TITLE

AN EVALUATION OF THE 1988 CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS IN KOGI STATE


BY

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, INSTITUTE OF ADMINISTRATION, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, /ARIA IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF A MASTERS DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (MPA) OF THE UNIVERSITY.

DECLARATION

I TUTU, Moses M. Tuwuma hereby declare that this thesis is written by me and that it was not copied from past research work. As much as possible, works of learned scholars cited in this thesis have accordingly been acknowledged. I therefore, take every responsibility for any short comings therein.



Tutu Moses

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to the following people: the blessed memory of my late father, Mallam Momoh Tutu, My loving mother, Suba Momoh Tutu (Mrs), my dear wife Hannah M. Tutu (Mrs), and my eldest sister Ramotu Bamaiyi Jigo (Mrs).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am indebted to my Supervisor, Professor P C A Daudu of the Department of Public Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria for his interest and painstaking supervision of my work from the beginning to the end despite the fact that the Academic Staff of all Universities in Nigeria were on strike during the period I was conducting the research. Dr. Omale of the same Department (Internal Supervisor) also deserves the same gratitude.

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My special thanks go to Mohammed Koro, Chief Commercial Officer in the Kwara State Ministry of Commerce and Industry for his strong financial and moral support to my family and myself through the period of undertaking this academic pursuit. May the Almighty God reward him abundantly (Amen).

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ABSTRACT

The Civil Service popularly called "Bureaucracy" has faced a lot of criticisms and condemnations by successive governments foi its alleged low level of efficiency and effectiveness, corruption and almost total lack of commitment. Because of these negative views of the Service, several Commissions. Panels and Committees have been set up to overhaul it but to no avail

The 1988 Civil Service Reforms therefore, is aimed at redressing the ills of the Service which previous Reforms have not been able to tackle.

This research has arisen with a view to evaluating the extent of implementation of the Reforms and its consequent effect on the efficiency and effectiveness of the Service.

Our findings have proved the following the need for re-introduction of the post of Mead of Service is very essential; the acrimony between the "professionals" and the "Administrators" has been removed to a great extent even though not-wholly; the Accountability clause which makes Commissioners both Chief Executives and Accounting Officers has not produced positive results.

Based on these findings, Kogi State carved out of the then Kwaia and Benue States has to a large extent implemented the recommendations of the 1988 Civil Service Reforms.

It further shows that the state is endowed with efficient manpower who if given enough encouragement will produce high results

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement Of The Problem

The Civil Service popularly called the "Bureaucracy" which is supposed to be that public machinery established for the purposes of articulating, promoting and executing government programmes and policies with the sole aim of development, has now been associated especially in less developed countries, with negative connotations and functions. The writings, comments and observations of learned scholars have alluded to this aspect.

This fact has been observed, noted, assessed and re-emphasized through various intellectual explanations: "Bureaucracy" appears to have acquired an opprobrious meaning and odious connotation because it is associated with inefficiency, lack of initiative, unintelligent rigidity in the approach to human problems, undue fussiness and bossiness on the part of officials and down-right stubbornness.[1]

We clamour for fast development of the economy and we seem to believe that the importation of technology is the answer; it would appear that a mighty spanner has been thrown into our wheel of progress by an unreasoning bureaucratic protocol and redtapism in a bid to maintain the statusquo.[2]

Ivon Stein noted that salaried, book-learned, disinterested, property-less bureaucrats ... who come rain or shine, let taxes rise or fall, ... they draw their offices behind close doors and bring up their children to be just as useful writing machines ... there is the ruin

of our dear father land.[3]

Joseph Stalin complaining about "Bureaucracy" observed that the danger is represented not only and so much by the old bureaucrats ... particularly by the new bureaucrats,... they have in mind those communists who try to replace the creative initiative and independent activity of the millions of working class and peasantry by office instructions and "decrees"... [4]

Ferrel Heady identified basic characteristics of the "Bureaucracy" in developing countries to include deficient skilled manpower necessary for developmental programmes; bureaucracies emphasize orientations that are other than production oriented.[5]

Onyia observed that government's efforts at revamping the nation's battered economy might come to nought unless the country's Civil Services are drastically re-organised and purged of their colonial mentality syndrome. The Nigerian Civil Services are still regimented by the rigid rules which are backward looking testament.[6] Igbintade commented that the Federal Government should re-organise the federal Civil Service so as to make the nation's budget a reality; success in implementation of the budget depends on efficiency and effectiveness of the civil servants because they have always frustrated the good intentions of all budget by their bureaucratic approach...[7]

Isah Hashim has observed that in the Nigerian environment, the public sector is predominantly, inefficient and highly prone to corrupt practices.[8]

The bureaucratic bourgeoisie that has been ruling Nigeria in collaboration with its

imperialist mentors since 1960 is addicted to bureaucratic and technocratic planning. This is being faithful to its class and character. The process starts with the conception of planning as a technical exercise requiring the expert skills of petty bourgeois and economists, capitalist oriented bureaucratic and similar elitist elements.[9]

Akase P. Sorka opined that in fact, in Nigeria, the critical political problem facing the country now is not political instability of the government nor even the inability to device national programmes for development. The real issue is administrative incapacity to get the government's decisions and programmes carried out.[10]

Ade Oladosu observed that: when the Pseudo-Nationalists in our midst talk despairingly of other Nigerians as having colonial mentality, they hardly realise that efficiency in the Civil Service today compares very poorly with what it was in those colonial days.[11]

In appreciation of the prevailing unresolved problems in the Civil Service as noted from the foregoing statements and one own strong belief that even though the 1988 Civil Service Reforms are aimed at solving the problems of the service, the issues are yet to be wholly tackled and hence, necessitating our embarking on this research with a view to offering solutions.

1.2 The Aim Of The Study

Having identified that problems still exist as to the total solutions to the efficient

performance of the bureaucracy, it is the aim of this study to examine the extent to which the 1988 Reforms have found solutions to some of the behavioural and structural impediments to the effective performance of the service by way of measuring the level of performance of the Bureaucracy, attributable to the reform measures.

It is also the aim of this study to provide the basis upon which further research could be embarked upon by interested scholars and other members of the public service such that constant review of the Reforms could lead to improvement in the performance of the bureaucracy. One other aim of this study is the provision of up-to-date data and analysis for the benefit of the Civil Servants; especially the Research and Planning departments of government establishments; higher institutions of learning and the general public.

1.3 Justification For The Study

The justification for embarking on this study rests on the premise that the Reforms which came into being since 1988, is old enough to be re-examined in order to measure the level of success of the exercise. The research will also bring out some shortcomings and proffer consequent solutions to the problems of the Civil Service.

It is equally of great importance to review the effectiveness and efficiency of the 1988 Reforms now that the present military government is planning to hand over power to a democratically elected government in the sense that some aspects of the Reforms that require revisiting could be amended and made functional before the incoming civilian government. If this is done, it is then hoped that the Third Republic should last longer and that

development of the people should be envisaged through the bureaucracy.

This research is important because it is generally seen by successive governments, the academia, and various learned scholars that the bureaucracy is the impediment to the successful attainment of government goals and programmes.

1.4 Research Questions

1. Has the professionalisation of the service as provided in the 1988 Reforms removed the inherent acrimony between "Administrators" and "Professionals" ?
2. Has the clause that provides that Commissioners should serve as both Chief Executives and Accounting Officers of their ministries ensured the efficient and effective management of the ministries?
3. Has the politicisation of the post of Director General ensured continuity and progress of the service?

1.5 The Significance Of The Research

The conduct of this research is of tremendous significance to Kogi State which is a new state. This is so because the data was collected from interviewees who came from two separate states with different bureaucratic operations and backgrounds. The states are Kwara and Benue. The Researcher feels that generalisation derived from the study, will create genuine bases for lasting and reliable government policies on the development of

"Bureaucracy". The overall interest for this research is the evaluation of the level of performance of the bureaucrats.

The conduct of this research is significant to the overall planning and development of the state and country at large. This is envisaged because useful information on how to improve the Civil Service to cope with the challenges of formulating and executing the goals and aspirations of the government will be obtained and made accessible to the government and those public organs charged with these responsibilities. Findings from this research will contribute to knowledge of researchers, Civil Servants, the higher institutions, and the general public and as such, help to solve the age long problem of the Civil Service.

1.6 The Scope Of The Study

The conduct of this research was limited to officers on salary GL. 08-16 deployed from the former Benue and Kwara States and from five selected Ministries in Kogi state.

The period of the study was limited to when the Reforms were introduced in 1988 to when the research was conducted in December 1991/January 1992.

This research evaluated the implementation of three areas of the 1988 Reforms namely the Professionalisation of the Service, the Politicisation of Post of Director General and the clause that provides for Commissioners to serve as Chief Executive of their Ministries and as their Accounting Officers.

1.7 Research Methodology

For the purpose of obtaining meaningful, relevant, reliable and valid generalisation on the research questions within a limited time, cost and convenience, a random sample of five ministries in Kogi State was selected for the research. The Ministries are: Ministry of Works, Governor's Office, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Health and Social Development, and the Ministry of Education

In order to reduce the population size to a more manageable one, the number of interviewees was limited to only officers on salary grade level 08 to 16 and Directors-General. These officers who are senior and experienced and who were deployed from both Kwara and Benue States were served questionnaire. In the same way, Directors-General were served different questionnaires which were carefully drawn to elicit the required data. On the whole, 411 people were interviewed. The hypotheses in from of research questions as earlier stated and as further stated below are limited to areas of the problems being evaluated. The research is limited to the extent to which the 1988 Reforms have been implemented and its consequent effect on the problems of the Service namely, the professionalisation of the Service; the politicisation of the post of Director-General and the clause that makes Commissioners both Chief executives and Accounting officers. It also examined the general assessment of the 1988 Reforms.

Specific research method used for the conduct of this research is as follows

1. **Questionnaire Method:** A Questionnaire survey method was used in the conduct of this research because of its effectiveness and reliability

this research because of its effectiveness and reliability.

The method was further used because of its relative ease in eliciting the required information within the shortest period of time and its relative low cost compared to the *interview method.*

The questionnaires were drafted in simple, open ended style and in accordance with the research questions being tested. However, different questionnaire were drafted for the Directors General who are political appointees. This method was used so as to elicit the required data from a large sample size for a reliable generalisations.

2. **Documentary Sources**: One of the techniques used in gathering the data for this research entailed the use of published works on the bureaucracy, public lectures, seminar papers, newspaper publications, and commentaries on previous and the current 1988 Reforms, etc.

1.8 Arrangement Of Chapters

Chapter one deals with the introduction of the problem; the aim of study, research questions asked; justification for the study; the scope and definition of basic terms and concepts.

Chapter two highlights the historical development of Bureaucracy in Nigeria since independence and the various Reforms and Commissions on the "Bureaucracy" before that of 1988. It also reviewed important literature on the subject of the research.

Chapter three presents a brief history of Kogi state; the structure and organisation of

Chapter four presents the research data and analysis

Chapter five is the conclusion. It draws up the summary of finding and the recommendations.

1.9 Operational Definition of Terms and Concepts

1. Bureaucracy for the purpose of this research it implies"all those institutions, agencies and organisation" created or financed by government and on which the government can call as of right, either to assist it in the formulation and execution of policies or to perform functions for which they have acquired specialized training usually at the government expense.

2. Bureaucrats: These are public officers who are employed purely on their "technical" expertise by the policy maker so as to achieve the aim for which the "Bureaucracy" was established.

3. Efficiency: Efficiency is used in this context to imply the extent to which the Bureaucrats attain the goals and objectives of the government within a given period of time through the successful economic use of the available human and natural resources.

4. Effectiveness: In the context of the research, effectiveness implies the ability for Bureacrts to produce desired results for the rapid development of the people within the shortest period possible.

5. Civil Service: The concept is interchangeably used with bureaucracy to mean the public Service in which the bureaucrats make use of the instruments of administration at their disposal to execute the goals and objectives of government for the upliftment of the general public.

The term Civil Servant is also interchangeably used with Bureaucrats. They are officials employed by the government to execute the goals and objectives of the government for the betterment of the governed

6. Development: For the purpose of this research, development implies the total process of social change by which public Officers utilise government machinery for the social, political and cultural upliftment of the people with the sole aim of improving their standard of living

7. Professionalisation: In the context of the this research and in the spirit of the 1988 Civil Service Reforms, professionalisation implies that Bureaucrats are made to specialise in a specific area of work and in a specific department of their ministry, where they profess skilled knowledge through working experience and training

8. Politicisation: This clause as provided in the 1988 Civil Service Reforms implies that the post of Commissioners and Directors-General (formerly permanent Secretaries) are both political appointment made by the President or a Governor of the State. The appointees are relieved of their post on the exit of the President or the Governor except they are reappointed by the succeeding government

10. Accountability: The term implies that commissioners who before the 1988 Reforms were only political heads (Chief Executives) of their respective ministries are now made to be both political heads and Accounting Officers responsible for the management of funds of their ministries; they are to be held responsible for any lapses or mismanagement of funds even after they have left the Office.

11. Administrators: The term refers to those generalist Public Officers who before the 1988 Reforms were engaged in the formulation and execution of government policies. They co-ordinated the activities of Other Civil servants in other cadres to the Permanent Secretaries (Now Director General). They were more superior to other career Civil Servants in the Civil Service.

12. Professionals: This term refers to all those Civil Servants who possessed professional certificates and performed skilled jobs different from the Administrators as defined above.

13. Continuity: Continuity in this context implies the extent to which programmes and policies of government are smoothly carried over from one successive government to the other by bureaucrats.

14. Progress: This implies the advancement of the Public Service through effective policies of the government initiated by Bureaucrats.

FOOT NOTES

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CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAME WORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theoretical Frame Work

In this chapter we intend to examine the theoretical models of three scholars upon which a theoretical framework for the conduct of this research is adopted. The three models that are examined are as follows:

i. E.A Suchman's Evaluative Research Model

ii. E. Mayo's Human relationist Modern Management Technique Model

iii. D. Easton's Input-output systems Analysis Model. The theoretical postulations of the three scholars are as follow:

2.1.1 Suchman's Evaluative Research Model

Suchman posits that in general whenever one asks such questions as -How good is the programme? what effects are we having?, Is the programme working as expected?, when one uses such instruments as rating sheets, appraisal forms, evaluation guides or research designs which involve company accomplishments before or after or in the presence or absence of a particular action, one may be said to be conducting an evaluation study.

Suchman further provides five different performance criteria that could be used in evaluation on Effort: This criterion is based on the assessment of input or energy paying no emphasis on the output.

b. Evaluation on Efficiency. This is concerned with the alternative paths or methods in terms of cost, time, personal, public convenience as well as the aim of achieving success or failure of the policy.

c. **Equity criterion:** This deals with the equal treatment of the programme on people in similar circumstances. This aspect also concerns the distributional impact of the derivable benefits and cost imposed by the programme being evaluated.

d. Effectiveness Criterion: This measures the results of an effort. Its major aim is to assess the effect of an effort and thus the effectiveness of effort of public policy with a view to identifying the success or failures of a programme. [1]

e. Proposing changes and offering recommendations by way of alternatives to any faults of programme.

2.1.2. Elton Mayo's Human Relationist Modern Management Technique Model

Elton Mayo's school of thought posits that for proper understanding of any organizational behaviour, some basic facts such as a more explicit recognition of the place and effects of valuers, much attention to methodology, a new conception of jobs or propositions, a recognition of the fact that employees are individuals who work as members of a group in organizations that must be defined as social institution, the role of the communications and informal relationships within

organization i.e. the psychological and physiological conditions must be given emphasis. [2]

2.1.3 David Easton's Input-Output Systems Analysis Model

David Easton provides an eloquent systems approach to evaluate the extent to which parts interact to make up a whole and its further relationship with the environment. The model seeks to develop detailed understanding of any programme by evaluating its goals and objectives; the mix of resources employed and how they are used. The uunderlying theory explains how the operations of the programmes is supposed to accomplish goals; external forces that influence the programme, and the way the programme produces higher order objectives. [3]

2.1.4. A Synthesis Of The Three Models As A Theoretical Framework For This Research

For the conduct of this research, a synthesis of Edward Suchman's Evaluative research, Elton Mayo's Human Relationist Modern Management Technique and David Easton's systems approach is adopted as its theoretical framework

Emphasis is however, made heavily on suchman's Model in the sense that his model embraces the theory of Elton Mayo and David Easton

This is so because, Suchman's Effort Criterion is in effect, David Easton's Input Analysis and Elton Mayo's Motivation

analysis which engenders more productivity. The Effectiveness Criterion of Suchman's Model is seen as implying the Output referred to by Easton and the Output of an increased productivity by workers referred to by Elton Mayo. The Environment as a dependent variable referred to by Easton could be inferred as the Equity criterion mentioned by Suchman and referred also as the physiological/psychological Inputs that affect the Output of workers as explained by Elton Mayo.

In the final analysis, Suchman's Evaluative Research Model will help us to measure the performance of the bureaucrats as a result of the enactment of Decree 43 of 1988 (Civil Service Reforms) and offer possible solutions to areas that require further revisiting using the three research questions/issues namely, professionalisation and increased performance of the bureaucrats; politicisation of the post of Director's General and efficient performance of the government business; and commissioners acting as both chief executives and Accounting Officers and the efficient management of government's business.

2.2 A Conceptualisation Of Bureaucracy

Having adopted a theoretical framework for the conduct of this research using a synthesis of the models of Edward Suchman, David Easton and Elton Mayo, for a proper grasp of the subject matter being researched upon, it is necessary to look at the works of other scholars on Bureaucracy.

