CENTRAL - LOCAL RELATIONSHIP IN CAMEROON AND ITS EFFECTS ON PARTICIPATION AT THE GRASS-ROOTS LEVEL.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this study has not been accepted in substance for any other degree and is not being submitted concurrently for any other degree somewhere else.

I certify that the study is entirely the result of my independent investigation. The various sources to which I am indebted are clearly indicated in the references. Any errors in this Study are entirely my responsibility.

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CERTIFICATION

This thesis entitled "Central-Local Relationship in Cameroon and Its Effects on participation at the Grass-roots Level" written by ASOBO NAPOLEON TENENG meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) in Local Government Administration in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my Parents, my Wife and my Kids Asobo Teneng Asobo, and Penn Patrick Asobo for their extra-ordinary patience, love and understanding. I dearly love you all

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performance of these institutions can be attributed to this relationship and fourthly to recommend a model through which this relationship can be strengthened in favour of the councils. For this work to have some focus, two hypotheses were formulated. The first states that the relationship between the central and the local government institutions in Cameroon is characterized more by control and command than mutual reciprocity in the exchange of resources. The second states that this relationship above has minimized the active participation of the local population in the activities of the councils.

Results from the analysis of the various data indicated that councils in Cameroon are not as autonomous as the^Law implies, neither do they possess the human, material and other temporal resources necessary for the effective accomplishment of their traditional developmental functions. The various central government actors charged with the responsibility of supervising the councils (communes) exercise wide powers of control and command on the various council authorities. Results from the data also confirmed that the high degree of central government control on the councils has negatively affected the active participation of the local population in the activities of these institutions located at the grass-roots. It further indicated that the high level of central government control and the minimal participation of the local population have in turn reduced the ability of the councils(communes) to perform their functions. In other words the effective performance of the councils has been hampered by the above relationship.

The work therefore, ended with the conclusion that the environment within which councils(communes) are existing in Cameroon is so inclement and so unconducive to the extent; that the survi-cl of these institutions is threatened. The environment needs an overhaul so as to extricate these institutions from the intricate network of controls exercised by the centre on the periphery. Relying on modernization theory, the work recommends the creation of a pluralist society which permits open competitions, bargains and compromises. A society which permits the effective existence of governmental and non-governmental organizations such as organized political parties, interest groups, professional and religious associations among many others, t further demands the effective decentralization ol power, responsibilities and resources within the governmental machinery, thus creating room for the existence of local self-government! Decentralization in this case is effected through devolution, thus extricating the councils from the suffocating grip of the central government authorities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Title Page.....i

Declaration.....ii

Certification.....iii

Dedication.....iv

Acknowledgements.....v-vi

Abstract.....vii-ix

Table of Contents.....x-xii

List of Tables.....xiii-xv

List of Appendices.....xvi

Abbreviations.....xvii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of Problem.....1

1.2 Aims of the Work.....12

1.3 Scope of the Work.....13

1.4 Significance of the Work.....13

1.5 Hypotheses.....14

1.6 Methodology of the Work.....15

1.7 Organization of Chapters.....20

Footnotes.....24

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1 Introduction.....27

2.2 Modernization Theory.....27

2.3 Local Government Environment in Cameroon.....53

Footnotes.....68

CHAPTER THREE: THE HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS IN CAMEROON:

3.1 Introduction.....74

3.2 The Development of Local Government In West Cameroon.....75

3.3 The Development of Local Government In East Cameroon.....84

3.4 Local Government in the Unitary State.....97

CHAPTER FOUR: EVALUATION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL ON THE COUNCILS.

4.1 Introduction.....115

4.2 Presentation of Data.....116

4.3 Analysis of the Various Responses.....123

4.4 Synthesis of the Opinions.....152

Footnotes.....160

CHAPTER FIVE: EVALUATION OF GRASS-ROOTS PARTICIPATION IN COUNCIL ACTIVITIES.

5.1 Introduction.....161

5.2 Analysis of Responses from Questionnaire 1.....162

5.3 Analysis of Data from Questionnaire 11.....186

5.4 Synthesis of the Opinions.....199

Footnotes.....206

Chapter Six: Evaluation of Council and Some Self-help Activities at the Grass-roots.

6.1 Introduction.....207

6.2 Budgets and Expenditure of the Councils.....208

6.3 Analysis of Some Selected Self-help Projects.....223

Footnotes.....231

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction.....233

7.2 Summary of Findings.....234

7.3 Recommendations.....239

5.01 Ways of Contribution to Council Activities.....163
5.02 On whether the population would like to attend council Meetings.....164
5.03 On whether the Structure of the Councils Provides for Freedom of Speech.....165
5.04 On whether Public Opinions Are Taken Seriously.....167
5.05 Evaluation of Their Performances in Council Activities...169
5.06 Part played by the Councils in the organisation of Community Development Activities.....172
5.07 Council's Performance in the Organisation of Elections...174
5.08 Council's Performances in Public Enlightenment.....175
5.09 Organisation of Community Development Activities by Councillors.....176
5.10 Part played by Councillors in Elections.....178
5.11 Part played by Councillors in Public Enlightenment.....179
5.12 Evaluation of the General Performance of the Councils....182
5.13 The impact of the Councils' Activities on the Local Population.....184
5.14 Same as Table 5.06.....186
5.15 Same as Table 5.07.....187
5.16 Same as Table 5.08 188
5.17 Same as Table 5.09.....190
5.18 Same as Table 5.10.....191
5.19 Same as Table 5.11.....194
5.20 Same as Table 5.12.....197
5.21 Same as Table 5.12.....199

5.22 Same as Table 5.13.....197

6.01 Mbouda Council, 1989/90 Budget.....209

6.02 Santa Council, 1990/91 Budget.....210

6.03 Eyumojock Council 1991/92 Budget.....210

6.04 Bamenda Special Urban Council 1991/93 Budget.....211

6.05 Yaounde Urban Community Council, 1992/93 Budget.....211

6.06 Mbouda Council, 1989/90 Recurrent Expenditure.....214

6.07 Santa Council, 1990/91 Recurrent Expenditure.....215

6.08 Eyumojock Council, 1991/92 Recurrent Expenditure.....215

6.09 Bamenda Special Urban Council, 1992/93 Recurrent Expenditure.....216

6.10 Yaounde Urban Community Council, 1992/93 Recurrent Expenditure.....217

6.11 Mankaha Bafut Water Supply Project.....224

6.12 Bess Awum Water Supply Project.....225

6.13 Meluf Water Supply Project.....225

6.14 Distribution of Self-help Projects(1979 - 1981).....226

6.15 Yearly sale of Arabica Coffee.....228

CHAPTER 1

I N T R O D U C T I O N

1.1 Statement of Problem

Almost all research work done on Africa presently still classify it as the least developed portion of the earth in spite of its huge human and material resources. Many reports emanating from the specialized agencies of both the United Nations Organisation and the Organisation of Africa Unity have highlighted with astounding constancy this undesirable position occupied by Africa even after the independence of almost all her territories. According to Mutawakal "of the thirty-six least developed countries of the World twenty-six are in Africa".[1]

In spite of the differences existing between these African Countries in terms of physical size, population, and other socio-economic circumstances, most of them particularly those South of the Sahara desert still share almost the same problems and challenges such as famine, mass rural exodus to cities and towns, a steady decline in economic growth, environmental degradation and political upheavals among many others.

There has been a plethora of reasons advanced as the causes of the woes of African Countries but most recently many development economists and other experts in related fields of study have held both the international scene and the internal administrative and political environment responsible. They advise that in as much as the respective governments of the developing countries should mount an intensive and organised pressure on the developed countries of

the need for a more equitable and just economic order, the same amount of energy if not more should be directed towards an internal political and administrative house-cleaning exercise. Nyerere, in his capacity as the Chairman of the recently created South Commission seems to emphasize this point when he reiterates that "South's plea for justice, equity and democracy in the global society, cannot be disassociated from its pursuits of these goals with its own societies".[2]

Many writers therefore stand firmly on the belief that democratic decentralized and participatory governments constitute the bedrock for any effective development particularly at the grassroots where the mass of the population is located. In buttressing the above point, a keen observer has confirmed that "certainly the French cabinet of Prime Minister Rocard has recently accepted that democracy and development constitute an indivisible couple".[3]

Viewed from this perspective, local governments and local institutions have attained a conspicuous position in the much research work done in public administration recently. Many interested writers have emphasized the strategic importance of local governments in the development process of a nation.[4] Gboyega, for example states that, local government institutions have a lot to offer a nation in its process of development. They can aid substantially in the political education of the masses, development of leadership skills in local actors, the acceleration of the development of accountable governance and the stimulation of

participation in socio-economic activities.[5] As if providing a conclusion to the above analysis, Okowa, submits in the case of Nigeria that:

> Indeed the government should reorganize the planning machinery to allow for increased participation of the rural people in the planning process as well as the process of plan implementation. In this connection, the local government units should be strengthened by the provision of better qualified manpower, and increasing their financial independence of the State Government.[6]

The history of the development of local government institutions in Cameroon is a checquered one due to the nature of her colonial experiences. Cameroon was first colonized by the Germans and later on by the English and the French. The German impact on local government administration is rather remote because no viable local administrative units were instituted during their rule. Cameroon was therefore to undergo two different types of political experiences which has had an enormous impact on her development from then up to the contemporary period.

The English administered their part through Nigeria. The Northern part of the English-speaking Cameroon was attached to the North under the leadership of Ahmadu Bello and the Southern part was attached to Eastern Nigeria under the administration of Nnamdi Azikiwe. Local governments operated in these parts of the country

following the respective patterns adopted by the Northern and the Eastern regions of Nigeria.

The other part of Cameroon then known as Eastern Cameroon was ruled by the French. Traditional local institutions were dismantled and all principal actors were assimilated into the mainstream of the central administration.[7]

The early fifties experienced a lot of national protest against the colonial administration which culminated in the independence of Cameroon. Southern Cameroon hitherto attached to Eastern Nigeria gained independence in 1961 and opted to join East Cameroon which had in turn gained independence in 1960. The Northern part of Cameroon opted to continue with the Northern region of Nigeria now constituting part of Adamawa and Borno States. Local Governments were to experience other dramatic changes in the then Federal Republic of Cameroon. In the English-speaking Cameroon then known as West Cameroon, local governments continued to operate following the model adopted from Eastern Nigeria. On the other hand, local institutions in East Cameroon were still assimilated into the mainstream of the central administration and their role was purely to provide information for the formulation of government policies concerning the local and rural masses.[8]

By 1972, the country finally united and became known as the United Republic of Cameroon. The Constitution was therefore amended to suit the new political situation. The relationship between the centre and the periphery also changed. The new law of

of them were constantly accused of inefficiency, corruption and high handedness. Biwole sees this central control from a different perspective. He posits that:

> When new council units were created, the administrative supervision received a new orientation. Its objective is certainly to ensure the control by the central administration of the management units, which the Municipalities represent, but also and above all to provide municipal administration with the indispensable technical support which would enable them to better integrate their activities and programmes within the framework of concerns and national priorities laid down in the national plan.[12]

There is a striking paucity of analytically documented data on the workings of the local government institutions in Cameroon. This is due to the deliberate neglect of these institutions and the systematic discouragement of research work in this direction by the past government. As late as in 1989, Mukong lamented this state of affairs in Cameroon. His remarks are as follows:

> I lament for my country Cameroon; and nation of highly talented children who cannot today provide proof of their talents as their works must be haunted by this ghost of censorship. Intellectual attainments in Cameroon is much hampered and hindered by the fear of arrests and detention through arbitrary actions.[13]

Paul Biya seems to have adopted the highly repressive tactics

used by Ahidjo to maintain himself in power. Mukong readily confirms that:

> He (Paul Biya) retained and employed all the instruments and methods of Ahidjo's era. When he arrested and detained people, unknown to the outside world, he succeeded in deceiving foreign governments that continued to give him financial assistance.[14]

Many individuals have persistently expressed their disgust and disappointment at the performance of these institutions located at the grass-roots in newspapers. Others have written petitions to the hierarchical authorities but no positive results seem to have been registered. Many more complaints have also emanated from official meetings and public gatherings particularly with respect to the financial recklessness of the authorities, their callous indifference to public opinions and aspirations and their extensive appetite for exploitation.[15] A great part of the population do not seem to feel the developmental impact of these institutions and a lot more do not even realize their existence. To many more these institutions have metamorphosed into another instrument of financial extortion, administrative intimidation and political manoeuvres.

Many African governments have invested a lot of human and other resources in these corporate bodies and yet their role in the process of national development has been viewed with a lot of sceptism. Oyugi asserts after an incisive analysis that "local government in Kenya is neither local nor government".[16] Although

many reforms and much research work geared at local government improvement in Nigeria have been undertaken, Adejo Odoh has still alluded to the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of these structures. Precisely he submits that:

> It is a situation where excessive politicking, excessive control of local governments, deficient resources base, a lack of popular participation in local government and an overall systems of field administration with a resultantly incapacitated governments register themselves.[17]

As if to provide a conclusion to the African situation, Dele Olowu asserts that "Local governments are generally of inferior quality, outside white South Africa, lacking the usual resources necessary for independent existence.[18]

One of the fundamental facts about local government is that it is not totally an independent entity. It is a sub-national or a sub-regional structure existing under the umbrella of a central national authority. Ronald Wraith, for example, reiterates the fact that local government institutions can in no circumstances be completely independent of the central government.[19] At the same time these sub-national or sub-regional structures are supposed to have some latitude of autonomy for the convenient and effective performance of their functions. Moreover, it is widely acclaimed as does Mawhood that the spread of power to sub national layers of the government would open up:

> The blockages of inert central bureaucracy, curing

> managerial constipation giving more direct access to the people to the government and the government to the people, thereby stimulating the whole nation to participate in national development plans.[20]

There is therefore a paradoxical twist in the relationship between central and grass-root governments. This relationship can be categorized into two. Firstly, they an facilitate local decision-making through the provision of the much needed human and material resources. Through devolution the central government can provide these Local structures with enough material, human and technical resources for the effective performance of their respective functions. Through the development of the partnership model of relationship, the central government can facilitate local decision-making by providing the much needed discretionary powers, the possibility for the easy generation of resources, enough personnel and general technical support. In this case these peripheral structures are left alone to develop the culture of responsibility, self-reliance, good governance and active mass participation at the grass-roots for national development.

On the other hand this relationship could constitute a source of constraint to the development of grass-roots government. In this case through the exercise of extensive control mechanisms these local structures are starved of the necessary resources and technical support because of the suffocating grip of the central government on them. By deliberately reducing the power of these institutions, starving them of the necessary resources, and

technical support and intentionally whittling down their functions,these institutions could be reduced to organisational cripples. They cannot therefore perform their traditional functions effectively and at the same time galvanize the grass-roots population into active participation in national development programmes.

According to the law, Councils in Cameroon are decentralized public authorities, having the status of a corporate body. They also have legal personalities and financial autonomy. However, they are to "administer all affairs under the supervision of the state to secure the economic, social and cultural development of the population"[21] Commenting on this element of state control, Biwole positively asserts that "local councils in this line of thought serve to enhance the acceptance of the policy of central government by respecting the programmes and standards laid down by the later".[22] Pushing his point further, Biwole emphasizes that the:

> Senior Divisional Officers therefore have to ensure a correct tactical translation at the local level, of directives of a strategic type which aim at harmonious and balanced development of the whole nation.[23]

In spite of the above position and well intentioned comments concerning the necessity and the convenience of State control of the councils in Cameroon, Mawhood has quite a different opinion. He pathetically submits that:

The arrival of West Cameroon to form part of the unified state has done little to modify Cameroon's centralist tendencies. Frustrations there have to still to be dealt with by the Yaounde government. One may speculate that the trend of centralization will sooner, or later, have to go into reserve. France had to wait for the arrival of a socialist government in 1982 before major changes in the central/local linkages could occur. The changes when it comes in Cameroon could be expected to be as a result of a radical shift in the regime rather than incremental.[24]

His position is further strengthened by Paul Ndue's most recent work on the workings of the councils in Cameroon. In his work Ndue submits that:

> From the Cameroon perspective, decentralization has tended to mean different varieties of deconcentration... Even when some attempts have been made to create lower jurisdiction with legal independent personality such as local councils, the central government has insisted on appointing and controlling the chief executive.[25]

Albert Mukong pushes this point further by asserting that the present regime is highly centralist, dictatorial and undemocratic. According to him all power is accumulated in the hands of the president who has very wide powers of decisional manoeuvre. Pathetically he posits that:

> We have no constitution and no tradition that hold us together; it is the gun and the bayonet that hold us together.... We have no institutions that belong to the state because the state has been reduced to the estate of the head of state and he directs it as it best suits him.[26]

The questions that this work seeks to address are as follows: What is really the nature of the relationship existing between the central and local government institutions in Cameroon? To what extent has this relationship enhanced or minimized the effective participation of the local population in the activities of these councils? In other words the nature of the relationship existing between the central and the local government institutions can affect the participation of the local population in the activities of these local institutions. The above situation can in turn affect the performance of these grass-roots institutions charged with the responsibilities of providing goods and services to the local population.

1.2 Aims of the Work

The major aims of this work are to:

(a) Examine the part that local government institutions can play in the political development of the nation;

(b) Explore the nature of the relationship existing between the central government and the councils.

(c) Critically determine how the performance of these local government institutions (councils) can be attributed to

this relationship and:

(d) Recommend a model through which this relationship can be strengthened in favour of councils, in order to obtain greater and faster political development.

1.3 Scope of the Work

This study has delved on the historical development of local government administration starting from the colonial epoch up to the contemporary period. The history so treated is detailed enough to bring out the nature of the relationship established between the councils and the central government from then up to the contemporary period. The period from 1972 to 1992 is treated with greater emphasis because it is the period within which the country evolved from a federal to a unitary state. The constitution was radically changed to suit the new political order. The relationship between the central and the then local governments took a dramatic turn as almost two diagonally opposite English and French Cultures were fused together without any pre-arrangements.

1.4 Significance of the Work

Modern trends of thought highly favour democratic, decentralised and participatory local government institutions. It is therefore timely and significant to undertake a study on local government structures and their relationship with the central government in Cameroon which has been under a single party rule for more than twenty-five years. The study will therefore bring into light the realities of the Cameroonian situation, particularly now that the country is still grappling with the problem of democracy and multipartism.

The president's call for greater participation of the masses at the levels of both policy formulation and policy implementation necessitates some research work on grass-roots participation in the present local government institutions; which many envisage constitute a suitable medium of expression and a convenient link between the masses and the seemingly distant central government.

This study will further stimulate the awareness of the importance of local government administration in Cameroon which has suffered some deliberate neglect since the creation of the unitary state. This will further kindle the awareness of the creation of some purposeful institutions for the training of senior and medium level manpower for the management of these institutions in Cameroon instead of the adhoc and disorganized arrangement presently in existence.

1.5 Hypotheses

The hypotheses formulated are as follows:

(a) The poor performance of the councils in Cameroon can be attributed to the excessive control exercised by the central government on these institutions.

(b) This control has negatively affected the mobilizational capacity of council actors and the active participation of the grassroots population.



1.6 Methodology of the Work

The data assembled for this work came principally from primary and secondary sources.

1.6.2 Data from the Primary Source

Data from the primary source came from answers derived from the questionnaires and the interviews conducted. The questions that were framed for the questionnaires were brief and as simple as possible in order to facilitate response. The respondents were in most cases told to tick just the right answers in the blank spaces provided for them on the sheets of paper. These questions therefore had multiple choice type of answers. In some few instances the respondents were also told to provide answers to some open-ended questions. Their comments in this case presented a broader and a more penetrative view on the subject under question.

The questions asked in the questionnaires revolved around the level of autonomy given to the councils (communes), the functions allocated to them, their financial situation and the calibre of staff employed by these councils. The amount of discretionary powers given to the councils was also considered since it determined along with the other variables, the level of control exercised by the central government on the councils. Questions were also asked on the various ways through which these respondents participate in municipal or council activities. The aim was to determine the level of participation at the grass-roots level in local government activities.

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Councils in Cameroon are divided into four broad categories. These are the urban community councils, special urban councils, urban and rural councils. Councils selected for this work included one of the two urban community councils. One of the two special urban councils, four urban and five rural councils. Apart from the above stratification, care was taken to make sure that councils came from four of the ten provinces of the Republic, and from both the anglophone and francophone zones.

The population was stratified into five groups which included farmers, traders, workers in the public and private sectors of the economy and those unemployed. The sampling population was determined from the specifications of Boll and Gall quoted in Adetoro27. These scholars suggest that 20% of the total population should be taken from a population of zero up to 1000, while 10% from that varying from zero up to 5,000 and 5% from that varying from zero up to 10,000 people. These proportions depend on the degree of homogeneity of the population under study.

The laws governing the organization and managment of councils in Cameroon are uniform all over the Republic and these laws are applied with relative consistency. Therefore 350 questionairs were distributed to a population of 946.968 people within the chosen councils. It therefore gave a percentage of 0.037, which is relatively representative following the specifications of Boll and Gall above. 946.968 people constitutes 0.074% of the total population of Cameroon which is estimated at 12 million28.

A second set of questionairs were distributed to workers of councils and the Ministry of Territorial Administration. This

ministry is the equivalent of the former ministry for Local Government in Nigeria, responsible for council affairs. 62.3% of the council workers were considered; which was largely representative. Their opinions were taken seriously because as workers in the councils, they directly experience the supervision and control of the councils by the central government. Relatively fewer people (15%) were chosen from the Ministry of Territorial Administration because they do not experience the supervision of councils, rather they are directly incharge of the supervision and the control of the councils. Therefore those considered were principally senior and medium level personnel who had a good knowledge of central government's supervision and control on the councils. It can be concluded that both stratified and purposive sampling techniques were used in the selection of the participants.

Unstructured interviews were conducted under informal circumstances because of the unconducive political environment prevailing at the time. Though these interviews were unstructured, the necessary information was still retrieved since the various personalities felt freer and more relaxed to express their opinions on the subject under study. The various personalities were the municipal administrator of Eyumojock rural council, the prefect of Bamenda Division, the government delegate to the Bamenda Urban Council, and the director of the local government training institute in Buea. The fear expressed by these people already indicated the high grip of the central government on the citizens. The questions revolved around the variables already mentioned

1.6.2 Data from Secondary Sources

Data from the Secondary source constituted information derived from official records, reports from official commissions, the 1960 and 1961 constitutions, and Councils laws of 1974 and the various presidential decrees of 1982, 1987 and 1990 concerning the reorganization of councils in Cameroon. These various sources provided information on the historical development of the councils, the organisation, and the management of these institutions and their relationship with other competing centres of power in the polity.. Ministerial orders, administrative accounts, minutes of council deliberations and speeches were also reviewed so as to principally determine the success of these institutions in the performance of their traditional functions.

Expert opinions came from published and unpublished text books, academic conference papers, Seminar papers, and Journals. These supplemented information got from the above sources and to the most part threw more light on the respective theories, the organisation and the workings of local government institutions in Cameroon and some other countries.

Data so far generated was organised and where possible tabulated so as to facilitate analysis. In this connection data was analysed using principally descriptive statistical techniques to either validate or invalidate the hypothesis. Chi-square was also used to distinguished the differences between the responses of anglophone and francophone respondents.

1.6.3 Problems of the Study

This research was conducted at a time when the country was experiencing a lot of political upheavals caused by the advent of multipartism. The sole ruling party could not easily grapple with the challenges posed by the various parties in the opposition. This scenario therefore provided room for many obstacles prominent amongst which was the inability to retrieve information from official records within the control of the administrative authorities. Most of the information from the official records were considered very confidential and it therefore needed considerable patience, skill and tact to gain access to them. Most of the authorities were not willing to give out these records for fear of jeopardising their positions.

In Cameroon, most administrative authorities are also important figures on the chess board of politics. The questions for the interviews were unrestructured while interviews were granted only under informal and casual circumstances wherein the personalities felt convenient, free and relaxed. Many appointments had to be scheduled and rescheduled in order to obtain the desired atmosphere.

The above problems were further compounded by the constraints of time and money. The financial problem was more excruciating because this programme was pursued while on study-leave with no salary. All the financial resources came principally from past savings and from some relatives and friends.

1.7 Organization of Chapters

Chapter one is considered as the general introduction to the whole work. It begins primarily with the statement of the problem under study followed by the aims of the work. The scope and the significance of the work coupled with the statement of the hypotheses are presented following the above order. The chapter ends up with the presentation of the methodology used for the organization and analysis of data and finally the present section on the organization of chapters.

Chapter two is divided into two parts. The first part is the exposition of the theoretical framework presented within the ambit of the modernization theory. Various concepts used in the work are operationally defined, while the theory is directly linked to the subject under study. Local councils (communes) following the theory are supposed to thrive in a pluralist society wherein there is the existence of various centres power within the political and administrative framework. The local councils in this case constitute one of the centres of power possessing enough autonomy, resources and discretionary powers for the effective execution of its traditional functions. The relationship between the central government and these local institutions is supposed to be characterised by partnership and mutual reciprocity in the exchange of resources. In other words the central and the local government institutions are supposed to adopt a cooperative posture in which they strive to use the various resources complementarily for the attainment of compatible goals set together in close collaboration.

The second part is the presentation of the environment within which the local council (communes) are thriving in Cameroon. This section brings out the various centres of power in the political and the administrative set-up and establishes the type of relationship existing between the councils and these various centres of power. A review of some major works relating to the subject under study is also presented here with the goal of determining the position of the councils in the political and the administrative maze in Cameroon.

The historical development of local government institutions in Cameroon comes up in chapter three. It starts with the development of local government institutions in West Cameroon, followed by the development of these institutions in East Cameroon, it finally ends with the presentation of local government institutions in the contemporary Cameroon. This chapter ends with the conclusion that the adoption of the French model of organisation and management of local government institutions in a one party political system has favoured the relationship of command and control to the disadvantage of partnership and mutual cooperation between the central and the local government institutions.

The exposition and the analysis of data gathered from the field follows up in the subsequent three chapters. Chapter four therefore, presents an analysis of data specific to the nature of the relationship existing between the central government and the local councils in Cameroon. The analysis ends up confirming that

this relationship is characterized more by control and command than partnership and mutual cooperation between these organizations.

The analysis of data in chapter five also confirms that the participation of the local population in the activities of the councils is minimized by the existence of this high level of central government control on these local institutions. They further confirm that they feel very little impact from activities of the councils consequently they do not feel part and parcel of the organization.

Chapter six is reserved for the evaluation of council activities at the grass-roots level. The analysis of related data coupled with personal observation confirm the inability of these local institutions to effectively perform their developmental functions. The central government, through the use of extensive control mechanisms has deprived these institutions of the various resources and powers necessary for the effective performance of their traditional functions. The activities of some non-governmental institutions, experiencing very little control from the central government were also reviewed. The results indicated that these institutions have succeeded in effectively performing their activities better than local councils which experience more control from above rather than from the local population from below.

These institutions wee mainly the cooperative unions, credit union institutions and other community development projects initiated and accomplished by the local population located at the grassroots.

Chapter Seven constitutes principally the conclusion of the work. A brief summary of the findings is presented here coupled with some recommendations proffered for the solution of some of the problems identified.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part begins with the present introduction and then proceeds to the presentation of the theoretical framework on which all the analysis is anchored. The theoretical framework draws its inspiration and conception from the modernization theory as viewed by J.S.Coleman, Pye and some other major scholars in the social science Research Council. The third and final part deals with the local government environment in Cameroon and the relationship between the various centres of power including these peripheral institutions. This portion tries to establish the nature of the relationship prevalent between the central government and the various Councils (Communes) coupled with the opinions of some major writers on the subject under study.

2.2 Modernization Theory

Most concepts used in this work are extracted from the modernization theory which deals principally with change. Modernization theory refers to a process of social change whereby the less developed societies acquire the characteristics common to the more developed societies. These characteristics are acquired as a result of the constant contact and communication between the various societies.

Modernization principally resulted from the early contact between the colonial invaders and the less developed societies which were then colonized. The colonialist in their various colonized societies tried to paint a picture of a better and more developed society where life was more comfortable and conducive. Since the traits of these developed societies painted by the colonialist were similar, a broader and less perjorative term was coined. The term was called Europeanization as opposed to colonization. During and after the second World War, people started feeling the impact of America as another major power in the global scene. The term Europeanisation was discovered to be parochial consequently Westernization was coined in its place.

Still, in the course of time, other countries in the Eastern part of the globe joined the club of the developed nations. These countries included particularly the Soviet Union and Japan Modernization was therefore coined to embrace all the characteristics of development prevalent in all developed societies.

The core of modernization according to Binder started with economic development [2]. Economic development here refers to the progressive increase in the material and social well-being of the individual in the society. It was there fore along the continuum of economic performance that societies could easily and decisively be rated. According to Okigbo this measurement revolved principally around numbers as for example "the growth of gross domestic product per head of population, or even when

disaggregated, the measurement still revolves around figures; the ratio of investment to income, the consumption function, the growth of government expenditure"[3] among many other variables. This definition implies that increase in the material well-being of the society goes with an increased rate of achievement along the continuum.

Modernization then becomes a societal process of social change in which economic development is one of the major components. Modernization therefore involves economic and non economic factors, which then render the conceptualization and the operationalization of this theory more difficult. Modernization is therefore a complex and entangling process that involves all the multifarious faces of a human being in a society. In spite of the conceptual and some terminological disparities, scholars tend to agree on some basic operational characteristics of modernization which according to Eisenstadt include " a degree of self sustaining growth in the economy or at least growth sufficient to increase in both production and consumption, a measure of public participation in a polity, a diffusion of secular-rational norms in culture, an increment of mobility in the society understood as personal freedom of physical, social and psychic movement and a corresponding transformation in the modal personality that equips the individual to function effectively in a social order"[4].

Modernization therefore involves an array of variables which include the development of suitable government and non-governmental structures, increased participation in the political

process,increased output per head coupled with increased distribution of the various goods and services and the maintenance of peace, cohesion and unity. It involves among many other aspects, economic, social and political dimensions of an individual in the society. As Okigbo rightly points out, man needs to "multiply the things in sufficient numbers (growth) for man to be himself at his best (development).[5] There is therefore a thin difference between modernization and development theories. Modernization involves "a complex of changes in institutions or societies for the betterment of citizens"6 while development is more extensive, involving both the structure of the economy, the polity and the socio-cultural values of the people and also the relationship between the developed and the underdeveloped nations. This relationship should not be parasitic but mutually beneficial for both the developed and the underdeveloped nations. Viewd in this, perspective, political development becomes a variable of social development and it constitutes the core of this work.

Political development includes all structural and cultural changes in the political system of modernizing societies. Political system here refer to "all those activities, processes, institutions and beliefs concerned with the making and the execution of the authoritative policy and the pursuit and the attainment of collective goals"7

According to Coleman, political development involves critical changes in the nature, the structure and the capability of the political system. Precisely he advances that political development

is:

> The acquisition by a political system of a consciously sought and qualitatively new and enhanced political capacity as manifested in the successful institutionalization of (1) new patterns of integration and penetration regulating and containing the tensions and conflicts produced by increased differentiation and (2) new patterns of participation and resources distribution adequately responsible to the demands generated by the imperatives of equality... The acquisition of such performance capacity is in turn a decisive factor in the resolution of the problems of identity and legitimacy.8

This scholar further holds that a society is developing politically if it perpetually strives to attain a higher level of differentiation, equality and capacity. Differentiation refers to the "progressive separation of roles, institutional spheres and association in the society undergoing modernization". It therefore refers to the progressive or constant division of roles, functions, and responsibilities between governmental and non-governmental organizations in the society. It involves the constant effort of the central government to effectively decentralize powers and responsibilities to governmental and non-governmental organisations in a society. In other words it involves the effective decentralization of functions, roles and responsibilities coupled with the effective distribution of resources and powers to lower subnational government and non-government organisations.

