ROOTS OF RURAL POVERTY IN YIL NGAS OF PLATEAU STATE, AD 1902-1952: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLONIAL EXPLOITATION AND SOCIAL DEPRIVATION

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THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE POST GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTERS IN ARTS DEGREE IN HISTORY

IN

THE FACULTY OF ARTS
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY,
ZARIA, NIGERIA.

JANUARY 2001

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own personal research and has not been submitted elsewhere for the award of any certificate.

CERTIFICATION

This thesis titled "Roots of Rural Poverty in Yil Ngas of Plateau State, AD 1902-1952: A Political Economy of Colonial Exploitation and Social Deprivation" by Samuel Barde Gwimbe has met the requirements for the award of Masters of Arts Degree in the field of History at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and thus approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am exceedingly grateful to God Almighty for His sustained grace over my life and the protracted period, which the writing this thesis has taken. I am most sincerely grateful to my Supervisor and First Internal Examiner, Dr. Enoch Oyedele, who repeatedly took time to go through the drafts of this work and made useful criticisms and suggestions, which have boosted its standard or quality. His kindness, understanding, fatherliness and friendliness to me, have known no bounds. He is a father and a God-fearing man indeed. My gratitude to my Second Internal Examiner, Dr. George Kwanashie, who exhibited encouraging interest in what I have contended in this work, is in ample proportions.

Late Dr. Mahmud Modibbo Tukur, who was my very first Supervisor died shortly after I had just began doing the research. I shall always remember his kindness and fatherliness and those meaningful discussions we had while seated on mats in the carpeted parlour of his residence near the ABU Post Office or Main Campus' main gate. He read and approved my proposal before he died. Dr. Tukur was a mentor who played not a small part in shaping my world-view as an undergraduate. May his soul and those of the faithful departed rest in peace. Amen.

Dr. Yusufu B. Usman grounded our History Departmental PG set in the seminal and critical traditions of our discipline. Professor Joseph Inikori widened our scopes and perspectives on contemporary world history. Dr. Charles K. Gonyok, at various times discussed the subject of this study with me. He has been my guardian since I came into School of Basic Studies several years ago. He kept reminding me of this study, to complete it. Professor (though at the time, Dr.) Monday Y. Mangvwat showed personal interest to supervise this work. The History Departmental PG Coordinator at the time, Dr. Y. B. Usman, thought differently, to guard against what he called in-breeding. Prof. Mangvwat has maintained a sustained interest in my progress and completing the work ever since. He wouldn't receive my greetings at a time, due to my delay in completing this study, but later changed that posture though no significant change had taken place at my end. I thank him for accepting me as I was.

I am very grateful to my mother, Nana (Mrs) Na'omi Neliyt Gwimbe Barde, who in times both good and hard, stood by my side with financial and culinary support in her own special way. I am grateful to my brother and his wife, Nde and Mrs. Gideon G. G. Barde, who supported me and never lost confidence in the fact that I could finish the study. I am grateful to my brother and wife, Nde and Mrs. Joseph D. F. Barde, who spared no effort to look for means to support me. I am grateful to my sister, Sarah, and her husband Nde Frederick G. Deshi, who ensured that that their support got to me from time to time. My thanks go to my eldest brother and village-head of Lungpye, Nde Paul G. Barde and his family, my eldest sister Rebecca G. Barde, my sisters, Nasande Fwenji, Ta'aziya Mwatungwa, Ladi J. Jitau, and their husbands, for all their prayers and tokens of support in ways too numerous to mention.

My gratitude goes to friends both of many years and those recently contracted. Dr. Lakshmanan E. Chelvarajan, who, for the joy of wanting us to be together, bought the form and mailed it to me when I was miles away. Silas Mwarangshak was always there for me with gifts and visits from Jos, which encouraged my studies during the Coursework. A shared communal life of **esprit de corps** developed and prevailed between me Architects Iliya D. Mamman and Philip Ephraim in such a scheduled way that each became a benefactor, co-cook and servant to the other two, in an equal and godly way. For that reason, I did not suffer much lack during the Coursework. Moses and Sarah Chigh were very observant Navigator missionaries and mentors who sympathized with my situation so much that they often gave support to meet specific needs at just the right time. Bulus Silas-Bossan, who then was Administrator of The Navigators Nigeria gave me lodgings when, because I lacked the resources both to stay in a guest-in and to photocopy materials, I studied and copied source-materials at the National Archive, Kaduna, for ten months at a stretch. At different times while reading at the said Archive, in Kaduna, I was hosted by my police-officer-cousins Golwi Kassem whose family, were very kind, and Ghana Yilwatda, who was still single.

John G. Longkat, Judah T. Goladi, Dr. Dan'azumi S. Bukar, Baju A. Ibrahim, Dr. Samuel W. Jimba, Salome N. Samuila, Isaiah A. Odagboyi, David E. Bwai, Ibrahim Tukur, as well as their spouses where applicable, The Navigator family in Gindiri, and other friends and relatives too numerous to mention, have over the years spoken to me, prayed for me and offered help or assistance in various ways. I thank all of them. Samuel Vilji, Abel B. Kato, and Pam G. Tiri for assisting me in word-processing and production of the draft, which was submitted for oral defence. They laboured hard and produced it in a short period of time. I remain grateful to them. My thanks go to Samuel Dabit for assisting me in the scanning and resetting and to Joshua F. Chundusu and Bitrus G. Saleh for assisting me in the final printing of this work.

My wife, Victoria, our niece, Nendelmwa, our children, Seyilnen, Nengolong, and Nkinpyeji, endured the periods of my absence, supported me in prayers and kept patiently waiting for when I would finish this work. I thank them for their love and understanding and for always being there with caring support and encouragement.

ABSTRCT

This is a study of the origins of rural poverty in Yil Ngas. This is an area situated on the south-eastern escarpment of the Jos Plateau, Nigeria. Employing the Marxist methodology of political economy, the study is an attempt to investigate the historical colonial reality of the origins or roots of rural poverty in the area, and the processes which facilitated their development, as a way of educating NGOs and individuals who are interested about tracing the causes of poverty as well as bringing 'development' in the area.

The period 1902-1952 is examined. In the process, the assumptions (or hypotheses) that the Yil Ngas is poverty-ridden now because of its difficult and rocky terrain (held by some elites) and, that, poverty has always been a cardinal part of social life in that area (held by some colonialists) are examined and dismissed. Colonial and anthropological views and positions, which are tantamount to distortion of Ngas pre-colonial and/or colonial history, to an extent, are broached and placed where they rightfully belong.

Rural poverty in Yil Ngas is viewed in the final analysis, in its changing dimensions, as a corollary of the colonial oppression and exploitation of the area, especially, its rural areas, during the stated period. The area and the people were both underdeveloped on the altar of serving and protecting colonial interests. The study finally, maintains that unless this unfortunate basis, of the development of rural poverty in Yil Ngas is reckoned with, no meaningful strategy of development would evolve or be successful, for quite some time to come.

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
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Abbreviations & Acronyms :

ABU : Ahmadu Bello University
ADO : Assistant Divisional Officer
BAUPROF : Bauchi Profile (archival code)
CMS : Church Missionary Society
CUMP : Cambridge University Missionary Party
DO : Divisional Officer (or District Officer)
DSP : District Superintendent of Police
JOHLT : Jos Oral History and Literature Text
JOSPROF : Jos Profile (archival code)
MO : Medical Officer
MRO : Mines Recruiting Officer
NA : Native Administration, or Native Authority, or Native Administrative (Area)
NAK : National Archive, Kaduna
NT : Native Treasury (or Native Treasurer)
OC : Officer Commanding
RWAFF : Royal West African Frontier Force
SNP : Secretary Northern Provinces (also, archival code)


PLATEAU STATE SHOWING YIL NGAS
KADUNA STATE
BAUCHI STATE
NASSARAWA STATE
TARABA STATE
YIL NGAS


ETHNIC GROUPS
IN PLATEAU PROVINCE
RUKUBA
IRIGWE
BIROM
PLAINS ANGAS
MONGUNA
RON
SURA
HILL ANGAS
CHIP
TAL
PA
HILL YERGUM
KULERI
MONTOL
PLAINS YERGUM
MAMA
KOFYAR
GOEMAI
LEGEND-
ETHNIC GROUP NAMES-
ETHNIC BOUNDARIES
PLATEAU EDGE
0 5 10 20 30 40 MILES




Fig (IV) A SKETCH MAP OF PANKSHIN TOWN

CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCING THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction

This prefatory chapter attempts to introduce this study and cater for the explanation of some key concepts, which are used in the study. In outline, it therefore comprises the definition of scope by space and by time; the statement of problem; the significance of the study; our chosen approach; and the (more or less) operational definition of some terms and concepts used in the study.

1. 1 Definition of Scope: The Place

Inhabitants of the area of study mostly, if not all, call it **'Yil Ngas,'** and call themselves, **'Ngas'mwa'**[1]. Special variants of these two names are **'Yil Nkar'ng'** and **'Nkar'ng'mwa'**, respectively. Yil Ngas literally denotes 'Ngas country,' 'Ngas world,' as well as 'Ngas land', which is the more common conception nowadays, while Yil Nkar'ng, which is more philosophical, denotes 'land of true humanity'[2] Essentially, therefore, Yil Ngas is the country where the Ngas people live, recognise as their homeland, and possess a particular outlook on life.

Yil Ngas is located on the south-eastern escarpment of the Jos Plateau. It stretches down from the roughly level top of the plateau to its foothills and even beyond, covering an area of about 2,334 square kilometres. It lies between latitudes 9° to 10° North and longitudes 9° to 10° East. By 1919, Ngas population, according to F. Beckles Gall, was 76,089, which was second only to that of Hausa-Fulani in the then Bauchi Province.[3] The 1963 census gave the population of the Ngas as 129,204, -- of whom 5% lived in Pankshin town. Although the

projected population of the Ngas living in their districts in 1985 based on the government established growth rate of 2.5 %, was over a quarter of a million, that is, 250,000. Today, they probably number about half a million.[4]

The major yardstick of the definition of Yil Ngas, which is used in this study, is politico-cultural. Yil Ngas was not apparently contained, at any time, in a single central state during the pre-colonial period.[5] It was only in 1952 that it became constituted into a single chiefdom, namely, the 'Angas Chiefdom'. Even geographically, it hardly constitutes a region; besides being the south-eastern flank of the Jos Plateau, Yil Ngas is markedly bisected into two 'regions': the obvious basis for the 'Hill Angas' and 'Plain Angas' categories used in colonial records.[6] Its altitudinal differentiation already indicates to an extent that it is also characterised by elements of climatic (or geographic) and dialectal (or linguistic) variation. Nevertheless, this does not obscure its uniformity in view of the following considerations, just for instance:

1.1.1 Names:

A clear indication of self-consciousness in Yil Ngas is the fact that the Ngas have common names for themselves, their lineages, their land, as well as for their neighbours. A place-name often of necessity signifies something of a unique society on the political and/or cultural map of the world; the name of a people inhabiting a particular place does not only identify them in relation to their geographic environment, but also gives them a cultural identity which is peculiar to them **vis-à-vis** other communities. In the case of' names such as **'Ngasmwa'** and **'Yil Ngas'**, it is not merely an abstraction from observed fact of 'cultural

unity' that has lent them to us through the good eyes of an observant anthropologist, as was the case with the **'Kofyar'** studied and christened as such, by Robert McNetting in the 1960s.[7] On the contrary, these names attest to Ngas recognition of their oneness or sameness, and have probably been in use for a long time.

Perhaps the oldest group names in Yil Ngas are the **'s'm nyam-mwa'** or couplet lineage names, whose meanings are often linked with Ngas intra-regional migrations and ancestries, always depicting — but, sometimes, on different grounds other than these — the historic roles of each of the lineages in the distant past.[8] Ngas lineages are mainly identifiable on the basis of their couplet, masculine and female agnatic, names. However, within the sphere of their indigenous religious practices, instances of intra-lineage intercourse do occur, which unite, characterise and give certain lineages a common sense of belonging. In such situations, a lineage is often characterised by its peculiar deification of one or some 'beings,' 'spirits' or idols, in the Ngas pantheon over and above the rest. Lineages with similar tendencies in practices must usually have been related in terms of having a common ancestor or a shared experience, in the past. It is regarded in some quarters as a shameful thing for a Ngas man or woman not to know his or her **s'm nyam,** which implies that, the person does not know his or her roots in the provinces of Ngas history. **S'm nyam** is also significant on the social plane because it represents and bestows a sense of 'brotherhood' or fraternity to people sharing a common one. Two Ngas people would see each other as fellow kinsmen upon discovering that they share the same lineage name.

The pair of names, one for sons and the other for daughters, belongs to that lineage alone. Examples are: **Ngo'chin** for males, **Po'kaas** for females; **Su'wa** for males, **Cha'lm** for females; **Ji'bem** for males, **Ma'nchip** for females.[9] Most instructive perhaps is the fact that these lineage names cut across various communities or districts within, though sometimes going outside, Yil Ngas.[10] Processes of inter-lineage 'fusion' might have been going on for a long time within and in-between polities, communities, and groups, which possibly is the reason why they comprise clans and members of different lineages. This must have contributed, at least to an extent, in the evolutionary process of a 'Ngas' culture, with its dynamics and features, before the end of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, till today the Ngas villager still holds on to his ancestral identity, his **s'm-nyam**, his name of historical belonging.

1.1.2 Dialects of a Language:

The Ngas people speak, as their own language, '**Shhk-tok Ngas**,' which is spoken with many dialects and varieties, in all the districts that constitute present day Yil Ngas. Although Shhk-tok Ngas has been classified by Joseph Greenberg as a member of the Angas-Gerka cluster of the Chadic branch of the Afro-Asiatic Family of Languages,[11] we are concerned at this point with Shhk-tok Ngas as a medium of communication, which to an extent, constitutes or lays bare the cultural distinctiveness of Yil Ngas, and not necessarily with what constitutes it as a language, its basic vocabulary, its origins, its development, and so on. The fact that there are dialects of Shhk-tok Ngas does not mean that there are also corresponding cultural distinctions; the dialectical differences are minor and

express themselves in accent.[12] Indeed the Ngas 'dialects' arose probably in consequence of the subtle influences of distance, relief, and time; but are at some points very closely related (should we observe) and, in some cases, constitute a little problem in conversation. The gap between such dialects is far smaller than between any of them and another related Chadic language (or dialect). Their generic name of '**Shhk-tok Ngas**' is not restricted to any one of the dialects; it is shared by all of them.

Ade Obayemi's observation that the most stable basis for defining cultural identity is the linguistic or dialectal, arising from his study of Ijumuland, is very instructive.[13] To an extent, the delimitation ofYil Ngas that presents itself to us today is derived from our awareness of Ngas language-speaking districts, villages, hamlets and their environs, in the geographic area already indicated above

1.1.3 **Customs and Traditions:**

In answer to the question, "Who are the Ngas?" Charles Gonyok aptly said in 1974, they are the "Ngas speaking people, who speak the Ngas language, with similar customs and traditions and recognise themselves as one and the same people, namely, Ngas."[14] Perhaps we need to add: who live in, or recognise Yil Ngas as their homeland. Yil Ngas is the indigenous home of the Ngas people: its physical (and social) environment, mutability, and the fertility of its soil(s) among other factors, willy-nilly affect the evolution of their (material and spiritual) culture, implying, in other words, the development of their ethos, language, customs, traditions, folklore, outlooks and so on.

Ngas traditions of origin often generally tend to retrace the routes they followed when they migrated from Bomo, or the Chad Basin to Yil Ngas, as they believe they did.[15] Versions of these traditions of migration differ with differing lineages and or places. But we hereby identify the migration-account chorus of these various traditions or versions, as an aspect of cultural uniformity in Yil Ngas, regardless of their peculiar details or differences.

The Ngas numerous festivals[16] -- **nmos-luun, nmos-taar, nmos-nwong, nmos-b'el, nmos-mor'gi, nmos-bwir,** and so on -- which are celebrated widely, also go a long way to expose the fact of cultural uniformity in this area. It is true that some communities celebrate some of these festivals with peculiarities in style. It is also true that different areas or communities celebrate a given festival at different times from their neighbours, both cases however simply indicate a conscious attempt to create variety on the one hand, and some room for each concerned community to play host to their neighbours, in turn, on the other. In spite of varieties, and different timings, the names of the festivals are (most usually) the same in meaning or significance, throughout Yil Ngas, or wherever each type is observed.

Initiation ceremonies like **Vwang**, for boys, and **Mbwaa,** for girls, also characterise the customs of Ngas people. **Vwang**, which is more popular probably, also has a longer antiquity, especially if it is true that the (male) age-grade system was a feature of all the communities in this region.[17]

A basic characteristic of Ngas festivals and such initiation ceremonies is that they have 'officially' or generally recognised musical tunes, and the types of

instruments that should be played in each case. Naturally the tunes dictate the dancing steps and the singing patterns whereby every singer composes and sings his own lyrics in harmony with the general melody. In the case of some festivals and ceremonies, **nmos-b'el** and **mbwaa** in particular, there are already fixed dancing steps, and in most cases, fixed lyrics, whereby all the dancers and singers, dance and sing together in harmony. However, despite the 'national basis' of most of the tunes, varieties of local tunes, which are peculiar to some parts of Yil Ngas, also exist. Such tunes are usually associated with such areas by inhabitants of other parts, who usually appreciate such peculiar tunes and then endeavour to copy them. Perhaps all the Ngas tunes developed and spread in this way. This has partially been made possible on account of the sameness of the musical instruments used throughout Yil Ngas.[18]

The Ngas 'indigenous' conception of life's continuity is not only a link between the dead and the living, but also the re-incarnation of the dead men (and women) who were of good social and moral standing, when they were alive. Apart from their **nwong-mwa**, or ancestral spirits, who must have been men of good conduct when they were still alive, before they were named as such, the Ngas also recognised the superiority of several other supernatural forces. 'Beings' in the Ngas pantheon, which included **Nen,** or God, **Njzhi'ghol,** or Satan. **Po'tng, (Ndur'hhk, Ntat'mei), Nwong-mwa** or ancestral spirits, **Kuum-mwa, Tau (Mmam)-mwa,** or idols, and the rest, did not command equal honour in the land. **Nen** is acknowledged as the overwhelming 'Being,' access to whom, and to whose counsel and power, is made through the other lesser 'beings,' with

one lineage or family preferring the 'services' of one, two or more of the 'gods' different from those preferred by the others.[19] In this way, the Ngas indigenous religionists do 'surrender' the determination of the calendar and times of their festivals, ceremonies, sowing, harvest and so forth, to the dictates of the 'gods' especially preferred by the royal and priestly clans of their villages as something which has been reserved for them, -- a clear basis, as to why differences no matter how minute, do exist in these affairs.[20]

At a personal level, a typical Ngas man would conceive his nature or existence as totemic. Totemism -- the belief that men have counterpart lives in animals, each man's double being a particular wild animal whose death or sickness entails that of the man[21] -- most probably characterised conceptions of man's nature; indeed the fact that '**song**,' the Ngas word for 'totem,' which literally means 'branch,' is not only known in, but also appears in the folklore of all Ngas communities (should we again observe), is a testimony of the place of totemism in Ngas cosmology. How both totemic life and good conduct fit into the reincarnation-matrix to engender continuity is not yet clear to us. We are presently concerned with identifying the cultural uniformity of Yil Ngas, and these features, for that matter, bear significance.

Therefore, granted the tenability of a cultural definition of a society, Yil Ngas can be seen as a society with a measure of concrete, internal historical development, which is peculiar to it, at least in form.[22] Related aspects of spiritual culture (as we attempted to demonstrate above) are themselves attestations to a shared process of historical evolution in a given society. It is our view that unique

aspects of material culture, and their relatedness with respect to (polities and) communities of Yil Ngas, can be more easily adduced only after an analysis of the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial political economy of the region has been made, and this study slightly broaches on its colonial aspect.[23]

1.1.4: **Area:**

The districts occupying Yil Ngas today would comprise Ampang-East, Amper, Kabwir, Garram, Wokkos, Pankshin, Kadung, Fier, Lankang, Chip, Pai, Tal, and Dishili Districts; all but the last, are in Pankshin and Kanke Local Government Areas of Plateau State. Dishili is in Bogoro Local Government Area of Bauchi State and for obvious reasons it is not included in the details of this study.[24] The other twelve district units (with their designations) were created in 1935, sequel to the imposition of colonialism, which started in Yil Ngas, in principle, in 1902, but in practice, in 1906.[25] The colonialists, in 1952 carved them out, though still under Pankshin NA, designating them as constituting 'Angas Chiefdom,' with a single chief, the 'Sarkin Angas' as its native administrative head.[26] Prior to colonialism, it seems the Ngas lived, largely organised in small states and/or independent polities. Administrative structures and titles must have been similar for (most, if not) all of the polities. This is significant in defining the historical, or nineteenth-century, Yil Ngas, the end of which is broached in chapter two.

A regional definition of Yil Ngas is possible, however, from various standpoints. A tenable approach is to describe the area by means of

circumscribing landforms. For the timebeing, we advance a definition once given by David Belin, a community health specialist on Yil Ngas, thus:

> The Ngas villages occupy both the ridge of the hills stretching from Tambes hills in the north-east, that form the escarpment of the Plateau, stretching westward to Rafin Sayi. A band of land north of the Kwanan Mayi escarpment stretching to the border with Mangu LGC and south of the escarpment, stretching to the Kanam, Langtang and Shendam LGCs' borders.[27]

Indeed many hills, streams, dry valleys, villages, terraces, and so on, characterise Yil Ngas. Some of the sub-urban centres in Yil Ngas today are Puel (otherwise, Dawaki), Per (otherwise Amper, or Chika), Kabwir, Jannaret, Kwabzak, Lankang, Chip, Langshi and the rest of them. Pankshin (formerly Fang'chen) is the main urban centre. One tarred, federal road passes through Yil Ngas from Jos through Pankshin and Amper to Langtang. A state road links Lankang area to Shendam, from Panyam. Another links Amper with Dengi. Another links Tafawa Balewa and Kabwir, through Puel (Dawaki). Virtually all other motor roads are local government, community or even village-owned roads.

1.2 Definition of Scope: The Time

History is the totality of human activity over space and time; whose study necessarily demands to be characterised not only by space (as contextually defined above) but also by the dimension of time. Unlike space, time has only one very fundamental, dimension: it is linear and irreversible; a precondition for the mutability of matter. The study of human activity 'over time' already implies 'influx.' Indeed, historical study cannot attain its real dimensions unless it is seen in the dynamic perspective of time. Hence the necessity of defining Yil Ngas in the context of time in this study cannot be over-emphasised.

This study is focused specifically on the colonial period of Ngas history, especially on the period AD 1902 to 1952. With regard to 1902, that was the year the colonisation of the Ngas began to be considered by Frederick Lugard and his lieutenants. With regard to 1952, that was when the final reorganisation of Pankshin NA, in which the Angas Chiefdom (which is the approximate political unit, ever to have been created representative of Yil Ngas) was created and the yearly exploitation of peasants' produce by executive fiat was abolished. As a basis for comprehending the colonial period, a survey of the eve of the colonial period going back to the end of the nineteenth century is attempted, as the immediate anteceding period.

1.3: Statement Of Problem

The sustenance of social life in Yil Ngas is increasingly and manifestly becoming harder and harder in this contemporary time. Even the general concern for social development among the Ngas in the last few decades attests to this assertion.[28] The situation as it appears is such that beckons the question: How long can man survive in Yil Ngas, if nothing is done? Let us look at some of the dimensions of the problem in the following:

1.3.1: Ecology:

A great threat to social life in Yil Ngas, probably, is the persistent desiccation of water resources and vegetation, in the absence of which man shall not live. Most of the pools, ponds and streams that used to provide for some fishing, garden-irrigation, drinking-water supply, swimming, and so on, have now

become beds of sand, of gravel stones, and deep, dry valleys, awkwardly reporting the erosion and weathering of the land.

In the hills, where the stream-beds often have less silt, the rain water always quickly flows off to the plains; but even there, the wet season torrents often wrought the flooding of the streams, chopping off their banks and corroding the silt-base, draining away into the lowlands of the Benue valley. This naturally results in decreasing humidity and increasing aridity, affecting all forms of life. However, the dearth of drinking water supply, as its impact, especially during the dry seasons is already too obvious in Yil Ngas today.

Another objective expression of decreasing humidity is the drying up of economic trees. Trees like **t'ng mhes**, or the locust bean, have already started withering away, fast. In some places, most are either already drying up, or too old to bear reasonable fruits. Young ones seem not to be growing up, at the scale at which the old ones are drying up. (And no one seems to care about planting them.[29] Yet everyone dreads the demise). Swamp grown plants like **ayaba** or the banana, **b'et** and **buu,** which are stalky-grass species used in making mats, and baskets, can hardly hold their own against the increasing waterlessness of the valleys. Besides, several former marshes have been cut into large stream troughs sequel to the heavy orographic rain torrents, and can no longer sustain the roots of plants such as these. Terrace farming, perhaps, the most formidable technique employed by the Ngas in controlling their environment in the production of material wealth, is on the ebb: it is becoming fashionable now to farm the valleys and plains and to neglect the hill-tops and sides. Probably this 'shift' in the

preference of the plains to the hills in cultivation (whereas in the past the hills were well cultivated as well) has had a negative impact on the nature of man's relations with his environment in Yil Ngas.

In a predominantly agricultural society such as Yil Ngas has been for most of its remembered past, sustained victory of man over nature is necessary in order to continue to produce material life needs. Engels long ago, aired such a view plus a warning, thus:

> let us not, however, flatter ourselves over much on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory, it is true, in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel the first.[30]

Hence, we should beware of nature's moves and seek to curb them always or we would continue to wonder how our predecessors lived in the places where we are living today. There is therefore a big cause for alarm in Yil Ngas since this seems to be the ecological question there today.

1.3.2: **Labour:**

Labour emigration, a feature, quite typical of twentieth-century Yil Ngas, must have had serious, adverse, effects on agricultural practice in this land, especially if emigration was not very significant before.[31] After the arrival of colonial domination and Christian missions in Yil Ngas, many Ngas youths and couples, have left home to live elsewhere often serving in capacities other than tillers. These can be grouped into three. Firstly, those that left for mission centres such as Kabwir, Wusasa, and Gindiri, to serve as 'missionaries,' pastors, messengers,

workers, and dispensers. Secondly, those who left for want of better, often less hilly, less stony farm lands in the lowlands of the Benue valley in particular (some however went as far as the bushes of Makurdi and Shagamu) some of whom became known as **ngo'dendi-mwa**, bohemians or roving fellows (who sold their labour and moved from one town to the other as they fancied). Today, the drift into the lowlands is much more remarkable. Thirdly, those who left home often through employment or schooling and are now dwelling in former colonial centers, mining-camp centres and cities and working in the services (civil, military, educational, medical, private business, and what have you)

The attitude of leaving home to go and work elsewhere has become so entrenched that a typical Ngas youth always desires and awaits the slightest opportunity to leave home until circumstances suggest the contrary. This therefore becomes very instructive as a large number of the labour force gets pulled out, which implies a fall in the scale of land cultivation, in spite of the increasing population. If this implication has any basis at all, then it cannot be unconnected with the ecological question, raised above. Obviously, in a land where more and more people are leaving for other places, nature would have an upper hand to frustrate social life. The situation Yil Ngas may not be too far from that now.

.3.3: **Material Resources:**

The popular conception of agricultural practice at present, which has to do with extensive, mechanised food production, might be easily used to write off the hill and rocky plots of Yil Ngas as utterly uncultivable. Nevertheless the Ngas have survived there predominantly as (petty) agriculturists by means of intensive

and bush-fallowing techniques of crop cultivation. Production of food with presentable surplus proportion above the subsistence level was possible even in the pre-colonial period (except that natural disasters sometimes imposed economic disequilibrium on the peasants).[32] Today, that is hardly the case. Most Ngas farmers are just managing to survive. The purchase of new clothes, of bicycles and motor-bikes by some of the farm folks have almost always depended on financial supplements given them by relatives working in towns elsewhere. Mere poll tax payment could be a big burden. Some children cannot continue schooling because their parents cannot afford the fees. **Nyiin** or hunger, often raises its ugly head during the months of July to August when the previous year's grain is exhausted, or tends to be exhausted and the early maize harvest is still at hand. That period is generally regarded as **taar nyiin,** the season of hunger. A lot of water must have passed under the bridge during the intervening, especially colonial, years, for the matter to attain its present intensity.

Rather more recurrent in the ordinary conversation of the villagers or tillers, is the term, **choor,** that is, poverty, which implies not only **nyiin** or the lack of food, but lack of other human 'needs' such as livestock, economic trees, clothing, shelter, furniture, money and the rest. However, the problem of getting food is gaining greater emphasis. **Choor** is sometimes spoken of figuratively like: **yii ki yel!:** the year has torn apart!; **yii ntami nyi, mu del mu putd nye'da?**: shall we go through this particular year at all?; and so forth. Customarily among the Ngas, as it may be among other peoples, it is not virtuous for one to talk of one's poverty plainly except with one's relative (who, by kin ethos, is expected, if

not bound, to offer one some help). So any inquirer, who happens to be an 'outsider' must at times wade through a shroud of metaphors and imageries to grasp their tale of lack.[33]

It is little wonder therefore, but quite illustrative, when old Ngas rural folks relate an account of a locust invasion of Yil Ngas and the resultant tales of woe and strife with *marked* audacity.[34] Why? -- the present **choor** often willy-nilly calls forth the memory of one starring case of relative similitude, or the other in the past. Locust invasions were natural hazards, which 'attacked' the province of Ngas social life; but is there any relationship between that and to the present situation? Both of them are periods of relative material lack, though vary in intensity, time, and nature of causes. The present **choor** in Yil Ngas, as far as we know, did not derive from a locust invasion. But no attempt has, in any quarter, been made, to trace and examine the cause(s), as far as we know. It might be an interesting experience for anyone to make a humble contribution on that score. Likewise an assessment of the concepts of wealth in Yil Ngas, such **mbii'katd,** or **long** as opposed to that of **choor**, would better present us with the nature of the latter, which is over-proclaimed as the **problem** facing the majority, if not everyone in the villages, by many Ngas people both at home and abroad.

1.3.4: **Politics:**

The politics of the Second Republic bore and bred two ugly questions in Yil Ngas: the land and the chieftaincy questions. The Ngas saying that **luu kh b'aam maar,** 'residence usually confiscates the farm-field' became a matter of

theory, when several clans lay ownership claims on stretches of square kilometres of land and insisted that such claims be recognised in the new districts' creation exercise of the defunct Nigeria People's Party (or NPP) administration in the former Plateau State.[35] Inhabitants of such pieces of land, no matter how small, were subjected to the wishes of the owner-clans, and any objections on the part of the inhabitants were often met with threats of seizing their farms, or inflicting injuries to their property and lives. Whole villages were declared 'landless,' whole wards of villages declared 'settler areas.' Before then, the question of land (ownership) rights had not been so explosive, for quite some time. This had the negative potency (and it still does) of causing increased emigration of peasants from such villages into the lowlands outside Yil Ngas, further exacerbating the containment of society by nature in the rural areas.

Intricately connected to land is the institution of **Ngolong**, which is the Ngas word for 'king' or 'ruler,' and/or 'chief'. In most cases, the occupant of that stool automatically becomes the sole-arbiter, if not the sole-owner in matters of land within his territory.[36] He, in council with his **diskammwa** or **miskammwa,** body of advisers or elders, could send into exile (with the co-operation of law enforcement agencies) anyone either from a spot or the whole of his territory. He could grant the 'proprietorship' or caretaker-ship of any piece of land to subordinate clan; he could also frustrate the continued stay of some clans in his territory by denying them the usufruct of even the farmlands in their bush neighbourhood. This also had (and still has) the negative potency of causing the

emigration of victims of the high-handedness of reactionary chiefs, with the collaboration of the law enforcement agencies.

The question of who may become **Ngolong**, when a stool becomes vacant, is the most explosive aspect of the chieftaincy question. Many members of royal clans, even ex-servicemen and retired civilians, often strive to become district heads because only members of royal clans who have become district heads are qualified to contest for the office of the **Ngolong Ngas** (a colonially created all Ngas chieftaincy stool), which position is both prestigious and lucrative.[37] It is as lucrative as the position of a local government chairman, for which people also bitterly contest. Hence, while on the other hand we see a horde of toilers hoeing and weeding the stony farm yards to eke out a living and possibly pay their taxes, on the one hand we see retired pensioners engaging in (bitter) strife over positions as in their capacities as **Ngolong-mwa,** or politicians, seeking to be **Ngolong Ngas**, local government council chairmen, chairmen of 'development' associations, of fund-raising/launching ceremonies, of parents and teachers associations. Such is the paradox of life, there. Therefore, instead of considering objective ways of how they can help alleviate the **choor** of the local folks, the chiefs and big men are more concerned with prestige and lucre; their roles and support of 'development associations' notwithstanding. They seem to be more interested in wielding and exercising authority over land, a lot more than in its renovation, rehabilitation or replenishment.[38]

1.3.5: **Problem:**

Having thus raised some of the aspects of the **problem** facing social life in Yil Ngas, without begging the question, we reiterate that life there is hard as these aspects, though mere appearances or symptoms, have combined to show. Indeed, the motivation to 'move the motion' for a historical study of Yil Ngas, especially its colonial period, arose largely from our perception of the trend of affairs there today. In the last few decades, 'development associations' have sprung up everywhere, mostly organised on district, sub-district and village area bases, and a general Ngas Development Association was formed in 1984 for the same purpose. In spite of their peculiar, even ulterior (sectional, 'class') objectives,[39] the development of Yil Ngas is a repeatedly common objective to all such development associations, which is quite instructive indeed.

But they have generally conceived the **problem,** the nature of the current socio-economic situation in Yil Ngas, as that of an ever-present stagnation, underdevelopment or backwardness, without question.[40] Such an attitude amounts to 'groping in a blind alley' for a solution to a problem whose nature is not yet known: it is only from a proper diagnosis of a disease that the correct treatment can be given.

Hence the study of the historical development of Yil Ngas especially in the first half of the twentieth century should not only be viewed as timely and instructive, but a necessary part of the *sine qua non* for the invention of any 'development strategies' at all for the area; as this has become the assumed behest of some of the associations, especially the elite-based ones. They have mistakenly placed the cart before the horse. The only way they can comprehend the nature of

the current socio-economic situation in Yil Ngas is to conduct nothing less than a historical study of the area, locating it in its concrete objective context, and therefrom go on to play their own part in changing it.

On our own part we simply observe that social life is becoming harder (expressing in a changing natural environment, degenerating labour power, and the talk about poverty) while nothing is done to identify its root causes, though efforts are inadvertently made from time to time to talk about the situation. This is the statement of the problem as it appears to us. Unless and until the roots of the problem are traced, (even if in part only) we see no certain possibility of objectively addressing this unfortunate situation prevailing in Yil Ngas.

1.4 Significance of Study

This study is significant in various ways, some of which are as follows: Firstly, our choice of Yil Ngas is deliberate. Its political economy is largely unstudied.[41] Whereas there is an increasing range of studies on Yil Ngas and even on its colonial historical experience, none has focused on the analysis of its political economy during the colonial period as we have attempted to do. This study of the dynamics of its underdevelopment as a colonised society would be very instructive, since its concrete experience might be quite peculiar. Secondly, as Yil Ngas is thus studied, it could be viewed as another humble contribution to Nigerian historiography. Since Yil Ngas is a 'hill-plain' society on the one hand and a 'minority' area on the other, it ranks among groups on which little has been covered.[42]

Thirdly, we hope that by looking at Yil Ngas between 1902 and 1952, we shall better be able to assess the nature of the changes, which occurred in its wake. Fourthly, we have attempted to underscore the need to take a closer look at the closing years of the nineteenth-century Yil Ngas to see clearly into its nature as a society in order to verify or discard some of the remarks made by earlier writers on Plateau societies, some of which appear to be more pedestrian and adventurist than anything else,[43] at least with due reference to Yil Ngas. Fifthly, we have attempted to lay bare the outline of what happened during the colonial conquest of Yil Ngas, an apparent area of controversy. Sixthly, we have attempted to show the nature of changing responses of Ngas elite and peasants to colonial exploitation and oppression up to the early years of the decade before independence.

1.5 Method Of Study

The method of investigation, employed in this study, is constituted by two significant factors: the kind of approach and the types of sources, as are briefly shown below.

1.5.1: **Political Economy Method**:

For purposes of clear analysis and objectivity, this study has been approached and done by means of Marxist methodology or political economy method. Political economy itself studies the relations of production and the conditions governing their development, which, in other words, are the same thing as conditions governing the production, distribution, exchange and consumption of material goods and services at various stages in the development of human

society.[44] We prefer the political economy approach because, in its economic analysis, it does not ignore the nature of political power, the class basis of the state, the influence of state policies on the economy and the mutual influence of various socio-economic systems conflicting or co-existing in the society. Some other advantages of this method are:

(i) As a historical science,[45] political economy conducts its analyses historically, a process which involves assessing relations of production through the stages of their emergence, expansion, consolidation, transformation, and so on.

(ii) Having arisen from the materialist conception of history, political economy gives primacy to material conditions, in the explanation of social life, because they are not only fundamental to human life but also objectively influence and affect human behaviour, in various ways.[46]

(iii) Political economy takes great advantage of materialist dialectics; it follows the dialectical provisions of historical materialism (which, among other things, involves the wholistic treatment of the society as a living and developing organism)[47] and applies them to the study of economic, political and social processes, and,

(iv) Political economy proceeds from the concrete to the abstract and then from abstract to concrete; it lays out the subject of investigation into its component parts and studies them separately (that is, analysis) and then reproduces (in theory) the subject of investigation as a whole entity through the piecing-together of its components (that is, synthesis)[48] and

thereby the 'essence,' 'inner logic' or 'true nature' of social phenomena, is revealed.

1.5.2: **Sources**

The sources used in this study are categorised as follows:

(i) Oral accounts collected by means of interviews conducted by the researcher.

(ii) Oral history and literature texts which have been compiled by others.

(iii) Secondary works, published and unpublished, composed by other researchers with bits of relevant information; and,

(iv) Archival materials or records and documents bordering on colonial correspondence and administrative policies and practices. As it turned out to be, the archival materials have furnished us with the bulk of the evidence analysed in this study more than the other sources. Since they are available, and given the peculiarity of our approach (which recognises, but does not depend fundamentally on any figures and quantitative values, to reach qualitative conclusions),[49] we seem to have given them deserved attention.

Concerning areas of apparent controversy which, to an extent, oral sources have gone to great pains to intensify, such as are generally covered by our chapters two and three, we have attempted to offer clearly objective angles, backed by extensive quotations of colonial eye-witness or first-hand accounts, which have not been advanced by other researchers, as such.[50] Points where we

disagree with colonial positions, and indeed other researchers, are to the best of our ability, indicated.

1.6 Operational Definition of Terms and Concepts

Some of the key terms and concepts employed in this study are used with the following definitions in mind:

a. Capitalism: This is a socio-economic system which flourished in Europe after the Industrial Revolution began in Britain in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Its development meant the demise of the feudal socio-economic system, which preceded and engendered it. Capitalism denotes private ownership of means of production and exploitation of man by man in the context of antagonistic class divisions, especially involving industrialists (or bourgeoisie) and wage labourers (or proletarians or workers) or as it also obtained in some colonial settings (like Jos Plateau), petty-commodity producers (or peasants). Up to the middle of the nineteenth century, not only had capitalism spread its tentacles to other parts of the world but was now prepared to secure sources for raw materials and of huge profits (through the disposal of its excess industrial products) in West Africa, and Nigeria in particular. Colonisation was the necessary option available to the capitalist system at that time, hence Britain occupied Lagos in 1851. In the course of time capitalist colonialism was spread all over Nigeria especially through conquest.

b. Colonialism: This was the system of direct subjugation, administration and exploitation of one nation or country by another. It was a system of 'domination' and 'violence' and not merely a matter of 'rule' as some people tend to regard it; it

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involved, first of all, subjugation (often by invasion and conquest); then administrative control (or imposition of an alien order) and ultimately, exploitation (which involved the taking away of material resources and the making of huge profits at the expense of the labour of the colonised). Colonialism began in Nigeria in 1861 with the formal annexation of Lagos by Britain and formally ended in 1960. In reality its roots were sunk on Nigerian soil before 1861 and its tentacles (for example multinational companies) are still very much with us.

c. Core-Periphery Concept: This concept is employed to describe any socio-economic system in which a centre of control and decision-making (that is, the core) is established and then structurally imposed on the surrounding areas (that is, the periphery) whose material and human resources it keeps draining and exploiting, in a one-way traffic fashion, without remitting anything other than what would enhance further exploitation of the periphery. To quote Palmer and Parsons:

> One problem with core-periphery models is how to relate the local and regional cores together in a world hierarchy, which leads to the use of terms such as 'peripheral centres' and 'semi-peripheries....' Nevertheless, the concept has great utility in clarifying a number of questions. For example... how the very words 'rural' and 'poverty' are expressive of the deprivation of peripheries to their core areas within a single socio-economic system.[51]

Hence, in that regard, the concept remains useful and significant.

d. Peasantry: This is a collective term descnptive of peasants. Peasants are semi-independent petty-commodity producers who, by implication, have not been separated from the means of production, by means of which they produce their

subsistence, but have at the same time been subjected to a relationship of domination, subordination and exploitation by a capitalist class, within a capitalist colonial system. They are, in other words, "those whose ultimate security and subsistence lies in their having certain rights in land and in the labour of family members on the land, but who are involved, through rights and obligations, in a wider economic system which includes the participation of non-peasants."[52]

e. Means of Production: This concept refers to the aggregate or combination of the implements of labour (including the hoe, axe, bow and arrows, hammers, saws, spades, and any machine tools) with the objects of labour (including the farmers' lands, the miners' layers of ore, or the lumber-jacks timber and forests, in other words, the objects to which the producers of goods direct their implements). Without them, man can produce nothing.

f. Forces of Production: By themselves however, the means of production can produce nothing. The most advanced automatic machine is a dead machine without man's labour. Along with man's labour (his hands and brains) the static means of production are set in motion for the production of material goods. It is this combination of man's labour with the working of the means of production which constitute the forces of production.

g. Relations of Production: These are the relations, which develop between categories of people in the process of producing material goods. In as much as relations of production cannot be visibly seen, touched or used (in the sense in which implements of labour can), their material character lies in the fact that they take shape and exist objectively, often independent of the wishes of the people

involved, but relative to their corresponding rights to the means of production and what is eventually produced. Essentially, relations of production are economic relations, which constitute the basis of a given society, allocating to each category of people the economic and social standing apropos of their group or class. On that basis arises the social superstructure in which politics, sports, philosophy, religion, fine arts and the administration of justice, are practised, and/or done.

h. Mode of Production: This concept denotes the specific way in which the means vital to life in a given society are produced under historically defined forms or kinds of relations of production. To every set of relations of production there is usually a characteristic and corresponding set of forces of production. In other words, it is the interconnection of a particular set of relations of production with their corresponding set of forces of production, which constitutes the mode of production in a given society.

i. Ecocline: This denotes an area, which constitutes a buffer zone between two (or more) territories inhabited by comparatively larger ethnic groups than the smaller and yet partially unique one(s) inhabiting the buffer zone(s). Cultural variation (whether economic, linguistics, political or religious variation) between the buffer zones (or ecoclines) and the larger communities often appear blurred, which on the one hand makes them (the ecoclines) cultural melting-pots between the larger groups, exhibiting a scenario of a varying continuum which is devoid of a sharp line of demarcation between the larger groups and, **ipso facto,** bestowing on them (the ecoclines) slightly unique features of distinct ethnic groups (though

possessing mostly, a combination of features of the encircling, large communities) on the other.

In the light of this concept, for instance, our definition of the boundaries ofYil Ngas, in this study, is only approximate, not accurate, because "the existence of ecoclines, regions of gradual rather than abrupt shifts from one local ecosystem to its neighbour, makes it difficult to demarcate even broad ecosystemic contrasts."[53] The 1952-creation of the Angas Chiefdom, only roughly approximates to its area. This concept is, however, employed because it objectively explains a phenomenon, which is peculiar to the south-eastern part of the Jos Plateau, which has been described (by Isichei) as a cultural 'shatter belt.'

j. Rural Poverty: Poverty itself denotes finding people in a situation, which is characterised by severe deprivations and adverse occurrences that are closely, though not exclusively, associated with inadequate economic resources.[54] One determinant pre-condition of poverty in a society is when its power structure is lopsidedly favouring the few as against the many. For instance, when the colonialists took over the reins of authority in Nigeria, they readily allocated to each area and segment a specific role reflexive of the power structure in which the colonialists and the 'urban' centres (where they lived) constituted the top flank while the peasants and the rural areas (where they lived) constituted the bottom. Wealth was redistributed on the basis of that structure, whereas, as a dialectical corollary, the distribution of poverty took the reverse order.[55] That is the basis of rural poverty's existence. Apart from the fact that, in absolute terms, poverty is the concrete existence of those severe deprivations and adverse occurrences often

closely associated with inadequate command of economic resources, in its own right – which means it can occur in any sector of the society, 'rural' or 'urban' -- however in relative terms, rural poverty is founded on the prism of comparison which usually renders poverty in urban centres to be a mere tip of the iceberg compared to the deeper and severer deprivations prevailing in the rural sector. Low living standards and definite inadequacies in things like nutrition, clothing, housing, sanitation, health, education an so on may often not be as terrible in the cities as in the rural areas simply because the powers that be sometimes show their magnanimity to alleviate conditions of poverty in the cities (which otherwise will remain an eye-sore, to them) through sponging on the over-stretched rural areas. Rural poverty, therefore, is the existence of those concrete conditions of severe deprivations and adverse occurrences, which are often closely associated with the sub-servience of peripheral areas to their core centres resulting in their inadequate command of economic resources;[56] a sub-servience emanating from the lopsided structure of political power in the society, in the first place.

k. Absolute and Relative Concepts of Poverty: When studies of poverty began in the Western countries in the nineteenth century, researchers attempted and today some are still attempting to establish a basic or fixed yardstick against which poverty could be measured anywhere and anytime, that is the so-called poverty line. Because of its supposedly general applicability, this concept of poverty is known as absolute poverty. Usually, its measurements border on assessing the quality of food, shelter, clothing and health services available to suspected victims of poverty and, as a result, absolute poverty has increasingly come to be known as

subsistence poverty. In other words, when people suffer deprivations even of their means of subsistence (within the context of their society), then it is said that their poverty is absolute.[57] That is the sense in which the concept is used in this study.

However, implicit in the revised understanding of absolute poverty is that implication that, within the context of a given society and time only can poverty be properly explained. There is nothing like a general yardstick employable in all societies for all time, for measuring poverty. Poverty then is best measured in terms of the acceptable judgements of members of a particular society of what is considered a reasonable and acceptable standard of living and life-style according to conventions of the day.[58] That is the first basis of relative poverty: it varies with differing place and time. Another explanation of relative poverty is that, in an impoverished society, some areas are poorer than others. It is in both senses that relative poverty is used in this study.

1.7 Summary

In this chapter, we have attempted to define the scope of this study, make a statement of the research problem, of the significance of the study, of our approach and the sources and finally gave an operational definition of some terms and concepts, which are used in the study. Chapter two, which is next, attempts to describe the political economy of Yil Ngas on the eve of the imposition of colonial domination on the area. This enables us see what obtained in Yil Ngas just before the colonial period began. Chapter three looks at how colonial domination was imposed on and how its immediate impact shocked and to and extent disrupted the political economy of the area. Chapter four looks at how the

area was turned into a colonial rural economy, having been engrafted on to the extractive capitalist colonial economy on the wider Jos Plateau. Chapter five examines the agonies of the area during the Second World War in the face of severe exploitation. Chapter six concludes the study.

Notes

1. Firstly, "Angas" is a Hausa-Fulani version of "Ngas", which is clearly an adulteration or a translation of the latter, the proper name with which the people call themselves. "**Ngasmwa**" is simply the plural of Ngas. "Ngas" as a word often functions as a descriptive noun. Secondly, as it might seem, I do not intend to imply that **Ngasmwa** are the only inhabitants of **Yil Ngas** today -- there are many others settled in different locations in the land such as the Hausa-Fulani, and the Tarok. Pankshin town, which is clearly a cosmopolitan community, comprises people from different parts of the country.
2. The term "**Nkarng**" has been translated by Isichei and others as "true soul" and "good mannered person" (see P. Yearwood (ed), *Jos Oral History and Literature Texts, Vol. I,* JHP, One Harmattan, Jos, 1981, p.xxii). But from my understanding of Ngas language, I see "nkar'ng" as a concept denoting a high human nature, which expresses in good manners and kindliness, hence my usage of "true humanity" as the suitable translation. On the other hand, "Nkar ' ngmwa" literally means the "public, " the "community" or the "crowds." However, its meaning comes out more clearly when it is put beside its opposite "Nlaabmwa, " which is the generic term for non-Ngas peoples, characterised by both a low human nature and uncultured manners. But this conception of things is fastly fading away in the face new ideologies such as Christanity.
3. I think that F. Beckles Gall and his informants must have estimated this figure. The colonialists could not have successfully undertaken a head count of the Ngas ople by 1919, which time, though, all the villages had been conquered, they did not have the man-power to conduct a good census. See F. B. Gall *Gazetteer of the Bauchi Province*, (Waterlow and Sons Ltd, London, 1920), p.18
4. All the other figures in this paragraph are derived from D.. S. Belin, "Strategies for the Development of Ngasland with emphasis on Health," paper presented at the Ngas Youth Movement Convention on on Saturday, 21st Dec., 1985. Cognisance must be given to Charles Gonyok's 1974 Ngas population figure - 126,860, - which is markedly lower than David Belin's 1963 census figure - 129,204. See Gonyok's "The Ngas and the Coming of British Administration, 1906-1935," BA Dissertation, History Department, ABU Zaria, 1974 (mimeograph). Interestingly, neither Gonyok nor Belin has given his source of the figure. The difference between their figures might be due to the changing constituents of the people called "Ngas", which has forced Charles to employ the term of "Ngas proper," versus "general Ngas" whereas Belin appears to be passive on this matter, quoting a projection of population from 1919 and 1963 figures. Either case, to me, is essentially an estimation; only suggestive of what Ngas population might have been. On the other hand, however, these figures, projections and estimations generally fail to reckon with the rates of emigration from and immigration into Yil Ngas.
5. Charles Gonyok's view is that they -- the Ngas -- lived in "dispersed hamlets, organised on village bases," which were "politically independent from one another" until sequel to the coming of colonial administration that they were re-organised into districts (op.cit, vii, p.10). See also Monday Mangvwat, "Class Formation in the Plateau Province: The Genesis of a Ruling Class 1902-60," (Ph.D Thesis, Dept of History, ABU Zaria, July 1984), pp. 43-4, whose view is that there were separate chiefdoms, "lineage-based, " but it was only later on that colonial efforts were made to put them under a single "tribal" paramount chief - and this was also done elsewhere in the

entire south-east and south-south-east shatterbelt of the Jos plateau, not only Yil Ngas. If the past cannot be clear to us, the present situation is: the districts of Yil Ngas do not merely form local governments, rather they fall within two states - Plateau and Bauchi - as the text will show below.

6. Charles Gonyok asserts in his work referred to above, that these two names have been given merely for geographical ---therefore administrative convenience. While some historians and anthropologists have used the term "Angas" uncritically, some have not only applied the "hills" and "plains" categories uncritically but have made efforts to read other meanings into them. For instance, Robert McNetting *Hill Farmers of Nigeria: A Cultural Ecology of the Kofyar of the Jos Plateau*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1968, p. 43) asserts that the hills have been tagged "refuge areas" because - besides "the fact that no one knows the circumstances under which the hills were settled - it is obvious that the hill settlers resorted to the hills according to his supposition being unable to "hold their own against the technological and organisational superiority of their neighbours." As it were this position is now being challenged and it beckons the question: where did man first live, the plains or the hills? The point is that, I think, McNetting 'is wrong!
7. Netting designates the "Kofyar" (an abstracted term from observed fact) as "the inhabitants of a sociogeographic region of relative cultural uniformity which is recognised by the actors, though not directly by means of a tribal name...." op.cit,pp.35-6. If this designation goes for the Kofyar, I realise that it can also go for the entire "linguistico-cultural group," a part of which the Kofyar and the Ngas only constitute (see Mangvwat, op.cit, pp. 43-6) .By the same token, therefore, the cultural definition of the Ngas (with a common name, living in a sociogeographical area speaking the Ngas language conscious of their cultural uniqueness with a single over-all chief) as a feature of Yil Ngas justifies its categorisation as a separate unit of study.
8. Each pair of **s ' m-nyam-mwa** (one for sons, the other for daughters) is a symbol both of identity, and pride in one's past. The Ngas man who is faced with danger is likely to incant his **s 'm- nyam** thus **"Piri! Ngo 'chin", "Piri! Suwa" or "Piri! Ngwan"!** both to invoke the fortunes which are supposedly associated with his identity as well as the power of the achievements of his ancestors or, to invoke their spirits (their **nwong-mwa**) to come to his rescue .The historicity of a **s 'm-nyam** is borne out by what it means or signifies, which, as far as I know, often reflect the user's inherited experience in the long ago past. For instance, **"Ngo ' chin"** means "the man that drives (others) away", **"Ngon'dyi"** means "the man that hails from **Dyi"**, whereas **"Su' wa"** rhetorically means "before whom has he run away?"
9. The sense of "brotherhood, " especially within a large clan, in some lineages would be such that forecloses in-group marriage, which if contracted would mean incest, which the the Ngas people generally abhor. Nevertheless, some lineages allow in-group marriage, even within the same clan. Some lineage names reveal the roots of the lineage, in terms of their last abode or most important place of dispersion within Yil Ngas or within the wider linguistico-cultural country as a whole, (see footnote 7, e.g. **"Manchip"** means "the lady from Chip" and its male equivalent **"Jibem"**, is simply referring to Jibarn, a place in Chip area, lying in the southern ecocline of Yil Ngas.
10. See note 8 above.
11. .Joseph H.Greenberg, *Languages of Africa* (Indiana Univ.Press,Bloomington, 1966) p.46.
12. Some the dialect are: Nwu'kos, Ngo-Pang'chen, Ngon-Garr'm, Nmyet, Ngom-Pang, Ngon-ngin, Ngom-Ewir, etc-- all obviously named after districts or villages where they are spoken. Until a general investigation of the dialects of Shhk-tok Ngas is done, we cannot say that we know all of them.
13. Ade Obayemi concludes that traditional aspects may not overlap with the linguistic aspect in defining cultural identity, but the linguistic is basic, see his "History, Culture and Group Identity: The Case of North-east or 'O-kun' Yoruba" in "History Research at ABU, Vol. 1, 1976/1977" (Dept of History ABU, Zaria) p.21 of the paper.
14. Charles Gonyok, op.cit .Also see note 1, above
15. Ibid,p.l.That they believe so is my own addition.
16. Gonyok (ibid,p.l5), writes of the significance of **nmos-nwong** instead of **nmos-luun** as the celebration of the end of dry season and the offering of prayers to the god of the soil for the fertility of the soil, and of **nmos-taar** as marking the end of the farm season and the offering of prayers to the gods for the new crops which cannot be eaten before this festival .Mangvwat

maintains (op.cit, p. 43, footnote) that Ngas history was recited, and miracles reminiscent of Ngas ancestors were performed during the **nmos-taar**.

17. Gonyok asserts (ibid, p.17): "The initiation cult is the most important in the life of every male in Ngasland" i.e. **Vwang**. However, with the exception of Wambutda, nothing has been said by other authors about **Mbwaa** (see his: *A Study of Conversion among the Angas*..... p.81). For further appreciation of the age-grade system, see Gonyok, Ibid, "Pre-1900 Ngas," as well as Isichei's "Introduction" in Yearwood op.cit. Also see the organisation of collective labour in Elizabeth Isichei (ed) *Studies in the History of, Plateau State, Nigeria,* The MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1982) p.37.
18. It seems that in all the Ngas **lu'warng-mwa** (palaces) in the past, there was always a **kung** (the big standing drum) and some **jeb-kungmwa** (a set of two smaller standing drums, always played together with the big one). Other common musical instruments generally made and used are: **nqh'zng** (a big drum placed in a lying position and sat on before it is played), **sar ' mbangak** (a drum hung on the shoulder with a rope before it is played), **ndeang'deang** (molo), **njzato** (flute), **gulitd** (another flute), **sombi** (buffalo horn), bel (a third kind of flute), **ndut** (a round flute made of round wild fruits), **nzeng ' kng** or **nve 'lang** and so on.
19. Knowledge of these was partially acquired over time, through personal observation, and partially through Lupwi Tungchama, 80, and Golkung Tungchama, 75, who was **ngowapkuummwa** or idol-worshippers before they died in 1991 and 1997 respectively. Group interview: Dungung (date: 29/ 12/ 1986).
20. These "differences" should not be over-emphasised. Capt. Foulkes in 1907 submitted that "the names of towns and kings, spirits and religious ceremonies are identically the same among the Angass, Suras, Lankan, Chip and Thal..." which Isichei has quoted over and over again (in Yearwood, op.cit.p.l, and Isichei, op.cit, 28), still makes much sense, because of the fact that at a wider level, it is difficult to separate these people (s).
21. R. Mohr, writing on the Ngas religious cults and concepts in the late 1950's, describes totemism as having "spirit doubles, totems, in the animal world," cited in Yearwood, op.cit, p. xxxiii.
22. Even if external factors -- such as the Jukun expansionists, Bauchi territorial overlords", and colonial dominators and exploiters -- sapped Yil Ngas of the substance of internal evolution, the outer shell that remained, the form that the external agents themselves had to recognise, still betrays a testimony of an independent reckoning of Yil Ngas. Probably the creation of the **Ngolong Ngas** stool was in reckoning with the fact of that appearance.
23. Besides aspects of material culture -- architecture, craftsmanship, (technology), farm implements and crop techniques, dress, weapons, etc \A can easily spread from one society to the others in contact with it, that their histories are vital in determining their peculiarities with regard to the societies that popularised them. And for the present matter, I am satisfied that the discussion in the text captures what I am saying.
24. Although the Ngas had settled there before 1900, it was not made a part of the administrative "Plains" and "Hill Angas" units created by colonialism. Places like Tapshin and Gambar however were recognised as Ngas towns from the outset by the colonialists, nevertheless they left them under the jurisdiction of Bauchi. It is now difficult to combine their sources easily along with the rest of the Ngas.
25. See Chapter Three.
26. See Anthony Goyol, *Nde Joshua Y. Dimlong, Ngolong Ngas: The Man, The Struggle and Victory*, (1998), pp.14-15.
27. David Belin, op.cit, p.2. More has been done on this definition to capture some of the internal hill-ranges, settlements and important streams as is given in chapter two below.
28. All sorts of development associations have come to exist since the second half of the 1970s. This is more than a move in keeping to the politics of the return to civilian rule in 1979.They have the objective of seeing newer schools, hotels, guest inns, dams and wells, to mention a few, come into being. This is their concept of development. This move still thrives in Yil Ngas.
29. Most of the moves to plant trees, it seems, have not usually been made to plant fruit (economic) trees. For instance, the morning network news of Radio Nigeria on 9/2/86 had it that the World Bank in conjunction with the Federal Government had voted N7.5 million to curb erosion, and introduce **several tonnes** of eucalyptus seeds, on the Jos Plateau. What about fruit and other economic trees? Is it that they cannot flourish there? Or, why has nothing been done to plant them

as well? Even so, apparently nothing has been done to actually plant the said tonnes of eucalyptus since then!

30. Cited in John Williams (translator) *Society and the Environment: A Soviet View*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 57.
31. I do not share the view that these people were completely confined in their neighbourhoods that they did not know anywhere beyond their neighbouring villages. There is alot of cause to believe that they knew of at least the peoples around them and they travelled and migrated. See footnote 9 above. That is why Charles Orr sounds absurd in his *The Making of Northern Nigeria,* (Frank Cass Co. Ltd, London, 1965) p.57, viz.: "It is rare to meet a native in such parts who knows his way beyond the next village."
32. See Isichei, op.cit, p. 33: "It was always possible for disaster to tip the fragile balance of self-sufficiency." If it was a "fragile balance" then how could they have afforded the resources to hold their festivals, marry more wives, and make investments in the forms of cattle, sheep and goats? Isichei has taken a subjective angle on this.
33. I am recounting both from personal experience and my field experience.
34. Elizabeth Isichei has also documented this, op.cit, p. 33.
35. I was a students' representative in a Committee appointed in 1981 by the Ampang East District Development Association to assist the government in the creation of more districts out of the said district. We came into contact with conflict and, direct affront due to such insistence. And this was not restricted to Ampang East District alone.
36. I have in mind the case of **Ngolong** of **Pang** (District head of Ampang East) who calls the territorial land of the district his own. The ownership right itself is exercised through the practice of **dan kh pii** or **dan kh yil** whereby the "gods" of a lineage are supposedly invoked to protect their heritage and arrest all trespassers; any acts of trespass are not to be condoned by the "gods".
37. The **Ngolong Ngas stool** has now become a **thing of pride** for members of the Ngas nationality, its colonial roots notwithstanding. (Some however do not know about that!) The stool is often associated with gifts of sorts to the occupant -- women, cars, cash, livestock, grain, and so on – besides the government paid salary, allowances and provided amenities.
38. To many, "development" is as stated in endnote ***29*** above. Is not "development" more than that? Development is not an act, it is a process; it is the process of the continual regeneration of the productive forces in a given economy. It is in this context that I use "renovation."
39. I am obliged to opine that most of these associations serve the interests of the Ngas people living outside Yil Ngas at the moment than of those within. It is not off-point to say that some are serving political ambitions of their mentors than anything else whether in or outside Yil Ngas.
40. This is the impression given by the themes and contexts of the symposia, lectures and convention papers of some of these associations' -- Ngas Youth Movement and Ngas Development Association (1984) in particular -- as I can put together.
41. Besides specific works of Daniel Wambutda on the religio-Christian aspect, and one essay by Charles Gonyok on the colonial political aspect, and general works by Elizabeth Isichei (one is based on oral history collected mainly from only Lankang, Kabwir and Amper Districts in Yil Ngas), Monday Mangvwat (his thesis on class formation in Plateau Province) and Bill Freund, there are hardly any other works.
42. Compare with Thomas Hodgkin, *Nigerian Perspectives,* Oxford University Press, London, 1975:3-4 who remarks on the cases of the Tiv, Igaia, Igbirra and so on, as "the histories of the peoples who appear too rarely, or not at all," in popular historical studies.
43. See for instance, Capt. Foulkes' (1907) statement that "The Angass evince no curiosity about themselves, and in the absence of traditions, one must have recourse to outside arguments" (cited in Elizabeth Isichei, op.cit, p. 8); Charles Orr's position that "Here we get an idea of what primitive man was like" and "they are almost invariably at war, with a neighbouring tribe or village, the probable cause being that some of their women have been carried off" (in his,op.cit p.56 --which suggests a Hobbesian state of nature); and George Murdock's contention that "Slavery is universal, and debt slavery common," (in his, *Africa: Its People And Their Culture History* McGraw Hill Book Company, New York, 1959,p.93). Also see Robert Netting, op.cit, p.43., and note ***6*** above.
44. Yuri Popov, *Essays in Political Economy: Imperialism and the Developing Countries,* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984), p.55.

45. See M. N. Rydina and G. P. Chernikov (eds). *Political Economy of `Capitalism,* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985), pp. 15 & 18, for highlights on political economy's stand as a historical science.
46. See Claude Ake, *A Political Economy of Africa,* (Longman, Essex, 1981), pp.1-3.
47. See V. V. Denisov, et al "Problems in the Methodology of Social Cognition, " in Sergei Syrovatkin (translated) *Philosophy in the USSR: Problems of Historical Materialism,* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981), p. 157.
48. Rydina & Chenikov, op.cit, p. 17
49. Political economy is a theoretical science, and this largely determines the specific features of its methods. The employment of mathematics in politico-economic studies is rrsinly of applied nature, but it is not dominant. See: Ibid, p.18 and L. Albalkin, et al. *Political Economy: A Short Course,* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983), p. 28., for further explanation of this position.
50. Due partially to ignorance of the evidence and partially to political reasons, oral informants and those who have relied on their accounts have mostly put, for instance, the posting of Umoru Attahiru to Yil Ngas in the nineteenth century rather than in 1911, and the appointing of Langkuk in 1902 rather than in 1912, and so on.
51. Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons (eds). *The Roots of Ruural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa,* (Heinemann, London, 1977), pp.3-4.
52. John S. Saul and Roger Woods, "African Peasantries" in Dennis L. Cohen and John Daniel (eds). *Political Economy of Africa,* (Longman, London, 1981), p. 113.
53. Conrad Phillip Kottak, *The Past in the Present: History, Ecology and Cultural Variation in Highland Madagascar,* (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1980), p. 47. (I owe the concept of ecocline to this source).
54. I owe this definition to E. O. Akeredolu-Ale (who in turn got it from Baratz and Grigby). See Akeredolu-Ale "Poverty as a Social Issue: A Theoretical Note" in 0. Teriba et al (eds). *Poverty in Nigeria: Proceedings of the 1975 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society,* (The E.S.N. c/o Econs. Dept, University of Ibadan, Ibadan,1975) p.45..
55. I hold the power theogy of poverty. On that see: Akeredolu-Ale, in Ibid, pp. 55-56; and B.Onimode, "The Dialectics of Exploitation: Poverty and Power in Nigeria," in ibid, pp. 335-341
56. Also see Jean-luc Vellut "Rural Poverty in Western Shaba, c.1890-1930" in: Palmer and Parsons, op.cit, p.294: "What is the connotation carried by 'rural poverty' in the history of this region? 'Rural' in its commonest acceptance indicates the existence of territory of different characteristics to some parallel urban area. We will use 'rural' in a wider meaning, connoting the relationship which links a core-area with its periphery within a particular historical context or 'historical bloc'.... ' Poverty implies living conditions very close to bare subsistence."
57. Michael Haralambos & Robin Heald, *Sociology: Themes and Perspectives,* (University Tutorial Press, Slough, 1980), pp. 14 0 - 142.
58. Ibid, pp.142-143, and Jean-luc Vellut, in op.cit p.295: "More generally... poverty is defined 'according to the conventions of the society in which it occurs'. Thus poverty is not only economic but social", (who quoted E. J. Hobsbawm). To the extent that poverty is 'social', it is also 'relative' because human societies vary.

CHAPTER TWO:

YIL NGAS ON THE EVE OF COLONIAL DOMINATION, *circa* AD 1900: A CONSPECTUS ON NATURE AND SOCIETY

2.0 Introduction

In this chapter, we attempt to focus principally on the socio-economic formation that was predominant in Yil Ngas by the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. That is, we attempt to understand the essence or nature of Ngas society before the imposition of British colonial domination, which we believe, brought with it certain fundamental and disruptive changes, but that is a subsequent consideration, treated from chapter three onwards.

A socio-economic formation (or, system) is a specific historical type of society based on a definite mode of production, representing a specific historical stage in the progressive development of mankind from simple to complex forms of social practice; that is from the communal system, through the slave-owning, feudal and capitalist systems, to the communist system, categorically speaking.[1] In other words, in a socio-economic formation, the mode of production constitutes a 'basis' on which the existing political, juridical, ideological intellectual principles and nuances together with their corresponding associations, bodies, and institutions, have already grown and crystallised into a superstructure. Thus, a socio-economic formation is an aggregate of: (i) the forces production in a given society; (ii) the relations of production which constitute the economic structure (or essential basis) of the given society and (iii) the superstructure of the given society which

comprises its political, juridical, and ideological relations and the corresponding institutions propagating them.

An explanation of the concept of socio-economic formation became necessary since our concern in this chapter is to lay bare the historical background to which the colonial economy of the twentieth century in Yil Ngas was counterpoised. This is so because to grasp the reality of any episode, we need to know what was there before it. Moreover, this study, as intended, shall also enable us to see if what we have been told about the Ngas (about all colonised peoples for that matter) in much of colonialist historiography is true.[2] We shall then be poised to suggest what prospects and potentialities stood before these people, had not the yoke of colonial domination been forced on them.

The chapter, however, is only a survey. It does not claim to be exhaustive in terms of detail. But, on the other hand, whenever continuities and soundings from the latter part of the nineteenth century are possible, we shall endeavour to highlight or make them in order to shed greater light on the period at stake. Generally speaking then, we hope to an extent, to account for the socio-economic context in Yil Ngas, specifically depicting the situation by the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, so that the real origins of poverty in her rural areas, or among her rural masses, may come into limelight when compared to the succeeding colonial (and post-colonial) period(s). The political economy approach which, we believe, is a far more superior methodology for the study of society, is basically what we have adopted in this (and subsequent) chapter(s). And to better

comprehend the issues mentioned above, we shall first look at the ecological context of Yil Ngas by the turn of the century.

2.1 An Ecology Of Yil Ngas By AD 1900: Man's Natural Environment:

> From now onward, instead of scattered hamlets the people usually lived in large villages without any stockades. The scenery was magnificent and the air bracing, which was no doubt due to the fact that we were now about 2000 ft. above sea-level [3]

Thus observed the 'Survey Party' in 1904, the first group of European explorers, essentially spies, to travel through Yil Ngas. They gave, as shown above, a poignant description of the unique settlement pattern(s), the beautiful landscape and the cool weather of Yil Ngas as was obtaining in the month of July 1904 (as it still does in the Julys of today). Coming from Bwarat area (which is in Langtang North LGA or) in Tarokland, to Gugur, on 2nd July 1904, which was the first Ngas community, to be visited, or spied on, by the Survey Party, they later visited, or spied out about five other areas in Yil Ngas which included Sh'wer, Dungung, Zwal Pang and environs (to see the large dome-shaped hill, B'um-Ka'b'ar, which is the highest point on the Pang Range), Tambes (to see Zwal Tambes, which is said to be the second tallest peak in Nigeria) and Pu'el (Dawaki), before leaving on the 7th July, 1904 for Lusa in Zarland. During their five days visit, the Survey Party passed through Yil Ngas from the south-east, moved slightly into its middle area and then finally took their exit through its north-eastern boundary, having to an extent obtained a fair view of the area.[4]

To better understand the atmosphere in which people entered into relations with one another in order to produce their material-life needs, we shall

attempt to examine the nature of the natural environment of Yil Ngas i.e. its terrain, its water system, its fertility, its biota (i.e. its flora and fauna), climate, and so on — with which man has had to enter into (ecological)[5] relations in order to live. How 'dynamic' or 'static' has the environment been? How resourceful, how tractable?

2.1.1: **The Physiography:**

To quote the so-called Survey Party of Europeans again:

> All through the country of the Angoss [Ngas], Seaua [Zar] and Jeraua [Jar], there are a great number of rocks similar in shape to the one at Wase, though in most cases smaller. It hardly seems possible that all these curious rocks should be pipes of volcanoes, but anyhow these and the whole lie of the land show that there must have been an extraordinary amount of volcanic disturbance here at some time.[6]

The periods during which tectonic, or volcanic, especially denudational processes, accompanied by changing climatic conditions, occurred in our region, since the formation of the Plateau upland in the millennia before our own, are not known to us. But, we agree with the Survey Party, that it must have been as a result of such processes, that the terrain ofYil Ngas is rocky and broken, and the relief, tantalising.

Who knows? One may dare to suggest that tectonic and denudational processes must have been responsible for the formation of the Taman, which has been rightly qualified as a re-entrant rift, valley. The Taman valley, which today constitutes vast sections of Lankan and Chip Districts of Pankshin LGA, looks like a rift-cutting with very steep sides, atop the eastern side of which perch volcanic mountains such as Zul Gibang.[7] Within its trough drained by the Taman waters, live thousands of people today in many settlements. Another though not so recognisable example of the outcome of tectonic and denudational activities in Yil Ngas is the

wide, broken, downland, or intervening 'valley' between the foothills of the Jos Plateau and the Ntal (Tal) and Pai mountains, which extends from Ampang-East, through Ga'rm (Garram) and Chip Districts, where it links the Taman valley perpendicularly. The process of denudation, which culminated in the separation of the Pai and Ntal (Tal) Mountain Ranges from the main Plateau upland, must have taken a very long period of time to complete. Thousands of people also live in this 'valley' as well as on the mountain ranges on both sides.

These crustal processes, especially denudational activity had, up to the end of the nineteenth century (and even today have), continued to disturb and erode the landscape of Yil Ngas, cutting deep gullies and leaving bare rock-masses around. Capt. L.F. Renny, a British colonial officer, who had come from Bauchi to partake in the conquest of Yil Ngas in 1906, gave an on-the-spot report, as he saw it, to his superior military officers, that:

> The *Angass* tribes inhabit a large tract of rough mountainous country ... inside the area inhabited by the tribe, there are practically no roads or even tracks, the whole country being a vast mountain range extremely rough and rocky and intersected in every direction by deep ravines which would render marching impossible for a column during the rains.[8]

Was it true that there were 'practically no roads... tracks, the whole country virtually a vast mountain range extremely rough and rocky and intersected in every direction by deep ravines...'? First, Renny perceived the land only from the direction of the movement of his colonising army: he saw, more than elsewhere, the 'outcrop territory' presently shared between Pankshin, Wokkos, and Ampang-East Districts and that was during the first colonial invasion of Yil Ngas.[9] Secondly, Renny saw but Renny exaggerated! Otherwise going strictly by his description, Yil Ngas was

practically uninhabitable, which was not, and is not, the case. He created the impression that seems as though the thousands of the 'enemy' whom he also mentioned in his report, must have supposedly resorted to the mountains only on the spur of the moment, dreading the advancing colonising army, at the head of which Renny himself walked! That was far from the truth. In such a hilly environment, erosion there was, and erosion there still is! Though its impact on the landscape of Yil Ngas is obvious, it does not demand such exaggerated qualifications. A more recent observer on the geography of the area, A.S. Dimka, said with particular reference to the mountains and hills, in 1983, that: "Most of these hills have been badly eroded by swift rivers giving rise to a very rugged topography with interlocking spurs"[10]

Here and there, bare inselbergs and other rock-masses could be seen today, in Yil Ngas, astride outcrops, hills and hillocks which are in turn either perching atop mountain ranges or scattered on the valleys and the vast downlands extending from the foothills; the very ground itself is strewn with sandstones, gravels, plutons, mica, **h'k-per** or feldspars, **h'k-fifi** or granites and so on. This is a blunt testimony to remote volcanic activities, and to persistent denudational processes.

One of the pernicious forces of denudation is hydraulic. Whether water falls like rain, flows like in a river, or fails to obtain like in a desert, its presence or absence is responsible for the denudation of the natural environment. Where water fails to obtain, it easily sets the stage for the operation of other forces, such as those of dessication (drying-up or decay), wind and fire. The fact of erosion has already

been mentioned, above, with reference to our area of concern, as an on-going reality. The hydraulic factor has played a no small part in carrying out the erosion of Yil Ngas over the centuries, and the land has for long been a 'watershed country', often characterised by steep slopes and swift rivers.[11]

Among or in-between the rock-masses, hillocks, hills, outcrops and so on, are wet-crevices, gorges, ravines, rivulets (features of a 'watershed country') and so on, whose waters wantonly furrow the land-surface and flow into bigger streams and rivers. The Taman River system drains, through her four tributaries, the western reaches of our region, while it empties itself into the Shimankar, which in turn empties into the River Benue. The Gyangyang, with her three tributaries, in conjunction with the Nyinang (Yinang) with its one tributary, drain the northern, eastern, and southern areas of Yil Ngas, and empty into the Wase, which in turn empties into the River Benue. The Lere stream flows partially out of Yil Ngas northwards until it eventually goes into the Gongola, which in turn, empties into the Benue. All of these waters do eventually drain into the River Benue; there is not a single rivulet in Yil Ngas that does not flow into the Benue.[12]

The area suffers from an annual dry season shortage of water. By the turn of the century, the present trend of relative scarcity of drinkable water already existed in Yil Ngas. It was not peculiar to the communities on the hills; those on the downlands, or so-called plains were not exempted.[13] Because of the slopes, most of the streams and rivers are usually in full flow during the rainy or wet-seasons. Great velocities, especially after the torrents, between the months of June and August, usually characterize the streams and rivulets. In November, 1914, that is, in the

early part of the dry season, H.S.W.Edwardes, a Divisional Officer in-charge Bauchi Division, a part of which Plain Angas happened to be, observed with specific reference to the "Plains Angass" sub-district that: "the minor streams show broad dry sandy reaches with no sign of water, while up stream where the bed is rocky there is a good flow."[14] Those downlands of Yil Ngas often dried up earlier than the higher and hillier areas. Yet at the same time, the colonisers of Yil Ngas, including Edwardes, thought the problem of water shortage, among others, could best be tackled by the people's moving out of the 'hills' into the 'valleys'. The 'dry sandy reaches', referred to by Edwardes, were usually scooped up to procure drinking water. It is generally believed, and it seems to be with some merit, that there were greater water resources in Yil Ngas by the beginning than by the end of the twentieth century, which is today. Inter-spaced along the 'broad dry sandy reaches' of Yil Ngas during the earlier decades of the twentieth century, were a number of ponds, good for swimming, fishing, drinking (especially by livestock) and so on.[15]

Wells were hardly sunk at all, except if we stretch the term to include pits that were dug in the valleys and on sandy river-beds in order to get drinking water. Springs were a feature of the hilly places; out of the rock-crevices or valleys amongst outcrops, good, cool and clear water flowed out perennially. Much of that still obtains. **B'utjei-mwa** (**b'utjei**, in the singular) or geysers, were known, witnessed by some and dreaded because of their destructiveness. Waterfalls were many, but active only during downpours of the wet-seasons. Today, some of the streams have changed their courses, and most riverbeds have not only widened but

are deeper with steep banks, in the downlands. In the hills, the streams are swifter and 'valleys' are marked with deep canyons and gorges.

Erosion itself attracts rather little attention except where it affects man's 'social practice',[16] especially in the realm of agricultural production. Natural factors, which contribute in making human life possible, such as land-forms, adequate rainfall, springs, caves, waterfalls, occasional ponds and so on, must have been quite resourceful in the pre-colonial agrarian economy of Yil Ngas, but the issue of arable land must have been even more important. Arable land in the modern sense employable for mechanised agriculture in such a rocky terrain would almost seem inconceivable. Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, there were some vast plains, largely uncultivated, that have now, today, been subjected to cultivation.[17] Most of the mountains, hills and hillsides were however cultivated, in spite of soil erosion by running water. And much as the streams and rivers are now more 'pervasive' and swifter, they are not 'useless'; they somehow still serve the interests of crop producers, especially in the downlands. For instance A.S. Dimka, again observed that:

> From the source, the rivers are swift, cutting deep into the mountainsides, creating V-shaped valleys with a few falls. At the foot of the escarpment, much of the gradient is reduced and most of the rivers have characteristics of mature rivers depositing silt over a distance of about 300 - 360m on either side of the banks.[18]

That kind of more or less long-distance transference of silt cannot be totally stopped, so long as the land remains sloppy, but a deliberate effort can be made to contain its intensity. By the end of the nineteenth century, there existed already cultivated techniques of containing the process in Yil Ngas otherwise it should have

rendered the highlands totally uncultivable, therefore uninhabitable to farmers, by now.

Capt.H.D.Foulkes, the coloniser-cum-ethnographer, who after being in and around Yil Ngas for about a year in 1907, took a personal interest in documenting the 'customs of the Angass' and with reference to their agriculture, noticed that: "The soil is exceedingly fertile..."[19]. A shocking revelation in spite of its notorious stoniness, which the travelling spies or 'Survey Party' in 1904, had frighteningly appreciated as a full obstacle, in their own reckoning, to crop-cultivation.[20] Foulkes further described the features of Yil Ngas soil to his fellow British colonial readers, as follows:

> The formation is sandstone and, for the most part, red sandstone, the latter on the high ground showing the rich colouring of Devonshire fields. In the plain Angass the sandstone is not much in evidence, the surface being strewn with granite rocks and the detritus there from.[21]

Till today, the same kinds of soils are most likely to be found in Yil Ngas, except that poor soils have begun to be mentioned alongside the rich. For instance, by 1983, Dimka, maintained that:

> ...most soils range from gravelly to sandy loam. Laboratory tests have revealed PH6.7. Shallow soils are under lain by hard lateritic pan, some few centimetres below the surface. In rocky hollows, soils are deep, and rich, enriched through weathering of soil nutrients from the rocks. Poorest soils are found at the foot of the escarpment far away the foot of the plateau due to over-cultivation and exposure by soil erosion.[22]

The rugged physiography of Yil Ngas, its characteristic mountains, hills, rivers and soils, therefore, have remained virtually the same since the beginning of the twentieth century, save for the seeming intensity of soil erosion and the dessication

of water resources, leading to the emergence of poorer and poorer soils and drier river-beds in the dry seasons. But what kinds of flora and fauna were found in Yil Ngas by the end of the nineteenth century? What plants and animals grew on and also inhabited its rough and rocky downlands and hills? Which of them are still to be found today? Let us now attempt to look at the flora and fauna of Yil Ngas, by the turn of the century under review.

2.1.2 : **The Flora:**

Social life, ideally speaking, can only be conceived in relation to a natural environment, which is characterised by an abundance of biotic life, in the (total) absence of which, under normal circumstances, social life disappears. Flora and fauna through the ages have been engaged as both 'means' and 'ends' in agricultural production (similarly they could become a terrible nuisance).[23] In Yil Ngas, certainly different species of food-plants and animal life were produced (which are mentioned specifically below in section 2.2.2) by the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, which is, we believe, partially why people had long inhabited the region.

Most of Yil Ngas during that period was covered with Guinea Savanna vegetation in the proper sense of the term. That is, it comprised a more woody, grassland than the Sudan Savanna type, except perhaps in the eastern and north-eastern reaches, which may not have been unconnected with social causes.[24] Grass was usually cut for roofing, apart from the grazing of animals. Hard wood from timber, obtained from the surrounding forests, groves and bushes was used as roofing sticks, for making **yang-t'ng** shades, of tool-handles, **ship-dyer** ladders, and

both the **ship-pii-ter** and the **bang'lang** wooden beds, as well as the **ship-pii-tong** stools, carved out of tree trunks or big branches, apart from its necessary utilization as wood-fuel. **Pii-wer-mwa** (**pii-wer**, for singular) or sacred fields, of different shapes and dimensions, ranging from a number of plots to acres, kept as virgin (uncultivated) lands in line with religious sanctions, were often more forested than the surrounding bushes. They also willy-nilly served as game-reserves, which hunters visited from time to time for game of various kinds.

Most of the common sylvae or economic trees in Yil Ngas today were already known and being grown, preserved or protected, in and around settlements and bush-farms. **T'ng-nmes** or the locust bean, **t'ng- torrii** or the boabab, **t'ng-ten** or the mahogany, **t'ng-khhr** or the silk, **t'ng-nde'miss** or the shea-butter, **t'ng-peid (t'ng-paad)** or the African olive or canarium, **t'ng-liis** or the tamarind, **t'ng-gang** or the fan-palm, **t'ng-l'ng-ghht** (**t'ng-tokjan**), **t'ng-njimi**, **t'ng-dep**, and others, were already common depending only on the various localities which favoured the growth of one or more species over the others. Parts of trees, such as their leaves, roots and barks, were often used in the supply of medicines. Fruits and/or seeds of both wild and cultivated trees, were exploited to obtain cooking oils, like the **muir-peid** or African olive oil and **muir-nmis** or shea-butter oil, to obtain the **muir-ten** or mahogany oil, used as a curative rubbing oil or lotion, and to obtain soup condiments like **njijaam,** made from locust-bean seeds, and **kurguk,** made from boabab seeds, among others. Fruit trees such as the mango, guava, citrus, orange, pawpaw and the banana, became popular or were introduced during the period of British colonial domination in Yil Ngas, that is, in the twentieth century.

Nearly, if not all kinds of grasses and trees in Yil Ngas had come to be put into use, in at least a single way each, by the end of the nineteenth century. Grasses were also used in making mats, baskets, fences like the **kar'm**, musical instruments like the **ndeng-deng**, apart from roofing and grazing. Only the **lesu** grass and the **gang-kat'm** shrubby-grass might have attained the status of being sometimes cultivated by the end the nineteenth century.

