

**AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AMNESTY PROGRAMME  
IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION**

**BY**

**SHAKIRA OMOTORIOGUN**

**(MSC/SOC-SCI/26076/2012-13)**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE,  
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY,  
ZARIA, NIGERIA**

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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE POST GRADUATE SCHOOL,  
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REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE DEGREE(M.SC) IN  
POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**NOVEMBER, 2017**

## DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation titled "An Assessment of the Nigerian Government Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta Region" has been carried out by me in the Department of Political Science and International Studies. The information derived from the literature, fieldwork and interview has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this dissertation was previously presented for another degree at this or any other Institution.

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Name of Student

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Signature

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Date

## CERTIFICATION

This dissertation entitled AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AMNESTY PROGRAMME IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION by SHAKIRA OMOTORIOGUN meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Master of Science (Political Science) of the Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

.....  
Professor Ejembi Unobe  
Chairman, Supervisory committee

.....  
Date

.....  
Dr Mohammed Faal  
Member, Supervisory committee

.....  
Date

.....  
Dr Aliyu Yahaya  
Head of Department

.....  
Date

.....  
Prof. S.Z. Abubakar

.....  
Date

Dean, School of Postgraduate Studies

### **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to Almighty God for his love for me and for seeing me through the completion of this work. All praise, thanks and adoration is unto His Holy name.

This work is also dedicated to my loving and wonderful husband, Mr. Daniel Tolulope Osasona for his love, prayers and understanding while I was away for this study.

I also dedicate this work to my father Elder Samuel Omotoriogun. You are one of the reasons I embarked on this programme. I appreciate your fatherly advice as well as financial supports.

Above all, thank you for believing in me.

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Shakira Omotoriogun

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Date

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## **Abstract**

Amnesty Programme was set up by the federal government of Nigeria under president Umaru Yar'adua administration to address many years of conflict that characterized the Niger Region. In its formulation, the programme has three core focuses which are Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. This work focuses on the rehabilitation and Reintegration part of the programme with a specific attention on training, job creation and constructive engagement. This research therefore examines the performance of the programme in these three areas. The significance of this study is that it brings to fore through an empirical study the actual impact of the amnesty programme on the peace process in the Niger Delta. The study employed both the Conflict Transformation and Incremental theory; the former to explain the nature of conflict in the study area, the latter to explain the amnesty programme as a public policy built on several previous policies in that region. Three instruments were employed to derive the data for this study namely; in-depth interview; structured and unstructured questionnaires; as well as documented materials on the programme as well as the conflict. The study was able to establish that greed, pollution, resource control, infrastructural deficits, unemployment, poverty, marginalization, corruption, economic exploitation, are all causes of the Niger Delta conflict, also the research found out that the amnesty programme has trained several ex-militants in various areas such as vocational training, training in science and technology as well as in the humanities both within and outside the country however only few of them had received job after this training. This research further reveals that the level of infrastructural development is poor and constructive engagement is lacking. The research hence recommends that this programme be broaden to accommodate other victims of environmental degradation suffered in the Niger Delta because restricting the programme to only ex-militant only marginalises others who had also being affected but had not taken up arms. Also, the government should make frantic efforts to provide job opportunities for those that had being trained so as to prevent them being drawn into taking arms again.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

The people of the Niger delta in Nigeria are historically known for their enterprising nature as indicated by their artistry in canoe making, fishing, peasant farming, as well as trading. It is a home to Nigeria's oil and gas resources. It is also the wealthiest region in West Africa. The Niger Delta is the source of about 90% of Nigeria's export earnings(Okonta,2002). It is one of the largest wetland in the world after the Pant Anal in South America and Mississippi, in North America. It has a land area of 112,110 sq.kms, 20,000 sq.kms of natural deltaic plain and population of 31.2million people made up of about 40 different ethnic groups who speak 250 languages and dialects(Ikein, 1990). It comprises nine States and 185 local Governments Areas. Oil was first discovered in commercial quantity in 1958 by Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in Oloibiri. The Multi-National Oil Companies (MNOCs) operating in the region, especially, SPDC, Texaco-chevron, and Nigeria Agip Oil Company limited, indulged in degrading the environment by polluting the air, rivers and surrounding lands in a manner not found in other oil and gas producing regions of the world (Ikein, 1990)

The region contains the largest oil deposits in Africa and one of the highest quality oil in the world. Its oil resources, unprecedented economic and geo-strategic significance and contribution are without question the mainstay of the Nigerian economy (Ikein, 1990). The region generated 600 billion US dollars from oil exports between 1956 and 2002 (Okonta, 2002) yet the region is home to some of the poorest people in the world.

The enactment of laws by the Nigerian State including the Oil Pipe lines Act of 1956 and the Federal Environmental Protection Act of 1988 are designed to support the Federal Government

Investments with the MNOCs making it possible for only minority to benefit from the resources. By these laws the oil bearing communities are prevented from participating actively in the oil and gas industry. Meanwhile, their lands and rivers are polluted by oil spills, acid rain and gas flaring.

Consequent to this, the traditional occupation of the people, which is agriculture and fishing has continued to suffer. This continued unabated and by 1975, the Oil Producing Communities (OPCs) had lost their traditional occupations and means of livelihood and all the same failed to gain from the oil and gas industry(Okonta 2002).

The region has been a hotbed of conflict for many decades between the Niger Delta Militants and the Nigerian Government on one hand and multinational oil companies on the other hand. The major reasons for the militant aggression are socio-economic deprivations and denial of resource control. The activities of the militant groups have, indeed, affected the Nigerian economy and caused considerable losses to foreign investors as well as adversely affecting the international energy market. Over 1 million bpd was being lost per day as of May 2009, SPDC force majeure 0.25m bpd the country was losing about 8.7b(\$58m) daily (estimate as at May 2009). In 2008, over \$20bn was lost as a result of the conflict. NLNG lost over \$2b which is 53% of installed capacity in 2009. About 1000 people lost their lives in 2008 and 128 people were kidnapped between January 2008 and January 2009. The East West Road abandoned for 2years, Michelin closed business and sacked 1500 in Niger Delta, Julius Berger/ Wilbur's pull out of ND and sacked workers, SMEs fled Niger Delta, critical oil and gas pipelines infrastructure breached and marine War Risk insurance: over \$90m p.a premium charged for cargo into Nigeria(Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, April 2015).

It is with the view to bringing to an end the activities of the Niger-Delta militants that both the Nigerian government and the MNOCs had instituted many programmes for the Niger-Delta. The MNOCs on their part have diverse programme under the Corporate Social Responsibilities (CSRs) such as scholarship schemes, construction of community markets among other projects (NAOC, 2009; SPDC, 2006). On the part of the Federal Government, several attempts have been made to forestall the activities of the militants among which include; upward review of the revenue allocation , the establishment of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affair with a minister, the establishment of the Niger Delta development Commission in 2000, the establishment of the Oil Producing Areas Development Commissions (OPADEC) in all of the oil producing states, and the establishment of the Amnesty Programme on 24<sup>th</sup> of June, 2009 by the Federal Government.

There was a post-amnesty summit in Kaduna state on October 15, 2009 where the blueprint for the development of the region was outlined. The blueprint has three cardinal areas which were training/skills acquisition, constructive engagement, and Job creation/infrastructural development. On the infrastructural and economic area, there was the call for N200 billion to finance some infrastructural and economic projects which includes: establishment of federal polytechnic of oil and gas in Bayelsa State, upgrading of facilities at the petroleum Training Institute, Effurun in Delta state, clean-up of the environment of oil spillages that have blighted the ecosystem, construction of East-West highway, construction of the Atlantic coastal highway, construction of East-West rail line running through Calabar-Uyo-Portharcourt-Yenagoa-Warri-Benin-Lagos, development of inland waterway, commencement of massive land reclamation, and development of new towns while retaining the history and culture of the people ( Etekte, 2007).



The other two programmes are training/skills acquisition for the former militants and generality of youths in the region, and constructive engagement. The skill acquisition was to be in the areas of oil/maritime services, fabrication and welding, exploration and production, Information Communication Technology(ICT), security services, etc. for a period of 3-18 months after which they would have the option for wage or self-employment. Constructive dialogue, on the other hand, is continuous cross-fertilisation of ideas and consultation with all stakeholders, former militants and leaders of the various communities on ways to better develop the communities.

Despite all of these, the ex-militants are still threatening to return to violence because according to them the government has not met all their demands. It is in line with this that this research is set out to assess the viability of the Amnesty Programme in bringing about a sustainable peace in the Niger-Delta with a focus on how the programme blueprint had fared.

## **1.2 Statement of Research Problem**

In spite of the loftiness of this programme and the success of the programme in terms of Demobilisation and Demilitarisation, there still seems to be problems with the Rehabilitation and re-integration aspect of the DDR as ex-militants are often reported of threatening to return to violence against the state as their needs are not yet fully met.

The question which this study intends to answer is, how does the operation of the Amnesty programme impact on sustainable peace in the Niger-Delta.

## **1.3 Research Questions**

1. What are the causes of the Niger delta conflict?
2. How has the amnesty programme performed in the areas of training and job creation
3. What impact has the programme had on the peace process in the area?

#### **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

1. To investigate the multifaceted causes of the Niger Delta conflict.
2. Assess the performance of the amnesty programme in the areas of concern which are training and job creation.
3. To find out the impact the programme has in building a sustainable peace in the area.

#### **1.5 Research Proposition**

The research raises the following propositions:

1. The Niger Delta conflict is caused by economic, political and social factors
2. The amnesty programme has not performed optimally in its areas of focus
3. The amnesty programme has had a negative impact on the general peace process in the Niger Delta

#### **1.6 Justification of the Study**

The Niger Delta militancy issue has been of serious concern to policy makers, scholars, business persons, the international community among other sector of the human life this is owing to the longevity of the problem which started as far back as 1966 as well as the trillions that had been lost to the conflict. Hence a study into programmes that are aimed at providing sustainable peace in the area such as the amnesty programme is a very important exercise. Scholars like Ikein (1990), Okonta (2002), have written on the causes and effects of the militancy in the Niger Delta; scholars like Ekpu (2007) and Etekpe (2007) have written on programmes including amnesty programme aimed at stopping the militancy.

However, no in-depth empirical study has been done to assess the performance of the amnesty programme especially as it relates to the rehabilitation and reintegration part of the DDR this is the gap that this research sets out to fill. The research is therefore significant in that it will:

- i. Espouse the role that has been played so far by the programme.
- ii. Establish the actual performance of the programme vis-à-vis its set out aim and objectives.
- iii. Bring to the fore the impact of the programme on the peace process in the Niger Delta and examine if the process can lead to a sustainable peace in the area.

### **1.7 Scope and Limitation**

This study assesses the Nigerian government amnesty programme in the Niger Delta region with a view to examine how the programme had fared in the areas of implementation and how that has impacted on the peace process in the Niger Delta region. Although the Niger Delta region is a wide area, the study is limited to Bayelsa state which is used as a case study.

The research faced certain limitations. First limitation is that of the terrain of the study area. The area of study is largely riverine thereby creating difficulties for the researcher to assess each area selected for the study. However, the researcher made use of assistants that are conversant with the terrain to carry out the research in such area.

Another problem was that it was quite expensive paying for a research assistant, however the researcher made use of a research assistant to carry out investigation in some of the areas chosen for study.

### **1.8 Chapter Outline**

This research is outlined into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction which comprises of the background to the study, statement of research problem, research questions, objectives of the study, research propositions, justification of the study, scope and limitations and chapter organization.

Chapter two deal with the literature review and theoretical framework while chapter three is an explicit explanation of the methodology used for the study. This involves the method of data collection and that of data analysis.

Chapter four presents an assessment of the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta region.

Chapter five is the summary, conclusion and recommendations.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents a review of existing literature on the topic of this research. The section is divided into two; the literature and the theoretical framework. The review was done through the thematic method and organized into the following sections: causes of the Niger Delta Conflict, Domestic Forces and the Development of the Niger Delta Conflict, the Niger Delta conflict, Amnesty, Component of the Amnesty programme among others.

#### **2.2 Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict**

Without doubt, domestic forces have played and continue to play a major role in the Niger Delta violence. In fact, most of the intellectual accounts of the Niger Delta violence focus on the relationship between the violence and these domestic forces including federalism/constitutionalism, political instability, corruption, resource predation, resource control, pollution, poverty, ethnicity and ancient hatreds, and political and social marginalization(Ikein, 1990; Olorode, 1998; Watts 2009).

#### **2.3 Domestic Forces and the Development of the Niger Delta Conflict**

A broad array of domestic forces has been blamed for the Niger Delta violence. Domestic Forces suggest interplay of local conditions, experiences, processes, and relationships that have fueled widespread frustrations, resentment, anger and violence. This paper will focus on these forces, at least to show that the violence manifesting in the swamps and creeks of the Niger Delta today, are not occurring by happenstance. Instead, like a house is built brick upon brick, the violence have been building up for several decades.

### **2.3.1 Economic Exploitation and Exclusion**

Scholars (such as Offiong 1980; Ikein 1990; Olorode 1998; Iyayi 2000; Okonta 2000; Okonta and Douglas 2003; Ukeje 2001; Watts 2009) have argued that decades of oil exploitation in the Niger Delta has transformed Nigeria's political economy making it one of the most resource-dependent nations on earth. Yet, instead of turning Nigeria into one of the most prosperous states on the African continent, oil production has accentuated the socio-political and economic woes of society including those of the oil-rich Niger Delta region. These scholars and many others argue that it is the disparity between the wealth appropriated from the region and the economic development of indigenes of the region that accounts for the conflict. Report also noted that remote rural communities in the Niger Delta have limited economic opportunities and often cannot access employment benefits from the oil conglomerates because they lack capital resources or skills (UNDP, 2006).

Shell, the largest multinational corporation active in the region, disagrees. Instead, it implicates political, social, and environmental concerns as the key factors that provoke militancy in the Niger Delta (SPDC 2007). Curiously, Shell subsumes economic issues such as resource control and resource distribution under political factors arguing that this is complicated by a high population growth rate that puts pressure on land through over-farming, deforestation, and soil erosion; the emergence of a new generation of well-educated youth attuned to the disparity between urban and rural areas and convinced that multinational oil companies (MNOCs) have the capability to redress this gap; and communities that believe that the best way of extracting a greater share of oil wealth is by holding MNOCs to ransom. Shell, however, does not address the charge of economic exploitation, which many scholars, militants, and rights groups blame as partly responsible for the violence. For these scholars, the gap between the billions of dollars

MNOCs appropriate each year as oil surplus or profit and the privation of the peasants who are forced out of their traditional homesteads and economic activity by oil-induced pollution, describes economic exploitation. Also, Shell does not address the wide scale corruption among Nigeria's political class and the misappropriation and misapplication of oil revenue that has bloated the bank accounts of a few while the majority of the Niger Delta inhabitants languish in poverty. Finally, it also does not address the role MNOCs play in courting, promoting, maintaining, and reproducing corruption and graft as rational business and profit-building strategies (Okonofua, 2010).

According to the UNDP (2006) while the Niger Delta oil wealth accounts for the bulk of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings (amounting to about \$231 billion between 1970 and 1999), these vast revenues have not translated to positive human development outcomes for the people. Higgins (2009) and the International Crisis Group (2006) argue that the slow pace of systemic reforms and lack of jobs, basic amenities in some parts of the Niger Delta have not only encouraged militancy in the region but have also boosted support for the insurgents among local population.

### **2.3.2 Social and Political Exclusion**

Since independence, the national power has been in the hands of the majority ethnic group. Thus, political access for minorities until now was closed. Moreover, elections since 1999 have been widely rigged in Nigeria including the Niger Delta and most of these fraudulent results are sustained by violence and threats resulting in huge democratic deficits. The people are economically exploited and deprived of the opportunity to alter state economic and social policy through the instrumentality of elections. Because many Niger Delta youths are convinced that formal institutions and local customary institutions (particularly the system of kingship) have

failed and are incapable of redressing grievances, they have turned to violence and militancy to challenge the government and extort money and oil from the oil conglomerates (World Bank 2007). Shell (2007) agrees, it notes that at the social level "anger is growing and increasing militancy is overthrowing traditional social order in some communities" leading to a situation where a "complex and dynamic fragmentation of communities characterized by frequent power shifts between factions" makes it virtually impossible to redress some of the grievances of the communities including the payment of compensation for damages caused by oil spill and land acquisition. Thus, it is the inter-ethnic strife in the region that disrupts the efficient allocation of resources and welfare especially to that segment of the population that is in dire need. While this may be true, Shell fails to explain what generates inter-ethnic strife in the first place and the role it plays in provoking and maintaining such strife. For example, Osaghae (1998), Okonta and Douglas (2003) and Okonofua (2010) argue that the oil companies orchestrate the inter-ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta in a modern day attempt at "indirect rule." The strategy is to encourage oil-bearing communities to dissipate energy in fighting over which community or communities should benefit from specific welfare and rehabilitation projects to the point where no community benefits. Thus, the Ijaw/Ilaje conflict and the Urhobo/Itsekiri conflict, for example, results from MNOCs stoking ethnic fires to facilitate oil production and expand its profit base.