Max Weber is one of the most renowned scholar of Bureaucracy. He studied the

German society from which he advanced his theory. He asserted that the ability for any organisation to achieve maximum control and administration of its subjects rests squarely on three sources of its legitimate authority namely:

a. Traditional Authority

This type of authority according to Max Weber rests on "an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them".In this type of society he explains, the leader derives authority from the established customs and traditions of the people.

b. Charismatic Authority

The charismatic authority is derived from the personal qualities of the leader of such an organisation which in most cases is endowed with supernatural, superhuman or exceptionally distinct powers or qualities.

c. Legal Rational Authority

The legal rational authority derives its strength mainly from due process of law in which obedience under it is owed to the legally established impersonal arrangements. The apparatus for this authority according to Max Weber is Bureaucracy which is the dominant institution of all modern society. Max Weber further expressed the view that in this system, the means are expressly stated to achieve certain established goals. He also explained that "Bureaucracy has the following characteristics:

1. "..... Precision, speed, unambiguity, discretion,

unity, strict, subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal cost". [4]

2. Hierarchical arrangement of offices where the level of jobs is subject to the control by the next higher level
3. A continuous organization of function bounded by rules
4. The separation of officials from the ownership of the organization
5. Appointment to offices made on ground technical competence
6. Official position exists in their own right and the job holders have right to a particular position.
7. Rules decisions and actions are formulated and recorded in writing. [5]

Weber also sees the Bureaucracy as the most efficient form of organization and writes thus:

Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization , for a purely technical point of view is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and in this sense, formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human being , it is superior to any form of precision, stability in stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. [6]

Adejo Odo has observed that the Bureaucracy is an instrument for realising the set objectives of government and that it brings about development be it political, economic or social. [7]

Yahaya Abubakar posits that the potential role of the Bureaucracy as a whole is the main instrument of political regulation and that it must be reorganised as one of the main channels of political struggle in which and through which different interests are regulated and aggregated. He further states that the Bureaucracy is the major instrument of social change and that it is the main if not the only engine of directed growth. He opined that the commitment of the Bureaucracy to the political process must then be accepted as a fait-accompli. [8]

Adu A.L, has observed that the Civil Service is part of the machinery of the executive branch of government and that it exists to put into effect government policies. He further observed that the effectiveness of government depends on efficiency of the Civil Service and its ability to respond in practical terms to its policy decision. [9]

Odenigwe, G.A. highlighting Herbert Simon's "organisation" model looked at Bureaucracy as a gadget of decision making apparatus whereby decision is a conclusion-drawn-factual-premise and value-of-premise. He sees decision making as the "heart of administration" which in this context is the purpose of Bureaucracy.[10]

Karl Marx sees Bureaucracy as central to the understanding of the modern state and that it must be explained not in functional but structural terms whereby the ruling class make

use of the public apparatus to exploit the masses.

A publication of the Academic Staff Union of Universities of Nigeria (1985) views the public service (Bureaucracy) as far from being an instrument for development and state policy; that it has become primarily a machinery for acquiring and retaining wealth and privilege, that its main vocation has become the accumulation of private property, no matter at what cost to the nation. It states further that the Nigerian Public service has also become a "letharian" which has also defied accountability to and control by people of Nigeria, to whom it is a matter, and the obedient servant. (12)

Leonard Broom sees Bureaucracy as the principle of social organization characteristics of 20th century industrial society popularly called rational co-ordination. He explains further that such organization is characterised by increased specialization, impersonality, reliance on general rules, and distance between top management and the ordinary worker, citizen...; usually the organization is associated with increased efficiency. (13)

Adu A. L. has observed that the Civil Service is part of the machinery of the Executive branch of government and that it exists to put into effect government policies. He further observed that the effectiveness of government depends on the efficiency of the Civil Service and its ability to respond in practical terms to its decisions. (14)

On the other hand, some scholars like Karl Marx sees the Bureaucracy as not serving the positive function of the development of the people.

2.3. Highlights Of The Development Of The Bureaucracy In Nigeria

The Nigerian Bureaucracy has evolved through different phases of its history and serving various political systems. We shall, therefore, highlight the salient features of political development in Nigeria before an examination of the various commissions and panels on the Reforms of the Nigerian Civil Service.

2.3.1 The Bureaucracy In Nigeria During The Colonial Era

The type of bureaucracy bequeathed Nigerians by the colonial masters was basically a replica of the Metropolitan West-Minister Model with its exploitative tendencies.

Basically, the Colonial Bureaucracy in Nigeria was established essentially to organise, manage, and to make easy the exploitation of resources from the peripheral Nigeria to the Western center.

The bureaucrats and their machineries were routed for the pooling of revenue from the people and also for the maintenance of law and order. This fact has succinctly been observed and stated by A.L. Adu as follows:

The concern of the Civil Service was therefore to prevent trouble, bring pax Britannica to their territory rather than the promotion of economic services except to create the conditions under which private enterprises could flourish and to intervene where

necessary to ensure fair-play to the unsophisticated peoples of the territory [14] The colonial administration was structured in a centralized way that maximum efficiency was achieved with least cost and the main core of the service was made up of political administrative service which was headed at the top by a Governor General of state for the colonies. He was the sole administrator of the colonies as he had the power to appoint and remove. Next in the hierarchy were the Regional Governors followed by Provincial commissioners (Residents) and District Commissioners who constituted the field administration. At each level of the administration, there were departmental administrations headed by Heads of departments and Divisions. The hierarchy of the (Colonial Administration) arrangement is better understood thus:

STRUCTURE OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA

Governor General	{Commander in Chief}
Regional Governor	{Chief Commissioner}
Provisional Commissioner	{Residents}
District Commissioner	{District Officer}

Source: The Chart on illustration of Colonial Administration in Nigeria [15]

The structure of the colonial bureaucracy in Nigeria was centralized so as to provide maximum loyalty to the Governor General and thus engender the attainment of a stable political order for rapid exploitation

The political order was maintained through the performance of law and order, police/judicial functions and the promotion routionization of traditional authority which invariably provided symbolic relationship between the officers that were formulating policies and the traditional rulers executing them especially in the Northern state of the country.

In terms of personnel, because the colonial masters set up the machinery of administration purely for economic reasons, they ensured that only efficient expatriates were employed into the service. Consequently, the early Bureaucrats were military personnel drawn from the regiments and occupation forces

It was only at the heat of nationalism that considerations began to be given to educated Africans even though marginally and for the purposes of pacifying the articulate few and the chieves plus of course, political parliamentarians at home."[17] The situation improved gradually as a result of increased nationalism and clamour for Africanisation of the servie and consequently independence

2.3.2 Bureaucracy At Independence (First Republic)

The Bureaucary at independence is the most organized structure inherited from the colonial masters as it provided the continuity chain to effect a less tedious transition programme because of the already well knitted skills of routine administratration and professionalisation. The major new role which bureaucracy was to perform then, was that of rapid economic development and the new political environment which entailed greater measure of autonomy and participation.

The Bureaucracy during this era introduced a lot of structural changes such as the government and the authority. A cabinet system of government with the prime minister at the helm of affairs (controlling both the government and parliament) was established. Ministers to work for the prime minister were chosen from among the party in power and they supervised various ministries. Under the Prime Minister was also his Secretary who arranged for cabinet meetings and also received memoranda from various ministries. The Secretary was also the Head of Services. Each Ministry had a permanent Secretary who was the Administrative Head of the Ministry but answerable to their heads and were answerable to their permanent secretaries.

The Services during the period of independence were vertically divided into classes and grades namely: Administrative, the Executive grades, and the Clerical Manipulative grade. [118]

The Administrative class was the highest class and it coordinated policy issues that arose from below and convey same that came from above. The executive class on the

other hand constituted the nerve center of the day to day work of the bureaucracy.

Some bureaucratic institutions such as National Electric Power Authority, Railway Corporation and Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation were created to cater for the welfare of Nigerians. The Civil Service Commission and the Federal Establishment Office and a host of other establishments were equally created.

The composition of the bureaucracy after independence was clouded with ethnic, regional and sectional problems such that the need to fill the service with Africans was not only a major problem but that of solving arisen public service problems like harmonising salary structure between the public and private sectors, acrimony between the "professionals" and "administrators", regional imbalance, uneven development, Nigerianisation of the Service, state balancing, etc.

2.3.3 The Structure And Composition Of The Service During Military Rule - 1966 - 78

The structure of the "Bureaucracy" remained fairly the same during the Military era like during the independence era. Both the regional and Federal Government pursued programmes of economic development and modernization. Nevertheless, some of the actions of the leaders were perceived as dysfunctional; administrative processes were corrupted while ethnic rivalry increased.

On 15th January, 1966, therefore, a section of the Nigerian army led by Major

Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu seized power from the ruling civilians and promised to rid the society of the perceived corruption and general social ills.

The Prime Minister along with prominent regional leaders were eliminated. He then imposed a unitary system of government instead of the Federal system. The intention was to unify all the Nigerian Civil Services as a political authority. This action was however, construed as an attempt to disintegrate some sections of the country and as such culminated in the massacre of the Igbos in the Northern parts of the country. This situation triggered off inter-tribal distrust, which resulted in the overthrowing of Aguiyi Ironsi's government on 29th July, 1966. Ironsi was then succeeded by Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon who ruled for nine years. During this period the service was responsible for the administration of the country. The Permanent secretaries had executive powers at the Federal and state levels because they attended Executive Council and Supreme Military Council Meetings respectively. Military Governors had executive powers and some of them lobbied Federal Permanent secretaries for their support over matters that were to be referred to the Supreme Military Council or Federal Executive Council or even directly to the Head of State. The executive position of civil servants i.e. permanent Secretaries changed during Murtala/Obasanjo era which seized power from Gowon on 29th July 1975 for reason of corruption and other social ills. This position of the Bureaucrats was so because they were no longer attending Executive Council or Supreme Council Meetings as initially was the case, but were mainly instruments of policy implementation.

Efficiency and effectiveness were not purely ensured and maintained for reasons of politicisation; "lootocracy" and mediocrity was introduced into the Service as stated earlier. The President was the Chief Executive who sat over executive matters assisted by his Ministers in the Federal Executive Council with similar features at the state level. The National Assembly and State Assemblies respectively formulated laws while the judiciary adjudicated.

The post of Secretary to the Government and Head of Service were retained at both the Federal and State levels but they were also not divorced from party patronage and considerations. At the lower and middle levels of the Service, acrimonies, conflicts, fear for lack of tenure and insecurity gripped the Service. This evil practice in the Service killed initiative, efficiency and commitment.

The inability of political and administrative persons to deliver expected goods for the development of the people led to the overthrow of the regime.

The overthrow of the civilian government headed by Shagari saw the emergence of a radical group of Military Administrators headed by Buhari. Buhari descended on both Civil Servants who they saw as indolent and ineffective. Some sanity was therefore restored backed by the populist vogue of "War Against Indiscipline."

The negative problems affecting the Service led to the setting up of Civil Service Reforms Panel by Buhari. The panel was to rationalise and come out with ways of sanitizing the Service which report was not implemented before the regime was overthrown. It was

during Babangida's era that the actual implementation of the report of the panel was effected.

It is the extent of implementation of the Civil Service Reforms in Kogi State that this thesis sets out to evaluate using some hypotheses.

Having highlighted the development of the Bureaucracy after independence, we would attempt to also highlight the major Civil Service Reforms since independence for a thorough understanding of the Bureaucracy in Nigeria.

2.4 Highlights Of The Salient Reforms On The Nigerian Civil Service Post Independence

2.4.1 The Adebo Wages And Salary Review Commission Of 1970-71

In the light of the cost of living and renumeration in posts with comparable responsibilities in the private sector, the requirements for the rapid development of the national economy, and the adequate development of efficient manpower in the public service and other factors, the Federal military Government set up the Adebo Wages Review Commission on 14th July, 1970.

1. Membership And Terms Of Reference

The Commission which was headed by S.O. Adebo with Mr. M.O. Abiodun; A.E. Ekukinam; Okon Eshiette; Sr. Bola Onitiri; and Mallam Mahmud Tukur as members had the following as its terms of reference:

(1) to review the existing wages and salaries at all levels in the Public Service and in the statutory public corporations and state owned companies;

(2) to examine areas in which rationalisation and harmonisation of wages, salaries and other renumeration and conditions of employment are desirable and feasible as between the public and the private sectors of the national economy;

(3) to consider the need to establish a system for ensuring that renumeration in the public service, the statutory public corporations and the state owned companies is perfodically reviewed and kept in proper national balance and,

(4) to make recommendations to the Federal Military Government, including, if necessary, the need for any appropriate interim measures pending final recommendations.[20]

2. The Basic Guidelines For The Commission

(1) The Cost Of Living Situation

The Commission more than any previous one on wages and salaries preoccupied with the incidence of the cost of living. It was to ascertain the rise in the cost of living since the last pay award, determine the extent to which it should be met by increased pay, and frame its recommendations accordingly.

At the time the interim proposal was put forward there were the following indication:

(a) increase in the overall cost of living index ranging from 27% to 113% or an average of 34% for all the cities they covered;

(b) that the rise in the cost of living was due primarily to the failure of supply to meet demand, which in turn was due to a number of factors of which the most decisive seemed to be disruption of production by the civil war; distribution problems arising in part from the same cause; shortage of foreign exchange needed to maintain or increase the supply of essential imports; and fiscal measures which, however are justifiable on other grounds, inevitably generated a rise in the cost of living.[21]

(2) The Requirements For Rapid Development Of The National Economy.

It was perceived that any general pay determination in the public sector must consciously or unconsciously take account of the broader interests of the national economy, at least because of the fact that the capacity of the public sector to meet the bill depends directly on the state of the National economy just as the accepted commitment could make quite a difference to continued well being of the economy.

In this regard, the commission was to examine factors that could lead to:

(i) a modernised and diversified agriculture that would be a stronger base for the economy;

(ii) the promotion of savings and its productive investment;

(iii greater premium than before on technical, professional and management knowledge, experience and performance; free mobility of labour between industries; between the private and the public sector; within states; between states and between the Federal

Government and States;

(iv) a reasonably contented labour force, with a deep sense of commitment to the national purpose.[22]

(3) Comparability Of Pay In The Public And Private Sectors

The commission was for the first time in Nigerian history specifically asked to take account of the level of renumeration as determining the level of pay in the public sector.

The justification for this consideration hinges greatly on the fact that the private sector has grown tremendously in the last decade and that it employs many more people than it used to; in every aspect it is a more significant element of the national economy than ever before and more prosperous; it is now absorbing more and more of highly educated manpower of the country; renumeration in the private sector is higher than in the public as basis for a fair comparison of differential payments and hence an equitable wages management in the country. On the whole, it helped to promote greater mobility between the Civil Service and outside employment which would be difficult in the absence of a reasonable harmonisation of pay levels between the two sectors.[23]

(4) The Adequate Development And Deployment Of Efficient Manpower In The Public Service

Some factors that were considered important for securing efficient manpower by any organisation were as follows:

(i) an accurate and clear job specification for every class of posts;

(ii) sound recruitment procedures;

(iii training programmes to improve efficiency or prepare the trainees for higher responsibility;

(vi) the use of meritorious performance as the test for eligibility for promotions as well as for advancement on time scales;

(v) the pay rate or scale should reflect the level of duties and responsibilities carried;

(vi) employment in each post of the best man for the job. [24]

(5) The Position Of The Rural Population

It was believed that one of the requirements of the rapid development of the Nigerian Economy was the improvement of its agriculture by modernising its production methods, diversifying its products, and recognising that increased agricultural productivity is an essential foundation for a more prosperous economy.[25]

(6) The Position Of Self-Employed Persons

The Commission was to look at the self-employed persons which included not only the lawyers, engineers, doctors and a host of other professionals but included the artisans, traders, craftsmen and market women because of their great role towards the development of the national economy.

The Civil Service is seen as the principal machinery for the achievement of the Nation's political and economic goals. The health and stability as well as the direction and implementation of development programmes of the system is determined by effectiveness and efficiency of the Civil Service.

It is observed that the tasks assigned to the Civil Service is governed by the nature and magnitude of the functions and responsibilities of the overall management of society which government has taken upon itself. In the same way, in the Nigerian Context, the social, economic, cultural, scientific, commercial and political as well as regulatory functions of government have, of necessity, been increasing in scope and complexity.

In the circumstances of a fast developing country like ours, it is observed by the Commission that the success and even survival of business enterprises depend very largely on governmental performance while the effectiveness of the government is to a large extent determined by the efficiency and competence of the Civil Service of which the higher echelon plays a crucial role both in the formulation and execution of policies. [27]

(II) The Structure Of The Civil Service

To perform the crucial tasks of the Service satisfactorily, the Service must be flexible, innovative, sensitive, imaginative, knowledgeable, relevant and humane. These qualities are required both for the creditable performance of its tasks and for the psychological well-being of the individuals manning the service; these qualities as are observed are determined by the

structure of the Service.

The structure of the Service could be divided into:

a. Organisation of Government

b. The Division into Ministries and Departments

c. Apportionment of Roles by the Head of Government of the functions of government among his colleagues - Ministers, Commissioners or whatever name they may be called.

d. Appointment of the tasks between the different classes of staff employed to carry them out.

