DEMOCRACY AND VIOLENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF *KALARE* THUGGERY IN GOMBE STATE, 2003-2013

BY

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MSC/SOC-SCI/12195/2011-12

BEING A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE,

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I hereby declare that this research thesis titled *Democracy and Violence: An Assessment of the Impacts of Kalare Thuggery in Gombe State, 2003-2013* is an original work.

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CERTIFICATION

The research titled Democracy and Violence: An Assessment of the Impacts of *Kalare* Thuggery in Gombe State, 2003-2013 is under the codes and principles governing the award of Master Degree of Science (M.Sc.) Political Science, in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

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This research is dedicated to my parents, Late Alhaji Abubakar Musa and Hajiya Hadiza Alhassan Abubakar; my wife Hadiza; and my child Muhammad (Maheer) for their moral support, encouragement and guidance.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE……i

DECLARATION…….ii

CERTIFICATION……...iii

DEDICATION…….iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT……v

TABLE OF CONTENTS……..vi

LIST OF TABLES AND CHARTS..……...ix

ABSTRACT…..……..x

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION.....1

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY.....1

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM.....3

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY.....4

1.4 RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS.....4

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY.....4

1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....5

1.6.1 Method of Data Collection.....5

1.5.2 Research Population.....6

1.5.2 Sample and Sampling Method.....7

1.6.3 Method of Data Analysis.....11

1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATION.....11
1.8 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS.....12
1.8.1 Democracy.....12
1.8.2 Violence.....12
1.8.3 Thuggery.....12
1.9 ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS.....13

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....14
2.1 INTRODUCTION.....14
2.2 DEMOCRACY.....14
2.3 VIOLENCE.....20
2.3.1 Forms and Causes of Violence.....21
2.4 POLITICAL THUGGERY.....29
2.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....32
2.6 SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY.....33
2.6.1 Basic Assumptions of the Theory.....34
2.6.2 The Significance of the Theory.....35
2.7 ELITE THEORY.....37
2.7.1 Basic Assumptions of the Theory.....38
2.7.2 Elite Theory and Democracy.....39
2.8 SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY AND ELITE THEORY.....41

CHAPTER THREE

GOMBE STATE AND THE RECURRENT PROBLEM OF THUGGERY.....43
1.1 INTRODUCTION.....43
1.2 GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING.....43

3.3 AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES.....44

3.4 POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SETTINGS.....44

3.5 THE CULTURAL BACKGROUND 46

3.6 THE ECONOMY.....48

3.7 POLITICS AND THUGGERY.....48

CHAPTER FOUR

EFFECTS OF KALARE THUGGERY ON DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITES.....61

4.1 INTRODUCTION.....61

4.2 DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF RESPONDENTS.....61

4.3 CAUSES OF KALARE THUGGERY.....65

4.4 EFFECTS OF KALARE ON DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES....69

4.4 SPONSORSHIP OF KALARE THUGGERY.....72

4.5 BENEFICIARY OF KALARE THUGGERY.....74

4.6 EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TOWARDS KALARE THUGGERY.....76

4.7 SECURITY SITUATIONS IN GOMBE STATE.....82

4.8 DISCUSSION OF MAJOR FINDINGS.....85

4.8.1 The Factors Responsible for the Recurrent of Kalare Thuggery.....85

4.8.2 The Effects of Kalare Thuggery on Democratic and Social Activities.....88

4.8.3 Effectiveness of Government Response Towards Kalare Thuggery.....91

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....96

5.1 INTRODUCTION.....96

5.2 SUMMARY.....96

5.3 CONCLUSION 98

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS.....100

REFERENCES.....101

APPENDIX I.....107

THE LISTS OF INTERVIEWED KEY PERSONALITIES.....107

APPENDIX II.....109

SAMPLE OF QUESTIONS TO KEY PERSONALITIES INTERVIEWED.....109

APPENDIX III.....111

THE SAMPLE OF QUESTIONS TO THE STUDY POPULACE.....111

APPENDIX IV.....113

SAMPLE SIZE TABLE 113

APPENDIX V 116

GOMBE STATE POPULATION 2013 AS PROJECTED BY GOMBE STATE BUREAU OF STATISITICS USING 2006 CENSUS REPORT AT 3.2% GROWTH RATE.....116

APPENDIX VI.....119

MAP OF GOMBE STATE.....119

LISTS OF TABLES AND CHARTS

Table 3.1	Lists of the Murdered People in Gombe State	57
Table 4.1	Demographic Information of Respondents	61
Table 4.2	Causes of *Kalare* Thuggery	65
Table 4.3	Effects of *Kalare* Thuggery on Democratic and Social Activities	69
Table 4.4	Sponsorship of *Kalare* Thuggery	72
Table 4.5	Beneficiaries of *Kalare* Thuggery	74
Table 4.6	Effectiveness of Government Response Towards *Kalare* Thuggery	76
Table 4.7	Security Situation in Gombe State	82
Chart 4.1	Factors or Causes of Thuggery	86
Chart 4.2	Effects of *Kalare* Thuggery on Democratic and Social Activities	89
Chart 4.3	Effectiveness of Government Response Towards *Kalare* Thuggery	92

ABSTRACT

Thuggery has become a pervasive phenomenon affecting innocent individuals and democratic activities in Gombe state. The kalare thugs move mostly in groups victimizing, terrorizing, intimidating, and injuring not only politicians but also innocent individuals at their homes, shops and on the streets which resulted to loss of lives and valuable properties in the state. It is against this background, therefore, this research attempted to the impacts of kalare thugs on democratic and social activities, in spite measures adopted by governments to overcome the phenomenon in the state from 2003 to 2013. Accordingly, the objectives of this study are to find out the factors responsible for the recurrent of kalare thuggery, to evaluate the impact of kalare thuggery on democratic and social activities and to assess the effectiveness of government policies and programmes designed to overcome kalare thuggery in the state. The study considered these assumptions which include, kalare thuggery recurs frequently in Gombe state because it is sponsored by the elites and by the thugs themselves, kalare thuggery affects democratic and social activities in Gombe state because individual lives and valuable properties are lost and measures adopted by governments to overcome kalare thuggery are inadequate because kalare thugs are protected by their sponsors and are subjectively punished by authorities concerned. The method of data collection and analysis is quantitative and qualitative which complement each other through the use of simple percentage, charts and tabulation. Similarly, two theories are used include Social Learning Theory and Elite Theory. Finally, the findings of the study shows that thuggery in the state is as a result of selfish interest of the thugs themselves, unemployment, illiteracy, poor governance, group sentiment, political manipulation, poverty, injustice and inactive security agencies; the impacts of menace as revealed include inflicting fear amongst candidates, hindering electorates from political activities, killing of innocent people, violating human rights, destruction of valuable properties, insecurity during and after elections and intimidation of people within the state. Thus, the government of Gombe state needs an effective response, in order to overcome the menace of kalare thuggery as recommended by the researcher.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Violence is a devastating phenomenon in the world. It has brought about loss of lives and valuable properties with socio-political and economic consequences. As a social phenomenon, violence has become a challenging occurrence attracting the attention of academics to conduct scientific research. This phenomenon, which is characterized by crisis, conflict, dispute, and rebellion, affects the development of modern states in all their ramifications. Thus, from Europe to North America and from Latin America to Africa and Asia, many states are facing political challenges, which often involve violence. For instance, Harroff-Tavel (2010) has cited a few of such cases which transverse the globe in the 21st Century. The first case was the 2005 experience of a wave of violent disturbances which beset the Paris suburbs, eventually spread to 200 cities in France. The second case is the 2008 experience of armed violence among different gangs in Cape Town, South Africa. The third case was the 2010 Brazilian experience of armed violence between drug gangs and the police in Rio de Janeiro. Similarly, United States also experienced a number of incidents of violence in 2012 including wanton killing by gunmen. Many countries in the Middle East were also engulfed in violent social and political crises in 2012.

Violence of different forms have also been recorded in different regions and at different times in Nigeria, throughout its political history. According to Akeem and Adeyinka, "the trends of violence continued in the Nigerian cities even after the 1st October, 1960 celebration of the Nigerian political independence from the British government. Cases of violence were recorded in the Nigerian cities in the 60s and beyond. Such cases include the riots that erupted from political party conflicts in the 1964 General Election and the Civil War that extended across the Nigerian rural and urban areas between 6th July 1967 and 7th January 1970" (Akeem and Adeyinka, 2012:58).

More recently, there have been, particularly in the Northern part of the country, ethno-religious violence, election violence and communal conflicts in the forms of pastoralists-farmers, settlers-indigenes and land disputes. Most Northern Nigerian states such as Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, Borno, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, Taraba, Yobe, Katsina, Nasarawa and others have experienced one form of violence or another. There are also incidences of violence in Eastern Nigeria, especially through the activities of the Bakassi Boys in the areas of Aba, Anambra, Enugu, Imo and Onitsha. The activities of the Oduduwa People's Congress have also contributed to a trend of violence in Western Nigeria, particularly in Lagos and Ibadan. Several cases of violence have also been recorded in Warri, Port Harcourt and Yenagoa in the forms of militant attacks on multinational oil companies and kidnappings.

Gombe State, being the focus of this research, has also experienced this trend of violence. Partly due to its strategic location in the North-East sub-region, whatever happens to the neighbouring states, tend to affect the state. Thus, since the creation of the state in 1996, the state has experienced several cases of violence. These include ethno-religious conflicts, land dispute, pastoralists-farmers conflicts, violent actions of thugs called *Yan kalare* and election

related violence, armed robbery, kidnapping and other related social vices. Of all these forms of violence, however, the most devastating one that keeps recurring in the state is thuggery by *Yan kalare.* In spite of the different measures adopted by different governments through policies and programmes to curb the menace, thuggery has remained pervasive in the state.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Since the return to democracy in 1999, thuggery has become a pervasive phenomenon affecting innocent individuals and democratic activities in Gombe state. The menace is affecting democratic activities during campaign, rallies and casting of votes which invariably cause loss of lives and valuable properties. Thuggery also perpetually affects innocent individuals on daily basis in their homes, shops and on the streets. The activities of thugs called *Yan kalare* in Gombe state have widely affected the relative peace enjoyed by the people. These thugs move mostly in groups victimizing, terrorizing, intimidating, and injuring not only politicians but also innocent individuals in the state. The menace results to death or poses deadly threats by deterring individuals from actively partaking in the political, economic and cultural activities in their environments. Hassan (2011) and Lamido (2008) explained and attributed *kalare* thuggery to only political affairs that affect political activities, but this research has gone further to examine *kalare* thuggery not only a political but also a social affair affecting democratic and social activities within the state from 2003 to 2013. It is against this background, therefore, this research attempted to examine the reasons responsible for the incessant *kalare* thuggery as well as its impacts on democratic and social activities, despite measures adopted by governments to overcome the menace, in the state from 2003 to 2013. Hence, the following questions are asked:

a) What are the factors responsible for the recurrence of *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state between 2003 and 2013?
b) What are the impacts of *kalare* thuggery on democratic and social activities in Gombe state?
c) How effective has been the government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery between 2003 and 2013 in Gombe state?

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of this research are as follows:

a) To find out the factors responsible for the recurrence of *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state.
b) To evaluate the impacts of *kalare* thuggery on democratic and social activities in the state.
c) To assess the effectiveness of government policies and programmes designed to overcome *kalare* thuggery in the state.

1.4 RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS

This study has the following assumptions:

a) *Kalare* thuggery is frequent in Gombe state because it is sponsored by the elites and by the thugs themselves.
b) *Kalare* thuggery affects democratic and social activities in Gombe state because individual lives and valuable properties are lost.

c) Measures adopted by governments to overcome *kalare* thuggery are inadequate as *kalare* thugs are protected by their sponsors and are subjectively punished by authorities concerned.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Researchers have conducted studies related to politics and political thuggery in Gombe state from 1999 to 2007.Their findings indicate that thuggery is basically a political phenomenon affecting only democratic processes such as campaigns, rallies and during elections. This research however, does not only view thuggery as a political phenomenon but also as a social menace affecting innocent individuals in their communities, residences streets and places of business. In addition, this study hopes to improve the existing body of knowledge concerning *kalare* thuggery in the state as well as benefit, the general public in both the state and the country. It is also expected that the outcome of the research would assist governments to understand better, the factors responsible for *kalare* thuggery, so as to formulate and implement more viable policies, to deal with it.

1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Both primary and secondary sources of data collection are employed in this study. The primary sources of data collection are used to obtain firsthand information. Similarly, the secondary sources employed because of the need to use the existing literature related to democracy and violence, such as: books, journals, articles, magazines, newspapers and other periodic/publications or reports print and electronic.

1.6.1 Method of Data Collection

A combination of survey research and qualitative content analysis methods are employed in this study. Accordingly, the instruments of data collection include questionnaires and interviews with key resource persons. As McNabb (2009) observed, such interviews with persons who are important and involved in the topic, "has been shown to be an ideal way to explore peoples' opinions, concerns, desires and experiences…" Amongst the key persons interviewed were government officials including state legislators, executives and judiciary, security agencies, traditional rulers, academics, victims of thuggery, the youths involved in thuggery and other individuals. Similarly, the researcher used and reviewed relevant text books, news papers, journal articles and reports as secondary data. These helped in broadening the general knowledge about thuggery in order to aggregate the information collected from the primary sources. The official reports, books, journal, articles, magazines, newspapers and other periodic reports and publications were consulted from various libraries and centres of documentation, these include: the Sir Kashim Ibrahim Library and the Post Graduate Library; Department of Political Science; Ahmadu Bello University; Zaria, The central libraries, Departmental and Faculty libraries of Gombe State University and Federal University, Kashere -Gombe state, the State Library, Gombe and the Library of the Centre for Democratic Development Research and Training (CEDDERT), Zangon-Shanu, Zaria and other personal libraries.

1.5.2 Research Population

This study used the population of Gombe state from 18 years and above as its research population. According to the 2006 Census report, as sourced from Gombe state Bureau of Statistics 2014, the general population of Gombe state is 2,365,040 and the population of 18

years and above is 1,087,271 using Annual Growth Rate at 3.2%. The general population of Gombe state in 2013 as projected is 2,948,468 and the population of ages 18 and above is 1,592,230. Therefore, the projected population of Gombe state from 18 years and above is 1,592,230, as of 2013, is taken as our research population and formed the basis of data collection and analysis.

The researcher also adopted Krejcie and Morgan (1970) classification of determining sampling size and unit of a given population. The classification uses a table to capture population and the size or number of questionnaires to be administered; and argue that their formula applies to every Social Sciences research. The table argues that in a study of 1,000,000 to 5,000,000 populations, the sampling size of 384 respondents is enough. This is also affirmed by the Research Advisors (2006) and argues that 384 populations size is enough for the population of 1,000,000 to 500, 000,000 in a given research. See appendices VI and V for further clarifications, calculation and detailed explanations. Therefore, the researcher adopted the population of 1,592,230, and the determining sample size is 384, as the respondents in this study. Finally, the researcher adopted 95% confidence level and 5% margin error as provided by Krejcie and Morgan (1970).

1.5.2 Sample and Sampling Method

Sampling method entails the "way sample units are selected from a parent population" (McNabb, 2009:127). According to Izah (2012:69), this technique is used in market surveys as well as political studies". Generally, there are two methods of sampling: the probability and the non-probability sampling methods. Probability sampling method is selected because of its appropriateness and significance to this study. It is "one in which the sample units (people,

parts, groups, homes, cities, tribes, companies etc.) are selected at random and all have an equal chance of being selected" (McNabb, 2009:127). Since, non-probability does not encourage chance selection techniques, the choice between the two samplings is purely based on the "cost-versus-value principle". This signifies the importance of probability sampling in this scientific inquiry. Probability sampling is divided into the simple random sampling, systematic sampling, stratified sampling and cluster sampling based on the peculiarity of the research's aims and objectives.

This study used a combination of cluster and systematic sampling techniques in determining the unit and size of the population and questionnaires distribution. Nonetheless, a stratified sampling technique is also used in determining the structured interview with the key personalities in the research. The area of study, Gombe State, comprises of 11 local government areas: Akko, Balanga, Billiri, Dukku, Funakaye, Gombe, Kaltungo, Kwami, Nafada, Shongom, and Yamaltu Deba. The 11 local government areas are further grouped into three Senatorial Zones: Gombe North Senatorial Zone (comprising Dukku, Funakaye, Gombe and Kwami Local Government Areas); Gombe Central Senatorial Zone (comprising Akko and Yamaltu Deba Local Government Areas); and Gombe South Senatorial Zone (comprising Balanga, Billiri, Kaltungo and Shongom Local Government Areas).

Furthermore, the three senatorial zones constituted the units of the study. Accordingly, the local governments are also divided into wards and three wards are selected on the basis of raffle draw which represented the local government area. The selected wards are Jekadafari, Shamaki and Ajiya, representing Gombe Local Government Area; Kumo West, Gona and Tumu wards, representing Akko Local Government Area; and Kaltungo West (Kalaring and Poshereng), Kaltungo East (Baganje, Termana and Lapandin Tai) and Ture, wards representing Kaltungo

Local Government Area. Three research assistants were employed; two of them are three hundred level students in the Department of Political Science, Federal University Kashere, Gombe and the other one is a Graduate of Political Science from Gombe State University who helped in administering the questionnaires.

For each of the three units of the study, one local government was systematically selected, making the sum of three local government areas. The three local government areas selected are Gombe Local Government, as the state capital, representing Gombe North Senatorial Zone; Akko Local Government, representing Gombe Central Senatorial Zone and Kaltungo Local Government, representing Gombe South Senatorial Zone. The selection of these local government areas, to represent their respective Senatorial zones, is due to the fact that they are well known centres of politics, trade and commercial activities in their senatorial zones. Focus group discussion, questionnaires and interviews with key resource persons are also spread fairly among the three local governments. Though not all local government areas were selected and covered, the researcher systematically selected three local government areas based on the three senatorial zones in the state. The 2013 population projection provided that Akko local government area has 228,325, Gombe local government has 181,366 and Kaltungo Local Government Area has 137,577 population of 18 years and above.; and the total number of the projected population of 18 years and above in the three local government areas is 547,268 and thus, 547,268 formed the actual population size in this research.

Statistically, to get the actual number of questionnaires that were administered in each local government area, the research divided the projected population of 18 years and above of each selected local government to the actual population size of this research which is 547,268 and multiply it with the number of questionnaires generated from Krejcie and Morgan (1970) scale

which is 384. For instance, if one taken says Akko Local Government, the result shown that 228,325 divided by 547,268; it gave us 0.4172088 and multiplied it by 384; one got 160.2 into one significant figure. Therefore, 160 questionnaires were administered in Akko Local Government Area, and the same formula were used in arriving at the number of questionnaires administered in other two local government areas, Gombe and Kaltungo, 127 and 97 questionnaires respectively.

Accordingly, the same procedure was also followed to get the proportionate number of questionnaires of each ward from the three elected wards within Akko, Gombe and Kaltungo Local Government Areas. Kumo West, Gona and Tumu wards were randomly selected in Akko Local Government Area; Ajiya, Jekada Fari and Shamaki wards were also randomly selected in Gombe local government area; and finally, Kaltungo East, Kaltungo West and Ture wards were randomly selected in Kaltungo local government area. For instance, Akko Local Government Area has a population of 228,325 populations of 18 years and above out of which Kumo West ward has 29,426, Gona ward has 23,729 and Tumu ward has 17,48; and the total is 70,642. To get the proportionate number of questionnaires for each ward, one has taken says Kumo West (29,426 divided by 70,642 and multiplied the result which is 0.4165511 by 160, and gave us 66.65). Thus, Gona and Tumu wards have 54 and 40 questionnaires to be administered respectively. Also, Gombe Local Government Area has 181,366 populations of 18 years and above out of which Ajiya ward has 14,978, Jekada fari ward has 24,183 and Shamaki ward has16,227; and the total is 55,388. To get the proportionate number of questionnaires of each ward, one has taken says Ajiya ward (14,978 divided by 55388 and multiplied it by 127, it gave us 34.3). Thus, Jekadafari and Shamaki wards have 55.4 and 37.2 questionnaires were administered respectively. Finally, Kaltungo has 137,577 populations of 18 years and above out

of which Kaltungo East has 13,787, Kaltungo West has 11,539 and Ture has 9,764; and the total is 35,090. To get the proportionate number of questionnaires of each ward, one has taken says Kaltungo East (13,787 divided by 35,090 and multiplied it by 97, it gave us 38.1). Thus, Kaltungo West and Ture wards have 31.9 and 26.9 questionnaires were administered respectively.

