The Politics of Settler/Indigene Conflicts in Benue and Taraba States

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DECLARATION

I here by declare that the work in this Dissertation titled "The Politics of Settler/Indigene Conflicts in Benue and Taraba States" was performed by me in the Department of Political Science under the supervision of Prof. Ejembi Anefu Unobe, Dr. Kayode Omojuwa and Dr. Isma'ila Shehu. The information derived from the literature are duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this work has been presented for another degree.

Akpar Terver Michael

CERTIFICATION

This project/dissertation titled "The Politics of Settler/Indigene Conflicts in Benue and Taraba States |", meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Ph.D Political Science of the Ahmadu Bello University and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

Prof. Unobe, Ejembi Anefu …….. ……..

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Dean, School of Post graduate	Signature	Date

DEDICATION

Dedicated to the homeless and numberless innocent Nigerian victims of the endless cycles of blood- letting and destruction in various part of the country. To you we owe everything, now and forever.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

There is no person who can sincerely hope to chart a course in his life or career all alone in pursuit of such an arduous goal as this programme. Many thanks to the grace of my Maker and Saviour, Jesus Christ, we have finally come through, mission accomplished! The journey has been tough but due to the firm guide and care of my supervisor, Prof. Ejembi Anefu Unobe with his Team, my second reader, Dr. Kayode Omojuwa and Dr.I'smaila Shehu, I have been able sift from the shaky idea I started off with. To my elders, Professors Ayo Rauf Dunmoye, P.P. Izah and the late Sabo Bako, the custodians of perhaps the noblest Profession on earth, I owe it all, now and forever.

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ABSTRACT.

The study, the politics of settler/indigene conflicts in Benue and Taraba States of Nigeria seeks knowledge from primary research to answer to the need to break down the endless cycles of violence across Nigeria, The search for answers to understand of a new dimension of identity conflicts – what does one make of a conflict in both rural and urban settlements about claims to territorial possession on the platform of ethnic identity with the volatility of even ethnic cleansing? To date very little is known about the malignancy of this form of conflict that is extremely violent: pitting kinship ties against citizenship and resonating sometimes with religion and politics. It is for this reasons that the study seeks to explain with primary data the causes of the conflicts, to examine the ideological platforms and the role of politics in settler/indigene conflicts; and to understand the relationship between claims to land, ethnic ideology and politics and how they either cause or escalate the conflicts. In doing these, the study adopted pluralism as a theoretical guide within a political economy approach. Qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis were adopted in a research design meant to complement both aspects of Research. The data collected with triangulation techniques was carefully analyzed and the following findings were arrived at – the conflicts appear to be motivated by issues that polarize around economic opportunities such as land ownership and political power; they strongly suggest a struggle for dominance first between fractions of the same class- namely, richer peasants using ethnic platforms for mobilization on causes that benefit them, and secondly, between a rentier state using power to wrestle control of the means of production from the peasant commodity producers at the marketing stage of production; that in the confrontation between social and cultural pluralism (kinship ties or ethnicity) and social pluralism (citizenship), it is the former that dominates social reality in these conflicts and serves to explain the potency and volatility of the eruptions. In the mutating settler/indigene conflicts, the ruling elites seek hegemony through the use of ethnic ideology anchored to land ownership to dominate the production arena. The study concludes with some candid observations that only genuine democracy and true governance can create conducive conditions that will make such ideological constructions such as settler/indigene platforms less potent.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 General Background to the Study

Nigeria is a plural country with well over 350 ethnic groups.It exhibits serious divisions between the North and the South, the Christian, Muslim and Traditional religions, the urban and rural,the rich and poor. These diversities of the country have in several ways been part of its fractious character. Infact, so fractious is the unity of Nigeria that pessimists have always doubted even the continued existence of the country as a united state.

These fears belie her vast potentials as a state of great promise. It has been noted that some of the most persistent divisions of Nigeria appear to be ethnic, religious and political (Otite; 2002.5, Alubo; 2006.53, Dunmoye; 1998) which it appears, are contradictions arising from material relations of production. This essentially economic character of conflicts in Nigeria shows that purely political conflicts could also at the same time have religious or ethnic connotations. Right from independence in 1960, Nigeria has been plagued by civil disturbances defined by some as contestations over citizen rights and opportunities by ethnic or religious groups who identify and target other groups either for descrimination or forced relocation from a particular terrain with all the violent means at their disposal (Nnoli;2003,Imobighe;2003,Alubo2006).

No part of Nigeria has been spared the vicious scourge of conflict though their prevalence and intensity have not been the same in their occurrence across the length and breadth of the nation. Nigeria's Fourth Republic took off with a vicious clash between the Hausa settlers and the Yoruba indigenes in Shagamu town (Ogun) in 1999. The Ife- Modakeke wars and the OPC face-off with the Nigerian law pre-date the Fourth Republic but are some of the other conflicts in

the South-West which restarted with a fearful ferocity. In the South-East came the Aguleri-Umuleri clashes in Anambra state which also started much earlier but spilled over into the present civilian dispensation.The Odi massacre left in its wake very troubling questions. From the South-south can be noted, the Eleme and Okrika hostilities, the Niger-Delta and MASSOB insurgencies, and the Nembe crisis which left up to 100 people dead in Bayelsa state in July 2002. By no means is this list exhaustive of the plethora of crises in Nigeria. One major character of civil disturbances in Nigeria has been its tendency to be associated with politics of identity which Alubo (2006.6) has described as a process of "othering" and being "othered".

This is a process that defines and separates "we" from "them" in inter-ethnic group relationships. At first this took the form of an alleged Hausa and Fulani hegemony under the cloak of Islamic conversion and the politics of *Northernisation* (Kukah: 2003) in the First Republic in the former Northern Region of Nigeria. This alleged religious character of identity politics itself engendered the fissuring of Northern minority ethnic groups' reaction to domination on the platform of an ethnic- /religious Middle-Belt forum. At the same time, a Yoruba political enclave in the west was being evolved with the formation of a pan- ethnic organization, the *egbe omo oduduwa* and another, the *Ibo state union* **(isu**) in the east.

Identity politics in Nigeria encapsulates a multi-layered nature in the guises of ethnicity, religion, class, or gender and exhibits contestations that appear to be covert platforms for other more serious conflicts such as fights over material resources and opportunities such as land and power (Alubo:2006.6). In recent times one common feature of identity politics in Nigeria has been the cover of "settlers" and "indigenes". These settler/indigene contests have seriously questioned the very basis of Nigerian unity because of their potential to disintegrate the country itself. It has come to dominate what is generally referred to as the national question which touches on claims

to territory and power, marginalisation, citizenship rights, identity loss, a most negative sense of belonging and self-determination in a single integrated Nigeria (Mustapha: 1998; Ikime: 2002; IPCR: 2003; Alubo: 2004).

The problem of settler/indigene conflicts assumes a serious dimension because each ethnic group in Nigeria has an identifiable homeland geographically (Alubo: 2006.5; Otite et al: 1999.21; Abah: 2003).These homelands appear to have been "staked" and "fortified" by the acclaimed "owners" or "sons of the soil" from intrusion by "settlers" who are excluded as "foreigners" This has tended to create a *laager* mentality in Nigerians.

Leading on from the separatist tendencies in the first republic earlier noted, new but the same platforms and territorial enclaves for ethnic mobilization, nationalism and hegemonic interests (Alubo: 2006.6) have arisen. Thus the *Afenifere* pan-Yoruba group is firmly ensconced in the south-west, the *Arewa* Consultative Forum in the North, the *Ohaneze* and *MASSOB* in the South –East, the Niger Delta Forum and the Niger-Delta Peoples Volunteer Force in the oil-rich South-South and the Middle-Belt Forum in the central part of Nigeria (Mair: 2000, Madunagu; 2000; Egwu: 2001; Alubo: 2003, 2006). The impression is veritably of an imminent balkanization of Nigeria into ethnic fiefs. The real problem is this character of conflict that is based on possession of land and appears to have constitutional support in various portions elaborated in various areas in chapter one of the 1999 Nigerian constitution.

The study focuses on identity conflicts in Benue and Taraba states in the Central region of Nigeria which is the home of people classified in its politics as ethnic minorities (Best: 2004. 8). This region of Nigeria has in recent times witnessed settler/indigene conflicts with such ferocity and volatility on a scale never seen before. Former minority comrades previously united against alleged Hausa and Fulani domination in the old Northern region have turned on each

other in orgies of violence that have devastated the entire area.This is why we have to focus directly on the problem in this particular area of Nigeria

However, attempts at focusing directly on settler/indigene conflicts are a relatively recent interest and even then, the major attraction has been more in their ethnic configuration. Meanwhile, we are confronted with a Nigerian state whose character and role in citizen definition and human rights protection is distinctively dubious. A society in which inter-group relations is highly fractious and violence-prone. Nigeria is also plagued with persistent conflict based on an ideology of territoriality and ethnicity that far too often takes the platform of settler/indigene contests.

The theoretical landscape has several problems of its own. The study of identity conflicts suffers generally from reductionism. Modernisation theory sees ethnic problems in Africa as the transition processes of the 'modernity' objectives of new nation-states; Dependency paradigms are preoccupied with the 'external constraints' of satellite state formations and Neo-Marxists with the 'false consciousnesses of Class identity ideologies. Pluralism mainly focuses on the 'integrative needs' of the nation-state.

Settler/indigene conflicts are based on possession of land and are partly explained by the theory of Territorial imperative which however does not account for the historical and political context of the problem in Nigeria. There appears to be a growing disconnect between the knowledge gathered from the theoretical landscape so far and understanding of the empirical problem on the ground.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The more recent studies of ethnic identity conflicts in Nigeria have examined contemporary forms of ethnic conflict in the urban setting in both colonial and post-colonial

African societies.Other studies have noted the development of a rural variant of ethnic conflict based on claims to land especially in Benue and Taraba states from the Central part of Nigeria. Other efforts have observed processes of continued social segmentation and fragmentation that at the time, appears to lead to exclusion and impeded access of groups to land and full citizen identity especially in Northern Nigeria.

This has not only questioned extant identities but also increased identity formation and boundary redefinition. This also appears to have given vent to conflicts and issues of citizenship status, a negative sense of belonging and a host of problems sometimes referred to as the National Question. It is quite evident that at the moment settler/indigene conflicts unlike ethnicity before show a highly mutant character. It continues to resonate sometimes with territorial possession (Taraba), sometimes with religion (Jos- North), sometimes with politics (Nasarawa-Toto) and it seems connected in some way with class. It is also important to observe that settler/indigene forms of identity conflict resonate with a distinct recurring ethnic variable anchored to land rights. This form has witnessed a steady virulence and persistence that is yet to be adequately explained.

They also appear to be conceptually distinct in character from mere ethnic conflict. On the ground, they have surpassed the latter in volatility and scale. Evidence from Nasarawa -Toto, Jos-North, Southern Kaduna State, and Southern Nasarawa State indicates that settler/indigene conflicts can involve several ethnic groups in tactical alliances against those targeted. It is thus because of these problems that we are motivated to search in more directions for empirical evidence that could help to explain the violent settler/indigene eruptions especially in Benue and Taraba states.

The study also wants to explain how an overt clash between rights to land combined with kinship ties against citizenship could help explain settler/indigene conflicts. It is quite apparent that kinship ties (which so far appear to oil the conflicts), are far stronger than any other ideological fronts and secular platforms (such as citizenship) at the moment. What does one make of a conflict in both rural and urban settlements about claims to land ownership with ethnic identities as fronts and with such volatility?

The use of such theories as the territorial imperative and pluralism provide some useful guide. They however do not yet fully account for the multi-dimensional character of the conflicts. How are settler/indigene conflicts motivated by land ownership claims under the cover of ethnic identity related to politics and the production system? To date, several studies have described the features using a plethora of theories but with far too little empirical data to explain these problems. To what extent does politics play a role in either cause or escalation of the conflicts and why?

1.3 Research Questions

The study seeks to probe the problem through the following research questions:

- How and why is land ownership tied to kinship ties responsible for settler/indigene conflicts in Benue and Taraba states?
- How do land ownership/use, politics and production relations factor in the cause and escalation of settler/indigene conflicts in Benue and Taraba states?
- What is responsible for the present malignancy of settler/indigene conflicts and the divide between the theoretical concepts vying for their explanation and the problem on the ground?

- Why are the settler/indigene conflict phenomena so severe in Nigeria and in other parts of Africa?
- What lessons can be derived from similar experiences elsewhere?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The study hopes to attain the following goals:

i. To explain through primary data, the material root causes of settler/indigene conflicts in Benue and Taraba states.

ii. To examine the ideological platforms and purposes, and the role of politics in settler/indigene conflicts.

iii. To explore the gaps in available research knowledge of the problem in other parts of Africa and seek explanation for the persistence of settler/indigene conflicts in Benue and Taraba states.

iv. To examine the relationship between land rights, kinship ideology, politics and how these cause and escalate settler/indigene conflicts.

1.5 Research Propositions

The research is premised on the following propositions;

i. Land and politics are motivating sources of settler/indigene conflicts in Benue and Taraba states of Nigeria .

ii. The clash of Citizenship and ethnic perceptions escalates violent settler/indigene contestations in Benue and Taraba states of Nigeria.

iii. Settler/indigene conflicts are identity indicators of class domination.

1.6 Scope and Delimitation of the Study.

The study will cover conflict areas in Benue and Taraba states of Nigeria involving settlers and indigenes. This will also include such conflict in both urban and rural areas. Time and material resources are major constraining factors given the large size of the study area. The study will also involve some form of research assistance which might pose challenges in the data collection phase of the work to be done.

1.7 Significance and Justification for the Study.

While a lot of efforts have gone into documenting the imprint of colonial rule on the demography and economy of Africa societies, very little has been done in the area of their inter-ethnic relations. Several scholars such as Rodney (1972), Ake (1980), and Nnoli (1980) have noted the disarticulated character of African economics as a result of manipulative colonial policies. Unfortunately, far too little effort has been seen until very recently in dealing with the quite debilitating effect of colonial rule on the social relations of African societies in the last hundred years (Akinwunmi ed., 2006, Odey ed.2007). These perhaps accounts for the weaknesses of concepts vying for explanation of persistent ethnic-prone conflict in Africa. Many concepts have ignored this essential character of the social conditions of Africa. The study is therefore, needed to fill in this critical gap.

The study encompasses more than just the characteristics of identity conflict in an area that provides a distinctive sample of a new form of conflict-the persistent problem of violent confrontation between alledged “settlers” and acclaimed “indigenes” particularly in Benue and Taraba states. It provides a very critical link between the theoretical concepts and empirical problem of this form of conflict by providing primary data from the field. The work is also significant in examining the situational and mutative character of identity conflict which has

not been adequately accounted for in many areas. It therefore provides a basic step from which to explore further other important aspects of the conflicts such as the class basis of identity platforms. It is for example meaningful to undertake a close examination of the clash of the modes of production thesis in explaining ethnic identity conflict in the central part of Nigeria.

Apart from the terrible toll in human and material resources so far, it is quite obvious that identity contestations if not managed would some day demand the very soul of the Nigerian nation. The logical option is to start by a thorough study which alone can avail a proper and meaningful understanding of cause and effect in a dynamic and dangerous phenomenon that presently threatens the very existence of Nigeria (Alubo;2006).The study of settler/indigene conflicts in this part of the country provides a rare sample to achieve this objective.

The threat of settler/indigene conflicts is even more unsettling because it has been noted to be related to a constitutional recognition of indigeneity in the Nigerian definition of citizenship (section 147.3 of the 1999 constitution) as earlier mentioned. How then can non-inclusive membership of a country as shown in the demands of say the *jasawa* of Jos-North Local Government Area of Plateau state and the Tiv of Taraba and Nasarawa states guarantee patriotic citizenry which is free and able to contribute to a fully integrated society?. The very quality of Nigerian citizenship is challenged by settler/indigene confrontations and questions the character of the state that offers quite obviously unequal privileges of such membership. For as Dunmoye (Sept. 2005) observes, *Nativity or indigeneity provide social and political privileges, while settler status disempowers*. To date, several attempts (Nnoli; 1978, 1989, 1998; Alubo; 2006, Otite; 2002) have mostly identified and described the ethnic and territorial character of this form of identity conflict. The study will therefore avail more understanding of this problem

particularly in Benue and Taraba states with perhaps the highest frequency of identity conflicts in Nigeria.

We are also interested in undertaking in the study of settler/indigene conflicts in Benue and Taraba states a better understanding of the politics and role of class divisions in the production arena in Nigeria. It is intended to see for instance, how land and other socio-economic opportunities feature in the identity conflicts. A position partially explored by Egwu (Nnoli; ed.1998) in which he however focuses mainly on the agrarian basis of the problem. We could therefore move farther and be able to show the real benefactors of these conflicts. Several case studies in Taraba, Nasarawa, Plateau and Benue states provide the opportunity to acquire more knowledge from field data which would no doubt move research forward in this area of interest.The intended knowledge from the study should also avail policy more intimacy and relevance in addressing a problem that has wrecked untold havoc in other societies in Africa.

Then the sheer persistence and volatility of these conflicts in the area of study makes for compelling interest. Analysts have noted the much higher frequency of identity conflicts in the central part of Nigeria than in any other particular region (Alubo: 2006.2, Imobighe: 2003.14, IPCR 2003). These two states straddle the far north and the south of Nigeria. Certainly the diverse plurality of Nigeria lies in this region and most importantly in its being the vital link in a vast country whose major strength perhaps lies in its sheer diversity which in these conflicts is under a serious threat.

1.8 Operational definition of concepts.

Indigene:

This is a Nigerian native of a particular area by lineal descent, birth, longest resident or first to settle in an area. Refers to ownership and is supported by section 14 (3) and 147 (3),

chapter two section 15 (3) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The common expression of this is “son of the soil”.

Settler:

This refers to a Nigerian resident of an area to which he/she does not belong. Being born or time spent in an area does not necessarily qualify one for nativity. If you cannot trace your lineal descent to a group that is culturally and historically endogenous to an area, you cannot qualify as a native of the place.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The Literature review examines key concepts in the study such as Conflict, settler/indigene Conflicts, the National question, Majority-Minority derivatives that help to explain the phenomenon under study. The chapter also explores key relevant themes to see the linkages that could provide more information on the causes, escalating triggers of the conflicts. These are: the matrix of conflict and change, an anatomy of social conflicts in Nigeria, Ethnic conflict, Modes of production, and the Environmental conflict theory.The chapter also adopts Conflict theory as a theoretical guide and justifies this within the context of its limitations.

2.2 Conflict.

Conflict like cooperation, is an integral part of social existence and social progress (Nnoli; 1998.6). Conflict is defined by differences in interests, ideas, ideologies, orientations, perceptions, tendencies, age, sex, religion, parentage, and ethnicity, race, etc. (Dunmoye; 1998, Nnoli ed; 1998, Otite ed; 1999). This can be found at all levels of social life; individual, group, institution and nation just as it exists at inter-personal, inter-group, inter-institutional and international levels. In fact so ingrained is conflict to existence that some writers such as Thomas Hobbes and Karl Marx have held that it is inherent in human nature and in particular political systems.

Conflict is seen by Coser (1956.8) as “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals.” This is perhaps why Otite (1999.1) sees it as the pursuit of “divergent interests, goals and aspirations by individuals and/or groups in defining social and physical environments.

According to Deutsch (1973.156) it is to be found "when ever incompatible activities occur." Park and Burgess (1921.574) see it as being designed to resolve "divergent dualism (and achieve) some kind of unity even if it be through the annihilation of one of the conflict partners."

At a broad conceptual level, this definition of conflict and change could enable us to get a glimpse of the problems at hand in the study. Various scholars have used different words to describe this particular phase and form of conflict. John Burton (1984) has called it "… deep-rooted conflict" while Lious Kriesberg, Northrup and Thorson (1989) refer to it as "intractable conflict". Azar (1991) prefers to call it "protracted social conflict".

Scholars have tried to explain conflict by situating it at the level and scale of violence. Robert Wolff defines violence as "the illegitimate or unauthorized used of force to effect decisions against the will or desires of others" (1969.606). Robert Audi (Shaffer ed., 1971.72) agrees with this view by seeing violence as the unjustified use of force. However, problems arise from these definitions which describe certain forms of violence as illegitimate or unjustified. What is violence used in the garb of authority wielded by the state against the will or desire of its citizens? In certain instances, a lot of the violence is state-sponsored and used by groups formed, funded and controlled by politicians in the corridors of power. Is state terrorism then justifiable?

Other scholars have tried to shift focus due to problems arising from these descriptions of violence. Thus Karl Schmitt (Lenden et al, 1968.3) sees it in terms of violence particularly political violence representing a disturbance to the political equilibrium of a state, a breakdown of its political system. In a similar vein, Gurr (1970.1) believes that violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors, including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies. A. H. Nieburg (1963.64) has

observed that "no system can hope to survive unless it can live with and adjust itself to the multidinous threat of violence which is the basis of social change". These views see violence as a regulatory mechanism and are state-centered in focus. Although a covert state involvement in the conflicts is not unusual, these conflicts involve mainly ethnic groups within a territorial space with their disparate claims, motives and other overlapping identities that are essentially non-state actors. Furthermore, these conflicts are escalated and managed within post-colonial plural societies confronting as it were, the divisive issues of their colonial history.

The major problem of these perspectives and others such as Sigmund Freud's frustration-aggression theory (1959) and Gurr's relative- deprivation thesis (1970) is that there appears to be a general emphasis on the status quo and threats against it.Such lobsided focus from the matrix of conflict and change perspective, limits our explanatory potential to understand the problem.They however provide the concepts for us to have a meaningful understanding of settler/indigene identity conflicts. Conflicts with settler/indigene identities appear to be features of plural societies which have fractured or where the laid down mechanism for dealing with such pluralism has failed or is in the process of failing (Babawale, ed. 2003.16).

It is the view of the social conflict perspective that a universal form of social interaction in which groups are naturally in conflict in their overlapping goals and purposes with mutual encroachment is the norm and also tends to be competitive (Vold, 1958). According to Anugwom (Ikejiani Clark ed 2009:37), "therefore, the competitive achievement oriented nature of modern society makes social conflict part and parcel of the dynamic of society".

It is therefore the view of the social conflict perspective that society rests essentially on a mixture of reasonable consensus (which explains progress or growth) and endless conflict (which explains change and progress). The social conflict theory thinks that other theories tend to

overlook conflict as necessary ingredient in explaining change in society. Change is in this view, a crucial element in explaining progress or growth which is hardly possible if people do not challenge the status quo (which is the basic fact of conflict).

The logic of the social conflict casts the picture of a society in a constant state of friction or struggle between different groups. In the view of this perspective, social behavior shows continuous tension between various competing groups. This tension does not necessarily need to be violent and can be in the form of labour union demands and negotiation, Party squabbles, struggle for membership between religious groups, disputes over budgetary issues (Schaefer and Lamm, 1995:19). In view of this perspective, social life consists of conflict which manifests in various forms expressed in several divergent ways. In the conflict perspective, conflict arises from the process of interaction between individuals and groups. It's causes and possible solutions are to be found within what Anugwom calls "the normative structure of a given society" (Ikejiani – Clark ed, 2009:38). The possible sources of conflict may be access to valuable and scarce resources which may be political, economic and social. It may also arise from major differences in opinion, beliefs and prejudice and discriminations.

So just like other theories such as pluralism, structural functionalism, systems, social conflict theories seek to understand and to explain social conflict in human society. They also seek to interpret concrete problems in human society by saying that conflict is a fundamental aspect of social life. What it means is that conflict can never be completely removed. The exception to this viewpoint is the Marxist conflict framework which predicts a resolution of conflict in the production of an egalitarian social order by the elimination of social classes. It predicts the emergence of a consensus in a classless society. To social conflict theories, even

consensus is a contrived reality arrived at by the coercion of the weak through formal agencies of social control using rules established by those in power or with power.

Social conflict theory emphasizes the ubiquity of conflict stressing the temporary state of consensus which can never be permanently sustained. (Jary and Jary, 2007). The idea of consensus is an idyllic illusion fostered on society by the powerful using social institutions that ensure compliance, reduce deviance and make possible control. To social conflict theorists, change is an inevitable feature of the social order. There are however, differences in the conception of the envisaged change and the manner of the change.There is however a basic agreement on the assumption that the way to development or progress is only through change. Social conflict theory sees through the web of complexity of human society, a three way matrix of change in the following manner.

Fig.1: A matrix of social conflict and change



Source: Edlyne E Anugwom, in Theories of Social Conflict in Maria Ikejiani Clark (ed.2007).

Theories are by their nature connected with practice or research. Both research and theory have a symbiotic relationship. Thus, while the whole process of social research makes it possible for social scientists to validate or to test existing theories, new theories are also formulated from the findings or research (Merton, 1968). Just as in physical or natural science, social or behavioural sciences have the task of understanding, explaining and predicting the social world. Given the task to understand and explain the problem in the study, we are inclined, given the position of the literature review to accept that social conflict theories are essentially

based on the rejection of the consensus model. This is a model hat sees the social world as inherently stable. Examples of these are the functionalists or system theorists.

Empirically,several examples of identity contestations can be cited to illustrate this point. We can cite similar examples elsewhere such as the racist identities of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and the Black Panthers in the USA, the Nazis in Germany, the Fascists of Italy; the religious identities of the Catholic IRA in Northern Ireland, Hezbollah in Lebanon; the ethnic identities of the Kurds in Turkey,Iraq and Syria; the Basque ethnic separatists of Spain, etc.In Africa, ethnic identity platforms appear to be more endemic and persisting.Virtually all African societies in states such as Ethiopia,Burundi,Rwanda,Congo DR,Ghana,Liberia,Cote d'ivoir,Nigeria have been wracked by ethnic conflict at several periods. In many ways, identity conflict suggests far deeper causes embedded in the fabric of the societies in which they arise.

In Nigeria such conflicts have been traced to what has been called the National Question. This refers to a combination of several issues such as marginalization of nationalities, denial of rights, self-determination and corruption in the practice of politics. To use the general perspectives of conflict in explanation of settler/indigene conflicts appears to be stretching the viability of the theoretical models and is far from adequate. In fact they fail to address the structural causes of the conflicts within the polity and the social conditions that give rise to them.Conflict theories it appears, are more meaningful in describing the mechanical appearance and operations of violent identity contestations. In the case of settler/indigene conflicts in Nigeria, Conflict theory models look like some generalized,quick-fix, symptom/ remedy profile or tool kit for a far deeper social malaise.In Nigeria, the structural faultlines of the problem of settler/indigene conflicts appear to lie deep within the context of what is generally referred to as the national question.

2.2.1 An Anatomy of Social Conflicts in Nigeria

A fairly extensive literature on social conflicts in Nigeria is now available by several writers. In this section, we examine and take a cursory look at the typology of these conflicts with a view to locating settler/indigene conflicts that have in recent times taken a firm bit most negative hold on the social-political landscape of Nigeria. We begin by first sketching what Otite et al (1999:18) describes as "The Nigerian context as a social system". Here the authors examine the historical origins of Nigeria as a country rooted in her colonial creation by the British imperialists spanning over seventy years (1897 to 1960). Though not explicitly stated, they outline what some writers have alluded to the artificial character of the Nigerian federation. This brought together various pre-colonial entities that encapsulate the sheer diversity of the Federal union with ethnic groups each dominant in defined geographical boundaries.

Contaminant with the above characteristics, have also emerged certain significant spatial social entities such as the three main religions – Christianity mainly in the south and Middle-Belt; Islam mainly in the North and traditional religion in about every part of the country. This is besides the sheer diversity of the reported 350 ethnics groups.These straddle the complexity of individual groups of both formal and informal settings which spawn diverse cultural symbols, strategic social institutions. The vegetations, ecologies, economics and occupations cut the picture of a complex and thoroughly diversified country loaded into Nigeria's 923,768 square kilometer boundary from the Atlantic Coast in the South to the Sahara desert in the North.

On top of these characteristics are differences in educational, social and administrative experiences of the North and the South. Put in the shade of Nigeria's military experience, the authors note the peculiarity of the politics particularly in the concept of "statism" that has created exclusive interests of regionalism and segregation. Writing in the same vein, Dunmoye (2005)

also explores in fair detail, the Political Economy of Contemporary Nigeria. These span the historical evolution of the country from pre-colonial to colonial times, the allocation of scarce resources through formal and informal ways; the character and direction of public policy making and implementation; the issue of ethno-religious conflicts; the military experience in politics, the democratic project; the character of the Nigerian state; the problem of corruption and prebendal cleavages; the nature of resources allocation. These facts are quite illuminative and as Otite notes, are indicative of the conflict-prone character of Nigeria.

Dunmoye (2005:7) provides three identifiable forms of social conflict in Nigeria. These are inter-communal and intra-communal conflicts and a national conflict. The first types he explains are those that occur between two or more communities. These are:

ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, boundary disputes, political conflicts disputes over farmlands and grazing areas.The intra-communal conflicts are listed as chieftaincy crisis especially succession; religious crisis, political representation, the Native/Settler syndrome and land issues.