(III) The Top Echelon Of The Civil Service

The top echelon of the Service is supposed to be as narrated by the Commission, divided into the top management and policy segment. These segments should comprise the most brilliant and competent officers who are associated with policy formulation and overall management. At this level, is the need to combine knowledge with capacity to plan, appraise, motivate and direct. This category of officers form the lynch-pin of governmental system. The quality and motivation of this category determine the responsiveness of government to societal needs and its capacity to achieve its objectives. The nation should recognise the importance of keeping this upper echelon of the Service in top form and maintaining its morale at the highest level by according it appropriate status and paying it something as near as possible to its market value outside the Civil Service. [28]

(IV) The Position Of Head Of Department

The commission viewed that the position of Head of Department is equivalent to that of General Manager of a company. They further made the following observations:

i. that professional Officers complained bitterly that the post of Permanent Secretary had been treated practically as the preserve of the Administrative class and that that class was put in a dominant position in the service;

ii. alternative remedies were suggested namely that each Ministry should have two heads of equal rank, one professional and the other administrative;

iii. that with the exception of Ministries like Finance Planning and Economic Development, Defence and the Cabinet Office, all Ministries should be headed by Professional officers.

iv. Quite a few number of Administrative Officers are younger than the Professional officers and that the former earn their promotions quite faster than the latter;

v. the performance of some of the administrative officers is not as satisfactory as that of the professionals neither are they as experienced as them also,

vi. the post of Permanent Secretary should not be reserved to only to the administrative officers but to whoever has the qualification and experience;

vii. arrangements must be made to give professional officers the opportunity of exposure to the kind of experience and training that fits a person for the highest managerial position.

viii The professional officer must show an appreciation of the importance of administration in the scheme of things as some of them feel as if administration meant nothing.

(V) The Position Of Head Of Service

It was the view of the Commission that the Head of Service is the leader of the service as a whole and should have the following responsibilities:

(a) Overall authority to manage the Civil Service;

(b) responsibility to supervise the constant adaptation of men and methods of changing tasks in the Service;

(c) a great share of authority and responsibility in questions affecting the interest of the public service as a whole; and

(d) the responsibility of tendering advice to the Head of Government on, inter alia, the apportionment of functions among Ministries and Departments.[29]

(VI) The Profession Of Administration

It looked at Modern Administration as a profession in itself. It therefore opined that Administrative officers must be trained with the kind of care that other professions take if the best kind of management results are expected from them. For attaining this high calibre of officers, it recommended the establishment and equipment of Administrative training

(VII) The Civil Service Grading System

It recommended that there should be a pay structure and the actual allocation of grades to individual posts which should ensure that the right pay for a well performed job. It stated further that the rate of pay should be fair in the light of:

(a) the work performed or to be performed;

(b) the quality of performance, and

(c) the principle of equal pay for equal work.

The following were the major provisions for the new grading system:

(i) In the light of the above observation, it recommended a 20 - scale unified structure which constituted the pay expectation of the career Civil Servant. Such scales were to be available for assignment to any posts on the basis of the volume and complexity of duties and the level of responsibility, as determined by a proper job evaluation.

(ii) The commission also recommended that the post of Permanent Secretary should not form part of the career structure but it should be given an incremental salary scale rather than a fixed rate.

(iii) Post classification was an essential provision for the grading system. Persons with similar skills were grouped for purposes of recruitment, assignment and promotion.

(iv) The merger of the work of Executive class with the Administrative to form a group. The former who may possess less qualification and experience were made to assist the latter and were assigned lesser responsibility and entry point salary scale.

4. Summary Of Recommendations

1. All sections of the Nigerian Community should be made aware of the close connection between issues of wages and prices and the general problems of economic development and serial justice. To that end, they recommended that an *Economic Advisory Committee proposed in the Second National* Development Plan should be established without delay as a way of increasing wider public participation in the process of economic development and planning.

2. Nigeria should adopt the principle of fair comparison with private sector for determining pay in the public sector.

3. Consideration should be given to "rationalising and harmonising" the various pension and other superannuation schemes by introduction of a national contributory superannuation scheme applicable to the different organisations in the public as well as in the private sectors.

4. Three levels of enforceable minimum wage should be established by zones as detailed in Appendix V to this report. Exception from this rule would be permissible under the circumstances described in paras. 79 and 81 of that report.

5. Government should make its declared policy to abolish the differential treatment meted to unskilled and semi-skilled labour so that this class of workers can be paid the same rates throughout the country without any geographical differentiation. This policy should be effected in two or three phases. The first phase should be immediately implemented by reducing the present number of zones to three in the manner set in Appendix V to the report.

6. Daily paid or unestablished staff should be considered for established posts after three years service, in accordance with the criteria laid down in the Report.

7. Top echelon personnel should be adequately renumerated, in accordance with the value of the job they perform, the service they render to society and the quality of their output. "Misfits should be quietly eased out without too much fuss".

8. More attention should be paid to the quality of individual and less-on-the-job performance, and less to seniority or paper qualification.

9. The concept of "security of tenure" should be discarded in favour of proper service discipline and the application of management-oriented principles and measures of excellence.

10. The duties of a Permanent Secretary should be clearly defined as well as the

qualifications required for their discharge.

11. Government should lay it down in most unambiguous terms that the post of Permanent Secretary will go to whoever possesses the qualifications and qualities enumerated whether such a person was originally an administrative or a professional officer.

12. Lists should be kept of potential candidates drawn from the entire Civil Service, for the post of permanent secretary. Government should ensure that the lists are used by the appropriate recommending and appointing authorities as the basis for their judgement.

13. Arrangements should be made to give professional officers the opportunity of exposure of the kind of experience and training that fits a person for the highest managerial positions.

14. The position of head of the service should be clarified in terms of duties and functions. He must be acknowledged as the leader of the service as a whole and should have, among other thing, the overall authority to manage the Civil Service and to supervise the constant adaptation of man and methods to changing tasks in the service.

15. Government should give their administrative Officers at all level opportunities to avail themselves of training facilities in public administration techniques and modern management practice.

16. A new grading structure unifying the professional, administrative and other classes should be established.

17. The Executives and Administrative classes should be merged so as to form an Administrative Group.

18. Every encouragement should be given to the sub-professional officers to acquire the additional qualification required for eligibility for advancement to the professional grade. Once he has achieved them, and provided his work and conduct are satisfactory, he should be given preference over outside candidates for vacancies in the professional grade.

19. A Public Service Review Commission should be appointed, among other things, to review the structure of the service, to develop the new grading structure proposed in paras. 128 to 139 and undertake the regrading of post on the basis of the new structure. The Commission should be assisted in this work by a grading team composed of three persons selected as indicated in paragraph 142.

20. Local Government Service Boards should be established where they do not already exit and where they exist or come to be established, they should take

over the personnel administration of all grades of local authority staff. Training and staff development programmes should be expanded and straightened with the full support and encouragement of the respective Ministries of the local government.

21. The conditions of service of local government staff and grading structure should every where be the same as those for the Civil Service.

22. The grading of Local authority posts on the basis of the new structure should be done by a team of three appointed by the state government.

23. The rate of pay for teachers working in government schools and those in grant aided schools under non-government proprietorship should be integrated and government should assume proprietary control in all schools in Nigeria, with jurisdiction over the staffing arrangements. Following such integration, the scale of renumeration for all teachers should be determined on the basis of scientific job evaluation and within the uniform grading structure already recommended for the Civil Service.

24. For purposes of pay and other conditions of service, a distinction should be made between public corporation which are regulatory or welfare/service agencies and those which are commercial or industrial.

25. The review of the grading structure of the Civil Service and the consequential post regrading should be extended to cover the regulatory, welfare or service

agencies. In respect of commercial and industrial corporations; determination of the grading structure and the grading of posts should be the responsibility first of the management of the corporation and secondly the Corporation Board.

26. Government should ensure:-

a. That general policy instructions to corporations are in consonance with the best social and economic interests of the nation.

b. That persons appointed to corporation boards are men and women of integrity with sufficient knowledge and experience in the corporation's field of activities, and

c. That there is an adequate body which can, on behalf of the Government, act as a watch dog of the public interest in respect of all the corporations.

27. As much freedom as possible should be left to Corporation Management and the post reserved from their ultimate jurisdiction should be kept to the minimum. The terms of reference of the statutory corporation service commission should be revised to limit its mandate to the matters listed in paragraph 157.

28. State-owned industries and companies should have complete freedom to operate outside Civil Service regulations, conditions and procedures and should be accessed and judged solely on the basis of their performance as

business enterprises.

29. In the universities, a distinction should be made between academic and non-academic posts. Levels of pay and other conditions of service of the latter should follow Civil Service patterns.

30. The organisation structure, the grading structure, and the grading of posts in universities should be reviewed by a special commission.

31. Government should consider whether the commission to review the renumerations of civil servants and others should also examine the pay of judges. If the Government so decides, the review body should be suitably instructed.

32. Government is invited to declare that the general award recommended in this report, should apply to the judges.

33. Following the general award now recommended to serving officers in the public services, the government should consider the need to increase the rate of annuities payable to pensioners.

34. Nigeria should not adopt as its standard the pay level in other countries whose levels of incomes are different from its own. Nigerian personnel should be paid at rates based on Nigerian economic situation. Oversees personnel should be offered, in addition to the basic Nigerian pay, an addition sufficient to

secure their services.

35. A National Board on Productivity, Prices and Incomes should be established without delay to undertake the task of rationalising and harmonising renumerations in various sectors of the national economy and to ensure that the structure of renumeration and their periodical adjustments are kept in proper national balance.

36. The National Board on Productivity, Prices and Incomes should see the early establishment of a national productivity scheme based on a tripartite foundation(Government, labour and employers) to be serviced by the Ministry of Labour.

37. The existing Price Control Board should be reconstituted into a Price Control Committee under the National Productivity, Price and Incomes Board.

38. The National Productivity, Price and Incomes Board should be used to "vet" collective agreement resulting from negotiations.

39. In the interests of harmonious industrial relations, Government should revitalise the Whitley Council Machinery and make it more effective. National Whitley Councils should be created.

40. After local authorities and the regulatory and welfare / service public corporations have been integrated in the Civil Service for the purpose of pay

and other conditions of service, these organisations should be represented in the appropriate whitley councils which operate as the negotiating machinery for civil servants.

41. The unskilled and semi-skilled labour grades should be given their own negotiating machinery, to be called Whitley Council "C" at the National level.

42. The title of Whitley councils should be changed to Public Service Negotiating Council A, B, or C.

43. Pending the take-over by Government of all grant-aided educational institutions, a joint negotiating council should be established for teachers in these institutions.

44. Each industrial or commercial statutory public corporation should establish a joint negotiating body on which the management and the employee sides will be represented.

45. State-owned companies should be left free to adopt the pattern of negotiating arrangements in use by companies in the private sector.

46. The universities should have two joint negotiating bodies, one to deal with the pay and other conditions of service of junior and intermediate staff, the other to perform a similar service in relation to the academic and other senior staff.

47. The continuing review of the renumeration of officers in the top echelon in the public sector should be undertaken by the Productivity, Prices and

Incomes Board. The Board should also be given the opportunity to comment upon proposals for changes involving other staff which could have significant implications for the national income policy.

48. A defaulting employer should be compelled by law to establish a collective bargaining machinery in his organisation when an application to the effect is submitted to the Commissioner of Labour and the latter is satisfied that such action is warranted.

49. Without delay, Government should restructure the Nigerian Labour Unions into industrial unions on the lines suggested in Appendix II to this report.

50. Joint Industrial Councils should be established.

51. Government should take the most energetic steps to see that there is in future only one central organisation of trade unions and see that its officers are democratically elected under rules prepared in consultation with unions and laid down by law.

52. Without prejudice to the independence of trade union movement, Government should provide the movement with financial aid.

53. The acceptance by Nigerian trade unions of aid from outside sources should be subjected to statutory control.

54. Government should insist upon some minimum qualifications for candidates for positions of leadership unions, especially for the position of secretary. It

should also be prescribed that no person may hold office in more than one union at a time.

55. Legislation should be enacted for employers to deduct from wages and salaries the contributions due from members to their industrial unions. It should also be provided by the law that the accounts of unions shall be audited regularly and promptly by suitably qualified persons.

56. Registration of all collective agreements should be established.

57. A labour court should be established to deal with disputes arising from the application or interpretation of collective agreements. The ruling of the court should be final and binding.

58. The powers of the existing Arbitration Tribunal should be increased to enable it to make awards - including monetary awards -which would be legally binding on both parties to the dispute brought before the tribunal.

59. The announcement of the general award should be preceded by the formulation and publication of definitive plans to step up the relief measures recommended by this commission. Those of them that are of a regulatory character should, if possible, be brought into force prior to the announcement of the award.

60. All ranks of officials and employees, from the highest to the humblest,

coming within the first operative clause of the commission's terms of reference, with the exception of those in state-owned companies, should benefit automatically from the general award at the rates indicated in Appendix V, provided that in the case of officials to whom general increases to salaries have been granted since the commission started its work, account is taken of those increases in application of them that present award. Arrangements should be made so that the payments to every group are made with reasonable promptitude.

61. The general award should become an integrated part of the recipient's salary, thus replacing the interim award previously made.

62. It is suggested that trade unions and employers in the private sector should get together and agree on what adjustments to make in the pay of the workers in the light of the Government award, having regard to the nature and the amounts of rate increases that may have been made since 1964.[30]

2.4.2 Udoji Salary And Wages Review Commission's Report

1. Aims And Objectives

The Udoji Salary and Wages Review Commission was established by an Instrument dated 13th September, 1972 and published in Official Gazette Extraordinary No.44 of 16th September, 1972, and amended by Legal Notice No.11 of 1973 dated 20th February, 1973. It was to review the salaries and wages of workers.

The structural and institutional rigidities which still hampered the efficiency and effectiveness of the Service despite the solutions provided by the Adebo Review Commission on the Civil Service necessitated the Udoji Commission.

The rationale behind the Commission was hinged on "... the realisation that financial resources were not the only impediments to the country's development process. Other impediments which include the shortage of experienced skilled manpower, efficiency, ecology, corruption, and lack of national consciousness or patriotism in the society as a whole and on the part of the Public Servants in particular"[31]

The Commission was charged with the following terms of reference:

1. examine the organisation, structure and management of the Public Services and recommend reforms where desirable;
2. investigate and evaluate the methods of recruitment and conditions of employment and staff development programmes of the Public Services;
3. examine all legislation relating to pensions as well as the various superannuation

schemes in the Public Services and in the private sector and suggest such changes as may be appropriate with a view to facilitating mobility within the public services, and also between those services on one hand and the private sector on the other hand, while at the same time providing for the retention in the Public Services of qualified and efficient personnel;

4. undertake, with the aid of appropriate grading teams, the regrading of all posts in the Public Services, establish scales of salaries corresponding to such grades and, as a result of job evaluation of posts, recommend salary scale to be applicable to each post in the services, and;

5. enquire into and make recommendations of any other matters which in the opinion of the Commission appear to be relevant to the foregoing and therefore ought, in the public interest, to be inquired into.

2. Major Observations And Recommendations Offered By The Report.

A. A New Style of Public Service

It stressed that their main message in the Report is the need for introducing a new style of Public Service. It also opined that its challenge should be the challenge of objectives set out in the 1st National Development Plan. The summary of its views on the findings with respect to the deficiencies of the existing style of Public Service are summed up thus:

i. Such Public Service will need to recruit and train specialised personnel and

use scientific knowledge to a much greater extent than at present; it must draw upon the resources of research and educational institutions and the experience of the private sector, both in Nigeria and abroad.

ii. There is need for a new conception of management, providing a more production or results-oriented approach to public service, concentrating attention and resources on the purpose for which institutions are created as servants of society.

iii. The new Public Service will need to manage its human resources in such a way as to motivate them to achieve defined goals more effectively; it must make the public service a better place to work, so that the employees will be inspired to give their best as members of teams engaged in common enterprises for the public good. He further recommended that in order to develop a New Style Public Service attuned to the demands of development, the following should be adopted:

a. Project Management,

b. Management by Objectives and

c. Programme and Performance Budgeting

B. Manpower Planning

It was noted that the examination of the manpower planning operations revealed the

following deficiencies:

i. Incapacity to undertake demographic studies showing employment status by states, education distribution by age, sex and the likes.

ii. Lack of current and comprehensive information on the stock of skills available in Nigeria;

iii. Lack of research on manpower;

iv. Low percentage of response from establishments selected for manpower surveys;

v. Lack of guidance to education planners in national or state institutions and universities because of inadequate data for estimating future manpower demand and supply situations;

vi. Inability to recommend training priorities in skills urgently needed for national development.


vii. Little evidence of co-ordination in matters relating to employment, education and manpower planning and

viii Inability to attract and retain competent professional manpower staff.

On the basis of the deficiencies from the foregoing, it recommended the strengthening of Manpower Planning Division in the Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction. It further recommended a reconstituted National Manpower Board to serve in an advisory capacity to the Division. The details of these proposals is stated on this chart:

CHART A

PROPOSED ORGANISATION FOR THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION



Source: Udoji Public Service Review Commission Report, p16.

The Commission gave major recommendations on the Manpower Planning thus:

1. The Manpower Planning Division of the Ministry of Economic Development should be reconstituted with the *following five sections staffed with* suitably qualified staff: Skills Identification, Skills Development, Skills Utilisation, Demography and Co-ordination.

2. Education and labour currently handled by the Social Services Division of the Ministry should be transferred to the Manpower Planning Division.
3. The Membership of the National Manpower Board should be reconstituted with the following representatives: three representatives from each state government, including one representative from the Ministry of Labour and one from the Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction (Manpower Dept); three representatives each from national bodies of employers and workers; three representatives of universities and institutions responsible for intermediate level manpower training; three members from the Federal Ministries of Education, Labour, Personnel, Industry and Finance.
4. The reconstituted Manpower Planning Division should embark on nationwide manpower survey to provide reliable information on the stock of manpower available. The survey and subsequent reports on an annual basis should be submitted to the Head of State.
5. The Ministry of Personnel and Public Managements should prepare a training handbook to assist trainers in the most effective methods of conducting training. The Ministry should also produce an inventory of

Public Service training facilities similar to that of the Center for Management Development.