In a nut shell, the total numbers of questionnaires were administered proportionately in three wards for Akko, Gombe and Kaltungo Local Government Areas were 384, this was derived from the scale table presented by krejcie and Morgan (1970) in conducting survey research. To determine the distribution formula of questionnaires, total number of research population which is 1,592,330 was divided by the actual number of research population which is 547,268. Therefore, the result is 2.9. Since the research is dealing with individuals, and there is no 2.9 individuals, the researcher rounded 2.9 to 3; and it now becomes 3. Thus, the interval distribution of questionnaire is, in every 3 individuals, one is given the questionnaire to fill as a respondent.

Finally, stratified sampling using structured interview is also conducted with the traditional rulers, specifically one 1st Class Emir or any representative in the three selected zones, Government officials including legislators, executives and the judiciary, residents and security agencies, the thugs, university lecturers, social and political analysts and the victims of *kalare* thuggery.

1.6.3 Method of Data Analysis

This study uses statistical package called Statistical Package of Social Science (SPSS) in analysing the data obtained through questionnaire administration in the field. Accordingly, data was uploaded into the software to process and release the result. After running the data, the researcher, then analysed the information, which is the result, using simple percentage and tabulation that shows the extent of *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state. Similarly, Content analysis based on the factor-analysis of the reviewed existing literatures is also used to complement the questionnaires and the interviews conducted. Thus, where necessary, graph and chart are used in discussing the major findings of this study.

1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATION

The study, basically, focused on democracy and violence specifically the impact of *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state between 2003 and 2013. The choice of this period is informed by the fact that thuggery frequently recurred in spites of the policies and programmes initiated and adopted by different administrations in the state. The period covered the administrations of Alhaji Muhammad Danjuma Goje (2003-2011) and Alhaji Ibrahim Hassan Dankwambo (2011-13). The limitations to this research include difficulty in accessing the relevant official documents that are paramount to this study. Also, some security agencies, government officials and traditional rulers did not honour and allow the searcher to interview them because of security reasons. However, all efforts have been made as this research has been conducted despite the challenges.

1.8 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Three major concepts are employed in this research. These are: democracy, violence and thuggery.

1.8.1 Democracy

The concept of democracy has been defined by different researchers in various ways depending on the circumstances and interests of their research. This research is predicated on the Western and liberal conception of democracy. In this perspective, democracy entails political freedom, rights, liberties and 'government by the people'. Therefore, democracy provides important values like equality, justice, peace and development in every political community.

1.8.2 Violence

Violence is any devastating phenomenon that affects individuals and their societies. It is triggered by individuals or organised groups which is characterized by crisis, conflict, robbery, kidnapping, dispute and rebellion. The phenomenon destabilizes peace, harmony, security and tranquillity of the different political community.

1.8.3 Thuggery

This entails acts of intimidating, victimizing, terrorizing, kidnapping and robbing the targeted or innocent individuals on the streets, at homes and in the shops by thugs either on political grounds or selfish interest during political, social and economic activities in their communities. Accordingly, this activity is called *kalare* in Gombe state and the thugs are popularly known as *Yan kalare.*

1.9 ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS

The study is basically divided into five (5) interconnected and interrelated chapters. Chapter One (1) is the introduction consisting of statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, research assumptions, significance of the study, research methodology, scope and limitations, conceptual clarification and organization of chapters. Chapter Two (2) consists of literature review and the theoretical framework. The review is essentially thematic. The social learning theory propounded by the psychologist called Albert Bandura was adopted to show the way youths become *Kalare* thugs. Likewise, the elite theory advanced by the four leading scholars including Pareto, Mosca, Michel and Gasset also provided a picture of how political elites manipulate *Kalare* thugs to gain and maintain political power. Chapter Three (3) focuses on the historical background of Gombe state and the evolution of forms of social violence and political thuggery. In Chapter Four (4), the researcher presented and analyzed the data collected, discuss the findings. Chapter Five (5) is the summary and conclusion. The referencing and indexing used in this research are based on the American Psychological Association (APA) style.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses and evaluates various arguments, postulations and issues put forward by different scholars and analysts on the issues of democracy, violence and political thuggery. Theoretical postulations on the elite and social learning theories are also reviewed and observed. The review is purely thematic. Our theoretical framework is predicated on an amalgamation of the cognitive and the elite theories of political analysis.

2.2 DEMOCRACY

The concept of democracy has been defined differently by different scholars depending on the circumstance and interest of their research. Accordingly, democracy here emphasizes political freedoms and procedures, including 'government by the people', political rights and elections or civil liberties. It entails 'civilian politics' that provide substantive values such as peace, social and economic development, or equality and justice in every political community even within the scope of this research.

The meaning and nature of democracy is subjected to its application in different environments. In discussing the nature of Nigerian democracy, Jega (2007:15) observes that "the dominant model, historically and contemporarily, in terms of the number of the countries who have used or are using it, is *liberal democracy*. It is predicated on the following principles: individual freedom; equality before the law; universal suffrage (voting rights); election and

representation". Additional features include popular sovereignty; popular representation; majority government; guarantee of freedom (basic); consensus and accommodation; peaceful resolution of disputes; free market and enterprise. Liberal democracy is also variously referred to as bourgeois democracy and elite democracy.

A democratic system is said to "enable citizens to control public policy pertaining to the holding of elections under certain forms, to the central, national decision making organs and to the maintenance of certain fundamental political liberties" (Hadenius, 1992:36 In Umar, 2007:3). However, this definition limits the scope of democratic experience to the central level of governance by excluding other important levels of analysis such as the state and local governments that played an important role in a federal system of government like Nigeria. Thus, any definition of democracy should not only consider the system that observes election to control public policy decisions alone but also recognizes other fundamental issues that have to do with social justice, economic development, political rights, harmony and social security.

Furthermore, Umar (2007) argued that the imperative for states to uphold democratic values and institutions is premeditated upon the entrenchment of the ideals of democracy which, unlike other forms of organization provide the citizens with the wherewithal to actively participate, directly or indirectly in the political system through the mechanisms of transparency, rule of law, civil rights and fundamental freedoms, and as a way of overcoming the short comings of the other systems. Democracy allows the citizens to know the processes of decision making with regard to the issues affecting their societies. Transparency, accountability and justice are the pivotal principles that accompany the human coexistence in democratic system without infringing their Fundamental Human Rights.

Democracy is not merely the establishment of democratic structures, institutions and procedures; it is also about the way democratic values and processes become embedded into the minds of individuals and groups in their political communities. With this in view, some scholars are pessimistic that the values of democracy, are blunted because the daunting economic difficulties, human rights violations and other abuses, ethnic cum religious crises and fragility of civil society, disclosed the challenges of democracy (Diamond, 1996; Monshipouri, 1995; O' Donnel and Schmitter, 1993 cited in Umar, 2007:3). Democracy in developing countries of Africa is not accompanied with the designed principles as "many cases of transition to democracy have spawned up what can be referred to as democracy without democrats or democratic dividends" (Jega, 2007:20). Nonetheless, Ake (1996) also strongly argues that democracy accommodates popular participation but such participation is highly restricted and accompanied by threats to socio-economic and political stability and development. As such, Umar (2007) also views democracy as a system that allows elite instability as a condition in which members of the political elite use violent actions or the threats of violence to remove persons from their command position in the national government.

Appraising the nature of democracy in Nigeria, Steenis (2009) notes that the "present elitist democracy is petrifying because dead money suppresses original ideas of free people. Creativity and autonomy are not appreciated. Democracy is hardly less violent than other social systems. Hundreds of millions of people are killed in wars started by democrats. Rich Western democracies support regimes that maintain a situation in which many people do not even get enough food" (Steenis**,** 2009:5). This shows that democracy in Nigeria is misused by the people in power at various levels of government without considering the social milieu which determines social coexistence to reach peaceful, stable and harmonious political communities.

Hence, democracy is associated with negative values, more especially in Nigeria where social vices including corruption, conflict for resource control, ethno-religious violence, armed robbery and kidnapping, are engineered by known and unknown people to achieve selfish interest. These and many are inimical to the nascent democratic and social activities in Nigeria.

However, a number of optimist scholars are of the opinion that democracy is not necessarily accompanied with violence in most cases. This is because, as Omotola (2011) argues, "in most democratic societies, disputes and conflicts do not necessarily result into violence because democracy possesses an internal mechanism through which differences and conflicts among individuals and groups are often resolved and one of the means of achieving the resolution, mitigation and containment of differences, disputes and conflicts is political party"(Omotola, 2011:235-6). This argument suggests that although there exist some elements of violence in democratic societies like disputes and conflicts, invariably, political parties exist as a means through which these conflicts and disputes are resolved and mediated. This postulation sees political parties as a functional mechanism that mediates conflicts in recent democratic societies without rigorous appraisal to dysfunctional aspect of political parties in those states. In this vein, political parties in recent democratic polities like Nigeria either result into conflicts and disputes, intra party differences or inter party disparities concerning five major issues as identified by Fischer (2003 in Omotola, 2011:238). These include identity conflict, campaign conflict, balloting conflict, result conflict and representation conflict.

Comparably, the study of democratic societies in Latin America illustrates that anticipating the restoration of democratic rule to pave way for peace and justice has been only partially achieved. This is because recent events suggest that democracy has made a difference in securing, merely, the basic rights to escape the physical violence of domestic warfare and

armed conflicts. But, the new wave of democracy has not been as successful in making the life of Latin Americans more dignified and decorous by improving living conditions and reducing poverty and unemployment (Grassi, 2010:3). A famous analyst of International Relations and Global Security, Beyer (2008:5) declares that "the ideals of democracy and human rights are perceived as hypocrisy, abandoned in the pursuit of strategic interests and at other times used to justify otherwise unjustifiable deeds of violence".

Similarly, Jega (2007:28) points out that, "for the Nigerian political class, democracy is hardly desirable if it means popular empowerment of the masses. Democracy is desirable, if it can facilitate access to power, create a window of opportunity to loot public treasury and keep the people at their mercy. The political class does not conceive democracy as an ideal to be cherished, struggled for and defended, for the common good. Rather, they see it as one avenue, among many, for ruling with accompanying personal gain, political advancement and, above all accumulation of wealth". In addition, Jega (2007) further categorised Nigerians into different classes which included the political class, the business class, the class of religious groups, the class of traditional rulers, the pro-democracy movements, professional groups, women's groups, workers and peasants; and these classes, in one way or the other, have affected the democratic or otherwise processes in Nigeria. Therefore, what democracy envisages is the likelihood of values and attitudes in the people that will turn into actual governmental policies, programs and projects that transcend into actions and to be implemented for the common good.

Lamenting the nature of Nigerian democracy, Obi (2004:9) argues, "It would appear that since the return of democracy, Nigeria has witnessed an escalation of violent conflicts. The struggles are driven by the quest to fill the power vacuum left by the retreating military, but more fundamentally, the contestations between various groups in a context of rising demands relative

to shrinking scarce resources. These conflicts have largely been identity driven: communal, ethnic and religious. The 'we' against 'them', 'indigenes' versus 'settlers and 'insiders' versus 'outsiders' relations of inclusion/exclusion have been continuously mobilized and deployed in the rivalries and violent struggles for access to power and resources". Obi attributes insecurity dilemma in Nigeria to the struggles to get and control political power by using differences of religion, ethnicity and regionalism that constantly challenge 'unity in diversity' for the attainment of a united Nigeria. General insecurity in the Northern part of the country, by insurgent group *Jama'atu Ahlussunna lid-Da'awatiwal Jihad* popularly called *Boko Haram* and other ethno-religious crises in the North Central; oil vandalization and piracy by the Niger-Delta groups in the South-South, kidnapping, robbery and other ill-fated activities of trash youths in South-East and South-West of the country, compounded the degree of national insecurity that calls for the urgent attention of the Federal Government.

One of the most prominent opposition leaders in Nigeria, General Muhammadu Buhari has argued that, "the economic mess, the corruption and the unacceptable level of unemployment… the shameless rigging and widespread perversion of the electoral process could not, in all honesty, have been said to produce a government of the people by the people…" (Usman, 1986:171). Therefore, democracy is associated with negative values including corruption, violence, economic crises and bad governance, blunted and incessant peace, harmony, justice, tranquillity and mutual coexistence in Nigeria. Therefore, democracy is interpreted and wrongly applied and as a result, politicians nowadays, perceived it as a channel of personal gain for which to invest their money and get political power through the use of violence and other illegal channels.

2.3 VIOLENCE

The concept of violence has attracted different definitions in a number of contexts and dimensions. According to Osaghae (1994:3) "Violence is any act that involves a threat to, or destruction of, lives and or property". This definition is significant because it brought two issues: threat and destructions, but violence on a wider outlook cannot be limited to only act of threat and destructions. Gurr (1970) and Hibbs(1973) have defined violence based on political grounds as the use of force, that is, the intentional use of force by an individual or society on the opponent(s) in order to injure, kill or destroy lives and property. Though, the above definition expanded the dimension of violence to a political angle but that alone cannot fully explain violence by looking at only one aspect which is political and exclude other important aspects in human society.

Accordingly, it is therefore necessary to look at and explain the concept of violence from different aspects such as socio-cultural violence, economic violence, and ethno-religious violence. According to the 2011Report by the Thinking Security for Africa, there are five forms of violence in Nigeria. These included political differences; religious extremism; communal differences; the economic struggle and crime; and in reality, each of these issues overlap with one another, in many important ways. This identification of the forms of violence helped us in understanding the dimensions of violence in Nigeria and Gombe state in particular. Consequent to any form that the violence may assume is the nature and disposition of the actors involved and whether the violence is incidental, ancillary or endemic. Therefore, violence, regardless of its form, is surrounded by the four compartmental circles: the organizers, the victims, the beneficiaries and above all, the environment.

2.3.1 Forms and Causes of Violence

Social and political violence formed the basic and integral part of violence. As observed by Osaghae (1994:5), social violence can assume a criminal posture when it is intra-personal and inter-personal or politically motivated and consequential if it is inter-group or inter-societal due to the involvement of a large or a small group of people. Similarly, Gurr (1970) classified social and political violence into three categories. These are turmoil violence, conspiracy violence and internal war. Hibbs (1973) also sees it in three situations: anti-system, politically significant and mass political action.

A study on social violence in the Republic of South Africa has shown that the root cause of social violence in South Africa is associated with the social matrix and the long history of oppression, poverty and exploitation in the country. This is due to the fact that, from 1948, the apartheid government denied the majority of South Africans access to central political authority and embedded racially-based social inequality. The state used vertical institutional violence to maintain this inequality, racial superiority and social control. In terms of opened political violence the state overpowered those opposed to it via 'legalized' detentions, convictions and bannings, and retorted violently to any resistance to its authority. The State harassment was directly through official government bodies. Structural deprivation in South Africa offers the context to understanding the high levels of crime. Likewise, the National Crime Prevention Strategy of the Republic of South Africa (1996) attributed the escalation in crime to the destruction of social control mechanisms, enormous social and economic disparity, unemployment and underdevelopment, the legitimacy crisis in state institutions related to the slow transformation from the old order, and the 'culture of violence' in South Africa. Therefore, As South Africa moves through the transition to democracy, the legacy of political

and other forms of violence will continue to take its toll on the psychological, social, political and economic coexistence of all South Africans. (Hamber, 1998:2-11).

Violence has its implications as far as the attainment of national security is concerned. Political violence is basically "carried out by youth gangs whose members are openly recruited, financed, and sometimes armed by public officials, politicians, party officials, and their representatives" (Luqman, 2010:13). The extremely competitive and ethnically charged nature of Nigerian politics, particularly at the highest levels, makes political stability a difficult national asset to secure. For example, the lengths politicians are prepared to go to obtain political office are evidenced by the fact that some have gone as far as seeking to create 'fake' police and other security forces, by purchasing uniforms for their hired thugs to wear. In addition to these, illegal firearms are being painted with Nigeria Police insignia. This questions the existence of an effective security force, when it can be readily supplanted with a fabricated replacement. Assassination has also been used as a tool for eliminating political opponents in the country (TSA, 2011:18).

Additionally, violence has contributed remarkably in the initiation of young people who are generally regarded as the future hope of the Nigerian society into crimes. Certain factors prompt this phenomenon including social disorganization resulting from the breakdown of values and norms in the society. The other challenges are encumbered due to negative social changes from the wave of globalization engendered by the movie industry, satellite and internets as well as economic meltdown have all contributed to the degeneration. For the youth, the consequences are more detrimental. Illegal roadside markets have become fertile grounds for petty thefts, daylight robberies and other criminalities that involve the youths. In a way, these youths are also co-opted and exposed to violence by the nature of their engagement in

para-security employments. Adisa (1994:149-162) instantiates this with Lagos State where the youths called Area Boys who are responsible for organized street violence are hired by Lebanese businessmen as bodyguards or intimidators; at same time, night clubs, restaurants, and brothels in several parts of Lagos employ their services as enforcers. Not only in Lagos, this trend is perhaps a major cause of concern as the politicians also employ these youths as bodyguards and errand boys from where they graduate into full blown thugs.

Today, thuggery has become a matter of national insecurity, especially during campaigns and elections. Security is thus elemental in governance as it is the protection of the lives, rights, dignity and property of the citizens and the resources, territory, sovereignty and lawful institution of the country. It is also when these institutions utilize the resources of the nation for the provision of secure, just and equitable living conditions for the citizens of the country that they own their legitimacy (Usman, 1986:173). However, in most African states, including Nigeria, the rulers of the states, empires and polities constitute the major threat to the security of the lives and properties of their own citizens. Meanwhile, the security agencies that exist to checkmate the excesses of such leaders become the propagators of disunity because of their political ambitions.

Ethno-religious violence also formed an integral part of violence. Albert (1994) considers a few cases of violence in Kano. Among other things, he argues that ethnicity, religion, and culture are the foundation of violence in Kano state. He further explains that the first major religious violence in Kano took place between December 18 and 29, 1980, it was triggered off by the Maitatsine sect under Muhammad Marwa. The riot was expanded to other places in Northern Nigeria such as Jimeta in 1984, Gombe in 1985 and Funtua in 1987. Between May 28 and June

5, 1985 over 61 people were killed and over 101 injured in some areas of the then Bauchi State, specifically Gombe, Azare, Kaltungo and Alkaleri.

Furthermore, religious violence also affects 'unity in diversity' in the contemporary democratic process of Nigeria. A study of violence suggests that conflicts between Nigerian Christians and Muslims have often manifested in deadly inter-religious conflicts. On September 8, 2000, Gombe state experienced religious violence in Kaltungo. The crisis erupted as a result of the apprehension arising from the agitation for the implementation of Sharia in the state. Also, on March 22, 2007, another religious tension occurred in Gombe, owing to a revolting act perpetrated by secondary school students who killed their teacher, Mrs. Oluwatoyin Olusesan of Government Day Secondary School, Gandu, in Gombe, that the teacher desecrated The Holy Quran while attempting to stop a student from cheating in the examination hall, it took the intervention of the security agents to forestall reprisals (Sampson, 2012:106-9).

Similarly, other major cases of violent ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria have included the Kafanchan-Kaduna crises in 1987 and 1999, Zangon-Kataf riots of 1992, Tafawa Balewa clashes in 1991, 1995 and 2000, the Kaduna Sharia riots of 2000, and the Jos ethno-religious riots of 2001. Although no exact figures of casualties are available, the Kaduna riots of 2000 and the Jos riots of 2001 have each claimed several hundreds of lives and generated violent ripple effects beyond Kaduna and Jos, respectively (Osaghae, 2005:19).

