Democracy, Conflict Resolution and Development

ABU Journal of Policy and Development Studies. Department of Local Government and Development Studies. Faculty of Administration Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. Vol. 4(2). 283-303.

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Abstract

Democracy is considered as a strategy for resolving conflicts and better means of improving National development. But many low income new democries are bedivilled by conflicts despite the opt for democratic experiment. This rekindle the debate on wether or not democracy is better strategy for resolving conflicts and means of improving National development. This study reexamine the nexus between democracy, conflict resolution and development across the globe. Secondary data was used to examine the nexus between the variables. Data was analyzed regionally across the globe so as to allow wider coverage. Findings of the study shows that while there is relative stability and high level of human development in highly advanced democracies, there is also such advancement in some 'dictatorial regimes'. The study also discovered relative high level of instability and development challenges in new democracies. This suggest that though democracy is likely to reduce conflicts and facilitate development in some countries, it is likely to perpetuate the opposite in the new democracies. Thus there is no generalization on the tendency for democracy to improve development and reduce conflicts across the globe. The study recommend the need to strengthen democratic institutions, improve social justice and fairness across the globe. This to a large extent would reduce conflicts and facilitate development across the countries.

Key words: Democracy, Conflict Resolution, Peace, Security and Development.

1. Introduction

Globally democracy is considered as the best form of government. This resurgence of interest is based on the notion that democratic governance is among the dominant strategies for resolving conflicts, promoting peace, security and development. Many countries have opted for democracy because of the expectation that democracy has the tency for resolving

conflicts, and promoting economic development. For instance the last two decades of the 20th century have witnessed transition of many countries to democracy. Many countries opted for democratic rule, this era was termed by Huntington as 'the third wave of democracy' (Huntington, 1990; Adejumobi, 2000; Ijere, 2015). The wave in most coutries was strengthened by the need to promote development and resolve conflicts among contending groups. This is also based on the realization that most advanced democracies are economically developed and relatively stable societies. It has been assumed that the higher the level of democracy the higher the stability and development. Hence democracy has been considered to serve as a vehicle for development, peace and progress. Democratic political processes regulate competition among groups with conflicting preferences and therefore facilitate the resolution of intense conflict (Collier and Rohner, 2004 ; Kinsella and Roussea, 2008). Albeit, studies also shows the contrary (Gerring, Strom, Thacker & Alfaro, 2007), significant number of the new democracies are surrounded by conflicts and critical development challenges. These countries after long years of democratic experiment have not overcomed their development challenges and resolved conflicts among contending elements within their polities. Instead rate of conflicts and development challenges continues to increase. This has raise a question whether or not democracy is better alternative for development and means for resolving conflicts. The main objective of the study is to examine whether nexus exists between Democracy, Development and Conflict resolution. More specific the research will explore the contribution of democracy on National Development and conflict resolution.

This study explores different opinions on whether or not democracy is the best alternative for development and a means of resolving conflicts among the contending groups. Literature on correlation between democracy, conflict resolution and development are often overlooked in the discursion of conflict, peace and security strategies. This study assumed that democratic governance if properly implemented has the tendency to promote development and reduce conflicts among contending groups.

The changing nature of violent Conflicts in the world and the use of Democracy as a Strategy for Conflict resolution

Conflict is a universal phenomenon and has been part of human existence. Individuals and groups throughout history have resorted to violent conflicts as a means of grabbing political power, or by groups holding or wanting to retain power. 'Violence has been pursued in the defense of order by the privileged, in the name of justice by the oppressed, and in the fear of

displacement by the threatened'. Thus, violent conflicts are caused by different motivations (Igwe, and Amadi, 2021). Though conflict has been part of human behavior, but in recent decades, the trends of conflicts across the world have changed. Most of the current violent conflicts in the world are not the wars between opposing states (i.e. inter-states conflicts), but take place within an existing state (intra-state). In the 1990s nearly all major conflicts globally were intra states (within states). 95 of the 101 armed conflicts between1989 and 1996 were intra-state wars. Most of these conflicts were either caused by identity or competition over resources and power (Anstey et al., 1998). It is against the background that currently the dominant strategy adopted for promoting internal peace and development favored by the international community is to promote democracy, the rationale for that is democratic accountability lowers incentives for rebellion. Many low-income countries are periodically surrounded by conflicts. The rationale for this strategy is that by making government more accountable, citizens will have less cause for violent opposition (Collier and Rohner, 2004). Therefore proponents of democratic governance presuppose that a democratic accountability promotes peace and development and better alternative that lowers incentives for rebellion.

