AN ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA AS AN EMERGING DEMOCRACY, 1999-2007

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis entitled An Assessment of Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria as an Emerging Democracy, 1999-2007 has been carried out and written by me under the supervision of Dr. Hudu Ayuba Abdullahi, Dr. Mohamed Faal and Professor Paul Pindar Izah in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria.

The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided in the work. No part of this dissertation has been previously presented for another degree programme in any university.

Mohammed Lawal TAFIDA

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This thesis entitled: **AN ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA AS AN EMERGING DEMOCRACY, 1999-2007** meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science of the Ahmadu Bello University Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my parents- Dr. Dalhatu Sarki Tafida, Hajiya Hauwa Muhammad Lawal and Hajiya Salamatu Tafida; to my maternal uncle-Professor Dalhatu Muhammad; to my family- Hajiya Amina, Dalhatu, Ibrahim and Mu’azu; to my siblings- Hajiya Sa’adatu Ahmed, Mohammed Sani, Mohammed Salisu, Shehu Usman, Umar Faruk, Zainab, Hadiza and Abubakar Sadiq.
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In the name Of Allah, the Guide to the Right Path and the Source of all Knowledge that we know and know not. One of the mercies bestowed by Allah to mankind is the capacity to reason in order to distinguish reality from illusion, the truth from falsehood and right from wrong.

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ABSTRACT

Contemporary civil-military relations is mainly concerned with the civilian leadership’s control of the military in a democracy. As such, this study assessed the factors that shaped the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military establishment in Nigeria (1999-2007). This is because Nigeria’s path of political development and by extension its civil-military relations differs from what obtains in countries with well-established democratic traditions. The study adopted and modified Peter Feaver’s Agency theory of civil-military relations. The study assumed that the nature of the interactions between the civilian and military leaderships, the role of the civil society and the international environment were prominent in shaping Nigeria’s civil-military relations since the inception of the elected civilian government in May 1999. The factors identified include the expertise of the civilian leadership and the willingness of the military to accept directives from the civilian leadership, the constitutional and policy frameworks under which these civilian and military leaderships operated and the roles of civil society and international actors notably the advanced democracies. Employing the qualitative content analysis method in the collection and assessment of data, findings showed the following: the civilian leadership’s knowledge of military matters enhanced the capacity to control the Nigerian military; the role of the civil society as advocate of liberal democratic civil-military relations was very limited; the military’s acceptance to obey constituted authority was a determining factor in civilian control capacity and the role of the international community in terms of its expectations and aid in the area of security sector reform gave an impetus to the capacity for civilian control of the military.
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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1-Background to the Study

The basis for military coups and rulership in many countries gradually eroded as a result of exerted pressure for political pluralism in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The intensification of the processes of globalisation, a multi-dimensional capitalist phenomenon, led to the triumph of the forces of capital over the restrictive forces of the state. As such, the economic implications for political stability in such regions of the globe inevitably led to pressures for political reforms. Military regimes, like the civilian-led autocratic regimes, became increasingly on the retreat due to agitations from within and the international community. These pressures coincided with the end of the Cold War, as witnessed by the triumph of the Western Capitalist powers over the Soviet-led Socialist hegemony in Europe. In short, the pressures for democratic change in many enclaves were largely conditioned “by the swift currents of globalisation and Western triumphalism” (Jega, 2007: 19).

As the forces of liberal democracy intensified in their spread, political disengagement began to occur and reached a climax in Africa in the 1990s across most of those states that experienced military intervention and rule. The soldiers began disengaging or withdrawing to the barracks as political power reverted back to the civilian elites. The general outlook of the post-transition period witnessed a reduction in the levels of successful military coups across Africa. The military was conditioned to accept civilian democratic rule and withdraw to the barracks. The nature of civil-military relations (CMRs) changed as the military establishment was subordinated to the supremacy of a civilian authority. This has been more evident in Africa since the end of the 20th century. The concept of civil-military relations connotes a dynamic interaction between military
and the many civil sectors of the state as defined by a boundary. This boundary defines where military power begins and ends in terms of statutory functions, roles and activities. This boundary could be defined by an established tradition or explicit constitutional provisions of a country. Examples are the 1979 and 1999 presidential constitutions of post-independent Nigeria where the role and power of the armed forces is stated in relation to the supremacy of the civilian authorities (FRN, 1979 Constitution, Section 197[1-2]: 64, FRN, 1999 Constitution, Section 217[1-2]: 85). In general, this change in the balance of power between the military and civil institutions in emerging democracies has led to changes in the nature of civil-military relations because the military surrenders control of political power. The fundamental role of the military is carried out under civilian directives. In some states like Algeria, Equatorial Guinea and Uganda, soldiers in power carefully devised exit plans by installing civilianised leaderships having strong and often, cordial ties to the military establishment.

Generally, the role of the military in a democratic dispensation depends on the level of political culture or the general orientation of the people towards the political system (Huntington, 1964, Finer, 1975). Where the political culture is high and the civilian leaders have legitimate right to rule, the military is forced to accept civilian control. At this level, the mature or developed political culture allows the military to employ subtle methods like normal constitutional channels and resorts to collusion with the civilian authorities. When it is low, the legitimacy of civil rule is eroded and thus weak civilian control ensues. The likely outcome is for the military to displace or even supplant the weak civilian leadership by resorting to threats to withdraw support or direct coercion against the civilian government (Finer, 1975: 126-127).

Nigeria has witnessed eleven successful and unsuccessful military coups. Most were against fellow military leaders with three of such leaders losing their lives while in office- Aguiyi Ironsi in
July 1966, Murtala Mohammed in February 1976 and Sani Abacha in June 1998. The marathon of successful and aborted coups against civilian and military governments resulted in prolonged military rule in the country. At certain periods, the military have expressed the imperative for disengagement because of the belief that it is an aberration to have soldiers in mainstream politics. As such, the coupists (turned rulers) ‘have been quick to declare their readiness to hand-over political power to an elected civilian regime’ (Onuoha, 2002: 19).

The last military regime (1998-1999) organized a short transition programme that culminated in the emergence of an elected civilian government under Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired general and one-time military head of state. The process also witnessed the participation of many retired military officers who had occupied offices in the previous military regimes. The administration completed its two terms of four years each and handed over to another civilian government in May 2007. This is the longest life-span that a civilian regime has achieved so far since 1960. In the past, segments of the fractured civilian elite, retired and serving military officers conspired in December 1983 to overthrow a civilian government in Nigeria (Othman, 1984). In the democratic era, a new form of civil-military relations has emerged. The military has remained in the barracks and a civilian-led dispensation endures within a more or less democratic framework.

1.2-Statement of the Research Problem

In contemporary civil-military relations in a democracy, the primary focus of analysis is based on two crucial issues. The first issue has to do with who controls the military and the second has to do with how such control is made possible. In a liberal-democracy, the elected civilian leadership is expected to exercise control on the military. However, the arena of civil-military relations in an emerging democracy differs from that of a well-established democracy. The
processes that exist for civilian control of the military may neither conform to what obtains in
the advanced democracies nor be uniform for all emerging democratic states. This has to do
with differences in historical experience, the legitimacy of civilian sectors of the state, the role of
the military hierarchy and the role of foreign interests in supporting or subverting the
emergence of democratic civil-military relations. Generally, an emerging democracy with fragile
political institutions faces challenges relating to systemic stability and continuity, especially if it
has experienced incessant military coups and prolonged military rule. This does not only pose
challenges to the democratisation process but also to the nature of civil-military relations.

An understanding of civil-military relations in Nigeria an emerging liberal-democracy is
important to note within the context of three considerations. First, such an emerging democracy
has in the past witnessed periods of military rule as a result of coups and possible civilian rule
before embarking on a process of enthroning democratic governance. As such, it has tendencies
of having weak civil sectors of the state and a class of retired military officials who may have
strong influence in the political landscape of the country. Second, the emerging civilian
institutions that are directly responsible for control of the military establishment are often
fragile due to relative institutionalisation of democratic culture. Thus, the government has to
device ways by which to impose its authority on the military establishment. Third, the transition
it embarked upon does not take place in isolation. The transition to democratic governance
cannot be understood devoid of the globalising currents of liberalisation of the democratic
space. Thus, the direct or indirect role of foreign forces as an external variable in pushing for
political changes within a transiting country is very important.

This work is anchored on examining the factors responsible for shaping how civilian control of
the military takes place in post-transition Nigeria, as an emerging democracy (1999-2007)
grappling with relatively weak, dysfunctional civil political institutions and intractable social contradictions that shaped military coups and prolonged rule.

**1.3- Research Questions**

i)-What is the nature of civil-military relations in Nigeria in the periods before and after the 1998 transition to a democratic dispensation?

ii)-What measures did the civilian leadership adopt to ensure effective control of the military?

iii)- What is the level of subordination of the military leadership to civil authority?

iv)-What is the role of social movements notably Civil Society Organisations during and after the transition to democratic rule as it relates to ensuring the supremacy of civilian leaders in their control of the military?

v)-What was the role of foreign actors in shaping civil-military relations more or less in line with liberal-democratic ethos?

**1.4-Aim and Objectives of the Study**

The aim of this work is to identify, examine and evaluate those factors and/or forces that shaped the nature of civilian control of the military in Nigeria as an emerging liberal democracy. In doing this, the work pursued the following objectives:

i)-To examine the historical antecedents of civil-military relations under past civilian and military dispensations before 1999 and how it has shaped the nature of civil-military relations between 1999 and 2007;
ii) To assess the nature and role of the civilian leadership in crafting and exercising control of the military between 1999 and 2007;

iii) To assess the nature and role of the military in the context of the military leadership’s acceptance of the supremacy of civilian authority;

iv) To examine the role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in shaping civil-military relations in Nigeria’s post-military regime; and

v) To examine and assess the contribution of the international community especially the Western powers in assisting the Nigerian civilian leadership’s effort to exercise control of the military.

1.5-Assumptions of the Study

Generally, the study proposed that certain factors are responsible for shaping the relationship between civilian leadership and the military establishment in Nigeria’s emergent democratic dispensation (1999-2007). These factors are located in Nigeria’s domestic and external environments and within the military establishment itself. As such, civil-military relations are shaped by the civilian leadership, the military, civil society and the international community. Thus, the study came up with four assumptions.

i) The first assumption (A1) states that knowledge in military related matters by the relevant civil authority enhances the ability to control the military in Nigeria.

ii) The second assumption (A2) states that acceptance by the Nigerian military leadership of the principle of civil supremacy has enhanced the capacity for civilian control of the military.
iii) - The third assumption (A3) states that domestic advocacy by social movements notably Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) has enhanced the civilian government’s effort to control the Nigerian military.

iv) - The fourth assumption (A4) states that International support for the promotion of liberal democracy in Nigeria has enhanced the civilian government’s capacity to establish control of the military.

The first assumption is based on the knowledge of some individuals who occupy strategic positions in the civilian government in effectively dealing with the military as an institution. Their expertise in military matters reinforces existing policy and constitutional frameworks and thus, contributes in controlling the behaviour of the military institution towards the political system of the emerging democracy. The second assumption has to do with the internal orientation of the military particularly, the transitional and post-transition leadership within the officer corps. This is with respect to their personal and institutional perception of democracy and their loyalty to civil authorities. The third has to do with the role of civil society groups. It is important in the advocacy for civilian oversight of military activities. The last is the role of the external environment notably the advanced democratic states in shaping civil-military relations by promoting policies such as training and administrative reform which strengthen the civilian leadership in its effort to exercise effective control of the military.

1.6 - Significance of the Study

This study of civil-military relations in Nigeria as an emerging democracy is important because of a number of reasons. There is need to understand the factors and forces that determine how civilian governments exercise control of their militaries. First, studies on civil military relations in a country generally focus on who controls the military. However, it neglects the factors that
determine how such control is exercised especially for states that have recently instituted liberal-democratic rule. Second, the post-Cold War winds of liberal democracy have largely swept away the vestiges of military rule around the world and this has led to changes in the civil-military relations of such emerging democracies. A major emphasis of the literature on civil-military relations of non-democratic or politically fragile states is based on developments within the Cold War period. The classical works by Huntington, Finer and Janowitz suffer the deficit of understanding the recent domestic and global developments that have invariably shaped civil-military relations in states transiting from military to civilian rule. These factors cover the institutional, orientational and systemic facets of such a dynamic and complex relationship. Third, in places where the military has played central role in mainstream politics, understanding the orientation of the military towards the new political arrangement is a justification for studies into the power relations existing in such country. It can even discern why a particular political order exists and endures while other dispensations have not. Fourth, the domestic and external factors are important in contemporary studies of civil-military relations especially for a country that transforms from a military regime to a civilian democracy. Thus, the nature of the elected civilian government, the role of civil society and the influence of the international environment are important in order to assess how they combine to shape the character of civil-military relations. Lastly, this study can serve as a reservoir of ideas for both decision-makers and scholars of political discourse. Such a study can be of use in making inputs for long-term policy options on how civilian leaders can effectively handle the military to ensure its subordination to democratic institutions. In the same vein, students of civil-military relations can draw important lessons from political history of erstwhile unstable states to build both descriptive and prescriptive theories for society as a whole to benefit from.

1.7-Scope and Limitations of the Study
The field of civil-military relations is vast and multi-dimensional in scope and content. As such, the scope of this research covered the intellectual, political, strategic and legal dimensions of civil-military relations in Nigeria as an emerging democracy. The intellectual dimension connotes the corpus of civil-military thought in terms of who control the military. The political dimension dwells on the phenomena of civilian control, praetorianism and the relative degree of military influence on mainstream politics. The strategic dimension covers the military assistance to civilian authority and the legal dimension implies subjecting the military to civil and military laws. In explicit terms it focused on a qualitative assessment of how the historical, political, societal, military and external factors have shaped civilian control of the military in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007.

In terms of limitations, the study faced a number of obstacles in the search for data. First, there was the fear of either acquiring false data or ending up with no data at all. In less developed countries where the political system is less open to the inner workings of government, some level of ideological prejudice exists within state institutions when it comes to providing accessibility to relevant information especially if such data are closely related to the defence and security of the state. Secondly, the study also observed the culture of poor record keeping especially in the library and archives of the National Assembly. It was observed that virtually all the relevant documents as in gazettes or proceedings of committee sittings were not found despite repeated visits. Related to this is the volume of data sought for the study from designated respondents. Some respondents were unwilling to provide specific details on questions asked in an attempt not to divulge what they saw as sensitive information. Others did not accept the request for an interview. Lastly, the study took a longer period to conclude as a result of repeated visits to meet respondents for designated interviews which formed an important segment of the primary data.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1-Introduction

The literature on civil-military relations (CMR) largely dwelt on theoretical and empirical issues that describe and explain the role of the military in the political system whether as a subordinate actor to civil authority (in the case of institutionalised liberal democracies, one-party/socialist entities) or as the main actor in the political arena as in states experiencing instability, militarism or praetorianism. It examined the recent trends in military regime decline and the shift in intellectual discourse on civil-military relations towards the issue of establishing
control of the military by civilian governments within the contemporary drives for reform in the security and defence sectors.

Civil-military relationship in a democratic state describes a situation where the military establishment is obedient, by accepting subordination, to elected civilian authorities. The boundaries which define the spheres of the civilian and military institutions are clear to both in their dealings with each other. This logic is a product of a number of interconnected factors that shape the power relations existing between the civilian and military spheres. In addition, the power relations that exist is complex and involves a multiplicity of interactions at different levels between the military and the society, between the political and military leaders as well as between the officer corps and non-military elites of a country (Dunmoye, 2011:9). This complexity is identified as having many dimensions. Nwolise (2010: 17-19) identifies 17 dimensions that constitute the realm of civil-military relations. These include: Human relations- mutual perception, security of lives and property; Intellectual relations- corpus of civil-military thought; Political relations- praetorianism, civil control and politicisation of the military; Strategic relations- Peace Support Operations (PSO), Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA), civil support, allies mobilisation and ; Legal relations- laws of war, military subjection to civil and military laws.

2.1.1-The Classical Liberal Assumption in Civil-Military Relations

There was an assumption that the civil-military relations in the peripheral states of Africa, Asia and Latin America like the Western countries would have a trajectory based on civil supremacy within the political legacies bequeathed to them by European colonial rule. Early studies of the military in the less developed regions of the world revolved around the liberal-pluralist paradigm or to be specific, the modernisation perspective that they were “part of an
institutional transfer of Western paradigms of governance” (Luckham, 1994: 13). In the liberal democratic state, a clearly defined boundary exists between political jurisdiction of civil authorities and the role of the military with the latter being ‘apolitical’ or ‘politically sterile’ in terms of subordination to the whims and caprices of civilian leaders. This is because

Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself and substituting extraneous values for professional values (Huntington: 1964: 71).

This long held perception was to be debunked as a result of what Perlmutter (1969: 382) describes as “the active and increasing role of the army in politics”. This intervention manifested in various degrees as one moved from one case situation to another. This trend had earlier manifested in the politics of many Latin American states was intensified when some newly-independent Asian and African states witnessed the intrusion of soldiers into mainstream politics by the second half of the 20th century. In the 1960s and 1970s, military coups and counter-coups became important features of the political system in many African states.

As far back as the 1940s, Lasswell (1941) provided a theoretical construct of what he describes as the Garrison State with the proposition that military attributes of violence, regimentation and centralisation are likely to take centre-stage in matters of state-craft. He identifies the ideas of Comte and Spencer, two leading pre-20th century sociologists, as providing insights into the military type of society in their discussions of the historical progression of human societies. He concludes that the idea of military men controlling the political affairs of modern and technically-driven states should not be a new phenomenon in the 20th century (Lasswell, 1941: 457). The trajectory of Lasswell’s construct is an antithesis of the liberal democratic society.
While the soldier is subordinated to the civilian authorities, the former acquires some level of managerial expertise in the social, political and economic sectors of the state. He provides a picture of the feature that marks out a garrison state where the soldiers who traditionally are “specialists on violence will include in their training a large degree of expertness in many of the skills that we have traditionally accepted as part of modern civilian management” (Lasswell, 1941: 457-458). Thus, the garrison state is run on the basis of compulsion. Centralisation implies constricting the political space as it relates to individual liberties. Consequently, the ruling elites are expected to abolish all channels of public opinion and suppress dissent (Lasswell, 1941: 459, 461). This phenomenon of militarism is in line with the position that the civilian political elites, in their bid to make state-craft more efficient and effective, adopt some of the values of the military institution especially in crisis situations. While this has not happened in the Western world where strong liberal traditions have endured over time, the concept is relatively significant in the study of states that have experienced military intervention and prolonged rule or in states where soldiers play a central role as guardians of the political, social and economic order like in Egypt or Libya under the Free Officers Movement and Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. This is not to say that the garrison state, in whatever form, has today given way to political systems that draw inspiration from the dominant paradigms of neo-liberal ideology or that some features in this political arrangement can be found in the current political systems of post-transition states.

2.1.2-The Phenomena of Military Professionalism and Intervention

The garrison state, as one of the many variants of authoritarianism is in contrast to the trends in the military’s withdrawal from mainstream political power and the democratisation of the political institutions of the post-military state in the late 20th and 21st centuries. Within the
context of the modern state system Hutchful (1998: 249) views the military as ‘a body of armed men and women practicing the legitimate profession of arms under the authority civilian leaders and the control of duly appointed commanders’.

As a special body possessing the platforms and instruments of coercion, the military or the armed forces have certain organisational attributes which distinguishes them by tradition and legal framework from the rest of the institutions in the society to which they belong. Huntington (1964: 8) outlines them as the special expertise (as in the knowledge and skills) to control sophisticated, coercive technology, the responsibility and corporatism (as in espirit de corps) within a command structure. The orientation, rigid hierarchy and social cohesion of the establishment is virtually based on the imperative for supremacy of military culture above all else as viewed by the officer corps which commands the lower cadre of its human resources. These peculiar attributes are translated into professionalism. Professionalism, according to Janowitz (1959: 487) is when “members of an occupation develop a training procedure, a body of expert knowledge, and a set of operating standards”.

The military is supposed to be composed of professionals based on its exclusive area of competence. It is this exclusivity that makes the military profession distinguishable from other types of professions in the society. For this to happen there must be a regulatory mechanism that determines the nature of recruitment and institutional socialization. Thus, it is generally emphasized that “the military as an institution controls entry into its profession and trains the potential professionals to become experts in the control and management of violence” (Babangida, 1991). The modern military is thus, described as a profession that employs expertise in the use of coercive instruments for a purpose determined by superior authorities who occupy the apex decision-making levels of state power. This is what obtains in those countries with
relatively stable civil-military relations be they liberal democratic or authoritarian-based systems.

The creation of new states in Asia, Africa and Latin America by colonial capitalism in the 19th and 20th centuries was anchored (like in the metropolitan political systems) on the principle of military subordination to civil authority and with the soldier expected to leave matters of policy-making in the hands of the post-colonial politicians. However, this intellectual dogma was made to stand on its head as a result of the phenomenon of military intervention in places like Africa, Asia and Latin America. Military coups were by no means restricted to such areas. The military has struck with mixed outcomes in China (1971), France (1958 and 1961), Poland (1981), Portugal (1974), former Soviet Union (1991) and Spain (1981). But it was in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia like Pakistan, South Korea and Thailand that the propensity for soldiers to stage coups and assume political leadership has been comparatively high.

Military intervention could be understood from two perspectives; the first involves the expansion of military roles outside established policy realms at the request of constituted civil authorities in order to address threats to the government or state. In the second perspective, it is a calculated process, in a swift or gradual manner, of wresting control of the decision-making organs of a country from an incumbent government, in theory, by the military forces of that country or, in practice by a segment of the military (with the direct or indirect support of a non-military ally) through the use of subtle or coercive means. The goal of such action is to transform the power relationship to an advantage for the soldiers in question and their allies outside the military establishment. Both angles converge on the issue of boundary breach in that the military embarks on a role outside the traditional boundary of its professional expertise whether defined by the constitution or long-established tradition.
Finer (1962: 126-127) identifies four levels of military intervention. The scope of such intervention increases from the first to the fourth. The military could employ subtle means in order to influence policy. It could also engage in blackmail where the government is intimidated to a point of complying with its demands. It could withdraw support for the government with the expectation that a rival group would have a leverage to displace the incumbents from power. Soldiers could supplant the government through a coup d'état. Thus, a coup is merely one kind of intervention. According to Luttwak (1980: 16) it “consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder”. As a strategy for overthrowing the government, it implies a sudden strike and seizure of the gravitational centres of political power by a small group of conspirators from the military which is part of the state apparatus (O’Kane, 1981: 288). Most of the 20th century was characterised by the preponderance of military coups in many countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Using Africa as a reference point, by the mid-1980s about two-thirds of the countries in the continent were either under military rule or had experienced some form of military intervention at certain periods (Wanyande, 2000: 107). Within a 40 year period since 1960 “over eighty successful military coups d’état were staged and over two dozen leaders were assassinated” (IPA/CODESRIA, 1999). Additionally, Thomson notes that between 1952 and 1990, military coups that were successful in Africa have “resulted in the toppling of governments in 60 per cent of the continent’s states” (2000: 123).

The role of the military in the development of the countries where they have taken over and ruled has been interpreted and assessed in both positive and negative terms. Soldiers whether in khaki or in mufti have been a supporting pillar of political stability and engineered socio-economic changes in places such as Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia and South Korea. For example, under a right-wing military regime that ruled for almost two decades, Chile witnessed economic
transformation and relative socio-political stability despite its poor record on human rights. This situation was the same in Indonesia under General Suharto. In contrast, Uganda under Idi Amin Dada witnessed a roll-back of the relative gains achieved under the preceding rule of Milton Obote. The economic fortunes of Uganda plummeted and foreign relations with its neighbours and Britain, the excolonial power deteriorated. In countries like Nigeria or Pakistan, the result has been mixed. Soldiers have played an important role in preserving the corporate existence of these countries; by executing a successful civil war to its logical end in Nigeria’s case (1967-1970) or preventing it’s a stronger neighbour from overrunning it in the case of Pakistan’s conflict with India since 1947. However, military rule has to some degree, been unable to address the major political and economic contradictions inherent in these countries and as such, have been forced to relinquish power to elected civilian governments. In Pakistan, the military whether in or out of government remains an important symbol of national cohesion and this has been enhanced by its monopoly of the country’s nuclear weapons even under periods of civilian rule. This pattern of civil-military relations has the features of a promilitary society, a politicised officer corps that maintains high levels of organisational professionalism.

The motives for military intervention are numerous, and generally, rest on the interests that the military coupists are trying to promote. The role of the army has generally been categorised as being a possible vanguard in the struggle for social justice, a reactionary force or merely an apolitical tool under the whims and caprices of civil authority. From a Marxian class perspective, the military is romanticised as a possible vanguard of socio-political change in alliance with revolutionary socialist forces. Tyoden (1985) posits that the peculiar form which global capitalism takes in less developed states and the social contradictions it generates leads to the emergence of revolutionary forces. This can provide an opportunity for a possible military role which can act as a vanguard for socialist change. In places like Egypt in 1952 and Libya in 1969,
soldiers kicked out conservative monarchies and established political regimes with nationalist-leftist leanings. Falola and Ihonvbere (1985) add that progressive forces may employ the military as part of a larger movement to replace the status quo with a new political dispensation. The military action can be said to be termed revolutionary or breakthrough coup. However, within the same Marxist tradition the military is viewed as anti-revolutionary given historical and empirical evidences. Mirsky (1981: 327) opines that “…by its nature, the army is a political force, and the military apparatus is part of state power and an instrument of the ruling class”. Even in retrospect, the aristocracy is the genesis of the officer corps in most preindustrial societies. Thus, the military is seen as merely an institution that defends the interests of the domestic and international capitalist forces. Samora Machel argues that “bourgeois armies claim an apoliticism…, even though they constitute the principal arm of repression of the oppressor-state, and guarantee the continued exploitation of the working masses” (quoted in Patcher, 1982: 601). The Marxist-Leninist paradigm argues that the emergence of social classes at relative periods in human history meant that special bodies (the army inclusive) became necessities for the preservation of the status quo (Lenin, 1967: 323). In the same vein, Ayu (1986) and Oyedele (1994: 514-525) opined that the military as a reactionary force intervenes in order to block political change, preserve the dependent capitalist order or to dislodge progressive regimes. This is what is referred to as a veto coup. However, these two scenarios are devoid of the possibility of a military intervention starting as one form only to change direction as a result of changes in the domestic and international environments or even within the military institution itself.

From the liberal-institutional perspective, it is argued that the military is an apolitical tool that operates under the civil control within a liberal democratic system. On the contrary, the apolitical or neutral position that ought to be the posture of the military is an illusion.
In fact, it is desirable that the military is political..., if the military is to defend democracy, it is imperative that it is fully conversant with democratic norms and features, which it serves and is able to interact with elected civil authorities around a range of issues critical to national security (Nnoli, 2006: 192).

While it is a fact that the boundaries of civil supremacy and military professionalism are clearly defined by historical reasons and constitutional provisions (Huntington, 1964), there lies ambiguity in the definition of the line that divides what constitutes the political and the apolitical. In reality, power cannot be divorced from politics and thus, such conceptual descriptions like sterility or apolitical military is subjective and irrational.

2.1.3-Typologies of Civil Military Relations

Within a span of five decades, several types of the relationship between the military and civil institutions have been developed on the basis of a number of criteria. It must be noted that there is no grand taxonomy in the field of civil-military relations. Works in the area of classification largely involves case studies that end up having limitations when applied to all political systems. It is therefore not surprising to have several criteria from a wide range of military observers as to the dynamics of power relations between the military and the civil groups in the political system. Taxonomic studies in this area include those by Adekanye (2008), Finer (1975), Huntington (1962, 1964), Janowitz (1964, 1977), Luckham (1971a), Nordlinger (1977), Perlmutter (1969) and Welch (1974).

The motive of a military intervention is identified as an important criterion. It implies that the orientation of the military as it relates to what is happening in the larger political environment shapes the tendency to engage or abstain from intervention into mainstream politics. The political motives of the officer corps are identified and used to determine the type of
intervention that takes place. The military could engage in a palace coup where the leadership is changed in order to maintain the status quo. A reform coup is carried out to bring about gradual change and soldiers wishing to bring radical change in the political system partake in a revolutionary coup (Huntington, 1962: 32-33). It must be noted that motives in themselves cannot provide an impetus for intervention without opportunity and disposition. The military operates within an environment that provides or inhibits the dispositions or opportunities.

Motives are dependent on moods, opportunities and dispositions available to the military. These factors include the collective consciousness of the military as a protector of the national interest, overt or latent crisis in the political system, level of political culture and the degree of legitimacy of the government (Finer, 1975: 20-71). In the classification, four possibilities are proposed. The first is that the military will not intervene if it does not have the opportunity and disposition to do so. In the second, if the military has the disposition and opportunity then, intervention is a likely. In the third, where there is no disposition but an opportunity exists, a brief and limited level of intervention could occur. Lastly, where there is the disposition but no opportunity, military intervention a remote possibility (Finer, 1975: 74-75). However, it is not clear as to who provides the opportunity or disposition for the military to engage or abstain from intervention.

The second type is the degree of power or autonomy that the military wield in the political system. In this case, intervention is at various levels. As a pressure group, soldiers could intervene using constitutional means in order to secure corporate rights or resort to extra-legal means like the withdrawal of support for or the forceful eviction of the incumbent leadership (Finer, 1975: 126). In addition, the ideology of a given political system could determine the power of the military in the society and its level of professionalism. In some states like Pakistan
and Bangladesh, the military is viewed as an important pillar alongside civil institutions. An anti-military ideology could render both military influence and professionalism on lower or higher levels. The Kenyan airforce suffered neglect by the Arap Moi government as a result of an attempted coup in 1982. It is also possible to see an inverse relationship between military power and professionalism in either pro-military or anti-military societies (Huntington, 1964: 96-97). In situations where the military is merely an arm of the ruling party, Nordlinger gives a picture of the ideologically-indoctrinated military:

In the military academies, training centers, and mass-indoctrination meetings, and in the frequent discussions that take place within the smallest military units at these times and places intensive efforts are made to shape the political beliefs of the military... (Nordlinger, 1977:15).

The military’s level of influence could also be examined within the context of the power they exercise in relation to what is at stake. Soldiers (as self-seeking guardians) could indirectly wield power from behind the scenes in situations where the civilian elites are politically weak; they could intervene directly for a short period to correct what they view as deviant tendencies or manifest their political ambitions by remaining in power (Nordlinger, 1977: 21-32). However, the role of external factors, outside the state has often been neglected by this position in the understanding of the military’s propensity to intervene or abstain. There have been instances of covert and even overt American support, on the basis of the Monroe doctrine for military coups in many Latin American countries in the 20th century.

The third is the degree of institutionalisation of civil power and the degree of role differentiation between the civil and military institutions. Where public support for the government is high the chances of intervention and rule are minimal or non-existent. Thus, there must be an acceptance of the supremacy of the civil institutions and the procedures of
how political power is acquired and exercised (Finer: 1975: 18, 78). The military’s role is a manifestation of the nature of power relations within the state. A state could have objective control of the military or a balance in the power relations between the military and civil institutions. The state could be under constabulary and subjective controls where civil institutions are more powerful than the military or where there is an overlap of functions between the civil elites and the military brass, or the guardian, garrison or praetorian states where the military is the most powerful force in the society (Luckham, 1971a: 22-35).

The fourth is the traditions of western states with well-developed political institutions as distinguished from those in less developed peripheral states. In the political systems of Europe and North America, the military could be based on aristocratic, totalitarian or democratic traditions. In the peripheral states, control of the military is based on personalist rule, authoritarian-mass, democratic, coalition and military oligarchy (Janowitz, 1977: 79-82).

The fifth is the degree of strength of institutions, the coercive and political capacity of the armed forces and the nature of the boundaries that determine the scope of military action are also used. In a society with a high level of democratic political culture, the political limitation of military power is more pronounced because of a clearly defined role, whether defined by historical tradition or by legal provisions, as to where military behaviour begins and ends. There is a strong attachment between the society and existing political institutions which operate to mitigate any possible interference from ambitious soldiers. The military’s tendencies to intervene against civil authority could also be foiled by reducing their coercive capabilities. The Arap Moi government in Kenya demobilized the airforce in response to a failed coup plot in 1982.
The sixth classification is based on the differentiations between the military traditions of the ‘Old’ professionalism as practiced in the Western societies and what is referred to as the ‘New’ professionalism of the non-Western states that have experienced military rule. In the first case, the military as an ‘apolitical’ player is responsible for external missions and retains a high degree of professionalism. In the second, the latter is political, engaged not only in external missions but has added another function in matters of internal security and maintained a high level of professionalism in its orientation and primary mission (Stephan, 1971: 27).

In his own contribution, Omoigui (2003: 9-13) offers six models of civil-military relations in terms of the integrity of boundaries between the civil political leadership and the military establishment, the degree of civil control and threat orientation of the military. Drawing from the 19th century Prussian tradition of military professionalism, his liberal model is based on the Huntingtonian thesis of objective and subjective controls. The boundary of civil military relations is clearly defined and the military has an external orientation under strong democratic control. The boundary is permeated or fused in the authoritarian, praetorian and integrationist models. In these models it is posited that the military largely plays an active role in the political processes of the state serving as an arbiter and partner in domestic and foreign policy-making.

In the agency model, the military is an agent of the ruling class based on delegated but controlled authority. In the pre-colonial entities of Africa, civil and military institutions are fused. Generally, these models are largely drawn from the works of Finer (1960) and Huntington (1964) and extent Feaver (2003).

The aforementioned classifications largely neglect the role of the international forces as an important variable. The end of authoritarianism and the emergence of liberal democracies were largely influenced by global currents associated with the end of the bi-polar Cold War or the
intensification of international economic relations. This affected the domestic structure of the state and society. If this issue is an important factor in the discourse on contemporary liberalisation and democratisation processes in Africa, Asia, the Americas or Eastern Europe then, the study of current civil-military relations in these regions of the world cannot be divorced from international political, economic and social forces.

Another observation is that of peculiarity. The typologies tend to make generalisations which to some extent, lack validity when applied to some countries or particular regimes. The significance of historical processes and factors that are peculiar to each political system tend to be ignored. Thus, similar political phenomena in many states cannot be analysed by applying the same criteria due to historical peculiarity. Even in the Western traditions where certain traits are common, American civil-military relations may differ in certain respects to that in France, Italy or Japan on the basis of history.

2.1.4 Causes of Military Coups

In a series of case studies on postcolonial Africa, Kposowa and Jenkins (1990: 862-863, 1992: 273-275, 1993: 127) identify four broad explanations as to why military coups take place. These are the political development argument, the military centrality thesis, the ethnic antagonism and the economic dependency models. The political development or modernisation thesis rests on the relationship between social change and political instability as a result of weak civil institutions inherited from colonialism (Huntington, 1968). The forces of modernisation unleash rising social mobilisation which is not matched by the slow pace of political institutionalisation. Thus, instability creates the conditions for military intervention. The apostles of modernisation emphasize on the effects of change either in the society or the military institution itself which brings instability in the political system of fragile states. The military thesis is based on the
argument that the military institution being the most cohesive body and given the resources at its disposal enhance the possibility of intervention in order to address the backwardness of the society (Janowitz, 1977). The ethnic antagonism model suggests that cultural pluralism, with a dominant outcome, triggers off military coups as a result of escalation in ethnic struggles for power (Jackman, 1978: 1273). In the same vein, Adekanye (2008: 15) identified the contradiction between the integrative and centralising tendencies of the military institution on one hand and the disintegrative potentials of multi-ethnic societies that are segmented. It implies that the role of the military can serve as a driving force for social integration on one hand and could sharpen social cleavages on the other. On the basis of the pattern of recruitment and composition, the military can be categorised into an ethnic-pluralising type where composition is based on representation from all ethnic groups in the society; the uni-ethnic type or the military that is dominated by one ethnic group and; the nationalising type where the recruitment is not based on ethnic identity but on individual willingness to serve in the military (Adekanye, 2008: 21-23). Theoretically, in a dispersed multi-ethnic society, a military coup is easier to plan and execute but more difficult to succeed as a state-wide phenomenon. Inversely, in a centralised multi-ethnic state, coups are to plan and execute but easier to succeed as a state-wide phenomenon in the long run (Adekanye, 2008: 32). This ethnic based framework of analysis neglects other equally important factors like the economy, the social class structure, ideological orientation and the effect of foreign influence in shaping civil-military relations. Somalia is a centralised uni-ethnic state comprising clans and families. To a great extent, Somali society is a homogenous social setting in terms of tribe, religion and language but inter-clan manipulation dissolved the bonds of ethnic solidarity with all institutions including the army collapsing and giving way to protracted civil war between militias since the early 1990s. In addition, multi-ethnic states like Kenya and Tanzania, with the exception of airforce incident and
army mutiny in 1982 and 1964 respectively, have experienced relatively stable civil-military relations.

The last explanation has to do with the weak economic base of the postcolonial state that is dependent on an unfavourable external market for the sale of its primary commodities. Fluctuations in the prices of primary exports and the resultant dwindling in external earnings adversely affect the revenue base of the state and consequently, the citizens’ living standards. This situation enhances socio-political unrest and induces military intervention (O’Kane, 1981: 289).

With respect to the unit of analysis of the phenomenon of military intervention, the perspectives can be categorised into two broad schools. While some, notably Janowitz and Auma-Osolo place emphasis on the internal dynamics of the military institution, others like Huntington and to a lesser extent, Finer identify the political system as a function in determining whether or not soldiers would displace the civil elites.

Janowitz (1977:103-105) examines the cause of military intervention from an institutionalist perspective. He identifies six variables that explain the patterns of military behaviour in new nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The first determinant is the organisational format of the military in terms of its service ethos, coercive power, national identity and managerial ability. The second is the degree to which the military has the capacity to provide political leadership outside its profession in the face of an absence of capable civil institutions in these countries. The third has to do with nature of social recruitment and education in terms of how the idiosyncrasies of the social groups which the military draws its manpower from affects its behaviour towards the political system. The fourth cover the issues of nationalist sentiments, professional ethos and the military’s level of acceptance or rejection of political, social and
economic changes in the society. The fifth dwells on the capacity to intervene and provide stable political leadership on the basis of the level of social cohesion. This capacity depends on training, indoctrination, operational experience as well as inter-generational cleavages in the rank and file. The last factor has to do with the capacity to create a legitimate political base under its control but outside the military establishment. This perspective neglects to a certain level, the inevitability of influence of the political environment in which the military institution operates in. The process of staging coups and forming the government are often carried out in concert with some segments of the civilian population. As such, this line of argument does not go challenged by Huntington (1968:194) who says that:

...the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organisational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society.

The environmentalist position is shared by Finer who focuses on the degree of weakness or strength of civil institutions in the political system. This is dependent on the political culture of the society or what he identifies as the level of “public attachment to civilian institutions” (Finer, 1975:18). If attachment is high, then the military cannot intervene and vice versa. Institutions are viewed as a complex set of procedures and organs whose legitimacy is based on a wide consensus in a society characterised by a strong political parties, civil groups and the source of sovereign power and the process of transfer of power are clearly defined and acceptable. However, in identifying the driving factors for military intervention, Finer adopts the approach of Janowitz as expressed in the motives and the disposition of soldiers in terms of the corporate awareness of national interest, sectional or personal interests and the ‘manifest destiny of soldiers’ as translated in the high sense of self-esteem over civilian political elites (Finer, 1975:
The opportunity to grab power is provided by increased dependence of civilian leaders on the military to stay in office, unpopularity of the civil leadership, the fear of civil war (Finer, 1975: 64-66).

In a synergy of the institutional and environmental frameworks, Dudley (1982: 78-79) distinguishes between predisposing and facilitative variables in the analysis of the behaviour of the military towards the political system. The facilitative variables determine the predisposing ones. The latter is operationalised into the composition and structure of the military, the degree of professionalism and their normative orientation. The facilitative factors basically comprise the degree of permeability of the boundaries of military power in terms of societal and extra-societal factors influencing military behaviour, the extent of independence of the communication channels of the military in relation to societal channels, the balance of societal forces and the coercive power of the military. He further adds with a caution that

The importance of each of these variables and their mix would vary from one society to the other; this fact means that one cannot give a satisfactory explanation of a coup without any reference to the contextual environment of the coup (Dudley, 1982: 79).

In studies of civil-military relations in post-colonial Africa where intervention was a major feature of politics, Decalo departs from what he labels the ‘organisational features’ of the military and ‘systemic weakness’ of the domestic political environment and shifts direction toward the proposition that military coups are manifestations of intra-elite conflict in terms of intra-civil, intra-military and civil-military relations existing in the political system. The features of the political system merely serve to analytically expose the internal state of the military, the elites and their personal ambitions (Decalo, 1973:115). This perspective is buttressed by the
observation of certain social and psychological traits among groups and individuals which in explicit terms and explanation suggest that:

Covert ambition, fear, greed, and vanity have catapulted military leaders into power, utilising a deflation of political legitimacy, or manipulating the powerlessness of most polities to defend themselves from assaults (Decalo, 1990: 11).

This can be understood within the dynamics of hierarchical structures, cliques, corporate and personal ambitions of some military officers in Africa (Decalo, 1990: xii-xiii). Most of the countries prone to political instability and possible military coups have

...regimes that are increasingly deficient in meaningful institutionalization and popular legitimation, with power strongly centralized in the hands of quasi-autocratic personalist rulers. Legitimacy is secured through patronage, clientelist alliances, systemic intimidation (Decalo, 1990: 113).

The issue of musical chairs in unstable societies is further examined within the context of class analysis. Military intervention is viewed as one strategy of inter or intra-class struggle between the dominant, factionalised groups. This involves studying the causal effects of primary contradictions in the processes of primitive accumulation and the secondary contradictions of factionalism within the political elite and the resultant synthesis of praetorianism. As an important instrument of class struggle, it serves as a platform for the social mobility of groups to capture power in the face of indecisive or rather irreconcilable conflict by the ruling group. Class struggle manifests itself in the form of ambitions to grab the instruments of state power in order to be strategically placed in the ladder of accumulation and patronage. As Kalu (2009: 90) puts it incessant military intervention could be driven by ‘individual ambition for power, conflict and
factionalization within the military class, conspiracy with certain elite groups within the civilian population’.

Once in power, the military constitutes itself into a ‘proprietary class’ which engages in an intractable cycle of factional struggles for the spoils of political office (Othman, 1989: 114) in a situation where the state is the dominant player in the economy. These factions view the state as a platform for primitive accumulation and thus, a protracted struggle ensues for the capture of political power through the use of force- insurrections, coups, assassinations and civil wars. These struggles can be understood in terms of a cyclical process: military leaders in unstable societies who harbour personal ambitions engage in a contest for strategic political offices. Where the military institution lacks a high degree of social cohesion, its lingering internal contradictions and crisis in the political environment could induce the propensity to engage in coups (Nnoli, 2006: 186). With reference to the Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia, it is observed that a coup could be staged by “conspirational elements of the military underclass, or militariat” that are analogous to the working class within the society as a whole (Kandeh, 1996: 387). It suggests that military coup is a product of “the structural division of labour between management (officers) and workers (militariat)” (Kandeh, 1996: 388).

The formation of cleavages and cross-professional coalitions by ambitious officers leads to incessant inter-factional struggles between and among them to check the power of rivals within and outside military circles. The political climate of unstable states with strong natural resource-base (Bangura, 1998: 24) has also been identified as motivation for incessant military intervention because of the temptation to maintain or achieve rentier status by the politicised segments of the officer corps. Though this line of explanation sounds plausible, some less-endowed countries like Mali and Somalia have experienced some form of praetorianism
comparable to those having comparably larger resource bases like Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Another factor which has often not been prominently featured as a plausible position on military intervention is the cultural heritage of countries (particularly in Africa) where the propensity for intervention was high in the past. It is argued that the phenomenon of coups can be partially explained as the resurrection of the warrior tradition which was a central political feature in pre-colonial African societies (Dunmoye, 1997: 307). This position is not valid for a number of African states that have not experienced military intervention. The Wolof, a major ethnic group in Senegal has a heritage of pre-colonial warrior-hood. Yet, there has not been a single military coup in that country.

Generally, when the propensity for military intervention is evident in a political system, it implies that there is high level of vulnerability. A state’s vulnerability to military intervention is conceptualised in terms of what is referred to as the Coup Risk factor. Belkin and Schofer (2003: 595) define it as ‘the probability of a coup attempt (whether or not successful), not to the probability of a successful coup’. Coup risk is dependent on a number of ‘deep, structural’ factors which, in summary, cover issues like the nature of government and society, and the type of political culture in the country. These can be distinguished from the trigger, short term (proximate) causes. The structural factors are categorised into three- the strenght of civil society, the legitimacy of the regime and the past history of military intervention in that country. The triggering factors depend on the structural factors because the latter category are embedded in the political system and thus, are the fundamental sources of regime instability. In a study of coup risk, Belkin identifies 21 variables with nine categorised as structural factors, seven variables being trigger causes and the rest sharing both categories (Belkin and Schofer,
However, the study fails to include the role and effect of external forces in serving either as trigger or structural factors. A country that has a weak economic base and is dependent on external economic and military support, it is possible for a foreign power to infiltrate its gravitational centres of power and destabilise the government through a coup or mass insurrection. Examples include Iran in 1953 and Chile in 1973. Inversely, a foreign power could deter or directly assist in suppressing a military revolt. In 1981, Dawuda Jawarra of the Gambia was able to reverse a coup allegedly sponsored by Libya with the assistance of Britain and Senegal.

2.1.5 The Legitimacy Question of Military Rule

The evaluation of military intervention and rule was earlier assumed to have benefits for unstable states with weak political institutions and low political culture. The military was viewed as the most effective social group that had the capability of playing a vanguard role in transforming the society in terms of socio-economic development and political stability which the state lacked. Hence, the expectation was that soldiers would provide the political leadership that was needed and as such, the primary role of the military had to go beyond corporate professionalism.

In newly-free countries, the officers usually possess high levels of education... the military can be effective at mobilizing the symbols of nationalism to include their role as creator and guarantor of national identity (Sorenson, 2007: 99).

This position is premised on the argument that the low levels of systemic institutionalisation and the inability of civilian elites to establish legitimate rule has negative effects on the stability and
development of the society. For such to happen, the better organised, better skilled military is forced to fill the vacuum.

In postcolonial emerging nation states, the military is the lead agency in the struggle for independence and thus well-positioned to lead independence, particularly if the post-independence political space is relatively vacant (Sorenson, 2007: 99).

In order to prevent systemic breakdown and possible collapse of the state, the soldiers are forced to intervene in a guardian coup in order to ‘rescue’ the weak state from the crisis of underdevelopment. Also, the role in which the military plays in the political system is anchored on the patriotism and nationalistic posture which civilian elites are accused of lacking. The advocacy draws some lessons from countries like Chile, Egypt, Indonesia and South Korea under Generals Pinochet Nasser, Suharto and Hwang respectively. It was during a personalistic-military regime that these countries witnessed significant socio-economic transformations.

On the average, soldiers in government have largely brought about negative consequences in the long-term for both the society in which they rule and the ethos of military institution to which they belong. They have been accused of transplanting militarism and its attendant violence which has resulted in social strife, economic collapse and civil wars (Fayemi, 1998). They have been adjudged to be poor managers of the economy and do not have the capacity for transparency and accountability. In short, military rule has generally failed to provide the much-needed stability required for development to take place. It is noted that the military institution in governance is by its very nature antagonistic to the development of the political and institutional framework for peaceful resolution of conflicts and for mobilising national energies to tackle these problems (Hutchful, 1997)
Because of this outcome, some military regimes have come to accept and conclude that military rule is an aberration (Onuoha and Fadakinte, 2002: 19). While it may be possible for the military to take over power from civilians, the issue of legitimising their rule becomes a problem, especially in societies where the political culture is not largely disposed to military rule but a swift return to the barracks. Generally, the military suffer from two weaknesses despite their coercive and organisational capabilities. The first is the ‘technical inability to administer any but the most primitive community’ and second has to do with ‘their lack of legitimacy that is to say, their lack of a moral title to rule’ (Finer, 1975:12).

The assertion is based on the fact that the military, as a professional body of special expertise that is run along the lines of command, obedience, brute force and cohesion which in relative terms, are deficient in the societal environment. At the same time, the military, in principle, lacks the culture of discourse, dissention or opposition as features of most contemporary political systems and by implication, cannot sustain authority when in power over time. This is why when opposition appears, the military rulers often employ brute force in order to crush it. In a situation where a military regime is institutionalised in the political system, there is an alliance with sections of the civilian elites or perhaps the junta has been able to transform the socio-economic fortunes of the state. The debate on whether or not the levels of military professionalism are compromised as a result of military intervention into mainstream politics has resulted in a discourse since the assertion by Huntington (1964: 2) where the relationship is constructed between the functional role of the military and the influence of the societal values on it. He posits that

Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their social function....The interaction between these two
forces is the nub of civil-military relations. The degree to which they conflict depends upon the intensity of the security needs and the nature and strength of the value pattern of society (Huntington, 1964: 2).

Using his assertion as a yardstick of evaluation, if the value pattern of less developed states differs from those in the mature democracies, then the functional imperatives are likely to take divergent paths. Where the political system requires the intervention of the military, it is possible for soldiers to effectively perform political functions of policy-making and internal police functions while at the same time maintaining a high standard of professionalism in terms of their corporate identity and expertise. As Stephan (1971: 27) notes in the case of Brazil, there are situations where professionalism can be maintained alongside other missions outside the traditional sphere of military functions. This he labels the ‘New’ professionalism of the military in a non-Western political system. He goes further to justify military intervention and rule by arguing that

The weaker the civilian government’s own legitimacy and ability to supervise a “peaceful” process of development, the greater the tendency will be for the new professionals to assume control of the government to impose their own view of development on the state (Stephan, 1971: 27).

However, this may not be true for other countries that have experienced military rule as each situation has its own peculiarities. This has some validity for some Latin American countries like Brazil and Chile where the armed forces have taken up roles outside their traditional areas of competence notably in matters of internal security, air space management and maintenance of oil refineries. In contrast, it is evident that the ethos of the military profession in Nigeria was perverted as a result of the prolonged and deep involvement of soldiers in mainstream politics. Many officers apparently got entangled in societal contradictions to a point where the level of
cohesion was affected at the height of military rule in the 1990s. According to Adejumobi (2001:
1) the military

...was badly devastated by long years of military rule in Nigeria....there were
winners and losers among military officers under military rule, but at an
aggregate level, the institution itself was a loser...The institutional culture of
...esprit de corps, strict subordination and discipline, organisational solidarity
were all squandered.

In many parts of the world where soldiers have intervened, the main subject matter does not
entirely dwell on the issue of the consequences for the military profession but on the effect of
such interventions and rulership on the political, social and economic situations of the societies
that they have lorded over. How has it affected the social conditions that shape the nature and
role of the state or society?

2.1.6 Military Withdrawal to the Barracks

The phenomenon of military withdrawal from mainstream politics became a major feature of
Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, and Africa in the 1990s. In general, the issue of military
withdrawal or retreat to the barracks has initially been discussed from two general perspectives.
These perspectives largely neglect the factor of domestic forces outside the military or of actors
external to the country in question. This is evident in the works of Finer and others. Their
positions revolved around a web of inter-connected parameters as expressed in motives,
dispositions and necessary conditions. The motives have to do with self-assessment of the
military and the challenges from within and outside the institution itself. The dispositions also
rest on self assessment and in addition, the generation of an internal consensus to withdraw
and the adequate protection of corporate interests. The conditions both military and societal
relate to whether or not the incoming civilians would protect the corporate interests (Finer, 1985: 23-24).

The first perspective has to do with the technical and moral deficiencies inherent in the military institution. Soldiers do not have the capacity to rule because they lack the technical skills of state-craft and have a moral handicap in justifying their rule over the society (Finer, 1975: 12-15). It is generally assumed that military regimes cannot effectively manage the politics or economy of a country because they lack the expertise to do so. Thus, military rule is an aberration and is expected to be corrective and brief (Dare, 1981: 351). In addition, military regimes face another set of challenges that relate to the issue of the capacity to generate popular support, institutionalise this support and to resolve the question of political succession (Finer, 1985: 18). As Welch (1974: 213) notes, military intervention often results in a dilemma for the members of the ruling junta, because they are “uncertain whether they have accomplished what their intervention allegedly was to correct. They are caught in a dilemma”. This implies that the moral question, though not unrelated to Finer’s argument, is a central issue in the politics of prolonged military rule. The process of withdrawal depends on the degree of cohesiveness of the military leadership in the drive to leave the scene and the propensity of societal and international factors in pushing for the military to leave the mainstream of political power. Welch goes ahead to conclude that certain important conditions are necessary for the military to retreat to the barracks. These are: the willingness of the military to accept subordination and relative obscurity from the political scene, the presence of civilian elites capable of claiming and retaining power, reinvigoration of popular support base outside the sphere of military control, the level of economic development and the relative satisfaction of the corporate and personal interests of the military establishment (Welch, 1974: 224-225).
Also, Perlmutter (1969) examines military withdrawal to the barracks in terms of the general orientation of the military without incorporating factors outside the institution. The orientation is defined as an arbitrátive type where the ruling military junta acknowledges the supremacy of civilian rule. Thus, the regime prepares to hand over to civilians because it is concerned that prolonged military rule would lead to fundamental compromises in the levels of cohesion and professionalism. There is also the concern that if hand over does not take place willingly, there could be reprisals in the long run when civilians assume power some day (Perlmutter, 1969: 393-397).

A number of typologies emerge in trying to explain military disengagement or transition to civil rule. According to Bennett and Kirk-Greene (1978:13) the nature of military withdrawal is of two broad types. In the first type, the military acts as a caretaker regime. It partakes a swift withdrawal from mainstream statecraft because it “is incapable of long-term rule and coexistence with a new set of political leaders is possible”. In the second type, the military sees itself as a corrective regime and as such the transition to civilian rule is gradual and slow “on the grounds that comprehensive systematic reforms are required which only the military can achieve”. In his own contribution, Adekson (1979: 213-216) identifies three approaches in trying to understand the nature of military disengagement with the focus being the type of political arrangement that emerges after the transition as against the duration of the transition period as proposed by Bennett and Kirk-Greene (1978). The first is countercoup-inspired approach where a group of dissident soldiers stage a countercoup and displace an existing military regime that has lost complete legitimacy. The motive may be to initiate a transition to transfer power to civilians. The second involves members of the military junta transform themselves into a quasi-civilian administration. Political legitimisation involves national elections and support from the
military. In the third approach, the military fully disengages from political power and hands over to civilians on the basis of a compatible and workable relationship (Adekson, 1979: 215-216).

In his own contribution, Ulfelder (2005) posits that military regimes are the most fragile of all authoritarian regimes. This is because a military regime is more likely to collapse due to contentious opposition from within its ranks and the tendency “to value the survival and efficacy” of the military profession (Ulfelder, 2005: 318). He goes further to say that “when elite rivalries or policy differences become acute, those officers are more likely to favor a return to barracks as a means to preserve military unity rather than a slide into naked rivalry” (Ulfelder, 2005: 318). This assertion sounds plausible and conforms to Finer's argument of the fear that when corporate cohesion is compromised, a civil war could ensue if soldiers do not retreat to the barracks. Would a military junta that has compromised the ethos of its primary constituency return to the barracks in the face of contending pro-democratic forces? Empirically, this may not be the case. Between 1993 and 1998, the Abacha regime refused to budge despite intensified domestic and external agitations for a democratic government. In fact, the regime employed the tactics of bribing, bullying and dividing members of civil society and the factionalised political elites during the crisis that accompanied the annulment of the June 12 1993 Presidential elections.

Military withdrawal to the barracks is dependent on numerous variables that often combine differently and provides a peculiarity on the basis of time and issues pertaining to the country in question. The driving force and transition path from authoritarian rule to democratic dispensation is diverse and did not take place at the same time in the countries concerned. With respect to time it can generally be stated that it spanned a period of about two decades beginning from the mid-1970s in states such as Brazil and Greece, Argentina in the 1980s and
reaching a climax in the 1990s in Chile and a number of African states. Also, there is the issue of remote and immediate factors. The remote factors can generally be categorised as external forces and the immediate ones largely related to internal forces within domestic political environment of the state. Factors responsible for the collapse of authoritarian governments and by implication, the military retreat to the barracks (whether virtual or real) can be grouped into three- the global, domestic and institutional factors.

