

***ALMAJIRCI (TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC SCHOLARSHIP) AND POLITICAL
THUGGERY IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF BAUCHI STATE,
2007-2015.***

By

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**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA**

JANUARY 2017

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NIGERIA**

JANUARY, 2017

Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation entitled *Almajirci (Traditional Islamic Scholarship) and Political Thuggery in Nigeria: A Case Study of Bauchi State, 2007-2015* has been carried out by me in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of bibliography provided. No part of this thesis was previously presented for another degree or diploma at this or any other Institution.

Musa, Umar Adam

Certification

This dissertation entitled *Almajirci* (Traditional Islamic Scholarship) and Political Thuggery in Nigeria: A Case Study of Bauchi State, 2007-2015 by Umar Adam, MUSA meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of M.Sc. Political Science of the Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my beloved mother late Hajiya Faximatu Zubairu Usman

Abstract

Political thuggery is one of the banes of developing democracies world-wide, especially in Africa. Politicians form and arm youth gangs to facilitate conflicts before, during, and after elections. In Bauchi State, a youth gang known as *Sarasuka* (the cut and stab gang) is the major instrument of political thuggery. *Almajirai* (pupils of traditional Qur'anic schooling system), because of the deterioration of the schooling system over the years, were alleged to be the gang's major source of recruitment. Through the lens of relative deprivation theory, this exploratory study examined the involvement or otherwise of *almajirai* in political thuggery in the State between 2007 and 2015. Using a qualitative research approach, the study utilized an in-depth interview and a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with stakeholders. The views of both the *almajirai* and the political thugs were obtained through twelve (12) FGDs across six most representative Local Government Areas in the State. Whereas, thirty-five (35) in-depth interviews with other stakeholders were conducted. The data generated were analysed using qualitative content analysis. Findings revealed that without any significant variation in the perception of stakeholders, there was a very weak level of involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State (2007-2015). Reform of the Nigeria educational sector, both the conventional and the traditional *Almajiri* systems; committed poverty alleviation, enforcement of law and order, were among the recommendations offered.

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List of Abbreviations

BASUG	Bauchi State University, Gadau
DPO	Divisional Police Officer
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FWSE	Formal Western System of Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
QCA	Qualitative Content Analysis
SALW	Small and Light Weapons
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
TQSE	Traditional Qur'anic System of Education

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Almajirci is a traditional schooling system of education commonly found in Northern Nigeria, in which children mostly from rural areas leave their homes to acquire Qur'anic knowledge under the supervision of a *malam* (Qur'anic teacher), who may be itinerant or resident in one place known as *tsangaya* (college). The pupils of this type of educational system named *almajirai* are pre-adolescents and young adults, mostly between 5 and 18 years of age. For a very long time before colonialism, *almajirci* was a successful system of education. Most of the "highly educated *Sheiks* (Islamic scholars/clergy) and others holding high positions in public service such as judges, administrators, teachers and opinion leaders" were, at a point in time, products of the traditional schooling system of education (Bambale, 2007). During this time, the traditional authorities in particular and the community in general catered for the welfare of both proprietors of *tsangaya* (traditional Qur'anic teachers) and their students. However, it is a historical fact that the socio-economic and political base of the Traditional Qur'anic Schooling System has collapsed (Sule-Kano, 2008). Several factors were responsible for this decay. For instance, during the advent of colonialism, the colonial government refrained from sponsoring the Traditional Qur'anic Schooling System. Similarly, the subsequent economic crisis aggravated by government economic policies such as the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), logically resulted into communities reducing its hospitality to the *almajirai* (Sule-Kano, 1997). Consequently, *almajirai* have to fend for themselves. The pre-adolescent *almajirai* known as *qolaye* and *Titibiri* increasingly engage into house-to-house begging and subsequently to street begging. The young adults known as *Gardawa* depend on little earnings from craft such as cap making, fingernails trimming, etc. Those with limited skills amongst them utilize

their physical strength to offer services such as ‘load pottering, truck pushing, water fetching, farm labour etc., or at worse depend on the earnings of the younger ones. However, many of these *Gardawa* abandon their studies at the expense of their personal subsistence (Khalid, 2006). More so, some among them engage in criminal activities such as theft, male prostitution, rape, etc. This last set of *Gardawa* often transform into being ‘*yan daba*, ‘*yan tasha* (motor park touts), ‘*yan tauri* (hunters), and ‘*yan banga* (local vigilante)(Ya’u, 2000), thereby making them vulnerable to manipulation by rich men and desperate politicians, who may employ them for the purpose of thuggery. It is this group that often attract the attention of scholars, public commentators, Governmental and Non-Governmental Organisations as constituting threat to peace, security, and sanctity of life and properties.

Moreover, Nigeria’s historical antecedent since independence has demonstrated a correlation between politics and violence. Specifically, political thuggery is one of the predicaments of politics in Nigeria since the pre-independence period (Igbafe & Offiong, 2007; Aluaigba, 2008). However, political thuggery is not peculiar to Nigeria but affects most developing democracies of the world. In recent times, it has become a growing challenge to the smooth conduct of elections, which is one of the major pillars of democracy in these countries.

Generally, youths are those manipulated for the purpose of thuggery. In all regions of the country, desperate politicians form and arm youth gangs and militias to facilitate conflicts, before, during, and after elections (Aniekwe & Kushie, 2011). They achieve this through intimidation, harassment, and all that it takes to gain an undue political advantage for their sponsors over the opposition. In the southern part of the country,

desperate politicians, for the purpose of thuggery, utilize youth gangs such as ‘Area Boys’ in Lagos, *Bakkassi* Boys in the South East, and *Egbesu* Boys in the Niger Delta. Whereas, Youth gangs in Northern Nigeria such as ‘*yan daba* in Kano, *sara-suka* in Bauchi, *Ecomog* in Borno, *Kalare* in Gombe, ‘*yan shinko* in Adamawa etc., are sponsored by politicians to unleash terror against political opponents or intimidate voters at the polling centres (Ibrahim, n.d.; Haruna & Jumba, 2011; Bello, 2013:28). These youth gangs employ the use of Small and Light Weapons (SALW) such as swords, daggers, axes, machetes, cutlasses, guns, hockey sticks, triangular rings etc. in order to execute their dirty job (Okeshola & Tsegda, 2013; Mbaya, 2013). Some of their activities include, ballot box snatching at the polling stations, kidnapping of party delegates during primary elections, instigating chaos during rallies/campaigns, stealing or destruction of voting materials, organizing revolt after election results are announced, etc.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Most of the literature on *almajirci* and the participation of *almajirai* in social violence relied on secondary data. There is yet a study dedicated specifically to investigate the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery through primary data. Besides, there is paucity of information regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in *sara-suka* in Bauchi State. This study is an attempt to examine the level of involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State from 2007 to 2015.

1.3 Research Questions

- i. Did the *almajirai* participate in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015?

- ii. To what extent did the *almajirai* participate in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015?
- iii. Were there any variations in the perceptions of stakeholders regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015?

1.4 Research Aim and Objectives

This study aimed at exploring the involvement or otherwise of *almajirai* in *sara-suka* in Bauchi State from 2007 to 2015.

The specific objectives of the research include:

- i. To investigate involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015.
- ii. To ascertain the extent of the involvement of *almajirai* in *sara-suka* in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015.
- iii. To identify the variations that may exist between the perception of stakeholders regarding the involvement or otherwise of *almajirai* in *sara-suka* in Bauchi State from 2007 to 2015.

1.5 Research Assumptions

The research made the following assumptions

- i. It is assumed that *almajirai* participated in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015.
- ii. It is also assumed that a large number of *almajirai* participated in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015.

- iii. Thirdly, it is assumed that there are significant variations in the opinions of stakeholders regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery (*sara-suka*) in Bauchi State from 2007 to 2015.

1.6 Significance of the Study

Identifying the backgrounds of individuals that constitute youth gangs is one of the essential strategies in curbing political thuggery. However, most literature on political thuggery in Nigeria focus largely on identifying its causes (Samuel, 2011; Ofili, 2011; Orji and Uzodi, 2012; Bello, 2013), nature and pattern (Samuel, 2011; Innocent and Eikojonwa, 2012; Bello, 2013), perpetrators and their motives (Bamikole, 2013). Other studies have concentrated only on election and post-election violence in Nigeria and analysing the causes (Ofili, 2011; Orji & Uzodi, 2012; Uwa and Sunday, 2013), indicators and patterns (Campbell, 2010; Orji & Uzodi, 2012), participants and perpetrators (Orji & Uzodi, 2012; Ofili, 2011), as well as, curbing strategies (Onebamhoi, 2011; Campbell, 2010). Likewise, some authors concentrate only on analysing specific youth gangs such as *sara-suka*, *'yan daba*, *Bakkasi* boys, *Area* boys, and *Egbesu* boys (Ibrahim, n.d.; Akinwale and Aderinto, n.d; Ya'u, 2000; Momoh, 2000; Halliru, 2013) that have been involved in political thuggery. However, a few studies have tried to identify elements of the society such as *Gardawa* who may be involved in political thuggery (Lubeck, 1985; Winters, 1987; Awofeso, 2003; Bambale, 2007; Sule-Kano, 2008).

Despite the increase in the number of literature, especially those speculating the involvement of *almajirai* in social violence, there is no empirical research indicating clearly the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery. This research attempts to empirically provide more reliable information on the involvement or otherwise of

almajirai in *sara-suka* in Bauchi State. This may go a long way in enabling policy makers, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and other development partners concerned with smooth conduct of elections, security, and the consolidation of democratic ideals in Nigeria, in understanding the different groups involved in political thuggery, thereby devising appropriate strategies of addressing the challenge.

1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The research in terms of location covers Bauchi State, Nigeria. Concerning context, the study is delimited to political violence with emphasis on political thuggery specifically, *sara-suka*. Consequently, the research did not investigate the involvement of *almajirai* in insurgency such as *boko-haram*. Neither did it examine their participation in other crimes such as robbery, burglary, rape, etc. Likewise, as earlier indicated, political violence existed in Nigerian politics for fairly a long time. Therefore, this study is restricted to 2007 to 2015. Similarly, in the history of Bauchi State 2007 to 2015 was a period that witnessed the reign of political thuggery in which a lot of lives and properties were lost (Awopuju, 2011).

The first major limitation of the research was getting the trust and confidence of the respondents, especially the proprietors of *tsangaya* and the politicians. This is due to the sensitive nature of the subject. Explaining how the *almajirai* may have been involved in political thuggery was, in most cases, difficult for the proprietors of *tsangaya*. Similarly, the politicians found it difficult to confess their roles in using political thugs. Therefore, interviewing them on such a topic was tricky. Furthermore, the phenomenon of *boko haram* insurgency has complicated the level of trust for the researcher. More so, the *boko haram* insurgents had attacked most police divisional

headquarters in the sampled LGAs. Consequently, interviews were not possible until after the intervention of some locals who guaranteed the trust of the researcher to the police and other stakeholders based on the agreement of reporting their opinions on confidentiality. Even with this, tape recording was not allowed in especially Katagum and Alqaleri LGAs. In Gamawa LGA, there was an instance of rejection. The DPO refused to accept any interview and insisted that the opinion of the PPRO was the opinion of the Police.

Another challenge was arranging the FGDs especially with the political thugs. Owing to the level of their education, the thugs were not very comfortable to grant audience. This is due to the security situation in the North-eastern Nigeria as the fight against boko haram is still on going. The thugs may not easily differentiate between researchers, and security intelligence. However, this difficulty was overcome through the use of some research assistants who lived in the several communities and are familiar with the thugs, especially their leadership.

Scheduling and rescheduling of interview date/time, was another problem. In some cases, the interviewer had to revisit some LGAs twice. Gamawa, the furthest in distance about 263km from Bauchi had to be revisited. The same case with Katagum 200km, Darazo 112km, and Alqaleri 56km.

In addition, most interviews were conducted in Hausa but responses were reported in English. As such, some conceptual matters arose in the course of the interview. For example, the term political thuggery is translated in Hausa as *bangar siyasa*. On the

other hand, the vigilantes are called '*Yan banga*'. Therefore, concepts had to be clarified to some of the respondents before they could understand the questions.

