MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN NIGERIAN POLITICS 1966 - 1979 AN ANALYSIS OP INSTITUTIONAL POLITICIZATION

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own research work and has not been submitted in any form for another degree or diploma at any other University or institution. Information derived from the published or unpublished work of others has been acknowledged in the text.

Mary Y. Garba.
December 1987.

CERTIFICATION

This thesis/dissertation entitled "Military Interventions in Nigerian Politics 1966 - 1979; An Analysis of Institutional Politicisation" by Garba, M.Y. meets the requirement governing the award of the degree of Master of Science in Political Science at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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Dedicated first to God, the Source
of Wisdom and Knowledge, and to
my Principled Cousin
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is about military intervention in politics. Considered an aberration before 1945, instances in which the military ployed an increasingly active role in politics of Third World countries became widespread after the Second War War. Analysts have posited many reasons to account for military involvement in politics. I have analysed the Nigerian case within the framework of politicisation.

The Nigerian Military is a creation of the colonia-lists who used the institution not only to conquer the local people but also to impose imperial rule upon them. The militarymon were trained and molded in thr British military traditions. They were taught to be politically neutral. Till independence, the Nigerian militarymen were highly professional and the ethos of political neutrality was maintained.

Within five years of independence, the institution had become highly politicised. This we indicate is the result of many interrelated factors, the most notable being the nature of Nigerian society itself. Politici sation, it is noted negates some important military values achieved during the process of professionalination. With political crises within the polity and the inability of political leaders to resolve them, the military is offered the opportunity to intervene. It struck on. the 15th January 1966. This development only set pace for further politicisation of the institution resulting in coups and counter-coupa .

Although I do not deny the existence of other explanations for the Nigerian situation, I am highly convinced by the available evidence that politicisation is central to understanding of military intervention in politics of Nigeria.

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INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of military intervention in the politics of African States has become the norm rather than the exception. The first military coup in Africa was in Egypt in 1952 where the colonels' seizure of power took place against "a blackcloth of a discredited political system that concentrated power in hands of a narrow oligarchy which appeared to be manipulated by British imperial interests and was symbolised by an ineffectual, pleasure loving hereditary rulers."[1] In 1958 in Sudan, some officers led by General Ibrahim Abboud seized control of the government. Subsequently with the independence of more African States in the 1960s and the assumption of political control of these States by the nationalists, there followed a series of military interventions in one form or the other. There was an abortive military coup in Algeria in 1961 which was led by "Four Generals". In 1965 however, the military succeeded in overthrowing the civilian government.

After the popular rebellion of 1964-65, Joseph Mobutu and the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) high command unseated the two rivals for presidency - Moise Tahombe and Joseph Kasavubu - in 1965 in Congo Kinshasa (Zaire). There were military coups in Central African Republic in January 1965; Nigeria - January 1966; Ghana - February 1966. In Ghana, Afrifa and his colleagues

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overthrew Kwame Nkrumah. In fact from 1965 military intervention became rampant in Africa. Gutteridge asserts that from 1965 to 1966 "there had been nineteen successful military coups and by the end of 1970 the total number of relevant major incident in Africa ..... was near to thirty."[2]

Since independence, Nigeria has had five military regimes - Ironsi's regime which lasted for only six months January 1966 - July 1966; Gowon 1966-75; Murtala/Obasanjo 1975-79; Buhari 1983-85; and the present Babangida regime. In fact Nigeria has been under military rule for sixteen years out of the twenty-six years of its existence as an independent nation. Two of these coups were cases of the military replacing civilian rulers, while the others were internal putsches within the military itself.

This thesis will attempt to seek explanations for military intervention in politics. I will try to focus on two conceptual variables namely: professionalism and politicisation. In other words I will try to find out whether the military intervenes in politics because of their professionalism or as a result of its politicisation. Nigeria is taken as a case-study and the period 1966-1979 which was the first period of military interregnuun in the country will be covered by the study.

What is professionalism? What is the role of the professional officer? Are the Nigerian military officers professionals? What is the level of their professionalism? What is politicisation? What causes it and what are its effects? Has the Nigerian Military been politicised? Under what objective conditions did they intervene? When was the Nigerian Military institution created? Who created it and for what purpose? After which model was the institution built? Under what socio-economic context is it operating? How can we correlate its reasons for intervening in politics with the results of its intervention? How has the Nigerian economy fared under the military? Which is a better system of government for the country, diarchy, or purely military?

I believe that answers to these questions will illuminate the phenomenon of military intervention. There is however no universally acclaimed norm of military behavior. Peculiar circumstances of individual countries and coup d'etats ought to be examined. In Nigeria, politicisation is central to understanding of military involvement in politics. Because the organisation is highly politicised as evident in the manner it managed the economy, it is difficult to suggest which system of government - civilian, diarchy or purely military - is good for the country.

METHODOLOGY

The primary source of data for this study is drawn from already written materials of renowned scholarship. In other words, library research method of data collection is used. Published speeches of coup makers are analysed. To enable the researcher have sufficient materials, a visit was made to libraries of military institutions such as the one in Jaji and the Nigerian Military School, Zaria. Data on political, economic and cultural context in which the Nigerian Military performed its role were drawn from historic journalism and scholarly studies.

In addition to the already existing materials some officers (retired and serving), and recruits we e interviewed; and their opinion sought on the issue of professionalism.

The first problem encountered at the course of data collection was how to get in touch with the army officers. Some of them, even after meeting them, were not willing to respond to the questions. This problem was mostly encountered with the Army arm of the military. Due to their constant spearheading of coup execution, they have grown very security conscious.

On the other hand, the Air Force and Navy arms were more willing to speak. However, senior army officers also spoke but from time to time withheld certain information.

CHAPTER I

THE PHENOMENON OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE POLITICS OF AFRICAN STATES: AN ABERRATION OR A NECESSITY?

An examination of the literature on military involvement in politics shows a move towards three prominent theories. These are military organisation and professionalism, systemic instability, and corporate and personal interests theories. There are also some other explanations such as the foreign influence argument. The tenets of each of these will be examined in turn.

Political theorists have long been concerned with the necessity for and the means by which the peace and security of society and its rulers may be obtained. Broadly speaking, this concern focused on the need for security from foreign invaders and from domestic rebellion. While organised armed forces are created to guarantee the first, the second is less easily secured. In fact theorists have long been aware that there may be a conflict between the two goals. That soldiers who repel foreign invaders often topple their own rulers.

Niccolo Machiavelli was overwhelmed by the disloyalty of mercenary soldiers to the rulers who employed them that he urged the adoption of civilian militias on the grounds that militiamen would fight better than

uncommitted mercenaries and be more loyal to their rulers. In this way he hoped to prevent officers from exploiting the loyalty of their soldiers for the purpose of ursurping the position of their rulers.[3]

To Machiavelli, the key to military obedience to civilian rulers is the inability of military commanders to acquire great authority over their men. At first instance, it will appear that military officers would conspire against their rulers; but the creation of civilian militia and the rotation of commanders would prevent them from executing their plans.[4]

The idea that military officers are generally a threat to civilian rulers and domestic tranquility has been persistent, both Hobbes and Mosca have expressed fear of standing armies led by career officers.[5]

Some theorists suggested conditions under which the military will not interfere in politics. Mosca, Andreski and Abrahams believe that military officers are obedient and loyal to civilian rulers when they belong to the same class and share same vested interests as the rulers.[6] In other words, they are not obedient when they are not of the same class. Some people also see politics and military as the exclusive domain of the aristocracy and as a result, they believe that the rulers

could always rely on the military for support; that is the contradiction existing between the two not being fundamental, nothing could bring a clash of interests.

However these theorists have failed to see that with the rise of military professionalism in the 18th and 19th centuries, officers have been recruited on the basis of their ability rather than social class. From this, one can say that military obedience no longer stemmed exclusively from shared class interests of officers and rulers, because professional officers developed a separate corporate identity. From this, one can see that military obedience depends on what one defines as professionalism.

1.1 ORGANISATION AND PROFESSIONALISM THEORY:

At this point, let us examine the first theory - organisation theory as it also deals with this concept of professionalism. The organisation theory analysts attempt to explain military intervention in politics in terms of their organisation. According to this view, military organisation is equated with any other form of organisation including political-intitutional organ. Military skills, values, and social relations are said to be non-traditional, their basic orientation is towards the nation, thus one can say that they are trained to have a national outlook which cuts across traditional

society which is characterised by primordial, sectional and tribalistic interests. They are professional and are just there to defend the interest of the st te. Since they are committed to the national interest, members of the officer corps are sensitive to problems in the political system, they feel compelled to look for the solution to these problems if only to save the nation from collapse.

Finer (who has two views as to the causes of military intervention in politics, that is organisation and professionalism theory and systemic instability theory) in admiration for military organisation - which is characterised by centralisation, hierarchy discipline, inter-communication and esprit-de-corps, feels that the army is "much more highly organised than any civilian bodies" and because of this fact he asks "why is military intervention in politics or military government the exception rather than the rule?[7] To buttress his point, he argued in reaction to an earlier assumption by Huntington (who sees military organisation and professionalism as inhibiting them from intervening in politics) that rather than inhibiting them from intervening in politics, the military intervene for reasons that stem from their professionalism.

Huntington believes that the professional officer is always obedient to civilian command.[8] He argues that due to the specialised skills and elaborate division of labour in modern nation states, the professional officer is no longer competent to combine politics with his role.[9]

He however, went further to qualify the equation of military obedience with military professionalism by stating that the setting for his relationship is the modern nation state, in which the civilian rulers must be legitimate, and the military must possess a degree of organisational autonomy within their professionally recognised sphere of competence.[10] To Huntington, skill specialisation leaves no time for politics.

Samuel Finer accepts Huntington's definition of professionalism as consisting of expertise, a corporate identity and ethic of social responsibility, but argues that Huntington's attribution of military obedience to the ethic is unsatisfactory because the principle of civilian supremacy is not always part of military professionalism. He argues that soldiers have intervened in politics where they have not absorbed this principle of civilian supremacy for reasons which stemmed from their professionalism. He points out that in countries with what he calls low political culture, (where political institutions, procedures, and organisation are not widely viewed as

legitimate) and where techniques of civilian control of military have not been institutionalised, the professional ethic of social responsibility may make the military officers assume responsibility of defending and protecting the national welfare.[11] In other words, the answer to the question "responsibility to whom?" may be either the nation (people) or government depending upon the interpretation the officers give to it. Military officers are still adhering to the vague ethic of social responsibility. That is, military obedience may derive from the way in which civilian institutions operate rather than the nature of the officer corps.

There is one basic flaw with Finer's point and this is his generalisation about the behavior, mood, and disposition of professional officers which implies the concept of professionalism as having a cross-national validity. To deduce patterns of civil-military relations from the postulated nature of military professionalism, one may only infer that the pattern holds for several different countries as long as the nature of professionalism is equivalent. (Ceterus paribus).

In my opinion, Finer's explanation is inadequate for accounting for the phenomenon of military intervention in politics. If professionalism warrants intervention, then why does the junta always hasten to say that

their move into the realm of politics is only transitional even if they do not believe in civilian supremacy? Why does the military most often lack the legitimate right to rule? After all if there is a principle of civilian supremacy in politics, then is it not supposed to be part and parcel of military ethics? Since most military institutions in Africa are trained along the liberal democratic models of Europe, particularly Britain and France where this principle is said to be most strictly adhered to and since the military leaders in African States are trained in the traditions of these States, is it not logical that the principle of civilian supremacy in politics is part of the organisational training they acquired? Granted that this is the case, then one finds that Huntington's argument is much more acceptable than Finer's. After all most of the military leaders in Africa that have found themselves at the helm of governmental affairs have openly confessed that their role in society is not to rule. To accept this contention is to indicate that the interchange of power between civilian on the one hand and the military on the other is to be deemed a healthy development.

Another thing is that Finer has not taken into account the socio-economic context in which military in different countries perform their role. Important variables such as level of economic development are very important.

Some scholars have argued along the line of Finer that officers actively and intentionally intervene in politics of developing countries because of their professionalism. They argue that professional officers possess modern technological skills and orientations which may be useful in the modernisation process. Officers sweep out corrupt and parochial politicians and institute modernising reforms. While this argument is tenable to a certain extent, the question still remains, how professional is the African military? How imbued are they with these characteristics that enable the modernisation process? How ready and willing is the civil society to accept such values?

Some other theorists such as Nun (1967), Pertras (1970) and Murray (1966) have rather stressed the marxist viewpoint. This viewpoint rejects the notion that Third World military is capable of any real development due to its dependence on the "big powers" for hardware, training and other procurements.

1.2 FOREIGN INFLUENCE EXPLANATION.

Before looking at the systemic instability theory let us first look at the foreign influence explanation because of its link with issue of dependence which is mentioned above. Some writers have argued that the

military in the Third World have intervened in politics as a result of foreign influence. Exponents of this view emphasise the reference group orientation of overseas trained Third World military officers towards the metropolis. This view assumes a structural dependence of Third World nations on the metropolitan countries becuase of technological dependence.

This dependence came to be through some historical development of these nations. Daniel Offiong (1980) explains the development of this dependence in three phases. The first stage according to him began with the development of trans-Atlantic slave trade which resulted in the massive transportation of the able-minded Africans to then newly discovered America to work in the plantation. This development, he argues had an adverse effect on the African countries in that the people that were to remain and develop the African technology were carried away and this in turn retarded the development of these people.

The second stage of this historical development was the time of direct control of these states. African countries were partitioned among the powers who were in need of markets for their manufactured goods and places to get raw materials for their industries because industrial revolution had taken off and slaves were no longer

needed. According to Offiong, it was at this time that the African countries were incorporated into the capitalist system as producers of primary products. There were no efforts made by the colonialists to develop local technology. And local elites were not granted loans to invest and compete with their foreign counterparts.

It was at this period argued Claude Ake that the African military institutions were created. They were also trained by the colonialists for the purpose of protecting colonialism. They ensured that they were very obedient to them.

To also protect colonialism they developed different ideologies which are essentially the same to justify the system. Claude Ake asserts

> Thus, all colonisers used essentially the same ideology. They all developed very similar justification for colonialism, from the same premises, namely that colonialism was beneficial to the colonised in the fundamental sense of improving the quality of their lives. Colonialism became, not self-seeking, not exploitation, but salvation.

To ensure that this process of exploitation continued after independence, the colonial powers handed power to some chosen nationalists who had been indoctrinated with western democratic ideas. This is the

period of development of Neo-colonialism. Basil Davidson declared

> "For what the colonial powers thought wise and necessary was the formation and promotion to power of "leading elites" or "middle classes" (those whom the French have so revealing called 'interlocuteurs valables' - negotiators worth talking to) groups of men who would ensure that post-colonial government should be "moderate and responsible" - should be, that is, a reflection of colonial government. And it is here ..... the seat of the trouble lie."

With this healthy political atmosphere, the economies of the African States are penetrated by multinational corporations who exploit the people and also hide their technology. As a result of this exploitation, Daniel Offiong explains, these states are riddled with all kinds of crises. As a result of this dependence and also fluctuation in the market prices of primary products, most of these states are trapped in debt crises.

With this situation, the western powers use aid programmes to achieve their aims. This aid programme is not limited but covers even the military programmes.

The aid programme offer includes the secondment of training and advisory personnel from the metropolis to the less developed nation.[14] To substantiate th

point Odetola added "In 1964 there were nearly 3,000 French officers and NCOs seconded or contracted to the armed forces of independent Africa States, while 1,500 Africans were undergoing training in France. During the same period about 600 British officers and NCOs were on secondment and more than 700 Africans were training in Britain."[15] With this, it is obvious why one should appreciate Gutteridge's proposition that "the armies of the new states tend to retain their colonial flavour, their foreign advisers and affinity with Europe longer than do the civilian public service."[16]

With this foreign aid programme, there is a feeling of gratitude on the part of the military leaders of these African States and thus hard for one to imagine that most of the military leaders would look critically and negatively at influences emanating from these countries.

Foreign aid according to Hoovey does induce a definite orientation of the military leadership concerned towards the donor countries' control."[17] The dependence has made the African armies more susceptible to influence in both internal and external policies.

On the whole one can say that this argument of foreign influence based on the economic dependence of African countries on the advanced nations especially the erstwhile colonial masters provides one way of understanding military intervention in politics; but it should be looked at in conjunction with other variables.

1.3 SYSTEMIC INSTABILITY THEORY

More cogent and acceptable is the second theory which relates to systemic instability in countries where the coups have occurred. The assumption here is that most developing countries have their political institutions founded on weak platforms. As a result, they are incapable of adequately performing their roles in the political system. On the part of the military, they often explain or attempt to justify their intervention in terms of this theory. Welch and Finer in talking about the roots and causes of military intervention in politics see it as occurring due to the political strategy of the nationalist leaders who came to perform political roles after the successful constitutional displacement of colonial rule. "On assuming power these leaders ..... tended to ascribe extra-ordinary powers of social, economic and political transformation to political parties."[18] This was possible because

independence was received on a 'platter of gold'. The army did not play any role in the struggle for independence. Because of this, they (nationalists) tended to see the political parties as means for positive transformation of society and gateways to rapid economic development. After a few years in power, the ruling elites apparently failed to usher in the much publicised development and this failure left a vacuum which only the military could fill. Finer in asserting that

> The political institutions of these countries were recent, tarnished by corrupt manipulation and fraud often imposed and hardly comprehended by the popular mass let alone loved and revered. The parliament was to them a facade for a selfish town-trained oligarchy.[19]

meant the same as Welch about the incapacity of the nationalists to govern.

Huntington whom we have seen earlier in the first theory as seeing professionalism as a hindrance to intervention in politics, rather believes that the military intervene as a result of systemic instability, for he asserts

> Most important causes of military intervention in politics are not the social and organisational character of the military establishment but the political institutional structure of society.[20]

Yet another analyst, Janowitz sees African military intervention in politics not out of a "designed militarism" but rather as only "reactive militarism" and by the former he means the non-predetermined intention of the military to be in politics, by the latter he means that the military intervene only when they are reacting against the weakness of civilian institutions.[21] This theory is most plausible in explaining military intervention. It clearly shows why civilian leaders rely on the military to maintain themselves in power. This reliance for extra-support to suppress some political opponents accords another role to the military and gets them on road to being politicised. This explains some of the ways the military gets politicised even if it has been professional and has internalised the concept of civilian supremacy. Having been politicised, the military seeks for the slightest opportunity to intervene.

In the case of Nigeria, the opportunity was provided for the January 1966 coup by the civil violence in the Western Region set off by the regional election of October 1965. Politicisation resulted in ignoring the ethics of civilian supremacy.

All military corps that have come into power have blamed ousted regime for maladministration and bad government. This normally implies that the military will do better when in power. This assertion is often proved to be erroneous. An examination of their policies, means of achieving their goals has shown the contrary. We have military officers who are as corrupt as the civilian leaders, and even worse offenders in some cases. Politicisation provides the key to understanding the reasons for military intervention in politics and their style of government. This is why it is very important to know the causes of politicisation.

The military will not adhere to any concept of civilian supremacy if the civilian leaders exhibit any incapacity to govern. A weak civilian government which relies on its military for extra support cannot be said to have realised this principle of civilian supremacy or on the other hand, if the regime does not accord the military its proper role in the society, then there is no talk of civilian supremacy in politics.

Nordlinger in referring to this principle after asserting that

> Soldiers who are imbued with these beliefs and values ..... are attitudinally disposed to accept civilian authority and retain a neutral depoliticised stance even when in sharp disagreement with government.

goes further to emphasise the fact that "civilians must exhibit due regard for the military".[22] This theory in part has given us some insights into some causes of politicisation which in turn leads to military intervention in politics.

1.4 CORPORATE AND PERSONAL INTEREST THEORY

The third major theory explains military intervention in politics in terms of the corporate and personal ambition of the military. Writers like S.Decalo have dismissed the fact that the African militaries are in anyway professional. To him, the assumption that the Nigerian military was modelled in the traditions of their British counterparts is false. He argues that

> empirical evidence suggest otherwise, African armies have rarely been cohesive, non-tribal, westernised or even complex organisational structures ..... Differential recruitment and promotion patterns cause tension and reinforce other lines of division on ranks, age, tribe and education. These have been only superficially papered over by flimsy and brief training programme that metropolitan countries set up in warring years of colonial rule.[23]

In examining the systemic instability theory, Decalo concedes to the fact that military intervention comes about as a result of the systemic social and structural weakness of the system which is characterised by institutional fragility, systemic flaws and low-level political culture. He however refuses to accept theories that are built around the mentioned factors. As far as he is concerned, such an approach lacks explanatory value. He says it is

> "both simplistic and empirically erroneous to relate coups in Africa to the status of a dependent variable, a function of the political weaknesses and structural fragility of African States and the failings of African elites."[24]

Decalo therefore feels that the proper reasons that explain military intervention in politics can be found in

> the internal dynamics of African military hierarchies, their officer cliques and corporate and personal ambitions.[25]

This theory seems to see the military as intervening solely for what they can get.

While this approach might throw light on the motives of the military for taking over power, yet it does not inform us much about the conditions that make their intervention possible. Even if military officers are ambitious for personal reasons to occupy the seat of political power, they still have to wait for a time that is most propitious if the people are to support their

mc, this is very central to understanding military involvement in politics.

However, Decalo's approach may assist in explaining why it has become very difficult for the military to effectively withdraw from politics even when they had promised to do so.

A close examination of the various theories and explanations put forward to explicate military intervention in politics will show that all are important. And to have a balanced result as to why the military intervene in politics, there is the need to bring the various explanations together. It is not enough to look at only one aspect because any empirical examination of civil-military relations in the case of any specific country will reveal an interaction of historical, political, organisational and professional variables.

In most countries conditions for military intervention are provided by the weakening in legitimacy of civilian authorities during the first years of independence. It is also a fact that in some countries, even with the weakening in legitimacy of civilian authorities, the military does not sometimes intervene until influenced from outside to do so.

It is also true that the changing political context after the military assumes power provides the necessary conditions for the activation of regional and ethnic ties in the organisation; that is where the society is heterogeneous. But it is not sufficient condition, for one might expect the military to have been insulated from the currents of mass behavior by virtue of its tightly organised normative framework. One would need to know therefore, at the very least, why organisational controls are not effective against environmental pressures.

1.5 THE MILITARY IN NIGERIAN POLITICS

Let us take a look at what some authors have said to be responsible for military intervention in politics in Nigeria.

Ball (1971) in treating the issue of military in politics starts by describing the organisation structure and qualities that the modern military possess. As far as one is concerned, his description just fits the military as found in developed politics; that is where both the economic and political systems have developed to a high level. And as Finer (1962) observed, the militaries of these states have internalised the concept of civilian supremacy. Ball clearly indicates

that military intervention is linked with the nature of the political system. He follows Finer's line of argument that due to the developed political culture of such states as United States of America, and other industrialised nations, military intervention in politics is less likely to occur there. The civilians in these states have succeeded in winning the allegiance of the military and the society as a whole. By this he implies that in political systems where the civilian governments lack prestige and have not won the allegiance of the people they govern, the military easily intervenes.

In treating the Nigerian case, Ball attributes military intervention to regional differences within the country in 1966. This regionalism and ethnicity infilterated the rank and file of the army and thus caused disunity which resulted in the July 1966 coup and the subsequent Civil War that started in 1967. The army that was supposed to be identified with the national interest became embroiled in sectional and regional wranglings. Before this time, was the army free from such divisions? If yes, how and why? Why did they engage in fighting? Could it be said that the intervention occured solely as a result of ethnic and regional differences? These are some vital questions which Ball does not answer in his book.

Ball also pinpoints that the recruitment policy was a major factor that contributed to the military discontent. Most of the officers were drawn from the south where the level of literacy was higher. And since western education was slow in reaching the north it was at a disadvantage position.

While Ball talks of professionalism, he does not apply it to the Nigerian case.

Gutteridge (1974) discusses the concept of professionalism.[26] He noted the impact of British military training on the African military officers who see themselves as molded in the British military ethos. He however qualifies the impact by indicating that some of the traditions were not well developed in the African military. By this he implies that they could be termed as professional but at a lower level than their counterparts in the advanced countries.

To Gutteridge, the fragility of the military professionalism coupled with the politicisation of the army by the civilian government led to intervention in politics. His analysis is well grounded. The army though were trained in Britain, came back to operate in a different context. The fragility of their professionalism he blamed on the policy of colonial rulers.