More so , in analyzing the nature and extent of insecurity in Nigeria, Mohammed noted that "the rising tide of ethno-religious and sectarian violence with its attendant destruction of churches and mosques, public places and institutions has further compounded the state of insecurity in most of the northern states" (2012:12). The situation of security challenges in

Nigeria had taken a different dimension by graduating into terrorism following the first bomb blast during the celebration of the country's Independence Day, 1st October 2010. This development ushered in a condition of disharmony, instability and above all social disorder that again threatens Nigerian nascent democracy. MEND claimed responsibility for the blast while the government attributed it to extremist Islamic sect called *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad* popularly known as *Boko Haram*. More often than not, other causes of violence are politically motivated by the authorities concerned as Mohammed (2012:13) rightly put it that "although the phenomenon of violence and conflict in Nigeria is in some cases politically induced and motivated, by and the state is neither impartial to the root causes nor neutral in its response to conflicts".

Other issues of ethno-religious violence are intertwined and complex. This is evidenced in the study of *The State, Ethno-Religious Divide and Conflicts in Tafawa-Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State*, carried out by Omeiza (2012) which points out that the 1991 ethno-religious violence between the Sayawa and Hausa-Fulani in Tafawa-Balewa was worrisome but the immediate cause of the crisis could not be precisely given, some believed that it erupted following an attempt by a Christian to slaughter pigs in the Muslim section of the town's only abattoir. It was also suggested that the conflict was ignited consequent upon roasted meat (*Suya*) made of pork and sold to a Muslim. However the major issue being contested during the crises, as gathered by Omeiza was the leadership of Lere District, an area the Sayawa people wanted to be governed by the native people and not the Fulani. In pursuant of the demand to govern the area, the Sayawa had clashed with the Head of Lere who was appointed by the Emir of Bauchi (Omeiza, 2012:185).

Nigeria has throughout its political existence grappled with one form of violence or the other. This is occasioned by the heterogeneity of the country in many respects and conflicting relationships. It is also during the democratic dispensations that this violence manifests most as compared to the military regimes. Yahaya (2012:63) puts it that "evidence abounds to suggest that such conflicting relationship is not new in the country rather they appear so simply because they were largely muzzled and forced underground during the country's period of military interregnums". Other political analysts believe that most approaches to the causes of violence focus on the immediate and visible factors that are responsible for the violence rather than the remote triggers and the social milieu that incubate the phenomenon. On this vein, Sampson, (2012:113-114) comments that poverty, corruption, non-implementation of reports on ghastly conflicts, impunity enjoyed by culprits, perversion of preaching and worshipping centres, unguided utterances, provocative journalism, religiosity, uncensored social media and so on are the elemental causes of violence with varied dimensions in Nigeria.

Nevertheless, communal violence as an ethnic phenomenon also formed the part of violence in Nigeria which poses a security challenge that leads to instability, crises and above all social violence. Differences in ethnic background and cultural disparities that are exploited by certain groups in their respective communities exacerbated the killing of people and destruction of properties worth millions of naira. Communal instability is one in which members of communal group use violence to change the distribution of authority among communal groups within the national population. For example, there has been a recurring violence between the Dadiya and Tula tribes in Kaltungo Local Government Area of Gombe state. The dispute has been over farmlands. These clashes have resulted in population displacement and the destruction of property.

Finally, economic violence is another form of violence in Nigeria. In discussing the factors responsible for the conflict in Nigeria, Dunmoye (2012:7) argues that, "a major factor that contributed to conflict in this country, even at the local community levels, is the economic crises and its impact on the reproduction of material existence of citizens. When people suffer from economic deprivation and poverty, they seek solace in group membership and collective action. At the local level, the struggle for the resources, that is, jobs, land and to some extent government patronage becomes intense, especially if the antagonists belong to different communities, ethnic group and religious groups". This argument is closely related to the stance of Luqman (2010), who insists that the factors responsible for any violence in Nigeria is as a result of state failure, poverty, unemployment and the rise and proliferation of ethnic militia groups in the country. However, there are other societies with poorer economic conditions and do not have such spates of violence.

Commenting on the poor economic condition and rate of crimes within the country in the 1980s, Usman (1986:185) posits that "crimes even though hardly constituting economic sabotage, cause considerable molestation, hardships and insecurity, to many citizens of this country". The Report of the Nigerian Police Force in 1981 shows that from 1st January-31st December, 1978, 231,351 cases of criminality were reported in which after investigation, 140,432 cases were of economic and financial nature worth N14,766,496.02. Correspondingly, Adisa discloses the extent of crimes in Nigeria, in which he describes that "rampant crime became a serious problem in Nigeria after the civil war of 1967-70. Consequently, in the two-and-half decades that have followed, concern about public safety has become an overriding concern among Nigerian citizens. The total figure of crimes reported to the police in 1980 was 245,972 which rose to 325,073 in 1983. Since then, it has stabilized, falling to 297,060 in 1986;

and 325,061 in 1989", for Bauchi State alone was 4,185. The range of violent crime statistics from 1987-Jan – June, 1990 can be seen to include all sorts of crimes reported to the police in the forms of murder, kidnapping, robbery, house/ store breaking, stealing, rape and so on as follows: 1987 was 279,058; 1988 was 325,861; 1989 was 296,218; and in 1990 (Jan-June) was 85,602 (Adisa, 1994:147-8).

Moreover, economic violence occasioned by conflict over grazing opportunities also abound. These have taken place across the length and breadth of the country between Fulani herdsmen and sedentary farming populations. In a study of conflicts between farmers and Fulani pastoralists (*Udawa*) in Northern Nigeria, Abbas (2012), relates the phenomenon to economic factor in which the predominance of socio-economic systems of production was based on agriculture and pastoralism, they are thus susceptible to drought, leading to struggles, frictions and violence. The dimension of militancy in the conflicts is associated with the advent of the aggressive *Udawa and Bakoloji* pastoralists that further led to the use of guns and other sophisticated weapons in the conflicts. So also, many clashes in the oil-rich Niger Delta have also involved purely distributive sectional struggles for the largesse of the oil industry, including infrastructures and financial compensations provided by the oil multinationals (Osaghae, 2005:21-3). It is observed by the Thinking Security for Africa (2011:32-3) that although, the threat from militants in the Niger Delta has decreased due to the Amnesty Policy of the late Yar'adua's administration, but criminal activities in the South-South region such as oil pipeline sabotage and illegal oil bunkering are prevalent and still present challenges to the government, which has a vital interest in securing the extremely valuable national assets situated in the Niger Delta. Militant attacks in the Niger Delta began in earnest in 2006. At the

height of the instability, Nigeria was losing 200,000 bpd and US$12 million daily. Shell, Chevron and Agip were the companies most affected by militant attacks.

Therefore, despite the fact that Galtung (1981) cited by Osaghae (1994) summarizes violence as any activity that is aimed at destruction of live and property, but the researcher concludes that violence is any devastating phenomenon affecting individuals, communities, modern states and the world at large in all spheres of life. It is characterized by all sorts of crisis, conflict, robbery, kidnapping, dispute and rebellion which are caused by the known or unknown individuals to a known or unknown target. As such, this phenomenon destabilizes the stability, peace, order, harmony and tranquillity of people in their communities.

2.4 POLITICAL THUGGERY

As a political concept, thuggery has been defined differently by different scholars. As observed by Howell (2004) and Asiegbu (2011), thuggery refers to the activities of thugs connected with stealing, killing, kidnapping, rudeness, victimization, intimidation and harassment. This manner affects peace, harmony and mutual co-existence among groups in their respective communities. If politics is criminalized through thuggery, right people who are the observers of good values tend to be scared and keep away from political processes. This suggests that thuggery is a violent behaviour affecting political processes in the Nigerian politics. Banwo (2003) maintains that the processes of the use of extra-judicial means in the course of the contest for or in exercising political power including intimidation, harassment, assassination, blackmail, and arson; physical and psychological attacks could not help to ensure sustainable peace and security within any democratic system like Nigeria. Hence, scholars believe that the attributes

of sponsoring thugs is due to the fact that Nigerian politics is characterized by rigging, violence and ropes under the manipulation of the few elites.

Furthermore, in discussing the causes of thuggery in Borno state, Mbaya (2013) had argued that the majority of youths in Borno state are jobless, illiterates, with no means of livelihood, they are impoverished, and being paid easily to manipulate election results. The political elite capitalize on this weakness and recruit the youths, who not only constitute the pillar of society but also the most vulnerable to the self-inflicted poverty, as their thugs and touts to perpetrate violence. Secondly, politics for personal gain – this has become a common feature in Nigerian politics. This is a situation in which an individual tries to hold on to power for personal gains. In an attempt to hang on to power, leaders often create a regime of violence, repression and bloodshed. They organize political thugs, hooligans and scavengers to sing their praises, intimidate opponents and kill them if they become intransigent. The unnecessary and uncoordinated urge to control, dominate and amass wealth for their family and friends informs the emergence of political thugs to be used to win election by all means. Thirdly, prebendal politics in Nigeria, politics is conceived as an investment. The politicians, having invested huge amount of money on campaigns and other political activities, coupled with the existing system of winner takes all, would want to win at all cost. In view of the above, the need to employ the use of thugs and touts to manipulate and rig elections becomes necessary, especially when such politicians are not popular candidates. Fourthly, refusal to accept electoral defeat in good faith is also a fertile factor that can breed thuggery and trigger violence in politics. And finally, absence of good governance and low political culture are also contributing factors to the menace of thuggery and violence. Similarly, hunger, marginalization, incapacitation, intolerance, domination, and apathy etc can also cause political violence.

On the whole, researches conducted by numerous scholars seem not to take into cognizance the historical sequence of democracy, violence and *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state since the return to democratic rule in 1999. The phenomenon of *kalare* thuggery keeps on reoccurring despite effort by different governments to tackle the incidence, in the state. This research attempted to examine the effects of *kalare* thuggery on democratic and social activities within Gombe state from 2003 to 2013. This is because the researches understand from the literatures reviewed that most studies had concentrated mainly on investigating the nature, factors responsible for political thuggery and the sponsors of thugs in Gombe metropolis and Gombe Local Government Area specifically from 1999 to 2008 by neglecting the significant aspect which is the effects of *kalare* thuggery on democratic and social activities in the state. However, the research has not only focused on the entire state as a case study, but also attempted to examine the effects of *kalare* thuggery on democratic and social activities within Gombe state from 2003 to 2013.

Secondly, researches conducted by for example Hassan (2011) and Lamido (2008) explained and attributed *kalare* thuggery to only political affairs that affect political activities, but this research has gone further to examine *kalare* thuggery not only a political but also a social affair affecting democratic and social activities within the state from 2003 to 2013.

Finally, the researcher had not only observed a gap from the previous researches in terms of their case study and time frame but the theories been used as the tool of analysis also diverged in this research. For instance, while Hassan (2011) used a combination of elite and frustration aggression theories, Lamido (2008) used power and elite theories in their studies. However, the researcher used a combination of social learning and elite theories in this research. This is so because social learning theory helps us to understand how *kalare* thugs learn and imbibe their

violent behaviours from a role model and subsequently the elite theory finally helps us to understand how different elites exploit and manipulate *kalare* thugs for their selfish gain, and consequently this affects democratic and social activities in Gombe state. It is therefore hoped that the study will improve the existing body of knowledge pertaining to the phenomenon of *kalare* thuggery and other related violence in Gombe state and Nigeria at large.

2.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theoretical frame work is an important aspect of scientific inquiry which "provides logical basis for expectations about the world" (Izah, 2012:28). Similarly, Galtung (1976:170) cited by Izah puts it that "theory is a set of empirical generalizations that are connected deductively; it refers to statements about relationships between variables". In a nutshell, the relevance of scientific theory in conducting research is not limited to simplification, but also generalization, harmonization, summarization, compartmentalization, regularization, mechanization, modernization and systematization of any patterns of studies resulting from investigation, exploration, description and exposition of data gathered in order to yield a valuable information to use and solve the existing challenge or problem affecting the mutual coexistence of human development and their environment. Accordingly, a research of this nature requires a sound political theory that is suitable and appropriate for analysis so as to find out the correlation and coefficient exist between the variables, in a given environment of a political system. Therefore, social learning theory and the elite theory are adopted to examine the causes and effects of kalare thuggery on democratic and social activities in Gombe state from 2003 to 2013.

2.6 SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY

Social learning theory branches from the general approach in psychology called cognitive behavioural approach. Studies of social problems affecting political communities led to the creation of scientific tools for analysis. From the 19th century onwards, scholars began to come out with different scientific methods to analyze social and political phenomena with the purpose to find the lasting solutions. Bandura (1979) argues that Guerry conducted the first empirical studies on criminology in France in 1820s relating crimes with the distribution of wealth and poverty. Guerry's major approach was cognitive-behavioural approach. The emergence of psychology as an independent domain of inquiry is generally dated to 1879 when the first experimental psychological laboratory was established by Wilhelm Wundt, a physiologist, in Leipzig, Germany. The first areas of investigation fell within what would now be recognised as cognitive psychology.

Accordingly, Bandura (1979) also notes that John B. Watson presented an instance on collecting data pertaining behaviour itself. Watson emphasised the effects of the environment, and also emphasised that human behaviour is entirely a product of learning, and lastly emphasised that researchers have to explain complex processes in terms of simple ones. Finally, Bandura (1979) understands that concepts like *stimulus, response, reinforcement, extinction* were developed and called operant conditioning to explain human behaviour in different environments. This cognitive-behavioural approach largely focused on individuals on how aggression, abuse and violence that are transferred among individuals and further explain the reasons for the abuse behaviour and violent actions mostly transmitted from one generation to other generations.

Correspondingly, Albert Bandura (1979) developed a model after the broader approach of cognitive behavioural approach called social learning model explaining why individuals behave the way they do. Against the general background that cognitive-behavioural theory focused on the individual- level factors which contribute to violence that Bandura amassed a large quantity of evidence on the importance of 'learning from role models' in human development. Thus, Social learning posits both direct conditioning and observational learning from role models as basic processes in development.

2.6.1 Basic Assumptions of the Theory

The social learning model maintains that individuals learn social behaviours by observing and imitating other people. Imitation of role models is the most important element in how children and individuals learn. This process can be seen in the development of language, aggression and moral decision-making. Social Learning Model argues that individuals become aggressive toward family and society members because of their aggressive behaviour learnt from the role models. In a nutshell, this model is guided by the elements of stimuli, organism, response and consequence (SORC or ABC-Antecedence, Behaviour and Consequence) which are the basic conditions of social learning and cognitive behaviour.

The operant conditioning is the strength of behaviours through positive and negative reinforcement, as well as the suppression of behaviours through punishment. In fact, corporal punishment may be chosen as a discipline method simply because it typically brings about children's compliance with parental demands. A research conducted by Bandura (1979) pointed out to both short-term and long-term negative effects associated with the physical punishment, such as increased physical aggressiveness, antisocial behaviour, criminal behaviour, mental health problems and partner or spousal abuse in adulthood. Social learning model explains the

presence of intergenerational transmission of violence and other behaviours. It is proposed that, while growing up, children receive feedback from others regarding their own behaviours, from which they begin to develop standards for judging their behaviour and seek out role models who match these standards. It is also argued that children and individuals who grow up in violent family and society may learn violent behaviours, imitate those behaviours, and then repeat those behaviours in future relationships.

2.6.2 The Significance of the Theory

Social Learning Theory establishes certain significance to the studies of human behaviours in their environments. The theory provides the following points to the study of social violence:

The theory is important because it focuses on individual behaviour as the level of analysis. The study of this nature helps the researcher to understand and make use of individuals specifically political thugs called *Yan Kalare*, as level of analysis. This is because it is the individuals that form groups and compositions of different groups form the society, and thus, individuals are only relevant to the society when they relate to others in a group to accomplish certain aims and objectives that facilitate social and political development.

The theory also suffices the background that individuals learn and transmit social behaviours by imitating the role models. This is important because imitation of role models serves as the major mechanism through which individuals behave in their respective environment. Accordingly, political thugs in Gombe state learn their violent behaviours, at the initial stage, through imitation of the role model called *Kalare* who was a brave hunter in the late of 1980s and early of 1990s. Because of their recognition in the society, subsequent generation of youths tend to imitate the violent behaviour especially after the return to democracy in 1999. Several studies have shown that politicians are the major actors involved in manipulating those jobless

youths as thugs in order to harass, sabotage, intimidate and threaten people who are considered as opponents in political processes. Self-centred politicians from different political parties continue to control and retain political power in the state, by such mean.

Finally, the theory suggests that any violent, abusive and aggressive behaviour might be disciplined through the physical and corporal method of punishment. Political thugs in Gombe state have been constantly attacking people in their environment which is not confined to election periods. Gombe state residents, caught between political violence and the epidemic of violent crimes, have been trapped in a state of persistent insecurity through killing, intimidation and use of threat. Perhaps, the widespread impunity enjoyed by *kalare* gang members compounds the problems of political violence and violent crimes in Gombe. It emboldens the gangs and encourages a greater scale of lawlessness the longer their conduct goes unpunished. The civil society leaders, Human Rights activists and other sources widely accused the police of turning a blind eye to the abuses of *kalare* thugs, especially those working on behalf of the PDP being the ruling party. During the elections, one police officer complained confidentially to Human Rights Watch that "Politics is making our life very difficult, PDP supporters are not arrested, or if they are, police officials, hand them over to the governor(HRW Report, 2007).The operational duty of Mobile Police officers called Anti-Kalare through the use of brutality and corporal punishment has drastically created fear in the minds of political thugs which drastically reduced the phenomenon in most areas of the state. However, the political dimension attached to the arresting and punishing the thugs by the government hinders efforts of the security agencies to overcome the menace of thuggery in Gombe state. This is because on several occasions when Kalare thugs who are the supporters of government are arrested by the police officers, the government directs the release of such thugs.

2.7 ELITE THEORY

Elite theory is a political tool advanced to explain political realities within a political system. This theory was developed from the popular writings of Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), and Robert Michel (1876-1936), and Ortega Gasset. The theory emanates from political sociology to explain the political and social relationships among individuals and groups in their societies with regards to decision making, power relations and resources; the theory is a complement to Pluralism and Conflict theories.

Generally, Mosca emphasized the ways in which tiny minorities 'out-organize and outwit' large majorities, the political classes. Mosca's term for political elites, usually have 'a certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority' over those they govern. Pareto postulated that in a society with truly unrestricted social mobility, elites would consist of the most talented and deserving individuals; but in actual societies elites are those most adept at using the two modes of political rule, force and persuasion, and who usually enjoy important advantages such as inherited wealth and family connections. Pareto sketched alternating types of governing elites, which he likened, following Machiavelli, to lions and foxes. Michel rooted elites 'oligarchies' in the need of large organizations for leaders and experts in order to operate efficiently; as these individuals gain control of funds, information flows, promotions, and other aspects of organizational functioning, power becomes concentrated in their hands. Emphasizing the inescapability and also the relative autonomy of elites, all three men characterized aspirations to fully democratic and egalitarian societies as futile (Higley, 2005:2).

In a nut shell, Kayode (2008) summarizes the meaning and nature of elites in Nigerian politics as "those citizens who have either an occupational or a vocational interest in issues of governance". He further argues that elites naturally include those inside and outside the

apparatus of government, those in media houses, Non-governmental organizations, educational institutions and the like, their attitude towards democratic rule has not been uniform. Therefore, elite can be defined as individuals who, by advantage of their defined positions in many respects of crucial establishments and arrangements, are able to determine political consequences frequently and considerably. Put differently, elites are individuals with the systematized aptitude to make factual political actions without being promptly punished by authorities concern. These individuals consist of high-status and reputable leaders, classical politicians, significant businessmen, top civil servants, high-ranking military officers, and other respected individuals in the society.

