

**AN EVALUATION OF TECHNICAL AID CORPS
PROGRAMME**

BY

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DECLARATION

I, Ahmed Bello certify that this project has been written by me and that is a record of my own research work. It has not been presented in any previous thesis.




A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ahmed Bello', is written over a horizontal dashed line. Below the dashed line is a solid horizontal line, and the name 'Ahmed Bello' is printed in a simple font directly under the solid line.

Ahmed Bello

CERTIFICATION


The undersigned certify that they have read and recommended to the Faculty Board of Department of Social Sciences for acceptance of this project titled "An Evaluation of Technical Aid Corps Programme", submitted by Ahmed Bello, in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Master of International Affairs and Diplomacy.



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ABSTRACT

This study was carried out with a view to evaluating the (Technical Aid Corps Programme. The study was specifically aimed at finding out whether TAC programme is achieving its stated objectives or not, what is the impact of the programme on Nigeria's Foreign policy and the problems and the prospects of the programme.

In carrying out the study, the researcher was limited to secondary sources like, official documents, books, seminar papers, journals and oral interviews. The materials from these sources were extensively used to evaluate TAC programme.

In the course of the study, it was found that since its inception in 1987, the programme has been providing man-power Aid to ACP countries. The acceptability of the programme by both the recipient countries and the Corps member volunteers have shown that the programme is achieving its objectives. In addition, the programme is indeed, not only a vital tool of implementing Nigeria's foreign policy but an instrument used by Nigeria to achieve economic and social interest as well.

The programme is besieged with numerous problems that is hampering its smooth and effective implementation.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Modern states are now highly interdependent on each other; politically, economically or otherwise. The growing interdependence that exists in the international system makes it impossible for any nation state be it big and powerful or small and powerless to exist in isolation. In another words, for any nation state to exist and survive it must interact and relate with other nation states. This means that each nation state should have a strategy, plan of action, statement of aims and objectives on how to relate and interact with other nation states.

The above brings us to the concept of 'Foreign Policy of a nation state". Foreign Policy like other social sciences is not an exact science and is defined differently by different scholars. While some scholars define it as that area of politics which bridges the all-important boundary between that nation states and its international environment, others see foreign policy as "a projection of the country's national interest into the transnational arena and the consequent interaction of one with the other"¹. At a more practical level, foreign policy activities are aimed at getting the other countries to appreciate and, if possible endorse one's own view points and objectives in the international system.

From most definitions of foreign policy, however, it seems clearly established that at least two factors influence the cause and context of foreign policy of state, namely, the domestic and external environments. In the domestic setting, such factors would include a country's internal cohesion political stability, economic, financial demographic, technological and military power among several others. On the external front, the foreign policy posture of a state would depend on the nature of the external "system" at a given time². Thus, the foreign policy of any nation state is a reflection of the domestic interest and strength of that nation and the situation in the external environment.

The foreign policy of any nation state comprises the objectives that it seeks in its international relations and the means and the methods by which it pursues them. Then, it is obvious that the objectives of foreign policy of nation states differ from each other. Even if they may be the same or similar; the methods and means of pursuing them must differ.

Generally speaking, nation states pursue their foreign policy objectives using two main methods. Peacefully by the use of diplomacy and forcefully by the use of military power or sanctions. The use of diplomacy could take various forms. It could take the form of entering into economic, political or cultural treaties and agreements, diplomatic negotiations or providing aids and assistance.

Soon, Nigeria realises the importance of providing aids and assistance to other nation states in meeting its foreign policy objectives. Consequently, in 1977, an inter-ministerial Committee was appointed by the then Head of State, General Obasanjo to come up with a blue print on provision of aids and assistance to other nation states by Nigeria. The committee comprised representatives of the ministries of External Affairs, Finance and Cabinet Office. Its report constituted the first policy on aid Nigeria had since independence. The provisions of the policy are:

- i. In giving aid, Nigeria should take into consideration her limited resources and, therefore, apply a system of weighing which would be based on the following four criteria.
 - a. Promotion of national interest - 45%
 - b. Taking into account the availability of high and middle level manpower in Nigeria - 20 %
 - c. Contributing to national economy and creating productive capacity for Nigeria - 25%
 - d. Providing relief during disasters and national emergencies in the recipient country - 10%³.

- ii. In operating this programme, Nigeria's aid must be based on fixed principles and guidelines, and, therefore, as much as possible:

- a. Cash payment must be discouraged.
- b. Whenever given, aid must promote, formally, discretely or informally the national interest via the development of Nigeria's industries.
- c. Priority should be placed on multilateral rather than bilateral aids⁴.

In addition to providing monetary and material aids to needy countries, especially poor African countries, Nigeria soon realised the need to provide manpower aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in order to promote its foreign policy. This, led to the establishment of the Nigerian Technical Aid Corps (TAC) programme at the end of 1986 by the Babangida administration. Central to the formulation, planning and implementation of the programme was the Minister of External Affairs, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi. Basically, the programme was established in order to provide man-power developmental assistance to ACP countries with the aim of promoting Nigerian's foreign Policy.

It was hoped that the above aim could be achieved through the following Nigerian Technical Aid Corps objectives:

1. To serve as a foreign Policy option aimed at complementing other forms of assistance to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.
2. To share Nigeria's know-how and expertise with other African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.

3. To promote co-operation and understanding between Nigeria and the recipient countries.
4. To facilitate meaningful contact between the youths of Nigeria and those of the recipient countries⁵.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The size, human and natural resources of Nigeria provided the framework within which Nigerian leaders perceived the country position and role in the international affairs since independence. It was the awareness of the great human and material potential of Nigeria that motivated the desire to play an active role in international affairs particularly with respect to African and other developing nations. (Izah, 1993).

Since independence in 1960, Nigerian leaders had hoped that Nigeria would play an active role in African affairs because of her human and natural resources. The political, social and economic underdevelopment of Nigeria especially up to 1970 prevented her from effectively playing that role and assuming leadership role in Africa.

Nigeria experience civil war for 30 months. During the war majority of African countries and other developed nations the Federal Government of Nigeria. Very few did not give their backing to the Federal Government of Nigeria.

The experience of the war had tremendous effect on Nigeria's perception of its role in African and other world

affairs. The war experience had re-emphasized the need for Nigeria's closer co-operation among nation states of the world in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific.

Before the civil war, Nigeria was a nation made-up of three powerful regions with powerful leaders within the regions, but without powerful central government. However, after the civil war Nigeria emerged as a strong united country with powerful central government. Oil was discovered in great commercial quantity in Nigeria immediately after the war. Infact, by 1971 Nigeria had become the tenth world oil producer. The discovery of the oil brought enormous wealth to Nigeria.

