A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE ABACHA REGIME: 1993-1998

BY

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE POST GRADUATE SCHOOL,
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OCTOBER, 1998

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own personal work. The interviews were conducted by me and the entire work written by me.

All the works of others referred to have been gratefully acknowledged in the notes and bibliography.

Declared this day 16:07:99

Signature .....

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CERTIFICATION

This thesis entitled **A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE ABACHA REGIME, 1993-1998**, meets the regulations governing the award of Degree of Master of Science, (International Relations), and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my mother, Mrs. Waya Audu, for her love for me and all her children and for her relentless prayers for me while the preparation of this work was in progress. Her concern for me throughout my stay in Zaria is appreciated.

This dedication is shared with my late father, Mr. Audu Adima who thought me the virtue of discipline and patience which proved pertinent in the entire production of this work.

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AUDU A. NICHOLAS
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ABSTRACT

This study critically examined the foreign policy of the Abacha regime, 1993-1998, a period coinciding with immense international hostility against Nigeria. Both primary sources, through interviews with foreign embassies and government institutions, and secondary sources by way of content systematic analysis, were used for the conduct of the study.

The following findings were made: The international hostility that came against Nigeria was most profound and first of its kind in Nigeria's history; and though average Nigerians went through much hardship as a result, the government refused to compromise with the international community; the sanctions themselves failed to change the attitude of the Abacha regime, an indication that they tailed to have their desired effect. The regime continued to snub dialogue with sanctioning states. However for economic reasons sanctioning states refused to apply sanctions that would probably have brought down the regime.

The study recommends that people far removed from the theory and practice of international relations should not be used in the conduct of Nigerian foreign policy. Government should not shun dialogue in its future dealings with foreign states. The little gains made in the area of regional security by Nigeria as a consequence of international hostility is commendable and should be maintained and improved upon.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0. INTRODUCTION

When talking about the Foreign Policy of a country, it is usual and indeed desirable to focus on the aspects of those policies that have endured over time. In the case of Nigeria, policies or principles of the various administrations at the realm of foreign relations which have endured over time are usually regarded by writers as constituting Nigeria's foreign policy: Africa being the centre piece of Nigeria's Foreign Policy; non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; a strong support for international and regional organisations such as the U.N. and the O.A.U.; resolution of disputes through the peaceful means of arbitration and negotiation, etc. However, it is equally true that, one can also talk about the Foreign Policy of a specific administration of any given country. For the purpose of this study, therefore, Nigeria's Foreign Policy 1993-1998, essentially refers to the series of articulated 'demands' the administration of General Sani Abacha made on the international system of foreign states and the series of responses to external events and situations, which results from the response and demands of the international environment.

The Foreign Policy of General Sani Abacha's regime no doubt was undertaken at a time of intense international hostility against Nigeria.

Kengley and Wittkopf (1993:44) assert that, "to every nation-state the international environment is hostile." Hostile in the sense that nation-states are sovereign entities and each pursues its objectives and priorities most often in ways

and manner that are contrary to the desires and comfort of others. For Nigeria, apartheid South Africa pursued policies that were irksome to her. Britain, the United States and other Western countries' lukewarm or even at times collaborative attitude towards South Africa under apartheid constituted a source of discomfort for Nigeria. The recognition of Biafra by some countries particularly those from Africa (Gabon, Tanzania, Zambia and Cote d'Ivoire) at the height of the Nigerian civil war crisis in the late 1960s is another example of international hostility towards Nigeria. Many other examples abound.

However, there comes a time, when nation-states are confronted with hostility of profound magnitude from the international environment that can clearly be distinguished from the routine 'on' and 'off' type that is common to all nation-states. Nigeria under General Sani Abacha can be said to have faced such monumental hostility from the international community as was exemplified by the economic and other sanctions canvassed and imposed on her by certain countries. She has had to contend with this hostility since 1993, when General Ibrahim Babangida's Administration annulled the June 12 Presidential Election. Subsequent issues binding on human rights abuses such as the hanging of Ken Saro-wiwa and his co-activists in 1995, compounded the situation.

1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Since gaining her independence from Britain on October 1, 1960, Nigeria has consistently enjoyed relative peaceful co-existence with the international

community. Belonging to the 'Monrovia' group, she was among the chief architect of the 'non-interference' clause in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (James Coleman, in Joseph Black and Kenneth Thompson 1963:45). Successive governments since Balewa pursued this clause in their foreign policy formulation and implementation. Ajibola (1978:19-20) says that this was pursued, sometimes to an absurd point.

At independence, the leader of opposition, Chief Obafemi Awolowo accused the Balewa government of failing to articulate any independent foreign policy for Nigeria (James Coleman in the service Newspaper, Vol. 1 No. 2, September 16, 1961). This was largely hinged on the fact that, Britain still represented Nigeria in some countries abroad and Balewa was known to consult closely with Britain before taking major foreign policy decisions. In addition to this, Izah (1991), posits that, largely due to domestic constraints. Nigeria as an independent nation-state failed to conceptualise any forceful foreign policy for most part of her independence. Generally, Nigeria did not present a controversial posture at the international arena. Consequently, she did not antagonise other countries and was in turn not antagonised.

Even during the civil war crisis, Nigeria still enjoyed good relations with most countries of the world. On the African continent, only four countries recognised the break-away state of Biafra. The administration of General Gowon, however, quickly mended fences with these countries once the war was over. Though Britain eventually supported Nigeria, she was initially hesitant and even

refused to sell arms to her. As a consequence of this initial hesitation, Nigeria turned to the 'East' where the defunct Soviet Union willingly came to her aid. Ajibola (1978), Izah (1991), Alkali (1996). At the end of the civil war, Nigeria emerged stronger and with her new found oil wealth, she indeed became a continental force with enormous economic opportunities. Countries of the world were most desirous of good relations with her and most did.

In 1975, when the government of General Murtala Mohammed recognised the MPLA in Angola and gave it material and diplomatic support, to the dismay and consternation of the United States, what appeared to be a confrontation with the United States did not degenerate further and relations improved shortly after that. Garba (1987:165) says that this was a manifestation of the fact that "the realities of bilateral economic relations outweighed political and diplomatic disagreements." Jimmy Carter, the American President even visited Nigeria in 1978, when Murtala's successor and his former number two, General Olusegun Obasanjo was Head of State. When Obasanjo's government nationalised the assets of British Petroleum in 1976, relations between Nigeria and Britain did not deteriorate much. Again in 1984, Britain and Nigeria did not allow the Umaru Dikko affair to affect their relations for long. On the whole, therefore, Nigeria has had good relations with the International community, particularly the Western Powers. Consequently, Nigeria has largely been left to grapple with her domestic affairs and to chart her foreign policy as she deems fit. This trend of events was to change decisively from 1993, when the presidential election was annulled. This

annulment irked the international community because of their suspicion that, the military in Nigeria were not committed to the democratisation process they had set in motion.

Again, in 1995, with the sentencing and later hanging of Ken Saro-wiwa and his co-activists, against passionate pleas by world leaders, the human rights violation situation in Nigeria came to the fore. The consequences were a marked changed disposition by the international community culminating in economic and other sanctions against Nigeria. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)'s Focus on Africa magazine of April-June 1996, p. 19, aptly captured this reality. It said:

> *Nigeria used to be the rich kid in the playground with the best toys. If she misbehaved and you threatened not to play with her, she simply took away her toys and playtime would come to an end. But Nigeria as a country is no longer in that position. General Sani Abacha discovered this when the Commonwealth surprised itself and suspended Nigeria, following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his fellow activists. At a stroke, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, who used to be one of the most widely travelled men in the world· didn't have so many places to visit.*

In the face of these challenges from the international community, especially as it is coming from her traditional friends, it is inconceivable that Nigeria's foreign relations will remain as it has largely been since independence. This study, sets out to clearly establish and analyse the salient shifts in Nigeria's foreign policy under General Abacha particularly the hostility of the international community towards Nigeria within the period 1993 to 1998. The reality of this problem is

made manifest when considered that her traditional friends with long ties of good relations constitute the major antagonists of Nigeria. The problem is compounded by the fact that, the domestic issues that led to this hostility are of the type that domestic support for the regime which is crucial, if it must effectively confront the international community was lacking. The conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy under General Sani Abacha, therefore, becomes necessarily problematic. The specific questions to be addressed include:

1. How has the hostile international environment contributed in shaping Nigeria's foreign policy under General Abacha?
2. What are the discernible elements and policies in her foreign policy that are directly or indirectly occasioned by this hostility?
3. To what extent has Nigeria during General Abacha's regime re-shaped her foreign policy in the light of sanctions and other hostile attitudes towards her by the international community?
4. To what degree of success and under what domestic and international constraints has she re-shaped her policies and priorities in her relationship with the outside world?
5. What positive benefits accrued to the Nigerian people as a result of these policies and actions by the Nigerian government, now or possibly in the future, and what is to be done to improve the situation?

1.2 PROPOSITIONS

1. Nigeria's Foreign Policy between 1993-1998, under General Abacha, was largely influenced by the international hostility especially the sanctions imposed on her within this period.

2. Sanctions will not have the desired effect on Nigeria because the targeted regime will take steps to evade them and the type and manner of their application will not be enough to force the regime to yield grounds.

3. At the prospect of imminent failure of these sanctions, the sanctioning states will make a volte face and Nigeria will embrace them, re-focusing emphasis on them to the neglect of her new friends, thus ending the whole saga without tangible gains for the Nigerian people.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of this study are to:

i) establish clearly the link between the hostility of the international community against Nigeria and her reaction at the level of foreign policy formulation and implementation during the regime of General Abacha.

ii) examine the domestic constraints e.g. the regime legitimacy, and general opposition from the domestic front that served to limit any effective response by the Nigerian state.

iii) also the constraining measures from the international environment which served to hinder or enhance the success or failure of Nigeria's response during General Abacha's regime, and

iv) to discern the benefits and pains of these policies within the period under study to the Nigerian people.

1.4 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

There already exists literature on the reactions of some countries that have experienced sanctions from the international community, either as a collective effort, to bring erring nations into line, where such efforts are directed by world bodies like the defunct League of Nations or the United Nations, or as unilateral actions of a state or a few. This study will, therefore, add to whatever literature that already exists on this subject. Again, for Nigeria, it will serve as an important record in her history for further reference. A lot has been written on the foreign policy of Nigeria since independence, under the various circumstances. This, under the special circumstances of profound international hostility (including the economic and other sanctions) against Nigeria will make a good basis for comparison with those of the past. It is also hoped that, this study may bring out more clearly the constraints on the effectiveness of economic

and other sanctions as a tool for making nation-states comply with international law or alter their policies in other regards.

Also, the period 1993 to 1998 saw Nigeria taking what can be considered a radical approach with regards to her relations with African countries, particularly those of the West African sub-region. This new approach is succinctly captured by her 'hard' stance on the Bakassi Peninsula row with Cameroon, her pioneering role in the Peace Keeping Operations in Liberia and again, her uncompromising stance on the now removed Johnny Koromah led junta in Sierra Leone. Generally, therefore, this study shall be significant in explaining the linkages between domestic policies and international reactions and vice versa.

1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

The study covers the period 1993 to 1998 terminating with the death of General Sani Abacha on the 8th of June, 1998. The central focus is on Nigeria's reaction to the hostility towards her by the international community. This hostility includes economic sanctions: as shown by the intense campaign by the Western nations for disinvestment and discouragement of new investments in Nigeria, withdrawal or denial of new facilities by the Bretton Woods Institutions - IMF and the World Bank; military sanctions: by their campaign and actual withdrawal of military personnel from Nigeria's military training establishment such as the War College, the suspension of all existing agreements on military equipment procurement and stoppage of the sale of military hardware and maintenance of

existing ones, cultural sanctions: by denying visas to all senior government officials and their dependents to major Western countries and the ban on sporting links with Nigeria. Ostracism; as is exemplified by her suspension from the Commonwealth; and other hostile international attitudes including the severance of air links by certain major western countries.

For Nigeria's reaction, focus is on her foreign policy formulation and implementation. This includes her official foreign policy pronouncements and general official attitude to the international community as a response to the hostility. The study also covers the official government policies and actions which are domestically targeted but which can clearly be seen to be a response to the current international hostility.

This study is not a comparative one. It does not seek to compare Nigeria's reaction to those of other previously sanctioned countries. Of course, the findings of this study may be used in a comparative study in future but, that is beyond the scope of this very study.

Considering the financial cost and time needed to get the 'full' primary sources for this study, the secondary sources, through the content analysis method were heavily relied on and whatever primary data obtained through the interview method were used to corroborate these. Also, problems were encountered in the area of information needed from the Ministry of External Affairs. Reason being that the study was largely carried out when General Abacha was still in office and soon after his death, thus many officials would not volunteer information on his

policies.

1.6 METHODOLOGY

Primary and secondary sources were used for the conduct of this research. Secondary sources included textbooks that touch on approaches to the study of foreign policy, individual case studies on countries that have passed through the experience Nigeria is passing through now - international hostility either through sanctions or other hostile attitudes. Works on Nigeria's foreign policy since independence also constituted a major area of concentration. Considering that the hostility against Nigeria and her reaction to it is still an unfolding phenomenon, journals, government publications, newspapers, magazines and trade reports also constituted a major area of data source. The basic methodological approach therefore, is content analysis.

Primary sources entailed interviews which were conducted as a fresh data source or in order to confirm the accuracy of the data gathered from foreign embassies in Nigeria, the External Affairs Ministry, and other relevant bodies. The target embassies were those of key European Union countries, the United States of America, on one hand as sanctioning countries and those of China, Iran, Bulgaria, as non-sanctioning countries. And countries within the West African sub-region which have largely remained passive over sanctions against Nigeria. A few countries here, which include Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Niger were the main target for interview. The target personalities for interview were the

secretaries of Embassies or their equivalent or their representatives. Target ministries were those of External Affairs, and other bodies which included Nigeria Airways, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. The interviews were with the appropriate officials or their representatives. For the sanctioning states, the questions were focused on their assessment of the whole issue of sanctions against Nigeria. What are the prospects that sanctions will have the desired effects. What is the new thinking concerning sanctions on Nigeria. Will they be maintained, modified, or discarded. To countries friendly to Nigeria, the content of the questions sought to understand their stand on the hostile attitude against Nigeria by sanctioning states. What level of economic, military, diplomatic etc., they maintain with Nigeria. To the countries of West Africa, questions sought to comprehend their position on the issue of sanctions on Nigeria, whether they are supportive of the sanctions or not.

With regards to the data collected and its analysis, focus was on the official statements, overt behaviour, the dominant attitudes and general perception of Nigeria towards the international community with a view to discerning deliberate policies on the part of Nigeria, to effect shifts in her relations with individual nation-states or groups within the international community as a consequence of the hostility. Indicators in this regard were sought from trade relations, cultural exchanges, military cooperation, mutual understanding on international issues, opening, closing, contracting or expanding the size of

missions abroad, diplomatic recalls, etc. Also analysed were the domestically targeted policies and actions of government which could be linked to the international hostility. The analysis was in a comparative manner using 'tables' to bring out clearly the state of Nigeria's foreign trade relations before and during the period under study. In this regard, the analysis endeavoured to discern Nigeria's principal 'friends' in terms of trade and general bilateral relations in the past and now, under hostility. Again efforts were made to discern the major instruments of Nigeria's foreign policy in the past and now under international hostility. The analysis also aimed to explain the linkages in Nigeria's reactions externally and those which are domestically targeted, under General Sani Abacha's regime.

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The insurmountable complexity of living in one world - our village Earth - which is at the same time an infinite number of worlds (Heraclides, 1991:1), makes a comprehension of certain world phenomena difficult. This is particularly true of one, such as the foreign policy of a nation-state. The phenomenon of a nation's foreign policy, while having much to do with the national character (with its coat of sovereignty), is also essentially linked to the external environment. This is even more pertinent when considering the foreign policy of a third world country like Nigeria. Clapham (1992:5) posits that, most Third World states are creations of the external element (through colonialism), and therefore, much of

their freedom of action lies in their ability to choose different ways of reacting to it. Thus, the framework for an analysis of foreign policy should be one that pictures world politics as the sum of its many interacting parts in a global society.

For the understanding of Nigeria's foreign policy that is significantly shaped by forces largely outside of Nigeria, the Linkage Politics Theory as propounded by Rosenau (1969) provides the most appropriate framework for analysis. Rosenau (1969:2) asserts that:

> *Politics everywhere, it would seem are related to politics everywhere else. Where the functioning of any political unit was once sustained by structures within its boundaries, now the roots of its political life can be traced to remote corners of the globe. Modern science and technology have collapsed space and time in the physical world and thereby heightened interdependence in the political world.*

The argument of Rosenau therefore, is that "political analysis would be greatly facilitated if propositions that link the stability, functioning, institutions and goals of national political systems to variables in their environments could be systematically developed", (Rosenau 1969:7). He argues that, "there is need to pay attention to international variables that contribute to the functioning of national institutions and the development of national policies." (Rosenau: 1969:3). As an example of such linkages, Rosenau, while considering the processes whereby the top political leadership of a society acquires and maintains its position of authority, pondered certain questions, which if properly answered on a case by case basis, will make the importance of these international variables to the functioning of national institutions and the development of national politics

manifest. To what extent are these processes dependent on events that unfold abroad? Under what conditions will the stability of cabinets and the tenure of presidents be reduced or otherwise affected by trends in the external environment? Are certain leadership structures more vulnerable to development in the international system than others? (Rosenau 1969:5). For the purpose of this study, the hostility against Nigeria by the international community represents a momentous international variable that has profoundly affected the development of Nigeria's national politics, and consequently, her international policy under the General Sani Abacha's regime. However, a major obstacle to a "systematic development" of this theory is lack of communication between those who specialise in comparative and national politics on the one hand and those who focus on international politics on the other (Rosenau (1969:7). The importance of this theory is that it takes a holistic view of both the domestic and external factors that give rise to specific foreign policies and actions. Instead of viewing these factors in isolation, they are seen as a 'unit' and this has the advantage of a better understanding of such a foreign policy under study. After all, the nature of foreign policy makes a holistic approach to its analysis pertinent. Modelski (1962), cited in Kengley and Wittkopf (1993:43), defines foreign policy as "the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment." So by its nature, foreign policy cannot be said to lie only within the confines of a nation-state, and to understand it, the many factors or variables associated with

both within the national boundaries and external to it must be understood. This is what the Linkage Politics Theory seeks to do.

In the case of Nigeria, the factors that have given rise to the current foreign policy thrust of General Sani Abacha's administration are both internal and external and are so interwoven that, unless considered together as a unit, clear understanding of it will be impossible.It is noteworthy that, the most salient issues that gave rise to the current international hostility towards Nigeria also have external linkages, it will be untrue to posit that, the presidential election of June 1993, in Nigeria had no international content. Was it purely a Nigerian domestic affair? Or did it genuinely concern other sovereign nation-states or organisations. What link can one find between the events in the defunct Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries between 1989 and 1992, and the world's insistence that Nigeria must democratise, coupled with the boldness to impose sanctions on her. As for the elections, other groups, external to Nigeria, certainly had keen interest in the elections and same can be said of the annulment.