2.7.1 Basic Assumptions of the Theory

Based on the postulations of the leading elite theorists, the research summarizes the basic assumptions of the theory as:

The elite theory assumes that any political community is divided into two, the few who are cohesive, well-organized and self-protective and above all have the power to allocate values for the communities, and the majority who are uncoordinated and confused without any political power to make policy. It is further assumed that the elites are obtained truly from the higher socio-economic status who possess certain qualities of superiority over the masses; also, the elites are essentially cohesive constantly defending the status quo, in order to ensure the protection of their gains at the detriment of the masses. The channel of sustenance include but not limited to coercion by security agencies, militancy, manipulation of the media, schools, indoctrination of masses with deceitful ideologies and stereotype; and finally, to ensure system maintenance of their interest, elite avoids any sort of rebellion or revolt against their interest by

creating institutional framework which permits gradual process to recruit and absorb tiny few individuals whom will also protect the general interest of elite.

2.7.2 Elite Theory and Democracy

Democratic systems must rely on the wisdom, loyalty and skill of their political leaders, not on the population at large. The political system is divided into two groups: the elite, or the 'political entrepreneurs,' who possess ideological commitments and manipulative skills; and the citizens at large, the masses, or the 'apolitical clay', of the system, a much larger class of passive, inert followers who have little knowledge of public affairs and even less interest. The factor that distinguishes democratic and authoritarian systems, according to this view, is the provision for limited, peaceful competition among members of the elite for the formal positions of leadership within the system (Monday, 2010:3-5).

Elite maintains different positions in their political system that inform them to behave the way they like. As stated by Kayode (2008:132) "the major determinants of particular elite attitude to democracy have been their individual positions in terms of the levers of power". The present elitist democracy is petrifying because dead money suppresses original ideas of free people. Creativity and autonomy are not appreciated. Democracy is hardly less violent than other social systems. Hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars started by democrats. Rich Western democracies support regimes that maintain a situation in which many people do not even get enough food (Steenis**,** 2009:5).

The growing impoverishment of most Nigerians paradoxically strengthened the system because it cemented their reliance on patronage networks for survival. In return for support, officers provided oil money for *Ogas* to distribute to ''deserving'' clients when there were diminishing

alternative sources. Military officers, post–civil war and mostly retired, were joined by governors, former governors, chairmen of local government authorities, business leaders, and a few traditional rulers. Over time, Obasanjo's circle grew also to include a few civilians with no independent power base of their own and therefore particularly dependent on him. Notable were the brothers Andy and Chris Uba, who performed a wide range of staff duties. He also made use of technical experts, including Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala from the World Bank, and governor of the Central Bank Charles Soludo, an academic who had held posts in the United States. Vice President Atiku Abubakar, using his American connections, recruited a number of these technocrats to government service (Campbell, 2011:24-5).

Therefore, the particular case of Gombe also shows that elite and politicians recruit unemployed youths into thuggery for their selfish aggrandizement during political processes like campaigns and elections to serve as thugs or to snatch ballot papers and ballot boxes in many ways, Hassan (2011:122). Elites more especially political class who hold political power used various means in order to remain in power without considering the state of socio-political harmony of their respective societies. These class of people recruit and sponsor some youths that show allegiance to them during political activities and consequently they also benefitted from the services the youths render to them during political activities; and in turn, the youths were motivated by little amount of money and other mind control drugs and light weapons.

2.8 SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY AND ELITE THEORY

Social Learning and Elite theories are used in this study because they are significant in explaining and examining *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state. The reason for adopting both theories is that the theories logically connect the historical antecedence of how *Yan kalare* started as a socio-cultural organisation and its subsequent becoming thugs to the current phenomenon of *kalare* thuggery as a social vice since return to democracy which is manipulated by the elites in Gombe state. Social learning theory, on the one hand, focuses on the behaviour of individuals to social and political violence. Individuals learn their certain behaviours by imitating the role models within their respective societies. These violent behaviours are transmitted from one generation to another. As such, we can infer that initially *kalare* thugs learn their behaviours, through imitation of the role model called *kalare*, who was a brave hunter in the late 1980s and the early 1990s in the then Bauchi state, they later became violent and vulnerable to political manipulation by selfish elites at the return of democracy in Gombe state in 1999.

Accordingly, Elite theory then enables us to examine the way in which ruling and non-ruling elites manipulate the *kalare* thugs to serve their interest in order to control and maintain political power. The elites use every means and tendencies at their disposal by ensuring that they remain in power. Therefore, Jega (2007) argues that it is preponderant to maintain that the political elites in Nigeria's nascent democracy are the cogs in the wheel of democratic progress the dictum of do-or-die affair in politics is a salient credo of an unwritten ideological structure in their manifesto. They sponsor all sorts of violence for upkeep of their personal gain and political advancement. It is for these reasons that they cherished the ideals of democracy in as much as it facilitates and creates opportunities for blunder and plunder of public treasury and

the people at their mercy. Democracy to these groups is only a desirable and a defendable venture if it is a means not an end; a means to power at the detriment of common good of the majority of the population whereas the end being the lofty ideals of good governance and personal liberty.

Finally, *kalar*e thugs learn their violent behaviours by imitating the role model called Kalare; it is against this background that these violent behaviours are transmitted from one generation to another over a long period of time in the state. Subsequently, the return to democracy in 1999 makes it possible for the political elites to exploit and manipulate *kalare* thugs during and after elections for their selfish gain on the one hand, and the *kalare* thugs themselves explore that opportunity to intimidate innocent individuals on the streets, homes and in their places of business activities on the other hand. Thus, this situation has prompted the researcher to conduct this research in Gombe state.

CHAPTER THREE

GOMBE STATE AND THE RECURRENT PROBLEM OF THUGGERY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Gombe state has a wide range of political, economic, socio-cultural and historical background. These and many factors determine the coexistence of people in the state, either within or

outside the state. The relationships are in multiple dimensions ranging from trade and commerce, cultural festivals and ceremonies, agricultural activities, ethnic and religious intermingling, political and administrative practices. These human activities have been in existence even before colonial conquest, to the colonial era and the present post-colonial condition (Independence and Post-Independence). Therefore, this chapter describes the historiography of Gombe state together with the sequential flow of social violence since the creation of Gombe state in 1996, during Gen. Sani Abacha's regime. The background of Gombe state is considered under the following:

1.2 GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING

Gombe state is located at Latitude 9°30′ and 12°30′N and Longitude 8°45′and 11°45′E in the centre of the North East region of Nigeria with the land area of 20, 265 Km^2. Being located in the north eastern zone, right within the expansive savannah allows the state to share common borders with the states of Borno and Yobe to the north and east, Taraba and Adamawa to the south, and Bauchi to the west. The climate type of the state is characterized by warm, though not exceeding 30°celcius during the hottest months of March-May. The rainfall period is around the months of June –November with the estimated annual average rainfall of 850mm. Similarly, the vegetation of the area is dominated by the Guinea Savannah with concentration of wood lands; and the topography of the place is mainly mountainous, undulating and hilly to the South-East and flat open plains in the Central, North, North-East West and North-West. River Gongola transverse the state by watering most parts of the state into the River Benue at Numan. Other numerous streams that are mostly seasonal served as tributaries to the River Gongola. The major dams in the state are the Dadin Kowa Multipurpose Dam, the Balanga

Dam and the Cham Dam providing regional water supply and irrigational activities (Gombe State Government Diary, 20013).

3.3 AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES

Gombe state is predominantly an agrarian state with more than 80% of the population engage in agricultural production. A number of food, cash crops and livestock are produced in the state. The food and cash crops production include: legumes such as maize, millet, sorghum, rice and wheat; legumes like cowpeas, groundnut, soya beans, and bambara nuts are heavily produced; vegetables in the area include tomatoes, pepper, onion, okra, pumpkin, melon, etc; the production of economic trees like mango, cashew, guava, locust beans etc are well produced; and the production of livestock like cattle, sheep, goat, pig, dog, donkey, poultry, rabbit, and fish contributes to employment opportunities to the teaming population in the state which facilitates the economic booming(Gombe State Government Diary, 20013).

3.4 POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SETTINGS

The pre-colonial history of Gombe Emirate paves the way for the development of Gombe state. Gombe Emirate was founded in 1804 during the Fulani jihad by Buba Yero, a follower of Usman Dan Fodio. Buba Yero made Gombe Abba his headquarters for a campaign against the Jukun settlements of Pindiga and Kalam, followed by extensive raids in which he went as far as Adamawa on the other side of the River Benue . Further lands were subdued by his son, Muhammadu Kwairanga, Emir of Gombe from 1844 to 1882.The Gombe emirate at one time extended from Gombe Abba to Jalingo, but in 1833 the Muri Emirate was created from part of its territory to form a state for the Emir's brother (Abba, 2000).

However, the colonial history of Gombe Emirate, during the reign of Emir Zailani (1882–1888) a religious zealot, Mallam Jibril Gaini, established himself at Burmi on the border between Gombe and Fika. Gaini managed to hold out for years against the combined forces of Gombe and neighbouring emirates, and was finally defeated and exiled by the British Royal Niger Company in 1902. The British conquered Gombe at the battle of Tongo in 1902. They moved the capital of Gombe to Nafada in 1913, and moved the capital again in 1919 to the present Gombe town. Waja was separated from Gombe in 1930 to become an independent District. However, the Waja headmen chose Sarkin Yaki of Gombe, brother of the former Emir Umaru Dan Muhammadu, as their chief (Abba, 2000).

Indeed, the post-colonial era, the British had set up the Gombe Native Authority system, which continued to function after independence in 1960. In 1976, the military regime of Olusegun Obasanjo broke up the Native Authority into the Gombe, Akko and Dukku Local Government Areas. In 2002, Gombe State Governor, Abubakar Habu Hashidu, broke up Gombe Emirate into parts, ruled by 2nd Class Emirs and two Senior District Heads. The following year, Governor Mohammed Danjuma Goje created two additional Senior District Heads. This has reduced the authority of the Emir at a time of increasing conflict between farmers and nomadic Udawa herders.

Gombe became a state on October 1st, 1996 with the capital in Gombe town during the regime of Gen. Sani Abacha. The state has 11 local government areas including Akko with the capital at Kumo, Balanga with the capital at Talasse, Billiri with the capital at Billiri, Dukku with the capital at Dukku, Funakaye with the capital at Bajoga, Gombe with the capital at Gombe,

Kaltungo with the capital at Kaltungo, Kwami with the capital at Malam Sidi, Nafada with the capital at Nafada, Shomgom with the capital at Boh and Yamaltu Deba with the capital at Deba (Gombe State Government Diary, 20013).

In terms of traditional rulers, the state has 15 First Class Emirs/Chiefdoms representing their respective emirates. The Emirates are as follows: The Emirate of Gombe headed by the Emir of Gombe, the Chiefdom of Kaltungo headed by the Mai of Kaltungo, the Chiefdom of Tangale headed by the Mai of Tangale, the Emirate of Waja headed by the Bala Waja, the Chiefdom of Dadiya headed by the Folo Dadiya, the Chiefdom of Cham headed by the Ndu Grah Cham, the Emirate of Dukku headed by the Emir of Dukku, the Emirate of Deba headed by the Emir of Deba, the Emirate of Akko headed by the Emir of Akko, the Emirate of Yamaltu headed by the Emir of Yamaltu, the Emirate of Pindiga headed by the Emir of Pindiga, the Emirate of Nafada headed by the Emir of Nafada, the Emirate of Funakaye headed by the Emir of Funakaye, the Emirate of Gona headed by the Emir of Gona and the Chiefdom of Tula headed by the Mai Tula (Gombe State Government Diary, 20013).

3.5 THE CULTURAL BACKGROUND

The people of Gombe are said to be diverse, on different languages, customs and traditions. According to Linguistic classification, the most dominant linguistic group exists in the area of Gombe State belongs to the Afro-Asiatic and Niger-Congo family of languages. Therefore, the ethno-linguistic group composition of the area consists, amongst others, Bolewa, Fulfulde, Tera, Tangale, Tula, Waja, Wurkum, Jara, Dadiya, Cham, Awak, Pero, Kamo, Kushi and Bagunji. Recently, Hausa, Kanuri, Yoruba and Igbo entered the area as a result of migration. In addition to all these various languages, Hausa language is a dominant means of communication followed by Fulfulde, though, English Language serve as the formal means of official

communication in the governmental established organisations. Similarly, the system of education is derived from the English curriculum but Arabic education is being taught at the *Islamiyya* Arabic schools (Abba, Shehu and Abba, 2000:3).

Furthermore, religious affiliations within the area could be seen in the three different beliefs. The first belief is Islam. This is the major religion within the area in which people observe the principles of Islam with the popular book of Holy Qur'an determining the day-to-day activities through the teaching and practice of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Such as: marriage, trade, education and interactions. Muslims in Gombe state are to have divided into sects such as *Tariqa* (*Qadiriyya* and *Tijjaniya*), *Izala* (one of Shiek Isma'il Idris Jos and the others), *Shi'ite* and other group of *Assalafi* followers.

The second belief is Christianity. This is the second dominant religion in the area in which the followers affiliated to the teachings of Jesus Christ with the Holy Bible as the code of practice. This religion also subdivided into different sects including, amongst others, Catholic, Baptist, ECWA and Pentecostal.

Finally, the third belief is the Traditional Religion. There are many forms of with different customs and traditions. These forms of religions were established even before the coming of Islam and Christianity into the region.

3.6 THE ECONOMY

Gombe state is a commercial area in the North eastern sub-region. People of Gombe state are mostly farmers since a vast population of the area are predominantly in rural settings. This made agricultural activities such as farming, rearing and fishing the major economic activities. The major factories in the state include: the Ashaka Cement, in Bajoga and small firms

including bakeries, sachet water manufacturers, block moulding industries, etc that provided little jobs to the vast majority of the populace. Accordingly, a variety of solid mineral resources are found in commercial quantity within the area. These include: limestone, gypsum, kaolin, silica, granite, iron ore, copper, coal, betonites and basalt. In a nut shell, people of Gombe state are entrepreneurs, various economic activities that directly or indirectly create social relationships in production of goods and services (Gombe State Government Diary, 20013).

3.7 POLITICS AND THUGGERY

Since the creation of Gombe state in 1996 by the Abacha regime, the people were part of the political processes for the entrenchment of democratic values. The state experienced both military and democratic governors. The two military governors served from 1996-1999 namely, Captain J.I. Orji and Col. Muhammad I. Bawa. The return to democracy in 1999 made it possible for the state to have three democratically elected governors from 1999 to date. The first executive governor was Alhaji Abubakar Habu Hashidu who served from 1999 to 2003; one tenure, under the umbrella of All Peoples Party (APP). The second Executive Governor was Alhaji Muhammad Danjuma Goje who served from 2003 to 2011, two tenures, under the umbrella of Peoples' Democratic Party. The third Executive Governor was Alhaji Ibrahim Hassan Dankwambo, the incumbent Governor, from 2011 to date.

Furthermore, the origin of *kalare* thuggery in Gombe dates back beyond the return to democracy in 1999. The native and popular name of thuggery is called *kalare* in Gombe state. The name *Yan kalare* is peculiar to Gombe State, though there are numerous appellations associated to the phenomenon in different parts of the country. Accordingly, thugs retain different names in different states. In Lagos state, they are called Area Boys; in Bayelsa State, they are known as *Egbesu*; in Abia state, they are referred to as *Bakassi* Boys; in Kano state,

they are called *Yan Tauri* or *Yan Daba*; in Bauchi state, they are named *Sara Suka;* and in Maiduguri, they are popularly referred to as *Ecomog*.

The origin of *kalare* which is the phenomenon as well as the act, could be traced back to the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to Hassan (2011) *kalare* groups are originally organized hunters moving in groups for the purpose of hunting wild animals for their consumptions. *Yan kalare* are the members of *kalare* who participate in hunting and other related activities in different groups. Mythically, *kalare* activities derived its name from a retired hunter who hails from Katagum zone in Bauchi state. The man was assumed to be an excellent musician of hunters who motivates them during the hunting events. He sang victory songs to those who excel and return successfully from the trip. The man, kalare, was popularly known for his great magical performance for assisting the followers with magical protection against local weapons like machete, cudgel, horns, broken bottles and other dangerous animals.

Furthermore, *kalare*, as an activity before the return to democracy, served as a functional mechanism and socio-cultural organisation in Gombe state. It serves two purposes; as economic activity providing jobs to the teaming population and as a social protection activity in which the members protect their environments from any attack by thieves, armed robbers and other external attack. Lamido (2008) argues that in the Mid 1990s, the man, *Kalare*, was invited to Gombe as a special guest at the victory ceremony of hunters in Jekadafari, Gombe. The man performed admirably well to the appreciation of the gathering which resulted to his greeting with exclamation: *Kalare*! *Kalare*!! *Kalare*!!! During and after the event, Kalare received numerous gifts as admiration from the people of Gombe. Eventually, people of

Gombe state, especially youths, joint the profession of hunting imitating the role played by *Kalare* as a model in promoting hunting activities.

As a result, vast majority of *Yan kalare* who formed associations of hunting activities within their respective communities, wards and streets became vulnerable to political manipulation. There are different groups of *kalare* thugs in Gombe metropolis. To mention but only few, there are *Yan kalare* of Jekadafari, *Yan kalare* of Kasuwan Mata, *Yan kalare* of Kumbiya-Kumbiya, *Yan kalare* of Malam Inna, *Yan kalare* of Barunde, and many more bearing different names like V-Mobile Group and First Class Group both within the state capital and other local government areas. The groups of *Yan kalare* received special consideration and respect because they are perceived as brave individuals in their respective communities. More often than not, these groups engaged in clashes among themselves either intra or inter groups and eventually affect innocent people during democratic and social activities in the state.

Accordingly, a return to democracy accompanied by democratic principles like freedom of association, speech and many more facilitated the growth and development of thuggery. A number of jobless youths join different political parties anticipating that when their party candidates win elections at various levels, they will guarantee them employment opportunities. As such, more youths became affiliated to a number of political parties by participating in political processes like campaigns and rallies of their preferred candidates under the disguise of supporters. Since political parties have their right to mobilize supporters at their discretion, and the supporters have the right to choose a political party to belong to, thereafter, politicians show their interest of sponsoring the thugs to help them to manipulate political processes; conflict arose due to the difference in their objective, interest and manifest. Eventually, *Yan kalare*

became subservient to politicians and political manipulation by the candidates of different political parties.

It is observed that the 1999 General Elections facilitated the growth and development of democracy in Gombe state. The situation gave the people of Gombe a confidence in civil rule to which considerable level of voters' turnout was recorded with a few cases of clashes and election rigging. The emergence of Alhaji Abubakar Habu Hashidu being the first elected governor in the state was recorded with some few cases of violence; this can be attributed to the fact that the election was supervised under the control of military regime. It was also the time when the set of politicians were falling up to organise themselves to control political power in their own state. Consequently, the involvement of *Yan kalare* into the political processes was very minimal because politicians were eager to democratize than living under the military rule.

The two major political parties were Peoples' Democratic Parties (PDP) and All People Party (APP). The gubernatorial candidate under the umbrella of All Peoples Party (APP) was Alhaji Abubakar Habu Hashidu whom after the election, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) declared him the winner. Also that the second political party in the state was the Peoples' Democratic Party in which Alhaji Yarima Abdullahi was their candidate in 1999 who lost the seat of governor to Habu Hashidu.

According to a Report, in 2007, by the Human Right Watch, the picture of thuggery manifested itself in the political processes of Gombe State in 2003. The Report stated that ahead of Nigeria's 2003 polls, the PDP mobilized large numbers of young men, ostensibly to protect their votes from attempts at rigging by rival parties. Community leaders, civil society activists and other residents of the state interviewed by Human Rights Watch, stated that those youths

were used to help the PDP in winning the election by stealing and stuffing ballot boxes, chasing away voters and intimidating INEC officials. This scenario, paved way for the persistence of thuggery and social violence in general. The organized thugs are now a constant feature of Gombe political scene and not only limited to political affairs but also have been implicated in numerous acts of criminal activity and violence against ordinary Gombe residents (HRM, 2007).