The society is therefore characterized by the central

government and the various organisations which constitute the major centres of power. The society is further characterized by structural complexity, inter-dependence between the various centres of power, increased effectiveness in political organisations and greater functional specialization. Local government institutions therefore constitute one of the centres of power with defined functions, powers and resources. Other non-governmental institutions include organized political parties, religious organizations, professional groups and other associations. This work looks specifically at the various functions, roles and responsibilities given by the central government to the Local councils in Cameroon. It further examines the various resources and the amount of power attributed to these institutions with the view of determining the nature of relationship existing between the centre and the periphery.

Equality refers to the ability of the central government to distribute goods and services satisfactorily in the society. According to Coleman equality is composed of three major distinguishable components namely national citizenship, universalistic legal order, and achievement norms. National citizenship refers to the normal basic equality derived from one's full membership in a national political community. Universalistic legal order refers to the domination of the universalistic over particularistic norms in government relations with the citizenry, for example equality before the law, equal rights to defend and assert all rights. Achievement norms refers to achievement over

ascriptive norms in the allocation of political and bureaucratic roles. The right to education in order to assure equality of initial opportunity.[9]

Equality therefore emphasizes the principle of egalitarianism which is attained through universal and uniform legal norms in the conduct of governmental business. These include universal citizenship, to all members of the political community, equal rights and obligations to the states, satisfactory distribution of goods and services which finds translation in education, active and the participation of every body, equal access to jobs and social welfare amenities. This work is therefore going to emphasize on the role of Local government institutions in the equitable distribution of goods and services.

Capacity according to Coleman refers to the "responsive, adaptive and the innovative capabilities of the central government".[10] It refers to the ability of the central government to constantly receive and respond to the demands coming from the environment and its capability to withstand the pressures and the shocks coming from the external environment without experiencing some distabilization and even disintegration. These include the development of problem solving capabilities, efficacy in the penetrative power of the government, greater institutionalization of political structure and procedures, increased participation, increased administrative and political scope and consequently increased implementation of policies.

It has been noted however that these variables sometimes

conflict rather than reinforcing each other, which can in turn, cause some instability in the political system. For example greater enlightenment, education and effective mobilization, all components of equality, could cause problems to the capacity of the political system, as a result of increased demands for participation, access and for goods and services. The central government therefore has to develop its innovative, adaptive, accommodative and responsive capabilities so as to cope with the contending demands and pressures emanating from the environment.

Most governments in the developing nations are always caught in this complex web of problems prominent amongst which are the elements of penetration geared at the maintenance of unity, cohesion and stability on the one hand and the conflicting demands of decentralization geared at the provision of enough room for equal access, mobilization and participation: In other words, greater separation of roles institutional sphere and association which leads to greater access, participation and more efficacy in the distribution of goods and services could cause problems of control and coordination at the central government level. The central government at this level is then forced to be innovative and accommodative in order not to distabilize the system.

The most recent reports indicate that most developing countries particularly those in Africa South of the Sahara desert have right from independence adopted highly centralist and sometimes authoritarian strategies, as in the case of Cameroon, in order to contend the problems of participation and identity.

Reasoning along the same lines Asante posits that:

> African leadership is not primarily concerned with economic growth and development but with strengthening and perpetuation of power. Political power has become particularly important and the struggle for it so intense and so absorbing that it has overshadowed everything including the pursuit of development.[11]

Peter Oakley and David Marsden attribute the failure of all past development strategies in Africa to the fundamental absence of the active participation of the masses in both policy formulation and implementation.[12] Most development economists and other scholars interested in development presently emphasize the need for greater separation of roles, institutional spheres and association as an effective catalyst for development. In other words these scholars are clamouring for effective decentralization of governmental powers, resources and responsibilities so as to ensure greater participation and equitable distribution of goods and services among many other advantages.

In trying to resolve this problem of differentiation, Ronald wraith[13] as well as many other writers have distinguished between decentralisation through devolution and decentralization through deconcentration. Decentralization through devolution occurs as Wraith has rightly pointed out, when governmental power is shared by the central government and other subnational organisations particularly the local government. Devolution according to Mawhood[14] is a form democratic decentralization, politically

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inclined and attributing wide ranging powers, resources and responsibilities to local self-governing institutions.

Egonmwan[15] on his part confirms that devolution occurs when decision on allocation of resources and implementation are taken at the Local Government level. Effective decentralization done through devolution therefore involves the effective and judicious distribution of powers, resources and responsibilities to local government units to the extent that they can authoritatively take local decisions, and authoritatively allocate resources for the resolution of local crises. Local government at this level serves as one of the competing centres of power in a polity possessing enough resources for the effective performance of a series of delineated functions. Local government is then recognized as an organisation with an institutional sphere, and specialized roles within a polity which in turn enhances functional specialization, greater participation and effectiveness in the implementation of policies. Its relationship with the central government is then characterized by mutual inter-dependence, cooperation and reciprocity in the exchange of resources.

Deconcentration refers to the "French ´equivalent for administrative decentralization within a single government hierarchy."[16] It involves the mere delegation of responsibilities and resources from the central government to the local authorities without the necessary powers to authoritatively take independent decisions. Local government at this level is almost under the control and the command of the central government.

Concerning the next variable which Coleman terms equality; it is felt that Local government units help to reinforce and enhance egalitarianism through the effective distribution of resources and advantages accruing from the political system. They also help to redistributes power in the political system. Local government in this case serves as a bulwark for taming and controlling excessive and sometimes tyrannic powers of the central government through the provision of subsidiary governments at the grass-root level. They therefore diffuse power in a political system thereby creating room for greater participation of the local population.

Participation involves not only the ability of the local population to select their leaders at the various levels of government, but also the power to determine their own priorities, assign resources and authoritatively resolve local crisis at the grass-roots. Local government units also play the vital pedagogical role of political education. It further exposes to the local population, the risks of power and the need for innovation while in power. It provides the local population with a suitable forum for effective discussion and exchange of ideas. Through participation they can use this forum to supervise and control the various local leaders.

Local government enhances the capacity of the system through the effective and more efficient redistribution of resources. This argument is based on the fact that the central government is too distant to comprehend the needs, the desires and the aspirations of the local population. In performing its traditional

functions specified in the democratic participatory and the efficiency services schools of thought, local government institutions are suitably placed to play a strategic role in the enhancement of the capacity of the political system as the next variable indicates.

Scholars like Olas[17], Orewa and Adewumi[18], have gone further in the analysis of the importance of local government institutions in a polity. They have adopted the functional approach which encompasses the criteria of both the democratic-particpatory and the efficiency-services schools of thought. They have for example categorised the functions of the local government into two major groups. The first groups of functions is placed under the general category which includes the promotion of democratic ideals, political participation, protective and infrastructural services. The second group is classified under the developmental category comprising of national integration, social, economic and manpower resources development.

Local government enhances the capacity of the system through the provision of an enlarged forum and other opportunities for the effective implementation of governmental policies. It further creates a suitable avenue through which demands, information and resources can be channeled to and from the central government to the local population at the grass-roots. It therefore increases the problem solving capacity of the central government through the enhancement of the penetrative, distributive, integrative and the participatory needs of the central government. It therefore

increases the responsive, the accommodative and the adaptive capacities of the central government.

Scholars including Coleman[19] confirm that countries, particularly developing countries face several and various challenges in the process of modernization. Binder Leonard[20] however holds firmly that four of them are considered as the most prominent amongst the various challenges. These four are the traditional political structure and the culture of the society undergoing modernization, the timing of the modernization thrust, the character and orientation of the political leadership and the sequence in which major "system-development problems" or crises generic to the political modernization process are encountered. This work will highlight the first three but more emphasis will be laid on the various "system-development problems" or crises generic to the political modernization process.

The Traditional political structure and the culture of the society could constitute an obstacle to modernization in that the leadership finds it difficult to dismantle these resilient and persistent structures and values. The generality of the population is not willing at this level to part with these deep and inherent traditional Structures and resilient cultural values. In the case of Cameroon, the advent of colonialism characterized by brutality and ruthlessness, has almost uprooted most of these deep and resilient political and cultural values which could frustrate the process of modernization.

The timing at this period in time does not constitute a major

problem because the general public is clamoring and it is quite prepared for a change in the political structure and values. This internal state characterized by this preparedness is reinforced by the global or international community which is presently linking democratic participatory governments to development.

The leadership at this stage is poised to follow the course of political modernization following the law permitting the creation of various political organizations, professional groups and a series of non-governmental associations.[21] The major problem which the present regime seems to be grappling with is that of controlling the various political forces and pressures storming the highly centralist and authoritarian structures put in place since independence in 1960. There are other problems no doubt, but this work is going to highlight the problems of penetration and participation; which then lead to the fourth challenge.

Binder's study of most developed political systems has led to the identification of many crises encountered by a country in the process of modernization. These various crises emanate from the many different economic, social and political experiences characterizing these polities. For the convenience of analysis, this work will adopt the five major crises agreed upon by coleman and his group of other scholars. The five crises are those of national identity, political legitimacy, distribution, penetration and participation. This work is going to highlight the first three briefly while laying greater emphasis on the crises of penetration and participation as already mentioned above.

The crises of national identity occurs when the community starts to question the ultimate source and the definition of their collective self as a political community. According to Pye identity crises occurs" when a community finds that what it had once unquestionably accepted as the physical and psychological definitions of its collective self are no longer acceptable under new historic conditions"[22] For the country to move forward, there is therefore the need for the redefinition of the collective self or the political community by the participants.

The crises of legitimacy occurs when the participants question the ultimate source and the nature of power of the leadership. Pye defines it as "a breakdown in the constitutional structure and the performance of the government that arises over the proper nature of authority for the system"[24]

The crises of distribution arises when the participant question the equitability of the central government in the distribution of scarce but allocatable goods, services and advantages emanating from the system. This crises occurs when the participants question the egalitarian principle used in the distribution of goods and services.[22]

The crises of penetration emanates from the need of the central government to gain access into the periphery in order to get what it wants from the local population. Penetration at the superficial level refers to the "infiltration, of a country, an organization etc by political financial etc means in order to gain influence, power and information"[25] La palombara advances that

penetration in its broadest sense means " conformity to public policy enunciated by the central government authority. It involves the probability that governmental policies regarding the polity as a whole or any of its subdivisions will be carried out at least with regard to the spirit of such policies and the regulations that ensure from them. He pursues his definition by adding that penetration according to the political elite refers to " whether they can get what they want from the people over whom they seek to exercise power. Such power clearly refers to areas of governmental policy that go considerably beyond taxation, conscription and the control of deviant behaviour"[26]

Penetration therefore refers to the desire of the central government to gain access into the periphery in order to effectively implement its policies and to extract what it desires from there. According to La Palombara, there are two main strategies that can be used by the central government for penetration. Firstly the central government can use forceful methods. In this situation, the desires, the attitudes and the predisposition of the peripheral population are not taken into consideration. The peripheral institutions are provided with little autonomy and discretionary powers to solve local problems. Power is then highly centralized.

Secondly the government can take decisions for implementation after consultation with the local population. At this level the desires, the attitudes and the predisposition of this local population is taken into consideration. The local population is

well educated on the policies and well mobilized for effective implementation. Power in the political system is diffused and the peripheral populations have enough power and resources for the authoritative resolution of local problems. Decentralization is through devolution which emphasises cooperation and partnership between the central government and the peripheral institutions.

La Palombara gives four main causes of the crises of penetration. Among these four, one is particularly pertinent for this study and consequently it will be reviewed with some depth.

The first crises results from the desire of the central government to expand to 'an existing empty territory. The exapansionist ambitions of the central government therefore come into conflict with the desire of either the occupants or the owners to prevent any in filtration by foreign elements. This is what he calls the crises of empty territory.

The crises of regional differences arises from the desire of the occupants of a certain region within the polity to maintain some major differences which could be in the form of dress, occupational patterns,authority patterns,family structure,ambition, discipline,race,religion,ideology,literary,physiociological orientation among many others. The third is directly linked to this one above. It involves the crises of communal autonomy. It results from the desire of a certain communal society to remain uninfiltrated by the central government because of their unique characteristics which are inconsistent with national development aspirations, for example the case of India and Ceylon.

The crises of peasant communities is very pertinent to this wor This crises concerns the local population. It involves not only elite and mass relations but also the dichotomy existing between the urban and the rural areas with in the polity. La Palombara rightly captures the problem when he posits that:

> In developing areas to day the most widespread and fundamental form of the penetration crises is that which requires that central governments come into closer touch with their rural populations. This problem is not merely one to be identified as involving elite and mass relations. Much more significantly it involves the urban-rural dichotomy and in this form it has distressed and plagued central authority and modernizers of the developed countries well into the twentieth century.[27]

A crises therefore arises from the opposition by the local population to clearly determined policies. One of the major problems facing developing nations is the development of suitable institutions through which the local population can participate fully in both policy formulation and implementation in close collaboration with the central government authorities. Almost all local government structures, which could have conveniently serve this purpose have been deprived of the necessary powers and resources for the effective performances of their traditional functions. According to Olowu[28] for example, almost all African local government institutions experience the problems of scarce resources, and the absence of autonomy and power to galvanize the

required resources for the effective performance of their traditional functions. These institutions further experience a lot of control and command from the central government authorities to the extent that they exist almost like central government agencies.

One of the principal aims of this work is to determine the nature of relationship existing between the central government and the local councils in Cameroon. Many variables come into play in the measurement of Central government control and command over the peripheral institutions. Brian Smith[29] for example specifies the following variables. The amount of functions given to area government discretionary gaps, the amount and powers to raise revenue, the physical size and the population of the area governments and finally their ultimate source of powers. Firstly, the amount of functions assigned to area governments. He emphasizes that a distinction should be made between exclusive functions and those performed concurrently with the central government. The amount of responsibilities delegated to area governments is also considered at this stage.

Secondly he includes the level of decentralization which finds translation in the various tiers of government in the polity, which could in turn provide "discretionary gaps" or leakages of authority. Local authorities with general competence are opposed to those subject to ultra-vires, and the amount of decisions centrally influenced.

Thirdly, the distribution of expenditure between the centre and the various subnational institutions. Fourthly, the amount of

amount of discretionary powers given to these institutions. The manner with which the central government manipulates these variables, will determine to a large extent the level of control and command exercised on the various councils.

2.2.1 Legal and Administrative Powers

Consideration is given at this level to the laws defining the powers of the councils, the organisation and the management of the councils. These laws also indicate the level of autonomy given to the councils and their position in the political and the administrative set-up.

2.2.2 Functions of the Councils

This work considers the amount of exclusive functions allocated by the central government to the councils, and the amount of functions performed concurrently by both the councils and the central government.

2.2.3 Manpower at the Disposal of the Councils

The aspect of human resources deals with the various methods of recruitment of the major participants into the councils, the working conditions of the staff and the number employed compared to those at the centre.

2.2.4 Finances of the Councils

This aspect lays emphasis on the various sources of finances, allowed to the councils by the central government, the maximum rates permitted and the amount of money flowing from the central government to the councils. Consideration is given to the level of financial control exercised by the central government.

2.2.5 The Level of Contact and Discretionary Power

These variables are considered together for the moment because they are closely related. The level of contact between the various actors directly affects the amount of discretionary power given to the council authorities. Discretionary powers here refer to decisions and functions that are undertaken without approval from the central government authorities.

The next important crises in this study is that of participation. Participation superficially would refers to the fact or action of taking part, of partaking or having or forming part. It also refers to the condition or fact of sharing in common, association as partners, partnership, fellowship[28]. It refers in this work to the ability of the local government institutions to share power, responsibilities and resources thereby acting as partners in the national development process.

According to Binder, Participation refers to " the involvement in the political process". He immediately goes ahead to caution that this political process need not be conceived as having particular outcome; it may be examined as a purposeless activity or it may be defined as an organized activity aimed at giving normative precision to the policy decisions made for the whole society".[31]

Myron Weiner goes further to present a sharper and more explicit definition of the concept. He posits that participation stands for:

> Any voluntary action successful or unsuccessful, organized or disorganized, episodic or continuous, employing legitimate or illegitimate method intended to influence the choice of policies, the administration of public affairs or the choice of leaders at any level of government national or local.[32]

Participation therefore stands for any form of action taken by the general population or all the participants in a polity, in order to influence the administration of public affairs. In the context of this work, it emphasizes on the ability of the local population to influence the administration of public affairs particularly at the grass-roots level. Participation here, refers to any action taken by the local population in order to influence the administration of public affairs at the local council level. It refers to the involvement of the grass-roots population in both policy formulation and implementation at the local council level. The encyclopedia rightly points out that it also involves "voluntary activities by which members of the society share in the selection of rulers and directly or indirectly in the formation of public policy"[33] particularly at the grass-roots level, as is the case in this work.

Participation according to Elaigwu[34] can be viewed from two perspectives. Firstly it can be a form of political access to the central or local government. At this level, the government receives inputs from the external environment. It involves, as is the case of this work, the ability of the local population to

provide the local councils with the necessary resources and support for the smooth running and the effective performance of the local councils. This sort of participation is measured by using variables such as the amount of financial contributions and the various methods used by the councils for the collection of these contributions from, the peripheral population, attendances in council meetings, participating in elections, seeking information, discussing, politicizing and canvassing for council representatives.

Secondly participation can be seen as an output coming from the various levels of government to the general environment. Participation here refers to the mobilizational and educational strategies of the central government used for the galvanization of the necessary support and resources from the local population. In the context of this work it refers to the ability of the local councils to educate and mobilize the local population and resources for the effective implementation of their policies. It looks at the performance of the councils in the organisation of community development activities, the encouragement of self-help organisations, the organization of elections and the organization of public enlightenment campaigns.

According to Myron Weiener five circumstances could lead to the crises of participation. Firstly the crises occurs "when the governing elite views the demands or the behaviour of individuals and groups seeking to participate in the political system as illegitimate."[35] In other words they are demands for political

access and behaviors of the local population which the ruling elite views as illegitimate, thereby frustrating their various ambitions.

The first crises occurs according to Weiner, when the governing elite feels that it alone has the right to govern thereby rejecting political demands from other groups. Another instance, under this category occurs when power becomes a prerogative of a well-defined social class or classes whose minority position does not prevent them from, believing that power should be shared with the majority. It could also mean that the elites have the majority of the power which it refuses to share equitably with the larger population.

The second crises occurs when groups that make demands may be organized into institutions which the governing elite view as illegitimate. The third is linked to this one above. It occurs when the demands made by these organized groups are so illegitimate that they cannot be included in the public policy. For example a group's preference for special and discriminatory treatment. The fourth crises occurs when the individuals or groups that seek power feel that those who handle it are illegitimate. All these four various methods of obtaining crises are not very important to this work.

The crises most pertinent for this work is the fifth and the last crises . Here the crises occurs when the governing elite view demands for political participation as illegitimate because the method used for making these demand is considered as illegitimate. The governing elite prescribes very narrow channels and very

difficult procedures to be used in making demands. For example, entrance into the political system occurs only when one participates actively in the activities of a particular party. Other forms of participation are proscribed, permitting only this sole access.[36]

In Cameroon, the peripheral population has no direct way of participating in national development activities except primarily through the councils and the sole party which has persisted up to the present period. Councils having been created as grass-root governments are supposed to constitute major centres of powers, allocated with enough powers and autonomy for the authoritative galvanization of resources for the effective performance of their functions. The mobilization of resources can effectively carried out only with the active participation of the local population. The participation of the local population in the activities of the councils will be measured principally at two levels as specified in the definition.

2.2.6 Participation As An input

Consideration is given here to the types of resources that the councils mobilize from the local environment with special emphasis on the local population; for the effective implementation of its policies. The various inputs revolve around the various sources of material and financial contributions made to the councils, the various amounts of these contributions, the attendances of the peripheral population in council meetings, their contributions in these meetings and the general evaluation of the performance of the

councils at the grass-roots level. These variables coupled with secondary data will go a long way in the determination of the level of participation of the peripheral population in the activities of the various councils in Cameroon.

2.2.7 Participation As An Output

Consideration here is principally on how the central government uses these local government institutions for the mobilization of the local population into the effective implementation of its policies. It also considers the ability of the councils to mobilize the local population for the effective implementation of locally selected policies. The variables at this level include the organisation and support of common initiative groups by the councils, the organisation of elections, and public enlightenment campaigns. Some projects accomplished by the councils will be examined with a view of establishing their impact on the local population.

The analysis up to this stage has been purely explanatory. The work proceeds from now with the analysis of the local government environment in Cameroon, which has been briefly highlighted in the preceding chapters.

2.3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENVIRONMENT IN CAMEROON

The environment within which the local government institutions have developed is unique because of the chequered political history of Cameroon. Cameroon was first colonized by the Germans, a followed by the English and finally the French. The organisation and the management of these institutions known as

councils,(communes) is adopted from the French model with some very slight elements from the English system. The historical aspect is treated detailly in the next chapter. The preoccupation at this level is to present the political and administrative environment in Cameroon and the place of the councils (Communes) in this political and administrative maze.

Cameroon operates what is called the semi-presidential system of government. It is purported that this system adopts some of the salient elements of both the presidential and the parliamentary systems of government.[37] In the semi-presidential system of government, there is supposed to be the complete independence of the three arms of government.

The three arms of government namely, the executive, the judicial and the legislative are separated but with some limited independence given to the latter two.. Each in principle disposes of means of bringing pressure to bear on one another. The executive for example disposes of various means of bringing pressure to bear on the parliament, the extreme of which is the dissolution of the parliament. The executive also has some power of control and supervision on the judiciary. The parliament also disposes of means of bringing pressure to bear on the executive, the extreme of which is the loss of confidence. At this stage the president is forced to either reshuffle or even dissolve the cabinet.

In order to maintain the stability, the unity and the indivisibility of the state, Cameroon reminiscent of France,

attributes the executive certain powers which are not within the control of neither the legislative nor the judicial. All these powers fall under what the French calls "Les Actes de Government" or Government Edditcts.[38] These powers therefore permit the president to rule by decrees. These Government Acts or Eddicts include the conduct of Foreign affairs, the maintenance of health and the security of the state.

In order to maintain the security of the state, the executive is permitted to use police powers which is exactly what is obtained in France[39]. Police power here refer firstly to the law enforcement agents charged with the maintenance of security. Secondly it also refers to powers given to the executive arm of government to limit and control the freedom of citizens. These police powers range from declaring a state of emergency to controlling trade Union activities and even individual hobbies such as hunting.[40] The executive arm of government therefore has the monopoly of these powers which are deconcentrated to governors, prefects, subprefects and municipal administrators in the various councils.

In order to maintain the stability and the unity of the state, the central government in Cameroon makes an extensive use of these police powers. Central government security agents in the name of police, gendarmes and military police participate in all public and private meetings organized by both public and private organization[41]. Commenting on the extensive use of these powers, Phillip Lippen and Richard Joseph confirm that:

These state officials therefore dispose of a large

discretionary power over the public which they are able to use, or threaten to use for ulterior reasons, wholly arbitrarily... The boundary between legality and illegality has therefore been effectively blurred.[42]

The above assertion confirms that the activities of the paramilitary agents touch on almost all aspect of the individual's life in Cameroon. The executive also has the powers to organize, supervise and control the public service. The members of the judiciary have grown over time to be integrated, just like in France, in the public service which is directly under the control of the executive. In describing the position of the judiciary in the administrative set-up in France, Hayward submits that:

The ordinary judicial hierarchy headed by the minister of justice, bear the indelible mark of the Napoleonic authoritarianism with its requirement that the judiciary should be a docile extension of the executive[43].

The government in Cameroon is highly centralized and dominated by the prefectoral order adopted from France. Richard Joseph, after an incisive analysis of the political system in Cameroon concludes that:

When we come to consider today the apparent peculiarity that Cameroon, since independence, has been governed to so great extent by Presidential decrees and laws of "exception", it must be borne in mine that the French colonialists were content to rule their territories on this basis until 1945.[44]

The members of the executive or typical civil servant in Cameroon is not above the law consequently it cannot be flouted with impunity. They are however administratively independent of the judiciary in course of executing their official duties . In case a crime is committed in the course of executing the official duty, the civil servant is tried by an administrative court. The civil servant just like in France therefore enjoys enough protection, prestige and power which motivates a lot of zeal and dedication in the performance of their duties. In describing the attitude of French civil servants to their job, which is almost a replica in Cameroon, Belorgey posits that they are

> Fundamentally under the law, mechanically integrated in the control system, psychologically conformist in nature.... A large part of the administrative life of the individual has the catechism of total submission to the laws and systematic reserve in the use of initiative. (translation is mine)[45]

The governors, the prefects and the subprefects particularly fall into this group since they are the direct representative of the head of state of their various administrative levels.

The Parliament just like in France has grown very weak and impotent over the years. The Cameroonian case has been reinforced by the long period of one party rule. The weakness of the parliament is attributed by most scholars to the constitutional restrictions, governmental ill-will, and the indifference, of some members of parliament.[46] Moreover all members of parliament in Cameroon just like in France enjoy a lot of facilities to the

extent that they find it difficult to obstruct or counter decisions and bill from the executive.

The executive arm of government in Cameroon has grown over the years to tower above all other arms of government. The judiciary and legislative are to the most part under the control of the relatively very powerful executives. The local councils (communes) are directly under the control of the executive. In commenting on the overwhelming power of the executive, Albert Mukong submits that "We have no institutions that belong to the state and make up the state because the state has been reduced to the estate of the head of state and he directs it as it best suits him"[47] In supporting pathetic submission of Mukong, Mujos Lokula Lekanga presents a more analytic perspective. He affirms in the case of Cameroon that:

> We all know that in Cameroon the legislative is only an extension of the executive while the judiciary is a mere appendage of the mighty executive. It is also household knowledge that in Cameroon the Government means the president and the president means the state.[48]

The executive arm of government in Cameroon is organized in a strict hierarchical prefectoral order. At the apex of this giant organisation is the head of state who coordinates activities of all the ministers, the top civil servants and the top military Officers. The President is followed by the governors in the provinces who are regarded as the direct representative of the head of state at the level of the province. The governors also control,

coordinate and supervise the activities of all the civil servants in the province in collaboration with the various top civil, military and paramilitary personnel located at the provincial level. The prefects come after governors. They control the divisions while the sub prefects control the subdivisions. In some very remote areas, a district head is appointed who then ends the administrative ladder at the lowest level.

Each administrator at the various levels is considered as the direct representative of the head of state at the particular level. Each can issue out orders which can control the life of the citizens in various ways within the ambit of police powers. Each at his level has various members of the armed forces at his disposal to facilitate the implementation of these orders. It therefore implies that any administrator can ban any meeting, or union whether private or public and can order the arrest of any individual who is considered a threat to public peace. This threat to public peace is not defined by the law following the presidential decree No. 52 of May, 7,1960, article 10"

The councils are directly placed under the control and the supervision of the administrator located at the various levels of the administrative ladder. A council in a divisional headquarters will be under the control of the prefect with while a council at the subdivisional level will be controlled and supervised by the subprefect. A council in the district will be controlled by the district head.

Though the various municipal administrators of the councils fall directly under the control and the supervision of the central government actor, the various council staff do not constitute part of the public civil service. The council staff have their own status as defined by the presidential decree No.77 - 91 of March 1977 [50] The various staff members are employed supervised and controlled by the various municipal administrators and the prefects at the provincial level:

The political system is organised in such a way that the various centres of power do not cooperate and collaborate directly with each other without passing through the administration. The council authorities for example do not interact directly with the cooperative, the various ministerial departments and non governmental organizations without the knowledge of the local administrator. The prefect at the level of department as analysis has shown is both a political and administrative leader, referring to what Bayart calls the presidentialization of the system.[51]

According to the legal texts, councils are supervised and controlled by the prefects in various ways. Administratively all the policies, programmes and projects of the councils are executed only after the prior approval of the various prefects at the divisional level. These also include the recruitment of the various personnel and even the municipal administrator. The finances of the councils according to the ministerial texts are under the custody and control of the central government treasurer.[52]

Traditional institutions do not have any direct relationship with the councils. Traditional rulers appointed to the councils exist on their own merit and they are not given any special consideration. Traditional institutions are considered as appendages of the central administration and as a consequence they receive some allowance from the central government as compensation for their complementary role. They are therefore under the direct control and the command of the prefect who has even the powers to discipline recalcitrant or disloyal traditional rulers. This constitute part of the colonial legacy which Richard Joseph explains in the following words:

> At every level of the hierarchy three basic principles could be seen in action: centralization, bureaucratism, absolute and arbitrary power. Existing traditional authorities were either swept away or brought into rigid collaboration.[53]

Given the following scenario Lippens and Richard Joseph hold that councils in Cameroon have right from inception been placed under the firm control and command of the central authority to the extent that the active participation of the local population in the activities of the councils has been greatly compromised. Councils have been transformed even after independence to poor and powerless institutions incapable of effectively performing their traditional functions. These institutions are described by the authors not as organs of consultation and mobilization but as "powerless councils of hand-picked chiefs and their notables, which the administrators utilized as they saw fit"[54]

Biya's contemporary administration has continued with the same legacy of centralization beaucratism, absolute and arbitrary powers. Very few critical research work has been encouraged particularly those pertaining to politics and administration. In commenting on the contemporary political atmosphere in Cameroon, Mukong pathetically submits that:

> I lament for my country Cameroon, a nation of highly talented children who cannot provide proof of their talents as their works must be haunted by the ghost of censorship.... Intellectual attainment is much hampered and hindered by the fear of arrests and detensions through arbitrary action."

Inspite of the highly centralist and authoritarian scenario painted by the above writers, Olama[56] holds that councils in Cameroon are decentralized institutions possessing enough financial autonomy for the effective performance of social and economic developmental activities at the grass-roots level. He however does not define the level of freedom and autonomy given to the councils neither does he distinguish clearly whether decentralization is done through devolution or through deconcentration.

Taking the queue from here, Biwole [57] confirms that central government control and supervision of the activities of the local actors is necessary since it provides the needed technical assistance by the council authorities and the assurance that policies drawn and implemented at the local level using the peripheral population fall in line with those drawn by the central government. The works of these writers rather look at principally

the positive side of central government control without giving enough attention to the negative effects. Moreover, their works do not have any theoretical foundations neither have they followed any rigorous scientific methods. This work is going to be more objective and more rigorous in its analysis of the data concerning the subject under study.

Mbombo Njoya[58] on his part affirm in a paper written on local councils that these institutions under the control of his ministry enjoy enough autonomy and discretionary powers for the effective performance of their functions. He goes further to enumerate the various sources of finance allocated to the councils and the amount of discretionary powers given by the central government to the various councils. He however warns that these councils have as "an imperative to work according to the texts and laws of the Republic56. The minister confirms and emphasizes on the existence of central government control and supervision on the councils, but he does not bring out the negative effect of this control on the councils. Moreover, the paper is more of a policy paper than a well researched academic paper.

On the other hand the president of the Republic in his book entitled Communal Liberalism expresses the firm desire of providing these peripheral institutions and the Local population "at the village level" with more powers and freedom to take local decisions and implement them without much interference from the central government actors. Talking on the councils, he proposes new perspectives to be taken in order to provide these institutions

with enough autonomy and freedom. He defines the new role of councils in the administrative and political set up as follows:

> The municipal councils are some sort of local assemblies where people debate problems of local interest. The first thing I expect of these councils is that it should first of all be a school of democracy where people discuss concrete problems.... It is also a school of management. People learn from there what a budget is. They learn from there that if needs are unlimited, the means unfortunately are not...[59]

The work of Paul Biya above is more of a manifesto than a rigorous research work. Moreover, the president seems to be confirming indirectly that the degree of central government control on the councils has been relatively high, which in turn has stiffled participation at the grass-roots. This work is going to establish the nature of this relationship and degree of grass-roots participation in council activities using scientific methods.

Phillip Mawhood[60] goes a step further in establishing the nature of the relationship existing between the central government and the local councils. He ends up with the firm conclusion that these peripheral institutions experience a lot of central government control to the extent that the participation of the local population in the activities of these institutions is very minimal. Mawhood's work though very researched lays too much emphasis on the historical development of these institutions. Generally he relies principally on historical facts to prove his

point. He does not look at the environment within which institutions are thriving and the relationship that these institutions entertain with various other centers of power in the polity.

