 2013 under the PDP-led administration. This was perhaps because the PDP had implemented its policies on economic empowerment and poverty reduction to some extent and less government transfers were made available to the voters compared to the APP period (1999-2007) when the government disbursed huge amount of money to the voters through its Option A4 policy.

#### **4.4 Causes of political defection in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

The main causes of political defection in Jigawa State during the period under review (1999-2013) are presented and analysed in table 30 below:

**Table 4.28: Views of respondents on the causes of political defections in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
------------------	------------------	-------------------

Lack of ideology/moles from the ruling party	33	7.59
Power-mongering/ protection of offices/seeking of appointments	79	18.16
Material gains/selfish/personal interests	167	38.39
Lack of good leadership/intra-party conflicts/lack of internal democracy/lack of political awareness	37	8.50
Threat by the ruling party/government	12	2.76
Effectiveness of the ruling party's policies/programmes	28	6.44
Lack of prospects in the opposition political parties/fear of electoral fraud	13	2.99
No idea	66	15.17
<b>Total</b>	<b>435</b>	<b>100.00</b>

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

Table 4.28 presents the views of respondents about the reasons for political defection in Jigawa State. As it can be seen, 167 respondents, representing the highest percentage (38.39%) and 79 respondents, equivalent to the second largest percentage, 18.16%, believed that the search for material gains or selfish interests and power-mongering or office-seeking, respectively, were the major causes of political defection from opposition political parties to the ruling party. While 12 respondents, which represented the least percentage, 2.76%, and 13 respondents, equivalent to 2.99% and which was second to the least percentage, believed that threat by the ruling party or government and lack of prospects in the opposition political parties and the fear of electoral fraud by the ruling party were the causes of political defection from opposition political parties to the ruling party.

The implication of Table 4.28 is that material gains or personal interest were the most important causes of political defection among the electorate; while power-mongering or office-seeking was the main cause of political defection among politicians. This position was supported by the views of Hajia Binta Farin Dutse, Jigawa State APC Women Leader (Interview, 2013) that "People used to defect to or support the ruling party because of threat and use of public funds to buy support by the latter". However, Alhaji Salisu Ku'it, the Chairman of the ruling PDP (Jigawa State) (Interview, 2012), believed that political defections from opposition political parties to the ruling party in Jigawa State are caused

by lack of good leadership in opposition parties to provide political direction to followers. Secondly, party members defected to other political parties when their current party could not win elections. According to him (Interview, 2012), “Party members could not endure endless electoral failures, so they had to defect to political parties that could win the elections”. A similar view was held by Alhaji Abdussalam (Interview, 2013), that political defections were as a result of the dominance of the ruling party. That “the ruling party had dominated the electoral process and even determined the electoral outcomes to the extent that some members of the opposition political parties, being tired of electoral frauds, felt contented to join the incumbent party in order to get access to power and public funds”. For Jangargari (Interview, 2012), political defections were part and parcel of the proper workings of democracy. That people defected in Jigawa State in order to exercise their democratic rights of peaceful assembly. Finally, for Samamiyya (Interview, 2013), intra-party conflicts and lack of cooperation were the causes of political defections in Jigawa State. According to him (Interview, 2013), “Our leaders lack cooperation. Everyone wants to become governor and if he fails to be nominated to that position, he will start looking for way out from the party, mostly together with his followership”. The implication from table 35 above is that elite political defection is caused by political office-seeking while voter political defection is for material gains in form of government transfers.

#### **4.5 The effects of political defection on democratic governance of Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

Democratic governance has three major components...1) political leadership; 2) political institutions and processes of the state; and 3) popular political participation.

##### **4.5.1 The effects of political defection on the political leadership and democratic institutions of Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

**Table 4.29: Major effects of political defection on the political leadership and democratic institutions of Jigawa State from (1999- 2013)**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Lack of adequate funds for executing public policies	103	23.68

Lack of good leadership and accountability	82	18.85
Lack of alternative policies/misplaced policy priorities	46	10.58
Lack of ideology by political parties, lack of cooperation, lack of internal democracy and frequent defections to the ruling party	47	10.81
Lack of politically informed voters	13	2.99
Electoral fraud and lack of independent public institutions	15	3.45
No effects	15	3.45
No idea	94	21.60
No response	20	4.59
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

Table 4.29 presents respondents' divergent views about the impact of political defection on the political leadership and institutions of Jigawa State. 103 respondents representing 23.68% which is highest percentage opined that lack of adequate funds for executing public policies was the effect of political defections in the state. However, 13 respondents, equivalent to 2.99%, the lowest percentage, viewed lack of politically informed voters as the effect of political defections in Jigawa State. The implication of the figures on Table 4.29 is that political defection had negative effects on the political leadership and institutions of Jigawa State between 1999 and 2013. However, the most important effects of political defection on the political leadership and institutions of the state were lack of adequate funds for executing public policies.

Corresponding data from interview and focused group discussions conducted (ANPP and APC, 2003) supported various claims of impact of political defection on the political leadership and institutions of Jigawa State. For example, Ku'it (Interview, 2012), Garba Liman Jangagari (Interview, 2012) and Farin Dutse (Interview, 2013), believed that the impact of political defection in the state was weak political institutions especially the institutions of opposition political parties. For Ku'it (Interview, 2012), "political defection bred weak opposition political parties and rendered them less credible alternatives to the ruling party". For Malam Ahmed Garba Hadejia and Muntari Gwanki (Interview, 2012), "Political defection made opposition political parties weak in Jigawa State to the extent

that the ruling party in the state usually became dominant and manipulated elections and arbitrarily controlled the state institutions including the house of assembly”. Farin Dutse and Sammaiyya (Interview, 2013) had argued that political defection rendered opposition political parties weak “... that is why we merged in 2013 to challenge the ruling party”. The decision reached in the FGD with participants from the APC (2013) also affirmed that opposition political parties in Jigawa State had limited power to directly influence the policies of the ruling party as a result of political defections. While the decision of FGD with participants from the ruling PDP (2012) pointed lack of credible alternative policies to those of the ruling party as the effect of political defection political leadership and political institutions in the state. For Malam Haladu Adamu (Interview, 2013), “Public institutions like the State Independent Electoral Commission and the security services were compromised as a result of political defection. There is no rule of law. The executive Governor is arrogant and he does not heed the advice of the opposition political parties”. In contrast, Jangargari (Interview, 2012) had argued that political defection had strengthened and consolidated democracy in Jigawa State.

**Table 4.30: Opinions of respondents on the effects of political defections on the roles of opposition political parties in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Tarnishing the image of the party	100	22.99
Eroding mass-base/supporters/fragmentation	61	14.02
Destroying the ideological base	65	14.94
Reducing membership fees due to the party	20	4.60
All of the above	34	30.81
Frustration	55	12.64
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

Opinions of Respondents about the effects of political defection on the roles of opposition political parties are presented on the Table 4.30. While 100 respondents, representing 22.99% believed that political defection tarnished the image of the opposition political parties in the eyes of the voters. In contrast, 20 respondents, equivalent to 4.60% thought reduction in membership dues was the effect of political defection on opposition political parties in the state. Thus, the most important effect of political defection on opposition political parties was the tarnishing of the image of parties before the eyes of the electorate. Reduction in membership fees due to the opposition political parties was not a strong effect of political defection perhaps because political parties nowadays rarely relied on party members for sourcing of funds. The implication of Table 4.30 was that political defection had impacted negatively on the image of opposition political parties before the eyes of the people thereby making them (the opposition political parties) unable to be the voice of the voiceless, protectors of individual civil liberties as well as credible alternative to the ruling party.

Corresponding data from the interview and FGDs conducted on the ANPP and PDP participants (2012) showed that political defection had resulted in lack of respect for the opposition political party by the ruling party. For instance, Malam Haladu Adamu (Interview, 2013), is of the opinion that "... The executive Governor is arrogant. He does not heed the advice of the opposition political parties". The decision of the FGD with

participants from the PDP pointed out the inability of opposition political parties to present credible alternative policies.

