

**THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESSURES ON  
NIGERIA'S DEMOCRATIZATION  
PROCESS: 1995-1998**

**BY**

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
## DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Lord Almighty, who made it possible for me to overcome all the forces of darkness to the successful completion of the course. Also to the memory of late Mr. Ohwe James Agbodoroba, who slept in the Lord in May 18, 1996.

I will forever be grateful to you for your love and the financial contribution you made towards my education. May your soul rest in perfect peace in the Lord. Amen.

## DECLARATION

I am declaring to the best of my ability that this thesis has been conceived and delivered by myself. It has never been a previous research work. All used works have been adequately acknowledged by proper referencing.



**ETABUKO, ESOSUAKPO EMMANUEL**

CERTIFICATION

This thesis entitled FOREIGN PRESSURES ON NIGERIA'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS (1995-1998) by Etabuko Esosuakpo Emmanuel, meets the regulations government the award of the Degree of Master of Science of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for its contribution in knowledge and literary presentation.

  
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## ABSTRACT

The study's main thrust was the analysis of the impact of the limited economic sanctions imposed against Nigeria because of the obnoxious policies of the Abacha military government. In addition, the study found out who really suffer the impact of sanctions. It is the ordinary people and not the military top brass and their civilian collaborators who made up the ruling class in Nigeria.

Secondary source materials were used. The materials included textbooks on economic sanctions imposed against other countries. Moreover, the Nigerian government publications on the imposition of economic sanctions against the country were used. In addition, local and international dailies and magazines that featured articles that had bearing on economic sanctions against Nigeria, were equally used. Also used were graduate theses on economic sanctions, published and unpublished seminal papers and academic journals. These were subjected to systematic content analysis.

In fact, the imposition of limited economic sanctions against Nigeria by the European Union, the Commonwealth and the United States of America failed. The sanctions failed because Nigeria's crude oil was not embargoed. A sector that brought 70% to 80% of foreign earnings to the government coffers.

The failure of the sanctioning states to sacrifice their economic interest was a major factor in the failure of the sanctions. Moreover, the unwillingness of the sanctioning states to freeze assets of top Nigerian military officers and their civilian collaborators in foreign land was another reason why the sanctions failed.

All countries in the world and most importantly, countries that are regional powers should encourage others to abide by implementing economic sanctions so imposed against an aggressive state. The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council should not use their veto power to render ineffective economic sanctions against an aggressive state.



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# CHAPTER ONE

## RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY

### 1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

The Nigerian civil population is known to be non-restive with military regimes. In view of this, military governments always announce their exit date with a transition timetable as they are assuming power.

It was no news therefore, when General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida on 27 August 1985 toppled the military government of General Muhammadu Buhari. After a short while. Babangida put up an elaborate transition timetable to civil rule. The transition programme looked so genuine so much so that military critics were deceived as to the logical conclusion of the transition programme.

The deceit was orchestrated to having Babangida transmuting to a civilian president, however he failed. He became confused and frustrated. The last phase of his transition programme was coming to an end. The presidential election results were being announced from all over the states of the federation. However Babangida was caught up in his own scheme, since he could not return himself as planned he went on to annul the presidential election of June 12, 1993 which was presumably won by Mashood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola. The public out cry against the annulment and the political pandemonium that followed the cancellation

left Babangida with no choice but to put in place the Interim National Government (ING). which apparently save the country from the political chaos that the country was heading with the attendant balkanization of the federating units of Nigeria.

The Interim National Government was headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan and if it has as its secretary General Sani Abacha. The I.N.G was to midwife the country to democratic governmence. The Interim National Government headed by Shonekan was toppled by General Sani Abacha on 27 August 1993. The coming of General Abacha into power was vehemently opposed at home and abroad by countries like Britain. U.S. Canada and others; which felt Nigeria needed a solid democratic foundation and not another military regime. The opposition against the Abacha government was due to the yearnings of the people who wanted democracy and therefore looking forward to seeing the truncated Babangida transition to be brought to its logical conclusion by announcing the remaining result and swear in the winner as Nigerian civilian president.

Political events in Nigeria took dramatic turn as Abiola; the presumed winner of the presidential election declared himself the president of the republic of Nigeria. He was arrested and detained by Abacha. Abiola's arrest and detention was condemned by all lovers and followers of democracy both at home and abroad. While Abacha was battling with what to do to placate the US. Britain and Canada on the one hand, and the Commonwealth on the other hand, another ominous sign of doom for his government reared its head from Ogoni land in the Niger Delta; where Ken Saro-Wiwa an environmentalist and a great crusader for a better deal for

his Ogoni people, where 54% of Nigeria's crude oil comes from has being arrested together with eight others on trumped up charges of conspiracy and murder of four Ogoni chiefs. Ken Saro-Wiwa and his kinsmen were tried by a military tribunal. they were found guilty and therefore sentenced to death by hanging. With the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his compatriots. Abacha has bitten more than he could chew. The imprisonment of Abiola and the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa gave Britain, U.S. Canada and the Commonwealth the opportunity to impose limited economic sanctions against Nigeria. The sanctions encompassed economic, diplomatic and military. These sanctions should be seen as foreign pressures on the Abacha's government to democratise and the administration to respect and improve on human rights condition in Nigeria.

#### **Economic Sanctions**

- i. Intensed campaign for de-investments of major United States and Western European companies and discouragement of new investment,
- ii. Withdrawal and denial of new loan facilities by the Bretton Woods financial institutions, i.e. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank,
- iii. N2 billion meant for the Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd (NITEL) to cover maintenance, training and research programmes.

- iv. The U.S.. assistance to the ministry of Health which amounted to \$11 million every year and SI 50 million to treat AIDS/HIV related case were suspended.
- v. The European Union Educational Assisted programmes in Nigeria that was granted N128 million and awaiting the approval of another N14.4 million to Nigerian Universities and Research Institutes were put on the hold,
- vi. N7billion oil palm belt development programme in Akwa Ibom. Imo and Rivers states,
- vii. N3.6 billion Northeast arid zone development programme alongside the Manbilla tea irrigation scheme,
- viii. N1.8 billion Oban Hills conservation programme,
- ix. N218 million for National Planning Commission.

#### **Military Sanctions**

- i. The withdrawal of military personnel from our military training establishment, particularly the Nigerian War College at Abuja.
- ii. The suspension of all existing agreement on military equipments and weapons procurement. Stopping the sales of new military hardwares and the maintenance of existing ones,
- iii. The severance of all military training programmes and personnel exchange agreement.

## **Diplomatic Sanctions**

- i. The suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth of Nations.
- ii. Denial of visas to all government officials both military and civilians alike and their dependents to major western European countries and the United States.

### **1.2 THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

The research problem is "the impact of foreign pressure on Nigerian democratisation process". Can the foreign pressure exact an impact that can change the military- government to genuinely democratise. However it is pertinent to clarify the major concepts used in the research problematic.

## **1.3 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION**

### **Impact**

As used in this work means, the effects, ostricisation and the pains suffered by the military government and the peoples of Nigeria as a result of the imposition of economic sanctions against the country from 1993- 1998.

The impact of the sanctions made the government to carry out extensive image laundering in the United States and Britain, the aims of these campaigns were to swing public opinion of these countries to favour the military government of Nigeria. On the economic level, our refineries were grounded and the military government resulted to buying petroleum product from other countries. The

breakdown of the refineries were due to lack of parts that were to be imported from the sanctioning states.

#### **Foreign Pressure**

Means the concentrated efforts of States, such as Britain, the U.S. Canada. South Africa and the Commonwealth of Nations as an international organisation that participated in the sanctions regime against Nigeria, to compel the military government to democratise.

#### **Democratisation**

As used in this work means a movement or transition from military regime to democratic government: where elective principles, merit, forthrightness and transparency are the watch words for those aspiring to get political offices.

#### **1.4 PROPOSITIONS**

1. The imposition of economic sanctions will make the military government to be recalcitrant since there is no embargo on Nigeria's crude oil.
2. The Nigerian military government still has a room for political manoeuvres because of disagreement among the sanctioning states on concrete steps to be taken against Nigeria.
3. It is the ordinary people, who will suffer the crumpling effect *of* the economic sanctions and not the ruling class.



## **1.5 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

It is the primary duty' of social scientists to analyse the socio-economic and political problems that emanate from unsound government policies of their countries. In view of this, the study's main thrust is to analyse the impact of the limited economic sanctions imposed against Nigeria because of the obnoxious policy of the military government: under General Sani Abacha.

In addition, the study found out who really suffer the impact of the sanctions, it was the ordinary people and not the military top brass and their civilian collaborators who made up the ruling class. In the course of the research, it was noted that sanctions do more harm to those that were supposed to be helped than those who were to be removed from office or changed their official position, it is pertinent therefore to call for a new way of applying sanctions that will frustrate the ruling class to change their ways than to suffer and subject the ordinary people to untold hardship.

## **1.6 THE RATIONALE AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY**

For every research topic picked by the student, it must have a bearing on societal problems and the solutions proffered should be seen as contributions to the body of scientific knowledge that will help solve similar problems in the future. It is with this understanding that the topic "The impact of foreign pressure on Nigeria's democratisation" process was chosen. It is the thinking of the sanctioning states, that

the imposition of mandated economic sanctions serve the dual purpose of punishing and at the same time forcing the targeted state to conform to the standard behaviour of civilised states.

But what has been left unnoticed (or noticed) and action has not been expedited on it. was the question of who pays the ultimate price of sanctions. If it is not the ruling class then imposition of sanctions are unjustifiable. In this vein, something needed to be done, so that appropriate punishment can be apportioned to the defaulter.

It is this mind-boggling question of sanctions regime that suffer the ordinary people, and how best to protect the interest of the ordinary peoples of targeted states, that this study will immensely contribute to knowledge.

## **1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS**

The study covered the period 1992. which was the last year of General Babangida government to 1998. As a matter of fact, the study was restricted to the transition programme, the arrest and imprisonment of pro-democracy activists and the impact of the economic sanctions imposed against the military government: of Nigeria under the Abacha regime. I was restricted by finance to travel to Abuja and Lagos particularly, to ministries of Internal Affairs. External. Trade and industry, the last but not the least the Central Bank of Nigeria.

However. I laid my hands on materials that were related to my topic from the library. Though these corpus of information cannot be compared to the

additional information that I would have gathered from interviewing personalities who were involved in the administration of the country at its hours of darkness.

## **1.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The theory chosen to analyse and explain this work is the **LINKAGE THEORY**. The world today is like a global village and no nation is entirely on its own. Whatever happens in one country in terms of threats by the government to its citizens is also a threat to the world as a whole.

This is so because, there are many activities that joined all countries of the world together. The links consist of trade, cultural, military and scientific co-operation. In a succinct international legal language, this co-operation is known as bilateral and multilateral agreements. Bilateral agreement involves two countries while multilateral involves more than two countries.

With these web-like links nations of the world come closer to maintaining the cordial relationships and avert any thing that may spell dislocation for the system. However, if there happens to be a problem in any part of the world that may threaten world peace either by internal crisis in a country, like what happened in Nigeria (the arrest and imprisonment of Abiola the presumed winner of the 1993 June presidential election and the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others) or by external aggression like the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The intervention of external forces to maintain peace in trouble spots of the world either direct or

indirect can not be over emphasised. In Kuwait, it was direct military intervention under the auspices of the U.N that flushed out the Iraqi army of occupation.

We have equally seen the political upheaval in Nigeria that has made individual states to condemn the policies of Abacha's government. He was condemned for hanging Ken Saro-Wiwa and the incarceration of Abiola. the resultant reactions from countries like Britain, U.S. South Africa and Canada were the imposition of limited economic sanctions against Nigeria.

In consonance with this line of thought among world opinion leaders in maintaining international peace and world order, one is left with little or no option but to use the linkage politics theory. This theory emphasises the common links that countries shared particularly the attendant cross-boundary policy reactions. This theory therefore is the adopted theoretical framework for the work. Rosenau, defines linkage politics theory as any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another (Rosenau 1969: p. 6) the major concepts used by Rosenau were: Output and Input. Output is the initial stage of linkage while input is the terminal stage. Policy outputs are therefore defined as those sequences of behaviour that originate within a polity and either culminate in or are sustained by its environment. Environmental inputs are considered to be those behavioural sequences in the external environment to which the polity outputs give rise. Similarly, environmental outputs are those sequences of behaviour that start in the external environment of polity and are either sustained or terminated within the polity: whereas polity inputs are those behavioural sequences within a polity to

which environmental outputs give rise. Meanwhile, there are three types of linkages: they are the Penetrative, Reactive and Emulative.

#### **A Penetrative Linkage**

This process occurs when members of one polity serves as participant in the process of another. That is, they share with those in the penetrative polity the authority to allocate its values. For instance, the activities of occupation army, the representative of private corporation like Shell the multinational oil giant operating in Nigeria and foreign aid missions in other countries.

#### **The Reactive Linkage**

It occurs when a recurrent reaction has similar boundary crossing reactions. The actors who initiate the output do not participate in the allocative activities of those who experience the input, but the behaviour of the latter is nevertheless a response to behaviour undertaken by the former.

Such reactive processes are probably the most frequent form of linkage since they arise out of joining both the direct and indirect outputs to their corresponding inputs.

The third type of linkage process is a special form of the reactive type:

### **An Emulative**

Process is established when the input is not only a response to the output but takes essentially the same form as output. It corresponds to the so-called diffusion or demonstration effect whereby political activities in one country are perceived and emulated in another. E.g. coup d' etat in West African countries in the 70's (Rosenau 1969: pp. 45-47). As a matter of fact, out of the three linkages identified by Rosenau, the reactive linkage is the one that best fit into the research topic " the impact of foreign pressures on Nigeria's democratisation process". In this vein it must be illustrated how the national - international linkage fit into the work we are looking at.