### **2.3.3 Environmental Degradation**

Oil exploration and production has generated serious environmental damages at several levels: land, water, and air pollution, depleted fishing grounds and territories, and the disappearance of wetlands (World Bank, 2007). These serious environmental conditions have provoked serious hardships for local peoples whose sources of livelihood has been severely impacted. Many local



populations have been displaced from ancestral lands and local resources and thrust into dependent relationships in overpopulated cities with no skills, craft or vocation to sustain them. The environmental devastation of the Delta has put pressure on local communities who continue to suffer from poor or inequitable land use practices (UNDP 2006). Existing measures to counterbalance the environmental damage are at best haphazard and inadequate and grossly underestimate the enormity of damage to the Niger Delta ecology. This chronic underestimation which translates to gross nonchalance is a major source of community discontent and violence (World Bank 2007).

Shell agrees that environmental pollution including oil spills is one of the main grievances of Niger Delta communities. However, it blames the spills on sabotage. According to Shell, between 1988 and 1994, about 28 percent of the spills at its operation areas were due to sabotage. By 1994, oil spills caused by sabotage accounted for 35 percent of all oil spills in its area of influence and this figure is increasing. Increases in sabotage-induced oil spills results mainly from the operations of the militant groups who target oil facilities. While Shell is right to highlight damages caused by warring groups, it does not address that percentage of oil spill that results from the routine business of oil production. It also does not address pollutions caused by effluent and other wastes it deliberately discharges into the environment, or spills caused by defective and obsolete equipment. Studies show that much of the Niger Delta violence results from grievances over pollution (Naanem 1995; Gbadegesin 1997; Eteng 1996). For example, Eteng (1997:4) argues that:

Oil exploration and exploitation has over the last four decades impacted disastrously on the socio-physical environment of the Niger Delta oil-bearing communities, massively threatening the subsistent peasant economy and the environment and hence the entire livelihood and basic survival of the people.

Up to 1.5 million tons of oil, which amounts to more than 50 times the pollution recorded in the Exxon Valdez tanker disaster, has been spilt in the Niger Delta over the past 50 years (Brown 2006). Quoting a panel of independent experts from the World Wildlife Federation UK, the World Conservation Union, and the Nigerian Conservation Foundation, Brown (2006) observed that damage to the fragile mangrove forests over the past 50 years amounts to a catastrophic oil spill occurring every year in one of the world's most important ecosystems. Apart from threatening rare species including primates, fish, turtles, and birds, the pollution is destroying the livelihoods of many of the 30 million people living in the region, damaging crops and fueling the upsurge in violence. The Niger Delta which is home to 7,000sq of the world's remaining, 9,000sq of mangrove and some 60 percent of West Africa's fish stock is now one of the five most polluted spots on the planet. Brown argued that the impact of oil and gas drilling especially pollution was a significant contributor to the violence and instability in the Niger Delta. This situation is worsened by the people's perception that oil companies are complacent or slow to act on legitimate complaints. For example, while local peasants were groaning under the yoke of pollution, which is unaddressed by Shell and the other oil companies, Shell alone boasted profits of \$22.94bn (€13.12bn) and extracted 900,000 barrels of crude oil a day in 2005 from its activities in the Niger Delta (Brown 2006). Environmentalists accuse Shell of using obsolete equipment to rake in billions of dollars in oil profit while paying little attention to how its ageing pipes steadily leak millions of gallons of crude oil into the pristine waters of the Niger Delta.

#### **2.3.4 Poor Infrastructure and Service Delivery**

A World Bank Panel Report (2007) describes the situation of the Niger Delta as "akin to a human emergency" and the UNDP (2006) describes the infrastructure and social services available as "generally deplorable." The neglect of infrastructure in the Niger Delta is either

blamed on the difficult terrain or the intransigence of local communities. In either case, the neglect criminally deprives local populations of access to fundamental social services. For example, the International Crisis Group (2007) observes that the town of Edeoha in Rivers state lacks basic services such as water, healthcare, education, electricity, and jobs. Also, the presence of the state is minimal with no local government office, a primary school that lacks chairs and desks, and a hospital that is twenty kilometers away and lacks medicine and equipment. This situation exists in the majority of communities in the Niger Delta and draws the flak of community leaders and militant organizations who insist that oil majors must contribute to the development of the region.

Oil companies often argue that some of the complaints of the communities, especially those that demand that they play more active roles in the development of the communities, are illegitimate. They argue that what communities demand is that they become some kind of alternative government and provide services the government ought to provide (Ukeje 2001). They argue that this would amount to double taxation and erode their profitability since various legislations enacted by the federal government particularly the Petroleum Decree No. 51 of 1969, the 1978 Land Use Act, and the 1999 Production Sharing Contracts Act established the general frameworks for the exploitation of oil resources including the applicable royalties, tax regimes, and the manner of allocation of costs between oil companies and government. The law provides for the payment of a flat rate of 50% tax on petroleum profits by MNOC's, and sets different royalty regimes, depending on the water depth in which the operation is carried out ranging from 12% for depths of 200-500m to 0% for depths in excess of 1000m. Operations in inland basins attract a flat royalty of 10% (Pengassan 2009). Shell also claims it pays compensation to the communities for the surface rights of all land acquired in the course of its exploration and

production activities, and for ecological damage due to its operations. It says its compensation Rates are fair and equitable and that all parties including the communities are happy and satisfied (Okonta and Douglas 2003).

This position has been severely challenged by the communities. For example, Shell admitted that between 1973 and 1993, it extracted 634 million barrels of oil from its ninety-six oil wells in Ogoni alone. It claims that before it withdrew from the area in January 1993 following community resistance, Ogoni accounted for 1.5 percent of its Nigerian operations. Ogoni land is only about 400 square miles and from here Shell is estimated to have extracted oil worth over \$30 billion. Shell claims that it spends about \$20 million each year on community development projects in Ogoni and other Niger Delta communities, a claim local NGOs and rights groups hotly contest. In fact, these NGOs insist that between 1970 and 1988, Shell spent a paltry \$200,000, or approximately 0.000007 percent of the value of oil extracted from the region on community development projects (Saro-Wiwa 1992). Despite these counter claims, Shell's argument brings into sharp relief the role government (local, state, and federal) play in the violence. We can briefly discuss the government's role from three directions: federalism, corruption, and poor governance/political instability.

### **2.3.5 Federalism**

Sagay (2008) and Akiba (2002) blame the Niger Delta violence on the nature of Nigerian federalism. They argue that the crisis in the region is not only over environmental justice and resource appropriation and distribution but also a struggle to create a stable and equitable socio-political system. The communities through the militant groups and other rights and socio-cultural groups seek redress within a federal structure they see as firmly stacked against them in terms of revenue allocation and the parlous state of infrastructure in the region. For this reason, the crisis

in the Niger Delta involves much more than agitations over ecologic damages, developmental issues, or security issues. Instead, the crisis results from a combination of all these and is complicated by the struggle for a true federal and fiscal structure (Akinyemi 1979).

Nigeria's federal system (which has undergone numerous changes since independence in 1960) has been unable to manage and contain the nations countless ethnic, sub-ethnic, regional, and religious cleavages. Some analysts argue that the federal system has never been properly and fully established and therefore remains a work in progress. These scholars advocate for the incorporation of fairness, justice, and equity into Nigeria's federal structure as a way of dealing with perceived shortcomings (Suberu 2001). To these scholars, then, Nigeria's federal structure has not failed; instead, it has never been properly or objectively applied. For example, Suberu (2001) argues that various military and civilian administrations have manipulated the federal system for their own gains in disregard for national development or the reduction or elimination of ethnic, religious, or regional tensions. Instead, ethno-religious cleavages have enhanced the power and influence of the federal government thereby distorting Nigeria's federal structure.

Other scholars disagree (Osaghae 1998; Sagay 2008; Akiba 2004; Nwabueze 2001). They argue that Nigeria's federal structure privileges the majority ethnic groups, is responsible for Nigeria's political instability, and exacerbates corruption, nepotism, and conflict. David-West (2002) for example, argues that Nigeria's vaunted federalism is at best a "parody of federalism. It is to all intents and purposes unitarism dressed out in an elegant facade of federalism." One proof of this is the recurring controversy over resource control. Another proof is the country's contentious revenue sharing practices. For example, the federal government allocates to itself a disproportionate amount of national revenues leaving the States and local governments with barely enough to pay salaries and wages and to maintain political patronages. This disparity has

the unfortunate effect of increasing the competition by the major ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo) for control of the central government and its vast resources to the detriment of the minority ethnic groups some of which are the storehouses of the nation's natural resource wealth. Thus, the federal structure with an allocative rather than derivative revenue sharing formula is partly responsible for the lack of economic and infrastructural development in the Niger Delta region and the political marginalization of its people.

### **2.3.6 Corruption**

Corruption has been shown to cost the Nigerian government as much as 60 percent of its tax revenues and increases with the expansion of the public sector (Okonofua and Ugiagbe 2004; USAID 2006). When at the highest level of government power is concentrated in a few hands, the corruption bug quickly contaminates the entire society, including the judiciary, legislature, police, military, school, and medical workers. For example, following the death of Nigeria's late maximum dictator Gen. Sani Abacha, over US\$ 5 billion was recovered from secret overseas accounts belonging to him and his family. It is estimated that between December 1993 and June 1998, over \$10 billion was stolen by Gen. Abacha and his associates. And these funds were revenues accruing to the state from oil production. When Abacha took over the reins of government in 1993, he commissioned the renowned economist Dr. Pius Okigbo to examine the finances of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) during the Babangida years. The Babangida administration (1985-1993) is believed to have turned corruption (and advance fee fraud) into an industry and in the process appropriated billions of dollars of oil revenue for himself (Okonta and Douglas 2003). While submitting his report, Okigbo accused Babangida and members of his government of gross corruption. According to him:

Between September 1988 and 30 June 1994, US\$12.2 billion of the \$12.4 billion [in the dedicated accounts] was liquidated in less than six years ... they were

spent on what could neither be adjudged genuine high priority nor truly regenerative investment; neither the president nor the Central Bank Governor accounted to anyone for these massive extra-budgetary expenditures ... these disbursements were clandestinely undertaken while the country was openly reeling with a crushing external debt overhang (Fayemi 1995).

Losses like this that are due to corruption total more than Nigeria's foreign debt and corruption diverts foreign investment, reduce valuable expenditure on social sectors (roads, bridges, health and education), leads to bogus capital projects, reduced asset life, and undermines the creation of a professional, meritocratic civil service (Okonofua and Ugiagbe 2004). Alassane Ouattara (2001) argues that an environment prone to corruption is one where public officials are not accountable for their actions, where law does not exist, and where the respect for basic human rights is breached. This implies the vicious circle whereby poor governance has kept the formal private sector small, public institutions weak and corrupt, and rules and regulations complex, inequitable, and arbitrarily enforced. In such an environment, social decay spreads and the young who have neither political nor economic opportunities become disillusioned. These persons are left only with four choices: to join the corrupt, to go abroad, to hide in the informal sector, or to violently challenge what they perceive to be the source of their problems. The Niger Delta militant appears to fall into the fourth category.

### **2.3.7 Political Instability and Poor Governance**

Scholars have argued that political instability in Nigeria is partly responsible for the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region and by implication, the Niger Delta violence (Ake 1996; Ukeje 2001). Beginning with the Gowon administration (1966-1975) to the present, governmental instability, especially the lack of continuity in government policy, has had adverse effects on the economic and social development of the region. For example, there has been only two recorded civilians to civilian transfer of power in Nigeria since its independence in 1960 Apart from the Obasanjo-Yar'Adua transition in 2007 and the Yar'Adua (Jonathan)-

Jonathan transition in 2011, every transition in Nigeria has been predicated on a military coup or midwived by a military regime.

Military governments typically begin by suspending the constitution, closing all airports, seaports, and borders, and suspending the policies of the past administration while hastily contriving new policy directions. In furtherance of their goals, they dismiss all or key government officials responsible for policy implementation and replace them with people new to the demands of such offices or too inexperienced to function effectively. This typically disrupts the smooth operation of government and kills off vital development projects crucial to the nation's economic and socio-political survival. Changes in policy concerning the distribution of oil revenue between the federal, state, and local government provides one example of policy disruption due to infrequent undemocratic governmental changes. Another example is the various agencies established by different administrations to speed up development in the Niger Delta. In every material fact, the functions of these agencies such as Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF), the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF), and the Ministry of Niger Delta overlap each other and exist most profoundly to launder the image of government and act as conduit pipes through which the government purse is drained by corrupt officials.

### **2.3.8 Demand for Self-determination**

Niger Delta militants accuse government and oil companies of misapplication and misappropriation of oil funds to the neglect of the communities and people. They challenge not only the prevailing revenue sharing formula but also the political structure and its mechanisms for the allocation of power. Thus, the agitations of the communities and militants are first and



foremost based in ideology. Two central issues constitute the ideological basis of the Niger Delta struggle: self-determination and resource control (Osaghae et al 2007). Self-determination involves the right of the Niger Delta people (or any distinct nationality for that matter) to live together in “its own way, determine its own political fate, preserve its own affairs and develop itself or even democratize as it may deem fit” (Okwu-Okafor 1994). It relates to the “right or freedom of a people that are subordinated, oppressed, dominated, colonized or even marginalized to assert and constitute themselves into a separate state” (Osaghae et al 2007). The right to self-determination devolves from the Nigerian constitution. In section 3 (c) the constitution confers rights to individuals to freely form associations and to take steps to preserve group integrity and personal liberty. Self-determination, in this context, implies the right of a people to associations that are spatially distinct with clear geographic, social, cultural, and political markings. Both the United Nations Charter on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human Rights also guarantee this right. The right to self-determination assures that cultural, religious, and linguistic minorities and peoples can strive for liberation from structures and institutions that subordinate, oppress, and marginalize them.

The implication of this is that Niger Delta militants consider the Niger Delta people an oppressed, dominated, stifled, and exploited group who must be liberated if not by peaceful means, then by violence. Self-determination translates to self-existence, self-management, self-development, and control over resources that inhere in the region. However, the government and other political stakeholders interpret self-determination as a clamor for separate and independent existence, and hence, must be brutally suppressed. But self-determination or autonomy does not necessarily mean separate and independent existence; rather, it is a desire for cultural autonomy, ethnic rights, political representation and inclusion, justice, and development (Osaghae et al

2007). Irrespective of how it is defined, the right or freedom to self-determine has driven numerous peoples all over the world, to mobilize, solidarize, build nationalism and to organize resistance through popular movements and institutions of violence. Also, the world over, the issue of self-determination is ideologically linked to the question of group identity. In the Niger Delta this identity is deeply etched in collective experiences of oppression, marginalization, and discrimination. And has happened in other parts of the world, discrimination, defined difference or “otherness” have provoked fierce and violent agitations and led to the likelihood of a potentially devastating civil war in Nigeria.

The second aspect of their belief concerns resource control. The concept of resource control as it applies to the Niger Delta conflict has three main components: a) the power and right of a community to raise funds by taxing people, services, and materials within its territory; b) the executive right of ownership and control of resources (natural and created) within the territory; and c) the right to customs duties on goods destined for its territories and excise duties on goods manufactured in its territories (Sagay 2008). This implies a complete reversal of the revenue sharing formula from an allocative strategy to one of complete and unconditional control. Militants argue that because of the primacy of resource control to the survival of whole groups and societies, their clamor is non-negotiable. The most articulate presentation of this clamor is the “Kaiama Declaration” (Okonta and Douglas 2003). This declaration proclaimed by the Ijaw (the dominant ethnic group in the region and fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria) on December 11, 1998 has several important articles. Article 1 asserted that all “land and natural resources within the Ijaw territory” belongs to the “Ijaw communities” and are the “basis of our survival.” Article 2 defended the rights of the “peoples and communities” to “ownership of and control of our lives and resources” and Article 4 advised all oil companies operating within Ijaw territory to

“withdraw from Ijaw land” pending the resolution of the issues of “resource ownership and control in the Ijaw area of the Niger Delta.”