1.8 Chapter Organization

The research is organized in five chapters. The first chapter is the general introduction, which constitutes the background to the study, the statement of the research problem, research aim and objectives, research questions, scope and limitation, justification of the study, etc. Chapter Two contains the literature review and the theoretical framework. Literature review was based on a thematic approach. Some of these themes included *almajirci* and social violence, political thuggery, causes of political thuggery, nature, and pattern of political thuggery in Nigeria the phenomenon of *sara-suka* and *almajirci* in Bauchi State, etc. Chapter Three covers the methodology. It discussed the study area, the geographical location of the study area, its peoples, and culture, political history of the study area, its socioeconomic profile. It further described the selected local governments, the research design which included sources of data, data collection technique, study population, sampling technique, and the technique of data analysis. Empirical analysis of the relationship between *almajirci* and political thuggery was done in Chapter Four. Finally, Chapter Five comprises the summary of findings, recommendation, and conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter thematically reviewed the relevant and related literature based on the key concepts of the research. The review was aimed at situating the research within the context of the existing literature with the view of identifying gaps in the literature. It began with the review of the literature on the nature, causes, pattern, and dynamics political violence and thuggery in Nigeria. The concept of *almajirci* and the phenomena of *sara suka* were also reviewed. The chapter rounded up with the explanation of the theoretical framework utilised by the research.

2.2 Political Thuggery and Violence

Like many other concepts in the social sciences, political violence has no universal definition due its nature and vagueness (Mars, 1975:221; Bamikole, 2013:316). For instance, there is no clear distinction between political violence and other concepts such as terrorism, insurgency, force, crime, etc. (Heywood, 2007:406; Hoffman and Graham, 2009:454). Furthermore, the dividing line between political violence and political thuggery is thin. The two terms have been used interchangeably. For instance, there is no much difference between Anifowose's description of political violence and Samuel's definition of political thuggery. Anifowose (1984) described political violence as,

The use of threat or physical act carried out by an individual or individuals within a political system against another individual or individuals and/or property with the intention to cause injury or death to persons and/or damage or destruction to property and whose objective, choice of target or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation and effects have political significance, that is tend to modify the behaviour of others in the existing arrangement of power structure that has some consequences for the political system.

Whereas Samuel (2011:29) defined political thuggery as “any act of intimidation, violence, hooliganism, brutality or gangsterism, whether leading to death or not, calculated to pose a threat or scale political opponent or perceived political opponents before, during or after elections and aimed at achieving an undue political result or advantage.” Some writers perceived political violence to be a means to political thuggery. In this regard, Haruna and Jumba (2011:114) explained, “Political violence refers to act of the processes of execution of the activities of political thugs enticed by politicians.” In other words, political violence is broader than political thuggery.

According to Bufacchi (2009:551), “an act of violence is political when it involves the actual or potential violation of someone’s basic rights.” In this regard therefore, if a citizen is actually or potentially deprived of his/her franchise, he is a victim of political violence.

According to Halliru (2013:209), political violence “refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies.” The weakness of this definition is that, it considered criticizing government policies an act of political violence.

Hoffman and Graham (2009:500) defined political violence as “the use of violence sometimes in situations in which people have reasonable avenues of peaceful protest”.

2.3 Nature, Pattern, and Dynamics of Political Thuggery in Nigeria

Generally, youths are those utilized for the purpose of thuggery. In all regions of the country, desperate politicians form and arm youth gangs and militias to facilitate conflicts, before, during, and after elections. They achieve this through intimidation, harassment, and doing all that it takes to attract an undue political advantage to their sponsors over their oppositions. In the southern part of the country, desperate politicians for the purpose of thuggery utilize youth gangs such as ‘Area Boys’ in Lagos, *Bakkassi* Boys in the South East, and *Egbesu* Boys in the Niger Delta. Whereas, Youth gangs in Northern Nigeria such as ‘*yan daba* in Kano, *Sara-suka* in Bauchi, *Ecomog* in Borno, *Kalare* in Gombe, ‘*yan shinko* in Adamawa etc., are sponsored by politicians to unleash terror against political opponents or intimidate voters at the polling centres (Bello, 2013:28; Haruna & Jumba, 2011; Ibrahim, n.d.). These youth gangs employ the use of Small and Light Weapons (SALW) such as swords, daggers, axes, machetes, cutlasses, guns, hockey sticks, triangular rings etc. in order to execute their dirty job (Okeshola & Tsegda, 2013; Mbaya, 2013). Some of their activities include, ballot box snatching at the polling stations, kidnapping of party delegates during primary elections, initiating chaos during rallies/campaigns, stealing or destruction of voting materials, organizing revolt after election results are announced, etc.

2.4 Causes of Political Thuggery in Nigeria

Several factors, both structural and otherwise, are responsible for the prevalence of political thuggery in Nigeria. The major ones are discussed below.

2.4.1 Unemployment

It is almost a consensus in the literature that youth unemployment is one of the major causes of political thuggery (Samuel, 2011:35; Bello, 2013:29; Mbaya, 2013:2095).

Halliru (2013) in his research on urban youth gangs (*sara-suka*) in Bauchi revealed that 76.0% of the youths who engage in physical political violence are unemployed. In addition, 67.0% of his respondents reported that they belonged to gangs due to unemployment (Halliru, 2013:213).

2.4.2 Poverty

Poverty and unemployment are directly related. A high level of unemployment accounts for high level of poverty. Most of the youths who engage in political thuggery come from humble families, which cannot fulfil their obligation. In order to make ends meet, these youths could join any activity that can help them to manage their poverty, hence need little effort to join any group of militia/thugs (Haruna and Jumba, 2011:117; Samuel, 2011:35; Bello, 2013:29). In this regard, 25.8% of the youth in *sara-suka* explained that poverty was their major reason for joining the gang (Halliru, 2013:213).

2.4.3 Illiteracy

Illiteracy is another reason why political thuggery is prevalent in Nigerian politics (Mbaya, 2013:2095). It is analytical to observe that an unemployed person bedevilled by abject poverty is likely to be an illiterate or received a low standard education. Some studies such as Halliru (2013:215) revealed that, most of those youth that are engaged or used by politicians for thuggery purpose are “either illiterate or received low level of education as such they become prey to overzealous politicians as they are vulnerable to resort to violence” (Haruna and Jumba, 2011:117).

2.4.4 The Role of security and law enforcement agencies

The laxity of the security and law enforcement agencies in Nigeria has heightened the level of violence. Loose national borders have resulted in the proliferation of small arms and light weapon (SALW). Even where suspects were detained, weak measures of law enforcement allow them to free themselves. This is because, decades of corruption, maladministration, and economic decline have weakened the capacity of successive Nigerian governments to prevent or punish mass violence. Participants in mass violence in Nigeria operate against the backdrop of impunity or, at best, a reduced risk of being punished. Nigeria's weak security and law enforcement capacity reflect on the country's inability to regulate the flow of small arms, curtail banditry, and check the activities of thugs and militia groups (Ndubuaku 2001, Human Rights Watch 2003, Human Rights Watch 2005, Adewale, 2005). It also reflects on the citizens' perception of the country's poorly trained and poorly equipped security agents, as demonstrated by a recent survey. In the survey conducted in Kano and Rivers States, majority of the respondents reported that they feared ex-military officers and local armed groups more than they feared the police (Hazen and Horner 2007: 65). This means that ex-military officers and local armed groups have greater capacity to restrain the people from violence than the police do. In many communities, vigilante groups have been established to fill security gaps left by the state and to protect the local population (Orji and Uzodi, 2012:29).

2.4.5 Politics for financial gains/ 'prebendal' politics

The lucrative nature of political offices in Nigerian politics is obvious. It is so profitable such that politicians do whatsoever possible to be elected to certain offices. Remuneration for political offices constitutes the major reason why most politicians present themselves. In Nigeria, politics is conceived as an investment. The politicians,

having invested huge amount of money on campaigns and other political activities, coupled with the existing system of winner takes all, would want to win at all cost (Mbaya, 2013:2095).

2.4.6 Lack of internal democratic structures and processes within political parties

Weak internal democratic structures and processes with major political parties in Nigeria, results into the imposition of an unpopular candidate (Bello, 2013:29). This in most cases leads to decamping from one party to another in order to compete with the other perceived inferior aspirant. In addition, the masses rejection of the unpopular candidates often culminates into a ‘do-or-die’ politics (Samuel, 2011:35).

2.4.7 Attitude of politicians

Another cause of political thuggery is the attitude of politicians. Politicians in contemporary Nigeria conceive of politics as a zero-sum game or a ‘do-or-die’ affair. They believe that elections must be won by hook and crook. This explains part of why they refuse to accept electoral defeat, and always try to acquire power for vengeance. This odious understanding of politics encourages them to employ thugs to achieve their desired ends. (Ugiagbe, 2010; Bello, 2013:29; Mbaya, 2013:2095).

2.5 The Concept of *Almajirci*

A number of authors have agreed that, etymologically, *Almajiri* is a Hausa word for *Almuhajir* an Arabic word meaning a migrant. Some authors relate *almajirci* to the migration of the prophet Muhammad and his companions from Mecca to Medina in search of Qur’anic education.

In terms of definition, different authors have offered several definitions. However, these definitions can be reduced to two perceptions.

One viewpoint sees *Almajirci* as a practice and/or an activity. According to Baba, (undated) *Almajirci* is the practice of scholarly migration. Yusha'u *et al* (2013:127), however, defined *Almajirci* as 'the activities in which *Almajiri* get involve during the process of acquiring Qur'an and Islamic Education'. Similarly, Khalid (2006:1) defined it as the activities of *Almajirai*, and Aluaigba (2009:20) refers to it as the practice of begging among *Almajirai*. Whereas Hoechner (2013: 8), refers to it as the practice of living as *Almajiri*.

If observed closely however, *Almajirci* is beyond just the practice of scholarly migration as loosely defined. It means that all students who leave their homes in search of scholarship including the Formal Western System of Education (FWSE) are equally *Almajirai*. Similarly, it is too loose to define it as the activities of *Almajirai* without specification. It means their entire life is *Almajirci*. It is also narrow to define it as begging. This is because begging was initially not part of *Almajirci* and even if it was, it is only an element of it.

As such, *Almajirci* is a complex system that involves several stages and pattern of search for knowledge. Therefore, it is most appropriate to refer to it as a system, which is the second perspective. In this regard (Fagge, n.d:1) described *Almajirci* as a system in which children from rural areas leave their homes to learn the Qur'an under the auspices of an Islamic teacher known as *Malam*, who may be in one place (sedentary) or moving around with the students (itinerant).

On the other hand, *Almajiri* (plural. *Almajirai*) simply refers to the pupil and student of Traditional Qur'anic System of Education (TQSE) (Baba, n.d: 3; Sule-kano, 2008:3; Aluaigba, 2009:20). More precisely, it refers to the migrant students of TQSE (Khalid, 2006:1). In a more detail “*Almajirai* are boys and young men from primary-school age to their early twenties, mostly from poor rural families, who live- beyond the state’s purview and regulatory interventions- in traditional Qur’an boarding schools in Nigeria’s Muslim North” (Hoechner, 2013:8). Alternatively, as Adamu (Undated) puts it ‘The *Almajirai* are usually pre-adolescents to young adult itinerant students following a mobile schooling system called *tsangaya* (college)’ (Adamu, n.d:4).

Sometimes *Almajiri* is used informally to refer to the poor, destitute, street child or beggar. For example, Adetoro (Undated) explains, “*Almajiri* in Hausa land in Northern Nigeria refers to any person that moves on the street for alms begging, sometimes in groups, around ages 7 to 15, under the command of a *Malam* of an informal Quranic school”. However, this usage is pejorative as Adamu (n.d:2) observed that ‘there is no concept more misunderstood than ‘*Almajiri*’ in Nigerian social and educational context’. He maintained that ‘about five distinct social youth clusters in Hausa urban centres are often interchanged – and those doing the interchanging have little understanding of the fundamental differences between the five. These groups are ‘*yan tauri* (hunters). ‘*yan daba* (street corner “dudes”), ‘*yan tasha* (Motor Park touts), *mabarata* (Beggars), and *almajirai* (young wandering scholars).’

From the above, the following can be deduced:

1. *Almajirai* are generally boys, and young male teenagers and not females. There is no, for instance, *almajira*. It is an invented concept that refers to female street beggars.
2. *Almajirci* is system of education and not a mere practice.
3. *Almajirai* are neither '*yan tauri*, '*yan daba*, '*yan tasha*, nor *mabarata*. They are pupils of TQSE.