The two-term model is used here to explain the linkage, i.e. the inner and the outer. The inner linkage is made up of groups that are either in support of the Abacha administration or against it. For the groups in support, we have the committee of Elders headed by J.T Useni and Youths Earnestly Ask for Abacha among others. For the anti-government groups are the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO). Civil Liberty Organisations to mention but a few. These groups had links with the government and the general populace.

These two groups are representing two interest groups entirely, while the pro-government groups are for the maintenance of the status quo. the anti-government groups are for a change of the baton. The pro-government groups are given the necessary support by government to sway public opinion to its favour

while the opposing group, will be pointing out. to the public why the status quo has to be changed. Which ever group the public tilt towards has won the day.

Meanwhile, the outer linkage is in two dimensions, the first dimension has to do with the anti-government groups, whose organisations were affiliated to international organisations. For instance, the Nigerian international base organisations such as CLO and others field reports of what government is doing to their foreign based for international consumption. This action was taken for one purpose, and that was to ginger the international community to support their course to the bringing down of the government through any democratic means deemed possible. Such foreign base organisations are Amnesty International and Human Watch International to mention but a few.

The anti-government groups succeeded in their campaign against the government brutality towards the opposition group, for they were proved right by the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others. The other dimension of outer linkage is the government to government communication channel. For instance, when Abacha arrested and detained Abiola. the South African president. Nelson Mandela sent his deputy and Bishop Desmond Tutu to Abacha on the need to respect the verdict of the Nigerian Peoples and to allow democracy to reign. Other world leaders like Bill Clinton of the United States and John Major of Britain equally pleaded with Abacha to set Abiola free: so that a government of national consensus can be formed to move the nation forward. (African Today Magazine: 1993: p. 16)

However, the summit of the Head of States of the Commonwealth of Nations which was holding in Auckland. New Zealand called on Abacha to spare the life of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others they appeal to the government to retry them in an open court and not the Kangaroo military tribunals that had sent many to jail without proper recourse to rule of law. General Abacha defied the advice of the commonwealth head of states and went on to hang them. The Head of States, who were attending the summit unanimously, agreed to impose limited economic sanctions against Nigeria.

The linkage politics theory is chosen for this work because of its National - International linkage that strongly emphasis the reactive response from other countries like U.S. Britain. Germany. Canada, and host of others against the Abacha regime as a result of its obnoxious policies and its repressive laws on the Nigerian State and its citizens.

It was the response of these countries and international organisations like the commonwealth and the European Union that informed the adoption of the linkage politics theory for the work, since the theory talks about relationship between states and how each state respond to the other as a result of its policies.

## **1.9 METHODOLOGY**

Qualitative content analysis was adopted in conducting this research. The source comprise of secondary source materials. These would comprises of text books on economic sanctions imposed against other countries. Nigerian government



publications pertaining to the sanctions since its imposition, local and international dailies and magazines that had been written on the impact *of* the limited economic sanctions on Nigeria.

Graduate theses on sanctions, published and unpublished seminal papers and academic journals that had touched on sanctions. This information had been presented in such a way that the successes of sanctions regime as non-coercive means of achieving political aim can be appraised in the Nigerian case.

#### **1.10 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS**

The impact of foreign pressures on Nigeria democratisation process from 1995 to 1998 consists of five chapters. The first chapter takes a critical look at the historio-political scenario of the Nigerian State from 1985 to 1998 under the rule of the military and their systematic decapitation of the Nigerian State and the plummeting of the state into a pariah one in the international system.

It is this state of ostracism that informs the theme of the thesis and at the same time a researchable problem worth looking into. The pressures on the military government to democratise came from the west and when the military government started to democratise, the exercise was characterised by gross human rights abuse, annulment *of* the 1993 presidential election and the Snail pace speed of the Abacha's transition programme led to imposition of limited economic sanctions against Nigeria by the west.

While the political scenario of Nigeria as of this period depicted power tussle between the military elite and the political elite, there is the international dimension i.e. the west which is equally interested in the development of democracy in Nigeria. With this dimension the Nigeria's situation became a cross border issue because of the involvement of western Europe. Therefore the theoretical framework chosen to explain this work is the linkage politics theory. This theory clearly shows the cross - frontiers influences that states have on each other in the international and national political systems.

The next chapter focuses on foreign pressures focuses on other countries, particularly the imposition and the implementation of sanctions as non-coercive means of changing other countries obnoxious policies either against their own people or against other countries. The success and failure of sanctions imposition on countries before Nigeria, and the improvement of sanctions application therefore became the major preoccupation of chapter two. otherwise known as literature review.

In this chapter, arguments were advanced for the use of economic sanctions and definitions were preferred for economic sanctions too. Some of the countries mentioned, as been sanctioned states were South Africa. Rhodesia. Libya, and Nigeria, equally mentioned too were Italy and the Dominican Republic, last but not the least Iraq. The chapter also stated the countries and the organisation that had the powers to imposed and administered economic sanctions and when and how to end the economic sanctions so imposed.

In chapter three, the focus was on 1985 to 1993. which conspicuously dealt with the Babangida's administration and the heat exacted by the west on his regime through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on the need to democratise, or there will be no loan facilities for his regime from the World Bank and the I.M.F. The west has equally made it known to the third world countries, that their scarce aid resources will go to countries that have democratised.

The economic and political policies of Babangida's administration were tailored to achieve the single purpose of democratising the economy and politics of the Nigerian State. The end results of these exercises were abysmal failure and the worldwide condemnation that followed the 1993 presidential election annulment.

Chapter four dwell on the ashes of the Babangida's political transition inferno and Abacha sprung up to build on its ashes. History open two doors for Abacha either to make it or mar the opportunity set before him. When Abacha chose to mar it. foreign pressures intensified and local oppositions formed blocs to deal with the dark forces of the political monster that was tearing the Nigerian State assunder.

The chapter also looks at the success and failures of the limited economic sanctions against the Abacha's regime. How was the -egime able to withstand the economic sanctions of the west and the way it carried out its transition programme was also included in this chapter.

Chapter five has in it summary, conclusion and recommendations from the previous chapters.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **FOREIGN PRESSURES AND DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN NIGERIA**

#### **A REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

The texts and materials that were reviewed for this work were materials on sanctions. Many scholars from different perspectives have defined sanctions. In doing so, the term non-destructive coercion has been largely employed for descriptive convenience. Non-destructive coercion means the utilisation of coercive techniques by a sanctioning state or states with the intent to alter the sanctioned state's behaviour while simultaneously maintaining the state as a viable political system (Lloyd 1975:5). Consequently, sanctions were viewed as a broad spectrum ranging in degrees of intensity from soft techniques such as diplomatic and political actions through economic and financial manipulations and ending with hard techniques such as physical threats and limited use of precisely defined force.

Sanctions are therefore: penalties inflicted upon one or more states by one or more others, generally to coerce the target nation(s) to comply with certain actions or conditions. Hence sanctions are conceived essentially as the imposition of economic, political or other penalties to bring about a change in the political behaviour of a country against which they are directed. It is to make the targeted nation(s) comply with certain norms the opposing party or parties deem appropriate.

some scholars believe that the primary-, aim and benefit that sanctions can offer -' could be measured by the degree to which the target country's behaviour changes as a result of these restrictions. Sanctions had been applied by nation(s) either individually or collectively against an adversary or a recalcitrant state. Most often this has been achieved through institutionalised bodies like the United Nations (UN). The Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Organisation of American States (OAS) and the ARAB League. In view of this assertion, the UN sanctions against Rhodesia were carried out under the sponsorship of Britain as the administering country.

Hoffman (1962: pp. 11-13) in his empirical analysis of the Rhodesian sanctions which were sponsored by Britain at the UN, were made possible because of reactions in other part of the world. The reactions were mainly directed at Britain as the administering country. Therefore, it had the single honour to sponsor the sanctions; otherwise, it should be seen as supporting the white minority illegal unilateral declaration of Independence by Ian Smith in 1965.

Another work on the Rhodesia case and the UN Sanctions was that of Kapungu L.T (1971:130-140). He maintained that the failure of Britain to sponsor sanctions against the Ian Smith UDI at the beginning of the declaration afforded the illegal regime an ample opportunity to put in place measures that were to assuage the impact of the sanctions. He also made a case against South Africa and Mozambique under Portuguese control, which supported the Smith regime to evade the economic sanctions by making available their ports, railways facilities in

supplying petroleum and petrochemical products to Rhodesia. South Africa took a step further in packaging Rhodesian tobacco, sugar and solid minerals in the name of South African companies to market in Europe and America. FCapungu. therefore. , • concluded that for economic sanctions to have the desired effect, it have to be quick and must be enforced by all countries, particularly those that share a common boundary by the sanctioned state on the one hand and the major trading partners on the other hand.

Still on Rhodesia John Lloyd (1975:272) believed that the application of sanctions against Rhodesia was not an easy decision by the British government. For one. there was a popular support for Ian Smith UDI by the British People, who sees the white minority in Rhodesia as their kith and kin. The reaction to the UDI was so strong among African countries that, they called upon Britain to crush the Ian Smith rebellion in Rhodesia or else, they will severe relations both economic and diplomatic ties with Britain. There was a worldwide condemnation of the Smith unilateral declaration of independence. Britain as the administering country, had to seek for UN resolutions to combat the threat to international peace by the Smith illegal government.

In response to this, the UN Security Council on December 3-4. 1966 subsequently passed resolutions 217.221 and 223 to impose voluntary, mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against Rhodesia. By 1968. the UN sanctions imposed against Rhodesia were fully in place. The sanctions regime against Rhodesia was. violated by countries like Japan. Germany. U.S. Portugal and South Africa.

Multinational corporations like Mobil, Esso and Shell B.P with their subsidiaries in South Africa flouted the oil sanctions.

This made the British government to embark on diplomatic shuttle in talking to the U.S. Japan and Germany to comply with the UN resolutions by enforcing the sanctions. The British move paid off when U.S. Japan and Germany agreed to enforce the sanctions. By 1969, the sanctions were having effect on the Rhodesian economy. This forced Ian Smith to negotiate for peaceful settlement. However, the peace talk failed because Britain insisted on universal adult suffrage for the majority black Rhodesian.

The failure of the Rhodesian peace talk made John Hughes, the president of the Rhodesian Associated Chambers of Commerce' to warn the government of increased unemployment, less credit for farmers if peaceful settlement of the crisis was not reached on time. (Lloyd 1975:329) these were indications that the regime was feeling the impact of the sanctions. While the sanctions could not be said to have failed were due to the fact that, the continued existence of the UN sanctions and the periodic review of the sanctions by the UN implementation committee were essential in reminding the white minority Rhodesians that their state was a pariah one. In one manner or another, the official UN sanctions would continue to embarrass states that maintain trade relations with Rhodesia either directly or through South Africa or Mozambique. (Lloyd 1975:342)

Another country in Africa that has tasted sanctions regime under the auspices of UN was Libya. Sanctions that were imposed against Libya were as a

result of Libya's failure to comply with the UN Security Council's resolutions 731 and 748: for the two Libyan security agents. They were implicated in the 1988 Pan Am Plane bombing at Lockerbie Scotland. All the passengers on board were killed. The sanctions included the freezing of Libyan funds and financial resources held in Europe and the United States (Time 1991: 16-17).

Moreover, there were embargoes on airlines to Libya, severance of diplomatic relations and sale of arms. When these sanctions were not working, the UN then expanded the sanctions to include the supply of equipment's used in oil and gas industry and the transportation sector of the Libyan economy. The impact of the economic sanctions could not be ignored by the government. It was so strong that the government has to forcefully eject African residents from his country. Gaddafi, the Libyan leader, has agreed to submit the two Libyans in question to the UN so that they could be tried in European country under Scottish laws, but not in Scotland as it was demanded by the British and the American governments. (Time 1999:6-8).

One of the oldest sanctions to be applied by international organisations was that of the League of Nations against Italy. In 1936 Italy invaded and captured Ethiopia for two purposes, one was the revenged defeat of Italy in the hands of the Ethiopian at the 1857 Adowa battle and secondly to have colony in Africa. The Italian action was seen by the league as an act of aggression. The league opted for diplomacy in settling the crisis without the application of sanctions. (Lloyd



1975:109). When diplomatic means of resolving the Ethiopian- Italian crisis failed, the league had to invoke article 16 of its charter.

Article 16 of the charter was imposition of sanctions against any member that embarked on aggressive pursuit against Member State. On June 30, 1936: the league sanctions against Italy were comprehensively in place. One of the areas targeted was the Italian economy. There were embargoes on Italian goods and any financial transactions were ceased forthwith.

Furthermore, the league called on its members to put into effect the sanctions imposed against Italy. Herbert Feis remarked on the sanctions against Italy thus:

The sanctions that were put into force did not seriously interfere with the Italian conquest of Ethiopia nor deeply disturb its economic life. They were either universal, extensive nor prolong enough to do so (Lloyd 1975:109).

The sanctions against Italy failed because the major powers, Britain and France did not put their weight behind the sanctions, infact the governments of these nations did allow the shipment of men and ammunition through the Suez Canal with which the war against Ethiopia was persecuted. The failure of the sanctions imposed against Italy were partly due to the austerity measures put in place by the Muslim's fascist regime because *of* the world economic depression. Secondly, Italian economy was quite stable: its agricultural sector was doing well too. Besides, the manufacturing and service sectors were equally booming. It could be said that Italy- had the potentials to withstand the sanctions (Lloyd 1975:113).

With respect to Cuba, sanctions have virtually become part of their daily affairs. Anna Schreiber's analysis of the U.S sponsored sanctions against Cuba, argues that the agreement on the part of members of the Organization of American States to stop trading with Cuba, was mere symbolic form of co-operation with the U.S than an effective way of injuring Cuba. (George Obiozor 1996:3-4).