The above factors prompted Nigeria to take active role in world affairs especially in developing countries of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries. To achieve this role, Nigeria soon saw the need to provide aids and assistance to needy nation states. In addition to providing monitory and material aids to needy countries, Nigeria soon realised the need to provide manpower aids to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. This led to the establishment of the Nigerian Technical Aid Corps (TAC) programme at the end of 1986 by Babangida's regime. Up to date, the programme has been providing manpower aids to ACP countries. This study is aimed at evaluating the programme in order to find out whether or not the programme is achieving its stated objectives, find

out the impact of the programme on Nigeria's foreign policy and find out the problems and prospects of the programme.

1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The period 1950-55 saw the beginning of the importance of aid in the economies of developing countries of Africa, the Caribbean and Asia. At this time most of the countries of Africa, Caribbean and Asia were still colonies. It was these countries that put pressure upon the developed nations to provide financial and other assistance.

The provision of aid to needy countries by donor countries could be done for several reasons. It could be for humanitarian reason or it could be used as an instrument of foreign policy. Professor Ate in his paper titled "Aid as an Instrument of Foreign Policy" postulated that aid of any kind was inter-related with foreign policy. In the early 1950s aid began as a response to the development needs of the new nations of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific. With the passing of time and the growing complexity of the international politics, aid started becoming a strong weapon and instrument of foreign policy.

The Suez canal crisis of 1956 in Egypt could probably illustrate the use of aid as a weapon and instrument of foreign policy. In February 1956 the World Bank was to provide loan of \$200 million and the USA and Britain were to provide \$70 million towards the building of Aswan Dam in

Egypt. The two World Bank, USA and Britain withdraw their offer of the loans for the dam for the fact that the then government of Egypt under Colonel Nasser was going communist and seems to support USSR during the cold war.

Nigeria as a member of the international community have her reasons for providing aids to needy ACP countries. Many scholars have put forward several reasons in an effort to explain the involvement of Nigeria in the provision of aid to African countries in particular and caribbean and pacific countries in general.

For example, Professor Ajada in his paper titled "The Blacks in Dispora" pointed out that in every four Africans, one is a Nigeria and in every five blacks in the world one is a Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeria should do all she can do within her power to defend and assist the black race. He saw the Technical Aid Corps as part of what Nigeria should be doing as the leader of the black race.

Similarly, Ate looked at the Foreign policy of Nigeria to be promoted by IAC programme in two perspectives. The idealist and Realist perspectives. On the idealist perspective, he sees TAC as a foreign policy instrument to be used in the pursuit of Nigeria's leadership responsibility to the Black Race.

On the realist perspective, he was of the view that TAC programme could be used to achieve so many things. Among others are:

- i. solving domestic unemployment problem
- ii. promotion of Nigeria's interest in the international scene
- iii. as a bargaining instrument in the international political system⁶.

In relation to the above, is the fact that all nation-states are interested in self-preservation; i.e. national security as well as stability. All nations are interested in prestige and power, which implies that every country no matter how weak or poor wants to have some degree of prestige among community of nations. Each state wants to be powerful or maximise whatever power she has. Each state aspires to have some cultural prestige, some dignity and wants to earn respect from other states⁷. A lots of scholars and political analyst believe that Nigeria could achieve the above objectives through the Technical Aid Corps programme.

From the above, it fellows that the TAC programme should be a laudable programme worth pursuing by Nigerian government regardless of the material and human efforts involved in the programme.

Strong and developed nations of USA, Britain, France, and others were using aid as an instrument in achieving their foreign policy objectives. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the North-South relationship grew more acrimonious, this led to the reassessment of the aid policies of these countries. The reassessment led them to the questions: was the provision of

aid achieving its purpose; was there to be no end to the provision of aid; what value was it to the donors? Answers to these questions led to the cut back of aid to recipient countries by U. S. A., Britain and France.

The above could be a testimony to the fact that the developed nations of U.S.A., Britain and France aid programmes are firmly based on well articulated principles, not on brotherhood or father Christmas principles. They provide aid only to those things they have in excess. Those things they don't have in excess are not to be provided as aid.

Turning to Nigeria, is the Technical Aid Corps programme firmly formulated on well articulated principles; does she realistically have the economy to provide such aid; is she not providing aid to those things she needs herself; does the money she is expending on the programme commensurate with the benefits being derived?

The main aim of this study, therefore, is to evaluate the technical Aid Corps programme. Hopefully, this would find answers to the issues raised above and elsewhere in this study.

The aid phenomena has a direct bearing with the underdevelopment of the recipient countries and the developed donor countries. The developed countries of the West, notably USA, UK, France, among others usually provide what they called Aids to the under-developed countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Pacific countries. The question is, who actually

benefits from the aid? Is it the recipient or the donor countries? The following assestion by George Washington that says, 'It is madness for one nation to expect disinterested help from another'⁸ could probably assist in finding answer to the above question.

It becomes clear from the above that there is no any aid to be given without any interest tied to it. This is particularly so with the developed western countries. It is no wander that John Foster Dulles made it known that; 'The United States does not have friends; it has interest.'⁹

Scholars like, Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, and Offiong in their theories of dependency and under-development of the third world countries saw and viewed the provision of aids to developing countries by developed nations as another means of economic and political control and exploitation of the third world countries. Amidst all these; it becomes obvious that this work falls within the under-development and dependency theory.

1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN

The study is a survey type designed to evaluate the Technical Aid Corps programme.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main aim of Nigerian Technical Aid Corps (TAC) is providing manpower developmental assistance to African,

Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. It was hoped that the programme could achieve its stated objectives that may hopefully promote Nigerian Foreign Policy.

Since its inception in 1987, the programme has been providing man-power assistance to ACP countries. The questions now are:

- i. Is the programme achieving its stated objectives?
- ii. What is the impact of the programme on Nigeria's foreign policy?
- iii. What are the benefits being derived by Nigeria from the programme?
- iv. What are the problem of the programme?
- v. What are the prospects and the future of the programme?

1.6 METHODOLOGY

The population used for the study was made up of ten TAC volunteers who had participated in the programme, the Director of Technical Aid Corps, the programme co-ordinator of TAC and two staff of Directorate of TAC.

1.7 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

The instrument used to collect data for the study were: official documents from Technical Aid Corps Office in Abuja, and interviews conducted with TAC. Volunteers that had benefited from TAC programme and three staff of the Directorate of Technical Aid Corps, Abuja.

The official documents were collected by the researcher himself. Similarly, the interviews were conducted by the researcher.

1.8 PROCEDURE FOR DATA ANALYSIS

The official documents and the results of the interviews conducted were analyzed by the researcher.

1.9 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Huge amount of money has been and is still being spent on the Nigerian Technical Aid Corps programme since its inception over a decade ago. A lot of human and material efforts have equally gone and are still going into the programme. It, then, becomes imperative to evaluate the programme with a view of finding out whether the programme is achieving its stated objectives or not, which in turn would justify the huge amount of money spent as well as material and human efforts put into the programme.