Gutteridge draws our attention to the role of personality in understanding military intervention in Nigerian politics. He argues that

> the possibility that more depend upon the character of a leader than on the military character of a regime is borne out in the case of Gowon as certainly, but entirely ..... The fact that Gowon made his mark at Sandhurst was attributable to his absorption of the appropriate ethos and of itself not by any means necessarily an asset amongst his African colleagues and contemporaries.[27]

Oyediran (1979) sees military intervention as a result of a general politicisation of the various institutions in the society as Huntington posits in his analysis.[28] The politicisation of recruitment and promotion policy by the introduction of quota system had serious negative effects on the organisation. Lower educational qualification was resorted to just to fill the quotas of some regions. This in effect lowered the standard and professionalism of the military.

Having been politicised, the military only waited for an opportunity to strike. As Oyediran observed, this opportunity was provided by the breakdown of law and order which accompanied the 1964-5 federal election and 1965 Western regional election. What one finds missing in his analysis is an initial assessment of the Nigerian military professionalism. One can only infer that he

see them as professional since he talks of politicisation; but the question still remains "how professional are they?"

Kasfir (1979) made an attempt to do a comparative study of four Nigerian military regimes. He attributed the reasons for intervention in politics to ethnicity and regional sentiments.

On the basis of his argument can one say that the coup that saw Gowon out of power was based on ethnic and regional sentiments? Certainly not, because Gowon hails from the same region as most of the plotters. Kasfir did not account for the abortive coup that saw to the death of Murtala.

Kasfir's work clearly shows that he was not interested in identifying the reasons for coup d'etats but rather the style of administration of each regime as well as the problems that each faced and how it handled them.

Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere (1985) examined military intervention in politics using the Marxian perspective. They focused their analysis on historical experience of the Nigerian social formation, the origins and nature of the postcolonial state, the accumulation

base of the dominant forces, their relations with transnational interests, and the intensity of class contradictions and struggles.

According to them, these factors determine not only the historical role of the social formation in the international division of labour, but issues such as revenue allocation, the need to employ ethnic and other sentiments in the struggle to expand and reproduce class interest, policy output, etc.

Nigeria was incorporated into the world capitalist system and peripherised in the international division of labour during the colonial period. Colonialism as a logical extension of imperialism imposed the colonial state to protect and reproduce the interest of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. The imposition of the colonial state also led to importation of alien institutions and social structures, a process which saw the arrest of natural process of state formation.

At independence, Nigeria inherited a fluid state of affairs - a weak state, institutions with low legitimacy, etc. With this situation the postcolonial state was faced with a lot of problems. There was the crisis of hegemony which arose from the distortion of the social formation in

the colonial period, the peripherisation of the economy in the international division of labour, the relegation of indigenous power elite to commercial and exchange activities, the relative power of other social classes, the inability of the postcolonial state to create and impose an alternative world-view on other social classes and the intra-class conflicts that characterised the politics played by the power elite following independence. The crisis of hegemony they also contend, had its roots in the exclusion of the majority from plan initiation, the attempts to preserve the colonial relations of production and accumulation. For example the continued use of Marketing Boards, the increasing level of organisation, militancy and consciousness among the working class, the frequent resort to force by the postcolonial state when confronted with popular protests, massive corruption, ethnic chauvinism, religious bigotry, use of state power and institutions to divert public funds into private accounts.

All these factors in combination with others threw the Nigerian social formation into a perpetual crisis. Under this condition, the officer corps which is said to be the military wing of the bourgeoisie having been politicised, and since they have monopoly of the instruments of coersion intervened in January 1966.

According to Falola and Ihonvbere, the military "hijacked" the struggles by trade unionists, students, peasants and other oppressed people. In other words, the military intervened to protect the interest of the dominant class when it became clear that opposition from other social classes had reached a level where they had created a counter-hegemonic force in the society. The opposition commanded the support of the majority and social order had broken down due to inability of dominant class to maintain control over capital accumulation and distribution of patronage.

Military interventions are seen as a manifestation of structural contradictions and crisis of hegemony which promote all-round instability.

On the whole, one can say that this perspective provides one way of examining the phenomenon of military intervention in politics.

We have seen in the literature review the three main theories - organisation, systemic instability and corporate and personal interests. The tenets of each has been looked into and the weaknesses brought out. The military on their part have often justified their intervention in politics on the basis of the second and by that imply that they can do better.

This thesis will focus on two conceptual variables namely: professionalism and politicisation. I will suggest in this work that within the Nigerian context, politicisation seems to be a dominant reason (al ough other reasons may also be valid) for military interven- tion in politics. My understanding is that it is impossible to generalise on the issue of military involvement in politics, peculiar circumstances of individual countries and coup d'etats ought to be considered. A general theory of military involvement in politics is a difficult task. Emphasis will be laid on politicisation.

There is the need to establish in the first instance whether the Nigerian military is professional. If yes, then to what extent? It is after this that the process by which the organisation got politicised will be examined. This, in effect calls for an exposition of the

two conceptual variables and also the definition of some concepts which are recurrent in this work.

1.6 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

Professionalism: 'Professionalism' can be defined as a field of activity which involves something more than long term commitment and a reasonable level of reward. Its members have an obligation to serve society in accordance with a code of duty over-riding personal ambition and convenience. It is sometimes referred to as vocation - a role to which an individual is called to perform.

Then the professional man is an expert with all that it implies in terms of intellectual activity; he must be fully aware of the historical and social contexts of his occupation and be able to apply his skills according to the need of society. This involves special training in skills, techniques and social responsibility. The application of this special skills cannot be separated from implicit social obligation.[30]

The professional groups regard themselves as exclusive (separate from mass of society). They have corporate identity borne of their training procedures and their particular duty to society. That is why it is

necessary for them to have control over their own membership, their qualification for entry into the profession and its code of conduct.

"Military professionalism" then will be defined in such a way to make sure that it holds for the officer corps of Britain and Nigeria. That is because most of the officers here in Nigeria were trained in the military traditions of Britain.

From the above, we have come to understand that 'profession' is used to describe vocation that is characterised by expertise, an ethics of social responsibility and corporate identity.[31] Expertise in turn ir olves the possession of specialised skill and knowledge which has been acquired by long training process which involves both formal education and practical experience. The skill of an expert can be measured by experts on the basis of universally accepted standards.

In the process of becoming a professional, the military officer is expected to acquire a sense of responsibility towards the nation. This norm of responsibility prescribes the way in which he is to use his expertise. To be professional, it is not enough to have a high degree of qualification or skill, one must also have accepted and internalised a code of ethics which

demands that the professional serves his nation.[32] For instance the expertise of a military officer is the special skill in the use and management of instruments of violence; however, this does not define the professional officer. He should also be committed to a primary responsibility to use his skill only for the defence of his country. He may not use his skill for private or selfish ends, his code of ethics forbids this. The norm and ethics of military profession determines the disposition of the officer's skills.[33]

In so far as the officer conceives of himself as professional he will be aware of the ethics involved in his social position and will consciously adapt his behavior to these norms in some fashion.[34] Due to his expertise and ethic of social responsibility, the officer has a sense of distinction or uniqueness, this is his corporate identity or self-image from non-professionals because of his special attributes. He feels a sense of social unity, comradeship and shared purpose with other professional officers. In short, professional training consists of acquiring skills which can be measured by stipulated standard of excellence and a specialisation process by which certain norms and values are internalised. Together the expertise and norms contribute to a unique sense of identity.

The purpose of this discussion of professionalism has been to show that the concept is multi-dimensional and includes both normative and empirical dimensions.

This means that officers must be evaluated separately on each dimension before an overall assessment of his professionalism can be accurately made.

THE CONCEPT OF POLITICISATION

Politicisation can be defined as a process involving either the inculcation of values and opinions or the expression of action towards the polity based on such values, which lies outside the political frame of reference dictated by the functional sphere of competence of any organisation. By the phrase "any organisation", this includes the military.

Politicisation is of two types. These are induced and overt. Overt politicisation represents the deliberate drive by the polity to inculcate extra-military political values into the armed forces. Induce politicisation has the same end result as overt; that is acquisition of an enlarge sphere of political reference, but differs in the process of acquisition of the political values. Thus, as opposed to being deliberately imposed by the polity, they are acquired or induced

spontaneously through the general process of interaction between the military and polity.

If a non-political institution such as the bureaucracy acquires and exhibits the characteristics of a political body such could be described as being politicised. In other words, there is the traditional belief that political leaders are solely responsible for the formulation of policies while the bureaucracy is to strictly implement those policies. The bureaucrats are professional and are not expected to be political; that is they are expected to have nothing to do with decision-making process.

Unfortunately, due to some reasons, the bureaucracy has increasingly been participating in decision-making process. It has become evident that politics and Administration are fused and that there is no dichotomy but a continuum. The deficiencies of one are corrected by the other. The bureaucracy has thus been politicised.

De Gracia (1962) defined Politics as "events" that happen around the decision-making centres of government." While Self sees it as "the use of State power." And Public Administration has been said to be concerned with the means of implementing political values.[35]

Because of the context in which it operates, the bureacracy is constantly under pressure from different sources. The political leaders use it to consolidate their position and reputation. The major social classes want to use it to obtain favorable treatment in terms of administration of services and preservation of their autonomy. On the other hand, the public officials have their own ideas about their role and profession. They want a higher social status and higher rewards for their services. These and other pressures converge on the bureaucracy and so politicisation becomes inevitable.

Bureaucracy may be thought of as a complex system of men, offices, methods and authority which large organisations employ for the purpose of achieving a goal.[36]

The first attempt to theorise extensively about the nature and significance of bureacracy was made by the eminent sociologist Max Weber (1864-1926). He identified some characteristics of bureaucracy which include

> High degree of specialisation, hierarchical authority structure ..... , impersonality of relationships between organisational members, recruitment of officials on the basis of ability and technical knowledge, differentiation of private and official income and fortune and so on.[37]

The military as an institution is purely bureaucratic in nature. It has satisfied almost all the characteristics that are mentioned above. It is worth noting

that with the passage of time, the military as an institution has acquired some characteristics which tend to separate it from the bureaucracy. In this thesis these developments will be examined as they relate to intervention in politics.

The military is an organisation that serves the public at large although "not necessary" to the exclusion of the very object of the organisation's endeavour.[38] It is a voluntary profession since the members are free to choose within it but it is also coersive in that the people are not allowed to group into voluntary associations but are restricted to a bureaucratic hierarchical structure. It is a career service with defined criteria for recruitment and promotion.

As a bureaucrat, the professional military officer specialises in management and strategy; that is he specialises in the use and management of instruments of violence. The main function of the military is to carry out the orders of political leaders. It is to defend the sovereignty of the nation state. It is expected to be politically neutral. But as we shall see, instead of being a political, the military have become partners or even sole formulators of policies in especially Third world countries. It has become politicised. Now what are the causes of politicisation?

THE CAUSES OF POLITICISATION

There are several reasons that account for the politicisation of the bureaucracy. These include incompetence of the decision makers (politicians), materialism, interference with the autonomy of the bureaucracy as regards recruitment and promotion.

Incompetence of political leaders to formulate good policies leads them to seeking assistance from the bureaucrats. In so doing, the politicians accord to the bureaucracy the role it is not supposed to perform and as a result, their incapacity becomes obvious to the bureaucrats. The administrators seeing this, lose respect for their masters and may even unseat them.

This is always the case when the military is involved. In most instances, political leaders rely on the military for extra-support to maintain themselves in power. In some instances, the military is used for selfish ends to quell demonstrations or deal with political opponents. This helps to politicise the organisation.

Materialism is also a major factor that leads to politicisation. The extravagant life style of the politicians in contrast with that of the common man and

the military officer due to corrupt embezzlement of public fund provokes the military into taking action. Sometimes the military takes action to improve their material base. A typical example can be seen when Dr. Busia of Ghana attempted to tamper with the annual budget of the military in his country. This attempt was met with resistance and that in part contributed to the staging of the coup that saw him out of power. A counter coup was staged against Gowon's government due to high rate of corruption by some military officers.

Interference with the autonomy of the bureaucracy or military organisation can result in politicisation. The military is a career service and thus has its own defined standards for recruitment and also promotion. It is hierarchical in structure and promotion is from one level to the other. For it to perform its role efficiently, it needs to be free from interference by political leaders or other sections of the society. Any attempt to tamper with its autonomy or its organisational structure can cause a hitch in its operation. We have seen from empirical studies that political leaders hardly allow the bureaucrats the autonomy desired for efficient performance of their role. In Nigeria, the political leaders have instituted quota system for recruitment into the organisation. This has

resulted in low performance as some people are recruited not based on merit but just to fill their quota. This issue will be discussed further in the next chapter.

MILITARY

The "military" comprises of the Army, Navy and Airforce. The army fight on land, navy in sea and the airforce in the air. The term is difficult to d fine. It is easier to say what it is not than what it is. It can be defined by its characteristics. The military is that section of the society that holds the monopoly of the instruments of violence. Its organisation reflects the application of modern techniques - other essential characteristics of the military validate this; for example central control, chain of command responsible for executive operational and disciplinary measures, hierarchy, independent communication system. The military is an embodiment of the national interests. These characteristics are typical of a modern military institution.

INTERVENTION

The term "intervention" implies an active calculated step, a forcible interference in this case in existing government by the military with the aim of maintaining

or altering conditions in the political system. There are four levels of military intervention and these are attained through certain characteristic methods. Before discussing these methods, let us look at the various levels.

The first level is that of influence. By this it is meant that the effort to convince the civilian authorities by appealing to their reason or their emotions. According to Finer (1962), this level is the "constitutional and legitimate" one, entirely consistent with the supremacy of the civil power.

The second level of intervention is that in which "pressures or blackmail is involved in influencing the civil power. Here the military seeks to convince the civil power by the threat of some form of sanctions. The span of such pressures is wide. It can range from hints or actions that are just barely constitutional at one end to intimidation and threats that are obviously unconstitutional at the other end. In both the first and the second level the military is acting behind the scene and thus difficult to know. The difference between the two levels is just the fact that in the first, threats and intimidation is not involved, but is involved in the second level.

The third level is that of displacement; ıat is the removal of one cabinet or ruler for another. This is achieved by violence or threat of violence. The objective is to replace one set of politicians by another more compliant set. However the civilian regime still remains in power.

The last level is that of displacement and supplanting. This level sweeps away the civilian regime and establishes the military in its place.

The mode by which the level is attained is in three ways. According to Finer, the first is by a threat to revolt, or alternatively to refuse to defend the government against its foes. (This is both a technique of blackmail, displacement and supplantment). The second way is by the military refusing to defend the government from civil disorder. The final method is by use of violence - commonly described as "coup d'etat". This concept will be discussed later.

The level to which the military presses its intervention is directly related to the level of development of the political culture.[39] According to Finer, in countries where the political culture is developed, legitimation of military rule is resisted. The typical

levels of military interference range from influence to blackmail and the characteristic methods are those which operate from behind the scene and the reason is that the civil institutions which are being manipulated are the ones that command effective public support.[40]

There are also societies of low political culture. In these societies, the public attachment to the political institutions is fragile and so offers little or no protest or oppositions to the military's violent disposition of the civilian rulers. According to Finer (1962)

> In these states, the political formula is feeble enough to allow the military to displace the civilian government by violence or the threat of it; i.e. to permit military replacing one government by another.[41]

But this does not necessarily mean that they are so feeble as to permit the military to supplant civilian government altogether and rule in its own name.

Then we have countries of minimal political culture - these are those societies usually in transition from "static and traditional culture", where public views on major political issues hardly exist. In such countries important issues as legitimacy and consensus

are irrelevant. One group of these countries according to Finer, are indeed deeply divided by cultural and ethnic pluralism, provincialism, regionalism, localism, etc.[42] Here the mode of intervention could be displacement and supplantment of rulers by threat or actual violence.

The last group of countries are placid, coherent and still predominantly traditionalist societies which indulge their elites in the struggle for power without feeling at all involved.

In these countries, the military's characteristic mode of proceeding is par excellence by violent displacement or open supplantment of the civilian authorities (the latter mode being more common and continual than in countries of third order of political culture discussed above).

In tracing military intervention in African countries, one can distinguish three levels from passivity to coup d'etat. The first was a relative passivity and abstention from political interference. This was confined to the immediate post-independence period. The military remained under sustantial expert influence which precluded any meddling in politics.

The second type of involvement saw resentment against European officers and African political leaders explode in mutinees. These outbursts were not intended - at least directly - to unseat the government in control. They were aimed at forcing the government to adopt certain policies notably higher pay, pension privileges or immediate Africanisation of the officer corps. This is another level of intervention where the military sits behind the scene and pressurises the government into adopting some policies.

The third is coup d'etat which brought full-scale military involvement in politics. There is yet another level of intervention where the government in power uses the military to suppress uprising and maintain itself in power. Sometimes the civilian rule hand in hand with the military where certain posts like Defence Minister is just left for the military.

In this work, I will use the term "military intervention" to imply the displacement and supplantment of one government by another through the threat or actual use of physical force.

COUP D'ETAT

The concept of coup d'etat has different names and slightly different meanings in different societies. Golpe de estado which literally means coup d'etat signifies the seizure and elimination of the person of the head of State.[43]

In Latin America the concept used is cuartelazo and this refers to barrack's revolt. Sometimes the two occur together. Cuartelazo failing, is repressed by loyalist troops and sometimes leads to civil war.[44]

Coup d'etat therefore, can be referred to as one of the methods employed to effect intervention. This method is used to displace or supplant the gover ment in power. The concept is used interchangeably with intervention.

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CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY

In this chapter, I intend to discuss the history and development of the Nigerian army up to the time of independence.[1] Emphasis will be laid on certain policies which were adopted. These policies include the recruitment, training, and the function of the army. Under the training policy an attempt will be made to examine the British model after which it was patterned. This will be followed by an assessment of the professionalism of the Nigerian army at the time of independence.

2.1 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

The army in Nigeria as in any other African state is a creation of the colonialists. In effect, the formation and development of the Nigerian army must be discussed in relation to the various stages of European contact with the West African coast. For the imperial powers, the establishment of political control would not have been practicable without locally recruited soldiers. This was certainly true of both French West and Equatorial Africa as well as of British West, East, and Central Africa.

The quest to suppress the slave trade which had developed as a result of the discovery of the New World and also to establish legitimate trade in other commodities therefore became the pretext for unequal treaties and military intervention by Europeans along the West African coast.[2]

Between 1849 and 1862, the British government appointed John Beecroft to be the British consul for the Bights of Benin.[3] This was one of the major attempts made to establish British administration and influence. The British administration undertook the settlement of disputes between warring parties and coastal chiefs. A typical example can be cited of the British military intervention in Lagos against Kosoko in favour of Akintoye. The British did not relent in their efforts to extend their administrative and commercial influence to the hinter-land and other parts of Southern Nigeria. To further the expedition successfully, there was the need for more troops.

In 1862 Stanhope Free who was then the Governor of British West African territories requested from the Colonial Secretary the creation of Lagos Constabulary Force. This force was meant to be a para-military force which will take over guard duties from the troops of the West Indian Regiment and protect lawful commerce, life and property.[4]

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The Governor of Lagos, Captain John Glover, made a similar request in a dispatch in June 1863, he said:

> I will suggest to your Grace that this armed police be increased to a hundred men; They are adept in learning their drill and I am proud of these soldiers and they have shown on two recent occasions at Epe that they can fight faithfully and well..... They would form the nucleus of a future force.[5]

The force performed both military and para-military duties. Glover again requested in 1863 the raising of a Hausa militia force of six hundred (600) men. This request was granted and the force was merged with the existing constabulary and renamed Lagos-Hausa Constabulary. This was the first major attempt to bring the force in Nigeria together. This combined force was led as a detachment by Captain Glover and was integrated with the main force under Sir Gannet Wolseley in Kumasi. The force was used to defeat the Ashantis in 1874.

Another development was the granting of a royal charter to the United African Company in 1886. The company later became known as the Royal Niger Company. Under this charter, it was given powers to administer justice and maintain order and good government over its area of jurisdiction. As a result of that, the company raised an armed police force of five British officers, two African warrant officers and four hundred (400) rank and file who were largely of Fanti

origin.[6] The Royal Niger Constabulary was purely run by the commercial organisation and was mostly used in Northern Nigeria. The constabulary was trained along military lines and its regulations were based on the British Army Acts. It consisted of an artillery unit and also a naval arm which was under the direct control of the Agent-General and senior executive officers of the Royal Niger Company. As its military needs increased in the 1890s the company began to experience a great deal of difficulties in recruitment and so became increasingly dependant on run-away slaves who saw service in the constabulary as a means of total emancipation and also security against a return to former master.

The Royal Niger Company and its force played a very vital role in making possible the incorporation of some parts of Southern Nigeria to the Northern part to form one British colonial possession. Between 1886 and 1900, the constabulary was engaged in more than one hundred military expeditions against the local peoples.[7]

One of the major weaknesses of the constabulary was the fact that troops were organised according to their ethnic origins. From the beginning, the Fanti, Yoruba, and Sierra Leonean recruits were organised into

separate sections and companies.[8] This system was also adopted when most of the men recruited were among the Yoruba, Hausa, Igala, Nupe, and others. This policy of recruitment and organisation was good and easier for the colonial system; but unfortunately it laid the foundation for future ethnic and regional rivalry within the armed forces which affected their esprit de corps after independence.

Another important development was the rebellion of West India Regiment in Sierra Leone which took place after the Berlin Conference of 1885 (the Berlin Conference resulted in the partitioning of Africa among world colonial powers). Consequent on this rebellion, the British decided to establish a regional force to protect the frontiers of all its possessions in West Africa. Joseph Chamberlain the then Secretary of State for Colonies therefore ordered the formation of the West African Frontier Force in 1897. The force was consolidated towards the end of the Ashanti war in 1900 and by that time most units had already had some service in other territories.[9]

In the light of that development, Captain Lugard was promoted to the rank of colonel and was given the task of raising the force in 1899. On the 31st March, 1899, Lugard came up with the West African Frontier

Force Order, which spelt out the organisation, establishment and location of the Force.[10] The West African Frontier Force (WAFF) was established and consisted of mostly Yoruba and Hausa speaking troops. Some elements of the Royal Niger Constabulary were incorporated into the W.A.F.F. (This was because by this time, the charter that was granted to the company had been revoked). The headquarters of the WAFF was at Jebba and Lugard was the Inspector-General with Lt. J. Willcocks as his second-in-command. The force consisted of two infantry battalions of eight companies each, one of which was mounted. Each company was 150 men strong and was exclusively commanded by British non-commissioned officers.[11]

Meanwhile, British government proclaimed the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria after its successful expansionist expeditions. And by 1900, the British government was fully in control of both northern and southern Nigeria protectorates. Colonel Lugard was also appointed the first High Commissioner for Northern Nigeria Protectorate. The era of private military forces raised by commercial organisations to protect their interests was ended with the merger of all locally formed military and para-military forces in British dependences of West Africa by the end of 1901.

The northern based unit raised by Lugard became known as the Northern Nigeria Regiment in the first half of 1901 and comprised of two infantry battalions, one mounted battalion and two batteries of artillery.[12] The Lagos-Hausa Constabulary was renamed Lagos battalion, while the Niger Coast Protectorate Force was merged with some elements of the Royal Niger Constabulary in the south to form Calabar battalion. Those elements of the constabulary forces not absorbed into the new military organisation were used to form the Nigerian Police Force.

By 1911, the Lagos and Calabar battalions then called First and Second battalions respectively were amalgamated into one regiment called the Southern Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force. With the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, the Northern and Southern Regiments became unified as Nigerian Regiment with headquarters at Lagos. The Nigeria Regiment had five organic infantry battalions, one battery of field artillery, a signal squadron, an office and a record office.[13] Commenting about the self-sufficiency of the military organisation, Obasanjo asserts:

> The West African Frontier Force (WAFF) provided the supporting services for sustaining the well-being of the regiment as a composite fighting force. The support and service unit of WAFF attached to the Nigerian Regiment or "the army in Nigeria" as it was often referred to, included thirty-six independent field squadron of West African engineers, workers, services of West African Engineers, West African army service corps, West African electrical and mechanical engineers, and West African military police. Technical training required by the regiment was provided at WAFF Training School in Teshie, Gold Coast.[14]

In 1928 the regiment joined the rest of WAFF when it became the Royal West African Frontier Force and the King of England became the Colonel-in-Chief of the force.

The Queen of England visited Nigeria in 1956 and conferred on the Nigerian Regiment the title "Queen's own". Thus up to independence, the Nigerian Regiment was known as the Queen's own Nigerian Regiment.

Earlier, the colonialists saw the need to prepare for the independence of its territories and as a result Britain decided on granting autonomy to each of the national regiments in its West African dependences. This was achieved by the disbandment of the West African Command on 1st July, 1956.[15] Thus the disbandment of West African Command resulted in military forces of four West African countries becoming

independent of one another, although they were still subject to the orders of the British Army Council in London.