6. The responsibility of the Chief Executive for the training of all staff under his control should be specified in the Civil Service Rules, and training institutions should ensure that their activities support his.

7. The Standing Committee on Staff Development should be reactivated to ensure coordination of the total training effort and assess the role of existing institutes especially ASCON and CMD which should be brought into full and meaningful participation for top level public management and development as soon as possible.

C. A New Style Of Public Service

With regards to the need for an Introduction of a new style of Public Service capable of meeting the challenge of the 70's and beyond, i.e Challenge of Development, the Committee gave the following recommendations:

1. There is need for a new conception of management, providing a more production or results-oriented approach to public service, concentrating attention and resources on the purposes for which public institutions are created as servants of society.

2. Such a Public Service will need to recruit and train specialised personnel and use scientific knowledge to a much greater extent than at present; it must draw upon the resources of research and educational institutions and the experience of the private sector, both in Nigeria and abroad.
3. The new Public Service will need to manage its human resources in such a way as to motivate them to achieve defined goals more effectively; it must make the public service a better place to work, so that the employees will be inspired to give their best as members of teams engaged in common enterprises for the public good.

The new style of Public Service Management which is tailored towards a result oriented management is recommended to use the following techniques which the Report also recommended for Nigeria:

1. **Project Management**

This is a system whereby various skills requirements can be brought together from Ministries and departments in task forces to design and carry out projects and then the members go back to their former Ministries' department. It is seen that this design provides more flexibility in solving problems than is typically afforded by the traditional functional bureaucratic structure

and that the results desired determine the roles and resources required.

2. **MBO**

This is a process of identifying goals and objectives, defining managerial responsibility in terms of expected result, and measuring performance and achievement against those goals and objectives. Action plans to achieve expected results in those areas, and set performance standards for acceptable work.

MBO centres around the working relationships between managers. It assumes that managerial behaviour is more important than managerial personality and that the behaviour should be defined in terms of specific results to be achieved against established goals, rather than in terms of common goals for all managers or common methods of managing. An important aspect of MBO as observed in the result is evaluation, feedback and redirection of efforts to meet predetermined work assignment.

3. **Programme and Performance Budgeting (PPB)**

The objective of Programme and Performance Budgeting as discussed in the Report is the use of the Budget against the desired results rather than on the inputs or activities. In this regard, it is stated that the PPB Managers are concerned with what is achieved by the expenditure incurred or the benefit deriveable.

Three major benefits that are deriveable from the PPB

modern technique of management are thus:

i. A coordinated pursuit of overall corporate goals rather than individual departments and agencies allowed to pursue their own limited objective regardless of overall priorities or possible conflicts of interests, etc.

ii. Objectives must be pursued by choosing the most cost-effective of all the alternatives of approaches available and not allocating resources according to influence or political horse- trading.

iii. The concern for productivity, economy and efficiency in the performance of the Public Service. This involves the giving of Public Servants clear targets at which to aim and clear standards by which their performance can be judged and rewarded using the right skill with maximum dedication and the most economic use of resources.

D. Civil Service Structure And Organisation

The Report observed that the Service, both federal and state was patterned on British model which had undergone some changes and modifications although remained basically a class and closed career service.

It observed also that the Service had more than six hundred

cadres and about 100 salary scales and officers that progress within their cadre and rarely move from one to the other and that when they do, they usually suffer a loss of seniority. This anormally, it noted, breeds class conflict and does not make for the best deployment and utilisation of available scarce manpower. It is status conscious and tends to concentrate consideration on the "assumed" rather than on the "actual" competence of a person.

It further observed that this development was in particular causing great tensions between top administrators and professionals to the extent it is affecting morale and productivity of the Service generally.

The Report noted that several Chief Professional officers complained of the following:

1. The boss complex of administrative Officers in their relation with professional officers. In some cases the administrative officers are younger in age and service experience than their professional colleagues.
2. Professional advice being subject to non-professional criticism by administrative officers on its way up to the decision making level;
3. The management of professional work programmes including postings and financial control being subject to the directions from administrators rather than in

the hands of chief professional officers.

4. The promotion prospects, prerequisites, status and prestige are far better in the administrative service than in professional services. This is responsible for the loss of professional talent to the private sector.

The Report also noted that Administrators complained of the following:

i. That the starting salaries for professional officers are often higher than those for Administrators and that in some cases professional heads earn more than Permanent Secretaries.

ii. That the recent disparity in promotion rates is a temporary phenomenon due to the fact that the administrative service expanded faster and has been more rapidly Nigerianised than the profession services;

iii. That the highest posts in the Service including those of Permanent Secretaries find it difficult to remain detached in considering conflicting advice from two different professions because they have not been trained to see the whole picture; and that where a ministry comprises different professional advisers it might be advisable to have an administrator at the head;

iv. That management is as much a profession as any other and therefore requires expertise which does not come by mere longevity in a technical job.

The Administrators therefore concluded that "the best way to remove the tension between Administrators and Professionals on the one hand, and the complaint of many Officers regarding unequal opportunities for advancement on the other hand is by introduction of a unified grade structure. This means the placing of all jobs of substantially equal difficulty and complexity in the same grade and on the same salary scale. It will offer opportunities for vertical and lateral mobility within the Service.

They recommended a complete integration of all senior management posts within a Ministry into one pyramid with divisions and sections organised in accordance with the objectives to be achieved. Particular aspects of the work of a Ministry should no longer be the particular assignment of any class of officer.

At top level, every senior Officer must be a Manager and should be responsible for the achievement of specific objectives with clearly defined resources of men, money and materials at his disposal. At the top of the pyramid should be the equivalent of a General Manager or Chief Executive and below him should be a Programme and Project Managers.

Major Recommendations

A. General

1. A unified grade structure be introduced which will embrace all posts in the Civil Service from the lowest to the highest and provide equal opportunity for every officer to advance to the highest post in the Service irrespective of his or her discipline.
2. In view of the expanded and complicated nature of the present demands on the Service, every effort should be made to bring into the Service, particularly at the higher level, suitably qualified and experienced candidates from outside Service.
3. The present dual hierarchies in Ministries be abolished by the introduction of a unified and integrated structure by which authority and responsibility for overall management is vested in one person to be known as Chief Executive/Director General.
4. The present incumbents of the post of Permanent Secretary and HOD should be eligible for appointment to the post of Chief Executive/Director General. The initial selection for the post should be conducted by an adhoc committee made up of the Head of Service Commission.

5. Future selection for the post of Chief Executive/Director General should be from the ranks of the proposed Senior Management Group.

B. Civil Service

(i) **Personnel Management.**

The report noted that there is a lack of clear definition of authority and responsibility for the overall management of the Civil Service in the sense that management is shared between the Head of the Civil Service, the Public Service Commission, the Ministry of Establishments and individual Permanent Secretaries. It asserts that such a situation does not make for efficiency because it is difficult to determine who at any given moment has ultimate responsibility for control. Complaints abound about delays in execution of several personnel functions including discipline to unbalanced and disproportionate increase in the Civil Service strength.

(ii) **Role of The Head of The Civil Service.**

It observed that until recently there has been hesitation in formally designating the office of the Head of Service and defining its functions because of the fact that:

a. People in power are averse to defining powers and

would prefer to leave matters flexible to convention and changing circumstances.

b. The difficulty of finding an officer who combines the necessary qualities of leadership and efficiency with the complimentary attribute of enjoying the confidence of the Head of Government.

c. There is diffusion of powers and functions between the Cabinet Office and the Public Service Commission on one hand, and between the Cabinet Office and the Public Service Commission on one hand and the Ministry of Establishments on the other hand.

d. That some top civil servants oppose the designation of one of them as Head of Service.

(iii) **The Role of The Public Service Commission.**

It considered that the powers of appointment, promotion and discipline should remain with the Public Service Commission and that more delegation should be made to Ministries. It further recommended that the Commissions should prescribe standards and to review and inspect Ministry actions to see that they conform to standards and policies.

(iv). **Recruitment.**

It observed that the then method of recruitment revealed

that it was perfunctory. This was so for reason that vacancies are normally not advertised and that the Commission relied on unsolicited applications; the advertisements even when put up are very dull and not capable of attracting the most promising men and women; the advertisement do not contain enough information about career prospects; there was not determined attempts at discovering traits, interests and abilities.

(v). **Promotion and Performance Evaluation.**

The Report noted there were lots of complaints which ranged from the lack of promotion prospects or an accusation of those responsible for promotion such as favouritism and partisan considerations to poor communications - in information about the potentialities of available talents and awareness about the opportunities in the respective departments of the Service.

(vi). **Confidential Reports.**

The report observed about the veracity and non objectivity of these reports because of the unfair method of accessing Civil Servants' worth; favouritism; corruption or sheer lack of competence in completing the evaluation forms; no satisfactory mechanistic ways of appraising performance.

(vii). **Discipline.**

The report noted that there was high indiscipline and lack of productivity in the Service for the following reasons:

(i). Lack of clear conception of objectives and thorough knowledge of the means of achieving them.

(ii). Lack of training in all cadres of the Service such so as to engender productivity and efficiency in the Service.

(iii). Inadequate office accommodation which results in indiscipline and low productivity.

(iv). Poor social amenities which brings about unfavourable conditions of service and consequently indiscipline.[32]

2.4.3 Akintola William's Report On The Public Service, Review Panel Established On 7th Feb., 1975.

1. Aims And Objectives

The panel was set up to receive and examine petitions and complaints against the grading and salary scales which were announced in the government White Paper on Udoji Report and to submit suitable recommendations to the Federal Military Government as soon as possible and in any case not later than end of February 1975.

2. Membership.

The Panel had the following people as members:

1. Akintola Williams	-	Chairman
2. Lt. Col. Mustapha Amin	-	Member
3. W.G. Tracy	-	Member
4. F.I. Adesanye	-	Member
5. M.T. Usman	-	Member
6. Chief F.R.A. Williams(CON)	-	Member
7. Mr. D.O. Hill	-	Consultant
8. Mr. A.P.P. Mckenzie	-	Consultant
9. Mr. J.T. Nelson	-	Consultant

3. Categorisation Of Petitions.

a. The petitioners complained that their posts were downgraded and that the Pre-Udoji relativities that existed between their jobs and other jobs had been changed to their disadvantage;

b. that academic qualifications and length of training had not been taken into account in evaluating their jobs;

c. that their seniority in their posts had not been taken into account in converting their old salaries to the new salaries.

d. that all the relevant factors had not been accessed

and given due weight in the evaluation of their jobs;

e. that the enhanced entry points into their Pre-Udoji salary scales had been completely wiped out in the new grading and salary structures;

f. that their posts should be upgraded without advancing any reasons;

g. generalised downgrading protests;

h. multiple and miscellaneous complaints;

i. Duplicate petitions, private sector petitions and those that cannot be answered because of the nature of petitions, lack of return address or other shortcomings.

4. Recommendations Of The Panel

On the various petitions received the panel critically examined the complaints and made recommendations which were summarised thus:

i. The petitions that required further job evaluation studies before they can be resolved should be remitted to the Public Service Review Unit which has all the necessary expertise for dealing with them;

ii. The government approves the administrative procedures for undertaking grading reviews already developed by the unit entitled "Guidelines for "Grading Review Procedures in the Public Service";

iii The Standard Form Letters in Annextures should be used as appropriate in answering petitions that may require individual replies;

iv. The effective grading for all Permanent Secretaries at the Federal and State levels should be Grade level 17 and Grade level 16 respectively;

v. The limit of the normal career expectation of all officers within the line management in Ministries at the federal level should be Grade level 16 and Grade level 15 at state level;

vi. That specialist jobs outside the line management which, on the merit of the incumbents, could attract

salaries at levels up to or exceeding those of Permanent Secretaries be clearly defined;

vii That all Officers in the Ministry within line management, irrespective of their discipline and background, should have equal opportunity of being considered for appointment when filling future vacancies in the grade of Permanent Secretaries (Chief Executives);

vii That all subordinate Senior Management Concept should continue to guide the training and the development of Senior Managers for the whole Public Service, the use of "SM" prefix as salary code should be abolished before it assumes a status symbol; etc. [33]

2.4.5 Dotun Philip's Panel On The Reorganisation Of Civil Service Of 1985.

In March, 1985, the Buhari administration commissioned a panel of nine members under the chairmanship of Professor Dotun Philip with the following terms and reference:

i. examine the adequacy of the federal civil service in its structure, composition and methods of operation to cope with the demands of government in the mid 80's

and beyond;

ii. examine the structure of the civil service and make recommendations with a view of streamlining the system where necessary;

iii recommend ways in which efficiency of the civil service and its morale can be enhanced;

iv. examine the extent to which earlier recommendations on improving the civil service were implemented and determine the causes of failure to implement any such recommendations;

v. determine the extent of over staffing at various levels especially at lower rungs (GL. 01-06) and make recommendations designed to prevent a reoccurrence of the phenomenon and ensure that staff numbers and personnel costs are kept to minimum consistent with efficiency;

vi. examine the practices in the management and operations of the civil service which give rise to available overhead charges and;

vii. make such recommendations as are considered necessary to achieve the objectives of streamlining the service, reducing cost, eliminating delays and increase efficiency.[34]

The report on the panel which recommended the reorganisation of the civil services so as to make it more efficient and effective in the operations of government business was not ready for implementation before the government was toppled. The report formed the basis of the current Civil Service Reforms embarked upon by the Babangida regime in 1988.

The 1988 Civil Service Reforms And Its Salient Features.

Having stated the aims and objectives of the Civil Service Reforms, it is important to also state some of the important institutional and structural features that are aimed at overhauling the service as a step further in solving its problems.

1. **The Minister/Commissioner as the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer**

The Accounting Officer of each Ministry is appointed and fired by the President/Governor during his tenure in office. The Minister / Commissioner is to render his annual report to the President / Governor and to face periodic checks in order to ensure full adherence to the Finance and Management Act of 1958 and its amendments.

The Minister/Commissioner is also to prepare Handing Over Notes to the in-coming government three months to the expiration of

the incumbent government. In order to ensure a smooth and flawless take over of a new government, each Director General is to prepare a comprehensive Handing Over Notes to his/her Minister/Commissioner as the new Accounting Officer.

2. Rendering of Monthly Returns

Ministers are to offer monthly returns of their receipts and expenditures to the Accountant-General with copies to Budget Department and the Auditor-General not later than three weeks of the following month. The Auditor-General has the power to sanction and surcharge any officer and has access to the president through the president's representative on the Audit Alarm Committee.

The Auditor General may notify the president of audit alarms of significant importance and serious pre-payments audit queries for which the Accounting Officer of the Ministry/Extra-Ministerial Department is liable or responsible.

All Audit queries are to be answered by the Accounting Officer himself and where such officer does not respond within the stipulated time, the Auditor-General may inform the president in writing.

3. Disciplinary Measures by the Civil Service Commission

The Reform on disciplinary procedures (Decree No.43 of

1988, PA 799) provides that for the Civil Service Commission to serve as an appellate Body for all petitions from Ministries/Extra Ministerial Department, in respect of appointments, promotions and discipline, its decision shall be binding provided that the Minister /Commissioner shall have the right of appeal to the president. These are part of the institutional features of the 1988 Reforms.

The Purpose Of The 1988 Civil Service Reforms

The 1988 Civil Service Reforms were borne out of the need to reorganise, revitalise and make efficient the performance of the "Bureaucracy" which several regimes have set up Committees / Commissions but had proved abortive so far.

The aims and objectives of the Reforms are thus:-

(i). "the attainment of Government objectives aims and policy;

(ii) the promotion of a better execution of the laws and programmes of the Government;

(iii an efficient and expeditious administration of government business;

(iv) the reduction of expenditure and improvement of the economy to the fullest extent consistent with efficiency in the operation of government and;

(v) to increase efficiency in the implementations of

government policies and programmes to the fullest extent practicable through the encouragement of specialisation of personnel and through other measures."

Pursuant to these aims and objectives, the decree provides General Guidelines for their implementation (Civil Service Reforms) as follows:-

1. The Minister - The Minister will now be both the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer, rather than the Permanent Secretary;
2. Tenure of office - The Permanent Secretary's appointment is already political, and its duration is at the pleasure of the president. Henceforth, holders of that position will retire with the Government which appoints them unless, of course, an incoming administration decides to re-appoint them;
3. Professional Service - Each Ministry will now be professionalised. Every officer whether a specialist or generalist, will now make his career entirely in the Ministry or Department of his choice, and thereby acquire the necessary expertise and experience through relevant specialised training and uninterrupted involvement with the work of the Ministry or Department;

4. Federal Civil Service Commission - Under the new arrangement, each Ministry will undertake the appointment, discipline and promotion of its staff under general and uniform guidelines to be provided by the Federal Civil Service Commission;
5. Ministerial structural changes - The Ministries of Finance and National Planning have already been merged and will now be called the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development;
6. Budgeting Office - The Budget Department(Revenue, Recurrent and Capital Estimates) of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development is hereby transferred to the presidency to afford the necessary fiscal supervision and control...[35]

Explanatory Notes On The 1988 Reforms

i. Internal Structure Of Ministry

Each Ministry is expected to have in hierarchical order, Departments, Divisions Units, Branches and Sections. No further sub-divisions below Section is allowed. Only schedule officers exist below "Sections".

The Ministries are not to have more than eight (8) Departments so also are the Ministries to have not more than

three(3) sub- divisions called "Units" namely: Internal Audit, Legal Unit and Public Relations Unit. These "Units" are not supposed to have sub-units but have schedule officers.

The number of staff allowed each "Unit" is not specified but to be determined by the Civil Service Commission and can vary from Unit to Unit depending on the volume and complexity of work. The head of each of the Unit is called Head and his salary could range between Grade level 14 and Grade level 17 as determined by the Civil Service Commission depending on the volume and complexity of work with possible variation from Ministry to Ministry.