The Report further stated that Gombe State is like the rest of Nigeria; a home of large numbers of unemployed young men who have little opportunity for legitimate employment or socio-economic advancement. The *kalare* thugs have proven easy prey for politicians who offer them small amounts of money, drugs, alcohol, and local weapons in exchange for engaging in acts of intimidation and assault to accompany their campaigns in a demonstration of muscle. Since 2003, *kalare* thugs have committed not only politically related crimes but also other forms of violent abuses with complete impunity. From politically motivated attacks in 2003, their activities have degenerated into assault, rape, harassment, and extortion of ordinary civilians alongside their continuing political role, most notably during the election period of 2007. As such, many *kalare* thugs are armed, most commonly with machetes, clubs and similar weaponry. The *kalare* thugs continued to engage in acts of intimidation of political opponents even after the 2003 elections. In September 2006 two All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) governorship aspirants were attacked by political thugs. The youths attacked the convoy of the National Secretary of the party, Senator Sa'idu Umar Kumo, destroying over 20 vehicles and injuring many of his followers.

The Human Rights Watch revealed that at the eve of 2007 election campaign and on the election days, *kalare* thugs played a significant role committing violence and intimidation on behalf of all major political parties. One International Election Observer told Human Rights Watch, that all political parties are using *kalare* thugs, especially the incumbent while the other opposition parties need to protect themselves. However, several credible reports, along with Human Rights Watch's own observations, indicated that the clear majority of *kalare* thugs were active during the electoral period working for the PDP. Habu Mu'azu who was the PDP youth leader in Gombe state put it to Human Rights Watch that "thank God we have more boys than the opposition." The PDP edge in terms of *kalare* recruitment was due largely to the fact that the ruling party had more resources to spend on hiring them (HRW, 2007).

Moreover, the Report continues that in March 2007, DPP Gubernatorial candidate and former State Governor Abubakar Hashidu was arrested for inciting a public disturbance after his supporters allegedly rampaged through the streets of Gombe town, looting and burning buildings. When a Magistrate Judge ordered that Hashidu be remanded in prison, *kalare* thugs disrupted the proceedings of the court and freed him from the dock, attacking and wounding the Magistrate with machetes in the process. Hashidu walked free from the courtroom and was never re-arrested. During March and April 2007, convoys of supporters of both the PDP and AC candidates were attacked by those believed to be *kalare* thugs in the eastern part of the state. On one occasion six cars were burnt and one child was killed in a clash at Deba. One woman, a journalist who was intending to contest for the State House of Assembly,under PDP Balanga constituency in 2007, was threatened by *kalare* youths in August 2006 after purchasing her nomination form. She told Human Rights Watch that *kalare* came to her house

in Gombe town. Four of them were armed with machetes, and they asked her to withdraw the candidacy or face the consequences.

On Election Day, Human Rights Watch also revealed that *kalare* members played an integral role in the efforts of the PDP to rig the polls. According to a report by a local observer group, the Network for National Stability, *kalare* members were seen snatching ballot boxes from polling stations to prevent voting in nine wards in Gombe state during the state polls. The ANPP reported to INEC and the police that voters had been chased away and ballot boxes snatched by *kalare* thugs in every Local Government Area in the state. In the vote collation centre in Gombe town, Human Rights Watch witnessed three thugs men wearing PDP campaign paraphernalia surrounding a lone INEC staff member who was trying to complete his results sheet for his polling station in the INEC office (already a violation of established procedure, as the sheets are supposed to be filled in and signed at the polling station). The three men, who had surrounded the official at his desk, shouted at him because he could not make the figures tally to include extra numbers that they wanted him to include. Many of those who attempted to stand up for a free and fair election in Gombe suffered reprisals, meted out by alleged *kalare* members, sometimes in the presence of the police. Abubakar Yunus, the ANPP Senatorial candidate for Gombe Central Senatorial District when said that when he witnessed *kalare* members stealing ballot boxes in Kumo town, he and his supporters surrounded the vehicle carrying the stolen materials and called the police. The police escorted the car to Kumo Police Station, but a senior Police officer on duty then allowed PDP party agents to take the ballot papers away (HRW, 2007).

The violence perpetrated by *kalare* thugs has not been confined to election periods. Only Gombe state residents were caught between violence and the epidemic of violent crimes. Political activities have been trapped in a state of persistent insecurity. According to HRW (2007), the *kalare* boys are easily identifiable by their weapons and their identities are known to many residents. For example, machetes were procured in preparation for the polls; these machetes remain in the hands of the thugs and are used after for other purposes. One civil society activist told Human Rights Watch that as often as once a week *kalare* thugs rampage through his own neighbourhood in Gombe town that the thugs are in a group; they clear everything in their path and, if they come across a motorbike, they smash it, if they come across a car, they smash it, if they come across a shop, they smash it. Another victim of *Kalare* argued that he was held up by youths brandishing machetes and robbed of his mobile phone at a roadblock and added that at times, they don't find the target they want and then innocent civilians become the victims. Likewise, a young boy was caught in the middle of a fight between two *kalare* factions and was stabbed to death near his Secondary School. In another event, a group of *kalare* thugs raped a girl of fourteen years who was hawking food on the street after she asked them for the money; two *kalare* thugs put her on a motorbike between them and drove her to the outskirts of town where she was gang-raped by five of them.

The response of the security agencies is also important. *Daily Trust* on Tuesday, 2nd February 2013 also reported that the widespread impunity enjoyed by *Kalare* thugs compounds the problems of violence and violent crime in Gombe. It emboldens the thugs and encourages a greater scale of lawlessness the longer their conduct goes unpunished. Similarly, the HRW (2007) reported that civil society leaders, Human Rights activists and other sources widely accused the police of turning a blind eye to the abuses of *kalare* thugs, especially those working

on behalf of the PDP. During the elections, one police officer complained confidentially to Human Rights Watch that Politics is making their life very difficult because PDP supporters are not arrested, or if they are arrested, police officials hand them over to the governor. Several civil society sources described instances where police officers themselves were working on behalf of the PDP, violating the law as well as the principle of electoral neutrality. For example, on gubernatorial Election Day in Tal, a town in Billiri district, the police in the company of PDP officials tried to remove ballot boxes from a polling station before the end of voting. The crowd tried to stop them; police and PDP officials took the boxes away. The police fired into the air to disperse the crowds. One of the bullets went into a house and killed a child, a girl. The residents chased the PDP officials out of the town and set fire to the police station. Also, prior to the April 2007 elections, the police in Gombe detained dozens of opposition supporters, mostly Action Congress members, in the run-up to the elections. The number of political detainees being kept in Gombe prison ahead of the elections increased dramatically. Even the Emir of Gombe expressed concern about politically-motivated detentions. The emir argued that thugs are not robbers who have committed any crime and the approach of the police is not humane, they are simply grabbing people and throwing them into jail, the police should help the public not terrorize them. Besides, one opposition lawyer also stated that he was representing over 200 cases of opposition party members who had been unlawfully detained without trial in the months preceding the elections.

On its effort to overcome *kalare* thuggery in the state, Gombe state government under governor Goje initiated the policy to provide the teaming youth with employment as compensation to the thugs. An agency called Gombe State Environmental Protection Agency (GOSEPA) was established. According to the former Senior Special Assistant to the Governor Goje on

GOSEPA, Muhammad I. Jalo, thousands of youths that benefitted from the policy were trained at different centres in the state and received various forms of assistance and loans to set up private businesses. A critical investigation published by the Sahara Reporters in October 2009 revealed the names of murdered people under Goje administration by political thugs. The report is titled *Unsolved Political Murders in Gombe State 2003-2009,* can be seen in Table 3.1

TABLE 3.1 LISTS OF THE MURDERED PEOPLE IN GOMBE STATE

S/N	DECEASED NAME	DATE OF DEATH	POLICE INVESTIGATING OFFICER	FORCE NUMBER
1	Kabiru Salisu	06/12/03	P.C Ado Hassan	407185
2	Yahaya Mohammed	04/02/04	P.C EmpndmNjuja	42271
3	Alfa Sale	09/02/04	P.C Ibrahim Dauda	GM Div.
4	Sani Mohammed	11/04/04	P. C Umar Ahmed	591122
5	Audu Lawan	29/04/04	P.C Yunusa Awai	432236
6	Salisu Audu	18/04/06	P.C Caleb Y	378615
7	Danjuma Bello	07/01/05	P.C Adibai Adamu	424023
8	Murtala Ma'aji	04/04/06	Adamu (GM Div)	350780
9	Alhaji Yusuf	10/04/05	P.C Usman Afuwai	42860
10	MurtalaTaju	17/04/05	Nathaniel J/Son	38320
11	Bashir Kawu	16/02/05	Ahmed Hamza	N.P 422860
12	Adamu Hammadu	02/05/05	Hammantalib Bogo	P. Sataion
13	Yakubu Ibrahim	02/05/05	P.C Japhet Emma	232996
14	Haruna Inuwa	15/07/05	W.P.C Hajara Haruna	GarbaDiv
15	Jibrin Ma'azu	17/07/05	P.C Sajo Alex	517766
16	Unknown Man	01/08/05	P.C Ndaba Mark	420582
17	Abubakar Haruna	14/08/05	P.C Hamza Hanisu	208121
18	Suleiman Hayatu	02/09/05	P.C Ahmed Moh'd	516612
19	Yáu Abdulkadir	21/09/05	P.C John Shuaibu	43217
20	Idi Isa	13/10/05	WPC Naomi Bulus	345679
21	Auwalu Moh'd	07/11/05	Ahmed Buba Pantami	Out Past
22	Adamu Suleiman	06/12/05	P.C Emma Adoka	438055
23	Tasiú Yunusa	09/12/05	P.C HohaApkan	438673
24	Sani Moh'd	27/12/05	InduBukar state	Low Cost
25	Usman Hassan	29/12/05	W.P.C EnoSambo	647731
26	Garba Musa	16/01/06	Samaila Adamu AM Div	43861
27	Mubarak Babangida	20/01/06	Adamu Suleiman	40363
28	Yusuf Mohammed	31/01/06	Adamu Magaji	GM Div
29	Usman Abubakar	03/02/06	Usman Afwai MD/GM	438058
30	Sadiq Aliyu	04/02/06	WPC AbigelSimond	609658
31	Shuaibu Ibrahim	17/02/06	Muna Luka	318789

32	Moh'd. Bello	13/02/06	Cpl Garba B	196220
33	Umar Abubakar	20/02/06	Rabiu Ibrahim GM Div	433926
34	Abba Mukhtar		Bright by Fire service	42860
35	Samaila Sale		Bright by fire Service	38320
36	Ibrahim Mukhtar	21/02/06	Shehu Gambo	N. P 422860
37	Usman Abdurrahman	23/02/06	Moses Sule Fed, ,low Cost	20038
38	Moh'd. Abdullahi	25/02/06	Wali Hamza	421892
39	Moh'd Sanusi	28/02/06	Danladi Adamu	436404
40	Sani Usman	09/03/06	Nathaniel J/son	38329
41	Dandogo Hassan	15/03/06	Auduayuba	616396
42	Abdullahi Bala	21/03/06	Mutuwa D. Pantami Out Post	208121
43	Aishatu Abubakar	16/04/06	Garba Mishelia	467912
44	Yahaya Sanusi	18/04/06	EypianNzuja	422719
45	Haruna Yusuf	25/04/06	Dan'AutaSaminu	259616
46	Moh'd S. Ibrahim	26/04/06	Nathan Anyim	321961
47	Hafsat Yusuf	10/05/06	F.P.C.H.U	691880
48	Usman Babayo	22/05/06	Ayuba Kutura GM Div.	407726
49	Ibrahim Abba	26/06/06	HauwaJohua	519706
50	Baba Moh'd	29/07/06	Jibril Shuaibu	Squat No 2
51	Abubakar Haruna	03/08/06	MatiaMalia	417361
52	Habu Ibrahim	15/08/06	Rabiu Alfa	632019
53	Abubakar Ahmadu	03/08/06	Salisu Dahiru	569941
54	Umar Abdullahi	12/10/06	MirigaApkan	345178
55	Ali Abubakar	21/11/06	Helen Joshua	61529
56	Sule Bello	25/11/06	Umar Audu	381876
57	Abubakar Adamu	30/11/05	Emmanuel Ojan	421876
58	Usman Sa'idu		JigalApman	43884

Source: Sahara Reporters, Posted Oct 13 2009, www.saharareportersonlinenews retrieved on 12-9-2013

In 2011, Governor Alhaji Ibrahim Hassan Dankwambo promised to overcome the *kalare* phenomenon in the state where he stated that "The youths will be empowered economically through training and not by arming them with axes, cutlasses and cudgels to terrorize the society in the name of politics." (Dankwambo Inaugural Speech, on 29th May, 2011). On assumption to office, Governor Ibrahim Hassan Dankwambo, vowed to ban *kalare* activities in the state. He designed a plan to rehabilitate and empower over 1,000 youths for the first time, most of them *Yan kalare*, to provide them with employment to make them more useful to the society. He designed out a plan, to provide them with employment. At the beginning of the

programme, some *kalare* thugs have relatively surrendered and they were trained as Road Marshal Assistants, Community Environmentalist and Security Workers.

However, on Tuesday 2nd, July, 2013, the *Daily Trust* 2013 published the nature of investigation it conducted, titled *The Return of Kalare in Gombe*. According to the report, after a short period of relative peace, the thugs resurfaced on the streets of Gombe town and other local government areas. The thugs now move freely with small arms and are known to have destroyed houses, shops and cars in many parts of the state. In some cases they break into people's houses, beat them and snatch some valuables. It further stated that thugs attacked a man and his wife around Herwa Gana of Gombe metropolis, where the thugs collected his phone and money. Consequently, the man was left with a deep cut on his hand. Also at Liberty Junction along the road to the Government House Gombe, a man was attacked with knives and other dangerous weapons by thugs who seized his handsets and ran toward Jekadafari area leaving the man helpless.

The report also disclosed that the Gombe State Police Command on two different occasions paraded 56 and 30 persons allegedly involved in killing, raping, robbery and terrorizing people. They also paraded some merchants allegedly involved in selling hard drugs to *kalare* thugs. According to the Commissioner of Police, the suspects were arrested with cache of arms, including knives, cutlasses, machetes, locally made gun, and other dangerous weapons. The State Police Commissioner, Kudu Abdullahi Nma, said the police had launched fresh effort to curtail the activities of *Yan Kalare*, and solicited the cooperation of members of the public to come up with useful information to help the Police.

Finally, the violent activities of *kalare* thugs from 2003 to 2013 revealed that the level of insecurity in Gombe state and has prompted the researcher to investigate and examine the factors responsible for the recurrence of *kalare* thuggery and its impact on democratic and social activities in Gombe state despite different measures adopted by different government to overcome the phenomenon from 2003 to 2013.

CHAPTER FOUR

EFFECTS OF *KALARE* THUGGERY ON DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the way data obtained in the process of this research are presented and analyzed by summarizing relevant opinions of key personalities and scholars from the reviewed literature and interview conducted in order to articulate their areas of convergence and divergence. The information is presented in a tabular form using frequency distribution and simple percentage as the tool of analysis. Meanwhile, content and factor-base analysis is also significant. There are seven major issues discussed in the table. Table 4.1 contains demographic information of respondents, Table 4.2 contains factors responsible for or causes of the perpetual *kalare* thuggery, Table 4.3 comprises the possible effects of *kalare* thuggery on democratic and social activities, Table 4.4 contains sponsorship of *kalare* thuggery, Table 4.5 contains beneficiaries of *kalare* thuggery, Table 4.6 captures of government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery and Table 4.7 contains security situation in Gombe state. Thus, out of the 384 questionnaires distributed, 381 which constituted 99.2 out 100 %, were filled and returned, and are the basis of our analysis.

4.2 DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF RESPONDENTS

Table 4.1 is a compound table containing demographic information of respondents. The information include age distribution, gender, marital status, literacy level, certificate possession and employment information. The table simplifies and summarizes the needed information in a complex presentation rather than presenting specific variable in a separate table.

Table 4.1 Demographic Information of Respondents

S/No:	Variable	Category	Frequency	Percent
1	Age	18-28 years	166	43.6
		29-39 years	134	35.2
		40 and above years	81	21.3
			381	**100**
2	Gender	Male	247	64.8
		Female	134	35.2
			381	**100**
3	Marital status	Married	208	54.6
		Single	173	45.4
			381	**100**
4	Literacy	Western Education	321	84.3
		Arabic Education	47	12.3
		None	13	3.4
			381	**100**
5	Certificate Possession	Primary School	102	26.8
		Secondary School	158	41.5
		Tertiary Institution	108	28.3
		None	13	3.4
			381	**100**
6	Employment	Employed	132	34.6
		Unemployed	249	65.4
		Total	**381**	**100**

Source: ***Author's Field Work, January 2014***

Age Distribution: Age distribution of the respondents ranged from 18-28, 29-39 and above 40 years. The selection of this distribution is because individuals who fall under these categories have the right to vote and be voted for during election. Out of 381 filled and returned questionnaires, 165 respondents are between 18-28 years which is representing 43.6%. The record also shows that 134 respondents are between 29-39 years which is representing 35.2% of the total percentage. Similarly, the 81 respondents representing 21.3% are from 40 years and above. Furthermore, the ranking of the overall age distribution shows that respondents from 18-28 years had taken the highest portion with 165 frequencies and 43.6%. This is followed by the individuals between 29-39 years with 134 frequencies and 35.2 %. It finally followed by the individuals who are 40 years and above which is the least frequency and percentage at 81 and 21.3 respectively.

Gender: Out of 381 filled and returned questionnaires, male category had 247 respondents representing 64.8%. The remaining 134 respondents representing 35.2% belong to the female category. Thus, the findings revealed that male category had the highest number of frequency of 247 respondents, representing 64.8%. While female category left with 134 frequency with its total 35.2%.

Marital Status: There are only two categories (married and single) in this finding. Out of 381 filled and returned questionnaires, married category had 208 respondents representing 54.6%. The remaining 173 respondents belong to the single category representing 45.4%. Therefore, the finding revealed that married category had the highest number of frequency of 208 respondents representing 54.6%. Single category is left with the 173 frequency of respondents representing 45.4%.

Literacy: This variable is supported by three categories including Western education, Arabic education and the none-options. The result of the finding shows that out 381 filled and returned questionnaires, 321 respondents belong to Western education category representing 84.3%, 47 respondents belong to the Arabic education category representing 12.3% and 13 respondents belong to the None category representing 3.4%. This indicated that majority of the respondents, 321 frequency and 84.3%, are literates by Western education; followed by the individuals who can read and write, 47 frequency and 12.3%, in Arabic education; and 13 respondents cannot read and write (illiterate) in any form of education suggested or belong to the None category.

Certificate Possession: Certificate as a variable has four categories consisting of Primary School category, Secondary School category, Tertiary Institution category and the None category on which the respondents have option of choice. Out of 381 total frequency, 102 respondents representing 26.8% belong to Primary School category, 158 respondents representing 41.5% belong to Secondary School category, 108 respondents representing 28.3% belong to the Tertiary Institution category and the remaining 13 respondents representing 3.4% belong to the None category. Therefore, the record has revealed that majority of the respondents, 158 frequency and 41.5%, possess Secondary School Certificate without furthering their educational career. This is followed by 108 respondents representing 28.3% that obtained Tertiary Institution Certificate. The third category is for the respondents who obtained only Primary School certificate. Finally, the least category is for the respondents who have neither attended any of the above three categories representing 13 respondents and 3.4%.