Again Human Rights activities in whatever country is the business of all other countries. Wilson said in 1919, that "we set this nation (U.S.A.) up to make man free, and we did not confine our conception and purpose to America." (The Economist, April 12th 1997, Vol. 343, p. 15). This assertion was given some sort of legal backing in 1948, with the Human Rights Declaration. So, the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his co-activists in 1995, though could be considered a domestic issue of Nigeria, was also clearly an international issue. These two

major issues of democratisation and human rights abuses in Nigeria have constituted the major factors that have put Nigeria in the position she is today. Conversely, it has served to shape the direction and content of Nigeria's foreign policy and certain domestic policies as well. When we attempt a consideration of Nigeria's reaction to the international environment from the domestic or the international perspective in isolation, or the resultant input from the international environment, it is difficult to capture the whole phenomenon. These linkages make it difficult for the Nigerian government's argument that, the two issues (lack of democratisation and Human rights violation) were strictly internal issues to Nigeria stand.

Generally therefore, to be able to capture the real sources of foreign policy (which other approaches tend to treat as outcomes of foreign policy), an approach,, which has the capacity to explain manifest and latent linkages that originate in national and culminate in international systems and account for those which flow in the opposite direction should be adopted. In the case of this study the theory will help us understand the linkages between democratisation problems in Nigeria and Human Rights abuses on one hand, and international hostility towards her on the other. Again, the linkages between the international hostility and Nigeria's reaction, both internationally and domestically will be comprehended. Rosenau (1969:45) sees "linkage" as "any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another." In this regard, its relevance to the study and understanding of foreign policies,

particularly that of Nigeria under profound international hostility is manifest.

While choosing the Linkage Politics Theory as the framework for analysis, it must be acknowledged that, as Puchala (1971:357) posits, no general theory of international politics exists and again, as Kengley and Wittkopf (1993:60) said about a theory of foreign policy, the most important models of how nations make foreign policy decisions (the rationale actor model, the bureaucratic politics models, and the here-in-history model) apply to all countries to some degree, but non applies to every country under every circumstances. However, it is possible to find a theory or a synthesis of them that adequately explains the particular circumstance of a country at a particular point in time. For the purpose of this study, therefore, the Linkage Politics Theory is the adopted framework.

1.8. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

Chapter One

It is introductory, stating the objectives, rationale and scope of the study, its methodology and the theoretical framework adopted for its analysis.

Chapter Two

It is a review of literature related to the study and they include, approaches to the study of foreign policy, works on sanctions including case studies, and on Nigeria's foreign policy since independence.

Chapter Three

The chapter examines both the major factors that brought international hostility against Nigeria and the hostility itself - mainly the various sanctions against Nigeria.

Chapter Four

It presents and analyses the reaction of the Abacha regime to international hostility.

Chapter Five

It draws conclusions from the analysis and findings from chapter four and gives some recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

A THEMATIC REVIEW OF SOME RELEVANT LITERATURE ON FOREIGN POLICY AND SANCTIONS

2.0 INTRODUCTION

For the purposes of a better understanding and focus of this study some literature related to the study were thematically reviewed. These included, approaches to the study of foreign policy, sanctions and works on Nigerian foreign policy since independence.

2.1 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY

Over the years, since international relations crystalised into a distinct academic discipline, largely within the twentieth century, attempts have been made to fashion out a framework through which the complexities of interdependence among nation-states and peoples will be better comprehended. This has led to many theories and approaches, most not exactly distinct from those that have been used in analyses outside the discipline of international politics. This clearly indicates its indebtedness to previous related disciplines like history and political science. Kengley and Wittkopf (1993:19) say that, the historical roots of the discipline lie in diplomatic history, an approach to understanding international relations that focuses on the description of historical events, not theoretical explanations.

The dominant earlier perspective on international relations was political idealism in its various strands. However, largely because idealistic thinking failed to prevent world war II, idealism as a theoretical perspective was discredited and this served to make political realism prominent. Classical realism itself has undergone several changes and modifications and it is credited with "preparing the way for serious theoretical thinking about global conditions and empirical (verifiable) linkages among them (Kengley and Wittkopf 1993:25) Later still, behaviouralism emerged and has done much to make the study of international relations and indeed allied disciplines more scientific. It emphasised that a "theory of international relations should contain a statement of the relationship between the two or more variables, specify the conditions under which the relationship(s) should hold (Kengley and Wittkopf 1993:26). It was therefore, largely defined by its approach to theory and the logic and method of its enquiry, it is better described as a methodology than as a theoretical perspective.

Hard as scholars have tried to fashion out a generally acceptable theory of international relations, none yet exist (Puchala 1971:357), and non indeed may exist in the near future. However, it is still desirable that, for the purpose of this study, the salient points of some of the major competing approaches to the study of international relations generally and foreign policy specifically be stated

without necessarily making a critique of them, since the perspective through which this study will be undertaken has been chosen (Linkage Politics Theory).

F.S. Northedge (1969) adopts the traditional approach to the study of foreign policy. In his foreign policy of the powers, he posits that, no country is an island on its own and must therefore, have to participate in activities with other states, and secondly, that political power is unevenly distributed between states. He also emphasises the continuity and change of factors that influence the foreign policy of states. These factors include the uneven military and economic development of the states forming the economic system, technological advancement, the opinions and fortunes of politicians and political parties, etc. He sees 'interest' as the motivational basis of foreign policy and argues that, this must be well grounded in public claims if it is to endure at all. Another salient point of Northedge's argument is the hierarchy of interests. This hierarchy determines which interests can be sacrificed for the other and which will wait until the other is achieved.

For the purpose of this study, Northedge's theory, to a great extent is quite relevant. His assertion that 'interest' is the motivational basis of foreign policy and must be well grounded in public claims if it is to endure at all has

some relevance to the understanding of the failures of a foreign policy such as that of General Sani Abacha that was clearly not grounded in public claims. Its emphasis on the 'hierarchy' in the determination of interest is also true of the foreign policy, under study. However, the Linkage Politics Theory of Rosenau has an edge over it as far as the understanding of a foreign policy of a nation goes. The theory's emphasis on the Linkage between domestic and external factors that give rise to foreign policies stands it out as one that can better comprehend this phenomenon.

Another important theory is the power theory, made so popular by Hans Morgentau (1973). In his Politics Among Nations he asserts that, all nations, define their interest in terms of power. Therefore, the conduct of foreign policy by states ultimately is aimed at maximising their power within the international arena. Whatever nations do, is subordinated to its calculation to maximise its power standing among the nations of the world. This theory's assertions are derived from certain assumptions on the nature of man, society and politics. However, this theory can hardly stand when a consideration of a foreign policy that has so much to do with the interest of a regime rather than that of the nation is being carried out.

James Rosenau (1967) in his Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy emphasises the importance of the domestic setting in shaping the content and conduct of the foreign policy of states. He sees a powerful 'linkage' between the domestic political milieu and the external environment. His emphasis on the domestic sources of foreign policy is however, not intended to dwarf that of the external environment, but that for the clear understanding of one, the understanding of the other is important. He pursues this linkage argument further in his Linkage Politics, (1969). Domestic sources of foreign policy, can therefore be seen as constituting the initial development of the Linkage Politics Theory of Rosenau, the adopted framework for the analysis of this study.

Another approach to the study of international relations which specifically deals with foreign policy is that of decision making. This approach, which essentially developed out of political realism both in its classical and neo-realist forms, assumes that foreign policy making consists primarily of adjusting the nation state to the pressures of an anarchical world system whose essential properties remain invariant, all states and the individuals responsible for their foreign policies confront the problem of national survival in similar ways.

Decision makers are essentially alike insofar as they approach foreign policy making and world politics; the actors responsible for foreign policy, decision making are always rational (Kengley and Wittkopf 1993:44). Quoting Verba (1969), Kengley and Wittkopf, (1993:45) define rationality as "purposeful, goal-directed behaviour exhibited when the individual responding to an international event... uses the best information available and chooses from the universe of possible responses that alternate most likely to maximise his goals."

The decision making approach therefore, sees policy making as a rational choice and it follows the intellectual sequence of problem recognition and definition, goal selection, identification of alternatives and finally choice (Kengely and Wittkopf, 1993:47). Allison (1971) has demonstrated the process of this rational process, using the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. This remains a very popular illustration of the working of the decision making approach among scholars.

2.2 THE CONCEPT AND APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN WORLD POLITICS

Sanctions in international affairs are penalties imposed against a nation to make it comply with international law or to alter its policies in order regards. These penalties are sometimes economic - in the form of boycott or embargo - but they may involve suspension of diplomatic relations or even military action.

Doxy (1972) cited in Kuyper (1978:1) says, "sanctions in the context of a legal system represents negative measures which seek to influence conduct by threatening and if necessary imposing penalties for non-conformity with law." International sanctions may be centralised or be multilateral or even a unilateral affair. Dr. George Obiozor in a paper, presented at the Lagos Garrison Command on Wednesday 24th April, 1996, on "International Sanctions on Nigeria: Options for a Viable Way Out" describes sanctions as "penalties inflicted upon one or more states by one or more others generally to coerce the target nation(s) to comply with certain actions or conditions." He expantiates further that, sanctions are conceived essentially as the imposition of economic, political or other penalties to bring about a change in the political behaviour of the country against which they are directed. He concludes that "majority of scholars believe that the primary, if not the only benefits that sanctions can offer can be measured by the degree to which the target country's behaviour changes as a result of these sanctions." Kuyper (1978:7) asserts that, "before 1990, the only two unadulterated cases of centralised sanctions are the economic sanctions against Italy (when it invaded Abyssinia), Southern Rhodesia (when it unilaterally declared its independence from Britain), under the League and the United Nations respectively.

In 1990, the United Nations Security Council, in an unusual unanimous vote, declared a trade and financial boycott on Iraq when it invaded Kuwait (the Guardian Newspaper, August 26, 1990:A4), later still, the five big powers on the Security Council reached broad agreement on a text authorising the use of force against Iraq (the Guardian Newspaper November 29, 1990:5). These represent instances of centralised sanctions at the United Nations. However, the current sanctions on Nigeria being championed by the United States and some Western European countries represents multilateral form of international sanctions.

Since the focus of this study is the reaction sanctions or international hostility has elicited from Nigeria, an indepth review of sanctions will not be made. Suffice it to briefly consider its application in a few cases.

Pieter Jan Kuyper (1975) in his book "The Implementation of International Sanctions: The Netherlands and Rhodesia" noted the problems associated with centralised sanctions, both from the perspective of sanctioning states and from that of the target states. From the perspective of the sanctioning states, he noted that, "bickering over the goals of sanctions leads to disunity among sanctioning states." States almost invariably do not apply sanctions strictly or indeed at all. Even states which are politically willing to implement sanctions frequently lack the motivation for a stringent enforcement, and the economic damage which

sanctions may cause to the sanctioning states or to certain sectors of their economy contributes to their failure. From the perspective of the target state he noted that, "when a state anticipates sanctions, it economically prepares for it and when the sanctions are eventually applied, the target state might continue this policy of economic mobilisation in order to adjust to the life with sanctions, and by taking counter-measures aimed at the sanctioning states, particularly if the target is sufficiently strong economically."

From the foregoing, he concludes that, sanctions are decided upon under strong pressures, that participants in the sanctions programme frequently tend to have different objectives, that even where sanctions have been plausible on economic grounds, they may be inevitably politically hopeless. That it is mainly their symbolic functions that make economic sanctions a tempting policy for governance.

C. Lloyd Brown-John, in his Multi-lateral Sanctions in International Law: A Comparative Analysis (1975) considered the Italian-Ethiopian case, the case of Dominican Republic and the Rhodesian case. His positions were that sanctions cannot even purport to succeed with massive injections of political manoeuvering. Consequently, sanctions are as much a component of political weight throwing as they are of strict law enforcement. He therefore, finds the frequency with which

it is being assumed that sanctions alone could be used to enforce international decisions disconcerting. He noted that supposition about the utility of sanctions in times of relative peace appear to have been founded upon the use of economic techniques, during war, but to him, the concept of economic warfare is qualitatively distinct from sanctions employed in pursuit of law enforcement. Under these conditions, sanctions are a related function of the primary state purpose, success in war. He also asserts that, the enforcement of law is so imprecise and sanctions are often so vague that a method for determining degrees of offence committed and sanctions to be employed are lacking.

After a thorough examination of the three cases, Lloyd Brown John concludes that there appears to have been a tendency to simplify sanctions to view them as something like a legal remedy to be imposed from two fundamental precepts: that states that violate international law will have contemplated the consequences in advance and a state of, in particular, a government that is exposed to international castigation will seek to survive. He said in each of the three cases discussed, the survival of the incumbent regime was in some manner contingent upon the bahaviour that triggered sanctions. Thus, because sanctions are perceived by the target state (and/or regime) to be a challenge to survival of

the state (regime), they will be resisted in every possible manner. Naive assumptions that states (regimes), once sanctioned, will repent and rectify deviant behaviour are dangerous for an effective planned sanctions programmes.

Among the three cases, only that of the Dominican was a success but this was attributed to the nature of the Dominican Republic, e.g. the political chaos of the post-Trujillo period, the drain on the economy, the strictly hemispheric nature of the exercise and U.S. dominance in the hemisphere coupled with the geographical and ideological isolation of the Dominican Republic.

Leonard T. Kapungu, who wrote the United Nations and Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia (1973), had this to say in his conclusions. That sanctions alone are a blunt and ineffective instrument of peace enforcement, in the absence of internal sanctions against the subject, economic sanctions can hardly be effective. That the application of enforcement measures, in order to be effective, must above all, be swift. The longer economic sanctions take to be effective the less they are likely to continue to receive international support. That an international control system, properly constituted is an indispensable machinery for effective enforcement of a programme of economic sanctions.

2.3 EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AS A CORRECTIVE DEVICE IN WORLD POLITICS

From the works on sanctions reviewed so far, it is apparent that there is much misgivings about the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool for coercing deviant nation-states into compliance with international law and norms. This is particularly so with regards to economic sanctions. There seems to be a consensus that in the process of applying these sanctions, a lot of room is left for the target states to manoeuvre, and that states will certainly utilise these opportunities to limit the effects of sanctions. Recent cases of international sanctions seem to support this position. After many years of sanctions, Libya continued to refuse, to yield to UN demand that the Libyan nationals suspected to have been involved in the bombing of the Pan-Am Airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland, be made available for trial in Britain or the United States. What can tangibly be said to be the gains from sanctions by the United States Against Cuba? Or that against Iran since the overthrow of the Shah by Ayatollah Khomeni? It is also reasonable to believe that, Iraq would still be in Kuwait today if the international community continued to rely on economic and other sanctions without the use of "massive" force.

However, Audie Koltz, writing on "Norms and Sanctions": Lessons from the Socialisation of South Africa" in the Review of International Studies, Vol. 22 No. 2 of April 1996, strongly disagrees, arguing that the effectiveness of

sanctions is made manifest when the conceptual framework for such an analysis goes beyond the realist assumptions implicit in most sanctions analyses. On page 173, he says:

> *One consequence of this realist foundation of sanctions analysis is the assumption that co-ordinated multilateral sanctions are extremely difficult to implement due to conflicting national interests. Some states, most analysis, argue, will circumvent sanctions in pursuit of economic gain, providing inevitable gaps in enforcement. Yet ample evidence demonstrates that states have been willing and able to implement international sanctions.*

Klotz believed that sanctions in the case of South Africa worked because it served as a socialisation process which eventually changed the minds of the architects of apartheid, including the National Party of South Africa. In the concluding part of his article, he said:

> *International sanctions promoted a norm of racial equality within South Africa substantially contributing to the abolition of apartheid by the end of 1991. Persistent international pressure against South Africa both strengthened anti-apartheid groups morally and materially, and added incentives for the ruling NP (National Party) to negotiate. In contrast to conventional analyses of sanctions which primarily examine the coercive effects of sanctions on target state behaviour this analysis has stressed socialisation effects.*

Klotz's conclusion seems to discount the factor of armed struggle against apartheid within South Africa itself which might have brought about the change

of heart that eventually broke the structures of apartheid. Thus, if the architects of apartheid and their sponsors got socialised, it might well have been the various groups that took up arms against them rather than by international sanctions. Afterall, but for the factor of the armed struggle, it is doubtful if the 'West' whose crucial contribution to sanctions was needed would have agreed in the first place to sanction South Africa. The hesitance found in, say the Reagan Administration's policy of 'constructive engagement' with South Africa serves to buttress this point.

It must be acknowledged that the concept of sanctions generally has a moral problem which is inimical to its success wherever and whenever applied. It is reasonable or rational to believe that, most target states challenge sanctions from the perspective that they have done nothing to warrant them in the first place. They therefore see them as manifestations of grand plans by sanctioning states to annihilate them. Thus, they steel themselves against them with all the resources at their disposal. When other states join them in this perception, it becomes difficult to effectively implement sanctions. This simply is a question of morality. Iraq invaded Kuwait, but the United States had earlier invaded Panama and Grenada. So where was the moral right to be so disgust with what Iraq did? Nigeria in 1998, with an effective military government, in association with other

Economic Community of West African States imposed sanctions on the military government in Sierra Leone which had overthrown a democratically elected government in that country. The government in Nigeria, now a champion of democracy did not come to power in a democratic way and has refused to be seen to be democratising sincerely during General Abacha's regime. Would the Johnny Koromah led government have given up power on account of the sanctions alone, even with the untold hardship to the citizenry? In conclusion, one would want to posit that, sanctions certainly put target states under the 'flood lights' and they feel uncomfortable in this state. True, in reacting to them, many adjustments are made within the national polity and in their external relations either to dilute the effects of sanctions or to show that these sanctions were not warranted in the first place. On this score, there is usually some truth since similar action that warrant sanctions are carried out elsewhere with impunity. Also, it is instructive to observe that the history of international sanctions shows that, the powerful nation states are hardly sanctioned.

2.4 NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE

In considering the main thrust of Nigeria's foreign policy prior to 1993, an understanding of the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa's foreign policy becomes imperative. The reason being the consensus that Nigeria's foreign policy has largely remained unchanged since that period.

Within Africa, Nigeria under Balewa approached the issue of Pan African Unity from a legalistic and conservative perspective. He advocated gradualism and functional approach to African unity and also of the principle of mutual respect among African States (Idang 1973:120). As far as Africa was concerned, she adhered to certain virtues in her dealings with African states. These were inevitability of national boundaries, the legal equality of all states, peaceful settlement of all African disputes by negotiation, conciliation or arbitration and promotion of functional unity and understanding among African States through the practical steps of economic, educational, cultural scientific and technical cooperation as well as the expansion of diplomatic representation in Africa (Idang, 1973). Military and economic diplomacy was clearly not on the agenda.

Outside of Africa, we can capture Nigeria's foreign policy posture through her United Nations policy, which fortunately or unfortunately, has transcended many administrations in Nigeria starting with that of Balewa. This policy has being: respect for political independence and territorial integrity of all states; total liquidation of all forms of colonialism and imperialism including white minority regimes in Southern Africa, respect for fundamental human rights, promotion of international peace and security as well as measures aimed at reducing world tensions, reunification of all divided lands through peaceful negotiations, general and complete disarmament, and the establishment and strengthening of the United

Nations agencies with lateral economic aid and equitable trade terms (Idang, 1973). Though Idang was specifically enumerating the cardinal policies of the Tafawa Balewa administration, these policies transcended most other administrations in Nigeria.