The three common compulsory Departments are Personnel Management, Finance and Supplies, and Planning Research and Statistics. It is not allowed to have other sub-divisions in each of the three common compulsory Departments other than those prescribed.

The Departments are to be headed by Directors and they are supposed to perform the following functions:

1. Under the new Structures, Directors of Departments now constitute the topmost Career Civil Servants in the Civil Service. They are the advisers of the Minister, in respect of the functions assigned to their respective Departments.
2. Under the general direction of the Minister, they

shall co-ordinate the men, money materials and other resources allocated to their Departments in order to achieve the objectives and targets of their Departments.

3. They assist with the initiation and development of policy (including the initial drafting of necessary Council Memoranda) in respect of the functions assigned to their respective Departments. They shall also implement decided policy.
4. They shall be members of their Ministries' Personnel Management Board, Finance Board and Planning Board.
5. They shall have power to approve expenditure not exceeding ₦50,000.00 on any individual matter of expenditure(or maximum total of ₦600,000.00 in one year).
6. They shall be responsible for the overall performance of their respective Departments.
7. They shall perform such other functions as may be assigned in particular cases by law or as may be determined by the Minister from time to time.
8. They shall perform their duties in close consultation and co-operation with other Directors of Departments in the Ministry.

It is not obligatory for all the sub-divisions under a Department to be created or operationalised right from the

onset. It is advisable and preferable for the sub-divisions under a department to be articulated and developed over time depending on the developments in the nature, volume and complexity of the work and the staffing situation of the Department. A Department could therefore be developed from bottom up or from top to the bottom and it could also be headed by a one-man Department Director which then builds up over time with the creation of Divisions, Branches and Sections as time goes on.

Three things are to go on together under the Reforms which are: as from Grade Level 14 to Grade Level 17, The Grade Level, the Post and the Subdivision must all go on simultaneously. Thus, if an official is on GL 14 it must mean that the official is a chief and is heading a section. The Grade Level must exist for Officers on GL 14-17 for any post to exist and for the headship of subdivision.

Nomenclatures such as "Ministry", "Office", "Bureau", "Department", "Division", "Branch", "Section", "Unit", "Director", "Officer", "Assistant", all have unique meanings and connotations which should not be confused with each other or used interchangeab- ly. In the same way "Bureau" is headed by an official not lower in status than a Director-General, whatever title that official may be given. [36]

ii. Personnel Management

The management of Personnel under the new dispensation has the following provisions:

(a). **Personnel Management Board (PMB) And Audit Committees.**

Subject to the provisions of Decree 43 of 1988, it is the Minister who shall compose the various Committees of the PMB. In doing so the Minister shall, in addition to the stipulations of the law, ensure that all Departments are fairly represented as far as possible and that the Committees shall be reviewed periodically in order to give a fair chance to all eligible officials to serve on the committees at one time or the other.

The Personnel Management Board is enjoined to supervise the work of its committees, the activities of which are also subject to the general direction and control of the PMB through the ratification of the minutes of its meeting before such minutes can become bases for further necessary action. The Minister/Commissioner is the chairman of PMB who shall ratify the minutes of the Committees of the PMB provided that where the chairman disagrees with any recommendations in the minutes he makes it available to the notice of the PMB for determination.

The Civil Service Commission is to act as observer in the PMB and its Senior Staff Committee is meant only to ensure compliance with the general guidelines governing appointment, promotion and disciplinary matters. The Civil Commission

representative does not participate in the PMB/Committee decision-making, nor is his/her signature on minutes required to validate such minutes.

The Chairman plus six (6) members shall form the quorum of the PMB and its Senior Staff Committee, whilst the Chairman plus three (3) members shall form the quorum of the Junior Staff Committees (HQ and Local). The PMB shall also regulate its own procedures and the procedures of its Committees and such procedures may include the use of Sub-Committees or adhoc panels, the work of which shall be subject to confirmation and adoption of the PMB.

(b). **The Role of Director of Personnel**

It is the duty of the Director of Personnel of the Ministry to sign and issue letters conveying any decision of the PMB or its Committees provided that such letters receive the blessing of the Minister or Commissioner. He co-ordinates all the activities of the Personnel Department such as recruitment, promotion, discipline, termination, training etc.

(c). **Open Advertisement**

Open advertisement within and outside the Civil Service to fill any vacant post in the Ministry shall be utilised only if there are no potential candidates within the Ministry to fill such vacancy through promotion and only if further delay in

filling the vacant post through internal promotion would jeopardise the performance of the Ministry's function.

Where such advertisements are necessary, all the required criteria for the vacant post must be unambiguously determined and made known to applicants.

(d). **Staff Development**

Any staff of a Ministry can be redeployed by the Minister or Commissioner to another Department within the Ministry provided the staff concerned possesses the relevant specialisation and skill for the new area of redeployment. Central deployment within a Ministry is allowed at least for purposes of efficiency and desirability.

The staff of the Planning Research and Statistics (PRS) Department in each Ministry, especially the Research Branch shall be representative of all Departments in the Ministry. This implies that at any given time, the staff of the Research Branch shall consist of a small core of Permanent staff and staff who are deployed to the Branch from all other Departments in the Ministry for specific periods to undertake research into specific problems falling within the area under the jurisdiction of each Department and relevant research staff from universities, research institutes and private corporations.

(e). **Training**

Training which should be obligatory and periodic for all staff of the Ministry falls within the exclusive authority of the Minister/Commissioner. It is now part of the pre-requisite for promotion and posting to relevant positions in the Service.

(f). **Staff Lists and Professionalism**

As a result of the enhanced professionalism installed by the Reforms, the earlier dichotomy between the so-called Professional class and the Administrative class has been removed. All Civil Servants now belong only in the professional class. They belong to either Director, Officer and Assistant cadre.

To enhance the management of this professionalism in the Service, Staff Lists or Nominal Rolls are henceforth to be prepared by all Ministries/Extra-Ministerial Departments in line with the three cadres of these hierarchical professions in the Service. Such hierarchical profession shall be subdivided into their cadres in descending order of seniority.

iii. Financial Management

The Reforms has introduced decentralisation and delegation in financial management for purposes of speeding up effective operations, policy implementation and decision-making,

particularly by officials at the management level i.e Grade Level 14-17 officials.

Various provisions of Decree 43 of 1988 are directed at achieving the objective of decentralisation, delegation and enhanced accountability.

(a) **Finance Board**

For the effective financial policy-making at the Ministry's level, and in order to ensure close and structured consultation on financial policy matters, and in order to facilitate the effective implementation of the provision of the Reforms on finance management, each Ministry may wish to have a Finance Board whose chairman shall be the Minister and whose other members shall be the Director-General and the Directors of Departments, with the Deputy Director of Budget as Secretary, and with the Deputy Director of Accounts in attendance to provide necessary information.

The duty of the Finance Board includes the following:

i. Consider and approve the Ministry's Annual Budget proposals before they are submitted to the higher authorities;

ii. Sub-allocate the Ministry's quarterly cash allocation among the various Departments, Units and other purposes of the Ministry;

iii identify at the beginning of every year the items/types of expenditure which shall be subject to the decentralised expenditure-approval powers specified in the Reforms;

iv. agree on the expenditure-approval levels within the maximum limits specified in paragraph 1 of section 1 which is operational during a given year;

v. advise the Minister on which of the Deputy Directors, Assistant Directors and Chiefs will be allowed to exercise the expenditure approval powers specified in the Decree;

vi. receive and advise the Minister on the Ministry's annual appropriate accounts and financial report before these are sent to higher authorities for necessary action;

vii perform such other functions as the Minister may assign to it from time to time.

(b). **Expenditure-Approval Powers**

The Power granted to incur expenditure is stated below:

AUTHORISING OFFICER OR BODY	INDIVIDUAL APPROVAL LEVEL	AGGREGATE ANNUAL LIMIT
Chief & Officer	Amount not exceeding ₦5,000.00	₦60,000.00
Assistant Director	Amount not exceeding ₦10,000.00	₦120,000.00
Deputy Director	Amount not exceeding ₦20,000.00	₦240,000.00
Director	Amount not exceeding ₦50,000.00	₦600,000.00
Director General	Amount not exceeding ₦100,000.00	₦1,200.000.00
Minister	Amount not exceeding ₦250,000.00	₦3,000.000
Departmental Tenders		

Board.	Amount exceeding	
	₦200,000 but not exceeding	₦0.5m
Council of Ministers	Amount exceeding	
	₦5 million. [37]	

If an Officer granted such expenditure power exhausts his aggregate limit before the end of a financial year, subsequent authorisation of expenditure falling within his individual approval limit shall be given by the next higher Officer.

All expenditure approval by an Officer shall be reported within a week to the next higher Officer for information and each officer shall be held accountable for the expenditure approved by him. The limit of authority to approve expenditure shall be subject in the usual manner to budgetary appropriation, quarterly release and financial regulations.

At the beginning of each financial year the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer shall designate which Deputy Director, Assistant Director or Chief and Officer in each Division, Branch or Section respectively may exercise authority to approve expenditure within the limits referred to above.

There shall also be the following Tenders Boards:

i. **Departmental Tenders Board**

ii. Director of another Department other than that asking for

Tenders - Chairman

2. One Deputy Director - Member

3. One Asst. Director - Member

4. One Chief of Section - Member

The Director-General is to approve the recommendations of the Board.

B. **Ministerial Tenders Board**

Director-General - Chairman

All Directors of Departments - Members

The Minister/Commissioner is to approve the recommendations of the Board.

The Planning, Research and Statistics Departments would serve as the Secretariat of the Tenders Board.

The expenditure power granted under section 1A as explained above shall not be exercised through the signing of necessary LPO or signing of relevant payment cheque. Rather the power shall be exercised through formal letters or internal memos issued by the relevant official to the Supplies Division authorising it to effect the purchase and later to the Accounts Division authorising it to effect payment after the authorising official is satisfied with the execution of the order.

Before such expenditure authority is exercised also, the

those who have been given new or enhanced financial powers under the Reforms. Audit Alarms is raised not only for the Accounting Officer but any of those responsible for incurring expenditure (Expenditure Powers).

In order to protect the Head of Internal Unit and his staff against victimisation by any official with expenditure powers, pre-payment audit queries shall be notified to the Accountant-General of the federation/state. Also, denial of promotion or advancement and any other disciplinary measures against such staff shall not be finally decided upon except the comments of the Accountant-General has been obtained and considered. Conversely, any staff of the Internal Audit Unit who is found to have colluded with any person to defraud government or effect an irregular payment shall be subject to severe disciplinary action which may include summary dismissal without option of a lighter punishment

General

1. Planning Board

Each Ministry may have a Planning Board whose chairman shall be the Minister and whose other members shall consist of the Director-General and the Directors of Departments, with the Deputy Director of Planning as secretary and with the Deputy Director of Research and Statistics in attendance

The duties of the Planning Boards shall include the following:

i. approve the Ministry's development plans before they are sent to higher authorities for necessary actions;

ii. approve the Ministry's research programmes for the year;

iii. agree on the Ministry's overall work programme and targets of achievements for the year;

iv. regulates its own procedures and determine its quorum;

v. receives and advise the Minister on the following reports and proposals before they are sent to higher authorities for necessary actions:

(a). Plan monitoring and evaluation reports;

(b). proposals for creating new sub-divisions or restructuring and rationalising existing ones;

(c). reports emanating from the Efficiency Section;

(d). reports of completed research projects and

(e). the overall Annual Report of the Ministry.

2. Research and Statistics Divisions (RSD)

The Research and Statistics Division should have three sections namely:

(1). The Sectoral Research Section, which is to conduct practical policy-oriented research into the sectors of the

society or areas of concern over which the Ministry has jurisdiction. Such research are supposed to be conducted by four types of staff/resource persons as follows:

i. the core staff in the section.

ii. staff in all other departments in the Ministry who are deployed for specific periods to the section to work(individually or in multi-disciplinary teams) on research projects concerning the areas of jurisdiction of their respective Departments;

iii. temporary staff from outside the Ministry who are spending their leaves in the section; and

iv. research contractors/consultants from outside the Ministry.

(2). The Operations, Organisation and Management Research (OOMR) section is to conduct research into Operational modalities, the organisational structure and management modalities of the Ministry itself. This section provides in-house management consultancy services for the Ministry itself.

(3). The Efficiency Section uses the results of the OOMR section to design efficiency targets for each sub-division and each occupational group within the Ministry. This section monitors the implementation and attainment of these targets and reports

periodically to the Minister.

(4). The Statistics Branch has Sectoral Statistics and Internal Statistics sections. The Sectoral section is to routinely collect and process statistics relating to the sectors of the society or areas of concern over which the Ministry has jurisdiction. The Internal Statistics section is to routinely collect and process statistics on the internal condition and situation of the Ministry itself.

(5). The Records Branch is subdivided into the Library Section, the Registry Section, the Computer Service Section and Data Bank Section. The Library section provides specialised literature and library services relevant to the functions assigned to the Ministry by Government. The Registry section keeps and manages all the files used within the Ministry for the conduct of its business, regardless of whether the files are kept in one central area or decentralised within the Departments or field stations.

(6). The Computer Service Section is to provide computer services to all Departments and Units of the Ministry. The services to be provided cover Personnel, Financial, Planning, and Operations matters. It is the "factory" of the Ministry's

Data Bank.

(7). The Data Bank Section manages the Ministry's data base. It processes, stores and arranges easy access to and retrieval of all data generated by or flowing into the Ministry. The data base is supposed to be computerised and should be linked with the National Data Bank.

3. Internal Monitoring of The Civil Service Reforms

Since the Civil Service Reforms deal with the Organisation Management and Operation of the Civil Service, the OOMRS apart from its other functions of serving as the Ministry's in-house management consultants, it is the Section in each of the Ministry which should monitor and be conversant with the implementation of the Reforms in the whole Ministry.

In the light of the General Guidelines for the implementation of the Reforms, it could be summarised by way of resume that the 1988 Civil Service Reforms are aimed at making the Service more result oriented, dedicated, efficient in the management of both human and financial resources of the government business and they also aim at removing the acrimony between Ministers/Commissioners and their Permanent Secretaries (Directors General) whereby the former are made Accounting

Officers and Chief Executives of their respective Ministries. The Reforms to a large extent are aimed at fulfilling recommendations of the Adebo and Udoji Commissions which were yet to be implemented before now.[38]

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CHAPTER THREE

THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF KOGI STATE'S CIVIL SERVICE.

3.1 Brief History Of Kogi State

Kogi State which was created on 27th August, 1991 along with other eight states by President Ibrahim B. Babangida with its headquarters at Lokoja is located on the intercepting point on longitude 7'49 and latitude 6'44E on the map of Nigeria.

The State headquarters lies between the range of hills called Mount Patti and the Confluence of River Niger and Benue. These range of hills and navigable water way provided by the Niger and Benue rivers gave it a strategic location which attracted growth of settlement, commercial activities and transportation.

The state is inhabited by three major ethnic groups namely the Ebirras, Igalas, Yorubas (Okuns). Other indigenous minority ethnic groups who are not least important are the Bassa Komos, Bassa Nges, Nupe, Kakanda, Egbirra Koto, Oworos, the Ogoris, Hausas etc. The State was carved out from the present Benue and Kwara states. The present Kogi State was formerly Kabba Province. Kogi State is made up of 16 Local Government Areas with 10 carved from Kwara State and 6 from the former Benue State. The break down of these Local Government Areas is in

Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 THE POPULATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS IN KOGI STATE CARVED FROM BOTH BENUE AND KWARA STATES

STATE	LGA	POPULATION	PERCENTAGE	TRIBE	%
1. Kwara (old)	Okene	309.397	14.735	Ebirras, Ogari	
2. Kwara (old)	Adavi	195.400	9.294	Ebirras	
3. Kwara (old)	Okehi	137.289	6.540	Ebirras	
4. Kwara(old)	Ajaokuta	80.336	3.827	Ebirras/Igala	
5. Kwara (old)	Kogi	77.516	3.692	Hausa, Nupe, Kakanda, Oworo, Yoruba	
6. Kwara (old)	Yagba East	75.522	3.597	Yagba (Yoruba)	
7. Kwara (old)	Oyi	66.253	3.156	Okun (Yoruba)	
8. Kwara (old)	Yagba East	64.576	3.076	Owe (Yoruba)	
9. Kwara (old)	Ijumu	61.885	2.948	Okun (Yoruba)	
10. Kwara(old)	Koton-karfe	53.976	2.271	Ebirra, Bassa, Gwari	
11. Benue (old)	Ankpa	248.281	11.828	Igalas	
12. Benue (old)	Idah	214.765	10.231	Igalas	
13. Benue (old)	Dekina	210.682	9.608	Igalas	
14. Benue (old)	Olam-aboro	114.231	5.442	Igalas	

15. Benue (old) Ofu	112.697	5.368	Igalas
16. Benue (Old) Bassa	85.620	4.078	Bassas
	2,099,269	100%	

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3.2 The Structure And Organization of Kogi State's Civil Service

To measure the extent to which the Provisions of the 1988 Civil Service Reforms have been achieved in Kogi State, It is imperative to examine the organization structure of each ofthe Ministries in the Civil Service in comparison with what is provided and attained in the Federal Civil Service.

To this extent, the diagrams of the basic Institutional structure of the Reformed Federal Civil Service and its components is attached as Diagrams 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 (Appendix A)

The basic institutional structure of the Reformed Federal Civil Service as indicated in the diagrams attached (Appendix A) is not structurally the same as what is obtained in Kogi State even though functionally has a common identify. The reasons for this assertion are as follow -

The Reformed Federal Structure provides for the Secretary to the Federal Government to be directly accountable to the President whereas in Kogi State, the Secretary to the State government is not wholly accountable to the governor. Instead, he is accountable also to the deputy governor. This implies that he serves two masters each of who could call him to order.