Sanctions were also imposed against Trujillo's government by the Organization of American States. Trujillo. was a Dominican Republic president. He was accused of eliminating his political opponents and he equally sponsored political instability across the Caribbean region (Lloyd: 1975:173-193).

By June 24 1960. Trujillo had sponsored exiled military officers of Venezuela origin in Dominican republic to overthrow the Betancourt government in Venezuela, the planned coup failed. President Trujillo did not stop at the coup attempt on Betancourt. He thereafter organised assassination squad to kill Betancourt. the man who was to detonate the electronic device ended up blowing himself into shreds and the other members of the squad were arrested. With this development, the Venezuela government requested the OAS to investigate the involvement of Trujillo's government in the assassination palaver. On August 21.1960. the OAS unanimously passed resolution 1 of the sixth meeting of consultation of the ministers of foreign affairs to deliberate upon the allegation against Trujillo\*s government. At end of the ministerial meeting the allegation was found to be true: and a resolution was passed (Lloyd, ibid: 252).

Resolution 1 recited the history of Dominican offences against Venezuela, culminating in the attempted June assassination, and concluded that collective action was justified under Article 19 of the OAS charter. The meeting then agreed to apply the following measures:

1. (a) Breaking of diplomatic relations of all member states with Dominican Republic
- (b) Partial interruption of economic relations of all the member-states with the Dominican Republic, beginning with the immediate suspension of trade in arms and implement of war of every kind.
2. To authorise the council of the Organization of American States to discontinue, by two-thirds affirmative vote of its members, the measures adopted in this resolution: at such time as the government of the Dominican Republic should cease to constitute a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere.

In September 1960: the OAS council appointed a special committee to review the effectiveness of Resolution 1 and to make further recommendations as required. In December, the committee reported, and on January 4, 1961 Resolution 1 was expanded to include the following:

- a) Petroleum and petroleum products
- b) Trucks and spare parts.

This complete sanctions scheme remained in force for exactly one year and on January 4th, 1961 the sanctions were removed. The removal of the sanctions was

.. due to the assassination of Trujillo and the promise of the new government to uphold democratic ideals (Lloyd 1975:205).

Perhaps the most widely discussed range of sanctions until recently was the one on South Africa. The policies of racial discrimination and repression in South Africa aroused strong feelings in the Republic itself: in neighbouring countries and in many parts of the world. Economic measures taken against South Africa over her apartheid policies increased significantly in 1985 and 1986. During this period, there were boycotts of South African goods by individuals in foreign markets and de-investment by foreign firms and banks in the Republic (George Obiozor: 1965).

There were equally international campaigns against sporting and cultural ties with South Africa. However, in terms of implementation, there were limited sanctions application by the governments of the United States, the European Union and Japan. Though pressures for more extensive sanctions especially from Africa and many countries in Asia continued to mount on the UN for total and comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. It was in this respect that the UN passed many resolutions on South Africa. The resolutions made it mandatory for all member states to comply. The UN drew on the principles embodied in Articles 51 and 58 of the Charter.

Some of the principles are:

The 1948 universal Declaration of Human Rights.

1965 International covenant on Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination.

1966 International covenant on Civil and political Rights, socio-economic and cultural rights.

And the 1973 international covenant on the suppression and punishment of the crime against Apartheid (George Obiozor 1996:8).

Meanwhile, the Commonwealth of Nations has its own sanctions package for apartheid South Africa as a member state. In 1961. South Africa was expelled from the Commonwealth of Nations because of its racist policies. By 1977. a united action was initiated under Gleneagles Agreement, which called for boycott on sports, trade, investment, financial and arms embargoes (Commonwealth Currents. 1993: 1-2).

The Commonwealth sanctions implementation committee, was not convinced that the sanctions were biting hard on South Africa. By April 1985. the sanctions implementation committee met and signed the Nassau Agreement to force member-states to fully comply with the sanctions application while there would be high level talk between the common wealth and the UN on the need for UN member-states to comply with the UN sanctions too. By 1986. the South African economy has started showing signs of distress.

However, by 1990 the structures of apartheid have been slowly dismantled. First was the freeing of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, then followed the unbanning of political parties like the African National Congress (ANC) and the Peoples Congress (PC).

There were also the receding of emergency media regulations and the ending of restrictions on organisations and individuals. The commonwealth has always made it clear that sanctions were not intended to punish but to persuade the leaders of South Africa to accept the need for genuine change (Commonwealth Currents 1993:4). In a historic announcement after over thirty years of commonwealth opposition to the apartheid regime in South Africa, commonwealth Secretary General; Chief Emeka Anyaoku said the adoption of a legislation establishing a transitional executive council which was to organise the non-racial elections by April 27, 1994, has opened a new chapter in the political history of South Africa. The commonwealth has therefore lifted its sanctions except the arms embargo till a post-apartheid government is firmly established (Commonwealth Currents, 1993: 4).

Audie Klotz (1996:17) highlighted the importance of economic sanctions as non-military tool to achieve non-military end. He maintained that economic sanctions were targeted on key sectors of the South African economy. Its crumbling effect lead to a change of heart of policy makers. He said the success of the economic sanctions against South Africa, though took longer time to achieve, had the desired effect that promoted a norm of racial equality in South Africa. The

persistent international pressures against the South African racist regime both straighten anti-apartheid groups morally and materially, thus added incentive for the ruling National Party to negotiate (Audie K. 1996:19-22). Iraq invasion of Kuwait was not accident of history. Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader and his parliament knew there could be no economic magic that would make Iraq pay its debt to Kuwait and still stand on its feet, after its protracted war with Iran.

The debts were incurred during the Iraqi-Iranian war. The Iraqi authority therefore agreed upon that Kuwait, the richest Sheikhdom in the Gulf region, was after all a former Iraqi territory. It only broke away with the help of the west. The Iraqi authorities agreed therefore to use their military might to annex Kuwait and its rich hydro-carbon deposit to boost Iraq's economy and give it a leverage above all the gulf states. The annexation goes without saying that, the debt owed by Iraq would be automatically cancelled (*Time*. January 7. 1997. p. 18).

With their resolve for success. Iraq's plan to invade and occupy Kuwait was completed, and countdown for invasion is what Iraqi military commanders was waiting for. On August 1. 1990. Iraqi forces over-ran Kuwait and sent the Sheikhdom ruler and his family on exile. The plan to invade Kuwait was orchestrated by the Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein and his insatiable quest for power and his expansionist policy to conquer the whole of the Arab world became the nightmare of his gulf states neighbours and the west, particularly the United States the policeman of the world (*ibid*. p. 18). The whole world has woken up to the reality of Saddam Hussein threat to world peace and the best way to stop him

with minimal casualty and less financial cost was being considered by world leaders. It was no more news of who should start the international build-up to crush Saddam Hussein and his military build-up of mass destruction (ibid. p. 18).

In fact, the Soviet Union was about collapsing and the cold war was fast losing relevance. As Soviet Union has become a lame duck in world politics because it was entangled with politics of disintegration at home. Therefore, the United States, the only formidable remaining power has the onus to assemble the needed international support to free Kuwait and to reduce the military capability of Iraq as a threat to its neighbours in the gulf region and the Middle East in particular.

On August 2, 1990, world leaders and all peace-loving people had called on Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally: so that the two countries can begin intensive negotiations to resolve their differences. This plea fell on Saddam Hussein's deaf ears. The world leaders have no other choice than to consider sanctions and possibly military action.

To achieve this, the world leaders must seek the support of Arab leaders and which country would lead the campaign against Iraq. The United States, undoubtedly, is in a position to lead the world in a new post-cold war order. On August 3, 1990, the US Defence Secretary, Dick Cheney and General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shown satellite photos of Iraqi armoured divisions massing along the Saudi Arabia border as though poised for an assault on the oil fields near Dhahran 280 km away to the Saudi Arabia Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar Ibin Sultan. Prince Bandar called his uncle the king



and assured President Bush that US forces would be welcome in Saudi. Within weeks, it was the Saudis who were calling on the United States to send their troops and use any means possible to kill Saddam Hussein. They were so alarmed by the growing Iraqi threat just over their border this imposing threat of invasion from Iraq, has made the Saudi authority to agree with the U.S. that Iraq must be stopped if would become another Hitler of the Middle East. (*Time*. January 7. 1991: 18).

President Bush recognised that the Saudis would not accept United States troops unless other Arab states, the United Nations and the Soviet Union also support the action package against Iraq. The United States helped to pass a United Nations resolution condemning Iraq within hours of the invasion. Secretary of State. James Baker, who was travelling in the Soviet Union, stood with his counterpart in Moscow and issued a joint declaration demanding Iraq's withdrawal, from Kuwait.

Algeria. Egypt and Morocco publicly condemned Iraq for the invasion. The Arab League in unprecedented show of resolve, followed suit. The coalition needed by the US to launch attack on Iraq had been achieved by the United States (*Time*. January 7. 1991: 18).

The first step in the action package against Iraq was imposition of sanctions. The United Nations (UN) Security Council on 6 of August. 1990 adopted and passed a UN Security Council Resolution 987 on Iraq for invading and occupying Kuwait. The resolution imposed severe economic sanctions to be backed by military force against Iraq. The resolution contain the following:

- (a) Iraq should immediately and unconditionally withdraw its forces from Kuwait for the two countries to begin intensive negotiations to resolve their differences.
- (b) The resolution bans the import of Iraqi and Kuwaiti products except medical supplies and humanitarian food supplies to Iraq and Kuwait.
- (c) It also bar the granting of funds or other financial and economic resources to Iraq and Kuwait by the international community and calls on member-states as well as non-members of the UN to abide by the resolution.
- (d) The resolution calls for measures to be taken to protect the assets of the legitimate government of Kuwait and its agencies and asks member states not to recognise any regime set up by the occupying power.
- (e) The resolution also sets up a committee consisting of all members of the Security Council to monitor the implementation of the resolution (*New Nigerian*. August 8. 1990: 8).

Meanwhile, the United States on August 2. 1990, had begun to move against Iraq. The first step taken by the President was to freeze the assets of Iraq and Kuwait in the US and prohibited trade too. President Bush called on his allies to follow the United States on the assets freeze and to wipe up sentiment for Arabs to condemn Iraq. The mounting storm against Iraq was not just a mere rhetoric. The United Nations has approved a comprehensive trade embargo on Iraq to be backed by force. With this development. Iraq's trading partners that were hard hit. like Turkey. Egypt and Jordan, have to be helped.

In this vein, President Bush persuaded Japan, Germany and wealthy Arab States to provide emergency assistance to these countries. He equally called on Saudi Arabia and Venezuela to pump more oil to make up for the four million bpd daily shortfall resulting from the blockade on Iraqi and Kuwaiti shipments (op cit: 8).

But this whirlwind of diplomacy represented only half of Bush's strategy. The other half is to present Saddam with a stark choice: quit Kuwait or be driven out by military force. To this end, Bush set in motion the largest US military deployment since Vietnam.

It began five days after Saddam's invasion with the dispatch of 210,000 troops to Saudi Arabia, enough to deter an Iraqi onslaught. Since President Bush had vowed to liberate Kuwait, General Colin Powell urged him to deploy a force so massive that if war becomes necessary, it could be fought all out and won quickly, unlike Vietnam. By November Bush had authorised doubling of the US force to 430,000, giving the allies the capacity to go on the offensive if Saddam refused to meet the January 15, 1991 deadline set by the UN for Iraq to quit Kuwait.

Bush also learned a valuable lesson from Jimmy Carter's obsession with the US hostage seized by Iranian students in 1977. Determined not to repeat that mistake, President Bush deliberately downplayed Saddam's holding 20,000 foreign nationals, including 3,000 Americans, some of whom were placed at key military installations as human shields against allied forces attack. Bush repeatedly insisted that he would not be deterred from military action by the hostage' fate. By early

December, his stern stance produced results. Saddam released his captives, apparently convinced that his foreign guests would not forestall an allied offensive and that releasing them might reap a propaganda benefit (ibid. p. 18).

With the January 15 UN deadline only two weeks away, both Saddam and Bush faced fateful decisions. So far, Saddam has shown no real interest in a peaceful withdrawal. Instead, he has reinforced the 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and 350 tanks deployed in Kuwait and Southern Iraq in the days after the invasion with 410,000 more troops and 4,100 tanks. Moreover, with only two weeks remaining before the United Nations January 15 deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, President Bush seemed determined to convince Saddam Hussein that his time is running out.

As the first of several signals that the US is preparing for combat, Bush dispatched 17 more warships to the gulf, which will bring the total to 64. The formidable armada includes the giant aircraft carriers *America* and *Theodore Roosevelt*. And six more American carriers, with as many as 300 attack planes, will be within striking distance of Iraq on January 15 (*Time*, January 7, 1991: 42).

In a pre-emptive move to avert possible counter-attack on America's citizens, the State Department ordered the evacuation of all non-essential staff and dependants from US embassies in Jordan and Sudan, where pro-Iraqi sentiment runs high. In an especially ominous move, officials said the Pentagon would soon start to vaccinate American troops to counter the potential threat of Iraqi germ warfare. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been warning that Iraq, despite its

denials, has developed biological weapons that are highly harmful to the troops deploy to the gulf region, (ibid. p. 42).

Saddam, seeing the allied military build-up against him. decided to summon to Baghdad 20 of his ambassadors, many to Nations that have contributed troops to the US-led alliance. He sent them back to their posts, carrying the message that he was ready for serious and constructive dialogue to avert war. But whatever optimism those words might have engendered were quickly undercut by Saddam's reiterated demand that any diplomatic settlement would have to link an Iraqi pullout from Kuwait with an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Though the United States has rejected such a linkage. Saddam's continuing effort to tie a resolution of the crisis to another intractable regional dispute is only one of the potential ploys that give American policy makers sleepless night.