Democracy, Development and Conflicts: The link

Among the prevailing intellectual debate amid of scholars is whether or not causality exists between democracy, conflict and development. One group of scholars opined that there is no correlation between them, rather contends that nexus exits between democracy, development, peace and security. They argued that liberal democracy offers the basic foundation for development, peace and security. Democratic values such as rule of law provide favorable route for peace, securityand development. Thus the more the wealthier state tends to be, the higher the level of chances of that country to be stable and sustain democracy (Lipset, 1959). This suggests that democracy is likely to be more favorable in higher than in low income

countries. While democracy makes rich countries safer and grow faster, it's likely to increase proneness to conflicts in low income countries (Collier and Hoefler, 2004). Appropriate democratic political structures play a very important enduring role in settlement of internal conflict and promoting economic development, because democratic structures offers effective means for peaceful handling of deep rooted conflicts through inclusive, just and accountable frameworks (Anstey et al., 1998). This suggests that there is link between democracy, peace, security and development. Democracy can work anywhere irrespective of its culture, history or poverty. The only precondition for democracy is elites' willingness to govern by democratic means (Diamond, 1999; Halperin, Siegle & Weinstein, 2009). Conversely Yi Feng (2005) contends that democracy has a positive impact on economic and social development, but mostly through indirect channels. But Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (1996) posits that democracies are more durable and likely to survive in more developed countries than in less developed ones. Lipset (1959) further added that the more the wealthier state tends to be, the higher the level of chances of that country to sustain democracy. Democracy promotes development and regulates competition among the competing groups with conflicting preferences (Kinsella and Rousseau, 2008:8). On the contrary Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 2002a, 2002b) found that the process of democratic reform may essentially delay development by intensifying the possibility of war and retarding development. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) contended that the possibility of conflict is higher in a situation where autocratic states make incomplete democratic transitions, but not when the transition is completed. Thus feelings of deprivation and discontent breed anger which a time leads to rebellion and provide the genesis for armed insurgency against the state; this usually arise when people believe that they deserve certain things but have been denied, due either to discrimination or incapacity on the part of the government (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Tilly, 1978, Anstey et al., 1998 and Collier and Rohner 2008). Though democracy is a

means of resolving conflict and promoting sustainable development, but it may also perpetuate conflict and possibly delay development, if it is not properly put in place. i.e. if democratic institutions are poorly designed and managed, it can equally serve as an instrument for aggravating conflicts and retarding development. In deeply divided societies democratic politics can easily be used for mobilizing social divides such as ethnicity, regional and religious differences into political sentiments and turning elections into conflict. In such divided societies combination of democracy and primordial politics can excavate tensions and politics of 'we versus them'(Anstey et al., 1998). The rebellion may be due to dissatisfaction by groups within society over the existing political or economic conditions or both. These feelings of dissatisfaction are usually resolved peacefully in democratic societies due to openness of the political system which allows lawful expression of feelings of discontent (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975; Diamond, 1999; Anstey et al., 1998). This alternative provision is not available in authoritarian states. This supports the preposition that authoritarian states are more prone to violent conflicts against the state than democracies and therefore the possibility of hindering growth will be higher (Kinsella and Rousseau, 2008; Rummel, 1995; Gurr, 2000). However the possibility of ethnic civil wars and rebellion is higher in authoritative societies than in democratic states. This may equally lead to sluggish progress(Sambanis, 2001 and Sambanis, 2002). Empirical studies supporting this view shows that open political systems experience few rebellions as compared to the authoritarian states (Kinsella and Rousseau, 2008; Muller and Erich, 1990; Ellingsen, 2000; Hegre, 2003; Collier and Rohner 2008). Thus partially democratic states are most likely to experience serious internal conflicts. This means that societies undergoing a regime change are at higher risk of civil war than stable political systems (Gates et al, 2006). Though democratization may bring a greater risk of domestic conflict, but the new regime is at lower risk of domestic conflicts if democratic political institutions are fully consolidated, due to its institutional mechanisms for

regulating conflicts and durable political institutions (Anstey et al., 1998; Michael, 2000). This proves the nexus between democracy, development and conflict resolution among and within states (Kinsella and Rousseau, 2008). Empirical studies of internal conflicts globally shows that democracies had a far better record of peaceful handling such conflicts than other forms of government (Anstey et al., 1998; Collier and Rohner 2008). Thus democracy operates as stimulant for development and a conflict management system without recourse to violence. But Halperin, Siegle & Weinstein (2009) argued that highly centralized and autonomous government is better for developing countries especially when it want to accelerate the development process to meet up with developed nations. Augustine and Cyriacus **(2019)** further provides evidence of no correlation between political regime and national development. Neither democracy nor authoritarianism has effect on the national development; rather development is the product of people's commitments toward national development. Empirical research further indicate that democracy does not lead to economic growth. What is critical and required for economic growth is a well-functioning political system with a long-term protection of civil and political freedoms (Rachidia and Sadiq, 2015). However these qualities are not exclusive values of democracies, but some autocracies were relatively able to maintain rule of law, property rights, stability, and provide basic social services (Haggard 1990, Zakaria 2003, Leftwich 2005). Menocal, (2007) further suggests that the tendency for authoritarian regimes to promote economic development is higher than democratic ones. Empirical evidence supporting this argument shows that some authoritarian regimes such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and Vietnam are more effective than democratic states in promoting peace and rapid development. The answer to the question whether or not nexus exist between democracy, conflict and development will of course depend on how one defines 'development' or 'conflict'(Menocal, 2007). This