At this time, the Nigerian Regiment comprised of five infantry battalions of about seven hundred commissioned and non-commissioned British officers. Less than fifty Nigerian officers and about six thousand men, with one battalion each located at Ibadan, Abeokuta, and detachments for guard duties in Lagos. Two battalions were stationed in Kaduna, while Zaria remained the recruit training centre.

The 1957 Constitutional Conference agreed to hand over the control of the military forces in Nigeria (including the young navy) to the Nigerian Government on April 1st, 1958.[16] Thus we have seen how the Nigerian army is a creation of colonialism.

Having seen the formation and development of the army as an institution, let us now turn our attention to certain important policies that were adopted. This include the recruitment pattern, training and the function of the army up to 1960. This analysis is important if we are to know whether there is any link between the colonial and the post-colonial nature of behavior of the military.

2.2 THE RECRUITMENT PATTERN AND A-POLITICAL NATURE OF THE ARMY.

As Gutteridge (1969) has observed, in matters of recruitment the imperialists operated on the basis of a combination of principle and expediency which was related to past experience in other parts of the world and to their own needs as administrators and agents of Law and Order within the colonial territory.[17]

Early in the 20th century, British recruitment policies in African territories fell into a pattern, influenced by experience gained from other parts of the world especially India. The policies only readjusted during times of local crises. The concept of the warrior type of the martial race of whom ready loyalty to imperial command could be expected was adopted. The ideal soldier was generally supposed to be an illiterate uncontaminated by western mission education and he must be from remote area. Eventually as the need for more skilled men increased this stereotype was occasionally modified but always with reluntance.

Evidence in the literature shows that Nigerian armed forces just prior to independence in 1960 were overwhelmingly British in the officer corps (including non-commissioned, warrant and commissioned officers). Only fifteen (15) of the 250 commissioned officers in 1956 were Nigerians.[18]

As we have seen, as a matter of policy, the British favoured recruitment of the other ranks from illiterate areas. A substantial portion of the ranks was recruited from the so-called Middle Belt, a relatively poor section of Nigeria where educational opportunities were extremely limited.[19] This policy was comprehensible since the people that lived in the hinterland had nothing to do with the coastal people, they were capable of impartial, even hostile, action when serious security matter arose.

But when the RWAFF was expanded during the Second World War, the Southern Nigerians were enlisted into the army as drivers, mechanics, etc as the technical field required people with some degree of literacy. They also saw the need to balance the ethnic composition of the army. After the war, recruitment in the south was continued, but most of the infantrymen still came from the Middle Belt. In general, the pattern of recruitment in the whole country was the same. The preferred recruiting areas were those farthest from the regional capitals in economically backward parts with few natural resources. The educated Nigerians preferred the civil service because the army profession was less rewarding. This in part contributed to the slowness in Africanizing the officer corps as only educated people were recruited for training.

An essentially British officer corps thus maintained 'standards'; a well-discipline and obedient rank and file carried out orders. Neither group questioned British control. Consequently, the Nigerian army was responsive to civilian control even though the civilians were British not Nigerians. As Miners observed,

> In theory an army should be a passive instrument in the hands of the government, an efficient agent to carry out the ends decreed by its political masters without sentiment or complaint. Few armies achieve this ideal completely, but the Nigerian military forces before 1958 came very near to it.[20]

This a-political nature of the army was achieved by the recruitment policy which concentrated on recruiting from illiterate areas and also by indoctrination of complete passivity to anything political. The army did not participate in the nationalist struggle for independence due to this deliberate political neutralisation of the armed forces by means of "standards" for officer recruitment, the political isolation of armed forces achieved by recruitment of soldiers from politically inarticulate sectors of Nigerian society and the inculcation of norms of political disengagement.

At this point let us turn our attention to another issue which is the training policy.

TRAINING

As already seen, the regiment was reorganised between 1940 and 1955 from three recruiting centres to reflect the new regional constituional structures of Nigeria. These centres were as follows: Zaria for the North, Enugu for the East and Ibadan for the West. After screening the candidates, those that passed the necessary qualifying physical tests were attested at the enlistment centre and sent to the Nigerian Training Centre in Zaria. Here they carried out basic training for six months before being posted to a combat service unit for deployment and continuation of training. The main training here was how to handle simple weapons of war.

Even though Nigerians were recruited in large number as rank and file into the regiment, not one person was commissioned as an officer. Lt. Seth Anthony of the Gold Coast was the first and only West African to be granted the King's Commissioned Officer at war time.[21]

General Nelson who was the General Officer in Command of West Africa in 1949 made the first proposal for the setting up of an African Military Academy to train African officer cadets for commissions. This proposal never materialised due to some reasons which

include the excessive cost and the consideration that when officers passed out, they would not be considered the equivalent of army officers in the British Army holding the King's Commission.[22] Instead, it was decided by the War Office in London that Nigerians and other West Africans enlisted as officer cadets in the Royal West African Frontier Force should be trained at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Aldershot for short service. And very limited space was reserved for the Africans in this academy.

Lt. Ugboma was the first Nigerian to earn a King's Commission as an army officer. He trained at Eaton Hall, and was granted a Short Service Commission in 1948. The number of the RWAFF commissioned officers increased by 1953 to include four Nigerians among whom were Bassey, Aguiyi Ironsi, and Ademulegun. Before then, those who became officers went directly to Britain for their training. However by the middle of 1953, the Regular Officers' Special Training School was established at Teshie in the Gold Coast (Ghana) as centre for recruiting and training all RWAFF officer cadets. They were in Teshie for six months after which they proceeded to Britain for full commissioning training.

The requirements laid down for admission to these courses were quite stiff. The British officers were determined not to be satisfied with anything but the highest standards, as the Foot Commissions recommended. Miners notes,

> In fact the tests were much more severe than those set for a British candidate for regular commission. A British officer cadet did not have to pass two selection boards nor did he have to go through Eaton Hall course (intended for British National Service officers) before going to Sandhurst.23

In 1954, the Nigerian Military School, Zaria was established as a boys unit where boys of about fourteen years of age could be given both secondary and military education for four years. The idea was to develop potential skills and thereby build up the skilled manpower that the regiment needed.

Before January 1956, the number of officers was only fifteen (15). Since January 1956, there was a net increase of seventeen in number of Nigerian officers from 15 to 32. In April 1958, the Nigerian Military Forces ceased to be under the control of the War Office in Britain and Nigerians took over full responsibility for the cost of their upkeep.

Although the rate of progress towards Nigerianization of the officer corps had increased from 2 per annum over the period of 1948-1955 to 7 per annum from 1956-1958, this was still slow since independence was at the doorstep.

There were mounted pressures on the Nigerian ministers from the House of Representative for the Nigerianization of the officer corps in 1958. As a result of that, from September 1958, former Secondary School students as well as regular soldiers were sent to take short course at Mons Officer Cadet School. This short-cut meant that an officer cadet would be commissioned in less than twelve months after leaving Secondary School. Consequent on all these measures there were sixty-one (61) officers at the date of independence. And as a whole, there were fifty-seven (57) Nigerian officers who held combatant commissions on first October 1960.[24]

With the change over the four years from 1950, the number of officers of Eastern origin increased.[25] The main reasons for Ibo dominance were that serving soldiers who were candidates for Short Service Commissions had to have high educational qualification and the Non-Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers

with these requirements were mainly found in the technical arms of the army where Easterners predominated Secondly, two Southern Schools began to develop military traditions like that of Government College Zaria and these were Government College Ughelli in present Bendel State and Government College Umuahia in the East which produced Kurobo, Eze and Madiebo.[26]

This development caused anxiety particularly in the North. One northerner Abdullahi Magajin Musawa commented,

> I am appealing to the Hon. Prime Minister that we in Nigeria should be united in diversity. I think it would be good idea if we equalize army officers ..... so that the officers in the Eastern Region, the Northern Region and the Western Region are equalised.[27]

This appeal was not granted since certain educational requirements were needed for one to be recruited as an officer cadet. At this time, there was strong adherence to the maintenance of 'standards'. Northerners made up only 14 percent of the Nigerian army officers but this was even better when compared with other areas. Taking the police for an example, northerners formed only 5 percent of the Nigerian Police Force at independence (13 out of 236). We shall discuss the implication of all these imbalances

in the next chapter. Suffice it to say at the moment that the army's record in Nigerianisation of the officer corps before independence was poor.

From the above, we have seen that in the process of Africanising the officer corps, many African cadets were trained in foreign military academies or in local schools under the tutelege of expartriate officers. Under their guidance, African armies generally retained the organisation structure and role concepts of the ex-colonial army. In this manner, the British army became the model on which the Nigerian army was patterned.

Because of the overwhelming influence that British army has had on the Nigerian army, it is worthwhile to paint a portrait of the British officer corps with emphasis on its role, ethic, self-image and conduct before examining the data which bear directly on the Nigerian officer corps. But before all these we will first look at the function of the army in Nigeria before independence.

2.3 THE FUNCTION OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY BEFORE 1958.

At the early stage of the European conquest of the present day Nigeria, the army was used for the subjugation of the local people to imperial rule. They were used to maintain peace and crush any rebellion that arose. Later the functions of the Military Forces were defined as the immediate defence of Nigeria from outside attack, and aid to the civil power in the maintenance of internal security. In practice the question of frontier defence surfaced when the French were faced with a rebellion in the Cameroons between 1959 and in 1960. There was the fear of spill-over effect.

In the 1950s troops were never required to aid the police even though they were ordered to stand by to assist if needed; notably during the Kano riots of April 1953, the riots in the Eastern Region over taxation in March 1958, etc. Before we discuss the British Officer Corps let us examine their combat experience.

2.4 COMBAT - EXPERIENCE

The Regiment as part of the West African Frontier Force with its five infantry battalions fought gallantly in the two world wars. Even though they were led by British army officers, the Nigerian Non-Commissioned Officers and the rank and file distinguished themselves and won laurels for bravery, dedication and loyalty.

Before these world wars, the army was used for expeditions to establish British rule on the frontiers of empires. The expeditions gave them experience in handling the weapons no matter how rudimentary they were. This also gave them experience in different kinds of tactics employed to win a battle. Above all, they came out of these expeditions braver and more experienced.

2.5 THE BRITISH OFFICER CORPS

In examining the British officer corps one discovers that perhaps the most salient characteristic of the officer corps is its class composition.[28] In England, education has long been one of the most recognised key indicators of class, and attendance at public school is a characteristic of upper class.[29] It was this criterion that Shelah Leader (1971) used to examine the class orientation of the British

officer corps. He discovered that because of their shared social class, and the common public school experience, British officers enjoy a feeling of solidarity which is probably even stronger than experienced by officers in other countries where officers are recruited from a broader spectrum of social classes.[30]

The class origins of British officers have great significance for the nature of the Armed Forces and the issue of civilian supremacy. Philip Abrams argues that the British army never became fully professionalised for the following reasons; military officers tended to be drawn from the aristocratic and gentry class and promotion has not been on the basis of proficiency in a technological skill which is comparable to those found in civilian organisation. Consequently, he argues, the loyalty and obedience of the British armed forces has been assured not because of civilian control, but because officers are still members of the British ruling class.[31] Promotion to the higher ranks is generally closed to routine and technological functions. The essence of the British officer is his dignity and breeding as an aristocrat. In this sense, the British army would seem to be a traditional rather than a rational modern organisation because status is ascribed rather than strictly achieved.

Until the Second World War the British army was composed of territorially based regiments. Traditionally, the officers and men in the regiment were drawn from a particular area and the civil pattern of deference, status and nobless oblige were transferred intact to the regiment. The mutual expectations of deference and responsibility which existed in civilian life provided the basis for hierarchy of command and obedience in the military. After the Second World War, this traditional structure began to be altered with the abandonment of the regimental system in the British army.

In the whole we can say that despite the fact that the British officers were trained to fight modern wars with fairly advanced weaponry, until World War II (and to an extent today) the British officer corps was a traditional organisation consisting of members of the upper class who commanded obedience largely on the basis of ascribed rather than achieved characteristics. The officer's self-image was that of a leader by birth as well as by training. In a sense, the officers represented an interesting melange of traditional and modern bureaucratic roles. The upper class contributed the manpower for armed force but modern skills and knowledge were acquired at military academies. A man

could not become an officer without professional knowledge and expertise acquired by studying and practical experience but this expertise was reserved for the socially privileged.

2.6 THE BRITISH ETHIC

Despite the existence of these traditional ascribed characteristics of officers, the ethic they adhere to is nearly identical in content to that of other advanced societies such as United States and France. The primary responsibility and motive of the officer is self-less service to the country. Above all, an officer must be obedient, loyal and honest. The British officers believe that this ethic is not only the desired ideal but also the actual motives of officers. The officers view themselves to be more honest and patriotic (in the sense that they seek to serve national rather than private interests) than politicians.[32] The officers accept civilian control because they believe that the job of the officer is to fight and not to rule. This is a functional specificity of the modern rational bureaucracy. The material and status rewards of military career is very good so there is no cause for alarm.

However, the key explanation for the officers' ethic of apolitical obedience and service is the legitimacy of the British political institution. Because England is democratic and has a competitive party and electoral system, there is a widespread assumption that the government represents the interests of the majority of Englishmen.[33] British officers concentrate on their job of defending the nation because they recognise that the elected governors are capable, well intentioned, and responsible to the electorate.

In reality, the military ethic of obedience, service to the nation by obedience to the government, and a strict separation between the army and politicians has been completely internalised by the British officers. This ethic is manifested by behavior which conforms to the ethic, as well as by a frame of reference which exclude the possibility of military behaviour which would be considered unethical.

In considering other dimensions of professionalism, such as expertise and corporate identity, the British officers believe that an officer should be an expert in at least one technical field as well as be capable of doing all that is asked or required of the

soldiers. They believe that commonsense, unusual courage and powers of leadership are no longer sufficient for an officer. The necessity for detailed knowledge is underlined by the fact that in England an officer must pass a written examination in order to rise from the rank of Captain to that of Major or to attend Staff College.

The British officers profess to have a strong corporate identity with other officers .... regardless of nationality. Even though they have corporate identity, they do not stress on expertise and corporate identity as hallmarks of professional officer; but an officer should have great leadership ability (with this goes the ability to manage war), display firm integrity or character and be motivated by altruism (patriotism and selfless service).[34]

Other qualities of a professional officer which are considered as important could be grouped into two broad headings: personal, moral qualities (such as courage, endurance, discipline, reliability, intelligence and command) and also organisational qualities (skill with weapons, constant striving for self-improvement by learning and practical seeking excellence, efficiency, achievement of goals with enthusiasm and loyalty to one's superiors).

In addition to these military knowledge and skills which are acquired both in military academies and in long term combat and administrative experience are necessary for a professional officer.

To summarise the above, we have seen that the British officer corps possess a corporate identity that transcends nationality, they have expertise based on military academy and practical experience, an ethic of subordination to civilian command and a self-image as leaders of men.

2.7 THE PROCESS OF ROLE TRANSFERENCE

Until World War II the Royal West African Frontier Forces were under the command of British officers and Non-Commissioned Officers. After the war, the British officer were assigned the responsibility for preparing national, Africanised forces for independence. The Chief of Staff of the West African Forces from 1948 to 1950 at first tried to preserve a centralised command on the grounds that it was cheaper and more efficient. At the same time, he was charged with the task of training African NCOs and officers. For this purpose, the Ghana (Gold Coast) military academy was set up in Teshie in 1953.[35]

As noted earlier, the British recruitment policy was influenced by their experience in India. The concept of the 'warrior' type of martial race was entrenched. At the time of recruitment and selection of potential officers, issues became complicated by the fact that men from the so-called "warrior" tribes in the north were illiterate and the educated young Africans were not interested in a military career. Therefore, the selection criteria was leadership and to some extent the ability to pass written examinations. Those who displayed great leadership potential were granted field commissions. They were also sent to Teshie where they received military training, a secular education, and etiquette lessons in order to prepare the officers for dining in the officers' mess.

A very important element in the role transferral process was the training of Nigerian officers in British military academies. Although the most senior and experienced officers rose through the ranks of the colonial forces, several then went on to Sandhurst. The junior officers went straight from high school (often boarding schools modelled after the British public schools) into military academies. This development contributed to a distinction between the senior and junior officers on the basis of military experience

and education. Some of the senior officers had acquired experience in handling simple hand weapons as a result of their service with British officers in Burma and other parts of the world. They also had experience in executing elementary military commands. The resulting difference in self-conceptions and sources of rank may produce friction in the officer corps. Hierarchical discipline is likely to break down due to conflicts between those with experience and those possessing a formal military education. At its worst effect, NCOs might be insubordinate to junior officers who could in turn be insubordinate to their senior officers.[36]

This potential strain in the authority based on hierarchy has other ramifications. Attachment formed in a horizontal peer group often serve to reinforce the cohesion of the vertical organisation.[37]

But in the African context, these peer group friendships may reinforce insubordination. In African states which have experienced coup d'etats, a common trend has been found: conspirators tend to evolve from peer groups. This is very true of Nigeria. In Nigeria, junior officers rebelled not only against the politicians but also against their superiors.

There are other inconsistencies in British influence on new African armies. For example two sources of deference and obedience to military officers were discussed above. In modern, professional army, deference is based on the greater experience, skill and knowledge of the officer. In traditional non-professional army on the other hand, deference emanates from the social status of the officer. Taking the African armies into consideration, neither of these sources is fully applicable. Those young officers who have been heavily influenced by the British concept of the officer tend to see themselves as "officers and gentlemen". As such, they expect the obedience of their subordinates. Generally, however, they are young and inexperienced and there are often tension and discipline problems between the experienced NCO and the young but inexperienced officer-would-be-gentleman.[38]

If the Nigerian officers were trained in the traditions of their British counterparts were they expected to and in fact did they measure up to the standards in the military academics?

One issue stands out clearly, the requirements for entry into Sandhurst and Mons differed for the British and African cadets.

For the British candidates, a successful completion of college preparatory program in secondary school was a pre-requisite. There was also the examination of character and personality after satisfying the first condition.[39]

In contrast, Africans needed only to pass a medical examination and show written proficiency in English and have passes in three other subjects at 'O' level General Certificate of Education.[40] Once admitted to the academy, African cadets were expected to meet the performance standards set for the British. However, due to some linguistic and educational handicaps of the African cadets, some allowance were made. For these reasons when African officers were commissioned, they were not considered the professional equals of their British counterparts.

To be specific, at Sandhurst, the leadership qualities of the African cadets are developed and improved upon at the same time that they acquire the necessary techniques and skills required of any officer.

To what extent then is the British military ethic inculcated at Sandhurst? The Sandhurst training manual serve to lead emphasises the development of leadership

character, and the ethic of disinterested service and obedience. Cadets are told that their allegiance is to the Queen and Senior Officers. Although officers are taught to be apolitical, they are encouraged to vote as part of their civic duty and courses in world affairs are taught to keep them informed on international politics. A Major-General I interviewed revealed that there is no military institution in the world that is a political. What can be argued is the level of intervention in politics.

Even though the African armies are not considered the equal of their British counterparts, there were exceptions to this generalisation. At graduation, there were Africans that received prizes for high performance alongside their British counterparts. Apparently, there were no different standards used to judge them but rather the cadets were distinguished on the basis of whether or not they were joining the British army.

2.8 PROFESSIONALISM OF NIGERIAN ARMY AT INDEPENDENCE

At independence, the Nigerian army was overwhelmingly Nigerian in the rank and file with 283 army officers out of which only 61 (22%) were Nigerians.[41]

The British gave commissioning of African officers a low priority as the spread of education was slow. They preceeded cautiously in their selection as the educational requirement was high. This was in effort to maintain standards and still mold them in the pattern of the British army.

Another reason which contributed to the slowness of Nigerianizing the officer corps was the fact that emerging political leaders of African states after 1945 did not appear to press for commissioning of African officers. Since the initiative was left in the hands of expertriates backed by War Office in London, there was no urgency about it.

Another major contributory factor was the fact that before independence, educated Nigerians scorned the military as a career as it was far less attractive in terms of remuneration than the civil service.

With all these factors we can see why the officer corps at the time of independence was small and to a large extent, this quantitative shortage of Nigerian officers had some qualitative effects on the overall professionalism of the armed forces.

Despite this, one can still argue that the army was professional. Those officers that were trained were imbued with the British ethic of professional officer. In a research conducted by She1ah Leader (1971) on the professionalism of Ghana army, he got the impression from British interviewees, that African officers should not be compared with their British counterparts because they are not as experienced as the British officers. Some of the interviewees asserted that African cadets, upon leaving Sandhurst and other British military academies, are good officer potential, but for professional reasons, they should not be compared with their British counterparts as the two armies differ in size and also function. They see the African armies as just being there for maintenance of internal security while the British army is for fighting aggression from the external environment. They also see the ranks and responsibility of the African armies as being by western standard not commen-surate with their experience and ability. One can cay that some of these judgments were influenced by racial prejudice. But one important distinction he discovered was the fact that unlike in most African armies, British officers do not bocome Colonels or Generals on the basis of six to ten years of non-combat service.

At the end of his research, he came up with the conclusion that Ghanian army like those of other African armies are professional even though some dimensions of British professionalism are inapplicable in the African context and some other standards should be applied. This brings out the fact that the concept of professionalism shifts in definition v;ith the national context.

We saw when discussing the British ethic that army officers see themselves as being more patriotic than politicians as they pursue national interest rather than private, and they are not involved in some corrupt practices. Tn examining the Nigerian army and comparing them with the civilian leaders before independence, the soldiers were more patriotic because before the first military intervention, there were no overt cases of corruption reported against the army. They also pursued national interest. In the Nigerian context some degree of corruption has, to a certain extent, been unconsciously accepted. So far it is not as open and much in terms of degree it is accepted. Officers might have been involved in some form of corruption but it was not reported. One may agree that they were t© a large extent free of it because the bulk of the officers were still expertriates. Even if they were involved in some form of corruption, this

should not be seen as against their professionalism since some degree of corruption has been accepted *hj* the society. The British officers judging African officers do not take such into consideration.

Taking the ethic of obedience to civilian command into consideration, one cannot see any point in time before independence when the Nigerian array was not submissive to civilian control. Some have argued that this was because they were commanded by British officers and there was the fear of using British superior army to crush any rebellion. The fact still remains that even though the civilians at this time were British, they still were obedient to them and the senior officers, Obasan;)o(1987) states that

> In 1%0, no Nigerian officer in his wildest dreams could have imagined the array playing any part in political governance. On the face of it, tho country was stable . . . . . And as long as the politicians respected the rules of the game, there did not appear to be any danger.^3

Unlike British officers whose obedience to civilian command is partly derived from their shared social class, the Nigerian officers wore obedient because they were taught to be so. The Nigerian officers do not share the same social class with bheir civilian rulers because bhey are recruited from a broad spectrum *o*± society.

It is also important at this point *to* note that any balance analysis of the professionalism of the

Nigerian army before or after independence must take into account the context in which the army is operating.

Even though ethnicity and regionalism were evident in the Nigerian polity, at the time of independence these divisons were not evident in the army. Obasanjo after talking about the apolitical nature of the army had this to say about the corporate identity of the officers.

> "One's ethnic background was never a subject of discussion and the tendency in those days was to see one's colleagues as officers and gentlemen."44

Most of the officers interviewed confirmed this. An officer's immediate sense of loyalty and identity tended to be directed towards officers of one's own rank and especially course mates, and fellow combatants. Loyalty was expressed in terms of obedience and mutual respect. The question "Would you say that you personally identified most strongly with other professional officers or with other group? was posed to all the officers and response was uniformly positive.

The situation according to some naval officers changed to some extent after the first military coup. Officers tended to cligue along ethnic and regional

lines. We shall come back to this point in the next chapter. Suffice it to know that at independence, the corporate identity of officers was high and devoid of ethnic divisions.

On expertise, the Nigerian officers acquired skills in the military academies both at home and abroad. They also affirmed that they were experts in the management of weapons of coercion.

When asked to rate the level of professionalism at independence in percentage, all the older officers scored it above 90 per cent.[45]

With this brief analysis of the Nigerian army at independence, one can say that they were professional even though they differed in degree from their British counterparts.

NOTES

1. Emphasis is laid on the army, because before independence, the Navy was very young and the Airforce had not be established. It is the army that exerts undue influence on military intervention and dominate coup executions.

2. Fage, J.F. An Introduction to the History of West Africa. The Syndics of the Cambridge University Press 1955 pp. 57-67. And for the campaign against slave trade read pp 98-104 or 136.

3. Ibid p.118.

4. The history of the Regiment can be seen in A.Haywood and F.A.S. Clerke: The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force. Gale and Polden Aldershot 1964. Also see article by S.C. Ukpabi in Journal of the Historical Society of Nigerian. 1964. pp. 129-47 and 1966, pp. 485-501.