The global factors have to do with the trends in the international system during the late 1980s and the 1990s. These cover the end of the bi-polar Cold War and the triumph of liberal ideology in Europe and later in other regions of the world, the intensification of the forces of contemporary globalisation and its added impact on the lingering economic crisis of states ruled by soldiers and lastly, the political agenda of Western states and finance institutions in terms of conditionalities for good governance and democratisation as well as the domestic outcomes of the international dimensions of the democratisation processes. According to Arnold (2005: 774):

Western support for the concept of good governance only appeared as the Cold War came to an end and it appeared with quite remarkable speed…. the principal concepts being advanced by the Western donors were good governance linked to aid conditionality.

In 1995, a published report of the Commission on Global Governance -a product of the 1991 Stockholm Initiative provided the ‘road-map’ for the promotion of good governance and democracy in states that were either under military rule or civil autocracy (Arnold, 2005: 775). Thus, it can be said that the processes of democratisation and military withdrawal have their roots within an imperialist construct. Hutchful (1995a: 100-101) provides a six- stage chronology of the international dimensions in the process of democratisation in Africa. It provides a picture of the dominance of international forces in the changes that shaped the political currents of
undemocratic political systems. These are: the collapse of the Soviet Union and its socialist hegemony; the triumph of the liberal paradigm and in essence the United States and its Western European allies; the drive by global capital to reduce the role of the state in the economy; the re-emergence of social forces that challenge the boundary of state power; the principle of interventionism under Western dominated international bodies like the United Nations framework and lastly, the proliferation of civil society groups that span across state boundaries.

Political and economic changes in the international system as a result the end of the bi-polar Cold War have influenced fundamental changes in the internal politics of most authoritarian states. It must be noted that these changes coincided with the economic crisis experienced by most states in Africa whose governments were either one-party civil authoritarian or military juntas. As noted by M’baya (1995: 71) the crisis manifested in the form of dwindling public revenues, fall in the growth rates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), rising cost of living and increasing public debt. This was attributed to poor administrative management, corruption, non-accountability and other authoritarian tendencies. These countries were forced to accept the ‘theoretical, financial and technical’ frameworks for structural reforms from the hegemonic Western powers, whose liberal-market ideology had triumphed over the socialist model in order to address their economic crisis. The triumph of liberal democracy, as one of the globalising forces was accelerated by “a new phase in capitalist development” (Mangisteab, 2002: 65-66). This triumph was made possible by the fracture from within and without of the authoritarian state. Subsequently, this phase largely conditioned the imposition of economic and political conditionalities of good governance on the economically weak undemocratic states of Africa.

With its new power and mobility, capital’s influence over governments has increased although the magnitude of its leverage over different
governments varies considerably....The pressure that capital exerts on governments is much greater in the less developed countries. Debt ridden African countries have been unable to resist the conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank (IFIs)... (Mangisteab, 2002: 67).

The promotion of liberal democracy and free market policies by Western governments, international agencies, notably the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the numerous international non-governmental actors such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch mounted pressures on these politically unstable and economically fragile states under military rule to chart transitions that would eventually culminate to the realisation of civil democratic rule. Accordingly, the Western Powers tied continued economic relations to “the introduction of free elections and the trappings of liberal democracy and good governance” (Petras and Veltmeyer: 2001: 107).

The second covers the socio-economic crisis of the state under military rule, the proliferation and sharpening of social contradictions that challenge state legitimacy resulting in a sustained and increased domestic agitation for democratic rule by disenchanted groups across social classes and post-transition outcomes. It is argued that as time goes by

...it becomes more difficult for military officers to exercise power effectively and then to seize power successfully..., the number of social groups and forces multiplies and the problems of coordination and interest aggregation become increasingly complex....the military become simply one of several relatively insulated and autonomous social forces. Their capacity to elicit support and to induce cooperation declines...other groups develops their own means of countering military action (Huntington, 1968: 229-230).

Ake (2000: 127-128, 132) identifies the forces that demanded an end to authoritarian rule and transition to democracy. These aggregate of groups include counter elites (excluded from
power), business people (negatively affected by regime policies), other professional groups, workers and peasants, officials of previous military regimes as well as the forces of the international community, notably some Western governments, the Bretton Woods Institutions and human rights bodies. A combination of unfavourable international economic climate and domestic mismanagement of state power led to the acceptance of harsh conditionalities from powerful creditors and as such, the resentment of authoritarian forms of leadership by social groups in these countries.

In addition to these, disengagement and democratisation depends on the demonstration effect of successful democratisation experiments in other countries (Conteh-Morgan, 2000). However, it has been suggested that such demonstration effect (from the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe) does not provide adequate explanation for the resurgence of multiparty democracy in societies under civil or military autocracy. Instead, economic crisis faced by such countries, has been identified as the main driving force behind the process of democratisation (Enemuo, 1992: 31). The economic plight of these countries led to the solicitation of assistance from the Western governments and inter-governmental financial institutions. The imposition of neo-liberal conditionalities in return for badly-needed credit lines worsened their social and economic situations. This led to the proliferation of agitations for liberalising the political space by affected groups in such countries. Many regimes were forced to either retreat or break down in the face of opposition which sometimes assumed violent dimensions as witnessed in Mali in the 1990s. As such, the democratisation agenda swept away the basis for continued military rule.
Another phenomenon that has been discussed is the rise of civil society groups in the agitation for democratic rule in Africa has been noted in the literature on transition and democratisation in Africa. In the opening segment of his article, Gyimah-Boadi notes

> Among the forces that dislodged entrenched authoritarianism in Africa... the continent’s nascent civil societies were in the forefront. It was often the resourcefulness, dedication and tenacity of domestic civil society that initiated and sustained the process of transition (1996: 118).

While credit has been given to these movements in the struggle for democracy in authoritarian polities, they have been identified as merely offshoots of external forces. They are instruments of controlling domestic discontent against authoritarian regimes’ policies of structural adjustment so as to mystify the actual goals of capitalism and imperialism (Petras and Veltmeyer: 2001: 128-129). The agenda of Western governments through these non-governmental bodies is to create a more conducive environment for the pursuit of their foreign policy goals—democratisation and free market economy. Accordingly, it has been noted that

> ...economic development could not be pursued in isolation from concern for accountable and responsive governance, and that development assistance to Africa dictatorships had generally proved a disastrous failure (Diamond, 1993: 5).

In essence, the genesis of recent pro-democracy civil society groups can be traced to the intensification of capitalist penetration of authoritarian states whose adjustment policies of reduced intervention in the social and economic life of societies has in turn intensified the agitation for democratic governance (Mangisteab: 2002: 67). However, a contrary perspective is advanced to indicate that their role is often exaggerated. It posits that
....the success or otherwise of the transfer of power from the military to elected civilian regimes is largely independent of the strength or intensity of civil society. The impact of the latter is limited when the state does not fracture from within (Nnoli, u. d: 7).

To buttress this position, it is argued that military regimes either stay in power or dictate political succession because of ‘the enfeebled and incapacitated nature’ of democratic advocacy groups by employing tactics ‘of divide and rule in order to break the agitations by groups and politicians for democracy’ (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999: 259). This raises the issue of whether the political deficiencies of military regimes or the forces of globalisation, is fundamentally responsible for the military’s withdrawal from the centre-stage of power in authoritarian entities. The state in Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America inevitably fractured in the face of globalisation. As such, the convergent agenda of external and domestic forces creates a blurred picture. There is difficulty in precisely ascertaining whether or not civil society would have succeed in fracturing the authoritarian state without external influences and eventually force the democratisation agenda on reluctant military juntas.

The third or institutional factors relate to the military establishment itself. These cover the ‘Mission Accomplished Model’ interpreted to mean that the military has achieved the goals that made it to seize power in the first place; politicisation and consequent factionalism within its ranks; lack of the legitimacy to stay in power; failure to address political and economic problems and lastly, the agitations for civilian (democratic) rule (see Kieh Jr and Agbese, 1993: 414-420). Others are the ascendancy of factions within the military leadership who harbour pro-democratic ideas and the general expectation among its rank and file that civil rule would be more beneficial to the military in the long run. Prolonged military rule could lead to compromise in the levels of professionalism and corporate cohesion. As such, it is generally
noted that soldiers who have initiated measures to hand-over power ‘appear to accept (often grudgingly) that their continued participation in government would damage their corporate, professional and class interests’ (Luckham, 1998: 596). In Ghana and Nigeria, the ascendancy of military leaders harbouring pro-democratic tenets led to successful democratic transitions during the regimes of Jerry Rawlings and Abdulsalami Abubakar (Anene: 2000). In some African states like Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger Republic and the Gambia, it is on record that soldiers have civilianised their rule, contested elections in their respective countries’ transitions to democratic rule and assumed democratic leadership. The militariat in the Gambia and Liberia under Captain Yaya Jammeh and Sergeant Samuel Doe transmuted into civilian leaders (Kandeh, 1996). Similarly in Ghana, Rawlings removed his uniform, contested and won two successive presidential elections in 1992 and 1996. This trend was the same in many places. They include Major-general Paul Kigame in Rwanda, Colonel Nguema-Mbasogo in Equatorial Guinea, General Lansana Conte in Guinea, Captain Blaise Campaore in Burkina Faso, General Omar El-Bashir in Sudan, Major-General Yoweri Museveni in Uganda and Colonel Idriss Deby-Itno in Chad. With respect to Nigeria, General Sani Abacha attempted to succeed himself in a teleguided transition programme. Since 1998, a number of retired military officers have participated as principal actors in the democratic process of the fourth republic.

In addition, the challenges to democratisation process particularly, for recent entrants to democratic rule in certain states having high cultures of militarism and militarisation as a result of either prolonged military rule or civil war have been highlighted by scholars like Adejumobi (1999) and Ekeh (1999) with respect to the imperative for demilitarising the political space in Nigeria. This implies that while military rule ends, there is a continuation of its practices in terms of “human rights abuse, state-engineered conflict and the militarisation of decision-making processes” (Fayemi, 1998: 84). He adds that while “several countries that have
democratised during the past decade, none can as yet boast of a serious movement beyond the formal processes of legitimation through ‘free’ and ‘fair’ elections” (Fayemi, 1998: 84).

Long period of military rule results in transplanting authoritarian inclinations. The same structures are handed-over to the new civilian regime which retains such legacies and applies them in the art of governance. It is within this light that Bangura (1998:5) notes that the African state in transition has generally failed ‘to develop institutions or rules of competition that would encourage politicians and pressure groups to conduct politics through constitutional as opposed to violent methods’. A state could transit to civil rule and still retain some vestiges of authoritarian tendencies instituted by the preceding military regime. The post-transition state may assume an authoritarian posture if the contradictions and subsequent conflict in the society challenges its power base. In a situation where such takes place, the democratic process is affected in terms of the nature of elections and party politics, the scope of basic freedoms and the degree to which the military have influence in the transition process and its outcome. In short, it is possible to have civil institutions devoid of democratic governance. According to Levitsky and Way (2006: 1) “new regimes combined electoral competition with varying degrees of autocracy”. This varied from one country to another. In places like Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Togo and the Congo Democratic Republic (former Zaire) military leaders were successfully grafted into the transition and emerged as civilian leaders. The electoral playing field was largely to the advantage of incumbents. Opposition groups were intimidated and coerced into either accepting such outcomes or going underground.

In Nigeria, many retired military officers who had participated in military coups and held strategic political offices in the past were either elected or appointed into executive and legislative positions in the new civilian governments that emerged after the two general
elections in May 1999 and May 2003. They include Olusegun Obasanjo, Theophilus Danjuma, Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, Joseph Garba, Ike Nwachukwu, Abdullahi Mohammed, David Jemibewon, Ahmadu Ali, Abdullahi Sarki Mukhtar, David Mark, Olabode George, Tunde Ogbeh, Kayode Are, Olagunsoye Oyinlola, Bala Mande and Mohammed Buba Marwa. Since the late 1970s, most of them continue to play prominent roles in the Nigerian economy either as proxies for foreign capital or control major stakes in domestic business concerns such as aviation, banking, construction, upstream petroleum services, shipping and telecommunications (Adejumobi, 2001: 171-174). During the 2003 presidential elections, four candidates were former military. The two main contenders were former military heads of state- Olusegun Obasanjo and Muhammadu Buhari. As such, retired military officers have become prominent in post-transition Nigerian politics. In Mali, popular disenchantment and subsequent uprising, forced the military establishment in 1992 to remove the repressive regime of General Moussa Traore and organize credible elections by a prodemocratic military regime led by Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure.

In a post-transition scenario, the crisis of underdevelopment and its role in political instability, as explained by Kieh Jr and Agbese (1993: 410) may create conditions for soldiers to attempt displacing the newly-born democracy. What may or may not prevent such a situation to materialise depends on the degree of military professionalism, the extent of civilian control of the military, the nature and intensity of divisions and power struggle within the military and the degree of the external pressure on the military to respect democratic values (Nnoli, 2006: 187-188). Nevertheless, it is important to note that three important determinants shape military withdrawal from mainstream political scene. These are the level of division among the ranks of the military, the level of social mobilisation among the civilian groups towards a political
transition and a strategy to craft effective civilian control on the military during and after the transition period (Trinkunas, 2000: 81).

However, it is too early to conclude whether or not the military in these new democracies may resort to displacing civilian governments as they have done in the past. It is important (as earlier noted) to point out that this new dispensation in civil-military relations in these emerging or transitional states, particularly in Africa (as compared to Latin America) is a relatively recent phenomenon. For over a decade, the life span of the Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has been characterised by continuous military subordination to civil-democratic authorities and inversely, an apparent absence of military coups.

Nigeria has witnessed about ten officially recorded military coups and prolonged military rule in between two civilian dispensations. A transition programme culminated in the withdrawal of the military to the barracks and the ushering of a civilian administration in May 1999. Previous attempts, notably in the early 1970s, and the period that ranged from the late 1980s to the middle of the 1990s were unsuccessful. The 1998/1999 transition to democratic rule in Nigeria has apparently led to an institutional power shift from military to civilian elites and thus, given rise to a new order or continuum in civil-military relations that is supposed to ensure subordination and loyalty of soldiers to their new civilian masters or principals. For the very first time in Nigeria’s history, the succeeding civilian government under the leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired general and one time military head of state spent eight years in power (1999-2007) of two terms of four years each and even handed power to another civilian administration in May 2007. All this took place devoid of any evident interruption by the military as contrasted to the fates of the short-lived and eventually aborted First and Second Republics. This is despite the fact that the problems that the military often capitalized to wrest power from
the civilians, like corruption, sectarian strife, nepotism and underdevelopment, were manifest in the eight years of the Fourth Republic. In his observation of the immediate post-transition era, Ihonvbere (2000: 344-345) notes that:

The Nigerian State, in spite of recent elections and the formal return of the military to the barracks, is still largely undemocratic and under the control of a weak, factionalised, corrupt and largely unproductive elite.

This phenomenon is a major political development in the history of post-colonial Nigeria as it relates to civil-military relations since the military under the guise of corrective policies terminated the last two civilian administrations in 1966 and 1983. What made the difference in the trend of civil-military relations from 1999 to 2007?

2.1.7 Guarding the Guardian of the State: Civil Control of the Military

The idea and practice of controlling the military predates the modern state system. The evidence lies in the classical works of Sun Tzu of Ancient China, Ibn Khaldun of Andalusia, Niccolo di Benardo Machiavelli of Florence and the Prussian military thinker, Carl Von Clausewitz. These ideas become a good starting point in the examination of civil-military relations because of their pioneering exposition into the relationship between politics and military power in the state. These works largely adopt the normative and historical approaches, and provide insights as to how political power can be managed within the context of military strategy. While they do not have explicit theories on the concept of civil-military relations, they highlight the significance of political control of military forces as an integral part of strategy in times of external and internal threats. While the main objective of military strategy is to defeat enemies and guard the state, Sun Tzu (1999: 125) prescribes the imperative for civil control
where he says “the general rule for military operations is that the military leadership receives the order from the civilian leadership to gather the armies”.

In addition, the sphere of military expertise is differentiated from civil authority with the former assisting the latter to shape the power of a country in relation to external enemies. However, a caution is made to the civil leadership to know where the boundaries of control stop and where expertise begins. This can be discerned to imply that there should be a limitation in civil control of the military. It implies that a boundary should exist that defines the respective roles of civilian (ruler of the state) and military leaders. The Master warns that ‘when the civil leadership is ignorant of military affairs but share equally in the government of the armies, the soldiers get confused’ (Sun Tzu, 1999: 79).

In his work The Prince Niccolo di Benardo Machiavelli is more explicit where control is not only prescribed but the art of its workability is spelt out. His ideas tend to emphasise on the use of expedient measures to preserve political power as against the centrality of morality in the conduct of statecraft as expounded in the works of Plato or Aristotle. In general, the Machiavellian paradigm starts with the imperative for the sovereign power to have effective control over the armed forces. He says that the military “must be under the control of either a prince or a republic; a prince must assume personal command and captain his troops himself” (Machiavelli, 1999: 41). He cautions the sovereign on the specific dangers and limits of delegating authority to the military leader. He specifically says that an incompetent commander should be removed and a competent one should have his powers limited by law to obviously prevent mutiny and coup respectively (Machiavelli, 1999: 41). This is situated within the realist notion that unlimited power in the hands of an armed group or military leader cannot be trusted to keep enemies at bay without resorting to possible temptations to engage in political struggles.
with superiors (as in the sovereign ruler) who is expected to always be on the guard, be ferocious and to trust no one.

Clausewitz (1976) establishes the relationship between the political leaders and the military within the context of war. In his view, the relationship between politics and war has to do with politics guiding military strategy. He says that “policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political” (Clausewitz, 1976: 605). While Nielsen (2004: 2) notes that politics shapes the conduct of war, and by extension, the relationship between military and civil leaders, she observes that:

...Clausewitz has little to say... about peacetime civil-military relations, to include relationships between political and military elites and relationships between armed forces and their societies... they are merely beyond the scope of his theory of war and discussions on strategy (Nielsen, 2004: 7).

In general, these classical works do not provide an explicit demarcation of where civil authority ends and where that of the military begins. This is not surprising. In their epochs, political power rested with a leadership that combined both military and civil functions. These pioneer attempts conceptualise political control (as against civil control) emanating from a leadership that was the both a civil and military sovereign. They do not take into cognizance the importance of future developments and the attendant changes that would evidently follow especially in Europe and America in the 20th Century. Van Eekelen (2002: 5) summarises the historical evolution of military leadership and organisation as follows:

In the feudal days the king himself was the field commander and his vassals came to his aid with their contingents. When armies came to rely on mercenaries their loyalty depended on the extent to which their leaders
were able to finance the campaign. All that changed with the advent of conscript armies, which involved every citizen but also led to officers’ corps with its own professionalism, traditions and culture.

As such, it can be inferred that the modern military emerged as a result of the separation and specialisation of political organs as well as the institutionalisation of clearly defined boundaries of competence between the military and civil political institutions.

The pioneer work on the concept of civil control within the context of the Western traditions was outlined by Huntington (1964: 72-94). He establishes a link between the nature and scope of civil control and the behaviour of the military toward the political system of a country. He draws up a number of concepts that attempt to explain the basis of civil-military relations in what he terms ‘democratic’ and ‘non-democratic’ societies. The rise and evolution of military professionalism is what distinguishes the ‘political’ from the ‘civil’ with respect to control of the military institution. While civil control is the most important, it is merely another component in the gamut of civil-military relations. Civilian control is valid when military professionalism exists and operates within the goals of governmental policy. More importantly, civil control is based on “the relative power of civilian and military groups... is achieved to the extent to which the power of the military groups is reduced” (Huntington, 1964: 80). In essence, the power of the military has to be minimised for the civilian leaders to exercise authority over the military on the basis of the latter’s confinement to its primary role within the directives of public policy.

Huntington identifies two types of civil control, subjective and objective civilian control. In the first type, the goal is to maximise civilian power over the military- implying an imbalanced power relation between the military and civilians in favour of the latter. Precisely, one civilian group imposes its power out of the multiplicity of political groups and at their expense on a military
institution that has minimum levels of professional ethos. Subjective control is maintained through governmental organs, social class domination and by constitutionalism. This type of control is restricted to political system that is authoritarian and the military professionalism is compromised by its level of interaction with the political ideology of the state (Huntington, 1964: 80-83). The second type, objective civilian control makes the military apolitical. It is based on maximising military professionalism while at the same time reducing the degree to which the military participates in politics. It is an anti-thesis of the subjective type where civilianisation of the military is maximised and the standards of professionalism is reduced.

Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state... The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism (Huntington, 1964:83).

Huntington adds with a caveat- for equilibrium, an abstraction put forward in his thesis, to be achieved, the levels of military professionalism and objective civilian control must be at maximum. This position, as reinforced by Kalu (2009: 90) warns that “civilian control decreases as the military become progressively involved in institutional, class, and constitutional politics”. Both levels of objective and equilibrium control reduce the power of the military to participate in politics by making soldiers ‘neutral’ and ‘sterile’. Objective civilian control rests on equilibrium of power relations between the dominant ideological orientation of the political system and the level of power of the military (Huntington, 1964: 84, 94). This is reinforced by an earlier position that the military is effectively controlled by “confining it to a restricted sphere and rendering it politically sterile and neutral on all issues outside that sphere” (Huntington, 1959: 381). Janowitz (1964: 7) shares Huntington’s position of boundary separation where the roles of the military
and civilian elites are clearly differentiated. This is reflected in laid down rules of control of the military to prevent intrusion by soldiers into mainstream and by implication, partisan politics.

The relationship between political neutrality and professionalism of the military has been reviewed by a number of scholars who argued with empirical evidence that it is possible for the military to maintain high levels of professionalism and still intervene in the politics of the state. Finer (1975: 20) gives an insight into the snag of objective civilian control using the German army of the Weimar Republic. He critically notes that “it is observable that many professional officer corps have intervened in politics- the German and Japanese cases are notorious....This is the whole weakness of Huntington” (Finer, 1975: 20).

The snag of Huntington’s thesis is also taken up by Feaver (1996: 15) noting that while professionalism seems to be the focus of (objective) civilian control, the issue of how this control takes place has not been adequately explained. In addition, it has been argued that objective civilian control has been emphasized while overlooking the issue of objective military control, a concept implying that the military is satisfied with being under the control of a legitimate civil authority. In essence, it is objective military control that determines whether or not the military would intervene. Auma-Osolo’s analysis of the Nigerian Army in the 1960s indicates that military professionalism is no guarantee that the soldiers would not intervene in mainstream politics (1980: 29-46). This implies an autonomous military with a parallel command structure that anytime it is disposed can intervene and sack the civilian regime. This concept of objective military control is more or less a self-control mechanism and smacks of praetorianism. Can military values be reconciled with that of the society in determining what constitutes the objective?
Contributing to the debate, Skauge (1994: 189-203) identifies a problem. A significant portion of the literature focuses on unstable or coup-prone states while neglecting the factors that shape civilian control of the military in stable, advanced democracies. This relative neglect has led to an ambiguous conception of civil control in stable states. In a study of these politically-stable states characterised by non-intervention by the military, the concept of objective civilian control needs modifications because an apolitical military does not exist in the practical sense and society is in a constant state of change and thus, the relations between the civil and military institutions may not only be stable and in an equilibrium, but always dynamic. This means that shifts in the boundaries of military and civil institutions are features that cannot be overlooked when studying civil-military relations. Therefore, civil control can be better understood within the context of the organisational processes of ‘contraction’ and ‘detraction’. Contraction has to do with concentration or high degree of civil authority initiation and participation in a centralised decision-making arrangement where the military has limited scope or autonomy in carrying out their professional duties. The opposite of this process is detraction (Skauge, 1994: 191). The Indian military has undergone both processes, starting with contraction and subsequently detraction since the country’s independence in 1947. Anand (2012: 186) draws a significant political development from Stephen Cohen’s book *The Indian Army: It’s Contribution to the Development of a Nation*. He looks at the transformation that took place in India’s civil-military relations just after independence. An alliance was established between the politicians and the civil service “for the purpose of reducing the role of the military in the decision making process”. Consequently, this political development proved to be “a major blow to the autonomy and influence of the military”. The political implication is that Indian military leaders largely serve as advisers to the government as decision making on defence and security matters became the monopoly of political and bureaucratic leaders. However, the civilian government’s
power (apparent subjective control) over the military was curtailed during the State of Emergency in 1971:

The Armed Forces stood as the last bastion before Mrs. Gandhi and her attempt to be a one-woman ruler of a police state. Sensing that the Army would step in and restore democracy if she went too far, she called for elections and lost (Anand, 2012: 187).

In political systems that do not have well-entrenched traditions which ensure effective civilian control as obtained in the advanced liberal-democracies, the incessant instability inherent in the centres of power gives rise to a number of methods that are multi-layered in structure and functions.

Welch (1974: 225) observes that “civilian control constitutes a task far more complex than the simple seizure of control”. Control methods range from subtle measures to coercive actions. Though subjective by Huntington’s standards, such methods are described as “contra-coup” strategies or sometimes denoted as “coup-proofing”. It is defined as “the set of actions a regime takes to prevent a military coup” (Quinlivan, 1999: 133). Contra-coup is similar to coup proofing in goals but coup-proofing has more extreme methods. Strategies are designed to defend a coup-prone civilian regime from possible military intervention. These involve recruiting or co-opting and intimidating the officer corps in order to support the regime and at the same time preventing the military from acting as a cohesive body to oppose civilian control (Trinkunas, 2001: 167). Some post-colonial entities introduce the processes of indigenising the officer corps or penetrating the military with political ideology of the ruling party. In societies where social cleavages are sharp, the regime manipulates family, clan, ethnic or religious ties to forestall a united opposition to its right to remain in power.
Adekanye (2008: 27) notes that in Uganda under the first dispensation of the Milton Obote government (1962-1971), the military was dominated by the Acholi ethnic group in order to check the influence of the Baganda. During the personalistic rule of Gnassingbe Eyadema (1967-2005), about 90 per cent of the Togolese military (FAT) came from his Kabre ethnic group (Fayemi, 1998: 89). Similarly, the coup prevention strategies adopted by the Kenyatta and Moi regimes in Kenya involved the “buying off of members of the military elites” and successfully “manipulated the composition of the officer corps through promotion and the assignment of sensitive positions to members of their respective ethnic groups” (N'Diaye, 2002: 621-622). In order to consolidate power by a beleaguered regime, the military could be purged of disloyal elements and in extreme cases, mass executions take place. Examples include the former Soviet Union under Josef Stalin, Ba’athist Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Uganda under Idi Amin and Liberia under Samuel Doe. Military officers are rotated at short intervals from one post to another without prior notice in order to prevent the creation of support bases for coup plotting; other roles outside the military sphere like engineering projects, crop production or manufacturing are assigned as diversionary tactics. External missions are assigned at regular intervals for the military to support regimes with similar interests as in the case of the United States military presence in the Korean peninsula in support of an anti-communist dispensation in South Korea. Guttieri identifies the significance of political ideology in the type of orientation given to the military as a way of behavioural control. It states that when “officers and enlisted personnel share the world view of the political leadership... the potential for conflict is mitigated when political elites and military officers share values” (Guttieri, 2006: 239).

The training curricula of soldiers are complemented with political doctrines of party supremacy and explicit procedures of military subordination is also laid out to officers. In addition, the government could also set up parallel militia bodies in order to serve as counterweights to the
conventional army. These militias are assigned the duties of protecting the regime by propagating the ideological base of the party in the society. In addition, it conducts surveillance of potential dissidents within the hierarchy of the civil and military elites, and provides support to the military as a rearguard during a war with another country. The funding of the military is aimed at either stifling potential conspiracies or boosting morale within its ranks and loyalty to the regime with modern equipment and remunerations. In the area of foreign training missions, the government restricts overseas courses to countries that follow the Western military tradition for fear of bourgeois influences. In some cases, training is highly restricted to prevent the receiving academy or staff college from becoming a staging post for coup planning (Hashim, 2003: 18-25, Patcher, 1982:596-609, Quinlivan, 1999:132-135).

While these methods are relevant for the study of regime survival in unstable or authoritarian political systems, they do not cover reasons or conditions that account for the acceptance by soldiers of the supremacy of civil rule in polities that have recently transited from military regimes to multi-party democracies. The question of what accounts for the absence of military (re)intervention into mainstream politics has not attracted contemporary scholarship because emphasis rests on the widely-held view that military rule is an aberration and thus, technically incapable of providing required political leadership. Besides, identified variables responsible for non-intervention by the military lose their validity in a situation where an intervention occurs. For instance, there was no early warning of a coup in Cote d’Ivoire. It was assumed that due to long period of political stability experienced under the one-party rule of Felix Houphet Boigny, the transition to a multi-party system would take place smoothly without any upheaval. The outcome of the transition to a pluralist party system was a military coup and a civil war.
The trajectory of recent works in civil-military relations largely explores the issue of security-sector reform particularly how to impose democratic control of the military and to assign national and international missions to them (Brzoska, 2003, Fitz-Gerald, 2003, Hendrickson, 1999, Winker, 2002). This has to do with institutionalising liberal-democratic structures in terms of command and control channels, oversight functions as well as redefining and shaping the doctrines in the use of military and paramilitary forces in transitional states. Some of these countries, particularly in Africa, are still grappling with the same problems that motivated military intervention in the past. How has this new trend of reforms affected civil-military relations in emerging democracies?

2.1.8 Contemporary Theories of ‘Democratic’ Civil-Military Relations

Since the 1990s, the post-Cold war literature on civil-military relations in liberal-democracies has added onto the dominant theme(s) of the Cold War period as professed by Finer, Janowitz and Huntington. The direction of the current theoretical debate dwells on the dangers of militarisation in developed democracies and the prospects of institutionalising control of the military in emerging democracies. It examines the degree of validity of the major postulations of already existing theories advanced by Finer, Janowitz and Huntington. Like the classical works, it describes and prescribes frameworks for understanding civil-military relations in the post-Cold war period. Examples include the analogy of the Fox and Hedgehog (Bruneau, 2005), Concordance Theory (Schiff, 1995, 2009), Agency Theory (Feaver, 1996, 2003), Unified Theory (Bland, 1999, 2001) and the factor of democracy as a globalising force in civil-military relations of transition states (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2006).

In the post-classical debate, these theories focus on the issue of civilian democratic control of the military in terms of who controls, how it ought to be done and the outcome of the power
relations between the military and the civilian institutions of the state. The trajectory is premised on the crisis between civilian leaders and the military in a democratic state outside the Euro-American liberal traditions. The idea of civilian control rests on a partnership or what is referred to as a cooperative relationship between the civil political elites, the military and the citizenry. The political elites are those who “have direct influence over the composition and support of the armed forces” (Schiff, 2009: 44) and could be found in all types of governments be they authoritarian, emerging or advanced democracies. The citizenry is defined in terms of the functional aspect of interest groups in the society. She explicitly says that the citizenry “is comprised of individuals who are members of unions or associations, urban workers and entrepreneurs, rural farm workers, those who may have the right to vote, or other groups that may be disenfranchised” (Schiff, 2009: 44). These three partner-actors concur in terms of dialogue, accommodation and shared goals to agree on military style, method of recruitment, the social composition of the officer corps and the decision-making process of the country (Schiff, 1995: 7-12, Schiff, 2009: 32-33). Concordance is established within institutional and historical contexts, between the military, political elites and the citizens. The cooperative relations established among these three might involve separation of the civil from the military sphere but it is not a requirement (Schiff, 2009: 32) as in the case of the classical works of Finer, Janowitz and Huntington.

Concordance does not require a particular form of government, set of institutions, or decision-making process. But it takes place in the context of active agreement, whether established by legislation, decree or constitution. It is also based on long standing historical and cultural values (Schiff, 2009: 43).
It then implies that the stronger this tripartite cooperative relationship (the military, the
government and the people), the less likelihood of any military intervention in that country
(Schiff, 2009: 32).

In his Unified theory, Bland omits the society and views civil-military relations as a product
of shared responsibility between civil and military leaders where control is not fused but merged
because “civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and
military leaders are responsible and accountable for others” (Bland, 1999: 9).

However, Feaver notes that while the empirical aspect of the literature on civil-military
relations is vast, the corresponding theoretical development has lagged behind (Feaver, 1996:
1-2). For any framework to provide an adequate explanation of the issues, it must satisfy four
benchmarks. The first is the ability of theory to create a distinction between civilian and military
spheres as it affects control of the military. The second is to explain the factors that determine
“how civilian (leaders) exercise control over the military”. The third is that theory should go
beyond professionalisation which is the basis for Huntington’s thesis on civil control. Finally, the
deductive method should be used to derive the theory “before it is empirically tested against
the historical record” (Feaver, 1996: 13-15). In this direction, the military must be viewed as
‘agents’ of their civilian ‘principals’. The relationship between the civilian leaders and military is
viewed as “a strategic interaction carried out within a hierarchical setting” (Feaver, 2005: 54).
The challenge in this relationship is that the principals demand that the agents protect them
from threats by enemies and at the same time, want to control the agents. The hierarchical
nature of relations is what constitutes the Agency theory:

The choices civilians make are contingent on their expectations of what
the military is likely to do, and vice versa. It is hierarchical (at least in
democracies) because civilians enjoy the privileged position; civilians
have legitimate authority over the military whatever their de facto ability to control the military may be (Feaver, 2005: 54).

The last imperative involves monitoring the agent if control is to be achieved. The relationship that exists between the military and the civilian leaders is based on an interactive, strategic game of interaction in that the military is monitored in order to carry out the orders of the civilian principals (Feaver: 2003: 57-58). Thus, the validity of the Agency theory depends on the degree to which the military fulfils the tasks assigned to it by the civilian leaders and is generally based on “how agents are monitored and also the extent to which the preferences of principals and agents converge” (Feaver, 2003: 56).

The prescriptive aspect of civil-military relations theory is further advanced by Bland where he advocates for shared responsibility between civilian and military leaders on the basis of “principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures” so that civil-military relations are embedded in the practice of civil control of the military in a liberal democracy (Bland, 1995: 10). In order to enhance stability and continuity in civil-military relations particularly in an emerging liberal democracy, the gap between the ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ dimensions of civil control must be narrowed. The hardware dimension covers the tangible- laws, legislative oversight committees and civilianised ministries of defence while the software covers “the framework of ideas, principles, and norms that shape civil-military behaviour in the (advanced) liberal democracies” which is argued has not been adequately incorporated into the military establishment of emerging democracies (Bland, 2001: 525).

Bland’s software concept is further treated in Bruneau’s Hedgehog and the Fox postulation which advances ‘the trinity of civil-military relations’ as indicated in the principles of civil-control, effectiveness and efficiency. The morale of this thesis is that the fox (the civilian leader)
knows many things and the hedgehog (the soldier) knows only one big thing- the use of force in which the fox has deficiency. In order for democratic control to be effective, the fox should have some expertise knowledge of what the hedgehog knows (Bruneau, 2005: 112-113). Thus, for civilian leaders to have effective control in terms of oversight functions by the executive, legislature or other relevant agencies, they must acquire some knowledge of military matters pertaining to policy-making. The power relation between the military and civil institutions is based on democratic civil control, effectiveness and efficiency. The bureaucratic aspect of military matters, as represented in the defence ministry facilitate inter-agency coordination and determine military effectiveness while the legislative arm of government plays a major role in military efficiency (Bruneau, 2005: 122-125).

These current prescriptions concur that the ‘separation’ approach as the ideas expounded by Huntington, Janowitz and Finer are characterised by a common shortcoming. Such ideas are based on an assumption that enhancing military professionalism is the most effective way of preventing either military intervention or insubordination to constituted civil authority. The civilian and military spheres should be separated to allow for effective civil control of policy aspects of defence matters and at the same time allow for maximising the level of professionalism by the military authorities. This is achieved under an equilibrium status called objective control. This outcome has a precondition- the boundary of power relations between civil authority and the military establishment should be clearly defined. This idea of separation is questioned on the basis that both civil and military institutions are interacting bodies in the political system and therefore cannot operate exclusive of each other. Besides, the military is an agent of the state (as represented by the government) that is charged with undertaking the task of protecting the latter. As such, the relationship between the civil authorities and the military
can best be explained in terms of an alternative which turns the separation approach on its head.

However, these post-Cold war positions merely modify the ideas of Huntington and others. The theories are products of the contemporary challenges in civil-military relations in the advanced democracies (with the exception of Bland who examined the role of the powerful, democratic Western states in the transmitting only the hardware aspects of civil-military relations to emerging democracies). Individually, they do not provide adequate framework for identifying, analysing and understanding the basis and dynamics of civil-military relations with respect to the trilateral roles of the military, the domestic political system and the international environment. Besides, these frameworks largely neglect the role of the external environment in shaping the domestic dynamics of civil-military relations in emerging democracies. Interestingly, Bruneau and Trinkunas (2006:777) highlight the globalising force of democratic imposition on transition states and its impact on civilian control of the military. In essence, military subordination becomes the imperative for ‘the global compulsion towards maintaining...the appearance of democracy’ and as such, accepting “the emergence of qualified semi-democracies with civilian leaders clearly in charge” (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2006:777).

Another approach is to examine constitutional framework of civil-military relations. As a guiding document, the constitution provides the fundamental set of principles upon which a country is governed. It provides the basis and scope of how power is exercised by the primary institutions of a country. For instance, Nigeria’s 1999 constitution explicitly states that

> The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution (Section 1 [2], FRN, 1999: 1).
However, control by a fragile civilian regime, through a constitutional arrangement, is an important but not the sufficient requirement to ensure effective control of the military as a function of stable civil-military relations. Constitutional provisions which specified the supremacy of civilian control did not prevent the termination Nigeria's democratic experiments by the military in January 1966 and December 1983. Effective civilian control involves other political factors that create the conditions for the government to secure obedience from the military within a defined constitutional arrangement (Trinkunas, 2000). This is translated in terms of the nature of the civilian government in terms of its ability to control and institutionalise a workable relationship with the military; the attitude of society towards the symbols of the political environment; the orientation of the military leadership towards its new role along horizontal and vertical terms, and the nature of expectations and degree of influence of external actors on such complex power relations of the country in question. A theory that explains civil-military relations ought to be a product of the realities that cover the military, political and external environments. Whether derived deductively or otherwise, it must be a product of empirical records or experiences and not vice versa.

The philosophy behind the democracy that emerged in Nigeria after prolonged military rule is drawn from the globalisation of the liberal-pluralist paradigm. The institutions of state power are shaped by a number of domestic and external factors. These factors are represented in the form of actors who in various capacities create the push and pull processes in civil-military relations. Like a weathervane, the state is a manifestation of “the direction of the political wind that is to the balance of pressures” (Bealey, Chapman and Sheehan, 1999: 35-36) in the political environment. The balance of such pressures results in a cooperative relationship between civil and military leaders where there exists mutual knowledge of the significance and roles that both
play in the system. The military leaders as represented by the officer corps accept the supremacy of civilian leaders. Acceptance is consolidated because the civilian leadership has the experience and expertise to handle military matters. After withdrawing to the barracks, the military is comfortable working with such civilian leaders. There is some degree of cooperation as conditioned by a combination of constitutional, social and historical factors (Schiff, 1995) that strike relative equilibrium between the civilian and military leaders within the context of the principal-agent relationship (Feaver, 2003). The military is seen as an important guardian of the emerging liberal-democratic order despite. The military agrees to be an agent of the civilian authority because of the latter’s expertise and the support it receives from international community. The military and political leaders cooperate to define the power relationship in concert with the liberal-democratic driven external environment. As Nathan (1996) puts it “civil-military relations clearly have to be based not only on control but also on dynamic interaction and cooperation between the military and civilian leadership”. This is the central theme of the current global drive for liberal-pluralism as it relates to the emerging democracies, which the ideas of Huntington, Finer, Janowitz and the neo-classical theorists of the post-Cold War era largely subscribe to.

Thus, civil-military relations are largely based on the interplay between the military leadership, the civilian authorities and the international environment. This interplay has created a cooperative relationship involving the military leaders, the civilian elites and external actors, with respect to the role of the military in a democracy and in retrospect, the nature of the transition to democracy as the stepping stone to the new civil-military relations.

The globalising winds of democracy brought about the collapse of authoritarian systems in many countries. As the world entered the 21st Century, military coups as an unconstitutional
means of regime change witnessed a relative decline in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This is largely due to domestic pressures for democratic governance and the posture of the international community. The focus is on the consolidation of democratic governance and the control of security forces for the purposes of stabilising the domestic and external environments. This development has affected the nature of civil-military relations of these countries. Thus, Bruneau and Trinkunas (2006: 777) make an important observation about this phenomenon.

Such is the global compulsion towards maintaining at least the appearance of democracy that the traditional military dictatorship has been replaced by the emergence of qualified semi-democracies with civilian leaders clearly in charge despite their reliance on armed force to rule.

The strategic security arrangements of the triumphant Western powers in the protracted Cold war were manifested in the systematic transmission of their own doctrines and practices in civil-military relations to transitional democracies (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2006:778). This transmission came after the processes of political reform had already begun in these countries. Political reforms placed emphasis on strengthening emerging civilian institutions and in effect ensure democratic control of the military in a changing environment. The military side of these reform agenda or the democracy promotion model was earlier developed in the 1970s for autocratic and unstable states in Europe and Latin America. It largely focuses on three areas namely, the privileged civilian control, military efficiency and effectiveness (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2006: 778). Efficiency is how assigned roles are pursued with the least possible human and material costs while effectiveness is the ability of the military to achieve the goals of the roles assigned by civil authorities (Bruneau, 2005: 123).
In the same vein, Matei (2011: 23) identifies six broad roles and missions carried out by military forces- fighting external wars, fighting domestic insurgencies, fighting crime, supporting humanitarian assistance and conducting peace support operations. She further identifies three major requirements that must be met for such roles to be effective and efficient. Firstly, the government must have in place a strategic plan of action or national policy. Secondly, it must put up relevant structures and processes, notably a defence ministry or interagency platforms that can execute military policy and lastly, the government must channel resources for training, equipping and providing other assets to the military to conduct any of the six major roles and missions (Matei, 2011: 23-24). These collectively imply a desirable situation where the military has the capacity to carry out missions assigned to them by civil authorities within available resources. While toeing the same line in conceptualising military effectiveness, Risa Brooks departs at the level of operationalisation. Four basic indicators are relevant in evaluating military effectiveness. The first is the extent to which the activities of the military are integrated across all levels. The second is the degree of the responsiveness of the military to internal constraints and the external environment. The third has to do with military skill as manifested in motivation and competence of its personnel and the fourth dwells on the quality of military weapons and equipment (Brooks, 2007: 9-10).

As the 20th century drew to an end, the major powers intensified their globalising policy of ‘promoting security sector reform’ on transitional democracies, most of whom were categorised as ‘fragile states’ (Ball: 2005). The push for the organisational and role reform of the security forces rested on ten fundamental principles of which the democratic civilian governments, civil society and the security forces (military, police and intelligence establishments) constitute the stakeholders. These are: accountability of security forces to elected leaders and civil society; adherence to international and domestic constitutional laws by security forces; transparency on
security-related matters; adherence to the same principles of public expenditure by security forces as in non-military sectors of the state; acceptance of clearly defined hierarchical authority, mutual rights and obligations between civil authorities and the military; capacity to exercise civilian control and oversight of security forces; civil society’s capacity to monitor activities and make inputs into security policy making process; a conducive environment for civil society to exercise its role; access by security forces to professional training in line with democratic tenets and; high priority accorded to regional and sub-regional peace and security by civilian authorities (Ball, 2005: 5).

These packaged prescriptions for the military and other security forces in transitional democracies are transmitted through governmental assistance and inter-governmental bodies like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). As part of the ‘good governance’ and democratic consolidation programmes, they are carried out by bodies like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The US International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Geneva Centre for the control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) provide capacity building programmes for military and civilian leaders in the exercise of democratic control and oversight of the security sector. The NATO expansion into Eastern Europe is under the auspices of the Partnership for Peace Treaty (PfP) which began in the 1990s (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2006: 784). The primary goal of such programmes is to transform and incorporate the civil-military structures of recipient states into a globalising system controlled by the donor states.

This ‘imperial’ project has witnessed the systematic incorporation of the unstable political arenas of erstwhile authoritarian enclaves in Africa, Latin America Eastern Europe and parts of Asia and the transplantation of the military doctrines and practices obtained in the Western
world. Apart from domestic constitutional requirements of transitional states, the external variable involves supporting elected governments to assign defined roles for their respective militaries particularly in the areas of peace support, counter-terrorism or counter-terrorism in order to mitigate praetorian tendencies. The security forces, particularly the military are expected to adjust and provide support to the liberal-democratic order in their respective states by subordinating to constituted civil authorities and to support such in discharging their duties within the laws and doctrines of military professionalism.

It has been noted that such civil-military programmes for African and Latin American states in particular, largely emphasize on the doctrine of civil control of the military. The literature gives less attention to the effectiveness and efficiency of these militaries. It is suggested that if the effective level of the military is enhanced, there is the fear that these emerging democracies could be threatened by possible intervention or threats from ambitious soldiers (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2006: 786). For such militaries, the emphasis would be to partake in internal peace support and external missions when directed by civil authorities. In addition states that comply with this expect to benefit from assistance in training, hardware and finance from the advanced democracies.

2.1.9 Summary of Literature

There is a vast volume of literature in the field of civil-military relations. These cover the subject-matter of who controls the military, the causes of, and the conditions under which praetorianism (military intervention) either as dependent or independent variable takes place and the impact of brief or prolonged military rule on the political trajectory of affected states. Axiomatically, theoretical constructs are products of given experiences at given periods. Most of these paradigms, models and approaches on the subject are either the products of
developments of the Cold war period with respect to states that were under the yoke of military rule or based on the globalising trends of security-sector reform in promoting liberal democracy. Even where such discourse exists with respect to civil democratic control and assigning of missions to the military, the regions of Latin America and Eastern Europe have so far provided the bulk of the literature (Born, 2002, Stephan, 1971). However, the literature does not identify explicit explanations as to what determines the ‘renaissance’ of civil-military relations with respect to the issue of political control of the military in emerging democracies. Even where studies have been conducted, one aspect of the civil-military dynamics is considered without others which are equally important in the assessment.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

A number of theories were examined in an attempt in trying to explain the problem under study. These are the Peter Feaver’s Agency Theory (2003, 2005), Rebecca Schiff’s Concordance Theory (1995, 2009), Thomas Bruneau’s civil-military analogy of the Fox and the Hedgehog (2005) and lastly, the democracy as a globalising variable in the civil-military relations of states in transition (Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, 2006).

The Agency theory is based on the traditions and experience of civil-military relations in the United States. The military is an ‘agent’ of the civilian leadership who is referred to as the ‘principal’. It is a two actor relationship, the principal and the agent. The goal of this theory is to explain ‘how civilians exercise control- identifying the factors that shape civilian control on a
day-to-day basis and the trade-offs inherent in the relationship’ (Feaver, 2003: 2). The question is how the principal controls the agent. It assumes that

In a democracy the hierarchy of de jure authority favours the civilians against the military..... Regardless of how strong the military is, civilians are supposed to remain the political masters (Feaver, 2003: 5-6).

The nature of the relationship between the principal and the agent is ‘a strategic interaction carried out within a hierarchical setting’ with the agent subordinate to the principal (Feaver, 2005: 54). The principal controls and directs the agent. This control takes place because the principal happens to be in a priviledged position having the legitimacy to do so (Feaver, 2005: 54). Explicitly, the civilian leadership controls through monitoring the activities of the military to the extent that the preferences of both the principal and the agent converge. It implies that the higher the level of convergence between the policy preferences of the principal and the agent, the higher the tendency for the military to obey the civilian principal (Feaver, 2003: 57-58). The agent is likely to shirk (disobey) the principal when there is incompatibility of the method or goal to be pursued. This translates to the degree of civilian intrusiveness in military affairs and perceived loss of autonomy by the military. To tackle shirking, the principal uses incentive-driven mechanisms to either punish the military or accords rewards that may reverse shirking behaviour (Feaver, 2003: 75).

Concordance addresses the issue of nature of the relationship between the three pillars of civil-military relations. It argues that stable civil-military relations can be understood as a partnership existing between the military, the government and the citizens (Schiff, 2009: 44). The general picture that concordance theory portrays is that it
Does not require a particular form of government, set of institutions, or decision-making process…. takes place in the context of active agreement, whether established by legislation, decree or constitution. It is also based on long standing historical and cultural values of such countries (Schiff, 2009: 43).

This partnership is a cooperative relationship based on dialogue, accommodation and shared goals in critical areas namely method of military recruitment, military style, composition of the officer corps and the decision-making process of the country (Schiff, 1995: 7-12, Schiff, 2009: 32-33). Though the theory does not discriminate between democratic and non-democratic regimes, it is based on case studies of two democracies outside Europe and North America. The Indian and Israeli militaries have never staged coups since their countries attained independence in 1947 and 1948 respectively. The stronger this cooperative partnership is, the less possible the chances of any military intervention (Schiff, 2009: 32).

The Fox and the Hedgehog approach of civil-military relations is Thomas Bruneau’s analogy of the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military establishment of some Latin American countries. The fox is the civilian leadership and the hedgehog is the military. Civilian leaders require some basic expertise on how the military establishment operates. According to Bruneau (2005: 113)

They must know enough to be able to ensure that the armed forces are doing what they are required to do, not only in terms of submitting to civilian control… but also in successfully fulfilling the… spectrum of roles and missions assigned to the diverse security forces.

The nature of the bond that exists between the civilian government leaders and military officials depends on the level of expertise the civilian leaders have of how to relate with the military establishment (Bruneau, 2005: 113). This relationship is contextualised in terms of what is
referred to as the trinity of civil-military relations namely democratic civilian control of the military, effectiveness and efficiency. Control has to do with subordinating the military to the directives of the democratic leadership. Effectiveness means carrying out the tasks as directed by the government and efficiency means carrying out these tasks within the confines of the resources approved by the government. For these to happen, the fox should have some knowledge of what the hedgehog knows in order to establish efficient and effective control (Bruneau, 2005: 112-113). The political sphere of the civilian government in terms of executive directive or legislative oversight should have some expertise in dealing with the military so as to keep it under democratic control and determine its efficiency. The bureaucratic arm of the civilian government as represented by the defence ministry should facilitate military efficiency (Bruneau, 2005: 122-125).

Bruneau and Trinkunas (2006) propose understanding the civil-military relations of emerging democracies as a product of global forces. Existing literature on the traditional conception of contemporary civil-military relations puts emphasis on ‘domestic political interaction of which international forces have little influence’ (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2006: 777). The end of Cold war has witnessed an intensification of democracy (including semi-democracy) as a global phenomenon (Bruneau, 2006: 777). Thus, ‘the impact of global democratization trends on civil-military relations.....allowed the US and Europe to transmit their civil-military doctrine and practices to emerging democracies’ (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2006: 778). The globalisation of liberal ethos by the advanced democracies has been accompanied by a systematic export of liberal conception and practice of civilian control of the military forces in the new democracies (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2006: 777). However, some of these emerging democracies face structural challenges ranging from electoral legitimacy to a military establishment with praetorian tendencies. Thus, the need to support civilian control measures through fostering
military effectiveness and efficiency. The objectives of this globalising policy are to prevent military coups against newly elected but fragile governments, enhance peacekeeping capabilities, collaborate in counter-terrorist measures and promote human rights (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2006: 786). Such transmissions of civil-military traditions are done through bi-lateral or multi-lateral assistance programmes in countries like Chile in Latin America or Hungary in Eastern Europe.

These theories have their respective limitations in explaining the genesis and factors responsible for the establishment of civilian control of the military in an emerging democracy like Nigeria. First, they are products of case studies of advanced democracies as in the case of Feaver’s principal-agent theory (1996, 2003 and 2005) which draws from the tradition in the United States. Second, Schiff restricts the concordance thesis to countries having a relatively long uninterrupted democratic history outside the western hemisphere namely India and Israel that have not witnessed any military coup (1995, 2009). Third, Bruneau (2005) is confined to the issue of civilian expertise in military matters as a function of control and is restricted to case studies of selected countries in Latin America. Lastly, Bruneau and Trinkunas (2006) neglect the significance of domestic efforts of an emerging democracy in crafting civilian control on military.

The Agency theory with some modifications was adopted as the theoretical framework for assessing the nature of civil-military relations in Nigeria as an emerging democracy. Despite its limitation, the Agency theory is more compatible in the analysis of Nigeria’s civil-military relations. This is because Nigeria’s constitution of 1999 is drawn along the lines of the United States model of presidential democracy. By law, civilian control of the military consists of direct executive command and indirect legislative oversight. The subject matter in the Agency theory just like in the traditional literature on civil-military relations rests on how elected civilian
leaders control the United States military. This is in terms of monitoring the latter’s activities and deciding what choices to make if directives are obeyed or disregarded (Feaver, 2003: 96-117). The agency theory is based on three broad assumptions. The first assumption states that rational choices determine the relationship between the military and its civilian principal. The second states that there is a shared position that the civilian principal is superior to the military agent on the condition that the military sees itself as an agent of the state rather than an arm of the government or regime in power. The third assumes that civilian control of the military is shared by more than one principal notably the executive and legislative arms of the government as well as certain specialised sub-organs under the legislative and executive arms (Feaver, 2003: 97-98).

Drawing from the democratic thesis, the military as an agent obeys the civilian principal because the latter derive their moral competence and legitimacy from the political environment in which the military operates (Feaver, 2005). In a mature presidential democracy, the expert knowledge of the military is not a basic requirement for civilian control to be effective:

Civilians are morally and politically more competent to make the decisions even if they do not possess the relevant technical competence in the form of expertise…. Although the expert may possibly understand the issue better, the expert is not in a position to determine the value the people will attach to different issue outcomes (Feaver, 2003: 6).

However, the democratic institutions in Nigeria are not as strong as those in the United States which have evolved for over two centuries. In the United States, the civilians have always been in control of the military. This is attributed to the absence of the environmental conditions that foster coups in other countries: catastrophic defeat in battle, collapse of civilian political order, persistent underfunding of the military coupled with cronyism and corruption in the military
personnel system’ (Feaver, 2003: 11). In addition, having a well established tradition of an offensive orientation has made the military in the United States to engage in external wars being a global power and as such the military plays minimal role in domestic matters. In contrast, the military in Nigeria, despite its peacekeeping exploits maintains a defensive orientation. Nigeria has had a long post-colonial history with military coups and rule disrupting three previous efforts at democratic governance. The 1998-1999 transition to a liberal democracy is a strategic trade-off by the military with the civilian sectors of the state and society to secure corporate benefits including self-preservation. Prolonged military rule had incurred more costs than benefits to the cohesion of the military.

Based on history, Nigeria cannot be classified as a matured liberal-democracy in relation to its former colonial power, Britain or even the United States, which Nigeria wants to mimic politically. As such, the newly elected civilian leaders have to rely on some additional leverage in order to effectively control the military. The interaction between the military and the political space in which it operates is a power-game relationship. The military, which had previously been in power for a long period would want to exercise full autonomy without civilian intrusion by disobeying directives (shirking) or even possibly staging a ‘come-back’ as witnessed in 1983. This additional leverage required for civilian control to take place includes having some expert knowledge of military behaviour, domestic societal support through civil society organisations and the globalising currents that assist in providing the semblance of a democratic dispensation. The environment where such a strategic interaction takes place is an overlap of the domestic and the external forces having the expectation that civilians exercise control over the military.

The domestic realm of the environment consists of the civil sectors of the state (the government) and the society (civil society organisations). The latter plays the role of democratic
advocacy and by extension indirectly promotes the subordination of the military to constituted authority. The government consists of the executive and legislative arms who directly relate with the military through its senior leaders at different levels. The government relies on both the constitutional powers vested on it and the expertise at its disposal to craft control and secure relative compliance from the military.