Some historians also touch on the nature of the relationship existing between the centre and the periphery in Cameroon and its effects on participation at the grass-roots level. These authors contradict the previous authors and confirm Mawhood's observation in the course of their historical narration. Though their treatment of the subject under study is relatively superficial, they however provide some material for analysis. Secondly these works were written around the early seventies when the political and administrative environment was quite different from what is obtains at the moment. These scholars include Jacques Benjamin[61] and Willard Johnson.[62]

Paul Ndue's research work is arguably the most recent on the subject under study.[63] After an incisive analysis of the political and the administrative environment, he ends up with the conclusion that decentralization in Cameroon with respect to the councils is done through deconcentration and not through devolution. Ndue's work is very illuminating since it is quite academic, but his theoretical framework is based on decentralization. In other words he does not lay much emphasis on modernization theory which brings out a more exhaustive analysis of the relationship existing between the various centers of power in a polity. Secondly he does not exhaustively treat the historical antecedents that have also

influenced the existing relationship between the centre and the periphery in Cameroon.

Mbarga Nyatte[64] also in his academic paper also analyses the problem under study in a most recent conference organized in Yaounde. Though his work shades enough light on his subject, he incidently looks at the nature of this relationship purely from the legal perspective. He does not give the other political and administrative variables the attention that they deserve. This method of analysis is also adopted by Abdourahman Oumarou[65] who happen to be a lawyer.

In looking at the general atmosphere in which local government institutions exist in Cameroon, some legal experts have proposed some strategies, which when adopted could provide these councils with the much needed power and autonomy that they deserve. Professor Kale[66] and Dr. Ndefru Zama[67] propose a total review of the constitution within which enough clauses defining the various powers of the councils would be inserted. This strategy does not pay enough attention to the other political and administrative aspect which are vital for the effective existence and performance of local government institutions in Cameroon.

In presenting the general atmosphere within which these institutions are thriving in Africa, Dele Olowu[68] in his works looks at all the various aspects that are treated in this work. Although, this work follows the same methodology, it rather looks at the Cameroonian situation only. This work principally intends to analyse the local government environment in Cameroon with the

cardinal objective of determining the nature of relationship existing between the central and local government institutions and how this relationship has affected the participation of the grass-roots population in the activities of these peripheral institutions. In order to continue the analysis of this subject under study, the review of related literature continues in the next chapter with the presentation of the historical development of local government institutions in Cameroon.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS IN CAMEROON

3.1 INTRODUCTION: The aim of this chapter is to present a concise history of the development of local government institutions in Cameroon, which ties with one of the principal aims of this research work. It is our belief that the interplay of major historical antecedents have contributed in modelling the present pattern of relationship between the central and the local government institutions and which in turn has influenced the participation of the masses in both policy formulation and implementation at the grass-roots level.

The history of the development of local government institutions in Cameroon is a checquered one due to the traumatic political experiences of colonial and post colonial eras. The country was first colonized by the Germans in the early 19th Century. Their system of administration was notoriously dictatorial and exploitative.1 Policies were designed from above by the Europeans and imposed on the villagers without any regard for native laws and customs. People were conscripted and taken to labour camps in the plantations, where many died miserably.

After the first World War, the Germans were swept aside and Cameroon was shared between the British and the French. However, Cameroon was placed under the Trusteeship of the league of Nations. The British part of Cameroons was divided into Northern and Southern Cameroons. For reasons of administrative and economic

convenience these two parts were administered by the British through Nigeria. Northern Cameroon was attached to the Northern Region of Nigeria and Southern Cameroon was attached to th Eastern Region of Nigeria. The other part of Cameroon remained as an entity under French administration. It was then called East Cameroon. After the second World War, the same powers continued to control this territory but then under the N.N.O. mandate. The arrival of independence, saw Northern Cameroon opting to remain with the Northern Region of Nigeria while Southern Cameroon decided to join the Eastern part of Cameroon. It changed from Southern Cameroons to West Cameroon. Both units were governed as a Federation. In 1972, Ahidjo organized a referendum which ushered in a united Republic of Cameroon.

In tracing the history of local government in Cameroon, the chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part is devoted to the history of local government institutions in Southern Cameroons which later became West Cameroon. The second is left to the history of these institutions in East Cameroon while the third and the last part traces the history of local government institutions in the United Republic of Cameroon.

3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN WEST CAMEROON

Before the arrival of the English indirect rule system of administration into West Cameroon, through Nigeria, the region was made up of a patchwork of tribal communities under the direct administration and control of the traditional rulers who were attributed enough powers. Law and order coupled with the

maintenance of interpersonal relationships was regulated by the native laws and customs put in place by ancestors. The medium of communication was basically oral. West Cameroon at that time was divided into two climatic regions; the Northern grasslands made up of the Lush green hills and mountains; and the coastal South, near the sea which was covered by the thick rain forests and fertile volcanic soil around the Cameroon mountain.

The indirect rule system, greatly attributed to the administrative ingenuity of Lord Lugard, quickly gained fertile grounds for rapid expansion in this territory because of the inability of the central government actors to gain access into the hinterlands. Many factors were responsible for the popularity and the rapid expansion of this administrative strategy. Firstly, the sheer distance and the difficult topographic nature of the region which discouraged constant supervision from the main central actors who at that time were based in Enugu, the Capital of Eastern Region. Secondly, the region experienced relative neglect from the British administration as a whole, because of its apparent poverty. Thirdly, the existence of a well elaborated system of local government revolving around the personalities of powerful traditional rulers motivated the English administrators to effectively devolve powers to these traditional rulers.

The indirect rule system emphasized the utilization of the traditional rulers as transmission belts in the management of the delicate relationship between the local population and the British colonialist. In other words the traditional rulers were granted

some latitude of autonomy to rule their respective regions following their native laws and customs, under the general supervision of the English generalists administrator. Cowan for example advances the view that traditional rulers gained enough autonomy:

> "As long as they stayed within the bounds of native tradition and refrained from exercising their powers in a way repugnant to the Western mores, they were permitted a large degree of autonomy. The role of the British administrative officer in this system was conceived as that of a sympathetic guide and supervisor.[2]

The local government institutions were organised in a three tier system comprising of divisional, district and local authority councils. West Cameroon did not adopt this system in its entirety, rather a gradual approach was adopted in which the three tier system was implemented only in the relatively advanced and experienced division of Victoria. The rest of the region maintained a two tier system made up of a federation of local authorities and the respective native authorities organized along tribal lines. By 1951, a fresh constitution gave Southern Cameroon thirteen out of the eighty elective seats in the enlarged Eastern House of Assembly. This provided some ample room for this region to press their demands forward at the National level. Thus, in 1953, Dr.S.M.L. Endeley succeeded in winning a motion demanding some autonomy for Southern Cameroons from the Eastern Region of Nigeria. He was motivated by the relative neglect and the

formation experienced from the pre-dominantly Ibo administration.

Southern Cameroon was therefore, granted a quasi-regional status with powers to legislate its administrative and political problems. Southern Cameroons existing then as one of the regions under the Federation of Nigeria had principally a legislative house consisting of a commissioner of the Cameroons, three ex-officio members, thirteen elected members, six National Assembly members and two special members.[3] By 1958, it became fully autonomous with the introduction of a ministerial form of government. The government thus had an appointed prime minister and four others to run the affairs of the region. Southern Cameroon was divided into six administrative divisions under the leadership of district officers, who resided in the principal towns of Buea, Kumba, Mamfe,Bamenda, Nkambe and Wum. All the local government institutions were operating under the above political and administrative structures.

Southern Cameroons with the attainment of a quasi-regional status in 1953, decided to organize a two tier system of local government made up of divisional and local authorities. Divisional councils were a replacement of the federation of local Native Authorities (N.A) which usually co-ordinated the activities of traditional rulers and their councils organized on tribal lines. Divisional councils derived their principal resources from local authorities which in turn had emanated from the Native Authorities(N.A). These divisional councils had an elected Chairman and other members elected from the lower tier. This tier

was in charge of the execution of difficult and capital intensive projects such as the construction of roads, bridges and major buildings coupled with the running of major health services. They also constructed some schools which by then was dominated by the missionaries and laymen.

The lower tier constituted the native authority, councils which also replaced the native authority system. These local authorities were dominated by powerful traditional rulers and democratically elected councillors who were served by a permanent staff. The Councillors under the Chairmanship of a traditional ruler or any other elected individual, normally met at regular meetings to discuss major issues and problems including the main policies of the council. The running of the councils and the execution of the above policies was principally in the hands of an elected committee of councillors and a trained administrator transferred from the central ministry. However, as the financial resources of the councils dwindled over time the number of committees was gradually reduced.

Most of the permanent staff were recruited mostly on merit and time was taken to train them for their respective jobs. Most of the senior staff were sent to courses in Ibandan while some were simply transferred from the Ministry of Local Government. The central Ministry constantly issued Local Councils' staff regulations, financial and stores memoranda for the effective management and performance of these institutions.[4]

These respective local government personnel performed a

variety of functions which included, the maintenance of hygienic conditions such as cleaning of markets, building of slaughter slaps and shades in the market, the maintenance of schools, the provision of subsidiary medical services and the supplementation of the activities of the departments of Agriculture, Forestry, Veterinary and Road Construction. The relationship between the central departments and local government was characterized by much cooperation and mutual reciprocity in the exchange of resources and information. Commenting on this relationship, Mawhood nostalgically asserts that :

> "West Cameroon in the 1960s was a fine example of administration and development in the late-colonial style, carried on into the age of independence. Out in the divisions and local authority areas life continued much as before, with a strong emphasis on the twin activities of community development and local government....The main rural development effort was placed in the hands of the Ministry of Cooperatives and Community Development, using large inputs of technical aid and voluntary labour. While community development staff managed the construction of new work, completed projects were handed over to local councils for maintenance, including the making of any subsequent improvements".[5]

The financial position was relatively comfortable compared to the amount of revenue collected by the central government particularly after independence in 1961. Local councils collected not only the poll tax, livestock tax, and assorted fees and charges for the operation of business, common in other local governments in Africa but also the graduated income tax which they withheld up to a minimum of 75%. They held up to 90% of the other taxes.[6] The financial autonomy of these institutions was very much guaranteed since much of their resources were internally generated. However, because of the general poverty of this region as mentioned earlier, the divisional councils were considered exorbitant. Moreover, they appeared too far from the local population. They were thus scrapped in 1966 and their assets were distributed to the respective local authorities. Local councils were then reduced from twenty-six to twenty-four in order to achieve economies of scale and greater efficiency.

West Cameroon fell under the political umbrella of Ahmadu Ahidjo in the same year. Ahidjo had succeeded to convince West Cameroon into accepting a one party state in the whole Federal Republic of Cameroon. He however promised the maintenance of the administrative, political and social identity of the English-speaking Cameroonians which the leaders accepted.[7] From then onwards, almost everything took a dramatic turn; with the arrival of the all-powerful super prefects and prefects including the powerful French trained repressive forces.

Local government institutions seemed to have suffered most

to these political changes. They were immediately stopped from collecting any graduated income tax and by 1968 most of the tax rates were decided upon by the central government. Secondly their activities which were hitherto almost autonomous were placed directly under the control and supervision of the prefects. The collaborative relationship gradually gave way to that of command and control.

The next local government elections were meticulously supervised and influenced by the central government. The arrival of S.T. Muna and his ambition to harmonize the system of local government with that of East Cameroon led to a sudden and dramatic decline of the autonomy of local councils. In 1968, all local councils were dissolved pending new elections. The executive secretaries and treasurers were transferred by the Ministry of Interior following the Prime Minister's directives." In describing the awe and stupefaction of anglophone Cameroonians, Jacques Benjamin posits that:

> No person in West Cameroon expected or believed that the government would take over the complete control of the councils; their Chairmen were from then appointed by the government at Buea, and these Chairmen in turn appointed their own Councillors with due approval from Buea. The traditional Chiefs were appointed only in six of the twenty-four council Chairmen and where their powers were completely indisputable. This was to eliminate the

Fons of K.N.D.P. and the ideology of A.N. Jua.[9]

A.N.Jua was then the Prime Minister and a staunch member of Cameroon National Democratic Party. He was disgracefully removed from office as a result of S.T.Muna's political manoeuvre with the support of Ahidjo). The strategies to distabilize the democratically elected and autonomous local government institutions did not end there.

The construction of a Local Government Training Centre had started in Buea in 1968 and it was ready for use by 1969. Contributions came from the respective local councils and some British aid. The government of Muna and Ahidjo promptly leased these infrastructure to the Pan African Institute for Development(P.A.I.D.) which formally occupied it for seven years. The centre's momentum was greatly slowed, amounting to nothing short of non residual courses and other correspondence courses. Residential course finally took off in 1973 and by 1974 the British Technical Staff handed them over to Cameroonians. The centre achieved very little during this transitional period until it was reborn in 1977 as a Municipal Training Centre to serve the whole Republic. East Cameroon had never had a tradition of providing courses designed particularly for local government staff, so this project came as a complete novelty to them.[10]

West Cameroon local authority councils which had gained a lot of autonomy, political awareness, democracy and mass participation at both policy formulation and implementation started giving way to central government control and command. By 1972 when the country

changed from a federation to a United Republic of Cameroon, Ahidjo and Muna's highly hierarchical and centralist tendencies had spread to every part of the Country.

Mass participation in the activities of the local authority councils had greatly diminished as central control and command replaced the relationship of cooperation and mutual reciprocity in the exchange of resources and information.

3.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT EAST CAMEROON

East Cameroon was considered an administrative department of France's central administrative machinery before the acquisition of independence in 1960. This administrative department was under the absolute control of a commissioner whose counterpart was in Togo. The title of Lieutenant Governors were given to the administrative heads of other colonies which were originally acquired by France.

Power, control and command was directly in the hands of French administrators who were responsible for the economic and socio-political life of the Cameroonians under the policy of assimilation. The aim of these Europeans then was to tailor out Frenchmen out of the black Cameroonians. Assimilation according to Cowan was:

> the imposition on colonial people of the culture, language and political institutions of France through a process of education and example... It was "cultural imperialism" which went hand in hand with political control.11

The Commissioner therefore maintained a heavy grip over the socio-political life of the native Cameroonians, making sure that the policies of the French were assimilated with enough precision. Every person fitted squarely in the hierarchical prefectoral system of administration instituted by France and no recognition nor any form of respect was given to traditional institutions, native laws and customs.[12]

The Commissioner, for the convenience of his administration, constituted an administrative council(conseil d' administration) made up of members chosen after enough scrutiny. These people included Europeans and Asians residing in Cameroon, and of course some prominent Cameroonians. These Cameroonians were mostly those who had spent at least five years in the public service, traditional chiefs, some rich farmers and those who had received some decoration from the French government. They were not necessarily the representatives of the people, rather these people were considered by the administrator as strategically placed for the provision of the necessary information for the smooth running of the administration and the penetration of the peripheral population.

Hierarchically, following the commissioner at the lower level were the prefects who were the direct representatives of the commissioner in the hinterlands. They in turn also organized a council of elders (conseil des notables) made of influential Africans and some Europeans for the provision of the much needed information for the smooth running of their administration and also

for the mobilization of the generality of the population into active participation in their respective programmes. Describing the magnitude of the powers of the generalist administrators in the French bureaucracy, Deschamps asserts that:

> The administrator was in charge of everything: administration, police, justice, taxes, roads, buildings, development of the economy and social progress. With him rested all the initiative and all responsibility. Supreme over the natives, he was also the first among Europeans, the representatives of the governor therefore France.[13]

Unlike the indirect rule system, the French assimilationist policy saw Chiefs and traditional rulers as "direct agents of the administration used for census taking, for recruiting laborers for forced labour (indigenate) for collection of taxes, for labour services, for maintenance of order, for public works, for proper management of agriculture etc."[14]

The French, in their quest to transform the natives, utilized a lot of brutality, intimidation and exploitation. People were conscripted indiscriminately into forced labour and other labour related services enumerated in the above quotation. Many suffered and died under untold misery. The police force was repressive characterized by constant torture and imprisonment without trial. Chiefs and traditional rulers were given extra powers which they used more for victimization and exploitation in collusion with some Europeans than for suitable public administration.

Explaining this point further Rev.Father Mveng quoted by Rubin asserts that:

> There are very few even among the present generation who do not recall the emotion-charged occasions during the nights when mysterious agents, come from one knew not where, descended on the villages, removed the able bodied men from their homes, and led them to unknown destinations. All too often, because of inadequate medical supervision and hard labour for long periods in unhygienic conditions, the destination was death.[15]

Widespread discontent and pressure for the institution of more participative, democratic and development oriented institutions were commonplace in this territory after the second World War. Many educated Cameroonians started questioning the enormous powers of the administrators, their callous indifference to the plight of the natives and their gross exploitative tendencies. They were further supported by prominent French writers who emphasized the need for the recognition of other people's traditions, and customs as vital conditions for civilization and development. Finally with the arrival of De Gaule into power the scene was set for greater freedom and autonomy of the colonies which until then were departments in the French Public Administrative system.

In February 1944, a conference was organized in Brazzaville, following extra pressures from the U.N.O., to look into possibilities of granting the African colonies greater autonomy and

democratic forms of government. De Gaule was represented in this conference by Rene' Pleven. The conference then came out with the following resolutions: firstly, that Africans(and Cameroonians in inclusive) were given greater opportunities to control the public service with the aim of subsequently leaving it in their hands; secondly, that African colonies were granted greater freedom and autonomy in the management of their internal affairs, and thirdly, that there was great reduction in the exaggerated powers of the French Commissioners and other generalists administrators.[15]

Following the resolution of the Brazzaville conference in 1944, a decree was issued from France, permitting the Commissioner in Yaounde to create Urban and Rural Councils(Communes) whose membership could be fully or partially elective. However, care was taken to emphasize the need for the appointment of the principal actors into leadership roles of these institutions by the French generalist administrators in order to secure control and coordination from the central government.

Yaounde and Douala first experienced the creation of local institutions in 1941 with the appointments of the mayor including the whole council by the central government. By 1947, some of them were elected and some were appointed. Some seats were reserved for Europeans and reputable Cameroonians "of good conduct". The first six rural councils (communes) were created in 1950 mostly around the rich cocoa producing area of Yaounde, the capital of the territory and by 1951 one was created in Garoua the main town in the whole Northern region of the country. 1952, saw the creation

of mixed rural councils in all the sub-divisions of the country with appointed mayors and elected councilors; contained in decree No.537 of August 21, 1952.

The organisation of urban councils was at two levels. The first level was made up of European quarters whose administrator-mayor was appointed by the central commissioner. He was a European solely responsible for the execution of all policies and the running of all council activities within the particular town. A municipal Commission made up of Europeans was however elected from a restricted suffrage and their major occupation was to provide information and support in the implementation of policies drawn by the assembly of the council.

The second level comprised of Cameroonians residing in the slumps of the towns. Here a deputy Mayor was also appointed by the Central Commissioner but he was hierarchically under the control of the European Mayor. He was assisted in his duties by quarter heads who were appointed and paid by the central administration. Most of these quarters heads (Chefs de quartier) did not necessarily posses any traditional titles while some did not reside in the quarters that they were expected to represent. These quarter heads constituted the municipal council (Corps Municipal) made up of twelve members appointed and paid by the administration. These people provided advice and information on the management of local problems in the African section of the town.

The organisation of rural councils was accompanied by a greater degree of democracy and autonomy than those in the urban

centres of Douala and Yaounde. Though the Administrator-Mayors were appointed from the central administration, the Councilors were elected with women inclusive. In fact a Woman was elected into a rural council in Sangmalema in 1952. Popular elections conducted councillors into the respective rural councils but care was taken to provide seats for the Europeans residing in the rural areas. All the thirteen seats reserved for expatriates were won by French citizens. The influence of Cameroonian Urban Elites was carefully prevented from penetration into the rural councils.[17]

The law therefore specified that only those who had resided in the particular area for a minimum of five years could contest for elections into rural Councils. These Councillors were thus highly dominated by farmers, local Chiefs, petty traders and many other illiterates. The ambitions of the French government nicely but bluntly put in the following report to the United Nations was attained. The report stated that:

> The goal seems to have been attained; the peasants voted for men capable of representing and if some of those elected were illiterates or did not speak French, they are none the less listerned to in the councils for this reason.[18]

The Councils at this period were divided into the Urban and the rural Councils. By 1955, some Councils in the major towns became too rich and powerful to be left in the hands of just any body. Consequently the Councils of Yaounde, Douala and Nkongsamba were transformed into full-duty Councils. Their Mayors were

Finally, these councils had very little sources for the internal generation of revenue. All Councils received the same amount of income from the government whether big or small. Councils were permitted to charge extra levies but councils hardly did this because of its unpopularity within the local population.

The functions of the Councils were categorized into two principal groups. The mandatory functions included the payment of salaries and the maintenance of major buildings and roads leading to the council area. The discretionary functions included the provision of medical services and building of primary schools. The remaining revenue could be spent as the Mayor or the Chief Executive desires subject only to the control of a generalist administrators.

Funds for road construction and other capital expenditure sometimes came from France entitled Petit Equipment Rural (PER) translated as small rural equipment. This fund had the dual objectives of political education and rural economic development. Various activities were accomplished by Councils using this fund prominent amongst which were the construction of feeder roads, ox-ploughing, plant and animal breeding, the construction of markets and abattoirs. The sizes of these projects were relatively small so as to facilitate close control and supervision by the generalist administrators at the local level.

Generally there existed a system of close control and supervision over all the local government institutions. Through the use of such variables as recruitment, finance, and functions,

the central government succeeded to put these structures under a firm grip. Commenting on the French policy on local government in her African colonies, Coleman advances that:

> In Nigeria the prompting of the nationalists led to the establishment of fully elected councils in the cities which frequently prove incapable of operating the administrative service, in some cases through inexperience. In French territory, on the other hand, the extension of democratic forms to the urban communities was the least pressing part of the programme of political evolution, which centered on representation in Paris and at the territorial assembly level.[20] (emphasis is mine).

The intention of the French administration, unlike the English was not the creation of viable, democratic and autonomous structures. On the contrary they wanted to create semi-democratic institutions in order to pacify the heavy pressure from numerous angles and at the same time ensuring the centre's close grip and control on the local population. Councils(communes) in this administrative system constituted part of the central administration and they were directly controlled by the French generalist administrators.

The popularity and the success of prominent nationalists in their search for independence orchestrated a change in the administrative direction taken by France towards these institutions in the late 1950s. All the councils in the Southern part of the

country were organized on democratic lines as multipartism persisted. Most of the major participants were elected by universal suffrage in exciting elections. However those in Northern Moslem part of the country still experienced some central government control since most of the population was inexperienced in local government administration. Two thirds of the Councillors were elected while one third was appointed including the Mayor. These Councils resembled each other in organization, structure and composition and they performed the same functions. These elections registered a huge success as popular candidates were elected to head the various councils all over the country.[21]

Three years after independence, marked the period of heavy state control of these institutions. Ahmadu Ahidjo in his quest for greater consolidation of power succeeded in the institution of a single party rule in East Cameroon. Most leaders of opposition parties were either arrested and detained or killed while some joined rangs within his party. Local government institution then came under the sole control of the ministry of Territorial Administration. Most principal actors were either appointed by the presidency or the ministry of Territorial Administration respectively.

The Mayor of full-duty councils were elected, including the councillors from an approved list drawn by the ministry. These people drew the broad policies of the councils and approved the budget. The Chief executive termed the government delegate was appointed by the president of the Republic in person.

The Mayors of the urban Councils were elected after the approval of the minister of Territorial Administration. Councillors were also scrutinized and approved before any elections. The municipal administrators of rural councils were directly appointed by the presidency. They were then the chief executives of the councils. Most of these municipal administrators were sub-prefects who combined these functions with those of the central government.

The functions of the councils were categorized into two. The first group comprised of mandatory functions which were quite few. These included the payment of salaries, debts of the councils and the running of the council itself. The discretionary functions included sanitary, health, education, Youth and sports among many others.

The sources of revenue for the councils were greatly reduced. These included poll tax, packing fees, slaughter fees and any other rates charged by the councils. The rates were fixed by the supervising authority. Grants and loans could be given to councils by the central government only on request and at the discretion of the ministry.

The calibre of the various personnel in the council was relatively low. Most of their activities fell under the control and the supervision of the generalist administrators. The success of the councils in the performance of their duty depended on the relationship existing between the generalists administrators and the principal actors at the council level.

Councils were permitted by the central ministry to group together in council unions so as to cooperatively undertake capital intensive projects. The leaders of these unions were not elected by the various councils concerned rather they were appointed by the minister. All of them were usually generalist administrators who combined their official functions with those of the council unions. Most resources were directed to other activities which were not approved by the various councils consequently councils hardly contributed their quota to these council unions.[22] Equipment and other infrastructure were hardly maintained nor replaced. By 1984 a presidential decree appointed trained council staff to replace these generalist administrators.

French-speaking Cameroon, having achieved small but genuine autonomy quickly lost it with the introduction of a single party rule by Ahmadu Ahidjo. The great excitement which accompanied local government elections in 1962 quickly died down with the introduction of elections using approved lists from the ministry coupled with the various appointments. By 1972, when Cameroon's Federal Structure was dismantled, Ahidjo had succeeded in one of his principal ambitions as exposed by Obiozor in the following exposed words:

> He wanted an integrated and unified Cameroon and that meant the elimination of political opposition and the remaining opponents or rivals as he embarked upon the final process of personalization of powers to himself... So through arbitrary

arrests, extortion, torture and censorship and selective liquidation, President Ahidjo overpowered all vocal opponents.[23]

Local councils in Cameroon existed under this political atmosphere as the narration proceeds to local government institutions in contemporary Cameroon.

3.4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITARY STATE

In 1972, another political revolution occurred in Cameroon. A referendum was conducted from which Cameroonian decided to change from the Federal to a Unitary system of government. West Cameroon, which was entrenched in the British culture and East Cameroon which was purely French opted to join together to form a United Republic of Cameroon. The Country therefore had a single party, with a single parliament and a single executive based in Yaounde the capital of the Republic.

The country was divided into seven provinces, several divisions and sub-divisions. The head of each province was a governor while divisions and sub-divisions were controlled by prefects and sub prefects respectively. Each of these administrators had enormous powers within their respective areas of jurisdiction since there were considered as the representatives of the head of state at their respective levels. Each administrator was unwearable only to his immediate hierarchical boss. Thus a sub prefect was answerable to the prefect while the prefect was answerable only to the governor. The governor in turn was directly

under the minister of Territorial Administration.

Reminiscent of the past French administrative system each generalists administrator controlled and commanded other ministerial departments including the councils and the local population within their levels of jurisdiction. Supreme over the various workers and the local population at these various levels they were given the authority to issue administrative orders binding on every person, in the interest of the state. They therefore, had enough control on members of the armed forces which they can use for the enforcement of these prefectoral orders. This situation still prevails in the contemporary Cameroon.

The two systems of local government administration were therefore fused together following the new local council law Number 74 - 23 of December 5, 1974.24 This new law provided for councils - (communes) which were mainly the Eastern Cameroon or Francophone model but with some slight concessions in details to pacify the Western, anglophone feelings.[25]

All the communes were a single tier, multipurpose organizations placed directly under the control of the central government administrator. Their sources of finances, functions and the personnel administration was tailored after what existed in East Cameroon before the 1974 law. The financial powers and responsibilities given to the councils in the anglophone Cameroon were greatly reduced and have continued to suffer this fate up to the present date. By 1986, the president made this observation of councils.

> The council reforms carried out by Law No.74/23 of December 5, 1974 opened new horizons for the functioning of councils... The taking over of the local councils teaching and Health Personnel by the State will continue. The supervision exercise will cover education and training of local councils officials, approval of local council budgets by the prefects and governors, laying down development objectives to the pursued by each council and control of the execution of council plans.[26]

In describing the development and the environment within which councils are thriving to day, the following variables are used so as to determine the nature of the relationship existing between the central government and the councils. These variables are: the legal and administrative powers given to the councils by the laws, the financial situation of the councils, the calibre of staff employed and the functions allocated to these peripheral institutions by the central government.

3.3.1 LEGAL/ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS

Councils in Cameroon then were divided into three main categories as follows: special urban councils of Yaounde, Douala, Nkongsamba, and Bamenda which were followed by urban and rural councils. By 1987, these councils were re-organized and classified into four main categories. The first group comprises of urban community councils made up of Douala and Yaounde. The second group are special urban councils of Bamenda and Nkongsamba. There are

then followed by urban and finally the rural councils. In other words, there are two main urban communities, two special urban councils, twenty-six urban councils and 170 rural councils. The provinces have also increased from seven to ten. The table below shows the distribution of councils in the respective provinces in Cameroon.

TABLE 3.1

Distribution of Councils in the ten Provinces of Cameroon

Province	Urban Community Councils	Special Urban	Urban Councils	Rural Councils	Total
1. Extreme North	-	-	1	19	20
2. North	-	-	1	6	7
3. Adamoua	-	-	1	8	9
4. Centre	1	-	7	34	42
5. East	-	-	1	16	17
6. South	-	-	3	17	20
7. Littoral	1	1	5	14	21
8. South West	-	-	2	16	18
9. West	-	-	4	26	30
10 North West	-	1	1	13	15
Total	2	2	26	170	200

Source: FEICOM: Yaounde, Trans Media, 1988 P.14.

Douala and Yaounde have been transformed to urban communities because of their economic and social importance. These councils have been split into four sub urban councils each, which group together to form the urban community council.

The 1974 law which is still enforced in the contemporary Cameroon specifies that the council is a decentralized corporate body, having a legal personality and financial autonomy. The

Council is charged with the responsibility of conducting local business under the supervision of the state in order to maintain the economic social and cultural development of their respective population. The councils are single-tirered, multi-purpose organisations. Candidates for the leadership role are selected principally through elections.

The procedure indicates that a candidate for any post is first of all screened at the lower levels of the administration and the party by the prefect and other party members. The name is further sent to the minister of Territorial Administration for final confirmation. All the candidates including the councillors and their leaders are selected and then grouped in a list at the level of the ministry. All the officials are in turn elected following this list and not on individual basis. In some cases, unpopular candidates are voted into office simply because they find themselves among popular candidates in a list.

The Mayors in the urban councils are elected among the councillors in their first sitting. Once elected, the mayor becomes the Chief accounting officer responsible for the execution of all the policies drawn by the councillors. Four urban councills each in Yaounde and Douala form the urban Community councils. Their various mayors are hierarchically below the government delegate. While the leader of the respective urban councils is a mayor elected by the councillors amongs themselves, the leader of the urban community is a government delegate to the urban community appointed by the head of state.

The urban community therefore, has two governing bodies. There is the sub-organ at the level of the four urban councils called the sub divisional urban council incharge of some specific functions in their respective quarters in the city. Then there is the urban community council comprising of the mayor and some selected members of each urban council, who preside over the destiny of the whole city with respect to council affairs. The leader of this urban community council is the government delegate. He is then the chief accounting officer responsible for the execution of all policies drawn by the assembly of urban mayors including the selected councillors from each of four urban councils that make up the urban community councils. These urban community councils are only two in Cameroon and they are located in Yaounde and Douala.

There are two special urban councils located in Bamenda and Nkongsamba. The mayors and the councillors are elected following the same list approved by the ministry. They however, have only one organ of deliberation, named the council assembly. The mayor presides over these meetings which draw up the various policies. The Chief executive and accounting officer is a government delegate appointed also by the president of the Republic.

Councillors in the rural councils are also elected following the list using the same procedure cited above. The municipal administrator is appointed by the minister. This appointed council administrator is then the Chief executive with all the powers to

execute all council business. All these candidates serve for a five year term which is renewable for an indefinite period. A full council in Cameroon meets twice in a year under the watchful eye of a central government administrators, whose presence is obligatory. Their observations and remarks are taken seriously. All rural councils are generally given a relatively low status in the administrative hierarchy in the Republic of Cameroon.