Table 1: A profile of types of communal conflicts in Nigeria

Inter-communal		Intra-communal	
(i)	Ethnic conflicts	(i)	Chieftaincy crisis (succession disputes)
(ii)	Religious conflicts	(ii)	Religious conflicts (sectarian)
(iii)	Boundary disputes	(iii)	Political representation
(iv)	Political disputes	(iv)	Land issues-inheritance & transfer of ownership
		(v)	Natives versuses settlers

Source: Dunmoye, R. A. 1998

The same kind of scheme for categorizing social conflicts in Nigeria by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution titled "strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria – consolidated Zonal Reports, (2008 second ed: 8). These are listed under such headings as History, Geographical Spread and categorization of conflict; the importance of prebendal politics.

The sheer size and detailed information in the categorization of social conflicts given by these three sources of literature provide a vivid roadmap of the character and social background of conflicts in Nigeria. They avail a fairly basic sketch of the causative factors of conflicts themselves.A panoramic view of these can be outlined.

Aside from the typology of the social conflicts in Nigeria, we can also explore the literature on their causes. Several probable factors are listed here. Otite et al (1999:19) lists seven of these as: the problem of landscape and resources available within there; boundary issues touching on claims of natives and those tagged as settlers. This is the one that the study explores in Benue and Taraba States. There is problem of a clash between farmers and pastoralists, fishermen and acclaimed pond owners, foresters and timber loggers.

The second reason given by Otite is the problem of disputed jurisdiction between traditional rulers.The other is listed as the creation of local government areas and their headquarters.The fourth is ethnicity with its sectarian fragmentation.The fifth is given as micro and macro factors with cultural and value preferences.The sixth is the demographic problem of

population explosion and conflict amidst dwindling resources. The last is given as the non-recognition and desecration of cultural symbols.

The probable reasons for the conflicts are informative but provide us with too generalized a picture for us to have an informed, analytical fact- based blueprint of the settler/indigene conflict in the chosen study area. For one thing, we can neither explain nor predict the malignancy and sheer persistence of settler/indigene conflicts.For these reasons therefore, an informed resolution of the problem appears elusive. This is why we have to dig deeper into the conflict landscape to unravel evidence for the persistence of the settler/indigene problem particularly in the study area.These reasons provide us with only clue patterns. They do not exactly give us a clear- cut indication of the primary and secondly actors in the conflicts. We cannot also see the intimate dynamics of the conflict situation.

By far, the strategic conflict Assessment of Nigeria by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) goes deeper in analyzing the social reality of settler/indigene conflicts.They point out the structural causes of conflict along such lines as security, political, economic and social. Like Dunmoye (2005) the analysis is done at the levels of international/regional, National, State, and local. Only perhaps the last three issues are directly relevant to the study here. The first two are only marginal.

Some of the issues listed in the Assessment as the Security-related manifestations of conflict as, proliferation of Small Arms, Inefficiency and Corruption of law enforcement agents, Vigilant Groups, Foreign Mercenaries and International tension and the subordination of All and Sundry to Civil Authority.

The Assessment also looks at political conflicts as the political manifestations. Also included here are succession and Dethronement conflicts, manipulation of political and Electoral

Outcomes and Territorial Disputes. All these are also relevant to the study. The Assessment Report lists Economic Manifestation of the conflicts at the general level. It goes on to look at Poverty, Unemployment and Inequality; Resources Competition (dividing the benefits from oil) and access to land.

These issues touch directly on the settler/indigene conflicts in Benue and Taraba States providing a vivid picture of the structural causes. On the social manifestations of conflict, the Report lists Ethnic and Communal Conflicts, religious conflicts, Unemployment Youth, Women ,Breakdown of social values, psycho-cultural dispositions, Vulnerable Groups.The Assessment Report is really comprehensive and also takes a direct look at the conflict trends in Benue State.Here it examines such issues as resource conflict, Farmers-Pastoralists Conflicts, boundary conflicts with other states – intra-Tiv conflict, Chieftaincy Disputes, Political conflicts.

The IPCR Assessment Report also takes stock of the conflicts in Taraba state (p. 98). It lists the major violent conflicts as follows: Tiv-Jukun citing mutual distrust between both groups, clashes over land, fears of marginalization especially by the Tiv, widespread poverty, unemployment of youths as a ready recruitment resource and the availability of small arms and light weapons.

Also listed in the same Assessment Report (p. 99) are the Kuteb-Chamba-Jukun conflict, the Mambilla-Fulani conflict and the structural and proximate causes. The Report is instructive though not exhaustive mainly because it is a nation-wide study.The specific details of the historical antecedents, demographic factors are therefore lightly treated.The gaps noted in the IPRC Assessment Reports are the details in the conflict situation giving a chronological chart of cause and effect in conflict cases. Notice that though most informative, the Report treats Benue and Taraba States separatetly.The reasons for the study of settle/indigene conflicts involving

both states lies in the fact that besides the ethnic factor which is very apparent, many other problems are glossed over lightly. This is why this study, the politics of settler/indigene conflicts in Benue andTaraba states is significant.

Besides, as noted earlier, settler/indigene conflicts have apparently surpassed mere ethnicity. It is intended to look at the sufficiency of otherwise of the concepts examined to avoid a proper understanding of settler/indigene conflicts as a distinct phenomenon. Their malignancy, volatility, scale and persistence seems to suggest far more omimous inplications than are presenty treated in the generalized approachs adopted so far. The study is a micro analysis of settler/indigene conflicts using a rich and tidy sample.

2.3 The Historical and Political Context of the Settler/Indigene politics and Conflicts

Attempts at documenting the imprint of colonial history have been disproportionately skewed towards economic and political analysis. Far too little has been had of social analysis and even less of the inter-ethnic relations of the diverse nationalities that colonial regimes came to cobble together into nation-states in Africa (Rodney, 1972, Ake 1981, Amin, 1974, Emmanuel 1972, Nkrumah, 1965). This is perhaps the significance of Yusufu Turaki's book, 'The British Society Legacy in Nigeria: A Social Ethnical Analysis of the Colonial and Post-Colonial Society and Politics in Nigeria' (1993). In eight chapters, the author defines key and critical groups in the colonial history of northern Nigeria; describes the evolution of inter-ethnic relations under colonial policies, charts the development of ethnic and political consciousness; details a social-ethnic analysis of the colonial legacy and its continuity into post-colonial society.

Turaki describes and analyzes the policies and attitudes of the colonial administration towards both Muslims and Non-Muslim Groups which institutionalized their status and socio-political role in the colonial hierarchical structure of the Northern region of Nigeria. It also

describes the socio-political consequences of this institutionalization in the pattern of relationships between Muslims and Non- Muslim Groups in Nigerian politics.

Turaki's work is referenced with similar works by various authors and scholars on the colonial creation of a differential socio-cultural ethos between Muslim and Non-Muslim groups in northern Nigeria. Some of these are worthy of a brief mention as they are directly to an understanding of the history of "Settlers" and "indigenes" in the middle belt.

Tseayo (1975) examines the structure of authority relations between the Tiv Non-Muslim group and the Government of northern Nigeria. He looks at the pattern of dominance of the Hausa-Fulani and the inferior status of the Tiv in the Northern system. The reaction of the Tiv to their "pagan" status is the source of conflict. This work is credited with providing a direct casuse of the Tiv-Jukun conflict because in the Northern colonial system, the Jukun were seen as belonging to a higher classification of ethnic-religious structure than the Tiv.

Also included in Turaki's book if a brief sketch toward's study which focuses on the colonial ideological justification of differential treatment of ethnic groups based upon racial and cultural differences. It describes the rationale of the colonial placement or sub-ordination of the Non-Muslim Group's as "inferior" "races to the" "ruling castes" especially the Hausa-Fulani. In this colonial scheme, the Tiv were classified as "inferior" and the Aku Uka was placed as part of "the ruling caste" Here in lie the seeds of conflicts for the Tiv cosmological structure challenged even the white man himself not talk of his colonial surrogates.

The book also records the account of M. G. Smith who in an article analysed the impact of colonial rule and Christian missions on the Kagoro in sourthern Zaria. Whereas colonial policy sought to institutionalize the inferior status and role of the non-Muslim groups such as the

Kagoro, the Christian mission had the impact of developing Kagoro resistance against Hausa-Fulani influence and dominance. This account no doubt provides a rare glimpse into the nexus between socio-political contexts of competing identities in the middle-Belt. One such identity is that of "Settlers" and "indigenes" "that presently provides platforms for conflicts.

A similar account of the paradoxical missionary impact in developing resistance to the Northern colonial system is that by Jan Harm Boer. The work focuses on colonial and Missionary policies, goals and objectives. A similar study is that by Eugene Rubingh (1969) on the Tiv.

Another important source material is that by J.A. Ballard. This work deals strictly with colonial administrative policies towards the Non-Muslim Groups in general. It describes the implementation of these policies and how they affect the political development of the Non-Muslim groups. It focuses on the application of the "Emirate" or "Pagan" administration in the Non- Muslim groups.

One other important work cited by Turaki is Okpu's (1977) Ethnic minority problems in Nigerian politics. It analyzes minority politics and may be classified with Hembe's book on J.S Tarka.

Turaki's study is detailed in the examination of the actors, the philosophies, objectives and practices of colonial policies that provide understanding of settler/indigene conflicts in the middle-best region. His definition of such colonial social-political entities as Non-Muslim Groups (NMG) is very useful. This refers to the use in colonial times to describe those ethnic groups who were non-Muslim. It conveys the colonial emphasis on social differentiation and stratification of Muslim and non-Muslim groups.

The Muslim Groups refers to the Hausa-Fulani who were more or less consolidated from the Islamic Jihad of 1804. It also includes all other Islamized and integrated groups. Thise refers to all those who came under the sway of Islamic law, practices, values, philosophy which provided the fundamental basis for the social and political structure of the Sokoto caliphate. Thus the Muslims Groups were considered to be superior to the NMG. The Fulani as a Caste sat atop of a pyramidal structure which had at it's base such structures as "pagans", "Primitive tribes", "native" rulers. The prominent Groups that enjoyed colonial advantage and privilege and played pivotal roles in the administration were the Hausa-Fulani, the Kanuri, the Nupe the Muslim Yoruba of Ilorin and Jukun within the middle-belt region of Nigeria.

Turaki's work is rich in providing a solid historical background in the ethnic relations grounded in the crucible of the colonial policies which have spawned the identities and consciousness that today use the platform of such conflicts as we see in "settlers" Vs "indigenes". It however does not give us a direct escalatory trajectory of events, issues and politics that have created the polarizing identity platforms and consciousness. It is however very illuminating and compulsory for any factual analysis of settler/indigene conflicts in the middle-belt region.

2.4 The Character and Evolution of Settler/indigene Conflicts in Nigeria.

The problem of settler/indigene conflicts is a fairly recent phenomenon in Nigerian politics but its roots lie deep in the history of the country in the colonial period. The words "settlers" (or non-indigenes), "indigenes" have become meaningful and relevant in relatively recent times in the politics of Nigeria. According to Hembe (Alli,ed.2005.101), "indigene" … is merely an ingeniously invented word used in Nigeria to define natives of a particular place as distinct from other citizens of Nigeria found in that locality." It is an identity platform used to

target and discriminate against fellow Nigerian citizens. In most cases, it rests squarely on an ethnic definition of the parties in the conflict and on land. The conflict involves a competition for access to resources between those that consider themselves "indigenes" and those that are regarded as more recent "settlers" (World Organization Against Torture 2002.133, Egwu 2002, Alubo 2003).

In the Nigerian practice, "indigene" refers to descent and not place of birth. This means that any citizen born outside the native home of his/her ethnic group is regarded as a "settler" with no provision for becoming an "indigene" (Mamdani, 2000; Williams, 2002. 101; Ewa, 2002. 77). The definition is graphically described by Alubo (2003. 56) in saying that "… to be born and have an entire working life in a State, other than that to which one traces one's ancestry, does not qualify one as an indigene of that state …" the practice of indigeneity is based on lineage. This practice is replicated in all areas of social interaction such as in employment especially in the civil service and Federal Institutions where senior positions are reserved for indigenes, in schools where children of non-indigenes pay higher fees, certificates of origin pave way for full opportunities for the "sons of the soil" in areas such as scholarships (Ekeh and Osaghae 1989).

This "nativisation" of citizenship ironically finds full support in various sections of the Nigerian Constitution (1999). These are to be found in Sect. 25 a, b, c, (the so-called grand parents clauses) which define the criteria for citizenship. The complication arises in Section 14, Sub-section 3 which enshrines the Federal Character Principles. This states that:

The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character…"

This also gives support for the quota system, a policy which gives priority to some states in employment, admission into Federal Institutions etc. (FGN, 2003. 128). The problem of the Federal character principle in reinforcing the settler/indigene conflict is clearly shown in the provision (Abasi ed, 2003. 9, Momoh 2002) for the appointment of Minister. Section147. 3 explicitly states that "provided that in giving effect to the aforesaid, the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each state, who shall be an indigene of such state." Yet the same constitution waxes stronger in its ambivalence in stating that, "For the purpose of promoting national integration, it shall be the duty of the state to; "a, b, c," (p.61). The contradiction is amplified in failing to address the residency rights of citizens in areas outside their places of origin (Sect. 15 (3) b of the 1999 Const.) or of women married to foreigners or men whose spouses are of foreign origin.

The Nigerian Constitution is a parody of full citizenship in prescribing what in practice amounts to two forms of mutually exclusive criteria that practically disempowers certain categories of citizens. Those tagged as "non-indigenes" or "foreigners". Most of the literature on this anomaly finds a strong consensus on what problems these Constitutional inconsistencies portend for settler/indigene conflicts (Alubo, 2003, Dunmoye, 2005, Kukah, 2006, Egwu, 2003). What also appears very evident in the literature on the subject is the linkage of settler/indigene conflicts to the national question (Momoh 2002, Dunmoye 2005, Alubo 2006, Nnoli 1998, Abah 2003). In fact Momoh (2002) argues that the indigene vs. settler debacle is both an aspect of and a product of the national question neither can be understood without a proper knowledge of the national question."

Another strand of consensus is to be found in the ethnic reduction of the problem. To put it succinctly, Momoh (2002} avers that "in Nigeria today, the national question has been reduced

to the nationalities question and this has been further reduced to the ethnic question. There is near unanimity about the ethnic formulation of the national question. Hence the discourse about federalism is merely about ethno – federalism, of politics about ethnic politics and economics of ethnic control (ala resource control)."

The issue is framed in two critical questions posed by Dunmoye (2005) namely, "who owns the land? – or " who was the first settler on the land? The effect of course is not only unequal forms of citizenship but critically the fact that indigeneship is now superior to citizenship. This resonates with the question by Mamdani (1998), "when does a settler become a native?" Much the same question is now being asked by the *Jasawa* in Jos North LGA and the Tiv in Taraba and Nasarawa States. Politics seems to frame the ambivalence and much the same position is shared by Dunmoye (2005.20) who goes to the extent to assert that the dichotomy between settlers and indigenes "are derivatives of ethnicity". Egwu (2003) in like manner refers to these conflicts as "rural ethnicity."

The third strand of consensus among scholars is the linkage of the settler/indigene problem to land, hence the territoriality of the conflicts (Abah, 2002; Alubo, 2006; Nnoli, 1998; Gyuse, 2006; Otite 1999; Best 1987). This aspect of the problem also resonates with the last one as ethnic groups are distinguished by the communal nature of their boundaries. Every ethnic group is domiciled and indeed dominant in a defined space or territory. Otite (1999.19) identifies this as the first source of conflict.

The fourth strand of consensus on the subject is that of pluralism with a population of over 140 million with over 350 ethnic groups. Three major ethnic groups – the Hausa and Fulani dominate the North, the Ibo the East and the Yoruba, the West (the so-called *Wazobia* triumvirate). The remaining ethnic groups tagged "minorities" are scattered in between the

three. This spatial characteristic of the Nigerian Federation also resonates with the constitutional contradiction described earlier. This is because the quality of residency citizenship rights makes it very significant where one comes from. It determines whether one is a majority or minority, whether one is an indigene or a settler. The combination of territorial possession, ethnicity and pluralism consummates and compounds the problem of the geography of citizenship in Nigeria.

There are also less common but by no means insignificant strands in the literature on settler/indigene conflicts. These are religion as in the cases in Wase, Jos- North (Plateau State), Nassarawa-Toto LGA (Nasarawa State), Zangon – Kataf (Kaduna State), Bauchi town (Bauchi State).

The last discernable consensual strand on settler/indigene conflicts focuses attention on the political – economy of Nigeria. This includes the historical evolution of the nation-state, the economic centrality of the capitalist system in a dependent and underdeveloped state, the nature of politics and persistence of subsumed pre-capitalist values arising from the effects of colonial heritage particularly on identity formation, and the consequences of military rule and the character of the state. Far less pronounced is the strand of thought found in the literature analysing settler/indigene conflicts from a class basis. Some of these are the works by Nnoli (1998.21, 29, and 34) Usman (1986), Cohen (1977), Zartman (1983).

One of the most serious difficulties that confront the student of African politics according to Billy Dudley (1982.3) concerns a conceptual problem defined by terminological ambiguity in the concepts employed. The second is a perception largely directed by an ideological bias. This is most pronounced among the studies of the modernisation school of thought. He notes for instance, a descriptive, historical, institutional or constitutional orientation in the western literature on African states (Coleman, 1960; Austine, 1964, Zolberg. 1969; Hodgkin, 1956).

These hold up the countries of the west as models in analyses of the problems of African Societies.

The observation that most are nothing but a collection of class – inspired ideologies designed to perceive African states as peripheral enclaves can be made (Dudley, 1982.17). Unobe (2002.10) seems to agree with this when observing that "indeed,the modernization paradigm, particularly as developed and applied to the study of the role of law in the development process is best understood if situated within the liberal ideology which sought to 'legitimise production of knowledge about the Third World countries at a time when there was in reality a growing conflict of interest between the rich and the poor countries of West and the Third World respectively and the subtle tension between knowledge and political manipulation that arose in the context of that conflict." Much the same point is made by Nnoli (1980.1) in observing that "it is often forgotten that the concepts that prevail in the academic community are not solely of an academic or scientific nature. They usually have an ideological and political character." This is particularly so with the concept of tribalism and of the modernization theory.

We intend to argue on two strands noted in the literature: the territorial nature of settler/indigene conflicts and their relationship with or within the ethnic phenomenon. The urban origin of ethnicity has been established notably by Nnoli (1980.21) in observing that "it was in the colonial enclaves that the colonised African made contact with the colonial environment, the coloniser, and Africans from different communal groups. The dynamics of this quadripartite contact gave rise to ethnicity in colonial and post-colonial African countries." The development of a rural variant of conflict defined by ethnic ties and territorial claims (Nnoli, 1998.54) suggests a phenomenon yet to be fully understood.

Settler/indigene conflicts by their ethnic definition have the distinct character of a locale other than the urban contact point and their territorial character shows a variation in the nature of what is ordinarily associated with ethnicity. To therefore lump them as just part and parcel of ethnicity appears conceptually clumsy. This then suggests very serious questions in any meaningful analysis and understanding of the phenomenon. The same point is made by Nnoli in his study of ethnic politics in Nigeria (1980) and Bakut (2005) which is discussed subsequently here.

While there exists an appreciable research and written effort on conflict in Africa in general, far less is to be found on settler/indigene confrontations. Until quite recently, such problems were wont to be subsumed under the study of ethnic conflict or labeled as false consciousness by leftist orthodoxy (Nnoli, 1980.11).The state-centeredness of theories such as Dependency and Pluralism to which the 'integrative needs' of state-building overrode every other need, perhaps tends to deflect the main focus from settler/indigene identity conflicts. Even when interest is placed on ethnic issues and other forms of identity conflicts, settler/indigene problems receive scant recognition and attention.

We think it is necessary to make a clarification on some key issues for us to have a sharper focus of the problem at hand. Whereas settler/indigene conflicts have so far often had an ethnic definition in the feuding parties, they encompass more than this. They are distinguished from ethnic conflict by the matter of a defined territory or space. This is the designated homeland of the "native" or "indigene" and the perceived power and opportunities and not just the ethnic origins and consciousness of the parties involved. It is the space, territory or homeland that is the object of contest and is also linked to a tracing of descent or ancestry. The ancestral descent account (mostly patri- lineal in Nigeria) is to prove the right of settlement so as to show who is aboriginal to the contested area and who is not.

The logic is that the earlier the date of settlement the more credible the claim. These and the consciousness of "othering" are ideological supports of the economic realities involved. The problem is that in a society with people with a scantily written history, the claims of the parties become mired in controversy as to who settled in an area first. This account is to support the claim of the "native" over the "foreigner" or "settler" whose right over the contested space is ousted or voided. Settler/indigene issues can even involve an alliance of two or more ethnic groups (for instance, Bassa/ Gbagyi alliance against Ebura in Toto Local Government area, Alago/Kwalla/ Eggon / Mada/Fulani against the Tiv (all in Nasarawa state) and the Berom-Anaguta and Afizere against the Hausa and the Fulani, united to fight off a targeted "settler "or "foreigner" at a certain level only for them to come "home" and begin to fight possibly even over the same "booty".

We note two things in this clarification. The homeland space or territory is indeed an economic structure or reality (land, fishponds, grazing lands, political or bureaucratic offices, titles or status). Together with the origin or tracing of ancestral descent which is the consciousness or ideological support, are necessary to monopolise the opportunity available in the contested space or territory. Ake (1981. 2) observes that this has been the problem in the treatment of tribalism or ethnicity "…because traditional treatments have failed to grasp it fully because they have regarded it merely as consciousness and failed to situate the consciousness in material conditions. Thus they fail to take advantage of the obvious and important fact that tribalism flourishes mainly because it is useful especially in the economic sense." We strongly feel the same also applies to settler/indigene conflicts.

2.5 The National Question and Settler/indigene Conflicts.

Before we proceed with the discussion of settler/indigene conflicts, we need to understand what is meant by the national question. We can see the meaning of the concept at two related levels- from the perspective of inter-group relations and that of class relations. In the first instance, it concerns the spirit of the political union of diverse ethnic groups or nations or peoples who are conscious of their identities (Saliu et al, 2005.4). It is about the choice of the type of relations among the diverse groups –whether they move towards a more integrated nation or one with some measure of self-determination for the groups. It becomes important when groups within the union try to dominate or exploit others. According to Toyo (1993.4), "we can redefine the national question as the question that arises when a culturally integrated and self-conscious group of people seeks advantages over other peoples or seeks a measure of self-determination." It concerns the appropriate relations between the groups in the state to resolve problems such as fear, marginalization, inequality, injustice that may arise (Anyanwu, 1993.28,, Ntalaja, 1999).

It is about the social, economic and political survival of nations or a nation-state. It concerns the nature of engaging relationships between/amongst peoples, groups and interests (Momoh 2002.2). Momoh goes on to observe that in Nigeria, the national question has been reduced to the nationalities question and even further to the ethnic question. So the dominant issues in the question have been ethnic perception of domination of minorities notably by majorities, economic marginalization, religious and ideological differences.

The second level of meaning of the national question concerns class relations between the rich and the poor, the dominant and the dominated. In Nigeria, class relations often overlap and resonate with ethnic lines. Ethnic problems are often fed by class contradictions just as class issues also find expression on ethnic platforms (Adejumobi 2003). The national question

according to Jimoh (Saliu, ed, 2005 .5) is necessarily a resultant effect of modern state formation. It is also seen as the process through which the ruling classes consolidated their hold on society. This is done by investing in the instruments of violence (Crowder, et al, 1970.11-13) with which to dominate the weak. Thus spawned in the wake of human development have been those relations of domination in different modes of production, among various nations and in different places. Such relations as could be seen in feudal, slave or Apartheid systems.

The national question in Nigeria has been examined by Toyo (1993.15-16) from two related perspectives, namely, external and internal. In the case of the former, the national question was relevant during British colonial rule. The major issues at that period were questions relating to attainment of self-rule, independence and full sovereignty from white foreign rule. The shift in this perspective in the contemporary period concerns questions about Nigeria's nominal independence, supplier of raw materials for advanced capitalist economies, dependent and peripheral state status and so on. In the case of the latter, several relevant questions are involved. In the words of Ajayi (1992.14);

> The National Question is the perennial debate as to how to order the relations between the different ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groupings so that they have the same rights and privileges, access to power and an equitable share of national resources; debate as to whether our constitution facilitates or inhibits our march to nationhood, or whether the goal itself is mistaken and we should order political arrangements to facilitate our search for legitimacy and development.

The internal aspect of the national question is therefore about self-determination, access to power, justice and the structure of relations among the ethnic groups and the component units or tiers of government (Osaghae, 1995.315). The major issues in the national question that are of benefit for understanding of settler/indigene conflicts in Nigeria are framed by the following questions raised by Adejumobi (2000. 126):

i. What should be the component units and tiers of government in the Nigerian federation?

ii. How should they be constituted, based on ethnic contiguity or administrative expediency?

iii. How should political power and administrative responsibilities be shared among the levels and tiers of government?

iv. How should the ownership of economic resources be structured in the Nigerian federation?

v. What should be the acceptable formulae for sharing federally collected revenue?

Others that could also be added are the role of religion in state affairs and what should be the generally acceptable definition of citizenship? These issues are framed in the national question debate. They are explicated in the history of Nigeria by the nature of over centralization of powers at the centre because of the civil war experience (1967-1970) and prolonged years of military dictatorship (1966-1979, 1983-1999).

The ethnic character of nationhood in Nigeria has exacerbated all issues including the identity conflicts arising from the sharing of power and economic resources. The creation of states by the military in 1967, 1976, and 1996 has created even more problems in terms of persistent cries of marginalization and domination mainly from minorities. At the local level, the creation of local governments from the reforms of 1976 specifically replicates the contests for power and resources from the centre. These contestations are ethnic in character and now due to the constitutional ambivalence on citizenship definition, are framed in the settler/indigene conflicts within territorial enclaves.

The problems arising from Nigeria's federal experience lie deep in her history even right from the British amalgamation of the south and the north in 1914.The carving of three regions with three dominant ethnic groups in each partly explains the reasons for the minority fear of

marginalization beginning with the move towards independence. This fear of the minorities also forms the background to the state creation exercises mentioned. It also explains such constitutional features as federal character and the quota system.

The national question is useful in explaining why identity conflicts are so persistent in Nigeria but it pales significantly in analyzing how these manifest at the local level with such volatility. Mamdani's question, when does a settler become a native is very relevant here. Besides, it now appears that the problem is apparently responsible for the theoretical ambiguity that reduces the issue to a pervasive ethnic denominator in its conceptualization. This however does not adequately account for the territorial character of the phenomenon. Perhaps the dominance of kinship issues lends credence to the ethnic factor but to suggest the ethnicity of the rural areas is in itself a theoretical anomaly. It is to the majority-minority conundrum that we now turn to seek for greater understanding from the literature.

2.6 The Minority-Majority Problem in Nigerian Politics.

Minority politics in Nigeria is a consequence of the character and quality of the nation-state, its politics, depth of unity, level of self-determination and federalism. These issues have evolved in the crucible of the political history of the nation-state under colonial rule. It is a derivative of the national question and like ethnicity, a creation of British colonial policy in Nigeria.

According to Mustapha (Nnoli, ed.1998:27) ethnic minority identities with their dominant politics of disadvantage have become a significant feature of post-colonial Nigerian politics since independence. They crystallized in the early colonial period beginning with the creation of three regions by the Richards constitution of 1946. These regions conformed to the communal ethnic boundaries of the three dominant ethnic groups- the Hausa and the Fulani in

the North, the Ibo in the East and the Yoruba in the West. The rest of the over 300 ethnic groups are scattered in between the three and are called minorities whose consciousness became defined as such in the negotiations leading to independence.

The advent of partisan politics would bring home to these groups a certain realization embedded in some assumptions that Mustapha (Nnoli, ed.1998) has observed became the logic of their perception. Some of these are worth restating: that the dominant parties earlier mentioned represented ethnic interests; that these ethnic interests would be dominant in their respective regions; that those outside ethnic blocs but subject to regional governments would suffer; the smaller ethnic groups in each of the regions saw themselves as confronting a majority dictatorship. Herein lay the major reason for their recognition of their powerlessness.

Ekeh (1994) also agrees with this but observes that numerical strength and political power did not necessarily coincide in pre- colonial Nigeria and cites several instances of this. For example, he notes the domination of the Sokoto caliphate by a Fulani minority; the exploitation of the more numerous Ibibio's of the interior by the Efik of old Calabar; the Ibo of the hinterland by the Ijaw (Izon) and the Urhobo by the Itsekiri. One critical lesson the minorities would perceive from the 1951 constitutional developments as the move towards independence became evident is that numbers correspond directly to political power.

Hembe (2003) in his book on J.S. Tarka and the dilemma of ethnic minority politics in Nigeria expresses much the same views and notes the intensification of the inter-ethnic rivalries at two major levels. First, at the national level, where the three majority ethnic groups dominated and competed for the control of the central government largesse soon to be vacated by the departing British authorities. Here the competition was extremely keen. For this reason each majority ethnic group tended to mobilize resources from its regional base to take control at the centre.