2.6 *Almajirci* and Social Violence

The conditions of *almajirai* and their values with regards social security have been lamented by Adetoro (Undated). He described the TQSE as an informal Qur'anic education that is solely financed through alms begging, based purely on Islamic indoctrination and under the tutelage of an untrained, unpaid Qur'anic teacher. Furthermore, *almajirai*, according to the writer, are frustrated, desperate street beggars who have the potentials of unleashing terror in the society. The author made reference to the news media reports of the several types of terror allegedly unleashed by *almajirai* in Northern Nigeria and warned that, *almajirci* 'could become a potential threat to Nigeria's national security if it is not totally harmonised with the western universal basic education system' (Adetoro, n.d:2). He observed that the source of the problem of *almajirci* was both in its curriculum and in condition of learning. The curriculum is restricted only to copying and memorisation of Qur'an (without necessarily understanding its meaning). This is done 'in an open air under the scotch of the sun and rain, (with) dirty and tattered dresses, roaming about the streets begging for alms and occasionally could only be lucky to get left-over foods as meals' (Adetoro, n.d:6). Worse still, the curriculum is in dearth of value education that would inculcate respect of the sanctity of lives and human dignity, obedience to rule of law, tolerance and

cooperation, as well as environmental friendliness in the students. He therefore asserted that ‘any child that grows up under the condition of *almajiranchi* curriculum would have a negative view of life’ (Adetoro, n.d:5). Under these circumstances, the *almajirai* turn into ‘socio-neglects that are compelled to destroy, conquer and kill through aggressive drives that makes them hostile and detached from others’ and therefore ‘become unfortunate victims of societal neglect and are simply hijacked to play active roles in many of the northern Nigeria’s conflicts while the female ones are often subjected to teenage pregnancies (Adetoro, n.d:6)’.

Adetoro’s analysis of *almajirai* and their lack of value education is erroneous in two ways. One, the author equates *almajiri* to all street beggars including women, which is misleading as Adamu (2010) elucidates. Two, Adetoro completely ignores the role of morality in the TQSE which is in contrast with Hoechner’s observation that “from the children’s (*Almajirai*) behaviour, I gained the impression that the prestige and self-esteem deriving from the moral code of conduct obtaining to every *almajiri* was an asset they could access whenever they needed to” (Hoechner, 2010:717). More so, discipline as well as moral values is stressed in the TQSE (Winters, 1987:178; Fagge, n.d:). Therefore, concluding that all *almajirai* are amoral is faulty. It appears to be the case that, only a few elements among them may prove amoral as is obtainable in all social groups including the pupils of FWSE where ‘value education’ is taught.

Winters (1987) discussed the influence of Qur’anic Schools and their students on the rise of fundamentalism and the spread of militant Islam in Northern Nigeria. He contended that Islamic fundamentalism is the banner of all Nigerian Muslims including the traditional ones (Winters, 1987:171). The author is of the opinion that the values

taught in Qur'anic Schools which stress unity between Muslims, alms giving and communal living have gone a long way in shaping its students to become militants (Winters, 1987:183). Like many writers, Winters explained the transformation the Qur'anic Schools went by demonstrating the declining influence of the *malamai*, which partly contributed to their militant response to modernisation.

He further explained that:

... [d]ue to the *Malam's* adherence to the traditions of social welfare established by Uthman dan Fodio and others, are finding their ranks being swelled by poor and disadvantage Muslims who, fleeing the droughts and poverty of their rural backgrounds, are driven to urban centres in search of employment. It is not surprising, therefore, that many *Malams* and Muslims see the resurgence of Islam in Nigeria as a means for the downtrodden to obtain equality, a resurgence, which they hope, will lead to the establishment of an Islamic state in which a social climate is created which allows every individual to realise his full potential. Having not profited from modernization in rural and urban areas, many Muslims have thus returned to a strict adherence to the ethics and values of Islam (Winters, 1987:182).

In another research titled "The *Almajiri* Heritage and the Threat of Non-State Terrorism in Northern Nigeria--Lessons from Central Asia and Pakistan," Awofeso *et al.* (2003) attempted to establish similarities between Central Asian *Madrasas* and the TQSE in Nigeria. The authors argued that the *Almajiri* heritage like the *Madrasas* in Central Asia is a system of Muslim education that dates back several centuries. Like many other authors, they concur that the *Almajirci* heritage underwent some major structural and functional transformations. They further indicated that the lessons from the 1980 *Maitatsine* terrorist insurgency in Kano, as well as the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in northern Nigeria since 1999, are a potential catalyst that the heritage of *Almajirci* may evolve into an apparatus for perpetuating non-state terrorism (Awofeso *et al.*, 2003:311). The authors compared the religious schools in Nigeria with those in Central Asia before and during the Soviet communist rule. Drawing on the trajectory of similar

educational systems in Central Asia prior to, during, and after Russian communist rule, the article offers reasons for the growing terrorist potential of the *Almajiri* heritage (Awofeso *et al.*, 2003:311). To them, therefore, *Almajirci* provides a fertile ground for Islamic extremists to breed terrorists who could be dangerous to the country and the world at large.

The comparison of Awofeso *et al.* (2003) between Central Asian *Madrasas* and the Nigeria TQSE is inadequate in two respects. One, the basis of comparison between the two is faulty in that *Madrasas* were formalised for a very long time and are better organised compared to Nigerian TQSE (Bano, 2009: 2). Two, the major example provided by the authors to prove their point of similarities between *Madrasas* and TQSE is the *Maitatsine* riot, which in the opinion of Hiskett (1980) was not unleashed by *Almajirai* but by '*Yan ci rani* (seasonal migrants).

In a research conducted by Bambale (2007), the social consequences of *Almajirci* and the problems of begging among *Almajirai*, were analysed. Like several other authors, he was convinced that *Almajirci* was a noble tradition which benefited Nigeria especially, the North, in that most of the “highly educated *Sheiks* or *Malams* and others holding high positions in public service as Judges, Administrators, Teachers and opinion leaders” were its products at a point in time (Bambale, 2007:6). Before now, begging was not part of the system. He acknowledged the role of increasing poverty caused partly by economic reforms in the country. Furthermore, the author blamed some Islamic clerics for the persistence of begging in *almajirci*. Some of these clerics, he said, became allured by material gains at a time when western civilization and western life style of materialism had encroached and gained it prominence. As such, they started

to migrate with their students from their villages to the urban centres. The life style of the urban centres was relatively individualistic thereby making life difficult for both the *Malamai* and their students (Bambale, 2007:9).

As a result, these clerics started to legitimise begging despite the Islamic injunction of its discouragement. These injunctions were either misinterpreted or manipulated for personal benefit of the clerics. Consequently, the *almajirai* were comfortably encouraged and even those people with productive capacity resorted to begging beyond the social type to economic or criminal type (Bambale, 2007:7-12). Most beggars, the author maintained, transform themselves into thieves, thugs, and even robbers. He cited that the *almajirai* caused a number of disturbances, which he believed. He asserted that:

There are a number of riots and disturbances, which were believed to have been influenced and facilitated by the beggars (*Almajirai*) in Kano metropolis. The very destructive *Maitatsine* Riot of 1981 and the Bonnke riots of 1991 are some of them. It is also reported that between 1991-1997 *Almajirai* have fully been involved in large scale looting of homes and shops in various parts of Kano metropolis, as well as facilitating and spearheading attacks on non-natives of Kano especially people of southern origin (Bambale, 2007:12).

The author concluded by commending and recommending the policy intervention of Kano State government during the Shekarau Administration of providing welfare to the teachers and pupils of TQSE in the state.

Generally, the setback of the social security perspective lies in lack of empirical evidence to demonstrate the fact that *almajirai* are often the perpetrators of crisis and/or disturbances (Hoechner, 2013: 11). On the contrary, Yahaya (1984) espoused that the students of FWSE especially of the higher institutions were much more involved in armed robbery, protest and even religious crisis on their various campuses. Even the

followers of *Maitatsine* were not actually *Gardawa* but *'yan-ci-rani* (seasonal migrants) as Hiskett argued (Hiskett, 1980:213).

Despite these pitfalls, the following could be synthesized based on this perspective:

- a. Some *almajirai* lack moral values as a result of diminishing impact of the TQSE
- b. Increasingly, some *almajirai* are getting involved in petty crimes, such as stealing, but not in armed robbery or other serious crimes like kidnapping, oil bunkering, hacking, organizing riots or violent protests, etc.
- c. Some *almajirai* may be involved or persuaded by some vested interests elements in the society to participate in disturbances, crises, riots, etc., but are not empirically proven to be the perpetrators.

2.7 The Phenomenon of *Sara-Suka* in Bauchi State

Literally, *sara-suka* is a compound Hausa word, which means, “cutting and stabbing”. It is used to refer to a group of thugs mostly youth who are engaged in thuggery and other criminal activities in Bauchi State (Ilelah, 2015). In order to earn a living, these gangs resort to a variety of criminal activities ranging from thuggery, extortion, robbery, kidnapping, rape, etc.

The phenomenon of *sara-suka* has become worrisome in Bauchi State since the return of democracy in 1999. However, the peak of their reign was in 2007 when the then governor of the state, allegedly utilized government machinery to stop his political opponents from contesting the 2007 governorship in the state. The *sara-suka* vehemently protected the interest of the supporters (Lawanti, 2009). In any case, there is almost a consensus that the formation and support of *sara-suka* was done by prominent

politicians to protect their political interests. It was feared that the use of *sara-suka* might lead to “a kind of 'warlordism', where wealth from political office can be used to finance permanent power (or protection) locally in one form or another” (Last, 2008).

Part of the criminal activities of *sara-suka* recorded between 2007 and 2015, was the 2011 post-election violence, where several lives and properties were lost (Awopuju, 2011). Similarly, in 2012 suspected members of *sara-suka* killed three (3) persons and injured another three (3) in the metropolis (Mohammad, 2012). Later in 2012, the state police command reported the arrest of twenty (25) members of *sara-suka* militant groups in various locations within the state, charged with crimes such as homicide, armed robbery, terrorism, etc., and as well recover some ammunitions and some quantity of weed. In another occasion, the state police command arrested over hundred (100) *sara-suka* members with dangerous weapons such as machete, knives etc. (Mohammad, 2012).

These armed groups were accused of kidnapping top politicians in the state as well as killing innocent people working with them. In September 2012, a former Comptroller General of Prisons and one of his security men were shot dead by unknown gunmen, and several others injured (Weekly Trust, September 22, 2012).

As a result of such activities of the *sara-suka*, Cleen Foundation (based in Abuja) marked Bauchi State as a major hot spot for violence tendencies prior to 2015 general elections. It stated that, any attempt to rig election in Bauchi could generate huge violent reaction. This is due to increasing poverty, unemployment, and youth exclusion, in addition to the activities of *sara-suka*.

Another problem that created tension in the national politics was the post-election violence in the state where thugs launched attacks on the Youth Corps members in some local government areas of which ten (10) Youth Corps were killed (Shehu, 2011).

2.7.1 Socio economic Implications of *sara-suka* in Bauchi State

The activities of *sara-suka* have not left Bauchi State without a number of consequences. These include the following

a) Breach of peace with attendant loss of lives and properties. Although there has been no official estimate of the number of lives *sara-suka* claimed, yet their activities in Bauchi State had claimed many lives and properties worth millions. A prominent activity of the *sara-suka* in Bauchi, known as '*shara*', where an army of thugs will raid a particular street, injuring anybody and destroying anything that they found. This instilled a general fear and insecurity in the society.

b) Emergence of unpopular and incompetent leaders. The *sara-suka* have been instrumental in disrupting the processes of free and fair election in so many part of the state such as Bauchi LGA, Gamawa LGA, Darazo LGA, etc. this at several occasions has led to the emergence of unpopular and incompetent candidates who could use *sara-suka* to his advantage. Ilelah (2015) concluded that, "the *sara-suka* activities contributed immensely towards the weakening the democratic process of the state, as they lead weak and incompetent candidates to attain or maintain their power in order to rule and govern the affairs of the state".

c) Proliferation of small and light weapons

Another implication of the activities of *sara-suka* is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons such as machetes, cutlass, pistols, etc. In this regard, Wunti (2012)

observed that, “increasing level of youth poverty led to the formation of armed groups in the name of *sara-suka* in order to actualize the interest of the ruling class. It is against this background that use of small arms proliferated in conflicts and violent acts perpetrated by political thugs, which really undermine human peace and security in the country”.

2.8 Theoretical Framework

There are several theories explaining why youth or people in general engage in violence. These include evolutionary theory, ecological theory, patriarchal theory, exchange theory, subcultural theory, resource theory, sociobiological theory, pathological conflict theory, social learning theory, etc.

Biological theories of violence emphasised the aggressive nature of man and the unavailability of violence in both the private and public spheres of the human society. This implies that, violence can naturally emanate from all human beings. Psychological theorists on the contrast, stress the frustration-aggression thesis. They believe that individuals engage in violence due to frustration because of deprivation, dissatisfied goals and disappointed expectation from constituted authorities. This suggest that violence can sprout from disgruntle individuals/groups. In the lens of social learning theory, violence like many other social behaviour is learned, and acquired. It believes that people learn from one another through observational learning, imitation and modelling. Social strategy theory upholds that individuals engage in violence in an attempt to achieve their social and/or political goals. In this regard, violence is perceived as politics by other means. Therefore, individuals choose to be violent as a matter of strategy (Feierabend, 1971).