The various council assemblies are incharge of drawing broad policies of the organisation. Therefore adopt council budgets and decide on major policies, projects and programmes. The Chief executive is in charge of the execution of these policies and the general administration of the councils.

It therefore implies that the principal actors at the local government level have relative access to the central government authorities since most of them are selected by these central government authorities. Inter penetration becomes easy since all of them belong to the same party and socially feel as part of the same group particularly in the rural areas. According to statistics, more than 90% of council leaders hold responsible post in the ruling party.[27]

3.4.2. *FINANCES OF THE COUNCILS*

The revenue base of these councils is very weak especially with those in most urban and rural areas which constitute more than 90% of the councils in Cameroon. Their revenue principally depends on assigned sources such as poll tax, cattle tax, and business licenses extracted from business ventures operating in the

locality. The respective rates are fixed by the law. These laws are explicit enough for the sake of scrupulous application.

The councils are also permitted to charge certain levies on some services provided particularly in the towns. These councils hardly collect enough revenue from this source because of the uncooperative nature of the local population which in turn makes collection difficult. Most urban communities in the cities and special urban councils are generally richer because of the thick population and bustling business activities which pay in a lot of revenue to the councils. These two categories of councils alone, account for 71.3% of the total council revenue in Cameroon but their population is not up to 10% of what obtains in other Councils in the whole country.[28]

The total expenditure of councils in the financial year 1990/91 compared to the total national expenditure is less than 4%. The table below shows the total expenditure of councils compared to the national expenditure for the past five years.

Table 3.2

Council expenditure compared to National expenditure

Revenue	Year (amount in thousand million francs C.F.A.				
Expen-diture	1986/87 31.4%	1988 29%	1989 ------	1990 24.5%	1991 14.7%
National Expenditure	800.0	650.0	600	600	550.0
percentage	3.93%	2.89%	---	4.1%	2.7%

Source: Ministry of Plan and Regional Development. Le Cameroun en Chiffres Yaounde, Direction de la Satistique, 1992, P. 23.

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Aid, loans and subventions to councils from the central government has hardly gone above 4,000,000,000 francs CFA which is about 0.5% of the national budget. For example, loans and subventions to councils for the 1986/87 and 1987/88 financial years were 2.503, 278,193 and 3,102,237,206 franc CFA respectively which amounts to 0.31% and 0.39% of the national budget.[29] Since then the fortunes of the councils have been dwindling steadily with the advent of the economic and political crises.

The revenue of the council is kept in the central government treasury and it is directly controlled by the central government treasurer. According to circular No.27/MINFI/DT/91 of 1991 the control of treasurer over council revenue include the control of the payment of council expenses, the recovery of council revenue, the management of council revenue, and the establishment and the production council accounts among many. This mixture of council revenue with that of central government coupled with extensive powers of control by the central government actor over this revenue clearly shows the high level of control and command over these councils. The law further permits the divisional officers(prefects) to use the revenue of the councils for any activity of national interest. In other words, these activities are not clearly defined by the law.

A council fund was created in 1978 by the central government. This organization is supposed to mobilize resources at the central level and redistribute these resources to the councils according to their various demands. They also give out loans to the various

councils for the effective accomplishment of their projects. The amount disbursed for loans has never gone above 0.4% of the national budget.[30] This organization is called special Council Support Fund for Mutual Assistance, abbreviated in French as Fonds D' Equipement Inter. Communale (F.E.I.C.O.M)

3.4.3 PERSONNEL SITUATION OF THE COUNCILS

The personnel situation of these councils is not very good. Most of the staff in these institutions, particularly those in the rural councils which constitute more than 85% of the councils in the country, have hardly gone beyond the primary school level. According to statistics, all the council leaders such as government delegates, mayors and municipal administrators have never hard any course in local government administration. 48% of them are local traditional rulers, traders, farmers and cattle rearers, while the rest are retired civil servants of the various professions such as teaching, nursing, clerks and so on.31 The Local Government Training Institute in Buea has succeeded to train only 440 students since its inception in 1979/80 academic year, which gives an average of two trained staff per council in the whole Republic of Cameroon. However most urban and rural Councils hardly employ these calibre of staff consequently of them are concentrated in the major cities and towns where most of the councils are rich enough to pay their salaries

The Secretary general of the councils are recruited and posted to the respective councils by the central ministry. Most of them have received some training in public administration and management

principally from the local council training institute (C.E.F.A.M.). They are responsible for the management of the respective staff which have been recruited by the councils. They are supposed to work closely with municipal administrators who generally have received little training in local government administration.

Generally councils in Cameroon do not possess the necessary staff in sufficient quantity to carry out their respective functions firstly because of their poor financial position and secondly because of the absence of training facilities.[32]

Most central government actors responsible for the supervision of these councils do not also possess enough knowledge on local government administration. These courses are hardly offered in the national school of administration where almost all of them are trained.

Most of these workers are not well paid as a result of the insufficient training received and the general poverty of the council. Most council workers in the Republic go for many months without their salaries as subsequent analysis will show in the next chapters.

Their salary scale and conditions of service are inferior to what obtains in the national public service, as a result, they are considered inferior to other public service workers. Their jobs are not secured either since most of the workers are employed locally by the Chief executive who also has ample possibilities of dismissing any of them.

1.4.4. FUNCTIONS ALLOCATED TO THE COUNCILS.

The functions of each category of councils are not very defined as is the case in France.[33] Councils are permitted to discharge most of their economic and social functions depending on the resources at their disposal. Generally the functions of the councils fall under the obligatory and the discretionary functions. The obligatory functions of the councils must be performed before the end of each financial year. On the other hand discretionary functions could be performed if the... council leaders feel that they still have enough revenue and other resources to undertake them. In other words, the central government is very concerned with the accomplishment of the mandatory functions which are relatively few in number. These include payment of salaries of the workers, debt servicing, contributions to social and economic activities decided upon by the central government and some basic municipal services such as civil status registration, burying of unclaimed composes, publishing of laws and maintenance of public law and order. The council is obliged to obey any other instructions emanating from the supervising authority at any time.

Discretionary functions are quite many. They involve cultural, social and economic responsibilities targeted at the improvement of the life of the local population. They range from the provision of water, electricity, recreational centres, markets and housing to the maintenance of roads. These functions are many and their execution is limited only by the resources at the disposal of the councils.

The law permitted councils to group together so as to cooperatively undertake capital intensive projects. Almost all councils in the Republic have grouped together to form these Council Unions. In the past all the accounting officers of these council Unions were generalists administrators who combined their traditional functions with those of the council unions. Many cases of recklessness were therefore registered as resources of the council unions were diverted to activities that had no bearing with the respective councils. Most councils therefore hardly contributed except under serious pressure from the central government. The most recent 'decree No.87 - 15 of July 15, 1987'[4] removing these generalists administrators from the control of these council unions has done very little to salvage the situation since most of the equipment and other infrastructure has already broken down.

Generally, the functions performed by the councils are not capital intensive and do not require a lot of skilled labour. Most councils in Cameroon find it very difficult to undertake such functions as veterinary services, agriculture, health, education and community development which need a lot of skilled labour. Most of the Councils do not have the required manpower, the money and the autonomy to perform these functions with ease. Experience from the field indicates that the councils do not collaborate closely with Central Government Ministerial Departments located at the council level . Any other form of coordination passes through the generalist administrators who are supposed to supervise the

activities of every other department within their areas of competence.

Local Council authorities therefore have enough access to the central government authority since the latter is directly under the control of the former. The principal actors at the local level are to the most part appointed by the central government rather than through election by the local population. These Council actors therefore tend to strive at all cost to satisfy the desires of the central government to the disadvantage of the local population.

The paternalistic attitude of the central government coupled with the numerous media of control have instituted a master-servant relationship between the central government and the councils over the years. The local Council authorities having been caught in this intricate network of controls can do nothing but look up to the central government for the provision of the necessary resources and directives. The final union of the two states in 1972 has further complicated the already formidable task or nation building in Cameroon, as a result of the great disparity between the anglophone and the francophone cultures. This great disparity has orchestrated some intense struggle for supremacy which in turn has generated a lot of conflict. The central government which is largely dominated by the Francophones has gradually adopted a more centralist and authoritarian posture particularly at the moment, that the country is experiencing a lot of political crises.

The observation of Lewis is even more pertinent now that the crises of identity has reached a very high proportion in Cameroon. According to him;

> The federation of the two states of Cameroon has complicated what would have been a formidable task for either of them alone - that of evoking a sense of common nationality, of constructing a coherent cluster of political values around national institutions. The process of constitution - making for the Cameroon federation did not advance this process very much since it gave expression to the political values of only one side. The structures erected for the central government tend to be authoritarian. It must be admitted that the disparities between the two states are very great.[15]

This political and administrative scenario has greatly frustrated the development of autonomous, democratic and participatory local government institutions at the grass-roots level. The powers of supervision and control having been hijacked from the local population and assigned to central government actors, has in turn prevented the local population from identifying with these institutions. Their support and active participation in the activities of the councils is greatly compromised. The activities of these councils do not leave the desired impact on the local population firstly because of the paucity of resources and powers to effectively perform their traditional functions and

secondly because of the little support coming from the peripheral population as data gathered from the field will indicate in the subsequent chapters.

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CHAPTER FOUR

EVALUATION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL ON THE COUNCILS

4.1 Introduction

The present chapter and the next that follows constitute the analysis of data accumulated so far, with the principal ambition of testing the two hypotheses already stated at the beginning of the work. Chapter four or this chapter proper, contsins the presentation and analysis of data concerning the level of control exercised by the central government on the local government institutions located at the grass-roots level.

The analysis is presented at three main levels. The first level is made up of the analysis of the responses got from the first set of questionnaires distributed to the general public. This first set is presented in this work as "Questionnaire I". At the second level, the analysis of data got from the responses from the second set of questionnaires, distributed to workers of the councils and the related ministry is analysed and presented. This is also considered in this work as "Questionnaire II". The third and the final part is the presentation of the synthesis of the responses derived from the two sets of questionnaires in order to come out with some valid conclusions.

Chapter five concerns itself with the evaluation of the participation of the local population in the activities of the councils. The arrangement and the presentation in this chapter also follows the same logical sequence as in this chapter. The

first part constitutes the analysis of responses derived from the first set of questionnaires followed by those derived from the second set of questionnaires. The third and the final part is the synthesis of the various opinions expressed in the two sets of questionnaires.

Data presented in these chapters came principally from the primary and secondary sources already specified in the introductory chapter of this work. The opinions expressed in the interviews conducted are presented simultaneously with the various opinions expressed in the questionnaires and other secondary sources. The analysis proceeds now with the presentation of the data accumulated from the two sets of questionnaires.

4.2 Presentation of Data

The presentation of preliminary data is also at two levels. The first level deals with the presentation of data from the first set of questionnaires considered as questionnaire 1. The second level deals with the presentation of data derived from the second set of questionnaires considered as questionnaire 11.

4.2.1 Data from Questionnaire 1 Distributed to the General Population.

Generally a set of 50 questionnaires were distributed to each rural council including the Bamenda Special Urban Council. Yaounde Urban Community Council had 100 questionnaires since it is made up of four Urban Councils. 350 questionnaires were distributed to various councils, while 256 were returned indicating a percentage of 73.1% as the following table specifies.

Table 4.1
Distribution of Questionnaires

Code	Council	Total Population	No. of Questionnaires given out	No. of Questionnaires. Number received	Percentage (256) distributed
1	Bali	27,343	50	35	13.67
2	Bamenda	105,165	50	38	14.84
3	Santa	53,791	50	36	14.06
4	Mbouda	86,160	50	30	11.71
5	Eyumojock	26,979	50	44	17.18
6	Yaounde	647,530	100	75	29.29
Total		946,968	350	256	100.75

Source: FEICOM Transmedia, Yaounde, 1988, p.14

It can be seen from the above table that the highest number of questionnaires were received from Eyumojock rural Council. While least amount was received from Mbouda Rural Council.

Respondents in Mbouda area were more reserved and more in accessible compared to other regions. Respondents from the francophone zone were not as cooperative as thoes from the anglophone zone as subsequent analysis will show.

4.2.1.1 Distribution According to Linguistic Zone.

The Councils in the Anglophone zone comprised Bali, Bamenda, Santa and Eyumojock. Those in the Francophone zone were made up of Mbouda and the four Urban Councils of Yaounde. It implies that four Councils came from the Anglophone zone while five came from the Francophone zone; Mbouda is in the Western province while Eyumojock is from South West.

59%(151) respondents came from the Anglophone zone while (41%) (105) of the respondents came from the Francophone zone. More of the questionnaires given to Francophone zone were not returned because of their relative inaccessibility. Some were not quite keen on participating in the exercise. There are some Anglophones living in the Francophone zone and some Francophones living in anglophone zone. Their number is normally inferior to the predominant group. Because of the strict application of the clearly defined laws, in the highly organized prefectoral system of administration, the population can be described as relatively homogenous in respect to the problem under study.

4.2.1.2 Distribution According to Sex

(68.75% (176) respondents were males while 30.17%(78) respondents were females. 0.78%(2) respondents did not indicate their sex. Males are in the forefront of the exercise. The population was also classified according to their various professions.

4.2.1.3 Distribution According to Profession.

Most of the respondents were traders followed by farmers. These two groups alone constituted 62.04% of the total population. The least represented were the unemployed with a percentage 07.42%. They were followed in this descending order by workers in the public and private sectors of the economy. The table below shows the detail and clear classification of the population.

Table 4.2
Distribution According to Profession

Profession	No.of Questionnaires	Percentage of sample population
Traders	86	33.59
Farmers	73	28.52
Workers(Public/ Private	44	17.19
Workers	34	13.28
Unemployed	19	07.42
Total	256	100%

These farmers and traders who constitute the bulk of the population are typical members of the grass-roots population. The classification was also done following their educational standards in order to determine the level of those who participated in the exercise.

4.2.1.4. Distribution According to Educational Standards

The highest number of respondents with a percentage of 50.4% had either some primary school education or some lower qualification. On the other hand only 07.4%(19) of the respondents had either a degree or a certificate from a specialized training institute. (25.8%)(66) of the respondents had some secondary school education followed 12.5% (32) of the respondents who come from the teachers training colleges. The implication is that most of the questionnaires fell in the hands of respondents with either primary or secondary school education, thus people who are not highly placed in the society.

This preliminary data described the population from the general public following their linguistic zone, their sex,

professions and their various levels of education. The next step will present the description of the population from workers of the councils and those in the related ministry. These people are considered in appendix 11.

4.2.2 Presentation of Data from Questionnaire11 Distributed to Workers.

These questionnaires were distributed to workers of the already named Councils. Workers from the related ministry came from the ministry of Territorial Administration in Yaounde. Each rural Council had 15 questionnaires while the Bamenda special Urban Council had 20. The ministry of Territorial Administration also had 20 questionnaires while the Yaounde urban community Councils had 50 questionnaires following the strength of its work force. The table that follows below better represents the pattern of the distribution of the questionnaires to the various councils.

Table 4.3.

Distribution of the questionnaire.2

Council	Number of Workers	No.of Question-naires given out	No.of Question-naires. Number received	Percentage of the 91
Bali	15	15	11	12.1
Bamenda	29	20	17	18.7
Santa	15	15	11	12.1
Mbouda	17	15	8	8.8
Eyumojock	17	15	8	8.8
Yaounde-1,2,3,4.	128	50	27	29.7
Yaounde-(Min).	46	20	9	9.9
Total	267	150	91	100

The respondents from the Bamenda Urban Council registered the highest level of participation while workers from the ministry participated least in the exercise because they were hardly available. Most of them also feared to participate in the exercise given the volatile political climate. 60.66% of the questionnaires were returned and considered for analysis as apposed to 73.1% of them from the general public. The workers from the francophone zone were not very responsive.

Generally the councils employ very few workers reflecting not only their poor financial situation but also the amount of responsibilities undertaken by the few employees and the councils as a whole. These workers were grouped according to their linguistic zones.

4.2.2.1 Distribution According to Linguistic zone.

The two principal linguistic zones registered almost the same amount of respondents. 51.6%(47) of the respondents came from the anglophone zone while 48.4%(44) of the respondents came from the francophone zone. This population was made up of both males and females.

4.2.2.2 Distribution According to Sex

69.2%(63) of the respondents were males while 30.8% of these workers were females. These councils therefore have employed mostly males opposed to females. The standard of education of these workers was also considered necessary in the work.

4.2.2.3 Distribution According to Educational Standard

Most of the workers in the councils are not very qualified following the analysis ,45.1%(41) of these workers have attained some primary school education while 40.65%(37) of the respondents have either some secondary or secondary technical education. On the other hand only 9.9%(19) respondents are very qualified possessing either a degree or a certificate from a professional school. The table that follows indicates more details of their various levels of education of the respondents.

Table 4.4.

Distribution According to Educational Standard

Code C3	Standard of Education	Number of Respondents	Percentage
1	Primary School	41	45.1
2	Secondary School	37	40.7
3	Teachers College	1	1.1
4	University/Professional School	9	9.9
5	No Response	3	3.3
5	Total	91	100

Most of the participants (85.8%) were therefore the junior staff with either primary or secondary school certificates. Councils in Cameroon hardly employ the highly qualified staff since they have to pay them from their respective budgets. 1.1% (1) respondents came from the teachers college indicating that councils hardly employ people who have benn trained to teach. It further indicates that councils are not incharge of the education of

children at the various levels.

On the other hand the ministry of Territorial Administration has career civil servants who are incharge of the councils. In which case they are not necessarily trained in council administration. The Department of Local Councils in the Ministry has a relatively weak staff strength and they are primarily incharge of drawing broad policies concerning the organization and management of the councils. The supervision and control of the councils is principally left to the generalist administrators located at the grass-roots level. The council laws and the decrees clearly define the parameters
of this control.

4.3 ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS RESPONSES

The principal aim at this level is to determine the nature of the relationship existing between the central government and the councils based on the responses got from the questionnaires. Its purpose is to determine whether the relationship existing between the Central government and the councils is that of partnership or control. The work therefore seeks to either validate or invalidate the following hypothesis; that the relationship between the central government and the councils is characterized more by control and command than partnership and mutual reciprocity in the exchange of resources.

In order to determine this level of control the following variables were used:- the level of autonomy given to the councils, the amount of access and discretionary powers given to the

linguistic zones.

Table 4.5

On whether councils are autonomous or not

Responses	Anglophone	Percentage	Francophone	Percenage
Yes	15	5.9	27	10.5
No	136	53.1	78	30.5
Total	151	59.0	105	41.0

Chi-square;

Anglophone X = 13.21

Francophone X = 18.76

Therefore the difference between the anglophone and the francophone responses is significant. The reasons are explained below:

The above table indicates that relatively few anglophones (5.9%) feel that their councils have the desired autonomy as opposed to 10.5% of their francophone counterparts. The implication is therefore that more francophones feel that their councils are as autonomous as the law implies. These respondents see nothing wrong with the amount of autonomy given to the councils as opposed to their anglophone counterparts who had experienced free and more autonomous local councils in the past, before the union in 1972. The francophone respondents, have been used to the operation of councils which are directly under the control and the command of central government actors during and after colonialism. To these people, councils are as autonomous as the law implies. However a large majority of the respondents have confirmed that these councils do not have the desired autonomy necessary for the

effective performance of their functions. 53% of the respondents from the anglophone zone hold this opinion while 30.5% from the francophone zone feel the same.

When they were asked further why they hold this opinion, most of them complained of excessive central government interference in the activities of the councils while some others hold that the centralized system of administration emphasizes a lot of government control on the councils. Here are some of their responses unedited;

1. The minister of Territorial Administration intervenes beyond limits.
2. The councils are teleguided by influential officials of the ministry of Territorial Administration.
3. The councils take orders from the government.
4. The government has total control over them so they are answerable to them directly or indirectly.
5. There is over centralization of power to the government.
6. The S.D.O.(Prefect) and the D.O (Subprefect) interfere beyond limits.
7. The government does not want councils to function as they like.
8. The law permits a lot of control.
9. The economy is state planned and state controlled.
10. Nothing in the councils goes uncontrolled by the government.
11. The prefect is supposed to control councils.

These various responses indicate that councils are the creation of the central government but they are not as autonomous as they are supposed to be. It further confirms that the local population is aware of the extensive interference of central government actors in the activities of the councils. Some already hint on the fact that these councils are under the control and command of the prefects.

The probe went further to ascertain whether the central government allocates enough functions to the councils.

4.3.1.2. <u>On the Functions of the Councils</u>

79.3% of respondents are not satisfied with the way in which functions are allocated to the councils.

When questioned further, fewer respondents, 65.93% assert that the functions and the resources of the councils should be increased while 29.9% hold that their functions and resources should not be increased. These respondents further confirm that these councils already have enough responsibilities and resources. They offer the following reasons for their opinions:

1. Councils do not perform their normal duties.
2. Councils need to be reorganized.
3. There is very little accountability.
4. The municipal administrator is not honest.
5. Councils does not perform many functions with the money collected.
6. The Mayor and the D.O.(Subprefect) do not spend the money well.

7. The Mayor is too inefficient.
8. No person knows how council money is spent.
9. The councils perform very few functions etc.

From the above responses, it could be concluded that the councils normally undertake little responsibilities with the money collected. According to them the councils are ineffective because accountability is low. These respondents on their part posit that these councils should not be given more functions and resources since there is very little accountability. They sort of feel despaired because councils in the country seem disorganized, ineffective and inefficient.

On the other hand, many more respondents(65.93%) hold that functions of the councils should be increased because of the following reasons:-

1. To enhance autonomy.
2. So as to permit the councils to perform their duties effectively.
3. To promote regional development.
4. To facilitate decision making in the councils. So that it can work faster.
5. This will enable development to go faster.
6. The council is near to the people and it can work faster.
7. Part of the in efficiency is caused by lack of resources and functions.
8. Most of the development is done by the government workers and the councils should be given more functions etc.

The above responses indicate that these respondents are quite aware of the fact that councils are vital instruments of development. They also hold that councils with more functions, more autonomy and resources will accelerate balanced development.

The conclusion from the above responses is firstly that councils do not perform most of their functions and secondly that these councils are poor in human and material resources. These responses further indicate that the councils will perform better if these councils have the necessary autonomy and resources.

Councils in Cameroon are allocated a wide range of functions which they have the liberty to perform if the necessary resources are available. Most of these functions are discretionary while very few are obligatory. The above responses allude to the fact that these councils strive to perform only the few obligatory functions as supportive secondary data shall indicate later on. The municipal administrator and the D.O. in Bamenda central confirm in the interview conducted that most council workers have not been paid for about 10 months of this year (1994). There upon, the few obligatory functions are not performed effectively. Most of the respondents feel that the council authorities are not very accountable. In order to push this point further, these people were told to indicate whether the money contributed to the councils is wisely spent.

4.3.1.3 <u>On Finances of the Councils</u>

71.6% of the respondents accept that the money collected by the council authorities is not wisely spent. In other words the

council authorities are not very efficient in the management of council revenue. On the other hand 27.73% of the population feel

their council authorities are quite efficient in the management of council revenue.

When they were questioned further, the respondents confirm that the revenue is either used for white elephant projects or on selfish projects, that do not benefit the local population at the grass-roots level. These respondents provide the following responses to buttress the above views on this issue. The answers are unedited.

1. Work is done (by the actors) only to save face and sometimes no work is done.
2. They often pay attention to luxurious projects that are of little use to the people.
3. The authorities do not care about the people but for themselves.
4. Most projects are not realized. This is tantamount to misappropriation and swindling of funds.
5. There is no control from the councillors and the general public.
6. It is taken for personal use by the authorities.
7. The general public cannot control them except the D.O. They usually connive.
8. It goes to the government treasury and it is directed to projects no related to the councils.

9. Most of the money is embezzled.
10. Control of the council authorities is not effective.
11. No increase in welfare activities etc.

The various responses already indicate that the public is conscious of the fact that control of the council authorities is from above and not from the grass-roots level. Some already suggest that there is some form of understanding between the central government actors and the council authorities, which encourages inefficiency in the management of council revenue. Queuing up from this response the respondents were then told to indicate the persons that the council authorities would prefer to serve as a matter of priority in the course of executing the policies of the councils. The council authorities would want to serve as a matter of priority, the people who exercise control on their activities. These people could either be the central government actors or the local population at the grass-roots level. The following table presents their responses.

Table 4.6

4.3.1.4 The People Most Likely to be Served by the Council Authorities.

Persons	Number of respondents	Percentage
S.D.O(Prefect	165	64.5%
Local Population	54	21.1%
D.O.(Subprefect)	35	13.7%
No Response	2	0.7%
Total	256	100%

Source: Survey conducted by researcher. Question No.15

The above table presents a clear picture of where the control of the council authorities comes from. 200 respondents corresponding to 78.12% of the population willingly agree that council authorities strive to satisfy and pacify the (S.D.O. and the D.O.) who are central government actors as matter of priority, since their actions and performance are supervised and controlled by them. The local population has little to do with this control and supervision as it shall be seen from the responses of the council workers and the analysis of subsequent supportive data.

On the other hand, 21.1% of the respondents feel the council authorities strive to satisfy and pacify the local population. These respondents hold that their council authorities are responsible to the population and thereby more development-oriented. The analysis could go further to determine the attitude of the anglophone respondents as opposed to their francophone counterparts. The table that follows indicates their various responses.

Table 4.7

The people most likely to be served by the council authorities

Code C.24	Responses	Anglo-phone	Percen-tage	Franco-phone	Percen-age
1	S. D. O	84	32.8	81	31.7
2	D. O	24	8.2	14	5.5
3	Local population	46	17.9	8	3.1
4	No Response	-	-	3	0.0
	Total -	150	58.9	106	41.4

Chi-square

Anglophone X = 72.02

Francophone X = 13.16

The difference between anglophone and the francophone feelings is significant. The reasons are explained here below:

It can be deduced from the above table that 41% of the anglophone respondents confirm that the council authorities want to satisfy either the S.D.O. or the D.O. at all cost while 17.9% feel that they want to satisfy the local population first before any other person. Relatively more anglophones 17.9% hold that the local population is served first as opposed to 3.1% of the francophone respondents, which implies that more authorities in the anglophone councils pay attention to the demands of the local population because these people had experienced freer and more development-oriented local council administration. On the contrary, more council authorities from the francophone zone struggle to pacify the central government actors first before the local population. These authorities have grown to accept and

accommodate the overbearing presence of central government actors based on the past colonial experience which emphasized central government dominance at the local level.

4.3.2 ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES FROM QUESTIONNAIRE 11 DISTRIBUTED TO WORKERS.

The responses come from the respective council workers and those incharge of council affairs in the Ministry of Territorial Administration in Yaounde. The subsequent analysis presents their opinions on the various issues raised concerning the subject under study.

4.3.2.1 ON THE AUTONOMY OF THE COUNCILS

These respondents were first of all told to determine whether councils in Cameroon have enough autonomy for the effective performance of their functions as implied in the 1974 council Laws. 87.0% (80) of these respondents immediately agree that these councils do not have the desired autonomy needed for the effective performance of their functions. These responses already corroborate the opinions expressed in questionnaire 1, which come from the general public. The analysis goes further to determine the responses from the various councils. The following table shows the classification according to the respective councils and the ministry.

Table 4.8

On Whether Councils Are Autonomous As The Law Implies.

Question: Are councils as autonomous as the law implies?

Code C.5	Responses	Anglo-phone	Percen-tage	Franco-phone	Percen-age
1	Bali	0	00	11	12.1
2	Bamenda	0	00	17	18.7
3	Santa	0	00	11	12.1
4	Mbouda	0	00	8	8.8
5	Eyumojock	0	00	8	8.8
6	Yaounde	8	8.8	15	16.4
7	Yaounde	0	00	7	07.7
8	Unclassified	3	3.3	3	3.3
	Total	11	12.1	80	87.9

Source: Survey conducted by researcher. Question No.1

The above table indicates that all the respondents with the opinion that the councils have enough autonomy come from Yaounde Urban Community Council. The government delegate to this Urban Community Council is a very powerful political figure who is relatively independent of the generalists administrators responsible for the supervision and control of these councils. It therefore implies that the council is not autonomous rather it is the powerful Chief executive who is autonomous.

All the workers in the ministry including all the other council workers support the fact that these councils are not as autonomous as the law implies. The general conclusion is that most councils do not possess enough autonomy as implied by the law.

When they were questioned further, these respondents feel the autonomy of the councils has been reduced by the much powers given to central government actors to control the councils. Here are

some of their typical responses:-

1. The central government agents have a lost of control over the councils.
2. The central government influences the actions of the councils for political reasons.
3. There is over-centralization in the government.
4. The councils are directed and controlled by the administrators.
5. Because of the control and the command system of administration.
6. The councils are mostly controlled by the D.O. and the S.D.O (Prefects)
7. The over interferences of Central government .
8. Limited power are given to the councils to act.
9. It is the government that is autonomous not the councils.
10. They cannot take decisions alone without reference from above.etc.

These responses above already indicate that the level of control exercised by the central government actors on the councils is quite high. They further confirm that the councils are placed administratively under the generalists administrators so as to guarantee the success of the political ambitions of the central government. These respondents already hint that the control of the councils by the central government is intentional and organized.

To push this points further, these respondents were told to indicate whether the contact between the various central government

actors and council actors is easy. The level of contact between the various actors could enhance the performance of the councils if this contact is for mutual benefit based on partnership and cooperation. On the other hand it could hinder the effective performance of the councils if this contact is to emphasize the vertical relationship which places the council actor at the mercy of the central government actors.

4.3.2.2. ON THE LEVEL OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE ACTORS

Almost all the respondents 96.7% affirm that council authorities have easy contact with the central government actors, while the remaining 3.3% did not indicate anything following the analysis of the computer. It can be concluded that these people are neutral. The contact between the various actors is therefore easy.

This easy contact between the various actors can enhance the performance of the councils if the council authorities are given enough latitude for independent decisional manoeuvre. The risk involved here is that the central government actors may be tempted to intrude beyond the desired levels in the activities of the councils as a result of this easy contact. The next question is then to find out if effectively these council actors are given enough room to take independent decisions. The table that follows provides the answers to this.

Observation.

4.3.2.3 ON THE DISCRETIONARY POWERS GIVEN TO COUNCILS

The various respondents were told to indicate whether major decisions can be taken and implemented without the approval at the central government actors. Their responses are found in this table below.

Table 4.9
On Whether Council Authorities Are Free To Take Major Decisions Independently.

Responses	Number of Respondents	Percentage
No	72	79.12
Yes	18	19.78
No response	1	1.1
Total	91	100

Source: Survey conducted by researcher. Question No.4

The above table indicates that 79.12% of the respondents assert that no major decision can be taken and implemented without the approval of the central government actors. It implies that the easy contact between these various actors is to facilitate this aspect of control. The easy contact is to obtain the approval of the central government actors on the various decisions taken at the council level. Only 19.78% of the population hold a contrary opinion.

The opinion of the workers in the Department of Local Councils in the ministry is considered important on this issue since the various decrees and circulars on the control of the various councils emanate from there. The next table presents the opinions of the workers in the central ministry in Yaounde on this issue.

Table 4.10
On Whether Council Authorities Are Free to Take Major Decisions Independently.

Respondent	Response	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Council Workers	NO	64	70.32
	Yes	18	19.79
Workers in Ministry	Yes	00	00
	NO	8	8.8%
	NIL	1	1.1
	Total	91	100

Source: Survey conducted by researcher. Question No.4

Of the 9 worker from the Ministry, 8 confirm that no major decision can be taken and implemented without the approval of Central Government actors. The remaining one respondent is undecided. The impression of these respondents is important since they are incharge of all the Councils in the Country. The discretionary powers of the councils are therefore, very limited.