The functions of Special Advisers are explicitly stated in the case of the Reformed Federal Civil Service whereas in Kogi State Government, at the time of the conduct of this research their functions are interwoven with that of Honourable Commissioners. In most cases, in some Ministries, the Honourable Commissioners are having more executive powers than the Special Advisers. This functional defects give room for role conflict. In the same vein, the Special Advisers at the Reformed Federal Service as shown by the diagrams, are directly accountable to the President whereas in Kogi State, they are not fully and directly accountable to the Governor. Instead, the function of their posts make the Special Advisers accountable partially to the Honourable Commissioners. This is so because Honourable Commissioners are Accounting Officers whereas Special Advisers are not.

The remuneration of Directors at the federal level as provided in the Reformed Federal Civil Service places them on Salary GL17 whereas their Counterparts at the State level (Kogi State in this case), are on Salary GL16. The differences in salary scale in all cadres as provided in the Federal Structure and that of Kogi State is a serious issue that demands redressing so as to put the State Civil Services at the same Structural functions and remunerations with that of the Federal Government for consistency and harmonization.

Diagram 3.3 which provides further breakdown of the Personnel, Finance, Planning Departments is exhaustive enough to have made provisions for subdivisions in each of the Departments whereas such detailed provisions at the state level (Kogi State) are not available. Because of these shortcomings, it could not be said that Kogi State Civil Service has fully implemented the provisions of the 1988 Civil Service Reforms as provided in the diagrams.

As provided further in diagram 3.3, each of the sections and units headed by a Deputy Director and an Assistant Director at the federal level, gives room for real specialization whereas at the state level (Kogi State), there are no such specializations on a pronounced level. This is so because the Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors are all assisting the Director who is the head of the Department. In this wise, they perform only duties and assignments given them by their Directors which are not in most cases specific or routined.

Because of the newness of Kogi State at the time this research was conducted, the implementation of the 1988 Reforms was at its youthful stage especially when two services ie Kwara State and Benue State bureaucrats were involved. It was observed and apparent too that in terms of remuneration (payment of allowances and fringe benefits), Benue State had more favourable

payment policy than that of Kwara and as such, the payment policy for Benue State was adopted for Kogi State. This adoption raised the morale of Civil Servants deployed from Kwara State whose payment benefits were less favourable.

It is worthy of note that some Civil Servants in Kogi State at the time of conduct of this research were yet to be aware of the provisions of the 1988 Reforms and as such, could not give any categorical assessment of it. They however, all appreciate the Structural and functional provision of the 1988 Reforms as provided in the diagrams. Based on this observation, the structure of the Reformed Federal Civil Service could be said to have a utility value on its surface except critically examined and proved otherwise.

The Kogi State Civil Service at the time this research was conducted had eight Ministries namely, Governor's Office; Ministry of Social Development and Health Services; Ministry of Works; Ministry of justice; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Education; and Ministry of Finance.

The diagrams showing their basic institutional structure are attached, as Diagrams 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11. (Appendix A)

The Reformed Civil Service Structure as provided in the diagrams could be adopted fully in Kogi State giving some time frame as perceived by the workers because of the level of qualified manpower that the state is endowed with to carry out the implementation of government policies and to occasionally review such policies.

A basic factor that could jeopardize the implementation of the Reformed Structure is the lack of enough funds as running cost. This fact is hinged on the premise that sufficient funds are needed for the rapid development of the state especially the provision of good residential accommodation to workers, provision of portable water, construction of good roads for the teaming population, provision of schooling facilities and a host of other developmental facilities for a new state.

The provision of these needs and the necessary working capital and tools in all Ministries and Departments from almost a single source of revenue ie Federal Allocation, cannot make it very easy to setup the required Departments Sections and Units in Kogi State as provided in the Federal Reformed Civil Service Structure. The level of tribal complexity in Kogi State is seen to have a tendency of hampering the effective implementation of the Reformed Federal Structure. This assertion is hinged on the premise that the three major ethnic

groups namely Ebirra, Igala and the Okuns are all politically conscious of each other's might ; that the three major ethnic groups are either sub-consciously or consciously struggling to attain the positions in the helms of affairs of Kogi State. by this development it is believed that the implementation of the Reformed Federal Civil Service Structure could be undermined in Kogi State Civil Service. This ethnic rivalry is also perceived by each of the groups as a possible major factor in the progress and development of the State.

A certain group of thought who compared the Reformed Federal Service Structure with what was obtained in Kogi State at the time of the conduct of this research had the feeling also that as laudable as the Reformed Federal Civil Structure appeared to be, the high level of political instability evident by the frequent change of government, could not allow for easy continuity of the government policies and programmes because of the inherent policy differentials by successive governments. It was also observed that in a democratic government being operated in Nigeria then, where different parties were ruling at both Federal, State and Local Government levels with different programmes, a unified structure of the service could be difficult to implement and be adopted in Nigeria.

It was observed that in Nigeria being one of the less developed countries, external influences could not be ruled out in the day to day running of administration . In this regard,it is asserted that certain group of people at the

top management level of Government in Nigeria could use their public positions to satisfy the yearnings and aspirations of external bourgeois for the enrichment of their pockets. It was then strongly believed that the Reformed structure was so neatly knitted to engender maximum exploitation of the masses for the maintenance and sustenance of the ruling elities and their cohorts

Despite the utility value attached to the Reformed Federal structure, it was observed that it does not provide for the specific level of training required for specific bureaucrats who should occupy specific positions and perform specific function. Instead, that good diagrammatic provisions are drawn out with new names to fit in leaving the very rudiments of corruption, nepotism and a host of other vises yet uncleansed in order to engender the anticipated effectiveness and efficiency of the service.

The legal unit provided in the Reformed Federal Structure which is supposed to be adopted in all the Ministries of the state is not strictly adhered to in Kogi state. Instead, heavy reliance is given on the Ministry of Justice for their technical expertise. In the same vein, the Public Relation Unit that is supposed to be created in each ministry of the state as provided in the Federal Structure is not established in most of the Ministries in Kogi State. Instead, reliance is given heavily on the Ministry of Information and Culture for the publicity of government programmes and activities of all the Ministries.

In comparison with the organisational structure of the Federal Civil Service and in consonance with the provisions of the 1988 Civil Service Reforms; it is apparent that Kogi State's Civil Service has very similar structures and could be said to have complied to a great extent with the provisions of the Reforms. Inference could also be made to the effect that going by the level of structural organisation of the State's Civil Service, a lot of competence, efficiency and effectiveness could be achieved by the Bureaucrats if given the necessary wherewithal and incentives.

3.3 An Analysis Of The Structure And Organisation Of The Kogi State's Civil Service

3.3.1 An Overview of The Kogi State's Service

As explained from the foregoing, the structure of the Kogi State's Civil Service is patterned on the provisions of the Reformed Federal Civil Service which as provided in the 1988 Civil Service Reforms (see diagram 3.1).

The secretary to the Kogi State's government is the Head of the State's Civil Service at the same time as the Coordinator between the Public Civil Servants and the Government and the major link between the Government and the governed. The Secretary to the State government initiates, formulates and

implements government policies. However, there appeared to be contradiction as to the seniority and positioning of statuses of the Secretary to the State government and that of Commissioners of Ministries. Many of the Commissioners were of the feeling and were of strong desire that they should be given paramount recognition than the Secretary to the State Government as the former was not a participant member of the State Executive Council.

At the time of the conduct of this research (Civilian Era - 3rd Republic), from information gathered and based on personal observations on the general feelings of the worker about the government of the state, it could not be explained whether the Secretary to the State government was actually the link between the Civil Servants and the government. This was so because, it was seen that most of the duties of the former were performed by the Deputy governor while the attention of SSG was needed only when there were no very serious policy issues involved.

It was also reported that though going by the structure of the Reformed Federal Civil Service, States' Commissioners are supposed to be Heads of their Ministries and to be assisted by their Directors General, the State Chief Executive was not strictly adhering to this. He played divide-and-rule policy (as alleged) whereby he had to boycott some Commissioners for their Directors General and Secretaries of some Boards and parastatals

instead of their Chairmen and General Managers as he felt favourable. There was general disaffection and apathy amongst the workers, against the government about the flagrant disregard of laid down Civil Service Rules and Regulations just for political interests and considerations especially when non Civil Servants were appointed to the Service on very high senior scales even when there were officers of more senior and relevant qualifications within the Service. Civil Servants deployed from Benue State from where the then civilian governor came from were alleged to have been placed above their colleagues because of personal and tribal considerations.

On the whole, despite some short-comings and defects in the structuring of the Service because of the newness of the state, the structure and organisation of the Ministries is such that it engendered effective and efficient performance of the Bureaucrats.

An attempt of the analysis of the organisational structure of the ministries is as follows:

3.2.2 Organisational Structure of The Governor's Office

As stated in diagram 3.5, the office succeeded in department-alising the offices with Directors General heading them whereas such Departments could have been headed by Directors with the Secretary to the state government as the Chief

Executive and assisted by the Director General Services (Cabinet). The appointment of as many as seven Directors General in a single Ministry is uncalled for (wastage of skilled human resources) and not in the spirit of the 1988 Reforms. Such appointments are done merely for political considerations. The overstaffing of the office is one of the sources through which the State's scarce resources is being drained.

The establishment of a legal unit in each Ministry as provided for in the Reforms is not implemented in the Governor's Office. This is one of the very serious shortcomings of the structure of the Office. It is discovered also that there was no Public Relations unit to publicise the activities of the Governor's Office.

It was observed that some of the Departments are mere Sections/Units or Branches tagged Departments with Directors as their Head of Department. Some of the departments are not big enough to be called so. The Establishment and Training Department with Management Services; Establishment; Pensions and Training units as separate Departments under the Director General Establishment and Training could be better regrouped as Sections under the Director of Personnel with each of the sections headed by a Deputy or Assistant Director.

The Departments of Political; Chieftaincy Affairs and Local Government; and Special Duties could be grouped into one

Department under a Director of Special duties. The Department of Information could be made a separate Ministry.

The Organisational Structure Of The Ministry Of Social Development.

The ministry of Health and social developmeht like some other ministries has the problem of role-conflict between the Commissioner of the Ministry and the Special Adviser on Health in the same Ministry. The role-conflict between Commissioner for Health and the Special Adviser has arisen because the former is supposed to be the political head of the ministry while the latter feels that he is more important than the former as a Speical Adviser hence, the generated role-conflict. It was not necessary to appoint a Commissioner and a Special Adviser in the same Ministry. Such double appointments are resource wasting, and crisis ridden.

It was observed that some of the department in the ministry of Health could have been merged to constitute a more viable one than the skeletal sections grouped differently as departments just to create vacancies for Officers on salary GL.16 to be designated directors of the sections. The department of medical services need to be merged with that of Pharmaceutical service and to be named department of Medical and Pharmaceutical Services since Pharmacy is part of medicine.

Medicine.

The Department of Finance and Supply, and that of Planning Research and Statistics need to be fully developed with all the necessary staff if possible, to be deployed from other Ministries where they are surplus so that it could have the detailed required Units, Sections and Branches as provided by the Reforms for better efficiency and effectiveness.

3.3.4 The Organisational Structure Of The Ministry of Works.

The Ministry of Works has a much better organised structure made up of eight Departments which is the maximum number recommended in the Reforms. The organisation within the Departments is good enough for proper co-ordination and supervision of functions as statutorily provided for the Ministry.

However, a legal; Internal Audit; and Public Relations Sections were not established at the time of this research. For a better and effective utility of this Ministry, there is need for their establishment.

3.3.4 The Organisational Structure of The Ministry of Justice.

The Ministry being a more purely technical one, has divided its Departments into five with Directors heading each of them. The major shortcoming on the structure of the Ministry is the

fusing of the Departments of Personnel with that of Finance and Supply which is not in consonance with the provisions of the 1988 Reforms.

The most interesting aspect of the structure of the Ministry is the deliberate policy of appointing both the Commissioner for Justice and its Director General from members of the Bench (lawyers). This arrangement makes room for better policy initiation, implementation, mutual understanding and respect for each other for a better performance.

3.3.6 The Organisational Structure of The Ministry of Agriculture.

The Ministry has a good structure that should engender better output but it looked very poorly funded as most of the workers are idle for lack of input to produce the required action.

The Department of Planning Research and Statistics was not established at the time of this research. It also lacked the legal unit which each of the Ministry is supposed to have.

3.3.7 The Organisational Structure of The Ministry of Commerce And Industry.

The Ministry of Commerce has six functional Departments with well qualified and dynamic Heads. The level of operations was well co-ordinated that the Ministry was seen as one of the most functional one. Its Commissioner was very powerful and influential such that he could get anything he needed for the

Ministry from the Governor. It was however, observed by some people that the Ministry was delving into the operations that were supposed to be done by some other Ministries because of the personal influence of the Commissioner.

3.3.8 The Organisational Structure of The Ministry of Education.

The Ministry of Education has the maximum number of eight Departments as provided in the Reforms. The structuring of the Departments is comprehensive enough to achieve the aim of setting standards and ensuring the attainment of sound policy of education in the state.

The Ministry is also one of those ones that has very qualified Officers than the number of available vacancies. Because of this, many of the qualified Officers who should have been heading Departments and Sections are compelled to head schools and even engage in teaching for lack of vacancies in the Ministries.

3.3.9 The Organisational Structure of The Ministry of Finance.

The Ministry of Finance has the mandatory three Departments namely, Personnel; Finance and Supplies; and Planning Research and Statistics. Other Departments created are mere Sections and Branches that are supposed to come under either of these three

Departments. It is therefore believed that some of the Departments are not viable enough to have stood on their own.

As a result of the 1988 Reforms which has removed the Accountant General's Office from the control and supervision of the Ministry of Finance, the usual loyalty and accountability of the Accountant General to the Commissioner of Finance is no longer there.

The accounts of the state are controlled and managed by the Governor of the state with the Accountant General heading the Department. Since the post of the Accountant General is now made political, the required level of competence and seniority is absent and as such, the tendency of the accounts of the state to be subjected to the control of the Governor and his political appointed Accountant General is high.

One other observation is the establishment of the Board of Internal Revenue with an Executive Chairman appointed by the Governor of the state and to him wholly is the chairman accountable. This structural defect is very unsuitable for the proper accountability and structural utility of the Ministry of Finance. The tendency for the Ministry not to have proper records and accounts of revenue derived by the Board is high since the chairman is a political appointee who could collaborate with the Chief Executive to swindle away the revenue realised by the Board of Revenue.

3.4. The Staff Strength And Biodata Of Civil Servants In Kogi State.

3.3.1 Staff Strength.

When the state was created in 1991, it was not established as to the actual number of staff deployed from both Kwara and Benue states until after one year when the state government through the Department of Establishment undertook a survey of the staff strength. From the report of the survey, it is indicated that Kogi State's Civil Service has a population of 11,744 and that it has a number of sixteen Ministries, Parastatals and Commissions put together. The detail of this is shown on table 3.2. below.

TABLE 3.2

SUMMARY OF ESTABLISHED POST BY SALARY GRADE LEVEL IN 1992 ESTIMATES
(GL.01-06 = 7.833; 07-13 = 3.273; 14-bove = 668)

	MINISTRY/DEPARTMENT	GL. 1	GL. 2	GL. 3	GL. 4	GL. 5	GL. 6	GL. 7	GL. 8	GL. 9	GL. 10	GL. 12	GL. 13	GL. 14	GL. 15	GL. 16	17 AND OTHERS	DG	COMM./ SP.ADV.	TOTAL
1.	GOVERNMENT HOUSE	118	111	212	84	56	95	62	57	26	35	30	27	17	9	9	2	4	-	854
2.	GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	82	103	112	144	115	112	148	130	80	84	40	37	33	22	15	9	10	4	1,299
3.	MIN. OF AGRIC. & RURAL DEV.	475	207	313	383	204	204	190	106	72	65	54	33	29	22	9	-	1	2	2,369
4.	MINISTRY OF FINANCE	131	58	85	111	47	56	40	64	35	22	21	16	12	9	5	2	1	1	716
5.	MINISTRY OF EDUCATION	96	51	100	161	119	61	40	22	15	30	41	51	50	55	10	5	1	2	908
6.	MIN. OF HLTH., SOC. DEV. & SPORTS	35	83	50	31	35	47	78	54	41	71	60	53	51	15	11	-	1	2	718
7.	MINISTRY OF JUSTICE	28	15	25	15	15	13	10	6	14	9	5	--	5	3	5	-	1	1	175
8.	MIN. OF WORKS & WATER RES.	232	242	206	274	140	114	223	67	39	35	30	43	44	11	7	-	1	1	1,709
9.	OFFICE OF THE STATE AUD-GEN.	10	26	36	59	26	51	32	33	32	7	10	7	4	1	2	1	-	-	317
10.	CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION	8	8	8	14	15	19	17	33	6	5	6	9	5	3	2	5	1	-	144
11.	JUDICIARY	400	250	177	146	204	130	118	49	28	37	31	21	17	5	5	19	-	-	1,637
12.	SHARIA COURT OF APPEAL	9	12	11	24	22	15	8	5	4	5	2	3	-	-	1	6	-	-	117
13.	JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE	4	5	2	10	5	4	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	-	1	5	-	-	48
14.	COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY	29	28	45	52	12	21	13	29	17	23	33	18	10	6	5	-	1	1	343
15.	OFFICE OF AUDTR-GEN FOR LGG.	5	5	5	22	7	6	7	12	3	4	2	1	3	2	3	1	-	-	92
16.	STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY	25	28	56	48	24	16	14	18	14	15	21	6	4	3	3	33	-	-	328
	TOTAL	1,681	1,232	1,347	1,578	1,036	959	1,003	668	432	448	396	326	285	166	93	88	22	14	11,774

SOURCE: Establishment Report Of The Dept. of Estab., Kogi State, 1992.