**Table 4.31: Views of respondents on the roles performed by opposition political parties in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Educating their members and the general public	80	20.46
Checkmating the activities of the ruling party	124	28.50
Creating opportunities for material gains to their members	10	2.30
Alternative to government	38	8.74
Protecting individual rights and civil liberties	39	8.97
Representing the interests of the people	49	11.26
Engaging the ruling party in vital public issues/debates	33	7.59
Others	53	12.18
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

Table 4.31 displays views of respondents about the roles performed by opposition political parties in Jigawa State. As it can be seen, 124 respondents equivalent to 28.50% thought that opposition political parties in Jigawa State had checkmated the activities of the ruling party as their main function; 89 respondents representing 20.46% believed that opposition political parties educated their members and the general public in Jigawa State; while, 9 respondents, equivalent to 2.30% believed that opposition political parties in Jigawa State created opportunities for material gains to their members as their function.

Table 4.31 implied that checkmating the activities of the ruling party and education of their members and the general public were the most important roles played by the opposition political parties from 1999 to 2013. The least role performed by opposition political parties was to create opportunities for material gains for their members. In other words, opposition political parties were more engaged in checkmating the ruling party and educating the public. They were less concerned with self-enrichment. However, the electorate might be deceived by media propaganda of some opposition party leaders as a way of checkmating the unpopular activities of the ruling party. This is confirmed by the arguments of Alhaji

Abdussalam and Malam Haladu Adamu (Interview, 2013) that the roles played by opposition political parties in Jigawa State was public criticism of the policies of the ruling party through the mass media because there was only one representative from opposition parties in the state assembly (2007-2013) and that had limited the ability of the opposition parties at parliamentary scrutiny of the ruling party's policies and programmes. Table 4.31 also implied that the most acceptable and conventional means of checkmating the ruling party is through parliamentary debates and passing of laws, which did not happen in Jigawa State in the period under review because of absence of substantive representation of the opposition in the State House of Assembly.

**Table 4.32: Views of respondents on rating the role played by the opposition political parties in Jigawa State from (1999 and 2013)**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Active	258	59.31
Passive	126	28.97
No idea	51	11.72
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field Work, 2012.**

The public assessment of the role played by opposition political parties between 1999 and 2013 is represented by the views of the respondents in the Table 4.32 above. The question was asked in order to find out whether opposition political parties in Jigawa State were active or passive throughout the period under review as well as throughout the length and breadth of the state. At times, opposition political parties may exist only in name without people being affected by their activities; or they may be active only during elections and become passive in elections intervals. They can also concentrate their activities in some regions or areas of the state, or even in urban centres or rural areas within the state. As it can be seen, 258 respondents, representing 59.31% believed that opposition political parties had performed an active role in the period mentioned. In contrast, 51 respondents, equivalent to 11.72% said they did not have any idea about the role played by opposition political parties between 1999 and 2013 in Jigawa State. Thus, Table 4.32 showed that a

large portion of the voting population in Jigawa State believed that opposition political parties in the state performed an active role within the period under review; only 11.72 respondents did not any idea.

Data from the interviews conducted have affirmed divergent views about whether or not opposition political parties had actually had active or passive roles in the period under review. For instance, Jangargari (Interview, 2012), Ku'it (Interview, 2012) and Malam Ahmed Garba Hadejia (Interview, 2012) indicated that opposition political played active roles in Jigawa State within period under review. For Jangargari (Interview, 2012), there were three categories of opposition political parties in Jigawa State:

The first group included those people who opposed the ruling party out of sheer jealousy; the second group was composed of those who waged political opposition for the sake of the state. They had tried to point out the lapses of the ruling party in order to effect improvements. They were the true opposition political parties in the state; the third group of opposition political parties comprised those people that one as a human being could not even explain the nature of their operation. You could not exactly determine what they were doing or wanted to achieve.

For Salisu Ku'it (Interview, 2012), opposition political parties had played two basic roles in Jigawa State: 1) they pointed out the lapses of the ruling party for the sake of effecting improvements. For instance, “there was a time when I was the commissioner for water resources, a member of the opposition political party came to me and told me that he saw a problem of lack of drinking water in the village of Gurum and we solved the problem. So, such opposition political opposition was a good one”; 2) they discredited the ruling party and the government. “The government of Jigawa State (2007-2013) had developed the infrastructure, improved agriculture, improved healthcare and education, but still some members of the opposition political parties discredited it”. However, Muntari Usman Gwanki (Interview, 2012) and Hajia Binta Farin Dutse (Interview, 2013) believed that the

active role played by opposition political parties in Jigawa State in the period under review was political education. According to Hajia Binta Farin Dutse (Interview, 2013), “We educated people against money politics because it is one of the grave problems we are facing in Jigawa State. And in this area, I am satisfied with our performance and that is why there are only two credible political parties in the state---the APC and the ruling PDP”. The decisions reached in the FGDs conducted in 2013 with Participants from the APC showed that the APC as an opposition political party performed actively the roles of political education of the general public and provision of viable alternative policies. Finally, Ahmed Bako Samamiyya (Interview, 2013), had argued that the ACN as an opposition political party had presented better alternative policies to those of the ruling party. According to him (Interview, 2013), “We have policies on energy, education, healthcare, transport etc. However, the ruling party had always confronted us with threat and even dismissal of our supporters from the civil service”. The implication of table 4.32 is that opposition political parties had performed active roles in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013. However, available evidence (See Table 3.5, p. 77 and Table 4.18 p. 101 above) indicated that opposition political parties were weak from 2003 to 2011, which meant that they were not strong enough in the legislature to scrutinize policies of the ruling party. Nevertheless, it is well known that opposition political parties in Jigawa State resorted to media houses (see Appendices IV and V for some interviews on political matters concerning Jigawa State offered by some opposition politicians from Jigawa State in ‘Iya Ruwa’ and ‘Ko Wanne Gauta Ja Ne’ Political Programs run by Radio Jigawa and Freedom Radio Kano, respectively) for expressing their political views and criticizing the ruling party.

**Table 4.33: Views of respondents on whether or not opposition political parties had performed the aforementioned roles effectively (1999-2013)**

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	226	51.95
No	133	30.58
No idea	76	17.47
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

Opinions of the respondents on whether the opposition political parties in Jigawa State had performed their roles effectively are presented on Table 4.33. While 226 respondents representing 52.95% said “Yes” believing that opposition political parties had performed their roles effectively in the state between 1999 and 2013. In contrast, 76 respondents, representing 17.47% said they did not have any idea of whether or not opposition political parties had carried out their functions effectively between 2007 and 2013. Table 4.33 indicated that barely more than half of the voting population in Jigawa State perceived opposition political parties to have performed the roles expected of them effectively.

This was the view countered by Alhaji Abubakar Abdussalam (Interview, 2013) when he said “Our party, the ANPP has only one representative in the State House of Assembly. The other opposition parties did even have representation. So, opposition parties cannot directly checkmate the ruling party at parliament. What some of our colleagues do is to criticise government on media houses”. The implication of Table 4.33 is opposition political parties had performed effectively in public criticism in media houses, but, at the parliamentary level, they were weak and could not render the democratic roles effectively in the period under study. The reason the weakness of opposition political parties in Jigawa State was as a result of spate of political defection. According to Table 3.5 and Fig. 3.6 above, in 1999, opposition political parties had 12 legislators in the State House of Assembly, but number declined to 1 legislator in 2003, and rose only to 2 legislators in 2007 and reverted to 1 legislator in 2011.

#### 4.5.2 The effects of political defection on the process of governance and political participation in Jigawa State (1999-2013)

**Table 4.34: Opinions of respondents on whether or not the ruling party had employed government money/resources at the disadvantage of the opposition political parties in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013**

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	325	74.71
No	59	13.56
No Idea	49	11.26
No Response	2	0.47
Total	435	100

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

The opinions of respondents about whether or not the ruling party had employed state funds/resources at the expense of the opposition political parties in the governance of Jigawa State are presented on table 4.34. This question was asked in order to assess the extent to which politics was monetized by the ruling party in the state. As it can be seen, 325 respondents, representing 74.71% believed that the ruling party/government had employed state funds and resources illegally in order to gain advantages over the opposition political parties between 1999 and 2013. These advantages ranged from commanding more supporters and electoral victory to stifling opposition political parties. In contrast, 59 respondents representing 13.56% did not believe that the ruling party had employed state resources at its advantage in dealing with opposition political parties. The implication of Table 4.34 is that more than 70% of the electorate in Jigawa State believed that the ruling party had used state funds and resources at its disposal to gain leverage over the opposition political parties. According to a respondent, “Yes, the ruling party used money especially during elections for ‘refreshment’. Even I, myself, had been given N300 in order to vote for PDP” (Administered Questionnaire, 2012). Another respondent also revealed that “Yes, the ruling party shared money, wrapper, yard and even soap and omo and other materials between 1999 and 2011 in order to get advantage over the opposition political parties in Jigawa State”(Administered Questionnaire, 2012). In essence, this implied that party politics in Jigawa State was monetized to a significant extent. This

position was in line with the decision reached in the FGD with participants from the PDP (FGD, 2013) that many of the opposition political parties criticised the government in the media in order to attract the attention of the ruling party materially (to transfer funds).