Like its disagreement with the concept of self-determination, the Nigerian state and MNCs disagree with this interpretation of resource control. As observed earlier, MNCs see the agitation as nothing more than a clamor for a share of the oil profit. Therefore, their answer is to surreptitiously court some of the more influential power brokers in the region with juicy security contracts and more direct cash payments. The government on the other hand sees the agitators particularly the militant groups as a bunch of criminals and renegades interested only in profiting from the clandestine oil trade. They see resource control agitations and the clamor for self-determination as the desire of unpatriotic forces to break up Nigeria and therefore, the agitators must be treated as rebels and violently suppressed or crushed (Osaghae 1998).

One conclusion that we can draw from these cocktail of causes is that there is a governability crisis in Nigeria that is morbidly stupefying. In one form or the other, the scholars examined above have made intimations of a morally decrepit government aided and abetted by international corporations who themselves are backed by the full strength and force of western capitalism and practices. The governability crisis begins as food and other necessities have disappeared from the shelves and food barns of Niger Delta peasants. The governability crisis is on full throttle as life-saving medicines have vanished from local hospital dispensaries, as white chalks have become unavailable to write on black boards in local schools, as roads harbor huge pot-holes that have become man-holes, and as scarce resources find their way into European and American banks and purchase million dollar homes in European and American streets. The governability crisis speaks to us from disagreements over Nigeria’s federal structure, its constitution, the nature of party politics, resource control, self-determination, and peace. Even as

violence continues to run rampant in Niger Delta swamps and creeks, a tiny few who occupy command positions within government and the oil industry, continue to be oblivious to the horrors that is daily unfolding and that threatens to consume all in this battle of the fearless dispossessed and the happy delirious.

## **2.4The Niger Delta Conflict**

In his book "Nigeria: The Challenge of Biafra" written after the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), Arthur A. Nwankwo (1972) noted that:

It is true that the basic problems that caused the Nigerian crisis remained unresolved ... and there seems to be no consideration for the health of the federation in the pursuit of individual or group interests - from the smuggling rackets to the huge payoffs in bribery and corruption. But it is also true that the traumatic bitterness of the war is rich with lessons for toleration and understandings. These lessons are our only guarantee against instability for they will serve as a buffer to cushion us through the rough times ahead. The mention of rough times ahead may have set some political noses twitching. But if it is realized that the contradictions in Nigeria are yet to be resolved, we will agree that Nigeria has anything but quiet to look to.

He was right. Yet, as Alexis de Tocqueville observes "never was any such event, stemming from factors far back in the past, so inevitable yet so completely unforeseen." While the Niger Delta conflict may not have taken analysts by surprise, the new manifestations of the violence particularly the spaces within which they are occurring, is to say the least, unfathomable. For example, since the end of the Biafra war, indicator after indicator have shown that the deep fissures that produced the war are lurking in shadowy spaces in the Nigerian clime, restless to produce another round of blood bath, only this time, with repercussions for the world's economic security and African regional stability. However, while the Biafra war was waged between clearly defined social units and armies, the current war is waged between a state army with identifiable landmarks, territory, and assets and a faceless, amorphous group of fighters with no

clearly marked territory and assets, but with a lot of violent rage and the means to do incalculable damage. It is this new war frontier with its own internal and external logics that is posing new challenges to peace building advocates across the world.

The struggle over control of the Niger Delta resources has not always been violent. Niger Delta communities from the very beginning were interested in negotiating and dialoguing the contentious politics of oil production. Osaghae et al (2007:10) reports that the struggle over resources was pursued by two set of actors: the elders/elites and the youths. They describe the elites as “businessmen, retired civil servants, traditional leaders, and political leaders in the Niger Delta. They generally adopt a peaceful, non-violent approach that maximizes negotiation and dialogue to resolve grievances. These elites pursue their demands through two types of movements: socio-political movements and ethno-cultural movements. Both of these movements abhor violence and use their political and cultural influences to press for changes in resource allocation and the provision of basic infrastructures including roads, schools, and health centers in the Niger Delta. However, their involvement took a violent turn in reaction to the repression they suffered during the Abacha military regime. Following the annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential elections and the parlous state of the Nigerian economy that was characterized by unemployment, poverty, and discrimination (all outcomes of the IMF/World Bank inspired policy of structural adjustment fastidiously implemented by the Gen. Babangida administration from 1985-1993), Niger Delta youths began to challenge the Nigerian state, oil companies, and elites in the region. The youths became increasingly suspicious of their elders and elites who they accused of being weak, fearful, greedy and generally ineffective in obtaining concessions from government and the oil companies on behalf of the people. They therefore resolved to seize the bull by the horn by mobilizing and engaging the state and the oil companies (Ikelegbe 2005).

Emboldened by their December 1998 convention in Kaiama, Bayelsa State, the youths began to make serious demands on the oil companies and the Nigerian state. For example, following the Kaiama declaration, the youths gave the MNCs a two-week ultimatum to pay compensation for the ecological damages caused by oil production or face militant action. They also asked the government to reverse itself on the revenue allocation formula or face violent resistance from the youths (Osaghae et al 2007). At the expiration of the two weeks' deadline, the youths under the nickname "egbesu boys" staged a peaceful demonstration to the seat of government in Yenagoa, Bayelsa state but were brutalized by agents of the state. To avenge the killing of their members, the youth reconvened in the evening and attacked military checkpoints and police stations, seizing weapons and ammunition. The action of these youths spread quickly and was replicated by youths in Odi and other communities such that in only a couple of weeks, violent resistance had become the creed in the Niger Delta forcing many oil companies to halt production and evacuate staff. Operation Climate Change (a series of activities designed to raise environmental awareness all over Ijaw land) had begun.

In response to the spreading insurgency, the federal government deployed two war ships and about 15 thousand troops of soldiers to the region, particularly Bayelsa State, which had become the hotbed of insurgency. On the morning of December 30, 1998, about two thousand youths dressed in black marched through the streets of Yenagoa, singing and dancing. Soldiers armed with machine guns and rifles opened fire on them killing three protesters - Amy Igbila (19yrs), Engineer Frank (28 yrs), and Goodluck Wong (29yrs) - and arresting thirty others (Okonta and Douglas 2003). The youths retreated but staged another march to demand the release of those arrested. Again, this new set of demonstrators was repelled by the fire power of the state and three additional demonstrators including Nwanchuku Okeri and Ghadafi Ezeifile were killed. A

state of emergency (the first of its kind) was imposed by the military throughout Bayelsa state and all forms of congregation even for church or worship were banned. Citizens were incessantly harassed and brutalized at military check-points and many reports of rape and extra-judicial killings were recorded.

The killings and maiming continued in the New Year and Ijaw villages were invading by soldiers. Kaiama, Yenagoa, Odi, and Oloibiri were besieged resulting in the death of hundreds of people and the displacement of thousands more. Also, two Ijaw communities (Opia and Ikenya) in Delta state were invaded by hundreds of soldiers. In those villages houses were burnt to the ground killing people, livestock and destroying fishing equipment and religious places. Nonetheless, "Operation Climate Change" continued with the formation of die-hard militant groups including the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA), and the Martyrs Brigade (MB) (Okonta and Douglas 2003; Hanson 2007).

These organizations along with others comprise thousands of well-armed youths trained in covert military operations and determined to engage the forces of the state in prolonged warfare. Two of these groups - NDPVF and MEND - deserve some more detailed discussion. The NDPVF was formed in 2003 as the militant wing of the Ijaw Youth Council. Its leader is Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo, erstwhile controversial president of the Ijaw Youth Council. According to Omojola (2009), the NDPVF was formed in reaction to the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta, the exclusion of Niger Delta peasants from the benefits of oil production, the ecological devastation of the Niger Delta area as a result of oil production, and the wide scale socio-political and economic marginalization of people of the Niger Delta. Thus, its primary goal is the mobilization

and organization of the youth against oil conglomerates and the state, which is in alliance with the oil multinationals.

The conflict between the NDPVF and the state has its roots in broader political scheming and arrangements. Following the 2003 nationwide elections, a turf war between the NDPVF leader AsariDokubo and the leader of the Niger Delta Vigilante, Tom Ateke, over support for candidates to elective offices in Rivers State, escalated due to Dokubo's perception that the State was aligned with Ateke. Miffed by this, Dokubo decided to engage agents of the state and oil corporation in an all-out war. He served quit notices to the oil companies active in the Niger Delta and raised an army he claimed was 10,000 men strong to "reclaim the resources of the Niger Delta." Amongst other demands, Dokubo and the NDPVF sought "resource control and self-determination" "by every means necessary," including kidnapping of oil workers, seizure of oil facilities, looting of crude oil, and physical engagement with security forces. It would appear that Dokubo's opposition to the state is a complete turnaround from the very cozy relationship that he had with the managers of the state prior to the conclusion of the 2003 elections. In fact, both Ateke's NDV and Dokubo's NDPVF along with many of the other militant groups operating in the Niger Delta got their start from the financial (and arms) support they received from politicians in the oil-producing states. Thus, their insurgency was fueled by the localization of corruption, the rise of powerful machine politicians, and the liberalization of violence prior to the 2003 national elections. State and local politicians engaged and deployed ethnic militias and warlords as political thugs to intimidate voters, snatch ballots, and generally forcefully manipulate the results of the general elections which were marred by large scale violence. Also, these violent political campaigns were financed with proceeds from looted crude, wherein warlords were deliberately inserted into the oil theft expedition organized through an elaborate



state-centered syndicate involving top military, political, corporate, and local leaders (Watts 2008).

In contrast to the NDV and NDPVF, which arose from the deliberate manipulations of political gladiators, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) originated in response to a different but interrelated set of challenges. It arose specifically from the fallout of Dokubo's violent engagement with the state as well as political developments in Bayelsa State. In 2005, Dokubo was arrested by the Obasanjo government in an effort to stop the escalating violence in the Niger Delta area. His arrest created a vacuum in the blossoming militant movement which was worsened by a split among the leadership of the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Community. Also, in that year, the governor of Bayelsa State Chief D.S.P Alamayeseigha was arrested in a federal government inspired sting in London, impeached, tried, convicted, and imprisoned on corruption charges. At that time, Alamayeseigha was the highest ranking Ijaw public official and popular among the Ijaws who gave him the title of "governor-general" of Ijawland. His disgrace and incarceration was, therefore, seen as an affront on Ijawland and a calculated attempt to continue the political emasculation of Ijaw speaking peoples. Thus, MEND from the onset sought to wage both an ideological and a tactical war against the state. It mobilized support from the Ijaws with a consistent reference to the decades-long quest by Ijaws for political and social relevance. It tapped into the ecological despoliation of Ijaw land and the concomitant impoverishment of peasant Ijaw farmers. It idealized the failed Isaac Boro 12 day revolution calling on Ijaws to stand firm in defense of their "God-given resources." MEND parades a very sophisticated organizational structure similar to the more successful rebel organizations in other parts of the world. This is because it is led by "more enlightened and sophisticated men than most of the groups in the past" as its leaders are educated and have

studied militant movements in other parts of the world (Obasi 2007). Its great strength is that its structure is difficult to fathom because of its very nebulous nature. This is why MEND is seen as an "idea" more than an organization (Hanson 2007). Owen (2007) compares MENDs organizational and operational model to a franchise operation that must adapt to local conditions. According to him "Nigeria is a fluid and difficult place to operate, so you need to choose the organizational structure that allows you to operate best." MENDs structure permits the group greater flexibility and confounds efforts to incapacitate them.

Central to the extractive logic of petrol-capital is the willingness and preparedness of the state and its MNOC allies to wage conventional war against non-state actors including environmental rights groups, student organizations, and militant movements. This determination to brutally suppress groups that directly or indirectly threaten Nigeria's oil production capacity resulted in the extra-judicial murder of the Ogoni activist and playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others by the Gen. Sani Abacha military junta. This resolve, as we have seen, was also demonstrated when Odi (the second largest city in Bayelsa state) and other Niger Delta communities were invaded by federal forces beginning in November 1999. However, militants have shown equal resolve to violently challenge the prevailing extractive logics and the local and international coalitions that sustains them. Since Nigeria is almost entirely dependent on this industry, prospects of a prolonged warfare in the region are especially troubling. The present DDR intervention aims to peacefully resolve the conflict and end the violence.

**Table 2.1: Militant Camps in Niger Delta as at 30 June, 2009.**

S/ N	Name of Camp	Location	Status of Camp	Leader(s)
1	Olugbobiri	Southern Ijaw Bayelsa	Major	Joshua Mckivet
2	Korokorosei	SILGA, Bayelsa State	Major	Africa Owei
3	Okiegbene/ebrigberie	SILGA, Bayelsa State	Major	Gidson
4	Robert Creek	Nembe, Bayelsa State	Major	
5	Cowthorne Channel	Nembe, Bayelsa State	Major	
6	Camp 5	Warri, South, Delta State	Major	Govt, Ekpenupolo(Tompolo)
7	Okerenkoro	Warri, Delta State	Major	
8	Opuraza	Warri, Delta State	Major	
9	Azuzuama	SILGA, Bayelsa State	Major	Jackson
10	Gbekenegbene	SILGA, Bayelsa State	Minor	Not available
11	Ezetu	SILGA, Bayelsa State	Minor	Victor Ben Ebukabowei
12	Agge	SILGA, Bayelsa State	Minor	
13	Kurutiye, Forupa&Okubia	SILGA, Bayelsa State	Minor	Not available
14	Ken Camp	Odi, Bayelsa State	Minor	Ken
15	Egbema Camp	Warri, Delta State	Minor	Kemgbakara
16	Ubefan	Warri, Delta State	Minor	John Togo
17	Berger Camp	Warri, Delta State	Minor	IniloSinito
18	Niger Delta Voluntary Force (NDFUF)	Akuku – Tor, Rivers State	Minor	AlhajiAsariDokubo
19	Niger Delta Voluntary Movement (NDVM)	Okirika, Rivers State	Minor	Tom Ateke
20	Borokiri (Ice Landers / Outlaw Cult)	BorokiriPorthacourt, Rivers State	Minor	Soboma George
21	Yeghe	Bori, Ogoni Rivers State	Minor	Solomon Ndigbara

Source: Amnesty bulletin 2010

### 2.5 Amnesty

Amnesty is defined as “a pardon extended by the government to a group or class of persons, usually for a political offense; the act of a sovereign power officially forgiving certain classes of persons who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted”. It includes more than pardon,

in as much as it obliterates all legal remembrance of the offense. Amnesty is increasingly used to express “freedom” and the time when prisoners can go free.

Amnesties, which in the United Kingdom may be granted by the crown or by an act of parliament, were formerly usual on coronations and similar occasions, but are chiefly exercised towards associations of political criminals, and are sometimes granted absolutely, though more frequently there are certain specified exceptions. Thus, in the case of the earliest recorded amnesty, that of Thrasylbulus at Athens, the thirty tyrants and a few others were expressly excluded from its operation; and the amnesty proclaimed on the restoration of Charles II of England did not extend to those who had taken part in the execution of his father. Other famous amnesties include: Napoleon’s amnesty of March 13, 1815 from which thirteen eminent persons, including Talleyrand, were exempt; the Prussian amnesty of August 10, 1840; the general amnesty proclaimed by the emperor Franz Josef I of Austria in 1857; the general amnesty granted by President of the United States, Andrew Johnson, after the American Civil War (1861- April 9, 1865), in 1868, and the French amnesty of 1905. Amnesty in U.S politics in 1872 meant restoring the right to vote and hold office to ex-confederates, which was achieved by act of congress. Those were true amnesties, pardoning past violations without changing the laws violated.

An amnesty may be extended when the authority decides that bringing citizens into compliance with a law is more important than punishing them for past offenses. Amnesty after a war helps end a conflict. While laws against treason, sedition, etc. are retained to discourage future traitors during future conflicts, it makes sense to forgive past offenders, after the enemy no longer exists which had attracted their support but a significant number remains in flight from authorities. Amnesty is often used to get people to turn in contraband, as in the case of China’s gun

restrictions, or the Kansas City ban on pit bulls. Advantages of using amnesty may include avoiding expensive prosecutions (especially when massive numbers of violators are involved); prompting violators to come forward who might otherwise have eluded authorities; and promoting reconciliation between offenders and society. An example of the latter was the amnesty that was granted to conscientious objectors and draft dodgers in the wake of the Vietnam War in the 1970s, in an effort by President Carter to heal war wounds. (there was no longer a war to protest, and there was no longer a draft to dodge).