The external realm of the environment consists of governmental and inter-governmental actors. This realm acts as a globalising force in the promotion of liberal democratic civil-military relations around the world. It exerts an influence on the domestic realm and serves as leverage to enhance control of the military. This is to be achieved through the policies of effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness involves setting a mechanism for the military to exercise policy as dictated by the civilian leadership with the support of foreign forces. Efficiency involves carrying out such policy within the framework of the resources allocated to it to avoid defence expenditure becoming a burden on the new democratic dispensation.

In essence, civilian control of the military in Nigeria as an emerging democracy (1999-2007) is established because i) the principal has some knowledge of how to deal with the military; ii) the principal can draw both domestic and external support in the course of relating with the military from the sections of society and foreign powers and iii) military through its officer corps accepts to obey the principal in its corporate self-interest because the benefits of subordination to civilian leadership incurs more benefits than costs.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

3.1-Introduction

The period covered in this study spans from May 1999 to May 2007 which covered the two terms of four years each of the administration of Olusegun Obasanjo. The qualitative method was used in the collection, presentation and analysis of the primary and secondary data in the research. The collection of data was made possible by first using face-to-face interviews and second, by investigating and using extant literature that covered any publication having both distant and proximal relevance to the study. The case study design was employed in the research. This is because the study covered a given and limited social unit. It is also suitable since the research employed more than one method of data collection. In addition, the case study was useful for this work because it dwelt “on a bounded subject or unit that is either very representative or extremely atypical” (Osuala, 2005: 185). The study employed the use of semi-structured questionnaires through an in-depth face-to-face interview series. It also incorporated a historical design in order to examine and identify relevant events and issues before May 1999 that shaped the trajectory of the relationship between the elected civilian leadership and the
military. It also made some relevant observations from extant literature (or secondary data) in retrospect. This was done through a chronological narration of the antecedents of civil-military relations and transitions to civil rule in Nigeria in order to draw a number of significant issues that had implications on the period under study.

3.2-Population of the Study

The population in this study considered categories while taking into cognisance the questions and assumptions put forward in the research. Four categories of respondents were identified as follows:

i) the first is the military establishment which forms an important object of study in civil-military relations;

ii) the elected civilian government formed the second category;

iii) the third category or societal variable was represented by the civil society, a catalyst for civilian supremacy over the military institution; and

iv) the fourth category is the international arena, which exerts some influence as a globalising factor on the domestic environment of Nigeria.

The scope of study covered the internal and external environments of the military establishment that have shaped its relationship with the political environment. The internal environment specifically covered the functions and competences of the governmental bodies that are constitutionally empowered to discharge civilian control over the military. Equally important was the role by military leaders in ensuring effective control of the
military establishment as an impetus to achieving civilian supremacy and control of the military. The external factor looked at the elements as conditioned and introduced by international actors (both governmental and non-governmental) which facilitated the ability of the internal environment to consolidate such civilian control of the military.

The population in this study consisted of ten officially-designated individuals and institutions. The size of the population was arrived at on the basis of the assumptions put forward in the study (Denscombe, 2006: 15). The population was identified on the basis of the public offices and the roles they played within the system of civil-military relations between 1999 and 2007. Four broad categories of respondents were identified and designated as forming crucial elements of the population under study. These covered the political leadership, the military leadership, the civil society and the international community. The political leadership as the symbol of civilian control of the military included the principal decision-makers of the government who had direct dealings in matters involving the military. These included the President who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Minister of Defence, and the National Security Adviser (NSA). The military as the second category was represented by two types of designated respondents- the military leaders or service chiefs and those who hold military command positions in premier military institutions but not below the rank of major or its equivalent in the navy and the airforce with respect to other officers. In addition, care was taken to ensure that only those that were in the service as senior, middle-ranking or junior officers between 1999 and 2007 formed the sample. These were drawn from the three armed services. The Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC) and the National Defence College (NDC) were chosen as locations for interviewing the second level respondents in second category. Introduction letters from the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria were served to all the
respondents directly or through intermediaries. In the fourth category, the research identified the civil society actors that participated in the processes of security sector reform with the Nigerian military notably, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) and the Freidrich Ebert Foundation. The international community formed the last category. The international community as the fifth category consisted of governmental and intergovernmental bodies whose policy thrusts focus on democratisation and security matters in Nigeria.

3.3-Method of Data Collection

The study employed two methods of data collection that is primary and secondary. The primary method involved the use interviews on a designated number of respondents who were either individuals or organisations. The purposive method of searching for and collecting data was used because the respondents were easy to identify. The study used the face-to-face formal interview as the instrument for primary data gathering. This technique was intended “to capture the respondents’ experience, beliefs or attitudes in relation” to the assumptions put forward (Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2006: 366). Semi-structured questions as well as covert non-structured discussions were administered during the interview sessions. The interview questions were open-ended and semi-structured. They were designed to give the respondents some room to provide as much information relevant to the research. The format of the questions was based on funnel sequencing (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; 260). This means for each category of respondents, the questions asked related to each other in a successive order. The scope of each set of interviews were aimed at capturing what the respective respondents said and identifying new ideas not envisaged in the research questions assumptions put forward.

The type of questions depended on the type of respondent that was interviewed. Respectively, this applied to the civilian leadership, the military and the civil society. As such,
questions asked depended on the status and roles played by the respondents whether as civilian leaders or military leaders.

Respondents from the civilian sphere were asked questions that bordered on civilian control, the military’s acceptance of their authority, their competence in handling military matters and the support received from the international community. This was meant to test the assumptions bordering on civilian expertise in military matters.

The questions posed to the military leadership dwelt on their general perceptions and reason(s) why they accept the supremacy of civilian leadership, the measures employed to institute discipline within the military hierarchy and the nature of the relationship between political and military leaders. Responses to such questions were meant to test the validity of the assumptions concerning military acceptance of constituted civil authority. The questions posed to the civil society organizations revolved around the nature and extent of the roles played in ensuring that the emerging liberal democratic order that came into being in Nigeria since 1999.

In the case of the international dimension, the question centred on the motives, nature and extent of the role of foreign governments particularly the advanced democracies of the western world. This focused on the support provided to the civilian government in the control on the military. This involved an extensive search for, and identification of relevant data which by themselves attempted to answer the research question in a positive or negative way.

The study made extensive use of secondary data. The secondary data relied on relevant information from both the physical library and internet sources. The study searched for and got useful documents from individuals, organisations, electronic and physical libraries. Some of the data related to the actions and pronouncements some of the respondents who could not be accessed for a face-to-face interview. Secondary data is useful in research because it can serve
as a means for verifying authenticity of responses gotten from conducting face-to-face interviews. The problem of credibility arose in the course of the search for useful secondary data. A criterion was applied in determining which secondary source is credible and relevant to the research assumptions- such data was accepted if the source is credible in terms of the author’s expertise on such matters and the context of such publication. The search for secondary data covered the following sources: historical publications (including biographies and autobiographies), policy documents (the 1999 constitution, legislations and pronouncements by relevant but inaccessible respondents) and periodicals (reports and interviews in newspapers and magazines) relevant to the direction of the study. The secondary data did not only furnish the study with a background of the issues revolving around civil-military relations in Nigeria but equally supplied some information of relevance. In certain respects, it generated some data that was used to evaluate the validity of assumptions.

The outcome of the responses in terms of consent to grant interviews was mixed. In the first category, the president and his chief of staff were the only respondents that granted interviews. The two Defence Ministers did not indicate any consent while the National Security Adviser repeatedly postponed the dates designated for an interview. The researcher was of the view that the respondent did not want to speak on such matters because he indicated that he was in the process of publishing a biography which covered the areas posed in the interview questions. In the second category, only one service chief out of the four designated in the sample consented to grant an interview. In the third category, the reaction was the same at the NDC where no single interview was conducted either due to respondents’ unwillingness or inaccessibility. Several visits were made to the NDC and appointments were fixed which were never honoured. During the last visit to the NDC, the secretary of the college was however helpful in providing some useful documents that came in handy as part of the secondary data. In
the case of the AFCSC, the researcher was permitted to grant interviews. However, the researcher did not have the freedom to determine who should be interviewed. The College authorities designated seven military officers from the army, navy and airforce for the interviews of which one refused to respond to the questions for an undisclosed reason. The CDD as represented by its director granted an interview for the study. In the same vein, a visit to the centre afforded the opportunity for some relevant documents on security sector reform to be purchased. While an interview was not conducted with the representative of the Freidrich Ebert Foundation, it responded by providing a publication related to the study. In the fourth category, the research had to rely on secondary data because the representatives of the foreign governments in Nigeria especially those of the United States and Britain did not respond for requests to grant interviews on the subject of support for Nigeria’s civil-military relations after prolonged military rule. This data covered both policy-based publications, declassified correspondences between Nigerian and foreign officials as well as any relevant information from the successful interviews.

3.4-Style of Data Presentation and Analysis

The qualitative method of presentation and analysis was used in this study. The data were analysed within the context of the negative or positive outcome they indicated within the context of the assumptions. The style adopted is the narrative technique. A narrative involves providing a logical account of certain events and issues in an attempt to describe and explain the degree of conformity or divergence with a particular set of plausible arguments. As such, the presentation and analysis of the primary and secondary data involved a deliberate attempt to describe and interprete these two sets of data within the context of responses, documented events and interactions that were gathered in the field study research (Biereenu-Nnabugwu,
2006: 378). This was done through observing the verbal (language) behaviour of the responses in the primary data as well as those pieces of relevant information from the secondary sources. The analysis was confined to comparing the data collected with the assumptions put forward in the study. The structure of analysis was conducted simultaneously with the presentation of the primary and secondary data. This technique identified particular events and issues of significance in order to provide a logical sequence of events that had political implications on the nature of contemporary civil-military relations in Nigeria. The analysis involved the relative convergence or divergence the data had with the assumptions in the study. The analysis of the data relied on three principles- personal abilities, evidence availability and alternative considerations from the volume data. This involved identifying particular responses of the categories and relating them to the objectives and objectives of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

AN OVERVIEW OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS FROM THE COLONISATION PERIOD TO POST-INDEPENDENT NIGERIA: 1863 TO 1998
4.1 Introduction

The history of civil-military relations in Nigeria is characterised by systemic instability, intra-organisational cleavages and conflict and equally important, the ascendancy of the military establishment in the political centre-stage of the Nigerian state. These features have been shaped and reinforced largely by factors situated within and outside the military establishment. This chapter examined the history of civil-military relations in Nigeria within the context of the colonial origins of the military, the post-independent factional cycles of military coups and civilian rule between 1960 and 1999 and its implication on the Nigerian state.

4.2 Colonial Origins and Evolution of the Nigerian Military

The origins of the military institution in Nigeria can be conceptualised as a colonial construct. Its main tasks were to support the colonial authority (under the control of white military officers as governors, resident and provincial officers) in pursuing the ends of political, social and economic policies to the satisfaction of the Metropolitan power. However, this important arm of the colonial state

...neither had a conception of, nor a commitment to social and economic development of the territory. These are matters left to the political power in the colonial state. The military under colonial rule took for granted the raison d’être of the colonial state. Indeed, it was not part of the military profession to question the raison d’être (Babangida, 1989).

The military has its roots in the various military formations that partook in the colonial conquests and state construction starting around the second half of the 19th Century. The major formation was the Lagos Constabulary under Lieutenant Glover which was formed around 1863 and merged with other outfits to form the West African Frontier Force in 1897. Other units
were the Royal Niger Company Constabulary established in 1886, the Oil Rivers Irregulars in 1885 and the Niger Coast Constabulary in 1891. By 1900 these formations were replaced by the Northern and Southern Regiments.

In an effort to reduce the cost of colonial administration, the Amalgamation of 1914 resulted in the merger of the two Regiments to a single formation called the Nigeria Regiment under the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). In recognition of the role of WAFF in the First World War (1914 to 1918), its name was amended to the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF). In 1958, it was renamed the Queen’s Own Nigeria Regiment when the British Army Council in London transferred authority to the Colonial government in Lagos (Garba, 1995: 181 and Jemibewon, 1998: 32). While the British exclusively comprised the officer corps and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) of the colonial army, the non-officer cadres or other ranks came from the native African population. It also meant that the highest rank a native could attain in the army was sergeant. Initially, majority of Lieutenant (later Captain) Glover’s Lagos Constabulary that began the military conquest in the 1860s came from the yet to be conquered Northern Protectorate and other British colonies in the West Indies and West Africa. By 1898 it had about 500 men. Its counterpart to the eastern shoreline, the Niger Coast Constabulary had 400 men in the same year (Ukpabi, 1986: 88). Another prominent military outfit, the Royal Niger Company Constabulary had 150 men under the command of three European officers. The men in this formation were initially drawn from Ghana and Sierra Leone. As colonial penetration moved into the hinterland, its composition changed as it recruited from diverse groups notably the Hausas, Igarras, Igbos, Nupes and Yorubas. In 1889 the constabulary increased to 421 men under the command of five officers and by 1899 it had further swelled to thirteen officers commanding 966 men (Ukpabi, 1986: 62-69). The conditions of military service for the natives in these outfits were unfavourable. For example Ukpabi (1986: 64) noted that soldiers could be
relieved of their appointment by their commanding officer at any time “without the obligation of giving any reason for his action to the soldiers concerned”. After the creation of the Nigerian entity, the military was used in suppressing revolts within the colony and in support of the colonial power in the two world wars (from 1914-18 and from 1939-45) where it saw action in parts of Africa and Asia. In its drive for colonial conquest, the British government increased its expenditure to foot the bill of the various formations it had mandated to create fear and subjugate the peoples that would eventually form the Nigerian colony. However, under the pretext of gross disorganisation and indiscriminate use of force to pacify many communities, the British Colonial power gradually merged these constabularies with the WAFF which completely took over their functions by 1900. In a harsh critique of the Royal Niger Constabulary, a senior WAFF officer Colonel Willocks provides a picture of these militias:

Their officers were in some cases soldiers only in name, some few had neither served in the army nor in the militia; the native officers were quite unfitted to hold any kind of independent command, the N.C.O.’s were sadly deficient in the very rudiments of military knowledge, and the men, though a certain proportion belonged to fighting classes, possessed no spirit de corps, and were badly trained (Ukpabi, 1986: 68).

This position while being factual was merely one of the various excuses that the WAFF Command used in order to get rid of the constabularies after they had played an important role in conquering various social formations and laying the grounds for a colony. Though the WAFF had also played a role in colonization, its main task was to secure the borders of this new colony and fend off the possible penetration of the French and Germans into British zone of pacification.

The gradual ascendancy of the WAFF into the position of the sole military outfit in British West Africa paved way for an unified command for recruitment and control of troops to support
colonial policy. Over the decades, ethnic composition of the Northern and Southern Regiments underwent changes. These ethno-demographic shifts were largely as a result of the relative effect of indirect rule across the colonial provinces and the fluctuating levels of economic exploitation with respect to each protectorate or province. According Barret (1977) in areas where indirect rule was effective there was less difficulty in recruitment and areas that had higher income from agrarian activities than the army’s wages recorded a lesser number of recruits. Between 1900 and 1910, about 80 percent of its ranks were drawn from the Northern provinces and the Yoruba-speaking areas of the Southern Protectorate to the extent that the Hausa and Yoruba languages were widely used as the medium of communication and this extended to the recruit training centres in Lokoja, Ibadan and Zungeru. These changes continued and by 1916 about 50 percent of recruits came from the non-Hausa area of the Northern provinces comprising “cattle rearing Fulanis, Kanuris, Dakka-keri, Shua Arabs, Zabermas, Muchis and other” groups (Barret, 1977: 106). The dominance by the Northern provinces of the non-officer cadres continued even after independence. In the late 1950s as the colony was inching towards independence, Fawole (2008: 97) notes that:

More than 60 per cent of the Nigerian officers were from what was then Eastern Nigeria, were mostly of Igbo origin... the bulk of the foot soldiers in the army were... recruited from among the non-Hausa/ Fulani ethnic groups of the Middle Belt.

This ethno-regional disparity would manifest when Northern NCOs and their men would play a role in influencing their regional superiors to provide the arrow head of the coup which resulted in the revenge killings of many Ibo officers and men in Lagos, Ibadan, Abeokuta and Kaduna.

4.3-The Phenomenon of Military Coups in Nigeria: 1966-1998
The post-colonial Nigerian state is characterised by instability, cleavages and dysfuntionalities. In addition, the assumption by an apologist of military organisational behaviour (Janowitz, 1977) that the military can be understood as a monolithic body has been invalidated in the case of post-colonial Nigeria. This relates to the social cleavages within the domestic political environment and how these have shaped its internal dynamics. The series of conflicts and intractable instability that characterised the liberal-pluralist Nigerian state has been explained in terms of the absence of capacity to provide social cohesion under a non-factionalised leadership.

Because the state itself was the major source of money and opportunities, it could neither remain outside these conflicts nor effectively assert its regulative functions. In effect, it was unable to maintain cohesion, provide stable bourgeois domination and effective class rule (Othman, 1984: 443).

The officer corps has not been immune to the intra-group factionalism and fractionalisation in the domestic political environment. As such, a vulnerable section of the military establishment at certain periods has engaged in a cycle of intervention into mainstream governance in reaction to conditions that are either internal or external. The military in power is in a constant state of threats from within because of the struggle for the spoils of political offices. Thus, the aborted or successful coup is often, as Othman (1989: 114) states

a direct product of the corporate interests of the armed forces and of the factional divisions in them. It is a struggle from which military officers as individuals stand to gain both professionally and materially. It is these corporate, factional and personal interests which best explain the cycle of coups and counter-coups and the relative stability or frailty of particular Nigerian regimes.
Initially constructed by the British colonial power along the lines of liberal democratic principles, the state in Nigeria has witnessed two short-lived civilian governments and prolonged military rule. In essence, the country has alternated from civilian to military regimes. The lifespan of military rule is more than the roughly ten years spent by the civilians if the period 1960-1999 is used as a basis for examination. The country has witnessed, in all, about ten successful and aborted military coups. This involved a group of revolting military officers either displacing a civilian government or purging a senior military leadership in power. It must be stated that the existence of a grand theory of all the military interventions in Nigeria is bound to have fundamental snags because “very often military intervention in government arises out of a combination of circumstances which produces a favourable climate for the military to intervene” (Jemibewon, 1978: 8).

The factors which give rise to successful and failed military coups range from general to peculiar issues. The motives that drive a section of the military to plan and execute coups are neither exclusively internal nor external but often complimentary in nature. As such domestic discontent emanating from the effect of public policies could reinforce existing relations of intra-group factionalism and propel the ambitions among soldiers. Ihonvbere rightly captures the environmental symptoms that exist before a coup is likely to take place.

...virtually all the successful and attempted counter-coups have taken place during periods of mass disaffection and action against the state, characterised by demonstrations, strikes, and riots, as well as by alienation and intense competition for power (Ihonvbere, 1991: 604).

Nevertheless, Garba (1995: 162) points out that the goal of any military coup “is to wrest power from those holding it”. It could be against the civilians or their fellow comrades-in-arms. Within the context of the alternation between civilian and military coups, the country’s political
history from 1960 to 1999 can be divided into four broad phases. These are the First Republic or first civilian phase (1960-1966), the first thirteen years of military coups and rule (1966-1979), the Second Republic or second civilian phase (1979-1983) and the second fifteen years military rule and coups (1984-1999).

4.4-The Military in the First Republic: 1960-1966

The federation of Nigeria achieved political independence in October 1960 with an agricultural-cash crop economy, parliamentary system of governance within a decentralised federal structure and a centralised military establishment as legacies of the British colonial construct. Even before independence, the colony was plagued with intra-elite factionalism largely due to the deliberate policy of divide and rule within the amalgamated entity. The indigenous political elite that emerged within this contraption was to a great extent factionalised along the structural cleavages imposed by the whims and caprices of six decades of colonial administration (1900-1960). The British did not engender integrative mechanisms among and between these regional entities; the political scenario as the country was inching towards independence became an arena where divisive strategies were employed in the struggle for power and domination along ethno-regional lines (Mustapha, 2008: 43). The nationalist movements like the trade unions and political groupings that agitated for self-determination either got subsumed into these factionalised struggles or got repressed by the colonial authorities. As explicitly observed by Fawole (2003: 161) the British colonialists made little attempt to down play or de-emphasize ethno-cultural dissimilarities between the contending principal ethnic nationalities on the one hand, and between them and the minorities on the other (Fawole, 2003: 161).
Ideally, the dominant class within a social formation should have the cohesive ability in forging a clearly defined framework for articulating diverse interests. Ultimately, this ensures relative stability of the political system. In reality, the dominant indigenous class in Nigeria before and after independence was so factionalised in the cut-throat struggle for power at the national and sub-national levels to the extent that it eventually affected the military establishment. The institutionalised cleavages that characterised such factionalised politics and policy directions among the political leaders shaped the structure and cohesive capacity of the military establishment. The organisational integrity of the post-colonial military which had evolved under secular British ethos was greatly affected as a result of the policy of regional quota system of representation. This policy gave rise to a distorted age structure and disparity in the entry qualifications of the officer corps. Thus, relative horizontal and vertical schisms gradually developed among the Nigerian officers (Luckham, 1971b: 24). In the same vein, Fadakinte (2002: 56) observed that ‘the military is pulled into the factional struggle of the dominant class, and the military becomes permeated with divisions which mirror the factionalised divisions of the dominant class as a whole’.

As such, the series of political contestations that spanned the first five years after independence in the form of the controversies and conflicts surrounding national and regional elections, the outcome of the national census and other sensitive issues gave the impetus for the ‘politically concerned’ faction of the military to strike in January 1966. The Balewa government exercised authority over the composition of the military as it related to recruitment into the officer corps. However, there is no clear evidence that the government as a policy openly interfered in the system of promotion and career structure within the military. The civilian leaders “were cautious about interfering in matters of the internal organisation of the
armed forces, with the single notable exception of the regional recruitment quota” (Luckham, 1971b: 230 and 245).

The manifestations of contestations as it relates to the composition, status and size of the military could be traced to the debates at the constitutional conferences in the late 1950s as Nigeria was being prepared for political independence. There was some level of resentment of the military institution within the emerging educated class of political leaders. The role of the military during colonial administration and the cultural perception of many social groups in the colony combined to create relative bias against soldiers. The profession was seen as suitable for school drop outs or social misfits. Ahmadu Bello spoke of the resentment of soldiers by people in his native Sokoto province (Bello, 1962: 23). During such political debates, there arrose the issue of whether or not the size of the military and the resources it should consume should be increased. In a negative response, Chief Obafemi Awolowo had argued that the country’s “defence policy should aim at doing no more and no less than maintaining and modernising the Queen’s Own Nigerian Regiment ....in its present size and strength” (Garba, 1995: 180).

At the resumed conference in 1958 at Ibadan a proposal was put forward for a bilateral defence deal between an eventually independent Nigeria and Britain. It provided for military assistance to Nigeria in return for British access to naval bases in Lagos, Port Harcourt and an air base in Kano in times of war. The deal was respectively approved by the Nigeria’s cabinet and parliament in September and October 1960 (Whiteman, 2008: 256). Despite the approval by the Balewa government, the treaty also proved to be divisive. The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact had advocates and critics, both at home and abroad. Some conference delegates like Ahmadu Bello, Tafawa Balewa, Muhammadu Ridadu, Festus Okotie-Eboh and Kingsley Mbadiwe supported the pact while Aminu Kano, Obafemi Awolowo and Anthony Enahoro were opposed to it. In
addition, many pressure groups including students, journalists and labour unions staged protests against the pact. The radical Casablanca group of African states notably Egypt, Ghana, Guinea and Mali mounted pressure on Nigeria to abrogate the deal and even boycotted a proposed summit of independent African states scheduled for Lagos in 1962. Such pressures and equally important, the notified disinclination of the British in October 1961 to continue with the pact led to its abrogation on January 21 1962 (Ojo, 1990: 255-259). The British saw no need for military bases in Nigeria. New technological developments had enhanced the range of its airforce which could now transport troops to distant places without resorting to the use of a third country in the West African sub-region as a staging post.

Another thorny issue was the divisive policy of ‘Nigerianisation’ of the military which was adopted at the pre-Independence Conference of 1958. This would play some role in the subsequent factionalism and intra-group ambitions within the officer corps. The debate among Nigerian politicians of the entry qualification and quota system for the officer corps was a factor that had an adverse effect on the organisational cohesion of the officer corps. The Balewa government defended the quota principle during parliamentary debates. The policy was in response to the ethno-regional disparity in favour of the Eastern and Western regions in the composition of the officer corps. The focus of the contestations was the army because the Nigerian Army (NA) had more strategic significance than the navy and airforce because it is the oldest and most developed of the military services. The Nigerian Navy (NN) and the Nigerian Airforce (NAF) were established in June 1956 and April 1964 respectively and had a limited number of officers and men. Between 1944 and 1961, of the 130 officers recruited and commissioned into the army and the airforce, there were 56 Ibo officers (about 43 percent) as against 27 Northern officers (about 21 percent) and 26 Yoruba officers (about 20 percent) drawn
from the Western and Northern regions respectively (see Appendix 1, Luckham, 1971b: 343-346). The Minister for the Army, Tako Galadima in May 1965 had this to say before the senate:

We introduced the quota system for the Army thus preventing the possible fear that the army would sometime become unreliable. If any part of the country is not represented in the army, we may harbour some fear that a particular section will begin to feel that it is being dominated (Dudley, 1973:96).

In the same vein, the distorted age structure and the difference in educational backgrounds and durations of military service affected the levels of hierarchical discipline according to which was “poorly institutionalised” (Oyediran, 1979: 23-24). There was some degree of dichotomy between those who rose through the ranks and those whose entry qualifications were either university degrees or secondary certificates. For instance the duration of promotion from Captain to Major between 1949 and 1954 in the Queen’s Own Nigeria Regiment was 64 months as against 28 months for the period between 1958 and 1961 in the Queen’s Own Nigeria Army. About 66 percent of the officers as at 1965 had a secondary certificate as recruitment qualification (Dudely, 1973: 94-95).

Between 1949 and 1962, a total of 130 Nigerians were commissioned as officers. Out of this number, 40 had a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) background implying that they rose through the lower ranks to eventually convert to officers after attaining Warrant Officer (WO) or Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) rank. There were five university graduates and the rest were either Sandhurst cadets or direct short-service-trained officers (see Appendix 1, Luckham, 1971b: 343-346). The first batch of Nigerian officers like Wellington Bassey, Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, Shodeinde and Samuel Ademulegun had risen through from the lower ranks to NCOs and received direct military commissions as against officers like Zakari Maimalari, Abogo Largema
and Kur Mohammed who are the pioneer Nigerian cadets at the prestigious Sandhurst military academy in Britain. While officers like Yakubu Gowon and Chukwuma Nzeogwu joined the army with a secondary school certificate, the likes of Olu Rotimi, Olufemi Olutoye, Adewale Ademoyega, Emmanuel Ifeajuna and Emeka Ojukwu entered with university degrees (Miners, 1971: 113-115). These disparities particularly in terms of entry qualifications had some effect in shaping the factionalism within and between the officer cadres. It was reported in the interview resume by Muffet (1982: 155) with Zanna Bukar Dipcharima, a member of the overthrown civilian cabinet that during the January 1966 coup “Ironsi upbraided the ministers” for having as the former government, forced on him young University graduates as officers. These boys were purely politically inclined and had little or no liking for soldiering.

The first attempt by a section of the Nigerian Military to unilaterally intervene was in 1964. A group of middle-ranking officers met to explore the possibility of intervening in response to the controversial general elections of 1964 and the effects on the political stability of the government and unity of the country. As Luckham (1971b: 238) puts it “a number of middle-ranking officers….Lt Colonels Ojukwu, Banjo and possibly Ejoor among them, seriously discussed whether the military should intervene to resolve the crisis”. This move was abandoned at its infancy because it failed to receive the support of the senior officers and some of their middle-ranking counterparts. The general mood within the leadership was to maintain the military’s subordinate status. This posture became evident when the military leadership tried to officially maintain a neutral position in the conflict between the country’s ceremonial president and the prime-minister over the control of the military. The British-led military ‘declined to take instructions from’ the president who wanted to declare a state of emergency (Asobie, 1996: 144, Luckham, 1971b: 237-238, Muffet, 1982:11).
The Nigerian military’s posture in relation to the political crisis that ensued since the establishment of self-government has been attributed to the British control of its command and control structure as well as the rotational structure of peace-keeping duties its formations were engaged in from 1961-64 in the Congo and Tanzania (Fawole, 2003:151, Luckham, 1971b: 237-238). It is significant to highlight that most if not all the officers had a tour of peacekeeping duty in the Congo. As at January 1964, there were 47 British officers or about ten percent of the entire officer corps holding command positions. The General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army Major-General Christopher Welby-Everard (a British officer expatriate) was determined not to allow the military get dragged into the squabbles of the factionalised political leaders. He swiftly overruled taking sides with the president. This policy continued under his successor, Major General Johnson Thomas Umunakwe Aguiyi-Irons, the first indigenous commander and most senior Nigerian officer. Besides, the Nigerian officers in the top command hierarchy like Ironsi, Shodeinde and Ademulegun had “served several years in the colonial period and were well-indoctrinated with British ideas of civilian control of the military” (Luckham, 1971b: 230).

Secondly, there were the intra-leadership cleavages amongst some key senior officers as a result of patronage networks established by political leaders at the federal and regional levels to court the loyalty of military in trying to exercise power over their political opponents. Muffet (1982: 51) provided an insight into the nature of social relations that existed within the upper echelons of the officer corps, thus:

...amongst many of the senior officers, relations were very bad indeed. Ademulegun was extremely jealous of Ironsi. Ojukwu was jealous of Ironsi, Ademulegun and Pam, as well, as has been seen of Gowon. Ironsi in particular hated Maimalari. In the upper echelons of the service there were many tensions.
A similar line was towed by Joseph Garba (1982: 49) who, was then a junior officer noted, that certain political leaders lobbied for different senior officers in the quest to replace the departing British head of the Nigerian military in the mid-1960s. He said:

Ademulegun... had the support of the Sardauna. Ironsi had the support of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. Ogundipe was recommended by the retiring British incumbent, Maimalari had the support of the Army. It is significant that no Eastern politician championed the cause of Ironsi, no Western politician championed the cause of Ademulegun, and the Northern political leaders were divided between Eastern and Western candidates.

While the factionalism within the upper echelons of the officer corps subdued the momentum of the 1964 coup plot, it however had an adverse effect on the vertical cohesion within the officer corps in terms of the social relations between the senior and junior officers. The level of military authority depended on the degree of harmony that existed between the leaders and their subordinates and the capacity of such vertical bonds between them to withstand external political pressures. In relation to this factor of hierarchical schism, there was another anomaly. The regional Premiers particularly Ahmadu Bello and Samuel Ladoke Akintola of the North and the West respectively had developed close relationships with the senior military commanders in their regions (Luckham, 1971b:240). These commanders were Brigadier Ademulegun and Lt. Colonel Abogo Largema. This situation led to the development of some dual loyalty by these commanders. The struggle for personal privileges among ambitious senior officers created the conditions for prebendal politics softening the civil and military boundaries of the state. This provided the opportunity for interference in military functions especially in quelling riots involving political opponents or tutoring political incumbents in the use of firearms (Asobie, 1996: 144, Asobie, 1998: 38).
4.5-The First Military Tenure of Factionalism and Cycle of Coups: 1966-1979

In general, the unfavourable political climate in the country and the long-term effect certain policies had on the military establishment provided the impetus for planning and executing the first successful military coup in January 1966 as there was an “absence of support among junior officers for the authority of their senior commanders” (Luckham, 1971b: 247). Conceptualising and discussing possible military intervention initially involved a group of junior officers, that is a number of army Majors and a Captain “and a small group of intellectuals” holding meetings in Lagos and Ibadan (Luckham, 1971b: 17) in the latter half of 1965. While the civilians involved in the meetings with Ifeajuna and Okafor have neither been named nor their specific roles mentioned in available literature related to the coup of January 1966, they were identified as “the group of radical intelligentsia- writers, poets and dramatists- who dominated the intellectual scene in places like Lagos and Ibadan”. They were by implication critics of the ruling NPC and its allies (Dudely, 1973: 97). The inner circle of conspirators were Ademoyega, Anuforo, Chukuka, Ifeajuna, Nzeogwu, Oji and Okafor while their “civilians friends dropped into the background and so far one can tell played no further part in planning the coup” (Luckham, 1971b: 17-18). In total 32 junior officers led by Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna were involved in organizing and executing what came to be called the January 15 1966 or junior officers’ Coup (Adekanye, 1999: 5). There is an allegation by one of the conspirators that seems to suggest that some senior officers namely Lt. Colonels Banjo, Fajuyi, Njoku and Ojukwu were either part of the conspirators or privy to the coup plans (Ademoyega, 1981: 70 and Dudely, 1973: 108). The coupists claimed that they had a mission of bringing about a revolution by eliminating the political leaders who symbolised decadence at the national and regional levels. Another impetus was the fear of an impending move by the NPC-led government to purge all institutions of power including the military establishment of dissident elements (Adekanye, 1981: 20). A day
after the coup, most prominent of the conspirators Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu said they struck in order to establish “a strong, united and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife” (see Akinnola, 2003: 18). This was to be achieved through the elimination of those forces that promoted corruption, nepotism, tribalism and made “the country look big for nothing before international circle” (Akinnola, 2003: 21). The Nigerian government had been alerted in advance by its former colonial power of “the pending coup d’état and had offered to leave British troops behind in Lagos” (Muffet, 1982: 17) to provide some support to the Balewa government after the Commonwealth Summit. This offer of assistance was however, turned down.

The coup started in the late hours of January 14 and continued into the following day of January 15 1966. In theory, the tactical goals of the coup were to eliminate senior military officers who were allied to the politicians, arrest all prominent political leaders and if they resist to execute them and to seize all points of strategic importance across the country (Dudely, 1973: 103). In contrast to what was supposed to be executed, the coup was carried out in Lagos, Kaduna and Ibadan but not in Enugu and Benin. While the coupists and their victims “were patterned in ethnic and/regional terms” it is argued that this was “more as a result of the tactical and political” reasons needed for the coup to be successfully executed (Luckham, 1971b: 84). A justification was advanced by one of the coupists, Major Adewale Ademoyega who claimed that their targets were persons who held strategic positions in government and the military command (Ademoyega, 1981: 82-83). Perhaps this explains why the army’s Quarter-Master General Lt. Colonel Unegbu was among the casualties because he refused to give the coupists in Lagos access to the arms and ammunition. However, Othman (1989: 119) painted a general but explicit picture of behavioral patterns in the military in relation to the social environment, thus:
The conduct of Nigerian military elites, like that of their civilian counterparts, has arguably often been animated by primordial ties or loyalties. But these values only prompt specific actions in response to particular goals of power or wealth.

The coupists succeeded in eliminating some top political leaders including the prime minister, the premiers of the Northern and Western regions, the federal minister of finance from the Mid-west and some senior and middle-ranking military officers from the Northern and Western regions in addition to one senior officer from the Mid-Western region. The president, the regional premiers of the East and Mid-west as well as the most senior military officer were either not within the reach of the coupists like Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and army chief General Ironsi or did not put any physical resistance to the coupists like Chief Michael Okpara in contrast to Chief Akintola who shot at the coupists when they came for him. However, there is no evidence from any historical record indicating that the prime minister put up any resistance when Major Ifeajuna and his soldiers came to apprehend him at his official residence. He was subsequently shot by the coupists.

The dominance of the Ibo ethnic group in the ring of coup plotters, the failure to eliminate political leaders in the Eastern and Mid-Western regions where most of the coupists came from and the casualties of the coup largely coming from the Northern region and to some extent, the Western region moulded suspicions within civilian and military elite circles particularly the Northerners that it was sectionally motivated. Thus, the coup’s outcome “looked patently to the other ethnic groups, particularly in the North and West” as an agenda to establish an ethno-regional hegemony “even though the Ibo political leaders … were solidly steeped in the vices of the First Republic as any other ethnic group” (Turi and Haruna, 1979: 27)
The major two implications arising from this coup on both military and civilian authority can be discerned. The first was that the civilian government had gradually lost the respect it previously commanded within the military circles especially among the junior officers. They saw the politicians as corrupt, nepotic and decadent. This was in contrast to the high expectations they and many of their highly educated civilian peers had at the dawn of independence. Secondly, the military leadership had lost the corporate obedience from the junior military officers. The latter saw them as part of the divisive politics affecting the country. As such, any solution had to be tied to doing away not only with the civilian leadership but also their agents in the military leadership. It was rightly discerned that “control was only institutionalised for one of the three levels of civil-military relations…that of the highest military commanders and the civilian government leadership” (Luckham, 1971b: 247).

However, the coupists were unable to take over the reins of government. In Lagos, The General Officer Commanding and obviously, the most senior military officer, Major general Aguiyi-Ironsi had escaped elimination by the coupists and quickly rallied loyal troops to restore relative normalcy. In the North, Lt. Colonel Ojukwu who was the most senior officer surviving and battalion commander in Kano refused to accede to Major Nzeogwu’s request for support. Nzeogwu refused to accept Ironsi’s order to surrender until he realised that it was only in Kaduna that the coup had succeeded. The coupists were gradually isolated as the remnants of the civilian and military leadership regrouped to chart a response to the crisis. No leader had emerged from the side of either what remained of the government or the coupists and this resulted in a confusion that engulfed the country. There was no consensus among the surviving cabinet members on the formation of a new government. The dominant Northern People’s Congress (NPC) put forward Bukar Dipcharima as candidate for prime minister but its estranged coalition partner, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) preferred Kingsley Mbadiwe.
To worsen matters, the military could only take orders from a substantive prime minister and the military faced the likelihood of dissention and further fragmentation if the leadership vacuum persisted in the country. This created the conditions for the politicians to hand over governmental authority to the military leadership. General Aguiyi-Ironsi persuaded the president of the Nigerian Senate, Nwafor Orizu who was then acting as Nigeria’s president to surrender the reins of government to the military on January 16 1966. In his handover speech, Orizu stated that based on the Council of Ministers’ inability to form a government he was unanimously advised “to voluntarily hand the administration of the country to the armed forces of the Republic with immediate effect” (Garba, 1995: 138). General Aguiyi-Ironsi became the first military leader in Nigeria and was addressed as Head of State and Supreme Commander. This move neutralised the junior officers’ coup and set the stage for their surrender to the new military government. The military regime arrested and put them in indefinite detention. The regime dismantled the political institutions of the First Republic. As a result of its deficient technical capacity to conduct the normal business of government and the identical behavioural traits shared with the civil service, the regime formed an administrative coalition with senior civil servants (Olugbemi, 1979: 98-100). This had some effect on the policy direction of the regime which was concerned with restoring stability and unity in the fragile State.

While the hierarchical cracks in the military had been relatively managed as a result of the intervention by General Ironsi, some of the policies that were pursued by the new military government proved counter-productive. These actions rested on attempts to reverse and suppress the divisive structures by implication federalism that engendered instability and disunity in the country. The first test for the regime came in February 1966 when an armed insurrection was declared in the Niger Delta area which was then part of the Eastern and Mid-
Western regions. This armed agitation was nipped in the bud on March 7 1966 when its ideologue and coordinator Isaac Adaka Boro was arrested by government’s military forces.

Generally it was expected that the unifying policies of the regime would regulate the socio-political tension in the country. However, these policy postures merely reinforced divisive perceptions in the society and invariably within the rank and file of the military establishment. This was borne out of the fact that from the onset, the Ironsi administration lacked the political experience to handle sensitive national issues that bordered on the corporate status of the military which the regime heavily relied upon. Thus, the unity of the country was threatened by centripetal forces. The Achilles heel of the government was the inadequacy in communication between it and the fractured society at one level and within the military establishment at another. The regime largely relied ‘on a small circle of trusted officials and friends for advice, and this tended to bring about the closure of the regime, to make it less responsive to outside political pressures’ (Luckham, 1971b: 257). In the same vein, the tendency among military officers that were deployed to administrative posts outside the military establishment was to strictly maintain the normal military structures of authority and command procedures. “The reluctance of the military government to share power with other groups” was as a result of the belief that the government “did not come to power by the leave of any political party or any section of the country” (Yahaya, 1979: 261)

This fatal policy of insulating the decision making structures of the regime from the potentially explosive pressures in the political and military environments and the tendency to centralise authority made the regime to commit strategic blunders. A major blunder was the unification policy or Decree no. 34 of 1966, which provided for abolishing the four-regional federal system of government. The Supreme Commander declared in a national broadcast on May 24 that:
...the former regions are abolished, and Nigeria grouped into territorial areas called provinces. Nigeria ceases to be what has been described as a federation. It now becomes simply the Republic of Nigeria (Tell Magazine, May 2011: 16).

In an attempt to control or minimise the contestations, cleavages and antagonisms that characterised the political landscape of the country, the regime had opted to replace the federal system with a unitary one comprising a centralised national government and smaller administrative units having delegated powers. This policy was met with negative reactions in various degrees in the Northern region and to a lesser extent in the Western region. In the North, this policy was seen by the various social strata as negative to their respective class interests. The unification policy was perceived as an attempt to consolidate the position of the Ibo traders who were already a powerful force in the economy. Those who saw themselves as voices of the Northern minorities saw unification as a blow to their aspirations for local autonomy from regional and national domination. The traditional rulers interpreted this policy to mean an erosion of their feudal authority since their power was dependent on the regional power structure. The anti-establishment forces were disappointed because the policy did not address the political rights of individuals and by extension inhibited the deepening of democracy. Since this policy was to cover the civil service, the civil servants of northern extraction saw this as a calculated attempt to foist a southern dominated civil service on the country (Feinstein, 1998: 237). There were agitations for Nigeria’s break-up in some parts of the country. In the North, there were violent demonstrations in places like Bauchi, Gboko, Gombe, Jos, Makurdi, Minna, Kaduna, Kano, Oturkpo, Zaria and Zungeru (Forsyth, 1982: 69). Between May and September 1966, many Northern residents of Eastern origin were attacked by mobs with fatalities recorded.
A second blunder was the list of military promotions announced in May 1966. This policy was quite normal by military standards and procedure, and was not a departure of the policy adopted by the preceding civilian government. It however, widened the disparity in the ethno-regional balance within the officer corps and tended to favour officers from the Eastern region. Of the 25 officers that got promoted to the rank of Lt. Colonel, eighteen were from the Ibo ethnic group. The rest comprised five Northerners, one Westerner and one Mid-Westerner of non-Ibo identity (Miners, 1971: 210, Turi and Haruna, 1979: 28). These gave an impetus to the earlier impression whether rightly or wrongly among certain Northern officers and civilian elites that the regime was tacitly pursuing an ethno-regional agenda. This was evident in some Northern military circles. In addition, these officers, their NCOs and other ranks had expected the regime to address primordial grievances particularly the trial and prosecution of those responsible for the killing of senior Northern officers namely Brigadier Zakari Maimalari, Colonel Abogo Largema and Lt. Colonels James Pam and Kur Muhammed. Though in detention, the trial of the coupists had not taken place by July 1966 and this was interpreted rightly or wrongly as a tacit approval of the coup and part of an alleged plan for Ibo hegemony in the political future of the country. In a demonstration of primordial solidarity, the Northern NCOs and other ranks mounted pressure on their Northern officers to act. In response to the mood within the military structure and in North, General Ironsi invited traditional rulers for a parley in Ibadan to discuss and solicit their support for national unity. He even made a concession to mutinous soldiers of the Federal Guards in Lagos by agreeing to have a northern officer as the second-in-command in order to pacify them for the appointment of an Ibo as their commanding officer. However, these palliative measures did not address the social tensions that affected not only the society but the army.
Consequently, a counter-coup was carried out by a group of Northern junior officers led by Majors Murtala Muhammed, Captains Theophilus Danjuma and Martin Adamu on July 29 1966. Other officers were Joe Garba, Ibrahim Babangida, Muhammadu Jega, Sani Abacha, Garba Dada, Ibrahim Bako, William Walbe, Paul Tarfa, Lawrence Onoja, Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, Shittu Alao and Musa Usman (Balogun, 2011: 168). The coupists had alleged that the supreme commander had failed to bring the coupists of the January 1966 to justice. Also, the unification policy made many northern elites particularly the intelligentsia to believe that the regime was pursuing an ethno-hegemonic agenda which was generally anti-North and did not address the minorities’ quest for more regions especially in the Middle Belt area of the Northern region.

In Lagos, Kaduna and Abeokuta the plotters haphazardly struck inflicting casualties on those seen as loyalists of the regime or potential obstacles to the coup. Ibadan was the epicentre of the July 29 coup because the supreme commander was on an official visit to the Western region. Arrested along with his host, Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi both were subsequently executed by the irate soldiers. In other places, most of the officers who were seen to be loyal to the Ironsi regime were either killed or rounded up. These included the commanders of the Abeokuta Garrison and 2 Reconnaissance Squadron, Lt. Colonel Okunweze and Major Obienu respectively (Ejenavwo, 2007: 16). It was only in the Eastern region that the battalion commander in Enugu was able to prevent bloodshed and the regional military governor, Lt. Colonel Ojukwu escaped elimination by evading the coupists led by Captain Gibson Sanda Jalo. As a result, a truce was established between units that were either loyal or against the regime. Ironsi’s deputy Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe had initially attempted to exercise authority during the coup by rallying loyal troops but his command was ineffective. The troops he dispatched to counter the coup were either overpowered or simply discarded his orders by joining the coupists. The coup saw the emergence of the army’s chief of staff, Lt. Colonel Gowon as the new head of the military
government on July 30 1966. In an effort to obtain political legitimacy from the opponents of decree no 34, he announced abolished the enabling decree and restored the federal structure on August 31 1966. There was a mixed reaction to this choice. Lt. Colonel Ojukwu was disinclined to Gowon. For Ojukwu, the logical thing was for most senior of the surviving officer, Brigadier Ogundipe to be the head of government. Besides, there were other senior officers in the Supreme Military Council (SMC) namely Commodore Akinwale Wey and Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo if Ogundipe declined to assume leadership. Ojukwu saw this coup as a revolt against the military regime of Ironsi which “was legally and formally vested and given specific order to restore peace” and thus, the emergence of Gowon he termed illegal and unconstitutional (Ojukwu, 1989: 9). In addition, both Gowon and Ojukwu took a dislike for each other as manifested in the Nigerian staff officers meeting of 1964 in Lagos. Ojukwu either raised the question of whose authority the army should respect in the event of a conflict between the prime-minister and the president (Forsyth, 1982: 41-42) or as documented by Luckham (1971b: 238) when he mooted a possibility for a possible intervention to arrest the national drift. It was said that after the meeting Gowon informed General Welby-Everard of Ojukwu’s comments.

Apart from the personality clash between the two, the July coup widened the existing cleavages within the military ranks and eventually led to the factionalisation of its unified command structure by the middle of 1967. The military crystallised into three main factions- the Federal faction comprising largely of Northern officers and men as well as those from the Western region and some of the non-Ibo Easterners in the military like Brigadier Ekpo who became a member of the Supreme Military Council. These were loyal to Gowon; the second faction was an Eastern or Biafran faction made up of Ibo officers and soldiers including those from the Mid-Western region, and some from the non-Ibo provinces of the Eastern region. There were a handful of officers from the Western region that included Colonel Victor Banjo,
Majors Adewale Ademoyega and Ganiyu Adeleke. Their allegiance to Ojukwu was borne out their philosophy that the three southern regions had to be “liberated from the oppression of the Northern Oligarchy” (Ademoyega, 1981: 207); the third faction was a Mid-Western faction exclusively comprising both Ibos and non-Ibos who initially remained neutral in the first few months after the July Coup but eventually joined either the Federal or Biafran side when the civil war broke out in June 1967. Examples include Gowon’s Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Ekpo and the Mid-West governor, Colonel David Ejoor who rose to become the head of the federal army. This last faction was not as prominent as the first two factions (Dudely, 1973: 144).

The political upheaval that welcomed the July 1966 coups manifested in the violent protests against the policies of the Ironsi regime and the killing of many Easterners (mostly Ibos) in the North. The leadership in Enugu reacted by refusing to cooperate with the central government in Lagos on concurrent financial matters like the issue of tax remittance. As Easterners in other parts of Nigeria left for the Eastern region, those from the Northern and Western regions especially soldiers and other public servants went back to their own respective regions. The agitation for secession from Nigeria increased from the Eastern region. The elites of the region held a conference on May 27 1967 and mandated Ojukwu to break away from Nigeria. An observer noted that “the loudest in their cries for an instant departure of the Region from Nigeria … in their denunciation of all Nigeria and Nigerians, tended to be ousted civil servants and some academics, or self-styled intellectuals” (Forsyth, 1982: 75).

The political crisis and the military factionalism provided the impetus for secession in May 30 1967 when its military governor, Colonel Ojukwu declared the sovereign state of Biafra. Earlier, the mediation effort between January 4 and 5 1967 by General Ankrah also known as the Aburi
Talks did not see the light of the day. There was a divergence in the interpretation of the agreements reached (Aluko, 1981: 131-132). The compromises made by Gowon and Ojukwu bordering on the political structure of Nigerian state and its military command were never implemented. Ojukwu and his supporters hinged their drive for secession on the grounds that Gowon at the instigation of his advisers reneged to abide by the agreements reached at Aburi (Forsyth, 1982: 80-83).

Both sides received moral and material support from a number of countries in Africa, Asia and Europe. Britain, its former colonial power and traditional supplier was willing to sell only a limited amount of weapons to Nigeria. The Labour government took into cognisance the issue of human rights abuses. There was the accusation that the people of Biafra were facing genocide in the hands of the federal military government. The United States refused back any side. The Nixon administration adopted a middle course due to the sharply divergent recommendations of the two principal bodies in charge of foreign policy, namely the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

There was a strong difference of opinion between the U.S. ambassador and the C.I.A. The latter evidently felt that the United States interests would be best served by taking the part of the Biafrans, while the State Department supported the forces for a strong One Nigeria (Feinstein, 1998: 249).

Since the Gowon regime was seeking international support, it broke with Nigeria’s pro-Western foreign policy orientation and thus, the former Soviet Union became a major source of arms supply (Izah, 1991: 87). Other major suppliers were the former Czechoslovakia and the Arab Republic of Egypt who happened to be allies of the Soviet Union. These supplies included jet-aircraft, battle tanks and artillery guns. Some foreign pilots were contracted to fly Nigerian
The Biafran will to fight and resist the Federal side eventually collapsed for some reasons. One, some Biafran officers, NCOs and men, who drew their experience from the Nigerian army were killed in the initial stages of the war thereby forcing Ojukwu to increasingly rely on foreign mercenaries like Bob Denard, Major Williams, and Colonel Rolf Steiner to serve as battlefield commanders. Two, the Federal side possessed superior fire-power. As the Biafran adopted the strategy of conventional warfare, the Nigerian airforce (NAF) was able to provide effective support against Biafran targets. Three, there was friction between Ojukwu and some of his field commanders over which strategic and operational policies that Biafra ought to adopt. Ojukwu
often redeployed field commanders who expressed contrary opinions and this created inconsistency in the war aims of the Biafran struggle. Of note were Majors Ademoyega and Ifeajuna, Colonels Banjo, Chukwuka and Njoku. The commander of the liberation army in the Mid-West, ‘Brigadier’ Banjo, Colonel Emmanuel Ifeajuna and Major Philip Alale were arrested, tried and executed in September 22 1967 for treason. Banjo was alleged to have sabotaged the military operations aimed at capturing Lagos during the invasion of the Mid-West (Ademoyega, 1981: 241-244). Banjo was even alleged to have been in secret contacts with the federal side and the envoy of Britain (Ademoyega, 1981: and Forsyth, 1982: 90). Four, the Federal Military Government through the strategic thinking of advisers notably Chief Obafemi Awolowo, then Federal Commissioner of Finance cut off Biafra from getting vital military and humanitarian supplies by controlling the airspace and sea lanes. An insider who served as a commander in the Biafran Army, Major Ademoyega (1981: 245-246) identified the economic blockade of Biafra as an important factor that contributed to its collapse. This geo-strategy was given an impetus with the support given to the Federal side by the ethnic minorities who inhabit the coastal communities in the Niger Delta.

In order to prosecute the war, the Nigerian federal government had to appeal to the regional and ethnic loyalties of the minority ethnic groups in Southeastern and Southwestern Nigeria, whose autonomy was threatened by secessionist Biafra. They were told that the federal Nigerian government would not do unto them what Biafra was about to do to them- assume their regional powers (Ekeh, 1999: 73).

These minorities harboured some fears of a possible Ibo hegemony if a sovereign Biafra was actualised. Major Isaac Boro and his militia group which had started the short-lived insurrection in early 1966 now fought on the federal side against Biafra. In the same vein, Nigeria was able to diplomatically persuade its contiguous neighbours namely the Republics of Benin, Niger, Chad
and Cameroun not to provide any moral or material support to Biafra. Of note is the case of some nationals of these countries serving in the Nigerian army during the war.

The civil war lasted for about thirty months in which the secession bid was defeated by January 1970. The war cost about two million lives largely civilians as a result of starvation and collateral damage. The civil war had significant effect on the structure of the Nigerian military. In the first place, the military’s numerical manpower size increased several fold from a mere 10,500 men as at early 1965 to about 250,000 men by January 1970 (Aluko, 1981: 34). It was now the largest military force in black Africa. This four-year incremental trend was a significant departure from the policy as at independence where the role of the military was restricted ‘to provide support for the fledging state,... help maintain law and order and provide the ritual marks of sovereignty with military parades, march pasts and guards of honour that gladdens a politician’s heart’ (Luckham, 1971b: 88).

The military’s size had an implication for the share of national expenditures devoted to defence. As the government was contemplating plans for demobilisation of combatants, it had to consider the financial implications of maintaining a large military during peacetime. Since the Gowon regime was slow in reducing the size of the military, the budgetary allocation kept rising annually from 1971 to 1975. By 1975, the defence expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at more than seven percent. This sharp increase in relation to the two preceding years had to do with plans to right-size and modernise the military with new weapons and barracks accommodation. In addition, post-war Nigeria sent many officers for training in Britain under an agreement that included the purchase of weapons for the army, navy and airforce. According to Aluko, about 300 officers were annually sent to Britain for training between the years 1970 and 1975 (1981: 63).
Table 1: Defence Expenditure of Nigeria, 1966 to 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defence Expenditure (millions of Naira)</th>
<th>As a Percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>25.10</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>107.50</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>162.62</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>359.91</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>314.85</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>285.90</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>370.25</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>420.16</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>532.92</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,116.70</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The civil war and the accompanying increase in the military’s size were part of the reasons for the annual increases in the defence expenditure. The army of over 10,000 men as at 1966 had reached a size of a quarter of a million by 1970. The table above shows that it was only in 1969 that defence expenditure had reached 10 percent of GDP. Secondly, the social composition of the military in terms of the regional quota introduced in the late 1950s and early 1960s to create a federal balance was greatly altered. Though no statistical evidence is available, this development became a long-term disadvantage to Ibo ethnic group. It was during the military
regime of Babangida (1985-1993) that one Ike Nwachukwu, a military provost and two-star general served as commander of an army division and member of the regime’s top decision-making organ.

The federal government was forced by the imperatives of war to throw open the membership of the army to all Nigerians irrespective of their proportional numbers, regional (or state) origins, ethnic backgrounds, religious affiliations, or places of residence (Adekanye, 1989: 190).