5. This quotation is taken from O.Obasanjo, Nzeogwu. Spectrum Press. 1987. p.35.

6. Ukpabi, S.C. "The Origins of West African Frontier Force" in JHSN Vol.III No.3. 1966. p.492.

7. Ukpabi, S.C. Strands in Nigerian Military History. Gaskiya Corporation Ltd. Zaria. 1986.

8. Ibid p.72.

9. Gutteridge, W.F: The Military in African Politics. London. Methuen. 1969.

10. O. Obasano op cit p.36.

11. Ibid p.36.

12. Ibid p.37.

13. Ibid p.38.

14. Ibid p.38.

15. Ibid p.42.

16. This does not mean the ability of the Nigerian Government to deploy army at will but that Nigerians themselves had to provide defence funds. Although the British subsidized this fund till independence.

17. Gutteridge W.F. op cit.

18. Miners, N.J. Nigerian Army 1955-1966. Methuen and Co. Ltd. 1971. p.36.

19. Ibid. It should be noted however that the middle belt enjoyed considerably more educational opportunities than the Islamic areas of the North.

20. Ibid p.100.

21. Gutteridge op cit.

22. Miners, op cit p.34.

23. Ibid

24. Ibid p.52.

25. Ibid, Calculation is done in terms of ethnic origin not place of birth. If it were done in terms of place of birth Ojukwu and Nzogwu would be counted as Northerners since they were born in the northern region. Similarly, the Ika-Ibo of Mid-West region are counted with the Easterners, since they speak Ibo. It seems that a calculation on this pattern had been done in the Defence Department in view of the regional origin of the Nigerian officers.

(Debate in the Federal House of Representative 'Written Answer' 7, February 1959) his reply (that 22 officers of Eastern region had been commissioned up to December 1958) can only be understood with facts on the assumption that Ika-Ibo are counted with the East.

26. Ibid p.53.

27. Ibid p.53. Miners also quoted it from Debate in House of Representative. 14 April 1960. Col. 1252.

28. Philip Abrams "The Late Profession of Arms: Ambiguous Goals and Deteriorating Means in Britain" Archives Europeennes de Sociologie Vol.6, No.2, 1965. P.E. Razzell "The Social Origins of Officers in the Indian and British Home Army" British Journal of Sociology Vol.14 No. 3. Sept.1963, 259.

29. Blondel J.: Voters Parties and Leaders: The Social Fabric of British Politics. Baltimore Md Penguin Books 1963. pp. 238-239.

30. To illustrate the privileges of the "Old School tie" see R.Heussler, Yesterday's Rulers the Making of the British Colonial Service. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1963.

31. Philips Abrams, "The Late Profession of Arms" op cit; and "Democracy, Technology and the Retired British Officer" in Huntington S. (ed). Changing Patterns of Military Politics. New York: Free Press 1962. pp. 150-189.

32. Leader S.G. Military Professionalism, Intervention and Disposition to Interven. University Microfilius, A. XEROX Company, Ann Arhor Michigan. 1971.

33. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba: The Civil Culture, Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co.; 1965 pp. 48-62, 315.

34. Leader S.G. op cit.

35. Lee J.M. African Armies and Civil Order. London. Chatto and Windus, The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969. p.41.

36. Luckham op cit.

37. Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II" Public Opinion Quarterly Vol.12 No.1, 1948.

38. Luckman op cit p.21.

39. However, graduates of the military preparatory Welbeck College are automatically admitted upon recommendation of the College Headmaster.

40. Miners N.J. op cit p.38.

41. Miners N.J. op cit

42. Leader S.G. op cit

43. O. Obasanjo op cit

44. Ibid p.44

45. At the end of the interview, I discovered that there was no concensus over the level of professionalism at independence. While the older officers scored it at 90 percent and above, tho younger, inexperienced officers especially of the rank of Captain rate it below 60 percent. The argument of the older officers is tenable since they have been in the army since colonial days and know how it was.

CHAPTER III

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN NIGERIAN POLITICS - THE COUP OF JANUARY, 1966.

In the last chapter, we concentrated on the evolution of the Nigerian army. This was in order to understand the chain of events that motivated the military to intervene in politics between 1966 and 1975. In this chapter, we will first examine the changes that occurred in the Armed Forces after independence. This will be followed by an analysis of the political background to military intervention. We shall also assess the extent to which these developments affected the professionalism of the military. It is also intended that we will examine the first coup d'etat. Emphasis is laid on motivation of the coups rather than the performance of the regimes.

3.1 CHANGES IN THE ARMED FORCES AFTER INDEPENDENCE

3.1.1 EXPENDITURE: As we have noted in the last chapter, the control of the military was handed over to the Nigerian Government in 1958. After independence, the ministerial responsibility for defence was in the hands of Northerners. Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu headed the Defence Ministry till his death in April 1965. He was succeeded by another Northerner Alhaji Inuwa Wada from Kano. Under Ribadu, some changes in

military expenditure occurred. He was an effective minister in securing a fair share of the government revenue for his ministry.

Immediately after assuming his post he succeeded in securing and inserting additional ₦2,000,000 for barracks development in the Supplementary Estimates of December 1960, and a further ₦1,500,000 was added to the Capital Estimates in April 1960 for reorganisation of the military institution. When the First Development Plan estimates were drawn, Ribadu secured an allocation of ₦60,000,000 for capital expenditure on defence. This shows a remarkable increase when compared with ₦11,000,000 actually spent on defence in the previous seven years, the greater part of which was spent on the army and the rest on the initial stages of the Nigerian Navy. The new plan envisaged the creation of Airforce, expansion of the Navy and a massive programme to rebuild and extend all the barracks and also set up a new Military Academy and Ordnance Factory.[1]

Some of the factors that influenced the increase in military spendings are both internal and external. One of these reasons was prestige. As far back as 1955, one Mr. R.A. Fani-Kayode (then an Action Group backbencher) called on the Government to initiate a

vast military expansion programme. He said,

> We can only reach the God-ordained hegemony destined for Nigeria - Supremacy South of Sahara - Sword in hand.[2]

Fani-Kayode's remarks were not considered serious then, but with Nigerians assuming control of the military in 1958, the suggestion was given a second thought.

The rivalry that existed between Nigeria and Ghana also played a major part in the increase on military expenditure. During the first three years of Ghana's independence, there seemed to be no significant expansion in the military establishment which she had inherited from Britain; but in July 1959, the estimates for defence increased by ₦1,400,000 and in November a plan was announced to increase the Ghana army by 50 per cent, re-equip it with new weapons and create a navy and an air force.[3]

With this example, many Nigerians felt that their country, the most populous in black Africa and six times as large as Ghana, should follow suit. Mr. Eneh asked the members of House of Representative,

> If a small country like Ghana has already established an Air Force, why should not this government think in terms of establishing an Air Force immediately.[4]

So, in the first four years of the First Development Plan about two-thirds of the money that was secured was used as follows:

Building & Rebuilding of barracks, depots, etc.	₦21,700,000
New Ordnance Factory	5,400,000
Warships	7,500,000
Aircraft and Air Force equipment	1,800,000
Army equipment	2,800,000
Total	39,200,000

The increase in capital expenditure did not result in a great increase in the size of the army. In seven years, the number of soldiers increased only by 3,000. Thus raising the number from 7,600 to 10,500 in 1963.[6]

This increase was made by the formation of a number of small units: the Nigerian Artillery which was disbanded in 1958 was reformed by the creation of two more batteries; an additional squadron of armoured cars; and a new Federal Guards Company was formed in each of the original five battalions in 1963.

In the whole, due to some economic pressures, defence took a very moderate proportion of government revenue up to 1966. The recurrent cost of the Army, Navy and Air Force was about 4.5 per cent of the total Federal annual budgets between 1959 and 1966, though

it rose in money terms from ₦8,000,000 in 1959-1960 to ₦16,000,000 in 1965-1966.[7]

3.1.2 THE COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY.

With the Nigerian assumption of control of the army in 1958, a quota system was introduced in the recruitment policy of ordinary soldiers: 50 per cent for the North, and 25 per cent each for Eastern and Western Regions. The Western Region's quota continued to be under filled despite the efforts made to bolster the proportion of Yorubas in the organisation in 1965.[8]

The introduction of regional quotas for ordinary recruits created controversy because it tended to cut down on the number of recruits of Northern origin where the majority of the infantry had previously been recruited. The same complaints were aroused when the regional quota for the recruitment of officers was introduced in 1961. This time, the measure tended to discriminate against the East where education had advanced.

The ministerial justification of the regional quota both for ordinary recruits and officers was the need to make the military a fully representative body and "to create an awareness in all sections of the community of their responsibilities for the defence of the borders of

this country" as Ribadu once said. Another justification according to Tarko Galadima, Minister of State for the Army was to ensure the loyalty of the army. He told the Senate:

> We introduced a quota system in the Army, thus preventing the possible fear that the army would sometimes become unreasonable. If any part of the country is not represented in the army, we may harbour some fear that a particular section will begin to feel that it is being dominated. But now ..... This country's safety is assured.[9]

In the implementation of the quota system, the Easterners did not encounter any problem filling their own quota.[10] Within the Northern region, there was effort to spread the allocated number evenly within the entire region. This policy meant that the Middle Belt, which was formerly the main recruiting area in the north felt that it was being treated unfairly. This resentment was most felt and expressed by the Tivs.[11]

In an attempt to implement the quota system for the recruitment of officers in the North, the qualification required was lowered at times in order to get people to fill the quota because the region lagged behind in western education. This as we shall see affected the professionalism of the officer corps.

An important event that also took place within the army at this time was that one hundred and thirty (130) soldiers left when a separate Cameroonian was formed.[12]

3.1.3 ENSURING THE LOYALTY OF THE MILITARY

As we observed in the last chapter, the Nigerian army before 1958 was very loyal to the political leaders albeit these leaders were the colonialists. This loyalty was dependent on a number of factors. One of the factors that they were taught to be subordinate to civilian command; more important, was the fact that most of the officers, NCOs and Warrant Officers were British. This did not offer the opportunity for rebellion. In addition, there was the well known fact that British military forces were by far superior in terms of training, equipment and experience than the Nigerian Forces. The colonial soldiers feared that the British would bring in their forces in case of any uprising.

Another means by which loyalty of the army was achieved was by the recruitment policy. The policy colonialists used tended to concentrate recruitment from backward areas where the people were politically unconscious and where the low pay was not challenged. Battalions were also rotated after every five years to prevent the

army from forming links with the local people. The politically conscious and educated Southerners needed for technical services were neutralised by being mixed with Northerners in the battalion; or were separated in small specialised units where they could do no harm.

After 1961, events took another course as most of these factors were no longer in existence. After independence, the Nigerian Government embarked on a policy of Nigerianising the officer corps. Consequent on this, the British Officers, NCOs and WOs had to leave. The recruitment policy also effected a shift to the the major ethnic groups.

By this time also, politics had already been introduced into the backward areas. And the policy of rotation of the army battalions was frustrated by the Congo crises commitment.

With these developments, the government sought for other means of ensuring the loyalty of the army. As already noted when discussing the composition of the army, the quota system was introduced to achieve this. In addition to this, soldiers from different ethnic groups were mixed up as far down as the sections of the platoon. This measure did not go without some problems

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since the technical sections required people with some educational qualification and they were mostly found in the Southern part of the country. The mixing up of the rank and file was meant to neutralise "any disaffected elements and enhance the corporate spirit of the Army".[13]

Apart from this, another major policy adopted was to increase the pay of the soldiers. Between 1958 and 1960 for example, the pay of most soldiers was roughly doubled. And from 1960 onwards, the soldiers received large bonuses on their pay for serving in the Congo. When the Congo operation was about to end, the Minister of Defence told the troops that a new salary review for the army was then about to be ratified by the Council of Ministers. He added:

> "The Army is like an engine and must be regularly lubricated if it is not to lose its efficiency."[14]

This salary review raised the pay of all soldiers, (not officers) by about 25 per cent. With this increase in pay package, there were no grounds for complaints.

3.1.4 DIVERSIFICATION OF TRAINING AND SOURCES OF EQUIPMENT

Another important development after independence was the fact that places of training and purchasing of equipment were diversified. Prior to this time, all

training of officer corps was done in Britain. With independence, there arose the need to expand areas since the places offered to African cadets in British military Academies were limited and there was the urgent policy of Nigerianisation of the officer corps. In effect, the areas were expanded to include Canada, Australia, India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and the United States. In 1961 Major Maimalari was the first Nigerian officer to go to the Pakistani Staff College. Officers were also sent to United States from 1962.

When it came to purchasing of arms, the same policy was adopted. The German machine gun was bought in preference to the British G.P.MG. The newly re-formed Artillery Battery was equipped with Italian field-guns and in 1965, the Swedish Car Gustar Mortar was bought for the infantry. The newly created Nigerian Air Force was directed by a West German officer till the January 1966 coup.

When asked how this diversification of sources of training and equipment has affected the corporate identity of the officer corps, the respondents uniformly agreed that it has broaden the knowledge of the officers. And since they receive a kind of 'harmonisation' course when the return, no adverse effects has manifested. They

all agreed that the training is almost the same everywhere in the world, what differ is the way they are taught.

3.1.5 THE REPUTATION OF THE MILITARY.

Prior to independence, the army was seen as an instrument of colonial subjugation. The generality of the people had no regards for the profession. With independence, there was the need to transform it into a national institution and this called for a break with the past. The first move was to change the colonial uniform. Dr. Azikwe said:

> "The fact that the uniform was designed originally for colonial army of occupation makes it imperative for a complete departure from the past to take place."[15]

The uniform was replaced by a smarter green uniform of long-sleeves jacket, long trousers and peaked cap. In fact everything was changed except the motto which was "Victory is for God alone". The title "Queen's Own" was also dropped.

Accompanying this change was also the change in personnel. There was a complete Nigerianisation of the army personnel. The last expatriate battalion Commander was replaced in 1963 and all the battalion officers were Nigerians by the end of 1963. In 1964 all the remaining staff appointments at Army and

Brigade Headquarters were Nigerianised with the exception of the G.O.C. Major-General Welby-Everard who finally left in February 1965.[16] The last British Seconded Officer left in August 1965 and at the end of the year, there was only one expertriate contract officer remaining - a Pakistani officer. In 1964, the only volunteer territorial army unit, the engineer squadron at Bukuru was disbanded.[17]

Compared to the Police Force, the Army had much better reputation for honesty and freedom from corruption. This was partly due to the fact that the army had fewer opportunities of contact with the public. This is not to say that they were completely without blemish. Lt. Col. Imo was court-martialled in February 1964 for misappropriation of property worth ₦192 from the Army Ordnance Depot and also for missing army transport. He was found guilty and sentenced to a severe reprimand. The Nigerian Navy was more scandalous. Three officers were court-martialled in 1964 for embezzling £60,000 (₦120,000) almost 10 per cent of the annual Naval estimates.[18]

In handling civil disturbances, the army had a better reputation than the police even though they acted only as stand-by. This was demonstrated during the Tiv

riots of 1964. The Army reached the height of its reputation at the time of Federal Elections of 1964 when it was ordered to organise parades and demonstrations to "show the flag" around the country, as a deterrent to any trouble makers. They were also asked to supervise the election. Dr. Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region, declared "The supervision of voting is necessary." He also said "because the Army is the only public force that is independent today ..... the police are doing nothing." Later on, he commented that:

> In the North and West the law enforcement agencies have been incorporated into the machinery of political parties. One of my ministers was rescued by the Army from NPC thugs thirsty for his blood."[19]

After the election crises, the Army continued to be viewed and generally recognised as the only really non-regional or national organisation in the country.[20]

3.2 BACKGROUND TO MILITARY RULE: TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION OF THE POLITICISATION SYNDROME.

The need to actually understand and analyse military intervention in Nigerian politics calls for an analysis of the trend of events within the polity before the military officers struck. In other words, there is the need to ascertain the extent to which these event influenced the behavior of the Armed Forces. In this light, we intend to examine the background to military intervention before getting to the coups.

3.2.1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS

During the colonial period those who governed the country were guided by constitutions drafted by the colonialists. In 1946, the Authur Richard's Constitution was promulgated without the least possible consultation with Nigerians. The key features of the constitution include: The division of Nigeria into three administrative regions; establishment of three Regional Houses of Assembly at Kaduna, Ibadan and Enugu with power to discuss general legislation and the right to pass their own regional budgets; selection of membership of each Regional House from existing Native Authorities who in turn selected five of their members as representatives to the Central Legislative Council; establishment of a House of Chiefs only for the Northern Region and selection of membership of the Regional Houses.

A glance at these features quickly draws one's attention to the fact that even though the constitution achieved the integration of Northern and Southern Nigeria in a common Legislative Council, it brought into force

[illegible] of the process of fragmentation in the country.

This constitution received a lot of criticisms. Many nationalists described it as "a stratagem of divide and rule".[21] When Governor Sir John Mcpherson arrived in 1948, the people seized the opportunity to demonstrate against the constitution. Consequent on this demonstration, the machinery for its review was set in motion in 1949. The new constitution came to be known as Mcpherson's Constitution which came into force in 1951.

Under this constitution, the regions gained more powers for both executive and legislative actions. In other words, regionalism was consolidated but the Public Service and the Judiciary remained unified.

This constitution was more rigid than the one it replaced and its complicated nature resulted in conflicting interpretations of what actually the provisons meant. Coleman referred to it as "essentially unitary". Eme Awa sees it as "embryonic stage of a Federation". While the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo "a wretched comprise between Federation and Unitarism."[22]

Due to its nature, the constitution could not but breakdown as result of crises resulting from its interpretation. A typical example was the Kano crises of 1953.

Another constitution often described as Lyttleton's Constitution came into force in 1954 in place of the former one. The new constitution did not make any fundamental change as the issue of regionalism was further consolidated. It provided for separate Governors, Premiers, Cabinets, Legislatures, Judiciaries, Public Service Commissioners, Civil Services, Marketing Boards and Development Plans. In fact "outside the Federal Civil Service and Foreign Service, only the Army appeared to be genuinely nationalistic."[23]

Arikpo rightly pointed out that:

> The 1954 constitution was the kernel of all further constitutional changes which culminated in the establishment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on October 1st 1963.

Oyediran (ed) (1979) observed:

> if anything, some of the several amendments that were made intensified the strains which existed not only between the Centre and Regions, but between the Regions and even communities within the regions.[24]

This separateness persisted even after independence.

3.2.2 ETHNIC AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS

We have seen above how the seeds of discord were sown in the country's constitutions. These seeds developed and yielded hostility amongst the people. It will

be erroneous for anyone to assume that ethnicism emanates only from cultural differences. As P.C. Llyoyd (1970) observed,

> "the hostility derives ..... not from the ethnic differences but from competition between peoples for wealth and power."

This observation is grounded on the basis of development of relationship between the various ethnic groups towards the end of colonialism in the country.

Prior to 1950, ethnic rivalry was limited to the Southern part of the country. The most important national organisation politically - Nigerian Youth Movement - founded in 1934 ran into probelms in 1941 over the issue of nomination of a replacement for Kofo Abayomi in the Legislative Council. This conflict resulted in a permanent split of the organisation. As Schwarz (1965) noted,

> The NYM was left with an almost entirely Yoruba membership and thus began the political tension between Ibo and Yoruba that plagued Nigerian politics ever since.

By 1948, Azikwe had ceased to be the Zik of Africa but Zik of the Ibo Nation.[25]

The process of drafting the Macpherson's constitution extended the conflict which was limited to the South to the North. The major issues that were to be settled at the General Conference at Ibadan in 1950

included the size of regional units in the Federation, regional representation in the Central Legislature, revenue allocation, Franchise and Citizenship, Ministerial responsibility and the Status of Lagos.

The Northern delegation demanded a 50 per cent representation at the Central Legislature and per capita division of tax revenue. The two Southern Regions were opposed to both demands. On the other hand, the Northern delegations opposed the demands by other regions for cabinet responsibility whether at the centre or at the regional level. They also opposed the demands to effect change in the existing regional boundaries.[26] Despite the oppositions of the other regions, the Northern delegations won their demands and thus the stage was set for the political dominance of the North.

In 1953, Enahoro moved a motion for gaining independence by 1956, the Sardauna opposed it and said that 1956 should be replaced by "as soon as practicable". The Southerners were angered.

Another important development along this line was the fact that all the political parties of the First Republic were regionally based. The NPC in the North had Sardauna of Sokoto as its leader; Action Group in

the West with Awolowo; and NCNC in the East with Zik as its leader. The ethnic bases of the political parties did not help issues instead worsened them. The relationship between the major ethnic groups in the country worsened as each struggled for power and domination during the 1959 Federal election. The election resulted in a coalition Government between the NPC and the NCNC while the AG acted as the opposition party. This election and the 1961 elections into the Northern House of Assembly which wiped out all opposition in the Northern Legislature confirmed the fears of the Southerners that the Northern domination has come to stay. This to a great extent contributed to the collapse of the First Republic. A cascade of political events led to the eventual collapse of the First Republic and urshered in the first military regime in Nigeria. We shall endeavour here to deal with some of these issues.

3.2.3 THE 1964-5 FEDERAL ELECTION

Before this election, the country got entangled in other crises like the Action Group alleged plot, and census controversy of 1962-4. When the census was conducted, the result was inflated so that the Northern Region maintained her dominant position in the country's politics. The West and the East with the help of the

Supreme Court could not invalidate the figures. Since the census did not stop northern domination, the Southerners hoped that appeal to the electorate in the 1964 general election will remedy the situation. Some people have referred to the 1964-5 election as a "classic case of the politics of brinkmanship". It was during this period that the first plot for military coup by some Nigerians in the army was planned.[27]

This election was contested by two major grand alliances - the NNA which was an alliance of NPC, NNDP, Dynamic Party of Chike Obi, Mid-West Democratic Front and the United People's Grand Alliance (UPGA) which was composed of the NCNC, the AG, NEPU and the United Middle Belt Congress. The UPGA campaign theme laid emphasis on the restructuring of the Nigerian Federation through the creation of new states which will strengthen the country's unity.

The NNA on the other hand put more emphasis on national unity through the representation of all ethnic groups at the Federal level particularly through job opportunities.

In the conduct of the elections, there were charges and counter-charges of harassment by all the parties in the three regions. Dr. Azikwe unsuccessfully attempted to postpone the election.

On the election day, UPGA leaders called on their supporters to boycott the polling booths as a protest against the arrest of some of their members who were to contest the election in the North and the West. Not only that, many NNA candidates were declared unopposed. This boycott was successful in the East and relatively successful in the West but a complete failure in the North. At the end of the election, NPC wing of NNA had won 162 of the 167 seats in the North.[28] This in effect meant that it could on its own form government at Federal level without having to ally with any political party. The position of the NPC was further strengthened with NNDP winning 36 seats.

When the results were announced, Zik was not happy, he therefore threatened,

> I would rather resign than exercise the powers to call on a person to form a government.[29]

He thus refused to announce the reappointment of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa until after about four days of stalemate with negotiations between the warring parties and the Chief Justice of the Federation Sir Adetokumbo Ademola. It was on the fourth day that Azikwe announced the reappointment of Balewa as Prime Minister after the plan drawn by the Chief Justice of the Federation had been accepted by the two warring parties.[30]

Fresh elections were conducted in areas where there was total boycott and the final result were NPC 162, NNDP 36, NCNC 84, AG 21, NPF 4, Independents 5.[31] When the broad base government was formed, AG was not included.

The resolution of this crisis in fact did not resolve the fundamental problems of the country "Nothern domination, Yoruba disunity, and Eastern aggressiveness were all highlighted; as were bitter personal animosities, the ugly scramble for jobs, the resort to force and fraud, the glaring inequalities of opportunities and the growing economic disparities."[32]

All these developments have gone to underscore the position of Huntington's school of thought that

> Military take over of government occurs in societies in which there is frequent disagreement among the groups competing for political power as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflicts.[33]

In Nigeria at this time, almost all the relevant social forces and institutions, including the military, had become highly politicised.

3.2.4 WESTERN REGIONAL ELECTION, OCTOBER 1965

The Federal election crisis was not the end of the matter; there was the 1965 Western Regional Election. Since the maximum life of any Legislative House under the parliamentary system of government was five years, the 1965 elections gave the people of the region opportunity to choose which of the contending parties should govern them - the NNDP or the Action Group.

The NNDP had some advantages over the AG. In the first place, it had the advantages of an incumbent. This the party utilised to the maximum. There was the advantage of having their supporters as the organisers of the electoral administration even though the overall responsibility of the election was with the Chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission, E.E. Esua. Furthermore, there was an internal rift within the AG/NCNC alliance. All these combined to give the NNDP a better chance of winning the elections.