indicates that the debate over whether or not nexus exist between democracy, conflict and development is still debatable.

Methodology

The study utilizes secondary source of data to investigate how level of democracy affect level of development and stability of countries across the globe. This source is appropriate given the nature of the study. Secondary data can give comprehensive information related to global democracy, conflict and development. The data was obtained from EIU Democracy Index (2022), Development Index (2023) and Global Terrorism Index (2022). Others were source from conference papers and journal publications.This study utilized Human Development Index, Life Expectancy and Growth National Income as variables to measure National Development across the globe. We have also used Democracy Index ranking to measure the level of democracy. Finally Global Terrorism Index ranking was used to measure the level of stability and conflicts among countries. Data drawn was presented in a table form and regionally alalyzed so as to capture the global distribution of the level of democracy, conflict and development.

Data Presentation

Data in this section are presented in three categories, the first is the analysis of global democracy index by regions, followed by global terrorism index by region and finally the global human development index. The analysis is based on comparison of the link between democracy, conflict and development.

Table 1. shows that the 2022 Democracy Index indicates that 8% of the world's population are in 24 countries and live in a full democracy, 37.3% in 48 countries in a flawed democracy, 17.9% in 36 countries in a hybrid regime, and 36.9% in 59 countries in an authoritarian regime. The 2022 global average score was 5.29 indicating a slightly better than

the score of 5.28 in 2021 (The State of Global Democracy in 2022, 2023). This indicate that more than half of the world are under 'dictatorship' regieme, only few countries were classified as 'full democracy'. This indicate that Western Europe is the region with highest number of full democracies in the world. Four out of the top five full democracies are in this region: Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland. While in Eastern Europe, there is no single full democracy. Three countries (Moldova, Montenegro, and North Macedonia) were now upgraded to flawed democracies (Global Democracy report, 2023). Thus terrorist attacks in the West have fallen every year since 2018 and decreased by 68 per cent. Political terrorism has now overtaken religious terrorism in the West, with religiously motivated attacks declining to 82 per cent in 2021(GTI, 2022). Most countries in the West occupied high ranking positions in the Human Development Index (HDI), Life Expectancy and Growth National Index (GNI). This indicate correlation between Democracy, Peace, Security and Development in the West. Data was presented regionally across the globe so as to provide wider coverage of analysis.

North America (Canada and U.S.) is the top-ranked region in the Democracy Index, but Canada still maintains the status as a full democracy, while the U.S. is still categorized by EIU as a flawed democracy. In this region, Costa Rica and Uruguay are full democracies, while Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba fall under the authoritarian regime classification (Global Democracy report, 2023). This improvement has effect on peace and development in the region. US recorded a significant improvement on the impact of terrorism in 2021, recording its lowest GTI score since 2015. In Canada the overall impact of terrorism fell due to a decrease in terror attacks between 2020 and 2021. Canada, U.S., Costa Rica and Uruguay also maintains high position on the Human Development Index. While the rest of the countries in the region. This suggest that countries categories as full democracies in the region have higher Human Development Index and have lowest records of terrorism.

But Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa is at the bottom of the Democracy Index rankings. 23 countries are considered 'authoritarian regimes', 14 countries are 'hybrid regimes', 6 countries under 'flawed' democracy, and only country Mauritius is considered as full democracy (Global Democracy report, 2023). The Sub-Saharan Africa is also impacted by deep rooted conflicts. It was the only region that has worst deteriorating impact globally. Of the eighteen countries globally that recorded a deterioration between 2020 and 2021, eight of them were in the sub-Saharan region (GTI,2022). The 2022 GTI report also shows that, conflicts have increased by 17 per cent in 2021 largely due to violence in Sahel and other countries. Three of the ten most impacted countries (Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso) by terrorism in 2021 were in the Sahel region. Sahel region account for the 35 per cent of global terrorism deaths in 2021 compared with just one per cent in 2007. In the last 15 years, Sahel region has increasingly become more violent zone, leading to deaths rising by over one thousand per cent between 2007 and 2021. This high rate of conflicts and terrorism may be attributed to the form of governance in the region. But in North Africa, 4 countries are considered authoritarian regimes: Sudan, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria. Only Morocco and Tunisia were classified as hybrid regime. Algeria was the only country that recorded deterioration due to an increase in terror-related deaths. This is the fourth year in a row that the region has improved. Consequently most African countries occupied lowest position in the Global Human Development Index ranking, low Life expectancy and low Growth National Income. This shows that most African countries which are bedevilled with conflicts are either dictatorial or hybrid regiemes with low Human Development Index.