Most of the officers and men from Eastern region had left the Nigerian military in late 1966 to fight for Biafra. This led to their dismissal from the military. This set the stage for Northern domination of the officer corps. The comparatively lower number of Westerners in the officer and non-officer cadre was based on the assumption ‘that the army was for delinquents, hot-heads, and those without means of livelihood’ (Balogun, 2011: 163). In an effort to widen support for the war, the Gowon regime had solicited for the recruitment of Westerners into the army (Alli, 2001: 210). Their numbers increased and by the war’s end there were about 70,000 Yoruba officers and men (Adekson, 1979). The Northern dominance would continue for about three decades. This was largely because such officers were easily absorbed into the army during the war without applying the quota principle or the required educational qualifications. Subsequently, they dominated the middle and senior officer cadre within a period ranging from the late 1970s to the late 1990s. While the Westerners were encouraged to join the army during and after the civil war, their numbers in the combatant cadre was relatively lower than that of the Northerners. Their educational qualifications had some influence in their preference for the engineering, educational and medical corps of the army. Even within the North, those from the predominantly non-Hausa areas particularly the former provinces of Adamawa, Benue, Borno, Plateau continued to have an edge over the Hausa or Fulani groups because of two main
reasons. The military profession was viewed as a more viable alternative by such groups for career mobility in relation to business, politics and the civil service. During the colonial period, the initial response to enlist for service by many Hausa was that of a belated recognition for the military profession. A testimony was provided by Ahmadu Bello on the relative resentment of the military profession in his native Sokoto province (Bello, 1962: 23). Towards independence, those who joined the military were stereotyped as academic failures who could not cope in more respected professions such as teaching, civil service job or even pursuing post-secondary education. Secondly, many NCOs and other ranks whether serving or retired encouraged their sons to enlist as officers on the basis of ‘like father like son’ principle. An example is General Mohammed Buba Marwa from Adamawa state whose father rose through the ranks to become a commissioned officer before retiring in the seventies. There are some places in the North Central area of the country where many extended families either have a serving or retired soldier.

The Gowon regime had prevented the break-up of Nigeria by successfully defeating the Biafran bid. In the same vein, it balkanised the regions into 12 weaker states as a way of placating sub-national agitations while articulating slogans and policies aimed at fostering national unity. One of such programmes was National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) aimed at promoting social integration. The regime avoided the mistake made by General Ironsi who by commission or omission relied on a selected group of senior civil servants as advisers in explicit terms ‘who irresponsibly urged him to various ill-considered decisions’ (Turi and Haruna, 1979: 28). Apart from the conventional wisdom of working with civil servants to augment for its technical deficiency in the running of governmental machinery, the military regime appointed some prominent politicians of the defunct First Republic as commissioners in the Federal Executive Council (FEC). This was to widen its support base and by implication its legitimacy.
These included Aminu Kano, Anthony Enahoro, Joseph Tarka, Obafemi Awolowo, Okoi Arikpo, Shehu Shagari and Waziri Ibrahim.

However, the regime was overthrown in a palace coup on July 29 1975 while General Gowon was in Uganda attending an African summit. The coup was spearheaded and coordinated by some army brigadiers and colonels. Some of the ring leaders “... had seen active service during the civil war” and “had now advanced within the officer corps to positions of influence” in the military command hierarchy. For example, Lt. Colonels Shehu Yar’Adua, Mohammed Jega, Abdullahi Shelleng and Muhammed Buhari had risen to become General Staff Officers of the Lagos Garrison, First, Second and Third army Divisions respectively (Farris and Bomoi, 2004: 87). Others who participated in the ring were Colonels Abdullahi Mohammed, Ibrahim Taiwo, Joseph Garba and Ochefu. According to an army intelligence officer, Aliyu Mohammed Gusau whom the plotters confided, the decision by General Gowon,

to renege on the promise to install an elected government in 1976 was the trigger that the colonels needed to topple his government. They wanted the emergence of a civilian government at the end of the war that would allow the military to return to the barracks (Farris and Bomoi, 2004: 88).

The postponement of the 1976 handover deadline by the regime was not enthusiastically welcomed in civilian and some military circles. Some who had served in the executive cabinet like Obafemi Awolowo and Anthony Enahoro, in contrast to the supporters of Gowon, particularly the military Governors, expressed reservations at this shift in policy. Criticism of the regime’s posture to renege its hand-over promise grew due to ‘the rising expectations of different sectors of the society’ (Campbell, 1978: 59). It has been noted that,
...while the public were becoming restless with Gowon’s administration, the army itself was fretting and beginning to complain aloud about the unsatisfactory situation in the army in particular and in the nation in general (Jemibewon, 1978: 33).

Some of the officers who had witnessed action during the war as battlefield commanders like Murtala Muhammed, Iliya Bisalla, Joe Garba, and Theophilus Danjuma had developed some resentments against their colleagues and superiors who were not directly involved in the fighting because they held administrative positions in Lagos or in the state capitals. It has been noted that the “war-time commanders...came to resent their exclusion from government” just as they did not “have much respect for those of their superiors who remained close to Gowon” (Othman, 1989: 121). In the same vein, there were the accusations of corruption leveled against some of his ministers and governors. The decision to postpone the transition to civil rule and cases of corruption was used by the coupists in the broadcast to Nigerians on July 30 1975. The new head of state, General Murtala Muhammed said that

...the affairs of state, hitherto a collective responsibility, became characterised by lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline and, even neglect. Indeed, the public at large became disillusioned and disappointed by these developments. This trend was clearly incompatible with the philosophy and image of a corrective regime. (TELL Magazine, May 2011: 36).

The new regime was closely supported by technocratic and patriotic reformers drawn from the public service like Yaya Abubakar, Allison Ayida, Tunji Olagunju and Patrick Dele Cole as well as the academia from Ibadan and Zaria. The regime embarked on a path to restore confidence in governance by adopting radically-inspired corrective policies in the domestic and foreign realms. Members of Gowon’s regime including the service chiefs and state governors were retired. Just
like its predecessor, the regime created an additional seven states and the reformation of the governance at the local level into a unified system was initiated. The process of drafting a constitution was initiated. In February 1976, the regime introduced the principle of federal character in political appointments and military recruitment as a continuation of the quota system of the 1960s and this was laid out within the context of the new nineteen-state structure. With respect to recruitment procedure for each of the services in the military, each state was entitled to an equal number of vacancies available for recruitment into the officer corps at any given time (Adekanye, 1989: 190). The application of the federal character principle in the composition of the Nigerian Armed Forces was enshrined in section 197(2) of the drafted 1979 constitution (FRN, 1979: 64). There was virtually no public institution that did not feel the pulse of the regime’s policy.

In an attempt to curb public misconduct, the regime purged the public service of about 10,000 workers for various offences and over 200 military and police personnel were demoted, retired or dismissed. The regime sacked many military and public officers found wanting. However, some military officers like Colonel Bukar Suka Dimka resented this corrective posture (Yahaya, 1979: 266) which they interpreted as hypocritical. Some had grudges over the way and manner those close to them were tried and dismissed from public office. The issue of promotions within the officer corps hierarchy added impetus to the coupists drive to strike. The defence commissioner, Major General Iliya Bisalla was incensed by the elevation of his course mates and a junior to ranks above his own. Brigadier Murtala Muhammed was elevated to the rank of a four-star general, while Obasanjo and Danjuma were promoted to three-star generals (Farris and Bomoi, 2004: 120, Othman, 1989: 127). On the morning of Friday, February 13 1976 the rebellious soldiers under General Bisalla, Police Commissioner Joseph Gomwalk and Lt. Colonel Bukar Dimka assassinated General Murtala Muhammed, Colonel Ibrahim Taiwo and a few
others. One of the targets of the coupists, General Ray Matthew Dumuje narrowly escaped when they attacked his vehicle. However, the coup was quickly aborted under the leadership of army Chief General Danjuma who rallied loyal forces to flush out and arrest the coupists in Lagos and other parts of the country. In an announcement, one of the regime’s loyalists who later became the number two man in the government Brigadier Yar’Adua said that the motive behind the coup was “to reverse the decisions of the Assets Investigation panel and to re-instate retired officers including the ex-military Governors and Gowon” (Farris and Bomoi, 2004: 121).

The allegations of Gowon’s complicity in the aborted coup and Dimka’s apparent visitation to the British High Commission premises took Anglo-Nigerian relations to an all time low (Aluko, 1981: 58). Since his overthrow in July 1975, Gowon had been in exile in Britain. Consequently, he was declared a wanted man and his retirement in 1975 by the successive regime was converted to dismissal. About 50 persons including Bisalla, Dimka and Gomwalk faced court martial and 32 were found guilty and executed by firing squad (Farris and Bomoi, 2004: 126). This was the first time in post-colonial history that a Nigerian government had executed coup plotters.

General Obasanjo succeeded his slain boss and continued with the policies already formulated since the 1975 coup which revolved around charting on the path to civilian democratic rule. With respect to reforming the military, Brigadier Yar’Adua was said to have concluded in March 1976 that “the present size of the army is....., such that it is impossible to equip properly and give it any meaningful training” (Farris and Bomoi, 2004: 126-127). Demobilisation of the army and promotions, which the previous regime failed to carry out, began in earnest. In order to modernise the officer corps of the military on the basis of professionalism and operational doctrine, a military staff college was established in April 1976. In an attempt to address the
security lapses arising from the 1976 coup, the regime created an all embracing intelligence outfit called the Nigerian Security Organisation (NSO) in 1977 under the leadership of Major general Abdullahi Mohammed, the first director of military intelligence (Garba, 1995: 157). Additionally, the regime established the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) in August 1979 to as a vehicle for interaction and articulating policy development capacity at the highest levels of government. Top government officials from both the civil public institutions and the military are annually selected to engage in interactive, research-based management courses aimed at developing strategic policy options for the country. Also, the new regime had to rely on a parallel structure of decision-making in order to articulate certain policies such as the assets nationalisation of some multinationals over their links with South Africa such as the oil giant, British Petroleum (BP). This structure known as the ‘inner core of five’ comprised the General Obasanjo, his deputy Major-general Shehu Yar’Adua, the army chief Lt. general Theophilus Danjuma, the police chief Muhammadu Dikko Yusuf and the army’s head of the Armoured corps Brigadier Ibrahim Babangida (Aluko, 1990: 384). A general picture was captured of the role of this clique within the Supreme Military Council, thus:

It is pertinent to note that in almost all cases decisions of the inner core of five were ratified with little or no question from the other members of the SMC in a rather military fashion (Aluko, 1990: 385)

Danjuma and Babangida had played an important role in foiling the 1976 coup. In retrospect, the team of Danjuma, Obasanjo and Yusuf had persuaded General Murtala Muhammed to recognise and support the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola on November 25 1975 (Sotunmbi, 1990: 370).
The transition was kept on course and reached the climax with the election of state governors, federal and state legislators, and Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) as the first executive president of the federal republic. Obasanjo transferred power to the civilians on October 1 1979. While the demobilisation programme had not reached its target, the army’s numbers had been reduced from 250,000 to 200,000 men (Farris and Bomoi, 2004: 121) in addition to an increase in barracks accommodation. The Obasanjo regime is credited for being the first military regime to hand over power to a civilian government in Nigeria. This was a rare occurrence in Africa of the 1970s where both military and civil authoritarian rule were prevalent.

4.6-The Second Civilian Tenure: October 1 1979 to December 31 1983

Within the context of the 1979 Constitution, the military was supposed to subject itself to the will of the civilian authority (Sections 197-200, part III, FRN, 1982: 64-65). The military under Shagari enjoyed significant autonomy and as such, civilian control was generally weak. This autonomy came about due to distrust and contempt between the military establishment and the civilian authorities. On assumption of office, Shagari initially declined to keep the defence portfolio for himself. Part of the reason for this was that “there appeared... some difficulty in getting the service chiefs to accept” who should be the defence minister (Shagari, 2001: 319). In addition, Shagari was not inclined to having a person with a military background holding the portfolio. This was because his perception and that of his close political associates was that the struggle for state power in Nigeria was generally between two groups- the civilians and the military (Alli, 2001: 210 and Othman, 1989: 114). This was borne out of situation where the ruling party at the federal level perceived certain elements within the retired and serving military profession who were critical of its style of governance as greater threats than the
opposition parties. As such, Shagari in short succession appointed two civilians, Iya Abubakar and Akanbi Oniyangi as ministers of defence in the first three years of his tenure before keeping the portfolio to himself till his overthrow by the military in December 1983. This weak civilian-democratic control was evidently captured by a civil-military relations analyst as follows:

In Nigeria, during the Second republic, the Minister of Defence was generally clueless about the decisions made by the military, and had no independent means of assessing military judgements placed before him. In short, the military has maintained virtual control over the military decision-making process (Fayemi: 1998: 87).

The administration’s relationship with the military gradually deteriorated as a result of political and professional factors. This deterioration in the relationship was borne out of some the existing fears harboured of the military by the government. Shagari was quoted to have said that only two parties exist in Nigeria- the civilians and the military (Othman, 1989). This era has been described by Ojukwu (1989: 10) as “a period during which the military” attempted to rule by proxy or rather to have an important role in governance. When this attempt failed the government was pushed aside. There were some occasions where the Shagari government overruled the military on issues ranging from the disastrous OAU peacekeeping mission in war-torn Chad to the killing of Nigerian troops by Chadian forces in 1980 and 1983. The OAU operation had to be aborted largely due to inadequate funding from the Western countries and the Nigerian government (Othman, 1989: 133-134). Many officers notably, Major-General Muhammadu Buhari, who was overseeing the campaign were unhappy because the President directed them to abandon retaliatory “operations against the Chadian regular troops” (Farris and Bomi, 2004: 170). The military’s displeasure led to a relative challenge of authority and

...was dramatically exemplified when Major-General Buhari, intent on inflicting a crushing defeat on the Chadian army for the capture of some
Nigerian soldiers in late 1983, for some days disregarded his orders from Lagos to cease hostilities (Othman, 1989: 134).

Shagari had earlier adopted the same conciliatory policy posture during the Nigeria-Cameroun border dispute where nine Nigerian soldiers were killed in May 1981 contrary to the preponderant calls by leading figures and sections of the public for a military response (Nweke, 1990: 412-413). Also, there was criticism of Shagari’s policy to pardon the protégés of the civil war that is, General Yakubu Gowon and Lt. Colonel Ojukwu both of whom were in exile in Britain and Cote d’ Ivoire respectively (Othman, 1989: 134). General Gowon had been declared wanted and subsequently dismissed from the army over alleged complicity in the Bisalla-Dimka coup of 1976. This was not welcomed by the some people closely linked to the regime of late Murtala Muhammed. After his return from exile on June 20 1982, the ex-Biafran leader joined the NPN. This came as a surprise to the political opposition especially the Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP) which had a strong support base among Ojukwu’s Ibo kinsmen.

Just like its first republic counterpart, the civilian administration of Shehu Shagari had finished its first term in office and had embarked on a second one after the 1983 elections when the military struck a few months later. According to Abba Dabo, an aide in Shagari’s cabinet there were nine attempts against the civilian government (Othman, 1984: 455). One of such attempts was by Alhaji Bukar Mandara, a former political ally of the regime. He was charged and convicted of treason by a court in July 1982 on the grounds that he planned to kill the president, prominent politicians and all army officers above the rank of Lt. Colonel. He was alleged to have approached some NCOs and other ranks to do his bidding (Akinnola, 2003: 55-60, Shagari, 2001:398). He won an appeal against the sentence on technical grounds and was subsequently released.
Going by the government’s handling of statecraft it was obvious that it would face threats. The administration had mismanaged the economy amidst the global oil glut; there was public discontent with its economic policies; there was friction and eventual fracture within the NPN which had formed an alliance in 1979 with the NPP in order to control the federal legislature. The intra-elite crisis within the ruling party led into an alignment of political forces. Personalities like Moshood Abiola, Shehu Yar’Adua, Mahmud Tukur and a host of others became disenchanted with the ruling party. They turned their support to the opposition notably the Unity Party Of Nigeria (UPN) led by veteran politician, Chief Obafemi Awolowo in the quest to wrest control of power from the NPN-controlled federal government in the 1983 general elections (Othman, 1984: 454); the results of the 1983 general elections were not accepted by the opposition parties and a sections of the Nigerian public. As such, pressure was building up against the government cutting across the civil-military divides. There was agitation within near top sections of the officer corps. There were voices within the military who felt that the civilian government had failed and thus embarked on secret plans to flush out the government from power. In a post-coup revelation, General Ibrahim Babangida said that the coup against civilian government was originally scheduled to take place before the August 1983 general elections but had to be postponed to December of that year (Othman, 1984: 456). According to a junior officer, the coup “was conceived and carried out by northern officers, civil financiers and political military apologists” (Alli, 2001: 215). It was these politically inclined officers that teamed up with other disenchanted political forces to plot the administration’s downfall. Shagari accused a powerful northern clique alias Kaduna Mafia in collaboration with some northern and southern academics of running “a campaign of calumny against his administration” (Shagari, 2001: 444). Shagari was referring to the cohesive amalgam of privileged personalities that once belonged to the ruling party but felt disillusioned with the party’s activities in the area of
governance and during the electioneering periods of 1979 and 1983. These were the sophisticated faction of the northern establishment whom he had fallen out with over political and economic interests. Reflecting on the situation of the period, General Obasanjo who in 1979 had handed over power to Shagari noted that “it was, so to speak, a matter of time before musical chairs would swing again” (Obasanjo, 1990: 229).

These factors collectively led to the civilian administration’s subsequent overthrow on December 31 1983. The service chiefs were dismissed. The crop of officers who had actively participated in executing and aborting the 1975 and 1976 coups respectively when they were middle ranking officers became the egg-heads of new military regime- Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, Babatunde Idrigbon, Mohammed Jega, Mamman Vasta and a host of other officers. The coup planners had the solid support some middle-ranking and junior officers like Mustapha Jokolo, Halilu Akilu, Dangiwa Umar, Abdulmumuni Aminu, Lawan Gwadabe, John Shagaya, Abutu Garba, Lawrence Onoja and David Mark who commanded the units which concretised the putsch. Brigadier Sani Abacha justified the military’s intervention on grounds that for four years, the inept and corrupt civilian administration had imposed a grave economic and political uncertainty on the country (Akinnola, 2003: 62). It is pertinent to note that the senior officers involved in this coup had acquired this experience and tendencies since the July 1966 incident when they were junior officers.


The succeeding military junta embarked on stern corrective measures which apparently violated the basic rights of many Nigerians. The regime was ‘unrelenting on the press and former politicians’ of the Second Republic. It put many politicians and businessmen in prison or detention including former President Shehu Shagari and his deputy, Alex Ekwueme. An attempt
by security agents and contractors of the government on July 5 1984 to abduct and repatriate Umaru Dikko from Britain failed. Dikko was a strong ally of Shagari and very prominent in the decision-making structure of the civilian government. The abduction failed and the incident created a frost in Anglo-Nigerian relations. Things began to get worse for the military government as it “alienated key constituencies” within the state especially in the military (Farris and Bomoi, 2004: 172). In a similar style like the regime of Major-general Aguiyi-Irons, the duo of Major General Muhammed Buhari and his deputy, Brigadier (later Major General) Tunde Idiagbon had some inadequacy in political communication with some of their colleagues in the Supreme Military Council (SMC). This led to another coup plot. Apart from the waning public support in the society, a gap existed between the puritanical posture of Generals Buhari and Idiagbon on one side and the expectations of other senior, middle-ranking and junior officers in the regime. There was a horizontal friction within the supreme military council, on grounds of high-handedness by Generals Buhari and Idiagbon. There was also a vertical friction between the apex leadership and some officers who had participated in the 1983 putsch. A testimony by Chris Alli, who was then a middle-ranking intelligence officer, narrates how Chief Alex Ibru paid a visit to General Idiagbon in order to intimate the latter on information he received regarding the conflict within the military’s top hierarchy. Idiagbon denied any rift and stated that the relationship was both ‘cordial and professional’. This intra-military crisis coincided with an inquiry set up by Buhari to investigate the award of contracts in the defence ministry which senior officers like Babangida and his cohorts saw as an exercise against their vested interests (Alli, 2001: 216 and 227). In another revelation by Habibu Idris Shuaibu who was by then a junior officer, the driving force behind the coup against General Buhari was his refusal to appoint middle and junior ranking officers into strategic political positions in government (Butts and Metz, 1996: 4). Buhari apparently told junior officers to wait for their turn. In essence, the
horizontal and vertical tensions created the conditions for Buhari’s ouster. A palace coup was carried out on August 27 1985 by a coalition of anti-Buhari officers cutting across the whole hierarchy of the officer corps. Buhari was replaced by his army chief, General Ibrahim Babangida. The Armoured corps and the Military Intelligence directorate, the respective professional constituencies of General Babangida and Brigadier Aliyu Mohammed played important roles in the coup that encountered minor resistance. An example is Colonel Sabo Aliyu, the Commander of Guards Brigade and Buhari’s Aide-Camp, Major Mustapha Jokolo who put up some resistance against the conspirators before they were overwhelmed. The key players in the coup’s leadership held strategic positions in the army. Babangida was the army chief; Brigadier Abacha commanded the Second Division. It was the closest of the army’s four divisions to Lagos; Brigadier Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, supported by Lt. Colonels Halilu Akilu and Anthony Ukpo was in charge of Military Intelligence (Balogun, 2011: 173-177). In the coup’s broadcast, Brigadier Joshua Dogonyaro justified the coup on the grounds that there was misuse of power by a small group of individuals namely Generals Buhari and Idiagbon resulting in an absence of cohesion and direction in the hierarchy of governance to the detriment of national aspirations and interests (Akinnola, 2003: 74). General Babangida changed the ruling body’s name to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and designated himself as president. As part of a strategy to strengthen its hold on power, the regime in 1986 scrapped the NSO, the dreaded security outfit used by the Buhari regime in detaining and interrogating perceived opponents and law-breakers. Its functions were broken down and shared by three new intelligence bodies namely the State Security Service (SSS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). He devised a number of methods in order to prevent the regime from being overthrown. The expedient manner in which the Babangida regime applied subjective
control mechanisms to placate potential military revolt and critics from civilian sectors of the society was captured by Dele Giwa in describing the personality of the military ruler.

The only known denominator about Babangida is that he is a man who understands the dynamics of power as a nebulous entity with deceptive heaviness which can easily serve as a burial ground of a man who misuses it (Garba, 1995: 81).

The regime forged close relations with middle-ranking officers in the barracks particularly those who held command positions at the Brigade and Battalion levels. Some of these key officers happened to be either part of the graduates of the third and fourth Regular Courses of the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) or were products of the Nigerian Military School (NMS) Zaria otherwise known as the ‘Ex-Boys’. An example is David Mark who was both an ex-boy and a regular course three graduate of the NDA. In December 1986, the regime established the Services Consultative Committee (SCC) which had all senior military and police officers as members. The purpose of this body as rationalized by the military president was to serve as “a unique and important avenue for opinions that may not be readily available to a government like ours that has retained its military character” (Babangida, 1986). Its membership was later widened to include middle-ranking officers in June 1991 and the name was changed to the Armed Forces Consultative Assembly (AFCA). It was in this ‘interactive’ forum that brought together “members of the Armed Forces and Police” that Babangida strategised to endear himself to its attendants. He drew their attention to the fact that his status as president came about through their mandate (Babangida, 1989). His regime proselytised agrieved and potential coup plotting officers with gifts and promises of accessibility to the networks of primitive accumulation. The loyalties of these officers were sought by offering political appointments at state and federal levels in order to regulate the intra-group factionalism that
often accompanies prolonged military rule thus, leading to possible coup plotting. Many military officers were at calculated intervals rotated in between top military and political appointments to create a wide audience of beneficiaries in the processes of accumulation. A section of the civilian elites were not left out in this prebendal politics as politicians, activists, business people and intellectuals were appointed as ministers, advisers and executives of public agencies. From 1966 when the military took over power to 1999 when it left the political scene, the Babangida regime has the highest number of military officers, who were appointed into political positions at the federal and state levels. This is in reference to the many officers who held ministerial, board and state governorship positions. For example, between August1985 and October1991, over 120 military and police officers holding ranks equivalent to Lt. Colonels and Colonels served as state governors, ministers, heads of agencies and aide-camps (list provided by Ejenavwo, 2007: 65-70). Of these, about 67 served as military governors alone. These placating methods against obvious dissentions within military and civilian elite circles enabled the regime to buy time and prolong its rule for eight years.

However, the regime’s survival tactics did not translate to political stability and like previous military regimes; it also faced two publicised coup attempts. The first was a plot uncovered on December 20 1985. This was led by Major-general Mamman Jiya Vasta, the minister for the federal capital territory and Brigadier Mamman Nasarawa, the head of the army’s infantry school. There were other officers drawn from the army, navy and airforce. The coupists allegedly proposed the use of military aircraft to attack the regime’s political and military centres including Dodan Barracks, the seat of governmental power. This was the first time some airforce personnel were involved in an aborted coup. This had a negative consequence on the relationship between the regime and the airforce pertaining to its future maintenance and procurement needs. According to the defence chief, General Domkat Bali the alleged motives
behind the coup revolved around regime’s rejection of the IMF loan, the regime’s policy toward human rights, the presence of some former public officers in government and the involvement of middle-ranking and junior officers in public affairs (Mohammed and Amuta, 2002: 390). A court-martial was set up under Major-general Charles Ndiomu on January 22 1986 and the tribunal found 15 persons guilty and sentenced ten of them to death by execution on February 5 1986. The foiling of the plot and the execution of the conspirators did not deter others from trying their own luck in the future. According to General Chris Alli, the 1985 coup plot was exposed because ‘a mole compromised it. The conspirators did not fall within the mainstream of the Army’s stock of professional coup merchants and artisans’ (Alli, 2001: 218). This is in reference to the group of officers that gathered experience in the art of coup plotting and execution from the July 1966 incident to the December 1983 putsch. Babangida once revealed that he was involved in all coups with the exception of the January 1966 incident. In the July 1966 and July 1975 coups, he had participated in installing two military regimes alongside officers like Murtala Muhammed, Theophilus Danjuma, Martin Adamu and others. By 1983, he had reached full maturity not only in executing coups but planning them as his colleagues in the Armoured corps played an important part in the coup against the civilian regime of Shagari and that of General Buhari, his immediate predecessor.

The second was an attempted coup carried out by junior army officers on April 22 1990 led by Lt. Colonel Nyiam, Majors Gideon Orkar and Mukoro. Many officers and men on both sides lost their lives. Apart from the coup’s casualties, its aftermath “resulted in the largest arrest of suspects and greatest number of executions”. Generally, over 69 persons were convicted and executed (Ihonvbere, 1991: 604). Just like the aborted coups of February 1976 and December 1985, the coupists were tried by a military tribunal under the army’s Quarter-master, Major-general Ike Nwachukwu. The trial started on May 21 1990 and the tribunal convicted some to
death and others to jail sentences on June 27 1990 (Mohammed and Amuta, 2002: 463-464).
The coupists’ grievances revolved around the two intractable issues- the moral basis of the Babangida regime and the alleged domination of the political space by what they referred to as the Northern Oligarchy. The resonance of coup signified three fundamental things.

First, it showed that despite the coup-proofing methods employed by the regime, the military both as a government and as an institution was still beset with relative breakdown of discipline and authority within its ranks. This was largely as a result of the intensification of factionalism within its hierarchy which in turn was driven by the social tensions in the society. Second, the coup highlighted the effect of Nigeria’s political contestations on the ruling military regime as reflected in the protracted ethno-regional antagonisms and the effects of such contestations on the social milieu of the military establishment (Ihonvbere, 1991: 602). The Babangida regime just like those of Gowon and Obasanjo were accused at different times by critics of promoting the interests of the Northern Oligarchy. Whether these allegations are true or false, the empirical deduction is that Gowon’s rise to power was a product of revenge killings by Northern junior officers in July 1966 and Obasanjo handed power to the NPN, an aggregation of political groupings led by a Northern mafia after an election whose results were contested by Awolowo and his allies in 1979. Thirdly, the coup was the first of its kind in Nigeria where civilians like the coup’s main financier, Chief Great Ogboru and ex-servicemen actively participated in its conception, planning and execution (Alli, 2001: 218). The role played by civilians in the previous coups has a great tendency to be confined to the ideological and financial aspects which logically precede military’s role in the planning and execution phases.

The regime introduced many structural changes in the machinery of governance in terms of state and local government creation. The country’s officer recruitment institution, the Nigerian
Defence Academy (NDA) a successor of the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) since January 1964 was upgraded to a five-year degree awarding institution in 1985. In an effort to bolster cooperation between Nigeria and other less developed countries, the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) was established in 1986 where Nigeria was to assist such countries with expertise to augment in for their skilled manpower shortage. The regime introduced administrative reforms in the civil service system in 1988 which eventually politicised the office of top bureaucrats. As a major part of the transition to democratic rule, elections into political offices were conducted initially under a zero party platform and later within a de jure two party system with the exception of the presidency. Special bodies were set up to tackle specific issues like rural development (DFRRI), national orientation (MAMSER), anti-drug war (NDLEA) etc. Some the regime’s policy drives proved divisive and explosive particularly the elevation of Nigeria’s observer status to that of a full member at the January 1986 summit of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Fez, Morocco. The regime had been advised against elevating Nigeria’s status by Bolaji Akinyemi, the country’s foreign minister but it went ahead by sending a five man official delegation to Fez (Olukoshi, 1990: 476). This move accentuated the religious divisions within both the government and the non-governing elite groups in the country. It was during Babangida’s regime that religion became a national theatre for elite contestations alongside ethnicity and region. The government was accused by critics of attempting to islamise the country (Kukah, 1993: 230-232). The regime exploited such divisive public debates as part of its strategy of survival at the expense of Nigeria’s relative social harmony.

Prolonged military rule by Babangida was characterised technocratic policies (Structural Adjustment Programme or SAP) and changes in the termination date of his rule on more than one occasion accentuated existing social tensions. These policies, recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank led to
untold hardship on the hapless citizens, with the urban dwellers being the worst hit following the disengagement of the state from social provisioning. Instead of the economic growth and self-sustenance promised under the SAP regime, the realities were, among others; business collapse, loss of jobs in both private and public sectors of the economy and a worsening in living conditions (Animashaun, 2008: 23).

These policies were anti-populist and subsequently led to civil demonstrations across the country. The increase in the cost of living, thanks to currency devaluation and ‘petroleum products subsidy removal’, not only reduced the size of the middle income groups but widened the gap between the rich and the poor. As such, state policies merely increased domestic pressure for military withdrawal and calls for civil rule began to gather momentum as civil advocacy groups began to emerge on the political scene. The final straw which ultimately forced an end to the Babangida regime was the annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential election. The regime had embarked on a transition programme a de jure two party system which in 1993 saw two candidates contesting for the presidency. Chief Moshood Abiola, a flag bearer of one of the parties was on his way to being declared as winner of the presidential election. However, the electoral process was stopped by the regime during the final collation of the results. While the general voting pattern of the election showed the Chief Abiola breaking the traditional barriers of sectionalism, the annulment amplified the latent forces of factionalism among and between military and civil elite circles. The June 12 impasse had transformed from a broad-based support for electoral democracy to a factionalised struggle for and against its actualisation among the elite as it pertained to regional and ethnic identities. Some opponents or rather northern chauvinists argued that June 12 was no longer feasible because it had been turned by the Yorubas into a ‘tribal property’ (Kukah, 1999: 119). As such, the critics of the regime, mostly politicians and the intelligentsia in the southern part of the country viewed the
annulment “as a plot by the northern faction of the Nigerian power elite to prevent a transfer of authority to a Southerner, on the verge of being declared the winner” (Enemuo, 1999: 3).

Apart from the agitations of certain domestic elite groups, Babangida failed to get support from many Western countries including Canada, Britain and the United States. Britain and the United States reacted negatively to the election annulment. On June 24 1993, the British government imposed a number of diplomatic and military sanctions on the regime. These include the suspension of military training courses for Nigerian military personnel and assistance to the National War College; the withdrawal of British military advisers from Nigerian military training institutions; the suspension of visa issuance to the Nigerian military, National Guard and the intelligence community travelling to Britain and; a policy of case-by-case review of all new aid to Nigeria (Ijewere, 1999: 156). In the same vein, the Clinton Administration warned that

The failure on the part of the military regime to respect the will of the Nigerian people and transition to democracy will have serious implications for US-Nigeria relations...We are in the process of reassessing our relations with Nigeria.... All aspects of our bilateral relations assistance are currently under review (Ijewere, 1999: 155-156).

Within his primary constituency, there was growing dissention within the higher and middle cadre of the officer corps. Many officers who had remained loyal to him for eight years were disinclined to a continuation of his regime in various degrees. These include Generals Salihu Ibrahim, Joshua Dogonyaro, Muhammad Balarabe Haladu, David Mark, Ahmed Abdullahi as well as Colonels Lawan Gwadabe and Dangiwa Umar. Some of the officers, notably General Haladu were of the view that the person of General Babangida was the genesis of the political crisis and concluded that his exit would be a step in resolving such crisis. Colonel Umar advocated for his immediate exit and for the next military government to organise fresh elections in the shortest possible time. In the end, General Babangida was forced by ‘his boys’ to step aside. In his place,
for an interim national government (ING) was set up with a civilian head of state and a combination of civilian and military officials on August 27 1993.

In a balancing act, Babangida grafted his erstwhile allies notably Abacha and Aliyu Gusau respectively as defence and army chiefs into the ING in order to protect his perceived vested interests while at the same time to accommodate the interests of opposition within the military. Babangida’s motive behind the establishment of the ING was based on three interconnected goals. In the first place, it was intended to serve as dependent platform that was would remain within his control even in retirement. This explains the frequent but unofficial visits by the head of the ING to Babangida’s private hilltop residence in Minna, Niger State. Secondly, the ING was supposed to provide Babangida and his allies “subtle protection, from the nation’s scrutiny of their stewardship” given the monumental corruption carried out during his reign. Lastly, the ING was meant to provide an avenue for a trusted ally, General Sani Abacha “to assume power in compensation for his loyalty and unalloyed support” (Alli, 2001: 220).

The administration of Shonekan was unable to gain significant political and judicial legitimacy which eventually led to its downfall. This was manifested in major four ways. The military command was autonomous due to Shonekan’s weak control over its leadership. It had disregarded Shonekan’s directive based on a “pledge to withdraw Nigerian troops from Liberia” (Farris and Bomoi, 2004: 234). Secondly, the regime did not get credible support from a broad section of the political class and the international community who merely saw the ING as a toothless surrogate of Babangida. Thirdly, a court ruling cited the illegality of the regime on the basis of Decree 61 of August 1993 from which it derived its authority. The decree was apparently signed by Babangida at a time, the court interpreted he ceased to be the president. The triggering factor that resulted in Shonekan’s forced resignation was the government’s
decision to accelerate the pace of economic liberalisation. The deregulation of the downstream oil sector and the privatisation of the oil refineries brought the regime on a collision course with labour and civil society groups who organised a national strike to shut down the country. There were even calls in some quarters for the military to take charge with the expectation that the June 12 mandate would be actualised (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999: 260).

A take-over was already in the offing as some senior officers held gatherings to finalise plans for the ouster of Shonekan whom many of them saw as a stranger in the corridors of power. One of such caucus meetings took place in Lagos and included Generals like Cyril Iweze, Edward Unimna, Ahmed Abdullahi, Chris Alli, David Mark, Ishaya Bamaiyi, Patrick Aziza, Tajudeen Olanrewaju as well as Colonels like Sambo Dasuki and Lawan Gwadabe. The navy and airforce were represented by Rear Admiral Festus Porbeni and Air Commodore Femi Johnson. It was at this gathering that General Sani Abacha, then defence secretary of the ING was endorsed as the head of state while Generals Oladipo Diya and Abdulsalami Abubakar grabbed the posts of Chiefs of General and Defence Staff respectively (Alli, 2001: 294-295).

On November 17 1993, the Shonekan-led ING was replaced in a palace coup by some military officers under General Abacha who dissolved the ING and set up the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC). Because of the hostile domestic and foreign reaction that greeted Abacha’s emergence as Nigeria’s new leader, the new regime reciprocated the negative posture with a brutal approach to governance in addressing threats and problems. Abacha quickly moved to consolidate his hold on power by retiring the service chiefs and a number of senior officers who had dissenting positions that included Generals Joshua Dogonyaro, Aliyu Gusau, David Mark and Colonel Abubakar Umar. He tightened his grip on the military to the extent that two successive army chiefs namely General Mohammed Chris Alli (December 1993 to August 1994) and General
Alwali Kazir ((August 1994 to March 1996) were sacked over doubts in their respective loyalties to Abacha. He employed a parallel structure of informants like General Ishaya Bamaiyi of the Lagos Garrison and Brigadier Ahmed Abdullahi, the army’s head of intelligence to report suspicious officers in the top hierarchy of the army. The Abacha junta instantly dismantled all the democratic structures under the Babangida transition. In an attempt to broaden the support base of the regime and proselytise the June 12 movement, Abacha brought on board some political actors into his first ministerial cabinet. These include Adamu Ciroma, Jerry Gana, Samuel Ogbemudia, Dalhatu Tafida, Babagana Kingibe, Ebenezer Babatope, Wole Oyelese, Bamanga Tukur, John Oyegun, Lateef Jakande, Don Etiebet, Wada Nas, Tom Ikimi, Solomon Lar, Abubakar Rimi, Olu Onagoruwa Alex Ibru and Iyorchia Ayu. Some of these politicians had been associated with the presidential struggles of Chief Abiola and were seen by Abacha as useful in legitimising his shaky start in power. In 1995, Abacha sacked most of these politicians from the cabinet afterwards. He realised that their continued presence in the government would increase their political influence and this could threaten his unfolding transmutation plans.

General Abacha began a new transition process with a five-party system that was unveiled on 30th September 1996. This process was expected to lead to his transmutation from a military dictator to a civilian democratic president. The domestic and foreign pressures on the regime merely increased its repressive policies against domestic opposition. In August 1994, the leaderships of three striking labour unions were dissolved by the regime over what it saw as their covert support for dissident groups agitating for an end to Abacha’s rule. These bodies are namely the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association (PENGASSAN). Even the university labour unions were not spared in this policy of repression. As the regime proscribed all of them, the unions continued to operate under new names.
In the international scene, the regime engaged in a tit-for-tat diplomacy with foreign actors. The vocal criticisms of the regime in a number of Western capitals made it focus on boosting relations with countries like China, Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea. Nigeria withdrew its participation in the 1996 African Nations Cup in South Africa due to President Nelson Mandela’s comments on the regime with specific reference to the personality of General Abacha. The regime severed diplomatic ties with Canada. This was over its moral and material support for civil society groups agitating for the realisation of the June 12 1993 presidential mandate and the agitations of the oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta. In another twist, General Abacha sought to promote a counter-strategy by driving a wedge between the Western powers.

The regime embarked on pitching Nigeria’s diplomatic tent with French interests in West Africa. This regime accepted the emergence of Charles Taylor as Liberia’s president in 1997. Taylor’s rebellion against Samuel Doe was covertly supported by the leaders of Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Libya. This ran counter to the American and British positions which had supported the ECOWAS military intervention. This intervention had attempted to prevent Charles Taylor from seizing Monrovia, the seat of power where President Samuel Doe was holed up. Nigeria’s policy shift became evident when Abacha attended the annual summit of Francophone states which held in Ouagadougou in 1997 and declared that the French language would be made a compulsory subject in Nigerian schools (Medard, 2008: 328). This was aimed at retaliating against American and British criticism as well as the diplomatic sanctions imposed on the regime. For the first time in Nigeria’s history, the regime fine-tuned its foreign policy to assume an overt hegemonic orientation in the West African sub-region. Financial and political support was extended to the emergence and subsequent civilianisation of military leaders like Colonel Idriss Derby-Itno in Chad, Captain Yaya Jammeh in the Gambia and General Bare Mainassara in Niger Republic (Kukah, 1999: 112). It covertly supported the elections of Ghana’s
Jerry Rawlings and Benin Republic’s Mathieu Kerekou. Abacha’s support for Kerekou’s return to power was due to the personal sympathy his successor and eventual predecessor Neciphore Soglo had for some dissident leaders of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) who had fled to Benin Republic. NADECO was set up by some politicians and activists in the struggle for the actualisation of the June 12 mandate. In an effort to counteract its international isolation, the military regime sought to demonstrate its leadership status in the sub-region by providing military support under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to restore an overthrown civilian government in Sierra Leone between early 1997 and early 1998 (Osaghae, 2010: 57, Okonta, 2008: 98). Additionally, one observer put it this way;

Abacha’s promotion of democracy in Sierra Leone deflected international pressure at a time when the country was suspended from Commonwealth meetings, decertified by the US on account of drug trafficking and confronted with (weakly enforced) international sanctions (Bach, 2007: 309).

The lingering border problem with Cameroun had been brewing since 1993. Border clashes were taking place in the disputed area. The Abacha regime swiftly responded by deploying a large contingent of Nigerian troops in the Bakassi area as a deterrent measure in 1994. With the military option out of its reach, the government of Cameroun took Nigeria to the International Court of Justice (Fawole, 2008: 100). As its relations with France improved, the regime declared its intention to hold onto the disputed area irrespective of the outcome of international arbitration.

It is important to note that sanctions did not affect oil operations as international oil companies continued their businesses in Nigeria despite the strained relations between the
Abacha regime and the countries of origin of these oil companies. These include Shell, Texaco, Mobil, ELF, Total, ENI etc. The European Union (EU) went ahead with a multi-billion dollar investment in development of Nigeria’s Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project and in March 1998 President Bill Clinton was quoted to have said that the United States would not object to Abacha’s transmutation agenda (Okonta, 2008: 124). This development extended to the military sphere. Between 1996 and 1997, the Clinton administration discreetly countered its declared policy of sanctions by supplying ‘trucks, radios and helicopters’ to Nigerian troops serving in the ECOMOG operations in Liberia (Bach, 2007: 309).

At home, the regime was notorious for incarcerating or eliminating a number of its perceived opponents. Many people from all walks of life were arrested and detained. Others were assassinated in mysterious circumstances. In the oil-producing Niger Delta, agitation was being mounted by social movements on the government to address the environmental and economic problems of the areas affected by oil spillage and material deprivation. One of such areas is Ogoni land in Rivers state. The agitation was articulated under the umbrella of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). The agitation led to violence. As such, the Ogoni rights leader Ken Saro Wiwa and eight others were sentenced by a tribunal and hanged in 1995 on charges of murdering “four Ogoni Chiefs who had challenged his leadership of MOSOP” (Kalu, 2008; 177). The hanging of Saro Wiwa and his comrades sent shockwaves around the world with condemnations from many governments in Europe, North America, Asia and even Africa. South African President Nelson Mandela called for ‘punitive measures against’ the regime from other African countries (Okonta, 2008: 119). This call did not materialise because Nigeria maintained warm relations with many African states and a number of them were also operating civilian or military dictatorships.
Chief Abiola who had supported Abacha’s take-over of the government in November 1993 with the expectation that the military would eventually hand over the presidency to him became frustrated and began to challenge the legitimacy and power of the regime. He was subsequently arrested and incarcerated for publicly proclaiming himself as president on 11th June 1994. His wife, Kudirat was assassinated on 4th June 1994. In general, a number of prodemocratic figures were either detained by security agents or eliminated by killer squads suspected to be on the orders of the regime. The repressive style adopted by General Abacha and his refusal to allow foreign governments to influence decision-making particularly as it relates to human rights increased tensions with a section of the international community. The execution of the Ogoni Nine led to Nigeria’s suspension from the Common Wealth (CW) organisation in November 1995 at an emergency post summit meeting in Millbrook, New Zealand. The regime had violated the declared principles of good governance which was agreed upon in 1991 of which Nigeria was a signatory at the CW Heads of State and Government summit in Harare, Zimbabwe (Oculi, 2010: 46, U homoibi, 2008: 237). The position of the CW on Nigeria’s suspension did not change after deliberations by leaders at its summit in Edinburgh between 24th and 27th October 1997.

In April 1996 a prominent traditional ruler in the North and nominal leader of Nigeria’s Muslim population, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki was deposed in controversial circumstances and exiled. Under the guise of a newly enacted Failed Banks decree, he was alleged to have abused his office. His son, Colonel Sambo Dasuki who served as a military aide to General Babangida had earlier fled the country as he was sought by the regime for allegedly being part of a coup plot in 1995 (Jibo, 2002: 301). In addition, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly had on 12th December 1997 passed a resolution calling for the release of political prisoners. This call fell on deaf ears.
The regime on many occasions took an extreme stand on any issue or activity that was perceived as a threat to its stability and legitimacy. On two occasions, it announced the arrest of suspects in two alleged coup plots. On 17th March 1995, the regime through the Head of the Joint Service Chiefs, General Abdulsalami Abubakar announced the arrest of more than 29 persons. Generals Obasanjo and Shehu Yar’adua, along with some serving middle-ranking military officers notably Colonels Bello Fadile, Lawan Gwadabe, Happy Bulus and Oluruntoba and a number of civilians were arrested on charges of planning to overthrow the regime. A military tribunal under Brigadier-General Patrick Aziza in June 1995 was set up to try the suspects. The coup was widely dismissed by critics of the regime as a set-up.

However, there is some plausibility in the regime’s allegation of a coup plot. It is a well known fact that Generals Obasanjo and Yar’adua were critics of the Abacha regime. Yar’adua played an important role by proposing the motion that called for an end to military rule by January 1 1994 during deliberations of the National Constitutional Conference (Adekanye, 1999: 193). The motion was in conflict with the yet undeclared transmutation agendum of General Abacha. It was said that ‘Abacha received more than 70 letters from world leaders.....to show compassion’ (Farris and Bomoi, 2004: 271) to the coup suspects. Whether Obasanjo and Yar’Adua were planning a coup or Abacha merely strategised to get rid of them because of their criticism of his regime, the fact still remains that these two former military officers had in the past participated in a coup. This is with reference to the July 1975 incident that sent Gowon out of office. Under intense pressure from world leaders and some prominent Nigerians, the regime in October 1995 commuted the death sentences of those found guilty of coup plotting, treason and conspiracy to long term jail sentences. General Yar’Adua eventually died in prison custody at Abakaliki in December 1997.
The second coup attempt involved senior officers close to the regime and some civilians. In the same vein, General Abubakar issued a statement on December 21 1997 that a coup plot had been uncovered involving Abacha’s deputy, General Oladipo Diya and a host of other military officers and civilians. In total, 26 persons were arrested, interrogated and charged. This political incident can be pictured in terms of the regime’s three characters (Sani Abacha, his deputy Oladipo Diya and Ishaya Bamaiyi, the army chief). Each of them had an agenda as dramatised in the intra-leadership power struggle. General Mohammed Chris Alli, a former head of military intelligence and Abacha’s army chief (November 1993-August 1994) summed the dynamics of the 1997 coup plot as follows:

Sani Abacha schemed to remove perceived obstacles to his self-succession plans. General Oladipo Diya sought to displace Sani Abacha and scuttle his plans. General Ishaya Bamaiyi on the third ring of the coup trilogy wanted to deal with his superiors and to take command of the nation. Realizing at some point that their respective games may have been compromised, Sani Abacha zeroed in on General Oladipo Diya using General Bamaiyi as a point man. General Bamaiyi anchored his safety on Abacha’s design by offering General Diya as the sacrificial lamb… there is no doubt that there was, not just one scheme, but three efforts to upstage varying interests. It was at once a master plan for General Sani Abacha’s displacement. It was also a measure of his naivety for General Oladipo Diya to be sold on the idea, and to be inveigled into believing that through the instrumentality of General Bamaiyi, the Chief of Army Staff, he could capture state power (Alli, 2001: 223-224).

It has been revealed that earlier in July 1994 one of the conspirators General Tajudeen Olanrewaju expressed his disillusion by the state of affairs in government to General Alli. He made suggestions that at this period, troops could be moved against Abacha and his henchmen from the ‘core’ North (Alli, 2001: 358). In the same vein, General Diya had on three occasions “suggested that Abacha should be overthrown”. He even suggested that General Bamaiyi should
be recruited into the coup since he was commanding the Lagos Garrison which would be useful in the process (Alli, 2001: 357).

A court-martial under Major general Victor Malu (who eventually became the first army chief in the civilian Fourth republic) was held for the coup suspects. The trial began on 14th February 1998. In its verdict on 28th April 1998, the tribunal sentenced General Diya and five others to death. Other suspects got jail terms ranging from two years to life imprisonment and 14 persons were released. The death sentences were not carried out up to the time the regime’s tenure came to an end. The regime came to an end with the sudden death of General Abacha on June 8 1998. He was succeeded by the military’s most senior officer, Major general Abdulsalami Alhaji Abubakar. In the midst of the crisis including the death of Chief Abiola in July 1998 who was still in detention, General Abubakar in contrast to the belligerent posture of his former boss fulfilled a pledge by initiating a transition process that reached its logical conclusion on May 29 1999 as a new civilian-democratic dispensation replaced the military after about 15 years of political interregnum.

4.8- Summary of Chapter

The chapter traced the genesis of the military as a central instrument in the Nigerian state formation and as a symbol of the post-colonial entity. Colonisation gave rise to the military establishment and other institutions that were either transplanted or co-opted to form what became Nigeria. In response to administrative needs, the colonial state created the conditions for the emergence of factionalised indigenous elite. This privileged group of sub-nationalists mainly struggled along primordial lines for the domination of the political space that was gradually evacuated by the colonial power as independence drew close. During colonial rule, the military was under effective control and this prevented the factionalised social environment
from affecting its cohesiveness and mandate as a guardian of law and order as well as a subordinate to political directives.

The post-colonial state is characterised by factionalism within the ruling civilian elite and this factionalism is transplanted within military establishment. As such, the civil and military elites have mutually reinforced the each other in the struggle for power in a zero-sum game where those who control the state decide how resources are to be allocated. Factionalism has led to an alternating cycle of military and civilian regimes from 1960 to 1999. While secondary contradictions notably ethnic and religious identities have at different times characterised the nature of political mobilisation in Nigeria, it would be erroneous to assume their roles as decisive given the equal importance of other factors relating to class orientation, personal ambition and material quest as features that shape the civil and military institutions of the state. The ensuing political actions of the governing elites impacted on the individual and group orientation of the officer corps. This compromised the military's institutional integrity and pulled down the immune mechanism of insulating the profession from political intervention. While the conspirators of all the coups in Nigeria often attribute their respective actions to the imperative for corrective action, the apparent motive is largely driven by factional and personal interests. The cycle of coups resulted in the socialisation of officers into cliques having political leanings. This had implications on the cohesive nature of the military institution. Thus, intensity of the divisive domestic political environment of the First Republic permeated the British-oriented military establishment and created the conditions for breakdown of authority and engineered a revolt by junior officers. The coup accentuated the existing divisive tendencies along regional and ethnic lines to the extent that by 1967, the military with the support of the already factionalised civilian elites fragmented the military in the ensuing civil war. Instead of the war and its outcome regulating the cut-throat struggle for power, the civilian and military
elites continued the factional struggles. The continuous balkanisation of the political units and the resultant centralised federation merely intensified the struggle for the spoils of political office either through coups or manipulated elections.

Apart from the British legacy of a subordinated military institution in the first republic, the external factor was less prominent when compared to the historically documented domestic factors in the shaping of civil-military relations in the first 20 years of post-colonial Nigeria. Initially, the external environment did not play much of the proactive role in shaping the civil-military relations in Nigeria as it did in countries like the Central African Republic, Uganda, Chile, Afghanistan or pre-revolutionary Iran. This is largely because of two reasons. Nigeria was relatively immune from the politics of the Cold War in comparison to places like Chile or Congo Democratic of Republic where the rival powers openly and effectively influenced military behaviour in such states. Secondly, Nigeria was initially less vulnerable to the external economic climate. The displacement of the cash-crop economy with oil production brought in plenty of financial resources for the military regimes of the 1970s as exemplified in their independent foreign and domestic policies. As such, Nigeria was not subject to aid conditionalities attached to democratisation or direct external agitation for military rule. However, things began to change by the middle of the 1980s. The globalisation of economic and political liberalism, thanks to domestic mismanagement and fall in global oil prices all combined to intensify the political pressure against military autocrats not only in Nigeria but in other countries. This coincided with end of the bi-polar cold war and the winds of political liberalisation began affecting the domestic political climate of African states including Nigeria. The last straw that broke the military yoke was the political crisis arising from the annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential election. This crisis incrementally intensified the domestic and foreign pressure for military withdrawal.
In conclusion, the chapter revealed that the nature of military behaviour in Nigeria has been largely shaped by the domestic socio-political situation which at certain periods compromised the extent of organisational cohesion within its ranks.

CHAPTER FIVE

POLITICAL TRANSITIONS TO CIVILIAN RULE IN NIGERIA AND THIER OUTCOMES

5.1-Introduction

This chapter discussed and examined the series of political transitions to civil democratic governance organised by the colonial administration and post-independent military regimes. This covers the period from the late 1950s to the late 1990s. In doing so, the chapter identified
and examined the organisational and political factors have shaped the typology, pattern and outcomes of military withdrawal and transition to civilian rule in Nigeria.

5.2-Typology of Political Transitions in Nigeria

The history of the political transition from military rule to civilian rule in Nigeria has been shaped by factors and circumstances that are both external and internal to the military establishment. As at 1999, Nigeria had witnessed six transition to civil rule programmes of which one was carried out by the colonial government in the 1950s to usher political independence. The other five were carried out by successive military regimes out of which only two reached the logical conclusion of military withdrawal and civilian return to rulership. It must be noted that most military regimes in Nigeria harboured a conviction that their rule is an aberration and as a result was meant to be a temporary corrective political arrangement meant to address the problems that were likely to threaten the unity and stability of the country. Typically, the incumbent military regime attempts to legitimise its limited period in office by discrediting the anti-populist policies of its predecessor and in most cases, pledging to withdraw on an appointed time with the introduction of a framework for civilianising the political structures of decision making through a more or less democratic process. The military’s drive for implementing a transition to civil rule and withdrawing to the barracks depends on the capacity of the regime in question to checkmate military and civilian groups opposed to disengagement, the ability of the regime to use civilian-based networks to legitimize their brief rule before handing over to civilians and lastly, the ability of the regime to portray some semblance of political neutrality in the process of handing over to civilians (see Dare, 1981: 351).

Within the context of the post-colonial-state, Adekson (1979: 214-217) identified three broad types of military disengagement. These have some significance in describing and explaining to
varying extents, all the successful and failed transitions from military regimes to elected civilian
governments. These are: the countercoup inspired approach, the military-turned political
patterns and the constitutional evolutionary model. It can be argued that these broad types
have manifested in overlapping sequences at different times where aborted and successful
transition to civilian democratic rule carried out by military regimes have taken place in post-
colonial Nigeria.

The countercoup inspired approach is where an incumbent military regime is ousted by a
dissident faction because its long stay power thus contributing to the loss of its legitimacy. The
new regime engages in a partial or complete disengagement depending on the motives of the
countercoup. One of the legitimising policies adopted by the Babangida regime was a promise
on behalf of the military to hand over power to an elected civilian government. The regime
ended up under hostile conditions installing a military backed civilian leader who briefly
operated under the same hostile conditions along elected civilians at the lower executive and
legislative levels.

The military-turned-political pattern involves the incumbent regime transmuting to a military-
backed civilianised government. Due to domestic and to some extent external pressures for
liberalising the political space, a systemic mutation from a military regime to what Levitsky and
Way (2003, 2006) refer to as a competitive authoritarian regime takes place as a strategy for
preserving the status quo. Where the cohesive nature of the military is threatened in an intra-
corporate struggle between those who want a total disengagement and those who want to
institutionalise the dominance of the military leadership in mainstream politics the logical
course of action is for “the military advocates purge the military democrats from the army. Then,
the military regime seeks legitimacy by formulating a power sharing arrangement with civilian
elites” (Anene, 1997: 64). This regime type adopts certain aspects of democratic rules to widen its support base in the society. Restricted electoral democracy on an uneven playing field to the disadvantage of opposition is instituted. This is merely to formalise such transmutations and what takes place is “a surface change from men-in uniform (khaki) to soldiers-in-mufti (agbada)”. This model clearly fits the Abacha transition when in implicit terms, the military ruler attempted to transmute to a civilian leader under a de jure government controlled-five party system. As noted by Fayemi (1999: 71) while “Babangida who put in motion the idea of constructing a disguised military party, it was Abacha who tried to implement and use it as an instrument of transition to civil presidency”.