A lot of violence was manifested during the period of the election. Consequent on that a ban on all meetings and processions was announced on the 19th September 1965 and thousands of Nigerian Police men were drafted to the region to maintain law and order. On the 30th September, the NNDP announced that fifteen of its

candidates had been returned unopposed, leaving 79 seats to be contested for on election day. The AG made several attempts to get the law courts to stop this overt rape on democracy but all to no avail. There occurred serious rioting resulting in the death of many.

After the elections, each of the two parties declared itself the winner. On the 12th of October, the leader of the Action Group Alhaji Adebenro, announced the formation of an interim government. Two days later, he and some of his supporters were arrested and detained. With this and the formation of government by Akintola and his party, large scale killings of opponents erupted. Despite many appeals to the Prime Minister to declare a state of emergency in the Western Region, nothing was done.

Meanwhile a conference of the Commonwealth Heads of Government was taking place in the country. When the meeting came to a close and the Prime Ministers had left, the military moved in to salvage the country from total collapse.

3.2.4 THE EFFECTS OF THESE EVENTS ON THE NIGERIAN MILITARY

As we observed at the beginning of this chapter, the number of soldiers increased by 3,000 in seven years

following Nigeria's assumption of responsibility in 1958. It increased from 7,600 to 10,500 in 1965. Of the 10,500, only a little above 500 belonged to the officer corps (530 of which were of combatant status)•

Some students of Civil-Military relations saw this relatively small number of officer corps as being politically unimportant in terms of staging a coup. Gutteridge (1964) posited

> three to five hundred officers in a country of forty million, base mainly on five stations, the majority of which are far from the capital, cannot for the time being be regarded as a political factor of the greatest importance.55

Against his contention, this numerically insignificant officers staged a coup and took control of government. Before staging the coup, as we have earlier seen, a lot of political crises besieged the whc e country, and the military being part and parcel of the society was not immuned against these developments. Let us examine the way and extent to which these events affected the professionalism of the military.

The main issue that affected the organisational integrity of the military was the problem of ethnic and regional conflicts. After the assumption of control of the Army in 1958, the political leaders got engaged in

a serious debate over the criteria to be used in the recruitment of the officer corps. The NPC favoured courage and their argument was based on the fact that courage is the foundation of any military recruitment and that to use educational qualification was to risk the officer corps being dominated by intellectuals who, because of their background and training, were basically not men of action but of words. The NPC leader was in the habit of saying that "The warrior is not a talkative."[36]

The NCNC leaders on the other hand favoured educational qualification. They argued that courage alone was not enough and in fact has become less important in warfare. That the management of contemporary military technology has become complex and thus requires training and acquisition of professional knowledge through formal training.

Why did the two political parties take different lines on military recruitment? To implement the criterion suggested by the NCNC would mean that the officer corps would remain dominated by Easterners as the Southern part of the country was educationally more advanced than the North. The NCNC argued in this way because it favoured them. However their contention was more cogent.

Closely linked to this issue was the question of a quota system to be introduced in the recruitment and promotion of officers. It was argued in 1958 that the Nigerian Army should be drawn from each region in the same proportion as the regional population stood in relation to total population.

Since the NPC were numerically stronger than the other parties in the government, they had their way in both the criteria for recruitment (even though some degree of educational qualification was considered) and the quota system. Consequent from 1958, the Nigerian Army was composed as follows: Northern Region 50 per cent, Eastern Region 25 per cent and Western Region 25 per cent, but when the Mid-West Region was created in 1963, the Western Region quota was reduced to 21 per cent while Mid-West had 4 per cent.[37]

Till 1959, potential officers had to have four credits, including English, in the School Certificate Examination (the equivalent of four passes at 'O' level G.C.E.). In September 1959 this requirement was lowered to four School Certificate passes. The academic standard was further widened in May 1961, the advertisements specified that as an alternative qualification, a Teacher Grade II Certificate or the Royal Society of

Arts examination stage II would be accepted.[38] Applicants with these minimum academic requirement still had to sit an entrance examination but those with five School Certificate credits were exempted. All these were attempts to lower the standard so that the North would fill its quota.

As these developments were going on, the issue of ethnicity and regionalism slowly penetrated the military organisation. The effect was not limited to the rank and file, the officer corps was also affected. In an interview with Major-General Sani Abacha, he revealed,

> Tribalism was deep-rooted in the military organisation. Whom you know and where you come from also mattered. Even religion was becoming a decisive factor. All these tended to negate the ethics of the military profession, and indeed esprit de corps for which the military is uniquely noted for. Luckily for the organisation, we have taken drastic steps to curb this unhealthy flow. Things like tribal and religious meetings have been banned from the barracks. Vernacular is also prohibited while on official duty .....[39]

These developments indeed lowered discipline within the organisation. A naval officer explained how difficult it became for an officer to command those under him who were not of the same Region as him.

Added to this was the issue of rapid indigenisation of the officer corps. "In 1962, the number of officer-cadets selected for the Kaduna course went up to 48 and then to 64 on the course that followed. Instead of recording a failure rate of about a third, practically all the cadets were sent for further training overseas."[40] As Luckham rightly pointed out discipline was poorly institionalised due to "distorted age structure and promotional pattern in turn determined by the rapid indigenisation of the officer corps."[41]

Except for eight or nine ex-non-commissioned officers at or near the top, virtually all the combatant officers were within the age group of between 20 - 35 years old in 1966.[42] In the first four years after independence, promotion was very rapid. Officers were promoted to upper ranks without fully mastering and getting experienced in their previous ranks. This rate of promotion affected the professionalism of the officer corps. This rate of promotion slowed down after 1964. This affected in particular the Majors and Captains who by 1965 had to wait much longer than their superiors before moving up.

Frequent dependence on the military by the politicians to keep themselves in power was another issue that affected the professional role of the military in society.

During the 1964-65 Federal election, the Army was ordered on the 18th November by the Prime Minister "to take immediate steps to ensure a return to normal life in the area". Almost a whole battalion together with Recce Squadron were moved into the Tiv division and they quelled the riots and arson.

At the end of September 1965, detachment of troops from the battalions at Ibadan and Ikeja were deployed to a number of towns in the Western Region to stand by if needed over the election period. They indeed opened fire in Mushin, and also in Ibadan, after the disputed results of the elections were announced.[43] These soldiers witnessed the blatant rigging of the elections.

By January 1966, law and order had completely broken down in the Western Region. The situation was such that the police alone would not have been able to handle it. It was obvious that only a concentrated military effort would be required if things were to return to normalcy. In situation like this, the army would be once more forced to suppress and probably kill their country folk in order to sustain Akintola's discredited government.

This constant dependence on the army to a large extent exposed the incompetence of the politicians to rule. In so doing the politicians ascribed to the military another role which it was not supposed to play.

At the trial of Awolowo also, evidence was given that there were attempts to get Ademulegun to initiate a military coup.[44]

The politicians were not the only set of people who tried to interfere with the Army. The intellectuals also had their part in the politicisation of the Army. Some of the intellectuals were looking on to the Army as the only means of bringing about political change in the country. For example it was during this period of crises that Chinue Achebe published his novel Man of the People in which he described the last days of a corrupt West African Government and ends with the military taking over power to cleanse the country.

All these developments contributed in politicising the Armed Forces. Since they were part and parcel of the entire society. And probably with encouragement of other successful military coups in some other African countries such as Congo (Zaire) in 1965; an abortive military coup in Algeria in 1961; Central African Republic in January 1965; the military in Nigeria struck.

3.3 THE MILITARY COUP OF 15TH & 16TH JANUARY, 1966.

3.3.1 DRAMATIS PERSONAE:

There is a lack of clarity on the number of soldiers/officers that took part in the coup. There were claims and counterclaims. After the coup, the Government of Eastern Region issued a pamphlet in which it asserted that thirty-two (32) officers and more than a hundred other ranks were imprisoned by Ironsi government for involvement in the conspiracy.[45]

On the Federal part, the Federal Government document claimed that fourteen (14) officers were in charge of operations in Kaduna, Ibadan and Lagos. Thirteen of the names on the federal list were found in the Eastern list. Only the name - Major Ademoyega - supplies the only name missing from the Eastern list. The Eastern list contained five Yoruba names while only one Yoruba name is found on the Federal list.

Out of the thirty-two officers that participated in the coup, 31 belonged to the group of officers who had completed normal secondary school or university course with their civilian contemporaries and who began officers' training immediately they entered the Army. From this composition, one can assume that many of them would share the enthusiasm for raidcal changes in

society that was common among Nigerian students. The other one - Okafor - was the only one who had served a long period in the ranks before being commissioned. Among the officers arrested, those with degrees and those officers who had at least spent two years at Sandhurst were prominent. Of the 14 Captains and officers of higher ranks, 8 had been to Sandhurst.

Major Nzeogwu said five officers were the originators of the coup.[46] He however did not mention their names. But it appeared they were: himself, Ifeajuna, Major Anuforo, Major Onwutuegwu and Chukwuka since Chukwuka was at Sandhurst with Anuforo, Onwuatuegwu and Nzeogwu.[47]

TRAINING AND REGIONAL/TRIBAL ORIGIN OF OFFICERS DETAINED FOR ALLEGED COMPLICITY IN THE COUP

Table 3.1

A. FEDERAL LIST (ALL WITH REGULAR COMBATANT COMMISSIONS AT THE DATE OF COUP)

Major Nzeogwu	Ibo/Mid-West	Sandhurst	1959
Major Ifeajuna	Ibo/Mid-West	*Mon	1961
Major D.O. Okafor	Ibo	Mons	1959
Major Anuforo	Ibo/East	Sandhurst	1961
Major Chukwuka	Ibo	Sandhurst	1960
Major Ademoyega[1]	Yoruba	*Mons	1962
Maj. Onwuatuegwu	Ibo	Sandhurst	1961
Capt. Gbulie	Ibo/East	Sandhurst	1962
Capt. Nwobosi	Ibo	Sandhurst	1963
Capt. Oji	Ibo	Mons	1961

Lt. Oyewole	Yoruba	Mons	1962
2/Lt Azubuogor	Ibo	?	1965
2/Lt Nwokocha	Ibo	Mons	1963
2/Lt Ojukwu[2]	Ibo/Mid-West	Canada	1963

B. i' ADDITIONAL NAMES ON EASTERN LIST ONLY (WITH REGULAR COMBATANT COMMISSIONS AT DATE OF COUP)

Lt.Col Banjo	Yoruba/West	*Sandhurst	1956
Capt. Udeaja	Ibo/East	Sandhurst	1960
Capt. Ude	Ibo	Mons	1962
Lt. Adeleke[3]	Yoruba	U.S.A.	1963
Lt. Ezedigbo	Ibo	India	1964
2/Lt Onyefuru	Ibo	India	1964
2/Lt Igweze	Ibo	Mons	1963
2/Lt Egbibor	? East	India	1964
2/Lt Olafimihan	Yoruba	India	1964
2/Lt Ngwuluka	Ibo	U.S.A.	1964
2/Lt Nweke	Ibo	?	1964
2/Lt Ikejiofor	Ibo/East	Australia	1963

ii FIVE OFFICERS WITH DIRECT SHORT SERVICE COMMISSIONS

Major Aghaya	Ibo	*NA Mech.& Elect. Eng.
Lt. Okafor	Ibo	*NA Engineers
Lt. Okaka	Ibo	*NA Ordance
Lt. Anyafulu	Ibo	* ?
Lt. Okocha	Ibo	* ?

ONE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE OFFICER

Lt. Amuchinwa

NOTES: *denotes an officer with a degree or professional qualification.

1. Major Ademoyega was the only officer on the Federal List who was not also named by the East; this seems to be because he was not imprisoned in Eastern Nigeria.
2. This officer is from the Mid-West and is not related to Lt.Col. Ojukwu.
3. See note 49.

On the part of civilian participation, Federal document had it that: "The Army officers plotting to seize power were assisted by some prominent civilian including politicians."[48] The only piece of information that seems to support the assertion is the behavior of Dr. Orizu during the coup. When the Prime Minister disappeared, he was asked to appoint Zanna Dipcharima as acting Prime Minister but he refused; thus making it easy for Ironsi to get power. Even this does not mean that Dr. Orizu and his colleagues had fore-knowledge of the coup.

3.3.2 THE COUP

Nzeogwu was in charge of operations in the North. He successfully eliminated the Sardauna of Sokoto, Brigadiers Ademulegun and Shodeide. After the death of Ademulegun and Shodeide, Colonels Kurobo and Bassey seemed to have accepted Nzeogwu's authority. There are different accounts concerning Lt.Col. Ojukwu. Luckham sees him as a tacit supporter of the coup while Foresyte said he was not in support at all. The Governor of the North with a number of Northern Ministers were arrested and detained. In fact the coup was a complete success in the North. On Saturday, Major Nzeogwu broadcast over Kaduna Radio proclaiming martial law, "in the name of the Supreme Council of the Nigerian Armed Forces". On Sunday, he appointed a government of civil servants in place of the deposed Northern ministers.[50]

In Lagos, soldiers from the armoured cars squadron had arrived from Abeokuta and teamed up with another group led by Major Okafor of the Federal Guards Lagos Island and Major Ifeajuna from 2 Brigade HQ Apapa. This group succeeded in killing Brigadier Maimalari, Lt.Col Unegbe.[51], Col. Kur Mohammed, Lt.Col Pam, Lt.Col Largema, the Prime Minister - Tafawa Balewa, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh the Finance Minister.

In Ibadan, another group of conspirators (though did not succeed in taking control of the town) killed Akintola. Nothing occurred in the Mid-West and the East.

Ironsi escaped being assasinated. When he escaped from his house, he went to the battalion at Ikeja which was under the command of Major Igboba. With his help and that of Njoku (who was the retiring Commanding Officer) and that of some senior (Northern) Warrant Officers, Ironsi gained control of the battalion. The troops were moved into Lagos where they recaptured the capital from the conspirators.

A faction of the Federal Guards and some Northern Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers broke loose from their Commander, Major Okafor and rampaged against Eastern Officers and men that were in support of the coup.

Ifeajuna and Okafor left for the East to continue with the operations but by the time they arrived it was too late. The Commanding Officer at Enugu had received signals from Lagos and so nothing occurred in the East.

On Sunday the 16th, Ironsi assembled the rump of the Cabinet and got them to surrender power to him. On Monday the 17th, Major Nzeogwu announced that he was offering his sword and command to the new Supreme Commander. Nzeogwu however surrendered only under five conditions which included an unconditional pardon for the conspirators and that those they deposed would not be brought back. The surrender was announced on the 18th.

3.4 MOTIVATION FOR THE COUP

A brief analysis of the personalities of those who carried out the coup, I believe, will give an insight into the motivation for the coup. Before that, we will briefly look at some suggestions which on close examination hold no grounds.

3.4 1 PERSONAL AND CORPORATE INTERESTS

In our discussion of the causes of military intervention in politics in chapter one, we saw that such theorists as Decalo believe that the military intervene in politics in order to achieve certain corporate interests such as increase in salary and promotions.

Could it be said that the same hold for the Nigerian case? The fact that the pay of officers had remained unimproved for six years could not have been the motive for the coup since officers received yearly increment and most of them had recently achieved rapid promotions. As Miners (1971) observed, if this had been the motive, then Ironsi would have increased pay of officers when he assumed power which is normal sequel to the installation of military regimes.

This argument does not rule out the fact that a coup could be motivated by personal interests as was in the case in the abortive "Operation Guitar Boy" in Ghana.[52] There are no grounds to believe the same for the Nigerian case.

As regards the Majors who staged the coup, four had been promoted substantive Majors and three had not yet received promotion. None of the officers involved in the coup had been superceeded in the Army list by an officer who was formerly his junior. At the time of the coup, Onuforo had achieved promotion to substantive Major while others were still contemporary Majors. So Onuforo, an Ibo had been promoted above Northerners.[53]

3.4.2 EXTERNAL INFLUENCE

Examining the motivation for the January 1966 coup in terms of external influence, i.e. the C.I.A. on the army, does not yield much convincing results. For it is inconceivable that the C.I.A. which is famous for its secret machinations around the world could connive with the conspirators to overthrow the Prime Minister who was a staunch supporter of the West.

It is also difficult to conceive it in terms of Zionist plot to eliminate the Sardauna for his conversion of 350,000 Northerners to Islamic faith and who was reported as being in the habit of saying that for him, "Israel does not exist." This is because the Nigerian Army had no links in whatsoever form with Israel. There were no training nor equipment purchasing connections. It is therefore difficult to imagine Nigerians risking their lives for the sake of the borders of the Middle East.

Rather than the above, the Ghana influence may seem plausible viewing the part she had earlier played in the Action Group alleged plot of 1962; but the argument still does not hold when applied to the January coup. The January coup plotters - Nzeogwu and his colleagues - unlike the Action Group plotters had access to as much

arms and ammunition as they would require. They also did not require any training as in the case of the Action Group members.

The only piece of evidence which connects Ghana with the coup was the fact that Major Ifeajuna fled to Ghana after the rout of the conspirators in the South by Ironsi and was welcomed as a hero. This does not really mean that Ghana had something to do with the coup.

What really seems plausible is that the Nkrumah dynamic regime might have served as a model for the conspirators when compared with the apparent weak government, with its inertia and corruption in Nigeria. More than this, there are no reasons to believe that Ghana played a greater part.

3.4.3. ETHNIC PLOT (IBO)

Some people have concluded that "the event of 15th and 16th January 1966 was not a mutiny as such, but a premeditated and carefully projected plan by the Ibo to impose themselves on the other tribes of Nigeria.[54] And that there was no intention to kill Major-General Ironsi, who was allegedly in the plot from the beginning. By implication, what is being said here is that the coup

was motivated by ethnic sentiments. Ibos carried out the coup because they did not want any other group in the country to lead.

This conclusion has been drawn on the basis of the ethnic composition of the plotters and also the selective pattern of the killings. It is indeed striking that almost all the conspirators come from the same ethnic group - Ibo. All the seven but one Majors mentioned by Luckham as the key planners were Ibos. The pattern of killings also was selective in regional and tribal terms. The only regional premiers that survived the coup were - Osadebey of the Mid-West and Dr. Okpara of the Eastern Region - all Ibos.

The tiny group of senior Northern officers was virtually obliterated while almost all the Eastern and Mid-Western officers survived. Major Unegbe was the only Ibo officer killed and it was because he refused to surrender the key to the armoury which was in his possession.

The figures appear alarming when it is considered that of the five Northern and Western officers of that seniority to survive, three were out of reach.[55] Gowon was searched for but he had a lucky escape. And Banjo

was thought to be sympathetic to the coup by the conspirators.

There are alternative interpretation of both the slective pattern of killings, this does not in anyway rule out the explanations in terms of a tribal plot. We shall come back to this point later but suffice it to say that it will be naive to totally accept the intervention in terms of ethnic plot. To me, the conspirators' objectives were both political and ideological in nature and ethnicity came to play some part which will be seen later.

3.4.4 THE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVES

As pointed out at the beginning when the discussion on motivation started, there is the need to know certain things such as training and background of some of the key organisers as this may provide a clue as to why they participated in the coup. Their background and relationship with civilians might have helped to shapen their political and ideological motives.

As Luckham pointed out, the conspirators could justly be considered as "intellectuals" both in respect of their professional qualities and in regard to their wider interests.

Majors Okafor, Chukwuka, Nzeogwu, Onwuatuegwu all held training posts at different times either in the Military Training College Kaduna, The Depot Zaria, or the Nigerian Military School Zaria. At the time of the coup Nzeogwu was Chief Instructor Nigeria Military Training College Kaduna and Onwutuegwu the Chief Instructor of the Infantry wing there. Three of the six officers, who held combat status in the Army, had university degrees or equivalent and were in the inner circle of the conspirators.[56] And two tacit supporters Lt. Col. Banjo and Lt. Col. Ojukwu also held university degrees or the equivalent.

The January Majors and Captains therefore belonged to the elite group of officer corps. Most of them attended Sandhurst or Mons Officer Cadet School. In Sandhurst, the professional training given them was longer, more intensive and at a higher educational level.

At the same time, the civilian involvement and intellectual interests of two of the most important planners - Nzeogwu and Ifeajuna who were in charge of operation in the North and the South respectively, were especially far reaching. Nzeogwu who was a product of Sandhurst, could be described as a sort of socialist and at the same time a devout Catholic (as Obasanjo described him). He read Karl Marx and

Mao Tsetung as the usual Military history. Ifeajuna was a graduate of the University of Ibadan where he had been a star athlete, and had contacts with radical intellectuals in the Civil Service and the Universities.

In the wider circle of tacit supporters, Lt.Col Ojukwu was a product of Oxford University, through his family background had connections with major and important personalities in the NCNC. Added to that fact, he had been a Civil Servant (District Officer) before joining the Army. Lt.Col Banjo had contacts with Action Group intellectuals in the Western Region. Their training and their contacts with civilians including politicians might have succeeded in infusing some extra-military values which might have resulted in widening their political sphere.

Coupled with the contact with politicians and intellectuals, was the issue of government reliance on the military to perpetuate itself in power. Finer (1962) rightly pointed out, any government that relies on its military to maintain itself in power exposes itself to contempt and coup d'etat. By its reliance on the military, the government in some unconscious manner ascribes to the military another role which it is not supposed to play. In the Nigerian case the army

was used as earlier mentioned to suppress the Tiv riots of 1964. Until about fourteen months before the coup, the military when on internal security duty, had never been called upon to give more than a display of force in support of the police. But in November 1964 they were deployed to pacify the Tiv region.

Three of the conspirators in the inner circle, (Onuforo, Ademoyega and Onwuatuegwu) were actively involved in the suppression of the Tiv and the distaste that soldiers felt during the course of that assignment might have been one of the reasons which had led them to taking part in the conspiracy.

In my opinion, the January coup though product of politicisation, the plotters were genuinely patriotic. The coup was a response to the direct pressure of civilian groups which sought to co-opt and enlarge the role of the military.

The plotters at the same time had an explicit set of political objectives even though it seems difficult to reconstruct them from the few public statements that Nzeogwu himself made while in control of Kaduna for few hours.

The political institutions that had emerged after independence were illegimate and corrupt. While the politicians were living extravagantly, they on the other hand urged the masses to accept austerity for the sake of economic development. This conduct evidently deprived the regime any moral authority among the masses especially those living in great towns.

The corrupt institutions could only be deployed by violence means; in Nzogwu's words "elections are always rigged. It is difficult to vote out a Nigerian Minister."[57] In carrying out the coup, they expressed both radical popular will and their deep-seated shame in the existing state of affairs.

In the radio broadcast made on the 15th January to announce the military take over, it was indicated that they had taken over power "to bring an end to gangsterism and disorder, corruption and despotism" and Nzogwu ended by "My compariots, you will no longer be ashamed Nigerians."[58]

In Nzeogwu's first radio broadcast which he made in Kaduna in the name of the "Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces", it was stated that

> "the aim of the Revolutionary Council is to establish a strong united and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife."

This was followed by a proclamation of extra-ordinary Orders of the Day, which decreed that

> "looting, arson, homosexuality, rape, embezzlement, bribery and corruption, obstruction of the revolution, sabotage, subversion of the revolution, false alarms ..... are all punishable by death sentence."[59]

The violent elimination of the representations of a corrupt moral and political order would create opportunities and conditions in which a new purified institutional structure could emerge. The plotters did not however mention clearly what shape this reconstruction would take. As Luckham observed,

> "The standard military themes of nationalism, anti-tribalism and anti-corruption were commingled with a certain amount of poorly digested marxism, deriving partly from left-wing civilian intellectuals, among whom the group had contacts."[60]

Their radical ideas may account for their distaste for the conservative and reactionary Federal Government dominated by the NPC and also their alliance with some members of the NCNC and the Action Group.

The political objectives of the coup must be considered within the context of the prevailing balance of power in January 1966. Many of the officers believed that all the weaknesses of the regime was

NPC's making because it controlled political life at the centre. The crises in the Western Region and the Federal Government's failure to deal with it was blamed on NPC's deliberate attempt to maintain allies compliant to itself in the South. The Majors were among those who believed there was a "plot by the NPC to carry out a political putsch of their own to neutralise the Federal Government, manipulate key appointments in the Army, and the Police and use the Army to crush rebellion in the Eastern and Western Regions. Nzeogwu stated

> The public is still largely unaware of the fact that a gigantic military operation over the Western Region was to swoop down on that territory on January 17th. The incident that is associated with January 15th today was to take place sometimes later, that is the following month. When therefore, the significance of the state of emergency due to be proclaimed on January 17th was made known to us, it became inevitable that the operation of January 15th must necessarily take place before the dawn of January 17th.[61]

There was really no evidence that anything more sinister than a normal increase in the military presence in Western Region was being planned when Akintola visited the Sardauna in Kaduna on the eve of the coup together with Brigadier Ademulegun and Lt.Col. Largema.