The findings of this study may assist in identifying the problems that could be constituting impediment to the achievement of the programme objectives and proffer solutions to the problems.

Furthermore, literature review had shown that an evaluation study has not been conducted on the programme in order to find out whether the programme is achieving its stated objectives or not. In view of this, the findings of

this study would serve various purpose and would be of specific interest to the following:

- i. Directorate of Nigerian Technical Aid Corps, Abuja
- ii. Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- iii. Departments of Political Science of Nigerian Universities.
- iv. Other individuals or organisations.

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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW2.1 BACKGROUND TO NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Nigeria became independent on October, 1, 1960. Until that date technically Nigeria did not have any foreign policy as it was not a sovereign state. At independence Nigeria was a federation of three main regions. There was much hope that she would play a significant role in international affairs particularly to African affairs because of her human and natural resources. But, the challenge of maintaining unity among the diverse peoples and largely autonomous regions seems to have forced the leaders to pay more attention to domestic problems immediately after independence. Much too often there has been the tendency to compare the role of Nigeria and particularly, Ghana, Guinea and Tanzania in the early 1960s and to find Nigeria failing to play her expected role. During the period covered by this study, Nigerian involvement in international affairs grew from passive to active participation particularly toward the close of the study. What this simply means is that Nigeria has particularly from 1970 been able to mobilize both human and natural resources to the pursuit of her goals and objectives in the international environment more than ever before.¹

The first six years of independence were characterized by lack of consensus among the political leaders, excessive

regional autonomy and jealousy, with the result that the central government was very much considered weaker than the region. Under the then existing domestic political climate .. it was simply not possible for Nigeria to make the desired impact on world affairs, writes Abubakar Rimi of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (later first civilian governor of Kano state). He went further to ask, 'how could the federal government under anybody, have an effective foreign policy when it is made weaker than the regional components? When the regions defy the centre? When the opposition was fermenting trouble and crisis and plotting to take over power through violence? When tribalism, sectionalism myopia, and self cantered interest were the order of the day? When the country was in a virtually state of anarchy? This seems to bring out a clear point that one of the crucial problems during the first six years after independence was how to develop a sense of belonging among the divers groups. One can not help raising the question of which comes first, a United country which can then mobilize its forces in order to attain her interest in the international system or a powerful foreign policy to be used to unite the people. the guess in the Nigerian situation is of course obvious. It would appear that these domestic problems seemed to have governed Nigerian foreign relations².

These domestic problems seem to offer more plausible explanation of the cautions and at times passive role played

by Nigerian during the civilian era more than any imported or inherited conservatism from Britain.

No nation which is weak at home politically or economically can be strong abroad. Foreign prestige is a function of home strength. The civilian regime did not have the political and economic strength of the regimes after 1970. Policy making or the identification of goals and objectives and the implementation are seen in this study as distinct. While it is argued that the goals and objectives have remained fairly consistent, the ability to attain them have drastically improved. In other words, the first civilian regime lacked the economical and political power necessary to pursue their foreign policy goals and objectives¹.

On January 15th, 1966 the civilian government of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa was overthrown by a Military Coup. Thus, began a series of effort to evolve a kind of arrangement that might enable Nigeria to utilize her human and natural resources. Regionalism, tribalism, nepotism and corruption which combined to weaken the state in the first six years of independence were to be wiped away. Their aim, according to Nzeogu, was to establish a strong, united and prosperous nation free from corruption and internal strife. There after, attention was focused on domestic uses and little attention was given to international affairs.

The weakest point in Nigerian foreign policy however was reached after the second coup, after which the Eastern region

seceded and declared the state of Biafra. The Biafran problem meant that Nigeria was forced into a position of needing foreign co-operation to support her continued existence as a sovereign state as constituted at independence. Consequently, foreign policy assumed a much larger role in the domestic politics of Nigeria than ever before⁴.

Until the need to keep Nigeria one piece, foreign policy did not serve an integrative function. But government resistance of pressures and interference from outside received the full support of the people. This was significant because it was the first time that there was consensus particularly among the elites. With the creation of states in 1967, the end of the war 1970 and the general amnesty, Nigeria had emerged more united than ever. Gowon had emerged as the saviour of the nation. He was a Nigerian hero, and he enjoyed a popular support throughout the country. The kind of support and power that no other leader before him had enjoyed.

Luckily, for the country also the oil industry exploded with the result that by the end of the year she had almost paid her war debt. Gowon post war regime showed an increasingly active participation in international, particularly African affairs by Nigeria. The lessons of the war had confirmed the need for closer cooperation among African states and the increased economic and political strength at home meant that goals of functional cooperation, preservation of sovereignty,

and the liberation of Africa could be pursued with much more vigour⁵.

The changing international situation as regarded colonialism in Africa had meant that the time is ripe to put an end once and for all to the question of colonialism in Africa. South African involvement into the Angolan situation only confirmed the earlier Nigerian fears that South Africa was the greatest enemy of black Africa and so Nigeria plunged herself with full strength into the question of liberating the remaining colonial enclaves in Africa⁶.

From the historical development of Nigeria's foreign policy, we could see the reason why Nigeria is prompted to take a leading and active role in world affairs. In addition to providing monetary and material aids to needy countries, especially poor African countries, Nigeria soon realised the need to provide manpower aid to African, caribbean and pacific (ACP) countries. By so doing, Nigeria believe that she could promote her cultural prestige earn some dignity and respect from such countries. This led to the establishment of the Nigerian Technical Aid Corps (TAC) programme at the end of 1986 by the Babangida's administration.

Since its inception to date, the programme has been providing man power aid to the ACP countries. The question now remains that; is the programme having impact on Nigeria's foreign policy? It is the intention of this study to find an answer to this question by evaluating the programme.

2.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AID

In the period 1950-55, aid began to play an increasingly important part in the economies of developing countries. Even so, it was on a small scale compared with later flows. During these years, for example, the bilateral aid flow came to a total of \$1.8 billion a year while multilateral aid only achieved a figure of \$100 million a year.

At this time most of the countries of Africa and the Caribbean as well as a number in Asia were still colonies and though they may have needed aid for their development remained dependent for its provision upon their metropolitan countries. It was the developing countries of Asia and Latin America in particular that first put pressure upon the developed nations to provide financial and other assistance. The Colombo Plan was set up in 1950 in response to their pressures. As aid became more important so the advanced economies established aid mechanisms: government ministries or other formal organizations to take responsibility for the disbursement of a donor country's official assistance⁷.