Although none of the above theories adequately explained why individuals engage in violence, this study will adopt the Ted Gurr's **relative deprivation theory**. It is preferred over other theories because it tries to combine the element of frustration-aggression thesis and the social learning thesis. It is both economic and psychological in its approach. The central argument of relative deprivation emanates from the elementary psychology that if individuals perceive a gap between what they get and what they ought to get or deserve, they will become frustrated. Given the opportunity, such individuals are likely to become aggressive and therefore rebel.

In the light of this theory, *almajirai* in Northern Nigeria were at some point in time honoured. They were perceived as righteous servants of Allah and prospective *malamai*. As such, they were hosted and sponsored by both government and private individuals. This gave the *almajirai* a sense of honour and prestige. However, during the colonial and post-colonial period the government rolled back its sponsorship of *almajirai*. Socio economic conditions of individuals and the society deteriorated because of economic policies of government such as the SAP. As a result, the welfare of *almajirai* became difficult leaving them in abject poverty and misery. Gradually the *almajirai* felt relatively deprived as citizens as compared to those in the formal western system of education. This perceived gap made *almajirai* frustrated. In order to demonstrate their discontent to the community and the authorities, some *almajirai* align with thugs to participate in protests, riots, crimes, etc.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction


The essence of this chapter is to explain the methodology of the research. This was done in four major sections including the introduction. The second section described the study area geographically, economically, politically, and educationally. In the third section, the selected local government areas of the research were briefly described. The last section explained the research design.

3.2 Study Area

Bauchi State lies between the Latitude of 9.3 and 12.3 North of the equator and Longitude 8.5 and 11 East of the Greenwich Meridian. It occupies a total land area of 549,259.01 sq. Kilometres, representing about 5.3% of Nigeria's land mass. It is bordered by seven states; Kano and Jigawa to the North, Taraba, and Plateau to the South, Gombe, and Yobe to the East, and Kaduna to the West (see Fig. 3.1).

Bauchi State was created in 1976 out of the defunct North Eastern State by the military regime of Gen. Murtala Muhammad. Later in 1996, Gombe State was created out of Bauchi by the military administration of Gen. Sani Abacha. Today the State has 20 Local Government Areas divided into three Senatorial Zones. They are Alqaleri, Bauchi, Bogoro, Darazo, Dambam, Dass, Gamawa, Ganjuwa, Giade, Itas/Gadau,

Jama'are, Katagum, Kirfi, Misau, Ningi, Shira, Tafawa Balewa, Toro, and Zaki
 (<http://www.bauchistategov.org/>).



1Figure 3.1: Study Area Map of Bauchi State and the six selected LGAs.

Source: Geography Department ABU, 2015.

3.2.1 The people, language, and culture

Bauchi State is the 11th most populous state in Nigeria. It has an estimated population of 4,706,909 in 2006. The male- female population is almost evenly distributed at 50.5% and 49.5% respectively. The population is predominantly young with 55.4% within (0-19) age bracket, 41.2% in the economically productive age (20-64 years), and 3.4% above the age of 65. In addition, only about 16% of the population are urban dwellers. Whereas, the overwhelming majority, 84%, live in the rural areas (The report on Gender and Growth assessment in Nigeria, 2007/2008:5-40).

Although about 60% of people in Bauchi speak Hausa/ Fulfulde, there are about 55 other ethno-linguistic groups. The major ones include the Jarawa, Warjawa, Badawa, Kare- Kare, Sayawa, Zulawa, Gerawa, Bolawa, etc.

In terms of religion, about 80% of the population are Muslims while 15% are Christians and 5% believe in traditional religion.

3.2.2 The economy

In 2005, Bauchi State was rated the 22nd richest state out of 36 States in Nigeria, with a GDP of about 4.7 billion Naira. Over 80% was contributed by agriculture, employing between 75-80% of the population. This was owing to the vast fertile soil conducive for the cultivation of crops such as maize, rice, millet, groundnut, guinea corn, etc. In addition, the state has an added advantage of animal farming. Animals such as cattle, sheep, goats, camel, and other livestock are in abundance. Despite these potentials in

agriculture, activities are still at subsistence level. Another important source of income is the tremendously rich tourism potentials. The state is the home of the famous Yankari Game Reserve, which is the Nigeria's premier Game reserve and the biggest in West Africa. Beside the Game Reserve, there are over 50 other attraction areas, such as the Rock Paintings at Goji and Shira, the State museums, the Tafawa Balewa Tomb (Adaba, 2006).

3.2.3 Political history

It is pertinent to briefly, look at the contribution of Bauchi to the political development of Nigeria. Bauchi can justifiably claim to be the cradle of progressive political thought in colonial Northern Nigeria. The contribution of the now famous Bauchi Discussion Circle in planting the seeds of nationalism in Northern Nigeria is not doubt. Bauchi also produced the likes of late *Malam* Sa'adu Zungur, who is considered by many the most radical and focused nationalist of his time. The State also shaped the political thoughts of *Malam* Aminu Kano minds of the *Talakawa* (the masses), the much-oppressed masses of Northern Nigeria. Bauchi also gave Nigeria its first Head of Government, the late Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and the first Speaker of the Northern Parliament, late Alhaji Ibrahim Jalo, etc. (Adaba, 2006).

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This political atmosphere of the state paves the way for the now famous '*a kafa, a tsare, a raka*' (wait, protect and guard), a slogan used for public monitoring of votes during elections in order to prevent election malpractice.

3.2.4 Education

In terms of education, Bauchi State is among the educationally backward states in Nigeria. According to the 2010 National Literacy Survey, the state is ranked 32nd out of 36 in adult literacy. It has 39.5% adult literacy in English and 69.8% literacy in other languages. Between 2008 and 2009, Bauchi State recorded 939,007, student enrolment at all the levels of education from primary to tertiary (Ministry of Education, Bauchi, 2012: 22). In the informal educational sector, the state has about 500,577 *Almajirai* spread across 7,733 *Tsangaya*. *Almajirai* therefore, amount to about 10.6% of the State's population (Ministry of Education, Bauchi, 2012: 79).

3.3 The Selected Local Government Areas

Alqaleri LGA is the home to the famous Yankari National Park, which is located 170km from Bauchi town, the capital city of Bauchi State. A 2006 census report of the Bauchi State National Population Commission puts its population at 329,424. The LGA is known for its crops such as millet, cassava, rice, guinea corn, beans, and sugar cane. Also found in the LGA are a large number of animals like cattle, goats, sheep, and poultry. The LGA is divided into administrative village areas which are Gajin Duguri, Ruga, Mai-ari, Gokaru, Mainamaji, Mansur, Kwaimawa, Bartak, Giger, Yalwan Duguri, Futuk, Garin na Allah, Kundak, Gabirawa, Yalo and Alqaleri (Adaba, 2006).

Bauchi is the capital city of Bauchi State. Despite its urban nature, agriculture abounds in some of its rural surrounding such as Liman Katagum and Durun. Crops like Guinea corn, beans, and groundnuts as well as extensive livestock farming are practiced. It has the population of about 493, 810 the largest in the state. The administrative village areas are Bauchi, Zungur, Galambi, Xan'iy, Makama, Harxo, Xan' amar, and Xankande. Others are Luda, Liman Katagum, Yamarat, Munsal, Xandango, Birshi, Miri, and

Kundum. The rest are Durun, Tirwun, Kangere, Galambi, and Gwaskwaram (Adaba, 2006).

Darazo LGA is located 112km from the state capital. The LGA has a population of 251,597 people and they are mainly farmers producing millet, groundnut, beans, maize, rice, and mango fruits. The area also has thousands of cattle, goats, sheep, and poultry. The administrative village areas are Darazo, Lanzai, Sade, Papa, and Gabarin. Others include Gabciyari, Konkiyal, Lago, Tauya, Wahu, and Yautare (Adaba, 2006).

Gamawa LGA is located in the farthest northern part of the State, and has a population of about 286, 388 who are mostly farmers. Animals found in this area include cattle, goats, sheep, and camels. The people are also known for art and handcraft in the pots and mats of various size, styles, and designs. The administrative village in the LGA are Alagarno, Dalmari, Raga, Zindiwa, and Tarmasuwa. Others are Gangawa, Gololo, Wabu, Marana, Gaxiya, Tumbi, and Gamawa (Adaba, 2006).

Katagum LGA is one of the oldest LGAs in Bauchi State. It has an estimated population of 295,970 of which are mostly Hausawa and Fulani farmers. The administrative village areas include Chinede, Buskari, Kunkel, Gambaki, Maxaci, and Bulkachuwa. Others are Azare, Bidri, Yayu, and Gangai (Adaba, 2006).

Ningi LGA is located 116km from the state capital and is known for the production of maize, guinea corn, rice, and vegetables. It is also the home of the Lame-Burra Games Reserve. As at 2006, the area has a population of about 387,192. The administrative

village areas are Gada, Dogon Ruwa, Ganji, Lumba Masussuka, and Ningi. Others are Rafin- Chiyawa, Lyayi, Balwa, and Y/Gungume (Adaba, 2006).

3.4 Research Design

3.4.1 Sources of data

This study, in terms of sources of data, utilized both primary and secondary sources. Concerning primary data, in-depth Interview and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) were utilized. The use of library research constituted the secondary data. Relevant textbooks, journals, scholarly articles, reports, relevant newspaper articles, and unpublished projects/thesis were used.

3.4.2 Population of the study

The population of the research consists of stakeholders in relation to political thuggery. These include politicians, political thugs, *Gardawa*, youth leaders, police officers, vigilante leaders, Islamicclerics; proprietors of *tsangaya* and *masu unguwanni* (ward heads). Earlier studies (e.g. Haruna and Jumba, 2011:114) have indicated that desperate politicians employ youths for the purpose of thuggery. Therefore, the politicians were considered as stakeholders in order to provide an insight regarding the involvement or otherwise of *almajirai* in political thuggery. Political thugs (*Yansara-suka*) were equally crucial population, since they are the major element in political thuggery. Youth leaders were equally a crucial population in this study. They are often the link between politicians and political thugs. They serve as contractors to the politicians in forming and organising the thugs for the purpose of political action. *Gardawa* were also considered important to the research because proving their involvement or otherwise is

aim of the study. As such their opinion is paramount. It is also important to mention that some of this *Gardawa* are at the same time regarded as ‘*Yan cirani*. This is because some of them engage in petty trading and menial jobs. The police are considered as stakeholders because of their strategic importance in recording useful information about thugs when arrested. The vigilante is a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) concerned with the local protection of lives and property. It is a voluntary organisation, which more or less performs the role of local policing. This is due to the diminishing capacity of the Nigeria Police in an era of increasing insecurity and crimes. In recent times, they work hand in hand with the police in order to enhance security. Vigilantes are therefore, regarded as stakeholders due to their considerable level of awareness concerning political thuggery and other crimes especially at the grassroots. Whereas the Islamic clerics are considered useful due to their level of awareness about *almajirci* and the activities of *sara-suka*. Proprietors of *tsangaya* were considered as target group; due to their experience of instances where some *almajirai* become deviants at some point. Similarly, *masu unguwanni*, are sampled to represent the perception of communities in the State.

3.4.3 Sampling technique and sample size

At the first stage, Bauchi State was divided into three based on the three senatorial zones of Bauchi North, Bauchi Central, and Bauchi South. In each zone, two most representative local governments characterized by the prevalence of political thuggery (*sara-suka*) as well as the presence of *almajirci* were selected. Thus, Gamawa and Katagum were selected to represent Bauchi North, Ningi, and Darazo to represent Bauchi Central, and Bauchi and Alqaleri were selected to represent Bauchi South (see fig. 3.1).

Regarding the sampling of the study population, a purposive sampling technique was adopted. Thus, one (1) police officer, one (1) youth leader, one (1) politician, one (1) Islamic cleric, and one (1) proprietors of *tsangaya* and one (1) Ward Heads were selected for interview in each of the six (6) LGAs. This makes the total of, six (6) police officers, six (6) youth leaders, six (6) Islamic cleric, six (6) politicians, six (6) vigilante leaders, six (6) Islamic cleric, and six (6) Ward Heads. This sum up to forty-two (42) interviewees.

The criteria used for selecting the police officers are as follows. In the police headquarters at Bauchi LGA, the Police Public Relations Officer was selected and interviewed. Whereas, in the other LGAs, the Divisional Police Officers (DPOs) found in the respective divisional police headquarters were purposively sampled, and interviewed. It is only in Gamawa divisional police headquarters that the DPO rejected the interview. Therefore, the total of five (5) policer officers were successfully interviewed.

