AN ASSESSMENT OF SELF DETERMINATION AS A STRATEGY FOR RESOLVING THE NATIONAL QUESTION SOUTH SUDAN

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis entitled "An Assessment of self Determination as a Strategy for Resolving the National Question South Sudan" is written by me in the Department of Political Science under the supervision of Dr. Yusuf Yakubu, and Prof. Kayode Omojuwa. The sources of data have been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of ʳeferences provided. No part of this Thesis was previously presented for another degree at any university.

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CERTIFICATION

This thesis titled **"AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AS A STRATEGY FOR RESOLVING THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN SOUTH SUDAN"** by Oduh Gabriel Obute meets the regulations governing the award of master of science (M.Sc) in political science and is approved for it contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

This research thesis is dedicated to God Almighty to whom glory and honour is given.

To my father, Barrister A. A. Oduh, I owe you a lot and to the entire members of the family, this is for you.

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ABSTRACT

This research, "An Assessment of the Right to Self-Determination as a Strategy for Resolving the National Question in South Sudan" was undertaken with the view to finding why and how the people of Southern Sudan came to identify themselves as a nation, irrespective of their religious and ethnic differences. The study adopted a thematic approach to the study by basing the analysis on literary texts. The ideological theory of nationalism was adopted in order to provide a systematic explanation for nationalism in Africa. The theory argues that nationalism in Africa is an ideological construction of disgruntled elites who mobilize the masses to their cause. After winning the sympathy of the masses, the elites and intelligentsia will start by negotiating with the dominant political group. It was found that the right to self-determination provided the platform for the attainment of statehood by the South Sudan but has not provided a permanent solution to the crisis of nationhood in South Sudan. Therefore, it was recommended that African states and South Sudan in particular, should embrace democratic principles in governance. The states should incorporate all the various segments and strata of the populace into governance. The rule of law and justice should be made to be the guiding star of governance. Finally it was *recommended that a level playing ground should be provided for all the people in various spheres of human endeavours.*

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATION

AU	**-**	African Union
CPA	**-**	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DOP	**-**	(IGAD) Declaration of Principles
GONU/GNU	**-**	Government of National Unity
GOS	**-**	Government of Sudan
GOSS	**-**	Government Southern Sudan
IDPS	**-**	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	**-**	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
OAG	**-**	Other Armed Group
SPLA	**-**	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army
SPLM	**-**	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement
SPLM/A	**-**	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army
SAF	**-**	Sudan Armed Forces
SSRDF	**-**	Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund
UN	**-**	United Nation
UNAMS	**-**	United Nation Advanced Muslims in Sudan
UNHCR	**-**	United Nation High Commission for Refugees
WSA	**-**	Wealth Sharing Agreement
ELI	**-**	Egypt Libya Initiative
NIF	**-**	National Islamic Front
EIJ	**-**	Eritrean Islamic Jihad

SSRC	**-**	Southern Sudan Referendum Commission
CNPC	**-**	China National Petroleum Company
MNDCP	**-**	Malaysian National Oil Company PETRONAS
PDF	**-**	Popular Defense Forces
JEM	**-**	Justice and Equity Movement

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

A multiplicity of armed non-state groups is heavily present in Africa. These armed non-state groups range from armed bands, vigilantes, cultists groups, private security outfits, criminal bonds, community, ethnic, religious or regional armies, to militias and rebel groups. These groups have played critical role in violent conflicts that severely undermined human security and the state capacity to guarantee it. The activities of these armed non-state groups have been felt in the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan among others. (Augustine and Wayfula, 2010:1-2).

The activities of these groups have adversely affected stability development and security of Africa. Although these groups existed in Africa in the pre-colonial, colonial and the immediate period that followed independence, there has been a resurgence since the 1990s, with groups being formed for dissent, resistance, civil defence and struggle for self-determination, political reforms and resources control in Sudan, DRC and Somalia with implication for human insecurity, massive internal displacement, disruption of livelihoods, violations of human rights, heightened criminality, loss of lives and humanitarian crisis (Ibid, 2010:2).

The activities of such armed non-state groups in Sudan are so devastating that the UN described it as the worst humanitarian and human

rights catastrophe in the world (Powell, 2005:31). The activities of these armed non-state groups have resulted in the death of about two million people (the Sunday Trust, January 30, 2011, p.18) and some two million people were displaces (Powell, 2005:13).

The conflict in the Sudan was driven and shaped by issues of national identity, ethnicity, language and religion, Sudan is diverse. The nationalist movements that take over power from colonial powers at independence formulated exclusive national policies based on race and religion. Ethnicity and economic marginalization were among the chief causes of rebellions against political regimes in Khartoum. In 1958, the government of General Ibrahim Abbound imposed policies of Arabisation and Islamization by repressive means such as forced Islamization of chiefs, changing weekends from Sunday to Friday and forcing parents to send children to Koranic schools in order to enforce cultural domination of Southern Sudan. Similar policies were pursued by successive governments after Abbounds regime was brought down through popular protest in 1964. (Jok, 2007:55-60). These policies were only terminated only after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005.

Economic and social exclusion played a critical role in the conflict in Sudan. Colonial government did not undertake policies for balanced economic growth in Sudan. It undertook export-oriented development programmes such as the production of cotton and gum Arabic. Agricultural schemes and transport infrastructure were planned and developed

according to British demand for these products. As a result, railway lines and agro-industry were developed in Central Sudan to the neglect of outlying regions of Southern and Western Sudan. Consequently, post-colonial administrations inherited gezira scheme and Sudan Railways in addition to a few light industries around Khartoum (Wassara, 2010:259).

Post independent governments in Sudan found it natural and normal to concentrate development programmes in Central Sudan. New dams were built at Rusaris and New Hanfa to boost irrigation projects in Khashmel Girba and Managil; Sugar Factories were constructed at Gunneid Hajr el Asalaya and Kenana; and Cement factories were constructed at Rabak and Arbara. These plans made for concentration of development activities in the centre of the country while Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Mile, Eastern Sudan and Darfur were excluded from economic development. This situation worsened feelings of marginalization (Wassara, 2010:260). These policies were only terminated after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.

When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ending the decades- long civil war was signed in 2005, the lock began to tick on Sudan's life as Africa's largest state. Although the breakup of Sudan was not then a foregone conclusion, both African and non-African leaders voiced fear that it could destabilize parts of the continent and lead to a domino effect of other nationalist secessions, most worryingly in large,

conflict-ridden states like the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Nigeria (McNamee, 2012:6).

On 9th July 2011, six years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, the south formally went its own way, creating Africa's 54th state. Opportunities to forge a new compact with the North were lost as officials in the south became convinced, certainly by the time of the 2008 SPLM convention, that Khartoum would never implement the provisions of the CPA or respect the benchmarks built into the agreement (Johnson, 2011) of signal importance was the sharply contrasting perspectives on the "one country, two systems" concept which the North interpreted to mean a federal-type arrangement, while to the south it was interpreted to mean a confederation (McNamee, 2012:8).

Khartoum was the first government to recognize South Sudan as an independent state after the CPA expired. The African Union admitted the Republic of South Sudan as its 54th member less than three weeks later on 27th July while the South Sudan was admitted into the United Nations as its 193rd member on 14th July 2011 (McNamee, 2012:8). None of this is to say that the African Union and the wider international community did not have serious misgivings about South Sudan going its way. Myriad problems were foreseen, from a possible resumption of war with the North (this time an inter-state war, which might draw in the countries' neighbours) to seemingly in surmountable development challenges. How South Sudan would address these challenges in the future could either soften reservations about

granting independent or cement international opinion against further ‘balkanization’ Africa (McNamee, 2012:10).

Security was always paramount in discussions about the viability of South Sudan as an independent state. The principal concern was that renewed conflict with the North could erupt over the status of Abyie (the tiny region which straddles the North-South border which both states lay claim to) and other border-related disputes in oil producing part of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States in the North. Abyie is a highly symbolic source of tension where Southern-aligned Ngok Dimka communities are pitted against nomadic Misseriya Arabs who migrate through the territory to graze vast cattle herds during the dry season. Control over parts of oil producing. Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states is contested by various northern and southern-backed factions and rival nomadic tribes (McNamee, 2012:10).

By the end of the 2011, fighting in the disputed states had resulted in more than 100,000 refugees, attacks had spread to unity state and upper Nile (Johnson, 2011), Juba accused Khartoum of aerial bombardments of refugee camps in both states, as well as supporting southern rebels suspected of attacks near southern oil installments. Southern Sudan’s president Salva Kiir claimed that Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir was trying to drag Africa’s newest state back into a “meaningless war” (Johnson, 2011).

However, conflicts within South Sudan between competing tribes and factions have been more deadly and potentially destabilizing to the new state than recent North-South confrontations. In the second half of 2011 clashes between rival ethnic groups in Jonglei state left thousands dead. In one incident alone, 600 ethnic Lou Nuer were massacred by fighters from the rival Murle community, it was reported that some 350,000 people had been displaced due to inter-communal violence in 2011 (McNamee, 2012:10).

Conflicts often erupt between different groups over water sources, cattle and access to grazing lands. South Sudan is bristly with small arms leftover from decades of conflicts. Poverty is rife across the whole of society through it is worst among the smaller ethnic minorities, many of whom feel marginalized and unrepresented in the new political dispensation, which gives more privileges to the more popular groups such as the Dimka's Rader, 2012). In spite of the SPLM's success in crushing several rebel factions and negotiating the surrender of others, and the conciliation efforts involving the UN peacekeeping mission (UNMISS), South Sudan's internal conflicts appear to worsen in 2012 (McNamee, 2012:11).

The main economic concern prior to the expiration of the CPA was not simply whether South Sudan could be viable on its own but whether secession could turn the North into a failed state (Johnson, 2011). The implications of secession for the North were immense; a potential loss of 75 percent of its revenues, about half of government revenues. In South

Sudan, there was no electricity, roads, schools or clinics in the run-up to independence (Brenthrust Foundation, 2010). The banking sector was among the poorly developed in the world, corruption was rife and trade cost was high. Three quarters of Sudan's oil was produced in the South but the pipeline and port facilities were controlled by the North. In January 2012, Juba began to shut down oil production after accusing the North of seizing $815 million worth of crude. Transit fee charged by Khartoum could re-ignite a wider North-South war (McNamee, 2012:12).

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Nationhood is achieved through the processes of nation building. Through these processes, a sense of community is developed among the people within the jurisdiction of a political system and provides for sense of identification, a common object of their allegiance, an emotional bond and social solidarity that cut across religion, race, caste, language, region, culture or occupation. These processes integrate the diverse sectors and strata of the society and produce the consensus and cooperation that conduce to domestic peace and political effectiveness (Garba, 2003:495).