By the mid-1950s, not only was aid being provided on a substantial scale but Cold War pressures were making it exceptionally politically sensitive as well. This may be illustrated by the case of Egypt at the time of the Suez Crisis of 1956. In February 1956 agreement had been reached for the World Bank to provide a loan worth \$200 million to finance the building of the Aswan High Dam on condition that

the USA and Britain provided a further loan of \$70 million to pay for materials and technical services. Egypt, for her part, was to provide the loan equivalent of \$900 million in services and materials. It was one of the largest aid packages to that date. Cold War considerations dominated the aid officers from both sides. Colonel Nasser was using his growing influence in the Middle East to oppose the Baghdad Pact which had been formed in 1955 and was clearly aimed at the communist bloc. The western offer to build the Aswan Dam was a move in the Cold War, made in response to hints (which the west did not believe) that the USSR would put up the money if the west failed to do so. In reaction to Nasser's continued 'intransigence' (it was the time when the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had said that either you are with us or against us in Cold War terms) the USA withdrew its offer of finance for the dam in July 1956. The British followed suit with the result that the World Bank offer of loan was also withdrawn. These moves led Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal in retaliation, so precipitating the Suez Crisis. Later the USSR did provide the loans which made possible the building of the Aswan Dam. The case of Egypt was a classic illustration of aid being used by both sides as a weapon - assistance to be given or withheld depending upon how the recipient behaved in Cold War terms⁸.

In the 1950s, then, the Cold War provided much of the political pressure for aid. This political approach was

reinforced by the popular economic arguments of the time which came to be associated with the American W. W. Rostow: that the newly emerging nations would only be able to bring their economies to the point of 'take-off' if they received and equate flow of capital to assist their development.

As early as 1956, the USA had passed its International Development Act; then Public Law 480 (P:480) was also passed under which food aid could be provided. In 1960, the new American President, John F. Kennedy, announced the Alliance for Progress.

The 1960s were to see a new mood applied to aid, Liberal opinion in the West begin to argue - with considerable success - that it was counter productive to apply aid to Cold War measures. The Third World countries which had already advanced the concept of Non-Alignment at the 1955 Bandung Conference were now joined by a new generation of freshly independent states as the western empires in Africa and the Caribbean were dismantled. And a great wave of popular enthusiasm in western countries saw the launching of the Peace Corps, VSO, CUSO and many other similar volunteer organizations to make popular the idea of aid and overseas service. In their widely read book The Ugly American Lederer and Burdick gave examples of how aid could be misused when it became a weapon of Cold War strategy. The United Nations declared the 1960s to be its First Decade of Development and

called upon the advanced economies to make available one per cent of their GNPS for development assistance.

During the next few years the main aid mechanisms - ministries or departments - were established. The USA created its Agency for International Development (AID), France set up the Ministry of Development Co-operation and Britain the Ministry of Overseas Development (now the Overseas Development Administration). In 1962, the OECD established the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) which became the most important donor club.

It is important to follow the growth of the aid idea. In the early 1950s it began as a response to the development needs of the new nations, especially those of Asia which had emerged from the European empires. Then the Cold War moved centre stage and too obviously aid became a weapon to be used or not depending upon the politics of a potential recipient nation. By the 1960s more sensible or relaxed views began to prevail and aid was to be less tied to Cold War considerations. At the same time aid became a popular cause in the western world: this popularity was reflected in the emergence of the volunteer movements. By the end of the decade, however, aid needed to be reassessed. In 1969 Lester Pearson, the former Prime Minister of Canada, was responsible for the Pearson Report (as a decade later Willy Brandt, the former Chancellor of West Germany, was to produce the Brandt Report). The Pearson Report called upon donor countries to

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provide 0.7 per cent of their GNPS as official aid by the end of the 1970s.

The decade of the 1970s, however, became increasingly difficult as the North-South relationship grew more acrimonious. In western countries disillusionment with aid set in: was it achieving its purpose; was there to be no end to the process; what value was it to the donors. In the USA, the pacesetter for the west, aid was cut back. On the other hand the Scandinavian countries and Holland were generous aid donors over these years and the only countries to achieve the Pearson goal of..... per cent of GNP for official assistance. In the middle of the decade the Yom Kappur War in the Middle East led the Agabs to use the oil weapon. As a result of the fourfold increase in the price of oil a number of Gulf states became immensely rich and were able to force the major countries of the west to sit down with representatives of the Third World and begin what we have come to call the North-South dialogue> This dialogue came to play an important role in rich-poor relations for the balance of the 1970s. Finally, during this decade, the number of UN members reached the 150 mark and organized pressures exerted upon the donor countries became stronger than ever before. Under the presidency of Rober McNamara the World Bank became the largest single source of development funds in the world.

These developments gave aid a central role in international affairs. Most developing countries were in

regular receipt of aid; often this formed an essential ingredient of their budgets. And almost all rich countries accepted the need to provide aid. This acceptance of aid as an apparently permanent aspect of the international relationship produced its own reaction. The enthusiasm of the early 1960s was replaced by indifference or a growing evnicis. When at the end of the 1970s ex-Chancellor Brandt of West Germany was asked to head the Independent Commission on International Development Issues to produce what has become known as the Brandt Report (Published in 1980) he did so against a background of growing world depression, disillusionment with aid a (growing number of people were seriously questioning whether aid does help development) and an increasing western tendency to downgrade all questions relating to North-South dialogue, as home problems of recession and unemployment became more acute and politically pressing. In consequence, the 1980s began with a number of question marks hanging over the very idea of aid.

Even so, aid is now highly organized; its administration is often streamlined; and both sides in the aid debate - donors and recipients - go through well known procedures in order to tackle new development problems⁹.

2.2.2 TYPES OF AID

Aid can be broken down under a number of headings. It may be provided in the form of financial grants and loans

technical assistance, food aid, emergency assistance among many others. It comes as both bilateral and multilateral¹⁰.

1. Bilateral Aid

This is direct country to country aid: for example, Britain answering a Kenyan request for a loan or France responding to a similar request from the Ivory Coast. The source of bilateral aid is one country and whatever arrangement is made is between the donor and the recipient. As a result the donor controls the way in which the aid is given and can take any political credit for whatever is achieved.

2. Multilateral Aid

This consists of aid channelled through an international agency such as the World Bank or one of the UN Agencies although it may also come from a group like the EEC. The advantage of this form of aid - so it is argued - is that it is free of politics and so is likely to be more objective. It does not always work in this way but that at any rate is the theory. But whether aid comes from a bilateral source - a single country - or a multilateral source it may still take a number of forms.

3. Project Aid

This is aid provided for a precise development: For the construction of a dam or the building of a road, the preparation of a university complex for a scheme of integrated rural development. projects can be watched as they grow and project aid is popular with donors since they can supervise their aid inputs and, if necessary, reassess the project from time to time. Furthermore, project aid provides a political bonus at the conclusion since as a rule something concrete has been left behind which can be pointed to as a British, American or World Bank achievement. It is important not to underestimate this factor. Both bilateral and multilateral donors like to be able to point to what they or their institution have achieved. Moreover, if donors feel satisfied it is easier for them to justify further aid to their constituents or electorates. Almost of World Bank aid is tied to projects as is a high proportion of all other aid.