In the case of the vigilante leadership, any of the chairperson, the secretary, or the public relation officer that was available was simply selected in each of the six (6) LGAs.

As for the politicians, the criterion of being a political office holder ‘ex’ or serving between 2007 and 2015 was considered. This office must be any of ward councillor, LGA chairperson, or a member of State or National House of Assembly. Based on this criterion, three (3) former ward councillors, one (1) former member of State House of

Assembly and two (2) serving members of State House of Assembly were interviewed. This made up six (6) politicians.

As regards the proprietors of *tsangaya*, only those who, at the time of the study, had headed and managed *tsangaya* with about 200 hundred students for at least 15 years were selected. This was based on the assumption that, the higher the enrolment of *almajirai* in a particular *tsangaya*, the higher the possibility of experiencing deviationist tendencies. On these criteria, six (6) proprietors of *tsangaya* were found qualified and interviewed.

As for the Islamic clerics, Friday congregational Imams who were well known in public preaching and sermons covered by the media were considered. Hence, six (6) Islamic clerics were interviewed.

Concerning the *almajirai*, between 10 and 12 adult (*Gardawa*) were selected in each local government for the focus group discussion. Unless were it proved difficult, efforts were made to draw this sample from different *tsangayu* within each local government. In this way, 6 set of FGDs were conducted.

Similarly, between 8 and 11 '*Yan sara-suka* were sampled for FGD in each of the 6 local governments. Efforts were made to draw their sample from different wards in order to ensure representation. Thus, 6 sets of FGDs were conducted. This sum up to 12 sets of FGDs.

3.4.4 Technique of data collection and instrumentation

Data were collected through an in-depth interview with some of the relevant stakeholders. They are politicians, police officers, proprietors of *tsangaya*, Islamic clerics, *masu unguwanni*, youth leaders, and the vigilante leaders. In-depth interview with these stakeholders was prioritized over other techniques of data collection, such as survey, because it had more capacity to produce vast amount of data, was flexible, it gave room to correct misunderstood questions, and it had high response rate, among other advantages (Babbie, 2010: 227; Wilkinson and Birmingham, 2003: 47; Sarantakos, 2005: 285; Walliman, 2001: 239). The other technique of data collection was the Focus Group Discussion (FGD). Focus Group Discussion refers to an informal discussion among selected individuals (usually 6-8, and rarely more than 12) about specific topics. According to Wilkinson (1998), FGDs are particularly the best choice of method when the purpose of the research is to elicit people's understandings, opinions and views, or to explore how these are advanced, elaborated, and negotiated in a social context. For this reason, FGD with some other stakeholders (*Gardawa* and the '*Yan sara-suka*') was preferred. Two sets of questions were directed at the *Gardawa* and the '*Yan sara-suka*' respectively. (see Appendix II).

The research utilized the instruments of semi-structured interview. A semi-structured interview falls between the structured and unstructured interview. It aims at achieving defined answers to defined questions, while leaving time for further development of those answers, and including questions that are more open-ended. The interview was directed to the study population i.e. the stakeholders with the exception of *almajirai* and political thugs. Unstructured type of interview was avoided, in order to prevent accumulation of unnecessary data capable of deviating from the research scope and considering the type and time of the respondents. Whereas, structured interview is likely

to restrict the necessary data needed from the respondents. The interview was conducted at different places convenient to the various respondents- at home, office, etc. Three different sets of interview questions were used to conduct the interviews. Set A for the police officers, and the vigilante, set B were directed at the politicians and the youth leaders and set C for the proprietors of *tsangaya*, Islamic clerics, and *masu unguwanni* (see Appendix I).

3.4.5 Technique of data analysis

The data obtained from the field were analysed using Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) and descriptive statistics such as percentiles. Qualitative content analysis otherwise known as latent content analysis is an analytic method of reducing data and making sense of them. It is a commonly used method of analysing a wide range of textual data, including interview transcripts, recorded observations, narratives, responses to open-ended questionnaire items, speeches, and media such as drawings, photographs, and video. It is the intellectual process of categorizing qualitative textual data into clusters of similar entities, or conceptual categories, to identify consistent patterns and relationships between variables or themes (Julien, 2008). These themes were extracted from both the interviews and the FGDs, categorized, and analysed in the subsequent chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 ANALYSIS OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF *ALMAJIRAI* IN POLITICAL THUGGERY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents, analyses, and discussion the data obtained from the field. It is done in four sections. The first section contains the characteristics of respondents and analysis of interviews and focus group discussions. The second section shows the thematic analysis of data and scaling of the interviews, followed by discussion of findings, which was carried out in sub sections.

4.2 Characteristics of Respondents and Analysis of Interviews

Forty-two (42) interviews were proposed with various stakeholders in political thuggery in the chosen research area i.e. Alqalери, Bauchi, Darazo, Gamawa, Katagum,

and Ningi. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the characteristics of the respondents and gives the breakdown of the interviews conducted based on the number of responses obtained.

Table 4.1: Characteristics of Respondents for the Interviews

S/N	Description	Proposed Number of Interviews	Number of Interviews Conducted
1	Police	6	5
2	Politicians	6	6
3	Proprietors of <i>tsangaya</i>	6	5
4	Islamic clerics	6	5
5	<i>Masu-unguwanni</i>	6	6
6	Youth leaders	6	4
7	Vigilante	6	4
Total		42	35

Source: Field Survey, 2015.

Table 4.1 shows the characteristics of the respondents, the number of proposed interviews in each category, and the actual number of interviews conducted. It could be seen from the table that, six (6) respondents in each category amounting to forty-two (42) respondents, were proposed for in-depth interview. However, thirty-five (35) were successfully interviewed. Five (5) out of the initial six (6) respondents in each of police, proprietors of *tsangaya*, Islamic clerics were interviewed and all in the category of politicians and proprietors of *tsangaya*, with the least response in the category of youth leader and the vigilante respectively. In all, six (6) interviews were not conducted based on either rejection or unavailability at the time of interview.

Table 4.2: Breakdown of Interviews Conducted

No. of proposed interview	42
No. of completed interviews	35

No. of interviews not conducted	6
No. of interviews rejected	1
Percentage response	83.3%

Source: Field Survey, 2015.

Table 4.2, depicts that out of forty-two (42) interviews proposed, thirty-five (35), which amounts to 83.3% were duly carried out. Based on the assertion of Babbie (2010), the completion rate of interview is considered significant for analysis if it is between 80-85%. Therefore, the percentage response of the interviews carried out is adequate for analysis.

Table 4.3: Characteristics of Respondents for the Focus Group Discussions

	<i>Almajirai</i>	<i>'Yan Sarasuka</i>
Alqaleri	11	8
Bauchi	12	11
Darazo	10	7
Gamawa	12	7
Katagum	12	9
Ningi	10	10
Total	67	52

Source: Field Survey, 2016.

Table 4.3 shows the characteristics of respondents of the FGDs conducted. A total of 12 FGDs were conducted. Two in each of the 6 LGAs. One with the *almajirai* and the

other with political thugs. All the 6 proposed FGDs with *almajirai* were successfully conducted and 67 participants were recorded. Likewise, all the proposed FGDs with the political thugs were conducted and 52 respondents were present. It could be recalled that the benchmark for the number of participants in the FGDs with political thugs, was put at 8 to 11. However, in two cases, Gamawa and Darazo, only 7 participants in each, were available. Nevertheless, this did not affect the validity of the FGDs as the minimum number of respondents for a valid FGD is put at 4 (Wilkinson and Birmingham, 2003).

4.3 Thematic Analysis of Response

In order to reduce the data generated from the field, responses were categorized into themes. Each category attempted to answer a research question. Category (I) answered the research question, ‘was there participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015’; category (II) replied the research question, ‘To what extent did *almajirai* participate in political thuggery in Bauchi state between 2007 and 2015?’ While category (III) answered, ‘were there any variations in the perceptions of stakeholders regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in *sara-suka* in Bauchi Sate between 2007 and 2015?’

Table 4.4: Thematic categorization of Interview responses

Themes I	<i>Almajirci</i> and political thuggery
Sub-theme 1	Characteristics of political thugs
Sub-theme 2	Problems of <i>almajirci</i> today
Sub-theme 3	Participation of <i>almajirai</i> in political thuggery
Themes II	Extent of the involvement of <i>almajirai</i> in <i>sara-suka</i>

Sub-theme 1	<i>Almajirai</i> and political actions
Sub-theme 2	<i>Almajirai</i> and other social crimes
Sub-theme 3	<i>Almajirai</i> and political thuggery
Themes III	Stakeholders' perceptions
Sub-theme 1	Security personnel
Sub-theme 2	Community leaders
Sub-theme 3	Religious leaders

Source: Field Survey, 2015.

4.3.1 Characteristics of political thugs

During the interview, the police and the vigilante (security group) were asked to describe the types of individuals they arrest during political violence. The following responses were recorded.

According to a respondent from the police,

Political thugs are mainly divided into perpetrators and executors. The perpetrators, often the architects of political thuggery, are mostly of middle age between 36 and 50 years. They constitute the politicians and their agents (gang leaders). The executors are mostly youth aged 18 to 35 years, who are 'boys' to those political agents (Anonymous, Interview, 2015).

Another respondent from the vigilante added, "full time political thugs are largely unemployed. They live on *Sara-suka*, theft etc., as source of livelihood. Some of them may be engaged in other petty economic activities such as operating a car wash, 'black market' i.e. selling fuel illegally by the roadside, working in the Moto Park, etc." (Anonymous, Interview, 2015).

Furthermore, almost all the respondents believed that political thugs are illiterates, or undereducated, as most of them have never attended any formal school either

conventional or Islamic. Some are school dropouts of both the conventional and the *almajiri* system of education.

In addition to these characteristics, all respondents from the police and the vigilante alike affirmed that, political thugs are drug addicts. A politician attested that

The phenomenon of *sara-sukaor* political thuggery is rooted from the free movement of illicit drugs and narcotics in our society. Some of our colleagues (politicians) explore this opportunity to intoxicate our hopeless youths to engage in violence in their favour...because one cannot kill, kidnap or part take in violence without being intoxicated (Anonymous, Interview, 2015).

A different respondent from the police further asserted, “These political thugs are mostly, if not all, from a poor background. Their parents are poor and in many instances could not charter for their basic needs. Hardly may you see a person from a rich family participating in political thuggery” (Anonymous, Interview, 2015).

Based on these responses therefore, it was found out that political thugs are mostly unemployed youth with little or no education, in addition to being drug addicts and of a poor background. This concurs with the description of thugs mentioned in the literature.

Likewise, the researcher’s observations during the FGDs with political thugs, confirmed the characteristics mentioned by the stakeholders during the interview. Even during the FGDs, some political thugs were smoking cigarettes. An indication of drug abuse tendencies among youth in northern Nigeria. Similarly, the thugs are characterised with low level education. This is because some efforts have to be made to make them understand the essence of the discussion. For example, some of them do know that ‘project’ has to be written before a students graduate from the university.

A point of observation that is also worth mentioning is the stark contrast in the characteristics of the thugs contacted in the metropolis and those in the rural areas. For instance, in the LGAs, only a few thugs are actually unemployed. Some are seasonal farmers, cleaners, messengers, and guards at the local government secretariats. Whereas, the thugs in the metropolis are mostly unemployed. This may account for the increased violence and the prevalence of thuggery in the metropolis. Therefore, most of the description provided by the stakeholders in the interviews suit the thugs in the metropolis.

Concerning the characteristics of the *Gardawa* contacted in the FGDs, those in the metropolis appeared cleaner, and more like urban dwellers, unlike their counterparts in the LGAs. This indicates the tendencies of cultural assimilation of urban lifestyle by the *Gardawa* in the cities. Consequently, there is greater possibility of transformation from *gardanci* to *sara-suka* in the cities.

4.3.2 Contemporary problems of *almajirci*

During the interview, three categories of stakeholders (proprietors of *tsangaya*, *masu-unguwanni*, and Islamic clerics) were asked, what are the problems of *almajirci* and *almajirai* today? The following responses were received.

One of the proprietors of *tsangaya* asserted

The problems of *almajirci* today in Bauchi (State) and elsewhere in Nigeria could be attributed to the government non-intervention in the *almajirci* system of education. This is because we do not have adequate facilities to accommodate our students, no feeding, no shelter, no classes, and no salaries for the teachers, etc. Had the government provided these things, no child will wander the street doing '*bara*' (soliciting for charity) (Anonymous, Interview: 2015).