**Table 4.35: Views of respondents on the State resources/machineries frequently employed by the ruling party in dealing with the opposition political parties in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
State funds	106	24.37
State offices/appointments	44	10.11
State election management officials (JISIEC)	35	8.04
Security services	33	7.59
All of the above	189	43.45
The judiciary, traditional political institutions etc.	28	6.44
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

Table 4.35 presents views of respondents about the State resources or machineries used frequently by the ruling party in dealing with the opposition political parties in Jigawa State from 1999 and 2013. Thus, 189 respondents, equivalent to 43.45% attested that all the resources and machineries mentioned were employed frequently by the ruling party between 1999 and 2013 in dealing with opposition political parties in the state. It was only the remaining 28 respondents, equivalent to 6.44% indicated other state machineries like the judiciary, traditional rulers etc as being used by the ruling party in its struggle with the opposition political parties in Jigawa State. It can be seen that all resources/machineries were employed at one time or the other by the ruling party and the assertion is represented by 189 respondents, representing 43.45%, but state funds were the most frequently used. State funds were easily disposable, as they could be used to buy votes from the electorate, bribe the INEC officials and even the security services in order to intimidate opposition parties' officials and supporters. According to Malam Haladu Adamu (Interview, 2013), "Election management body in Jigawa State is fully controlled by ruling party. In most cases, election results are announced during the local council polls even before the completion of the voting. The implication of Table 4.35 is that State institutions were

compromised and used by the ruling party to stifle opposition political parties and state resources that could have been used for developmental projects were diverted by the incumbent party to dominate the political process.

**Table 4.36: Views of respondents on when the State resources/machineries were more massively employed by the ruling party:**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Before election	196	45.06
During election	191	43.90
Post election	48	11.04
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

The views of the respondents on when the ruling party massively employed State resources/machineries are stated on Table 4.36. As it can be seen, 196 respondents, representing 45.06% indicated that state resources were more massively employed by the ruling party before election period; while 191 respondents, equivalent to 43.90% believed that they were used during election period. The remaining 48 respondents, amounting to 11.04%, however, said that the ruling party employed the resources/machineries more massively during post election period. It can be easily noted that, the ruling party spent more resources and employed more State apparatus before and during election periods. This amounted to opinions of 88.96%, but only 11.04% of the respondents mentioned post election period. In other words, most of the electorate in Jigawa State believed that the ruling party used to employ more State resources in the period before or during elections and less at the post election times in order to buy support and stifle the opposition political parties. Malam Ahmed Garba Hadejia (Interview, 2012) had argued that the ruling party “...was always able to manipulate elections and control the State institutions, including the house of assembly”.

The implication of table 4.36 is that ruling party usually spent more funds on the Election Day in order to buy political support. The ruling party used to have its agents who gave out money to the willing voters instantly to vote for the incumbent party at polling units. In

addition, on the Election Day, even some electoral officers and security services were bought by the ruling party agents.

**Table 4.37: Views of respondents on the effects of political defection on political participation in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Positively	147	33.79
Negatively	230	52.87
No idea	58	13.34
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

Table 4.37 presents views of respondents on how political defection had impacted on democratic participation in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013. As it can be seen, 230 respondents representing 52.87% thought that political defection had negatively affected political participation of people in Jigawa State. While 58 respondents amounting to 13.34% said they did not have idea about the effect of political defection on political participation in the state. This implies that over half of the voting population in Jigawa State believed that political defection had negative effects on democratic participation in the State. Moreover, only a small portion of the electorate did not know whether political defection had either positive or negative effects on political participation. According to Malam Haladu Adamu (Interview, 2013), “The impact of political defection in Jigawa State was lack of the democratic competition. The ruling PDP had dominated the state house of assembly and all the 27 local government councils in the state”. The implication of Table 4.37 is that political defection had really impacted negatively on political participation as opposition political parties were weak and could not present better alternative policies; the electorate could not vote based on sound decisions but naively on the basis of material gains. In other words, political defection had prevented active political participation of voters in public issues.

**Table 4.38: Effects of political defection on political participation in Jigawa State (1999- 2013)**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
It causes voter apathy	170	39.00
It limits political choices	131	30.00
Lack of proper policy implementation	89	20.00
Uninformed policy decisions	35	8.00
No effects	3	1.00
No idea	7	2.00
Total	435	100.00

**Source: Field work 2012.**

Table 4.38 presents respondents' views of the effects of political defection on political participation in Jigawa State. As it can be seen, 170 respondents, representing 39.00% and 131 respondents, representing 30.00% believed that voter apathy and limited political choices were the two main effects of political defection on political participation in the state. Then, 3 respondents, amounting to 1.00% said that political defection had no any effects on political participation in the state. The implication of Table 4.38 is that voter political apathy and limited political choices were the major effects of political defection on political participation in Jigawa State. However, according to Alhaji Abubakar Abdussalam (Interview, 2013), "Political defection has rendered us as a political party powerless. We had experienced electoral fraud that is why we and our colleagues in other political parties, ACN and CPC, thought to come together and find a way to overcome injustice by the ruling party".

#### **4.6 Discussion of the Major Research Findings and Verification of Assumptions Nature of political defection in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

Political defection had given rise to unstable party system which was characterised by existence of many nominal political parties. In 1999 were there only four political parties (APP, AD, PRP and PDP) in Jigawa State. In 2003, AD and PRP defuncted while PDP and APP persisted. In 2007, the APP transformed into the ANPP and new political parties emerged (CPC, DPP and ACN). In 2013, the three major opposition parties merged into

the APC. Thus, from 1999 to 2013, only the PDP survived as a political party in Jigawa State. However, as at 2012 Local Government Election, there were 26 political parties in Jigawa State (JISIEC, 2012)

There were two forms of political defection in Jigawa State between 1999 and 2013. These were elite political defection and voter political defection. The elite usually defected from opposition political parties to the ruling party. The exception was only in 2006 when ruling APP merged with the opposition PDP. Table 4.12 shows that in 2003 nine opposition party leaders had defected to the ruling ANPP and were rewarded with executive offices (7 commissioners and 2 advisors). In 2007, 16 out of 29 members of the ruling PDP cabinet were defectors from the ANPP. Similarly, in 2003, Table 4.14 showed 3 legislators belonging to the opposition political parties had defected to the ruling APP. Also, in 2007, Table 4.15 shows that 12 ruling APP legislators had defected to the opposition PDP. However, Table 4.16 indicated that no elite political defection took place in the Jigawa State House of Assembly.

Table 4.25, Table 4.26 and Table 4.27 showed political defection of voters between 2003 and 2013 in Jigawa State. In Table 4.25, 19.48% of the voters of the ruling party defected to opposition political parties between 2003 and 2007. In Table 4.26, 7.74% of the voters of opposition political parties defected to the ruling party between 2007 and 2011 and; in Table 4.26, 0% of the ruling party voters had defected to opposition political parties.

The trend of voter political defection was generally greater between 2007 and 2011 than between 2011 and 2013. There were nor political defections from 2011 to 2013. Table 4.26 and Table 4.27 showed that the number of opposition parties' voters who defected to the ruling party between 2007 and 2011 was greater than the number of the ruling party's voters that defected to the opposition parties within the same period. Likewise, voter's political defection from opposition political parties to the ruling party between 2007 and

2011 was higher than voter's political defection from the ruling party to opposition political parties between 2011 and 2013. That is, more voters defected from opposition parties to ruling party between 2007 and 2011 and fewer voters had defected from the ruling party to opposition political parties between 2011 and 2013. The reason for the change in trends of voter's political defection is that the electorate shifted their support or voted for material gains and the rates of poverty in the State determined the extent to which they rushed to vote in order get the material resources or funds. Thus, when the rate of poverty in State was high, voter's political defection would also be high. The highest rate of poverty in Jigawa State was 90.9% in 2007; in 2013, the rate of poverty in the State was 88.5%.