Amnesty can at times raises questions of justice. An example was the Ugandan government's offer not to prosecute alleged war criminal Joseph Kony, in hopes that further bloodshed would be avoided. David Smock noted, "The downside of it is the impunity that it implies; that people can commit atrocities and say they will only stop if they are given amnesty....."

Amnesty is also any initiative where individuals are encouraged to turn over illicit items to the authorities, on the understanding that they will not be prosecuted for having been in possession of those items. A common use of such amnesties is to reduce the number of firearms or other weapons in circulation.

### **2.5.1 Component of the Amnesty Programme**

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

While many contemporary approaches including multilateral and bilateral agencies continue to prioritize democracy and governance as key to long-term stability, many shorter term mechanisms for conflict prevention and peace building are assuming growing importance (Muggah, 2009). Selective amnesties, smart sanctions, and interventions such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) are increasingly being used to keep post-conflict societies from slipping back into conflict and to stimulate economic growth and development

(Doyle and Sambanis 2002). Paradoxically, as investments in such conflict prevention and peace building initiatives is growing, there is increasing doubts about whether they achieve what is attributed to them. For example, critics claim that DDR programs are too often narrowly conceived, inflexible, technocratic, bureaucratic, and detached from the political transition or broader recovery and reconstruction strategies (Muggah 2009). Because of these concerns, scholars seek more evidence that DDR can achieve what is expected and often is ascribed to it.

DDR comprises a cluster of activities designed to contain arms, dismantle armed groups and prevent the reoccurrence of war or violent conflict (Muggah 2009). Collier (1994), Berdela (1996), Stedman (1997), and Muggah (2009) argue that DDR is more often undertaken by a constellation of international agencies and national governments. From a political economy perspective, DDR encapsulates the strategic and bureaucratic priorities of the security and development sectors of a state. Because of this, the Nigerian Amnesty program stimulates the discourse on the policy priorities of the Nigerian government and particularly its political class or governing elites. According to Duffield (2007), DDR is at the heart of neo-liberal forms of power and government ability. This means that DDR does not emerge spontaneously from below; rather, it is part of what Muggah (2009:2) describes as a "broader 'Weberian' project of securing the legitimate control of force" from combatants on behalf of the state.

Contemporary DDR approaches typically consist of a series of carefully designed and phased activities aimed at creating a suitable environment that would encourage stability and development. Advocates of DDR believe that the three components of the program (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) interlock and are mutually reinforcing activities. Disarmament has been defined as the collection of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons from combatants and at times from civilians (UN 1999;

Nillson 2005). The focus of disarmament is the reduction of the number of weapons (especially illegal weapons) in order to create a safer society. Because the relinquishments of weapons have often been traumatic for combatants, the disarmament process is first and foremost a confidence-building exercise (Hithcock 2004). DDR advocates argue that disarmament is a critically important component and emphasize the generation of visible and tangible evidence of success in terms of arms and munitions collected. However, they recognize that this component alone is incapable of providing the desired outcomes and must be complemented with parallel activities such as demobilization, reintegration, economic reconstruction, confidence and security enhancing activities, and the promotion of democracy and the rule of law (Muggah 2009; Spear 2006). Although disarmament when undertaken with concrete verification mechanisms and when arms are destroyed has the potential for building confidence in the peace process between erstwhile warring parties as was the case in Northern Ireland, it is more beneficial for ex-combatants (due to improved socio-economic and political conditions) to abandon their desire to resort to arms in order to solve grievances.

Demobilization is seen as the process of disconnecting combatants from their armed groups or units or significantly reducing the number of combatants serving in armed units (Berdal 1996; Hithcock 2004; Nillson 2005). The goal of demobilization is to give back to the state, its monopoly of violence by disbanding non-state armed groups and paramilitary forces. This activity or phase is critical to the process of reintegration, which is defined as the political, economic, and social integration of ex-combatants, their families, and primary support network into civil society (Nillson, 2005). This definition includes several components including:

- 1) political integration wherein ex-combatants, their families, and support structure become part of the decision making process of their community.

2) Economic integration in which ex-combatants, their families, and support system are enabled to develop their livelihoods.

3) Social integration wherein local communities accept ex-combatants, their families, and primary support system as members of the community. Governments emerging from war frequently demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants into existing security structures and or civilian populations. Muggah (2009) argues that the challenges accompanying reintegration into either category are immense. Depending on the context, the process is often heavily politicized and the absorptive capacities of areas for civilian reintegration are often greatly limited (Azam et al 1994). Also, there is the possibility that ex-combatants that remained partially organized within their existing command structures could potentially play the role of spoilers as happened in Sierra Leone in 2000 (World Bank 2002). Along this line, Knight and Ozerdam (2004) observes that in some cases, ex-combatants unintentionally reinforced latent command structures especially when precautions to prevent this from happening were not adopted in advance. In contrast, if ex-combatants were too hastily demobilized especially when the process failed to adequately dismantle command and control structures as happened in Angola, they could trigger insecurity in the communities of return (Muggah 2009; Spear 2006).

Conventional DDR envisions a continuum that extends from a narrow minimalist (establishing security) to a broad maximalist (incorporating development) perspective (Jennings 2008). The minimalist approach according to Muggah (2009:23) is “focused on expedience, where the program aspires less to creating a lasting impact on the lives of ex-combatants and more to time-limited gains.” These approaches focus on removing weapons, cantoning ex-combatants and generally fulfilling the terms of peace agreements. While the strategic goals of the minimalist approach include a reduction of the likelihood of war reoccurrence, the micro objectives focus on



de-linking the command and control of armed groups. In contrast, the maximalist approach “implies a more ambitious, transformative reintegrative agenda (Muggah 2009).” The focus is on interventions that have more ambitious focus and scope. Their objectives include the rehabilitation of ex-combatants and the reinforcing of public institutions and their legitimacy by promoting markets, property rights, and socio-economic and political infrastructures. These objectives are partly achieved by redressing distortions in state spending and promoting policies and activities that stimulate economic growth and enhance human capacities and endowments.

Despite the great enthusiasm about its utility in conflict prevention or post-conflict intervention, a body of critical literature that questions and challenges core DDR assumptions is emerging (Jennings 2008; Pouligny 2004). One of the main concerns is that DDR glosses over the complexity of conflict and artificially grafts DDR programs onto volatile conflict and post-conflict societies. Case studies (Humphreys and Weinstein; Pugel 2009) for example, demonstrates the genuine risks that accompany the imposition of DDR interventions from the top especially if they are divorced from the political, social, and economic context in which violence or conflict is imbedded. Muggah (2009:3) observes that DDR is “too often resorted to in a knee-jerk fashion and launched in such a way that it is isolated from the broader clutch of processes associated with governance, state consolidation and economic recovery.”

Apart from this, critics also quarrel with the conceptual dimensions of certain aspects of DDR especially the aspect that concerns the reintegration of former combatants. The concern is that generic approaches to reintegration are inadequate for dealing with the heterogeneous and differentiated motivations of armed groups. Some critics worry that combatant-centric approaches to reintegration misfire completely and that investment should be directed instead to more inclusive or area-based programs focusing on employment, infrastructural development,

and economic growth (Pouligny 2004; Jennings 2008; Willibald 2006). These critics specifically target the rational choice models and monetary incentives (such as payments to combatants) dominating the field. Finally, critics and practitioners worry that DDR lacks clear benchmarks or metrics to determine success. Muggah (2009) argues that while this is also true of other development interventions initiated by multilateral and bilateral contributors in complex environments, the “fact that DDR deals specifically with weapons and armed groups suggests an extra layer of caution is warranted.”

## **2.6 Historical Background to the Nigerian Government Amnesty Programme**

The development of the amnesty programme came forth from the pronouncement of the amnesty programme by the then president of Nigeria which was followed up by the initiation of a Planning and Design Committee. This committee comprised of consultant from different background with skills in development and security project, skill stake holders, and government officials. The Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta (SAPND) is the chairman of the amnesty committee. Through the committee, a working plan was developed and the project is designated as an intervention project where amendment to its components are regularly reviewed and updated has its Standard Operating Procedures (SDP). It should be noted that this committee stands as a consensus building platform of the DDR project. Ejovi and Ebie (2013;132) recorded that the presidential panel of amnesty and the disarmament of agitators in the Niger Delta was held on May 5<sup>th</sup> 2009, and the panel set out the terms, procedures and processes for the amnesty implementation. The amnesty granted by former president Yar'Adua was in pursuant of section 175 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The DDR programme development originated from the mutual cognition and recognition of input from different key stockholders and ministries in the PAP committee to form Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).

The emphasis is on Nigerians designing the DDR project for fellow Nigerians. The DDR project is currently managed by Nigerians with 80 percent of the staff coming from the Niger Delta State- a strategy of owner-based model in the implementation style. The SOP forms the base line for the amnesty implementation. The Nigerian DDR is completely funded by the Federal Government of Nigeria(FGN) and comes under the presidency project and budget. However, the Office of the Special Adviser on Niger Delta ( OSAPND) through the SAPND directly defend the amnesty budget before the National Assembly so as to receive approval as part of the year budget; its disbursement is made directly from the central bank of Nigeria to OSAPND. At a recent press briefing by the SAPND, honorable Kingsley Kuku stated that a total of N234,133,917,560 (USD\$14, 233,064,89.72) budgetary allocation since its actual implementation program began in March 2010(Kuku 2014 a &b). This budget spending involves overhead cost for staff, delegate's stipends, and DDR project cost.

It is important to acknowledge that the Nigerian government decided to manage the DDR programmes by themselves. The possible reason might be that experiences from the Africa countries DDR program is a case study of itself for review and analysis, and it has not been so good. In addition, there were already emerging researchers with strong argument for local actor's involvement in peace building. Another possible reason might be that the FGN has already established sustainable structural transformation agencies or act at different period and this includes;

1. Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) in the 1960s.
2. Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) in the 1980s.

3. The Revenue Act by the national assembly in 1991. This law made provisions for more funds for the region for more development with 1.5 percent derivation funds (Eteng et al 2013;432).
4. Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992.
5. Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000.
6. Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs in 2008. (khan, 1994)

### **Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA)**

The Niger Delta Basin Development Authority is a service-oriented organization that is positioned to meet the water requirements of stakeholders in the most satisfactory and cost-efficient manner, while ensuring good quality and sanitation and paying adequate attention to the preservation of the ecosystem, using proven technology and a well-motivated workforce.

The vision of the NDBDA is in consonance with that of the Federal Ministry of Water Resources i.e to harness efficiently and effectively the nations water resources for multi-purpose uses in an integrated and sustainable manner to meet present and future needs- particularly as it affects the Authority's area of jurisdiction (Niger Delta Basin).

The NDBDA is to produce appropriate drainage and irrigation infrastructure for local farmers to boost food production within the time fund is appropriated. They are also to construct appropriate dams and reservoir infrastructure to store water for all year round agricultural uses. To also monitor the infrastructure already put in place for maintenance by the users/beneficiaries to ensure sustainability and value for the investment, to also train personnel on the use of the infrastructure/ facilities and work through the Honorable Minister of Water Resources and to make input on the funding requirement of the needed infrastructure for unhindered access to safe water and sanitation in the Niger Delta ([www.NDBDA.gov.ng](http://www.NDBDA.gov.ng))

## **The Niger Delta Development Commission**

NDDC was established in 2000, well before the amnesty program, to facilitate “therapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is , socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful”. After the 25-year Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan (NDRDMP) was launched in 2007, NDDC was designated lead agency for its implementation (Niger Delta Development Commission, 2001).That it was to be based in the Rivers state capital, Port Harcourt, and led by Niger Delta indigenes, raised expectations. The overwhelming verdict across the region, however, is that it has not met those expectations. In October 2013, then acting managing director Christy Atako reported that it had completed only 37 percent (2,328 of 6,349) of projects launched since 2000. That December, President Jonathan lamented that little on the ground justified the large federal appropriations for the commission. Its officials say projects are not completed due to inadequate funding and stress that they have never received their entire annual statutory budgets. While funds are apparently duly appropriated, the commission is often short-changed within the opaque federal bureaucracy; it is still owed more than 700 billion naira (about \$3.5billion) from the Obasanjo and Yar’Adua administrations (1999-2010). Projects are further impaired by the irregular manner in which contributing partners sometimes release funds without regard to legal requirements (Saliu, 2007). The NNDC has also been plagued by “recurrent internal power struggles and distrust among principal officers, compounded by board-management politics” that have stultified its performance and delivery. The most serious problem, however, may be corruption. There is concern the commission may in effect have become more a conduit through which funds are pumped into the pockets of politically connected individuals than a vehicle for the region’s development. Some politicians, especially in the federal legislative committees on Niger Delta

development, and also in the Delta states assemblies, are alleged to view and manipulate it as their cash cow. Funds that do reach the commission have also been the subject of charges of corruption and outright theft involving some governing board members and senior management. In 2009, a diagnostic review of the commission by Accenture Management Consultants reported that: “A critical look at NDDC’s operating model/structure reveals a misalignment between purpose and structure, as the mandates of a number of directorates are not clear”. A more recent report by the public service reform bureau concluded that “virtually everything that could be wrong with an organisation is wrong with NDDC ....[It is constrained by] poor leadership, weak institutional systems and a culture of impunity ... [and] the development interests of the Niger Delta region do not appear to be the primary concern of many in the Commission”.(kingman, 1999)

### **The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs**

Created in 2008, the ministry was conceived as a federal mechanism to formulate and execute programmes and projects for development and security in nine oil-producing States. Its priorities are road construction; establishment of skills acquisition centers; water supply and electrification projects; housing schemes; environmental protection and remediation initiatives; agricultural and industrial development programs and public safety and security ([www.mnda.gov.ng](http://www.mnda.gov.ng)). Nevertheless, the ministry has had little impact. Many of its projects are incomplete or long abandoned. Its flagship effort, the 338km east-west highway that initially ran from Warri in Delta state to Oron in AkwaIbom state and is being extended to Calabar in Cross River state is significantly over budget and still under construction, despite repeated assurances of imminent completion. Public confidence has diminished. In April 2013, Ondo state oil-producing communities demanded it be disbanded. In March 2014, Senator James Manager, chairman of

the Senate committee on the Niger Delta, observed that it had “failed to commission a single project since its creation”. Donors have failed to finance a proposed \$10 billion multi-stakeholder trust fund for a ten-year Niger Delta Development Action Plan, unveiled in 2013. Performance is hampered in several ways, beginning with dwindling budgets. Of the 456 billion naira (about \$2.8 billion) the ministry received over six years, 2009-2014, 349 billion naira (\$2.1 billion) went to the east-west highway. Like the NDDC, it has not received all its appropriations (daily sun, 2015). In 2013, a year in which, Senator Manager observed, it was “terribly underfunded”, the finance ministry released only 49 percent of what it was due. In July 2015, the ministry’s permanent secretary reported that since 2012, it had received from finance between 48 per cent and 50 per cent of appropriated funds. From August 2014 until July 2015, she added, nothing had been received for capital projects.

The ministry also faces organisational and operational challenges. A UNDP governance expert observed: “The MNDA is a regional ministry, but is configured like a technical line ministry. The result is that it lacks the essential regional focus and presence to address and respond to the development challenges in the region”. The terrain in most of the region makes road and other infrastructure construction more expensive than elsewhere; work is further hampered by the long rainy season, intermittent disruptions by youths, excessive demands on contractors by some communities and influential individuals and kidnappings (daily sun, 2015).

The ministry is also allegedly hobbled by corruption. Contracts were said to have been awarded to companies in which senior government officials, members of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the dominant party in the Delta, and prominent ethnic leaders have substantial interests, regardless of their performance history or capacity. In 2014, the House of Representatives Committee on Niger Delta Development said it had discovered numerous contract irregularities,

including that over 30 companies that received contracts for infrastructure development projects were not properly registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission, the most basic requirement for doing business in the country. A director in the ministry's finance and accounts department and four other staff are presently on trial in an Abuja High Court over a 700 million naira (\$3.5 million) fraud charge.

In addition to their separate shortcomings, the NDDC and MNDA have been undermined by institutional rivalry. A governance expert observed that they “function in silos”, independent of each other, resulting in “lack of coordinated and concerted development actions, and duplication of projects and waste of resources”. With respect to development, the Delta remains largely as it was when the insurgency ended in 2009. The frustrations arising from the unmet hopes, persisting poverty and rising unemployment risk leading to resumed agitation and youth militancy. They could also provide a pretext for organised gangs to resume attacks on oil industry installations in the name of advancing the region's struggle for environmental and distributive justice.