In the Sudan these projects of nation building and state building failed to the point that the Southern part seceded to form an independent state. This study is undertaken with the view to assessing whether the right to self-determination has been able to resolve the national question in the South Sudan.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research problem is examined with the following questions.

1) What was the character of the national question in Sudan before the expression of the right to self-determination by the South?
2) How did the issues surrounding the national question lead to the expression of the right to self-determination in Sudan?
3) How effective has the expression of the right to self-determination been in resolving the national question?
4) Is expression of the right to self-determination an appropriate or desirable instrument for resolving the national question or the crises of nationhood in Africa?

1.4 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the study is to achieve the following:

i) To unravel the character of the national question in Sudan before the expression of the right to self-determination by the South.
ii) To examine how the issues surrounding the national question led to the expression of the right to self-determination by the South.
iii) To assess the efficiency of the right to self-determination in resolving the national question.
iv) To find out if the right to self-determination is an appropriate or desirable instrument for resolving the national question in Africa.

1.5 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS

The study is based on the following propositions:

i) Self-determination cannot effectively resolve the crisis of nationhood in Africa.

ii) Economic productivity and political efficiency are required for the construction and consolidation of nationhood in African states.

iii) Self-determination will not resolve the crisis of nationhood in the Sudan.

1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Sources of Data:

For the purpose of this study, data were collected through the analysis of various documents. The methodology had three phrases, first, the identification and compilation of relevant document for the topic; second, screening the document by its relevance to the topic; thirdly, synthesizing and analyzing the selected document. Due to time and challenges of gathering information through other methods, the method proved most appropriate for the study, therefore secondary sources of data was utilized in this research, secondary data are data that have been used by other researchers, and have been assessed, scrutinized and analyzed, in which case the data might have been distorted. Sources of secondary data for this study include: newspapers, magazine, journals, published, textbooks, unpublished thesis and internet materials the comprehensive

peace agreement (2005), and referendum acts (2009). These secondary data are extracted through literature review.

1.6.1 METHOD OF DATA PRESENTATION

Data collected for this work are presented in a qualitative fashion. This means the data would be descriptive. This means that the data would not take the form of numbers, tables and other statistical tools such as charts, variance, standard deviation, mean, media and mode.

To the extent to which numerical information are used, they would only be supplementary (Neumann, 2006:159).

1.6.2 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

In this study qualitative method of analysis is adopted which involves the application of logical statement to data, to make sense through some forms of careful scrutiny to discover traits, procedures, meaning and relationships.

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The research work is not only significant to the body of knowledge on resolving the national question in Africa, it also provides a guide to policies makers in a way that the crises of nationhood will be mitigated as not to result into secession.

1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

This study covers the crisis of nationhood facing the states of Africa. It focuses on the crisis of nationhood in Sudan which led to an armed

conflict that was only resolvable by secession. It also projects into the future of the North and South Sudan's prospect of nationhood.

The challenges or difficulties faced in the course of this research included; limited time, financial resources and accessibility to relevant sources of data.

1.9 DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Secession: Secession is the transmission of right or obligation from states which have altered or lost their identity to other states. Such alteration or loss of identity occurs when complete changes of sovereignty takes place over portion of territory. It is frequently used to refer to any attempt by a national minority to exercise its right to self determination. It is an expression of a desire to found an independent state.

Nationhood: This can be defined as a stage in the political life of a state at which parochial identities, emotions and loyalties either vanish or are suspended by national ones, so that the people become socially, culturally and politically integrated and bonded together (Garba 2003:495).

National Question: Is the totality of political, economic, territorial, legal, ideological and cultural relations among nationalities or national groups in various socio-political formation and how this interrelationship between the various nationalities or groups within a country is handled. The national question in Sudan therefore has to do with how these interrelationships threatened national unity and led to the south seceding.

Crisis is an extreme situation of conflict, which has reached a turning point, where critical decisions have to be taken or else the conflict escalates to a point of extreme violence. Crisis is a degenerated state of conflict, where threat to human security, intense violence characterized by fighting, death, injury, large scale of displacement of population.

1.10 ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS

This research is organized into five chapters. Chapter one is a general introduction into the study, it consists of the background to the study and the problematic of the study. Chapter Two offers review of related literature and theoretical framework. Chapter Three contains a background discussion on political development in Sudan, examining as much as possible the underlying causes of grievances through the process of identity formation to armed struggle and then independence in South Sudan. Chapter four examines independence and its aftermath in South Sudan by assessing the efficiency of the right to self-determination in addressing the national question in South Sudan, challenges and prospects. Chapter five contains the summary, conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

One controversial but enduring legacy left by European colonialism in Africa was national borders. Colonial administrators broke up or clustered people, languages, customs and alliances with little rational guidance form history tradition and logic (Bamfo, 2012:38). Where a region or an ethnic group is located relative to other regions has been an important but other overlooked factor that determines whether a disenchanted group or region will stay in a political union (Bamfo, 2012:38).

During the struggles for national liberation, Africans sometimes had recourse to violence, notably in the form of armed conflict. This phenomenon did not disappear with independence (Gonidec, 1981:232). This increasing trend towards the use of violence for the purpose of removing rulers from the political scene or bringing pressure to bear upon them is not only due to the use of force by rulers to gain the adhesion of the population and their participation in the exercise of power (Gonidec, 1981:232, 241). This can be referred to as the crisis of nationhood, in which the diverse ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups that were carved into a nation by colonialists have not been properly integrated through nation building.

2.2 THE ISSUES AND PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL QUESTION IN AFRICA

According to Mazrui (1982:27), any discourse on nationhood in Africa ought to proceed, from pan-Africanism. He drew a distinction between the pan-Africanism of colonial Africa and pan-Africanism of post-colonial Africa. Mazrui (1982:27) argued that pan-Africanism in the colonial era was a movement of liberation while the pan-Africanism of independent Africa is a movement of integration. For him, pan-Africanism as a liberation movement had greater success than as an integrate quest. Pan-Africanism as a movement of liberation was focused on decolonizing Africa and Africans were able to maintain a viable spirit of solidarity in pursuit of decolonization.

Pan-Africanism as a movement for greater political and economic integration, on the other hand, has had a much less impressive record. Even those countries that started with a substantial level of regional integration later experienced acute tensions, and the level of integration declined (Mazrui 1982:28).

Proceeding from thence, Mazrui (1982:29) argued that problems of integration were even more fundamental at the national than the regional level. Furthermore, he argued that racial consciousness had aided continent-wide pan-Africanism, however, ethnic consciousness militated against national integration within individual African states. Hungwe and Chipo (2010:33) concurred with Mazrui that the idea of “nationhood was fostered in the struggle that won the liberation as African people identified

themselves as a physical and psychological entity which existed in the form of geographical location where cohesion subsisted amongst members who felt a sense of belonging, patriotism and pride".

Nation-building in individual African countries has been disrupted by narrow ethnic consciousness and politicized lineage (Mazrui 1987:44). Introducing an economic dimension to the crisis of nationhood in Africa and Nigeria in particular, Gambo (2011:7) argues that citizenship in Africa has been replaced with indigeneship. While citizenship is the "legal relationship between an individual and a state which the state recognizes and guarantees the individual rights, indigeneship s a social construction which seeks to exclude other people from enjoying certain rights and privileges within the community" (Gambo 2011:5-6). Gambo associates this phenomenon with the diminution of socio-economic fortune of Africa.

In the case of Nigeria, Gambo (2011:7) argues that as socio-economic opportunities were fast diminishing, contestations over scarce but allocatable resources got heightened among competing groups engaging each other on conflicting identity platforms. This gives rise to conflict in Nigeria based on ethnic, religious and regional identities. This creates a situation in which each group feels that it has not been fairly and equitably treated and then a tendency to attribute this unfair treatment to the rising influence of some groups develops (Gambo, 2011:7). Furthermore, resurgence of identity based contestations over scarce resources are fueled

by massive loss of capacity of the state to engage in basic social provisioning (Gambo, 2011:7).

Chowdhury (2009:642) introduced a political dimension to the crisis of nationhood in Africa. He argued that state failure is caused by domestic factors. He does believe that economic factors cause state failure, but political decision to manage economic problems is similarly important. In his argument Chowdhury (2009:642) said that states are more likely to suffer institutional weakness because of longer term economic and social characteristics. These include the lack of fiscal resources available to government-primarily the result of a low tax base, lower state capacity (which often comes as a result of political decisions such as patronage), the availability of national resources and being landlocked. But he argues that lack of fit between societies and the state, coupled with bad leadership creates instability.

In the same vein, Clapham (2004:89) argues that even in places where resource endowments might have enabled state to rise, African states have been unable to attain stability because to rent-seeking leadership, neo-patrimonialism and poor governance. This political dimension has created a legitimacy problem for the African state and has forced citizens to increasingly retreat from their national identity which the post-colonial had sought to promote into communal, ethnic, religious and forms of identities thereby making it unrealizable the goal of constructing a citizen with solid African identity, a detribalized, scalar and patriotic identity

(Jega, 2003:34). This agrees with the argument that the “state in Africa has not become a reasoning presence but remains a formidable threat to everybody except the few who control it” (Ake, 1994:7).

The consequences of this negative perception of the state is that most have turned away from it to seek fulfillment in their community, ethnic group or nation. When the state fails to effectively discharge its obligations to the citizens, the sense of emotional attachment to the state is easily lost to a primordial group that is exclusively and purposefully constructed to fill in the gap created by the state failure (Gambo, 2011:8).

Nzongola Ntalaja (2011:2) attributes the crisis of nationhood in Africa to the socio-cultural history of Africa, besides the economic and political factors. He said that good citizenship requires a shared set of goals and values in a political community, whether it is a village, a town or a larger grouping, is an idea that was fundamental to the very notion of a human being in pre-colonial Africa. He argued that indigeneity or “jus sanguinis” is the first principle of citizenship in Africa. Thus, Ntalaja observed that social exclusion is a function of class and other identity-based distinctions (Nzongola Ntalaja, 2011:7).

The question of indigeneity in Africa (which emphasizes the primary of loyalty and attachment to ancestral land and primordial groups were national loyalty) assumes political significance with identity-based conflicts in which the bone of contention is control over power and resources such as land (Nzongola Ntalaja, 2011:7). The indigeneity question gives rise to

identity conflicts, exacerbated by growing poverty and states declining capacity for development. In such situation, an emancipatory thrust becomes part of the quest by marginalized people for their own chiefs and land (Nzongola Ntalaja 2011:8). The effect of all this is that it creates division among the diverse ethno-cultural groups within the African state rather than integrates and builds solidarity among them.

The crisis of nationhood is created by failure of the post colonial African state to democratize both political and economic institutions by expanding the political and economic space to empower women, the young, ethnic minorities and other state of the population. This requires the expansion of the boundaries of post colonial citizenship beyond indigeneity in conformity with the pan-African ideal and the realities of globalization, it is this future that now has major consequences for democracy, political stability and sustainable human development.(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2011:3-4). However, building and expanding these institutions are expensive and requires a long time (Chowdhury, 2000:643).