#### **Manifestations of political defection in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

There were several manifestations of political defection in Jigawa State between 1999 and 2013, the most important of were frequent political decamping, compromised democratic institutions, weak opposition political parties and anti-party politics. In Table 4.9, 18.85% of the respondents believed that frequent political decamping was the more common manifestation in Jigawa State between 1999 and 2013; 15.40% of the respondents identified compromised democratic institutions like the electoral commission, security services and courts as the more common manifestation of political defection in Jigawa State; while 12.64% and 12.41% of the respondents believed that weak opposition political parties and anti-party politics, respectively, were the more common manifestations of political defection in State during the reviewed period.

#### **Causes of political defection in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

Material gains and political office-seeking were the main causes of political defection in Jigawa State between (1999 and 2013). The electorate tended to vote on the basis of material inducements made available to them by the political parties, particularly the ruling

party. This made the voters to shift their support to the ruling party where government spoils were readily available. In Table 4.28, 38.39% of the respondents asserted that the search for material gains or personal interests was the main cause of political defection among voters between 1999 and 2013 in Jigawa State. Only 2.76% believed that political defection was caused by the threat from the ruling party or the incumbent government to the electorate or opposition political parties. Political defection among the politicians or the elite was caused by political office-seeking. Politicians defected in order to get access to nominations or political appointments or even to defend their current appointments or positions. Still, in Tables 4.28, 18.16% of the respondents linked political defections among the elite to power-mongering, protection of offices held or seeking of new appointments. Material gains and political office-seeking as the main causes of political defection in Jigawa State during the period under review have also been confirmed by the views of respondents that the ruling party had employed State funds to buy political support. In Table 4.34, 74.71% of the respondents said that the ruling party had used State funds in buying political support; 11.26% of the respondents said they had no idea as to whether the ruling party had bought political support with public funds. And, Table 4.36 shows that 45.06% of the respondents believed the funds were spent immediately before elections or during election period (43.90% of respondents).

#### **Effects of political defection on democratic governance in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

Political defection had diverted State funds from executing public policies to buying political support in Jigawa State between (1999 and 2013). In Table 4.29, the most important effect of political defection on political leadership and democratic institutions was lack of adequate funds for executing public policies. This was represented by the views of 23.68% of the respondents. Only 2.99% of the respondents in the table (Table 4.29) invoked lack of politically informed voters as the effect of political defection. The

estimates of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in Jigawa State from 2003 through 2013 further indicated that public policies were not well-executed because the funds to be used for the execution of these policies were diverted to other uses. Thus, in Table 3.1, the objective poverty rate in Jigawa State in 2003 was 71%; it rose to 90.10% in 2004; to 90.9% in 2007; to 74.1% in 2011 and to 88.5% in 2013. It is interesting to note that poverty rates were higher from 2003 to 2007 during the administration of the ANPP Government. This was because the ruling ANPP had diverted huge funds to buying political support under the former Governor Ibrahim Saminu Turaki through his programme of money transfer to the polling units under Option 4 Policy as per Jigawa State Law No. 5 of 2004. Under Option 4 Policy, N70, 000 were transferred to party representatives at each of the 3,527 polling units in the State under the pretence of community development.

Political defection had made opposition parties less credible, weak and incapable of carrying out their democratic roles of protecting civil liberties of the individuals, providing viable alternative policies to those of the ruling party and engaging in active political competition. This finding is supported by the views of respondents in Table 4.30, where the more important effects of political defection on the roles of opposition political parties in Jigawa State between 1999 and 2013 were tarnishing the image of opposition parties (22.99%); erosion of their mass-base or supporters and causing fragmentation in them (14.02%) as well as destruction of their ideological base (14.94%). In Table 4.31, the most important roles played by opposition political parties in the State between 1999 and 2013 according to the views of respondents were checkmating the activities of the ruling party through the political programmes in the mass media and educating their members and the general public. Opposition political parties performed less of their roles of providing alternative to government (8.74%) and protecting individual rights and civil liberties

(8.97%). Furthermore, in Table 3.5, the number of the opposition party legislators kept decreasing from 1999 to 2013 and that further indicates the weakness of the opposition. In 1999, the membership of the opposition parties in the Jigawa State House of Assembly (which consisted of 30 members) was 12; it fell to only 1 in 2003, and rose to 2 in 2007. In 2011, it fell back to 1 member again. This meant that opposition political parties were numerous enough to scrutinise and reverse the unpopular policies of the ruling party. Lastly, in Table 4.10, 65.51% of the respondents said that opposition political parties in Jigawa State had no credible alternative policies to those of the ruling party.

Political defection had resulted in the employment of State funds and resources by the ruling party in order to buy support of the electorate at the expense of opposition political parties in Jigawa State between 1999 and 2013. This had resulted in a dominant ruling party operating alongside weak opposition political parties in the State. In Table 4.34, 74.71% of the respondents believed that the ruling party had employed State funds at the expense of the opposition political parties from 1999 to 2013. Such use of public funds by the ruling party in the State was a public knowledge to the extent that only 11.26% of the respondents had no idea about it. Table 3.5 shows how the membership of opposition party in Jigawa State House of Assembly dropped from 12 legislators to 1 from 1999 to 2011. In contrast, Table 3.6 shows that the ruling party membership in State Assembly had arisen from 18 legislators in 1999 to 29 legislators in 2011. Besides, there were three major opposition parties in the 2011 Elections (ACN, CPC, and ANPP), apart from the nominal political parties.

State institutions were compromised by political defection to the extent that they could not make independent decisions in issues bordering on political competition between ruling and opposition political parties in Jigawa State between 1999 and 2013. In Table 4.35, 24.37% of the respondent had asserted that State funds had been spent by the ruling party

to buy political support from the electorate. Then, 43.45% believed that State offices, State Election Management Officials and the Security Services were used by the ruling party frequently in dealing with opposition political parties in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013. Thus, the line between the ruling party and the government was blurred.

Political defection had prevented active political participation of the electorate in the political process by causing political apathy and limited political choices. In Table 4.37, 52.87% of the respondents believed that political participation was impacted negatively by political defection. In Table 4.38, 39.00% of the respondents said that political defection had caused voter apathy between 1999 and 2013; while 30.00% of the respondents believed that political defection limited political choices for the youth. Only 1.00% of the respondents did not believe that political defection had no effects on political participation. The youth did not readily participate in opposition political parties because the latter's image was tarnished in the eyes of the electorate as a result of spate of political defection (see Table 4.30). The membership of the opposition political parties was also eroded by political defection (see Table 4.30). The ruling party remained the choice available for the youth where lured by government transfers.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter summarises the report of the study, draws conclusion and proffers a set of recommendations on how the effects of political defection on democratic governance can be mitigated in Jigawa State.

#### 5.2 Summary

The gale of political defections by political parties has become very common in the Nigerian political process especially with the advent of the Fourth Republic. Politicians easily defect from their parties to other political parties in search of prospects for nomination as candidates for election or political appointments. The electorate, also, easily shift their support between political parties not because of the issues these new parties advance, but for material gains.

In Jigawa State, political defections have become so common among political parties and the electorate since 1999. In 2003, many members of the opposition political parties particularly from the PDP defected to the then ruling APP. Also in 2006, most members of the ruling APP left the party and joined the opposition PDP. In addition, in 2011, some members of the ruling PDP decamped to the opposition political parties especially the ACN, CPC and ANPP. While the gale of political defections is growing fast in Nigeria, there has been less emphasis and generally lack of a systematic and comprehensive study of such political defection in the literature. This study has, therefore, set out to examine political defection and its effects on democratic governance of Jigawa State from 1999 to

2013. In essence, the scope of the study was from 1999 to 2013. A great deal of political defection had taken place during this period, making it fertile for systematic research.

The variables investigated were office-seeking, material inducement and political defection and the effects of political defection on the politics and democratic governance of the study area.