### **The Petroleum Industry Bill**

The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), is an effort to conform the oil sector to international norms and improve relations with host communities, is also a source of tension. The draft that was first submitted to the National Assembly by President Yar'Adua in December 2008, withdrawn and then re-submitted by President Jonathan in July 2012 recommended, among other things, creation of a Petroleum Host Communities Fund (PHCF) for the development of communities within the petroleum-producing areas. It proposed this be financed by a 10 per cent net profit tax on every upstream producing company but did not define a “host community” or an institutional structure for administering the fund.



The bill has raised local expectations, but passage is held hostage by several interests. Northern lawmakers and other elites argue that the need the fund is meant to address has long been dealt with by earlier concessions to the Delta, including the 13 per cent derivation formula, the NDDC, the MNDA and the amnesty program. Several northern policy analysts have argued that, if passed in the form proposed by the Jonathan administration, the Delta states would reap a disproportionate share of national resources. Multinational oil companies, such as Shell and Exxon, argue the new tax would render their projects unprofitable; other stakeholders object to the discretionary powers the bill would grant the petroleum resources minister and the governing structures of the National Oil Company, National Gas Company and National Petroleum Asset Management Company, which are proposed to replace the NNPC. The bill's future is thus uncertain.

The programme structures of these agencies provided experiences and lessons learnt which will obviously play a dominant role in the amnesty decision making and framing of the DDR project in 2009. Out of the four(4) development agencies in the list above, only NDDC is functional today with OSAPND but with different mandates and responsibilities in Niger Delta Region. Given the implication of the likely DDR project cost and the issues of the conflict- the FGN is confident of funding the DDR programme without assistance.

It is particularly interesting to note that the introduction of new trend by Nigerian DDR project- that is, the incorporation of 1000 people from the impacted- conflict-communities (ICC) into the DDR training programmes. The local actors/ implementers extended the training opportunities to people whose communities were immensely affected by the decades of oil conflict by the region. These categories of people form the second cohort of amnesty project beneficiaries. Of

importance to note is that this 1000 people never carried arms during the conflict but directly affected by the destructions of lives and properties.

The Demobilization/Rehabilitation and Reintegration activity is estimated to last about 5years for the first phase. 30,000 ex-agitators(militants) were targeted.


**Table 2.6.1**

From August 6- October 4, 2009. Disarmament activities with key activities being:	Then 6-12 months	Lastly up to 5 years(up to first phase)- reintegration with key activities being:
1) Collection of arms and ammunition, explosives	Verification and documentation	Knowledge and skills acquisition
2) Documentation and biometrics	Wellness assessment	Education
3) Destruction of arms and ammunition	Transformational nonviolence training	Reconciliation with local community
4)	Peace-building and conflict resolution	Conflict resolution framework/mechanism
5)	Counseling and career guidance	Financial empowerment
6)	Reintegration classification	Monitoring and evaluation
7)	Graduation and demobilization	Exit of Amnesty

30,000 ex-agitators have been successfully demobilized from June, 2010- December, 2012 (Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, 2015).

This study, therefore, is intended to provide the much needed evidence whether the amnesty programme has been faithfully implemented and everything stated in the blueprint for the development of the region that was promised has been carried out. The study will be used to assess the performance of Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta. This evidence will now provide the answer to whether the amnesty programme can guarantee a long-term peace and development in the region.

**KEY COMPONENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTY PROGRAMME**



**Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme April, 2015)**

## 2.7 Theoretical Framework

There are two distinct bodies of theoretical framework in regards to this research work. The first operates under the rubric of conflict formation theory which is a strand of conflict theory and contains four theoretical postulations that draw attention to the formation of the violence in the Niger Delta. The second theory is the incrementalist theory which explains the implementation of the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta region.

### Conflict Theory

In the late 1960s Johan Galtung (1969; 1996: 72) proposed an influential model of conflict that encompasses both symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. He suggested that conflict could be viewed as a triangle, with contradiction (C), attitude (A) and behaviour (B) at its vertices. Here the contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived 'incompatibility of goals' between the conflict parties generated by what Mitchell calls a 'mismatch between social values and social structure' ( Mitchell, 1981: 18). In a symmetric conflict, the contradiction is defined by the parties, their interests and the clash of interests between them. In an asymmetric conflict, it is defined by the parties, their relationship and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship. Attitude includes the parties' perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These can be positive or negative, but in violent conflicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of the other, and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Attitude includes emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative (will) elements. Analysts who emphasize these subjective aspects are said to have an expressive view of the sources of conflict.

Behavior is the third component. It can include cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behaviour is characterized by threats, coercion and

destructive attacks. Analysts who emphasize objective aspects such as structural relationships, competing material interests or behaviours are said to have an 'instrumental' view of the sources of conflict.

Galtung (1969) argues that all three components have to be present together in a full conflict. A conflict structure without conflictual attitudes or behaviour is a latent (or structural) one. Galtung (1969) sees conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. As the dynamic develops, it becomes a manifest conflict formation as parties' interests clash or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive. Conflict parties then organize around this structure, to pursue their interest and the same time develop hostile attitudes and conflictual behavior. And so the conflict formation starts to grow and intensify. As it does so, it may widen, drawing in other parties, deepen and spread, generating secondary conflicts within the main parties or among outsiders who get sucked in. This often considerably complicates the task of addressing the original, core conflict. Eventually, however, resolving the conflict must involve a set of dynamic changes that involve de-escalation of conflict behaviour, a change in attitudes and transforming the relationships or clashing interests that are at the core of the conflict structure.

A related idea due to Galtung (1990) is the distinction between direct violence (children are murdered), structural violence ( eg. children die through poverty) and cultural violence. The type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence is often referred to as personal or direct violence and to violence where there is no actor as structural or indirect violence. In both cases individuals may be killed or mutilated, hits or hurt in both senses of these words and manipulated by means of stick or carrot strategy but whereas in the first case this consequences can be traced back to concrete persons as actors, in the second case this is no longer meaningful.

There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances. Structural violence is a form of violence wherein some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. Institutionalized adultism, ageisms, classism, elitism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, racism and sexism are some examples of structural violence as proposed by Galtung. These structures make for opportunities and advances that humans could not create for themselves, including the development of agriculture, technology, science and art; however, these structures take tolls elsewhere, meaning that these structures are both productive and detrimental (Sinisa, 2016). Resources are unevenly distributed, as when income distributions are heavily skewed, the literacy/education unevenly distributed, medical services existent in some district and for some groups only, and so on. Above all the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed. The important point here is that people are starving when this is objectively avoidable then violence is committed regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation, as during a siege yesterday or no such clear relation, as in the way world economic relations are organized today.

Although structural violence is said to be invisible, it has a number of influences which shape it. These include identifiable institutions, relationships, force fields, and ideologies, including discriminatory laws, gender inequality, and racism (Chopra A, 2014). Moreover, this does not only exist for those of the lower class, although the effects are much heavier on them, including the highest rate of disease and death, unemployment, homelessness, lack of education, powerlessness, and shared fate of miseries. The whole social order is affected by social power (Chopra, 2014).

Cultural violence refers to aspects of a culture that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence, and may be exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art. Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look or feel “right”, or at least not wrong (Galtung, 1990). One mechanism of cultural violence is to change the “moral color” of an act from “wrong/red” to “right/Green” or at least to “acceptable/yellow” (Galtung, 1990).

Direct violence can end by changing conflict behaviour, structural violence by removing structural contradictions and injustices, and cultural violence by changing attitudes. These responses relate in turn to broader strategies of peacekeeping, peace building and peacemaking. Galtung defined ‘negative peace’ as the cessation of direct violence and ‘positive peace’ as the overcoming of structural and cultural violence as well. As related to the issue of the causes of the Niger Delta conflict, it is the various institutions developed by the Federal Government that is hampering development in the Niger Delta Region and also various discriminating laws, revenue allocation, that is causing the conflict in the Region and the way the Government tend to address it is to implement the Amnesty Programme so that the people of the Region could start benefiting from their resources and also cause a meaningful development in the Area.

### **Conflict Formation Theory**

The study will examine four distinct ideas related to the formation of the Niger Delta conflict. Firstly, to examine the issue of environmental security, Interest in these issues peaked after the publication of Tad Homer-Dixon’s (1999) “Environment, Scarcity and Violence,” Robert Kaplan’s (2000) “The Coming Anarchy,” and Michael Klare’s (2001) “Resource Wars.” These works and many others which focus on the environment raise questions concerning environmental degradation, rehabilitation, and conservation. For example, Kaplan in “The Coming Anarchy” argued that "eco-demographic pressures" have created numerous emergencies



within African states including poverty and malnourishment, and these challenges have forced many African societies into acts of violence. In essence, the violence in the Niger Delta results from environmental degradation including oil-induced pollution that has immense negative effects on the local economy. By this analysis, Niger Delta militants use violence not only to force environmental rehabilitation and conservation, but also as a means of economic subsistence.

The second strand of conflict formation theory focuses on the tension between resources, politics, and civil conflict. Khan (1994), Karl (1997), Coronil (1997), Collier, (2000), Watts et al (2004), and Robinson (2006) examine polities dominated by oil revenue and the mechanisms through which rent-seeking produces what Watts et al (2004) call “petrol regimes”. They observe that oil rent in Nigeria has historically sustained a “parasitic ruling elite” and enabled the state to fraudulently purchase political consent from exploited minorities while maintaining the “delicate northern hegemony within a competitive multi-ethnic polity” (p4). Okilo (1980), Ikporokpu (1996), and Watts et al (2004) argue that consent is obtained through a derivation principle that distributes oil rents and royalties to states and this is complicated by massive institutional corruption.

Similarly, Collier (2000) uses resource-dependency to analyze and explain rebellion in Africa. According to Collier (2002), oil is a lootable resource that engenders intense antagonisms amongst competing socio-political forces. The predatory nature of these diverse forces within and outside of government produces armed conflict and civil wars. Thus, people rebel not because of the existence of grievance but because of the abundance of opportunities available to do well through war. Colliers economics of war thesis has found support from Keen (2005) and Reno (2000). Keen argues that the objective of warfare is not to win but to create conditions and

opportunities for the plundering of vital resources without the requirement of accountability. In this sense, internal warfare does not approximate to the breakdown of law and order or of rationality; instead, it creates a new type of order and rationality. Keen argues that civil war stimulates “another system of profit, power and even protection, granting actors the opportunity to loot, and exploit civilians” (Keen 2005:51). Ren(2000) also attaches little significance to grievance. He argues that corruption, the privatization of the state, and the personalization of power weakens state institutions and leads to state collapse with warlords superintending over vast fractious of territories that have lootable natural resources. Injustice and social grievance, therefore, exist only as ideological tools utilized by greedy persons to access lootable resources.

The third strand of conflict formation theory addresses ethnicity, ethnic mobilization, and ethnic conflict (Ijomah 1998; Sagay 2008; Watts et al 2004). These works help us understand Nigeria’s pre-colonial and post-colonial political formations and its nascent federalism. Sagay (2008), observes that before colonialism there was no Nigeria. Nigeria is a British creation and consists of over 400 fiercely independent and often acrimonious nationalities. These societies would fight over territory, food, culture, religion, trade, and opportunity. Ijomah (1998) describes these nationalities as "inconsistent cognitive elements" which were forced together to pursue British economic interests. He accused the British of not "creating clear behavioral assertions" to foster nationhood. Watts *et al* (2004) examine local forms of community and ethnic mobilization that are vital aspects of the social relations of oil extraction. How these relations are forged, negotiated, and reconfigured including land use and reform, customary laws, territoriality, contact with oil companies and forms of identification (ethnicity, gender, age, chieftaincy, clanship) around traditional authority and locally specific forms of capitalist development have important implications for the Niger Delta conflict.

The fourth strand of conflict formation theory associate oil neither with incumbent politics nor predation proneness. Instead, it focuses on the link between violent intra-state conflicts and state/corporate enclave politics. Watts et al (2004: 5) note the striking “lack of local level dynamics ... and the total invisibility of both transnational oil companies (which typically work in joint ventures with the state) and with the intersection of local politics and petrol-capitalism.” Instead of pursuing oil extraction as a source of predation or state military power, Watts et al (2004) focuses on how petrol-capitalism produces particular kinds of enclave economies and governable spaces that are characterized by instability and armed violence.

It is easily seen, then, that theories of conflict formation are immensely useful for explaining the causes of the Niger Delta conflict and the mobilization of insurgency. However, they have limited application in explaining the peacebuilding process or the transformation of destructive conflict to constructive conflict. They also have limited applicability in regards to the larger conceptual quarrel between change and stability and their connection to the implementation of the Amnesty Program.

### **Incremental Theory**

The notion that decision makers incremental course corrections from the status quo has dominated thinking about policy change since the late 1950s. While the concept is general, it has been applied with particular success in the study of public policy (Lindblom, 1959).

The incrementalist based their approach to budget behavior on models of decision making featuring Consideration of limited rationality in the face of complexity and uncertainty. In that framework outputs are governed by Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and these SOPs are incremental in nature (Wildavsky, 1974).

Policy makers are expected to use incremental decision rules for three reasons. The first involve the relative ease of reversing mistakes following incremental changes. The second concerns the desire of participants to establish stable expectations in a complex and uncertain environment. Third concern the nature of overlapping, conflicting, and interacting institutions, which push policy makers toward compromise (Davis, 1966).

Incrementalism in its pure form implies that a decision path will be a random one. This is the case because today`s decision is an adjustment from yesterday`s. However, we do not know exactly how increment adjustments are made at any one point in time. We commonly assume that the adjustment is random

Lindblom summarized six primary requirements of incremental model in this way; rather than attempting a comprehensive survey and evaluation of all alternative, the decision maker focuses only on those policies which differ incrementally from existing policies. Only a relatively small number of policy alternative are considered for each policy alternative. Only a restricted number of ‘Important’ consequences are evaluated.

The problem confronting the decision maker is continually redefined, incrementalism allows for countless ends- mean, and means –ends adjustments which, in effect, make the problem more manageable.

Thus there is no one decision or ‘right’ solution but a ‘never’ ending series of attacks on the issue at hand through serial analysis and evaluation.

As such, incremental decision- making is described as remedial, geared more to the alleviations of present, concrete social imperfections than to the promotion of future social goals (Lindblom, 1959).

Incrementalism also posits a structure model; it is presented as the typical decision-making process of pluralistic societies, as contrasted with the master planning of totalitarian societies. Influenced by the free competition model of economics incrementlists reject the notion that policies can be guided in term of central institutions of a society expressing the collective “good”. Policies, rather, are the outcome of a give and take among numerous societal “Partisan” (Borick,2005).

Partisan “Mutual – adjustment” is held to provide for a measure of coordination of decision among a multiplicity of decision makers and in effects to compensate on the societal level for the inadequacies of the individual incremental decision – maker and for the society`s inability to make decisions effectively from one center.

Incrementally theory holds that the selection of goals and objectives is intertwined with, not distinct from the scientific analysis of the problem. Decision makers only consider alternatives for dealing with a problem that differs marginally (Incrementally) from existing policies (suggesting that they do not completely remake policy every time they make a policy decision but instead refashion existing policy). For each alternative, only important consequences are considered. Problems confronting the decision maker are continually redefined. Constant ends– means and means-ends adjustment are made to better manage policy. Seldom are there ever decision or totally correct solutions available to resolve a problem (Davis,1966).

Incremental decision-making is remedial, not holistically devised or future oriented. Rarely are decisions faced in all or nothing terms (Borick, 2005)

Basic Assumptions of Incrementalist Theory:

- i. Decision makers only consider limited values, goals, alternatives and only realistic solutions to the desired goal.

- ii. The options available involves successive and limited comparisons
- iii. The goal of a policy is not radical, one time solution to societal problems but marginal or incremental policies or changes.
- iv. Policy proceeds in chronological series
- v. Policy makers do not seek to establish an optimal policy, rather, they confine their analysis to small variations to present policy
- vi. The test of a good policy is that it must be inclusive in nature.
- vii. The decision making process involves political bargaining and has to satisfy political rationality of decision makers.

This model is based on the premise that decision making process does not give itself to the postulations of the rational model that presupposes that the decision maker is like a rational being in the economic sense in that he desires only to satisfy his needs and because he has a perfect knowledge of the options available to him he chooses the best among available options. This model posits that in order for any policy to be made the main consideration is the need to build upon existing policy in that direction. This is done with a focus on the necessity of the moment and not a “one size fits all” approach but inclusive processes where all decision makers view are sort.