If numerical staff strength is anything to go by, the state's total number of eleven thousand, seven hundred and seventy four workers if they possess the necessary expertise, training and qualification, is appropriate for the good performance expected of the state.

3.4.2 The Biodata Of Civil Servants From Five Ministries

Having known the staff strength of the State's Service, it is important to know the basic information about the calibre of workers so as to project the type of performance expected of them. The biodata of the Civil Servants in the selected five Ministries is stated on tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8

TABLE 3.3

THE BIODATA OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE MINISTRY OF WORKS

Salary Structure	No.	Age Range	No.	Years of working exp.		State of Deployment	Sex	No.	Qualifications	
GL. 08 - 10	5	20 - 31	20	5 - 10	12	Kwara 67	Male	115	Certificate - Degree	120
GL. 12 - 14	99	32 - 43	120	13 - 15	140	Benue 88	Female	10	Graduate/Others	23
GL. 15 - 17	51	44 - 45	15	16 - 29	3					
	155									155

SOURCE:

Data Collected on The Biodata of Interviewees

Civil Servants In The Ministry of Works, Kogi State.

TABLE 3.4

THE BIODATA OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE GENERAL SERVICES DEPT. OF GOVERNOR'S OFFICE

Salary Structure	No.	Age Range	No.	Working Exp.	No.	State of Deployment	Sex	No.	Qualifications	
GL. 08 - 10	12	20 - 31		5 - 10	5	Kwara 15	Male	22	Certificate - Degree	22
GL. 12 - 14	8	32 - 43		13 - 15	15	Benue 13	Female	6	Graduate/Others	6
GL. 15 - 17	8	44 - 45		16 - 29	8			28		28
	28				28	28				

SOURCE:

Data Collected on The Biodata of Interviewees

Civil Servants In The Governor's Office (General Services),

Kogi State.

TABLE 3.5

THE BIODATA OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

Salary Structure	No.	Age Range	No.	Working Exp.	No.	State of Deployment	Sex	No.	Qualifications	
GL. 08 - 10	20	20 - 31	12	5 - 10	5	Kwara 22	Male	35	Certificate - Degree	33
GL. 12 - 14	12	32 - 43	20	13 - 15	30	Benue 20	Female	7	Graduate/Others	9
GL. 15 - 17	10	44 - 45	10	16 - 29	7			42		42
	42		42		42	42				

SOURCE:

Data Collected on The Biodata of Interviewees

Civil Servants In The Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Kogi State.

TABLE 3.6

THE BIODATA OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

Salary Structure	No.	Age Range	No.	Working Exp.	No.	State of Deployment	Sex	No.	Qualifications	
GL. 08 - 10	15	20 - 31	10	5 - 10	14	Kwara 45	Male	68	Certificate - Degree	65
GL. 12 - 14	45	32 - 43	53	13 - 15	52	Benue 36	Female	13	Graduate/Others	16
GL. 15 - 17	21	44 - 45	18	16 - 29	15			81		81
	81		81		81	81				

SOURCE:

Data Collected on The Biodata of Interviewees

Civil Servants In The Ministry of Education, Kogi State.

TABLE 3.7

THE BIODATA OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

(Ministry of Health, Social Development, Youth and Sports)

Salary Structure	No.	Age Range	No.	Working Exp.	No.	State of Deployment	Sex	No.	Qualifications	
GL. 08 - 10	40	20 - 31	12	5 - 10	15	Kwara 35	Male	65	Certificate - Degree	30
GL. 12 - 14	49	32 - 43	60	13 - 15	42	Benue 65	Female	35	Graduate/Others	70
GL. 15 - 17	11	44 - 45	28	16 - 29	43					
	100		100		100	100		100		100

SOURCE:

Data Collected on The Biodata of Interviewees Civil Servants In The Ministry of Health and Social Development, Kogi State.

Conclusions On The Organisational Structure Of The Kogi State's Civil Service.

As shown on these tables, the following conclusions could be drawn:

i. The Civil Servants possess very sound and good educational qualification which is a sine-quanon for high performance in the spirit of the provisions of the 1988 Reforms.

ii. Most of the Civil Servants fall within the age range of 31 to 43 with not very many especially at the Directorate level, above 46 years of age. Very few of them have reached the mandatory retirement age of 55 years of age or 35 years working in the Service.

iii. The bulk of the Civil Servants are males with very small number of the female sex.

iv. The sample size of the population (Civil Servants from both Kwara and Benue States respectively) is representative enough for a reliable generalisation of findings for reasons that, of the five Directors General interviewed (table 'R') only one of them had spent 25 years of working experience while the least had spent 19 years. This implies that they were relatively young in the Service and as such, had not reached the mandatory retirement age.

v. From the table (3.8) it also shows that the Directors General possessed at least a first degree with three of them

possessing Post-university graduate certificates. This implies that those of them at the top echelon of the Service were young and highly educated. The politicisation of the posts which require their leaving the Service on expiration of the administration is therefore a dis-service to them and to the State.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Data Presentation

This chapter presents the data on each of the hypotheses tested on the Evaluation of The 1988 Civil Service Reforms in Kogi State. The aim is to ascertain whether or not the Reforms have achieved the set objectives in Kogi State using the stated hypotheses earlier mentioned in the introductory chapter.

Since the performance of the Civil Servants could not be measured quantitatively by its level of turn-out like the business sector, because of the nature of public goods involved in the public sector, generalisation would be based purely on the evaluative responses gathered from those interviewed. The indices used in measuring the level of productivity of the Civil Servants before the Reforms, are the general consensus evident by the various Commissions and Reports on the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the Service as stated in the earlier chapters. Empirical findings from this research are valid bases for conclusions.

4.1 The Effect Of The Clause In The Reforms That Makes Commissioners Both Political Heads And Accounting Officers On The Efficiency Of The Service.

This data is gathered to test if the reversion of the

earlier process whereby Permanent Secretaries now Directors General were made Accounting Officers while Commissioners were only Political heads and now placing the two responsibilities on the Commissioners for purposes of efficient management of the Service has actually brought about the required changes.

The data is presented thus:

Table 4.1.

Distribution of Responses On The Effect of The Accountability Clause On The Effectiveness of The Service

Effect of the clause	No. of Responses	%
Positive Effect	34	8.272
Negative Effect	377	91.727
Total	411	100.

Source Collected Data from five selected Ministries in Kogi State on The Effect of The Accountability clause.

4.2 **The Effect of Professionalisation of The Service On The Acrimony Between Administrators and Professionals.**

The data is stated below;

Table 4.2

Effect of the Professionalisation	No. of Responses	%
Positive Effect	310	75.4
Negative Effect	101	24.5
Total	**411**	100

Source Data collected from five selected Ministries On The Reforms in Kogi State.

4.3 The Data On The Effect Of The Politicisation Of The Post Of Director General And Its Effect On Continuity And Progress Of The Service.

Table 4.3

Distribution of Responses On The Effect of The Politicisation Of The Post of Directors General

Effect of The Clause.	No. of Responses	%
Positive Effect	61	14.8
Negative Effect	350	85.1
Total	411	100.

Source Data collected from five selected Ministries on The Effects Of The Reforms in Kogi State.

4.4 **The Data On The General Assessment Of The Implementation Of The Reforms In Kogi State is stated thus:**

Table 4.4

Distribution of Responses on The Assessment of The 1988 Reforms in Kogi State.

Assessment of The 1988 Reforms	Number of Respondents	%
The Provisions engenders better and efficient performance in the Service	190	46.2
The Provisions have not drastically changed the problems of the Service	175	42.5
The Provisions are half way between what it was before and after the Reforms	46	11.1
Total	411	100

Data Analysis

4.2 **Effect of the Provisions of The Reform That Makes Commissioners Both Political Heads And Accounting Officers.**

Looking at the data on table 4.4.1, it is evident that the Provisions in the Reforms (Decree 43 of 1988 P A 786) that commissioners (in case of States) shall be the Chief Executive and Accounting Officers of their Ministries and that they should be responsible for the general and overall direction, supervision and execution of polices, activities and programmes of their Ministries is not a popular decision to the career Civil Servants and even with the Directors General who are Political appointees.

This conclusion is so because 377 of the 411 Civil Servants inclusive of Directors General which represents 92% interviewed responded negatively to this fact.

It was only 34 out of 411 which represents 8% interviewed that indicated positive response to the clause. Analysing critically the details of the responses given by

the respondents which have been grouped into either positive or negative in the data under analysis, reasons for the objection of the policies are as follows:

(i) The complete politicisation of the Service and that of the management of the Public Finances is a dangerous trend which makes it possible for the Commissioners in this case, to mismanage and even defraud the state government since they know that they are political appointees who could leave the Service at any time the need arises.

(ii) Making Commissioners Accounting Officers in addition to being political heads of their Ministries could mess and even jeopardise the effective management of the Accounts of the government in the sense that most of the Commissioners are not versed with the Financial Regulations, Office Procedures, Stores Regulations and other related guidelines.

(iii) The provision of making Commissioners to perform the dual functions of Heading their Ministries and also being the Accounting Officers makes them so powerful that they could decide to victimise any of their staff that offends them especially those of them that have sympathy for other political parties different from that of the Commissioners. Such incidents they reported had occurred in the State.

(iv) The Provision in the Decree has created friction between the Commissioners and their Directors General because

the former do not carry the latter along in the scheme of things since they could wield both Political and Economic power over the latter to their benefit.

Despite the fact that it is conclusive from the percentage of the population that gave negative response to the provision which makes Commissioners as Accounting Officers, the views though of a small percentage, of those that agreed to the provision are also genuine. Such views are as follows:

i. It has been observed by previous governments that some Permanent Secretaries who were Accounting Officers frustrated efforts of their political heads once expenditure approvals from such heads were not in their favour. For this reason, they felt that Political heads should as well have the expenditure power for a faster and easier execution of government programmes and policies.

ii. Since the Decree provides that political heads are pecuniarily liable for any lapses, fears of mismanagement or defrauding of government funds by the Political heads do not pose any fear or jeopardy to the management of the finances of their ministries.

iii. Both Commissioners and Directors General are political appointees and that the latter are Deputies to their Commissioners and as such, there should not be any fear or friction between the two authorities as they are supposed to co-

operate with themselves as a team belonging to the same political party in the same state.

4.3 Analysis Of The Data On The Professionalisation Of The Service And Its Effect On The Inherent Acrimony Between Administrators And Professionals.

Looking at table 4.2 it is evident that 310 representing 75% of the respondents agreed that the professionalisation of the Service is of positive effect. The table shows that only 101 respondents ie 25% opined that aspect of the clause has not brought about serious positive effect.

By the result of this finding, conclusion could be drawn to the effect that the professionalisation of the Service has succeeded to a great extent in removing the inherent acrimony between the Administrators and the Professionals. From the responses given by the interviewees which have been analysed into either positive or negative, reasons why it is felt that the clause has removed the inherent acrimony are as follows:

i. As observed in Udoji's Report the major issues as follows: the "boss" complex of Administrative Officers in their relation with professionals; that the relatively younger ages in service of Administrators than their professional colleagues; the promotion prospects; prereguisites; status and prestige including postings and financial control. All thee are more favourable to the Administrators. Professionalisation has now reversed this and hence made every Civil Servant to be a professional and to have equal

career prospects.

ii. Prior to the 1988 Reforms, the starting salaries of some Professional Officers were higher than the Administrators, but with the Professionalisation of the Service, the salary structure of all the category of workers have been harmonised and even made more attractive, hence raising the morale and standard of the workers.

iii. The appointment into the highest post in the Career Service as a Director General is now open to every career Civil Servant be he a Professional or an Administrator.

iv. As a result of the Professionalisation of the Service, training and retraining of all category of workers for consideration for promotions is a good prospect in the Service. Because of this provision, all cadres of workers are happy and satisfied with the system.

Some of the views expressed by the 101 (25%) of the respondents as to why they see the professionalisation clause as having no positive effects include the following:

(i) Despite the professionalisation clause, the Personnel Officers still perform the roles that were performed by the Administrative Officers while the other cadres are looked upon as of lesser importance.

(ii Professional Officers who become Directors General find it difficult to remain detached in considering

conflicting advice from two different professions because they have not been trained to see or look at issues dispassionnaly.

(iii Management is as much a Profession as any other and as such, requires expertise which does not come by mere longevity or experience on a technical job which the Reform has laid emphasis on.

(iv) Professionalisation of the Service makes it impossible for inter ministerial movement and as such, does not widen the experience and scope of the Civil Servants as they have to take a career job on recruitment, to a particular ministry until they retire or are sent out of Service. Routinisation in a particular Ministry leads to inbreeding and obsolence.

4.4 Analysis Of Data On The Politicisation Of The Post Of Director General And Its Effect On The Continuity Of The Service.

As indicated in table 4, 350 (85%) of those interviewed have indicated that the politicisation of the post of Director General is a dis-service rather than solving the problems of the Service.

On the other hand, 61 persons (15%) have indicated that the provision is of a positive effect. Judging by these figures, it

is conclusive that the aspect of the Reform that has politicized the post of Director-General is not favourable to the Civil servant.

In the same vein those Civil servants who have been appointed Director-General are not in support of the politicisation of the post because of their having to vacate the post on expiration of the tenure of office of the administration that appointed them

Career Civil servants are also not in support of the politicisation of the post of Director-General because of the disregard for efficiency, seniority and effectiveness in those appointable to the post who should normally be recommended by the Civil Service Commission for consideration and approval of the Chief Executive of the State.

Reasons advanced generally which have been condensed into either positive or negative as table 4.4 indicate serve as the basis for rejecting the provisions. They are as follows:

i. The post of Director-General is supposed to be the highest post in the career Service which any career Civil Servant within the administrative cadre should aspire to and as such, it should not be politicized.

ii. Politicizing the post of Director-General implies the politicisation of the whole Service for reason that those to be appointed must be loyalist to the ruling party. In this wise, mediocre, sycophants, absentee-contractors in the guise of politicians are appointable in the service while merit, seniority, dedication and efficiency are thrown away.

iii. Politicisation of the post of Director-General leads to witch-hunting, favouritism and bastardisation of the Service because of the fact that those Civil Servants who have sympathy for other parties than the ruling one will be humiliated and frustrated out of the Service by the Director-General.

iv. Politicisation of the post of Director-General deprives the Service of young, energetic and efficient Civil Servants appointed Director-General as they have to leave the Service prematurely on the expiration of the tenure of Office of the Government.

v. Non career Civil Servants are appointed Director General to the neglect of some very senior and efficient Civil Servants for purely political considerations. This trend breeds unco-operative attitude by senior appointable Civil Servants to Directors General and consequently leads to disharmony in the Service.

vi. Politicisation of the post of Director General does not encourage continuity of the operations of the government on the expiration of their incumbency.

vii. Politicisation of the post of Director General does not give respect to the post like that which Permanent Secretaries had attracted.

viii The politicisation of the post of Director General does not make uniformity of structure and organisation like other Services such as the Armed forces, Paramilitary forces, Judiciary, and a host of others who all have Heads appointed from within their Services based on merit, seniority and other valuable considerations.

Reasons advanced by those (61) who see the Politicisation of the post of Director General as a good venture, explained the reasons for this stand as follows:

i. Evidences have shown that some super-Permanent Secretaries have in the past frustrated the efforts and programmes of government because of their

influential positions in the Executive Council and as such, the need for the politicisation of their post by appointing those loyal to the government was desirable.

ii. The Civil Service inherited from the British colonial government was obsolete and retrogressive and as such, required changes like the politicisation of the post of Director General which was long recommended by the Udoji Civil Service Reforms.

iii. Politicisation of the post of Director General is an innovation in the Service that has enhanced the status of those appointed especially when their renumeration has been increased tremendously.

4.5 Analysis Of Data On The General Assessment Of The 1988 Reforms.

This data is aimed at evaluating the performance of the Service before the Reforms of the 1988 and what it is after the Reforms based on the general assessment of those in the scheme of action ie the Civil Servants. This method is the most convenient methods since the performance of the Civil Servants cannot be measured in terms of the turnover like it is in the private sector by nature of the Public Service. We have earlier pointed out this. This aspect has become important as a general way of assessing the feelings of the workers with the aim of

measuring its effectiveness.

Civil Servants numbering 189 which represents 46% of the total population are of the view that the Reforms generally engender better and efficient performance than what it was before the Reforms for these reasons:

i. The provision for promotion of workers twice in a year i.e January and July each year such that vertical mobility within the Service is more rapid than what it was, makes workers to perform their duties effectively;

ii. The vigorous pursuit of training policies as enshrined in the Decree is a positive moral booster than it was before the Reforms;

iii. The formation of a Personnel Management Board and the Junior Staff Committee in each Ministry has a great advantage than what it was especially on recruitment, promotion and discipline.

iv. The provision for an aggrieved worker to petition the Civil Service Commission on any decision of the Ministry is a comprehensive equity and fair-play measure aimed at improving the welfare of the workers than hitherto and

v. Delegation of powers to incure expenditure as provided in the Decree is an effective process aimed at early execution of policy decision.

execution of policy decision.