As earlier mentioned, the January coup is a result of politicisation. As noted in chapter I, there are two types of politicisations - the overt and the

induced. One of the important precipitating factors of induced politicisation relates to the internal organisation of the military; this concerns the degree to which the military reflects the social structure of the society of which it is a part. To the extent that all armies are part of a social system, it obviously must reflect the attributes of the structure of that system. Most of the respondents conceded to the fact that the Nigerian Military is a product of the Nigerian society at large and because of that it reflects some of the major contraditions found in the society. As implicitly noted, the primary feature of professionalisation is that such reflections become minimised. As Gutteridge (1970) observed, and as we saw in Chapter II, professionalism of the Nigerian Military differs in some degree from that of their British counterparts. This is due to the fact that the professionalism was not well developed in the Nigerian officer corps. The major contributory factors being the rapid Nigerianisation of the officer corps and the entrenchment of the quota system.

While such social reflections were minimised during the process of professionalisation, so that the professional military man sees himself primarily as a military representative rather than a product of that part of the social structure from which he is drawn,

the introduction of quota system resulted in lowering the standard criteria for recruitment. This in effect affected the standard of the officers produced. With politicisation of recruitment and promotion, the army became a reflection of ethnic divisions within Nigeria itself. The introduction of the quota system at officer and ordinary rank levels might have made some soldiers to think that they owed their presence in the army to their region of origin. This consideration might have led some of them to be more sympathetic to the views of their regional governments or their political spokesman especially on such national issues as the census and Federal elections.[62]

Political consciousness in the Army was further accentuated by the political crises in the country during the first few years of independence. By heavy reliance on the army to maintain themselves in power, the politicians undermined their own position by becoming susceptible to political pressure and to material reward for its loyalty.[63]

The first military coup was partly an abortive attempt by military officers of the Eastern region to rectify their grievances. While the second which was

a counter-coup that brought Gowon to power, was largely carried out by Northerners as a response to the first. In both instances the pathology of politicisation was obvious.

NOTES

1. Miners, N.J. Nigerian Army 1956 - 1966. Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1971.

2. Debate in the House of Representatives, 14th March 1955, p.164. Laughter was raised at a reference to Fani-Kayode's view, Debate in the House of Representative 17th January, 1955.

3. West African Pilot 4th July, 1959. Ghana's projected increase in expenditure was not in fact achieved, according to the Accountant-General's statement at the end of the Finan-cial Year. Government Printers, 1961.

4. Debate in the House of Representative, 14th April, 1960. Col.1263.

5. Miners, N.J. op.cit.

6. Ibid p.95.

7. Ibid p.96.

8. West African Pilot 3rd December, 1966, quoting Col. Adebayo. Special intakes for Westerners in 1965, see advert Daily Express (Lagos) 15th May.

9. Senate Debate, 1st May, 1965, Col. 262.

10. In 1962 a crowd of 690 volunteers besieged the barracks at Enugu, eager to fill the 15 vacancies for recruits available for one intake. Nigerian Army Managazine (NAM) 1963. p.59.

11. Daily Times, 6th April, 1962 - United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) Press Conference, Daily Express (Lagos) 30th March, 1963 - Tarka speaks at the treason trial.

12. Royal Nigerian Army Magazine 1962, p.99.

13. Miners, N.J. op cit p.101.

> "The Armed Forces in Nigeria are not regimentalised, men from all over Nigeria being deliberately mixed up in all units." Notes on RWAFF.

14. Daily Times 26 October, 1963.

15. Nigerian Outlook 18th November, 1961.

16. Miners op cit.

17. History of the Unit is given in Royal Nigerian Army Magazine. 1962. Its disbandment Nigerian Army Magazine. 1964.

18. Daily Express (Lagos) 31st Oct., 1964.

19. Dr. Okpara's Speeches are in Nigerian Outlook 24th December, 1964.

20. West Africa 16th January, 1965. No.58.

21. Oyediran O. (ed) op cit.

22. See Coleman, Eme Awa, Federalism in Nigeria. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1964 and Awolowo O. Awolowo - the Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Cambridge University Press, 1966.

23. Kirk-Greene A.H.M.: Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Source-book 1966 - 1970. Oxford University Press 1971 vol.1 p.11.

24. Oyediran O. (ed) op cit

25. See his speeches as President of the Ibo State Union. West African Pilot. 6th July, 1949.

26. See Government of Nigeria: Proceedings of General Conference on the Review of the Constitution Lagos: Government Printers 1950.

27. Miners, N.J. op cit p.146.

28. Oyediran O. (ed) op cit

29. Ibid

30. By this plan, there was going to be a broad-based national Government. Fresh elections were to be conducted in all areas where there had been a total boycott and grievances were to be taken to the Law Courts and a commission was to be set up to review the constitution.

31. Oyediran op cit p.187.

32. Ibid

33. Huntington as quoted by Oyediran op cit.

34. Miners, N.J. op cit

35. Gutteridge W.F.: Military Institution and Power in New States. London, 1964. p.105.

36. See J.Bayo Adekson, "Military Organisation in Multi-ethnically segmented Societies: A theoretical study" Ph.D Desertation. Brandiers University. May 1976. Especially pp 88 -130.

37. Oyediran O. (ed) op cit

38. Advertisement in the Federal Government Gazette 17th September, 1959 and 8th May, 1961.

39. Sani Abacha in an interview with Aku. 1986.

40. Miners, N.J. op cit p.110

41. Luckham, A.R. "The Nigerian Military: Disintegration or Integration" found in Panter Bricks (ed) Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to Civil War. The Athlone Press. 1970.

42. Nigerian Citizen. 24th March, 1962; 9th January, 1963. West African Pilot 14th January, 1963.

43. Miners, N.J. op cit

44. Ibid p.115

45. Ibid p.134

46. January 15th - Before and After. pp 89-91 West Africa 29th January, 1966. p.127.

47. Miners, N.J. op cit p.170.

48. Ibid p.170

49. This assumes that G.S. Adeleke, N/245, who is named in January 15th - Before and After, 89, as one of those imprisoned at Enugu, is an error for G.Adeleke N/412.

Samuel Funsho Adeleke, the officer whose number was N/245 was given an executive commission in 1962 after seventeen years in the ranks. He served with the Federal Army during the Civil War and was buried with full military honours in 1968.

The other officer, G.Adeleke N/412 was given a regular commission in 1963 and disappeared from the Federal Army after 1966. He is the only Yoruba officer (apart from the other named conspirators) who cannot be accounted for in the Civil War.

50. This follows the account in West Africa No. 22 January, 1966.

51. It was said that Unegbe was murdered for his refusal to surrender the keys to the armoury that were in his possession.

52. Lt. Authur who was court-martialled said that he felt that there were too many superior officers - some of them young who were preventing the promotion of others.

53. The four Northerners were Bissalla Capt/A Major 18/9/63; Haruna Capt. 18/9/61 A/Major; Murtala Mohammed Capt 18/9/63 A/Major; Shuwa Mohammed Capt. 1/9/64 A/Major.

54. The Nigerian Situation: Facts and Background. p.2.

55. Brigadier Ogundipe and Colonel Adebayo were abroad on courses, Lt.Col. Fajuyi on holidays in his home town. Luckham Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-67. Cambridge University Press.

56. These were Majors Ifeajuna and Ademoyega.

57. New Nigerian (Kaduna) 17th January, 1966.

58. West African (London) 22 January, 1966.

59. See S.K. Panter Bricks (ed) Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to Civil War. Athlone Press, University of London. 1970. pp 184-6.

60. A letter written by Nzeogwu to Dr. Tunji Otegbeye, the leader of the Nigerian Socialist Workers and Farmers Party, published in Advance The Nigerian Workers Own Newspaper. That's where Luckham made the mentioned conclusion.

61. Interview with Tai Solarin in Nigerian Tribune (Ibadan) 2nd July, 1967.

62. Gutteridge contends that the maintenance of a deliberate balance by quota between regions (in Nigeria before Civil War) had it appears only masked tribal fears. W.F. Gutteridge, "Political Role of African Armed Forces" in African Affairs. Vol.66 No.262, April 1967. p.94.

63. As we observed earlier in this chapter, when the British Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers left, the Government doubled the pay of soldiers so that it was on par with that of the police. This as observed was aimed at securing the loyalty of the Army.

CHAPTER IV

THE MILITARY AND POLITICISATION JULY 1966 - JULY 1975.

In this chapter, we intent to continue with our discussion of the various coups that occurred between the period 1966 - 1975. In effect, we will concentrate on the coups of July 1966 and July 1975. But before that, we will first examine the consequences of the January coup on the military.

4.1 THE CONSEQUENCES OF JANUARY COUP ON THE ARMED FORCES.

The January coup had some serious consequences on the Army. The first and major impact was on the organisational structure.

As earlier noted, there were organisatioan strains resulting from the rapid indigenisation policy of the officer corps. This situation was compounded by chenges in the distribution of authority that resulted specifically from the elimination of many of the officers at the top of the hierarchy. Thus the gap in experience and in ascriptive qualities such as age, and seniority between the upper and lower ranks of the officer corps, between commanders and subordinates was made narrower than hithereto.

This resulted in over-familiarity which in turn led to contempt between high- and lower-ranking officers. And that particularistic relations of friendship and clientele, ethnic and region tended to develop at the expence of organisational ties. Discipline became weakened and it became more common for subordinate officers to answer back query, orders and stand by their rights.

Important development also were changes that resulted in the ethnic composition of the officer corps. The subsequent imposition of military rule accentuated the predominance of Easterners in the top ranks of the Army. Of the fifty-three (53) Majors and officers of higher rank in the Army at the beginning of the year - 1966, eight (8) were killed in the coup and its aftermath, five were imprisoned, and four - Lt.Col. Fajuyi, Lt.Col Ojukwu, Lt.Col. Ejoor, and Major Hassan Katsina were made military governors in the Ironsi regime. Major Ifeajuna escaped to Ghana, in additon, Lt.Col Kurobo was transferred to head the Airforce and Col. Adebayo went on course to England. This left thirty-three (33) senior officers to fill the posts in the army; twenty-four of these were Easterners or Bendel-Ibo. Only two senior Northern officers were left. Lt.Col. Gowon was made the Chief

of Staff (Army) and Major Akahan was placed in charge of the 4th battalion.

The placement in the Army in March 1966 was as follows:[1]

2 Brigade (Southern Nigeria)		Tribe & Region
Brigade Commander	Lt.Col. Njoku	Ibo - East
2 NA Ikeja	Major Igboba	Ibo - Mid-West
Abeokuta Garrison	Lt.Col. Okonweze	Ib - Mid-West
4 NA Ibadan	Major Akahan	Tiv - North
Federal Guards Lagos	Major Uche	Ibo - East
1 NA Enugu	Major Ogonewe	Ibo - East

1 Brigade (Northern Nigeria)		Tribe & Region
Brigade Commander	Lt.Col Bassey	Efik - East
3 NA Kaduna	Major Okoro	Ibo - East
Depot Zaria	Major Akagha	Ibo - East
5 NA Kano	Acting Major Shuwa Mohammed	North

Following the normal channel of promotional system according to the principle of seniority and merit, there was little or no evidence of systematic discrimination in favour of the Ibo as a group. The appointment of Majors Akahan and Shuwa Mohammed was an attempt by Ironsi to adjust the regional balance of the officers. The appointment of Akahan also was a means of placating the North.

The predominance of Ibos in the high ranking position to some extent assured Ironsi of their loyalty. But this could not guarantee that of the rank and file where northerners predominated.

These changes resulted in suspicion. The changes that were salient in the eyes of junior Northern officers and NCOs were gross overall changes towards greater Ibo numerical dominance at the higher level. This impression was probably hightened by the fact that most of the postings put Ibo officers into command assignments rather than staff or specialist positions. Thus by March 1966, Ibo officers held ten out of thirteen (13) unit command positions whereas in January, they held only five out of twelve (12).[2] This conspicous position of Ibo officers in the hierarchy also fitted in well with the Northerners' understanding of the new political position namely: that the East had gained what the North had lost.

4.2 THE DISCONTENT OF NORTHERN OFFICERS.

The Military Government's clumsy handling of the political situation in the months after the coup was to Northern officers one critical point.

One complaints in particular was made against Ironsi by northern officers and ranks: that he did not order the trial and punishment of the original conspirators

of January 15th coup. Ironsi had been elevated to the supreme power by the Army to suppress the original coup and thus it was naturally expected and demanded that those officers who so offended against all military traditions and honour by murdering fellow officers should be made to pay the penalty for their crimes.

But Ironsi had given his word to the conspirators that they would not be killed and would be free from legal prosecution. He in fact did not intent to turn back on his word. Furthermore, there was the pressure from Southern intellectuals who saw the conspirators as heroes and thus demanded their immediate release.

When action by Northern officers was demanded, he deferred any decision by asking the new Army Chief of Staff Lt.Col. Gowon to carry out a full investigation of the coup. This report was not submitted before Ironsi's death. Anytime he was asked he was in the habit of answering "Justice will be done."[3]

However the main complaint against the Ironsi regime was the list of Army promotions announced in May. Eleven Majors were promoted Substantive Lieutenant Colonels and fourteen others were given the acting rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Eighteen of the twenty-five

promoted were Ibos. In the normal procedure of promotion, there was no discrimination against the north. The one northerner - Major Hassan Katsina who was promoted substantive Lieutenant Colonel was the most junior of the eleven so promoted. And three of the four Northerners - Shuwa Mohammed, Mohammed Murtala and Haruna given acting Lieutenant Colonels were still only substantive Captains.[4]

To the Government these promotions were simple example of promotion on merit; but to the Northern rank and file, it appeared that an Ibo government was doing what it was expected to do to promote Ibos to senior positions.

The situation was normal even with these complaints. The turning point came later and was marked by Decree No. 33 and 34 of May 1966. Decree No. 34 purported to do away with Nigeria's Federal constitutional structure and make the country a unitary state.

This decree confirmed the Northerners' fears that the military regime was determined to deprive them of power. Students at the Ahmadu Bello University demonstrated in protest of the decree and called for its repeal. This was followed by riots in northern cities in which many Ibos were killed. This made the regime

lose its legitimacy in the region. Consequent on this, the discontent of Northern officers took a political form.

The Northern other ranks urged their officers to do something about the situation. In addition to this, students from the only northern university then - Ahmadu Bello University might have had some tremendous influence on the Northern officers.[5] The links with the students might have served to shapen the officers' overall political perspective rather than to :nerate specific plans for intervention. There is no evidence to prove that students had a prior knowledge of the coup.

Similarly, one or two Northern officers might have had links with former Northern politicians. There is evidence that the politicians attempted to obtain access to groups within the military.[6] But it is difficult to determine whether in fact they did so, and even if they did, it is not certain whether this had specific consequences for the organisation of the coup that followed. Whether those officers who were 'accessible' in one way or another were in fact the coup makers.

It is in our view that the fusion of organisational stress and political conflict through belief in an Ibo conspiracy was enough in itself to motivate revolt independent of any political influence by Northern politicians. There is really no evidence that there were transactions between the Northern young officers and former politicians. If there were, such contacts might have hastened things along even though to me, the alliances within the Army itself (such as that between junior Northern officers and NCOs) were of more direct relevance than outside contacts.

From the time of the May 1966 riots, all officers were caught up in a spiral of mutual fear and distrust. Ironsi himself came to rely to some great extent on informed contacts with Ibo unit commanders (such as Lt.Cols Okoro and Akagha) in the north for information on political developments in the region in preference to the officer Northern Regime administration.[7]

This in fact increased the fears of the Northern officers particularly after Ironsi announced his decision in mid-July 1966 to appoint military 'prefects' at a provincial level, to post the Military Governors away from their regions, and to rotate battalions. This was an attempt to tighten central control and also to advance unity in the country. But by this time, the

military itself was riddled with distrust and rumours of impending coups culminating in the counter-coup of July 1966.

4.3 THE JULY 1966 COUP

On the night of 28th - 29th July 1966, Ibo officers were murdered in the army units at Abeokuta, Ibadan and Ikeja. General Ironsi and Lt.Col. Fajuyi were seized and later assassinated. Negotiations then began between the rebels and Brigadier Ogundipe who was the next most senior Army officer. Lt.Col. Gowon was sent to parley with them.

Meanwhile, the rebel officers had also taken over Army units in the North with the slaughter of more Ibo officers and soldiers. In the East, Lt.Col. Ojukwu moved fast and removed the weapons from the soldiers at Enugu into police control before they learned of what was happening in other parts of the country.

Fighting in Lagos and Ikeja area ceased before the night of 29th July and negotiations followed continuing to the morning of 1st August. At the meeting, the only alternative Northern officers accepted to secession was that Gowon as the most senior Northern officer becomes the Head of State.[8] n the

1st of August Lt.Col. Gowon went to Lagos and announced on radio his assumption of power.

Lt.Col. Ojukwu refused to accept his authority arguing that Ironsi's death had not yet been confirmed and therefore, the post was not vacant. He went further that Gowon was not the most senior serving officer, apart from Commodore Wey (Head of the Navy) Brigadier Ogundipe (the High Commissioner in London was was at home at the time of the counter-coup) was there and was supposed to be the Head of State. There were also three other Lt. Colonels who ranked above Gowon in terms of military seniority - Bassey, Imo and Njoku.

Rather than accept Gowon's authority, Ojukwu opted for the secession of Eastern Region which resulted in the bloody Civil War.

4.3.1 THE CONSPIRATORS:

The coup was organised by junior officers (Lieutenants and acting Captains) though the treatment of many victims was taken out of their hands by Non-Commissioned officers, middle level officers w re also involved in the coordination of actions and in subsequent negotiations. The Officers who carried out the coup were almost entirely Northerners although there

was one Yoruba (Temporary Major Alao) in the coordinating group. There were also three among the active junior officers.[9] The Northerners were not ethnically cohesive. The group was composed of people from the different ethnic groups in the North.

4.4 MOTIVATION FOR THE COUP.

From the composition of the officers that carried out the coup and the pattern of killings, there is a tendency for one to conclude that the coup was a consequence of confrontation of primordial groupings. To make such conclusions will be misleading. As Luckham observed, tribal and regional ties never entirely superceded organisational relationships. This is clear both from the persistence of military status, norms and from the fact that the conflict itself drew much of its energy from tensions between the various levels of the military hierarchy, between Non-Commissioned Officers and Officers, between junior Officers and their seniors as we have noted while discussing the effect : of the January coup on the military.

Common interests and goals were widely shared and this helped in mobilising a substantial proportion of the officers and men from all areas of the North; including those who were previously in political opposition to one another, ranging from the Tiv and

Northern Yorubas on the one hand, to the Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri on the other.

The common political course of these groups was fashioned from the political conditions prevailing in July 1966 which defined the situation in terms of regional sentiments, resistence to administration and political unification and opposition to the real or supposed dominance of Ibos both in the struct re of central government and the military.

When Gowon assumed power, the new political balance created by the coup encouraged officers who had earlier wanted the North to secede, to support a strong Federation. Some even advocated within a few days of the coup the immediate invasion of the East to bring it back under the common political framework by force rather than by negotiation.[10]

4.5 THE COUP OF JULY 29TH 1975: ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE THE IMAGE OF THE MILITARY

Gowon as we noted above came to power on the 1st of August 1966 after the counter-coup that was carried out by predominantly Northern officers and men. As we also observed, not all officers accepted Gowon's authority. The Ibos that were most hit by the coup gave Lt. Col. Ojukwu the mandate to opt for secession.

This attempt by the Eastern region culminated in a Civil War with the Federal Government fighting to maintain the integrity of the Federation. The war ended on the 15th January, 1970 with Major-General Effiong renouncing secession and Gowon's acceptance at a ceremony in Lagos.

The end of the war was followed by a period of reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Gowon was able to achieve much in this regard because of the much money gotten from the sale of crude oil.

In October 1970, Gowon outlined a nine-point political programme for return to civilian rule in 1976. He said in a broadcast:

> When we shall have reorganised our Armed Forces, prepared a new constitution, conducted a new census, purge the country of corrupt and unpatriotic elements and fulfilled the other tasks already mentioned, it will remain the duty of the Military Government to organise free and fair election.

He however failed to carry out any of its provisions. And in 1974 he postponed indefinitely the return to civilian rule. He said it was due to "high degree of sectional politicking, intemperate utterances and writings."

On the 29th July 1975, Gowon was overthrown in a bloodless coup by the same group of officers that put him in power in July 1966.

One commentator said that the fact that the coup succeeded without even a token resistance demonstrated quite clearly that Gowon's popularity amongst his fellow officers had sunk to a very low ebb. That is one way of looking at it. Another is that the dominant command of General Gowon's 'constituency' in the Army was drastically curtailed when the size of the Armed Forces rocked from 8,000 in 1966 to about a quarter of a million after the war.

There were a number of grievances against the regime which we shall examine.

4.5.1 WEAKNESSES OF GOWON REGIME

One complaint against the regime was the alarming rate of corruption. Many Nigerians believed that Gowon did not enrich himself through the abuse of office. This was confirmed by some of the military officers who overthrew him in 1976. But his lieutenant evidently wallowed in the vortex of corruption.

According to the then Nigerian Army Chief of Staff, Major-General David Ejoor, about one hundred (100) Nigerian Military officers were penalised for stealing since the country's Civil War ended."

Although, no case of corruption was proved against Gowon, he presided over a corrupt system. There was the clear case of corruption levelled against the late Governor of Benue Plateau State, Late Joseph Gomwalk by the Late Aper Aku. The latter swore an affidavit against the Governor on alleged account of financial wrong doings in the award of contracts and expenditure of public fund. Gowon moved in very fast and cleared the Governor. In so doing Gowon was seen to be playing only lip service to his enunciated crusade against corruption. He was also seen as being sectional because Gomwalk hailed from the same state as him. Earlier, Joseph Tarka, the then Commissioner for Communication, was made to resign when a similar procedure was instituted against him by a former aide.

In fact the Federal Asset Investigation Panel 1975 found almost all the Governors guilty of misappropriation of public fund. The only two Governors that were exempted were Brigadiers Mobolaji Johnson and Oluwole Rotimi.[12]

Another grievance against the government was the issue of reorganisation of the Army. The Force rose from 10,000 in 1966 to a quarter of a million after the Civil War. Under normal circumstances, Gowon was supposed to have demobilised all those conscripted on an

emergency basis for the Civil War purpose. But this was not done. To him, what was important was to leave the army as it was while effecting piecemeal internal structural reorganisation for purpose of more effective control. Unfortunately, many of his officers believed that while Major-General Hassan had done well as Chief of Army Staff, his successor Major-General David Ejoor did not help the situation by his laxity as regards the issue of Army reorganisation. The size of the military affected their professionalism. As most of them - officers, revealed, most of the officers recruited during the war did not receive intensive military training. And at the end of the war, the expanded military resulted in large units with very few experienced professional officers to groom the younger ones. The large size of units did not allow for effective transfer of military traditions. This greatly affected the overall professionalism of the military. The officers that carried out the coup were of the opinion that the military be demobilised.[13]

The accommodation of the military was al o poor. Many of the soldiers became angry with being quartered in 'bashas'[14]

Coupled with this, was the complaints made with regards to Gowon's inaccessibility to fellow officers and important people in the society. As Gowon settled down to the issues of governance after the Civil War, his contacts with many of his military colleagues gradually decreased. Many of the officers were not pleased with such development. This was expressed by General Jemibewon[15] and General Murtala Mohammed who said in his address to the Nation

> ..... After the Civil War, the affairs of State, hitherto a collective responsibility, became characterised by lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline and even neglect. Indeed the public at large became disillusioned and disappointed by these developments. This trend was clearly incompatible with the philosophy and image of a corrective regime ...
>
> ..... Unknown to the general public the feeling of disillusion was also evident among members of the Armed Forces whose administration was neglected, but who out of sheer loyalty to the nation, and in the hope that there would be change, continued to suffer in silence. Things got to a stage where the head of the administration became virtually inaccessible even to official advisers, and when advice was tendered, it was often ignored.[16]

In fact Murtala's address to the Nation summarises all the weaknesses of the regime. This is what has engaged our attention. The motive was political.