Another proprietor of *tsangaya* added that "...even the recent governmental intervention (*almajiri* integrated school intervention) is not adequate. It is only a negligible proportion of *tsangayu* that are benefiting..." (Anonymous, Interview: 2015).

However, two (2) of the five (5) proprietors of *tsangaya* agreed that there are some problems of *almajirci* today contributed by the system itself. A proprietor of *tsangaya* from Gamawa declared that, "among the proprietors of *tsangaya* nowadays, there are those who accept large number of students beyond their managerial capacities, for exploitative purposes or any other excuse. Consequently, he may not know the where about of some students who decided to abscond" (Anonymous, Interview: 2015).

Similarly, another respondent said,

Most of our pupils are adherent to our rules and regulations. Even though few among them deviate. Moreover, in most cases these children were already stubborn right from their homes. Their parent decided to send them to *almajirci* because they could not discipline them. In any case, if we were not able to bring them to order, we asked their parent/ guardian to come and take their children. Moreover, most of the parents of *almajirai* are at the heart of our problems. They do not care to sponsor their children after dropping them in the *tsangaya*. Many will bring them without foodstuffs, adequate clothing etc. in this case even if you do not like '*bara*'; you have to let the children survive (Anonymous, Interview: 2015).

In the perspective of one of the *masu-unguwanni*, the parent of *almajirai* contributed most for the decay of *almajirci*. He said, "There are several instances were parent abandon their children in the name of *almajirci*. They leave them with

the *Malam* without any food, adequate clothing, etc. Sometimes we have to help the *Malam* to trace back to parents to come for their children” (Anonymous, Interview, 2015).

An Islamic cleric believed that

The major problem with *almajirci* is the inability of most of the proprietors of *tsangaya* fail to modernize and come to terms with the reality of the present time. Some strategies adopted 50 years ago when the government recognized the system could not work in the present times. For instance, *Malamai* should not admit any child whose parent did sponsor his feeding and shelter (Anonymous, Interview, 2015).

From the perspective of the *almajirai*, the problem with the system of their education was expressed thus,

Our most challenging problem is feeding. This is especially for the younger *almajirai*, who have to wander around to beg for food. Sometimes, they get while some other times they come back empty. Moreover, we the *Gardawa* cannot beg. Therefore, we have to do some menial jobs to eat and feed some of our younger ones (Anonymous, FGD: 2016).

Some *almajirai* further complained that, “Shelter is another pressing problem to us (*almajirai*). We have no specific conducive building for ourselves. Unlike our counterparts in the conventional schools, they have specific classes, toilets, and other facilities, which we do not have” (Anonymous, FGD: 2016).

According to these responses, there are two major categories of problems associated with *almajirci* today in Bauchi State. These are the internal and external problems. The internal problems are associated with the *almajirci* system itself, the proprietors of *tsangaya*, and the parents of *almajirai*. The system is obsolete, and therefore, could not sustain itself in the face of contemporary challenges. For some reasons, a section of the proprietors of *tsangaya* are exploitative and do not bother to admit students beyond their

regulative capacity. Similarly, some of the parents of *almajirai* do not care about the welfare of their children. It seems they wanted to relieve the burden of parental responsibility on themselves due to poverty or otherwise. Consequently, *almajirai* have to depend on *bara* or menial jobs for those that have the strength and skills.

The external factors on the other hand are largely the blame on government. In addition to allowing the system without regulation, the intervention of successive governments has not been adequate. Therefore, *tsangayu* rely on philanthropic assistance to shelter their students and classes.

This finding is in consistence with that of Fada (2005), whose study reveals that, “several actors contribute to the perpetuation of the *almajiri* system of education. These are: the parents, the *almajirai*, the *Mallams*, the host communities, and the government”. It is similarly in line with the findings of Fagge (undated), who reveals that, “the effect of the transformation of *Almajirai* schools is breeding rampant cases of theft and street begging”.

Furthermore, these problems of *almajirci*, based on the theoretical assumptions of the research, could push the *almajirai* into a state of relative deprivation thereby frustrating some of them to engage in social crimes.

4.3.3 Participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery

Based on the problems associated with *almajirci*, it was speculated that *almajirai* could get involved in political thuggery. Consequently, all key stakeholders were asked the question; do you think *almajirai* participate in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015?

In response to this question, stakeholders were divided into two. Those who believed that *almajirai* did not participate political thuggery and those who believed they did. Majority of the stakeholders, nineteen (19) out of thirty-five (35), maintained that *almajirai* participate political thuggery. Whereas, sixteen (16) of the thirty-five (35) stakeholders disagreed. It is also noteworthy to notice that there was only 8% difference between the two opposing stakeholders. Notwithstanding, data was collected on a bases of 'Yes' or 'No' in order to conclude if there was link between *almajirci* and political thuggery (see the fig. in appendix III).

Some of the reasons put forward by the advocates of involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery, was the fact that some of the political thugs were ex *almajirai*. One of the Islamic cleric explained thus, "These children (*almajirai*) are used to following politicians to campaign and rallies in the town. So, I may not be surprised if one day these children transformed into thugs"(Anonymous, Interview: 2015). Interestingly, a proprietor of *tsangaya* from Gamawa responded, "I will not blame anyone who believed that *almajirai* participate in political thuggery. This is because some of our students, who dropped out of school, use to join political thugs. I myself have one person as example"(Anonymous, Interview: 2015).

On the other hand, stakeholders opposing the participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery advanced the following arguments in the words of a police officer

...due to the complexity of Nigeria when there is any crisis be it political, ethnic etc., it will be amplified to religious crisis, and *almajirai* become affected. Most crises are not caused by *almajirai*. The *almajirai* in as far as I am concerned are exonerated. This is because the *almajirai* are not opportune to come out and defend themselves. Because they are voiceless, nobody cares to defend them.

Since they have no defendant, they are used as victims (scapegoats) and most of the crisis; in as far as, I am concerned, has nothing to do with *almajirai*. Political thugs are bunch of miscreants in the society who have the political cover of the politicians. In as far as, I am concerned... because most of the accusations are unfounded. *Almajirci* is different thing and political thuggery is a different thing. The *almajirai* are just being accused (Anonymous, Interview: 2015).

For a clearer picture of the responses, table 4.5 shows the details of stakeholders' opinion on the bases of 'yes' for the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery and 'no' for their non-involvement.

Table 4.5 Participation or otherwise of *almajirai* in political thuggery.

Groups	Response		Total
	No	Yes	
Police	(3) 18.8%	(2) 10.5%	(5) 14.3%
Politicians	(2) 12.5%	(4) 21.1%	(6) 17.1%
Proprietors of <i>tsangaya</i>	(4) 25.0%	(1) 5.3%	(5) 14.3%
Islamic clerics	(1) 6.2%	(4) 21.1%	(5) 14.3%
<i>Masu unguwanni</i>	(2) 12.5%	(4) 21.1%	(6) 17.1%
Youth Leaders	(1) 6.2%	(3) 15.8%	(4) 11.4%

Vigilante Leaders	(3) 18.8%	(1) 5.3%	(4) 11.4%
Total	(16) 100.0%	(19) 100.0%	(35) 100.0%

Source: Field Survey, 2015.

When the same question was asked during FGDs with both the *almajirai* and political thugs, the following responses were received. One of the participants in the FGD with the *almajirai* revealed, “Some ex *almajirai* do become political thugs for one reason or the other. However, I have not known of any *almajiri* living in the *tsangaya* with his teacher and at the same time participating in political thuggery” (Anonymous, FGD: 2016).

In the opinion of another *almajiri*, he believed that

...most of those you see in thuggery are doing it based on their interest and not because they were taught in the *tsangaya* to become thugs. Neither was their teachers accommodating to them after joining thuggery. In that case, one cannot call them *almajirai* anymore. So, in my opinion *almajirai* do not participate in political thuggery (Anonymous, FGD: 2016).

A participant in the FGD with political thugs asserted that

If you see any *almajiri* in thuggery, he must have been disowned by his *tsangaya*. No matter the hardship in *almajirci*, if some has no interest in thuggery he cannot do it. It is just the normal peer group influence... if you mean a serving *almajiri* participating in political thuggery, there is none. But ex-*almajiri*, yes (Anonymous, FGD: 2016).

Based on the responses of stakeholder, it could be observed that they were divided into two. Those for and those against the participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery.

Furthermore, even those who are of the opinion that *almajirai* participate in political thuggery believed that these *almajirai* were dropouts i.e. *ex almajirai*.

Conclusively, there was participation of *ex-almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015. This answered the first research question, which says, ‘Was there participation of *almajirai* in *sara-suka* in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015?’

4.4 Extent of the Involvement of *Almajirai* in Political thuggery

Based on the findings above, the majority of the stakeholders (54%) held the opinion that *almajirai* are involved in political thuggery. Nevertheless, it is paramount to investigate the extent of the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery, based on this 54%. To achieve this, the following themes were extracted from the interviews and the FGDs.

4.4.1 *Almajirai* and political actions

In order to ascertain the type of political activities the *almajirai* get involved, the following questions were asked. Have you ever used *almajirai* for any political action/activity? This question was targeted at the politicians, thugs, and the youth leaders. In response to this question, a politician asserted that “Yes, we use to ask the adults (*Gardawa*) among them to cast vote to our candidates. Sometimes with the consent of their teachers, while some other times without their consent” (Anonymous, Interview: 2015). A youth leader added that, “the young *almajirai* on their own use to join our campaign team, when rallying in the town. May be is because of the music we

use to play. This is because we do not normally ask them to follow us. In some instances, we use to chase them away when we foresee a clash with the opponent” (Anonymous, Interview: 2015). Similarly, participants from the thugs attested that “We do not really use *almajirai* for political action. But on their own, the younger ones sometimes help us in pasting of posters, or follow our campaign teams during rallies in the streets” (Anonymous, FGD: 2016).

When the proprietors of *tsangaya* were asked, ‘Have you ever been tempted or intimidated by any politician to ask your students to participate in any political action? If yes, how did you responded? Majority of them responded in the same way. For example, one proprietor of *tsangaya* explained,

The politicians occasionally come to them to campaign to us just as they do to other people in the town. If we are convinced, we ask our family and students (adults) to cast their vote for them. However, intimidation or enticement, I have never experience such from any politicians. Most of them respect us and solicit for prayers from us (Anonymous, Interview: 2015).

A different proprietor of *tsangaya* added that,

During my almost 20 years of running a *tsangaya*, no politician has ever come to me regarding political matters. This is because I do not have interest in politics. Moreover, my students clearly know this. Therefore, they do not participate with my consent. However, is possible they do without my knowledge (Anonymous, Interview: 2015).

Based on these data, it was found out that *Gardawa* participate in political activities, though restricted to exercising their franchise. The younger *almajirai* participate in rallies and campaigns, mostly without the consent of their teachers. However, some among the *almajirai* are not allowed by their teachers to participate in any political activity.

Moreover, it could be deduced from the content of these responses that, there are tendencies that those young *almajirai* who follow the campaigns and rallies may learn the ill behaviours of the thugs in the campaign team. For example, it could be argued that most campaign singers had the background of *almajirci*. Similarly, some may likely transform into political thugs.

4.4.2 *Almajirai* in political thuggery

In order to ascertain the extent of the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery, all stakeholders were asked to mention a percentage of political thugs they knew that were *almajirai* out of the overall political thugs in their locality. Consequently, several percentages were given in response. In order to reduce these responses for analysis, a scale (based on a Likert scaling) was formulated indicating the extent of the involvement, as in table 4.6.

Table 4.6: Breakdown of Interview Responses According to LikertScale

Range of Responses in Percentage (%)	Scale	Scale Label
1-20	Very weak involvement	1
21-40	Weak involvement	2
41-60	Average involvement	3
61-80	strong involvement	4
81-100	Very strong involvement	5

Source: Field Survey, 2015.

Table 4.6 shows that stakeholders were divided into two based on whether or not there was involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State, or not. Those stakeholders, who believed that there was non-involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery, were excluded in the further analysis. Whereas, those who believed that the

two were related were ranked '1', '2', '3', '4', and '5' respectively. Furthermore, those stakeholders who believed that about 1-20% of political thugs were *almajirai* were ranked '1' on the scale. This means that the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery was 'very weak'. The participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery were considered 'weak' (rank 2) in the case of 21-40% involvement. Rank '3' was regarded an 'average involvement', if respondents ascribed 41-60% participation of *almajirai* in thuggery. Rank '4' refers to 'strong involvement', if the percentage ascribed was 61-80%. The highest rank was '5' denoting a 'very strong involvement' on the range 81-100%.