The study has drawn a sample of 500 respondents from a population of registered voters prepared by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for conducting the 2011 General elections in Jigawa State for the administration of the questionnaire. A sample of 8 respondents was drawn and used for interviews from the main political parties in the state. In addition, 4 officials, 2 from the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission and the other 2 (one from Freedom Radio and one from Radio Jigawa) were interviewed. In all, eight FGDs were conducted on the youth and women members of the ruling PDP and opposition ACN, ANPP and APC. In essence, Primary data were collected using questionnaire administration, interview schedules and focus group discussions. Governorship and State House of Assembly election results for the 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 and records of incidence of poverty in Jigawa State as compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics from 2003 to 2013 were used as sources of secondary data for the study. Both the primary and secondary data were employed in the analysis, interpretation and determination of findings. The study has employed rates of political defections as an index for measuring the level and trend of political decamping in the state.

Relevant literature on political parties, democracy, democratic governance and political defection were reviewed and gaps were identified. The gaps in the literature included lack of comprehensive and systematic studies on political defection in the area of study within the time frame of 1999 to 2013. Beatriz Magaloni's theory of dominant ruling party

survival was employed to guide and place the study in proper perspective. In general, the theory specifies the conditions under which, political defections from the ruling party to opposition political parties or vice versa, take place. It specifies how the ruling party deters its members from splitting and how it promotes fissures and political defection from opposition political parties to the ruling party. The theory also describes voter political defection and how the ruling party uses punishment regimes and fund transfers to control voting behaviour.

Within the period of the study, some of the manifestations of political defection included frequent political decamping, anti-party politics, non-presentation of the opposition political parties in the state assembly, existence of moles belonging to the ruling party while operating in opposition political parties and many political parties existing, dependent on and sponsored by and working for the ruling party. The major findings from the report reveal that material inducements and political office seeking are the main causes of political defection which has had negative effects on democratic governance in the study area. Political defection has rendered opposition political parties unable to perform their democratic roles of presenting credible alternative policies to the ruling party, of fighting corruption and acting as the voice of the people in the study area. This has resulted in the dominance of the ruling party in the politics of the study area. It was also found that political defection had compromised the institutions of the state and endangered adherence to rule of law and public accountability as more resources were employed to buy political support rather than being spent on developmental projects. The report of the study further revealed that the trend of political defections was sustained and propelled by the incidence of poverty in the state. In fact, the relationship between political defection and incidence of poverty was symbiotic and vicious as the latter forced the voters to search for material gains from politicians and the former made politicians to divert resources from

developmental projects to buying political support and hence political defections. In all, political defection has posed serious problem of stability of political parties and party system in the study area.

### **5.3 Conclusion**

Political defection appeared to be a key feature of the politics of Jigawa State in the period reviewed. It has negative effects on democratic governance as it has rendered opposition political parties inactive as they are unable to discharge their roles; hence the dominance of the ruling party in the state. It has also made political parties in the state unstable. Out of the four main political parties in the state in 1999: the PDP, AD, APP and PRP, only the PDP has survived. Similarly, out of the five main political parties in the state in 2011: the PDP, ACN, CPC and ANPP, only the PDP survived to 2013. The AD, PRP, APP, ANPP, ACN and CPC which were once the major political parties in state had died away. Material inducements and political office seeking were the main forces behind politics of political defection in the study area. Political parties and the party system in the study area will continue to experience instability if nothing is put in place to checkmate the gale of political defections. And this will continue to create problems for democratic governance in the state which is the mainstay of democratisation.

### **5.4 Recommendations**

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are proffered:

1. The perception and practice of politics as a means of gaining political power and material resources as the main reasons for political defection by both politicians and the electorate should be de-emphasised by the government through robust and conscientious public enlightenment programmes. Politicians should be made to know that politics is a means of acquiring political power for service to the people

and not a means of acquiring power for serving private interest that should even be pursued through political defection.

2. The government should ensure adequate and proper execution of public policies and avoid diverting public resources for buying political support. This can be achieved by promoting accountability of public offices and resources. When government uses the State resources for execution of public policies and avoid employing same for buying political support and transfers to politicians, political defection may diminish.
3. Political institutions in the State should be strengthened and made capable of making independent decisions in their respective areas of competence. This can be achieved by reducing interference by the government or the ruling party in their activities. When the political institutions of the State are adequately strengthened, they will render their services impartially between the ruling and opposition political party and that further improve the morale of the latter and party members will not feel obliged to defect to the ruling party.
4. Opposition political parties should be strengthened to allow them carry out their democratic role effectively. This can be done by giving the opposition political parties a fair level playing field with regard to political competition. This will reduce the probability of the opposition party politicians to defect to the ruling party in search of nominations.
5. Political competition should be upheld among political parties so as to expand political choices among the electorate and checkmate the problem of political apathy.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix I: List of Political Party Officials Interviewed

S/N	Name	Venue	Date and Time
1.	Malam Salisu Mahmud Ku'it	PDP Secretariat, Dutse, Jigawa State.	27/11/2012 10:50am-11:30am.
2.	Malam Garba Liman Jangargari	PDP Secretariat, Dutse, Jigawa State.	27/11/2012 1:20pm-1:50pm.
3.	Malam Ahmed Garba Hadejia	Residence, Gumel Town.	28/11/2012 2:00pm-2:56pm.
4.	Muntari Usman Gwanki	Residence, Hadejia Town.	08/12/2012 10:40am-11:30am.
5.	Alhaji Abubakar Abdussalam	G9 Quarters, Dutse, Jigawa State.	10/12/2013 4:30pm-5:40pm
6.	Malam Haladu Adamu	G9 Quarters, Dutse, Jigawa State.	10/12/2013 3:30pm-4:40pm.
7.	Malam Ahmed Bako Samamiyya	APC Old Secretariat, Jigawa State, Dutse, Jigawa State.	12/11/2013 4:00pm-4:47pm
8.	Hajia Bintu Farin Dutse	APC Old Secretariat, Dutse, Jigawa State.	16/11/2013 11:00am-11:45am

**Source: Field work, 2013.**

### Appendix II: List of JISIEC Officials Interviewed

S/N	Name	Venue	Date and Time
1.	Yusuf Wadabo	JISIEC	27/11/2013 12:pm-12:37pm
2.	Mal. Lawan Taura	JISIEC	27/11/2013 12:37pm- 1:10pm

**Source: Field Work, 2013.**

### Appendix III: List of Radio Programmes Presenters on Party Politics Interviewed

S/N	Name	Venue	Date and Time
1.	Dan Jummai Gumel	Radio Jigawa	05/12/2013 11:am-11:41pm
2.	Garzali Yakubu	Freedom Radio Kano	12/12/2013 1:00pm-1:45pm

**Source: Field work, 2013.**

**Appendix IV: IYA RUWA Political Programmes Listened to by the Researcher**

S/NO.	NAME OF INTERVIEWEE	POL. PARTY	DATE OF INTERVIEW
1.	SA'IDU HASAN MIGA	APC	12/2/2008
7.	HON. ADO SANI KIRI	APC	03/03/2008
8.	HON. FAROUK ADAMU ALIYU	APC	14/05/2009
4.	ALH. SARDAUNA YARO Y.	APGA	24/07/2009
2.	ALH. IBRAHIM BUA HADEJIA	APP	16/01/2011
5.	ALH. GARBA MOHD MADOBI	CNPP	17/04/2011
6.	ALH. TASIU DANMALAM JAHUN	DPP	19/02/2012
3.	ALH. ISA DUNIYA BAHUTU	PDP	24/09/2012
9.	ALH. SALISU MUHMUD KUIT	PDP	15/11/2012
10.	AMMINU IBRAHIM RINGIM	PDP	06/02/2013

**Source: Radio Jigawa, 2013.**

**Appendix V: KO WANNE GAUTA JANE Political Programmes Listened to by the Researcher**

S/NO	NAME OF INTERVIEWEE	POL. PARTY	DATE OF INTERVIEW	DURATION OF INTERVIEW
1.	ALH. KARAMI JAHUN	ACN	01/11/2008	19:51
5.	MURTALA GARBA ZAI	ACN	24/09/2009	_____
4.	ISHAQ HADEJIA	APC	06/11/2008	_____
6.	SANI ZORO	APC	07/02/2009	_____
2.	AMINU KASTI NABAMAINA	PDP	27/06/2014	15:00
3.	HON. ISA MARNE KANTI KAZAURE	PDP	23/11/2008	_____
7.	NASIRU LARABA	PDP	05/04/2012	_____
8.	NAFIU MAIMANCHESTER	PDP	12/03/2009	_____
9.	UMAR KYARI JITAU	PDP	18/09/2013	_____