One of the drawbacks to this approach is that the project may become a showpiece which is little related to the real needs of the local people. Donors may become more anxious to show what they have achieved on the ground than concerned with its effects upon the people it is supposed to assist. On the other side recipient governments are sometimes so busy making political

mileage out of what they have provide for their people that they overlook more fundamental needs. Project aid, in other words, makes it easy for both sides in the aid equation to appear to be doing something useful.

4. Programme Aid

Programme aid consists of more general help for a country's on-going development efforts without the aid being tied to specific projects. Such aid provides foreign exchange which allows the recipient to purchase foreign inputs and sustain its development momentum. Supervision is more difficult: in effect the donor provides finance for the recipient and leaves its use to the latter's discretion. Programme aid is politically less popular with donors than project aid. It may be more useful at the recipient end.

5. Technical Assistance

This covers three activities, First, the provision of experts and advisers. These may be provided to do a precise job where no local people with the requisite training are available. Or they may act as advisers, usually to the government, on specific projects or general planning. In most cases technical assistance includes - or should include - the training of local counterparts while the job is being done.

Second, technical assistance concern training in the rather different sense when experts are sent specifically to train local people at college, university or at some other training establishment. Alternatively training may be provided in the donor country where places at its universities or other higher education establishments are made available for trainees from a Third World country. There is a huge and apparently growing need for technical assistance: as countries overcome one problem in their development so they discover the need for new skills and further trained personnel as they go on to the next stage. It will long time, it seems, before technical assistance can be phased out.

5. Financial Aid

Financial aid comes in several forms. It could come in the form of direct donation of money to a recipient country, payment of project or programme by the donor country or provision of loans (soft or hard) to the recipient country.

7. Food Aid

Food aid consists mainly of cereals followed by dairy products, fats and cooking oils. Most food aid is given bilaterally while the share of the World Food Programme (WFP) is twenty-five per cent.

The main sources of food aid are the USA (50%), the EEC (20%) and Canada (10%). A major criticism of food aid is that it is a cheap way for donors to offload their surplus foods and keep their own farmers happy. The majority of food aid goes to low income countries with food production deficits. Over the years 1976 - 81, for example, fifty per cent of all food aid went to four countries with large or very large populations: Egypt, Bangladesh, Indonesia and India.

8. Emergency Assistance

This is given in response to disasters: floods, earthquakes, droughts or other natural calamities and to provide for the refugees created by such disasters or as a result of wars. Emergency aid for feeding and clothing refugees is provided by various relief agencies, many of them non-government and channelled through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.

Apart from bilateral - country to country - responses to emergencies a number of international bodies exist specially to deal with these emergencies. The most famous of all is the International Red Cross. The UNHCR is solely concerned with refugees as opposed to other disasters. The World Food Programme has created the International Emergency Food Resources (IEFR). Some

countries such as Sweden or Britain have created their own disaster relief organizations while a number of voluntary organizations (NGOS) such as Save the Children or War on Want began in response to emergencies.

9. Military Aid

This comes in many forms: It could be in the form of providing military equipment and or training. It could be in the form of providing troops for peace keeping or defence agreement with a recipient country.

Since independence, Nigeria has been providing the above discussed aids to needy countries especially the ACP countries. However, in 1980s Nigeria realised the importance of providing technical assistance in promoting and achieving her its foreign policy objectives. Consequently, in 1986, Nigeria established the Technical Aid Corps programme. The programme has been providing man power technical assistance to ACP countries since its inception. This study hope to evaluate the programme in order to find out whether or not the programme is a achieving its stated objectives.

2.3 TECHINICAL AID CORPS (TAC) PROGRAMME

2.3.1 BACKGROUND

It was on October 1, 1987 that the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. General Ibrahim Babangida, announced the creation of the Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TAC). The rationale behind the establishment of TAC was, according to the then President, "to assist States in Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific Regions, which in the past requested Nigeria's assistance, in the field of expert personnel". The President added by saying that the Scheme would enable Nigeria shares its known how and expertise with its fields and neighbours. The President made it very clear in his speech that 'Nigeria looks forward to no other compensation than fostering of mutual understanding'. The Scheme was expected to serve Nigeria's foreign policy objective of 'the eradication of colonialism, Apartheid, and the enhancement of the dignity of black man in the Diaspora'. The Scheme was therefore not only an explicitly demonstration of Nigeria's foreign policy aims and objectives but also 'a realistic and bold alternative to direct financial aid to the recipient countries'.

2.3.2 OBJECTIVES

Though the Scheme was announced and its operations started in 1987 the legal backing to it by way of a decree and official Gazette publication of same did not come up till May 1988.

1993. President Babangida signed Decree 27 establishing the Nigerian Technical Aid Corps into law on January 22 1993. It was published in the official Gazette of May 5 1993. The Decree lists the following four major objectives of TAC:

- i. To share Nigeria's know-how and expertise with other African, Caribbean and Pacific countries;
- ii. To give assistance on the basis of the assessed and perceived needs of the recipient countries;
- iii. To promote co-operation and understanding between Nigeria and recipient countries; and
- iv. To facilitate meaningful contacts between the youths of Nigeria and those of the recipient countries¹².

Indeed, the declared objectives of TAC were primarily to promote mutual understanding between Nigeria and the target/recipient countries, through which the dignity of black people would be promoted. None the less, it was quite understandable that, through implementation, Nigeria was expected to use the Scheme as a foreign policy instrument to realize its national interests. In this regard, recipient countries were expected to at least respect Nigeria's declared interest in the international fora. It follows therefore that despite the declared objectives of the Scheme, Nigeria stood to gain diplomatically from its over all implementation.

The Decree establishing the Scheme vests its implementation in the Directorate of Technical Aid Corps. The Directorate, according to the Decree, "shall be an integral

part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All matters affecting the Scheme were the responsibility of the Directorate. Such matters include the management and general administration, recruitment and orientation of volunteer corps; assigning volunteers to recipient countries; and receiving and debriefing of volunteers on their return from the recipient countries.

2.3.3 SELECTION OF VOLUNTEERS

To partake in the Scheme, a prospective volunteer should have acquired at least a University Degree or its equivalent, a minimum of three (3) years post qualification working experience, and any such other professional qualification as the Directorate may, from time to time, specify. There is no limit to the professional fields from which selections were to be made. The field of selection are dependent on the recipient countries' requests. The assistance offered under the Scheme is covered by an Agreement between Nigeria and the receiving country detailing responsibilities and obligations of each of the signatory party. The responsibilities of Nigeria under the Scheme, among other things, includes the sourcing of volunteers, payments of both offshore and onshore allowances as well as the passages to and fro of volunteers to the countries of their deployments. The recipient countries on their part provide appropriate accommodation, medical

facilities and transportation to and from the places of work of the volunteers.