For the sake of analysis, stakeholders were categorized into three groups. The security, religious leaders, and community leaders. The security consists of the police and the vigilante; and religious leaders compose of the proprietors of *tsangaya* and the Islamic clerics. Whereas, community leaders comprise of the *masu-unguwanni*, politicians, and youth leaders.

During the interviews, the police and the vigilante were asked the question; 'are there *almajirai* among the individuals you arrest during political violence? If yes, what is their percentage out of the overall arrested individuals?'

It is worthy to recall that majority of both the police and the vigilante, 60% and 75% respectively, believed that based on their experience those arrested during political violence are not *almajirai* and do not even have the history of *almajirci*. Therefore, the scaling will be restricted only to the remaining 40% and 25%, who upheld that they arrested *almajirai* during political violence.

Table 4.7: Security perception on the extent of *almajirai*'s involvement in political thuggery.

Category	Scale					Total
	V. weak involvement	Weak involvement	Average Involvement	Strong involvement	V. weak involvement	
Police	(2) 100	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(2) 100
Vigilante	(0) 0	(1) 100	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(1) 100
Total	(2) 67	(1) 33	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(3) 100

Source: Field Survey, 2015.

However, table 4.7 depicted that the two (2) police officers, opined that *almajirai* were among those arrested during political thuggery with less than 10% involvement, which was rated 'very weak involvement' on the scaling. In the confirmation of the only vigilante, who believed that *almajirai* were about 32%, among the political thugs. This indicates a 'weak involvement' according to the scale.

Exactly 90% of proprietors of *tsangaya* and 20% of Islamic clerics did not believe that *almajirai* were involved in political thuggery. However, the remaining 10% of proprietors of *tsangaya* and 80% of Islamic clerics, who held that *almajirai*, participate in political thuggery were asked the question, 'if you think *almajirai* participate in political thuggery, what percentage of political thugs do you think are *almajirai*?'

Table 4.8: Religious leaders' perception on the extent of *almajirai*'s involvement in political thuggery

Category	Scale					Total
	V. weak involvement	Weak involvement	Average Involvement	Strong involvement	V. weak involvement	
Proprietors of Tsangaya	(1) 100	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(1) 100

Islamic Clerics	(3) 75	(1) 25	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(4) 100
Total	(4) 75	(1) 25	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(5) 100

Source: Field Survey, 2015.

Table 4.8 indicates that all the proprietors of *tsangaya* and three (3) of the Islamic clerics, believed that the percentage of *almajirai* as political thugs is about 10%, which is considered ‘very weak involvement’ based on the scale. Whereas, one (1) among the Islamic clerics rated the percentage at 25%, which is regarded ‘weak involvement’ on the scale. In a nutshell, none of the religious leaders believed that *almajirai* strongly participated in political thuggery. Whereas the majority (90%) acknowledged that involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery is ‘very weak’, 10% accepted it was ‘weak’.

Regarding the opinion of community leaders, the same question as the religious leaders’ category was asked. 67% of both the *masu-unguwanni* and the politicians and 25% of youth leaders maintained that the *almajirai* are not involved in political thuggery.

Table 4.9: Community leader’s perception on the extent of *almajirai*’s involvement in political thuggery

Category	Scale					Total
	V. weak involvement	Weak involvement	Average Involvement	Strong involvement	V. weak involvement	

Politicians	(2) 50	(1) 25	(1) 25	(0) 0	(0) 0	(4) 100
<i>Masu- unguwanni</i>	(3) 75	(1) 25	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(4) 100
Youth leaders	(3) 100	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(3) 100
Total	(8) 73	(2) 18	(1) 9	(0) 0	(0) 0	(11)100

Source: Field Survey, 2015.

Nevertheless, Table 4.9 indicated that, only politicians believed that there is a strong involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery. Whereas, one (1) of the *masu-unguwanni* accepted that the involvement is ‘weak’; the other Three (3) *masu-unguwanni*, two (2) politicians, and all the youth leaders indicated a ‘very weak’ involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery. Summarily, 73% of community leaders believed that there is a ‘very weak’ participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery; 18% upgraded it to a ‘weak’ involvement, another 9% an ‘average involvement’.

To summarize the perception of stakeholders regarding the extent of the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery, their responses were merged in Table 4.10. While for a more detail, see the responses in the table in appendix IV.

Table 4.10: Stakeholder perception of the extent of the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery

Category	Scale					Total
	V. weak involvement	Weak involvement	Average Involvement	Strong involvement	V. weak involvement	

Security	(2) 67	(1)33	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(3) 100
Religious Leaders	(4) 75	(1) 25	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(5) 100
Community Leaders	(8) 73	(2) 18	(1) 9	(0) 0	(0) 0	(11)100
Total	(14) 74	(4) 21	(1) 5	(0) 0	(0) 0	(19)100

Source: Field Survey, 2015.

Table 4.10 shows the aggregate response of stakeholders regarding the extent of the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi between 2007 and 2015. Only 5% of the stakeholders believed that there was an ‘average’ involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State. While, 21% held the opinion that this involvement is ‘weak’. Conversely, the majority of the stakeholders, 74% opined that there was ‘very weak’ involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015.

As regards the responses of both the *almajirai* and the political thugs, when faced with the same question i.e. to mention the extent of participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery, there was almost a consensus that participation was ‘very weak’. This is because the highest percentage recorded in all the twelve FGDs was 20 percent.

Upon these responses, it was concluded that there was a very weak participation of *almajirai* political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015. This answer the second research question that interrogated thus, ‘To what extent did the *almajirai* participate in *sara-sukain* Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015?’

4.4.2 *Almajirai* and other social crimes

For a better understanding of the types of social crimes the *almajirai* may have involved in, the proprietors of *tsangaya* were asked the question, ‘Has there been any security investigation in your *tsangaya*, charging you or your students of any crime? If yes, what sort of crime was that?’

Four (4) of the five (5) proprietors of *tsangaya* interviewed responded ‘no’ to the question. However, a proprietor of *tsangaya* in Alqaleri LGA responded ‘yes’. He said,

Sometimes this year (2015), *boko haram* insurgents attacked a nearby town. Therefore, there was a police investigation in the town and our *tsangaya* was one of it. On finding nothing, securities warned us to be very careful in accommodating any stranger, as there are security reports that the insurgent may attack the town at any time. They were not suspecting us of any crime. Only that nowadays people are cunning, they may pretend to be *almajirai*, but they are not (Anonymous, Interview: 2015).

Another question directed towards the proprietors of *tsangaya*, asked, ‘How often do students become deviants? What sort of crime do they engage in?’

The following responses were recorded. All the proprietors of *tsangaya* unanimously acknowledged that some students become deviant at some points. However, their number is very few. I was told to that, “Occasionally, few students become stubborn. They abscond during classes and wander around in the town. Some of them use to be away in search of money in the market, working as help in some houses etc. Subsequently, some of them dropped out and some we dismiss” (Anonymous, Interview: 2015).

Furthermore, the police and the vigilante were asked regarding the crimes, which the *almajirai* are accused. In response to the question, ‘what sort of crime/violence are the *almajirai* being accused of? The following responses were recorded. The police

responded “Most of the crime we found *almajirai* engaging is basically petty stealing” (Anonymous, Interview: 2015). However, the DPO in Ningi LGA added that “we recently had a case where there was an inter-*tsangaya* fighting, which resulted in injuries. Some of the casualties were hospitalised and we had to intervene and detain some of the stubborn *almajirai* among them” (Anonymous, Interview: 2015).

4.5 Variations in Stakeholders’ Perceptions

For the sake of analysis, an attempt was made to investigate from the various perceptions of the stakeholders if there exist any variation. In order to achieve this, stakeholders were divided into four categories. These are the security personnel, the community leaders, religious leaders, and the *almajirai*/political thugs. Variations within and among these groups was aimed at understanding the different perspective of the stakeholders regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State within the period of the study.

4.5.1 Security personnel

With respect to both the police and the vigilante groups, it could be noticed that each of the two groups contributed 11.4% and 14.4% of the total responses. Specifically, 75% and 65% of the vigilantes, and the police were negative regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery. However, all the remaining 35% of the Police held that the involvement of *almajirai* in thuggery is ‘very weak’. Meanwhile, the remaining 25% of the vigilante upheld that the involvement is ‘weak’.

It could be seen that there was no sharp contrast in the perception of both the police and the vigilante. In the first instance majority of them are of the view that *almajirai* did not participated in political thuggery in the State during the period of the studies. Similarly,

the security group did not go beyond ‘weak’ involvement of *almajirai*. In other words, none of them thinks that there was an average, strong or very strong participation of *almajirai* in thuggery. This may be because both the police and the vigilante perform similar function of protecting the lives and properties of the people, the apprehension, and detention of criminals, etc. However, the point of divergence in the group lies in those who believed that the *almajirai* participated in thuggery. Meanwhile the entire vigilante subscribed to a ‘weak’ involvement, all the police ascribed a ‘very weak’ involvement. This difference may be because of the differences in experience between the police and the vigilante. The vigilante, although, not formally trained may have more understanding of the local community than the police who in many cases in Nigeria are subject to transfer from one community to the other. Therefore, it is most likely that the vigilante might have experience more cases than the police might have had. Moreover, the police usually make arrest formally unlike the vigilante. As such, the police might have only formal arrest experiences, unlike the vigilante that has informal experience.

4.5.2 Community leaders

Considering the politicians and the group of *masu-unguwanni*, it will be noticed that each group contributed 17.1% of the overall responses. Exactly 80% of each group maintained the fact that *almajirai* are involved in political thuggery, whereas 20% disagreed. However, the point of departure between the two groups is in their perception of the extent of the participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery. While half of the politicians maintained a ‘very weak’ participation, the remaining insisted on an ‘average’ participation. On the other hand, majority of the *masu-unguwanni* were for a ‘very weak’, and a few of them were for a ‘weak’ involvement of *almajirai* in political

thuggery, but none of the *masu-unguwanni*, subscribed to an ‘average’ involvement of *almajirai* in thuggery, needless of a ‘strong’ participation. The youth leaders contributed 11.4% of the overall responses. Similar to other community leaders 90% of them accepted that *almajirai* participate in political thuggery. Interestingly all of them believed that there was a ‘very weak’ involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in the State at time of studies.

Studied closely, the youth leaders and the *masu-unguwanni* were more similar in perception. Whereas, the politicians are a little different from the two. This is because in all the perception gathered, only the politicians recorded an ‘average’ participation of *almajirai* political thuggery. The reason may be that some of the politicians do not really know the backgrounds of the political thugs they or their colleagues employ. In most cases, they employ the services of thugs through youth leaders, who have better knowledge of the backgrounds of the political thugs. Besides, only 9% of the politicians held this perception. Which means 81% were not much different from the other community leaders. Then it is safe to conclude that there were no significant differences in the perception of community leaders regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State at the time of this study.

4.5.3 Religious leaders

In order to understand the variations that may exist between and among the categories of stakeholders, it is interesting to notice that both the proprietors of *tsangaya* and the Islamic clerics have equal representation of 14.3% each of the total responses. However, their responses based on whether *almajirai* participate in political thuggery in Bauchi state are directly opposite. In other words, 90% of proprietors of *tsangaya*, and 10% of Islamic clerics did not admit any participate of *almajirai* in political thuggery. Conversely, the same 90% of Islamic clerics and 10% of proprietors of *tsangaya* accepted some level of participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery in the state.

Ironically, even the 90% of Islamic clerics, who subscribed to the participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery in the state, agreed with the 10% of proprietors of *tsangaya* that there is a very weak or at least weak participation of *almajirai* in the phenomena of *sara-suka*. It could be deduced, therefore, that there is no significant difference of opinion between the proprietors of *tsangaya* and the Islamic clerics.

4.5.4 The *almajirai* and the political thugs

According to the responses of participants in the FGDs, there were no significant differences between the perception of political thugs and the *almajirai*. This is because all their responses were largely on the scale of '1' i.e. 'very weak' involvement of *almajirai* in political thugs. In other words, both the *almajirai* and political thugs none of the participants is of the FGDs believe in an 'average', 'strong', or a 'very strong' involvement.

In a nutshell, there was no significant variation in the responses of all the nine categories of stakeholders with the exception of the politicians. This is contrary to the assumption made in earlier, which says that there are significant variations in the perception of stakeholders regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery (*sara-suka*) in Bauchi State from 2007 to 2015. This may be possibly due to some of the reasons mentioned elsewhere in this chapter. Nevertheless, all other categories believe that there was a very weak or at most a weak participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi state from 2007 to 2015. Most of the respondents believed that members of *sara-suka* were indiscipline youths living with their parents, who were mostly drug addicts, poor and unemployed, in addition to being generally illiterate in both conventional and Islamic education.