Middle East and Central Asia the region has a substantial number of countries were considered as authoritarian regimes. No country is considered as full democracy in this region. But Israel (7.97) and Cyprus (7.43) are considered flawed democracies. Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, and Pakistan were classified as hybrid regimes, and the rest of the

countries in the region are classified as authoritarian regimes(Global Democracy report, 2023).

East Asia and Oceania contains the fullest democracies apart from Western Europe: New Zealand, Taiwan, Australia, South Korea, and Japan. The region also contains high number of countries that fall under the category of flawed democracies(Global Democracy report, 2023). These countries are relatively stable and occupies high position on the Global Human Development Index ranking.

In Russia and Eurasia region the average impact of terrorism score improved in the Russia and Eurasia region, with all countries recording improvements, apart from Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which recorded no change. The region recorded the highest improvement in the impact of terrorism globally. However most countries in this region were classified as either hybrid or dictatorship regimes, yet they have high or medium human development index (Global Democracy report, 2023).

The 2022 GTI report indicate that in 2020, 97.6 per cent of deaths from terrorism occurred in conflict affected countries. As the intensity of conflict increases, so does the lethality of terrorist actions. Most of these conflicts are in low income countries with either hybrid or dictatorial regiemes. Terrorist attacks in conflict countries are more than six times deadlier than attacks in peaceful countries. This proves that terrorism appears to be higher in conflict areas than in peaceful regions.

Discurssion of Major Findings

This research aimed at ascertaining whether democracy is a better means of improving development and conflict resolution mechanism across the globe. It has been argued that democratic accountability lowers the incentives for rebellion and this why currently the strategy favoured by international community for promoting internal peace is to promote democracy. In spite of these values of democracy, many new democracies are bidevilled

with conflicts and development challenges. This shows that though democracy has been used as a conflict resolution mechanism across the globe due to its values such as rule of law which provide favorable route for peace, security and development. It has also been proved that democracy has not fulfill these promises in many new democracies. However wether democracy has fulfilled its promises or not, it largely depend on the political culture and the strength of democratic institutions in those countries. This suggest that though democracy is not universally means to an end, yet democracy is likely to better work in many countries than others.

This result indicate the nature of contemporary global conflicts have changed. Most of the conflicts around the world are intra state conflicts (within the state), these conflicts generally uccurs in less developed countries and flawed democracies. This indicate that there is relationship between the level of economic development, level of democracy and conflicts. This shows that less developed countries and flawed or dictatorial regiemes are more likely prone to conflicts due to lack of effective democratic institutions that guarantee justice and fairness. This breed conducive atmosphere for conflicts to emerge. This results coincided with Collier and Rohner (2008) empirical findings which shows that in rich countries democracy makes countries safer, while in low income countries democracy increases proneness to political violence.

However, there are some exceptions with some countries in Asia such Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Korea and Japan which are either flawed or dictatorial regiemes yet they have relative stability and are economically advanced. This shows that advancement in democracy is not the only variable that determine rate of stability and economic development. This means state stability and development is not the function of democracy, rather other factors must be necessary.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In spite of the increasing intrest on democracy, many new democracies have been bedeviled with insecurity and development challenges. Actually partly democratic countries are more prone to conflicts and face development challenges than full democracies, and full autocracies. This suggest that most countries with low human development index are from Sub-Saharan Africa with 0.547 and South Asia with 0.632. Whereas Europe and Central Asia scored the highest with 0.796. These countries were mostly categorized as either full or flawed democracies. These countries enjoys relative peace and stability. However, most of the low income countries in the Sub Saharan African countries were found to be either authoritarian or Hybrid regimes under the EIU categorization of democracy index. These countries are terrorized with high level of conflicts and insecurity. This suggests nexus between democracy, conflict and development in those countries. Interestingly countries like Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Korea and Japan are not full democracies under the EIU democracy index, yet they have high Human Development Index and are relatively 'stable' states. This also proved that the link between democracy, conflict and development in those countries is inconclusive. This suggest that there is no universality on the tendency for democracy to improve development and reduce conflicts across the globe. It depend on the indices or cretaria used to measure the variables. These findings confirmed our assumption that democratic governance if properly implemented has the tendency to promote development and reduce conflicts among contending groups. The study recommend the need to strengthen democratic institutions, improve social justice and fairness across the globe. This to a large extent would reduce conflicts and facilitate development across the countries.