With these policies, Nigeria since independence has remained active in peace keeping around the world. These are largely United Nations Peace Keeping Missions and include those in the Congo in the early 1960s, Somalia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Cambodia. Her contribution to the liberation of Southern Africa was also enormous. She chaired the anti-apartheid committee at the United Nations until the relevance of that committee faded away with the attainment of majority rule in South Africa.

Generally, however, it is being argued by certain scholars that, prior to 1975, the Nigerian diplomatic style lacked dynamism and action. That it failed to respond correctly to the needs of Africa, and could not offer leadership in action and thought which Nigeria's human and material resources endowments demanded from her in the context of Africa and the black race. Nigeria's failings in this direction, particularly her UN policy is linked to her idealistic and utopian conception of the UN. That by insisting that all international issues be judged by their inherent qualities of goodness, and by adhering to the dogmatic and optimistic interpretation of the UN Charter which was taken at face value,

Nigeria's leaders prior to 1975, greatly exaggerated the role of the UN and its subordinate organs in world politics, but tended to ignore national power and interest as factors in inter-state relations (Idang, 1973). Other scholars including Tyoden (1987) continue to criticise both the Balewa and Gowon Foreign Policies on this account. He was so critical that he termed the Balewa foreign policy timid (apparently for what one would rather consider the necessary tentative steps of infancy), while praising that of Murtala Mohammed as one that was conducted for the interest of Nigeria (Tyoden 1989:124-125).

Since independence, Africa has remained the centre piece of Nigeria's foreign policy. This policy inevitably makes the West African sub-region her immediate concern. So after independence, Africa was ideologically broken up into radical and conservative groups which transcended into the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups respectively. Nigeria was viewed by many as a conservative country. Thus, even within the West African sub-region, some countries that were of the radical bent, particularly, Ghana, Guinea and Mali tended to see Nigeria as an imperialist tool in the hands of Western countries. This apprehension no doubt chilled relations between Nigeria and these countries, most especially in the formative years of the O.A.U. Happily, however, this situation has changed and ideological differences among the countries in West Africa have become less marked.

Again, within the sub-region, Nigeria has for years played significant and positive roles in championing good neighbourliness and unity. She was among the founding fathers of the Economic Community of West African States. She was also instrumental in bringing about the establishment of the River Niger Commission, the Chad Basin Commission and had undertaken reconciliatory roles in many West African countries. More importantly, though having the capacity to do so, Nigeria has refrained from irredentism even where opportunities presented themselves. Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon have on several occasions presented Nigeria with such opportunities. In a nutshell, Nigeria prior to 1993, did not practice a belligerent foreign policy and has largely remained at friendly terms with her neighbours. Indeed, Nigeria continued to be a passive on-looker of events even within the West African sub-region. It was therefore, a novelty when she prime-moved the West African Monitoring Military Force (ECOMOG) and over-whelmingly contributed for it both in men, equipment and finance, in 1990, under the administration of General Babangida.

One irking problem which Nigeria encountered over the years with her relations with most other West African countries was the French factor. France has consistently served to distort and frustrate Nigeria from her leadership role in the sub-region using the Franco-phone countries, which though politically

independent, remain economically within the French orbit. In her inevitable confrontation with France, Nigeria is often left alone to fight, without support from other countries within the sub-region. In this respect, she was the only African country to sever diplomatic relations with France over nuclear tests in the Sahara (Coleman, 1963:2). However, the antagonistic stand which most Franco-phone West African countries confronted Nigeria seems to be waning as France progressively withdraws her financial backing to her former colonies.

2.5 NIGERIA'S RELATIONS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES

In reviewing Nigeria's foreign policy since independence, it would not be out of place to accord her relations with Western countries some special attention. Reasons being that, for most part of her independence her external relations concentrated in the West and were much more elaborate than those with even the African countries. Again, these countries particularly the United States and Britain could be said to have constituted her traditional friends.

Britain was the colonising power of Nigeria but unlike some other countries, her attainment of independence came without much bitterness. Coleman (1963:12) asserts that, throughout the whole process of decolonisation the British government in London and in Nigeria more or less used its "good offices to

facilitate the intra-Nigerian compromises that were reached, the end result being a graceful British departure with Commonwealth commitments strong and Anglo-Nigerian relations remarkably friendly. This friendship continued after independence and Balewa did not hide his intentions to continue cultivating even more friendly relations, not only with Britain, but the West as a whole. This probably led to the accusation that Balewa was consulting too closely with Britain on foreign policy issues.

However, Nigeria's relations with the West has not been completely without sore points. Apart from Nigeria's clash with France over the later's atomic bomb test in the Sahara in the 1960s, it was the civil war situation in Nigeria that eventually brought Nigeria at loggerheads with her traditional Western 'friends.' As has already been shown in Chapter One, this was brought about by Britain's hesitancy in supporting Nigeria with weapons to prosecute the war against secessionist Biafra. Added to this, the United States was ambivalent and showed no interest in the conflict, choosing to see it as a British concern. Nigeria was thus, severely disappointed and had to receive arms from countries of the 'East' particularly the Soviet Union, which she had kept at arms length all the while. This disappointment was made complete with the knowledge that France was supporting Biafra with arms through other countries.

The argument here is that, inspite of these facts, Nigeria remained at good relations with these countries. Her largest embassies continued to be located in these countries and her trade relations continued to increase with them. Infact, though Britain hesitated she eventually supported Nigeria. At the ideological level, Nigeria choose at independence to practice the British parliamentary system. When the Second Republic came, it was the American Presidential model of governance that she imbibed. This clearly is an indication as to her rosy relations with these countries.

The emphasis this study places on Nigeria's relations with the West has to do with the fact that, today, these countries are championing the threat and actual imposition of sanctions on Nigeria. This fact informs the thesis that Nigeria's relations with these her 'traditional friends' will no longer be at ease and this will represent a major change in Nigeria's foreign policy since independence.

2.6 THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LINKAGES IN NIGERIA FOREIGN POLICY

It is more than useful to understand the components of a phenomenon to be able to properly discern its actions as it interacts with other phenomena. For Nigeria, therefore, a little background knowledge of her history and people will

help us comprehend better the conduct of her foreign policy since independence, most especially the internal-external linkages inherent in it.

Nigeria is a country located in the West African sub-region among fifteen other countries, most of which (excepting Ghana, Sierra-Leone, Gambia and Liberia) are French speaking. She is largely a British creation. She gained independence through negotiations from Britain in October 1960. Nigeria occupies an area of about 923,768 square kilometers and this large land mass is inhabited by hundreds of different linguistic groups, the largest being the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo, Tiv, Kanuri, Ijaw and hundreds of others. At independence, Nigeria had three 'powerful'; regions, North, East and West. The mid-West was later created out of the West. The North was bigger than the rest, combined both in size and population but was educationally disadvantaged. Again, while the North was significantly Moslem, the East and West had a predominant Christian/traditional African religions. Nigeria today is divided into 36 States and though the capital city now is Abuja located about the centre of the country, it has been Lagos that served as Nigeria's Federal Capital for more than three decades since independence. The approximate projected population of Nigeria is a little over 100 million.

Economically, Nigeria is endowed with great human and material resources that is unequalled in Africa as a whole. But these resources largely have remained undeveloped and Nigeria continues to remain only a potential great power, both within the African continent and the world generally. Another important factor is that, out of her 38 years of independence, the military have imposed themselves on her for 27 years and are presently maintaining that imposition. Therefore, most of Nigeria's foreign policy has been conducted under military rule as is presently the case.

Scholars who have written on Nigeria's foreign policy since independence are quick to acknowledge the importance or even the primacy of domestic factors on foreign policy. Idang, (1973) brings this out clearly. In his consideration of Nigeria's internal politics and foreign policy from 1960 to 1966, he was quick to acknowledge that "at the outset we must be concerned with how Nigeria's foreign policy is affected by such basic factors as Nigerian geography, the character of the Nigerian population as well as the relevant aspects of Nigeria's history, early as well as recent, her economy as well as her political system" (Idang, 1973:3). Though these are considered domestic factors, it is clear that Nigeria's history both early and recent, her economy and political system even before independence cannot be divorced from external factors. In demonstrating the influence of

domestic factors on major foreign policy issues, Idang (1973:41) looks at the compromises between what he called "Northern Conservatism" and "Southern Radicalism" as it reflected on Balewa's foreign policy conduct. He said:

> *The verbal compromise between Northern conservatism and Southern radicalism explains the Balewa government's occasional shift from an openly pro-Western position to that of dynamism and militant assertiveness. The abrogation of the controversial Anglo-Nigeria Defence Agreement in January 1962, the 1961 breaking of diplomatic relations with France following French atomic bomb tests in the Sahara, and Nigeria's refusal in the face of potentially serious economic damage to seek associate membership of the European Economic Community (on the ground that such an association with the EEC was inconsistent with her foreign policy of non-alignment) are instances of these shift on the conservative-radical spectrum.*

This assertion clearly demonstrates the influence of Nigeria's Federalism on her foreign policy during the Balewa government. Idang, (1973:153) also acknowledges the influence of external factors on Nigeria's foreign policy and says Nigeria was indeed vulnerable to outside influence and pressures.

> *Apart from Nigeria's vulnerability to outside influence and pressures there was an increasing attempt on the part of the Nigerian political elites to solve their country's internal problem through foreign policy. There was, for instance an almost universal belief among the attentive public that African and other international questions were directly relevant to Nigeria's political development.*

For Gambari (1980), domestic politics established their primacy over all other factors affecting Nigeria's foreign policies. He says indications in this direction

can be found in the changes that have occurred since the civil war, arguing that prior to this, the relationship of various ethnic and ideological groups was largely responsible for the 'case-by-case pragmatic and compromise approach to national differences", citing the Defence Pact and the EEC issues as examples. He posits that "this situation has changed considerably since the civil war, as Nigeria moved towards national association and relations among the ethnic, regional and ideological groups, resulting in a more centralised, federally controlled, self-confident and vigorous foreign policy process" (Gambari, 1980:153). He goes further to attest to the supremacy of domestic factors by saying that "those foreign policy issues that easily translated into a domestic political struggle generated the most heated controversies (Gambari, 1980:153). Though Gambari (1980) saw domestic factors as the primary determinants of Nigerian foreign policy, he nevertheless acknowledged also the importance of external factors. He saw the influence of the international political environment on Nigeria's foreign policy process in the realm of ideas like the concept of anti-colonialism, anti-racialism and non-alignment which became pervasive in the new States of Africa and Asia when Nigeria was becoming independent (Gambari, 1980:155).

The proceeding illustrations, for the purpose of this study, serves to show the linkages that are implicit when domestic factors influence the formulation and conduct of foreign policy that is inevitably reacted to in the external environment.

For instance, the fact that, the government at the centre at the time of independence was essentially a "conservative north" party meant that a conservative approach to foreign policy would be the norm under Tafawa Balewa. Invariably, there was a reaction from the international environment, particularly from African countries, many of whom considered Nigeria an imperialist stooge. In turn, the Balewa government as has been earlier demonstrated, shifted position and reversed his stand on certain issues like the Defence Agreement and the EEC, which had earlier portrayed his foreign policy as conservative, and pro-West.

Tyoden (1989) making an assessment of Nigeria's foreign policy from a Marxist perspective asserted that, "a bourgeois-commercial ruling class has since the mid 1950s been controlling political, social and economic processes in Nigeria. Given this control which emerges from its dominant power-position in the social formation, policies are drawn up which in reality are nothing more than an embodiment of the interests of the dominant social class and its imperialist mentors" (Tyoden, 1989:124). Clearly, this assessment discounts the importance of other factors such as ethnicity in influencing foreign policy but rather emphasises that of ideology. However, it is still implied that, internal factors largely shaped Nigeria's foreign policy.

2.7 SUMMARY

From the review of Nigeria's foreign policy so far, one would agree that, "though Nigeria has had changes in her foreign policy since independence, significant continuities exists." Earlier, Akinyemi (1978), had also said Nigeria's foreign policy demonstrated a remarkable consistency from 1960-1975, adding that Nigeria remained essentially pro-west in both economic and political orientation. Gambari (1980:133) is also of the opinion that Nigeria's foreign policy had remained consistent, arguing that "it was the experience of the civil war and the behaviour of Western powers and some African states towards the Nigerian government that brought about changes in emphasis of Nigerian foreign policy, when her non-alignment was taken more seriously." On the same issue, while agreeing with Nweke (1981) and Olu Agbi (1980), Alkali (1996:141) says despite the popular eulogisation of Nigeria's foreign policy under General Murtala Mohammed which was variously described as "more assertive and dynamic" or more "nationalistic and radical", both in substance and outcome, Nigeria's foreign policy was no more radical, or reformist, or revolutionary under the military than under civilian government of the First Republic.

More importantly, a review of Nigeria's foreign relations since independence has shown that, never has Nigeria been persecuted by the international community so profoundly and for so long. This hostility which has

culminated into sanctions against her is therefore, unique in her history and a consideration of her foreign policy under this condition is worthwhile. It is also interesting that those championing the threat and actually imposing these sanctions are her traditional friends (countries).

CHAPTER THREE

THE MILITARY IN POLITICS AND GENERAL BABANGIDA'S INCONCLUSIVE TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE PROGRAMME

3.0 INTRODUCTION

Since 1966, when the first Republic was terminated by the bloody January coup, led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu, many others, both successful and unsuccessful have occurred and Nigeria has generally remained under military rule. The January coup, whetherby ommission or commission brought to power General Ironsi who was himself overthrown in July by a coup prime-moved by officers from the Northern Region. This coup brought the then Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon to power. It was Gowon who first indicated the military's unwillingness to sincerely democratise. Earlier, he had assured that, he would hand over power in 1976, to civilians, but was later to change his mind on his promise, before the year 1976, even approached. His argument was that, 1976, was no longer feasible but could not mention an alternative date. He was overthrown by then Brigadier Murtala Mohammed in 1975. Murtala who had promised to hand over power in 1979, was assassinated in the Col. Dimka led coup of February, 1976, but his administration could not be toppled and General Olusegun Obasanjo continued in office as head of State. It was Obasanjo that eventually fulfilled the promise and handed over power on October 1, 1979, to a democratically elected government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari.

That General Obasanjo was able and willing to hand over power as he did is a rarity, not only in the military politics of Nigeria, but Africa as a whole.
The tradition is, either to refuse to democratise and to remain in power in

uniform or to metamorphose into a civilian president through hastily organised elections that are anything but free and fair. Thus, it becomes doubtful if Murtala himself would have actually handed over power in 1979, as his successor did. This thinking is informed by the reluctance with which General Obasanjo assumed the mantle of leadership when Murtala Mohammed was assassinated. The manner in which he religiously prosecuted his transition programme confirms that he was not hungry for power in the first place. It is now history that Alhaji Shehu Shagari's government which represented the Second Republic was again overthrown by General Muhammadu Buhari in late 1983, thus ending the second Republic. Buhari himself was overthrown in a "place coup" spearheaded by his erstwhile Chief of Army staff, General Ibrahim Babangida in August, 1985.

3.1 BABANGIDA'S INCONCLUSIVE TRANSITION.

The Babangida administration, which promised not to stay in power a minute longer than necessary was to remain in the saddle for eight sapping years, to the dismay of most Nigerians. His inauguration of the Political Bureau on January 13, 1986, marked the commencement of his transition to civil rule programme which was to start in the 3rd quarter of 1987, with the establishment of the Directorate of Social Mobilization, National Electoral Commission, the Constitution Draft Committee and to terminate in 1992, with the presidential

election and the swearing in of the new president and final disengagement by the armed forces (Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, Transition to Civil Rule Programme 1987, p.11) This transition programme was obviously a lengthy one. On this, Babangida said "the broadly spaced transition in which democratic government can proceed with political learning, institutional adjustment and a re-orientation of political culture at sequential levels of politics and governance, beginning with local government and ending at the federal level, stressing that our political programme must be gradual, purposeful and effective.

Though Babangida himself had warned that, "this administration is committed to the successful implementation of this political programme, therefore, let me warn that, attempts by any individual or groups to distract us or put obstacles in the part of a planned and effectively supervised return to a democratic civil order shall be treated as sabotage (The transition to civil Rule Programme, 1987), it was clear that, at the end of it all he lacked the will to sincerely democratise and it is he who should be held responsible for derailing the transition programme. He was forced to step aside in 1993, with the transition programme still remaining inconclusive.

Prior to his sudden relinquishing of power, after installing an unpopular Shonekan in an interim Government as the Head of State, the unending programme of the Babangida administration caught the attention of the international community. It was becoming clearer and clearer that the military in

Nigeria were not sincere with the democratization process. It dawned on Nigerians and the international community that, though the Babangida administration had convincingly pretended to be prosecuting what appeared to be a water-tight transition to civil rule programme, he had a hidden agenda to perpetuate himself in power. This hidden agenda which was suspected for a long time was confirmed when General Babangida annulled the 1993, presidential election that was generally believed to have been won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola of the Social Democratic Party, without any convincing reasons for doing so. Moreso, this election had been adjudged by many as being the freest and fairest in the history of Nigeria.

As earlier mentioned, the unwillingness of the military to voluntarily relinquish power is legendary. First 1970:438) argues that, though army men may not seize power with an appetite for it, the appetite is fed by office. Thus on assuming power, they will promise a short stay as both Babangida and Abacha promised, but may find it difficult to keep that promise. Babangida for instance, took over power in August 1985, and had by 1986, inaugurated a Political Bureau to prepare a transition programme. Indeed, he might at first sincerely considered handing over power and might have assumed that the length of time he allotted to himself as the President of Nigeria will be enough to satisfy his power ambition, he later discovered that they were not. First (1980:439) says that, "among soldiers in the act of staging a coup, it is a matter of military honour to declare that the army has no political ambitions, no

inclination to cling to power. Reassuring words are issued to citizens disinclined to accept the prospect of a more or less permanent military government, and these words may often be sincerely meant but as the months go by, they are uttered with diminishing emphasis".

The tactics of General Babangida in his democratization process strongly indicated he was scheming for diarchy - the rule by the military and civilians (The West African January 12-19 1992, No. 3878, p.59), and wanted to remain at the top with civilians occupying the other positions. A pointer to this is the way and manner election tribunals dispensed with electoral cases emanating from losers. Most of these cases were thrown out without delay and the results of such elections upheld. This was a marked departure from the experience of 1983, when tribunals and normal courts had a field day upholding results in one court and nullifying it at the next in a reoccurring fashion. So, before the presidential election was held on 12th June 1993, almost all cases pertaining to elections at the other levels had been dispensed with. However, the presidential election adjudged the most free and fair in Nigeria's history was not to be that lucky. Though a court in Abuja had given an injunction that the election be suspended, it was ignored by the National Electoral Commission, the body charged with the conduct of the elections and it seemed logical to do so (The West Africa Magazine 28 June - 4 July 1993, p.1078), and the election was conducted peacefully and many if not most of the results had been announced without serious complaints from the rival National Republican Convention

(NRC) which from all indications had lost the election. The only objection from NRC was over Abiola's dress at the polling station (The Guardian Newspaper, June 15, 1993. Even before the election, the wholesomeness with which General Babangida disqualified political associations, banned the so-called "old breed politicians" and imposed political parties on the people should have warned Nigerians that some scheming were in the works. Probably this informed the suspicion of a hidden agenda. In any case, till date, the only plausible reason one can consider with regards to the annulment is that which says Babangida did not intend to hand over power and that even if his son had won the election, he would still not hand over to him.