However at a second level, in the regions each dominant group would not share its control of the resources with the minorities thus confirming the fear of the minorities about their powerlessness. This informed their grievances and demands that led to the setting up of the Willinks commission in 1958.

When the Willinks commission failed to deliver on their demands, Mustapha (Nnoli, ed.1998) notes a number of responses : between 1951 and 1983 they ganged up to demand a regional government of their own (Cross river, Ogoja and Rivers).On failing to achieve their autonomy demand, they sought to limit the powers of the regional governments by for instance agitating for a stronger central government that would redress excesses by insisting on a centralized police force; they formed political alliances with the dominant political parties in other regions to ensure protection from their own dominant regional parties.

The examples of this are to be seen in the formation of such minority parties such as the Bornu Youth Movement, the Benin Delta Peoples Party, the Niger-Delta Congress and the Middle-Belt Peoples Party (Okpu 1977).The political alliance of the Tiv-based United Middle-Belt Congress in the second republic (1960-1966) from the north with Awolowo's Action Group Party is a notable illustration of this development. The minorities then became a key part of both oppositional and clientalistic strands in Nigerian politics.

The military regime of General Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975) in the impasse leading up to the civil war sought to undercut the tyranny of the regional enclaves by the creation of states in 1967.This would alter the minority response according to Mustapha (Nnoli, ed.1998) in two ways. In the first instance, by the creation of states some minorities became majorities and this would lead to the emergence of the politics of statism. The solidarity of the minorities began to collapse as minority majorities became pitted against minority minorities. Then too, minorities

came to the realization that by acceding to centralization in a bid to access power, they had yet not escaped the tyranny of the majorities because precisely power had shifted elsewhere. Not ignoring the fact that states were also created in majority areas.

This development then introduced intense acrimony between the centre and states particularly in the oil states of the Niger-delta. Fiscal federalism also meant federal control of the revenues from oil mainly found in minority areas. The multiplication of state creation demands mirrors the complexity of the problem precisely "because political entrepreneurs from both majority and minority groups saw it as a surest way to plug into the centralized federal purse (Nnoli, ed.1998)." The relevance of the majority-minority contention in Nigerian politics in settler/indigene conflicts lies in the culture of politics of sharing the political and economic spoils of state by patronage at all levels from the federal to the local Government. The Nigerian elites have imbibed an insatiable appetite for their own binge of primitive accumulation from the resources of the state. This is why as in the words of Mustapha (Nnoli,ed.1998.), "… contractors, civil servants and local politicians collude to dredge up real or imagined differences to justify particular claims to new states and central patronage", including the majority-minority controversy."

The literature on the national question and the majority-minority contention can provide some understanding of our first and second research questions but weaken considerably in the case of the third. Even then, what we have is a framework of analysis that can provide some useful guide. We are yet to see any study that clearly shows the application of this perspective at the local level, particularly in settler/indigene conflicts.

In many cases of settler/indigene conflicts, disagreements centre on specific problems woven around histories, myths, land and power. For instance, Otite (2002) cites the case of Manu

Vaase's (a clownish Tivman) procession into Wukari as a major trigger in the perception and sensibilities of the Jukun in their conflict with the Tiv in Taraba state. A second instance in this case study is the result of the 1959 Federal elections in which a Tiv/Hausa political coalition won against a Jukun candidate leading to the election of the first Tivman as member of the House of Representatives in Lagos. This apparently would show the Jukun fear of the tyranny of numbers in electoral contests.

Another illustration of this is in the Jos-North case study. It does appear that behind the religious smokescreen is the raw reality of the economic and political power of the *Jasawa* in Plateau state. Real micro-level case studies are needed to test this proposition. Therefore, the general application of this perspective is helpful but needs testing from the field. We need data from the field to test these concepts.

2.7 Ethnicity and Settler/indigene Conflicts.

Much of the studies on Ethnic conflict in Africa have stereotypical views and some of these need brief restating. Ethnicity and not Tribalism it has been pointed out by scholars is the proper concept. It has been explained, that the former is more inclusive and scientific (Mamdani, 1976.3). Besides, Tribe as has been pointed out is a racist and ideologically self-serving concept (Nnoli, 1978.3). Quite contrary to the views of mainly western scholars (Park, 1950, Barth et al, 1964.333-348, Spengler et al, 1956), Nnoli (1978.35) has observed that the colonial contact situation is the real cradle of ethnicity. He insists that the phenomenon did not exist in the pre-colonial period, pointing out that no African language has the equivalent word for it as evidence. It is not 'some barbarous mystique peculiar to the African' as has been claimed (Huntington, 1993, Kaplan, 1994, Suliman, 1999.30) but a product of colonial contact.

We examine the literature to know what the phenomenon itself means. Two prominent schools of thought vie for attention here on the meaning and nature of ethnicity; these are the Primordialists and Instrumentalists. Primordialist theory holds that conflicts involve members of the ethnic group with common primordial bounds that determine their personal identity and makes the group a natural community that is older than the modern nation or modern class systems (Van de Goor, 1999.18, Staven Hagen, 1994). The instrumentalists hold that the group is motivated by changing mutable identity platforms which are underlined by "the conscious and imaginative construction and mobilization of differences (Appadoria, 1996.4).

Ake (2000) observes that in the last fifteen years the controversy between the two streams of thought has revolved around whether ethnicity exists at all. He thinks that the primordialists' categorization is misleading because it glosses over the questions of their existence by taking their timelessness for granted. He believes that this position is only begging the whole issue (2000.94).

To Ake the categorization of the instrumentalists is also misleading because it emphasizes an element in the discussion that is far less important. That the ethnic group is a fickle phenomenon contrived willfully as an exploitable resource. Manipulability and exploitability cannot be a useful definition of ethnicity, he says. That is however not to deny that ethnicity is used thus and often too. No one, he says, can deny that ethnicity is a contrived, mere ideological representation or imagined rather than real. This is because as Nnoli (1978.21) observes, ethnicity operates at the level of ideology which serves the interest of the class that invents it. Just as to deny ethnicity is as illogical as denying the wind because we cannot hold it.

What we must always remember is that ethnicity is always grounded in an element of social imagination. But even the imagined communities' though distinct and unique, at any

particular point in time, within any given context are not unchanging. On the contrary, a constant re-imagining process continues as relationships within and between groups is reworked through social interaction. The 'us' and 'them' is constantly and subtly being redefined as "histories are told are retold, traditions invented and denied, statuses ascribed and challenged; allegiances forged and broken; and identities claimed and rejected" (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983).

Even within the objectionist camp, there is no uniform range of characteristics of ethnic groups. There is even more controversy. Granted that they are in agreement that ethnic groups are defined by what they call 'putative commonalities', but that is exactly the source of the problem. There are wide differences on what these commonalities are. Some emphasize 'the congruities of blood, speech, custom" (Geertz, 1963.109), some emphasize "myths, memories, values and symbols" (Smith, 1986.15). Others define them as "birth and blood, belief in common ancestry, a common history with common heroes and enemies and historical attachment to a particular territory" (Horowitz, 1985: 139-40). The Harvard Encyclopedia (Thernstorm, et al., 1980: iv) has as many as 14 indications that can be used to define an ethnic group.

Ethnic conflict has been attributed to the existence of Ethnicity, a phenomenon associated with interactions among people of different ethnic groups. It also includes ethnocentrism which includes such attributes as group identity, beliefs, parochial orientation, and group pride. Perhaps even more important, Ethnicity has been identified as being behavioral in form and conflictual in content (Nnoli,1978.6). Ethnicity has also been established to be characterised by a common consciousness of being in relation to other ethnic groups.

The origin of Ethnic conflict in African societies has generally been traced to the colonial urban contact situation in the towns to which Africans had been forced to relocate to engage in production (Nnoli,1978.35). The work by Nnoli (1989) on Ethnic conflict in Africa has among

others sought to answer why Ethnic identity is conducive to severe conflict in Africa and why Ethnic conflict in Africa is more severe than in Europe and North America? These questions do not indicate per se that only Africa can be cited in explaining this phenomenon.

Questions have been posed on the propriety of even making Ethnicity a decisive and independent variable of study given its colonial and neo-colonial history in Africa. Scholars such as Archie Mafeje have noted that so-called tribalism is not only an out-dated misplacement but makes a highly dubious distinction between Africans and other peoples of the world, and "it oversimplifies, mystifies and obscures the real nature of economic power relations among Africans themselves and between them and the capitalist world" (Mafeje,1971.253-262).

Others such as Magubane (1969.538) have held that focusing on Ethnicity deflects serious efforts at understanding African societies because it ignores the primacy of ownership of the productive forces, the material basis of society and the nature of the social system. Much the same views are also expressed by Mustapha (Nnoli,ed.1998.47) and Egwu (Nnoli ed,1998.54).Richard Sklar has warned that undue focus on Ethnicity could be diversionary as it could be merely a mask for preserving the class privileges of the emergent classes in Africa(1967.6-8).This area will however be examined in greater detail subsequently.

Nnoli (1978.10) has pointed out the relative negligence of far more fundamental issues such as the economic structures, and the social and class structure of African societies. Even when Ethnicity is studied, there is a tendency to stress the negative to the detriment of such things as elements of history and culture which bind ethnic groups together. The exclusiveness of ethnic groups is stressed and ethnic boundaries in pre-colonial times fabricated. Perhaps even more significant, is the clarification that ethnic contradictions have an objective basis in the social

structure being an element of its ideological superstructure. It depends on and is a function of the mode of production which is the infrastructural basis of society.

Nnoli points out that ethnic conflict sometimes coincide with class conflicts (1998.11).A view also shared by Dunmoye (1998.7), Alubo (2006.53) and Otite (2002.5). Empirical evidence in Nigeria however suggests that ethnic, religious identity consciousness tends to have a stronger resonance and appeal than class consciousness (Joireman, 2003. 1, Mustapha; 1998, Ikime; 2002, IPCR; 2003).Abah (ed.2003) observes that even citizenship in Nigeria is premiumed on your identity and the borders of citizenship. Kukah (2003) similarly observes the use of religion as the preferred option to build the hegemony of the Petty-Bourgeois, Muslim-dominated elite in the North in the first republic under an overarching ideology of "one north, one people under one God".

The key questions are whether Ethnic conflict best explains conflict in Africa and Nigeria in general; and how (if at all) do they help to explain settler/indigene conflicts in the Middle-Belt region? The first question has been partially addressed and it serves very little to re-cycle the controversies driving the discourse on Ethnic conflict studies. Suffice it is for us to note here that as Nnoli (1998 11) observes, Ethnicity operates at the level of politics and ideology and so could be articulating ephemeral if not dubious objectives. The danger of too narrow a focus on it as an explanatory variable is real and could give us very different results too. In the first place, the tendency is to view ethnic contradictions as the most paramount in African society. As earlier indicated, class contradictions supersede ethnic ones and are at the base of social structure even though in Nigeria, ethnic lines also coincide with class lines.

Then it is often taken for granted that the problem of conflict lies at the heart of the mere existence of ethnic groups. Ethnic pluralism itself is not the problem, but the ideological purpose

to which the phenomenon is put is the real cause of conflict (Ake 1999.96). Even this needs some qualification. It is assumed that ethnicity has always had a negative contribution to African societies. Nnoli (1998.7) observes that it provided a platform on which to organise African resistance against colonial domination most especially at the cultural level. Social upheavals such as the *Maji Maji* (Tanzania) and the *Mau Mau* (Kenya) during colonial rule in East Africa are given as indicative of this argument. Even here in Nigeria in the Middle-Belt region among the Tiv it provided a launch pad for the anti-colonial cultural resistance of the *Ijor* (1912),*Ivase*, *Hoyo* and *Nyambuan* (1939), *Haakaa* or *Namakaa* movements (Tseayo;1974.56-74).Then it also provided a viable social anchorage for Africans destabilized by social uncertainty and insecurity in the towns to which they were forced to re-locate under colonial rule (Nnoli;1989).This does not in any way, deny the destructive reality of Ethnic conflict nor remove it's causative potential for social disharmony. In fact it is in this character of the Ethnic phenomenon that we are interested.

A string of scholars within the framework of what is generally referred to as the 'Modernisation'cluster of theories have advanced the view that ethnicity is an inherent aspect of social change in all culturally heterogeneous societies (Apter, 1955, Coleman and Rosberg, jr, 1964, Lemarchand, 1972, Melson and Wolpe, 1970, Morrison and Stevenson, 1972, O'Connel, 1968) are some of the few examples of 'Modernisation' scholars. Coming from a convergence of mainly western-biased sources in the social sciences, contributions have come complete with what Offiong (1980.14) has called perculiar "clue concepts" and "key explanatory categories".

Political Sociologists concerned with investigating the political consequences of 'modernization' in the "backward", "primitive", "tribal", "detribalized" polities have conducted studies on ethnic conflict particularly in African societies. The charismatic leadership of Kwame

Nkrumah in a study by David Apter (in Stillman, ed.1955.55-93) was supposed to be the primary integrative mechanism for welding ethnic groups together in Ghana. He however and crucially failed to explain how the charismatic leader is able to arise and be sustained in an ethnically plural society (Nnoli, 1978.14).More than five decades after independence, the explanatory failure of this concept is perhaps typified by the demagogic leadership personalities strewn right across Africa for example,who have instituted the authoritarian one-party regimes and life-presidents and reduced citizens to mere subjects of conquered territories. Those that Ake (1999) has called the natural enemies of Democracy.

Few other examples in this regard are studies to determine the location of power within societies such as the power structure in the Asante kingdom of Ghana by W. Tondoff and K.A. Busia; that by J. Beattie in the Bunyoro kingdom and in an Igbo society by I.Nzimiro (Nwabuzor & Mueller, 1990.35) It is however very evident that whatever objectives these studies might have had, far too little has been realized so far in understanding the dynamics of so-called 'traditional' African society. The travails of Democracy and Development for instance, shows that the patronizing study of African societies in the 'pre-industrial' stage have instead exacerbated the conceptual problem of underdevelopment in Africa. Ake (1999.84) notes how the complex problem sheds light on the common assumptions of prevailing Development strategies which do not reflect the dynamics of the social forces in Africa.

They implicitly for instance, assume that it is the people and their 'backward ways' that are the problem. Unobe (2002.10) seems to agree with this in observing that "in the circumstances modernization had to be presented as a uniform and desirable global process which only started in Europe and has been held in the Third World by forces of tradition." This

is perhaps why scholars such as Ake (1991) have asserted that western social science such as 'Modernization' amounts to social imperialism.

The most pervasive theme of this analytical perspective is linked to the impact of increased urbanisation, commercialisation, and professionalisation on ethnicity. The expectation is that these processes will bring to bear an integrative and binding effect on the diverse ethnic groups (Morrison and Stevenson, 1972.90).Quite on the contrary, the persistence and volatility of ethnicity long after tremendous heights have been attained in all areas mentioned in most African societies certainly means that the diagnosis of the problem has been dead wrong. Between them, the views of such political scientists as James Coleman(1960), David Apter (1963,1965),Gabriel Almond(1960),G.Bingham Powell (1965) and Samuel Huntington(1965,1968,1971) pointed in the direction that Africa and other developing societies were moving from the world of 'Traditional ' values to more western ones and beliefs.

This change was supposed to effect changes such as industrialization, cultural secularization, parliamentary Democracy and 'Modernity' The opposite has clearly been the case. Industrial growth has led to what Economists have referred to as growth without development, cultures have not collapsed but become rigid along ethnic boundaries and authoritarianism and dictatorship have checked the culture of Democracy in most African societies and tradition rather than diminishing, continues to challenge modernity.

Other notable and key modernization concepts are McClelland's 'need for achievement'(n-Achievement) theory which posits that, it is values, not motives or psychological forces that determines the rate of economic and social development(January1963.17) Several assumptions of the theory have been found to be invalid. For instance, on his thesis that pre-industrial or traditional societies suffer from a low achievement orientation (January 1963.387), Barret (in

Baldwin, 1972.29) has demonstrated a high n-Achievement value in traditional Igbo society prior to Western contact. Which leads LaVine(1966.3) to conclude in another study of Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba schoolboys that from their high n-Achievement scores from the Thematic Appreciation Tests(TAT) Nigerians are after all, not traditional. The invalidity of McClelland's thesis shows that Modernisation theories are not reflective of the dynamics of social realities in Africa but of a subjective ideological bias. Others in similar vein are Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth theory (1960.4-39) and Hagan's innovation thesis (1962).

A number of observations can be made in general about Modernisation theories and their assumptions. Offiong (1980.23) comments that Africa is treated as a "closed system" that does not reflect her dependent status in an international environment dominated by imperialism. Unobe (2002.11) thinks that "… What all these suggest is that the tendency by modernization theory to look at the development process in the Third World countries as a mere duplication of what took place in Europe is purely ideological and cannot produce valid understanding of the issues involved."

Then there is the assumption that manifestly thinks of underdevelopment as an original state of 'backwardness' which completely ignores the exploitative relationship between Africa and the western world from colonial to Neo-colonial dependency. It becomes very obvious as one delves into the various concepts of Modernisation theory that in seeking a transformation of African "traditional" societies to "modern" western models, there is an explicit denial of western guilt in Africa's underdevelopment.

It is the sort of imperialist ideology implicit in their anthropological studies which in the era of colonialism dehumanised the African in order to 'save' him with colonial imposition. Western society is depicted as the ideal or model that must be sought after. As Chambliss

observes, it allows the industrialised capitalist economies to maintain their exploitative relationship with the non- industrialised and enhances western ethnocentrism (in Offiong, 1980.24). What can also be said is that ethnicity has not only had a negative impact and it is therefore illogical to isolate and focus on those aspects alone to the exclusion of the positive. Ethnic conflict appears to be a real problem with enough controversies of its own. It cannot therefore provide the cast principles and tested analytical framework to explain settler/indigene conflict.

The critical question still is whether ethnic conflict helps to explain settler/indigene conflicts and to what extent? Otite (2001.64, 222, 274) and Best (2004) have tried to answer this question without much explanation at the level of the relationship of the conflicts with the relations of production which seems to suggest far more serious study. From our examination of ethnicity so far, it is doubtful whether it is the primary cause of conflict in the first place. In Nigeria, the ethnic problem is fed by a number of far more critical causes. For some (Nnoli,ed. 1998.,Madunagu 2000,Joireman 2003,IPCR2003) ethnicity is only an ideological fabrication no matter it's symbolic appeal and impact, even though a definite relationship exists between ethnic consciousness and production relations.

True, ethnic Groups are a major identity platform for the manifestation of settler/indigene conflicts but as earlier pointed out; they appear to form only one aspect of this problem. The critical part , the material basis –land, power, status, grazing lands, fishponds, markets et cetera is actually what feeds the ideological structure which is necessary for excluding 'targets' which are often other ethnic groups. To that extent therefore, ethnic conflict is not and could not be primarily explanatory of settler/indigene conflicts being only part of the whole phenomenon. It is even more significant to note views that question the basis of ethnicity itself and further question

whether it is necessarily conflict-prone (in Ake, 1999.95,Suliman ,1999.3). It is also important to note that two case studies in the Middle-Belt area in central Nigeria-Toto local Government Area in Nasarawa state and Jos-North local Government Area in Plateau state have shown a religious dimension in addition to the ethnic component.

It is quite apparent that ethnicity and ethnic identity are highly contentious grounds on which to rest the study of conflict in Africa alone (Danbazau1991, Kukah 2000, and Fandahunsi 2003). It therefore becomes evident that ethnicity and ethnic identity are inadequate frames of analysis and cannot provide the meaningful explanation that we seek for settler/indigene conflicts and we must turn to other components of the problem.

2.8 The Peasantry and the Class Factor in Settler/indigene Conflicts.

There is a consensus among scholars and analysts on the steady decline of agriculture in Africa. From a reported 2.7 per cent in the 1960s to 1.2 per cent in the 1970s (Dunmoye 1989, Ake 1999.88) The massive food crisis of the 1980s was blamed on a number of causes-international capital in disarticulating productivity, climatic factors, low level of technology, land policies and the peasantry. The Peasant smallholder subsector is the dominant component in agricultural production in Nigeria and indeed in much of Africa. The peasant relies mainly on family labour, a small amount of capital for his inputs and family ownership of land. Traditional farming systems featuring the use of simple tools such as hoes, cutlasses are still the technology that the peasant relies on to till the soil. Land is the major factor of production and capital investment is extremely low. The land tenure system is still mostly freehold. There is some hired labour involved especially among the richer peasants (the so-called kulak elements), In the main,

their primary relation to production is as producers of commodities for the international market and the urban areas (Cohen, 1980, Dunmoye, 1989).

The critical issue about the peasantry has been its political orientation given its predominant size. The debate has ranged on about the perception of the left on the peasantry about their anticipated role in the class struggle in Africa. Before the Maoist revolution in China in 1949, orthodox Marxists did not see the peasantry as a revolutionary force, calling them, 'rural idiocy' ,'a sack of potatoes' (Dunmoye 1983).In Africa, the debate has centered on whether the peasantry is a physical or revolutionary force. The most pronounced position has been the postulation by Fanon that they are a revolutionary force (1967). However our focus is not on the role of the peasantry in a class struggle but to examine the class structure of a social formation exuding a primordial ideological consciousness under capitalist relations of production.

The colonial regime in its philosophy of incorporation and domination, had sought to control peasant agricultural production. This was affected through taxation, introduction of a currency, and cash crops. The survival of the peasantry is a contradiction in the predominantly capitalist relations of production. Peasant production has been described by Goran Hyden (1989) as 'economies of affection' and this mirrors the diametrical clash of interest between them and the surplus- expropriating capitalist economy. Peasant production not only feeds the urban population but also cushions the rural areas from increasing pauperization, alienation and marginalization. In fact Mafeje (1991.35) has observed that "African lineages have proved themselves a great source of security to individual members and a vital mechanism for the defense against the worst aspects of capitalist individualism."

However, analysts have examined the peasant question (Alavi, 1965 Hobshawm, 1973 Davidson, 1974 Saul, 1974 Bernstein, 1977 Kohnert, 1980) and shown clearly that capitalist

penetration of agriculture does not transform or affect peasants uniformly. Dunmoye (February, 1987) has argued that differentiation of income; land holding are expressions of antagonistic relations between peasants. This involves struggling for economic independence, competition, land grabbing and the concentration in the hands of the few. The penetration of capital expresses itself in fractional divisions within the same class. Agricultural production has largely been a struggle between the state and the elite on one hand and peasants on the other for control of production and the appropriation of surplus.

It is a struggle between its manifest and latent functions. While the manifest function demands increased agricultural productivity, the latent function demands the control of what the peasant produces. Due to the undemocratic character of the state, the latent function of agricultural policy which expresses the interests of the political elite, is able to prevail over the manifest one (Ake1991, 89).

In Nigeria, the role of state intervention is evident in such programmes as the Agricultural Development Projects (ADP), River Basin Development Schemes, and Green Revolution programmes of the state under the direction of International Capital. Such projects are in the interest of the political elite and their capitalist partners bent on controlling peasant agricultural production. Not only have such projects brought Nigeria prostrate with foreign debt, they have taken away the social cohesion role of peasant production in feeding the urban centers and instead engendered competition amidst dwindling resources in the rural areas. At the community level, it is interesting to see such micro-level studies such as that by Mustapha (Nnoli 1998.22) show how agrarian change contributes to conflict. Settler/indigene conflicts could also be examined to discern the patterns of state role and the politics of agriculture in peasant production.

We must note however that settler/indigene conflicts as shown in some case studies already cited such as that of the *Jasawa* of Jos-North are not just a peasant phenomenon. They are not just about rural agricultural production politics alone either as they involve issues of power and economic opportunities in the urban areas as well. They in a very direct way, join the issue of class with the problem of kinship ties. Kukah (2000.19) alleges a marriage of traditional institutions and democracy for the redefinition and solidification of cultural boundaries in the creation of chiefdoms, districts and village heads. This is done for the purpose of legitimizing elite rule most especially under military regimes which tend to seek accommodation with traditional authority as in the days of colonial rule.

They show how through the politics of peasant production, alliances of the non-dominant classes can be used by fractions of the political elite through identity ideology. Nnoli (ed.1998.5) has observed the symbolic dimension which makes conflict arising from ethnic identity more intense. Much the same can be said for settler/indigene identity which can assume volatility and ferocity quite unknown when religion is joined with ethnicity as in the case study of Jos-North Local Government Area. That is why we have to examine the clash of modes of production that is at the centre of settler/indigene conflicts.

2.9 The Clash of Modes of Production as an Escalatory Factor for Settler/Indigene Conflicts.

When ever conflict in Nigerian society is examined, one critical factor is often taken for granted. The totality of the colonial experience cannot just be reduced to only processes of capitalist incorporation, fragmentation and disarticulation. In just about 70 years, colonial rule was both an epoch and an episode. Afigbo (1986) observes that it led to massive changes, creating new public institutions and a completely new ethos of the public sphere. It redefined the

character of political and physical space by bringing into being new notions of citizenship, status and rights. Structures of economic opportunities were dramatically altered setting in motion a process of class formation at both urban and rural levels.

The present era is one characterised by the dominant position of the capitalist mode of production in which goods produced become commodities for exchange. Land, labour and capital goods are also exchanged on markets and controlled through relations of ownership. At the same time, there also exists in Africa, older modes of production which have been reduced to minimal although by no means inconsequential importance. These refers to Traditional, pre-colonial economies with varieties of pre-capitalist modes of production- communal hunting, pastoral and agricultural modes (Ake, 1975. 90).Unobe (2002.10) graphically describes the process:

> Colonialism was first and foremost a search for profits; it was not a civilizing mission. It is in this context that colonialism's deliberate efforts to avoid drawing the whole labour force into the capitalist process makes sense, for in this way, capitalist exploitation could be subsidized through the preservation of the rural structure of land control and production favourable to the maintenance of a low organic composition of capital. In this way,colonial capital was saved from bearing the burden of paying fully for the cost of reproducing the labour force, Colonialism, therefore , promoted or encouraged the existence side –by-side with capitalism other modes of production in the colonies because it was its best interest to do so given its major objectives.

The very basis of the agrarian question concerns the dilemma of a transformation from pre-capitalist to capitalist relations of production. Part of the historical basis of present-day agrarian crisis has been traced to the inability of colonial capitalism to completely decompose pre-capitalist relations of production such as the surviving peasant-based agriculture. The survival has been explained in two ways. Firstly, it is explained in terms of a 'dissolution and

preservation' thesis (Meillasoux 1972).This refers to the goal of colonialism to attain it's interest of cheap labour while at the same time avoiding the cost of reproducing the same labour. It therefore undermined the self-sustaining agricultural communities and preserved them at the same time in some distorted form.

Secondly, it is also explained in terms of 'articulation of modes of production' (Ray 1975) which argues that in the third world, capitalism dominates but with the co-existence of the pre-capitalist modes of production which it cannot completely diminish. A serious effort is needed to link this explanation at the super structural level of ideology which can be seen in the identity conflicts in the Middle-belt region.

The seminar paper; *Epistemological/Methodological limitations in researching on Indigene versus Settlers' dichotomy in Nigeria-Reflections on Plateau state* by B.T.Bakut (presented at the In-house seminar of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, IPCR, Abuja on 29 November, 2005) also provides some glimmer of light.

According to Bakut, a colonising and 'schooling' process that has seen the indiscriminate use of concepts such as "Tribe" and the much more recent one, "Ethnic Group" then entered into the fray,. These unfortunately have no bearing on the people of Africa who have more meaning for such equivalent terms such as 'clan', 'lineage', and 'the people'.

Bakut also uses the Muslim concept of *umma (*the people) used to identify the transnational membership of the faithful (Mayall, 1990; Chan, 1999) and defined as dwellers in the *Dar al-Islam* (Home of Islam) contrasted with the *Dar al-Harb* (Home of war) as concepts of inclusion and exclusion that have serious implications for identity definition in Nigeria. The reason is that the *umma* sees all Muslims in the same context and non-muslims as not part of 'the people'. The non-Muslim is not part of the *umma* and therefore subject to discrimination. Bakut

notes the influence of this dichotomy for the differences between the Hausa and the Fulani (seen as the face of Islam in Nigeria) and the non-muslims. It is useful to link Bakut's explanation here to Kukah's (chapter 1) description of the use of religion as a tool for acquiring and consolidating power in Northern Nigeria.

The paper also takes a look at the diversity of Nigeria's pluralism, and describes the several conflicts wrecking havoc across the nation and makes the observation that contrary to the ethnic and religious intolerance that are often cited, it is rather what he calls due to the dualism of "us" (self-defined group) versus "them" (other defined groups). Much the same as Alubo's othering process mentioned earlier on. Kukah (2000. 24), feels the problem have more to do with the failure of the main project of national integration in Nigeria. This is most especially seen in the persistence of such realities as *Sabon Garis Unguwan Musulumi, Unguwan Kabilu.*

That the Nigerian state must make a distinction between citizens and subjects and then concludes that only democracy can free us. However, without equity, the majoritarian principle compromises the promise of democracy. It is within the context of mass migrations and settlement (pre- and during colonialism) and against the exclusive homeland background that the examination of the crisis in Plateau state is made. The events that Bakut cites are the 1992 and 1995 Mangus/Bokkos conflicts, the 1994, 2001, 2002 2004 outbursts leading up to the Plateau Peace Conference, 2004.