Moreover, two motive lied at the heart of the struggle for decolonization of Black Africa. First, the struggle was carried out under the banner of pan-Africanism, whose roots in the African diaspora of North America and the Caribbean had given rise to the pan-African project of a single nation under one continental state or several regional federations. Second, at the other extreme, there were reactionary nationalists dreaming

of reviving pre-colonial nations. However, the political map of Africa that was driven by the colonialists subsisted (Ngozonla-Ntalaja 2011:8).

The colonial heritage of political boundaries magnified the crisis of nationhood for the African state. The political institutions that were established by the colonialists made no provision for integrating the diverse socio-cultural and ethnic elements of the colonial state societies. That was because the colonial intercept was basically commerce and the plundering and exploitation of both natural and human resources of the colonized territories of Africa (Bamfo 2012:38). But what was to create the basis for nationhood in Africa was unconsciously and spontaneously initiated. The element of nationhood in post colonial African came from petty bourgeoisie, the proletariats and semi-proletariats masses of the working people who had migrated to urban and industrial centers outside of their ethnic homelands. It was this segment of the population that developed some emotional attachment to the new political community before independence (Ngonzola-Ntalaja 2011:9).

Corruption, both of economic and political nature have exacerbated the crisis of nationhood in Africa. All the level of economic corruption Gambo (2011:14) argued what actually fuels and feeds controversy are the widespread corrupt practices perpetrated by public officials with impunity. The belief then is that when you have your own appointed into high profile political office, such appointment brings with it robust prosperity for the immediate relations and cronies of the appointee. In order to cleanse

oneself of the impurities of poverty, one must play the ethnic card to create access to the national coffers (Gambo 2011:14). It is this economic corruption that has given political corruption some primordial and parochial character instead of national one.

Ibrahim and Oumar (2008:216) bring out the nature of political corruption that militates against nationhood in Nigeria in particular, and Africa in general. They argue that the newness of modern political power in the hands of indigenous Africans, caused by the newly achieved political freedom from European domination, gives many young Africans the ambition to rule (Ibrahim and Oumar 2009:217). On the other, those to whom political power has fallen into their hands have the desire to rule forever. This produce gerrymandering, the rigging of elections and the inflation of population census figures in order to gain personal advantage or profit. Politicians thus, fan tribal suspicion and extreme regionalism in order to win votes at elections. Deliberate lies are told against other tribes ethnic or linguistic groups or religious groups (as the case may be) by politicians and their supporters and their supporters to sow the seed of suspicion and fear of dominion by other groups in the hearts and minds of simple-hearted voters (Ibrahim and Oumar, 2009:216).

Admitting that nation-building is not an easy task anywhere, and there is no shortcut to nationhood, Ibrahim and Ndongo (2009:221) believe that African states can adopt a form of political association among its units or ethnic and linguistic groups that will adequately protect the interest of all.

By this they believe, the task and process of nation building can be continued generation as the process requires as long time.

The modernization of African economies and their enlargement should have initiated a partial erosion of kinship and reproductive loyalties in favour of more purely economic rivalry. But this has not happened. The modernization of African economies has not as yet served to neutralize the heightened sense of ethnic affinity that has come with ethnic pluralism in the new African nation-states. (Mazrui, 1981:40). The process of national integration in African countries requires a partial decline in the power of kinship symbolism and ethnic confrontation (Mazrui, 1981:42).

In the case of Sudan Bamfo (2012:40) observed that Sudan was the last country in African and under the best of conditions, the vast expanse of land and diversity of its people posed a formidable challenge for any government wanting to keep active line of communication with all its regions and peoples. Deng (2006) observed that the crisis of nationhood in Sudan had a social basis that was rooted in government policies. He claimed that there was strikingly high gross reproduction and death rates, high infant mortality rates poor diet, medical services and poor education to the South Sudan which fell far below the rest of the country. Such discriminating policy served a North-South divide in Sudan (Deng, 2006).

Cultural differences between the North and South were believed to contribute more to exacerbating the crisis of nationhood in the north than any other factor. The inability of the North and South to interact freely was

engendered by linguistic differences and cultural problems that did not permit intermarriage between the two regions. Thus, regional and parochial attachments were sustained and promoted (Bamfo, 2012:41).

Mazrui (1981) observed that the crisis of nationhood in Africa is associated with military coups and military rule. In most African states, the military had striken at least once, to take over power from civilian politicians. Once in power, the military jettisoned the constitution and ruled by decree and power becomes concentrated in the hands of a few military officers and their few civilian allies. The rest of the masses are marginalized politically. Also, the masses withdraw any legitimacy placed on the state.

Chowdhury (2009:639) argues in the way vein as Mazrui. He argued that military intervention does not only alienate the masses from the political system, but it also create situation whereby the international community accuses the military of human right abuses on which ground the regimes are denied and needed to blind institution for nation building. This international dimension to the crisis of nationhood in Africa is supported by Nzongola-Ntalaja (2011:9). Nzongola-Ntalaja said that the territorial nation state corresponded to the neocolonial strategy of imperialism, whose interests would be better served by a large number of weak and impoverished states.

The task of nation building requires that there be a strong government (achieved through state building) to granted the delivery of public goods. Rotberg (2004:210) outlined these services in descending

order of importance; security dispute resolution, freedom to participate in government and basic rights and services. But these goods and services are nearly always delayed by budgetary requirements before allocation to regional governments and into programs designed to provide public goods, albeit limited services in many countries with high poverty rates (Hutchinson and Johnson, 2011:741). These services are required to sustain confidence, trust and national loyalty in the national government. The absence of them causes the people to withdraw their loyalty and allegiance to ethnic, religious or cultural communities. The masses become divided rather than integrated (Hutchinson and Johnson, 2011:741).

Most African states are rentier states, particularly those rich in high value resources. These states rarely need tax revenue to finance the government. As individuals become increasingly irrelevant to financing governments, institutional efficiency declines as governments no longer require economic productivity realized from the population to finance themselves. As institutions erode and governments no longer need to meet the demands of the population, trust decreases, and prospects for instability rise (Hutchinson and Johnson, 2011:741).

2.3 SELF-DETERMINATION

Van Wait (1999:9) observed that although self-determination became university recognized as a fundamental principle to the maintenance of friendly relations and peace among state, the principle of self-determination had been embraced by the U.S President Woodrow Wilson, Lenin and

others. The principle of self-determination was also in the reconstruction of Europe in the Aftermath of the First World War (Van Walt and Seroo, 1999:9).

Quoting the paragraph one of the Article one of the United Nations charter, Van Walt and Seroo (1999.9) said that the Article provided that “all peoples have the right to self determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political states and freely pursue their economic social and cultural development. For this reason, they that the right to self determination is firmly established in international law (Van Wail and Seroo, 1999.9)

Following this line of argument, it can then be said that when people anywhere, including the people of South Sudan, lay claim to self determination, they do so with some legal backing from the code of international law. This is why some scholars argue that the concept of self determination is a very powerful one. As expressed by Van Walt and Seroo (1999.9) other is as powerful, visceral, emotional unruly and as steep in - creating aspirations and hopes as self determination” The concept evokes emotions, expectations and fears which often lead to conflict and bloodshed (Van Walt and Seroo, 1999.10)

To be extent to which the claim to self determination antagonize the claim to sovereignty, it becomes very hard to explain, at least satisfactorily, how the principle of self determination contribute to conflict prevention On the other hand, it is argue that compliance with the right to self

determination is a fundamental condition for the enjoinment of other human right and fundamental freedoms, whether civil, political, economic, social or cultural (Van Walt and Seroo 1999.9). However, Pavkovic and Radan

(2003:4) observed that the increased recognition of the principle of national self determination has led to an increase in the number of civil war or inter-states conflicts. This, they argued, is a competition for sovereignty among different national groups within states. Yet, the realist theory of international relations insists on the primacy of territorial sovereignty over national self-determination. Thus, the realist theory supports the policy of containment of self determination within the boundaries of existing states. This was way successful during the cold war since the super-powers restrained each other from supporting claims to self determination that would have led to the dissolution of existing ones (Pavkovic and Radan, 2003:4).

This way, it can easily be seen that neither the emphasis on attritional sovereignty nor the increased claims to the right to self determination has reduced conflict. It then follows that the solution lies elsewhere

It is in the light of this position that Van Wait and Seroo (1999:12) have identified two dimension to self determination; internal and external self determination self determination. They argue that self determination has an internally dimension, which is participatory democracy. According to them the right to self determination can be expressed through the right to decide the form of government and the identity of rulers by the whole

population of a state and the right of a group of population within the state to participate in decision making at the state level Thus, internal self determination can also imply the right to exercise cultural, institution, religion or terntonal political autonomy within the boundaries of the existing state.

Had the people of South Sudan found this internal principle of self determination applied to them, the crisis of nationhood in the old Sudan would have been mitigated at least, if not prevented. This is because the ground would been eroded for them to aspire for ‘’Full” self determination.

Van Walt and Seroo (1999:13) went further to explain that external self determination implies the right to decide on the political states of a place in the international community in relation to other the right to separate from the existing state of which the group concerned is a part, and to set up a new independent state (Van Walt and Seroo, 1999:13). This external dimension of decolonization was widely applied as an instrument of decolonization.

These scholars have left us in the darkness with respect whether a hierarchy exists between these two dimensions of self determination Also we are not made to understand whether the two dimensions of concept are capable of resolving the crisis of nationhood. Although in the case of South Sudan, the External dimension of self determination was applied.

According to Van Walt and Seroo (1999:13) self determination is a process rather than an outcome. There is no one prescribed outcome- for the

exercise of self determination. According to the United Nations General Assembly, "the establishment of a sovereign and independent state, the free association or integration with an independent state on the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitutes modes of implementing the right to self determination by that people" This declaration obvious does not recognize the internal dimes ion of self determination identified by Van Walt and Seroo.

For Rourke (2008:123) self determination helps to end many of the abuses associated with ethic oppression. Arguing further, Rourke said that if all ethnic nationalities were allowed to peacefully found their own sovereign states on join those of their ethnic brethren, the tragedies of Bosnia, Chechnya, east Tinor, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sudan and many other strife-torn peoples and countries would not have occurred (Rourke, 2008:123).Apparently, Rourke accedes to the fact that self determination, where correctly applied, could prevent or resolve conflict He relies on the external dimension of self determination. Applying this argument to the peoples of South Sudan may not hold much water because there not many different ethnic groups within South Sudan.