**Source: Freedom Radio (Muryar Jama'a) Kano, 2013.**

**Appendix VI: List of the FGDs Participants (Women and Youth, PDP)**

S/N	Name	S/N	Name
1.	Ladi Musa	9.	Sadisu Husaini
2.	A'isha Suleman	10.	Magaji Sunusi
3.	Hasana Aliyu	11.	Bamasi Usman
4.	Jummala Tijjani	12.	Ya'u Auwalu
5.	Amina Yunusa	13.	Jibrin Dan Bala
6.	Asabe Umar	14.	Ali Yusha'u
7.	Hajara Umar	15.	Ibrahim Wada
8.	Altine Ibrahim	16.	Dahiru Sa'idu

**Source: Field work, 2013.**

**Appendix VII: List of the FGDs Participants (Women and Youth, APC)**

S/N	Name	S/N	Name
1.	Habiba Sani	9.	Ibrahim Haruna
2.	Jamila Sunusi	10.	Bashar Ahmed
3.	ZainabHaruna	11.	Ya'u Isma'ila
4.	Binta Mustapha	12.	Abdullahi Husaini
5.	Hasiya Dan Azumi	13.	Tijjani Rabi'u
6.	Zaratu Shitu	14.	Usman Sale
7.	Hajara Wadaye	15.	Zaharadeen Sulaiman
8.	Zulai Abubakar	16.	Abubakar Muhammad

**Source: Field work, 2013.**

**Appendix VIII: List of the FGDs Participants (Women and Youth, ACN)**

S/N	Name	S/N	Name
1.	Kadija Musa	9.	Hamza Mallam Datti
2.	Bikisu Badamasi	10.	Yasir Labaran
3.	Rashida Kabiru	11.	Danmadani Usman
4.	Tabawa Alhaji Ali	12.	Ahmed Abdullahi
5.	Jummala Adamu	13.	Ahmed Mudi
6.	Jamila Hassan	14.	Musa Auwalu
7.	Hafsat Sabori	15.	Umar Ishaq
8.	Lantana Salihu	16.	Bala Inuwa


**Source: Field work, 2012.**

**Appendix IX: List of the FGDs Participants (Women and Youth, ANPP)**

S/N	Name	S/N	Name
1.	Hamdiya Safiyanu	9.	Yakubu Ali
2.	Altine Abbas	10.	Idris Damina
3.	Hauwa Mu'awiyya	11.	Sulaiman Lawan
4.	Hidatu Abdu	12.	Ya'u Hamidu
5.	Saliha Abdulkarim	13.	Yahaya Umar
6.	Furera Haruna	14.	Sadiku Madaki
7.	Fatsima Yunusa	15.	Iliyasu Salisu
8.	Amina Dan Kaila	16.	Mutari Mahdi

**Source: Field work, 2012.**

**Appendix X: The Graphical Presentation of the Administrative Structure of Jigawa State:**




**Fig. 4: The Administrative Structure of the Jigawa State Government**

**KEY:**

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>Ministry for local Government</b>        | <b>9. Ministry of Infra. &amp; Community Dev.</b>      |
| <b>1. Ministry of Works &amp; Transport</b> | <b>10. Ministry of Information</b>                     |
| <b>2. Ministry of Land &amp; Housing</b>    | <b>11. Ministry of Women Affairs &amp; Soc. Dev.</b>   |
| <b>3. Ministry of Justice</b>               | <b>12. Ministry of Agrc. &amp; Natural Resources</b>   |
| <b>4. Ministry of Education</b>             | <b>13. Ministry of Commerce &amp; Industry</b>         |
| <b>5. Ministry of Health</b>                | <b>14. Ministry of Finance &amp; Economic Planning</b> |
| <b>6. Ministry for Water Resources</b>      | <b>15. Ministry for Special Duties</b>                 |
| <b>7. Ministry of Environment</b>           |  |

**Source:** Sparc, Jigawa State Public Service Management Reform, Office of the Head of Civil Service, Compendium of Mandates Draft Report, June 2011.

## Appendix XI: The Political Map of Jigawa State



Source: Geography Department BUK (2014)

Figure 5: The Political Map of Jigawa State

## Appendix XII: Questionnaire (English Version)

Department of Political Science and International Studies  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Dear Sir,

I am a student in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, conducting a research *Effects of Political defection Democratic Governances in Jigawa State, Nigeria, ( 1999-2013)*. The purpose of the study is to evaluate the nature, causes and impact of political defection on the politics and democratic governance of Jigawa State under the current Nigerian democratic dispensation. Therefore, you have been selected at random to participate in the survey.

The study is purely academic in partial fulfilment for the award of Master's degree of science (M. Sc. Political Science). I promise you full confidentiality in accordance with the ethics and standards of the scientific community. I do hope that you will kindly complete the questionnaire below objectively.

I appreciate your effort and also hope that you will find the questionnaire most interesting and appealing. I look forward to receiving your reply.

**SECTION A: BIODATA**

Q.1 SEX: (a) Male [ ] (b) Female [ ]

Q.2 AGE: (a) 18-30 years [ ] (b) 31-40 years [ ] (c) 41 years and above [ ]

Q.3 EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION :( a) Primary Certificate [ ] (b) O' Level [ ] (c) Tertiary [ ] (d) Others: (specify).....

**Q4 OCCUPATION**

(a) Civil servant [ ] (b) Businessman [ ] (c) Farming [ ] (d) Politician [ ] (e) Student [ ] (f) others: (specify).....

Q.5 MARITAL STATUS :( a) Married [ ] (b) Single [ ] (c) Divorced [ ] (d) Widowed [ ]

Q.6 RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION (a) Islam [ ] (b) Christianity [ ] (c) Others: (specify).....

Q.7 ETHNIC IDENTITY: (a) Ngzimawa [ ] (b) Hausa [ ] (c) Fulani [ ] (d) Badawa [ ] (e) Kanuri [ ] (f) Others: (specify).....

**SECTION B:**

**(1) NATURE OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE**

Q.8 Which of the following manifestations of carpet-crossing do you think are more common in Jigawa State since 1999?

(a) Anti-party politics among political parties [ ] (b) Lack of presence of opposition political parties in the State House of Assembly and Local Government Councils [ ] (c) Compromised democratic institutions (e.g. electoral commission, security services, courts etc.) [ ] (d) Political defections [ ] (e) Weak opposition political parties [ ] (f) All of the above [ ] (g) others.....

Q.9 Do you think opposition political parties have credible alternative policies to those of the ruling party in Jigawa State?

(a) Yes [ ] (b) No [ ] (c) No idea [ ]

Q.10 Which of the following ways do opposition political parties use to checkmate the activities of the ruling party in Jigawa State?

(a) Parliamentary debates [ ] (b) Public criticism/ media debates [ ] Civil demonstrations and rallies [ ] (d) others (pls. specify).....

**(2) CAUSES OF POLITICAL DEFECTIONS IN JIGAWA STATE**

Q.11 What do you think cause members of opposition parties to defect from their parties to the ruling party in Jigawa State?

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**SECTION C: EFFECTS OF POLITICAL DEFECTION ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF JIGAWA STATE:**

**(1) Effects of political defection on the political leadership and democratic institutions of Jigawa State.**

Q.12 What do you think are the major effects of political defection on the political leadership and democratic institutions of Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013?

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Q.13 How does changing party membership from opposition party to ruling party affect the roles of opposition political parties?

- (a) By tarnishing the image of the party [ ] (b) By eroding mass base/supporters [ ] (c) By destroying the ideological base [ ] (d) By reducing membership fees due to the party [ ]
- (e) All of the above [ ] (f) Others (pls. specify)

.....

Q.14 Which of the following functions do opposition political parties perform in Jigawa State?

- (a) Educating their members and the general public [ ] (b) Checkmating the activities of the ruling party [ ] (c) Creating opportunity for material gains to members [ ] (d) Alternative to government [ ] (e) protecting individual rights and civil liberties [ ] (f) Representing the interests of the people [ ] (g) Engaging the ruling party in vital public issues/debates [ ] (h) Others (pls. specify).....

Q.15 How can you rate the role of opposition political parties in Jigawa State within the period under study (2007 to 2014)?