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Table 1: Democracy Index, Developmen Index and Global Terrorism Index

Democracy Index 2021			**Human Development Index (HDI)**	**Life expectancy at birth**	**Gross national income (GNI) per capita**	**GNI per capita rank minus HDI rank**	**HDI rank**	**GTI**	
Overall score	Rank								
Full Democracy		Country	Value	(years)	(2017 PPP $)	Country		Country	Rank
Norway	9.75	Switzerland	0.962	84	66,933	5	3	Afghanistan	1
New Zealand	9.37	Norway	0.961	83.2	64,660	6	1	Iraq	2
Finland	9.27	Iceland	0.959	82.7	55,782	11	2	Somalia	3

Sweden	9.26	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	0.952	85.5	62,607	6	4	Burkina Faso	4
Iceland	9.18	Australia	0.951	84.5	49,238	18	5	Syria	5
Denmark	9.09	Denmark	0.948	81.4	60,365	6	5	Nigeria	6
Ireland	9	Sweden	0.947	83	54,489	9	9	Mali	7
Taiwan	8.99	Ireland	0.945	82	76,169	-3	8	Niger	8
Australia	8.9	Germany	0.942	80.6	54,534	6	7	Pakistan	10
Switzerland	8.9	Netherlands	0.941	81.7	55,979	3	10	Cameroon	11
Netherlands	8.88	Finland	0.94	82	49,452	11	12	India	12
Canada	8.87	Singapore	0.939	82.8	90,919	-10	10	Mozambique	13
Uruguay	8.85	Belgium	0.937	81.9	52,293	7	16	Colombia	14
Luxembourg	8.68	New Zealand	0.937	82.5	44,057	16	13	Egypt	15
Germany	8.67	Canada	0.936	82.7	46,808	9	15	Philippines	16
South Korea	8.16	Liechtenstein	0.935	83.3	146,830	-15	14	Democratic Republic of the Congo	17
Japan	8.15	Luxembourg	0.93	82.6	84,649	-13	17	Chile	18
United Kingdom	8.1	United Kingdom	0.929	80.7	45,225	9	17	Chad	19
Mauritius	8.08	Japan	0.925	84.8	42,274	12	19	Kenya	20
Austria	8.07	Korea (Republic of)	0.925	83.7	44,501	9	20	Yemen	21
Costa Rica	8.07	United States	0.921	77.2	64,765	-14	21	Thailand	22
Flawed		Israel	0.919	82.3	41,524	10	22	Turkey	23
France	7.99	Malta	0.918	83.8	38,884	12	26	Indonesia	24
Israel	7.97	Slovenia	0.918	80.7	39,746	10	23	Sri Lanka	25
Spain	7.94	Austria	0.916	81.6	53,619	-8	23	Libya	26
Chile	7.92	United Arab Emirates	0.911	78.7	62,574	-15	25	Iran	27
United States of America	7.85	Spain	0.905	83	38,354	10	27	United States of America	28
Estonia	7.84	France	0.903	82.5	45,937	-2	28	Greece	29
Portugal	7.82	Cyprus	0.896	81.2	38,188	9	29	Israel	30
Czech Republic	7.74	Italy	0.895	82.9	42,840	0	32	United Kingdom	31
Botswana	7.73	Estonia	0.89	77.1	38,048	8	30	Palestine	32
Italy	7.68	Czechia	0.889	77.7	38,745	4	30	Germany	33
Cabo Verde	7.65	Greece	0.887	80.1	29,002	17	33	Nepal	34
Malta	7.57	Poland	0.876	76.5	33,034	8	36	France	35
Greece	7.56	Bahrain	0.875	78.8	39,497	-1	35	Tanzania	36
Slovenia	7.54	Lithuania	0.875	73.7	37,931	5	34	Peru	37
Belgium	7.51	Saudi Arabia	0.875	76.9	46,112	-10	38	Tunisia	38
Cyprus	7.43	Portugal	0.866	81	33,155	3	39	Algeria	39
Latvia	7.31	Latvia	0.863	73.6	32,803	4	37	Bangladesh	40
Malaysia	7.24	Andorra	0.858	80.4	51,167	-19	45	New Zealand	41
Lithuania	7.18	Croatia	0.858	77.6	30,132	8	41	Cote d' Ivoire	42
Trinidad and Tobago	7.16	Chile	0.855	78.9	24,563	14	43	Burundi	43
Jamaica	7.13	Qatar	0.855	79.3	87,134	-39	42	Russia	44
Timor-Leste	7.06	San Marino	0.853	80.9	52,654	-25	46	Uganda	45