Arguing further however, Rourke (2008:123) stated that the principle of self determination becomes more problematic in practices. He said that given the thousands of which groups in the world, the world may become more chaotic if each ethnic nationality were to seek independence or autonomy. Additionally, Rourke (2008:123) observed that many ethnic e

overlap. Disengaging the various nations that have intermingled presents a great difficulty. A third problem of self determination is that if applied to all ethnic groups, microstates would be created and that these micro-states may not be economically and militarily viable enough provide foe the security and economic welfare of its citizens (Rourke 2008:124).

According to Ronen (1979:6), neither written words nor official interpretations motivate peoples to seek self-determination; rather, they are instrument to speaking it. Ronen (1979:7) proceeded to say that self-determination proceeds from the aspiration of human beings to be "'free" or to be "'free from" what they perceived as 'others''. Thus, Ronen (1979:7) argued that self-determination means the control of one's self but warns that the control is not rarely as freedom, ration as a positive human condition or a pre-requisite for a positive human condition for the ''good life" self-fulfillment and the like (Ronen, 1979:7)

From the forging, the only major motivation for self-determination is the perceived oppressiveness of the political system. Since even the oppressiveness of the political system can be a perceived one, tendency exists for "enemies" of the state to spread propaganda against the state which may result into conflict. The introduction of the notion of freedom into the concept of self-determination only points to the internal dimension of self-determination. However, the South Sudanese lacked this freedom in the "old Sudan".

Writing about the South Sudan had wanted the application of the internal dimension of self-determination. The South Sudan wanted the right to control their own political, economic and social affairs within the “Old Sudan” through a federal arrangement. It is the denial of this ‘freedom then that provided the motivation for the aspiration for the external dimension of self-determination. The external dimension of self determination is the aspiration for the establishment of a sovereign political entity separate from the old (Hereclides, 1991).

2.3.1 THE RESORT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The recourse to secession by rebel or militants groups fighting a war of liberation is due to the rise of violence by the state to suppress legitimate demands and agitations in previous occasions (Bamfo, 2012:40). Much of the regions of the nation-states that resort to secession did not wake up one to aimed rebellion against the state. Their leaders have made several efforts at achieving their interests by legitimate means. These are manifest in South Sudan, Katanga (Congo Brazzaville), Biafra (Nigeria) among others (Bamfo, 2012:38). Besides the use of violence to suppress agitations and claims, the state might have failed in providing security of the populace of the region who have gone to settle in other parts of the states.

There is another reason advanced to why regions resort to secession in the concentration of economic resources in the province, especially the presence of rare mineral such as cobalt, uranium and oil. The discovery of oil in commercial quantities in both the North and South Sudan in the 1980s

raised the stakes for the south to break away (Bamfo, 2012:40). According to Bamfo (2012:40), the 2003 “Niger Delta Manifesto” gives a rambling account of the history of the plunder of oil by colonialists and the Nigeria government.

Furthermore, the region or group must have believed that it stands a better chance of benefiting more by breaking away than remaining in the “old” state (Bamfo, 2012:42).

Geographic location of the region r province that is seeking to secede has been adduced to be one of the factors for a region, province or a part of any state to seek to secede. Besides that location in coastal area would provide easy way of escape for rebel leaders should the secessionist bid failed, there are other advantages that can follow if the secessionist region is located on the coastal part of the state. Bamfo (2012:43) observed that location in costal or border regions afford the opportunity for easy shipment of arms across the borders. In addition, it also provided an easy escape route for rebel leaders should the secessionist effort failed. Yet, location along borders reduces the ability of the state to engulf and siege the region. (Bamfo, 2012:43).

However, McNamee (2012:8) added that the selfish ambition of leaders to held as national heroes necessarily drives them into secessionist ambitions. In order to achieve their ambitions, leaders of secessionist movement would stand on the claim that the “old” state had lost opportunities to forge a new compact with the region (McNamee, 2012:8).

Social divisions that reach right down to the lowest stratum of the population makes it easy for rebel leaders to win the support of youths who avail themselves as soldiers. Women also would usually give their support due untold sufferings. This is a case where the distrust and lack of confidence in the state has reached a point that even when a new compact were to be forged, the state cannot be trusted to implement them (McNamee, 2012:8).

2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to explain the phenomenon of the crisis of nationhood in Africa in general and South Sudan in particular, this study has adopted the ideological theory of nationalism. This theory views nationalism as an ideology based on a strategy of stigmatization and emulation of a dominant other. This ideology according to the theory is built by the intelligentsia in order to resist the domination posed by some dominant group. The theory argues that the ideologically-minded intelligentsia will opt for nationalist politics when locked in conflicts with others for the control of economic resources or the state, if not for the establishment of a new state (Gellner, 1983).

Basing their political claims on the new ideology, the intelligentsia will resort to the main symbols of this ideology to mobilize followers who will help them achieve their aims. Proponents of this theory include: Greenfield L., Plameraafz J., Smith A.D. and Berlin I (Jaffrelot, 2003:43).

The utility of this theory lies in the fact that nationalism in Southern Sudan was expressed amidst ethnic heterogeneity with a massive support from the populace. In other words, the multi-ethnic and multicultural nature of Southern Sudan could not prevent the emergence of Southern Sudan identity which formed the basis for the overwhelming vote for secession on the January 9^{th} - 11^{th} 2011 referendum that saw the birth of the new nation.

Nationalism in Africa is not much less than an ideology developed to justify the struggle into which the group propagate the ideology is locked with another. In this wise, nationalism in post-colonial has not changed from the kind of nationalism that was expressed during colonial period against western powers. Then, nationalism was a struggle for obtaining independence (at least a political one) in the form of the transfer of political power from imperial powers to indigenous people. Nationalism is known for a struggle among the indigenous people over political power for its use to decide who gets what, when and how.

In summary, nationalism in post-colonial Africa, as in the colonial era, occasioned by the powers of alienation, exclusion, marginalization and domination of one group by another usually politically dominant. This explains why after independence, secession attempts have been made at various times in various states, regardless of whether such secession could result in the creation of an economically unviable state.

CHAPTER THREE

BACKGROUND: NATIONALISM AND CRISES OF NATIONHOOD IN SOUTH SUDAN

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The result of the January 9, 2011 referendum in which southern Sudanese were to decide whether to become independent or will continue to be part of unity government in Khartoum showed that over 98% of voters favoured independence for South Sudan. This referendum came in the aftermath of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (hereafter to be referred to as CPA) signed in Naivasha, Kenya in 2005.

But how was the identity built among the people of South Sudan that they would rather choose, in an overwhelming referendum result, to be independent from Khartoum? What experience led to that decision? Answering these questions would require brief retrospective look into pre-colonial and colonial Sudan and we shall proceed from there.

3.2 PRE-COLONIAL SUDAN

The geo-demographic and socio-cultural background of Sudan is rather complex. In terms of land mass, Sudan is the largest country in Africa. With a land area of over 2.5 million square kilometers, Sudan is about ten times the size of its former colonial power, the United Kingdom. Its forty-two million population is largely divided along lines of religion (70 percent Muslims, 25 percent animists, and 5 percent Christians) and economic activity at the grassroots level (nomadic and sedentary). The

majority of people often classified as animists in Sudan are mostly syncretic in that they simultaneously adhere to Christianity. Significantly, there is a major ethno-regional divide between the dominant Arab North and the minority Christian – Animist black African South, a divide that has historically been a conflict fault line. Another ethno-regional conflict fault line exists between the largely black African Muslim dominated northwestern region of Darfur and the hegemonic Arab Muslim populations of North – Central Sudan (Omeje, 2010:172).

For a greater part of post-medieval and pre-colonial history, Sudan was under the occupation of different Egyptian dynasties whose intervention into the affairs of their southern neighbours goes further back to many centuries. B.C. the Turkish-Egyptian occupation of 1821 to 1885, which precipitated a popular nationalist revolt led by the Self-appointed Islamic Mahdi Mohammed Ahmed was the climax of Egypt's domination of Sudan. The Mahdist rule (1885 - 1898), which was an attempt to build an assertive state based on Islamic principles, was toppled in 1898 by an extraordinary colonial conquest in an alliance between the British and Egyptians (Sudan imperial northern neighbours). (Woodward, 2008:109).

The Anglo-Egyptian condominium that effectively colonized Sudan during the era of European colonialism lasted from 1898 to 1956, when Sudan was granted independence after a protracted decolonization struggle. The British decisively dominated the condominium (Woodward, 2008:109).

In both pre-colonial and colonial history, there was a political construction of Sudan's non-Arab territories, especially the southern region as territories for violent exploitation of resources for the benefit of the imperial occupiers (Turco-Egyptians and the British) round for the economy of Sudan's Arab North. In both dispensations, Turco-Egyptians, Europeans and northern Sudanese Arabs were involved in moving south from the administrative capital of Khartoum in the North in search of the riches of the southern Sudan. At first, Ivory and livestock were the main targets, but by the 1850's it was slaves for export to Egypt and Arabia and for domestic slavery in northern Sudan (Woodward, 2008:109).

Slavery in the South was partly borne out of the deep-seated prejudice the Arabs have for the Negro whom them they perceived as an inferior race. The British ended the Arab-led trans-Sahara in the later nineteenth century, but this did no diminish the violence that characterized the predation and subjugation of non-Arab territories (Deng, 1995:488).

3.3 SUDAN UNDER COLONIAL RULE

A number of colonial policies and practices contributed to the construction of Sudan's non-Arab territories as out posts for imperial conquest and violence extraction of resources. The first was Re Isolationist Southern Policy, a classical divide and rule policy introduced by the British after 1930. This colonial policy was to govern the north and south separately to avoid the political radicalization of the comparatively backward

south for the effects of growing nationalist sentiments and revolts in both Egypt and the Arab-dominated Northern Sudan (Johnson, 2003:50).

Following the isolationist policy that deepened the gulf between Sudan's north and south, some nationalist politicians and colonial historians felt that the British would either groom southern Sudan for separate statehood or perhaps affiliate the region to the colony of British East Africa, with whom the South of Sudan seemed to have more socio-cultural affinity than Sudan's Arab north. Against the protest and fear of domination and marginalization by southerners, the British succumbed to the intense pressure from both Egypt and the northern Arabs to ultimately unify Sudan. The Isolationist policy ended in 1946, with the unification of Sudan's north and south. The unification followed the Sudan Administrative Conference convened and attended by predominantly northern nationalist elites as part of the effort to strategize for decolonization and self rule (Johnson, 2003:150).

Second, the British colonial authority primarily promoted economic and social development in the Arab North Region at the expense of the non-Arab native African tribal peripheries. In particular, colonial cash crop production (notably cotton) and educational institutions were mostly concentrated in the Arab north-central regions. Subsequently most of the educated elites that led the nationalist struggle for independence were of the northern Arabs. The Arab elites that led the independence struggle based their nationalism on the instrumental convergence of Arab and

Islamic identities – a mobilization and solidarity strategy that completely alienated and threatened the non-Arab, non-Islamic south (Aleski, 2005:10-12).