By laying down a basic definition of the concept 'indigene', as the first to occupy a particular place, Baku notes the problem arising from confusing this with 'citizen'. He then observes that it is actually the cut off point of reference that seems to be the real problem in contention and joins issues with Saminu Turaki's (The Governor of Jigawa state) assertion that

every past Nigerian leader was a settler (National Democratic Party Bulletin, 2004) by using the 1804 Jihad as a cut off point and Jibril Ibrahim's (2004) reference to the 1979 constitution of Nigeria. Quoting Mahmood Mamdani (2004) who thinks that indigeneity has meaning only in relation to colonial legacy and law, Bakut concludes that the issue of indigene(not citizen-a legal/political construction) can only be over ownership of a certain geographical space based on ancestral links by using the principle of 'first residents' or the 'longest to reside' in the area.

The pertinent question then is, since the constitution and law accepts indigeneship, what rights then does a resident citizen (settler) have vi-a-viz the indigene? How can there be existent two unequal membership criteria for one Federal Republic? For it is quite clear that the very concept of the indigene contradicts the rights of the citizen. .

Bakut is more comfortable with the view that African social organization is bound up with their cosmology which links up the living and the dead. In essence, citizenship which is a concept of legal and political definition cannot deny the African his kinship or lineage ties to an ancestry by birth. Therefore, it is the failure to accept the enduring and intricate nature of African claims to indigeneity and the legal limitations of citizenship based on the Westphalian state system that tends to generate conflicts and perpetuate the differences between indigenes and settlers.

This framework of analysis is then applied in examining the violent outbreak in Jos in1994 upon the appointment of a (Hausa) caretaker chairman of Jos-North Local Government Area which was consistent with his rights as a citizen as guaranteed by the constitution but inconsistent with autochthonous claims to indigene ship rights. Much the same reason also triggered an outbreak of violence when another Hausa man, (Alhaji Muktari Mohammed) was

appointed as coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) for Plateau state in 2001.

Bakut then tries to resolve this tangle by observing that while the question of territory is central to the African sense of identity, it is however, not conceived as property to be exploited. Rather, it is a communal space kept in trust for the benefit of the (ethnic group)……This is because the territory.. is conceived as a frontier ..and not a boundary as defined by the Westaphalian state system. The ownership,…while belonging to the ethnic group is actually made available for the benefit of all resident (including foreigners) within the frontier, not on the basis of citizenship, but based on the understanding that while the foreigner is free to reside and pursue his socio-economic interest, he must recognize the ownership of the land as belonging to the ethnic group.

Thus from this understanding, the African attachment to land specifically is not merely physical but spiritual. The claim to ownership or indigeneship is based not on deeds of purchase or citizenship bestowed by the state, but on the link of the ethnic nationality to their 'dead' (ancestors), the living and the 'yet to be born' Bakut argues that kinship ties identify the in-group (and the 'other') and cannot be revoked or neutralized even by international frontiers whereas citizenship can be acquired, renounced or revoked (except the one based on ancestry). Therefore, while citizens' rights are protected, these must not infringe on the claims of indigenes to cultural and religious values which are embedded in the ownership of their land. Kukah (2003: 22) makes the same point in observing that the settler indigene problem lies in the crisis of the politics of belonging.

Bakut's views appear to the raise the matter that has been ignored by Euro-centric scholarship that has paid little heed to the non-neutrality of some of these concepts. In Africa,

kinship ties are still stronger than those of citizenship which perhaps explains why in the far north of Nigeria, the nomadic herdsmen still roam the boundaries of Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroun at will or why the same boundary slices through towns or even farmlands without necessarily dispossessing them of their claims to ownership in the western part of Nigeria.This problem of a clash between a frontier line and the claims to land is also replete in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba state.

However, Bakut glosses over the big rift in the middle of the two concepts. In truth, they are contrasting in nature and in this issue, can only be resolved by upholding one against the other. The Nigerian Constitution comes down on both sides rather like Janus the two-faced Roman god of war. The problem is even more complicated by other developments in African societies during and after colonialism. What Bakut fails to locate in his analysis is the effect of the incorporation of hitherto communal and feudal systems of production into the capitalist economy. What is perhaps needed is to examine this process with a view to finding out how this has affected the evolution of settler/indigene confrontations particularly in the middle-belt area.

Nonetheless, it has been observed, (Mustapha quoting Afigbo, 1986) that colonialism led to massive population shifts and created new public institutions and a totally new ethos of the public sphere to go with them. It re-defined extant notions of political and physical space .It created, even if it did not fully nurture, new notions of citizenship; who was a citizen, how to acquire the status, and the rights that go with it.

This would radically alter the structures of economic opportunity and class formation. Perhaps even more significant, colonialism also transported into the socio-political terrain, specifically Euro-American concepts of political organization such as nationalism, democracy, federalism, secularism, separation of powers, and even socialism (Feinstein1973) which

reshaped the perceptions, goals and methods of political actors(Nnoli,ed,1998.38-9). Much the same point is also made by Nnoli (1998. 4) when he says that Africa is a society under a sustained pressure of rapid change and is likely to be conflict-prone. He thinks that much more than Europe, Asia and the Americas, Africa has and continues to witness rapid socio-cultural, political and economic changes imposed on its population from outside the continent over the past hundred years.

This serves as the context within which to understand the dilemma between indigene ship and citizenship. In the same strain, Mustapha (Nnoli, ed.1998.49) laments what he calls the ossification of 'strangerhood' in the Nigerian constitution contrary to the historical dynamic of intergroup relations in many Nigerian communities.

Perhaps moving much further than Bakut, it is Mustapha's suggestion that a two-track definition of state membership incorporating indigeneity and longevity of residence and commitment is possible to resolve the issue. Whether this can allay the quite legitimate fears of swamping of a contested space by non-indigenes in democracy's game of numbers as the Jukun allege in Taraba state or the perceived economic and political power of settlers (*Jasawa*-Hausas) in Jos-North Local Government Area in Plateau state is another matter.

2.10 Environmental Conflict Theory.

We finally conclude the review by examining what is known as the environmental conflict theory. Here, we take stock of the contradictory body of literature on the environmental causes of violent inter-group conflict in developing countries. We review key scholarly works of the environmental conflict field and look at their shortcomings in areas such as research design, theory, and normative foundation.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, an ambiguous body of literature emerged on the theme of environmentally induced conflicts (Collier et al, 2003, *Geopolitics* 9 (Special issue), Ross 2004,Sulliman 1999). These studies hold the general claim that increasing resource scarcity and environmental degradation contribute to violent conflict. Contradicting these are scholars who have questioned the methodological and theoretical foundation of this view and findings (Carius et al, Ecologic 1999, Gleditsch, UNEP 2004, Soysa Global Environmental Politics,2(2002a), Dalby,2003).

Environmental Conflict theory is hardly coherent and has evolved a host of divergent conceptual approaches, methodologies and levels of analysis. Apart from this difficulty, there is the complexity of its being divided into specific sub-themes such as water conflicts, land and territorial disputes or conflicts over mineral resources including oil and diamonds.

The major strains of environmental conflict theory have evolved from the development of environmental security as a new theme in International Relations studies. Beginning with the 1980s, scholars (Westing, ed. 1986, Brock et al, 1999; Deudney, JIS 19(1990); Matthew 2002) aimed at including and linking conventional security thinking with such themes as environmental change and resource depletion.

This was a multi-disciplinary and largely conceptual debate which mobilized academic and political stakeholders. By the end of the cold war, it was expanded and became characteristic of a search for alternative paradigms in international affairs and security studies. In the main, the contributions were focused on the circumstances under which biophysical environment represents a threat to national and global security. Even right to the present moment the discourse on environmental security stresses the potential threats to stability and the broadening of (post) national security

2.10.1 Elements of Environmental Conflict Theory.

Most of the studies on environmental security lay strong emphasis on empirical evidence and a "process-tracing" methodology that is applied to numerous case studies. It focuses predominantly on causal links between environmental security, degradation and acute national and international conflict in developing countries and countries in transition. Two main research streams are evident. There the group of researchers at the university of Toronto directed by Thomas Homer Dixon, usually referred to as " the Toronto Group" (Dixon, *International Security* ,16 (1998); 19 (1994); *Population and Development Review*,21(1995); Environment, Security and Violence,1999; *International Security*,20 (1995).

A second group of scholars associated with the "Environment and Conflict Project" of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich and the Swiss Peace Foundation in Bern. These consists of such studies as Baechler, Change and Security Report, 4 (1998), Dordrecht 1999, Baechler and Spillman, (1996). Although both groups used different terminology and concepts, their main aim is to reveal empirically when and under what circumstances resource scarcity causes armed conflict. The analysis focused mainly on renewable resources that are key for food production such as cropland, freshwater, and forests. Both groups operated exclusively on the basis of ex-post analysis of cases where environmental scarcity had actually led to conflict. Consequently, both defined conflict typologies and theorized on the socio-political processes that led to violent conflict.

A third strand in the environmental conflict theory was a product of the criticism of the theoretical and methodological positions of the Toronto Group and to some extent that of Encop. This came from a number of researchers associated with the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in Oslo, Norway. This was a more heterogeneous group of scholars out to test

and validate or disprove conclusions of previous research. They used statistical methods and conducted large country tests. As a result of this, their efforts provided a "clearer picture of geographic and diachronic frequency distributions of environmental conflict cases" Through the use of quantitative models; they had a clearer perspective on the weight of the various variables in the studies and were therefore able to refine the existing models. They now included new ecologic and socio-political variables that focused on renewable and non-renewable natural resources.

In addition, they challenged the conclusions of the previous research especially the alleged determinism between resource scarcity and violent conflict. They however retained the alleged determinism between resource scarcity and violent conflict. They still continued the idea of investigating causalities and correlations between environmental variables and domestic armed conflict. Now included in their work was an insistent call for other independent and intervening variables such as poverty, political regime type, or cultural variables (Smith and Ostreng eds.1997, Gleditsch and Sverdrup, 2002, De Soysa, 2002a). However no new theoretical insights or ground-breaking concepts could be seen in their work.

Generally, the criticism of the environmental conflict theory has hinged on the robustness of research designs, the conceptual value of core variables, neo-Malthusian assumptions and a western-leaning bias. The Toronto Group for instance has been accused of violating important principles of research design such as lacking control groups, offering imprecise variables, and neglecting variation on the dependent variable (Eberwein in "*Environmental Change and Security: A European Perspective* "(2002). Sprinz (ibid.183-194) criticized their variables for appearing concurrently as causes and measures of environmental problems. He went further to accuse ENCOP of lacking an *ex ante* formulation of research hypotheses. Ronnfeldt criticized

the concepts for overly complex models which offer only general conclusions. Toset, Gleditsch and Hegre (*political Geography,* 2001) disapproved of "the widespread tendency in studies of environmental security to refer to future crisis as empirical evidence".

The conclusions of environmental conflict studies appear overly generalized and presumptive to explain settler/indigene conflicts. In this study, we however find particular relevance for environmental conflict theories in one respect. The mass migration of the Tiv in the 18th and 19th centuries is explained by demographic factors- the search for land. We also find of direct relevance the problem of the Tiv migrant labour in the production arena inside Taraba state. However, these identity platforms also appear to be part of the elite ideological manipulations to further their specific interests. In Nigeria, they seem to be facets of a prebendal political culture that motivates political elites and groups bent on exhorting privileged access to the national purse. They cannot therefore adequately account for the causes of these conflicts.

The study has sketched the historical background to show the essential character of the Nigerian state as imperialist forces cobbled it together in the context of self-interest. In doing this, we reveal the fault lines that underline the fragmentation and segmentation processes that have become the foundation of identity formation.

2.11 Theoretical Framework

It is a major contention of conflict theory that society is characterized by a continuous struggle within and between different groups. This friction between the various groups arises from the interaction between them over access to valued scare resources. These are located in economic, political and social contexts. Conflict is an inescapable feature of human society and so is change. Infact these can neither be progress or development unless change occurs. However, a distinct divide exists between two perspectives within the theory: the marxist and the

liberal conflict perspectives. The liberal perspective sees conflict and consensus as two co-existing features of conflict dynamics but the Marxist perspective predicts a final resolution of conflict by its elimination in a classless society.

The Marxist Perspective of Conflict

The Marxist conflict theory is encapsulated within the Marxist ideology. This is generally referred to as Marxist and is derived from the writings of Karl Marx and his associate, Fredrick Engels. This ideology is actually a critique of capitalism. In is basically based on a materialist conception of human history. It generally assumes thatk the mode of production of goods and services and the way the ezchange of these goods and services constitute the basis of all social process and institutions. Marx is of the firm view that it is the economy that is the foundation upon which s erected the superstructure of culture law and government. In this view, it is those who own the means of production that determines the economic fortunes of society, its political and social values.

It is the argument of Marx that society is divided into classes on the basis of the ownership or non-ownership of the means of production. In this view then, those who are property owners constitute a class and those that do not constitute another class. It is therefore the class between classes that private the motive force of history. This is the basis of the struggle between classes and is reflected in the contradiction between the forces of production and the social relations of production. In every human epoch, there is this conflict between the class that owns the means of production and those that do not. The conflict is engendered by the fact that the social relations of production (the relations which people in the production if the essential necessities of human existence must enter into) changes at a lower pace than the forces of production (this includes, science and technology and all those national things needed in the

course of production). The result is a revolution and conflict that produces change. Thus contained within each social epoch, is the ingredient for conflict between the contending social classes. In the slave-owning state, it is between the slaves and the slave owners; in the feudal state, it is between the nobility (the owners of the means of production) and the serfs (the class does not own the means of production). In the capitalist system, it is between the bourgeoisie, the owners of the means of production and the proletariat (those who must sell their labour). This constitutes what Marx calls the materialist conception or theory of history. The dynamics of social conflict and change Marx, refers to as material dialectic.

As already stated the basic difference between Marx's theory of social conflict and the others is the fact that in the former, there is a resolution in the social dynamics of conflict and change. This means that in the communist epoch that succeeds the capitalist epoch, socialism is achieved and this leads to the production of a classless society in which social classes are abolished. In this sense then, a permanent consensus is reached.

Marxist materialist interpretation of history has greatly enriched the general understanding of history but critics have accused him of economic determinism. That the idea of man being governed by materials needs reduces him to an earthbound beast that is utterly bereft of the devine and anything lofty (Williams Ebenstein, 1993).

In summary, these are tenets of Marxist dialectics:

(i) The law of the transformation of quantity into quality, according to which gradual quantitative changes give rise to revolutionary qualitative changes.

(ii) The law of unity of opposites which holds that the unity of concrete reality is that of opposites of contradictions.

(iii) The law of the negation of the negation which holds that in the clash of opposites, one opposite negates another and is in turn negated by a higher level of historical development that preserved forms of both negated entities. A process represented in the triadic schemes of thesis antithesis and synthesis. (Marx & Engels, 1973), selected works in three volumes, vol. 3, Moscon Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Liberal Perspective of Conflict

The major point of divergence o the Marxist theory of conflict with the rest lies in its prescription that in the end a consensus will be achieved in society and conflict eliminated. A host of other non-Marxist perspective hinge their analysis on the inescapable existence of conflict in society and its management. In their own view, a consensus can never be permanently achieved in the management of conflict in society. We examine these by taking a cursory look at theirl major theoretical positions.

Burton (1983):

"Conflict is a relation in which each party perceives the others' goals, values, interest and behavior as antithetical to its own"

Zartman (1991:370) observes that conflict is the result of interaction and contact among peoples. It is "an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decision and expression of the basic fact of human interdependence." Perhaps, moving the definitions a little closer to the causes of conflict, Stagner (1995:53) points out that may also be caused by "frustration in a relation or interaction". This is made even more explicit by Wright (1990:5) in observing that:

> *There are individuals and inconsistencies in the sentiments, purposes, claims or option of social entities in ideologies religion, and cultural areas, and when the parties initiate actions based on their perception and orientation, it may lead to social tension that in turn may make conflict more probable.*

These lie within the realm of psychocultural perspective which detail the fears and threats perceived by parties to a conflict, accounting for the intensity of the feelings involved. The psychocultural perspective seeks explanation at the overall level of conflict in society in terms of shared assumptions, perceptions and images about "what people in society values, their definitions of friends and foes, and the means, groups and individuals use to pursue their goals (Avruch, 1991). The truth of the matter however lies in the reality that conflict does not arise only from psychological disposition but from other environmental or structural factors prevalent in society notwithstanding the self-sustaining facts of historical irredentism.

Besides, the pyschocultural perspectives are the structural paradigms which emphasize the forces which can make a society more or less prone to particular levels and forms of conflict and violence. It is a rational-explanatory models which can explain one's friends and foes. Although structural and psychocultural explanations seem so different, yet in truth, they are not so incompatible. Each set of factors seeks to explain different aspects of conflict behavior. Thus the fears and threats that are identifiable with the pyschocultural model account for the intensity of feelings involved. However, only the structural model can rationalize for the reasons for actions takenk in particular directions (Ross, 1983:67). Structural models seek explanation of conflict, violence, and wars by focusing on how the organization or society determines action but pyschocultural models look to the actions themselves and how they interpret the world (Sandole and Sandole, 1987).

Central to the liberal perspectives of conflict is the theme that society is not static but in a constant flux. These produces change and arise from the contradiction in the human environment. This is perhaps why Dougherty (1977:330) has observed that conflict is a catalyst for development. In this sense, technological rivalry for instance has moved nations forward

technologically. These would seem to explain the reason for the reality of conflict bit cannot account for the immediate or specific reasons for particular conflict.

Perhaps moving the discussion further, Mitchell (1989) adduces the possible reasons for social conflict. He says, conflicts originate in individuals and group reactions to situations of scarce resources, in divisions of functions within society and in the differentiation of power and competition for a limited supply of goods, status, valued roles and power as an end in itself.

Actually, there is an extension of the "endemic conflict" thesis which emphasizes the positive functions of social conflict in producing social change or group cohesion. It is thus in this sense that Coser observed that:

> *Conflict is a form of socialization. This means essentially that….no group can be entirely harmonious, for it would then be devoid of process and structure. Groups require disharmony as well as association, and conflict within them is by no means altogether disruptive factors.*

Which is perhaps why Lee (1964:3-10) thinks that "the society without conflict is a dead society…" In the same sense, conflict helps in analytical thinking, increase cohesion and promotes competition which serves as a foundation for organizational development and even reduces tension. This appears to contradict the commonly held view of conflict as dysfunctional and negative.

The negative strain of thought in liberal scholars on conflict is identifiable with writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, (Cranston M., ed 1964.42) who sees man as selfish, cunning and unscrupulous in his popular book 'The Prince". The same reasoning as also found in the writings of Thomas Hobbs (1588-1679). Infact Hobbs shares with Marx the view that conflict is implicit in particular political systems (Ebenstein, 1969:1). Writing on this aspect o the dysfunctionality of conflict, Winkers (1975:56) observes that:

> *It is the conscious motives of man that makes him go to war, it is he 'dark soul' in man that makes him conflictual because, most atimes, man becomes comflictual on the reason of honor, wealth, fear of domination and the quest for superiority which are personal, inbuilt and of his negative side*.

George Simmel presents the peculiar view of that while conflict is unavoidable, it is complementary with peace. This means that they are interdependent and often interwoven. (Ikejiani-Clark ed, 2009:47). This contrasts sharply with the Marxist notion of conflict as so cumulative and connected that would make peace or resolution impossible except through the class struggle. These views however, present us with a skeletal module of explanation but generally fall short of the rank of general theories. Essentially, they are useful but in specific and fragmented contexts that need to be explained in detail.

We are inclined to choose Ralf Dahrendorf's conflict theory as the preferred theoretical framework of the study. Dahrendorf's ideas are similar to Simmel. He believes that society is characterized by both equilibrium (consensus) and conflict. His recommends that consensus should focus on value integration in human society while conflict should focus on conflict of interest as well as coercion. In dahrendorf's view, conflict is a likely result of prior consensus (defined as interaction) just as conflict can produce consensus. Both therefore are in this sense prerequisite for each other. However, the central idea of Dahrendorf is the notion of authority which he sees as being central in its structure. Cardinal to Dahrendorf is the notion of a differential distribution of authority in the society. In this sense, authority, invariably become the determining factor of systematic social conflicts.

Dahrendorf is not such a straight forward model but its usefulness for the study is the idea that authority in social organization as imbued with positions of super ordination (those in authority positions) and subordination (those in the same organization but without authority).

The central relevance of Dahrendorf's model for the study is his notion that individual while involved in serval social formation or groups/organizations do not occupy super-ordinate position in all of them. It therefore means that while a person may occupy a super-ordinate position in one organization, may occupy a subordinate position in another. also these exists in each organization, a dichotomous structure of authority. Meaning that the existence of or emergence of two conflict groups in each organization (with super-ordinate and sub-ordinate authority) characterizes interest that are both contradictory in substance and direction. This captured by Dahrendorf as:

> *This dissociation emerge from the fact that the same set of people do not occupy authority positions in all spheres of life, rather the person with authority in the political spheres may lack it in the religious spheres. Therefore, there exists a space for compromises and consensus (Okeibunor and Anugwom, 2002:79).*

Our choice of Dahrendorf's model despite its limitations as the preferred theoretical model is because it best explains the interests, roles, values, prejudices, sentiments and ideas of all the primary actors in the settler/indigene conflicts in Benue and Taraba States. It is therefore a more relevant model for guiding the task of explaning, analyzing and understanding the conflicts in the study area. For the Jukun, the super-ordinate authority of the Aku Uka does not translate to the political sphere where the local government chairman of Wukari Local Government council enjoys super-ordinate status. In democracy's game of numbers, the Tiv ethnic groups in Wukari are culturally subordinate in status where the Aku is super-ordinate but have the political; weight to determine who emerges as chairman of Wukari LGA (which they did in 1987). The central problem of the conflicts in Takum revolves around a traditional chieftaincy institution whose authority is super-ordinate but politically subordinate.

CHAPTER THREE

Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

Methodology is the fundamental basis of unity of all sciences. According to Nachmias, et al (1996:13), the distinction of the scientific mode of knowledge from the others are the basic assumptions on which it rests and its methodology. They define a scientific methodology as "a system of explicit rules and procedures upon which research is based and against which claims for knowledge are valuated". The major roles of methodology in the social sciences are in the areas of providing rules for communication; rules for reasoning and rules for inter subjectivity (Nachmias; 1996 14-15).

The chapter elaborates the research design, the characteristics of the study population, the sample and sampling techniques, the sources of data collection, the instruments for data collection, the validity of instruments of data collection, the method of data analysis and the limitations of the methodology.

3.2 Research Design.

The study is a cross-sectional, field case study of eight conflict sites involving four ethnic nationalities straddling two states in North Central Nigeria. It employs both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis.

A research design is a program that guides the investigator in the collection, analysis and interpretation of observations. It provides a logical model of proof that enables the researcher to draw inferences about the causal relations among the variables under investigation (Nachmias 1996. 98). According to Kerlinger (1977), a systematic, controlled empirical and critical investigation of hypothetical proportions about the presumed relations among natural

phenomena. A systematic attempt to provide answers to questions (Tuckman 1972:1). Nwana (1981:1) sees it as "a process of finding out the solution to a problem".

The use of both quantitative and qualitative methods is structured to overcome a specific problem noticed from the review of literature. Much of the research efforts in understanding ethnic conflicts and indeed settler/indigene conflicts employ qualitative methods. This is a method of data collection and analysis which is derived from the **verstehen** tradition of social scientific knowledge. It holds that because of the subject matter of the social sciences, it diverges from the natural sciences in approach. The German Sociologist, Max Weber (1864 – 1930) says if social scientists are to truly understand the behaviour of individuals and groups, they must have empathy. They must gain an understanding of the reality of the symbols, values and attitudes of their subject. But this methodology has been criticized for suffering from certain ethical, political and problems of generability. Nevertheless it does not diminish the reality that scientists must gain an empathic understanding of societal phenomena and recognize both the historical dimension of human and the subjective aspects of the human experience (Nachimias et al, 1996. 280).

The option of overcoming the challenge of primaery methods rests on the collection of data. Therefore the study also seeks quantitative data from primary sources. The research design is therefore structured to gather data from:

i. The material roots of settler/indigene ideology – land ownership/use, political and bureaucratic offices (beneficiaries) schools, clinics (comparative spread/benefits).

ii. The ideological platforms of settler/indigene conflicts – conceptions of citizens, indigenes, settlers, migration history, tradition and culture while the first answers to the

demands quantitative methods in the study, the second answers to that of qualitative methods.

The research design is structured to measure correlation of two key variables. These are politics and settler/indigene conflicts. This is done at the level of the units of analysis of the study. This are the perceptions, norms, attitudes and behaviour of the groups of ethnic nationalities involved in settler/indigene conflicts at the sites where the fighting takes place. This involves looking for the attributes found in the twin sources elaborated in the previous paragraph.

These are issues of claims to land, its use, power (political and bureaucratic office benefits of schools, clinics, and markets by the various groups. It also includes the benefits, norms, traditions, history, culture, perceptions of these groups. A related unit of analysis in the study is the examination of these attributes in individuals who belong to specific groups in occupational, gender, generational (age) clusters at the conflict sites.

A third option of overcoming the challenge of qualitative methodology is to use the data collection technique of triangulation. This is discussed in fuller detail in a subsequent section.

3.3 Population of the Study

The population is the entire set of relevant units of analysis or data is called the population. This includes the "aggregate of all cases that conform to some designated set of specifications" (Nachmias et al 1996: 179). As used here in the study, it is the aggregate of all contending ethnic nationalities involved in the conflicts in eight conflict sites straddling two states (Benue and Taraba) in Central Nigeria that are embroiled in fighting over socio-economic and political opportunities. These are; Abako, Sai, Gbeji and Jootar in Benue State and Takum,

Wukari Peva and Chanchanji in Taraba State. The opportunities are defined as land (ownership/use) and power (sharing of political and bureaucratic offices), schools (spread), clinics and (markets).

3.4 Sample Unit

A single number of a sampling population is referred to as the sampling unit. This could be an event, a voter, a household used in the study; it refers to one of those ethnic groups who fight others over claims to land and/or socio-economic opportunities using "settler" and "indigene" ideological platforms. It is normal for each sampling unit to have numerous attributes but as used in the study, the relevant ones are the ethnic ideological platforms which include the perceptions, attitudes, symbols, values, traditions, history of all ethnic groups. These constitute the ideological structure of the platforms used in the conflicts. The other relevant component attributes here are the size, use of land and the socio-economic and political opportunities.

3.5 Sample Frame.

In research, the definition of the population leads to the drawing of a sample that adequately represents that population (Nachimias et al, 1996. 181). A sampling frame is made up of a complete list of all sampling units in the population. Frame is made up of a complete list of all sampling units in the population. However under actual research conditions, this is rarely possible. Therefore, a substitute list is normally made. The process or procedures used in drawing up this list is the goal of the sampling process. The sampling frame is a list of the population that is representative, accurate and adequate.

"In the study, it is a list of all members of the ethnic groups involved in the conflicts using "settler" and "indigene" ideological platforms. It comprises of various strata of these groups involved in the conflicts in the area specified – the Middle – Belt region defined by the two states as the case study using settler / indigene ideological platforms.

3.6 Sample Design.

The definition of the population and sampling framework obvious the next challenge of the researcher – this concerns the representatives of the sample. For this reason, various sampling techniques are used to make sure that any sample drawn from the population is as representative of it as possible. This can be achieved right from the sampling design stage.

The study makes use of probability sampling methods which ensure that each unit of the population has an equal opportunity of being selected. This is done in first drawing up a cluster sample. This involves the selection of larger groupings such as the ethnic groups selected from the population. Then simple random samples are drawn by observing that each member of the ethnic groups selected cannot have another number of his/her family selected. So members of the groups drawn are selected from different families. The study also employs a stratified sampling method by drawing units from the various strata of the groups selected.

Thus samples are selected across various strata of the ethnic groups from family, generational, gender and occupational strata. At each stage, a proportional number of units are selected. Each ethnic group has a separate sample at each site surveyed.

3.7 Methods of Data Collection, presentation and Analysis.

Social scientists have a choice of methods of data collection. They have surveys, mail questionnaires, personal interviews and telephone interviews. Having decided what the research

is all about and how it is to be conducted, we proceed to the data collection stage. The recording of observations about the phenomena under study results in the collection of data. Nachmias (1996:204) lists four general forms of data collection. These are (i) observational methods (ii) survey research (iii) secondary data analysis (iv) qualitative research.