Cereals of various kinds were grown in Yil Ngas. Sorghum, millet, maize, fonio (hungry-rice), and rice, were among cereals cultivated in their different species. **Nnaza** or sorghum, for instance, had **nmalok, sadai, nnaza-neid** and **nnaza-pye**, as varieties. **Kas** or millet had **nmoor**, kas, **nchualng** and **nlep-lep** or **mbeter** as varieties; so it went for **mbalwo** (colloquially, **mbawo**) or maize, and for **guzuk**, **lerng**, and **gutung**, three varieties of fonio. A dark-coloured type of rice, which is now (apparently) extinct, was reportedly grown. Legumes like **nlang'kang (nmalaar**, otherwise **kom)** or groundnuts and **nfufuas (kom'zut)** or bambara-nuts were also cultivated. So were **hy'rm** or beans, **nzji'ta (nsha'ta)** or pepper, **taba (ta'a)** or tobacco, **lem**or sesame and **shiin**_or beniseed. Apparently, an environment like Yil Ngas did not quite favour the extensive cultivation of root crops, but various species of **bwer** or yams, **nda'mwalm** or cocoyams, **laa'wur** or sweet-potatoes and **nvu**, were grown in swampy and less stony plots.[25]

Bwer-kii and_**bwer-zwal**, which were wild varieties of yams and an edible cassava-like sugarish root stuff known as **ma'nyam'yil**, were known and sometimes dug out, cooked and eaten. Various wild fruits were known and eaten.

There were no orchards at all, except, if the term is stretched to include the preponderance of sylvae on a given field, farm or sacred locality.

The natural impact of agricultural practice on the vegetation of Yil Ngas, through bush-clearing for cultivation, over-cultivation of a given field, and the scourge of swidden practice, in addition to meeting the demands of architecture, tool-making, and fire-wood energy, must have had its toll by the beginning of the twentieth century. However, the fact that several 'bushes' and their resources were protected from careless violation or destruction by bush-burning, as it is a common practice today, implies that the rate of ecological imbalance is far higher today than by the turn of the century under review.[26]

2.1.3 : **The Fauna:**

Different kinds of game were found in relatively large numbers in the forests and bushes of Yil Ngas, early in this century. The "roan, hartebeest, pig, guinea-fowl, fancolin, pigeon",[27] hare, quail, antelope, buck and monkey were common. The [illegible] buffalo, elephant, lion, leopard, among others, were known, but it is not clear whether they had become extinct in the region by the end of the nineteenth century or not. Today only **tom-mwa** or guinea-fowls, **nkafwan-mwa** or hares, **joli-mwa** or monkeys, **pep-mwa** or antelopes, **nkwim-mwa** or quails, and some burrowing animals are found in the bushes of Yil Ngas. Snakes, both poisonous and not, were, and are still, found in different species in Yil Ngas. Notable python hunters were recognized and always contacted for python oil or skin. In the maintainous areas, besides **joli-mwa** or monkeys, other members of the ape family like the **nkheb'** or baboon and the **nkerr** (a wild type of monkey) may

still be found. In addition, rock badgers and **kiik-mwa** or porcupines are found in the caves.

Mountain-faring or-climbing livestock like goats, sheep, and the **n'ng-nkar'ng** or **muturu** cow, were kept throughout the area. Poultry were also kept throughout. Elements of these livestock are still found in the area today. Only **bhr'ng-mwa** or horses, which by the end of the nineteenth century were being kept and accorded deep respect,[28] have today disappeared completely. **Aas-mwa** or dogs were kept, as household pets as well as 'helpers' in the areas of security, hunting and shepherding. Their becoming an important, or popular source of protein today is a later development, closer to the end than to the beginning of the twentieth century.[29]

2.1.4 : **The Climate:**

One of the most formidable weapons with which 'nature' over the centuries has continued to settle scores with 'society', is the factor of climate. The scourge in this regard is 'worsening' climatic or weather conditions. Changing weather conditions do not always make life difficult, sometimes they are more favourable to human, or to biotic life as a whole, than not. With reference to the Jos Plateau area, a number of climatic changes, occurred in the centuries before the nineteenth century, such that the societies in the area had had to bear with problems of adjustment, as the climate changed over and over again.[30]

In spite of such climatic changes and the struggles to adapt on the part of the people, Yil Ngas was free of any severe droughts, which completely hindered crop production in a farming season. It does not always follow that harsh-turning

climatic conditions, must have severe drought as one of its dimensions. As this is apparent, we could suggest that the pre-nineteenth century climatic changes on the plateau upland were favourable, to the extent that they did not bring any drought to Yil Ngas, as far as it could be remembered, up to the beginning of the twentieth century.[31]

The weather seasons, which determined the people's agricultural calendar, were and are still four, which comprise the **taar-pas** or wet season, which roughly runs from June to September, the **taar-weyb** or harvesting season, which roughly runs from October to December, the **taar-luun** or dry season, which roughly runs from January to March, and the **taar-fongfong** or windy-sprouting season, which roughly runs from April to May, have hardly changed since the end of the nineteenth century. Rainfall probably varied in the area, as it still does today, more or less with varying altitude: heaviest in the highlands and lowest in the downlands. We do not have an idea of the average volume of rainfall by the turn of the century in question; today, however, the overall average rainfall for most years is 1250mm.[32] Temperatures hardly go below 42° F. or 4.5° C, but could rise as high as twice this figure in the months of February to April in the downlands. The combined effect of such favourable climatic conditions was the fact that crops thrived well enough in Yil Ngas and the landscape and weather turned out to be pleasant. The scenery was magnificent and the air bracing, said the Survey Party, in 1904. Yil Ngas was an area endowed with a cool, healthy, weather, like elsewhere in the Jos Plateau area. Early colonialists, on account of its perceived climatic 'healthiness', wished that some Europeans would eventually settle in Yil Ngas.[33]

Therefore, there is no gainsaying the fact that by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the problem of Ngas agriculturists was not that of a difficult, intractable natural environment. The latter was resourceful enough to meet their various needs of food, shelter, clothing, tools, water, and so on. The sight of the land, at first, might have seemed somewhat tantalizing to outsiders, the ground discouraging; but the people had dared both, had learned to eke out their livelihood from it. 'Nature' was, to that extent, by the end of the nineteenth century, no longer any great threat to 'society' in Yil Ngas. How did the (Ngas) people or 'society' achieve this victory? How did they 'create' their farms to contain the rough ground, volatile downpours, and light humus and sandy loam? What kind of tools did they use? What ideas did they implement? This brings us to the question of the peopling of the area: how they were interrelated or settled, and how they confronted their natural environment.

2.1.5: **The Sociosphere**[34]:

Unlike the 'Kofyar', to talk of the Ngas by the end of the nineteenth century was not merely to create an abstract fitting name for an observable 'fact' of a single people-group who were not yet conscious of their ethno-social or cultural uniformity.[35] It is important to stress here that the name 'Ngas' had long been in use to the extent that, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the knowledge of its origins had even began to fade.[36] But the question is: Who were, or are, the Ngas people? Writing at the behest of the colonial government, after six weeks' field research on the Ngas and nearest 'relatives' in 1934, A.B.Mathews concluded that:

> The Angas-speaking peoples have all more or less the same culture and the same origin, but owing to the partition of the area both by the

> [colonial] Administration in sometimes an arbitrary manner, and also by the geographical and historical factors concerned, they have become separated from each other and dialects of Angas are in use throughout, not a common speech[37].

With reference to the lowest common denominator or basic identification of the Ngas people(s), Mathews however maintained that: "They are a people of patrilineal exogamous totemic clans, which are scattered about the country"[38] A purely anthropological definition, this is. The reality and scope of the labour process, which was responsible for their sustenance and self-realisation, with its conscious, creative, and purposeful character was left out completely. Qualities, which distinguish man from other animals, are labour, consciousness and speech. For Mathews to have reckoned with the latter qualities, but not with the first in his definition(s), left much to be desired. Furthermore, what Matthews meant by 'clans', to be precise we should refer to, as lineages, precisely patrilineages. A patrilineage may be referred to as a structure made up of related patrilineal clans, that is, made up of clans descended from a common, remote, male ancestry, numbering from some hundreds to thousands. While a clan is a relatively smaller group of people linked by blood and kinship, that is, originating from one not-too-distant ancestor, whose members are bound by descent, language, customs and lifestyle.

So from available oral information and the accounts of Mathews, we can argue that the Ngas lineages had long been scattered across the region to the extent that there was hardly any settlement that was not made up, population-wise, of clans or sub-clans or households of various patrilineages. Alongside traditions of local dispersion held by various clans, with regard to the place(s) their forefathers must have emigrated from in Yil Ngas, pointing out the various historical experiences

connected with their lineages, every lineage had acquired its own pair of names for its members: one for all sons, the other for all daughters. Hence, in spite of speech, custom, and religion, members of a particular lineage were identified on the basis of their **s'm-nyam** or lineage identification name. But this was just another dimension of the **jep'pup** phenomenon.[39]Various inhibitions and sanctions against intra-lineage marriage existed in the kinship relations between members of most patrilineages. **Jep'pup** matters commanded greater significance at the clan, sub-clan or household levels, in practice, than at the lineage level. Whereas, lineage walls had frequently been trespassed in the periods before the beginning of the twentieth century, clan structures remained uniquely distinct, since the radius of their spread normally did not transcend a locality with few settlements.

When 'tribal' territories obtained or existed in Yil Ngas,[40] probably long before the period under review in this chapter, intra-clan ties were properly maintained. But, as the Ngas society moved towards the nineteenth century, relations of a different kind as expected, gradually gained significance in the area. 'Tribal' territories, it seems, had already been superseded by more palpable, political systems, which gave rise to the development of state systems. States arise only in societies where, among other things, the organisation of production led to the creation of surplus produce, above the means of subsistence. Hence, Yil Ngas, must have been inhabited by a hard-working people who produced surplus above their subsistence, therefore were not only characterised by issues of descent, religion and custom.

The sheer size of Ngas settlements vis-a-vis the settlements of their lowland neighbours by the end of the nineteenth century, to an extent, indicate the larger size of their labour-forces at the time. Of course, this is not to say that 'size' is synonymous with 'performance' per se; but when performance has, seemingly occurred on the basis of size (or might), then there is nothing wrong in acknowledging the place of size. Ngas settlements were large, but pitched on mountains, hills, hill-sides and plains.[41] This might have been due to ecological, especially climatic, as well as strategic-military reasons, and so forth.

Emerging from Tarokland in the south-east into Yil Ngas in 1904, the 'Survey Party' of British spies, though explorers to themselves, made the comparative observation as they entered Yil Ngas that: "From now onwards, instead of scattered hamlets the people usually live in large villages without stockades."[42] Doubtless, the use of stockades, to surround settlement premises, was a feature of the lowlands peoples, which included, among others, the Jukun, Goemai, Yom, Gerka, Tel and Tarok, whose settlements the spies visited before getting into the Ngas country. The evidence of unstockaded, yet large, settlements began to be seen in Yil Ngas. Then, coming with a view to conquer, as Officer Commanding the first 'punitive' expeditionary army sent against Yil Ngas in 1906, Capt. Renny, whose proclivity to exaggerate issues was hinted on earlier, nevertheless said, at the time, that Ngas settlements were "very thickly populated and the population of the whole tribe must be at least 250,000".[43] Renny further observed that: "All the [Ngas] towns are built in separate compounds (holding 20 to 80 people) scattered as a rule over several square

miles in the hills, some of them constructed on the highest peaks which are well-nigh inaccessible."[44] Whereas the 'Survey Party' of spies had come into Yil Ngas from the south-east and, after spending six days, left through the north-east; the 'Punitive Expedition' of first invaders came into Yil Ngas, two years later, from the north, invading it right into the middle, and, after twelve days, left through the east.[45] Both parties stayed and moved around, long enough to make useful observations. Hence, we strongly surmise that by the beginning of the twentieth century, Ngas settlements, in comparison to those of their lowland neighbours, were large in area, the compounds were built separately, and the populations were thick.

Up to the end of nineteenth century, farmers in Yil Ngas had long embraced the practice of keeping at least two farms, the homestead and the bush farms, especially for the production of their staple crops of millet and sorghum. This practice must have been adopted to guard against natural hazards as well as to allow for expansion, while over-cultivated plots were left to fallow. As a result of the continued practice of land tenure, homestead farms were eventually reduced to mere garden-sized plots due to increase in population. Some of the 'natural' hazards they faced were locust invasions, destruction of crops by birds, monkeys, baboons and livestock, poor rains, and so on. The 'famines' they went through, were somewhat 'naturally' determined.[46] Periods of pre-colonial famine in Yil Ngas were sometimes due to droughts, which lasted longer than the annual water shortages during the dry seasons (which still occur today).

The ecological features of their life by the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore, were big compounds surrounded by homestead farms, situated in large village or town settlements, which, in turn, were surrounded by bush farms, intermittently superimposed on the bush neighbourhoods where animals were grazed and bush resources, such as wild fruits, fire-wood, timber and game were got. In the same token, they developed a system of terracing, which was viewed by the colonialists as one of the best in Africa. Terracing was probably the most 'amazing' phenomenon the early colonialists saw in Yil Ngas. Some thought that 'whiteskinned' people possibly from the north must have brought it into Yil Ngas.[47] Others thought of the utter difficulty of tilling such a stony terrain and simply wondered, how and from where the Ngas borrowed the technique of building terraces.[48] Thus, Boyd Alexander, leader of the 'Survey Party' of spies, observed with reference to what he saw and initially thought in the first week of July1904, that there was very little grass, and few bushes, and it must have been very difficult to grow crops in such a stony soil.[49] Yet, in the next breadth, Alexander did not conceal his deference for the ingenuity of the Ngas people in terracing their entire country:

> The whole land was mapped out into little terraces sometimes only a foot or two broad, built to hold up the rain as it ran down the hill, and prevent the soil from being washed away. In places no longer cultivated, only the dilapidated terrace walls remained, through the rents of which in course of time the soil had been blown or washed down. In this case one saw only low walls encircling a hill, and I cannot but think, though with deference... that a similar cause may have led to the erection of the extraordinary systems of concentric walls, which exist in Rhodesia [Zimbabwe]...[50]

Furthermore, Alexander did not conceal his sense of wonder when, thanks to terracing, he saw every available space on their farms was already cultivated:

> Dugurh [Dungung] stands at the foot of Mt. Ampang [Zwal Pang], which is over 4,000 ft high. We climbed this and found a large plateau at the top covered with populous villages. It was wonderful to see the way in which every inch of the ground was cultivated. Even spaces not more than a square foot in area, where a little soil had been collected, had been planted with millet or guinea corn, which is the ordinary food of the people throughout the country.[51]

The fact then remains that Yil Ngas was, after all, cultivable, despite Alexander's initial reservations. The difference between what he initially thought and what he later saw, which shocked his imagination, was the employment of appropriate 'technology'. The technique of terracing was employed at all altitudes, in the downlands and in the mountains. The valleys, swamps, plains, hilltops and hillsides, were all cultivated. Their tools, which were designed to face the hardest grounds, were therefore very strong. They included the big hoe, the small hoe, the axe, the hammer, the **kyeang**, the **nuk**, and the **mbamji**, a pestle-like digger with a flat-bladed metal head and a wooden handle. These tools were of different sizes, for different services. With their aid, man appeared to have subjected 'every inch of available ground' in Yil Ngas to cultivation up to the beginning of the twentieth century, among other achievements. With populous communities, which every early calling foreigner saw, at least, it was necessary that adequate, and possibly surplus, food supply was guaranteed, which in such a terrain, apart from enough man-power, required the use of appropriate tools and technical ideas, such as **kak kh pang'gang** (or **kak kh pang**), which is building of terraces.

Kwol'm or the smithing of tools was already an established craft. Part of the iron ore was imported from Boghomland, while the other part was extracted from a rock type, which was more commonly found in the Wokkos Polity area. From the smelting and smithing centres of Wokkos and environs, hoes, especially big hoe blades, which were always in demand were usually either exported to, or imported by other communities in exchange for other goods. Consequently, most of the 'outcrop territory' of Yil Ngas acquired the name **Pang-chen,** that is, the 'Hoe Mountain Range' from which the colonialists got their corrupted version, **Pankshin**, which is still being used today. But some hoes were also imported from Boghomland. From the locally mined iron-ore in Wokkos, the **gyer'k,** a type of iron rod and from the communities of Pang-chen, the **chen-kom**, a huge big-hoe blade, were made and used as currency. The **masana**, a pocketable iron rod, was used in such a way that when hit, once or twice, against a piece of **nkum**, or charred silk cotton, held against a pocketable piece of **h'k-per,** or feldspar stone, fire was produced. When properly hit, the cotton would catch fire. Hence the lighter was called **nkum-masana.** So while the land was rocky, the dwellers had begun to put the rocks to several uses especially since the beginning of the period when they started iron-smelting.[52]

By the beginning of the twentieth century, stones or rock pieces were being used in various other important ways as **h'k nchwa'lang** or sling stones, **h'k char'char** or hand-thrown stones, **h'k fet bh'dhr** or anus-cleaning stones, **h'k shin'gwak** and **h'k sar shin**, which are grinding or mill stones, **h'k t'r'ng**, **h'k pang-dyer**, **h'k gh'zj'ok**, **h'k pii-bwir** and so on. Stones were used as **h'k dyik lu**

or building blocks, thus the Ngas, by the turn of century in question, built mostly stonewalled huts. **H'k shii-lu**, were stones used in making of foundations, which hold the buildings in place. For granary or corn-bin walls and ceilings, however, refined clay mixed with mud and brittle grasses to obtain mortar was artfully (or ceramically) used. In every big ancestral compound, there was a **nefur**, an arena, characterised or evidenced by the presence of a **pang**, a lowly-built circle, or semi circle, of stones, neatly arranged up to two or three feet high and about two feet wide. Hence the term **pang nefur** is sometimes used to describe a **nefur**. The frontage of every house where there was no **nefur** had a **po pang** which means a smaller place than a nefur where some stones were put for people to sit on, during moments of rest, grief, brief consultations or, joy, especially as spectators, during song and dance entertainment sessions.

Probably the technique of building stone-laid walls without the use of mortar or clay, in the historical development of the Ngas people, up to AD 1900, was an epitome or a relic of their pre iron-working days. The use of mortar or clay in building their houses must have been developed later, when perhaps, they had attained the iron-working stage and could take advantage of iron-headed tools not only to dig up much clay but also mix mortar. Not only the **po pang**, which was lowest, the **pang nefur** which was higher than the **po pang** but lower than the **bong n'ng**, or the cattle-keeping **kraal**, which was not as wide as the **nefur** but probably as tall as, or slightly shorter than **lu tap** walls, which were small, hut-sized and carried a thatch roof, were generally built of neatly-arranged stones, but smacked of how life was when the ancestors of the Ngas simply took advantage of their rocky

terrain to meet their shelter and recreational needs. It is logically tenable to suppose that the **lu tap**, which by that turn of the century had become nothing but a bush-farm watch-shed, was initially not only man's home, an advanced alternative to cave-dwelling, but older than the **bong n'ng**, which in turn was older than the **nefur**, which in turn was older than the **po pang**, based on our graduation of their varying levels of importance. When clay was discovered may not be easy to tell. But Ngas pottery and other clay articles in about 1900, made of very good clay have survived not only as vessels of an age but works of art, which demand research attention.

Ostensibly the general atmosphere of the 'world of nature' in which social conditions took place in Yil Ngas by the beginning of the twentieth century was, after all, favourable. For anyone to suggest, at that time or today that life was so difficult and hardship so persistent, on account of the difficult terrain, the scarcity of water, the infertile soils and so forth in Yil Ngas, they would only end up, in the light of the evidence, sounding pedestrian. Nevertheless, this is not to say that a 'golden age' in the history of our region was in process, nor in the offing. Several ecological problems still remained to be solved. For instance, baboons, monkeys, birds, locusts (occasional invaders), striga weed (**buur** in Shhk'tok Ngas, or **wuta wuta** in Hausa) and the balancing of hilltop and hillside cultivation with the cultivation of the valleys, swamps and plains where the rains and rivers annually deposited a lot of humus and silt. On the whole, society was already far from cringing at the mercy of nature. Society had conquered nature to the point where social needs were sufficiently met. The natural conditions had therefore given man

the specifics of what to sow, plant, or protect, and what to weed out, uproot, cut-down, or burn off; what to build with; what animals to keep, what animals to fight or kill; what techniques and ideas to adopt; what tools to make, and so forth. All these factors however reflect, to an extent, the region's forces of production. For it is the function of labour to ensure that nature's resources, are used for the production of material needs, by a given population.

As for the 'population question' by the beginning of the twentieth century, it is difficult to give discrete figures for Yil Ngas, figures of density and size. Apart from the guesstimations of British colonialists at the time, we can only have recourse to other dimensions of the ecology of Yil Ngas, such as the large settlements, to 'imagine' their population. Even though, we have relied on both colonial and oral sources, there are no ascertained figures. Compared to our cities of today, the large settlements, which obtained in Yil Ngas by the beginning of the twentieth century, may not be any big deal. But compared to settlements of neighbouring peoples and communities and adjudged by means of the yardsticks of their day, the settlements were said to be large. As such, they must have been likewise large collections of labour-power, which naturally translated into a generally sound scope of production. All capable folks -- be they males or females, children or the aged, the visually-handicapped or the lame, rulers or the ruled -- participated in food production, within the pre-colonial economy of Yil Ngas. There were practically no idlers, beggars or other forms of the lumpen. That is why we could suggest, above, that the large settlements reflected the regions forces of production.

While the forces of production in Yil Ngas answer the question of how and what implements of labour were used for the production of material needs under 'given' natural and social conditions by the beginning of the twentieth century, it is the relations of production that answer the question of who owned the implements and means of production. In order to comprehend the nature of the mode of producing material needs in a given society, which is the essential determinant of any socio-economic formation, it is necessary not only to underscore the type of forces of production which characterised it but also its characteristic relations of production. It is in the political economy of a given society that its modes of production can be located and the relations of production are recognised. Therefore let us look at the political economy of Yil Ngas by AD 1900 anon.

2.2: A Political Economy of Yil Ngas by AD 1900: Man's Production Relations:

The inhabitants of Yil Ngas by AD 1900 had fashioned out the means, techniques, and tools, appropriate for sustaining their struggle for existence in a natural environment, which had a somewhat peculiar and indeterminate ecological niche of its own. Peculiarities between the downlands and the highlands existed but their common denominators outweighed their differences.[53] (The whole of Yil Ngas lay on the south-east and eastern escarpment of the Jos Plateau, and its colonially-designated "Plain Angass" areas should not be likened to the "lowlands" of Plateau State today, hence our preferred use of "downlands" to qualify such areas in this study). Throughout Yil Ngas, techniques of shifting hill-cultivation, (blended to a greater extent with swidden practice) and intensive cultivation, (blended to a greater

extent with mixed-cropping,) were respectively employed in the bush and homestead farm sectors, regardless of whether a given community was located in the east, west, north or south. Whether, it was the people on the mountains or those in the downlands, they were generally inclined as conditioned, inevitably, to cultivate the hilltops and hillsides as well as the plains and valleys, the most fertile of which, were usually reserved, for the ngolongs as **maar'yil (moor yil)** or **maar'long (moor'long).**[54]

Their production process was labour-intensive. In order to build and maintain the terraces on their farms alone was labour demanding. Climbing and other aspects of farming on hills were painstaking. Hence, most of the communities' workforces must have been sizeable; their implements, both sufficient and suitable, as earlier contended. A production process does not only involve people who spend their labour-power therein, but also persons or groups of people with their varying relations to the means of production, on the one hand, and varying relations to the other persons or groups of people in the same society, on the other, all of whom, therefore, in one way or the other, are related to the process itself. And it is the sum-total of these material or economic relations between people, or groups of people, which develop in relation to production -- and indeed, to consumption, distribution, and exchange -- that are called social relations of production (as defined in chapter one).

What specific material relations existed between the inhabitants of Yil Ngas by AD 1900, between them as individuals, groups, settlements or communities, polities, sexes, tillers, shepherds, age grades and between parts of or

change of ownership was something that was done gradually. Only with reference to bush-farm plots, the sphere in which shifting cultivation was practiced, were any leases made. After having been granted permission to use the bush-farm plot he requested, a land user was expected to give a bundle or two of seed corn, if what he cultivated was millet or sorghum, or a small quantity, if it was another crop, annually, as a token of recognition to either the clan-head or **ngolong** concerned. The practice of giving **ken-shwe**, or seed corn, as obtained in several communities lately, was known and respected. Failure to be sensitive to that requirement could make a user lose the permission within a year or two, as the leaser may take back the plot. Therefore, Foulkes was wrong when he said in 1907, if what he said was with reference to a settler or new comer to whom a bush-farm plot was leased, that: "As long as however a man remains in the town, his farm is absolutely his own to do as he likes with.... even the king himself has no claim to any share of the produce"[56] That was not exactly the case. But it was not usually something that a **ngolong** or clan-head could take the **ken-shwe** by force. But if what he said was with reference to a new comer's homestead farm, then to an extent, he was right, since after some decades, or a generation or so, when perhaps the old economic trees on the plot must have died out, and his usufruct rights over the plot were no longer in doubt.

Under normal circumstances, members of the clan (or family) with the usufruct would freely harvest all its sylvan produce (if any); and only a share went to the current tiller of the plot, whose cultivation of the plot protected them from bush fires and so on. In some places, apart from a lease-holder's annual payment of

a token to the head of the land 'owning' clan, every compound-head relinquished a bundle of seed corn annually to the **ngolong**, the 'nominal' owner of their village area.[57]

So, in fact, land was theoretically vested in 'someone' -- the **ngolong** or some clan-head(s) -- in Yil Ngas; but not in everybody. Foulkes was somewhat right when he said in 1907 that there was "no such thing as communal property"[58]. Practically speaking, land belonged to various clans or households each of whose head was the titular 'owner', which, translated into his being its usufruct rights holder. Relics of communal ownership of land therefore existed only within the confines of a given clan or household, and did not extend to everyone in a given community. Elders of such land-owning and/or-holding clans would normally jointly decide on the usufruct of their heritage. The ngolong of a given community could also be the head of a land owning clan, with full legal rights over it. Sometimes, however, that was not the case. Not all clans, including some kingly clans, legally speaking, "owned" land by the beginning of the twentieth century in Yil Ngas, apart from their homestead concerns. Ownership of land was not a necessary condition for holding of kingship.

Generally and legally speaking, however, any ngolong was seen as the owner of his territory. Through factors like conquest, lack of foresight or lack of interest in land speculation on the part of the forefathers of some lineages, clans or households who, though settled early enough in an area, were found to be without adequate land by the beginning of the twentieth century.[59] After land was "acquired", its management was virtually the collective responsibility of all the

elders of the clan or lineage, even though outwardly it seemed like a personal property of their clan-head. In principle it belonged to the leader, in practice it belonged to the clan. Through the practice of land tenure coupled with the dread of disputes, some clan estates, even in bush-farms sector, were already sub-divided between its constituent sub-clans, households and so on, by the beginning of the twentieth century. In the land-tight homestead farms sector, it was not possible to adjust the boundaries by a metre without causing palaver. A household-head alone could redistribute such homestead holdings in the face of more wives having been married by himself, his brothers, or sons and nephews. Even so, certain plots, like the king's or **ma'ran** the queen's homestead plots, could not be tampered with at all for whatever reason. Regardless of the usually increasing male or female population, in the **luu-war'ng** or palace, such plots were not owned by the individuals but by the offices, which they occupied. The plots were open to other members of the clan if elected, and so they could not and were not to be shared out.

The rugged topography of Yil Ngas must have contributed its toll in intensifying the land question especially regarding homestead farms, which were often tightly distributed. Homestead plots were hardly left alone to fallow, but annually replenished with cow dung, wastes from other animals and ashes, in order to obtain maximum yields.[60] Bush-farms, however, were usually cultivated for some years and then allowed to fallow before they were opened up again. That some of them became woods (of the Guinea-Savannah type) presents the testimony that the period of fallow was often long. The tightness or pressure in land experienced over homestead farms was therefore lessened in the area of bush-farms.

Such woods and bushes were resorted to during hunting expeditions, and for wood-fuel, timber, tool-handles, walking sticks, roofing-grass and pasturage.

Two factors can further help us understand the pre-colonial (which today, is indigenous) concept of land in Yil Ngas by the turn of the century, in question. First, **dan kh' yil** which literally means 'hard-stepping on territory', was an annual ritual concerned with retracing the borders of clan or lineage territories, whose scopes, probably varied between five and fifty square kilometres. The smallest ones could sometimes be the area of a village, just as the largest ones could sometimes be the area of a polity.[61] This ritual was usually conducted by the **ngolong kuum-mwa** (**ngolong-kuum** for singular} or chief priests and the **jebriytmwa** (**dyem-riyd** for singular} or spiritual 'watchmen' of the clans; who 'traversed' sometimes spiritually and/or physically, the exact boundaries of their clan territories to guard against trespassers thereby protecting and safeguarding the 'property' of their ancestors, so as not to provoke their wrath, whose spirits formed a part of the clan's pantheon, at the time. The **ngolong** or clan-head, elders and other political notaries concerned, always participated in performing the rites. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the **dan kh' yil** 'ideology' had become deeply entrenched in the outlook of Ngas people regarding authority over land. The performance of the ritual was not only the final display of such authority but, unlike today, everyone respected it. Land had become so important that man and land relationships,[62] as far as ownership was concerned, were made to seem as though the spirits and interests of the people were being protected by their territories as much as their territories were being protected by the people's spirits and interests, living or dead. It was

commonly believed that if someone else, clan or individual, attempted to claim ownership of by way of 'hard-stepping on' an estate which did not rightfully belong to them, bad luck would befall them. Either, as it was feared, they would all die sequel to the performance of the **dan kh' yil** rites by the rightful owner(s) of the estate, or other mysterious things would happen to the trespassers, short of resorting to arms for physical combat. This 'ideology' contributed in reducing disputes over territories, a great deal, as no one would ordinarily want to call forth on oneself the wrath of the ancestral spirits of the land-owning' clans. Land-owning clans, however, jointly and freely cut timber, hunted game and used the streams, ponds, and pastures, in common with the other clans who had settled among them. Where sanctions existed regarding fishing, felling of trees, or hunting, they usually applied to everyone regardless of family background. Respect or due regard was, sometimes, given to land-owning clans by way of ascribing to them ranks of seniority either politically or religiously, or both.

Secondly, **luu kh' b'aam maar** which literally means 'residence usually confiscates farm field' was a well laid-down principle and accepted in Yil Ngas by the beginning of the twentieth century. It implies that once a field was allowed for newcomers to settle on, in any community, the owners of the field were bound eventually to let the settlers own whatever part of the estate that they had settled on, thereafter. At least, every married man and woman was entitled, or possessed the right, to having his or her own a homestead farm by the beginning of the twentieth century. However, in practice, the change of ownership did not take a sudden or automatic course. It took years, probably not less than a 'generation' because the

initial owners might only be gradually releasing the remainder of the field, around where the settlers' buildings stood, to them, in addition to harvesting, if any, and taking away all or sharing with the settlers (or co-inhabitants, if neighbours) the sylvan produce from the field(s) in question. The settlers' giving of **ken-shwe** served as a permanent reminder of how they got possession of the place. Until several years, therefore, probably decades, had passed, this arrangement remained.[63]

In Yil Ngas, then, by the turn of the century, the concept of land-ownership was three fold. At one level it approximated to 'tenancy' where tokens of a bundle or two of the produce were given as **ken shwe** or seed-corn, in addition to the sylvan produce or at least a share, to the 'owners' of the farmlands wherein the 'tenants,' the settlers, in other words, had settled. This was the lowest level. At the next level 'ownership' approximated to 'proprietorship,' where clans controlling vast **fuul-mwa** (**fuul**, in singular) or arable bush-farm estates -- with wide borders of about three to five square kilometres in area -- were known to acknowledge their reserved rights of usufruct over them, but they did not own them to the extent of conducting **dan kh'yil** rites over them. In rare cases, the heads, or proprietors, of such estates were required to further give **ken-shwe** to the ngolong of their polity. The practice of **dan kh'yil** largely belonged to the next type of landowners, whom the former regard as having either political or spiritual seniority over them, but did not pay fixed dues to them. Instead, gifts of various kinds, a goat, a ram and grain, might, from time to time pass from the leaders of the subordinate clans to members of the highest category of landowners, but it lacked any compulsiveness. Yet these were part and parcel of the pre-colonial forms of taxes or tributes known as **wap,**

which literally means 'worship.' Where political tributes were collected at the time, however, like in Per (Amper) and Pang (Ampang) for instance, they might as well have been collected for other reasons than land or territorial 'ownership.'[64] It was at that level of the concept of 'land-ownership' in Yil Ngas that, as already maintained, was particularly characterized by the **dan kh' yil** ritual, performed by spiritual leaders of clans with ownership claims over vast territories they alone could neither adequately populate nor cultivate. Since they sometimes possessed political overlordship, they also performed the role of adjudicators between communities within their territories, on land matters.

When heads of clans with **dan kh' yil** rights also have the office of ngolong, they could send away a condemned cultivator into exile. Many ngolongs had power to sentence to death. Generally however, a ngolong was regarded as the statutory owner of the estate on which his village or mini-state was established, including the farmlands of his subject-clans, even if his own direct clan owned but little land. He could send an offending subject into exile, even if the latter's clan (or household) owned much land with usufruct rights over many **fuul-mwa** or bush-farm fields. Thus, the theoretical basis of vesting land in the ngolong, which Foulkes stressed, was already beginning to give way to a politico-legal basis. This was probably because the basis of political and spiritual power was stronger than that of material power, which merely land-owning clans, more or less, possessed.

In his study of the communities and groups in the Jos Plateau region during the nineteenth century, Mangvwat has, on the basis of oral evidence, suggested that, at the intellectual and philosophical level, most of the groups in the

area believed that all land belonged to God and that no individual or group of individuals owned land. However we suggest that, with reference to Yil Ngas by the end of the nineteenth century, Ngas communities believed that, as a direct concern, some humans owned land, the ngolong and heads of land-holding clans, and if on the contrary, someone thought differently, he dared not express it too openly lest he incurred the wrath of the powers-that-be, in which case, he could be fined or forced into exile. Among the people-groups on the Plateau, for example, the Mwaghavul, whom Mangvwat has cited, had formed the habit of attributing the ownership of land to God, its maker, but the Ngas did not as recognise His nearness to their own realm as to attribute the sole ownership of land to Him.[65]

Instead of invoking God directly, who was believed to be supreme but somewhat very remote, they invoked their **nwong-mwa** or ancestors' spirits, whose omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotence were not in doubt. The value this gave to the land question was that the land-owning clans were never alone in watching over their territories, as they annually embarked on their **dan kh' yil** ritual trips, purportedly to ward-off trespassers and natural hazards like locust-invasions and geyser-outbreaks and so on.[66] There was a link of protection and cooperation between the invisible spirits of ancestors and the living kings, queens, priests, elders both men and women, on the one hand, and between the latter and their ancestral territorial holdings. A vertical continuum, viewed as not easily broken, held the three together. Hence unique or special concepts of man-and-land relationships had already developed in Yil Ngas.

It was far from being in a narrow sense of one obtaining a certificate of ownership over a given piece of land, which settled its ownership, as we understand it today. In the land-tight homestead farms sector, for instance, it was not possible to adjust a boundary by a metre without causing much ado or palaver. A household head alone could redistribute homestead holdings in the wake of more wives having been married by himself, his brothers, sons or nephews. But he must still be seen to be fair, otherwise his action would be contested. Moreover, certain homestead plots, like the king's, queen's or any office holder's, were not at all included in the re-distributable area, of a concerned household or clan's holdings. This was because, increasing male or female population (in the palace) notwithstanding, office-based homestead plots did not belong to occupants of the concerned offices as such, but they merely enjoyed tilling rights over the plots only as long as they remained in those positions. The moment change of baton occurred in the offices responsible for such plots, the new occupants automatically took over the plots. Hence such plots could not be apportioned during redistribution exercises. The same conditions also applied in the bush farms sector, though redistribution exercises were far less frequent in that sphere than in the homestead sphere.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, all bush-neighbourhoods in Yil Ngas, where bush farms were situated, had features of being cultivated or having been cultivated before, as earlier contended. European explorers and colonialists saw 'contour lines' or dilapidated 'walls' of age-old terraces in the bushes, during the century's first decade, apart from the proper terraces seen in farm-plots still being cultivated. A testimony to the fact that the Ngas people had

been labouring hard enough that, almost everywhere had once been tilled, except perhaps their 'sacred grounds' where the evidence of terrace walls might already have disappeared (as is the case today). But what kind of labour processes were undertaken to guarantee man's survival and welfare in Yil Ngas by AD 1900?

2.2.2 Labour:

> Their whole social and religious fabric is founded on an agricultural basis. They are essentially agriculturists and judging from results, admirable ones.
>
> - Foulkes, 1907.[67]

Agriculture was the principal economic activity practised by Ngas people by the beginning of the twentieth century. We said earlier that in the 'world of nature' Ngas 'civilisation' up to the beginning of the twentieth century was 'agrarian'. Foulkes made a correct assessment of the whole basis of their life in 1907, when he said as cited above, that they were essentially admirable agriculturists. Yet, in the next breadth, blinded by his colonialist mentality, Foulkes scandalized them: "Their [agricultural] system appears too good for their own intelligence to have evolved."[68] And, if the Ngas did not evolve it, how did they come by it? Foulkes opinion was that "they must have been taught it," and agriculture "being mainly a mechanical process there was little to forget", after they must have been taught.[69] Foulkes did not, however, suggest who might have taught agriculture to the Ngas, to further make his false assertion seem true.

Instead, he went further to insult their intelligence: "I doubt if they understand in the least any principles."[70] Which principles? Principles of agriculture, which he as a British colonialist, knew, of course! What were they? Crop rotation and the practice of intensive agriculture on every farm, inferred easily

from Foulkes' remarks, still condemning Ngas agricultural practice: "There is no rotation of crops, but there being at present no necessity for any 'intensive' cultivation, that matters little. A farm is sown for 5 years consecutively and is then allowed to lie fallow for the same period, there is sufficient land to permit of this..."[71] Shifting cultivation, which Foulkes had just described, was quite strange and unknown to him! However, its practice was the very reason why intensive cultivation was not practised on Ngas bush-farms. On their homestead farms, however, there was always not only the necessity for intensive cultivation, but it was already in practice, which Foulkes was unable to see. Since there was plenty land in the bush-farms sector, which he acknowledged, then it is clear that their substitute for crop rotation was shifting cultivation, which the narrow-minded colonialist could not see. Foulkes' simplistic assumption that the absence of crop rotation and intensive cultivation on their bush-farms was tantamount to inability to understand any principles of agriculture was, therefore, quite wrong.

Furthermore, Foulkes observed that during the five-years fallow period on a bush-farm, "the undergrowth which springs up on the vacant land supplies all their needs in the shape of firewood,"[72] indicating an above-average or fast replenishment rate. During that period, enough soil nutrients would have been absorbed to warrant resumption of cultivation thereafter. Like his predecessors the spies, who three years before, were in Yil Ngas, Foulkes narrated what he saw in 1907 regarding their use of every available space, their intense expenditure of labour and dogged commitment to the building and maintenance of terraces, especially on hilly farm sites: "In the hills [Hill Angas area] every little scrap of

ground is utilised, and whole mountain sides are terraced up at an enormous expenditure of labour. On the steeper slopes the terraces may be 3ft.[three feet] high, built up of rocks and stones, and frequently only a few inches wide, just enough room for one row of guinea corn."[73]

Practising agriculture in a geographic environment characterised with the kind of topography that Yil Ngas had and still has, must have, no doubt, been labour intensive. But Foulkes failed to give the credit of knowing how to overcome such a tough environment, through terrace farming, to the Ngas people. Had he done so, he would by the same logic, probably have undermined any rationale for constraining the Ngas to submit to the colonial regime. Colonial mentality, or whims and caprices, made it such that the colonialists sometimes portrayed the colonised as warlike and healthy, but at other times, as lazy and unintelligent, though they always exploited their labour. Thus, Foulkes laboured to suggest in 1907 that the Ngas were hard-working and had daringly subjected most of their 'tough' area to cultivation, yet he also thought they were low in intelligence. He did not realise, as it were, that when the going got tough, the Ngas people being tough, got going. They had creatively embraced shifting cultivation, which incidentally he knew nothing about, and developed an attractive method of terrace farming, yet to him they were just pedantic labourers![74] If so, let us suppose it, then they must have been working just like robots or by instinct like bees, still at the biological stage, which was far from the truth. Foulkes preferred to attribute the origin of their knowledge to some more intelligent creatures, without reason. He must have had some 'whiteskins'

at the back of his mind, as the erstwhile teachers of the Ngas in the mechanics of their agriculture.[75] We have already contended in this chapter, however, that from the way their houses were built, settlements were patterned, sites selected and so forth, the Ngas had not only demonstrated that they understood, and had mastered, their environment to a great extent, that they were a people, with time-packed experience and principles with which they continued to struggle to conquer nature, and by the turn of the century in question, they had already recorded many victories in that regard. The Foulkeses of this world would never successfully deny those victories, nor distort their history. In this sub-section, we shall look more critically at the way the Ngas people sustained the struggle to produce material wealth, as a people and as communities.

Labour is the capacity of people to adapt the resources of nature to their own uses, satisfying their own material and spiritual requirements, and those of others. It is always conscious, creative, and purposeful. Consequently labour is usually expended commensurate to the requirement necessary to transform nature's resources to man's use. In Yil Ngas, by the turn of the century in question, every capable man or woman grew millet or sorghum, or both on their bush-farms. Either millet or sorghum or both, plus maize, which was constant, were grown in their homestead farms. Rice was grown on more or less swampy stream banks. Sesame and beniseed were usually grown in the neighbourhood of, if not as extensions of, their bush-farms. Each man or woman was directly responsible for the conduct of work on his or her own farms. The farms of the women were generally smaller than those of their husbands. It seems it mattered little if a woman gave all her efforts to

working on her husband's farm, especially if she was his only wife, and if he was always so good as to later stack her own granaries with more produce than was basically required for the family's feeding, leaving the rest for her to do as she pleased with.

The family unit materially paid more attention to working on the plots of the husband. This was because each wife plus her own children, as a group or unit, by and large, were going to receive a share of the produce from his farms. Women and daughters shared out their time between working on husband and father's farms and their own, which for the daughters meant their mothers' farms. While the daughters often gave more assistance on their own mothers' farms, the sons, as a rule, worked more on their fathers' farms. In fact, men with male children were generally regarded as rich men because it was realised that, as often as that was the case, such men could harvest the upwards of one hundred (100) sheaves or bundles of corn, at the end of the cropping season. On the bush-farms, the practice had even become commonplace for men to spend some nights, in order to work from dawn till dusk, on the days following such nights. Men could work from morning till dusk for up to a week, with only either the women or children, going-back home in the evenings to bring them more supplies in the mornings, and/or simply, to maintain the social link with other people. If a man had adult sons, they stayed back at will, depending on the outstanding volume of work.

Generally, such men cooked their own evening meals there on the farms. Their elderly fathers may not always stay the nights with them. Such stay was made possible as a result of the **lutap-mwa** or the laid-stone walled, thatch-roofed, huts

that were used as farm pavilions.[76] In these, the men passed nights beside red embers of burning logs of wood, which kept the place warm. Pieces of yams and sweet potatoes were usually roasted, and the **mpam-pam** millet-flour cakes baked, in such **lutap** hearths. Extra farm tools were kept in the **lutap**. Tools for different aspects of farm work such as the axe, big-hoe, small-hoe and the rest were only kept in the **lutap** during the seasons of their relevance. By the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, traces of inter-communal division of labour had taken shape between the various settlements, or parts of Yil Ngas, on the one hand, and between Yil Ngas herself and the other regions around, on the other. By the same token, divisions of labour had come to exist between constituent clans or sections of given settlements, between member-households of several clans, or village-wards, and even between members of households, with respect to operations in agriculture. Hence, quite a number of 'units' of labour had been engendered and were operating in the region by the turn of the century.

The basic and commonest unit of labour in Yil Ngas at this time was family labour. This was made up of a man, his wives, and his children, including all his dependants, nephews and nieces. The father, as well as each of his wives, operated at least the two categories of farms: the homestead and bush-farms. More sorghum was grown in the downlands, while more millet was grown in the highlands. A husband could have another bush-farm in which the same crops were planted. Adult. Members of the family generally could individually keep little plots for the cultivation of legumes and little corn for private use.

Wives were generally amenable to the wishes of their husband, especially whenever he wanted more hands on his own farms. Of course, the husband also, from time to time, visited and worked on his wives' farms, especially when people from outside his family rallied to work on a farm of any of his wives. During harvest, at the husband's instigation, the whole family took some days' turns to set on the women's farms, beginning with the first wife's, until they had brought home all the produce from the different plots or farms owned by parent-members of their family) though in most cases the husband's main bush-farm's harvest was done with the aid of the **dywuang** or solicited labour. Each wife got a portion of the husband's produce proportional to what the husband discerned to be her need, depending on the number of her children. Whatever the wives each realised from their own farms was not in principle required to be shared with anyone at all; they just simply added it to what their husbands had allotted to them.

Each year, where the need existed, the head of the family provided members, be they wives, daughters or sons, with the necessary implements of labour. Whenever any of his sons was due to marry, he, together with his brothers and cousins, as a rule, had to use grain surplus, livestock from his own or extended family's herd or flock, or through trade by barter, acquire the livestock, to pay the bride price. Once married, a young man normally and shortly thereafter disengaged himself from his father's ambit of production and then established his own.

Closely related to family labour, however, was household labour. This was made up of a father, his wives, sons, unmarried daughters, daughters-in-law, and grandchildren, including of course whoever else was a ward or dependant, in a

given household. This form of labour appears to have been an older form than family labour. By the turn of the century in question, it obtained in households where the head of the structure was fast ageing, and though he still had many dependants, orphans and widows, he happened to be hesitant to let his married sons disengage themselves from his ambit of production and control. Once a situation like that existed, the sons had had to be patient, until his death, when his vast farms would then be shared out to his married sons, assuming their independence. The evidence of household labour also lay in the fact that, in some situations, it was the sons themselves, who, though married, pooled themselves around their father to operate a large farm together. Even if they kept other farms privately, those were usually for the procurement of other crops, such as groundnuts, bambara nuts, sesame, sweet potatoes and so on, but, sorghum and millet were corporately produced. So their own shares of sorghum and millet produce derived from the 'old man's farm. This was 'communal' labour of a kind, but as soon as the harvests were done, shares were distributed and consumed privately at the family level. The head of the household however was usually expected to meet certain personal, pressing needs of the members, (acting like a Santa Claus, the legendary Father Christmas) from his granaries where portions of the surplus produce were kept, in his name. So Foulkes was not entirely correct when he stated that: "...there is no such thing as communal property..."[77] However, property in farm produce and livestock at the family level was much more in evidence than at the household level, just as family labour was commoner than household and all the other forms of labour, by the beginning of the twentieth century. The fact that household labour smacks of being

older than the family form of labour does not mean that it was necessarily bound to die out with older generations. Even the hard-grind of the yoke of colonial domination could not destroy it. Instances of its practice stood their ground, though in a reducing capacity, during the up to the third quarter of the twentieth century.[78]

Some forms of property were still controlled at the level of the household. Examples are livestock, especially cattle, sylvae, and farmlands, as stated earlier. Sometimes, forms of such property were still jointly owned at the clan level, especially where the households constituting the clan were living together in one village or neighbourhood, such that what may be owned and controlled by a household was in actual fact its own share in the clan property only. The eldest man in the household usually served as the controller, if not custodian, of such household property. Hence the livestock that were paid off as part of bride prices for the (first) wives of their sons were still, to a large extent kept at the household level, in spite of the preponderant practice of family labour, at the time. Fathers were required to pay the bride price of only the first wife of each of their sons. The bride price of other younger wives of a member of a household, was his personal responsibility, in principle. In practice, however, all male members of a household normally assisted him in keeping with the Ngas stronger principle that **nmad'-dh' mbii dyem'pup**, meaning, "a wife is a patrimonial concern". The plain implication of this is that, in the event of the man's death, any male member of the household was qualified, to inherit his widow or widows, without having to pay another bride price. Relics of that practice existed up to the latter half of the twentieth century.

Property in livestock at the family level also existed: a member of a household could own a flock or herd of his own apart from the common household flock or herd. Sometimes his were shepherded and kept in a separate pen or kraal; sometimes they were kept and shepherded together with those belonging to the household, but the shepherds concerned knew who owned which animal(s) in the flock and herd. In principle, women were never entitled to own property in livestock, except dogs and fowls. They always had to say in principle that everything belonged to their husbands, even if in fact they owned some sheep or goats, of their own. Even so, they hardly owned cattle. Their consolation lay in the fact that no-one, including their own husbands, could just take any of their own livestock without first getting their personal consent. They were usually expected to consent to such requests, so long as she saw the seriousness of her husband's need and/or her children's interests were seemingly protected. Shepherds were often the direct children of owners of flocks and herds. In situations where livestock were collectively kept and maintained at the clan or household levels, children especially of those who had private (or family) apart from the joint or collective shares in the livestock were mandatorily required to be among, if not the sole shepherds of the stock. Shepherding was reserved for boys. Where no sons were born to a man or where his sons had out-grown the adolescent stage, he was usually constrained to take male children of relatives to help him. Even at the household level, which ordinarily had a larger population than a family unit, life could sometimes be so difficult that boys were sometimes hired from relatives and friends of the

household. Hirelings were usually paid in different forms, the commonest being a she-goat or an ewe, per annum.

Compound labour was another form of the organisation of labour in Yil Ngas at the time. Whereas household labour was based on extended family ties; compound labour was based on good neighbourliness, and the joy of staying together in the same compound, though, not necessarily having a common ancestry or living father. In its widest scope, it sometimes included members of neighbouring compounds of a village-ward. Most such compounds were made up of members of different households, where even distant blood ties were difficult to be traced, yet coming together from time to time, to give helping hands on one another's farms or on the farms of the aged and weaker members of their compounds, was their delight. The motive was to strive to guarantee the welfare of everyone in the society, that is, to be their brothers' keepers. They seemed to know that when some had foodstuffs while others lacked, things would not augur well for them to continue to live together in the same compounds. Besides, no-one was indispensable as he or she could fall sick, or lose a loved one, or grow old, and so become demoralised and weak. Thus in every aspect of farm work, which usually began with sowing, growing, harvesting, threshing, and ending with clearing or re-clearing of farms, stronger members of compounds normally spared time to work as a team, on the farms of other members, who, for reasons of age, sickness and other obvious reasons (in light of their farming calendar), were lagging behind.

Their goal was in order to have good harvests, in their compound, at the end of the farming season; a foolproof design, which guaranteed an income for adult

members of a compound. Away from the farms, compound labour also operated in the areas of building and roofing huts, like the **gantang war'ng**, where the men and adolescent boys usually slept, and met to discuss issues of common interest. Other dimensions of compound labour were gender-based. The men organised local hunting expeditions. The women combined to weave grass sheets and corn-stalk sheets for their roofs and shelters, in turn. The men ginned and spinned cotton into yarns. The women made fine clay 'pastes' known as **ntezu** to make embroidering patterns (with their fingers) on the inside walls of rooms, and so on. Though a much commoner tendency was for each man and woman to personally carry out these activities, in season. Doing it at the same time with others, was the rule; meaning, each person worked at his or her own thing (sitting in the same shade) and only gave helping hands to one another after they had been through with their own. This was true, to an extent, in their crafts-making industry as well as in agricultural production. Yet their inclination to finishing any activity in the spirit of teamwork remained strong.

Another form of labour was the **dywuang**, the solicited or invited labour, in which a farmer who was in need solicited help of other members of his or her compound, or village-ward. It could be as few as two youths, or it could be members of one sex or age-grade depending on the nature of the work. Usually members of ones ward, or of other wards in the village, were invited for farm work, or for other kinds of work (roofing, building, threshing, hunting, etc.) and they often obliged themselves and rendered the service. Sometimes they gave excuses if they were not available This kind of labour, grouped together with household labour

which was based on descent or kin-ship, and compound labour which was based on neighbourliness or kith-ship, attested as evidence, to an extent, for what James Scott has called, "the moral economy of the peasant".[79] People were generally often available to render a helping hand to the one who needed labour, food, or other forms of assistance. The underlying principle was to guarantee collective, communal survival. The moral economy of the peasant, granted a sense of security to any member of the society in his or her 'rainy and stormy days'. Labour and food (including, in this connection, livestock and sylvan produce) were therefore given or got free for nearly nothing in exchange. The operation of the moral economy was and should be regarded as both a reminiscence and evidence of a 'communal' society; a reminiscence because the heydays of communalism in Ngas society lay in the past; an evidence because its diehard features were still prevalent. Labour and food, were increasingly becoming value defined, that is, were being attached other significances other than the moral one, by the beginning of the twentieth century in Yil Ngas. Uppermost in that regard was the commercial value.

First, as an example in that category, was the age-grade or peer-group labour, comparable to what M.Y. Mangvwat has called, "rotation labour,"[80] which, as a rule in Yil Ngas, was organised on gender basis. In this form of labour, peers or companions of a common age grade organised themselves in such a way that they worked on each other's farm(s) on a rotative basis, beginning first with the eldest to the youngest member's farm, day after-day. This, variously called **nwuk** or **saar** or **ye kh' saar**, meaning 'the joining of hands', was not made up of all the members of an age grade in a village, or a ward, as a rule, but, of those of them who reckoned

that they were not only agreeable with one another, but, made of the same stuff, a bunch of equals, as it were, when it came to farm work. The **ye kh' saar** labour was most characteristic of the youths, but by no means restricted to them; women where known to be quite fond of it, except perhaps, older men, who focused most of their attention on their own farms and those of their wives, rather than think of co-labouring on rotative basis with their own peers. A material bond was underlying **ye kh'saar** labour in that members were shortly reckoned to be "indebted" to one another. When someone had been to another's farm but his or her own turn had not yet been reached due to the drudgery of the rotation process, the former was regarded as being indebted to the latter. Labour was therefore exchanged for labour; hence it was not free. In the event that someone absented oneself from another member's farm-work day, for reasons other than sickness, such a member was required to pay up by way of making a separate arrangement to work on the member's farm. Therefore, although on extrinsically, **ye kh'saar** labour was a means of increasing labour by means of corporate effort, intrinsically, it was a means of labour exchange between its members. The host on a specific day usually provided of refreshments, in form of food and drinks, not costed as part of the bargain.

This brings us to another category of value-defined labour in Yil Ngas, by the end of the nineteenth century. Included herein are, let us say, debt-defined and reward-defined forms of labour. In the first instance, people who were indebted to others in the form of the purchase of a hoe, a cloth, a pot, a goat, a ram, and so on, on the understanding that it would be returned, but failed to do so, usually, as a last

resort, bargained for the refund in the form of manual work.[81] Sometimes it was a group that was involved. Young men were fond of this kind of problem-solving approach, well knowing too that the older folks would be too glad to have them work for them. So deals were made, and labour was, in a sense, sold in exchange for something else.

In the second instance, farm labour was usually organised in favour of parents, especially of the mother, of a girl to whom a man was engaged, made up of himself and his kith and kin. This group usually worked the girl's mother's farm at least once a year, until the couple were married. Another case in point, in the second instance, was when a lad was hired to shepherd livestock over which he had no inheritance rights, he was usually entitled to at least a sheep or a goat with every passing year. This kind of service could take several years to end; as a result, the hired shepherd or his father usually became endowed with his own little flock, as his reward, by the time he was due to leave the service. Hence, labour was characterised with the award of certain material benefits, which attracted people to 'give', so that they might 'get' in exchange.

Dywuang-yil, literally: 'prick-the-earth,' but essentially 'invite-the-public' or in Hausa, **gayya,** labour was another form of value-defined labour in Yil Ngas, by the end of the nineteenth century. This was the organisation of labour that cut across all the compounds and wards of villages. It was essentially voluntary, and composed of folks who saw the farmyard as an arena for the determination of 'local champions' in farming speed and skill. **Dywuang-yil**_or, as it was also known, **gayya,** labour symbolised the transformation of agricultural activity into both an art

and a sport. It afforded the best skilled farmers, the opportunity to display their prowess and expertise. Great fanfare, (including drumming, singing, horn blowing, fluting and so forth) usually characterised. Although it was usually voluntary, not compulsory, **dywuang-yil** was usually so compelling; a delight of the strong and able-bodied. A detachment of the 'visible' **nwongmwa or** masqueraders, who functioned as gang-drovers, was usually in attendance during conducts of the **dywuang-yil.** Their role was to drive on, with whips, the slow and tiring workers to double their efforts and catch up with the faster folks, and, at the same time, do a good job.

Dywuang-yil was used for big farms where any phase of farm work (weeding, ridging, harvesting and so on) demanded a lot of work. In fact, it was not just anybody that could apply for the **dywuang-yil** and take it to his farm. It was well-to-do household, compound, or clan heads who benefited most from this type of labour simply because they had enough surplus or the means to entertain the 'workers' on such days. The workers ate, drank, sang, and danced, after the work was done, while still on the man's bush-farm, and thereafter they returned home to continue with singing and dancing. No particular fees were paid, as far as we know. And the 'poorer' folks usually needed to be backed by the more well-to-do before they could take the **dywuang-yil** or **gayya** labour to their farms. Summons for **dywuang-yil** usually went out in the name of their 'more influential' supporters, but the work would be done on their own farms. This may be another dimension of the moral economy, that was practised, on the one hand, and also of an emergent class society, on the other. The office of the **ngolong maar,** that is, the king of farming,

had already come into being.[82] He, it was, who must be consulted to secure a fixed date, before **dvwuang-yil** was announced and organised to work for the person concerned. And the office of **ngolong maar**, as expected, was usually occupied by a star farmer, sometimes the best 'star' farmer of the village. A material bond or basis underlay the **dywuang-yil** labour in that its attendance (though voluntary) was usually at its peaks, if the host was a man of renown and was always very generous in supplying provisions during the exercise. Its summons were usually announced or shouted by the village heralds just as in the case of **maar-yil** labour.

Maar-yil (or **moor-long, maar-long**) labour was probably older than **dywuang-yil**. It usually cut across a concerned village's entire population. This was the form of labour organised to work on the main farm of the **ngolong,** the king, to assist him. As the names **maar-yil,** literally meaning, the societal or 'national' farm, and **moor long**, meaning, the royal farm, actually suggest, that name(s) refers primarily to the farm itself, which was more of a public, rather than the private enterprise or liability of the **ngolong**, who enjoyed its produce. It therefore existed in favour of the kingship, not the person occupying the office. It is only in the secondary sense that the name(s) refers to the type of labour characteristic of it. **Maar-yil** labour was such that it was usually compulsory, not voluntary, to go on days announced by the palace heralds; all the people were required to go out and work on the farm. For all the processes of cultivation -- planting, weeding, mulching, 'bending the ears, harvesting, threshing and so on -- all the subjects resident within a king's domain, went from time to time, in the spirit of **maar-yil** labour, to work on the farm. Children, the sick and the aged were exempted. Hence,

this was corvee labour, instituted to favour the kings. The value of what was harvested from such a farm reflected part of the material basis of and the benefits associated with, the office of **ngolong.**

The king always fed his subjects on such **maar-yil** days, which in fact had all the features of a **dywuang-yil** labour except it was compulsory, therefore, much better attended. **Maar-yil** labour was probably the best form of communal or community-wide labour; even though it had acquired a 'coercive' character. The office of the **ngolong maar,** to an extent, mattered a lot in the organisation of **maar-yil** labour, as well as in **dywuang-yil**. During **maar-yil** sessions, which he usually fixed, he and his competitors (in the display or speed and skill) who, by their work usually inspired the other folks, were usually adjudged and scored informally by the other participants as to who was better or best, in one thing or the other. All round the year, then, the people came together at community level, at least once, in each season of their agricultural calendar to work together on the king's official farm, apart from **dywuang-yil** sessions, when they came together, largely, and worked on farms of well-to-do men and women.

When a person decided to start a new farm, and matters of usufruct were in his favour, he would first of all set up a sign: a shea-butter stick with its leaves tied to the top of the stick and place it at the edge of the plot.[83] After that, he would cut a few of the 'trees and brushes' around the stick, to drive out every doubt in the minds of other interested contestants for the cultivation of the same plot. Usually just before the rains had ceased during a given farming season, a portion of the earmarked plot was tilled, with ridges made, early enough for the late planting of

crops like fonio or sesame, but when this was reckoned to be too late for the crops to make any yields before the dry season, the new farm was left with unplanted ridges, until the next cropping season, six months later. During the next farming season, more ridges were sometimes made, and the farm was planted with crops.

Most planting, essentially sowing, was done between the months of May and July, since the rains usually began before the end of April. They planted their staples of sorghum (in its **sadai, nnaza-pye, nnaza -ned,** and **malok**_species) and millet (in its **nmoor kas,** and **nchualng** species) first, because some species needed more growing time or needed to be planted early. **Malok and nmoor** were usually early enough to be harvested in September and October. The **kas** known as **mbeter** or **nleb-leb,** was grown on the plateau-upland proper, especially in Pankshin, Kadung and Fier Districts, usually transplanted from nurseries in September but would ripen and be ready for harvest in November. Other food crops, more or less of a secondary nature, like **mbalwo** (maize), **guzzuk** (fonio or **acha**), **yh'rm** (beans), **nlankang** (**kom** or groundnuts) **nfufwas** (**kom'zut** or bambara nuts), **bwan** (pumpkin) and **fori** (**flor** or rosale), and non-food or "cash" crops like **buttuk** (cotton), **beng** (**tu** or guord), **taba** (**ta'a** or tobacco) and so on, were planted usually after they had planted their staples.

A dark species of rice, now extinct, was cultivated in small quantities.[84] It was usually grown on small scale by the turn of the century in question. Yams were planted in the homestead gardens, which were in fact different from the homestead farms in a general sense, they stood closest to the houses, usually the most endowed with compost-material, and were much smaller than the other homestead farms.

Such homestead gardens were usually designated as **puk mbalwo** or 'maize' plots, and were therefore, very small in area. Planted amidst the maize, two yam species existed: **bwer leyb** or plains or downlands yam, and **bwer jzwal** or highland yam. **Nda mwalm** or **mwalm** or cocoyams, **nvu** or **rizga,** in Hausa, and **ndankali pye** and **la'wur,** two species of sweet potatoes, were also cultivated, mainly in the swampy valleys, but on small plots.

The weeding process known as **koss**, began almost as soon as the crops were planted. It was usually conducted between the months of June and early August. Then it was succeeded by the mulching season, **taar gon** (**gon**, being the mulching itself), in the months of August and September which was done only on the sorghum and millet farms except for **kas-mbeter**, which had, and still has, a different agronomy. In October, the **shwe-teb'** season usually succeeded that of mulching. **Shwe-teb'** implies the bending of sorghum crops' ears to enable them dry up faster. Let us quote Foulkes' 1907-eye-witness account on this issue:

> ...the whole family turns out into the farm and reaching up as far as they can break each one so that the ear hangs down. A few days later these are all cut and packed into bundles to be taken to the granary. The bundles are small, and 100 last a man and his wife the twelve months and to get this requires about 3 acres.[85]

Millet, on the other hand, could be harvested without breaking the ears to hang down as its heads usually dry up faster than those of sorghum; but both were harvested at the same time, after their heads had dried up enough to be put in the barns and, later, granaries.

Much as the basic unit of production, or of the organisation of labour, was the family unit, by the end of the nineteenth century, every individual adult

(cultivator) was a factor of labour, in his or her own right. Almost every man and woman, either ran, or was believed to be capable of running their own farms single-handedly, even if extra hands of labour were not available to give support. In practice, however, every male or female adult established his or her own farms; aided and intensified by the increasing balkanisation of homestead farms. In order to produce more grain to cope with social demands, therefore the families gave greater attention to each of their bush-farms especially, to those of the family-heads, as earlier highlighted.

During the dry season, most of the units of labour, highlighted above, still bore a certain measure of significance. Women collected and wove the roofing grass, corn stalk, made pottery, and decorated the houses, the men cut beams, timber, and did the roofing of their houses, etc, together. Even in hunting, women exclusive, features of **dywuang-yil, household, compound, nwuk** (peer group) and **family** (including their dogs) forms of labour still prevailed. However, the institutionalised forms of organised-labour in hunting were **kwat'teng** and **kwat'bako,** the former being more restrictive, while the latter was free for all men who liked to participate in it.[86]

More labour-power was expended in shepherding than in hunting. The Ngas kept both the long-horned and **n'ng-nkar'ng** or **muturu** or hill cattle species. They also kept horses, sheep, goats, poultry and dogs. Boys, and sometimes ladies, mostly the uncircumcised boys and girls below the age of puberty, shepherded their fathers' livestock. Hardly was there a compound without any sheep and goats at all (or even cattle and horses for that matter) by the end of the nineteenth century. In

the downlands in particular, hardly was there a young man who never experienced shepherding. More livestock, especially sheep and cattle, were as a matter of fact kept in the downlands. The very concept of shepherding in Yil Ngas, **mhed' kh leyb**, literally means, 'going to the plain,' thus, the same word used for plains and valleys, is central in defining the concept. Hence, it could be inferred that, the **leyb** referring to shepherding derived from the **leyb** referring to plains or valley, where shepherds usually took their flocks and herds for pasturage.[87]

Young women, on their own part, generally helped their mothers, aunts, step mothers or grand-mothers with domestic chores, ranging from cooking, washing kitchen utensils, grinding, pounding and threshing as well as in making cornstalk matting materials for door covers, veranda shades and beds, and (using their fingers) making fine embroidering patterns on the inside walls of rooms and so on. Older men carved stools, wooden beds, drum cylindrical trunks, pestles and mortars, wooden spoons, smoking pipes, hoe-handles, and so on; worked iron, producing new knives spears, hoes, and arrow-heads; built new stone-and-clay huts at home, and one laid-stone hut, or **lutap**, on their own and each of their wives' bush-farms.

Women made beautiful pottery from locally sourced clay and **ka'jng** handbags from boabab bark fibres, as well as **ka'tm** flour containers. These articles were usually made or woven with colourful patterns meant to add beauty. Men usually cut open the calabashes and made engraved fired decorative designs on their barks. A lotion was made from the mahogany seed, known as **muir-ten**. Women made their commonest make-up cosmetic from **mbob**, a yellow substance on the

surface of stagnant water, especially during the dry seasons, which they boiled, rolled into balls, dried, and pounded into powder, the final stage in which it was ready for use. Men made cloth yarns from the ginned and spinned cotton wool by means of the handloom. The yarn proved to be a strong cloth called **b'aat**. With this, they made their **nv'tat (nfu'tat, nfua'tat)** or **nfwet** or a jumper and/or gown for men, **mur'du** or a pair of trousers, **mbanta**, or bante, **gudu** or a cover cloth, and the **n'jzwal b'aat** or a cloth bag. Other bags the men used, were **mbala** and **n'jzwal n'chip**. The latter was used mostly during ceremonies or festivals because of its great artistic patterns, made of boabab bark fibres just like the women's **ka'jng**.

After the harvests which were mostly done in November-December period, the Ngas threshed some of their crop produce, which was usually threshed through utilising household or compound labour and the grains were stored up in special granaries called **nlèès**. Bundles of produce, which were not to be threshed were later removed from the **lu-nap** or roofless barns, where they had been packed after the harvest, and placed in some **dyér** or other granaries, just before the commencement of the next rainy season. One **lu-nap** was large enough to hold the upwards of (100) hundred bundles. A family normally required a number of **dyer-mwa** and **nlees-mwa,** all granaries, into which both the un-threshed and threshed produce, were kept, respectively. After apportioning produce to his wives, a man usually kept the remaining produce in his own granaries, for special uses. A **dyer**, in principle, was a private, out-of-bounds, unit and any act of trespass was frowned at or treated as a serious offence. Even between a husband and a wife, it was safer for the one to be

permitted by the other before he or she ventured into the other spouse's granary. Under certain difficult conditions however, it was generally allowed.[88]

In the light of man's struggle to eke out a livelihood in Yil Ngas by the end of the nineteenth century, we would say that he had come a long way, through a purposeful and organised use of labour and the resources of nature at their disposal. Different relations of production were entered into in order to cope better with the challenges of their collective struggle. While, at the same time, several lines were drawn indicating who owned what, made what, should get what, and how and why and so on. In short, the labour process that was in operation in Yil Ngas by the turn of the century in question, placed a rather high premium on the people to put in their best in terms of labour-power in order to produce their subsistence but to realise or guarantee a good measure of social well-being was for families to thrive much higher than merely to hold their 'heads above the water.'[89] Hence, everyone, to them, was labour-worthy, neither the king nor the handicapped was exempted from work. Unemployment was, if not almost, nil. They had well spelt out principles of work of their own. By the turn of the century, certain checks and balances were already operating to distribute work in terms of age, sex, rank, place group 'trade', and so on. Their relations of production were responsible for engendering the checks and balances, as we have attempted to show in the present sub-section. And on the basis of the same relations, goods and services were distributed and utilised. Let us look at the way that was done.

2.2.3 Utilisation of Produce

Most cereal-and sylvan-produce in Yil Ngas by the beginning of the twentieth century was consumed as food. In Foulkes' day, that is, by 1907, according to him, about one hundred bundles of corn were required to feed a single family alone;[90] a figure we would consider to be on the high side in meeting the subsistence needs of a present day family in Yil Ngas. Two explanations are possible here. First, the sizes of families have apparently dwindled, which therefore indicates or suggests that a significant change in Ngas family structure might have gradually taken place. Second, sizes of corn bundles must have changed overtime since the turn of the century in question, and besides, they did not at the time, nor do they today, maintain any uniform standard for determining a bundle. Rather, the size of 'a bundle' varied with varying area or location. Nevertheless, they had enough grain for the sustenance of their society, according to the 'Survey Party,' who were more or less spies, as well as Capt. Foulkes, who even reported that they had not experienced any famine lately, as contended in chapter three.

The portions of produce shared out to the women by their husbands were designated for the feeding of the families, though the women had the liberty of doling out small grain gifts out to their maternal female kin, that is, their **jep'nin** relatives, who were in need. The grain reserved by the family heads or husbands, were used in performing a whole spectrum of social services: (i) it was a 'grain reservoir' to which the family went for assistance when a wife's stores were exhausted; (ii) to meet the grain needs of needy or dependent relatives, in keeping with the moral economy; (iii) to make the payment of fines, debts, bride price and

tokens (say, on a borrowed farm plot); (iv) to provide quantities of food and drinks during sessions of group labour work (on family farms) and during festivals, and so on and so forth.

With regard to sylvan produce, it seems that any of three ways of its utilisation was used in one situation or the other: (i) in one respect sylvan produce was treated as a preserve of the land-owning family or clan; (ii) in another respect, sylvan produce was shared between the land-owning and land-borrowing families; and (iii) in the third respect, the cultivator of a borrowed plot freely consumed its sylvan produce without any mandatory recourse to its owner, especially if the plot was used by the cultivator as a homestead farm, in which case the principle of **lu kh' b'aam maar,** or 'residence usually confiscates the farm field' was used by extension after about one generation, to dispossess land-owners of plots near any cultivator's residence who used such plots as part of their homestead farms.

A festival of one kind or the other marked virtually every season of the Ngas agricultural calendar. In Yil Ngas at the time, there was at least a festival during, before or after, the **taar pas** or the wet, cropping season, which lasted from June to October, the **taar weeb** or the not-too-dry, harvesting season, which lasted from November to December, the **taar luun** or the deciduous, dry season, which lasted from January to March and the **taar fong'fong** or the budding, windy and humid not-too-dry season, which lasted from April to May. The fact that some of the festivals were named after some of their lunar months testifies to the frequency of holding festivals in Yil Ngas as a whole. Different areas, or even villages, in an area, had peculiarities in 'form' and 'time' of specific festivals but in significance,

the specific type of festivals did not quite vary. Thus, **nmos luun, nmos taar, nmos nmorgi, nmos nwong, nmos beel, nmos bwir**, and so on, were celebrated at slightly different times, wherever they were known to be celebrated, and in peculiarly different styles from place to place, whereas they had more a less a common meaning regardless of which areas were concerned. Instead of seeing these festivals as avenues of 'burning off' portions of surplus grain, we should see them as vents through which, especially during the dry season, the elders overwhelmed and boosted the spirit of the work forces to work harder, with greater zest, during the next cropping season. Though various religious meanings and functions were associated with the holding of different festivals, it was usually imperative to do each festival according to its rules so as not to incur, as it were, the wrath of their ancestors. Hence, whereas few of the festivals could sometimes be waived, others, under no circumstance, should be waived otherwise, the king, or the chief priest, was blacklisted and faced with threats of deposition.[91]

During the festivals, large volumes of cereal-brewed beer, the **nmos**, were produced. It was only in the event of holding of these festivals, we understand, that young men drank beer freely and the women, the makers, could take some of it. Apart from festival, times, youths and women could only have access to much beer during the **dywuang-yil** and **maar-yil** labour sessions. As said already, beer and food were, usually, served after the work had been done. Young men had their minds set on the glories and virtues of labour far away from the secondary pleasures of drinking some beer. Women were believed to be, and therefore expected to act as, great symbols the Ngas unsung morality, purity and kosher goodness.[92] Hence,

Ngas women were expected to be indifferent to, not necessarily complete abstainers from, several foods, including **nmos**. Children were not encouraged to drink it, either. Women and children could drink the unfermented and sweet **j'm**, which was **nmos** brew's unfermented, penultimate stage after which fermentation began. Beer was a special preserve of influential and old men, and their guests. **Nmos** was not commercialised at all. Today, it is largely commercialised and has become a valued commodity, to both its sellers and drinkers. In those days, as a guest to an influential man, a youth could sometimes be served with a calabash of **nmos**. Festivals were usually largely characterised by much eating, besides the drinking. Notable in this connection was the great consumption of protein, in the forms of chevron, beef, mutton, chicken, and so on. Livestock were killed to mark the occasions, as well as to grant everyone a rich and pleasant diet. Fowls were nonetheless usually locked away, as, the practice was permissible during festivals, when any relative of a given family could catch just any of their cock or hen and go with it, or, even roast and eat it there, without being questioned. Youths took great delight in making new friends among the opposite sex. Matters of costume, voice, and dancing-style were significant in marking folks out, as objects of spectacle. Someone could truly get a new spouse, through such interactions! The festivals remained very significant as high-points of the life and collective operation of an essentially communal people.

Nascent, materially divergent, classes were, all the same, appearing on the horizon in Yil Ngas by end of the nineteenth century. The designation, **'ngolong'**, or 'king', **ipso facto** means, 'possessor of livestock' literally, and 'possessor of

wealth' essentially. **Lu'war'ng**, a **ngolong**'s official residence, was usually one of the largest compounds in any community. The **lu'war'ng** or palace of Kabwir alone, for instance, was as large as consisting of up to four hundred huts in 1907![93] A **lu'war'ng** was also a seat of justice and it was there that most fines were imposed on people and, of course, taken. Big games like buffaloes, boars and the like, killed in the bushes and forests around, were usually taken to the **lu'war'ng** and cooked there. Some of the land-owning clans' compounds were often as large, as the **lu'war'ng**, especially if their **fuul-mwa** or farm-fields were vast and they often received tokens of gratitude from tillers who were used portions of the fields. Taken literally, '**lu'war'ng**' means 'large compound', or large house such that it can be suggested that whereas the concept had come to refer purely to the **ngolong**-holding compounds by the end of the nineteenth century, it was likely to have previously emerged as a concept referring to all influential and material people's compounds. This suggestion is the more tenable, considering too that within such other large compounds, or within the village-wards in which they were located, the headmen were also called and, to an extent, treated like the **ngolongmwa** (in plural form). Hence, in large communities there were (as there are today) several 'smaller kings' or **ngolongmwa** in the large compounds and wards who were subordinate to the over all **ngolong**. Where such obtained, if the households or clans in which the 'smaller kings' ruled were related to the clan of the over all **ngolong**, the smaller kings, usually also served as members of the body of elders who assisted the king.

The separation of secular from religious leadership had already occurred in several sections of Yil Ngas by the end of the nineteenth century. Some colonial

observers seemed to have over-emphasised the fact that this development was more pronounced in the so-called 'Plain Angas' than in the 'Hill Angas' areas, reducing it to a one-nil ratio.[94] This was too reductionistic. The fact is simply that they studied, and knew the downlands, more than the highland communities. Powers may not have been separated between the king and chief priest in some Ngas polities, yet that notwithstanding, the king's office was virtually characterised with the same form of honour and respect in Yil Ngas. None of the kings had actually 'attained' the level of royalty wherein he had practically disengaged himself from agrarian production, to depend exclusively on the taxes or tributes that his subjects paid to him. Nor, in the light of the Spartan ethos of Ngas male behaviour, would such an **ipso facto** weak, docile and over-dependent ruler lasted for any significant moment on his stool. A **ngolong** had to always prove his mettle as a successful farmer to continue to enjoy his people's respect and loyalty. In theory, he was of course free to do whatever he pleased. His power was 'absolute' somewhat, yet he could be deposed. Though not exempted from labour, he was usually helped by the community in the upkeep of his farms, unlike what Foulkes said in 1907:

> The king does everything for himself, and is, possibly, supposed to do it somewhat better than anyone else; he manages his own farms, and has no one even to whisk off flies... As a rule he is a capable man, but at times, as may be supposed, he is merely a tool in the hands...[95]

of the elders. He did 'everything for himself in terms of the taking of initiative and management of his own businesses. But he was usually a capable farmer and descendant of the ruling house before he was selected to be king, and he had to be good natured or kind-hearted towards people. Apart from his personal effort after

becoming king, he relied heavily on collective labour for the working of his farms. He relied on **maar-yil**, compound, and household forms of organised labour. From all his own and the economic activities associated with his office, the king realised what was necessary for the sustenance of his own household. Hence, what goods accrued to him by virtue of his office, such as tokens of recognition, of friendship, fines, 'taxes' (which existed in rudimentary form) and confiscation from delinquents, were only additional 'surpluses' for him to distribute and use as he wished. The **ngolong kuum-mwa**, literally 'priest-kings' but essentially 'chief-priests,' who, by means of several manipulations often took advantage of their offices and more or less enriched themselves, continued to grow in influence. Medical fees and ritual fees and fines charged, as it were, for the propitiation of the 'gods' and 'ancestral spirits', were some of the possible sources through which they aggrandised themselves. Because of the lucrativeness of their office they were more vulnerable to removal than even the kings, to whom they were subordinate. Hence, in order to survive they had to direct the conduct of their craft in such a way that it favoured influential members of their communities; they constantly kept at trying to 'keep the steam from blowing off the lid of the kettle', so to speak.[96]

In Sh'wer (Shuwer), presently in Amper District, a uniquely distinct system of administration existed. Their king **de jure** was, and still is, a woman. In other words, the highest position in that community was that of a **ma'ran** or queen. But because of the several inhibitions faced by women at the time -- she could neither attend the shrine gatherings, even during the performance of very important rituals, nor could she lead men to war -- she had come to accept reigning through a male

regent, who was called **ngolong,** not her husband but a descendant of either of two sons of Nawitit, the first **Maran** of Sh'wer (Shuwer). So whereas two partrilineal clans exist in Sh'wer (Shuwer), up till date, which continue to supply the male regents, the office of the **maran** is always occupied by a matrilineal female descendant of the first **maran**, and upon the death of the incumbent, another was usually brought to replace her, no matter whether she was living in Sh'wer (Shuwer) at the time or not.[97]

Generally speaking, by the beginning of the twentieth century, huge surpluses were being produced in Yil Ngas. While part was re-invested to re-vitalise the energy and determination in the work forces through festivals; part was used as social security, for the payment of bride prices, fines, and for off-setting emergencies, in keeping with the practise of the moral economy of peasants; and part was kept and invested in the forms of livestock; and saved in the form of **dyerk** or iron rods, and cowry shells. Therefore, to a large extent, the relations that existed between people in the production of material values by the beginning of the twentieth century in Yil Ngas served as a basis for the distribution and consumption of what was produced. Features of nascent, materially dominant groups and class structures, comparable to feudatories, had become observable. But feudalism as a system was not the dominant social formation that was in operation. Perhaps, given the time, through trade and warfare, and the transformation of the (local) forces of production, its system, eventually, would have developed in Yil Ngas. The absence of a single, encompassing, state structure or the operation of more or less non-centralised but separately, organised machinery or set-ups of government in Yil

Ngas at the time, should not misguide us to assume, that a 'classical' communal social formation was in operation there, either. Let us further look at the nature of inter-group relations, which characterised Yil Ngas by AD 1900.

2.3 Inter-Group Relations of Yil Ngas By AD 1900

By inter group relations, we mean those links and connections (i) which, though everyone was a farmer, existed between groups of different specialisations such as millet and sorghum producers, craftsmen and women, sylvan producers, pastoralists, men, women, and so on; (ii) which, though every community, within a given scope, was Ngas, existed between hosts, settlers, easterners, westerners; (iii) which, though some nationalities, or communities were agrarian, while others were either nomadic or commercial, existed between sedentary and nomadic communities, or between short-distance and long-distance trading groups; (iv) which, though different polities were at different stages of political development, or were characterised by different forms of political organisation, existed between the small and the big or between centralised and segmentary political communities, and so on. For purposes of our present analysis, let us categorise issues in the light of conceptions (i) and (ii) above as more or less belonging to the context of internal, while those in the light of conceptions (iii) and (iv) above as more or less belonging to that of external relations.

2.3.1 Internal Relations

By AD 1900, notable producers of goods other than grain, such as craftsmen (blacksmiths, potters, carvers, cloth-weavers, etc), sylvan producers (African olive oil, mahogany oil, locust-bean cake, boabab-seed cake-producers, etc.) and

pastoralists (owners of herds and flocks, both large and small), and the rest of the people within the sub-sections of Yil Ngas which were somewhat defined by 'peculiarities of goods', and between the area and the other areas surrounding it. Our attention here shall centre mainly on the processes of trade and warfare in Yil Ngas by the end of the nineteenth century.

Possibly bolstered by intermarriages and kinship feelings, the operation of the 'moral economy' featured greatly in the first two categories of relations, that is, in the relations between fairly specialised groups of producers, and between the sub-sections of Yil Ngas. As already stated, female relations of a family, relations either on the basis of **jep'pup** (paternal) or the **dyem'nin** (maternal) ties, were usually furnished with gifts of material values especially foodstuffs whenever they visited the concerned family and expressed the difficult state of affairs in their homes, even if the family itself was not in better circumstances. Marriages were made from far and wide in Yil Ngas; as such, the acquisition of particular good, which were better produced in certain areas within the region, could easily be done by means of kinship relations, apart from trade, which was mostly by barter.

It is not true that the villagers confined themselves to their own village-vicinities, and were altogether untravelled. That was largely a figment of the imagination of colonialists like Charles Orr.[98] On the contrary men or suitors traversed the length and breadth of Yil Ngas, simply, for marriage sake. That apart, several important roads that linked the sub-regions of Yil Ngas with one another, and with the regions beyond her borders did not merely exist but were blessed with fair volumes of traffic each year. Cowries, **chen-kom** large-hoe and **gyer'k** iron-

rods were used as media of exchange, or as forms of money,[99] but much local trade was by barter. And in their own practice of trade by barter, the process of processing the exchange was often time-consuming because, in some instances, a seller of a commodity had to be approached by a buyer who had the needed commodity for which he could give his own away, in exchange. Market places were only emergent in the region, especially at Pu'el (Dawaki), Per (Chika), and Langshi where non-Ngas, or Hausa/Fulani and Kanuri elements had, in the course of the nineteenth century, settled and built nucleated Hausa-type communities.146 Between the sub-regions, especially between the downlands and the highlands certain goods were sold and bought. The **b'aat** cloth, guinea-corn or sorghum, sheep, and salt imported from places in present-day Nasarawa State, were sold by the downlands communities to the highlands communities, while the latter sold **chen-mwa** (hoes), **muir peid,** or **moor paad** (African olive oil), **guzzuk** (fonio) and millet in exchange. Langkang, in the western downlands, was a leader in salt trade, when colonial invaders got there in January 1907.[100]

Apart from the practice of the moral economy, which was itself based on the number of reliable connections offered by one's kinship and kith-ship ties, and the somewhat expanding trade by 'money' though mainly by barter, thievery, banditry, and the usually undisclosed royal punishment by plundering the resources of wrong doers were still being practised, which generally affected the flow of material values from certain hands to others. But we do not subscribe to the view that the matter of intra-group and external relations in Yil Ngas, as elsewhere, was marked by conflict and a permanent state of warfare and insecurity.[101]

Internally, wars were fought, but they were more of skirmishes than forays. As a matter of fact, as far as the Ngas were concerned, the idea of fighting was not always to kill. Instead, fighting, as between brothers or townsmen, had its generally accepted rules and regulations (though unwritten), the violation of which was usually greatly criticised and condemned. Certain parts of the body, like the eye and the testis, for instance, were not supposed to be tempered with in the cause of a fight. Man-with-man fighting was, in that sense, a kind of sport: meant for a show of strength, or of 'brain and brawn,' but certainly not to kill.[102] The same principle informed their local battles, which were skirmishes at best, such that even Foulkes could remark that "They fully enjoy their fight such as they are."[103] Writing in 1907, he further maintained that they neither made war deliberately nor took time to scheme beforehand for the purpose, but that each fight occurred on the spur of the moment. Whereas there was the absence of premeditations and long-preparations for wars, on the one hand, there was the constant readiness on the part of the menfolk to take-to-arms, if the need arose anytime at all, on the other. There was nothing like a standing army. Foulkes saw this being as primitive.[104] We on our part, see it as being progressive, believing that soldiers should play a part in the production of material goods during peace times.