Under the constitutional evolutionary model, the military regime engages in complete disengagement allowing for civilians to take over under a “workable relationship between the military and civilian sectors of society” (Adekson, 1979: 216). The Murtala-Obasanjo regime which ousted the Gowon regime partly as result of its indecisive transition programme clearly fits into this type. The regime withdrew the military to the barracks and installed an elected civilian military administration in October 1979. This was repeated from June 1998 to May 1999 when the Abubakar administration, coupled with existing pressures from the domestic political scene and international community executed the shortest transition programme in Nigeria’s history to install an elected civilian government.

Transitions take different forms depending on the circumstances which the military regime finds itself in- this has to do with its level of internal cohesion and the natures of the domestic and international environments. Transitions also depend on the degree of pressure mounted by civilian sectors within the domestic political environment and the level of influence the international community exerted on the military to quit and allow for an elected government.
This is valid in the case of the military regimes under Babangida, Abacha and Abubakar (1984-99) where there was an expectation from the domestic and international environments for elected civilian governments to replace the military. The politicians provide the political incentives either in the form of support or demands, which the military needs to make arrangements for the incoming civilian dispensation. Irrespective of the outcome of a transition to civil or democratic rule, the period of a transition programme either as a consequence of military retreat to the barracks or a military incumbent’s drive to transmute is of two types.

In the first type, the military is more of a caretaker regime. A swift transition is set in motion on the basis of the apparent non-viability of prolonged military rule, despite the issues that led to the ouster of the civilian regime. To the caretaker regime “coexistence with a new set of political leaders is possible” (Bennett and Kirk-Greene, 1978: 13). As such, the military regime hands over to an elected civilian government within the shortest possible period. The good example is the transition programme of General Abubakar which started in July 1998 with the unbanning of partisan activities and ended in May 1999 with the swearing-in of elected officials at all levels of government. It is the shortest military-to-civilian transition programme in the history of Nigeria.

In the second kind, the military is categorised as more of a corrective regime because “comprehensive systematic reforms are required which only the military can achieve” (Bennett and Kirk-Greene, 1978: 13) before it gives way to an elected civilian government. The transition is conducted in phases and takes a lengthy period. The colonial transition to independence under Governors Lyttleton and Robertson was in phases. This was characterised by granting some form of self rule at the sub-national levels and setting the process of creating an indigenous officer corps for the military in preparation for independence at a later period. In the
post-colonial era, the regimes of Gowon (1966-75) Buhari (1984-85) and Babangida (1985-93) fit this corrective picture given their decisions to postpone the dates of terminating their rule. The Murtala-Obasanjo (1975-1979) regimes seem to have some peculiarities because it has the two tendencies both a caretaker and corrective government.

5.3 The Colonial Transition to Independence

The colonial transition to independence was carried out gradually with the lowest tiers of authority being the first to have elected or appointed Nigerians taking over the reins of administration. There was also an increase in the number of elected Nigerians that served in the central legislative from four to 139 members, an advisory body for the colonial authorities from 1922 to 1951. The three regions were granted self rule at different times in the 1950s. The Eastern and Western regions got their autonomy in 1957 while the North got its own in 1959. Nigerians who had served in the colonial army played a marginal role in the drive towards independence compared to the activities of artisans, teachers, journalists and clerks. This was because the ex-servicemen lacked a cohesive leadership platform to articulate their agitations as there was a multiplicity of bodies that were “highly localised, isolated, and working at cross-purposes, each claiming to represent the interest of all ex-soldiers” (Olusanya, 1968: 229). In addition, there was a lack of support from the nationalist movements who themselves were factionalised and as such, could not agitate against the discriminatory policies exist in the colonial army (Olusanya, 1968: 231). The outcomes of the pre-independence conferences in the late 1950s were often characterised by disagreements on issues that were not only restricted to the civilian sphere of statehood but touched on the controversial structure of the Nigerian military. While delegates collectively agreed on the need to ‘Nigerianise’ the military, there were divergences on the composition, recruitment qualification and the command structure of the
officer corps. As noted by Garba (1995: 130) “the debates generated by such efforts only exacerbated emotions and the exploitation of these emotions by the elite would play constantly on fears and suspicions of Nigerians”.

The initial tendency as engineered by inter-regional suspicion among delegates was for each region to have a separate military command structure. However, the outcome of the discussions was the creation of a unified military command and control structure for the federation. The policy of regional quotas as the basis for recruitment into the officer corps to the disapproval of some delegates especially from the Western and Eastern regions carried the day. This policy was introduced as a result of inter-regional suspicions of possible use of the military by a region of the country which dominated the officer corps against other regions after independence. This was in reference of the ‘apparently lopsided configuration’ or dominance of the Nigerianised officer corps by the Eastern region and the reactive discomfort of the leaders of the Northern region (Fawole, 2008: 97). This policy outcome in addition to the series of political crisis would years after independence play a relative role in terminating the unstable civilian government and lay the grounds for conflict, factionalism and coups in Nigeria for decades.

5.4-Transitions under First Era of Military Rule

The first military regime under General Ironsi had pledged to restore civilian rule after implementing corrective measures in the overheated polity. In a national broadcast on May 24 1966, the supreme commander had given some hints indicating that the administration was a temporary one. He said

I wish to make it clear that the prohibition of the formation of political associations has no sinister motive. The limitation period until the 17th of January 1969 may be reduced if the military government accomplishes its aims before then....... As a corrective regime we must ensure that the
fatal maladies of the past are cured before we relinquish power. We propose as a last act to give the country an accurate count as well as a constitution, which will guarantee unity, freedom and true democracy to all Nigerians everywhere. (Tell Magazine, May 2011: 17).

The regime, however did not last long enough for history to determine whether it was going to abide by this policy declaration. The first transition to civil rule was unveiled by the military regime of Lt. Colonel (later General) Gowon who succeeded the six-month old regime of General Ironsi. The first task was fighting against the Biafran secessionist bid from 1967 to 1970. After the war, the regime proposed a transition to civil rule programme that was supposed to culminate in a civilian government by 1976. The military aspect of the transition included the withdrawal of soldiers to the barracks was hinged on reducing the size of large army, providing accommodation to its personnel and by implication, slashing expenditure on defence. The political aspect covered the following namely: drafting and adopting of a constitution, organisation of political parties and elections which would culminate in the installation of an elected government at in all tiers (Jemibewon, 1978: 29-30). However, there were divisions within the regime as to the system of governance the country should adopt to prevent the crisis that engulfed the parliamentary, loose federation of the First Republic. There was also the issue of the time it would take for the military to be ready for to leave the scene. Gowon wanted to avoid cracks within the military especially as it related to the plan for demobilisation of the army and the nature withdrawal to the barracks. This was also linked to the issue of whether the country as a whole was ready for civilian rule. The transition was never really set in motion. The indecisiveness of the regime was manifested in its inability to set in motion the drafting of a constitution and lifting the ban on partisan political activities. In a national broadcast on October 1 1974, General Gowon said that after consultations within the military and police hierarchies,
the government had decided to postpone the 1976 hand-over date calling it unrealistic. He justified this policy action on the grounds that:

Those who aspire to lead the nation on the return to civilian rule have not learnt any lessons from our past experiences..., there has already emerged a high degree of sectional politicking, intemperate utterances, and writings which were deliberately designed to which up ill feelings within the country to the benefit of the political aspirations of a few (Jemibewon, 1978: 31-32).

There were two possibilities available with respect to when and how civilian rule would emerge-to keep its pledge and hand over power by 1976 irrespective of its readiness or to postpone the termination date so as to adequately prepare the military for its new status in a civilian dispensation. The regime opted for the latter under the guise of certain inadequate conditions necessary to sustain unity and stability. This posture was counterproductive as Gowon and his group of supporters came under tremendous pressure from within the military and from sections of the society to initiate the hand-over process. There emerged a group of middle-ranking and senior officers who believed that military’s credibility and corporate status were threatened and the country was being dragged towards disaster as public support for the regime was gradually waning. There was an agreed policy that was proposed for the demobilisation of the military in terms of reducing its size from 250,000 to 150,000 men and the infrastructure especially office and residential accommodation needed to prepare it for a return to civilian rule.

However, this was not moving according to schedule. The pro-civilian government faction of the military began to wax stronger within the regime and command structure. Some officers namely Theophilus Danjuma, Joseph Garba, Ibrahim Haruna, Olusegun Obasanjo, Ibrahim Taiwo and Iliya Bisalla sided with the tide of military withdrawal as soon as possible. In addition, there
was disappointment on the part of civilian leaders like Chief Awolowo as there was an eagerness for a return to democratic rule. They were of the opinion that “the military will have to hand over power to civilians if they are to retain their credibility with the public and ensure that a fair situation prevails in the country after the promised date” (Campbell, 1978: 64).

The pro-disengagement faction within the military capitalised on such public opinions to oust the regime in July 1975. The new military regime led by Brigadier Murtala Ramat Muhammed charted a new course in the drive to hand over power to civilians by 1979. Despite the aborted coup which ended the life of General Muhammed, his successor continued with the transitional policies. The Murtala-Obasanjo regimes created new states, established a uniform system of Local government in 1976 and kick started the process of drafting a new constitution with a Constituent Assembly from 1975 to 1978.

There was an attempt by some foreign leaders to persuade the regime to delay the hand over to civilians. Major general Joe Garba who was then Nigeria’s external affairs commissioner revealed that ‘Helmut Schmidt of West Germany had argued in favour of the regime extending its stay in office until Nigeria’s political and economic circumstances were well stabilized’ (Garba, 1995: 159). As an indication of its willingness to withdraw from the political scene, it went further by replacing the military governors of states with caretaker supervisors called military administrators. The electoral process was characterised by lifting the ban on political activities and formation of political parties in 1978. Of the 17 political associations that applied only five were registered by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) in December 1978. All but one of the registered parties had some semblance with the main parties of the First republic. All the parties won elections at the state and federal levels in various degrees. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) won the presidential election in rather controversial
circumstances as the court had to decide on the basis of necessity to validate its victory despite the fact that in explicit terms, the NPN did not have the required two-thirds majority of the total votes cast in the 19 states of the federation as stipulated in the 1979 constitution. In order to have the required majority and subsequent effective control of the fragmented federal legislature, the NPN struck an alliance with the Nigeria Peoples Party of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. The Obasanjo regime was accused by opposition parties of having a covert sympathy for the NPN in the presidential election (Adekanye, 1989: 194). This was because the NPN was a platform that was meant to represent the interests of the privileged elements in the society that included top businessmen, aristocratic elements, seasoned politicians, university dons, administrators, retired military and police commanders largely from the North (Othman, 1984: 444).

5.5-Transitions under the Second Era of Military Rule

The Buhari regime neither made a credible statement nor provided any indication of a proposed transition programme but was occupied with the corrective policies in an effort to address the ethical, social and economic problems of the country. This regime was swept aside in a palace coup in 1985 with another regime led by Babangida unveiling as one of its policies the plan to return the country to civilian rule. However, it eventually became obvious that the regime’s ‘style of transition politics was so uncertain that it became accused of harbouring “hidden agenda” and of shifting the “goal post” in a football match of political struggle’ (Onuoha and Fadakinte, 2002: 7).

The series of electoral cancellations in 1989, 1992 and 1993, and the postponement of handing over dates under an imposed and regulated two-party system coupled with the harsh economic policies of liberalisation and commercialisation gradually eroded the regime’s legitimacy in the polity. The regime had placed a ban on partisan politics in 1987 on a certain group of politicians
by discrediting them as ‘Old Brigades’ (Reno, 1993: 67) in an effort to teleguide the transition outcome that would be favourable to it (Onuoha, 2002: 247-248). These personalities had over the years built networks of power and influence within and outside government circles. As beneficiaries of rentier accumulation at various periods in Nigeria, they were more experienced and had wider connections than the ‘New Breeds’ who were recent entrants. They include Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, Adamu Ciroma, Solomon Lar, Bamanga Tukur, Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, Sule Lamido, Abubakar Rimi, Arthur Nzeribe, Shehu Musa, Patrick Dele-Cole, Lema Jubril, Umaru Shinkafi, and Olu Falae. The thirteen political associations created by the old breed were denied registration. Instead, two government-controlled political parties were formed on August 27 1989- the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the centre-right National Republican Convention (NRC). In another twist, these politicians were unbanned and allowed to contest for elections in 1992 within this de jure two party system. The presidential primary elections at the parties’ levels were cancelled by the regime on grounds of irregularities. The old breeds were again banned from participating as candidates. Another electoral contest was organised which saw the emergence of a presidential candidate in each party. The presidential elections were held on June 12 1993 which saw Chief Moshood Abiola emerging as the obvious winner. The military regime suspended the electoral process as the results were being collated and counted. On June 23 1993, General Babangida annulled the elections and this sparked a protracted crisis for the next five years. According to Onuoha (2002: 248-249) “the cancellation or annulment of the June 12, 1993 election triggered off the most serious political crisis in Nigeria yet after that of the civil war”. While some observers saw the annulment as part of a hidden agenda by the military ruler to continue in office, others mostly the southern politicians and intelligentsia viewed it as an agenda by the ‘Northern Oligarchy’ to prevent a duly elected southerner from being the president (Enemuo, 1999: 3 and Ijewere, 1999: 157-158). An important manifestation
of the military’s tendency to continue in office was the political kite being flown in the media for Babangida to continue in office under the banner of Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) and a Swiss-based outfit called Kroner Public Relations owned by one Keith Atkins (Newswatch Magazine, April 5 1990: 10-20). On June 10 1993, the Arthur Nzeribe-led ABN had sought and gotten a court injunction to stop the June 12 presidential election from being conducted. As the elections still went ahead on the basis of a military decree No. 52 of 1992 which prohibited the any court from preventing the realisation of the objectives of the transition programme, the ABN again went to court. In its ruling, which ruled that defying an earlier court order is improper and that the election is illegal and its outcome null and void (Taiwo, 2002; 209-211). The regime used these court rulings to justify its action. In a broadcast to the nation in July 1993, Babangida mentioned other reasons which justified the annulment by citing the enormous breach of the rules and regulations, electoral irregularities as well as “cases of documented and confirmed conflict of interest between the government and both the presidential aspirants, which would compromise their positions and responsibilities, were they to become president” (Tell Magazine, May 2011: 65).

The reasons advanced by the regime for the annulment were not convincing to critics of military rule in general. From 1990 to 1992, the regime had conducted elections and sworn-in all the elected officials with the exception of the presidential seat. On two occasions, 1990 and 1992 the regime shifted the hand over date. The marathon of elections and their cancellations prompted speculations that Babangida had a hidden agenda of wanting to continue in office. Dissent within the primary constituency of the regime that is, the military began to manifest. Agitations for the regime to quit and hand over to Abiola intensified from politicians, activists, professionals, foreign governments and even military officers like Colonel Dangiwa Umar.
It was during this period that the Nigeria began to feel the weight of diplomatic pressure from sections of the international community, particularly some Western governments and Non-governmental bodies on the need for the democratic order to emerge and for the military to retreat to the barracks. The governments of Britain, Canada and the United States began to downgrade their links with Nigeria especially in matters of defence. Even when Babangida was forced to step aside in August 1993 as a result of mounting pressure from within and outside military circles, the successive but short-lived ING operated alongside the already existing democratic structures that were created under the Babangida transition.

In the end, the regime was substituted for a military-backed interim national government (ING) led by Chief Ernest Shonekan, the prime minister in Babangida’s transition cabinet and who happened to come from the same ethnic group and locality as Chief Moshood Abiola. His choice as new leader was meant to appeal to the sentiments of cultural identity. However, this did not help matters though he like Abiola had built a reputation for many years in the private sector as an industrialist. In a desperate but calculated effort to proselytise the agitations which were more intense from the political elites and other prominent groups in Southwestern Nigeria, Babangida supplanted a surrogate. The romance between Shonekan and his military backers only lasted for about three months. The legitimacy crisis confronting the ING led to its replacement by the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) under General Abacha. The emergence of Abacha as head of state was partly made possible by the provisions of the decree that established the ING and the manner in which he outmaneuvered other potential rivals like Generals Joshua Dogonyaro and Aliyu Gusau to grab the seat on the eve of Shonekan’s resignation. Using a series of military decrees, Abacha dismantled the transitional and democratic structures created under the Babangida era. In an effort to buy time and widen regime legitimacy, he unveiled a constitutional conference in 1994 which at the end of its
teleguided deliberations recommended a modified presidential-rotation system based on six geopolitical zones. This was documented in a draft constitution in 1995. However, this draft was never promulgated.

Using a de jure five party system, a new transition was set in motion that saw some elected offices contested for. These parties were the United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP); the Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN); the Congress for National Consensus (CNC); the Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM) and; the National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN). These platforms were controlled and funded by Abacha through his proxies like Lt. General Jeremiah Useni, Alhaji Wada Nas, Chief Don Etiebet and a host of others within and outside the government. The parties collectively adopted Abacha as their presidential candidate. Under tightly controlled electoral contests at the local government and legislative levels, the regime employed strong arm tactics in intimidating those undesirable figures from contesting elections on the platforms of these parties notably Chief Olusola Saraki of the CNC and Alhaji M.D. Yusufu of the GDM. Simultaneously, the regime indirectly orchestrated a series of agitations and even hosted a controversial ‘Two million man’ march under the auspices of a platform called Youth Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA). The march appealed to General Abacha to shed off his khaki, contest unopposed and become Nigeria’s civilian president by October 1998. This process was cut short in June 1998 with the sudden death of General Abacha in mysterious circumstances. His death saw an immediate change in the policy tone of the military through its new leadership who terminated military rule in May 1999 and installed an elected civilian government.

5.6-The Driving Factors behind the 1998/1999 Transition to Civil Rule

The sudden death of General Sani Abacha in June 1998 was a watershed in the political history of Nigeria. This is because the process of transmuting the military dictator to a civilian president
suddenly gave way to a new transition that was dictated by the drive to hand over power to a civilian regime through a more credible electoral process. To rephrase Anene (1997: 64) the institutionalising policy by Babangida and Abacha was upturned by an abdication scenario. Power had shifted to those who favoured military retreat from governance. Just like the Murtala-Obasanjo tenures (1975-1979), the Abubakar led military regime was dominated in words and deeds by ‘military democrats’ who realised that the corporate survival and role of the Nigerian military can better be accomplished in the barracks as against when they remain in power. There were a number of mutually-reinforcing factors that informed the military’s decision to withdraw from statecraft.

The first was the instability and conflict that had afflicted the military institution as a whole especially the protracted factionalism that existed within the officer corps. Many years before, General Babangida had admitted that military intervention had negatively affected the level of professionalism. There was need to address this through the political education of officers in order to accept subordination to constituted (civil) authority and insulate the military from external influence (Whiteman, 1990: 32-33). In the same vein, the military had inflicted other damages to its own well-being. It is observed that:

Budgetary allocation to various military formations was misappropriated by unit commanders without developing the military institutional infrastructure like the barracks, (equipment, materials) and logistics research and development. Furthermore staff allowance, welfare packages and pension benefits were embezzled by officers’ corps who had no opportunity to occupy political offices (Yoroms, 2011: 123).

As a result of the annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential elections and its protracted crisis, the officer corps within the military hierarchy had crystallised into two broad factions- the prodisengagement and the antidisengagement factions. The latter were beneficiaries of military
rule and had cause to oppose military withdrawal because of the possibility of retribution when civil rule is ushered. They tend to “opt for a constitutionalized military rule under which the military leader trades his uniform for a civilian one” (Anene, 2000). These military officers and their civilian cohorts were largely the loyalists of Abacha and had the upper hand during the regimes of Babangida and Abacha. With Abacha’s demise, the tables of opportunity turned in favour of the military democrats. The assumption of General Abubakar as the new head of state gave way to the ascendancy of the faction that opted for the policy of military disengagement. Since the officers in the prodisengagement faction placed the “value the survival and efficacy of the military above all else” a policy of “a return to the barracks as a means to preserve military unity” (Ulfelder, 2005: 318) was adopted against the background of the mass disenchantment with military rule by a wide section of the civilian elites and Nigerians in general. A combination of self conviction and intense external persuasion made this new ruling faction to believe that the military should relinquish power if its corporate and professional outlooks are to be restored. Prolonged military rule with its attendant problems of governmental corruption, factionalism and indiscipline had done much damage not only to the civilian sphere of the state, but also to the ethos of military professionalism. In tactful admittance of past mistakes and to solicit domestic and international support for the policy direction of the new regime, General Abubakar made a national broadcast on Monday July 20 1999 where he said that:

...we must admit that mistakes have been made, particularly as our most recent attempt at democratisation was marred by maneuvering and manipulations of structures and actions. At the end, we have succeeded in creating a defective foundation on which a solid democratic structure can neither be constructed nor sustained (Guardian Newspaper, July 21, 1998: 15).
Because of the protracted failure by previous military regimes to execute a transition to civil rule programme that would reach its logical conclusion, the military establishment had realised the grave error in terms of the effect this had on its corporate image and internal cohesion. As such, the military institution had over time lost respect in the public domain. The way forward was for the regime to install democratic governance and leave the centre-stage. This group had now dominated the levers of decision making and was able to placate potential dissenters.

The second factor had to do with the change in the political milieu and level of influence of retired military officers who in the past held strategic appointments in previous military regimes. The level of influence by retired military officers in Nigeria’s political scene has gradually increased. As a group, they never developed as a major force during the nationalist movement of the colonial period (Olusanya, 1968) largely because they seldom crystallised as a cohesive group among the emergent indigenous elite classes. In the post-colonial period, a number of factors such as the cycle of military coups, the civil war, mass purges and economic factors led to a large number of military retirements and dismissals (Adekanye, 1999: 3-14). It is important to observe that the emergence of the military elite both in uniform and in retirement as a powerful bloc has its roots in the mid-1970s. The indigenisation and nationalisation policies created the conditions necessary for enhancing their emergence and dominance in the processes of primitive accumulation. This dominance became obvious towards the end of military rule in the late seventies. Fayemi observed that ‘many of the military officers who ruled the country between 1975 and 1979 soon found themselves in business and politics, courtesy of the nationalized companies with close links to the military’ (Fayemi, 1999: 69).

However just as the role of Nigeria’s militariat in the economy was incremental over time; it was also the same in the political arena. It was during the transition to civil rule programme of
the late 1970s that the activities of retired military officers began to be visible in the political arena as a number of them joined the parties of the Second Republic and even contested for elective offices within these parties, the local and state government levels. Some contested for posts during the December 1976 local government elections. About 43 percent of those who contested for the 69 councillorship positions in Kaduna state were retired military personnel (Adekanye, 1999: 71). However, most of the retired senior officers preferred to remain behind the scene as supporters of such parties. In retirement, most engaged in private economic activities which covered agriculture, defence contract procurement, banking, private security, shipping, mining and construction to mention but a few (Adekanye, 1999: 35. See also Table 6.1: 138-141). During the Second Republic, a number of them contested for legislative and executive positions at the federal and state. However, their impact either individually or as a group in politics was minimal. During latter part of Babangida’s transition programme, agitations for reversion to civilian democratic rule gradually intensified. The numbers of retired officers involved in partisan activities increased especially after the annulment of the elections of June 12 1993. Their activities were not coordinated under cohesive umbrella because of their political inclinations within the context of the June 12 crisis. For example while General Akinrinade was an advocate of the June 12 mandate it was noted that Generals Obasanjo and Yar’Adua opted for and even supported the establishment of an interim government of national unity (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999: 256). These inclinations were largely defined by political culture of factionalism that permeated the military and post-military realms. Thus, these ex-military men were unable to crystallise into a single political group after retirement despite being monolithically socialised for long periods during military service.

Between 1991 and 1998, the number of retired military officers that joined partisan increased and included personalities like Generals Yakubu Gowon, Ibrahim Haruna, Olufemi
Olutoye, Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, Joseph Garba, Dumuje and Colonel Yohanna Madaki (Adekanye, 1999: 192). During Babangida’s transition programme (1987-1993) one of the most prominent political gladiators to emerge was Major-general Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, General Obasanjo’s deputy. He established the Peoples Front (PF), a strong political structure that was national in outlook. He used this platform to build a network of political bridges and dominate the party he joined. In addition, a former head of state, General Yakubu Gowon joined one of the two government-approved parties to contest for the presidency in 1992. It was not until at the height of agitations against military rule in the late 1990s that many of them became members of interest groups (in various ways) demanding an end to military rule. They include Olusegun Obasanjo and Shehu Yar’Adua (both of whom were imprisoned by General Abacha), Dan Suleiman, Alani Akinrinade, Joseph Garba, David Mark, Ike Nzuchukwu, Emeka Odumegu Ojukwu, Lawrence Onoja, Abubakar Umar, Braimoh Yusuf, Tunde Ogbeha, Theophilus Danjuma, Muhammadu Buhari, Tunde Idiagbon, Ibrahim Babangida, John Shagaya, Jeremiah Useni, and Augustus Aikhomu.

As new self-professed democrats, they were now increasingly convinced that civil rule was the viable option out of the Nigeria’s protracted political crisis. The crisis had negatively affected their business and political ambitions. Despite being out of military service, they had all along maintained some form of informal ties with serving officers in the regime and at the same time established bonds with civilian elites in the political and economic realms. Their role in the transition process particularly in the activities of political parties is a manifestation of the indirect influence they had in the regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar as it relates to the imperative for civilian-democratic rule.
The third factor was the direct and indirect roles of the international community. Many Western governments, intergovernmental bodies like the European Union (EU), the Commonwealth (CW) and the United Nations (UN) which made policy pronouncements of condemnations and sanctions against prolonged military rule as well as the support they provided to pro-democracy Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). These include the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), Campaign for Democracy (CD), Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), Civil Rights Congress (CRC), and the Campaign for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR). In retrospect, the role of external forces in providing some impetus to the domestic agitations for military withdrawal in Nigeria was manifested in ‘the degree of international isolation..., and the encouragement of pro-democracy and human rights groups facilitated the tempo of internal resistance to dictatorship’ (Obasanjo, 1999: 263)

These CSOs mounted successive pressures on the regimes of Babangida, Shonkak and Abacha to quit and respect the results of the June 12 1993 elections. In 1998, the Group of 34 (G-34) a coalition of prominent but strange bedfellows comprising both civil and retired military elites called on the Abacha regime abandon his obvious transmutation agenda which was supposed to have culminated in his assumption of a civilianised presidency by October 1998. It must be noted, however that the role of the CSOs was limited in scope and intensity given the fact that they were not united in the struggle against military rule because of their ‘enfeebled and incapacitated nature’ (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999: 295). For example, on February 5 1994 the CD split into two irreconcilable factions over financial and political reasons which resulted in one of the factions forming another body, Democratic Alternative (DA). Also, some NADECO members like Alex Ibru, Ebenezer Babatope, Olu Onagoruwa, Iyorchia Ayu and Lateef Jakande left the struggle and joined Abacha’s first ministerial cabinet in 1993 (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999: 259-262).
The fourth factor was the apathy of the general public who had largely lost confidence in the political system. This subjective posture was largely due to years of governmental corruption, repressive socio-economic policies and the unwillingness of the Babangida and Abacha regimes to allow for the emergence of a democratic dispensation. The accumulated effect of the Babangida and Abacha regimes had considerably ‘eroded public trust in government and deepened ethnoregional divisions’ (Enemuo, 1999: 3). Leading political activists notably from the southern part of the country like Chiefs Gani Fawehinmi, Anthony Enahoro and General Alani Akinrinade called for the convening of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) to calls for the establishment of a Confederation and regional army commands through the devolution of powers (Enemuo, 1999: 3).

While the posture of the majority of Nigerians was largely passive, the general mood was that of skepticism and sometimes indifference to events at the political centre-stage. In addition, the policies of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) had a general negative effect on the cost of living on majority of Nigerians. SAP widened the gap between the rich and the poor as the population of the middle class dramatically shrank. As a result, a wide section of the populace generally lost confidence in governmental activities because the deregulative policies or rolling back of the state in its function as a social service provider was widely viewed to be anti-people. With respect to the political transition, the amount of public resources expended by the Babangida and Abacha regimes reached a quagmire without any tangible results. The Abubakar regime departed from past tendencies and set in motion, the process of restoring the public confidence in the political system. This was clearly demonstrated by the pledges to restore civil rule and the release of many political prisoners on 16th June 1998. General Obasanjo was among the 16 high profile detainees released. He had been incarcerated and convicted to
serve a commuted life sentence by the Abacha regime. The social bond between government and the society is a major prerequisite for the corporate existence and stability of the country.


The transition programme embarked upon by the regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar was characterised by a number of significant events. These had an impact on the nature and outcome of the transition programme. The Abubakar transition as earlier noted is the shortest process in Nigeria’s history where a military regime set in motion the basic processes of handing over power to an elected civilian government. Within nine months that is from July 1998 to April 1999, the regime set the ball rolling as an electoral body, three registered political parties and rounds of intra-party and inter-party elections dotted the political landscape. Since the late 1970s when the Obasanjo military regime had successfully organised a transition with political zeal, no other military government after it had done so until 15 years after the Second Republic had been sacked by soldiers who claimed to have intervened as a corrective measure.

The endorsement by the international community notably the Commonwealth (CW) and the United Nations (UN) of the transition programme is significant as manifested in the acceptance of the regime through the partial lifting of certain diplomatic restrictions on top government officials. As such, it provided a complimentary momentum to the regime’s aim of restoring elected civilian rule after almost 15 years of military intervention. This was demonstrated in the visits by diplomatic delegations from the CW and the UN led by their scribes, Chief Emeka Anyaoku and Mr. Kofi Annan respectively. In addition, some western government sought to broker a solution over the crisis of the June 12 mandate between the regime and Chief Abiola who later died on July 7 1998 while meeting with an American delegation in Abuja that included
Susan Rice, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Nigeria’s diplomatic isolation was partly lifted as international delegations increased their visits to Abuja and Nigerian officials notably General Abubakar had the opportunity of visiting a number of Western capitals and even attending CW and UN gatherings.

The death of Chief Moshood Abiola on Tuesday July 7 1998 though, in rather controversial circumstances provided an opportunity for the post-Abacha military regime to turn another political leaf. The five-year old agitation for the actualisation of the June 12 mandate was no longer feasible. The central figure behind the struggle was dead and the structures of the aborted Fourth Republic, which could have served as the basis for the actualisation of the June 12 mandate, were dismantled by General Abacha when he came into office in November 1993.

General Abubakar dismantled the Abacha transmutation structures and within a month of coming into power opened the arena to the politicians to set up their own parties in order to contest for elections. Instead of using Abacha’s 1995 draft constitution, the new regime opted for a slightly amended version of the defunct 1979 constitution. On July 20 1998, the regime announced a ten-month transition programme starting from August 1998 and ending in May 1999 (Onuoha, 2002: 322-324). The elections were conducted in three phases- the Local Government elections on December 5 1998; the Governorship and State Legislative elections on January 9 1999; the Federal Legislative Elections on February 20 1999; and the Presidential election on February 27 1999 (Enemuo, 1999).

The performance of the many parties that participated in the Local government election was used as the basis for eventually registering three of them- the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the All Peoples Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). A veiled reference was made
of the ‘prominent role played by retired and serving military officers in the whole process of party formation and selection of presidential candidates’ (Fayemi, 1999: 69).

The national spread in membership of the PDP was more than the other two parties and included the members of the defunct SDP and of significance, ‘the solid support of most retired military officers, some suggest as many as 200 of them’ (Mustapha, 1999: 282). The APP was an aggregation of conservative politicians and pro-Abacha politicians. While the PDP and APP had more national spread than the AD, the latter drew most of its membership from the Southwestern part of Nigeria comprising the disciples of the late Obafemi Awolowo and members of NADECO a June 12 pressure group. The AD was registered in order to bring on board the political elements that were championing the June 12 mandate and advocating a more radical agenda than members of the PDP and APP.

The PDP held its presidential primaries in Jos on November 26 1998 and two major groups slugged it out for their candidates to grab the ticket. The mainly NPN elements supported former Vice President in the Second Republic, Alex Ekwueme while the disciples of Shehu Yar’Adua and many retired military officers preferred General Olusegun Obasanjo. As a result of the money-bag politics displayed by the battalion of retired generals at the convention, the candidature of Obasanjo carried the day. Generals Theophilus Danjuma, Ibrahim Babangida, Aliyu Mohammed Gusau and Mohammed Inuwa Wushishi were the top financial contributors in the PDP. All of them had served under General Obasanjo during the civil war days as subordinate field commanders and eventually when he became military head of state. The APP convention in Kaduna on December 11 1998 was characterised by a violent crisis and as potential front runner Alhaji Abubakar Olusola Saraki met strong opposition from the Senator Mahmud Waziri led party executive. The emergence of Saraki, a Yoruba from the North had the
potential of derailing the discrete transition agenda of zoning the presidency to the south. Eventually, Chief Ogbonnaya Onu was installed as the presidential flag bearer. This made Saraki and others to withdraw their support for the APP in the presidential election. On the same day in Abuja, the AD convention saw Chief Bola Ige (an ardent critic of military rule and a disciple of the late opposition leader in the First and Second Republics, Chief Obafemi Awolowo) slugging it out with Chief Olu Falae, a federal technocrat and a former secretary to the regime of General Babangida. In the end, Falae grabbed the ticket. Another drama took place just before the presidential election. The APP as a junior partner formed a joint ticket with the AD and substituted Chief Onu with former spy chief Umaru Shinkafi as a Vice Presidential candidate to Chief Falae.

From these political outcomes, two fundamental trends can be discerned. The transition programme was a calculated and teleguided process up to the stage of the presidential election where two candidates had emerged by December 1998. A broad section of the civilian elite including the military opted for a president from the south and by coincidence from the same geographical location and ethnic identity as Chief Abiola in order to regulate the divisive acrimony in the political arena, already aggravated by prolonged military rule. Secondly, the two candidates in question were relatively connected to the military establishment. Olusegun Obasanjo was part of the military establishment from 1961 to 1979. Even after retirement he maintained relationships with serving officers and military regimes. The regime of General Babangida sponsored his bid to become the UN secretary general. Chief Olu Falae was a federal bureaucrat who had served under the Babangida regime as the county’s top civil servant. He was known to have defended some of the regime’s harsh policies, notably the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Like Obasanjo, he was a victim of Abacha’s gulag and was released from detention on the same day as Obasanjo on 16th June 1998 on the orders of
General Abubakar. The presidential election took place on February 27, 1999 which saw Obasanjo winning the contest with 62.78 percent of the total valid votes cast. Unlike the episode of the 1979 election that had to be resolved by the courts, Obasanjo met the electoral and constitutional requirements to be declared the winner of the election.

While there was no direct, overt interference by the regime in the activities of parties except in the process of registering them in December 1998, the influence of some retired military officers who were close to the regime in shaping the activities of the parties creates some room to infer that the transition process was indirectly ‘teleguided’ to suit the interests of four political forces- the serving and retired military, the factionalised civilian elite and the external powers interested in a return to civilian rule. This was reinforced by the degree of solidarity the factionalised civil and retired military elites exhibited in their collective desire to have a civilian regime by May 1999 irrespective of the degree of its democratic antecedents.

A significant event took place in Abuja on Saturday October 3, 1998 that would have implication for the transition programme and eventually the nature of civil-military relations in the post-military dispensation. The military regime convened an interactive session involving both serving and retired top brass drawn from the military and police. It included former heads of state and their deputies, all previous and incumbent service chiefs and officers equivalent to the rank of Brigadier-general and above who had served in the military and police from the 1970s to the late 1990s. The gathering was convened to discuss and provide the way forward on five core issues. The interaction covered the military’s image within the context of the June 12 crisis, its dismal human rights record and widespread governmental corruption; the implication of the agitations for a Sovereign National Conference on the corporate status of the military; the third had to do with the individual and group agitations for restitution as a result of the brutality
of prolonged military rule; the fourth was some guarantees for indemnity and finally; a framework for consigning the military to the barracks and to prevent their return to power in the future. The two visible absentees were former heads of state Generals Obasanjo and Buhari (Adekanye, 1999: 195). The parley between the serving and retired military brass did come not as a surprise as “long after leaving the force, typical retired top officers continue to wield an amazingly powerful hold over their colleagues, meaning most erstwhile juniors, still in active service” (Adekanye, 1999: 175).

Based on the interactive session, the regime did not respond to the agitations for a sovereign conference but rather set up a body to draft a constitution along the lines of the 1979 and 1989 versions. While the Abubakar regime did not visibly interfere in the intraparty and interparty electoral processes, the emergence of General Olusegun Obasanjo as one of the flag bearers in the presidential race and the subsequent winner of the presidential elections and the manner in which the AD and APP fielded a joint ticket seems to indicate that the military designed a pacted transition where the civilian leadership that was suppose to emerge would be acceptable to wide section of Nigeria’s factionalised, the military establishment and the international community. This pacted transition was made possible by ‘the emergence of the military in retirement as the most potent force in Nigeria, based on its massive fortunes accumulated, and social networks established, during its long stay in power’ (Enemuo, 1999: 7). Generals Danjuma and Babangida were known to have visited Obasanjo just after his release from prison custody in order to persuade him to contest the presidential elections. The manner in which Obasanjo was released from prison and how he was persuaded and supported to return as Nigeria’s leader seems to suggest that the Abubakar transition was a pacted one.
A pacted transition is a deliberate and calculated process of transferring the reins of power after an election from one regime to another regime whose composition is expected would preserve or be less concerned with harming the vested interests of members of the departing regime as well as the aggregative interests of the governing elite. The emergence of such contestants may also depend on the nature the degree of acceptance or rejection by the domestic political environment and international actors. Where domestic opposition is weak and the external environment is disposed to such a direction, the pacted transition is easily undertaken by the departing regime. As such, the process involves the careful selection of those who would emerge as contestants in the electoral process. Those who were viewed as harmful to such vested interests were either proselytised or schemed out of the struggle for power. While the military establishment had finally come to terms with the fact that civil rule was the only viable option, it came with a political caveat. As identified by Richard Kohn (in Dinneya, 2006: 135), prolonged military rule tends to create a materially privileged and bureaucratically-equipped military elite. This social engineering gradually creates a general impression among the military elite, both serving and retired, of a doubt about the civilian elite capability to uphold the corporate existence and stability of the country. As such, if the military is to withdraw, a pacted transition is a feasible option. This was the obvious policy of the departing military regime in Nigeria. This discrete policy played a role in shaping the direction and outcome of the transition programme to civil rule. Thus, it was more of a question of who the military would hand over to before stepping aside. The emergence of an Obasanjo presidency in May 1999 can be situated within Ekeh’s theory of civilianisation. It is based on ‘the bold-faced assumption that the affairs of the postmilitary state can be effectively managed only by the former military rulers’ Ekeh (1999: 75). In retrospect, this line of thinking was openly declared by Shehu Musa
Yar’Adua during the Babangida transition of which he (Yar’Adua) was a presidential aspirant. At the 1992 SDP campaign rally in Sokoto, he boasted that,

Being a retired soldier was one of the reasons why I and my friends decided that I should contest... I am the most competent to stop the military from coming back to power because as a retired military man, I know them very well and they know me. I possess the capability of preventing them from staging coups (Farris and Bomoi, 2004: 200).

The democratic mandate of General Obasanjo can be attributed to two major inter-connected factors. The first reason had to do with his personality. He was a field commander and hero who represented the federal side and negotiated the terms for Biafra’s surrender in 1970. He was a former military head of state between 1976 and 1979 and made history as the first Nigerian military ruler to hand over power to an elected civilian regime. During the 1983 coup, serving military officers had solicited that he resumed his military commission to head the new military regime. He turned down the offer (Obasanjo, 1990: 227). As a result of these, he became not only a respected national figure, but an international statesman having connections with international bodies such as the Commonwealth (CW) and later Transparency International (TI) the anti-corruption watchdog. He was a member of the Eminent Persons Group at the CW which was saddled with bringing an end to Apartheid in South Africa and a board member at the TI. He eventually became a critic of subsequent military rule under Generals Buhari, Babangida and Abacha as he consistently advocated for a return to civilian democratic rule. He became a political prisoner in 1995 when he was jailed in connection with a coup plot against the regime of Abacha. His entry into partisan politics shortly after his pardon and release by General Abubakar was engineered by retired military colleagues and juniors who saw him as the right man having the experience and personality to be accepted nationally. By coincidence he shares
the same ethnic and geographical clusters with Abiola the acclaimed winner of the June 12 1993 Presidential elections.

In essence, he had the support of the retired and serving military brass, the factionalised political and social elites as well as the tacit endorsement of foreign governments who saw him as the suitable man for the job. The second one had to do with the support base he quickly cultivated as a candidate within the rising retired military elite and a wide section of Nigeria’s civilian elite across ethnic, religious and geographical divides. In a revelation, General Babangida gave the reason why Obasanjo was picked to contest for the presidency. He said:

> The emergence of Obasanjo came as a result of what happened in the country. The country was in a very serious crisis and we had to find the solution to these problems... So, we looked for a man who has been involved in the affairs of this country, who held position either in the military or in the cabinet and who has certain beliefs about Nigeria. All of us that were trained in the armed forces, there is one belief you cannot take away from us, we believe in this country because this is part of our training. We fought for this country (Sunday Trust, 10th March 2013:3).

The retired military officers who supported him contributed 400 million Naira for his electoral bid (Enemuo, 1999: 5). The PDP remained united despite the acrimony that accompanied his emergence as its presidential flag bearer and went ahead to exploit the crisis arising from the APP convention which saw leading figures like Olusola Saraki and Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu giving their support to his candidacy (Enemuo, 1999: 5).

**5.8-Summary of Chapter**

This chapter examined civil-military relations within the context of the previous attempts at transiting from military rule to civilian rule from the eve of Nigeria’s independence to the period
1998/1999. It was observed from the body of data gotten from historical records that a combination of factors both internal and external to the military establishment in various degrees at different transitory periods have shaped the genesis, direction and outcome of the transitions to civil rule and the withdrawal mechanism of the soldiers from mainstream politics.

The gradual transfer of power from the colonial power to Nigerian leaders was characterised by divisive political debates surrounding the composition of the military and its future linkages with the departing colonial power. The effects of the colonial transition to independence especially, the development of a Nigerian officer corps resulted in the entrenchment of factional and personal ambitions within the military institution. This is because the British project of engendering divide and rule made the emerging civil elites to fashion out a military based on regional balancing and personal acquaintances. In addition, the usage of the military in the factional struggles by the ruling elites created gradually created a dichotomy between the commanders and their resentful junior colleagues. The transition resulted in a six-year project before a section of the military terminated it.

The intensification of factionalism within the domestic environment and the gradual emergence of serving and retired military leaders as a major bloc in the politics of Nigeria have largely determined the success or failure of a transition to civil-democratic rule. The second attempt at transition was carried out entirely by domestic elites both civil and military who departed from the British legacy of parliamentarianism to the American presidential system. The acrimony resulting in the zero-sum game of the presidential system and the fall-out within the ruling class forced an alliance between a section of the political class and an ambitious military leadership to terminate this experiment after four years. The subsequent military leadership as a product of past coup plots since July 1966 experimented with different approaches to power
transfer resulting in elongation of tenures and increased social tensions within the Nigerian polity. The failure to transfer power to an elected civilian government, rising domestic agitations and deteriorating economic conditions and its resultant external pressures led to the departure of the military in 1999 after 15 years of rule.

The civil-military basis for the Abubakar transition in 1998 and 1999 is a product of three overlapping forces- the pro-withdrawal idiosyncrasy of the post-Abacha military regime, the influence of the domestic political forces and the pressure of the international environment. In essence, the transition was made possible by an aggregative agitation of domestic and external forces within the context of a political caveat nurtured and executed by the departing military regime and its allies in the civilian realms. The transition was carefully teleguided to ensure the emergence of a civil leadership that was fairly acceptable to a wide section of interested groups that cut across the military, civilian and international divides.

Ake provides an inventory of such forces to include political elites excluded from power and sections of the business community affected by successive military regimes’ policies, professional groups, workers and the international community as well as many senior officials of previous military dictatorships (Ake, 2000: 127-128, 132). The military’s withdrawal from mainstream politics was characterised by the emergence of a ‘prodemocratic’ military leadership. The fear of factionalism and continued political turmoil in the country greatly shaped the orientation of such military leaders. Their worldviews converged with the growing domestic agitations of the antimilitary rule groups and the international community which imposed the conditions for democratic governance in its economic relations with the Nigerian state.
CHAPTER SIX

AN ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC NIGERIA: MAY 1999 TO MAY 2007

6.1-Introduction

This chapter examined the intrinsic factors, and processes that have shaped civil-military relations from May 1999 to May 2007. This period was a starting journey in the fourth attempt by Nigeria to operate a liberal democratic system. This implies an elected civilian government with a subordinated military establishment.

In specific terms, the chapter presented the structure of civilian control of the military within both constitutional and policy articulation frameworks and the factors that determined this
control within the period. The historical, constitutional, institutional and environmental trajectories of civil-military relations in this period were considered within three major factors-the antecedents of the civilian leadership that emerged after May 1999 with reference to the executive arm of the government; the nature of the military establishment bequeathed to the civilian leadership and the role of the international community as a catalyst in shaping the nature of civil-military relations in Nigeria.

6.2-The Constitutional and Policy Frameworks of Nigeria’s Civil-Military Relations

The elected civilian government came into being after a relatively short transition from military to civil rule. The civilians governed the country within the framework of a written, federal constitution that came into being on 29th May 1999. This constitution has some resemblance with its 1979 counterpart in that it provided for a presidential system within a three-tier federal arrangement. Both documents provide for the office of executive president who is empowered to act as commander-in-chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces. In addition, the documents implicitly provide for a tri-service military organisation namely: the army, the navy and the airforce.

The major differences between the two documents are that (a) the 1999 version was not formulated by an elected body, (b) some provisions in the 1999 constitution are not included in the 1979 version and (c) in terms of duration, the 1999 version has outlasted its 1979 counterpart which was proscribed by the military coup of December 1983. Generally, the provisions relating to the relationship between the political leadership and the military are the same in both the 1979 (FRN, 1982: 64-65) and 1999 constitutions (FRN, 1999: 85-86).

The civilian government in a more or less style exercised the constitutional powers vested in it to adopt and execute a series of policy measures to craft control and oversight of the Nigerian
military. These policy actions coupled with the orientational and institutional postures of the military as well as the ideological paradigm and policy role of the international environment as a globalising phenomena combined to shape the nature and dynamics of civil military relations in Nigeria as an emerging democratic country.

6.2.1- Constitutional Framework of Nigeria’s Civil-Military Relations

An understanding of the logic of civil-military relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic should begin with some insights into the relevant provisions of the 1999 constitution before examining their implications for policy directions of the civilian government. The constitution is a fundamental set of principles upon which Nigeria is governed under a liberal-democratic arrangement. This has some implication for the conduct of civil-military relations in Nigeria. The 1999 constitution (FRN, 1999: 85-86) identifies three principal institutions that are directly involved in matters of civil-military relations— the military, the executive and legislative arms of the Nigerian state. Based on the principle of civilian leadership’s supremacy and control over the military establishment, it provides for the following:

i. The president is designated by the constitution as the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. The president has executive powers relating to control of the military in terms of the selection and promotion of military leaders as well as the operational use of the military (Section 218 (1) and (2), FRN, 1999: 85). The president is empowered in matters of appointment, promotion and discipline of the military leaders (service chiefs) for the three services which comprise the Army, the Navy and the Air Force and such branches of the armed forces (Section 217 (1), FRN, 1999: 85). In addition, the president can delegate responsibility to any member of the armed forces which by
implication means delegation without recourse to its hierarchical command structure (Section 218 (3) and (4) [a-b], FRN, 1999: 85);

ii. The National Assembly has the legislative power to determine the military's composition and provision for its maintenance, training and equipping (Section, 217 (2), Section 219 [a-b] and 220 (1-2) FRN, 1999: 85-86);

iii. The executive and legislative arms of the government are vested with the powers to subject the military through its leadership structure to objective control. The constitution empowers both the two arms to interact with the military in determining its operational functions within its primary role as an instrument of protecting the Nigerian state from external threats and a secondary role in support of government’s efforts at providing internal security (Section 217 (2) [a-d], FRN, 1999: 85);

iv. The existence and operations of two bodies (the National Defence Council and the National Security Council) through which the apex civilian leadership interacts with the military’s top leadership (the service chiefs) to articulate policy direction in matters relating to the activities of the military and other security establishments (See the Second Schedule, Sections 16 and 17, Sections 25 and 26, FRN, 1999: 143-144 &146);

Based on the 1999 constitutional provisions, three positions can be deduced. First, the military is subject to control of the constitutionally designated civilian authorities in terms of its composition, operational roles, funding, training and maintenance. Second, the executive and legislative arms of the civilian government have jurisdiction over the composition and functions of the military. The third has to do with the twin controls which the military is subjected to. The president has the power to appoint its top military leaders, exercise disciplinary control and decide promotions as well as define the operational use of the military. As part of its role to check executive excesses, the National Assembly has the power to regulate the president’s
constitutional jurisdiction by legislating on matters that border on the composition, operational use and funding of the military (FRN, 1999: 85-86).

In theory, the National Assembly was to exercise control through its constitutionally defined legislative and oversight functions. The case was somewhat different in practice. A general verdict indicated that the legislature was relatively weak in its activities and by extention, its functions as a crucial partner in democratic civilian control of the military establishment. This is not to say that the military disobeyed the legislature. The military leadership was occasionally summoned, just like other agencies of government to defend their budgetary proposals before legislative committees. This democratically imbalanced picture reflected the nature of politics within the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) which controlled the executive and had a majority in the bi-cameral legislature. The desire by the president, its most powerful figure to control all key decision theatres to some extent rendered the National Assembly ineffective. This took the form of gratifying legislators in return for impeaching their belligerent leaders. The military-like style exhibited by the executive arm and the crisis within the ranks of the legislators made the latter look more of a subordinate partner in the democratic process.

In a valedictory speech before his colleagues Anyim Pius Anyim, the Senate President accused the executive arm of being responsible for the poor performance of the National Assembly. He noted “the greatest obstacle has been the presence in parliament of some merchants who trade the parliament to the executive” (Daily Trust Newspaper, Thursday, 29th May 2003:1). In essence the National Assembly merely operated ‘as a rubber stamp’ of the executive ‘as far as military matters are concerned’ (Fayemi, 2003: 69). Two major interconnected factors are identified which accounted for a weak legislative arm under the civilian regime. The first had to do with the legislative capacity to exercise its constitutional functions of
concurrent democratic control of the military and the second bordered on the internal political weakness of the legislature which manifested in the form of unstable leadership. Generally, there was some degree of technical limitations among many legislators on the functions and roles of the National Assembly and by extension, matters pertaining to exercising regulatory powers as it pertains to the office of the commander-in-chief. With the exception of a few legislators like David Mark and Tunde Ogbeh of the Senate and Abdullahi Ibrahim of the House of Representatives, most had little or no expertise on military matters.

In 2000, a study of eight selected African countries (including Nigeria) was undertaken by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The study noted that in all the eight countries, legislative oversight of the military budget is very weak because of the absence of the “expertise needed to scrutinize military budgets” and “the lack of continuity in the membership of the defence committees, as the leadership of the parliament changes regularly” (Omitoogun, 2002: 274). In the case of Nigeria, it was noted that the Defence Committees of the National Assembly changed in its composition three times between May 1999 and May 2003 which was a blow to the learning process for legislators (Omitoogun, 2006: 175, Omitoogun, 2002: 274). This observation is buttressed by Kayode Fayemi, an expert on security sector reform in transitional states. In the case of Nigeria, he rightly observed that:

Not only are parliamentarians often unaware of developments, but their role in terms of determining policy on the size and character of the armed forces, overseeing their activities and approving the orders under which they function, has been short changed by an over-bearing executive (Fayemi, 2003:69).

The National Assembly was plagued by a series of leadership crisis for the most part of its tenure (May 1999 to May 2007). This was largely attributed to the power struggle between the
executive and the legislature to ensure that the latter was kept under control of the presidency. This implied discarding the principle of separation of powers. The Nigerian Senate was the worse of the two chambers when it came to this crisis. In an account of the leadership crisis in the upper chamber of the Nigerian legislature, Amadi (2005: 7) noted that:

Power play at the Senate revolved around the Presidency, using a network of senior ministers working in concert with powerful Senators to ensure that the executive wing have little or no problem in pushing their bills and keeping the Assemblymen in toe (Amadi, 2005: 7).

The invisible hand of the executive played an important role in the series of leadership changes in the National Assembly. The Senate had six presidents and the House of Representatives had three in eight years. The instability was even more in the Senate as it had two successive leaderships in less than two years. The first Senate President, Evans Enwerem merely spent 26 weeks in office. The second leadership under Chuba Okadigbo spent about year before it was replaced. This series of leadership changes implied reshuffling of oversight committees thereby eroding the continuity in the legislative process. Despite the political transition from military to civil rule in Nigeria, the continued militarisation of decision-making processes was largely responsible for the drive by the executive to stifle the legislature as regulatory institution of the government. As such, the executive arm of government was more prominent in exercising civilian control of the military because the legislative arm was often confined to its internal power struggles and inability to keep the executive in check when the need arose.

6.2.2-Policy Orientation and Direction in Nigeria’s Civil-Military Relations
On 29th May 1999 when General Abdulsalami Abubakar handed over the instruments of authority to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the latter declared in his inaugural speech that military reform was one of his policy thrusts. He said:

The espirit-de-corps amongst military personnel has been destroyed; professionalism has been lost. Youths go into the military not to pursue a noble career but with the sole intention of taking part in coups and to be appointed as military administrators of states and chairmen of task forces. As a retired officer, my heart bleeds to see the degradation in the proficiency of the military. A great deal of reorientation has to be undertaken and a re-definition of roles, re-training and re-education will have to be done to ensure that the military submits to civil authority and regains its pride, professionalism and traditions. We shall restore military cooperation and exchanges with our traditional friends. And we shall help the military help itself (Tell magazine, May 2011: 57).

The president’s observation of the military's decline in the level of professionalism was not only restricted to him as expressed in his maiden presidential speech, but was a widespread opinion within many Nigerian and international circles. For example, a military officer provided a picture of the intra-organisational schisms that infested the Nigerian military establishment, thus:

Officers hardly recreated in messes and even if they did, were skeptical about discussing topical issues due to mutual suspicion. Most officers were interested in holding political rather than military appointments thereby throwing professionalism to the dogs... the military involvement in politics tremendously affected training and combat readiness of the Nigerian military (Dimlong, 2006: 31).

The politicised nature of the military led to factionalism and as military rule dragged on, many officers had imbibed ambitious attitudes outside the profession- this was tied to accessibility to political offices outside the barracks for primitive accumulation and influence both within the barracks and in the larger society. This affected the hierarchical discipline within the officer corps as ‘opportuned’ junior officers looked down not only on their peers but also their
superiors. It was common knowledge that some senior officers who were not selected in past military regimes to occupy political appointments grumbled in silence or compromised their seniority to seek favours from their privileged junior colleagues. A military establishment infested with politically ambitious officers not contented with pursuing their military careers within the dictates of the profession has the tendency to displace a civilian authority in a coup. President Obasanjo in one of his diatribes stated that:

One of the things that I had to do therefore to bring stability was those officers who had tasted power, not power in the military sense but power in the political sense had to be moved out. Because the feeling with them would be any slightest thing with the new civilian administration- they would say ‘look, you see they (the civilians) are not doing it well, we can do it better’. There would be that tendency so far as long as they are in the military (Obasanjo, 2011-Appendix A).

On inheriting the military as an immediate threat, the Obasanjo government began a series of short and long term strategies to arrest this trend. The first of such policy measures began on the 10th June 1999. The government identified those military officers who had the tendency to get involved in coups or acts of insubordination, as the government wanted to have effective control of the military. This governmental action involved picking out the ‘bad eggs’ from the good ones and throwing them away. The criterion for this identification was based on previous appointments under military rule. Those who held positions as military governors or administrators (either in acting or substantive capacities), head of agencies and their military aides were retired. It was said that between 90 and 93 officers from the three services were affected in this exercise. If such officers remain in service, they could capitalise on any slight blunder by the civilian government to initiate a challenge.
Of this number, 53 were from the army, 20 from the navy, 16 from the airforce and four were police officers (Fayemi, 2003: 67). The second criterion was for restoring some hierarchical sanity within the officer corps. This was based on the enforcement of the promotion regulations and retirement age. Those who failed the periodic promotion evaluations and those who had exceeded the 35 year limit in military service were shown the way out. In total, over 200 officers from the army, navy and airforce were summarily retired on the basis of these two criteria.