They are concerned that Baghdad will try to split the alliance by proposing to withdraw only in return for a promise to call an international conference on the Arab-Israel dispute. However, the governments of Saudi Arabia. Egypt and Syria have shown no interest in such ideas so far. they could be under pressure from their own people if Saddam chose to press the point.

But the United States is not likely to accept the idea under those conditions. This is what the State Department officials call "the Nightmare Scenario" in which Saddam would withdraw partly from Kuwait, retaining the Warbah and Bubiyan Islands, which control Iraq's access to the gulf, as well as the Silver of Northern Kuwait that includes the Rumaila oil field. President Bush has made pre-emptive

strike against that possibility by insisting on the backing of the 14 other members of the UN Security Council that only a complete withdrawal would be acceptable (*Time*. January 7. 1991. p. 43).

However. Saddam has concluded that he can drag out the fighting long enough to force a diplomatic solution that would leave him in power in Baghdad and with a plausible claim to partial victory. If so. the Pentagon says, he does not understand the awesome power of the military forces arrayed against him. "The US attack will be something entirely outside Saddam's realm of experience" says former Army Chief of Staff. General John Wickham. "it's not clear he can even imagine what will happen." With the clock ticking away many people hoped the Iraqi leader would still show the sense not to put Bush's determination to the ultimate test (ibid. p. 43).

Soviet Union attempted to broker a peace deal between the US-led alliance with Iraq. Moscow had secured Baghdad's commitment to a supposedly unconditional pullout from Kuwait, but the agreement was accompanied by a string of conditions. Washington and its major partners advanced a number of reasons for rejecting the Soviet mediated offer, ranging from simple distrust of Saddam to news of scorched-earth policy in Kuwait, by putting Kuwaiti oil wells on fire if they are attacked.

But the predominant reasoning is the feeling that delay is beginning to work against the allies. They are being pulled into the very bazaar bargaining that they have sworn to avoid. If negotiations had stayed on course the way they were going.

the US and friends would have had to either consent to a Soviet rescue of Saddam from certain defeat, and all too likely his resuscitation as an aggressive menace to Middle East and world peace, or risk being called war-monger (*Time*, March 4, 1991: 14).

On February 15, 1991, Baghdad announced its readiness to deal with the basic UN resolutions demanding withdrawal from Kuwait subject to far-fetched conditions: one of the demand condition was reparation for allied bombing. To this Bush promptly denounced the proposal as a cruel hoax. When the allied forces rejected the Soviet-Iraqi proposal, Moscow, on 17 February 1991, invited Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz to Moscow. In Moscow, Gorbachev handed Aziz a Soviet proposal that was quickly communicated to the allies. Basically, Iraq would withdraw, supposedly unconditionally, from Kuwait. In return, Moscow would undertake to preserve Saddam from punitive actions, a war crime trial for instance, guarantee Iraq's territorial integrity, try to get economic sanctions against Iraq lifted and work for an overall Middle East peace conference, which, among other things, would address the problem of the Palestinians and Arab-Israeli dispute. Again, this proposal was rejected by the allied forces. The rejection was based on the following ground:

- (a) The proposal did not set any time-table or procedures for withdrawal. What was to prevent Saddam from dragging it out for weeks or months, or from stopping on some pretext with most of Kuwait still occupied (ibid. p. 15).

- (b) The plan was also vague about the timing for any release of prisoners of war (Saddam's regime is still holding some Iranian prisoners more than two years after a cease-fire between the two countries).
- (c) Moreso, the proposal was silent about restoring the pre-invasion government of Kuwait, a prime request of the United Nations resolutions.

Privately, the coalition partners decided to go further and spell out what they would accept. Their proposal was sent by Bush to Gorbachev, presumably to be relayed to Tariq Aziz when he returns to Moscow after communicating the Soviet proposal to Saddam. The allied proposal dealt almost with when and how Iraq was to withdraw from Kuwait.

Washington and its partners made it a point of refusing even to discuss anything else - Palestinians, regional disarmament, Middle East peace conference, until the withdrawal was complete, if they did, the withdrawal will not be unconditional. In fact, their key proposal at that point was that the pullout had to be completed within 96 hours of Iraq's agreement. Besides, the Iraqis would have to withdraw along routes marked by the allies. Any Iraqi's army unit wandering outside those routes or even staying in their fortifications would continue to be attacked from the air. Also, the Iraqis would have to agree to an immediate exchange of prisoners, and an equally prompt reinstatement of the pre-invasion Kuwait government headed by its Emir, Sheik Jaber-al-Ahmad al-Sabah (*Time*, March 4, 1991, p. 17).



When Saddam Hussein received the allied proposal, he outrightly rejected it: in its place presented another proposal with the tacit approval by Moscow to the allied forces. This time Iraq did agree to a prompt exchange of prisoners. But the plan still conspicuously failed even to mention some key allied concerns, notably, the restoration of the pre-invasion Kuwaiti emirate. Iraq would begin a withdrawal two-days after a cease-fire agreement has been signed. The pullout would be completed within a fixed period but no specific time was mentioned. Countries to be selected by the UN Security Council that had taken no part in the fighting would supervise the pullout.

When it is two-third complete, the economic sanctions against Iraq would be lifted. When it would be finally completed all UN Security Council resolutions condemning Iraq and initiating steps against it would cease to have any effect.

Once more, the allied forces rejected the Iraqi-Soviet backed proposal. This was based on the following reasons:

- (i) The allied forces opposed any formal cease fire before or for that matter during an Iraqi pullout (though they would not attack the withdrawing troops),
- (ii) Saddam, they fear, would use the respite to rest, regroup and resupply his badly battered troops in Kuwait. He might then renege on the withdrawal agreement and resume the war.
- , (iii) Even if the withdrawal did begin. Iraq might drag it out for weeks. Besides, allowing Saddam to withdraw and save his tanks and artillery: one American

official noted, "the proposal amounted to saying give me a couple more weeks so I can kill some more Kuwaitis."

- (iv) Who were the neutrals that will supervise the Iraqi pullout? Cuba. Libya. Yemen and perhaps other bitterly anti-western and pro-Saddam states? Would their presence mean allied forces would be barred from entering Kuwait in the wake of the retreating Iraqis? And what if Saddam invented some pretext to stop or reverse the withdrawal?
- (v) Having agreed to a cease-fire, would the allies have to go back to the UN Security council for fresh authority to attack the Iraqi troops, a move subject to Soviet or Chinese veto?
- (vi) The proposal to lift the embargo while one-third of the Iraqi troops remained in Kuwait was particularly sore point to the allied forces. The coalition has mounted on an embargo continuing even after full withdrawal to keep Saddam's aggressive ambitions in check. Otherwise, they worry, he could use a renewed flow of oil revenue to buy weapons to replace those that were destroyed by American bombers and emerge in a few years a greater menace than ever before.
- (vii) Annulment of all UN resolutions after withdrawal would relieve Iraq of any pressure to pay reparations for ravishing Kuwait. Whether such reparations can ever be collected from, an Iraqi economy knocked practically flat by bombing is uncertain. But Washington has some hope of using the threat of

them perhaps to be collected by attaching future oil revenues as another club to hold over a post-war Baghdad regime (*Time*. March 4. 1991. p. 19).

In this unending exchange of proposals between the allied forces and the Iraqi government have turn to dog and cat play. Iraq however, refused to accept the allied forces proposal. On February 23 1991 Ignatenko, Gorbachev's spokesman at a press conference agreed with a questioner that Iraq had lost its chance to negotiate a peaceful settlement and the Soviet spokesman appeared far more interested in soothing allied annoyance with Moscow's earlier efforts than in making any further attempts to save Saddam.

So, on 27 February 1991 the bombing of Iraq by the allied forces began. Iraq caved in and surrendered to the massive fire power of the allied forces (ibid, p. 20). Iraq was forced by the allied forces to enter a post-defeat agreement with the United Nations. It was agreed that Southern Iraq and the territory around Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were no fly zone to Iraqi troops and airforce. The allied forces will bring down any Iraqi plane and destroy any Iraqi tank seen or sighted within the zone.

Iraq would be allowed to sell \$2 billion worth of oil every six months to buy food and medicine. This is what is known as the UN-Iraq oil-for-food agreement. Iraq was to allow unrestricted search for places where the Security Council's Inspection Commission (UNSOM) thought are the sites for making and storing Iraq weapons of mass destruction. By this agreement, all Iraq's weapons of massive

destruction and what it takes to make them have to be destroyed by UNSOM (ibid, p. 21).

The preamble to the November 1995 imposition of limited economic sanctions were cumulative effects of the annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential election by General Babangida. General Abacha was privy to the cancellation of the elections and by August 1995. had become a head of state of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Abacha ascension was punctuated by the arrest and finally imprisoning Abiola; the presumed winner of the June 12 presidential election. The last straw that broke the camel's back was the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others.

The sanctions regime against Nigeria was co-ordinated by the countries and the international organisations involved. It was therefore a multilateral sanction. (*Tell* magazine 1996:pp. 12-16). The economic sanctions imposed against the country included unsigned negotiations for loan facilities from the International Financial Systems (IFS) and the stoppage of all financial aids. These were some of the developmental programmes, under the economic, sanctions are as follows:

3.6 billion north-east arid Zone development programme alongside the mambilla tea irrigation scheme

1.2 Billion Oban Hills conservative programme.

2 billion NITEL maintenance, training and research.

3.6 billion middle belt programme and 218 million for National Planning Commission Management Support Unit.

Intense campaign for de-investment of their major companies operating in Nigeria and discouragement of new investments.

Withdrawal and denial of new loan facilities by the Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.

Apart from the European Union aids. Britain. Germany and Belgium account for a total aids of 24.87 billion under the Lome III Convention.

Besides, there were military sanctions too. Below are the sanctions:

The withdrawal of military personnel from our military training establishment particularly the war college.

The suspension of all existing agreement on military equipment/weapons procurement. Stopping of sales of military hardware and maintenance of existing ones.

Denial of visas to all government officials both military and civilians alike: and their dependant to major Western European countries and United States.

In addition to these sanctions the Shell Petroleum Development Company was pressurised by the European Union to pull out of Nigeria, and they equally advised shell not to sign the Final Investment Decision (FID) on the \$45 billion Liquefied Natural Gas Project. None of this advice was taken by shell, rather, shell embarked on serious image laundering in Europe and America for investing heavily in their host communities (Newswatch: 1995. Vol. 22.16-20). Rather than shell pulling out. its operations were only stopped in the Niger-Delta area, waiting for the storm to abate so that the company can start its operations once more. In a

nutshell, these were the multilateral sanctions imposed against Nigeria under General Abacha era.

It will be difficult to measure the success and failure of the impact of the economic sanctions against Nigeria. Attempt would however be made to express the view that any policy action taken by the government either to amend or conform to some generally accepted norms must have been influenced by the sanctions. If that is the case, then there was an impact. The next chapter, will look at the immediate and remote causes of the Babangida transition and point out if the regime was pressurised to democratise.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESSURE ON NIGERIA'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS 1985-1993**

It was apparent by early 80 "s that a wind of change has being blowing across the continent of Africa. This unprecedented change was due to resurgence of democracy as a result of the collapse of Socialism in the great republic of the Soviet Union. The collapse of Soviet union therefore awakened and fanned the embers of democracy as' the only viable system of government and with its attendant capitalism with emphasise on economic liberalisation and respect for human rights.

The insistence of the advanced western countries and the United States on the implementation of these principles on third world countries became so serious that aids would only be given to countries of the third world that have democratise and liberalise their economy. It was this unpalatable condition to military rule but most favoured by the masses that General Ibrahim Babangida met. when he came into political limelight in August. 1985 as Nigeria military head of state. In fact, the pressures that were brought to bear on democratisation and human rights by the West on the government of third world countries gained momentum because of the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. The West has realised the dangers of political monolithism and military dictatorship in Africa. The Gorbachev induced changes in the erstwhile Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, emboldened the west

to decree political conditionalities for aid to African states. Professor Claude Ake

put it thus:-

The reforms in Eastern Europe contributed to this change of heart by providing the west with a dramatic vindication of its own values and a sense of historical inevitability *of* the triumph of democracy. Thus the west has come to regard democracy as an important item on the African agenda.

Henceforth, western countries insisted that an African government in need of economic assistance in any form must prove that it has established a good record on human rights and has moved manifestly towards liberalising its political system. An OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) release in November 1990 stated that:

> Henceforth allocation decisions will be more influenced than in the past by country's record on human rights and democratic practice (Bluwev 1992: 41).

This was followed by a blunt declaration early in 1991 by the British foreign Secretary. Douglas Hard that:

countries, which turn towards pluralism, public accountability, respect for the rule of law. human rights and market principles should be encouraged. Government which, however, persist with repressive policies should not expect us to support their folly with our scarce aid resources (See Bluwev 1992:42).

Several similar pronouncements have come since 1990 from spokespersons of government of Germany, the U.S. Canada, the Scandinavian countries and Belgium. Rather belatedly, but equally firm was President Francoise Mitterrand of



France, who told the annual Franco-African summit at the French Atlantic coast resort at la Baule in June 1990 that France was at one with her Western allies in insisting that democratization and observance of human rights would henceforth be the supreme prerequisites for aid to every third world country (See Bluwey: 43).

With time however. Western countries began to sound more assertive on political conditionality. In addition to Douglas Hurd's statement referred to above. the United States Assistant Secretary for African affairs: Hermon Cohen told a meeting of the United States Information Service (USIS) in 1991 that foreign investment required a positive political climate.

Where there is the rule of law. where there is political tolerance, where people can speak their minds, where they can petition the government, where people feel they will have a good chance to conclude contacts..... This means democracy, good governance and transparency (Bluwey 1992:44).