Employment: This variable informed us more about the respondents' employment status. There are only two categories, as either employed or unemployed. 132 respondents representing 34.6% are employed; the remained 249 respondents representing 65.4% are unemployed. Hence, majority of the respondents are unemployed based on 249 frequency representing 65.4% and the employed respondents stand with 132 respondents and 34.6%. This reflected the record of employment statistic in Nigeria that shows there is high rate of unemployment in Gombe state.

4.3 CAUSES OF *KALARE* THUGGERY

Table 4.2 revealed that selfish interest, unemployment, illiteracy, poor governance, group sentiment, political manipulation, poverty, injustice and inactive security agencies are the major causes of *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state, as shown below:

Table 4.2 Causes of *Kalare* Thuggery

S/No:	Variable	Frequency	Percent
1	Selfish Interest	39	10.2
2	Unemployment	91	23.9
3	Illiteracy	34	8.9
4	Poor Governance	53	13.9
5	Group Sentiment	19	5.0
6	Political Manipulation	48	15.2
7	Poverty	54	14.2
8	Injustice	21	5.5
9	Inactive Security Agencies	12	3.1
	Total	381	100

Source: ***Author's Field Work, January 2014***

The Table 4.2 discusses the factors responsible for *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state. The 39 respondents representing 10.2% believed that thuggery is caused by selfish interest of the thugs. 91 respondents representing 23.9% believed that the major cause of thuggery is unemployment. 34 respondents representing 8.9% are of the view that thuggery is as a result of the level of illiteracy in the state. Group sentiment contributes to thuggery as depicted by 19 respondents representing 5.0%. Out of 381 respondents, 58 respondents representing 15.2% believed that political manipulation is the cause thuggery in the state. Poverty is seen a cause of thuggery by 14.2% of the 54 respondents. Meanwhile, injustice and inactive security agencies contributed to thuggery as shown by 21 respondents representing 5.5% and 12 respondents representing 3.1% respectively.

The data in the above table show that the major cause of thuggery in the state is unemployment with 91 respondents representing 23.9%. Unemployment is the cause of poverty as 54 respondents representing 14.2%, if combine constituted 38.1%. This is palpable because even the reviewed literature shown that unemployment and poverty are the basic phenomena that cause violence in many parts of the country. Equally, the key personalities interviewed believed that amongst other factors unemployment and poverty are the foremost elements that cause *kalare* thuggery in the state. It is also evident that Table 4.1, category 6 under employment variable, conferred that majority of the respondents are unemployed (249 respondents representing 65.4%) that led to poverty. This can be understood from the fact that most of the thugs have benefited from the properties they mugged from the innocent people. The victims of thuggery in the state confirmed the lost their money, provisions, phones, recharge cards, jewelleries and other valuable materials. Therefore, thuggery in Gombe state can be married to the twin effects of unemployment and poverty which the consequences of it affecting

individuals at different levels of social and political coexistence in their respective communities.

Political manipulation is also observed as a factor facilitating thuggery in Gombe state. Evidence abounds to vindicate the statistics obtained in Table 4.2, 58 respondents representing 15.2% of the total data obtained shows that political manipulation by politicians is responsible for thuggery in Gombe state. Reflecting this information, the gamut of personalities interviewed including politicians, executives, a legislator, a judge, traditional rulers, victims, thugs and the residents, believed that politicians are hijacking thugs for their selfish gain and benefit. In fact, the sundry of the interviewed key personals agreed that the causes of thuggery in Gombe state are unemployment, illiteracy, poor governance, political manipulation, selfish interest of the thugs, injustice, poverty and inactive security agencies. It is important to emphasize that other key personals that were interviewed further believed that the causes of thuggery are not only limited to the above mentioned factors but also included indiscipline and abuse of power by the incumbent government (Sayoji, Jibrin, Abubakar, Waziri and Halima 2014).

Poor governance and injustice are amongst the major causes of thuggery in the state. As statistical records show in Table 4.2, 53 respondents representing 13.9% and 19 respondents representing 5.0% (about 20% if all put together) believed that poor governance and injustice respectively contributed to thuggery in Gombe state. Therefore, government in Nigeria at various levels are accused of maladministration, mismanagement, corruption, unjust, and above all unconstitutional practices in routines functions which decisively resulted to injustice and poor governance.

Selfish interest, group sentiment and illiteracy of the thugs constituted other factors responsible for thuggery in the state. The statistical records on Table 4.2 disclosed that 39 respondents representing 10.2%, 19 respondents representing 5.0% and 34 respondents representing 8.9% (about 24.1% all) believed that selfish interest, group sentiment and illiteracy respectively caused thuggery. This is evident as most of the literature reviewed also shown that thugs by their selfish interest benefitted from their operations at different points they take away valuable materials from the innocent individuals ranging from handsets, jewelleries, handbags, and other related materials including money. This position is confirmed by the Police Public Relations Officer as the thugs engaged in criminal activities by attacking individuals in their shops, homes and streets between 8pm to 11pm in areas that are not easily accessible by the police which in turn becomes the thugs' source of living. The researcher supplementary gathered that most of the thugs are not educated, Majority of them are Secondary Schools dropouts, moving on the streets sloshed in a day light.

Inactive security agency is the final factor responsible for the recurrence of thuggery in the state. As shown by the above Table 4.2, that 12 respondents representing 3.1% believed that security agencies are not functioning, either by arresting and or by punishing them, the way it is supposed to do and as such the thugs get way which such reckless attitudes. On several occasions security agencies were accused of been politicized by the elites in many respects. In a secret interview with the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gombe State Headquarter the researcher learnt that those security agencies can never give you details of *kalare* information you need because of the politics involved in Gombe state and who so ever gives you, will lose his uniform.

Finally, the menace of *kalare* or thuggery is gyrating in Gombe state due to a number of factors that are responsible for the persistence of the phenomenon based on the statistical record of the respondents. They are not limited to unemployment, poverty, poor governance, illiteracy, group sentiment, political manipulation, selfish interest of the thugs but also inactive security agencies who do not stick to their responsibilities and organizational mandates, of being neutral, to protect the lives and properties of Nigerians; all these exacerbated social violence that affect democratic and social activities in many respects.

4.4 EFFECTS OF *KALARE* ON DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES

Table 4.3 captured the effects of the perpetual *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state which basically included creating fear amongst candidates, hindering electorates, killing innocent people, violating human rights, destruction of valuable properties, insecurity during and after election and intimidation of people.

Table 4.3 Effects of *Kalare* Thuggery on Democratic and Social Activities

S/No:	Variable	Frequency	Percent
1	Creating Fear Among Candidates	77	20.2
2	Hindrance of Electorates	28	7.3
3	Killing Innocent People	106	27.8
4	Violation of Human Rights	18	4.7
5	Destruction of Properties	74	19.4
6	Insecurity	40	10.5
7	Intimidating People	38	10.0
	Total	381	100

Source: ***Author's Field Work, January 2014***

Table 4.3 is on the effects of thuggery on democratic and social activities in Gombe state in which the findings revealed that out of the 381 filled and returned questionnaires, 77 respondents representing 20.2% are of the view that thuggery created fear among the candidates. 28 respondents representing 7.3% believed that thuggery affects democratic and social activities through hindrance of the electorates. 106 respondents representing 27.8% believed that killing innocent people is the effect of thuggery on democratic and social activities. The finding shows that 18 respondents representing 4.7% are of the view that violation of human rights is among the effects of thuggery on democratic and social activities. 74 respondents representing 19.4% believed that thuggery resulted to destruction of properties in democratic government. Insecurity during election is as a result of thuggery as believed by 40 respondents representing 10.5%. Finally, 38 respondents representing 10.0% considered intimidation of people is also among the consequences of thuggery on democratic and social activities.

Statistical record, from Table 4.3, has shown that majority of respondents, 106 frequency representing 27.8% of the total filled and returned questionnaires, clearly assumed that rampant killing of innocent people is the foremost evil of thuggery in Gombe state which in turn affects democratic and social activities. Jibrin, Waziri and Ibrahim (2014) believed that thugs attacked innocent people, as they hardly lay hands onto their target; they attempted to attack everybody they come across. This trend is affecting democratic and social activities negatively, especially in the Third World Countries, where democracy not allowed to be played in accordance with its guiding principles. Democracy when it is allowed, according to its norms, will facilitate stability and good governance.

The researcher observed that the situation sends a message that *kalare* activities still exist despites the fact that Governor Dankwambo announced the demise of the phenomenon during his inauguration ceremony. Analytically, this indicates that there is a difference between policy pronouncement and policy action. The researcher reliably gathered that during the local government elections in 2013, Governor Dankwambo was heard speaking to *Yan kalare* in Hausa language that *bakin da ya haneku, shi ke muku umurni yau.* This means, "The one, who told you to surrender your weapons, is the one telling you to take them". Hence, thuggery has two dimensions in Gombe state, the one manipulated by the elites and the other one that is guided by the selfish interest of various thugs for their daily benefits.

Statistical record from the above table has shown that 77 respondents representing 20.2% and 28 respondents representing 7.3% of the total filled and returned questionnaires believed that creating fear among candidates and hindrance of electorates are also the possible consequences of thuggery in Gombe state that affect democratic and social activities. Politicians and other related elites were accused of sponsoring thugs for their selfish benefits. It is gathered that no political party can deny the fact that they hired, recruited and sponsored thugs during elections. The set-up of thugs is not limited to candidates of different party affiliations but also involved ordinary electorates who go to sundry polling units to vote for their desired candidates.

Post-election violence of the 2011 General Elections was flared up by the opposition thugs who were unhappy with the election result. Thugs burnt valuable materials including vehicles, houses and offices of officials of PDP in the state. Also, innocent electorates lost their lives and properties during and after the 2011 General Elections. Therefore, thuggery affects democratic and social activities through quashing its core values specifically free and fair election in

Gombe state by creating fear among candidates and hindrance of electorates during and after elections.

Violations of Human Rights, intimidating people and insecurity during and after elections are further classified as the possible effects of thuggery pertaining democratic and social activities in Gombe state. Table 4.3 revealed that 18 respondents representing 4.7% and 38 respondents representing 10.0% respectively believed that political thuggery affects democratic and social activities through violation of Human Rights and intimidation of people. Sayoji (2014) argued that thuggery can only promote political instability, intolerance and disharmony in the society that invariably lead to revolution or eventual disintegration of a country. Hence, violence perpetrated by thugs has not been confined to election periods, as citizens have been caught up by thuggery and other related violent crimes are engulfing. These are likely to put the state in a perpetual insecurity.

4.4 SPONSORSHIP OF *KALARE* THUGGERY

Table 4.4 is about the sponsorship of *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state. The result of data gathered shown that politicians, elites, securities and the thugs are the sponsors of *kalare* thuggery.

Table 4.4 Sponsorship of *Kalare* Thuggery

S/No:	Variable	Frequency	Percent
1	Politicians	209	54.9
2	Elites	111	29.1
3	Thugs Themselves	47	12.3
4	Securities	14	3.7
	Total	381	100

Source: ***Author's Field Work, January 2014***

Table 4.4 revealed the sponsors of *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state based on the 381 filled and returned questionnaires administered. Out of 381 filled and returned questionnaires, 209 respondents representing 54.9% considered politicians as the major sponsors of thugs. 111 respondents representing 29.1% believed that elites sponsored the thugs. 47 respondents representing 3.7% believed that selfish interest motivated the thugs. Security agencies accounted for 14 respondents standing with 4.70% as sponsors of *kalare* thugs.

It is chiefly believed that politicians and elites are the major sponsors of thuggery in Gombe state. This is indicated by Table 4.4 as 190 respondents representing 63.76% considered politicians as the major sponsors of thugs and 72 respondents representing 24.16% believed that elites sponsored the thugs respectively; these will be about 88% of the total filled and returned questionnaires. According to Sayoji (2014) thugs are recruited, trained, and sponsored by their masters, politicians, to intimidate, deter and terrorize their political opponents during elections. These politicians include those in government and the opponents ranging from intra to inter party relations.

The selfish interested of the *kalare* thugs and the security agencies most often influence thuggery in the state because thugs are benefitting from their operations on daily bases as the source of income. It is also gathered by the researcher that security agencies like police instigate strange unrest in order to make money, part of which they remit as a return to their High Ranking Officers, who sent them for such operations, especially away from salary time.

4.5 BENEFICIARY OF *KALARE* THUGGERY

Table 4.5 revealed the beneficiaries of *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state. The results shown that politicians, elites, securities and thugs themselves, are seen as beneficiaries of the violent acts of *kalare* thugs.

Table 4.5 Beneficiary of *Kalare* Thuggery

S/No:	Variable	Frequency	Percent
1	Politicians	195	51.2
2	Elites	118	31.0
3	Securities	10	2.6
4	Self	58	15.2
	Total	381	100

Source: ***Author's Field Work, January 2014***

The table 4.5 exposed the rate of benefit and beneficiaries of *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state. Out of 381 respondents, 195 representing 51.2% believed that politicians benefitted from *kalare* thuggery that accounted for violence. Elites, ruling and non-ruling are said to be beneficiaries of thuggery, from with 118 respondents representing 31.0%. 10 respondents representing 2.6% considered the security agencies as the beneficiaries of *kalare* thuggery. Some 58 respondents representing 15.2% believed that the thugs themselves benefitted from their operations.

In summary, the table shown that politicians and elites are the major beneficiaries of thuggery in the state, with 82.2% while security and the thugs as the beneficiaries with 17.8%. The sole beneficiary of thuggery according to the statistics presented on Table 4.5 shown that politicians have taken the highest portion of the responses signifying 195 respondents representing 51.2% of the total frequency and percentage. This is followed by 118 respondents representing 31.0%.

Here, concerning 58 respondents representing 15.2% believed that thugs themselves benefitted from the phenomenon. This is possible because thugs on their selfish interest decided to attack people by snatching their valuable materials and sometimes killing, beating and wounding innocent people in their shops, homes and on the streets. This attack was neither influenced by any politicians, elites nor security agencies but rather selfish interest of the thugs. This situation is more of social phenomenon than being political which was mainly influence by politicians to achieve a hidden political objective. As argued by (Jibrin, 2014) "thugs are addicted to violent behaviours because of the fact that they grew up without proper upbringing or home training and therefore they benefitted from the act".

Similarly, it is widely believed by majority of the respondents (most of them are politicians and elites) and the interviewed personalities believed that politicians sponsored and benefitted from the thuggery in the state. The observation of the researcher is that those politicians and elites are the beneficiary of thuggery attributed the phenomenon to political manipulation as the major cause of thuggery in the state; and at the same time, neglecting the views of other respondents who believed that thugs by their selfish interest benefitted from their operation affecting innocent individuals as major victims of the phenomenon whereby it has to do with social affair; this view represented the views of the victims of thuggery in the state. This can assumed the reason why *kalare* thuggery persists in the state; consequently, *kalare* thuggery becomes a social phenomenon than only a political one.

4.6 EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TOWARDS THUGGERY

Table 4.6 described the effectiveness of government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state. The result of this study has exposed the level or effectiveness of government response as very effective, effective, good, partially, poor and very poor. This is further explained below.

Table 4.6 Effectiveness of Government Response Towards Kalare Thuggery

S/No:	Variable	Frequency	Percent
1	Very Effective	28	7.3
2	Effective	43	11.3
3	Good	58	15.2
4	Partially	64	16.8
5	Poor	72	18.9
6	Very Poor	116	30.5
	Total	381	100

Source: ***Author's Field Work, January 2014***

Table 4.6 disclosed the effectiveness of government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state. The respondents rated the effectiveness of government efforts towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery. 28 respondents representing 7.3%, out of the total 381 filled and returned questionnaires are of the opinion that government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery was very effective. 43 respondents representing 11.3% believed that government response towards overcoming thuggery was simply effective. 58 of the total respondents representing 15.2 % answered that government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery was good. 64 respondents representing 16.8% considered government action towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery was partial 72 respondents representing 18.9% believed

that government action towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery was poor. 116 respondents representing 30.5% believed that government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery was very poor.

Furthermore, record in Table 4.6 vindicated that respondents, who believed the government response towards overcoming thuggery in Gombe state, is both poor and very poor to many respondents and it is presented as 49.4%, if it is combined together. This fact is against the number of respondents who believed that the government response to thuggery is very effective, effective and good, if put together, it is about 33.8% of the total percentage. Neutrally, about 16.8% of the total percent revealed that security situation in the state is partial, meaning; it is incomplete or half-done. The government response towards overcoming thuggery according to the interview conducted with different personalities in the state, which also corresponded with the literature reviewed in chapter two, evidently shown that the state government within the scope of this research has initiated three major policies as a response to overcome *kalare* thuggery. These include military action called Anti-Kalare Squad and democratic action by absorbing thugs onto employment opportunity in the agency called Gombe State Environmental Protection Agency, GOSEPA, under the leadership of Governor Danjuma Goje, and the third policy was also initiated through democratic value which is popularly called Gombe State Youths Rehabilitation and Empowerment Programme under the leadership of Governor Ibrahim Dankwambo aimed at providing employment opportunities to the revive *Yan kalare* into the three areas of Environmental Marshals, Road Marshals and Traffic Marshals.

The policy of military action adopted by Gombe state government during Goje administration was popularly called Anti-Kalare by using military personnel including soldiers and Mobile Police whom were given special training and mobile equipment that helped them in tackling *kalare* phenomenon areas in the state. At the beginning of their operation, Anti-Kalare Squad recorded tremendous achievements in the sense that many thugs were arrested, trailed, prisoned and punished depending on the forms of their crime. In spite of the efforts recorded by the Squad, the members were worried with the way political office holders, specifically ruling party was handling the issue related to thuggery on which they quarrelled that ruling party is making the operation very difficult because those thugs who support the ruling party were directed to be released without any punishment and this challenged their operation.

However, Anti-Kalare Squad was accused by the civil society and the opposition parties of being sentimental on arresting and punishing the thugs, who are involved in various levels of political process. The Squad was accused of being aligned and loyal to the ruling party without ensuring justice in their actions. The Squad was also accused of identifying some areas as always their target during operation, simply because the place is being dominated by the opposition thugs, while leaving other areas that are dominated by the thugs who are supporters of the ruling party. On several occasions, people accused government of being biased on punishing the thugs as only the opposition thugs were arrested waiting for trial, while the ruling thugs, even if they were arrested, the government directed the officials concern to release them without punishment.

The establishment of Gombe State Environmental Protection Agency (GOSEPA) as a democratic policy aimed at providing employment opportunity to the thugs. The agency was established to ensure that living environment is healthy and clean. The thugs were given

appointment as cleaners on the major roads and streets in the state capital. The agency made some efforts in ensuring that high number of thugs were absorbed; all efforts has been made to get the exact number of the trained and benefitted thugs under GOSEPA, but no exact record was given to the researcher and nevertheless, the researcher interviewed the former Senior Special Assistant, Mohammed I. Jalo, to Governor Goje on Gombe State Environmental Protection Agency who stated that more than one thousand youths benefitted from the policy; and also some of the thugs were trained and received various kinds of assistance and loan to set up private business at different centres in the state.

The researcher learnt that when the policy was established, only thugs whom were supporters of the ruling party benefitted from the programme and neglecting other thugs who were supporters of the opposition parties. Another problem associated with the policy is that many thugs, who were given job under GOSEPA, failed to take their job very serious; as a result, they were not active to do the work. This is because the thugs know that there was no penalty attached to absentees who failed to appear at their primary assignments. A change of administration from Governor Goje to Governor Dankwambo in 2011 had also weakened GOSEPA for the implementation of the policy. The new administration of Governor Dankwambo embarked on establishing another new policy to tackle the menace of *kalare* in Gombe State. The new policy is popularly called Gombe State Youths Rehabilitation and Empowerment Programme with a major task to rehabilitate and change the attitude of thugs to become productive in the society.