Warfare, according to Foulkes, occurred between Ngas communities when, or in the event that a man was murdered because he went into sacred woods of a neighbouring (prejudiced) community while hunting, or a woman was kidnapped or raped while working alone on a bush-farm, or there was a dispute over sylvae or

farm plots on communal borders, and so on. In his 1907-account, he described a typical battle-process, apart from the mentioned causes, as follows:

> From causes such as these [mentioned above] big battles may ensue. Eyewitnesses and those immediately on the spot commence a quarrel, blows are struck, a man gets killed, the *kururua* [war cry]... is raised, and is taken up by the neighbouring towns; a messenger is sent in hot haste to the king: the latter calls on his *Serikin yaki* [War Leader]... who sends out his couriers with their horns and their own peculiar shouts; men come running out from every house asking 'where is the fight?' on being informed they hurriedly arm themselves and, taking their antidotes to the arrow poison, hie them [sic] to the battlefield; no one capable of bearing arms remains behind; on the field of battle itself everyone is shouting and arrows are flying thick. The distance between the combatants is some 120 yards, the effective carrying range of the bow; as this is the chief if not only weapon of offence, there is no object in trying to get closer and indeed if anyone does it is at once remarked that he is anxious to die.[105]

Stating the tactics employed in such battles:

> When once the battle is joined the tactics are somewhat as follows. There are a number of men, the important ones who carry large round shields of cowhide. They go forward shouting their war cry **'Shigelele! Naingelele! Gur andap! andap gurm shikwop!'** 'The hawk! I am the hawk! I can swoop down among you like the hawk and kill a man with my spear!' and shake their shields vigorously. Following them comes a group of bowmen who, taking cover behind the shield, shoot off their arrows, the owner of the shield darting about all the time warding off all the arrows he can. One side or the other, generally of course the bigger tribe [polity], soon puts into the field a numerically superior force and the inferior one, giving way, is pursued to the foot of their hills, but no further. The pursuit however is carried out with great circumspection, no one taking risks. No fighting is done in the rocks, as none of the assailants are sufficiently intrepid to venture among them.[106]

And the casualty limits and punitive intent of the battles:

> The casualties in a big fight might number 15 or so on either side, very rarely more, and generally much less, about 5. The direct object of a fight is not often attained, for instance, if a woman carried off is the original cause, she is never got back as the result of the battle, she is taken well into the hills and as soon as her captors are driven

> to the foot of them, the fight is over and the victorious tribe [polity] has to retire.[107]

Yet, with regards to Foulkes' last point that the object of a fight is not often attained' and that in the case of a kidnapped woman, 'she is never got back as the result of the battle', we disagree. Foulkes seemed to think that once an offending community was punished for its misdemeanour, the aim of the battle was achieved. Prisoners of war, whether men or women, however, were sometimes returned, so were the kidnapped, for whose sakes battles were fought. Indemnities were paid, like in the case of the kidnapped, if they had already been sold into slavery, substitutes could be given in return. These were necessary measures to heal the breach and re-establish the state of peace that was prevailing between the warring parties, before the war. Otherwise revenge had to be sought, either then or later in time, especially by the victorious but deprived group.

2.3.2 External Relations

The very fact that by the end of the second decade in the nineteenth century, non-Ngas elements had already established a number of settlements in the eastern part of Yil Ngas, through peaceful interaction rather than force, is sufficient to mock at that view in the face. Moreover, this should also illustrate somehow, the nature and attractiveness of the region's external trade, since, as it were, most of the Hausa/Fulani, Kanuri elements, who settled at Chika in Per (Amper), Lungwa in Puel (Dawaki) and Langshi in Pang, practised both trade and farming while in those areas. They played a vital role in conducting the region's external trade with communities in Bauchi and Wase spheres of influence; they exported the goods mentioned above, and imported swords and horses, and so on, into Yil Ngas. With

more horses in their ken, trade and travel by the Ngas at the time, into neighbouring regions, was made easier, although there were far more trekkers than travellers on horse back. So, while it is true that there were moments of hostility or that internal security was not always guaranteed, they did not constitute a permanent state of affairs in any part of the region, talk less of the whole of Yil Ngas.

Goods like the **b'aat** cloth, **gyer'k** iron-rods, **muir peid** or **moor paad** (African olive oil) and to a far lesser extent slaves were exported from the region, especially to the Boi, Lere, and Bauchi markets in the then Bauchi Emirate. The capturing and selling of slaves was more characteristic of periods of famine and conflict, none of which probably occurred during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It is alleged for instance that the practice became notorious in the 1850s because of a terrible famine, which befall Yil Ngas.[108] But in selling folks into slavery, the moral economy was not left out; ones older relative (parent, uncle, or brother) could under duress sell one into slavery. Both highland and eastern downland areas, sometimes sold folks into slavery. The practice was not peculiar to one section.

A distinct route ran from Boi through Puel (Dawaki), Kabwir, Dungung, Gwoktok to Ntal, and beyond to the lowlands of Qu'an-Pan Local Government Area and Nasarawa State, beyond. Another distinct route linked the outcrop country with the Taman valley and the regions lying to the south outside Yil Ngas occupied by the Goemai, Kwalla, Kofyar and others. The third road linked the areas to the north of Pangchen (Pankshin), starting around the northern mountains near Tapshin, to the settlements in Bauchi Emirate in the North central and to Mwaghavul in the

Northwest.[109] The last road extended from Chika in present-day Amper area to Boghom land on the one hand, and to Tarok and, and Wase sub-emirate on the other. The (occasional) traders travelled in bands or caravans, usually armed, if not with bows, clubs and arrows, at least with **nkangsakali** swords or **nk'm-chuk** big knives and **chuk'ke** penknives.

Bauchi's threat to their independence had virtually declined before the end of the nineteenth century. In the first place, they had not quite or fully lost it to Bauchi with whom some communities had probably maintained relationship of 'live and let live' sometimes by the middle of the nineteenth century. It seems that the areas had virtually better secured their independence, and Bauchi's overlordship over them was basically nominal rather than real, by the end of the nineteenth century. That is why it seemed so strange to the British colonialists, at the beginning of the imposition of their colonial domination on Yil Ngas, that a people who formerly, as was supposed, were generally subject to Bauchi could prove to be so negligent of their orders to pay taxes to them, as the new lords in Bauchi. This matter is analysed and dismissed, in chapter three.

Rather than treat the account, which was given to them, not even in the emir's palace, in Bauchi, to the effect that the Ngas, especially those of the Puel (Dawaki), Kabwir, and Per (Amper) axis were not only subject to Bauchi by the end of the nineteenth century, but were annually paying **jizya** taxes to her on an **aman** (trust) basis, as a mere allegation, or a matter which was subject to further investigation, the colonialists were gullibly gladdened by the prospect of easily accessing another territory, that is Yil Ngas, which, by virtue of their conquest of

the emirate of Bauchi, automatically fell to them as a territorial benefit. Like those early colonialists, several authors and scholars today have generally bought into that position, and have adopted what at a glance is a questionable account, without, as it were, a proper analysis of the evidence of Ngas-Bauchi relations during the nineteenth century.[110] In our position, the mere evidence which maintains that the Ngas of Kabwir-Puel-Amper axis were never defeated by, indeed had never really fought with Bauchi both before and during Ibrahim's emirship (c.1845-1879), during which they were allegedly cruelly oppressed and taxed by Bauchi, which allegedly, they paid annually in kind (including material goods and slaves),[111] contains a number of weaknesses or contradictions which purport to destroy it. Could they have been cruelly oppressed if indeed their relationship with Bauchi was truly that of an **aman** (a trust)? Could they have subjected themselves to cruel oppression for some probably roughly thirty to thirty-six years without any attempts to resist (it seems, nothing like that is remembered!) or, for once, to opt for a military resolution of their oppression given that they had not before tried their luck against the oppressor's forces in battle? Did Ibrahim cruelly oppress all of Bauchi's **aman** (if many) territories during his reign? Why did he cruelly oppress the (said) Ngas communities simply because, as alleged by Isichei, they attempted to resist payment of tribute to Bauchi? It seems that a different position can quite objectively be maintained, in the interpretation of the evidence, rather than the one above. That should not detain us here; it should be the subject of a separate study, as it is big enough to deserve such attention.

Suffice it here to state that the s0-called Plains Angas communities were alleged said to have subscribed to the overlordship of Bauchi sometimes during the nineteenth century, and had sometimes paid tributes to her, as **aman** territories[112] until the coming of the British to Bauchi in 1902. Islam, however was not imposed on the people, neither were they subjected to a muslim (rulership or) system of government up to the end of the century. Bauchi's overlordship over the so-called Plains Angas communities, it seems, was nominal rather than real, during the century as a whole, or especially by the end of it (as said above). Eventually their relationship with Bauchi was probably that of 'live and lets live.'[113] Whatever was the true position of relations between Bauchi and the concerned Ngas communities during the nineteenth century, they seemed to have preserved much of their independence since it is clear that they refused to send any tributes between 1902 and 1905 to Bauchi, even after they discovered, definitely in 1903, when DSP Glenny went to their land purposely to collect colonial tributes, that Bauchi herself had cowered in weakness before a stronger imperialist invader (the British), who was the one now requesting their tribute(s).[114]No Ngas community paid taxes to the British until during the first colonial invasion of the area in April 1906; though, at the same time, none of the 'Plains Angass' communities ventured to test the strength of the colonialists by means of arms. Some 'Hill Angas' polities, however, made that attempt.[115]

In a nutshell, the internal and external relations in Yil Ngas by the end of the nineteenth century were such that made for the general wellbeing of the land. Groups of producers attempted to distribute their produce and products of external

trade in every direction, and the presence of immigrant settlements in the region, afforded them the opportunity to acquire goods from elsewhere as well as to begin to set up their own 'market places', in the region. Instead of the colonially engendered jinx that warfare was the dominant feature of inter-group relations both within Yil Ngas and between Yil Ngas and the surrounding areas, we hold that relative peace and tranquillity were quite predominant; otherwise, the logical development which a constant state of warfare would have engendered, was the formation of a standing army (or armies)[116] but none had emerged in Yil Ngas. Only offices such as that of the War Leader, variously called as **As-lek, Sathi** and or **Garkuwa** (the last being in Hausa) had come to be associated with some of the polities. Hence a **ngolong** did not, himself, need to go to war. Feudal relations and titles, thus heralding the dawning of a new order, then, had begun to be maintained and used, but the society was still transitional, still largely communalistic. Even in the sphere of trade, their merchant capital was generally a small phenomenon; under the pressure of need influential men sometimes caught and sold other folks into slavery but that of course was not their 'specialty.' The **ngo'mbikaat,** or rich man, did not at all depend on that kind of traffic for the stacking of his barns, the basis of his wealth laid elsewhere: the basis of his wealth laid in crop and livestock production., Nevertheless the volume of exchange that transpired in the region and between it and its neighbouring regions, went a long way in wielding the different groups of producers together, both within and without Yil Ngas. Hence with reference to the issue of apparent long isolation of Plateau communities from the trading network of West Afuca,[117] we would suggest that Yil Ngas was one of the

regions on the Plateau which, by the end of the nineteenth century, had had a close brush with the trading network, in that it had relations with the outside world through Bauchi Emirate and its satellite states among others. But, was Yil Ngas characterised by a social formation, which we can identify? That really brings us to the central question in this chapter.

2.4: Socio-Economic Formation of Yil Ngas by AD 1900

The over all picture that emerges from the foregoing sections of this chapter is that the social formation that was predominant in Yil Ngas by the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century was the communal socio-economic formation, which had already outwardly, or in appearance, begun to be subordinate to features of the more advanced feudal socio-economic formation. The facts (i) that land was generally vested in the **ngolong** of a given community rather than in God or in the whole community; (ii) that there was a **maar-yil** operated in favour of the **ngolong,** which was ran by means of a form of corvee labour organised by the **ngolong-maar**; (iii) that the **ngolong** title in essence meant 'possessor of wealth' and several other titles, such as **ngolong-kuum, ngolong-maar,** and so on, had strong material bases; (iv) that tokens of tenancy or forms of tribute were paid by tillers to owners of borrowed farm plots or to the **ngolong,** and so on; are quite suggestive of feudal principles and institutions. However, essentially and generally the society was transitionally communalistic.

The differences, which marked out the sub-regions of Yil Ngas were principally ecological not socio-historical. The so-called sub-regions of Yil Ngas were at the same level of socio-economic development, that is to say. First, the fact

that the downland polities in the Kabwir-Puel-Amper axis, later proved to be more susceptible to colonial domination than the highland communities, did not make them any less savages, if, as Foulkes suggested, the rest of the Ngas people were savages and cannibals.[118] After all, they were, in comparison, used to having a nominal overlord, Bauchi; while the highland polities were used to not having any overlord, nominal or not. Hence, they responded differently to colonial occupation. They were not any less developed or civilised because they ventured to resist colonial domination; to hold such a view is misleading. After all it was partially from the highland communities that the downland communities got implements of labour and other highland goods, in exchange for their own goods and services. Secondly, Pai communities of Yil Ngas were not any more primitive or backward than the other groups.[119] Apparently the Pai were the best makers of **b'aat**, the cloth, which the Ngas used to sell to the local Hausa traders, as an export commodity. Due to the hard texture of the **b'aat** made in Pai area, the Hausa-Fulani liked it much, for making horse-saddles.[120]

The sloppy state of the land, being an escarpment, denied Yil Ngas the chance of having a typically identical environment throughout, instead the unique peculiarities in the environment affected the relations that developed between man and nature. While rice could only be grown in the swampy valleys, for instance, fonio (**acha**) could only be grown on the hills. But the form of relations that developed between man-and-man were everywhere essentially the same in the region. Similar forms of labour, consumption, conflict, ownership and exchange

were predominant among the communities. These facts of their life proved that the Ngas communities were virtually at the same stage in their historical development.

A man's wealth was partially determined by the size of his family work force (a factor which was both a 'cause' and an 'effect') as well as by the size of his herds and flock(s), the number of his sylvae, and the number of bundles of corn harvested, and brought into his barn. Possessing much of these, saliently qualified a man to be elected to the kingship if he was of royal descent, or to any other post of authority. Such places of authority afforded people the opportunity to become richer. Whereas the number of wives married by most men, according to Foulkes, was four, the kings married the upwards of over twenty wives![121] Some of these women were usually inherited, as wives of the deceased king, who, as a rule, remained at the palace to become wives to his successor. Physically, he copulated with only the younger ones. It was also a rule that for every new **ngolong,** new wives must also be acquired for him as a mark of honour, shown to him by his lieutenants. A king, however, was supported by everyone, in terms of production and so was expected to act like a father to everyone, always providing folks with the basics of life such as food, protection, and shelter. Many orphans lived and fed under him. The needy found favour in his sight, and the wealthy were mostly his friends.

In the background of 'centres' of wealth, normally lurks its opposite, poverty. But the gaps between the wealthy and the not-as-wealthy or the poor, those living next to the level of subsistence, were narrow, compared to those, which were many, which developed in the course of the twentieth century. Besides, the

distribution of the mainly two categories of people was such that in every clan, household, or compound, there were the menfolk, mainly elders, who were privileged to be richer than the others. Nevertheless, like the king, they were required to act the father to less privileged fellows in their localities, who, in turn, gave them respect and other forms of service. The separation of 'wealth' from 'poverty' had not become contradictory, to be of any worrisome notice. The practice of the moral economy of the peasant definitely played a significant part in the (fairly equitable) redistribution of wealth in the society.[122] Hence, in essence, there was social inequality in the society, but no social poverty.[123] Possession of land was not necessarily a wealth-determining factor, despite the token gifts, which at times were too small to cause any differences in the income level of the recipients. Neither was participation in trade a major source of wealth. The scope and practice of trade was too limited, when compared to those of farming. A sizeable or large family workforce coupled with hard work, was more determinant of wealth, than other factors. The logic of the economic life in the region generally, (in spite of differences in wealth) was that it allowed for greater social intercourse, integration, and mutual benefit, among the groups rather than for alienation, discrimination and cheating. The general participation in labour, the general desire to produce surplus, and the practice of the moral (welfarist) economy combined to make this possible. Their settlements in which they lived at that time, were neither 'towns', nor 'villages', the great divide between town-and-country had not yet occurred. That took place in the course of the twentieth century.

2.5 Conclusion

Yil Ngas as a region held some promise for greater social development, with its segmentary political arrangements, and culture of guaranteeing collective welfare, in spite of rank, or status, by the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. It was a society in motion, in a state of transition. Features of the feudal order were beginning to emerge, much as the basis of the society remained predominantly communal. Its agrarian economy was self-sustaining, healthy and sound. Frontiers of containable conflict and diplomacy existed. It is in the dialectical motion of factors such as those that social development occurs or stagnates. Thus none was imposing or damn too threatening to the progress and independence of Yil Ngas. The coming of the British colonialists in the first decade of our century however, orchestrated a series of events and changes, quite unique or distinct from what the Ngas polities were used to, expected, would have desired, or could contain. For they imposed colonialism on the region; and that forms the subject of chapter three.

Notes

1 Based on the materialist-conception of history: "A specific historical stage in the development of society is called a socio-economic formation. The history of mankind is not a conglomerate of incidental events but a definite process leading from bottom to top, from the simplest to the more sophisticated types of socio-economic formations. In the cause of its development from the lowest social formation, the primitive-communal system, to the communist formation, which is the highest and whose first stage is socialism, mankind passes through the slave-owing system, feudalism and capitalism. Each nation at a given period of its existence belongs to one or another formation, depending on the level of its socio-economic development." A.N. Yakorlev, et al. *Fundamentals of Political Science: Textbook for Primary Political Education* (Progress Publishers, Moscow 1979), pp.113 - 14.

2 With specific reference to charges of primitiveness, drunkenness, laziness, untravelledness and ignorance levelled against the colonised. Imagine such remarks, in one work: "Then carpentry is of the crudest. Their **turumi**s mere cavities in an unshaped trunk...", "... of the pagan village heads it is difficult to say much. They are generally elderly men and frequently under the influence of liquor..." and "The Angass are primitive people and ... have some difficulty in counting and have resorted to pieces of grass." Being views of H.S.W. Edwardes (ADO) in 1914, in "NAK, SNP 10 23P/1915: "Plain Angass Assessment." See also references I have made in reaction to Charles Orr's position in this study. See his, *The Making of Northern Nigeria,* (Frank Cass Co. Ltd, London, 1965) p.57

3 Boyd Alexander, *From the Niger To the Nile, Volume I* (Edward Anold, London, 1907)p.95.

4 Ibid: pp. 94 – 100

5 J. Frolov (ed.). *Dictionary of Philosophy* (Progress Publishers, Moscow 194) p. 117: "Modern ecology is concerned with a number of above-organismic levels of the organic world, such as populations... and biosphere as a world. Ecology is also understood as a science... called upon to study the interaction between society and nature" It is in the latter sense that we are using the term in this work. See also Conrad Philip Kottak, *The Past in the Present: History Ecology, and Cultural Variation in Highland Madagascar* (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1980) p. 47.

6 Boyd Alexander, op cit, pp. 99 - 100.

7 Zul (Jzwal) Gibang is, itself, a volcanic mountain, even as stated by Central Planning and Organising Committee, PIDAF (names, absent) Pankshin Chapter, in their, *Pankshin: History and Industrial Potentiality* (1987): p.14. Considering the rather very steep slopes of the Taman Valley, J.M. Fremantle, Resident Central Province, thought that no vehicles would be able to travel down there, saying, "... The first car down to Lankan should be recommended for a M.B.E."! The western are not as steep as the eastern slopes, hence a road has been built down to the valley. The quotation is from, "NAK Jos Prof. 56/1923: Pankshin Division - Report on quarter ended 31st Dec., 1922."

8 NAK SNP 6, C140/1907: "Bauchi Province -Patrols and Expeditions (Confidential)."

9 Ibid. The "Angass Punitive Expedition" or Army came from Bauchi through Lusa in Zarland and, in Yil Ngas, invaded or visited Nmyet, Wuseli, Wokkos, Balang, Chigwong, Pankshin,"Ampam" (Kuwang) and "Ampier" (Per) before leaving for Kanam. Hence Renny saw more of the high outcrop mountains (see the section: 'Region', under the 'Introduction' in his report) than of the downland and plains.

10 A. S. Dimka, 'The Geography of Pankshin' in his: "The Impact of Universal Primary Education on Rural Farm Labour and the Economy of Pankshin Local Government Area of Plateau State" (Unpublished B.A. Dissertation, Dept. of Geography, A.B.U. Zaria, 1983) p.11.

11 Ibid. See also: NAK SNP 379/1910 (H.D. Foulkes) "Report No. 15/1907: Some Preliminary Notes on the Angass."

12 The plateau-like upland, a part of which Yil Ngas is, constitutes the hydrographic centre of Nigeria, most of the feeders of the Niger and Benue Rivers within the country derive their origins from this upland. Yil Ngas is a watershed to the Gongola's Lere tributary, to the Wase and Shimankar Rivers, all of which empty into the Benue. See: C. G. Ames (mimeograph compiled,) "Gazetteer of. Plateau Province., 1932" (Found at Pankshin LGC Secretariat) & Foulkes, Ibid.

13 See H.S.W. Edwardes, op.cit, & H.D. Foulkes, Ibid
14 H.S.W. Edwardes, Ibid.
15 Field notes, 1987.
16 For a concept of 'social practice', which is made up of the struggle for production of material values, the class struggle and the scientific experiment, see: Mao Tse Tung, *Five Essays On Philosophy* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977) p.105.
17 Many of the early (European) observers in the twentieth century noticed this fact: See among others, H.S.W. Edwardes, op.cit. para. 8 and Boyd Alexander, op.cit. pp.97-98.
18 A.S. Dimka, op cit. p.11.
19 H.D. Foulkes, op cit, (NAK SNP 379/1910)
20 Alexander, Op cit, p.11.
21 H.D.Foulkes, (in) NAK, SNP 379/1910, op cit. para 1.
22 A.S.Dimka, Op cit. p.11.
23 Right from the earliest periods of domestication of animals by man, he has used animals in his own struggles for survival. But till date , some animals are 'pests' to him, because they temper with the crops and livestock he keeps.
24 See Boyd Alexander, op cit & C.G. Ames, op cit p. 133
25 From fieldnotes: Root crops were very important though (lately introduced like the cassava) in combating the threat of famine resulting from causes like locust invasions.
26 From field notes: No-one could cut new grass in some communities, nor set the bush ablaze until after the king and chief priest had performed their rituals and given public permission.
27 H.S.W. Edwardes (NAK SNP 10/23 p/1915) op cit. para 80.
28 Field notes: 1987
29 From field notes: Dogs were 'shepherding animals' not in the sense of leading flocks and herds by themselves but escorting the shepherds. The eating of dog meat was more or less 'forbidden' for women, it was a 'near-taboo', for to the Ngas folks, women were depositories of cultural purity and pride, and should not eat or touch anything 'unclean'. Besides, it was not meat eaten by all men, nor was the eating commercialised like today.
30 Joseph Mangut, "An Archaeological Investigation of Ron Abandoned Settlements on the Jos Plateau: A case study of Historical Archaeology" (History Dept., A.B.U. Zaria, 1987) p.5.
31 Foulkes (NAK: SNP 379/1910) Op cit.
32 A. S. Dimka, op cit, p. 12
33 See Boyd Alexander, op cit, pp.95-96 & NAK SNP6 C140/1907 "Bauchi Province: Patrols and Expeditions (confidential)", wherein in para 29, of Resident Oliver Howards "Report No. 28 for April - July 1906" he said "The Angass country is healthy and may eventually be settled by white colonists." In same vein, H.D. Foulkes, in para 2, op cit, said: "This neighbourhood is a good situation for an eventual 'Hill Station' "
34 This is specifically referring to the interaction between nature and society, whose character is mainly determined by rational human activity. For more information, see V. D. Zotov, *The Marxist- Leninist Theory of .Society: Identity and Diversity of social Development in the West and East* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985) p.42 & Enrid Alayev, *Social and Economic Geography: An Essay in Conceptual-Terminological Systematisation* (Progress Publishres, Moscow, 1986) p.7.
35 That was the case of the Kofyar up to the 1960s when Robert McNetting studied their ecology, in: *Hill Farmers of Nigeria: Cultural Ecology of the Kofyar of the Jos Plateau,* University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1968.
36 Colonial authors in the 1920s and '30s, believed this. H.R. Palmer took the name to be the name of the people living in the neighbourhood of Lake Chad from whom have evolved many other peoples, C.G. Ames and A.B. Mathews followed him in regard to this. Thus putting to question the view put forward by Foulkes that the name was given to the Ngas by their so-called Fulani overlords.
37 A.B. Mathews, ADO, (NAK SNP 17/21560): "The Angass and Kindred Peoples of the Pankshin Division", para 3.
38 Mathews, Ibid.
39 The commonest context symbolising this is the (patrilineally-defined) clan, in which descendants of an a male ancestor, possibly of a 'family' of four to five generations now, numbering from tens

of folks to some hundreds, still sharing and controlling certain things together. See C.K. Gonyok, "The Ngas and the coming of British Colonial Administration" (B.A. Dissertation, History Dept., A.B.U. Zaria, 1974) and, Elizabeth Isichei (Ed.) *Studies in the History of Plateau State, Nigeria* (The MacMillan Press, London & Basingstoke, 1982); p.21.

40 A tribal territory was one which all the clans that have combined to constitute the tribe, now recognised a wider sphere than their individual clan territories, as the common property of the tribe. This consisted mainly of hunting grounds, common woods, pastures and common lands. This definition is derived largely from V. D. Zotov, *The Marxist- Leninist Theory of Society: Identity and Diversity of social Development in the West and East* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985)p.137. My contention is that right from not later than the Seventeenth Century, features of statelets or kingdoms had already begun to develop. This view tallies with that of Monday Y. Mangvwat, when he suggested that the **ngolong** institution dates back to c. Eighteenth Century, in his "A Historical synopsis of the Political Economy of the Jos Plateau Region c 1800-1900 A.D" (A paper submitted to the workshop on the History of the Central Nigerian Area, Dept. of History University of Jos, Nigeria, Sept. 1984).

41 Even in the 'so-called, colonially designated, "Plains Angass", this was the case. See, H.S.W. Edwardes (NAK SNP 1023p/1915) op cit.

42 Boyd Alexander, op cit. 95.

43 L.F Renny (NAK SNP 6 C140/1907): "Report On Angass Expedition," para 3.

44 L.F.Renny "Diary of Events of Angass Expedition" in "Bauchj Province: Expeditions and Patrols", SNP 6, c. 140/1907 (NAK).

45 Ibid, para 4.

46 But the very occurrence of 'natural hazards' in a repeated fashion, conducting the destruction of man's property or possessions, is an evidence of man's ignorance, and negligence, and so it is also somewhat 'socially determined. Man has the creative capacity to conquer nature, at least when it concerns the conquest of pests or fauna. Thus remarked Chinghiz Aitmator: "We have reached such summits of civilisation where man should be not only 'consumer' of nature but also its guardian and co-creator. Today we are in a position in which not only are we dependent on nature but nature is itself dependent on us. We should use our will and our intelligence -- these great gifts of time and space, and of Nature and History --"...in V. D. Zotov, Op cit, p.47.

47 See H.D. Foulkes (NAK SNP 379/1910) op cit para 56: A breed of the Hamitic Hypothesis.

48 Boyd Alexander, op cit, p.77

49 Ibid. p.97

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 The antiquity of iron-smelting and-working is not yet known to me (I have not yet succeeded in laying my hands on David Tambo's thesis); the antiquity with reference to Yil Ngas, this is.

53 These are discussed in different parts of this, and other chapters.

54 Field notes, 1987.

55 H. D. Foulkes (NAK SNP 379/1910), op.cit, para 68.

56 Ibid

57 Field notes: In places like Lur in present-day Kabwir District, a bundle of corn was relinquished by each compound head to the king, as it is still done today.

58 As in note 55.

59 For instance, Luchyeb people were the first to settle in Ampang-East but have little command of the land, today.

60 A form of 'intensive cultivation' was being maintained', rather than hold that it was neither in evidence nor practised at all, as claimed Foulkes in NAK SNP 379/1910, op cit para 56

61 This aerial range is my own guess to cater for both village-like polities and mini-states (such as Pang, for instance).

62 Cf. Mangvwat, Op cit: p.4.

63 Field notes: where the newcomers were relatives or friendly, some of the sylvae were usually given to them at once, and the whole of the estate was left to them generally within shorter durations of time. Irmiya Chorching: 1987.

64 Field notes: certain tributes were paid to kings of (Amper or) Per and (Ampang or) Pang, at the time for instance. Foulkes specifically mentioned a thirty pieces tribute of **b'aat**-made **majai** (Dallong or) Pai paid to Per. See Foulkes, (NAK SNP 379/1910) op cit,

65 Apparently, they conceived of God quite remotely, rather than a gender-based personality. Neither did they strongly hold the idea of Him as female: theirs was a male-centred world. The female possessive pronouns, when sometimes used in reference to God, was a general feature of Shhk-tok Ngas or their language, which is employed when referring to a third party whose identity, as to the ownership of a certain phenomenon, is, for that moment, not to be disclosed. See Foulkes, Ibid, para 28

66 Not in all Yil Ngas, it seems, did they or do they perform the **dan kh' yil** mysteriously, that is, travelling invisibly', but in Ku'wang, capital of the present Ampang-East District, that was the attitude. Elsewhere, other 'methods' of doing it were used; in places like Dyi and Kor in the present Pankshin District, for instance, some 'special' (in a religious sense) hungry rice or fonio, was used, visibly in scattering at the borders. Yil'dmma Ipshak: 1987.

67 Foulkes, NAK SNP 379/1910, op cit, para 56

68 Ibid

69 Ibid

70 Ibid

71 Ibid

72 Ibid

73 Ibid

74 Ibid

75 Ibid.

76 These are known as the **lutap-mwa** (**lutap** in the singular), meaning' huts for keeping watch'. They could have been another reminiscence of the Zimbabwean dry stone walls, to the likes of Boyd Alexander.

77 Foulkes, (NAK SNP 379/1910) op cit, para 68.

78 Up to the mid-1970s, I saw households in Dungung such as that of Lok'kat of Kapkang compound doing just that.

79 A phenomenon to which he has devoted a whole book: James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of The Peasant* (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1976).

80 Mangvwat, op cit, p.10

81 Cf. Dan' azumi Bukar, "Peasant Impoverishment in the Jos Division, 1902-1950" (M. A. Thesis, History Dept., A. B. U. Zaria, 1986) describes a similar practice.

82 Fieldnotes: Irmiya Chorching (1987).

83 H..D.Foulkes, Op. cit.

84 See Foulkes, (NAK, SNP 379/1910) op cit para 58. Where it is specifically mentioned.

85 H.D Foulkes, Ibid.

86 See: Foulkes, op cit para. 58. **Kwat'teng** was a part of their system of justice; an ordeal for the determination of innocence or guilt of any accused. If an accused latter did not yield to appeals to go on the **kwat'teng** regarding the matter for which s/he was accused, it meant s/he was pleading to be regarded as 'guilty'. The process of the ordeal was like this: the **ngolong kum,** members or-his own clan, and, possibly, others, taking strong rope-made nets like fishing nets, normally went into the nearest place and wherever they spotted an antelope, they let an individual climb a tall tree both to keep an eye on the animal and to charm it to lie down by making a glottal (buzzing) sounds continuously like a bee. While that went on, the others would set their nets on long specially selected sorghum stalks, net to net, around the spot where which the antelope must have laid. Once that was completed, the man on the tree would stop the charming sound, go down the tree on which he had been perching, and drive the animal out of its lair, and try to chase it. As the animal attempts to run away, after the accused person must have thrown a stone into the ring, and if the antelope ran through the netted ring-wall without I breaking any net, the accused person was certainly guilty, but if the ropes fell round it and therefore trapped it, he was thereby proved to be innocent. Whether this was practised elsewhere or not, we know that Dungung, among (other places) was known for **Kwat'teng** for the sake of catching game, either as an ordeal or ordinary hunting purposes, in the downlands. **Kwat bako** involved folks from neighbouring village or a single village, ransacking their woods for game.

87 Revealingly, much as the plains and valleys were not cultivated, they were devoted to the grazing of livestock. The term, **meh'd-leyb,** denoting 'to go shepherding', literally means 'to go to the plain.' The ecological implications are great; they could not have raised crops and livestock in the same kind of places; the plains were more grassy and more difficult to cultivate, to weed; the livestock needed the grassy and wetter plains to do well; where there were more plains, (the downlands), there were more flocks and herds and shepherds; but some goats were kept to some volumes in the highlands, being more adopted to hills etc. Note too that, the uncultivated valleys and plains sewed as 'reservoirs' for the supply of timber, grass for roofing, and bamboo sticks; as well as "checks" against erosion and the fast escape of flowing water; hence wet-groves and bushy-river banks, ponds, and swamps were quite common at the time, than perhaps, is the case today.

88 Such as during feeding in corn; no-one could do it alone; someone had to be inside, another outside, to serve him with, handfuls of it. Other times, were when someone was sick, deceased etc.

89 An allusion to James C. Scott's op cit, introduction.

90 See Foulkes, op cit, para 58. H.S.W. Edwardes made the same remark, in 1914, See NAK, SNP 10 23p/1915, op cit paras. 75-76.

91 It may be useful someday to compute which festivals were very important, and in which area, (and which were not) in a separate work.

92 See definitions, of their special name for themselves **nkar'ngmwa**, in chapter one.

93 See Foulkes, op cit.

94 See, for instance, A.B. Mathews, (NAK SNP 17 21560) op cit.

95 Foulkes, op cit

96 They were very susceptible to removal. See Foulkes op cit, para 45.

97 Nenkangmwa, c.65, incumbent Maran or Queen of Sh'wer, interviewed at Sh'wer Palace, on 15th April 1995.

98 See Charles Orr, *The Making of Northern Nigeria,* Op cit, p.57.

99 See Elizabeth Isichei, op cit, p.44

100 Thus said Oliver Howard in January 1907, see: "Report on the Angass Expedition: From Resident Bauchi province to the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria" in: "Bauchi Province: Expeditions and Patrols (confidential)" SNP 6, C.140/1907 (NAK).

101 Peter Yearwood (ed) *Jos Oral History and Literature Texts* (Jos History Project, History Dept. Univ. of Jos, Harmattan 1981

102 Relics of values such as that are still inculcated in their youths today. See also D. N. Wambutda, op.cit, p.39: "...it was against their ethics to attack a person when such a person was at a disadvantage."

103 Isichei, Ibid, 44

104 Foulkes, op cit, para 98

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid

107 Ibid

108 See Elizabeth Isichei, op cit, p.44

109 Many of our informants suggested these routes.

110 See for instance, Elizabeth Isichei, op.cit, pp.43-44 and Daniel Nimcir Wambutda, *A Study of Conversion Among the Angas of Plateau State of Nigeria With Emphasis on Christianity,* (Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1991), pp.38-41 & 43. Charles Gonyok, (op.cit, pp.25-26) has apparently accepted the said account like Isichei and Wambutda, but has also maintained cautious position as borne out by note 113 below.

111 Isichei, ibid, p.44; and Wambutda, ibid, p.43

112 John Nengel, *Precolonial African Intergroup Relations in the Kauru and Pengana Polities of Central Nigerian Highlands, 1800-1900* (Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1999) pp.84-88, offers an interesting definition of **'aman'** or **'amana'** as well as maintains that, in the context of his area of research, payment of tribute by so called **amana** territories did not always mean loss of independence, on their part. This position might be a likely basis for understanding the Plain Ngas – Bauchi relations or context, during the nineteenth century.

113 This position was first maintained Foulkes in 1907, and later in 1974 by Charles Gonyok, op. cit, pp.27-28.

114 See Oliver Howard "Report on the Angass Expedition: From Resident Bauchi province to the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria" in: "Bauchi Province: Expeditions and Patrols (confidential)" SNP 6, C.140/1907 (NAK).

115 Ibid

116 Of course, this is not a rule, but a tenable tendency.

117 Foulkes, op cit, para.98

118 Foulkes, op.cit, paras 105-107

119 Mangvwat classifies them among the most primitive of the groups in the Jos Plateau area. See his, op.cit, p.3. So also did F. Beckles Gall in 1919. See his *Gazetteer of Bauchi Province*, p.16.

120 Evidence from Foulkes, op.cit, para. 110: which goes that, "...the people of Ampier have learnt from the Dollong [Pai] to weave **majai-i**, which are superior feris, of a texture similar to our webbing. They are broader too than feris, and the threads used are much thicker and more closely woven."

121 See Foulkes, Op cit

122 When Edwardes, op cit, in as late as 1914, that is, ten years after the imposition of colonial domination had began in Yil Ngas, made this general observation: "As is usually the case among peoples of this type, there is very little variation in wealth, all are on the same level, enough to eat and houses that cost them a week's work, but no clothes, no possession, a contented minimum," one would counter-observe that he was using a belated norm to describe an area where much variation in wealth had come into being.

123 Akeredolu-Ale, (in op. cit, pp.46-50) has offered the contention that high inequality can occur along with a narrow poverty margin and low inequality can also occur with a wide poverty gap.

CHAPTER THREE:

THE IMPOSITION OF BRITISH COLONIAL DOMINATION ON YIL NGAS, AD 1902-1919

3.0 Introduction:

By the opening years of the twentieth century, the Nigerian area north of the Niger-Benue confluence was being intensively invaded by Britain in the protection and pursuance of her imperial and colonial ambitions. The southern parts of the country had almost been completely conquered.[1] The central and northern parts, otherwise, 'Northern Nigeria' in colonial parlance, had hardly seen an invading colonial army, yet unawares, had already been furnished with a 'High Commissioner' in the person of Captain (later, Lord) Frederick Lugard.[2] As the first commander of the British-owned Royal West African Frontier Force (R.W.A.F.F) back in 1898, Lugard had pitched his headquarters at Jebba, up the Niger.[3] With his declaration of the 'Protectorate of Northern Nigeria' on 1st January 1900 and the proclamation of himself as its High Commissioner or 'chief governor' at his new base, Lokoja, Lugard wasted no time in despatching executive messages informing the rulers, the emirs in particular, of his proclaimed sovereignty over them, requiring them to acknowledge it through payment of taxes. He needed to assert his authority either by conquest or fiat in the area before governing it. If the rulers chose to recognise his authority, then they would not be invaded; but their failure to do so would provoke his taking of military measures against their communities and emirates. Many of them actually discountenanced his overtures, and as a result, military expeditions were sent into various directions to deal with the patriotic, though to the colonialists, recalcitrant, fronts.[4]

One such military expedition obtained a walkover victory over Bauchi Emirate, while on its way to Borno, on 16th February 1902. Although Bauchi had rejected Lugard's proclamation and sovereignty over it, its defence organs were loath to act, militarily-speaking, when the invading expedition arrived. The emir, Umoru had fled with a large following leaving behind a near-empty town. Thus, before the expedition arrived, Bauchi fell to British colonialism without a gunshot.[5] Thereafter Lugard immediately appointed Charles L. Temple, as the first Resident, Bauchi Province. To support the Resident, who, by-and-large, was like a military governor, a WAFF detachment was also stationed in Bauchi, thus turning the latter into a new base for the incorporation of the surrounding areas and peoples. But one grave 'error' the British colonial authorities in Bauchi committed was they did not only see themselves as the 'new lords' of what was Bauchi Emirate at the time, but crassly conferred on themselves overlordship over the various communities and peoples in the vicinity of, and even at distant locations from, the emirate, whom they generally regarded as having been subjects of the Emir of Bauchi before his emirate's fall in February 1902. The Ngas were one such people.

This chapter attempts to describe the roughly one and a half decades of British colonial invasion and conquest of Yil Ngas, spotlighting: the earlier and latter 'war years,' their immediate impact, the unrelenting and recurring acts of resistance, the plunder of economic and human resources, and the quest for pliable indigenous leaders and folks to join the ranks of colonial staff, among other issues. The features of the period under review in this chapter, AD 1902-1919, are obvious: first, it was marked by encroachment and tension; conflict and conquest; pillage and plunder; taxation and resistance; political and ideological changes. Secondly, it was marked

by problems tantamount to a long period between the initial contact, conquest and occupation and the final conquest and occupation of the area. Instead of an increasing government there developed a scenario of a lessening government presence, giving vent to the pursuit of various nationalistic ambitions, especially by some polities hitherto occupied by fiat rather than by force. The latter factor is probably explainable on the grounds that prior to 1918, to quote Michael Watts, "the system of colonial administration [in Northern Nigeria] was still experimental...."[6] At the wider level, however, the active involvement of Britian, Nigeria's colonial dominator, in the First World War fought between 1914 and 1918, leading to the recall, to the war's frontiers, of several colonial officers, mostly staff officers of British infrantry on secondment under Britain's Colonial Office and on posting to Nigera, was a remote yet specific factor responsible for the lessening government presence. The touring officers' practice, which kept the remainig colonial officers at centers such as Bauchi rather than stationed where the 'colonised' peoples such as the Ngas were, when the officers only went on tours to the areas from time to time, during the years of the said war, caused the emergence of rumours of the departure of political or colonial Europeans, whom they despised, and the staying back of religious or missionary Europeans, whom the people tolerated.[7] Such rumours partially served as fuel for the pursuit of patriotic ambitions. Those who acted on their bases ended up with surprising discoveries. Without further delay, let us look at the initial process of invasion and subsequent subjugation of Yil Ngas by British colonial forces.

3.1: Contact, Invasion And Partial Conquest, 1902-1907:

After the colonialists had established their authority over Bauchi Emirate, which began in February 1902, and while on tour, precisely in May 1902, Charles Temple learnt of the existence of the Ngas people.[8] Temple apparently kept the matter to himself until September 1902 when in the first ever-written-colonial report on the Ngas people, he informed Lugard. The report was brief but certainly based on hearsay, contents of which were furnished to Temple probably during the said tour, or when he was back in Bauchi town. It reads:

> Angus. I have not reported on these people before. They are situated to the south of Dass. The principle [sic] towns are Dawaki, Ampyer and Kubbirr. Up to the time of our arrival they had always paid taxes to Bauchi.[9]

This report, to a large extent, reflects the initial erroneous mentality of the colonialists towards the Ngas people, that is, that 'they had always paid taxes to Bauchi'. Though basically it refers not to the whole but only the eastern part of Yil Ngas, which the colonialists later daubed 'Plain Angass District' and is today roughly represented by Amper and Kabwir Districts of Kanke Local Government Area, the report gives the erroneous impression that Pu'el ("Dawaki"), Per ("Ampyer") and Kabwir ("Kubbirr") were the most important or principal polities in Yil Ngas. Misrepresentations therefore abounded in that small but dangerous report. The contention that the Ngas as a whole or the mentioned polities and surrounding communities had 'always' paid taxes to Bauchi before 1902 was an overstatement of sorts. Bauchi's authority over the said eastern part of Yil Ngas, if there really was any, seemed to have waned to a nominal status within several decades before the British takeover in Bauchi.[10]

Buachi's overlordship over the mentioned polities of Yil Ngas, by the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore, if there really was any, was not a practical one.[11] As already maintained, the British in Bauchi assumed at that time without reservation that the peoples in the vicinity of the Emirate had all been subject to the Emir of Bauchi before their takeover. In their assumption, this included all the Ngas polities, most of whom before they could come into direct contact or confrontation with the colonial forces had already been puzzled and bothered with orders from the Bauchi colonial government asking them to send in their taxes 'fully and promptly.'

When Temple had either gone on leave or another assignment, the Acting Resident, Mr. Chartres, sent the first order to Yil Ngas sometimes between October and December 1903, and made such an unwarranted demand. Our sources are silent as to how the order was sent. But no tax was paid to Bauchi on account of it. Resident Temple himself later sent a District Superintendent of Police (or DSP) named Glenny, in March 1905 to the Ngas country, to collect their tribute, but also to no avail.[12] The Ngas polities, more especially those that had not previously come under the nominal tutelage of Bauchi, did not only ignore the orders, but, in the words of the blood-thirsty successor of Charles Temple, Colonel Oliver Howard, were generally "disposed to regard threats of punishment as vain boasts"[13] to the annoyance of Howard himself and other colonialists who resolved to await the opportunity when they would prove their mettle against such polities in the battlefield.

The failure of the orders dispatched twice to Yil Ngas, in 1903 and 1905, to yield any positive results, on the one hand, and the alleged recurrence of Ngas

polities' invasions and pillage of Zar (Sayawa) and Jar (Jarawa) communities, of nearby trade-routes and camps of Fulani cattle-rearers, in the northern and north-eastern vicinities of Yil Ngas, up to 1906, on the other, suddenly metamorphosed into what the colonialists were looking for: The pretexts for the invasion and/or conquest of Yil Ngas. In April 1906, Oliver Howard, the expert at his own game, anxious to check what he daubed "the undesirable state of affairs," which, according to him, was caused by the Ngas exercise of their independence or freedom to such an effect that some of their polities were often invading those their non-Ngas neighbours and disturbing the peace.[14] Howard must have thought to himself that, it was bad enough for the Ngas to have held on tightly to their independence in spite of the British, but what with the atrocious acts they were allegedly spearheading and which were spreading fast to their conquered neighbours! He stated his complaint to Lugard, implicating Wuseli and some other Ngas polities, thus:

> The Angass finding that their past misdoings [overlordly, revenue-drive campaigns] still remained unpunished [remained unchecked], gained confidence and went farther afield to raid viz, the Seiawa and Jarawa towns; Filane cattle were seized by Wusele, the owners killed, the neighbouring trade routes became unsafe, and were consequently abandoned. The semi-truculent pagans [partly patriotic non-Muslim peoples] of the Leri District became fired with a desire to emulate this example of successful defiance, and hence a loss of Revenue from that District ensued.[15]

Surely, the last point raised, was a most attractive pretext, beckoning for immediacy of action! For loss of revenue to have occurred due to the alleged offensive operations of some Ngas polities, it was in the colonial government's interest, naturally, to attack and arrest the situation, otherwise, its own very existence was doomed. That is how Howard courted Lugard and other readers' sympathy on the situation. The impact of Ngas defiant behaviour on already colonized peoples

lying to the north of Yil Ngas was what Howard despised the most. His mind was therefore made, and the grounds, as it were, were now laid for him to quickly check that 'ugly' state of affairs. Hence, a military expedition was immediately dispatched against Yil Ngas in April 1906.

3.1.1 First Invasion, 1906: The So-called Angass Expedition

The first colonial military expedition sent against Yil Ngas, arbitrarily named the "Angass Expedition", initially comprised Oliver Howard (the Resident of Bauchi Province), Capt. L. F. Renny (O. C. Troops, Bauchi), Dr. Inness (Medical Officer, Bauchi), Lieutenant R. A. Mackworth, one maxim and one millimetre gun, and eighty rank and file soldiers. Leaving Bauchi on 13th April, the expedition trekked through Katagum, Bununu, Getal, Lusa and finally entered Yil Ngas at Nmyet, better known as Goshin Dutse (Howard's Goshen Ducie) on colonial records, on 18th April 1906. Howard later increased the population of the expedition by adding a re-inforcement of one thousand manual labourers recruited from nearby Zar (Sayawa) land lying to the north of Yil Ngas, in the so-called colonial Lere District, after three days of commencement of military operations. Probably against their own wish, those Zar men were on a short notice mobilized, in the form of forced labour, to join a colonial expedition; probably they willingly rose to the occasion.[16] The expedition toured and invaded several parts of Yil Ngas between 18th April and 2nd May 1906, spending exactly two weeks when they left.

In the course of their activities in the region, whenever a polity or community showed a slight lack of interest in fighting, Howard quickly exploited the opportunity to ask for the immediate submission of their tax to him, actually a heavy indemnity: In this connection, since the people of Nmyet did not take up arms

against the expedition, Howard instantly required them to pay their tax. He even re-assessed and reduced their initially estimated tax by fifty percent! In his own account to Lugard, he declaratively announced that: "At Goshin Ducie [Nmyet] we entered the Angass country."[17] According to Howard, Nmyet at the time was reportedly "much oppressed by its neighbour Wussele [Wu'se'li]."[18] Howard did not later disclose whether this assertion was true or not, especially after getting into contact with Wu'se'li. Unlike Charles Temple, first resident of Bauchi, who probably relied on travellers' reports to determine the taxes expected from each Ngas community concerned, than went physically to make the assessments himself, Oliver Howard, his successor who led the first invading colonial army against Yil Ngas, and had commanding views on the area, was magnanimous to Nmyet, which he described as 'friendly.' Probably reckoning with Nmyet's size, Howard instantly maintained that in fact, his predecessor, Charles Temple, had assessed and fixed the town's tax "at 100,000 cowries which I consider excessive. I accordingly reduced the assessment to 50,000 cowries."[19] Nmyet must have quickly paid the sum, reckoning with the gesture. Moreover, Howard did not abduct their ngolong or chief when he left the area, which indicates their having met his demand.

From Nmyet, Oliver Howard sent for the Ngolong and subordinate rulers of Nemel, a neighbouring polity to both Nmyet and Wuseli, better known in Hausa as "Kabaran" in colonial documents, to bring their tribute to him, which they did. The expedition therefore did not visit Nemel. But, according to Howard, because the ngolong and his subordinate rulers procrastinated in paying in their tribute and the implication of the allegation that they had helped in hiding or sheltering some livestock belonging to Wuseli people, he abducted all of them and detained them to

accompany the expedition for 'the remainder of the tour.'[20] On the other hand, if they had not 'accepted' to accompany the expedition as stated, the option given them was that the ngolong would stand trial under the 'Revenue Proclamation', something they had never heard of, placed as a hurdle before them.[21]

The expedition left their Nmyet base with all the abducted chiefs of Nemel and marched to Wuseli, a distance of about seven miles according to the colonialists, and arrived at about 8.30 am on 19th April 1906. Wuseli was where armed resistance was first used against the expedition in Yil Ngas. The Wuseli people were not taken at a surprise; contrary to Oliver Howard's designs, they were on the alert. According to Capt. Renny, on the expedition's arrival, large groups of Wuseli people were observed driving off herds of cattle and flocks of sheep, and the expedition at once opened fire on these groups with the millemetre and maxim guns to, if possible, prevent the escape of the cattle.[22] It seems Howard had wanted to take Wuseli at a complete surprise in which nothing about their visit was to be known. "I had failed to procure a messenger to this place" he claimed, but later exposed his initial reluctance to enter into any negotiations with Wuseli when he said: ".... the mission was considered too dangerous and as I did not wish to expose my own messengers to almost certain death. I accordingly requested the Officer Commanding Troops to attack the town without … preliminaries."[23]

The expedition found the terrain of Wuseli to be rather difficult and rocky. The nature of the terrain must have been the principal reason why Wuseli's armed resistance was not the combined or concerted resistance type, to which the colonialists were more exposed. The colonialists, therefore erroneously explained away this strategy of military engagement, which could be compared to the guerrilla

warfare strategy, as a fact of lack of combination and organization, or of weakness and primitiveness.[24] While in Wuseli, Capt. Renny was quick to notice the tenacity of Wuseli men both in holding on to the highest peaks from which they discharged volleys of arrows, and in returning to their battle posts each after they had been driven off by riffle fire. On the whole, Capt. Renny gave the conservative figure of only forty-two casualties, all on Wuseli's side, even though the expedition operated in Wuseli for three days. Out of those, thirty were reportedly killed on the first day of the war, that is, on 19th April 1906 alone.[25]

From the very day the expedition arrived Wuseli till the last, they had to be on the alert and maintain the most vigilant defence of their own posts and men, because a swift attack could be launched on them at any moment of day or night. Wuseli soldiers did not want to ordinarily concede defeat; they kept on trying their best against the foe. After the colonial soldiers had captured some of the difficult but strategic heights in the town, they took up covering positions while the town was broken. The one thousand "friendly pagans", as Renny usually described the earlier-mentioned Zar labourers, were made to accomplish this task, "the work entailing too much labour for the troops to accomplish by themselves."[26] Probably armed and/or equipped with axes, hoes and clubs, these labourers, who were brought at the behest of Resident Howard on the third and final day of the war, razed down the compounds, and then plundered or destroyed the possessions, of Wuseli people. It took them three days to finish the job.

Howard's intention was to reduce the people of Wuseli to nothing, to the status of mere inhabitants of ruins and debris. His first and immediate frustration in that endeavour was the fact that their roofs were not only thatched with grass but had

conical mud ceilings underneath, thus burning could only destroy the roofs but not the interiors. Only the manual breaking of the walls could do. According to Howard: "The food found was inconsiderable in quantity and was destroyed as it could not be transported to Bauchi"[27] Wuseli people must have packed away most of their foodstuffs, if Howard's claim is reliable. In any case, it was wicked of the colonialists to destroy food no matter how small its quantity was! The expedition finally left Wuseli on 22nd April 1906, leaving behind them, ruins and ashes, and a molested, deprived and homeless people. Even Capt. Renny was persuaded to admit that there must have been a larger number of the wounded than the forty-two dead, which he mentioned.[28]

In the course of the expedition's operations in Wuseli, prominent representatives from Nyel'ng (Nyelleng) and Bal'ng-Shipang (Ballang-Shipang)[29] went to Howard to make submission on behalf of their communities and to dissuade him from bringing the expeditionary force to their areas. Their submission must have been prompted by news of the terrible havoc unleashed on their neighbour, Wuseli. Even so, Howard still 'toured' Nyel'ng and Bal'ng-Shipang with the expeditionary force, though, not with the intention of attacking, but to re-assess their tax positions and to ask them to pay the new taxes or tributes immediately.[30] Thus, that tour was partially a show-of-force and partially a revenue collecting campaign. As we would expect, Howard later stated that both places were suspicious and slow in bringing the tax demanded and as a result, he abducted their ngolongs to Chigwong "about six miles distance before their towns would bring the moderate amount demanded."[31] For their quick surrender, therefore, Nyel'ng and Bal'ng-Shipang were readily 'rewarded' with a number of strange provisions in one day: (i) their taxes were

instantly reviewed upwards; (ii) they were ordered to pay their taxes immediately, and (iii) their two kings were abducted pending payment of their taxes. These were all done on the day the expedition visited the two communities: 22nd April 1906.

The expedition arrived Chigwong on 23rd April 1906. According to Howard, Chigwong people, at first, were hostile and not forthcoming, in his words, they 'appeared truculent and inclined to fight.' To make matters worse, they were found to have given asylum to Wuseli people and livestock. Notable among the Wuseli refugees was the ngolong himself, whom Howard put to arrest at once. The livestock were driven off, as additional booty to the expedition and the colonial government, with the help of some Chigwong people to a destination which our sources do not identify[32] As said, the livestock were driven with the help of some Chigwong people whose community Howard initially regarded as unyielding and inclined to fight. Though they did not fight, they also refused to pay the tax sum demanded by Howard. Though still armed with one thousand labourers, the expedition only burnt the town of Chigwong without however breaking it. Howard regarded this as only "a slight punishment for their defiant attitude."[33] The Ngolong of Chigwong was however abducted, pending payment of the tribute demanded of his community, which was later paid and "an excellent understanding" according to Howard, was shortly thereafter established between the colonialists and the polity.[34]

On 24th April 1906, the expedition left Chigwong and headed for Pang (Ampang-East), which, according to Howard, was the "largest town [polity] in the Angass district."[35] On approaching Ku'wang, capital of Pang, according to Howard:

> my messenger was shot at and the town prepared to fight, however, after pitching camp in the valley below, and after waiting for some hours, the Sarki [Ngolong] came out. I believe he decided to do this

> after consulting the Sarkin Kabyir [Ngolong of Kabwir] who is friendly to the Govemment.[36]

It seems, in the face of a common enemy such as the colonial invading army, the much the Ngas polities did in favour of one another was to inform and to advise; but sometimes they blackmailed one another, a far cry from maintaining strong bonds of protection and solidarity. In times of dire distress, it seems, an everyone-for-oneself scenario often emerged. In Howard's ignorance, Ku'wang, at this instance, readily passed the buck to Wokkos and shoved the colonial demand for on-the-spot submission. Howard himself was convinced that Pang people wanted to take up arms against the expedition. Howard, therefore, pacified Ji'dm'ma, the Ngolong of Pang, with words, as he later claimed:

> I had to speak severely to the Sarkin Ampam [Ngolong of Pang] and to tell them that he had nearly exposed his town [or polity] to punishment similar to that meted out to Wussele [Wu'se'li] and that until he paid his tax, and until I was satisfied as to the good behaviour of his people it would be necessary for him to accompany me.[37]

Thus, as Ji'dm'ma was threatened with abduction, according to Howard, he "protested that he was friendly but that he and his people were harassed by taunts of effeminacy from Wokos [Wokkos], and that if we could deal with Wokos, his town would settle down quietly."[38] That is to say, his polity would submit without further delay.

The next day, that is, on 25th April 1906, the expedition broke camp and headed for Wokkos, and then pitched camp two miles east of Dyis'kheb.[39] Before getting there however, the expedition got an intimidating ordeal or 'escort' from the men of Pang. Probably this was Pang's show-of-force in lieu of fighting. Howard reacted, and later described how intimidated the expedition was, from that experience:

> informed after marching five miles that we could advance no further, owing to the impracticability of the road for horses, carriers, and the gun; after much trouble I obtained a guide who said that he knew of a possible road. The road ran up a steep gorge between the Ampam [Pang] and Wokos [areas]. Sometimes, the former was lined by hundreds of semi hostile Ampam [Pang] people, who advanced down the gorge. I had to warn them that any farther advance would be treated as a hostile act. I am convinced that these people contemplated an attack on our rear.[40]

The Wokkos ('Wokos') people "allowed the column ascend their steep and almost inaccessible mountain unopposed; how the gun and the carriers managed to get up remains a marvel to me"[41] confessed Howard, who simultaneously expected an attack from the front as well as wondered whether they would successfully get there. The average height of the Wokkos "plateau," according to him, varied "from 5000 to 5500 ft., about 2000 feet above the surrounding country."[42] On 26th April 1906 the column of soldiers left camp at dawn and proceeded in the direction of Dyis'kheb, which according to Renny, was lying on "peaks and ridges 5500 feet above sea level."[43] Large groups of Wokkos people were observed on these ridges and maxim and rifle fire were opened on them at ranges up to 800 yards. The same procedure was followed in the attack as at Wuseli (Renny spelt it as 'Wussili'): the column was divided into two parts, scaling the heights in different directions. After Wokkos soldiers had lost possession of the heights, the column took up covering positions whilst the breaking of the town was accomplished by the one thousand labourers brought from Zarland, "the work entailing far too much labour for the troops to accomplish by themselves."[44]

Capt. Renny put the casualty figure at thirty dead, all on the side of Wokkos. Often the actual figure was far bigger than what the colonialists, reported.[45] The hostility and size of Wokkos seemed, as it turned out to be, to have been exaggerated

to the colonial invaders by their informants. When they got there, the place was less inclined to fight and smaller than they had thought, though, they did not see the whole of the Wokkos area. [46] However, Howard acknowledged that its inhabitants had recognizable fighting potentialities.[47]

On 27th April 1906, the expedition left Wokkos and headed for Pang'chen (Pankshin), a polity which was "said to be subject to Wokkos" and was harbouring the livestock of Wokkos people, according to Howard[48] who did not later state categorically whether or not he later found that Pang'chen, at the time, was actually subject to Wokkos or that it was keeping custody of Wokkos people's livestock which were hidden there before the expedition invaded Wokkos. All he said about the Pankshin area was: "I found the place very frightened and quite friendly, so after collecting a small amount of tribute which was readily paid, I returned to Ampam [Ku'wang] via Chigwon."[49]

On the expedition's return to Ku'wang on 28th April 1906, to Howard's chagrin, Pang still held back on paying taxes to the colonialists. In Howard's view, this was not due to lack but to sheer defiance and insubordination. He, therefore, threatened to abduct the Ngolong of Pang to Bauchi and warned, that "continued refusal to pay would lead to unpleasant consequences."[50] Pang still did not pay and Ngolong Ji'dm'ma was abducted to Bauchi. Ji'dm'ma himself seemed prepared to be the sacrificial lamb, if only his people would be left alone as free. He was detained in Bauchi for one month, before he was left to return home. As a political detainee, abduction was expected to be a schooling experience for him, winning him to the side of the colonialists. The Ngolong of Wu'se'li, in that regard, was his abduction 'schoolmate,' since he too, did not return home until after one month. The

colonialists had hoped to transform Ji'dm'ma and make him willing to serve them, on his return. However, as we shall later see, Ji'dm'ma was not changed.

On 29th April 1906, when still with Ji'dm'ma of Pang as well as the Ngolong of Wuseli, who was arrested six days before, as abductees, the expedition left for Per (Amper). In Howard's description, Per was: "a large and powerful place [polity] with dependent towns almost as large and important as itself and consequently inclined to shake off all authority. I was compelled to remain in the town until all these towns had come in and paid tribute."[51] That stay took only two days of the expedition's time.

In Resident Temple's first report on the Ngas, in September 1902, Per was mentioned alongside Puel (Dawaki) and Kabwir as the principal towns (polities) of Ngas communities hitherto said to be subordinate to Bauchi. Of these, Puel and Kabwir were not visited by Resident Howard or the expedition, however Howard reported that he "spoke to their chiefs on two separate occasions, attempting as far possible to arrive at a fair assessment" of the taxes that each of their areas should pay, noting however that difficulty would "be found in making the dependent towns pay."[52]

The expedition finally left Yil Ngas, after twelve days of military operations, of burning and breaking of towns, of show-of-force visits and on-the-spot collection of taxes, or tributes as they were sometimes called. On 1st May 1906, the expedition left Yil Ngas from Per (Amper) and headed for Sabongida in Kanna (originally K'nna, later adulterated to Kanam) District for the purpose of carrying out further military operations there. They left behind them a Yil Ngas with a harrassed and molested people; with two polities without rulers, their kings having been abducted;

with kraals and pens without livestock, the herds and droves having been driven off; with families rendered fatherless, homeless and hungry while the wet season was already at hand; with communities, shocked, wounded and bereaved. Several fathers and/or husbands or husbands-to-be were killed. Only the conservative figure of seventy-five, were estimated to have been killed in both Wuseli and Wokkos as a whole.[53] Indeed, that April-1906 colonial expedition was not just a punitive expedition as the colonialists themselves reluctantly regarded it, but an exploitative and destructive invasion. The "Angass Expedition" so-called, gave as much attention to tribute-gathering or the revenue-drive, as to punishing insubordinate polities. Where the expedition did not make war, they threatened war: the very sight of over eighty soldiers of the WAFF type, plus one thousand labourers comparable in power-capacity to several bull-dozers or tanks, plus herd-drivers, messengers and carriers, might have been terrorising and crippling enough to some communities. Essentially therefore, the expedition invaded every community to which it went, or through which it passed, economically, politically, emotionally and psychologically, if not physically.

On top of all the pillage, demolition, and terror, which characterised the 'Angass Expedition' so-called, the colonialists still paradoxically claimed that their purpose was to promote the peace and welfare of Yil Ngas. The desired effect of this first invasion of Yil Ngas, as Col. Howard claimed, was to punish the celebrated irresponsibility and brigandage of Wuseli and Wokkos polities, which as it were, kept appearing in the hearsay-based security reports, which hitherto were submitted to him in Bauchi.[54] However, the ultimate intent behind the punishment of notorious polities such as Wuseli and Wokkos, was to use it as a necessary step or key to open

the way to full imposition of colonialism on the whole of Yil Ngas. So the expedition had to be made, so that, as colonialists assumed, the early and complete colonisation of Yil Ngas would be accomplished shortly. This assumption formed the basis of Howard's apologia after the deed had been done:

> before attempting to deal with the Angass as a whole, or to demand tribute from the more peace loving and inoffensive towns [polities], it... [was]... necessary to punish Wussele [Wuseli] and Wokos [Wokkos] for past misdeeds and to give practical proof that the government was not only but fully able to deal with these places with a comparatively small force.[55]

Regarding other benefits of the expedition, according to Howard: "The amount of Revenue collected will more than defray the cost of the expedition; the exact amount will depend upon the price of the sheep and goats collected, which have been sent to Ibi and Amar. ...".[56] While celebrating the anticipated cash revenue and profit from the pillage, Oliver Howard was not oblivious to the problems that still remained to be solved, nor was he convinced that they had finally crushed the potentialities of the people in resisting the imposition of colonial domination on their country. For one thing, Howard was not happy with their size; for quite another, he was pessimistic about their easy surrendering to the British after all, and averred that:

> It is extremely hard to form any estimate of the population of the Angass country, but it cannot be far short of from 200,000 to 250,000; the hills are literally covered with towns. The people are difficult to deal with and it will require time, patience, and constant visits to establish perfect order.[57]

this
And took about fourteen years to come through.
^

3.1.2 Second Invasion, 1906-1907: The So-called Angass Patrol and Sura Expedition

The second invasion of Yil Ngas by British colonialists was launched eight months later in 1906. In his report to the High Commissioner, covering the period April-July 1906, Oliver Howard still regarded the situation in Yil Ngas with mixed feelings. He stated: "This district should be placed under the charge of the Assistant Resident in charge of the Kanna District (when there is one) and should then be visited by him with a patrol of 40 [forty] men and a maxim, this force would be strong enough to deal with any opposition..."[58]

In his next report, that is, for August-September 1906, Oliver Howard had become quite anxious about the situation in Yil Ngas. He proposed that Capt. H. D. Foulkes, who had now assumed duties as Assistant Resident in charge of Kanna District, be permitted to extend his administrative tentacles over Yil Ngas, and if permitted, to begin with leading a patrol force there, especially to Pang (Ampang-East) in either December 1906 or January 1907, to collect her tribute. "Much has been achieved in this District and I consider that unless the moderate tribute demanded is, fully, collected, this tribe [Ngas ethnic nationality] will relapse into its former unsatisfactory condition," he added.[59]

Then in his report for October-December 1906, having received the Acting High Commissioner's approval to send out the patrol force, Howard defined the desired scope of operations of the "Angass Patrol" as the colonialists called it, thus:

> Captain Foulkes has visited all the plain Angass towns [the concept 'Plain Angass' probably used for the first time!] and reports that they are preparing their tribute. He also visited Wussele [Wuseli] and reports that this town [polity] is, now, submissive and well behaved.
>
> The Sarkin Ampam [Ngolong of Pang] is friendly but some of his subordinate towns absolutely refuse to pay their tribute. This chief informed Captain Foulkes that until these towns had been compelled

> to recognise the government his District would not settle down and pay tax.[60]

The Angas Patrol left Bauchi on 17th December 1906 with Lieut. G. L. Uniacke as Officer Commanding, and proceeded to Pang in company of Capt. Foulkes, to visit the allegedly unyielding subordinate towns and where necessary to collect their tribute by force. Howard thought the patrol would not meet with any opposition nor, in the end, destroy lives and property. Nevertheless, this turned out into another exploitative and destructive invasion launched by the colonialists against the Ngas. The Ngolong of Pang had played on the intelligence of colonial invaders by means of intrigue and projection, well knowing the riskiness of exposing his troops to the fire-armed troops of the colonialists in a full-fledged war. During the first invasion in April 1906, he allegedly smartly passed the buck to Wokkos. In his interview with Capt. Foulkes during the latter's visit in October 1906, he allegedly passed the buck to his subordinate towns. Now that a patrol was sent to deal with the allegedly difficult towns in his polity, and if the allegation was correct, the truth was going to be revealed, shortly. Foulkes later explained that during his visit in October 1906, he threatened the Ngolong of Pang:

> that if he would not pay his tribute, I should return with a military force in about two months' time and take it for myself. He impressed upon me that ...the attitude of his outlying towns and section of his own people made it almost impossible to do so. He agreed however to bring in the share of Ampam [Ku'wang and environs] itself, which amounts to half of the whole, I said I would deal with the refractory towns when I come again.
>
> Not only, however, has he paid this stipulated share but I discovered, eventually that these towns made no difficulty about bringing me what I asked for, and that they had already given to the **Sarkin** [Ngolong] a portion of the tax when he had sent for it. This portion he has kept [for] himself, as he did not send it in to me. In fact it was Ampam [Ku'wang and environs] itself, which was obstructive.[61]

The patrol got to Kabwir, in Yil Ngas, on the 23rd December 1906, six days after it had left Bauchi. Apart from Lt. G. L. Uniacke, the patrol comprised Dr. Manuk as medical personnel, fifty native rank and file soldiers, a maxim gun, thirty-one transport-carriers and later about four thousand five hundred (4500) more carriers, including herd-drivers, made up of two groups from Kabwir and one group from Munok, whom Foulkes had separately recruited, most probably conscripted in the manner of forced labour, to assist in lifting the thousands of loads of booty won by the patrol in Ku'wang and environs alone![62]

The patrol set on Ku'wang very early in the morning of 24th December 1906 after breaking camp at 4.00a.m. They met Pang soldiers on guard on the way to Ku'wang. According to Lt. Uniacke, in the attempt to clear their way with fire-arms up to the palace, as the soldiers had also resisted with weapons, some thirteen dead bodies of Pang soldiers were counted.[63] And on the next day, 25th December 1906, which, certainly, was a Christmas Day in colonialist Britain and for the three white officers of the patrol, Foulkes decided that the patrol needed to withdraw from Ku'wang to return later, not because of Christmas! But as he later stated:

> as my time was limited, and it appeared as if they were determined not to enter into negotiations of any sort, I made up my mind to leave Ampam [Ku'wang and environs] for the present and do the round of the smaller towns, returning again later on.[64]

Before their retreat however, Foulkes ordered the patrol force to break part of the **lu'war'ng** or palace, and to burn the thatch roofing of several other compounds of Ku'wang, especially those built on hill-tops and sides whose flames could be viewed from far and near. Ku'wang itself is situated on a high edge of the Pang Range.[65] As it were, that was how Foulkes and his colleagues celebrated their Christmas in 1906!

On the 26th and 27th December 1906, the patrol stayed in Dungung, and got food and an instalment of tribute, part of which Yilwatda, the Ngolong of Dungung, reportedly stated that he had already been paid it to Ji'dm'ma, the Ngolong of Pang.[66] On the 28th, the patrol got to Munok where its own ngolong alongside those of Langshi and Gwoktok paid their tributes to Foulkes.[67] While in Munok, Foulkes first heard of the existence of another polity farther south known as Gar'm (Garram) which no colonialist had visited before. Foulkes took the patrol to Gar'm (Garram) because he thought it was part of Pang, but later discovered that it was a different polity, independent of the latter.[68] He said:

> We arrived there early on the 29th [of December 1906]. The town [polity] lies mostly in a long narrow valley at the foot of the Wokkos hills and parallel to them.... I do not suppose that I saw the whole of the township [polity], but what I did see indicated a large population and the valley prove every sign of being even more fertile than the general run of those lying at the foot of the Murchison Ranged.[69]

In that fertile valley, the patrol met with instant resistance but Gar'm (Garram) soldiers were driven off with gunfire. Here the patrol killed, as they claimed, only two people; and captured thirty-two cattle and thirty sheep. More people must either have been killed or, at least, wounded. The cattle were the **n'ng-nkar'ng** or **muturu** type and so were smaller, wilder and more active, than those of Pang, and they all broke loose and got away on the same day! Nine were eventually recaptured, with the help of labourers conscripted from Munok, of Pang, who, in any case, literally chased, caught, and carried each cow, bodily, into the Camp, while the patrol stayed in Gar'm (Garram).[70]

Between 1st and 5th January 1907, the patrol went back in Ku'wang, confiscating and impounding grain and other valuables, on the way. On arrival, Foulkes learnt that Ngolong Ji'dm'ma had abdicated his throne and gone into self-

exile! He seemed to have died shortly thereafter.[71] Ji'dm'ma could not, as it were, countenance his loss of independence and accept a subordinate role.

The patrol confisticated not less than four thousand three hundred and ninety (4390) loads, mainly bundles, of grain from Ku'wang and environs, and were paid, as tax, ninety (90) sheep from Wuye ("Ungwan Yi"), thirteen (13) sheep and one horse from Dungung, in addition to many cows, sheep and goats from other places. When all the items were sold, it reportedly brought a total value of £126.00![72] Foulkes had taken that very handsome booty only as tribute! The whole catalogue of colonial exploitative and destructive events in Pang, beginning especially on the eve of the Christmas Day of 1906 when her **lu'war'ng,** or palace, and other compounds around it were destroyed up to the 5th of January 1907, when thousands of grain-loaded carriers, carrying the people's freshly-harvested grain and hundreds of livestock departed from Pang, has remained clear in the oral traditions of Pang people as when **Nasara piyn Pang!** That is, when 'the white man cracked (or broke) Pang!'[73] But Foulkes felt there were still a lot more things to take, not only from Pang, but the whole of Yil Ngas because he believed and maintained that the Ngas had great wealth in the form of sheep and cattle.[74] Even if the Ngas were wealthy, they might not have been as wealthy as Foulkes believed. It was on the basis of such wrong suppositions that Foulkes and other colonial invaders derived their justification for pillaging the communities.

From Kabwir, the patrol, toured some other communities in Yil Ngas and on 9th January 1907 joined another detachment of soldiers at Lere, lying outside Yil Ngas to the North-West, to combine and embark on the invasion of Mwaghavul land and environs known as the "Sura Expedition," scheduled to follow immediately after

the "Angas Patrol". The other detachment comprised Oliver Howard, the Resident of Bauchi; Capt. E. E. Williams, the Officer Commanding "C" Company of 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment; Sgt Harry; forty-one Rank and File; and seventy-three transport-carriers and herd-drivers. Thus, bringing the totals to two political officers, Howard and Foulkes; four European officers; one medical doctor, Dr. Manuk; one maxim gun; ninety-one Rank and File soldiers and one hundred and four Bauchi-brought transport-carriers and herd-drivers, who participated in the so-called "Sura Expedition" of January 1907.[75]

The expedition stopped over on 10th January 1907 at Pyemgiji of Pyem land. On the same day, while still in Pyemgiji, rulers of nearby Kadung people's communities of Kwanka and Tin'jim ("Tingin") went to Howard and declared their submission. Howard, at once, allotted to each chief the tax, which his community was required to pay: each was taxed one hundred sheep or its equivalent payable in that very month![76] Those chiefs, it was alleged, warned Howard and the expedition, that communities in the present Fier District area of Yil Ngas, with whom they had thrown their lot before retracing their steps, were likely to offer opposition to the expedition when they shall have reached Takkas, one of the communities in the Fi'er area.[77]

The expedition got to Takkas on 11th January 1907 and, according to Howard, "every effort was made to avoid hostilities" but, as he claimed, the people attempted to hinder the expedition from passing through to Fi'er town, and so military action was taken against Takkas, and fighting ensued, leaving a consecutive figure of fifty-three dead, plus many others wounded, all on the side of Takkas. On the side of the colonialists, one cattle-driver was killed, and five were wounded,

which included three cattle-drivers, one private soldier and Lt. Uniacke, himself. In addition to the casualties of men, which the Takkas community suffered, thatched roofs of compounds were burnt and ponies and sheep valued at about £14 were confiscated.[78]

On the morrow or on 12th January 1907, the column proceeded to Fi'er town. Fi'er soldiers mobilized themselves to resist the expedition. Fighting again ensued. A large portion of Fi'er town was burnt and some horses and goats were confiscated. About thirty-four dead were reportedly counted, and many wounded, on Fi'er's side. Finally, Fi'er and Takkas polities surrendered to the colonialists on 13th January 1907.[79] Howard at once demanded from Fi'er a tax of £25, to be paid on the same day, either in horses, sheep, or salt, "the latter article being plentiful in this District".[80] The chief and his subordinate rulers, according to Howard, " professed themselves able and willing to pay this amount which they said was less than they had expected would be demanded; they returned to the town to collect it..."[81] However, in the evening they returned to apologise to Howard because the value of fourteen horses "remained outstanding and I was therefore obliged to retain the Sarkin Fier [Ngolong of Fi'er] as a hostage pending payment."[82] That is to say, the ngolong was abducted, but we don't know for how long.

On January 14th 1907, Oliver Howard, with an escort of twelve WAFF men, went ahead of the main column of soldiers to Langkang, after certain chiefs of Miyr ("Yirwa," later"Mirwa") and Bwar'k ("Barok", nowadays, Bwarak) had explained, according to Howard, that their allegiance hitherto, belonged to that polity. Langkang town was about six or seven miles from Fi'er, according to Howard, and was said to be the current "principal salt market of the district."[83] Howard was

careful to observe correctly that in Langkang there was distinct speech from that of Fi'er.[84]

Langkang town and environs was on the alert and quite prepared for the arrival of the expedition. Bowmen, actually soldiers on guard, were seen in the bush near Langkang who refused to get close to Howard or engage in dialogue. The adjacent hills, as reported to Howard by his connoisseurs, were filled with armed men, or more soldiers, who suddenly descended towards the colonial group of only thirteen men, in large bands. Howard ordered his soldiers to open fire on the bands of Langkang soldiers, which they did. Shortly thereafter the main column of the expedition arrived and helped to disperse the Langkang soldiers. Sections of Langkang population on the plain, as it was later discovered, did not join in the opposition and so were not visited with gunshots, as were those in the hills. When hostilities ceased, the colonialists reported consecutive casualties of twenty-one dead and many wounded on Langkang's side. Howard immediately imposed taxes on them, to be paid on that same day, which included some unstated quantities of salt, goats, cattle and horses. Chiefs of the two sections in the plain, probably Abwor-dyis and Jing, paid their share readily. The Miskom of Langkang or the leading chief himself, who stayed in the hills, declared his surrender on 15th January 1907, but failed to pay his share of the tribute, which amounted to about £10. As a result, Howard abducted and took him as a hostage when the expedition left the area.[85] Like others before, he may have been allowed to return home after a while. The second invasion of Yil Ngas, came to an end when in the morning of 16th January 1907, the expedition left for Panyam to carry out operations in Mwaghavul land, lying to the west and north west of Yil Ngas.[86]

Like the first, the second invasion was equally destructive and starkly exploitative. Loads of food-grain in thousands of bundles, herds of cattle, horses and goats, and flocks of sheep, were carted or driven off, out of the region. Hundreds of families were bereaved. One king, Ji'dm'ma of Pang abdicated his throne. Two others kings, those of Fi'er and Langkang, were abducted. Houses, were burnt, both in Pang and Fi'er, but broken, mainly in Pang, and many were rendered homeless and left probably without their barest subsistence, and so on. Apart from these, the aftermath of the second invasion also elicited the beginning of new socio-political and economic developments in Yil Ngas, featured next.

3.2 A New Order, Resistance And More Conquest, 1907-1919

The colonialists were bent on mercilessly exploiting the resources of Ngas people despite the destruction and plunder they had already wrought between April 1906 and May 1907. Howard virtually stood for the unnamed policy of taking-taxes-by-any-means-possible in the area, which, in turn, became one of the causes of the next wave of battles, in more colonial invasions. With the virtually involuntary surrender of Wokkos polity in May 1907, the colonialists heaved a big sigh of relief, having, as they thought, satisfactorily accomplished their 'immediate' desire at the time, that is, the conquest of the 'whole' of Yil Ngas. Nevertheless, the task had already taken them a whole year: from April 1906 to May 1907, some twelve months had already passed by! In the interim, Capt. H. D. Foulkes came on the scene in the wet season of 1906, as the first Assistant Resident in-charge of Kanna District, which was shortly thereafter enlarged to include Yil Ngas, as earlier maintained. Convinced of his assessment of the situation in Yil Ngas, Foulkes maintained in December 1907, that: " ...it may be safely asserted now that there will be no further

trouble. They have taken their overthrow in a proper spirit."[87] And giving a pat on the back of the colonial machine which made the situation possible, he said: "the net result of a year's work … has been that the whole Angass people, including eleven new tribes [polities], are under control."[88]

Events in the subsequent years soon proved that the day of final victory for the colonialists was still a far cry from 1907. In spite of the sacrifices that they had made, some Ngas polities or communities were quite ready to make some more in order to defend their sovereignty. Naturally Resident Howard's avowed principle of "only attacking the more powerful tribes [polities] in the hope that the smaller ones would draw the logical inference, ...did not have that effect."[89] The smaller polities according to Capt. Foulkes, "assigned their immunity to the influence of their own particular **kum [kuum]**, or **dodo**, acting on their behalf, and imagined that whatever the reason was, that occasioned us to leave them alone at first, the same would hold good in future; and in consequence, most of them had to be visited [with an expeditionary force] in turn."[90] Each such polity held out its banner of independence against the yoke of colonialism until it had been vanquished, and in some cases, broken or resettled.

But why did Foulkes charge the Ngas of lack of unity of purpose? Was unity only expressed when Ngas polities declared ethnic or national solidarity one with another in war? Foulkes probably did so, due to his surprising ignorance of their segmentary political reality, which also, had been historically forged and determined.[91] Such ignorance seems to be the only basis on which we can explain the colonialist's failure to appreciate the segmentary or non-centralised platform characteristic of the political sphere of Ngas country up to the first decade of the

twentieth century. Another extreme tendency of colonial analysts was the exaggerated balkanisation of the communities of the non-centralised peoples; so much so that the peoples were made to look like folks living behind closed walls.[92]

The matrix for social interaction and forms of exchange as stated in chapter two, was not a narrow one. Military alliances between polities were neither impossible nor altogether absent. It did not have to require all the Ngas polities pitching up a combined force of resistance against the yoke of colonialism before the fact of their propensity for making alliances, one with another, could be appreciated. The fact is that a polity (what the colonialists confused for either a 'tribe' or 'town' as from the first decade and/or 'village area' or 'district' as the decades rolled by, during the twentieth century) was composed of a group of adjacent but smaller polities with forms of shared historical experience and outlook, binding them together. The superiority of their area kings was mostly spiritually, rather than temporally, based. Kings participated in material production,[93] as maintained in chapter two. Thus at the level of labour, no marked differentiation had taken place between the king and his subjects.

The relative weakness of Ngas polities in the face of the invading colonial armies was not an expression of incapability to unite, or lack of combination, as Foulkes put it, nor of the failure to raise a single, national or ethnic-based, force of resistance to meet the colonialists, but due to the relative inferiority of their weapons. In the face of the colonial army, tendencies similar to both the combined and the guerrilla tactics of armed resistance were employed by patriotic Ngas polities, but they were each defeated. Therefore, the issue was that of arms, not of style of engaging the enemy in the battlefield. That is the painful fact, which

Foulkes, paradoxically could not ignore in his 1907-appraisal of the military potentialities of the Ngas vis-a-vis their colonial enemies:

> They are at bay, and are desperately determined at all costs to keep what they have. For years past they have allowed no stranger to come into their territory. ... The people are of a very independent nature, and are, most certainly, of a martial disposition. Their collapse before us is no real detraction. Against similar weapons and superior numbers they have fully maintained their independence. ....The mountainous nature of the country together with its extreme rockiness, are, in themselves, almost sufficient deterrents, and this with their poisoned arrows and known determination to fight if molested, rendered them quite immune from outside interference.[94]

Events in the subsequent years combined to prove however that the separate tendencies of various polities to rise in resistance, was, in the ultimate analysis, more difficult to quell, than could have been otherwise. Were the various separately patriotic polities to pool their forces together and engage the colonialists in pitched battles, it would have been easy for the invaders to salutarily crush such organised resistance. A single defeat on the side of the supposed (Ngas) allies would have been vastly weakening and devastating enough, forestalling any acts of resistance from any corner. Fortunately that was not the case. Lack of combination, after all, contrary to Foulkes' view, was not alone "the one essential [factor] for any real resistance..." to the colonialists' consolidation of gains and losses in Yil Ngas. As cited above, Foulkes himself happens to have rightly stated it, that for quite some time, the collapse of Ngas polities to the colonialists between 1906 and 1907 was "no real detraction", that is, no real belittling, or actual weakening of their strength. It is little wonder that up to 1919, F. Beckles Gall, the Resident of Bauchi, still referred to some Ngas polities as among the "most backward" and "unsettled" peoples of his province.[95] Obviously what qualified them for that enlistment derived

mostly from their recognised patriotic potential and frequent tendency to stand in resistance to the interests of the colonial regime.