The urgency to see democracy in Africa by the West was due to the fact that. there was a link between market oriented reforms of structural adjustment package by the International Financial Institutions (IFIS) with the tacit Support of the West and multiparty system. It became clear that the minority and dictatorial government were outdated and had to be jettisoned. Since structural adjustment policies were aimed to reverse all that the minority urban dwellers enjoyed now to benefit the rural majority: a majority elected government should therefore support structural adjustment programme. This was what encouraged the World Bank and the

International monetary fund to call for good governance which was however interpreted by Western governments as political pluralism.

It was clear that the recent denial of credit facility to Kenya (pending political reforms) by her Western donors that opposition by government over political liberalism would no longer go unpunished. That was the positive demonstration of political will that gave credence to Hermon Cohen's April 1990 declaration before Bretton woods conference held in Washington D.C.. that:-

We (the U.S. and its Western allies) believe that in future competition for donor assistance resources, those governments which are not responding to popular demands for democratisation will find themselves in an increasingly disadvantageous position (see Bluwey: 46).

### **3.2 BENEFITS OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATIONS ENJOYED BY NIGERIA**

Nigeria like most of the third world countries after independence, depended heavily on aid from donors" countries to meet its developmental needs. The only way aid can be given to a country was through the signing of bilateral and multilateral agreements with advance countries of the West and Eastern European countries.

In view of the poor economic base of the country before the oil boom. Nigeria's first development plan was drawn on the hope of aid. The aid package included among others scholarship: loan facilities and most importantly, technical aid assistance. The technical aid was the provision of high level manpower by

donors" countries to Nigeria. These technical personnel, were engaged in areas where there were insufficient local personnel or total absence of them pending when those sent on course overseas had finished their training to come home to man these areas.

Nigeria has been benefiting from the technical aid assistance right from 1960. These experts were sent to sectors like agriculture, energy, education, telecommunication and health. From the 80s. Nigeria reliance on technical aid on education, agriculture and health had greatly reduced to areas of supplying of high technological instruments and equipments. However. Nigeria's dependence on the technical aid in the fields of telecommunications and energy have not abated as noted in the third national development plan of 1975 to 1980.

Another crucial aspect of bilateral and multilateral relations to Nigeria have being the provision of loan facilities from the world bank, the IMF and private financial houses in Europe and U.S. for example, the Paris and London clubs. International organisations like the UN and its agencies, the European union and the commonwealth to the developmental effort of the people and the government of the federal republic of Nigeria. The importance of the technical aid assistance cannot be overemphasised, but it never helps in developing human resources locally. According to UNDP human development report of 1991. states that of all the categories of development aid. technical assistance is the ripest for reform.

A great deal of money is involved, especially in the most needy region of the world. Africa receives \$6 billion in technical assistance each year. The report says

too much is often spent on foreign experts and too little on building up local institutions and national consultants. While Nigeria can be grouped among the poorest in Africa, undoubtedly. Nigeria has not got all it takes for the country to stand on its feet financially, scientifically and technologically, the country dependence on these areas will continue for a long time at the rate at which we are going.

### **3.3 POLITICAL POLICIES OF THE BABANGIDA'S ADMINISTRATION PROGRAMME 1988 TO 1992**

The wind of change is blowing across the continent of Africa. The wave of de-socialism from the former USSR and the successful democratic transition fuelled by the movement for multiparty democracy in Zambia. Benin and Cameroon play significant role on the one hand and the threat of the west to tie aid package to democratisation forced Babangida to embark on transition to civil rule too. Babangida realised that, the success of his transition programme has to be based on sound political policies, which will lay the foundation of his transition timetable. One of the political problems identified by Babangida was the absence of viable political arrangement. He therefore promised to set in motion a transition programme.

On December 31. 1985. while presenting the 1986 National budget, he launched the political transition timetable, which began with public debate on Nigeria's political future through the inauguration of the Sam Cooley Political Bureau in January 1986. The Sam Cooley lead Bureau, on 27<sup>th</sup> March. 1987

submitted its report to the Federal Government. The bureau's report was followed by government white paper in May 1987. The government then provided a transition time-table as shown below:

Table 1: Showing timetable for the political transition in Nigeria. 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 1987.

Establishment of the Directorate of Social Mobilisation.

Establishment of National Electoral Commission.

Establishment of Constitution Drafting Committee.

4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 1987.

Election into the local governments on non-party basis.

1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 1988.

Establishment of National Population Commission.

Establishment of Code of Conduct Bureau.

Establishment of Code of Conduct Tribunal.

Establishment of Constituent Assembly.

Inauguration of National Revenue Commission.

2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter 1988.

Termination of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

3<sup>rd</sup> & 4<sup>th</sup> Quarters.

Consolidation of the gains of SAP.

1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 1989.

Promulgation of a new constitution.

Release of New fiscal arrangement.

2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter 1989.

Lift of ban on party politics.

3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 1989.

Announcement of two recognised and registered political parties.

4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 1989.

Election into local government on political party basis.

1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 1990.

Election into state legislatures and state executives.

3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 1990:

Convening of state legislatures.

4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 1990:

Swearing in of State executives

1<sup>st</sup> & 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 1991:

Local government elections

1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 1992:

Election into Federal Legislatures.

Convening of National Assembly

3<sup>rd</sup> & 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 1992.

Presidential election.

Swearing in of New President and final disengagement by the Armed for

These policies were backed up by some agencies. These were:- Mass Mobilisation for Self-reliance, Social Justice and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) was inaugurated on 2<sup>nd</sup> September 1987. MAMSER was to perform the function of political conscientisation and socialisation of the Nigerian people for the creation of a new political culture. MAMSER was also said to be for the education of all Nigerians for economic recovery. A good politico - economic foundation for a democratic take off, but it was not sustained.

Consequently, the Babangida administration also created the Directorate for Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI). DFRRI, in conjunction with MAMSER were to encourage grassroots democracy and at the same time to better the living standard of the rural people by providing them with social amenities. The transition programme was followed religiously by the administration, except for some arbitrary changes and adjustments here and there. The bureau's view as to when the military should finally disengage from politics was divided while majority of its members suggested 1990, the minority recommended 1992. This view of handing over date of 1992 was endorsed by the administration. Because it was to the favour of the military government and their collaborators who were benefitors of the regime.

The administration hinged its consideration on major issues, such as the successful mobilisation of the citizenry for the purpose of elections as well as the conduct of National census which have to be tackled before handing over of power

to democratically elected civilian government. It is only then, the transition could be said to have been completed. The promulgation of decree 19 of 1987, therefore marked the process of military disengagement from politics (Oyejide: 1992:9).

The decree equally empowered the government to establish the National Electoral Commission (NEC), whose major function was to organise election at all levels of government. It was hoped that with the coming into effect of the 1989 constitution and putting in place, all the necessary political structures, 1992 will mark the end of military withdrawal from Nigerian politics: with successful completion of the presidential election that was slated for June 12, 1993; Nigeria will join the community of democratised Nations of the world, thereby taken its rightful position in Africa in particular and the world in general.

#### **3.4 ECONOMIC POLICY OF BABANGIDA TRANSITION PROGRAMME FROM 1985 TO 1992**

The compliance of the Babangida's administration to the request of the West for economic Reforms was packaged and carried out in such a way as to impress the international financial community for more assistance and continuous access to credit line, and the rescheduling of both long term and medium term loans, this had raised confidence in the Nigerian economy there by given the London and the Paris clubs and any other member of the international financial institutions to assist Nigeria in any way possible. (Onimode: No. 11, 1989:P. 11). The consequent result



of this was the application of the Structural Economic Adjustment Programme. (SAP).

In fact, the familiar conditionality of SAP include massive retrenchment without benefits or redeployment, trade liberalisation, currency devaluation. deregulation of interest rates and foreign exchange, drastic subsidy withdrawal across the board, foreign exchange auction for flexible exchange rate, privatisation of state owned enterprises under the rolling back of the public sector, huge budget cuts, credit squeeze and debt equity swap SAP did not in any bring succour to the Nigerian suffering masses, rather it increased their misery and left many in a perpetual state of want. (Onimode: Ibid P. 12). The Babangida government refuted popular opinion on the state of the economy and the general welfare of Nigerians when the political bureau in its report alleged that government:

Is redistributing social hardship against labour, the peasantry and other members of the poor population and government is sharply in favour of capital both domestic and foreign (Dayomi 1992: 370).

The effect of SAP on the Nigerian urban and rural poor was a stale story in the mouth. The implementation of the structural adjustment programme was like a bad wind that blows nobody good. In fact, the application of SAP as the panacea to Nigeria's economic crisis and the foundation whereupon, the democratic government was to take off has been criticised.

Bade Onimode (1989: op. cit. No.11. pp. 14-15) has pointed out that, the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programme was both theoretical failure

and practical catastrophe. Theoretically. SAP was laissez-faire capitalist development model or ideology, which has not worked anywhere in the third world. , Even in Western Europe. North America and Japan where it succeeded, it was at the expense of slavery, colonisation, the wholesale of expropriation of the peasantry and neo-colonialism. There is no way a Third World country can embark on these policies and succeed. According to Bade Onimode. the implementation of S.A.P as a panacea to the Nigerian economy totally contradicts developmental economic theory of growth in a mono economy like Nigeria. Trade liberalisation in SAP also contradicts economic theory, which recommends import restriction for dealing with trade deficit. Depreciation and not devaluation is also the first adjustment for an over valued currency theory.

Even devaluation in debtors countries fails to satisfy the classical condition for improving the trade balance which is that, the elasticity of demand for exports and imports should be greater than interest rate, in order to increase savings is also theoretically false. Saving depend mainly on the level of income and not on real interest rate, and for economic recovery, theory recommends lower interest rate in order to stimulate investment.

The currency auction or flexible exchange rate imposed by SAP is also theoretically false for small countries international trade. Fixed exchange rate, and not flexible exchange rate is the prescription because a flexible exchange rate system transmit external shocks and worsen the balance of payment.

### **3.5 THE REACTIONS TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE TRANSITION PROGRAMME 1988-1992**

The implementation of the political and the economic policies of Babangida's transition programme attracted negative reactions from the members of the public particularly pro-democracy and anti-military activists. Among the political policies that was challenged was the open Ballot system. The Civil Liberty-Organisation filled a suit against the government on the open ballot at the Ikeja High Court, on the ground that it exposes people to unnecessary danger that breed's hostility among the voters who otherwise should have been allowed to exercise their franchise in secret.

The Babangida's administration quickly enacted Decree No. 25 of 1990. thereby legalising the open ballot for the December local government elections. Another political policy that irked the social justice crusader. Gani Fawehinmi was the Better Life for Rural Women. He challenged the legality of the establishment of the Better Life programme in a Lagos high court, and any kobo spent on it was illegal and prayed the court to declare it null and void. Babangida responded by promulgating the National Commission for Women Decree No. 30 of 1989. thus occasioning the dismissal of the Fawehinmi suit.

While there were passive resistance to some of the political policies of the transition, there were much more destructive ones. Protest that followed the implementation of the economic policies, particularly SAP. the most alarming resistance to the regime took place during the Ahmadu Bello University. Zaria

student's demonstration which led to the massacre of students in 1986 and the anti-SAP nation-wide demonstration of May 1989.

In both cases, the government took panicky measures with which to cushion the effects of the hardship that goaded the demonstration. In the former case, the vice-chancellor of Ahmadu Bello university Ango Abdullahi was retired and in the latter case, there was SAP relief package which was introduced and most of the subsidies were not removed any more, a device that made things easier for the people. But one pathetic case was the banning of the National Association of Nigeria Students by the administration, which felt the volcanic effect of SAP demonstration was due to student's active participation.

Babangida often promulgated decrees as a tool of fighting the opponents of his government as noted by the constitution Review Project, that from 1983 to 1990. the military government under Babangida promulgated more than 300 decrees. For instance. Decree No. 1 of 1984 destroyed the power of rule of law. by vesting all power of law making on the military. Decree no 13 of 1984. nullified any suit in any civil court challenging any decree. The most draconic of all the laws was the state security detention decree No 2. of 1984. and Decree No. 47. 1987 which was directed against students" demonstration. Any high institutions that its students had gone on demonstration against the government policies has to be shut for as long as it pleases the Head of State, till he deem it fit to reopen such institution.

In fact. General Babangida can not be exonerated from abuse of human rights in Nigeria. However, as much as he arrested those that opposed his

administration under decree 2. he never kept them permanently in detention, he released them after a while. This gesture promoted a semi - friendly condition for the antagonist of his administration to operate. (Olayiwola 1992: 261-265).

There is no gainsaying that the political and economic policies of the Babangida administration were not influenced by pressures from the west. His transition to democracy was also influenced by the impact of foreign pressures if not his administration would be starved of the needed financial and cash flow from the west.

### **3.6 ANNULMENT OF THE JUNE 12 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND BABANGIDA'S LAST DAYS IN OFFICE**

According to the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> quarter 1992. of the transition timetable there would be a presidential election. This date was however changed to June 12. 1993 at the end of the election. M.K.O. Abiola was presumed to be the winner of the election, both local and foreign observers claimed the election was the fairest in the country. As the results of the election were coming to the National Electoral Commission, so it was announced state by state. The chief returning officer, who was also the Chairman was the one announcing the results, when a court ordered him to stop doing so forthwith.

An organisation known as Association For Better Nigeria (ABN) was the one that seek court injunction and challenged the validity of the results, alleging massive electoral fraud: therefore the results should be declared null and void. By

June 23, 1993. General Babangida annulled the presidential election, which was presumed to have been won by M.K.O Abiola. The annulment of the presidential election sparks off massive protest, which was met with both natural and naked force of the coercive apparatus of the state. There were tales of death, tears and sorrows for many families across the Country whose members were either killed by the police or died in the fear of another outbreak of civil war that forced many to go to the state of their origin, a movement that occasioned the death of many through motor accident. (*Tell Magazine* 1993:12-16). The most articulated political policies of the transition programme came to an abrupt end. when Babangida was caught in his own political vortex. He cleverly planned his exit, not minding the uproar in the country. He sold the dummy of an Interim National Government (ING) to the Nation, where Chief Ernest Shonekan was made chairman while General Abacha was the secretary and minister of Defence (See *Tell Magazine* 1993:17).