Third, in the decade before independence, the interim transitional government dominated by the Arab Sudanese (albeit under the superintending watch of the British colonial authorities) embarked on a personnel indigenization policy known as Sudanization, which was essentially aimed at replacing western colonial officials with educated natives. This policy was to the practical advantage of the Arab north, which accounted for a large proportion of the educated manpower. The implementation of the Sudanization policy by the British led to educated northerners acquiring administrative positions throughout the non-Arab territories of the south and Darfur region. The domination of the peripheries by the Arab northerners under the personnel indigenization policy was greatly facilitated by the arbitrary imposition of the Arab language (hitherto restricted to the north) on the South as a complementary official language to be used alongside the English language (Aleski, 2005:13-14).

From the stand point of the Southern Sudanese, the effect of the language policy in entrenching exclusion and exacerbating the structures of violence was cataclysmic.

By 1954, two years before independence, some eight hundred administrative posts had been “Sudanized” nationwide with only six junior positions were filled by southerners. Many in the South then interpreted

Sudanization as a euphemism and camouflage for Arabization. In many ways, colonial policies and politics heightened the tension between the Arab north and non-Arab populations, especially the fear in Southern Sudan of a northern Muslim domination. As such, the countdown to political independence, especially the last year of colonial rule, witnessed mounting political instability in Southern Sudan, including popular riots and a muting by a detachment of southern army officers who formed the Anyanya guerilla movement. The national election of 1954 won by the pr0-Egyptian faction of the northern elites, the National Unionist Party (NUP) of Ismail al-Azhari did not allow the fears of the minority south. Instead, the NUP government essentially continued with the lopsided colonial policies that alienated and threatened the South. (Aleski, 2005:15).

The political tension created by the colonial state greatly undermined its capacity to maintain relative autonomy as a neutral empire in domestic conflict mediation. There was sporadic resistance against indirect administration, especially in Southern Sudan because of the despotic nature of the regimes and their penchant for Arabization (Ibid).

3.4 IDENTITY FORMATION

The core reality for the vast majority of the people of southern Sudan is an endless chaos that they have no power to control or shape, characterizing their inner world as well as their outer experience (Andrew, 2005: 154).

The form of nationalism which was expressed in Southern Sudan was such one that was built on faith, Christianity. The government of General Ibrahim Abbound that came to power in 1958 – 1964 launched a ferocious outach throughout the South of Sudan, on towns and villages, killing and looting without restraint (Werner, Anderson and Wheeler, 2000:210). The civilian population of Southern Sudan took refuge either deep in the forests of the South or in neighbouring countries of Uganda, or Congo. During this period, the Church in the Equatoris area of Southern Sudan was transformed from a small community of those brought up on mission stations and in mission schools into a mass movement affecting almost every rural community (Andrew, 2005:55).

Here close relations began to develop between the settlement of the displaced people and the camps of the Anyanya Guerilla forces, and Christian faith began to be the common umbrella for an emerging southern identity. In the period between independence (1956) and 1964, the Christian faith inevitably came to fill the “disastrous void” in Southern identity and political expression created by the barrenness of colonial policy in the South (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981:421).

3.5 POLITICS IN INDEPENDENT SUDAN

Factorial political struggle and instability is a major feature of state politics in post-colonial Sudan. Since independence, Sudan has been ruled by a montage of unstable Arab-dominated civilian regimes and military cabals. Political instability manifested in military coups and counter coup

d'états, popular uprisings, and insurgency wars – has been a dominant feature of political life. Political instability in Sudan can be explained by two factors that are somewhat related (Omeje, 2010:175).

First is the long standing struggle between Islamic fundamentalists and moderate secularists in the core north over their nature of state organization. These struggle transverses civilian and military political elites. Religions fundamentalist whose intention is to create a theocratic polity based on fundamental Islamic principles throughout Sudan draw their ideological persuasion from the strong Mahadist tradition that has persisted in the country since the late 19th Century. Policies of Islamization and subtle Arabization have at various times been pursued in consonance as state policies with the regimes of General Ibrahim Abbound (1958 – 1964). General Ja'afar Nimeiri (1969 – 1985), Ahmad Al-Mirghani (1986 - 1989) and Omar Al-Bashir (1989- the present). Major political parties in the country had been led by direct descendants of the Mahdi. The moderates, on the other hand, favoured a secular state, but disagree on whether the state be run according to Marxist-Leninist principles or capitalism. That was during the Cold War (Omeje, 2010:176).

Second was the state's violent response to insurgencies in the non-Arab peripheries. These insurgencies were for the most part precipitated by the state's use of violence to extract resources and enforce compliance to policies considered to be harmful by non-Arab citizens, especially the Christian – Animist South. Successive northern governments since

independence increasingly tried not only to defeat southern insurgents militarily but also to restrict the activities of Christian Muslims while promoting Arabization and Islamization throughout the Sudan. The Sudanese government's war efforts in the South and in the Darfur region were given a boost by the oil revenues of the 1980s. The state was inclined to provide security to the strategic oil sector (largely in the volatile south). The international oil firms made high demand for high profile protection. The oil firms occasionally relied on local militia groups for protection services. (Woodward, 2008:110).

An international dimension is introduced to the conflict. While oil revenue aided the purchase of military weapons and equipments, a number of foreign countries exploiting Sudanese oil like China were linked with "oil for arms" deals with the central government of President Omar al-Basir. A great deal of the military hardware used by the Sudanese government for prosecuting the civil wars in the country was supplied by China in return for the oil in central and Southern Sudan. Since the 1990s, Sudan had been consistently ranked as one of Africa's most corrupt countries under the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency international, only surpassed in level of corruption by the failed state of Somalia during the preceding three years of 2007 – 2009. Corruption related to siphoning away of huge oil receipts has also been widely reported among regional government officials in Southern Sudan since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 (Omeje 2010:177).

3.6 CIVIL WARS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH SUDAN

For the purpose of this study, civil wars in Sudan will be grouped into two periods or phases. These phases are 1955 – 1972 and 1983 – 2005.

3.6.1 The First Phase of the War (1955 – 1972)

The first phase of the Civil War started with the mutiny of southerners in the Southern Equatorial Corp of the colonial army in August 1955, a few months to national independence, when power was firmly in the hands of a conservative Arab north-dominated transitional government. The mutinies, among others things protested Arab domination and the refusal of the central government to introduce a federal political structure favoured by the British colonial authority as a more suitable arrangement for the relative autonomy of the non-Arab minorities. Spirited efforts by the unitary central government to crackdown on mutinies seceded only in forcing a section of them into the bush as a guerilla movement, later named the Anyanya. Many southern students and youth joined the movement. This first phase of war was largely the result of dysfunctional colonial structures that exacerbated the political, economic and development asymmetries between Northern and Southern Sudan (Aleski, 2005:113).

While the Anyanya rebellion scarcely affected normal life in the north, save for the economic pressure felt by the channeling of droindding central government revenues (mostly from the export of cotton) to the war project, the insurgency turned the entire southern region into descriptive war theater. The economic activities of the hard pressed southern insurgents

ranged from banditry for food to recruitment, training and raiding of government police posts and logistical deployments in the south for arms acquisition and occasional ambushes to capture military materials and goods (Aleski, 2005:113). The underground supply of the military equipment for the insurgents was maintained through neighbouring Uganda and Ethiopia. The successive governments of Sudan exploited the opportunities of the Cold War at different times to receive military aid and supplies from the Soviet Union and the United States (Aleski, 2005:113).

Economic pressure due to the war effort and falling external revenue from cotton forced the military government of General Nimeiri to negotiate with the southern rebels, leading to the Addis Ababa peace treaty of 1972 that ended the first phase of Civil War. The peace treaty inter alia, established regional autonomy for the south and integrated the Anyanya Guerilla into the national army (Woodward, 2008:110).

3.6.2 The Second Phase of War (1983 - 2005).

Another round of war broke out in 1983 under the Islamists – dominated government of General Gaafar Nimeiri. The outbreak of the war followed the breakdown of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. Chevron discovered in commercial quantities of onshore oil in its unit's oilfield north of Bentiu in southern Sudan in 1980. To break the South's claim over the new oil discovered, in its region, President Nimeri introduced a new federal structure that split the three administrative regions of the non-Arab ethnic minority south into a ten arbitrarily constituted states. Nimeri's government

then absorbed the major oil town of Bentiu where Chevron had oil production fields (a hitherto part of Southern Sudan) into the new Arab-dominated Unity state straddling, the north and south (Omeje, 2010:178).

Consequently, a pipeline was to be constructed from southern oil field to Port Sudan in the North. A decision was also made to move the site of a new oil refinery for domestic production from Bentiu (a disputed southern town) Kosti, a northern town. Nimeri's new federal structure aggravated the dispute over the boundaries of southern and northern Sudan, especially in areas with significant oil fields such as Abyei. These government policies fueled resentment and violent resistance in the South (Omeje, 2010:179).

In an effort to ingratiate his government with Islamic fundamentalist organizations in the north, Nimeri appointed a fundamentalist cleric and strongman – leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Turabi as the country's Attorney-General. Turabi reintroduced Sharia law as a state law. This led to a violent campaign for self-determination under the new rebel movement, Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SLPM) led by Colonel John Garang. Colonel Garang until his defection to the Southern cause was a senior Sudanese army officer. He was an ethnic Dinka from the south. The SPLM (thereafter became Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army) fought for control of economic resources in the oil-rich south, abolition of Sharia as a state law, a return to the colonial boundaries between the north and south, and political inclusion (Omeje, 2010:179).

Ultimately, the hard-line position of the insurgency was the secession of Southern Sudan. During the Cold War, Southern Sudan received significant military support from the Marxist government of Mengistu Haide Mariam in Ethiopia and the defunct USSR, while the central government was mainly supported by the United States. Chevron was said to have played a leading role in lobbying for U.S. financial and military support to the Sudanese government as a means to secure its huge oil mining license in the country and other related benefits. The main plank of SPLM's strategy in the war was to launch descriptive and crippling attacks on oil facilities in the south as a means to diminish the revenue base of the central government and thereby its capacity for continued war making. SPLM attacks on the oil facilities make Chevron to repeatedly suspend its operation and its eventual withdrawal from Sudan in 1992. At various times, major oil companies in Sudan such as Chevron, France's Total, and the Swedish Lundin Oil relied on the services of local militias (mostly hired from Arab territories) for protection of their oil operation, facilities and personnel (Omeje, 2010:179).

Since 1997, Asian oil companies, in particular the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and the Malaysian National Oil Company, PETRONAS, played major roles as strategic partners with the Sudanese Company Sudapet in the special consortium formed by the Sudanese government for oil exploration. China forged a strong business partnership with Sudan, producing and pumping crude oil through the 1,000 miles

pipeline constructed by the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) from the Heglig oil fields in the South to the northern export terminal of Port Sudan on the Red Sea. CNPC was Sudan's largest foreign investor with $15 billion in capital (mostly in the energy sector) in Sudan since 1999. Sudan has since the late 1990s imported most of its arms and military equipment from China, which enables the state to protect the vast Chinese oil infrastructure in the country and also to prosecute wars in the Sudanese peripheries (Omeje, 2010:180).