Claude Ake, in his consideration of the transition programme of General Sani Abacha, which was to be announced shortly in October 1995, advanced reasons why the military find it difficult to democratize and why General Abacha may equally fail in his democratization bid. He said:

> *General Abacha has promised to announce a transition programme by October 1, 1995, and it looks as though he will come through. Whether it will get us anywhere is another matter. Even with the best of intentions, it will not get us very far unless it is informed by the singular fact that military-sponsored democratic transitions have never succeeded especially in Nigeria. The military and democracy are in dialectic opposition. The military is a taut chain of command, democracy is a* ***benign anarchy of diversity. Democracy presupposes human solidarity,*** *the military presupposes its total absence, the inhuman extremity of killing the opposition. The military demands submission, democracy enjoins participation, one is a tool of violence, the other a means of consensus - building for peaceful co-existence.*

Claude Ake's position is clearly that, the military as an institution completely

lack what it takes to prosecute a democratic transition programme because it is opposed to democracy. Nothing can be nearer the truth, (Tell 11 September, 1995). For the purpose of this study, the importance of the annulment lies more in the reactions it elicited from Nigerians and the international community which significantly prepared the way for hostilities against Nigeria. At the international level, Britain's reaction to the suspension of the transition programme was swift and represented the feeling of the international community to some degree. The Guardian Newspaper of Friday, June 25, 1993, reproduced the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affair's speech on the matter:

> *I deplore the decision of the Nigerian military government to annual the Nigerian political election, suspend the National Electoral Commission, and thereby stop the transition to civilian rule. All the reports we have received from observers on the ground suggest that the elections were free and fair and gave Nigerians a genuine chance to express their views democratically. We have consistently supported the programme for a return to democratic civilian rule and made it clear that we expected this process to be completed by 27 August. There have already been delays enough. This decision is bound to have serious implications for Nigeria's relations with the international community and the United Kingdom will have no option but to reassess its own bilateral relations with that country. Although the decision to cancel the election will inevitably increase tensions in Nigeria, I urge all parties to respond peacefully and hope that even at this late stage this decision can be reconsidered.*

On the domestic front, most Nigerians received the annulment announcement with shock. It was clear that, the politicians, were highly against the annulment but were rather taken by surprise and could not confront it cohesively. Dr. Iorchia Ayu, the Senate President's reaction, as reported in the Guardian of

Thursday 1 July 1993, represents the frustration most Nigerians felt. He was reported to have expressed utter disappointment at the cancellation of June 12 election and what he called a forced return "once again to the starting block in our quest to elect a civilian president. He said the latest turn of events was particularly painful because the June 12 poll was universally adjudged to be free and fair and a healthy step towards the installation of a durable democracy in Nigeria. He asserted that, "there is no doubt that the glaring inconsistencies and outright contradictions in the implementation of the transition programme and the frequent changes, midstream, of the rules guiding the project will deepen the crisis of credibility both of the regime and the transition programme".

The hostility against Nigeria from the international community, therefore, has its major root in the political impasse that come to characterise the democratization process of General Ibrahim Babangida. The second area of concern to both Nigerians and the international community which also facilitated the eventual imposition of sanctions against Nigeria and to which shall be examined next, is the human rights question. Though human rights violations continued to receive the attention of human rights groups, both in Nigeria and outside, it seemed it was subordinated to the democratization process while it lasted. When the process suddenly came to a halt, the human rights question now came to the fore.

3.2 SKEPTICISM OVER GENERAL ABACHA'S TRANSITION PROGRAMME

Apparently, having tasted the bitter transition programme of General Babangida, Nigerians and the international community were very skeptical of the General Sani Abacha's transition to civil rule programme when it was announced in October of 1995. The transition programme which was to finally terminate in October 1998, was also considered too lengthy. The Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Chief Emeka Anyaoku for instance, was disappointed with the long transition programme and wanted to see a shorter one. Desmond Tutu of South Africa wanted a transition programme of not more than two years and that is should accommodate the annulled June 12 Presidential poll and the immediate release of M.K.O. Abiola (The Guardian Newspaper October 3, 1995). The United States, which had earlier unilaterally placed partial sanctions on Nigeria, said they will remain as a sign of her disapproval of Abacha's transition programme, which they considered too lengthy (The Guardian Newspaper October 4, 1995). They also wanted Abiola released. Reactions from New Zealand and the European Union were moderate and much more realistic as far as the Abacha regime was concerned. They acknowledged with some satisfaction the commutation of the sentences earlier passed on the coup plotters, but urged the Abacha regime to go further. Specifically, the European Union, wanted the government to pursue the transition programme with sincerity (The Guardian Newspaper October 4, 1995).

It is thus, clear that, the democratization process continued to be a vexed issue as far as the international community was concerned. Expectations of the various foreign countries interested in the democratization process in Nigeria were much higher than General Abacha was prepared to go. Indeed as the process proceeded, Nigerians and the international community became more convinced that 1998, will not be a year of hand over to a civilian government, democratically elected, but rather a year General Abacha will succeed himself. A feat General Babangida with all his scheming could not achieve.

The skepticism that became evident when General Sani Abacha announced his transition programme has much to do with the military's past record in the democratization process. A statement by the National Organising Committee of NEPU-PRP as the association's position on General Sani Abacha's October 1, 1995 broadcast captured the feelings of most informed Nigerians. The statement said:

> *The broadcast of the Head of State General Sani Abacha on Sunday October 1, 1995 announced a political transition programme. This is the fourth transition programme announced by Nigerian military rulers in 25 years since the end of the civil war in 1970. The first one was announced by General Gowon in 1970. The second one was announced by General Murtala Mohammed in 1975. The third one was announced by General Babangida in 1986. We are now faced with a fourth one whose stated objective, like all the earlier three is to return Nigeria to democratic rule, on sound lasting foundations. But in the 25 years since the first one was announced, Nigeria had only being under democratic rule for four years 1979-1983. The military has ruled for 21 years of the 25 years and for sixteen of the 21 years, they were engaged in implementing transition programmes to return the country to democratic rule. Now, they want three more*

> *years for implementing the fourth transition programme. This is clearly unnecessary. Given their record, even if they take another 30 years, will they return Nigeria to democratic rule? (The Guardian Newspaper October 27, 1995).*

This was the big question both Nigerians and the concerned international community posed. Evidently, it was clear that, both remained highly skeptical and their skepticism was never proved wrong. For the international community, therefore, the transition to civil rule of General Sani Abacha represented no marked departure from that which General Babangida floated in 1986, but never saw the light of day. Their hostile disposition towards Nigeria, therefore, continued to find a good excuse in it.

3.3 HUMAN RIGHTS AS A GOAL OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

Kurt Waldheim, in his foreword to a United Nations publication The United Nations and Human Rights - enumerated the basic tenets of human rights. He said "the universal Declaration of Human Right proclaims a series of principles and standards to be realized by member states and by the international community. The international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights and the international covenant on civil and political rights convert those principles and standards into legal obligations for accepting states and provide international measures for their implementation". Though all national-states give their consent to the ideals of human rights through the universal Declaration of human rights which was proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United

Nations in Paris in 1948, human rights violations by governments continues to be a common occurrence all over the world.

However, the concept of human rights is one that is very problematic. It is problematic, not much for lack of a consensus among states as to what it is, but rather in the area of its infringement. When can it be said that it has been infringed upon? This problem emanates from cultural differences among national states. Hardly will a government agree that it has violated the fundamental right of an individual, especially when those sponsoring the accusation are foreign governments. In this regard, the United States and some Western European countries, especially Britain seem to want to set standards and countries which fail to meet up with these standards are accused of human rights violations. Curiously enough, the United Nations through the United Nations Human Rights Commission, has consistently found the United States and Britain guilty of human rights violations. Human rights violations occurring in the United States and Britain have been detaily documented by the rapporteurs sent out by the commission (Guardian Newspaper 20th April, 1997). But this has not made them stop acting as the protectors of human rights all over the world. Ironically, they fail to treat all nation states equally. While decrying human rights abuses in one country, the same acts are ignored in others.

The United States and to some degree Britain have elevated the question of human rights into a foreign policy goal. Various American and British

governments have at various times asserted that, the level of human rights record of a country or regime will determine the relation with their country and often also, link their willingness to aid other poorer nations to it. But as earlier indicated, the criteria used by these countries in determining culprits of these abuses it anything but fair, thus making their policy on human rights a mess. It therefore, not surprising that, these champions of human rights have never really won any human rights battle with any country. Reason could be that, because they lack the moral strength to indict other nations they fail to muster enough support from other nations for that purpose. In 1997, the Economist magazine considered this problem. It said:

> *For the past six years, the European Union has sponsored a motion censuring China at the annual session of the UN Human Rights Commission. This year, however, France and Germany have backed off, making a common EU position impossible. In Washington meanwhile, the Clinton administration has been facing a barrage of accusations that America is sacrificing human rights policy on the alter of trade with China. Fighting for human rights in places like Muammar and Nigeria has become more difficult as a result (The Economist April 12th - 18th Vol. 343, No.8012, p.15)*

The magazine went on to assert that "the whole shambles will merely confirm the prejudices of skeptics who think that the very motion of linking human rights and foreign policy is mistaken". But as will be seen later, the position taken by the United States, Britain and other Western countries on Nigeria, including the imposition of Sanctions on her is overtly linked to her human rights abuse records.

In Nigeria, the mere that an un-elected military government is in place is a clear indication that the fundamental rights of the individuals are being violated. But military rulership did not start in Nigeria in 1993. Therefore, it would appear strange that while other military regimes escaped international hostility while they lasted, though violating the same human rights tenets as the General Sani Abacha's regime, or the proceeding one, a closer look may indicate cogent reasons for this development. One that readily comes to mind is the collapse of the Soviet Union which served to discount the communism factor significantly in world politics and also removed the second pilar of the bipolar world system leaving the USA as the only standing pilar (at least for now). Consequently, this exposed Nigeria and other countries to the dictates of Western countries. No longer fearing the influence of the Soviet Union in Nigeria and thus the spread of communism, the West is no longer restrained in its dealings with states that seem to deviate from their set standard of behaviour in the international arena. Moreso, Nigeria is believed to lack the economic strength to positively respond to Western antagonism. Again, it is fact that human rights organizations have continued to grow in number in Nigeria and continue to wax stronger. Their persistent criticisms of human rights record in Nigeria could also be a contributory factor in bringing it to the fore.

Generally, two major issues stand out in considering the human rights question in Nigeria as they relate to international hostility against Nigeria. First, the annulment of an election, considered very free and fair and the subsequent

incarceration of the acclaimed winner irked both Nigerians of conscience and the international community. Relatedly, the jailing for long prison terms of convicted coup plotters in July 1995, which included a former head of state and his deputy also served to heighten anxiety over human rights violations. The contention here is that, the trials were conducted in secret and justice may not have been served. Amnesty international, an international human rights agency expressed fears that some or all of the defendants may be prisoners of conscience. It asserted that "the trials were grossly unfair and that the tribunal i an arm of the government rather than a regular court of law" (Amnesty International News, October, 1995 vol.25, No. 10).

Secondly, the Ogoni Uprising as championed by Ken Saro-wiwa which climaxed with the hanging in November, 1995, of Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists contributed in no small way in bringing about international hostility on Nigeria. The Ogoni Uprising can be traced to the presentation of th Bill of Rights to the Federal military government in 1990, by leaders of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and traditional heads of various Ogoni clans. In that bill, after lamenting the sufferings of the Ogoni peoples on account of oil exploration activities, the neglect of their area by successive federal and Rivers State governments and the consequent lack of amenities and social services, as well as their political marginalization in the country and defining themselves as "a separate and distinct ethnic nationality", the Ogonis demanded "political autonomy to participate in the affairs of the

republic as a distinct and separate entity. (Eghosa Osaghae, The Ogoni Uprising Oil Politics, Minority Agitation and the Future of the Nigerian State" in African Affairs, Volume 94, No.376 July 1995, p.327). It is worthy of note that, Ken Saro-Wiwa a renowned international writer was both leader of MOSOP and the Ethnic Minorities Rights Organisation of Africa (EMIROAF). He was therefore in a position to internationalise the Ogoni question. Though Saro-Wiwa and the other eight Ogoni activists were hanged purportedly for murder in 1995, it was widely believed that their hanging was politically motivated and orchestrated by the government. The trial was also considered unfair by Human Rights groups. Amnesty International described the trial as grossly unfair. (Amnesty international News, November, 1996, Volume 26, No. 9). The hanging provoked international condemnation, moreso when it coincided with the meeting of the commonwealth Heads of Government in Auckland, New Zealand. It served to earn Nigeria a suspension from the Commonwealth which has not yet been lifted.

As earlier mentioned, human rights issues were subordinated to the democratization process while it lasted under the general Ibrahim Babangida's administration. It seemed as if Nigerians and the international community had hoped that, with the attainment of democratic rule in 1992 or 1993, Human rights questions will naturally be addressed. When the democratisation process failed to anchor successfully, issues binding on human rights became topical. Writing in the Guardian Newspaper of Tuesday July 1, 1993, under the caption,

"The Transition and Mischief makers", Steve Uwagha said:

> *Inspite of the many arrests of human rights activists, journalists and closure of media houses because of orchestrated phony threats to the transition programme the illegal and lawless ABN (Association for Better Nigeria) has been allowed free rein by the government to propagate its satanic call for another four years of IBB. The government's observation of the rights of the latter to self expression was never extended to the pro-IBB should go-on-schedule groups. Why such barefaced double standard.*

This outburst clearly shows that the long suppressed anger and patience over human rights violations by the government had reached its limit when the presidential election was finally terminated on the 23rd of June 1993. From the international community these twin issues of democratisation and human rights violations opened the floodgate for sanctions on Nigeria.

For the General Sani Abacha's regime, issues binding on human rights, like the democratization issues, continued to occupy prime position in international community's consideration of the policies of his administration. And there continued to be many grey areas which gave rise to friction between the Abacha administration and concerned foreign countries. There continued to be many political prisoners in prison. These included journalists, human rights activists coup plotters (including General Olusegun Obasanjo and General Shehu Yar'Adua) who was later to die in prison. Rather than this situation improving for better, the federal government announced in December, 1997, that a plot to violently overthrow the government was uncovered and General Oladipo Diya and other top ranking officers were involved. On the 28 of April, 1998, General

Oladipo and five others were sentenced to death, while others bagged various jail terms, including life imprisonment. This development further infuriated the international community thus enhancing hostility against Nigeria.

It must be noted that, throughout the regime of General Sani Abacha, human rights issues continued to occupy prime position in the national life of Nigeria. Killings, which can logically be linked or said to be political like that of Alhaja Kudirat Abiola served to fuel much discontent for the Abacha regime. Conversely, they served to agitate the conscience of the international community against the military government in Nigeria. Always, their reaction was to threaten Nigeria with sanctions, or to impose them or to maintain existing ones.

3.4 INTERNATIONAL HOSTILITY TOWARDS NIGERIA

International hostility towards Nigeria for obvious reasons that have been stated earlier - lack of a sincere democratisation process on the part of the military leadership in Nigeria and poor human rights records on the part of the government, came mainly as sanctions in its various forms, economic, military, diplomatic, financial and cultural. However, the international community has also presented Nigeria with hostility that cannot be strictly regarded as sanction. The suspension of the national air carrier of Nigeria - Nigeria Airways - from its lucrative US route and eventually the London route; refusal of the US to certify Nigeria on illegal drug related matters, represent significant hostile measures towards Nigeria to date. It is important to point out from the onset that

the question of the desirability of sanctions against Nigeria for the stated reasons (though very tempting) is beyond the scope of this study. It may only be mentioned in as much as it serves to point the way as to the likely success or failure of the sanctions.

In considering the imposition of sanctions in all its forms on Nigeria, it is instructive to note that the degree and enthusiasm with which they were being canvassed and applied varied from country to country. On the whole, however, in threatening and actually imposing sanctions, certain countries stand out as being most significant. These are Britain the United States, Canada and South Africa. The European Union Countries generally, have also been active in the sanctions saga, even though theirs may be more of advocacy than actual imposition and may be rather as a result of trying to tow the European Union line than individual countries wanting to undertake sanctions from the moral standpoint of their countries. The position of South Africa and to some extent, Zimbabwe has more to do with their call for sanctions against Nigeria which opened the way for sanctions when Ken Saro-Wiwa and others were hanged. For Nelson Mandela, of South Africa, this was a pressure he resisted for a long time when urged to initiate sanctions on Nigeria when the Presidential election was botched, and when in 1995, General Olusegun Obasanjo and General Shehu Yar' Adua and 40 others got convicted on coup plot charges. He now gave in and called for comprehensive economic sanctions against Nigeria when Ken Saro-Wiwa was executed with eight other Ogonic activists. Canada is prominent

as an adversary because it has consistently maintained its critical stand over human rights violations and other related matters in Nigeria. For instance, when all other countries and wold personalities were pleading with General Sani Abacha to "temper justice with mercy or to have the highest regard for human rights and democracy over the verdict on Saro-Wiwa, Canada was seriously questioning the "desirability of sentences rendered by secret trials with unseen evidence" (newswatch magazine, January 8, 1996, p.10)

3.5 THE PHASES OF SANCTIONS AGAINST NIGERIA

The imposition of sanctions on Nigeria has phases and these phases coincide with domestic incidents in Nigeria binding on democratisation and human rights matters. The first incident was the cancellation of the presidential election of June 1993. One of the first countries to react to this annulment was Britain, which warned that it will have to "reassess it bilateral relations with Nigeria (The Guardian Newspaper, June 28, 1993) and went on to impose sanctions. British sanctions included: withdrawal of training courses for members of the Nigerian armed forces in the United Kingdom, suspension of assistance to the National War College in Lagos, including the withdrawal of British advisory team, suspension of the issuance of the United Kingdom entry visas for members of the Nigerian armed Forces, the National Guard and the Nigerian State Security and Intelligence Services and their defendants, suspension of special treatment for visa applications for officials of the federal

government, state government and parastatals, all new aid to Nigeria will be reviewed on a case by case basis, and further action to be taken in consultations with British allies such as the United States (The West magazine 5-11, July 1993, p.1139).