Moreover, the news of the June 12 1993. presidential election annulment was received with a great shock and disbelief by the international community. There were spontaneous reactions all over the world as countries that had signed bilateral and multilateral relations recalled their ambassador's home for consultations. There after. Britain was the first country in the west, that condemned the annulment and immediately suspended all bilateral relations with Nigeria and recalled its military attache and officers in Nigeria's military institutions home (*Tell magazine*, *ibid.* 18).

This initial action by Britain was followed by the U.S and finally their western allies. The measures taken by these countries were, visa restriction on Nigerian military officers, their families and their civilian counterparts, and all bilateral relations, which invariably included aid enjoyed by the country has to cease till when Nigeria restore democratic government. Although, the Babangida transition to democracy had failed, one has no doubt, in his mind that it was the impact of foreign pressures that made him in the first place to democratise.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESSURES ON NIGERIA'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS, 1993-1998

#### 4.1 THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO ABACHA'S ADMINISTRATION

Since Nigeria became an independent country in 1960 till date. It has signed bilateral and multilateral agreements with individual countries from all over the world and it has also entered into agreement with international organisations such as the UN. and its agencies, the Commonwealth to mention but a few. that the country has enjoyed full membership rights. Nigeria, like every other country in the third world also benefited from aid that came from the west and the international organisations thereby supporting and aiding the developmental efforts of the country. The aids came in the form of loan facilities and technical services.

Particularly. Nigeria has benefited from the Commonwealth Universities Union, associations for architects, engineers, lawyers, and technical co-operation, commonwealth foundation for social-economic assistance, youth programmes, counsellor relations, employment, labour and technical schemes (*Newswatch*: 1995; 12-23). Furthermore Nigeria benefited from its bilateral and multilateral relations with the Group of seven and the European Union. Some of the aids coming to Nigeria were as follows: -



- i. N2 billion meant for Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd (NITEL) to take care of maintenance, training and research programmes.
- ii. The U.S. assistance to the ministry of Health amounted to SI 1 million every year, and \$150 million to treat AIDS/HIV related,cases in the Health sector.
- iii. Education and research institutions under the institutional development programme assistance has been given to thirty-five institutions of higher learning. The assistance included exchange programmes, staff training scheme and supplying of journals and books to schools that most needed them. The trypanosomiasis research institute is one of the research institutes that has benefited from aid programmes. The Project Co-ordinator. Professor Anosa said N128 million had been spent and N41.8 million awaiting approval and N14.4 million worth of instruments and computers were supplied by donor countries to the research institute.
- iv. The Financial sector has not being left out too. The Nigeria industrial Development Bank and New Nigerian Development Bank (NIDB & NNDB) got the loan of S30 million in 1983 and in 1993. these banks were given \$95 million to boost their operations.
- v. Aid and technical assistance have being given to the Imo State Equipment Centre. Owerri. Centre for Management Development. Lagos. National Centre for Economic Management. Ibadan: Nigerian Institute for Palm Oil Research. Benin City: National Root Crops Research Institute. Umudike.
- vi. The European Union aid programme to Nigeria included the following:

- N 7 billion oil palm belt development programme.
- N 3.6 billion northeast arid zone development programme alongside the Mambilla tea and irrigation scheme.
- N 1.2 billion Libraries programme.
- N 1.8 billion Oban Hills programme.
- N 2 billion NITEL maintenance, training and research
- N 2.5 billion scheme for the development of the Katsina arid zone
- N 3.6 billion middle belt food programme and
- N 218 million for National planning commission.

Apart from the European union aid. Britain. Germany and Belgium accounts for a total aid of N24.87 billion under the Lome III convention (*Newswatch* magazine 1995: 16-23). Pressures on Nigeria's democratisation process has being on since the Babangida administration, though not as serious as we have seen in 1993 to 1998. The forcefulness of the foreign pressures under this period was due to three important events in Nigeria. These events were the imprisonment of Abiola. the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and flagrant abuse of human rights by the regime.

These unforgettable events were perpetuated by General Sani Abacha. who came to power on November 17. 1993. On his assumption to power he set up a deceitful constitutional conference, which was to give a transition timetable for military disengagement from politics. In this new development the June 12. 1993 presidential crisis that brought him to power has been laid to rest: since there was a

plan for a new transition to democratic rule. The consequences of these unfolding events by the Abacha administration led Abiola to declaring himself the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Lagos. Since the Abacha regime had belatedly taken unfair decision to remain in power.

In fact the Abacha regime responded by arresting Abiola and he was accused of treasonable felony. He was eventually thrown into detention without bail. All legal battles by his lawyers to make his case heard in court was blocked by the administration of General Sani Abacha. (*Tell* magazine 1998; 12). While the country was still to wake up from the *deja-vu* of Abiola incarceration, there came the bizarre news of the arrest of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others. Ken, an environmentalist, a campaigner for fair sharing of the oil revenue to benefit the Ogoni people, whose land about 65% of Nigeria's crude oil comes from. He was the leader of an organisation known as the movement for the survival of the Ogoni people.

The MOSOP leadership has embarrassed the military government right from Babangida's regime to that of Abacha in both local and international forum where the plight of the Ogoni people was a subject of discussion and there were accompanying recorded video cassettes of the area which were shown to the international audience to beat their point home. This development of MOSOP campaign had made environmental base organisations internationally and well meaning individuals in Europe to condemn Shell, the multinational co-operation that operates in the area as the major cause of the plight of the people. Shell was

told to either to embark on environmental rehabilitation of the area ecology and handsomely reward the Ogoni people or pack out of Ogoni land.

With this development, MOSOP was not only a threat to the federal government but also a threat to foreign capitalist interest in Nigeria. MOSOP leadership has to be stopped before they cause irreparable damages. A secret plan to implicate the leaders of MOSOP by the federal government was set in motion. The "D day came, when Ogoni Youths lynched four of their chiefs who were accused of been government agents to death as they were on their way to MOSOP meeting in Ogoni land. Meanwhile, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others, popularly known in the media circle in Nigeria as the Ogoni nine, were arrested and charged for the murder of the four prominent Ogoni chiefs. The killing of the four chiefs was accumulated hatred the youths had for them. They were also seen as conservatives and presumed collaborators with the security forces set up by the federal government to pacify Ogoni land.

The death of the four came in the wake of several inter-ethnic feuds with neighbours which the leaders of MOSOP believed were instigated by the security forces to excuse the long-standing put down of the Ogoni people. The stage was set for the MOSOP leaders who were in custody to face the wrath of the Abacha administration (Newswatch No 31, 1996: p. 19). A tribunal was set up by the regime to try them in the riot that led to the death of the four chiefs. The tribunal was headed by Justice Ibrahim Audu Auta. At the end of its sitting, the tribunal found the MOSOP leaders guilty and sentenced them to death by hanging.

By November 9, 1995, the Armed forces ruling council, the highest decision making body in Nigeria rectified the death sentence passed on Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine others and the order to hang them was given forthwith. On 10<sup>th</sup> November 1995 the eight were hanged in Port-Harcourt prison yard.

All entreaties by world leaders to spare their life fell on Abacha's deaf ear. The way and manner the trial was conducted by the tribunal, its verdict of death on the nine and finally their hasty execution was seen by critics of the administration as a judicial murder. The counsel to the accused was refused to present documents and audiotapes of conversations as an evidence of government involvement, the counsel quitted the case as a sign of protest. The government ably got a new counsel to represent the accused in the case before the tribunal. It was the unfair manner the case was handled by the government that made critics to admit that the case was premeditated murder. The Commonwealth heads of state and other world leaders including the European Union and the United State condemned the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others from Ogoni land. This act of judicial murder by the Abacha administration was the apex of human rights abuses in Nigeria. The spontaneous response to the killings was the call for the imposition of limited economic sanctions against Nigeria.

#### **4.2 THE FACE OF STATE TERROR FROM 1993-1998**

Abacha was not unaware of the opposition that would confront his administration by the time he has taken full control of the realms of government. If there is anything that the human race dreaded mostly, both poor and rich, small and the mighty is death, either by design or by nature. Since people dread death, death will be the answer to all those that wish his administration evil. Armed with this philosophy, the Abacha regime has no time to waste, the regime set up a terror machine, whose main duty was to kill and burn the houses of those opposing his government who had fled the country: This was also to send the message to others, that a similar fate awaits anybody that dares the regime.

There are other Nigerians, who are not politically inclined but they are economic heavyweights, they are the chieftains of the Nigerian banking and the economic sector: If this group should throw their weight behind his political opponents, his administration will be in a big trouble. The Abacha regime moved quickly to pre-empt such step by setting up the Failed Bank Tribunal decree all in the name of sanitising the banking sector. The terror machine and the Failed Bank Tribunal became the two state empowered apparatus to deal with all perceived enemies of his administration.

In fact, the Abacha's terror machine was made up of the following: Abacha. Ismaila Gwarzo. the national security adviser. Major Hamza Al-Mustapha. the chief security officer to the head of state. Peter Nwadowa. the director-general of the state security service (SSS). Zakari Biu. the head of the National Intelligence Agency

(NIA) and Brigadier General Ibrahim Sabo. the boss of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) *{Tell. October 5. 1995. p. 12}*. These people made up the highest level of the terror machine, those to carry out the decisions reached by this group was headed by Hamza Al-Mustapha.

The team headed by Al-Mustapha included Colonel Olu. Major Brutai. Major Ishaku. Alhaji Mohammed Doda. Colonel Frank Omenka. Major Argungu. Lt. Colonel Garba and Warrant Officer Atanda. By mid-1995. Abacha had agreed that elimination by extreme prejudice was the only option for many leading opposition figures to his administration. These figures were Pa Alfred Rewane. leader and financier of the opposition National Democratic Coalition (NADECO). Kudirat. the wife of Abiola. the presumed winner of the presidential election; General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua. former deputy head of state (ibid. p. 12).

Another man that was killed by the squad was Aliyu Mohammed, secretary to the government of the federation, during the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. Mohammed declined to serve in the Abacha junta, preferring, he said, to retire to his farm in Kafanchan. Kaduna State, where he hold a prestigious traditional title. On his retirement, he joined the Nigerian National Farmers Council. Aliyu Mohammed, as the president of the council, embarked on reorganisation of the farmers' council, a kind of pressure group. This act became his undoing, because security reports now indicated that he was using the podium of the council to launch a campaign for the office of president. Aso Rock sent Aliyu Mohammed the necessary signals and put him back on the path of rectitude. Aliyu Mohammed

denied the allegation that he was gunning for the presidency, in one of the secret meetings he had with Abacha. However, Abacha was not convinced, so the order was given to eliminate him. Mohammed was travelling in Benue State when his jeep was involved in an accident with a giant truck. He was wounded, but not too badly. He came out of his jeep and used his cellular phone to call for help. Help soon came in the form of helicopter from Abuja, and it flew him to Abuja. He was reported dead when the helicopter arrived Abuja (ibid. p. 13).

Many other top Nigerians, among whom were those hitherto close to the dictator, including two former ministers. Mr. Alex Ibru and Dr. Onagoruwa were to join the dreaded list later. These people were to be eliminated one by one, mostly through attacks by hoodlums and armed robbers. The Nigerian police, whose top officers were privy to the political killings, were to report these killings as such. Those who sensed danger early enough were able to escape abroad. But such Nigerians like Chief Anthony Enahoro, Professor Wole Soyinka, Lt.-General Alani Akinrinade, Brigadier David Mark, Air Commodore Dan Suleiman and many others were not beyond Abacha's reach. The dictator's hit men were well paid and a bull shit can fetch the marksman a million dollars. These threats made the exiles to be very cautious of their movements in the land of their sojourn (ibid. p. 13). Al-Mustapha was presiding over a formidable terror machine, whose wealth and sophistication could not even be imagined by Abacha's most perspective opponent.

The main objective of the entire multi-billion-naira terror machine was to break Abiola and his supporter. This was to keep the way open for Abacha in his



self-succession ambition. Major Hamza Al-Mustapha ruled the group with the assistance of a committee of elders. The elders were made up of Mustapha. Lt. Colonel Abdallah. Dr. Aisha (assistant superintendent of police). Lt. Colonel LA. Yakassai. Major'Biliaminu Mohammed and Alhaji Duba. In fact, the elders had unlimited access to money, provided mostly from the Armed Forces Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) under the command of Major General Edward Unimna. Houses were bought for these officers in the elite Gwarimpa Federal Housing Estate in Abuja. For their comfort, so that they could perform their duties with military precision.

While taking care of Abacha's security, among others. El-Mustapha authorised the purchase of Prado jeeps for each of the elders in the security department (ibid. p. 14). But the job of dispensing terror was not merely for the men of muscles and machine guns. The Abacha foundation was said to be intellectual centre for the justification of the campaign of terror the dictator was unleashing on the citizenry. These intellectual supporters usually reeled out points to support Abacha and justify his terror tactics. Members of the intellectual vanguard were said to include Professor Auwalu Yadudu. Dr. Sule Hama. Professor Ukeji. Dr. Ali Adamu of the National Primary Education Commission (ibid. p. 14). The funding for the elders and the intellectual hawks was provided directly from security votes and selected Federal Government parastatals and corporations.

One of such key parastatals was the Federal Housing Authority (FHA). under the leadership of Brigadier General Ibrahim Ali. In fact, the elders and the

intellectual hawks were said to have made a tidy sum from the Gwarimpa housing project on which the Abacha junta dedicated =N=15 billion. Two other parastatals include the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) and the Nigerian Maritime Authority (NMA) (ibid. p. 14). In a deft manner, the Abacha regime promulgated the Failed Bank Tribunal. The decree was meant to cow many money bags into vacating the political scene by themselves venturing into politics or financing someone. More than 250 economic heavy weights were sent to cells and prisons across Nigeria. The detainees included bank executives and debtors to both liquidated banks and thriving banks.