The chief interest of the colonialists in Yil Ngas during the period 1906 to 1919, however, was not simply to invade and foster the military subordination of the region, but to bring into operation a new social order, one that would exist totally at their own mercy. To do this, they had to transcend the political strand within the superstructure, to the socio-economic level wherein lay the basis of the society. The "basis of society" concept, as already highlighted in the glossary, denotes the relations that characterise the production of material life needs, relations existing between producers and other folks (producers and consumers, alike). The political developments and changes in Yil Ngas in that period, which are subjects of much debate and controversy especially among the Ngas people,[96] must be very important but not any more crucial than changes related to the state of the material producer to land, and to labour, changes which sought to transform the basis of the economy itself. Let us however attempt a reconstruction of the burdensome, intriguing and sometimes bloody process of the haphazard transition to, or entrenchment of, an all-encompassing, **de facto** colonial social order, which came to be recognised by all the polities in Yil Ngas, as the ultimate legal and sovereign authority in the region.

3.2.1 Colonial Manifesto for Minorities, 1906-1911:

In their anxiety to justify and make most imperative the achievement of colonial interest(s) in Yil Ngas, the colonialists sometimes misinterpreted the history of the Ngas people in the process. The 1919-statement of Beckles Gall, which referred to some communities, in the Hill Angass area, as among the 'most backward' in Bauchi Province, has already been cited and debunked. Going back to 1902, when

Charles Temple first forwarded a report on the Ngas, they were generally said to have always been subject to the Emir of Bauchi, and paid taxes to him up to the time of British colonisation of Bauchi earlier in the year, which is an unacceptable statement. But the most mendacious account came from Lugard, the chief exponent of the principles-and-practice of British colonial occupation and domination in the so-called Northern Nigeria. In drawing out his blueprint for the introduction of what he called 'the benefits of civilisation' among ethnic nationalities such as the Ngas, as High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, Lugard crassly averred in 1906 in a report to his London-based superior, the British Secretary for Colonies, which was later published, uncorrected as it was, in 1911, that the Ngas people as a whole had sold themselves into slavery in about a decade before, and had only returned to their homeland in the wake of the anticipated security and freedom guaranteed by the forthcoming British colonial occupation to their country, thereby attributing to British colonialism the place of the agency responsible for the liberation of the Ngas from slavery![97] To whom the Ngas had allegedly sold themselves was, surprisingly, not mentioned by Lugard!

The alleged cause of the Ngas alleged sale of their entire nation into slavery was said to be famine. Foulkes claimed to have gathered during his field experience in 1907 that the Ngas experienced a severe famine probably in the 1880s. Maybe they did. It is doubtful, however, if there was a much severer famine in the mid-1890s, which Foulkes knew nothing about, except if it was very restricted in scope. But whatever was the severity of the famine, which Lugard had in mind, it could not have been a sufficient cause to make a section, not even the whole, of the Ngas people to willingly sell themselves into slavery at anytime, nor by AD 1896, one

decade before the coming of British occupation to their country, as Lugard implied. In his own words, Lugard actually erroneously maintained in 1906 that:

> ...10 years ago, ...the entire Angass tribe sold themselves into slavery but with the advent of British rule they deserted their masters and returned, and the Angass Hills are now thickly populated. I hope that these tribes [the Ngas and neighbouring minorities] are gradually brought under administrative control -- even though in some cases the use of force may be involved -- these recurrent famines and consequent depopulation by starvation and slavery may wholly cease.[98]

The mere mention of the Ngas in the context of recurrent famines, which led to depopulation and wilful surrender into slavery, is tantamount to distortion of their history. Lugard distorted a period of Ngas history on the backdrop that, although the last famine the Ngas had allegedly suffered, according to him, was ten years before, they were not affected by the latest famine of 1904-1905, which shook many parts of Bauchi Province,[99] yet he still painted a picture in 1906 of Ngas communities which had been in a desperately helpless situation, therefore as vulnerable as ever. He made his description of their situation seem so real (as though he was giving an eye-witness account, which was not the case!) as a basis to justify the application of his colonial 'prescriptions' in their country. The second flaw in Lugard's position was the fact that the celebrated nation of so-called ex-slaves, or the Ngas as he claimed, had not been actually depopulated by famine and starvation, as was the trend, which he mentioned, but were found inhabiting 'thickly populated' hills. The third flaw was in fostering the lie that, as concerned as the Ngas were in retaining their freedom and inhabiting their hills, they cared little about themselves as a people. That, whenever it came to struggling for survival, which often involved making some sacrifice, they easily offered themselves as a nation into slavery in one fell swoop, and quickly quit their masters in the same manner, once signs of a new social order

appeared on the horizon, which in the present instance was, to use Lugard's words, the approaching British 'introduction of the benefits of civilisation by permanent occupation' which, essentially meant trappings of capitalist colonial domination. This was absolutely false. Certainly the Ngas hills were not populated because of the soon-coming agency of colonial occupation; the area had certainly been inhabited consistently for at least five hundred years before the end of the nineteenth century.[100] And nothing was farther from the truth than for Lugard to regard the colonial domination of the Ngas as a civilising and responsible agency, promoting prosperity and liberation. The decades following 1906 essentially present a contrary kind of evidence: that colonialism promoted the impoverishment and dependency of the Ngas nation.

Then in his apologia for the so-called punitive expeditions frequently despatched from various colonial bases such as Bauchi, to coerce smaller nationalities and/or their polities into submission and the continued use of force in protecting 'the peace' whenever the colonial order was threatened at any place or time, which apparently was not the approved course of action by the British Secretary for Colonies, Lugard contended that there was the need to enlighten ethnic nationalities on the uses of a light tax as well as on

> ... the obligation to cease from outrages and war. So-called 'punitive' expeditions, which leave behind them only the memories of a raid and bloodshed, are detestable... but the protection of peaceful tribes from wanton aggression, and the introduction of the benefits of civilisation by permanent occupation are objects which justify recourse to force when other methods have failed, and in these conditions only can the government of northern Nigeria be accused of taking initiative in coercing pagan tribes [non-Muslim, ethnic nationalities].[101]

Thus, 'frequent outrages,' 'wanton aggression,' and 'war' among sections of, and between various nationalities, including the Ngas and their neighbours, was another kind of problem, which Lugard identified. Several colonialists had a knack for exaggerating the spate of pre-colonial warfare among our various nationalities; what were mostly skirmishes far from forays, were made to seem as though the nationalities or their polities lived in a constant state of unrest formerly. Where allegations concerning 'outrages and warfare' in the pre-colonial period among peoples and polities might have some credibility, as Mahmud Modibbo Tukur has argued, such encounters and conditions were nothing other than a dialectical response of African, especially West African, communities to the pernicious stimuli of Western European imperialism whose impact was felt either directly or indirectly by such polities or economies with increasing intensity since the fifteenth century.[102] Therefore, Lugard's prescription of 'the introduction of the benefits of civilization by permanent occupation' in this regard, if anything, was merely designed to arrest the ugly situation whose origins could not have been unconnected with the pre-colonial pursuit of European imperialist interests in West Africa, in the first place.

After identifying the 'problems' of the Ngas and other nationalities, which included famines and depopulation by starvation and constant warfare (which we have either debunked or rightly blamed on imperialist roots, above) Lugard proffered his colonial 'solutions' to them. This is what we reckon to have been his colonial manifesto or blueprint for the effective colonization of minorities in Bauchi Province, and other parts of the so-called Northern Nigeria, whether they were smaller polities or nationalities. Specifically, he called it 'the introduction of the benefits of civilisation by permanent occupation', which included:

> The introduction of new food plants, and of better modes of cultivation, the access to markets at present closed to them, where food may be bought in exchange for silvan products of commercial value, the inauguration of industrial missions, and finally, in extreme cases, the direct assistance of government are benefits which it is worthwhile to acquire at the cost of a light taxation ...[103]

First, in that connection, Lugard talked of bringing the various nationalities under colonial administrative control. Perhaps this was because, in Lugard's view, they seemed to be living out an uncontrolled manner of life. Essentially, Lugard meant the actual subjection of the nationalities to a consistent tax-paying lifestyle. Secondly, 'the introduction of new food plants and better modes of cultivation' was another solution, which Lugard assumed would be welcomed by the nationalities and would promote produce variety, better yields, and development of new culinary tastes. The new food plants to be introduced would also serve as a check against locust invasions, if they happened to be root crops. Thirdly, 'the access to markets at present closed to them' would enable the peasant producers of the various ethnic communities to dispose of their surplus food produce 'in exchange for silvan products of commercial value.' Fourthly, in times of economic hardship, access to 'direct assistance of government' in terms of relief supplies would also be a solution. Finally, to undertake 'the protection of peaceful tribes' or non-resistant polities from any wanton aggression by their neighbours through the use of police patrol from time-to-time.

In conclusion, Lugard stated that those five benefits or solutions could be earned by concerned nationalities or polities at the cost of (i) "a light taxation" and (ii) the obligation to recognise the colonial peace or, as he put it, "to cease from outrages and war", as earlier maintained. Such top-level decisions of Lugard, as outlined above, were normally sent down, for implementation, to British officers in

charge of the affected or concerned peoples and polities, with despatch. Were the Ngas people, in the discussion of whose faulted historical context and experience the solutions were proffered, ready to accept these conditions? Did they actually see the situation as Lugard saw it? In a nutshell, the colonialists merely assumed many unfounded things. Firstly, they assumed that they had accomplished a cheap conquest of the Ngas, who did not even pitch a large-scale, combined, resistance against them. Secondly, they assumed, by December 1907, that the stage was already set for the entrenchment of colonial political policies (especially those bordering on taxation) when in actual fact not all the polities had been conquered. Thirdly, they assumed beyond reasonable limits (in spite of their terrifying descriptions of the topography and terrain in their military reports during the invasions), that Yil Ngas was greatly endowed with wealth.[104] Suggestions of poverty with reference to Yil Ngas, or any of her polities, during the first decade of the twentieth century, were completely absent in colonial reports,[105] which implies their general belief in the material endowment of the area. Finally, they assumed that, in view of the benefits of 'civilisation' by permanent colonial occupation as spelt out by Lugard, the imposition of what, to the colonialists, was 'light taxation,' would be peaceably welcomed by the polities of Yil Ngas. And, with a warped and incredible account of Ngas history (as on the eve of the colonial domination of their country), Lugard's expectation of the collaboration of all Ngas polities in accepting the so-called 'light taxation' in exchange for the 'civilising benefits,' must have been superfluous. During the period under review in this chapter, different communities of Yil Ngas responded to the tax question differently. Some of those responses and what generally happened concerning the matter are discussed below.

3.2.2 Colonial Taxation, Resistance And 'Poverty', 1907-1915: Challenges of Loyalty and Disloyalty

In April 1908, Howard submitted to the High Commissioner that: "The assessment of the Hill Angass and Sura is extremely low and it should be brought up to the level of the Plain Angass... as soon as accurate census has been made."[106] Possibly a semblance of a census for tax-collection purposes, populational estimates probably, had before March-ending 1908 already been carried out in the so-called 'Plain Angass' area. In any case, their taxes were highest in an area of vast scope, the so-called 'Pagan' Belt, which, apart from Plain Angas also included the so-called Hill Angas, 'Sura' areas, 'Baron,' and Bukuru District (though the latter was treated differently), warranting Howard's comparison. Furthermore, he would rather that taxes, which till then were taken generally in kind rather cash, should thenceforth begin to be taken in the physical-labour rather than the material-wealth kind.[107]

This proposal, as it were, was partially informed by Ngas hatred for parting with their livestock, no matter the matter. Livestock were their investments. Giving an example with the proposed tax for Wokkos polity, Howard drove these points home to his superior, thus: "The assessment of Wokkos is £5, if this town [polity] were allowed to pay its tax in labour it would pay £50 more readily than it now pays £5 in kind. The same remark applies to all the Angass towns [polities]; none of these like parting with their goats and stocks."[108] Finally he announced that in 1909, when deliberate, necessary efforts, as it were, shall have been made, the Bauchi provincial government would ensure that "cowries and cash will be in circulation so that the present assessment [of 1908] will be paid without any difficulty," in Yil Ngas, in particular and 'Pagan Belt,' in general. And when 'cowries and cash' shall have been introduced into the increasingly tax-ridden economy of the so-called Pagan Belt,

according to Howard's vision for the exploitation of physical labour as tax, then: "It would be an easy matter to raise the assessment of Hill Angass and Sura district by £400 or £500 if this amount could be taken in labour on local roads, dams, etc, the construction of such roads and dams would do much to improve the district and to educate the inhabitants..."[109] At least, after introducing a relatively standardized medium of exchange or cash, which was controlled by the provincial government, concrete cash equivalents of physical labour man-hours worth hundreds of pounds, could more easily be taken as tax, from the concerned sub-districts. Howard was therefore resolved that the imposition and collection of taxes among the Ngas and their neighbours was to be done at all costs; anything could be taken in the partial absence of cowries and cash. Apart from physical labour, livestock, corn, pepper, salt and roofing grass were still takable materials as tax. Continued increasing of tax rates, as it were, was a colonial imperative. See how Lugard's light taxation principle began to be translated in practice! However, Oliver Howard suddenly died on 20th September 1908 in Bauchi before his grandoise proposals especially for 1909 saw the light of day. But Gowers, who succeeded him, and other Bauchi-based colonialists, only made minor changes, that is, they generally adhered to executing blueprint(s), which the Lugards and Howards of this world had drawn out. How did the Ngas polities, some of which had suffered severely during those first two pillaging invasions, respond? How did the colonialists commend or counteract their actions? This section attempts to present a picture of what followed, as from the middle of 1907.

With regards to the fears of the colonialists after the first two colonial invasions of Yil Ngas just as the colonialists were met with armed resistance at some

places, the colonialists were now greeted with much unwillingness to part with their property as tribute until they were harassed either by the colonialists'show of force or as in some cases, until the colonialists invaded and confiscated their property as 'tax.' At this point, let us examine the attitude of Howard's subordinate, Assistant Resident and Capt. H.D.Foulkes, who was the officer on-the-spot in Yil Ngas, as far as tax collection was concerned during his residency and service there, between 1908 and 1911. George Ormsby, another British colonialist, by 1911, succeeded Foulkes at Pankshin Station, in Yil Ngas, until 1913, when he was taken out of the area.

Shortly after the end of second invasion in January 1907, Foulkes bared his mind on how he wished to re-organise the various polities of Yil Ngas and place them under districts, in order to make tax collection easier. He said:

> Several towns nominally follow the Sarkis [Ngolongs] of Ampier [Per] and Kabir [Kabwir], but for practical purposes they are virtually independent. If they find orders unpalatable, they ignore them, and if they choose to refuse to pay their tax, as they frequently do, the two Sarkis [Ngolongs] mentioned state they have no means of compelling them to do so.[110]

Furthermore, in order to make tax collection in Yil Ngas easier, Foulkes said: "I consider, therefore, that, if it be feasible to place the Angass district under the control of one of the really strong Sarakuna of Bauchi, say Ajia, it would be advisable to do so, and to commence now by handing over to him as many of the towns [polities] as would make no objection to paying to him."[111] The Ngas were immediately placed, with Howard's approval, under the Ajiya ("Ajia") of Bauchi. Anything easing tax-collection sailed smoothly on Howard's table, as this did. For about four years in the so-called Plain Angas, and five years in the so-called Hill Angas areas, Yil Ngas was subsequently, and native-administratively, placed under

the tax-collection supervision of Attahiru, the Ajiya or 'Treasurer' of Bauchi emirate, member of the emirate council and nominal Sarki, in the sense of Fiefholder, of Lere and environs.[112] In the colonial scheme of things, Attahiru who for all practical purposes resided in Bauchi and only had a country residence in Lere also made another country residence in Pu'el (Dawaki) of Yil Ngas where he used to put up whenever he went to the Ngas country to collect taxes. Thus he was not a resident chief, but was, more or less, a colonially made fiefholder, or absentee chief, of the Ngas country. Like Mamudu Hassan, the Chiroma of Bauchi, emir's son, Attahiru's short-lived predecessor, Attahiru must have been more nominal than real and largely shoved by several independent-thinking polities of Yil Ngas.[113]

The colonialists had removed the Chiroma virtually within six months after the first invasion in 1906, as the over-all Bauchi-recognised and named chief of the Ngas people, due the ineffectiveness of the lie itself: the Ngas did not pay him homage or taxes, even though he remained behind in Pu'el (Dawaki) for three months after the first colonial invasion. In the first place, he had not been there before. Howard and other expeditioners had brought him before the end of the first invasion, because, as claimed in Bauchi, and subsequently recognized by the colonialists, he was the designated fiefholder of the Ngas country. The entire Ngas, including the so-called Plain Angas polities, had all ignored and treated him as though he did not exist. The colonialists had to seek and maintain a more effective medium of tax-collection in Yil Ngas. Foulkes stated in January 1907 that: "It so happens that with the possible exception of Pankshin," all other so-called Hill Angas polities could "pay all their tribute in cattle, for which there is always a ready market in the neighbouring Filane [Fulani] towns. The cost of driving them in would be

small, so that for the present they should pay direct to me."[114] Lere, lying to the north-west of Yil Ngas, was a typical, so-called Fulani, town where Hill Angas cattle taken as tax, could be sold. But Foulkes, as it were, was not comfortable with the fact that Hill Angas tax was going to be paid to him directly, rather than through an agent: a chief. A far cry from the principle and practice of indirect rule, as it were, which was the approved Lugardian principle of colonial governance in Northern Nigeria at the time! The Ajiya might have done slightly better than the Chiroma, hence he was not removed but retained even though nominally as the Bauchi recognised and named over all chief of the Ngas people until 1911, when, in the Plain Angas and 1912, when, in the Hill Angas areas, Umoru Attahiru, his son and Langkuk Ngokut, Ngolong of Langdang of Pang'chen (Pankshin) polity, were respectively appointed as fourth class chiefs over the two parts, concerned.

Meanwhile, Foulkes was still residing in K'nna (Kanna) or Dengi in Boghomland, and was only visiting Yil Ngas for tax and other purposes until 1908 when he shifted base to Leyb Zat'tur in Yil Ngas. Had Attahiru been effective in doing his work, probably Foulkes might not have shifted base. The cost of collecting and transporting tribute, which, mostly, was in kind, was part of Foulkes' troubles with Yil Ngas. He had complained that: "The cost and trouble of collection and realisation of tribute in this tract is very great"[115] which probably mostly informed his relocating there. Then he considered the provision of wheeled transport as a step towards reducing the cost of human transport, since taxes were taken more in kind than in cash at that time.

When Foulkes resolved as from the middle of 1907 that he would take Ngas tribute mainly in no any other currency than cattle, which he was convinced, most of

the polities could afford, he did so with a view to arresting both the high cost of tax collection and the losses sometimes incurred in the course of carriage. Cattle needed not to be carried; but simply driven off at a smaller cost. All the polities could pay their tribute to Foulkes at Dengi or K'nna, directly, rather pay to the Chiroma, as their Fiefholder at Lere of Bauchi; before it was eventually sent to Foulkes sometimes probably without the records tallying. Foulkes must have preferred to personally take stock of what was paid by the separate polities concerned. His personal supervision made or could make the scheme operate more smoothly than leaving, say, the Chiroma, to do it. Capt. Foulkes, among several colonial officers -- like Howard, Renny, Uniacke, etc -- singularly obtained a richer eye-witness experience of Yil Ngas between 1906 and 1907. Hence, while others, like Capt. Renny virtually exaggerated their wealth, Foulkes should have given a more objective report. Unfortunately, Foulkes allowed himself to believe in what he had not yet seen. In 1907, he later made confession, as it were, of his faith rather than doubt, in what he believed, thus: "I went to the Angass with the impression that they had great wealth in the shape of sheep and cattle, and still believe them to have it, but at the same time, I have hitherto failed to see it for myself."[116] Probably his bodyguard and travelling companions helped in sustaining his belief since he stuck onto it even when he could not see the evidence. What he personally saw evinced of a different scenario:

> Every compound has two or three, but there were no indications of any herds or flocks belonging to any one man. There must be considerably more than they will admit, but though I have been to the district twice, have traversed practically the whole country, and continually from summits of hills have obtained commanding views of the district, I have, so far, been unable to verify my anticipations of large numbers.[117]

distant future. The herds and flocks were threatened with depletion, to say the least. No wonder, some Ngas polities and communities were ready to display their protest and/or make open resistance, and thereby show their disapproval of the exploitation not only of their produce but also of their livestock.

Sequel to the imposition of taxation on Yil Ngas, virtually a reign of terror ensued. Though this was for the most time, silent, it featured with notable instances of open conflict and bloodshed, here and there up to the early 1930s. Intrigue, fraud, murder, attacks and counter-attacks became parts of the new social order. Going by our accessed colonial records, the sorry outcomes for the most part occurred during the period under review in this chapter. While the colonialists increasingly won the loyalty of some of the hitherto resistant polities in Yil Ngas, others were still strongly opposed to their tax-imposing social order ranging from large groups to the individual.[120] We cite three instances or examples, below.

A radical instance (radical and patriotic to us, stubborn and disturbing to the colonialists) of opposing the colonial order and its imposition of taxation was the case of Bal'ng Ka'leyb, in 1906. Better known as Ilbissa in colonial records, in which case, it should have been spelt Yil'bs'sa, thus Bal'ng Ka'leyb was for a long time called with the name of its incumbent ngolong when colonial domination was imposed on the area, due probably to his patriotism (notoriety, to the colonialists). Bal'ng Ka'leyb, according to Howard, was a subordinate town of the Bal'ng polity.[121] In his first act of aggression, Yil'bs'sa and his men, prevented Langkuk, the ascendant 'Ngolong of Pankshin' from going to see Capt. Foulkes at Nmyet during the latter's first visit toYil Ngas in October 1906. They also seized Langkuk's horse.[122] Eventually Langkuk must have had to take a circuitous route to Nmyet

when he reported the matter to Foulkes. The second instance was when they attacked Capt. Foulkes himself, seizing three tribute cattle, from him. Foulkes' bodyguard consisted of only three men when he was attacked, but Foulkes himself "luckily, checked the attack by shooting the leading pagan [Ka'leyb soldier]."[123] And the attackers withdrew.

This case was later matter-of-factly cited in self-defence by Oliver Howard when William Wallace, the Acting High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, accused him of failing "to obey orders and cease slaying" by stopping his frequent expeditions and patrols in Bauchi Province.[124] Howard cited it as one of the very typical problems that obtained in what he called a 'Pagan District,' by which he meant an area occupied by segmentary societies whose subjects still practised primal religions rather than Islam. He argued further that such situations compelled a colonial officer to despatch a patrol force to go at once and arrest the situation before other groups nearby followed suit. Howard used the opportunity to politely seek permission to send a patrol against Bal'ng Ka'leyb, after citing it as a case in point:

> It had been my intention to authorise Captain Foulkes to arrest the chief of this truculent village, he would have required 25 soldiers for the task and the loss of life would, probably, have been small, but in view of the prohibition of all military measures, I have informed Captain Foulkes that he is not to visit this village; the result will probably be that the powerful Balam group [Bal'ng Shi'pang] which submitted without fighting and which has paid tax, will come to the conclusion that if a small village can attack an Assistant Resident with impunity they also will be able to disobey his orders and withhold tribute without danger. Balam's example will be followed by all the independent Hill Angass....[125]

-- and a return to square one would occur! Apparently Howard's diplomatic petition to send a patrol against Bal'ng Ka'leyb was not approved. After one month, Howard further stated his fears to the High Commissioner: "I sincerely trust that... if Ilbissa

[Yil'bs'sa] does not come in to Bauchi and if he is not punished the neighbouring portion of the Hill Angass district will relapse into barbarism and one of the Districts in which tin is supposed to exist will be closed."[126] But in spite of the prohibition against further resort to military measures, which Wallace gave in February 1907, the Bauchi-based colonialists still despatched in May 1907, a patrol force of thirty rank and file soldiers under the command of Col. Sgt. Maynard, in the company of Capt. Foulkes, to Bal'ng Caleb, the same month in which the Ngolong of Wokkos polity finally surrendered to the colonialists.

The patrol was sent to deal with Yil'bs'sa and his people who resisted any negotiation when the colonial force arrived. Fighting took place on the next day. In the final analysis, the colonialists acknowledged that they killed only ten men, and as usual, that must have been very conservative. The patrol also took away large stores of grain found in caves immediately in the rear of the **lu'war'ng** or Yil'bs'sa's compound, but caught no cattle because they had all been driven off before the patrol arrived. In fact, when the patrol arrived, they heard men driving off cattle behind a hill in the neighbourhood of the **lu'war'ng**, and attempted to pursue them, according to Maynard, "up a narrow and steep path, the track of which was within the arrow range of the caves" and they heard people shouting at them but saw no one. "The cattle were nowhere to be seen, and after searching the rocks for men and food for sometime," they went down and encamped at the foot of the mountains, near a stream and rested until the next day when the battle was fought. Bal'ng Ka'leyb soldiers attacked the camp and, in reply, according to Maynard, the patrol force pillaged the place.[127]

Let us cite, as our second example, a case of self-punishing protest in Wu'se'li, which occurred in October 1907. Wu'se'li people demonstrated in disapproval of the imposition of the Foulkes' livestock-based taxation, in the selfsame year in which Foulkes had introduced his tax-collecting criterion in Yil Ngas. Generally speaking, according Alvarez, a missionary who happened to be visiting Yil Ngas at the time, "there was considerable resistance among the Ngas" against colonial taxation as a whole but specifically speaking, Wuseli people, in protest, "burnt their homes rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy," as had happened in April 1906.[128] Wuseli, which was not only the first polity in Yil Ngas to experience rifle fire, but also the first to be razed to the ground, or broken, in 1906, was up, in the next year, in bitter protest against colonial taxation: burning off roofs, which must have been completed during the intervening -- November 1906 to April 1907 -- dry season! Colonialists such as Foulkes and Howard did not, at all, mention responses of this nature, in their official reports because they would embarrass and scandalise them of (extreme) villainy before their superior officers. Elizabeth Isichei gleaned this evidence from a missionary source.[129] It is therefore possible that there were such other 'suicidal' acts of resistance as the Wuseli type, which were not documented at all.

A rather difficult case for the colonialists to explain, which occurred in Munok of Pang, in March 1908, forms our third example. Probably as a way of protest against colonial taxation, a travelling Hausa colonial messenger was murdered, but Munok people gave the incident a religious explanation, which, to an extent, pacified Resident Howard, when he went with an escort-force to deal with their community. The messenger's Ngas guide and interpreter, though "wounded and

very much frightened", happened to have escaped and returned to tell the tale to Howard, who was nearby, touring other parts of the same polity, such as Ku'wang and Dungung. The murder of Waziri Ajia, a colonial courier, probably an appendage of Attahiru the 'Ajia' of Bauchi, at Munok of Pang polity was probably committed at the instigation of some of ward-heads or chiefs of the town, who, according to Oliver Howard, elected to offer him "as a sacrifice to the tribal deity; it appears that once the victim has been offered in this manner to the deity nothing can save him."[130] Apparently when Howard understood this, and though he had started destroying Munok, he was somewhat pacified and repented of inflicting further punishment or making any arrests, which he had threatened to do, not even of Gambir, probably Ngombwir, a ward-head whom Howard named the chief-offender and "who first attacked and knocked down courier Waziri Ajia [and] gave a cry offering him as a sacrifice..."[131] Nevertheless it is noteworthy that before Howard understood the situation, 'he' had already wreaked havoc on the town. On Howard's arrival at Munok, he was met by the ngolong, whom he ordered to arrest Gambir. The ngolong failed to do that, and as a result, Howard announced to him, there and then, that he would be taking Munok's tax -- of unknown description -- and at the same time, he imposed an executive fine of nineteen pounds two shillings (£19.2s.0.) on Munok community, as well as destroyed the compounds of the ward-heads or chiefs responsible, or thought to be responsible. It is doubtful if Munok commnity was able to pay that huge fine, since she stood alone, unlike Fi'er which though with satellite towns and communities, got only slightly above twenty-five pounds (£25) in the year before.

Meanwhile, evidences of new loyalties to colonialism from some Ngas groups at this time were on the increase. Langkuk had gone as team-leader of chiefs of communities in Pang'chen (Pankshin) area, who though accompanied him, stood at a distance. Langkuk kept kneeling and rising several times, as he approached Foulkes, at Nmyet, to declare their submission and loyalty. That was most probably in October 1906.[132] The colonialists gave Chiefs of Pu'el (Dawaki), Kabwir and Per (Amper) fifth-class staves of office in 1908, probably to appreciate their efforts in tax collection and also enhance their honour before their subordinate towns. A Wokkos community was ready to go and raid Munok because of what happened to Waziri, had Howard not intervened, as it were, and told them not to do so, according to Howard, himself. When other two messengers hitherto sent to Gwoktok of Pang, at the time that Waziri and his guide had been sent to Munok, were apparently shot at near Munok on their way back, they returned to Gwoktok and its ngolong sent them with an escort of one hundred armed men to Howard, their master, who was at Dungung, four miles away. Of course, they were not attacked. And the Ngolong of Gwoktok, who was said to have pledged himself not to let anyone kill them and drag him into trouble afterwards, by that kind gesture, won the admiration of Howard. Such loyalties, however, were not always appreciated.

An example of that, takes us to Tipap of Pai District area in the south-east of Yil Ngas, when during a tax collection tour in February 1914, an unfortunate incident occurred. Capt. Wallace Wright, a colonial military observer said the sad incident, which occurred in Tipap, was almost without precedent in the whole of Nigeria, since colonialism began. Indeed the 'reign of terror' that had resulted did not pass away with the nearly ten years of the first invasion of Yil Ngas. Major Edgar,

the District Officer in charge at Pankshin station at the time, was on a tax-collecting tour in Pai District, in the company of a new military detachment as escort, who, in turn, had their own carriers and servants, recruited from the local Ngas population, especially from communities near Pankshin station. Lieut. Giles was the Officer Commanding the escort. Langkuk, the 'Sarkin Pankshin,' who, since 1912, had been appointed a fourth-class chief in charge of the so-called Hill Angass District, which included the Pai area, was also in the entourage. Apparently, two rank and file soldiers were anxious to get some fight in Pai. So they decided, as it were, to murder one of their servant-boys in cold blood -- part of whose job was driving along his master's goat besides carrying his other things. This occurred somewhere, in the neighbourhood of Tipap, with a view to giving the impression that Pai people had killed him, which would therefore require Pai to be militarily 'punished.' But their scheme failed in that some of the civilian members of the entourage, or carriers, had unsuspiciously spied on them, and reported the two murderer-soldiers, to Edgar.[133]

Maj. Edgar and Lt. Giles decided that the soldiers should be court-marshalled. The two soldiers were arrested. But when it came to the court marshal or trial, presided over by Maj. Edgar, other soldiers in the detachment protested to the extent that a mutiny nearly broke out. Maj. Edgar, Langkuk, carriers and servants, were all frightened, terror and danger stood before them as a military detachment, or so to speak. They seemed like potential victims of the dog-eat-dog syndrome, which colonialism had produced. Maj. Edgar had to release the two soldiers without any court-marshal before relative calm was regained.[134] Colonial native soldiers, like their white colonial 'masters' had now become so mentally 'possessed' if not obsessed, with the practice of fighting against indigenous peoples that they even

engaged in framing-up pretexts for war. In the present instance, even Lt. Giles, their commander, lost confidence in them. He later commented with reference to that detachment thus: "they would try any sort of trick to try and get up a fight with one of the pagan towns, thus trying to get the DO and myself to believe that the country was not friendly and that the inhabitants ofTipup [Tipap] had killed the boy..."[135]

The behaviour of those soldiers, however, was a logical consequence of the continued colonial tendency to terror and violence in Yil Ngas right from the inception of their social order. Colonial tours often seemed like marauding expeditions. Lives, servants, carriers, grain, cattle, sheep, goats and other forms of the loot, were often merely existing at their mercy, and taken as their birthright; taken merely as some fringe benefits available to the colonialist and the soldier. But the main objective of their tours in Yil Ngas, whatever reasons they might have given besides, was to foster tax assessments and collection. For the first time since 1906 when the colonialists first invaded the region, mention of 'poverty' in any part of Yil Ngas, as far as accessed records are concerned, was made in 1914 when Edgar reported that:

> I have now visited the remaining two towns in the Thal [Ntal, or Tal] District and all the towns and villages in the Pe [Pai] District. I have been received in a friendly manner everywhere, and supplies have been plentiful. The Pe [Pai] people are very poor.[136]

Yet, in spite of the people's state of poverty, it remains noteworthy that, during the tour, the colonial party, were furnished plentifully with supplies (flour, cows, goats, fowls, eggs, woodfuel, water, pots etc,) everywhere they went. (But two colonial-soldiers still desired to shed the blood of such a friendly population, when they sought in vain for a pretext of war, to further impoverish them! That was terrible.)

Having been willy-nilly subjected to the rapacious tentacles of the colonial tax economy for the upwards of a decade, none should be surprised if Pai people were found to be 'very poor.' Yet in their poverty, they were 'everywhere' friendly or loyal.

Even in the eastern part of Yil Ngas, that is, in the so-called Plain Angas District, which in 1913, two years after Foulkes' exit from Yil Ngas in 1911, was removed from the "independent" districts list and placed in the Bauchi Division, that is, under the Bauchi's emirate native authority. Our second example of unappreciated loyalty comes from there, where though ample observance of law and order characterised the area during the second decade of the twentieth century, the plight of the encompassed communities was worsened by the increasing tax incidence. The staves of office hitherto given to three of their leading chiefs in 1908, including Wutar of Pu'el (Dawaki), Longshin of Kabwir and Wutar of Per (Amper), proved to be symbols of greater entrapment than relief, since none could stop or resist the increasing tax charges up to the end of the period under review in this chapter. Adult males and females alike were all included in the payment of colonial taxes. Reporting in 1914, about taxation in Plain Angas District, H. S. W. Edwardes, District Officer of Bauchi Division, said that there was a tax increase of two shillings per adult male over what was charged in 1912. For an estimated population of about 18,457 taxpayers, the sum of £388.8 was charged. Taxes charged in 1914 were £163.19 and £78. 6 from Amper and Kabwir sub-districts areas respectively, covered a total area of forty-two villages altogether. The 1914-tax assessment also included (i) hoe tax, which ranged from one shilling three pence to one shilling six pence per hoe; (ii) livestock tax, which was one penny charged per goat and/or sheep; and (iii)

head tax, which was three pence per adult female. Unfortunately, Edwardes did not mention the total 1914-tax charged in Plain Angas District, after due collections were made.

In the same report, Edwardes disclosed that his 1915-proposed tax for the Plain Angas District totalled at £424.4, made up of the following items: (i) one shilling nine pence per adult male; (ii) eight pence per adult female; (iii) six pence per head; and (iv) six shillings seven pence per compound. These charges were predicated on the thinking that an average compound in Plain Angas contained 3.5 men, 5 women, 2.2 children, which gave a total average of 10.7 persons per compound. Likewise, Edwardes estimated that there were averages of 7.5 sheep, 3.6 goats, and 86.8 corn-bundles per compound, being that statistics collected from the forty-two villages of the district gave a total of 109,000 bundles harvested in 1914. He was also careful to observe that "the variations from the average are wide" between various compounds. Tax charge-rates between 1912, which was £383.8 and 1915, which was £424.4 in Plain Angas District, implies an increased difference of not less £40.6, or 10.58%, had been added to the 1912 total tax. It seems that the tax incidence in the district, kept on being increased relative to the increasing impoverishment of the people.[137]

Edwardes therefore 'kept increasing' their taxes despite their quiescent submission from the start to British colonialism, and his significant personal remarks on their location, terrain and observed standard of living (or of the standard of living of their neighbours).[138] At the same time, Edwardes maintained that: "Owing to the extremely broken and hilly nature" of Plain Angas District, "the country may be said to be impassable to pack animals and the result is that there is hardly any trade or

traffic and the people are extremely poor."[139] Like Edgar's remarks on the Pai sub-district of Hill Angas District, Edwardes' statement was the first mention of poverty in Plain Angas District. Thus since 1906, the evidence of social poverty in Yil Ngas began to rear its ugly head in 1914, especially in Plain Angas (and Dok Pai, its neighbour) where stern tax conditions seem to have been introduced at an early stage. One decade after Yil Ngas was subordinated to colonial pillage, continual exploitation through increasing taxation, confistication, forced labour, and the reign of terror, poverty manifested. However it should be noted that in both instances in which the existence of general or social poverty began to emerge, as was alleged, it was based, in each case, on the comparative knowledge of a neighbouring society in which better conditions obtained. Molyneux thought the Pai people were 'very poor' when compared to their Plain Angas neighbours, who seemed better off and, in the same year, Edwardes thought the Plain Angas people were 'extremely poor' when compared with their neighbours in Bauchi Division where colonially established markets already existed and trade was beginning to thrive. For Edwardes, because Plain Angas roads were not passable for pack animal transport, the people generally produced grain not more than "a contented minimum", the unfortunate location "of the district in a backwater amidst rocks" which deprived it "of the stirring influences of trade" and thus, they cared nothing for Manchester goods, which by and large were second-hand British clothes, and preferred their old clothes of leaves and leather, hence they were 'extremely poor,' as far as he was concerned. The antidote, which he prescribed, was to increase "facilities of acquiring wealth" which included colonially established markets and roads. In his words, when trade, which he called "the vivifying force," was "introduced by means of a road the district will ...

respond at once within two or three years ..."[140] Therefore, none should be surprised that Edwardes, who was a new comer to the Ngas scene, thought the Plain Angas people to be 'extremely poor.' To an extent, therefore, the Plain Angas and Pai communities were declared to be poor simply because they had not yet been hooked to the apron-strings of British colonial capitalist system which was spreading its tentacles all over Nigeria, through roads and markets. Edwardes thereafter, as it is further discussed in chapter four, established markets at Pu'el (Dawaki) and Amper and built a road from Amper to Bukuru in the Minesfield. But whatever Molyneux or Edwardes believed to be the people's observed state of material endowment or lack of it, they did not consider it a sufficient condition to keep their taxes low or at a steady figure or even reduced. Instead, Edwardes increased the taxes several times and still gave a hint of continuing to do so, especially after two or three years' time of the introduction of the "vivifying force" of trade by means of a road, when the Plain Ngas might be made to pay 50%more taxes.[141]

Therefore, while in areas where colonial domination and its accompanying imposition of taxes was challenged and resisted, the people concerned had to pay for their resistance through blood-letting and loss of property in addition to indemnitous colonial taxes, but where cheap loyalty was given to the colonialists, the people had to pay for their quiescent submission through heavily-imposed, increasing taxation and facing of frame-ups and blackmail. In either case, colonialism was the winning party. Yet some very observant colonialists were beginning to perceive the evidence of poverty, which, though they seemed oblivious to the fact that, the continued plunder of the Ngas or any other nation's resources, for the upwards of ten years, would eventually produce that. And the solutions they proffered were those of the

Lugardian manifesto for the governance of ethnic minorities, those that would later allow the colonialists charge higher taxes and not to allow the masses recover from the disruptive shock and plunder of the approximately ten years of the coming of colonial domination. What a paradox!

It is little wonder, therefore, that there were generally not less than ten uprisings in Yil Ngas between 1907 and 1917, averaging on one uprising per year. However, in three years of the emergence of the evidence of poverty in 1914, there were six recorded uprisings alone, when in 1915 and 1917 in particular, there were the Fi'er, Miyr ("Mirwa") and Kadung uprisings, and later, respectively, there were the Pai, Ntal and Gwabbi uprisings. Only the latter three, which occurred in 1917, for reasons of space, are examined below. The frictions and demonstrated acts of resistance that took place between 1907 and 1917 were in the latter years superseded in intensity and scale by three incidents of equal or greater magnitude. In a sense, the intervening developments were just like parts of a process, which was gathering momentum and reached its culmination in the later half of 1917, in reaction to which the colonialists again despatched forces of invasion to conquer the concerned polities. Let us look at these developments.

3.2.3 Third Invasion, 1917: The So-called Pai Patrol

Some two important instances of friction and aggression occurred in Yil Ngas in 1917, which had to do with tax-collection and the terror or violence that usually accompanied it. They both occurred in the second half of the year, within the span of three months from each other and in the adjacent territories of Pai and Ntal (Tal), respectively. Both uprisings were specifically concerned to crash the native tax collector, in the Hill Angass area, Langkuk, the aforementioned Ngolong of

Pang'chen (Pankshin), an ascendant fourth-class colonial chief whose role we shall attempt to highlight more clearly later. The first uprising occurred in Pai of all places in Yil Ngas: this time around, the friendly and loyal Pai people of 1914 were done with friendship with colonialism, and were up in arms against it.

John H. Molyneux, the ADO in-charge, at Pankshin Station, colonial headquarters of Hill Angas and the other sub-districts, like Sura and Baron in the 'Pagan' District or Belt, rendered an account, which summarizes it beautifully enough, whose parts we hereby extract and/or paraphrase in this and following paragraphs: Molyneux's predecessor, named Ryan, had submitted a report in 1916 concerning Pai sub-district, which showed a satisfactory situation and gave rise to hopes that "this extremely savage tribe [ethnic nationality] were gradually settling down."[142] Early in 1917, however, some representatives of Pai leaders reportedly went to see Molyneux at Pankshin station where he explained the fact that their tax in 1917 would be the same as in 1916, and they expressed their readiness to pay it.

In Molyneux's presence, however, Langkuk, the District Head of Hill Angas, reportedly dialogued with the visiting Pai leaders and though Molyneux did not understand what was discussed, he neither asked Langkuk nor did the latter bother to tell him later. In any case, Langkuk shortly thereafter "asked leave to go unescorted by the District Officer and police to collect tax" in Pai sub-district.[143] Apparently his discussion with the leaders who visited Pankshin had deceived Langkuk into thinking that he would be safe. Probably he was also yearning to assert his authority in Pai, devoid of any trappings of colonial assistance, which often belittled and made him look weak. Molyneux continued: "At first I demurred but on the second day as he told me that he and his people had made 'juju' with the Pai men and that he

considered it safe, I agreed to his going. It seemed a chance for the D. H. [District Head] to assert his authority at last in Pai without the backing of police and political officer."[144] Langkuk paid the visit in early June 1917. Near Dok, en route Kup, in spite of the initial and the last promise of the Chief Priest, made at the foot of the hill before Langkuk and entourage began the climb that there would be no attack, Langkuk soon discovered that he had walked into a trap.[145]

The Chief Priest of Kup, according to Molyneux, had secretly organized the blocking of the road up the steep escarpment of approximately 3500 feet above adjacent Plain Angas surroundings. Langkuk and his entourage were attacked and seven of his men were killed while thirteen others were wounded.[146] On receiving the news, Molyneux sent to Bauchi for thirty-eight rank and file soldiers, whom, in colonial parlance, he called police, under the command of Major Price, and on 1st July 1917, he and the troops moved to Wokkos; on the 2nd, to Munok; on the 3rd, to Sh'wer (Shiwer) where they rested till 5th July 1917, when they moved to Pai and encamped at the foot of their hills. A delegation from Dok reportedly paid them a visit and exonerated Dok from any plans to fight the colonial army, but left no doubt regarding the intention of other Pai communities, such as Kup, Bil, Ban, Jok, Tipap and Iyang, to fight.[147] According to Molyneux:

> Near Kup a signal horn was blown and immediately we were attacked by a force, which Major Price and I estimated at some 500 men. The attack, accompanied by much shouting and blowing of war horns drumming, etc, was made in force on the front and flanks...[T]hey pushed two charges on our front with considerable determination.[148]

The terrain was very rocky and full of caves, according to Molyneux. In addition to its 'brokenness,' its covering vegetation enabled Pai bowmen to get to close quarters with the patrol force. A combined force of bowmen from the six

towns was allegedly pitched against the patrol force, which, in turn, was armed with guns. "They charged [at] the police [soldiers] in mass … as this section of Pai had … never experienced rifle fire. The action lasted for two hours and they drew off after suffering the loss of the Sarkin Wari [Chief Priest].., his son and the Madikin Kup."[149] Maj. Price reported to Molyneux that a conservative figure of twenty-three dead bodies, were found, on the side of Pai soldiers, and no casualty on the patrol's side. Furthermore, Langkuk and Chief of Dok, later reportedly supplied names of those killed, including the Chief Priest and his son's, to Maj. Price.[150]

Pai polities had gradually been incorporated into the colonial economy through the imposition and collection of taxes, but had not been subdued in a military sense, yet. Hence, there is no located account of the invasion of Pai on record in the course of the invasions of Yil Ngas during the first decade of the twentieth century, though Molyneux, as cited earlier, seems to infer that Dok had 'tasted' gunfire before, which we doubt.[151] But as suggested above, Pai polities had started to pay taxes to the colonialists since the said first decade. Foulkes mentioned them in his 1907-anthropological notes.[152] The so-called 'extremely savage Pai tribe,' as Molyneux called them, had designed to be paying tax to the colonialists until 1917, when they decided to throw off the yoke. As a result, they came for the first time into direct military confrontation with the forces of colonialism. In this encounter however, (after invaders like the Howards and the Foulkes of this world had left the Yil Ngas scene) which occurred one decade after the conquest of the majority of the polities in Yil Ngas, John Molyneux still employed the same methods that were used then, in dealing with this latter-day enemies of the colonial order. Kup was 'broken' the very next day after the battle! Molyneux himself reported that

on 7th July 1917: "parties of [soldier] police and labourers were sent into the houses near [our] camp to find food and cooking pots. They were attacked. Seven dead bodies [of Pai fighters] were again seen and checked by Major Price and I then decided to destroy the town."[153]

The breaking of the town took three days and was completed on 10th July 1917. Grain granaries hidden in corn bins hidden in the walls of huts were discovered and 'real damage' was inflicted, according to Molyneux. Pai people's homes and stores were, therefore, destroyed in addition to the lives already lost. But still, according to that colonial butcher, Molyneux, "a serious loss does not entail starvation."[154] It often does! Not all the grain found in Kup was destroyed, however. Apart from what was reserved for feeding of troops, some of the captured grain and livestock were sold in lieu of the tax, which Kup people should have paid.[155]

Thereafter, a tour of various Pai communities was made in order to collect taxes. For promptly paying their taxes to Molyneux, he could not consider Tipap, Rong, Jok, Bwer, Iyong and Lassum, to be 'extremely savage.' He maintained furthermore, that because they " showed a considerable alacrity in collecting and bringing in tax. It was necessary to make a wide difference between our friends and our enemies,"[156] hence they for the reason stated they bagged colonial classification as friends! The unfortunate mentality of colonial conquerors like Molyneux was the likening of African resistance and patriotism to savagery and African submission and loyalty to civilisation. In the bid to civilise his enemies, on Molyneux's return to Pankshin station, he reported that the Chief of Kup and his surviving elders had gone into Pankshin 'to see the Station and to broaden their outlook,' which, by force or

fiat, he must have arranged. In any case, the conquest of Kup signified the fall of the Pai polities to the yoke of colonial domination.

The attitudes, which characterised Yil Ngas polities invaded during the first decade, to an extent, were also exhibited by the polities, which were patrolled in the second decade of the twentieth century. In far away Chip sub-district of Hill Angas, a spirit of deep loyalty allegedly gingered the Chip people to send a delegation to Pai to congratulate Molyneux and the patrol force for a job done well.[157] However, in the nearby Hill Yergam sub-district, an opposite tendency appeared to be the case. Molyneux apparently reflected well on the mood of the times when he maintained that: "All those border tribes [including Pai, Hill Tarok, Tel, Ntal and the others] are extremely restless owing to renewed rumours of government leaving the country. But I am able to state definitely that the action taken was just in time to prevent a Yergam [Tarok] rising"[158]

In a nutshell, Pai was conquered and plundered. Besides the lives, tax, food, and livestock, which were surrendered or lost to the invading patrol force, the security organs of Pai were ravished. ; Chip was earmarked, in this instance, as a loyal polity. A delegation from there was allegedly sent to Molyneux simply to salute him over the defeat of Kup. Dok, a Pai polity, was also loyal; they did not only fail to identify with the patriotic Pai communities but served as informants and collaborators with the colonialists, against them. As a result, while Dok was left unscathed, Kup was broken and its stores ransacked or pillaged; its citizens rendered homeless in the middle of the wet-season. The colonially orchestrated reign of terror, in the demand for tax-revenue brought in its wake more hardship for Pai people.

Their casualty figure of thirty dead, from every indication was an understatement, talkless of the wounded, records of which were not compiled.[159]

3.2.4 **Fourth Invasion, 1917-1918: The So-called Pankshin -Tal Patrol**

The second instance of a big conflict, which resulted from the concern of some communities to resist the imposition of colonial domination, especially where this involved the payment of taxes also occurred in 1917 as already stated; staged by the communities of and in Ntal (Tal) sub-district area. The reaction was also geared towards the destruction of the local tax collector, or Chief of Pankshin, Langkuk, who for about five years was appointed as the fourth-class District Head of what was called either Hill Angas or 'Pankshin District.' The year 1917 was terrible for Langkuk. After surviving the fatal attack made on him and his followers in June at Pai, he was once again attacked with the same motive: to kill him. Ntal (Tal) soldiers, now successfully, prosecuted that desire in September 1917, three months later.

F. G. Heathcote, who was the ADO in-charge of Pankshin District at the time, forwarded a report to the colonial government which began with these words: "On September 24th 1917, Lankuk, District Headman ... a Fourth Class chief appointed by the Government left Pankshin to proceed to Chip in order to investigate into the death of a Hausa Trader. ..."[160] Heathcote made no further reference on the case of the Hausa trader's alleged death in Chip. He, however, maintained that on 25th September 1917, Langkuk proceeded from Chip to Ntal (Tal) with an entourage of about fifty-two or so persons, including women and carriers. They put up in Kwabzak's palace, Kwabzak being the capital, as guests of Mutkai ("Mudge"), the

central Ngolong of Ntal (Tal) polity. It seems no one knows for sure today why Langkuk decided to go into Ntal (Tal) without prior permission from the ADO or the usual 'police' escort, who, actually, were soldiers stationed on guard at Pankshin. Charles Gonyok has put forward the view that while in Chip, Langkuk learnt of the Naanshang Festival holden in Ntal (Tal), and being such a big celebration, he went into Ntal (Tal) hoping to be honoured as Chief of the entire Hill Angas District. There, Langkuk met his nemesis.[161] Heathcote, before Gonyok, put forward the following view:

> It would appear that Lankuk went there to explain to the people of Tal that there was an opportunity for them to earn cash by now going to the mine at Mangu and carrying tin to Bukuru and so, later, avoid selling their livestock in order to get cash required to pay their annual tribute.[162]

To the gradually being 'colonised' Ntal (Tal) people, the visit must have been generally offensive. Whether it was the reasons put forward by Heathcote, or Gonyok, or the combination of the two, that actually motivated Langkuk to go into Ntal (Tal), the fact remains that the visit by and large increased, or purported to increase, the scope of colonial subordination, oppression, and exploitation of Ntal (Tal) people. The people, therefore, decided to resist this new wave or dimension of colonial domination. Heathcote was not too surprised with what occurred in Ntal (Tal) because:

> ...The pagan tribes [non-Muslim peoples] in this vicinity [the Pai, 'Hill' Tarok, Tel, Piapung, Ntal, etc.] have been disturbed for some time past; probably on account of the absence of an adequate armed force. The murder of... Maltby [a colonial officer] in July 1916 occurred not far from the village of Rong in Pe [Pai]; while Lankuk himself was attacked near Dok in the same district in June [1917]... when he barely escaped with his life....[163]

In the wee hours of 26th September 1917, Ntal (Tal) warriors, who, as alleged, in the night of 25th September, had gathered in the standing homestead corn and surrounded the Kwabzak palace, attacked the palace and murdered Langkuk and all his fifty-two or so followers, when he was just about to set off for Chip. It is generally reported that the Ntal (Tal) warriors ate the massacred victims' meat. According to Gonyok, this could be understood in light of the fact that during any Naanshang Festival, the Ntal (Tal) people usually caught strangers and offered them as sacrifice to their deities and ancestral spirits. Hence, the meat was eaten ritualistically, rather than as a mere delicacy.[164]

What to the Ntal (Tal) people was a patriotic uprising was nothing but an 'outrage' to Heathcote, who, nevertheless, captured the mood of the warriors, whom he called 'offenders,' when he maintained that their aim was "to stop payment of tribute and refuse admittance to anyone coming on government business and they were apparently confident that they could destroy, by ambushing in the Tal [Ntal] crops, any force sent against them."[165] Sequel to the massacre in Ntal (Tal), therefore, a patrol force tagged the 'Pankshin-Tal Military Patrol,' simply rendered as 'Tal Patrol', was despatched from Bauchi to go and bring the 'culprits' to book. The patrol force consisted of Lieut. F. H. Bush as Officer Commanding; two subalterns; a British non-commissioned officer; a medical officer, Dr. McLeod, later on 7th December 1917 relieved by Dr. Wood; two machine guns; and one hundred and two (102) rank and file soldiers; which arrived Pankshin on 17th October 1917. In the company of Heathcote, who took seven Pankshin-based soldiers as personal bodyguard, the patrol force left Pankshin on 19th October via Pang (Ampang-East) and arrived Gar'm (Garram) the following day. While in Gar'm (Garram), according

to Heathcote, they "learnt that the people of Tal had removed their non-combatants, supplies and all property from their villages. A messenger sent to Kwabzak to try and bring about a peaceful settlement and handing over of the real instigators of the crime [the uprising] for trial failed to obtain a hearing."[166]

Therefore the colonial force prepared to attack the Ntal (Tal) country, whose forces were apparently prepared for the defence. Before proceeding to Kwabzak, headquarters of Ntal (Tal) sub-district, the patrol force blocked the boundary area between Ntal (Tal) and Pai, lying to the north-east:

> As the attitude of the neighbouring tribes, Pe [Pai] and Hill Yergam [Tarok] was uncertain, a detachment consisting of an officer and thirty R & F [rank and file soldiers] proceeded to take up a position on the Tal-Pe border for the purpose of preventing Pe [Pai] joining forces with Tal [Ntal], an event that would greatly augment the work of the patrol, and at the same time prevent the people of Tal [Ntal] taking refuge in Pe [Pai].[167]

The bigger part of the patrol force occupied Kwabzak on 21st October 1017, but found something of a ghost town; it was deserted. According to Heathcote, efforts were made through some Ntal (Tal) men found not far away from Kwabzak, to get through to their leaders and request the surrender of the 'chief offenders' said to be Rambok and Bokun, in order to forestall any fighting, but to no avail. On 22nd October 1917, Heathcote gave the orders and the standing corn in Kwabzak, especially surrounding the palace and houses of the alleged leaders of the uprising, was cut down and their houses destroyed. To the chagrin of the colonialists, they soon discovered, as hitherto speculated, that "all property had been removed from these houses, the damage done was inconsiderable..." as the colonialists thought.[168] Burning down somebody's shelter, which is one of the basic needs of man, could not

by any criterion have been inconsiderable damage. In itself, the act could only have increased the animosity of Ntal (Tal) people towards the colonial patrol force.

It is funny that Heathcote partially 'justified' his corn cutting-down business in Kwabzak by assuming that all corn was going to utilised in the production of beer, by which according to him, the Ntal (Tal) people used to be 'very intoxicated.' Most of it was used in the making of non-intoxicating foods and drinks, as far as we know. Due to his untenable assumption, however, he gave evidence suggestive of the fact that the Naanshang Festival was being held when Langkuk visited and unfortunately met his nemesis in Ntal (Tal), but exaggerated the period during which the people remained drunk: "It is stated that at the time of Lankuk's arrival at Kwabzak the first brew from the new crops had just been made and that the majority of the population were drunk from the time of the outrage [uprising] up to the arrival of the patrol."[169] The majority of the people could not have been drunk between 25th September and 21st October 1917, that is, for the upwards of one month! Were they that perpetually drunk, how could they have taken necessary precautionary measures, which enhanced their defence? They could not have been as prepared as the patrol found them to be, if unbriddled drunkenness was their preoccupation. However, it is permissible and possible that the celebration of their victory over Langkuk, whom many hitherto deemed to be mystically indestructible,[170] must have lingered beyond the normal period of the Naanshang Festival.

In the afternoon of 22nd October 1917, Heathcote with bodyguard left the patrol force at Kwabzak and proceeded on the tour of other villages of Ntal (Tal) with a view to assessing their attitude, whether friendly or unfriendly, towards the colonial regime. Kyam was deserted, just like Kwabzak had been; a ghost town.

Between Vong'rong ("Vonron") and Kwag'lak, Heathcote and bodyguard were attacked, to which they reportedly replied with four rounds of gunfire. While others allegedly escaped, one Ntal (Tal) man was found dead. After Heathcote's embarkation on tour, Lt. Bush of the patrol, also with bodyguard, left Kwabzak on a separate tour, on the same day. He went to Hamtul ("Amtoul"), where a Hausa trader was reportedly murdered during the time of the killing of Langkuk, that is, during the Naanshang Festival of 1917. Hamtul forces gave them a hostile reception; they were 'heavily attacked.' They replied in the same manner with gunfire. Some fourteen Ntal (Tal) warriors were allegedly found dead.[171]

Meanwhile, Fod'gwim, said to be a son of the celebrated Rambok, leader of the September uprising, reportedly deflected to the side of the colonialists, on the same day: 22nd October 1917. According to Heathcote, Fod'gwim immediately assumed the role of a guide to the colonial army but at the same time thought that he could persuade some members of his family to join him, and, if possible, some other Ntal (Tal) people to do likewise. As Heathcote put it, he 'went, out of his own accord, to get in touch with the people of Tal [Ntal].' He almost lost his life in the process:

> On the morning of October 23rd [1917], ... Fodgwim, was observed being chased over a hill to the south of the camp. His pursuers were driven off, three pagans [Ntal soldiers] being killed. Fodgwim reported that while endeavouring to bring his family into camp, he was attacked by men of Amtoul [Hamtul] and Buzzniong [Bas'nong] who knew that he had come out from the patrol....[172]

At that point, according to Heathcote, it became clear to himself and the patrol force that 'no peaceful settlement could be arrived at.' Therefore Heathcote gave the orders and the soldiers combed the surrounding country-neighbourhoods of Ntal (Tal) villages or towns with a view to 'destroy war camps.' Each village-vicinity was visited in turn. At those villages 'found to be implicated in the outrage [the

September uprising],' according to Heathcote, "the houses and 'beer' crops [meaning sorghum and millet!] of the chief men"[173] were destroyed, that is to say, the houses were burnt and broken and their homestead crops, cut down.

Meanwhile surreptitious fighting was still going on. As it was observed with regards to the 'conquest' of Pai three months before, Tal patrol's operations were the actual conquering invasion that took Ntal (Tal) in 1917; before then, Yil Ntal or Ntal country had not confronted a fire-armed force. In other words, like their Pai neighbours, Ntal people had started to pay annual taxes to the colonialists since the first decade, but had not come into open confrontation or contact with a colonial invasion force as they experienced in 1917. And whereas Ntal (Tal) people had registered their disgust with colonial taxation, and with Langkuk (who, to Ntal people was probably its very personification!) whom they assassinated, and were perhaps glad to have done so successfully through a concerted uprising, they did not use the same strategy when the colonial patrol force arrived. With the memory of the activities of the so-called 'Pai Patrol' still fresh in their minds, they did not put up a combined or concerted resistance against the colonial army, as they did overnight and massacred Langkuk and his entourage at dawn. Instead they resorted to fragmentary efforts, reclining on mountain fastnesses and in bushes,[174] epitomizing a change of strategy between their attack during the September uprising and their defence during the October invasion, under review.

On the side of the invading colonial army, Heathcote received a report from Lt. Bush, which he forwarded to Bauchi, on 24th October 1917, that two Ntal (Tal) soldiers were killed near Hamtul (Amtoul). On the next day, seven more Ntal (Tal) soldiers were killed near Bas'nong (Buzzniong). In both cases of battle with the

Hamtul and Bas'nong forces, the latter were reported to have first attacked the invading colonial army. No casualties were reported on the side of the colonial army, armed with guns.[175] At Bas'nong, Heathcote further reported that a certain property belonging to Langkuk was found and that the subsequent searching of houses at other villages actually produced a large amount of articles belonging to either Langkuk himself or members of his entourage. Such articles found or recovered were handed over to relatives[176] of the murdered men who had followed the colonial army from Pankshin, being fully confident in the capacity of the said army to protect them. As the colonial army defeated the Ntal (Tal) forces at one place after the other, and searched their towns and villages, according to Heathcote, "great numbers of human skulls were found, all marked with sacrificial signs and many in a state denoting but recent death."[177]

If 'great' at all should be the word, the great numbers of skulls suggests that there were more skulls which happened to have been found than the fifty three or so, who were recently killed were entitled to. The evidence indicated an entrenched practice. Skulls of the fifty-three or so, killed in about one month before the commencement of the colonial invasion under reference, must have been part, to use Heathcote's expression again, of the 'many skulls' which 'denoted but recent death.' In other words either before, during, or after the notorious September night, which witnessed the infamous murder of Langkuk and entourage, other victims had faced the same fate. However, Ntal (Tal) cannibalism was explainable, though not excusable, only on the bedrock of the ritual practice of human sacrifice that constituted a pillar of their indigenous or primal religion, especially during the Naanshang celebrations, as earlier maintained. As the colonial army traversed Ntal

(Tal) land, according to Heathcote, they made discoveries of portions of cooked human flesh, usually kept in cave-based ritual or fetish altars in their wooded shrines. Thus, as their skulls were ritually marked with sacrificial signs and preserved, as trophies, probably, in tribute to Naan, the flesh of the victims were also ritually cooked and eaten, as it were, in the same spirit. But in the present instance of facing a colonial invasion, it seems like it was now the turn of Ntal (Tal) people to die.

The Ntal (Tal) people incurred several casualties, as the colonial patrol visited one community after another, apart from the earlier-mentioned two or seven men killed in Hamtul (Amtoul) and Bas'nong (Buzzniong) respectively on 24th and 25th October 1917. On 26th October, two more soldiers were killed in Kyam by a section of the patrol force led by Heathcote himself, another section of the patrol led by Bush, while eleven Ntal (Tal) soldiers were killed near Puzzuk by a detachment from the far southern (or Muri) border, to cooperate with the bigger patrol from Bauchi, which today would be the Mikang border. On 27th October 1917, Heathcote ordered that all the standing corn on farms along the Gar'm (Garram) – Kwabzak road, having been used by some Ntal (Tal) soldiers as a cover to attack certain civillian travellers, be cut and it was razed down completely by the patrol force.[178] On 28th and 29th October 1917, some eleven and three Ntal (Tal) soldiers respectively, were reportedly killed in Mh'dong (Medong). Then on 31st October, another eight were reportedly killed near D'kep. On 2nd November 1917, at the expense of twenty rounds of gunfire, six more, were reportedly killed in Mh'dong (Medong).

Meanwhile, on 31 October 1917, Heathcote had received a message from Colonel (formerly Capt.) Foulkes, now serving in Muri Province, that Bokun, said to be one of the ringleaders of the September uprising, was arrested in Tulu valley of Tel (Montol) land, in the present-day Mikang LGA. On the Ntal side of the border, Heathcote kept making efforts to arrest Rambok, the other alleged ringleader, who still had a large following. Up to 6th November 1917, Rambok remained invincible. But, according to Heathcote, who was already frustrated after several errands despatched, on 8th November 1917, some Ntal (Tal) men led Rambok in, who surrendered to him, at exactly 12.45 pm. Heathcote then asked, as he claimed, the OC patrol, "to cease all movements of troops."[179] The war was over! Other Ntal (Tal) leaders soon realized they could walk in and out of the patrol's camp, unarrested. Several Ntal (Tal) groups went and registered their submission to the colonial regime, according to Heathcote.

On 15th November 1917, in company of an Officer and an escort, Heathcote left for Pai, according to him, to give the Ntal (Tal) 'a better chance to settle down' before his returning to interrogate their leaders. Heathcote toured all Pai and Hill Tarok ("Yergam") communities, while the bigger part of the patrol force waited for him, battle-ready, at Kup and he "failed to find any evidence that assistance had been given to the people of Tal [Ntal]," by any person or group of persons, during their war of defence or resistance against the patrol force.[180] On 26th November 1917, Heathcote together with the party, which had gone with him on tour to Pai and Hill Tarok, returned to Ntal (Tal), while he sent the bigger part of the patrol force to Gar'm (Garram) to wait there, in case of any surprise or attack in Ntal and, also, the absence of the bigger force would make it easier for him to meet with the Ntal (Tal)

leaders and people. Heathcote met with the leaders who, **in absentia**, deposed Mut'kai (Mudge), the Ngolong of Ntal (Tal), Rambok's younger brother and 'elected' Fodgwim, Rambok's son, as their new leader or over-all chief.[181] This was the same Fodgwim who acted as a guide and informant to the colonialists during the war. Couldn't he have been imposed? It is very likely that Heathcote, by way of rewarding a loyalist and collaborator, imposed him on the people, but for administrative propriety's sake, reported that the leaders present elected Fodgwim to be their new leader.

Meanwhile, Mut'kai (Mudge) had gone on self-exile to Piapung, three days after the assassination of Langkuk, and had not returned home ever since; so the disappointment of the people with him could be understood. Rambok his elder brother, who remained with the people, naturally became their interim leader or rallying point, up to the last day of the war. 0n 2nd December 1917, Heathcote left Kwabzak for Puzzuk and Chip and on the following day, the bigger part of the patrol force followed in his trail from Gar'm (Garram), purposely 'to show the whole force to the people,' by whom, he meant the Ntal-Puzzuk, Chip, Mupun and western or Pankshin-Ngas peoples, through whose lands the patrol force returned to Pankshin.

Of all the colonial wars of invasion in Yil Ngas, that of Ntal, which started in October and ended in November 1917, took the longest period of time: one and a half months. It probably took the largest number of lives likewise: the over-all casualty figure of above seventy dead, arrived at through adding the various stated figures in Heathcote's reports, is certainly very conservative. Heathcote could not after all ascertain the casualties in some encounters between Ntal soldiers and the colonial patrol force. Besides, mention was not made of the wounded fighters on the

side of Ntal except on the side of the colonialists, which were very few. Many Ntal people seemed to have been tortured and wounded, but, since a wounded enemy was still an enemy, this hardly came to Heathcote's notice. At any rate, he was at a great disadvantage to attempt to ascertain the numbers of the Ntal wounded, since, for days, the latter would not let 'anyone' go near them. Houses were destroyed; standing crops, cut-down. 'Temples' or shrines, ravished. Livestock, plundered. Belongings were confiscated, often on the claim that they belonged to the deceased Langkuk or his late followers. The latter position cannot be gainsaid, either. Terror loomed on the horizons of Ntal (Tal) land. The alien, the 'unconcerned' traveller and trader, and the ordinary messenger, were often vulnerable; even a fellow Ntal man who was believed to be a traitor, could easily be killed. Probably not less than five hundred Nigerian lives, including Langkuk and entourage, were lost and wounded within the over-all time span of about two months, in Ntal sub-district![182]

Again, the colonialists were a bit at bay, with the typical topography and terrain of Yil Ngas, especially in the Ntal (Tal) and neighbouring areas. Unfortunately, the patrol force went to Ntal at the end of the wet season, certainly not a good time to make war in such a locality. Heathcote's descriptions of the physical landscape and landforms of Ntal (Tal) in relation to those of Pai, Tel, Tarok and Chip seem insightful:

> The districts of Tal [Ntal], Pe [Pai] and Hill Yergam [Hill Tarok] form a group of Mountains rising out of the Muri plain [the Benue Valley] but cut off from the Hill Angas mountains [the south-eastern escarpment of the Jos Plateau] firstly by the valley that runs from Garam [Gar'm] in a south- westerly direction by Puzzuk in the Muri plain [the Benue valley]; and secondly by the low ground lying south and east of Garam [Gar'm].... Though a hilly country, Tal [Ntal] is more open and less difficult than Pe [Pai] but at this time of the year was covered in tall crops.

> Pe [Pai] is separated from Tal [Ntal] by an uninhabited plain, covered in low 'bush' rising gradually from Garam [Gar'm] southwards and then falling rapidly into the Muri plain [the Benue valley] by way of Tulu valley [in Tel land] . .... The town of Chip is situated in an eastern offshoot of the Lankan Valley...[183]

That group of mountains rising out of the Benue valley, a part of which Ntal, Pai and Hill Tarok areas constituted, is sometimes called the Murchison Range in colonial literature. Furthermore, Heathcote also specifically described the relief, vegetation, fertility and extent of cultivation of the land area of Ntal (Tal) thus:

> In Tal [Ntal], near Medong [Mh'dong], the land rises to a height of over four thousand feet. The valley running west of Kwaglak into the Muri plain [the Benue valley] divides the district into two well-defined areas with steep ascents on each side; but on the western side of the district the mountains slope more gradually. The whole is intersected in all directions by fertile valleys and is fairly well wooded. All the available area is under cultivation.[184]

But the patrol force destroyed much of what was cultivated and was due for harvest, making nonsense of all the labour and other resources already utilized or invested on the farms. Heathcote also attempted to describe the ethnic-variation and/or-mapping that characterized Ntal land and neighbouring territories, thus: "The peoples of Chip and Garam [Gar'm] are racially allied to Tal [Ntal] and are Angas in origin. Pe [Pai] are a mixture of Angas and Yergam [Tarok]."[185] Different forms and levels of integroup relations, whether ethnic, socio-marital, political, economic or commercial relations, had been dynamically existing between people-groups and/or polities of any locality in and around Yil Ngas since pre-colonial times. Thus, Heathcote was able, to an extent, to bring out some of the past and prevalent ethno-evolutionary processes, which linked various peoples together in an ecocline.[186] What is also of interest here is the fact that it was some these fairly unique groups and polities situated along what we have called here, the ecoclines -- especially those

lying in the south and south-west such as the Hill Tarok, Pai, and Ntal peoples, and north and north-west, such as the Fi'er, Kadung, Miyr, and Gwabbi peoples -- of Yil Ngas, which were still lifting high the banner of resistance, often by means of 'violent struggle,' during the second half of the second decade, under review. Elsewhere in Yil Ngas the colonialists seemed to have gained a more 'permanent' foothold and control. Why some of the said groups were still carrying their arms to resist colonial domination in the latter part of the second decade is explainable on the basis of how, in the first place, they were incorporated into the colonial social order. As maintained earlier, they were incorporated through the process of indirect subordination, a roughshod form of indirect rule, or subordination through the backdoor: through imposition of heavy taxation, where none existed before. When they began to feel the ravaging pangs of the increasing tax incidence since the first decade, added to which were the exploitative tendencies of the Ngas-aristocratic face of colonial domination at the time, represented by Langkuk, in the Hill Angass District, they began to champion the cause of resistance. Hence, Oliver Howard's decade-old principle of dealing with the more troublesome polities as a way of giving the supposedly submissive or loyal ones a clue on the strength of the colonial government to deal with any opposition, worked in some cases, but, in other cases, it worked only for a while or failed. Unfortunately, Howard himself died almost a decade before the Ntal rising or conquest.[187]

When the friendly and submissive polities were fed up with colonial taxation, nothing else could prevent them from rising in protest. They often waited anxiously to hear of the expected departure of the colonialists, and often acted, even when it was just a rumour.[188] For the avoidance of doubt, they had often seen but little of the

colonialists: military expeditions and patrols which had visited these places – Pai, Ntal, Gwabbi, etc – before the middle of the second decade of the twentieth century, were few if not nil on the scale. Lack of colonial personnel, appears to have partially negated coverage of the whole ground during tours, on the one hand and Yil Ngas' ecoclies' relatively more altitudinuous terrain, or distance from colonial centers like Pankshin Station, on the other, might have another factor. After more than ten years since Capt. Foulkes declared the supposedly completed colonial occupation of Yil Ngas, multiple uprisings (which, to the colonialists, were outrages) occurred, which required more than a mere show-of-force or escort, to contain. As it turned out, even the showing of the whole force to the people, referring to inhabitants of Chip and Langkang sub-district areas in the south-western and western ecoclines, in December 1917, on the return trip of the Pankshin –Tal patrol force, did not have the desired effect. Ugly incidents occurred on the way and gunfire was frequently resorted to; lives were lost in the process.[189]

However, the ostensible cause of the last, major, occurrence of armed conflict between the colonialists and their Ngas 'subjects' during the second decade of the twentieth century, was the problem of clearing the road from the 'Pankshin Station,' for the simple marching pleasure of the over one hundred and seven (107) man-strong Pankshin -Tal Patrol, on their return from Bijim land, which was in Lere District at the time, and lay to the north-west of Yil Ngas, where hithereto the patrol had gone from Pankshin to carry out some operations. At least, the refusal of a community of Gwabbi polity, to clear their apportioned part of the road was the immediate, or apparent, cause of the conflict. But the remote cause of the incident was nothing but taxation, though the colonialists, represented, on the spot, by

Heathcote and Lt. F. Henry Bush, underscored and treated this as a secondary cause.[190] In their collective decision, the Gwabbi as well as Nyel'ng people, had resolved neither to take orders from the colonialists nor to pay their 1918 tax, whatever the resultant consequences might be.[191] Theirs was an honest and naked resolve to 'take the bull by the horns', or to take their arms and resist colonialism. A resolve similar to that of Yil'bs'sa of Bal'ng Ka'leyb, taken about ten years earlier

It happened that Heathcote had given an order on 10th December 1917, that all the villages along the main roads to and from Pankshin Station should clear apportioned sections of such roads in their vicinities. A Gwabbi village along the road to Bijmland however refused to clear their portion, in line with their resolve. Heathcote visited them to know why, and he later narrated it that:

> On the 14th December [1917] I visited the hamlets on the lower slope of Gwabbi Hill, whereupon the inhabitants retired up the hill and refused to come down. I took into custody [as detainees] two Gwabbi men who stated that the men of Gwabbi had all agreed together to refuse to clear their road or to pay their tribute in 1918.[192]

Heathcote's abduction of two men immediately provoked Gwabbi men to stage a militant protest, two days later when with the detainees in custody he was passing by or returning to Pankshin, during which an armed mob of about one hundred and fifty men 'beat off the guard and rescued the two prisoners' and retired up the Gwabbi hill, according to Heathcote. As claimed, Heathcote attempted with his bodyguard, to follow them up the hill with the aim of recovering the detainees and possibly settling the matter without the use of force, but were fired at, and so they had to stop. He further claimed that he sought to get in touch, through using messengers from a neighbouring village, with people of the concerned Gwabbi community but all without success. So, in frustration and in his own words: "Not having sufficient

force to deal with the matter at the time, I left."[193] Heathcote left, leaving to fight another day. He had already resolved to shortly visit Gwabbi with a colonial army 'to deal with matter.' He must have thought to himself that it was just a matter of time; the 'Tal Patrol' would return from Bijimland, after all. And they returned on the eve of Christmas, that is, on 24th December 1917.

Heathcote later summarised the events accompanying the operations of the Pankshin-Tal Patrol in Gwabbi in a report, which he forwarded to the colonial government. The patrol force left in two directions on 4th January 1918 and got to Gwabbi on the following day. An Officer led a smaller part of the patrol or a detachment along Bal'ng (Ballang) hills, or on the eastern side. They were attacked on arrival, in which one soldier and a guide were wounded. The main body of the patrol force followed, on the western side, the main road to Bijim and waited at the foot of Gwabbi Hill, while Heathcote and bodyguard conducted a round of the compounds in the village, which had ignited the trouble, in the first place. According to Heathcote:

> I found the compounds ... deserted, I ascended and joined the Officer in charge of the detachment on the summit. An inspection of the houses there proved that the pagans meant to resist. Houses had not been lived in for a fortnight or more and all grain, property and non-combatants had been removed.[194]

Gwabbi people and soldiers, it seems, had taken refuge in caves near their compounds as a security strategy and/or for the timebeing. From time-to-time, arrows were shot at Heathcote and the detachment, from those caves. On the 6th and 7th January 1918, the colonial soldiers began to return the fire coming from Gwabbi soldiers, with bullets. According to Heathcote:

> the caves from which Gwabbi men were shooting, were when necessary fired into and then searched. The pagans retired further into

> the hill along innumerable cracks and crevasses. A [colonial] soldier was wounded on each of these days [6th and 7th January 1918][195]

On 8th January 1918, Gwabbi soldiers wounded one more colonial soldier but lost four or more on their own side, but only four dead bodies were later found by the colonial patrol. Grain was found in some caves and Heathcote claimed he removed only enough 'to pay the tribute required from Gwabbi for 1918' as he further claimed that other stores of grain, which were later found, were left untouched. Houses of chiefs were destroyed, most probably burnt and broken. On 9th January 1918, due to gunfire, eight more dead bodies of Gwabbi soldiers were found. On 10th January, Heathcote tried, as he claimed, to use a man of Bal'ng Ka'leyb ("Ilbissa") to summon Gwabbi leaders into submission but it failed, even though on 11th January, he succeeded in getting them into a ceasefire. According to Heathcote, on 12th January, in order to give Gwabbi people "time to consider their position, I left with an escort visiting Takkas, Vodni, Panyam and Fier, the remainder of the patrol going to Ilbissa [Bal'ng Ka'leyb]," to wait there, in case Gwabbi people resolved to resume their militant resistance, further maintaining that: "On the 16th of January, I learnt that Gwabbi elders were willing to meet me at Takkas, and on the next day [17th January] I proceeded there forthwith."[196]

Heathcote's interrogation of the elders of Gwabbi lasted for three days; a day at Takkas, and two days at Gwabbi itself. "They stated that they had all conspired together to refuse to clear the road or pay tribute and to resist the patrol, no one, not even the Headman [their ngolong], who died of wounds on the 18th of January [the first day of Heathcote's interrogation of Gwabbi], being accounted solely to blame."[197] Hence Heathcote could not take any ringleaders as prisoners of war, as that was the common practice, following other militant conflicts. But the loss of

lives on the part of Gwabbi was great, plus the stores of grain, which were removed.

But Gwabbi people still had to clear the road, their losses not withstanding.

Heathcote honestly reported after the whole ordeal that:

> The road was cleared at once. The pagans [Gwabbi elders] stated that their casualties were thirty-three killed or died of wounds, including the headman [the ngolong]. Undoubtedly several pagans [Gwabbi fighters] may have been killed in caves; others may have been severely wounded and fallen down among the rocks where their bodies were not seen.[198]

Lt. Bush, the OC Patrol, further explained, virtually with a tinge of exaggeration, that:

> Owing to the nature of the ground, huge rocks piled one over another with deep intervening spaces and hollows (forming caves) it was in most cases impossible to identify pagan casualties. Men were seen to fall but on searching vicinity no trace of blood was visible only blood on rocks.... The cracks between rocks were in cases hundreds of feet deep; it was in country of this nature that the hostilities occurred. A fall down these crevasses could not be anything but fatal.[199]

Such hyperbolical descriptions must have frightened Bush's military superiors a lot, who read his reports. But the same physically rocky and tantalizing terrain offered advantages to Gwabbi's defence. Heathcote appreciated this, as well as revealed what we may call, more aspects of the cave culture of Gwabbi people, though with no less tinge of exaggeration, thus:

> … on the precipitous eastern edge of a promontory of the Bauchi [i.e. Jos] Plateau, running in a northerly direction, from Pankshin and at a height of about a thousand feet above the Pankshin road, lies the main part [capital] of the village [polity] of Gwabbi. From the small plateau formed by this promontory rise hills composed of huge rocks piled one upon another, the interstices of which form caves, often of great size and depth, and innumerable underground galleries. Into these natural and often inaccessible defences that in many cases had been strengthened by additional breast-works of stone [as defence walls or farm terraces], the Gwabbi warriors retired. The deeper caves usually entered from above by means of a notched log by way of a ladder [a **shiyp-dyer**], probably formed the underground dwellings of the non-combatants and the storehouses of their grain and property.[200]

Whether or not Heathcote's probability as stated, holds any water, we may never know, until special research into the pre-colonial history of Gwabbi is done. With reference to their immediate past, however, Heathcote realised that they had, up till then, been independent, and narrated that: "The people of Gwabbi informed me that they had been visited some years ago by... Foulkes, ... since then they state that not even **Lankuk** had ascended their hill."[201] Foulkes left Yil Ngas on transfer to Muri Province in 1911, thus Gwabbi must have reverted to a position of live-and-let's-live with their neighbours and the colonial regime, until that January-1918 encounter, when the colonialists militarily invaded and overwhelmed them. Generally speaking, Heathcote disclosed that:

> The pagans in these mountains have given considerable trouble in the past; Mirwa [Miyr], Fier and Kadim [Kadung] that are marked as 'unsettled,' revolted in 1915. At the time of the present outbreak [uprising] a patrol was operating but a few miles north of Gwabbi and Bijim [in Lere District].[202]

Whatever 'considerable trouble' the so-called 'pagan' groups must have given to the colonialists, it must have been largely due to the problem that colonial taxation constituted to their well-being. The introduction of taxation was the chief cause of the troubles that kept confronting the colonialists. It provoked the devastation of lives, homes, and property, to great proportions; the plunder of stores, herds and flocks; the uprising of the peace-loving people; the perpetuation of a reign of terror; (the imposition of colonial chieftaincies;) and so on. Several of our informants have recalled very vividly the time when upon the sighting of a band of strange travellers, an individual had to either take cover or take to his heels; in fact the sight of a stranger in a white cloth alone was a bad omen.[203] This is reminiscent of the reign of terror that prevailed in the region right up to the end of the second decade. (No

wonder, then, this situation must have informed some of the warped and derogatory conceptions of the colonised 'pagans' in the view of colonial anthropologists). The bid to enforce the payment of taxes in the period under discussion left a negative impact on Yil Ngas in various ways. For one, it disrupted the process of material production, consumption and preservation depleting the land of its precious (plant, farm-yielded, animal, and, in a sense, human) resources. The practice as seen by the inhabitants of Yil Ngas, posed a threat to their well-being. None of the other provisions of the colonial package during the period under review provoked as much tension, destruction, deprivation, and blood-letting, as taxation did.

In addition to taxation, the colonial package still contained other provisions, which in their respective ways also placed a heavy premium on the resources of the Ngas producers during the period up to 1919; thereby increasing their yoke and subjection to the colonial order. Let us look at some of these changes, which the imposition of colonial domination on Yil Ngas brought in its wake.

3.3 Political Changes

In order to make it easy to foster the economic exploitation of Yil Ngas, especially in terms of taxation, during the period under review in this chapter, the colonialists needed more hands than they alone provided. As a result, they practically tried to make the rulers of the various polities subject to them, and thereafter utilised their labours in carrying out colonial missions, among which tax-collection was chief. They succeeded with some rulers, but not with all of them from the start; that was partially why they launched several military invasions against Yil Ngas as from 1906, in the first place. The incumbent indigenous rulers, or **ngolongmwa** of Yil Ngas, were in a matter of one year deprived of their sovereignty

(and substance of power), mostly by force, and turned into colonial chiefs.[204] They became part and parcel of the colonial machine, milking the Ngas economy. Their continued use of the title, 'Ngolong', on themselves, was a misnomer after the conversion, because the word 'Ngolong' does not quite correctly translate into the word 'chief.' From even the works of colonialists, like Foulkes, Ames, and Mathews, we see that 'ngolong' of the pre-colonial period, was an office approximating to 'kingship.'[205] In a sense then, kingships were overthrown or abolished depending on the situation, when colonial domination was imposed; chiefhoods were substituted or imposed. In the place of kingdoms and/or independent states, chieftaincies and/or vassal state-statuses were imposed or substituted.