- (a)Active [ ] (b) Passive [ ] (c) No idea [ ]

Q.16 Have opposition political parties been able to perform the aforementioned functions effectively in Jigawa State within the period under review?

- (a) Yes [ ] (b) No [ ] (c) No idea [ ]

**(2)The Impact of Carpet-crossing on the Process of Governance and Political Participation in Jigawa State (1999-2013)**

Q.17 In your opinion, has the ruling party been using government money/resources at the disadvantage of the opposition political parties in Jigawa State since 2007?

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Q.18 Which of the following state resources/machineries has the ruling party made use frequently in dealing with opposition political parties in Jigawa State?

- (a) State funds [    ] (b) State offices/appointments [    ] (c) State INEC officials (d) Security services [    ] (e) All of the above [    ] (f) Others (pls. specify).....

Q.19 When do you think are state resources/machineries massively employed by the ruling party?

- (a) Before election period [    ] (b) During election period [    ] (c) Post election period [    ]

Q.20 How does politicaldefection affect the level of political participation in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013?

- (a) Negatively [    ] (b) Positively [    ] (c) No idea [    ]

Q.21 What are the effects of political defection on the level of political participation in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013?

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.....

Thank You  
**Amadu Ibrahim**  
**P15SSPS8297**

**Yours sincerely**

**Appendix XIII: Questionnaire (Transliterated Hausa Version)**

Sashin Kimyyar Siyasa,

Ya Maigirma,

Ni dalibi ne a sashen nazarin kimiyyar siyasa da ke Jami'ar Ahmadu Bello, Zaria. Ina gudanar da nazari kan *Sauyin Sheka tsakanin Jam'iyyun Siyasa da Abubuwan da ke haddasa shi, da kuma Tasirin hakan kan Yanayin Gunarda Mulki a Jihar Jigawa*. Wannan bincike za a aiwatar da shine kan harkokin siyasar da suka wakana tsakanin shekara ta 1999 zuwa ta 2013. Makasudin binciken shine domin duba tasirin sauyin sheka tsakankanin jam'iyyun siyasa kan yanayin harkokin siyasa da gudanar da mulki a Jihar Jigawa. Bisa hakan aka zabe ka/ki a matsayin daya daga cikin mutanen da za a saurari ra'ayoyinsu domin yin wannan bincike.

Wannan bincike ya kasance bincike ne na karatun neman Digiri na biyu kan kimiyyar al'amuran siyasa. Ina mai bayyana maka alkawari da kuma tabbacin sirranta dukkan wasu jawabai da zaka zayyana. Ina fatan zaka cike tambayoyin da ke karkashin wannan jawabi bisa adalci da kuma gaskiya.

Nagode bisa kokarika tare da fatan cewar tambayoyin zasu gamsar da kai kamar yadda ya kamata. Ina mai sauraren amsoshinka dangane da wannan bincike nawa.

**SASHEN NA FARKO: TARIHIN RAYUWA**

Q.1 JINSI: (a) Namiji [ ] (b) Mace [ ]

Q.2 SHEKARU : (a) 18-30 [ ] (b) 31-40 [ ] (c) 41 zuwa sama [ ]

Q.3 MATSAYIN ILMI: (a) Takardar shedar kamala Firamare [ ] Shedar Sakandire [ ] (c) Makarantar gaba da Sakandire [ ] (d) Da sauransu: (Bayyana matsayinka in baya cikin wadanda aka zayyana).....

Q.4 SANA'A : (a) Ma'aikaci [ ] (b) Dan Kasuwa [ ] (c) Manomi [ ] (d) Dan Siyasa [ ] (e) Dalibi [ ] (f) Dasauransu (Yi bayanin matsayinka).....

Q.5 MATSAYIN AURE : (a) Ina da Aure [ ] (b) Bani da Aure [ ] (c) Mun rabu da Matata/Mijina [ ] (d) Mijina ya rasu [ ]

Q.6 ADDINI : (a) Musulunci [ ] (b) Kiristanci [ ] (c) Dasauransu (Yi jawabai).....

Q.7 KABILARKA : Ngzimawa [ ] (b) Hausa [ ] (c) Filani [ ] (d) Badawa (e) Kanuri [ ] (f) Dasauransu (Yi jawabai).....



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Q.13 Shin ta yaya kake ganin sauya sheka daga Jam'iyyar adawa zuwa Jam'iyya mai mulki ke tasiri akan rawar da Jam'iyyun adawa ke takawa?

- (a) Zubar martabar Jam'iyya [ ]
- (b) Janyewa tare da zaizaye magoya baya [ ]
- (c) Lalata akida da alkiblar Jam'iyya [ ]
- (d) Ragewa Jam'iyya hanyar samun kudin shiga [ ]
- (e) Dukkan ababen da aka lissafa a sama na faruwa [ ]
- (f) Dasauransu (Yi jawabi).....

Q.14 Cikin wadannan ayyuka da aka zayyana a kasa, wane ka sani jam'iyyun adawa ke aiwatarwa a Jihar Jigawa?

- (a) Suna ilimantar da mambobinsu da kuma sauran al'umma [ ]
- (b) Suna sanya ido kan ayyukan da Jam'iyyar da ke mulki ke aiwatarwa [ ]
- (c) Suna samar da damammaki ga mambobinsu domin amfana da abubuwan rayuwa [ ]
- (d) Suna matsayin zabi ga al'umma a inda gwabnati ta gaza [ ]
- (e) Suna kare mutuncin al'umma tare da kwato musu hakkokinsu [ ]
- (f) Suna kare muradun al'umma
- (g) Suna shiga hancin Jam'iyya mai mulki ta hanyar shirya mahawarori [ ]
- (h) Dasauransu (Yi jawabi).....

Q.15 Ta yaya zaka kimanta rawar da Jam'iyyun adawa suka taka wajen cigaban Jihar Jigawa a tsakanin lokacin da aka dauka na gudanar da wannan bincike (wato tsakanin shekara ta 1999 zuwa ta 2013).

- (a) Sun taka muhimmuyar rawa [ ]
- (b) Babu wani abin a yaba [ ]
- (c) Bani da masaniya [ ]

Q.16 Shin kana tunanin cewar Jam'iyyun adawar sun gudanar da abubuwan da aka lissafa a sama kamar yadda ya kamata a Jihar ta Jigawa tsakanin shekara ta 1999 zuwa ta 2013?

- (a) Kwarai Kuwa [ ]
- (b) Ba suyi komaiba [ ]
- (c) Bani da masaniya [ ]

**(2) Tasirin Siyasar Sauyin Sheka kan Sha'anin Gudanar da Ayyukan Gaunati da Shigar Jama'a a Dama da sucikin Harkokin Siyasa daga 1999 zuwa 2013.**

Q.17 Bisa ra'ayinka, shin kana ganin cewar Jam'iyya mai mulki na amfani da kudade ko kadarorin gwamnati wajen yakar Jam'iyyun adawa a Jihar Jigawa daga 1999 zuwa yanzu?

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Q.18 Shin da wadanne kadarori ko kayayyaki ne Jam'iyya mai mulki tafi amfani wajen yakar Jam'iyyun adawa a Jihar Jigawa?

(a) Kudaden Jaha [ ] (b) ofisoshi/mukamai [ ] (c) Jami'an hukumar zabe ta Jaha [ ]  
(d) Jami'an tsaro [ ] Dukkan abubuwan da aka bayyana a sama ana amfani dasu [ ] (f)  
Dasauransu (Yi jawabi).....

Q.19 Shin a wane lokaci kake tunani cewa Jam'iyya mai mulki ke amfani da wadannan abubuwa sosai?

(a) Kafin lokacin zabe [ ] Lokacin da ake zabe [ ] (c) Bayan kamala zabe [ ]

Q.20 Shin ta yaya kake ganin yin siyasar sauyin sheka ke tasiri kan shigar mutane a dama da su cikin al'amuran siyasa a Jihar Jigawa daga 1999 zuwa 2013?

(a) Yana Kawo Nakasu [ ] (b) Yana Habakawa [ ] (c) Bani da Masaniya [ ]

Q.21 Wadanne tasirce-tasirce ne siyasar sauye-sauyen sheka suka yi kan shigar mutane cikin al'amuran siyasa a Jihar Jigawa daga 1999 zuwa 2013?