Each of these methods has its own strengths and weakness and also depends on the type of research being undertaken. By the design of this study, certain methods of data collection are adopted. One key part of the study is Qualitative research and it therefore employs a number of Qualitative research methods. Another key component of the study involves the collection of primary and secondary data. Primary data from the survey of the conflict sites and secondary data from Archival records, Census reports, Journals, Magazines, and Books.

The qualitative data is collected using such survey methods as focused group interviews, key informant interviews and semi-structured interviews.

This is done using a questionnaire with open – ended questions. These are questions that are not followed by any specified choice. It is normally used to elicit data about opinions, attitudes, sentiments, histories. Once respondents understand the intent of the question, they can express their thoughts freely, spontaneously and in a language of their own choice.

The focused group discussion interview mode is found suitable for the subjective nature of the topic and follows certain guidelines (i) it takes place with respondents known to have been involved in a particular experience. An example of such is to seen in the conflicts involving fighting under “settler” and “indigene” ethnic platforms. (ii) it refers to situations that have been analyzed prior to the interview. (iii) it proceeds on the basis of an interview guide specifying topics relating to the research hypotheses. In this study, the questionnaire serves as the guide and

is used for all the groups. (iv) it is focused on the subjects' experiences regarding the situations under study (Nachmias;1996.234).

In this study, it is about the experiences of Members of the ethnic groups. Focus Group discussion interviews are innovative methods of data collection which targets group values, beliefs, preferences, characteristics, problems, dynamics and success (FGD). It is an interviewing method aimed at selected groups with the goal of understanding group needs, characteristics, and dynamics within the context of an issue under study. In this study, it is targeted at the ethnic groups involved in the conflicts (Obasi, 1999:167-68).

The FGD can be used to study such groups as artisans, rural famers, market women, old men and old women, primary school teachers, university lecturers, civil servants, medical doctors etc. A normal FGD is recorded both on tape and on paper. The main researcher serves as the moderator of the interview session while the assistant records the proceedings.

In FGD sessions, a small group of between 4 – 10 people is selected and in this study, it is from all the ethnic groups at each conflict site. It is done separately for all the groups involved. Ten people are randomly selected across gender, age, religion, marital status and occupational strata in the following order: (i) 1 adult male (ii) 2 adult females (iii) 3 male youths (iv) 4 female youths.

During the sessions, the moderator ensures that a suitable environment is arranged, personal particulars recorded, all members participate and none dominates the discussion.

Through FGD, data on a group experience on problems can be generated in a comparative perspective. It requires a code for analysis of the data.

The same questionnaire is also used in the study to collect data by interview separately from key informants. There are as follows: at least two people of gender who are community leaders, chiefs, family heads, traditional persists, civil servants and politicians.

The same questionnaire is also used in conducting semi-structured interviews with five respondents from each ethnic group. These are in the ratio of male (3) to (2) female leaders in occupational, community-based organizations, one of which must be a youth group.

As already stated, the study in the adoption of the political economy approach, seeks to collect both primary and secondary data. This is based on the premise that ideological orientations are but a superstructure emanating from a socio-economic and political base that nourishes it. Beneath these ethnic platforms are to be found, the material conditions of existence of these groups as they seek to provide food, shelter, clothing and other essentials of sustenance within their defined environment. The truth is that we cannot ignore production and consumption in the understanding of any social problem. This is the reason for the second guide to the second goal. It is used in the construction of a format to collect primary data from the following:

i. Land – ownership structure and mode of use such as land tenure system.

ii. Schools – comparative spread, number per conflict site, specific areas of grievance.

iii. Clinics – comparative spread and number.

iv. Markets – marketing structure, beneficiaries, and potential conflict flash points.

v. Sports and recreation – social amenities, spread beneficiaries.

vi. Political/bureaucratic offices – sharing format, beneficiaries, areas of grievances.

The study also employs secondary data using content analysis from books, archives, journals, newspapers, magazines. Notable in this regard is the demographic data by the Nigerian population commission publications.

3.8 Triangulation

Research very generally takes place in various settings – formal or informal with the use of verbal (oral or written) or non – verbal personal methods. These seek information on personal definitions of ethnic identity under "indigene", "settler" and "citizen" concepts on migration history; on tradition, culture differences and on the nature and levels of discrimination/marginalization responses.These requires various forms of data collection. Four major forms of data are obtainable and are used in the study from verbal and non-verbal acts or responses and in two settings – primary sources and secondary sources. The combinations of methods used in this study are observational methods, survey research (interviews and questionnaires), content analysis from secondary data, and qualitative research. As pointed out earlier each of these data collection methods has its own merits and also some inherent shortcomings. For example, qualitative research data has the limitation of generalization.

When research findings are limited by the data collection methods used, social scientists use two or more methods of data collection to test hypotheses and measure variables (Nachmias 1996). This is part of the design of this study. The objective is to minimize the specific problems of qualitative research. For example, the limited sample size is counterbalanced by the primary data obtained from the survey on the material roots of ideological conflicts at the sites and by secondary data.

This method of dealing with the degree of specificity of certain methods is called triangulation. It is the major logic in the data collection and analysis stages in the study.

3.9 Method of Data Analysis

Analysis of data in social science research is generally divided into two main types: qualitative and quantitative. Although elements of quantitative research such as diagrams and flow charts are used in qualitative research, the Verstehen tradition indulges in empathic understanding of social phenomena and is inductive in nature. It uses mainly field research methods, mainly case studies which take place in natural settings. It employs much descriptive material in its analysis. It is based on the logic of showing how the observations help to analyze data by isolating the variables (by induction) and how these might be developed into theory (Nachimias et al, 1996). This study employs a lot of descriptive research methodology to analyze the data.

a) According to Nachmias, (1996. 294) the analysis of qualitative data is done using certain regularities or patterns that are noticed from the observations recorded in the course of fieldwork. The study adopts the model of conflict dynamics to analyse data collected, History of the relationship, the primary and secondary actors, the structures (factional goals, attitudes and behavior), the intensity (low, moderate or extreme violence), Strategies adopted by parties, including communication pattersn and interactions between parties, the patter of regime responses, and the facilitators of conflict transformation.

The study also uses semiotics, the science of signs. It examines tell- tale signs of conflict in specific things or ways in the conflict as in the following:-

i. Bill/sign boards
ii. Town names
iii. Occupational trends
iv. Cultural Analysis of the ethnic groups

The analysis of the quantitative data is done by looking at the issues chosen for examination as described earlier – land, schools, clinics, markets, sports and recreation and political/bureaucratic offices. The analysis will use inferential statistics, percentages, ratio, frequencies, and graphs, pie charts, to evaluate comparative spread, beneficiaries and potential factors that breed grievances or discontent.

CHAPTER FOUR

Historical Overview of the Study Area

4.1 Introduction

The chapter gives a general historical overview of the major themes that give understanding of the evolution of the various group identities in a newNigerian state.It weaves the intricate canvass of the various group identities within the developments in the nation. This concerns such issues as Federalism and regionalism, the problems of the majority-minority clash, constitutional roots of settler/indigene definitions.The chapter gives a view of the historical context of the evolution of group identity and perspective.

4.2 Historical Evolution of ethnic politics and identities in Nigeria

The Nigerian nation-state like that of most African states was a creation of European imperialism (Uwazie et al; ed.: 1999.2, Nnoli: 1998.10, Otite et al; 2001.18, Abah; ed. 2003). The various ethnic groups that presently populate the country were arbitrarily carved into one entity by an external force-British colonialism which designed and shaped it according to their imperial interests. Largely through the activities of George Goldie and his Royal Niger Company, the colony was secured by the Berlin treaty of 1885. The Northern and the Southern protectorates were brought together to become Nigeria by Fredrick Lugard in 1914. The Federal system with strong regional units in the First Republic (1960-1966) was effected by constitutional adoption under colonial rule by the Richards and the Macpherson constitutional arrangements in 1946 and 1951 respectively. The parliamentary system of Government was adopted by the Independence constitution from the arrangements of the constitutional talks in London by 1958.

The Nigerian Federation that emerged as an independent nation in 1960 was a product of British imperial interests and not a creation of the voluntary consent of the parties that presently

constitute it (Abah: 2003.3). Nigeria is largely based on a tripod of three major ethnic groups. The Hausa and the Fulani dominate the North; the Yoruba the South-West and the Ibo the South-East. The remaining part of what is estimated to be well over 300 ethnic nationalities are scattered in between the major three in various proportions and localities.

The majority versus minority conflict in Nigerian politics is a product of these facts of the Nigerian State. Minority fears of domination by the majority are real and motivated the complaints that led to the Willinks commission from 1958 by the British colonial government (Hembe; 2003, Mustapha in Nnoli, ed. 1998.3). Some historical accounts (Uwazie:1999.8) have observed that to say that the British united Nigeria is a wrong interpretation of Nigerian history, alleging that the exigencies of imperial economic interests, manpower and geographical factors more than anything else dictated the amalgamation of the two protectorates of Nigeria (Tseayo: 1974; Ikime: 1986, Otite; 2001).

Examination of key stages in the political development of Nigeria will help our understanding of the background to the conflict between various ethnic groups. These are mainly, British colonial economic and indirect rule policies and Nigeria's constitutional history. The character of the state that was fashioned pre- and post-independence appears to have affected the relationship between the state and her citizens, and critically too, that between the citizens themselves. One significant feature of colonial rule that helps to explain conflicts between ethnic groups in Nigeria lies in the colonial policy of indirect rule.

The policy meant the government of the colony through the chiefs, traditions and customs of the people. British colonial officials were meant to remain at the background and implement colonial tax policies, maintenance of law and order and building of public infrastructures such as roads, bridges through labor conscription by passing their instructions

through the local chief. In such areas of northern Nigeria as the emirates of the former Sokoto caliphate, the well-established and efficient bureaucracies operated by the emirs and those ethnic nationalities with a centralized authority such as the Jukun, indirect rule was successful.

The process by which the colonial state wove into social policy its principles, interests and ideology using the institutions and values of the Nigerian people it had conquered produced different responses and results. Farther down south in Yoruba land where the Oba had limited authority, the policy was a qualified success. However in those areas with polities with diffused political structures and republican ethos such as among the Ibo in the east and the Tiv in the middle-belt area, indirect rule miserably failed.

The British sought to remedy this failure by creation of a 'warrant' chief system and by co-opting collaborators and yoking them to the emirs and the native authorities. This practice also saw the arbitrary carving up of ethnic groups between two or more native authorities as happened up to 1914 when the Tiv were split between the Obudu district in southern Nigeria and the expanded Wukari Federated Native authority to the north. It also featured the subordination of non- Muslim ethnic minorities of the middle-belt area to the dominant emirate system of the then Northern Region (Turaki,1993). In order to dominate African subjects, Colonial policy used divide and rule tactics to manipulate ethnic consciousness and regional sentiments to keep the people apart along religious, tribal and regional lines (Okpeh et al, 2007.96).

Certainly such indirect rule practices can help to explain the present eruptions of settler/indigene clashes. The more recent instances of these are in the southern part of Kaduna state in Kafanchan (1992 and 1999) where the settler/indigene conflict took on a religious form among other reasons. This includes clashes in Zagon Kataf (Kaduna state) in April 2001; Other's are in Wase, in July 2002 and Jos in 2001and November 2008 in Plateau state and in Bauchi

town (Bauchi state) in 1999 and 2009. In Taraba state, the settler/indigene clashes have been between the Jukun and the Tiv and the Kuteb and Chamba, Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups. Nnoli (1978.113) has argued that the British rule was anything but indirect and took a heavy toll on the social-political and economic lives of the ethnic communities by reinforcing communal identities which had been previously non-existent.

Turaki (Turaki,1993.63-64,143) describes how it not only enhanced the notoriously unchecked authoritarian powers of the emirs and chiefs but also institutionalized the inferiority status of the non-muslim people of the middle-belt (Kukah, 2003.3). It has become apparent that recent studies of post- colonial African societies have laid disproportionate emphasis on the colonial disarticulation of the economy and not their inter-group relations. These conflicts are best understood in the context of such colonial policies. The Nigerian Council Bill of 1910 ensured the amalgamation of 1914 but Lugard continued to govern the North as a separate entity by proclamation. This continued the special relationship of the British with the North which had started with the introduction of indirect rule.

The differences between Northern and Southern Nigeria continued when the North was insulated from the Clifford Constitution's introduction of the elective principle into Nigerian politics in 1922.When Bernard Burdillon colonial Governor of Nigeria in 1939 split the southern provinces into two but left the North intact, the stage was set for structural imbalance that would divide a people in whom the native policy of indirect rule had already instituted ideas of separateness and exclusiveness. In sheer landmass, size and population the North outstripped the other two divisions of Nigeria (Abah; 1986.3).

The Arthur Richards' constitution of 1946 gave constitutional support to the Regional structure of Nigeria. Thus the Federal system introduced by the Oliver Littleton constitution in

1954 was one of unequal partners steeped in mutual antagonism and suspicion among the nascent Petty-Bourgeois elite in a country that now seemed to be made of only the three dominant ethnic nationalities each secluded in its regional enclave.

These constitutional developments laid the foundation for the Independence constitution of 1960.This period introduced fractious elite competition through the politics of regionalization, ethnic bigotry, mutual antagonism, intolerance and confrontation in the first republic. Political Parties sprouted out of the cover of pan- ethnic bodies-the Action Group out of the Egbe omo Oduduwa in the West, the Northern Peoples Congress out of the Jamaa mutanen Arewa and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons out of the Ibo State Union and remnants of the Nigerian Youth Movement in the East.

These contributed to competition and a lack of elite consensus that eventually led to the military coup of January 1966 which itself triggered the counter coup d'état of July1966.Clashes among mobilised ethnic groups in Nigeria helped to push the first republic into a civil war in1967. In place of the old regional structures, the military created states in 1967. This apparently has only highlighted another dimension to identity conflicts in Nigeria. That it is a problem with a hierarchy of layers-there are minorities within minorities and successive creation of states in 1976,1987 and 1996 has not resolved the old problems of competition, fear, domination and marginalization (Ikime:2001.65, Alubo:2006.57, Toure:2003.23).

The major contributions of the 1979 (chapter1 section 14(3) and the 1999 (section 14(3-4)constitutions point to the divisiveness of Nigeria's political elites in their network of squabbles over economic benefits and is a recognition of the Federal character principle and a Quota system. In essence, this amounts to a nativisation of citizenship in Nigeria (Alubo: 2006.68).This

outline charts the character of Nigerian citizenship and its role in the history and politics of identity conflicts in Nigeria.

The nature of colonial economic policy also forms a meaningful background to our study of settler/indigene conflicts in the central region of Nigeria within which Benue and Taraba states are located. Nnoli (1980.14) cites the introduction of commodity production as a major destroyer of the intricate web of kinship ties that welded pre-colonial society together. He notes how their introduction impersonalized relationships based on complex roles in the production process and brought in divisive competition for the market under colonialism.

The creation of new values of individualism and competition created countervailing blocks of solidarity groups based on shared language and culture vying for spoils of the market. The spiraling emergence of new and more groups with their own identities spewed competition in the market place. This background to the study provides a useful insight into the territorial nature of the conflicts and most significantly, the often neglected disarticulated social relations of production that became a product of the colonial imposition in the post-colonial period. It appears to pit two critical concepts against each other, namely citizenship and kingship. Manipulative colonial policy would lead to a redefinition of boundaries of ethnic groups in the colonial period. Adaptation to the demands of the commodity markets also led to a fragmentation and segregation of commodity enclaves all cut off from each other. Thus Cocoa production became an exclusively Yoruba/western preoccupation, Groundnuts and Cotton in the North, the central region had beniseed and Soyabeans, Palm oil in the East and Rubber in the Mid-west. The same pattern also obtained in the exploitation of mineral wealth.

This disarticulated nature of colonial economy also impacted negatively on ethnic relations. The serious study of identity conflicts in Nigeria can be seen in the works of Nnoli

(1978, 1989, and 1998) which have established contemporary forms of ethnic conflict in the urban setting in both the colonial and post-colonial society. This position appears to have been shifted farther by other studies notably by Egwu (Nnoli, ed.1998) which have noted the development of a rural variant of ethnic conflict based on an ideology of land. Other studies such as that by Mustapha (Nnoli, ed. 1998.27-51) have observed processes of continued segmentation and fragmentation leading to exclusion and impeded access of groups to full citizenship in the nation-state in post-colonial society.

This has not only questioned previously existent identities but also increased identity formation and boundary redefinition giving vent to issues of citizenship status, a sense of belonging and what is commonly referred to as the National Question. It is quite evident that at the moment settler/indigene conflicts like ethnicity as observed by Nnoli (1978) shows a highly mutant character, resonating sometimes with religion, politics and class. It is also important that we note too that settler/indigene forms of identity conflict show a recurring ethnic variable. They are however distinct in character and indeed have surpassed the former in volatility and scale. As evidence shows, settler/indigene conflicts can involve several ethnic groups in tactical alliances against the 'othered' ones who are to be eliminated. It is thus because of the present theoretical problems that we are motivated to search for empirical evidence that could help to explain the violent eruptions in Benue, Plateau and Taraba, Oyo, Kaduna, Bauchi and Nasarawa state

4.3 Tiv Migrations and Settlement in the Benue Valley

Written accounts of Tiv history are mostly charted from the later period of the 19th century. As a people, they numbered 1.5million and were ranked 6th by order of size of Nigeria's ethnic groups by the 1963 census. They are presently scattered across four states in the Middle-belt region, namely, Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa and Plateau. According to Tiv oral tradition and

most other notable accounts (Makar 1994, Bohannan 1952, Doward 1971), Tiv had only two children by which this nationality is sub-divided.

A generally acceptable account is that the Tiv migrated from the Congo area in Central Africa to a place called Swem in the Bamenda highlands in North-Western Camrouns (Downes 1971, Bohannan 1952, Akiga 2003). For reasons that still remain shrouded in conjecture, the Tiv left Swem and moved northwards across the Bamenda highlands, rivers Moan and Mkomen on to Nwange hill, on the Northern frontier of present-day Cameroun. From Nwange hill, the Tiv are reported to have moved in three broad streams to colonize the territory that they presently occupy in the Benue Valley (Makar, 1994.).

According to Makar (1994.10), the Tiv met a host of atoatiev-foreigners but pioneer settlers in the area- Ugee, Utange, Undir, Ukwese, Ulive, Ugbe and Iyon. Other scholars such as Abraham (`1940) and Greenberg (1949) have also accepted the Central Africa abode of origin. Yuhe (1978) has suggested the hostility of neighbours as a probable cause of the migrations while Makar (1994. 5) puts it down to a probable population explosion and /or infertile land. What is however very certain is that the entrance of the Tiv into the Benue Valley was anything but peaceful and they fought wars with various nationalities such as the Jukun, the Chamba, the Udam, Alago, Idoma, Utange and Ugee.

In fact, the subsequent course of Tiv movement within the Benue valley was triggered by a fateful clash with one of their most formidable adversary- the Chamba. A major theme in the history of the Benue valley is the Tiv-Chamba military clash on the western banks of river Katsina-Ala, at the foothills of Ushongo hills and on the western bank of the Donga River (Makar1994. 32). These wars had disastrous consequences for both parties- it broke the military supremacy of the Chamba in the area and caused a great dispersal of the Tiv in all directions. So

profound were the changes brought by these wars that the Tiv would move to occupy a pre-eminent place in the Benue valley that Downes estimates that by 1850 before the colonial intrusion, were well established south of the Benue river (Downes 1952).

The observation by Makar that Tiv migration was motivated by socio-economic rather than military objectives does not however obscure the fact that they now emerged as the greatest power in the Benue Basin and they made the best of acquiring land and spreading as they saw fit (Hembe 2003.39). Indeed, so menacing did the movement of the Tiv become to Jukun territory to the North that at a point the Aku Uka had to engage the services of a notorious Fulani mercenary,Dankaro (called Damkor by the Tiv) to help protect Jukun territories against continued Tiv encroachment (Hembe 2003.40). That the Jukun at this point were militarily weak was obvious and their efforts to protect their territories proved futile and had to wait the coming of the British colonialists with dire consequences for Tiv/Jukun relations. Hembe summarizes the situation:"on their arrival the British colonial masters took note of the migratory tendency of the Tiv people and they made up their minds to put a stop to it".

This British attitude to the Tiv would prove decisive and would become a major factor in Tiv-Jukun relations during the colonial period and even after. With much determination, the British set out to put a stop to the *Munchi* menace and began to draw up arbitrary boundary lines called the *Munchi* wall to herd in the Tiv. These boundary lines would put the Tiv at a great disadvantage relative to their Jukun neighbours and forms an important background in the present conflicts.

4.4 The Entrance and Settlement of the Jukun in the Benue Valley

There are two accounts of Jukun genealogy. The first is associated with a long dead empire described as the Kwararafa kingdom which is said to have flourished some centuries in

antiquity. The evidence for this are references inferred from a translation of the Kano Chronicles, an account of letters written by various royal personalities and a list of the kings of Kano as translated by H.R. Palmer(Jacobs in Odey et al.2007.302). This theory is largely the work of R. Palmer and C.K. Meek who saw in the Jukun a race of Hamites who migrated from Egypt and brought with them the concept of divine kingship.

A second version of Jukun origin was given support by the publication in 1963 of J. H. Greenberg's version of his classification of African languages. Greenberg groups the Jukun and other languages closely related to it under the group name Jukunoid, a sub-family of the Benue-Congo. Now according to Shimizu's study of Jukunoid languages, the general location of most of the languages lies in the area along the Cameroonian border. Instead of a northern abode of origin from Yemen or Egypt this version traces the Jukun to the south.

The significance of this account lies in later developments during colonial rule which saw the British in the major role of protectors of the Jukun, against the other ethnic nationalities especially the Tiv. For the battle henceforth would rage along the divide of those who supported the Jukun against the Tiv such as Palmer and Freemantle(the emirate school) and those who supported the Tiv such as Ruxton, Gordon, Rowe and McKay (the Tiv school).

It is important to note that Jukun-Tiv contacts were not always problematic and the two peoples cooperated in many ways. For one, extensive trading links existed between them long before the British came. The Jukun for instance, supplied the Tiv with salt from mines in the Awana-Arufu region(Makar1994.43).Tiv women made and sold pots bought and used by Jukun women who used these in their *Tashi* or local beer brew sold to Tiv consumers at local markets (Agbe in Akinwunmi ed.2006.276).The Tiv also shared close cultural ties with the Jukun and at a period in Tiv history, a form of chieftaincy institution , *Tor Agbande* (Drum chiefs) was

conferred on individuals by religious rites from the **Aku Uka**, the Jukun king (Akiga 2003.400, Makar, 1994. 60, Hembe 2005. 70). Besides ,both the Tiv and the Jukun claim Wukari, the capital of the Jukun king as their own and it served the interests of the Jukun to have the Tiv do the farming and leave them with their fishing and Salt and Galena-mining activities.

It appears to have served both parties very well. For this reason therefore, intermittent Jukun anxiety and actions over the pronounced Tiv presence around Wukari did not elicit the hostility which the British came to stoke. In fact it is told of an incidence in which a Tiv man, Buryako was appointed to the office of Agaiya by Aku Zakanju Tsonkwa (R. C. Abraham, N.N.Nak.34, Odey ed.1980.325). Tiv migration into Wukari rose to such unprecedented levels that according to Bohannan, by the 1950s, over half the subjects of the **Aku Uka** were Tiv (Tiv Economy.5). This situation would alter irretrievably at the arrival of the British. Through a policy of divide and rule, the British arbitrarily demarcated the frontier limits between the Tiv and the Jukun as well as other neighbours with the absolute belief that the Tiv were mere settlers. Freemantle drew a "*Munshi wall*" that sought to protect Jukun territory from Tiv domination. To protect the Jukun from the Tiv horde of" settlers", a ring policy had to be implemented. Later, some parts of Tiv land proper was put under the authority of the Wukari Native authority and the **Aku Uka** in the Muri Province (Agbe 2007 Akinwunmi 2007.337.). The seeds of a fateful conflict were sown and provide an essential background to the study.

4.5 The Chamba and Kuteb Settlement in the Benue Valley.

The Chamba are also sometimes referred to as the Ugenyi in Tiv oral traditions, occupied a very strategic place in the Benue valley before being displaced by the Tiv. According to Makar (1994.31) Chamba elders at Takum are agreed that their place of origin is Tibati in the Cameroons. This appears to have resonance with other historical sources as well (Akinwunmi ed.

2007.523).The Chamba then migrated to Adamawa where they clashed with the Fulani. The following are the segments of the Chamba: Tikari, Jidu, Pari, Lufum and what is known as the Chamba proper- Pyeri, Daka Nupabi and poba.

The Chamba broke up into two major streams- one settling at Donga on the western banks of the Katsina-Ala river and another at Takum. What is apparent from the Chamba account is that migrations in the Benue valley before the British intrusion were quite fluid. The Chamba for some time played a strategic role in the area as attested to by some of their neighbours, most notably the Tiv. There existed extensive social and economic links between the Chamba and the Tiv. The Tiv accept that they learnt the art of circumcision from the Chamba as well as fishing, cloth weaving and sack making. The Chamba also supplied salt in the trade (Akiga 2003).

What is apparent from various sources is that at a point the Chamba were a military power that it is claimed even conquered the numerically superior Kuteb of Takum and posed a formidable threat to Tiv expansion. What is significant in Chamba history here is that their clash with the Tiv led to the latter's dispersal in the Benue valley. This fateful collapse of Chamba military power allowed the Tiv the strategic reach to expand without hindrance and consequently lay the basis of the settlement problems involving all the groups in the area. This account also frames the background to the present crises in Takum Local Government Area. Here as in Wukari British divide and rule policies subordinated the numerically superior groups, namely the Tiv, Chamba and Kuteb to the rule of the Jukun. These are the same ingredients of a conflict that presently pits all the groups against each other in the area.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Characteristics and Basis of the Settler/Indigene Conflict in Benue and Taraba States

5.1 Introduction

The chapter involves a presentation and analysis of qualitative data collected from the field work. We start with a socio-demographic report of the conflict sites to provide a background to our findings. The data is presented using the concept of conflict dynamics which involves the following: the history of the relationship, the primary and secondary actors, the strurtures of conflict (factional goals, attitudes and behaviors), the intensity of the conflict (low, moderate and extreme violence), strategies adopted by the parties including their communication and interactions between parties, the patters of regime responses and the facilitators of conflict transformation.

We start with an analysis of data collected from the second (oral) survey, present our findings and analyze them. Then we follow with a description of the sample and the respondents and take stock of the discernable patterns and the variables in focus.

Certain general characteristics of our respondents are worth noting here: none of the respondents is less than twenty and none more than ninety-five. From the results of the oral interviews, there appears to be an overbearing ethnic perception and slant of the responses- none is spectacularly deviant. Most lie within the stereotypical range-flowing with the ethnic account of most issues.

This perhaps suggests that the social values of the most active and influential members of people involved in the conflicts are deeply embedded with perceptions ranging from disagreeable to even hate of ethnic “enemies” in their public views.

This inference needs some qualification. Interactions with people from all ethnic groups and general observation of post –conflict street- level relations are remarkably different from their public views. A herd instinct pervades all groups, in public. We examine data from all the

respondents in all eight conflict sites concerning the frequencies of the patterns which we define here as "how often people are discriminated against due to perceptions that they are "settlers" or "foreigners?" The responses from the Tiv in conflict sites located in Taraba state are decidedly positive that almost every time and everywhere, a Tiv in Taraba will suffer discrimination of whatever kind (an average of 73.6%). The Jukun inside Taraba are not generally targeted but feel their Tiv neighbors are bigoted in their perceptions about them (69%). Those inside Benue feel the same as their Tiv counterparts inside Taraba.

5.2 Socio- Demographic Report of the Conflict Sites.

The conflict sites in both Benue and Taraba Sates are populated by neighboring Jukun and Tiv ethnic nationalities that straddle the common border (See Appendix B & C). The socio-economic setting of all groups living at the conflict sites is fairly basic. In both the urban and rural settlements, farming, fishing and marketing are still the main occupations of the vast majority of the people. The family household is the main socio-economic unit of social organization in all the ethnic groups in the area. These are the Chamba, the Kuteb, the Jukun, the Fulani and the Tiv.

Peasant subsistence production of certain food crops such as Millet, Maize, Beans, and Corn is still dominant. Although family labour is still the main source of labour, contract labour also exists. The production of the chief agricultural crop, yams, has become both subsistence and a commercial crop and indeed the mainstay of the agrarian economy. Its production is also very dependent on the contract labour system. New houses using modern materials of technology are liberally scattered especially in the Tiv settlements with the odd satellite antennae. This is perhaps indicative of the changing social status of these inhabitants. The production arena is the

hub of all forms of socio-economic activity. It appears to be the nerve centre of the life, the politics and indeed the conflicts of these societies.