The first chieftaincy stool to be imposed on the Ngas people was that of the Chiroma of Bauchi, Mamudu Hassan, emir's eldest son, and nominal 'fiefholder' of the 'Angass District,' as earlier maintained.[206] That is to say that before the Ngas were actually brought within the ambit of colonial domination, they had already been furnished with a 'chief,' based on what dubious informants told the British colonial authorities in Bauchi. The Chiroma accompanied the first expeditionary army in 1906 and remained in "Dawaki [Pu'el], an important and friendly Angass town [polity] for the next two or three months" to begin to see to his duties.[207] However, it was Foulkes' decision that if the inesteemable standing of Mamudu Hassan, the Chiroma, did change before the Ngas people, meaning that the Chiroma had failed to gain the confidence of the Ngas people, he would be replaced by the "Chief of Ampang [Ngolong of Pang]."[208] During the few months' interval between April and December 1906, the colonialists realised that the Chiroma was not even getting the allegiance of the polities hitherto alleged to have accepted the

overlordship of Bauchi, talkless of the formerly absolutely independent Ngas polities, therefore, by the end of that same year he was removed and blamed as being too young and weak.[209] As earlier maintained, the colonialists appointed Attahiru, the Ajiya (Ajia) of Bauchi Emirate and Sarki (in the sense of Fiefholder) of Lere, to replace him, in January 1907.[210]

At the same time, the colonialists planned that when Pang was 'thoroughly' brought under control, it " would be flattered at having its chief selected for the sub-headship" of the "Angass District," a kind of an on-the-spot chief, while Attahiru remained an absentee, nominal, superior chief. This, then, was the revised colonial thinking concerning the anticipated role of the Ngolong of Pang. But by January 1907, Pang was still intransigent to the demands and expectations of the colonialists, although a patrol force had just returned from pillaging and plundering her capital, Ku'wang and environs. Besides, Wak'yur (Foulkes's "Wagyur"), Ji'dm'ma's successor, was not an attractive fellow to Foulkes, to warrant instant anticipation of good results from Pang, as far as getting a candidate for the sub-headship of the Angas District from her, was concerned.[211] This new ngolong's name, 'Wak'yur,' by which he is remembered, doubtlessly was a kind that certain **dhs'kam'mwa** or palace-chiefs who, as kingship watchers or guardians, usually bestowed after the first few days in office of a new ngolong, suggestive and/or predictive of his potential or anticipated future leadership style. Hence, Wak'yur was not his proper name given at birth, but a royal name given after he had become king or chief. Being a political name, its political interpretation was as follows: it was better, that is '**wak**', to act the fool, that is, '**yur**', in dealing with the present circumstances, in which case, the colonialists and taxation were implied, that relative peace may

return, than to provoke further trouble. Thus Wak'yur's name captured the mood of the times in Pang, and signalled her readiness, reluctant readiness as it were, to submit to the colonial regime. However, it also seems that Foulkes still saw to it that the Chief of Pang was, he was later flattered with a classed or graded colonial staff of office to serve in the earlier stated capacity: as the Sub-District Head of Angas District.

A popular oral tradition from Pang suggests that Wak'yur, or a certain Ngolong, of Pang was given the first staff of office in Yil Ngas but due to his sheer disregard for carrying it whenever all the leading ngolongs were summoned to Bauchi, the same staff was later transferred to Langkuk, who, as alleged, had encouraged him not to make any capital of the staff whenever they went to see a colonialist, such as Foulkes, or trekked in company of other leading ngolongs to Bauchi together, to meet with the resident. Thus, the tradition implies that Langkuk cheated his Pang counterpart of the staff of office. It might not have been Wak'yur, who seemed to have fallen victim to what his royal name purported, because Howard removed him during a tour in March 1908 under the guise that he was an incompetent drunkard. But this was when he failed to have collected the tax due from Pang and remitted same to Attahiru, the Ajiya, in the first quarter of that year, which most other Ngas polities had done.[212] It is difficult now tell whether that failure was one of Wak'yur's pranks therefore deliberate, or it was true that he was really too incompetent to have collected the tax, or it was just an administrative error. Going by that report, it would seem that the infamous staff of office in question, though given in principle, must have been given, to use the colonialists' words, 'to flatter the Chief' of Pang either by the end of that first decade or

beginning of the second, especially between 1911 and 1912, before Langkuk later replaced him. If that was the case, the staff in question must have been given to Pangji,[213] Wakyur's successor, that is, given later than the fifth-class staves of office given to the Ngolongs of Pu'el, Kabwir and Per, which were approved in March 1908, but probably before the fourth-class staff given to Umoru, Attahiru's son, in 1911, whose area of jurisdiction was smaller than his father's, whom he more or less succeeded. Being in rank next to Attahiru, the over-all, albeit nominal chief of the whole Ngas country, Pangji's staff must have been more than a fifth-class staff, which was the kind earlier given to the three other chiefs, which automatically leaves us with two options: either a third or fourth-class staff of office, which, in any case was what Umoru, Attahiru's son, and Langkuk were later respectively given in 1911 and 1912, when the 1906 colonially-created 'Ngas Chiefdom,' as it were, though better known as Angas District, was splitted into two. If on the other hand, it was in 1912 that Langkuk through intrigue deprived him of the infamous staff of office, then that was after the split had been made. It seems that by the time of Capt. Foulkes' exit in 1911, however, Pang's disinteresting or unattractive attitude of just playing along, had been gauged by the colonialists for what it was worth: the Chief of Pang was not flattered after all. He was still adamantly resisting colonialism, as it were, in his heart and mind, which epitomized the failure of their flattering strategy. So, his account was better left, and it seems to have been neatly left, out of accessed colonial records.[214]

With Umoru Attahiru's appointment in 1911, the Plain Angas area, where his jurisdiction was restricted, was turned into a new and separate district or chiefdom, with Umoru continuing with the honorific title of 'Sarkin Angas,' which he had

inherited from his father, and retained until his exit, fourteen years after, albeit ruling over a smaller part of Yil Ngas. Unlike his father who only maintained a country residence in Pu'el (Dawaki), Umoru's appointment required him to go and stay permanently in Yil Ngas. Instead of staying in Pu'el (Dawaki), however, he made his headquarters and lived in Chikka of Per (Amper) town where he remained until 1925 when he was retired and pensioned off. Between 1906 and 1913, the Plain Angas District was under the sub-residency's office in Kanna (Kanam), then Wokkos and lastly in Pankshin, when, with the exit of the Resident,[215] Capt. Foulkes in 1911, George Ormsby had succeeded him. But Ormsby himself was withdrawn from Pankshin Station in 1913, the year in which the Plain Angas were transferred from Hill Division, and place under Bauchi Division and Emirate, when and where, in the colonial records, they got the appellation of 'Bauchi Angas,' and they were, of course, transferred together with Umoru Attahiru as their over-all chief until 1925 when he was retired and pensioned off and they were brought back, as it were, to what was now Pankshin Division. The area remained without another over-all chief, except that they had a Plain Angas Native Court council between 1926 and 1935, when smaller districts were created out of the old district structure.

In the Hill Angas area, Langkuk, the 'Chief of Pankshin,' was appointed a fourth-class chief or district-head in 1912.[216] As already maintained, his ambition outstripped the limits of the power at his disposal. Eventually, not the colonialists, but Ntal opponents murdered him on 26th September 1917 in Ntal (Tal), those who were strongly opposed to the colonial causes, which he championed. His title was either the 'Sarkin Pankshin' or 'Headman' of Hill Angas District, in the colonial records, throughout the period of his tenure. After his unfortunate death, or, as from

1918, there was no specifically appointed district-head, but, beginning from 1919, there was a Native Court council which always sat in Pankshin, whose president was the Chief of Pang, in whose absence the Chief of Pankshin usually acted for him, until 1936, when new and smaller districts were created out of the old district structure. Meanwhile, after Ormsby's exit in 1913, there was no colonial political officer to take care of the area, at Pankshin Station, on a permanent residential basis. The Officer Commanding the military detachment already stationed there, as was charged, carried out the routine duties of the office of the Resident or District Officer, as it later came to be known. Colonial political officers, who visited the 'Pankshin District' or 'Hill Angass' of Hill Division as DO's between 1913 and 1919, which include Messrs Ryan, Edgar, Molyneux, Heathcote, Carlyle, and Monk, mostly went there in the capacity of touring officers, especially during periods of tax assessment and collection or strife.[217]

The foregoing scenario, however, brings into relief not only the vital role of the OC in-charge of the soldiers in Pankshin, but, how badly the colonialists needed the services of Langkuk in Hill Angas District. However, Langkuk happened to have been appointed as chief over an area not yet fully conquered. That was perhaps why a military detachment was stationed at Pankshin in the first place to be of assistance, in maintaining colonial peace. To the people(s) who were yet to be really conquered by the colonialists, Langkuk was nothing but a facsimile of the colonialists, and as a result several attempts were made to eliminate him, until he was finally killed in Ntal, as said above. Our informants are full of accounts of the terror and exploitations of Langkuk's reign.[218]

When, for instance, it was alleged that Langkuk requested and/or it was subsequently suggested by a colonialist in 1914 that 'the plain Angass should be detached from the Bauchi Division and placed with their other Angass people under the Sarikin Pankshin,'[219] that is, to be placed under Langkuk, the Divisional Officer in-charge of Bauchi Division at the time, H. S. W. Edwardes, made this reaction:

> Though this sounds an attractive scheme I must on full consideration record my disapproval of it for various reasons. The plain Angass are quite contented as they are. They enjoy great freedom and suffer no exactions or oppression from Umoru Sarikin Angass. Sarikin Pankshin [Langkuk] is an old fashioned pagan, and though he is of the greatest value as a ruler of the wild hill peoples I cannot but feel that to put the plain Angass under him would be a retrograde step. Umoru is a more humane, more enlightened, more progressive man, who desires the prosperity of his people and can I think be trusted. Association with highly developed Bauchi Native Administration and Treasury is likely to be of solid advantage to them.[220]

Neither the abuses showered on the person of Langkuk nor the eulogies poured on the person of Umoru, is the most important point made by Edwardes here, but the poignant fact of the greater suffering of exactions or oppression in Hill Angas District, which Langkuk was largely responsible for orchestrating and could not, as Umoru his counterpart could, be exonerated from taking the blame. Probably more people heaved a sigh of relief when Langkuk was killed than mourned him, in Hill Angas District, where he ruled, because he was an oppressive, exploitative ruler.

Beginning from 1919, when the 'Pankshin Pagan Court,' was (probably) established, whose name was changed to 'Angas Native Court' in 1927, up to 1936, the administration of justice, locally, devolved on this court, instead of on any single chief, as it was the practice during Langkuk's time.[221] The court comprised elected area-chief as members and Kopkama, the Chief of Ampang, was its president

throughout its time existence. To reiterate, this court, which lasted between 1919-1936, was only for the Hill Angas District.

In the Plain Angas District, an 'Angass Judicial Council', had existed side-by-side with the office of Umoru Attahiru, the so-called 'Sarkin Angas,' but was shortly replaced by an Alkali Sharia Court before, or early, in early 1914. The first Alkali of the court happened to be the former scribe of the proscribed Angas Judicial Council. He was himself shortly sentenced to two years imprisonment for manslaughter and a new Alkali was appointed.[222] After the retirement and pensioning off of the 'Sarkin Angass' Umoru Attahiru in 1925, however, the Alkali Sharia Court at Amper was abolished in 1927, and an Angas Tribal Court was created for the area till 1936, when with the creation of new and smaller districts, court structures were also reviewed.

The initial creation of two chieftainces, one of Hill Angas and the other of Plain Angas, meant in effect the recruitment of more people as colonial workers. In addition to the colonialists and their numerous followers and servants, more people were recruited, as staff of chiefs, into colonial service and the burden of their material sustenance was passed on to the masses of Ngas producers. When Langkuk was killed in Ntal (Tal), for instance, he had a following of not less than fifty-two persons all by himself! While Umoru by 1914 had about twelve district staff under his office, alone. And whereas, Umoru himself was paid ten pounds per month at the time, others, among his staff, received three pounds each who were title-holders; 'Sarkin dogarai' received one pound monthly and other 'dogarai' received fifteen shillings each.[223] All at the expense of the producers of wealth; these people were paid heavily; the tax-payers themselves got nothing, in return.

In Pai and Ntal, as from 1917, Pupchina and Fodgwim, became the new chiefs, respectively. The original indigenous leader of the Pai was so uncompromising that he would not meet with the colonialists, who found a good ally in Pupchina, the Chief of Dok. Pupchina had formerly served as a link or collaborator between Pai people and the colonialists, and when he was made their District Head, the people did not immediately welcomed the idea. With the support of the colonialists, Pupchina remained in that position up to the early 1930s, when he died.

Fodgwim, on the other hand, acquired his ascendancy after the fall of Mut'kai (Heathcote's "Mudge" and Lawrence's "Mutke") the Ntal leader at the time of the elimination of Langkuk. Fodg'wim also was a guide and an ally of the colonialists, during the invading patrol's operations in Ntal in 1917. Allegedly, the Ntal people elected him in preference to Mutkai after their surrender in 1917. He died two years later in 1919. However, Fod'gwim was later, post-humusly, accused of extorting tax-money. Wrote Lawrence in 1920:

> It is no use blinking the fact that Fodgwim was unpopular in Tal [Ntal]. His adherents were practically confined to his own household, and those Tal men who were not actually open followers of Mutke [Mutkai] in the disturbances were at any rate apathetic. From enquiries I have made as to the tax incidence exacted last year I am firmly convinced that Fodgwim put £100 or more into his own pocket. The Tal [Ntal] tax was £50, Fodgwim in 1919 brought in £56, but he collected 1/6 [one shilling six pence] from every adult male whereas the "book" incidence is 6d [six pence]. I propose collecting at 1/6 [one shilling six pence] this year and shall be surprised if the total tax is not the neighbourhood of £200. Fodgwim's death therefore may not prove an unmixed evil.[224]

In a nutshell, the Pupchinas, the Fodgwims, the Langkuks, the Longshins, and the Wutar upon Wutars of this world, did not play an insignificant role in hastening the

process of the imposition of colonial domination on Yil Ngas. In a sense, they were all collaborators with the colonialists and traitors in their homeland, because of either their weakness or selfish interests. On the other hand, there were the infamous and unsung masses and individuals who vainfully resisted colonialism and tried to defend the sovereignty of their land.

3.4 Ideological Changes

Shortly after the imposition of colonial imposition on Yil Ngas began in 1906, Christian missionization had followed suit fairly immediately. Missionaries of the Cambridge University Missionary Society (CUMP) who were affiliated to the Church Missionary Society (CMS) of the Church of England started proselytising in Kabwir in 1908, and settled in there, at Tuwan, in 1910. They sought to reach he Ngas population through the introduction of western medicine and literacy, besides proselytising for Christ. By 1914, their achievements in the area of medicine and literacy education were so impressive to the Bauchi Divisional Officer, H. S. W. Edwardes, that he rated the missionary effort at Kabwir among the best in Northern Nigeria.[225]

Our main interest here, however, is to highlight the impact of this missionary effort on the political economy of Yil Ngas. Farmlands of certain value had to be sacrificed before the missionaries could establish their station; farmlands not only for the physical buildings but as farm plots for the adult pupils some of whom were trained and sent elsewhere in Yil Ngas to serve as local church teachers and evangelists. While they were in Kabwir, they mixed learning with farming. Secondly, the mission boy ironically, became renown for their reckless drunkenness, which was not attractive to outside observers.[226] They took advantage of the

CUMP's tolerance of the drinking of nmos or the local beer and, enlightened as they were, left records of alcoholic abuse. Probably the missionaries had appealed to their intellects more than their hearts, although of course the CUMP, with their CMS or Anglican doctrine, did not forbid the taking of alcohol. In the exercise of their liberty in sipping much beer (simply because they were 'mission boys' or symbols of a new dispensation) they did so in flagrant violation of the indigenous norms checking excessive consumption of alcohol by youths, which we mentioned chapter two. Thirdly, the presence of missionaries, coming with their Christian message, was sought to be exploited by some ambitious figures to their own advantage, who used relations with the Christian missionaries as a stepping stone for attainment of higher social and of political standing. The cases of Chinke in Gar'm (Garram), and Wagit of Per (Amper), stand out in point.[227] Fourthly, and perhaps, most importantly, the Ngas folks who were associated with the mission no longer adhered to the authority of the local chiefs concerning sowing and harvesting times, neither were they frightened by the nwong, or ancestral spirits, especially the masquerades, again, and such other instruments of control and order in the pre-colonial setting. Their Christian practice of monogamy constituted the lessening or a drain on the workforce a male farmer was entitled to have, in the pre-mission period. All these developments characterised the wave of change transforming the pre-colonial relations between people in material production during the period under review.

Generally speaking, the entire process of the coming of colonialism elicited many movements in the supply of labour. The Ngas people had to adjust their minds to the concept and reality of forced labour such as they had not known before. Messengers, chiefs, carriers, escorts, pupils and so forth, tendentiously became

people who had more or less resigned their places on the farms and in the pastures, and had found a new niche in the colonial setting. The Ngas people had to also adjust to the reality of seeing their own people, as it were, their kith and kin, practising a lifestyle void of farming; something that not even the ngolongs were at liberty to do in the pre-colonial economy of their recent past. As from the 1920s, Ngas workers in the service of colonialism only continued to be on the increase both in number and importance. The setting up of sub-residency, district and later divisional headquarters in the area, first in Wokkos in 1908, then later in Pankshin in 1909, with its own jail and court houses and a stationed military detachment meant in effect the feeding of a population which was an added burden to the region's political economy;[228] the building of houses and roads; the porterage of various stores and goods; and the gradual division of town from country. Emigration from pre-colonial domiciles became a frequent development, contrary to the notions of seclusiveness on the part of the indigenes held by some colonialists in the period. There was insecurity to property and life. Several boundary stones were shifted to the shock and surprise of many. The boundary question between Amper and Kanam in 1916, for instance, was a difficult one to solve. Threats were given to the effect that crops of Ngas farmers would be cut down on the farms situated in the area of controversy with the people of Kanam, but the people were not easily deterred.[229] Land had a value and its system of ownership right from pre-colonial times, and so the matter should not have been treated simplistically. Definite lines of division were often not readily agreed on partially because farmers on one side wanted to acquire and keep more land under their own control as well as because of the confusion that

the imposition of colonial domination, and the naivety of the colonial political officers, on issues they knew very little about, often engendered.

Mine labour had already begun during the period under review: folks in Yil Ngas were now being urged to go the Minesfield (in Ron, Mwaghavul and Birom lands) to earn money and pay their taxes. The basis of the society in Yil Ngas as a whole was roguishly hijacked and overwhelmed by the fact of their colonisation, during the period under review and forms of new relations, political, economic and social relations, were imposed on, or, installed in the place of old ones. This, briefly speaking, was the ideological essence of the period 1902 to 1919 when colonialism was imposed on Yil Ngas.

3.5. Conclusion

It was actually during the period 1902 to 1919 that the imposition of colonial domination on Yil Ngas was introduced and accomplished. It was not completed in 1907, the year in which the colonialists first thought that they had accomplished the conquest of the region. That was far from the reality. There is no basis in accepting that only wars fought in the first instance between 1906 and 1907 were wars of conquest whereas those fought during the second decade between 1914 and 1917 were merely patrols despatched to check the unbecoming outrages of the colonised. All were wars of invasion and conquest, regardless of the timing. In most places, regardless of the decade, the fact was that several of the resistant polities had never experienced rifle fire before. Moreover, the wars were essentially identical with one another, they were mostly associated with bloodshed, the burning and breaking of houses or towns, the plunder of grain and livestock, the destruction of standing crops, the arrest of alleged ring-leaders and the abduction of rulers. Besides, the

secret behind the capacity of such resistant polities in standing against the colonialists (at gun-point) for such a long period of time was a tribute to their strategy or practice of fighting separately or in separate polities, and to defend such polities with all their strength even if their neighbours on every side were already won to the side of the colonial invaders. Lack of military combination therefore was a principle, which detained or delayed the immediate and over-all subjugation of the area to colonial domination, allowing for meditation on the part of polities that were yet to confront gunfire as to whether they would like to do so or not. This explains therefore why some polities in Yil Ngas did not go to arms against the colonialists. The colonialists themselves observed and positively appreciated the prior military potentialities of Ngas communities, vis-à-vis their neighbours' in their on-the-spot reports.

As a rule, the imposition of colonial exploitative tributary relations on such an unyielding region was not an easy task. Pre-colonial kingship offices were either overthrown or absorbed and transformed into colonial chieftaincies. New chieftaincies were imposed. An army of former reputable farmers, shepherds, farm-hands was recruited, or was being recruited, in the period, to work in the new dispensation as chiefs, messengers, head-carriers and so on. The activities of the missionaries further exacerbated the question of the supply of labour on the farms where and when their pupils were now merely combining farming with learning. It was in circumstances such as these that the first crop of the bohemian lumpen-drunkard in the area today, must have arisen. Among the new indigenous colonial staff, servants, carriers, messengers, bodyguards of chiefs, etc, the first crop of bohemian drunkards, known as the ngodendimwa, was probably produced. This

should cause no confusion since as from the 1920s, we see some of the early products of the missionary effort in Kabwir taking up jobs in the colonial offices in Pankshin, the care-free drinking of alcohol and the observance of vices, hitherto deemed immoral, among the youths became openly practised. The indigenous authorities could not arrest the situation very well, for after all, the new elites, realised that they were no longer the true authorities in charge. Neither could the colonialists, brains behind the current waves of inhumanity and social corruption adequately restore moral sanity in the community; they did not always know the facts, and where they did, their solutions were dexterously installed and protected, by force.

The introduction of taxes as well as the plunder, the blood and the fire, which went with it, need no reiteration. This was the most disheartening dimension of the imposition of colonial domination on Ngas polities. Grain reserves were depleted, **kraals** were depleted, and labour power and man-hours were wastefully exploited on the roads and in the mines. The peasants had to get money. Emigration, migrant-labour, and the commoditization of various resources including labour, grain produce, sylvan produce and livestock, which hitherto were got sometimes given almost for free on the basis of the pre-colonial moral economy, had forcefully been intensified. A semblance of severe social poverty had begun to rear its ugly head. Boundary stones were shifted time and time again; the quest for meaning and greater material security in the peasants' life (a matter which is also a present reality in our time) in the emergent colonial life had begun. If he could not retain most of his grain and livestock (especially where he was the custodian of clan or household property) a peasant could at least hold on to his own plots on the clan's farmlands. In a

nutshell, the basis of the society in Yil Ngas was hijacked and overwhelmed, by force, during the period between 1906 and to 1919; the old pre-colonial political economy was to a large extent disrupted and superimposed with very crude relations of capitalist colonial political economy. The mode of producing things was tending towards greater individualism away from the pre-colonial predominant communalism. Besides, producers were now conditioned to keep at the back of their minds the fact that they were no longer producing only for the benefit of themselves, their families and the local community but also for the powers that-be, based in either Pankshin or Bauchi.

A new process had now been set in motion. However, colonialism in Yil Ngas, as it was in various places in Northern Nigeria, up to the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, in the line with Michael Watts' assertion cited in the introduction to the chapter, was virtually still experimental, still brutally trying and testing strategies of sinking its roots. The next chapter attempts to highlight how a colonial economy was consolidated or sank roots in Yil Ngas, and how the area, in that process, was transformed into a rural colonial economy.

Notes

1. With the possible exception of Egbaland (and probably Asaba) every area in the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria had been colonially taken by 1900. See Obaro Ikime, *The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest,* (Heinemann, London, 1977, pp.57-58).
2. The Protectorate of Northern Nigeria as was proclaimed on 1st January 1900 at Lokoja by Lugard was merely a cartographical claim. Writing of Lugard's appointment as High Commissioner, Margery Perham maintained: "a colonial governor can seldom have been appointed to a territory so much of which had never even been viewed by himself or any other European." Lugard's case was therefore, odd. See Michael Crowder, *The Story of Nigeria,* (Faber and Faber, London, 1978, p.172), and O. Ikime, Ibid, p.77.
3. Crowder, Ibid, pp. 157-158
4. Ikime, Op.cit, Chapter 5

5. Ibid, pp. 83-85, recount the fall of Bauchi and the combine) plight of ethnic groups such as the Dass, Jengre, Shiri, Ningi, Mwaghavul, Ziggam, Wajah, Berom, Tangale and Ngas, among others, which were situated in the same belt, at the hands of the British invading forces, between 1902 and 1907.
6. Michael Watts, *Silent Violence: Food, Famine and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983) p.l66.
7. Such rumours and selective, discriminatory, feelings contributed their part in the Pai and Tal uprisings of 1917 as the war reports following the uprisings would show.
8. Temple first heard of the Ngas in May 1902 (and reported on them in September). See E. Isichei (ed) Studies in the History of Plateau State, Nigeria, op.cit, p.221 and f.n. 53. The report focused directly on areas hitherto nominally subject to Bauchi, holding that communities of Pu'el ("Dawaki"), Kabwir ("Kubbirr") and Per ("Ampyer") axis at that time -- the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century -- were the major polities of Yil Ngas and that they had always paid taxes to Bauchi up to February 1902, when the British colonialists arrived and took Bauchi.
9. Ibid.
10. See external relations in chapter two.
11. According to a certain tradition the first Emir of Bauchi, Yakubu, is generally remembered to have been content with the allegiance of the so-called Plain; Ngas communities, but he did not charge them of tribute. It was\~on- successor Ibrahim (1843-1879) who invaded and cruelly collected tribute from them. After his death however, his cruel posture could not be carried on with to the extent that these polities relapsed to the position of sending only occasional gifts, or tribute when they could, but not on an "always" or consistent basis. The British soon discovered how "nominal" the authority of Bauchi was when they brought the Ajia of Lere, the supposed "field holder" on behalf of Bauchi, and were shocked on the poor reception he was given.
12. Oliver Howard, "From the Resident Bauchi Province, To H. E The High Commissioner, Northern Nigeria," Report No. 438/1906: in SNP6, C140/1907, "Bauchi Province - Patrols and Expeditions (Confidential)," NAK.
13. Ibid. The title of 'Colonel' used on Oliver Howard, is taken from Daniel Nimcir Wambutda, *A Study of Conversion Among the Angas of Plateau State of Nigeria with Emphasis on Christianity*, (Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1991), pp.43-44. I have not come across it anywhere besides.
14. Ibid
15. Ibid
16. I think it was a combination of force and volition.
17. Howard, Op cit.
18. Ibid
19. Ibid
20. Ibid
21. Or so I think, how would Howard have explained that in that situation, with all the language bottlenecks? (See Ibid).
22. L.F. Renny, "Diary of the Angass Expedition: From 0. C. Troops, Bautchi, to Brigade Major, N. N. R.," SNP 6, C140/1907, op.cit, NAK.
23. Oliver Howard, Op.cit
24. See L. F. Renny, "Report on Angass Expedition: From 0. C. Troops, Bautchi, to Brigade Major, N. N. R," SNP6, C140/1907, op.cit, NAK and Howard, Ibid.
25. Renny, "Diary of the Angass Expedition" op.cit
26. Ibid.
27. Howard, Op.cit. Wuseli people might have packed some of their food and hidden it away. On moral grounds, however, it was wrong for the expedition to destroy any quantity of food, large or small.Howard's key reason was that it could not be packed to Bauchi!
28. Renny, "Diary...." Op.cit. On the expedition's side, there were no casualties among the soldiers and only two labourers were wounded, according to Renny.
29. Howard did not distinguish Shi 'pang from Kal'eyb, but I guess it was Bal'ng Shi 'pang, given the confrontational activity of Bal'ng Kal'eyb, which followed shortly, against colonialism.
30. Howard, Op.cit
31. Ibid.

32. However, these livestock, together with those taken later were subsequently sent to Ibi (on the Benue) and Amar and sold, after the expedition, and the money was taken to the government in Bauchi; as we shall see.
33. Howard, Op.cit
34. Ibid
35. Even today many Ngas people prefer to refer to Kuwang as "Pang" which generally refers to the Ampang East District which is roughly occupying the area of Yil Pang, the pre-colonial polity.
36. Howard, Op.cit. Probably the Ngolong of Kabwir was later reported to Howard as having advised the Ngolong of Pang to co-operate with the colonialists.
37. Whether or not Jid'mma pointed at Wokkos ("Nwukos" should have been the correct spelling, perhaps) or Howard simply made a scape-goat on him, is now difficult to say. However, we read from the same Howard that Wuseli and Wokkos were two of the notorious polities which provoked the coming of the expedition, in the fist place. Meanwhile, see Howard, Ibid.
38. Ibid
39. The Wokkos (or Nwu'kos) community which could be first reached from the direction of Kuwang was Dyis'nkep. The same area was reported to be the part of Wokkos (Polity) which fought the colonial army. Interview with: Yild'inma Ip'shak, c.65, village head and farmer, Dyis'kheb, 13th January, 1987.
40. Howard, Op.cit. "People of Yil Pang," is used here because, in such a situation, the men of Wuye, Dang'chor, Shar'rm, Mwel, Ga'ab, Jinna, Kuli and Lu'cheyb, to mention some places, who were in the immediate vicinity of Kuwang, must have been mobilised to prepare for war; people could have come from places in the foothills of the Mt. Pang, such as Muel, Leyb-Kulit and Dungung, at a short notice. In the October (1906) encounter, folks were mobilised from far and wide; men went from Dungung, for instance, to fight on the side of Yil Pang. Interview with: An'kop Barde, c.85, and Deshi Barde, c.90, farmers and residents of Dungung, at Dungung, 29th Dec. 1986.
41. Howard, op.cit
42. Ibid.
43. Renny, "Diary..." Op.cit: his "peaks and ridges" description of the place was by far more objective than Howard's "Plateau."
44. Renny, Ibid. The 1000 or so labourers from Zaarland (of what the colonialists called Leri i.e. Lere District), were now used in "breaking" Dyis'nkep just as they had broken Wuseli; in the previous week.
45. If at 800 yards, maxim gun-shots were fired on a rocky terrain, it was very difficult for Renny to determine actual Wokkos casualties at such distances; no wonder, nothing was said of the wounded men. Neither have declared what they took away."
46. Howard observed: "Here again the people could not make up their minds to make a serious attack." Like in Yil Pang, but better than the latter they gave some fight though half-heartedly. News of what happened at Wuseli may have weakened both their arms and minds. Furthermore, Howard stated: "I am informed that dependent Wokos towns exist beyond a stony and almost inaccessible range, but I considered the lesson given sufficient..." hence the expedition was not taken to those places; which (probably) included Dakup (its present district headquarters) and Tazuk, among others, according to an informant. Howard, ibid; and interview with: Yild'mma Ip'shak, Op. cit.
47. Howard, Ibid. He stated: "I imagine that its importance is largely due to the strength, of its position and the fighting qualities of its inhabitants...."
48. Howard, Ibid. It is likely that the expedition did not find any of these claims to be so, or probably because of the brevity of their stay in Pankshin they could not check to find out.
49. Howard, Ibid.
50. The colonialists hoped to see a transformed Pang on Ji'dm'ma's return, poised to serve and submit to them. Ji'dm'ma however, was not changed.
51. Howard, Op cit
52. Ibid.
53. Renny, "Report...." Op.cit. The truth is, no one knew exactly how many people were killed. Only estimates could be made. Renny stated that: "The attack on both towns.... were frequently fired at ranges varying from 20 to 1000 yards and a careful estimation showed that 75 dead were accounted for." If 42 were earlier reported dead at Wuseli and 30 at Wokkos, equalling 72 in all, then it means three others in Penny's estimation must have been killed in either place to give us 75; those three were not accounted for.

54. Howard, Op.cit: claimed, for instance, that DSP Glenny, who, reportedly, visited Yil Ngas in March 1905 "was repeatedly asked" during the visit "why Wussele and Wokos were permitted to raid inoffensive and friendly towns and maintain their defiant independence, " sequel to which he submitted an interesting report on the matter to the Resident.
55. Howard, Ibid. Based on the existing accounts of Ngas relations with the Bauchi (what Howard calls "Filane") jihadists, no attack was ever launched (successfully) on any community later characterised as "Hill Angas" by the colonialists, nor in which (probably 150) lives were lost, or houses were broken. An account of the "Plain Angas" experience, is given in: Daniel Nimcir Wambutda, *A Study of Conversion Among the Angas of Plateau State of Nigeria with Emphasis on Christianity,* Op cit, pp.38-41.
56. Howard, Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Howard, Province of Bauchi: Report No. 28, for April-July 1906," in SNP 6, C.140/1907, Op cit
59. Howard, "Province of Bauchi: Report No. 29, for August-September 1906" in: SNP 6, C140/1907
60. Howard, "Province of Bauchi: Report No. 30, for October-December 1906" in: SNP 6, C140/1907
61. H. D. Foulkes, "Report on Angass Patrol" (dated 24th January 1907): Submitted to the Resident, Bauchi Province, in: SNP6, C140/1907, op.cit.
62. This number is arrived at by summing the 390 loads, per, roughly 390 carriers (from Kabwir) on 2 January, and 4000 loads per roughly 4000 carriers (again, from Kabwir) between 3rd and 5th January, 1907) plus the unknown number of cattle catchers and keepers from Munok who recovered 9 cows for the colonialists, which we approximately to 110 men.
63. G. L. Uniacke, "Report on Angass Patrol: From the 0. C. Patrol, to the 0. C. 'C' Coy. I/N. N. R" dated 10th January 1907, in: SNP6, C140/1907, op.cit.mentioned 11, while Foulkes mentioned 13 dead on Pang's side and 2 messengers on the colonialists' side.
64. H. D. Foulkes, "Extract from Report on Angass Patrol b Assistant Resident Captain Foulkes dated 24th January 1907", in SNP6, C140/1907, op.cit.
65. Despite of Ku'wang's altitude, the colonialists were still able to capture it.
66. Foulkes, "Extract …" Op cit.
67. Ibid
68. Ibid
69. Ibid
70. Ibid
71. Ibid: Writing on 24th January 1907, roughly three weeks after Jid'mma's abdication, Foulkes referred to him as the "late Sarki Ampam. " Could he have died after his exit? Not likely.
72. Ibid: The 4390 loads, is the total figure raised by adding 390 and 4000 loads, mostly of grain, taken away, in those respective regards. See note 62 above.
73. Wambutda recounts a different account of the same incident, placing its date alongside that of the first invasion. The date used in this study is the correct one. However some useful aspects or events leading to Jash's death, which Wambutda contains, are left out for the timebeing simply because they aren't clear enough to the present writer. It seems Jash was killed in a much smaller encounter, murdered, because Foulkes hated him and saw him as a much bigger obstacle than even Ji'dm'ma or Wak'yur, the two kings who changed baton at that time. For comments relating to Wambutda, see his: Op cit, pp.44-45.
74. Ibid
75. Foulkes and Uniacke's figure for the WAFF Rank and File, in the Angass Patrol was 45, they did not mention any Transport carriers; Williams instead mentioned 50 Rank and File and 31 Transport carriers, among other personnel. I have used Williams' figures only.
76. Howard, "Sura Patrol: From the Resident Bauchi Province, to H. E. The High Commissioner, Northern Nigeria" dated 31st January, 1907, in: SNP6, C140/1907, op.cit. Each of the two chiefs was taxed 100 sheep or its equivalent payable latest on Howard's return fron Mwaghavul land in the same month! It is not clear now whether the 'Kwanka' mentioned refers to the place with that name or, as in some circles, to the Kadung people, as a whole, which would have implied their general surrender in that instance to colonial domination. For now, I am assuming the latter.
77. Ibid

78. On casualty figures see E. E. Williams, "Report on Sura Expedition: From the 0.C. Sura Expeditionary Force, to the Brigade Major, Northern Nigeria Regiment" dated 30th January, 1907; on the tribute, see Howard "Sura Patrol,,," ibid, in: SNP6, C140/1907, Op. cit.
79. Ibid (both Williams and Howard).
80. Howard, Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Howard, Op cit.
85. Ibid, and Williams Op.cit
86. It was after the 'Mwaghavul' the expedition was named: "Sura" was what the Hausa-Fulani called the Mwaghavul then. After the conquest, more or less, of Kadung, Fier and Langkang areas, lying in Yil Ngas, had been "accomplished", it was only proper for the "Sura Expedition" to go over to Mwaghavul land.
87. Foulkes "Some Preliminary Notes on the Angass: Report No.15/1907, Kanna District, Bauchi Province" in: JOSPROF 379/1920. Here Foulkes reports, just on the basis of possibility, that a Wokkos area may still be holding on to their independence, otherwise, everywhere in YilNgas was pacified.
88. Ibid. Like Howard, Foulkes was anxious to think that the havoc wrought by their invasions were not quite terrible.
89. Howard "Report on Angass Expedition..." op.cit.
90. Foulkes, "Some preliminary..." op.cit.
91. Lack of combination militarily on a terrain such as Yil Ngas' was much more a feature of adaptation forged over the centuries than otherwise. So also, the fragmentary (in form) and molecular (in essence) organisation of their political landscape's mapping, characterized mainly by non-centralised rather than centralised formation, was also historically forged for convenience' sake, regardless of given the level of their forces of production at the time, which, by and large, was the same with that of the so-called centralised societies.
92. Authors such as Charles Orr have tended to over-emphasis the exclusivity and isolation of fragmentary formations, to great harm. Margery Perham's description of communities of the Jos Plateau area as were characterised by "atomic organisation" is evidence of that tendency; see Margery Perham (ed), *The Economies of a Tropical Dependency, Vol. 1: The Native Economies of Nigeria* (co-authored by Daryll Forde and Richenda Scott) (Nuffield College and Faber and Faber Ltd, London, 1945) p. 1.
93. All Ngolongs actively participated in the manual production of material needs, however, the area kings had powers such as of sending a man on exile, of passing a death sentence, and sitting in judgement on crucial and disputes. The practice, compared to their Hausa-Fulani neighbours, was different only in the sense that they had not disengaged themselves from active labour, to simply sit in the palace while their subjects worked on their own farms.
94. Foulkes "Some Preliminary notes..." op.cit.
95. Beckles Gall, *Gazetteer of Bauchi Province* (Waterlow & Sons, London, 1920), p. 16.
96. One section or the other has usually complained against others concerning how the others have continually deprived them of the sole privilege of producing candidates to occupy the Ngolong Ngas stool. Sentiments are sometimes high, when the Kwabzak massacre, (of Langkuk and 52 others), is discussed especially by the people of his home area.
97. Frederick Lugard "Bauchi Province, 1905-1906" in Annual Reports: Northern Nigeria 1900-1911 (at National Museum Library Jos), p.390.
98. Ibid.
99. They knew nothing of the famine, which ravaged Tangale and Waja axis of the same Province. Since Yil Ngas was not hit by the said famine, while many places in were, probably this intensified, in some way, the colonialists view that Yil Ngas was wealthy. With reference to 1907, Foulkes wrote on the produce and other endowments of YilNgas as said, "nature was so bountiful" to them. See Foulkes, "Some preliminary notes..." op.cit
100. Since the times of their remembered past, the Ngas have not relocated to another place before going back to their homeland. Oral and written sources are agreed on that: the only exception is this very incredible statement made by Frederick Lugard.
101. Lugard, Op cit.

102. Mahmud Tukur, "The Historian, the Jurist and the Sokoto Jihad," in: *The Essential Mahmud Tukur: Selected Writings of Mahmud Modibbo Tukur*, edited by Tanimu Abubakar (MtMC, ABU, Zaria), pp.24-25.
103. Lugard, Op cit.
104. Foulkes described Yil Ngas in 1907 as "these mountain recesses eddying backwaters formed by the succeeding waves of immigration conquest, and trade," Yil Ngas was not lucky enough in the nineteent century to possess a thorough major trade route encompassing it. In one sense, that slowed down individual distribution of wealth, in another sense, it preserved the material wealth levels of communities.
105. Until 1914, during Major Edgar's duties in Pai, when he first reported that the people there were very poor, no one had said that before.
106. See: Oliver Howard: Bauchi Report No 35, "Quarter Ending March 1908" in SNP 7/2308/1908, Op cit.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid
110. While "tribute" was constantly taken during the first and second invasions, the smartly dubious Resident, Oliver Howard, preferred often to state that a "moderate tribute" was charged latter than clearly describe each in both quantitative and monetary terms.
111. Foulkes, "Extract...." Op.cit.
112. Ibid. Both Foulkes and Gowers considered Mamudu as too young and weak.
113. Foulkes, Ibid. When Foulkes proposed asking the Ngas to pay tax in cattle to him directly, it seems that Attahiru's efforts were not so successful.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid
116. Ibid
117. Ibid
118. A capitation tax is one paid equally by all people, in a given social unit.
119. The exact picture could have best been got from an actual assessment report. Informants who supplied the information: Deshi (90) and Ankop (85) Barde; Yild'mma Ipshak (65) (and John Kwashi (76) retired teacher and administrator, at Pankshin on 12.1.1987).
120. Apart from Gambir of Munok, there were the Garkuwa of Pang, Yiljash, and "Dlan-Gwop" (Lang'kop) and (Yil'kob'ba) "Il-Gwoba" (to use Foulkes spellings) whom Foulkes threatened to deal with after pillaging Kuwang and environs. Concerning "Il-Gwoba" (probably "Yilkobba") Foulkes threatened to arrest and send him to Bauchi, for him to have a proper sense of proportion between Yil Pang and the colonial order. See Foulkes, "Extract...." op.cit.
121. Howard "Bauchi Report No. 35: Quarter Ending March 1908," SNP7/2308/1908 (NAK).
122. Foulkes "Extract...." op.cit.
123. Ibid.
124. See Howard, "To the Acting High Commissioner" Op cit.
125. Ibid
126. Ibid
127. J.H.Maynard,"Escort to the Angass Country, Report on: from 'C' Coy 1 NNR to OC 'C'Coy, dated 28th May 1907," SNP 7, 2713/1907.(NAK)
128. As in note 119 above.
129. Isichei cites a letter written by a CMS missionary Alvarez to one Pelly, in October 1906 as her source of the information. See her edited: *Studies in the History of Plateau State, Nigeria* (MacMillan Press, London, 1982), a footnote on p.209.
130. Howard, "Bauchi Report No. 35: Quarter Ending March 1908," SNP 7/2308/1908 (NAK)
131. Ibid
132. Foulkes, "Extract..." Op cit
133. Wallace Wright (Captain, General Staff, Brigade Office, Nigerian Regiment, Kaduna) made that statement in forwarding the report on the incident at stake to the Lt. Governor, Northern Provinces, dated 12th May 1914. See "Pankshin Friction between Troops and Natives," SNP 10/2, 122P/1914, (NAK).
134. Ibid
135. Ibid

136.Ibid
137.Edwardes, Op cit.
138.Ibid
139.Ibid
140.Ibid
141.Ibid
142.John H. Molyneux, "Report on Bauchi: Pai Pagan attack on Sarkin Pankshin. 2 police escorts: Report on Pai Patrol" (dated 19th July 1917), SNP 1O, 256/1917 (NAK) - hereunder tagged "2nd Report," please.
143.Ibid
144.Ibid
145.Ibid
146.Ibid
147.Molyneux "Report No. 724/1917: from ADO Pankshin District to D.O Naraguta Division" in: SNP 10, 256/1917, op.cit, dated 8th July 1917, hereunder tagged "1st Report" please.
148.Ibid
149.Ibid
150.Ibid
151.The possible time during which a force on tour might have visited Dok was sequel to the murder of Malby in nearby Tel land and a patrol force was sent to deal with them. But until that is confirmed, our doubt should tentatively retain its place.
152.Foulkes "Some preliminary notes" op.cit
153.Molyneux, 1st Report.
154.Ibid
155.Ibid
156.Ibid
157.Molyneux, 2nd Report.
158.Ibid.
159.When you check the reports, you are not likely to find such.
160.F. G. Heathcote "Events Leading to the Patrol" in "Sarkin Pankshin and Thirty Others killed by men of Tal (2) military patrol", SNP 10, 471P/1917 (NAK).
161.C. K. Gonyok, "The Coming of Colonial Administration to Ngasland, 1906-1935" (BA Thesis, History Department, A.B.U Zaria).
162.Heathcote, "Events..." Op cit.
163.Ibid
164.Gonyok, Op cit
165.Heathcote "Events..." Op cit.
166.F. G. Heathcote "The Patrol Summary of Events" in "Sarkin Pankshin and Thirty Others killed by men of Tal (2) military patrol" SNP 10, 471P/1917 (NAK)
167.Ibid
168.Ibid
169.Ibid
170.Peter Yearwood (ed), *Jos Oral History and Literature Texts, Volume I*: One Harmattan, Jos, 1981.
171.Heathcote, "The Patrol..." Op cit
172.Ibid
173.Ibid
174.At the worst, it was possible for them to have been so frightened of facing the colonial column that it was "better" for each community to face its own plight separately.
175.Heathcote "The Patrol..." Op cit.
176.Ibid
177.Ibid
178.Ibid
179.Ibid
180.Ibid
181.Ibid
182.Langkuk and followers (53) plus the stated Ntal dead (70) would add up to 123 alone, talkless of the many which were not accounted for.

183.Heathcote, "The Patrol ..." Op.cit
184.Ibid
185.Ibid
186.Turn to Chapter One for a definition of the concept of **ecocline**.
187.Howard died suddenly on 20th September 1908 in Bauchi. See: W.F.Gowers "Bauchi Province, Report for the period July-December 1908, Report No 37" in: SNP 7/10/335/1908. (NAK.)
188.Such expectations and related rumours were apparently prevalent.
189.On 4th December 1917, according to Heathcote, at Longmer in Chip District, an unsuccessful attempt was made to arrest a man who had been mobilising the people of Puzzuk against the colonial order, who also boasted that he was bullet-proof. Anti-colonial feeling in the area got strong, as a result. At several places along the way through Chip and Langkang, when the Pankshin-Tal Patrol force, passed through the area while returning to Pankshin, they were fired at, and the patrol fired back.
190. However, the colonialists took the 1918 tax despite the heavy punishment they had already inflicted Gwabbi people with.
191.Heathcote "Summary of Events in Gwabbi" in SNP 10, 417p/1917, op. cit. It seems that when Gwabbi was dealt with, Nyel'ng reviewd her position because the patrol was not taken there to deal with that community as well.
192.Ibid
193.Ibid
194.Ibid
195.Ibid
196.Ibid
197.Ibid
198.Ibid
199.F. Henry Bush "Origin of trouble leading to operations at Gwabbi" dated 31st January 1918, (in SNP 10, 471/1917, op.cit) with characteristic exaggerations.
200.Ibid
201.Ibid
202.Heathcote "Summary of Events in Gwabbi" Op cit.
203.Yildm'ma Ipshak (c.65), Irmiya Chorching (c.95), Deshi Barde (c.90) and An'kop Barde (c.85) shared vivid tales of the insecurity-orchestrated by colonialism. All interviewed in January 1987. :
204.N. B. Kochakova "The Evolution of Traditional Political Structures in Nigeria in the Colonial Period" in: *Africa in Soviet Studies: Annual, 1985* edited by A. Gromyko et al (Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1985) p. 107. (Chiefs are just like tools to plied by different people for their own uses).
205.See Foulkes' "Some preliminary notes..." and Mathews' "The Angas and kindred peoples..." op.cit, for instance.
206.Howard "Report on the Angass Expedition" op.cit.
207.Ibid
208.Ibid, and Foulkes "Extract...." (op.cit). The Ciroma of Bauchi, Mamudu Hassan, actually remained in Puel, but nobody seemed to have noticed his presence, among the Ngas while he stayed at Puel (Dawaki).
209.Foulkes, Ibid
210.Two "Bauchi" chiefs were appointed successively but Ngas people gave half-hearted commitment to them
211.Foulkes, "Extract...." Op.cit
212.See: Oliver Howard: Bauchi Report No 35, "Quarter Ending March 1908," SNP 7/2308/1908, para. 97
213.If Pangji was actually Wak'yur's successor, then Damian Gotom's (in his: "Chieftaincy Institution in Ampang East, Pankshin Local Government Area of Plateau State, NCE Project, 1984, FCE Pankshin, p.31,) dating suggesting that Pangji succeeded Wak'yur in 1929, instead of 1908, which was the date of Wak'yur's exit from power, is very far from reality.
214.Edwardes, Op.cit
215. Since the last quarter of 1908, full powers of a Resident in charge were granted to Capt. Foulkes over the Hill Division, a name Gowers immediately substituted for the Pagan Belt or Pagan Division when he took over the province following the demise of Howard. Foulkes however was a Resident III. Ormsby was also a Resident of Foulkes' kind.

216. There are several write ups designed to eulogise Langkuk, which incidentally contend that the colonial appointment was made in 1902, when to all intents and purposes, the colonialists were just learning about the existencxe of the Ngas people. See, for instance: Dasun Kevin Tongrang, "The Life History of Lankuk The Ngolong of Pankshin (1891-1917)": (NCE Project, Department of History, FCE Pankshin, 1985).
217. Such were colonial officers as Ryan, Edgar, Heathcote, Molyneux, and so forth..
218. Chorching Nmwel (c.95) and others view Langkuk as a terrible exploiter of the people, for personal gains more than for the sake of colonialism.
219. Edwardes, op.cit
220. Ibid
221. Incidentally, it was not until 1919 before the first "Native Treasury" in Yil Ngas was established, at Pankshin Station. This was the last in the Province to be established, out of seven, meaning that all the taxes (and booty) forcefully taken from the area were going into the central provincial accounts direct, with nothing spared for the area concerned. See F. Beckles Gall, Op.cit, pp. 26-26.
222. Edwardes, op.cit
223. Ibid.
224. B.R.Lawrence, "Report on the Half-year ending June 30th 1920" JOS PROF 248/1920.
225. Edwardes, Op cit.
226. 'Sarkin Angas' Umoru, based at Amper had cause to complain about that habit in 1914. See "CMS", JOS PROF 9/1914.
227. Ibid & Edwardes, Op cit.
228. "Bauchi-Pankshin (Angass) Boundary Re (1914-15) BAU PROF 26/10.
229. "On Wokkos Station," see SNP 7, 5482/1908.

CHAPTER FOUR:

THE TRANSFORMATION OF YIL NGAS INTO A COLONIAL RURAL ECONOMY, 1920-1935

4.0 Introduction:

The present chapter is a reconstruction of some significant changes and processes which occurred in Yil Ngas after the one and a half decades long struggle for supremacy between the forces of British colonial occupation and the various resistant and patriotic fronts in the region leading to the eventual overthrow of the latter. The substance of that struggle forms the bigger chunk of chapter three.

For another one and a half decades, that is, as we examine the period 1920 to 1935, we reckon that Yil Ngas was confronted with increasing burdens of the colonial order on the one hand, while on the other, we realise that all the resistant polities had now been fully pacified by their relative weakness vis-a-vis the strength of the so-called Pax Britannica and were readier now to subscribe to her overlordship than hitherto. The fact that no less than two insurrections were still to follow mattered little because the general trend was not affected.[1]

With the eventual surrender of all the polities of Yil Ngas by the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, grounds were apparently cleared for the colonialists to now firmly consolidate, enormously harness and meticulously exploit their gains and privileges in the region. Whether or not they succeeded in carrying out this scheme by the end of the approximately one and a half decades period, we shall see.

The sub-themes in this chapter are three-fold: the creation of colonial infrastructure; the creation of a colonial social structure; and the exploitation of peasant labour and produce. Let us focus on the first of these, now.

4.1 Creation Of Colonial Infrastructure:Introduction

Among the burdens of the colonial order which were imposed on the gradually pacified people of Yil Ngas was the construction of houses, offices, barracks, camps, sites, roads and so on. These were intended, to provide a technical basis for the smooth operation of the burgeoning economy of exploitation. It is such features that are collectively referred to as infrastructure in this work.

In reconstructing the account of the creation of colonial infrastructure in Yil Ngas therefore, attention would be given to the search for a site on which to locate the seat of power and the subsequent selection of Pang'chen, which the colonialists called 'Pankshin' from the outset, for the purpose and its subsequent transformation into a 'town', the siting of various other units of infrastructure within Pankshin town itself, the construction of rest camps at deliberately selected locations; and the construction of motorable roads and so on. These are considered under separate headings.

4.2: The Changing Colonial Seat of Power: Pankshin Transformed

Before the commencement of the wars of colonial invasion, the members of the only British exploratory party or group of spies known to have visited Yil Ngas, and that was in 1904, after having bewailed the rockiness of the terrain, observed to their own chagrin that the land's scenery was quite beautiful and the air was pleasant and invigorating, as we saw in chapter three. Thereafter, the nominal choice of the Ngas country as a good site for a

prospective colonial settlement was repeatedly made during the wars of colonial invasion fought in the region, by commanding officers of the invading expeditionary forces. Oliver Howard, for instance, observed, after leading the first invading army to Yil Ngas, in 1906, that: "The Angass country is healthy and may eventually be settled by white colonists."[2] Then Captain Foulkes who became the first British colonial officer to be in-charge of Yil Ngas said, in 1907 thus: "This neighbourhood is a good situation for an eventual 'Hill Station'."[3] By this Foulkes could be interpreted to be advocating for the siting of a hill-based political centre in the region. However, Howard, as cited above, was apparently advocating for something more, he was apparently advocating for the development of a settler-type colonial economy in Nigeria, with the humble wish of turning Yil Ngas into one of its nerve centres.

In any case, documented views favouring the siting of a colonial centre in the region, which were left behind by the first generation of British colonial officers in Yil Ngas, might have cumulatively influenced the maintenance and sustenance of Pankshin, in the reckoning of latter generations of colonial officers, as their permanent seat of power within the region and its environs. In fact, the (so-called) first generation of colonial officers, did not just talk as it were but also endeavoured to put their wishes into action, when they established (or caused the establishment of) the first colonial station in Yil Ngas in 1908, at Leyb Zat'tur in Wokkos and the second colonial station at Nwulmi hill, which later became better known as Manung hill, in Pang'chen (Pankshin). The factors responsible for the choice of the Wokkos site were, not only, the aesthetic, the climatic, and the sanitary, but also the economic,

political as well as military-strategic.[4] Immediately below is an account of that first station.

4.2.1 The Wokkos Station

The first colonial station or centre in Yil Ngas was sited in an area known as Leyb Zat'tur, and though situated near Ka'gar in Pang polity, it actually fell within the territorial frontier of Wokkos polity. Established in 1908, that is, roughly two years after the commencement of the colonial invasion of the region, the station was abandoned within a year's time. Shortly, after it had taken off, Oliver Howard, submitted a report by March-ending 1908, on the siting of such a station and the sudden fact of the completion of work on the site, to the Secretary, Northern Provinces, explaining that:

> Assistant Resident Captain Foulkes in-charge Kanna-Angass-Sura District has made his headquarters at Kanna. This was as of the time necessary as Kanna required a considerable amount of attention; the Angass District was only partially under control and the Sura tribe was quite uncontrolled, now that the whole district is controlled have conditions altered.[5]

Howard's successors, however, had to face uprisings at different flash-spots until 1917, and so would not agree with him that by 1908, the whole area represented by the present-day Kanam, Kanke, Pankshin, and Mangu Local Government Areas, had been virtually brought under control. Then Howard expressed his choice of the Wokkos site and tried to justify it, thus:

> It appears to me essential that the headquarters should be in a healthy, central, position near the independent Hill Angass who still require constant attention. Wokkos fulfils these conditions. Its situation is healthy, it is near no compound, it lies between Wokkos, (sic!) Ampan [Pang, Ampang-East] and is not more than one day's march from any of the independent Hill Angass towns.[6]

Besides, according to Howard, the Wokkos people did not mind its situation within their territory:

> Wokkos is the most satisfactory of the Hill Angass [polities]. I was afraid that the people would resent my proposal to [site] a station near the town and they might possibly [make] trouble, this has not however been the case, the chief [has] been willing and helpful and there has been no friction.[7]

Moreover, Howard had had to admit or to confess to the fact that:

> It has been found in the past that pagans of the Bukuru, Sura (sic!) Angass districts are very apt to die if brought in to Bauchi, it will in future be possible to deal with most such cases either at Bukuru or at Wokkos and to imprison convicted pagans either at Wokkos or in the temporary gaol at Bukuru.[8]

But 'Plateau' prisoners often died in Bauchi prison, obviously, not because they were 'pagans' or were hailing from the 'Bukuru', 'Sura' and 'Angass' districts. They must have died as a result of maltreatment and torture meted out on them by non-pagan prison warders. Then there was also the fact that Bauchi was hotter than most places on or around the Jos Plateau. Thus, Howard admitted the fact of their death but denied the actual reasons responsible for it, as it were.

However, Howard intended to remove the whole jail from Bauchi to Leyb Zat'tur since convicts' mortality rate in Bauchi was rather high. A prison yard was therefore erected at Leyb Zat'tur in Wokkos in 1908. In addition to the prison yard, various other buildings were also raised and completed in the brief period before the end of March in 1908. The stationed military detachment comprised of thirty-five rank and file soldiers, under the command of one D. S. C. Fowler. During part of 1908, Resident George Ormsby was in charge of Hill Division, whose headquarters Wokkos was, when Capt. Foulkes went on leave. Apart from the administrative officer on the spot, such as either Foulkes or Ormsby, and the military detachment, there was also a section of civilian staff assisting in running the affairs of the station. So official buildings

apart, a barracks and other residential quarters had had to be constructed, to accommodate all.

But the buildings were raised through conscription of local labour, or forced labour. No wonder, the station was built within the span of three months. According to Oliver Howard, the "Hill Angass... worked willingly on the new station at Wokkos."[9] Perhaps it was because of this their surprising 'willingness' that he felt obliged to report that the work had already been completed by the time of his writing! Had Howard told his superiors exactly how 'willingly' the people had worked and why, it would have made things easier to believe him on such a claim. Therefore, it is no error to maintain that the people must have been coerced to work with a lot of vigour and without respite, rather than to think that they actually 'willingly' executed the project. Just another instance of forced labour! This view is quite imperative since Howard himself strongly contended that the people had been under-taxed and that at any rate their taxes could best be paid in that present instance in the form of labour.[10] In other words, besides the taxes they had already paid against the previous year in the forms of grain, livestock and cowry-cash, they were now required to pay an additional tax in kind, that is, in the form of physical labour. Rather than voluntary or 'willing' labour, therefore it was forced labour wearing the garb of a tax increase, that was put to work in the construction of the colonial station at Leyb Zat'tur in 1908.

In a separate report, which Captain F. E. Bissell, the Medical Officer of Bauchi Province at the time, submitted in November 1908, to the Secretary Northern Provinces, after inspecting the station in his official capacity,

contained the following observations, when the station was just in its eighth month.

> The station itself is situated on a hill some 4000ft above sea level and 1600ft above the plain at the base and is quite away from the native town of Wokkos; at present it consists of the following buildings: Residents' House, D.S.P. house, gaol and Police Barracks, with houses for native staff and servants; the European houses, gaol and Police Barracks are built of mud [with mud-roofing!][11]

Furthermore, he said: "The situation is fairly wooded for mountain site and the air is particularly invigorating; the temperature is very equable for a tropical district..." And in the light of future expansion, Bissell explained that:

> The soil is gravel on a substratum of black clay and the site is very rocky; there are two fairly large grassy plains on the hill, which would give ample room to build should the station become a larger one.[12]

Meanwhile the colonialists had, through forced labour, also caused the Ngas to construct a road good enough for pack animal transport linking the station to Chigwong in the foothills below, a route both to Bauchi and for getting of supplies for use at the new station. "Government Donkeys have been usefully employed in transporting grain to Wokkos" on that road, reported Howard at the time.[13] Not only did the people pay the heavy cost of constructing the Wokkos station as well as its adjoining road with their labour, but they also paid the cost of maintaining it with their grain and livestock. The food that the British and Nigerian colonial staff, soldiers, and servants took, while at Zat'tur, must, as usual, have been taken either free or at give-away rates. Numerous livestock belonging to Ngas people must have been packed to the station and consumed. Then there were the other food items that were needed, and so on.

Anyone would have thought that, in view of the evidence thus far adduced, the Wokkos station had come to stay and that it adequately met the needs and purposes of the colonial regime, which founded it. Regardless of the duress the people had gone through and the wanton expenditure of their resources, the Wokkos station was soon abandoned in the same year in which it was founded. The colonial whim now preferred another location more or less in the vicinity of Wokkos polity, namely, the Nwulmi Hill or what became known as the flat top of Manung or 'Pankshin Hill'.

4 .2.2: **The Pankshin Station**

Capt. Foulkes suddenly decided to move his headquarters from Zat'tur in Wokkos, to the Pankshin area for similar or better reasons than those, which favoured Wokkos over Kanam. By the end of 1908, when, alas, the movement to Pankshin was already decided, Resident Gowers, who succeeded the late Howard, advanced the advantages of the decision, thus:

> An excellent site for the headquarters of this division has been chosen at Pankshin. The principal advantages which this site possesses over Wokkos are (a) better water supply, (b) greater elevation, (c) room for indefinite expansion, (d) easy accessibility over the Plateau both from Bukuru and from Bauchi and Leri [Lere] ...Pankshin might form a useful health station for officers stationed on the Benue.[14]

Pankshin station, which became the second colonial seat of authority to be cited in Yil Ngas, was established during the closing weeks of 1908 on the top of Mt. Nwulmi, a part of the so-called 'Pankshin Hill,' but the construction of the station itself must have lapsed into 1909 before it was completed.

By altitude the Pankshin station was situated on a higher point than its immediate predecessor, the Wokkos station, which, in turn, had also been a higher point than its Kanam predecessor. In his report, Bissell had innocently

compared the Wokkos station and Pankshin-hill areas, without knowing that the station would later be moved to the latter, thus: "The [Wokkos] station faces N.E. [north-east] by N. [north] and is partly sheltered by Pankshin hill which rises [sic] the other side of a valley to some 500ft above Wokkos..." and "through this valley a stream runs having origin partly in Wokkos and partly in Pankshin hill."[15] While the two neighbourhoods simultaneously served as watershed for the stream passing by Chigwong, they varied markedly in altitude. Yet, it was to the higher location between the two altitudes, that is, the Pankshin hill, that the colonialists suddenly moved their headquarters in the area.

Apparently no specific report was later submitted on the Pankshin station after it had been established in 1909. Writing in recall in 1910, barely two years after relocating to the Pankshin hill, Foulkes succinctly maintained that: "Before our arrival in the [Ngas] country, Pangchen (present Pankshin) was only a minor town of a group... of which Bwet [Bet] was by a long way the largest."[16] In other words, in the immediate neighbourhood of Mt. Nwulmi on which the new colonial station now stood, was a number of communities the largest of which was Bet.[17] Besides the implied smallness of scale of Pang'chen, these communities constituted either the whole of Pang'chen polity or a part of it during the pre-colonial period. It is little wonder that they collectively betrayed a brazen show of surrender in the face of the colonial invading armies in 1906. Another deterrent factor why Pang'chen communities did not go to arms with the colonialiusts must have been the knowledge of what onslaught would befall them, when they saw the lessons learned in a hard way by neighbouring polities like Wu'se'li and

Wokkos, which ventured to resist. Hence, Howard was sometimes inclined to refer to the Pang'chen communities as 'very frightened', 'of lesser importance' or, simply, 'not important,' in his war reports. To reiterate, these communities seemed in 1906 to have spontaneously elected not to confront the colonial invaders in a battlefield, but sued for peace. Foulkes, in his 1910-recollections, further shed light on the matter, when he explained that:

> ...on my first coming here, Serikin Pankshin [Ngolong of Pankshin: Langkuk] was the only one who took his courage in his hands and came out to meet me. The others [other Pang'chen kings], seeing that no misfortune had befallen him, applauded his good sense and agreed to make him their representative and chief in their relations with me, and under his auspices, were brought in one by one.[18]

Such recollections are useful because they furnish us with eye-witness accounts of the situation in Pang'chen before the colonial station was taken there, and thus, enabling us in assessing the scale of growth that the place must have undergone before it later metamorphosed into a 'Pankshin-Town'. From the evidence contained in the recollections thus far, five notable positions can be taken concerning the period stretching from the imposition of colonial domination up to the siting of the station in the area. First, the Pankshin town area was characterised by a cluster of (ten or so) communities of varying sizes. Secondly, none of the other communities, which included Nwulmi (Wulmi), Bong, Yimtul, Bwar'k (Bwarak), Lang'dang (Ner), Fwor, Duk, Dilla and Vel, was larger than Bet (Anguwan Galadima). Thirdly, the communities were separately governed by their own kings, and therefore relatively independent of one another. Fourthly, the ascendancy of Langkuk, hitherto king of one of the communities, namely, Langdang, to the office of group-chief over all the communities in the area presently represented somewhat by Pankshin town,

was a sequel, not an antecedent, to the colonial presence in the area. Hence, their oneness as a polity must have been based on belonging to a shared community of common understanding, known for hoes as 'Pang'chen', a group name, which incidentally encompassed them all. Fifthly, Pang'chen was a minor or weak but very careful polity when the colonialists went to conquer Yil Ngas; probably reckoning with their situation, they tactfully avoided any confrontation with the colonialists. But it is doubtful, if Pang'chen was ever actually subject to, or a vassal of Wokkos polity, which impression Resident Howard laboured to create during the first colonial invasion of Yil Ngas in 1906.[19] Pang'chen might just have been stigmatised as a vassal to Wokkos, either by informants or Howard himself, simply because she did not give any headache to the colonialists, when they got there. First presentations and/or impressions matter a lot, goes the adage! Apart from Howard, no-one including Foulkes for that matter, who visited or stayed in Yil Ngas, seems to have mentioned anything supportive of the assertion, ever since.

From the start, the colonial station retained on its Pankshin site all the 'departments' it had had while at Zat'tur: including the residency, the prison, the detachment and barracks, the couriers, the servants, and so on. Coming on the heel of the establishment of the new station, however, was the establishment of the first Hausa settlement in Pankshin in 1909, situated next to the colonial station on the top of Mt. Nwulmi. Even though the Hausa were later asked by the colonialists to shift their settlement to the foot of the hill in 1915, their presence was one of the new features accompanying the colonial station at its Pankshin site. Meanwhile, the Hausa did not waste time in claiming, or seeking to claim a stake in the native administration of both

Pang'chen and Yil Ngas.[20] Suffice it to say that infrastructurally speaking, this new Hausa settlement in the region was an additional unit, to the growth and expansion of the new colonial station on the one hand, and the wider Pankshin-town 'community', on the other hand. Shortly after the relocation of the Hausa settlement to the foot of the hill in 1915, where they got nearer to the Ngas people, it was christened 'Manung' meaning 'they are wise', derogatively indicative of the sharp practices of the Hausa, denigrated by the Ngas host communities.

Up to 1920, while it cannot be said that the new Pankshin 'community' made up of both the colonial station and the surrounding villages remained constant without traces of both immigration and emigration, it can surely be said that, during the same period, 1909 to 1920, the place was gradually turned into a centre of attraction of some sort; a small hotbed of competing political interests and murderous ambition, both between and among the Ngas and Hausa-Fulani elements. At least, that was the case, before, and after, the assassination of Langkuk in Ntal (Tal) in 1917, when some local notables wanted to secure a stake within the colonial economy, to obtain a share of colonial power for their own personal and selfish reasons.[21] And while the colonialists appeared not to have been disturbed much by that situation, they nevertheless (twice) considered transferring their station from the Pankshin town area to locations elsewhere, because their bid was to safeguard and promote colonial interest first and foremost, not that of the colonised who were always subjected to forced labour in pursuance of such interests, once identified.

The first proposal affecting the status of Pankshin town as a colonial seat of power was one actually seeking only a partial, or temporary, transfer. The DO in charge of Pankshin District, G. L. Monk, made the proposal in 1919 to the effect that a second and temporary headquarters be established in Pai sub-district to cater for the eastern half of the district with an ADO posted permanently there, at least, every dry season.[22] But Monk's superiors apparently ignored it.

While on tour in Bokkos, one Acting Resident made the stronger proposal in April 1920 to the effect that the station be fully transferred from Pankshin to Bokkos. However, B. R. Lawrence, the first DO in-charge of the new-created Pankshin Division in 1920, who did not share the viewpoint of his superior on the matter, made the following submissions, which seem to be the nearest, on-the-spot, assessment remarks on the Pankshin station and its environs, since 1910: "the Acting Resident was at Bokkos and was struck with the possibilities of Bokkos as the District Headquarters. This...has some great advantages as well as, in my opinion, some disadvantages,"[23] said he, as he stated the advantages of Bokkos:

> ... for the advantages you have fine open country for troops, plenty of water, excellent ground, laterite for roads, you are near Bukuru railhead, also the telegraph and post offices. Bokkos could easily be -- and will be -- connected up with Ropp by dry season motor road before next Christmas...[24]

Then the disadvantages, which were more:

> On the other hand, Bokkos is a poverty stricken land in the matter of food, the excellence of the laterite soil for roads diminishes the productive value of the land. Accha is the only crop grown in any quantity. The feeding therefore of a number of troops would be a serious question...
>
> Though water is plentiful wood... [is difficult to get in Bokkos] ...much more so in fact than at Pankshin. The climate of

> Bokkos is bleak to a degree, Bokkos is 100 feet higher than Ropp, which is in the neighbourhood of 4,200 feet... The Kaleri [Kulere] can be easily administered from Bokkos, what about Pai, Yergam [Hill Tarok] and Tal [Ntal] at the other corner of the District? They are infinitely more accessible from Pankshin and... require as constant attention as, if not more than, Kaleri [Kulere] itself.[25]

Then Lawrence argued in favour of Pankshin:

> Food is difficult in Pankshin, but the formation of a grain reserve is an easier matter.
>
> Water is a difficulty in Pankshin, but not a great one. I am convinced that professional well-diggers... could find water on the hill itself [Mt. Nwulmi]... The hill site at Pankshin is... a fine situation and the labour which has been expended on the trees, shrubs, etc, has borne fruit; it is a delightful station and there is plenty of sport for gun and rifle within a couple of miles; this Bokkos lacks. I am aware that these attractions should not decide the position of Administration Headquarters, nevertheless their presence or absence does colour or discolour ones outlook upon life.[26]

Making the following recommendations, in conclusion:

> The solution is, of course, two officers for the District and two stations, one at Pankshin and the other at Bokkos. If two officers cannot be spared then Bokkos could at any rate be used as Headquarters for a year or two with a view to opening up Kaleri [Kulere], but I believe that a return will be made to Pankshin, and am consequently in favour of maintaining the buildings here.[27]

Nothing else was virtually said or done about the proposed Bokkos station, after Lawrence's report. Instead, the Pankshin station remained, and its embryonic town community was left alone to expand both demographically and infrastructurally. For, it demands no over-emphasis that the siting of the colonial seat of power in the Pankshin town area was a vital infrastructural outfit, which as from 1920 onwards proved to be more useful than the colonialists had envisaged, in their exploitation of Yil Ngas and the wider Pankshin Division..

The fact of exploitation in Yil Ngas attained an added dimension in the wake of the increasing population in Pankshin town in the early twenties, which needed to be supplied with ample food-grains by, among others, the various communities of Yil Ngas, in order for it to survive. In his cited comments above, made in 1920, Lawrence had observed that **food** was a difficulty in Pankshin town already. With the addition of a regular or weekly market, a native court (which used to meet openly under the trees for some time!) and a grain reserve, by the early twenties, and a hospital, in the early thirties, efforts to ensure the survival or sustenance of the burgeoning population in Pankshin town, on the part of the colonialists as well as their Nigerian employees, only became intensified because a great part of that population was not involved in agricultural production. Nevertheless, the market, the grain reserve, the so-called native court, the prison and so on, were new units of infrastructure within the wider unit that the town itself represented. The fact remains at this stage that Pankshin had assumed the features, even if only in embryo, of a **town** as it is technically understood.

> Historically, the first division of settlements into different types had to do with a major social division of labour which led primarily 'to the separation of individual and community from agricultural labour, and hence to the separation of *town* and *country*...' This division has been retained to this day: all settlements are divided into two main types - *towns* and *urban* settlements in general, whose population is mostly linked with non-agricultural activity, and *rural settlements* or *villages* where agricultural production is the main sphere of employment.
>
> Accordingly, a country's entire *population* or that of a region [as has been the case in Yil Ngas since the 1920s] is divided into *urban population* and *rural population*.[28]

Let us therefore accept that on the basis of this technical definition, **Pankshin** had become a **town** in the early twenties. However, there is no

doubt that with the establishment of the prison, market, grain reserve and hospital, in Pankshin town, the colonial state had put into place some of the structures that would make for the easy operation of their economy of exploitation. What was the nature of these units of colonial infrastructure, which were located within Pankshin town? Let us look at the market, the grain reserve and the prison.

Monk probably was the first DO to mention the market in Pankshin town in colonial records, when he wrote in 1919 that: "Corn however is still hard to obtain in the markets, especially the Hausa markets at Pankshin and elsewhere..."[29] The caption 'Hausa markets' was certainly not to imply that the markets in question were exclusively attended and operated by Hausa people; rather, the Ngas folks were apparently not sufficiently motivated to jump at the prospect or presence of a new market in the vicinity set up by Hausa traders, to which they went *en masse*, since there were markets they were already used to, in taking and getting their goods, regardless of their distances from their various places of domicile. As Monk himself further explained:

> Whilst at Pankshin I made arrangements with Sarkin Angass [Umoru Attahiru, who was based at Per] to get the plain Angass to bring their corn to Pankshin and Panyam markets instead of carrying it farther afield, and I hope they will realise the advantages of the nearer markets and that the position will be permanently improved.[30]

However, whether they saw the advantages of nearer markets or not, it really did not matter to Monk because he was of the general opinion that "the local pagans are not sufficiently highly taxed to induce them to bring out and sell their surplus corn."[31] After connecting it to the need for higher taxes, Monk apparently said nothing more on the Pankshin market.

The second mention of Pankshin market by the colonialists was made by Lawrence made in April 1921 when he described it among two, other markets, thus:

> Chip market is large and well patronised. It is held every four days. A new market place was built in November. Panyam market is a daily one. A new market place has also been built here. **Pankshin market flourishes for 3 months after harvest and then languishes.** A new market place was built in November [1920]. It is held every Friday.[32] (Emphasis and parenthesis added).

So for more than ten years of the existence of Pankshin station, there was no standing market in the station's vicinity. Probably the market continued to flourish and languish intermittently until the latter half of the 1920s -- after motor transport had got to Pankshin town -- when, as in 1927, Reo lorries belonging to Yoruba traders visited Pankshin town sometimes three times in one week.[33] That was indicative that Pankshin town had now metamorphosed into an emergent urban-cum-commercial centre; what with a Friday market and a grain reserve to which peasant supplies were taken, by hook or by crook, meeting the needs of the growing community.

The Grain Reserve was very little reported on, by the colonialists. Neither have our informants any vivid recollections with regard to it. The original idea of the grain reserve was most probably Lawrence's, in 1920, although there is also the possibility that the OC of the military detachment in Pankshin town, sponsored it. As a matter of fact, Lawrence first mooted it, in his defence of leaving the colonial station at Pankshin as against transferring it to Bokkos: according to Lawrence, grain could be obtained from the 'fat lands' of Yil Ngas such as Ntal, Gar'm, Chip and Langkang, to sustain the grain reserve and the burgeoning town community.[34]In another report

submitted in the same year, Lawrence defined the initial purpose of the grain reserve as he explained the process of collecting the grain: it was exclusively for the use of WAFF soldiers stationed in Pankshin town. However, because, according to him, grain was "practically unobtainable in the local markets" the formation of the grain reserve became "necessary to prevent the troops from starving."[35] The process of collection was like this:

> The grain is weighed on arrival and the cash for each bag handed to me by the O.C. (the transaction passes through his accounts) and I in turn hand it to the carrier. I make it a rule that the actual farmers who together fill the bag with grain should supply a carrier, so that the money is paid as directly as possible to the farmers themselves...[36]

No further report was made on the Grain Reserve nor the feeding of the troops, except, of course, on their activities, which imply that the Grain Reserve was quite in place and running smoothly in meeting the needs of the Military Detachment for as long as the detachment was kept in Pankshin station, and for as long as grain remained practically unobtainable in local markets. Probably the name of the grain reserve was either too business-like or too blunt, hence it was strangely avoided in subsequent colonial correspondence in the twenties. But the fact of collecting grain, and therefore the continuation of the reserve, remained a viable feature of the colonial economy headquartered at Pankshin town. With the passage of time, grains were not only requisitioned for the sake of troops, but also for the survival of the NA prison, hospital and School, especially as from the thirties, much of which evidence is in chapter five. The Grain Reserve, essentially was a beach-head of exploitation, and, as far as the area of administrative collection, accompanied by compulsory supply of food grains was concerned, it was a fine beginning for a colonial outfit. However, its existence was necessitated by

the colonial basis of Pankshin Town, by its detachments of soldiers and later, policemen, by couriers, servants and prisoners and later still, by needs of the Minesfield, whose pursuit it championed.

The NA (Native Administration) Prison's development seems to illustrate, to an extent, Pankshin town's dynamic expansion during the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century. The prison was built in 1909 and later rebuilt in 1919. Whatever happened to the first prison built at the Pankshin station under Capt. Foulkes' supervision in 1909, we do not know. It might have got dilapidated and ruined, due to lack of care and renovation, during the years of the First World War when resident political officers were withdrawn and replaced with touring political officers. Monk's report by December 1919 did not say anything on the former prison but indicates that prison or lock-up services were still in vogue, maintaining that:

> There have been no native prison and the practice of handing over prisoners to Jos of Pankshin [a prominent relative of late Langkuk] for custody being in many ways undesirable - a new prison built in December [1919]- on the ruins of Sarkin Kanam's house in the abandoned Hausa Ungwa [on the Nwulmi hill]. This will form a central prison for the district, and will be managed by a Sarkin yara [Chief warder] with Hausa speaking pagan dogarai under him, under the immediate supervision of the Political Officer.[37]

In the following year, 1920, Lawrence gave an update on the new prison:

> The new prison, ... rather small, however it suffices for present needs... Each prisoner has a mat and a blanket. Soap is given out every Sunday in small quantities for the washing of their persons and the blankets. The diet is ample and frequently includes meat... The prison is also used for provincial court prisoners awaiting trial, but they generally only occupy it for a night or two. There is no other suitable place of detention.[38]

The prisoners were employed on jobs like cleaning the station, keeping the Rest House compound in good order, cleaning roads, repairing culverts, etc.

There were not usually more than two at any given time, so they could not do much work due to their fewness. Their being given blankets and meat was a 'good' experience for a start, especially on the part of the few prisoners. However, whereas there had not been more than two prisoners at any given time, there were at the same time a total of forty dogarai royal bodyguards, at the Pankshin station, on the pay-roll of the colonialists in 1920. Out of that number, only the Chief Dogari and three others were directly assigned to take charge of the prisoners. What were the rest occupied in doing? Of what use were they? Lawrence was very candid, perhaps, when he commented on them that: "They are not a brilliant company, but there are some useful members. They are gradually improving as a whole, four having been changed... for the better."[39] Candid in criticising them, but obviously, not willing to dismiss them! They were probably a residue of the large followership of the late Ngolong Langkuk, or simply part of the emerging lumpen town-dwellers who were too willing to share in the privileges afforded by either the Pankshin station or colonial service, or both. 'Wherever there is a carcass, there the vultures will gather.'[40] Since Lawrence preferred to keep them but yearned for their improvement, they must have been of potential importance to him, a reserve force of servants, awaiting the taking into custody of more prisoners.

In the following year, 1921, not too surprisingly, the new prison was enlarged in such a way that it could "hold sixty prisoners comfortably"; although the average number of prisoners had only risen to up six, by the first half of the year. By 1922, that figure must have risen possibly by 400%, since Lawrence could even spare and keep fifteen prisoners to work in Panyam, especially on the roads, an experiment whose success made him to build a

small lock-up or cell at Panyam, where the prisoners were usually kept at night.[41]

In 1923, the new person was improved upon in accordance with prescriptions of the Medical Officer, or MO, of the Bauchi-headquartered Central Province, who had hitherto inspected the prison, and, while the supplementary cell in Panyam was already completed in order to hold some prisoners during the wet season, Lawrence decided to build another at Bokkos for the same purpose of engaging prison labour in road work.[42]

The Pankshin prison was further repaired in 1924: "...owing to some heavy storms, the prison buildings had fallen into disrepair. This has ... been rectified by the prisoners themselves."[43] In the same report, Lawrence also revealed that:

> There has been a recent influx of iron thieves and receivers, so that the numbers are now beginning to assume useful proportions. I have had twenty unshackled prisoners working on a long stretch of uninhabited road between Pankshin and Vodni for some weeks. They are getting work done which would otherwise have to be paid for...[44]

Later in the same year, Lawrence admitted that the building was "now too small for the number of prisoners" and, after all, that the MO had "passed the prison for a maximum of 40 inmates, only." Consequently, Lawrence's space saving strategy was to engage inmate gangs of ten to thirty prisoners on road work along the Pankshin-Vodni road.[45] Prisoners were often subjected to shackles and leg-irons (like slaves) while they toiled in the early twenties. The Pankshin prison-building's roof was all along that of mud until 1925, when Lawrence, reported that:

> The prison has been roofed with grass. This was badly needed. All flat mud roofs leak in Pankshin, which station probably has heavier rainfall than any other Divisional Headquarters in the [Central] Province.[46]

During the last quarter of the same year, the average number of inmates, according to Lawrence, was "very high" throughout; they were "far too many for the prison to hold" and so various gangs were "stationed at Panyam, Bokkos and elsewhere on road work." However, "a useful gang" was "kept in Pankshin at work on the new road up the [Nwulmi] hill" on which the station perched.[47]

By 1927 the yearly average of inmates was in the upwards of fifty; and the same routine of sanitary work, road work, breaking of stone for cement work, making of repairs on prison walls, floors, and so on, characterised the dynamics of prison labour in Pankshin town.[48] By June 1930, some new conditions had come to characterise both the Pankshin prison and its inmates: warders were engaged to replace the **dogari** folk; there were prison earnings, and so forth. Capt. Oke, the DO in-charge of Pankshin Division at the time, who seemed to have a knack for statistics, reported that:

> The prison was enlarged by the addition of a large cell during the first half of the year it now has accommodation for nearly 200 prisoners. ...[A]t the beginning of the year there were 6 awaiting trial and 126 prisoners in the prison while at the close there were 87 prisoners and one man awaiting trial. The daily average worked out at 100.3 as compared with 113.78 in 1929.
>
> There were 3 deaths making a death rate of 29.9 as compared with a death rate of 79.1 in 1929 during which nine prisoners died. The health of the prisoners was good as only 24 prisoners were ill for 286 days.... Prison earnings amounted to £38.11.5 during the year.[49]

It is doubtful whether the usual option of payment of a fine, instead of serving a prison term, which is common nowadays, was in vogue and/or allowed at that time. Money was hard to come by. It seems that every proven case of crime committed always attracted a prison term at the Pankshin NA prison. Monetary options were not usually stated. But, the introduction of

prison earnings, paid by members of the public in exchange for employed prison labour, was intended to help off-set the costs of feeding the prisoners now that their numbers kept increasing more geometrically than otherwise. Probably payments made in kind for hired prison labour were also entertained. Due largely to the fact that once a man was charged to court, he was almost certain of being thrown into prison, the numbers kept increasing. The increase on the daily average of two prisoners in 1920 up to one hundred prisoners, in custody, in 1930, would be in the upwards of 5000% difference, in ten years! Many people found themselves going to prison for trivial cases. There was always room for more inmates. With the passage of time, many statements implying going to Pankshin or being taken to Pankshin were generally and readily understood, in the communities of Yil Ngas, to mean going to prison.[50]

In a nutshell, the NA prison was a vital unit of infrastructure not only in terms of the punishment of convicted criminals as the colonialists understood it to be, but also in the procurement of free and available labour for immediate and daily use. Prisoners played their part in building Pankshin town and in constructing colonial roads within the division; and in both respects the labour of prisoners from the various communities of Yil Ngas, was significant.

If however, the development of Pankshin town was to be assessed on the basis of the development of the market, grain reserve, and prison, which have been briefly considered above, then we could comfortably conclude that Pankshin town up to the early 1930s was more of an embryonic urban colonial centre, which was both grain and labour-power consumptive in character, than a burgeoning commercial community. It could not at the time develop a viable market for food commodities probably because it held within itself an

expanding band of prison inmates and a collecting grain reserve, the operations of which phenomena were dialectically opposed to the evolution of a viable commercial community, which incidentally was not what the colonialists had gone there to prosecute. No wonder, sixteen years after the colonial station had moved to Pankshin, in spite of the presence of the military, and later police detachment, stationed there for a long time; the expanding civilian population; the grain reserve, which reserved grain against rainy days; the native court; the very expansive NA prison; the Friday market, and so forth; Lawrence in 1925, could still audaciously refer to the Pankshin station as a bush station to which a newly recruited policeman needed not to be posted![51]

In 1928, a new site was chosen for the NA buildings, that is, the divisional headquarters and other buildings, to be shifted from the top of Mt. Nwulmi down to its north-eastern foothills, probably for reasons of space, not access by road, since a motor-road up the mountain had already been completed and used since 1924. In the meantime, having accepted and approved the said moving down of NA buildings in 1929, the Resident of the 1926-created Plateau Province, Capt. P. Lonsdale further observed that as far as what he called colonial institutes (by which he meant the DO's office, NA prison, grain reserve, court and so on) were concerned, the Pankshin station was actually a pace-setter in the province! That movement from the hill-top to the foot-hills must have injected the station with a new lease of life, to such an extent that Pankshin station, according to Lonsdale, was rapidly being transformed "into a model for other N.A centres."[52]

British colonial administration had now built a typical colonial centre in Yil Ngas, one, which in the colonial scheme of things, became a point of collection of material valuables and of people, a reference point for others NAs to notice, but to us, what we may call a core unit of colonial infrastructure. The same process, which turned Pankshin into a typical colonial town, or centre, also transformed the wider Yil Ngas into a typical colonial countryside. A core does not exist without a periphery. But it was not as automatic as this may sound; it actually involved some deliberate actions on the part of the colonialists to ruralise the country of the people, apart from the town. Let us feature this through looking at the development of colonial infrastructure in the wider Yil Ngas, during the period under review in this chapter.