Though the Directorate is responsible for the recruitment and the selection of the volunteers, recruitment and selection go through three stages of screening and short-listing; interview and selection. The Directorate nonetheless utilizes the assistance of professional bodies in this process. Such bodies include, among others, the Nigerian Medical Council, Council of Registered Engineers of Nigeria; Nigerian Midwifery and Nursing Association; Nigeria Bar Association; Nigerian Institute of International Affairs; The Presidency; the Federal Ministry of Education and other relevant bodies. The professional bodies assist not only in ensuring that the best candidates are selected in their respective fields of specialization but also ensure the application of the Federal Character in the selection of candidates. The involvement of the professional bodies is concentrated on the interview and selection of candidates. The Directorate is solely responsible for screening and short-listing of candidates. Once the candidates were selected and cleared by the recipient countries, they would undergo an orientation programme by the Directorate before departing for their respective posts. Their service period is for a fixed non-renewable period of two years. However, the recipient countries are free to offer those volunteers permanent jobs in their respective fields after their service periods¹³.

2.3.4 DEPLOYMENT OF VOLUNTEERS

At inception in 1987, 102 pioneer volunteers were deployed to twelve countries. The pioneer recipient states were: Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, Zambia, Mozambique, Lesotho, Jamaica and Fiji. By the middle of 1989, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Djibouti, Suriname and Guyana had requested for volunteers. Consequently, the scheme has witnessed a steady increase in the number of volunteers and receiving states. From the 102 volunteers deployed to 12 ACP countries between 1987 and 1988, the number increased to 237 volunteers for 27 ACP states during 1992 to 1994 service period. Indeed, as at 1998 over 1049 volunteers had participated in the scheme in 21 African countries, 5 Caribbean states and one Pacific Region country. The countries that have, so far availed themselves of Nigerian volunteers are as follows: Angola, Belize, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central Africa Republic, Comoro Islands, Cote d'Ivoire, Commonwealth of Dominica, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji Island, The Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya (Shelter Afrique) Kingdom of Lesotho, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, St. Kitts and Nevis, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

Many of the recipient States and the UNDP have engaged the services of over 94 (Ninety-four) of the Volunteers at the expiration of their service period on separate mutually agreed

terms. Such countries include Jamaica, The Gambia, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Fiji Island, to mention a few. Some ACP States have equally used the TAC facility to recruit Nigerian professionals on contract basis. The import of these records of achievements is that TAC volunteers have played and continued to play a key role in projecting a positive image of Nigeria and Nigerians in the recipient countries. This development accords with the foreign policy objectives of Government.

2.3.5 THE IMPACT OF TECHNICAL AID CORPS (TAC) PROGRAMME

Since its inception in 1987, the programme have been providing the required manpower to ACP countries. The acceptability of the programme by both volunteers and recipient countries is shown by the yearly increase of number of volunteers and recipient countries. For example, the scheme started with only 102, volunteers and 12 recipient countries. As of writing this report over 1,000 volunteers have participated and about 36 ACP countries have benefited or now benefiting from the scheme. This could be regarded as measure of achievement and success of the programme.

With regards to the above, it could be argued that the scheme seems to be facilitating contact between the youths of Nigeria and those of the recipient countries thereby promoting cooperation and understanding between Nigeria and the

recipient countries. This is another mark of success of the scheme.

Turning to the impact of the programme on Nigeria's foreign policy, the rationale behind the establishment of the scheme was to assist ACP countries and for Nigeria to use the scheme as a foreign policy instrument to realize its national and international interest. It was found that the programme seems to be earning Nigeria some cultural prestige dignity and respect not only from ACP countries, but from other countries and international organisations. Analyses have shown that the recipient countries of the scheme seems to respect Nigeria's declared interest in the international fora.

Similarly, Nigeria seems to be using the programme as foreign policy instrument to realise its national interest. This could be shown by Nigeria withdrawal of its TAC volunteers from countries such as Jamaica and Zambia because of their anti-Nigerian posture in the international fora. By this, it could be argued that Nigeria seems to be gaining diplomatically from its overall implementation of the scheme. This could be regarded as mark of achievement and success in Nigeria's foreign policy.

In addition to the above, it was found that Nigeria benefits from TAC programme in so many ways, among the main ones are the following:

- i. Nigeria is using the scheme to get employment for its youth in other countries and international organisations.

For example, about 15% of the ex-volunteers have either been retained as permanent staff by the recipient countries and organisations or were recruited by the United Nations volunteer service. The facility of the TAC are now been used by ACP countries to recruit Nigerian professionals on a contract basis.

- ii. Using the scheme to get employment for Nigerian youth could be regarded as an indirect way of solving domestic unemployment problem of Nigeria.
- iii. Nigerian youth that get employment in other countries and organisations through the scheme gets their salaries in hard foreign currencies in which they remit some to Nigeria. This, in one way contributes to Nigerian economy

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CHAPTER III

RESULTS, ANALYSIS & DISCUSSIONS

In this chapter, the data collected for the study are presented and analyzed to answer the research questions. The results are then discussed.

The study was designed to find answers to the following questions:

- i. Is TAC programme achieving its stated objectives?
- ii. What is the impact of the programme on Nigerian's foreign policy?
- iii. What are the benefits been derived by Nigeria from the programme?
- iv. What are the problems of the programme?
- v. What are the prospects and the future of the programme?

3.1 RESULTS

The instruments used to collect data for the study were official documents from TAC office in Abuja and interviews conducted with TAC staff and Ex-TAC volunteers. The following are the results obtained:

3.1.1 Results from the official documents and interviews conducted with selected staff of TAC office, Abuja

TAC OBJECTIVES

1. To serve as a foreign Policy option aimed at complementing other forms of assistance to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.
2. To share Nigeria's know-how and expertise with other African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.
3. To promote co-operation and understanding between Nigeria and the recipient countries.
4. To facilitate meaningful contact between the youths of Nigeria and those of the recipient countries¹.

The Recipient Countries, Past and Present

The Nigerian Technical Aid Corps beneficiary countries, past and present are as follows:

AFRICA

1. Angola
2. Burkina Faso
3. Cape Verde
4. Central African Republic
5. Comoros Island
6. Djibouti

7. Equitorial Guinea
8. Ghana
9. Kenya
10. Lesotho
11. Liberia
12. Mozambique
13. Namibia
14. Senegal
15. Seychelles
16. Sierra Leone
17. Swaziland
18. Tanzania (ANC, Morogoro)
19. The Gambia
20. Zambia

CARIBBEAN

1. Belize
2. Commonwealth of Dominica
3. Guyana
4. Jamaica
5. St. Kitts and Nevis

PACIFIC REGION

1. Fiji Islands

NEW REQUESTS

1. Brazil in South America
2. Malaysia in Asia
3. Niger in Africa
4. Philippines in Asia
5. Sao Tome and Principe
6. Togo in Africa².