On its part the State Department in Washington announced that the United States was suspending all assistance to Nigeria totaling $22.8 million, except for humanitarian assistance intended for the people of Nigeria and that which furthers the democratization process. The Americans also expelled Nigeria's military attache and suspended the travel to Lagos of the new defence attache. The United States also asked its citizens to defer travel to Nigeria until the situation became clearer (The West African Magazine 5-11 July, 1993, p.1139). However, it was the United States" announcement through its State Department spokesman Mike McCurry to the effect that, the United States had "authorised" its embassy in Lagos "to initiate high level contacts with a variety of people who are opposed to the Babangida regime" that irked the Nigerian government (The West Africa Magazine 5-11 July, 1993, p.1139 and to which it reacted angrily.

The take over of government by general Sani Abacha from the Interim National Government, hurriedly put in place by the departing President Ibrahim Babangida, which was headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan was the next issue on which the international community heaped sanctions on Nigeria or continued with those previously applied. Not only did General Sani Abacha take over, he

dissolved democratic structures put in place by General Babangida. His ten minutes broadcast on November 17, 1993, dismantled the National Assembly and all State Assemblies, all federal and state executive councils and the two political parties.

Canada's foreign affairs minister, Mr. Andre Owellet, in a statement, urged the new military government "to restore elected institutions and to complete the transition to democracy promptly. He added, that the dismissal of parliamentary, state and local elected officials and banning of democratic rights and parties are a major setback, canceling five years of progress. The military through further intervention cannot solve the crisis caused by its annulment of the presidential election" (The Guardian Newspaper November 24, 1993). The Canadian Minister then hinted that, the sanctions imposed on Nigeria five months ago would remain while Canada maintains a keen interest in future developments. It also advised Canadians to "defer all travel to Nigeria" (The Guardian Newspaper November 24, 1993).

The European Union countries which reacted through the Belgian embassy said: "the European Union condemns the fact that the democratic process in Nigeria has been interrupted through the resumption of power by a military dictatorship, which constitutes a serious setback for both Nigeria and the whole of Africa.

It strongly urges the Nigerian military authorities to re-establish democratic institutions with all speed.

The European Union has decided to examine without delay the consequences of this regression in the democratic process of Nigeria" (The Guardian Newspaper, November 24, 1993).

From the United States, the chairman of the African Sub-committee in the US House of Representatives Mr. Harry Johnson condemned the "seizure of power in Nigeria" saying, "the Nigerian people have spoken clearly and loudly about their desire for full democracy and civilian rule", that the latest move by the Nigerian military does nothing to solve the political crisis generated when General Ibrahim Babangida annulled the June 12, Presidential election". He concluded that, " the US must make absolutely clear to General Sani Abacha that the only way out of Nigeria's political crisis - and the only path to normal relations with the U.S - is the full and early return to unhindered democratic rule" (The Guardian Newspaper, November 24, 1993). The paper also reported that the US, Britain, Japan and the Commonwealth Secretariat had earlier deplored the return of the military.

The European Union countries did not stop at condemnation alone, they announced fresh sanctions on Nigeria which included: the review of exports of defence materials to Nigeria on a case by case basis; movement of Nigerian military attaches in the European countries to be restricted while Nigeria's military personnel undergoing training in various defence institutes in Europe were to be sent home.

Also, Britain in reaction to the return of the soldiers, announced that it

was cutting off a 34 million pounds defence related aid to Nigeria. There were also indications that, orders placed by Nigeria for tanks with a British firm and for helicopters with a Germany company, among others may be affected (The Guardian Newspaper, December 4, 1993).

It is interesting to note the conditions the European Union countries gave Nigeria for a positive review of the sanctions already announced against her. These conditions were: a commitment to a restoration of democratic civilian rule, unhindered by the military; a time-table for the restoration of democracy; arrangements to this end must begin urgently, there must be genuine efforts at the highest level, to address the problems of corruption; all fundamental human rights to be respected, and commitment to tackle the serious underlying economic problems and an early resumption of a dialogue with the international financial institutions (The Guardian Newspaper December 6, 1993). The issues of corruption and dialogue with the international financial institutions were featuring for the first time.

Later still, the European Union countries enlarged the list of their sanctions to include: travel restrictions on all military staff of Nigerian diplomatic missions, imposition of a case by case review, with a presumption of denial, for all new export licenses for defence equipment, cancellation of training courses for all Nigerian military personnel, review of new European Union aid projects on a case by case basis and suspensions of all non essential high level visits to and from Nigeria (The Guardian Newspaper 6 December,

1993).

The third domestic incident in Nigeria which caught the attention of the international community was the arrest in 1995, of suspected coup plotters among whom were General Olusegun Obasanjo and General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, a former Head of State and a Deputy, respectively. The British government expressed concern about the arrest of General Obasanjo, while acknowledging that, he was a distinguished Nigerian who has expressed a strong commitment to an early return to democratic civilian rule and urged that he be treated in accordance with the process of law either charged promptly or released (The News magazine 27 March, 1995). When the 51 coup suspects were arraigned before a military tribunal, the US State Department disclosed it was planning seriously the imposition of fresh sanctions on Nigeria. When 40 of the suspects were convicted with some condemned to death the US threatened oil embargo on Nigeria should any of the convicts be executed. The Americans were angered that the trials were conducted in secrecy and the charges were not made public, while the suspects had no access to appeal in civil courts. However, the single most important incident that climaxed world condemnation of Nigeria and stiffened sanctions on her was the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni human rights and minority rights activists on November 10, 1995, in Port-Harcourt. The hanging came in defiance of local and international appeals for clemency. Again, it happened at a time Heads of Government of the Commonwealth of Nations, most of whom had joined in appealing for clemency

were gathered in Auckland, New Zealand.

Nelson Mandela, South African President who had resisted pressures from the United States and the Western Nations to lead the way in calling for expulsion of Nigeria changed his position, and joined by Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, called for the imposition of sanctions against Nigeria (Newswatch magazine, January 8, 1996). Instantly, Nigeria was suspended from the organisation (Commonwealth) and given 2 years within which it must democratise or face expulsion. The Commonwealth also set up an eight member committee to monitor Nigeria's human rights record within that period. The Commonwealth's action marked the commencement of fresh sanctions by individual countries against Nigeria.

All the European Union nations, the United State and South Africa ordered their ambassadors home for consultations. The United States also placed a ban on the sale and repair of military goods and services in Nigeria. The ban on insuance of visas to senior military officers and senior government officials and their families was extended to include military officers and civilians who actively formulate, implement or benefit from the policies that impede Nigeria's transition to democracy. Nigerian officials visiting the United Nations or international financial institutions were restricted to within 25 miles of such organizations.

The 15 member European Union pummelled Nigeria by imposing arms embargo, a freeze on aid and restriction on visas. Britain, Nigeria's biggest

trading partner slammed a total arms embargo on Nigeria (Newswatch magazine, January 8, 1996, p. 10). Britain also brought pressure to bear on Shell Petroleum Development company, its largest concern in Nigeria, to pull out of the country. It asked Shell not to sign the Final Investment Decision (FID), on the $45 billion Liquefied Natural Gas Project in Nigeria (Tell Magazine, November 27, 1995). For South Africa, Mandela ordered the withdrawal of the invitation extended to Nigeria's Super Eagles to play in a four nation tournament, to which they had been already invited. The South African Sports Ministry said it was taking the action to "condemn the inhuman actions of the Nigerian government in the strongest terms possible". The South Africans also called for the expulsion or Nigeria from the upcoming Miss World Competition taking place there. (Tell Magazine, November 24, 1995.

Though varied and coming at different intervals, George Obiozor, the Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs was able to clearly tabulate the major sanctions on Nigeria. In a paper he presented at the Lagos Garrison Command Officers Training Week, on Wednesday 24 April 1996, titled "International sanctions on Nigeria: Options for a Viable way Out", said, the Western world has proposed and imposed the following sanctions on Nigeria:

- The withdrawal of military personnel from our military training establishment particularly from the war College.
- The suspension of all existing agreement on military

equipment/weapons procurement agreement. Stoppage of sale of military hardware and maintenance of existing ones.

- Denial of visas to all senior government officials and their dependents to major Western countries.
- Intense Campaign for Disinvestment of their major companies and discouragement of new investments.
- Withdrawal/denial of new facilities by the Breton Wood Institutions - IMF, and the World Bank.

Although these constitute the basic sanctions on Nigeria, as has been earlier shown, individual countries announced various other forms and have been carrying out various forms of hostile acts towards Nigeria.

International hostility also came upon Nigeria other than those from nation-states. These indeed constituted problems, for the Abacha regime. Transparency International (TI), the Berlin-based anti-corruption group, Trans-Africa a cross-section of powerful African-American politicians, scholars, civil rights leaders and entertainers, and the Good Government Section of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation of Dutch Parent (OECD) are some of the groups that remained very critical in opposing the Abacha regime and in calling for comprehensive sanctions on Nigeria. In as much as they may not impose sanctions themselves, their persistent denigration of the Nigerian government constitutes a sources of hostility that both enhanced sanctions from elsewhere and threatened the military government in Nigeria, (The News Magazine March

27, 1995, p.16). While Trans-Africa vowed to humiliate General Sani Abacha out of office, the Transparency International alerted Western Nations that the arrest and detention of Obasanjo is "a challenge to the whole movement towards democracy and accountability in Africa (The News Magazine, March 27, 1995, p. 17).

Hostility also came from the UN in way of its condemnatory resolutions. At the 53rd session for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, in 1997, Nigeria's human rights record was scored low (The Guardian Newspaper April 4, 1997. This was the verdict of the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed rapporteur for Nigeria. The rapporteur, therefore recommended; the abrogation of state security (detention of persons) decree 2 of 1994, consider abolishing the death penalty, the release of the coup plotters revocation of all decrees which destroy or limit fundamental rights and freedom, abrogation of all decrees which establish special tribunals or oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, urgent training of law enforcement officers on the code of conduct for law enforcement officers and the basic principles on the force and firearms, restorations of independence of the Nigerian Bar Association which should be permitted to regulate and govern itself.

As harmless as the UN indictments appear, they were coming at a time when world attention was focused on Nigeria's human rights record and this served as a confirmation of the accusations by human rights organizations that the Nigerian military leaders care less about upholding the fundamental rights of

its citizens. The inevitable consequences was that world hostility against Nigeria increased.

3.6 SUMMARY

This chapter essentially enumerated the various threats and actual imposition of sanctions Nigeria suffered over the years, from 1993 to 1998. It is noted that, apart from certain hostile attitudes towards Nigeria, like the recalling of ambassadors and high commissioners, only Western countries actually announced the imposition of sanctions against Nigeria and seem to be carrying them out. An exception might be the cancellation of an earlier invitation extended to Nigeria to partake in a four nation football tournament in South Africa by South African government, at the height of the crisis, when Ken Saro-Wiwa and 8 other Ogoni Minority rights activists, who were also collectively leaders of the movement for the survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) were hanged.

On the threat and actual imposition of sanctions, it shall be interesting to know to what extent they have actually been imposed and to what degree of success. However, this will be done in the next chapter when an analysis of the sanctions and the hostile attitudes of the international community towards Nigeria and her reaction to them would be made.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL HOSTILITY AGAINST NIGERIA

4.0 INTRODUCTION

Even before the Abacha regime assumed power on the 17th November, 1993, world hostility against Nigeria- had already manifested. However, it was the "luck" of the regime to largely manage this hostility. Sanctions and other hostile attitudes against Nigeria were to continue unabated throughout the administration of General Sani Abacha. Nigeria's traditional trading partners canvassed for sanctions and many actually imposed them, pointing to Nigeria's lack of a sincere democratization programme and human rights violations. The sanction measures, therefore, were aimed at coercing the Nigerian military regime into having a rethink over these two vexed issues.

Right from the onset, there were different reactions from Nigeria over these sanctions. While some particularly, the pro-government group tried to play down the factor of sanctions against Nigeria, others, whom one would rather call the opposition, saw sanctions as a positive step towards taming the Abacha regime. To this group, which included the various human rights and pro-democracy groups, though sanctions were welcome, their application was far below expectation, both in type and degree. Thus they canvassed for tougher sanctions which should include a total embargo on Nigerian oil. Though it is the thesis of this study that sanctions on Nigeria will fail to have the desired effect, which means they will fail to change

the attitude of the regime in Nigeria in the direction for which sanctioning states sought, it was never doubted that deliberate reactions will come from the Nigerian government as it confronts international hostility. Again, although sanctions may not have the desired effect, they nevertheless affected Nigeria adversely, particularly the ordinary Nigerians.

As widely publicised as the sanction saga was, only a few countries actually rolled out sanctions against Nigeria. Apart from the United States and Canada, only the European union countries have actually articulated and imposed punitive measures against Nigeria and seem to be carrying some out. Within the European Union itself, it is clear that most countries are only carrying out the sanctions programme in name. Interestingly there are other measures which have been taken against Nigeria, which do not come under sanctions, at least from the standpoint of the sanctioning states. Though Nigeria views these measures as sanctions, it is being treated here simply as "international hostility", Two issues are involved here. They are the severance of air link with Nigeria by the United States and Britain and the continued refusal of the United States to certify Nigeria on drug related matters. The consequences of these actions on Nigeria and the Nigerian people, and the government reaction to it puts them at par with other sanction measures.

4.1 GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO SANCTIONS

Though it is a fact that the annulment of the presidential election that was held in June of 1993, initiated international hostility against Nigeria, it was the General Sani Abacha's administration that was largely saddled with the task of managing the crisis. His administration, therefore, devoted almost entirely its energy at the foreign policy realm to the management of the crisis from the time the regime was inaugurated in November, 1993, to General Abacha's death in June 1998. Largely also, it was Tom Ikimi, an architect and a former Chairman of the National Republican Convention, who became the regime's Minister of Foreign Affairs, that spearheaded and directed the foreign policy thrust of the Abacha regime.

The foreign policy pursuit of the Abacha Administration in both pronouncements and actions was diversionary and confusing both to Nigerians and the international community. In other words, though the momentous responses of the administration to international hostility was unmistakable, it was difficult to understand what the administration intended to achieve considering the manner policies were articulated and implemented. Until 1995, the major area of contention as far as the international community was concerned, was the annulment of the election of June 1993. However, before the Abacha regime came to an end in 1998, many other contending issues emerged and their emergence was a consequence of the regime's hard stance on the issue at stake, and this served to heighten tension. First, the regime hunted down M.K.O. Abiola and clamped him into prison for

declaring himself President in August 1994, the trial and sentencing of the alleged coup plotters in 1995, which included a former head of state and his deputy, Generals Olusegun Obasanjo and Shehu Yar'Adua; the sentencing and hurried hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni Minority and civil rights activists in November 1995, the killing of Alhaja Kudirat Abiola, by unknown assassins, the jailing and harassment of human rights activists and journalists, the apparent manipulation of the transition programme, ostensibly to pave way for the self succession of General Abacha, the trial and sentencing of General Oladipo Diya and others over an alleged coup plot against the government, which many believed was a set up, etc. These happenings, served to increase the vehemence with which hostility was heaped on Nigeria by the international community.

Haruna, writing in the Thisday Newspaper on 17th June 1998, under the caption "Abacha and Nigeria's foreign policy" captured the reactions of the administration to international hostility in summary. He said of the style of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tom Ikimi: "His style which has remained unchanged is to harangue, issue threats, raise alarm, blackmail and practically abuse perceived opponents of the regime especially on the much criticised human rights record of the regime. He unwittingly made more enemies for the regime in the process". Of General Abacha himself, he said "in his single minded pursuit of the objectives of his administration, he never considered any external opposition too strong to engage". Blatantly, the government refused to dialogue with its perceived enemies. Many intended visits from the Commonwealth and other concerned countries

including the United States failed to materialise. All attempts to discuss the Nigerian crisis was frustrated by the Abacha regime. For instance, the government refused to allow the eight nation fact finding committee set up by the Commonwealth in the wake of Nigeria's suspension from that organisation to visit Nigeria, though they continued to meet elsewhere. The last effort at rapproachment was made by the Thomas Pickering led mission, but this again was scuttled at the last minute by conditionalities set by foreign affairs minister Tom Ikimi. Generally, the Abacha Administration failed to present any substance in its reaction to international hostility. Some of the measures it took were clearly panicky and embarrassing.

One such measure was the apparent sponsoring of pro-government rallies all over the country. Related to this was to threaten critics with reprisals. General Sani Abacha himself lamented that the criticisms were a deliberate interference in the national and internal affairs of Nigeria (Guardian Newspaper, November 16, 1997, p.1). Shortly after this Tom Ikimi indicated that Nigeria will formerly realign the diplomatic posturing of its foreign policy to make it relevant to the present circumstances (Guardian Newspaper November 17, 1995, p.1). This meant that Nigeria may in effect be shopping for new allies in place of her traditional western friends. Then it became clear that Nigeria was acting in panic when the government raised a 33-member joint National Committee of Traditional rulers and Leaders of thought to advice it on current attempts by the international community to isolate Nigeria (Guardian Newspaper, November 23, 1995, p.1). This committee which

essentially had to do with foreign policy was inaugurated on the 29th November, 1995, by the Federal Capital Territory Minister, Lt. General Useni. At the inaugural ceremony, he branded all countries that called for Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth enemies. (Guardian Newspaper November 30, 1995, p.1). Earlier, he had said that Nigeria would brook criticisms (over the hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa and others) from foreign and domestic interests no more (Guardian Newspaper, November 15, 1995, p.1).

The Guardian Newspaper in its editorial of Monday November 20, 1995 clearly captured the rather disjointed posture of the Abacha Administration as it reacted to world outrage, when the commonwealth suspended Nigeria. It said:

> *...however, what should be paramount now is how Nigeria can conduct its diplomacy to reduce the hurt of the global outrage and regain the goodwill and confidence of her traditional friends. But this project is not helped in the least by the ostentatious posturing and recriminatory rejoinders from all manner of government spokesmen who ought not to be speaking for Nigeria at this time. .....It is clearly deplorable that other government functionaries choose to be pugnacious when they should not. The foreign affairs minister Chief Tom Ikimi, and Information Minister Dr. Walter Ofonagoro have been so inelegantly combative that they have not helped matters. Nor do we see what purpose is served by comments by traditional rulers or the minister of the Federal Capital Territory or the Minister of State for Petroleum Resources.*

Indeed, the government prosecutor in Saro Wiwa's case Chief Philip Ezebilo, also became a foreign policy expert, saying of the sanctions that "everything will die down in a few months" and that "Nigeria will overcome" (Guardian Newspaper, November 21, 1995, p.3).

This rather shoddy handling of the crisis by government, prompted Chief

Matthew Mbu, a former foreign affairs secretary in the Interim National Government, and professor Adekunle Ajala, of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), to raise an alarm, accusing the foreign policy operators of diplomatic ineptitude (Guardian Newspaper November 22, 1995, p. 1.2). Apparently this castigation did not help matters and people who should not even comment on such sensitive issues continued to do so. For instance, Alhaji Abdulrhaman Okene of the Northern Elders Forum, castigated African countries for backing the Commonwealth in its denunciation of Nigeria and urged the federal government to no longer give premium to African countries in its foreign policy consideration but to base its foreign policy more on economic considerations (Guardian Newspaper, November 22, 1995 p. 36). Concern at the manner government was handling the crisis was also voiced by the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry. At its 107th yearly meeting in Lagos, it called for restraint in handling the diplomatic row between Nigeria and some nations. It considered it counterproductive under the circumstances to repudiate Nigeria's traditional allies "on the basis of one incident", saying that although there are no permanent friends but permanent interests in international relations, nonetheless, the country should not on the basis of one incident contemplate changing overnight relations with long taproots nurtured over decades with friendly countries for new untested ones". That "what the present situation calls for is sober realistic and professional diplomacy" and that it was desirable that government pronouncements on the subject are well thought out and coordinated (Guardian Newspaper,

November 7, 1995, p.40).