4.3: How Yil Ngas Was Made A Colonial Countryside

As part of the effort to consolidate their control and ensure the smooth operation of their system of domination through taxation and the exploitation of produce and labour, the colonialists were inadvertently poised during the 1920s and 1930s to, more effectively, prosecute one of their earliest intentions in Yil Ngas: the construction of colonial roads and rest camps, and the siting of colonial markets and smaller stations, albeit connected in one way or the other to Pankshin town, to Bauchi town, and to the tin Minesfield in Bukuru area. Therefore, let us look at the process of, and the effort involved in, constructing and establishing these aspects of colonial infrastructure in the region, beginning with the roads.

4.3.1: Tracks, Routes, Roads:

Starting from the opening years of the invasion of, and the establishment of colonial regime in Yil Ngas, from the days during which

Oliver Howard was the resident in-charge in Bauchi, it was a principle generally accepted among the colonialists within the province that manual labour expended in road making, particularly, to use colonial parlance, in 'opening up' the Pagan Belt, a part of which, Yil Ngas was constituted to be, was not wasted at all. In those earlier years, the colonialists made use of whatever they found: pre-colonial trade routes, hitherto plied mostly by human porterage, age-old footpaths, Fulani cattle tracks and so forth. Colonialists even ventured to create particularly tracks of their own, usable by pack animal transport, such as was constructed between Bauchi and Ningi, to the north, and between Bauchi and Wokkos, to the south, in 1908. In the following year, 1909 Oliver Howard could blatantly submit, in his hypocritical style, as earlier cited, that: 'The Hill Angassawa have voluntarily improved their tracks sufficiently to open up the district to trade.' Ironically, only Oliver Howard would have resorted to the use of 'voluntary' in that respect. The 'improvement' of such tracks was an entrenched obligation for the hill communities of Yil Ngas so long as Oliver Howard was the resident in-charge at Bauchi. Meanwhile, it must have involved much expenditure of labour before such improved tracks became amenable to pack animal transport, considering that around Wokkos, the terrain was very rocky as it is today. 'Voluntary' was Howard's euphemism for forced labour, which every often he fondly employed.

In the Plain Angas area, in about 1914, we encounter the rude surprise of a new beginning: Edwardes began to broach the question of the need for the creation of a pack animal road that would link the Amper area in the Plain Angass sub-district with the tin mines situated in the Bukuru area. Edwardes

conviction was that: "The whole economic future of Angass [Yil Ngas] depends on the construction of a good native road to Bukuru."[53] He further explained his conviction, when he maintained or proposed that:

> The obvious market for Angass produce is the Minesfield. A good native road should run from Bukuru via Leri-Boi-Dawaki-Amper - to Wase. The total length would be about 90 miles. The section Dawaki-Amper [part of the section of the proposed road directly encompassing Yil Ngas] would be the most difficult but I have reconnoitred a route where it would be well within the capacity of a native road maker [a Nigerian contractor] to construct a road with local help [Ngas peasants' labour].
>
> It is difficult to exaggerate the supreme importance of this road to the people of Yergum [Tarok land], Western Kanam [Boghom land], and above all the Angass [Yil Ngas]. It is vital and would raise them from a stagnant into a thriving community.[54]

With such a proposal, only little time was required to make real the pack transport arterial road. After all, it is clear from Edwardes' remarks that he was going to commandeer the labour of the encompassed communities within his jurisdiction in order to prosecute his intentions, especially the labour of the Ngas communities within his division to whom he considered the road project to be of superlative importance and whose produce needed to be linked, according to him, to the good markets constituted by the tin mines in the Bukuru area, in order to liberate them from *poverty*; poverty elicited not by lack of goods but by the alleged absence of a market for the 'proper' or capitalist disposal of their surplus produce. Hence, Edwardes saw his pet proposal as emancipative, but, essentially, it was colonialistic, designed to directly exploit and impoverish the people and the region.

Before 1920, the major routes and roads linking or encompassing Yil Ngas, generally speaking, included the (formerly Wokkos -later) Pankshin-

Bauchi Road, Kabwir-Bauchi Road, and Wase-Bukuru Road, which intersected the Pankshin-Bauchi Road at Boi and was linked to the Benue River system at places like Amar and Ibi. The Pankshin-Daffo Road, which terminated in what was ihe Bokkos tin mining area, the Naraguta-Ibi Road, which intersected the Pankshin-Daffo Road at Panyam and actually linked the vast tin mining area of the Bukuru-Naraguta axis with the Benue valley and river system. And lastly, the Piapung-Boi Road which linked the two main roads, namely, the Ibi-Naraguta and the Wase-Bukuru Roads, which ran from the lowland through the south-eastern and eastern foothills, respectively, to the Jos Plateau. This Paipung-Boi Road served as a bridger between the two main roads as it ran along the foothills of the Jos Plateau's massif, across Ntal, Gar'm, Ampang-East and Kabwir District areas.

Not all the roads were reworked and used by motor vehicles, during the 1920s. Nor were the colonialists really desperate to introduce motor transportation to ease the movement of goods and people. No, for quite a long time, the roads, though designed for vehicles, were plied more by caravans of porters and labourers carrying grain and other goods on their heads, to the tin fields. Trekking was the basic form of going to, and returning from the tin mines; this was true throughout the period under review in this chapter, as far as Yil Ngas was concerned. Motor vehicles were mainly utilised in the transportation of some colonial goods and services, such as grain collected for the grain reserve, whereas the people of Yil Ngas were compelled to expend their manual energies and resources on the making of the roads, colonial buildings and head-carrying of goods for the colonial state.

The coming of B. R. Lawrence to Pankshin as a resident Divisional or District Officer in 1920 can be regarded as a turning point in the making of colonial roads in the division. Technically, Lawrence was not prepared at all to initiate any road-making programme, when he arrived. He had neither the staff nor the equipment. Nevertheless, he commenced work on roads during the wet season of that year, 1920. He later unapologetically reported that: "No road-making work is attempted in the farming season, but the roads have still to be kept clean. There should be much activity on the roads, after harvest, all over the District."[55] Because it was necessary from Lawrence's point of view to keep the roads clean, he caused the various communities to clear the roads in spite of the wet season during which the bulk of the people devoted most of their time to their own farms.

Lawrence seemed not have found good persons recruitable as road staff in Yil Ngas and elsewhere in Pankshin Division. According to him: "Road supervisors are badly wanted but intelligent men are few and far between in this District ....I will endeavour to train some men myself later on."[56] In the following year he actually recruited six men as his first team of road staff, but probably in line with his quoted opinion above, only one Chimlang among those recruited was definitely an indigene of Yil Ngas, or even Pankshin Division as a whole. Chimlang was not among the favoured two who were sent immediately to Jos to do a course and to later train the other four. That apart, the work was going to be too much for the six men to manually execute themselves. They merely served as supervisors while the various communities continued to bear the actual load of the labour involved.

Lawrence increased the road staff strength in 1924 in order for them to cater for certain jobs within the capacity of four or five men, standing as a gang.[57]

Lawrence conceived the challenge of making roads in Pankshin Division as a most serious one when he began in 1920, due to the topography of the area. When he reported that he had had a lot of difficulty in finding a good route down the Langkang valley in 1921, and that he was indeed in the course of working on his fourth and best attempt down the slope, Fremantle, Resident of Central Province, had already become so hopeless about any such possibility, so he jocularly wrote back that the first car down the Langkang valley from Pankshin, along the Ibi-Naraguta Road, shall be recommended for the award of the MBE![58] However, because of the usefulness of the Ibi-Naraguta Road in the supply of goods to the tin mines, Lawrence did not give up. Calling it the great and most important trade route in Pankshin Division, Lawrence finally succeeded by opening up the cattle track down the Langkang valley as his fourth tried route.[59]

Meanwhile, a dry season motor road linking Pankshin to Jos had quickly been made, during the dry season of late 1920 and early 1921. It is surprising that Lawrence had linked Pankshin to Jos, rather than to Bauchi, which was his provincial headquarters. The simplest explanation is that this was necessitated by the faster transformation of Jos into a greater and nearer cosmopolitan and economic beachhead to which other places around were being connected. Situated in the heart of the tin mining area, as it was, Jos, not Bauchi, practically speaking, was Lawrence's industrial and economic headquarters. As a result of the making of that road, however, the first car to reach Pankshin, which brought Bishop Jones and a party of the CMS en route

Kabwir, arrived in March 1921. It was parked at the foot of Mt. Nwulmi until after some days when it departed for Jos again, via Panyam.[60]

Lawrence, of course, endeavoured to 'make' all the roads he wanted to make in Hill Angas and its neighbouring Sura and Baron Districts during the dry season of late 1920 and early 1921. This naturally involved an overkill of the exploitation of the labour, energies, time, tools, food and other resources of the peoples and communities encompassed; just like what Edwardes had done in the prosecution of similar ambitions in Plain Angas District five years before as earlier indicated. It is palpably tenable that several communities must have initially resisted being used, to work on these colonial roads, until they were threatened or even coerced. Lawrence himself reported of the attitude of a Jing community in Lankan (Langkang) sub-district area which prevented the NA road men from going through with the Ibi-Naraguta-Ibi Road on their own soil, talkless of participating in it themselves, which, according to him, was due to their place not having been properly taken yet, by the colonial state, which he described as "an 'unsettled' village where the inhabitants preferred to do the work in their way and threatened the road men..."[61]

Apart from that single instance, Lawrence acknowledged in the same report, however, that work had already been done, or, was already in progress, or, was about to begin on the other roads, in Yil Ngas and elsewhere, in 1921; these excerpts should give us the enormity and scale of the work involved:

> South and East of Pankshin has been started a road which should be a great trade route; that is a road north from Tal [Ntal] through Garram, Kaler, Gwoktok, Manok and Dungun. From Tal as far as Kaler has been done and from Dungun westwards to Chigwom and the borders of Pankshin. From Dungun north to the market of Dawaki and south to Kaler must

be done next season; and also the Pankshin end must be completed.[62]

Furthermore:

> The Tal-Garram road is a new cutting through the bush, is practically straight to Tal and avoids all hills; the old road was circuitous, hilly for the latter part, stony and at least a mile and a half longer. Moreover the new road taps a belt of **giginya** timber, the existence of which was apparently unknown to my staff. For the building of the Tal and Garram Rest houses **azaras** were brought from Takkos, over 20 miles from Garram and 30 from Tal whereas **giginya** was in reality close at hand...
>
> A road from Tal to Tal Puzzuk (borders of Chip District) where it joins the fair Chip-Tal Puzzuk road has also been made. Thus the fat valley of Tal is joined up on the west with Chip market and on the north with Ampam (Angass) towns and Dawaki market.[63]

Moreover:

> Roads are badly needed in Pai and Yergam, especially a road leading there. It was the custom to go to Shuwir [Sh'wer] and thence to Gugur (both in Bauchi Division) when going to Yergam, but branching off from Shuwir to Pai. This method was circuitous, there were no Rest houses, and the road near Shuwir and Gugur were very stony indeed, cruel on horses hooves, moreover I dislike crossing another Division. I wish to make a road from Manok straight to Pai and thence round the foot of the Pail hills to Warok in Yergam.
>
> This I was able to do in March... There is now a direct road from Manok through Lanshi to the foot of the Pai hills (about 8 miles) and thence to Warok (about 9 miles). A road also branches off from this one north to the Gugur boundary (about 3 miles).
>
> There is also a new road from Manok to the borders of Funyelang. Also, about 2 miles west from the Rest house at Funyelang towards Pai. Funyelang and Kwallak rest camps (about 7 miles) have also been joined up, this road moreover leads from Funyelang towards the market of Langtang, (Muri Province). Warok and Funyelang require to be completely joined up (about 2 miles) and Funyelang and Gantan (about 7 miles), also Gantan and the Gugur boundary. If the promised market is established at Gantan after the rains it will surely be a great success.[64]

It is probably not surprising to note that Lawrence was indeed building some of these colonial roads into those parts of his division, both within and without Yil Ngas, such as 'north Yergam,' Chip, Ntal, 'South Sura' and Wuseli, which up to 1922, were still regarded as not yet 'opened,' or safe enough for colonial agents to pass through, unprotected. In fact the question of 'opening' them up was still pending. Infrastructural opening of such places through roads, and rest houses, sometimes preceded their political opening during which the local colonial officer would officially declare them to be safe enough for any colonial staff and property to pass through unguarded, within a margin of five years. Roads were therefore built sometimes with a guard, regardless of the temporary intransigence of such unopened encompassed communities, and with the labour usually recruited from communities, which had already been adequately pacified. The roads in relation to such communities were not only a means of exploiting their resources but also of indirectly usurping their power and controlling them. By 1926, when Plateau Province was created, however, there was hardly any community that was not yet 'opened' by British colonialism in Pankshin Division in general and Yil Ngas in particular; hence, the scope of the exploitation of labour and other resources of all the communities expanded and increased until the late 1920s when it attained its highest point, at which it remained stable throughout the decades up to the early 1950s, as far as road-making in Pankshin Division was concerned.

Wherever the colonial whim wished to follow through with a road, the adjacent communities were immediately saddled with the task of supplying the manual labour and providing their own victuals while doing the work. This

fact, simply put, represents a chorus in the oral information that we accessed, which, to an extent, is also corroborated by some colonial sources. In 1924, for instance, Lawrence documented his blue print for the latter part of that year as follows:

> Throughout the rains I am going to have small gangs of labourers working between Panyam and Pankshin...I have discussed the matter with the pagan sarakuna [chiefs] and have come to an arrangement whereby each village near Pankshin-Panyam road comes out to work on one day each month. This will not interfere with farming, and means that we shall get about 100 labourers each day for nine to ten days throughout the wet season. We shall thus be able to effect improvements at the best time of year and the dry season work will be considerably lightened.[65]

How that arrangement was not going to interfere with farming shall remain a riddle forever. What is clear is that it was impossible. There was no how a permanent engagement of manual labour in the making of a motor road during a wet season would not affect farming within an agrarian economy. The measure of the labour engaged on the road was equal to the measure of labour lost on the farms that year. When confronted by his resident with the question, "this work will be paid for?", Lawrence answered thus: "No, it is statutory labour. It is most necessary if the road is to be kept open throughout the rains, and you have my assurance that it is no hardship. The first month's work has been most successful."[66]

Statutory labour was believed to be collective or public labour from which no one was exemptible and for which no one was to be paid. The people therefore gave their labour free of charge; but this is not say that they willingly gave it. They had more or less a zero-option to serve the colonial state, as a colonised people. And if this was no hardship for Lawrence to arrange and to enforce, it was certainly a big hardship for the encompassed communities, to

say the least. Statutory labour, which Lawrence introduced, essentially was an organised form of forced labour. Lawrence 'successfully' maintained his strategy of utilising unpaid, compulsory or statutory labour on the roads throughout his tenure, which ended in 1925.

It was until 1926, it seems, as far as accessed colonial records are concerned, that we find the first mention of some form of payment made to the forced labourers, since the pattern of labour supply for road-work which was on a village-by-village basis was not changed, following Lawrence's exit. C. G. Ames, who was one of Lawrence's successors in that year, made the following submission, precisely in September 1926:

> R. F. Donaldson has inspected and reported on the Pankshin-Shendam road throughout its entire length and also Kunkyam to Boi road and the Kabwir to Boi road... The expenditure (special) of £1000 on this road has been now authorised, and work is being progressed with...
>
> The Assistant Treasurer goes along this road every Saturday and pays the labourers on the spot, at the end of their week's work. Different villages and ungwas provide the labour each week. Labourers working elsewhere than on this road (e.g. in the bush with the sawyers) have to come to Pankshin to collect their pay.[67]

The colonialists must have realised that it was both better and safer to pay some monies to the labourers, if they were going to continue to exploit their labour on roadwork. They probably knew that the people would not and could not be stretched in the course of time beyond their limits of reasonable submission. And so they introduced the little cash re-enforcement technique.

In 1927, C. G. McKenzie, who was the immediate successor of Lawrence, reported on the pace of work on the Pankshin-Shendam road, maintaining that: "Good work has been done by all pagans of Plain Angas....The bulk of the heavy work was accomplished during the Rainy

Season by the Hill and Plain Angas Pagans for which payment was made..." He further expressed with pleasure that: "It is satisfactory to know that from now onwards the road will be motorable during the dry season or from September to May at least as far as the Pankshin-Shendam boundary."[68]

Whereas the payment of requisitioned labourers in road-working appears to have become a permanent feature of the late 1920s, the introduction of permanent gangs who were employed to perennially cater for the upkeep of specific roads, such as the road leading from Pankshin to the tin mining areas, almost began at the same time. It came soon after. However, neither of these strategies of maintaining permanent gangs on some roads was a reason sufficient to urge the colonialists to abolish the use of statutory labour. Instead, in McKenzie's terms, the fact that permanent gangs were employed especially on "the Dorowa-Mongu-Pankshin Road," did "not interfere with the responsibility of various local Village Heads for supplying labour when necessary."[69]

Therefore, as far as the making of colonial roads in Yil Ngas in the 1920s and early 1930s was concerned, it should be evident to the reader that statutory labour, which was the main form of engaging the communities, existed up to the early 1930s. Even though, the factors of prison-labour, paid labour, and permanently employed gangs must have played their part in the prosecution of colonial ambitions through road-making, the bulk of the labour that made the roads was, naturally, statutory labour, which was organised forced labour, got through the auspices of the village and district heads, who were increasingly trained and tailored to suit and serve the smooth operation

of colonial policies and interests, during the period under review in this chapter.

Due to the satisfaction afforded by the exploitation of the above stated categories of road-labour, and their effectiveness in road-making, among other variables in Yil Ngas in particular and Pankshin Division in general, McKenzie in 1927, finally and proudly, stated the colonialist position, as far as the future of road-making in that division was concerned, thus: "I have come to the conclusion now that there is nothing in the matter of road construction in this Division that cannot be accomplished..."![70] The role of the colonial roads built in the 1920s and 1930s in the transformation of Yil Ngas into a rural setting shall however not be clearly comprehended if it is not shown what colonial phenomena were pitched along as well as at the separate ends of the roads. Let us now look at such phenomena as other units of colonial infrastructure in Yil Ngas, which were located away from Pankshin Station.

4.3.2 Camps, Markets, Sub-Stations

In most cases, the colonialists first ensured that various rest camps (or rest houses) were built for their own use or comfort during tours, and NA market days and sites established in several communities in Yil Ngas before colonial roads were later built leading to such locations, or sometimes to places beyond. Essentially while the rest houses and markets served as centres for the exploitation of the resources of such communities right from the start, it was difficult sometimes to carry off the exploited resources through unrepaired roads and paths. Hence the making of roads in the 1920s and early 193 Os was made imperative not only by the nature of the things that were needed in colonial centres such as Bauchi, Pankshin and the tin mines, but also

by their (the colonialists') knowledge of what resources (and commodities) existed at the ends of, or along, the colonial roads, which could be obtained, even under the guise of NA established markets, where conditions of unequal exchange were sustained.

In his-1914 report on the Plain Angass District, Edwardes admitted that two rest houses, at Kabwir and Amper respectively, had already been built in the sub-region even though a colonial road had not yet been built within the area. He bared his mind on the need to establish NA markets, and, in particular, how already he had established the Pu'el (Dawaki), and how very soon, he would establish the Per (Amper) market, in that year, both in the Plain Angas area:

> been
> There has no established market up to the present, but as soon as a road passable for pack animals reaches Amper there will be a good opening. Amper would form the collecting centre for the Yergum [Tarok] country, western Kanam [Boghom] and Angass and the caravans would be able to draw large supplies of grain from this area for the mines field. As a preliminary step, I have established a small weekly market at Dawaki [Pu'el], at the point where the Lusa-Kabwir road intersects the line of the new trunk road. This will be accessible for caravans from the mines field south of Bukuru even before the new road is made. There are large supplies of corn available in the immediate vicinity and it is desirable to get a trade started at once even on a small scale. Boi market day is Tuesday so I have made Dawaki [Pu'el] market day Thursday, and in due course if and when the road is through, Amper market day will be Saturday.[71]

Till date, the Per (Amper) and Pu'el (Dawaki) markets are held on Saturday and Thursday respectively, and thrive well, even though the Minesfield has long fallen to the point of operating at a very low ebb, as far as extracting tin is concerned. However, somewhat ironically today, Pu'el (Dawaki) market is the larger of the two. Edwardes took and/or was taking those steps because, according to him, in Plain Angas area, there was "no

demand for Manchester goods. The buying power of these people will remain very small till they can find a ready market for their produce."[72] From such a clear submission as this, it is obvious, let us say: (a) that Dawaki market which was established in 1914 as a child of necessity, or, where grain could be readily sold and bought; it was established small, a deliberate 'preliminary step' paving the way for the proposed or soon-to-take-off Amper market; (b) that Amper town, through its proposed market, in Edwardes' design, was soon to be turned into a colonial sub-station or centre, whose relevance transcended Plain Angas District borders; it was scheduled to be responsible for the collection of grain from the Plain Angass District itself as well as from the neighbouring Taroh and Boghom lands; (c) that the colonialists, and Edwardes in particular, wanted to create a vent for the dumping of second-hand textiles and clothes, the so-called Manchester goods, imported from England; (d) that the colonialists, and Edwardes in particular, wanted to hastily commodify grain produce available in the district and its environs; (e) that the NA established markets and collection centres were aimed at increasing the purchasing power of the people though they had not asked for any colonially-established markets, nor for any colonial money; and (f) that the said Pu'el (Dawaki) and Amper (Chikka) established markets were sited at places where since the pre-colonial past a Hausa settlement had each been established. However the central interest or reason, why the markets were established, was what Edwardes himself had succinctly stated: caravans from the tin mines south of Bukuru had had to be urgently loaded with fresh supplies of Ngas grain, 'market or no market', 'road or no road.' This was uppermost. The

presence of the markets, therefore, was just going to be a significant catalyst towards the attainment of that colonial aim.

Edwardes' proposed road, Amper-Bukuru road was built before 1920, when both the Dawaki and Amper markets had become regular and permanent Thursday and Saturday markets respectively. Amper had continued since 1911 to be the sub-district's headquarters and since the mid-teens the collection centre of the 'Plain Angass District,' up to 1920. At the time of Edwardes' report in 1914, Amper had already acquired the other features of a colonial sub-station: there were already a court house, a lock up, an alkali's house, a rest house, and a district chiefs compound; all of these were NA buildings or 'public buildings' as Edwardes preferred to call them. Naturally, with such largely juridical sort of NA buildings in place, which were manned by thirteen district staff – which included, a District Head, Umoru Attahiru; an alkali or judge, Mohammadu; five titled palace-chiefs; and six **dogari** palace-guards -- the colonialists had already prepared Amper for its 'proper' role: to serve as a collection centre of grains for the tin mines and other colonial 'institutes,' to use Lonsdale's term, such as the NA prison and government hospital, which were located in Pankshin, in the 1920s and 1930s respectively. In the 1930s and even 1940s, Amper also served as a collection centre of crops such as groundnuts and cotton especially after the global tin glut of the early 1930s. Therefore, the Amper sub-station was indeed another unit of colonial infrastructure, which was situated, and it co-ordinated exploitative activities, in Plain Angas District, during the period under review in this chapter.

Shortly after the arrival of Lawrence in 1920 to take charge of Pankshin District, which in the same year became a full-fledged division, he

described the rest house already built in Gar'm (Garram) at the behest of his predecessors, as "a hovel, by way of a rest house, in a bare, shadeless space..."[73] in disapproval. Thereupon he saw to the building of a better one. In Ntal (Tal), one of the polities lately taken by the colonialists in 1917, no rest house had hitherto been built. Lawrence immediately saw to the building of one in the same year, 1920, and later explained that the " rest house was built as a dry season headquarters and is rather more ambitious. It is of the same style as those in Nupe Division of Ilorin Province... The cost of the house with numerous outhouses was under £30. Tal [Ntal] labour was not expensive, but the house could be built anywhere for ... £40."[74] Besides being a rest house, the building was intended to be a dry season, or another 'headquarters' for the divisional officer. Hence, it was, exceptionally built, or, made 'more ambitious' than the rest. Notice the fact that it was built largely at the expense of free Ntal (Tal) labour! The actual amount was not stated: just 'under £30,' was what he said.

Lawrence believed that a good rest camp had "a stablising effect on truculent tribes [independent-minded peoples]."[75] As a result, he expended much energy on seeing to the building of many rest camps in Pankshin Division. In 1923, he reiterated the fact that he attached "far more importance to Rest Houses" because, in the first place, the divisional administration was "so much more direct," than indirect, so to speak, so he had to travel and stay in remote and distant spots, where there were rest houses, because they had a steadying effect on the concerned communities. "They are worth the money expended on them and the work itself is an excellent disciplinary measure," he further maintained.[76]

Thus, in addition to the reason given earlier in 1920, Lawrence presently contended that the abject absence of any trace or trickle in his division of the colonial myth of indirectly administering the territories, was **ipso facto** responsible for the need and bid to build and improve rest camps and/or rest houses. Like the NA buildings at Amper in 1914 and the special rest house in Ntal (Tal), in 1920, all other rest camps and houses, therefore, were microcosmic colonial stations, rural headquarters and centres, strategically scattered in the Pankshin Division in general, and Yil Ngas in particular.

Out of eighteen rest houses in the Pankshin Division, in 1923, only three were located in the Hill Angas District.[77] Its sheer proximity to the divisional headquarters, Pankshin, situated within its borders, seemed to have made it unnecessary for the divisional officer to spend any night away in the same district; he always got back to his residence from anywhere within the district if he so wanted. However, in 1925, out of the forty rest houses in Pankshin Division, ten were located within the Hill Angas district alone, a number which was higher than any of the other seven corresponding districts of the same division;[78] meaning that Yil Ngas was not actually spared from being guarded and watched over through the building of colonial camps and rest houses, despite its relative proximity to the Pankshin Station. Essentially, it is noteworthy that the rest camps were mainly centres of exploitation and the enforcement of colonial domination over colonised communities. That is why even communities in Hill Angas District could not be spared from having the facility. Hence, rest houses were units of colonial infrastructure that were located in the relatively remoter countrysides (comparable in essence to

Pankshin, the tin mines, and other locations, that is) and those nearby for the easy exploitation of the people and their resources.

In the so-called Hill Angas District, the colonialists did not apparently establish any NA markets. When Lawrence arrived in 1920, there were already in existence what the colonialists called Pagan and Hausa markets. Hence, just like Monk, his roving immediate predecessor had done in 1919, Lawrence readily assessed and bemoaned the economic position of the markets, thus:

> Local markets do not prosper in spite of encouragement; the pagans do not want to bring in their produce and they are not sufficiently highly taxed to compel them to do so, they can get all the cash they want on the mines...
>
> Chip market is the one place in the District where corn can be obtained occasionally. Tal [Ntal] serves the Chip market with corn and groundnuts.
>
> Palm oil, rice and groundnuts, are brought up from Muri Province [that is, Mikang, Shendam and Qu'an-Pan areas] by Hausa traders. All the way from Panyam to Chip one meets strings of these traders on the way to the markets of the mines fields...
>
> Traders from Dawaki [Pu'el] to the mines fields prefer the open route via Boi and Leri [Lere] to the mountainous but shorter one through Pankshin.[79]

The picture painted by Lawrence reflects that the general market which everyone attended -- 'traders,' 'pagans,' Hausa and sundry -- was the Minesfield, and this, from two major directions: one encompassing the western and the other, encompassing the eastern parts Yil Ngas. Lawrence also indicated that the local marketing of grain was not flourishing in the so-called Hill Angas area principally because the folks preferred to sell their labour in the tin mines rather than sell off their surplus grain in the local markets, which apparently was what the colonialists preferred. And what was

Lawrence's prescribed antidote to that situation? Impose higher tax rates to such an extent that would force them to sell their produce in the local markets in addition to their labour power, which was already being used in the Minesfield! (Exactly what Monk stood for in 1919!)

On the whole, whenever the colonialists felt it necessary to give 'help' to an old market by way of raising new buildings in the place of dilapidated shelters, they sometimes 'helped.' They even established new markets at places they felt necessary, but the evidence for this during the 1920s, is scanty. Probably only the NA ('pagan') markets of Gar'm (Garram), and Kabwir, which were established in 1930, were the only couple of markets to be established by the colonialists in many years. And this was at the time a somewhat 'progressive' step to the colonialists, since cash flow was quite a difficulty in the Hausa markets due to the tin glut which was beginning to rear its ugly head. The sudden drop in tin prices and output of the mining companies, which subsequently ensued, badly affected local trade. There was a sudden scarcity of money in 1930 and trade failed to be quite as brisk as it was in 1929. The immediate impact of this development, however, was felt in the Hausa markets probably because of their middleman position, than in the so-called pagan or NA markets, operated by the indigenes of Pankshin Division.[80]

In 1930, the too-much tin in the world market and the self-saving measures taken by the larger tin mining companies on the Jos Plateau, to which the markets of Yil Ngas amongst others, had come to be subordinated, produced a difficult situation for them. Their welfare largely depended on the welfare of the tin mining industry; and we can only imagine what must have

become of some of these markets as the tin glut ensued for some two to three years during the early 1930s. Some of them suffocated into non-existence, others dwindled. No amount of assistance from the NA authorities in repairing the stalks and buildings, little as it was, could save the situation.

In a nutshell, or to conclude this section, it is noteworthy that the building of rest houses, and indeed rest camps, at strategic places, many of which were, in effect, rural headquarters and collection centres for peasant resources, the development of special collection centres or colonial sub-stations such as was done in Per (Amper) and lastly the determination of market days, sites, structures, and the needed commodities, all of which came forcefully in evidence in the 1920s and early 1930s, are largely an indication of how the whole of Yil Ngas was tied to the apron-strings of British colonial capitalism, to secure its effective exploitation and underdevelopment. Like the roads which were built during the same period, the camps, markets and sub-stations were in effect units of colonial infrastructure established to see to the smooth penetration of the region and its smooth exploitation by the colonial economy into which it had been incorporated and subjugated and/or 'enslaved.' Yil Ngas could only produce and supply whatever it was required of. It had now been turned into a predominantly rural territory whose centres of labour and surplus-produce consumption, or utilisation, lay far away from its frontiers, or functioned not for its own benefit even when located within its frontiers, such as were the Pankshin station and the Amper sub-station, the rest camps and the established markets and so on.

4.4 Development Of A Colonial Social Structure: Introduction

Another sphere in which significant changes appeared during the period, 1920 to 1935, in Yil Ngas, was the sphere of the society's social structure. In the words of Zotov: "Classes, estates, strata, substrata, and all social groups taken together form an intricate system of relationships and hence society's social structure that is determined by and affects its economic structure, its basis."[81] New classes, settlements, settlement patterns, titles and positions which definitely did not exist in the pre-colonial context of Yil Ngas were engendered or established suiting the dictates of the colonial order, especially during the period under review in this chapter.

In that bargain, the processes of the reorganization of existing districts into smaller political units, of the redefinition of the roles of the local chiefs, of the development and emergence of new classes in the society, of the resettlement of patriotic, though colonially thought to be recalcitrant, communities at colonially designated locations and so on, became notorious, and therefore worthy of comment. Let us focus attention on these factors, one after the other.

4.5 Reorganization of Hill Angas and Plain Angas Districts

With the reorganisation of the Northern Provinces in 1926, the so-called Plain Angas District was finally separated from Bauchi Province and ceded to Pankshin Division of the newly-created Plateau Province. Sequel to that transfer various reorganization exercises within Pankshin Division, a part of which the Hill Angas and Plain Angas Districts happened to be, were attempted or carried out. The colonialists believed that the breaking down of the more or less arbitrary 'Hill Angas' and 'Plain Angas' Districts would lead to

the creation of districts which were more 'traditional' in basis than those two had hitherto been. So they kept attempting to reorganize and redefine what to them were districts, which reflected the 'traditional' basis of the various communities concerned, in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

This bid to properly reorganize Yil Ngas by the colonialists came to a head when A.B. Mathews was sent from Kaduna in 1934 by Northern Nigerian colonial government to investigate the matter and make appropriate recommendations for the consideration of the Chief Commissioner, which at the time, was the title of the man in charge of the northern region. Mathews himself believed that the breaking down of the hitherto two large Ngas districts into smaller district-units was both necessary as well as viable towards making "a living thing of a pan-Angas federation,"[82] which was an entity anticipated by the colonialists.

Twelve districts, which have more or less remained till today, resulted as the outcome of that quest for reorganization (affecting the hitherto Hill Angas and Plain Angas districts,) namely: Pankshin, Lankan, Ampan, Wokkos, Garram, Chip, Pai, Tal, Kadun, Amper, Fier and Kabwir Districts. In each, a native court was sooner or later established as part of the reorganization process.

The significance of the reorganization exercises during the 1920s and '30s in terms of the social structures lies in that fact that on the formal and physical level, more people were privileged to move up the social ladder as colonially-appointed district heads, district scribes, dogari staff, and tax-collectors, to mention a few, than hitherto was the case within the colonial economy. Essentially however, the colonialists wanted the smaller districts in

order to more effectively exploit and dominate the peasant producers in the remotest locations and villages, thereby further safeguarding their colonial interests. The newly upgraded chiefs, who became designated as 'district heads' were naturally expected to double as vehicles of leadership as well as of collection of taxes, grains, livestock, labour and other goods and services, as and when occasion dictated, which it always did. As shown in chapter five, these items and services were on the concurrent list of the colonialists, year in and year out.

Hidden at the back of those reorganization exercises was a principle of exploitation. As Hale Middleton, the then Resident of Plateau Province, used to state it: "we have to make the separate works of a clock before we can start to manufacture the clock itself"![83] This implies that, after the new districts had been fashioned out into the right pattern, the next step after testing their effectiveness, was to piece them together into a bigger structure of exploitation, the so-called Pan-Angas Federation which, in Middleton's hopes, was to be financially self-reliant and strong.[84] Hence, the impact of districts' reorganization was expectedly felt beyond the early 1930s, in terms of the greater cooperation and conformity with the colonial order, which the new districts were intended to show.

Also, the gap between the country, represented by the rural areas of Yil Ngas, and the town, represented by Pankshin-Town, Jos, and the Minesfield, was bound to become wider due to the emergence of the district centres or colonial sub-stations such as Amper had become since 1911, to which the masses could go with items and services which were required by those in authority. The coming into being of twelve district-centres was similar to

building a new rung between the villages and the town centres; and this was an added feature on the emerging social structure in Yil Ngas within the colonial setting.

4.6. Resettlement and Changes in Settlement Patterns

Changes in the location of some compounds, wards, villages, and communities within Yil Ngas, did not only affect the pre-colonial settlement patterns which were largely in evidence up till now, but also succeeded in affecting the social structure of the region. The compulsiveness of the colonial regime did not provide any room for the pardoning of 'erring' and opinionated individuals, groups and communities; or, so it seems. Hence, when the elders of Nekong village-ward of Nemel, in the area which is today designated as Kabwir District, resisted the counting of their wards in the 1932 'Census,' the whole community were shortly forced to leave their peaceful abode on the promontory of the Jos Plateau, better known as Jzwal (Mt.) Nemel, and to relocate themselves at a place in the foothills, specified for them by the colonialists, while the rest of the wards on the mountain were left intact.[85] The people had objected because the 'census' was a means of reviewing and increasing the tax package of each ward. By doing so, Nekong people had badly 'inconvenienced' the colonialists, and were punished, among other things, with forced resettlement to the said foothills.

In the same year, 1932, the entire communities of Jok and Tipap in Pai Sub-district of Hill Angas District, were also forcefully removed from the Pai Range, better known as Murchison Range to the colonialists, and resettled at a specified place in the foothills of the range. Their 'crime' was to have celebrated the exodus of the colonialists, which unfortunately was not taking

place then or in the immediate future. It seemed to have been rumoured in Pai that the colonialists had already left the country. So they celebrated it. However the celebration was even made along with human sacrifice. As a result, two NA, or colonial workers, including the district scribe and an NA policeman or **dandoka**, were caught and used as sacrificial victims; lost to humanity forever.[86] Painful as the killing of the two men was, it can hardly be classified otherwise: the incident was an unfortunate outcome of a religious dimension, in which the struggle for independence was fought spiritually, as opposed to the military strategy, which was now too dangerous to employ. Hence, when a detachment of armed policemen was posted there immediately after the event, the people did not attempt to fight physically. Therefore, it was an over-statement on the part of Hale Middleton to have called the action a 'revolt.' With such a judgement of the matter, the key officers drastically punished and their communities were forced to relocate to the Pai Mountain Range foothills, by the colonialists.[87] Every so often, such 'forced migrations' usually scattered the fabric of the concerned communities and partially transformed their social relations of production which, in turn, was reflected in their social structure.

Particular mention deserves to be made of the impact of Christian missionary activities with regard to settlements, resettlements and settlement patterns. The earliest crop of converts to Christianity in Yil Ngas were usually willy-nilly constrained to leave their home communities after conversion, to go and settle in the vicinity of the missionary station(s). Tu'wan, in present-day Kabwir District, became renown for the first missionary station in Yil Ngas, whence the Christian faith spread to other places. The introduction of

elementary forms of western education (the 3 Rs: reading, writing and arithmetic) as well as the giving of western medical care further played their parts in attracting immigrants to missionary stations. People settled in the neighbourhood of the mission stations for easier access to these amenities; regardless of whether they became serious Christians or not.

New settlements, or congregations (in places where the settlements were not new) were founded and formed by some of the evangelists who had been trained by the missionaries and sent out to go and work for the gospel, either as private preachers or mission-assisted evangelists. That, in a sense, was how places such as Ka'lashi, (which literally means: 'On Christianity') and Lungpye in present-day Amper and Ampang-East Districts, respectively, were developed or founded. A non-licensed evangelist, Ngoliyt of Lung Ngwa of Pu'el (Dawaki), during the mid-teens, migrated to Pang territory and founded Lung'pye, (which, in full, is **lung (nkin) pye,** meaning: 'new settlement of victory,' or 'new settlement of a bright future'), either just before, or about the same time when the Tu'wan-based missionaries opened their Amper work.[88] Some of the Ngas evangelists, both licensed and non-licensed, later opted for missionary work themselves. As from the early 1930s onwards, Christian missionaries from Yil Ngas emigrated and settled in places like Wusasa in Zaria Province, in particular. Some of the products of the mission school at Tu'wan constituted part of the first crop of NA workers employed at Pankshin station in the 1920s as couriers, clerks, house servants, treasurers, NA policemen, and, in the districts, as district scribes. In a nutshell, missionary activities indeed contributed to an extent, in orchestrating the

processes and conditions, which led to the emergence of a new social structure in Yil Ngas, especially during the period under review in this chapter.

Generally speaking, there is no disputing the fact that the colonial order along with its exploitative system of taxation contributed in no small way in bringing about resettlements and emigrations, away from Yil Ngas, for both economic and political reasons. Whenever the colonialists received reports that some people had emigrated from certain parts of Yil Ngas, they still sceptically asked for the same tax sums due from such areas (they even kept increasing the taxes!) without caring to find the truth about the alleged emigrations; sometimes they merely gave excuses of lack of time to do so. For instance, in 1924, B.R. Lawrence's assistant, O.M. Best, reported to him that there was a reduction in the total tax sum realised from certain hamlets (Best's "**unguoi**") to the south of Pankshin town. When contacted, the hamlets blamed the shortfall on "considerable emigrations," which had newly taken place. Of course, Best was not happy about the alleged development, as he admitted that he had not the time to check things personally, but he still emphasised that not less than £15, on a recount, might be found to be still due from the said hamlets![89]

Emigrations and resettlements of individuals, families, clans and entire villages, took place here and there as from the 1920s and thereafter, largely in response to colonial taxation, among other demands of the situation. Some became annual migrant labourers to the Minesfield; others resorted, either for good or for bad, to new occupations and or new locations; and others still, remained as it were in their usual locations and occupations but kept depleting their own kraals, flocks and herds, or those of their subordinate folks (either

by hook or by crook) in order to meet their tax obligations and those of their nexts-of-kin, to the colonial state. In a nutshell, colonial taxation (and the related system of levies) worked, to a large extent, in engendering a new social structure in Yil Ngas in the 1920s and the 1930s. The gap between the 'poor' and the 'rich' was widened. Shapes of various strata, consistent with colonialism, emerging on the horizon of the society in Yil Ngas during the period, can possibly be traced out.

4.7. Portrait of Yil Ngas' Social Structure in the 1920s and '30s

We begin, at this juncture, by following the views of Roxborough, and therefore maintain that the classes in question, which emerged in Yil Ngas, may not correspond with those of any other rural territory, known to the readers. This is because: "In the third world,... rural class structures vary greatly from one country or region to another, and some rural class structures are quite complex in themselves... In addition, it is often in the rural arena that some of the most profound changes take place."[90] Secondly, all the classes in Yil Ngas, among other places in Plateau Province, to follow the views of Mangvwat, were not only in embryo but were subordinated ultimately to "the metropolitan ruling classes in far away Britain,"[91] through various echelons of economic disarticulation and social segregation, here in Nigeria.

With specific reference to Yil Ngas, 'the European ruling oligarchy', to use Mangvwat's description, was the class on the top of the social hierarchy. This was made up of all the Residents, DOs, ADOs, Military Officers, Police Officers, Mine Managers, and Senior Missionaries, all of whom were Europeans. These people were those whose decisions were regarded in principle as final, within their respective spheres of jurisdiction. They were those who defined

what justice was, and determined who deserved it. They enforced colonial justice to get what sort of order they deemed necessary. They were not expected and did not manually engage themselves in production. Nay, they were too superior for that. Yet they ate the best of fares, lived in the best of houses and wore the best of clothes. They were the richest in many senses, and had many attendants and servants.

The emergent African elite class stood directly below the European ruling class. This class was made up of all the district heads, such as Pupchina of Pai, the better-educated government officials, who were indigenes of Yil Ngas, such as Jan Panaki and Joshua Wadak,[92] tribal chiefs of the other ethnic groups, such as Ahmadu Gana of the Hausa and Hardo Baya of the Fulani;[93] army and police rank-and-file officers, district scribes, king-makers and royal princes, such as Jos of Pankshin (Langkuk's relative), missionary-trained evangelists, urban teachers and missionaries and the chief warder. These were the most dependable crop of Africans as far as the Europeans were concerned. They earned the next highest categories of incomes, and as a result, had servants and many wives in most cases, and were quite rich, at least in the getting of the new cash introduced by colonialism. Members of this class were in a sense, the African lieutenants to the European ruling class, carrying out their orders with alacrity, rather than behaving like chiefs on whom the gimmicks of the so-called Indirect Rule principle were being tried. In Yil Ngas, colonial administration, was generally blunt and direct, leaving no one in doubt as to who-was-who and what-was-what. The members of this African elite were allowed some marginal participation in the "bureaucracy as well as

other social and economic privileges devoid of real economic and political power,"[94] by their European superiors.

Next came the Rich Peasant Class, otherwise, to use Zotov's description, the petty bourgeoisie,[95] made up largely of those pre-colonial clan, and household heads, who owned some means of production (grain surpluses and livestock in particular, often given in exchange for labour power) and lived mainly by their own ends and resources. Often they paid their own taxes and those of their nexts-of-kin and still had surpluses of assets to use as they pleased. It was the kraals and flocks and herds of these rich peasants, which increasingly suffered depletion due to the avarice of the colonial system, its European managers, the chiefs and office bureacrats.[96] Rich peasants, to an extent, were self-reliant, but held more or less no titles beyond the ones inherited, if any, and lived, of course, in the rural areas. Whereas, their immediate superiors were found mainly in the urban centres and district headquarters, the rich peasants were often at the remoter locations away from such centres. Because tentacles of the colonial order spared no-one, some of the rich peasants eventually resorted to going to the tin mines during the 1930s and 1940s, in order to offset their tax obligations, due to the tremendous losses they had suffered in the course of the colonial period.

Below that class was the Middle Peasants and/or Semi-Proletarians. This class was made up of the couriers, clerks, typists, rural teachers and religious instructors. The rural semi-proletarians earned their own subsistence by means of their own labour but had to annually go to the tin mines to meet their other obligations such as taxes (debts and fines, if they had incurred any). Locally, at home they could still sell their labour power to the rich peasants in

exchange for the meeting of those needs that they did not have the means of meeting. The urban proletarians earned their livings principally through their salaries. Any careless management of their salaries easily pushed them to the brinks of bankruptcy, want and extortion such was the case with Maikwagiri, Gofwan and Tibbin, at certain periods of their service at Pankshin station.[97] Their incomes were barely above their levels of subsistence.

The last two classes of the poor reflected again the 'rural' and 'urban' distinctions. In-between the urban and the rural poor were the poor peasant class, made up of those who through disasters and colonial exploitation had lost virtually everything, to such an extent that they became roving hire-hands in exchange for what they would eat within a fortnight or so, especially during the 'hungry' months of July and August. Relations who belonged in the rich peasant class were so often expected to go to the rescue of such families. Heads of such families would usually endeavour to go to the Minesfield like other men, but often they ate off much of their meagre earnings, in the form of their keeps, and virtually returned home with nothing. Eventually, a great number of such people emigrated to the lowlands of the Plateau Province, in the hope of better lives after having been frustrated and bogged with taunting of village chiefs for failing to pay their taxes.

The urban poor were made up of the dogari staff and such (other lumpen or) hangers-on to whom life in the town, especially at Pankshin was drab, dreary but necessary. Cases of stealing and hunger characterised this group. At one point, they were declared as not coping with the cost of living in Pankshin town, and wages had to be increased. But the lumpen-proletariat were often a bunch of roving bohemians (**ngo'dendi'mwa,** or **yan dandi**) who

lived on the daily-wage kinds of job and moved from place-to-place, as hunger and their whims and caprices dictated. They married wives they could not keep and served in any capacity they could afford, including playing of musical instruments, such as the sing-along **ndeang-deang**, in order to entertain their listeners for little gratifications.

Among these emergent groups and classes, the Middle Peasants were probably the largest in number, followed by the Rich Peasants and the Rural Poor and the Urban Poor, followed by the African Elite; and finally, the European Elite class takes the least position in terms of population. But it was that small European minority who determined who should bring what, when and how, because they constituted the leadership in the colonial social order which was operating in Yil Ngas, in Plateau Province, and in Nigeria, as a whole.

The emergent social structure in Yil Ngas, especially during the 1920s and 1930s, engendered and incorporated within its own system several other structures (such as the political, residential, occupational, educational, religious, and ecological structures), which to a large extent reflected its features. They reflected a social structure in which some classes were not only subordinated by others but were being exploited by them. However, any social structure is usually a reflection of the economic structure of a given society, therefore, in order to better understand the nature of exploitation in Yil Ngas especially within the social structure of the region, let us focus attention on the economy of Yil Ngas during the period under review in this chapter.

Yet in 1927, C. G. Ames, ADO in charge of Pankshin Division, maintained that in view of the high cost of living in Pankshin Town, salaries of the **dogari** staff, which were among the lowest, had to be increased: "The high cost of living at Pankshin made it quite impossible for a **dogari** to support a few wives and a large family on 15/-[fifteen shillings] per month it would hardly be reasonable to expect anyone to do so."[99] So their salary was raised to twenty-five shillings per month. That fact in itself shows that in the apparent land-of-plenty, as far as crop yields in the Plateau Province were concerned, life was not cheap and there were 'paupers'! While the concerned **dogarai** were not peasants living in the village areas in 1927, they could have found life cheap were things easy to come by, in Pankshin town, given that it was located in the land of 'highest' crop yields. This contradiction, to an extent, remains a riddle.

In order to explain the riddle we dare to advance that it was due to the facts that (i) the favourable crop yields statistics emanating from Yil Ngas were generally false and incorrect for the upwards of eight years; (ii) the Ngas peasants were reluctant to push their surplus grains into Pankshin Town to bring down the grain prices while at the same time the urban underlings such as the **dogarai** were not prepared to go to the villages to procure grains at cheaper rates; or (iii) the exploitation of peasant produce through the supply of grains to the Minesfield, the NA prison, grain reserve, and payment of taxes, was already a severe reality, the evidence of highest crop yields statistics notwithstanding, hence residents of Pankshin Town were shackled with want, as it were. Perhaps a careful examination of these three hypotheses, or suggested explanations, would indicate the third to be the most plausible,

followed by the second. Hence, on the probable employment of the principle of 'the more you produce, the more you surrender' the colonialists brought the Ngas peasants into the position of 'good' supplies of stores of grain.

Grain supply was not the only role allocated to the Ngas peasants by the colonialists. Through diverse means and processes the Ngas peasant had already been strongly impressed upon to spare a big part of his labour-power for work on colonial buildings, roads and in the Minesfield, by the late 1920s. And Ngas peasants had to perform these two roles allotted to them: supplying of labour and foodstuffs: for the next two or three decades, among other unsung colonised peasantries, both within and without Pankshin Division. Thus, O.K.Oke, DO in charge, Pankshin Division, submitted at end of 1928 that: "Large numbers of pagans continue to go to the Mines for short periods. The markets are all well filled on market days and I should judge that trade is good -- the Hausa settlements are flourishing."[100] The statement seems ominous and contradictory. Should it be taken that because peasants or so-called 'pagans' trooped to the Minesfield, where they spent their labour and lived by their own food resources, they were necessarily benefiting by so doing? Was it not in order to get colonial money to offset their taxes and other levies that they were desperately selling their food surpluses in that aftermath of the harvest season, and therefore sold at give away prices? When a colonialist such as Oke says that 'trade was good', simply because he could observe, or he received reports, that markets were filled on market-days, it did not mean that trade was necessarily good. When the colonised are involved in buying and selling, it is hardly in the service of their own interest to be doing so. This is more so when they are a predominantly peasant population. They

may even sell off large quantities of their own goods, but it is the monetary value of what large quantities of goods they have sold that engenders their poverty. The money was usually very small; implying a very low purchasing power. The Ngas and other peasants of Pankshin Division attended the markets not by their own choice. Their poverty or taxes compelled them.

This, or something worse, was what resulted in the Plateau Province in 1930. There was a terrible drop or slump in the prices of tin (due to the general depression in the international capitalist order but also) because there was a tin glut in the world market. Many of the mining companies were closed down. Even the larger ones had to obtain many subsidies from the colonial government in order to continue to conduct skeletal operations. In every community in the Plateau Province, the ripples of the slump were felt. The provincial annual report for that year actually contains the fact that:

> The firms European and African are suffering severely from the reduced purchasing power of their customers; there is serious unemployment among the educated Africans, artisans etc. in the principal trading and mining areas; while the pagan farmers, accustomed for many years to find a ready and at times an urgent demand for their labour and surplus products, are now at a loss to find a market for either.[101]

Hence, the Plateau Province experienced an hour of economic darkness. The peasant, Ngas and otherwise, in that province was the worst hit. Money, which was necessary in brokering peace with the state, not was forthcoming. The peasant had reached the end of the road, a cul-de-sac as it were, in the colonial scheme of things. Except for the passage of time, by 1932, the situation had not changed for the better at all. Hale Middleton, the resident in-charge Plateau Province wrote at the end of the year that he instinctively breathed a sigh of relief at the thought that the year 1932 was over and that, whatever the

future held in store for Plateau Province, any change that occurred must be for the better, since during the twelve months of 1932, the province seemed to have reached the lowest depths of financial depression and political stagnation. Furthermore, he maintained that:

> Two consecutive bumper harvests have caused the pendulum to swing the other way, with the result that there is now everywhere a glut of corn and the **markets are full of sellers, with practically no buyers.** As recently as April 1931 the price of guinea corn was up to £14 per ton in Jos and Bukuru while, at the end of 1932, almost unlimited supplies were available at £2 per ton, with progressively decreasing value in proportion to the distance from these two main trading centres...[102][Emphasis added]

Hale Middleton seemed to have exhibited colonial ignorance in light of the fact that, in a deflation-smitten economy, the lack of money is a hidden type of poverty, when he finally maintained, in the same report, that:

> **Of poverty,** as we understand it **there is no sign,** nor can it be said that the tax-payer is lacking in material wealth; his difficulty is to liquidate his assets and turn his property and his labour into ready money. Under present circumstances that must necessarily take time...[103][Emphasis added]

A bad situation, we should say. But Middleton held that it did not amount to poverty. In reply, let us say: Of poverty as we non-colonialists understand it, there was a clear sign! Within the context of rural poverty, the towns, which in the reckoning of Middleton were the 'main trading centres,' Jos and Bukuru were the two places where there was no lack of cash, where grains were still sold, to use his words, 'with progressively decreasing value in proportion to the distance from these two main trading centres.' This reflects that town centres were better off than the rural areas where peasants were found or lived. While they were not poor in physical material wealth, but because they had already been incorporated into the capitalist colonial cash

economy in which the basis of wealth was ones purchasing power and not the volume of material goods in ones possession, Plateau peasants were poor. Unless their goods could be turned into money at reasonable rates, peasants' assets could not be used to meet their obligations to the state, their local officials, and even their immediate families as effectively as it was expected. So they must have looked gloomy and sad. Their labours probably amounted to meeting only the barest subsistence of their families. Their surpluses had suddenly acquired the status of wastes or junk goods.

This situation had two features of rural poverty. One was the deprivation of the countryside by the town-centres. The other was the deprivation of the peasants by the bourgeoisie through deflation: in which, by means of possession of surplus over and above their subsistence, they had the outward appearance of rich country men but in essence, they had, more or less, not more than their bare subsistence on the basis of the value attributed to their goods and services by the colonial political economy. This type of poverty is what we call in this study, hidden (or covert) rural poverty. The effect of this form of hidden colonial deprivation on Ngas peasants, to be precise, was quite devastating.

While good crop yield statistics from Pankshin Division in those glut or depression years were still being forwarded to Jos annually, T. Farley Smith, the DO in-charge of the division, strongly recommended in 1933 a tax reduction of one shilling in favour of Hill Angas District tax-payers, that is, each should be allowed to pay three instead of four shillings annually, till the period of the depression had elapsed, when "they must expect it to be raised again when economic conditions improve," he further maintained.[104] Nothing

was done to reduce the tax per head in Plain Angas District, by way of a similar recommendation, because Smith believed that the people were better off than their hill counterparts; so he still required four shillings, regardless of the economic depression, from each Plain Angas tax-payer.[105]

In Plateau Province, the residents in-charge, and the DOs, were at many times acting like corn-brokers and middlemen on behalf of the mining companies, in relation to the producing communities, on the one hand, and also between the latter and their respective NAs, divisions, on the other. In May, 1933, for instance, Featherstone, the DO of Jos, in a memo to Browne, the DO of Pankshin, indicated that Pembleton, the Resident, had assigned him to inform him that ATMN (Associated Tin Mines of Nigeria Ltd) were anxious and ready to buy 20 tons of guinea-corn delivered at Barakin-Ladi at £2 per ton. Featherstone further urged Browne to write the company direct and inform them if his 'pagans' would take the corn at such a 'low price,' because the company was "anxious to buy locally, if possible, in order to put money into the pockets of the local population, but should the corn not be forthcoming they wish to make early arrangements to buy elsewhere."[106] ATMN's anxiety to buy from the local producers was not so much 'in order to put money into the pockets of the local population,' as it was in order to get corn at the cheapest price, without incurring the slightest cost of transportation. That option was naturally cheaper than buying from private middlemen and suppliers, such as the UAC, for instance.

However, a chain of connections or relations was produced as a result of ATMN's anxious, but stated interest, viz: (i) they approached the resident, at a short notice, for corn to be supplied below the current market price,

delivered at their place; (ii) the resident approached DO Jos, who, probably had none to offer but, was assigned to write to DO Pankshin; (iii) he wrote and stated the company's reported need and terms, anticipating necessary action from Pankshin. All these were done in order to satisfy the ATMN primarily. Browne, on his part, ascertained from his staff, that guinea corn would not be got in any much quantity at that time of the year in the so-called Hill Angas District, especially in Ampang-East and Garram Sub-Districts where, in those days, it was 'grown to any great' quantity. He, therefore, wrote the ATMN in July 1933, who had hiked up their price offer to £3 per ton, provided corn was supplied, and stated that corn producers were reluctant to sell any at that time, which was deep into the rainy season.[107] In November 1933, Browne wrote another letter to the ATMN asking if they would buy corn at the rate of £3 per ton, which was the July-1933 rate ATMN had offered (which was naturally higher than the current market rate at that harvest-time!), but got no reply. The ATMN turned down the offer by their silence.[108]

By the end of 1933 however, there was a revival in the tin mining industry, so it is doubtful if Farley Smith's recommended tax cut in favour of the 'Hill Angas' tax-payers ever saw the light of day. And whereas the price of tin shot up from £105 per ton in 1932, it reached the stalwart figure of £200 per ton by the end of 1933. Yet "grain prices remained ridiculously low," in the Plateau Province despite the upshot in tin prices.[109] Plateau peasants' incomes had still to be kept low. The mining companies always preferred to buy grain from them at the cheapest possible rates.

In March 1934, for instance, the manager of the LNT (London Nigeria Tin Mines, of London Tin Corporation Ltd), wrote the DO Pankshin, and

reported that there was a considerable shortage of corn in Gana District and asked for peasants to be sent with supplies from his division.[110] In reply, DO Pankshin advised LNT to send a buyer to a central place wherever he could buy corn in bulk in Pankshin Division, and promised to help the buyer whenever he arrived.[111] Instead, the LNT opted for the assistance of the DO Pankshin, in ensuring "a steady flow of grain to get to the Gana market",[112] rather than send a buyer. They were not prepared to lift a foot and go in the direction of the grain supply, which lay outside Jos Division. Mining companies and their managers seemed to possess an unhealthy influence over the DOs. Hence they asked for goods and services from the NAs and viciously dictated the terms of the transactions. The state, or Plateau Province, represented by the Resident and the DOs, virtually stood at the mercy and service of the tin-mining industry and its capitalist owners and operators. The correspondence of the DO Pankshin, with the mining companies, and other NAs, in 1930s and 1940s, was largely dictated by corn demands and supplies, often fixed at the lowest rates, putting the masses on the side of unfavourable conditions, for a long time. But two significant, apparently emancipative, but essentially unsatisfactory developments, one of which occurred in 1934, and has been referred to, above, but deserves further comment and the other in 1935, which deserves a brief consideration.

4.8.1: **Famine Relief, 1935.**

At the close of the period, which ended in 1935, the colonialists created a famine relief fund in favour of Pankshin Division. It seems that in the unpredictable circumstances following the corn glut years, 1930-1933, the colonial officers in Pankshin Division were at a loss as to what was to be done in response to the situation of apparent corn scarcity, which came on a heel of

a dire, depression-caused, deflation. Should they continue to be at ease, or play the patron and feed the markets with corn? In July 1935, J.M.Noad, the DO of Pankshin Division, applied for approval from the Chief Commissioner of Northern Nigeria through the Resident, Plateau Province, to create what he called a Suspense Account, which Pembleton readily tagged "Famine Relief' before forwarding it to Kaduna, for approval. Noad had requested that:

> In order to relieve the prevailing corn shortage I propose to buy corn and put it on market at cost price. I should be glad for your permission to open a Suspense Account for £400. I have purchased 20 tons of corn from UAC Ltd at Bukuru at £7.10 per ton and am ordering more. As a start I think it best to confine sales to Pankshin market where a check can be kept on profiteering. I am sending out to all the Districts advertising the fact that corn will be on sale each day. It is no great hardship for those really in need of corn to send one member of the family to buy in Pankshin. I am afraid if it is sent out to the Districts in bulk that little will get beyond the chiefs households.
>
> If the plan is not successful, other measures will have to be taken. I propose limiting the sale each day to four measures per person. A Native Administration scribe will be in charge of the sales, which will be conducted in the open market. Extra **dandoka** [native policemen] will be posted to see that reasonable order is preserved. There has been no change for the worse in the general food situation and there is nothing approaching famine conditions anywhere, but little assistance will be welcomed by the people.[113]

Approval was given to the DO's application by the government of Northern Nigeria, exactly two weeks after. Hence, a DO was for the first time undertaking to buy corn from outside Pankshin Division which was later to be distributed at cost price. The pattern of how it was distributed is on Table1, below.

Going by Table 1, it can be observed that (i) 67% or 230 bags out of 344 bags of the relief corn were retained in Pankshin town alone, where the market, prison and police consignments were all kept back, and distributed

accordingly, and (ii) although five out of the ten recipient communities clearly lay outside Yil Ngas, which included: Kanam, Ron, Gindiri, Daffo, and Panyam, they were allocated only 18.5% or 62 bags,

TABLE 1: **Distribution Of The 1935 - Relief Corn**

Receiving Community or Institution	**Quantity of Corn in Bags**	**Quantity in Percentage**
Pankshin Market	159	46
Police	10	3
Prison	61	177
Kanam	10	3
Amper	50	14.5
Ron	20	6
Gindiri	10	3
Daffo	12	3.5
Panyarn	10	3
Kumbul	2	0.5
Total = 10 Communities	344	100%

out of a total of 344 bags, as against the four remaining communities, which included: Pankshin market, Police, Prison and Amper, which lay in Yil Ngas, receiving 81.5 % or 272 bags, out of a total of 344 bags of the relief corn.

The relief corn was however not eventually consumed in the manner shown or illustrated by Table 1. Were we to draw table of consumption for the relief corn, it will show a different pattern because not a grain of the 50 bags sent to Amper was collected by the people, given at cost price, that is, at less than the current market price as it allegedly was! As farmers began to bring new crops for sale in the markets -- in Amper and elsewhere -- in October 1935, the DO sent to Amper and called back the 50 bags (which equalled 14.5% of the relief corn), to sell them, additionally, to the NA prison (which alone had earlier taken 61 bags, or 17.7% of the corn) but this time around, the bags were not sold at cost price, but at the current market rate in Pankshin

Town. Otherwise, the incurable deficit on the Suspense Account was going to be unbearably much. Fortunately the NA prison 'needed' the corn as well as 'had' the money to buy it at the current market rate and so the deed was done.[114] Thereafter the Suspense Account was closed. Actual receipts took 50.1 % (or £207.8.6) and a deficit of 49.9% (or £206.4.6) out of a grand total sum of £413.13, which was initially expended in the purchase of the relief corn. About half of the initial capital was lost.

So the 'Famine Relief,' funded through the Suspense Account of Pankshin Division, was a colossal failure. But it is not clear how the loss of 49.9% of either the corn, or the money, occurred. Probably the colonial officers inflated the cost of the corn on the records before it was issued out for distribution. Probably the designated middlemen in the distribution, (NA policemen and scribes) swindled off part of the corn and, or the money. Probably both or none of the above reasons were responsible, for the loss.

But the zero demand, which greeted the relief corn during its four months' stay at Amper must have puzzled the colonial officers at Pankshin station. Noad was wrong in his assessment of the economic situation, especially subsistence capacities of most communities under his jurisdiction, after all. Deflation had not actually given way to inflation, though, on the surface, that was what it may have seemed. The situation of strain or near-stress in food supplies, which apparently obtained in Pankshin Town, was not characteristic of most places in the division. It seems at the time, as suggested by the evidence, that while few communities were actually stressed especially in Kanam area,[115]which lay outside Yil Ngas, and others were nearly stressed, such as probably those around Pankshin Town, some communities were

simply comfortable, at least, comfortable enough as to not be attracted by a cheap corn-supplement available especially at Amper market. Conditions in Pankshin Town and environs where the colonialists more or less had the privilege of direct observation and where about 81% of the relief corn was consumed, must have been bad and describable as nearly stressed. In Amper and environs on the other hand, where the relief corn was turned down, subsistence conditions must have been better, and probably good. Although the two locations, Pankshin town and Amper were both within Yil Ngas, the former was a growing sub-urban location with a growing consumerist population, while the latter, to all intents and purposes, was no more than a rural colonial centre (being a district headquarters with a weekly market) whose population was still largely involved in direct production of food produce, hence their different responses to the relief corn's presence. Taken broadly, and respectively, it could be suggested that the western and more hilly parts of Yil Ngas, and as well more proximate areas to the Minesfield were by this time nearly stressed, whereas the eastern and probably southern parts which were more distant from the Minesfield were not stressed at all or not as stressed as to need help. The lessons, which the colonialists learnt from the Famine Relief, especially from the Amper case, where the relief corn was later withdrawn, must have remained fresh in their minds for a long time. As it will be noticed below, they were not inclined any longer to take such practical steps towards famine relief after 1935, even when the Ngas people in 1949, tabled their need before them in that regard.[116] Rather, they focused on bare-faced exploitation of the people's food produce up to the early years of the last decade before Nigeria's independence.

4.8.2: Mathews' Report Implemented, 1935

To a very large extent, the brazen process of reckless exploitation of the food produce of the peasant was pivoted on and conducted through the ready office of the chiefs, especially the district heads, whose transformed role in the colonial political economy, following the Mathews' Report (referred to in section 4.2.1 above) and its applied reforms, which began in 1935,[117] involved a greater degree of participation on their part than hitherto. A. B. Mathews, as stated in chapter two, was sent from Kaduna in 1934, by the Northern Nigerian colonial government to, by way of fieldwork, look into the native administrative organisation of the people(s) of Pankshin NA and advise government on how to reorganise them for the better. After completing his assignment, he forwarded a report to government.[118] Before the implementation of Mathews' Report, no district head in Yil Ngas had a graded 'Native Court' under him or was himself a 'Native Authority.' Before 1935, these factors were jointly shared by groups of districts and, or, district heads. As the Mathew's Report, and the reforms which it advanced, underscored the powers of the chiefs, they were finally translated into the true semblance of colonial chiefs;[119] a development, which placed them at the far cry of the independent kings, which was what they mostly were, before the colonial invasion and subsequent domination of Yil Ngas. Whatever kingly roles they were still apparently performing were merely symbolical and formal, not substantial. In fact, Mathews even observed that this situation of forms without substance was not only typical of the chiefs but the entire Ngas society. Disturbed by his research findings, Mathews confessed on behalf of British colonialism, saying: "We are primarily to blame. The social fabric is

rapidly breaking down and the ancient sanctions no longer have the force they did."[120] Conversely as the colonial order was rapidly strengthening its sway and its sanctions were beginning to attain another but greater level of force, which they did not have before, the place of the chiefs was becoming more pitiful and disrupted.

Thus the stage was set for the unravelling scenes in the drama wherein successive Divisional Officers and chiefs were partially observed to be carting off both the food surpluses and bare subsistence of the peasant producers to the tin mines and the other colonial 'institutes,' -- that is, prisons, hospitals, primary schools, and so on, -- unhindered. Though quite aware that their system was subjecting the masses of the people to a lot of stress as far as the food question was concerned, the colonialists in Pankshin Division never again attempted to help the people (as a whole not only the peasant producers), in the form of relief corn supplied allegedly at cost price, to supplement their subsistence, even when the facts glaringly indicated that food was difficult, at such times, to come by. These issues, among others, are discussed in chapter five.

4.9 Conclusion:

The nature of hidden rural poverty served to an extent to disguise colonial contradictions, especially during the depression years in the eyes of the local African elites and the so-called traditional rulers, but naturally the peasants had always had mixed feelings. In periods both of depression and 'progress' they always belonged to the disadvantaged and exploited side. They had always borne the brunt of the excesses of colonial capitalism. They had to pay the taxes, build the roads and houses, meet the obligations of the new

social order through the use of their produce and meet the exercises of the selfsame colonial order through loss (or undervaluing and liquidating) of their produce. Of course, they were hard-pressed and getting more and more impoverished in the process, becoming more subservient and entangled in the capitalist colonial political economy.

This chapter has attempted to reconstruct the processes of infrastructural, sub-regional and class transformations as well as the ever-present exploitation and undervaluing of peasant produce, which criteria it has also employed in the determination of the kind of economy the region of our study was transformed into, during the 1920s and early 1930s. Precisely speaking, Yil Ngas was transformed with a colonial rural economy. Its pre-colonial political economy, which lingered in a subordinated form up to the end of the second decade, was now generally undermined and substituted with a new one. That is, to use our terms in another sense: it was substituted with a colonial rural political economy.

In this chapter, the processes of exploitation in the comparative rural versus urban or suburban areas, assumed the overt, but much more of the hidden forms of impoverishing exploitation, which resulted in our adopted concept of hidden rural poverty. The reorganisation of Yil Ngas into twelve districts, courtesy of Mathews' Report, was by and large the setting of the stage for deeper socio-economic dealings between the colonialists and the masses of Ngas people, which put the nail on the coffin of their incorporated exploitation and impoverishment. Chapter five is an attempt to reconstruct that period.

Notes

1. These were slight occurrences in the Pai District in 1923 and 1932.
2. NAK: SNP 140/1907, Op cit.
3. NAK: Jos Prof 379/1910, Op cit.
4. Of course the colonialists did not put it that bluntly..
5. NAK: SNP 140/1907, Op cit
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid
8. Ibid
9. NAK: SNP 7/2308/1908, Op cit.
10. Ibid
11. NAK: SNP 7/5482/1908
12. Ibid.
13. NAK: SNP 7/2308/1908, Op cit.
14. NAK: SNP 7/10/335/1909, Op cit
15. NAK: SNP 7/5482/1908, Op cit.
16. See: H.D.Foulkes, "Angass Grammar": NAK: SNP 35/1911.
17. Yet, due to certain power devolution arrangements, which Chiefs of Pang'chen communities adopted, spear-headed by Langkuk, Ngolong Bet accepted to be 'Galadima' against which Foulkes ever frowned when Langkuk mentioned it. See: Ibid. Bet has become so commonly known as 'Anguwan Galadima' that in a recent study of the historical development of Pankshin town, it was apparently substituted for 'Bet' throughout. See: See: Joseph Odafiowho Mentie, "The Historical of Settlement Pattern in Pankshin Town" (NCE Project, Department of Geography, FCE Pankshin, in affiliation to Univ. of Jos, 1989)
18. NAK: SNP 35/1911, Op cit.
19. See NAK: SNP 140/1907, Op cit
20. The activities of Ahmadu Gana, an immigrant from Bauchi who later became Sarkin Hausawa of Pankshin, and his supporters in 1920 and 1921, in seeking to install him as the next Chief of Pankshin, claiming Langkuk's vacant stool, after the latter's assassination, is illustrative. The colonialists saw how dangerous he was to the extent that he was eventually sent to jail in Bauchi.
21. No matter the extent of efforts to deny involvement of persons like Rambok who allegedly conspired with aspirants like Jos Dimlong, in the murder of Langkuk by recent authors, at least, that was the outcome of Carlyle's investigation in 1918.
22. B.R.Lawrence, "Pankshin Division HALF-Year ended June 1920" : NAK: JOS PROF 248/1920.
23. Ibid
24. Ibid
25. Ibid
26. Ibid
27. Ibid
28. Enrid Alayev, *Social and Economic Geography: An Essay in Conceptual-Terminological Systemisation* (Progress Publisher, Moscow, 1986) p.107
29. G.L.Monk, "Rep[ort on Pankshin Division for Half-Year ended December 1919" :NAK: JOSPROF 70/1920.
30. Ibid
31. Ibid
32. B.R.Lawrence, "Pankshin Division, Half-Year ended 30th April 1921": NAK: JOSPROF 213/1921.
33. C.G.McKenzie, "Pankshin Division Annual Report for 1927" :NAK: JOSPROF 63/1928
34. NAK: JOS PROF 248/1920. Op cit.
35. Ibid
36. Ibid
37. NAK: JOSPROF 70/192, Op cit.
38. NAK: JOS PROF 248/1920. Op cit.
39. Ibid
40. Matthew 24:48 of Holy Scriptures, paraphrased.
41. B.R.Lawrence, "Pankshin Division Report On, for Quarter ended September 1922" NAK: JOSPROF 927/1922

42. B.R.Lawrence, "Pankshin Division Report On, for Quarter ended April 1923" NAK: JOSPROF 226/1923
43. B.R.Lawrence, "Pankshin Division Report On, for Quarter ended June 1924" NAK: JOSPROF 254/1924
44. Ibid
45. B.R.Lawrence, "Pankshin Division Report On, for Quarter ended September 1924" NAK: JOSPROF 299/1924
46. B.R.Lawrence, "Pankshin Division Report On, for Quarter ended March 1925" NAK: JOSPROF 221/1925
47. B.R.Lawrence, "Pankshin Division Report On, for Quarter ended June 1925" NAK: JOSPROF 257/1925
48. C.G.McKenzie, "Pankshin Division Report On, for Quarter ended September 1927" NAK: JOSPROF 386/1927
49. Oke's records were later reported by his successor Doelberg, "Pankshin Division Report On, for Quarter ended June 1930" NAK: JOSPROF 259/1930
50. Even nowadays, that expression is still common in the speech of the Ngas.
51. NAK: JOSPROF 257/1925, Op cit.
52. NAK: JOSPROF 31/1929.
53. NAK: SNP 10/23P/1915.
54. NAK: JOS PROF 248/1920. Op cit.
55. Ibid
56. NAK: JOSPROF 213/1921, Op cit
57. NAK: JOSPROF 164/1924
58. NAK: JOSPROF 213/1921, Op cit
59. Ibid
60. Ibid
61. Ibid
62. Ibid
63. Ibid
64. Ibid
65. NAK: JOSPROF 164/1924, Op cit
66. Ibid
67. NAK: JOSPROF 487/1926.
68. NAK: JOSPROF 386/1927.
69. Ibid
70. Ibid
71. NAK: SNP 10/23P/1915, Op cit
72. Ibid
73. NAK: JOS PROF 248/1920. Op cit
74. Ibid
75. Ibid
76. NAK: JOSPROF 927/1922, Op cit
77. NAK: JOSPROF 226/1923, Op cit
78. NAK: PANKSHIN NA 299.
79. NAK: JOS PROF 248/1920. Op cit
80. NAK: JOSPROF 295/1930
81. V.D..Zotov, *The Marxist-Leninist Theory of Society: Identity and Diversity of Social Development in the West and East*, (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985) p.116.
82. A.B. Mathews, ADO: "The Angass and Kindred Peoples of the Pankshin Division," NAK: SNP 17/21560
83. Ibid
84. Ibid
85. NAK: JOSPROF 3/1933
86. NAK, PANKSHIN NA 611
87. See Ibid & c.f. NAK, Jos Prof 386/1927, Op cit
88. See: D.N.Wambutda, *A Study of Conversion Among the Angas of Plateau State of Nigeria with Emphasis on Christianity* (Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1991) p. 158. By 1919, the Amper missionary work had aready begun.
89. NAK: JOSPROF 254/1924
90. Ian Roxborough, *Theories of Underdevelopment* (Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1979) p. 72.

91. M. Y. Mangvwat, "The Missionary Factor and Class Formation in Plateau Province, 1902 - 1960" (Paper presented at the 27th Annual Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria held at the University of Ife, 18th-24th May, 1986); mimeograph
92. Jan Panaki was the first Native Treasurer of Pankshin Division. When he died, the crisis over who should inherit his vast estate was a matter of serious concern (see NAK, Jos Prof. 259/1926). Joshua Wadak was the lucky successor to Panaki's prestigious position in the mid 1920s. (Both of these men were Ngas).
93. These men were 'Hausa' and 'Fulani' leaders in and around the Pankshin town in the case of Ahmadu Gana, and in the whole of Pankshin Division in the case of Hardo Baya - in the early 1920s.
94. Mangvwat, Op cit
95. Zotov, op cit, p.126.
96. Henry Gofwan, 80, Ex-District scribe and farmer, in Mwel, Ampang East District (Interviewed, 3rd January 1987) disclosed that his father had four (in the Ngas sense) kraals of cattle, which he inherited and subsequently emptied! (The Ngas don't have a number for a kraal full of cows but let us put it at about twenty-five cows per kraal).
97. Junior civil servants at Pankshin employed in the early 1920s.
98. NAK, PANKSHIN NA 792.
99. NAK, JOS PROF 63/1928.
100. NAK, JOS PROF 31/1929
101. NAK: JOSPROF 5/1931
102. NAK: JOSPROF 3/1933.
103. Ibid
104. NAK: PANKSHIN NA 742.
105. Ibid
106. NAK: PANKSHIN NA 179. Vol. II, "Corn Supply Of." See: DO, Jos (E.K. Featherston) to D.O. Pankshin, dated 25th May 1933.
107. Ibid. See: D.O. Pankshin (H.R.F. Browne) as a directive given to A.D.O (Pegge) to act accordingly, which he did, dated 15th July 1933.
108. Ibid: no reply, in the form of a document was filled, hence our conclusion.
109. NAK: JOSPROF 301/1933.
110. NAK: PANKSHIN NA 179. Vol. II, Op cit. See: LNT's Manager (N.I. Lothay) to D.O. Pankshin, dated 19th March 1934.
111. Ibid. See: D.O. Pankshin (T.F. Smith) to LNT's Manager, dated 22nd March 1934.
112. Ibid. See: LNT's Manager (Lothay) to D.O. Pankshin, 26th March 1934
113. Ibid. D.O. Pankshin (J.M. Noad) to Resident Plateau, 5th July 1935. There is no doubt that precarious conditions affected food reserves in some parts of the division. Capt. J. Wilkie, an SUM missionary at Tutung, in Kanam NA, reported in the same month that people around Kafil (Kafel) were in great want of food; some had sold off their livestock.
114. Ibid. In actual fact, the prison scribe was persuaded by the D.O., who knew that 'funds' were available for prison corn purchase, the decision was taken on 24th October 1935.
115. See endnote 113 above, for a cited case.
116. See 'The Post-War Years' section, in chapter five.
117. A.B. Mathews, ADO: "The Angass and Kindred Peoples of the Pankshin Division," NAK SNP 17/21560, Op cit.
118. Ibid
119. A similar posture about the transition of kings to chiefs is also taken in chapter three in the section titled 'Political Changes.'
120. Mathews, Op cit.

CHAPTER FIVE:

BETWEEN STRAINS AND STRESSES, 1936-1952: YIL NGAS IN THE THROES OF INCORPORATED COLONIAL EXPLOITATION

5.0. Introduction

This chapter attempts to examine and reconstruct the resultant situation after the process of the transformation of Yil Ngas into a rural colonial economy had been carried through to an advanced stage. That was the stage at which the imposition of the social relations of petty commodity production had adequately been entrenched within the economy of Yil Ngas; at which the administrative and social structures had been panel-beaten enough to afford the smooth transmission of orders from top to bottom; at which there was a surfeit of peasant produce in the markets but with a comparatively dire lack of cash on the part of peasants. That point was reached in the early 1930s, as chapter four has attempted to show.

However, for another, roughly, one and a half decades, that is, as we reckon with the period 1936-1952, it seems the political economy of Yil Ngas was virtually characterised by a systematised, incorporated and rapacious process of the exploitation of its material and human resources. This was pursued and done by the powers-that-be, in the service, protection and promotion of the interwoven interests of the colonial state (represented by the DOs and Residents) generally and its capitalist tin-mining industry (represented by mine managers and grain collection centres) particularly. In the service of those interests, the colonialists maintained an overt demand for corn and labour from the peasant and subservience from the chief, in each and every community. Many colonial officers, who served in Yil Ngas during the

period, were exacting and mean. Few sometimes expressed sympathy but essentially like the proverbial shedding of crocodile tears, they were all committed to the service of the colonial status quo. Hence by the logic of colonial arrangements, members of the lower rungs of the social ladder, or peasants, who were the bulk of the population, were sometimes generally relegated to the level of 'dwelling in the shadow of death' as it were, during the period. We shall look into that more, as the chapter proceeds.

The year 1936 has been regarded by both colonial and post-colonial writers on Yil Ngas,[1] as a turning point: this was because the economic depression years of the early 1930s were gradually replaced by better market conditions, and the reorganised districts in Pankshin Division, along with their 'new' district heads and 'native' courts which were introduced between 1934 and 1935, were just beginning to function. Goble, the Divisional Officer in Pankshin, at the time, saw 1936 as characterised by positive changes after years of the great depression. He gave summary remarks on the year thus:

> There has been marked improvement in the economic condition of the people in comparison with the last few years... In 1936 there has been no locust invasion, rainfall has been adequate, and crops were well above the average... The percentage nickel coinage received in tax payments indicate that there is more money in circulation... a welcome change after conditions of the last few years.[2]

Hence, in a nutshell, 1936 was a year, among years, which witnessed a new lease of life. However, apart from Goble's reasons, given the infrastructural, socio-economic and political developments, which reached their culmination by the mid-1930s, significant changes were bound to occur in the period beginning from 1936. The culmination of those processes and developments meant, in essence, that the ball, setting the course of change,

was left in the court of the colonialists: the nature and direction of change was thenceforth dictated almost exclusively by colonial whims and caprices. Having already secured colonial hegemony over the administrative structures and taken command of the markets and road-network of Yil Ngas, as from 1936 the colonialists seemed determined to take the fullest advantage of those acquisitions, to heckle and hassle the masses of the Ngas, among others, for various demands, as dictated by colonial interests.

In his study of the coming of colonial administration between 1906 and 1935 to Yil Ngas, Gonyok has rightly connected his period of study to the period which followed as from 1936, acknowledging that there was increased mobility, introduced by new lines of communication and other sources of social change, the impact of which changes became significant in Yil Ngas after his period of study.[3] Thus, the period beginning immediately from 1936 was characteristic of a turning point. The 'increased mobility' of the period up to 1935 however did not decline in the period beginning from 1936, instead it virtually shot up to the status of more or less unstoppable mobility; a spate hitherto unattained or unequalled on the part of the coloniser as well as of the peasant, of the miner as well as of the mine labourer, and so forth. So, 1936 might actually have been, a turning point, in the colonial scheme of things in Yil Ngas.

In this chapter, it is expected that the evidence of that dynamism, or increased mobility, and that impact, would be portrayed, and would enable us to say whether or not the masses of the Ngas peasants were, among others, the better or the worse for it (than hitherto), in the bargain for livelihood, during the period. It is also expected that we would catch a glimpse of the general

situation of the Plateau peasants and their circumstances. In outline, this chapter devolves on two (or three) sub-themes: the pattern of intensive material exploitation, (and) the pattern of exploitation of labour, and (interwoven into those two, the collaboration with, and exploitation of, the local ruling elites).

5.1. Pattern And Rhythm Of Material Exploitation: Introduction

There is no gainsaying the fact that the increased mobility elicited by the transformational processes of the 1920s up to the early 1930s, led to the facilitation of the smooth and undisturbed accomplishment of colonial designs in Yil Ngas. However, there seemed to be a pattern, a drumbeat rhythm, about the whole thing, hence the title of this section.

What, as it were, was a boon to the colonialists was necessarily a bane to Ngas peasants whose aspirations were diametrically opposed to those of their colonial oppressors. One notorious sphere where the colonialists placed particular emphasis was the extraction of food produce. Not only the surpluses realised above the subsistence of the peasant producers' families, but also, invertebrately, their very subsistence itself was at several times requisitioned through strong-arm methods in the interest of the colonial economy. The forcible extraction of food produce, especially grain, was only one aspect of material exploitation. There were other spheres such as the forcible extraction of taxes, levies, fines, sylvan produce, cash crop produce, roofing grass,[4] wood fuel, charcoal, livestock and so on. But a consideration of the account of food produce is sufficient for the purposes of this study, since the same pattern was used in other cases.

The proper integration of Yil Ngas within the extractive pseudo-capitalist economy of the country was accomplished in the late 1920s and early 1930s, hence it is pertinent that a study of the exploitation of food produce in the area should be done in the context of the general trend in Pankshin Division or Plateau Province or even the Northern Region, as a whole, in order to secure a wider picture of what was going on specifically within the smaller area of our concern. To wit, the policies of corn control, corn supply to the Minesfield, and corn requisitioning by the colonial authorities, indeed had a wider and far-reaching effect within the colonially-determined Northern Nigeria, but with varying degrees of intensity between and within its provinces, divisions and sub-divisions. Therefore peculiarities characteristic of Yil Ngas, Pankshin Division or Plateau Province, for that matter, can be pointed out. A look at the processes of the implementation of the said policies, would serve as a catalyst towards the attainment of that objective.