Allegations of miscarriage of justice, high-handedness on the part of the National Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) and the Failed Bank tribunal came from different detention centres in various parts of the country (*Tell*. September 21. 1998. p. 20). For example, detainees in Kaduna and Kano complained of being denied justice. They had won the interest of human rights groups who intervened to secure their release because of their predicament. The Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), led by Femi Falana, a Lagos lawyer described the decree as a weapon for settling personal scores. Falana gave instances of abuse of power by the Abacha junta which who lock up their perceived enemies on trumped-up charges. Other anomalies he observed were the fact that the judges are not responsible to the chief justice of the federation and thus lack control and with the amount NDIC pays each prosecutor (=N= million per case), they were desperate to

convict the detainees at all cost. This, therefore, informed his argument that the detainees be granted bail.

Another non-governmental organisation, the Human Rights Enlightenment Commission (HREC). said it was inhuman to clamp people into jail indefinitely when they have not been convicted by a court of law. According to Johnson Esezobo. president of HREC. "stealing (depositors" money) or whatever it is alleged against the detainees is not more serious than the rebellion against the people's constitution through a military take-over of government or the looting of the treasury in the name of security veto." The group lends its voice to calls that the detainees be released on bail, since theirs is a bailable offence (ibid. p. 22).

#### **4.3 THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO THE ABACHAS ADMINISTRATION**

Before turning our attention to the impact of sanctions during Abacha regime, mention should be made of the intense internal opposition to the regime. The internal opposition against the administration emanated from the annulment of the June 12. presidential election on the one hand and on the other the killing of the Ogoni nine. The refusal of Abacha to swear in Abiola as the president of Nigeria sparked of a nation-wide strike by the National Union of Petroleum and National Gas workers (NUPENG) and the Petroleum and National Gas senior staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN).

In fact, the organisers believed that the strike action which they had embarked upon would force the Abacha regime to both negotiate with Abiola or step down thereby moving the nation forward. The impact of the strike was so much, so that there was not a sector of the economy that did not feel its effect. The leaders of NUPENG and PENGASSAN were arrested and detained by the Abacha administration. The government being afraid of a general strike by the Nigerian Labour Congress in solidarity support for the members of NUPENG made the government to dissolve the leadership of the congress on August 17, 1994 and a sole administrator was thereafter appointed to oversee the affairs of the Nigerian labour Congress. (*Tell*, 1996:12-16).

Another group of opposition to the government was the National Democratic Coalition, an umbrella organisation for all pro-democracy activists: it was formed in May 1994. The coalition seeks dialogue in dealing with the Abacha regime so as to release Abiola and the need for the country to democratise. This was however rejected by Abacha, who prefers arrest, detention and killing anybody that opposes his regime. Furthermore, the Abacha regime waged war on the mass media. *Newswatch* magazine and the *News*. These National dailies and the weekly magazines were not only proscribed but their editors and field journalists were arrested and detained, while others were sent to jail by the military tribunals that were set up by the regime. The journalists who were jailed were Chris Anyanwu of the *Sunday Time* magazine (STN). George Mbah editor of the *News* magazine and Charles Obi of *channel* magazine (*Tell* November 1996:12-16). The crack down

of the regime did not end with the pro-democracy activists alone it was extended to include those in the military: officers that stood for the realisation of June 12, 1993 presidential election were arrested for planning coup to unseat the Abacha regime. Critics named this crackdown of the military as a frame-up coup. Those arrested at different times were Obasanjo, Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, Gwadabe, Diva, Adisa and Olanrewaju to mentioned but a few. All these retired and serving soldiers were tried by a military tribunal that found them guilty and they were sentenced to death by firing squad. Their sentence were commuted to life imprisonment (*Tell*, ibid. p. 16). With this scenario the coast was cleared for Abacha.

Dare Babarinsa of *Tell* magazine aptly put it thus:

Abacha has broken all taboos, including the discretion of the office of head of state with his jailing of General Obasanjo and others. All the political heavy weights of old. Lt. General T. Y. Danjuma. Gen. Gowon. Alhaji Shehu Shagari and many others are clearing away from the Atlas. He has taken on all comers the opposition National Democratic coalition, the workers, students. University teachers, lawyers and pro-democracy groups. Abacha's philosophy is that if you are a driver of thirty tonne lorry, you don't need road manners, every road user has to give way or get crushed".

Abacha's tyranny has no equal in the political history of Nigeria.

#### 4.4 THE IMPACT OF THE SANCTIONS ON THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY FROM 1993-1998

It is indicative to point out that: in all the literature reviewed the main target of the sanctioning states was on the economy. It is much more complex when one critically looks at the sanctions regime against Nigeria from 1993 to 1998.

In fact, it is difficult to measure the impact *of* the sanctions on the Nigerian economy. This becomes clear when we take a second look at the list of sanctions imposed against Nigeria. These were as follows:

- a. Arms embargo:- This covers arms, ammunition, and military co-operation with Nigeria. The most worrisome part of the arms embargo was that, there might not be further supply of spares despite the technical service agreements.
- b. The stopping of funding Agricultural and Environmental base projects:- Among the agricultural projects were the =N=7 billion oil palm belt development programme from which Risonpalm in Rivers state. Adapalm in Imo state. Abiapalm in Abia state and Akwapalm in Akwa-Ibom. The =N=3.6 billion ecological restoration programme included the Katsina afforestation programme and the Mambilla Tea plantation and the irrigation scheme. There was Oban Hills conservation project in Cross-River State that amounted to =N=1.8 billion.
- c. 2 billion for NITEL was- to be expanded on maintenance, training and research.

- d. Health:- \$150 million quarterly allocation from united state international development and European union aids in the rural health project, drug revolving scheme, child immunisation as well as HIV/AIDS.
- e. Education:- N1.2 billion libraries programme and N690 million aid to research institutions.
- f. Financial embargo:- all financial and loan facilities from the World Bank, IMF and the African development bank, were put on hold till Nigeria democratise.
- g. Suspension of commonwealth assistance and access to its economic, science and technological, and exchange programmes suspended too.
- h. Travelling embargo:- on the military and their families and those civilians that participated in the administration of General Abacha from going to the U.S. and Europe.

In what measure then do these sanctions affect the Nigerian economy? The arms embargo on Nigeria did not affect the armed forces. The government simply turned to china and India to acquire their military soft and hardwares to the chagrin of the west. Nigeria's military officers were sent to India for training rather than going to Western European and U.S. military institutions. The arms embargo, did not work, therefore there was no change in policy direction of the regime.

All the sanctions put together had little or no effect on the Abacha administration. The foreign aids for environment and agricultural sector, the Health, Education and the financial sectors, on the short-term were single handedly

taken care of by the Petroleum Trust Fund. Even in the long term, if the sanctions regime had lasted as long as ten years the PTF would have continued to provide the necessary funds and effectively taken the place of the foreign donors (*Tell. Ibid: 19*).

#### **4.5 THE RESPONSE OF THE REGIME TO THE SANCTIONS**

The fact is that the limited economic sanctions imposed against the Abacha regime did not work; still the regime reacted by promulgating the decree that empowered the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) and the Nigerian Human Rights Commission (NHRC). These two administrative outfits were meant to show the west that the regime was not as bad as it was painted by its critics.

The setting up of the Petroleum Trust Fund did not come up by accidental coincidence of rescuing the Nigerian economy. Particularly, those aspects that affect the people's lives: from the dwindling crude oil prices at the world market and the lack of accountability, probity and transparency that have been flagrantly displayed by Nigerian public office holders. Rather, the Petroleum Trust Fund was set up as a result of the limited economic sanctions imposed against Nigeria by the European Union, the United States of America, Canada and the Commonwealth of Nations. The catastrophic effects of these sanctions were the drying up of funds and aids packaged from these countries and organisations. There was therefore the urgent need to have a home groomed interventionist financial organisation that can



rescue the gloomy situation that hang around the working masses of the Nigerian people.

In this vein, the Petroleum Trust Fund was established under Decree 25 of 1994 by the Abacha administration. The PTF would utilise funds accruing to its coffers from the sale of petroleum products less sum specified deductions and others which included marketers' margins, disbursements to the Federation Accounts, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC). payment of Value-added tax (VAT) and excise duties (*New Nigerian*. August 29. 1995. p. 7). According to the fund executive chairman. General Mohammadu Buhari (rtd) "the fund is intensive intervention finance organisation, working within the administration's development strategy, so that it can reach deep into the rural parts of our country where the majority of our people live" (*New Nigerian*. August 18. 1995. p. 2).

The Fund has identified 24 key projects in the nation's social services sector for immediate execution. These projects include: Highways, waterways, urban roads, mass transit vehicles, health care and tertiary health institutions, drugs and vaccines revolving scheme (the Bamako initiative), farm power machinery, procurement of agricultural inputs, completion of national strategic grains projects and development of inland and coastal fisheries irrigations. In addition to these were the rural-urban and semi-urban water supply scheme, police and other security agencies, logistics facilities, including barracks, police stations and prisons would be rehabilitated nation-wide. The connecting of local government

headquarters to the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) national grid. NITEL telephone and railway facilities and metroline project.

General Buhari further explained that the Fund's intervention would be restricted to the socio-economic projects spelt out in its enabling decree under the jurisdiction of the federal, states and local governments (ibid. p. 1). The Fund had a starting off grant of =N=30 billion as monies accrued to the Fund from October 1994 to June 1995. The Fund was to get =N=61 billion at the end of the year of 1995.

Moreover, the Board of Trustee of the PTF had zoned the country into six for effective implementation of its programmes. Zone One comprises Lagos. Oyo. Osun. Ogun and Ondo States, with Lagos as headquarters. Zone Two: Abia. Anambra. Enugu and Imo States with Enugu as headquarters. Zone Three: Kebbi. Sokoto. Katsina. Jigawa. Kano and Kaduna States, with Kaduna as headquarters. Zone Four: Yobe. Borno. Bauchi. Taraba and Adamawa States, with Maiduguri as headquarters. Zone Five: Kwara. Kogi. Benue. Niger. Plateau and the Federal Capital Territory with Jos as headquarters. While Zone Six comprises Edo. Delta. Akwa Ibom. Cross River and Rivers State and has Benin as operational headquarters.

In all, three types of projects were identified and funds would be allocated as follows: Federal projects 48 per cent, state projects (including local governments) 50 per cent. Federal Capital Territory (FCT) projects 1.5 per cent. Funds for states projects would be allocated to the 30 states using an abridged formula that

emphasised needs in place of social development and benefits. The main objective of the Fund's intervention policy was in the short term to resuscitate the nation's collapsing social services and deteriorating infrastructures, thereby alleviating the people's hardship and in the long term to lay the foundation for rejuvenating the economy for growth and increased production (ibid. p. 2). The following are some of the sectors in the social services that the PTF intervened:

**Road transportation:-** The Fund intervened in the transport sub-sector with a view to improving both inter- and intra-city mass transit system. The intervention will seek to:-

- i) Encourage state, local government and the general public to employ the use of bicycles and motor-cycles as a mode of mass transportation. The Fund shall look into the possibility- of mass importation of bicycles and expanding manufacture in the country,
- ii) Intervene with the federal, state and local government in the rehabilitation of their various mass transit fleets and strengthen their institutional capacity to maintain the fleet at a top working conditions at all times. Measures to increase cost recovery will be strengthened,
- iii) The Fund will provide additional new buses, ferries or boats spare parts and tyres for their proper day-to-day operations,
- iv) The Fund will equally establish institutional support facilities nation-wide for road transportation system. This will include, encouraging establishment

in the transport sector to organise a training workshop for the operators, manufacturers of the basic spare parts required to sustain the operational fleets. And the establishment of garages for haulaging vehicles in cities and along the highways. This will equally introduce sanity into the transport system.

**The Education Sector:-** Education is one of the basic human needs and is not only accepted as being a means of meeting other needs, but also as a means of accelerating development and improving productivity by promoting economic growth. Intervention in this sector is therefore considered as a vital link to other sectors with positive multiplier effects. Intervention to enhance quality education will address the following:-

- i) Rationalisation and zoning of educational institutions across the sector for rehabilitation to satisfy immediate needs and facilitate raising the falling standard of education in the country,
- ii) Provision of equipment for workshops, laboratories and computer centres and institutional strengthening to maintain and sustain their operations,
- iii) Provision of textbooks, exercise books and all other reading materials for educational pursuit will be achieved by encouraging local production of low-priced editions through zonal bookshops across the country.

- iv) There will be strengthening of educational resource centres, which will produce local teaching aids, and they will be empowered by enabling decree to supervise schools.
- v) The states ministries of education and local governments educational boards would be strengthened to enable them carry out effective planning, organising and managing the educational system for proper result achievement,
- vi) The Fund will encourage research activities of all facets of human activities in the improvement of the life and well being of the Nigerian people. This will be funded by the PTF in collaboration with foreign agencies, which are sympathetic to the course of the government and people of Nigeria.

**The Health Sector:-** The World Health Organization (WHO) defined health as a "state of complete physical, mental and social well being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." Thus causes of ill health can be biological, environmental or socio-cultural, psychological or a combination of these.

All these factors need to be considered in attempt to ensure satisfactory health care delivery system. Intervention in this sector is also considered vital and will address the following areas:-

- i) The rehabilitation and upgrading of infrastructural facilities in selected health institutions across the country.