The law on this issue is quite clear. It states in article 1 subsections 1 - 3 that all major decision must be taken and implemented with the approval of supervisory authority. The impressions of almost all the workers in the ministry and the majority of the council workers tie with the 1974 law which is in practice.[1]

These respondents who confirm this level of control provide the following reasons for their impressions.

1. Because councils are not autonomous.
2. The Central Government uses this as a means of control.

3. The Council law states so.
4. All such decisions and their financing are taken by the central government.
5. This is because the decisions must be acceptable to the central government which must be in their favour.
6. The councils must be autonomous even though decisions will be tribal.
7. The system is state planned and state controlled.
8. The S.D.O. (Prefect) and D.O. (Subprefect) have the powers to control them.
9. The council law is used to control the council by the minister.
10. The municipal administrator depends on the advice of the D.O.

These respondents confirm that the council law is designed to facilitate and authenticate central government control over the councils. These respondents also emphasize the fact that councils in Cameroon are not autonomous but rather placed under the control of the central government actors. These responses therefore show that the easy access between the various actors is principally to facilitate control and command and not for mutual cooperation. The councils therefore have very little discretionary powers.

The functions allocated to the councils were also considered important in the analysis. The amount of responsibilities given to the council will determine their degree of autonomy. The central government can appropriate all the major functions leaving the councils redundant. This can serve as a medium of control because

their existence will be of little consequence to the local population.

4.3.2.4 ON THE AMOUNT OF FUNCTIONS GIVEN TO COUNCILS

These respondents had to indicate whether they feel that the functions of the councils should be increased. The next table presents their answers.

TABLE 4.11
OnnWwether the Functions and the Resources of the Councils should be increased.

Respondent	Response	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Yes	1	82	90.11
No	2	9	9.9
Total	2	91	100

Source: Survey conducted by researcher. Question No.6

Most of the workers 90.11% confirm that the functions of the councils should be increased, including the corresponding resources while very few, 9.9% have contrary opinion. Most of these workers (90.11%) therefore justify the opinion that the councils are not effectively performing most of their traditional functions as further analysis will show.

When these respondents were asked why they feel council's functions and resources should be increased, most of them affirm that councils with enough functions and resources will accelerate development since they are closer to the people. Others feel that councils with enough functions and resources will gain the necessary autonomy, which implies that these councils do not have

enough autonomy:- Most of them provide the following answers:-

1 They (councils) will be able to develop faster.

2. Because the Councils are working for the people and they are crossest to them.

3. With more resources they will serve the people more.

4. This will lead to the proper development of the Councils.

5. So that they (Councils) can expand.

6. So that councils can be more buoyant and carry out their desired functions.

7. They can serve the people of the locality well.

8. Because they are crossest to the local population.

9. Their sources of revenue is poor and so they cannot perform well.

10. Part of the inefficiency of the councils is caused by the shortage of funds and other resources.

11. It enhances autonomy and the efficiency of the councils.

12. Councils will perform more functions if their financial base is increased. They will further serve the people more since they are closer to the people.

The responses indicate that these respondents are conscious of the importance of councils as instruments of development. They also feel that councils need the desired autonomy, so as to perform their desired functions effectively. They also confirm that these councils perform few functions because of the scarcity of resources, which implies that the central government has appropriated all the major functions and resources leaving the

councils redundant. In other words the central ministerial departments at the grass-roots level undertake most major developmental functions since the councils' functions and resources are few. Generally councils in Cameroon are poor. The Presidential Decree No.80 - 17 of January 15, 1980 defines their sources of revenue and also the maximum rates to be charged.2 The government through this strategy deliberately reduces the powers and the influence of the councils on the local population at the grass-roots. On the basis of this observation, the research wanted to find out the opinions of the various participants on the level of control exercised by the central government on the financial transactions of the councils.

4.3.2.5 ON COUNCIL FINANCES

The respondents, as workers of the councils, were told to evaluate the amount of control exercised by the central government on the financial transactions of the councils. Their responses are registered in the following table:

TABLE 4.12
The amount of control on the Finances of the Councils.

Response	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Much	52	57.14
Very much	20	21.98
Average	15	16.48
Little	2	2.2
No response	2	2.2
Total	91	100%

Source: Survey conducted by researcher. Question No.8

A large number of these respondents (79.12%) accept that the amount of control exercised by the central government on the financial transactions of the councils is either much or even very much. This opinion clearly confirms what the council laws indicate. According to Ministarial Decision Number27/MINFI/D.T./1991[3] the central government treasurers are not only to safely keep the revenue of the councils but also to control and supervise all their financial transactions. The above opinions therefore indicate that this law is applied by the various central government actors concerned on the field.

On the other hand, 18.68% of the workers feel that this control is either moderate or little. This opinion is not quite correct as further analysis shall indicate. The procedure taken before any expenditure is incurred by the councils is clearly defined and is followed strictly by the various participants.

The central government actors can also supervise and control the councils through the influence exerted in the recruitment of the various participants in the councils as the following analysis will indicate.

4.3.2.6. <u>ON THE PERSONNEL SITUATION OF THE COUNCILS.</u>

The question sought to find out if central government actors exert some influence in the recruitment of the various participants into the councils. These respondents feel that the recruitment is done through the following ways:

TABLE 4.13
Factors determining recruitment

Code	Factors	Number of Respondents	Percentage
1	Pressure from above	36	39.6
2	Personal Connection	17	18.7
3	Merit	7	7.7
4	All of the above	20	28.57
5	No response	5	5.5
	Total	91	100

Source: Survey conducted by researcher. Question No.10

The majority of the respondents 39.6% from the above table are of the opinion that recruitment is done with some pressure from the central government actors above.

28.57% hold that recruitment is done with the combination of pressure from above, merit and personal connections, while 18.7 accept that this is done based purely on personal connections. On the other hand only 7.7% of the respondents feel recruitment is done based on purely merit. On the whole, 86.87% of these respondents confirm that the recruitment of the various participants into the councils is done with some form of external influence. The law on this issue is also quite clear. According to the 1974 Council Laws chapter 11 Article 24... no council worker can be recruited without the prior approval of the prefect and the governor respectively.[4] This aspect will be discussed further in section three of this Chapter.

In order to determine the calibre of actors exerting the highest amount of control on the councils, the respondents were told to indicate the persons that the councils authorities are most

likely to satisfy and pacify at all cost. Their various opinions are registered in the following table.

TABLE 4.14

4.3.2.7. The Persons Most Likely to be Served by the Council Authorities:

Response	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Local Population	36	39.56
S.D.O.	27	29.67
D.O.	26	28.56
No Response	2	2.2
Total	91	100

Source: Survey conducted by researcher. Question No.13

39.56% of the respondents in the above indicate that the council authorities would prefer to satisfy the local population. In which case, they feel that their council authorities are development oriented since they strive to serve the local population at all cost. On the other hand a larger number of the respondents, 58.24% feel these council authorities would prefer to satisfy the central government actors as a matter of priority.

29.67% of this population indicate the S.D.O. (Prefect) while 28.57% indicate the D.O. (subprefect) as the persons most likely to be satisfied by the council authorities . This result confirms as that from the general population that the appointed local authorities are very likely to pay more attention to the central government actors to the disadvantage of the local population, which has little influence on their decisions. The views of the

francophone and the anglophone respondents on this issue can also be tabulated in the following table:

Table 4.15

The Persons most likely to be served by council authorities

Code	Responses	Anglo-phone	Percen-age	Franco-phone	Percen-age
1	Local Population	24	26.4	12	13.2
	D.O	19	20.9	7	7.7
2	S.D.O	5	5.5	22	24.2
3	No Respons	-	-	2	2.2
4					
	Total	48	52.8	43	47.3

Source: Survey conducted by Researcher.

Twice as many anglophone respondents 26.4% as opposed to 13.2% from the francophone zone are of the opinion that their authorities strive to serve the local population. It implies that more council authorities in the anglophone zone are free, from the excessive control of the central government actors than their francophone counterparts. It also indicates that more authorities in the anglophone zone are development oriented because of their past experience in the operation of autonomous and development oriented institutions.

The above result also confirms that more francophone council authorities tend to satisfy and pacify the central government actors. In other words they experience more control. 31.9% of

TABLE 4.16

4.3.2.8 On the level of control exercised by the Centre on the Councils.

Response	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Too High	37	40.66
High	33	36.26
Moderate	18	19.78
Little	1	1.1
No response	2	2.2
Total	91	100

Source: Survey conducted by researcher. Question No.12

40.66% of the respondents from the above table feel that the control of the central government on the council is too high. 36.26% assert that the control is just high, which implies that 76.92% of these respondents hold the opinion that the amount of control exercised is either too high or just high. Most of the respondents have therefore confirmed that the level of control exercised by the central government actors on the councils is relatively high.

19.78% of these respondents feel that the level of control is moderate. The prefect of Bamenda Central, the Director of Local Council Training Institute in Buea and the Municipal Administrator of Eyumojock Rural Council openly confirm the existence of this high level of central government control in the activities of the Councils.

The following table indicates the responses of both the Anglophone and the Francophone respondents.

them from the franchophone zone feel this way as opposed to 26.4%. This can still be attributed to their past colonial experience in administration.

Of the 9 workers from the related ministry, that responded to the question, 8 of them feel that council authorities want to satisfy the central government actors at all cost. This opinion is very important since they are responsible for all the decrees defining the management of the councils. These people therefore confirm the inability of the councils authorities to effectively satisfy the local population given this high level control.

These respondents have confirmed as those from the general public that the control and the supervision of the council authorities comes principally from the central government actors and not from the local population at the grass-roots level. They in this act confirm that the law on the control of the councils is strictly followed as further analysis shall indicate in chapter six.

In order to conclude the analysis these respondents were told to evaluate the over all level of control exercised by the central government actors on the councils. Their impressions here will

throw more light on the observations above. The table below summarizes their responses:

Table 4.17

On the level of autonomy exercised by the centre on the councils

Response	Anglo-phone	Percen-tage	Franco-phone	Percen-tage
Very High	27	29.7	10	10.9
High	17	18.7	16	17.6
Moderate	2	2.2	16	17.6
Little	-		1	1.1
No Response	-		2	2.2
Total	46	50.6	45	49.4

Chi-square

Anglophone X = 119.77

Francophone X = 49.27

Differences in opinion between anglophones and francophones is very significant; indicating the level of disparity in opinions.

The above table indicates that 48.4% anglophone respondents declare that the level of control is either too high or high as opposed to only 28.5% respondents from the francophone zone. It therefore implies that fewer francophone respondents share this opinion with their anglophone counterparts. On the other hand 17.6% respondents from the francophone confirm that this control is moderate as opposed to only 2.2% respondents from the anglophone zone who feel this way. More francophone respondents are satisfied with this level of control. These responses further support the fact that these francophone respondents do not easily realize the

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existence of this high level of control because of the past colonial experiences. Local government institutions during the colonial period were completely under the control of the central government actors following the French hierarchical prefectoral order. This policy was rather encouraged after independence by reinforcing it with a single party rule.

On the other hand more anglophones feel that the level of control is too high because of their past colonial experience. These people had experienced the British model of local government during the colonial period which gave room for a lot of autonomy and freedom. This policy was pursued during and after independence and it was reinforced by the existence of a multi party political structure. In experiencing the present French model of Local government administration, these respondents are consequently more conscious of the high level of central government control.

The responses from the second set questionnaires to the workers of the councils also intended to evaluate the level of control exercised by the central government actors on the councils. The analysis from various responses indicate that the councils are not as autonomous as the law implies. They however confirm that council authorities have enough contact and access to the central government actors but this level of contact is to facilitate the control of the peripheral institutions. The various peripheral actors go there to receive instructions and clearance for their various policies and projects conceived.

Most confirm that no major decisions can be taken and

implemented at the periphery without the approval of the centre. The analysis further confirms that central government control extends to the financial transactions of the council authorities and the recruitment of the various council staff.

4.3. SYNTHESIS OF THE OPINIONS

The opinions of the respondents from the two sets of questionnaires display a lot of similarities. This great similarity in opinions already indicate that laws pertaining to the supervision and control of the councils are very clear and precise. It also demonstrates the relative consistency in the application of these laws in the hierarchical prefectoral system of administration.

According to the 1974 laws which are presently in operation councils are decentralized public collectivities with legal rights and financial autonomy. They are supposed to manage all local affairs under the control and the supervision of the state.[5]

Most of the respondents from the two sets of questionnaires confirm that these councils are not as autonomous as the law implies. In other words they confirm that these councils do not possess the desired autonomy to freely perform their desired functions. 82.8% of the respondents from the first set of questionnaires (to the general public) hold this position while 87.9% of the respondents from the second-set of questionnaires(to workers) feel the same. Comparatively more of the council workers confirm the absence of this autonomy since they are closer to the administration of the councils.

Responses from the open ended questions also indicate that the interference of central government actors in the activities of the councils is very popular and high. The law permits this level of interference by the central government actors when it declares that, the central government actor has all the powers to "initiate and supervise administrative, economic and social activities in order to guarantee the balanced and harmonious development of the councils"[6] These activities therefore include the control of all the administrative, financial and political activities of the council actors. The director of the local government training centre, the government delegate to the Bamenda Urban Council, the divisional officer of Bamenda Central, the Municipal administrator of Eyumojock Council all confirm this high level of Central Government control and supervision. Therefore the respondents who feel otherwise are not correct.

Almost all respondents from Questionnaire 11 confirm the existence of a high level of contact between the various council actors and the central government authorities. 96.7% of these workers confirm this level of contact. This is quite possible because almost all the various council and central government actors are members of the ruling party, moreover, all council actors are appointed based on the recommendation from these central government authorities. Unfortunately this high level of contact is principally to provide the necessary clearance of all local council policies and projects since one is completely subordinate and subsequently under the control and the command of the other.

70.11% of these respondents go further to testify that no major decision can be taken and implemented at the local level without the prior approval of the central government actors. The 1974

council laws, section 11 article 33 states this clearly. It states that: " the prefect may annul or suspend any act of the government delegate, mayor and municipal administrator which infringes on the statutory and administrative regulations."[7] These infringement is not defined. There are many other laws defining the various powers of control and command which could be found in the appendix to this work.

Generally, 69.53% of the respondents from Questionnaire 1 hold that the functions of the councils should be increased as opposed to 90.11% respondents from Questionnaire 11. These respondents feel that the central government has reduced the functions of the councils for the purpose of control. In other words the central government has used its powers to deprive the councils of most of their various functions. The remaining respondents either confirm that their respective councils already have enough functions or that their councils are too ineffective to be allocated more functions.

The law gives the councils a wide range of social, economic and cultural functions. These functions are categorized into obligatory and discretionary functions.[8] The response above indicates the councils perform just their few obligatory functions. This fact is further supported by the assertions of the

personalities interviewed. All of them confirm that most of the Council workers have gone for a minimum of nine months without their salaries in 1994 financial year. It therefore implies that most councils are presently incapable of accomplishing even some of the obligatory functions which include the payment of salaries.

Most of the developmental functions are undertaken by more powerful and well equipped central government agencies thereby reducing the power and the influence of the councils on the local population. The divisional officers(subprefect) coordinates the activities of all central government agencies including thoes of the councils. Councils in this case are reduced almost to the level of central government agencies with little autonomy and functions. They are however placed for the convenience of supervision under the control of this powerful central government actor located at the grass-roots.

Looking at the control of the financial activities of the councils, 79.12% of respondents affirm that the level of control is either too high or high. The law on the financial control of the councils is very clear and precise. The 1974 law states that all Councils property including their revenue is state property under the control and the supervision of the state. In this wise, all council revenue is kept in the central government treasury under the control of the Treasurer of the central government. Rates to be charged by the councils are defined from the centre."

The law was amended in 1987 giving more power of control and supervision to the central government authorities, in the

Ministerial Decision No.27/MINFI/PT/91 of 1991 issued in Yaounde.[10] This law permits central government control of the financial transactions of the municipal administrators and Mayors almost on a daily basis. The law also gives the generalist administrators powers to supervise and control the expenditure of the councils.

The central government does not have a stipulated amount of money allocated to the councils. Council revenue comes principally from a proportion of the poll tax collected by the council authorities, jangali tax derived from the cattle and some communal taxes clearly defined by the central government. The implication here is that the central government has used many the strategies to control most of the activities of the council authorities. Councils are not given the powers to decide on the rates to be charged nor the possibilities of deriving revenue from undefined sources. The forces of law and order always see into the strict application of the various laws clearly spelt out. The degree of control of the financial transactions of the councils is therefore relatively high as indicated by most of the respondents.

The recruitment of the various participants in the councils is done principally with the influence of central government actors. 86.67% of the respondents made up of council workers and those in the related ministry confirm that the respective workers are employed with the influence of external central government actors. Only 7.7% of these workers feel that recruitment is purely on merit.

Most cardinal actors in the councils are appointed directly either by the presidency or the supervisory ministry. The law further stipulates that the recruitment of junior staff should be channelled to the centre for approval first before implementation.

Generally councils employ very few staff as confirmed by the secondary data because of the paucity of the resources. Even most of the few staff employed have not received some form of training. The relatively inexperienced and unskilled staff cannot effectively perform the various responsibilities of the councils.

78.12% of the respondents in Questionnaire 1 distributed to the general population cónfirm that various appointed council authorities strive to satisfy the central government actors first before the rural population as opposed 58.24% from Questionnaire 11. The obligatory functions of the councils are principally the payment of debts, running of the councils and the payment of Salaries. These councils are not forced to undertake a lot of developmental activities except these councils authorities feel that they possess the necessary resources. In which case developmental functions are discretionary.

On the other hand 21.1% of the respondents in Questionnaire 1 and 39.56% of the respondents in Questionnaire 11 confirm that their council authorities strive to satisfy the wishes of the local population. These few constitute the dedicated and dynamic council authorities who strive to satisfy both parties since the central government controls more power.

In order to prove the above point, the workers in

Questionnaire 11 were told to evaluate the degree of central government control on the activities of the councils. 76.92% of these respondents hold that this control is either too high or just high. All the personalities interviewed confirm that the central government control on the councils is too high. Some central government actors particularly the prefects and the sub-prefect hold that their control is necessitated by the desire of the central government to assure effective administration at the grass-roots level. This in other words means that councils are not created as self-governing institutions used to provide the local population with the sense of responsibility and self-reliance but as deconcentrated administrative units used for penetration and control.

The central government has therefore used its powerful position to starve these councils of the necessary resources so as to render them inferior and subordinate to the central government actors located at the grass-roots level. The law goes further to spell out all the various areas of control and supervision and these areas include the daily financial transactions of the councils, the various administrative, economic and social activities of the council actors. Moreover, they are appointed to their various council posts following the recommendations of the central government actors at the grass-roots.

The advent of multiparty politics in Cameroon has rather motivated the central government to tighten its grip on these peripheral institutions. The Municipal administrators of

Nyumojock, Mbengwi and Limbe Urban council have been summarily dismissed because the central government actors hold that these council actors sympathize with some newly formed opposition parties. The government delegate to the Bamenda Urban council has resigned his post while council elections have been postponed automatically following a presidential decree No.546/PJL/AN.[11]

The analysis has therefore shown that the relationship between the central government and the councils is characterized by control and command and not by partnership and mutual reciprocity in the exchange of resources.

FOOTNOTES

1. Government of Cameroon: Council organisation: Law No. 74 - 23 of 1974: National Printing Press, Yaounde 1977, PP 177 - 178.
2. Ibid PP.239 - 243.
3. See Ministerial Decision No.27/MINFI/DT/91 of 1991 from the Ministry of Finance Yaounde.
4. Government of Cameroon: Op.cit PP. 177 - 178.
5. See Decree No.77 - 91 of March 25, 1977 from the Presidency of the Republic, Yaounde.
6. Government of Cameroon. Op.cit.PP.177 - 190.
7. Ibid P.184.
8. Paul N.Ndue: Decentralization and Local Government in Cameroon Friendrich Ebert Foundation, Yaounde, 1994, PP.17 - 20.
9. Government of Cameroon: Op.cit.PP.186 - 190.
10. See Ministerial Decision No. 27/MINFI/DT/91 of 1991 from Finance, Yaounde.
11. See Bill No.546/PJ.L/AN of 1994 from the National Assembly Office, Yaounde.

CHAPTER FIVE

EVALUATION OF GRASSROOTS PARTICIPATION IN COUNCIL ACTIVITIES

5.1 Introduction

The present chapter, as already stated earlier deals principally with the evaluation of the participation of the Local population in the activities of the councils. The accent here is on the amount of support both in cash and kind, provided by the local population to the councils in order to permit the effective performance of their traditional functions. The Chapter is divided into four main parts. The first part is the present introduction while the second part constitutes the analysis and presentation of data from the first set of questionnaires distributed to the general public. They are considered as "Questionnaire 1". The third part is the analysis and presentation of data from the second set of questionnaires distributed to workers of the councils and those in the Ministry of Territorial Administration. This data is considered under "Questionnaire 11" in this work. The fourth and the final part constitutes a synthesis of the various opinions leading up to the conclusion.

Participation at this level is categorized into two parts. The first part views participation as an input coming from the local population in the Councils. Here the local population willingly participates actively in the activities of the councils through the provision of material and other forms of support. This sort of participation is measured in terms of the amount of material and financial support given to the councils, attendances in meetings

organized by the councils, ideas and proposals put forward by the local population in these meetings and the responses of the council authorities to the proposals put forward by the local papulation.

The second part looks at participation as an output coming from the councils to the local population. The intention here is to find out the amount of mobilizational activities carried out by the councils. These include the organization of community based activities, elections and public enlightenment campaigns. This Chapter's primary aim is to test the following hypothesis which states that:

> The high level of central government control and command and has minimized the active participation of the local population in activities organized by the councils.

5.2 ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES FROM QUESTIONNAIRE 1 DISTRIBUTED TO THE GENERAL POPULATION.

These responses came from workers in both the private and public sectors of the economy, farmers and rural dwellers and even the unemployed. Those working with the councils and the related ministry were not considered in this group as indicated above.

5.2.1. PARTICIPATION AS AN INPUT.

The respondents were first of all told to enumerate the various ways through which they contribute financially and materially to the upkeep of the councils. Contributions here could be voluntary through donations and they could also be involuntary derived through the various forms of taxation.

212 respondents corresponding to 82% confirm that their

contribution is done through taxation, 75% of the total population indicate levy as another method used for contribution while a very small portion of the population 1.9% indicate voluntary forms of contributions such as donations. It therefore implies that council revenue is derived principally through these involuntary methods such as taxation and levy. These methods are relatively costly since it must be accompanied by some form of coercion. On the other hand voluntary forms are relatively unpopular in the country since only 5 respondents corresponding to 1.9% indicate this method.

The search went further to determine where these few five respondents came from, in order to discern the councils that have received some donations from the public.

TABLE 5.1

5.2.1.1. WAYS OF CONTRIBUTION TO COUNCIL ACTIVITIES.

Method	Zone	No. of Respondents	Percentage of 256
Voluntary	Anglophone	5	1.9%
	Francophone	00	00
	Total	5	1.9

Source: Survey by the researcher Question No.6

The above table indicates that all the 5 respondents representing 1.9% of the total population come from the anglophone zone of the Republic . It follows therefore that some few councils in the anglophone zone have received some form of donations from the public as opposed to none at all from the francophone zone. This further tallies with fact that anglophone councils which had

once operated freer and more democratic institutions could easily derive voluntary support from the general public. On the other hand, councils in the francophone zone which have perpetually experienced the command and the control structure have never experienced this attitude from the public. Donations to councils in this zone remain a relatively new phenomenon.

In order to penetrate further into the analysis, the various respondents were told to indicated whether they would like to attend meetings organized by the councils. Normally councillors are the principal persons obliged by the law to attend these meetings. The intention here is to find out if the local population would like to participate in this activity if given the opportunity . Surprisingly most of them confess that they would not like to attend meetings organized by council authorities even when given the opportunity to participate. The table below presents their various opinions.

TABLE 5.2

5.2.1.2 ON WHETHER THE POPULATION WOULD LIKE TO ATTEND COUNCIL MEETINGS.

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Yes	63	24.6
No	186	72.65
No Response	7	2.7
Total	256	99.95

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher Question No.9

The responses of the various respondents are clear from the following table, 72.65%(186) confess that they would not like to attend council meetings as opposed to 24.6% of the total population. Based on the above responses the respondents were told to indicate whether the present structure of the councils provides the public with enough room for the free expression of ideas. The assumption is that people will normally attend meetings wherein they can participate actively and freely. On the other hand they will boycott meetings where too much control and command is exercised thus stiffling participation. Still, a large majority, 72.65% still confirm that the present structure does not provide enough room for the free expression of opinions. The table below also tabulates the responses.

TABLE 5.3

5.2.1.3. On whether the structure of the councils provides for freedom of speech.

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Yes	63	24.6
No	186	72.65
No Response	7	2.7
Total	256	99.95

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher.
Question No. 10.

While 24.6% of the total population are affirmative, 72.65% hold the contrary opinion. This large majority seem to indicate what obtains in the usual council meetings. It shows that in

ouncil meetings, the councillors and other participants are isually controlled in such a way that freedom of opinion is nhibited. The law on this issue is quite clear. Chapter 11 rticle 60 of the 1974, the law permits the municipal administrator o either expel or even arrest anybody considered as disturbing ublic peace in council meetings. As usual the disturbance of this ublic peace is not defined by the law. The conspicuous presence f the prefect and the forces of law and order reinforce this egative aspect of the law. When questioned further, the espondents gave the following answers for the opinion expressed bove:-

. There is limitation of freedom of speech.
. What is done is not to the public taste.
. Because there is no reasonable autonomy.
. No freedom of speech.
. You cannot talk anyhow, you will be arrested.
. There is no cordial relationship, there is conflict of opinions.
. Councils are generally believed to deal to the benefit of the public without allowing public opinions.
. The Mayor does not allow anybody to talk.
. The municipal administrator cannot permit you to say anything.
0. Some people are not given room to talk by the Delegate to the government.
1. Generally council meetings are not free but controlled.

These various responses already confirm the fact that the high level of central government control on the councils does not permit the free flow of opinions from the general public and even from the councillors who are representing the public. The very clear fact here is that the presence of the prefect, the forces of law and order and the council leaders rather intimidates and produces an unconducive atmosphere for free flow of opinions from the various councillors and other participants in these meetings. Most Councillors interviewed also confirmed this fact. The probe continued by asking the respondents to indicate whether the opinion of the general public are taken seriously by the council authorities. The intention here is to find out if these appointed council leaders are responsive to the opinions of the public. Their responsiveness would normally attract public support and participation in their programmes. The following table displays their responses.

5.2.1.4. ON WHETHER PUBLIC OPINIONS ARE TAKEN SERIOUSLY

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Yes	56	21.8
No	195	76.2
No Response	5	1.9
Total	256	99.9

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 12.

Most of the respondents, 76.2% hold firmly that the opinions of the general public are not taken seriously by the council

authorities, which implies that these authorities are not popular with the local population. It further confirms the minimal support given by the local population to the various council programmes. These respondents were further demanded to give reasons for their above opinions. The following are some of the reasons advanced by some of them:

1. Because of the unpopular measures taken by the council authorities.
2. There is hardly any change in their activities.
3. Because the councils do not have balanced development.
4. There is no genuine representation.
5. The municipal administrator does not care what people say.
6. Most public demands are not met up.
7. The councils are yet to be autocritical .
8. There is no work change in their activities.
9. The council activities do not reflect public desires.
10. The government Delegate is not obliged to take our ideas.
11. Councils alone take decisions, which are always unpopular.

The reasons above are quite explicit. These respondents hold that public opinions are not taken seriously firstly because the council authorities do not feel obliged to do so, secondly because the activities of the councils do not reflect the desires of the public and finally because the performance of the councils is poor. Responses from these respondents keep revolving around the fact that these councils are not open systems; responding to public opinions. The above responses already hint on the fact that

Councils are not effectively performing their functions because of the absence of the vital input from the local population.

Taking the queue from here, the various respondents were asked to evaluate their performances in the activities of the councils. Their responses to this question will not only indicate their level of performance but also whether they effectively participate in council activities in spite of the huddles mentioned above. The following table displays their ratings:

TABLE 5.5:
5.2.1.5 Evaluation of the population's performance in council activities

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	00	0 0
Active	26	10.15
Average	35	13.67
Below Average	178	69.53
None at all	8	3.12
No response	9	3.51
Total	256	99.98

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 16.

Of the total population under study, only 23.82% of the respondents confirm that their performance in council activities is either average or above average. In other words only 23.82% of the population are of the opinion that their participation in council activities is relatively positive and active. On the other hand 72.65% confess that their performance is below average. The

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implication here is that a large majority of the population does not participate actively in council activities because these councils are not responsive to their demands. This majority is not actively involved in council activities rather they are distant and apathetic. This high level of apathy can be attributed to their inability to express their opinions freely and more importantly because of their inability to control or check the excesses of the various council leaders at the grass-roots level as mentioned earlier.

In order to further prove the above allegation, these respondents were told to indicate the method that is most suitable for the selection of leadership at the grass-roots. 75% of the respondents support direct democratic elections through universal suffrage. 16.4% prefer that leaders should be elected indirectly by the councillors who are the representative of the people. On the other hand only 3.9% of the population support the present method of appointment used by the central government. Therefore 91.4% of the population prefer some form of elections in which the local population will participate actively in the selection of leaders.

The responses further confirm that the present method of appointment used by the central government is unpopular. In other words this constitutes some of the decisions taken without any consultation and the support of the local population at the grass-roots.

The responses to this question bring out three major facts. Firstly that this local population is interested in participating actively in council activities if they are provided with the opportunity, secondly that the local population prefers that these local councils should be open and responsive to their opinions and demands, thirdly and finally that the control of the councils should principally be left in their hands. It therefore indicates clearly that the control exercised by the central government over the councils has gone a long way to discourage the support and the active participation of the local population in council activities. This assertion is further supported by the various responses from the open ended questions already presented earlier. The very fact that the central government has taken over much of the control of the councils, in itself reduces the chances of the local population in participating actively in council activities.

The second part of this analysis intends to find out whether councils on their part usually mobilize the local population into active participation in developmental programmes, since the opinions and the demands of the local population are not always taken seriously. Participation at this level is initiated from above and then directed down to the local population. The ingenuity and the initiative of the local population to the most part is not exploited.

5.2.2 PARTICIPATION AS AN OUTPUT.

Participation as an output from the councils to the local population can be evaluated by looking at the role of the council

in the organization of community development activities, elections and public enlightenment campaign.

5.2.2.1 ON THE ORGANIZATION OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES BY THE COUNCILS

The respondents were told to evaluate performance of the councils in the organisation of community development and other self-help activities. The aim here is to determine the part that the councils play in initiating and supporting these activities. The responses to these questions indicate not only the level of the participation of the councils but also the impact of this participation on the local population. Most of them are convinced that the performances of the councils is poor as the table below indicates.

TABLE 5.6

Part played by the Councils in the Organisation of Community Development Activities.

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	2	0.78
Active	10	3 .90
Average	65	25.3
Below Average	142	55.46
None at all	33	12.89
No response	4	1.56
Total	256	99.89

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 17.

77 respondents representing 29.98% of population positively rate the performances of the councils in the organisation of community development and self-help activities. These respondents hold that councils are either active or performing averagely in the organization of these activities. Generally councils hardly initiate these activities given the paucity of resources as already proven in the previous chapters. However, some councils which are development oriented still promote and support these activities.

On the other hand 69.91% of the respondents have a negative impression concerning the performance of the councils in this activity. These respondents affirm that the performance of the councils in this activity is either below average or even zero. This opinion is possibly correct given the general poverty of the councils and the absence of popular support from the local population from below as further analysis will still prove. These respondents were also told to rate the performance of the councils in the organization of elections.

5.2.2.2 ON THE ORGANIZATION OF ELECTION

All elections are normally initiated organized and funded by the central government. The councils at this level act merely as agents of execution under the direct control of the various central government actors posted at the local level for this exercise. Elections are therefore conducted with the active participation of the generalists administrators, the forces of law and order, the councils and the general population. The table that follows presents their various opinions.