At inception in 1987, the programme started with only 12 recipient countries. The number grew to 27 ACP states during 1992/1994 service period. The number has now swelled up to 32 countries during the 1999/2001 service period. The number is expected to continue growing as new ACP countries are making requests to benefit from the programme.

TAC VOLUNTEERS

The programme started with only 102 volunteers in 1987. This number increased to 237 in 1992. As at 1998, over 1049 volunteers had participated in the scheme. 376 volunteers participated in the 1999-2001 orientation course and were deployed to various ACP countries.

Many of the ACP countries and the UNDP have engaged the services of the volunteers at the expiration of their service period on separate mutually agreed terms. Some ACP states have equally used the TAC facility to recruit Nigerian professionals on contract basis. This is still going on. For

example, during the last exercise (199/2001) about 35 medical doctors, were forwarded to Fiji for direct employment.

PROBLEMS

1. FUNDING

The programme is highly capital extensive requiring millions of dollars for its execution. This has been the programme's main, problem since its inception to date³.

2. POPULATION EXPLOSION OF VOLUNTEERS

When the scheme started in 1987, it started with moderate number of applications from volunteers. However, as time goes on the applications started multiplying geometrically with each passing service period.

For example, in the 1999-2001 service period, over 40,000 volunteers applied, out of which only 300 were selected to participate.

3. RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

- i. Inability of fulfilment of terms of agreement by some recipient countries.
- ii. Delay in the clearance of volunteers by most of the recipient countries.

iii. Inadequate publicity that is given to the scheme in the recipient countries³.

4. COMPETITION FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AND ORGANISATIONS

The following countries and organisations compete with Nigeria in sending volunteers to ACP countries.

- i. Cuba
- ii. China
- iii. U. K.
- iv. America
- v. Egypt
- vi. UN among others⁶.

5. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The international politics going on at given period of time sometimes interferes with the activities of the programme⁷.

6. VOLUNTEERS

The unbecoming attitudes and activities of some volunteers, who either indulge in private practice or other personal pursuits to the detriment of their primary assignments⁸.

3.1.2 RESULTS FROM THE INTERVIEW CONDUCTED WITH SOME EX-TAC VOLUNTEERS

From the interview conducted it was found that the programme is mainly made up of the followings:

- i. hardships
- ii. frustration
- iii. difficulties,
- iv. challenges
- v. gains⁹.

3.2 DISCUSSIONS

The main objective of this study was to evaluate the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) programme in order to answer the following questions:

- i. Is TAC programme achieving its stated objectives?
- ii. What is the impact of the programme on Nigeria's foreign policy?
- iii. What are the benefits being derived by Nigeria from the programme?
- iv. What are the problems of the programme?
- v. What are the prospects and the future of the programme?

Official documents from TAC office and interviews conducted were the instruments used to collect data in order to answer the above questions. Data were collected and analyzed by the researcher.

On the question "is TAC programme achieving its stated objectives?" The answer to this question has been discussed in chapter two under the impact of TAC programme.

On the question of the problems of the TAC programme, this could be viewed and discussed under the following headings:

3.2.1 THE PROBLEMS OF TAC PROGRAMME

i. Directorate of Technical Aid Corps

The Directorate is charged with the responsibility of the overall management and general administration of the TAC programme, conducting interview and recruiting volunteers, organising orientation courses for selected volunteers, providing return air ticketing offshore and onshore monthly allowance to each volunteer and other activities involving miscellaneous expenses. All these requires millions of dollars for their execution. The subventions and extra-budgetary allocations from the Federal Government to the Directorate are grossly inadequate to meet the demand of the Directorate. The financial constraints seems to be the main factor affecting the smooth and effective running of the programme.

Population explosion of volunteers applying to participate in the scheme in each service period is another serious problem affecting the TAC Directorate. The

Directorate use to set certain criteria and for prospective volunteers have to satisfy the criteria before they are selected for interview. During the interview, successful candidates are subjected to vigorous interview processes.

Whatever the criteria set and whatever the nature of the interview process the Directorate always end up with huge number of over qualified candidates for either interview or final selection. Because of the financial constraints of the Directorate, the Directorate can only select very few candidates to participate in the programme in each service period.

The following could probably illustrate the point being made. In the 1996/98 service period, about 38,000 candidates applied, 4,000 were called for interview. Only 200 candidates were finally selected to participate in the programme for that service period. Because of this, all kinds of things comes into play (politics, corruption, tribalism, Regionalism and what have you) during the final selection of volunteers thereby causing all kinds of problems to the Directorate.

Another problem that is of concern to the Directorate and the scheme is the inability of fulfilment of terms of agreement by some recipient countries. For example, some recipient countries failure to accommodate volunteers have resulted in the Directorate having to shoulder added financial burden of renting suitable accommodation and paying medical expenses for the volunteers. Among such countries are

Equatorial Guinea and the Gambia. Added to the above have been the inadequate publicity that is given to the scheme in recipient countries. This unawareness make some citizens of recipient countries to nurture the ideas that Nigeria is using the scheme to provide employment for its excess manpower or worse still, that the scheme may be used for other sinister purpose. This brings problems not only to the Directorate but to the volunteers and other Nigeria citizens in such recipient countries.

The Directorate have to receive clearance from recipient countries before volunteers are allowed to travel to their respective countries. Some recipient countries are in the habit of delaying clearance for volunteers thereby causing problems for the Directorate.

Because of the diplomatic gains that goes with provision of Technical Aid, many countries are now embarking on the provision of aids to ACP countries such countries includes: America, Cuba, China, Egypt and U.K. Nigeria now compete with these countries. This competition is another source of problems to the Directorate.

International politics is another important factor affecting the Directorate and the scheme. The commonwealth's decision in Auckland to suspend Nigeria's membership to the organisation following the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa triggered reaction that affected the TAC programme. While in pursuance to the International Community's Pariah Status

accorded Nigeria, Namibia withheld clearance for volunteers recruited for that country. Tied to the same trends Nigeria had to withdraw assistance, with TAC volunteers inclusive to countries such as Jamaica and Zambia because of their anti-Nigeria posture in international fora.

The unbecoming attitudes and activities of some volunteers are another source of problem to the directorate. Some volunteers either indulge in private practice or other personal pursuits to the detriment of their primary assignment. Some were reported behaving in a way that might portray Nigeria and Nigerians bad.

i. TAC VOLUNTEERS

Findings from the interviewed conducted with some ex-TAC volunteers have shown that the programme as it affects them is a combination of hardships, frustration, difficulties, challenges and gains. At home, Nigeria they come in different forms and ways. The first is the herculean task of getting selected to participate in the programme. If a volunteer is lucky to be selected to participate in the scheme the next problem is getting clearance from the recipient country deployed. In some cases, the clearance takes months before it comes. In some it takes years while in some cases it does not come at all. This creates untold hardships, frustrations and difficulties not only to the volunteers but to the TAC Directorate as well.