South Africa	7.05	Slovakia	0.848	74.9	30,690	1	40	Venezuela	46
Slovakia	7.03	Hungary	0.846	74.5	32,789	-2	44	Tajikistan	47
India	6.91	Argentina	0.842	75.4	20,925	17	47	Canada	48
Brazil	6.86	Türkiye	0.838	76	31,033	-3	48	Ethiopia	49
Panama	6.85	Montenegro	0.832	76.3	20,839	16	52	Italy	50
Suriname	6.82	Kuwait	0.831	78.7	52,920	-32	54	Lebanon	51
Argentina	6.81	Brunei Darussalam	0.829	74.6	64,490	-42	49	Austria	52
Poland	6.8	Russian Federation	0.822	69.4	27,166	-1	49	Benin	53
Indonesia	6.71	Romania	0.821	74.2	30,027	-4	53	Saudi Arabia	54
Bulgaria	6.64	Oman	0.816	72.5	27,054	-2	51	Spain	55
Philippines	6.62	Bahamas	0.812	71.6	30,486	-8	58	Ecuador	56
Namibia	6.52	Kazakhstan	0.811	69.4	23,943	1	59	Argentina	57
Croatia	6.5	Trinidad and Tobago	0.81	73	23,392	1	56	Jordan	58
Ghana	6.5	Costa Rica	0.809	77	19,974	8	57	Switzerland	59
Hungary	6.5	Uruguay	0.809	75.4	21,269	5	55	Australia	60
Colombia	6.48	Belarus	0.808	72.4	18,849	8	60	Mexico	61
Dominican Republic	6.45	Panama	0.805	76.2	26,957	-8	67	Ukraine	62
Romania	6.43	Malaysia	0.803	74.9	26,658	-8	61	Malaysia	63
Mongolia	6.42	Georgia	0.802	71.7	14,664	17	64	Paraguay	64
Serbia	6.36	Mauritius	0.802	73.6	22,025	-1	62	Bahrain	65
Lesotho	6.3	Serbia	0.802	74.2	19,123	4	62	Netherlands	66
Guyana	6.25	Thailand	0.8	78.7	17,030	6	64	China	67
Singapore	6.23	High Human Development							
Sri Lanka	6.14	Albania	0.796	76.5	14,131	17	68	Sweden	69
Albania	6.11	Bulgaria	0.795	71.8	23,079	-8	64	Senegal	70
Moldova	6.1	Grenada	0.795	74.9	13,484	18	70	Japan	71
Papua New Guinea	6.1	Barbados	0.79	77.6	12,306	26	71	Uruguay	72
Peru	6.09	Antigua and Barbuda	0.788	78.5	16,792	2	71	Rwanda	73
Thailand	6.04	Seychelles	0.785	71.3	25,831	-17	69	South Africa	73
North Macedonia	6.03	Sri Lanka	0.782	76.4	12,578	21	75	Togo	73
Montenegro	6.02	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.78	75.3	15,242	4	73	Morocco	76
Hybrid regime		Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.777	71.7	23,358	-16	76	Norway	77
Bangladesh	5.99	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.774	73.9	13,001	15	77	Ireland	78
Tunisia	5.99	Ukraine	0.773	71.6	13,256	11	78	Romania	78
Paraguay	5.86	North Macedonia	0.77	73.8	15,918	-3	79	Finland	80
Malawi	5.74	China	0.768	78.2	17,504	-8	82	Brazil	81
El Salvador	5.72	Dominican Republic	0.767	72.6	17,990	-11	82	Cyprus	82