5.2.1 The Area of the Conflicts

A shown on the map (See Appendix D), the conflict sites in both Benue and Taraba states are located on sections of two Federal Roads – Gbeji on the Wukari- Kwatan-Sule road and the rest on the Wukari- Takum Federal road. There are no major demographic features except for the hills at Takum. The general terrain is open grassland plains transversed by several rivers and streams. The wet season generally lasts from mid-April to October while the dry harmattan (dry season) lasts from November end to March. Both seasons provide different levels of water and grasses but are of serious importance to the Fulani pastoralists who have become a major factor in the conflicts in the area. The major areas of their presence are in Wukari and Takum Local Government Areas of Taraba State.

All the conflict sites in Benue –Abako and Sai, Jootar and Gbeji and are located in two local government areas –Katsina – Ala and Ukum respectively . These sites except for a motley number of resident Nigerian citizens are populated by the Tiv ethnic group.

The socio-economic picture of Takum town (population, 134, 576; 2006 census) is more evenly distributed among the major ethnic nationalities involved in the conflicts there. These are the Chamba, the Kuteb and the ekpan Jukun. The major issue of conflict in Takum is a chieftaincy title – the chief of Takum town. In the fringe of these major parties to the conflict are the Tiv in the outlying settlements and the ever-roving Fulani and Hausa residents.

5.2 Benue State

There are four study sites in Benue state; these are Abako, Sai, Gbeji and Jootar. These are also conflict sites. These settlements are some of the places where the fighting took place.

While Abako and Sai are in Katshina-Ala Local Government Area, Gbeji an Jootar are in Ukum Local Government Area. All these sites are situated right on the border between Benue and Taraba, Gbeji sits on the Wukari – Kwatan Sule-Makurdi Federal road; Jootar lies on the Wukari – Zaki-biam road; Abako and Sai lie on the Wukari – Takum road.

All the study sites in Benue state are mainly populated by the Tiv. Here power or political offices are shared according to a rotational policy that shares everything according to Kingship ties. Due to the Tiv sharing philosophy of "Yan na angbian" (eat and give to your brother), political offices are shared according to rotational agreement. Since the sites are wholly populated by one ethnic group, the Tiv, we cannot meaningfully infer any discrimination or domination. In fact the political offices are shared within the group. The bureaucratic offices are regulated by the relevant laws and bodies which implement recruitments into the bureaucracy whether at the Local Government Area level or at the State level.

The sharing of offices, schools, clinics and other facilities in the sites in Benue state does not present any overt causative inference, what is relevant is the location of these sites- they are sitting right at the vortex of the actual fighting and violence. A summary of the profile of the sites is given as follows:

(a) Abako: This is a town of 587 people made up of 530 males and 511 females (2009 census). It is a Tiv dominated town that was formerly in Taraba until 1992. The predominant occupation of the inhabitants of this settlement is farming. It is located right at the common border between Benue and Taraba which is the Wukari – Takum road. Abako was burnt down by the Jukum in 1990. It has a big yam and produce market with an estimated turnover of between ₦80, 000 and ₦100, 000 per market. The major causative register of the conflicts here are the

people with farmland inside Taraba. Majority of the farmers here sit on the border itself but go to farm on land inside Taraba.

Abako has two secondary schools, one private and one Government- owned, three primary schools but no business outfit other than the market. The settlement is part of a council ward and elects one councilor into the Katshina-Ala Local Government Council. The survey recorded 85 motor cycle taxis (Achaba) as the most viable business endeavor besides the market. Interestingly Abako has a very high register on inter-ethnic relations – the market is frequented by the Jukun in droves. No recreational facilities and over half of the active young people here are unemployed.

(b) Sai: is an Old Dutch Reformed Mission Church (DRMC) out post which received Christian missionaries as far back as 1911, Akiga (2003). Here as in Abako, the major occupation is farming. Sai also sits astride the Wukari – Takum Federal road which is also the boundary between Benue and Taraba states. It also has a produce market but on a much smaller scale and volume of business than Abako. It has a population of 1, 041 (530 males and 511 females). It has six schools (primary and post primary). Four are privately – owned, two by Government (one primary and one secondary). It also has one ill-equipped vocational skill center. As a result of the conflicts in the area, a mobile police cantonment has been sited at Sai.

Sai has 3 privately-owned clinics (1 missionary church- owned). The poverty here is almost palpable and over 60% of the young are unemployed. Most are not educated up to even school certificate level. The school drop-out rate here is quite high, it is even worse for girls. What is very pronounced here is crime-armed robbery on a syndicate level, as a result, insecurity is quite high here. The police are outgunned, out manned and most inadequate. The army command from Takum periodically (because of epidemic crime wave levels), have to sweep Sai

and its environs. Sai, Abako and Chanchanji supplies the bulk of the ethnic "foot solders" for the fighting.

Sai has a very high register of Kinship ties as well as claims to land ownership. Apart from claiming and using land inside Taraba itself, it has a town settlement in Ananum, Ananum is a Tiv settlement populated by blood relations of Sai who migrated to their present location inside Taraba even before the colonial intrusion. Therefore kinship ties are the major causative register here. Besides, Sai is less than ten kilometers from Chanchanji, the strategic Jukum settlement along the Wukari – Takum road.

A major factor in the fighting here are the young unschooled, unemployed but very active young men who are the ethnic militia executing the actual fighting.

(c) Jootar: A settlement of Tiv refugees from inside Taraba State. People uprooted by spill over violence from the UMBC – NPC so –called "Tiv riots" from Benue provinces and the usual Tiv-Jukun fighting in 1966. The original founding group is dais to have been led by Yeke Bogo. He was followed by Tangur Gaza and another party of displaced people. The original idea of the settlement was aptly spelt out in the spirit of "Kaa mem" (come and rest) which was how these founders saw things, they came from Chonku (a town the Tiv call Choku).

By the 1991 population census, Jootar has a population of 1, 728 (823 males and 905 females). It has a yam market that at period of the survey comatose. As a result, farmers from here, who are major segment of the population, have to carry their produce (mostly yams) to Wukari yam market. A new police station was also being built.

Due largely to a negligent Local Government attitude towards Jootar, most issues involving the government, the feeling of all the interviewees on this were cool and negative. The inhabitants

here see the government as unresponsive, crude, patronizing and aloof on most problems areas concerning the settlement.

Most inhabitants of Jootar, life is lived on the fault line of setter/indigene conflict – a settlement of refugees from crises within Taraba, with farms inside Taraba, they are identified by a dilemma.

Jootar's strategic location and proximity to Wukari makes it a prime target of each attack as it was in 1990 – 2002. With just 1 public primary school to serve the population of 1, 728 (2006 census), there are 2 post-primary schools (privately – owned). There is one borehole, no public recreational facility of any kind; there is insufficient data to specify the number and the percentage of the youth in the total population of the settlement/town. Real unemployment and most militia have been the youth who have made a heavy imprint on crime trends after rounds of violence. The post-war trauma here is very high. Total negligence by government.

5.3 Taraba State

(a) Chanchanji: A small Jukun settlement sitting at the foot of river Chanchanji, it is completely surrounded by a 'forest' of Tiv settlements all around. The headquarters of Chanchanji council ward in Takum Local Government Council. The Tiv are an absolute majority here and always elect one councilor. It boasts of more Government presence than it's revenue – churning neighboringtown – Peva. There are two private schools here (1 nursery primary and 1 secondary). Two Government Schools (1 primary and 1 secondary).

There are two functional boreholes with overhead tanks, one local government clinic with fairly basic and functional equipment. It also boasts of a police station and a court (Grade II Area court).

The total Jukun population here is about 150 but Chanchanji is the strategic center of the Jukun here. It is always a target of every fighting and was completely razed in the 2002 eruption. Most inhabitants are farmers and a few, traders. The only recreational activity (private iniation) is a football club. The youth participated heavily in the fighting. The post-war trauma here is very high. It is a 'spiritual power' reserve base. This segment of the society features very prominently in the fighting – giving the warriors spiritual (psychological) insurance with charms. Unemployment is quite high here and poverty levels reflect in the small petty businesses. As a study site, Chanchanji was superlative in the amount of co-operation and insightful information received on the conflicts.

(b) PEVA: A Tiv-dominated town with an estimated population of over twenty thousand. Founded by Tor Peva of Shitire clan in Katshina-ala Local Government Area of Benue State. It has become a victim of the contested name/identity by having its name swallowed up and changed to Peva-chanchanji. Local sources here allege that the police station, clinic and court at Chanchanji were originally destined for Peva. They also affirm that few private schools are registered at the local Education Authority at Takum under the name, Chanchanji. Peva is also part of Chanchanji council ward but has one supervisory councilor slot at the Takum Local Government Council. It is a selection done by the Local Government Chairman with the ruling party officials at Takum. Intense lobbying for this position takes place. Also appointed from Takum are the Local Government appointees on the Peva market management committee.

5.4 Conflict Dynamics

Conflict dynamics is normally in the form of patters of analysis in the following order:

a) History of the relationship,

b) The primary and secondary actors,

c) The structures (factional goals, attitudes and behavior),

d) The intensity (low, moderate or extreme violence),

e) Strategies adopted by parties, including communication pattersn and interactions between parties,

f) The patter of regime responses, and

g) The facilitators of conflict transformation.

a. The History of the Relationship

This involves a close examination of the relationship between the conflict parties across time pre-dating the creation of the Nigerian State. It examines the character of their relationship spanning political, economic, and cultural context. The parties involves in study are: the Jukun, Tiv, Chamba, Kuteb, Hausa and Fulani. Howver, emphasis will be place on a detailed account of the relationship between the major actors. The present conflictual status of the relations between the Jukun and especially the Tiv would seem to suggest that they had always been fighting each other. A closer scrutiny of Tiv – Jukun relations pre-colonialism opens up quite different perspectives. For one thing, the relationship between the two was symbiotic. Trade and religion seemed such powerful themes underlining their co-operation and inter- dependency. In social relations, inter-marriage took place between them and Tiv women sold sorghum and pottery (large clay pots) to Jukun women who brewed *Tashi* (Local beer brew) which was consumed by Tiv customers with their Jukun friends at drinking joints at market places (Akinwumi et al, ed. 2006). The problematic part of Tiv-Jukun relations took a decisive turn for the worse with the coming of the colonial administration.

From the period of the establishment of British Colonial rule, successive colonial officers used divide and rule tactics to exacerbate the relationship between the Jukun and the Tiv. The

problem set up by the British was the "proper sphere" of the Tiv and how to demarcate a boundary line between them. The next division issue was the role of the Tiv in the Wukari Federation Local council which comprised Wukari, Takum and Donga districts. While the Jukun, Chamba and Kuteb were represented on this council, initially the Tiv were not until 1957. The decisive turn for the worse came with the Federal elections of 1959 with the defeat of the Jukun candidate, Ibrahim Sangari by Charles Gaza, a Tiv sponsored by a Tiv/Hausa coalition.

Between 1960 and 1963, the violent conflicts between the Tiv-dominated United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) party and the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) spilled over into Wukari from Benue. There were clashes, killings, arson, looting. While the Jukun aristocracy under the Aku – Uka and the native administration supported the NPC, the Tiv went with the UMBC. This period further worsened Jukun-Tiv relations.

The second Republic (1979-1983) seems to have favoured the Tiv in their support for the Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP) which won Gongola State which had emerged from the split of Benue Plateau in 1975. The majority Jukun were supporters of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). Matters took a turn for the worse when Tor Musa a Tiv was appointed chairman of Wukari Local Government Area (1981-1983). Progressive Tiv political gains under Bamanga Tukur of the NPN as Governor in 1983 when another Tiv man, Samuel Tor Agbidye was made commissioner and Emmanuel Yawe press Secretary did not please the Jukun (The Analyst Vol. vi, No. 1, 1991).

In Takum, the confrontation is between the Jukun, the Chamba and the Kuteb over claims to the ownership of the traditional chieftaincy institution of Takum.The Chamba allege that after an unbroken rule of ten chiefs, (the last was deposed by the British in 1914) they have been shut out of the claim to the chieftaincy. The Kuteb claim it and cite an unbroken rule from 1914 to

1996 when the last *kuru kpante* died. The Jukun claim it as theirs because historically the chief of Takum has always had alliegance to the Aku Uka, the Jukun paramount chief.

Matters came to a fateful head with the creation of Ussa Local Government Area out of Takum in 1996.The subsequent elections of 1996 and arbitrary boundary redefinition of the two local governments particularly after the Kuteb massively won in both areas appear as key ingredients for the outbreak of violence. The fighting broke out in December1997 and continued till 1999.

Progressively, politics seems to have become a veritable arena for a conflict between two adversaries identified by ethnic platforms covering a host of other conflicts such as the now perennial land problems. These mutually antagonisms are part of the baggage of colonial divide and rule policies just like settler/indigene conflicts.

Else where in the study, we described how scholars have observed and described the Benue basin as one vast migratory plain (Moshey.1899) with fluid movements of different groups with in the area (Erim, Gundu, 1992). These migration movements provide a suitable contextual background for understanding the history and evolution of inter-group conflicts within the area, the imposition of Pax Britannica and increasing spread and influence of Christianity pacified much of the middle-belt region and opened up new opportunities in inter-group relations. More security emboldened more Tiv with various problems to migrate to other areas. Ubaa (1970:35) has noted land shortages, better prospects, quarrels with elders and family disputes, witchcraft problems as some of the challenges that motivated most Tiv to seek better pastures by migration (Hembe, 2003:49).

These migrations took the shape of group (family) and individual instead of whole- scale clan movements noticed much in earlier on. This followed a rural-rural pattern mainly from

southern to northern Tiv land and then into adjoining southern Taraba mainly into Ibi, Wukari and Takum and into Nasarawa. Tiv migration in pre-colonial times into Wukari and Takum was massive and needed the intervention of the British to avoid being swamped by Tiv settlements (Jacobs, in Odey et al, 2007: 337 – 45). Herein lies the seeds of the Tiv –Jukun crisis, for the situation became so critical even with the intervention of the British that Downes (1971) observes that by 1850, half of the Aku's subjects were Tiv (Makar, 1975). Jacobs (Odey ed. 2007:364) records that by 1934, Tiv districts were transferred to the newly formed Tiv division and some 13, 000 Tiv were left living in Wukari. By 1946, they had increased to 22, 000 or more than half of the Aku's subjects.

In the case of Takum, the Tiv who had been removed from Jukun territory by 1931, come back in numbers and the report said:

As was in evitable they started to filter back and by 1922, the number of Tiv in Takum District was estimated at over 10, 000. Though in 1921, the office number of Tiv residents was nil (NAK SNP 17/3/2498 Takum district, Wukari Division, Benue province, Intelligence Report on, by Mr. K. Dewar)

In a major reassessment of colonial policy in 1929 after the Aba women's riots, investigations revealed that the assumption that the Jukun-speaking peoples of Takum and Donga were an early off shoot of the Jukun stem was most incorrect and that the Chamba, the founders of both Takum and Donga chieftains were conquerors of the Jukun rather than the conquered (NAK MAK Prof. (Fed) 4/24/AR/INT/W/1, Wukari District, P. 10). Infact in the verbatim record of the same report on reorganization by Mr. Dewar, it was discovered that:

> The effect of the Chamba conquest of the Jukunised tribes south and east of Wukari was to remove all recollection of Jukun political supremacy if ever such supremacy existed. In Takum, the Zomper (Kuteb) now the most important

> tribe numerically and politically in the district, specifically deny that the Kimbi (chief of the Jukun) of Takum ever had any political authority over them, nor is such claim made by the Kimbi himself who, however, still proffers a vague allegiance to the Aku.

This leads us to two important conclusions: the land problem between the Tiv and the Jukun in wukari Local Government Area despite years of official British meddling did not and might not just vanish. Infact, the sheer numbers of the Tiv in the area, as it is even right now, remains a critical part of the problems. Secondly, as in Wukari, the same colonial and post-colonial policies directed at rending asunder any positive relationship between the Jukun and Chamba ethnic groups are remote causes of the conflicts through the years of intigues designed to play off each ethnic group against the other. The embers of the fateful conflict were kindled in Wukari and Takum to set the Jukun against the Tiv and the Kuteb and the Chamba using a constructed ideological consciousness.

b. The Primary and Secondary Actors

The primary actors in the settler/indigene conflict in Benue and Taraba States are; the Jukun, the Tiv, the Chamba, Kuteb, Hausa/Fulani, the government, the media, non-governent organizations, the women, the youths. This is categorise as follows:

i. Primary actors: This includes the Jukun, Tiv, Chamba, Kuteb and the government. The Jukun as primary actors in the conflict are involved in the conflicts at the following sites; Wukari, Takum, Chanchanji, Abako, Peva and share boundaries and farm lands with the Tiv at the following sites; Gbeji, Sai, and Jootar. The major area of Jukun involvement in the conflict as primary actors concerns the position of the Aku-Uka, the Jukun paramoun chief. Wukari is a local government area and a conflict site. It is populated mainly by the Jukun, the Tiv and the nomadic Fulani and a number of Hausa. Being the biggest urban area among all

the sites, (population. 157,170; 1991 census), quite a number of resident Nigerian citizens live there. It is also the biggest vortex of violent conflicts in the area.

Wukari is also the headquarters of the Aku uka, the Jukun paramount chief. Therefore, apart from being an urban local government council, it is a nerve centre of political/bureaucratic influence of the Jukun elite with state-wide and even national aspirations. Its uniqueness is also evident in its having the earliest and most serious sensitive potential for violent eruptions. Just about 3 kilometers from the city centre, series of successive Tiv settlements hem in the town-dwelling Jukun in Wukari town.

The Tiv are also a primary actor in the conflict, they are only ethnic group that are to be found in all tha conflict sites in Benue and Taraba States. They on the other hand, present a totally different culture and cosmology from the Jukun. The egalitarian – minded Tiv detest and strenuously work to undermine concentration of power in any person. According to Jibo (1993. 200):

> In politics, the Tiv culture discourages the building of a political career which could lead to pre-eminence in it. Under the *ya na angbian* (eat and give to your brother to eat too) principle, once you get elected to the legislature for a term, you are expected to "decline" it the next time round so that another person may also "taste" the political experience on the post.

In contrast to the centralized authority in the Jukun society, Tiv society is divided into lineages based on blood relationships (Hembe, 2003:51). According to the oral traditions, the nation is descended from the two sons of Tiv, Ichongo and Ipusu. It is also based on this genealogical history that the Tiv structure of social organization rests – on the kindred structure (Akiga, 2003:106, Hembe, 2003:33, Jibo, 1998. Rubingh, 1969).The lineage segment or "Tar" is the unit of socio-political organization in Tiv society. Makar (1975) identifies twelve Ityar;

shitire, Ukum, Mbyaikyor, Jembgagh and Jecira are descended from Ipusu while Ugondo, Tongov, Ikurav, Nongov, Iharev, Masev and Turan trace their roots to Chongo. In Tiv social organization, elders administer and implement policies according to custom and tradition. Their power derives from the consensual decision-making model. Other co-ordinate bodies also exist with some level of autonomy to check and balance the power of the elders. These are the age – grades, matri-lineal agnates, and the segmentary opposition principle.

Yuhe (1978:42) observes that all Tiv are by custom of equal jural status. Nobody is more privileged by birth than the other. This egalitarian principle does not however preclude achievement of political power, influence, affluence and prestige as opportunities are taken and exploited by those to whom they present themselves.

Therefore the social and political organizations of Tiv people shows that power resides in the elders who take decisions by consensus. In contrast to the Jukun, no one person or structure wields sacrosanct power over people. What approximated in Tiv society to the Jukun spiritual veneration of the divine king was the fear of the *Mbatsav*. The concept somehow defies a precise definition. To Sorkaa (1974:8), it is the central word for power and as Hagher (1980:87) observes, it is the single force at the centre of all Tiv life. The main function of the *mbatsav* initially was the preservation of the good of the society. To make all things right-to ensure the fertility of marriages, bountiful harvests, generally healthy living free from disease and pestilence, good fortune et cetera. The *mbastav* in their secretive occultic perception came to possess a most dreaded reputation. Given the checks and balance principle in Tiv social organization and function, the fear of the *mbastav* witnessed massive and violent eruptions of protest movements such as *Namakaa, Haakaa* (1933), *Ijor*, (1912), *Ivase, Hoyo* and *Nyambuan* (1939), (Tseayo, 1974).

From the foregoing, it is clear that differences in culture and world view would predispose both ethnic groups to conflict particularly over an issue such as land. However, we must hasten to note that the antagonistic posture of Jukun – relations began with the coming of the British colonialists.

A closer examination of the interviews from all the sites, affirm that cultural differences are part of the problems between the ethnic groups involved in the conflicts. This is particularly true of the Tiv and the Jukun. The two cultures are polarities apart; we therefore closely examine the cultural disposition of both groups with a view to understanding how they tend toward conflict.

It is in Wukari Local Government council that the clash of opposite cultural values assumes meaning that appears to shed light on the cultural roots of the conflicts. Here, it throws up the specter of a confrontation of conflicting values. In this vein then, kinship confronts citizenship, tradition challenges democracy, ascription squares up with prescription. This scenario is to be found in the Jukun and the Tiv kinship structure and cosmology.

There are two main groups of the Jukun ethnic nation – the Kpanzo and the Wapan. One of the key differences between the two is dialectical. The kpanzo are to be found in Donga and Takum towns, sharing these with the Chamba and the Kuteb respectively. The traditional head of the two is called the *Kuru Kpante* whose allegiance is to the Aku Uka at Wukari. The Wapan regard themselve as the original Jukun and traditionally produce the Aku Uka. They have two ruling houses, Adi and Atoshi. The Wapan Jukun lives mainly in Wukari town, Rafin Kada, Gidan Idi, Gidan – Dorawa, Gidin Waya, Bakyu, Arufu, Akwana and Tapare.

There are also lesser groups of the Jukun apart from the two described here. These are linguistic groups that are Jukun but are less regarded. They are the Baanu and the Nyonyo. The

Banyu are mainly fishermen and are found along the river Benue at Dampar, Jibu, Ibi, Chinkai, Abinsi, Gbajimba, and Makurdi. The Nyonyo are on the other hand to be found in Sondi, Kente, Bye-pi villages.This group is linguistically related to the Etulo who are found at Uga in Buruku Local Government Area of Benue State.

In spite of the ethnic affinity within these Jukun- lined groups, the Wapan resolutely keep at bay the Baanu and Nyonyo as second class Jukun. Very much like the Greeks at home regard those in the migrant colonies abroad such as those in Cyprus or Macedonia. The main reason for this is that the Wapan run a highly closed and exclusive system of traditional administration completely shrouded with secrecy, complexity and myth. All authority is centered in and radiates from the Aku and is exercised through a maze of senior personages from the Wapan big four ruling families of Abo Achuwo, Abo Zike, Kinda Achuwo and Kinda Zike.

To the Wapan, the Aku is a deity and is God's vice-regent on earth. The supremacy of the Aku is incontestable to them. The Local government Area was right from the beginning divided into four districts based on the four ruling families. Each district is under a member of the royal family. Therefore, political leadership in Wukari for long has been conceived as an exclusive preserve of the Jukun of royal stock. It is therefore in this sense, an abomination for any other person, Hausa,Tiv or lesser Jukun to normally and successfully rule as Wukari Local Government Chairman. The reason for this is straight forward. Under the 1976 Local Government Reforms, the chairman of the council is number one by protocol and as the chief security officer, Outranks the Aku. To arch-Jukun traditionalists, the situation in which a non-Jukun (or even lesser Jukun) supervises the Aku Uka who is the main determinant of political appointments in Wukari, from the state to Federal levels is simply intolerable (Odey ed. 2007. 320 – 323). The exceptions to this expectation have been met with utter failure.

The Chamba are also made a primary actor in the conflict, but their presence and involvement as defined in the study is limited to Takum, and Peva conflict sites. They are one of the protangonists in Takum local government. The Kuteb and the ekpan Jukun are the other primary actors in the conflict in Takum.

The state government of Benue and Taraba and the federal government of Nigeria are primary actors in the conflict. They occupy positions of authority for the general protection of lives and property, social welfare of citizens and guarantee of rights under the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Their roles in the conflict through the police and the army and other security agencies are primary actors by their actions or inactions. The laws of Nigeria prescribe who is a citizen and who is not.The other primary actors in conflict are the ethnic militias who fight the wars at all conflict sites.

ii. Secondary Actors: The secondary actors in conflict are the Hausa and Fulani who are mainly found in Wukari, Peva and Takum. Other secondary actors are the witch doctors who provide spiritual support for the fighting ethnic armies. Also included here are the non-governemntal organizations, the women and the youths.

The Structures of the Conflict in Benue State

This refers to the factional goals, attitudes and behaviours of all the actors.The sensitive issues involved are culture, power,economic opportunities.Power is exclusively enjoyed by the Tiv with no option of any other non-indigene sharing it.To that extent therefore, there is discrimination against those defined as non-indigenes who are Nigerian residents of the Tiv-dominated areas.

Fig 2: Scores indicating the structures, processes and causes of conflicts in Benue State.



Source: Field Survey: 2010.

An indication of selected issues in Benue state in the four conflict sites, namely, land, economic opportunities and culture.

It does appear that land problems are at the highest consideration at Abako and Jootar while culture ranks higher than any other issue at Sai. The most probable explanation could be adduced from the fact that both Abako and Jootar are border sites sitting at the very epicenter of the disputes, (indeed Abako had been in Taraba and was merged with Benue only in 1992 and Jootar was razed to ashes in the 2002 crisis)

As for Sai, a most probable reason for the high score for culture appears to be that the settlement is dominated by one ethnic group, the Tiv and the existence of the sister settlement of

Ananum (a settlement founded by a half brother of Sai) fifty nine kilometers from the common border, inside Taraba.

Figure 3: Scores indicating the structures, processes and causes of the conflict in Taraba state.



Source: Field Survey: 2010

Note: pow- power (political / bureaucratic offices), land- ownership/use, econ-economic opportunities and cul -cultural differences.

We proceed with our analysis by examining the structures, processes and causes of the conflicts as indicated by the data on the table in figure 3. From this data, we can see that the levels of targeting and discrimination are highest at Peva, a big and thriving Yam market where discrimination in the marketing of produce is very high.

We also note that Chanchangi is a small Jukun settlement completely surrounded by the Tiv and make up more than 80% of our interviewees there. Takum and Wukari appear to be crucibles of inter-ethnic conflict anchored to territory (land) with their high levels of violence.Culture ranks high at Wukari probably because of the position of the Jukun king.

Looking at Figures 2 and 3, we can observe the following in respect of the structures, processes

and causes of the conflicts: this information is indicative of very specific problems in each case. For instance, using the data in figure 2,the specific ways by which people are victimized because they are "foreigners" in Benue state are land, economic opportunities, and culture in that order. Now where the complementary information supports this is in the area of spelling out what is involved in each case.

Thus in the case of land for example, there are Tiv people who live in Sai in Katsina-Ala Local Government Area in Benue state but have farms in Taraba state. The problem concerns their access to land there. This problem is made the more complicated by the fact that the boundary line arbitrarily divides families between the two states. The problems involved in the case of power concerns disenfranchisement of Tiv residents of Taraba state which is complicated by socio-cultural ties between the two states. Those whose kith and kin straddle the two states still stick together in peace times as in conflict times and this is true of all primary actors in the conflicts especially the segmentary opposition principle in Tiv culture.It is instructive that theTiv allege discrimination in Taraba but ignore their total dominance at those conflict sites in Benue.

The Intensity of the Conflicts in Taraba State

Fig. 4: Index of the magnitudes of the conflict from Taraba state



Source: Field Survey, 2010.

Source: from field questionnaire- *How often are people discriminated against due to notions of being "settlers" or "foreigners?*

Exclusion from marketing activities involving their own produce, unfair taxes and levies and unequal economic opportunities are some of the topical issues involved in the case of the third ranking problem of the Tiv in Taraba state. Perhaps the most instructive case here is Peva, a Tiv town in Taraba state mentioned in the first part of the survey. Different school fee rates, certificates of state of origin, admission into Government institutions are some of the discriminatory practices suffered by non-indigenes.The Tiv dominance in the production of Yams in both Benue and Taraba has been discussed in some detail and reflects the conflict dynamics and the choice of the theoretical framework.

The data on the figures 2 and 3 is however directly relevant and explains both the processes and the causes of the conflicts but on an almost case by case basis. We therefore move

towards the findings of the study and conclude the data analysis by turning to the consequences of the conflicts. We can put the data thus:

Figure 5: An index of the consequences of the conflicts in Benue and Taraba states.



Source: Field Survey, 2010.

As could be seen, the score ranges for the category "victimized" are highest in Benue (30%) and Taraba (over 60%) as well as the ones for "marginalized". The consequences of the conflicts are clearly very negative especially in the extreme "marginalized" ranges of scores. The picture is highly generalized and could be used together with the one on Figures 2 and 3 to understand more specific cases in the conflict sites in both states.

A careful observation of the data from the field leads us to a retrospective glance at the initial quest of the study. The interest of the study among others is keyed on the apparent resilience of kinship ties allied with territory representing indigeneity.This appears to oust

citizenship. The matter is compounded by a tacit constitutional recognition of the concept of indigene which is at the centre of violent conflicts crusading under the banner of "indigenes" versus "settlers" or "foreigners". This is why we seek to know how land and politics are related to these conflicts.