5.2. Pre-War Years, 1936-1938

The year 1936, which began the period under review in this chapter, however, in terms of the comparative levels of subsistence reserves of the masses in Pankshin Division in particular and Plateau Province in general, was not regarded by the colonialists as any significantly better than 1935 (the year of famine relief). Regardless of the earlier stated encomiums, which Goble poured on the year 1936, he still submitted that the heavy rainfall and locust-free cropping season of 1936 brought little benefits because the margin of production of staple food crops over the extant scope of consumption was quite low.[5] And, clearly impelled by the pains suffered by the colonialists due

to the failure of the famine relief measures taken in 1935, Goble also painted a dark, famine-ridden general picture of Pankshin Division's past. With superlative garb, Goble maintained that: "The area [Pankshin Division] has in the past been particularly susceptible to famine and relief measures, at such times have necessitated heavy expenditure by the Native Administrations."[6] But we know that it was only during Noad's time, Goble's immediate but one predecessor, who in 1935 took action to relieve the food strain of the people, but the scheme failed. Suffice it for Goble to have said that on the whole, the difference in the level of production over consumption in the year 1936 was quite low. By that position, Goble did not deny the prospect of the derivation of food surpluses from the Pankshin Division, except that he did not want Resident Pembleton to expect much. On his own part, Pembleton completely denied the prospect of any derivable surplus from Plateau Province in his annual report for 1936, which he forwarded to the Chief Commissioner, in Kaduna. Said he, conclusively: "there is no surplus for the industrial population of the Minesfield."[7] This tendentious denial of the food contributions of Plateau communities to the Minesfield was necessitated by the desire, it seems, on the part of residents such as Pembleton to put pressure on the regional government in Kaduna in order to push other provinces to despatch their grain surpluses into Plateau Province for the fullest benefit of the mining companies. More grain obtained was always better than to experience any scarcity, no matter how brief. That attitude of denying the readiest dependence of the Minesfield on Plateau communities' produce, however, was as dangerous as the latter attitude of mine-labour recruiting technocrats, especially during the Second World War, in spinning out the lie

that Plateau peasants, in the period up to 1945, preferred to sell off their food surpluses to the mining companies in order to obtain their tax obligations and other fees, rather than worked as mine-labourers.[8] Neither extreme is backed by evidence.

With reference to Yil Ngas, for instance, the colonialists apparently rejoiced over how readily taxes were paid-in before 31st March 1936, as well as, over the fact of growing 'collection centres' of grain surplus in the area. Reporting on the first half-year of 1936, in Pankshin Division, S.H.V. White, Noad's successor who later handed over to Goble, made this submission concerning a part of Yil Ngas, precisely Ntal (Tal) District:

> Tal: 105 square miles... General tax: £523, completed early, well before 31st March. An able and progressive chief, and an energetic people, make this a happy, contented and fairly prosperous district. Its affairs run smoothly and well. It is the principal groundnut-producing district, and sends large exports, through Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo middlemen, to Jos in the season. Rimi cotton (**kapok**) is also an export to the railway. A good deal of grain is grown as well.[9]

Then in his annual report by the end of the year, Goble identified Amper as another viable collection centre, a source of surplus produce for the Minesfield: "The headquarters of the District, [sic] Chikka, is becoming increasing important as a collecting centre for produce, ground-nuts, and being exported by lorry and donkey to the Minesfield and Jos."[10]

Hence it may be a correct assumption to hold that whilst the general margin of production over consumption in the Pankshin Division in 1936 might have been low, the margin for the communities in and around Tal and Amper Districts must have been high that is to say, must have been higher than the divisional average. If on the other hand, if we further assume that it was due to the farther distance of Amper and Tal Districts from the Minesfield

when compared to other places in Yil Ngas, or in Pankshin Division for that matter, in their growing importance in supplying food resources to the Minesfield, then we need not over-emphasise their importance. Other Yil Ngas communities, being nearer than those two to the Minesfield, must have taken their surplus food produce there directly, rather than through any collection or despatching centres, or must have carried the inevitable onus of supplying Pankshin, for the sustenance of her NA 'institutes' (NA prison, hospital, grain reserve, emerging town community and school). Of course, the third guess is: they might just have been uninvolved on-lookers who did nothing, which is most unlikely. However the fact that some districts, such as Ntal (Tal) and Amper, were regarded as growing enclaves for the exploitation, and indeed were actively involved in the traffic, of grain produce into the Minesfield (and were given particular mention out of the 23 districts in the division), is significant. It indicates part of the growing mobility mentioned from the beginning of the chapter.

In the same 1936 annual report, features of the district administrative units as well as the emergent roles of chiefs, especially the districts heads, in Pankshin Division, were broached. The 23 so-called 'independent units,' or districts, were grouped and served by only two Native Treasuries: the Pankshin and Kanam Native Treasuries. The Kanam NT catered for Kanam District alone. Of the 22 districts under the Pankshin NT, 12 lay within the area designated as Yil Ngas in this study. Commenting openly on the administrative character of the division in relation to its districts in 1936, Goble categorically mentioned the 'less direct' style of colonial administration over Kanam District, modelled on the practice in other emirates of Northern

Nigeria. The 22 districts under the Pankshin Native Administration, however, were administered more or less on direct basis, though they had 'tribal' chiefs, meaning district heads, and/or federated councils, as Native Authorities in their respective domains. Goble also mentioned that more problems existed in federated councils than in full-fledged districts.[11]

Hence, by 1936 (i), contrary to Gonyok's contention,[12] suggestive that between 1926 and 1935, Yil Ngas had witnessed the establishment of the so-called 'indirect rule' on its soil, there was no evidence of the so-called 'indirect rule' concept and practice in Pankshin Division (Goble described the practice in Kanam District as 'less direct,' not indirect, even though it was modelled on emirate lines); (ii) some district structures had not yet been fully recognised by some of the their constituent communities even though their boundaries had probably not been changed since Mathews' Report was implemented; and (iii) local government administration was directly conducted by the colonial officer, though the office and role of a district chief, regardless of whether he had an individual or shared area of jurisdiction, got better defined. Like the **dandoka,** or native policeman, differences with whom were formal not essential, the district or village chief had by and large, been turned into another zombie, or errand boy, at the disposal of the DO, employed in the exploitation of peasant producers.

The account of 1936, with reference to Pankshin Division in general, and Yil Ngas in particular, became the basis of what ensued in 1937 an 1938, as far as colonial food-produce exploitation for the benefit of the Minesfield, was concerned. However, the evidence is rightly circumstantial. When there was a record rise in the labour force of the Minesfield in 1937 due to a

feverish desire to produce enough tin to meet the quota Britain had requisitioned Nigeria to supply, as Isichei suggests,[13] there must have been a correspondingly intensified demand for corn from Yil Ngas and elsewhere, during which the colonialists used strong-arm methods in order to attain their objective. When, on the other hand, there was a recession in the tin industry in 1938, as Freund suggests,[14] less pressure must have been put on peasant producers' corn, in Yil Ngas and neighbouring communities, for quick supplies, compared to the 1937-case, a disappointing experience to peasants who had to sell their produce at terribly give-away prices, or who might not have sold any, at all. Such vicissitudes and contradictions elicited by changing conditions in the Minesfield as shown, always left Plateau peasant producers napping, frustrated and disappointed.

5.3. Second World War Years, 1939 - 1945

The 1938 recession in tin production on the Jos Plateau however, did not last beyond that year. Due to the stimulus of war fever, the recession suddenly gave way early in 1939 to a rapid increase in tin production. Freund compares what was happening in the tin industry in Nigeria in 1939 to the pursuit of British interests during the First World War:

> As in the First World War, the British Government, was particularly concerned with intensifying its dollar earnings to pay for American war purchases. As a gesture of goodwill, [colonial] Nigeria lifted the tax discrimination against tin exported straight to the USA that had been imposed in the First World War. By the end of 1939, the USA had decided upon a policy of deliberate stockpiling of tin metal and the British Government pushed mining companies to produce to the utmost.[15]

Hence with such a directive, to produce tin to the utmost, which was by and large thrust on the shoulders not only of the mining companies but more on the

colonial state, colonial officers on ground were left without any option other than going in a helter-skelter fashion pushing whichever and whatever food resources and labour into the Minesfield.

5.3.1. Wartime Food Administration of Northern Nigeria

It is clear that all the efforts expended in the conquest and incorporation of the diverse administrative (and economic) units which comprised the so-called Northern Nigeria by British colonialists was not merely intended to attain administrative decorum but primarily to dictate and coordinate the pace and direction of economic exploitation on a wider scale; that is, to exploit all opportunities, especially where a vital commodity as tin which was found in large quantities in the Jos Plateau area, was in big demand. Alahira has adequately identified what the main concern of the British in colonizing the so-called Northern Nigeria was initially intended to secure: the sources of tin located, at some, at the time, unknown area in the hinterland.[16] Moreover, the exceptional significance of tin mining to the colonialists must have been responsible as to why capitalist production, to agree with Gavin Williams, was limited to the Jos Plateau Minesfield alone,[17] in the whole colonial economy of Nigeria.

But, at the same time, the colonialists were damn too afraid of the "economic and political consequences of the emergence of a fully proletarianized working class on the Plateau,"[18] which would have been engendered by the wide operation of the capitalist relations of production in their tin mining industry, so they fought hard to prevent its emergence. The tin mining companies contented themselves with a small piece of semi-proletarianised labour, on the one hand, and a non-permanent but larger chunk

of what they ironically called 'voluntary' labour, on the other.[19] Voluntary labour, ironically, comprised of forced labour peasants recruited from Plateau Province through arms-flexing methods, and so were usually treated with the least respect and paid the least wages. In agriculture, plantation cultivation was virtually not encouraged, but peasant and petty commodity production, which though preferred was even restricted: "colonial administration and commerce restricted its further development."[20] Hence agricultural production in Northern Nigeria, during the colonial period, was largely relegated to the smallest possible unit of labour and production, namely, the individual, or at best the family, through whom substantial surpluses were procured, especially during any economic emergency, doing a lot of damage to the subsistence needs of the concerned families. In such cases, family famines usually followed, no matter the scale.

During the early 1940s, sequel to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 in which Britain, Nigeria's colonizing power, was a principal actor, such an unhealthy situation developed; a situation which led not only to the shortage of foodstuffs in the markets but famine for a wide cross-section of the population. A host of economic pressures imposed by the war on British economy were inadvertently transferred onto the shoulders of her colonies, Nigeria inclusive. Hence, in 'Northern Nigeria', apart from the forced labour, which was introduced to aid increased production in the Plateau tin mines, there were two important food-based war-induced policies: the groundnut and corn campaigns. According to Bill Freund:

> The groundnut campaign was initiated to force peasants to increase groundnut production. Food for the mines-field was requisitioned even though 1942 and 1943 were years of light rainfall and bad harvests. In Plateau Province, 8000 tons of

> grains were requisitioned in 1942 and people died of starvation. There was simply not enough food coming to the mines-field to allow for increased production.[21]

While groundnut production policy was on one hand, and corn supply, control, pricing and distributing policies were on the other, the massacring effects of the latter policies, as Freund indicated, demand no over-emphasis as far as the Plateau Province was concerned. People died of starvation!

Indeed, it was in March 1942 that the Chief Commissioner (as he was called) in charge of Northern Nigeria -- as its chief executive -- took it upon his own honour, to direct, control, and authorize as to the price, the place, the destination, and the agency to handle, of corn produce (which included guinea-corn, and millet) within his area of jurisdiction. An official contractual offer was granted to the UAC Ltd, to purchase and store corn, or create a grain reserve, for the benefit of the Army and the Minesfield and also to cater for any emergency. Residents of Northern Provinces were all directed to cooperate with and assist the UAC when and where necessary, as she sought to discharge the services asked of her. Michael Watts has pointed out that:

> The administrative dicta handed down to the regional and local-level officers were specifically to monitor price trends and promote provincial self-sufficiency in cereals as a matter of wartime policy... In practice, the colonial program during the war was a complex, and at times chaotic, amalgam of price control and grain requisition coupled with a vigorous forced commodity production policy. The axis about which much colonial policy revolved was, in fact, food. By 1942, at least, an allocative priority for grain purchased by or on behalf of the government had been agreed on...[22]

The tin mines and the army were the major recipients of the purchased corn; others were government institutions (such as prisons, schools, hospitals etc.), the export sector, and the famine reserve.[23]

It is noteworthy that UAC was solely offered the contract to purchase, distribute, and store corn, partially as a deliberate policy aimed at stamping out all indigenous Nigerian contractors, hitherto involved in the supply of corn to the colonial army. The UAC, as well as the Residents in-charge of the Northern Provinces, were required to report to the regional government any Nigerian contractor, found to be buying and storing corn in large quantities, to later sell out when prices might have gone up, or who claimed to be a grain contractor for any government agency.[24] While Nigerian contractors were excluded as though they were an endangered species, another European firm, John Halt Ltd, was later assigned to execute the contract together with the UAC, in the same month: March 1942![25] The status quo was maintained for five years. The central administration of food purchasing, distribution and storage was finally abolished in November 1947, roughly two years after the end of the Second World War. The government of Northern Nigeria, however, did not regard the policy's over-all implementation and methods of grain acquisition as having been normal or germane with market conditions. That was partially why they abolished it.[26]

The deeper explanation of the regional government's action in formally abandoning the practice, however, was the obvious subsidence of the war-induced pressures hitherto zoned to the Northern Nigerian colonial government as her 'quota' in the British war economy: hinged particularly on the unbreakable export of tin in its largest quantities and at the lowest possible costs to the United States of America, in exchange for arms.[27] Now that the war was over, the pressure also subsided; hence the decision, on the part of the regional government, to abolish the practice.

With bigger commands of merchant capital, together with government's backing, compared to any Nigerian trader or indigenous group, which were faced with the problem of colonial 'illegality,' UAC and John Holt, must have had a field day in grain business during the years of the said war. It was unthinkable for these firms to wade into transactions or venture into purchasing trips, which in the end might prove unprofitable. The UAC, for instance, sternly refused to oblige the request of the DO in-charge, Pankshin Division, to go from Jos and lift one hundred and ten (110) tons of corn from Shendam and Dengi to the Minesfield in October 1942 and to also put a buying agent in that area. The company contended that:

> In view of the small tonnage... purchased at Shendam and Dengi and the difficulty of transport it would be preferable to leave this corn find its way naturally to the mining camps nearest to that area. At the present time we are getting more than the mining companies can store and we are not anxious to take up more than is necessary.
>
> If you consider that it is desirable to buy at these places we will try to make arrangements for delivery to be made to the nearest mining companies. We do not wish to place an agent anywhere, we are not established for the purpose of buying corn...[28]

So UAC managers refused, placing company interest above that of government. A tendency or attitude betrayed in the very year in which UAC was given the contract, which she was very unlikely to have refrained from in the years after 1942. Within seven months of the contract, UAC had become a proud and uncompromising grain monopoly.

Meanwhile her refusal to transport the 110 tons, described as 'small tonnage,' ostensibly had some serious implications for Pankshin divisional administration. In the first place, 110 tons, that is, 1100 bags in all, was not a small quantity of corn to be lifted by human porterage from the lowlands,

where Shendam and Dengi are located, through the steep and difficult escarpments of the Plateau massif into the Minesfield. Pack animal transport (precisely: the use of the donkey) was not so entrenched in that region as to lift such a substantial load of corn to its expected destination. About 37 full lorry-load (on the basis 30 bags per lorry load) trips were necessary to move the stock to the Minesfield. Later in the same October 1942, the Pankshin NA lorry was able to move only 17 bags (approximately one and a half tons) out of the 61 tons collected at Shendam, "as far as Pankshin to await further transport."[29] Hence the remaining tons of corn must have found their way into the mining camps by means of human porterage, at the behest of the DO of Pankshin, to avoid spoilage or loss of the corn. Hundreds of able-bodied men must have been forced to lift the remaining 93 tons or 930 bags. In the second place, if UAC's report cited above, that the mining companies had already bought and stockpiled enough corn in their storerooms was a anything to go by, then the 110 tons must have later been sold at give away prices, thereby imposing a deficit on Pankshin Division's capital, which was used in ('buying' or) requisitioning the corn in the first place, to assist UAC, as initially required by the regional government.

Between 1942 and 1944, when Shendam Division (headquartered at Shendam) was placed under the charge of the DO of Pankshin Division and, being in charge of two extensive divisions, it would not have been any difficulty for the DO to 'purchase,' actually requisition, 110 tons of **nmoor** or **gero,** the early millet crop, as soon as its harvest was done. Other producing areas of **nmoor** such as Chip, Ntal (Tal), Gar'm (Garram) and Per (Amper) in Yil Ngas, must have taken their quotas to the nearest collection centres[30] such

as Pankshin station (where some of the supplied grain normally went to the NA prison, school and hospital) and Amper sub-station, from where it was sent off into the mining camps in Jos Division. All district headquarters in Yil Ngas were collection centres in their own right. Hence, in addition to the farthest reaches of the mining community's corn-demand, going beyond the frontiers of Plateau Province, and its internally distant collection centres in the lowlands of the province such as Dengi, Wase, Langtang, Nshar (Yelwa), Shendam and Kwande, there were also collection centres spread along the eastern and south-eastern escapements of the Jos Plateau massif, from where the NA 'institutes,' to use the colonial term again, and mining camps always got their immediate, usually emergency, supplies of corn.

Going by the 1942 contract, UAC was not supposed to go into provinces which were located near Plateau Province, talkless of locations within it, to buy corn, since, as it was expected, such corn would "continue to find its way" into the Minesfield without any agency playing the middleman.[31] The paradox of it all was that UAC had long been into buying and selling corn in Plateau Province before the beginning of the British war economy. That, however, lies outside the scope of the present study. Suffice it to say that there were several other contradictions, which characterized the operation of the war economy in Northern Nigeria. Watts relates it thus:

> With one hand the government exhorted the peasant producer to 'grow more food' and to aspire to the lofty and laudable goal of surplus food production, and with the other placed unrealistic demands on direct producers for compulsory cash-crop production, conscripted military and mines labour, and obligatory grain requisitioning... During the war the number of staple foodstuff consumers increased as the number of food producers declined, further fuelling the inflationary, spiral.[32]

The avalanche of contradictions within the Northern Nigerian regional economy, no doubt, constitutes one of the backgrounds contributory to our understanding of the pattern of grain exploitation in Yil Ngas during the period under review in this chapter.

5.3.2. Grain Produce In A Mining Province: Between the Colonialist and the Capitalist

Several other processes concerning the question of food seem to have either pre-empted the war-time food administration 'policy' of the Northern Nigeria or been derived from it. The process of direct sourcing of food supplies by the mining companies from the Plateau communities through the agency of colonial officers, for instance, was older than the regional government's war-time policy, which did not circumvent it. On the contrary, the policy aided it to become an entrenched practice in its own right, both during and after the war. Sequel to the corn-glut years (that is, the early 1930s), not only were the mining companies, but the divisional, and even the provincial authorities in Plateau Province, were reportedly exhibiting especial interest in the time, place, price and destination of corn produce and its surpluses among the Plateau communities. Their interest was essentially geared towards ensuring a steady supply of corn to the Minesfield on the one hand and the provision of a ready and near market for the said produce, somehow shielding it from being out-competed in its own local market by corn, which was imported from the other provinces, on the other hand.

Just as it was the case with Plateau so-called 'voluntary' labour, Plateau food-produce, which was reportedly 'voluntarily' sold to the NAs and the mining companies, was, at any time, the cheapest to be found, compared to the corn brought from outside the province, transportation costs notwithstanding.

The reason responsible for this comparative under-valuing of Plateau corn-produce was the fact that other provinces' corn was usually supplied at current market prices, freight charges inclusive, in line with their provincial authorities' arrangements, whereas Plateau corn was usually supplied at the mining camps and the NA collecting centres at controlled prices, fixed below current market rates, exclusive of any freight charges, which were not usually paid to the supplying peasants.[33] In other words, corn supply from other provinces was conducted in manners safeguarding the interests of the concerned provinces, but corn supplied from inside Plateau Province was bought, or made to be bought, in manners, which protected the joint interests of the capitalists, who were involved in the tin sector, and the colonialists, who were involved in mentoring the administrative machinery of state, that is, Plateau Province.[34] To a large extent, indeed, provincial interest was attached to, and dictated by the interests of the mining industry. Hence Plateau Province was **ipso facto** a tin miners' province. Their interests determined, if not dictated, the direction of provincial policies, colonial social security and administrative style.

5.3.3. Locusts, Grain Scarcity and Hunger

The war fever must have had an immediate, plundering impact on the socio-economic life of the people of Yil Ngas, caused by the anxiety of the colonial state. However, by the end of 1939, there were other developments, which were undisturbed by it, as it were. The Village Head of Gugur in Amper District, for instance, applied to the DO for the permission to establish a market in Gugur and got the approval the very next day, in April 1939.[35] A nearer market, than the one at Chika, would help in the disposal of grain

surpluses, or hasten sales, and guard against deflation, occurring in the Gugur local economy, the chief might have thought. Circumstantially viewed, this particular report illustrates that surplus produce was available at Gugur for the Minesfield. The request bore tidings of good things, tidings of the kind of collaboration the colonialists wanted from chiefs. This was the more so, as it bordered on the supply of surplus food produce, grain in particular.

The prospect of a bumper harvest in Gugur that year, however, must have been dashed by the sudden locust invasion of the Amper District area, which occurred in June, barely two months after Gugur market was established. Reports of flying swarms of hoppers were heard from different parts of Plateau Province but it was only in Amper District that damage to crops was definitely reported,[36] in the whole province.

At the divisional level, swarms of hoppers were first observed in June 1939, in Chip District, but were destroyed by inhabitants of the concerned village. Thus, it was only in Amper District where damage to crops was recorded. In July 1939, swarms of hoppers appeared in the east of Kanam District, where they inflicted slight damage to crops. Swarms also had brief stops in Tal, Garram, and Wokkos Districts. In August, they appeared in the north-west of Ron District. After that, there was no official report of locust swarms again until April 1944.[37] Colonial reports of that kind usually down-played the degree of damage done to the people's crops. As a local precedent to the Second World War, which started in September 1939, though in Europe, however, flying swarms and locust invasions occurring between June and August 1939, must have been viewed as a bad omen, by many Ngas primal religionists, when news of the war arrived. Being suddenly confronted with

demands of the Second World War, which meant greater loss of their surpluses, especially in areas where the locusts had left their mark such as the communities of Amper District, the peasant producers must have been faced with a shocking predicament. The **Maar' nlong** famine, literally meaning the 'farm-bereft' famine, which is remembered by the people especially in Amper area, characterised by very poor yields, must have occurred about this time.[38]

J.A.Wall, the Agricultural Assistant or '**Mallamin Gona**,' in charge of '**kasar Panyam**' and '**kasar Pankshin**' as he described it himself, taking charge of what later became the Sura/Pyem and Angas Chiefdoms collectively, was stationed in Panyam. His reports on the Panyam area were more detailed. Apparently overwhelmed by the sheer size of his area of responsibility, Wall did not say anything on 'kasar Pankshin' beyond Pankshin District, in 1939, talk less of reporting any famine, or food stress, in Amper area. Nevertheless, he reported something in that connection with reference to the Panyam area, when he wrote in October 1939 that:

> *A kasar Panyam talauci ya yawa, har da kaza zuwa ga su awaki har da doki zuwa dan mutum a sayar a samu kudi. Ba mu sani ba ko da yaya za mu zama a lafiya?*[39]

Which translates as:

> In Panyam area, poverty abounds; it has pushed some people into stealing; they began from the hen to the goats, even the horse and the human child, to sell to get money. We don't know by what means shall we live in safety?

Interestingly, Beever, the DO in-charge of Pankshin Division at that time, apparently did not want it to be said that there was poverty, talkless of famine, in any part of his domain. In forwarding Walls' report, Beever refused to agree with him on the question of the poverty of people in Panyam area or in Mwaghavul land simply because, according to him, the nearness of the

Minesfield was a sufficient reason for anyone in that area not to be economically stressed, or hard-pressed. The mining companies, in his words, were "crying out for labour since the outbreak of the war."[40] Since wage-labour work abounded in the Minesfield, no one had any reason to be in want, even of food (as though the mines were established to produce food)!

Earlier on, Beever had also counteracted Wall's contention in the same month, October 1939, that there had been a relative lack of rain earlier in the wet season leading to poor yields in the division. Beever produced rain gauge figures for April to October taken at Pankshin Station, illustrating the normal average rainfall for the division, on the one hand, and citing the current corn price in Pankshin Town, which did not show any rise above what was expected if there was a shortfall in corn produce that year, on the other. But rainfall conditions were not usually uniform (as Beever himself admitted) nor were figures taken in Pankshin town, universal, in the division.[41] Besides, October corn prices could not be regarded as a good index in measuring poor yields since October was usually a 'harvest' month, not a 'hungry' month such as July or August. Wall wrote from inside the Mwaghavul or Panyam society, not from the comfortable recesses of Nwulmi hill, the headquarters station-site in Pankshin town, Beever's base. Therefore Wall's contention seems more tenable and should be upheld.

With a reported situation of food stress in Panyam and environs (outside Yil Ngas) as well as a probable situation of food stress, if not strain, in the Amper and environs (situated in the east of Yil Ngas) by the end of 1939, it can be correctly taken that food conditions in the bigger part of the following year, 1940, for the whole Pankshin Native Administrative area (if

not for the whole Pankshin Division for that matter, that is, including Kanam Native Administrative area) could not have been better, but probably worse than in 1939.

The introduction of forced labour in favour of the tin mines in order for the companies to raise their production levels to the utmost in 1942 was the immediate factor responsible for the intensified requisitioning of grain. If it was not intensified immediately, the food question in the Minesfield was bound to be acute. So the peasant producers' subsistence was simply sacrificed on the altar of meeting the food needs of the increased forced mine-labourers: According to Freund's discovery, food produce was requisitioned even though 1942 and 1943 witnessed light rainfall and bad harvests. In 1942, as stated earlier, 8000 grain tons were requisitioned in Plateau Province alone. Many people starved to death. As a result, in July 1942, the colonial authorities called a temporary halt to forced labour intake from other provinces into Plateau Province and its Minesfield, in order to lighten the burden on the distressed peasant food economy of the province.[42]

The colonial authorities in Plateau Province immediately reorganized their efforts and took decisions which in their thinking reflected the necessary relation which existed or was thenceforth to exist, between their system of grain exploitation and each division, sub-division, district, village community or locality in Plateau Province and on 14th August 1942, L.H. Goble, now as the Acting Resident of the province, despatched a circular to the DOs explaining and directing that:

> It is not proposed to put any restriction on the movement of 'free' corn from areas adjacent to the Plateau in the direction of the Plateau. On the other hand it has been found desirable to restrict movement of corn from other corn-producing areas. For

this reason it may be necessary to prevent corn which has been imported into the Plateau Province being moved out of the area, although it is impossible that there will be any appreciable movement of this nature...

There is some chance that a good deal of corn from the Shendam Division may find its way into Muri Division instead of flowing towards the Minesfield. The DO, Shendam, should therefore make an order prohibiting the export of corn from Shendam Division to Muri Division, and full publicity should be given to the order through the Native Authorities.

It should be decided not to interfere with supplies from Jemaa and Southern Divisions. These areas supply local mining companies, etc, and flow through normal trade channels is satisfactory. Similarly in the northern parts of Pankshin, special measures by the administration do not seem necessary.

In the southern parts of Pankshin Division and Shendam Division, it will be necessary for supplies to be organised by the administration. I have informed the Chief Commissioner that I consider that 300 tons should be available from these two areas.[43]

To concretise his last assertion, Goble immediately gave a requisition order: "I have to request that DOs, Pankshin and Shendam... to impose a quota upon areas in order to obtain the quality required, but before doing so it will be preferable to see what can be done in the open market."[44] In the same circular, he further directed the DOs of Pankshin and Shendam Divisions to commence sending to him weekly reports on (i) grain tonnage bought during each week; (ii) tonnage supplied to mining companies; and (iii) tonnage at hand.[45] Thus the grain-requisition 'ceasefire' of July 1942 was broken within two weeks of August! Certain specified areas such as the southern part of Pankshin and the whole of Shendam Division were categorically earmarked for immediate exploitation as soon as the **gero** harvest was done, from which some 300 tons of grain were to be taken.

By 'southern parts' of Pankshin Division, Goble must have been referring to districts such as Southern Sura (Mang'gun and Chak'fem), Jipal, Chip, Tal, Garram, Pai, Amper and Kanam. By that proposal, the colonialists meant simply to bring such southern communities into line alongside the districts which occupied the northern parts of Pankshin Division where, as stated, special measures as far as grain procurement was concerned, did not seem necessary. In other words, by virtue of their relative proximity to the Minesfield, the northern communities had already been thoroughly subjected to the gripping and rapacious food demands of the war economy. The 'northern parts' might have included districts such as Tof, Ron, Northern Sura, Gindiri, Fier, Kadun, Lankan, Wokkos, Pankshin, Ampang-East and Kabwir. Since 'special measures' were not necessary to secure grain from the northern parts of Pankshin Division, it is clear that Goble, having served in Pankshin before, had observed that they were already in the undesired practice of surrendering grain beyond what they could bear. With a combination of the use of force, strong-arm methods and the various requisitioning policies on the part of the colonialists, especially in places situated within some hours' or a day's walk from either the Minesfield or colonial stations such as Pankshin town, it increasingly became difficult for the peasant-producers to keep back whatever grains were required by their colonial overlords, at whose mercy they stood.

Communities within Plateau Province, especially within Pankshin, Shendam and Jos Divisions, during the years of the Second World War, were usually compelled to sell off their food produce to mining and trading companies at prices officially approved by the regional government.[46] This

had the terrible effect of making the peasants sell off their food produce at the imposed, so-called approved, rates, to put them out of 'trouble' with colonial authorities, who needed both the cereals and the cash, which they 'extracted' through grain-requisitioning and taxation, respectively. It was the ugly enterprise of 'unwarranted' lowering of local grain prices in Plateau Province to levels lower than even the approved rates that was also proposed in August 1942 by Goble, the Acting Resident, to be introduced during that year's forthcoming harvest of crops. Through this obnoxious strong-arm method, the 'markets' would be flooded with large quantities of grain in exchange for trifling sums of money. It is against this background that UAC's reluctance by the end of that year, to go to Dengi and Shendam and lift 1100 grain-bags to the Minesfield, must have proved very offensive to the colonial officers who ordered the collection. It is also against this backdrop that the unpalatable news of many Plateau peasants dying of starvation in 1943 due to the colonialists action of virtually 'robbing' them of 8000 tons of grain produce in 1942, can be understood. They faced scarcity, hunger and want. A situation worse than poverty; the grain question was a very acute one indeed. It was not long, however, that the ripples of the peasants' starvation reached the mining camps, especially in 1943.

Because the matter was treated with confidentiality, the hunger that was prevalent in the mining camps was not, in the reckoning of Mine Managers, to be reported to the colonial authorities. Hence for reporting to the Resident, in July 1943, that his company's mine labourers: "had not any chop in camp and had not had a bite to eat all day owing to there being no **gari** [fried cassava flour] or yams in the market," one British miner named

Blackshaw, of Naraguta Tin Mines, Korot Areas, was morally dismissed as a windbag who should not be taken seriously, in a reaction by his company's manager to the Resident.[47] Rather than urge the Resident's support in providing food to help the labourers, Blacshaw's manager preferred to treat their hunger with levity and name-calling.[48] A practical response on the part of the Resident would have entailed putting intense pressure, once again, on the rural food-producing communities and peasants, of Yil Ngas and elsewhere, for fresh supplies in order to cater for Britain's interest in the Second World War, via tin production, which could not be mortgaged in the face of such hunger, even in the mining camps. More pressure put on the lean or vanished subsistence of the peasant producers would only have forced more of the starving people to die.

5.3.4. Groundnut Campaign: A War Measure

The suffering of the people did not deter the colonialists from saddling them with additional demands of the war economy. In April 1943, the greatest groundnut propaganda in Pankshin Division was launched as a necessary supplement to the war effort. In a Hausa well-worded circular despatched on behalf of the DO by Nuhu Bayero, the Headmaster of Pankshin NA School, peasant farmers of the division, Yil Ngas inclusive, were once again urged to contribute to the defeat of the Germans, this time around, through groundnut production. Addressed to the District Heads, the circular said:

> *Kun sani dai mai babban abu ne wajen sha'anin yaki domin kuwa karafa da ake yaki da su kamar su bindigogi, da mairuwa da tanki da sauransu sai da mai suke motsi. Domin haka Gwamna ya ce a gaya maku, ya ce ku noma gyada, su noma gyada, su noma gyada. Ku gaya masu, da ku da su duka, mai kaunar Allah mai kaunar a ci azzalumin nan* Hitler *wanda shi ke makiyin Allah, makiyin adalci da gaskiya, bayan ya noma hatsi sauran gonakinsa shi noma gyada.*[49]

Furthermore:

> *Gwamna ya ce babba da yaro, bai dauke wa kowa ba, a yi wa Ingilishi gudmnmuwa da gyada! Kowace sana'a mutum ya ke yi Gwamna ya ce ya gama da noman gyada. Kun sani sai an sha kari ake iske zuma. To mu mike tsaye mu dau fatanya, mu dau garma, mu tono gyada, mu tono nasara.*[50]

Explaining that:

> *Ba don karafuna kadai ake son mai ba, galibin abinci bai ciryuwa sai da mai, hanyar samun mai ga Ingila ta yi wuya domin haka gare mu suka rataya: mu kuwa mu mike mu ba su gyada har mai ya nashe suo To haka kowa zai san Nigeria ta Arewa ba ta haifi malalata ba.*[51]

And pin-pointing the advantages:

> *Da wajan pam £6-10-0 ake sayen kowane* ton *na gyada. Amma a wannan ta bana da ake so mu noma za a fara sayen kowane* ton *a bakin £9-0-0. watau sulai 180 kenan. Kai, bana da hadahada! ga kudi, ga taimako! Yanzu kayan yaki uku ne a Nigeria, ga soja, ga ceburun kuza, ga kuma garmar hudar gyada. To maza mu tashi tsaye, Allah shi ba mu sa'a mu ci Jamus kaf!*[52]

Our English renditions are as follows:

> You know that oil is a big issue in the matter of warfare because indeed the metals [metalic weapons], which are presently being used in fighting, such as the guns, whether of the navy, or the tank, and other types, operate only with the facility of [lubricating] oil. For that reason, the Governor requires everyone to make effort in groundnut cultivation because it is needed. What the Governor has directed to be communicated to you is: you should cultivate groundnuts; tell your peasants to cultivate groundnuts. Tell them, plus yourselves and sundry, everyone who loves Allah, who loves the defeat of that oppressor, Hitler - who himself is a hater of Allah, a hater of righteousness and truth - that after planting grain, he should use the rest of his farmland to plant groundnuts.

Furthermore:

> The Governor says both the adult and the child, he has not exempted anyone, should render assistance to the English with groundnuts! Whatever may be ones occupation, the Governor says he should crown it up with groundnut, when you gain

> quantitatively that you would secure honey. So then, let us stand up, small-hoe, let us pick the big-hoe, let us dig-up groundnuts, let us dig-up victory.

Explaining that:

> It is not only because of metals [metalic weapons and other machinery] that oil is being demanded; the main food dishes are not tenable unless oil is used; having found it [very] difficult to obtain this oil, it is on us that England depends; we then should rise up and give them groundnuts, even oil, which will overwhelm them! By so doing, everyone will know that Northern Nigeria has not given birth to useless people.

And pin-pointing the advantages:

> In the past, a ton of groundnut used to be bought at about £6-10-0. But this one that we are requested to cultivate will begin to be bought at £9-0-0 per ton, that is 180 shillings each. Surely, soon there will be combinations of opportunities! See money, see help! Presently, there are three weapons of war in Nigeria there are the soldier, the tin-mining shovel, and then the ground-nut farmer's big-hoe. So then, let us rise up at once, and may Allah give us favour to defeat Germany flat!

However, in view of the dictum 'he who pays the piper dictates the tune', we can understand with Nuhu Bayero why he did not mention the peasant farmer's grain, among the Second World War's weapons, which Britain had secured in Nigeria. It is common knowledge that without food, neither the soldier, nor the shovel, or the big-hoe, (or the soldier, the mine-labourer, and the peasant-farmer) would 'do' what was expected of them. It remains to be mentioned that from such pressures, it is circumstantially evident, that Ngas, other Plateau, and, for that matter, Northern Nigerian peasant farmers were subjected to great pains during the war to meet the stiff food demands of the British war economy. In the case of Pankshin Division, it only became obvious that groundnut requisitioning, by that circular, was going to be as nerve-wracking as corn requisitioning, which was not played-down, to pave way for groundnut requisitioning.

Meanwhile, in May 1943, Lenox Conyingham, the DO of Pankshin Division, gave an order requisitioning 100 bags, or ten tons, of groundnuts, at £6-10-0 per ton, from Gar'm (Garram) and Ntal (Tal) Districts alone.[53] Incidentally, these were two out of the few districts in Yil Ngas, which happened to have cursorily accepted the urgings of the colonial state to cultivate groundnuts during the economic depression years of the early 1930s. But were they in a position to give out 10 tons of groundnuts on that very eve of the next planting season? How many of the peasants were going to oblige the requisition at £6-10-0 per ton, rather than the £9-0-0, which was contained in an earlier circular, despatched in April, one month before?

The 100 bags were allegedly to be sent to the Resident, so the matter was expected be treated as very urgent. However, by early June 1943 only 14 sacks of seed-groundnuts had been received at Pankshin station from Tal. These were later taken to the NA prison rather than to the Resident in Jos.[54] Evidently none was recorded as having been supplied by Garram. And, it is very likely that sheer refusal to supply the groundnuts, was the attitude of the peasant producers not only in Garram, even in Tal District, which gave a small part of what was requisitioned. Their respective District Heads had both allegedly reported a lot of groundnuts harvested in their domains in 1942. Besides, why were not the 14 bags taken to Jos as earlier indicated? It seems the DO had lied to the concerned district-heads to oblige their quick action, only.

5.3.5. Ngas and Other Plateau Peasants In Severe Conditions

During the Second World War, Yil Ngas and her peasants were virtually plunged very deeply between the strains and stresses of social

subsistence and grain scarcity. Many channels of grain exploitation were employed such that it became difficult to escape being trapped in one way or the other. It was difficult for many cadres of the peasantry to feed well. Neither could they generally change their 'clothings', mainly of leaves and skins, in favour of the local or foreign textiles. Nor could they leave their thatched round-huts in order to build the grass-roofed four-cornered houses, in line with the colonial status quo. Instead, the period heralded increased emigration of Ngas families to the lowlands. For some, things remained bad since the **Maar'nlong** famine of 1939[55] The forces which had been gathering momentum in Yil Ngas right from the 1920s finally reached their zenith during the Second World War.

Regarding the changing conditions of peasants in Yil Ngas, Watts must have been correct in maintaining that after the First World War, "the terms of trade moved sharply against Plateau peasants" being that "the tax burden", which, still according to Watts, was raised significantly in 1919, subsequently "grew much more quickly than cereal prices."[56] While taxes kept on being increased, grain prices kept on being detained, which stagnated. Other colonial demands also increased as from the 1920s in Yil Ngas in relation to wages and prices: While the people continued to surrender more and more of their produce, labour-power, time, livestock and so forth, they got little and little in return. Colonial fees benefited no peasant.[57]

Watts, however, contradicted himself in his view that before 1945, "the local pagan communities, on the Plateau, proved obdurately uninterested in wage labour preferring to pay the colonial tax burden in grain."[58] That view could have been tenable only if the Plateau communities' peasant producers

were making anything much in their grain sales. But Watts had already agreed that they were not, as pointed out above. Instead, since the First World War, the Plateau communities' peasant producers had been losing more and more; talkless of the situation between 1939 and 1945, that is, during the Second World War, when peasants suffered the worst economic conditions, darkly reminiscent of the years of colonial invasion and conquest especially in Yil Ngas, but probably worse. Their alleged 'paganity' and 'obduracy', which Watts bothers to observe, amounted to nothing in those gloomy years during which in addition to the lowly-fixed 'controlled' grain prices at the regional -- Northern Nigerian -- level, the Residents of Plateau Province at that time had made it 'customary' to further lower the already lowly-fixed grain prices for the benefit of the purchasing companies, such that no reasonable and right thinking 'pagan' grain-produce would prefer to pay his taxes, including grain levies or requisitions, purely on the basis of his grain produce alone. So, as a matter of fact, Plateau peasant-producers had to go to the Minesfield and work, before 1945, in order to 'earn' money to offset their colonial tax burdens.

Neither the peasants nor non-peasants were given any opportunity to trade in grains. Foodstuffs were usually heavily requisitioned by the colonial authorities or garnered at the collecting centres for the benefit of the purchasing companies and next to nothing was left for anybody to engage in grain trade with. No wonder, K.P. Maddocks, the DO of Pankshin in 1940, urged the Provincial Agricultural Officer, an inquisitive man, to agree that: "there are no native traders of any standing dealing in foodstuffs in Pankshin Division. Foodstuffs are marketed directly by the individual farmers and there are no middlemen."[59] Hence, although there were frequent caravans of grain

porters and occasional hooting of grain-loaded lorries streaming to the Minesfield from various directions and locations in the Pankshin Division, this enterprise did not evolve any indigenous middleman class of traders, or business-oriented people of 'any standing' in the division.

Instead, the semblance of merchant capital was securely kept and controlled by the UAC, Managers of Tin Companies, and the DOs in-charge of Pankshin Division during the Second World War. By strong-arm methods, peasant producers were kept at bay and could be 'easily' compelled to give away food. That was why, even at those times when it was obviously uneconomical (or suicidal) for them to give away grain, they lacked the way out. This was true, of course, of peasant-producers in Yil Ngas and other Plateau communities whom Michael Watts has had the effrontery of describing as 'obdurate pagans' up to 1945.

The general picture in Plateau Province during the war as far as food exploitation was concerned could be viewed thus: rather than allow hunger at any time to impede the pace of tin extraction -- an action which was inimical to British war interests, -- grain was regularly and clandestinely imported from Plateau communities by means of colonial strong-arm methods, and in exchange, hunger was regularly and clandestinely exported to the same communities -- which action was not inimical to British war interests. Hence, the areas, which constituted the periphery, were continually sacrificed on the altar of sustaining and protecting the main colonial 'institute' in the province, or in Northern Nigeria, that is, the tin mining industry which constituted the core; help from other provinces notwithstanding. Up to the war's end in late 1945, Yil Ngas and the other Plateau communities more or less in the vicinity

of the Minesfield were unrelentingly subjected to the perennial reproduction of food scarcity, or **strain**, and, or naked hunger, or **stress**.

5.4. Some Anthropological Views: A Critique

In utilizing such concepts as 'obdurate pagans' in describing Plateau peoples, Watts has willy-nilly bought into the colonially-apologetic, anthropological views, that sometimes smear our sources with falsehood. For instance, a group of colonial anthropologists published some works in 1945, on what they thought were 'native economies' located within the Nigerian colonial economy.[60] Regarding the Plateau communities as part of their so-called native economies, they also posited that the same Plateau communities had hardly changed in appearance since the pre-colonial period, thus betraying the impression that no significant change had occurred in them during the colonial period up to 1945. Margery Perham, for instance, maintained that Plateau communities at the inception of the colonial period were characterised by "primitive cultural backwardness and atomic organisation."[61] In the same year, (1945), Daryll Forde submitted that the same Plateau communities presently, were generally characterised by "ethnic groups with distinctive economic and other cultural features."[62] Thus in the similarity of the two statements, we can appreciate the position that Plateau communities were said to have remained basically unchanged in form and substance for approximately half a century, that is, for the whole course of the colonial period up to 1945.

We have earlier maintained that because of the many significant changes which had taken place in the political economy of Yil Ngas and other Plateau communities in the period up to 1945, it was not only the 'substance'

but the 'form' of their economies, that had generally changed for the worse. Their meals lost a lot in nutrition, their clothes became poorer and their houses became decrepit, to mention a few. The suggestion of the so-called distinctive features characteristic of Plateau peoples and communities could not have meant a sustained existence of 'ethnic', 'economic' or 'cultural' isolation or immobility in the province during the colonial period up to 1945. On the contrary, as a province, the Jos Plateau area probably ranked next to none in terms of the interaction of ethnic elements and human mobility in the period up to 1945 due to its 'buoyant' tin mining industry. With regard to the same reason, its peoples and local economies were all incorporated by graph into the capitalist extractive colonial economy peculiar to Plateau Province, prior to that date, and in the course of time, its peoples and economies had increasingly acquired similar features and attributes which by 1945 were apparently more glaring and pronounced than the differences which distinguished them. The salutary colonial-cum-capitalist demands and the resultant strangulating conditions of food scarcity, elicited by the Second World War, naturally played not a small part in the homogenizing tendencies, which at the time had become characteristic of Plateau economies.[63]

The evidence of change could not however be completely denied by those 'concerned' anthropologists. In a surprising instance, Daryll Forde, inclined himself to acknowledge, and rather objectively stated in 1945, that "the pagan [Plateau community's] economy is no longer self-contained, particularly for communities that are in close contact with alien [non-Plateau] groups which have penetrated the area."[64] But close contact with immigrant (other Nigerian or foreign) elements alone could not have **ipso facto** brought

about economic disarticulation on the Jos Plateau, as Forde implied. At best, close contacts were simply part of the social context, which facilitated the disarticulation of such economies. The two culprits responsible for the disarticulation and resultant dependency of such economies on the mine economy on the Jos Plateau, were the general practice of colonial domination, on the one hand, and the particular operation of extractive capitalist mine economy, on the other hand, up to 1945, when Daryll Forde and his colleagues published their works on the so-called 'native economies' of Nigeria.

With reference to the Plateau Province, it is clear that apart from denying that European interests were responsible for the unfortunate situation, Forde surprisingly captured some useful reality in his remarks as lastly quoted above. Without reservation, based on what Forde observed, it is tenable to hold that the closer to, and therefore the more involved a Plateau economy, or community, was found to be, in relation to the tin mining economy, the greater was its dependence on it. In the same vein, the farther away a Plateau economy was situated in relation to the tin mining industry, the relatively lesser was its involvement and dependence on the mine economy. At least, on that structural basis, the relative degree of damage, which was done to the peasant economies in Plateau Province, could be given a proper explanation, rather than the mere suggestion of close contacts between immigrant elements and indigenous communities. Even if an issue is to be made of the suggestion that close contacts were disruptive economically speaking, that position fails to explain why the contacts came into being in the first place. Their **raison d'etre** was the mine economy, especially when it was drastically boosted and expanded by British Empire's Second World War's war-efforts. Hence, the

close contacts were simply part-and-parcel of the inevitable resultant situation; the pursuit of British capitalist cum-colonial interests constituted their very foundation.

5.5. Post War Years, 1946-1952

Whereas the Second World War physically came to an end in 1945, its exploitative and rapacious economy as was practised on the Jos Plateau was not revised or hindered but maintained for another two years, especially in Pankshin Division. Because they were beneficial to the colonial social order even in the aftermath of the war, the compulsiveness of imposed levies and grain requisitioning orders as well as the usual atmosphere of the state of emergency, which characterised the preceding war period, were largely maintained. On the whole however, colonial food requisitioning activity pursuant of British interests in Plateau Province naturally remained a priority in the aftermath of the war, especially in Pankshin Division, except that in organization, the requisitioning activity became decentralised, and in scope, it became non-generalised, but more specific and restricted, than in the period up to 1945.

In Pankshin Division, grain-requisitioning activity began to be done either on the basis of native administration areas, which were Pankshin and Kanam NAs, or districts, which concerned especially those not bordering directly on the Minesfield. In that endeavour, Yil Ngas was directly placed under the grain exploitative tendencies peculiar to Pankshin Native Administration (or NA), under whose schedule she had been placed since 1936. As from 1946, but more so from 1948, many areas in Pankshin NA were once again faced with grain requisitioning in a manner similar to the pre-war

situation. Grain quotas were virtually imposed on the persons of the District Heads rather than on the district-communities directly. It seems that the colonialists were hoping that in doing so they would further promote and concretise the offices of the District Heads and/or district councils. In practice however, hardly was there any difference made or felt on the part of the peasant producers; whether the quotas were imposed on the persons of their chiefs or on their very communities directly, the ultimate provision of the grains was largely their own onus. In both situations, they remained at the losing end.

An equally pernicious practice of grain exploitation that was largely, though quietly, maintained in the aftermath of the war was the system of using collecting centres where mining companies' buying agents bought grain at government-regulated prices in the producing areas, in the province. The tentacles of this exploitative system, which were mostly developed during the Second World War, continued to linger over the communities of Pankshin NA, Yil Ngas inclusive, even in the post-war period. Rather than allow the operation of 'free' market relations on the simple basis of supply and demand, the provincial-cum-divisional colonial authorities (in collaboration with tin-mining capitalists) preferred to allow for the operation of regulated market relations on the basis of unequal exchange, which favoured the mining sector and disfavoured the rural, grain-producing communities. Thus, apart from the direct imposition of grain quotas on the rural communities, the technique of utilizing collecting centres with buying agents and regulated prices was another dangerous tool gainfully employed by the powers-that-be to hinder the development of free market conditions, on the one hand, and the emergence of

an indigenous class of middlemen or grain-traders, on the other hand, particularly in the communities of Pankshin NA, right up to the middle of the twentieth century. Even in the situation where peasant-producers themselves, especially those in districts either partially encompassed or lying adjacent to the Minesfield, despatched quantities of grain to be sold directly at the mining camps, but the price control plug was already in place to give them unequal financial benefits in exchange for such grain.

The evidence of grain exploitation in Pankshin NA through requisitioning, or through imposition of, sometimes unspecified, quotas on various and respective districts by the colonial authorities, in the post war period, to an extent, exists. With the aid of some archival evidence, in the form of, especially the official correspondence of successive DOs in-charge of Pankshin Division, even with stated figures at some points, a reconstruction of the dealings can possibly be ventured. However, let the reader be careful to observe, as we proceed, that: (i) the nearer a district of Pankshin NA was located to the Minesfield, the less was its own share of requisitioned grain, or, which is one and the same thing, the farther a district of Pankshin NA was located to the Minesfield, the greater was its own share of requisitioned agrain.[65] This was the general tendency. (ii) For the first two years in the post-war period, the manner of colonial grain requisitioning was random and sporadic, while in the five years from 1948 to 1952 it was turned into a yearly and more organized affair. Now, let's look more at these issues.

5.5.1. State of Emergency Sustained: 1946 - 1947

In January 1946, as the new-year commenced, W.H. Paul, the DO of Pankshin Division, requisitioned the Ngolongs of Ampang and Wokkos

Districts of 365 and 240 **mudus** of corn, respectively, allegedly for the benefit of NA prison. Later in the same month, 900 **mudus** were requisitioned from Ngolong of Tal and Long of Chip each, allegedly for the benefit of NA school. Then, in April, E.O.W. Hunt, as new DO, requisitioned some unspecified quantities of grain from the heads of Wokkos, Tal, Fier, Chip, Kadung, Ampang, Garram, Kabwir, Amper, Pai, Lankan and '**Sura Ta Kudu**' Districts for the alleged benefit of NA school, hospital and prison.[66] (Districts such as Jepal, Pankshin, Gindiri, North Sura, Tof and Bokkos, were not included in these requisitions).

In October of the same year (1946), L. J. Logan, another DO of Pankshin Division, requisitioned 8 **gero** bags from Tal, 4 from Garram and 8 from Chip Districts. Later in the same month, Logan further requisitioned 10 corn, 4 groundnut, and 2 beans bags from Tal, and then 10 corn bags from Chip District. In November, following a tip-off from a native policeman (or **dandoka**) that the Long of Chip was in a position to supply much corn, Logan requisitioned 50 bags of corn from the chief! Later in the same month, Logan requisitioned 10 corn bags from Ngolong of Amper as well as 1 beans bag each from the Ngolongs of Garram and Tal and the Long of Chip.[67] Table 2, below, illustrates the requisitioning pattern in the Pankshin NA for the year 1946. It shows that with six requisitions, the most requisitioned district in Pankshin NA in 1946 was Chip, followed on that basis by Tal with four, Garram with three, Ampang, Wokkos and Amper with two each, and the others, which were requisitioned only once, each. Moreover, out of a total of twenty-five requisitions in that year, only one went to South Sura, which lay

outside Yil Ngas. That implies that about 96% of the requisition orders for that year went to places within Yil Ngas.

As the foregoing scenario of grain exploitation in Pankshin NA was unravelling itself, the Plateau Provincial Government of British colonialism managed for the first time to comment on what they called the impact of the influx of people on the land, soil, wildlife and flora of the Jos Plateau since the

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TABLE 2: **Pattern of Grain Requisitioning in Pankshin NA, 1946**

MONTHS DISTRICTS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Ampang	x			X								
W okkos	x			X								
Tal	x			X						X	X	
Chip	x			X						xx	Xx	
Kadung				X								
Fier				X								
Garram				X						x	X	
Kabwir				X								
Lankan				X								
Amper				X							X	
Pai				X								
South Sura*				X								

Key: a) 1,2,3 = Months (January, February, March, etc)
b) Ampang, Wokkos, etc = Districts which were requisitioned
c) * =The only district outside Yil Ngas (all the others fell within its borders)
d) x = Requisitioned once in the month
e) xx = Requisitioned twice in the same month.

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beginning of the twentieth century. Speaking through their own Land Rehabilitation Committee[68] the colonialists evaded mentioning in the Committee's report specifically that the influx of people -- whether of European or African elements -- was motivated largely by the operation of an

extractive tin mining industry on the Jos Plateau. After studying the report, however, it would be evident to anyone that it was due categorically to the operation of a colonial capitalist mining economy for about half a century in the province that the deterioration, depletion, and exploitation of much arable land and of other agro-economic resources on a vast scale, had taken place. The backdrop of this unfortunate development was the forcing of more and more peasant food-producers into the more or less inescapable wage economy of the tin mines, toward off-setting the huge tax burdens imposed on them by the self-same colonial regime which master-minded and asked for (in terms of tin) the battered ecological situation on the Jos Plateau. Therefore, the colonialists' realisation, as it is in that Committee report, was another proverbial shedding of crocodile tears. No significant sanctions were declared towards rehabilitating the land or relieving Plateau communities' troubles with grain requisitions, regardless of the grim realities of the emergent ecology of the Jos Plateau, in particular, and Plateau Province in general, which, arising from that report, they now recognised.

Instead, further imposition of grain quotas on chiefs of concerned communities and districts, especially in Pankshin NA, continued. Despite a written assurance from J.M. Noad, the Senior Resident of Plateau Province, to Calder, the DO of Pankshin Division, in April 1947, that NA hospital, prison and school would, for that year, be supplied with corn from the colonial government's Grain Reserve in Jos, which assurance had been given in response to a report of corn difficulties in Pankshin NA which the DO had submitted to the Senior Resident, Calder still requisitioned some districts of Pankshin NA of beans and groundnuts.[69] Of course, difficulties in corn did not

imply difficulties in beans and groundnuts supply. But, if there was corn scarcity, and then beans and groundnuts, which supposedly were available, were requisitioned, then what food securities were the peasant producers left with? Barely none, or next to none. They only faced the certainty of shifting from a grain-strain to a grain-stress situation.

In April 1947, Calder requisitioned the Ngolongs of Garram and Tal and the Long of Chip of 1 groundnut and 1 beans bag each. Later on, in order to collect the requisitioned items from his people, Ngolong of Garram petitioned the DO for police assistance, because of difficulties, which he had encountered. Neither was his request for police obliged nor was he left alone by the DO. Instead, Calder gave a much sterner order to him, to quickly send the items to Pankshin Station.[70] In the same month, evidently not resting heavily on the Senior Resident's promise to supply corn, Calder requisitioned Rit of Gindiri of 10 corn bags, allegedly for the benefit of NA hospital.[71] Hence, Pankshin NA's communities were not entirely relieved of corn requisitioning in the first half of 1947, when the promise of the Senior Resident was still in place.

During the second half of 1947, when it seemed obvious that the promised corn, to be supplied from the Grain Reserve in Jos, was not forthcoming, the DO intensified his requisitioning activity. Thus, in July, Calder requisitioned, Ngolong of Tal and Long of Chip of 15 corn, 5 beans and 4 groundnut bags each; while Ngolongs of Garram and Ampang and 'Masu-sharia' of South Sura and of North Sura were requisitioned of 5 corn bags each; lastly, Mishkom of Lankan was requisitioned of 3 corn bags. Calder did not state the reason(s) for which the items were to be supplied.[72]

Then, in August of the same year, Calder requisitioned Ngolong of Tal and Long of Chip of 2 groundnut bags each, allegedly for the benefit of NA prison. Later, in the same month, Ngolong of Tal was requisitioned of 50 **gero** bags, allegedly for the benefit of NA hospital and school. Then, in October, Calder requisitioned Long of Chip and, once again, Ngolong of Tal of 10 groundnut, and 15 beans bags each, while Ngolong of Garram was requisitioned of 10 bags of each of the two items. The reasons behind the requisitioned items were not stated. Lastly, but not the least, in December, Calder requisitioned Ngolong of Amper, alone, of 100 corn, 5 groundnut, 5 beans, and 10 rice bags and Ngolong of Kabwir, also alone, of 100 corn bags; all, allegedly for the benefit of NA hospital, prison, and school.[73] Table 3 below illustrates the grain-requisitioning pattern in Pankshin NA for the year 1947. With six requisitions, as table 3 shows, Tal District was the most requisitioned district

TABLE 3: **Pattern of Grain Requisitioning Pankshin NA, 1947.**

MONTHS DISTRICTS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Garram				x			X			x		X
Tal				x			X	xx		x		X
Chip				x			X	X				
Gindiri *				x								
Ampang							X					
Southern Sura*							X					
Northern Sura*							X					
Lankan							X					
Amper												X
Kabwir												X

Key:
a. 1,2,3 = Months (January, February, March, etc.)
b. Garram, Tal = Districts Concerned
c. Gindiri* = Any area outside YIL NGAS
d. x = Requisitioned once in the month
e. xx = Requisitioned twice in the same month.

in Pankshin NA in 1947, followed, in that regard by Garram and Chip Districts, with four requisitions each, and others concerned, with one each, but at different times of the year. Out of a total of twenty-one requisitions in that year, only three went to districts outside Yil Ngas. In other words, the bulk of the requisitioned grain in 1947, like in 1946, was taken from Yil Ngas, rather than from elsewhere in the Pankshin NA.

Following the eventual failure of the Grain Reserve in Jos to supply Pankshin station with the promised grain, the reported difficulties in corn supply, not only in Pankshin but also in Kanam NA,[74] as well as the increasing tendency of some districts of Yil Ngas in not meeting the grain quotas imposed on them we could conclude that 1947 was a year largely characterised by scarcity, if not total lack of surplus grain, especially in Yil Ngas and Kanam, if not generally in Pankshin Division.

Meanwhile, by November 1947, the regional government of Northern Nigeria released their decision that all requisitioning of grain should cease, and, in the same vein, the practice of keeping Grain Reserves was also to stop. The abolition of those two exploitative policies was beautiful, but its impact was restricted to the provincial level. At the divisional, and especially the NA levels, the regional government presented a rather ambivalent position as far as the stoppage of grain requisitioning locally was concerned. According to Weatherhead, Secretary of the Northern Provinces (SNP):

> It has long been the practice of Native Administrations to purchase at harvest bulk grain supplies for local institutions and in some Provinces small reserves have been operated... Traditionally the provision of adequate reserves against local shortages is a responsibility of Native Authorities.
>
> Where such purchases have been made by Native Authorities in the past, His Honour [the Chief Commissioner] has no

> objection to continuance of the practice but the attention of the Native Authorities concerned should be drawn to the necessity for paying the prices ruling in the free market at the time of purchase and for operating any reserves held in such a way as to interfere as little as possible with the flow of grain through normal channels.[75]

So grain requisitioning was allowed to continue at the NA level, provided that market prices at the time of asking for the quotas were paid out to the peasants. And, since the quotas were usually demanded during the harvest season, then only the lowest prices in the free market (given that at harvest time, grain prices were usually very low) would be paid out to the producers, in the long run.

5.5.2. More Requisitioning, Hunger, and Divergent Reactions, 1948-1950

In Pankshin NA, the keeping of grain prices lower than existing prices in the markets at the time of allocating the quotas, however, was not abandoned, for another five years, until 1952. Instead there was a renewed vigour on the part of the DOs and ADOs who served at Pankshin, in seeing that imposed grain quotas were fully met by the concerned districts and at prices lower than the corresponding market rates.

When it was alleged in February 1948 that some districts of Pankshin NA were declining to meet their quotas, by Adamu Kyana, the NA Prison Scribe, Mr. Calder, the DO, immediately ordered the Native Police Chief, in the same month, specifically, "to send **yandoka** [native policemen] to Tal, Garram, Kabwir, and Amper to ginger up production of quotas asked of them..."[76] Having been noted for not usually meeting the quantities requisitioned of them, the four districts in Yil Ngas, were now to be confronted with police action, to heckle out the 1947- imposed quotas, despite the hard conditions hitherto reported concerning that area, as far as grain

supply was concerned. The very police action which Calder refused to oblige the Chief of Garram in April 1947 for the same purpose, was now unleashed on the people of Garram, Tal, Kabwir and Amper Districts, at the behest of the NA Prison Scribe.

Joshua Wadak, the Chief Scribe/Treasurer of Pankshin NA, was further directed by Calder, the DO, in February 1948, to "send grain quotas to all other districts", except in that connection, the four districts being confronted with police action. Although the grain quotas imposed on the 'other districts' were admittedly big in the reckoning of Wadak, but they were, all the same, required to turn in their quotas latest by the month-end, less than three weeks from the date of the order![77] A total of 255 corn, 80 beans, 60 groundnut and 40 rice bags were requisitioned from the affected districts. Out of that, 155 (as against 100) corn, 65 (as against 15) beans, 35 (as against 25) groundnut, and 25 (as against 15) rice bags were requisitioned from districts within Yil Ngas (comparative to those outside Yil Ngas). Wadak, the Chief Scribe/Treasurer, was, again, further directed to personally record the weekly cumulative supply figures per district, as the communities of the concerned districts responded.[78] The February ending deadline was not observed by any of the districts. By middle of April, (1948), when the last traced records of the weekly cumulative supply figures were entered, none of the districts had fully met its quota. On the whole, North Sura, Gindiri, Lankan and Fier Districts had turned in above half of their corn quotas. The rest had mostly performed below average.[79]

That notwithstanding, in September (1948), Calder again requisitioned the Ngolongs of Tal and Garram and the Long of Chip of 70,50 and 50 **gero**

bags respectively, alleged for the benefit of NA prison. In spite of the fact that the three districts had all performed below average in the February requisition, they were still put under pressure. In the final analysis, Chip District turned in 14.52 bags, while Tal and Garram Districts gave 6.23 and 4.62 bags respectively, in November of the same year, after reminders had been issued to Chip and Garram Districts.[80] All the three districts performed below average. However, the demand figures for each district were higher in the September than in the February requisitions.

It is noteworthy that whereas the number of colonial requisition orders, in Pankshin NA, between 1946 and 1948, declined with the passage of time, the substance of what was requisitioned on an annual basis, in terms of the number of bags, did not vary much.[81] In 1946, seven requisition orders were issued; in 1947, five were issued; but in 1948 and 1949 only two were issued annually. And between 1950 and 1952, requisition orders, were issued only once in a year. As time went by, it seems the colonialists were learning somehow that it was not how frequent the districts were requisitioned that yielded the desired results, but how well-timed. It seems also that the grain scarcity, which hit parts of Pankshin NA in 1947, was quite a restraining factor in 1948, forcing the number of requisition orders to drop to two. But, given the boom conditions in the tin mines in 1948, as Isichei suggests there were,[82] which was usually accompanied by greater demands for labour leading to drain of labour from the farms, grain-crop harvests for the year 1948 might not have been impressive, but probably poor.

In February 1949, D. H. Wanton, ADO to Calder, requisitioned thirteen districts of Pankshin NA repeating, almost exactly, the figures hitherto

requisitioned in February 1948. A downward review of Wokkos District's quota from 20 to 10 corn bags; the cancellation of quotas for other cereals, which included rice, beans and groundnuts; and the addition of Kabwir and Amper Districts to the eleven districts on the previous list, were the only differences. A total of 285 corn bags were requisitioned from the thirteen districts, out of which 185 (as against 100) bags were imposed on districts in Yil Ngas (comparative to those outside Yil Ngas). Regardless of the below average performance of the districts in the February and September 1948 requisitions, this latest one was deadlined March ending, 1949.[83]

On receiving the ADO's order, Mishkom of Lankan petitioned the DO soliciting his cooperation in making bulk payment of the proceeds, to be realised from the requisitioned corn to be supplied by his subjects, directly to him. He needed the whole money, according to him, in order for him to later pay it out to his concerned subjects or peasants. Out of the same proceeds however, he also proposed to dole out rewards to all his village-ward heads and lieutenants who would help him in influencing the producers in collecting the corn before its subsequent carriage to Pankshin Station. He further explained that the practice of paying the porters directly and individually at Pankshin Station was often causing confusion and trouble, as some of the porters were, merely, labourers who only participated in carrying the corn but not its owners. Mishkom of Lankan's proposal was approved in March 1949. It was also decided thereupon that all such payments in Pankshin NA thenceforth were to be done through the District Heads and Chiefs provided that the Chief Scribe/Treasurer would always make sure that a native policeman was present at any of the pay points.[84]

It was therefore not until March 1949 that District Heads, Village Area Heads, Village-ward Heads and other officials who had been involved in the collection of requisitioned corn since the 1920s, were for the first time formally and officially, given the go-ahead to derive some allowances described as "**ladan wahala** [stipend for suffering]" by Mishkom of Lankan. Unofficially, it is doubtful if the chiefs had not been lopping off any loose corners of either the collected requisitioned grain or of the proceeds, which were sometimes paid to the people through their agents, since the 1920s. While the chiefs and their lieutenants, however, got entitled to taking some allowances for their efforts in enforcing grain requisition orders, it was criminally wrong for them to derive those allowances from the below-the-market-rated proceeds of the economically disadvantaged producers. It was also inconsiderate of the colonial officers in Pankshin Station to approve such a proposal. The burden of the chiefs' allowances should have been borne by Pankshin NA, for whom the chiefs worked, and not by the peasant-producers. With (both) officially (and unofficially) approved allowances for chiefs charged on the peasants' requisitioned produce, or proceeds realised therefrom, the peasant producers in both respects were naturally left at a pitiful, losing end.[85]

Armed with the DO's approval to receive payments on his people's behalf and charge some undefined allowances for himself and his chiefs, Mishkom of Lankan, not surprisingly, attempted to beat the March-ending deadline for the February 1949 requisition order. When he turned-in 18 corn bags all at once by middle of March 1949, Wanton, the ADO, was so flabbergasted that he instantly waived the remaining 12 bags, out of the 30

bags initially required of Lankan District in the February requisition. He waived the remaining bags, according to him, out of sympathy for the current situation of corn scarcity in Lankan District. "They are very shot of corn there and are excused the remainder of their quota", said Wanton, the ADO, with seeming finality[86]

Unfortunately, this decision, by graph or design, was not communicated to the Mishkom of Lankan. As a result, being unaware of the waiver, Lankan District, shortly thereafter, still supplied some additional 4.34 bags, placing her well ahead of the other concerned districts when the deadline elapsed.[87] On the whole, out of a total of 285 bags contained in the 1949-February requisition, only a modicum of 42.37 bags, roughly one-sixth of the total, had been turned-in. Only 7 out of 13 districts had supplied that. Having alone contributed 22.34 bags, slightly more than half of what was collected (42.37 bags), Lankan alone had actually accounted for one-thirteenth of the 285 bags requisitioned in spite of the fact that they were 'very short of corn there.'[88]

Whether it was because they were, as alleged, very short of corn or because they surprisingly turned-in a bulk of 18 bags that Lankan Districts' quota was reviewed downwards (in Wanton's waiver), is a difficult issue to explain. It seems, however, that the of drawl of 18 bags so pleased the ADO that he immediately gave the waiver (though only on paper!) in sympathy with Lankan's difficult corn situation. When they turned in 4.34 additional bags, Wanton did not, however, order the return of the bags to Lankan for the simple reason that they were 'very short of corn there.'[89] What pretence! Wanton actually had nothing more than mere sympathy for Lankan peasants. He had

not compassion. If the Mishkom of Lankan had turned-in all the 30 requisitioned bags, Wanton would very gladly have received them albeit knowing that they were 'very short of corn there'. Thus Lankan peasants' survival was not Wanton's immediate concern.

Among the other 12 districts, requisitioned along with Lankan District, the highest contribution of 5.16 bags, which was less than one quarter of Lankan's supply, was given by Fier District before the deadline elapsed. After receiving a 'reminder' from Calder in May 1949, with that month's end as a new deadline, none of the other districts succeeded in meeting its own quota except Gindiri, but Kadung, up to four months after the order was given, according the records, had contributed nothing. Gindiri District cleared its own quota of 30 bags in April 1949. By the end of May, Chip had turned-in only 8.03 bags, out of 30 requisitioned, Jepal, 7.34 bags out of 10; Amper, 7.42 bags out of 20; North Sura, 16.83 bags out of 30 and South Sura only 19.49 bags out of 30, all outstripping Fier whose contribution remained unchanged at 5.16 bags out of 15, since March. On the whole, by May-ending, a total of 131.69 bags had been turned-in, falling short of half of 285 bags (that is, 142.5 bags), by 10.81 bags. Out of the 131.69 bags collected, a big chunk of 73.86 bags was contributed by Gindiri, Jepal, North Sura and South Sura Districts, which areas incidentally lay outside Yil Ngas; whereas only 57.83 bags (which fell short of half of 131.69 bags by 8.02 bags) was contributed by eight, out of nine, districts which lay within Yil Ngas, Kadung District having contributed nothing.

What understanding can we derive from this scenario? If Lankan District which was reportedly suffering from corn scarcity, alone contributed

22.34, out of 57.83 bags, which was the total supplied by concerned districts of Yil Ngas, the zeal and personal interest, probably accompanied by stern, arm-flexing methods, of the Mishkom of Lankan, must have been responsible. Since only 35.49 bags were collected by the other seven districts, Kadung exclusive, why should we not conclude that the problem of lack of corn was a common one to Yil Ngas, at the time, and probably more acute in districts like Ampang, Kabwir, Wokkos, Pai and Kadung than in the celebrated Lankan District? Why was no punitive or police action taken against Kadung District as was taken against four districts in the previous year? The necessary appreciation of the general lack of grain in Yil Ngas by the Pankshin-stationed colonialists in districts not far from Pankshin Town, which included Pankshin District, itself, then Wokkos, and Fier Districts, might have been responsible.

The evidence that hunger had taken hold of Yil Ngas was, at the same time, ringing out through people's petitions to Calder, the DO. What were the chiefs to do? Were they to attend to the hunger of their people or to the arbitrary quotas, which the colonialists were constantly imposing on their districts? How were quotas determined in the first place? Some of these questions must have disturbed the chiefs demanding for answers.

The determining criteria for imposing grain quotas, on some usually selected districts, of Pankshin NA, were not standardized. Questions of population, labour force, arable land area, soil fertility, crop type(s) were criteria sometimes used but based more on hearsay and colonial assumptions than pure statistics. Average farm yield statistics were not usually seriously considered when quotas were imposed. Instead, colonial authorities in Pankshin usually relied heavily on assumptions, hearsay, current market

prices, availability of item in the market and records seldomly kept by ill-equipped field staff, which the colonialists sometimes, outrightly, rejected! Some crop yields records were usually too good to be true. For instance, reacting to some staggering crop yield figures for Pankshin Division, submitted in 1948, a Provincial Agricultural Officer pointed out to Calder that some of the results would, if correct, constitute world records![90]

Based on such staggering figures submitted by farm surveyors and other field staff (who were Nigerians), the grain quotas continued to be despatched, rather than withdrawn. Hence, the field-staff were willy-nilly adding to the suffering of the peasants. With such statistics in mind, divisional authorities were inclined to listening to the yearning and cry of the people for food, which often went contrary to their assumptions and expectations. In such circumstances, chiefs were often caught between and betwixt their people and the colonialists, without any solution to the dilemma. Districts under the jurisdiction of Angas Central Native Court[91] came face-to-face with that situation in 1949. Their Chiefs collectively dared to ask Calder, the DO for 100 bags of corn aid to beef up the subsistence of their hunger-ridden people. The concerned District Heads, at the time, were members of the said court, which was the highest decision-making body at the people's level. Through J.Wannet, a district Scribe, the Chiefs wrote to the DO, in April 1949, thus:

> *Bayan dubun gaisuwa Muna roko zuwa gareka; kan abinci ya yi wuya bana na zancen dawa; domin a cikin kasuwoyin mu na Lanshi da Amper da Dawaki da Pai da wadansu kasuwa duk. Mudu sisi, sisi ne; kuma mun gani a coon kasuwa a wani lokaci ba-Hatsi; har wadansu su koma kasuwa hannu banza; domin wuyar hatsi dalilin rokon mu ke nan zuwa gareka; domin muna so ka taimake mu cikin kudin NA Pancin mu samu kamar katanko 100 na dawa; domin muna so da mai aiki da masu noma duk, mu samu wannan taimako. Shine muna so ka roka mana Rasdin cikin Girmanka; domin za mu yi wannan dabara*

tun yanzu don taimakon kasa. Kuma in an samu, lailai ne za sayar da wannan dawa don a mayar ma NA da kudin da ya saya wadanan katankuna.[92]

Which translates as:

> After observance of due protocols, we are placing our request before you; with respect to the recent food scarcity, especially the question of corn, in our markets of Langshi, Amper, Dawaki, Pai and elsewhere. A **mudu** [measure] sells at six, six, pence now. And we have observed in the market that there is no Grain, such that some intending buyers do return home empty handed due to the serious scarcity of grain. It is on this basis that we are making our petition; we want you to help us with funds of Pankshin NA to buy about 100 bags of corn, because we all want this help, the worker as well as the farmers, all. That is why we wish you would ask the Resident on our behalf with your dignity and good offices because we intend to use this device now in order to assist our land. If our request is granted, surely the corn would be sold and the money hitherto used to purchase the bags returned to the NA.

In spite of that petition, Calder still adamantly 'reminded' them, actually ordered them, to endeavour to make good their outstanding quotas, of the February-1949 requisition, come May![93] In the meantime, the chiefs' petition was in April, whose concern, at that point in time, was to assist their people with food supply; while the DO's interest was for the chiefs and their respective peoples to bring their quotas anyhow. How was this dilemma or contradiction to be resolved? The people's subsistence was not Calder's immediate concern. Not even when his agents, the chiefs, had raised the alarm, that farmers were themselves caught in a grain stress, he did not care. Instead, Calder directed Joshua Wadak, the NA Chief Scribe/Treasurer, to reply the chiefs' letter and say that:

> there is nothing to prevent them [from] making their own arrangements for getting grain out from Jos as the Sarkin Kasuwa does. Cost is 35/-per bag plus 3/6 freight, equals 38/6 which at 90 mudus to the bag works out at 5.13 per mudu.[94]

Advising Wadak to specifically state that:

> The remedy for this is to put a greater acreage under cultivation every year, to farm intelligently and to make use of compost and manure. They must also learn to look ahead and set aside a larger reserve of grain to tide them over until next year's harvest; and not be tempted to sell their stocks when grain is scarce and good prices are offered by the improvident.[95]

The people's capacity to save was weakened not because they lacked the appropriate intelligence, but because they lacked the resources with which they could demonstrate their intelligence, in investments. The colonial regime had always resorted to various ways and strategies to deprive the colonised peasants of grain, livestock and whatever was deemed needful or of some market value. And Calder knew of it. He had been part of the problem of exploitation, all along. He was only utilizing diversionary tactics in his comments. Why did he refer to the Sarkin Kasuwa (Head Marketer) of Pankshin Town? The man was probably a Hausa trader who, for all his ingenuity, was not in a position to address the current grain stress of the area. Why did he refer to the future like that? At least, unless the present hunger of the people was quelled, there would in no future to plan for. The chiefs and their people required an immediate remedy.

After comprehending the DO's tactics, the Court Members wrote a second petition for corn-aid, and diplomatically reduced the quantity of corn to be purchased from 100 to 50 bags. They also spared a while to debunk the points raised by Calder in his contentious 'lecture' or advice delivered through Wadak. Another District Scribe, M. Mukan, in May 1949, wrote the Court Members' second memo:

> *Bayan gaisuwa takardan ka... ta sadu da mu da cewa mu yi dabara kamar yada Sarkin Kasuwa Pankshin ya ke yi, da cewa bufun dawa a Jos 35/-, ladan moto 3/6, shine ya kawo 38/6.*

Amma muna rokon ka girma da arziki domin kai ne shugaban mu, idan muna cikin matsuwa kai ne za mu waiwaye ka.[96]

Explaining and petitioning that:

Kuma ka sani ba mu iya adana kurdi a hannu ba, domin rashi. Kuma talakawa ba za su iya samu kurdi a hannu kamar 38/6 nan ba. Mu sarakuna kuma ba za mu iya samun kurdi daidai da bufu 100 nan ba, sabili da talakawa. Dalili ke nan mun roke ka dommin kai kuma ka yarda mana Beitelmal ta danka kurdi ta sayar mana da bufu guda 100 a Jos idan ta kawo an sayer tukuna a mayer mata da kurdi. Idan ba haka ba talakawa ba za su samu abincin da za su yi kokarin kara gonaki ta yi yawa ba. Domin ka sani wani yana da 1/- wani kuma yana da 6d domin ya je ya yi au a kasuwa, a yaushe zai samu 38/6?[97]

Responding to the question of more farms for more yields thus:

Kuma batun yawan gonaki da ka ce talakawa su kara gonaki su yi yawa domin a ga amfanin taki da gonakin zamani, kuma abinci ya yawaita a ci a rage don gobe. To, ranka ya dade, talakawa suna kokarin noma kwarai da aniya, amma a cikin shekaran nan da suka wuce, ruwan sama yana tsinke mana da wuri, gama wojejen da suna shukan dawa idan dawa ya soma fitda kai sai ruwa ya tsinke, dawa ba za ya fitda saba sosai kuma ba. Kuma idan ruwa ya yi yawa ya kan kashe idon saban dawa. Kuma wojejen da suna noman **bater** *da acca lokacin da acca ya fitda kai idan babu ruwa acca ta kan zama ciyawa, noman* **bater** *kuma kasa ta bushe babu daman noman garma. A wani shekara yawan ruwa ya kashe amfanin gona go shin kaka. Ka ga dalilin da abinci yana kasa mana a nan Kasar Pankshin kenan. Kai dai ka taimakemu da yardan ka.* [98]

And querried the justification of corn requisitioning in the face of such hunger:

Kuma idan ka ce babu hanyan taimako, To yaya kenan? Gama muna gani abinci bai ishe talakawa bana ba. Dalili ke nan mun garni kamar wadansu masu ungwa dayawa sukan dauki kurdin su tukuna su je kasuwa su saya dawa tukuna su kai Pankshin saboda su prisoner da Asibiti da Makaranta a lokacin da ka ce mu aiko da dawa zuwa Pankshin, yana zama masu tilas su dauka 6d su saya dawa mudu 1. Ga shi muna tsamani kai ba za ka ki taimakon mu ba gama kai ne shugaban mu, kuma zancen yunwa ba kankanin abu ba ko kadan. Idan ka yarda ka taimake mu ko rabin bufu 100 ko ya fi hamsin.[99]

Our English rendition is as follows:

> With protocols duly observed, your memo... has challenged us to employ the strategy being utilized by the Sarkin Kasuwa [Head Marketer] of Pankshin Town, and has also informed us that a bag of corn sells at 35/- [thirty-five shillings] and each freight charge is 3/6 [three shillings three pence], adding up to 38/6 [thirty-eight shillings six pence]. But we are soliciting your resourceful dignity because you are our leader, and if we are hard-pressed, you are the one whose attention we would draw.

Explaining and petitioning that:

> In addition, you should know that we are not able to spare money in our hands, due to lack. And the peasants would not be able, individually, to raise and bring, in their own hands, money up to 38/6 [thirty-eight shillings six pence]. We the chiefs, also, cannot raise money, which is sufficient to purchase 100 bags for the sake of the masses. That is why we plead with you so that you would direct the Native Treasury to vote some money to purchase the 100 bags in Jos, which if she does and supplies the corn, it would be sold, then the money is returned to her. Otherwise, the peasants would not secure the food necessary for them to increase their efforts so as to enlarge their farm-plots. You know, someone has [only] 1/- [one shilling], and another person has [only] 6d [six pence] with which to buy corn in the market when will he secure 38/6 [thirty-eight shillings six pence]?

Responding to the question of more farms for more yields thus:

> Also deserving comment is the matter of more farms which you mention, saying that the peasants should open-up more farms, that they would be many, and the results of modern fertilizer and farming would be realised, and that food may be plenty enough to be reserved against tomorrow. Well, your honour, the peasants have been exerting a lot of energy on farming with dogged determination, but in the last few years, the rains have usually ceased for us too soon; however, in the areas that plant guinea-corn, when the heads begin to grow, the crops would not produce any good grains as a result. And if the rains are too much, they often usually destroy the gestating grains of corn. And in areas where **bater** [a transplanted, quick-ripening type of millet] and fornio are grown, when the fornio-heads have grown out but then the rains stop, the fornio usually becomes mere grasses and planting of **bater** becomes difficult, the ground will be too hard to use the big hoe. In a certain year, plenty of rain on the eve of harvesting season actually ruined the expected crop yields. Now you see, that is why we have often usually run short, of food here in Pankshin area. You could just help us with your approval.

And querried the justification of corn requisitioning in the face of such hunger:

> And if you say there is no way to help: then, what do we do? For we have noticed that food is not sufficient for the masses of the people this time around. In view of which fact we have also noticed that some village-ward heads, in fact many, do take their own money to the market to buy corn before sending-it-in to Pankshin [Station] for the prisoner[s], hospital and school, during those times that you order us to bring corn to Pankshin, it is usually imperative for them to pay 6d [six pence] in order to secure 1 **mudu**. Meanwhile, we have been thinking that you would not refuse to come to our aid being that you are our leader, for the question of hunger is not at all a small phenomenon. If you are persuaded then assist us with half of 100 bags or anything more than fifty.

This second memo was neither replied nor was any action taken to meet their solicitous demand. Calder refused to be moved towards helping the hunger of the people. Not even for the sake of the lower class of chiefs, the Village and Village-ward Heads, who were allegedly spending their own monies in order to meet quotas demanded by colonial grain requisition orders! If in May 1949, the chiefs were paying as much as six pence per **mudu** of corn, then it was just as meeting the quotas at a great loss because, at that time, the NA was usually paying only two pence per **mudu** for any requisitioned corn, which was supplied in the dry season.[100] They were losing four pence per **mudu**, far from making any profits.

Intransigent as he was to the outcry of Ngas leaders for the supply of grain in their markets, Calder further requisitioned, in August 1949, the Ngolongs of Garram and Tal and the Long of Chip of 1000 **mudu**s of **gero,** or 10 bags, each. In his requisition letter, he even made the intimidating caveat: "*Ina so in ga wanda zai kawa nasa da wuri,*"[101] meaning: 'I will like to see who will bring his quickly.' This became the refrain in many grain-

requisition letters, at that time. No rewards were given to districts, which took the items quickly. The statement was simply meant to boost the response of the concerned District-Heads.

The August-1949 requisition was deliberately designed to catch up with that year's **gero**-harvest. It was also deliberately restricted to the three 'important' **gero** producing districts.[102] The Long of Chip alone positively responded to the August-1949 requisition and he somewhat deliberately gave over 200% of what he was ordered to supply! Instead of 1000 **mudus**, or 10 bags, he supplied 2032 **mudus**, or 20.32 bags, of gero, in September 1949.[103] The superfluous supply of 20.32 gero bags within a month of the requisition order, which demanded only 1000 mudus, was over-zealous for the chief to do. He could not have easily raised that quantity without resorting to strong-arm methods. It was not long before Chip peasants demonstrated their disaffection with his attitude and the exploitative requisitioning racket of the colonial regime. In reaction, they diverted some requisitioned grain to the Pankshin market, in 1950, rather than take the bags to the colonial station. This is discussed shortly, below.

On their part, Garram and Tal District Heads did not supply any gero in response to the August-1949 requisition, according to the records;[104] their people may only have been too glad with the ripening of the **gero** crop. It had arrived to temporarily relieve them from hunger's grip, which was usually stronger in the wet season. It is not clear (having not been documented) whether or not any (punitive) police action was taken against them.