Zambia	5.72	Moldova (Republic of)	0.767	68.8	14,875	-1	81	Lithuania	83
Bhutan	5.71	Palau	0.767	66	13,819	5	80	Mauritania	84
Ecuador	5.71	Cuba	0.764	73.7	7,879	37	73	Vietnam	85
Madagascar	5.7	Peru	0.762	72.4	12,246	13	85	Angola	86
Fiji	5.61	Armenia	0.759	72	13,158	4	87	Czech Republic LT	86
Hong Kong	5.6	Mexico	0.758	70.2	17,896	-16	88	Denmark	86
Mexico	5.57	Brazil	0.754	72.8	14,370	-5	86	Gabon	86
Ukraine	5.57	Colombia	0.752	72.8	14,384	-7	88	Kosovo	86
Senegal	5.53	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.751	69.6	11,961	11	82	Sudan	86
Armenia	5.49	Maldives	0.747	79.9	15,448	-14	97	Taiwan	92
Liberia	5.43	Algeria	0.745	76.4	10,800	13	96	Albania	93
Georgia	5.12	Azerbaijan	0.745	69.4	14,257	-8	100	Armenia	93
Honduras	5.1	Tonga	0.745	71	6,822	34	90	Azerbaijan	93
Tanzania	5.1	Turkmenistan	0.745	69.3	13,021	-1	93	Belarus	93
Kenya	5.05	Ecuador	0.74	73.7	10,312	11	99	Bhutan	93
Bosnia and Hercegovina	5.04	Mongolia	0.739	71	10,588	9	90	Bolivia	93
Morocco	5.04	Egypt	0.731	70.2	11,732	4	97	Bosnia and	93
Sierra Leone	4.97	Tunisia	0.731	73.8	10,258	10	94	Herzegovina	93
Bolivia	4.65	Fiji	0.73	67.1	9,980	9	94	Botswana	93
Guatemala	4.62	Suriname	0.73	70.3	12,672	-6	92	Bulgaria	93
Uganda	4.48	Uzbekistan	0.727	70.9	7,917	18	107	Cambodia	93
Gambia	4.41	Dominica	0.72	72.8	11,488	0	106	Central African	93
Nepal	4.41	Jordan	0.72	74.3	9,924	8	104	Republic	71.1
Turkey	4.35	Libya	0.718	71.9	15,336	-27	117	Costa Rica	93
Pakistan	4.31	Paraguay	0.717	70.3	12,349	-10	100	Croatia	93
Côte d'Ivoire	4.22	Palestine, State of	0.715	73.5	6,583	21	109	Cuba	93
Benin	4.19	Saint Lucia	0.715	71.1	12,048	-7	104	Djibouti	93
Nigeria	4.11	Guyana	0.714	65.7	22,465	-47	107	Dominican Republic	93
Mauritania	4.03	South Africa	0.713	62.3	12,948	-17	102	El Salvador	93
Authoritarian		Jamaica	0.709	70.5	8,834	4	110	Equatorial Guinea	93
Palestine	3.94	Samoa	0.707	72.8	5,308	24	112	Eritrea	93
Kuwait	3.91	Gabon	0.706	65.8	13,367	-25	113	Estonia	93
Burkina Faso	3.84	Lebanon	0.706	75	9,526	-1	103	Georgia	93
Lebanon	3.84	Indonesia	0.705	67.6	11,466	-11	116	Ghana	93
Algeria	3.77	Viet Nam	0.703	73.6	7,867	6	113	Guatemala	93
Qatar	3.65	Medium Human Development							
Kyrgyz Republic	3.62	Philippines	0.699	69.3	8,920	-3	113	Guinea-Bissau	93
Iraq	3.51	Botswana	0.693	61.1	16,198	-43	110	Guyana	93
Mozambique	3.51	Bolivia (Plurinational	0.692	63.6	8,111	0	119	Haiti	93

		State of)							
Jordan	3.49	Kyrgyzstan	0.692	70	4,566	26	121	Honduras	93
Haiti	3.48	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.691	70.6	4,811	20	118	Hungary	93
Mali	3.48	Iraq	0.686	70.4	9,977	-12	122	Iceland	93
Gabon	3.4	Tajikistan	0.685	71.6	4,548	23	126	Jamaica	93
Angola	3.37	Belize	0.683	70.5	6,309	6	120	Equatorial Guinea	93
Ethiopia	3.3	Morocco	0.683	74	7,303	1	122	Kuwait	93
Russia	3.24	El Salvador	0.675	70.7	8,296	-8	124	Kyrgyz Republic	93
Niger	3.22	Nicaragua	0.667	73.8	5,625	6	129	Laos	93
Comoros	3.2	Bhutan	0.666	71.8	9,438	-15	125	Latvia	93
Rwanda	3.1	Cabo Verde	0.662	74.1	6,230	2	127	Lesotho	93
Eswatini	3.08	Bangladesh	0.661	72.4	5,472	4	128	Liberia	93
Kazakhstan	3.08	Tuvalu	0.641	64.5	6,351	-2	131	Macedonia	93
Oman	3	Marshall Islands	0.639	65.3	4,620	12	131	Madagascar	93
Vietnam	2.94	India	0.633	67.2	6,590	-6	130	Malawi	93
Egypt	2.93	Ghana	0.632	63.8	5,745	-2	135	Mauritius	93
Zimbabwe	2.92	Micronesia (Federated States of)	0.628	70.7	3,696	22	136	Moldova	93
Cambodia	2.9	Guatemala	0.627	69.2	8,723	-20	133	Mongolia	93
United Arab Emirates	2.9	Kiribati	0.624	67.4	4,063	14	137	Montenegro	93
Togo	2.8	Honduras	0.621	70.1	5,298	-1	138	Namibia	93
Congo (Brazzaville)	2.79	Sao Tome and Principe	0.618	67.6	4,021	13	139	Nicaragua	93
Guinea-Bissau	2.75	Namibia	0.615	59.3	8,634	-23	134	North Korea	93
Djibouti	2.74	Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.607	68.1	7,700	-18	142	Oman	93
Nicaragua	2.69	Timor-Leste	0.607	67.7	4,461	7	140	Panama	93
Azerbaijan	2.68	Vanuatu	0.607	70.4	3,085	23	142	Papua New Guinea	93
Cuba	2.59	Nepal	0.602	68.4	3,877	10	144	Poland	93
Cameroon	2.56	Eswatini (Kingdom of)	0.597	57.1	7,679	-21	141	Portugal	93
Bahrain	2.52	Equatorial Guinea	0.596	60.6	12,074	-47	147	Qatar	93
Sudan	2.47	Cambodia	0.593	69.6	4,079	3	148	Republic of the Congo	93
Belarus	2.41	Zimbabwe	0.593	59.3	3,810	9	145	Congo	93
Guinea	2.28	Angola	0.586	61.6	5,466	-14	149	Serbia	93
China	2.21	Myanmar	0.585	65.7	3,851	5	145	Sierra Leone	93
Burundi	2.13	Syrian Arab Republic	0.577	72.1	4,192	-2	152	Singapore	93