2. As indicated in the same table, 175 representing 42.5% of those interviewed declared that the Reforms have not brought about any drastic change in the Service for the following reasons:

i. the Audit-Alarm provisions in the Reforms which provides for an alarm against any fraud in the Service is a mere paper provision as such alarm has never been raised despite the fact that there have been frauds detected by succeeding governments.

ii. the Reforms have made it easier for Chief Executives to perpetrate their nefarious acts in the name of the freedom and full power given them in the Reforms.

iii the Reforms have polluted the Service of all forms of people appointed as Chairmen of Boards, Committees, Advisers, Special Assistants, Account General, Auditor General, Directors, Directors General, etc who are very inefficient and inexperienced but appointed purely for political reasons.

3. On the other hand, 46 people representing 11% of the respondents are of the view that the Reforms are mid way between positive and negative because some structures and institutions of the Service before the Reforms are good while some aspects

are not good. They feel that some bad aspects of the Reforms such as the politicisation of the post of Director General and the making of Commissioners as Accounting Officers should be amended.

On the whole from the data analysed, it could be generalised that it is not the whole aspect of the Provisions of the Reforms that are of negative effect but that some specific items like the politicisation of the post of Director General and the Accounting Officer role of Commissioners tested within the scope of this research - that have negative effect on the Service.

On the other hand, the difference between those who feel that the Reforms have achieved more positive changes than those who affirm negatively is very insignificant ie 46% to 42%. This then implies that the effects are not too significant and as such, the need for a revisiting of the Reforms is desirable.

4.6 Summary Of Findings

The 1988 Civil Service Reforms have laudable aims and objectives geared towards the eradication of inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and consequent speedy formulation and implementation of the goals and policies of the government.

The Accountability clause contained in the Reforms which aims at enhancing checks and balances with a view to combining

authority with responsibility has to a great extent not achieved the desired efficiency and accountability. This is so because of some attendant problems which range from apparent impracticability of the Audit-Alarm provision; the lack of financial management skills of some political appointees; the tendency for Accounting Officers to swindle out public funds; and a host of other reasons.

The professionalisation of the service has to a great extent reduced the acrimony between "Professionals" and "Administrators" which are due mainly to the professionalisation of posts and their statuses and the improved chances of anyone being appointed Director General. Never-the-less, seasoned Administrative Officers are of the view that professionals appointed Directors General cannot remove themselves from the cocoons of their professional colleagues when it comes to taking vital decisions that affect the whole Service. They also feel that professionals are not versed in administration as a profession.

The politicisation of the post of Director general has not wholly brought about positive effect that it was expected to bring in the service. Some of the reasons for this conclusion is due to the early retirement of dedicated and effective civil servants who are appointed Directors General; the appointment of mediocre as Directors general basically for political

reasons; the creation of a vacuum in the Service as a result of the exit of qualified administrators who have to leave the service much earlier because of their opting for political appointment; and the general structural and institutional changes introduced which are seen as impediments to the progress and development of the service. Some of them require revisiting.

A finding of this research indicates that since independence, the Nigerian "Bureaucracy" has been bedeviled with problems of inefficiency and ineffectiveness which had bothered successive governments such that several commissions and panels were set up to remedy the situation with no apparent solutions to it. The implementation of the 1988 Reforms is a step in the right direction but it requires further changes.

Our review of related literature has further shown that several scholars have viewed the "Bureaucracy" with negative connotations and impressions and as such, have proffered that there should be radical overhaul of the system. Others view it positively and as such would like to maintain the status quo.

Data gathered and analysed have to a certain extent proved that the 1988 Reforms have not yet provided comprehensive or final solutions to the problems of the Civil Service.

From the data on the feelings by the civil servants why they are not happy with the politicisation of some structural and institutional arrangements in the service, such as

appointment of Directors General and a host of others, it is evident that the ill feeling is because of the purely political consideration rather than merit and efficiency in their appointment.

The findings have shown that the organisational structure of some of the ministries are not in conformity with the provisions of the Reforms because of the skeletal groupings and formation of some Sections and Branches that are not big enough to be Departments.

The findings of this research have also shown that to a large extent, Kogi State Civil Service has strived to comply with the provisions of the 1988 Reforms even though it still needs to do some comprehensive reorganisation and restructuring in order to fully comply with the provisions of the Reforms.

Research findings have shown that Kogi State inherited from Benue and Kwara States a very high quality manpower which if well placed and utilised would bring about sound policies and programmes of the state government.

Our findings have also indicated that there exist mistrust and ill-feelings between Civil Servants deployed from Kwara state and those deployed from Benue state. Such ill-feelings are predicated on the seniority statuses of those from Benue state over those from Kwara especially when some of them were either mates in the Service when they were all in Kwara state or when

they graduated from the universities only to discover that they are now junior in rank due to differential state policies before they were deployed to the new state.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Conclusion

The Nigerian Civil Service being the administrative machinery of government used for the initiation, propagation and implementation of its policies and programmes has undergone series of chequered history occasioned by the need to cause innovation both at individual and institutional level through various Reforms and Committees set up by the federal government.

The reports of these Commissions and Committees have recommended the need for a radical overhaul of the administrative set up. The solutions which they proffered have yet achieve the required changes. The unattained solutions to these existing defects, had necessitated the setting up of the Committee to redress the anomalies in 1988. The recommendations were accepted and consequently have led to the promulgation of Decree 43 of 1988 (Reorganisation of the Service).

The Decree provided laudable solutions to the problems of the Service amongst which are professionalisation of the Service; Politicisation of the post of Director General; making Commissioners and Chief Executives to also perform the power of Accounting Officers; emphasis on training and retraining in the Service; using Audit-Alarm as one of the ways of preventing fraud and mismanagement of public funds; Promotion of Civil

Servants to be conducted twice in a year with more exhaustive evaluative prerequisites; giving Civil Servants enough opportunity to petition decisions of Personnel Management Boards to the Civil Service Commission; etc. Despite the laudable provisions in the 1988 Reforms, a lot still requires to be done by way of re-evaluating some of the recommendations. This fact has necessitated the conduct of this research which has come out with the following findings:

i. the professionalisation of the Service has reduced tremendously the inherent intra-bureaucratic conflict between the Administrators and the Professionals;

ii. the politicisation of the post of Director General has not contributed to the positive innovation and changes. Rather, it has led to excessive political considerations, primordial attachments, sycophancy and ethnicity in the conduct of government business by those appointed Director General and other political appointees.

iii. The provision of vesting Commissioners with the power of Accounting Officers of their Ministries for purposes of efficiency and effectiveness in the management of public affairs has not achieved the desired goals.

iv. the achievements of the 1988 Reforms compared to what it was before now, are more innovative and effective; however, much still requires to be done by way of re-evaluating some

of the aspects.

The 1988 Reforms to a great extent have taken consideration of the Udoji recommendations which were not implemented in the Service but which were seen as laudable for the progress and development of the people.

5.2 Recommendations

A. General

The following recommendations are offered as antidotes to the age long problems of the Service:

1. The appointment of Directors General should not be politicised but should be made promotional such that only senior officers that have risen to the rank of Directors and who have maintained impeccable records with sound academic background should be promoted to that post. The advantages of the non-politicisation of the post of Director General are numerous. They include better performance; proficiency; effectiveness; political neutrality of the top management; continuity in the service even on the change of one Administration to the other; co-operation and offering of sound advice by subordinate officers because of their respect for seniority and efficiency; etc.
2. Training and retraining of civil servants as provided in the Reforms should be given the serious attention that it deserves. In this regard, enough funds should be released to all the Ministries, Departments and parastatals to sponsor such deserving Civil Servants rather than making the policy measure mere budgetary routines and political gimmicks.

3. Sufficient and adequate motivations in form of office, residential accommodation, and housing loans should be provided to Civil Servants. In addition, transport facilities in the form of vehicle loans and government public transport to convey Civil Servants from office to their abode should be provided. It is also necessary that welfare services like workers savings programme; insurance scheme; increased pension and retirement benefits; furniture loans; supply of basic food to workers at subsidised prices and a host of social incentives should be given paramount attention so as to induce workers' efficiency and effectiveness.

4. Of great importance is the need for the government to reintroduce the post of Head of Service. This has become necessary because of the fact that all other public services like the police, the Armed forces, the prisons, and related government bodies all have Heads with the exception of the Civil Service. This anomaly should, therefore, be rectified with a view to depoliticising the Service and to reducing the work load of the Secretary to the state government. In the same way, the post of Secretary to the state government should be separated from that of Head of Service so as to ensure continuity and progress of the Service.

5. The Rules and Regulations of the Service popularly known as the General Orders (Civil Service Rules) should be reviewed because some of the provisions are obsolete and out of tune with the progress and development which the Service requires and the general socio-political upliftment of the country.

6. A total war on indisciplined Civil Servants by way of suspension, demotion, warning and even dismissal depending on the gravity of the offence should be effected. These tough measures when necessary will encourage discipline and loyalty.

7. Reinforcements like awards, gifts, accelerated promotions, letters of commendations and a host of other gestural incentives should be put in place in appreciation of bold, fair, outstanding and positive performance by Civil Servants. All these should be made as standing reward measures so as to encourage proficiency, efficiency and dedication to duty.

8. Orientation courses should be introduced to newly appointed Directors General and Commissioners so as to acquaint them with the rules and regulations of the Service and other procedures for better performance in the spirit of the provisions of the 1988 Reforms.

9. The Accountability clause provided in Decree 43 of 1988

(Reforms), section 9 (1) page 789 and 790 should be reviewed to create further improvement to the clause.

10. As an alternative to the ineffectiveness of the accountability-clause, commissioners should be posted to Ministries of their areas of specialisation and should perform only decisive policy matters while Accounting financial experts should be appointed to serve as Financial Accountants and they should advise Commissioners on such related matters. Any lapses discovered from such ill-advice should be penalised either before or after expiration of their tenure of office.

11. The appointment of an Internal Auditor by Accounting officers of each Ministry/Department to audit the accounts and records of revenue and expenditure provided in section A198, pp33 -35 of 1988 Reforms needs be revisited. The revisiting should amongst other things make the establishment of audit departments and appointment of Auditors independent of Chief Executives and Accounting Officers. The department and their staff should be directly under the Office of the Auditor General for proper co-ordination and fair performance of their duties.

12. In the spirit of professionalisation of the Service, Directors General and Commissioners should be made to serve in specific ministries for the whole of their tenure of

office rather than the practice of cabinet changes which reshuffles them from time to time. This policy measures if adopted, will ensure that Commissioners and their Directors General specialise and are made efficient in the performance of their duties in ministries of their related skills.

13. For the purposes of efficient and effective performance of their duty, Commissioners before their appointments should be made to undergo courses and to be tested in management and general administration such that only the best and most qualified persons are appointed into such post.

14. As a further step towards the engendering of efficiency and effectiveness in the Service, the issue of geographical spread and political consideration should be de-emphasised such that any applicant from any part of the state or country should be appointable into the Service as long as he/she is competent and efficient.

15. The provision in the Reforms for the Civil Service Commission to be responsible for the appointment of officers on salary GL 07 to 10 should be reversed in the same spirit of autonomy and professionalisation of the Service. In this regard, each Ministry/Department should appoint, promote, and discipline officers from grade level 01 - 16. The Civil Service Commission should only serve as

advisory body in order to ensure uniformity and continuity of the Civil Service.

16. Promotion of all cadres of staff should be based amongst other qualities as provided in the Reforms, on a maximum of three satisfactory years on one post. The four years term on each post for officers on salary grade level 14 to 16 provided in the Reforms is rather too long to motivate workers for better efficiency and effectiveness.

17. A standing body should be set up by the Federal Government to periodically review and evaluate the structure and organisation of the Service for a more sustained development.

18. In the same vein as above, a Committee of Head of Service of all the states of the Federation should be set up and should hold meetings with the Federal Head of Service periodically to discuss and advise the government on vital Service matters before policy decisions are made.

20. A National Committee should be set up to review the outdated Civil Service Rules and Regulations and that such Regulations should be applicable to all the State Services for purposes of uniformity, applicability and standardisation in the spirit of the 1988 Reforms.

B. Specifics

1. A body should be set up in the state to fully implement the provisions of the Reforms. This is necessary because some of the Ministries are yet to comply while those that have done so did it skeletally.
2. In the same vein, the Departmentalisation of the Service provided in the Reforms should be fully embarked on so that the Departments could be made functionally efficient with all the Units, Branches and Sections set up in order to achieve the aims and objectives for which they are supposed to attain.
3. The Department of Research Planning and Statistics should be fully established and developed in order for it to embark on necessary research, documentation, publication and advice to the state government on vital problems affecting or that may arise in the state. This has become necessary because of my finding that some of these departments are not really performing their statutory duty neither are they offering the relevant advises to their ministries.
4. The state government should ensure that it looks into the issue of distrust, ill-feeling and disaffection between Civil Servants deployed from Kwara and Benue states respectively as a result of the differential state placements and promotions of colleague Civil Servants of

same years of graduation and seniority so as to engender co-operative attitudes amongst them.

5. The professionalisation clause should be re-evaluated with a view to reverting the former Administrative officers in their profession and name, as administration itself is a profession which cannot be learned by the longevity of years in the Service. Other professional officers could retain their professional status and name with some amendments where necessary.

6. The present salary structure of the Service should be re-assessed with necessary upward adjustment made. This is necessary because the devaluation of the Naira in Nigeria has rendered the pay package of the workers irrelevant to his livelihood. The policy where differential salary implementations by the state governments are made to workers even when the Federal Government has announced the provisions is not conducive to the progress and development of the Civil Service.

7. On the whole, the job security incentive and political neutrality which have encouraged Civil Servants to take up appointment in the Service and to remain until retirement, should be protected and preserved rather than its politicisation, tribalisation, cultural divisions, and primordial regimentalisations occasioned by politically

appointed Heads of Ministries and Departments in the state.

5.3 Areas That Requires Further Research

In view of the structural, behavioural, and institutional problems that have hindered the development which the Civil Service is supposed to effect as earlier stated and the consequent undertaking of this research and its findings, there is the need to suggest other areas that require further research in order to find lasting solutions to these problems. The areas are:

1. A research to establish whether the Reforms could effect the political stability of the country since the Bureaucrats are the major instrumental organs that formulate and implement government policies and programmes should be undertaken.
2. Research is also needed to test the extent to which the provision of the Audit-Alarm measure in the Reforms prevented financial mismanagement, embezzle-ment, and the consequent effective and efficient performance of the "Bureaucracy".
3. Research is also needed to test whether the delegation of authority to other category of Officers to incur expenditure provided in the Reforms has increased efficient and fast implementation of policies and programmes of the

government and finally

4. Whether the new modalities for promotion of staff provided in the Reforms have increased the productivity of workers.

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
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APPENDIX 'A'

DIAGRAM 3.1


BASIC INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE REFORMED FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE



SOURCE

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, EXPLANATORY NOTES FOR GUIDANCE ON IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS, (VOL.II).

DIAGRAM 3.2 **APPROVED MODEL ORGANOGRAM OF A MINISTRY**
IN THE REFORMED CIVIL SERVICE



SOURCE: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, EXPLANATORY NOTES FOR GUIDANCE ON IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS, (VOL.II).

DIAGRAM 3.3
FURTHER BREAKDOWN OF THE PERSONNEL, FINANCE PLANNING DEPARTMENTS.





DIAGRAM 3.4


ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF KOGI STATE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE



SOURCE: Organisational Structure Of The Governor's Office Lokoja
Drawn by The Personnel Department, 1993.

DIAGRAM 3.5


ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT YOUTH AND SPORTS, LOKOJA.



SOURCE: Organisational Structure Chart Collected From The Personnel Department, Of The Ministry Of Health &

DIAGRAM 3.6


MINISTRY OF WORKS, LOKOJA: ORGANOGRAM



SOURCE: The Organisational Structure Of The Ministry of Works, Lokoja. Submitted by The Personnel Department, 1993.

DIAGRAM 3.7


ORGANISATIONAL CHART OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE LOKOJA



SOURCE: The Organisational Structure Of The Ministry of Justice.

DIAGRAM 3.8


THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF KOGI STATE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION



SOURCE: The Organisational Structure Of The Ministry of Education, Lokoja, Fowarded by The Department Personnel, 1993.

DIAGRAM 3.9


ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY



SOURCE: The Organisational Structure Of The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Lokoja, Compiled by The Department Personnel, 1992

DIAGRAM 3.10


THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF KOGI STATE'S MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES



SOURCE: The Organisational Structure Of The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Lokoja, Compiled by The Department Personnel, 1993.

DIAGRAM 3.11

THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MINISTRY OF FINANCE



SOURCE: The Organisational Structure Of The Ministry of Finance

APPENDIX 'B'

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTERED TO SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS IN KOGI STATE

ON SALARY GL.08 AND ABOVE.

SECTION A

BIODATA

Please answer the following questions in the spaces provided.

(a) Status: _____

(b) Salary grade level (GL): _____

(c) Present Ministry: _____

(d) Years of working experience: _____

(e) State deployed from: _____

(f) Age: _____

(g) Maritial status: _____

(h) Sex: _____

(i) Qualification: _____

SECTION B

RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

1. Do you think that the 1988 Reforms has brought any positive changes in the service?
   Indicate below reasons for your answer:
   (a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

2. Has the politicisation of the post of Director General brought about better performance in the Service? Indicate below your reasons.

(a)

(b)

/

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

3. Has the politicisation of the Service reduced the inherent acrimony between Administrators and Professionals? Give reasons below:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

4. Do you think that the provision of the clause that makes Commissioners both Chief Executives and Accounting Officers of their Ministries brought about better efficiency in the Service? Give reasons below:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

5. State below major shortcomings of the 1988 Civil Service Reform.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

6. Please state below alternative solutions to the problem of inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the Civil Service.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

7. Please offer general comment on the 1988 Reforms and suggest areas that require further research:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)