Similarly, writing in the Guardian Newspaper of December 15, 1995, p.29, under the heading "External Pressure is Legitimate". Femi Okoronnum described the General Abacha's Administration's reaction to the suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth, as repressive, insensitive, arrogant, resentful of truth and deluded by a misplaced sense of importance". He went on to assert that, "the concerned world tells the government to demonstrate greater commitment to democratization but it says it none of their business. The administration is urged to release political prisoners and detainees but it tells a bold lie that none exists in Nigeria. The world threatens Nigeria with sanctions but it dares them to go to hell, that it can get by without the rest of the world". (Guardian Newspaper December 15, p.29.).

It is therefore clear that, the Abacha Administration reacted arrogantly at world hostility and many Nigerians were concerned about this reaction. However, it also seems the government completely ignored such concern but rather continued to encourage those that supported its confrontational stand against countries that were pressuring the government to have a re-think. Thus, in what appeared to be an endorsement of the call by the Northern elders Forum - that Nigeria should ditch needy African countries - the Chief of Army Staff, Major General Alwali Kazir, speaking at the Chief of Army Staff Conference said, "it was regrettable that some nations that have in the past benefitted from Nigeria's generosity and brotherliness now champion a campaign for reprisal against the country". He then said, "thiseraof generosity was over (Guardian Newspaper, December 8, 1995, p.1).

The arrogance of the government was also expressed by the various embassies of the Western countries. Specifically, the French, the British and the United States Embassies saw the General Sani Abacha's administration's refusal to embrace dialogue as arrogance and insisted that he gave nothing back to warrant a re-think over the sanction measures.

4.2 THE MYTH AND REALITY OF THE SANCTION MEASURES

Yusuf Danesi, writing in the Vanguard Newspaper or 23rd May, 1996, p.7 enumerated the various forms of international sanctions. He also considered the likely effects of a comprehensive international economic sanctions on Nigeria bearing in mind the structure of Nigeria's economy which is largely based on foreign cooperation and aid. He concluded that the effects of such sanctions on Nigeria even from Britain and the United States alone are better imagined. Indeed, when the spectre of economic sanctions became a reality to Nigerians, it was believed in several quarters that, economic sanctions against Nigeria involved trade. Thus it was believed that, since Nigeria depended so much on imports from outside, her economy would be crippled if indeed sanctions came. Relatedly, it was also believed in several quarters that this will ultimately lead to the collapse of the military regime in Nigeria due to uncontrollable protest from the Nigerian masses who will be over-whelmed by the harsh effects of the sanctions.

True, the various sanction measures as enunciated by the sanctioning states did not include trade, but the mere fact that economic sanctions were clamped on

Nigeria served to indicate that trade sanctions would necessarily be involved. It must have been in the realization of this fear that, Rear Admiral Jubrila Ayinla, former Minister of Commerce and Tourism, now the Chief of Naval Staff, assured Nigerians that no trade sanction of any form has been imposed against Nigeria by the international community. (Guardian newspaper, December 31, 1996, p.32). He went on to add that, "all the European countries that hitherto imposed some sanctions against Nigeria have their nationals in the country running their businesses and all these activities have received a boost".

For a clear understanding of the impact of sanctions on Nigeria, we must come to terms with what the various measures entail. In terms of foreign investment, military cooperation, trade and aid, the United States and Western European countries constitute the most important associates of Nigeria. Since these countries constitute the actual sanctioning countries, a brief reconsideration of the nature of their sanctions will be worthwhile. Indeed, a very close look at the nature of sanctions against Nigeria indicates that, those of the United States are not very different from those of the European Union countries. In the light of these similarities, a consideration of the sanctions as announced by the European Union countries in 1993, and reaffirmed in 1995, will be enough to capture the major elements of the sanction measures. The common position of the European communities on sanctions on Nigeria, taken on the 20th of November, 1995, as published in the official journal of the European Communities No. LZ98/1, says, the Union:

a) Reaffirms the following measures adopted in 1993:

- suspension of military cooperation
- visa restrictions for members of the military of the security forces, and their families.
- suspension of visits of members of the military
- restriction of movement of all military personnel of Nigerian diplomatic missions
- cancellation of training courses for all Nigerian military personnel
- suspension of all high level visits that are not indispensable to and from Nigeria

b) Introduce the following additional measures:

i) visa restrictions on members of the Provisional Ruling Council and the Federal Executive Council and their families.

ii) embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment.

This communique, went on in paragraph 4 to add that, "development cooperation with Nigeria is suspended. Exceptions may be made for projects and programmes in support of human rights and democracy as well as those concentrating on poverty alleviation and, in particular the provision of basic needs for the poorest section of the population, in the context of decentralized cooperation through local civilian authorities and non-governmental organizations". Basically

these constitute the sanctions from sanctioning states against Nigeria, including those from the U.S.

Now, it is clear that, these sanctions were informed by the desire to seek a change in the behaviour of the military regime in Nigeria by depriving it of something it values. But it is also clear that, these measures as enunciated above were not enough to force the regime's hand. One major sanction measure has to do with the military cooperation, both in terms of training and arms supplies. However, arms supply is a tricky business and most governments find it difficult to effectively control. Again a country denied arms can indeed buy the same arms from a third party. Defence correspondent with the Guardian Newspaper, Madu Onwuorah, opines that, despite an arms embargo, the military may still be able to buy weapons on the international market and the big losers will be the major western defence contractors (Guardian Newspapers, December 19, 1995, p. 9). Also Aminu, in an article in the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 2 Numbers 1 and 2, 1986, p.81), had stated that "Nigeria had procured arms through third parties during the civil war when Britain initially refused to sell arms to her." It is therefore possible that Nigeria could conveniently do so again, if need be. It is clear that this need did not even arise. Even with this limitation, Nigeria was not deterred from going into sierra Leone and forcefully confronting the Bakkasi Peninsula row with Cameroon. Indeed, in terms of weapons, personnel and upkeep, Nigeria continues to be the power behind the ECOMOG force.

From the Embassies of the European countries visited for interview. It was

discovered that, one area in which they considered that sanctions hurt most was the restriction on the insurance of visa to the members of the provisional ruling council, the Federal Executive Council, the military and their defendants. The French, the British and the Americans all felt so. However, it is foolhardy to think that, this denial will in anyway force the Nigerian military government to change its mind. Without visiting the capitals of Western countries, these Nigerian officials can conveniently get all they want. The only thing they might miss is the weather that cannot be brought to Nigeria. The political attache at the French Embassy had opined, that the denial of visa to this category of Nigerians denied them the privilege of shopping constantly in Europe and this represented a personal loss and will hurt them more. However, these sanctions excluded trade and other commercial relations with Nigeria and therefore, can be considered insignificant in denying Nigerians that have the money access to the things of goods life.

Thus since sanction s excluded trade, trade and other commercial activities continued to grow. For instance Britain, which is a significant trading partner of Nigeria and a sanctioning state continued trading favourably with Nigeria. Table 1 brings this out clearly.

TABLE 1

UK-NIGERIA TRADE 1992-1997 IN MILLION POUNDS

YEAR	UK EXPORTS	UK IMPORTS	BALANCE OF TRADE POSITION	% CHANGE IN EXPORTS OVER PREVIOUS YEAR	% CHANGE I IMPORT OVE PREVIOUS YEAR
1992	622.6	167.5	455.1	14.3	-49
1993	634.6	112.3	522.3	2.0	-49
1994	547.9	124.5	33.4	-28.0	9.8
1995	431.5	181	250.5	-6.0	31
1996	433	294	139	3.4	38
1997	426.22	122.3	303.9	-1.6	140

SOURCE: From the Commercial Attache, British High Commission, Lagos

This UK-Nigeria trade pattern from 1992-1997 shows a fabulous trade surplus in favour of Britain. Again it indicates that it was only in 1994, that British exports to Nigeria significantly declined to 457.9 million pounds from the previous 634.6 million pounds in 1993. It is therefore, difficult to attribute any fluctuation in the volume of UK exports to Nigeria to the factor of sanctions. Similarly, the fluctuation in Nigeria's exports to the UK cannot be decisively attributed to sanctions. Various other factors may be responsible.

For the United States, Mr. Thomas Pickering, the under secretary of State for Political Affairs, United States Department of State, had this to say about US-Nigeria trade relations. This was with regards to trade and investment. He said:

> *As bad as things were in Nigeria, business with the US is growing. Our Embassy estimate that US investment in Nigeria total as much as $7,000 million, an increase in the last five years of about $3,000*

> *million. Two-way trade between the US and Nigeria grew from $4,900 million in 1994 to $6,700 million in 1996. Oil export form the bulk of both investment and trade, but US firms also have interests in manufacturing and services. Our dependence on Nigerian oil is real and growing. This is despite the widespread decay of Nigeria's infrastructure, the lack of sophisticated support services, the erosion of work standard, and some internal disruptions and protest in oil producing regions. Imagine if the investment climate were conducive, if the government were representative, and if the corruption problem were eliminated or at least severely reduced, Nigeria could lead the region and the whole of Africa into a new era of economic growth and expansion (News Newsletter of the United States Information service, February, 1998, p.6).*

France is another important European country and a sanctioning one against Nigeria. However, sanctions have failed to have any negative effect on France-Nigeria Trade/commercial relations. When President Ibrahim Babangida visited France in 1990, he was reported to have said that Nigeria was the biggest trading partner of france in Africa (Tribune, February 28, 1990, p.1). In 1998, Mr. Philips Peltier, France Ambassador to Nigeria, authoritatively maintained that France had more investment in Nigeria than all the Francophone countries on the continent, including Congo, formerly Zaire, with all its natural resources (National Concord, February 11, 1998, p.14). The importance of Nigeria as a trading partner to France for many years, is made manifest when the total volume of trade France has with the West African countries is compared with that of Nigeria. Table 2 which shows the total volume of trade between 1979 and 1980, brings out the importance of Nigeria as a trading partner with France.

TABLE 2
FRANCE-WEST AFRICA TRADE PATTERN 1979-1980 IN MILLION FRANCS

COUNTRY	EXPORT TO FRANCE 1979-1980		EXPORT FROM FRANCE 1979-1980		FRENCH TRADE BALANCE 1979-1980	
Senegal	1.035	791	1.655	1.753	620	962
Gambia	33	29	39	52	6	23
G/Bissau	2	19	23	38	21	19
Guinea	222	183	412	413	190	230
S/Leone	16	19	80	96	64	77
Liberia	458	528	536	531	78	-197
I/Coast	3.336	3.316	4.723	4.803	1.387	1.447
Ghana	66	97	77	11	11	14
Togo	221	264	729	711	508	447
Benin	46	59	470	569	424	510
Nigeria	6.157	12.726	3.246	5.717	-2.911	-7.009
WEST AFRICA	11.592	18.031	11.932	14.594	+340	-3.337

SOURCE: Culled from the National Concord 14th July, 1981.

This is despite the long standing frosty relation that had characterized the Nigeria-France ties as has been narrated by Bola Akinterinwa in his article "Nigeria and France: The need for a better understanding" published in the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs Volume 12, Numbers 1 and 2, 1986, p 58). This table clearly shows that, Nigeria was the single most important trading partner to France in West Africa in 1979-1980. However, Mr. Peltier's assertion in 1998, that France has more investment in Nigeria than all the

Francophone countries in Africa combined means that its trade and investment in Nigeria has increased over the years. Table 3 below, shows that, inspite of sanctions Nigeria-France trade relations between 1990 and 1997 was not really affected. It also shows a continued trade surplus in favour of France.

TABLE 3
COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES FRANCE/NIGERIA IN MILLION FRANCS

		1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	EVALUATION 1990-91
TOTAL	Exportation Importations Solde	2911 3508 -213	3563 3979 -214	4188 3852 335	3167 4316 -1149	2536 6032 -3496	2096 3892 -1795	2592 7108 -4516	2671 4146 -1476	-8.2% 18.2% -878
FOOD CROPS	Exportation Importations Solde	263 79 184	264 70 194	244 93 162	109 97 12	102 170 -68	68 150 -82	93 194 -101	171 254 -83	-35.0% 223.3% -267
ENERGY	Exportation Importations Solde	75 3338 -3263	66 3817 -3761	79 3693 -3614	272 4137 -46066	250 5799 -25527	400 3656 -3406	135 6866 -6464	80.4% 3853 -3717	 15.4% -454
INDUSTRY	Exportation Importations Solde	2570 86 2484	3231 90 3141	3862 75 3788	3862 82 2903	3985 58 2102	2160 86 1691	1777 48 2047	2095 39 2323	2306 -54.7% -161
INTERMEDIATE GOODS	Exportation Importations Solde	756 62 694	701 70 630	949 67 891	929 71 858	744 30 714	508 64 444	490 24 467	574	-24.0% -82.6% -130
PROFESSIONAL EQUIPMENT GOODS	Exportation Importations Solde	756 1 754	1085 1 1085	1543 1 1542	1005 1 1004	703 3 700	423 2 421	624 4 620	705 3 702	-6.7% 155.6% -63
CONSUMER GOODS EARTH TRANSPORT MATERIALS	Exportation Importations Solde	161 23 138	234 17 216	210 16 194	230 10 220	151 24 127	234 19 215	394 20 375	420 25 396	161.1% 9.1% 257
	Exportation Importations Solde	898 898	1201 1 1210	1161 1161	821 821	562 682	611 611	587 586	663 662	-26.2% 235

SOURCE: Office of the Political Attache, French Embassy, Lagos

It would seem from the foregoing that, while the sanctioning states continued to maintain sanctions, deliberate efforts were made, not to disrupt trade with Nigeria. As the political attache at the French embassy had maintained, during the interview, sanctions are a double edged sword, and sanctioning states were very careful in using the sword against Nigeria. Indeed, almost all European Union countries witnessed increases in trade with Nigeria within this period. These include the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, only Denmark, Finland and Ireland generally witnessed a lull in trade activities with Nigeria in the period under study. (This day Newspaper, Lagos March 10, 1998, p.16).

Though trade and other commercial activities continued between Nigeria and her major trading partners, the atmosphere for investment was polluted. Not so much by sanctions but by the democratization process which generated intense anxiety in the private sector. The Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), says that, "of particular concern is the whole question of the credibility of the entire transition programme and its potential implication for the stability of the polity. These worries are rooted in the fact that business cannot carry on successfully in a politically unstable and volatile environment" (The Newsletter of

the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry June 1998, p.1) According to the Chamber "there was also an increasing uneasiness that a high and disproportionate attention and resources of government are being devoted to political activities, to the detriment of economy and the fortunes of business".

At the various embassies of the sanctioning countries, there was a general consensus that sanctions against Nigeria may not have their desired effect. One feels that, this is a clear acceptance of the failure of sanctions in this case. But as the French political attache said, they could not be called off because nobody wants to accept failure.

4.3 THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON ORDINARY NIGERIANS

Again, while the various sanctioning countries insisted that sanctions were not targeted at the ordinary Nigerians, it was indeed this category of Nigerians that suffered as a result of the sanctions. For instance, in the area of sports, the cancellation of Nigeria's hosting rights of the 8th World Youth Championship by the Federation of International Football (FIFA), was a bigger loss to the millions of football loving Nigerians than the Abacha regime, though it would have no doubt made some public relation gains, if it had hosted the tournament. Though

FIFA itself said the cancellation was on health grounds, there can be no doubt that pressure on FIFA by sanctioning states was a major factor (The News magazine 27 March 1995. Relatedly, it was a fall-out from international hostility that eventually saw Nigeria out of the African Nations Cup Competition on two consecutive times in both South Africa and Burkina Faso. Nigeria's rather unexpected poor performance at the just concluded World Cup tournament (France '98) could be attributed partially to its failure to feature in the last two tournaments of the African Cup of Nations.

Another area in which ordinary Nigerians suffered is in the area of political asylum. Though the French Embassy in Lagos, in an interview with the author had claimed that, genuine Nigerian asylum seekers in Europe generally were negligible, and that most of the papers sent back to European embassies for verification in Nigeria are not genuine, there can be no doubt that genuine political asylum seekers are being denied this privilege. In the first place many visa applicants are turned down. The French embassy which is even more liberal in this respect turned down many visa applicants in the past years as table 4 below shows.

TABLE 4
PROCESSED VISA APPLICATIONS BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY, LAGOS (1995-1997)

YEAR	1995	1995	1997
Applications for short term visas	4,158	3,327	3,445
Short terms visas granted	3,056	2,518	2,463
Percentage of success	73%	73%	71%
Total number of applications for all types of visas	9,256	7,638	8,811
visas granted, all types	7,878	6,295	7,148
Percentage of success	85%	82	81%

SOURCE: The French Embassy, Lagos

Similarly at the British High Commission, Visa Section, it is on record that many Nigerians are refused entry visas. Not only this, their passports are stamped, indicating that visa was refused thereby limiting their chances of getting visas into Western countries in future. Again very high fees are charged and whether these visas are issued or not the money is not refunded (see the National Concord editorial of 23rd October 1977). This sort of treatment has a moral link with sanctions that were clamped on Nigeria by these countries. To Individuals, a visa denial could mean very much.

The Guardian Newspaper of February 4, 1996 on page 44, reports that in Britain 90,000 asylum applications were received between 1993, and December 1995. Out of this number only 4 were granted asylum while 15 were allowed to stay on compassionate groups. The paper quoted the British Home Office as saying that, 4,340 applications were received from Nigerians in 1994, and 3,225 in the first half of 1995. Germany had 10, 000 Nigerian political asylum seekers in 1992, but fewer than 10 were granted political asylum. Both

Britain and Germany confirm that almost all Nigerian political asylum seekers were not genuine. This goes to confirm the French Embassy assertion earlier stated.

It is clear that Nigerians were taking advantage of the political situation in the country to seek economic gains elsewhere. But with the fake documents and stories they took abroad, they must have blown the political crisis in Nigeria out of proportion and this served to stiffen the resolve of the international community against Nigeria. Conversely, they would have also unwittingly credited the Abacha Administration by proclaiming that they were being persecuted by the government, when it was now found that they were not.

Other areas in which sanctions took a visible toll on Nigeria is in the area of aid. Here again, it is the ordinary Nigerian that suffered and may continue to suffer. This is because, most of the agencies that benefitted from such grants that were stopped or severely reduced were of immediate importance to the people. One of these agencies is the Sokoto Environmental and Protection Agency (SEPA) which was being financed by the European Union and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Thisday Newspaper June 4, 1996). Others, include the Animal Trypanosomiasis project at the University of Ibadan, funded by the European Union, the Planned Parenthood Federation of Nigeria, which depends largely on the United States

Agency for International Development (USAID) which had its assistance reduced considerably and the stoppage of USAID assistance to the State' Ministry of Health (Newswatch Magazine July 22, 1996, p.8). There were several other projects which were of direct benefit to the people, but had to be suspended because of sanctions.