TABLE 5.7

Council's Performance in The Organisation of Elections.

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	39	15.23
High	63	24.60
Average	52	20.31
Below Average	83	32.42
None at all	15	5.85
No response	4	1.5
Total	256	99.91

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 18.

15.23% of the respondents in the above table rate the performance of the councils in the organisation of elections as very high 24.6% of the population describe it as just active while 20.3% of the of the population feel their performance is average. Therefore 60.1% positively rate the performance of the councils in the organization of elections. It implies therefore that councils usually perform relatively better in this activity.

On the other hand, 32.4% of the population rate the performance of the councils in this direction is below average while 5.85% feel councils do nothing all. To these respondents most of the organisation is done by central ministerial departments located at the grass-roots level. They therefore hold that councils have very little to do with the organization of elections. This however constitutes the minority view.

The analysis went further to determine whether councils also participate actively in enlightening the public on topical issues. Their various responses are represented in the table that follows.

TABLE 5.8

5.2.2.3 Councils Performances In Public Enlightenment

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	00	0.0
Active	18	7.03
Average	116	45.31
Below Average	65	25.39
None at all	52	20.31
No response	5	1.95
Total	256	99.99

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 19.

The above table indicates that 52.37% of the population feel the performance of the councils in public enlightenment is either average or above.

25.39% of the population and 20.31% hold that councils either perform below average or do nothing at all. On the whole, 45.70% of the population hold that councils do not either perform well or do nothing at all in enlightening the general public.

The above analysis indicates that councils do not perform well in the organization of self-help activities which demand a lot of initiative where as they perform averagely well in the organization of elections and public enlightenment activities. These activities

are initiated at the national level and coordinated principally by central government actors at the grass-roots level.

Councillors are supposed to constitute part of the administration of the councils. It is therefore worthwhile to evaluate their performance in the above mentioned activities so as to discover what part they play in the mobilization of the general public into participating in development activities. These respondents as in the preceeding case were first of all told to evaluate the performance of councilors in the organisation of community development activities. The following table presents their various response.

TABLE 5.9

5.2.2.4 Organisation of community development activities by Councilors.

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	00	0.0
Active	38	14.84
Average	116	45.31
Below Average	69	26.95
None at all	29	11.32
No response	4	1.56
Total	256	99.89

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 20.

Most of the respondents, 60.15% hold that the performance of their various councillors in the organisation of community development activities is either above average or just average. Most of them are of the opinion that their Councillors are effectively encouraging the Local population in the organisation of self help activities. The Councilors are therefore working in close collaboration with the local population while councils are considered as distant from the local population. These Councillors are therefore more active than the council authorities. On the other hand, 38.27% of the total population conclude that the performance of their councillors in the above at activity is below average. To these respective respondents, Councillors do not perform well in the above activity. These are councillors who participate in this activities.

The respondents were further told to evaluate the part played by their Councillors in the organisation of elections.

The: responses are in the following table:-

TABLE 5.10

5.2.2.5 Part Played By Councillors In Elections.

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	20	07.8
Active	114	44.53
Average	46	17.96
Below Average	66	25.78
None at all	6	2.34
No response	4	1.56
Total	256	100

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 21.

Most of the respondents in the following table still affirm that the councillors are doing a good job in the organisation of elections. All their ratings are positive, ranging between average and above. Therefore, 70.29% of this population have accepted that their councillors perform either averagely well or even more in the this activity.

The above analysis brings out the fact that councillors perform quite alot of activities during elections. These councillors contribute in the mobilization education and enlightenment of the local population. They alos help in counting of the votes. On the other hand, 28.12% feel their councillors are not very active. The respondents were also told to asses the part played by their councilors in enlightening the public. The general impression is also positive. 51.17% of the population have a

positive opinion on the performance of their councillors in the above activity, while 47.37% of the population have a negative impression. These 47.37% of the respondents confirm that the performance of the councilors in enlightening the public is either below average or even lower. The details of their responses could be seen from this table here.

TABLE 5.11

5.2.2.6 Part Played by Councillors In Public Enlightenment

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	01	0 .39
Active	33	12.89
Average	97	37.89
Below Average	91	35.54
None at all	29	11.32
No response	5	1.90
Total	256	100

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 22.

The table above is quite explicit. It shows that 12.89% and 37.89% of these respondents rate the performance of the councilors in this activity as either average or above average.

On the other hand, 35.54% of them rate their councillors performance as below average while 11.32% conclude that their councillors do nothing in this direction.

More than half of the population 51.17% conclude that the performance of their councilors in the above activity is either average or even above. It therefore implies that a reasonable

amount of councillors participate actively in the enlightenment of the public on major issues of interest.

Councilors unlike their councils perform averagely well in all the above activities. In other words most of them perform well in the organisation of self-help projects and they even perform better in the organisation of elections. Their performance in public enlightenment is just average. The conclusion therefore is that councillors as individuals are more interested in the development of the local population since they help this local population in the organisation of community development activities and elections. They also play an important part in enlightening the general public on major issues of national interest.

On the other hand most of the respondents confirm that the council authorities do not play an important role in the organization of community development activities. This impression confirms the fact that most of these council authorities hardly go beyond the obligatory functions. They however perform well in the organization of elections and public enlightenment campaigns because the are initiated, coordinated and financed by the central government..

These respondents were told to evaluate the general performances of the councils in discharging their functions in spite of the absence of this active participation from the grass-roots population below.

0.39% of the population hold that the councils performance is excellent. In other words councils perform extremely well in

scharging their functions. 12.8% of the population hold that the erformance of the councils is good while 14.45% of the population el the council's performance is average. Therefore, 27.64% of he population have a positive impression on the general erformance of the councils. These 27.64% of the respondents feel he performance of the councils is either average or even above verage.

On the other hand, 60.93% of the population conclude that the erformance of the councils is below average, while 10.54% of the opulation feel councils do nothing towards the development of the eople. It therefore, implies that 71.47% of the population have negative impression on the performance of the councils. These espondents rate the performance of the councils as either below verage or even zero. Some Councils according to them do not erform any developmental function at all.

The analysis went further to find out the impression of the nglophone population as opposed to their francophone counterparts. he table below summarizes their impressions.

TABLE 5.12

5.2.2.7. Evaluation of the general performance of the councils.

Response	Number of Respondents Anglophone	Percentage	Francophone	Perce.
Excellent	----------	-----	1	0.39%
Good	14	5.46	19	7.42
Average	16	6.29	21	0.03
Below-Average	112	43.75	44	17.18
None at all	09	03.51	18	7.03
No Response	2	0.78	--	---
Total	153	59.76	103	40.24

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 23.

This table above indicates that more francophone respondents have a positive opinion on the performance of the councils as opposed to their francophone colleagues. Of 27.64% respondents who feel this way 15.89% of them come from the francophone zone while 11.75% come from the anglophone zone. It implies that more councils in the francophone zone effectively perform their duties when compared to the other councils in the anglophone zone.

On the other hand, of the 71.47% respondents who have a negative opinion on the performance of the councils, 24.21% come from the francophone zone while 47.26% come from the anglophone zone. Almost twice the number of anglophone respondents feel this way. It therefore implies that many more councils in the anglophone zone hardly perform their responsibilities effectively. Generally, councils in this region are materially poorer and less

equipped than their counterparts in the francophone zone. Moreover, the respondents from this zone expect more from their councils given their past experiences in council administration.

The respondents were further told to evaluate the impact of the councils' activities on their lives. 3.5% of the respondents feel impact of the councils on their lives is much, while 17.18% feel the impact is average. No respondent feels that the impact is very much. On the whole, 20.69% of the population rate the impact of the councils' activities on their lives positively.

On the other hand 37.89% feel that the impact of the councils, activities on their lives is below average while 40.63% of the population feel no impact at all. It therefore implies that 78.52% of the population rates the impact of the councils as either below average or even zero. It implies therefore that 78.52% of the population feel the impact of the councils' activities is below average. In other words this impact is minimal. The following table shows the detail responses from the various respondents.

TABLE 5.13

5.2.2.8 The impact of the councils' activities on the local population.

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very much	--	-----
Much	9	03.5%
Average	44	17.18
Below Average	97	37.89
None at all	104	40.63
No response	2	0.78
Total	256	100.2

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 24.

The responses are almost a reflection of their impressions on the performances of the various councils. The implication is that these councils perform rather poorly, leaving very little impact on the lives of the local population. This further gives another reason why the local population has little or no interest in the existence of the councils. In other words most of the citizens at the grass-roots are aloof and indifferent to the activities of the councils because of the little impact left on them. These councils therefore exist more as instruments for the penetration of the periphery by the central government actors than autonomous and self-governing institutions needed for the development of the local population. Active participation of the local population is therefore minimized giving way to apathy.

Participation as an output emanating from the councils to the local population is consequently used more as an end than a means to an end. The central government actors in conjunction with the council authorities are permitted by the law to mobilize the local population with the principal ambition of penetrating, supervising and controlling their activities and not to organize them into autonomous and self governing units. In supporting this assertion, most respondents confirm that councils authorities do not perform well in the organization of community based and self-help activities.

Councillors on their part perform well in these activities because they do not constitute part of the administration of the councils. They usually perform these activities just like any other citizen interested in the development of the area. The council authorities and the councillors perform well in the organisation of elections and public enlightenment campaign because they are teleguided at the central government level.

Respondents from the second set of questionnaires were also told to evaluate the performance of the council authorities and councilors in the above named activities. These respondents who are mostly workers of the councils and the related ministry already constitute part of the administration of the councils. They were to evaluate the performances of these persons in the organization of community based activities, elections and public enlightenment activities.

5.3 ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM THE SECOND SET OF QUESTIONNAIRES(DISTRIBUTED TO WORKERS)

These people were also told to evaluate the performance of the council authorities in the organisation of community development or self-help activities. The following table presents their various responses:

TABLE 5.14

5.3.1 The part played by councils in Community Development Activities.

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	1 .	1 .1
Active	2	2.2
Average	18	19.78
Below Average	52	57.14
None at all	15	16.48
No response	3	3.30
Total	91	100

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 14.

23.08% of the population feel that council authorities perform positively in the organisation of community development activities, in which case councils are responsible institutions of development, on the other hand, 57.14% feel that the performance of the council authorities is below average while 16.48% feel they do nothing in this direction. Therefore 73.62% of the population give the councils a fail mark on their performances in the above activity. These respondents feel that most council authorities are not active

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Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	1	1 .1
Active	2	2.2
Average	18	19.78
Below Average	52	57.14
None at all	15	16.48
No response	3	3.30
Total	91	100

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 14.

23.08% of the population feel that council authorities perform positively in the organisation of community development activities, in which case councils are responsible institutions of development. On the other hand, 57.14% feel that the performance of the council authorities is below average while 16.48% feel they do nothing in this direction. Therefore 73.62% of the population give the councils a fail mark on their performances in the above activity. These respondents feel that most council authorities are not active

in the organisation of community development activities while the 23.08% of the respondents feel that they are active. A large majority of the respondents confirm as those from the general public that most of these authorities hardly organize self-help activities cooperatively with the local population.

These respondents were also told to evaluate the performances of these authorities in the organization of elections. Their responses are in the table below.

TABLE 5.15

5.3.2 Part played by councils in the organisation of elections.

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	13	17.28
Active	44	48.35
Average	20	21.97
Below Average	10	10.98
None at all	2	2.2
No response	2	2.2
Total	91	99.98

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 15.

14.28% of the respondents feel that council authorities are very active in the organization of elections, 48.35% feel that they are active while 21.97% hold that their performance is average. 84.44% of these respondents feel that these council authorities perform well in the organization of elections. Their performance according to them is relatively good and encouraging.

On the other hand, 10.98% of the population feel that their

performance is below average while 2.2% of them feel that they do nothing at all. Therefore, 13.18% of these respondents feel that the performance of the council authorities is either below average or even zero.

These respondents were finally told to rate the performance of these authorities in the organization of public enlightenment campaigns. The following table presents their various responses.

TABLE 5.16

5.3.3 Part played by councils in public enlightenment campaigns.

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	2	2.2
Active	12	13.18
Average	21	23.07
Below Average	51	56.04
None at all	3	3.3
No response	2	2.2
Total	91	100

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 16.

38.42% of the respondents give the council authorities a pass mark which means that these councils perform the task of public enlightenment relatively well.

Cn the other hand, 56.04 feel the performance of the council authorities is below average, while 3.3% feel they do completely nothing. 59.34% of the population unlike the general population

rate the performance of the council authorities in this activity negatively. On the whole, it can be concluded that most of these authorities do not perform well in the organisation of public enlightenment activities.

These respondents therefore feel that council authorities do not perform well in the organisation of community development or self help activities and public enlightenment campaigns. These activities happen to demand a lot of initiative and responsibility which unfortunately the council authorities do not possess in a large quantity. While they confirm as the general public does that these authorities do not perform well in community development activities, they further confirm that they do not also perform well in enlightening the public on major issues.

As council workers they are better placed to assess this activity because they are closer to the administration of the councils. The councils are merely agents of execution. Inspite of the support of the central government, some of them do not still perform well in enlightening the public on major issues.

When these respondents were told to evaluate the performances of the councillors in the organisation of community development activities, 59.34% of the population indicated that their councillors performance was either average or above.

On the other hand, 37.36% felt that their councillors either perform below average or even lower. This group of respondents therefore, declare that their councillors do not perform well in the organization of self-help projects. The table below presents the detail of the responses.

TABLE 5.17

5.3.4 Councillor's performance in the organisation of community development activities.

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	1	1.1
Active	25	27.72
Average	28	30.76
Below Average	18	19.78
None at all	16	17.58
No response	3	3.29
Total	91	100

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 17.

The table above indicates that 59% of the respondents have declared that councillors are either very active or averagely active in the organisation of community development activities, it implies therefore, that the majority of the workers rate the performances of the councilors positively.

On the other hand, 37.38% affirm that the performance is below average. These fewer workers hold that their councillors do not participate actively in the organisation of community development activities. Most of these workers however confirm that councillors as individuas do participate averagely well in developmental activities within their community.

The respondents were further told to evaluate the activities of the Councilors during elections. 52.74% feel that the councilors performance is at least above average. These 52.74%

respondents feel that their councillors perform reasonably well during elections, in other words they participated actively.

On the contrary, 43.95% of the population confirm that the performance of the councilors is either below average or zero. These people therefore hold that councilors do not perform well during the organisation of elections. The following table presents the details of the respondents.

TABLE 5.18

5.3.5. Councillors performance during elections

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	4	4.4
Active	22	24.17
Average	22	24.17
Below Average	26	28.57
None at all	14	15.38
No response	3	3.3
Total	91	99.99

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 18.

28.57% have accepted that Councillors perform below average while 15.38% hold that these councilors do nothing in this direction. These people are of the opinion that their council authrities rather than the councillors organize and effectively carry out elections initiated from the centre.

These workers were also told to evaluate the performance of the councilors in the organisation of public enlightenment campaigns. The intention here was to find out if councilors

participate in enlightening the public on major issues of interest. The following table presents their responses.

TABLE 5.19

5.3.6. Councillors performance in public enlightenment Campaigns.

Response	No.of Respondents	Percentage.
Very Active	1	1.1
Active	10	10.98
Average	37	40.65
Below Average	27	29.67
None at all	13	14.28
No response	3	3.3
Total	91	99.98

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 19.

The above table indicates that 1.1% of the respondents feel that councilors are very active in enlightening the public, 10.98% feel councilors are active while 40.65% feel these councilors' performance is average. It therefore, implies that 52.73% of the population confirm that councilors' performance in the above activity is either average or above average.

On the contrary, fewer respondents affirm that the performance of the councillors in enlightening the public is either below average or even zero. 29.67% holdthat their performance is below average while 14.28 affirm that councilors do nothing at all. On the whole, it can be concluded that more than 50% of the councillors perform well in enlightening the public on major issues.

This section of the analysis intended to bring out the impressions of the workers of the councils and those in the related ministry on the performance of the councillors in the above activities. Many more respondents confirm that councillors perform well in the organization of community development activities, elections and public enlightenment campaigns. These Councillors according to most of these respondents perform better than their council authorities in the above activities.

In an attempt to conclude the whole analysis at this level, these respondents were told to evaluate the general performance of the councils and the impact of the councils' activities on their lives. The subsequent tables will present their various responses.

TABLE 5.20

5.3.7. Evaluation of the councils' performance

Response	No. of Respondents	Percentage
Excellent	-	--
Good	27	29.67
Average	30	32.96
Below Average	30	32.96
None at all	4	4.4
No response	0	00
Total	91	99.99

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 21.

Unlike the responses from the general population, many more

workers rate the performance of the councils positively. Following the above table, 62.63% of the population rate the performance of councils as either above average or average. To the majority of workers these councils are performing their various functions effectively. It should be remembered that as workers, they are responsible for the performance of these councils and thus see nothing wrong with what the councils are doing. Secondly, they also feel that Councils utilize the very meagre resources at their disposal effectively.

On the other hand, 37.36% rate the performance of the councils as either below average or zero. These 37.36% of the population conclude that the councils are not effectively performing their developmental functions. The hold as most of the respondents from the general population that councils are not effectively performing their duties. This opinion seems to be true given the information already gathered earlier. However, most of the analysis will take place in part three of this chapter dealing with the synthesis of the opinions.

Some cross tabulation can be made so as to determine the percentage of francophones as opposed to anglophones. The following table will best present the various responses.

TABLE 5.21

5.3.8. Evaluation of the councils' performance responses according to linguistic zone.

Response	Anglophone	Percentage	Francophone	Percentage
Good	7	7.7	2-0	21.97
Average	10	10.96	20	21.97
Below Average	24	26.37	6	6.6
Poorr	4	4.4	0	0
Total	45	49.45	46	50.54

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 21.

The above table indicates that more francophone workers 43.94% rate the performance of their councils positively as apposed to only 18.6% workers from the anglophone zone. It therefore, implies that far more anglophone workers are dissatisfied with the performance of their councils as opposed to their francophone counterparts. These francophone councils are usually more equipped than the anglophone zone,given their relationship with powers at the central government level.

On the contrary far more anglophone workers rate the performance of their councils negatively as opposed to their francophone counterparts. 30.77% anglophone feel this way as opposed to only 6.6.% francophone workers. Reasons will be advanced in the third section of this chapter.

In order to advance further in the analysis these respondents were told to evaluate the impact of the councils' activities on their lives. The performances of the councils could either leave or not leave that desired impact on the population as experience has shown. 35.17% of the population rate the impact of the councils' activities on their lives positively. These workers therefor feel some impact of the councils activities on their lives. the impact is either average or above average.

On the contrary 64.8% of the population feel the impact of the councils' activities on their lives is below average. These 64.8% feel that the council do not influence their lives much even as workers of these councils. It therefore implies that the impact of the councils' activities on the lives of the local population is very minimal if already most of the workers hold the same opinion.

The table that follows will distinguish the response of anglophones from francophones.

TABLE 5.22

5.3.9 Evaluation of the impact of the councils activities.

Response	Anglophone	Percentage	Francophone	Percentage
Very Much	3	3.2	7	6.9
Much	2	2.2	6	6.6
Below Average	13	14.28	11	12.08
Average	34	34	25	27.47
None	-	37.36	-	-
Total	49	53.84	42	46.15

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Question No. 22.

The above table indicates that 18.68% francophones are convinced that the impact is either much or average while 16.48% from the anglophone zone hold this same opinion. It also implies that more francophone workers have a positive opinion, when compared to their anglophone counterparts.

On the other hand 37.36% of anglophone feel that this impact is below average as opposed to 27.47% from the francophone zone. As workers, most of them feel the impact of the councils' activities on their lives is either below average and even lower. It therefore implies that the impact will be far more minimal with the local population which is farther away from the administration of the councils. Most of these workers go for many months without salaries and their working conditions are relatively poor, consequently the impact of the councils' activities on their lives

should be minimal.

These respondents were told to give some suggestion on how the councils in Cameroon could experience some political development. Most of them hold that for councils to experience some political development, they should be democratized, and given enough autonomy to manage their own affairs. Most of them also stress that the respective council authorities should be elected and not appointed. Some already hint that the power of control and supervision should be given to the local population through democratic elections. Here are some of the responses:-

1. Candidates should be screened and they should be elected by the population.
2. Councils should seek to represent the views of the common man rather than the government.
3. Councils should have more powers and responsibilities to act independently.
4. Councils should be fully democratized.
5. Elections should be organized in the councils and they should be free and fair.
6. Learned people should be employed in the councils.
7. Councils should have more democratic elections and more community support.
8. The councils should be provided with more finance and powers to manage this money
9. Many more staff should be trained and placed to manage council business .

10. Greater political campaigns and elections should be free, not government controlled.
11. Councils should shave limited control from the govern but to operate as in Britain and European Countries.
12. Power should go to the people through participating in elections.
13. Council administration should be open to all including the public. Council meetings should be more frequent and open.
14. The municipal administrator should be elected and he should have less powers etc.

These responses express the desire of the workers to have a more transparent and participatory form of government. It further indicates that the councils authorities have much powers of control on the workers but they are in turn controlled by the central government actors rather than the local population. These workers therefore yearn for more democratic, open, free and fair elections wherein the active participation of every person in the activities of councils will be guaranteed. They do not support this system of administration wherein all the powers are concentrated in the hands of a few appointed persons.

5.4. A SYNTHESIS OF THE OPINIONS

The intention of the whole analysis in this chapter was to find out if the local population participates actively in the activities of the councils.

The whole analysis has proven that the local population at the grass-roots does not participate actively in the activities of the

councils in Cameroon. Most of the material contribution to the councils' activities is done principally through taxation and levy. These methods are involuntary demanding a lot of coercion on the part of the councils authorities and the central government actors. Voluntary participation which is more positive and active is not popular with the local population.

The general public further confirms that active participation is not popular because the present structure does not provide enough room for the free expression of ideas. Moreover the few ideas expressed are not taken seriously by the council authorities. These council authorities are protected by the law against any form of control from the local population. In which case the local population is controlled by the central and local government actors and not the other way round. This inverse relationship balances unfavorably against the local population which is more vulnerable, weaker and poorer.

Most of these respondents further confirm that the council authorities perform poorly in the organisation of community development and other self-help projects within the local population. 67.91% feel this way as opposed to 29.98% who feel that these council authorities perform fairly well. These activities demand a lot of cooperation and mutual exchange of ideas between the council authorities and the local population which unfortunately is minimal.

Interestingly many more council workers and those in the related ministry feel that these council authorities perform poorly

in the organization of self-help projects within the local population. This observation is more pertinent since they are closer to the administration of the councils. 73.62% of this population feel this way as opposed 23.08% who feel otherwise.

The impressions of these two groups of respondents confirm that cooperation and mutual exchange of resources does not exist between the council authorities and the local population. It also indicates that the council authorities hardly perform their discretionary functions which are principally community development oriented . It further testifies that there is no cooperation between the councils and the central ministerial departments responsible for the organization of the various developmental activities at the grass-roots.

Most of the respondents from appendix 11 further confirm that the performance of the council authorities in enlightening the public is relatively low. 59.93% feel these authorities hardly educate the public on major issues as opposed to only 38.42% who feel the council authorities perform averagely well in this activity. This observation is pertinent because these respondents are very conversant with the workings of the councils and most of them even constitute part of the administration of the councils.

Councils and individuals at the grass-roots level are not permitted to engage in public enlightenment campaigns without the permission and the supervision of the prefects. In most cases central government actors are sent directly to the grass-roots to explain government policies when deemed necessary. The councils at

this level merely provide supportive services. The impression of the workers above stem from the fact that councils on their own do not engage in educating the public on topical issues. They however confirm that councils perform poorly even under the supervision and the support of the central government.

84.61% of the workers and 60.15% of the respondents from the general population confirm that councils do well in the organisation of elections. This is one of the few responsibilities initiated. organized, supervised and financed by the central government in which the council authorities are directly involved. Councils authorities are obliged to work for their own interest and that of the central government for the successful accomplishment of the elections. The principle of self-interest motivates these various actors to perform effectively.

Councillors generally perform well in all these mobilizational activities. Councillors perform better in community development activities where a lot of personal initiative and independence of thought is highly demanded. Councillors on their part do not constitute part of the administration of the councils. They merely sit once or twice in a year to draw-up the broad policies of the councils but they do not supervise the execution of these policies.

These councillors perform well in all these activities because they happen to be responsible citizens who are interested in the development of the grass-roots population. Councillors in this case are free and more autonomous than the council authorities who must work within the strict guidelines of the central government.

Councils on the whole do not perform the various activities effectively because they do not have this latitude of freedom and autonomy which does not only inhibit a lot of initiative and self-reliance but also minimizes the active participation and the support from the local population.

In order to wrap up the whole analysis in this chapter these various respondents were told to rate the general performance of the councils. 71.47% of the respondents from the general public affirm that this performance is either below average or even lower. In other words councils are generally ineffective in the performance of their various functions.

On the other hand only 37.36% of the respondents of the council workers and those of the related ministry confirm the ineffectiveness of the councils' performance. Most of these people hold that councils are effective in the performance of their functions. Their decisions are influenced by their positions since they constitute part of the administration of the councils which supplies the goods and services. On the other hand they may imply that the councils do their very best with the very little resources at their disposal.

The impressions of the general public should be taken more seriously since they are the principal recipients of these goods and serves produced by the councils and their workers. Most of them hold that the performance of the councils is generally in effective.

When questioned further most of the respondents from the two

groups confirm that they receive little or no impact from the activities of the councils. This impression re-enforces the fact above that the performance of the councils is ineffective. 78.52% from the general public feel they receive little or no impact while 64.8% from the various workers in Questionnaire 11 feel the same.

It therefore implies that most of the respondents do not identify themselves with the councils since they receive very little impact from the councils' activities. In other words the inability of the councils to produce the desired impact from their activities alienates the local population and prevents this local population from providing the necessary support and encouragement to the councils.

The council authorities mobilize the local population once in a while into participating in some developmental activities. This mobilization is not geared at the organisation of the local population into self-governing and self-reliant units but principally to penetrate supervise and control the activities of the local population. The participation of the this population is relatively minimal since it is involuntary devoid of enthusiasm and zeal. The minimal participation from the local population is obtained principally through the threat of sanctions and various forms of intimidation.

All the personalities interviewed confirm the absence of this active participation of the local population in council activities. All of them including the prefect of Bamenda, the Subprefect the Municipal Administrator and the director of the training institute

categorically hold that the participation of the local population in council activities is minimal. All of them, on the other hand confirm that, the participation of this very population in self-help and other non-governmental organisations is quite high, and this is confirmed in the next chapter that follows. It should be noted that these self-help and non-governmental organisations experience very little control from central government actors at the grass-roots. It further proves the point that the local population is not willing to participate actively in these organisations whose control and supervision has been hijacked by the central government.

The second hypothesis which states that the high level of central government control has minimized the active participation of the local population in the activities of the councils, has been validated. The next chapter examines the performances of the councils and some non-governmental organisations which receive little central government control so as to determine whether this control in reality affects participation.

FOOTNOTES

Government of Cameroon: Council Organisation: Law No.74 - 23 of 1974 National Printing Press, Yaounde,1977 PP. 140 - 145

CHAPTER SIX

EVALUATION OF COUNCIL AND SOME SELF-HELP ACTIVITIES AT THE GRASS-ROOTS.

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The preceeding chapters attempted an empirical analysis of primary data extracted from the field. These chapters presented the varying views of the participants on the level of control exercised by the Central Government on the various councils and also the level of the active participation of the local population in the activities of these councils. The analysis of the data reveals a high incidence of central government control over the councils and the minimal participation of the local population in the activities of the councils.

The main thrust of this chapter is to show that the high incidence of central government control on the councils and the minimal participation from the grass-root population has negatively affected the output of the councils. This chapter is divided into two main parts, apart from the present introduction. The first part presents the various budgets and the expenditure patterns of some selected councils so as to evaluate the quality and the quantity of goods and services produced by the councils. The analysis will also show how the high level of central government control and the minimal participation from the population below has adversely affected the quality and the quantity of goods and services

produced.

The second and final part presents an analysis of some selected projects initiated, accomplished and are being managed by the local population with minimal control from the central government and active participation from the local population located at the grass-roots. The aim here is to show that the high degree of central government control and the minimal participation from the population at the grass-roots has negatively affected the performance of the councils.

6.2 BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURE OF THE COUNCILS

The various budgets and the expenditure pattern of the different councils are extracted from what is called the administrative accounts presented to the Assembly of the Councillors and the Minister of Territorial Administration, who is one of the principal supervisory authorities of the councils, at the end of each financial year. The administrative accounts are divided into two main parts. The first part is the budget of the council in question while the second part deals with the expenditure pattern of the council for the Financial year in question.

Each administrative account also comprises of a detail presentation of the management accounts produced by the treasurer who is a central government actor. This said Treasurer is the sole custodian of the revenue of the council within his area and is therefore responsible for the control and supervision of each

financial transaction undertaken by the Municipal Head of the Council in the course of the financial year. In this case the Municipal head is obliged to work directly and closely with the Treasurer and the Prefects at their various levels.

The analysis at this stage will start firstly with the presentation of the budget of each council. The budget of the selected councils shows the principal sources of revenue, the ability of the councils to extract revenue from the various sources and the relative amount of support coming from the local population at the grass-roots. The analysis starts with the rural councils which are poorer, then proceeds to special urban and urban community councils which are richer. The tables that follow presents the various budgets in Francs C.F.A.and the Naira equivalents.

6.2.1 ANALYSIS OF SOME COUNCIL BUDGETS

TABLE 6.1

MBOUDA COUNCIL; 1989/90 BUDGET

Budget Source	Anticipated Revenue		Actual Revene	
	In Francs C.F.A	In Naira	Francs C.F.A	Naira
Taxation and Recoveries	100,563,400	8,045,075	50,999,836	4,079,986
Miscellaneous- & Causual- Receipts	4,802,761	384,220	2,392,086	191,366
Last Year- Revenue Pending	6,675,182	541,214	6,675,182	541,214
Total	112,041,343	8,970,509	60,167,104	4,812,566

Source: Administrative Accounts, Provincial Service, For Councils, Governor's Office, Bafoussam, May 1990, P. 2 - 7.

TABLE 6.2

SANTA COUNCIL; 1990/91 BUDGET

Budget Source	Anticipated Revenue		Actual Revenue	
	In Francs C.F.A.	In Naira	Francs C.F.A.	Naira
1. Taxattion and Recoveries	40,383,600	3,230,688	16,913,830	1,353,106
2. Miscellaneous & Causual Receipts				
3. Last Year	16,400,000	1,312,000	1,866,515	149,321
4. Revenue Pending	28,310,818	264,865	19,058,368	1,524,669
Total	85,094,418	6,807,553	37,838,913	3,027,097

Source: Administrative Accounts,Provincial Service, For Councils, Governor's Office, Bamenda, May 1991,PP. 2 - 7.

TABLE 6.3

EYUMONOCK COUNCIL,1991/92 BUDGET

Budget Source	Anticipated Revenue		Actual Revenue	
	In Francs C.F.A.	In Naira	Francs C.F.A.	Naira
1. Taxattion and Recoveries	25,157,000	2,012,560	7,274,607	581,968
2. Miscellaneous & Causual Receipts				
3. Last Year	500,000	40,000	113,100	9,048
4. Revenue Pending	12,008,511	960,680	978,000	78,240
Total	37,665,511	3,013,240	8,365,707	169,256

Source: Administrative Accounts,Provincial Service, For Councils, Governor's Office, Buea, May 1992,PP. 3 - 9.