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Na gode.  
Amadu Ibrahim  
P15SSPS8297

**Appendix XIV: Interview Schedule for Opposition Political Party Officials**

**Interview Schedule for Opposition Political Party Officials**

**Name of the Interviewee**.....

**Date of the Interview**.....

**Time of the Interview**.....

**Place of the Interview**.....

**OCCUPATION**.....

**SEX: Male** [  ]

**Female** [  ]

**NATURE OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.1 Do you think your party is a credible and viable alternative to the present administration in Jigawa State?

Q.2 What are these alternative policies?

Q.3 What is your assessment of the general nature of opposition political parties in Jigawa State?

Q.4 Are you satisfied with the general performance of opposition political parties between 1999 and 2013 in Jigawa State?

Q.5 How do you view the trend of political defection in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013?

**CAUSES OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE**

Q.6 What do you think cause political defections by political parties?

Q.7 Did material benefits have any effects on voters in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013?

Q.8 Do you think the ruling party has exercised undue influence in its relationships with opposition political parties in Jigawa State between 1999 and 2007 or between 2007 and 2013?

**EFFECTS OF POLITICAL DEFECTION ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.9 What impact do you think political defection have in the running affairs of Jigawa State?

Q.10 Has the ruling party effectively and efficiently managed state resources in Jigawa State?

**Appendix XV: Interview Schedule for the Ruling Party Officials**

**Name of the Interviewee**.....  
**Date of the Interview**.....  
**Time of the Interview**.....  
**Place of the Interview**.....

**OCCUPATION**.....

**SEX:** Male [ ]

Female [ ]

**NATURE OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.1 Do you think opposition political parties have credible and viable alternative policies to those of the ruling party in Jigawa State?

Q.2 What is your assessment of the general nature of opposition political parties in Jigawa State?

Q.3 Are you satisfied with the general performance of opposition political parties between 1999 and 2013 in Jigawa State?

Q.4 How does the ruling party relate with opposition political parties in Jigawa State?

Q.5 How do you view the trend of political defection in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013?

**CAUSES OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE**

Q.6 What do you think cause political defections by political parties?

Q.7 How do political parties source their campaign funds in Jigawa State?

Q.8 Do you think the ruling party has good relationship with opposition political parties from 1999 to 2013?

**EFFECTS OF POLITICAL DEFECTION ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.9 How does absence of adequate representation of opposition political parties in the state house of assembly affect parliamentary business in Jigawa State?

Q.10 How independent of the executive have public institutions (like the courts, electoral commission and security services etc) been in Jigawa State since 1999?

**Appendix XVI: Interview Schedule for the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission (JISIEC) Officials**

**Name of the Interviewee.....**

**Date of the Interview.....**

**Time of the Interview.....**

**Place of the Interview.....**

**OCCUPATION.....**

**SEX:** Male [  ]

Female [  ]

**NATURE OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.1 Do you think opposition political parties have credible and viable alternative policies to those of the ruling party in Jigawa State?

Q.2 What is your assessment of the general nature of opposition political parties in Jigawa State?

Q.3 Are you satisfied with the general performance of opposition political parties between 1999 and 2013 in Jigawa State?

Q.4 How does the ruling party relate with opposition political parties in Jigawa State?

Q.5 How do you view the trend of political defection in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013?

**CAUSES OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE**

Q.6 What do you think cause political defections by political parties?

Q.7 How do political parties source their campaign funds in Jigawa State?

Q.8 Do you think the ruling party has good relationship with opposition political parties from 1999 to 2013?

**EFFECTS OF POLITICAL DEFECTION ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.9 How does absence of adequate representation of opposition political parties in the state house of assembly affect parliamentary business in Jigawa State?

Q.10 How independent of the executive have public institutions (like the courts, electoral commission and security services etc) been in Jigawa State since 1999?

**Appendix XVII: Interview Schedule for the Presenters of Political Programmes (Iya Ruwa and Ko Wanne Gauta Ja Ne Programmes) on Radio Jigawa and The Freedom Radio Kano**

**Name of the Interviewee.....**

**Date of the Interview.....**

**Time of the Interview.....**

**Place of the Interview.....**

**OCCUPATION.....**

**SEX:** Male [  ]

Female [  ]

**NATURE OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.1 Do you think opposition political parties have credible and viable alternative policies to those of the ruling party in Jigawa State?

Q.2 What is your assessment of the general nature of opposition political parties in Jigawa State?

Q.3 Are you satisfied with the general performance of opposition political parties between 1999 and 2013 in Jigawa State?

Q.4 How does the ruling party relate with opposition political parties in Jigawa State?

Q.5 How do you view the trend of political defection in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013?

**CAUSES OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE**

Q.6 What do you think cause political defections by political parties?

Q.7 How do political parties source their campaign funds in Jigawa State?

Q.8 Do you think the ruling party has good relationship with opposition political parties from 1999 to 2013?

**EFFECTS OF POLITICAL DEFECTION ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.9 How does absence of adequate representation of opposition political parties in the state house of assembly affect parliamentary business in Jigawa State?

Q.10 How independent of the executive have public institutions (like the courts, electoral commission and security services etc) been in Jigawa State since 1999?

**Appendix XVIII: FGDs Schedule for Ordinary Card-Carrying Members of Opposition Political Parties (Women Participants)**

**NATURE OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.1 What is the level of women participation in politics in Jigawa State?

Q.2 What roles does your party perform in Jigawa State?

Q.3 Do you think your party is a credible and viable alternative to the ruling party in Jigawa State?

Q.4 How do you view the trend of political defection in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013?

**CAUSES OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE**

Q.5 What do you think cause political defections from opposition political parties to the ruling party?

Q.6 How do material benefits affect voting behaviour in Jigawa State?

**Effects OF POLITICAL DEFECTION ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.7 How independent of the executive have public institutions (like the courts, electoral commission and security services etc) been in Jigawa State since 1999?

Q.8 What impact do you think political defection has on public institutions in Jigawa State?

**Appendix XIX: FGDs Schedule for Ordinary Card-Carrying Members of Opposition Political Parties (Youth)**

**NATURE OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.1 What is the level of youth participation in politics in Jigawa State?

Q.2 What roles does your party perform in Jigawa State?

Q.3 Do you think your party is a credible and viable alternative to the ruling party in Jigawa State?

Q.4 How do you view the trend of political defection in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013?

**CAUSES OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE**

Q.5 What do you think cause political defections from opposition political parties to the ruling party in Jigawa State?

Q.6 How do material benefits affect voting behaviour in Jigawa State?

**EFFECTS OF POLITICAL DEFECTION ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.7 How independent of the executive have public institutions (like the courts, electoral commission and security services etc) been in Jigawa State since 1999?

**Appendix XX: FGDs Schedule for Ordinary Card-Carrying Members of the Ruling Party (Youth)**

**NATURE OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.1 What is the level of youth participation in the politics in Jigawa State?

Q.2 What roles does the ruling party perform in Jigawa State?

Q.3 Do you think opposition political parties have credible and viable alternative policies to those of the ruling party in Jigawa State?

Q.4 How do you view the trend of political defection in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013?

**CAUSES OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE**

Q.5 What do you think cause political defections from the ruling party to opposition political parties in Jigawa State?

Q.6 How do material benefits affect voting behaviour in Jigawa State?

**EFFECTS OF POLITICAL DEFECTION ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.7 How independent of the executive have public institutions (like the courts, electoral commission and security services etc) been in Jigawa State since 1999?

**Appendix XXI: FGDs Schedule for Ordinary Card-Carrying Members of the Ruling Party (Women Participants)**

**NATURE OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.1 What is the level of women participation in the politics in Jigawa State?

Q.2 What roles does the ruling party perform in Jigawa State?

Q.3 Do you think your party is a credible and viable alternative to the ruling party in Jigawa State?

Q.4 How do you view the trend of political defection in Jigawa State from 1999 to 2013?

**CAUSES OF POLITICAL DEFECTION IN JIGAWA STATE**

Q.5 What do you think cause political defections among political parties in Jigawa State?

Q.6 How do material benefits affect voting behaviour in Jigawa State?

**EFFECTS OF POLITICAL DEFECTION ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF JIGAWA STATE (1999-2013)**

Q.7 How independent of the executive have public institutions (like the courts, electoral commission and security services etc) been in Jigawa State since 1999?