The Sudanese government, especially under Omar al-Bashir used a nexus of desperate measures to enforce control over the oil resources in the south and to win the Civil War. These measures included scorched earth policy, the arming of combative militias, divide and rule manipulation of ethnic rivalries in the south, and orchestration of famine/starvation as instruments of war. Under the scorched earth policy which lasted between 1992 and the early 2000s, government soldiers and state-sponsored militias were used to forcibly evict and raze many southern villages within the strategic oil belt. Depopulation and displacement became rampant. Oil companies like the Canadian Talisman Energy were accused of continuously allowing government forces to use their airstrip to launch raids on surrounding villages in order to secure oil bearing lands and company assets (Omeje, 2010:180).

Bashir's government introduced a new law, the Popular Defence Forces Law, which provided for the creation of a paramilitary forces and

militias to support the war effort against the southern rebels. Many analysts argued that the government used Jihadist rhetoric in recruiting and mobilizing paramilitary fighters. The Sudanese Army recruited, armed and deployed the Murahaleen and bands of nomadic Arab tribesmen as militias to decimate southern villages, combat rebel fighters and protect the licensed oil operations. Arson, rape and abduction and torture of vulnerable persons were some of the strategies used by the militias. Government forces and militias persistently obstructed the delivery of humanitarian and to war-affected southern communities and Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps, attacked delivery trucks of various humanitarian agencies and ultimately forced several humanitarian organizations to evacuate from places in dire need of assistance. It was estimated that over two million people were killed in the Civil War in Southern Sudan, with over four million others displaced. (Omeje, 2010:181).

A fragile peace returned to South Sudan after the signing of the long negotiated Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the South and North in 2005, which among other things, provided for the incorporation of SPLA/M into a Government of National Unity (GNU), 50 – 50 sharing of oil revenue between the North and South, restriction of sharia law to the north, review of boundary demarcation between the north and south; and holding of self-determination referendum for the south after a six-year period in which they (southerners) could vote to either remain in Sudan or secede as an independent state.

3.7 PARTIES TO THE CRISES IN SOUTH SUDAN

Since the Torit Mutineers in 1955, rebel groups have sprung up in their members in the Sudan. The first recognized rebel group in post-colonial Sudan was the Anyanya movement. Given the multiplicity of rebel groups in the Sudan, an exhaustive treatment of the groups cannot be done here, rather, a summary of rebel groups which are considered to be the main rebel groups in Sudan will be provided.

Sounthern Frowp: This rebel group was launched in 1955 and was led by Emidio Tafeng and Pan Ali Gbutala. Some disappeared into the countryside and others settled in Congo-Leopoldville (Kinshasa) where they regrouped to launch Anyanya I armed movement in 1963 (Wassara, 2010:263).

Anyanya: This rebel group led by Emidio Tafeng was founded in 1963. It had an estimated strength of 15,000 members. It operated mainly along the border areas of Congo (now the DRC), Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. Its adopted guerilla tactics in its struggle for the abolition of Arabization and Islamization policies that were imposed by the government of Ibrahim Abbound on the non-Muslim Sudanese. The group fought a Civil War with Khartoum. It signed the Addis Ababa agreement with the government in 1972 to end the Civil War (Wassara, 2010:263).

Anyanya II: This rebel group was first led by Samuel Gai Tut and Akuot Atem from 1975 – 1983 when they were replaced with William Abdalla Choul and Gordon killing after the former were killed by the Sudan

people liberation movement. The rebel groups sought for the secession of Southern Sudan form the rest of Sudan. However, this idea was rejected by the government by Ethiopia for the fear that it might Sparka Secessionist agitation by Eritreans (Wassara, 2010:265).

Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army: The rebel group was founded in 1983 and led by Dr. John Garang up to 2005 when he died and was succeeded by Salva Kiir. It had an estimated strength of 125,000 members. It was supported by the Ethiopia Derg. It operated in the whole of Southern Sudan parts of the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Eastern Sudan. It was transformed into an Army in 2005 after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The fought for the creation of a unified Sudan based on Marxist – Leninist principles. (Wassara, 2010:266).

The Eastern Front: The rebel group emerged in 2005 with an estimated 6,000 to 7,000 members and led by Musa Mohammed Ahmed and Mabruk. It was an Almagam of rebel groups that operated under the Umbrella of Democratic National Alliance established in 1989. The group signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement in 2007 (Wassara, 2010:264).

Sudan Liberation Army: This rebel group was founded in 2003 with some 8,000 to 9,000 members, led by Abdel Wahid el-Nur. It operates in the three states of Darfur with a concentration around Jebel Marra Mountain. The SLA wages an armed struggle to liberate Dafur. A faction of the SLA led by Minni Minawi joined the government of Sudan after signing

the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in 2006. It operated in Darfur like a pro-government militia group. (Wassara, 2010:264).

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM): This militia group was founded in 2003 with an estimated strength of 5,000 members. It was led by Khalil Ibrahim and operated in Darfur. It signed a framework peace agreement with the government in Qatar in February, 2010 (Wassara: 264).

There were many other rebel groups and militias that operated in Darfur. Some of these militia groups were often hired and organized by the government as auxiliaries of the national army to fight rebels groups. They are heterogeneous in compositionand operated under different names, often according to their geographic locations. The militia groups were part and parcel of the government's counterinsurgency strategy. The militia groups are cheap to maintain because they did not receive regular wages from the government. Their work was voluntary and self-paying because they keep all the loot acquired during an operation (Wassara, 2010:274). It could then be understood how militia groups could spring up so very easily in Sudan. Some 18 militia groups were absorbed into the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement in 2006, after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM in 2005.

The crises of nationhood in the Sudan demonstrates two contrasting features. The ease with which rebel groups break up into opposing factions shows that they were not committed to the initial cause. Yet, the absorption

of some eighteen militia groups into the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement shows that leadership of SPLM has been accepted by those militias. The fact is that these militia groups that were more or less "mercenaries" were not invited to be part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement had their anger abated or at least they found reason for renouncing their earlier "cause"…

The subjection of the people of South Sudan to hardship and inhumane treatments played a role in the identity construction of South Sudan. It was out of this identity that ethnic and religious differences were downplayed to create a nation based on South Sudan.

However, given the spate of proliferation of both rebel and militia groups in the Sudan, the question that is still lingering in the world unknown is whether there would not emerge another nationhood crisis in South Sudan in the years to come. Although this will largely depend on the form of government and leadership that would emerge in South Sudan in the years to come. The type of government and leadership will show whether a section of the population will be marginalized, oppressed and subjected to inhumane conditions of underdevelopment and economic exploitation.

CHAPTER FOUR

SELF-DETERMINATION AND ITS IMPACT IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

4.1 INTRODUCTION


While nationalism in Africa during colonialism was sparked by distaste for the white man and his works (Snyder 1976:164), the crises of nationhood in Sudan was provoked by the distaste for political, economic and cultural domination of Sudan by Arabs (Omeje, 2010:176).

For the people of South Sudan, the promise of independence is saddled with challenges similar to those witnessed by post-independence Africa into late 1950s and early 1960s. Then, the euphoria was short lived as several African countries lapsed into a state of authoritarianism, corruption and instability. Will Africa's newest state learn from the mistakes of the continent's post-colonial past or will it repeat them?

The people of South Sudan witnessed the single most important defining moment in their lives, the independence of South Sudan. The festivities witnessed singing and dancing in the streets of Juba and partying in other parts of the world, similar to the excitement and jubilation that attended Sudan's March towards independence in the late 1950s, when doubt was not left in the minds of many that the new era would herald prosperity and political freedoms (Emmanuel, 2011:91).

Several years down the Line, the hopes of Africa independence and its dividends began dissipating as political experiments unraveled structural problems and degenerated into colonial style, exclusionary autocracies

fueled by corruption and patronage. Will Africa's newest state do better? Will it move forward as a united country will it suffer the same dangers of abuse of power as many other post-independence African states, including the predecessor state, Sudan?



4.2 INDEPENDENT SOUTH SUDAN

On July 9, 2011, South Sudan was officially declared independent. On January 9th – 15th, 2011, South Sudan held a peaceful and transparent referendum on Southern secession or unity, as was specified in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Ted 2011:1). An estimated 3.9 million people were registered to vote, including

those residing in other countries. An estimated 3.8 million people (about 97.5%) voted in the referendum, which was deemed peaceful and transparent by international observers. According to the South Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) 98.8% voted for secession, while 1.1% voted for unity (*Daily Trust*, 2011). The Sudanese President Omar El-Bashir officially accepted the result of the referendum which was also endorsed by the international community.

But the CPA which provided for referendum was provided did not suddenly come about. It emerged through a process of negotiations and mediations. What then is the origin of the process?

Alarmed by the deepening crisis and multiple failed attempts by outside mediators, members of the Inter-Government Authority for Development (IGAD), a regional organization that promotes cooperation and development, formed a mediation committee consisting of two organs: a summit committee of Head of State from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda and a standing committee composed of their mediators. Preliminary talks were held in November 1993 and January 1994, and formal negotiations began in March and may of the same year. The committee presented the Declaration Of Principles (DOP) at the May 1994 meeting with the following provisions: the right of self-determination with national unity as a high priority, separation of religion and state (secularism), a system of governance based on multiparty democracy, decentralization through a loose federation or a confederacy, respect for

human rights and a referendum to be held in the South with secession as an option. The National Islamic Front (NIF) government initially resisted the DOP particularly its endorsement of self-determination and secularism. The SPLM accepted the DOP. (Ted, 2011:16).

The IGDP mediators initiated and based their conflict resolution efforts on two premises: first, that the Sudanese conflict was affecting not only Sudan, but also destabilizing the broader surrounding region; and second, that the conflict would only end if its root causes were addressed. Conditions were ripe for talks as both sides were exhausted from years of fighting. In addition, Khartoum was seen as being amenable to mediation by IGAD because some of its mediators were viewed as friendly towards the National Islamic Front (NIF) government. In 1994, however, relations between IGDP member, Eritrea and Sudan began to deteriorate, largely due to Sudan's support for an Eritrean opposition group, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ). Meanwhile, serious opposition to the DOP began to emerge from the Bashir government. The most contentious issues were secularism and self-determination which the Khartoum government refused to concede (Ted, 2011:16).