The following could probably illustrate the point being made. In 1997/99 serving period, about 65 volunteers were deployed to Namibia; but up to the time of writing this report their clearance is yet to arrive.

Some volunteers complained that, the onshore allowance given to them is not enough to take care of their family commitments in Nigeria. This is so because the allowance is converted from dollar to Naira at government approved rate.

Away from Nigeria, in the recipient countries, volunteers encounter difficulties, frustration and hardship in many ways. The first, is getting to know the people by their culture, getting familiar with the new environment and the problem of trying to re-adjust in order to fit in. Loneliness and boredom that could lead to home sickness and other temptations is a big challenge that volunteers have to live with.

Due to initial lack of trust and the believe that volunteers have come to take their jobs, Indigens of recipient countries are sometimes hostile to volunteers. Consequently, they feel insecure with volunteers. Added to this, is the fact that indigens have the believe that their home government pays volunteers.

The TAC voluntarism is not made up of difficulties, hardships and frustrations only but it has its own gains and reward. First and foremost, it enable the volunteers to get exposed and gain experiences by going out of their country of

birth to another. This widens their scope and perception of the world outside Nigeria.

Participating in the programme is like going on break for the volunteers. Break from stress and pressure of whatever sort. The period usually serves as time for the volunteers to sit back, reflect and try to consolidate their life.

Volunteers gain financially from the scheme as well. Their offshore allowance is paid in dollars. For those who are able to utilise their allowance well, would emerge financially strong at the end of their service period. Findings have shown that some volunteers were able to buy or build their personal houses, bought cars and invested in business after their service period.

Added to the above, is the fact that, volunteers use the scheme to get contract or permanent employment in their respective recipient countries or other international organisations.

After we have looked and discussed about the nature and structure of Nigerian Technical Aid Corps programme, its aim and objectives, its problems and prospects the questions that remain pertinent are: does Nigeria have the economy to continue providing such aid; is there to be no end or time frame to the programme; is the scheme actually having value to the recipient countries; is Nigeria not providing aid to those things she needs and herself; does the money she is expending on the programme commensurate with the benefits being derived?

Findings from this study have shown that the scheme seems to be having value to the recipient countries. On the question whether Nigeria is not providing aid to those things she need and herself? It is a common knowledge in Nigeria that professionals like Doctors, Nurses, teachers, etc, seems to be inadequate to meet her needs. But it could be argued that the number of professionals that participate in the scheme in each service period is so insignificant to cause any problem.

On whether the monies Nigeria is expending on TAC programme is commensurate with the benefits being derived. To answer this question we have to first consider the followings:

- i. the position and the role Nigeria is expected to play in ACP countries in particular and the world at large.

- ii. The short and long term socio-political and economic gains Nigeria is capable of deriving from the schemes. When we consider these factors, to my mind the benefit Nigeria is capable of deriving from the scheme seems to be commensurate if not more than the monies she is expending on the programme.

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SUMMARY, GENERALISATION, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, a brief statement of the problem the procedures used as well as the findings are presented. The generalisations made on the basis of the findings, the implications of the findings and recommendations are also presented.

4.1 SUMMARY

The main objectives of this study were:

- i. to find out if TAC programme is achieving its stated objectives or not.
- ii. to find out the impact of the programme on Nigeria's foreign policy.
- iii. to find out other benefits been derived by Nigeria from the programme.
- iv. to find out the problems of the programme and its future prospects.

Official documents from TAC Directorate and interviews conducted were the instruments used to collect data for the study.

It was found that at inception, in 1987, the programme started with only 12 recipient countries and 102 volunteers. The number of recipient countries have now swelled to 32 during the 1999/2001 service periods. Over 1,000 volunteers have now participated in the programme. The number of recipient countries and volunteers keeps on increasing with each service period year.

The acceptability of the programme by both recipient countries and volunteers have shown that the programme is achieving its stated objectives. It was found that TAC programme is indeed a vital tool of implementing Nigeria's foreign policy. Nigeria is using the programme to get employment for its youth in other countries and international organisations.

As with any programme the scheme has its own problems. Among the most important ones are: funding, population explosion of volunteers, problems from recipient countries and volunteers, competition from other countries and organisations and international politics.

4.2 GENERALIZATION

The following generalisations may be drawn on the basis of the findings of this study:

- i. To some reasonable extent this study has succeeded in evaluating the TAC programme.

- ii. TAC programme has achieved and is achieving its stated objective. The programme is indeed, not only a vital tool of implementing Nigeria's foreign policy but an instrument used by Nigeria to achieve economic, social and other political interest. Thus, the scheme is a laudable programme Nigeria cannot afford to abandoned.
- iv. The yearly increase of number of recipient countries and volunteers shows the acceptability of the programme.
- v. The programme is besieged with numerous problems that is hampering its smooth and effective implementation.

4.3 IMPLICATIONS

Since this study has, to some reasonable extent evaluated the TAC programmes, the results and suggestions from this study could be used to improve the scheme. The acceptability of the programme by recipient countries and volunteers plus the economic, social and political benefits Nigeria is deriving from the scheme have show that the programme is worth pursuing at all cost.

The programme is beseiged with numerous problems within and outside Nigeria that seems to be constituting empediment to its smooth and effective implementation, therefore, all efforts to eliminate or reduce the problems should be done.

4.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of the findings of this study, their discussions and implications, the following recommendations are made:

1. The findings from this study, have shown that TAC, programme is achieving, its stated objectives and that Nigeria is gaining politically, economically and socially from the scheme. Therefore, Nigeria should continue with the programme.
2. The objectives, management and administration of the programme should be re-examined, re-structured and re-organised to make it more effective.
3. The subventions and extra-budgetary allocations from the Federal Government to TAC Directorate should be tripled.
4. TAC Directorate should come-up with ways of solving the problem of population explosion of volunteers, problems from recipient countries and international politics interfering with the scheme.
5. TAC Directorate should only deploy volunteers to those recipient countries that abide and fulfil their terms of agreements.
6. Postings to recipient countries should only be made known to selected volunteers, after receiving their clearance.

Off-shore and on-shore allowance of volunteers should be increased especially with the recent increased of salaries by Obasanjo's Government.

Highly qualified Nigerians with good training and records of achievements should continue to be sent out on the programme.

To the volunteers, voluntarism means the giving altruistically out of divine love without asking for much in return. Consequently, voluntarism is characterised by some hardships, frustrations, difficulties, challenges and of course some gains. This means that, volunteers should be considerate, and patient. Above all, they should always think of what they could do to the programme not what they can gain from it.

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