When Tom Ikimi, the foreign affairs minister closed down Nigeria's High Commission Offices in Ottawa Canada, the Canadians refused to retaliate immediately, but eventually had to temporarily close shop in Nigeria. The consequences of these actions were that, Nigerians seeking visas to Canada or wanting to have anything to do with the Canadian High Commission necessarily had to go to Accra, Ghana. No doubt this represented another burden ordinary Nigerians had to bear as a result of the hostilities between Nigeria and the Western countries. Similarly, the severance of air link with Nigeria by the U.S. and Britain brought upon ordinary Nigerians so much hardship. For instance, Nigerians travelling to the U.K out of Lagos had to route through other European countries since European airlines operating into Nigeria are not allowed to fly directly into the U.K with Nigerian passengers without a stop over in their countries. Again, U.S. bound passengers had to go through Europe or take Ghana Airways from Accra or Air Afrique from any of the West African countries. All these represent financial and psychological inconveniences to Nigerians brought about by the hostilities.

It can be discerned from the above analysis that though sanctions served to batter Nigeria's image abroad and denied Nigeria assistance at home in many areas, it is indeed the ordinary Nigerian citizen that took the burden. The targeted military regime of General Sani Abacha itself lost a little.

4.4 THE POLITICS IN THE SEVERANCE OF AIR LINKS WITH NIGERIA AND HER DECERTIFICATION ON DRUG RELATED ISSUES

The controversy surrounding these two issues as to whether the actions of these two Western Nations were politically motivated and can be linked to the current sanctions on Nigeria still lingers on. First is the issue of the severance of air link with Nigeria by the United States and Britain. While the two countries continue to maintain that this had nothing to do with sanctions, the general belief in Nigeria is that this decision was politically motivated and has much to do with current sanctions on Nigeria by these countries. The interview with the Nigeria Airways, through its corporate affairs division confirms this thinking. Secondly is the issue of the continued refusal of the United States to certify Nigeria as a country that is cooperating with the United States and other international agencies in the effort to limit illicit drug trade. Related to this is the United States continued condemnation of Nigeria as a haven for international criminals and criminal activities. Ambassador Thomas Pickering's remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, which was published in the News newsletter of the United States Information Service of February 1998, clearly presents the United States position on the situation. He said:

> *...Nigeria's criminal and narcotics activities affect the security interests of the United States and the Well being of our citizens. Some estimates that the cost of advanced fee fraud to the U.S. is easily more than $100 million annually. Insurance and credit card fraud may well exceed $2300 million dollars each, although we do not know the scope of the problem. Nigerians are among the largest importers of heroin to the United States, Nigeria nationals narcotics activities are conducted on a world wide basis, posing risk not only to the US but to many other nations. Our effort to cooperate on law enforcement and counter-narcotics activities have been stymied by lack of Nigerian cooperation. Nigeria has become a center for international criminals, and risks becoming a host to Pariah nations.*

It is evident from this speech that the United States hostility against Nigeria is reinforced by its belief that Nigeria's efforts toward counter-narcotics activities and other measures aimed at limiting the criminal activities of Nigerian international criminals are far from sufficient. While the spokesperson for the Department of Good Governance and Democracy at the USIS, denied that the refusal of the US to certify Nigeria has anything to do with sanctions, arguing that certification and decertification of countries is an annual event, Mr. Pickering's speech clearly shows that there is at least a link between the drug issue and the totality of Nigeria's relations with the U.S.

Similarly, at a workshop organized by the Nigerian-American Chamber of Commerce in March 25, 1998, at the Eko Hotel, Lagos, Ambassador William Twaddel, the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria in a speech reproduced in the "Crossroads" of May 1998, indicated that the US total policy towards Nigeria is influenced much by the issue of drug trafficking and the related issue of advanced fee fraud. He said:

It is no exaggeration to say that, if a calculating enemy of Nigeria had set out to undermine and destroy Nigeria's reputation and Nigeria's potential to become an active, respective member of the international community, that enemy could not have contrived a scheme more effective and damaging than the campaign conducted today by Nigeria's home grown and home based 4-1-9 mafiosi. .....Narcotics trafficking, and in particular the large

role that Nigerian trafficking organizations play in smuggling heroin to the Eastern United States, is another major bilateral problem and concern. Our law enforcement agencies have documented a direct connection between 4-1-9 fraud and Nigerian heroin trafficking networks.

On October 7,1998, at Ahmadu Bellow University, Zaria, Ambassador Willian Twaddel more or less repeated this assessment and continued to deny that, the decertification of Nigeria was political, saying it was purely based on the merits of the case. This was contained in his speech "The United States and Nigeria: Traditional Friends" (News Newsletter of the United States Information Service).

It is also instructive that, the US directly links this problem to the Nigerian governments. At the United Nations Commission on Narcotics Drugs, (UNND) conference in Vienna, Austria, April 16-25, 1996, Robert Gelbard, US Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics told the conference that, Nigerian drug mafia have the support of the military governments. He said, "we now see Nigerian trafficking organizations as one of the most extraordinary treat that we and probably the entire community of nations face throughout the world in terms of drug trafficking. Fundamentally, these involve Nigerian trafficking

groups based in Lagos, protected by the various military government with branches around the world". (Newswatch Magazine July, 1996, p. 17).

At the offices of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency a spokesman for the agency denied all the US allegations and said the US was only playing politics with the drug issue. He pointed out that the NDLEA through its efforts has drastically reduced drug trafficking by Nigerians and was actively cooperating with other countries and agencies in this direction. He regretted that, the agency was loosing the assistance it usually receives from the US because of the unfair decertification of Nigeria. Similarly Major General Musa Bamaiyi (The NDLEA Chairman) himself sees Nigeria's drug problem with the US as politics. He accused the US of doing nothing to reduce drug consumption at home saying that "deal with demand reduction in your shores instead of engaging in political finger-pointing (Newswatch Magazine July 1, 1996, p. 17).

Whether this American action can be linked to sanctions or not, it has greatly helped to denigrate Nigeria's image abroad. Here again, ordinary Nigerians who find themselves outside Nigeria are usually subjected to embarrassing treatment by their host countries as a result.

Another area or contention is the severance of air link between the United States and Nigeria. While it is strongly believed that this has political undertones in Nigeria, the United States insists that it has to do purely with security considerations. The Guardian Newspaper of August 13, 1993 reported

that "coming at a time of strained relationship between the American government and the Nigerian military leaders over the political impasse, the suspension of flight services was seen by aviation and diplomatic watchers as one of the harsh measures lined up by Washington to press the military to hand over to a civilian government on August 27th". The paper also went on to report the swift denial of the American Department of Transport, which said that, the decision to cancel flight services with Nigeria was taken after complaints by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) on October 8, 1992, about the security lapses at the Murtala Mohammed International Airport, and several meetings with the Nigerian Aviation authorities. Despite the denials by the United States that the above contending issues had any bearing on sanctions against Nigeria, it is safe to infer that all these issues were brought to the fore by political considerations. They cannot therefore, be resolved on their own but through a political solution.

Similarly, the Nigeria-Britain Aviation row, which climaxed in May 1997, with the blanket banning of Nigerian registered airplanes from flying into British airspace and Nigeria's swift retaliation introduced another controversy as to whether this action by the British had political undertones. The ban by the British Transport Department was hinged on its finding with ADC Airlines and the Merchant Express Airlines which BCAA claimed lacked safety standards (Thisday Newspaper, May 23, 1997, p.7). The same newspaper reported that, before now, Nigeria Airways was suspended by the British Civil Aviation

Authority (BCAA) from flying into London and Gatwick for lack of insurance cover. Indeed, Nigeria Airways had run into several problems in Britain which led to the seizure of its planes on several occasions in the past. These seizures were however, mostly hinged on debt owed by the Airline to various creditors.

Following the blanket ban however, Nigeria's swift retaliation indicates that Nigeria did not buy the British argument that, it acted on safety reasons. For Nigeria therefore, it was a political decision and it responded as such. When in May 1998, Mr. Graham Burton claimed that Britain has since August 1997, lifted the ban it placed on Nigerian registered aircraft from flying into Britain and expressed displeasure that since the action nine months ago, no Nigerian registered aircraft has operated into the U.K (Thisday Newspaper May 23, 1998, p.3), it became obvious that reasons other than safety were responsible for the ban.

The lifting this ban seems to have come because of British Airways; pressure on the British government which was losing even more than Nigeria Airways as a result of the ban. British Airways used to operate 10 weekly flights into Nigeria (prior to the ban).

From the two issues discussed, it would seem that, while the sanctioning countries publicly heaped certain category of sanctions on Nigeria, other sanction measures were disguised as outcomes of safety and security considerations. This was to avoid retaliatory measures from Nigeria, which would no doubt hurt the sanctioning states. This thinking is reinforced by the

fact that, there was no indication that Nigerian registered aircraft became any different from what they were before the ban, though the ban was now lifted without conditions.

4.5 THE BALANCE SHEET OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER HOSTILE ATTITUDES AGAINST NIGERIA

It can be discerned from the foregoing that, the reluctance of the sanctioning states to institute sanction measures on Nigeria that would really hurt the military administration had nothing to do with mercy on the Nigerian citizens, rather, it was to protect their own economies. When Western countries recalled their Ambassadors/High Commissioners in the wake of the hanging of the "Ogoni 9", many of them insisted that their return will be hinged on an improvement in the human rights records of the Abacha Administration and its sincere prosecution of its democratization process. In an interview with the French Political Attache and the spokesperson of the Department of Good Governance and Democracy (USIS) they all agreed that there was no change in the government's handling of the two issues at stake under General Abacha. Yet, the High diplomats returned. Earlier, Ambassador Walter Carrington of the United States had denied that, his return to Nigeria signified an endorsement of his home government of the Federal government's three year transition programme. He said he returned at the behest of his government to convey the concern of the U.S. and to express his country's views on what is needed to move forward with a credible democratic transition (Guardian Newspaper,

March 5, 1996, p 1).

More frankly, Mr. Maclennan, of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office said that, the United Kingdom as a trading nation could not possibly ignore a market of Nigeria' size, besides he added, Britain has invested as much as 1.3 billion pounds in Nigeria and was the latter's biggest creditor. Furthermore, Britain was not interested in Nigeria just because of historical ties, but the fact that the country was "Africa's Super Power" (The West African Magazine, 27 May - 2 June 1996, p. 820). Though the description of Nigeria as Africa's super power may sound too flattery, there is no doubt that, Nigeria's potential as a trading partner and investment cannot be ignored by any country. Similarly, the Nigerian-German business council's protest to the German government, over the latter's sanctions on Nigeria, which it said was hurting the council's business interest is instructive. Mrs. Frederiquie Diettendance, who spoke on behalf of the council asserted that, the Nigerian Federal Government had already embarked on retaliatory moves by providing business, hitherto given to the European countries to the Asian nations like China, India and Korea (New Nigerian Newspaper, March 11, 1996, p.4)

Thus, when in June 1998, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, U.S. Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, said after the death of General Sani Abacha that "We must not stand idly by and be 40% of Nigeria's Oil Market and not insist upon a relationship consistent with our values of democracy and human rights" (Crossroads, June 1998, p.3), he could not have

been speaking the minds of U.S. business Chieftains. Interestingly, at the office of the USIS, the spokesperson from the Department of Good Governance and Democracy, refused to answer the question as to why the U.S. government refuses to include an embargo of Nigeria's Oil in its sanctions. It is clear therefore, that with all the noise Western countries made with regard to sanctions and their quest to bring to the fore Nigeria's democratization process and issues of human rights, they were not prepared to sacrifice their economies for this. The Abacha administration, therefore, correctly read these countries in this respect and shunned dialogue. Thus, the biggest weapon the Abacha administration welded against sanctioning states was the enormous Nigerian market and its potentialities. The sanctioning countries were much aware that Nigeria could readily get replacement as they withdrew. An indication to this is the fact that investors still had confidence in Nigeria's economy, particularly the oil sector. This is exemplified by the oversubscription of an offer by Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited in early March, 1996, to raise $330 million to part finance the company's natural gas liquids recovery project at Finima, Bonny in Rivers State (Guardian Newspaper March 5, 1996, p.1).

While the sanctions lasted, there continued to be unhindered trade and related activities between Nigeria and the sanctioning states. It is indeed clear that, had General Abacha's administration continued, sanctions on Nigeria would not have worked any miracle. The British's unconditional re-establishment of the air link with Nigeria shows that any sanctions measure that

hurts the sanctioning state is likely to be withdrawn.

Relatedly, though statistics on the volume of relations Nigeria has been able to establish with other countries as a consequence of sanctions by her traditional partners is scanty, there is no doubt that not much went beyond pronouncements. It takes time to establish such relations as the Lagos Chamber of Commerce has indicated. Whatever gains made in this direction may be temporal as the sanctioning states return in full force.

4.6 THE LINKAGES OF THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO HOSTILITY BY THE ABACHA ADMINISTRATION

The apparent linkages between domestic and international policies in the Abacha Administration's reaction to international sanction might not appear so obvious at a glance. However, a little appraisal of these reactions brings out the linkages. At the home front, the administration as earlier mentioned was busy encouraging pro-government rallies both at the local and state government levels. Solidarity visits to military administrators and other high ranking officials of the administration, particularly General Sani Abacha himself, continued to be encouraged. Meanwhile, some "progressives" were appointed into key positions in the General Abacha government. At the same time, any imagined opposition to the government was effectively muzzled. The All-politicians conference which was to be held in Lagos in 1996, was blocked by government, Chief Bola Ige's book "People, Politics and politicians of Nigeria (1940-1979)", which was billed to be launched at the Nigerian Institute of

International Affairs on the 17th of April, 1996, was equally stopped by security agents, and the government generally continued to entertain no opposition at home. Many opposition leaders fled abroad, those who were brave enough to remain in the country continued to visit Nigerian prison cells across the country.

On the brighter side, the government promulgated the Failed Bank Decree which brought some sanity to the financial sector. This decree sought to bring people who hitherto had defrauded the banks to be brought to book. Similarly the dethronement and banishment of the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Dasuki and the enthronement of Alhaji Maccido as the new Sultan seemed to go down well with the populace. These actions, albeit momentarily presented the regime as a purposeful one. Again, the establishment of the Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund, headed by General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd), served to indicate the concern of the administration for the citizens. However, the apparent confirmation that General Abacha was scheming to succeed himself rendered these achievements useless as they were seen as campaign strategies. It is however, clear that the domestic policy formulation and implementation of the Administration was geared towards presenting the administration to the international community as one that had an overwhelming support of Nigerians.

To the outside world the regime continued to talk tough, shunning dialogue. It made Canada a "scapegoat" and closed Nigeria's mission in that country. Government attempt to launder its image abroad was carried out through non-diplomatic channels. Here, the government chose prominent

Nigerians, who were not in government to do the job, though almost all of them would claim they were not sent. Relatedly the government continued to encourage "fact finding missions" mostly by African-Americans to Nigeria. Though many of such visits took place, the most visible remains that of Louis Farrakhan, head of the 20,000 member Chicago based Nation of Island who visited twice in February 1996, (Guardian Newspaper March 8, 1996, p. 1). These visits were generally believed to have been sponsored by the Federal Government. For Louis, the Embassy studded enclave (Eleke Crescent) in Victoria Island, Lagos, was renamed Louis Farrakhan Crescent. Again, expensive adverts were placed in the "New York Times", praising the regime of General Sani Abacha (Guardian Newspapers March 8, 1996, p.1). These adverts were believed to be sponsored by the government, or were placed by those who benefit from the Government.

While the Abacha Administration continued to ask Western countries for "understanding", it was clear that it was at the same time trying to diversify Nigeria's trading partners by bringing in other nations particularly the Asians (National Concord November 6, 1996). The paper reported that, already the Chinese were in the country engaged in the Ports, Transportation, energy, housing and the visible trade sector. In August 1996, the Federal Government invited the Chinese to rescue the Delta Steel Complex. It was also evident that deliberate attempts were made by the government to get closer to Iran. The visit of the Minister of State for Petroleum Resources, Alhaji Chafe to Iran is

instructive. The regime also attempted a diplomatic coup by encouraging more contacts with Iraq, as evidenced by the Minister of Information Dr. Ofanagoro's visit to that country. Maumar Ghadafi's visit to Nigeria, apart from contravening the no-fly ban by the UN, also served to indicate to the Western countries the direction Nigeria was going. The administration was, therefore playing a wild card. While seeming not to bother to dialogue with the west, it was subtly using informal channels to coerce these states into reconsidering their stand.

However, the biggest success of the administration seems to be within the West African sub-region. Sanctions against any nation can hardly succeed if the neighboring countries of the target state refuse to cooperate with the sanctioning states. From all the Embassies of the West African countries visited, it was clear that they did not support sanctions against Nigeria. These countries include Ghana, Niger and Cote D'Ivoire. At the Ghanian High Commission Offices at the Ghana House, the Deputy High Commissioner Mr. Amao Awua, maintained that Ghana could not support sanctions against Nigeria. He went further that, Ghana was indeed supportive of Nigeria in the Commonwealth. All the other West African countries visited insisted that, sanctions against Nigeria meant sanctions against the entire West African Sub-region, as such they could not support them. Though it is not very clear how the General Abacha Administration was able to get this support, it seems the subtle diplomacy of consultation and the "Big brother" generosity of Nigeria worked

here. The administration's continued insistence that only African countries that were ready to reciprocate Nigeria's good gesture will receive the country's support could not have failed to make the message clear. The several consultative visits by the various leaders of the sub-region to General Abacha indicates the level of rapport that existed between them.

Nigeria's role in Liberia and later Sierra Leone was the ace card the Administration used both with other West African leaders and the larger international community. Though it was the administration of General Babangida that first sent troops to Liberia under the ECOMOG arrangement, it was the General Sani Abacha's administration that saw to their continued stay and the final accomplishment of its task. After the Babangida administration, it was evident that Chief Ernest Shonekan, had no stomach for the continued stay of the Nigerian soldiers in Liberia. Indeed, he had already asked General Abacha, then the Defence Secretary, to commence putting the logistics in place for a Nigerian pull out. The leaders of the West African sub-region, could therefore, not have been sure of what would happen if General Abacha were to leave the seat of power in Nigeria.

Later still, General Abacha was to present the world with a dilemma when he successfully used the ECOMOG troops to remove the military government of Major Johnny Paul Koromah who had some months back, over thrown the democratically elected government of Alhaji Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The re-instatement of Kabbah with the continued assistance to that country by

Nigeria endeared the administration to many countries within the sub-region and beyond. Reverend Jesse Jackson, speaking at a forum with the African community at the UN headquarters in New York, confessed that Nigeria presented America with a dilemma as it had helped restore democracy in Sierra Leone and peace in Liberia but was itself an undemocratic country (Guardian Newspaper, March 20, 1998). Though the Johnny Koromah government had continued to allude to the fact that, the Abacha Administration was itself undemocratic and a military dictatorship, just as Charles Taylor did before he became president of Liberia, the comity of Nations could not easily condemn Nigeria on this ground. Though Nigeria itself was undemocratic, it has shown that, the forceful sacking of democratic regimes might not be tolerated in future. This singular act by the Abacha Administration no doubt bought it some time, albeit at a great cost to Nigeria, both in lives and money.