In July 1994, the polarization of the two sides intensified after Khartoum government appointed a hard-line NIF member to its delegation. The Khartoum delegation professed the government's commitment to Islamic Law as part of a religious and moral obligation to promote Islam in Sudan and throughout the continent, and rejected self-determination as a

ploy to split the country. In September 1994, then President Moi of Kenya convened a meeting of the Committee's heads of state, Sudan's Bashir and the Leader of SPLM/A. The Khartoum government walked out of these peace talks, rejecting the DOP. However military setbacks and intense international pressure forced the government back to the negotiating table in Nairobi in 1997 and it formally accepted the DOP. The return to the IGAD process was, in part, in recognition of the government's failed effort to attract other mediators, who might have been more supportive of NIF position (Ted, 2011:16).

Further meetings in 1997 – 1998 sought to narrow divisions between the two sides, with the government of Sudan formally agreeing to self-determination for the South. The government of Sudan also appeared within to compromise on some other issues. In May 1998, the parties, despite some progress earlier, disagreed on which territories were part of the South. The Khartoum delegation defined the south as the three provinces of Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatorial and upper Nile, established at independence in January, 1956. The SPLM/A argued that Southern Kordofan province and southern Blue Nile province and other areas on the margins of the three core provinces were also part of the South. These were also serious disagreements on the duration of the interim period before a referendum on self-determination, and issues relating to interim arrangements were shelved by the mediators in part to avoid a breakdown

in the talks. The questions of state and religion remained unresolved (Ted, 2011:16).

A follow-up meeting between the parties took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in early 1998. The talks collapsed due to differences on the role of religion in politics. The parties also disagreed again on the territorial definition of Southern Sudan for the purpose of a referendum. In February 2000, the parties met in Nairobi but failed to make progress. In early June 2007, President Moi reconvened the stalled IGAD peace talks in Nairobi. No progress was made. In January 2002, IGAD mandated President Moi to merge the IGAD peace process with the Egypt – Libya Initiative (ELI), a peace initiative launched by the governments of Egypt and Libya in 2000. Several peace negotiations were initiated throughout the 1990s, all of them ineffective. A divided southern opposition eventually coalesced under the leadership of John Garang and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM), which had steadfastly asserted complete independence for the South (Maitre, 2009:5).

On 9th January, 2005, the government of Sudan and the SPLM signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Naivasha, Kenya, which effectively ended the 21-year old civil war and triggered a six-year interim period. (Maitre, 2009:57). More than a dozen heads of state from Africa attended the signing ceremony. The then Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who led the US delegation, urged the government of Sudan and SPLM to end the conflict in Darfur (Ted, 2011: 17).

4.3 THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

The preamble to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement opened with the statement that:

> ***"Whereas the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A) (herein after referred to as the "parties"), having met in continuous negotiations between May, 2002 and December, 2004, in Karen, Machakos, Nairobi, Nakuru, Nanyuki and Naivasha, Kenya, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process, and, in respect of the issues related to the Conflict Areas of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states and Abyei Area, under the auspices of the Government of the Republic of Kenya.***

Conscious that the conflict in the Sudan was the longest running conflict in Africa; that it had caused tragic loss of life, destroyed the infrastructure of the country, eroded its economic resources and caused suffering to the people of the Sudan. Informed by the sensitivity to historical injustices and inequalities in development between different regions of the Sudan that needs to be redressed. (The Comprehensive Peace Agreement retrieved from www.en.cpa/documents)

By the preamble, the peace, security, future and destiny of the Sudan has been entrusted to the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army irrespective of other militia groups.

The chapter six of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which contained Security Arrangement, signed at Naivasha, Keknya on 25th September, 2003, declared the status of other Armed Groups (OAGs) in the country as follows:

a. No armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces.

b. The parties agree that those mentioned in (a) above who have the desire and qualify shall be incorporated into the organized forces of either party (Army, police, prisons and wildlife forces), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions (CPA Document, p.89-90).

The Chapters II and III of the CPA which focused on power sharing and wealth sharing respectively recognized only the two parties. The power sharing agreement allowed the SPLM/A to dominate the government of Southern Sudan. Impliedly, when the people of Southern Sudan voted for secession, they acceded to the leadership of the SPLM/.A.

Now that the international community has recognized only the two major parties to the conflict, smaller armed groups could be subsumed under the two even when they repose no confidence in them. It was then normal for them to wait for the result of the referendum of January 9 – 15 – 2011. If the two parts of Sudan went their separate ways, the militia groups that were subsumed may now break away again and begin fresh agitations.

However, these agitations can be mitigated if the SPLM/A-led government of South Sudan will uphold the democratic principles of accountability, equality, respect, and justice for all citizens, taking into account the cultural, ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic diversity and gender equality of the people of South Sudan.

Impliedly, the ground on which those who dissent the government will mobilize the people and form an identity will be eroded. Most importantly amidst other agreement in Part A of chapter 1 of the C.P.A. tagged the machakos protocol dated 20th July, 2002, the parties agreed that the people of South Sudan have the right to self determination inter alia through referendum to determine their future status, that at the end of six years interim period that shall an internationally monitored referendum organized jointly by GOS and SPLM/A for people of South Sudan to confirm unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system established under peace agreement or vote secede.

This is premised in the fact that a democratic government is built on popular support (http://iihr.org/documents).

4.4 CHALLENGES OF INDEPENDENCE IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

So far, South Sudan has been developing its own institution, it has its own parliament, judicial and government, with all the trappings of a legal regime. Opposition politics has also taken root in the new country, although the dominance of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) in government and parliament means that opposition parties remain largely

weak and ineffective. Nonetheless, state building reform initiatives such as establishing and putting into operation a new system of government and public administrative for all South Sudan are commendable (Emmanuel, 2011:92).

Saddled with the legacy of the liberation struggle the SPLM – like many other Africa Liberation Movements who used undemocratic and often authoritarian methods to fight for freedom – retain that militarized culture and a sense of entitlement. Its virtual domination of institutions of government makes it difficult to separate the SPLM from the government of South Sudan. The SPLM already holds nine of the ten state governorships in South Sudan and therefore, controls most bureaucracies at country level (Emmanuel, 2011:92). The SPLM, like most political parties, has neither the incentive to share power with other parties nor the motivation to accelerate democratization. Having acquired power through the barrel of a gun, some former insurgents have come to regard power as their birth by right (Emmanuel, 2011:92). This has led to frustration among members at grassroots level about the party's participatory nature and responsiveness to their needs.

Allegations of corruption persist regarding the newly formed government of Southern Sudan and the new authority has faced challenges in establishing a functioning administration: neither military nor civil servants are paid in a regular fashion.

According to Maitre (2009:61), the CPA provisions regarding political representation allows the SPLM 70% of the seats in the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) while the ruling NCP has 10%. The SPLM is in the compromising position of having a predominant share of the leadership in the nascent southern government.

During the interim period, especially since the April, 2010 elections, a number of rebellions were launched by members or senior SPLA commanders. One is George Arthur, a dissident senior military officer in the SPLA who launched a rebellion against the GOSS in 2010. (Ted, 2011:13) in April 2010, he ran for governor of Jongle State and lost. He accused the SPLM of rigging the election. In July 2010, SPLA forces captured a helicopter, within Russian crew members and a senior Commander of Athor Forces (Ted, 2011:13). More than 1,000 people were killed and an estimated 200,000 people displaced as a result of these conflicts (Ibid).

In October, Athor expressed his readiness to return to the SPLM after a declaration of amnesty by President Kiir. However, Athor never returned but continued his military campaign against the Government of South Sudan.

Major General Peter Gadet is another former SPLA Commander who launched a rebellion against the Government of South Sudan in March 2011. Gadet fought against the SPLA for most of the 1990s until he rejoined the SPLM in 2006. In May, 2011, President Kirr renewed his reconciliation efforts to unite the South before independence by announcing amnesty to

those willing to return and participate in the political process through peaceful means (Ted, 2011:14).

4.5 POST REFERENDUM AND INDEPENDENCE IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

Events following the announcement of the result of the referendum to determine the right to self-determination of Southern Sudan are likely to point to the future of both Sudan and South Sudan.

When the results of the January 9 – 15 2011 referendum were announced in the Sudanese Capital of Khartoum, the response of the Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir, was “we accept and welcome these results because they represent the will of the southern people”. (*The Daily Trust* Wednesday, February 9, p.32, 2011). While the statement seemed to have attested to the free and fair conduct of the referendum, some reports have it that the Sudanese President had made several unsuccessful attempts to stop the referendum from holding (*Daily Trust*, Friday, February 11, p.2011). The reports suggest that it was not yet over between the two countries, besides there are still unresolved issues over the Abyei and Southern Kordofan.

Aside from the hostile relations that may linger on between Sudan and South Sudan, there is also the problem of internal insurrection. The argument being made here is that not all those who voted for the secession of Southern Sudan did so because they wanted to live together. There may be a hidden motive that the government of Sudan was a powerful force, so

that the stronger force be dealt with, then the weaker force. The Government of South Sudan (as may be perceived) will be faced later.

In line with the claim above, South Sudan authorities reported attacks by a renegade militia in South Sudan's Jonglei oil state, killing at least 211 people. South Sudan army said that forces loyal to George Athor, a former army officer who launched a revolt after losing in 2010 elections, carried out the attacks in Jonglei (*Daily Trust*, Wednesday, February 16, 2011, p.32).

In October, 2011, Rebels from the South Sudan Liberation Army attacked a town in the oil-rich unity state and at least 80 people died (*Daily Trust*, Monday October 31, 2011 p.41). Whether these rebels were externally or internally sponsored they are citizens of the newly Independent State of South Sudan. South Sudan emerged out of a referendum that was free, fair and transparent. The question is why wont these rebels not wait for some time to see whether the SPLM/A led government of South Sudan will uphold the principles of equality of all before the law, popular will and the fundamental human rights of the people?

In January, 2012, South Sudan faced the problem of ethnic conflict. Rival ethnic groups clashed in the Jongeli State, making the South Sudan to declare a disaster in that state. (*Daily Trust*, Friday, January 6, 2012, p.54). in a similar report, an opposition leader in Sudan Hassan al-Turabi warned that Sudan would soon see an 'Arab Spring' popular uprising

because President Omar al-Bashir was unable to overcome the economic crisis and end insurgencies in Darfur and the border regions.

From the foregoing, it can be said that secession in the Sudan has implication for peace and stability in the two states in terms of new conflicts. These are those conflicts that will arise between the states and those that will emerge within each state.

In the months of April and May, Sudan and South Sudan relations turned hostile with the two states accusing each other of attacks. These attacks were done in the oil-rich regions of South Sudan and these raised concerns in the UN Security Council, such that the two states would have faced threats of sanction from the United Nation Security Council but for Russia and China's resistance (*Daily Trust* Wednesday, May 2, 2012).