### **Weakness of the Theory**

Decisions by consent among partisans without a society wide regulatory center and guiding institutions should not be viewed as the preferred approached to decision making. Decision so reached would of necessity, reflect the interest of the most powerful, demands of the underprivileged and politically unorganized would be underrepresented.

Incrementalism tend to neglect basic societal innovations, as it focuses on the short run and seeks no more than limited variations from past policies, thereby wasting time dealing with the immediate problems and no overall strategy is developed (Yehezkel'1964).

Incremental theory is the antithesis of intrusive central planning, which can create rigid work systems unable to deal with the actual problems faced at the grass root level (Keneth, 1964). Despite its weaknesses the theory still has relevance in explaining the implementation of the Amnesty programme.

### **RELEVANCE OF THE THEORY**

The amnesty programme was instituted in 2009 after several consultations with stakeholders within and outside of the Niger Delta. This wide consultation is in line with the premise that for a policy to be adjudged successful, it must be sufficiently inclusive. To confirm this further, FME (2007: 2) reads “a good policy is one that clearly results from comprehensive involvement of key stakeholders in its design development” this is in line with the premise of incrementalist postulation that policy are comprehensive and involves many stakeholders like the case of the amnesty programme the interesting element that make up the committee is what the OSAPND call the “leaders”. The so called leaders are the key stakeholders, also included are the warlords and militia commanders. Inherently, there is a typical form of social capital on which the members of the Niger Delta Youths base their positions and this is referred to as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC). IYC plays a dominant role in the amnesty program hence majority of the delegates or leaders are also strong members or previous office- holders of the IYC. IYC provides a playground for future Ijaw leaders as well as offering access to wider oracle of influential people and their impact on the amnesty consensus building committee must be acknowledge. It is important to note that the DDR program development originated from the

mutual and recognition of inputs from different key stakeholders and ministries in the PAP committee to form the SOP.

The premise that decisions are made in chronological series is equally satisfied by the policy under review. The policy clearly was an improvement on similar policy on the Niger Delta crisis such as NDDC, Ministry of Niger Delta Affair among others.

Another postulation of the model is that policy proceeds from chronological series. This is given credence by this policy in the sense that it took different efforts at different time to come about the policy. Starting with the Nigerian Constitution which stipulates social justice and equality, the policy proceeds to create a just environment for the Niger Delta people.

Also, the premise that decision makers take decisions based on the limited resources, information and value available to them is found to be true within the context of the policy under review. The Federal Government did not have all the resources to settle the Niger Delta crisis that is why it has to spread the programme for a period of 5 years.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter discusses the techniques of deriving data for this study. The chapter talks on the location of the study, the sources of data collection, the sampling techniques and procedure and the technique of data analysis.

#### **3.2 Location of the Study**

The study area of this research is the Niger Delta area which may informally be referred to as the oil producing states in Nigeria. The area is made up of nine (9) states which are: Bayelsa, Edo, Delta, Ondo, Rivers, Cross River, Akwa Ibom and Imo with a total population of 31.2 million people comprising 185 Local Government Areas. Out of these states, Bayelsa state has been chosen as the case study for the research and this selection was done using the simple random sampling technique. Bayelsa has a riverine and estuarine setting. A lot of her communities are almost (and in some cases) completely surrounded by water, hence making these communities inaccessible by road. The population of the area is 1,998,349 as at the 2006 census (National Population Commission, 2006) it has an area of 21,110 km sq.

#### **3.3 Sources of Data**

There are two sources from which data for this study was generated. They are; primary and secondary sources.

For the primary source, the data for this study was generated through:

1. Open and close-ended questionnaires
2. In-depth Interview

For the secondary data, data was sourced from the existing literature documented in academic books, journals, periodical, published articles, magazines, newspapers and internet materials. These materials was assessed and collected from the Kashim Ibrahim Library (KIL) ABU Zaria, Postgraduate Library of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, ABU Zaria, Faculty of Social Sciences Library, and Department of Political Science Library among others. Also, the official reports and documents on the Niger Delta conflict and other government gazette on the amnesty programme was utilized.

### **3.4 Sampling Procedure**

The area of study which is the Niger Delta Region is made up of 9 States with 185 local government. Having chosen Bayelsa State has the case study using the simple random sampling technique, the State is made up of 8 Local Government Areas and 105 electoral wards (INEC, 2011) due to size and the need for a concrete study, two of the LGAs was selected for the study. The selection of the two local Government was done using simple random sampling techniques. Through this system, Yenagoa and Nembe LGAs were selected.

### **3.5 Population and Sample Size of the Study**

A population according to (Chein, 1981 in Nachmais and Nachmais, 2009) “is the aggregate of all cases that conform to some designated sets of specification” .Yenagoa and Nembe being the area of study has a total combine population of 484,275 (353,344 for Yenagoa and 130,931 for Nembe) as at the 2006 census (National Bureau of Statistics, 2006).

The sample size on the other hand is any subset of sampling units from a population. It is derived where a subset includes any combination of sampling unit that does not include the entire set of sampling units that has been defined as the population (Nachmias and Nachmais, 2009).

Yenagoa Local Government has a total number of sixteen federal wards with 236 polling units as presented in the table below

**Table 3.1: Distribution of the Wards and the Polling Units in Yenagoa LGA.**

S/N	Wards	Number of polling units
1	Attisa I	26
2	Attisa II	10
3	Atissa III	12
4	Epie I	17
5	Epie II	21
6	Epie III	19
7	Gbarain I	17
8	Gbarain II	17
9	Gbarain III	13
10	Ekpetiama I	18
11	Ekpetiama II	10
12	Ekpetiama III	17
13	Bisemi I	7
14	Bisemi II	12
15	Okordia	9
16	Zarama	11
Total		

**Source: INEC, 2008**

Table 3.1 above shows the distribution of the polling units in each of the sixteen wards in Yenegoa Local Government of Bayelsa State.

Nembe local government has a total of 13 federal electoral wards with 194 polling units as presented in the table below:

**Table 3.2: Distribution of the Wards and the Poling Units in Nembe LGA.**

S/N	Wards	Number of Polling Units
1	Bassabiri I	11
2	Bassambiri II	14
3	Bassabiri III	7
4	Bassambiri IV	8
5	Ikensi	29
6	Mini	18
7	Igbeta-Ewoama	27
8	Okoroma I	19
9	Okoroma II	15
10	Oluasiri	16
11	Ogbolomabiri I	11
12	Ogbolomabiri II	14
13	Ogolomabiri III	12
	Total	

Source: INEC, 2008

For this study, the sample size of 384 is chosen as representative of the total population of 484,275. This choice is arrived at using the Morgan and Kreiche's formula (Morgan and Kreiche, 1970). To arrive at that sample size, the formula:

$$S = \frac{X^2 NP (1-P)}{d^2 (N-1) + P (1-P)}$$

Where:

S = required sample size.

$X^2$  = the table value of chi-square for 1 degree of freedom at the desired confidence level

(3.841).

N = the population size.

P = the population proportion (assumed to be .50 since this would provide the maximum sample size).

d = the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (.05)

The study employs the **multi-stage cluster sampling technique**.

The sample size for each of the wards is derived with the formula:

$$\text{Ward Sample Size} = \frac{\text{Number of Pollin Units}}{\text{Total Number of Polling Units}} \times \frac{384}{1}$$

Based on the size as indicated in table 1 below, Yenagoa with a total of 16 wards gets 212 of the questionnaire while Nembe with 13 wards gets 172 questionnaires of the total of 384 questionnaires for the study.

From this formula therefore, the sample size for each of the wards is presented in the table below:

**Table 3.3: Distribution of the Wards and their respective Sample Size (Yenagoa)**

S/N	Wards	Sample Size $(\frac{N}{TN} \times \frac{384}{1})$	Number of Polling Units
1	Atissa I	23	26
2	Atissa II	9	10
3	Atissa III	11	12
4	Epie I	15	17
5	Epie II	19	21
6	Epie III	17	19
7	Gbarain I	15	17
8	Gbarain II	15	17
9	Gbarain III	12	13
10	Ekpetiama I	16	18
11	Ekpetiama II	9	10
12	Ekpetiama III	15	17

13	Bisemi I	6	7
14	Bisemi II	11	12
15	Okordia	8	9
16	Zarama	10	11
	Total	211	236

Source: Researcher's Calculation

**Table 3.4: Distribution of the Wards and their respective Sample Size (Nembe)**

S/N	Wards	Sample Size ( $\frac{N}{TN} \times \frac{384}{1}$ )	Number of Polling Units
1	Bassambiri	9	11
2	Bassambiri 11	12	14
3	Bassambiri 111	6	7
4	Bassambiri iv	7	8
5	Ikensi	25	29
6	Mini	15	18
7	Ibgeta-Ewoama	24	27
8	Okoroma I	16	19
9	Okoroma II	13	15
10	Oluasiri	14	16
11	Ogbolomabiri I	9	11
12	Ogbolomabiri II	12	14
13	Ogbolomabiri III	10	12
	Total	172	201

Source: Researcher's Calculation

Table 3.3 and 3.4 above shows the distribution of the sample size across the wards of the study area. At each of the units within the ward level, the **systematic sampling** method was applied whereby the first house was selected at random upon which the *n*th house was selected for administering questionnaire. The individuals selected in households where male or female.

### **3.6 Target Population of the Study**

The first category is the questionnaire which was administered to youth and elders of the region. The second category was interview with two staff each from the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and Amnesty office as well as community leaders from 2 of the communities selected for the study. Three leaders from any of the militant camps and five other members of the militant group will also be interviewed.

### **3.7 Method of data presentation and analysis**

The Data gotten from the field work was presented in tabular form followed by a qualitative interpretation and analysis of the tables. The interview was transcribed and the Data triangulated and analyzed.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME IN THE NIGER DELTA

#### 4.1 Introduction

This study is primarily aimed at assessing the performance of the Nigerian government amnesty program in the Niger Delta Region. To achieve this a total of 384 respondents were sampled for questionnaires however, only 325 questionnaires were duly filled and retrieved, consequently, the analysis in subsequent sections of this chapter are based on 325 retrieved questionnaires. The questionnaires are supported with interviews with selected officials and stakeholders on the Niger Delta issue. The analysis was run using statistical package version IBM 23. In presenting the analysis the bio data variables were presented in frequencies and percentages. Summary of findings as well as discussions on findings were also presented.

#### Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

In this section the demographic characteristics which include; age, religion, occupation and educational qualification were presented in separated tables for the options per variable distribution in frequencies and percentages.

**Table 4.1: Age distribution of Respondents**

Age	Frequency	Percent
18-25 yrs	50	<b>15.4</b>
26-33 yrs	145	<b>44.6</b>
34-41 yrs	111	34.2
42 yrs and above	19	5.8
Total	325	100.0

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

The table above shows that a total of 15.4% of the respondents are between 18-25 years, while 44.6% are between 26-33 years as against 34.2% that are between 34-41 years and the rest 5.8% are from 42 years and above. The data therefore reveal that majority of respondents are



between the youthful age. This is demonstrated in the presence of 94.2% (that is 18-41 years) of respondents being of the labour force age and are the most active population for violence.

**Table 4.2: gender distribution of respondents**

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Male	<b>197</b>	<b>60.6</b>
Female	128	<b>39.4</b>
Total	325	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Field Work, 2015

On the respondents gender status, while 60.6% are males and the rest 39.4% are females. This shows that majority of the respondents are males. However, the researcher got responses from both gender within the study area in which the women population are equally of a large number.

**Table 4.3 Religion Distribution of Respondents**

Religion	Frequency	Percent
Christain	296	<b>91.1</b>
Muslim	9	2.8
Traditional Religion	20	6.2
Total	325	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2015

According to the table above, a total of 91.1% are of Christian religion while 6.2% are of traditional religion and the rest 2.8% are of Islamic religion. It can be inferred from the table that majority of the respondents are Christians. The reason for this can be as a result of the fact that Niger-Delta areas are most populated by Christians which historically had the first contact with the colonial masters. The presence of animist as the second group of respondents with high number shows the preservation of tradition religion by some of the population.

**Table 4.4: Occupational distribution of Respondents**

Occupation	Frequency	Percent
Civil servant	80	24.6
Business	129	39.7
Farming/fisherman	104	32.0
Others	12	3.7
Total	325	100.0

Source: Field work, 2015

A total of 39.7% are business persons while 32.0% are farmers/fishermen as against 24.6% who are civil servants and the rest 3.7% are into other occupation including those who ticked unemployed. This shows that most of the respondents are either civil servants, business persons or into farming and fishing.

**Table 4.5: Educational qualification Of Respondents**

Qualifications	Frequency	Percent
No formal education	110	33.8
Primary education	73	22.5
Secondary education	102	31.4
Tertiary education	40	12.3
Tatol	325	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2015

On respondents' educational qualification 12.3% have tertiary education, while 22.5% have primary education, as against 31.4% who have secondary education and the rest 33.8% who have no formal education. The data reveals that the population is moderately educated as demonstrated with the high number of secondary school and tertiary school holders.

**Table 4.6: Awareness of Respondents on conflict in the Niger Delta**

Response	Frequency	Percent
Yes	315	96.9
No	10	3.1
Total	325	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2015

An overwhelming majority of the respondents numbering 96.9% are aware of the conflict in the Niger Delta while the rest 3.1% said they are not aware. This implies that most of the respondents are aware of the conflict in Niger Delta. The response from the table is justifiable revealing based on the span of years that the area has being under conflict. It is therefore not surprising that the vast majority of respondents are aware of the conflict in the region. In historic perspective, agitation within the region has being there as far back as 1966 when Isaac Boro moved other comrades for the emancipation of the region. This trend was also followed by other Niger-Deltans notably, Saro Wiwa who was executed by General Sani Abacha due to his tenacious call for resource control in the Niger-Delta.

**Table 4.7: causes of the Niger Delta Conflict**

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Unemployment	80	24.6
Poverty	118	36.3
Environmental degradation	45	13.9
Government Neglect	69	21.2
Others	13	4.0
Total	325	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2015

The table above revealed that 24.6% of the respondents believe that the cause of the conflict is unemployment while 36.3% believe poverty is the cause of the conflict as against 13.9% who believe that environmental degradation cause conflict and 21.2% believe it government neglect is the cause while 4% said other factors such as resource control, greed etc is the cause of the conflict. This implies that the main causes of conflicts include; poverty, unemployment, government neglect and environmental degradation. However, the major factor is poverty which is linked to other factors like government neglect, unemployment and others.

The informants from the interviews almost agreed that the main cause of the conflict in the Niger Delta is that of resource control, environmental degradation, unemployment, and poverty. Other

factors suggested by some key informants include; lack of development, youth restiveness and greed of governments. In an interview with one of the militant leader Gen. three lion of Niger Delta Cader in addressing the causes of the conflict stressed that:

Nigerian government practiced criminality, so we took arms for the whole world to know we are not satisfied. The major cause is environmental degradation but really unemployment was what really provoked us most in our group. Some states here existed before Abuja yet, they are backwards. Everywhere here is polluted, no schools, no treated water, no hospitals... (Interview, 2015)

Another unique findings in the in-depth interview, was the association between marginalization and the conflict. One respondent observed that:

“There are 15 obnoxious laws against the Niger Delta. 15 that we know, the land Use Decree, the Petroleum Act of 1959, amended in 1999, the exclusive Export Zone Decree, the Native Ordinances, 15 of them including the Obsome Land Law. All laws have enslaved the Niger Delta and enslaved the Niger Deltans. This is the abrogation of all these laws so that the Niger Delta people can have increased participation and authority over what rightfully belong to them”.

Suffice to say that in the in depth interviews, there were numerous indicators for the concept of marginalization.

**Table 4.8: Whether there are other Programmes taken by Government before the implementation of the Amnesty Programme**

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Yes	243	74.8
No	82	25.2
Total	325	100.0

Source: Field Work

A total of 74.8% believe that there are programmes taken by the government before the implementation of the Amnesty program while the rest 25.2% said government has not taken any programmes before the implementation of the Amnesty program. The table reveals that government has taken other programmes before the amnesty program; this agrees with existing

reality in which government had initiated several programs to quell the conflict in the Niger Delta such as review of the federal revenue formula to accommodate higher allocation to the region, the setup of the ministry of Niger Delta, the setup of Oil producing area commissions among others.