- ii) The rehabilitation of existing medical equipment and furniture in selected health institutions,
- iii) Reinforcement of existing essential drug revolving funds and introduction of same in other areas where they do not exist, but there would be modification of the system to include large procurement of drugs or consumable directly from reputable manufacturers,
- iv) Resuscitation of and encouragement to local manufacturers of essential drugs and other medical consumables especially in our tertiary institutions nation-wide,
- v) Encouragement and sponsorship of studies for the preparation of major capital-intensive health projects to be co-funded by the Fund and foreign agencies,
- vi) Institutional strengthening for more effective planning and operation of our health institutions,
- vii) Encouragement of community participation in the maintenance of health institutions and their general operations,
- viii) Institutional strengthening to achieve manpower and equipment rationalisation across the sector nation-wide.

- ix) Strategies for implementation of the above will address such issues as environment, poverty- alleviation, community integration and participation in projects, women in development and inter-sector links, such as water supply which has remarkable effect on health (*New Nigerian*. August 31. 1995. P-7).

**Food Production:-** The agricultural sector of the economy cultivates about 34.40% of the total land area of Nigeria and the sector employs about 44.60% of the population and contributes about 87.0% of the Gross National Product (GNP). This is the most important national economic activity in the country. Therefore, any deliberate effort made to properly plan and systematically implement the food production policy will have both social and economic impact on the majority of the population. Intervention in this sector will include among others: land preparation and provision of all necessary infrastructure through established government agencies ... facilitating the formation of co-operatives to take advantage of the Fund's small scale loan for farmers,

- i) The Fund will provide information on storage technologies, credit facilities through established banks: inputs like fertilisers, herbicide, tractor services and other facilities from federal, state and local government agencies under the supervision of specialist consultant,
- ii) The Fund will intervene in facilitating the rehabilitation of farm mechanisation units in federal, state and local government agencies and

provide institutional strengthening to maintain and sustain the' service to farmers through farm co-operative,

- iii) Reactivation of agricultural extension services and farm training centres to enhance the farmers knowledge of modern agricultural production methods and inputs,
- iv) Promoting cash crop production along with food crop production to further improve national production on food security, thereby improving the well being of the population.
- v) Rehabilitation and completion of selected sound irrigation projects in order to avoid the ruination of land through water logging and to raise insalinity.
- vi) The Fund will promote the establishment of agro-allied industries to utilise farm products at peak seasonal level, thereby avoiding wastage (ibid. p. 7).

**Water Supply:-** Water supply and sanitation may encompass a range of development projects concerned with the provision of potable water for domestic consumption and the improvement of personal and community sanitation.

The principal objectives of water supply project is to ensure the supply of safe drinking water for basic human needs and animal consumption. On the other hand, the principal objectives of sanitation projects are to ensure the safe disposal and the recycling of waste materials to promote efficient sanitary behaviour.

Intervention in the water supply sector has vital positive multiplier effects on all other sectors, especially health and food production. Intervention of the



Petroleum Trust Fund will include the following areas among others: Rural areas, where systems that required little maintenance will be developed for the

- a) effective rehabilitation of all existing bore holes and massive drilling of new ones in rural and semi-urban areas. These boreholes will be equipped with the installation of hand pumps or similar devices such as windmills to provide potable water for both human and animal consumption. This will however require storage tanks with simple reticulation.
- b) Additional water for animal consumption would be provided through the building of small dams or simple burrow pits near nomadic settlement or along grazing routes.

***Semi-urban areas:-*** Effective rehabilitation of all existing bore holes and massive sinking of additional ones and associated pumping, storage and reticulation facilities would be provided. Solar operated pumps may be considered to eliminate the use of generating plants which in itself is an environmental hazard. Additional water for animal consumption may be provided in the savannah and the Sahel belts by building small dams near settlements and along grazing routes.

***Urban centres:-*** Immediate rehabilitation of all existing water supply schemes would be embarked upon. This will ensure the continuous supply of water and proper maintenance of the plants would be a continuous exercise to enable the plants to work to the level of capacity utilisation at all times.

The Petroleum Trust Fund will encourage the fabrication of parts locally for the maintenance of plants at the water supply stations to conserve and to promote

professionalism among Nigerians foundry experts (*New Nigerian*. September 1. 1995. p. 7). In fact, there is no doubt in the mind of Nigerians that the Petroleum Trust Fund would not have come at a better time than the period it came into existence. The Fund waded into areas that needed the urgent attention of the federal, state and local governments. The success of the Fund's work was appreciated by all Nigerians.

Whatever must have induced the government to put its act together in terms of its human rights and democratisation process may not be due to the sanctions but a diversionary plan by the Abacha government to be accepted by the west. In line with this policy of deceit, the Abacha administration invited the UN Human Rights Commission to visit Nigeria and see things for themselves

On the 6<sup>th</sup> of June 1997. two man team from the UN Human Rights Commission arrived in the country. They were Mr. John Shattach of the Bureau for Democracy. Human Rights and Labour and MacAuthur Deshager of the National Security Council. The comment made by John Shattach at the end of their visit was that. Human Rights situation in Nigeria has deteriorated since 1993. by this, the administration human rights record was scored low. With this unfavourable report. General Abacha. wrote the UN secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali. that decree No 2 of 1984 would be amended so that court can entertain a habeas corpus from any detainee under the decree. He also informed the UN scribe that legal draughtsmen are working on the civil disturbances decree of 1987.

Henceforth, the special military tribunal would not have a military officer as a member and there would be a provision for appeal by those found guilty by the first military tribunal to especial military tribunal. In addition to this, the administration promised to release all political detainees. When Abacha finally fulfilled his promise, he released criminals who had finished their jail terms and few politicians with little or no local acclaimed status (*Newswatch*, op cit.: No. 31 P.22).

The failure of the sanctions regime against Nigeria can be deduced from the failure of the sanctioning states to embargo Nigeria's crude oil. Analysts in the petroleum sector, were of the view that there were sanctions on Libya and if sanctions tentacles were extended to Nigeria's petroleum, there would be unprecedented high price of crude oil hitting \$21 per a barrel. This situation does not look benign to the economic interest of the west and USA the only way to rest the problem was to leave Nigerian petroleum untouched. The reason for their decision was not far fetched. Majority of the countries in Western Europe depended on Nigerian crude oil. As the German ambassador pointed out. some of their refineries were built to suit Nigerian bonny light oil and if they should stop buying Nigerian oil. they have to overhaul their refineries and that is what Germany could not stomach.

Most importantly, the major oil companies operating in Nigeria are owned by the west, for instance. Shell is owned by (Britain and Netherlands) Agip (Italy) Elf petroleum (France) mobile. Texaco. Chevron and Ashland (U.S.). In fact, the investment of these oil companies is enormous so much so that, it will be difficult

for their government to impose sanctions against Nigeria's oil, a sector that is overwhelmingly dominated by western interest.

All the oil companies that operate in the country petroleum and gas sector, take 43% of crude oil for their operations. In 1994, this was translated to an average of 887,200 barrels per day. They only pay royalty and petroleum profit tax. The main buyers of Nigerian oil are the West and USA (*Newswatch*, Ibid. p. 18) Western European countries, such as Germany, France, Spain and Netherlands collectively import more than 700,000 barrels of bonny light every day. While the US imports 750,000 barrels per day.

The west and USA failed to embargo Nigeria's oil, due to the fact that their investment in the sector conservatively put at \$40 billion. Besides, proceeds from oil sales benefit the west more than Nigeria's up to 35 percent of oil earnings is used for servicing Nigeria's \$30 billion foreign debt (*Newswatch*, Ibid: p. 19).

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Foreign pressures on Nigerian's democratisation process started in 1986. this was when the west dramatically shifted their aids toward the new emerging democracies in Eastern Europe after the collapse of Soviet Union. It would be politically unwise and economically miscalculation, if the west should abandon Africa, the continent that has supplied Europe and the US. their needed raw-materials and available market for their goods and services.

Therefore they put in place an economic and political guidelines for African countries to follow and adopt if not. there would be no more aids to them no matter what. Not even France that was known to be more protective of its colonies. If France could team up with its western allies to force African countries to democratise and liberalise the governments and the economies of Third World countries, it could be interpreted by the Africans that this action should not be taken for granted at all by those concerned.

In fact, it was this political vortex that Babangida administration found itself. There is no third world country that can single-handedly pursue an economic development plan without seeking short and long terms loan facilities from international financial institutions. This was what forced the Babangida administration to equally toe the path to democratisation and economic

liberalisation. When the Babangida administration implemented the IMF and World Bank prescription his government was allowed to reschedule. Nigeria's foreign debt, and allowed borrow from even private foreign banks and equally qualified for loans under the Lome II and III conventions. Babangida's only and major problem was his inability to hand over power to the elected civilian president of his well-tailored transition timetable. His failure to fulfil his promise not only make him to be the most hated man by the Nigerian people, but also find himself falling out of favour with the west in particular and the international community in general. A situation that was totally apolitical.

The Babangida administration horridly put in place, an Interim National Government as a face saving device to retain some amount of self-respect and honour, rather than go down memory lane as the Nigerian head of state who aborted Nigeria's chance into the third republic. This seems like what he was running away from, unfortunately his name has entered the annals of history as the man who stopped Nigeria from matching towards the third republic as it happened in many countries in West Africa.

From 1993-1998. Nigeria passed through its darkest period in history. General Sani Abacha. who was the head of state of Nigeria within this period, was not only a despot but a sanguinary leader as well. He did not only threw the presumed winner of the June 12. 1992 into prison, but also perpetually kept him there as long as he lived on earth: so that Abiola political will to be Nigeria's civilian president could be broken.

By Nov.. 1995. the Abacha regime once again attracted the attention of the west and the whole world in general, when the ardent environmental and human rights campaigner Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others were hanged by the regime on what seems to be government instigated action in the oil rich Ogoniland which led to the killing of the four chiefs. The Abacha's bravado, in killing Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others, made the international community, i.e. the commonwealth, the European Union, and the United States to impose limited economic sanctions against Nigeria. The assumption of the sanctioning states was that sanctions would not only compel the Abacha regime to democratise but also make him to improve on human rights records that has reached all time high in the country-.

The sanctions regime against Nigerian by the commonwealth, the European union and the United States did not in any way threaten the Abacha regime. This was so because, the sanctions were not comprehensive and constructive enough to deal a deadly blow on the Nigerian economy. It is a known fact, among the sanctioning states, that the mainstay of the Nigerian state is petroleum. If Nigeria's oil is embargoed, there was no way the Abacha government could have stayed in power up to five months. The failure of the west to add oil on the sanctions list underscore, their sincerity in forcing the Abacha's administration to democratise. It is obvious that the west is only protecting their economic interest in Nigeria. This interest is dominantly seen in the oil and gas sector of the Nigerian economy.

The sanctions imposed against Nigeria did not fail because the Abacha regime had especial policies on the ground to counterbalance the sanctions regime.

there was no attempt by the government to seek the support of the Nigerian people to back the government in preparation against the harshness of the sanctions, so that one can manage what one has and even prepare to make sacrifices if it so called for.

No. it was not Abacha's magic touch, rather it was the failure of the west in particular, who knew what to do and deliberately failed to do so. One can not hold them responsible because, all what foreign capital needed was a brutal leader, who can create the enabling environment for foreign capital to operate, any thing that will disrupt its operations and thereby stop its profit drive has to be crushed. Foreign capital find this brutality in Abacha. this might be the only reason why Nigeria's oil was left untouched and this also explained the abysmal failure of the sanctions regime against Nigeria from 1995-1998.

In conclusion, it was quite unknown to majority of Nigerians that the Babangida administration that ruled the country from 1985-1992 was under pressures from the west. This was made possible by the adept and crafting ability of IBB administration to turn the IMF and the world bank economic and political blue prints as home grown conditionalities. The application of these pressures that were mounted systematically and properly applied that forced Babangida to quit the political scene by 1993.

On the other hand, the pressures on the Abacha" s regime were obvious. It was made as a matter of urgency in the US congress, where embargo on Nigeria's oil was favoured by the blacks, while the moderate white conservatives prefer oil sanctions as a last resort, of course, this was the thinking of the European Union too.



It was the failure of the west to impose sanctions against Nigeria's oil that made the sanctions imposed against Nigeria to be ineffective. Abacha knew what the west wanted. That was democratising the government and liberalising the country's economy, no matter who emerges as the president at the end of the democratisation exercise. As long as this was the rule of the game: he was prepared to follow it religiously and possibly returning himself as the next civilian president of Nigeria's fourth republic: in the true spirit of sportsmanship. After all. it was no news in West Africa, there were Mattiew Kerekou of Benin Republic. Eyadema of Togo. Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Yahya Jammeh of Gambia. All these leaders were former military leaders of their countries who returned themselves as civilian president of their countries. If the west did not frown at their transmutation from military to democratically elected leaders, there would not be a condemnation from the west either if Abacha succeeds himself in likewise manner in Nigeria.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

While one will subscribe to the use of economic sanctions as non-coercive instrument of achieving world peace, its use should be encouraged in the following ways-:

The sanctioning states should sacrifice their economic interest if they want a quick result from sanctions imposition. Let's take the Nigerian case for instance, if the sanctioning states had embargoed the Nigerian oil. the Abacha regime would not have lasted long. If military actions could be taken to maintain it and lives are

destroyed as sacrifice by participating states: so be it. Then economic interest should be considered as lesser sacrifice compared to the men and materials that could be wasted as the ultimate price for peace. In addition, sanctioning states should evaluate the investments of the leaders of the sanctioned state in overseas and as a matter of fact, such assets should be frozen by the governments of the states where they are invested. When this is done, the leaders would be forced to heed to international opinion. If this was done in the Nigeria's case, the Abacha regime would not have survived it.

The flimsy excuse of the sanctioning states for not adopting stringent economic actions as stated above because the ordinary peoples of the sanctioned state would be the ones to suffer has no basis whatsoever, the masses have being on the receiving end. They can survive it for a while, for as long as the objective is meant to usher in a good government for their betterment.

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