The establishment of Gombe State Youths Rehabilitation and Empowerment Programme was to provide employment opportunities to the thugs. The policy aimed at reviving *Yan kalare* into the three major areas Environmental Marshals, Road Marshals and Traffic Marshals. The roles

of these marshals are to (a) ensure that the environment is keep clean through the supervision of Environmental Marshals, (b) ensure that all traffic congestions are controlled to avoid unnecessary accidents under the supervision of Traffic Marshals, and (c) ensure that unlawful parking by the motorists on the major roads is in order to reduce congestions. This policy was announced during Dankwambo's swearing-in to office May 29th, 2011 which he said "no more *kalare* in the state".

The implementation of this policy became realistic when the Governor started his First Batch of training these thugs. In this batch, one thousands (1,000) youths, whom were believed to be members of *kalare*, were given training to, firstly, help in controlling the traffic junctions all over the state. The numbers of these youths were increased during the Second Batch training, on which one thousand five hundred (1,500) youths were trained comprising thugs and non-thugs. During the Second Batch training, the scopes of their responsibilities were also expanded to not only traffic control but also environmental and ward supervisions.

The transformation policy is targeted to tackle the *kalare* activities in the state through provision of employment to the thugs without consideration of party politics. Thugs of different groups were asked to collect and fill the forms to be absorbed. After transformation of two thousand five hundred (2,500) individuals, majority of them are thugs, the devastating activities of *Kalare* still continues to exist in the state taken new dimension of attacking individuals on the streets and their homes particularly around 8pm to 11pm on daily bases. This phenomenon affects peoples' harmony and economic activities. Similarly, a victim of *kalare* thuggery revealed that the thugs attacked him in his shop in which they beat him with daggers and wand which they snatched valuable provisions, recharge card, phone and money. He further stated that when he was crying for help, people were running away to save their life; and nobody

answered his call; and even when he reported to the police nothing was done to get the thugs (Umaru, 2014).

Finally, people in support of government viewed that the policy and programmes initiated by the Dankwambo administration, provides employment opportunities to hundreds and thousands of Gombe state youths; there by drastically reducing and preventing them to participate in thuggery and other social vices. Nevertheless, those hardened core of *Yan kalare* elements that were not disposed to rehabilitation and re-integration into society were rounded up by security agents and after prosecution, they will now serve time in various prisons within the state. As a result of decisive action and timely foresight, the Dankwambo administration was able to eliminate the *Yan kalare* scourge which is why the state is now enjoying unprecedented peace and tranquillity (Dangana, Garba, and Ahmed, 2014). Conversely, Jibrin (2014) had a dissimilar judgment of *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state, "government is not handling thuggery very well, as it also employed its own thugs working for the political party which is controlling the government in power", and when asked about the effectiveness of the government response towards overcoming thuggery in the state, he added that "government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery is ineffective, as it does not punish those involved in such activities of streets attack and killings".

Therefore, to sum up these views, one can understand that those in government are covering the reality of *kalare* thuggery in the state without exposing the idly picture of the phenomenon. The researcher gathered and observed that government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery in the state is biased regarding its implementation and execution stage because not all thugs were involved into the programme; even those that were involved, government command them to do it wishes, when the need arise; most thugs feel reluctant to appear at their primary

stations to discharge their duties at various traffic stations; they ended visiting offices of government officials (politicians) to collect money on daily. Meanwhile, those thugs that were not part of the ruling party, government directed the police (on political grounds) to arrest them and put them into prison without legal trial by the court. This is why on several occasions, the opposition parties and public commentators have been crying, and calling the attention of government, police and other security units to stop their attitude towards overcoming *kalare* in the state.

4.7 SECURITY SITUATIONS IN GOMBE STATE

Table 4.7 revealed the security situation in Gombe state. The result of the data gathered shown that no security, partial security and yes or there is security in Gombe state. The detailed explanation can be seen below.

Table 4.7 Security Situations in Gombe State

S/No:	Variable	Frequency	Percent
1	Yes	62	16.3
2	Partially	125	32.8
3	No	194	50.9
	Total	381	100

Source: ***Author's Field Work, January 2014***

Table 4.7 answers security situation in Gombe state. Out of the 381 filled and returned questionnaires, 62 respondents representing 16.3% are of the view that there is security in Gombe state on which they responded "Yes" regarding the question "Is there security in Gombe state?" 125 respondents representing 32.8% believed that there is partial security in the state which they responded "Partially". 194 respondents representing 50.9% out rightly

believed that there is no security in Gombe state on which they responded "No". Accordingly, majority of the respondents with 194 frequency representing 50.9%, presented in Table 4.7, believed that there is no security in the state. This is due to the fact that *kalare* activities persisted and caused the loss of lives and properties worth millions of Naira. The nature of their activities ranged from killing, kidnapping, street attack, house break-in, shoplifting, frightening and threatening the innocent individuals in their respective communities, which in turn deter and destabilizes their harmony and coexistence. Thus, this situation not only affects social but also democratic activities through intimidating, scaring, exasperating, galling and even killing of the electorates cum candidates of different party affiliations.

Correspondingly, Table 4.4, talks about the sponsorship of *kalare* thuggery which revealed and presented that politicians and elites are the major sponsors of *kalare* thuggery in the state and this stands by 209 respondents representing 54.9% and 119 respondents representing 29.1% respectively. Too, in terms of beneficiary of *kalare* thuggery in Table 4.5, the result also revealed that politicians and elites are the main beneficiary of thuggery in the state, as 195 respondents representing 51.2% and 118 respondents representing 31.0% respectively.

Furthermore, the second category of respondents, are of the opinion that there is a partial security in Gombe state. The exact figure is presented in Table 4.7 which shows that 125 respondents representing 32.8%. This means that the respondents are afraid to say there is security in the state due to the fact that thugs have been operating their exercise at various places without enjoying an absolute security. On the interview with the victim of thuggery in the state, the victim said security is for the government officials, security agencies and politicians, the masses and ordinary people in Gombe are not secured, since their lives and properties are not protected by the securities on which thugs used to enter people shops and

house and raided them (Umaru and Habu, 2014). These two people said so because they were victimized by thugs in the state.

Moreover, only 62 respondents representing 16.3% believed there is security in the state on which they responded "Yes" as shown in Table 4.7. This is because the respondents are pro-government policies. In spite, the study also revealed that security situation in Gombe state needs to be improve going with the finding of this research. In a critical analysis, 194 respondents representing 50.9% which constituted half of the total respondents believed that there is no security Gombe state; likewise, 125 respondents representing 32.8% believed that there is a partial security in Gombe state. This means that there is incomplete security in the state against only 62 respondents representing 16.3% believed that there is security in the state. Therefore, going with the statistical record of the total respondents, one will believe that activities of thugs called Yan *kalare* affected the security situation in the state. The situation is not only affecting social activities characterized by killing, kidnapping, street attack, house break-in, shoplifting, frightening and threatening the innocent individuals and more often than not, it also exacerbated violence; but also it impacted on democratic activities through scaring, exasperating, galling and killing of the electorates and candidates of different party affiliations in Gombe state.

4.8 DISCUSSION OF MAJOR FINDINGS


The major findings of this research are those extracted from the objectives and assumptions of the study. These include the factors responsible for the frequently *kalare* thuggery, the effects of thuggery on democratic and social activities and the effectiveness of government responses toward overcoming *kalare* thuggery. This is not to say that other issues discussed in the process of data presentations and analysis are irrelevant for their emphatic discussions here, rather the choice of these issues, here, is due to the fact that the earlier research questions, objectives and assumptions openly suggested the selection of these values for logical simplification and assessment.

4.8.1 The Factors Responsible for the Recurrence of *Kalare* Thuggery

Statistical record on Table 4.2 revealed that selfish interest, unemployment, illiteracy, poor governance, group sentiment, political manipulation, poverty, injustice and inactive security agencies are the major factors contributed to *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state. The record read thus, 39 respondents representing 10.2% believed that *kalare* thuggery is caused by selfish interest of the thugs. 91 respondents representing 23.9% believed that the major cause of thuggery is unemployment. 34 respondents representing 8.9% assumed that *kalare* thuggery is as a result of illiteracy in the state. Group sentiment contributed to *kalare* thuggery as depicted by 19 respondents representing 5.0%. Out of 381 respondents, 58 of them representing 15.2% believed that political manipulation caused *kalare* thuggery in the state. Poverty resulted to 14.2%, representing 54 respondents of the general cause of thuggery. Meanwhile, injustice and inactive security agencies contributed to thuggery as shown by 21 respondents representing 5.5% and 12 respondents representing 3.1% respectively. Nevertheless, the above information

is scientifically simplified using a graphical presentation for wider picture of understanding. This is presented in Chart 4.1

Chart 4.1 The Causes of *Kalare* Thuggery



Source: ***Author's Field Work, January 2014***

Chart 4.1 exposed the logical picture on factors responsible for the recurrence of thuggery in Gombe state. The multitude of these factors have been discussed in chapter four under Table 4.2, the causes of *kalare* thuggery, which imperatively described the reasons for the pervasive *kalare* thuggery in the state. However, important issues need to be reiterated because of their significance to notice; the three types of the collected data (through questionnaires, interviews and reviewed literature) generally proven that the gamut factors responsible for the perpetual thuggery in Gombe state include selfish interest, unemployment, illiteracy, poor governance, group sentiment, political manipulation, poverty, injustice and inactive security agencies; all these contributed perpetually to the endless thuggery, as a socio-political phenomenon, affecting the people and democratic process negatively in Gombe state in spite the policies and programmes initiated by the two administrative governors within the period under study. The

factors can further be classified on folds, the government or elites that have a largest portion and the thugs in particular of blame.

The ruling elites' fault is attributed to the lack of employment, ineffective policies on education to booster literacy level, poor governance, manipulation in political processes, injustice and inactive security agencies. Government of Gombe state has been accused in many respect related to the above atrocity which felt reluctant to overcome the aforementioned issues that invariably influenced thugs to emulate violent behaviour leading to thuggery and more often than not resulted to social violence. The government is being biased to its different decisions on tackling the menace of thuggery in the state.

On several occasions, public commentators and political analysts blamed political elites on supporting *kalare* thuggery for their selfish gain, in the state. A Police Officer secretly informed HRW (2007) that politics is making their life very difficult; PDP supporters were not arrested, and or if they were arrested, Police Officials, handed them oer to the governor. Similarly, some thugs had been detained on purely political ground as a result, they should be released, they are human beings and they have human rights like any other human being. It was also, reported that the Emir of Gombe (Alhaji Shehu Usman Abubakar) expressed concern about politically motivated detentions by saying that these (thugs) are not robbers who have committed any high degree of crime. The approach of the police is not humane, they are simply grabbing people and throwing them into jail…The police should help the public, not terrorize them.

Finally, Mbaya, (2013), Sayoji, Jibrin, Abubakar, Waziri and Halima, (2014) condensed the reasons for thuggery and simplified in this way that the majority of youth are jobless, illiterates,


they are impoverished, and being paid easily to manipulate election results. Politics for personal gain, being a situation in elites organize thugs, hooligans and scavengers to sing their praises, intimidate opponents and kill them; and prebendal politics, as an investment by hungry politicians also created chances on which politicians have invested huge amount of money and resources on campaigns and other political activities. Conclusively, it can now be summarized that, the sundry of the interviewed personalities wholeheartedly believed that factors responsible for the perpetual thuggery in Gombe state are not only limited to unemployment, illiteracy, poor governance, political manipulation, injustice, poverty, inactive security agencies but also group sentiment and selfish interest of the thugs which forced the thugs to engage the violent behaviour of *kalare* in Gombe state.

4.8.2 The Effects of *Kalare* Thuggery on Democratic and Social Activities

Statistical record on Table 4.3 revealed that creating fear among candidates, hindrance of electorates, killing innocent people, violation of human rights, destruction of properties, insecurity during elections and intimidating people are the key effects of *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state. The record read out of the 381 filled and returned questionnaires, 77 respondents representing 20.2% believed to the fact that *kalare* thuggery created fear among the candidates of different political parties. 28 respondents representing 7.3% believed that *kalare* thuggery affected democratic activities through hindrance of electorates. 106 respondents representing 27.8% believed that killing innocent people is among the effects of *kalare* thuggery on democratic and social activities in the state. The finding also shows that 18 respondents representing 4.7% are on the view that violation of human rights is another effect of *kalare* thuggery on democratic and social activities. 74 respondents representing 19.4% believed that *kalare* thuggery resulted to destruction of properties. Insecurity during and after elections is

also a result of *kalare* thuggery as shown by 40 respondents representing 10.5%. Finally, 38 respondents representing 10.0% considered intimidation of people is also among the consequences of thuggery on democratic and social activities. Nevertheless, the above information is scientifically simplified using a graphical presentation for wider picture of understanding. This is presented in Chart 4.2.

Chart 4.2 Effects of *Kalare* Thuggery on Democratic and Social Activities



Source: ***Author's Field Work, January 2014***

Chart 4.2 exposed the logical picture of the persistence effects of thuggery in Gombe state. The multitude views about the analysis of these effects have been discussed in Chapter Four in Table 4.3, the effects of *kalare* thuggery on democratic and social activities, which imperatively evaluate the effects of the prevalent thuggery in the state, however, very important issues need to be reiterated here because of their significance. Generally, the three types of data collected (through questionnaires, interviews and reviewed literature) had proven that the gamut effects of the perpetual thuggery in Gombe state are basically including creating fear

amongst candidates, hindering electorates, killing innocent people, violating human rights, destruction of valuable properties, insecurity during and after election and intimidating people.

Jibrin, Waziri and Ibrahim (2014) believed that thugs attacked innocent people, where they hardly lay hands onto their target; they tempted to attack everybody reviewed. The reviewed literature also established that between December 2003 and April 2007, at least 115 people were killed and scores more injured as a result of *kalare* violence in Gombe state. During March and April 2007, convoys of supporters of both the PDP and AC candidates were attacked by those believed to be *kalare* gangs in the east of the state. On that occasion, six cars were burnt and one child was killed in a clash at Deba.

It was also gathered that *kalare* thuggery consistently affects democratic and social activities in many areas of Gombe state. The consequences of the phenomenon do not only affect politicians and elites but also ordinary individuals were affected since 2003. A former Commissioner who left PDP for an opposition party lost his farm as a result of thuggery in 2005. In September 2006, thugs attacked the convoy of Senator Sa'idu Umar Kumo, destroying over 20 vehicles and injuring many of his followers. In March 2007, when DPP Gubernatorial candidate and Former State Governor, Abubakar Hashidu, was arrested, the thugs upset the actions of the court and freed him from the dock, attacking and wounding the magistrate with machetes. It is very clear that majority of thugs participated in 2011 the electoral processes were working for PDP; and it was the thugs of different political parties fuelled the crisis of 2011 Post-Election violence which harmfully affected many individuals.

Nevertheless, thugs consistently attack individuals without any political inclination. *Daily Trust* (02-07-2013) reported that the Gombe State Police Command paraded 86 persons allegedly

involved in killing, raping, robbery and terrorizing people. They also paraded some merchants allegedly involved in selling hard drugs to members of notorious *kalare* gangs.


However, the researcher also observed that the effects of *kalare* thuggery have been politically and socially motivated which affected different people in different places and time in Gombe state. The violent behaviours of the thugs affected innocent individuals within their social environments. As a result, government properties including vehicles and offices were burnt, offices and valuable properties of different political parties were destroyed and burnt, innocent individuals lost their valuable properties on the streets, in their shops and at homes. Furthermore, the phenomenon has directly or indirectly affected many elites of various positions in both public and private establishments and ordinary individuals with different degrees of injuries ranging from wounds to loss of lives within the state. Similarly, the researcher further observed that no single person disputed the existence of thuggery in a perpetual manner and no single individual deny the fact that selfish interest of both the political elites and *kalare* members influenced the perpetual nature of thuggery through sponsorship and benefit in the state; where there is clear disparity amongst the personalities interviewed, is on the issue that whether the present political dispensation has succeeded in tackling the menace of *kalare* effectively and at the same time, whether the people of the state enjoy peace and security without any element of thuggery affecting them in their societies.

4.8.3 Effectiveness of Government Response Towards Overcoming *Kalare* Thuggery

Statistical record on Table 4.6 exposed the ranking assessment by respondents on government action towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state. The respondents rated the government efforts in overcoming thuggery by either very effective, effective, good, partially, poor and very poor. 28 respondents representing 7.3%, out of the total 381 filled and returned

questionnaires are of the opinion that government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery is very effective. 43 respondents representing 11.3% believed that government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery is simply effective. 58 respondents representing 15.2% believed that government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery is good. 64 respondents representing 16.8% considered government action towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery is partially. 72 respondents representing 18.9% believed that government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery is poor. 116 respondents representing 30.5% believed that government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery is very poor. Nevertheless, the above information is scientifically simplified using a graphical presentation for wider picture of understanding. This is pictured in Chart 4.3.

Chart 4.3 Effectiveness of Government Response Towards Overcoming *Kalare* Thuggery



Source: ***Author's Field Work, January 2014***

Chart 4.3 exposed logical picture of the government response towards overcoming thuggery in Gombe state. The analysis of government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery under two different administrations have been deliberated in Chapter Four specifically Table 4.6,

titled government response towards overcoming thuggery, which imperatively evaluated the effects of the prevalent thuggery in the state, however, very important views need to be reiterated here because of their significance. Generally, three types of the data collected (through questionnaires, interviews and reviewed literature) had shown that there are three policies and programmes initiated by the government of Gombe state from 2003 to 2013 in an effort to tackle the menace of *kalare* in the state. The first two policies were initiated by Governor Danjuma Goje from 2003 to 2011in the form of military action and provision of employment popularly called Anti Kalare Squad and GOSEPA respectively, to the known thugs; while the last policy was initiated by Governor Ibrahim Dankwambo popularly called Gombe State Youths Rehabilitation and Empowerment Programme which aimed to provide employment opportunities and reform the thugs to be useful in the state.

Assessing the position of these policies, different views of respondents depicted that the rate of government response towards overcoming thuggery in Gombe state is partial, poor and very poor to sundry respondents and it is presented as 64%, if it is combined together which is against the percentage of respondents who believed that the rate of government response towards overcoming thuggery is very effective, effective and good, if put together, it is about 36% of the total percentage. The issue of thuggery in Gombe state has a political dimension. As a result, the menace becomes perpetual and pervasive harming innocent individuals with high degrees of injuries and brutal killing together with the loss of valuable properties on the streets, in the shops and in their homes routinely.

In their views, public commentators in the state lamented that government response towards overcoming thuggery is ineffective, as it does not punish those found guilty on which these thugs ended killing innocent individuals. To the politicians, those in support of Governor Goje always blame Governor Dankwambo on the menace of thuggery in the state; likewise for those in support of Governor Dankwambo always blame Governor Goje on the menace of *kalare* in the state. However, general public including the victims of thuggery consistently blame the ruling elites and other politicians of being sponsoring thugs to achieve their political interest without minding the future generations in the state. Security agencies have narrated to the researcher that government is at the fore front of thuggery in the state. Some police officers and some prison staff have revealed that government is making the job to handle thuggery very difficult; as they know the thugs and their locations and sometimes even where they hide, but because of the nature of their job (command and directive) on one hand, and their higher officers have to be together with the government on the other hand, they could not command them to critically engage on special duty to arrest all the suspected thugs for trial.

The establishment of the two policies, GOSEPA and Gombe State Youths Rehabilitation and Empowerment Programme by Governor Goje and Dankwambo respectively, was to absorb the thugs into a functional employment opportunities that will provide monthly income and them and by implication it will serve an a measure to the menace. This idea, theoretical, is good. However, in the process of implementing these polices all the governors have failed to take into cognizance that these thugs contributed in one way or the other to bring them to their various offices and as such when they committed such violent crime the government is unwilling to punish them. The researcher finally gathered that more thugs have not been absorbed through the policies; only those who support the ruling party are marginally employed. On several

occasions, even those that were absorbed, they failed to appear at the place of their primary assignment, they ended up visiting houses of some politicians looking for money while in the night attacking innocent individuals collecting money and other valuable properties to a lesser extent, and where these are not available they even kill people. Thus, these and many more contributed to the perpetual thuggery in the state.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presented the summary and the concluding aspect of the major points on which the researcher identified in chapter one to four. These included issues ranged from topic identification, data gathering and analysis to the presentation of findings.