**Table 4.9: Some of the Programmes**

Responses	Frequency	Percent
NDDC	107	32.9
Ministry of Niger Delta	141	43.4
Oil producing Area Commission	58	17.8
Others	19	5.8
Total	325	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2015

The table above reveals the type of measure taken by the government before the implementation of the Amnesty program, a total of 32.9% said it is through NDDC while 43.4% said it is Ministry Niger Delta, 17.8% said it is Oil Producing Area Commission while 5.8 said others.

An informant stressed that “government created NDDC; ministry of Niger Delta was created but jeopardized. They used the money for something else” (Interview, 2015) another informant stressed that the measure used previously was dialogue. He however stressed that “these dialogues has not been taken seriously and somehow did not achieve its aim” (Interview, 2015)

**Table 4.10: Awareness of Respondents on the amnesty programme**

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Yes	319	98.2
No	6	1.8
Total	325	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2015

The above table shows that 319 respondents representing 98.2% said they are aware of the amnesty programme while the rest 6 or 1.8% said they are not. This implies that almost all the

respondents are aware of the amnesty programme. The data in this table is not surprising owing to the massive publicity given to the programme by the federal government at various stages of the programme.

The response above is also supported by the interview responses. An informant says “the programme has impacted greatly and restores peace. It is supposed to be a means to an end, to get people employed through training, to give room for investors to come into the country” (Interview, 2015)

**Table 4.11: The performance of the amnesty programme in terms of training of ex-militants**

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Very good	31	9.5
Good	127	39.1
Fairly good	101	31.1
Not good	66	20.3
Total	325	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2015

On how the amnesty programme has performed in terms of training ex-militant, 9.5% said very good while 39.1% rated it as good. Another 31.1% rated it as fairly good and the rest 20.3% rated it as not good. This shows that most of the respondents either rate the amnesty programme in terms of training ex militant as good.

The response by some of the interview indicates a partial agreement regarding the success of the training package. A respondent affirmed that “the amnesty programme have succeeded partially in the area of training. The training is very slow. Every camp has a number of people and they all need to be considered even the community members and not just us the militant”.

Also in an interview with Mr Salami of Amnesty Office, he affirms the fact that 30,000 militant members signed up for the Amnesty Programme and since then, the amnesty office has been

working to reintegrate them into productive society, primarily by placing (and sponsoring) them in vocational and higher education courses in Nigeria and abroad. As of March 2015, 15,451 had graduated, while 3,482 were still in training and 11,200 are awaiting training. As of August 2015, 17,381 have graduated from the training, 3,472 are currently in training, 877 were repatriated and 9,147 are awaiting training. (Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, 2015)

**Table 4.12: forms did the training take**

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Formal schooling	106	32.6
Vocational training	87	26.8
Skill acquisition	89	27.4
Others	43	13.2
Total	325	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2015

On what form the training took, a total of 32.6% said it took the form of formal training while 26.8% considers it as a vocational training. 27.4% said it took the form of skill acquisition and the rest 13.2% said it took other forms. This implies that majority of the respondents believe the training is in the form of formal schooling. The response tallies with the massive training of ex-militant educationally both within and outside the country.

The interview responses corroborated the table above. An informant said they have tried in the area of training our young ones in schools both in Nigeria and abroad. Although, he stressed that “government are using one hand to shake us and one hand to bite us” (Interview, 2015) The respondent further said:

*“they say they are learning to become carpenters and brick layers. Tell me, when they come back to the community, there is no industry, nowhere to apply their trade. They won’t even give them loans to establish a business. So where are they going to work? Where are they going to apply their trade? What is reintegration in all these? Is this what they call economic reintegration? It doesn’t make sense to me”.*

There was a high degree of uniformity among respondents that the Amnesty programme despite its vocational and skills training effort was a failure. Respondent cited the non- availability of industries to absorb the trained or retained ex-combatants, as one reason for the failure.

**Table 4.13: Is the Unemployment Situation in the Niger Delta Better Now Than Before the Conflict?**

Responses	frequency	Percent
Better	70	21.5
The same	150	46.2
Worse	105	32.3
Total	325	100

**Source:** Field work, 2015

The table above shows that 70 or 21.5 percent of respondent sees the employment situation in the Niger Delta as better now than before the conflict while 150 or 46.2 percent respondents sees the employment situation in the region as the same and 105 or 32.3 percent of respondent sees the situation as worse. Opinion of respondents in the in-depth interview are strongly uniform, what appears to be the consensus was that apart from the reinsertion benefits paid monthly to ex-combatants, there was no work to reintegrate ex-combatants into and also the 65,000 naira monthly stipend paid is well above the 18,000 naira national minimum wage and most entry-level salaries, many recipients would rather receive that payment than accept a job. Also only 233 of the delegates had found jobs with credible organization as of August 2015 (Federal Government Of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, (2015)).



**Table 4.14: In Terms of Medical Care, Oil- Related Pollution, and Education, Do You Think the Situation is Better Now Than Before the Amnesty Programme**

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Better	30	9.2
The same	260	80
Worse	35	10.8
Total	325	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

The table above shows that 30 or 9.2% of respondent agree that the situation in the Niger delta is better now in terms of medical care, Oil-Related pollution, and education than before the Amnesty programme while 260 or 80% agrees that the situation still remains the same. Only 10.8% of respondents agree that the situation is worse than before that Amnesty programme.

**Table 4.15: Does the Amnesty programme involve the local population in its implementation process**

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Yes	136	41.8
No	189	58.2
Total	325	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2015

The table above reveals that majority of the respondents numbering 41.8% said the amnesty programme has involved the local population in its implementation process and the rest 58.2% said it has not. The shows that the respondents are divided on whether the programme has being inclusive. Although, the higher number of respondents feel it is not consultative.

The interview with some militants shows that the programme has not being consultative. However, interview with other officials from the Amnesty Office shows otherwise. An informant affirmed that “the programme has succeeded in the area of consultative engagement. They have

an office on Peacebuilding and Community Integration Development (PBCID) (Interview, 2015).

**Table 4.16: level of satisfaction with consultation in the implementation of Amnesty programme**

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Very satisfied	30	9.2
Satisfied	50	15.4
Fairly satisfied	56	17.2
Not satisfied	189	58.2
Total	325	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2015

On the level of consultation in the implementation of the programme, a total 9.2% are very satisfied while 15.4% are satisfied as against 17.2% are fairly satisfied and the rest 58.2% are not satisfied. This shows that majority of the respondents are not satisfied with the level of consultation in the implementation of the programme.

The responses from the interviews clearly also shows the lack of consultations with the key stakeholders in the amnesty programme. One of the respondent Mr Festus categorically stated the total absence of consultation and constructive engagement by the government. He affirmed strongly that:

The problem with the amnesty programme is that the government just sits in Abuja, design one thing and think they have some slaves in the Niger Delta that must take whatever they brought from their Abuja. They should try and go to the rural areas for consultation, talk with the rural people and get to know their real problems because if indeed they have adequately consulted the people and tried to meet with their needs, why are there still militancy? (Interview, 2015)

**Table 4.17: whether the amnesty programme has had a positive impact on the peace process in the area**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	220	67.7
No	105	32.3
Total	325	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

The table above reveals respondents' view regarding the impact of the amnesty programme on the peace process in the study area. 32.3% feels the amnesty programme had impacted negatively on the peace process in the area while 67.7% feels the programme had impacted positively on the peace process in the study area. This shows that majority feels the programme had impacted positively on the peace process in the area.

The response here is however supported with most of the responses from the interview. One of the informants who was an ex-militant MrDagogo of Territorial Camp affirmed that the programme has had a positive impact on the peace process because many of the militants laid down their weapons and embraced the programme. Even the production of oil has greatly increased in the region and many of the youth involved in violence are now being trained in various areas of life. He however added that for the peace to be sustained, employment should be created for the youth, else, they will return to violence.

**Table 4.18: impact on the peace process**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Surrendering of weapons	49	28.3
Sending youths to schools	114	41.0
Reduce loss of lives	21	12.1
Reduced vandalization	32	18.6
Total	220	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2015

On respondents response on ways the programme has impacted on the peace process, 49 respondents representing 28.3% said it has made Surrendering of weapons by militants possible while 114 or 41% said it has enabled youths to be sent to school while 21 or 12.1% said it has reduced vandalization of pipeline and the rest 32 representing 18.6% said it has reduced vandalization of pipeline. This shows that the programmed has impacted on peace process especially through Surrendering of weapons by militants which is the first step in the process of building peace in any community and the rehabilitation of erstwhile militants by sending them to school.

In an interview with an ex-militant leader, general three lions, he affirmed that the amnesty programme has had a positive impact on the peace process. According to him

“it brought about peace, many have now gone back to school and left the creek. Many of us have never entered airplane but today some of us are pilots” (Interview, 2015).

Another informant stressed that “we all know the state of crime as of the crisis but after the Amnesty programme, there have been relative peace” (Interview)

**Table 4.19: How satisfied are you with the Amnesty programme generally**

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Satisfied	94	28.9
Not Satisfied	231	71.1
Total	325	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2015

The table above showed that 28.9% aresatisfied while 231 representing 71.1% are not satisfied. It can be concluded that only few are actually satisfied with the level of impact while majority of the people are not satisfied.

In the light of the interviews conducted, it can be inferred that few of the respondents feels the programme has had a great impact on the peace process also rumours that some militant were planning to return to taking up arms was confirmed to be true. Some of the ex-militant categorically stressed that if the government had stopped the programme by December 2015 as it promised to, they would have returned to the creek. An ex-militant Tubor, confirm to the researcher that government has tried in the area of training which has helped reduced violence in the area, he however stressed that in terms of infrastructure, the area is backward (Interview, 2015)

**Table 4.20: Do you think the Amnesty programme can guarantee peace in a long term?**

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Yes	45	13.8
No	280	86.2
Total	325	100

Source, Field Work (2015)

The table above shows that 45 or 13.8 percent of respondent believe that the programme can guarantee a long term peace in the region while 280 Or 86.2 percent of the respondents believe that the amnesty programme was a short-term success and long term failure.

The result of the in-depth interviews are interesting,respondent believe that the Amnesty programme cannot guarantee peace in a long term. They anchored the failure on aberrations in implementation, which one respondent(NP) calls the “Nigerian Factors”. The Nigerian factor refers to greed, corruption and cronyism rolled up in one. Another respondent Eti, Referenced the fact that some ex-combatants such as Gen John Togo who initially accepted Amnesty, went back

to fighting as evidence that the program was doomed to fail. He argued that the program appears successful now, only because, as is typical with new projects in Nigeria, funds are still flowing into and out of it. As soon as the funds stop flowing as we are already hearing, the fighting will resume

### **4.3 Summary of the major findings**

The following are some of the major findings in this research work:

1. Many theories have been advanced that attempt to link the Niger Delta conflict to economic fissures including poverty and unemployment. It has been shown that Nigeria has some of the highest poverty and unemployment rates in the world (UNDP 2006). The situation appears to be particularly dire for Niger Delta people because of the associated environmental problems resulting from oil production. This fact appears to be substantiated through these research findings. Both from the questionnaire and the interview responses, this research finds out that greed, pollution, resource control, infrastructural deficits, unemployment, poverty, marginalization, corruption, economic exploitation, are all causes of the Niger Delta conflict.
2. The amnesty offer, retraining and reintegration opportunities encouraged the insurgent groups to disarm; over 30,000 purported members signed up between October 2009 and May 2011. Since then, the amnesty office has worked to reintegrate them into productive society, primarily by placing (and sponsoring) them in vocational and higher education courses in Nigeria and abroad. As of March 2015, 15,451 had graduated, while 3,482 were still in training. About 11,200 (37 per cent of those who registered) were awaiting placement in academic or vocational training facilities and receiving a 65,000 naira (about \$350) monthly stipend. As of August 2015, 17,381 have graduated from the

training, 3472 are currently in training, 877 were repatriated and 9,147 are awaiting training (Mr Sanami, 2015). Judged by its primary objective of reintegration, the program has not really achieved significant results. The number of militant still awaiting training is quite disturbing because those militant might be forced to return to the creek if the federal government fail to do something about them shortly.

3. In an interview with Mr Sanami, he made the researcher to understand that as at the end of March 2015, only 151 of the 15,451 graduates from the training programs had found jobs with credible organizations in the country. Also as of August 2015, 233 of the delegates had found jobs both in Nigeria and outside Nigeria. Many currently being trained have high expectations of positions in oil, gas and aviation companies, but industry source insist there presently is limited room to absorb many job-seekers.

Also in an interview with an ex-combatant Emughan B P, he said 65,000 naira monthly stipend paid to the ex-militants is well above the 18,000naira (\$90.50) national minimum wage and most entry-level salaries, many recipients would rather receive that payment than accept a job. Ending those stipends could create new security problems.

4. The monthly stipends paid the militant are collected by the ex-militant commanders who then pay the “boys” who were in their camps, reinforced bonds that in some cases remain unbroken, giving the former commanders the ability to rally their fighters to any new cause and this also shows there is problem with the demobilization aspect of the DDR programme
5. The Amnesty programme did not adequately involve the local population in its implementation process. About 17.2 are fairly satisfied while 58.2 are not satisfied at all meanwhile there is an office on Peace Building and Community integration

Development(PBCID) in the Amnesty office responsible for that. This could be one of the reason the programme is encountering problems because when there is no adequate constructive engagement in a proper DDR program, that programme will fail in a long run.

6. In an interview with two militant group leaders, Mr Dagogo of territorial camp and Gen. Three Lion, it was discovered that most of the militants still at the creek were those that their names were not incorporated into the Amnesty program due to the fact that they never accepted the programme when it was still opened to them. Some of them never believed the programme so refused to accept it and when the programme started it was too late for their names to be included. This triggers their anger and agitation. This work also finds out that some ex-agitators returned back to the creek because they see the Amnesty programme as a failure.
7. Even after the rehabilitation exercise, in an interview with some ex-militants, they were still threatening to return back to the creek if the Amnesty program will end December 2015 because their needs were not fully met meaning violence is still considered the best option for agitation.
8. Majority feels the Amnesty programme has had a positive impact on the peace process in the region as many militant groups surrendered their weapons and accepted the Amnesty Programme. Oil production in the region has greatly increased, kidnapping has been reduced to the minimum and vandalization has also been greatly reduced. Foreign expatriates that once vacated the region have returned to business.



9. 45 or 13.8 percent of respondents believe that the programme can guarantee a long term peace in the region while 280 Or 86.2 percent of the respondents believe that the amnesty programme was a short-term success and long term failure.

The result of the in-depth interviews are interesting, respondents believe that the Amnesty programme cannot guarantee peace in a long term. They anchored the failure on aberrations in implementation, which one respondent (NP) calls the “Nigerian Factors”. The Nigerian factor refers to greed, corruption and cronyism rolled up in one. Another respondent Tubor, Referenced the fact that some ex-combatants such as Gen John Togo who initially accepted Amnesty, went back to fighting as evidence that the program was doomed to fail. He argued that the program appears successful now, only because, as is typical with new projects in Nigeria, funds are still flowing into and out of it. As soon as the funds stop flowing, the fighting will resume.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Summary

The Niger Delta Amnesty program was instituted at a time of great social, political, and economic ferment and trepidation. Fear hung in the air like ripened banana fruits. Apprehensive businessmen jettisoned their lucrative oil businesses and fled the region. People – natives and foreigners alike – dreaded to walk the streets at anytime. On top of all that, the Nigerian state was on the verge of economic ruin. 80% of its domestic revenue and 95% of its foreign exchange came from oil exports, mainly produced in the Niger Delta. A mix of socio-political, environmental, and economic challenges had unleashed the potent energy of peasant youths on the nation. Their modus operandi was simple, the use of armed violence to redress what they termed “decades of exploitation and marginalization.” Oil installations were attacked ceaselessly and oil workers, many of whom are expatriates, were kidnapped and released after the payment of hefty ransoms. Some of these “captives” died in the process of their capture, in captivity, or during attempts by security forces to seize them from their captors. Within a short while, the psychology of fear, upon which the militants based their operations, began to yield the real dividends. Governments (Local, State, and Federal) courted them. Politicians of different stature feted them. Oil companies, who for decades resisted calls to make their operations cleaner and safer, fell over them. And the militants milked these important stakeholders for effect. They issued threats and ultimatums, and in some instances, backed up their threats with action. Soon, they began to control their own territories, over which new emergent generals presided. By August 2009 when the Amnesty program was introduced, over 100 dreaded militant camps or

territories had been created. Militancy boomed and many individuals, who had no conception of the central ideas behind the Niger Delta struggle, became emergency, cash-and-carry militants.