There were demands for the reassignment of State governors because they had remained as governors for too long and had become very corrupt. According to the

Head of State (Murtala), there were allegations of corruption, misuse of public funds, abuse of office, deprivation of the people's rights and ostentation."[17] April 1974 was the date Gowon was believed to have set for effecting the change; but the date passed without any announcement. Speculations had it that younger military officers would be given governorship and there was a clear feeling that restive officers felt it was time they too were given a chance to serve. And such restiveness could only have increased when General Gowon rallied to the defence of Governor Joseph Gomwalk of Benue-Plateau State against whom a civilian had sworn an affidavit alleging corruption.[18]

The announcement made in 1974 that the "return to civilian rule in 1976 was unrealistic" was however the main factor that led to his overthrown. On 1st October 1974, Gowon made his much awaited speech on political issues. He said,

> ..... Four years ago when I gave 1976 as the target date for returning the country to normal constitutional Government, both myself and military hierarchy honestly believed that by that date, especially after the bloody Civil War ..... every Nigerian would have learnt a lesson, there would have developed an atmosphere of sufficient stability ..... Regretably, from all the information at our disposal, from the general attitudes, utterances and manoevers of some individuals and groups, and from some publications, during the past few months, it is clear that those

> who aspire to lead the nation on the return to civilian rule, have not learnt any lessons from our past experiences.[19]

The return to civilian rule was thus postponed indefinitely. However, to the general public, it was time to set the machineries for return to civil rule in motion. In a television press conference, Professor Ishaya Audu, Isa Kaita and Aminu Kano expressed their opinions over the need to return the country to civil rule. Commenting on the agitations, then Brigadier T.Y. Danjuma said:

> There is nothing wrong with the agitations by members of the public for a return to civilian rule..... The public agitations for a return to civil rule were merely a reminder to the military regime that it was overstaying its tenure of office.[20]

Danjuma's opinion was a representation of those of the members of the military.

When Gowon postponed the return to civil rule, a new framework was established called "Federal and State Advisory Council" with members drawn from all walks of life - to give Nigerians greater participation in government.

This development was interpreted in different ways in various quarters. It was interpreted in some quarters as an attempt to deny the country a constituted government. The military men however felt it was time for them to leave the stage.

Coupled with this was the general discontent in the country which resulted in many strikes by workers. A typical example was the strike by workers in the private sector of the economy who demanded for increase in their salaries. This was prompted by the Udoji awards in the public sector which led to high rate of inflation. The inflation made the objective of the increase meaningless.

On the 29th July 1975, Gowon was overthrown and Murtala Mohammed became the new Head of State.

As we observed, divisions that developed within the military as a result of politicisation had serious consequences on some dimensions of professionalism. As we saw, divisions developed within the organisation over certain policy - issues. The issue of disengagement from politics had serious consequences on the corporate identity of the military. And once this dimension of professionalism is in danger, the result is always coups and counter-coups. As a result of this, skill level and efficiency equally suffer. Many respondents of the Navy and Air Force wings made serious comments with regards to this issue. They observed that due to fear of coups, most of the weapons imported are locked up in safe places. When requested by unit

commanders when going on bush exercise, certain categories are not always released. And to worsen the situation, the number of times they go on bush exercise is drastically reduced to only three times a year. Without constant practice one wonders how these soldiers would be able to handle the weapons in case of any external aggression.

Since divisions had developed due to politicisation, one was not surprised at the abortive coup that saw the death of General Murtala Mohammed. However, the junta which he led before his death continued with his programme and tried to restore the image of the military. First, the military institution itself was purged and reorganised. Secondly, the regime released a plan to disengage the military from politics and returned to the barracks in 1979.

NOTES

1. Miners, N.J. The Nigerian Army 1956-1966. Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1971. p.183.
2. Luckham, R. op cit
3. The Eastern document, January 15th - Before and After gives the information about Lt. Col. Gowon's report.
4. Miners, N.J. op cit p.210. The Easterners predominated among the cadets taken for officer training in the period 1955-1958 when selection was entirely in the hands of British officers.

5. Most officer cadets were accepted for training after passing W.A.S.C. examination at Secondary Schools. Their colleagues would have stayed on at least another two years in order to pass their Higher School Certificate examination, before going to university. Thus a 2nd lieutenant with one year of training and one year of experience would be the school contemporary of a first year university stulent.

6. See facts cited in M.J. Dent, "The Military and the Politician" in Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to Civil War; S.K. Panter-Bricks (ed) Anthlome Press 1970. There were ties of kinship between Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed and ex-Minister of Defence, Alhaji Inuwa Wada. Dent suggests that the latter was using his private wealth and/or NPC funds to increase his support in the military.

7. Luckham, R. op cit p.60.

8. Ibid

9. Ibid p.77. The Yorubas however were said to be northern Yorubas.

10. The detailed summary of political events after the coup is discussed in chapter XIII of R. Luckham. op cit.

11. The General told an interviewer on a television programme in Ibadan that the officers included five (5) lieutenant colonels, sixteen majors and 55 lieutenants ..... Africa No. 85 September 1975.

12. Federal Military Government's views on the Report of Federal Assets Investigation Panel 1975.

13. That's one of the reasons that Dimka gave as why they planned the abortive coup. According to him, that they heard of plans to demobilise the military.

14. Bushas are ramshackle buildings put up by soldiers themselves as temporary dwellings.

15. Jemibewon, op cit pp. 32-33.

16. Daily Times 1st August 1975.

17. Ibid.

18. Elaigwu J. Isawa, Gowon West Books, 1986.

19. The Nigerian Standard 20th October 1974.

20. Daily Times 30th July 1975.

CHAPTER V

THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY UNDER THE MILITARY

Many analysts have commented on the performance of military governments in economic development. Such analysts like Nordlinger (1970) have emphasised military ineptitude in handling problems of Third World development. They have argued that the military's prime motive for intervening in politics is to insure its corporate interests. And this inhibits economic growth.

We have argued in the previous chapters especially chapter three that the Nigerian Military has been politicised. And this is a consequence of many interrelated factors. These factors create the opportunity for military intervention. More often than not in Africa the major factor has been the economic crisis.[1]

This chapter aims at examining how the Nigerian economy fared under the military from 1966 to 1979. It will be argued that the military rulers often are worse managers of the economy than the civilians they replace. Since they control the means of coercion, their economic abuses and mismanagement often go unchallenged.

The importance of political stability as a prerequisite to economic development cannot be overemphasised. Political disorder disrupts economic activities and thus blocks development.[2] In Nigeria, the military contributed in maintaining a commendable level of political stability particularly after the Civil War.[3] Between 1970 and 1979 Nigeria according to Akin Iwayemi[4] witnessed "rapid economic growth." This is what we intend to examine, whether this growth involved structural transformation of the economy.

Since independence, Development Plans have come to be the chief means of articulating the country's macro economic objectives and programmes. By 1979 when the military regime of Obasanjo handed power to the civilians, the country was implementing its third development plan. Each plan embodied the goals, strategies and socio-economic policies for accelerating the country's development process.

OBJECTIVES. With each development plan since 1962,, the objectives have been spelt out in almost identical terms with occasional addition here and there; but the general trend and direction have been maintained. In 1962, the objectives were stated as "achievement and maintenance of the highest possible rate of increase in the standard of living and awareness of both the potentials

that exist and the sacrifices that will be required."[5] Targets were set at a growth rate of 4 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.)

By 1970 when the Second Development Plan (1970-1974) was launched, a few more objectives were added: "United, Strong, and Self-reliant nation, great and dynamic economy, just and egalitarian society, full opportunities for all citizens and a free and democratic society."[6] This was to be pursued basically through productivity in agriculture, shift of resources to manufacturing industries and the maximum exploitation of petroleum to earn needed foreign exchange as revenue for the Government.

The same objectives remained valid for the 1975-80 Development Plan; but emphasis this time was shifted to income redistribution, reduction in unemployment, diversification of the economy and indigenisation of the economy. The objective of development of technology only came in the 1981-85 Development Plan under the Second Republic.

With benefit of hindsight, there were a few objectives that were ahead of their time: egalitarianism, balance in development and equitable income distribution. How could there be equitable distribution of

income when production was still very low? The neglect of self-reliance and development of technology as objectives at the early stages increased the dependence on import with dire consequences in terms of balance of payment deficit.

Before examining the sectoral growth of the economy, we will take a general look at the growth of the economy as a whole.

5.1 POST INDEPENDENT ECONOMIC GROWTH - AN OVERVIEW

Despite the short-comings in the objectives there was, according to official figures, considerable economic growth in the post-war period.

Table V.1

Annual Growth Rates of the Nigerian Economy 1966-1975
(in percentage)

Period	GDP	Investment
1960 - 1965	5	13
1966 - 1969	2	-13
1970 - 1975	8	35
1966 - 1975	8	22

Note: The GDP and Investment rates are in constant 1962/3 prices. Figures are for fiscal years April to March.

SOURCE: Computed from Federal Office of Statistics National Accounts of Nigeria. 1960/61 to 1975/76 (1978)7

Table V.1 gives a comparative picture of growth performance of the economy since independence. There was an expansion in economic activity in the post-colonial period 1960 - 1965. Prior to this period, economic activities that would accelerate the development of the country were limited in scope and kind. The 150 small scale industries that existed at that period were established within five years before independence.[8] This was done in order to maintain grip on the Nigerian market which was being threatened by the advent of political independence. In fact the objective of economic development ran counter to that of the colonialists who were more interested in exploitation. With independence therefore, economic activities aimed at developing the Nigerian economy increased. During the civilian regime (1960 - 1965), the economy grew at the rate of 5 per cent annually.

As shown in the table, the economy experienced its fastest growth rate when the military was in power, special thanks to the oil boom which gave Nigeria unprecedented income. However, the growth rate was neither consistent nor well managed throughout the period. The country was plunged into a bloody Civil War between 1966 - 1969. During this period there was a downturn in economic activity and all the resources at the disposal of the government were diverted to the

prosecution of the war. Moreover, as the political climate was not favourable for investments, foreign companies withdrew. Consequently, the growth rate dropped to 2 per cent per annum.

The end of the war witnessed a resurgence of economic activities. There was expansion in investments, exports, imports, money supply, prices, and government fiscal operation. From 1970, the economy grew at an average rate of 8 per cent.

The most important contributory factor was the increased earnings from the sale of oil. Nigeria joined OPEC in the early 1970s. And OPEC assumed administration of pricing of oil in 1973. By 1974, the price of oil skyrocketed. The country benefited from this development (see Table V.3). The oil boom therefore imparted a significant stimulus to the rest of the economy. It was not a coincidence that the economic growth rate increased after 1974 surge in oil revenue.

Economic development is not a consequence of economic activity and investment perse, but involves structural transformation occurring in various sectors during the process of economic growth. As such, we are going to examine the development of different sectors during the military era.

5.2 SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT

Table V.2

Sectoral Growth Rates in the Nigerian Economy For Selected Periods 1960 - 1975 in Constant Prices (in percentage)

Period	Agric	Oil & Mining	Manufac-turing	Building & Construction
1960 - 65	2	38	15	10
1966 - 69	-1	8	6	1
1970 - 75	-1	12	14.5	21

SOURCE: F.O.S. National Accounts of Nigeria 1960/61 to 1975/76: Lagos.

Table V.2 gives the growth rates of different sectors from 1960 to 1975. We shall examine the performance of each of these sectors.

5.2.1 AGRICULTURE

Generally endowed with a good climate and plenty of fertile land, Nigeria at independence had high hopes of being self-sufficient in food production to feed her growing population. She also had the hopes of providing sufficient raw materials for her young industries. These hopes were not realised as the post-colonial State uncritically accepted and continued the colonial policy on agriculture which did not augur well for the sector. The colonial policy laid emphasis on traditional method of organising production with its low level of technology. And coupled with lack of official encouragement for merchanised farming, this policy blocked the

emergence of a bouyant agricultural sector and the creation of a large plantation.

The post-independent period (1960 - 1965) was characterised by very limited policy on agricultural development. Agricultural development was regarded as regional responsibility. And as the regions depended on cash crops for development, policy at this time concentrated on the production and marketing of export crops. The planners of the 1962-68 Development Plan had hopes that adequate food supply would continue to be provided by private initiative with little government intervention.

Coupled with this policy was the problem of drought in the sub-Saharan region which forced people out of their land. As shown in table V.2 the growth rate of this sector between 1960-65 barely kept pace with the population growth. The sector grew at the rate of 2 per cent per annum.

The military took over power in the midst of political confusion which culminated in the Civil War of 1966 - 1969. This period witnessed the neglect of the agricultural sector which resulted in decline in food production. The growth rate declined to an annual average rate of 1 per cent. Other factors that

contributed to this development included poor weather, poor transportation system and declining prices. As food production index declined that of import increased. However food import index declined between 1967 and 1968 due to stringent measures imposed on importation by the government.[9] By 1969, food import index rose again.

1970 witnessed the end of the Civil War and the launching of the Second National Development Plan (1970 - 1974). The plan was primarily concerned with rehabilitation of economic activities that were adversely affected during the war. The agricultural sector continued to decline. In 1974, food production index rose to 82.[10] This was still below prewar level.

Apart from the factors earlier mentioned, the increased earnings from the oil sector led to massive food importation. This liberal food importation policy stifled local production. Coupled with this was the provision of social amenities in the urban areas and the neglect of the rural areas. This attracted the youngmen from the rural areas thus leaving very few people to engage in food production.

With all these developments, the export crop sector also declined. In fact by 1977 the export of groundnuts, oil palm, and cotton had almost ceased. This period could rightly be described as the period in which the agricultural production sector entered its crisis stage.

As food shortage became increasingly discernible, the need to adopt definite food production policy became obvious. Some of the measures that the Military Government took to cope with the situation included the supply of farm imputs at highly subsidised price rates. Most of these farm imputs were imported. This provided Government officials and Civil Servants avenues of amassing wealth. There was also the introduction of price guarantee to farmers for their food crops. There was the reform of the Marketing Board system and the creation of seven Commodity Boards.[11]

The Government also launched two nationwide campaigns - The National Accelerated Food Production Programme in 1972 and the Operation Feed the Nation in 1976. These campaigns were designed to accelerate food production of major staple food crops through the introduction of high yielding seeds. The NAFPP launched in 1972 emphasised research in order to develop a good package of technology to ensure high yield.

Unfortunately, these programmes were rendered ineffective due to shortage of competent technocrats and structural bottlenecks in the distribution of imputs.[12]

Other long-term government actions to improve food production included the establishment of River Basin Authorities throughout the country with grandiose objective of establishing food production irrigation facilities, food control and water reservoirs. As always the case with Nigerians, the opportunity was quickly seized by both government officials and contractors to amass wealth. These programmes have not solved the problems of food shortage.

There was also the promulgation of land use decree. This was an attempt to reform the agricultural sector. The essence of the decree in the rural areas was basically to facilitate large-scale farming.[13] The decree allows an individual to own up to 5000 hectares of grazing land through the acquisition of Customary Right of Occupancy.

Unfortunately, the decree was not backed up with efficient law enforcement and coupled with slowness in implementation, it was left rather ineffective. Although the decree invested the ownership of all virgin land on the State, people have not desisted from selling land.

In the export crop sector, some reforms were also carried out. The pricing policy of the Marketing Boards and the decline in investment and output were reviewed.[14] Double tax system (tax duty and produce sales tax) was abolished. The Commodity Boards were now primarily to be concerned with interest of farmers. These policies though good, did not yield any significant result due to government slackness in ensuring implementation. Only lip services were paid to these policies.

5.2.2 INDUSTRY - (MANUFACTURING)

Prior to independence, the Colonial Administration was not concerned with industrialisation process in the country. The colonialists expended efforts on development of raw materials to be exported to the metropolis. This involved simple processing of palm oil, palm kernel oil, latex rubber, raw cotton and cotton seeds. There was no effort made to develop skills in the agricultural sector. Colonial investment was geared towards the development of infrastructures required to facilitate easy exportation of this produce. Investment in the mining sector was primarily intended to facilitate the extraction of minerals for the same purpose. As it was in the agricultural sector, Nigerians provided the required unskilled labour while the Europeans were responsible for skilled functions. Consequently there was a direliction of development of local skill.

Colonial industrial policies did not establish the basis for industrial take off in the country. Rather, the policies inhibited industrial growth. Most of the medium and small scale industries that existed in the country were established within five years before independence and they relied on foreign personnel for skilled jobs while Nigerians provided the bulk of unskilled labour.

At independence Nigeria emerged essentially as an exporter of raw materials. The industries existed in a predominantly agricultural economy with little or no linkages. In fact if there were any linkages it was with the metropolis.

From 1960 to the early 1970s, the government industrial policy did not depart remarkably from the colonial policy of import-substitution. This period in fact witnessed the consolidation of the policy. Import-substitution behind high tariffs protection was an important factor responsible for the expansion of the industrial sector. At independence the output of this sector was slightly over a million naira or 4.8 per cent of the GDP. But by 1979 it has increased to 6.2 per cent of the GDP.[15]

However, the growth rate was not consistent throughout the time. The period marked by political crises and subsequent Civil War witnessed a decline in growth rate. This in turn affected the output of the sector. As the political climate was not favourable foreign investors withdrew.

By the end of the Civil War in 1970 and with the surge in oil revenue, the sector picked up again. The post-war period under the military regime of Gowon has [illegible] nationalism.

"The Government between 1972 and 1977 set out to expand state sector expenditure through indigenisation proposals for several manufacturing industries."[16] The indigenisation decree was promulgated in 1972. It was reviewed substantially in 1977, resulting in phase two of the decree which was designed to correct problems that had arisen with the 1972 decree.

The decree listed two categories of enterprises. The first was to be reserved exclusively for Nigerians. Apart from the retail trade and road transport, the category of enterprises reserved exclusively for Nigerians relates to almost entirely marginal sectors of the economy. This included advertising, public

relations agencies, pool betting business and lotteries, assembling of radios, radiograms, television sets, tape recorders, electric domestic appliances not combined with manufacturing of components, hairdressing, haulage of goods by road, laundry, etc.

The second category of enterprises consisted of those open to aliens under certain conditions. It embraced far more vital sectors of the economy. The list included wholesale distribution, shipping, construction industries, boat building, furniture making, manufacture of metal containers, manufacture of bicycles, production of saw timber, etc. Foreigners may participate in enterprises in this category under two conditions. First the enterprises must be fairly large ones with capital of over ₦1,000,000. Second, there must be 40 per cent Nigerian participation. Several large scale commercial and industrial enterprises were to increase Nigeria's equity participation to 60 per cent.

The areas that were affected by the decree included refineries, liquid natural gas, pipelines, rails, roads, and oil tankers. 55 per centshares in oil producing companies was requested by the Federal Government. And the Government also began to own outrightly all new refineries and 80 per cent shares in two National Gas producing industries.[17] In July 1979, a new corporation -

Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) raised its participation in the oil companies from 55 to 60 per cent.

In the banking system, the Government acquired between 40 - 50 per cent shares in leading commercial banks and insurance companies.[18]

These measures can hardly constitute a serious attack on dependence. The sphere of economic activity reserved for Nigerians are quite insignificant in terms of GNP. Hairdressing, candle manufacture, etc exert an insignificant influence on the Nigerian economy.

Most significantly, the indigenisation decree does not bring under Nigerian control the really big enterprises and the multinational corporations which dominate the economy. These include Unilever, Tate and Lyle, Turner and Newall, John Holt, etc. The failure to indigenise these enterprises is alarming because they not only dominate the economy, they are also profitable. For example, United African Company made a profit of £22 million (₦44 million) in 1974.[19]

In addition to his policy of indigenisation and with money from the oil sector, the Federal Government undertook a massive investment in the private sector. There was investment in infrastructures and facilities such as

electricity generation and telephone system. But despite the huge investment in this sector, reliable and efficient electric power and telephone services remain elusive. The huge investment afforded government officials and contractors avenues for making fast money.

The Government also embarked upon capital projects during the Third National Development Plan (1975 - 1980) which included three steel mills.

By 1975, manufacturing firms reported an increase of 34 per cent in their products and private trading firms had a 53 per cent turnover in the same period.[20] All these steps taken by the Government were said to be attempt at controlling the commanding heights of the Nigerian economy which the civilians of the First Republic did not care to do.

Despite the expansion of this sector, Nigeria has been unable to develop an integrated industrial sector which is capable of servicing national domestic economy. According to Odetola, the obstacles include unreliable power, water supply, obstructive bureaucracy and traits of industrial unrest.[21]

The domination of the economy by multinationals as noted above is massive. All major production, procurement, pricing, recruitment and other decisions are still done almost exclusively by the foreign firms. The situation becomes more alarming when it is realised that decisions about what to produce, which machine and what raw materials to use, who is to manage the operation and at what cost, still rest with foreign partners. This shows that the control of the companies by Nigerians is a mirage.

The bulk of products produced are consumer goods. And production is not based on local resources. As skill is not developed, all skilled jobs are performed by expertriates. And since there is no clear policy on acquisition of technology, and know-how, the Nigerian worker is peripherised in the process of production.

5.2.3 OIL AND MINING

Mining and quarrying have remained central to the Nigerian economy. Modern activities in mining have involved crude petroleum and associate gas production in which foreign-owned oil companies are partners.

Commercial crude oil production in Nigeria began in December 1957. After a relative slow start, production reached 6 million tons by 1964 and increased

sharply in the following years to 21 million tons. This expansive development was interrupted in the middle of 1967 by the outbreak of the Civil War;[22] and production fell to 7.1 million tons in 1968. In 1969, however, the pre-war peak was already passed with 27 million tons and a total production of approximately 77 million tons was registered in 1971 to place Nigeria 10th World's largest petroleum producer.[23] The output of oil rapidly increased to an average of 2.2 million barrels a day in January 1974. In 1975 it fell to 1.5 million barrels a day.[24]

As Akin Iwayemi noted, two factors were responsible for the importance of oil in 1970s. The first was the participation of government in oil exploitation through the NNOC (Nigerian National Oil Corporation which NNPC replaced). And the second factor was the rise in oil prices when OPEC assumed the administration of oil prices in 1973. As already noted, the State acquired 55 per cent of equity in oil producing companies in the country. This percentage was later increased to 60 per cent.

Government oil policy during this period was an off-shoot of decisions made at OPEC meetings. The development of domestic industries were enshrined in the Third National Development Plan.

From 1971 oil dominated Nigeria's export. It became the main source of government revenue. Table V.3 portrays that . For example in 1977, oil revenue was ₦5.8 billion out of a total government revenue of ₦8.2 billion.[25]

Table V.3

Oil Contribution to Federal Government Revenue 1965-1977

Year	Oil Revenue (₦m)	Total Revenue (₦m)	Oil Revenue on Total Revenue %
1965	27.1	321.0	8.4
1966	37.7	339.2	11.1
1967	41.2	300.0	13.7
1968	23.3	299.9	7.8
1969	72.5	435.9	16.6
1970	196.4	758.1	25.9
1971	740.1	1410.9	52.5
1972	576.2	1389.9	41.5
1973	1461.6	2171.3	67.3
1974	4183.8	5177.1	80.8
1975	4611.7	5861.6	78.7
1976	5548.5	7070.3	78.5
1977	5821.5	8251.3	70.6

Source: (1) World Bank, Nigeria: Options for long-term Development, p.227 for data for 1965 and 66.

(2) Federal Ministry of Finance, "Declining Government Revenue and Measures for Mobilisation of Internal Resources for Economic Development and Self-Reliance" (1978).

During 1960 - 1969 period, the overall balance payment was in deficit in 1960, 1964, 1966 and 1967.[26] Merchandise trade was in deficit between 1960 and 1965. But between 1966 and 1969, the deficit in the non-oil sector was counterbalanced by surplus from the oil.[27]

Balance of payment surpluses were recorded in 1965, 1968 and in 1969. In those years the oil sector accounted largely for the surpluses, because the non-oil sector recorded large deficits on current account.[28]

During 1970 - 1979 period the foreign exchange position was appreciably enhanced by the phenomenal increase in earnings from crude oil exports. The value of exports increased at an annual average of ₦754.7 during this decade. With this came the problem of how to judiciously spend the money.

Ambitious schemes were undertaken. The implementation of the Second Development Plan and the reconstruction of war ravaged areas led to increase in the level of imports. The value of imports during this period averaged ₦4,338.4 million, almost ten times that of the previous year. The indigenisation of foreign owned enterprises during the military regime of Gowon and Murtala/Obasanjo also resulted in large outflow of capital particularly in 1974 - 1975. Balance of payment

surplus was recorded in 1973. This surplus increased to ₦3.1 billion in 1974. This development was however short-lived; by the end of 1975 it had dropped to a sum of ₦15.5 million while in 1976 and 1977 there was a deficit of ₦340 million and ₦447 million respectively.[29]

In 1978 following the glut in the international crude oil market, a deficit of ₦1.1 billion was estimated. Faced with this grim situation a balance of payment support loan of ₦627,430,366 was contracted in Euro-currency Market.[30]

The country is also endowed with huge gas reserves of about 2,406.945 billion (m^3). However the gas used since 1960s to the present day is produced in association with crude oil. Gas production fluctuated from 0.144 billion (m^3) in 1960 to the peak of 30.050 billion (m^3) in 1979. It is rather disturbing that the greater proportion of gas produced is flared. Gas flared range between 83 and 90 per cent of total production between 1972 and 1979.