An important area of advocacy by experts of military reform focuses on the level of defence expenditure which is often viewed as a burden in a country where either military rule or internal wars persists. The main goal is to reduce defence expenditure and divert resources to social and economic sectors. In Nigeria’s case, the problem was not the size of the annual defence expenditure but the level of corruption attributed to military rule. When the civilian government came into office in 1999, one of the policies it pursued was to increase expenditure on defence. Based on the table 2, evidence shows that while the military expenditure never reached two percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), there were increases in annual expenditures. With the exception of the 2000 and 2003 financial years, the annual military budget increased in Naira terms when compared to the preceding financial year. These increases largely had to do with providing the military with training, equipment and barracks accommodation. According to Obasanjo (2011) what the military wanted from the civilian government was the provision of training both locally and abroad, upgrading their salvageable equipment and provision of reasonable welfare in terms of the mess, barracks accommodation, salary etc.

Table 2: Defence Expenditure of Nigeria, 1999-2007 (In the constant value US Dollars, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Naira (Billions)</th>
<th>US Dollars (Millions)</th>
<th>Percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An aspect of security sector reform as an international norm for transitional democracies is the issue of right-sizing the military in order to reduce its burden on public expenditures and divert resources towards non-military sectors of the state. Many countries with authoritarian governments in the less-developed world tend to have their defence forces consuming the lion share of their annual budgets. As such, demilitarisation processes include reducing the size of the military in order to reduce the size of the defence budget. The common assumption is that the government would at the same time be in a better position to provide for a relatively small military force than a large one. While this thinking was not a new one in Nigerian public circles, the government initially intended to embark on reducing the military’s size.

At a function on 17th August 1999, the Defence Minister, while not explicit on the issue of size reduction, hinted on plans to reorganise the military. On the ground of the costs to the government and the imperative for military efficiency and professionalism, the military was supposed to be trimmed to a manageable size. Along the same line in July 2000, the defence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>1,795</td>
<td>1,105</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Data Base, 2009
minister while disclosing that the government has sought external assistance to re-professionalise the military seems to have painted a picture of ‘an over-sized armed forces’ (Danjuma, 2000: 4). The motive for such a policy drive was to have a smaller, highly mobile and well equipped military force that can effectively carry out missions within the resources allocated to it by the civilian government (www.africa.unpenn.edu/Newsletters/irinw82399b.html accessed on 15/8/2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Airforce</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>77,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>94,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>92,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/5</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3: Manpower Strength of the Nigerian Military for selected years**

However, based on the data available for the selected years as provided in table 3, there was an increase in the manpower levels of the Nigerian military. Though the size of the military fell between 1999 and 2005, this is not the same when comparing the years 2005 and 2007. With 1999 as exception, one of the legacies of the Obasanjo’s administration was bequeathing a larger army as at 2007 when it left office in relation to the year 1998.

As the new civilian government was interacting with some foreign countries to assist in its drive of military reform, it also embarked on a policy of educating military leaders on the supremacy of the civilian dispensation. At the graduation ceremony of senior officers in July 1999 at the National Defence College (then referred to as the National War College), the president drew their attention on the importance of accepting and operating within seven basic principles that define civil-military relations in Nigeria. These principles collectively imply the supremacy of the civilian leadership over the military establishment. The military should accept the constitution as the supreme guide for the armed forces; they should accept the elected civilian president as their Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) and the supremacy of other elected officials over those appointed; accept the leadership of civilians in the defence ministry; the supremacy of civilian decision-making in matters related to the defence budget; the supremacy of the laid down political and strategic goals by civilian leadership; accept the right of civil authority to exercise judicial review of rulings by military court martial and; the need to apply civilized principles to all military trials and investigations (Obasanjo, 1999). This policy pronouncement was aimed at defining the new status of the military and the need for it to adjust to this new status after being in power for many years.

In line with this policy, the government through the defence minister directed the service chiefs to institute a series of reorientation programmes for officers and men, cadets and
recruits. This policy was aimed at inculcating the doctrine of subordination to civil authority and enhanced career security under a democratic dispensation (Danjuma, 2000: 8-9). The challenge is to harness the “ideas, principles and norms that shape civil-military behavior in liberal democracies” and implant them into the psyche of “the officer corps’ in particular and the “defense establishment” in emerging democracies such as Nigeria (Bland, 2001: 525). In a show of support for the government’s policy direction, experts from outside the military notably the academia and the Civil-Society Organisations (CSOs) participated in lectures and workshops that were organised in many military formations across the country. With the emergence of civil democratic rule in 1999, the confrontational stance of the CSOs changed to that of advocacy. As Jibrin Ibrahim, the country director of the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) puts it

...a lot of civil society organisations felt that a relationship between civil society and democratic government should not be only a confrontational relationship. The question of advocacy became very important that the focus was to address policy issues and try to encourage government to adopt progressive policies that would promote development and democracy in the country (Ibrahim, 2012-Appendix E).

Two examples of CSOs can be given to show evidence of collaboration between CSO and government in such direction. The Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) and Freidrich Ebert Foundation organised workshops for military officers in collaboration with the National Defence College (NDC) on the status and role of the military in a democratic order. These involved interactions between resource persons under the auspices of the CSOs and military officers on how the relationship between the civilian institutions and the military establishment should take place within a liberal-democratic context. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) organised a national workshop in 2006 involving four resource persons (Mohammed, 2006). According to the published proceedings consisting of 120 pages, it is not clear whether the
Nigerian military was involved in the exercise or the proceedings were meant as a handbook for the military since one of the contributing resource persons, Istifanus Zabadi came from the Centre for Strategic Research and Studies (CSRS), an arm of the National Defence College (NDC), the highest military training institution in Nigeria. The only military officer in attendance as indicated in the communiqué of the workshop represented the NDC commandant.

However, what is evident is that there was an attempt by some CSOs to raise the issue of civil-military relations within a democratic context. The CDD has evidently been more prominent in civil-military discourses within the context of the global push for security sector reform in transitional democracies than other CSOs in Nigeria. According to its country director a number of civil society organisations played a key role in trying to place civil-military relations as well as civilianisation of the military on the agenda and the Centre for Democracy and Development was extremely active in that regard. We, developed, for example a manual on security sector reform which was extremely important in trying to get civil society more engaged in that process (Ibrahim, 2012-Appendix E).

The CDD published a handbook on the basic principles of security sector reform which provides a comprehensive road-map to democratic governance of the security sector (Ball and Fayemi, 2004). Apart from this handbook, the CDD has been involved in formal interactions with the military in matters pertaining to acceptance of the supremacy of democratic institutions and respect for human rights in the course of performing their professional duties.

The key issue for us really was the subordination of the military to civilian control and while this was achieved at the formal level, we feel it is just as important that at the ideological level, this be accepted as the reality for the country (Ibrahim, 2012-Appendix E).
However, the role of international forces remains an important factor in shaping the activities of CSOs in Nigeria’s civil-military relations as it borders on security sector reform. With respect to the activities of the CDD and the Freidrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the international input is evident. The handbook published by CDD was co-sponsored by a number of external bodies namely: the South African-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, the Center for International Policy in Washington (United States), the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Ottawa and the British Department for International Development (DFID). The activities of the Freidrich-Ebert-Stiftung are driven and funded by the German government. Generally, CSO activities in Nigeria depend to some extent on external support. As such, the CSOs are part of the various channels used by the international community to globalise democratic practice and by extension, the doctrines of liberal civil-military relations.

The second policy action is in how the civilian government responded to behaviours that constitute acts of insubordination by military leaders. When military leaders resist directives from civilian leaders their action is what Feaver (2005, 1998: 409-410) refers to as ‘shirking’ as a result of civil-military frictions. As in the case of the conflict of policy direction in the 1950s between the American President Harry Truman and General Mac Arthur during the Korean War, this was not taken lightly by the Nigerian civilian authorities. Acts of disobedience to civilian authorities due to intrusive monitoring of the military establishment was perceived by military leaders as undesirable.

In April 2001, the first set of service chiefs of the civilian administration were summarily sacked and retired. Jerry Gana, the government’s chief spokesman justified the sack to journalists by saying that it was done “in the interest of national security and it was devoid of any ulterior motives” (Daily Trust Newspaper, Thursday 26th April 2001: 1-2). These retirements
came as a result of the open criticism and resistance by General Victor Malu, the army chief concerning the civilian authority’s policy of inviting Western military advisers to come and reprofessionalise the Nigerian military. General Malu viewed this invitation to train the military on peacekeeping operations as a ploy by the United States to update its intelligence data base on Nigeria’s military and thus, criticised the civilian leadership for compromising the country’s security. (See Thisday Newspaper, 2nd June 2002: 12-13 and Weekly Trust Newspaper, Saturday 24th November 2007: 61). The civilian regime saw Malu’s comments as stepping out of line and a challenge to its authority. The shirking posture by General Malu had the potential of eroding civilian control of the military and threatening Nigeria’s ‘nascent democracy’. Subsequently, he along with the heads of the naval and air services were relieved of their posts and retired. It is not clear whether the other service chiefs were tacitly in support of Malu’s criticism of the government’s version of military reform. The civilian leadership exercised its constitutional powers of appointment and discipline of military leaders. It sent a signal that any officer found to have exhibited an act of insubordination would be shown the way out. Equally important this development signified the restoration of the supremacy of civilian law over military authority.

Thirdly, the civilian government embarked on reforming the legal framework provided for in The Armed Forces Decree No. 105 of 1993 which was enacted on 6th July 1994 under military rule. Under civilian rule, this decree was amended in 2004 by the National Assembly as The Armed Forces Act (CAP. A20). This 22-part document consisting of 137 pages provides in detail the legal and structural frameworks for the establishment, command and composition of the armed forces. The Act identifies the obligations and privileges of military personnel, defines their operational jurisdiction, conditions of service and the application of military law in matters of professional misconduct within the Armed Forces. In addition, it provides for the jurisdiction
of civilian courts of law in matters involving military personnel not satisfied with court martial procedures or rulings (The Armed Forces Act, 2004: 88-94).

In the same vein, the government embarked on reforming the instruments of civilian control by re-grafting the Ministry of Defence (MOD), an important interface organ as the formal gateway upon which all civil institutions interact with the military establishment. In the hierarchical order of Nigeria’s democratic civil-military relations, the authority of the MOD takes precedence over the apex military organ known as the Defence Headquarters (DHQ). The DHQ has the task of harmonizing and coordinating the three armed services through firm policy direction in matters of command, control, communications, intelligence and logistics (MOD News Bulletin, 2011: 8). The DHQ is headed by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who chairs and coordinates the activities of the service chiefs. The chiefs are the respective heads of the three armed services. Before 1999, the defence ministry had been subverted by the military since the CDS and service chiefs were members of the top decision making body of the military regime. Under the civilian dispensation the CDS, with the support of the service chiefs, is expected to ensure that the three armed services are well funded, trained and equipped to execute the defence policy of Nigeria. In addition, the CDS is to ensure that the military is kept away from the partisanship that exists in the liberal political environment (Garba, 1995:191).

After May 1999, the imperative for civilian control pushed for restoration of the status of the defence ministry that still retained a military presence but under the control of civilian leaders. President Obasanjo appointed Theophilus Danjuma, a retired two-star general and his army chief during his days as military head of state as defence minister to kick-start the process of civilianising the ministry. Danjuma was assisted by a number of civilians who evidently had no previous military background. The defence ministry adopted the recommendation of the MPRI
team that the responsibilities in defence ministry be divided between the minister and the deputy or deputies as obtained in the defence department in the United States. Table 4 below shows that the defence ministry had at different times a minister and ministers of state for defence.

Table 4: List of Defence Ministers and the Service Chiefs (May 1999-May 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minister of Defence</th>
<th>Minister of State</th>
<th>Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)</th>
<th>Chief of Army Staff (COAS)</th>
<th>Chief of Naval Staff (CNS)</th>
<th>Chief of Air Staff (CAS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Chris Agbobu (December 2002-May 2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador T. Aguiyi-Irons (August 2006-January 2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Rowland Oritsejafor (June 2003-August 2006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
. Based on Table 4, there were three senior defence ministers and eight ministers of state for defence between June 1999 and May 2007. In the first term of the civilian government General Danjuma held the defence portfolio and five ministers of state worked with him at different times. It is noted that the MOD was restructured along the tradition of its American counterpart. Between February 2001 and May 2003 a minister of state was appointed for each of the armed services namely the army, navy and airforce. After May 2003, the subsequent ministers and their deputies such as Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso and Aguiyi-Irons were civilians with no or perhaps little previous military experience. There is no credible evidence to show that the successors of General Danjuma were neither competent hands in running the defence ministry nor effective in relating with military leaders on policy matters. It was under the tenure of Rabiu Kwankwaso (as defence minister from 2003-2006) that for the first time in Nigeria’s history a 58-page document was inaugurated in June 2006. It explicitly defines the defence policy of the country in terms of objectives, national interests and threats, operational missions while taking into cognisance the changing dynamics of the national and external environments (FRN, National Defence Policy, 2006). The objectives of this policy are to:

a. Protect Nigeria’s sovereignty, citizens, values, culture, interests, resources and territory against external threats;

b. Provide defence as well as strategic advice and information to Government;

c. Promote security consciousness among Nigerians;
d. Respond to requests for aid to civil authority;

e. Participate in disaster management and humanitarian relief operations at home and abroad;

f. Assist government agencies and levels of government in achieving national goals;

g. Protect Nigerians wherever they may reside;

h. Ensure security and stability in the West African sub-region through collective security;

i. Participate in bi-lateral and multi-lateral operations and;


In most liberal-democratic countries, the basic functions of the MODs are to define the roles of the civilian and military officials in their formal interactions related to defence policy, ensure effective implementation of missions assigned to the military and efficient supervision of available resources allocated to the military in the national budget (Bruneau and Goetze Jr, 2006: 78-81). Under the new defence policy, the cardinal mission of the MOD is expected to:

To generate, employ, and sustain combat-ready, integrated and rapidly deployable Armed Forces, capable of quick assemblage to meet varying contingencies both at home and abroad (FRN, National Defence Policy, 2006: 17).

An interesting aspect of this policy lies in chapter seven of the document which provides a policy definition of Nigeria’s civil-military relations. In principle the document recognises the different roles of the executive, legislature, civil society and the armed forces as vital in the implementation of the defence policy (FRN, National Defence Policy, 2006: 51-55). The articulation and implementation of the national defence policy is heavily dependent on the role of the MOD. In explicit terms, the defence minister is saddled with supervising the day to day functions of the MOD within the context of the goals of defence sector reform. Notably, these
include providing effective civilian leadership and control, institutionalising the policy of military professionalism and roles in line with expectations of the government and international best practices. As a tri-service establishment, the civil-military hierarchy is structured in such a way that the Defence Minister acts as the delegated civilian representative of the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C). The minister is assisted by one or more junior ministers as obtained in some Western countries such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). The permanent secretary is the ministry’s top bureaucrat and supervises the civilian aspect of the MOD in terms of administrative procedures and controls. To promote combat readiness, the civilian aspect provides support services to the armed services in areas such as human and financial resource management, procurement, medical and legal services (MOD Bulletin, 2011: 6). The military aspect of the MOD is largely handled by the DHQ. The CDS as the military’s top officer is directly answerable to the Defence Minister and in council meetings at the levels of national security and national defence is answerable to the president and commander-in-chief. The CDS operates as a kind of a policy gateman for the armed forces since the office is largely an interface between the policy formulation arena of the civilian authority and the policy action arena of the military leadership. The CDS who could be appointed from any of the three services has the responsibility of chairing and coordinating a formal gathering of the joint military command comprising the chiefs of the army, navy and airforce. While the service chiefs are answerable to the minister they could by-pass the minister in their capacities as members of the National Defence Council to reach the president when the need arises.

Fourthly, the civilian regime capitalised on the existing good will it had at its disposal with the international community to solicit the cooperation of foreign governments in re-training the Nigerian military as part of the efforts to re-professionalise it in line with the contemporary liberal democratic standards. The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom
extended assistance in such direction (Idachaba, 2011: 387). According to General Theophilus Danjuma, a retired general and the Defence minister in the new civilian government:

Re-professionalizing the Armed Forces is absolutely necessary if firm and enlightened civilian control is to be effective. Consequently, we at the Ministry of Defence have sought the assistance of the United States government in the tasks of reprofessionalizing our armed forces... Without external assistance, the Nigerian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence will not be up to the complex tasks of reprofessionalizing an over-sized armed forces (Danjuma, 2000: 4).

The United States government through a number of agencies notably United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) extended assistance to Nigeria in areas such as military financing, military education and training (IMET), counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism as well as the direct military sales of equipment (Mikell, 2008: 301). The government took advantage of the resumption of military contacts with some countries like the United States and United Kingdom to send Nigerian officers abroad for training. One of such beneficiaries of the resumed overseas military training programmes is General Martin Luther Agwai, who attended and excelled in the class of 2000 at the National Defence University in the United States (Agwai, 2012-Appendix C). He became the third army chief, third CDS and force commander for the United Nations-African Union mission, a hybrid peace keeping operation in the Darfur region of Sudan.

From these it can be argued that three broad categories of considerations should be considered when examining the logic of civil-military relations in Nigeria between May 1999 and May 2007. These are the domestic considerations of the nature of the civilian leadership and the nature of the military leadership and the international dimension as a consideration of Nigeria’s civil-military leadership.
6.3-The Nature of Civilian Leadership: Experience and Expertise

An important component of civilian control of the military in a country that has experienced military coups and military governance is the level of expertise by civilian leaders in military matters. This component provides an advantage to civilian leaders as they become equipped with the knowledge of how to effectively interact with the military establishment through its commanders. In addition, it creates confidence within the military circles in the government’s capacity to interact with them at the point of policy making and leave the military within its constitutionally defined zone of professional conduct. In essence, the expertise of Nigeria’s civilian leaders in military matters created the opportunity to understand the organisational milieu of the military and helped in crafting control measures. Crafting such control is also facilitated by the confidence of the military in the civilian authority’s ability to interact with it in a positive way.

As the date for inaugurating the civilian government inched closer, the president-elect assembled a number of personalities who had served with him in the military. They had supported him in different capacities when he was military head of state between February 1976 and October 1979. In May 1999 he appointed them into offices that have strategic implications for the security and authority of the regime. In essence, they formed part of the nucleus of his government. Apart from their official routines of interacting with the civilian institutions of the state, they were saddled with the task of sustaining the process of securing the loyalty of the military. One of these personalities was Major general Abdullahi Mohammed who was appointed chief of staff in the presidency. He is the pioneer director of military intelligence. He was recalled by Obasanjo from his post as a military governor to serve a second time as the head of Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and kick start the Nigerian Security
Organisation (NSO), the civilian intelligence outfit after the aborted coup of 1976. He served in this position until his retirement in 1979. He also served as the National Security Adviser (NSA) to Obasanjo’s predecessor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-1999). In an interview, Obasanjo (2011) pointed to the role played by General Mohammed with respect to the interaction between the military and the executive arm of government.

I also appointed somebody who has been a military man before as my chief of staff... General Abdullahi Mohammed, so that if the military want to reach out to the President, they have somebody they can go to..., the chief of staff, I have known him since 1961, he can come to me and he can deal with a lot of their problems, he can give them all that confidence... and it helped (Appendix A).

Apart from coordinating the day to day activities in the president’s office, he also served as a sort of ‘bridge-builder’ or alternative medium of interaction between the military leaders and the president- whenever the military leaders wanted to reach out to the president, it was he that facilitated such interaction and vice versa. In an implicit manner he himself confirmed how expertise shapes the role he played.

My role is my experience. As someone who come from the intelligence community it was my business to know what was going on and so I was able to study the First Republic, the Second Republic and I was part of the military. I was military governor of Benue-Plateau for a short period and in the army I was the first director of military intelligence. From Plateau I was recalled to start the NSO. With all these backgrounds I guess I was well placed to be able to advise my boss (Mohammed, 2012-Appendix B).

His role was to facilitate what Pion-Berlin (2010: 532-533) identifies as ‘unofficial venues’ where civilian and military leaders interact through informal channels in order to address potentially diverge policy preferences.
The Minister of Defence, Lt. General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma was a former army chief when General Obasanjo was military Head of State. He was a major supporter in Obasanjo’s bid to become president from the party primaries in 1998 to the general elections in 1999. He served as head of advisory committee that ensured a smooth transition after Obasanjo’s electoral victory. His military experience played a role in the ability of the civilian authority to exercise control over the military and saddled with articulating Nigeria’s defence policy.

Lt. General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, a former military intelligence chief for many years, one-time coordinator of national intelligence and army chief under Shonekan (August-November 1993) was appointed the National Security Adviser (NSA). In retrospect, he succeeded Major general Abdullahi Mohammed as head of the DMI in November 1979. He served as acting head of the NSO and was instrumental in splitting it into three agencies which he coordinated from August 1986 to December 1989. He was saddled with the daunting task of coordinating the activities of all the governmental security agencies in the country and by extension, assisting in stabilising the new government through the policy articulation of a security road-map for the civilian government. Kayode Are, a retired Colonel was saddled with leading the State Security Service (SSS), a civilian counter-intelligence outfit (an equivalent of the FBI in the United States). This outfit was useful in identifying threats to regime stability and by implication, national security. In a related development, two retired generals namely Tunji Olurin and Mohammed Chris Alli (the latter worked closely with General Gusau in the 1980s at military intelligence corps) briefly served as sole administrators of Ekiti and Plateau States when the Federal government on different occasions, invoked its constitutional powers to declare emergency rule. Alli had served as governor in Plateau under the Babangida regime and before then, was implicated but exonerated in the coup of February 1976. He served as General Abacha’s first army chief from November 1993 to August 1994. His mandate as sole administrator was to
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restore relative law and order in Plateau State which had been engulfed in an intra-elite conflict along sectarian lines. The civilian governor was apparently unable to control the social upheaval and was at loggerheads with the Federal government.

It is important to note that the NSA had not only acquired experience as a military officer but also acquired expertise when he headed the civilian intelligence community during Babangida’s regime. In a May 2001 Wikileaks document, the NSA was identified as one who helped “Obasanjo assume control of the armed forces as civilian president” (www.wikileaks.org/cable/2001/05/01ABUJA954.html, accessed on 16/4/2013). He participated in a meeting with American diplomatic and military officials on implementation of Operation Focus Relief (OFR) a programme that extended military assistance to Nigeria. He had to personally intervene when the civilian government’s cooperation deal with the United States was facing opposition from General Malu coupled with the bureaucratic delays in paying Nigeria’s counterpart funding of about 3.5 million US Dollars as contained in the bilateral agreement where the US was expected to provide training and equipment to the Nigerian military as a peacekeeping and a counter-insurgent force through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Military Professionals Resources Incorporated (MPRI). Subsequently, a defiant General Malu and his counterparts from the navy and airforce were summarily sacked and retired by the civilian government (www.wikileaks.org/cable/2001/05/01ABUJA954.html accessed on 16/4/2013).

These men had acquired a lot of political and professional experience during their military careers which on the average, spanned about two decades. Like their boss Obasanjo, they knew the internal dynamics of the Nigerian military both as a professional body and as a government of the day. More importantly, they were among the clique of military officers who removed
General Gowon in the Coup of 29 July 1975. One of them was General Danjuma. He was made the head of the army and was at the vanguard in aborting the February 1976 Coup.

After the departure of the military from governance in May 1999, the new Defence Minister conducted tours around the country where he visited military formations and interacted with officers and men on the imperative for obedience to civil authority. In one of his tours he admonished officers and men on the need to remain loyal and obey the civilian authorities. In a lecture titled ‘The armed forces shall rise again’ General Danjuma reminded the officers of the One Mechanised Division, Kaduna on the need to...

...resist the temptation to be cajoled into illegal activities like coups... so we must learn to subordinate ourselves to civil authority... the armed forces have no place for political officers. Your commanders have been directed to search and flush out such officers to save our nascent democracy (The Guardian Newspaper, Tuesday 12th October, 1999: 7).

The defence minister continued with these policy pronouncements whenever he interacted with the military. On one occasion, he recounted how the military’s combat capabilities had dwindled as a result of many years of being in government. He notified the military of plans to resume training exercises in order to revive its level of professionalism and combat readiness. In a valedictory service to mark his departure from office in May 2007 Danjuma warned the military against acts of insubordination or coups which he compared ‘to the dreaded HIV/AIDS’. He said

Anybody in uniform who prefers political appointment should be free to drop his uniform... Military regimes are no longer fashionable. The world has changed and we in Nigeria have to change (Daily Trust Newspaper, Thursday 29th May 2003:2).
Such declarations were aimed at engendering an orientational shift toward adherence to the principle of military subordination to civil authority. It can be said that the level of expertise in the executive arm of the civilian government gave an impetus to the capacity to secure obedience and institute subordination of the military to civil authorities. The civil authority had the asset of expertise in military matters based on collective past experience in part as a result of respective military careers and in part due to prolonged service in military regimes. This facilitated the capacity to secure obedience from the military. While the civilian leadership was focused on instituting and sustaining control over the military, it was not unmindful of the occasional concerns raised by the military through its leaders. The civilian leadership was able to distinguish certain military behaviours that were calculated to be considered as legitimate from those that were considered as acts of insubordination. This largely had to do with in-depth knowledge by civilian leaders of the organisational psyche of the military particularly the officer corps.

My military experience makes me know the psychology of the military, the likes and dislikes of the military, the weaknesses and strengths of the military and the strong points of the military (Obasanjo, 2011-Appendix A).

Expertise in military matters enables a civilian leadership to gauge the mood of the military especially when it comes to its corporate interests. Such interests shape the extent to which the civilian leadership, in its rational thinking can go to support the military’s freedom of action particularly if such action would enhance the military’s relationship with its civilian leaders. This is confirmed by the chief of staff to President Obasanjo, Major general Abdullahi Mohammed with respect to the dual roles played by retired military officers who are serving in a democratic government. These roles involve relating with the military and their civilian colleagues.
Now because the retired military in the civilian period know this, they know the military and their thinking now they've gone into politics. They are in a position to relate with the serving military and the civilian politicians and this has helped in stabilising the civilian dispensation (Mohammed, 2012-Appendix B).

In the same vein, it is asserted that the emergence of the civilian government composed of some key decision makers having military backgrounds had a positive impact on the relationship between the military and its new political masters. General Martin Luther Agwai, an army chief and later CDS attests to this in a hypothetical tone while making a veiled reference to the Second civilian republic (1979-1983).

If you have an institution that has been legitimised to carry weapons and yet you buy the weapons and give them and you don’t care, you don’t ask what they do with the weapons. You don’t want to know what they do and yet you still want to stay and give them direction and give them instruction and say they are under you- that is what happened to that Second Republic... Frankly speaking, I make bold to say that may be if you had another pure civilian that had come out in 1999 as the president I’m not sure if we would not have had another military coup. This is because it is self-preservation. If you find as an institution, nobody cares about you, if you find as an institution the only thing the person wants is to dish out orders to you and doesn’t matter what happens, then something is wrong (Agwai, 2012-Appendix C).

As such, caution is often employed as a strategy in shaping how civilian control is exercised such that it does not snap the cord in the relations between the apex policy makers of the state and the monopolisers of coercive power who are ethically bound to obey them. Discrete signals of approval or support are communicated to the military command for it to exercise limited autonomy in exceptional situations where cooperative relationship between the principal and the agent is likely to face problems if such behaviour is not exhibited. In the same vein, civilian
leaders extend tacit support to the military if such support would enhance the confidence of the military in the authority of civilian leaders. Two cases can be used to illustrate the trade-off policy of the civilian leaders in their relationship with the military establishment.

The first case is based on the posture of the civil authority to acts that constituted extra-judicial measures in the course of supporting the civil authority and other security forces to quell the incessant sectarian conflicts plaguing the country. The massacre of civilians by military personnel at Odi town in Bayelsa state in November 1999 and in some communities of Logo and Zaki Biam Local Government Areas of Benue state in October 2001 are examples. A number of military and police personnel posted to these areas for peace-enforcement missions were killed by armed militias. When the military carried out revenge attacks in these centres, the government was not inclined to stop the extra-judicial actions of soldiers. Though not directly providing a justification, Obasanjo described the actions of the military in these words: “whatever they are taught to do or not to do, soldiers fight in self defence” (New York Times Newspaper, 30th October 2001). The pretext for these deviant military actions was that it wanted to fish out those responsible for the killing of security personnel. This governmental posture contradicted the security sector reform principles of ensuring that security forces discharge their missions within the norms of international humanitarian laws and the 1999 constitution. The tacit connivance of the civilian authorities in the actions of the military implied the military’s loyalty took precedence over the protection of human rights in such a situations.

The second case has to do with the posture of the civilian leadership in allaying the fears of the Nigerian military concerning the vulnerability of its troops stationed in the disputed Bakassi peninsula. The civilian leadership adopted a cautious approach in trying to allay the fears of a possible attack by Cameroun.
I was cautious. Some of the military leaders wanted war and felt that my being cautious could jeopardise their security in case there is a surprise attack from the other side... I had to manage the situation for them to not feel that this man wants to put us there as sitting ducks or lame ducks to be clobbered by the enemy. What I did was to tell the Camerounians that if you are moving a small unit, a platoon let us know and if we are doing so, we’ll let you know. Although we had the problem of Bakassi, we still maintained that exchange of communications which is a means of maintaining peace... The military appreciated that I have the experience without being immodest—both in war and in peace. I kept them posted as to what was going on in government which they needed to know (Obasanjo, 2011-Appendix A).

This was a result of the fear of the Nigerian military becoming sitting ducks for a possible surprise attack by the military forces of Cameroun in the disputed Bakassi peninsula. This dispute predates 1999, involving occasional military engagements by both countries over control of the peninsula and its surrounding waters. The Nigerian military had been occupying the peninsula. The government was able to convince the military top brass that they need not worry about the possibility of such scenario. The government was trying to resolve the dispute with Cameroun using peaceful means. This resolution strategy revolved around the judicial arbitration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which in its eventual judgment on 10 October 2002 ruled that parts of the disputed areas including the peninsula be ceded to Cameroun.

6.4-The Nature of Military Leadership: Obedience to Civilian Leadership

Like any formal organisation, the leadership of the military establishment is hierarchical and tightly controlled along vertical lines. A requirement for effective civilian control is an effective control of the military by its commanders at various levels of professional authority. While the top military leadership is expected to be obedient to constituted civil authority, the subordinate
cadres of senior military officers are also expected to follow in line as they exercise their own intra-organisational controls at their various positions on their junior officers and men. This picture is somewhat dependent on historical and social factors in terms of how the military views its previous role as the government in power and its current status as a subordinate arm of the democratic civilian institutions of the state.

To begin with, the military leadership that emerged when the civilian leadership came into being in May 1999 was evidently a product of a number of developments traceable to past military regimes. The purges that occurred especially during the Babangida and Abacha regimes reduced the number of politically-ambitious officers who were either retired or executed for various reasons. The four publicly declared failed coup attempts between 1985 and 1998 increased the number of officers who left the military service through executions, imprisonments, retirements and dismissals. The military was equally a major casualty of its own incessant coups and prolonged rule that was characterised by such tendencies affecting its members.

...look at our system and see the casualties the military inflicted upon itself. How many coups and attempted coups? How many people were killed? How many lost their jobs because of the suspicion that they wanted to overthrow a government? We inflicted casualties on ourselves. There were those whose motivation in joining the military were to be governors because they have seen a military governor. Likewise for military officers who were ministers at the federal level. These officers were few in numbers. They were encouraged by parents, friends and relations to go into the military for this possibility (Agwai, 2012-Appendix C).

This does not take into cognisance the numbers that were retired as a result of reaching the 35 year service limit. The surviving ex-officers had been participants in successful or botched coups
against a military government in the past and the civilian government of the Second Republic. Some of these officers eventually became democratic converts and joined in the struggle to end military rule. It must be said that the actual number of such officers is hard to come by due to non-availability of such data. The incoming civilian regime widened this number through its mass retirement of suspected political officers between 1999 and 2001.

The attitude of the military leaders towards adjusting to a new status under a civilian dispensation was driven by the conviction that military rule negatively affected its social fabric. As such, it is better to have a civilian regime in their corporate self-interest to increase the possibility of an enhanced professional career. The needs of the armed forces are best taken care of by a civilian regime than a military one. This is confirmed by Major Getso, a directing staff in the Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC). He summed up his observation about the changes in the college.

Because of the full implementation of democracy, the college has received a lot of boost. We now have a lot of foreign students and we have a lot of our own officers going abroad for training (AFCSC, 2012-Appendix D).

Apart from the efforts by the civilian government to introduce structural changes in the training of the military in order to keep it occupied with its professional role, there has also been a shift in the world view of military leaders. This shift has enhanced the capacity of civilian control of the military. The responses by three senior military officers to the question of military subordination to civil authority are similar and indicate what is expected from the military with respect to obedience to constituted civilian authority. In line with the position by Feaver (2005), Air Commodore Ekagbo had this to say regarding the relationship between the civilian as the principal and the military as the agent.
The tax payer is our master and we must support that tax payer. We must subject ourselves to civil authority. The training emphasizes on that very much because that’s the way it should be. The world has changed and we cannot afford to live in the world of yesterday when everybody is moving forward. It is emphasized that the military must subject itself to civil authority (AFCSC, 2012-Appendix D).

Under the liberal-democratic dispensation, the military as the agent is required to obey its civilian leadership, who is the principal. The principal-agent relationship is defined within the context of legitimacy. The military is obliged to subject itself to the directives of the civilian authority. The new global trend is that the military lacks the legitimacy to question the authority of the civilian leadership. In a similar line of response, Navy Commander Anabraba established a link between training and obedience to civil authority.

Being subservient to the political masters is the crux of our training. I know that this question may have come because of military involvement in politics. Just see that as an aberration and not the norm. The crux of our training is to be subordinate to the political masters. That is why after Obasanjo came to power, the military was re-directed towards professionalism and we are enjoying it (AFCSC, 2012-Appendix D).

This orientational shift within the senior circles of the military was not only latent but was demonstrated in the occasional public pronouncements made by top military leaders. At a ceremony in Lagos where 28 newly-promoted officers were decorated with their new ranks, Admiral Ibrahim Ogohi, the first defence chief under the new civilian government admonished the beneficiaries to respect the rule of law and be subject to the civil control. He warned that “the nation expects more from you, there is no military government...The President expects absolute loyalty and full professionalism from you” (Onuorah and Peters, 2000). In addition,
General Alexander Ogomudia, who succeeded Malu as army chief in 2001, echoed similar lines. He posited that the Nigerian military has

No business interfering with the governance of the nation... Soldiers with political ambitions had been advised to go back to their village where they could join any of the political parties... Any army personnel bent on playing politics while still in service would be flushed out of the Force... the military has been there for so many years and it was not able to solve the nation’s problems... The present generation of the military is aware that our orders come from the political class and we are duty bound to have unquestionable obedience to civil authority, but more importantly the rule of law (Udogu, 2002: 336).

This clarion call by military leaders was not confined to pronouncements at the level of organisational operations. Even at the level of training such signals were conveyed to officers on the need to imbibe military professionalism and respect the supreme authority of civilian leadership. According to Brigadier general Ojiji

One aspect of the reprofessionalisation process of the Nigerian Armed Forces when the civilians came to power in 1999 was to ensure that military personnel should know a lot and be conversant with subordination to civil authority. Almost all the courses harp on that, all the training exercises harp on that (AFCSC, 2012-Appendix D).

As a central tool of socialisation, education is an important vehicle for group socialisation and as noted by Guttieri (2006: 237) is useful in molding the psychological milieu of members of the military profession.

Education that shapes officers’ beliefs and norms regarding the military’s role in relation to the executive, the legislature and civil society sets a tone for civil-military relations.
This implies that training is an important tool for shaping the organisational psyche of the military especially as it relates to acceptance of the supremacy of elected civilian authority. Major Getso revealed that one of the important principles inculcated to officers during their military training is the principle of obedience to constituted civilian authority. His position conforms to the principle that the military accepts the supremacy of the 1999 constitution as the operational basis for the conduct of Nigeria’s civil-military relations. According to him:

The professional military is always subservient to the civil authority or rather constituted authority because we derive our powers from the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The constitution now gives us or rather directs us to be subservient to the constituted authority (AFCSC, 2012-Appendix D).

The military focused on such indoctrination measures in its officer training programmes including those at the tactical level for junior officers. Though not disclosing when it did and the nature of the changes in the military training curricula, Wing Commander Ekwueme disclosed that the AFCSC

...has introduced courses in civil-military relations bringing out the essence of subordination. It keeps on coming up in the topics we give students to research on in their college paper and Director’s paper. During exercises we conduct to bring out and highlight the issue of subordination to constituted civil authority (AFCSC, 2012-Appendix D).

The centrality of the principle of the supremacy of the civil authority in civil-military relations can further be illustrated with one example of the keynote address to participants of course 27 at the AFCSC in August 2004. The commandant of the college, Air vice marshal Odesola highlighted the imperative for military professionalism.

I am aware that most of you here have not experienced complete and proper professionalism since you were commissioned as officers... So you
have not really known the military in a democratic setting like it is now, and therefore could not have enjoyed the benefits that democracy could do to enhance military professionalism. Military in politics and the practice of the military profession are strange bedfellows because military in politics created distractions and relegates the practice of our profession to the background. These distractions took a toll on the military profession in Nigeria as training and discipline, (the livewires of military professionalism), were neglected in pursuit of self sustenance and security of the military regime and in some cases, self-succession. This has been the bane of military professionalism in Nigeria (Odesola, 2004: 2-3).

In a concerted effort to either cling onto power or hand over to civilians, military regimes have often been mindful of the type of orientation that the military imbibes. This is especially true when it borders on the military’s obedience (as a guardian) to the government of the day. For countries that have fragile, dysfunctional civilian state institutions, the military becomes an important instrument of exercising authority. This is an important component of governmental control of the military establishment. Whether it is a military or civilian government, the expectation is for officers and men to abstain from any negative action that could affect their loyalty to constituted authority. It is within this light that one of such regimes decided to establish a capacity building institution that would cater for the professional leadership requirements of the armed forces of Nigeria. On 16\(^{th}\) June 1992, the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida established the National War College (NWC) which changed its name to National Defence College (NDC) in 2007. One of the cardinal objectives of the College has been to

Relate within a democratic framework, the higher management of defence to broaden national interest and in particular, to study the principles of resource allocation and force structuring within finite budget limits (NDC News Magazine, July 2012: 4).
This objective clearly takes into cognisance the importance of the military to focus on its profession while subject to policy directives from elected civilians. As such this college is to inculcate the culture of subordination to constituted authority to the participants who are senior officers, mostly drawn from the three armed services. In an assessment of the contribution the NDC has made in the arena of democratic civil-military relations, General Babangida noted that:

...long before Nigeria returned to democratic rule, military officers who passed through this College were prepared for life of service under civilian leadership and control. Thus, by the time international partners were falling over themselves to give lessons in civil-military relations within the democratic context, most senior officers in the Armed forces already knew that... It is no wonder that the military has firmly kept to its professional duties because this is right and also out of enlightened self-interest (Babangida, 2012: 13-14).

The military leadership was not unaware of the costs of insubordination to the civil authority. As such, it came up with a number of reforms in order to boost professionalism and secure the corporate loyalty of its officers and men. One of such was the restoration of the merit system in its promotion system. Promotion based on professional competence had been negatively affected under periods of military rule. Under the new system, officers were required to pass their periodic professional examinations in a maximum of three attempts before acquiring the next rank. The use of age bracket in determining the minimum rank within the regular officer corps was introduced. Any officer that could be promoted to the next rank where his cohorts belong over a specific period of time was to be retired. Also, the retirement rule was applied to those who had served for 35 years. This helped in curtailing the clientelist culture within its ranks which in the past bred the conditions for hatching military coups. In addition, the military command published a 107-page document in 2005. The third army chief, General Martin Luther Agwai was a central figure in publishing this document. The document is titled Tradition.
Customs and Ethics of the Nigerian Army provided in detail, the organisational etiquette for its officers and men within the realms of the profession in an attempt to enhance the values of military life and enhance the corporate status of the armed forces.

...if you remove discipline, there’s no military. What makes the military unique and strong is discipline. That’s why when I was chief of army staff we reviewed that book on military codes and ethics by comparing the British and American traditions in the developed world and our own internal culture. And if you don’t have these ethics, part of it is even the way you dress. You cannot go for a function with bathroom slippers. You are supposed to be an ambassador of the military. You cannot go to a function wearing singlet or wearing a dress that does not represent the institution. Remember, immediately a person sees you coming, he has started judging you. Ah, is that how military officers look? They are useless. When somebody sees you looking smart in both military uniform and civil dress, he wants to engage with you. Also, what you say, where you say it and why you say it is very important. If you open your mouth too much you may reveal a secret that could lead to the death of your colleagues. So, these are the things that, I will continue to say, make the military a unique organisation (Agwai, 2012-Appendix C).

A new documented National Defence policy was unveiled in 2006 for the first time in Nigeria’s history. It was also the first time that a Nigerian government had made the defence policy as a document. Past administrations often relied on sections of the constitution as the basis for policy action. Also, the new defence policy is generally more explicit than what obtained in the past where the defence policy was not clear on how military power ought to be used in the event of external or internal threats. Past civilian regimes merely employed drew implicit inferences from the constitution to draw up defence plans as the need arose.

In a lecture to participants and other guests at an International Conference on promoting stable civil-military relations in a democratic Nigeria on 5th July 2000, the Defence Minister
publicly declared the positive effect of the purges within the military establishment as it had proselytised insubordinate tendencies and enhanced loyalty to the civilian leadership.

The mass retirement of the political military officers was widely acclaimed within the military itself and I believe that the current military leadership is genuinely committed to achieving the President’s goals (Danjuma, 2000:3).

While this assertion cannot be evaluated within the context of its psychological impact on the officer corps, the fact is that the military remained subordinate to the civilian authorities. Without being asked as to whether public opinion in the military is tilted towards politics or professionalism, Commander Anabraba was bold to say confessed that the level of professionalism among military officers has increased since the advent of civilian era in 1999. He went ahead to make a generalisation that ‘to the best of my knowledge, no officer is interested in politics. We are very subordinate the way we are carrying on’ (AFCSC, 2012).

However, a contrary position put forward by General Agwai indicates that the reason why the military was able to adjust to operating under a civilian dispensation after 15 years in power was because its level of professionalism was not greatly affected as most outsiders and critics have reported. Majority of the officers and men were preoccupied with their conventional duties in the barracks as against a minority who got involved in military coups and holding political offices outside the military establishment. While not rejecting such position in its entirety, he views the notion that a consequence of their prolonged rule significantly affected the level of military professionalism as erroneous.

Let me say upfront that there has been a very erroneous misconception about the military by Nigerians and non-Nigerians, by academics, by people I have read so much. They did not understand the military, especially the Nigerian Army. When you have a military coup... the way
people perceived it was every military person was involved in that government, which is not true. For example, we have 36 states, honestly those military officers that were purely involved in politics at no time did you have more than 200- the governors, the ministers and so on. The rest of us, the (military) job I would have done whether it was a civilian or whichever government that was in charge. So I think this erroneous perception has to be looked into... when people are talking of re-professionalising the army, I just feel it is just a continuation of training. If you ever heard me as Chief of Army Staff using that phrase, I was just using it for political reason. Because if I want to get something out of government and the government says because they want to re-professionalise the army, I say ‘ok, we want to reprofessionalise the army’ so that you can give me what I want to run the normal thing or to do, whether it was civilian or military government. Because the role of the army is clear. The role of the Armed Forces is clear. The role has not changed whether it is civilian or military... In Nigeria, the military still remained intact. It was very easy for the military to get back when the civilians came into power in 1999 (Agwai, 2012-Appendix C).

This position is plausible if one examines the history of the military’s past roles in the running of Brazilian government and economy. In his study, Stephan (1971) was able to show that the military professionalism can remain relatively unaffected or even enhanced under the period of military rule. While an additional role exists in terms of political governance, it is possible, as witnessed in Brazil or Chile for the military to significantly retain its professional levels despite the organisational consequences of intervention as witnessed in other countries such as Uganda under Idi Amin Dada.

In general, it can be said that the nature of military leadership in terms of the orientational shift within the officer corps enhanced two fundamental developments with respect to control. The military leaders and their officers cooperated with the constituted civil authority in their enlightened, corporate self-interest towards crafting control measures on the military. There was the realisation that the military enjoys more long term benefits when not in political office
in terms of the level of social cohesion within its ranks, the attitudes of the larger society
towards the subordinated military and the average lifespan of the careers of military personnel
under a civilian regime. Successive military leaders were able to exercise professional control
over the military establishment by instituting measures aimed at restoring discipline and
corporate cohesion.

6.5-The International Dimension in Nigeria’s Civil-Military Relations

The international dimension of Nigeria’s civil-military relations was based on a mutual interest
that converged on the civilian regime’s desire to have effective control of the armed forces and
the willingness of foreign powers to have a military establishment whose roles would be based
on global democratic practices in the areas of efficiency and effectiveness. In essence, the
international aspect of Nigeria’s civil-military relations can be understood within the context of
the globalisation of liberal-democratic civil-military relations. This is a deliberate policy
articulated within various auspices by the advanced democracies in the West to systematically
graft certain doctrines and practices on the vital institutions of a democratic state that has
emerged from an authoritarian system. The goals of such policy are to promote systemic
stability thereby creating the necessary conditions for liberal-market policies for the benefit of
the advanced democracies.

Even before the advent of the civilian government in 1999, the regime of General Abdulsalami
Abubakar had established contact with the United States Government as it borders on military
assistance to Nigeria as the country was moving towards a democratic dispensation. This
interaction revolved around training the Nigerian military in preparation for adjustment to its
traditional status within a liberal-democratic dispensation. The incoming civilian government
continued with this bi-lateral agreement. The genesis of this mutual agreement can be traced to
the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) - two policy thrusts launched by the Clinton administration (1992-2000) in 1996. The stated goal of ACRI is to assist the military forces of some African countries with training and non-lethal assistance (O’Hanlon, 2002) so as to shoulder the intractable security challenges in the African continent. The ACSS programme is to train top military and civilian personnel in the core areas of military efficiency, civil-military relations within a democratic context as well as decision making within a security-oriented framework (Aka, 2002: 257-258).

After the failure of the synergised US humanitarian-military mission in Somalia and subsequent withdrawal in 1992, the Clinton Administration developed the ACRI framework where a select group of African states including Nigeria would shoulder the responsibility of promoting sub-regional stability in their respective zones of influence through peace keeping and peace enforcement missions. Some African governments including the Abacha regime saw this policy as a ploy to intervene in their domestic matters and had the potential of undermining their hold onto power. In 2003, the ACRI programme was replaced by a modified programme, African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) by the Bush Administration (2000-2008). ACOTA was not only to provide training, technical assistance and arms sales, but to complement recipient governments in the global fight against terrorism and drug trafficking as championed by the Bush Administration in its national security strategy. By 2007, nineteen African countries including Nigeria were part of the ACOTA programme (Volman, 2009: 13-14).

As the winds of political transition intensified, the advanced democracies extended military assistance to transitional democracies in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America. The proposed military programmes rest on actualising what Bruneau and others have conceptualised and explained as the three trinities of civil-military relations- (civil control,
military effectiveness and military efficiency). The first is to aid in establishing and sustaining control of the military by the civilian government. The second involves establishing military efficiency where the military carries out a task within the resources provided to it by the civilian leadership. The third is instituting military effectiveness which implies carrying out the missions mandated by the civilian authorities to its logical end. For civilian control in a more or less democratic framework to be instituted, the principles of military efficiency and military effectiveness have to be in place (Bruneau, and Matei, 2008: 915-921, Bruneau, 2006 and Bruneau, 2001). The Abacha regime rejected this policy given the cold relations that existed between Nigeria and the United States. The new civilian government solicited for international in particular, American assistance for military reforms in the areas of training and doctrine to enhance civilian control and boost professionalism (Danjuma, 2000).

The events related to the September 11th attacks on American soil accentuated the interest of policy analysts and eventually, the Bush Administration (2000-2008) toward using Africa particularly the Gulf of Guinea as an alternative energy source to the volatile Middle East region to meet the import needs of the United States. One of the important arguments put forward is the shorter distance of the area to the United States or Western Europe when compared to the Middle East (De Barros, 2004: 70). As at 2002, the African continent accounted for about 12 percent of US oil imports (Valle, 2004: 53). In the same year, the countries in the Gulf of Guinea accounted for about 12.4 percent of the oil imports of the North American continent while nine countries of the European Union (EU) imported about 38.6 million tonnes from the Gulf of Guinea countries or seven percent of their total oil imports (Neumann, 2004: 62-63). At a symposium on 25th January 2002 in Washington, US Assistant Secretary of State Walter Kansteiner III was quoted to have said that
As the political and security situations of the Persian Gulf deteriorate, the availability and appeal of reliable, alternative sources of oil for American market grows. African oil is emerging as a clear direction U.S. policy could take to provide a secure source of energy ...African oil is of national strategic interest to us, and it will increase and become more important as we go forward (Dieterich, 2004:29-30, Neumann, 2004: 64).

Within this area of West Africa lies Nigeria, the continent’s most populous country, the largest exporter of crude oil and a military with relative experience in local and foreign peace support operations. Nigeria is the fifth largest supplier of crude oil to the United States. In 2002 alone the country produced and exported crude oil to the US at the rate of 600,000 barrels per day (Valle, 2004: 53). The relative instability in the country as a result of unresolved socio-economic problems especially the insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta area resulted in interruptions in oil production. In years of 2000 and 2005 oil production was cut by 800,000 barrels per day and 100,000 barrels per day respectively (Metogo, 2006: 9). The activities of insurgents in the region continued with the destruction of pipelines resulting in a loss to the government of four billion US Dollars in revenues in 2006 (Adebajo, 2008: 2). As a continuation of policy of the preceding military regime, the civilian government adopted using the carrot and the stick approaches to manage the crisis and it included the deployment of the Joint Task Force (JTF), a tri-service military outfit to provide security and suppress threats to oil production by multi-nationals in the area.

Nigeria’s interaction with the Western powers is hinged on political, military and economic considerations. In essence, the strategic importance of Nigeria as an oil supplier, an emerging democracy having a large well-experienced military that can handle peace support operations within its volatile borders and its leadership role as sub-regional peacekeeper in West Africa provided the policy motivations for the advanced democracies particularly the United States and
Britain to enter into military agreements with the Nigerian government to promote systemic stability not only for Nigeria’s nascent democracy but also the sub-region. In general, the pillars of US-Nigeria military cooperation rested on promoting the capacity of Nigeria’s civilian government to exercise control of the military by improving its military professionalism and help build the capacity of the military to effectively respond to crisis within the country and also at an international level (http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/africa/afrindex.html accessed on 15/8/2012).

The policy of the Western powers was to support the civilian government in crafting control over the military through institutional reforms. In their collective self-interests and the stated policies of the Western countries, military regimes have limited capacity to promote long term stability for their security and economic interests when compared to elected governments. Thus, the military should not only give way for elected civilian leaders but also to subordinate itself to civilian governments. In an interview with Victor Oladokun, Obasanjo highlighted the position of the international community with respect to military rule. He said

*Every Nigerian... military and civilian knows that the world does not approve of military regimes. If they have heard it in the past, now they have seen it with the world imposing sanctions on us during the last military regime (Oladokun, 1999).*

Sequence to the exploratory interactions that took place just before and after the departure of the Abubakar regime between the governments of Nigeria and the United States, a military agreement was reached for the Military Professional Resource Incorporated (MPRI) a team of military contractors visited the country in August 1999. This outfit is made up of retired military personnel who had served in the United States military. The MPRI is one of the many quasi-private outfits contracted by the US government to interact with transitional states in Africa,
Asia and Latin America in matters bordering on military training based on the doctrines of liberal democracies as well as to facilitate the sales and use of military equipment. The role of the MPRI is to simultaneously enhance the level of professionalism and support the civilian government in subordinating the military. With respect to Nigeria, the area in focus was retraining of the military so that it can adjust to its new status and revert to its professional role within a civilian dispensation. In addition, the process continued with a high-level meeting between military and civilian officials on policy harmonisation with respect to the second phase of Operation Focus Relief (OFR). The Nigerian side was led by the Defence Minister General Danjuma and included all the service chiefs while the Deputy Secretary of Defence Benard McConnell led the American delegation that included the US Ambassador to Nigeria, William Twaddel (The Guardian Newspaper, Wednesday 2nd February 2000). Under the OFR programme, Nigeria was among three West African countries that were selected to benefit from lethal assistance from the US government through the MPRI programme. These countries were expected to enhance their peace keeping capabilities in the West African sub-region and by implication help improve in the crucial area military effectiveness (www.nairaland.com/756107/wikileaks accessed on 15/8/2012). Military effectiveness within this context was to serve a dual role- to assist the civilian government in assigning roles and missions for the military and secondly, to harmonise the military strategy of Nigerian military with that of the Western powers as it relates combating common threats in the West African sub-region and Africa in general. Nigeria’s former colonial power was not left out in provision of military assistance toward the same policy direction. The civilian government resumed the overseas training of some of its officers in Britain especially at the prestigious Sandhurst Military Academy where many of Nigeria’s officers were trained as far back as the 1950s. This study could not access in detail some relevant aspects of the bi-lateral deals reached between the two countries. However one instance is signified by an agreement
reached between Nigeria and Britain for military cooperation to resume since the unilateral withdrawal of British military advisers in 1993 from the NDC. According to General Theophilus Danjuma a tri-service exercise with the British military was agreed upon to assist the Nigerian military in reviving the capability to conduct joint operations (Guardian Newspaper, Wednesday 3rd November, 1999: 3). In September 2001, it entered into an understanding with Nigeria to provide advice in the reorganisation of the latter’s Ministry of Defence to enhance civilian control measures, effectiveness and efficiency of the military in areas such as administration, procurement, equipment and training (www.unhcr.org/refworld/country_HRW_NGA_3cab1e085.o.html accessed 14/6/2013).

By implication, the Nigerian military is expected to be subject to the directives of civilian authorities by extending its operations in a peace-support role to conflict-prone areas within the country. In addition, the Nigerian government is expected to make available their military forces in support of regional and sub-regional security under organisational auspices when indirectly requested by the international community. The external commitments made by the government of a country especially as it relates to regional or global security enforcement may give rise to making available the military to execute the mandates laid down by the international community of which the country belongs. Even before May 1999 successive civilian and military regimes had sent Nigerian soldiers on many peace keeping missions within and outside the African continent. Within the context of such military assistance, the United States (US) expressed its interest of support for civilian institutions in Nigeria and the subordination of the military to civil authorities.

A primary goal in the US military’s engagement with the Nigerian military since May 1999 has been to help solidify the democratic transition by strengthening civilian oversight of its military (through) an action plan
that was jointly developed, agreed to, and funded by the US and Nigerian governments (United States Embassy, March 2001: 3).

Based on signals by the Clinton administration through its the Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the cardinal goal of US foreign policy is permanently based on three pillars of national interest – the promotion of democracy, economic growth and military strength (Larson, 1993). Between October 1998 and September 1999, Nigeria received 27.5 million US Dollars worth of uncatagorised assistance from the Clinton Administartion. As part of the efforts to pursue these national interests, the US is supposed to engage in strategic cooperation frameworks with its traditional democratic allies and potentially important countries including transitional democracies. Such partners are expected to receive assistance in the political, economic, cultural and military realms to ensure stability not only domestically but within their regions of influence. In the case of military cooperation with Nigeria, the motive of the United States as the egg-head of the globalisation of liberal-democratic civil-military relations the following are observed and discerned:

As the Nigerian government welcomed the US assistance, some military leaders were not ready to cooperate towards implementing it. Of significance was General Malu the army chief who challenged the authority of the Defence Minister. He held the view that the notion of low levels of professionalism in the Nigerian armed forces and as such, needed the assistance of outside powers to restore professionalism was false. This notion of low level of professionalism is also questioned by General Agwai (2012) in an interview who became the third army chief. Within the context of the need for external assistance, the position by General Malu is plausible if in retrospect the statement credited to a top US official in the Clinton Administration is
anything to go by. Whether taken as a form of diplomatic flattery or a fact, Leonard Robinson Jr., US deputy assistant secretary of state for African Affairs stated in 2000 that

Nigeria has spent more on international peacekeeping operations than the United States, Britain, France or any of the other Western Industrial powers. When the European Powers were debating whether to send troops to end conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, Nigerian peacekeepers were at work in West Africa (Aka, 2002: 249).