5.2 SUMMARY

This research titled *Democracy and Violence: An Assessment of the impacts of Kalare Thuggery in Gombe State, 2003 2013.* Since 1999, *kalare* thuggery emerged and inclined to politics, as a pervasive phenomenon, affecting innocent individuals and democratic activities that became a major subject of discussion in the state. The menace has affected not only democratic activities during campaign, rallies and elections at different levels which invariably caused the loss of lives and valuable properties. But also perpetually affects innocent individuals which resulted to loss of valuable properties and lives routinely in their homes, shops and on the streets. The research examined the factors responsible for the incessant thuggery and its terrible effects on democratic and social activities despite different measures adopted by the government to overcome the menace in the state from 2003 to 2013.

This research is designed in five (5) interconnected and interrelated compartments. The first component is Chapter One (1) consisted introduction and statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, research assumptions, significance of the study, research methodology, scope and limitations, conceptual clarification and organization of chapters. The second

component is Chapter Two (2) comprised literature review and the theoretical framework arranged thematically. Two socio-political theories have been adopted: the Social Learning Theory propounded by a psychologist called Albert Bandura that shown how individuals learnt certain behaviours and internalized to become part of them, at the same time, it guided us by seeing how youths in Gombe state became *kalare* members through imitation of a role model. Likewise, the Elite Theory advanced by the four leading scholars including Pareto, Mosca, Michel and Gasset also provided a picture on how political elites manipulated *kalare* members to gain and maintain political power from 2003 to 2013, subsequently a political and social thugs.

The third component is Chapter Three (3) that described the historical background of Gombe state including geographical location, agricultural activities, cultural settings, economic activities, and political administration. The evolution and forms of thuggery was also discussed. The fourth component is Chapter Four (4) in which the data gathered through questionnaires, interviews and reviewed literature were presented and analyzed; information presented in the tabular forms have been analyzed using simple percentage on the causes or factors responsible for the reoccurrence of *kalare* thuggery as a social menace, the effects of *kalare* thuggery on democratic and social activities, the sponsorships of *kalare* thuggery, the beneficiaries of thuggery, effectiveness of government response towards overcoming *kalare* thuggery, and the state of security in Gombe state. The final component is Chapter Five (5) that discussed the Summary and conclusion.

5.3 CONCLUSION

This study utilized three types of data included questionnaire, interview and review of relevant literature which proved that factors responsible for the *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state is limited to selfish interest, unemployment, illiteracy, poor governance, group sentiment, political manipulation, poverty, injustice but also inactive security agencies; all these contributed to the recurrent *kalare* thuggery both as political and social phenomenon. Generally, the effects of the perpetual thuggery in Gombe state are basically included creating fear amongst candidates, hindering electorates, killing innocent people, violating human rights, destruction of valuable properties, insecurity during and after elections and intimidating people.

The researcher observed that these effects have been politically and socially motivated which affected different people in different places in Gombe state. As a result, both government and private properties including vehicles and offices were burnt, offices and valuable properties of different political parties were destroyed and burnt, innocent individuals lost their valuable properties on the streets, in their shops and at homes. Besides, elites and innocent individuals of various positions in both public and private establishments have been affected by the *kalare* thuggery with different degrees of injuries ranging from wounds to loss of lives within the state.

The government of Gombe state initiated three different policies in an effort to overcome the menace of *kalare* from 2003 to 2013. The first two policies were initiated by Governor Danjuma Goje from 2003 to 2011in the form of military action and provision of employment opportunities to the thugs popularly called Anti Kalare Squad and GOSEPA respectively; the last policy was initiated by Governor Ibrahim Dankwambo popularly known as Gombe State Youths Rehabilitation and Empowerment Programme which aimed to provide employment

opportunities and reform the thugs to be useful in the state. These policies were rated by the respondents as partial, poor and very poor to sundry of them and it is presented as 66.2%, if it is combined together which is against the percentage of respondents who rated the governments' responses toward overcoming *kalare* thuggery as very effective, effective and good 33.8% if put together of the total percentage. These polices however, as shown, are inadequate as the public commentators, victims of *kalare,* political analysts and the residents of Gombe state consistently cry for the perpetual thuggery in affecting their mutual coexistence and harmony by harming democratic activities and the innocent individual through loss of valuable properties and their lives without arresting and punishing the culprits in the state. The government has been accused as not objectively making fruitful efforts to tackle the menace but ended making pronouncements without rigorous implementation.

Finally, the researcher observed that the activities of thugs called Yan *kalare* have fuelled insecurity in the state which is characterized by killing, kidnapping, street attacks, house break-ins, shoplifting, frightening and threatening innocent individuals losing their lives and valuable properties that invariably exacerbated social violence affecting democratic and social activities especially during campaigns, rallies and election related activities for which electorates and candidates of different party affiliations are scared and frightened of in Gombe state.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The researcher recommended the following:

a) The government should ensure the physical punishment to the kalare thugs regardless of their political parties' affiliations. This will deter them from involving into thuggery within the state.

b) The government should also ensure effective supervision of the trained and employed *kalare* thugs at their places of primary assignments; those who fail to appear at their stations should be punished while those that are punctual should be rewarded.

c) Finally, the government should initiate other programmes including awareness campaigns that will transform and dissuade the *kalare* and intended thugs psychologically from involving into such violent behaviours within the state.

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APPENDIX I

THE LISTS OF INTERVIEWED KEY PERSONALITIES

1) Honourable Inuwa Garba — 23-02-2014
   Honourable Speaker, Gombe State House of Assembly
2) Alhaji Abdulkadir Abubakar — 21-07-2014
   Sarkin Yakin Gombe, Gombe Emirate
3) Alhaji Mohammed Sayoji Ahmed — 14-04-2014
   His Royal Highness, Emir of Pindiga Emirate
4) Alhaji Shehul Hadi Ahmed — 15-07-2014
   Honourable Commissioner of Works, Gombe state
5) Professor Waziri A. Ibrahim — 22-04-2014
   Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Gombe State University
6) Alhaji Muhammad Abubakar (D.O) — 16-04-2014
   Special Adviser to Governor Dankwambo on Political Matters
7) Alhaji Mohammed I. Jalo — 17-03-2014
   Deputy Chairman, Akko Local Government Area and
   Former Senior Special Assistant to Governor Goje
8) Alhaji Abdullahi Abubakar — 19-04-2014
   State Secretary, All Progressive Change (APC)
9) Mallam Umaru Hassan — 27-04-2014
   Victim of Thuggery in Gombe state
10) Habu Haske Jekadafari — 11-04-2014
    Claimed Former Thug, Jekadafari, Gombe state

11) Alhaji Inuwa Ahmad 23-06-2014

Wazirin Kaltungo, Gombe state

12) Alhaji Muhammed Jibrin Kwami 18-04-2014

Resident of Riyadh Quarters, Gombe state

13) Alhaji Shu'aibu Al'ufi 20-05-2014

Secretary, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)

Akko Local Government

14) Hajiya Halima Ibrahim 13-05-2014

Victim of Thuggery, Bomala, Gombe state

15) Justice Ibrahim Nafada 24-04-2014

Honourable Judge, Gombe State

16) Mr. Fwaje Atajiri 16-05-2014

Police Public Relation Officer, Gombe State Headquarters

17) Ibrahim Sani 03-05-2014

A Claimed Reformist Thug, Kumo, Gombe State

APPENDIX II

TYPE (A). SAMPLE OF QUESTIONS FOR KEY PERSONALITIES INTERVIEWED

Dear Respondent!

I am a postgraduate student undergoing a research on **Democracy and Violence: An Assessment of the Impact of *Kalare* Thuggery in Gombe State 2003-2013.** Kindly, assist in realizing the success of the research work by giving your objective view, opinion or experience on *kalare* thuggery.

May I humbly thank you in advance for responding to this questionnaire which helps in generating data towards improving the society by presenting the menace of *kalare* thuggery as it unfolds. All information given will be treated confidentially. I remain grateful. **Abubakar Umar Alhaji**

1. What, in your opinion, is *kalare* thuggery?
   ……
   ……
   ……
   ……
2. What are the causes of *kalare* thuggery in your locality?
   ……
   ……
   ……
   ……
3. Who are the dominant actors/participants of *kalare* thuggery?
   ……
   ……
   ……
   ……
4. What weapons do the participants use in promoting *kalare* thuggery?
   ……
   ……
   ……
   ……

5. What do you think is the target of *kalare* thugs?

   ……
   ……
   ……
   ……

6. Who are the dominant victims of *kalare* thuggery and why do you think so?

   ……
   ……
   ……
   ……

7. To what extent does *kalare* thuggery affects democratic and social activities?

   ……
   ……
   ……
   ……

8. Do you think democracy provides stability?

   ……
   ……
   ……
   ……

9. How government responses towards *kalare* thuggery?

   ……
   ……
   ……
   ……

10. How effective is the government response towards *kalare* thuggery?

    ……
    ……
    ……
    ……

APPENDIX III

TYPE (A). THE SAMPLE OF QUESTIONS FOR THE STUDY POPULACE

Dear Respondent!

I am a postgraduate student undergoing a research on **Democracy and Violence: An Assessment of the Impact of *Kalare* Thuggery in Gombe State 2003-2013**. Kindly, assist in realizing the success of the research work by giving your objective view, opinion or experience on *kalare* thuggery.

May I humbly thank you in advance for responding to this questionnaire which helps in generating data towards improving the society by presenting the menace of *kalare* thuggery as it unfolds. All information given will be treated confidentially. I remain grateful.

ABUBAKAR UMAR ALHAJI

SECTION (A). DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF RESPONDENTS

Note: Respondents are to select only one option from question 1-6 in this section.

1) Age Distribution:
   (a) 18-28 (b) 29-39 (C) 40 and above
2) Gender:
   (a) Male (b) Female
3) Marital Status:
   (a) Married (b) Single
4) Literacy:
   Western Education (b) Arabic Education (c) None
5) Certificate Possess:
   (a) Primary (b) Secondary (c) Tertiary (d) None
6) Employment:
   (a) Employed (b) Unemployed

SECTION (B). THE MENACE OF *KALARE* THUGGERY

7) Do you know *kalare* thuggery?

……

……

……

8) What causes *kalare* thuggery in Gombe state?

……

……

……

9) Who sponsor *kalare* thuggery?

……

……

……

10) Who are the beneficiaries of *kalare* thuggery?

……

……

……

11) Are all members of political parties involved?

……

……

……

12) How *kalare* thuggery affects democratic and social activities in your locality?

.....

.....

.....

13) How effective is the government response towards *kalare* thuggery in the state?

……

……

……

14) Is there security in the state?

……

……

……

15) On your own view, suggest way out to *kalare* thuggery.

……

……

……

APPENDIX IV

Sample Size Table*

From The Research Advisors (2006)

There are various formulas for calculating the required sample size based upon whether the data collected is to be of a categorical or quantitative nature (e.g. is to estimate a proportion or a mean). These formulas require knowledge of the variance or proportion in the population and a determination as to the maximum desirable error, as well as the acceptable Type I error risk (e.g., confidence level).

But why bother with these formulas?

It is possible to use one of them to construct a table that suggests the optimal sample size – given a population size, a specific margin of error, and a desired confidence interval. This can help researchers avoid the formulas altogether. The table below presents the results of one set of these calculations. It may be used to determine the appropriate sample size for almost any study.

Many researchers (and research texts) suggest that the first column within the table should suffice (Confidence Level = 95%, Margin of Error = 5%). To use these values, simply determine the size of the population down the left most column (use the next highest value if your exact population size is not listed). The value in the next column is the sample size that is required to generate a Margin of Error of □ 5% for any population proportion.

However, a 10% interval may be considered unreasonably large. Should more precision be required (i.e., a smaller, more useful Margin of Error) or greater confidence desired (0.01), the other columns of the table should be employed. Thus, if you have 5000 customers and you want to sample a sufficient number to generate a 95% confidence interval that predicted the proportion who would be repeat customers within plus or minus 2.5%, you would need responses from a (random) sample of 1176 of all your customers.

As you can see, using the table is much simpler than employing a formula.

Required Sample Size†

Population Size	Confidence = 95% Margin of Error				Confidence = 99% Margin of Error			
	5.0%	3.5%	2.5%	1.0%	5.0%	3.5%	2.5%	1.0%
10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
20	19	20	20	20	19	20	20	20
30	28	29	29	30	29	29	30	30
50	44	47	48	50	47	48	49	50
75	63	69	72	74	67	71	73	75
100	80	89	94	99	87	93	96	99
150	108	126	137	148	122	135	142	149
200	132	160	177	196	154	174	186	198
250	152	190	215	244	182	211	229	246
300	169	217	251	291	207	246	270	295
400	196	265	318	384	250	309	348	391
500	217	306	377	475	285	365	421	485
600	234	340	432	565	315	416	490	579
700	248	370	481	653	341	462	554	672
800	260	396	526	739	363	503	615	763
1,000	278	440	606	906	399	575	727	943
1,200	291	474	674	1067	427	636	827	1119
1,500	306	515	759	1297	460	712	959	1376
2,000	322	563	869	1655	498	808	1141	1785
2,500	333	597	952	1984	524	879	1288	2173
3,500	346	641	1068	2565	558	977	1510	2890
5,000	357	678	1176	3288	586	1066	1734	3842
7,500	365	710	1275	4211	610	1147	1960	5165
10,000	370	727	1332	4899	622	1193	2098	6239
25,000	378	760	1448	6939	646	1285	2399	9972
50,000	381	772	1491	8056	655	1318	2520	12455
75,000	382	776	1506	8514	658	1330	2563	13583
100,000	383	778	1513	8762	659	1336	2585	14227
250,000	384	782	1527	9248	662	1347	2626	15555
500,000	384	783	1532	9423	663	1350	2640	16055
1,000,000	384	783	1534	9512	663	1352	2647	16317
2,500,000	384	784	1536	9567	663	1353	2651	16478
10,000,000	384	784	1536	9594	663	1354	2653	16560
100,000,000	384	784	1537	9603	663	1354	2654	16584
300,000,000	384	784	1537	9603	663	1354	2654	16586

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Professional researchers typically set a sample size level of about 500 to optimally estimate a single population parameter (e.g., the proportion of likely voters who will vote for a particular candidate). This will construct a 95% confidence interval with a Margin of Error of about 4.4% (for large populations).

Since there is an inverse relationship between sample size and the Margin of Error, smaller sample sizes will yield larger Margins of Error. For example, a sample size of only 100 will construct a 95% confidence interval with a Margin of Error of almost 13%, too large a range for estimating the true population proportion with any accuracy.

Note that all of the sample estimates discussed present figures for the largest possible sample size for the desired level of confidence. Should the proportion of the sample with the desired characteristic be substantially different than 50%, then the desired level of accuracy can be established with a smaller sample. However, since you can't know what this percentage is until you actually ask a sample, it is wisest to assume that it will be 50% and use the listed larger sample size.

The number of sub-groups (or "comparison" groups) is another consideration in the determination of a sufficient sample size. Since the parameter must be measured for each sub-group, the size of the sample for each sub-group must be sufficiently large to permit a reasonable (sufficiently narrow) estimation.

Treat each sub-group as a population and then use the table to determine the recommended sample size for each sub-group. Then use a stratified random sampling technique within each sub-group to select the specific individuals to be included.

If you would like to calculate sample sizes for different population sizes, confidence levels, or margins of error, download the Sample Size spreadsheet and change the input values to those desired.

$$n = \frac{X^2 * N * P * (1-P)}{(ME^2 * (N-1)) + (X^2 * P * (1-P))}$$

Where:

n = sample size

X^2 = Chi – square for the specified confidence level at 1 degree of freedom

N = Population Size

P = population proportion (.50 in this table)

ME = desired Margin of Error (expressed as a proportion)

This formula is the one used by Krejcie& Morgan in their 1970 article "Determining Sample Size for Research Activities" (*Educational and Psychological Measurement*, #30, pp. 607-610).

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APPENDIX V

GOMBE STATE POPULATION 2013 AS PROJECTED BY GOMBE STATE BUREAU OF STATISITICS USING 2006 CENSUS REPORT OF 3.2% GROWTH RATE

The total population of Gombe state according to 2006 census and projected by the Gombe State Bureau of Statistics in 2013 using 3.2% growth is 2,948,468. Similarly, the population of 18 years and above of Gombe state in 2013 is 1,592,230. Therefore, the proportional distribution of the three selected Local Government Areas of Akko, Gombe and Kaltungo are as follows:

Akko = 422,693

Gombe = 335,733

Kaltungo = 254,753

Total = 1013179

To get the percentage population of each Local Government Area from the general population of Gombe state, the following steps are considered:

$$Akko = \frac{422693}{2948468} \times \frac{100}{1} = 14.34\%$$

$$Gombe = \frac{335733}{294868} \times \frac{100}{1} = 11.39\%$$

$$Kaltungo = \frac{254753}{294868} \times \frac{100}{1} = 8.64\%$$

Therefore, to get the percentage population of 18 years and above from the population distribution of 1,592,330 for the each Local Government Area, these steps are also considered:

$$Akko = \frac{1592330}{100} \times \frac{14.34}{1} = 228325$$

$$Gombe = \frac{1592330}{100} \times \frac{11.39}{1} = 181366$$

$$Kaltungo = \frac{1592330}{100} \times \frac{8.64}{1} = 137577$$

$$Total = 547268$$

From the above calculation therefore, the actual population size is 547,268 that formed the basis of analysis of the three Local Government Areas.

Since, our actual population size is 547,268, it is imperative to calculate the proportional distribution of each local government population in order to get the number of questionnaires distributed to each Local government Area. This can be seen below:

$$Akko = \frac{228325}{547268} \times \frac{384}{1} = 160.21 \cong 160$$

$$Gombe = \frac{181366}{547268} \times \frac{384}{1} = 127.26 \cong 127$$

$$Kaltungo = \frac{137577}{547268} \times \frac{384}{1} = 96.53 \cong 97$$

$$Total = 384$$

To determine the proportion of the selected wards in each local government area selected, the following steps are considered:

Akko Local Government Area (228325) which included Gona (23,729), Kumo West (29,426) and Tumu (17,487) and the total population of the three wards is 70,647:

$$Gona = \frac{23729}{70647} \times \frac{160}{1} = 53.74 \cong 54$$

$$Kumo\ West = \frac{29426}{70647} \times \frac{160}{1} = 66.65 \cong 161$$

$$Tumu = \frac{17487}{70647} \times \frac{160}{1} = 39.61 \cong 40$$

$$Total = 161$$

Gombe Local Government Area (181,366) which included Ajiya (14,978), Jekadafari (24,183) and Shamaki (16,227) and the total population of the three wards is 55,388:

$$Ajiya = \frac{14978}{55388} \times \frac{127}{1} = 34.34 \cong 34$$

$$Jekadafari = \frac{24183}{55388} \times \frac{127}{1} 55.45 \cong 55$$

$$Shamaki = \frac{16277}{55388} \times \frac{127}{1} = 37.21 \cong 37$$

$$Total = 126$$

Kaltungo Local Government Area (137,577) which included Kaltungo East (13,787), Kaltungo West (11,539) and Ture (9,764) and the total population of the three wards is 35, 0900:

$$Kaltungo\ East = \frac{13787}{35090} \times \frac{97}{1} = 38.11 \cong 38$$


$$Kaltungo\ West = \frac{11539}{35090} \times \frac{97}{1} = 31.99 \cong 32$$

$$Ture = \frac{9764}{35090} \times \frac{97}{1} = 26.99 \cong 27$$

$$Total = 97$$

Therefore, the total size of the questionnaires distributed is 384 as derived from Krejcie and Morgan 1970.

APPENDIX VI
MAP OF GOMBE STATE



SOURCE: **Adopted From Administrative Map of Gombe State Government.**