When a newly appointed ADO, in charge of Pankshin Division, K.J. Johnson, asked Wadak, the Chief Scribe/Treasurer, in March 1950, regarding

how much the peasants were being paid for the grain they supplied. Wadak said: "NA buys corn at a controlled price of 2d [two pence] per mudu; but this is not so in the market. In the rainy season NA pays 4d [four pence] per mudu. The people bring it themselves."[105] Peasant producers themselves were usually the porters of their own grain to Pankshin station, for which they were paid nothing, but then, they were compelled to give their own corn at half the market price, in the dry season, and about half the market price of the same commodity, in the wet season, after forfeiting the cost of porterage. Surely, they must have felt the pang of colonial violence, such as described, not only in their stomachs but also in their hearts and minds.[106]

Mr. Johnson, the ADO, went further to request Wadak to furnish him with the corresponding prices of corn in Pankshin and Amper markets (in Pankshin NA) as well as in Dengi market (in Kanam NA), with a view to reviewing Pankshin NA's rates, upwards. In March 1950, Wadak reported that corn was selling at 4d [four pence], 2½ [two and a half pence] and 2d [two pence] at Pankshin, Amper and Dengi markets, respectively. In light of that information, Johnson approved a ½d-[a half pence] increase to the dry season rate of 2d [two pence], which the Pankshin NA was paying out to the peasants, in 'exchange' for corn supplied.[107] Thus, the NA rate was now to be exactly equal to the price of corn at Amper market, which was 2½d [two and a half pence] then, and given that Amper market was one of the farthest locations from Pankshin Station, Johnson must have approved what in essence was the lowest of the varying prices of corn in Pankshin NA for the benefit of the peasants. However, Pankshin NA was still collecting corn from peasants below the market rate as long as it was not paying out to the peasants the

prevailing price at any time in Pankshin market for corn delivered at Pankshin Station. Johnson's approval of an increase, therefore, meant very little. Thus, Pankshin NA by 1950 had not yet taken it upon herself to comply with the 1947 Regional Government's directive that NAs should pay out prices ruling in the market for such corn, as earlier stated.

After the slight review of the NA rate, in March 1950, Johnson, in the same month, issued another requisition order to heads of some fifteen districts in Pankshin NA, demanding a total of 240 bags of corn. Out of that quantity, 160 (as against 80) bags were requisitioned from districts lying within Yil Ngas (comparative to districts lying outside Yil Ngas). Different district heads must have responded in various ways to that order. Not quite untypical of Dashe (Dasha), the Long of Chip, however, who faithfully reported to the DO by letter, scribbled by his District Scribe, that after despatching a caravan of 33 porters with grain to Pankshin Station, representing the quota from his district, he later discovered that the 33 carriers, on getting to Pankshin Town, deflected and sold all the corn at the Pankshin market! In reaction, when he got the tip-off, Dashe (Dasha) summoned all the carriers and established the fact of the matter, and fined each of them 5/- (five shillings) totalling up to £8.5s (eight pounds five shillings). Clearly, the District Head was vehement with his people. In his letter, he requested the DO to direct the Sarkin Kasuwa (Head Marketer, of Pankshin Town) not to receive into the market any corn, which was meant for the NA.[108]

Mr. Johnson, the ADO, was overtly sympathetic with the behaviour of the 33 peasants because of the manner in which they had rationally handled the corn they were sent with: They sold it in the market, the place where their

corn received greater money value! In his comments as he forwarded the matter to Calder, the DO, Johnson said: "**Dawa** is now 4d [four pence] a **mudu** in Pankshin market. So you hardly blame them for selling when the NA buys [sic] 2½ [two and a half pence]!"[109] Probably, in order not to allow Johnson influence the determination of the matter, Calder, decided to suspend further discussion on it, and directed Johnson stay further action, pending when he (Calder) had visited Chip personally and enquired into the matter.[110]

5.5.3. Amnesty and Abolition, 1951-1952

In April 1951, F.B. Hadow, a new DO, issued a requisition order to fifteen districts of Pankshin NA, seeking a total of 130 corn bags, at the 1950-reviewed rate of 2½d per **mudu**. From that total, 85 (as against 45) requisitioned bags were imposed on districts within (as against those outside) Yil Ngas. No deadline was fixed. Within two weeks of the requisition however, Hadow surprisingly despatched another circular which asked the concerned district heads to stay further action. Only corn already collected was to be turned in, for which 4d [four pence!] instead of 2½d [two and a half pence] per **mudu**, would be paid out to the peasants, but where none was already collected, the people should just forget it. His reasons were: "*akwai matsi ainun, kuma kudin dawa ya hau ainun*" meaning: "there is too much stress, and corn's price has risen too high." The circular closed with the words "*ku shaida wa mutanenku su huta abinsu,*"[111] which translates as: "tell your people to just take their rest"! Hadow, seemed like a bringer of good news, whose feet upon the mountains were beautiful.[112]

That was an amnesty offered to all; something not done before. A thing Calder, his predecessor, had deftly refused to do in the year before. Some

District Heads acknowledged receipt of the amnesty and also reported to the DO what they had already done to meet their quotas. Mishkom of Lankan reported that they had not found it easy persuading the Lankan people to collect the corn. Ngolong of Tal reported that all the corn, 5 bags, had been gathered but would be sent-in after the planting season was over. Long of Chip, Dashe (Dasha) maintained, that since his people had not yet collected the corn, which was 15 bags, he would tell them to just forget about it.[113]

Later, however, on the advice of Adamu Kyana, the Prison Scribe, Hadow requisitioned the Long of Chip and Ngolong Tal, in September of the same year, 1950, of 20 gero bags each, allegedly for the benefit of NA prisoners. It has not been documented whether any of these districts met their own quota at all, in part, or in full. What is clear at this juncture is that Hadow did not offer another amnesty, assuming probably, in view of the approaching harvest season that the hardship would soon be over.[114]

In January 1952, Gabriel Ching'd'ab Wuyeb, a new Chief Scribe, on the advice of the Prison Scribe, requisitioned, once again, the Long of Chip and Ngolong Tal of 8 and 7 corn bags respectively, allegedly for the benefit of NA prison. No deadline was fixed. The records of their performance, apparently, have not been kept.[115] Later in April of the same year, D.H.E. Vessey, a new DO, requisitioned the usual fifteen districts of Pankshin NA of 216 corn bags. Five of the districts were further requisitioned of 19 beans bags. Three districts were further requisitioned of 7 groundnut bags. Out of the 216 corn bags, 123 (as against 93) bags were imposed on districts within (as against those outside) Yil Ngas. The beans and groundnut bags were all imposed on specific districts lying inside Yil Ngas.

Mr. Vessey was a bit concerned about the current situation of grain scarcity in Pankshin NA as a whole. Therefore, he gave the April-1952 requisition order diplomatically, and persuasively, to pacify the Chiefs into cooperating with him. He said:

> *...na sani lalle kun matsu akan karancin hatsi, amma ku tabbata tilas ne su pursuna da ku ke aikowa a ba su abinci haka ina so ku yi taimako ko da shike ku kanku kun matsu.*
>
> *Bana za'a taimaki mutanenku da biyan kudin dawa sosai. Saboda wahalan daukowa a kai, na yarda za'a biya mundun Dawa akan kobo biyar (5d). Ina zato mutanenku za su yi murna su kawo maza maza.*[116]

This translates as:

> ...I know very much that you are hard pressed due to grain scarcity, but you know that it is a must that the prisoners whom you are sending are fed, likewise the school children. For that reason, I will like you to help although you are, yourselves, hard pressed.
>
> This time around, we shall help your people through good payment for corn. In view of the trouble of porterage, I have approved that a **mudu** of corn should be paid for at the rate of five pence (5d). I am assuring that your people will be happy to bring [it] quickly.

It is very likely that the current price (which Vessey did not disclose) of corn in Pankshin market was about 4d per mudu the reason why, in reckoning with the cost of porterage, Vessey thought that 5d per mudu was a good offer to the peasants. The problem, as it is clear from Vessey's comments, was not the price but the scarcity of grain. After all, it is common knowledge that when high demand is accompanied by the scarcity of a commodity, its price naturally increases. Since they were hard pressed, that is, in a situation of stress, in which hunger was the order of the day, the chiefs and the grain producers needed the same grain, regardless of its hiked price, for their own feeding and sustenance. Thus, for all his diplomatic overtures, in

terms of the quantity of the grain turned-in, the outcome of the April-1952 requisition must have been very small. Records of the responses of the districts, apparently, have not been kept. However, the April-1952 requisitioning order was actually the last of its kind, issued in Pankshin NA.

In the same April 1952, Vessey, dispatched the NA Assistant Storekeeper, Daniel Midah, with £150 [one hundred and fifty pounds] to Shendam Division, to buy as much corn as the amount could attract.[117] This was the beginning of the period in which Pankshin NA began to purchase corn purported for the benefit of her prison, hospital and school, from Shendam Division, by means of buying agents periodically despatched. Shendam Division itself kept increasing in importance in the area of food production due, partially, to the increasing population of immigrants from Pankshin Division in general, and Yil Ngas, in particular, since the late teens, the period which witnessed complete conquest and subjection of Yil Ngas to British colonialism.

Apart from making arrangements for bulk purchases of corn from Shendam Division, Vessey also approved that corn could be "bought from a contractor" by Pankshin NA.[118] Thus, in October 1952, Mishkom of Lankan recommended for the DO's approval, the appointment of one Danfulani Lankan to serve as 'NA Contractor,' for the purchase of corn. While the matter was still pending, in December 1952, probably assuming that silence meant consent, Mishkom of Lankan reported in December 1952, that the said Danfulani had already collected a store of corn, in his unnamed 'capacity' as 'NA Grain Contractor', which he would soon be sending porters with, into Pankshin Station.[119] The man was anxious to do the job. So he imposed

himself on the NA authorities, and later got their recognition as the first indigene of the division to serve in that capacity. That began the period of engagement of contractors in procurement of grain by Pankshin NA. An ADO, who succeeded Vessey, in the same year, upheld Vessey's decision that from then on grain for NA prison, school and hospital should thenceforth be bought in Shendam Division,[120] to the chagrin of some of the long serving native administrative staff, who did not like the decision.[121] Thus, the exploitation of peasant produce through requisitioning, a practice which had lingered since the 1940s, in Pankshin NA, with its severest onslaught on the districts of Yil Ngas, was abolished, in 1952.

In summary, we have maintained that food produce was exploited in Yil Ngas (and other Plateau communities) in different ways and at different levels, during the period under review in this chapter. There were northern Nigerian governmental, Plateau Provincial and Pankshin Native Administrative needs and interests which bordered on the exploitation of peasants' food produce, thus when the regional government rescinded its grain reserve-keeping policy, Pankshin NA continued with hers in the name of feeding hospital patients, school children and prisoners, for which she kept requisitioning the people's corn and other farm-produced articles. Grain requisitioning was maintained as a constant, more or less annual, phenomenon over the districts of Yil Ngas. Only Pankshin District was excluded.[122] Strong-arm methods of chiefs and the police were used to force out the grain. Tables 4, 5, and 6, which appear at the end of this section illustrate other some details of colonial requisitioning in Pankshin NA.

Table 4: **Recorded Requisitioned Corn in Pankshin N.A., From 1946 To 1952**

S/No	District	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	Total
1.	Chip	77	30	80	40	20	35	20	**30**
2.	Tal	27	140	70	10	20	35	20	**322**
3.	Garram	4+	75	50	10	5	5	10	**159+**
4.	Fier	+		15	15	5	5	5	**45+**
5.	Ampang	3.65		20	20	20	5	10	**78.6**
6.	Kadung	+		20	20	5	5	5	**55+**
7.	Lankan	+	3	30	30	20	5	20	**118+**
8.	Wokkos	2.4		20	10	5	15	3	**45.4**
9.	Pai	+		20	20	30	5	10	**85+**
10.	Kabwir	+	100		20	10	5	10	**145+**
11.	Amper	10 +	100		20	20	5	10	**165+**
12.	Gindiri *		10	30	30	30	10	30	**140**
13.	Jipal *			10	10	10	5	3	**38**
14.	North Sura *		5	30	30	30	15	30	**140**
15.	South Sura *	+	5	30	30	10	15	30	**120+**
	Total	**124.05+**	**468**	**425**	**315**	**240**	**170**	**216**	**1958**

Key: a) * = Districts outside Yil Ngas
b) + = Unspecified quantity of requisitioned corn.
c) 1958.05+ = minimum total bags requisitioned
d) 100 **mudus** = 1 bag

Table 5: **Recorded Requisitioned Beans, Pankshin NA, 1946-1952**

	District	1946	1947	1948	1952	Total
1	Chip	1	20	15	5	**41**
2	Gindiri			15		**15**
3	Ampang			15	3	**18**
4	Lankan			5		**5**
5	Pai			10		**10**
6	Wokkos			5		**5**
7	Amper		5		3	**8**
8	Tal	3	20		5	**28**
9	Garram	1`	11		3	**15**
	Total	**5**	**56**	**65**	**19**	**146**

Key: (a) * =Area lying outside Yil Ngas
(b) 146= Recorded total beans bags in some 4 years; records for 1949 & 1950 have been found
(c) 131(90%) = Recorded bags requisitioned from selected districts in Yil Ngas
(d) 1 bag=100 **mudus**

Table 6: **Recorded Requisitioned Groundnuts, Pankshin NA, 1946-1952**

	Distirct	**1946**	**1947**	**1948**	**1952**	**Total**
1	Chip		17	15		**32**
2	Gindiri*			15	3	**18**
3	Jipal*			5		**5**
4	Ampang			10		**10**
5	Lankan			5	2	7
6	Tal	4	17		5	**26**
7	Amper		5			**5**
8	Garram		21		2	**23**
	Total	**4**	**60**	**50**	**12**	**126**

Key: (a) * = Districts lying outside Yil Ngas
(b) 126 = Recorded total beans bags requisitioned in some four years; none for 1949& 1950
(c) 103 (83%) = Recorded total bags requisitioned from some districts in Yil Ngas
(d) 1 bag=100 mudus

Table 7: **Recorded Requisitioned Rice in 1947 & 1948, Pankshin NA**

	District	**1947**	**1948**	**Total**
1	Chip		15	**15**
2	Gindiri*		15	**15**
3	Ampang		10	**10**
4	Tal	5		**5**
5	Garram	5		**5**
6	Amper	10		**10**
	Total	**20**	**40**	**60**

Key: (a) * = District Outside Yil Ngas
(b) 45 (75%) = Bags requisitioned from some districts in Yil Ngas
(c) Records for other years have not been seen
(d) 100 **mudus** = 1 bag

More seriously, there was the factor of Plateau provincial collaboration with mining companies in which peasants' food produce was placed at the disposal of the mining and buying companies (such as UAC and John Holt) at the lowest prices. Large quantities of corn were gathered at the collection centres at the behest of the Residents and DOs and then packed off into the Minesfield. As a consequence, famine or hunger and lack, became more or less constant or recurrent on the part of peasant producers in Yil Ngas (and similar communities). The rhythm of their experience was that of a deafening vibrating sound, with one pitch higher than the other. The pitch of stress was higher than that of strain, like that of a clinical siren signalling that someone was in a critical condition, on the way to hospital, either to recover or to die. Its pattern was that of a narrowing spiral between conditions of stress and strain, with 1942/43 and 1949 (as well as 1939 in the Amper area) as the worst times. Ngas chiefs and elders spoke out in 1949 but their hue-and-cry fell on deaf ears. After reducing the peasants virtually to the level of 'prisoners' or 'beasts of burden' for more than a decade, and when it suited them, the colonialists abandoned the practice of requisitioning or 'forced collection' of food produce in 1952, in Pankshin NA.

5.6. Pattern Of Exploitation Of Labour: Introduction

While the increased mobility which followed the subjection and incorporation of the whole of Yil Ngas into the British capitalist colonial economy in one sense, translated into the cheapening and frequent exploitation of the peasants' grain-produce to a high degree, the mobilisation and cheap exploitation of the peasants' labour power was another denotation. Indeed,

their labour power was annually employed on the farms whose produce the colonialists badly coveted, yet they had to dig the colonisers' wells, build their roads and houses, carry their loads to designated destinations, go and toil in their mines, etc, all, utilizing the same labour power. The dry season, which formerly was partially a resting and energy-replenishing season for the peasants, virtually became as labour-prone as the wet season.

When compared to the exploitation of grain produce, in Pankshin NA, the question of labour exploitation is lacking in documentary evidence. From both the written and oral sources, what obtain are basically scanty generalisations. For the purpose of this study however, aspects of human porterage and mine labour are briefly discussed, hoping that the essence of what happened is captured.

5.7. Bands of Porters

During the period under review, most transportation of requisitioned grain produce was by human porterage. Pack animal and motor transport were by comparison, quite limited and possible only on some routes,[123] as far as Yil Ngas was concerned. Thus, bands of porters, or carriers traversed to and from between distant locations such as Garram, Chip, Amper, Ampan, Kabwir, Dok-Pai and Tal Districts, and the Minesfield and towns such as Pankshin, Bukuru and Jos, up to the middle of the twentieth century.

In 1936, Goble, the DO of Pankshin Division reported to the Resident that large quantities of groundnuts were transported from Tal District: "Almost entirely by carriers. The bulk is too great to make motor transport economical. The return journeys frequently bring iron bought in Jos and Bukuru to the Tal area."[124] Motor transports had not yet been extended to Tal District. Their first

motor road was proposed by the end of 1936 and constructed thereafter. Also,[125] the fact that Tal carriers frequently returned home from Jos and Bukuru with iron pieces, which became raw materials for their smithing furnaces, was not a strong basis to justify the practice of forced-porterage of goods, from Tal to the Minesfield. It tingles our imagination that Goble believed that head-loaded transport was more economical than the motor-loaded type. Was it the cost of fuel or the number of trips that the DO was afraid of? At least, consistent provision of motor transport could have helped the carriers, from Tal, for more than half the distance, to Jos, if a lorry was placed somewhere in Chip on the road which emerged from the Lankan Valley. However, colonially-speaking, it was more economical to lift goods through human porterage because its cost was not borne by the government and other beneficiaries such as the mining companies! That is the plain meaning of Goble's position.

Peasants were placed at the mercy of the Resident, or DOs, the trading companies, and the chiefs, to move their goods, on their heads, from place to place within Pankshin Division or Plateau Province. The value of such porters' labour was placed very low. Otherwise, it could not have been more economical than motor transport to lift a 'great bulk' of goods from Tal to Jos area in 1936. Just as grain and grass quotas,[126] among others, were usually imposed on the communities of Yil Ngas, up to the early 1950s, labour requisitioning, accompanied with arm flexing methods, was also practiced during the same period. Various communities were ordered, from time to time, to provide certain numbers of able-bodied men, and in short distances, women, for the lifting of goods to designated destinations, by either the DO or the

chief, sometimes in collaboration with a trading, or mining company. That was forced labour. Since 1906, during the wars of colonial invasion, when plundered goods were to be exported, it was forced labour that was used, people, in their thousands, were ordered to carry the articles. Since then forced labour had come to stay up to the 1950s, where this study terminates.

At such a vantage position in relation to the peasants, it is difficult to suppose that after UAC had turned-down the offer of 110 tons of corn, collected at Dengi and Shendam in 1942, the DO in-charge of Pankshin and Shendam Divisions at the time, allowed the corn to waste, without requisitioning human porterage to lift it away. The NA lorry was used in lifting only 1.7 tons of the grain, as earlier indicated, but the bulk of the corn must have been lifted by head-loaded transport.

Audu Adamu, the NA Agricultural Assistant, Wall's successor, reported during a tour in December 1951, that Tal groundnut was in the process of being transported to Shendam, which was a collection centre, and he counted 105 head-carriers, or porters, in that instance, who lifted it.[127] The project looked too organised for it to have happened without the use of force. Able-bodied peasants must have been requisitioned, or coerced by order of the District Head, from the different Tal villages to participate in the lifting, under the watchful eyes of Audu Adamu. In the absence of motor and pack-animal transportation, head-loaded, human transportation was their best option. But it was usually by coercion. In this way, the labour-power and time of peasants in Yil Ngas, and neighbouring areas, was unjustifiably utilized by the powers-that-be, in exchange for trifles. The quality and quantity of their activity often

outstripped the value of their stipends. Their suffering whether individually or collectively was both physical and economical.

5.8. Troops of Mine Labourers

As earlier maintained, it was misleading for Resident Pembleton to hold that there was no surplus produce for the Minesfield, in Plateau Province, by 1936, just as it was wrong for Michael Watts to hold that, up to 1945, Plateau peasants were not quite involved as labourers in the Minesfield as they were as producers and suppliers of grain and other food items. Any acceptance of Watts' position would mean that even during the regionally organised forced labour regime which was introduced in the Minesfield in the early 1940s, as a result of which hundreds of conscripts from other Northern Provinces were ushered into Plateau Province, the Plateau indigenous workforce was left intact, at best, as suppliers of victuals. If labour for the Minesfield was so needful that conscripts were brought from 'abroad,' that is, from outside Plateau Province, what on earth would have hindered the colonialists from taking undue advantage of the local, 'available' and 'cheap' labour? Could Plateau peasants have been found to be incapable of mine, or for that matter, manual labour(s)? Far from it,[128] the position to which the capitalist colonial economy operating in Plateau Province in the early 1940s had relegated some sections of Plateau peasants, was one in which they had become labourers of labourers.[129] Therefore, that impression that "the Plateau itself got off lightly" especially during the forced labour regime in the Minesfield, in Freund's words, "is... extremely misleading,"[130] He additionally explains:

> Plateau labour was officially considered to be 'voluntary'. However, as with the formal conscript totals, the volunteers were actually often the product of strong-arm methods on the part of the NAs. Moreover, mines managers took to bribing

> chiefs to augment the labour supply... At the end of 1942,... [about] 11 ,000 of 50,000 adults, male and female, in Jos... [Division] had 'volunteered' for work on the mines. In southern Pankshin and Shendam... [Divisions], the NAs were... collaborating in recruitment 'enthusiastically'. Workers were shipped in for only one month at a time, but the numbers were substantial. At the end of 1943 rains, 1 in 15 of the adult male population of Shendam and 1 in 23 from Kanam were at the times. In the Ngas area of Pankshin... [Division], mines managers procured large numbers of workers through direct arrangements with the district officer [the DO]. Labourers were brought in from the farther reaches of the province, such as Wamba and Jemaa, but in smaller numbers. Workers from Plateau Province... did not only work in the dry season. In 1943, intense pressure was exerted to keep 15,000 'voluntary' labourers from the Plateau at work during the planting season.[131]

Sometimes, better referred to as 'controlled voluntary labourers', Plateau peasants also earned less when compared to their conscript counterparts brought from outside Plateau Province. Those from the outlying areas in the vicinity of the tin Minesfield which included sections of Berom, Ron, Ganawuri, Pyem, Mwaghavul, Pengana, Buji, Amo, Irrigwe, Ngas, Bache, Anaguta and Afizere peasants, among others, were even the worst for it: they earned the least.[132] This resulted in a great deal of cases of sickness, malnutrition, and death, in 1942 and 1943, as was earlier maintained.

An indication that the colonialists placed a high premium on Pankshin and Shendam Division as very important sources of mine labour, was the redeployment of Walmsley, then DO of Jema'a Division, in August 1943, to relocate at Pankshin Station, as a Mines Recruiting Officer, or MRO, probably the first of its kind in Plateau Province, to concentrate on fishing for men in Pankshin and Shendam Divisions and to be responsible to the Resident of the Province, which, in the present case was Pembleton.[133] Thus, besides the collaboration of the DOs, with the mines managers and chiefs to conscript

Ngas peasants, which Freund mentions as having been an on-going reality in the area, there was still an officer of high profile, another DO, placed at Pankshin Station, the then double or joint-headquarters of both Pankshin and Shendam Divisions, who was specially assigned to recruit troops of mine labourers from those divisions, besides those obtained through collaborative arrangements. No wonder, peasants from the two divisions, especially from the northern parts of Pankshin Division were shipped in large numbers into the Minesfield, in both dry and wet seasons, in those days. In the discharge of Walmsley's duties, arm-flexing and open-force methods must have been used, thus giving vent to another form of forced labour, practised by the colonialists in Yil Ngas.

When agrarian labour is exploited in large proportions of man-hours over a long period of time, it disrupts agricultural practise. This situation must have characterised many communities lying within the Minesfield, or on its fringes during the period under review in this chapter, with varying degrees of disruption, from one community to the other, or from one moment to the other.[134] For instance, it was on a sad note that Audu Adamu, the NA Agricultural Assistant, reported to the DO, in June 1951, that Takkas people of Fier District, in northern Pankshin Division, had abandoned farming; and turned mostly into permanent mine labourers.[135] Situated more or less on the south-eastern fringes of the Minesfield, the Takkas agrarian community for a long time was directly exposed to the thaw of the labour-hungry tin mining industry. A number of mining camps and companies had been situated and operated in that vicinity since the 1920s, or even before.[136] At a location like that, an outcome, such as Adamu reported on, could have resulted. Thus

farming became a secondary occupation to many Takkas people, to whom agricultural life was resorted to, only when the vicissitudes of conditions in the tin mines, so warranted.

A big part of the mine labour, supplied from districts lying in Yil Ngas, to the Minesfield, however, was migrant, as Freund has also suggested,[137] rather than the permanent type, which many in Takkas had reportedly opted for. Immigrant Hausa labourers were, in most cases, those who metamorphosed into permanent labourers, having adapted to the weather, and, due partially to distance, they formed the habit of not returning to their provinces of origin. For the traffic of migrant mine labourers to continue to flow in both seasons, or throughout the year, it was colonially 'logical' on the one hand that they should be paid less, to keep them wanting to go back to the Mines, to toil some more, and on the other, strong-arm methods and arrangements were sustained at the home-front, to keep sending them back to the Mines, whether they liked to go or not. Hence, 'controlled voluntary labour,' as the colonialists and mine managers virtually used to describe Plateau mine labourers, was more or less an apt description. It simply fails to show directly that requisitioning, actually coercive, tactics, were often resorted to, by the DOs and chiefs, in order to satisfy the mining companies' more or less insatiable demand for this cheapest source of mine labour.

The recruitment of Ngas peasants, among other south-eastern Plateau peasants, by virtue of the presence of Walmsley at Pankshin Station and the frequent visits of mine managers to Pankshin Station, especially in the 1940s, was mostly, directly co-ordinated in Pankshin Town. The mine labour recruits were usually despatched in their hundreds like troops on foot, or jam-packed

in lorries seldomly sent to Pankshin Station by mine managers, and driven, into the Minesfield. Thus, as from the early 1940s, Pankshin Town became, among other things, a notable mine-labour recruiting centre.

Before the 1940s, there were different points of recruitment to which hundreds of Ngas labourers went, or were sent to, by the DOs, depending on the demand by the various mine companies. Even then, there were many volunteers from the communities in Pankshin District, in particular. In his half-yearly report submitted at the end of June 1936, for instance, it was only with reference to Pankshin District that Goble said: "This unit has benefited very considerably by work on the Minesfield to which hundreds of its young men have gone, and are still going, though in much reduced numbers."[138] Goble perceived the 'benefit', but not the impoverishing, unequal compensation, which the peasants got in exchange for their labour-power, from the capitalist employers of such 'volunteered' labour-power. But two significant points emerge (i) that hundreds of able-bodied peasants went from Pankshin District alone, and (ii) that the numbers reduced, in view of the planting season. The differences in the practice of mine labour recruitment, between the late 1930s and early 1940s, in Pankshin District, might only have been the creation of a recruiting point in the district itself and the practice of recruiting in the wet-season, aided by the use of strong-arm methods, introduced during the forced labour days, in the Minesfield, in the early 1940s.

The fact that many Ngas, and other Plateau peasants, were exploited in various ways through their status as 'controlled,' actually 'forced' mine labourers during the late 1930s up to the early 1950s, where this study terminates, which led to their suffering physically, emotionally, materially and

mentally, cannot be gainsaid. This was in addition to the exploitation of their labour in lifting goods, like 'beasts of burden', discussed above. Records on the labour question in Pankshin NA have not been found, especially given the fact that Walmsley though a DO by rank, was taken from the office of DO and made an MRO, or Mines Recruiting Officer, and then stationed at Pankshin. Were figures of recruited labourers during the 1940s available, they would have been both illustrative and instructive.

5.9. Conclusion

The coincidence of the period under review in this chapter with the operation of the British Second World War economy was not a mere coincidence. Having been incorporated into the British capitalist colonial economy in the period up to 1935, as the last Chapter purports to show, it was both natural and inevitable that Yil Ngas (and its neighbouring communities) should play a vital role in the said war economy, during the period under review in this chapter. While the Germans created labour camps composed of so-called 'inferior peoples' which became their food producing 'factories,' in Eastern Europe, the British, though not with identical candour, created 'controlled' labour and grain supplying reserves, in her colonies, a typical example of which were the Plateau communities, and of course, Yil Ngas in particular, especially given the situation that the tin and other minerals, which were being extracted by private capitalist concerns on the Jos Plateau brought undue advantage to Britain in the war.[139]

There was poverty in Plateau Province, especially in the rural areas, among the peasants. Food was at most times difficult to come by, and yet they toiled on their farms and in the Mines, all year round, with little time to rest.

Rural poverty in Yil Ngas, accompanied by inflationary trends in the market, and terrible exploitative treatment from government officials, in fixing of low prices for requisitioned grain and paying lowest fees for mine labour, attained the character of overt poverty. In the last period (or last chapter), it had the character of covert poverty, where deflationary conditions were more prevalent. In the period under review, peasants lacked not only in money but also in material needs. People, including the chiefs this time around, talked of their poverty openly,[140] which could be seen, and felt in more than one ways.

Notes

1 For instance Gonyok, C.K. "The Coming of Colonial Administration to Ngasland, 1906-1935" Op cit, suggests that 1936 began a new period. Wambutda, Daniel Nimcir, *A Study of Conversion Among the Angas of Plateau State of Nigeria with Emphasis on Christianity*, Op cit, regards the period 1936-1960 as 'modern times' juxtaposed against the period 1906-1935, which he calls 'colonial period.' The reality, of course, is that the colonial period did not end until 1960. But it remains a consensus that 1936, however, signifies the beginning of a new period.

2 L. H. Goble "Annual Report - Pankshin Division, 1936", NAK: PANKSHIN NA 248(B).

3 Gonyok, Op cit.

4 Roofing grass specially was usually collected via requisitioning just like grain, up to the early 1950s; for the roofing of the buildings at Pankshin Station.

5 Goble, "Annual Report - Pankshin Division, 1936" Op cit.

6 Ibid

7 Resident Plateau (E.S. Pembleton) to S.N.P., dated 31st August 1936, in: "Review of Communications in Plateau Province in Relation to Economic situation", NAK: PANKSHIN-NA 892.

8 Technocrats like Order-Browne, the colonial office expert on African labour, in the early 1940s, played no small part in misinforming the British public on the forced labour introduced in the Plateau tin mines, (in contravention of an ILO ordinance) especially on Plateau labour. (Michael Watts must have imbibed such fallacies before adopting the same stand.) See Freund, Op cit pp 137-138.

9 (Capt.) S. H. V. White, "Pankshin Division - Half yearly Report: January - June 1936". NAK: PANKSHIN-NA 248

10 Goble "Annual Report... 1936" Op cit

11 Ibid.

12 Gonyok, C.K. Op cit (p. 88) suggests that the 1926 - 1935 saw the establishment of the so-called 'indirect rule' in its true sense in Yil Ngas. Now, we have realised that even up to 1952, when the Angas Chiefdom, which approximates roughly to our area, Yil Ngas, such a practice did not obtain.

13 Isichei, Op cit

14 Bill Freund, *Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines* (Longman, Burnt Hill, 1981) p136

15 Ibid.

16 H.A, Alahira, "Labour and Capital: Mechanism of Labour Exploitation in the Jos Tin Mines, 1900-1960," (Paper presented at History Departmental Seminar, Department of History, ABU Zaria, on 27th March 1998) p. 9

17 Gavin Williams (ed) *Nigeria: Economy and Society* (Rex Collins, London, 1976) p.18

18 Ibid.

19 Bill Freund, Op cit, pp. 143 – 144.

20 Gavin Williams Op. cit p. 18.

21 Freund Op cit. p.139

22 Michael Watts, Op cit p. 327

23 Ibid.

24 SNP (E. Walwyn) to Residents of Northern Provinces "Control of Corn Prices" dated 21st March 1442, in: "Corn, Supply of," NAK: PANKSHIN NA 179 Vol. 11

25 Ibid.

26 SNP (A. T. Weatherhead) to Residents of Northern Provinces" Grain Reserve Policy" dated 25th November 1947 in "Corn Supply of (Vol. 11). Op cit p. 136.

27 Freund, Op cit p. 136.

28 District Manager of UAC (G.R. Webb Parkis) to Resident Plateau: "Mines field Corn Supply" dated 31st October 1942, in: "food and corn supply to the mines-field" Jos Prof., 3rd collection, 1938 Vol. 11 (NAK).

29 D. O. Pankshin (Lenox Conyngham) to Resident Plateau "Corn Reserves" dated 31st October, 1942, Ibid.

30 The collection centres were the mining companies "buying centres", from where they bought corn at the lowest ('controlled') prices. Commenting both on the UAC's abandoned grain and the Dengi and Shendam "buying centre", the Acting Resident Goble said in a letters to Administrative District. Minerals Production, Jos that: "The proposal was that mining companies would make their own arrangements for transport from the buying centres to their camps", in Ibid. When the companies preferred to buy from UAC, they usually paid more due to the commission charged.

31 District Manager of UAC, Op cit.

32 Watts, Op cit p.327.

33 The instrument used to obtain grain at controlled rates was requisitioning, which once employed, supplying the grain on the part of those on whom its quotas were imposed became compulsory.

34 For instance acting Resident Plateau (L" H. Goble) to joint General Manager, ATMN Ltd: "Sale of Corn to mines labour" dated 12th August, 1942, in Ibid stated: "I hope... to arrange for supplies to be provided through Pankshin and Shendam Native Administrations, at cost appreciably below the controlled price, and it is presumed that your company will release this corn when customary in the past. That was the practice, as far as Plateau grain was concerned!

35 Ibid.

36 See "Markets, 1939 - 1957", PANKSHIN-NA (NAK).

37 Ibid.

38 Fieldnotes: Interview with Tapar Dape, 49, District of Amper, Ex-serviceman and farmer, at Amper on 11th April, 1995.

39 See "Agricultural Reports, 1939-1953 (Kanam, Pankshin, Panyam)", NAK: PANKSHIN-NA 87.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Freund, Op cit p. 139.

43 See "Food and Corn Supply to the Minesfield" (Vol. II) Op cit.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid

46 See note 34 above.

47 See: "Food and Corn Supply to the Minesfield" (Vol. II) Op cit. A. Blacshaw, had an open mind. He must have again sounded offensive to his Managers, when in the same memo he maintained that: "Surely the powers-that-be [or colonial authorities], in this country [Nigeria], who preach British responsibility and justness to the world, should see that natives under our protection [especially mine labourers], are given the opportunity of purchasing their needs in the open market at a price within the bounds of their salary."

48 Ibid

49 In "Groundnuts" NAK: PANKSHIN NA 800.
50 Ibid
51 Ibid
52 Ibid
53 Ibid
54 Ibid
55 That period in the description of some of our informants was made more terrible by the memory of the Maar'nlong famine or stress especially in the Amper area.
56 Michael Watts, Op cit p.223.
57 See: Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, (Howard Univ. Press, Washington DC, 1982), p.205. Rodney's dictum that: "Colonialism had only one hand – it was a one-armed bandit" holds true in describing the situation in Yil Ngas.
58 Michael Watts, Op cit p.223.
59 In "1 Appointment of Marketing Officer. 2 Marketing. 3 Native Trade" NAK: PANKSHIN NA 755.
60 I am referring to: Margery Perham (ed) *The Economies of A Tropical Dependency* (1945) as a collection of works. Volume I is titled *The Native Economies of Nigeria* jointly written by Daryll Forde and Richenda Scott, while Volume II is titled *Mining, Commerce and Finance* written by Penelope Bowler, et al.
61 Volume I: Ibid.p.1. We have earlier broached on the concept of 'atomic organisation' in chapter three. It suggests living behind 'closed walls.'
62 Ibid p.24
63 Volume II: Ibid pp 24-25. No doubt, there must have been varying conditions but Plateau peasants were all regarded and treated as 'voluntary labourers in the Minesfield,' they were also termed 'unskilled' due to the periodic nature of their going to the mines. Labour employed on 'pick and shovel and headpan' was reserved for 'pagans from the Plateau' according to Bowler, who, in the final analysis, either lived in their own homes' (e.g. Beroms, Afizeres, Anagutas, Rons, etc) or in 'temporary shelters,' whenever they went to the Minesfield. The mining companies housed immigrant labourer, 'in huts of the village type,' in addition to their better wages, which they got. The more or less common experiences, which Plateau peasants faced, became homogenizing conditions, among them.
64 Volume I: Op cit. p.195
65 This has not been stated bluntly anywhere in our sources. However, districts such as Pankshin, Tof, Bokkos, etc were not usually requisitioned as far as we can see. The only problem with this position is our inability to explain why North and South Sura Districts, lying very close to the Minesfield were usually requisitioned while Pankshin District was left out, apart from its being a good supplier of mine labour and holder of a growing non-food producing urban population.
66 In: "Supply of Corn for Prison… Pankshin NA" Op cit.
67 Ibid
68 In: "Land Rehabilitation, Plateau Province, 1946" NAK: PANKSHIN NA 975.
69 In: "Supply of Corn for Prison… Pankshin NA" Op cit
70 Ibid
71 Ibid
72 Ibid
73 Ibid
74 Ibid. Details of difficulties in Pankshin NA were not stated. However, in Kanam NA the 'Sarki' reported to the DO that due to lack of grain, some families had emigrated while some were threatening to do likewise simply to escape forthcoming corn requisitioned quotas.
75 Ibid
76 Ibid
77 Ibid. That quotation also appears in quotation marks in source.
78 Ibid
79 Ibid. By 14th April 1948, Chip had brought 3.06 bags out of 30 requisitioned; Fier, 8.92 bags out of 15; Gindiri, 22.94 out of 30; Jepal, 3.89 out of 10; Ampang-East, 2.24 out of 20; Kadung, 6 out of 20; Lankan, 19.26 out of 30; N. Sura, 25.29 out of 30; S. Sura, 10.15 out of 30; Wokkos, 3,38 out of 20; and Pai, 7.77 out of 20.
80 Ibid

81 See Table 4 & tables with year-long figures below.
82 Isichei, Op cit
83 Ibid
84 Ibid
85 Apart from losses imposed on peasants' corn by low prices fixed by colonial authorities, the derivation of chiefs' allowances from proceeds realised must have left the peasants with virtually nothing.
86 In: "Supply of Corn for Prison... Pankshin NA" Op cit
87 Ibid. By March-ending or the expiration of the deadline, Lankan District alone had turned-in 22.34 bags out of 30 requisitioned; Wokkos had turned-in 3.66 bags out of 10; Fier, only 5.16 out of 20; Jipal, 1.32 out of 10; (and though not originally included on that requisition's list, Garram turned-in 3.58 bags), giving a total of 42. 37 bags. Other districts had turned-in no grain.
88 Mishkom of Lankan seemed to have woken up to his responsibilities in serving the colonialists in a new way, now given the fact that undefined allowances.
89 In: "Supply of Corn for Prison... Pankshin NA" Op cit
90 In: "Crop Yields Statistics," NAK: PANKSHIN NA 792.
91 Since 1946, a greoup of neighbouring district heads of three or more than three, could constitute the Court. The group, which wrote memo in question, included heads of Amper, Pai, Ampang and Kabwir Districts.
92 The memo is dated 15th April 1949. In: "Markets" Op cit.
93 See text of endnote 90.
94 In: "Markets" Op cit
95 Ibid
96 Ibid
97 Ibid
98 Ibid
99 Ibid
100 See text of endnote 105.
101 In: "Supply of Corn for Prison... Pankshin NA" Op cit
102 Among the gero producing districts of Pankshin NA, Amper was left out here.
103 In: "Supply of Corn for Prison... Pankshin NA" Op cit
104 Ibid
105 Ibid
106 Fanon's contention that colonial violence was not only political and economic, but also emotional and psychological was borne out by this situation. See his: *The Wretched of the Earth* (Penguin, London, 1980) pp.48, 201-250.
107 In: "Supply of Corn for Prison... Pankshin NA" Op cit
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid
110 Ibid
111 Ibid
112 C.f: Isaiah 52: 7 in the Holy Scriptures.
113 In: "Supply of Corn for Prison... Pankshin NA" Op cit
114 Ibid
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid
117 Ibid
118 Ibid
119 Ibid
120 Ibid
121 Ibid. Adamu Kyana, the Prison Scribe, among others kept requesting the DO to requisition the districts in 1953 as he was used to doing in the past, but to no avail. A new dawn had begun.
122 See endnote 65.
123 See: "Review of Communications..." Op cit. By 1936, there were only three motor roads encompassing Yil Ngas (i) the Jos –Shendam main road, which passed through Pankshin and Amper, was an all-season road; (ii) the Amper- Dengi road, which was a dry season road; and the Vodni- Takkas road, which was also a dry season road. There were trade

routes on which pack animal transport was sometimes used e.g. Amper-Boi-Minesfield route.

124 Goble, "Annual Report - Pankshin Division, 1936" Op cit.

125 Ibid. Resident Pembleton proposed the Chigwong-Ampang-Garram-Kwabzak road and included among projects to be executed in 1937.

126 In: "Supply of Corn for Prison... Pankshin NA" Op cit. Grass requisitioning was maintained alongside grain requisitioning up to 1951. Wadak mentioned that fact to Hadow when he arrived in April 1951.

127 In: "Agricultural Reports, 1939-1953 (Kanam, Pankshin, Panyam)", NAK: PANKSHIN-NA 87, Op cit.

128 See: Freund, Op cit pp. 139 & 146. The truth is that they were preferred to labourers from elsewhere. Mining capital preferred putting pressure on 'voluntary labour' because of its cheap nature.

129 Daryll Forde in: Volume I: Op cit. p.195: describes a situation in Vom where "it was estimated that 75% of the labour on the farms of Hausa and other mine working immigrants was done by pagans [Plateau peasants.]" Local peasants who were paid least wages in the Minesfield lived either in their own villages or temporary shelters outside the mining camps, because no provision was made to accommodate them, in the first place in the camps (Forde and Freund have both reported on this!). They either sold their labour to mining companies or fellow, though better treated, mine labourers to work on their farms, just to earn a little more money. Thus my concept of 'laboureres of labourers.'

130 Freund, Op cit, p.143

131 Ibid: pp 143-144.

132 Ibid, p.146 & see note 129 above.

133 In: "Food and Corn Supply to the Minesfield" (Vol. II) Op cit.

134 Dan'azumi Bukar "Peasant Impoverishment in Jos Division, 1902-1950" (MA Thesis, History Department, ABU Zaria, 1984), has reviewed the extent of disruption of agriculture particularly in Birom land.

135 "Agricultural Reports, 1939-1953 (Kanam, Pankshin, Panyam)", NAK: PANKSHIN-NA 87, Op cit.

136 On a map of Bijim and environs, lying to the north-east of Takkas area, one could see indications of sites of (i) Tapshin Mining Camp (ii) Gora Dan Tsoho Camp (iii) Kwapa Mining Camp and (iv) Anglo-Construction Mining Camp. The map was drawn by Carlyle, DO, Hill Div., 1917.

137 Freund, Op cit, p.143

138 Goble, "Annual Report - Pankshin Division, 1936" Op cit.

139 The extent of the advantage Britain got cannot be quantified in this study.

140 Fieldnotes: For some Ngas peasants, life has been at its low ebb since the Maa'nlong famine, especially in the Amper area, where the said famine occurred in 1939. Poverty, since then, has been more or less confessed by many as though it is alwayts there. Interviews with: Chorching, c.95, in December 1986; Yil'dm'ma Ipshak c.65, in January 1987; & Ta'par Dape, c.45, in April 1995; Op cit.

CHAPTER SIX:

ROOTS OF RURAL POVERTY IN THE DYNAMICS OF COLONIAL DOMINATION IN YIL NGAS: A SYNTHESIS

6.0 Introduction

This last chapter of the study attempts a synthesis[1] of the essential factors, which we have encompassed thus far. The essential content of the first chapter is the study's problem statement which borders on a perceived 'fact' of poverty in Yil Ngas today, and demands no re-iteration or over emphasis. The essential contents of chapters two to five however are expected to be analytically relevant in our bid to address the stated problem to a great extent, hence deserve to be revisited.

As we piece-together or synthesise the essential contents or elements of chapters two to five, it is hoped that a general and pointed picture of the nature of colonial domination in Yil Ngas between 1902 and 1952 would emerge, to provide us with a basis for drawing a general conclusion to this study. In order to better comprehend the said picture from the perspective of different angles, however, let us briefly summarise the essential elements of the said four chapters of this study and then review the changing stages of colonial domination-and-exploitation, and its resultant corollary of poverty, in Yil Ngas, and what it provoked in the experience of the colonised masses, peasants and non-peasants alike, based on chapters three to five.

6.1 A Synopsis Of Essence: Chapters Two To Five

Before the imposition of colonial domination on Yil Ngas, the region was characterised by polities at the transitional stage between communalism and feudalism. However, the ownership distribution and utilisation of means of

production was largely based on communalistic principles. Hence, the communal mode of production was basic, except that figments of feudal social relations had begun to rear their heads, here and there.

The evidence of embryonic feudal relations indicated a society in which inequality was an extant phenomenon. The presence of inequality however did not, and does not, always suggest the presence of social poverty in a concerned economy: It did not translate into social poverty in Yil Ngas on the eve of the imposition of colonial domination on its polities. Land rents were not exploitative, were mostly viewed as tokens of gratitude paid to the landlords by the tenants. Apparently, famine conditions characterised the region in the mid-1890s, yet only its memory lingered into the next decade, by 1907 there was no evidence of social poverty in any Ngas community on its account. Its debilitating shocks and effects had sooner than later been overcome.

Polities situated in the north-western, central, western, and southern parts of Yil Ngas, possessed full political sovereignty. Polities situated in the less hilly eastern and north-eastern parts had, before the turn of the century, nominally mortgaged their independence to Bauchi emirate in exchange for peace and other relations with her. Having, as alleged, been made to occupy the status of **aman** territories at some point in the course of the nineteenth century, **Jizya** was probably (at some point) paid to Bauchi by the concerned polities. That, in itself, however, should form the subject of a separate study, designed to examine and cross-examine the claims and counter-claims, if any, so that a proper picture of the truth can be featured and tendered. The relationship between the eastern polities of Yil Ngas and

Bauchi appeared to be that of "live and let's live", essentially and basically. Thus Bauchi's over-lordship in that connection, by the beginning of the twentieth century, as we have contended in chapter three, was nominal rather than real.[2] As maintained in chapter two, the relationship was insufficient to erode, talkless of disrupt, the political economy of the concerned polities of Yil Ngas, as far as the last decade of the nineteenth century was concerned.

On the whole, all the polities of Yil Ngas had the liberty to trade and interact with their neighbours on matters of common interest, whether located within the region or outside its borders. With generally recognised methods of settlement of disputes, dispute between Ngas polities and groups hardly escalated into open or protracted wars. Their battles were generally skirmishes with negligible or no loss of lives. Contrary to what the colonialists speculated, exchange of goods and services was not merely present but the constant phenomenon in their intra-group relations, rather than war.

The political "map" of Yil Ngas in the last decade of the nineteenth century, or on the eve of the imposition of colonial domination, if drawn, shall have revealed a region of mini-states or kingdoms, chieftaincies and smaller communities in varying scales of political development and organisation, with each producing what surpluses and items it could, with areas of specilisation, but there was homogeneity of distribution, exchange and consumption of goods and services among the communities, especially in normal circumstances. During times of economic hardship, the practice of the moral economy was a big remedy, which also operated as a substitute to trade. Insecurity and lawlessness usually attained their peaks at such

times, but were reduced to low levels as soon as the situation improved. Thus, as we saw in chapter two, colonialism met a healthy self-sustained agrarian economy in which enough surplus was often produced to cushion the shocks and vagaries of nature and society, in Yil Ngas.

Then the period of colonial invasion and conquest of Yil Ngas began in the first decade of the twentieth century. However, the intellectual angle of the invasion was pitched on a wrong footing. Several lies, distortions of truth and assumptions constituted the mental basis of colonial invasion with which the militarily resisting and non-militarily resisting polities of Yil Ngas had to contend. Early colonial literature and correspondence partially contended that Yil Ngas was backward, primitive and generally inhabited by a people who had just returned from slavery abroad, to their homeland.[3] The assumption had it that they wilfully gave themselves into slavery to unnamed slave-masters, guessingly of Bauchi origin, but on the news of the soon-coming colonial domination of Bauchi, their assumed land of slavery, they snatched at freedom and left their masters and returned to Yil Ngas. It was further assumed that they were a people much-afraid, insecure and helpless. Thus from the intellectual angle, colonialism was viewed as having the potentiality of liberating, civilising and enriching or stimulating the prosperity of the Ngas.

Then from the military or political angle, Yil Ngas was generally accused of disregarding colonial orders to pay taxes to the colonial government in Bauchi -- after the fall of Bauchi Emirate in February 1902. Certain polities of Yil Ngas were specifically accused of attacking innocent travellers, commandeering Fulani cattle and invading neighbouring non-Ngas polities and peoples, especially the Zar and Jar

peoples, which were already 'friendly' or loyal to the colonialists. Even among their fellow Ngas polities, they were allegedly accused of threatening the peace in-between, according to the colonialists. Hence the taking of military action against such notorious polities, as was thought by the colonialists, would amount to punishing their misdemeanours and hindering the other polities from taking the same course. Thereby the colonialists derived their first pretext for invading Yil Ngas with an expeditionary force in April 1906. A number of towns were destroyed with infernos and manual bulldozing of residential compounds, huts and granaries, in which the combined energy of 1000 labourers was utilised. Deriving pretext after pretext, several expeditions and patrols were later pitted against various other Ngas polities, with severe destructive effects, especially in 1917, before the conquest of Yil Ngas was completed.

During the invasions for conquest, in the processes of destruction by infernos and the razing down of buildings, a lot of material wealth was plundered, apart from removable items simply destroyed and the people killed and wounded, brute force and naked violence were utilised against anyone who stood in the way. Ranging, for instance, from 50,000 cowries taken from Nmyet; 1500 sheep sold at Amar and Ibi; 4,390 loads of grain taken from Kuwang and environs; to, the destruction of standing corn on the farms in Ntal; the impact of colonial invasions was very severe and instructive. The invading armies recovered the costs of (especially the ammunition utilised in) prosecuting expeditionary campaigns, as well as obtained sufficient rewards for soldiers (who had personal servants and goats while on tour!) and revenue for Bauchi Province or the colonial government.

Direct, but passive, assessment of the material endowment of Yil Ngas commenced simultaneously with the invading campaigns. The immediate contention of expeditionary commanders was that Yil Ngas was very wealthy! As a result, a vigorous and unbridled tax-gathering regime was instituted within Yil Ngas as soon as the colonialists got the very opportunity to do so in 1907, even while the whole area had only been partially subdued. Their headquarters, initially a sub-residency, in that region was lifted from Boghom land and placed at Wokkos in 1908 and later, at Pankshin, in 1909, in Yil Ngas, as a step towards ensuring the success of that campaign. It was still cardinally due to economic reasons that the divisional headquarters could not, later, be removed from Pankshin to Bokkos in the early 1920s, in spite of an official directive to that effect. Between 1906 and 1908, taxes were taken in the form of grain, cowries, sheep, goats but, preferably, cattle. Alongside these forms, taxes in cash also began to be taken as from 1909, when coin money was introduced in Yil Ngas, in the same year. Many kraals were depleted. Corvee labour, employed on building and roadwork sites and in the porterage of booty' was levied on 'friendly' or pacified communities. The savings (in the form of livestock) and food reserves of the peasant producer were severely ransacked and pillaged. Insecurity to life and property became the order of the day. The peasant community's self-sufficiency was undermined and partially destroyed. By the middle of the second decade of the twentieth century the colonialists began to mention 'poverty' with respect to places in Yil Ngas in their reports. Emergent features of social poverty naturally became evident to them after nearly a decade of the plunder of material resources in Yil Ngas.[4] By 1919, however, the whole region had become

completely subjected to the tentacles of colonial domination, as we saw in chapter three.

The transformation of Yil Ngas into a capitalist colonial rural economy characterised the 1920s up to the mid-1930s. Pankshin Station was transformed into an urban centre with a sizeable non-farming population, a prison, a clinic (which was later turned into a hospital) and a grain reserve. For the first time in Yil Ngas a sizeable non-farming community emerged and developed, that is, in Pankshin Town.[5] Peasant produce was requisitioned from the outlying areas of Yil Ngas and stacked into the grain reserve for the benefit of the 'urban' population. Amper was also transformed into a colonial sub-station in the so-called Plain Angas area. Rest camps were built at strategic locations in Yil Ngas, and elsewhere in Pankshin Division, which served as colonial bases for the DOs while on tour. An awkward kind of corves labour[6] was imposed on the communities, which was employed in the construction and reconstruction, expansion and maintenance of old routes and roads, and building of rest houses in the districts and new offices in Pankshin Station. Labour officers who supervised the requisitioned (or forced) labourers, in the construction of such projects, were usually very harsh and violent, in the treatment of the people. Songs were composed and stories were told by Ngas peasants reflective of such treatment,[7] Motor transport between Pankshin Station and the Minesfield, which encompassed places like Bukuru, Naraguta, Barakin-Ladi, Jos, Bokkos, and their environs, commenced in the early 1920s. Motor-transport beyond Pankshin Town into the lowlands, beyond the eastern border of Yil Ngas, became possible by the late 1920s and early 1930s. Surplus produce was carted off from places like

Shendam and Dengi (beyond Yil Ngas) and also from Amper and Pankshin Station (within Yil Ngas) into the Minesfield by lorries and caravans of porters. Pack animal transport was also employed where possible. The economic incorporation of Yil Ngas into the capitalist colonial economy was accomplished at this time, with Pankshin Station as a local 'core' and the outlying communities constituting the 'periphery.' At the macro-level within Plateau Province, the whole of Yil Ngas, which was transformed into a predominantly rural economy, constituted a periphery to the Minesfield.

At that time, the districts were reorganised and the authority of the District-Heads and Federated District Councils was more or less confirmed by means of the creation of a graded native court under the headship of each. Taxes hitherto charged differently from the "Hill Angas" and "Plain Angas" districts (the latter, having been carved out of Bauchi and placed under Pankshin Division in 1925) were harmonised and raised twice higher. Market places and stalls were established and constructed in many locations within the outlying districts, as well as Pankshin District, where hitherto such facilities did not exist. Peasant produce was therefore easily accessed at such locations as well as at the district centres, (having been directly supplied by the producers themselves) by non-indigenous (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba) traders and colonial messengers, couriers and agents; a situation which hindered the evolution of an indigenous middleman class of traders. Due to the multiplicity of markets and the blessing of bumper harvests, which translated into high supply, prices of peasant produce were maintained at very low levels. While colonial taxes were skyrocketing, prices in the rural markets more or less remained constantly low. Adding insult to

injury, to this unfortunate situation, there was a tin glut in the world market, at the macro-international level in the early 1930s, which translated into low demand for Nigerian tin (and a sheer drop in its price), which, in turn, translated into nearly zero demand for the plateau peasant's produce. Large quantities of corn, beans and fonio, and healthy-looking goats, sheep, cattle and poultry were given away by the peasants in exchange for a few pennies, if not taken to the market and then returned home unsold. Trade by barter was now no longer in vogue; everyone was trapped in the colonial cash economy and the Ngas peasant was turned into a miserable petty commodity producer. Each peasant wanted to sell off his surplus produce to meet his tax demands and to avoid getting into trouble with the District-Heads and their **dogari** staff or the native policemen, but there was already a hindering corn glut in the province. That was how the Great Depression,[8] which was orchestrated by the contradictions of the world capitalist economy, persecuted the Ngas peasant in the early 1930s who had lately been hooked to its colonial tentacles and placed at (one of) its lowest wrungs. He was into a cash economy, but cash to him was the hardest thing to come by. Not for lack of goods, but for the gross under-valuing of his goods. His rampantly exploited labour-power was also grossly under-valued. That was the basis or essence of his poverty in the deflation-ridden economy of the depressional years in the early 1930s, as we saw in chapter four.

The Ngas peasant could no longer be content with going to the mines in the dry season and selling off his surplus at harvest time to meet his tax demands, due to the difficulties encountered in the early 1930s. The combination of tin-glut and corn-glut translated into low demands for mine labour and corn supply. Yet the Ngas

peasant had already been trapped in their inter-woven vicious circle. The colonial authorities supplied seed ground nuts in the early and mid-1930s and promoted its cultivation in the districts of Yil Ngas as a cash crop alternative, but this was allegedly greeted with a low response from the peasants due allegedly to a local negative belief about groundnuts.[9] When tin prices appreciated by the mid-1930s however, greater numbers of Ngas peasants flocked into the Minesfield as labourers. A grain scarcity occurred in Pankshin area at that time, but the eastern parts of Yil Ngas around the Amper-centre, were not affected. A Famine Relief Fund was established and corn was supplied at market rates by the colonial authorities to cushion the effects of the scarcity, especially in Pankshin Town and environs. The fund was mismanaged and the money that was initially spent in procuring the corn was not fully recovered. And, just before the beginning of the Second World War in September 1939, a locust invasion and destruction of crops occurred in the Amper District area, which translated into the **Maar-n'long** famine, which adversely affected the people of the area. People were destitute and ate all sorts of wild fruits and roots because their "farms were empty," which is the literally meaning of **Maar-n'long**. But the colonial authorities did not go to their rescue with another relief corn, probably due to difficulties and losses suffered in the first case. They did not even acknowledge the said famine in their reports.[10]

Instead of bringing more relief resources to cushion the frequent recurrence of grain scarcity which left the peasants sometimes with insufficient subsistence, the exploitation of peasant produce by the colonial authorities in Yil Ngas was not only intensified, but reached its high-water marks during the 1940s.[11] As part of the

British war effort, there was a feverish increase in tin extraction and exportation from the Jos Plateau such as had never before been witnessed since the start of the industry in the early 1900s.[12] Labour in large dimensions was conscripted from the northern provinces into the Minesfield in abject disregard of an ILO Ordinance forbidding the utilisation of forced labour methods, which Britain had signed in 1933.[13] Forced labour-recruiting or strong arm methods were used to 'conscript' labour from Plateau Province with the active cooperation and collaboration of Divisional Officers, District Heads and Mines Managers. Large numbers of Ngas peasants were maintained in the Minesfiled in both dry and wet seasons. Peasants began to go to the mines more than once in a year. While conscripts from other provinces were called "political labour" and treated with more respect and better wages, Plateau peasants were classified as "controlled voluntary labour" and were paid the lowest wages and given the hardest tasks which involved using the digger, the shovel and the head pan. Mudus of grain were carried by the men into the Minesfield with which to prepare their own meals, and due to lack of much experience in cooking their meals were poorly made as well as lacking in nutrients. Diseases were rampant and deaths were common in the mining camps. While conscripts from other provinces were housed in huts provided by the mining companies, the companies left Plateau peasants to stay in shaggy shelters temporarily made by the peasants themselves.[14]

Another side of the feverish expansion of tin mining sequel to the commencement of the Second World War was the exploitation of peasant produce, as said above. While the recurrent spate of grain scarcity continued to force the worst-hit peasants to sell off their few livestock in order to procure grain for their own

survival, the heaviest demand for requisitioned grain by the provincial authorities in order to feed the upwards of 70,000[15] forced labourers in the Minesfield was made in 1942 and 1943. Some 8000 tons of grain were requisitioned from Plateau Province alone, and peasants died of hunger as a result. Strong-arm methods were used to confiscate even the bare subsistence of families, as requisitioned corn. The 1942/1943 case was a high-water mark in the impact of grain requisitioning, which, with specific reference to Yil Ngas, had commenced in the early 1920s.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, corn requisitioning with reference to Pankshin NA, which encompassed Yil Ngas, was organised around 15 districts out of22; and out of that number 11 were districts within Yil Ngas, (see table 4 above). Between 1946 and 1952, when the practice of corn requisitioning was abandoned, about 195.8 tons (or 1958 bags) of corn were requisitioned from the said 15 districts allegedly for the benefit of NA prison, hospital and school. Out of that figure, about 152 tones (or 1520 bags), which was 77.65% of the total, was accounted for by the 11 districts of Yil Ngas, clearly indicating where the burden of corn exploitation within Pankshin NA was mostly borne. As part of the immediate environment of the core sector, Pankshin District was consistently left out of the requisitioned districts during the period; its peasants' surplus produce was either locally supplied to the urban community in Pankshin Town or taken directly into the Minesfield and sold. The same goes for the other six districts OF Pankshin NA, (none of which thought fell within Yil Ngas), which were more or less lying within the Minesfield.[16] Not much has been documented with reference to the requisitioning of other grain crops. (see Tables 5, 6, and 7,above). But the same pattern of heavier burden borne by districts

of Yil Ngas was, in any case, maintained. Another high-water mark of corn scarcity was hit in 1949 when, for the first time, the Angass Central Native Court members, actually a collection of District Heads of Yil Ngas, repeatedly petitioned the divisional authorities for corn relief on behalf of the peasants in their districts. Corn requisitioning had continued to be done alongside the recurrent spate of corn scarcity. Mining companies themselves had also from time to time made their own arrangements, in consultation with the DOs of Pankshin, and obtained grain from the rural communities, directly. By April 1949, however, there was a terrible lack of grain in many markets of Yil Ngas and yet the colonialists still expected them to meet their requisitioned corn quotas, regardless. Needy peasants went looking for grain in the markets but often returned home without any grain, with which to feed their families, but with only their hard-earned or borrowed monies. When available, the corn was quite unaffordable, due to its high price(s). Famine conditions again reared their ugly heads, and the peasants, with their weak money-earning position, suffered most. After 1949, grain requisitioning was gradually revised by the divisional authorities perhaps due partially to the growing intransigence of some Ngas districts to meeting their quotas, partially to the strong case made against the practice in the April-1949 petitions for corn relief, and partially to the unsung demonstration of thirty-three Chip peasants who dared the authorities by selling off the despatched requisitioned corn in Pankshin market instead of submitting it to the colonial authorities, at far less than the current market price. Whereas in the period from 1902 to 1919, the basis of social poverty was the plunder of people's savings (in terms of grain) and investments (in terms of livestock), and whereas in the period between

1920 and 1935, the basis of the people's poverty was gross under-pricing of their surplus produce and labour-power, in a deflation-smitten economy. It should be noted that, in the period from 1935 to 1952, it was a combination of factors: (i) the intensified exploitation of peasants' labour-power and material resources, including their very subsistence, was prosecuted in exchange for lowly controlled wages, in the mines, and prices, in their markets and requisitioned grain collection centres; (ii) the Ngas peasants were mostly left with a weak purchasing power, an empty or low-surplus base, depleted livestock resources, a depleting and demoralised work-force, and a lowered subsistence level in an inflation-smitten economy, which characterised their region both during and after the Second World War, up to the middle of the century, as we saw in chapter five.

6.2: Changing Forms Of Colonial Exploitation Versus Ngas Responses

In the foregoing synopsis, three bases of poverty were identified in the experience of Ngas peasants under the ambit of colonial domination between 1902 and 1952. In pin-pointing the bases of poverty which occurred as a consequence of colonial exploitation it is important to also pinpoint the victims' responses. An assessment of the bases or roots of rural poverty, as this study has been conceived to be, will not be complete without a brief recollection of how the victims succumbed to, or attempted to overcome their oppression, exploitation and misery, in short: their poverty.[17]

Some of their responses were strategic for alleviating poverty because they were based on a correct understanding of the causes and nature of their deprivation. Some were not strategic and probably made their situation worse. The fact of

appropriate or inappropriate responses themselves however, **ipso facto** proves that the victims were actually impoverished, and there was indeed a form of poverty, which they experienced, though the 'causes', as it were, kept changing, and so were its forms of deprivation. To each form of deprivation, there were a set of responses given by different groups of the people.

During the period covered by chapter three, 1902-1919, there was, first of all, poverty which resulted from the invasion, destruction of lives and property and the ransacking, confiscation and plunder of their savings or investments in the name of collection of tribute. Granaries were ransacked and loads of grain were taken away or destroyed, caring nothing about their victims' subsequent survival. Herds of cattle and other livestock were driven off, in lieu of small cash tributes, or regardless of their higher value within the pre-colonial indigenous economy. Among the different responses of the Ngas at this time, not all of which we might have identified, there were probably four separate and notable tendencies. First, there was withdrawal from the scene of oppression and exploitation especially exhibited by some members of the leadership. People went into self-exile or forced exile both in protest and as a way of escaping further injuries and embarrassment.[18] Second, there was collaboration and, or, projection exhibited by some members of the leadership, who collaborated with the forces of oppression and exploitation, to oppress and exploit their fellow Ngas people. These were self-centred persons who were anxious to utilise and exploit any opportunities of shifting the pinch of their poverty, which their entrapment in the colonial situation signified, to others.[19] Third, there was self-persecution as a form of protest against colonial oppression and exploitation. People burnt their own houses in

protest against paying tribute. Some might rather have committed suicide than to yield to their impoverishing predicament. Goats, which hitherto would have been kept for further multiplication, for instance, were sometimes deliberately killed and eaten on the grounds that that was better than to lose them to the colonialists as tribute.[20] Fourth, there was confrontation which involved militant (and intellectual) resistance to the forces of oppression and exploitation. After having at first tolerated or been defeated by the invading forces, they still resisted the taking away of their savings, investments and means of subsistence by means of arms (not withstanding, the fact that they were later forced into submission).[21]

During the period covered by chapter four, 1920-1935, Ngas peasants' poverty resulted from their entrapment in, and at the same time, relative seclusion from the capitalist colonial cash economy. Channels of acquiring colonial money in order to meet their tax demands and freely acquire their needs and wants were narrow and expensive. They were oppressed and exploited not due to lack of goods but due to the gross under valuing of their goods and labour. A number of responses were made by various Ngas groups to their oppression, again, not all of which we might have identified. First, there was acceptance to participate in the continued operation of the system of oppression and exploitation. White-collar jobs were offered by the colonialists and were readily accepted by several people who were anxious to improve their personal situations, economically and socially. These included local treasurers, district scribes, chief scribes, district-heads, village-area heads, **dogarai**, native policemen, teachers, couriers and messengers, clerks, warders and so on.[22] Secondly, there was the setting up of market places in every village and hamlet as a

way of drawing colonial money into their own coffers. While the colonial authorities established some market places, the people, in the hope of participating in it and acquiring some money, set many others up, as a response to the colonial cash economy. Different market days were fixed, attracting varying volumes of goods and cash.[23] Thirdly, there was also the resort to labouring in the tin mines during the dry season, still as a way of getting colonial money. Even there, their labour-power was under-valued, and during the depression, it was largely ignored. Fourthly, there was withdrawal from the scene or situation of oppression and exploitation. People emigrated to other places in search of better material and monetary conditions. Some migrated into the lowlands where it was easier to produce higher crop yields and, of course, surplus. (The problem, which confronted them in the lowlands however, was the fact that commodity prices were mostly lower there than in Yil Ngas due to their greater distance from the Minesfield, but such migrants benefited greatly in the area of producing enough subsistence for their families). Some migrated up North into Hausaland, though under the guise of Christianity, and settled at Wusasa in Zaria Province. Economic determinants also formed part of the reasons why they emigrated from Yil Ngas.[24] Fifthly, conversion to Christianity, which came to Yil Ngas on the heels of early colonial invasion and conquest, was also another response. Some thought that by becoming Christians, they would be exempted from payment of taxes.[25] Some hoped that by becoming Christians, and thereby freeing themselves from indigenous sanctions which generally controlled and dictated the paces of production and consumption of farm produce, they would be better accommodated within the cash economy, in terms of doing things as dictated by conditions in the

colonial markets. Some converted to Islam for similar reasons. Sixthly, there was increasing attendance at the elementary schools with a view to participating in the system of colonial oppression, as an escape route. Seventhly, there was physical resistance to the system of colonial oppression and exploitation. Some of its workers were physically assaulted or murdered.[26]

During the period covered in chapter five, 1936-1952, Ngas peasants' poverty resulted from the intensified, systematic and almost wholesale exploitation of their material resources (in the face of recurrent scarcity and low prices) and labour (in the face of lowly-fixed and relatively decreasing wages), within an inflation-smitten economy. Food resources dropped at several times below subsistence level, but quotas of requisitioned grain had to be necessarily met. Weeks were devoted to labouring in the tin mines, (maintenance of roads, and carrying of goods), because their tax demands which were difficult to be met, had to be met anyway. Such was the experience of most of the peasants, and some died of hunger, cold and exhaustion. Again, a number of response characteristics of the Ngas people to such oppression and injustice could be identified. First, there was mass or intensified attendance in the mines. In large numbers, Ngas (male)[27] peasants went to toil in the mines, in both wet and dry seasons. This is different from those times when they were coerced or requisitioned as mine-labourers and sent into the Minesfiled by the colonial authorities. In other words, apart from the strong-arm methods, which were employed especially during the Second World War to recruit mine labour among the Ngas, they also attended the mines on their own initiative for the purpose of earning money to pay tax, settle other colonial levies, and meet personal or family needs.

Secondly, there was increased participation in the system of colonial oppression. Some fought as British combatants in the Second World War; and some picked up jobs with the NA, as an escape route. Thirdly, there was partial refusal to supply requisitioned grain, or silent resistance to the meeting of its quotas. Only little efforts were made at times by some District Heads to cause their subjects to supply what was requisitioned. But policemen were sometimes sent by the colonial authorities to force out the grain quotas and counteract that response.[28] Fourthly, there was the solicitation for help or relief sought from the colonial authorities by the central body of Ngas chiefs or leaders on behalf of their subjects. Famine conditions were prevalent in the villages, and emergency relief corn was sought, as an assistance, to be sold in the markets. They argued against grain requisitioning under such conditions of hardship and urged the authorities to give them some assistance, for the benefit of the unsung masses. But their request was not granted.[29] Fifthly, there was a response of righteous indignation or civil disobedience or even protest, by some peasants. They allowed requisitioned corn to be collected, and accepted to be despatched with the collected quantities of the corn loaded on their own heads, for onward submission to the colonial authorities in Pankshin Station, but took the loads to Pankshin market and sold them off at the current price in the market, which was about twice the amount the colonialists were doling out in exchange for such corn.[30] That was a response of non-violent resistance or righteous indignation. They certainly were tired of suffering in silence. And, not too surprisingly, shortly thereafter the practice of grain requisitioning which for long was used to exploit peasants' produce and foreclose any prospects on their part (through paying very low prices for their

produce), of turning their remaining surpluses into money, after paying their taxes, was abolished, as we saw in chapter five.

Grain requisitioning, it seems, was used to establish and maintain a poverty-creating parallel market for the peasants of Yil Ngas, up to 1952. However, because it was probably becoming unpopular as the people kicked against it in various ways, the practice was abolished. In any case, grain requisitioning was just one aspect of the process of colonial exploitation, which was responsible for their poverty. On the whole, the Ngas peasant was not only relegated to the rural sector, but was exploited in various ways and placed at a disadvantaged position in the capitalist colonial cash economy, hinged on the tin mines.

Most of those who, as it turned out, were "privileged" to attend school and later participate in the colonial system of oppression and exploitation, did not return to live in the villages among the peasants again. Those who did, went as members of a higher socio-economic class, because of their expanded income-base, they went either as teachers, pastors, district scribes, farm and sanitation officers, or local policemen. Apart from keeping large farms where often, in recognition of their social standing, the peasants of concerned villages constrained themselves to give them free labour, they also collected monthly salaries or allowances. Most of these colonially produced elites and their children (after them) did not return to the socio-economic status of the peasants any longer. Moreover, they constructed houses in urban locations such as Jos, Bukuru, Kaduna, Zaria Kano and, of course, Pankshin, especially for those Ngas elites hailing from other districts (other than Pankshin District), and constituted themselves into a part of the Ngas Diaspora (although most

its distinctive features, with the exception of Zaria, developed in the period after the period covered in this study).[31] Their relative abandonment of their home villages after their own "escape" only functioned to make their peasant relatives and kinsmen's conditions of poverty more despicable and desperate. Mingling and interacting with them would have cushioned their poverty, to an extent. In any case, they were not only a rural but an underdeveloped civil service-biased elite, who until 1952, did not apparently produce a single grain-contractor or business man of any standing from their own group.[32] Thus, their relatively privileged position, in comparison to that of the peasants, was therefore not a sufficient basis to suggest that after all, colonialism liberated, civilised and brought prosperity to the Ngas people. They all were a colonially subjugated and generally exploited people, except with varying degrees of exploitation.

6.3: General Conclusion

This study has been concentrated on the determination of the roots of rural poverty in Yil Ngas between 1902 and 1952 or more or less, in the first half of the twentieth century. The assumptions or, let us say, "hypotheses" of the colonialists have been (i) that poverty was a tangent of the rugged locality and a permanent feature of the pre-colonial existence or history of Yil Ngas; (ii) that the imposition of colonialism on Yil Ngas was a positive, liberating and civilising development, (iii) and that the Ngas were a bunch of ex-slaves who needed both to be given assistance and made prosperous.

After due analysis of our sources, we found that poverty was neither a tangent of Yil Ngas as a locality nor a notable, talk less of permanent, feature of the pre-

colonial economy the Ngas people. Their hill fastnesses were fertile and well cultivated. Their soils were usually maintained by techniques of rotational bush-fallowing, intensive agriculture and terracing. And they had cattle, sheep, goats and poultry. The moral economy of the peasant was practised as a check against any biting state of lack, the existence of inequality not withstanding. We also found that far from emerging from a former state of slavery, it was indeed British colonialism that ventured to enslave them, especially the peasants in the rural areas, during the period under review in this study. The combination of colonial invasions, taxation and a reign of terror which involved the abduction, confiscation and wanton destruction of lives and property, broke the independent spirit of the people, and compelled them to occupy the status of the colonised and exploited. To agree with Walter Rodney, they were largely turned into "objects of history" by colonialism, and so they functioned like the chattel slaves, who could be pushed and moved into any direction at any time, by their owners.[33]

In adopting a contrary position, or as a counter-hypothesis, we suggested in chapter one that the roots of rural poverty in Yil Ngas might be traced back to the colonial period of their history. And surely, after due analysis of our sources, we have demonstrated by way of this study that the roots of rural poverty in Yil Ngas, which is still a prevalent reality, were basically colonially determined. Colonialism created rural poverty in Yil Ngas - destroying the self-sufficiency of the peasant, it forced him into the wage-labour and petty-commodity markets, into where very low wages and prices were zoned and pegged. Ngas peasants were transformed into a dependent and impoverished peasantry.

Their experience however was not particularly unique within Plateau Province because the general and "dominant feature of the colonial experience on the Plateau and in the lowlands was *immobilisme* and the juxtaposition of rural poverty and expatriated mineral wealth."[34] 'Immobilisme' not in the sense of immobility, but of things not working as they were supposed to be, the high mobility in transformed Ngas society not withstanding. As a result, the form of rural poverty that was created in Yil Ngas seemed to have possessed peculiar features of its own. In comparison to what was created in Jos Division, particularly in Birom land, rural poverty in Yil Ngas was more relative than absolute in character, whereas in Birom land, it was more absolute than relative in character. The peasantry in many parts of Jos Division were separated from the means of production, especially land, through mining,[35] and that, in comparison did not significantly occur in Yil Ngas. And then in contrast to what obtained in the lowlands, rural poverty in Yil Ngas must definitely have been severer. The lowlands were, to an extent, a place of refuge into which a chunk of Ngas emigrants fled. Their work-force was not drained into the Minesfiled as much as that of Yil Ngas generally, and especially in the 1940s (as shown in chapter five). Therefore rural poverty in the lowlands must have been purely relative in character.

It has been shown that the terrible and biting conditions of the absolute poverty which confronted the Birom peasants in the 1940s, constrained their elites to form the Birom Progressive Union in 1945 to secure just compensation for mining leases, resist further evacuation of peasant villages for opening up of new mining sites and challenge Hausa domination of Jos NA, and later participate in the nationalist ferments of the early 1950s.[36] That was a progressive response, indeed. In

the lowlands, or Shendam Division where the NA's base was Shendam Town, it seems that the Tarok elites of Langtang were either sidelined or dissatisfied enough, to form the Yergam Union in the early 1950s, to partake in the nationalist ferments that were then emerging in the Middle Belt area of the colony.[37] In Pankshin Division, which stood between Jos and Shendam Divisions, it seems there was only David Lot, a Mwaghavul pastor, who rose to the occasion of politics, and became the first president of the 1951 formed Middle Zone League.[38] Ngas elites were apparently too engrossed with maintaining their privileged positions in Pankshin NA, as Chief Scribe, Native Treasurer, District Scribes, Clerks and so on, and failed to respond to the impoverishment of their villages and peasants via establishing a political organisation. They were not any less educated than their Birom and Yergam [Tarok] counterparts, but were certainly not as sidelined as the Birom and probably Yergam [Tarok] elites in the running of their NA machinery between 1920 and 1945. Neither did they form a political body to enable them partake in the nationalist ferments as a (Ngas) people. The passivity of educated Ngas elites in the early 1950s, to national developments, was probably an index of their long period of responding to poverty by struggling to participate in the colonial system of oppression and exploitation, locally at Pankshin NA level.

Finally, we must maintain that the much talk about taking development to the rural areas of Yil Ngas by government bodies, NGO's and the Ngas educated elites today, (as we are hoping that someday, such talk would be accompanied by relevant practical steps) would not bring any significant change(s) to the prevailing conditions of rural poverty, unless the analysis of the roots of their underdevelopment and

poverty is done and the overtime responses of both elites and peasants are known, to serve as a basis for selecting future strategies and course(s) of action. This study was intended to be a humble contribution in influencing necessary action in that direction.

Notes

1. Through 'analysis' political economy lays out the subject under investigation into component parts and studies them separately, but thereafter it determines their places as mere aspects of a single whole, which is what 'synthesis' is all about. See M. N. Ryndina and G. P. Chernikov, op.cit. p.17.
2. Charles Gonyok holds the same view of relations between "Plains Angass" and Bauchi Emirate on the eve of colonial domination. Op.cit, pp. 27-28.
3. Martin Chanock says in a similar analysis of Central Africa: "In the earlier literature there was an assumption that underdevelopment and rural poverty were a natural part of the 'subsistence' world which pre-dated colonialism, and that colonialism itself... created additional wealth by increasing the flow of cash ...into the rural areas. Later analyses ...have stressed the ways in which colonialism created rural poverty - destroying the self-sufficient peasantry and forcing them into the labour market," in his "Agricultural Change and Continuity in Malawi," in "Palmer and Parsons", op.cit p.398. This study belongs by typology to the later analyses, which he mentions.
4. It was mentioned with reference to Dok Pai and Plains Angass areas by Molyneux and Edwardes, respectively, in 1914. See chapter three.
5. Hitherto, only Europeans including the missionaries at Tuwan must have been exempt. The Hausa settlers of Dawaki, Cika and Langshi were, to all intents and purposes, farmers rather than traders up to the 1920s.
6. Unlike the usual practice of corves labour, the peasants were required to still pay their taxes apart from giving their labour.
7. Ngas peasants had a song that said that: "while Mandiko, the African evangelist, rings the bell for us to worship God. Pappur, the road headman, comes up to say that we should go down and build high and wide roads." Charles Gonyok, op.cit, p.59.
8. For further comprehension of the effects of the Great Depression on African colonies, see: Claude Ake, op.cit, pp.69-71.
9. In a correspondence with district heads on the matter, it was shone by a D.O. that very small quantities of seed groundnuts were requested by most districts, except in Garram, Tal and Chip. In one district, the head said it was not usually productive (period) - but it was feared to be the source of a certain disease (details to be given later).
10. They reported the damage, not the famine. Details of the sufferings of the victims were given by an informant. See chapter five.
11. From the point of view of analysing only the colonial administration of Yil Ngas. Wambutda states: "The administration of Williams [in the early 1930s] was the peak of colonial administration; for not much changed after that!" and went ahead to acknowledge the 1952 reorganisation of Pankshin NA which led eventually to the selection of the first Ngolong Ngas, as the "only significant event worth mentioning" with regard to the period following 1935 which he christens as "Modern Times". In the first place, William's period was before Noad and Goble's periods during which the administrative reforms based on Mathews Report were made. Secondly, it is superficial to assess the course of colonial administration only from the angle of political reorganisations. Colonialism was not only a system of 'political rule' but also of total but especially 'economic domination' and as such its features should be assessed from both angles. Wambutda, op.cit, pp.48-50.
12. Bill Freund, op.cit, p.136.
13. Ibid, p.137
14. Penelope Bowler, op.cit, p.25
15. Isichei, op.cit, p.269: gives the figure of 70,800 forced labourers.

16. These were Kamwai, Tof, Ron, Daffo-Monguna, Richa and (probably) Butura Districts which roughly occupied a big part of the area of the present Bokkos LGA of Plateau State.
17. This kind of doing a synthesis also obtains in: Jay Mandle, *The Roots of Black Poverty: The Southern Plantation Economy After the Civil War,* (Duke University Press, Durham N.C., 1978), pp.105116.
18. For instance, Jid'mma of Pang and Mutkai of Ntal.
19. For instance, Langkuk of Pang ch en and Fodgwim of Ntal.
20. For instance, Wuseli people in 1904.
21. For example, Yilb'ssa of Bal'ng Ka'leb; 'Dlan Gwob' and Yifkobba of Pang, and probably Jash of Pang
22. E.g. Jan Panaki, Tibbin, Gofwan, Walbe etc.
23. As a result, there is hardly a hamlet today without a place, which was formerly used as a market place, at the time, in Yil Ngas.
24. For instance, it was sequel to his retrenchment by SUM that Yohanna Gowon of Lur (father of General Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria's Head of State, 1967-1975) and family, accepted the invitation of Bishop Tugwell of CMS and emigrated to Wusasa in Zaria Province, and retained the job of a pastor, in 1930. See Wambutda, op.cit, pp.163-164.
25. That was the case of Siman Nimcir Wambutda of Lungpye then (later, he returned to Dungung, his hometown) - (father of Professor Daniel Nimcir Wambutda). See: Wambutda, op.cit, p.176.
26. Disturbances occurred in Dok Pai District in 1923 and 1932. In the latter case, after declaring that they would pay tax in that year, the peasants of Tipap and Jok murdered a District Scribe and a native policeman, who might have been viewed as the immediate symbols of their oppression. See: "Pai District-Disturbances in," PANKSHIN-NA 611 (NAK).
27. "Unlike the Birom, the Ngas did not believe in women doing heavy work and he did not send his wife to work on the Minesfiled." Wambutda, op.cit, p.186.
28. This happened in 1947 against Kabwir, Amper, Garram and Pai Districts. See chapter five.
29. This occurred in1949, ibid.
30. This occurred in 1950. Ibid.
31. The other part was constituted by emigrants into lowlands, at the time, most of whom have stayed there permanently.
32. Probably Danfulani of Lankan who was introduced in 1952 by the Chief of Lankan as a "Grain Contractor" was the first indigene in that regard. As it turned out, Danfulani did not have a solid capital base such that he resorted to borrowing money from Pankshin NA, frequently, before supplying them with corn between 1952 and 1954 See "Corn Supply of (Vol. 11)", op. cit.
33. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,* (Howard University Press, Washington DC, 1982), p.230.
34. Isichei, op.cit, p.276
35. Dan'Azumi Bukar, op.cit, pp.260-262
36. Ibid, and Isichei, op.cit, pp.274-275
37. Isichei, ibid.
38. Ibid.

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2. Golkong Tungchamma, c.80, farmer, interviewed at Dungung on 29th Dec. 1986.
3. Henry Gofwan, c.95, former colonial worker and district scribe, interviewed at Mwel on 2nd January 1987.
4. Irmiya Chorching, c.100, farmer and local medicine man, interviewed at Mwel on 2nd January 1987.
5. Deshi Barde, c.90, farmer, interviewed at Dungung on 29th Dec.1986.
6. Ankob Barde, c.85, farmer, interviewed at Dungung on 29th Dec. 1986.

7. Yildimma Ipshak, c.65, village-head of Dyiskep and farmer, interviewed at Dyiskep on 13th Jan., 1987.

8. Tokzakk'a Jingpinna, c.70, village head of Vel, and farmer, interviewed on 12th January 1987 at Vel.

9. John Kwashi, c.75, former civil servant, interviewed at Pankshin on 12th January 1987.

10. Na'omi Nelit Barde, c.70, farmer, interviewed at Lungpye on 26th Dec. 1986.

11. Tapar Dape, c.47, District Head, Amper District, interviewed on 12th April 1995 at Amper.

12. David Boji, c.51, Village Head of Se ri, interviewed at Seri on 13th April, 1995.

13. Musa Gowok, c.65, Fanner, trader, and evangelist, interviewed on 12th April, 1995 at Amper.

14. Daniel Wutani, c. 60, fanner, interviewed at Amper on 12th April, 1995.

15. Goma Merkuk, c.65, Village Head of Sh'wer, interviewed at Sh'wer on 13th April, 1995.

16. Nenkangmwa, c.65, Maran or Queen of Sh'wer, interviewed at Sh'wer on 15th April 1995.