Although militancy appeared to contain enormous benefits, there were also major challenges. The Nigerian state was capable and willing to use force to quell this emergent resistance movement. It did so with the creation of the Joint Task Force (JTF) a crack team of no-nonsense soldiers drawn from the various arms of the Nigerian military. The JTF in keeping with its mandate and promise to “fight to the finish” swung into action and leveled whole villages, leaving in its trail many deaths and a mass of homeless, traumatized, and angry villagers. Despite its mandate to “fight to the finish,” it soon became clear that the government had to adopt another approach, a less aggressive one, to deal with the problem of insurgency. The Amnesty program was that approach.

From the onset, the Amnesty program encountered difficulties. The first challenge was how to build confidence with combatants, many of whom had come to see the state and its representatives, as enemies. How do you encourage combatants who were suspicious of every move of government to suspend their apprehension and give the program a chance? Of a truth the Amnesty program got a big boost from the federal government especially with President Jonathan, himself from the Niger Delta, in charge. In order to surmount the first challenge, the program had to engage a second challenge – money. Where will the money come from to handle the different stages of the Program? This question, and the first, was answered when the government generously opened its coffers to the program. Huge sums of money were disbursed not only to buy the support of some renegade combatants, but also to establish the program as a long-lasting institution capable of resolving not only the conflict in the Niger Delta but conflict everywhere in Nigeria.

Today, the program is still active but the ceasefire that was called in order to establish the Amnesty program is no longer active. Despite what appears to be relative calm in the Niger Delta (compared to the situation in 2008 and 2009), violence everywhere in Nigeria appears to be spiraling out of control especially with the Boko Haram insurgency in the northern parts of Nigeria. Some stakeholders, however, believe that the Amnesty program is working. In fact, Kingsley Kuku, the special adviser to the Nigerian president on Amnesty, called the verdict on the performance of the program. According to him:

The amnesty proclamation, and subsequent post-Amnesty disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program, is the sincerest, boldest and most profound effort by any Federal Government of Nigeria since 1960 to address the agitation for fairness, equity and development in the oil-bearing Niger Delta.

In a sense, Kuku is right. There were drastic reductions in the levels and frequency of attacks immediately following the introduction of the Amnesty program. Overall, the study finds that the Amnesty program appears to be partially successful at the macro-level since it facilitated the resumption of full oil production activities in the Niger Delta. As a result, crude oil output increased from about 1.3 million bpd at the peak of the conflict to about 2.2 million bpd now. With this increase, government revenue from oil has increased tremendously and the profitability of oil companies has quadrupled. This is good news for the federal government and oil companies, which have been shown to be addicted to oil revenue or profit. This shows clearly that the state/petrol-capital alliance is the primary beneficiary of this DDR program. This partial macro-level success, however, must be qualified. Apart from enabling the resumption of full oil mining activities, the Amnesty program has been unable to engage other macro level changes. For example, it has not produced the much anticipated security sector reforms, which is crucial in order to develop the type of intelligence that would be proactive in preventing future armed conflict. The Nigerian Police Force, a humongous, monolithic body of law enforcement officers,

remains ill-equipped, ill-trained, and ill-funded to provide the much needed service to Nigerian people. Moreover, the task of using one central force to police a nation of 150 million people that are fragmented along multiple lines begs for urgent reforms. This was of no consequence to the planners and implementers of the Amnesty program. Also, cooperation or collaboration with other large scale institutions such as the school and the family has not been developed such that the success achieved at the level of increased oil revenue cannot be replicated elsewhere. Thus, apart from the state/MNOC alliance, other key sectors of the society appear to be alienated from the Amnesty program, thereby permitting the ultimate breakdown of the peace process.

At the micro-level, the results show that the program has effect on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. The program participants are less likely to reintegrate economically, which suggest a critical failure for the program. Because of its noticeable failure at the economic level, which in the Niger Delta is the structure upon which all else rests, the Amnesty program is unable to reconfigure the base of militancy in the Niger Delta. This is despite the fact that the program has been successful in co-opting and engaging some militant leaders (along with their members) through the payment of reinsertion allowances, choice contracts, and skill/vocational training. The refusal of many insurgent groups to enter the Amnesty program and the commitment of MEND (the main insurgent group in the Niger Delta) to continue armed hostilities with the Nigerian state is predicated in part on the program's remove from communities and local people whose sufferings fuelled agitation in the Niger Delta in the first place. These local people continue to suffer the negative effects of oil production including pollution. They also continue to be unemployed, poor and lacking basic necessities of life including medical care and education. Some Armed insurgent groups also refused to be part of the program because the framework for peace ignored some of the more direct causes of the

conflict including greed, corruption, and others. Those empowered to implement the program are part of the original architecture of the conflict and could not be trusted to implement the program in the best interest of the communities. The study demonstrates that the social, economic, and political circumstances surrounding the implementation of the Amnesty Program reflects defects in program design, ultimately affecting the outcomes. Not only did the program lack the endorsement of critical segments of the population including local communities and still active insurgents. Thus, the program failed most dramatically in its inability to provide ex-combatants with a longer term framework for economic advancement. It is clear, then, that the Niger Delta Amnesty or DDR program has been unable to alter the Niger Delta conflict dynamics in any sustainable way. The conflict, which initially was put in pause mode by the introduction of the Amnesty program, appears to be rebounding, and this will have dire consequences for people of the Niger Delta and all who come to the Niger Delta for economic or socio-political reasons. More importantly, the study finds that the Amnesty program preserved what Charles Tilly (1978) called “revolutionary situations.” Tilly described a revolutionary situation as the emergence of a condition of “dual sovereignty.” According to Tilly (1978: 200), dual sovereignty depicts:

The appearance of contenders or coalitions of contenders, advancing exclusive alternative claims to the control over the government ...; commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the subject population ...; the incapacity or unwillingness of the government or its agents to suppress the challenger coalition.

Thus, the Niger Delta conflict appears to be rebounding because the outcome of the peace initiative either preserved the existing condition of dual sovereignty or accelerated conditions for the rebounding of dual sovereignty. It is instructive to note that the conditions for the rebounding of dual sovereignty typically presents with the absence of outright military victories and often following negotiated settlements (Licklider 1995; Walter 1997; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003;

Mason and Quinn 2009). In the Niger Delta case, the extant negotiated settlement preserved some or all of the pre-conflict conditions that provoked the violence. In that sense, instead of weakening or dismantling the condition of dual sovereignty, the Niger Delta Amnesty or DDR program appears to strengthen that condition. As the condition of dual sovereignty waxes instead of waning, the Amnesty or DDR-induced peace fragments into the resumption of armed hostilities. The results of this study show clearly that the Niger Delta Amnesty or DDR program has preserved the structural conditions that make the resumption of armed conflict decidedly inevitable.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

With the costly Presidential Amnesty Program for ex-insurgents due to end in a few months, there are increasingly bitter complaints in the region that chronic poverty and catastrophic oil pollution, inadequate infrastructure, local demands for a bigger share of oil revenues, youth unemployment which fuelled the earlier rebellion, remain largely unaddressed.

Two agencies established to drive development, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), have floundered. Two others mandated to restore the oil-polluted environment (particularly in Ogoni Land) and curb or manage hundreds of oil spills yearly, the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP) and the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), have been largely ineffective. The PIB, intended to improve oil and gas industry governance and possibly also create special funds for communities in petroleum-producing areas, has been stuck in the National Assembly (federal parliament) since 2009. Although the Amnesty programme has been awarded a success in the sense that it has brought about relative peace to the region that was once

known for violence and restores oil production. The programme has also been credited for its ability to reduce kidnapping and attract foreign expatriate back to the region.

Despite all this success, majority of the people from the region are still not satisfied with the implementation of the programme because it is assumed that the programme only focuses more on militants compare to community members at large as many of their grievances are not yet met.

The Amnesty programme therefore as impacted positively to the peace process in the Niger Delta region but it cannot guarantee a long-term peace in the region as violence in the Niger Delta may soon increase unless the Nigerian government acts quickly and decisively to address long-simmering grievances and incorporate those militant currently at the creek into the programme.

### **5.3 Recommendations:**

To halt this drift, this study makes the following recommendations:

To the federal government

1. The DDR programme should be broaden so as to accommodate other victims of the environmental degradation suffered in the Niger Delta. Restricting the programme to only ex-militant only marginalises others who had also being affected but had not taken up arms.
2. Government should take urgent steps to stop environmental degradation by:
  - a. Reviving the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP) as a statutory entity, independent from the petroleum ministry, and directing it to commence clean-up arrangements and operations in Ogoni Land and other adversely affected areas quickly;



- b. Strengthening the ability of the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) to respond to oil spills rapidly and effectively; and
  - c. Discouraging the environmentally damaging proliferation of artisanal refineries by improving the availability of properly-refined petroleum products and creating long-proposed modular refineries across the region.
- 3. Government should strengthen security and rule of law, including by encouraging partnerships between security agencies and local communities in place of the pipeline protection contracts awarded to ex-militant leaders and ethnic militia groups.
- 4. The executive arm of government should work closely with the National Assembly to ensure speedy passage of the long stalled Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) this legislative year, on the basis of compromise between Delta interests and those of other areas.
- 5. The Winding down of the amnesty program should be gradual; this will allow for greater accommodation of the wishes of the trained militants to fit into available job opportunities.
- 6. Streamline regional development responsibilities, particularly by winding down the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) and reforming the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to make it a more accountable and effective agency and thereafter ensuring it is well-resourced. It is with such governmental efforts that the goal of ensuring a developed and secured Niger Delta can be achieved.

**To major oil companies, including Shell and ENI (NAOC):**

7. Major oil companies should Intensify efforts to curb pollution by upgrading or replacing aging infrastructure more regularly, installing more sensors for early detection of pipeline breaches, and giving greater support to NOSDRA and grassroots campaigns against artisanal refineries.
8. They should Intensify efforts to create jobs for local youth by increasingly outsourcing marginal jobs to local companies and utilizing local materials and expertise in compliance with the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act.
9. They should Honour financial obligations more conscientiously, particularly to the NDDC, NigeriaContent Development Fund, and Ogoni Environmental Restoration Fund.
10. They should also Contribute more actively to fighting oil theft, particularly by instituting better metering at production points and more transparent oil-loading arrangements.

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**APPENDIX ‘A’**  
**QUESTIONNAIRE**

**Department of Political Science and International Studies**  
**Faculty of Social Sciences**  
**Ahmadu Bello University**  
**Zaria – Nigeria.**

**Dear Respondents,**

I am a postgraduate student in the above named department, conducting a research on the topic: **An Assessment of the Performance of the Nigerian Government Amnesty Program in the Niger Delta Region.**

I would be grateful if you could answer the following questions by ticking and comment where required. Meanwhile, be assured that your responses will be treated with high level of confidentiality and used only for the purpose of this research.

Thank you.

**OMOTORIOGUN SHAKIRA**  
**M.SC/SOC-SCI/26076/2012-2013**

**SECTION A: BIODATA**

1. Age Bracket: (a) 18-25years [ ] (b) 26-33years [ ] (c) 34-41years [ ] (d) 42 years and above [ ]
2. Gender: (a) Male [ ] (b) Female [ ]
3. Religion: (a) Christian [ ] (b) Muslim [ ] (c) Traditional Religion [ ]
4. Occupation: (a) Civil Servant [ ] (b) Business [ ] (c) Farmer/fisherman [ ] (d) Others \_\_\_\_\_
5. Educational qualification: (a) No formal education (b) primary education (c) secondary education (d) tertiary education
6. Local Government Ward \_\_\_\_\_

**SECTION B: Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict**

7. Are you aware of the conflict in the Niger Delta?(a) yes (b) No
8. What do you think are the causes of the conflict? (a) Corruption (b) unemployment (c) environmental degradation (d) others specify.....
9. Are there any programme implemented by the government before the implementation of the Amnesty program?(a) yes (b) No
10. What are the programme (a)NDDC (b) ministry of Niger Delta (c) Oil Producing Area Commission (d) others specify.....

**SECTION C: Amnesty Program And Its Three Cardinal Area**

11. Are you aware of the amnesty programme? (a) yes (b) no.
12. How has the Amnesty programme performed in terms of training ex-militant? (a) very good (b) good (c)fairly good (d)not good.
13. In what form did the training take? (a) Formal schooling (b) vocational training (c) skill acquisition (d) others specify.....
14. Is the employment situation in the Niger Delta better now than before the conflict?(a)better (b)thesame (c)worse
15. Think about the situation in Niger Delta in terms of medical care, oil- related pollution and education, do you think the situation is better now than before the Amnesty Programme? (a) better (b) thesame (c) worse
16. Does the Amnesty programme involve the local population in its implementation process? (a) Yes (b) No.
17. How satisfied are you with the level of consultation in the implementation of the programme? (a) Very satisfied (b) satisfied (c) fairly satisfied (d) not satisfied.

**SECTION D: Impact of the Amnesty Programme on Peace Process.**

18. Do you think the amnesty programme has had a positive impact on the peace process in the area? (a) Yes (b) No.

19. If yes, in what ways has the programme impacted on the peace process?(a)surrendering of weapons by militant (b) sending youths to school (c) reduce loss of lives (d) reduced vandalization of pipeline
20. How satisfied are you with the level of the impact? (a) very satisfied (b) satisfied (c) fairly satisfied (d) not satisfied
21. Do you think the Amnesty Programme can guarantee peace in a long term?(a)yes (b)no



## **APPENDIX ‘B’**

### **INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

**Department of Political Science and International Studies**

**Faculty of Social Sciences**

**Ahmadu Bello University**

**Zaria – Nigeria.**

**Dear Respondents,**

I am a postgraduate student in the above named department, conducting a research on the topic: **An Assessment of the Performance of the Nigerian Government Amnesty Program in the Niger Delta Region.**

I would be grateful if you could answer the following questions by ticking and comment where required. Meanwhile, be assured that your responses will be treated with high level of confidentiality and used only for the purpose of this research.

Thank you

**OMOTORIOGUN SHAKIRA**

**M.SC/SOC-SCI/26076/2012-2013**

#### **INTERVIEW QUESTIONS:**

1. Are you aware of the Niger Delta conflict?
2. What are the remote and immediate causes of the conflict?
3. Sir/ma, do you think the causes of the conflict are genuine enough to warrant the use of violence?
4. What efforts had been made in the past to resolve the conflict?
5. Did you think the amnesty programme was/is a good strategy to end the conflict?
6. Has the amnesty programme being implemented to its fullest or the way it was design?
7. If yes, how, and if no, why?
8. With particular reference to the three cardinal areas of training, job creation and constructive engagement (consultation), can you say the programme has succeeded in all of these?
9. Are you aware that some of the militants are threatening to return to the creek?
10. What in your opinion could likely be the reason?
11. In your own view, what has been the impact of amnesty programme in the Niger Delta?

12. Do you think the programme has foster peace & can guarantee a long term peace in the region?
13. What do you think can be done to enhance the impact of the programme on the peace process in the Niger Delta.

**APPENDIX 'C'**

**LIST OF INTERVIEWEE**

<b>S/N</b>	<b>Names</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Date and Time</b>
1	Mr. Sanami	Director of Admin Department, Amnesty office, Abuja	04/12/2015 11:50am-2:01pm
2	Mr. Jumbo Chapps	(Head,registry)reintegration department , Amnesty Office Abuja	04/12/2015 2:30pm-3:00pm
3	Mr. Success Akpan	Community leader Nembe LG.	04/12/2015 10am-10.30am
4	Mr Sylvester A.	Account department, NDDC	8/12/2015 11:00am-12:52pm
5	Mr. Ojo Abdullahi	NDDC	8/12/2015 12.54pm-1.15pm
6	Gen. Three Lions (militant leader)	Niger Delta Voluntary Force(NDFUF)Western Zone	04/12/2015 3.40pm-4.05pm
7	Mr Dagogo(militant leader)	Territorial camp	04/12/2015 3pm-3.30pm
8	EjemiUtubodiminiTubor(militant)	Camp 5	11/12/2015 5:04pm-5:28pm
9	Okoro Posi NP (militant leader)	Ken camp	04/12/2015 4.05pm-4.50p`m
10	Emughan B Peredigha(militant)	Camp5	11/12/2015 12pm-12.30pm
11	Saniyo Joseph(militant)	Camp5	12/12/2015 10am-11am
12	EmughanSeidoughawarisuwotei(militant)	Niger Delta Voluntary Force(NDFUF)	12/12/2015 2.30pm-3.15pm
13	SapeleTuwaepiri(militant)	Camp 5	16/12/2015 1.pm-1.40pm
14	Mr. Festus Patrick	Community leader	16/12/2015 3pm-4.00pm