The data on Figures 2 and 3 showing the structures, processes and causes of the conflicts gives us data by strongly showing that power (representing politics) and land in an essentially agrarian societ are part of the fuel that feeds the violence in these areas.

The second quest is perhaps amplified by the plurality of the area anchored to the history of ethnic relations in pre- and post- colonial times in Nigeria. The economic opportunities it appears are a common denominator to all the ingredients framing these conflicts under whatever platform. Thus we are able to have a meaningful insight into our research objectives. This also appears to positively affirm our first research proposition which is that *land and politics are motivating sources of settler/indigene conflicts in the Middle-belt region of Nigeria.*

It is a far more complicated matter trying to adduce some empirical support for the last research quest of the study, which is that these conflicts are indicators of class domination. What it does perhaps indicate is that more of the poor as noted in both urban and rural sites (from field observations) are at the heart of the active involvement in the conflicts. In looking at how settler/indigene conflicts are related to politics, and the system of production, we may be safe to say, in the study, key issues in the production system- land for agricultural production and the markets for agricultural produce- are being manipulated for political ends using ideological platforms. The reasons for this are not the ethnically puritanical resumes touted by the settler/indigene militias but are directly related to issues of economic domination of one group by another.

Exclusion eliminates the competition for the booty. Apparently, in the Middle-belt of Nigeria, largely because of prebendal values, it is politics of particular self-interests that are at the center of issues. That production includes not just agriculture as in the rural areas, but also politics itself which is actually in control of the levers of decision-making.In Nigeria, politics is a business by itself just as could be religion and identity platforms such as settler/indigene confrontations.This seems to support our second proposition which is that, *the clash of citizenship and ethnic perceptions escalates the violence settler/indegiene contestations in the Middle Belt Region.*

The coincidental connection between both situations is that in Wukari, the aftermath of the 1987 elections has been blood letting, arson, ethnic cleansing of notably the Tiv in the 1990, 1991, the 2001 and 2002 eruptions. In Takum, from 1997 to 1999, the local government became like Natal province in South Africa just before the end of Apartheid, "the killing fields". Even at the period of the survey, Takum town still bears the marks of a post war terrain – destroyed structures, post war trauma. One day, closing very late due to a heavy interview schedule, we could not find any eating place. We were told most non-indigenes have relocated their business elsewhere because of the fighting in Takum.

5.4 The Findings of the Study

In this chapter, we also present and analyse primary data collected from the field work. We also use secondary data from demographic records, Archives, Books, and related sources. Data presented here is from the first guide of our fieldwork and survey as stated in section of the third chapter. This is the material basis of ideology. Data here was collected on land ownership and use, the spread of the beneficiaries of political and bureaucratic offices

including ward/village heads, the distribution pattern of schools, clinics and the structure of markets.

The evidence from data collected at the conflict sites in the study seems to strongly indicate that land is the central causative factor in settler/indigene contestations. Our analysis of the production area in the fourth chapter explains why land is such a predisposition factor in settler/indigene conflicts in the study area.There is data to see the patterns of land ownership and use (tenure systems) and its consequent impact on the causes and escalation of the conflicts.

According to the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (land use Act of 1978 and its amendments) and all its extant laws on sovereignty, land is vested in the powers of the Government to legislate on. This power at the local level is supervised or overseen by the state executive. The land is however held in trust and used in accordance with local laws and customs. Thus land disputes matters fall within the jurisdiction of the customary courts and other civil courts of competent jurisdiction.

Going by this definition of powers and guidance on operation of the Law, local laws and customs are a yardstick on who owns and uses the land. It is taken therefore that the laws and customs of the indigenous population would be used. In this regard inside Taraba, where the crux of the land problem lies, the plurality of the society has been reinforced at the cultural level and not at the social level. It is in the latter that control over land lies. Historical antecedents as noted in our second chapter, seems to have set in motion inexonerably rigid structures of dialogue between the major ethnic groups. In Wukari and Takum local government areas, fractious inter-ethnic relations between the Jukun and the Tiv on the one hand and between the Kuteb, Chamba and Jukun on the other, have almost primed the degree to which issues over land and culture

would ignite into explosions of violence particularly pertaining to control over land matters. In both local governments all the conflicts so far have had land at the centre as the major causes.

As explained in the previous chapter, massive Tiv migrations to Taraba (pre-and Post-colonial), the Jukun insist, has made them so intransigent as to have become lawless. The Tiv insist that they are no less indigenous than any other in Taraba, even claiming Wukari which they call Waka.

The Jukun in several personal interviews accept that some Tiv in Taraba actually merit claims to land they occupy, possess and use but say the problem is with the Tiv predilection to arbitrarily increase acreages. This happens when 'brothers' are encouraged by their kinsmen long established in their locations to take either virgin or fallow land. Now as explained earlier, only tiny fractions of Jukun are engaged in any large – scale farming of any kind. What this does is to leave more and more land open to new claims.

After several conflicts, The Jukun has resorted to a legal position through which they can exercise actual control over land. In 1988 they centralized operative control over land, occupied or not in the office and person of the *Aku Uka*, the chairman, Wukari Local Government Area and the ward/village heads who supervise the use of land in their various locations. They (the Jukun) also designate vast parcels of land as protected forest reserves free from any farming activities. All those measures are supervised by an octopus- like organisation – the Jukun Youth Forum.

The problem of control over use of land in Wukari, Ibi, Donga, Gassol and Ussa is no where vanishing for two main reasons: one is the sheer population of the Tiv farmers with their pervasive ways of effective occupation and use of land. The use of Herbicides has very largely affected the old land tenure system of leaving freehold and land to fallow and shifting

cultivation. The Second reason is the population density of the area. It is to this last reason that we turn to seek source explanation for how and why the problems arising from the land tenure system continue to centre on the Tiv presence inside Taraba. How does their use of land constitute a problem in the manner land is shared?

5.5 Demographic Factors that Cause and Escalate the Conflicts

There is a higher population pressure on land in Benue state (84 persons per square kilometer) than in Taraba State (27 persons per square kilometer). In fact Taraba according to data from the same census report (See Appendix E, P. 29) along with Kwara, Yobe and Cross River State have the smallest population in the nation with less than 2 million people. However, nationwide, Taraba has the lowest population density per kilometer along with Yobe, Borno, Kebbi, Niger and kwara (P. 34). This data taken alongside another from the same census report (P. 33) shows some demographic data with startling revelations. Namely, the southern part of Tiv land is classified as are of the areas in Nigeria with the most densely populated areas with over 200 persons per square kilometer. The report lists the most densely settled areas in Nigeria as:

The core oil palm belt areas of Akwa Ibom, Abia, Imo, Anambra and Enugu States

1. Parts of the coal producing areas of Oyo, Ogun and Ondo State along with the non-swampy areas of Lagos State
2. Okene district of Kogi State
3. Southern Tiv land in Benue State
4. The Kano groundnut growing areas
5. The Jos plateau
6. The Katsina home districts of Tsagoro, Malamawa and Nagajin Gari and

7. The Sokoto home districts of Hama Ali, Dingyadi, Gumbi and Bodinga.

The Southern parts of Tiv land listed in the above classification lie in Vandeikya, Konshisha, Kwande and Ushongo Local Government Areas. It is recognized in the migration problem affecting the land factor by Taraba State for more attractive agricultural prospects with rich farmland and being sparsely populated (P. 35). This is also illustrated with the citation of the 'Kparev' factor in the settler/indigene conflicts inside Taraba State (Akinwumi et al, ed. 2006:84) by and large it has been acknowledged that the Kunav and Gaav of the Jechira lineage in Tiv land where population densities have led to greatly disappearing natural resources are the bulk of this Kparev (Downes, 1952). They for similar reasons were the first to venture into other career prospects aside from agriculture such as trading (Tiv Economy. 5) Ubaa (1970: 28) observes how this encouraged rural-urban but especially rural – migration trends inside Taraba State.

Table 2: Population Density of Six Contiguous States in Central Nigeria

Geo Admin. Zones		Area KM^2	%	Male Population	%	Female Population	%	Both Sexes	%	Density
S/N										
01	Adamawa	35, 470	3.84	1,050, 791	1.2	1, 051, 262	1.2	2,102, 053	2.4	59
02	Benue	32, 910	3.56	1, 368, 985	1.5	1, 384, 112	1.6	2,753, 077	3.1	84
03	Plateau	58, 030	6.28	1, 657, 209	1.9	1, 655, 203	1.9	3,302, 412	3.7	57
04	Taraba	55, 920	6.05	759, 872	0.9	752, 291	0.8	1, 512,163	1.7	27
	Total	182, 330	19.73	4, 836, 837	5.4	4, 842, 868	5.4	9, 679,705	10. 9	53

Source: 1991 Population Census of the Federal Republic at National Level P. 31.

As clearly shown by the data on table 1, the 1991 population census of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Analytical Report of the National level, P. 31), Benue and Taraba are grouped in the East-central Geo-Administrative zone. In this classification which shows population distribution by state and sex, the following indices are indicated-Benue has a territorial space of 32, 910

square kilometers with a population of 2, 753, 077 and a population density of 84 people per square kilometer. Taraba on the other hand covers an area of 55, 920 square kilometers and a population of 1, 512, 163 and a population density of 27.Therefore the low population density of Taraba attracts migrant labour and settlers from Benue.

5.6 Occupational Characteristics

Between the Jukun and the Tiv, there appears to be a spatial distribution of two major occupations. While the majority of Jukun are heavily invested in fishing and marketing of fishing produce, the majority Tiv are inclined towards farming and its related products. This distribution has meaningful connotations in the conflicts involving the two and is explained subsequently. The development of a largely capitalist economy in Nigeria has naturally spawned a distinct working class particularly in the bureaucracies of the state apparatus. This is seen in the civil bureaucracy of the local government council and in the state and federal agencies. In these are found quite a number of Jukun, Kuteb and Chamba. The Tiv allegation here (at all conflict sites surveyed) is that they are discriminated against in recruitment exercises into the bureaucracies in Taraba on account of being non-indigenes. This is discussed in much fuller details later.

The spatial distribution of the major occupation in Taraba state opens up certain noticeable characteristic features that could have covert/causative potentials for problems. One of these is the open-secret that the Jukun claim and indeed control land they cannot on their own, farm. They must use migrant Tiv labour to do the farming especially of yams which is the chief economic crop of the area. The Tiv of Taraba are apparently a dominant labour force but must use land the Jukun claim and increasingly, control. The Tiv are also characteristic of this some what labour stereotype. Being mainly farmers, they rely on the Jukun to do the fishing even in stretches of rivers inside Benue state. Abinsi and Makurdi are deep inside Benue state but the

fish products consumed there as in much of Benue state itself is supplied by Jukun fishermen and women.

This apparent inability of the Jukun to fully utilize land had indeed led the British Colonial authorities at that time to conclude that unless the Tiv farming population was incorporated into the Wukari Native Authority in 1933, it would be insolvent. Part of the official British opinion felt that rather than exclude the resourceful Tiv farmers from Wukari, for tax and food resource production reasons, their migrations and settlement into the area should be encouraged. This problem of Tiv migration into the then Wukari Native Authority was at the centre of much of the '*Munchi* Ring' policies of the colonial Authorities. A strong segment of official colonial policy saw the solution to this Tiv migration menace in shutting off the influx of Tiv farmers into the region.

One significant and recent development in this spatial division of occupations is the Jukun foray into commercial yam farming. Quite a number of Tiv admit that they are the victims of their own "mistakes". They allege that they taught the Jukun the commercial farming of yams and set the stage for the hatching of the Jukun 'genie'. Namely, from a mainly fishing preoccupation, the Jukun are now avid yam farmers and need the vast lands which the Tiv in earlier times monopolized without any noticeable Jukun resentment. Of course, committant with this development have been other socio-political developments which have stoked Jukun anger at what they now consider as the brazenness of this uppity, Tiv 'Settlers'. One of these is the Tiv growing confidence and foray into local politics beginning with the election of Tangur Gaza into the Federal House of Representatives in 1959 and of Iortyer Musa as chairman, Wukari Local Government Council in 1981.What was perhaps so irking according to the Jukun about these events is that the latter case was during a civilian regime and Governor, (A.Barde). The Jukun

openly and soundly complain of a conspiracy to make them slaves in their own land (Times Week No. 43 of Feb. 3, 1992).

In the same fashion and perhaps even more alarming than irritating is the Manu Vaase incident of 1957 (Gyuse et al, 2006. 142).The unfortunate tragic comedy is as innocuous as it was tragic for Jukun-Tiv relations. This clownish Tiv man recklessly gathered a few like-minded kinsmen who carried him on their shoulders in a procession around Wukari. Their objective in the mindset of the republican Tiv was a theatrical demand that it was the turn of the Tiv to produce the next Aku uka. Now in the cosmology and tradition of the Jukun, the Aku Uka is a divine personality. From this perspective, it was a declaration of war on the Jukun kingdom. It is thus against this background that any meaningful understanding can be made of the developments about claims to land, of migrations into Wukari, of Tiv settlers and of the politics of exclusion of non-indigenes.

Problems relating to competition arising from the use of land in the commercial farming of yams are compounded by two key factors. Both are inter- twined and self – reinforcing in their occurrence and sustenance. One has to do with the sheer lucrative worth of yams as a commercial commodity. From the field survey and available records at the Wukari yam market segment, between 40 – 60 Lorries per day are loaded with yams for various parts of Nigeria. This number is the estimate of the peak season which is from mid- July and January end. We were also given an estimate of 30 – 50 Lorries in the off season which is February to June when the supply begins to tamper off. About the same impressive figure (80 – 90 Lorries) was the estimate given for Peva – a Tiv – dominated but Jukun – controlled market in Takum Local Government Area.

The Local market management committee and Government levy per lorry amounts to between ₦3, 500 – ₦5, 000. This amounts to between ₦245, 000 – ₦450, 000 per market day in the peak season and ₦105, 000 – ₦250, 000 in the off-season. These estimates are really what they are, estimates. This is because the sheer lucrative market for yams is some what shrouded in a cult-like secrecy of the beneficiaries who unscrupulously rip-off their employers, the local Government Authority for their own benefit as a group. To perhaps buttress this point even better, an insider informant told us that the chairman of the Wheel barrow loaders, a key component of the marketing chain, can in less than six months, build and complete a four-bedroom bungalow. Namely, he earns far more than a fresh University graduate employed in the local bureaucracy jobs. It is therefore no secret and quite possible that the violent conflicts over settler/indigene platforms are but a smoke screen, a mere camouflage of the real fight over the spoils of an economic endeavor that churns out prodigious revenues and benefits for the operators.

Therefore, when as we examine subsequently, the Tiv began to construct their own exclusive markets, such as Dan Anacha, Ayu, and Gbor Begha, to the exclusion of the Jukun right inside Taraba State the dice was readily cast for a fateful confrontation. Not over ethnic identities as we are made to understand but over privileged access and control over a most lucrative enterprise. We do well to remember that political economy accepts that those who are economically privileged tend to be interested in preserving the existing order, and some of these markets were actually the real targets of the fighting in the 2001 eruptions. These are Dan Anacha, Ayu and Peva which suffered serious damage in the violence.

The second factor apparently responsible for violent eruptions arising from the claims over land is that of migrant Tiv labour. From a secondary effect of mass migration of Tiv people

into Taraba in the 18th and 19th century, it has become a cause all by itself of the initial problem. This is because; an average commercial yam farm is between 2 - 3 hectares big. Considering that yam farming is a labour-intensive activity, the life cycle of yam production can never be successful except with well organized and skilled labour. Now being relatively new comers, it seems the Jukun have never really mastered the labour-intensive skills of commercial yam farming. They rely on a syndicated structure of Tiv labour resident in Taraba or seasonally flowing in from the Tiv of Benue state. It is also this same syndicate that serves both the average and big-time Tiv farmers inside Taraba. Indications and information from data collected clearly point to a labour price war before the violent outbreak of 2002. To upset each other, both the Tiv and Jukun hirers of Tiv labour outbid each other to 'derail' the farming activity of the other.

To curtail the marauding 'pirates' of Tiv labour, the Jukun in patented 'contracts", 'sign' long-term 'agreements' with their clients from inside the Tiv of Benue state. The contract labour (system) comes complete with 'managers' who recruit, transport, house and even entertain client labourers. To make sure that these clients do not 'stray', the Jukun are alleged by their Tiv competitors to outbid, and 'spoil' their clients with better terms of engagement. These among others could even include a free provision of hoes and other implements such as machetes, hoe grinders and the like. A Tiv farmer at Tse Gbor (about 13 kilometers from Wukari) alleged that Jukun farmers pay N30.00 per heap mould while they pay 20.00. It is neither unusual nor infrequent either that poaching of clients does happen in these labour skirmishes.

Given this rather small and defined environment, with an ethnically-based structure and character of competition, squabbles do well so easily turn into shooting wars. These wars it seems are 'initiated, escalated and mobilized by ethnic soldiers under ethnic banners. This is because they are the direct beneficiaries, the owners of a system that directly benefits them and

so are involved in precipitating violent events. The causes are of course not those puritanically ethnic and well articulated issues often touted by the '*Mandarins*' of the yam industry in both ethnic groups. These are the '*Kulak*' elements among the farmers. It is also to this important segment of the increasingly conflict-prone but lucrative activity that we now turn to unravel the threads of what increasingly looks like a Gordian knot of conspiracy and complicity.

A survey of the conflict sites seems to suggest the existence of a fairly high-income earning; privileged and influential class like the spider in the web is always at the centre of events and developments. They, it appears are connected somehow with the events that serve as triggers to violent eruptions. These elements are found both at the level of the production of the yams crop and at the marketing stage in the markets. They are at the very centre of the production process itself. They indeed own and control the major stakes in the system that allocates benefits and dispenses sanctions by exclusion from benefits.

The major benefit at the production stage is land and at the marketing stage, it is the huge revenues derived from taxing the commodity buyers and sellers. Very informed insider sources told us of the intense politicking and lobbying that goes with this selection of the market management committees.

While three of our conflict sites in Taraba are in Takum Local Government Area, namely, Chanchanji, Peva and Takum town, only one, Wukari is from Wukari Local Government. Wukari is largely the epic-centre of the yam production area and conflict, Chanchanji is the headquarters of Chanchanji council ward in Takum Local Government Area. It is a small but strategic Jukun settlement sitting at the foot of the old bridge across river Kunkun. It is the nerve center of Jukun/Kuteb/Chamba interests from Takum town. The Tiv are an absolute majority here and always supply the elected councilor from the ward. The Tiv however allege that the

councilor is merely a token presence as his possible impact is dissipated or swamped by Jukun-dominated interests at Takum. They call this settlement Abogo. They also allege that to forestall a possibly bigger impact of the Tiv on the local politics of the area, this council ward is perhaps the biggest rural council ward in Nigeria and has remained one large 'prison' for the huge Tiv population in the area. They feel that it ought to have been split up to allow them more access to power.

5.7 Semiotics

Semiotics is generally defined as the science of 'signs' and is commonly identified with symbols and meanings. It is commonly associated with content analysis, though it can be applied in a variety of research contexts. Peter k. Manning and Betsy Cullum –Swan (1994. 466) provide some sense of the applicability of semiotics in the following ways. "Although semiotics is based on language, it is but one of the many sign systems of varying degrees of unity, applicability and complexity. Morse code, etiquette, mathematics, music and even highway signs are examples of semiotic systems".

There may not be a hard and universally acceptable meaning inherent in signs; however meanings reside in minds, not that a most cursory interpretation can be made, even at face value of a situation, event or occurrence. If for example, we arrive at a location and see festooned banters, balloons, posters, banners particularly in certain gaily colours, we could interprete it to mean a celebration of some kind. In much the same manner, as we note in our collection of data from most of the sites of our study, certain common visual characteristics, suggest that we could be right to seek some deeper explanation and meaning. These are to be seen in the clash of identity in the sign posts/billboards, town names, settlement patterns. We should be correct to read meanings. After all signs are things that are assigned special meanings by different people

in different contexts. These meanings are social constructions. Semiotic analysis involves a search for the meanings intentionally or unintentionally attached to signs. Take for instance, in much of Africa, fresh leaves on a wall, road, or structure suggests danger, death or something negative. This is perhaps why demonstrations in Africa by people with fresh leaves are neither positive nor possibly even peaceful.

5.8 The names of towns or settlements with contested versions.

Table 3: Names of towns/settlements with contested versions from Benue and Taraba

S/N	Current Name	State	Version	
			Jukun	**Tiv**
1	Abako	Benue	Bako	Abako
2	Ayu	Taraba	Tsokondi	Ayu
3	Amadu	Taraba	Ku fai-Amadu	Amadu
4	Chanchanji	Taraba	Chanchanji	Abogo
5	Dan Anacha	Taraba	Kwararafa	Dan-Anacha
6	Peva	Taraba	Peva-Chanchanji	Peva
7	Rafin-Kada	Taraba	Rafin-Kada	Genyi
8	Wukari	Taraba	Wukari	Waka
9	Chonku	Taraba	Chonku	Choku

Source: From Fieldwork survey, 2010.

Perhaps even more explicit and provocative are the names and sign boards with names and places in Benue state. For example, we saw a town with the name "New Gboko" – the name of traditional headquarters of the Tiv in Benue state. The signs are things that are assigned special meanings. These could be logos, animals or people.

5.9 Names

Names also carry special meanings particularly in the conflict sites. *Munchi* is a name generally associated with the Tiv people. It is credited to the Fulani in their alleged encounter with the Tiv. Migration myth has it that the Fulani kept some of their cattle stock with their friends, the Tiv for safe keeping. When they (The Fulani) came to claim their property, the Tiv could not account for the cattle. *Munchi* (Hausa for "we have eaten") was their response. This

name is therefore meaningfully used by the Jukun and others for the Tiv to depict their untrustworthiness if not craftiness. Depending on the people involved and circumstance, it is used derogatively.

The Tiv generally refer to all non-Tiv groups as "*Uke*" or "*Atoatiev*". The name *Uke* comes up in Tiv genealogy as referring to the second son of their aboriginal ancestor whose identity is not so important here. The Tiv name for their neighbors '*atoatiev*' which translates as "foreigners" or "people of the bush" is contemptuous. It also means "rustics' or "un initiated'. These names are therefore used with an intended special meaning to negatively depict a person who by all accounts is not supposed to be a friend or even cultured.

Names are tactical props of the ideological platforms on which these people engage in the conflict over distribution and ownership of the names of production**.** They are therefore in this context but a means to the ends of possession or dispossession. They amplify the ideological regime of identification and discrimination between "in" and "out" groups. They suggest a continuation of the economic struggle by some other means. They are in themselves dependent on the economic reality involved. As part of the ideological platform, they sustain and reinforce the identity which separates "us" from "them" and sets the stage for discrimination, dispossession and even of domination (real or apparent). This appears to be true of all the sides to the conflicts in the area.

The contested names of towns and settlements indicate conflict. This represents a constructed context which essentially is, a conflict of contested identities. Very much like the traumatized psyche and distorted personality of children of broken homes. It also suggests a conflict over claims to ownership of the places. It is a projection of the claims over land. It is a possessive claim to own the town/settlement, place or abode. They represent the fault lines of

possession and dispossession. It seems this conflict mirrors the endless struggle for dominance in culture and the production arena. The conflict in this context masquerades under an ideological construction of ethnic and cultural platforms. It is also perhaps suggests here a struggle between fractions of the same class of political elites.

This statement however reeds a qualification; since it is largely the peasants of the rural areas that are involved in the fighting, it is at best a distorted picture that emerges. When however taken within the context that it is elite-driven, it portends a much more complicated process involved.

In the context of the discussion therefore, we accept the framework of the second element in the concept of class as explained namely, the distribution of ownership of means of production. The conflict over names of settlements/towns suggests a struggle within the agrarian economy over land between the fractions of the class that controls the distribution of the benefits of the major productive activities. This is why perhaps, the ownership is critical – control over land and the towns that contain markets with their prodigious marketing proceeds as analyzed previously.

The important point to note from our approach is that these contestations are but expressions of an economic reality. Ake (1981:2) observes that the morality and values of a society tend to support the preservation of the existing division of labour and distribution of wealth in that society. The autonomy of morality and social values is more apparent than real.
Our discussion is perhaps better understood as showing the primacy of the economic structure in understanding society. This is true of its morals, values, politics and we think no less of its conflicts.

5.10 Settlement Patterns and Spatial Behaviour

What one sees in the conflict sites especially in Taraba state are all ethnic groups living together in villages, settlements and towns; Living in rural and semi-urban and urban environments. Not so manifestly clear is the pattern of settlements and towns. A closer examination perhaps reveals meaningful facts that are relevant in understanding the causative factors of settler/indigene conflicts. The 'signs' examined in semiotics are not limited to the quite obvious ones such as those we have already discussed. Sometimes the symbolism is very subtle. In the conflict sites especially those inside Taraba state, they are not too obvious but carry very serious massages. We can recall the Manu Vaase incidence already mentioned as a case in point. To the Jukun, there was nothing comical about the Tiv procession. In much the same vein, we examine the settlement patterns which the Jukun see as a slow colonization process.

Spatial behavior refers to attempts of individuals to structure the space around them. For instance, people move toward or away from a person or object, maintaining distance or closeness. Accordingly, the range, the frequency and outcomes of such movements provides significant data for different research objectives. When personal space is violated, a lot of stress is often produced. Those who consider their space violated get tense and anxious.

There are therefore distinctive patterns in the way people use the space around them in interacting with others. Every people and culture adopts unwritten codes regulating how closely others can approach or live with them. Cultural variations in personal space can have serious implications in culturally heterogeneous societies (Nachimias, 208:9)

While the Jukun generally live in nucleated settlements and in towns, the Tiv love and live in highly dispersed compounds and households. This tendency of the Tiv is especially true of agrarian producers. Part of the reasons for this behavior is the shifting cultivation tenure system

preferred by them. They need more and more space to indulge in this form of agricultural practice.

In Taraba, the Jukun feel and allege that they are being swamped by the Tiv. Meanwhile, the Tiv, reminiscent of the frontier psychology see the vast unpopulated lands of Taraba as new opportunities and greater freedom for more numbers of kith and kin and more security. There is after all security in numbers.

The picture of the settlement pattern of southern Taraba shows the pockets of Jukun towns and settlements hemmed in and increasingly ringed with a vast array of Tiv compounds, villages and settlements. The Tiv with a typical frontier men mentality prefer sparsely populated and isolated areas to settle. What perhaps became more alarming to the Jukun was the steady growth of big Tiv- dominated towns with very strong economic profiles. Some of these towns are the yam markets of Dan-Anacha, Ayu, Donga Gaba, Gbor Begha, and Ananum. This does not include towns with more noticeable Tiv presence. This aspect of Tiv expansion into Taraba has been evident and pervasive as far back as the 19th century (Gyuse, et al, 2006: 136)

One of the most basic principles of research is to advance knowledge by collecting data to answer research questions to resolve the problem that motivates the quest in the first place. By doing these, we also attempt to confirm hypotheses/propositions or disconfirm them (Miller, D, 1991:4). In looking at the socio-demographic picture of the conflict sites we have noted the following: the Tiv and the Jukun, the Chamba, the Kuteb and the Fulani that are involved in the settler/indigene conflicts and live in both urban and rural environments; are people who are involved in small – scale peasant production of agriculture (both agrarian and fishing); are also nomadic grazers based mainly on family labour; the spatial distribution of occupations between the Jukun and the Tiv appears to have changed with the relatively recent entry of the Jukun into

commercial yam farming. Both ethnic groups are therefore now rivals and competitors for the vast fertile and sparsely populated lands of southern Taraba State.

However, it appears that the Jukun control land but cannot fully utilize for commercial yam farming. They need migrant Tiv labour coming in mainly from Benue State. Therefore, both the Tiv farmers and their Jukun rivals have to compete for the services of this source of labour.

The foray of the Tiv into politics and their sheer numbers and relative success starting from 1957 has alarmed the Jukun. It has also apparently exacerbated the conflicts over land. The picture is even clearer in the light of the role of a high-income earning, privileged and powerful elite at centre of the conflicts. From the data presented so far, we can deduce the following:

(i) The data adequately accounts for the first research question but its utility for the second is only partial being relevant to the first part of the question only.

(ii) It provides a useful background picture of the third research question.

For the Jukun of Wukari Local Government Area, certain indices are very critical from our presentation of data. Commercial yam farming and marketing are very lucrative economic activities. Both are controlled considerably by the Tiv whose sheer members and land-grabbing instincts are as sharp as they are pervasive. Their reason for the conflicts is therefore, sheer survival logic what with the Tiv successful foray into politics. The fighting therefore is a survival stratagem to avoid total domination hence the relevance of their operation *pastwi* (operation to recover our land). The legend in following quotation could not be more poignant and from the Aku uka, no less.“ They (the Tiv) came here to farm, we allowed them, gave them chieftaincy titles, now that their numbers have increased, they believe they are many enough to colonize us …… the Tiv would not allow us to give land to our children.” Mallam Shekarau Angyu Masalbi Kuryo ll (**Timesweek** No.43, Feb. 3, 1992).