The tasks of nation building and state building are complementary. (Garba, 2003:495). These tasks are also necessary pre-conditions for the actualization of nationhood. However, state building is a costly and capacious venture, involving social interventions ranging from judicial reform to rebuilding infrastructure (Dobbins et'al, 2007). But building a nation is a very slow process usually carried out by means of trial and error. It is a continuous adventure and one generation passes away with other general talking its place, but the task of nation building goes on (Ibrahim and Ndongo, 2009:221-222).

As such, the people of South Sudan need to be patient with the new government as new institutions and infrastructures are build. The

government also needs to show the will and commitment to build and strengthen institutions by establishing the rule of law culture.

For the old Sudan, secession does not seem to have resolved the crisis of nationhood; although there is the prospect that secession would in the end, resolve the conflict once the border issues are addressed. On the other hand, within the new components there is a great challenge ahead. Considering their economic viability. The widening and expanding of the political space largely depends upon the economic resources available to the states and the way the resources are managed. Therefore, corruption must be fought vigorously.

For the North, secession of the South Sudan means depleting resources, but means increase resources for the South. Yet the fate of the two states lies in the ultimate outcome of the negotiation on the border regions of Abyie and Southern Kordofam where large oil deposits are located. So therefore basing our analysis from the aforementioned event in Sudan after the secession of the south, we can as confidently conclude that secession has not effectively resolved the national question or crises of nationhood in Sudan. For the people of South Sudan despite a shared goal of independence, local and tribal identities remain stronger than any sense national consciousness in South Sudan. Conflicts among tribes have claimed several thousand lives in South Sudan, often impassable state of Jonglei, etc.

The escalation of violence has deepened divisions among its communities and leaders, some of whom may be manipulating conflict to their own end.

A major dilemma for the South will be the decision on the utility of the oil infrastructure. Although the bulk of oil is produced in the South, the oil industry infrastructure is concentrated in the north with it fulcrums located in both Khartoum and Port Sudan. Thus, the oil infrastructure in the north is well developed logistically-refineries, pipelines, export terminal, airport, roads, etc. whether by accident or design, the north has been successful at indigenizing labour input to dominate the industry and this has a linked the northern economy to the truth, any disjuncture between southern interest and the utility of oil infrastructure in the north is a category of uncertainty that carries high risk. The oil infrastructure will fall into disuse if the south chooses other option. This could be costly for both parties and also Multinational Corporation that have invested heavily in the sector as this could entail loss of revenue, given the dominant role of oil Sudanese economy, any change in revenue will upset the core interest of both parties.

A South Sudan in transition will face various challenges, but these are not insurmountable. Good political will, active internal dialogue, and a commitment to the ideals of democracy and good governance are prerequisites. All citizens must be involved in decision making through full participation and a respect for plurality that leaves no place for marginalization.

One of the main tasks of the new government should be to open up the political space-both among political parties and within the SPLM itself. Meaningful participation of other political forces in government processes could help avoid confrontation between the various parties, saddled as they are with the legacy of a long war. The issue of marginalization has been a problem in Sudan for decades, and there is a real danger that the south would fall prey to this old practice. The litmus test for the viability of South Sudan lies in its efforts to transform structures of governance to become more inclusive and responsible to people's needs.

Much as referendum can prove effective in conflict resolution and the bringing of sustainable peace, its conduct is a necessarily difficult and costly one.

Whether referendum could be effective in conflict resolution is a function of the institutional design which goes to determine the credibility legitimacy and acceptability of the result by parties to the conflict. In the case of Sudan, the institutional design could be said to have met the minimum standard requirement that it could lead to sustainable peace in the Sudan and is capable of being used as a model. Hence, acceptability and the pledge to respect and honor the result by President Omar Al-Bashir.

The assault launched by forces loyal to George Athor, also a southern Sudanese on the people of Jonglei on 15th February, 2011, after the referendum, only goes to explain the fact that compromise must meet opposition and explained violent opposition by a marginalized group. It is

also a pointer to the fact that except Sudan's People Liberation Movement government in Southern Sudan led by Salva Kiir combines leadership with democratic accountability; Southern Sudan could be plunged into another civil conflict. Meaning that the overwhelming vote of 98.85%, and the peaceful conduct of the referendum will not automatically translate into building coherence among the ethnic groups and the new political elites for a sustainable peace that can guarantee political stability.

Another important issue to look at is the domino effect on other secessionist agenda in the continent. That is to say the secession of South Sudan could lead to further secession in Africa or be regarded as an appropriate or desirable instrument in resolving the national question or the crises of nationhood in Africa. Therefore, other secessions; successful, failed and ongoing in Africa would be examine to come up a position on this issue.

Talk of state partition in African usually starts and ends with Resolution 16, adopted at the first ordinary summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964. The resolution declared that all members states of the OAU pledged to respect the borders that obtained when they achieved independence. Adherence to the principle of Uti possideties ('as you possess') was a necessary evil, the argument went: the lines drawn by colonial map markers paid scant attention to traditional boundaries and instead sliced trough tribes, ethnic groups, even families, in some cases

dividing them across two or more states. Any attempt to untangle the map making legacy would be a recipe for endless war and chaos.

The pledge to respect colonially-inherited borders and the principle of non-interference in states from squabbling and promoting stability on the continent. If ‘stability’ meant preserving the sanctity of Africa’s borders then it has been a notable success: beside south Sudan, only Eritrea has seceded in the past half century. If it meant preventing conflict, refugee crises and other humanitarian disasters, history’s verdict is also clear (McNamee, 2012).

4.6. CONCLUSION

In subjecting the research questions to test, the national question in Sudan before the independence of the South was one characterized by sharp division between the Arab and the predominantly African South The national question was characterized by the apparent oppression of the African South by the Arab North. Loyalty to the state was consequently withdrawn to parochial institutions with a corresponding diminution of confidence in the state. This answers question one.

The recalcitrant position of the Arab-Led government in oppressing the African South and the use of force to quell popular agitations by the African South evoked nationalism in the South and a bond of unity among the Southerners. This sparked off violent resistant of state policies in the South leading to a violent conflict that lingered for many years. This could

not have been resolved in any other way apart from the application of the external dimension of self determination.

To the extent at which the South and North Sudan will not live together under the same government. Self determination was a platform for the attainment separate statehood by the South from one old Sudan but has not adequately provided the needed panacea it was intended to as ethno religious and territorial conflict escalates. These conflict in it various dimensions have become a new threat to life and peaceful co-existence between the North/South Sudan and amongst the people of South Sudan, as new interest emerged among different minorities, the desire for participation in governance amongst the native as well as fear for new form of marginalization and the need to access resources have created new dynamics of armed conflict in South Sudan

As demonstrated in the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan self determination in an appropriate and a desirable instrument for resolving the national question in Africa only if the state cannot guarantee the internal dimension of the right to self determination.

Finally, the thesis confirms the proposition that economic productivity and political efficiency are essential for the construction and consolation of nationhood in Africa Without this as a precondition, self determination alone cannot resolve the crisis of nationhood in the Sudan, Africa and anywhere in the world.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 SUMMARY

This study was organized into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction to the study. In the background to the study, crisis of nationhood in South Sudan emerged out of a myriad of factors with the roots traceable to colonial days. Development policies in Sudan encouraged the socio-economic development of Northern Sudan at the expense of Southern Sudan. Attempts by successive governments in independent Sudan to impose Islamic religion and economic marginalization of the South were part of the causes of the conflict in Sudan.

The study sought to determine how the issue surrounding the national question led to the independence of the south by examining the character of the national question before the independence of the south; and also to look the efficiency of self-determination in resolving the national question in Sudan.

In chapter two, the theory of nation building was used to explain nationhood in Africa. The theory presupposes that, national integration and consolidation leads to the formation of modern nation state in Africa. It emphasizes the role of leadership in the nation building.

Chapter three contains a detailed discussion on the national character of Sudan, examining as much as possible underlining issues that led to the secession of the south.

In chapter four, a demonstration was made to the effect that crisis of nationhood in Sudan was sparked by the political, economic and cultural domination of South Sudan by Arabs in Northern Sudan. The conflict in Sudan defiled all other solutions. The conflict was resolved through the referendum of 9th January, 2011. Voters voted overwhelmingly for the independence of South Sudan. A series of mediation led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 between the major belligerent groups, SPLM and the Government of Sudan.

5.2 CONCLUSION

The crisis of nationhood in post-independence Africa in rooted in antagonism demonstrated by political leader form one region to the state towards others. This creates divisive tendencies that sometimes permeates the whole social strata in with the state. The division gives rise to corruption that depletes public resource that would have been used for public provisioning. Hence, the politic of exclusive emerges and that tasks and policies of social integration fails.

Primarily, politics in post-independent African states often follow after colonial pattern and models of politicking. The politics of social exclusion economic marginalization and political domination of one group by another usually provides, the withdrawal of national loyalty to parochial association

or identities. Furthermore, governments in post-independent African states tend to be based on coercion and repression of popular dissent. In other words, the inability of the post-colonial states in Africa to provide a level – playing ground for the citizens in all parts of the polity leads to dissatisfaction. The dissatisfaction itself often results from injustice and refusal of the government to allow the rule of law to operate in the polity.

Yet, another dimension to nationalism in Africa is the fact that the masses are not well educated. Sometimes, the masses scarcely understand the issues at stake. They are rather swung into action by the intelligentsia arm of the elites. One is tempted to argue that nationalism in Africa is not spurred by true feeling of patriotism rather, the selfish political interest of the elites and the intelligentsia, given the fact that not soon after independence African states got embroiled in internal conflicts that sometimes lead to secession or civil war.

Sudan's experience of long violent and devastating wars with its far reaching traumas might provide a basis for internal cohesion in the newly independent state of South Sudan. However, it does follow that internal peace and stability can be guaranteed without good governance that is based on majority popular consultation, rule of law and social justice. It now remains to see how nation-building will take place in the new state of South Sudan.

As has been demonstrated, those who often take part in nationalist movement are usually drawn from the segment of population that has been

subjected to the same social, economic and political conditions. Usually, these deplorable conditions of marginalization and exclusion provide the basis for solidarity. That was why the people of South Sudan evolved the feeling of unity that they belong together and share a common destiny, regardless of the ethnic and religious differences.

Now, peace and stability between the two states of Sudan and South Sudan will depend to a large extent, on the recognition of the sovereignty and respect for the territorial integrity of one state by the other. A compromise must be sought on the boundary demarcation between the two states.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

It is therefore, recommended that South Sudan should embrace democratic principle in governance. The states should incorporate all the various segments and strata of the populace into governance. The rule of law and justice should be allowed to be the guiding star of governance. Finally, a level playing ground should be provided for all the populace in all spheres of human endeavours. In other words South Sudan should uphold democratic principles of accountability equality respect and justice for all citizens taking into account the cultural, ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic diversity and gender equality of the people of African states in general and Sudan in particular.

Impliedly the ground on which those who dissert the government and mobilize the people to form an identity will be eroded hence the enjoyment of all right and duties is based on citizenship not otherwise.

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