These linkages between what the administration did domestically, within the West African sub-region and at the international avenue can now be seen to have been purposefully done. For instance, the use of the so-called "progressives" by the Abacha administration, the pro-government sponsored rallies and the few popular actions by the government at least momentarily confused the international community. They were not sure if the regime had not acquired true legitimacy. Could it be that, the majority of Nigerians were actually in support of the regime? The French political attache at the French embassy indeed agreed that, the European Community was willing to give the

Abacha Administration a chance when he announced the transition programme. This chance he said was open until the five political parties endorsed General Abacha as their sole presidential candidate.

4.7 GENERAL ABACHA'S INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

One notable departure in Nigeria's foreign policy during General Abacha's regime is in the area of its choice of instruments used in pursuance of its foreign policy. As earlier noted, all preceding Nigerian leaders, had a penchant for using "diplomacy" of negotiation, consultation and reconciliation as opposed to military or the "gun boat" diplomacy. Even economic diplomacy was not deliberately or purposely pursued for set objectives. There had been no indication that Nigeria's generosity to needy African countries had any "strings" attached, neither for the national interest of Nigeria, nor even for any regime's interest. With the coming of General Abacha's regime, economic diplomacy was purposely used, especially within the sub-region. This instrument of foreign policy was successfully used to at least restrain West African countries from openly condemning Nigeria as she engaged the international community in their stand against her over, democratization and human rights issues.

Secondly, the regime's use of military diplomacy within the West African subregion was apparent considering Nigeria's hard stand with Cameroon over Bakkasi peninsula and her decisive action in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

With the sanctioning countries, the regime's constant reminder that their economic interests in Nigeria will be at stake if they continued antagonizing Nigeria, more than anything else, served to create a stalemate in their confrontation with Nigeria. By and large, the purposeful use of these instruments of foreign policy by the Abacha regime was a novelty. Though it is clear, military diplomacy could not be used against the sanctioning Western countries, and economic diplomacy was only indirectly used, "clean diplomacy" was clearly shunned.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.0 INTRODUCTION

This study represents an attempt at capturing the momentous international hostility that came against Nigeria during the regime of General Sani Abacha and his regime's efforts at managing that hostility. The rest of the chapter presents the summary of the major findings of the study, draws conclusions and makes recommendations before terminating with a bibliography.

5.1 MAJOR FINDINGS

At the end of our data presentation and analysis, some findings were made. First, it was noted that, the period 1993 to 1998 was a most trying one in Nigeria-Western countries relations. The condemnation of Nigeria by these countries was unprecedented. Relations had never been so chilled and for so long. Nigeria's response was also uncompromising. However, it was equally discovered that, this crisis did not go deep enough to significantly threaten the Nigeria-Western countries" relations for long. These ties remained strong, and though the issues at stake were not resolved and the parties involved refused to back down, the imperatives of economic realities served to subordinate the contending political and diplomatic issues.

In the course of imposing sanctions on Nigeria, one major problem the sanctioning states may genuinely have encountered was how to separate the

generality of Nigerians from the regime. At the various embassies of the sanctioning states, there seemed to be a genuine concern that, sanctions should hurt only those they target. But it is difficult to isolate the regime from the populace. Ironically, therefore, it was the ordinary Nigerian that had to take the heavy burden of sanctions, as far as it could be ascertained, only discomfort in the area of embarrassment was caused the regime as a consequence of the sanctions. Thus, Nigeria as a country was the worse for it, as her image was battered abroad.

Secondly, it was clear that, the sanctioning states wanted to avoid measures against Nigeria that could equally hurt their economies. Measures that could have significantly affected the regime in Nigeria were avoided even when it was clear that they could help bring the regime to its knees. For instance, if the sanctioning states had avoided Nigerian crude Oil, it is possible that the Abacha Administration would have reconsidered its policies. But clearly, they were not ready to do so, and billions of dollars of oil money continued to pour into the confers of the administration. So long as the flow of this money continued, the administration could not be constrained in luring personalities into its fold, that would have otherwise presented the regime with stiff opposition. This money, it is most likely, also helped the government to weaken external pressure, by sponsoring divergent voices in the various sanctioning states, particularly the United States.

The unconditional lifting of the ban on Nigerian registered aircraft to fly into Britain can also so be seen to be to safeguard British interest. Similarly, though sanctioning countries imposed visa restrictions on government functionaries, they

refused to heed calls to freeze the accounts of these people who had huge sums in the banks of these states outside Nigeria. This points to the fact that, sanctioning states are not prepared to hurt their economies in the process of sanctioning, thus the difficulty in its success.

It was also observed that, in its determination to stop the angry international community in their track, the Abacha Administration sought relevance by remaining central in the peace process in Liberia and by spearheading the return to power of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone. The latter function served to present Nigeria and the incumbent regime as guardian of democracy. As was noted in the analysis, this momentarily put the sanctioning states in dilemma. The effective leadership role, which the regime under Abacha propelled Nigeria to play within the West African sub-region was occasioned by the exigencies of international hostility against Nigeria. There can be no doubt that, this sacrifice which Nigeria made has earned her significant respect among the West African countries. This respect and honour will service to enhance the advancement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) objectives. It can therefore, be inferred that the people of Nigeria have gained in this respect, but no doubt at a great cost. The regime pauperized the citizens economically and many precious Nigerian lives were also lost.

At another level, Nigeria's confrontation with her Western traditional friends has shown that, though she might have failed to realise her potentials as a great nation, she nevertheless, has a clout that cannot be completely ignored by any

nation. Her strategic location within the West African sub-region, among countries that lack the kind of resources she has, her intimidating population, and a relatively well developed manpower (though largely scattered around the world), serves to earn her some respect. These factors made it impossible for the sanctioning states to damn her. Consequently, it strengthened the "hand" of the administration of General Abacha in its confrontation with the international community.

Another finding has to do with the countries of the West African sub-region. These countries can be said to have "abstained" themselves from sanctions against Nigeria. Though officials at the Embassies of Ghana, Cote D'Ivoire, Niger, indicated that, their countries were supportive of Nigeria over the issue of sanctions, it seemed this was carefully done as not to provoke the sanctioning states. True, West African States did not castigate Nigeria in any way, but they did not also support her openly. In the commonwealth, of course Ghana showed understanding with Nigeria, but could not go further to openly side with Nigeria. The position of countries within the sub-region, over the issue of sanctions against Nigeria fits the dictum that "head or tail they will win".

States that seemed to have been cultivating good relations with Nigeria during the sanction period, found it more difficult to entertain the interview questions. This shows that, they did not want to say anything that would hurt their relations with Nigeria. At the Chinese, Iranian and Bulgarian Embassies, the interview questions were either politely turned down or cleverly evaded. In all these places, the complaint was that, they were political questions.

Lastly, it was discovered that, domestic factors and external factors were inseparable in understanding the foreign policy of any state. The domestically targeted actions of the General Sani Abacha's administration were made deliberately to be reacted to at the international arena. Only an understanding of both factors as a unit enhances the understanding of a country's foreign policy and Nigeria's foreign policy within the period 1993 to 1998 is not an exception.

5.2 CONCLUSION

Inferring from the proceeding findings, it is possible to draw certain conclusions. One, it can be said that, sanctions against Nigeria by the sanctioning countries have failed to have their desired effect. Indications in this direction can be seen from the manner all the Ambassadors and High Commissioners returned after they had hurriedly left the country at the height of the crisis, when Ken Saro-Wiwa and his co-activists were hanged. These diplomats had insisted as they left that, they would only return if there was any positive change in the government over the contending issues. At their various Embassies after their return, it was agreed that the Abacha administration arrogantly refused to address the issues. Their unconditional return therefore, can be seen as a significant warning in their resolve against the regime and Nigeria. There is no indication that they returned to plot the demise of the regime, which ended with the death of General Abacha by natural causes.

Secondly, the first proposition of this study which said that, Nigeria's

foreign policy between 1993 and 1998, under General Abacha, was largely influenced by the international hostility especially the sanctions that were imposed on her within this period has been proved.

The regime's policies, both domestic and foreign, have been shown to be linked to the international hostility against Nigeria. In deed, at the foreign policy realm, it is difficult to see any undertaking by the government that had absolutely nothing to do with the fall-outs of the international hostility against Nigeria.

Thirdly, as the last finding indicated, it can conclusively be said that, sanctions on Nigeria have failed. This failure automatically also confirms the other proposition which said that at the prospect of an eminent collapse of these sanctions, the sanctioning states will re-embrace Nigeria and the crisis will effectively be over. It can be said that even with General Sani Abacha in power the crisis would have come to an end, sooner than later. Though a much more thorough research is needed to actually determine what gains Nigerians as a people got as a result of the reactions to sanctions by the government, it is easy to note that, the burden of the sanctions fell on the ordinary Nigerians. But also as the Abacha Administration fought for relevance, it took certain actions within the West African sub-region which greatly enhanced the leadership position of Nigeria within the sub-region. Here one is referring to Nigeria's role in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, it is not very clear if Nigeria will maintain the little gains made in the area of bilateral relations with other countries, particularly those of the Asian countries and Eastern Europe. Concretely, therefore, it is difficult to see what benefits ordinary Nigerians got as a result of the responses of the Abacha regime to international hostility.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Diplomacy is certainly not about learning what the international community wants or expects of you, and doing it. It is more about talking or even coercing other nations into aligning with your position. This can, however be done only subtly and the key word here is dialogue. Dialogue in this sense is more effective when done on the basis of government to government or nation to nation. The General Sani Abacha's administration had no stomach in using diplomacy as an instrument of resolving the crisis at hand. But it is acknowledged that the difficulty the regime faced in selecting the options was quite obvious. First, the issues at stake lacked consensus among Nigerians. Added to this, the regime had in key positions people who were not given to solving problems through the use of diplomacy. The lack of consensus among the Nigerian elites over how Nigeria should react to international hostility dove-tailed into the foreign policy arena and a government, not of the reconciliatory bent continued to distance itself from dialogue.

It is recommended that, in all future engagements with the international actors, and no matter the level of provocation, dialogue should not be shunned, but embraced, even if with pretence.

Secondly, in the struggle to ward off international hostility, the General Abacha's administration carried out certain actions which in the long run, benefitted Nigeria. True, there is little to show that, the Abacha regime's refusal to give in to international and domestic demands that he releases political detainees

and prosecutes the democratization programme with all sincerity had anything to do with the interest of Nigeria. Indeed the role he propelled Nigeria to play in Liberia and Sierra-Leone may have been purely for the benefit of the regime, one still feels that Nigeria as a country gained. This is in spite of the undoubtable economic cost to Nigeria. Most important in this respect is the role the administration, through ECOMOG, continued to play in Liberia and later Sierra Leone. The success recorded in this area of regional security should be built upon by successive Nigerian leaders. Nigeria should not hesitate to take necessary action bordering on security within the sub-region, once convinced of its necessity and relevance. Nigeria's leadership seems to have been enhanced and acknowledged by countries of the sub-region as a result.

Relatedly, whatever gains that were made in the direction of new friends should be followed up. The "friends" Nigeria made as a consequence of the civil war were ditched once the civil war ended. At least the enthusiasm died down too soon. This should not be the case this time around. The South-south option should be taken seriously.

Again, it is here recommended that, more use should be made of the trained career diplomats that abound in Nigeria's foreign service in handling issues bordering on diplomacy. If they are not enough, there is a big reservoir of them in the academia. They should be used rather than drafting in people too far removed from the theory and practice of international relations.

Lastly, the instrument of sanctions as a tool of correction in the conduct of

international relations should be given a careful second look. Its effectiveness is lacking. A comprehensive appraisal of sanctions may make it more effective. For now, it can only work where the target country is not important within its region. Also, such sanctions must have the blessing of the neighbouring states of the target state.

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APPENDIX 1

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR SANCTIONING STATES

1. What was your country's general assessment of the whole phenomenon of sanctions on Nigeria when it was initiated in 1993?
2. What specific sanctions has your country applied against Nigeria over the years?
3. In your own opinion, has there been any improvement in the government's prosecution of the transition to civil rule programme or on human rights records - the two major issues that brought sanctions on Nigeria?
4. When in November 1995 Ken Saro-Wiwa and 8 other activists were hanged, your country's ambassador/high commissioner was recalled. What informed his return"?
5. Has the incumbent regime in Nigeria done anything to warrant a rethink on the sanctions issue?
6. What are the prospects that sanctions will have the desired effects on Nigeria?
7. What is your country's present thinking concerning sanctions against Nigeria?
8. What is your country's position on Nigeria's continued suspension from the commonwealth? (For Commonwealth countries only)?
9. (For Britain only) - The severance of air links with Nigeria in 1997, was it part of sanctions? And what is your country's present thinking on it.

10. (For United States of America only) - How true is it that, the twin issues of the severance of air links with Nigeria and her decertification over drug related issues are not related to sanctions being imposed on her, and what *is your country's present thinking over these issues?*

11. (For the U.S.A. only) - There has been calls from certain quarters in the US for the imposition of Oil sanctions on Nigeria. These calls come from Trans Africa and certain parliamentarians in the US. Elsewhere, the National Coalition of Democratic Organisations have also called on the US to impose oil embargo on Nigeria and to stiffen other sanctions. Why do you think the US government finds it difficult to do this?

APPENDIX 2

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR NON SANCTIONING STATES

1. What is your country's stand on the hostile attitude towards Nigeria by the sanctioning states?
2. What level of economic, military, diplomatic etc., relations do your country maintain with Nigeria now? Is it an improvement over the pre-sanction era?
3. In your opinion, what is the prospect that sanctions and other hostile attitudes will have on Nigeria as a country and the incumbent regime in particular?
4. In your own opinion, do you think there has been any improvement in the democratization process of the present military regime in Nigeria and on human rights records since the imposition of sanctions?
5. Should the sanctions be called off, modified or strengthened?
6. Has Nigeria's response to the international hostility against her been satisfactory from your country's view point.

THE WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

1. What is the position of your country on the sanctions and other hostile attitudes of some countries on Nigeria?

2. Is your country supportive of the actions of the Nigerian government in responding to the sanctions and other hostile attitudes of the international community so far?
3. What prospects do you think the sanctions have of having their desired effect on Nigeria as envisaged by the sanctioning countries?
4. The accusations leveled against the Nigerian government of lack of a sincere democratization process and poor human rights records are the two major reasons for sanctions on Nigeria. In your country's opinion, has there been any improvement in this regard, since the imposition of sanctions?
5. Do you see any link between sanctions on Nigeria and her pioneering role in bringing peace to Liberia and the reinstatement of Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone?
6. What do you consider as consequences of the international hostility against Nigeria with regards to economic political, diplomatic and social relations within the West African Sub-region generally and your country in particular.
7. (For Ghana only) - what is your country's position on Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth"

APPENDIX 3

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR MINISTRIES OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INFORMATION AND CULTURE

1. What in summary is Nigeria's official position on the international hostility against her at the time of initial imposition of sanctions and now?
2. In what major areas do you consider that international hostility, particularly the various sanctions have hurt most?
3. What is Nigeria's position now, concerning her continued suspension from the Commonwealth"
4. What policies, both internationally and domestically targeted are in place to counter international hostility.
5. Under what international and domestic constraints (if any) are these policies and actions being pursued?
6. What degree of success has these counter measures been?
7. Considering that sanctions came mainly as a result of democratization problems and the accusation of human rights violations against the government, what level of improvement exist in these areas as of now?
8. What lessons for Nigeria and what benefits to the Nigerian people as a consequence of the counter policies and actions of the Nigerian government?

APPENDIX 4

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

1. The United States government consistently refuses to certify Nigeria over drug related matters. In yourr opinion, what is responsible?
2. Has the United States at any time openly linked their refusal to certify Nigeria to the current sanctions on her?
3. What other benefits, apart from clearing Nigeria's name at the international arena do you think accompany certifications
4. What financial support has the agency received in the past from the United States' government or any other related international agency? (The specific figures should be specified please).
5. What is the official position of the NDLEA over the United States' refusal to certify Nigeria?
6. What can you say is the success level of NDLEA's fight against illegal drug trafficking and consumption over the years.

APPENDIX 5

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR NIGERIA AIRWAYS LIMITED

1. Your organisation as the National air carrier of Nigeria is directly affected by world hostility on Nigeria. Immediately after the annulment of the Presidential election in June 1993, a Nigeria aArways aircraft was hijacked by a group called Movement for the Advancement of Democracy (MAD). Not long after this, the US Aviation authorities stopped Nigeria Airways from flying into U.S., citing security lapses at the Nigerian airports. Again, the British aviation authorities followed suit in 1977, citing the unworthiness of Nigerian registered air planes. What do you think is the link between These issues?
2. What is your opinion over the persistent assertion by both the United States and Britain, that their action over the severance of air links between their respective countries and Nigeria has nothing to do with sanctions?
3. What other measures have been taken against the airline as a result of international hostility against Nigeria?
4. What measures has the airline taken in the light of these difficulties to move ahead?
5. As far as Nigeria Airways is concerned, do you agree with the measures the Nigerian government has taken so far to counter international hostility on her?

6. What prospects for Nigeria Airways in these hostile times?

APPENDIX 6

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

1. Sanctions have been placed on Nigeria since the last few years for certain reasons. What in your own opinion represents Nigeria's response so far, and should her response really be"
2. What results can we concretely see as the consequence of Nigeria's response to the sanctions?
3. In view of question 2 above, what is the possibility that the sanctions on Nigeria will have the desired effect?
4. In your own opinion, do you agree that the government has sufficiently addressed the twin issues of democratization and human rights violations - two issues that the sanctions are hinged on?
5. Though other hostile attitudes towards Nigeria, like the severance of air link by the US and Britain with Nigeria, the refusal of the US government to certify Nigeria on the illegal drugs issue are not considered as sanctions by the countries involved, don't you consider them part of the sanctions?
6. What is your opinion on the continued suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth, and what do you think Nigeria's reaction should be at this stage?
7. What benefits do you think will accrue to the Nigerian people as a result of the Nigerian government's response to world hostility?

APPENDIX 7

APPENDIX 7

LIST OF EMBASSIES OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES AND INSTITUTIONS THAT GRANTED INTERVIEWS

@ The French Embassy, Ikoyi, Lagos

@ The American Embassy (USIS), Marina, Lagos.

@ The Ghana High commission, Lagos

@ The Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Lagos

@ The Federal Ministry of External Affairs

@ The Federal Ministry of Information and Culture

@ The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA)

@ Nigeria Airways Limited

* The Bulgarian Embassy, Lagos

* The Chinese Embassy Lagos/Abuja

* The British High Commission Lagos/Abuja

* The Iranian Embassy, Lagos

* Cote D'Ivoirian Embassy, Lagos.

* These embassies failed to grant full interview after several visits but officials of these embassies volunteered scanty answers to the questions but pleaded anonymity.