TABLE 6.4

BAMENDA, SPECIAL URBAN COUNCIL; 1992/93 BUDGET

Budget Source	Anticipated Revenue		Actual Revenue	
	In Francs C.F.A.	In Naira	Francs C.F.A.	Naira
1. Taxattion and Recoveries	373,860,240	29,908,819	151,560,094	12,132,007
2. Miscellaneous & Causual Receipts				
3. Last Year	62,700,000	5,016,000	40,040,047	3,203,203
4. Revenue Pending	42,180,436	18,702,445	42,180,436	3,374,434
Total	478,740,676	53,627,264	8,365,707	18,709,664

Source: Administrative Accounts, Provincial Service, For Councils, Governor's Office, Bamenda, May 1993, PP. 2-10.

TABLE 6.5

YAOUNDE URBAN COMMUNITY COUNCIL 1992/93 BUDGET

Budget Source	Anticipated Revenue		Actual Revenue	
	In Francs C.F.A.	In Naira	Francs C.F.A.	Naira
1. Taxattion and Recoveries	37149600000	297198000	27535107000	2202808000
2. Miscellaneous & Causual Receipts				
3. Last Year	4456800000	365544000	2789709000	223176000
4. Revenue Pending	----------	---------	----------	---------
Total	41606400000	333752000	30324816000	2425984500

Source: Administrative Accounts, Provincial Service, For Councils, Governor's Office, Yaounde, May 1993, PP. 2 - 9.

The format for the presentation of the various accounts by the councils is the same for the various categories of the councils. The differences lie in the various amounts budgeted and collected from the various sources by the councils at the end of each financial year. The Yaounde Urban Community Council has no amount carried forward which indicates that the Municipal Head succeeded to collect all the revenue of the council by the end of the financial year from the treasury.

The revenue for the councils come under two broad headings namely Taxation and Miscellaneous including Casual Receipts. Taxation here include revenue got from poll tax, business licenses, liquour licenses, cattle tax, slaughter house tax, sanitary inspection tax, market fees, building permit tax, motor park fees, stadium tax, police fines etc.

Miscellaneous and Casual receipt include subsidies and advance granted by the state, and FEICOM, gifts, legacies, sale of council property, treasury advances, fines imposed by courts, etc.

Looking at the above sources from where the revenue of the council comes, it is already easy to discover the councils inability to recover the anticipated amount of revenue expected from the various sources. But for Yaounde Urban Community Council, all the other councils demonstrate a very low level of revenue recovery. The rural Council of Mbouda shows that it recovered 57% of the anticipated revenue, Santa shows 44% while Eyumojock is the least with 22%. Bamenda special Urban Council shows 54% while Yaounde indicates 74%. On the whole, Yaounde urban community

council has done better than all the rest because of the relative accessibility of the various resources to the administration of the council. On the whole, the councils' performance in the generation of revenue from the indicated sources is low because the local population is not always willing to pay their various taxes to the councils

The councils also generate relatively very small amounts of revenue from the miscellaneous sources. The implication is therefore that the councils generate little revenue from alternative sources except taxation. In other words the councils do not generate funds from profitable business ventures, appeal funds, gifts and legacies etc. It further indicates the very low level of cooperation and interaction between the general public and the councils. The inability of the councils to generate the expected revenue will have a direct negative effect on the execution of their various projects as it will be seen in the expenditure patterns of the councils.

The principal source of revenue available to the councils is then the various forms of taxation. Taxation as a source of revenue has proven ineffective firstly because the councils do not possess enough human resources for the collection of these taxes and secondly because the local population is not always willing to pay the various taxes for reasons already advanced in the preceeding chapters.

6.2.2 AN ANALYSIS OF THE EXPENDITURE PATTERNS OF THE COUNCILS.

The presentation of the expenditure pattern of the councils will follow the same logic above as in the case of the budgets. It will commence with the rural councils followed by the Bamenda special urban and the Yaounde Urban Community Councils, as the following tables indicate.

TABLE 6.6

MBOUDA RURAL COUNCIL

RECURRENT EXPENDITURE: 1989/90

ITEM OF EXPENDITURE	AMOUNT IN FRANCS	AMOUNT IN NAIRA
Staff Emoluments	28,835,660	2,306,852.08
General Supplies	10,310,397	824,831.76
Common Expenditure	6,554,647	524,371.76
Miscellaneous	2,385,800	190,864.00
TOTAL	48,086,504	3,846,919.60

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT:1989/90

ITEM OF EXPENDITURE	AMOUNT IN FRANCS	AMOUNT IN NAIRA
FEICOM	1,500,000	120,000.00
Roads, Bridges	5,689,773	455,181.84
Commercial	79,625	6,370.00
Electricity	2,995,532	239,642.56
Water	1,500,000	120,000.00
Forestry	840,000	67,200.00
Education	84,000	6,720.00
TOTAL	12,688,930	1,015,114,40

Source: Administration Accounts. Provincial Service for Councils, Governoor's Office Baffousamm, May, 1990, pp. 9 - 22.

TABLE 6.7
SANTA RURAL COUNCIL, 1990/91

RECURRENT EXPENDITURE

ITEM OF EXPENDITURE	AMOUNT IN FRANCS	AMOUNT IN NAIRA
1.Staff Emoluments	18,584,564Frs.	1,486,765.01
2.General Supplies	2,272,529	181,802.32
3.Common Expen.	5,259,663	420,773.04
4.Miscellaneous	1,186,620	94,929.06
TOTAL	27,303,376	2,183,269.43

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

ITEM OF EXPENDITURE	AMOUNT IN FRANCS	AMOUNT IN NAIRA
1.Market Slabs	57,650Frs.	4,612.00
2.Water Supply	7,258,375	580,670.00
3.Youth & Sports	15,000	1,200.00
4.Council Houses	5,700	456.00
5.FEICOM	1,686,600	134,928.00
TOTAL	9,023,325	721,866.00

Source: Administrative Accounts. Provincial Service for Councils, Governor's Office Bamenda,May, 1990,PP.10 - 23.

6.3.2.3 TABLE 6.8
EYUMOJOCK RURAL COUNCIL, 1991/92
RECURRENT EXPENDITURE IN C.F.A.FRANCS.

ITEM OF EXPENDITURE	AMOUNT IN FRANCS	AMOUNT IN NAIRA
1.Staff Emoluments	2,563,069Frs.	205,045.52
2.General Supplies	744,900	59,592.00
3.Common Expenditure	1,075,118	86,009.44
4.Miscellaneous	495,000	39,600.00
TOTAL	4,878,087	390,246.96

= 72%

Fr. C.F.A. = =N=

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

ITEM OF EXPENDITURE	AMOUNT IN FRANCS	AMOUNT IN NAIRA
1.Roads Bridges	-------	--------
2.Agric.Engineering	100,000	8,000.00
3.Health &Social Welfare	52,000	4,160.00
4.Youth and Sports	30,000	2,400.00
5.Council Union	50,000	4,000.00
TOTAL	232,000	18,560.00

Source: Administrative Accounts. Provincial Service for Councils, Governor's Office Buea. May, 1992,PP.10 - 24.

6.3.2.4 TABLE 6.9

BAMENDA SPECIAL URBAN COUNCIL, 1992/93

RECURRENT EXPENDITURE

ITEM OF EXPENDITURE	AMOUNT IN FRANCS	AMOUNT IN NAIRA
1.Staff Emoluments	84,007,427Frs.	6,720,594.01
2.General Supplies	12,013,273	961,061.08
3.Common Expend.	15,020,325	1,201,626.00
4.Miscellaneous	977,500	78,200.00
TOTAL	112,018,525	8,961,481.09
	= 72%	

Fr. C.F.A. = =N=

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT.

ITEM OF EXPENDITURE	AMOUNT IN FRANCS	AMOUNT IN NAIRA
1.Roads Bridges	15,450,622	1,236,050.00
2.Social Welfare	4,650,000	372,000.00
3.Town Planning	7,172,806	573,825.00
4.Promotion of Production	2,176,306	174,105.00
TOTAL	29,449,734	2,355,980.00

Source : Administrative Accounts. Provincial Service for Councils, Governor's Office Bamenda. May, 1993,PP.10 - 24.

6.3.2.5 TABLE 6.10
YAOUNDE URBAN COMMUNITY COUNCIL, 1992/93
RECURRENT EXPENDITURE

ITEM OF EXPENDITURE	AMOUNT IN FRANCS	AMOUNT IN NAIRA
1.Staff Emoluments	12,178,806,000	974,304,480.00
2.General Supplies	5,789,085,000	463,126,800.00
3.Common Expendi.	2,184,670,000	174,773,600.00
4.Miscellaneous	1,016,146,000	81,291,680.00
TOTAL	21,168,707,000	1,693,496.560.00

Fr. C.F.A. = =N=

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

ITEM OF EXPENDITURE	AMOUNT IN FRANCS	AMOUNT IN NAIRA
Roads,Bridges,Commercial	3,194,780,000	255,582,400.00
Social Welfare	1,170,750,000	93,660.000.00
Town Planning & Water, Electricity	1,005,700,000	80,456,000.00
Promotion of Production	1,094,600,000	87,568,000.00
Administrative Equip.	1,601,100,000	128,088,000.00
TOTAL	8,066,930,000	645,354,400.00

Source: administrative Accounts. Provincial Service for Councils, Governor's Office Yaounde, May, 1993,PP.10 - 24.

- Promotion of production deals with agricultural and rural engineering, animal husbandry, forestry, handicraft and industrial products.
- Social Welfare includes, health, education, Youth Development and sports, mass education and social welfare services.
- Administrative equipment includes, the building of offices, stores, workshops, garages and council houses.

The above accounts indicate that the various councils spend a relatively large amount of income on recurrent expenditure as compared to the capital expenditure. Mbouda for example spends 76.6% of its total budget on recurrent expenditure, Santa spends 72.1%, Eyumojock spends 58.3% while Bamenda spends only 47.9% and Yaounde spends 69.8%.

Bamenda Council gives a false impression of spending less on this item because it actually spends 60.5% of her total budget for the 1992/93 financial year. In other words 39.5% of the budget was still blocked in the central government treasury. Most of the projects earmarked for this year have either just be gun or not begun at all. The budget for Eyumojock rural council is comparatively very small. The 2.6% of it spent on capital expenditure is virtually negligible. On the whole a large part of the budget is spent on running the council while a small part is spent on development projects. It therefore implies that the councils spend very little on projects that have some direct impact on the local population.

A keener look at the capital expenditure of the various councils may illustrate this point further. The amount of money allocated for water electricity and social welfare is generally too small for the satisfaction of a reasonable portion of the population. In spite of these various amounts allocated most councils owe huge amounts of money to the water and electricity corporations. Most of the public taps under the responsibility of the councils are soon to be sold to private individuals, so as to

alleviate the burden of the various concerned councils. The electricity corporation has simply switched off lights from the major streets in towns and cities including Yaounde and Douala.[4]

Mbouda for example allocates only 5,689,773 Frs C.F.A.(=N=455,181.84) for roads, bridges and other physical infrastructure. This amount is far too small for the maintenance of all the untarred roads in this area. During the rains, almost all the roads in this area would be impassable if the participation of the local population is minimal. The local population with the help of the department of Community Development and High ways maintain the roads at this time of the year.

Apart from the water project which has gulped 7,258,374 Frs C.F.A (=N=580,669.92), Santa rural council spends 0.2% of her budget in social welfare activities. Of the 9,023,325 frs for capital expenditure, only 78,350frs (=N=6,268) 0.9% is spent on other social welfare infrastructure. The amount of money allocated for the water project was used for the construction of an embankment and reservoir, around the lake which is the principal source of the water. The job would have been far cheaper with the active participation of the local population as is the case with other community development projects which shall be specified later on in this chapter.

The Eyumojock rural council has not succeeded like the other rural councils in the Republic. The council succeeded to spend just 232.500frs (=N=18,600) representing 2.1% of the total budget. The council is so poor that it is incapable of neither paying its

workers nor its debts which are obligatory functions. Social welfare services are not obligatory functions and with the acute scarcity of resources, almost nothing has been effectively done for the past two years.

The special urban and urban community councils which are richer have allocated some money for roads, bridges and other infrastructure but the goods have either not been effectively delivered or partially done. The Mayor of the Bamenda special urban councils confirms this in the following words in his speech to the assembly:-

> Our roads have remained unrepared because the grader has not been repaired... The Fishpond bridge started last year was completed and is in use; though it has not been properly done for lack of proper equipment... We have done some work on the food market site with the assistance of Azire credit union who supplied us fuel and lubricants to to the tune of one million francs.."[4]

The speech of the mayor of one of the only two special urban councils in the Republic is very pathetic. The above remarks indicate clearly that nothing effective was accomplished for the whole of last year. Azire Credit Union is a local self-help organisation which opted to help the council.

The Yaounde urban community council presents an uglier sight. Most of the roads in the town either need tarring or repairs. The public taps have been shut and most streets are not lit in the

night. According to "The Herald" newspaper, Yaounde is" one of the dirtiest cities in the World"[5]

Experience on the field confirms the very negative side of central government control. Most councils do not find it easy or retrieve their revenue deposited in the central government treasury. Firstly the procedure is long and cumbersome. For money to be got by the municipal head of the Bamenda Urban Council, for example, the treasurer has to sign, followed by the signature of the prefect and finally that of the governor. Secondly the treasurer from the first stage can claim that the treasury is empty and cannot pay the required amount. The municipal head has to either wait or negotiate. There are cases where the treasurer has refused to pay council bills even when the council has its revenue in the treasury. In which case council revenue is sometimes used by the central government even to the detriment of the councils. See the various administrative accounts showing the debts owed to the councils from the previous year by the central government.

Most Local Government actors in the course of negotiating, connive with central government actors to use council revenue for personal ends. Last year (1993/94) Emah Basile, of the Yaounde Urban Community Council, returned a billion frances C.F.A (=N=8 million) to the central government coffers, while he was in turn awarded 25% of this amount as compensation for the efficient management of council revenue. On the other hand all the junior workers in this council had gone for the whole of that year without salaries.6 In supporting the above observation, Ndue asserts in

the case of these councils that:

> The income available to the councils quite often is used carelessly with regards to rural and urban councils... Not only does the expenditure not seem to always obey rigorous logic, but also some serious short-comings noticed between budget estimates; and the results of the administrative accounts show some fantasy in the assessment of the real financial possibilities of the councils.'

Generally the performance of the councils is quite low firstly because of their inability to generate the necessary resources: Secondly because of the over all inefficiency of most council accounting officers; thirdly because of the excessive central government interference in the activities of these councils and fourthly because of the absence of vital support and the active participation of the grass-root population in the activities of the councils. Reasoning along the same lines, Ndue confirms that"... Councils have a very limited scope within which they carry out their activities and this is why their financial policy is insignificant at the local level. The control of the resources is only carried out partially with regards to the establishment of the base of taxation, and as well as the collection of revenue destined for councils"[8] A recent survey conducted by a public relation firm from France indicated that the popularity of the council leaders has fallen to 12%[9].

Considering the results of the above survey the central government has decided to postpone council elections which were to take place in June, 1994 to February, 1996. The central government in so doing, indicates its desire to maintain inefficient and unpopular candidates to electing popular and more effective candidates who will strive to serve the local population at the grass-roots level. The next step of the analysis will evaluate the performances of some non-governmental organisations experiencing very little central government control and active participation and support from the local population.

6:4 ANALYSIS OF SOME SELECTED SELF-HELP PROJECTS

The principal ambition here is the presentation of some self-help projects which have been accomplished by the local population working in conjunction with central government agents. The local population are the principal initiators of these projects and they participate actively in every phase of the project up to the final stage of execution. The principal function of the central government agent is to provide the necessary technical expertise which is in the form of advice, direction and supervision at a very minimal level. This job is best done by community development staff whose major objective is to motivate the local population into participating actively in projects that improve their lives. The cardinal objectives of community development revolve on "the participation by the people themselves in efforts to improve their level of living with reliance as much as possible on their own initiative; and the provision of technical and other services in

ways which encourage initiative, self-help, and mutual help and make them more effective".[10] Below are some of the projects accomplished by local population through strategy of community development. These project include water supply, road construction and cooperative projects.

6.4.1 M'NKAHA BAFUT WATER SUPPLY PROJECT OF APRIL, 1993

TABLE 6.11

ITEM	COST IN C.F.A.	COST IN NAIRA.
Estimated cost	5,705,000frs.	456,400
Survey	1,400,000	112,000
TOTAL COST	7,105,000	568,400

COST SHARING PATTERN	IN C.F.A.	IN NAIRA
1. Community Contribution Cash.....	650,000frs	52,000
2. Community Contribution Kind.....	660,000frs	52,800
	1,310,000	104,800
3. UNICEF Pipes	250,000	20,000
4. S A T A Cash	1,400,000	112,000
5. State(Community Dev.Department)	500,000	40,000
6. Foreign Aid(Cash)	2,500,000	200,000
7. Other Sources	1,145,000	91,600
Grand Total	7,105,000frs	568,400

Source: provincial service of Community Development Bamenda,1993. PP. 11 - 13.

6.4.2. BESS AWUM WATER SUPPLY PROJECT PHASE TWO 1994

TABLE 6.12

COST SHARING PATTERN	IN C.F.A.	IN NAIRA
1. Community Contribution Cash.....	1,017,000frs	81,360
2. Community Contribution Kind.....	1,690,000frs	135,200
External Support(HELVETAS	3,000,000	240,000
TOTAL	5,707,000frs	456,560
	=========	=======

Source: Provincial service of Community Development Bamenda, 1994 PP. 13 - 15.

1,310,000	104,800
=========	=======

6.4.3 MELUF WATER SUPPLY PROJECT (CONCEIVED IN 1979 AND COMPLETED IN 1983, 4 YEARS AFTER)

TABLE 6.13

COST SHARING PATTERN	IN C.F.A.	IN NAIRA
1. Community Contribution Cash.....	4,000,000frs	320,000
2. Community Contribution Kind.....	5,150,000frs	412,000
3. Government Contribution (C.D.)	3,000,000	240,000
	9,670,000	773,600
4. Foreign Aid	25,680,000	2,054,400
5. C.D.Santa	9,000,000	720,000
TOTAL	53,500,000	4,280,000
	==========	=========

Comments of E.W Kulling, SATA Head Office Switzerland on his visit to the Meluf Water Supply Project..." We are very impressed to see the big efforts made by the population in community work, cash contribution and self-help interest. We should encourage them to continue in this way and spirit..."

Source: Divisional Service for Community Development, Nkambe, 1993 PP. 7 - 10.

These water supply projects need a lot of participation from the local population which in turn needs a lot of skill in the coordination of the local population below. The table below shows the distribution of the various successful projects accomplished by the different self-help groups in the North West and South West provinces in 1984. At this time, the idea of community development was just being introduced to the other francophone provinces. According to records, offices had just been installed in the various divisions in these provinces and nothing tangible had been done in this direction in the francophone province which can be evaluated.11 Community participation is both in cash and kind. Contribution in kind includes manual labour at the site, stones, sand, sticks and other temporal resources brought by the local population to the spot. The local population is the principal recipient of the goods and services produced.

TABLE 6.14

DISTRIBUTION OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS(1979 TO 1981)

PROVINCE	No. OF V.D.C.	No. OF PROJECT
South West	305	154
North West	217	313
TOTAL	522	467

Source: Department of Community Development, Ministry of Agriculture, Yaounde, 1981 P.12.

V.D.C. Stands for Village Development Committee.

The above table indicates that South West Province has more village development committees (305) than North which has (217) but North West Province has more registered accomplished self-help project(313) than South West (217).[12] Many of these self-help projects done at the village level are sometimes not registered with the community development agent.

The cooperative societies which constitute another form of self-help venture have developed rapidly in Cameroon particularly after independence in 1960. The North West province alone has 11 cooperative unions, 118 cooperative societies and 31,000 members.[13]

In 1980 the government wanted to use these cooperatives societies for the development of North West Province by pumping a lot of money into those organisations so that it could be channeled to the farmers. The elected leaders which had been hitherto, responsible to the farmers became reckless and exemplified gross mismanagement since they were then controlled more by the central government than the local farmers. By 1982, two years later, the various cooperative societies were audited and all the corrupt, and inefficient officials were sacked. They were also forced to pay back the embezzled sums of money.

All the 118 cooperative societies have gone back to the fundamental principles of voluntarism, self-help and mutual-help. These cooperative societies are performing well and the farmers are once again enjoying their services. These societies are responsible for the collection, transportation and sale of the

farmers' coffee to the World market. They also arrange for funds for members, and supply them with the necessary agricultural inputs at a relatively cheaper rates. The table below shows the amount of produce sold for the farmers from 1978 - 1983 through the Unions in North West Province.

TABLE 6.15
YEARLY SALE OF ARABICA COFFEE

UNION	YEAR	FIGURES IN KILOGRAMMES.				
	1978/79	1979/90	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83
	kg	kg	kg	kg	kg
1. Nso	2,290,468	1,501,758	1,633,000	1,160,053	1,457,185
2. Kom	2,174,262	1,484,378	1,484,373	1,551,927	1,450,340
3. Bamenda	769,110	610,415	565,534	640,715	528,045
4. Nkambe	1,131,121	993,495	1,172,902	1,081,981	1,029,582
5. Santa	1,090,948	1,241,032	1,141,414	1,017,598	1,213,227
6. Ndop	505,543	568,080	345,038	528,043	407,160
7. Pinyin	894,016	774,785	636,818	334,092	489,936
8. Bali	254,178	168,055	157,069	146,354	130,991
9. Moghamo	189,559	149,462	146,556	125,930	113,510
10 Oku-Noni	957,530	535,560	832,421	843,974	646,662
11 Mbengwi	374,393	240,890	225,864	248,864	118,553
TOTAL	10,631,128	8,042,206	8,342,994	7,679,657	7,585,241

Source: The New West Cooperative Association Ltd.
N.W.C.A. Statistics Office Bamenda, 1989.

The decline in the volume of produce sold can easily be noticed, immediately the level of central government intervention in the activities of the cooperatives became too high as from 1980/81. Since then the cooperative movement in Cameroon has never regained the popularity it had with the local population in the North West Province.

The cooperative credit union movement has also grown steadily in the whole Republic. The Credit Union has become one of the most

popular source of banking for the local farmers and the rich Urban Citizens alike. It helps save excess cash and gives loans to the needy at cheaper rates. One of the most popular is Azire credit Union Limited which started in Bamenda with a membership of 123 in 1969 and rose to 2992 by 1983. Share savings rose from 994,000 frs C.F.A.(=N=79,520) to 532,300,000 frs. C.F.A.(=N=42,584,000) by 1983.

Loans given out also rose from 35 people in 1969 to 1303 people in 1983, amounting to 1,296,000 frs C.F.A(=N=103,680) in 1969 to 472,800,000 frs(=N=37,824,000) in 1983.[12] The Center province including Yaounde, the National Capital has a membership of 20,350 people in the Credit Union with a sharesavings of 303,005,343 frs(=N=24,240,428) C.F.A. Loans given out also amount to 97,069,382 frs C.F.A(=N=77,655,504).[15]

All these above projects have been effectively executed by these ever growing and buoyant organisations with minimum control from central government actors and the active participation of the local population at the grass-roots. The local population appreciates the value of projects, initiates them, and then participates actively in every phase of the execution in conjunction with the technical expertise and the minimal supervision of the central government actors. The local population has been managing these projects and enjoying the services rendered as opposed to what obtains from the councils.

Local government institutions in Cameroon have not been able to perform effectively firstly because of the excessive control of

the central government actors reflected in the legal provisions, the recruitment of the various participants, the generation and the management of council revenue, and the minimal discretionary powers given to the appointed council leaders.

Local governments as Oyeyipo has rightly observed, should be given the possibility "to grow, to make their own mistakes, to correct such mistakes and to become respectable, responsible and trusted institutions of governance at the grass-roots level."[14]

FOOTNOTES

1. The Government of Cameroon: Council Organisation: Law No.74 - 23 of 1974 National Printing, Yaounde, Press, 1977 PP. 177.
2. Minutes of Eyumojock Rural Council for 1992/93 Administrative and Management Accounts Sessions, held in Eyumojock in May 4, 1994, PP. 5 - 7.
3. Asona Ndifor: "Council Elections: Biya Dribbles the Nation" In the Herald: No. 121, July 1994, P.2.
4. Address of the Government Delegate to the Bamenda Urban Council; presented on the 1994/95 Draft Budget to the councilors. Bamenda, May 5, 1994, P.2.
5. Asona Ndifor: Op. Cit P.2.
6. Ibid. P.2.
7. Paul Ndue: Decentralization and Local Government in Cameroon: Yaounde Friedrich Ebert Foundation,Yaounde 1994, P. 19.
8. Ibid. P. 19.
9. The Messenger: Biya Postpones Elections Vol. 11 No.09, May 1994, P.6.
10. The United Nations - Organisation: Public Administration Aspects of Community Development Programmes Office for Public Administration, New York,1959, P.2.

11. Government of Cameroon: Plan for Community Development: Ministry of Agriculture, Yaounde. 1981, P.12.

12. Ibid PP. 12 - 15.

13. North West Cooperative Association Ltd:"North West Marketing Cooperatives in the New Deal Era" Bamenda 1986, PP 2 - 6.

14. Ibid P.16.

15. Department of Cooperatives: "Big Magazine" Ministry o f Agriculture, Yaounde,1984 PP. 2 - 5.

16. E.A.O. Oyeyipo: "Local Government Institutions problems and Prospects" In E.A.O Oyeyipo et al (eds): Leading Issues in Territorial Decentralization in Nigeria and France, Ahmadu Bello University Press, Zaria,1988, P.17.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The relationship existing between the central and the local government institutions could be rightly categorized into two distinct groups. Firstly, this relationship could constitute a source of support and encouragement to development. At this level, the central government provides these local government institutions with the much needed autonomy, discretionary powers and resources for the effective accomplishment of their traditional functions. This relationship is thus characterized by partnership and mutual reciprocity in the exchange of resources.

It could on the other hand constitute a source of constraint to the development of local government institutions. At this level, the central government through the extensive use of control mechanisms, transforms these institutions into organizational cripples by depriving them of the much needed autonomy, discretionary powers and the necessary resources for the effective performance of their delineated functions. The relationship is therefore characterized by much control and command emanating from the central government to the local institutions.

The objectives of this study were firstly to find out the part that local government institutions can play in the political development of Cameroon, secondly to explore the nature of the relationship existing between the central and the local government institutions; thirdly to critically determine how the performance of these institutions can be attributed to this relationship and

fourthly to recommend a model through which this relationship can be strengthened in favour of these local government institutions in Cameroon.

For this work to have some focus, to hypotheses were formulated. The first stated that the inability of local councils to effectively perform their functions could be attributed to central government's control and command over these institutions. The second stated that the nature of the relationship above was responsible for the low level of mobilization by the council actors and the minimal racticipation at the grass-roots level. Results indicated that the inability of councils to effectively perform their functions was a consequence of the high level of central government's control and command over these institutions. This type of relationship has reduced the capacity of council actors in the mobilization of the local population into active participation in council activities.

7.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The principal aim at this level is to provide a terse analysis and discussion of major findings derived from this work. The analysis and the discussion of these findings is divided into two main parts. The first part deals primarily with data concerning the nature of the relationship existing between the central and the local government institutions in Cameroon while the second part is the analysis of data concerning the participation of the local population in the activities of the councils at the grass-roots level.

7.2.1. Level of Control

Data analysed at this level ends with the conclusion that the

relationship prevalent between the central government and the local authorities is characterized more by control and command than mutual reciprocity in the exchange of resources. The various control mechanisms used by the central government to dominate and control the councils (communes) finds translation mainly in the political and the bureaucratic set-up instituted in the country. The monolythic political system which was instituted in 1966 has over the years, tended to emphasize a high level of central government control and command on the councils (communes). This model of control has been reinforced further by the adoption of France's semi-presidential system of government which arrogates more powers to the executive, at the expense of the legislature and the judicil arms of government.

All the various centres of power in the polity, including the councils, traditional institutions the press and even the cooperatives are placed directly under the supervision and control of the central government actors located at the various levels of the administrative pyramid. At the council level, all the political and the administrative authorities are either directly or indirectly appointed by central government authorities. Municipal administrators in rural councils for example and government delegates posted to urban community councils are appointed by the presidency. Mayors in urban councils on their part are elected only after their candidature has been scrutinized and approved by the political and the administrative authorities at the centre.

At the bureaucratic level, the central government has deprived these local institutions of most of the qualified manpower available in the country. Almost all the principal actors in the

administration of the councils are recruited, by the central government authorities. The financial capabilities of the councils, as the data indicates, have been greatly reduced by the central government. The clearly defined sources of revenue allocated to the councils are relatively few and the little revenue generated by the councils is preserved in the central government treasury, under the control of the treasurer who is not a council staff. The various central government actors, particularly the prefect and the treasurer are permitted by the legislation to regularly control the expenditure pattern and the major activities of the council authorities. In other words the various council authorities possess very little discretionary powers. This falls in line with some of the principles of French hierarchical prefectoral system of administration.

The functions allocated to the councils could be conveniently categorized into obligatory and discretionary functions. The obligatory functions are few while the discretionary functions are relatively many and varied. Data analysed so far indicates that very few of all the two types of functions are effectively accomplished by the various councils given the paucity of the various resources.

On the other hand respondents confirm that the high level of central government control has effectively minimized control from the grass-roots below. Most of the respondents affirm with some despondency that the various council authorities pay more attention

to the demands of the central government authorities than those emanating from the local population who are poorer and powerless. They therefore rate the performance of the councils as either very low or low and that little impact from their activities is felt at the grass-roots level. This above observation is obvious given the paucity of human, material and other temporal resources at the level of the council, the high incidence of central government control and the minimal participation of the local population in the activities of the councils as further analysis will show.

7.2.2 The level of participation

Data derived from the second part also indicates that the participation of the local population in the activities of the councils is minimal. The council authorities perform rather poorly in the organisation of self-help development projects because this activity demands a reasonable amount of human and other temporal resources which the councils do not possess. It therefore, confirms the fact that council authorities hardly mobilize the local population into taking part in programmes initiated from above at the council level. On the other hand, council authorities perform slightly better in the organization of elections and public enlightenment campaigns because these activities are initiated, organized, funded and supervised by the central government. The implication here is that participation as an output emanating from the councils to the local population succeeds at the local level only with the active support of the central government.

Participation as an input emanating from the local population

into the councils is low. The respondents attributed their minimal participation to the present set-up which does not provide them with enough access into the decision-making processes and also to the insensitivity of the council authorities to their various demands which are channeled piece meal. In other words the input of the local population in policy formulation and implementation at the council level is very low given the few openings provided to them at this level.

Some self-help projects of development organized by non-governmental organizations experiencing very little supervision and control from the central government were also evaluated. Experiences and results from the field demonstrate that the local population contributes immensely to the success of these projects initiated and effectively accomplished by these institutions. These projects included community based projects such as the provision of portable drinking water, road construction and maintenance, cooperative marketing societies and credit union organisations found in the provinces. Moreover, these institutions experiencing very little supervision and control from the centre are far more effective in the accomplishment of their functions than councils(communes) which are under the supervision and the control of the central government authorities. It can therefore be concluded that the high level of central government control in the activities of the councils has minimized the active participation of the local population, which in turn has negatively affected the output of the councils.

7.3 Recommendations

The environment within which local government institutions operate in Cameroon is not conducive and convenient. The parasitic relationship existing between the central and the local government institutions is virtually threatening the very existence of the Councils (communes) to the extent that they may collapse if the situation is not addressed right from now. Given the socio-political scenario prevalent in Cameroon, the environment needs a gradual but total overhaul of the system so as to guarantee a peaceful and effective transformation of these councils (communes) into veritable community goverhments.

A community government is an institution put in place principally for the satisfaction of the desires,needs and aspirations of the citizens. A community government looks outwards to the satisfaction of the various demands and pressures emanating from the various interest groups and associations making up the community as a whole. The principal objective of the government is the utilization of the citizens in both policy formulation and implementation. The leaders and other policy-makers consider themselves as public servants charged with the responsibility of satisfying the desires and the aspirations of the citizens.