Uzbekistan	2.12	Cameroon	0.576	60.3	3,621	6	150	Slovakia	93
Venezuela	2.11	Kenya	0.575	61.4	4,474	-6	150	Slovenia	93
Saudi Arabia	2.08	Congo	0.571	63.5	2,889	11	153	South Korea	93
Eritrea	2.03	Zambia	0.565	61.2	3,218	7	154	South Sudan	93
Libya	1.95	Solomon Islands	0.564	70.3	2,482	13	155	Swaziland	93
Iran	1.95	Comoros	0.558	63.4	3,142	6	156	The Gambia	93
Yemen	1.95	Papua New Guinea	0.558	65.4	4,009	-4	157	Timor-Leste	93
Tajikistan	1.94	Mauritania	0.556	64.4	5,075	-20	158	Trinidad and Tobago	93
Equatorial Guinea	1.92	Côte d'Ivoire	0.55	58.6	5,217	-22	159	Turkmenistan	93
Laos	1.77	Low Human Development							
Chad	1.67	Tanzania (United Republic of)	0.549	66.2	2,664	7	160	Uzbekistan	93
Turkmenistan	1.66	Pakistan	0.544	66.1	4,624	-19	161	Zambia	93
Syria	1.43	Togo	0.539	61.6	2,167	12	163	Zimbabwe	93
Central African Republic	1.43	Haiti	0.535	63.2	2,848	2	162		
Democratic Republic of Congo	1.4	Nigeria	0.535	52.7	4,790	-22	163		
North Korea	1.08	Rwanda	0.534	66.1	2,210	6	165		
Myanmar	1.02	Benin	0.525	59.8	3,409	-7	166		
		Uganda	0.525	62.7	2,181	6	166		
		Lesotho	0.514	53.1	2,700	-2	168		
		Malawi	0.512	62.9	1,466	13	169		
		Senegal	0.511	67.1	3,344	-10	170		
		Djibouti	0.509	62.3	5,025	-32	171		
		Sudan	0.508	65.3	3,575	-14	171		
		Madagascar	0.501	64.5	1,484	8	173		
		Gambia	0.5	62.1	2,172	-1	173		
		Ethiopia	0.498	65	2,361	-5	175		
		Eritrea	0.492	66.5	1,729	3	176		
		Guinea-Bissau	0.483	59.7	1,908	0	177		
		Liberia	0.481	60.7	1,289	7	179		
		Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	0.479	59.2	1,076	9	180		
		Afghanistan	0.478	62	1,824	-2	177		
		Sierra Leone	0.477	60.1	1,622	-1	181		
		Guinea	0.465	58.9	2,481	-13	182		
		Yemen	0.455	63.8	1,314	1	183		
		Burkina Faso	0.449	59.3	2,118	-8	185		
		Mozambique	0.446	59.3	1,198	2	184		

		Mali	0.428	58.9	2,133	-11	186		
		Burundi	0.426	61.7	732	4	187		
		Central African Republic	0.404	53.9	966	1	188		
		Niger	0.4	61.6	1,240	-3	189		
		Chad	0.394	52.5	1,364	-7	190		
		South Sudan	0.385	55	768	-1	191		

Source: **Democracy Index (2022) EIU, Developmen Index (2023) and Global Terrorism Index (2022).**