If the content of this statement is credible, it then implies that Malu had a good case despite his disobedience to the directives of the civilian leadership. Inviting a foreign power to interact with the military on the grounds of assistance can undermine national security. Being the main provider of military assistance to Nigeria the US apparently played a role in influencing the decision by the civilian government to sack General Malu. A 2001 Wikileaks document provided some evidence in that direction (Refer to Appendix F). In a meeting between Nigerian and American officials in Abuja, Ambassador Howard Jeter noted General Malu’s opposition to the US-Nigeria military cooperation. He suggested that sacking the belligerent army boss would provide the way forward. The document specifically cited Ambassador Jeter’s comments to General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, Nigeria’s National Security adviser.

Embassy is hopeful that the Nigerian defense establishment is now ready to move forward productively. The retirement/dismissal of General Malu and his cohorts should pave way (www.wikileaks.org/cable/2001/05/01ABUJA954.html accessed on 16/4/2013).

In an interview, General Malu revealed his opposition to the invitation of the US military to Nigeria under a military assistance agreement, flouting the history of Nigeria’s peace keeping
credentials in relation to that of the US especially its apparently failed mission in Somalia and the nature and basis of his sack by his civilian principals.

What the Americans wanted to do was not to set up a command. The Americans because of five years of Abacha’s administration that blocked Americans from developing or updating their intelligence on armed forces of Nigeria... wanted to train us for peacekeeping missions... We succeeded in peacekeeping where the Americans have not succeeded... it was due to the interference of the Americans when they found out that I was a stumbling block that they gave Obasanjo as a condition for their cooperating with him that that he must get rid of the COAS. So the retirement of Chief of Air Staff and Chief of Naval Staff was just a sacrifice because Obasanjo wouldn’t have known how to explain to Nigerians what General Malu did to be retired (Interview with Weekly Trust, Saturday 24th November 2007: 61).

It is not clear whether other military agreements with other countries were also opposed by General Malu. However, what is obvious is his overt opposition to the nature of military assistance the United States offered to Nigeria which according to him the Obasanjo administration accepted without taking into cognisance the contrary advice of the army’s leadership. Subsequent to the sacking of the heads of the army, the airforce and the navy, the military cooperation between Nigeria and the US not only continued but was expanded into other areas apart from the MPRI programme.

Based on table 5, eight categories of military cooperation agreements in the form of assistance to the Nigerian military were implemented between years of 1999 and 2007. Volman (2009) describes the nature of some of these military assistance programmes. They include Foreign Military Sales (FMS) that is, the total value (in US Dollars) of defense articles delivered to a foreign government or international organisation in a fiscal year. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has to do with the value amount in the form of a loan or grant extended to a foreign
government or international organisation for it to buy defence articles from the US in a fiscal year. For African countries including Nigeria FMF programmes are free. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) describes the total value of licensed sales directly made by a foreign government from US manufacturers. The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) programme has to do with the acquisition cost (in US Dollars) of defense articles transferred to foreign governments in a fiscal year. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme is described at two levels. In the first level, it is the value allocated (in US Dollars) for training of foreign military personnel in any fiscal year at US military training facilities. In the second, it is the total number of military personnel trained at such facilities (Volman, 2009).

An examination of the table 5 shows that annual variations exist in all the categories of the US-Nigeria cooperation as either agreed or implemented. However, no reasons were discovered in this study to provide the rationale for such trends. In the first category, the year 2002 recorded the highest in US military sales agreements to Nigeria peaking 8,498,000 US Dollars before steadily slumping to a low of 724,000 US Dollars in 2007. In the third category, the value of military deliveries of equipment to Nigeria peaked at 6,849,000 US Dollars in 2005. The FMF programme which covering the areas of training and technical agreements, the table indicates an unstable trend with the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 witnessing no activity on the part of the United States. This covered assisting the Nigerian Airforce (NAF) to upgrade and refurbish its ageing fleet of C-130 Hercules transport aircraft (Prendergast, 2003:18). Under the EDA programme, the Nigerian Navy acquired seven coast guard patrol boats from the United States (Mikell, 2008: 286, Volman, 2009: 17). It is not clear where this category of assistance falls within this table. In the fifth category, commercial sales to Nigeria by licensed companies in the United States peaked at 3,631,000 US Dollars in the year 2007. Foreign military construction sales agreements seem to be the only categories where less, in financial terms has been
committed. With respect to the IMET programme for Nigerian military officers, relative variations also exist for the period under scrutiny. The years 2004 and 2005 indicated that Nigeria did not benefit or participate in IMET programmes. In total, 425 Nigerian military officers benefited from IMET programmes at a total cost of about 3,745,000 US Dollars between 1999 and 2007.

Table 5-US Military Aid to Nigeria, 1999-2007 (In Thousands of US Dollars)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Sales Agreements</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>6,738</td>
<td>8,498</td>
<td>6,672</td>
<td>4,622</td>
<td>2,318</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Construction Sales Agreements</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Construction Sales Agreements</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Sales Licensing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,509</td>
<td>2,858</td>
<td>3,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET Deliveries</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET (Number of)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It was not only the US that provided military assistance to the Nigeria. In line with past policy of diversifying sources of military procurement, other countries assisted the country in the form of sales of new equipment or upgrade of existing. In an agreement with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Nigeria took delivery in 2006 of 15 F-7 Ni fighter aircraft to the NAF at a cost of 251 million US Dollars. These aircraft are meant to replace Nigeria’s ageing fleet of Russian-built MiG-21 fighters which had become unserviceable and non-operational for some time. In 2005 Italy and Nigeria entered into a 74.5 million US Dollar agreement involving the repairs and sale of military aircraft as well as training and logistical support. Five G222 Turbo-prop transporters were repaired and an additional one was bought. In 2007, four Nigerian military helicopters were configured by the Italians for transport as well as search and rescue missions (IISS, 2007: 300).

At another level, the international dimension of Nigeria’s civil-military relations extended beyond the civilian government’s drive to control its own military forces. It is said that foreign policy, as a behaviour of a country towards its external environment is a product of its domestic situation. Driven by the need to foster stability in Africa with particular reference to its West African neighbours in the enlightened self-interest of its civilian leaders, Nigeria adopted a policy of zero tolerance for unconstitutional or illegal take-over of power in a number of countries. This policy was articulated at the level of sub-regional and regional frameworks. Nigeria participated in drafting the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol on democracy and good governance which among its principles affirmed the position that no government in
any member state shall be recognised if it comes into office through unconstitutional means. In the section on constitutional convergence principles, the protocol advocates for ‘zero tolerance of power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means’. It also advocates for the member states of ECOWAS to have ‘politically neutral armed forces under a legally constituted political authority’ as well as ensuring ‘free, fair and transparent elections as the only means of accession to power’ (WASCOF/FOSCAO, 2001: 10-11).

The African Union (AU), of which Nigeria played an important role in its establishment in May 2001, the principles of promoting democracy, good governance, popular participation and human rights formed part of its fundamental objectives. In article 4, sections (m) and (p) of its constitutive act, the AU charter calls on members states to ‘respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance’ and upholds the principle of condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments’ in Africa (Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2001: 6). Subsequently, Nigeria applied this principle on a number of occasions when the military or a usurper took over power outside the constitutional frameworks of affected countries. Nigeria condemned the military coups in affected countries and called on the coupists to restore democratic governance in Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome et Principe and Togo. Nigeria even went further to scale down its diplomatic relations with countries that experienced unconstitutional take-over of their governments by their military forces.

The first test of this policy came when President Fradique de Menezes of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome et Principe (DRSTP) had travelled to Nigeria on an official visit. On 16th July 2003 he was displaced in a short-lived coup by a group of soldiers who had the support of the opposition political party. Through mobilisation of global public opinion, President Obasanjo played an important role as an international statesman in mounting pressure on the coupists
and their supporters to reinstate the civilian government after a few days of mediation and threats of possible intervention from Nigeria and other international actors. According to Nigeria’s President Obasanjo in the aftermath of reinstating the civilian government of Sao Tome et Principe,

….the return of President (Fradique de) Menezes to power and the restoration of democracy in the DRSTP was a remarkable achievement for Nigeria’s foreign policy. The reaction to the military adventurers, the process of negotiation as well as my presence in Gabon and the DRSTP to ensure an end to the military action, had certainly sent a strong signal to military officers contemplating extra-constitutional means to subvert democratically elected governments (Thisday Newspaper, 6th August 2003).

Secondly, Nigeria joined other countries in condemning the political development in Guinea Bissau where the military had staged a coup on 14th September 2003. Nigeria applied the same policy in the case of Togo when the military helped Faure Gnassingbe to usurp the presidency on 6th February 2005 a day after the death of his father Gnassingbe Eyadema. The defined constitutional procedures for acquiring power were not followed by the coupists in installing Faure Gnassingbe. The constitution states that in a situation where the presidency is vacant, the head of Togo’s parliament should assume the office in an acting capacity. However, he was prevented from doing so by the Togolese military. Nigeria joined with the international community to force Faure into legitimising his presidency by holding elections in April 2005. Again in August 2005, Nigeria condemned the coup in Mauritania and played a role in that country’s suspension from the African Union as a measure to persuade the new military rulers in Nouakchott to hasten the process of democratic transition. By implication, Nigeria sent signals to the international community that military coups and military regimes would neither be recognised nor tolerated. Just as it took measures to ensure that its own military did not cross
the red-line, it also wanted the militaries of other countries particularly within its own sub-region to allow for democratic governance to reign. A stable African environment is an important enhancer of Nigeria’s national interests. Military regimes, armed insurrections or rebellions would not be tolerated by Nigeria for like a domino effect such trend could also affect its own domestic scene.

In general, the external dimension in Nigeria’s civil-military relations can be summed up in this way. There is a relative convergence of the vital security interests of the civilian government and the international community. The civilian leadership wanted the military to accept its control and the international community wanted a conducive environment devoid of political instability within the country to tap into the nation’s resources notably oil. The international community extended assistance to the civilian government so that it facilitates in crafting control of the military and for it to accept its new status in a civilian dispensation while at the same time pursuing its missions as defined by the civilian leadership. The civilian principal and its external supporters joined hands to craft civilian control, defined the scope and direction military missions as well as engendering some level of military efficiency thorough oversight of how resources are utilised to achieve such missions especially for those outside the country. It is important to state that while the while there existed a convergence of mutual interests regarding the training and equipping of the Nigerian military, every donor country acts within the principles of its national interests. For instance, General Agwai provides a picture of the philosophy behind US military cooperation with Nigeria.

People give you aid because of what they would benefit. They would give you equipment in order to keep their own industries working. They could ask you to send Nigerians to go and learn, they may indoctrinate and brainwash your children with their own culture and way of life... The American State Department gave 10 million dollars in aid for the Charlie 130 aircraft and the amount of cash that touched Nigerian hands was less
than 200,000 dollars. When an American comes here to fix equipment, the air ticket, the hotel accommodation, the food he eats is out of the 10 million dollars. People have their national interest. Nobody gives you a free lunch anywhere in this world—may be here in Nigeria. The Nigerian government paid the bulk sum for my education in Washington while the Americans I think paid only 10 percent (Agwai, 2012-Appendix C).

As such international military assistance to an emerging democracy comes with certain conditionalities that are tied to the long-term economic and ideological benefit of the donor actor. Nigeria’s status as a major oil producer, its peacekeeping credentials and the possible consequences of an unstable Nigeria on the stability of the African continent made the advanced democracies to resume military cooperation with Nigeria when civil democratic rule was restored in 1999.

6.6-Findings and Analysis of Study

Based on the primary and secondary data presented, the following formed the findings of the study:

The first assumption states that knowledge in military matters by the civilian authority enhances the ability to control the military. Some of the key political leaders particularly in the executive arm of the government had the expertise. Their military backgrounds as coup makers and members of past military regimes helped in laying the groundwork for a cooperative venture with the military leadership. This gave an impetus to the effort to institutionalise civilian control of the military. The incessant internal crisis and instability in the legislative arm of the government was a setback for oversight functions on the military. Civilian democratic control of the Nigerian military was largely left at the mercy of the executive arm of the government.
The second assumption borders on acceptance by the military leadership of the supremacy of civilian leadership enhancing civilian control of the military. The military remained obedient to the constituted civilian authority after the transition. Prior to the transition programme, the military began preparations to adjust to the new democratic order based on the negative consequences of prolonged military rule on its career structure and organisational cohesion. These changes became evident during General Abubakar’s regime (June 1998-May 1999) which predated the emergence of the civilian leadership. The transition indicated a shift from praetorianism to an acceptance of civilian control by the military. The military submitted to civilian directives even when there were hiccups as it related to the security of the country as exemplified in the American military training aid and the Bakassi conflict.

In the third assumption, it was discovered that a limited number of CSOs were actively involved in SSR activities when compared to the CSOs not directly involved in such activities. Also, the two CSOs identified in this study received financial and technical support from external donors. It implies that the tempo and direction of CSO activity in the promotion of Nigeria’s democratic civil-military relations is dependent on the interests of foreign powers through certain donor agencies.

In the last assumption, international support for liberal democracy as a globalising process has enhanced civilian control of the military in Nigeria. This is demonstrated by the active involvement of the United States through its diplomatic and military channels in the civil-military matters of Nigeria. The United States took an interest in influencing the selection of military leaders and in providing assistance especially in personnel training, the upgrade and sale of military equipment that would suit their interests within Nigeria and the African continent. The important position of Nigeria as an oil producer and exporter to the Western
world, its capacity for peace support operations in West Africa as well as its status in terms of its population and by implication, the potential size of its market have all combined to push the external powers to support a consolidation of its transition to civilian rule through military cooperation. This cooperation was intended to re-create a Nigerian military along the lines of a liberal-democratic ethos where soldiers as subordinates are expected to keep off the sphere of civilian authority and support the new dispensation by obeying the civilian leadership.

Thus, it can be stated that civilian control of the military in Nigeria as an emerging democracy (1999-2007) was shaped by the expertise of the principal or civilian leadership (particularly the executive arm of government) in relating with the military, the acceptance of the military or agent to subject itself to the directives of the civilian leadership and the influence of the international community as a globalising force in support of the promotion of liberal democratic civil-military relations in Nigeria.
CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

7.1-Introduction

This chapter, being the final stage in the study of the logic of civil-military relations in Nigeria as an emerging democracy from 1999 to 2007 covered the summary and conclusion drawn as a result of the study. The summary aspect briefly provided what the study did on the basis of each chapter. The conclusion ended the study with a provision of what was covered and what was not.

7.2-Summary of the Research

The problematique and objectives of the study revolved around examining the factors that shape the relationship between the military and the civilian leadership in a new democratic dispensation as it relates to civilian control of the military. The relevance of the study was based on the gap in the body of the literature which is the dearth of information on the factors that define the dynamics and direction of the relationship between the military and the civilian leadership in emerging democracies. While studies have been conducted for Latin America and Eastern Europe, this cannot be said for Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. The scope of the study covered the period 1999 to 2007. However, a historical background of Nigeria’s civil-
military relations was conducted in order to indicate certain implications for the period 1999 to 2007.

The study employed a modified Agency theory out of a number of related theories and concepts in order to explain the logic of civil-military relations in Nigeria’s new democratic era. As such, a number of post-cold war theories were examined and one was adapted into a framework that explained the nature, basis and direction of civil-military relations in Nigeria. Generally, these theories were important for the study in adopting assumptions and the methodological approaches.

The methodology adopted a qualitative assessment approach in the course of gathering and analysis of data. Two main ways of gathering relevant data were used. The primary data involved the use of semi-structured questions for an identifiable group of respondents through a series of face-to-face interviews. The secondary data involved the use of relevant public documents, pronouncements by relevant personalities in periodicals and other texts.

The historical basis of civil-military relations, in terms of the behaviour of the military in the political arena and the transitions that culminated in civilian rule, was examined and this served as the basis for understanding the basis and dynamics of civil-military relations at the level of constitutional and policy frameworks, civilian expertise, military orientation and external strategic interests.

The study discovered that the civilian leadership exercised effective control over the military because the general orientation of the officer corps especially the military leadership focused on the acceptance of the supremacy of civil authority within the context of Nigeria’s democratic system. The international environment served as catalyst for enhancing civilian control of the military. This is a factor that contributes to a country’s stability is international recognition and
support. The support for the civilian government came in the form of training, the rehabilitation and sales of equipment to the Nigerian military. Military assistance was geared towards military efficiency and effectiveness. The expectation is for the military to accept directives from and to obey the civilian leadership. The international dimension was even manifested in determining the composition of the military leadership. This expectation was also accompanied by the military’s acceptance to exercise such roles and missions within resources allocated to it as appropriated in the defence budget. The military had to adjust to the practice of going before the legislature in order to defend its budgetary proposals before committees of the Senate and the House. While the civil society’s role did not fizzle away after the realisation of democratic rule in 1999, its activities in the realm of civil-military relations can be said to be limited in scope and depth. A very limited number of groups are active in the arena and the depth of such activity is confined to advocacy which is in contrast to the ideal where such activity is supposed to cover the whole spectrum of governmental policy making, implementation and evaluation.

7.3 Conclusion

The status and role of the Nigerian military are products of a number of reasons. The military accepted to be subject to the directives of civilian authority as a result of the transition to liberal-democracy which was conditioned by a number of domestic and international expectations for military withdrawal from mainstream politics. The role of civil society groups, large segment of the retired military and the civilian elite and the pressures from the International community combined to shape the internal impetus among the serving military elite on the imperative for democratisation and military withdrawal to the barracks. These factors played different roles in different degrees towards shaping the tempo and direction which culminated in the emergence of an elected civilian government in May1999.
The civilian leadership that emerged was a product of a carefully pacted transition that was directly and indirectly orchestrated by the departing military regime. The expertise of the civilian leadership in military matters and the acceptability of the personalities to the military establishment created the basis for imposing civilian (largely executive) control of the military. Such expertise enhanced the civilian leadership’s freedom to choose, in terms of hiring and firing, the military leaders in efforts to maintain military subordination and uphold the constitutional principle of civil supremacy in the emerging democratic dispensation. The part of the requirements for the establishment and sustenance of democratic civil-military relations is the exercise of legislative control and the active role of the civil society in order to regulate the arbitrary use of military forces. In Nigeria’s case, the existence of a relatively weak legislature due to, a relative dearth of expertise, executive interference and the resultant incessant leadership crisis inhibited the capacity of the legislature to effectively exercise its oversight functions. The study was unable to source data from the National Assembly on its oversight functions of the military. This was due to poor record keeping in both its library and archives, and the lack of response from certain individuals associated with the defence committees of the two legislative chambers for an interview. With respect to the role of civil society, the study discovered that a civil society exercised a limited role in the area of interactive. This role focused on the agitation for the civilian government to use military forces within internationally defined standards in order to support democratic practices as obtained in advanced democracies. The reason for this limitation is based on the shift by external donors who determine the funding and agenda of the civil society in Nigeria. In retrospect, the activities of civil society to confront military rule in Nigeria was largely aided by the financial, technical and ideological support of external governments and organisations. The study did not cover the reason why such support
for civil society in such area was limited in comparison to the past where support for contestation with the military was relatively much.

The international variable as manifested in the cooperative frameworks or rather aid to the civilian leadership for the reprofessionalisation of the Nigerian military covered training and supply of equipment. Such international aid was designed to support military effectiveness and efficiency in order to enhance effective civilian democratic control as an institutionalised requirement for the consolidation of liberal-democracy. While military efficiency and effectiveness manifested themselves in Nigeria’s civil-military relations from May 1999 to May 2007, the study could not decipher the impact or rather the effect of such international aid due to the inaccessibility of graphic information on the quantitative relationship between military effectiveness and efficiency on one hand and the degree of civil democratic control on the other hand.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
Resume of the Interview with His Excellency, General Olusegun Obasanjo (Rtd), GCFR, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters (July 1975-February 1976), Military Head of State (February 1976-October 1979) and Executive Civilian President of Nigeria (May 1999- May 2007) in Abuja on 7th September 2011.
Q. Did your past experience and professional expertise as a military officer and one-time leader of a military government come into play in ensuring that the military accept its new role in the democratic dispensation?

A. The first thing to bear in mind is that the military was my constituency. In fact one easily could say that I was a product of the military. So that is very important. The military was the one I was taking over from. So having been a military man before, they (the military) did not have the anxiety- what would this man do? How would he do it? The military was reasonably comfortable (with me) and that’s also very important. And I know that a soldier or an officer out of the military is like fish out of water.

So I also know that when you are enjoying or you have enjoyed a particular position, you want to keep on enjoying it. Those military boys who had enjoyed the life of being governors or ministers... is really different from being professional military officers, they want to continue enjoying it. So how do we break that?

Q. What measures did the new civilian administration take in order to establish an effective framework that defined a new role for the Military?

A. My military experience makes me know the psychology of the military- the likes and dislikes of the military, the weaknesses and strengths of the military and the strong points of the military.

So one of the things I had to do therefore to bring stability was those officers who had tasted power, not power in the military sense but power in the political sense had to be moved out. Because the feeling with them would be any slightest thing with the new civilian administration- they would say ‘look, you see they (the civilians) are not doing it well, we can do it better’. There would be that tendency so far as long as they are in the military... So I think about 90 or so officers were retired. Not out of malice but to ensure stability. I did not give any notice to them; I just retired them, no matter your rank... But I was able to do that because of my own military background, experience and training... because your training in the military is how to run the affairs of men, how you manage men, how you manage materials whether in peacetime or in war and I have had experience of managing men and materials both in war and in peacetime. This is peacetime, how do we now manage? And so it definitely helped. For instance, when I came in, I looked at a number of things- their training, welfare and equipment.

Q. How true is the assumption that the participation of retired military officers in democratic activities has aided in the process stabilising the political system and fostering a subordinated military establishment? How does this chemistry work?

A. For the military to have the feeling that they can reach this man, for he is their man, I also appointed somebody who has been a military man before as my Chief of Staff, General Abdullahi Mohammed, so that if the military want to reach out to the President, they have somebody they can go to... the Chief of Staff, I have known him since 1961, he can come to me.
and he can deal with a lot with their problems, he can give them confidence and all that. And it all helped.

I know that a good soldier wants three things- a good soldier is not particularly interested in politics. So what does he want? Training, equipment and reasonable welfare... in his mess, barracks, that’s all. Having dealt with the issue of those who have political ambitions, the ones that that are in the service I have to take interest in their training both local and abroad- what we need to do to get them really professional, make them real professional officers. So we did that. Then we looked into their equipment and material, give them confidence- if you want me to go to war, what equipment have you given me? And then of course, a little bit of welfare for them. And they don’t demand much. When I was a young officer, what did I need? My little room as a single officer, I could take a loan to buy a car, I ate good food, I could go into games or sports and then look after my men. That is all!

Q. Were there any challenges encountered in the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military? If yes, what were the challenges?

A. Well, challenges were, you see the involvement of the military in governance disrupt the hierarchy- how do now get a minister a major or lieutenant colonel, how does he deal with a major general who is there, does he.... So, there was a need to bring back the hierarchy, seniority, the appointment. That had to be done. And that was not easy.... The other thing was training. Training had been substantially neglected.... So we said training both internally and externally.... There are some courses abroad for them and that also helped. The barracks, their accommodation, we had a lot of barracks; some were even in excess... but were not well maintained. So we decided annually let us look at these barracks because that’s their home. Then some of their equipment were not maintained. Some had become obsolete. Can we discard those that are obsolete and update some of them? It is not always going for new equipment. Can we upgrade what we have and make them (the military) feel confident and make them competent?

There’s nothing that should make a (retired) military man not to participate in politics. If I have been trained all my life with the principles of war and politics has to do with war without bloodshed, then those principles apply and you’ll find that all the principles of war apply in politics. And some people think that soldiers don’t know anything. Soldiers are trained to manage men and material. What else do you do in government other than manage men, money and material? In the so-called developed world, after the Second World War, General Eisenhower was a president in the United States. So, the retired military have something to offer to stabilise a great power after an upheaval of a world war....

Q. What form of support did sections of the international community give to Nigeria in the effort to institutionalise control over the military?

A. The international community gave us military training in their own military institutions... that’s very good. As I said a military man takes training very seriously. There is no organisation
that takes training as part of one’s career development like the military and that’s very important. Some countries, as part of our participation in UN peacekeeping gave some equipment and material and we got replenished. To the best of my knowledge, we did not get any money from any country to run the military. But they were able to give us training and that’s very important. They also sold equipment to us. So for me, we knew what we wanted and we asked them and they gave us....

Q. What were the results of such measures as they relate to the professional orientation of the officer corps?

A. A lot we did together (with the military). We worked on their terms and conditions of service. As a military man myself I had some ideas... the new defence policy, we worked together.

Q. Did strains occasionally exist in the relationship between the civil authorities and the military leadership in matters pertaining to defence policy, budgets or national security? If yes, please provide one or two instances and how the authorities managed such strains.

Where we would have had a strain, fortunately we did not was in Bakassi. I was cautious. Some of the military leaders wanted war and they felt that my being cautious could jeopardise their security in case there is a surprise attack from the other side. You know the military, they want the best equipment since they see these equipments as their toys, and they want the latest equipment to prepare for war that may never come. I tried to strike a balance on this issue. I had to manage the situation for them not to feel that this man wants to put us there as sitting ducks or lame ducks to be clobbered by the enemy. What I did was to tell the Camerounians that if you are moving a small unit, a platoon, let us know and if we are doing so, we'll let you know. Although, we had the problem of Bakassi, we still maintained that exchange of communication which is a means of maintaining peace... the military appreciated that I have the experience without being immodest- both in war and in peace. I kept them posted as to what was going on in government which they needed to know.
Appendix B


Q. Did your past experiences and professional expertise as a military officer and one-time leader of a military government come into play in exercising and ensuring that the military accept its new role in the democratic dispensation?

A. My role is my experience. As someone who comes from the intelligence community, it was my business to learn what is going on and so I was able to study the First Republic, the Second
Republic and I was part of the military. I was military governor of Benue-Plateau for a short period and in the army I was the first director of military intelligence. From Plateau I was recalled to start the NSO. With all these backgrounds I guess I was well placed to be able to advise my boss.

Everywhere in the world especially in the older countries, a number people who served in war have come to serve in politics. But the military itself, right from the Academy it is basic that you are taught to accept the civilian authority.... Now, because the retired military in the civilian period know this, they know the military and their thinking... now they've gone into politics. They are in a position to relate both with the serving military and to relate with the civilian politicians and this has helped in stabilising the civilian dispensation.

Q. Were there any challenges encountered in the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military? If yes, what were the challenges?

A. I’m not sure there were any challenges. The only one I remember and it was decisively dealt with. There were some hiccups between General Malu and Obasanjo. I don’t want to go into details. The mere fact that Malu is talking shows that something was defective. Obasanjo being a general himself tackled him decisively and effectively. Apart from that, all the Security advisers, apart from Gambo Jimeta... had military backgrounds up till now. It was their duty to advise the government of the day on security. And because they know both sides (military and civilian) they have been able to ensure little hiccups.

Q. What form of support did sections of the international community give to Nigeria in the effort to institutionalise control over the military?

A. I do not know whether the civilian government got any military support from the international community. But the only support you might say they got is to stabilise. You know that coup and all that before it comes usually the civilians would have done something which the military come out say they didn’t do this, they didn’t do that. So I think the international wrote the (country’s) debt off. The civilians had more money to do what they needed to do. And if they did it well, the military had no case. In any case, it was not the duty of the military to judge the civilians. They are not taught to do that. But because in the past, we had some less educated people. These days where most officers are graduates, they are well grounded in the doctrine of civilian supremacy and military subordination. But the thing that the civilian should watch out is to give directive and let the senior people in the military implement it. They should not go down below and begin to interfere with the authority of the military leadership.
Appendix C


A Brief Autobiography

I was commissioned on 9th September 1972 as a second lieutenant. I was commissioned into what was called the Recce Corps which later became the Armoured Corps, the same corps with former President, General Babangida. I first met General Babangida in NDA as our instructor. He was a major then when we were cadets and that has been the basis of my relationship with Babangida till today. I worked for him twice, in my military career. Once I was a military assistant
when he was Chief of Army Staff for the period and before then, he was Director of Army Staff
Duties and Plans during the Shehu Shagari regime and I was general officer grade II in charge of
staff duties under him.

I had some training here at home and also abroad. I did some courses in the UK and some in the
US. I went to the Staff College in Jaji in 1983. I also went to the National War College in
1996/1997. My military career was quite interesting because I was lucky and in the history of
the Nigerian Army I would count myself among the luckiest officers. Because I went into the
army with my school certificate and by the time I was leaving the army I had a master’s degree. I
went to the National Defence University in Washington in the US. I became the first commander
of a hybrid force between the African Union and the United Nations in Darfur. Even after I left as
Chief of Defence Staff to command the hybrid force, I was still in the military for another two
and a half years.

Q. What was the orientation within the officer corps as the civilians took over political power
in 1999 as it relates to the acceptance of the new democratic dispensation?

A. Let me say upfront that there has been a very erroneous misconception about the military by
Nigerians and non-Nigerians, by academics, by people I have read so much. They did not
understand the military, especially the Nigerian Army. When you have a military coup, I tell you
that I never participated in any form of government and the way people perceived it was every
military person was involved in that government, which is not true. For example, we have 36
states, honestly those military officers that were purely involved in politics at no time did you
have more than 200- the governors, the ministers and so on. The rest of us, the (military) job I
would have done whether it was a civilian or whichever government that was in charge. Agreed
and I do not deny that being in the military and in a military government some of us may have
benefited some influences. But I can equally tell you that some have benefited more under
civilian rule than under military rule. So I think this erroneous perception has to be looked into
and I hope that those who are younger would study it and really understand. And if you do that
then it would give you a clearer picture to now say when people are talking of re-
professionalising the army, I just feel it is just a continuation of training. If you ever heard me as
Chief of Army Staff using that phrase, I was just using it for political reason. Because if I want to
get something out of government and the government says because they want to re-
professionalise the army, I say Ok, we want to reprofessionalise the army so that you can give
me what I want to run the normal thing or to do, whether it was civilian or military government.
Because the role of the army is clear. The role of the Armed Forces is clear. The role has not
changed whether it is civilian or military. In some countries I agree the military got into politics
through and through at every level- local government level, state government level, federal
government level, the key appointments, the key decisions and everything was done.
Q. What internal measures did the military adopt to restore discipline and professionalism within its establishment as well as instilling obedience to constituted authority?

A. In Nigeria, the military still remained intact. It was very easy for the military to get back when the civilians came into power in 1999. The only thing you would say we need to do is to make sure (which we did in our time) that the younger officers understand their constitutional roles. And understand that if your father encourages you to go to NDA and so that you become a governor or minister then you have come to the wrong place. That’s the only thing we did. But that you re-professionalise the military- there was nothing that we did that was different.

The only challenge that I would argue is that frankly speaking, if you check the military as an institution suffered the most under military rule than under civilian rule. The equipment that Shagari administration bought were more than the equipment Gowon, Murtala and Obasanjo put together bought for the armed forces. You go and check. And that’s what I kept telling officers when I was chief of army staff that we have more to gain under civilian rule. I can go (unfortunately I became chief of army staff when there was an ex-military who was president) but I can go to a civilian president and talk to him and concoct things militarily which he may not understand professionally and get a favour. Then I can go to a fellow military man to look for that same favour for the institution.

Yes, it is wrong to say that military rule has not had an effect on the military as an institution. But to say that military rule really disoriented and disjointed the military is not completely right. This is because not very many people were involved. The few people that were involved may be out of envy, if we are course mates and you were a governor and I’m not. I may be envious- why is it you and not me? But as an institution, the real disorientation as was not widespread as people outside thought it had been.

Go back again and look at our system and see the casualties the military inflicted upon itself. How many coups and attempted coups? How many people were killed? How many lost their jobs because of the suspicion that they wanted to overthrow a government? We inflicted casualties on ourselves. There were those whose motivation in joining the military were to be governors because they have seen a military governor. Likewise for military officers who were ministers at the federal level. These officers were few in numbers. They were encouraged by parents, friends and relations to go into the military for this possibility. But the majority of the military joined because they were motivated to serve and be part of the defence of this country. To be part of those playing the constitutional role that the country has given to the military. That’s why even after the fashion of military coups had disappeared in most places in Africa including Nigeria, so many young men and women wanted to join the military. That’s why it has remained easy to motivate people, and say these are the rules of the game. The military is a very unique organisation in that it cares about the personnel and their families. I always tell people there is a quotation found in some graves in Kohima in Burma during the Second World War. It says ‘when you get home, tell them of us that for their tomorrow we gave our today’. These fighters who came out to fight today, gave up their tomorrow for other people and their
children to have their tomorrow. Some of them got killed, some of them got maimed. If you want somebody to really give up his tomorrow for you knowing that he has a wife and children and everything, you have to motivate him and in the motivation show honest and sincere leadership and in the end convince him that he is sure if something happens to him what he is leaving behind would have something to look up to.

Q. How did this chemistry develop between the civilian authorities and the military leadership since 1999? In what way did the presence of retired military officers in the civilian government facilitate such a relationship?

A. I don’t rule out the possibility that the presence of such civilian leaders with previous military background would have helped in facilitating the chemistry between the civilian and military leaders. However, the curriculum of NDA, then and now talks about geopolitics. At the Junior Staff College level, at Senior Staff College level, at the National War College or Defence level you do geopolitics. You don’t operate in isolation. The beauty of the military is that it is result-oriented. I call you as your commander and give you directive- you will move One Division from Kaduna to Katsina to defend our border with Niger Republic. That’s a task. The GOC would call his Brigade Commanders and sub-divide the task among them. Everybody sees himself as a partner, has a role to play and as a brother’s keeper. That’s the big challenge we have in the country. You see, you know and you pretend you know and you don’t want to learn. How many of our universities in Nigeria today have anything to do with the military? How many have read or put military history as a subject to be read in the university? How many in their curriculum have military geography? How many even know what military geography is? So you see this is the problem. So if you don’t know unfortunately you don’t know. And if you have an institution that has been legitimised to carry weapons and yet you buy the weapons and give them and you don’t care, you don’t ask what they do with the weapons. You don’t want to know what they do and yet you still want to stay and give them direction and give them instruction and say they are under you- that is what happened to that Second Republic.

Stability comes in other countries with so many things. Look at the Americans after the Second World War. Who was their president? – General Eisenhower. He was Allied Supreme Commander. Because of that period, they needed someone who would transform and who be an intellect in the transformation between war and peace. And you need someone who knows so much about war. But unfortunately in the case of Nigeria then and I think now, I make bold to say that they don’t care about the military. We have seen these military people. Oh! These coup people we don’t have anything to do with them, we are politicians, we give them orders and on and on.

This is what makes the military tick. Because of the military’s understanding of geopolitics, they understand that, though they are not politicians, they have to operate under political instruction and institutions. What makes them think that way? The civilians want to use a tool they don’t
know anything about. A government wants to use the military and defence is one of the tools that the government can use for its projection. See the Americans. Today if they talk to you on the table, you don’t agree and talk rubbish, tomorrow they would bring helicopters, drones and everything over your head and you’ll start thinking twice. So the military is a tool that you can use. For you to use that tool, you must understand at what time, what effect, what’s the standard of training that these people have, that you can use them when you need them. These are the things we don’t do in this country. That’s why you’ll keep on hearing ‘oh, they have stayed too long, 35 years they must go’.

Q. How true is the assumption that the participation of retired military officers in democratic activities has aided in the process stabilising the political system and fostering a subordinated military establishment?

Frankly speaking, I make bold to say that may be if you had another pure civilian that had come out in 1999 as the president I’m not sure if we would not have had another military coup. This is because it is self-preservation. If you find as an institution, nobody cares about you, if you find as an institution the only thing the person wants is to dish out orders to you and doesn’t matter what happens, then something is wrong. The military is part of the society. What is wrong in taking devoted, committed, knowledgeable military people and giving them a job? Colin Powell was secretary of state. So, there are potentials in the military and also to make the military feel to be part of the society, if they see part of their people being ministers, part of the military leaving and being given key positions in government. Then they begin to see that they’re part of the government. But if they see the only qualification that makes one to be a leader is that you must be a card carrying member of a political party and winner takes all, and then one is creating instability for the country. And one there’s instability, who bears the brunt? It’s the military.

Q. Did strains occasionally exist in the relationship between the civil authorities be it executive or legislative and the military leadership in areas like organisational reforms, budgetary allocations and national security? If yes, please provide one or two instances and how such strains were managed.

A. With regards to the issue of strains- once you have demand, competition among so many people then there’ll definitely be strains. Assuming I am the minister of defence- heading an organisation and you’re the minister of health- you’re heading an organisation. You may have in your budget, you may need five percent of the GDP of Nigeria and in my budget, I may need 10 percent of the GDP of Nigeria and we have to debate. Definitely, it depends on personality and everything. If you see it as winner and loser, then there must be strains in the relationship. But if you are able to live above board by arguing rationally and defending your position, you get what you agitated for. And lobbying is everywhere. I lobbied for the military. I stood up and fought so
many things. Maybe if I have time to sit down and write my memoirs, you would read them. I
fought so many things. I tried to get enough statistics to convince. One thing is clear, ask those
who were in government on how many times Obasanjo said ‘go and see the chief of army staff
and get how to present your case’. I would sit down and articulate our position and do visual
presentation and so forth.

I believe in the saying that there are no bad soldiers, but bad officers. All of us have leadership
qualities built in us. All we need to do is to study and develop such capacity for leadership. I
strongly believe that there’s nobody born a leader. All of us have leadership qualities when we
are born. What we do with it is what matters. And this is where the military becomes unique.
This is because the military tries to bring out these leadership qualities from you. And if you
remove discipline, there’s no military. What makes the military unique and strong is discipline.
That’s why when I was chief of army staff we reviewed that book on military codes and ethics by
comparing the British and American traditions in the developed world and our own internal
culture. And if you don’t have these ethics, part of it is even the way you dress. You cannot go
for a function with bathroom slippers. You are supposed to be an ambassador of the military.
You cannot go to a function wearing singlet or wearing a dress that does not represent the
institution. Remember, immediately a person sees you coming, he has started judging you. Ah,
is that how military officers look? They are useless. When somebody sees you looking smart in
both military uniform and civil dress, he wants to engage with you. Also, what you say, where
you say it and why you say it is very important. If you open your mouth too much you may
reveal a secret that could lead to the death of your colleagues. So, these are the things that, I
will continue to say, make the military a unique organisation. At the end of the tunnel, you are
going to use such values as an insurance policy. That’s another thing that many people don’t
accept. If you don’t have a standing military that is well trained and disciplined, when you need
the military would you start training them the day you need them? No! You cannot start
gathering a football team because we are going to play next week. That’s why on a sad note you
saw how many gold medals we collected in the last Olympics (laughter). These are the things
that most people don’t realise. What I stood by when I was in service is that the military is a
good instrument that can be used in so many ways to project this country. You can use it to add
power to this country, to add resources and to earn respect for this country. But anything you
want to use, you must invest- put money in training, put money in equipment and put money in
what you want them to do. If you don’t have those ethics if you don’t have discipline, honestly
that’s what causes everything to fall apart. Why are the Asians developing faster than other
parts of the world? Go to Japan, with all the development, no Japanese would cross the road if
there’s no green traffic light- even if the road is empty and there’s a zebra crossing with a red
light on the other side, I was shocked when I went to Japan from New York. That is discipline-
doing the right thing at the right time. Not because somebody is looking at you but because you
are convinced in your heart that this is the right thing.
Q. What form of assistance did foreign governments and international bodies provide to the Nigerian Military since 1999 in an effort to boost the levels of training and professionalism as well as to sustain the military’s acceptance of an emerging democratic dispensation? Did such assistance have an impact? If Yes, how and if No, why?

A. Part of the international aid to the Nigerian military is this man you are talking to. In 1999, I told you earlier that I did a masters degree at the National Defence University in Washington. It was after the election and swearing in of the President in May 1999. I was director of military training in the Nigerian Defence Academy when I was told that I have been nominated to go for a course in America. I would not have gone for that course if the embargo was still on. They lifted the embargo and I went. I say with all sincerity that I benefited a lot and if I had done things a little bit different in the military that was for that knowledge in the course. So on that background; I am one of the beneficiaries.

The military, just like the other sectors in the country benefited from some of this foreign aid. But let me say upfront again that there is a great misconception in this country about foreign aid. I hope that Nigerians would understand that every country acts on its own national interest. If you have ever gone to the developed world, you’ll find that nobody invites you to his house and gives you five cents or five Euros and would not demand that you return it tomorrow. So let Nigerians understand the issue of aid. Nobody gives you any aid because he loves you. People give you aid because of what they would benefit. They would give you equipment in order to keep their own industries working. They could ask you to send Nigerians to go and learn, they may indoctrinate and brainwash your children with their own culture and way of life which we don’t understand.

The American State Department gave 10 million dollars in aid for the Charlie 130 aircraft and the amount of cash that touched Nigerian hands was less than 200,000 dollars. When an American comes here to fix equipment, the air ticket, the hotel accommodation, the food he eats is out of the 10 million dollars. People have their national interest. Nobody gives you a free lunch anywhere in this world- may be here in Nigeria. The Nigerian government paid the bulk sum for my education in Washington while the Americans I think paid only 10 percent. The international aid helped. It came at the right time. It helped the military institution to also see the latest developments in other militaries- the way they behave, the way they do things. It also kept a network of exchanges that if today you want to, which I did when I was in service, I would send an email or I would call one of my foreign colleagues that I know- what is your view about this thing? Or I want to have your view on this thing we are about to do. We need this equipment- do you have it in your army? Which is the best way we can get or utilise it? If I did not have the opportunity or exposure to meet these people and train with them, I would not know. It also helped us to be more proficient on some of our equipment. When I was chief of army staff, I sent my men to assist when Taraba was divided into two by floods.
Appendix D

Resume of Interviews with a selected group of military officers drawn from the three armed services at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC), Jaji Cantonment on Wednesday 4th April 2012. This series of short interviews covered the issues of professionalism, training and subordination to constituted civil authority number of military officers selected by the College. These were namely: Brigadier general Nsor Okpa Ojiji, Brigadier general Johnson Adesoji Oladeinde, Air Commodore Ekagbo, Navy Commander Pakaribo Solomon Anabraba, Wing Commander Chinegwundoh Ekwueme and Major Ahmed Ibrahim Getso.

i) Brigadier-General N. Ojiji, Department of Joint Studies
Q. What type of training does the AFCSC give to its participants? Does it have a direct correlation with imbibing the principles of military professionalism and obedience to constituted civil authorities?

A. We in the College take on packages that have to do directly with the law- the soldier and the law and in this instance as constitutionally require, those packages are meant to drive home the point of first, professionalism in the military and also the relationship between the military and the law, the relationship the military and the populace, the relationship between the military and the government. One aspect of the reprofessionalisation process of the Nigerian Armed Forces when the civilian government came to power in 1999 was to ensure that military personnel should know a lot and be conversant with subordination to civil authority. Almost all the courses harp on that, all the training harp on that.

Q. Does professionalism shape the principle of military subordination to constituted civil authorities? If yes, how is this so?

A. To a large extent what we do here is about professionalizing the soldier and encouraging civil-military cooperation which has to do with military assistance to the civil authority, military assistance to the civil power. These are all aspects of the military’s subordination to constituted authority.

The system where we have to go to the Senate to defend our budget is a new development in our culture. We appreciate the fact that democracy has come to stay in Nigeria and this has aided professionalism.

ii) Air Commodore Ekagbo, Department of Air Warfare

Q. What type of training does the AFCSC give to its participants? Does it have a direct correlation with imbibing the principles of military professionalism and obedience to constituted civil authorities?

The taxpayer is our master and must support the taxpayer. We must subject ourselves to civil authority. The training emphasizes that very much because that’s the way it should be. The world has changed and we cannot afford to live in the world of yesterday when everybody is moving forward. That is emphasized that the military must subject itself to the civil authority.

iii) Brigadier-general J. Oladeinde, Department of Land Warfare
Q. What type of training does the AFCSC give to its participants? Does it have a direct correlation with imbibing the principles of military professionalism and obedience to constituted civil authorities?

The department of land warfare is involved in the training of junior officers of the ranks of majors and captains which we know them as middle-cadre officers. These are the officers that are really representing the army in the training of junior ones like the junior ranks, senior NCOs and others. If you have these officers and they are not well trained, naturally there would not be a link with the executive orders given from above at the strategic level and then for such orders to be conducted at the operational and tactical levels. So we train the junior ones like the captains in the junior course and the majors in the senior officer course. For some time now, we have been having some civilians who normally join us especially some security agencies like the SSS, the immigration, the FRSC. The aim is to develop the civil-military relations and then to make sure to imbibe discipline in our junior officers. Because if you want to give an order to a junior officer and you don’t take orders yourself, even in the Nigerian culture if want to be a known person or adult, you should be able to respect elders. How do we imbibe this thing? It is by you inculcating it and making sure that you pass it to the junior ones.

Like the cadre we are having now, we are having training on service operations based on most of our military operations like land warfare and tri-service operations. During the tri-service operations we do geo-politics, we go on tours and all those things. All the trainings we are having are really meant to indulge discipline in our personnel. Just like when a recruit enters the depot, he goes to the parade ground- that’s where he is shaped to be military personnel. In some months, that civilian aspect of him is shaped and he starts behaving like a military personnel. So as middle-cadre officer who is going to take over from us, we need to train them to know how to take discipline seriously. If you don’t take orders, how do you give orders to your juniors?

Q. How has the emergence of democratic governance in Nigeria affected training and doctrine in terms of the courses offered in your institution?

The democratic dispensation has really affected the military. If fact we have gained too much. Not that during the military era we did not gain. With the democratic system you don’t give orders directly. It has an institutionalised system that has been put in place- You have to go through the presidency, to the national assembly to make sure that even if you fund your budget you have to go and defend it. That’s why our senior officers go to the national assembly to defend the budget. Under the civilian system, the situation has improved unlike under the military era where a senior officer can just go to the barracks and give orders. Whether you like it or not, you have to take it like that.

Now there’s democracy and under this system when you pass a law, people are there to argue, to test that law. You can’t just give an order when people are not there to tell you whether it can work or not. The military under this civilian era has subject itself. That’s why you have a
minister of defence who is a civilian. You even have women who are ministers of state for defence- equality of gender.

iv) Commander P.S. Anabraba,

Q. How has the emergence of democratic governance in Nigeria affected training and doctrine in terms of the courses offered in your institution?

Being subservient to the political masters is the crux of our training. I know that this question may have come because of military intervention over the years and all that. Just see that as an aberration and not the norm. The crux of our training is to be subordinate to the political masters. That’s why after Obasanjo came to power, the military was re-directed towards professionalism and we are enjoying it. To the best of my knowledge, no officer is interested in politics. We are very subordinate the way we are carrying on. Because of democracy, we even have more foreign teaching aids, more foreign experts coming to assist with the training. The partnership that we have with the Western world has enhanced training.

v) Wing Commander Ekwueme, Department of Air Warfare

Q. What type of training does the AFCSC give to its participants? Does it have a direct correlation with imbibing the principles of military professionalism and obedience to constituted civil authorities?

A highly professional military man means that he is highly trained and he knows that he has to obey constituted authority. The College has introduced courses in civil military relations bringing out the essence of subordination... it keeps coming up in the topics we give students to research on in their College paper and Director’s paper. During exercises, we conduct to bring out and highlight the issue of subordination to constituted authority.

vi) Major A.I. Getso

Q. What type of training does the AFCSC give to its participants? Does it have a direct correlation with imbibing the principles of military professionalism and obedience to constituted civil authorities?
The Professional military is always subordinate to the civil authority or rather constituted authority because we derive our powers from the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Constitution now gives us or rather directs us to be subservient to the constituted authority... Because of the full implementation of democracy, the College has received a lot of boost. We now have a lot of foreign students coming to the College and we have a lot of our own students going overseas for training.

Appendix E

Resume of Interview with Jibrin Ibrahim, Political Scientist, Rights Advocate and Director of Centre for Democracy and Development at the Shehu Musa Yar’adua Centre in Abuja on Monday, 14th May 2012.

Q. What is the nature of interest by Civil Society in Security Sector Reform in Nigeria especially as it relates to the Armed Forces since 1999?

A. The growth of civil society in Nigeria was rooted in opposition to military rule. In the 1980s and 1990s, a lot of the engagements of civil society were rooted in combating military rule and therefore, they were extremely active over those two decades in contesting the legitimacy of military rule and that struggle was extremely successful. Now, what became clear as the military were forced to withdraw was that because the military had been in power for almost 30 years, their level of control in the society, in the political and governance system was extremely high.
For example, many of the generals became extremely rich through their participation in the governance of society and through that system were able to influence politics and society.

I think a number of civil society organisations played a key role in trying to place civil-military relations as well as civilianisation of the military on the agenda and the Centre for Democracy and Development was extremely in that regard. We developed, for example, a manual on security sector reform which was extremely important in trying to get civil society more engaged in that process and it is important for you to get a copy of that manual that we developed which has been widely used for the past seven to eight years in trying to promote security sector reform.

**Q. What is the nature of the relationship between Civil-Society and the Military in Nigeria since the inception of Civil Democratic Rule in 1999?**

The key issue for us really was the subordination of the military to civilian control and while this was achieved at the formal level, we feel it is just as important that at the ideological level this be accepted as the reality of the country. We in the CDD have also collaborated closely with the military in terms of a programme they conducted last year to improve civil-military relations and there’s a book that has been published about that engagement in which the Chief of Defence Staff wanted to place on the agenda the question of ‘winning hearts and minds’. With the coming of the civilian administration, the new policy at the level of the CDS is winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population and encouraging a form of relationship between civilians and the military that is based on mutual respect, rather than the recurrent conflicts that have been going on.

**Q. To what extent has advocacy shaped the crafting of legislation and formulation of policies towards consolidating the new role being played by the Nigerian Military since 1999?**

A. We participated by going around the barracks in the country and talking to a cross section of military, both officers and men on how to achieve that and central to it really was the question of the edification of the rule of law which we feel is the foundation on which that can be built. So that’s my general response.

**Q. What form of support did foreign governments and organisations provide for advocacy in the effort to engender Security Sector Reform in Nigeria since 1999?**

A. We received support from the Department of International Development of the UK in trying to engage on this. Part of what we also receive the support of, is trying to promote this work not just in Nigeria, but also in West Africa. We work with a major association, the African Security Sector Network, which is a Pan-African specialised organisation that works across the continent in terms of promoting security sector reform.

The position that civil society fizzled away after the departure of the military is erroneous. But what happened in 1999 is that a lot of civil society organisations felt that a relationship between
civil society and democratic government shouldn’t be a confrontational relationship. The question of advocacy became very important that the focus was to address policy issues and try to encourage government to adopt progressive policies that would promote development and democracy in the country. Therefore, the relationship changed. My feeling is that there has been a significant enlargement of civil society since the civilian government came on board. So I don’t think it fizzled away.

However, a number of challenges occurred since 1999. One of the challenges was that there was a lot of funding from foreign organisations under the military era to promote contestations with the military. Over the last few years, that funding has reduced considerably and therefore, with reduced funding, the visibility of some civil society went down and that may account for the impression that they fizzled away.
WikiLeaks.org/cable/2001/05/01ABUA954.html is one of the many declassified documents accessed by the researcher on 16th April 2013 at 6.13PM. A select group of such documents records the discussions that took place between American and Nigerian officials on implementation of United States Military Assistance to Nigeria. On different occasions, the US Ambassador Howard Jeter and his military advisers had discussions with President Obasanjo, Defence Minister General Danjuma, National Security Adviser (NSA) General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau along and some Nigerian officials on matters relating to the funding and training of some formations of the Nigerian military within and outside the country.

Appendix F

Viewing cable 01ABUA954, POST OFR ROUND-TABLE MEETING WITH NSA ALIYU MOHAMMED

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SUMMARY. During an April 19 post-Operation FOCUS RELIEF (OFR) round-table meeting, Nigeria’s National Security Advisor told us that the Nigerian civilian government has complete control of the military. The NSA was pleased that the OFR meeting had been positive, but deep frustration that the MPRI payment had not been made (as he had been assured by MOD and other officials). General Mohammed also supported the notion of using retired Nigerian military officials for counterparts in the MPRI program. END

SUMMARY.

Following the OFR Roundtable, Ambassador Jeter, DOD PDAS McConnell, AF PDAS Mark Bellamy, DATT, and Counselor for Regional Affairs called on National Security Advisor General Aliyu Mohammed (ret). The NSA was joined by his principal assistant, LTC M.I. Idris.
3. (C) McConnell briefed the NSA on the results of the OFR round-table. McConnell said that MOD officials had agreed that Operation FOCUS RELIEF Phase III (OFR P3) personnel would be billeted inside the perimeter of Nigerian bases, but would not be co-located in Nigerian barracks. The specific bases were not yet identified. (COMMENT: As noted reftel, the Chief of Army Staff has committed to a site inspection by Nigerian Army personnel and the DATT on April 25. Embassy is cautiously optimistic that the basing issue will be resolved favorably. END COMMENT.) MOD officials had also agreed that Nigerian forces would deploy to Sierra Leone for one year. DATT then briefed the NSA on which Nigerian elements and locations had previously been identified for P3 training. He also noted that in order for OFR P3 to begin on time it was necessary for the MOD to confirm the military units selected for the training.

4. (C) The Ambassador advised the NSA that a meeting on the edges of the round-table with Nigerian Chief of Army Staff LtGen Victor Malu had gone extremely well. Malu had told the U.S. side that he was not opposed to OFR and his positive attitude towards the program had been misrepresented in the media. The U.S. side had expressed its continuing high regard for Malu and assured him that articles critical of him on the Internet and in the American print media did not represent U.S. views.

5. (C) McConnell advised the NSA of the continuing hope that Malu would accept the standing invitation to visit the U.S. to meet with senior U.S. defense officials to discuss OFR and other matters of mutual interest. Finally, McConnell reminded the NSA that the U.S. has yet to receive Nigeria’s USD 3.5 million for the MPRI program.

6. (C) The NSA responded that the Nigerian government remained firmly committed to OFR and that Nigerian elected officials were completely in charge of the military. He said that he was pleased that the Roundtable had gone well, but expressed surprise and frustration over the MPRI payment not being received. General Mohammed said that he had been assured by senior Ministry of Finance officials that the payment had already been made. He again requested that the U.S. Treasury account number where the MPRI payment would be received be passed directly to him. The NSA said he would personally carry the account number to President Obasanjo to have the President sign the order to the Nigerian Central Bank to make immediate payment.

7. (C) COMMENT: Later that day, the NSA's office passed the Embassy copies of the Nigerian MOD documents which transferred the MPRI payment funds from the MOD to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The documents were dated April 18 and 19, which suggest that MOD personnel handling the transfer of funds had been misleading the NSA for several months concerning their delay in making the payments, or that the Ministry of Finance had delayed the release of the funds to the MOD. In any case, the last step is for the CBN to transfer the funds to the U.S. Treasury account. Embassy hopes this issue has now been put to rest. END COMMENT.

8. (C) In further discussions concerning MPRI, McConnell and the Ambassador noted that the U.S. has proposed to the MOD using retired Nigerian military personnel as counter-parts. This
solution might make it easier for the Nigerian side to ensure regular and reliable participation in the program. NSA Mohammed said he thought this was an excellent idea, and said that he knew several retired generals who would be good for the program. He named retired Generals Archibong and Jaffar Isa, both of whom were also strong supporters of OFR.