The various regimes did not develop any concrete policy on the production of gas. The only attempt was made in 1979 when Obasanjo's regime promulgated a decree: the Associated Gas Reinjection Decree (1979) which required every oil-producing company in Nigeria

to submit to Government, not later than April 1980, its plans for "Schemes for the viable utilisation of all associated gas produced and projects to reinject all gas produced in association with oil but not utilized."[32] The decree made it illegal for any company to flare associated gas after January, 1984 without permission. The companies till today have refused to take the laws seriously.

Other minerals that were exploited and are still being exploited include coal, columbite, and limestone. The production of coal declined over the years due to diminishing demand. Coal was mostly used in the 1960s and early 1970. The Military governments did not pay much attention to the production of columbite as there was decline in world demand.

On the other hand, government encouraged the production of limestone because of cement industries and the steel mills projects of the Third National Development Plan. Between 1970 and 1975, the oil and mining sector grew at an averaged rate of 12 per cent.

5.2.4 BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION

Since 1960, the country had made considerable progress in this area. The first phase of military rule (1966 - 1969) saw a downturn in development of

construction sector. The growth rate during this period was 1 per cent. This is because the attention of the government was focused on the war.

With the end of the war in 1970, government embarked on a policy of reconstruction. With increase in government revenues from rents and royalties in respect of oil extraction, government building and construction activities expanded significantly. Official estimates put the contribution of this sector to GDP in 1975/76 at ₦2.98 billion or 10.9 per cent. By 1979/80, building construction amounted to about ₦5.58 billion or 15.9 per cent of GDP.[32]

The sector is very important in terms of its contribution to the Gross Domestic Capital Formation. From about 50.8 per cent in 1975/76, its contribution to GDCF went as high as estimated 70.7 per cent in 1979/80.[33]

With the recognition of the significance of this sector in economic development, the Federal Military Government in the Second and especially Third National Development Plans devoted large sum of money for construction. Through the concerted efforts of both State and Federal Governments, road network increased from

66,086 km in 1960 to 114,768 km in 1980. Port construction was also increased. However, there was the problem of port congestion during Gowon regime. With increased port facilities and modern cargo handling equipment, the congestion of the early 1970s was greatly reduced.

On the other hand, the inherited colonial rail lines and the postal system have remained unimproved.

One important problem of the construction sector like other industries is the fact that very little local materials (sand, gravel and timber) are used. The rest are imported and this is a heavy burden on the government. The military government established cement factories, but the production capacity of these local factories are far below the demand of the construction industry. For exemple, in 1975, the total estimated demand for cement was 4,950,000 metric tonnes per annum whereas Nigeria's total local production was only 1,200,000 tonnes.[34] And three years later these figures in 1978 were 7,222,000 and 2,300,000 metric tonnes respectively.

Production of bitumen for road construction was also very low. Construction companies, rather than reinvest the huge amount of profit they make in the country, prefer to repatriate it and government is left with the burden of importing bitumen and other chemicals required

for construction. Most of the government officials like the situation as it affords them the opportunity to siphon money out of the country.

From our discussion of sectoral development or performance under the military, we have seen that every sector except agriculture expanded after the Civil War. Development however was not fundamental. The record of the economy was less impressive than official figures may suggest. For one thing, the economy's performance was not nearly as good as it appeared to be. First, the fortuitous oil boom as pointed out provided most of the increase in GDP. Excluding oil, GDP expansion was as follows according to official figures:

1971 - 72	-	7.5 per cent
1972 - 73	-	0.0 per cent
1973 - 74	-	6.2 per cent
1974 - 75	-	8.9 per cent.

Annual growth averaged 4.6 per cent for the three years to 1973 - 1974 and 5.7 per cent for the four years to 1974 - 1975.[35]

Secondly, official statistics are unreliable. Moreover, the consequent web of indeterminancy and unverifiability nurture the natural tendency of those at the helm of affairs to tilt the official growth rate

upwards. For example as Sayre (1977) pointed out, knowledgeable unofficial estimates indicate that the impact of the West African drought on agricultural output caused a decrease in GDP in 1972-73 and a smaller increase than 6.2 per cent in 1973 - 1974.

The degree to which government and government bodies carried out the projects of the Second and Third Development Plans was disappointing. In fact execution of the plans could not be considered satisfactory. This was recognised by knowledgeable persons. Officials were aware of and concerned about a deficiency of implementation capacity and particularly an inability to prepare projects or to work with foreign experts in doing so.[36] In fact government departments sometimes were hardly aware of the plan even as it applied to their own operation; "in some of the Executive Ministries Officials are not quite familiar with the content of the programmes under the plan."[37]

We have discussed in the beginning how the objectives of the plans were not placed in the order of their importance and this to a large extent has perpetuated Nigeria's dependence on the industrial nations.

Rather than achieving the proclaimed goal of reducing income and wealth disparities, inequality probably increased. This roused broad and bitter disillusion and anger by 1974, and in recognition of the "sensitive" and "explosive" nature of the issue, the Third National Development Plan (1975-80) stressed the goal even more strongly than the Second.[38]

Retrogression on the income and wealth distribution issue was widely recognised. This was rather cautiously noted in official publications. In 1973, it was observed that "not much has been done. Government is probably waiting for Udoji Public Service Review Commission to complete its work before embarking on a major policy to reduce existing disparities between earnings in the public and private sectors on the one hand, and between the low and high income workers within each sector, on the other."[39] Similar observations were made in 1974 "Unfortunately, Nigeria has never had an articulate and deliberate income policy."[40]

> It is possible to record a high growth rate in per capita income while the masses of the people continue to be in abject poverty and lacking in the basic necessities of life, particularly in a situation such as in Nigeria today, where the momentum of growth derives from a sector whose direct impact on the bulk of the population is small.[41]

Unofficial comments were made and were more blunt. For example Sam Aluko, Professor and Head of Department of Economics, Obafemi Awolowo University (formerly University of Ife) Ile Ife said:

> The tendency is for the rich to grow richer and for the poor to grow poorer. This appears to be what has been happening in our economy. Our economy has so far betrayed the third objective of a just and egalitarian society. The growing pattern of income and wealth distribution between the high and the low, between the urban and the rural areas, between the employed, between the unemployed, between the military and civilian population and even between Federal Government and the State Governments is just anything but egalitarian. The economically strong has been growing weaker, butteressed by the increased abundance of the resources available to the governments.[40]

There was income disparity between urban and rural populace. The rural-urban gap was further widened by the Udoji wage increases of 1974-75. These not only substantially boosted urban incomes relative to rural incomes, but acted to reduce agricultural output by raising the price of hired farm labour.

The Udoji wage awards was uncalled for. This helped to raise the level of inflation in the country.

Table V.4

COMPOSITE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (1960 = 100)

Year	All Items	Accommodation	Food	Transport
1966	125.5	116.8	133.1	122.9
1967	120.8	119.7	120.1	124.5
1968	120.3	122.6	112.6	130.2
1969	132.3	120.1	133.9	132.0
1970	150.6	129.7	164.4	143.4
1971	174.7	132.4	211.4	144.0
1972	179.6	135.4	216.6	149.4
1973	189.6	135.4	225.6	155.7
1974	213.6	138.2	261.4	202.6
1975	285.1	141.7	367.7	233.7
1976	348.1	147.8	464.7	249.2
1977	423.1	148.1	592.2	251.9
1978	179.1	186.2	632.1	370.2
1979	535.4	236.5	682.8	456.9

Sources: 1966 Central Bank of Nigeria: Economic and Financial Review Vol.8 No.1 June 1970.

1967 - 1974: T.O. Okurounmu, "Analysis of Consumer Price Movement in Nigeria (1967 - 1974).

CBN, Economic and Financial Review vol.14 No. 1 March 1976.

1975 - 1979: CBN Annual Reports.

Table V.5

RATES OF INFLATION IN NIGERIA
(Annual Percentage Changes in CPI)

Year	All Items	Accommodation	Food	Transport
1966	9.7	20.5	2.3	1.0
1967	3.7	-9.8	2.5	1.3
1968	0.4	-6.2	2.4	4.6
1969	10.0	18.9	-2.0	1.4
1970	13.8	22.8	8.0	8.6
1971	16.0	28.6	2.1	0.4
1972	2.8	2.5	2.3	3.8
1973	5.6	4.2	0.0	4.2
1974	12.7	15.9	2.1	30.1
1975	32.5	40.7	2.5	15.4
1976	33.9	26.4	4.3	6.6
1977	21.5	27.4	0.2	1.1
1978	12.3	6.7	25.7	47.0
1979	11.8	7.9	27.0	23.4

Source: Derived from Table V.4.

The general price level as shown in tables V.4 and V.5 maintained an upward trend inspite of government anti-inflation stance. The period between 1960 - 1969, was characterised by moderate increase in general price level. From 1970 (at the end of the Civil War) inflation became a major problem as the overall price index shot up by 13.8 per cent that ye and by additional 16.0 per cent in 1971 (as shown in table V.5). Staple food prices increased by 22.8 and 28.6 per cent respectively in the two years. This was a

consequence of shortage of goods and services, increased in money supply and the post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation programme embarked upon by the government.

Between 1972 and 1973, there was relative price stability due to various anti-inflation measures and a slow-down in post-war economic activity. A double-digit inflation resurfaced in 1974. And this was mainly due to inflationary trends from world economy. The price situation deteriorated further in 1975 and 1976. Demand pressures which mounted following the inflow of huge oil money and the Udoji Salary increase in those two years resulted in unprecedented price hikes of 32.5 and 33.9 per cent respectively. With this situation, essential commodities were out of reach of the common man.

We can see how the money that accrued to the Federal Government was mismanaged. Indiscrim ıate orders for cement to build army barracks, house the projected World Festival of Black Arts, and keep pace with domestic demand for housing led to shipping of 20 million metric tons of cement, valued at ₦600 million to Nigeria, all at the same time. Over 400 ships were awaiting for anything up to a year, and at Nigeria's expense, before they could off-load their cargoes at

Lagos. Huge public spending yielded meagre returns in the docks, roads and railways.

The huge investments that were embarked upon opened up avenues for government officials and contractors to amass wealth. Corruption was pervasive. When the Gowon government was toppled, all except two Governors were found guilty of corrupt enrichment.

From our discussion, we have seen that there was no radical transformation of the economy during the military regimes. If there was anything, it only showed how incapable the military is in managing the economy. Most of the major decisions were decided by Civil Servants. For example the 'Super-perm-sects' in Gowon regime.

There is really no much difference on how the military managed the economy from the civilians. The indigenisation that was carried out was not fundamental, any civilian regime could have done as much.

Before we conclude this chapter, let us examine Defence expenditure vis-a-vis other sectors' expenditure.

5.3 DEFENCE AND SECURITY EXPENDITURE

Defence and security expenditure has been increasing since 1960. The expenditure on defence rose from ₦4 million in 1961 to ₦25m in 1966.[43] During this period, the size of the military was just under 11,000.[44] From 1967 onwards, there was a rapid expansion of the military. This was due to the Civil War of 1967 - 1969. The dramatic expansion of the military to 250,000 by 1975 and the relunctance to implement the demobilisation policy accounted for large increase in expenditure.

Table V.6

TOTAL FEDERAL EXPENDITURE ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMPARED TO TOTAL FEDERAL EXPENDITURE ON AGRICULTURE AND EDUCATION 1972 - 1977 (₦'million)

Year	Gen. Administration and int. security	Agriculture	Education
1972	607.1	33.1	28.6
1973	588.1	48.8	26.7
1974	822.8	112.0	196.9
1975	1,803.2	300.0	850.0
1976	1,805.6	147.7	1,051.2
1977	864.6	59.2	446.8

Source: C.B.N. Economic and Financial Review. Vol. 15 No. 2 (1977).

NOTES

1. This is extensively discussed in Chapter III.

2. The Nigerian experience between 1966 and 1969 is a vivid example. This is elaborated upon later in this chapter.

3. The only politically uncertain period between 1970 and 1979 was the February 1976 abortive coup in which the then Head of State, General Muritala Mohammed, was assassinated. The 1975 coup which saw Gowon out of office was essentially a peaceful palace coup.

4. Akin Iwayemi: "The military and the Economy" in Oyediran (ed). Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule pp. 47-72.

5. Federal Government of Nigeria: First National Development Plan 1962 - 1968. The details of the objectives have been provided in the Plan.

6. Federal Government of Nigeria: Second National Development 1970 - 1974. p.32

7. The table was adopted from O.Oyediran (ed) op cit p.64.

8. Ibid

9. Akin Iwayemi "The Military and the Economy" in Oyediran (ed) op cit pp. 47-72. Ref. p.67.

10. Ibid

11. Ibid p.57

12. Dunmoye, R.A. "Technocratic Reformism and Nurtur Capitalism: The Agrarian Policy of the Post-Colonial State in Nigeria." A paper presented at the National Conference on Nigerian Gover and Society in the 21st Century, A.B.U. Zari May 4th to May 9th, 1987.

13. The Government believed that one of the grea problems which presented a more rational uti tion of land for agriculture in the rural a was the traditional concept of land owners Federal Government of Nigeria: Agrarian R- Rural Development in Nigeria: Country Rev Federal Department of Rural Development, (undated) pp. 32-34.

14. Central Bank of Nigeria: Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. December 1978.

15. Alkasun Abba & Co.: The Nigerian Economic Crisis: Causes and Solutions. Gaskiya Corporation Ltd. 1985.

16. Odetola O. Military Regimes and Development: A Comparative Analysis in African Societies. George Allen & Unwin (publishers) Ltd. 1982.

17. Ibid

18. Claude Ake: Revolutionary Pressures in Africa. Zed Press London. May 1978.

19. Daily Times. Monday, July 15, 1974.

20. Odetola, O. op cit

21. Ibid

22. Schatzi, L.H.: "The impact of the Civil War on the Nigerian Petroleum Industry" in The Journal of Business and Social Studies. Vol. 2, No. 1 Sept. 1969 pp. 65-74.

23. Gavin Williams (ed) Nigeria: Economy and Society. Rex Collings Ltd. 1976.

24. Akin Iwayemi, op cit p.59. This fall in production was a result of slump in the oil market and OPEC's deliberate decision to limit production.

25. Ibid p.60

26. Central Bank of Nigeria: Economic and Financial Review. Vol. 16 December 1978. p.5.

27. Ibid

28. Ibid

29. Ibid

30. Federal Republic of Nigeria: Official Gazette Lagos, 21st March, 1979 vol.66.

31. Daily Times.

32. Federal Republic of Nigeria: Fourth National Development Plan (1981-85)

33. Ibid

34. Ibid p.155

35. Calculated from Third National Development Plan (1975-80) p.19 (1974-75) prices constant.

36. For example see Second National Development Plan, Second Progress Report p.101-103.

37. Ibid, the document continues "It is the duty of every Head of Department and also his senior staff to take greater interest in, and be constantly informed of progress in the implementation of his Ministry's plan projects ..... Every official should always be ready to discuss his Ministry's projects with confidence."

38. Federal Republic of Nigeria: Third National Development Plan pp. 31, 33.

39. Second Development Plan, Second Progress Report p.32.

40. Federal Republic of Nigeria: Third National Development Plan. p.37

41. Ibid p.27.

42. Daily Times (Lagos) April 21st 1975 p.14.

43. Akin Iwayemi: "The Military and the Economy" in Oyediran (ed) op cit p.62.

44. Miners, N.J. The Nigerian Army 1956 - 1961. Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1971.

45. Odetola O.: op cit p.113.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

As we have seen in the study, some theories have been put forward to explain the phenomenon of military intervention is politics. These include organisation and professionalism theory, political instability theory, corporate interest theory and the foreign influence explanation.

While some theorists argue that professionalism inhibits intervention, others see military intervention as a result of some reasons that stem from their professionalism. From this, one concluded that it all depends on what one defines as professionalism.

The political instability theory lays emphasis on the weaknesses of political institutions and the inability and incapacity of the civilian leaders to rule. Because of these weaknesses, the leaders are unable to resolve political conflicts to which the political system is subjected to. This in effect creates a state of anarchy. With this situation, the military intervenes in order to save the country from total collapse.

The corporate interest theory sees military intervention in terms of the drive by the military to protect certain interests which it has been deprived of.

The foreign influence explanation stresses the fact that due to Third World economic and technological dependence on the advanced nations, they have become susceptible to influence. The military, according to this theory is influenced to overthrow any government that is governing against the interest of the instigator nation.

In an empirical studies of any specific country one may discover that there is an interaction of all these theories.

The attempt at getting a universally applicable definition of military professionalism has not been easy. Library data and indept interviews reveal that most of the industrialised nations define the concept in almost similar manner. This is partly due to the fact that they have to a large extent attained a high level of development.

The interviewees agreed that western professional officers have expertise derived from an academy training and combat experience, a corporate identity and an ethic of disinterested and patriotic service and responsibility to the State (i.e. Government). Professional officers must possess integrity, drive for

self-improvement and a desire to achieve missions with a high degree of excellence. Officers should be efficient and capable leaders. Their bearing should be apolitical and obedient. The ethic of civilian supremacy is an integral element of the definition of professionalism in the British and American military tradition.[1]

However, all the respondents agreed that the ethic reflects the political context within which these professional roles are performed. Therefore if an African officer, who meets all of the western standards of professionalism, intervenes in politics by means of coup d'etat, the act should not be considered as unprofessional. As most of the respondents put it:

> "Our duty is to defend the country from external aggression and also assist the police to maintain internal security. Our first allegiance is to the State. Anybody or thing we feel is a threat to the survival of Nigeria is our enemy."

Even then, the military does not just intervene in most cases, there is always a measure of politicisation (either overt or induced) that takes place. In my opinion, politicisation is central to understanding military intervention in politics.

Understanding the western definition of the concept of professionalism has been necessary because the development of the Nigerian military has to be placed within its historical context.

As we saw in chapter II, the Nigerian Military is a colonial creation. The British established a professional army in Nigeria which by 1900 was made up of mostly Nigerian other ranks. Recruited from the broad spectrum of society, the organisation reflects some of the attributes of the structure of the system. During the process of professionalisation, such reflections were minimised. But with the assumption of control of the army by Nigerians in 1958, the training of officer corps was stepped up. As it was hurriedly done, professionalism was not well-developed in the Nigerian Military. Coupled with the politicisation of recruitment and promotion by entrenchment of quota system at both officer and rank levels, the achievements at professionalisation were to some extent negated thus resulting in the highlightment of the various contradictions that are found in the system at large.

Political consciousness of the military was accentuated by the political turmoils in the country during the first five years of civilian rule after independence. Having been politicised and with the opportunity found in crisis situation, they struck.

The first military coup which is discussed in chapter III was partly an abortive attempt by military officers of the Eastern Region to rectify their grievances. The second which is analysed in chapter IV was a response to the first.

The assumption of total government power by the military led to further politicisation on a number of grounds. First the military became obliged to make policy decisions and cooperate with the major civilian political groups. Even though the military unmistakably remained in the executive, it was by necessity transformed into a political group. Secondly, the process of political rule by the military meant that the top leaders were to some extent divorced from the military and this might have led to development of internal cleavage. And thirdly, since military assumed power, it became prone to the development of divisions on how or what policies ought to be executed, when power ought to be returned to civilians, where to site projects, etc.

When Gowon assumed power, most of his regime's policy decisions were decided in cooperation with civilians. In fact the civilians - Ayida, Asiodu and Damida became very powerful. Some of his military

colleagues were not happy with that development, the situation was aggravated when some of their advice were not accepted. This led to development of cleavage within the organisation.

More important was the problem of when power ought to be returned to civilians and the conditions under which such a return might be effected. As we saw in chapter IV, there were indeed many grievances against the Gowon regime, but it seems the major one that brought down the government was the issue of military disengagement from politics. The comments of even those within government circles showed that there were divisions concerning certain policy issues. After Gowon's announcement that the return to civil rule had been postponed, alot of dust was raised concerning it. General Danjuma (now retired) commented on the general public reaction that it was a reminder that the military was overstaying.[2] And not long after that, Gowon was overthrown in a bloodless coup on the 29th July, 1975.

Since divisions had developed due to politicisation thus endangering the corporate identity of the military, one was not taken unawares by the abortive coup that saw the death of General Murtala Mohammed.

An examination of the economy under the various military regimes in chapter V shows that the military's management of the economy does not show any significant difference from the way the civilians managed it. The monopoly of coercive power enabled the military to achieve a commendable level of political stability which is a pre-requisite for economic development. One would have expected the various military regimes to transform this advantage into high level of economic achievements. Unfortunately, the reverse was the case.

Despite the large amount of money that accrued to the Federal Government during the period of the oil boom, there was no tangible policy achievement. The landable indigenisation and land use decrees were aimed at mollifying the conflict that existed between international and domestic bourgeoisies. In fact the indigenisation decree handed over the most important sectors of the economy to outsiders whose interest was only in the exploitation of available resources to enhance their profit position.

Sectoral development and output show that the oil industry was progressing than any of the other sectors. This as we observed was mainly due to rise in demand in the oil market.

The Agricultural sector was worse than any other sector. Poor agricultural policy resulted in poor yield. Local food production was further strangled by government policy of massive food importation. This retarded the development of the sector. In an attempt to grapple with this issue, the military adopted some policies which included the launching of two nationwide campaigns - NAFPP and OFN - which did not yield the desired result as it only opened up avenues for siphoning the country's money abroad.

The manufacturing industry did not show any radical change in terms of the quality of its products. There was no concerted effort made to lay a solid base for industrial take-off. The idea of establishing a steel rolling mill came only in the Third National Development Plan. The project was not achieved till in the civilian era of the Second Republic.

All the regimes kept the policy of import-substitution which they inherited from their predecessors. By adhering to this policy, the various governments believed that the indigenes would be able to acquire skills to enable them develop their own technology. This thought tends to ignore the fact that the multinational corporations would do all within their means to hide their skills from the indigenes. As a matter of policy, the

international bourgeoisies make sure that all major production, procurement, pricing, recruitment of personnel and other important decisions are in their hands. The lack of an indigenous technology, negated the holding of 60 per cent shares in the oil industry.

The building and construction industry also heavily relied on imported materials. This, as we already noted, afforded government officials and Civil Servants who dominated the policy-making process the opportunity to loot the economy.

In short there was no fundamental change during the military regimes. Decisions were dominated by civilians especially in the Gowon regime. The money gotten from the sale of oil was mismanaged. High degree of corruption characterised the Gowon regime. The government also adopted certain policies which were not good for the country; e.g. the Udoji award was uncalled for. This gave rise to inflation all over the country. Essential commodities were removed from the reach of the peasantry.

The increase in military budgets is largely as a result of politicisation. The transformation of the military into a political group affords it the opportunity to struggle with other groups over revenue

allocation. And since it is ruling, it automatically takes the lion share.

Whether we accept them or not, military regimes have become part of the political process in Nigeria. And in my opinion, politicisation accounts for intervention. To keep the military out of politics calls for a change of the political system. Both capitalism and socialism as practised in the advanced countries are progressive. Nigeria's capitalism is distorted and retrogressive. If the country is going capitalist, then capitalism should be practised in its purest sense.

NOTES

1. The maintenance of that ethic is probably due to the perceived legitimacy of political institutions and procedures institutionalised techniques of civilian command and a reciprocal relationship between the Armed Forces and the Government which involves the exchange of obedient subordination for a measure of military autonomy, introduces an element of bargaining and ambiguity into the military ethic.

2. See chapter IV.

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APPENDIX

stions used during the Interviews

For how long have you been in the military profession?

Can you say the military in Nigeria is professional? State reasons.

What do you understand by the concept of professionalism?

4. Did you receive any specialised training under the military apart from the routine military training? State the types (if any)

5. How has the diversification of areas of training enhanced the esprit de corps of the military? What are the disadvantages?

6. Do you think your colleagues who now hold political posts will still be able to perform military duties effectively when they come back to the barracks? What are your reasons?

7. Can you say the Nigerian Military has maintained the same level of professionalism since independence? If No, why? (Express in percentage).

8. What is your opinion about military intervention in politics?

9. Do you apire for any high political post in a military government? Give reasons.

(Retired Officers)

10. Why did you decide to retire?

11. What do you do now?

(Those holding political post)

12. How much time do you have to carry out your military and political duties?

13. How has your present assignment enhanced your professionalism?