4.6 Discussion of Major Findings

Based on the data presented, the major findings were discovered and discussed as follows.

- a) The first major finding was that, there was participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015.

Nineteen (19) stakeholders out of 35 i.e. 54% believed that *almajirai* participated in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015. Whereas, 16 of the stakeholders i.e. 46%, insisted that *almajirai* did not participate in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015. This finding is similar to the findings of Ya'u (2000) and the assertion of Bambale (2007), who both reported that a significant number of 'Yan *daba* (thugs) in Kano were at some point *almajirai*. Moreover, this may be because poverty and unemployment are part of the major causes of political thuggery

and *almajirai* share these characteristics. However, it is noteworthy to mention that, although *almajirai* participate in political thuggery, as was agreed by most of the stakeholders, yet, a large portion of the *almajirai* do not participate in political thuggery. This is indicated in the slight margin of 8% between these two groups of stakeholders. Some of the reasons of the non-participation of some *almajirai* may be because the community perceived *almajirai* to be righteous which make them to restrain in participating in political thuggery. As such, most *Gardawa* engage in menial jobs for sustenance. This impression was perceived during the interviews with some stakeholders who vehemently rejected any link between *almajirci* and political thuggery. That was part of reason for a slight margin between the stakeholders regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery.

- b) The second major finding was that, there was a very weak level of involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015.

Majority of the stakeholders (74%), maintain that the involvement of *almajirai* in the menace of *sara-suka* in the State was ‘very weak’. Some other stakeholders (21%) perceived the involvement to be ‘weak’. Likewise, only (5%) of the stakeholders insist on an ‘average’ involvement.

Accordingly, it was found out that only an insignificant number of political thugs were *almajirai* or had the background of *almajirci*. This finding is similar to the opinion of Hoechner (2013) who believed that most of the accusation that *almajirai* are violent, criminals and amoral, is a mere allegation. It is also in congruence with the findings of Kurawa (2003) who asserted that, “(only) few *almajirai* are criminals engaged in breach

of public peace. The *almajirai* are made victims of unfounded allegations. Most of those engaged in rioting and crimes are hooligans and others whose parents are known in their wards”.

- c) The third major finding revealed that, there were no significant variations in the perception of stakeholders regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery.

The possible reason for the insignificant variations in the perception of the stakeholders may be that most of them, with the exception of some politicians, were well aware of the social menace of thuggery in their respective communities. During both the interviews and the FGDs, I was severally told that political thugs are mostly youth living with their parents within the community. More so, even were an *almajiri* join thuggery his role is often passive. The few politicians that did not concur with the overwhelming majority of the stakeholders may have had different experience with the *almajirai* in their locality. Although it was observed during the interviews, that most of the respondents, who were advocates of to the participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery, could not cite examples of political thugs, who were *almajirai* or had the background of *almajirci*. This gave the impression that some of the stakeholders were actually speculating based on the theoretical assumption that the difficulty in which *almajirai* found themselves in, could push them into political thuggery and other social vices. Consequently, these assumptions were verbally exaggerated, but empirically unfounded.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

This final chapter is in four sections. It began with the introduction followed by the summary of findings, conclusion, and recommendation,

5.2 Summary of Findings

This research was set out to investigate the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015 with the objectives of finding out the involvement or otherwise of *almajirai* in the phenomena of political thuggery, the extent of the involvement of *almajirai*, and any possible variation in the perceptions of stakeholders regarding this involvement.

Relevant and related literature were reviewed on the subject matter i.e. the concepts of political thuggery and almajirci. Based on the review it was discovered that there was no previous research conducted on the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery.

The major findings of the research revealed that *almajirai* participated in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015. However, there was a very weak involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015. It also revealed that there was no significant difference in the perception of stakeholders regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015.

Other findings include the discovery that political thugs are mostly unemployed youth, with little or no education, in addition to being drug addicts and of a poor background. The problem of *almajirai* is majorly *bara* because of the minimal or no intervention of successive Nigerian governments, coupled with the negligence of parents of *almajirai* in sponsoring their children. Some *Gardawa* participate in political activities, through exercising their franchise, whereas, the *qolaye* and *titibiri* participate in rallies and campaigns. Lastly, the major social crimes that *almajirai* engaged in, is petty stealing.

Earlier it was assumed that *almajirai* participated in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015. According to the findings of the research, this assumption has been proven correct.

Another assumption made was that a large number of *almajirai* transformed into *sara-sukain* Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015. However, this assumption was proven incorrect based on the findings. It was discovered that there was a very weak participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State between 2007 and 2015.

Similarly, the third assumption, which says, there are significant variations in the perceptions of stakeholders regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery (*sara-suka*) in Bauchi State from 2007 to 2015, was also proven incorrect, based on the findings of the research. It was discovered that there was an insignificant variation in the perception of stakeholders regarding the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State, 2007-2015.

5.3 Conclusion

It was concluded based on the findings of the research that without any significant variation in the perception of stakeholders, there was a very weak participation of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State, 2007-2015.

This research has established findings on the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery in Bauchi State. It, therefore, prepares the ground for further research especially in the aspect of investigating why some *almajirai* engage in political thuggery. In addition, understanding whether *almajirai* is the actual reason that some *almajirai* engage in political thuggery is also worthy of investigation. In addition, the findings of this research have contributed to the discourse on the two social problems of *almajirai* and political thuggery, at least in Bauchi State, by providing a field research specifically on the involvement of *almajirai* in political thuggery and the extent of this involvement.

5.4 Recommendations

- i. Nigerian educational system both the conventional and the *almajiri* systems of education be reformed to increase access and enhance skills acquisition.
- ii. The government should be truly committed in the alleviation of poverty. Poverty alleviation interventions especially through boosting agriculture, which is the economic mainstay of Bauchi State.
- iii. The reform and the enforcement of electoral act to incorporate and enforce stringent rules against politicians found guilty of employing political thugs. The reluctance of the constituted authorities in punishing law offenders have resulted

in politicians gaining more grounds in forming and funding an empire of political thugs.

- iv. Similarly, youth found guilty of thuggery should be punished according to the law.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: Interview Questions

SET A: POLICE AND VIGILANTE

1. What type of individuals do you usually arrest during political violence?
2. Were there *almajirai* among the individuals you arrest during political violence? If yes, what is their percentage out of the overall arrested individuals?
3. Do you think that there is a relationship between *almajirci* and political thuggery in Bauchi State?
4. What sort of crime/violence are the *almajirai* been accused of?

SET B: POLITICIANS AND YOUTH LEADERS

1. Have you ever used *almajirai* for any political action/activity?
2. Do you think *almajirai* participate in political thuggery in Bauchi State.
3. Do *Almajirai* form parts of political thugs in Bauchi State? If they do, what percentage can you assign to them?

SET C: MALAMAI, ULAMA, AND MASU UNGUWANNI

1. What are the problems of *almajirci* and *almajirai* today?
2. How often do students become deviants? What sort of crime do they engage in?
3. Is political thuggery among these crimes?
4. Have you been ever tempted or intimidated by any politician to ask your students to participate in any political action? If yes, how did you responded?
5. Has there been any security investigation in your *tsangaya*, charging you or your students of any crime? If yes, what sort of crime was that?
6. Do you think *almajirai* participate in political thuggery in Bauchi State?

APPENDIX II: FGD Questions

SET A: *Almajirai*


1. What are the problems of *almajirci* and *almajirai* today?
2. How often do students become deviants? What sort of crime do they engage in?
3. Is political thuggery among these crimes?
4. Have you ever participated in any political action/activity?
5. Do you think *almajirai* participate in political thuggery in Bauchi State.
6. Do *almajirai* form parts of political thugs in Bauchi State? If they do, what percentage can you assign to them?

SET B: Political thugs

1. Have you ever used *almajirai* for any political action/activity?
2. Do you think *almajirai* participate in political thuggery in Bauchi State.
3. Do *Almajirai* form parts of political thugs in Bauchi State? If they do, what percentage can you assign to them?

APPENDIX III: More Tables and Figures

Participation or otherwise of almajirai in political thuggery.



Source: Field Work, 2015

APPENDIX IV

Stakeholders' Perception on the Extent of the Involvement of *Almajirai* in Political Thuggery.

Groups		Very weak involvement	Weak involvement	Average involvement	Strong involvement	Very strong involvement	Total
Police	Frequency	(2)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(2)
	Percentage (%)	100	0	0	0	0	100
Politician	Frequency	(2)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(4)
	Percentage (%)	50	25	25	0	0	100
Proprietors of <i>Tsangaya</i>	Frequency	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)
	Percentage (%)	100	0	0	0	0	100
Islamic Clerics	Frequency	(3)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(4)
	Percentage (%)	75	25	0	0	0	100
<i>Masu Unguwa</i>	Frequency	(3)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(4)
	Percentage (%)	75	25	0	0	0	100
Youth Leader	Frequency	(3)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(3)
	Percentage (%)	100	0	0	0	0	100
Vigilante	Frequency	(0)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)
	Percentage (%)	0	100	0	0	0	100
Total	Frequency	(14)	(4)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(19)
	Percentage (%)	74	21	5	0	0	100

Source: Field survey 2015

APPENDIX II: Focus Group Discussion Schedule

(a) FGD schedule with *Almajirai*

S/N	LGAs	<i>Almajirai</i>	Date	Time	Venue
1	Alkaleri	FGD1a	21/06/16	11: 38am	
2	Bauchi	FGD2a	28/06/16	09:05pm	
3	Darazo	FGD3a	14/06/16	3: 13pm	
4	Gamawa	FGD4a	15/06/16	5:30 pm	
5	Katagum	FGD5a	16/06/16	5:17pm	
6	Ningi	FGD6a	08/05/16	10:48am	

(b) FGD schedule with political thugs

S/N	LGAs	Political Thugs	Date	Time	Venue
1	Alqaleri	FGD1b	21/06/16	4:35pm	
2	Bauchi	FGD2b	28/06/16	11:12am	
3	Darazo	FGD3b	14/06/16	11: 57 pm	
4	Gamawa	FGD4b	15/06/16	7: 13pm	
5	Katagum	FGD5b	16/06/16	10:18am	
6	Ningi	FGD6b	08/05/16	11:10am	

APPENDIX III: Interview Schedule

S/N	Name	Position	Date/ time	Venue
1	Anonymous	Former councillor Makama A, Ganjuwa, Bauchi, Bauchi State	Thus, 03 Sept. 2015. 2:45pm	
2	Anonymous	Personal Assistant to Fmr. Gov. Isa Yuguda and youth leader PDP 2007 to date.	Thus, 03 Sept. 2015. 1:56pm	
3	Anonymous	Imam Central Mosque Qofar Dumi, Bauchi, Bauchi State	Thus, 03 Sept. 2015. 11:15am	
4	Anonymous	Ward head Qofar Dumi Gabas, Bauchi, Bauchi State	Thus, 03 Sept. 2015. 1:08pm	
5	Anonymous	Police Public Relation Officer Bauchi State Police Headquarters, Bauchi.	Thus, 04 June 2015. 12: 34pm	
6	Anonymous		Fri, 29 May 2015 07:21pm	
7	Anonymous	Maiunguwar Layin Sarki, Ningi, Bauchi State.	Sat, 30 May 2015 4:10pm	
8	Anonymous	Fmr. Councillor Ningi LGA 2007 to 2011	Sat, 30 May 2015 3:15pm	
9	Anonymous	Teacher and Proprietor of Tsangaya	Sun, 31 May 2015 11:03am	
10	Anonymous	DPO Police Divisional Headquarters Ningi, Bauchi State.	Sun, 31 May 2015 12:18pm	
11	Anonymous	Head, Vigilante Ningi, Bauchi State.	Sun, 31 May 2015 01:42pm	
12	Anonymous	Ward Councillor Alqaleri East, Alqaleri, Bauchi State.	Tues, 1 Sept. 2015 05:42pm	
13	Anonymous	Youth Leader, Alqaleri East, Bauchi State.	Tues, 1 Sept. 2015 06:12pm	
14	Anonymous	Fmr. State House of Representative Udubo constituency Gamawa LGA, Bauchi North	Thus, 3 Sept. 2015 03:35pm	

		Senatorial District.		
15	Anonymous	DPO Police Divisional Headquarters Alqaleri, Bauchi State.	Sat., 01 Aug 2015 11:43am	
16	Anonymous	Youth Leader, and Chairman Garko Plaza		
17	Anonymous	Teacher and Proprietor of <i>Tsangaya</i>		
18	Anonymous	Sarkin Bindiga, Head, Vigilante Alqaleri, Bauchi State.		