After a thorough survey of the conflict sites in Benue and Taraba States employing the methodology outlined in chapters 3 & 5, we arrived at the following findings:

The settler/indigene conflict in Benue and Taraba States are caused,, escalated and maintained by a complicity of four cardinal factors. These are namely: History, politics, demography and economic factors. We therefore present these with a view to answering the research questions outlined in section 1.3 of chapter 1 (p.6). These will also justify' or invalidate the proposition and objectives of the study as presented in section 1.5 and 1.4 on pages 7 and 6 respective.

Although it is evident in the literature on ethnic relations most especially between the Jukun and the Tiv, the two foremost and consistent adversaries in the conflict, there is a definite corroboration of this in the oral accounts of the interviewees from both groups. This is quite noticeable in the different versions of their migration history. This n itself might not seem so unique as it could hardly be expected that two different cultures or civilization should have similarities in their genealogy. What is however, significant is in the contrasting slant of the accounts with a specific focus on who settled in the area first. We note the tell-tale signs of the conflict even in the names of tourns as is describes on table ( ) (p.). Take for instance, the Tiv dispute even the name for Wukari by calling it Waka, claiming that the settlement was founded by a Tiv hunter.

There appears to be no obvious historical accounts from the interviews, of Jukun-Tiv wars but there is evidence of Tiv-chamba struggle for supremacy pre-dating the now ubiquitous Jukun-Tiv rivalry – what most Tiv oral accounts suggest is an initiation of conflict with the Jukun with the coming of the whiteman, namely the Colonial regime of the British. Infact, interviewees from the Tiv divide finger the British for setting asunder what was previously a

relatively stable and symbiotic relationship between them and the Jukun. The Jukun account does not seriously question the culpability of history like the Tiv but instead, blame it al on demography. Namely, they appear to agree with the Tiv that both groups did not fight any major wars in the long history of their relationship but allege that the Tiv want to take advantage of their increasing population over time. To the Jukun, history is only a marginal element in the causative factors responsible for the fighting.

It is interesting to note here that the Chamba who fought along and bitter war with the Tiv (documented by Tiv oral songs on the war), do not express the kind of intensity of hostility for the Tiv that they show for the Jukun. What appears very evident from both accounts (the Chamba and the Jukun) is that their previously non-combative relationship has this in itself is too strange as the Chamba are locked in a deadly duel for supremacy in Takum with the ekpan (a proto-Jukun group) over the stool of the kuru kpante. This is the paramount (second class chief of Takum town).

According to the Chamba, they have been locked out of any claims to the title since 1914 when the last chamba kuru kpate was deposed by the British. This is inspite of a Gazatte by the defunct Benue-Plateau state government dated 22nd May 1975, giving legal and equal claim to the chieftaincy title to the ruling houses of both ethnic groups (Appendix "F"). The problem is complicated by the claims of a third party to the conflict here, the Kuteb, the mimorically superior group in Takum and Ussa Local Government Areas. Infact, the Kuteb have monopolized claims to the stool by an unbroken chain of successive kuru Kpantes from 1914 to 1995.

Therefore the picture of the conflict in Wukari and Takum sites revolves around settler/indigene platforms but for very different causative reasons. In Wukari, it is over land

between a numerically significant ethnic group, the Tiv and the authority and jurisdiction of the Aku Uka, the Jukun king. Here, the refusal of the Tiv to be totally subject to the Jukun ,king and over claims to land is a major reason for the conflicts between the Jukun and the Tiv in Wukari. Whereas in Takum, it is between the chamba, the ekpan Jukun and the Kuteb over claims to the traditional chieftaincy title of the kuru kpante of Takum town. This is the major causative factor of the conflict there.

In all these areas, the major adversaries are joined by other by no means insignificant allies. In Wukari, all Jukun in the adjoining local government area such as Ibi, Donga Gaba, Gassol owe allegiance to the Aku Uka and pitted against all Tiv residents in those areas. Secondly other smaller groups such as the Hausa, the Fulani and other Nigerian ethnic groups in the area play various supportive roles to either of the adversaries as the situation dictates particularly in politics. In Tiv on their own side, ate joined in the confrontation by their own kith and kin in the adjoining sites in Jortar, Gbeji, Sai, Abako in Ukum and Katsina-Ala Local Government Areas in Benue State. The situation is not helped by certain demographic factors such as peculiar character of the boundaries between the neighbouring communities in the two states.

CHAPTER SIX

Summary and Conclusion

6.1 Summary

The study, the politics of settler/indigene conflicts in the middle belt region has been undertaken in eight conflict sites in Benue and Taraba state. These represent the sample from the two states. The introductory chapter summarizes the critical background to the study from the imperialist colonial origin of the Nigerian State. It also examines the problem of the study – the challenge of the puzzle explaining how and why land and blood ties have become platforms of identity conflicts in Nigeria's plural society. It focuses on the contemporary crisis of violent conflicts between "settlers" and "indigenes" in various parts of the country.This is a conflict that is defined by claims to territorial possession and casts troubling shadows on the theoretical discourse on the subject as well. It looks at the critical objectives of the study and it's significance in the quest for knowledge.

The study is divided into six chapters; the first introduces and states the problem of the research as well as sets the major objectives. It notes the plurality of Nigeria across political, sectional, demographic, religious, ethnic and other divisions. From the historical background of Nigeria, we observe several violent eruptions, communal, religious but most importantly, ethnic in nature. The Theoretical problem seems to be that the theoretical discourse on settler/indigene conflicts is yet to fully resonate with the social reality on the ground. How do we account for a phenomenon that seems to mutate without any apparent logical principle that could give us some insight into how to explain it?

The second research question seeks to find out how land ownership/use together with power and production relations are responsible for the causes and escalation of settler/indigene conflicts?

The third research question wants to find out what is responsible for the present malignancy of settler/indigene conflicts in Benue and Taraba states as well as the gulf between available knowledge and the problem on the ground

These research questions therefore motivate us to set our research objectives in the following way:

i. explain through primary data, the national root cause of settler/indigene conflicts in the middle – belt region of Nigeria
ii. To exermine the ideological platforms and purposes and the role of politics in settler/indigene conflicts.
iii. To expore the gaps in available research knowledge and seek explanation for the persistence of settler/indigene conflicts in the middle-belt region.
iv. To examine the relationship between land rights, kingship ideology, power and how these cause and escalate settler/indigene conflicts.

Having set our objectives to guide us to undertake the study, we frame our propositions with which to collect data to test the inference of our variables thus:

i. Land and power are key motivating sources of settler/indigene violence in the middle – belt region.
ii. The clash of citizenship and kinship perceptions causes violent settler/indigene contestations in the middle-belt region.
iii. Settler/indigene conflicts are indicators of class domination.

The study proceeded to define the scope and delimitation. These are defined as the scope and delimitation. These are defined as covering the conflict areas in the middle-belt region involving settlers and indigenes. This includes conflict in urban and rural areas. We defined the middle – belt region as being two neighboring states, Benue and Taraba. The potential challenges of the study are then spelt out as well as the area of coverage which is explained in greater detail in the methodology.

We then proceeded to explain the significance and to justify the study, to start with, the study is significant in seeking to document a much neglected aspect of Nigerian history. While observing a disproportionate effort to document negative colonial imprint on Nigeria's economy, society and so on, we see nothing in the area of her inter-ethnic relations which also suffered no less.

It provides a critical link between the theoretical concepts seeking to explain the settler/indigene phenomenon and the studies seeking knowledge on this area.

The study is also significant in examining the situational and mutative character of identity conflict which is yet to be fully accounted for in the theoretical discourse so far.

The subject matter is also significant for several reasons especially the violence and methods that settler/indigene conflict entail. The study is also significant for examining the constitutional ambiguity that seems to give tacit support for perception that motivates setter/indigene platforms. This is to be seen in section 147:3 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In Nigeria at the moment, citizenship is challenged by kinship ties, (Dunmoye, 2005).

It is also significant for the study to take a closer look at the issue of class struggle and domination in the production arena. In this case, it is in the agrarian economy and in the urban area.

The sheer persistence and volatility of settler/indigene conflicts should command our attention in an area that is plurally most diverse.

The study undertakes a review of related litgerature in the second chapter. It also anchors it here with a theoretical framework of analysis. It attempts a better understanding the meaning and origin of the concept in Nigeria. The roots of the concept goes much farther in the colonial past but has acquired more urgency and relevance in recent times. According to some it is a coined word in recent political experience used to define natives of a particular area as compared with other Nigerians residents there. Settler is an identity platform based on lineal descent and on ethnicity. It is the platforms used in recent times to discriminate against other Nigerians.

Those who are settlers in an area are therefore considered to be non-indigenes unless they trace their ancestry and lineage. Mere birth does not qualify one to be an indigene . Scholars have also documented how these definitions have played out in practice in discriminating against other in contest over opportunities .

Scholars have also noted the constitutional support in this 'nativisation' of citizenship. These are found in section 25a, b, c (the grand parents clauses). It is also found in section 14(3) in the Federal Character Principles. They have also noted its ambiguity in failing to address the residency rights of citizens outside their areas of origin section 15 (3)b of the constitution.

These sections also give support for the Federal Character Principles, Federal quota and inconsistency. What is also noted in the literature in the area is the linkage of settler/indigene

conflicts to the National question . Momoh goes as far as to think that it is an aspect and product of the national question.

A related strand of consensus among scholars in the subject is its linkage to land. These have noted the territoriality of the conflicts . This territorial character is also linked to ethnic groups. Pluralism is also identified as an important theme to examine settler/indigene conflicts given the plural diversity of Nigeria with an estimated 350 ethnic groups.

The resonance of settler/indigene conflicts with religion in several case studies in Wase, Jos North (Plateau State), Nassarawa-toto (Nassarawa state), Zangon – Kataf (Kaduna State), and Bauchi. Another group of scholars have linked the concept with the political economy of Nigeria by looking at the historical evolution of the state and the introduction of capitalism and problems relating to pre-capitalist values and military intervention.

A far less pronounced stand of consensus on the concept examines it from a class perspective .

The review of literature also examines settler/indigene conflicts from a framework of ethnic conflict. Noting that the phenomenon is defined by ethnic configuration has been traced to the colonial period and phenomenon as part of ethnic conflict has been to have serous problems . Noting the mutative character of the conflicts, some have seen it as a multi-layered bundle.

Other reviews on the subject within the same perspective of ethnic conflict are those of the modernization school of thought. Critics have noted the ideological bias and in consistency of this approach . The conclusive opinion on this aspect of the discussion is that ethnicity is only an ideological fabricatin no matter its symbolic appeal .

We also review relevant literature to see if the settler/indigene phenomenon is part of Agrerian change. Noting that it has been observe that the conflicts have always been linked to

land (Yakubu, ed. 2003:20) some of the conflicts identified are in Kaduna, Nassarawa, Taraba, Kukah thinks its part of the prebendal culture of Nigeria. Egwu refers to it as rural ethnicity. It is linked to the agrarian question which is observed to be underscored by the centrality of agriculture in Africa. Agrarian change appears to have been critically affected by the nature of state of state intervention in peasant Agricultural production . The conclusive observation is that agrarian change appears to be only partially explanatory of settler/indigene conflicts.

The review also takes a critical look at the literature on the peasantry. Given that the conflicts are mostly in the rural areas where peasants live, it is reasoned that some knowledge could be had in looking at this area. Noting the relationship of the peasants as producers of commodities, some scholar to capitalist system as an anomaly, they tend to exude a primordial ideological consciousness under capitalist relations of production.

Scholars have also noted that what is called the peasant question show an uneven impact of capitalist relations on this group. The conclusive argument seems to be that settler/indigene conflicts are not just a peasant phenomenon. They appear to link the issue of kinship ties to class.

Some have noted that though Nigeria is a capitalist economy, some forms of pre-capitalist relations still persist. In this vein the, they discuss a thesis of a clash of models of production as the likely problem in settler/indigene conflicts they allege that a politics of peasant agricultural production within a nascent capitalist economy characterizes a clash of models of production. The dilemma of transforming from pre-capitalist to capitalist relations of production.. Much in the same perspective, Bakut (2005) thinks it's the colonial baggage of ideological biases that forms the clashing ideological identities.

Bakut thinks it's the confusion arising from social concepts in Africa being understood by different and ignorant Euro-Centric concepts. We ended the review with the environmental

conflict theory which cites increasing resource scarcity, environmental degradation as possible themes of discussion. Criticism of environmental conflict theory hinges on its generalized premises, presumptive assumptions that overlook the historical context within which settle/indigene conflicts have evolved.

The review takes a close look at the national question from the position of inter-group relations and that of class relations. It notes the attempt to understand what it is all about.It embodies a concern for the appropriate relations between the groups and the attempt to resolve problems of fear, marginalization, inequality, injustice (Anyanwu 1993:28, Ntalaja 1999). Momoh thinks its being reduced to the nationalities question which has been further reduced to the ethnic one. Toyo discusses the national question from a political economy perspective. Other writers on this perspective are Osaghae, 1995, Adejumobi, 2000.

The review also takes a look at the minority-majority problem in Nigerian politics. Noting how issues here evolved in the course of Nigerian history, it sees the linkage to ethnicity and Federalism . Mustapha it examines the minority issues from the problems arising from devolution of power under Federalism and how this conformed to communal ethinic boundaries. Other contributors on the minority-majority issue are Ekeh (1994), Hembe, 2003.

The third chapter is exclusively devoted to methodology. It elaborates the research design, the characteristics of the study population, the sample and sampling techniques, the sources and instruments of data collection, the validity of instruments of data collection, the method of data analysis and the limitations of the methodology.

The research is a cross-sectional field case study of eight conflict sites in Benue and Taraba states in North Central Nigeria. It employs both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. It has twin methodological objectives of collecting data from:

i. The material roots of settler/indigene ideology – land ownership/user political and bureaucratic offices (beneficiaries), schools, clinics.

ii. The ideological platforms of settler/indigene conflicts – conceptions of citizens, indigenes, settler, migration history, tradition and culture.

The study utilizes such qualitative research techniques as:

i. Focus group discussions

ii. Key informant interviews

iii. Semi-structured interviews.

We use the instrument of a designed questionnaire to collect data in all the areas.

The study also utilizes the technique of Triangulation which social scientists use to overcome structured weaknesses in the research by the adoption of more than one method.

6.2 Conclusion.

The data obtained from the field at the sites in Benue and Taraba states leads to certain conclusions of the findings:

Settler/indigene conflicts tend to gravitate around land ownership claims under the banner of ethnicity because of the symbolic appeal or potency of the ideology. This ideology is meant to justify an essentially economic reality. These are the material benefits from the means of production from an agrarian economy that is dependent on land. The migration of the Tiv into Taraba for demographic reasons as well as the contract labour system serves to affirm our first research question, viz: How and why is land ownership tied to kinship ties responsible for settler/indigene conflicts in Benue and Taraba staes of Nigeria?

In examining the conflicts sites in Benue but most importantly in Wukari Local Government Council and Peva and Takum town, we can deduce the following: land and power

seems to have become key variables in first the disarticulated agrarian but capitalist Nigerian economy. Prebendal cultural variables justify our choice of theoretical framework. and serve to explain the character of politics especially in Wukari Local Government under the direction of "God-fathers", conflicts will definitely erupt in the light of the interests of a numerically significant group such as the Tiv,the Chamba and the Kuteb.

However, the third proposition, namely that settler/indigene conflicts are identity expressions of class cleavages is not justified by the data collected and analysed.

The data also seems to buttress the clash between social pluralism and cultural phralism viz – citizenship vs kinship. This is perhaps why ethnic loyalties run so deep. Why Nigerians cannot seem to accept the challenge of much more diverse but more integrated and successful plural societies from other parts of the world.The problem of identityconflicts such as the settler/indigene conflicts is part of the uncompleted project of nationhood in most African states.The critical issue hinges on good governance and the character of the state in responsibly meeting the challenges of nationhood in a fast changing and complex world. This depends on the character of the ruling elites and the agenda that is fashioned for development.

6.3 Recommendations

1. Women/youth empowerment schemes through skills/enterprenuerial programmes would tackle the high unemployment rates and crime levels. No solution will succeed unless these critical segments of the population are empowered with the right skills for productive activities.
2. Residency laws through legislation-for a clear regime of rights for those Nigerians domiciled anywhere they reside.

3. Constitutional resolution of the settler/indigene dichotomy by de-emphasing indigeneity in resoyrce sharing arrangements.
4. Involve more civil society and community-based organisations in resolution of conflicts.
5. Programmes for sports and recreation in conflict- endemic areas.
6. Agro-based industries in endemic/conflict zones
7. More proactive social engineering approach to conflict e.g. use creative traditional conflict resolution methods

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APPENDIX A

Department of Political Science

Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria

Kaduna State, Nigeria.

QUESTIONAIRE ON THE STUDY OF SETTLER/INDIGENE CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE-BELT REGION OF NIGERIA.
DISCUSSION FORMAT.

SECTION A Definition of key variables.

1. In your own opinion, who is an
    i. Indigene?
    ii. Settler?
    iii. Citizen?

READ THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIAN CHAPTER IV.

2 What in your own opinion is the difference between your own definition and what the constitution says and what can be done?

B. Who is responsible for the frequent fighting in this area?
    i. How is land and politics part of the fighting?
    ii. Between you, your neighbor and the Government, who is to blame?
    iii. What is the major cause for the fighting here?
    iv. Who is really your enemy in the fighting and why?

C. What does your tradition say about land ownership/use and how do you share land here?
    i. How does your culture feature in all of this?
    ii. Are there other causes of the conflicts and is there a hierarchy in the issues involved? ?
    iii. Why must you fight and join your own kin to discriminate against other Nigerians?

D. In what specific ways are people discriminated against in this area?
    i. What are the levels of targetting, descrimination and manipulation?

ii. How frequently are people discriminated against and victimized on the allegation that they are"settlers" or "foreigners"?

iii. What are the material and psychological effects of the targeting and discrimination? i

v. How would you describe your own condition here?

E. When and how did you settle here?

i. Why do you join your brother to fight other Nigerians?

ii. What about your neighbor?

iii. Who is the first to settle here?

iv. Is this part of the conflict and why?

APPENDIX G

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SAI.

S/N	NAME OF INTERVIEWEE	SEX/ AGE	STATUS/ OCCUPATION	DATE	TIME	REMARKS
01	Iorsambe, F. M	M – 45	Business	16-06-2009	2:00-2:42PM	Adult male
02	Grace Gbeji	F – 31	Housewife	16-06-2009	2:00-2:42PM	Adult female
03	Esther Peter Sai	F – 33	Housewife	16-06-2009	2:00-2:42PM	Adult female
04	Aondoaver Agbidye	M – 27	Farmer/Trader	16-06-2009	2:00-2:42PM	Male youth
05	Terungwe Iorvaa	M – 21	Student	16-06-2009	2:00-2:42PM	Male youth
06	Hossana Sai	M - 25	Teacher	16-06-2009	2:00-2:42PM	Male youth
	KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW COMMUNITY LEADERS					
07	Sai Peter	M – 55		16-06-2009	7:30-8:00	
08	Akawe Donko	M - 40		16-06-2009	8:10-8:50	
	CHIEFS.					
09	Chief Iortswam Awange	M – 47	Chief	04-04-2009	1:20-1:50	
10	Chief Akpese Ausa	M – 45	Chief	04-04-2009	3:00-3:20	
	FAMILY HEADS.					
11	Gyangyang Ierver	M – 60	Retiree	04-04-2009	10:05-11:40	
12	Iorshambe Malu	M – 49	Farmer	04-04-2009	12:00-12:20	
	TRADITIONAL PRIESTS					
13	Samuel Ande	M – 49		05-04-2009	08:00-09:00	
14	Itrokyaa Anule	M – 38		05-04-2009	11:00-11:40	
	CIVIL SERVANTS.					
15	Mr. Agye	M – 36		05-04-2009	08:00-09:00	
16	Tseber Agudu	M – 40		05-04-2009	11:00-11:40	
	POLITICIANS					
17	Mhiir Wuaho	M – 53		05-04-2009	11:00-11:50	
18	Christopher Ikyor	M – 50		06-04-2009	10:00-11:00	

	SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW **OCCUPATIONAL**					
19	Terna Nyamombor	M – 24	Wheelbarrow pusher	10-04-2009	09:00-09:20	Male
20	Tsarban Innocent	M – 29	Yam sellers Ass.	10-04-2009	09:30-10:00	Male
21	Aza Memga	M – 27	Farm laborer	11-04-2009	08:30-09:00	Male
22	Igyor Chirkov	F – 30	Palm oil Seller	11-04-2009	10:00-10:40	Female
23	Martina Saaga	F – 31	Palm oil Seller	09-04-2009	08:00-08:40	Female
	COMMUNITY – BASED ORGANISATIONS.					
24	Abo Ngati	M – 35	Share Bam Credit	10-04-2009	11:00-11:40	Male
25	Mlanga Shami	M – 40	Nchar Dev. Asso.	11-04-2009	01:00-01:30	Male
26	Aza Wende	M – 52	Hunters Asso.	11-04-2009	02:10-02:40	Male
27	Bridget Aande	F – 40	Food SellerAsso	08-04-2009	09:00-09:33	Female
28	Mary Ihwakar	F – 45	Food SellerAsso	08-04-2009	10:17-11:00	Female
	YOUTH GROUP					
29	Mkorior Vandeh	M – 22	Student	03-04-2009	09:40-10:00	Male
30	Andrew Shim	M – 38	Yam seller	03-04-2009	10:20-11:00	Male
31	Ember Mbalam	M – 24	Student	03-04-2009	11:20-12:00	Male
32	Kwaghkuma Abachi	F – 25	Student	04-04-2009	12:00-01:00	Female
33	Pelen Abotar	F – 23	House wife	04-04-2009	02:00-02:30	Female

APPENDIX G

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CHANCHANJI

S/N	NAME OF INTERVIEWEE	SEX/ AGE	STATUS/ OCCUPATION	DATE	TIME	REMARKS.
01	Saleh Bako	M – 44	Farmer	13-07-2009	9:00-10:00AM	Focus Group Discussion. Adult Females(2) Male Youth (3). Female Youths (4)
02	Boyung Samaila	F – 20	Student	13-07-2009	9:00-10:00AM	
03	Larai Abuya	F – 22	House wife	13-07-2009	9:00-10:00AM	
04	Mansir Ayuba	M – 25	Student	13-07-2009	9:00-10:00AM	
05	Ishaku Nwunyi	M – 24	Student	13-07-2009	9:00-10:00AM	
06	Rasheed Idi	M - 24	Trader	13-07-2009	9:00-10:00AM	
07	Talatu Umar	F –18	Student	13-07-2009	9:00-10:00AM	
08	Lamin Ayuba	F – 20	Student	13-07-2009	9:00-10:00AM	
09	Jamai Ahmadu	F – 22	House wife	13-07-2009	9:00-10:00AM	
10	Fatima Idi	F – 19	Student	13-07-2009	9:00-10:00AM	
	KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW COMMUNITY LEADERS					
11	Idi Ahmadu	M – 39	Trader	03-08-2009	9:00-9:40	
12	John Ibrahim	M - 43	Business Man	03-08-2009	9:50-10:40	
	CHIEFS					
13	Mal. Audu	M – 49	Farmer	04-08-2009	3:00-3:37	
14	Zackary Iliya	M – 45	Farmer	04-08-2009	4:00-4:20	
	FAMILY HEADS					
15	Abdullahi Isah	M – 50		05-08-2009	09:00-09:40	
16	Idi Maizuma	M – 47		05-08-2009	09:50-10:40	
	TRADITIONAL PRIESTS					
17	Danjuma Adamu	M – 51		06-04-2009	03:00-03:50	
18	Ayuba Adamu	M – 46		06-04-2009	02:00-02:55	
	CIVIL SERVANTS.					
19	Saliu Ayuba	M – 34		07-08-2009	04:50-05:20	
20	Ibrahim Maigari	M – 35		08-08-2009	04:35-05:10	
	POLITICIANS					

21	Hon. Idi Maigari	M – 40		07-08-2009	09:00-11:00	
22	Yusus Lani	M – 31		05-08-2009	12:00-01:30	
	SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW OCCUPATIONAL					
23	James Nzon	M – 40	Fish seller	15-08-2009	09.00-09.35	Male
24	Emmanuel Habu	M – 40	Builder/Mason	15-08-2009	10.00-10.30	Male
25	Bala Abdullahi	M – 33	Farmer	15-08-2009	10.45-11.28	Male
26	Sunya Galuya	F – 38	Business	15-08-2009	11.45-12.20	Female
27	Baayi Aboshi	F – 32	Businesswoman	15--08-2009	12.40-1.30	Female
	COMMUNITY – BASED ORGANISATIONS.					
28	Bala Bina	M – 33	Farmer	14-08-2009	11:08-10:20	Male
29	Gomnati Sabo	M – 30	Trader	14-08-2009	01:30-02:00	Male
30	Saleh Abershi	M – 40	Tailor	14-08-2009	02:10-02:40	Male
31	Jumai Ibrahim	F – 27	Fish Seller	14-08-2009	02:50-03:20	Female
32	Esther Nwunyi	F – 30	Farmer	14-08-2009	03:30-04:00	Female
	YOUTH GROUP					
33	Solomon Ezekiel	M – 24	Farmer	14-08-2009	04:10-04:40	Male
34	Ali Maigari	M – 25	Student	14-08-2009	04:10-04:40	Male
35	Hamidu Adamu	M – 33	Business man	14-08-2009	04:50-05:16	Male
36	Patu Salisu	F – 25	Housewife	14-08-2009	05:20-06:00	Female
37	Zainab Yahaya	F – 20	Student	14-08-2009	06:09-06:30	Female

APPENDIX G

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR JOOTAR

S/N	NAME OF INTERVIEWEE	SEX/ AGE	STATUS/ OCCUPATION	DATE	TIME	REMARKS.
01	Zum Norgba	M – 65	Farmer	05-11-2010	2:00-2:45PM	Focus Group Discussion.
02	Shidoo Kpum	F – 40	House wife	05-11-2010	2:00-2:45PM	
03	Zaiyor Shom	F – 41	House wife	05-11-2010	2:00-2:45PM	
04	Isaac Iboiyo	M – 29	BEMOAN	05-11-2010	2:00-2:45PM	
05	Son Itroikyaa	M – 34	Trader	05-11-2010	2:00-2:45PM	
06	Julius Nenge	M – 36	Trader	05-11-2010	2:00-2:45PM	
07	Rose Igba	F –22	Student	05-11-2010	2:00-2:45PM	
08	Mary Akua	F – 23	Student	05-11-2010	2:00-2:45PM	
09	Ngunan Kpum	F – 25	Student	05-11-2010	2:00-2:45PM	
10	Doom Aker	F – 30	Food seller	05-11-2010	2:00-2:45PM	
	KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW COMMUNITY LEADERS					
11	Obadiah	M – 50	Artishe	06-11-2010	09:30-10:14	
12	Vashir Kuegh	M - 37	Comm. Leader	06-11-2010	08:45-09:22	
	CHIEFS.					
13	Zaki Orashima Gbar	M – 65	Chief	06-11-2010	11:00-11:30	
14	Zaki Kwagh Aondo Aper	M – 60	Chief	06-11-2010	12:00-12:40	
	FAMILY HEADS.					
15	Isaka Abi	M – 59	Chief	05-11-2010	09:50-10:27	
16	Zaawua Nenge	M – 67	Chief	05-11-2010	11:00-12:23	
	TRADITIONAL PRIESTS					
17	Tuhemba Igbian	M – 63	Chief	07-11-2010	10:00-10:40	
18	Donko Ishibi	M – 54	Chief	07-11-2010	11:10-12:00	
	CIVIL SERVANTS.					

19	Orya Ivo	M – 51	Chief	04-11-2010	04:40-05:18	
20	Tyotume Yumna	M – 40	Chief	04-11-2010	08:10-09:40	
	POLITICIANS					
21	Alh. Aliyu Dagera	M – 66		05-11-2010	03:00-03:40	
22	Hon. Andrew Orngu	M – 45		04-11-2010	04:00-04:40	
	SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW OCCUPATIONAL					
23	Tsavpee Agahia	M – 36	Vulcanizer	26-11-2010	10.00-10.30	Male
24	Moses Avenda	M – 39	NURTW member	26-11-2010	09.00-9.40	Male
25	Anengah Mathew	M – 38	Transporter	26-11-2010	11.00-11.30	Male
26	Suega Adzege	F – 24	Food Vendor	26-11-2010	02.00-02.20	Female
27	Dinah Mbakeren	F – 26	Trader	26-11-2010	03.00-03.35	Female
	COMMUNITY – BASED ORGANISATIONS.					
28	Iver Felix	M – 36	Anenga Boys Ass	26-11-2010	04.00-04.20	
29	Tar Boniface	M – 30	Anenge Boys Ass.	26-11-2010	04.30-05.00	