¶9. (C) The meeting concluded with Ambassador Jeter noting that the discussion during the roundtable had been frank and productive, giving hope that both programs could now move forward expeditiously. While other issues would certainly arise, they could be handled in a collaborative way. The NSA agreed that this was now the case.

¶10. (C) COMMENT: As noted reftel, there are still hurdles to overcome before we can be confident that OFR3 will begin on time in Nigeria. However, after an open and productive roundtable, and a clear message of support from the NSA, Embassy is hopeful that the Nigerian defense establishment is now ready to move forward productively.

The retirement/dismissal of General Malu and his cohorts should now pave the way. END COMMENT.

Jeter

Appendix G

Viewing cable 01ABUJA873, Operation FOCUS RELIEF Roundtable

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000873

SIPDIS

FREETOWN FOR MCCONNELL AND BELLAMY

E.O. 12598: DECLAS 4/19/11

TAGS: PREL MASS MARR NI SL

SUBJECT: Operation FOCUS RELIEF Roundtable

(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

¶

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 23.

¶

2. (C) SUMMARY: Nigerian Minister of Defense Danjuma chaired an Operation FOCUS RELIEF (OFR) round-table meeting on April 19. The Minister took the role of facilitator in the almost-two hour meeting, restating and clarifying various concerns raised by both sides. General Malu was unrepentant regarding his untenable focus on equipment rather than the bilateral defense relationship. However, in the end, the participants agreed that: there was a need for a MOU to clarify all issues related to OFR; on Wednesday, April 25, a U.S. Nigerian team would travel to the identified training sites to look at the Chief of Army Staff’s proposed billeting areas for the U.S. soldiers; the length of deployment of the Nigerian battalions to Sierra Leone will be one year. END SUMMARY.

¶

3. (C) Nigerian Minister of Defense, LTG Theophilus Y. Danjuma (Rtd), chaired an Operation FOCUS RELIEF round-table meeting on April 19. In attendance on the Nigerian side were: Minister Danjuma, Chief of Army Staff LTG Victor Malu, Chief of Defense Staff Vice Admiral Ibrahim Ogohi, a representative of the Air Force, a representative from the Office of the MOD Permanent Secretary, and Danjuma’s Personal Staff Officer Col Ichyaku Pennap. On the U.S. side were: Ambassador Jeter, PDAS-D McConnell, PDAS-S/AF Bellamy, BG Fuller, A/DCM, DATT, OSD AF Deputy Director, OSD Nigeria Desk Officer Ikins, JCS representative Captain Richard Heimmerle, and PolMilOff (notetaker).

¶

4. (C) After a 30 minute small-group meeting (including only the Ambassador, the Minister, Mr. McConnell and Mr. Bellamy), Danjuma invited the American side to explain its concerns. Ambassador Jeter said that the meeting should serve to look at the necessary preparations for OFR Phase 3, including the issues of basing, length of deployment, and end-use for equipment transfers.
5. (C) McConnell began by noting that a meeting between the Nigerian and American Presidents would occur in early May. He said that the meeting would, no doubt, include a discussion of the bilateral defense relationship, and that he was confident that the Presidents would be looking to the future growth of that relationship. That is why it was imperative to ensure commonality of purpose in this core aspect of the relationship. McConnell explained that Phase 3 (P3) was slated to begin on August 27, but that preparations would have to begin very soon. He noted that Phase 2 (P2), which includes Ghana and Senegal, would commence on May 29, and added that in those two countries, U.S. soldiers would be housed with their host battalions. He explained that the U.S. required this arrangement to meet force protection requirements, and because this would allow the American and West African soldiers to interact and learn from each other, both during and outside of training. He strongly emphasized that this was a mutual training and learning experience. In terms of basing, he said, the U.S. would like P3 in Nigeria look like P2 in Senegal and Ghana. He explained that the U.S. was not necessarily requesting that the American soldiers live inside Nigerian barracks, but inside of the perimeter of battalion bases. General Fuller agreed, and noted that living alongside of their fellow soldiers was a Special Forces tradition and suited their philosophy for joint exercises and operations.

6. (C) The Ambassador noted that it would be a good idea to have an "off-site" for officers from the Special Forces team and the Nigeria battalion participating in OFR P3 before P3 began. This would allow the officers to get to know each other on a personal basis, generate mutual understanding, and would also give the Special Forces soldiers a chance to learn Nigerian culture from their hosts. Ambassador Jeter offered Embassy assistance for such a meeting. (COMMENT: There seemed to be general MOD civilian support for this idea, though Malu and Ogohi remained silent. (END COMMENT)

7. (C) Malu then addressed his concerns, first by noting that he believed the misunderstandings in Phase 1 (P1) occurred because the training did not take place as originally envisioned. The Nigerian Army, he said, was appreciative of and excited by the U.S. offer of assistance. However, the Service Chiefs had wanted to know what equipment would be supplied (he said that the equipment list for P1 was not passed to them until the training began), and had expected the training to focus on equipment not regularly found in the Nigeria inventory.

8. (C) Malu emphasized that, while grateful for the offer to equip the battalions, he had expected the U.S. to provide the type of logistical support his ECOMOG forces had received in Liberia through PA&E. He objected to training in tactics because he did not want five Nigerian battalions that had a different doctrine than the rest of the Army. He added that, when a Nigerian battalion is selected for peacekeeping duty, they are already given three months to train and prepare for the mission. For P3, Malu noted, the training should be based on the equipment that would be provided, and that equipment should be items that the Nigerian Army does not already have (he explained that the Army has plenty of rifles, but needed more items like machine guns and RPG:).
9. (C) The Minister then asked Malu to address the issue of co-locating the soldiers. Malu said he would not mind locating space "outside the barracks", and allowing the U.S. to assess the locations for security.

10. (C) McConnell responded that the equipment for P3 would be the same as P1. He explained that this had been discussed before P1 had begun, and was based on limited U.S. resources (USD 90 million) to fund OFR for seven West African battalions (including the cost of equipment and the soldiers). The U.S. had agreed to weapons and equipment for individual soldiers, crew served weapons (machine guns and mortars), communications gear, medical equipment and vehicles. Moreover, the equipment was selected with attention given to compatibility with Nigerian Army equipment. There had never been any U.S. suggestion of equipping to UN scale, McConnell added. The training and equipment "had to be a package deal," because the USG was unable to provide lethal assistance without training and still meet Congressional concerns. Finally, McConnell said, there was certainly a benefit to soldiers being together, interacting, and exercising together, regardless of the equipment or POI. OFR was in the national interest of both countries, and deserved support.

11. (C) The Ambassador explained to General Malu that the kind of support he had received in Liberia from the U.S. was still available, but in Sierra Leone it would be provided by the UN. OFR, the Ambassador noted, should be looked at as the beginning of a process to build capacity in the sub-region to deal with conflict as well as natural disasters. This went beyond ACRI, he said. McConnell noted that ACRI was moving from State to DOD, and the U.S. would seek Nigeria's feedback on ACRI thus far. ACRI would have to make sense to Nigeria, McConnell said, because Nigeria was a critical component.

12. (C) Malu returned to Liberia, and noted that PA&E support there had been extremely important. He added that if he had had the choice of the PA&E support or an equal amount of money, he would have chosen PA&E. He asked why the U.S. was not giving PA&E support to Nigeria now. McConnell responded that constantly using PA&E would not allow for the growth of the bilateral defense relationship. In that case, Malu said, it would be better to give Nigeria additional course vacancies through IMET, and then try to do joint exercises in the future when the Nigerian Army would be better prepared to participate. He added that every battalion slated for OFR had been to either Liberia or Sierra Leone at least three times (implying a high level of tactical combat experience and no need for additional training).

13. (C) Minister Danjuma noted that General Malu was arguing that if the current equipment scale was maintained, then the POI should be shorter. General Fuller stated that the POI could be reviewed, but he did not believe it could, or necessarily should, be shorter. Moreover, EUCOM had reviewed the P1 POI, and had already incorporated suggestions from the Nigerian battalions who had participated. Finally, the POI was not just about the equipment, but also about interaction of the soldiers. McConnell reiterated that he believed both Nigerian and American soldiers had gained a great deal in P1, and rhetorically asked, "What is the downside to joint training?"
14. (C) Chief of Defense Staff Ogohi then identified four areas of concern: (a) If OFR training was just for Sierra Leone-bound units, or if other Nigerian soldiers could gain from it; (b) the need for a MOU; (c) his concern that the UN mandate in Sierra Leone could end and that therefore, August was a late starting date; and, (d) that basing had to be decided by the Chief of Army Staff, and that the Nigerian Army would provide for security. McConnell agreed on the need for a MOU, and offered to provide a draft document to the MOD. On the UN mandate, McConnell explained that no one could tell the future. August had been selected because of the time needed for preparations. The Ambassador added that Nigeria was in P3 because the U.S. could not get the necessary answers to put Nigeria in P2 starting in May. Moreover, McConnell pointed out, while OFR was just a piece of the bilateral defense arrangement, OFR could be used as an opportunity to demonstrate to the U.S. Congress the validity of expanding the overall defense relationship. On basing, McConnell said he understood from earlier comments that Nigeria had agreed that the U.S. soldiers could live on the bases outside of the actual barracks, that is, working the base perimeter.

15. (C) General Malu then returned to his concern that five Nigerian battalions would learn different tactics and doctrine than the rest of the Army. General Fuller explained that while this was ultimately a Nigerian decision, the training was not on peacekeeping skills but on combat operations, and that most of the skills could be easily transferred. We will move quickly and finish early if standards are met, General Fuller added.

16. (C) The Minister then said that the length of deployment would be for one year, which was then confirmed by Malu and Ogohi. Returning to basing, the Minister suggested that a team of Nigerians and Americans go to the sites and see if the U.S. could accept the sites chosen by the Army. The Ambassador pointed out that four bases were under discussion (three with the battalions and the forward operating base (FOB) in Abuja), and asked if site surveys had already been done. Colonel Nelson affirmed that surveys had been done, that he had sent a letter requesting use of the FOB, and plans had been drawn up. He had believed that the notion of a "base-within-a-base" had been accepted, but then learned that it had not seen.

17. (C) General Malu returned the discussion to the POI, and said that the Army should give input into the POI. General Fuller explained that the POI had in fact been negotiated last summer, but that it could be reviewed again. However, he did not see much flexibility in adjusting the length of the POI. McConnell agreed that the length of the POI could not be changed, but that changes in the actual instruction could be discussed. Malu again noted his concerns regarding doctrine, stating that the Commanding Officers from P1 had expressed concern about the POI changing Army doctrine. McConnell responded that the POI focused on small unit tactics, not on doctrine. Fuller added that the ideas of the Commanding Officers of the battalions from P1 had been integrated into the newest version of the POI. He noted that he would be happy to meet with the Commanding Officers of the remaining three battalions and incorporate their ideas.
18. (C) Bellamy then addressed General Malu's comments about the equipment, clarifying that it had already been determined that the equipment in P3 would be the same as P1. General Malu again stated that he would have liked to replace the rifles (of which the Army has enough) with more machine guns or RPGs.  (DAO COMMENT: Despite Malu's comments, Nigerian Army rifles are generally in very poor condition and not fit for combat. END DAO COMMENT)

19. (C) The Minister then summarized the meeting, which he described as very useful. He noted that that:- There is a need for a MOU to clarify equipment and other issues - On Wednesday, April 25, a Nigerian and a USG representative would travel to the bases to look at the Chief of Army Staff's proposed basing options for the U.S. soldiers. He added that adjustments could be made to General Malu's proposals.- Deployment of the Nigerian battalions to Sierra Leone will be for one year.

20. (C) Finally, the Ambassador raised the issue of the trucks provided in Nigeria to the battalions during P1, which had not been shipped to Sierra Leone as agreed. The Minister instructed General Malu to look into the trucks.

21. (C) COMMENT: A number of positive conclusions were reached in the meeting, including length of deployment and a clear acknowledgement of U.S. concerns for force protection. Moreover, a clearing of the air on various issues was certainly healthy.

22. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Minister Danjuma was impressive. The normally reserved Minister took control of the discussion at a number of points, redirecting the discussion to the key issues at hand. However, it was also clear that he was hesitant to force a confrontation with Malu or Ogohi. The ultimate test of wills will come during the inspection of the proposed sites for bases for U.S. trainers. OFR P3 for Nigeria could still collapse if General Malu's notions do not meet with U.S. requirements, and the U.S. inspectors are required to reject the options he offers. Malu certainly understands this. In this case, we will see how far the Nigerian political decision-makers are willing to enforce their authority to continue a program they clearly support.

23. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Post faxed a draft MOU to AF/W and AF/RA for an initial review. The document was reviewed and edited in Abuja by PDAS-D McConnell, PDAS-S/AF Bellamy and General Fuller. Post requests quick coordination by the Department to provide a draft MOU that we can forward to the Minister for his comment. END ACTION REQUEST.

24. (U) This cable was not cleared by PDAS-D McConnell, PDAS-S/AF Bellamy, or General Fuller.

25. (U) Freetown minimize considered.
Appendix H

Viewing cable 01ABUJA1312, NIGERIA: THE OBASANJO ADMINISTRATION AT TWO YEARS.

Reference ID Created Classification Origin

01ABUJA1312 2001-06-13 07:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Abuja

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ABUJA 001312

SIPDIS


TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PREL ECON ENRG NI

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: THE OBASANJO ADMINISTRATION AT TWO YEARS

-- A WORK IN PROGRESS

Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter, reasons 1.5 (B/D).

A Quick Start?

2. (U) As a retired general and former military Head of State acceptable both to the military establishment and to Northern elites, Obasanjo, a Yoruba from the Southwest, wasted no time in putting his stamp on the Fourth Republic. Immediately upon taking office he retired hundreds of military officers who had held political positions and chose a new set of military Service Chiefs. He also instituted review panels for human rights violations, failed contracts, and dubious oil-lifting agreements. His carefully balanced Cabinet, vetted by the Senate for regional and ethnic composition, took office a month later, following rigorous and spirited sessions on government ethics and the development goals of the Administration. His hand firmly on the governmental tiller, Obasanjo appeared poised to put his programs quickly into place, including needed economic reforms.

3. (C) Instead, he stumbled. While President Obasanjo has been a tireless national leader with his eye on an endless series of issues (and he has a cadre of talented,
ambitious, and pragmatic political operatives at his service) he is no master of the smoke-filled room. Key policy initiatives were launched without proper preparation (primary example: the unilateral and failed bid to raise fuel prices in the summer of 2000). In a self-seeking political environment where back-scratching and going-along-to-get-along are essential political tools, Obasanjo often came across as the stern schoolmaster laying down the law to unwilling pupils.

4. (C) Obasanjo developed a tense and testy relationship with the National Assembly. An often contemptuous President jostled almost daily with resentful Senators and Representatives. While the President indulged in contests to install or unseat National Assembly leadership, his first full budget proposal languished, as did other initiatives. As advised by the IMF, Obasanjo exercised tight control over the national budget that did finally pass, but legislative critics decried his refusal to spend funds duly appropriated. The Universal Basic Education Scheme and the Poverty Alleviation Program, both launched with much fanfare in 2000, took little account of constituent interests, and generated much avoidable opposition and ill-will among the 36 state governors. The former was ultimately reworked, and the latter quietly scrapped and replaced.

Reforming the Military -- Civilian Authority Ascendant

25. (C) One bright spot for the nation is the military's assumption of a more traditional mission of national security and regional peacekeeping. Well-timed retirements and reorganizations have side-lined many practitioners of military old-think. USG training (Operation Focus Relief, MPRI) demonstrates to the rank-and-file that a proper orientation wins equipment, training, respect, greater legitimacy, and professional opportunity. Whether the very upper ranks accept these opportunities as readily is perhaps still an open question. The sudden "scheduled" retirement of Army chief General Victor Malu came after his continuing obstructionist behavior, behavior that bordered on insubordination. But we should remember that President Obasanjo neutralized what we and others expected would be a real political threat (we recall some of our British colleagues predicting Obasanjo's demise within six months of assumption of authority). In fact, the sacking of the Service Chiefs, which occurred with some predictable protests from northerners, but not from the military establishment, represented a watershed in Nigeria's political-military relations: a clear assertion of civilian authority over the man-on-horseback.
Appendix I

Viewing cable 01ABUJA1547, NIGERIA: AFTERNOON TEA WITH PRESIDENT OBASANJO

Reference ID  Created  Classification  Origin

01ABUJA1547  2001-07-05 13:32  SECRET  Embassy Abuja

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

1. (C) After a several-week hiatus, Ambassador Jeter met with President Obasanjo for a relaxed, Saturday afternoon tea at the President's residence on June 30. A very positive and wide-ranging discussion ensued which included security assistance (Operation Focus Relief and MPRI), law enforcement issues (crime in Lagos, FATF, counter-narcotics and extradition), the Delta, inter-communal violence in Nasarawa State, Obasanjo's planned September travel to the U.S., new leadership for the OAU and ECOWAS, AGOA.

2. (SBU) Ambassador Jeter was accompanied to the meeting by his Staff Assistant (notetaker). The President's Principal Secretary Stephen Oronsaye was also in attendance. SIPDIS


3. (C) Ambassador Jeter began the discussion by noting that he had just visited Sokoto and Kebbi State (Ref C and D). The President noted that the Governor of Kebbi State, Alhaji Mohammed Aleiro, had recently been to see him, complaining that he was losing control of the mallams (Islamic religious leaders). President Obasanjo, chuckling, recounted that he had
suggested that Governor Aleiro stop giving them money while explaining to them that the President was coming to visit, and the money had to be put toward projects. The excuse would be that the President wanted to commission as many projects in Kebbi as he had in Sokoto. "After my visit," the President said he told the Governor, "just don't resume giving them any."

¶

4. (C) President Obasanjo, jovially noting that it was good that the Ambassador was "getting out to visit Nigeria's different regions," began to order the States he believed the Ambassador should visit, based on his view of the quality of State leadership. The President listed, in descending order, Katsina (Governor Yar'adua), Kaduna (Governor Makarfi - "he's a good boy"), Adamawa (Governor Haruna), Rivers (Governor Odili), Cross Rivers (Governor Duke), Bauchi (Governor Mu'azu), Plateau (Governor Dariye), Oyo (Governor Adesina - "Lam is the best of the AD governors"), and Benue (Governor Akume).

¶

5. (C) Huffing, President Obasanjo then added that Delta State (Governor Ibori) and Edo State (Governor Igbinedion) were "the worst."

NASARAWA UPDATE

¶

6. (C) Ambassador Jeter raised the recent communal violence in Nasarawa, that reportedly had displaced tens of thousands of people. The President said he too had heard that 40,000 people had been displaced as a result of inter-communal violence (Ref B). He further added that three police officers had been killed, and three were missing. President Obasanjo said that if he were asked to explain the reasons for the conflict, he would not be able to do so, except that it was a very old conflict between a people who see themselves as indigenous to the land (Jukun) and see the Tiv as invaders. The President further noted that the Tivs were an aggressive people, who had the reputation of taking over wherever they went. Ambassador Jeter elicited a knee-slapping laugh from the President when he rhetorically noted that General Malu was a Tiv. President Obasanjo concluded by characterizing Nasarawa State Governor Adamu as one who "behaves and talks maturely," and indicated that he believed the inter-communal violence would be brought under control.

AFRICA GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITIES ACT (AGOA)

¶

7. (SBU) Ambassador Jeter noted that he had met recently with the Minister of Commerce, and had attended the Vice President's opening of the Ministry's AGOA office on June 29. Nigeria had not yet met all of the requirements of AGOA, such as establishing a visa regime but there was clearly interest and efforts being made to do so. The President stated that Minister Bello wanted to begin selling inputs to countries that had already qualified under AGOA, and asked
the Ambassador if that was acceptable. Ambassador Jeter said that as far as he knew it was, but that it was also important that Nigeria finish meeting the requirements to receive the full benefits of AGOA. The President agreed, and explained that he had set an output target for goods under AGOA. In response to Minister Bello's request to sell inputs to qualified countries, the President had agreed but had doubled the target Minister Bello had to meet.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

¶ 8. (C) TRUCKS: The Ambassador informed the President that cooperation between the Embassy and the Army on Operation Focus Relief (OFR) had improved greatly in recent months, and that 1 Battalion (Birnin-Kebbi), 20 Battalion (Serti) and 222 Battalion (Ilorin) had been selected for OFR P3 training. However, there were several issues that needed quick attention and resolution. Ambassador Jeter informed the President that the trucks delivered to Nigeria during OFR P1 had still not been sent to Sierra Leone, and that the two "missing" trucks were still, in fact, missing. A visibly upset Obasanjo stated that he had wanted to deal personally with the issue of the missing trucks, but that NSA Mohammed had urged the President to allow him to resolve the issue. Turning to his Principal Secretary, the President proceeded to dictate a memo to the NSA. His composition to the NSA stated that he was upset that the issue had not been resolved as promised, and demanded resolution and a report by July 4. Turning to the Ambassador, President Obasanjo said that if the NSA did not report resolution by July 4, he would deal with the missing trucks personally. The Ambassador emphasized that unless all of the trucks from OFR P1 were delivered to Sierra Leone, the U.S. could not send new trucks for the units training in Phase 3. The President agreed, saying, "Naturally," and added that shipping the trucks was easy to accomplish and would be done.

¶ 9. (C) FOB: The Ambassador raised the need for a decision on a forward operating base (FOB) for OFR P3, and noted that the Air Force Base in Abuja had been discussed for many months; however, the Embassy had yet to receive a confirmation that the Abuja base would be acceptable to the military. The President asked Oronsaye to make a note for him to raise the issue with Minister of Defense Danjuma.

¶ 10. (C) MPRI: The Ambassador explained that the MPRI payment had been made, but that it had come up short by approximately USD 320,000. The President asked if that was due to fluctuating exchange rates, and waving his hand, said that it would be resolved. The more fundamental concern regarding MPRI, the Ambassador said, was that counterparts had still not been assigned for all of the team. This could be a very useful program for the Ministry and the military, Ambassador Jeter emphasized, but not until real cooperation existed. President Obasanjo firmly agreed that the program could be of great benefit, but said, "I don't think our people understand it well." He noted that he had discussed the program with members of the Services during a military retreat in Kaduna, and it was clear from the questions that there was a lack of understanding. However, he would meet the week of July 2 with the new Chief of Army
Staff (Major General Ogomudia), whom he described as "a man you can work with," unlike Lieutenant General Malu who "had a chip on his shoulder" and had "outgrown his shoes." "Just don’t worry," he told the Ambassador.

DRUGS, THUGS AND LAUNDERING

¶ 11. (C) FATF: Turning to law enforcement issues, Ambassador Jeter raised the FATF finding, and noted that he wanted to make sure the President was aware of the seriousness of the issue to Nigeria’s image. A visibly consternated Obasanjo said that the Minister of Justice had failed to act, and that he had reprimanded an apologetic Bola Ige during a recent Council of State meeting. (NOTE: After the meeting concluded, Oronsaye reiterated to the Ambassador the level of the President’s frustration over the confusion and lack of action by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance. END NOTE.)

¶ 12. (S) NDLEA SUPPLEMENTAL: Ambassador Jeter noted how pleased we were with the cooperation we were experiencing with the NDLEA. However, the Ambassador also told the President that the Embassy was concerned that the NDLEA had only received 350m Naira in the supplemental budget, instead of the requested 2.2b Naira. It was clear, the Ambassador noted, that the agency could not do its business without the resources, and that the size of the expected supplemental (2.2b Naira) had helped push Nigeria over the top during the 2000 annual narcotics certification process. A surprised Obasanjo, in reference to certification, said, "We're not done? We have to do it again?" The Ambassador explained that certification was an annual process. The President rolled his eyes, and said, "God must be God of Obasanjo. After what I did last time (in reference to the renditions), if the press had found out they would have torn me apart."

He then said that NDLEA would get more money, and asked, "If I give them another 350 million - - Is that okay?" The Ambassador responded that the key was that NDLEA be able to operate effectively.

¶ 13. (C) EXTRADITION: The Ambassador noted that, in terms of counter-narcotics certification, the Embassy was working with the Ministry of Justice and others to develop a workable extradition process. One piece would include training for prosecutors, and perhaps some judges, to serve on an extradition court. However, Nigeria would have to create such a court. Ambassador Jeter asked if such a court could be created. President Obasanjo responded that he would create it if allowed by the NDLEA enabling act. However, he said, Nigeria needed assistance in the form of training. In a dismissive response to a reference to AG Ige’s and Chief Judge Belgore's statements that such a court could be created (Ref A), an animated Obasanjo said "Belgore is the most corrupt judge in Nigeria. I will have to be very careful when I replace him in July."
LAGOS CRIME: Ambassador Jeter said he recently had seen Lagos State Governor Tinubu on the crime situation in Lagos. The situation had our people, and many other diplomats in Lagos, very afraid. There had been two carjackings of Embassy vehicles, and one Nigerian police escort had been killed. President Obasanjo said he was aware of the situation, and that it would be taken care of. (NOTE: The President implied that he had a solution in mind, but did not reveal his plans. END NOTE)

THE OIL BUSINESS

Delta AND OIL: The Ambassador noted that recent events in the Delta had raised some concern, particularly the hostage situation at the Exxon-Mobil Bonny Island facility (Ref E). The President said, "Leave it with me," implying that he had some action in mind, but not giving any hint of what it might be. The Ambassador then raised the oil block production sharing contracts (PSC) bidding process, and noted that some of the companies had expressed concerns the process seemed to have stalled. The President stated that he did not deal with commercial issues except to approve or disapprove a recommended action. Gruffly waving his hand, he told the Ambassador that he too should not get involved.

OAU, ECOWAS, AND DELE-COLE

The President stated that Nigeria would support the Namibian candidate, Foreign Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab, in his bid for Secretary General of the OAU. Ambassador Jeter noted that Ambassador Kouyate was also seeking the post. President Obasanjo said that Kouyate was a good man, but that before Salim-Salim, all of the Secretary Generals had been from West Africa and had been Francophone, so Nigeria was supporting a candidate from southern Africa. Turning to ECOWAS, Ambassador Jeter said that he hoped a replacement for Kouyate could be found who could match Kouyate's skills, drive and stature. Praising Kouyate, the President said that if he had his way, Kouyate would stay on in his present post. However, he noted, Kouyate had decided to leave. That being the case, Obasanjo said that the Chairmanship should remain Francophone, but that the Executive Secretary could be an Anglophone.

Ambassador Jeter asked the President if he had selected a replacement for Patrick Dele-Cole, the President's former Special Advisor on International Affairs and Nigeria's former Ambassador to Brazil (who was released during the cabinet shake-up in early June). The President said he had not yet decided if he would replace Dele-Cole, but if he decided to, the replacement would be Ad'obe Obe. Obasanjo described Obe as relaxed, bright and forthcoming. (COMMENT: Obe presently serves as the President's Personal Assistant and Speechwriter. While lamenting the departure of Dele-Cole, Embassy has a similar impression of
MESSAGES FOR WASHINGTON

18. (C) Ambassador Jeter asked the President if he had any messages he wanted to convey to Washington. President Obasanjo said he had little to convey, except that he was "really satisfied" with the state of the bilateral relationship. He then noted that he was anticipating an invitation from President Bush to visit Houston in September, where he expected to meet with former President Bush (the Elder), host a meeting of "Nigerians in the Diaspora" and speak at the Baker Institute. The President also noted that he planned to attend the Corporate Council on Africa Summit in Philadelphia in September, and to speak at Johns Hopkins on health care during that same trip.

SAA FLIGHT ISSUES

19. (C) SAA FLIGHT ISSUES: After the meeting with the President concluded, Ambassador Jeter raised the high number of turn-arounds on the South Africa Airways flight from Lagos to New York with Oronsaye. The Ambassador noted that the MOU on INS presence at MMIA was presently being cleared through the GON and that the Embassy was looking into INS training for Nigerian Immigration. In the meantime, however, there was a clear need for additional NDLEA presence at the airport to monitor the flight. Ambassador Jeter strongly emphasized the importance of the flight for Nigeria's image and any future hope of a U.S. carrier establishing a direct flight between the U.S. and Nigeria. Oronsaye resolutely agreed, thanked the Ambassador for informing him of the issues at hand, and promised to inform the President.

COMMENT

20. (C) The Ambassador and President had not met since the President's trip to Washington. The intent of the meeting was to catch up on various issues of mutual concern. President Obasanjo was interested, friendly and animated, particularly on security assistance. However, we were surprised by his continued lack of understanding of the certification process, and his lack of detailed knowledge on the conflict in Nasarawa State (Ref B and previous). However, the President appeared engaged and cooperative on nearly every issue. Ambassador will meet with NSA Mohammed on July 2 and raise a different set of issues following on President Obasanjo's May visit to Washington (septel).

Jeter
Appendix J

Viewing cable 01ABUJA1841, NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR MEETS CHIEF OF AIR STAFF

Reference ID  Created  Classification  Origin

01ABUJA1841  2001-07-26 08:52  CONFIDENTIAL  Embassy Abuja

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

CO N F I D E N T I A L  S E C T I O N  0 1  O F  0 2  A B U J A  0 0 1 8 4 1

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/RA BITTRICK, AF/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2011

TAGS: MARR MCAP MASS PINR NI

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR MEETS CHIEF OF AIR STAFF

(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 16, Ambassador Jeter met with the new Chief of Air Staff (COAS), Air Vice Marshall Jonah Wuyep. Wuyep was strongly supportive of the MPRI program. He and his staff emphasized the need for undergraduate pilot training and a domestic capability to carry out periodic depot maintenance and manufacture spare parts for the Nigerian C-130 fleet. Wuyep agreed to the use of Air Base Abuja as a forward operating base (FOB) for Operation Focus Relief (OFR) Phase 3 but said that no buildings would be available for OFR use. He offered to send a member of his staff along with the DAO/PA&E/3rd Group team to view the FOB that same day. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) Ambassador Jeter was accompanied to the meeting by Acting Defense Attaché Major Oliver Cass and Staff Assistant/PolMilOff (notetaker). AVM Wuyep was joined by Air
Commodore (AC) Kolawole (Logistics), AC MAD Bello (Operations), AC Ajomale (Plans), and a
junior staffer. Media was present during the initial courtesies and some of the discussion of
training and assistance for the Air Force

but then was asked to leave.

¶

3. (C) MPRI: The Ambassador stated that he believed the MPRI program was excellent and
could substantially and significantly assist the Nigerian Ministry of Defense and the military
Services to improve their budgeting, procurement and other systems. However, the
Ambassador noted, MPRI had not been embraced by the Ministry and the Armed Services to
date, and the program was now seriously behind the schedule described in the jointly-
developed action plan. Some of the team was still without counterparts. If positive change did
not come soon, he would have to recommend ending the program.

¶

4. (C) AVM Wuyep noted that he had been in the U.S. when he was appointed Chief of Air
Staff. While there, he had received what he described as "an excellent briefing" on both the
MPRI program and OFR. He agreed fully with the Ambassador on the value of the MPRI
program, and noted that his Service had sent a number of counterparts to the team. He believed
that the initial difficulties with the program were caused by a "lack of information." Ambassador
Jeter pointed out that former Chief of Army Staff Malu had been given briefings on both
programs (MPRI and OFR), but still pretended he did not know what they were about. Malu and
the Ambassador enjoyed a long-standing friendship, an Malu could have called on him at any
time to answer any questions he might have had. Clearly, Malu had some issues with the MPRI
program (and OFR), but avoided seeking information or answers that might have put his
concerns to rest.

¶

5. (C) FMS/IMET: Ambassador Jeter outlined the present FMS cases for the Air Force, as well
as the types of IMET courses available. Wuyep emphasized the need for pilot training
(especially undergraduate pilot training), and assistance for the Nigerian C-130s. AC Kolawole
stated that Nigeria needed to be able to perform periodic domestic depot maintenance on the
C-130 fleet. AC Ajomale added that the Air Force would like to develop the research and
development capacity to manufacture C-130 spare parts in Nigeria. In response to a question
from Major Cass about the operability of the C-130 fleet, Wuyep stated that two of the eight
Nigerian C-130s were operable, but that all eight had sound airframes and could be repaired.

¶

6. (C) Ambassador Jeter noted that the present level of security assistance for Nigeria was
likely to remain steady for several years, and these requests could certainly be entertained.
COAS added that it would be important for the Air Force to consider the end-state it would like
to reach with the C-130 fleet and other programs, and then communicate that to the Embassy.
PolMilOff added that the MPRI team was ideally suited to help the Air Force consider how to
plan for procurement and budgeting to reach such an end-state.

¶

7. (C) OFR FOB: Ambassador Jeter noted that the Minister of Defense had approved Air Base
Abuja as a FOB site for OFR P3. The Embassy wanted to work with the office of the COAS to
move forward quickly. The Ambassador noted that it would be helpful to have access and use of several of the buildings on the base for the FOB, and asked if that would be possible. He also noted that the Embassy team needed to view the base as quickly as possible. Wuyep said that while he approved the proposal to use the air base, there were not sufficient buildings to allocate to the FOB. The Air Vice Marshall then assigned one of his officers to visit the base that afternoon with the Embassy team. He also confirmed that electricity and water were available on the base.

8. (C) COMMENT: Wuyep and his staff were friendly and easy-going. Understandably, responsible for an Air Force with few functional aircraft, they were focused on ways to repair and refurbish their equipment and train their pilots. However, this initial meeting was very positive, and we expect good and open relations with the Air Force as a result.

9. (C) DAO COMMENT: The Nigerian Air Force clearly went out of its way to be accommodating to the Embassy team; immediately after the meeting with Wuyep, the A/DATT was able, on short notice, to make a tour of the Nigerian Air Force base to be used as the OFR Forward Operating Base (FOB). Not only was permission granted, the A/DATT was accompanied by the base commander. A detailed description of the A/DATT's observations will follow SEPTEL.

10. (C) BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION: Wuyep told the Ambassador that he flew missions for the Nigerian Air Force in both Southern and Eastern Africa early in his career, in support of "liberation movements," including the delivery of supplies to the ANC, SWAPO, and the MPLA respectively.

11. (U) Contrary to bio reports Post has seen in the past, Wuyep stated that fishing is not a hobby. He enjoyed fishing while training in the U.S., but does it very infrequently in Nigeria.

Jeter
Appendix K

Viewing cable 01ABUJA2226, STAR INTERVIEW -- ARMY MINISTER BATAGARAWA

Reference ID  Created  Classification  Origin

01ABUJA2226  2001-09-06 10:18  CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Abuja

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 06 ABUJA 002226

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2011

TAGS: PREL MASS MARR OIIP OPRC PINR KPAO NI

SUBJECT: STAR INTERVIEW -- ARMY MINISTER BATAGARAWA

PUBLICLY ADVANCES THE MIL-MIL RELATIONSHIP

REF: A. ABUJA 2072

   Â¶1. B. ABUJA 1436

(U) Classified by CDA Andrews; Reasons 1.5 (d).

Â¶1. (U) In the "Star Interview" section of the Daily Trust newspaper on August 30, Army Minister Lawal Batagarawa expressed his views on the security assistance relationship with the
United States and on Operation Focus Relief, in addition to other topics relating to the Nigerian military and Ministry of Defense. The Daily Trust is a newspaper produced in Abuja (unlike the majority of Nigerian dailies produced in Lagos), and has a significant readership in the North. Northerners have been the most suspicious of U.S. activities vis-a-vis the military.

¶

2. (C) Batagarawa had been aware of a desire on the part of the Embassy to have a larger and more focused media campaign on OFR and the MPRI programs, particularly to address rumors of "U.S. espionage," but had stated that the GON should lead this cause (Ref B). Recent public statements by President Obasanjo and Minister of Defense Danjuma on these topics, in addition to this particularly noteworthy interview, clearly demonstrate the Army Minister making good on his promise. The article is reproduced in its entirety in para 5 (particularly noteworthy sections are in all caps).

¶

3. (C) Batagarawa, since the inception of his tenure in February, has played a key role in working with the Mission to advance U.S. and Nigerian interests in regards to military-to-military programs. His willingness to personally intervene as Acting Minister of Defense on the security assistance program (Ref A) led to the eventual transfer of funds for the MPRI program. Moreover, through his good offices, ODC Abuja now meets biweekly with Ministry of Defense officials to work together to advance the Embassy's security assistance program.

¶

4. (C) Batagarawa is clearly intelligent, thoughtful, and unlike many of his colleagues, willing to make decisions on the spot when he perceives them to be in the best interests of Nigeria. Batagarawa may travel to the U.S. in early October. If he does, Mission strongly urges the Department and relevant Washington agencies to engage seriously and "roll out the red carpet" for this impressive interlocutor.

¶

5. (U) The Daily Trust, August 20, 2001

The U.S. is not on a Spying Mission - Batagarawa: Mallam Lawal Batagarawa is the Minister of State, for Defense, Army. In this interview with Hameed M. Bello, our Senior Reporter, he comments on renovations in the barracks, the 'downsizing' of the army, the Nigerian/U.S. military partnership, pensioners within the Army, the War College, and more. Excerpts:

Q: Did your appointment as Minister of State, for Defense, Army, come to you as a surprise?

A: Well, I am not sure I am competent to comment on my appointment, so I would rather leave that question.

Q: How have soldiers in the barracks fared since the advent of this regime in terms of welfare facilities, and so on?

A: Well, first of all, I will split your question into two. One is how do the private soldiers in the barracks feel. The most competent person to answer that question is the soldiers in the barracks. On the issue of the dilapidation of the barracks, we are dealing with these problems at
two levels. First of all, there is a presidential committee on barracks rehabilitation, whose
cchairman is a senior officer from the Federal Ministry of Works, with representatives from the
Army, Navy, Airforce and the Police. They are to handle and rehabilitate barracks for these four
services. Their modus operandi is that for now they have taken one major barracks from each of
the services and they are concentrating their activities on those barracks. The idea is simple. It
is to concentrate resources so that we have the maximum effect, rather than spread money in
such a way that the effect is not felt at all. I will give you a very simple example. If you allocate
N250 million, let's say to rehabilitate police barracks what it will come to about N1 million per
barracks, you will agree with me that such an effort will have no impact at all. That is why the
decision is that you concentrate your resources on specific barracks so that you achieve the
maximum effect. In other words the Army, Navy, Airforce and the Police have money within
their budgetary allocation for this year for barracks maintenance and rehabilitation. Now, what
we are doing is to pick barracks across the country and try to attend to part of the barracks with
the resources that are available. But again we are concentrating efforts and resources in
specific locations, not all over the country. Again what we want to do is systematically bring all
the barracks to the required standard, but we do not have the resources to do all of that at the
same time, so we make selections across the country.

Q: The Defense Minister has said that military commanders would be involved in the renovation
of the various barracks. Since government is emphasizing the reprofessionalization of the
military, won't that go contrary to government's efforts in this direction?

A: I think you are approaching it from the wrong perspective. A commander in any particular
location is responsible for the welfare and upkeep of his troops with their families. That includes
ensuring that the barracks is habitable. So if you do not involve him at the level of supervision,
who else can supervise this work? Is it just the professionals who will come today and go away?
He knows the minute details of what is wrong in those barracks. He has to certify that those
weaknesses or defects in the barracks have been dealt with, and that is the involvement that
the Minister of Defense is talking about. It is not that he (the commander) would be the one
awarding contracts, supervising the contracts and satisfying the contractors. That is a
professional job meant for architects and quantity surveyors and engineers. He is to ensure that
things are done correctly to the satisfaction of his officers and men. That is the level to which he
would be involved.

Q: Some two years ago when this administration came into power, one of the visions of the
regime was to downsize the military to make it mobile and provide facilities for them.

It seems as if this downsizing has been stopped. What is responsible for the stoppage sir?

A: Well, you have supplied part of the answer yourself. You will agree with me that this
government in each situation where it has committed itself to a particular activity, we normally
study the situation based on the objective we want to achieve, and then study is thoroughly
analyzed and then on the basis of the detailed knowledge we then go about meeting our
objective. We are in the process of studying the components that will determine what is the optimum size of the military we require. What sort of equipment do we need to provide for that military? So this is not something that you will jump into. It is something that you have to study thoroughly, you know. You have to take into account the training you require. You decide what is the optimum level of the military you require, then you straighten-out the hardware on the basis of that. Then you work out the training requirements on the basis of that also. It is when you do all this work and you have all the different components in perspective, that you begin to act. Another issue that you have to take into consideration, which is something you know very well, is the fact that the military is not like all human institutions. It is not something that is static; it is dynamic. Certain circumstances have changed between 1999 and today, and whatever we have to do we have to talk them into consideration, and we are taking those factors that have changed into consideration to determine what we are doing.

Q: Nigeria and U.S. have a military partnership which gave birth to Operation Focus Relief (Training for Combat Readiness). Nigerians do not understand this partnership. Some are even saying that Americans are on an espionage mission. What clarification can you make on this?

A: Okay, first of all, there are a number of countries Nigeria has defense cooperation agreements with. United Sates of America is one, the Russian Republic is another. Others are South Africa, Iran and a number of others. We have military cooperation agreements with them. As a consequence of these military agreements, we have two programmes with the U.S. One is Operation Focus Relief. Focus Relief is targeted as follows: A number of nations are involved in the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone with training and equipment. So, it is all the countries that are involved in the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. Focus Relief is targeted at all countries participating in the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. The Second is the MPRI program.

Q: What is MPRI?

A: MPRI is: Military Professional Resource Incorporated. It is essentially a group of retired, responsible military officers of American origin who are employed by the government of the U.S. to provide assistance to friendly countries like Nigeria that have military cooperation agreements with them. What do they do? It is a simple thing.- We sit in Nigeria and look at our military and identify what are the weaknesses in our military establishment. The military and the Ministry of Defense would sit down and identify what are the weaknesses in our military establishment. Then we sit down with these military personnel from the United States who have served in a number of commands and staff posts. We would ask them in what way should we deal with these specific problems. The point is simple, we lead, they support us. There is nothing like a spying mission. If we have professionals who have varied experience in Nigeria, we will use their services. The U.S. officials participating in MPRI are paired with Nigerian military officers, and whatever they do, is carried out jointly. We don’t allow the Americans to go into areas we consider sensitive to our security.
Q: I recall that the Nigerian Army has a reserve list which is supposed to be a list of officers who have been retired from the army and some of them have seen battle, especially in Biafra. Why haven't we drawn from the pool of these veterans? Is there anything unique about the MPRI that we need to learn from?

A: Well, first of all, let me start with the simplest position. You can always learn something new from another person. You learn everyday from your child. That is a fact of life. So, for every officer in the MPRI programme, we have his Nigerian counterpart, both serving and retired in which case we are already tapping into the experience of some of our retired personnel as counterparts to those Americans. Secondly, there is something unique about these people. First, technologically, they have an edge over us. Number two, in terms of management sciences, the American Economy has developed management sciences to an art, there is something we can learn from in this regard. In information technology, we can learn something from them. We are also learning from the Nigerian veterans..

Q: What do you think the Americans stand to gain from the partnership?

A: Well, first of all, let me start from peacekeeping operations. Everybody in the World has something to gain if the world is at peace. We have seen the catastrophes in Somalia, in the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In the Middle East Americans have an interest in peace returning to those areas just like everybody else. If there is peace in Nigeria, they will come and invest, and make profit.

Q: What is the cause in the delay in the payment of pensions? Why does the Ministry default in payment as and when due?

A: First of all, as you are aware, pensions in the last two years have been reviewed about three times. The increase in the amount of pension has gone up about 400 percent or more, about 600 percent, if I am correct. That has increased the volume of money we are to pay as pension. The second thing that has happened was that a lot of people who were entitled to pension, were not collecting pension because the previous amount was meager. All of them have come back into the pension scheme because the money is now important to them. Those not in the system before, you are not aware of them because maybe they have died, or for whatever reason they are not there. Now that they have come, it will change your budgetary allocation making it inadequate. These twin problems are basically things that have created a backlog. The third issue is that there are a lot of people who are not entitled to pension but who are doing everything they can to ensure they get on the pensioners' list. Because of the activities of these bad eggs, we have to be cautious so that due process of establishing who is entitled to pension is followed, and these massive increases have taken place on the basis of the two things I have identified means that we have to make adjustments. The budgetary system now if different from what is was before. This time, once you go before the National Assembly and they approve the budget, if you wish to change it, you have to take a supplementary appropriation bill to them, which has to get through due process. A combination of these factors is
responsible for the delays. We hope that these problems will be solved between now and December and with effect from January 1, we should not have any problem with the pensions. We hope by then, we would have had our facts and figures ready.

Q: Sir, there has been this allegation that even the selection process to the War College has been so politicized that those who do not merit to be there have been admitted. What comment do you have on this?

A: I do not comment on speculations. If you say it has been alleged, then what is the basis of the allegation? Unless you have certain specific cases on the basis of which I can respond, I don’t think I will respond to that question.

Q: In the 70s and early 80s when there was professionalism in the military, soldiers interacted among themselves in the officers’ messes. Now the messes are deserted, ministers don’t honor functions in the mess. What is responsible for these developments?

A: Let’s get our understanding correct. I will not say that going to the mess is what constitutes professionalism in the army. Number two, I don’t know how many messes you have been to, that you can say with any degree of authority that officers are not going to the mess. Number three, it is not all functions by the military that the minister has to attend. A lot of functions conducted by the army are not even attended by the Chief of Staff or his principal staff officers. Let us not trivialize the issue of professionalism.

Q: The present administration is keen on reprofessionalizing the military and the best way to achieve that is to train and retrain the military and equip it. What special training is the Army giving its men to keep them combat ready?

A: From the day a young man enrolls in the Defense Academy his career pattern is worked up to the time he will become a General. Okay, there are a minimum number of courses he has to attend. There are certain postings he must do, directing staff in training institutions and command. And these training facilities that have been allowed run down are now being rehabilitated and upgraded and that is the difference.

Q: There was a report that troops participating in the United Nations Peace Keeping Mission are in low morale, especially those from Ukraine, is the Nigerian troop having a similar experience? What is the cause?

A: I have been in Sierra Leone and I found the morale of our officers and men very high.

Q: In relation to the ex-Biafran soldiers who are agitating for absorption into the Nigerian Army, we don’t know what your ministry is doing on that and what the implications are for the Nigerian Army itself. What would happen if the army wish to reabsorb them?
A: You have just been asking me about "downsizing" the Nigerian Army and now you are asking me to reverse gear and go the another way. Let's face it, the Biafran Army was involved in treason. To fight your country or against your country is treason, alright? These people were not staff of the Nigerian Army, so how do you reabsorb them? Reabsorbing means you were in before and you are being taken back. They were never in before, so how can they be taken back? Unless you are saying we should go and recruit the former Biafran Army into the Nigerian Army. That's a different ball game altogether. They cannot talk of reabsorption because they were never part of the Nigerian Army. Biafra is not Nigeria.

Nigeria is Nigeria. So you can't reabsorb soldiers from another country into your own country.

Q: The government has been talking about transparency in public life for the nation to move forward. What efforts are the Army making to ensure that there is transparency in all its activities?

A: You see, transparency requires a number of things, but the most fundamental is that there must be checks and balances and we are complying in the Nigerian Army with all the rules and regulations. There was a retreat for the military in Kaduna and Ibadan and we are going to go round to all the military formations to do this retreat as part of the effort for the campaign for transparency and accountability. Also specific programs are being worked out at different locations to deal with these issues.

Q: At the retreat in Ibadan, the president called upon the officers to open up so that government would tap from whatever complaints they may have and find out how to satisfy the rank and file of the military in terms of morale and so on. How was your experience in the course of the retreat?

A: It was very beneficial, very educative and it was a good training ground for me.

Q: What measure is the Nigerian Army taking, especially with your leadership to ensure that the Army does not make any incursion into politics?

A: We have agreed that one of the best ways to keep any mischief-maker in the military from making any incursion into politics is basically good government and you will agree with me that this government is providing that. Two, the press has always been involved in promoting extreme disharmony in the society in a fundamentally negative fashion. That provides the military boys the excuse they are looking for. So, the responsibility is not that of the government alone. It is for all of us. What do we say about ourselves if mistakes are made, how do we approach the resolution of those mistakes? In 1983, some people were openly calling for the military to take over. The press was urging the military on. In 1993 when Chief Shonekan was the Head of State, some people were openly telling Sani Abacha to come and let the military finish what they have started, hand over to, Abiola and all that. The Press and other influential members of society can play their own part.
Q: Sir, would you support an Obasanjo/Atiku ticket come 2003?

A: You don’t need to ask that question.

Q: For what reason sir?

A: Look, let’s get it right. First of all, why in the first place do we support Obasanjo? All the reasons that recommended Obasanjo to be supported by all Nigerians are still valid today, two years later. Added to that, you will testify there is greater hope in the Nigerian system. In 1999, Niger Delta was a total no go area. It affected the important economic activities going on in Nigeria, especially the exploration of oil. The Niger Delta is peaceful today. There is no vandalization of pipelines, no kidnapping of oil workers, economic activities are picking up in the place and express roads have been constructed. Even in Abuja, today there is relative security and there is calm all over the country. In the year 2000, the economy grew, for the first time above the rate of population growth. You can see electricity supply stabilizing in Abuja and it is the same all over. In some parts of Lagos, especially the industrial area, there is a continuous power supply for 22 hours non-stop. Proper lights, not the mini-mini lights (laughs). The cost of food items has gone up since the inception of this government and salaries have also gone up, so that people could afford various items. We should be happy about that. Out of your salary you can pay school fees comfortably. Most civil servants are even buying cars.

Q: (Cuts in) Tokunbo cars?

A: Still, it is a car (laughs) no be car? Is it not better than walking over long distances? There is qualitative improvement in our lives in the past two years. Some people out of genuine ignorance have not articulated this. Some do so out of mischief, some out of dishonesty, but the truth of the matter is that the achievements are there on the ground for people to see. We wish to extend the borders of peace on the African continent. That is very important, we should never underestimate peace. This government has brought peace. It has brought greater security for life and property, and when you take all these together, you don’t need to ask me whether I would support Obasanjo or not come 2003.

Q: Finally sir, what legacies would you like to leave for the Army?

A: That is left for history to judge, not for me to say. One thing I would say is that I am prepared to give my best in order to improve the situation beyond the level at which I have met it.

Q: What sort of Army would you like to leave behind?

A: The most efficient, the most effective and the most respected Army in the world.

Andrews
Appendix L

Viewing cable 01ABUJA2451, NIGERIA: MINISTER OF DEFENSE ON UNAMSIL ROTATIONS,

Reference ID Created Classification Origin

01ABUJA2451 2001-09-26 08:37 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Abuja

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002451

SIPDIS


TAGS: PREL MASS MARR KPKO SL NI

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: MINISTER OF DEFENSE ON UNAMSIL ROTATIONS,

505 AGREEMENT

REF: A. STATE 143583

Â¶ B. ABUJA 2117

Â¶ C. ABUJA 2289

Â¶ D. STATE 151930

Â¶ E. ABUJA 2218

Â¶ F. ABUJA NI 228

Â¶ G. STATE 141654

Â¶ H. ABUJA 2448

Classified by CDA Andrews; Reasons 1.5 (b/d)

Â¶1. (C) CDA Andrews, accompanied by DATT, called on Minister of Defense Danjuma 25 September. After the Minister offered his personal condolences on the attacks against the U.S., and CDA offered his condolences for the victims of the Jos riot, he raised the USG request that Nigeria adjust its troop rotations for UNAMSIL (Refs A-F). Danjuma stated that when he returned from his vacation, he was told of the meeting between Ambassador Jeter and the
President and informed that the President had agreed to keep one battalion in Sierra Leone until January. However, Danjuma explained, the MOD had reviewed this and the subsequent request (that Nigeria not replace one battalion leaving Sierra Leone in September), and had determined that the MOU between Nigeria and the UN that governs Nigeria's participation in UNAMSIL did not permit the GON to meet the U.S. request. He added that he had briefed the President on his analysis, and the President had agreed that Nigeria could not make the change without UN consent. The President had agreed to send a letter to the Ambassador explaining this position, and Danjuma provided a copy of the letter. (Text of the letter to Ambassador Jeter, which Embassy has yet to receive in original, is at para. 7.)

¶

2. (C) If UNDPKO approached the GON and made the request, would the GON reconsider, Andrews asked? Danjuma replied that Nigeria had already begun to rotate troops, and that some had been airborne (over the Ivory Coast) when told to return (following our initial requests). Danjuma said, "The troops have been at the two airports ready to go for two weeks. I would not want to face them. I would not want to explain to them the kind of game we're playing." When Andrews asked the timing of the planned September rotations, Danjuma was unsure, explaining that that information was with the Chief of Defense Staff. (DATT COMMENT: 65 Battalion rotation began on 17 September but was summarily cancelled and troops called back. The cancellation does not support a Nigeria/UN agreement either, since rotating units after one year is a general policy. END DATT COMMENT)

¶

3. (C) Turning to OFR P3, Andrews explained that the 505 Agreement between the U.S. and Nigeria signed in September 2000 would have to be amended to cover some equipment being transferred in Phase 3 (Ref. H). Andrews explained that the MFA had forwarded the Embassy's Note and the proposed response to the Minister's office for approval, which was required urgently. Danjuma said he had not seen the documents. (COMMENT: CDA provided the Minister with another copy. END COMMENT)

¶

4. (C) Andrews then told Danjuma that he had been to see the Air Force Minister, Dan Chuke, to request a blanket clearance for medical evacuation in light of OFR P3. (Ref G). Danjuma was unsure if even he could approve such a request, let alone the Air Force, and opined that the request might have to be forwarded to the Presidency for a decision. (DATT COMMENT: MOD was the next stop after seeing Air Force Operations and the Air Force Minister. END DATT COMMENT)

¶

5. (C) Finally, Andrews noted that former PDAS-D McConnel was planning a trip to Nigeria soon, and that OFR and MPRI FY02 would be on his agenda. Andrews noted that Nigeria still had not paid the outstanding $320K for MPRI FY01. Danjuma seemed mildly surprised that the outstanding payment remained an issue.

¶

6. (C) COMMENT: It seems clear that MOD and DHQ have driven the reversal of the President's decision to support the initial USG request. Nigerian soldiers are poorly paid, and
UN PKO deployments mean equipment and additional salary. The Minister’s concerns about informing expectant soldiers that they will not deploy and will not receive additional income are unfortunate but understandable. It is unlikely that the GON would reconsider this position, or would have the ability to reconsider it (due to bureaucratic inertia) in time before rotations occur. The two battalions rotating in (73 and 65) are the units that were originally scheduled for training in OFR P1 but were replaced because of logistical/basing issues. With these two Nigerian battalions rotating in now, there may be room under the UNAMSIL troop ceiling for only two of the three Nigerian battalions being trained in OFR P3. END COMMENT.

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(¶) Begin Text:

21 September 2001

UNAMSIL TROOP DEPLOYMENT

I write in respect of your meeting with President Olusegun Obasanjo on 24 August, 2001 during which you conveyed a proposal from your Government concerning the rotation of Nigerian battalions participating in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). On that occasion, as might be recalled, the President was positively disposed to the US suggestion that one of the Nigerian battalions expected to be rotated out in September be kept until January 2002. A further request was subsequently made on behalf of your Government that the Nigerian battalion to be rotated out of Sierra Leone should not be replaced. I am to inform you however the His Excellency’s attention has been drawn to the fact that Nigeria’s participation in UNAMSIL is governed by conditions spelt out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between it and the United Nations (UN). This agreement requires certain steps be taken before a contributing country can increase or decrease its troop size in UNAMSIL. It will therefore be understood that it will not be proper at this stage for Nigeria to change the composition of its forces in UNAMSIL, as this will amount to unilateral abrogation of the MOU. Accordingly, it has been decided that the rotation of Nigerian battalions in UNAMSIL should proceed along the lines earlier arranged with the UN and it is hoped that you will appreciate the difficulty in acceding to the request of the US Government. Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and personal esteem.

/sgd/

Ambassador A.O. Esan,

Ag. Chief of Staff to the President, C-In-C

cc:

Honorable Minister of Defense

Honorable Minister of Foreign Affairs
8. (U) Freetown minimize considered.

Andrews