The community is therefore pluralistic made up of a multiplicity of interest groups and associations engaged in various activities geared at the achievement of varying and sometimes conflicting goals. The various groups become veritable centres of power, which articulate objectives, make demands and sometimes put

pressure both on each other and the central government in the quest for the achievement of their set objectives. These groups therefore constantly bargain, negotiate and arrive at compromises. In this case the various groups form coalitions in which the majority is attained, decisions are reached, conflicts are abated and new resources are allocated.

The stability and the balance of the system is maintained because firstly individual groups including the central government are constantly negotiating, secondly there is a general agreement on the rules of the game decided upon by the various groups constituting the community, and thirdly because individuals belong to two or more groups at the same time. This overlapping membership also helps to mitigate the sharpness of the conflict.

The central government is therefore, one of many and varied groups in the community, however it plays the role of the main actor since it has powers to make major decisions that can greatly affect any of the groups. The central government, being the first among equals, can therefore create a suitable arena within which a healthy competition within the various groups can take place, while it sometimes plays the role of the umpire. The central government is therefore, made up of sub-groups that can also bargain, negotiate and coalesce. The government for example is made up of the executive bureau, the legislative committees, judicial councils administrative departments and parastatals among many others. The councils on their part are supposed to be out of the machinery of the central government, since they constitute one of the major

centres of power in the community. The government gains legitimacy and support firstly because every citizen is allowed to participate freely, through universal suffrage, in the selection of the leaders and secondly because these leaders in turn compete for votes and other forms of support from the citizens in a democratic free and fair atmosphere.

Local government institutions are supposed to be governments at the grass-roots possessing a democratically elected leadership charged with the authoritative formulation and implementation of policies principally designed at this level. Working within broad national guidelines the local government becomes a forum through which the local community confronts and resolves problems and issues that are beyond the scope of the individual. It takes action on the desires hopes and aspirations of the local community while the provision of goods and services becomes one of the many functions. The identity of the local government does not only derive from the goods and services produced but also from the community that it is intended to serve.

A Local government institution also constitutes one of the major centres of power in the whole community. The national legislation allocates enough powers and autonomy to this institution while supervision and control lies principally with the community that it is meant to serve and some minimal supervision from the central government which happens to play the role of the main actor in the polity. The local and the central governments are supposed to be open systems which permit the systematic flow of

information and other resources from both the internal and external environment. The central government should therefore be constantly negotiating with the local government institutions, private non-governmental organisation and the community as a whole. In other words the relationship between the central and the local government should be that of partnership and mutual cooperation.

For councils (communes) in Cameroon to attain this status the central government must first of all release its suffocating grip on these institutions. At the national level, it is recommended that the federal system of government which existed from 1960 up to 1972 should be re-established since it preserves not only the cultural identity of the anglophones and the francophones but also guarantees the autonomy of the regions. The semi-presidential system adopted from 1972 should give way to the presidential system in order to reduce the enormous powers attributed to the executive at the expense of the other arms of governments. In this case the amount of supervision, control and domination exerted by the presidency, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and the prefects on the councils will be greatly reduced.

The multiparty political system initiated in 1991 should be pursued with greater vigour and enthusiasm. The constitution in particular should be totally revised so as to provide the various centres of powers, including the councils, with the necessary protection. The political system should therefore permit the existence of political parties, interest groups, professional associations, religious and non-governmental organisations and of

course the councils. These public and private organisation should constitute fora through which interests and demands are articulated and where necessary channelled to the central government. Open competition, bargains and compromises which are the hallmarks of democracy should permeate all the various socio-political organisations in the country.

Councils in the context of Cameroon, should be people-oriented, looking principally towards the satisfaction of the desires of the local population. The organisation, the management and the workings of the councils should be clearly defined in the constitution of the Republic. The local government officials should be elected directly by the local population whom they are expected to serve. Therefore the various mayors, municipal administrators and councillors should be elected by the local population located at the grass roots. Councils are then different from central government departments firstly because they derive their powers from the constitution and secondly because the respective main actors are elected and not appointed through

7.3.1 Discretion

Councils should be able to enjoy wide discretionary powers spelt out in the constitution so as to extricate them from the suffocating grip of central government authorities. The relationship existing between the councils and central government departments should be characterized by partnership and mutual

cooperation. Municipal Administrative Boards(M.A.B) should be created at the various levels to coordinate and supervise all the development activities taking place within the council area. They replace prefectoral control.

This board should comprise either the prefect as in the case of urban councils or subprefects as in the case of rural councils, all heads of central government departments and the various principal actors within the councils. All major national and local issues and policies concerning the local population are discussed at this level including the various strategies necessary for the effective execution of the adopted policies. The plans and projects of the different heads of central government departments including those of the councils are debated upon and approved at this level before any execution. The atmosphere should be characterized by bargains and compromises while council authorities should be strongly defending the positions of the local population whom they represent. Major targets are set at this level while pending evaluation at a stipulated period of time decided upon by the various parties. Local council authorities are protected from the excessive domination of central government actors by the powers attributed to them by the constitution and the mandate emanating from the electorate. Executive orders from the prefects should be abolished completely.

7.3.2 Access

Council authorities should be able to use both formal and informal channels to penetrate and influence policies drawn at the

central government level. The various media of penetration include organised professional associations such as the national association of mayors, municipal administrators and secretary generals of councils; political connections and associations; the writing of petitions and personal contact between the various actors. Local government actors could, using the strategy of "cumul des mandats", handle both national political posts and local government responsibilities at the same time. They can therefore use these different channels to penetrate and influence decisions taken at the central government level.

7.3.3 PERSONNEL

The local councils should strive as much as possible to recruit qualified personnel and also provide them with the same working conditions obtaining at the central government level. The various council staff should mix freely, discuss and negotiate with their counterparts at the central government level so as to enhance mutual trust, and cooperation. At this juncture, councils should be given the necessary confidence and trust by the central government. The local government training institute should be reorganized and enlarged for the provision of training facilities to medium level and junior staff, while the senior staff could receive graduate and post graduate training in the different university centres. Recruitment should be done independently, based on necessity, merit and the availability of resources within the councils.

7.3.4

Functions allocated to the councils should be categorized into two principal groups. The obligatory functions should be relatively few since they demand some measure of central government supervision and control. Discretionary functions should be many and varied so as to stimulate initiative and responsibility at the grassroots.

7.3.5 PARTICIPATION

Generally the responsibility of supervision and control is more effectively handled by the local population who are the principal recipients of the goods and services produced by the councils. For the councils to effectively and conveniently perform their functions, their operations should fall within the following guidelines.

(1) Their activities should have some direct and clear correlation with the interests and the desires of the local population. The local population must be well educated on the policies of the councils and the likely consequences of these policies on their lives before willingly supplying the human, material and other temporal resources. Councils must constantly educate and mobilize the local population into active participation in their activities. These activities should include the encouragement of community based and other self-help projects, general public enlightenment on major issues and the education of the local population on democratic values and responsibility. The council authorities

should work closely with central government actors, traditional institutions, village development committees, the cooperatives and other self-help committees amongst many others so as to guarantee the effective execution of their programmes.

(2) Council authorities should exercise fairness, objectivity and equality in the treatment of the citizens located at the grass-roots. Councils authorities should therefore strive to maintain some balanced development within their area of jurisdiction.

(3) Council authorities should not charge higher fees than it costs to produce the goods and services. In other words councils should avoid the tendency of exploiting the local population. Working within these guidelines, council authorities should be able to gain the confidence and the vital support of the local population whom they are supposed to serve.

Councils should be categorized into urban and rural councils so as to facilitate management and control by the various actors. Urban councils should be managed by mayors while rural councils should fall under the control of municipal administrators. The various secretary generals should be career administrators responsible for the management of the personnel and other resources placed at their disposal for the effective implementation of council policies. The mayors and the municipal administrators are political leaders who should strive to work cooperatively and in

partnership with the secretary generals of the councils.

The relationship between the local population, the councils and the central government should be triangular characterized by equality, partnership, cooperation and mutual exchange of resources. Local and central government institutions ought to view themselves as large organisations working principally for the development of the citizens. They should therefore coalesce and cooperatively work together for the mutual benefit of all the citizens. They should therefore be open systems permitting the systematic flow of information to and from the environment so as to enhance their respective accommodative and adaptive capacities. The local population is a large repository of resources from where the council authorities can extract enormous amounts of resources for the effective accomplishment of their respective functions.

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APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC

Dear Respondents,

Asobo Napoleon is a research Student in Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, Nigeria. He is presently conducting a research project on the relationship between the central government and the councils(communes) in Cameroon.

You are thus kindly requested to respond as objectively and as exhaustively as possible to the questions found in this questionnaire. The answers will be treated VERY CONFIDENTIALLY. Therefore, your name is not needed, neither is you signature.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sign

Department of Local Government Studies

(A) General Instructions: Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge or ability. You can just tick where necessary.

(B) Your Personal Background:

(1) Age: Under 30 years_____

30 - 39 years_____

40 - 49 years_____

50 - 59 years_____

60 and above_____

(2) Sex: Male_____

Female_____

(3) Standard of Education(Your highest qualification)

(a) No formal education_____

(b) Primary School_____

(c) Secondary /Technical School_____

(d) Teachers college_____

(e) University/Professional School_____

(4) Occupation: Farmer_____

Trader_____

Worker in the private sector_____

Worker in the Public sector_____

Unemployed_____

(5) Location: (Name it)

Council Area_____

(C) Questions

On Autonomy of the councils.

(1) Are councils as autonomous as the law implies?

Yes_____

No_____

(2) If so, why? _____

On the Functions of the Councils

(3) Do you consider the allocation of functions to your councils by the government as satisfactory? Yes_____

No_____

(4) Do you think councils should be given more functions and the corresponding resources?

Yes_____

No_____

(5) If so, why?_____

_____

On Finances

(6) Through which of these ways, does the general public contribute financially to council programmes?

(a) Levy_____

(b) Taxation_____

(c) Voluntary contributions_____

(d) All of the above_____

(7) Do you think the money contributed is wisely spent by the council authorities?

Yes_____

No_____

(8) If so, why?_____

_____

On Participation As an input

(9) Do you always attend meetings organized by council authorities? Yes_____

No_____

(10) Does the present structure of the council provide enough room for the general public to express their opinions freely?

Yes_____

No_____

(11) Why do you say so?_____

_____

(12) Are public opinions taken seriously by council authorities?

Yes_____

No_____

(13) Why do you say so?_____

_____

(14) How will you want the leadership of the councils to be constituted?

(a) Through elections_____

(b) Through Voting by councillors_____

(c) Through appointment by the central government.

(15) Which of these persons will your council authority prefer to satisfy as a matter of priority?

(a) S.D.O (Prefect)_____

(b) D.O. (Subprefect)_____

(c) The local population_____

(16) How will you rate your own participation in council activities?

(a) Very high_____

High_____

Average_____

Below average____

None at all_____

Participation as an output

What part has your council played in:

(17) The organisation of community development and self-help activities?

Very active_____

Active_____

Average_____

Below average_____

None at all _____

(18) The organization of elections;

Very active_____

Active_____

Average_____

Below average_____

None at all_____

(19) The organisation of public enlightenment Campaigns;

Very active_____

Active_____

Average_____

Below average

None at all_____

What part has your Councillor played:-

(20) The organization of community development and self-help activities?

Very active_____

Active_____

Average_____

Below average_____

None at all_____

(21) The organization of elections

Very active_____

Active_____

Average_____

Below Average_____

None at all_____

(22) The organization of public enlightenment campaigns:

Very active_____

Active_____

Average_____

Below average_____

None at all_____

(23) How will you rate the general performance of your councils in the discharge of their functions?

Very good_____

Good_____

Average_____

Below average_____

Almost zero_____

(24) How will you rate the impact of the council's activities on you life?

Very high_____

High_____

Moderate_____

Below average_____

None at all_____

(25) Any comments and suggestions on how councils can experience political development in Cameroon?_____

_____

_____

_____

The end. Thank you

APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONNAIRE TO COUNCIL WORKERS AND WORKERS IN THE MINISTRY OF TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION(MINAT)

Dear Respondents,

Asobo Napoleon is a research Student in Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, Nigeria. He is presently conducting a research project on the relationship between the central government and the councils(communes) in Cameroon.

You are thus kindly requested to respond as objectively and as exhaustively as possible to the questions found in this questionnaire. The answers will be treated VERY CONFIDENTIALLY. Therefore, your name is not needed, neither is you signature.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sign

Depatment of Local Government Studies

(A) General Instructions: Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge or ability. You could just tick where necessary.

(B) Your Personal Background:

(1) Age: Under 30 years_____

30 - 39 years_____

40 - 49 years_____

50 - 59 years_____

60 and above_____

(2) Sex: Male_____

Female_____

(3) Standard of Education:(Your highest qualification)

Primary School_____

Secondary /Technical School_____

Teachers Training College_____

University/Professional School__

(4) Occupation: Worker in the Council_____

Worker in the Ministry_____

(5) Location: (Name it): Town/City_____

Village_____

(C) QUESTIONS

On the Autonomy of Councils

(1) Are Councils as autonomous as the law implies?

(2) If so,why?_____

_____

On the level of Contact

(3) Do Council authorities have easy contact with centr
government authorities, e.g. S.D.O, D.O. etc?

Yes_____

No_____

(4) Can any major decision e.g.(employment, award of contracts etc) be taken and implemented without the approva. of the central government authorities?

Yes_____

No_____

(5) If so, why?_____

_____

On the Functions of the Councils

(6) Do you think Councils should be allocated more functions and the corresponding resources?

Yes_____

No_____

(7) If so, why?_____

_____

On Finances

(8) How will you rate the amount of control exercised by central government authorities on your council's financial transactions? Very much_____

Much_____

Moderate_____

Little_____

Very little_____

None at all_____

(9) How can this be remedied?_____

_____

On Personnel

(10) Which of the following factors is most dominant in determining recruitment in your Council

Merit_____

Pressure from above_____

Personal connection_____

All of the above_____

(11) To what extent do you consider your council leader as selfless, hardworking and honest?

Very high degree_____

High degree_____

Moderate degree_____

Low degree_____

(12) How will you rate the influence or the control of the Central Government authorities on the Councils?

Very high_____

High_____

Moderate_____

Little_____

Very little_____

(13) Which of these people will the council authorities prefer to serve as a matter of priority?

(a) S.D.O(Prefect)_____

(b) D.O.(Subprefect)_____

(c) The Local Population__

Participation as Output

What part has your council played in:-

(14) The organization of Community development and self-help activities?

Very active_____

Active_____

Moderate_____

Below average_____

None at all_____

(15) (b) The organization of election

Very active_____

Active_____

Moderate_____

Below Average_____

None at all_____

(16) (c) The organisation of Public enlightenment campaigns.

Very active_____

Active_____

Moderate_____

Below average_____

None at all_____

What part has your Councillor played in:-

(17) (a) The organization of community development and self-help activities?

Very active_____

Active_____

Moderate_____

Below average_____

None at all_____

(18) The organisation of elections:

Very active_____

Active_____

Moderate_____

Below average_____

None at all_____

(19) The organisation of Public enlightenment Campaigns.

Very active_____

Active_____

Moderate_____

Below average_____

None at all_____

General

(20) How would you want the council leadership to be constituted?

(a) Through direct election_____

(b) Through voting by Councillors_____

(c) Through appointment by the central government_____

(21) How will you rate the performance of your council?

Very good_____

Good_____

Average_____

Below average_____

None at all_____

(22) How will you rate the impact of your council's activities on your life?

Very much_____

Much_____

Average_____

Below average_____

None at all_____

(23) Any general comments or suggestions on how councils in Cameroon can experience political development?_____

_____

_____

_____

The end. Thank you.

Decree No. 77-91 of 25 March 1977

to determine the supervisory powers over councils, council unions and council establishments.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC,

Mindful of the Constitution of 2 June 1972, as amended by law No. 75-1 of 9 May 1975;

Mindful of Law No. 74-23 of 5 December 1974 organizing councils,

HEREBY DECREES AS FOLLOWS:

PART I

General provisions.

1. (1) Supervisory powers over councils, council unions a council establishments shall be exercised by the Minister of Territori Administration and, under his control by governors and prefec under the conditions laid down by this decree.

(2) Any action taken by governors or prefects in the exercise of their supervisory powers shall therefore be reported immediately to the Minister of Territorial Administration.

2. (1) The supervisory authorities shall be responsible for:

— defining measures necessary for the harmonious development of the councils;

— improving the efficiency and quality of council services;

— promoting the training, further training and retraining of councils staff;

— overseeing the operation of the executive branches of councils.

(2) They shall in addition, have permanent responsibilities for providing assistance and information to councils and council establishments and for co-ordinating and controlling their activities. To this end they shall obtain from municipal admini tors all the information, explanations or reports which they dee ssary

for the performance of their duties. They shall have access to all municipal offices workshops and worksites and to all council establishments.

(3) They shall be empowered to approve, sanction and control decision-making and executive branches and, subject to the conditions laid down by this decree, to approve, annul or reverse any of their acts.

3. In each province or in each division, the provincial local council service or the divisional local council bureau shall be responsible for the technical study of the files relating to the fields of competence of the governor or the prefect, in matters of council supervision.

PART II

Supervision of councils.

CHAPTER I

Supervision of municipal councils.

4. (1) The election of a municipal council shall be recorded by an order of the Minister of Territorial Administration.

(2) In the event of irregularity in the conduct of the poll in a council, the Minister of Territorial Administration may, by virtue of his office, cancel an election within thirty days following the date the election results were announced. In that case, new elections shall be held within three months thereafter.

5. After the ballot, the prefect shall without delay submit any cases of electoral disqualification, disqualification of candidates or disqualification for membership provided for by the law, to be dealt with by the Minister of Territorial Administration who may announce the resignation of the municipal councillors concerned.

6. (1) The prefect shall oversee the application of legal provisions governing the functioning of the municipal council in particular the preparation of the agenda, the quorum, the length of sessions, the regularity of meetings, the keeping of registers and the drawing up of minutes of council proceedings.

(2) He shall be informed of the convening of a council and shall receive its agenda within a period of eight clear days. In emergencies, he may reduce this time limit.

(3) He may request that the council meet in extraordinary session.

7. The prefect or his representative shall access to the meetings of the municipal council. If he speaks, his remarks shall be entered in the minutes. He may neither take part in the voting nor chair the meeting.

8. (1) The meetings of the municipal council shall be chaired by the mayor in the urban councils, and by the municipal administrator in the rural councils.

(2) In the councils subject to the special provisions of Part VI of the law organizing councils, meetings shall be chaired by the chairman of the municipal council. The election of the chairman and the vice-chairman of the municipal council of such councils shall be officially recorded by an order of the Prime Minister.

9. The decisions of the municipal council shall be taken in the form of resolutions numbered serially and entered on their date in a register numbered and initialled by the prefect. The serial numbers shall begin again at the start of each financial year.

10. (1) Within fifteen days following the council's session, the government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator shall send the resolutions of the council, under registered cover with acknowledgment of receipt, to the prefect for approval.

(2) The prefect shall submit without delay for the approval of the governor or the Minister of Territorial Administration, any resolutions on matters concerning which their approval is required.

11. (1) The approval of resolution or the refusal to approve it shall be indicated either by note on the resolution itself or by a letter sent to the municipal authority within this period, the resolution shall be deemed to be approved.

(2) Approval shall render the resolution enforceable.

(3) If approval is refused, the supervisory authority shall be bound to indicate the irregularities found and the means of correcting them.

(4) A decision that has been annulled shall not be enforceable. However, annullation of a refusal to approve shall not constitute approval. In that case, the supervisory authority must re-examine the council resolution with a view to taking a fresh decision on it.

12. Except as provided for by law the supervisory authority shall have no power to take the place of the municipal cou[illegible]

13. (1) Resolutions shall be null and void if taken:

— outside the field of competence of the council;

— outside regular sessions;

— contrary to law or regulations.

(2) This nullity shall be recorded by an order of the Minister of Territorial Administration on his own initiative or after receiving the prefect's report.

14. (1) Resolutions taken after a debate in which municipal council members who are interested parties have taken part either directly or through representatives may be annulled by the Minister of Territorial Administration on his own initiative, or after receiving a report from the prefect, or on the application of a council taxpayer or of any person concerned.

(2) In that case, the annulation shall be pronounced by a ministerial order accompanied by a statement of reasons within two months of the session at which the resolution in question was taken.

(3) The government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator shall register the said application and issue a receipt for it. He shall forward the application to the prefect with his recommendations and the reasons for them.

(4) The annulation order may be appealed against in the administrative court by any interested natural person or corporate body.

15. In case of an injurious or discamatory council resolution likely to affect third parties, those who feel wronged may apply to the prefect to obtain the deletion of the offending passages from the municipal registers. Such appeal shall remain admissible for an indefinite period. The deletion shall be effected on receipt of an order of the prefect.

16. A municipal councillor who, without reasons which the council deems legitimate, has not participated in three successive sessions may, on the recommendation of the council, automatically be declared to have resigned by the Minister of Territorial Administration.

17. (1) Voluntary resignation shall be recorded by an order of the Minister of Territorial Administration and shall take effect one month after its lodging at the district office, at the sub-prefecture or at the prefecture of the area.

(2) Collective resignations shall be inadmissible.

18. A municipal council may be dissolved by decree. In urgent cases and after receiving the prefect's report, the Minister of Territorial Administration may issue an order suspending it for a period not exceeding two months.

19. (1) In the event of dissolution of a municipal council or when the council cannot be constituted, the Minister of Territorial Administration shall, by an order, appoint a special commission of seven members including a chairman and vice-chairman.

(2) The powers of the special commission shall be determined by the act setting it up. The special commission shall cease to exist as from the time the new municipal council is formed.

20. In the event of patent incompetence, serious offence or an offence liable to penal sanction entailing forfeiture, the duties of the chairman or vice-chairman of a municipal council may be terminated under the same conditions as those provided for in Articles 43 and 44 below for the mayor and his deputies.

Chapter II

Supervision of the municipal authorities.

21. (1) The election of a mayor and his deputies shall be recorded by an order of the Prime Minister.

(2) In the event of irregularity in the election of the mayor or the deputies, the Prime Minister may annul such election [illegible] recommendation of the Minister of Territorial Administration [illegible] the application of an elector of the council, within thirty [illegible] the session during which the election was held.

(3) In the event of annulation of the election of the mayor and of his deputies, one of the five eldest councillors appointed by the Prime Minister shall deputize for the mayor until the election of the new mayor which shall take place within thirty days of the act declaring the election null.

22. In the event of the death or resignation of the mayor or of his inability to perform his duties, the deputies in order of precedence shall act as mayor; failing this, one of the five eldest councillors appointed by governor shall act as mayor.

23. The government delegates to urban councils shall be appointed by decree of the President of the Republic. The municipal administrators, their deputies and the deputies of the government delegates shall be appointed by an order of the Prime Minister.

24. The government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator shall be responsible, under the control of the prefect and with the assistance of the competent State bodies, for:

— preparing the council budget and placing it before the council;

— authorizing expenditure;

— administering council revenue;

— directing work;

— taking necessary measures in connection with council roads, lighting, water supply, fire fighting, natural disasters and the straying of domestic animals;

— drawing up annually a schedule of municipal road works; the said schedule shall be submitted for the approval of the prefect when passed by the municipal council;

— placing contracts, signing leases and letting work on tender in correct legal form;

— concluding deeds of sale, exchange, apportionment, acceptance of gifts and legacies, and effecting purchases and transaction on behalf of the council, in correct legal form, when such acts have been authorized in accordance with the statutory and administrative provisions in force;

— conserving and administering the property of the council, and taking all measures of conservation for this purpose;

— administering the council staff and making appointments to council posts, excluding those of the secretary general of the council office the municipal revenue collector and the council storekeeper;

— representating the council at law;

— issuing building permits and applying the relevant regulations;

— in general, executing the decisions of the municipal council and reporting to it thereon.

25. (1) Under the control of the competent administrative authority, the government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator shall through orders, exercise administrative powers to maintain law and order pursuant to the statutory and administrative regulations, with a view to ensuring the maintenance of public peace and hygiene.

(2) Such powers shall in particular relate to:

a) All matters concerning: unencumbered passage on public thoroughfares, cleaning, removal of obstructions, prohibition to place

any articles likely to cause damage to others or to the public on public thoroughfares or public squares or at the windows of buildings, prohibition of any noise which may affect the tranquility of the inhabitants, the occupation, under any form whatsover, of public thoroughfares, in particular by setting up stalls or by private processions;

b) regulations for policing burials and the maintenance of good order and decency in cemeteries.

26. The government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator may delegate part of his powers and duties to his deputies by an order submitted for the prior approval of the prefect, subject to the provisions of Article 90 below.

27. (1) The government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator shall exercise his powers through a municipal order or a decision. For the purpose of control by the prefect, such acts shall immediately be deposited at the district office, at the sub-prefecture or at the prefecture of the area.

(2) A copy shall be sent directly to the Minister of Territorial Administration.

28. Any correspondence from the government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator relating to matters that are subject to supervision must be channelled through the prefect. In urgent cases, a copy shall be sent directly to the addressee.

29. The acts of the government delegate, the mayor or municipal administrator shall become enforceable after being approved by the prefect and after publication by means notices or otherwise, subject to the provisions of Article 70 below.

30. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 29 above, municipal orders relating to temporary regulations shall be immediately enforceable, provided that the supervisory authority may annul them in cases of abuse of power or infringement of statutory or administrative regulations. Individual decisions shall become enforceable only after notification to the person concerned.

(2) Orders relating to permanent regulations shall become enforceable fifteen days following their lodging at the prefecture. The prefect may authorize enforcement within a shorter period.

31. An appeal may be made against the acts of the government delegate, the mayor of the municipal administrator. It shall be addressed to the official concerned and shall be free of charge. If the appeal is not successful, or if the municipal authority fails to

reply within one month, the matter shall be referred to the prefect who shall have two months in which to give his decision. The prefect's failure to reply shall be deemed to be an implicit rejection.

In the case of a dispute claim, proceedings may be instituted as from the date of notification of an explicit rejection or from the date of an implicit rejection.

32. (1) The prefect may annul or suspend any act of the government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator which infringes the statutory and administrative regulations but may not amend the provisions of such act on his own initiative.

(2) The municipal authority concerned may dispute the decision in the form of procedure and within the limits laid down by the regulations. In such cases the appeal to higher authority shall be to the Minister of Territorial Administration.

33. (1) Draft decisions to employ, advance or dismiss council staff shall be subject to prior approval by the prefect who shall examine their correctness, legality and appropriateness. In the event of dispute, the prefect shall refer the matter to the governor whose decision shall be final.

(2) Provided that in the event of dismissal or delay in advancement, the employee concerned shall retain the right to defend his interests in accordance with the labour code governing council staff.

(3) Draft contracts of employment for expatriate staff, supervisory staff and managerial staff, and draft additional clauses and termination notices, shall be submitted to the Minister of Territorial Administration for prior approval.

34. In matters coming under their respective juridictions, the Minister of Territorial Administration, the governor or the prefect may, when appropriate, automatically take the place of the government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator when any one of them refuses, after formal written notice has been served, either to put into effect an act prescribed by the statutory and administrative regulations, or to execute or to have executed a resolution which has become enforceable or a final court ruling.

35. The prefect shall initial the registers of the government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator.

36. (1) The government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator shall ensure the regular updating of the inventory of records, as well as the proper keeping of all the council records.

(2) In cases of negligence jeopardizing the safety of the records, the prefect shall order that all the papers, files and documents of the previous years be deposited at the prefecture.

37. (1) During the handing over of functions, a report shall be drawn up and signed by the outgoing authority and the incoming authority to signify acquittal and assumption of responsibility.

(2) A copy of the said report shall be sent to the prefect and to the Minister of Territorial Administration.

38. (1) Each year, during the meeting for the approval of the administrative accounts, the government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator shall place before the municipal council, the report on the checking of the records which had earlier been drawn up in the presence of the deputies.

(2) If the municipal authority concerned refuses to undertake the check, the prefect may, after serving formal notice, appoint one of his assistants to carry out the check with the assistance of the deputies of the said municipal authority or, failing that, of two municipal councillors.

39. (1) The government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator shall provide any inhabitant of the council area on demand with information concerning the reports on municipal council meetings, the budget or the accounts, or shall allow him to make copies of those documents. Such documents must not be removed.

(2) In case of refusal by the municipal authority concerned, the prefect shall summon him to accede to the demand.

40. (1) The government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator shall be the trustee of the council's title deeds, securities and documents.

(2) In the case of a government delegate, mayor or municipal administrator being personally responsible for the destruction, concealment, abstraction or removal of council documents, registers or acts, or any instruments or effects contained in the records or remitted to him in his official capacity, he shall be required to restore, at his own expense, any such documents that it is possible to replace, without prejudice to any legal proceedings to which he may be liable.

41. Persons acting in contravention of municipal orders shall be liable to the penalities provided for in Section R 369 (10) of the Penal Code.

42. Where the personal interests of the government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator are in conflict with those of the council, the prefect shall appoint as a replacement the deputy or, where appropriate the municipal councillor best fitted to defend the interests of the council.

43. For minor offences, the prefect shall be empowered to inflict a warning or a reprimand of the chairman of the municipal council, the government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator. He shall give reasons for his decision and cite the enactments which have been infringed.

44. Where the offence is clearly of a serious nature or where the municipal authority has previously been penalized, the prefect shall forward the complete file on the investigation to the Minister of Territorial Administration for decision.

45. The mayor and his deputies may be dimissed from office by Presidential decree under the conditions set out in the law concerning councils.

46. (1) In the vent of persistent inertia, obvious inefficiency, serious misconduct or serious and repeated negligence of duties, the mayor and his deputies may, jointly or severally, be dismissed by the municipal council on the direction of the Minister of Territorial Administration.

(2) In urgent cases, the Minister of Territorial Administration may suspend them from their duties. The prefect shall then convene, with thirty days, a meeting of the municipal council to decide on dismissal. Its chairman shall be one of the five eldest municipal councillors chosen by his peers. The decision shall be taken by an absolute majority of the members present.

47. For the offences referred to in Articles 44 and 46 above, the government delegates may be removed from office by decree of the President of the Republic; the municipal administrators, their deputies, and the government delegates' deputies may be so removed by order of the Prime Minister.

Chapter III

Supervision of council finances.

48. Any resolutions that institute new measures affecting the council budget must be submitted for approval to the Minister of Territorial Administration before the said budget is drawn up.

49. (1) The municipal council shall meet to vote the budget in the first half of the month of March each year.

(2) Fifteen days before the council meeting, the budget estimates shall be forwarded to the prefect who has seven days in which to make any remarks. He may call on the government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator to clarify certain points or make certain adjustments in the budget estimates.

(3) The estimates prepared by the government delegate, the mayor or the municipal administrator shall submitted to the municipal council.

50. (1) Any resolutions having a bearing on the council budget vote shall be forwarded by the prefect to the governor for approval. Such approval shall be given not later than 15 June, after the provincial service in charge of councils has reviewed them and the competent provincial finance services have given their visa. The council budget shall take effect from 1 July.

(2) In councils that have a financial controller, the latter shall give his visa to the resolutions bearing on the council budget vote.

(3) Copies of the budget approved by the governor shall be forwarded by him to the Minister of Territorial Administration and to the Minister of Finance.

51. Special revenue and expenditure authorizations shall be voted by the municipal council and approved by the governor. A copy of the relevant resolution shall be forwarded to the Minister of Territorial Administration.

52. (1) Transfers of credits from head to head or from subhead to subhead shall be voted by municipal council and approved by the governor.

(2) Transfer of credits from paragraph to paragraph shall be authorized by municipal order approved by the prefect.

(3) No transfers of credits shall be made from the investment budget to the recurrent budget.

(4) All transfers of credits shall be communicated to the Minister of Territorial Administration.

53. Resolutions to amend the rate of municipal taxes and fees collected by councils, and provisions governing the assessment and